2017 IL 121483

IN THE

SUPREME COURT

OF

THE STATE OF ILLINOIS

(Docket No. 121483) 

In re JARQUAN B., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. 

Jarquan B., Appellant). 

Opinion filed November 8, 2017.

CHIEF JUSTICE KARMEIER delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion. 

Justices Freeman, Garman, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

 Justice Thomas specially concurred, with opinion. 

 Justice Burke specially concurred, with opinion, joined by Justice Kilbride.

OPINION

¶ 1 On November 17, 2015, respondent Jarquan B., a delinquent minor, was found 

to be in violation of his misdemeanor probation sentence pursuant to the Juvenile 
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Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/1-1 et seq. (West 2014)) and 

was ordered to be committed to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ) on April 

26, 2016. Respondent appealed his commitment, arguing that a newly enacted 

amendment to section 5-710(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act that became effective 

on January 1, 2016 (the 2016 amendment), precluded the trial court from 

committing him to the DJJ for his misdemeanor offense. Pub. Act 99-268 (eff. Jan. 

1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b)). A divided panel of the appellate 

court affirmed the commitment order. 2016 IL App (1st) 161180. We allowed 

respondent’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15, 2016)) and 

now affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 

¶ 2 STATUTES INVOLVED

¶ 3 Section 5-720(4) of the Juvenile Court Act, which sets forth the trial court 

procedures to resentence a delinquent juvenile upon the revocation of probation, 

states:

“If the court finds that the minor has violated a condition at any time prior to the 

expiration or termination of the period of probation or conditional discharge, it 

may continue him or her on the existing sentence, with or without modifying or 

enlarging the conditions, or may revoke probation or conditional discharge and 

impose any other sentence that was available under Section 5-710 at the time of 

the initial sentence.” (Emphasis added.) 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) (West 2014). 

¶ 4 At the time respondent was initially sentenced, section 5-710(1)(b) of the 

Juvenile Court Act, which lists the kinds of sentencing orders available to a trial 

court, provided as follows: 

“A minor found to be guilty may be committed to the Department of Juvenile 

Justice under Section 5-750 if the minor is 13 years of age or older, provided 

that the commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice shall be made only if

a term of incarceration is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the offense 

for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b) 

(West 2014). 

¶ 5 Effective January 1, 2016, section 5-710(1)(b) was amended to provide: 
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“A minor found to be guilty may be committed to the Department of Juvenile 

Justice under Section 5-750 if the minor is at least 13 years and under 20 years 

of age, provided that the commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice 

shall be made only if a term of imprisonment in the penitentiary system of the 

Department of Corrections is permitted by law for adults found guilty of the 

offense for which the minor was adjudicated delinquent.” Pub. Act 99-268 (eff. 

Jan. 1, 2016) (amending 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b)). 

¶ 6 BACKGROUND

¶ 7 In January 2015, the State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship of 

respondent, a minor, for the offense of criminal trespass to a motor vehicle, a Class 

A misdemeanor (720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 2014)). Respondent entered a plea of 

guilty on February 26, 2015, and the circuit court of Cook County sentenced 

respondent to 12 months’ court supervision, 30 days’ stayed detention, and 

community service. At respondent’s sentencing hearing, the trial court informed 

respondent that in accordance with section 5-710(1)(b), if he violated the terms of 

his supervision, it could place him on probation or hold him in custody for up to 30 

days or send him to the DJJ. At the time of respondent’s sentencing, the maximum 

sentence for a Class A misdemeanor was less than one year of incarceration. 730 

ILCS 5/5-4.5-55 (West 2014). 

¶ 8 Two weeks after respondent’s initial sentencing, the State moved to execute the 

stayed mittimus on the ground that respondent had left his residential placement on 

multiple occasions without permission. The trial court entered an order continuing 

the motion to stay the mittimus and placed respondent on electronic home 

monitoring. Later that day, respondent violated his electronic monitoring, and the 

trial court ordered him to serve 10 days in the juvenile temporary detention center 

(JTDC). Shortly after his release, respondent again violated the terms of his 

sentence, and he was ordered to serve additional time in the JTDC.

¶ 9 In September 2015, the State filed a petition alleging that defendant violated his 

supervision by leaving his residential placement multiple times after he was 

released from the JTDC. Respondent failed to appear at the subsequent hearing, 

and the trial court issued a warrant for his arrest. On October 13, 2015, respondent 
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appeared before the trial court and admitted to the State’s petition. The trial court 

revoked respondent’s court supervision and continued the case for sentencing. 

¶ 10 At respondent’s sentencing hearing on November 5, 2015, the trial court 

sentenced respondent to six months’ probation and again inquired whether 

respondent understood that, based on his admission, he could be sentenced to the 

DJJ. Respondent acknowledged that he understood the terms imposed and the 

possible penalties if he violated the terms of his probation. On the way back to 

respondent’s residential placement facility, however, respondent fled from the 

residential placement staff, thereby again violating the terms of his probation. The 

next day, the State filed another petition alleging that respondent violated his 

probation. 

¶ 11 On November 17, 2015, at the hearing on the State’s petition, respondent 

admitted to the probation violation. The trial court once more inquired of 

respondent whether he was fully aware that, based on his admission to the 

probation violation, he could be committed to the DJJ. Respondent acknowledged 

that he understood. The matter was continued for sentencing. However, prior to 

respondent’s sentencing hearing scheduled in early December 2015, respondent 

again absconded from his residential placement without permission. An arrest 

warrant was issued, and respondent was eventually arrested on February 5, 2016. 

