alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### In the Matter of Michael Bossett, Petitioner, v Leonard Portuondo, as Superintendent of Shawangunk Correctional Facility, et al., Respondents.

[769 NYS2d 913]

*640Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (transferred to this Court by order of the Supreme Court, entered in Ulster County) to review a determination of the Commissioner of Correctional Services which found petitioner guilty of violating certain prison disciplinary rules.

Petitioner was found guilty of violating the prison disciplinary rules prohibiting inmates from smuggling, introducing narcotics into the facility and engaging in activities detrimental *to the*facility’s order. The charges arose out of an investigation conducted by correction officers, which included a watch on petitioner’s mail and information from several confidential sources indicating that petitioner was an active participant in a group of individuals who introduced controlled substances into the facility for sale to other inmates. Petitioner challenges the determination on the ground that certain procedural errors require its annulment.*

Initially, we are unpersuaded by petitioner’s contention that the statement of charges in the misbehavior report gave insufficient notice of the charges against him. The acts of misconduct were described in sufficient detail to satisfy the statutory requirements *(see*7 NYCRR 251-3.1) while affording petitioner the means of defending himself *(see Matter of Encarnacion v Ricks,*289 AD2d 625 [2001], *lv denied*97 NY2d 613 [2002]). Certain information was properly withheld to prevent jeopardizing the safety of the confidential informants, facility security and the efficacy of the investigation *(see Matter of Watkins v Goord,*307 AD2d 503 [2003], *appeal dismissed*and *lv denied*1 NY3d 532 [2003]).

*641Similarly, we reject petitioner’s argument that the hearing was not commenced in a timely manner *(see*7 NYCRR 251-5.1 [a]). Petitioner errs by counting the date upon which the misbehavior report was written as one of the seven days within which the hearing is to be held *(see Matter of Infante v Selsky,*299 AD2d 612, 613 [2002]). In addition, the one-day extension granted to the Hearing Officer was properly authorized and petitioner has shown no prejudice resulting therefrom *(see Matter of Matos v Goord,*293 AD2d 855, 856 [2002]). The remaining contentions raised by petitioner have been examined and found to be without merit.

Cardona, P.J., Mercure, Carpinello, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ., concur. Adjudged that the determination is confirmed, without costs, and petition dismissed.

*

 Although petitioner has abandoned his substantial evidence argument, the proceeding was nonetheless properly transferred to this Court, as he raised the issue before Supreme Court in his petition (see *Matter of Chastine v Selsky,*303 AD2d 801, 802 n [2003]).
BILL OF COSTS

TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, SIXTH DISTRICT, AT TEXARKANA

No. 06-15-00036-CV

DeBerry 3 Operating Company, LLC

v.

Quitman Independent School District, et al.

(No. T-3625 IN 402ND DISTRICT COURT OF WOOD COUNTY)

TYPE OF FEE CHARGES PAID BY

FILING $195.00 NOT PAID SMEAD ANDERSON & DUNN

Balance of costs owing to the Sixth Court of Appeals, Texarkana, Texas: $195.00

Court costs in this cause shall be paid as per the Judgment issued by this Court.

I, DEBRA AUTREY, CLERK OF THE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS OF THE 

STATE OF TEXAS, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true and correct 

copy of the cost bill of THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH DISTRICT OF 

TEXAS, showing the charges and payments, in the above numbered and styled cause, 

as the same appears of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, 

witness my hand and the Seal of 

the COURT OF APPEALS for 

the Sixth District of Texas, this 

October 8, 2015.

DEBRA AUTREY, CLERK

By ___________________________

Deputy
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                         7
<MULTIPLIER>                      1,000

<S>                               <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                     12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                 DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                    JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                      DEC-31-1999
<DEBT-HELD-FOR-SALE>                1,161,655
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<TOTAL-INVEST>                      1,414,680
<CASH>                                 43,219
<RECOVER-REINSURE>                    518,658
<DEFERRED-ACQUISITION>                129,746
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                      2,635,537
<POLICY-LOSSES>                     1,313,310
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<OTHER-INCOME>                              0
<BENEFITS>                            539,378
<UNDERWRITING-AMORTIZATION>           143,092
<UNDERWRITING-OTHER>                  124,799
<INCOME-PRETAX>                      (174,085)
<INCOME-TAX>                           59,179
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                  (233,264)
<DISCONTINUED>                              0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                             0
<CHANGES>                                   0
<NET-INCOME>                         (233,264)
<EPS-BASIC>                           (6.65)
<EPS-DILUTED>                           (6.65)
<RESERVE-OPEN>                        632,850
<PROVISION-CURRENT>                   452,697
<PROVISION-PRIOR>                           0
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<PAYMENTS-PRIOR>                      219,505
<RESERVE-CLOSE>                       828,923
<CUMULATIVE-DEFICIENCY>               (72,361)



</TABLE>
STATE EX REL. David Wayne POYDRAS v. STATE of Louisiana

No. 2017-KH-0611

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 2018

**ON SUPERVISORY WRITS TO THE FIFTEENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, PARISH OF LAFAYETTE**

PER CURIAM:

Denied. Relator does not identify an illegal term in his sentence, and therefore, his filing is properly construed as an application for post-conviction relief. *See* *State v. Parker* , 98-0256 (La. 5/8/98), 711 So.2d 694. As such, it is subject to the time limitation set forth in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Relator's application was not timely filed in the district court, and he fails to carry his burden to show that an exception applies. La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8 ; *State ex rel. Glover v. State* , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So.2d 1189.

