alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Frankie CUEVAS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-781

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 14, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1416 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1416

 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to recognize Indian tribal 
   governments for purposes of determining under the adoption credit 
                   whether a child has special needs.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 26, 2021

 Mr. Kilmer (for himself and Mr. Young) introduced the following bill; 
         which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to recognize Indian tribal 
   governments for purposes of determining under the adoption credit 
                   whether a child has special needs.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Tribal Adoption Parity Act''.

SEC. 2. RECOGNIZING INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF 
              DETERMINING UNDER THE ADOPTION CREDIT WHETHER CHILD HAS 
              SPECIAL NEEDS.

    (a) In General.--Section 23(d)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 (defining child with special needs) is amended--
            (1) in subparagraph (A), by inserting ``or Indian tribal 
        government'' after ``a State''; and
            (2) in subparagraph (B), by inserting ``or Indian tribal 
        government'' after ``such State''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendments made by this section shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after the date of the enactment of 
this Act.
                                 <all>
```
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
COMPANY'S UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AT SEPTEMBER 27, 1998 AND
UNAUDITED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF OPERATIONS FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED
SEPTEMBER 27, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-27-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             DEC-27-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-27-1998
<CASH>                                          13,390
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   54,646
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (1,377)
<INVENTORY>                                     75,687
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               144,280
<PP&E>                                         899,902
<DEPRECIATION>                               (342,285)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 742,134
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           26,176
<BONDS>                                        233,463
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        11,676
<OTHER-SE>                                      72,106
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   742,134
<SALES>                                        372,795
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               372,795
<CGS>                                          365,014
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  393,627
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              32,678
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (40,356)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    62,618
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                          (102,974)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (102,974)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (8.82)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (8.82)
        

</TABLE>
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
       
<S>                                <C>                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      3-MOS                    3-MOS               
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  MAY-31-1997              MAY-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                     JUN-30-1996              JUN-30-1995
<PERIOD-END>                       AUG-31-1996              AUG-31-1995
<CASH>                                  14,695                        0
<SECURITIES>                                 0                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                           24,167                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                 0                        0
<INVENTORY>                                  0                        0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                        54,455                        0
<PP&E>                                 114,830                        0
<DEPRECIATION>                          13,138                        0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                       6,265,143                        0
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                1,226,395                        0
<BONDS>                              1,470,800                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        0                        0
<PREFERRED>                                  0                        0
<COMMON>                               118,665                        0
<OTHER-SE>                           3,620,510                        0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>         6,265,143                        0
<SALES>                                      0                        0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        12,835                        0
<CGS>                                        0                        0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                          904,387                   41,570
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             0                        0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                             0                        0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           0                   20,525
<INCOME-PRETAX>                       (891,552)                 (41,570) 
<INCOME-TAX>                                 0                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                   (891,552)                 (41,570) 
<DISCONTINUED>                               0                        0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                              0                        0
<CHANGES>                                    0                        0
<NET-INCOME>                          (891,552)                 (41,570) 
<EPS-PRIMARY>                              .08                      .01 
<EPS-DILUTED>                              .08                      .01  
        





</TABLE>
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

JUDGMENT RENDERED JUNE 21, 2013

NO. 03-10-00407-CV

Renee Sheree O'Carolan, Appellant

v.

Gary D. Hopper, Appellee

APPEAL FROM 200TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY

BEFORE JUSTICES PURYEAR, GOODWIN AND FIELD

AFFRIMED IN PART; REVERSED AND REMANDED IN PART –

OPINION BY JUSTICE PURYEAR

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the record of the court below, and the same being 

