alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Amendment to Offer Letter - William C. Houghton



 Exhibit 10.79 
 

 
 November 17, 2008 
 William
C. Houghton 
 Dear Bill: 
 Anesiva, Inc. (the
“Company”) is pleased to offer you an amendment (the “Amendment”) to your employment terms, as set forth in the offer letter between you and the Company, dated July 9, 2008 (the “Offer Letter”). The employment
terms set forth in this Amendment are effective as of November 17, 2008 (the “Amendment Date”). Unless this Amendment specifically states that it supersedes a term in the Offer Letter, the terms of the Offer Letter shall remain
binding and in full force and effect. 
 1. Retention Bonus. You will be eligible to receive a Retention Bonus in an amount equal to
two (2) months of your base salary currently in effect, to be earned and payable on the following schedule: (i) 50% of the bonus on November 17, 2008, (ii) 25% of the bonus on November 26, 2008, and (iii) 25% of the
bonus on December 15, 2008. 
 In the event that you resign from employment with the Company for any reason before February 9,
2009, you agree that you will repay to the Company this Retention Bonus amount paid to you (“Retention Repayment Amount”) pursuant to this Section. Any Retention Repayment Amount that must be repaid pursuant to this paragraph will be paid
within thirty (30) days following your last date of employment with the Company. 
 In the event that you are involuntarily terminated
from employment with the Company, you will not be liable for repayment of the Retention Bonus. 
 2. Employment Relationship.
Your employment with the Company is and continues to be “at will” as described in Section 12 of your Offer Letter. 
 3.
Supersedes. This Amendment supersedes and replaces any prior agreements, representations or understandings, whether written, oral or implied, between you and the Company regarding this subject matter described herein, provided that unless
specifically superseded by this Amendment, the terms of the Offer Letter remain in full force and effect. 
 We hope that you find the
forgoing terms acceptable. You may indicate your agreement with these terms and accept this Amendment by signing and dating the Amendment and returning it to me. 
  

			
	Very truly yours,
	
	ANESIVA, INC.
		
	By:	 	/s/ Jean-Frederic Viret
		 	 Jean-Frederic Viret
 Vice President & Chief
Financial Officer



 I have read, and accept and agree to, the terms of this Amendment to my Offer Letter: 
  

	
	/s/ William C. Houghton
	William C. Houghton

 Dated: 11-19-08
Shirlene BRITT, et al. v. RICELAND PETROLEUM COMPANY, et al.

NO. 2018-C-0551

Supreme Court of Louisiana.

May 25, 2018

Denied.
Kelley MAHONEY, Appellant, v. Francis MAHONEY, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-3622

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 23, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
1 QUICK BAIL BONDS, LLC v. STATE

2160204

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

January 18, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
Antonio RICHARDSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4480

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
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#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Michael Ray HARRISON, Defendant-Appellant

No. 16-41587 Summary Calendar

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

Filed September 29, 2017

Robert L. Rawls, Assistant U.S. Attorney, U.S. Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of Texas, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Douglas Milton Barlow, Barlow Law Firm, Beaumont, TX, for Defendant-Appellant

Before BENAVIDES, CLEMENT, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Michael Ray Harrison appeals the 120-month within-guidelines sentence imposed upon resentencing for possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court previously granted Harrison’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and vacated Harrison’s original 327-month sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act in light of *Johnson v. United States,*— U.S.—, 135 S.Ct. 2551, 2563, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015). Harrison now argues that his 120-month sentence is unreasonable. In support of his argument, he asserts that the district court imposed the maximum sentence because the court did not understand the effect of Johnson; that the district court “did not understand [its] authority to order the sentence to be served concurrently with [his] state sentence;” and that the 'district court failed to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and ignored his mitigation arguments.