Relator has now fully litigated several applications for post-conviction relief in state court. Similar to federal habeas relief, *see* 28 U.S.C. § 2244, Louisiana post-conviction procedure envisions the filing of a successive application only under the narrow circumstances provided in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.4 and within the limitations period as set out in La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.8. Notably, the Legislature in 2013 La. Acts 251 amended that article to make the procedural bars against successive filings mandatory. Relator's claims have now been fully litigated in accord with La.C.Cr.P. art. 930.6, and this denial is final. Hereafter, unless he can show that one of the narrow exceptions authorizing the filing of a successive application applies, relator has exhausted his right to state collateral review. The district court is ordered to record a minute entry consistent with this per curiam.
Exhibit No. 32.1
----------------

Form 10-KSB
Epicus Communications Group, Inc.
File No. 000-17058


   Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as Adopted
    Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
    ---------------------------------------------------------

In connection with the Annual Report of Epicus Communications Group, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-KSB for the year ended May 31, 2005 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, Gerard Haryman, Chief Executive and Financial Officer of
the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted
pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

 (1) the Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
     15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 (2)  the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
     material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
     of the Company.


Date: August 30, 2005                By:           Gerard Haryman
                                        --------------------------------
                                                          Gerard Haryman
                                                     Chief Executive and
                                                 Chief Financial Officer



A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Epicus Communications Group, Inc. and will be retained
by Epicus Communications Group, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and
Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS OF VITAL LIVING PRODUCTS, INC. FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 30, 2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                             400
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  279,008
<ALLOWANCES>                                    11,015
<INVENTORY>                                    295,879
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               576,059
<PP&E>                                         858,962
<DEPRECIATION>                                (704,758)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 745,798
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        2,359,290
<BONDS>                                         11,597
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                  2,966,969
<COMMON>                                        34,221
<OTHER-SE>                                  (4,626,279)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   745,798
<SALES>                                      1,006,108
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,289,889
<CGS>                                          916,985
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                1,806,094
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                (3,960)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              55,417
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (567,662)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (567,662)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (567,662)
<EPS-BASIC>                                      (0.22)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0


</TABLE>
Christopher WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4657

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Josef BOZEK and Eva Bozek, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. BANK OF AMERICA N.A., et al., Defendants-Appellees.

No. 16-3917

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Submitted April 13, 2017 *

Decided April 14, 2017

Josef Bozek, Pro Se

Eva Bozek, Pro Se

Cody Joseph Cocanig, Attorney, Winston & Strawn LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee Bank of America, N.A.

Gary E. Green, Matthew J. Ruza, Attorney, Katie N. Simpson-Jones, Attorney, Clark Hill PLC, Chicago, IL, for Defendants-Appellees PNC Mortgage, PNC Bank, National Association

Brian Merfeld, Attorney, Pierce & Associates, P.C., Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee Pierce *&*Associates

Before Diane P. Wood, Chief Judge, Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge, Frank H. Easterbrook, Circuit Judge

*

 We have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary because the facts and argument are adequately presented in the briefs and record. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

Order

A state judge ordered the home of Josef and Eva Bozek sold in foreclosure. In this federal suit under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), and other federal statutes, the Bozeks accuse their lender and other financial institutions of racketeering and discrimination. They sought a federal injunction against the sale that the state court ordered. The district judge declined to enjoin the sale, and although the federal suit remains pending the Bozeks immediately appealed on the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).

The Bozeks’ home was sold in October 2016, and a state judge confirmed the sale the following month. See 735 ILCS 5/15-1508. Appellees contend that this moots the federal suit, but it does not, if only because the appellate judiciary of Illinois might reverse or modify the order confirming the sale. And a federal court could in principle order the sale undone. A case is not moot as long as some relief is possible, see *Campbell-Ewald Co. v. Gomez,*— U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 663, 669, 193 L.Ed.2d 571 (2016), and that’s true of the Bozeks’ situation.

This is as far as they get, however, because a federal injunction precluding enforcement of a state court’s order is forbidden by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 *508U.S.C. § 2283. None of that statute’s three exceptions—injunctive relief “expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of [the federal court’s] jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments”—applies to the Bozeks’ request. They contend that the state court lacks jurisdiction and that there are other defects in the foreclosure proceeding, but those defenses must be presented to and resolved by the state court.

