Morrissette next argues that NRS 484C.110 violates the Equal

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it provides for disparate treatment for those who drink versus those who consume prohibited substances. In particular, Morrissette points to trial testimony indicating that the presence of drugs in a person's blood can indicate impairment while the presence of drugs in a person's urine does not indicate impairment but only prior use that could have occurred days earlier. He then argues that it is unjust that someone could legally drive with a debilitating hangover from overconsuming alcohol the day before but could not legally drive even though not impaired 2just because there were metabolites of prohibited substances in his urine.

Morrissette's argument is patently without merit. First, the Equal Protection Clause requires "that all persons similarly situated receive like treatment under the law." Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 371, 998 P.2d 166, 173 (2000). Morrissette fails to demonstrate that those who consume prohibited substances are similarly situated as those who legally consume alcohol. Second, unless the challenged statute infringes on a fundamental right or involves a suspect classification, courts apply

...continued used to convict [him]." However, as there was overwhelming evidence that supported the three non-impairment theories of liability, any error under an impairment theory would have been harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1015-16, 195 P.3d 315, 317 (2008) ("[W]e conclude that harmless-error review applies when a general verdict may rest on a legally valid or a legally invalid alternative theory of liability.").

2 We note that, contrary to Morrissette's claims, a responding police officer testified that he conducted a series of field tests and concluded from them that Morrissette "was impaired," meaning that it was "unsafe [for him] to operate a motor vehicle."

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### Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 542, 50 P.3d

1116, 1120 (2002). Morrissette does not allege any suspect classification, and although he alleges that the statute infringes on a fundamental right, he does not identify what that right is. There is no constitutional right to drive or to use illicit drugs. 

### Id. Finally, this court has held that the statute in question passes rational basis scrutiny and does not violate the Equal Protection Clause. 

### Id. at 545, 50 P.3d at 1122 (evaluating the statute which at the time was codified as NRS 484.379).

Morrissette next argues that NRS 484C.110 violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again Morrissette fails to support his claim with relevant authority or cogent argument such that we need not consider this claim. 

### See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d at 6. Finally, Morrissette appears to argue in his reply statement that "a statute" is void for vagueness. Because this argument was not raised in the fast track statement, we need not consider it. 

### See NRAP 

### 3C(e)(3) ("The reply must be limited to answering matters set forth in the Fast Track Response."). Furthermore, Morrissette's argument is without merit as the allegedly vague language, "may impair," does not appear in either statute relevant to his conviction. 

### See NRS 484C.110; NRS 484C.430. For the foregoing reasons, we

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED.

3 (0) 1947A AO).cc: Hon. Jerome M. Polaha, District Judge Kenneth J. McKenna Attorney General/Carson City Washoe County District Attorney Washoe District Court Clerk

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