alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Yolanda AUSTIN, Appellant, v. DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST COMPANY, Appellee.

No. 1D15-3113

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 29, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARIO ORLANDO GOCHESMONTANO,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-73136

Agency No. A098-438-059

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted February 21, 2012** 

Before: FERNANDEZ, McKEOWN, and BYBEE, Circuit Judges. 

Mario Orlando Goches-Montano, a native and citizen of El Salvador,

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order denying

his motion to reconsider its underlying decision dismissing as untimely his appeal

FILED

MAR 01 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-73136

from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) removal order. We have jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a). We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s denial of a motion

to reconsider. Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 791-92 (9th Cir. 2005). We

grant the petition for review. 

The BIA dismissed Goches-Montano’s appeal as untimely without the

benefit of our decision in Irigoyen-Briones v. Holder, 644 F.3d 943, 948 (9th Cir.

2011), which held that the 30-day deadline for filing a notice of appeal with the

BIA is not jurisdictional. We therefore remand for the BIA to reconsider whether,

under the circumstances presented, it will hear the appeal from the IJ’s decision in

this case. See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002). 

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED; REMANDED.
Bryant CROSLEY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3918

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 27, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
Ralph Monroe HAIR, DOC #484707, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3108

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 21, 2018

Ralph Monroe Hair, pro se.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

NORTHCUTT, KHOUZAM, and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
SANTANDER BANK N.A., Appellant, v. Donna GAVER, Mark Gaver, and Fawley Family Partnership, Appellees.

Case No. 2D17-2601

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion file March 16, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### ARKANSAS KRAFT CORPORATION *v.*Gary HALBROOK

74-38

512 S.W. 2d 544

Opinion delivered July 8, 1974

[Rehearing denied September 9, 1974.]

*Laser, Sharp, Haley, Young & Boswell,*P.A., for appellant.

*Felver A. Rowell, Jr.,*for appellee.

Lyle Brown, Justice.

As a result of injuries received from playing softball on a tract of land owned by appellant, appellee was awarded judgment for SI5,000. For reversal appellant contends (1) that the court should have granted its request for a directed verdict, and (2) that it was error for the court to tell the jury that appellee was an invitee upon the premises.

The Conway County Softball Association is composed of a number of amateur teams. In July 1969 the teams were par*885ticipating in a district tournament at Morrilton. Appellee was a regular player on one of’ the local teams and while in the act of sliding into home base suffered a severe break of an ankle. Appellee’s tort action was based on the allegation that the home plate was installed with some two to four inches protruding above ground level; that such construction constituted negligence; and that his injury was caused by his foot coming into *contact*with the protruding base.

Whether the trial court should have granted a directed verdict can be determined from a set of facts which are fairly undisputed. The first two games of the tournament were played on the field of Sacred Heart School. The playing surface was not satisfactory. Bill Hice, the district softball commissioner, obtained permission from appellant to use a pasture belonging to appellant which was at the time being converted into a baseball field. Fill dirt was in place, the backstop was up, and the fence had been erected. On Sunday morning before the game that afternoon, the district commissioner and the two umpires went to the field and made final preparations for the game. They put down the necessary lines and installed the bases. The two umpires who participated in getting the field ready were paid from tournament fees. Neither of the three men were employed by appellant. Balls and bases were bought from filing fees paid by the participating teams.

We think it crystal clear that if the home plate was improperly installed it was not the work of appellant, its agents, or employees. It is true that some of appellant’s employees were present on the premises at the time of the accident; however, all the evidence is to the effect that they were there as players. Certainly they did not take any part in. supervising the activities, nor is it shown that they had any authority to participate in supervision. The district commissioner for the softball league testified he was in complete charge of the field on the day in question.

Reversed and dismissed.
Thomas PACK, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3198

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 4, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Henry G. ALVAREZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-4948

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 01, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________ No. 12

- 12514 Non

- Argument Calendar

________________________ D.C. Docket No. 1:11

- cr - 20786

- UU

- 1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff

- Appellee,
versus REGGIE DAVID SANCHEZ, Defendant

- Appellant.

________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

________________________ (June 11, 2013) Before TJOFLAT, PRYOR and ANDERSON, Circuit J udges
. PER CURIAM:

Case: 12-12514 Date Filed: 06/11/2013 Page: 1 of 22 Manuel Vazquez, appointed counsel for Reggie David Sanchez in this direct criminal appeal, has moved to withdraw from further representation of the appellant and filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 139 6, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Our independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel ’ s assessment of the relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel ’ s mo tion to withdraw is GRANTED , and Sanchez ’ s convictions and sentences are AFFIRMED
.

