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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. MICHAEL T.*

(AC 41053)

DiPentima, C. J., and Devlin and Sullivan, Js.

Syllabus

Convicted, after a jury trial, of five counts of the crime of risk of injury to

a child, two counts of the crime of unlawful restraint in the first degree,

and of the crimes of assault in the first degree, criminal attempt to

commit assault in the first degree, and assault in the second degree,

the defendant appealed to this court. The defendant lived in an apartment

with N, his girlfriend, and her five daughters, including the victims, J

and D. The defendant, after an argument with N, began to yell at the

victims for disobeying a rule about hanging out of their bedroom window.

The defendant then grabbed J, lifted her off the ground and carried her

to the stove in the kitchen, where he ignited the gas burner and placed

J’s right hand over the flame. The defendant dropped J, but he then

picked up D and carried her to the stove, where he placed both of her

hands on top of the flame for up to one minute. Subsequently, D received

medical treatment at a hospital for her severe burns and underwent

several surgical procedures, including the amputation of several fingertips. Forensic interviews of the victims were recorded and, in those

recordings, the victims identified the defendant as the individual who

had burned their hands on the open flame from the stove burner. Prior

to trial, the defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the state from

entering video recordings of the forensic interviews into evidence, which

the trial court denied on the first day of trial. At the close of the state’s

case, and again at the close of the defendant’s case, the defendant moved

for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two counts that charged him

with risk of injury to a child, and the court denied those motions.

Following the jury’s verdicts, the defendant filed a motion for a new

trial on the ground that the admission into evidence of the forensic

interviews necessitated a new trial, which the court denied prior to

sentencing. Held:

1. The defendant’s unpreserved claim that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting the forensic interviews into evidence because they failed

to satisfy the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against hearsay, as established in State v. Griswold (160

Conn. App. 528), was not reviewable; the defendant’s appellate argument

differed from what was presented to the trial court, defense counsel

having claimed before the court that Griswold, a case where the defendant sexually abused the victims, was inapplicable to the present case

and that the admission of a forensic interview pursuant to the medical

treatment and diagnosis exception required evidence of a sexual assault.

2. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the forensic interviews

of the victims were not relevant: the relevancy argument raised by

defense counsel to the trial court, which focused on the connection

between forensic interviews, cases involving sexual assault and the

constancy of accusation doctrine, contradicted existing precedent and

was wholly without merit because the medical diagnosis and treatment

exception to the rule against hearsay has no direct connection to the

constancy of accusation doctrine and is not limited to sexual assault

cases; moreover, the defendant’s claim on appeal that the recordings

of the forensic interviews failed to meet the standard of the applicable

provision (§ 4-1) of the Connecticut Code of Evidence in that they did

not tend to make the existence of any material fact more or less probable

than it would be without such evidence, was unavailing, as, during the

forensic interviews, the victims identified the defendant as the person

who had burned their hands and discussed the extent of the injuries

they suffered, which satisfied the low hurdle of relevance and had

obvious value to the state’s case.

3. The defendant’s claim that the prejudicial impact of the forensic interviews

of the victims outweighed their probative value and that those interviews

were cumulative and, therefore, should not have been admitted into

evidence, was not reviewable; the defendant failed to brief that claim
adequately, as he addressed the claim in a single sentence and failed

to cite any authority or to present any reasoning to support his claim

regarding the prejudicial impact or cumulative nature of the forensic

interviews.

4. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court improperly

denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two

counts of risk of injury to a child, which was based on his claim that

neither J nor D were placed at risk of injury to their physical or mental

health because neither victim actually witnessed the burning of the

other; it was undisputed that D was present in the apartment when the

defendant burned J and that J was in the apartment when he burned

D, the jury reasonably could have concluded, on the basis of N’s testimony and the photographs admitted into evidence that depicted the

layout of the apartment, that the defendant created a situation that was

likely to result in injury to D’s mental health as a result of her witnessing

the burning of J, and although there was conflicting evidence as to

whether J directly observed the burning of D, evidence is not insufficient

because it is conflicting or inconsistent, as it is the jury’s exclusive

province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the jury can decide what part of a witness’ testimony

to accept or reject.

5. The defendant could not prevail on his claim that the trial court made a

constitutional and evidentiary error when it improperly precluded him

from presenting evidence of third-party culpability by not allowing him

to testify about N’s prior statement to him that she had burned the

victims, which was based on his claim that the court improperly determined that the statement against penal interest exception to the rule

against hearsay did not apply to N’s alleged admission to the defendant

that she had burned the victims: the defendant had to establish the

unavailability of N to use the statement against penal interest hearsay

exception, and although the defendant claimed that N was unavailable

because she was reluctant at trial to make a statement against her penal

interest, there were pauses in her testimony, her version of the events

was opposite to that of the defendant, her testimony would not be

favorable to the defendant, and she had demonstrated a willingness to

lie to protect herself, those contentions, unsupported by case law or

other legal authority, failed to acknowledge that N testified during the

defendant’s criminal trial and were not encompassed within the five

situations of unavailability previously set forth by our Supreme Court;

accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that

the statement against penal interest exception to the rule against hearsay

did not apply, and, therefore, the defendant could not prevail on his

evidentiary or constitutional claims.

Argued September 9—officially released December 3, 2019

Procedural History

Substitute information, in the first case, charging the

defendant with three counts of the crime of risk of

injury to a child, and with the crimes of assault in the

first degree and unlawful restraint in the first degree,

and substitute information, in the second case, charging

the defendant with three counts of the crime of risk of

injury to a child, and with the crimes of criminal attempt

to commit assault in the first degree, assault in the

second degree, and unlawful restraint in the first degree,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

New Haven, where the cases were consolidated and

tried to the jury before B. Fischer, J.; thereafter, the

court denied the defendant’s motion to preclude certain

evidence; subsequently, the court denied the defendant’s motions for a judgment of acquittal as to two

counts of risk of injury to a child; verdicts of guilty of

five counts of risk of injury to a child, two counts of

unlawful restraint in the first degree, and one count

each of assault in the first degree, criminal attempt to
commit assault in the first degree, and assault in the

second degree; thereafter, the court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial, and rendered judgments in

accordance with the verdicts, from which the defendant

appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Judie Marshall, with whom, on the brief, was Freesia

Singngam, for the appellant (defendant).