Harrison’s arguments are unsupported by the .record and do not show that his within-guidelines sentence fails to account for a factor that should receive significant weight, gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or represents a clear error of judgment by the district court in balancing the sentencing factors. *198
      *See United States v. Cooks,*589 F,3d 173, 186 (5th Cir. 2009); *United States v. Campos-Maldonado,*531 F.3d 337, 338 (5th Cir. 2008). The district court noted that it had considered the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a) and that the sentence was appropriate in light “of the nature and circumstances of the offense” and Harrison’s “extensive criminal history” and would “serve as just punishment, promote respect for the law, and deter future violations of the law.” Given the deference accorded the district court’s sentencing determinations, we will not reweigh the § 3553(a) sentencing factors. *See United States v. Rodriguez-Bernal,*783 F.3d 1002, 1008 (5th Cir. 2015).

AFFIRMED.

Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R. 47.5.4.
T hi s di s pos i t i on i s notappr opr i a t e f orpubl i c a t i on and i s notpr e c e de nt * e xc e pta s pr ovi de d by9th C i r . R . 36- 3.

T he pane l unani m ous l yc onc l ude s thi s c a s e i s s ui t abl e f orde c i s i on ** w ith o u t o r a l ar g u m e n t. See F ed. R . A pp . P . 34 (a )( 2). NOT F OR P UB L I CAT I ON UN I TE D STATE S C OU RT OF APPE ALS FOR T HE NI NTH CI RC UI T L AMAR A N OD AR OV NA LATS ABI DZE; TAM AZ LATS ABI DZE, P et i t i o n ers, v. E R I C H . H O L D E R , J r ., A tto rn e yG e n e r a l, R e s p o n d e n t. N o. 08- 71601 A ge nc yN os . A 079- 258- 307

A 079- 258- 308 ME MOR AN DU M *

O n P e t i t i on f

orR e vi e w of

an O r de rof

the B o ar do f I m m ig r a tio n A p p e a ls S ubm i tt e d Jul y19, 2010 ** B e f o r e : B . F L E T C H E R , R E I N H A R D T , an dW A R D L A W , C ir c u it Ju d g e s . L am ar a N od ar ov na L at sabi dze andT am az L at sabi dze, ci t i ze ns of G eorgi a, pe t i t i on f orr e vi e w of

the B oar d of

I m m i gr a t i on A ppe a l s ’ ( “ B I A ” ) or de rde ny i ng the i rm ot i on t o r e ope n ba s e d on i ne f f e c t i ve a s s i s t anc e of

c ouns e l . O urj ur i s di c t i on i s gov erned b y 8 U . S . C . § 1 25 2. W e r evi ew for abu se of di sc re t i on the deni alof a 

# FI LED AU G 02 2010 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS08- 71601 2 m o tio n to r e o p e n an dd e n o v o q u e s tio n s o f law . Moh am m ed v. G on zales , 400 F . 3d 785, 791 ( 9th C i r . 2005) . W e de nyi n partand di s m i s s i n partthe pe t i t i on f or r e v i e w. T he B IA ac t ed w i thi n i t s di sc re t i on i n d enyi ng pet i t i on er s’ m ot i on t o reopen b e c au s e p e titio n e r s d idn o t e s tab lis h th a t f o rm e rc o u n s e l “f

a ile dto p e r f

o rm w ith suff i ci entcom pet ence . ” See M oh am m ed , 40 0 F . 3d at79 3. Itfol l ow s that p e titio n e r s ’ c la im th a t th e B I A v io la te ddu e p r o c e s s f a ils . Se e La ta v . I

NS , 204 F . 3d 1241, 1246 ( 9th C i r . 2000) ( r e qui r i ng e rr orf orape t i t i one rt o pr e va i l on adue p r o c e s s c la im ) . W e lac kju risd icti o n to co n sid erp etit io n er s’ co n ten ti o n th at fo rm erco u n se l’ s appe a l br i e f

f a i l e d t o a de qua t e l yc ha l l e nge the i m m i gr a t i on j udge ’ s de c i s i on b e c au s e p e titio n e r s f

