IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William F. Groulx, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 121 M.D. 2018

 : Submitted: October 26, 2018

Pennsylvania State Police, :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

JUDGE COHN JUBELIRER FILED: January 24, 2019

Before this Court in our original jurisdiction are the Preliminary Objections 

(POs) filed by the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to the Petition for Review in the 

Nature of Writ of Mandamus (Petition) filed by William F. Groulx (Petitioner), pro 

se. Petitioner challenges whether he is required to register as a sex offender under 

the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA)1 because requiring 

him to do so violates the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions’ prohibition 

 

1 Sections 9799.10 to 9799.41 of the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41, 

effective December 20, 2012. SORNA was amended by the Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27 

(Act 10). The Act of June 12, 2018, P.L. 140, (Act 29), reenacted and amended various provisions 

of Act 10. 
2

against ex post facto laws.2 In its POs, PSP argues that the Petition should be 

dismissed because Petitioner lacks standing as he has 20 years left on his minimum 

sentence before he is eligible for parole and is therefore not aggrieved at this time. 

PSP also seeks dismissal of the Petition on the ground that passage of new legislation 

has rendered Petitioner’s claim moot and that Petitioner, under any iteration of the 

law, is required to register for life. For the reasons that follow, we overrule the POs 

in part, sustain them in part, and dismiss one of the POs as moot given our decision 

to grant Petitioner leave to amend his Petition.

I. Background

On March 5, 2018, Petitioner filed the Petition in our original jurisdiction. In 

the Petition, he alleges he was charged in May 2012 with 194 counts of child 

pornography, Section 6312(d) of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. § 6312(d), which was 

graded as a felony of the second degree.3 (Petition ¶ 4.) In March 2013, he pled 

guilty and was sentenced in June 2013 to 25-50 years in prison. (Id. ¶¶ 5-6.) 

According to Petitioner, while he was convicted of a sexual offense that would 

require him to register as a sex offender under SORNA, doing so would violate the 

 

2 The United States Constitution has two provisions prohibiting ex post facto laws. The 

first is contained in Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. 

art. I, § 9, cl. 3, which applies to Congress, and the other, contained in Article I, Section 10, Clause 

1 of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, which applies to the states. Article 

I, section 17 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, Pa. Const. art. I, § 17, provides “[n]o ex post facto

law . . . shall be passed.” 

3 Appended to the Petition as part of Exhibit B is a February 23, 2015 order of the Court 

of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, wherein Petitioner is identified as pleading guilty to 

indecent assault, a Tier III offense under SORNA. The order further states that Petitioner was 

found to be a sexually violent predator, and as such, is subject to lifetime registration under 

SORNA. Based on the differing docket numbers, this order appears to be separate from the 

conviction for child pornography, which forms the basis of the Petition. 
3

constitutional prohibition against ex post facto laws since SORNA was enacted after 

his conviction, as well as constitute double jeopardy.4 (Id. ¶¶ 11-13.) For support, 

he cites Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193 (Pa. 2017), cert. denied, 138 

S. Ct. 925 (2018), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that SORNA 

violated the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Pennsylvania 

Constitutions. (Petition ¶ 11.) As a result, he seeks removal from the SORNA 

website, contending, at most, if at all, he would be subject to a prior version of 

Megan’s Law.

5

 (Id. ¶¶ 13-14, 16.) Petitioner also seeks damages in excess of $1 

million on the basis that his reputation has been harmed by his wrongful inclusion 

on the SORNA website. (Id. ¶ 17.) 

In response to the Petition, PSP filed POs on May 9, 2018. The first PO 

alleges that Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

Specifically, PSP avers that the passage of the Act of February 21, 2018, P.L. 27, 

(Act 10), which amended SORNA, renders the Petition moot. (POs ¶ 7.) PSP also 

notes that Muniz would not entitle Petitioner to relief because his conviction 

 

4 Petitioner alleges he was convicted on June 12, 2013, which, according to him, was 

“approximately six (6) months prior to the enactment of SORNA on December 20, 2012.” 