On February 18, 2016, the trial court conducted a sentencing hearing on the State’s 

November 2015 petition to revoke probation. Before reaching a decision, the trial 

court continued the matter for sentencing, warning respondent that he had “one 

more chance” and, if he left his residential placement again, the court would 

commit him to the DJJ. 

¶ 12 In mid-March 2016, respondent did not appear at his sentencing hearing. An 

arrest warrant was issued resulting in respondent’s arrest about a month later. On 

April 26, 2016, over the objections of defense counsel, the trial court found it to be 

in respondent’s best interest to commit him to the DJJ.

¶ 13 ANALYSIS
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¶ 14 The central issue in this case is whether, on the date of respondent’s sentencing 

on his misdemeanor probation violation, April 26, 2016, the trial court had the 

statutory authority to commit him to the DJJ. The crux of respondent’s argument 

relies on the applicability of the amendment to section 5-710 of the Juvenile Court 

Act that became effective on January 1, 2016, which precludes the trial court from 

committing a minor to the DJJ for a misdemeanor offense. 705 ILCS 

405/5-710(1)(b) (West Supp. 2015). 

¶ 15 Before this court can address whether the trial court erred in committing 

respondent to the DJJ, we begin our review, as we must, with the question of 

whether this court should consider the issue because the appeal has become moot. 

¶ 16 I. MOOTNESS

¶ 17 No dispute exists that, having served the terms of his sentence, respondent’s 

appeal is rendered moot. In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 15 (“Where *** the 

appeal involves the validity of a sentence, such appeal is rendered moot if the 

sentence has been served.”). Although the general rule is that reviewing courts will 

not decide moot questions, we will consider an otherwise moot case where it falls 

under a recognized exception. Id. The appellate court here held that the validity of 

respondent’s sentence, although moot, was reviewable under the public interest 

exception to the mootness doctrine. 2016 IL App (1st) 161180, ¶ 14. Both the State 

and respondent urge this court to consider respondent’s claim under the public 

interest exception. This narrowly construed exception requires that (1) the question 

presented is of a public nature, (2) a need exists for an authoritative determination 

of the question for the future guidance of public officers, and (3) the question is 

likely to recur. In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, ¶ 16. 

¶ 18 In In re Shelby R., this court applied the public interest exception in a case 

where a juvenile completed her sentence and had been released by the time the 

appeal was decided. Id. ¶¶ 10, 23. Applying the exception, this court concluded the 

detention of a juvenile is a matter of public concern and that the liberty interests of 

minors posed a significant need for authoritative intervention, as did the need to 

provide guidance to judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys on a question that 

was likely to recur. Id. ¶¶ 16, 22-23. 
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¶ 19 As in In re Shelby R., this case satisfies all three requirements for application of 

the public interest exception. First, the question we are asked to address is certainly 

of a public nature, as it deals in general with the detention of minors. See In re J.T., 

221 Ill. 2d 338, 350-51 (2006) (the question of how long a minor will remain 

incarcerated or subject to parole restrictions or the custodianship of the Department 

of Corrections is a question of public importance). Second, resolution of this issue 

will undoubtedly affect the procedures that must be followed in similar proceedings 

under the Juvenile Court Act. Thus, future guidance of public officers is necessary 

to provide clear direction in the application of the relevant provisions of the 

Juvenile Court Act and create a uniform body of law. As to the third criterion, the 

parties agree that the question herein is likely to recur despite it being over a year 

since the 2016 amendment to the Juvenile Court Act became effective. Respondent 

notes that a juvenile may be placed on probation for a misdemeanor offense for a 

period not to exceed “5 years or until the minor has attained the age of 21 years, 

whichever is less.” 705 ILCS 405/5-715(1) (West 2016). Therefore, application of 

the 2016 amendment could recur well after the effective date of January 1, 2016, to 

a minor sentenced to probation prior to the effective date of the amendment. 

Accordingly, we agree with the parties that the public interest exception to the 

mootness doctrine should apply and review by this court is appropriate. We now 

turn to the merits of respondent’s sentencing issue. 

¶ 20 II. MERITS

¶ 21 This appeal requires us to construe the statutory language of various provisions 

of the Juvenile Court Act to determine whether a delinquent minor’s commitment 

to the DJJ, upon probation revocation, is permitted for an offense no longer eligible 

for commitment. As such, our review is de novo. In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 114994, 

¶ 13. 

¶ 22 The cardinal rule in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the 

legislative intent. People v. Chapman, 2012 IL 111896, ¶ 23. The most reliable 

indicator of that intent is the plain and ordinary meaning of the statutory language 

itself. People v. Goossens, 2015 IL 118347, ¶ 9. Our analysis of the provisions in 

the Juvenile Court Act is also guided by the fundamental principle that statutes 

must be read as a whole and not as isolated provisions. In re Shelby R., 2013 IL 
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114994, ¶ 32. Therefore, we must construe words and phrases in light of the other 

relevant portions of the statute so that, if possible, no term is rendered superfluous 

or meaningless. People v. Smith, 2016 IL 119659, ¶ 27. If the language of a statute 

is clear and unambiguous, we will give effect to the statute’s plain meaning without 

resort to other aids of statutory construction. Alternate Fuels, Inc. v. Director of the 

Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 215 Ill. 2d 219, 238 (2004). 

¶ 23 Respondent’s primary argument is that the trial court erred as a matter of law by 

committing him to the DJJ for violating the terms of his probation. Because 

sentencing on the revocation of probation took place after the effective date of the 

amendment to section 5-710(1)(b), respondent claims that the lower courts erred by 

considering the language of another section of the Juvenile Court Act (705 ILCS 

405/5-720(4) (West 2014)) to interpret whether the amended version of section 

5-710(1)(b) applies to his particular situation. 

