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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

Plaintiff, : Case No. 18-CR-113

vs. :

PATRICIA MULLINS : Judge Thomas M. Rose

Defendant. :

DEFENDANT, PATRICIA MULLINS’ MOTION TO

SUPPRESS EVIDENCE & STATEMENTS; REQUEST FOR HEARING

Defendant, Patricia Mullins, (hereinafter “Ms. Mullins”), by and through counsel, hereby 

moves the Court to suppress any and all evidence seized from her residence, in addition to any

statements she made in relation to the above-captioned matter. As grounds for her Motion, Ms. 

Mullins states that the evidence seized and any statements made were obtained in violation of her

Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution.

Ms. Mullins’ arrest herein resulted from her unlawful seizure, occasioned by law 

enforcement’s unjustified entry into her residence. The officers’ unlawful entry and subsequent 

search were not supported by a duly issued and executed search warrant or any exceptions thereto;

were not pursuant to Ms. Mullins’ knowledgeable or voluntary consent; were not based upon 

probable cause; nor were they within the scope of searches incident to a lawful arrest. 

In addition, any statements attributed to Ms. Mullins were derived from the officers’ 

unlawful entry and seizure, and absent a knowing and valid waiver of her Miranda rights. Ms. 

Mullins submits a memorandum in support of this Motion for consideration, and requests a 

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hearing, to develop a factual basis for this Motion and, to present additional legal arguments in 

support thereof.

Respectfully submitted,

DEBORAH L. WILLIAMS

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

By s/Cheryll A. Bennett 

Cheryll A. Bennett (0063671)

Assistant Federal Public Defender

1 South Main Street, Ste. 490

Dayton, Ohio 45402

(937) 225-7687

Cheryll_Bennet@fd.org

Attorney for Defendant

Patricia Mullins

MEMORANDUM

FACTUAL SUMMARY

On July 28, 2018, Montgomery County Sheriff Deputies Matthew Snyder and J.D. Bone 

forcefully entered Ms. Mullins’ home; a blue and white Cirrus camper, located at 5407 Edgewater 

Drive. At the time the deputies entered Ms. Mullins’ home, they allege that they had observed, 

through the camper’s window, a non-responsive white male laying on the floor, just inside the 

door. 

The deputies forced the camper’s door open and went inside. At the time they entered, 

they noted that the non-responsive white male had vanished and a female now laid in his place. 

The deputies arrested the female and searched the camper, where they found Ms. Mullins and two 

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men in bed. The deputies also allege that they observed a sawed off shotgun, drugs and drug 

paraphernalia on a table to the right of the entry door. The deputies seized and detained Ms. 

Mullins in the rear of a locked cruiser, where they then interrogated her. During this 

interrogation, Ms. Mullins made several incriminating statements. Although Ms. Mullins 

executed a Miranda rights waiver, her waiver was not knowing and voluntary.

Subsequent to their initial entry, the deputies obtained a search warrant for the camper, 

where they discovered additional firearms, currency and approximately 400 grams of 

methamphetamine.

LAW

Ms. Mullins’ seizure, arrest, and the search of her residence were all unreasonable. As the 

Supreme Court noted in Payton v. New York, a person’s home is a place where they can retreat 

from government intrusion, and an individual’s right to be secure therein, shall not be violated, 

absent exigent circumstances. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 589-90, 100 S. Ct. 1371 (1980). 

Consequently, when the right to privacy must reasonably yield to the right to search, it 

must, as a rule, be decided by a judicial officer, not a police officer. Johnson v. New Hampshire, 

403 U.S. 443, 449 (1971). The rule, while not firm, is subject to only a few specifically 

established and well delineated exceptions. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); 

Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1960). The burden is on those seeking the exception 

to show the need for it. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948); United States v. 

Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). 

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In the present case, Ms. Mullins’ seizure, arrest and the search of her home were 

unreasonable and not supported by probable cause or any exception to the warrant requirement. 

Consequently, all evidence seized pursuant to such actions, must be suppressed.

In addition, any statements Ms. Mullins made should be suppressed, not only as “fruit of 

the poisonous tree” pursuant to Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), but also because 

they were not the product of a knowing or voluntary waiver of Ms. Mullins’ Miranda rights. 

The Fifth Amendment protects individuals from the admission of statements made during 

custodial interrogations where they have not been given Miranda warnings. Miranda v. Arizona, 

384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). To determine whether a defendant’s statements were voluntarily 

made, a court must ask whether, in the totality of the circumstances, law enforcement obtained the 

evidence by overbearing the will of the accused. Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 513-14 

(1963). Their inquiry focuses on the: (1) conduct of law enforcement officials in creating 

pressure; and (2) suspect’s capacity to resist that pressure. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-

401 (1978). The government must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, the 

voluntariness of an accused’s statements. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1985).

In order to establish that a defendant’s statements resulted from coercion, a court must 

find that: (1) the police activity was objectively coercive; (2) the coercion was sufficient to 

overbear the defendant’s will; and (3) the defendant’s will was, in fact, overborne by the coercive 

police activity. McCall v. Dutton, 863 F.2d 454, 459 (6th Cir. 1988). Whether such coercion 

was sufficient to overbear an accused’s will requires consideration of the totality of the 

circumstances including “age, education, and intelligence of the accused; whether the accused has 

been informed of her constitutional rights; the length of the questioning; the repeated and 

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prolonged nature of the questioning; and the use of physical punishment, such as the deprivation 

of food or sleep.” Ledbetter v. Edwards, 35 F.3d 1062, 1067 (6th Cir. 1994). Ms. Mullins’

statements were not made knowingly, and were coercively obtained. As such, they must be 

suppressed.

For all the above reasons, Ms. Mullins requests that the Court suppress all evidence seized 

and all statements she made, in the above matter.

Respectfully submitted,

DEBORAH L. WILLIAMS

FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER

By s/Cheryll A. Bennett 

Cheryll A. Bennett (0063671)

Assistant Federal Public Defender

1 South Main Street, Ste. 490

Dayton, Ohio 45402

(937) 225-7687

Cheryll_Bennet@fd.org

Attorney for Defendant

Patricia Mullins

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing was served upon Dwight Keller, Assistant 

United States Attorney, by electronic filing, on the date of the timestamp hereon.

s/Cheryll A. Bennett 

Cheryll A. Bennett

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