(Petition ¶ 13.) There are several flaws with Petitioner’s averment. First, SORNA was enacted 

on December 20, 2011, but did not go into effect until December 20, 2012. Second, Petitioner’s 

conviction occurred six months after SORNA went into effect. However, as discussed below, the 

date of conviction is immaterial; rather, it is the date of the offense that controls. 

5 The Act of October 24, 1995, P.L. 1079 (Spec. Sess. No. 1), 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9791-9799.6, 

commonly referred to as Megan’s Law I, was declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. 

Williams, 733 A.2d 593 (Pa. 1999). The General Assembly subsequently enacted the Act of May 

10, 2000, P.L. 74, commonly referred to as Megan’s Law II, which was deemed constitutionally 

infirm by Commonwealth v. Williams, 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003). In response, the General 

Assembly enacted the Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 1243, commonly referred to as Megan’s 

Law III, which was struck down as violating the single subject rule of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution. Commonwealth v. Neiman, 84 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013). SORNA replaced Megan’s 

Law III. 
4

occurred after SORNA was enacted. (Id. n.3.) In addition, PSP alleges that, even 

under prior versions of Megan’s Law, Petitioner would have been subject to lifetime 

registration as a sexually violent predator. (Id. ¶ 8.) In its second PO, PSP asserts 

Petitioner lacks standing because he is not subject to the registration requirements 

while incarcerated. (Id. ¶ 10.) Because Petitioner is not eligible for parole until 

approximately 2038, his claim is currently non-justiciable, according to PSP. (Id.

¶¶ 11-13.) PSP seeks dismissal of the Petition with prejudice.6

Petitioner filed an answer to the POs, in which he acknowledges passage of 

Act 10, but contends he is still aggrieved. (Answer ¶¶ 8-9.) He argues he committed 

the offense in 2012 and was charged in May 2012, which predates the effective date 

of SORNA in December 2012. (Id. ¶ 9.) As such, according to Petitioner, he should 

have been sentenced pursuant to the Act of November 24, 2004, P.L. 1243, 

commonly referred to as Megan’s Law III, which was in effect at the time of 

commission of his offense, not SORNA or Act 10. (Answer ¶ 10.) With regard to 

the standing issue, Petitioner responds that, although he is incarcerated, he currently 

appears on the registration website. (Id. ¶ 13.) 

After briefing, this matter is ready for disposition.

II. Discussion

When ruling upon preliminary objections, we must accept as true all wellpleaded allegations of material fact as well as all reasonable inferences deducible 

therefrom. Thomas v. Corbett, 90 A.3d 789, 794 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2014). The Court is 

“not bound by legal conclusions, unwarranted inferences from facts, argumentative 

allegations, or expressions of opinion.” Id. The Court “may sustain preliminary 

 

6 Although it seeks dismissal of the Petition, PSP did not assert any specific objection to 

Petitioner’s claim for damages, which sounds in tort. 
5

objections only when the law makes clear that the petitioner cannot succeed on his 

claim, and we must resolve any doubt in favor of the petitioner.” Id. “A 

demurrer . . . should be sustained only in cases that are free and clear from doubt and 

only where it appears with certainty that the law permits no recovery under the 

allegations pleaded.” Russell v. Donnelly, 827 A.2d 535, 536 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003)

(citation omitted). With the above principles in mind, we turn to PSP’s POs. 

A. Standing/Ripeness 

Because standing is a threshold issue, Johnson v. American Standard, 8 A.3d 

318, 326 (Pa. 2010), we address that PO first. PSP contends that Petitioner lacks 

standing to bring his claim because he is incarcerated and will remain incarcerated 

for at least another 20 years before he is subject to any registration requirements. 

PSP argues that even if the Court assumes that Petitioner has a direct and substantial 

interest in the litigation, Petitioner cannot show he has an immediate interest since 

he is not eligible for parole until approximately 2038. It points out that under 

SORNA, a sex offender is not required to register while incarcerated. See Section 

9799.15(c)(1)(i) of SORNA, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.15(c)(1)(i) (tolling the period of 

registration for individuals incarcerated in a federal, state or county correctional 

institution). 