Case: 12-12514 Date Filed: 06/11/2013 Page: 2 of 2
Dishon PUTZ, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Casey PUTZ, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-3150

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

March 8, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Appeal is dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

                                           

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-27-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             SEP-29-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-28-1997
<CASH>                                          58,584
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   20,554
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    114,654
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               204,580
<PP&E>                                         212,162
<DEPRECIATION>                                  98,909
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 361,382
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          114,395
<BONDS>                                        270,344
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             1
<OTHER-SE>                                    (35,213)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   361,382
<SALES>                                        430,918
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               430,918
<CGS>                                          332,622
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  332,622
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                88,443
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               7,527
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  2,326
<INCOME-TAX>                                       953
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,373
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,373
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    27.46
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    27.46
        

</TABLE>
#### Carlton Tremell TURNER, Plaintiff-Appellant v. David THOMAS; Lonnie Nail, Defendants-Appellees

No. 16-30043 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 28, 2017

Donna Unkel Grodner, Esq., Grodner *&*Associates, A.P.L.C., Baton Rouge, LA, for Plaintiff-Appellant

Eddie David Gilmer, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General for the State of Louisiana, Shreveport, LA, for Defendants-Appellees

Before KING, ELROD, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Carlton Tremell Turner, Louisiana prisoner # 372940, appeals the district court’s dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint following a jury verdict for the defendants. He also appeals the district court’s denial of his postjudgment motions for a new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and for reconsideration of the denial of the motion for a new trial.

This court has a duty to examine the basis of its jurisdiction, sua sponte, if necessary. *Mosley v. Cozby,*813 F.2d 659, 660 (5th Cir. 1987). A timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement in a civil case. *Bowles v. Russell,*551 U.S. 205, 214, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007).

Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(1)(A) requires that the notice of appeal in a civil action be filed within 30 days of entry of the judgment or order from which the áppeal is taken. Turner’s timely Rule 59(a) motion for a new trial suspended the time for filing a notice of appeal. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(v). Thus, the latest date on which Turner could have filed a timely notice of appeal was April 25, 2016, 30 days after the district court’s March 24, 2016, order denying his Rule 59(a) motion. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), (a)(4)(A). However, Turner’s notice of appeal was not filed until May 18, 2016.

Turner’s motion for reconsideration of the denial of his Rule 59(a) motion had no additional tolling effect. *See Charles L.M. v. Northeast Indep. Sch. Dist.,*884 F.2d 869, 870 (5th Cir. 1989). Further, his motion for reconsideration, which alleged substantially the same grounds as urged in *182the first Rule 59(a) motion, was successive. *See id.*Such successive motions are “condemned by well-established authority.” *Id.*Accordingly, we will not review Turner’s motion for reconsideration. *See id.*

Because Turner’s notice of appeal was filed more than 30 days after the March 24, 2016, order denying his motion for a new trial, it is untimely as to both the underlying judgment of dismissal and the denial of his motion for a new trial. Given the absence of a timely notice of appeal in this case, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

APPEAL DISMISSED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
Joshua ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-4672

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed April 4, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Sadikey JENNIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-3964

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 23, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 99.11



STATEMENT OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER UNDER 18 U.S.C. §1350



I, Robert V. Dickinson, the chief executive officer of California Micro Devices Corporation (the Company) certify for the purpose of section 1350 of chapter 63 of title 18 of the United States Code that,
to my knowledge:



| | (i) |  | the Annual Report of the Company on Form 10-K for the annual period ended March 31, 2003 (the Report) fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (ii) |  | the information in the Report fairly represents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | ---- |  | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                    |  |  | 
|------------------- |  |  | 
|Date: June 30, 2003 |  |  | 
|                    |  |  | 



A signed original of
this written statement required by 18 U.S.C. §1350 has been provided to California Micro Devices Corporation and will be retained by California Micro Devices Corporation and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.



---

|1 |  | The material contained in this Exhibit 99.1 is not deemed filed with the SEC and is not to be incorporated by reference into any filing of the Company
under the Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, whether made before or after the date hereof and irrespective of any general incorporation language contained in such filing.
|- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
EX-10.139.D







Exhibit 10.139d




CASH INCENTIVE AWARD AGREEMENT




     AGREEMENT made effective February 1, 2009 by and among Tiffany & Co., a Delaware corporation
(the “Company”), Tiffany and Company, the New York subsidiary corporation of the Company
(“Tiffany”) and • (“Executive”).