¶ 24 Respondent misunderstands the sentencing provision under section 5-720 and 

the reason the trial court considered the language of that section in ordering 

respondent to be committed to the DJJ. 

¶ 25 Section 5-720 provides the procedures for revocation of a juvenile’s probation 

or conditional discharge. When, as here, a petition is filed charging the minor with 

violating a condition of his probation, section 5-720 requires the trial court to hold a 

hearing to determine whether a violation has occurred. 705 ILCS 405/5-720(2) 

(West 2014). If the trial court determines that the minor has violated a condition of 

his probation, then the trial court may, among other things, revoke probation and 

impose any other sentence that was available under section 5-710 “at the time of the 

initial sentence.” 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) (West 2014). 

¶ 26 In this case, after finding respondent guilty of violating a condition of his 

probation, the trial court looked to the sentences available at the time of 

respondent’s initial sentence to court supervision, which was entered on February 

26, 2015. It is undisputed that at the time respondent was initially sentenced, he 

faced the possibility of being sentenced to the DJJ. As such, the trial court 

sentenced respondent to a term of commitment in the DJJ. 

¶ 27 As stated above, respondent essentially asserts that his sentence following the 

revocation of probation is invalid because the amendment to section 5-710(1)(b) 
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that became effective on January 1, 2016, prohibits the trial court from committing 

a minor to the DJJ for misdemeanor offenses. The plain language of the amendment 

is not at dispute in this appeal. What is at dispute is whether a commitment sentence 

that was available at the time of respondent’s initial sentence prior to the 

amendment was still a sentence the trial court could impose after the effective date 

of the amendment to section 5-710(1)(b). Thus, the question presented does not 

center on what the plain language of amended section 5-710 means but to which 

cases it should apply. 

¶ 28 Respondent contends that the 2016 amendment and section 5-720(4) are in 

conflict such that his commitment to the DJJ was unauthorized because the 2016 

amendment precludes the trial court from imposing a sentence that was available at 

the time of his initial sentencing. In other words, respondent disagrees that the 

specific language in section 5-720(4)—stating that a trial judge may “impose any 

other sentence that was available under section 5-710 at the time of the initial 

sentence” (emphasis added)—evinces legislative intent to set the date of available 

dispositions as of the time of the initial sentence. Instead, respondent urges this 

court to focus only on the amendment and its purpose of prohibiting the 

commitment of minors to the DJJ for misdemeanor offenses. 

¶ 29 The State, on the other hand, argues that respondent’s interpretation of the 

relationship between the two provisions of the Juvenile Court Act is illogical 

because it renders the plain meaning of section 5-720(4) inoperable by eliminating 

the retrospective nature of the provision allowing courts to revoke probation and 

impose any other sentence that was initially available. The State contends that this 

court need look no further than the plain language of section 5-720(4) to find that 

sections 5-710(1)(b) and 5-720(4) work harmoniously even after the amendment. 

The State argues that section 5-720(4) should be construed as governing sentencing 

in juvenile probation revocation proceedings and section 5-710(1)(b) should be 

read as governing initial sentencing in juvenile proceedings. Under this 

construction, the State argues that the version of section 5-710(1)(b) in effect at the 

time of initial sentencing should apply because this construction gives effect to the 

plain meaning and purpose of both provisions. That is, in this situation, a 

delinquent minor who was initially sentenced on or after January 1, 2016, could not 

be committed to the DJJ, but a minor misdemeanant who was initially sentenced

prior to that date could be committed to the DJJ in probation revocation 
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proceedings before or after January 1, 2016, because that sentence “was available 

under Section 5-710, at the time of the initial sentence.” 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) 

(West 2014). For the following reasons, we agree with the State.

¶ 30 On November 17, 2015, respondent admitted to violating his probation, and the 

matter was continued for sentencing under section 5-720 of the Juvenile Court Act. 

During this period, respondent repeatedly violated the terms of his probation by 

leaving his residential placement home. This led the trial court to issue a warrant for 

his arrest. Respondent was not apprehended on the warrant until February 5, 

2016—a date after the effective date of the 2016 amendment to section 5-710(1)(b). 

At the subsequent sentencing hearing, the trial court explained that because 

respondent was initially sentenced in 2015, all sentences available at that time, 

including commitment to the DJJ, were possible. Instead of immediately 

committing respondent to the DJJ, the trial court gave respondent multiple chances 

of avoiding commitment by allowing him to remain on probation. Despite this, 

respondent left his residential placement without permission, and the trial court 

issued an arrest warrant. The trial court then, in accordance with its oft-repeated 

admonishments, sentenced respondent to the DJJ. 

¶ 31 The record is clear that respondent’s conduct of leaving his residential 

placement merely provided the grounds for revoking his probation under section 

5-720 of the Juvenile Court Act. 705 ILCS 405/5-720 (West 2014). When read 

together, section 5-720(4) and the amended section 5-710(1)(b) show that the trial 

court properly sentenced respondent to the DJJ. That is so because the trial court 

did not sentence respondent to the DJJ for a new offense based on the conduct that 

resulted in the revocation of his probation. Rather, the trial court’s commitment 

sentence constituted a resentencing for the original, underlying offense. See People 

v. Young, 138 Ill. App. 3d 130, 134-35 (1985) (“When a defendant is admitted to 

probation and that probation is revoked, the trial court may sentence the defendant 

to any sentence that would have been appropriate for the original offense.”); In re 

Darius L., 2012 IL App (4th) 120035, ¶ 32 (“When the circuit court revokes 

probation, a new sentence is imposed.”). Accordingly, once the trial court 

determined that respondent had violated a condition of his probation, the trial judge 

revoked respondent’s probation and, pursuant to section 5-720(4) (705 ILCS 

405/5-720(4) (West 2014)), resentenced him for the original offense of criminal 
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trespass to a motor vehicle (720 ILCS 5/21-2 (West 2014)). At no time was 

respondent’s sentence or his guilty finding vacated by the trial court.