Kathryn W. Bare, assistant state’s attorney, with

whom, on the brief, were Patrick J. Griffin, state’s

attorney, Maxine Wilensky, senior assistant state’s

attorney, and Karen A. Roberg, assistant state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

DiPENTIMA, C. J. The defendant, Michael T., appeals

from the judgments of conviction,1

rendered after a jury

trial, of assault in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (2), five counts of risk of injury

to a child in violation of General Statutes § 53-21 (a)

(1), two counts of unlawful restraint in the first degree

in violation of General Statutes § 53a-95 (a), criminal

attempt to commit assault in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes §§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 (a) (2),

and assault in the second degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-60 (a) (2). On appeal, the defendant

claims that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by

admitting into evidence the forensic interviews of the

two minor victims, (2) improperly denied his motions

for a judgment of acquittal with respect to two counts

of risk of injury to a child and (3) improperly precluded

the defendant from presenting evidence of third-party

culpability. We disagree and, accordingly, affirm the

judgments of conviction.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. In August, 2015, the defendant lived in a New

Haven apartment with N, his girlfriend,2 and her five

daughters, including eight year old J and four year old

D. J and D shared a bedroom with their sibling, S. In

the early afternoon of August 16, 2015, the defendant, N

and her five children, one of whom was the defendant’s

child, were in the apartment when a neighbor came to

the door. N spoke to the neighbor and their conversation escalated into an argument over the actions of J,

S and D. After this interaction with the neighbor, N

went into the bedroom and observed J and D ‘‘hanging

out of the window.’’ Previously, the defendant had

placed screws in the window frame to prevent the children from engaging in this behavior. Upon seeing J

and D hanging out of the window, N ‘‘yelled’’ and then

‘‘spanked’’ them each one time with her hand. N then

sent the two girls into the living room.

The defendant, after an argument with N, subsequently came out of his bedroom and ordered J, S and

D to exit their room. After the three girls came out of

their room, the defendant began to yell at them for

disobeying the rule about hanging out of their window.

He then grabbed J, lifted her off the ground and carried

her to the stove in the kitchen. The defendant ignited

the front gas burner and placed J’s right hand over the

flame. J, in pain and crying out, began to kick and, as

a result, the defendant dropped her.

The defendant then picked up D and carried her to

the stove, where he placed both of her hands ‘‘on top

of the flame.’’ D yelled and screamed as the defendant

kept her hands in the fire for up to one minute. Afterward, the defendant, a former emergency medical technician, instructed N to submerge D’s hands into the
bathtub filled with warm water. He further instructed

N to go to a nearby pharmacy for medical supplies to

treat D’s burns.

By the time N returned to the apartment from the

pharmacy, D had white blisters on her hands, and the

defendant indicated that she needed to go to the hospital due to third-degree burns. The defendant spoke to

his mother to obtain transportation to the hospital. He

then instructed N, J, S and D to falsely state that D’s

burns had resulted from an accident. The defendant, N

and D went to the hospital, while the other girls stayed

with the defendant’s mother.

As a result of her burns, D screamed and cried during

the car ride to the Saint Raphael Campus of the Yale

New Haven Hospital. At this point, N observed that D’s

hands appeared white and ‘‘bubbly.’’ Upon arriving at

the emergency department, D received immediate treatment from the medical staff. Mark Shapiro, a physician

and the head of the emergency department, observed

pronounced burns on both sides of D’s hands. Although

D’s left hand sustained greater damage, Shapiro determined that both hands exhibited second-degree and

third-degree burns.3 He also described the charring

under D’s fingernails as indicative of a fourth-degree

burn.4 After evaluating D and prescribing pain medication, Shapiro arranged for her transfer to the burn treatment unit at Bridgeport Hospital.5 D received medical

treatment at Bridgeport Hospital for approximately six

weeks, undergoing several surgical procedures, including the amputation of several fingertips.

In the early morning hours of August 17, 2015, Khristine Cuddy, a New Haven police detective, went to

Bridgeport Hospital to investigate the circumstances of

D’s injuries. N provided Cuddy with consent to search

the New Haven apartment. Cuddy proceeded to the

apartment, arriving at approximately 7 a.m. After further investigation, Cuddy interviewed J. Cuddy

observed a blistered burn on the bottom portion of J’s

right hand. Later that day, the Department of Children

and Families invoked a ninety-six hour hold6 on the five

children and obtained an order of temporary custody

on August 21, 2015.7

Monica Vidro, a licensed clinical social worker

employed by the Yale Child Sexual Abuse Clinic, conducted forensic interviews of J and D on August 28,

2015, and October 13, 2015, respectively. In these

recordings, J and D identified the defendant as the individual who had burned their hands on the open flame

from the stove burner. Afterward, Vidro recommended

that both children receive mental health treatment,

which they did.

The state charged the defendant in two long form

informations. The first information set forth the following alleged crimes with respect to J: criminal attempt
to commit assault in the first degree in violation of

§§ 53a-49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 (a) (2); assault in the second

degree in violation of § 53a-60 (a) (2); three counts of

risk of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1)

by placing J’s hand over an open flame, failing to seek

medical attention for J and causing J to witness the

burning of D; and unlawful restraint in the first degree

in violation of § 53a-95 (a). The second information set

forth the following alleged crimes with respect to D:

assault in the first degree in violation of § 53a-59 (a)

(2); three counts of risk of injury to a child in violation

of § 53-21 (a) (1) by placing D’s hand over an open

flame, denying D medical attention and causing D to

witness the burning of J; and unlawful restraint in the

first degree in violation of § 53a-95 (a).

At the conclusion of the trial, held in July, 2017, the

jury found the defendant guilty on all counts, with the

exception of the count charging risk of injury to a child

by failing to seek medical attention for J. The court

rendered judgments of conviction in accordance with

the verdicts and imposed a total effective sentence of

thirty-eight years of incarceration, execution suspended

after twenty-eight years, and five years of probation.

This appeal followed. Additional facts and procedural

history will be set forth as necessary.