considered, because it is the opinion of this Court that there was error in the trial court’s 

order denying the appellant’s spousal-maintenance enforcement claim: IT IS THEREFORE

considered, adjudged, and ordered that the trial court’s order denying the appellant’s spousalmaintenance enforcement claim is reversed, and we remand that claim to the trial court for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. FURTHER, we affirm both (1) the trial court’s 

summary-judgment order denying the appellant’s claim for continuation of spousal maintenance 

and (2) the trial court’s final judgment on the remanded property-division claim. It is 

FURTHER ordered that each party shall pay the costs of the appeal incurred by that party, both 

in this Court and the court below; and that this decision be certified below for observance.
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Marilyn Kelly,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Elizabeth A. Weaver

Maura D. Corrigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

May 27, 2009 

p0518 

Order 

 

May 27, 2009 

137751 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 137751 

 COA: 287300 

Macomb CC: 1984-000602-FC 

GEORGE JURICH, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the October 22, 2008 

order of the Court of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because the defendant’s 

motion for relief from judgment is prohibited by MCR 6.502(G).
Unassociated Document


    


     

    Supplement
Contract

    


    The
Seller (hereinafter referred as “Party A”): Hainan Zhonghe Pharmaceutical
Co., Ltd.

     

     

    Legal
Representative: Cui Xueyun

     

    Address:
No.168 Nanhai Street, Haikou, Free Trade Zone

    
      
        
          	
                  Post
      Code: 570216

                	
                  Tel:
      0898-66822833

                


        

      

    

    


    The Buyer
(hereinafter referred as “Party B”): Hainan Twenty First Media Co.,
Ltd.

     

    Legal
Representative: Weiqiong

     

    Address:
Fortune Plaza, Binhai Street, Haikou

     

    Post
Code: 570102

    
      


       

      
        Through
friendly consultation between both parties, to ensure better performance of
“Property Sale and Purchase Contract” (hereinafter referred as “Original
Contract”) signed on October 9, 2008, it is agreed by both parties to revise the
Original Contract as following:

      

      


       


      
        
           


        

        
          1

          
            

          

        

        
           


        

      


      Article 1
The Article 10 about taxes and fees relating to transfer of property in Original
Contract is revised as: Party B shall be in charge go through transfer
procedures and Party A shall assist actively. Taxes and fees incurred hereby
shall be paid by Party B.

      


      Article 2
Article 3 in Original Contract regarding price is revised as: calculated by
building area, the sale price of that property is RMB17500 Yuan per squatter
meter, the total amount is RMB16,234,750.00 Yuan only.

      


      Article 3
Matters unmentioned in this Supplement Contract, if any, may be regulated
separately through negotiation by both parties and supplemented agreement may be
signed hereto, which has equal effect to this Supplement and Original
Contract.

      


      Article 4
The two parties shall consult with each other and mediate any disputes, which
may arise about the contract. If all attempts fail, the two parties can appeal
to the organization of arbitration in Haikou and ask for a final
arbitration.

      


      Article 5
This contract is in four copies with equal effect to Original Contract, will
come into effect on the date of signature.

      


       


      
        
           


        

        
          2

          
            

          

        

        
           


        

      

      


      Party A
(Chop): Hainan Zhonghe Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.

      


      Representative:

      


      Party B
(Chop): Hainan Twenty First Media Co., Ltd.

      


      Representative:

      


       

      Singed in
Haikou City on October 27, 2008

      



      
        
           


        

        
          3
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-20324 Conference Calendar

RICHARD HUNTER, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus CITY OF HOUSTON, REDMAN, Officer, UNKNOWN OFFICER, Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. CA H 96-291

- - - - - - - - - - October 23, 1996 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Richard Hunter, Florida prisoner #210660, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing his pro se , in forma pauperis , civil rights action as time-barred. Hunter argues that the action is not time-barred because he was not aware that his property was being held as evidence in a criminal proceeding until his sentencing on July 8, 1994, and that the limitationsNo. 96-20324 - 2 -

** See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. , 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman , 460 U.S. 462 (1983). period was tolled from the time of his arrest until his trial and sentencing because he could take no action to recover the property. We do not address this argument because Hunter’s challenge actually concerns the state forfeiture proceeding. The Rooker-Feldman ** doctrine precludes federal-court relitigation of any claim that is "inextricably intertwined" with a state-court judgment. Howell v. Supreme Court of Texas , 885 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1989). Hunter may not circumvent this rule by casting his complaint in the form of a civil rights action. Liedtke v. State Bar of Texas , 18 F.3d 315, 317 (5th Cir.), cert. denied , 115 S. Ct. 271 (1994). Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED on the ground that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider Hunter’s claims. See Sojourner T v. Edwards , 974 F.2d 27, 30 (5th Cir. 1992) (court may affirm judgment on any basis supported by the record), cert. denied , 507 U.S. 972 (1993).
AFFIRMED.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Alonso Rodriguez GUTIERREZ, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 16-50942 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed March 30, 2017

Joseph H. Gay, Jr., Assistant U.S. Attorney, Diane D. Kirstein, U.S. Attorney’s Office Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Laura G. Greenberg, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Maureen Scott Franco, Federal Public Defender, Federal Public Defender’s Office, Western District of Texas, San Antonio, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before REAVLEY, OWEN, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Alonso Rodriguez Gutierrez pleaded, guilty to illegal reentry following deportation, and he was sentenced within the guidelines range to a 24-month term of imprisonment and to a two-year period of supervised release. Rodriguez Gutierrez asserts that the sentence is substantively unreasonable because it is greater than necessary to satisfy the statutory sentencing factors.