¶ 32 We agree with the State that the plain language of section 5-720(4) focuses on 

the sentences available under section 5-710 at the time of a minor’s initial sentence. 

The phrase “at the time of the initial sentence” in section 5-720(4) clearly means 

that the version of section 5-710 in effect at the time of initial sentencing for the 

underlying criminal offense controls what sentencing options may be available 

when a minor violates a condition of probation and probation is revoked. That 

language in section 5-720(4) ensures that, although the General Assembly may 

from time to time amend section 5-710, such amendments would not alter the range 

of available sentences that were an option when a minor is placed on probation and 

admonished as to those possible available sentences that could be imposed or later 

imposed if the minor violates a term or condition of probation. See In re Dexter L., 

334 Ill. App. 3d 557, 560 (2002) (citing People v. Witte, 317 Ill. App. 3d 959 

(2000), and In re Tucker, 45 Ill. App. 3d 728, 730-31 (1976)). The whole point of 

the statutory language of section 5-720(4) was designed to deal with this very 

scenario.

¶ 33 Respondent’s narrow interpretation conflicts with a plain and literal reading of 

the Juvenile Court Act, rendering the language of section 5-720(4) “at the time of 

the initial sentence” meaningless and inoperative. Ignoring the plain reading and 

application of section 5-720(4) would mean an exception or limitation on available 

sentences upon revocation of probation would change each time section 5-710 is 

amended. The number of exceptions or limitations could be endless.1 Indeed, a 

judge’s admonishment would be rendered meaningless if the possible sentences 

could be changed after a minor is initially sentenced to probation. This result would 

undoubtedly cause uncertainty as to whether a punishment initially withheld as 

deterrence would remain available if a delinquent minor violates the terms of his or 

 1

Since the enactment of sections 5-710 and 5-720 in 1999 (Pub. Act 90-590 (eff. Jan. 1, 1999)), 

section 5-710 has been amended 17 times. See Pub. Act 91-98 (eff. Jan. 1, 2000); Pub. Act 92-454 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2002); Pub. Act 94-556 (eff. Sept. 11, 2005); Pub. Act 94-696 (eff. June 1, 2006); Pub. 

Act 95-337 (eff. June 1, 2008); Pub. Act 95-642 (eff. June 1, 2008); Pub. Act 95-844 (eff. Aug. 15, 

2008); Pub. Act 95-876 (eff. Aug. 21, 2008); Pub. Act 96-179 (eff. Aug. 10, 2009); Pub. Act 96-293 

(eff. Jan. 1, 2010); Pub. Act 96-1000 (eff. July 2, 2010); Pub. Act 97-1150 (eff. Jan. 25, 2013); Pub. 

Act 98-536 (eff. Aug. 23, 2013); Pub. Act 98-803 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015); Pub. Act 99-268 (eff. Jan. 1, 

2016); Pub. Act 99-628 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017); Pub. Act 99-879 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017).
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her sentence. Respondent’s view ignores this court’s fundamental rule that, 

“[a]bsent express language in the statute providing an exception, we will not depart 

from the plain language and read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or 

conditions that the legislature did not express.” People v. Shinaul, 2017 IL 120162, 

¶ 17. 

¶ 34 Even if section 5-710(1)(b) and section 5-720(4) conflict as respondent claims, 

the result would be the same. First, for reasons explained above, our interpretation 

accords with this court’s rule that “[e]ven when there is an apparent conflict 

between statutes, they must be construed in harmony if reasonably possible.” 1010 

Lake Shore Ass’n v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 2015 IL 118372, ¶ 37 

(citing Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 459 (2002)); see also

Barragan v. Casco Design Corp. 216 Ill. 2d 435, 441-42 (2005) (“Where two 

statutes are allegedly in conflict, a court has a duty to interpret the statutes in a 

manner that avoids an inconsistency and gives effect to both statutes, where such an 

interpretation is reasonably possible.”). In other words, before declaring two 

statutes to be in conflict, “[w]e must presume that several statutes relating to the 

same subject *** are governed by one spirit and a single policy, and that the 

legislature intended the several statutes to be consistent and harmonious.” Uldrych 

v. VHS of Illinois, Inc., 239 Ill. 2d 532, 540 (2011). That is precisely what our 

interpretation achieves. And, even if there could be no harmonious interpretation, 

an application of this court’s specific/general rule of statutory construction is fatal 

to respondent’s argument on the grounds that section 5-720(4) unquestionably 

controls over section 5-710(1)(b) since it is the more specific provision. See Moore 

v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 480 (2006) (“Where a general statutory provision and a 

more specific statutory provision relate to the same subject, we will presume that 

the legislature intended the more specific provision to govern.”). That is so because 

section 5-720(4) applies only in probation revocation proceedings and is restricted 

to that type of sentencing decision, whereas section 5-710(1)(b) applies generally to

sentencing proceedings. As such, respondent’s argument that the amendment 

controls since it is the most recent enactment also fails. See People ex rel. Madigan 

v. Burge, 2014 IL 115635, ¶ 32 (“[T]he canon that the specific governs the general 

applies with special force where *** the earlier provision is specific and the later, 

general provision makes no mention of the earlier provision.”).
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¶ 35 It is not necessary to address the legislative history upon which respondent 

relies, having found the plain language of the amendment to be unambiguous. 