a ile dto r a is e th is c la im w ith th e B I A . Se e B a rr o n v . A s h c r o ft , 35 8 F . 3d 67 4, 67 8 (9th C i r. 20 04 ) ( general l y r equi ri ng exhaust i on of cl ai m s bef ore th e B I A ) . P E T I T I O N F O R R E V I E W D E N I E D in p a r t ; D I S M I S S E D in p a r t .
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THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND THE CONDENSED CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS
OF INCOME AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY RERERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
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**EXHIBIT 31.2**
**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 302 (a) OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT**
I, Phillip J. Smith, certify that:
1.  I have reviewed this report on Form 10-Q/A of Stater Bros. Holdings Inc.; 2.  Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material factor omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of thecircumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the periodcovered by this report; 3.  Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included inthis report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results ofoperations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in thisreport; 4.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
 a)  Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controlsand procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material informationrelating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us byothers within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is beingprepared;  b)  Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls and procedures andpresented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controlsand procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on suchevaluation; and  c)  Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financialreporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter that hasmaterially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’sinternal control over financial reporting; and
5.  The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recentevaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and theaudit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalentfunctions):
 a)  All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation ofinternal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affectthe registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information;and  b)  Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees whohave a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting.
Date: May 6, 2005   /s/ Phillip J. Smith     Phillip J. Smith  Senior Vice President and Chief Financial Officer  (Principal Financial Officer)
Robert BRIGGS, DOC #Y15156, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2682

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 7, 2018 Rehearing Denied March 14, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
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</TABLE>
Gary R. THOMAS and Georgia M. Thomas, Appellants, v. US BANK TRUST, N.A., as Trustee for LSF8 Master Participation Trust, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-4719

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 14, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Darron GOODS, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 17-6579

United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

Submitted: August 28, 2017

Decided: September 11, 2017

Darron Goods, Appellant Pro Se. Debra Lynn Dwyer, Assistant United States Attorney, Ellen Elisabeth Cobb, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Before SHEDD, KEENAN,'and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

PER CURIAM:

Darron Goods appeals the district court’s orders denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion. The district court granted a certificate of appealability as to all of Goods’ claims. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. *United States v. Goods,*Nos. 1:06-cr-00309-JFM-9; 1:15-cv-03069-JFM, 2016 WL 5415631 (D. Md. Sept. 28, 2016; filed May 2, 2017, and entered May 3, 2017). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

*AFFIRMED*
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</TABLE>
United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

___________________________

No. 21-3042

___________________________

United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

v.

Fredrick Perkins

lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant

 ____________

Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Northern District of Iowa - Western

 ____________

 Submitted: May 9, 2022

Filed: June 22, 2022

[Unpublished]

____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

____________

PER CURIAM.

Fredrick Perkins entered into a plea agreement with the government, under

which Perkins agreed to plead guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in

furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). 

The parties agreed that Perkins was a career offender under the U.S. Sentencing

Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a)(1)–(3) and (c)(1); that his Guidelines sentencing
range was 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment; and that a 165-month sentence should

be imposed. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C). Perkins also waived his right to

appeal. The district court1 accepted the guilty plea. Perkins thereafter alternatively

moved to withdraw the guilty plea or for rejection of the plea agreement. The district

court denied the motion and imposed the agreed-upon sentence.

Perkins contends that the district court erred in denying the motion to withdraw

his guilty plea, arguing that his Illinois convictions were expunged under Illinois law

and therefore should not have been considered in determining his career offender

status or his criminal history category. We do not reach the merits of this argument,

however, because we conclude that Perkins has waived his right to appeal. 

See United States v. Scott, 627 F.3d 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2010) (appeal waiver requires

dismissal “if the plea agreement and waiver were entered into knowingly and

voluntarily, if the appeal falls within the scope of the waiver, and if dismissal of the

appeal would not result in a miscarriage of justice”). Moreover, despite Perkins’s

argument to the contrary, enforcing the waiver does not result in a miscarriage of

justice. See United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 891 (8th Cir. 2003) (en banc)

(appeal waiver not enforced if doing so “would result in a miscarriage of justice”). 

Perkins’s sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum nor is it otherwise legally

or constitutionally invalid. See id. at 891–92 (illegal sentence constitutes a

miscarriage of justice). 

The appeal is dismissed.

______________________________

1The Honorable Leonard T. Strand, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Northern District of Iowa.

-2-