I

The defendant first claims that the trial court abused

its discretion by admitting into evidence the forensic

interviews of the two minor victims. Specifically, he

argues that the forensic interviews of J and D (1) did

not meet the requirements of the medical diagnosis and

treatment exception to the rule against hearsay, (2)

were irrelevant and (3) were more prejudicial than probative and were cumulative. The state counters that

these arguments are unreviewable, meritless or harmless. We conclude that the defendant cannot prevail on

this claim.8

The following additional facts and procedural history

are necessary for our discussion. On June 16, 2017, the

defendant filed a motion in limine to preclude the state

from entering video recordings of the forensic interviews into evidence. In his motion, the defendant primarily argued that the recordings were irrelevant.9 On

July 6, 2017, the state filed a memorandum of law in

support of admitting the recordings of the forensic interviews into evidence.10 Five days later, the defendant

filed a reply, iterating his claim of irrelevance.11

On the first day of trial and outside of the presence

of the jury, the court heard argument on the admissibility of the forensic interviews. The prosecutor emphasized that the interviews satisfied the requirements for

the medical treatment exception to the rule against

hearsay and, thus, were admissible into evidence.

Defense counsel argued that forensic interviews were
admissible only in cases involving a sexual assault. He

further contended that ‘‘the reason [forensic interviews]

usually are allowed in terms of relevance is because

we have this theory of constancy, that a sex assault

victim is going—is not going to—or normally is not

going to say anything. That’s usually the relevance.’’ He

also claimed that the present matter, involving physical

abuse, was distinguishable from State v. Griswold, 160

Conn. App. 528, 127 A.3d 189, cert. denied, 320 Conn.

907, 128 A.3d 952 (2015), a sexual assault case.12 The

prosecutor countered, inter alia, that the existence of

sexual abuse is not a prerequisite for the admissibility

of a forensic interview.

The court issued a preliminary ruling that, subject to

an offer of proof, the forensic interviews of J and D

would be admitted into evidence pursuant to the medical treatment hearsay exception and the reasoning set

forth in State v. Griswold, supra, 160 Conn. App. 528.

After both J and D had testified, the state called Vidro

as a witness outside the presence of the jury. Vidro

described her educational background, her employment with the Yale Child Sexual Abuse Clinic and the

purpose of and the manner in which a forensic interview

is conducted.13 Vidro emphasized that the particular

purpose of a forensic interview was to assess any needs

regarding the child’s safety, medical treatment and mental health treatment. Vidro conducted a forensic interview of J and D following a referral due to abuse concerns. Following the interviews, Vidro recommended

that both children continue receiving mental health

treatment at the trauma clinic of the Yale Childhood

Violent Trauma Center.

At the conclusion of the state’s offer of proof, defense

counsel again challenged the relevancy of the

recordings of the forensic interviews of J and D. The

court admitted the recordings into evidence, stating:

‘‘I’m going to stand by my preliminary ruling, and I

do make the following findings regarding the medical

treatment exception: that this court concludes that the

statements are admissible because the purpose of the

interviews, despite being primarily to establish or prove

past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecutions, [was] at least, in part, to determine whether

the victims were in need of medical treatment. That

would include physical and/or mental health. The statements were reasonably pertinent to obtain a medical

diagnosis or treatment, and the interviewers—the interviewer occupied a position within the chain of medical

care. Again, this court follows the reasoning of State

v. Griswold, [supra, 160 Conn. App. 528].’’

Vidro then testified before the jury. She stated her

training, qualifications and general information regarding a forensic interview of a child.14 She noted that

the forensic interview with J occurred in August, 2015,

following a referral due to suspected abuse. The prose-
cutor played a redacted recording of J’s forensic interview for the members of the jury and provided a typed

transcript. During the interview, Vidro informed J that

her job was to speak with children to ensure their safety

and health. Vidro also indicated that a pediatrician and

other individuals were observing the interview from a

nearby room. Following the interview, Vidro recommended that J engage in mental health treatment and

have no contact with the defendant.

Vidro conducted the forensic interview of D in October, 2015,15 as a result of suspected abuse. The prosecutor again provided a transcript to the jury and played

a redacted recording. During the interview, Vidro

informed D that her job was to make sure ‘‘kids are safe

and healthy’’ and that her coworkers, such as physicians

and nurses, would observe the conversation. Vidro subsequently recommended mental health treatment and

that D have no contact with the defendant.

Following the jury’s verdicts, the defendant filed a

motion for a new trial pursuant to Practice Book § 42-53.

He argued, inter alia, that the admission into evidence

of the forensic interviews necessitated a new trial. The

court denied the defendant’s motion for a new trial

prior to sentencing.

A

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court abused

its discretion by admitting the forensic interviews into

evidence. He first contends that the forensic interviews

failed to satisfy the requirements of the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the rule against hearsay

as established in State v. Griswold, supra, 160 Conn.

App. 528, and State v. Estrella J.C., 169 Conn. App.

56, 148 A.3d 594 (2016). The state counters that this

appellate argument differs from what was presented

to the trial court and, thus, is unpreserved and not

reviewable. We agree with the state.

We begin with the applicable legal principles. ‘‘Our

standard of review for evidentiary claims is well settled.

To the extent [that] a trial court’s admission of evidence

is based on an interpretation of the [Connecticut] Code

of Evidence, our standard of review is plenary. For

example, whether a challenged statement properly may

be classified as hearsay and whether a hearsay exception properly is identified are legal questions demanding

plenary review. . . . We review the trial court’s decision to admit [or exclude] evidence, if premised on

a correct view of the law, however, for an abuse of

discretion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State

v. Taupier, 330 Conn. 149, 181, 193 A.3d 1 (2018), cert.

denied, U.S. , 139 S. Ct. 1188, 203 L. Ed. 2d

202 (2019); see also State v. Miguel C., 305 Conn. 562,

571–72, 46 A.3d 126 (2012).

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the

truth of the matter asserted and generally is inadmissi-
ble. State v. Burton, 191 Conn. App. 808, 828, 216 A.3d

734, cert. denied, 333 Conn. 927, A.3d (2019);

see also State v. Carrion, 313 Conn. 823, 837, 100 A.3d

361 (2014); see generally Conn. Code Evid. § 8-1 and

Conn. Code Evid. (2009) § 8-2. The rules of evidence,

however, recognize that certain out-of-court statements

warrant an exception to the general rule that hearsay

constitutes inadmissible evidence. State v. Cruz, 260

Conn. 1, 7, 792 A.2d 823 (2002). Section 8-3 (5) of the

Connecticut Code of Evidence provides that ‘‘[a] statement made for purposes of obtaining a medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past

or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source

thereof, insofar as reasonably pertinent to the medical

diagnosis or treatment’’ is not excluded by the hearsay

rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness.