Sections 5-710(1)(b) and 5-720(4), as well as the 2016 amendment, can be read 

harmoniously without resorting to extrinsic aids of statutory construction. In re 

Estate of Shelton, 2017 IL 121199, ¶ 36 (“Where the language of a statute is clear 

and unambiguous, we will apply it as written, without resort to extrinsic aids of 

statutory construction.”). 

¶ 36 For similar reasons, we reject respondent’s argument that the rule of lenity 

applies. See People v. Fiveash, 2015 IL 117669, ¶ 34 (“[T]he rule of lenity applies 

only to statutes containing grievous ambiguities, leaving us unable to do more than 

merely guess the legislature’s intent.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) (citing 

People v. Gutman, 2011 IL 110338, ¶¶ 43-44)). 

¶ 37 Additionally, we reject respondent’s argument that section 4 of the Statute on 

Statutes (5 ILCS 70/4 (West 2014)) entitles him the option to be sentenced under 

the amended section 5-710(1)(b) or the prior version. 

¶ 38 Section 4 of the Statute on Statutes provides, in relevant part:

“If any penalty, forfeiture or punishment be mitigated by any provisions of a 

new law, such provision may, by the consent of the party affected, be applied to 

any judgment pronounced after the new law takes effect.” 5 ILCS 70/4 (West 

2014). 

¶ 39 Although we have not found a case from this court directly on point, we find the 

appellate court decision in People v. Denier, 76 Ill. App. 3d 214 (1979), to be 

instructive. The issue in Denier concerned whether, upon revocation of probation, 

defendant was entitled to elect to be sentenced under the law as it existed at the time 

of his offense or under the law in effect on or after the effective date of the 

amendatory act where his sentence of probation occurred prior to the effective date 

of the amendment. Id. at 215.

¶ 40 To resolve the question of whether the defendant could elect to be resentenced 

under the amended act, the Denier court considered the language of a separate 

section of the Unified Code of Corrections, section 8-2-4(b) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977 

Supp., ch. 38, ¶ 1008-2-4(b)), which was amended by Public Act 80-1099 (eff. Feb. 
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1, 1978) and distinguishes between those defendants yet to be sentenced and those 

who have already been sentenced before the cutoff date. Id. Section 8-2-4(b) stated 

in pertinent part: 

“If the defendant has not been sentenced before the effective date of this 

amendatory Act of 1977, he shall have the right to elect to be sentenced under 

the law as it existed at the time of his offense or under the law in effect on and 

after the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977. If a sentence has been 

imposed before the effective date of this amendatory Act of 1977, the defendant 

shall not have the right of election even though his case has not been finally 

adjudicated on appeal ***.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977 Supp., ch. 38, ¶ 1008-2-4(b). 

¶ 41 Citing this court’s decision in People v. Grant, 71 Ill. 2d 551 (1978), which 

upheld the constitutionality of section 8-2-4(b), the Denier court stated that it was 

reasonable to distinguish “ ‘between those defendants, on the one hand, who had 

not yet been accorded any sentencing hearings prior to the cut-off date, and those, 

on the other hand, whose sentences, already imposed, would require remandments 

for additional sentencing hearings.’ ” Denier, 76 Ill. App. 3d at 215 (quoting Grant, 

71 Ill. 2d at 561-62). The Denier court went on to explain that section 4 of the 

Statute on Statutes did not give the defendant any relief because it has been early 

held that section 4 “ ‘does not give the defendant the right to be sentenced under a 

law not in full force and effect at the time of his sentence. It could only apply to 

those classes of cases in which a new law had become effective prior to the date of 

the actual sentence.’ ” Id. at 216 (quoting People v. Lisle, 390 Ill. 327, 328 (1945)). 

Accordingly, the Denier court rejected defendant’s argument that he was entitled to 

be sentenced under the amendatory act because, having already been initially 

sentenced to probation in 1976, he did not have the right to elect to be resentenced, 

on revocation of probation, under the new amended act. Id. at 217. 

¶ 42 Although we acknowledge that opinions from the appellate court are not 

binding on this court (People v. Rivera, 198 Ill. 2d 364, 373 (2001)), we find that 

Denier reinforces our earlier analysis that the phrase in section 5-720(4) “at the 

time of initial sentence” means the sentencing options listed in section 5-710 at the 

time of initial sentencing remain viable on revocation of probation even if section 

5-710 is subsequently amended after initial sentencing. The only reason respondent 

can argue that he was entitled to be sentenced under the amended section 
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5-710(1)(b) is because he failed to appear at his December 2015 sentencing hearing 

and was not arrested until after the effective date of the amendment. As in Denier,

the fact respondent was subsequently resentenced, on revocation of probation, for 

the original offense does not provide him the option of being sentenced under the 

amended section 5-710(1)(b), which did not become effective until after the date of 

his initial sentence. Contrary to respondent’s belief, resentencing for his probation 

violation is different from a situation where a court vacates a sentence. This court 

has held, in that situation, a defendant is entitled to elect sentencing under a new 

statute. See People v. Reyes, 2016 IL 119271, ¶ 12 (holding that the defendant was 

entitled, on remand from a vacated sentence, to be resentenced under the new 

sentencing scheme that was enacted during the pendency of defendant’s appeal). 