     Whereas, on March 17, 2005 the Board of Directors of the Company adopted, and on May 19, 2005
the stockholders of the Company duly approved, the Company’s 2005 Employee Incentive Plan, as
subsequently amended (the “Plan”); and



     Whereas, the Stock Option Subcommittee of the Compensation Committee of the Company was
appointed the “Committee” under the Plan by said Board of Directors; and



     NOW THEREFORE, based upon the foregoing and in consideration of the mutual promises
hereinafter set forth, it is hereby AGREED as follows:



     1. This Agreement is intended to be an Award Agreement under the Plan and is subject to all
terms and conditions set forth in such Plan, including the Plan provisions limiting implied rights.



     2. Executive agrees that he/she shall not be entitled to any cash bonus in respect of the
fiscal year ending January 31, 2010 except as provided in this Agreement.



     3. Tiffany agrees to pay, or, failing that, the Company shall pay, cash Incentive Award to
Executive in respect of the fiscal year ending January 31, 2010 only as follows:


(a) Such award shall be paid, if at all, following the close of such fiscal year and after
financial results have been determined and publicly announced, provided that Executive remains
employed with Tiffany through the end of such fiscal year;



(b) No award shall be payable unless the following Performance Measure is achieved:

the Company’s consolidated net earnings for such fiscal year (as adjusted by the Committee pursuant
to Section 9.1 of the Plan) equal or exceed $116,000,000;



(c) If the condition stated in subparagraph (b) is satisfied, a maximum Incentive Award of $•[see
Schedule I attached] will be payable to you, subject to the discretion of the Committee to reduce
such award; the Committee will not be limited in the exercise of such discretion.




(Continued)




I









 








     4. This Agreement shall be governed by the law of the State of New York applicable to
agreements made and to be performed within said state.



     IN WITNESS WHEREOF, parties hereto have entered into this Agreement effective as of the date
first stated above.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Tiffany & Co.	 	 
	 

	 	(the “Company”)	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 

[Name of Executive]

	 	 

	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	Tiffany and Company	 	 
	 

	 	(“Tiffany”)	 	 
	 
	 	 	 	 
	 

	 	 

	 	 






Schedule I




	 	 	 	 	 
	Michael J. Kowalski
	 	$	2,000,000	 
	James E. Quinn
	 	$	1,036,000	 
	James N. Fernandez
	 	$	1,036,000	 
	Beth O. Canavan
	 	$	840,000	 
	Jon M. King
	 	$	840,000	 






II
#### William Robert DIXON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Robert LEGRAND, Warden; et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16728

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Submitted February 14, 2017 *

Filed March 1, 2017

William Robert Dixon, Pro Se

John L. Ward, IV, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General,- AGNV—Nevada Office of the Attorney General, Carson City, NV, for Defendants-Appellees

Before: GOODWIN, FARRIS, and FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Nevada state prisoner William Robert Dixon appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging constitutional claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. *Toguchi v. Chung,*391 F.3d 1051, 1056 (9th Cir. 2004). We may affirm on any basis supported by the record, *Thompson v. Paul,*547 F.3d 1055, 1058-59 (9th Cir. 2008), and we affirm.

*572Summary judgment on Dixon’s access-to-courts claim was proper because Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether defendants’ alleged refusal to request Dixon’s legal materials from Ohio in a timely manner caused his injury. *See Lewis v. Casey,*518 U.S. 343, 348-49, 116 S.Ct. 2174, 135 L.Ed.2d 606 (1996) (access-to-courts claim requires actual prejudice to contemplated or existing litigation, such as inability to meet a filing deadline or to present a claim); *see also Harper v. City of Los Angeles,*533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In a § 1983 action, the plaintiff must ... demonstrate that the defendant’s conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed injury.”).

The district court properly granted summary judgment on Dixon’s claim alleging denial of mail because Dixon failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether he properly exhausted administrative remedies or whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him. *See Woodford v. Ngo,*548 U.S. 81, 90, 126 S.Ct. 2378, 165 L.Ed.2d 368 (2006) (“[Pjroper exhaustion of administrative remedies ... means using all steps that the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses the issues on the merits).” (emphasis, citation, and internal quotation marks omitted)); *Williams v. Paramo,*775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th Cir. 2015) (a prisoner who does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that “there is something particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative remedies effectively unavailable to him.... ”).

We do not consider documents not filed with the district court. *See United States v. Elias,*921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).

We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised in the opening brief or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on appeal. *See Padgett v. Wright,*587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

All pending motions and requests are denied.

AFFIRMED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
kl10k123108x109_32809.htm


    

     

    
      
         

      

      
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