In State v. Griswold, supra, 160 Conn. App. 528, this

court set forth the relevant legal principles regarding

the medical diagnosis and treatment exception to the

hearsay rule. ‘‘Out-of-court statements made by a

patient to a [medical provider] may be admitted into

evidence if the declarant was seeking medical diagnosis

or treatment, and the statements are reasonably pertinent to achieving these ends. . . . The rationale for

excluding from the hearsay rule statements made in

furtherance of obtaining treatment is that we presume

that such statements are inherently reliable because

the patient has an incentive to tell the truth in order to

obtain a proper medical diagnosis and treatment. . . .

The term medical encompasses psychological as well

as somatic illnesses and conditions. . . . Statements

made by a sexual assault complainant to a social worker

may fall within the exception if the social worker is

found to have been acting within the chain of medical

care. . . . Although [t]he medical treatment exception

to the hearsay rule requires that the statements be both

pertinent to treatment and motivated by a desire for

treatment . . . in cases involving juveniles, [we] have

permitted this requirement to be satisfied inferentially.’’

(Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id., 555–56; see also State v. Abraham, 181 Conn. App.

703, 711, 187 A.3d 445, cert. denied, 329 Conn. 908,

186 A.3d 12 (2018); see generally E. Prescott, Tait’s

Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (6th Ed. 2019)

§ 8.17.2, pp. 566–67.

Before the trial court, defense counsel argued that

the admission of a forensic interview pursuant to the

medical treatment and diagnosis exception required evidence of a sexual assault. Defense counsel concluded

by noting that because the present case involved physical abuse, Griswold, a case where the defendant sexually abused the victims, was inapposite.

On appeal, however, the defendant altered his argument regarding the admission of the forensic inter-
views. Rather than arguing that Griswold was inapplicable to the present case, the defendant contended in his

appellate brief that the state had failed to establish

the necessary elements for application of the medical

diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception, as set forth

in Griswold. Our law does not permit such a tactic.

‘‘It is . . . well established that [a]ppellate review of

evidentiary rulings is ordinarily limited to the specific

legal [ground] raised by . . . trial counsel. . . . To

permit a party to raise a different ground on appeal

than [that] raised during trial would amount to trial by

ambuscade, unfair both to the trial court and to the

opposing party.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Rogers, 183 Conn. App. 669, 680, 193 A.3d 612

(2018); see also State v. Bennett, 324 Conn. 744, 761,

155 A.3d 188 (2017). Accordingly, we decline to review

the defendant’s argument, raised for the first time on

appeal, that the state failed to establish that the forensic

interviews in this case should have been admitted into

evidence pursuant to Griswold.

16

B

The defendant next argues that the forensic interviews of J and D were not relevant. Initially, he notes

that the court did not rule on the relevancy objection

made in his motion in limine and at the proceedings

on July 19 and 24, 2017. The defendant also asserts, in

a general manner, that the recordings of the forensic

interviews failed to satisfy § 4-1 of the Connecticut Code

of Evidence. The state counters that recordings of the

interviews tended to make more probable the facts that

the crimes had occurred and had been committed by the

defendant. We conclude that the defendant’s relevancy

arguments are without merit.

As an initial matter, we set forth the applicable legal

principles. ‘‘Section 4-1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides: Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that

is material to the determination of the proceeding more

probable or less probable than it would be without the

evidence. As it is used in [the Connecticut Code of

Evidence], relevance encompasses two distinct concepts, namely, probative value and materiality. . . .

Conceptually, relevance addresses whether the evidence makes the existence of a fact material to the

determination of the proceeding more probable or less

probable than it would be without the evidence. . . .

In contrast, materiality turns upon what is at issue in

the case, which generally will be determined by the

pleadings and the applicable substantive law. . . . If

evidence is relevant and material, then it may be admissible. . . . [T]he trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility . . . of evidence. . . . The

trial court’s ruling on evidentiary matters will be overturned only upon a showing of a clear abuse of the

court’s discretion. . . . We will make every reasonable
presumption in favor of upholding the trial court’s ruling, and only upset it for a manifest abuse of discretion.’’

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Sampson, 174 Conn. App. 624, 635–36, 166 A.3d

1, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 920, 171 A.3d 57 (2017); see

also State v. Pena, 301 Conn. 669, 674, 22 A.3d 611

(2011).

The relevancy argument raised by defense counsel

to the trial court focused on the connection between

forensic interviews, cases involving sexual assault and

the constancy of accusation doctrine. Specifically,

defense counsel stated: ‘‘The point being that in my

opinion, and I think the cases are pretty clear, the reason

we do the forensic interviews and the reason they’re

usually allowed in terms of relevance is because we

have this theory of constancy, that a sex assault victim

is going—is not going to—or normally is not going to

say anything. That’s usually the relevance. And so what

the state usually does is they put in the forensic interview to show that they are consistent with what they

testified to or what has been said in—in the case. That’s

why it’s relevant. In this case that didn’t happen. . . .

So, there’s no constancy issue in this case. So, really

there’s no reason to need to put in the forensic interview

in the first place. . . . There’s no constancy issue, so

there’s no relevance.’’

In its preliminary ruling on the admissibility of the

forensic interviews, the court implicitly rejected the

defendant’s relevancy argument premised on the constancy of accusation doctrine. After restating § 8-3 (5)

of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, the court referred

to State v. Griswold, supra, 160 Conn. App. 528. In that

case, we specifically stated that the rationale for the

medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception is

that ‘‘statements made in furtherance of obtaining treatment [are presumed to be] inherently reliable because

the patient has an incentive to tell the truth in order

to obtain a proper medical diagnosis and treatment.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 555; see also

State v. Cruz, supra, 260 Conn. 7–8; State v. Miller, 121

Conn. App. 775, 780, 998 A.2d 170, cert. denied, 298

Conn. 902, 3 A.3d 72 (2010). To the extent that the

defendant has reasserted this specific relevancy argument in this appeal, we conclude that it contradicts

existing precedent and is wholly without merit. The

medical diagnosis and treatment hearsay exception has

no direct connection to the constancy of accusation

doctrine and is not limited to sexual assault cases.

The defendant also argues that the recordings of the

forensic interviews failed to meet the standard of § 4-

1 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence, in that they did

not tend to make the existence of any material fact

more or less probable than it would be without such

evidence. We do not agree. In the forensic interviews,

J and D identified the defendant as the person who had
burned their hands and discussed the extent of the

injuries they suffered. Mindful that our jurisprudence

has recognized the ‘‘low hurdle of relevance’’; see State

v. Nowacki, 155 Conn. App. 758, 773, 111 A.3d 911

(2015); and the obvious value of this evidence to the

state’s case, we conclude that this argument fails.