¶ 43 Finally, we would note that if we accepted respondent’s argument that section 

5-710(1)(b), as amended from time to time, controls as to what sentencing options 

are available at resentencing upon revocation of probation, unintended 

consequences would result. For instance, if an amendment to section 5-710 

increased the penalties for the underlying offense after a minor was initially placed 

on probation, the minor would be subject to the increased penalties upon revocation 

of probation despite the fact that the new harsher penalties were not a sentencing 

option when the minor was initially sentenced. And, of course, the trial judge could 

not have admonished such a minor of the subsequently increased penalties, which 

were not available at the time of initial sentence. Our determination that section 

5-720(4) dictates what version of section 5-710 should be applied when a minor is 

resentenced after a violation of probation avoids that situation because the 

increased penalties were not a sentencing option “at the time of initial sentence.”

¶ 44 Accordingly, we hold that the amendment at issue did not prevent the trial court 

from committing respondent to the DJJ for a violation of probation, as the 

amendment occurred subsequent to the date of initial sentencing on the underlying 

offense. 

¶ 45 CONCLUSION

¶ 46 For the foregoing reasons, we hold that the trial court did not err as a matter of 

law in ordering respondent committed to the DJJ. 
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¶ 47 Appellate court judgment affirmed.

¶ 48 JUSTICE THOMAS, specially concurring: 

¶ 49 I join the majority opinion. The court splits today over whether these two 

statutes are conflicting. Ultimately, though, the entire court agrees that section 

5-720(4) precludes the application of the amended version of section 5-710(1)(b) to 

respondent's case. I write separately to explain more fully my view that there is no 

statutory conflict for the court to resolve and that resorting to rules of construction 

for conflicting statutes is unnecessary. While this may seem like a minor point, the 

view being expressed by the other specially concurring justices is antithetical to the 

way this court has always construed statutes and, in a different case, could lead to 

courts ignoring a clear legislative direction as to how a statute should be applied.

Because the legislature has dictated precisely how these statutes should be read, 

this court is not free to ignore that direction and decide the question for itself. 

¶ 50 As the majority correctly holds, this case can be resolved on the basis of plain 

statutory language and well-established legal presumptions. There is no need to 

look at rules of construction that apply to conflicting statutes, as there is no conflict 

between these statutes. As the majority notes, this court has a duty, when 

reasonably possible, to construe statutes in harmony and in a way that gives effect 

to both. Supra ¶ 34. Here, that could not be easier, as it is not even arguable that the 

two statutes conflict.

¶ 51 In section 5-720(4), the legislature gives specific directions to the trial court on 

how to proceed when sentencing someone in a probation revocation proceeding. 

The available sentences are those that were “available under section 5-710 at the 

time of the initial sentence.” 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) (West 2014). In other words, 

the legislature recognizes that there will be times when section 5-710 is amended to 

change the sentencing options, and it included this language in section 5-720(4) to 

make clear that the court’s available options are those that were available at the 

time of the original sentence. As the State put it, “[b]y enacting section 5-720(4) 

with its retroactive focus, the General Assembly ensured that, although it might 

amend section 5-710 from time to time, such amendments would not diminish 

compliance with previously imposed terms of probation by compromising the 

certainty of the consequences.” This case simply represents one of those situations 
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in which the sentencing options have changed. Section 5-710(1)(b) was amended to 

take away the possibility of a sentence to the DJJ for a misdemeanor. Far from 

being a conflict, this was the exact scenario that the legislature anticipated, 

planned for, and addressed in section 5-720(4). And the reason for section 

5-720(4)’s retroactive focus is obvious: the minor is provided with certainty 

regarding the consequences of violating probation. 

¶ 52 The statutes can be read in perfect harmony, and there is no inconsistency 

between them. Accepting respondent’s interpretation would render the relevant 

language of section 5-720(4) a nullity and violate this court’s duty to read the 

statutes harmoniously. In her special concurrence, Justice Burke settles on the exact 

same harmonious construction as the majority and agrees that only respondent’s 

interpretation precludes harmonious construction. Infra ¶¶ 68-69. If the statutes can 

be read harmoniously, they do not conflict. 

¶ 53 Justice Burke states that “[t]here is nothing remarkable about finding that two 

statutes conflict.” Infra ¶ 65. It would be remarkable, however, to find that these 

two statutes conflict, as it is patently obvious that they do not. Accepting Justice 

Burke’s position would fundamentally alter the common understanding of a 

statutory conflict. Section 5-710(1)(b) is part of a statute titled “Kinds of sentencing 

orders” that sets forth the “kinds of sentencing orders [that] may be made in respect 

of wards of court.” 705 ILCS 405/5-710 (West 2014). Specifically, section 

5-710(1)(b) deals with commitments to the Department of Juvenile Justice. By 

contrast, section 5-720(4) is part of a statute titled “Probation revocation” that sets 

forth procedures for the court to follow in juvenile probation revocation 

proceedings. 705 ILCS 405/5-720 (West 2014). Specifically, section 5-720(4) 

deals with the choices that the court has upon finding that a minor has violated the 

terms of his probation. 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) (West 2014). One of these is to 

revoke the minor’s probation and impose a sentence. If the court chooses that 

option, the sentences that are available are those that were available under section 

5-710 at the time of the original sentence. How these two statutes can possibly be in 

irreconcilable conflict is anyone’s guess. 

¶ 54 My principal point of disagreement with Justice Burke is over her assertion that 

both of these statutory provisions apply to this case by their plain language.