Where, as here, a defendant fails to object to the reasonableness of the sentence imposed in the district court, our review is for plain error. *See United States v. Peltier,*505 F.3d 389, 391-92 (5th Cir. 2007). Gutierrez disputes that such an objection is required under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51, but he concedes that this question is foreclosed, and he has raised the question to preserve it for possible further review. *See id.*

Rodriguez Gutierrez argues that the guidelines range for his offense is too high “because of the illegal reentry guideline’s lack of an empirical basis and the problematic manner in which the Sentencing Commission , established the offense levels for illegal reentry.” These legal contentions have been rejected. *United States v. Duarte,*569 F.3d 528, 529-31 (5th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Mondragon-Santiago,*564 F.3d 357, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2009).

Rodriguez Gutierrez asserts that the 24-month sentence is greater than necessary to provide an adequate deterrence and fails to account adequately for his personal history and characteristics. His arguments amount to mere dissatisfaction with the district court’s weighing .of the statutory sentencing factors and are insufficient to rebut the presumption of reasonableness applicable to within-guidelines sentences. *See United States v. Ruiz,*621 F.3d 390, 398 (5th Cir. 2010); *United States v. Gomez-Herrera,*523 F.3d 554, 565-66 (5th Cir. 2008). He has shown no error, plain or otherwise. The judgment is AFFIRMED.

*

 Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
exv10w6







	 	 	 	 	 



Exhibit 10.6




2008 AMENDMENT TO

NON-QUALIFIED DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLAN

FOR THE

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

OF THE FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF DALLAS

FOR DEFERRALS EFFECTIVE JANUARY 1, 2005





     Pursuant to the authority granted to the Board of Directors of the Federal Home Loan Bank of
Dallas, under Section 6.01 of the Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan for the Board of
Directors of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas for Deferrals Effective January 1, 2005 (the
“Plan”), the Plan is hereby amended as follows:



     Article IV of the Plan is hereby amended to add a new Section 4.05 that provides as follows:




“4.05 Transition Relief. The transition guidance issued by
the Internal Revenue Service under Section 409A of the Code provides
an exception to the general timing rules for distribution elections.
As a result, Participant’s elections for the 2005, 2006, 2007 and
2008 Plan Years may be revised on or before December 31, 2008 with
respect to the timing and method of payment; provided, that such
revised election does not cause amounts that were otherwise payable
in 2008 to be paid in a subsequent year and does not provide for
amounts payable in a subsequent year to be paid in 2008. The
Committee will interpret and administer this provision to ensure
compliance with IRS Notices 2007-86 and 2006-79 and any additional
guidance issued by the IRS.”



     The effective date of this 2008 Amendment to the Nonqualified Deferred Compensation Plan for
the Board of Directors of the Federal Home Loan Bank of Dallas for Deferrals Effective January 1,
2005 shall be December 10, 2008.



     Executed this 10th day of December, 2008.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	FEDERAL HOME LOAN BANK OF DALLAS

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Timothy J. Heup
 	 
	 	 	Corporate Officer 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 


ATTEST:




	 	 	 	 	 
	 	 	 
	/s/ Brehan Chapman
 	 	 
	Corporate Secretary
Exhibit 32



Certification Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350

(as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002)



In connection with this quarterly report of Nanophase Technologies Corporation (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending
September 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), we, Joseph E. Cross, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, and Jess A. Jankowski, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to our knowledge:



1. The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



2. The information contained in the Report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.



Date: November 7, 2005



/s/ Joseph E. CrossJoseph E. CrossChief Executive Officer/s/ Jess A. JankowskiJess A. JankowskiChief Financial Officer
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-30805

Conference Calendar

 

ALLEN JERRY FIELDS, JR.,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

PHILLIP J. BAIERS, Individually and in his official capacity as

Special Agent FBI; JOHN M. TANZA, Individually and in his

official capacity as Special Agent FBI; WILBERT SANDERS,

Individually and in his official capacity as Louisiana State

Trooper,

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Louisiana

USDC No. 98-CV-969

- - - - - - - - - -

August 26, 1999

Before KING, Chief Judge, and JOLLY and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

 Allen Jerry Fields, Jr., federal inmate # 08388-035,

appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint filed on

May 26, 1998, as frivolous. His motion for the appointment of

appellate counsel is DENIED.
No. 98-30805

-2-

Fields alleged constitutional violations occurring on May 6,

1992. Fields argues that his claims had not prescribed because

he filed his complaint within one year from the date on which he

discovered a case that led him to conclude that his rights had

been violated. Fields asserts, correctly, that while state law

governs the prescriptive or limitations period, federal law

governs when the cause of action arises or accrues. See Gartrell

v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 257 (5th Cir. 1993). Under federal law,

a cause of action accrues “when the plaintiff is in possession of

the `critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted

the injury,’” not when he discovers the legal basis of his claim. 

Id. (citations omitted); see Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 51

F.3d 512, 516 (5th Cir. 1995) (“A plaintiff need not realize that

a legal cause of action exists; a plaintiff need only know the

facts that would support a claim.”). Accordingly, the district

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Fields’

claims are frivolous because they have prescribed. See McCormick

v. Stalder, 105 F.3d 1059, 1061 (5th Cir. 1997).

Fields also argues that the district court erred in denying

his motion for appointment of counsel. The magistrate judge

denied the motion, and Fields did not appeal to the district

court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This court lacks jurisdiction

to address the magistrate judge’s order denying Fields’ motion

for appointment of counsel. See Colburn v. Bunge Towing, Inc.,

883 F.2d 372, 379 (5th Cir. 1989).

AFFIRMED; MOTION DENIED.
James FULTON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D17-3531

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed March 6, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.