C

The defendant next argues that the prejudicial impact

of the forensic interviews of J and D outweighed their

probative value. He also contends that these interviews

were cumulative and, therefore, should not have been

admitted into evidence. The state counters that these

arguments are unreviewable due to an inadequate brief.

We agree with the state.

The defendant’s appellate brief contains the following

single sentence addressing these arguments. ‘‘Even if

the trial court believed the forensic interviews were

relevant, they should have been excluded pursuant to

. . . § 4-3 [of the Connecticut Code of Evidence]

because [their] probative value was outweighed by the

danger of unfair prejudice, and the evidence was cumulative.’’ The defendant failed to cite any authority or to

present any reasoning to support his arguments regarding the prejudicial impact or cumulative nature of the

forensic interviews.

‘‘We are not required to review issues that have been

improperly presented to this court through an inadequate brief. . . . Analysis, rather than mere abstract

assertion, is required in order to avoid abandoning an

issue by failure to brief the issue properly.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Fowler, 178 Conn.

App. 332, 345, 175 A.3d 76 (2017), cert. denied, 327

Conn. 999, 176 A.3d 556 (2018). ‘‘[F]or this court judiciously and efficiently to consider claims of error raised

on appeal . . . the parties must clearly and fully set

forth their arguments in their briefs. . . . The parties

may not merely cite a legal principle without analyzing

the relationship between the facts of the case and the

law cited.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Claudio C., 125 Conn. App. 588, 600, 11 A.3d 1086

(2010), cert. denied, 300 Conn. 910, 12 A.3d 1005 (2011).

Accordingly, we decline to review these unsubstantiated arguments regarding the prejudicial impact and

cumulative nature of the recordings of the two forensic

interviews. We also conclude, therefore, that the defendant’s claim that the court improperly admitted into

evidence the forensic interviews of J and D must fail.

II

The defendant next claims that the court improperly

denied his motions for a judgment of acquittal with

respect to two counts of risk of injury to a child. Specifically, he argues that the state failed to produce evidence

that J witnessed the burning of D, and that D witnessed

the burning of J. He contends that neither J nor D were
placed at risk of injury to their physical or mental health

because neither victim actually witnessed the burning

of the other. We disagree.

The following additional facts are necessary for the

resolution of this claim. In count four of the first information, the state charged the defendant with violating

§ 53-21 (a) (1) by causing or permitting D to be placed

in a situation that her life or limb was endangered, or

her health was likely to be injured, by allowing her to

witness the burning of J. In count five of the second

information, the state alleged the same violation of § 53-

21 (a) (1) with respect to J as a result of her witnessing

the burning of D. The defendant moved for a judgment

of acquittal with respect to these two counts at the close

of the state’s case17 and his case.18 In both instances,

the court denied the defendant’s motions.

On appeal, the defendant argues that the state failed

to produce evidence that each girl directly observed

the burning of the other, and therefore the defendant’s

conduct fell outside the ambit of § 53-21 (a) (1).19 We

are not persuaded.

We begin our analysis by setting forth the relevant

legal principles germane to this claim. ‘‘A defendant

who asserts an insufficiency of the evidence claim bears

an arduous burden. . . . The standard of review [that]

we [ordinarily] apply to a claim of insufficient evidence

is well established. In reviewing the sufficiency of the

evidence to support a criminal conviction we apply a

two-part test. First, we construe the evidence in the

light most favorable to sustaining the verdict. Second,

we determine whether upon the facts so construed and

the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom the [finder

of fact] reasonably could have concluded that the cumulative force of the evidence established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. . . . In evaluating evidence, the trier

of fact is not required to accept as dispositive those

inferences that are consistent with the defendant’s innocence. . . . The trier may draw whatever inferences

from the evidence or facts established by the evidence

it deems to be reasonable and logical. . . .

‘‘[A]s we have often noted, proof beyond a reasonable

doubt does not mean proof beyond all possible doubt

. . . nor does proof beyond a reasonable doubt require

acceptance of every hypothesis of innocence posed by

the defendant that, had it been found credible by the

trier, would have resulted in an acquittal. . . . Simply

stated, [o]n appeal, we do not ask whether there is a

reasonable view of the evidence that would support a

reasonable hypothesis of innocence. We ask, instead,

whether there is a reasonable view of the evidence that

supports the jury’s verdict of guilty.’’ (Citations omitted;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Berrios, 187

Conn. App. 661, 671–72, 203 A.3d 571, cert. denied,

331 Conn. 917, 204 A.3d 1159 (2019); see also State v.

Harper, 184 Conn. App. 24, 30, 194 A.3d 846, cert.
denied, 330 Conn. 936, 195 A.3d 386 (2018).

Next, we turn to the relevant statutory language. Section 53-21 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Any person

who (1) wilfully or unlawfully causes or permits any

child under the age of sixteen years to be placed in

such a situation that the life or limb of such child is

endangered, the health of such child is likely to be

injured or the morals of such child are likely to be

impaired, or does any act likely to impair the health or

morals of any such child . . . shall be guilty of (A) a

class C felony . . . .’’ In construing this statute, our

Supreme Court has long recognized that ‘‘subdivision

(1) of § 53-21 [(a)] prohibits two different types of

behavior: (1) deliberate indifference to, acquiescence

in, or the creation of situations inimical to the [child’s]

moral or physical welfare . . . and (2) acts directly

perpetrated on the person of the [child] and injurious

to his [or her] moral or physical well-being. . . . Thus,

the first part of § 53-21 [(a) (1)] prohibits the creation

of situations detrimental to a child’s welfare, while the

second part proscribes injurious acts directly perpetrated on the child.’’ (Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. James E., 327 Conn. 212,

219, 173 A.3d 380 (2017); see also State v. Padua, 273

Conn. 138, 147–48, 869 A.2d 192 (2005). This statute

criminalizes the creation of a situation likely to result

in injury to the mental health of a child. See State v.

Scruggs, 279 Conn. 698, 713–14, 905 A.2d 24 (2006);

State v. Aziegbemi, 111 Conn. App. 259, 265–66, 959

A.2d 1, cert. denied, 290 Conn. 901, 962 A.2d 128 (2008).