Petitioner responds that he is currently aggrieved and, in support, cites Padgett 

v. Noonan (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 412 M.D. 2017, filed July 30, 2018), slip op. at 7-8,7

wherein this Court found that an incarcerated individual has standing to challenge 

application of SORNA despite the inmate’s release not being imminent. Petitioner

 

7 Padgett is an unreported panel decision, which, under our Internal Operating Procedures, 

may be cited for its persuasive value. Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal 

Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 
6

also points out that he is already listed on the website as a sex offender and is being 

forced to comply with the registration requirements.

While PSP considers its PO as one challenging standing, it is more akin to a 

ripeness challenge; therefore, we will address both concepts. Our courts have 

recognized a “considerable overlap” between the two concepts but equally 

understand that they are distinct. Yocum v. Pa. Gaming Control Bd., 161 A.3d 228, 

234 (Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). Standing requires a litigant to be aggrieved. Id. 

A party is aggrieved if they have “a substantial, direct and immediate interest” in the 

litigation. Id. at 235 (citation omitted). On the other hand, ripeness “reflects the 

separate concern that relevant facts are not sufficiently developed to permit judicial 

resolution of the dispute.” Id. at 234 (citation omitted). For a matter to be ripe, there 

must be an “actual controversy,” with consideration given to “whether the issues are 

adequately developed and the hardships that the parties will suffer if review is 

delayed.” Bayada Nurses, Inc. v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 8 A.3d 866, 874 (Pa. 

2010). 

The parties do not appear to dispute that Petitioner has a substantial and direct 

interest in the litigation; rather, the dispute is over whether Petitioner’s interest is 

immediate. An interest is immediate if the causal connection between the asserted 

violation and harm complained of “is not remote or speculative.” Fumo v. City of 

Philadelphia, 972 A.2d 487, 496 (Pa. 2009). In Gregory v. Pennsylvania State 

Police, 160 A.3d 274 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017) (Cohn Jubelirer, J., single judge op.),

8 we 

held that an inmate who was granted parole but not yet released had an immediate 

interest in whether SORNA applied to him. Relying on Williams v. Department of 

Corrections (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 353 M.D. 2014, filed October 15, 2015) (en banc), 

 

8

In accordance with Section 414(b) of our Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code 

§ 69.414(b), a reported single-judge opinion of this Court may be cited for its persuasive value. 
7

where we held death row inmates had standing although there were no active death 

warrants in effect, we determined “the harm [wa]s not speculative because the harm 

will be imposed by operation of law.” Gregory, 160 A.3d at 277. We explained that 

as soon as his home plan was approved, the inmate would be subject to SORNA’s 

registration requirements. Id. 

PSP attempts to distinguish Gregory from the instant action on the ground 

that, there, the inmate had already been approved for parole whereas, here, Petitioner 

has not and is not even eligible for parole for nearly two more decades. Since 

Gregory was decided, this Court has, on a number of occasions, found standing for 

individuals similarly situated to Petitioner. In Padgett, slip op. at 7-8, a case cited 

by Petitioner, we held the petitioner had standing despite his release not being 

imminent. We explained that “[t]he harm Padgett complain[ed] of [wa]s not 

speculative or remote. Indeed, by operation of law, Padgett’s name will be included 

on the registry upon his release from prison.” Id. (citation omitted).

One month after Padgett was decided, the Court issued another unreported 

decision, Beers v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 338 M.D. 2018, filed 

August 29, 2018).9 Before us in that case were preliminary objections similar to 

those filed here, challenging the petitioner’s standing. “That the statute tolls 

registration requirements while [the p]etitioner is incarcerated . . . does not deprive 

him of standing,” we held. Beers, slip op. at 7. There, we explained that the 

petitioner averred that he was placed on the registry and was subject to harassment, 

threats, and vilification as a result, making the harm not speculative or remote. Id.

at 8. Here, Petitioner alleges he is already listed on the website; therefore, like the 

 

9 Like Padgett, Beers is cited for its persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of 

this Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). 
8

petitioner in Beers, the harm is neither speculative nor remote. Rather, Petitioner 

alleges an immediate interest in the litigation and as a result has standing. 