According to Justice Burke, section 5-720(4) unambiguously states that courts may 
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sentence juveniles to the DJJ for misdemeanor offenses, which is the exact opposite 

of what section 5-720(1)(b) says. Infra ¶ 63. Section 5-720(4) says nothing at all 

about sentencing juveniles to the DJJ for misdemeanors, let alone 

“unambiguously” so. Rather, it provides that, when sentencing juveniles upon 

revocation of probation, the sentencing options that are available to the court are 

those that were available under section 5-710 at the time of the original sentence. 

This in no way conflicts with section 5-710. Rather, it tells the court which version 

of section 5-710 to look at. Similarly, Justice Burke claims that, under its “plain 

terms,” section 5-710(1)(b) applies to this case. Infra ¶ 64. This section, however, 

says nothing at all about what sentences are available in probation revocation 

proceedings, a point that the other specially concurring justices concede. 

¶ 55 To put it another way, section 5-720(4) prevents even the possibility of there 

being a conflict here. When the court sentenced respondent at the probation 

revocation proceeding, section 5-720(4) directed the court to use the version of 

section 5-710 that was in existence at the time of the original sentencing. The 

amendment that Justice Burke relies on was not in that version of section 5-710. 

Any changes that were made to section 5-710 after the date of respondent’s original 

sentencing hearing are simply irrelevant.

¶ 56 Justice Burke also states that:

“Importantly, this provision [the amendment to section 5-710(1)(b)] makes no 

distinction between different types of sentencing decisions. It does not state that 

it applies only to initial sentencing proceedings, and it does not contain any 

words of limitation that prohibit its application in probation revocation 

proceedings.” Infra ¶ 62. 

But any such language would have been wholly unnecessary and redundant, given 

the existence of section 5-720(4). It is a basic legal presumption that “the 

legislature acts rationally and with full knowledge of all prior legislation.” People 

v. Jones, 214 Ill. 2d 187, 199 (2005). Thus, this court presumes that, when the 

legislature enacted the relevant changes to section 5-710(1)(b), it did so with full 

knowledge of the existence of section 5-720(4) and it understood that sentences of 

commitment to the DJJ for misdemeanors would still be allowed in probation 

revocation proceedings. Justice Burke has it exactly backwards. If the legislature 

had intended that the changes to section 5-710(1)(b) would be exempt from section 
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5-720(4), then the legislature would have had to include such language in section

5-710(1)(b). But the legislature of course would not have to include language 

explaining that section 5-720(4) remains fully operative. If Justice Burke’s position 

is correct, it would mean that every change of sentencing options ever made in 

section 5-710 conflicts with section 5-720(4), despite the fact that the relevant 

language of section 5-720(4) exists solely to address such changes. This obviously 

cannot be correct. Moreover, while it is certainly true that the amended version of 

section 5-710(1)(b) does not “contain any words of limitation that prohibit its 

application in probation revocation proceedings” (infra ¶ 62), the reason for this is 

that it does apply in probation revocation proceedings. For those juveniles 

originally sentenced after the amendment’s effective date, the amended version of 

section 5-710(1)(b) will apply in any future probation revocation proceedings. For 

juveniles sentenced before the amendment became effective, however, it will not 

apply at their probation revocation proceedings. See 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) (West 

2016). 

¶ 57 The problem with the analysis put forward by Justice Burke is that she reads the 

statutes to the exclusion of the principles of statutory construction. Justice Burke 

wants the court to answer the question whether, if section 5-720(4) did not exist, the 

amended version of section 5-710(1)(b) would apply to respondent’s case. But this 

is an invalid question that yields no useful answer. That is not how courts read 

statutes. Section 5-720(4) does exist, and it precludes the amended version of 

section 5-710(1)(b) from applying to respondent’s case. The court cannot assert a 

conflict based upon statutory language that the legislature says does not apply to 

this case. As the appellate court put it perfectly in In re Detention of Diestelhorst, 

307 Ill. App. 3d 123, 128 (1999), “statutory language is a reliable indicator of true 

meaning only when it is read in the context of the entire Act.” If we simply follow 

our obligation to read these statutes in para materia (People v. McCarty, 223 Ill. 2d 

109, 133 (2006)), presuming that the legislature amended section 5-710(1)(b) with 

full knowledge of the existence of section 5-720(4) (Jones, 214 Ill. 2d at 199), no 

one would be able to assert the existence of a conflict.
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¶ 58 JUSTICE BURKE, specially concurring:

¶ 59 The majority reaches two major conclusions in this case. First, the majority 

holds there is no conflict between sections 5-720(4) and 5-710(1)(b) of the Juvenile 

Court Act of 1987 (Juvenile Court Act) (705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b), 5-720(4) 

(West 2016)) and that one “need look no further than the plain language of section 

5-720(4)” (supra ¶ 29), to determine that section 5-720(4) is the governing 

provision in this case. Second, the majority holds in the alternative that, even if 

sections 5-720(4) and 5-710(1)(b) were in conflict, section 5-720(4) is the more 

specific provision of the two and, for this reason, must be given controlling effect. 

Supra ¶ 34. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s first holding 

that section 5-720(4) and section 5-710(1)(b) are not in conflict. 

¶ 60 In April 2016, the circuit court of Cook County revoked the respondent minor’s 

probation and committed him to the Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). 

Respondent had previously been adjudicated delinquent for committing the 

misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass to a motor vehicle. At issue in this appeal 

is whether the circuit court possessed the authority under the Juvenile Court Act to 

commit respondent to the DJJ for violating his probation. 

¶ 61 Resolution of this issue requires us to construe the language of two provisions 

of the Juvenile Court Act, sections 5-720(4) and 5-710(1)(b). Section 5-720(4) of 

the Juvenile Court Act provides that, if a court determines that a minor has violated 

his or her probation, the court may impose any sentence “that was available under 

Section 5-710 at the time of the initial sentence.” 705 ILCS 405/5-720(4) (West 

2016). Section 5-720(4) thus incorporates by reference the version of section 5-710 

that was in effect at the time the minor was originally sentenced. See, e.g., People v. 