Affirmed
Brian Jovon NEWMAN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-1152

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 29, 2018 Rehearing Denied June 4, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2



CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER OF

CRESCENT BANKING COMPANY

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the
Quarterly Report of Crescent Banking Company (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2004, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Leland W. Brantley, Jr.,
Chief Financial Officer of the Company, do hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| |  |  |  |                             |  |                                                                
| |  |  |  | --------------------------- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------
| |  | 
| |  |  |  | /s/ LELAND W. BRANTLEY, JR.
| |  |  |  |                             |  | Leland W. Brantley, Jr. Chief Financial Officer August 16, 2004
awamendfordiroptions.htm


    
      
         


      

      
         


        
          

        

      

      
         


      

    


    EXHIBIT
1

     

    OPTION
TERMS (amended December 3, 2008)

     

    Name of
Grantee:                                                                Al
Williams

     

    Date of
Grant:                                                                June
5, 2008

     

    Number of
Shares
Granted:                                                                           73,833

     

    Exercise
Price:                                                      $0.01625

     

    Type of
Option

    (Qualified
or
Non-Qualified):                                                                           Non-Qualified

    


    Vesting:                                                      24,611
shares vest immediately upon the date of grantabove

     

    
      	
               
      

            	
              49,222
      shares have vested on December 3,
2008

            


    

     

    


     

    


     

    Amendment
to the Option Terms acknowledged by Grantee:

     

    


     

    _____/s/ Al
Williams_____________

     

    Print
Name: Al Williams
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jerome Danek GLEATON, a/k/a Jerome Danek Gleatin, a/k/a Jerome Gleason, a/k/a Ronnie, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-6773

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: November 17, 2016

Decided: November 22, 2016

Jerome Danek Gleaton, Appellant Pro Se. Olivia L. Norman, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee.

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and MOTZ and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Jerome Danek Gleaton seeks to appeal the district court’s order dismissing his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2012). A certificate of appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2012). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S.Ct. 1595, 146 L.Ed.2d 542 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85, 120 S.Ct. 1595.

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude that Gleaton has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability, deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
#### Short *v.*Pullen.

Opinion delivered January 23, 1897.

Usury — Agent’s Bonus. — Where a husband as agent makes a loan of his wife’s money at the highest legal rate of interest, and in addition takes a commission for himself without her knowledge, the loan is not usurious.

Appeal from Little River Circuit Court.

Will P. Fea£EL, Judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

This is a suit on a promissory note. The defense is usury. The proof shows that appellees applied to one John C. Short, husband of the appellant, for the loan of four hundred and fifty dollars. Short did not have the money at the time, but informed appellees that he could get the money for them. The terms of the loan, as agreed upon between Short and appellees, were that appellees would have to pay 12s per cent, for the use of the money. It was agreed between Short and appellees that they should give two notes, one for $450 with interest at ten per cent, per annum from date and one for' $22.50, the amount of interest above ten per cent. The latter note was to be paid in lumber. This occurred in Arkansas. After this, Short returned to Illinois, where his wife lived, and induced her to let appellants have $450 at ten per cent, interest. Short and appellees appointed one Duncan to consummate the loan. Short sent to Duncan a check for $450 and two notes for appellees to sign. Duncan delivered the check to appellees, upon their signing the notes. One note was for $450 at ten per cent, per annum from date payable to appellant. The other was for $22.50, to be paid in lumber, and was made payable to John, *386C. Short. The note payable to appellant was sent to her by mail, and the other note was serit to John C. Short. The appellant (Mrs. Short), the proof shows, had no knowledge or information that John C. Short had contracted for a bonus'or any greater rate of interest than ten per cent, and, according to her evidence, which is uncontradicted, did not know that appellees had given him any note. The proof shows that it was not “the intention of appellant to charge, take or receive of appellees more than ten per cent.” The case was tried by the court, sitting as a jury, who found in favor of appellees, and rendered judgment accordingly.

*J. C. Head*for appellant.

There must be intent to take usury. The usury must be *proved.*2 Rice, Rv. sec. 549. A commission taken by a husband for himself beyond the legal rate of interest, without the knowledge of the wife, or her consent, does not make the loan usurious. 33 Am. Rep. 140. A bonus taken by an agent without the knowledge or consent of the principal is not usury. 51 Ark. 548; 1 B. M. 534; 54 Ark. 578; 59 *id.*366. The proof of usury is on defendant. 57 Ark, 256; See 116 IT. S. 98.

Wood, J.,

(after stating the facts.) The judgment is contrary to the law and evidence. *Gregory*v. Bewly, 9 Ark. 22; *Baird*v. Millwood, 51 Ark. 548; *Vahlberg*v. *Keaton, id.*534; *Scruggs*v. *Scottish Mortg. Co.,*54 *id. 572,; May*v. Flint, 54 *id.*578; *Blackburn*v. *Hayes,*59 *id.*366; *Holt*v. *Kirby,*57 Ark. 256.

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Samuel Q. NORWOOD, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3766

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT
      23.1























CONSENT
      OF INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM








We
      have
      issued our reports dated March 12, 2007 accompanying the consolidated financial
      statements and management's assessment of the effectiveness of internal control
      over financial reporting included in the Annual Report of P.A.M. Transportation
      Services, Inc. on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2006. We hereby
      consent to the incorporation by reference of said reports in the Registration
      Statement of P.A.M. Transportation Services, Inc. on Form S-8 (File No.
      333-80505).







GRANT
      THORNTON LLP


Tulsa,
      Oklahoma


March
      12,
      2007
Bobby Lee CANTY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4134

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.