Finally, ‘‘[w]e are mindful that § 53-21 (a) (1) is broadly

drafted and was intended to apply to any conduct, illegal

or not, that foreseeably could result in injury to the

health of a child.’’ State v. Scruggs, supra, 724–25.

Applying these principles to the facts of the present

case, we conclude that the defendant’s claim of evidentiary insufficiency must fail. It is undisputed that D was

present in the apartment when the defendant burned J

and that J was in the apartment when he burned D.

N stated that she was cleaning the kitchen when the

defendant called J, S and D out of their room. The

defendant, after screaming at the girls, picked up J,

carried her to the stove, ignited the flame and burned

her. On the basis of this testimony, and the photographs

admitted into evidence that depicted the layout of the

apartment, the jury reasonably could have concluded

that the defendant created a situation that was likely

to result in injury to D’s mental health as a result of

her witnessing the burning of J.

With respect to J, there was conflicting evidence as

to whether she directly observed the burning of D. In

her forensic interview, J stated that she and N attempted

to stop the defendant when he was holding D’s hands

over the flame. D also indicated during her forensic

interview that J saw the defendant burn D’s hands. J
testified at trial, however, that after the defendant had

burned her hands, she went to her bedroom. She heard

D cry out as she was getting burned. J saw D after the

burning, when D placed her hands in the bathtub filled

with water. D testified at trial that J was in her bedroom

when the defendant burned her. We are mindful that

‘‘[e]vidence is not insufficient . . . because it is conflicting or inconsistent. . . . It is the [jury’s] exclusive

province to weigh the conflicting evidence and to determine the credibility of witnesses. . . . The [jury] can

. . . decide what—all, none, or some—of a witness’

testimony to accept or reject.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Young, 174 Conn. App. 760,

766, 166 A.3d 704, cert. denied, 327 Conn. 976, 174 A.3d

195 (2017). Accordingly, we conclude that the defendant’s claims of evidentiary insufficiency are without

merit.

III

Finally, the defendant claims that the court improperly precluded him from presenting evidence of thirdparty culpability. The defendant contends that this preclusion resulted in constitutional and evidentiary error.

Specifically, he argues that the court should have permitted him to testify about N’s prior statement to him

that she had burned J and D. We disagree.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. On direct examination, N testified that the defendant had physically assaulted her and burned J and D.

She also admitted to lying to Detective Cuddy about

the burnings, both at the hospital and a few days later.

The police arrested N on August 28, 2015, and interviewed her again. During this interview, N inquired to

the police detective: ‘‘Why can’t you just say it was me

and call it a day?’’ N later testified that she made this

untruthful remark from a desire to conclude the investigation. N also iterated that she did not burn the victims

but that it was the defendant who had done so.

The defendant testified at his trial and stated on direct

examination that N had made an ‘‘admission’’ to him.

The prosecutor objected on the basis of hearsay, which

the court sustained. On redirect examination, defense

counsel asked if the defendant ever had told the police

that N confessed to him. The prosecutor raised an objection, which the court sustained. At this point, the court

excused the jury, and the prosecutor indicated that

the objection was based on hearsay. Defense counsel

responded that N’s admission constituted a statement

against a penal interest and had not been offered for

the truth of the matter asserted. The court disagreed

and again sustained the prosecutor’s objection.

The court permitted defense counsel to make an offer

of proof. The defendant testified that N had confessed to

burning the victims and that the defendant had informed

the police of this confession. The jury returned, and
the court stated it had sustained the prosecutor’s objection. In his motion for a new trial, dated August 3, 2017,

the defendant reasserted this claim, arguing that the

evidence was not hearsay because (1) it was not offered

for the truth of the matter asserted or (2) it constituted

a statement against civil or penal interests.

On appeal the defendant claims, for the first time,

that the court’s ruling violated his sixth amendment

right to present a defense.20 He also claims that the

court improperly determined that the statement against

penal interest exception to the hearsay rule did not

apply to N’s admission to the defendant that she had

burned the victims. We conclude that the court did not

abuse its discretion in ruling that this hearsay exception

did not apply, and therefore the defendant cannot prevail on either his evidentiary or constitutional claims.

First, we set forth the applicable legal principles and

our standard of review. ‘‘When a trial court improperly

excludes evidence in a criminal matter, the defendant’s

constitutional rights may be implicated. It is fundamental that the defendant’s [right] . . . to present a defense

[is] guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the United

States constitution. . . . In plain terms, the defendant’s right to present a defense is the right to present

the defendant’s version of the facts as well as the prosecution’s to the jury so that it may decide where the

truth lies. . . .

‘‘Nevertheless, [i]t is well established that a trial court

has broad discretion in ruling on evidentiary matters

. . . . Accordingly, the trial court’s ruling is entitled to

every reasonable presumption in its favor . . . and we

will disturb the ruling only if the defendant can demonstrate a clear abuse of the court’s discretion.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Watson, 192 Conn.

App. 353, 375–76, A.3d (2019); see also State

v. Durdek, 184 Conn. App. 492, 499 n.5, 195 A.3d 388

(defendant is bound by rules of evidence in presenting

defense, and if proffered evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay, defendant’s constitutional right to present defense is not violated by its exclusion), cert.

denied, 330 Conn. 934, 194 A.3d 1197 (2018); State v.

Ramos, 182 Conn. App. 604, 614, 190 A.3d 892 (sixth

amendment rights, although substantial, do not suspend

rules of evidence), cert. denied, 330 Conn. 917, 193 A.3d

1213 (2018).

Section 8-6 of the Connecticut Code of Evidence provides in relevant part: ‘‘The following are not excluded

by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as a

witness . . . (4) . . . A trustworthy statement against

penal interest that, at the time of its making, so far

tended to subject the declarant to criminal liability that

a reasonable person in the declarant’s position would

not have made the statement unless the person believed

it to be true. In determining the trustworthiness of a

statement against penal interest, the court shall con-
sider (A) the time the statement was made and the

person to whom the statement was made, (B) the existence of corroborating evidence in the case, and (C)

the extent to which the statement was against the

declarant’s penal interest. . . .’’ See also State v. Bryan,

193 Conn. App. 285, 299, A.3d (2019); State v.

Azevedo, 178 Conn. App. 671, 685–86, 176 A.3d 1196

(2017), cert. denied, 328 Conn. 908, 178 A.3d 390 (2018);

E. Prescott, supra, § 8.34.2, pp. 631–32.

To use the statement against penal interest exception

to the rule against hearsay, ‘‘the proponent of the evidence must demonstrate that the declarant is unavailable. See State v. Schiappa, 248 Conn. 132, 141, 728

A.2d 466, cert. denied, 528 U.S. 862, 120 S. Ct. 152, 145

L. Ed. 2d 129 (1999).’’ State v. Rodriguez, 146 Conn.

App. 99, 109, 75 A.3d 798, cert. denied, 310 Conn. 948, 80

A.3d 906 (2013). Thus, in the present case, the defendant

had to establish the unavailability of N to use the statement against penal interest hearsay exception. See State

v. Bryant, 202 Conn. 676, 694, 523 A.2d 451 (1987).

