2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

7-7-2009

United States of America v. Dante Williams

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-4225

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009

This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova

University School of Law Digital Repository. For more information, please contact Benjamin.Carlson@law.villanova.edu.

Recommended Citation

"United States of America v. Dante Williams" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1054.

http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1054
*

The Honorable Paul S. Diamond, United States District Judge for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 08-4225

_____________

DANTE RENAULT WILLIAMS, 

AKA James Trice, AKA Pierre; 

v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Dante Renault Williams,

 Appellant

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(Criminal No. 92-cr-00065)

District Judge: Honorable Gustave Diamond

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

June 1, 2009

Before: FISHER, CHAGARES, Circuit Judges, and DIAMOND, District Judge*

.

____________

(Filed: July 7, 2009)

____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

____________

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Dante Williams appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion for
2

a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Williams sought a reduction

in his sentence based on the Sentencing Commission’s recent amendments to the

Sentencing Guidelines that retroactively lowered the base offense levels for crack cocaine

offenses. Williams was convicted, in part, of a drug offense involving crack cocaine, but

his sentencing range was ultimately calculated based on his status as a career offender. 

Because the crack cocaine amendments do not lower Williams’s applicable sentencing

range, the District Court did not err in refusing to modify Williams’s sentence. We will,

therefore, affirm.

I.

Because we write solely for the benefit of the parties, we will only briefly recite

the essential facts.

On February 18, 1994, Dante Williams pled guilty to distribution and possession

with intent to distribute more than 5 grams of cocaine base in violation of 21 U.S.C. §

841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B)(iii), as well as money laundering in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and (2). Williams was sentenced as a career offender under U.S.S.G. §

4B1.1 under the mandatory sentencing guidelines regime then in effect. His offense level

was calculated at 34, with a criminal history category of VI, amounting to a guidelines

range of 262-327 months of imprisonment. The sentencing court sentenced Williams to a

prison term of 264 months on the drug charges and 240 months on the money laundering

charge, to run concurrently. Williams did not file a direct appeal.

In 1997, Williams sought a reduction in his sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582. 

The sentencing court denied that motion on September 30, 1997. Thereafter, in
1

Section 3582(c)(2) allows a court to reduce a term of imprisonment “in the case of

a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing

range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 994(o).” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). A court “may reduce the term of imprisonment,

after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the extent that they are

applicable, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by

the Sentencing Commission.” Id.

3

November, 2007, the Sentencing Commission amended the crack cocaine guidelines by

revising a portion of the drug quantity table at § 2D1.1(c). U.S.S.G. Supp. to App. C,

Amend. 706 (Nov. 1, 2007). The effect of Amendment 706 was to decrease by two levels

the base-offense sentencing levels for crack cocaine offenses. United States v. Mateo,

560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Wise, 515 F.3d 207, 218 (3d Cir.

2008). The Sentencing Commission later determined that Amendment 706 was to be

applied retroactively. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c) (Supp. March 3, 2008). Williams then filed a

new motion for a reduction in sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), seeking a full

resentencing.1

The District Court denied Williams’s motion on September 30, 2008, finding that

Amendment 706 does not reduce the sentencing range applicable to Williams because the

sentencing court had calculated his guidelines range under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, the careeroffender provision. The District Court further held that, even if Williams was entitled to

the benefit of the retroactive amendment, the Supreme Court’s decision in United States

v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) did not render the Sentencing Guidelines advisory for

retroactive prison term reductions through the collateral vehicle of 18 U.S.C. §

3582(c)(2). 
4

II.

We have appellate jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We

review de novo a district court’s interpretation of the criminal statutes, see United States

v. Howerter, 248 F.3d 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2001), as well as the construction of the

Sentencing Guidelines, see United States v. Wood, 526 F.3d 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2008). 

III.

Williams argues that his sentence should be reduced because that sentence was

“based on” the crack cocaine offense to which he pleaded guilty, the base offense level of

which was lowered by the Sentencing Commission. Williams further argues that a

district court adjusting a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2) must also treat the amended

Guidelines range as advisory, and impose a sentence based on the procedures set forth in

the Booker line of cases to ensure that his sentence is “sufficient but not greater than

necessary” under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We disagree.

This Court’s opinion in United States v. Mateo forecloses the relief that Williams

now seeks. There, we reasoned that, to be entitled to a reduction of sentence under §

3582(c)(2), “a defendant’s sentencing range must have been lowered by recalculation

based on the amended base offense level.” 560 F.3d at 154 (citing U.S.S.G. §

1B1.10(a)(2)(B)) (emphasis in original).

If the sentencing court sentenced Williams under § 2D1.1(c), the crack cocaine

amendment would serve to lower Williams’s base offense level. Here, however, the

sentencing court determined Williams’s sentencing range using the alternative career

offender provisions. Because Williams was sentenced under § 4B1.1, and not § 2D1.1,
5

he was not sentenced “based on” a sentencing range that was later lowered by the

Sentencing Commission. Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155; see United States v. Doe, 564 F.3d

305, 309 (3d Cir. 2009). Amendment 706 does not affect Williams’s applicable

sentencing range, and therefore, as in Mateo, § 3582(c)(2) does not authorize a reduction

in his sentence. See 560 F.3d at 155; see also United States v. Caraballo, 552 F.3d 6, 10

(1st Cir. 2008).

Williams next relies on the Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Booker,

543 U.S. 220 (2005) and Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) for the proposition

that, when considering a motion to reduce a sentence pursuant to § 3582(c), district courts

have discretion to deviate from the advisory Guidelines where the Guidelines do not serve

the goals of sentencing. We have previously held that Booker does not affect eligibility

for a § 3582(c) sentence reduction. See Doe, 564 F.3d at 313-314; Mateo, 560 F.3d at

155 (“Section 3582(c) provides the only authority to reduce sentence here, and ‘[n]othing

in [Booker] purported to obviate the congressional directive on whether a sentence could

be reduced based on subsequent changes in the Guidelines.’”) (quoting Wise, 515 F.3d at

221 n. 11). 

Because the District Court lacked statutory authority to provide Williams with the

relief requested, it properly declined to conduct a review of the original sentence under

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors.

IV.

For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the decision of the District Court.