We similarly find this matter is ripe for consideration. In Gregory, we 

explained that “the issues [were] fully developed for the Court’s review” and that 

“[w]aiting for SORNA to be imposed upon [the petitioner] would add little to this 

Court’s review of the legal issues raised.” 160 A.3d at 277. More recently, in Lusik

v. Pennsylvania State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 405 M.D. 2017, filed November 26, 

2018), slip op. at 8,10 we held that, although the petitioner may not be released until 

2024, this did not render his challenge unripe for review. We reiterated what we 

held in Gregory that “delaying resolution of this matter would add little to our 

review.” Id. PSP points to and we discern nothing that alters that conclusion here. 

Accordingly, PSP’s PO as it relates to standing/ripeness is overruled. 

B. Failure to State a Claim

PSP’s next PO alleges Petitioner failed to state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted. This PO is actually threefold: (1) Petitioner’s claim is moot because 

SORNA was replaced by subsequent legislation; (2) Petitioner was sentenced after 

SORNA was enacted, and is therefore, subject to its requirements; and (3) Petitioner, 

as a sexually violent predator, has always been required to register for his lifetime, 

regardless of what version of Megan’s Law is applied to him. We address these 

arguments in turn. 

 

10 Lusik is cited for its persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of this Court’s 

Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).
9

1. Mootness

PSP contends that Petitioner’s claim is moot because SORNA was replaced 

by Act 10, which has now been reenacted and amended by the Act of June 12, 2018, 

P.L. 140 (Act 29). Courts generally decline to review a moot question. Pub. 

Defender’s Office of Venango Cty. v. Venango Cty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 893 A.2d 

1275, 1279 (Pa. 2006) (Venango Cty.). “A case is moot when a determination is 

sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the 

existing controversy.” Chruby v. Dep’t of Corr., 4 A.3d 764, 770 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). An issue may become moot 

because of an intervening change in the applicable law or the facts of the case. 

Venango Cty., 893 A.2d at 1279.

Here, PSP argues the intervening change in legislation renders Petitioner’s 

claim moot. Petitioner responds that he is not subject to SORNA or, importantly,

“any ‘amended version’ of the statute” or “future enactments.” (Answer ¶ 10; 

Petitioner’s Brief (Br.) at 7.) Thus, it is apparent that Petitioner disputes his need to 

register as a sexual offender under any law. Although Petitioner has not formally 

sought leave to amend his Petition to provide for the subsequent legislation, we 

construe his Answer and brief in opposition to the POs as such a request, and grant 

him leave to do so. See Rule 126 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, 

Pa.R.C.P. No. 126 (providing Rules are to be “liberally construed to secure the just, 

speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding to which they 

are applicable”); Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 766 (Pa. 2014) 

(providing that materials filed by a pro se litigant may be liberally construed). This 

holding is consistent with our recent decision in Lusik, slip op. at 10-11, in which 

we construed various filings of a pro se litigant as a request to amend his petition. 
10

Like Lusik, we discern “no prejudice or surprise to PSP . . . in granting leave to 

amend the Petition, particularly at this early stage of the litigation.” Id. at 11. By 

granting leave to amend, PSP’s PO is, itself, rendered moot. Id.

2. Applicability of SORNA

Alternatively, PSP argues that Petitioner failed to state a claim because he 

would have been subject to SORNA anyway since he was sentenced after it took 

effect. SORNA was enacted on December 20, 2011, but did not go into effect until 

December 20, 2012. Petitioner was convicted on June 12, 2013. However, it is not 

the date of conviction that is the relevant measure of time; rather, it is the date of the 

offense. “A law violates the ex post facto clause . . . if it . . . changes the punishment, 

and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when 

committed.” Commonwealth v. Allshouse, 36 A.3d 163, 184 (Pa. 2012) (emphasis 

added); see also Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794, 807 (Pa. 2015) (holding “the 

imposition of a more severe sentence based on a statute that was amended after the 

act was committed, but prior to the result of that act, violates the ex post facto

prohibition”) (emphasis added). In Rose, the Supreme Court explained that the 

purpose behind prohibiting ex post facto laws is a concern for “the lack of fair notice 