Our Supreme Court has employed the definitions of

‘‘unavailability’’ from rule 804 (a) of the Federal Rules

of Evidence with respect to this hearsay exception.

State v. Lopez, 239 Conn. 56, 74–75, 681 A.2d 950 (1996);

see also State v. Wright, 107 Conn. App. 85, 89–90, 943

A.2d 1159, cert. denied, 287 Conn. 914, 950 A.2d 1291

(2008). ‘‘Rule 804 (a) lists five situations in which the

declarant witness may be considered unavailable: (1)

the court has determined that the witness has a testimonial privilege; (2) the witness persists in refusing to

testify despite a court order to do so; (3) the witness

has a lack of memory; (4) the witness is unable to be

present or testify because of death or existing physical

or mental illness or infirmity; and (5) the witness is

absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance . . .

[or testimony] by process or other reasonable means.’’

(Emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Frye, 182 Conn. 476, 481, 438 A.2d 735 (1980).

The defendant argues that N ‘‘was unavailable, pursuant to the rules of evidence and, therefore, her statement should have come in as a statement against penal

interest.’’ Specifically, he noted that N was ‘‘reluctant’’

at trial to make a statement against her penal interest,

there were ‘‘pauses’’ in her testimony, her version of

the events was ‘‘opposite’’ to that of the defendant, her

testimony would not be ‘‘favorable’’ to the defendant

and she had demonstrated a willingness to lie to protect

herself. These contentions, unsupported by case law or

other legal authority, fail to acknowledge that N testified during the defendant’s criminal trial and are not

encompassed within the five situations of unavailability

set forth by our Supreme Court. As a result of the

defendant’s inability to meet the threshold requirement

of N’s unavailability, the statement against penal inter-
est hearsay exception cannot provide a path to admit

this testimony into evidence. Further, as a result of

the court’s proper evidentiary ruling, the defendant’s

constitutional claim must fail.

The judgments are affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with our policy of protecting the privacy interests of the

victims of family violence, we decline to identify the victims or others

through whom the victims’ identities may be ascertained. See General Statutes § 54-86e.

1 These convictions arose from charges set forth in two separate informations that had been consolidated and tried together.

2

In connection with the events of this case, N was arrested on August

28, 2015. On November 21, 2016, she pleaded guilty to five counts of risk

of injury to a child in violation of § 53-21 (a) (1). Her sentence, which had

not been imposed at the time of the defendant’s trial, was capped at twenty

years incarceration, execution suspended after ten years, with the right to

argue for a lesser sentence.

3 Shapiro described a first-degree burn as ‘‘something analogous to a

sunburn. . . . It can be a thermal burn, it can be from chemicals. It’s a very

superficial burn that only involves the outer layer of the skin called the

epidermis . . . .’’ Shapiro further explained that ‘‘[a] second-degree burn

is one that is deeper and goes into the dermis, which is the layer below the

epidermis where there’s nerves and fat and other structures. And that can

be either partial or full thickness second-degree burns based on how deep

it goes within that layer. . . . [A] third-degree burn basically is a full thickness burn, meaning that it goes through all the layers of the skin . . . .’’ In

the emergency department, burn classification is determined by the appearance of the burned area, with ‘‘first [degree] being pink, second [degree]

being blistered, [and] third [degree] being white.’’

4 Specifically, Shapiro stated: ‘‘When you see black or brown or charring,

that can indicate a deeper burn. Brown or black is when it gets through

the skin and starts to get down into the muscle and the bone, but on a

fingernail it just may be the nail itself is charred, but the thing is, usually

black or brown is a sign of even—what we call a fourth-degree burn, which

is when you get to the muscle and the bone.’’ Richard Garvey, a surgeon

at the Bridgeport Hospital, stated that the presence of this black material

indicated a heat source of approximately 700 degrees Fahrenheit.

5 Shapiro also testified that the defendant had told the nurses that D’s

injuries resulted from touching a hot stove. Shapiro stated that this statement

was inconsistent with the burns on both sides of D’s hands that he observed

because a person generally does not touch something with the back of their

hand, or with both hands.

6 See General Statutes § 17a-101g (e) and (f).

7 See General Statutes (Rev. to 2015) § 46b-129 (b).

8 As a result of our conclusion that the defendant failed to demonstrate

that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the forensic interviews

into evidence, we need not reach the issue of harm. ‘‘When an improper

evidentiary ruling is not constitutional in nature, the defendant bears the

burden of demonstrating that the error was harmful. . . . [W]hether [an

improper ruling] is harmless in a particular case depends upon a number

of factors, such as the importance of the . . . testimony in the prosecution’s

case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on

material points, the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and,

of course, the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. . . . Most importantly, we must examine the impact of the . . . evidence on the trier of fact

and the result of the trial. . . . [T]he proper standard for determining

whether an erroneous evidentiary ruling is harmless should be whether the

jury’s verdict was substantially swayed by the error. . . . Accordingly, a

nonconstitutional error is harmless when an appellate court has a fair assurance that the error did not substantially affect the verdict.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ayala, 333 Conn. 225, 231–32, 215 A.3d 116

(2019); see also State v. Tarasiuk, 192 Conn. App. 207, 218, A.3d

(2019) (incumbent on defendant to show that nonconstitutional evidentiary

error was harmful in order to obtain new trial).