Lewis, 5 Ill. 2d 117, 121 (1955). There is no dispute that, at the time respondent was 

originally sentenced for his misdemeanor offense, section 5-710 did, in fact, allow 

for commitment to the DJJ for misdemeanor violations. Thus, under the plain terms 

of section 5-720(4), respondent could be committed to the DJJ in his probation 

revocation proceeding. 

¶ 62 However, it is also undisputed that as of January 1, 2016, section 5-710(1)(b) of 

the Juvenile Court Act precludes a court from committing a minor to the DJJ for a 
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misdemeanor. 705 ILCS 405/5-710(1)(b) (West 2016). 2 The amended section 

5-710(1)(b) controls the sentencing of juvenile offenders after its effective date. Id. 

Importantly, this provision makes no distinction between different types of 

sentencing decisions. It does not state that it applies only to initial sentencing 

proceedings, and it does not contain any words of limitation that prohibit its 

application in probation revocation proceedings. On its face, the amended version 

of section 5-710(1)(b) applies to all sentencing decisions after January 1, 2016, 

including the sentence imposed on respondent as a result of his probation 

revocation in April 2016. 

¶ 63 It is not possible to give effect to both section 5-720(4) and section 5-710(1)(b) 

in this case. Section 5-720(4) unambiguously states that the circuit court had the 

authority to commit respondent to the DJJ for the misdemeanor offense of criminal 

trespass to a motor vehicle. At the same time, section 5-710(1)(b) unambiguously 

states that the circuit court did not possess that authority. Consequently, the two 

provisions are in direct conflict. 

¶ 64 In holding that there is no conflict between the statutory provisions, the 

majority and Justice Thomas, in his special concurrence, adopt the State’s 

argument that this court “need look no further than the plain language of section 

5-720(4)” to find that the two provisions work in harmony. Supra ¶ 29. But this 

simply is not true. By their plain terms, both provisions apply with equal force to 

the probation revocation proceeding conducted in April 2016. Merely referencing 

the plain language of section 5-720(4) and ignoring the plain language of section 

5-701(1)(b) places significance on the text of one provision to the exclusion of the 

other without any justification.

¶ 65 There is nothing remarkable about finding that two statutes conflict. It is simply 

a recognition that each statute, by its plain language, directs different action. The 

problem is deciding which statute takes precedence—a problem resolved by using 

canons of statutory construction. See Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 479 (2006). 

 2

Effective January 1, 2017, Public Act 99-628 amended section 5-710(1)(b) by specifying that 

commitment to the DJJ is permissible only if the minor was found guilty of a felony offense or first 

degree murder. Pub. Act 99-628, § 10 (eff. Jan. 1, 2017). However, that amendment does not alter 

the meaning or effect of section 5-710(1)(b) as it relates to this case.
- 21 - 

¶ 66 As the majority correctly notes in its second, alternative holding, one of our 

well-established rules of statutory construction provides that “[w]here a general 

statutory provision and a more specific statutory provision relate to the same 

subject, we will presume that the legislature intended the more specific provision to 

govern.” Id. at 480 (citing Knolls Condominium Ass’n v. Harms, 202 Ill. 2d 450, 

459 (2002)). The specific provision is construed as an exception to the general 

provision. People ex rel. Madigan v. Burge, 2014 IL 115635, ¶ 31 (citing RadLAX

Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012)). 

¶ 67 Application of this rule determines which statute should govern here. The 

amended section 5-710(1)(b) is the more general statute because it applies to all 

sentencing proceedings in juvenile cases after January 1, 2016. No words of 

limitation are included. Section 5-720(4) is the more specific provision because it 

applies only in probation revocation proceedings and is restricted to that limited 

type of sentencing decision. Therefore, section 5-720(4) must be construed as an 

exception to the general terms of amended section 5-710(1)(b).

¶ 68 Moreover, reliance on the general/specific canon defeats any argument that 

amended section 5-710(1)(b) should govern because it is the more recent provision. 

If amended section 5-710(1)(b) controls here, it would render a portion of section 

5-720(4) meaningless and inoperative. Specifically, it would entirely eliminate the 

retrospective nature of section 5-720(4) by nullifying the directive that the court 

must look to the sentences that were available “at the time of the initial sentence.” 

Such an interpretation would amount to repeal by implication. However, repeal by 

implication is disfavored. In re Marriage of Lasky, 176 Ill. 2d 75, 79 (1997). 

“Courts assume that the legislature will not draft a new law that contradicts an 

existing one without expressly repealing it, and that the legislature intends a 

consistent body of law when it amends or enacts new legislation.” Id. Therefore, 

the canon that the specific controls over the general applies even when the general 

provision is the more recent. Burge, 2014 IL 115635, ¶ 32 (citing Radzanower v. 

Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976), and Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 

535, 550-51 (1974)). 

¶ 69 Here, amended section 5-710(1)(b) does not expressly repeal section 5-720(4). 

In the absence of explicit language repealing section 5-720(4), we must assume that 

the legislature did not intend that result. Thus, the terms of section 5-720(4) apply 
- 22 - 

in this case and operate as an exception to the modified sentencing options that 

were adopted in 2016. For this reason, the circuit court possessed the authority to 

commit respondent to the DJJ. 

¶ 70 For the foregoing reasons, I specially concur.

¶ 71 JUSTICE KILBRIDE joins in the special concurrence.