and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what 

was prescribed when the crime was consummated.” 127 A.3d at 798-99 (emphasis 

added) (citation omitted). The Superior Court has described it as a matter of 
11

providing individuals “fair warning that their conduct will give rise to criminal 

penalties.” Commonwealth v. Grady, 486 A.2d 962, 964 (Pa. Super. 1984).11

Here, it is unclear when the underlying offense was actually committed. We 

know it occurred sometime before May 2012, when Petitioner was charged.12 If the 

offense was committed before December 20, 2011, the date SORNA was enacted, 

application of SORNA to Petitioner may violate the ex post facto clause. See 

Commonwealth v. Kizak, 148 A.3d 854, 859-60 (Pa. Super. 2016) (holding it is the 

signing of legislation by the governor that is dispositive); Commonwealth v. Wall, 

867 A.2d 578, 583 (Pa. Super. 2005) (date of enactment, not the effective date, 

controls for purposes of ex post facto analysis).13 Because we “may sustain 

preliminary objections only when the law makes clear that the petitioner cannot 

succeed on his claim, and we must resolve any doubt in favor of the petitioner,” 

Thomas, 90 A.3d at 794, we must overrule PSP’s PO to the extent PSP contends 

Petitioner would have been subject to SORNA anyway based upon the date of his 

conviction.

3. Lifetime registration requirement

Our inquiry does not end here, however. PSP also alleges, that Petitioner is a 

sexually violent predator, and as such, was required to register for life under prior 

iterations of Megan’s Law. Although it does not state as much, it appears PSP is 

averring that because Petitioner has always been required to register for life, he has 

 

11 Although not binding on this Court, a Superior Court decision can be cited for its 

persuasive value. Lerch v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 180 A.3d 545, 550 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2018). 

12 The docket reflects an offense date of October 16, 2010. 

13 Kizak and Wall are cited for their persuasive value. Lerch, 180 A.3d at 550.
12

not shown that his penalty has increased, and therefore, there is no ex post facto

violation. 

As a preliminary matter, although Petitioner does not aver that he is classified 

as a sexually violent predator in his Petition, he does admit to being “found . . . a 

Sexual[ly] Violent Predator” in his Answer to the POs and also “stipulate[s] he was 

classified as such” in his brief.

14

 (Answer ¶ 5; Petitioner’s Br. at 7.) While generally 

our review of POs is limited to “accept[ing] as true all well-pleaded material 

allegations” contained within the complaint or petition, Thomas, 90 A.3d at 794, we 

may also consider a plaintiff’s or petitioner’s answer to POs. See Higbee Corp. v. 

Kennedy, 428 A.2d 592, 593 (Pa. Super. 1981) (“To determine the propriety of an 

order granting a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer, we must accept 

as true all well-pleaded averments of fact of the party against whom the motion is 

granted and consider against him only those facts that he specifically admits.”) 

(emphasis added) (citation omitted); see also Schaffer v. Batyko, 323 A.2d 62, 64 

(Pa. Super. 1974) (finding trial court erred in not considering plaintiff’s answer to 

preliminary objections).15 Accordingly, for purposes of this PO, we accept as true 

 

14 Although he admits to being found to be a sexually violent predator, Petitioner attempts 

to challenge the finding on the basis that his designation was only shown by a preponderance of 

the evidence and not by a reasonable doubt, as required by Commonwealth v. Butler, 173 A.3d 

1212 (Pa. Super. 2017), petition for allowance of appeal granted (Pa., No. 47 WAL 2018, filed 

July 31, 2018). (Answer ¶ 5.) Whether Petitioner is properly classified as a sexually violent 

predator is not before us. Any challenge to that designation is outside this Court’s jurisdiction. 

Until his classification as a sexually violent predator is overturned, we must treat him as such. We 

further take judicial notice of the criminal docket in his case, CP-66-CR-195-2012, which reflects 

he was sentenced as a sexually violent predator on June 12, 2013. Per his Petition, his petition for 

post-conviction relief was denied by the trial court. (Petition ¶ 8.) The Superior Court affirmed 

the trial court’s decision and the Supreme Court denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal. (Id.