Assuming, arguendo, that this court were to reach the issue of harm, we

would conclude that the defendant had failed to meet his burden that an
evidentiary error substantially affected the verdict. The defendant argued

that the admission of the forensic interviews was harmful because the jury

heard from J and D more than once, the forensic interviews occurred in a

sympathetic setting and the prosecutor focused on these interviews in her

closing argument. The state countered that the evidence against the defendant was overwhelming in that four witnesses identified the defendant as

the person who burned J and D, and the medical testimony established that

the burns were neither accidental nor self-inflicted. Additionally, the state

presented consciousness of guilt evidence supporting its case against the

defendant. Thus, if this court were to reach the issue of harm, we would

conclude that the defendant had failed to meet his burden that an evidentiary

error substantially affected the verdict.

9 Specifically, the defendant stated that ‘‘most cases involving a forensic

interview involve an allegation of sex abuse . . . [and that] most sex abuse

cases involve a delay in disclosing the actual abuse . . . .’’ The defendant

further argued that the relevancy of forensic interviews usually is based on

the constancy of accusation doctrine. We note that this doctrine ‘‘permits

a person to whom a sexual assault victim has reported the alleged assault

to testify regarding the fact and timing of the victim’s complaint.’’ State v.

Samuels, 273 Conn. 541, 547, 871 A.2d 1005 (2005); see generally Conn.

Code Evid. (2009) § 6-11 (c); State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284, 304, 677 A.2d

917 (1996). More recently, our Supreme Court concluded that ‘‘the constancy

of accusation doctrine should continue to be employed in Connecticut to

counter implicit juror bias against victims, including children, who delay in

reporting sexual abuse, but in a modified form intended to address the

potential prejudice to defendants caused by the testimony of multiple constancy witnesses.’’ State v. Daniel W. E., 322 Conn. 593, 618, 142 A.3d

265 (2016).

10 In its memorandum, the state, inter alia, acknowledged that the

recordings contained the hearsay statements of J and D, but asserted that

they were admissible under the medical treatment or tender years exceptions

to the rule against hearsay.

11 Specifically, the defendant contended that the constancy of accusation

doctrine is limited to cases of sexual assault, that this was not a case of

‘‘incremental disclosure’’ by J and D and that the concept of incremental and

delayed disclosure by abused children is ‘‘well-known.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.)

12 Specifically, defense counsel stated: ‘‘If you look at Griswold, that obviously involved a sex assault case. Although it doesn’t talk about the underlying reasons for why it was relevant in the first place, I think it’s presupposed

that those forensic interviews were relevant because we had a constancy

issue because most people, according to our law, most people don’t think

that sex assault victims are going to—or they think that sex assault victims,

if they were raped, would tell immediately. That’s the purpose of allowing

that interview in. I understand what Griswold says. I don’t really have an

answer, this, you know, this forensic interview was pretty much done exactly

the way they said in Griswold. I don’t have a problem with that. My point

is, this is not Griswold because it’s an assault, a physical assault. And there’s

no question as to when it took place and what the kids said. . . . And I

still haven’t heard what the state’s relevance is relative to either [J’s] or

[D’s] interviews. . . . This is an extremely big stretch of Griswold, and I

think that’s inappropriate.’’

13 Our law recognizes that the statement sought to be admitted pursuant

to this hearsay exception need not be made to a physician, so long as the

interviewer is acting within the chain of medical care. See State v. Cruz,

260 Conn. 1, 10, 792 A.2d 823 (2002); State v. Eddie N. C., 178 Conn. App.

147, 171, 174 A.3d 803 (2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 1000, 176 A.3d 558

(2018); State v. Donald M., 113 Conn. App. 63, 71, 966 A.2d 266, cert. denied,

291 Conn. 910, 969 A.2d 174 (2009).

14 Specifically, Vidro defined a forensic interview as ‘‘a nonleading factfinding interview of a child where there is a concern of abuse.’’ She also

stated that the purposes of such an interview are to assess whether the

child is safe, requires medical care or requires mental health treatment.

Vidro noted that the interview is recorded and that the child is made aware

that others will observe the interview. The purpose of the recording and

the presence of observers, such as an employee of the Department of Children and Families or a member of a law enforcement agency, is to minimize

the trauma of multiple interviews.

15 Vidro explained that D’s hospitalization caused the delay of her forensic interview.
16 After the verdict, the defendant filed a motion for a new trial pursuant

to Practice Book § 42-53. He argued, inter alia, that the forensic interviews

‘‘did not fall under the medical diagnosis exception to the general prohibition

against hearsay.’’ An evidentiary argument raised for the first time in a

postverdict motion for a new trial is not preserved for appellate review.

See State v. Daniel W., 180 Conn. App. 76, 96 n.7, 182 A.3d 665, cert. denied,

328 Conn. 929, 182 A.3d 638 (2018); see also State v. Messam, 108 Conn.

App. 744, 760, 949 A.2d 1246 (2008) (problems inherent in allowing counsel

to wait until after adverse verdict to raise objections to evidence are too

obvious to warrant discussion).

17 At the close of the state’s case, defense counsel argued: ‘‘These are the

counts where, essentially, [the defendant] is alleged to have forced one of

the kids to watch the burning of both kids, and there’s two counts because

there’s two injuries or two victims. My recollection is that there’s no evidence

of that. He didn’t deliberately do that. In fact, I think the testimony for [J]

is that she was in the bedroom, at least during the part of it when it happened,

and she certainly wasn’t—he was deliberately forcing her to watch. But I

think that that’s—that covers both counts . . . .’’

18 Specifically, defense counsel stated: ‘‘I would just say just for the record

I’m going to—we move for motion for judgment of acquittal based on the

prior arguments I made.’’

19 At trial, the defendant challenged the absence of the general intent

element with respect to § 53-21 (a) (1); see, e.g., State v. Euclides L., 189

Conn. App. 151, 161–62, 207 A.3d 93 (2019); while on appeal, he focuses his

sufficiency claim on whether each child was present when the other was

burned. To the extent that his appellate argument is unpreserved, it is

nevertheless reviewable by this court. See State v. Revels, 313 Conn. 762,

777, 99 A.3d 1130 (2014), cert. denied, 574 U.S. 1177, 135 S. Ct. 1451, 191

L. Ed. 2d 404 (2015); State v. Griffin, 184 Conn. App. 595, 613, 195 A.3d

723, cert. denied, 330 Conn. 941, 195 A.3d 692 (2018), and cert. denied, 330

Conn. 941, 195 A.3d 693 (2018).

20 The defendant requests review of this claim pursuant to State v. Golding,

213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823 (1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R.,

317 Conn. 773, 781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).