(citing Commonwealth v. Groulx (Pa. Super., No. 310 MDA 2016, filed Jan. 9, 2017) and 

Commonwealth v. Groulx (Pa., No. 85 MAL 2017, filed June 20, 2017))).

15 Although not binding on this Court, we find the Superior Court’s decisions in Higbee

and Schaffer persuasive. Lerch, 180 A.3d at 550.
13

Petitioner’s admission and stipulation that he was classified as a sexually violent 

predator. 

Under SORNA or any version of Megan’s Law, a sexually violent predator 

has been required to register for life. SORNA, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9795.15(a)(6); Megan’s 

Law III, former 42 Pa. C.S. § 9799.15(a)(6); Megan’s Law II, former 42 Pa. C.S. 

§ 9795.1(b)(3); and Megan’s Law I, former 42 Pa. C.S. § 9795(a). Therefore, 

Petitioner cannot show that the period of registration increased. Without the 

infliction of a greater punishment, the ex post facto clause is not violated. Allshouse, 

36 A.3d at 184; Rose, 127 A.3d at 807. Therefore, Petitioner cannot state a claim to 

the extent that he alleges he is subject to a greater registration period. See Marshall 

v. Pa. State Police (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 552 M.D. 2017, filed July 18, 2018), slip op. 

at 7-8 (sustaining PO on basis of failure to state a claim when there has been no 

increase in registration period).16

However, Petitioner does not appear to limit his claim to just the imposition 

of a greater registration period. Rather, Petitioner avers he should not be subject to 

“any additional sanctions that are tied to the limitations imposed by SORNA.”17 

(Petition ¶ 16.) Because PSP has not shown that Petitioner would have been subject 

to these additional sanctions without SORNA, we overrule the PO to the extent 

Petitioner alleges that he is subject to more onerous registration requirements. 

 

16 Marshall is cited for its persuasive value in accordance with Section 414(a) of this 

Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a).

17 Although Petitioner does not identify what those additional sanctions are or how they 

may be more onerous, we note that PSP did not object to this averment on the basis it was vague 

or lacked sufficient specificity as permitted by Rule 1028(a)(3) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil 

Procedure, Pa.R.C.P. No. 1028(a)(3). 
14

III. Conclusion

Accordingly, we overrule PSP’s PO on the basis that Petitioner lacks standing 

to bring this claim and/or that this matter is not ripe for consideration because of 

Petitioner’s continued incarceration. We grant Petitioner leave to amend the Petition 

to include an allegation that he is not required to register as a sex offender under any 

subsequent versions of SORNA that have been or may be enacted. PSP’s PO 

challenging the Petition on the basis of mootness is, itself, dismissed as moot, in 

light of our granting leave to amend. To the extent PSP asserts Petitioner would 

have been subject to SORNA based upon the date of his conviction, we overrule the 

PO. To the extent PSP asserts Petitioner cannot state a claim because he would be 

subject to lifetime registration under any version of Megan’s Law, we sustain the 

objection. However, we overrule PSP’s PO to the extent Petitioner alleges more 

onerous registration requirements outside of the period of registration. 

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

William F. Groulx, :

Petitioner :

 :

v. : No. 121 M.D. 2018

 : 

Pennsylvania State Police, :

Respondent :

O R D E R

NOW, January 24, 2019, upon consideration of the Preliminary Objections 

(POs) filed by the Pennsylvania State Police (PSP) to the Petition for Review in the 

Nature of Writ of Mandamus (Petition) filed by William F. Groulx (Petitioner), pro 

se, and Petitioner’s response thereto, which we construe as a motion for leave to 

amend, we GRANT Petitioner leave to amend the Petition to include averments that 

he is not subject to any subsequently enacted laws. Petitioner shall file the 

amended petition within 30 days and serve the same on PSP. Failure to do so 

will result in dismissal of the Petition with prejudice. Because of the Court’s 

grant of leave to amend, PSP’s PO to dismiss the Petition as moot is DISMISSED

as moot. Additionally, we SUSTAIN the PO for failure to state a claim to the extent 

it challenges the time period for registration. PSP’s remaining POs are 

OVERRULED.

_____________________________________

RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge