CFIA Evaluation of the Zoning for Foreign Animal 

Disease Control in the US

March 2014

Animal Import/Export Division Division de l’importation et l’exportation des animaux

Animal Health Directorate Direction santé des animaux 

Canadian Food Inspection Agency Agence canadienne de l’inspection des aliments

59 Camelot Drive, Ottawa 59 promenade Camelot, Ottawa
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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................................................... 5

PART 1 - REVIEW OF THE VETERINARY INFRASTRUCTURE OF THE UNITED STATES FOR 

ZONING ........................................................................................................................................................ 6

1. LEGAL AUTHORITY ............................................................................................................................ 6

a. Federal authority: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)............................................6

i. Legislation on prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases.....................................6

ii. Regulations governing quarantine and interstate movement of animals ..............................6

iii. Zoning within a state ............................................................................................................. 6

iv. Reporting............................................................................................................................... 7

v. Emergency power for control of exotic disease outbreaks ...................................................7

vi. Compensation ....................................................................................................................... 7

b. State authority ........................................................................................................................... 7

2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE.................................................................................................. 9

a. Veterinary Services, United States Department of Agriculture .....................................................9

i. Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services Organizational Structure (SPRS)........12

ii. National Import Export Services (NIES)..............................................................................13

iii. Science Technology and Analysis Services (STAS)...........................................................17

iv. Program Support Services (PSS) .......................................................................................19

b. State Veterinary Services........................................................................................................19

c. Accredited veterinarians..............................................................................................................21

d. Stakeholders ...........................................................................................................................22

3. HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES ......................................................................................23

a. Personnel ....................................................................................................................................23

b. Education and training ............................................................................................................23

c. Monitoring and audit programs ...................................................................................................24

i. Strategic plans: objectives and priorities.................................................................................24

ii. Performance assessment ...................................................................................................24

iii. Compliance .........................................................................................................................25

d. Budget and finances ...............................................................................................................25

e. Material resources.......................................................................................................................25

4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS .................................................................................................26

a. Contingency planning..................................................................................................................26

i. Federal emergency plans........................................................................................................26
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ii. APHIS emergency plans .....................................................................................................26

iii. State emergency plans .......................................................................................................28

b. Livestock traceability: animal and premises identification ......................................................28

c. Internal movement controls.........................................................................................................29

d. Surveillance and reporting of epidemiological information .....................................................29

i. Passive surveillance................................................................................................................29

ii. Active surveillance...............................................................................................................30

e. Laboratory support ......................................................................................................................30

PART 1 - CONCLUSIONS..........................................................................................................................32

PART 2 - PROCEDURES FOR ZONING AND MAINTAINING ZONE INTEGRITY ..................................33

1. SUSPECT PHASE.........................................................................................................................34

a. Triggers .......................................................................................................................................34

b. Field investigation....................................................................................................................34

2. INVESTIGATION PHASE ..............................................................................................................35

a. Sampling .....................................................................................................................................35

b. Diagnosis.................................................................................................................................35

3. ACTIVATION PHASE ....................................................................................................................36

a. Decision to activate Incident Management Team.......................................................................36

b. Reporting.................................................................................................................................36

c. Movement Controls .....................................................................................................................37

4. ACTION PHASE ............................................................................................................................38

a. Initial activities .............................................................................................................................38

i. Biosecurity...............................................................................................................................38

ii. Vector/wildlife control to contain them within the zone .......................................................38

iii. Epidemiological investigation/tracing ..................................................................................38

iv. Initiate surveillance..............................................................................................................39

v. Disposal...............................................................................................................................40

b. Containment/Eradication activities ..........................................................................................40

i. Refine boundaries of zone based on epidemiology and tracing .............................................41

ii. Zone boundary controls ......................................................................................................41

iii. Surveillance in disease free zone .......................................................................................41

iv. Compensation .....................................................................................................................41

v. Decontamination of vehicles ...............................................................................................41

vi. Cleaning and disinfection of premises ................................................................................42

vii. Vaccination..........................................................................................................................42

5. RECOVERY PHASE......................................................................................................................44
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a. Proof of Freedom Surveillance....................................................................................................44

b. Release of Quarantine ............................................................................................................44

c. Recovery of Free Status .............................................................................................................44

Part 2 - CONCLUSIONS.............................................................................................................................46

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.........................................................................................................47

REFERENCES............................................................................................................................................49
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INTRODUCTION

The Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) of the United States Department of Agriculture 

(USDA) and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) have undertaken evaluations of each other’s 

capacity to contain and eradicate a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak via zoning (also known as 

regionalization). The objective is to enhance mutual understanding of each country’s processes for 

zoning and potentially enable the agencies to formally recognize each other’s zoning decisions in the 

event of a foreign animal disease (FAD) outbreak. This recognition could limit disruption of trade from 

disease-free zones within the affected country as well as the economic impact.

In evaluating the equivalency of zoning processes, fundamental considerations are the veterinary 

infrastructure of a country’s veterinary services including legal authority, organizational structure, human 

and material resources, and emergency preparedness measures.

The second part of the evaluation consists of reviewing the emergency response phases in the event of 

an incursion of a highly contagious foreign animal disease and the procedures for establishing and 

maintaining the integrity of infected and disease-free zones. First, is the suspect phase: the triggers and 

the field investigation. Second is the investigation phase involving sampling, an epidemiological

investigation, diagnosis and zoning. The third phase is the activation phase: activation of an Incident 

Management Team, official reporting, and movement controls. The objective of the next phase, the 

action phase, is to define the scope of the outbreak and to prevent further transmission. Measures 

include biosecurity on the farms, vector/wildlife control, epidemiological investigation and tracing, 

surveillance, and disposal of contaminated material. Containment and eradication activities additionally

include surveillance in disease free zones, compensation to encourage reporting, and measures to limit 

spread, such as decontamination, cleaning, disinfection, and vaccination. The final stage is the recovery 

phase involving the proof of freedom surveillance, release of quarantine and movement restrictions and 

recovery of free status. 

Diseases of concern for this review are highly infectious diseases which have a significant impact on 

livestock population and consequently, the national economy. These include foot-and-mouth disease 

(FMD), classical swine fever (CSF), exotic Newcastle disease (END) and highly pathogenic avian 

influenza (HPAI).
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PART 1 - REVIEW OF THE VETERINARY INFRASTRUCTURE 

OF THE UNITED STATES FOR ZONING

1. LEGAL AUTHORITY

a. Federal authority: United States Department of Agriculture (USDA)

i. Legislation on prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases

The Animal Health Protection Act was enacted in 2002 to better equip veterinary services to perform 

various animal health safeguarding activities. The Animal Health Protection Act, Title 7 of the United 

States Code (7 U.S.C.), Chapter 109, Sections 8301-8317 [1], gives the USDA authority to regulate 

export, import, control disease, and engage in eradication activities. All relevant items to exercise control 

over zoning animal health matters such as prevention, control and eradication of animal diseases, 

quarantine, interstate movement of animals and animal products, zoning, reporting, and emergency 

power for control of exotic disease outbreaks, are included in the Animal Health Protection Act in general 

terms. The shared legal responsibilities between federal and state governments are emphasized.

The Secretary of Agriculture has the authority to act in an Extraordinary Emergency. The Secretary may 

take action within a state after review and consultation with the animal health official of the state, only on 

finding that measures being taken by the state are inadequate to control or eradicate the pest or disease

(Subsection 8306 (b) [1], page 37 [2]) .

ii. Regulations governing quarantine and interstate movement of animals

Interstate movement of animals and animal products is regulated at the federal level. The Secretary of 

Agriculture can prohibit and restrict movements of commodities at risk within the state. The Secretary has 

the authority to inspect and make seizures on any premises in the US (Subsections 8305 – 8307 [1]).

iii. Zoning within a state

In Title 9 of the Code of Federal Regulations (9 CFR) [3], regulation 9 CFR Part 71.1 [3] defines a free 

area as the states, territories, or the District of Columbia or portions not quarantined by the Secretary of 

Agriculture for the specific contagious, infectious, or communicable animal disease. 

According to Regulation 9 CFR Part 71.2, when the Secretary of Agriculture determines that poultry or

other animals in any state, territory, or the District of Columbia are affected with any contagious, 

infectious, or communicable disease of livestock or poultry for which a quarantine should be established 

or that other basis for a quarantine exists, notice will be given of that fact and a rule will be issued 

accordingly, placing in quarantine such state, territory, or the District of Columbia, or specified portion 

thereof. This allows Federal officials to designate for quarantine any portion or area of a state, including a 

zone. This rule will either absolutely forbid the interstate movement of the quarantined animals from the 
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quarantined area or will indicate the regulations under which interstate movements may be made. The 

phrase "that other basis for quarantine exists" allows federal officials to impose a quarantine in the event 

that a serious animal disease event is considered imminent but not yet proven to exist. 

iv. Reporting

Regulation 9 CFR Part 161.3(f) [3] requires accredited veterinarians to immediately report to a federal 

officer and the State Animal Health Official (SAHO) all diagnosed or suspected cases of a communicable 

animal disease for which APHIS has a control or eradication program, and all diagnosed or suspected 

cases of any animal disease not known to exist in the US. Individual states require veterinarians licensed 

to practice in the state and persons in care of livestock and poultry to report reportable diseases of that 

state and, in many states, to report any of the OIE-listed diseases.

v. Emergency power for control of exotic disease outbreaks

The Animal Health Protection Act authorizes the Secretary to declare an Extraordinary Emergency. This 

would allow federal officials to hold, seize, or destroy contaminated material and to prohibit or restrict 

movement within the state or portion of a state.

The Secretary of Agriculture has declared an Extraordinary Emergency for at least three animal health 

incidents in the last ten years: exotic Newcastle disease (END) in early 2003 (four declarations, one each 

for California, Arizona, and Nevada, and one for Texas and New Mexico together), bovine spongiform 

encephalopathy (BSE) in early 2004 (for Washington State), and for avian influenza (AI) in 2004 (Texas, 

[4]). 

Authorization for a Declaration of Extraordinary Emergency could take as little as an hour in a major 

emergency such as foot-and-mouth disease (FMD). When the declaration is published (a few days later) 

it states the actual effective date. In the meantime, during the hour or two it might take to get federal 

authority to act, the state has authority to act immediately.

vi. Compensation

Compensation is described in regulation 9 CFR Part 71.14 and 9 CFR Part 53 [3] at the federal level. 

Compensation is based on fair market value, as determined by the Secretary. Compensation can be paid 

at the state level also, so the federal level would pay only the difference with the market value, if there is 

one. If there is any violation, no compensation is paid (9 CFR 53.10 [3] and [5, 6]).

b. State authority

State-level regulations are designed to control animal movement and internal commerce. Each state has 

the authority to place quarantines and hold orders as necessary in the event of a disease outbreak. 

Animal health authorities in each state are responsible for monitoring and controlling diseases in that 

state’s domestic livestock and poultry. Each state may develop its own respective domestic commerce 

regulations. 

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between a state and USDA–APHIS can be signed to outline 

expectations and procedures for a joint response in case of an animal health emergency. At this time, 
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there are no signed agreements with individual states related to expectations and procedures for a joint 

response. The USDA-APHIS’ Veterinary Services (VS) has signed an MOU October 11, 2009 with the 

National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials that provides a detailed explanation of actions to be 

taken by the Veterinary Services and National Assembly members to ensure effective communication in 

the event of an investigation or initial laboratory finding of a potential high-consequence livestock disease

(Appendix B [7]).
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2. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

a. Veterinary Services, United States Department of Agriculture

The Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) (Veterinary Service Deputy Administrator) reports to an APHIS 

Administrator who in turn reports to the Under Secretary of Marketing and Regulatory Programs (Figures 

1, 2 and 3).

The Veterinary Services (VS) has a mission to protect and improve the health, quality, and marketability 

of the nation’s animals, animal products and veterinary biologics by preventing, controlling and/or 

eliminating animal diseases, and monitoring and promoting animal health and productivity. The CVO and 

the VS represent the veterinary authority which speaks for the country as far as official international 

dialogue is concerned. The VS consist of four main parts: Surveillance, Preparedness and Response 

Services; National Import Export Services; Science, Technology and Analysis Services; and Program 

Support Services.

The organizational structure of the Veterinary Services includes the key functional capabilities (Article 

3.2.3, Point 3 of the OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code [8]), namely, epidemiological surveillance, 

disease control, import controls, animal disease reporting systems, animal identification systems, 

traceability systems, animal movement control systems limited to interstate movements, communication 

of epidemiological information, training, inspection, certification, laboratory, and field systems. These 

functional capabilities are portrayed in the detailed organization charts and descriptions below.
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Figure 1. USDA organization chart which displays the Headquarters Organization, including the Secretary, Chief Officers, Under 

Secretaries, and Assistant Secretaries for various agencies within USDA [4].
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Figure 2. APHIS organization which displays the Headquarters Organization, including the 

Programs and Offices within APHIS [4].
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Figure 3. Veterinary Services organization chart which portrays the organization of the Veterinary 

Services and its Programs, Offices, and Centers [4].

i. Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services Organizational Structure (SPRS)

The SPRS reports directly to the Deputy Administrator of the Veterinary Services. SPRS comprises the 

Animal Health Centers, the National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center, the SPRS Logistics 

Center, the One Health Coordination Center, and the Districts (Figure 4). Six geographic Districts (Figure 

5) provide leadership for the implementation of all VS surveillance, preparedness, and response field 

activities. Within each District, Assistant District Directors serve as the primary points of contact for State 

Animal Health Officials and other local stakeholders. The SPRS key services include animal health 

incident management; commodity business planning; disease program, surveillance, and animal disease 

traceability policy setting and administration; emergency preparedness; epidemiologic investigations and 

tracing; veterinary accreditation; and veterinary stockpiling [9].

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center (NPICC)

(formerly known as National Center of Animal Health Emergency Management (NCAHEM))

NPICC develops strategies, policies and exercises for preparedness activities, develops disease specific 

plans and incident management and coordination during an animal health incident, coordinates Animal 

Disease Traceability and the National Veterinary Accreditation Program and coordinates delivery of 

training to field personnel and accredited veterinarians. NPICC is responsible for supporting the 

Emergency Support Function (ESF) #11 – Agriculture and Natural Resources under the National 

Response Framework, specifically for animal health incidents. ESF #11 is coordinated by the USDA and 

provides the structure for coordinating Federal interagency support in an incident response.

Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator

Associate Deputy 

Administrator Chief of Staff

National Import 

Export Services

Science, 

Technology, and 

Analysis Services

Surveillance, 

Preparedness and 

Response Services

Program Support 

Services
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Surveillance, Preparedness & Response Services Logistics Center (SPRS Logistics Center)

The Logistics Center is responsible for oversight of the National Veterinary Stockpile of veterinary 

countermeasures animal vaccines, antivirals, or therapeutic products, supplies, equipment, and response 

support services that states, tribes, and territories needed to respond to animal disease outbreaks. 

Furthermore, the Logistics Center ensures rapid deployment of the animal disease countermeasures and 

the availability of animal identification tags and other supplies. The deployment of the National Animal 

Health Emergency Response Corps when needed is a responsibility of this center.

ii. National Import Export Services (NIES)

The NIES comprises Policy, Permitting and Regulatory Services, District Field Services, Animal Import 

Center Services, Port Services, Agricultural Select Agent Services, and International Animal Health 

Standards Services (Figure 6). The NIES operates six service centers, several animal quarantine 

facilities, and multiple ports of entry. The NIES key services include: import animal and animal product 

inspection and quarantine; import and export policy setting and administration; facility inspection; health 

certificate endorsement; World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) representation and disease 

reporting; pathways analysis and risk assessment; permit issuance; pre-export inspection; and select 

agent registration and inspection [9].
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Figure 4. Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services (SPRS) organizational structure.

Associate Deputy Administrator

Executive Director

Chief of Staff Staff Support 

Specialist

Staff Assistant

Veterinary 

Program 

Specialist

Chief 

Epidemiologist

Administrative 

Officer IT Coordinator

Cattle Health

Center

Avian, Swine 

&Aquatic Animal 

Health Center

Sheep, Goat, Cervid & Equine 

Health Center

National Preparedness 

and Incident 

Coordination Center

SPRS Logistics 

Center

One Health 

Coordination 

Center

District One District Four

District Two District Five

District Three District Six
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Figure 5. Districts of the Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services (SPRS).

District 1

FLORIDA

MISSISSIPPI

WEST

VIRGINIA

RHODE ISLAND

WASHINGTON

OREGON

IDAHO

MONTANA

WYOMING

NORTH

DAKOTA

SOUTH

DAKOTA

NEBRASKA IOWA

MINNESOTA

WISCONSIN

ILLINOIS

INDIANA OHIO

MISSOURI KANSAS

COLORADO

UTAH

NEVADA

CALIFORNIA

ARIZONA NEW MEXICO OKLAHOMA ARKANSAS

KENTUCKY

VIRGINIA

TEXAS

MASSACHUSETTS

GEORGIA

ALABAMA

SOUTH

CAROLINA

NORTH CAROLINA TENNESSEE

PENNSYLVANIA

MARYLAND

NEW JERSEY

NEW YORK

CONNECTICUT

VERMONT

NEW HAMPSHIRE

MAINE

DELAWARE

LOUISIANA

MICHIGAN

District 2

(includes Puerto Rico)

District 3

District 4

District 5

District 6

(includes Alaska and Hawaii)
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Figure 6. National Import Export Services (NIES) organizational structure.

Associate Deputy Administrator

Executive Director

Science Leader 

Position Staff Assistant

Staff Assistant

Chief of Staff Administration 

Services

Regionalisation 

Evaluation 

Services National 

Director

Planning 

Permitting & 

Regulatory 

Services 

National 

Director

Animal Permitting 

& Negotiation 

Services National 

Director

Service Centers 

National Director

Animal Products 

Permitting & 

Negotiation 

Services 

National 

Director

Animal Import 

Center Services 

National 

Director

Port Services 

National 

Director

Agricultural Select 

Agent Services 

National Director

International 

Animal Health 

Standards Services 

Director
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iii. Science Technology and Analysis Services (STAS)

STAS comprises the Center for Veterinary Biologics, the National Veterinary Services Laboratories, the 

Center for Epidemiology and Animal Health, and Office of STAS Interagency Coordination (Figure 7). 

The STAS key services include: analysis of response options; animal disease modeling; animal health 

data acquisition, analysis, and interpretation; animal health data standards; animal health surveillance 

design; diagnostic capability and capacity; economic analysis; national animal health laboratory network 

coordination; national studies and large scale epidemiological investigations; OIE Collaborating Center; 

predictive modeling; risk assessments; veterinary biologics approval and monitoring regulatory activities

[9].

Figure 7. Science, Technology and Analysis (STAS) organizational structure.

Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health (CEAH)

The CEAH [10] explore and analyze animal health and related agricultural issues to facilitate informed 

decision-making in government and industry. CEAH is also the OIE Collaborating Center for Animal 

Disease Information Systems and Risk Analysis. CEAH is comprised of five units: Monitoring and 

Modeling; Information Management and Analytic Support; Surveillance Design and Analysis; Risk 

Identification and Risk Assessment; and Program Support and Evaluation.

The National Animal Health Surveillance System (NAHSS) [11] is a network of federal, state, industry, 

university, laboratory, and other partners that collaborate through surveillance to protect animal health. 

The goal of NAHSS is to systematically collect, collate, and analyze animal health data and promptly 

Associate Deputy Administrator

Executive Director

Office of STAS 

Interagency 

Coordination

Scientific Advisor

Center for 

Epidemiology and 

Animal Health

National Veterinary 

Services Laboratory

Center for 

Veterinary Biologics

Management & 

Program Analyst

Staff Support 

Specialist
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disseminate vital information, especially to those partners responsible for maintaining animal health. 

Early detection and global risk surveillance for foreign and emerging animal diseases is a NAHSS’ goal.

The USDA initiated the National Animal Health Monitoring System (NAHMS) [12] in 1983 to collect, 

analyze, and disseminate data on animal health, management, and productivity across the US. NAHMS 

conducts national studies on the health and health management of US domestic livestock populations. 

These studies are designed to meet the information needs of the industries associated with these 

commodities, as identified by people within those industries. The swine, dairy beef and poultry 

commodity groups are generally studied every 5 years.

The National Animal Health Reporting System (NAHRS) [13] is designed to collect data from chief state 

animal health officials on the presence of confirmed World Organization for Animal Health (OIE)-

reportable diseases in specific livestock, poultry, and aquaculture species in the US. Under NAHRS, 

participating state animal health officials report monthly on the occurrence of confirmed OIE-reportable 

diseases in US livestock, poultry, and aquaculture species. NAHRS reports animal disease occurrence to 

the OIE as required.

National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL)

The NVSL [14] is responsible for diagnosis for domestic and FADs, provision of diagnostic reagents, 

training, and laboratory certification for selected diseases. The NVSL serves as the national veterinary 

diagnostic reference and confirmatory laboratory for the APHIS VS program diseases and is an OIE 

reference laboratory for 13 diseases, including avian influenza, FMD, and Newcastle Disease. NVSL 

coordinates activities; participates in methods validation; and provides training, proficiency testing, 

assistance, materials, and prototypes for diagnostic tests. Training of state and federal field veterinarians 

to detect foreign animal diseases and training for laboratory diagnosticians are functions of the NVSL. 

The NVSL comprises four laboratories at two locations: the Diagnostic Bacteriology Laboratory (DBL), 

Ames, Iowa; Diagnostic Virology Laboratory (DVL), Ames, Iowa; Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic 

Laboratory (FADDL), Plum Island, New York; and the Pathobiology Laboratory (PL), Ames, Iowa. In 

addition, the NVSL operates the program office of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network 

(NAHLN). The FADDL is responsible for diagnosing and confirming FADs, training of Federal and State 

veterinarians in the recognition and diagnosis of FADs and is the manager of the North American FMD 

Antigen Bank.

The NAHLN [15] is a cooperative effort between two USDA agencies—the Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service (APHIS) and the National Institute of Food and Agriculture (NIFA), formerly the 

Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service (CSREES), and the American Association 

of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD). It is a multifaceted network comprised of sets of 

laboratories that focus on different diseases, using common testing methods and software platforms to 

process diagnostic requests and share information. There are over 60 laboratories in NAHLN. The 

state/university laboratories in the NAHLN perform routine diagnostic tests for endemic animal diseases 

as well as targeted surveillance and response testing for FADs. State/university laboratories participate in 

the development of new assay methodologies. The NAHLN laboratories are trained, proficiency tested 

and follow standardized testing protocols for avian influenza (AI), bovine spongiform encephalopathy 

(BSE), chronic wasting disease (CWD), CSF, END, FMD, pseudorabies virus (PRV), scrapie, swine 

influenza virus (SIV), and vesicular stomatitis virus (VSV).

Center for Veterinary Biologics (CVB) 

The CVB [16] regulates veterinary biologics (vaccines, bacterins, antisera, diagnostic kits, and other 

products of biological origin) to ensure that the veterinary biologics available for the diagnosis, prevention, 
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and treatment of animal diseases are pure, safe, potent, and effective. The CVB regulates veterinary 

biologics and is responsible for enforcing the Virus-Serum-Toxin Act [17]. 

iv. Program Support Services (PSS)

PSS provides key support services for both VS personnel and stakeholders. PSS comprises the 

Planning, Finance and Strategy Staff, Management Support Staff (including the Professional 

Development Staff), the Chief Information Officer, and the Writing, Editing, and Regulatory Coordination 

Staff. The PSS key services include: monitoring; animal health information technology systems; guidance 

documents; regulatory coordination; recruitment; Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Animal Health 

facilitation; strategic planning; technical training; and workforce/succession planning [9].

b. State Veterinary Services

Cooperation exists between the USDA and individual states on several animal disease eradication, 

certification, disease control, and monitoring programs. The state veterinarian and the Assistant District 

Director establish a Unified Command to coordinate disease management. In an animal health 

emergency the state activates its state, regional, or local emergency operations centers to interface with 

other agencies within the state (page 66 [2]). The initial response is state level.

With respect to animal disease reporting, all federally accredited veterinarians and state laboratories are 

required to report OIE-listed diseases to the USDA (page 46 [2]). 

A National Animal Health Surveillance System (NAHSS) [11] integrates health monitoring and 

surveillance activities conducted by federal and state agencies, and the National Animal Health Reporting 

System (NAHRS) assimilates and reports on animal disease occurrence [13]. 

The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) [18] is an example of federal, state, and poultry industry 

collaboration in low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) surveillance and disease programs for Salmonella

and Mycoplasma. Other cooperative programs include the National Pseudorabies Eradication Program, 

the National Swine Brucellosis Eradication Program, the Bovine Tuberculosis Eradication Program, the 

Brucellosis Eradication Program, the Voluntary Bovine Johne’s Disease Control Program, the National 

Scrapie Eradication Program, the Voluntary Federal Cervidae Tuberculosis Herd Accreditation Program, 

the Federal Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Herd-Certification Program, and the Equine Infectious 

Anemia (EIA) Control Program.

Information on the following six states was used to illustrate the similarity of activities among states and 

their involvement and cooperation with national programs. North Carolina, Iowa, Oklahoma, Colorado, 

and Texas are all classified as free states in the Bovine Tuberculosis Eradication Program, the 

Brucellosis Eradication Program, and the National Swine Brucellosis Eradication Program, and Stage V of 

the National Pseudorabies Eradication Program [19].

In North Carolina [20], the Veterinary Division is under the authority of the Commissioner, 

Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (NCDACS). The Veterinary Division 

“protects the health of the state’s livestock and poultry population through the 

administration of regulatory animal health programs and its diagnostic laboratory system. 
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Responsibilities include the surveillance, monitoring, control, and eradication of diseases; 

regulation of animal movements; inspections and testing on the farm and at markets and 

sales; providing diagnostic laboratory service to owners and their veterinarians; and 

conducting regulatory disease testing to facilitate interstate and export movement of 

animals and food products.” North Carolina has a reportable list of 30 diseases including 

“foreign animal diseases” as a disease entity, for which all persons practising veterinary 

medicine in the state must report to the State Veterinarian within two hours after the 

disease is suspected to exist.

The Animal Industry Bureau of the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

(IDALS) [21] has as its mission “to protect, safeguard, and improve animal health among 

all livestock industries in Iowa through animal movement regulations, exhibition 

regulations, import regulations, and cooperative disease control/ education campaigns; to 

cooperatively work with academia, industry groups, and others to eradicate/ control 

infectious and contagious diseases of importance to animal agriculture in Iowa; and to 

protect the animal agriculture industry FAD introductions and maintain a state of 

emergency preparedness sufficient to deal with disease and natural disaster concern.” 

The Bureau has a list of 9 reportable diseases (avian influenza, BSE, chronic wasting 

disease, enzootic Newcastle disease, FMD, Johne’s, pseudorabies, scrapie, and West 

Nile virus).

The State of Colorado [22], under the Commissioner of the Colorado Department of 

Agriculture (CDA), has an Animal Industry Division headed by the State Veterinarian, an 

Assistant State Veterinarian, a Livestock Disease Veterinarian, and two field 

veterinarians. The Animal Industry Division is responsible for animal health and disease 

control activities and laboratory services. Colorado has a reportable disease list of 33

diseases, including “vesicular diseases” as a disease entity, which must be reported to 

the Colorado State Veterinarian. Under the Livestock Health Act, Colorado Revised 

Statutes, Title 35 Agriculture, Article 50: “Any person who knows or has reason to believe 

that any livestock that belongs to or is in the possession of such person, or any livestock 

upon such person’s premises, has a reportable disease shall immediately report such 

disease to the State Veterinarian”. In addition to the diseases on the list, any disease of 

unusual morbidity or mortality that does not fit a normally expected clinical picture shall 

be reported. 

The State of Oklahoma [23] has an Animal Industry Services under the Oklahoma 

Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry (ODAFF) which covers the area of animal 

health, meat inspection, and dairy production inspection. Oklahoma has a reportable 

disease list of 87 animal and poultry diseases. Under provisions of Title 59, Oklahoma 

Statutes, Section 698.15, the State Board of Agriculture declares and requires the 

following actions regarding contagious or infectious diseases of domestic animals by any 

person engaged in the practice of veterinary medicine: (1) listed reportable diseases shall 

be immediately reported to the State Veterinarian, and (2) the name, location and species 

for the disease identified must be provided. In addition, diseases not confirmed or 

diagnosed as a listed reportable disease shall be reported if the following clinical 

symptoms are exhibited: (1) sore mouth or muzzle, especially if accompanied by foot, 

udder, vulva, or skin lesions resembling blisters or vesicles; (2) encephalitis (central 

nervous system) conditions in all animals and avian species; (3) high death loss, 

especially over a short period of time in animals more than several weeks old; (4) 

reproductive problems; and (5) any highly unusual condition or unusual symptomatology 

of any kind. The State maintains its bovine brucellosis, tuberculosis, pseudorabies, and 

swine brucellosis free status, surveillance and import restrictions, and monitors and/or 
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maintains surveillance for trichomoniasis, tuberculosis, bovine babesiosis, Johne’s 

disease, anthrax, pullorum-typhoid under the National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP),

pseudorabies, scabies, screwworm, malignant catarrhal fever, and all vesicular diseases. 

The Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC) [24] has as its mission: to protect the 

animal industry from, and/or mitigate the effects of domestic, foreign and emerging 

diseases; to increase the marketability of Texas livestock commodities at the state, 

national and international level; to promote and ensure animal health and productivity; to 

protect human health from animal diseases and conditions that are transmissible to 

people; and, to prepare for and respond to emergency situations involving animals. 

TAHC works to protect the health of all Texas livestock. The TAHC works to protect the 

health of both domestic and exotic Texas livestock. The TAHC has a reportable disease 

list of 67 species-specific and multiple-species diseases. Under the Texas Administrative 

Code, Title 4, Part 2, Chapter 45, Rule 45.2, a veterinarian, a veterinary diagnostic 

laboratory, or a person having care of an animal must report the existence of reportable 

diseases to the TAHC within 24 hours after diagnosis.

c. Accredited veterinarians

The Veterinary Services maintains a list of active federally accredited veterinarians who assist with 

disease exclusion and control during non-emergencies, however, the accredited veterinarians can be 

called upon for emergency disease responses. For the most part though, accredited veterinarians 

perform official diagnostic tests, inspections, treatments and vaccinations, and submit diagnostic 

specimens to designated laboratories.

Accredited veterinarians must satisfactorily complete a core orientation program presented by the APHIS 

VS Area Office of the state in which they wish to perform accredited duties, as well as any required statespecific training. Veterinarians must indicate their accreditation category: Category I includes all animals 

except food and fibre species, horses, birds, farm-raised aquatic animals, all other livestock species, and 

zoo animals that can transmit exotic animal diseases to livestock; Category II includes all animals. 

Accreditation must be renewed every 3 years. Accredited veterinarians must complete APHIS-approved 

supplemental training for re-accreditation: 3 units for Category I veterinarians and 6 units for Category II 

veterinarians (9 CFR Parts 160, 161 [3]). The training is available online at no charge [25].

Federal legislation allows for the establishment of standards of conduct for accredited veterinarians: 

accreditation could be suspended or revoked if there is a violation. An accredited veterinarian shall 

perform the functions of an accredited veterinarian only in a state in which the accredited veterinarian is 

licensed. The tasks to perform are clinical examinations, animal identification, export certification, official 

seals application and removal, blood sampling, and application of cleaning and disinfection plans. The 

regulations concerning accredited veterinarians are published in 9 CFR Parts 160, 161, 162 [3]. The 

regulations require accredited veterinarians to be able to develop appropriate biosecurity protocols, as 

well as cleaning and disinfection protocols, to control communicable disease spread. These skills are 

necessary to control or prevent the spread of diseases encountered within the normal course of 

veterinary practice. In the event of an FAD outbreak, accredited veterinarians would follow biosecurity 

measures and cleaning and disinfection protocols developed at the state or federal level. A National 

Veterinary Accreditation Program Reference Guide, July 2011 [26], details the involvement of accredited 

veterinarians in control and eradication programs, animal health emergency management, movement 

controls, disease surveillance, laboratory submission, cleaning and disinfection, and animal identification. 

Additionally, the National Veterinary Accreditation Program (NVAP) [27] details the compliance 

requirements and regulations pertaining to the responsibilities of the accredited veterinarian.
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d. Stakeholders

Mechanisms are in place for collaboration/ interaction with all stakeholders, including state governments 

and industries. There is legal provision in the Animal Health Protection Act (109, Sec. 8310) [1] on 

cooperation among stakeholders to carry out operations or measures for animal health protection, 

including different federal agencies, states or political subdivisions of states, national governments of 

foreign countries, local governments of foreign countries, and domestic or international organizations, 

domestic or international associations. All decisions or policy changes involve a regulatory change, which 

includes a consultation process with all stakeholders, including industry representatives.
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3. HUMAN AND MATERIAL RESOURCES

a. Personnel

There are 83,730 veterinarians registered in the US: 546 are permanent veterinarians at the national 

level: 369 are field veterinarians; 11 are in Emergency Management and Diagnostics and 31 are in the 

National Veterinary Service Laboratory. 67,000 veterinarians are federally accredited. The Veterinary 

Services employ 179 full-time veterinarians in the Eastern Region and 184 full-time veterinarians in the 

Western Region [2]. In 2001, APHIS established the National Animal Health Emergency Response 

Corps (NAHERC) [28] as an additional resource to supply veterinary personnel for emergencies.

Between FY 2002 and FY 2005, funds for the veterinary services more than doubled. It resulted in 

approximately 300 additional permanent staff (20% increase) to address, at least partially, the under 

staffing noted in the review of the National Association of State Departments of Agriculture (NASDA). 

Personnel were added in key positions in surveillance and emergency response.

b. Education and training

It is apparent that the VS of the USDA strongly encourages continuing education and training of federal 

and state veterinarians, especially in the area of FAD preparedness and animal disease control and 

eradication. The VS offers FAD training courses, courses in epidemiology, emergency response, FAD 

agents, scrapie surveillance, brucellosis, tuberculosis, Johne’s disease, pseudorabies, and poultry 

diseases. Federal veterinarians must achieve a designated number of continuing education hours, 

ensuring that the VS consists of fully-trained personnel capable of responding quickly and adequately to 

emergency situations (page 72 [2]). NPICC has a responsibility for planning and coordinating delivery of 

training of field personnel for readiness to respond to an animal disease outbreak as well as training of 

private veterinary practitioners to work cooperatively with federal and state veterinarians.

There is over 250 specially trained state or federal veterinarians, known as Foreign Animal Disease 

Diagnosticians (FADDs). On average, 160 participants are trained in FAD diagnostics each year. The 

FADD course is a 2-week classroom and laboratory course that provides training in identifying and 

diagnosing FAD diseases in poultry and livestock, and in the investigation of potential foreign and 

emerging animal diseases. Foreign Animal Disease Practitioner (FADP) courses for APHIS field 

Veterinary Medical Officers and state veterinarians are 1-week classroom and laboratory courses to 

demonstrate necropsy techniques, sampling, and FAD investigation (pages 74, 75 [2]).

The National Veterinary Accreditation Program certifies private veterinary practitioners to work 

cooperatively with federal veterinarians and state animal health officials. Continuing education is a 

requirement for private veterinarians to maintain accreditation (page 72 [2]). A great proportion of the 

core group of veterinarians (80%) are the accredited veterinarians, who would be in the front lines of the 

response. Mechanisms are in place to monitor this group and to ensure that proper training is provided 

for rapid detection and response.

There are 28 veterinary medical schools in the US accredited by the American Veterinary Medical 

Association (AVMA) (page 21 [2]).
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c. Monitoring and audit programs

i. Strategic plans: objectives and priorities

According to the VS Strategic Plan 2006-2011 [29], the Veterinary Services is responsible for protecting 

and improving the health, productivity, quality, and marketability of animals, animal products, and 

veterinary biologics by monitoring animal health and conducting surveillance for animal diseases; 

preventing, controlling and/or eliminating zoonotic and animal diseases; and partnering with domestic and 

global stakeholders. Priorities are to improve and streamline the regulatory processes, to resource the 

National Surveillance Unit and complete national surveillance objectives, to complete the eradication of 

brucellosis and tuberculosis, to improve LPAI/ HPAI surveillance, to establish the National Veterinary 

Stockpile, to continue development of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network, to complete 

National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) accreditation, to support new technologies that improve 

productivity, to increase the number of veterinary biologics available, and to improve VS information 

technology.

The Veterinary Services 2015 Project, One Health Strategic Direction [30] has the aim to have the VS 

lead in the animal health component of One Health. The goals in this One Health strategic plan include 

the alignment of VS policy, programs and infrastructure with the plan’s vision, building collaborations and 

partnerships in the OH community and building new skill sets to support and integrate the One Health 

principle. 

ii. Performance assessment 

In 2000, APHIS established a cooperative agreement with the National Association of State Departments 

of Agriculture Research Foundation (NASDA) to coordinate an assessment of capabilities of the US, state 

governments, and the livestock industry to protect US livestock from animal diseases. The NASDA report 

was published in October 2001 as the National Animal Health Safeguarding Review [31]. It included 

domestic detection and surveillance, exclusion committee, international information, and response. 

The mission of the exclusion committee was to review all facets of efforts to prevent incursions of FADs 

into the US, from gathering international animal health information, promulgating import regulations, and 

physical inspection activities at ports of entry, to domestic surveillance and monitoring systems.

There are six strategic goals that guide USDA’s core performance measures: to enhance international 

competitiveness of American agriculture; to enhance the competitiveness and sustainability of rural and 

farm economies; to support increased economic opportunities and improved quality of life in rural 

America; to enhance protection and safety of the Nation’s agriculture and food supply; to improve the 

Nation’s nutrition and health; and to protect and enhance the Nation’s natural resource base and 

environment.

Different types of reviews and audits are done regularly to evaluate the efficacy and adequacy of the 

Veterinary Services, and changes are made according to findings and recommendations. Different 

sources of funds are available to ensure proper response in case of an emergency, and there is good 

collaboration with other stakeholders. The states are a crucial player of the VS if an emergency situation 

should occur. Based on recommendations of previous reviews, many discussions and working 

collaborations were implemented to improve communication and to harmonise efforts.
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iii. Compliance

APHIS Investigation and Enforcement Services unit investigates violations of VS regulations and 

coordinates with the Office of General Counsel to prosecute these violations. USDA’s Office of the 

Inspector General conducts periodic independent audits of the VS programs to ensure compliance with 

program objectives [2, 32, 33].

d. Budget and finances

The budget for VS was, from 2001 to 2007 respectively (in millions of US dollars): 272, 260, 518, 344, 

335, 261, and 296. The budget difference between 2001 and 2007 is 9%. Some of the budget comes as 

transfers from the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC), a government-operated corporation that 

stabilizes farm income and prices. The budget for Emergency Management and Diagnostics (EMD) went 

from 2.6 million in 2001 to 9.4 m in 2007. As an example, CCC transfers for AI (low/highly pathogenic 

avian influenza) amounted in 2002 to $84.4 m, in 2004 $15.4 m, in 2006 $37.2 m, and in 2007 $8.2 m. 

while a transfer of $ 214 m for END occurred in 2003 (pages 23, 24 [2]).

Funds are provided to state cooperators through grants and cooperative agreements. In an animal health 

emergency VS may obtain additional funds from other unobligated sources as determined by the 

Secretary of Agriculture. The Deputy Administrator of Veterinary Services can send a written request to 

the Secretary for CCC funds to respond to an emergency pest, disease threat, or outbreak affecting US 

agricultural commodities (page 22 [2]).

e. Material resources

The VS operates or staffs six Animal Health Districts, four hub locations (Fort Collins, Colorado; Ames, 

Iowa; Raleigh, North Carolina; and Riverdale, Maryland), six NIES Service Centers, 17 NIES Northern 

Border Ports, 11 NIES Southern Border Ports, three NIES Animal Import Centers (Los Angeles, Miami, 

and New York) and six NIES Air and Sea Ports [9]. In FY 2008 APHIS operated 4273 vehicles and 44 

aircraft. The operating costs of the vehicles in FY 2008 were over $8.3 million (page 72 [2]).

The National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) [14] provides diagnostic services for domestic and 

foreign animal diseases, responds to animal health emergencies, assists in managing the National 

Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) and serves as an international reference laboratory. It 

comprises four laboratories at two locations, the Diagnostic Bacteriology Laboratory (DBL), Ames, Iowa, 

Diagnostic Virology Laboratory (DVL), Ames, Iowa, Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory 

(FADDL), Plum Island, New York and the Pathobiology Laboratory (PL), Ames, Iowa.

Research responsibilities in relation to animal health and veterinary public health matters are conducted 

in Agriculture Research Service (ARS) laboratories. In FY 2008 had a budget of $74 million for livestock 

protection research and $104 million for food safety research (page 35 [2], [34]). 

For communication, there is the VS Process Streamlining System (VSPS) [35] which provides a 

consistent and standard method of capturing data at all levels. Information is shared among 

stakeholders, which include VS personnel, accredited veterinarians, state officials, importers, and 

exporters. The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) Information Technology System

[15] is setup to standardize data, maximize the efficiency of data transfer, report laboratory results in the 

event of an animal disease outbreak, enhance surveillance programs and recognize emerging issues. 

The system is available in all NAHLN laboratories. 
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4. EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS

a. Contingency planning

i. Federal emergency plans

Contingency plans are available at all levels of intervention and follow national standards included in the 

National Incident Management System. Once VS identifies an animal health incident the Agency 

activates its response system following National Incident Management System standards [36, 37], which 

employ an Incident Command System (ICS) at the incident level. In the event of a major animal health 

emergency in the US, ICS makes it possible for the appropriate local, state, and federal governments and 

their private sector partners to respond in a coordinated, mutually supportive manner to define the nature 

of the disease outbreak or other emergency, initiate an appropriate response, eliminate or control the 

disease or other hazard, and help facilitate recovery (page 65 [2]).

The ICS provides a managerial and organizational structure to accomplish the objectives in the incident 

action plan. In any given animal health incident, one of three levels of response (local, state, and federal) 

may be appropriate and commensurate with the severity of the outbreak or other emergency. Industry 

agricultural officials as well as non-agricultural personnel from government (for example, the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) through the National Response Framework (NRF) [38] and the 

private sector are included to accomplish national-level crisis management, response coordination, 

consultation, and consequence management (page 65 [2]).

The NRF [38] was developed in response to the Homeland Security Presidential Directive to align federal 

coordination structures, capabilities, and resources into a unified, all-hazards approach to domestic 

incident management (page 66 [2]). The NRF presents the guiding principles that enable all response 

partners to prepare for and provide a unified national response to disasters and emergencies. It 

establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. A second 

edition of the National Response Framework became available in 2013, while the first edition was 

released in 2008. It describes how communities, tribes, states, the federal government, private sectors, 

and non-governmental partners work together to coordinate national response; describes specific 

authorities and best practices for managing incidents; and builds upon the National Incident Management 

System (NIMS) [36], which provides a consistent template for managing incidents. 

ii. APHIS emergency plans

Extensive coordination efforts are in place to ensure continual collaboration between all stakeholders in 

emergency response. Emergency preparedness and response are done in partnership with various 

governments and stakeholders: federal, state, tribal, local, industry, and other private sector cooperators. 

APHIS coordinates the efforts mounted jointly by the federal government and the governments of affected 

states. Each year VS provides FAD and emergency response training to federal and state veterinarians, 

program specialists, and others [39].
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The Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services (SPRS) [40] is an integrated system for dealing 

with animal health incidents in the US. For preparedness and incident management, The SPRS develops 

and distributes emergency response guidelines based on the National Incident Management System and 

the Incident Command System for responding to a foreign animal disease or pest, and providing incident 

goals, objectives, strategies, procedures, and timelines; coordinates investigations and disseminates 

information about suspected outbreaks of foreign animal diseases; manages the National Animal Health 

Emergency Response Corps (NAHERC), a reserve of veterinarians and animal health technicians who 

can assist state and federal response efforts during an animal health event; and supports continuity of 

business planning through cooperative agreements with universities. For interagency coordination, the 

SPRS identifies resources and clarifies roles in the event of an animal emergency through participation in 

interagency and international working groups and permanent assignments at other Federal agencies; 

develops methods and techniques to obtain and analyze surveillance information within USDA and 

APHIS; leads the implementation of the joint USDA/Department of Homeland Security foreign animal 

disease modeling analysis center, and contributes funding to additional modeling efforts through 

cooperative agreements; and coordinates development and deployment of emergency disposal and 

decontamination tools through international, federal, state, industry and academic working groups and 

partnerships. The SPRS Logistics Center manages the National Veterinary Stockpile (NVS) of vaccines, 

supplies, equipment, field tests, vaccines, and support services) to ensure states have the resources to 

fight catastrophic animal disease outbreaks.

NVSL provides APHIS’s laboratory services. The NVSL provides a wide variety of information and 

services including the diagnosis of domestic and FADs, support of disease control and eradication 

programs, reagents for diagnostic testing, training, and laboratory certification (pages 64, 65 [2]). 

APHIS has developed agent-focussed response plans and guidelines for FMD, CSF, END and HPAI [41-

44] and for other diseases including African swine fever (ASF), Rift Valley fever (RVF), and peste des 

petits ruminants (PPR). These plans address agent-specific issues within the emergency response, such 

as initial field investigations; local disease control, health and safety, and special eradication activities; 

and interagency coordination.

To minimize the danger of a catastrophic multi-state FAD outbreak, APHIS, in cooperation with its state 

and industry partners, is expanding the US’ ability to respond to any animal emergency by developing 

locally based, nationally coordinated Animal Emergency Response Organizations at the state level. 

APHIS has designed these organizations, which draw upon the principles of the Incident Command 

System, to integrate easily with each state’s emergency management system as well as the National 

Response Framework (NRF). The NRF directs federal government agencies to mobilize for such 

emergencies (pages 65, 66 [2]).
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iii. State emergency plans

A primary role of state government is to supplement and facilitate local efforts before, during, and after 

incidents. The state provides direct and routine assistance to its local jurisdictions through emergency 

management program development and by routinely coordinating these efforts with federal officials. 

States must be prepared to maintain or accelerate the provision of commodities and services to local 

governments when local capabilities fall short of demands.

Under the Framework, the term “state” and discussion of the roles and responsibilities of states typically 

include similar responsibilities that apply to US territories and possessions, and tribal governments. Under 

the Stafford Act [45] , states are also responsible for requesting federal emergency assistance for 

communities and tribal governments within their jurisdiction. In response to an incident, the state helps 

coordinate and integrate resources, and applies them to local needs.

In an animal health emergency, including the outbreak of a highly contagious or significant zoonotic 

disease, the state activates its state, regional, or local emergency operations centers (EOCs), as needed, 

to interface with local governments, other state agencies, and the private sector. The State Veterinarian 

and the Assistant District Director (ADD) establish a Unified Command, which serves as the focal point for 

coordinating the disease management decision-making process (page 66 [2]). 

An example of a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) (Appendix 4 [2]) for the state role in animal 

emergency exists although no agreement has yet been signed. The MOU defines that the state and 

APHIS will work together in a unified command response organization, using the National Incident 

Management System. The operational activities under the program may include information 

dissemination, biosecurity measures, disease investigation, surveillance, vaccination, quarantine, 

valuation and compensation, depopulation, disposal, cleaning and disinfection, and evaluation for 

repopulation through use of sentinel animals. The state may have to mobilize additional resources from 

within the state. An MOU between VS and the National Assembly of State Animal Health Officials was 

signed October 11, 2009 on the communication of an initial investigation or laboratory finding of a high 

consequence livestock disease (Appendix B [7]).

 

b. Livestock traceability: animal and premises identification

Specific regulations pertaining to identification of certain cattle over two years of age and swine in 

interstate commerce are located in 9 CFR Parts 71.18 and 71.19, respectively. Specific regulations exist 

pertaining to the identification of animals for the control of certain diseases, that is, the identification of 

cattle for tuberculosis (9 CFR Part 77) and brucellosis control (9 CFR Part 78), identification of swine for 

brucellosis (9 CFR Part 79) and pseudorabies control (9 CFR Part 85), identification of sheep and goats 

for scrapie control (9 CFR Part 79), and identification of poultry for exotic Newcastle disease (END) 

control (9 CFR Part 82). General regulations for the traceability of US livestock moving interstate when 

animal disease events take place are found in 9 CFR Part 86, which was issued by the USDA on 

January 9, 2013 [46]. 

The rule of 9 CFR Part 86 establishes minimum national official identification and documentation 

requirements for the traceability of livestock moving interstate. The species covered in the proposed rule 

include cattle and bison, sheep and goats, swine, horses and other equines, captive cervids (e.g., deer 

and elk), and poultry. The covered animals moved interstate, unless otherwise exempt, would have to be 

officially identified and accompanied by an interstate certificate of veterinary inspection (ICVI) or other 

movement document. Livestock moved interstate to a custom slaughter facility or entirely within Tribal 

land are exempt from the regulations.
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Cattle: the official identification requirements for interstate movement apply to all sexually intact cattle and 

bison 18 months of age or over, female dairy cattle of any age and dairy male cattle born after March 11, 

2013, cattle and bison of any age used for rodeo or recreational events, and cattle and bison used for 

shows or exhibitions, unless exempt as indicated in 9 CFR Part 86.4 (b) 1 (i) A to D and (ii) for cattle and 

bison moved interstate direct to a slaughter establishment or to a livestock facility and then to a slaughter 

establishment, where they are harvested within 3 days of arrival. The ICVI is required for all interstate 

movement with the exemption that: 1) they are moved directly to a recognized slaughtering 

establishment, or directly to an approved livestock facility and then directly to a recognized slaughtering 

establishment, and they are accompanied by an owner-shipper statement; 2) moved directly to an 

approved livestock facility with an owner-shipper statement and do not move interstate from the facility 

unless accompanied by an ICVI; or for some other situations indicated in 9 CFR Part 86.5 (c).

Swine: The traceability rule for swine is based on the existing regulations for swine in 9 CFR Part 79.19 

without change in the requirements for interstate movement of these animals.

Sheep and goats: The traceability rule requires that sheep and goats moved interstate must be officially 

identified prior to the interstate movement unless they are exempt from official identification requirements 

under 9 CFR Part 79.

Poultry: Poultry that are required to be officially identified for interstate movement must be identified by 

sealed and numbered leg bands in accordance with the National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) 

regulations (9 CFR Parts 145 through 147) or a group/ lot identification number (GIN) when it may be 

used. Poultry moving interstate must be officially identified prior to interstate movement unless: as 

agreed to by the states or tribes involved in the movement; the poultry is from a hatchery to a redistributor 

or poultry grower; or the shipment is from a redistributor to a poultry grower and the person responsible 

for receiving the chicks maintains a record of the supplier of the chicks. Poultry moved interstate must be 

accompanied by an ICVI unless: they are from a flock participating in the NPIP and are accompanied by 

the documentation required for participation in that program; they are moved directly to a recognized 

slaughtering establishment; they are moved under permit in accordance with 9 CFR Part 82 pertaining to 

END, and other reasons indicated in 9 CFR Part 86.5 (g) .

c. Internal movement controls

Interstate movement regulations of live animals and poultry are included in 9 CFR Part 71 [3] which give 

provisions for movement, animal identification during interstate commerce, and provisions on maintaining 

sanitary conditions in facilities and means of conveyance. Each state has the authority to place 

quarantines and hold orders in the event of a disease outbreak. 

d. Surveillance and reporting of epidemiological information

i. Passive surveillance

In 2012, APHIS conducted 586 investigations of suspected FADs or emerging disease incidents in 47

states and Puerto Rico. Of these, 475 were vesicular complaints, 275 in equids, 152 were in bovids, 18 

in goats, 13 in sheep, 9 in pigs, 5 in alpaca and 3 in deer. Of the 586 investigations of suspected FADs, 

36 resulted in a confirmed FAD finding, all 36 were diagnosed as vesicular stomatitis.

The number of FAD investigations in previous years was: 1013 in 2004, 995 in 2005, 491 in 2006, 383 in 

2007, 290 in 2008, 302 in 2009, 361 in 2010, and 327 in 2011 [47].
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ii. Active surveillance

APHIS has partnered with other federal and state agencies and the commercial poultry industry in 

conducting surveillance for AI for many years. All commercial poultry flocks are tested for avian influenza 

through industry, state and federal efforts. The USDA tests wild birds for avian influenza in cooperation 

with the states and Department of the Interior. The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) H5/H7 

LPAI Monitored Program requires the testing of meat-type chickens (broilers, roasters, Cornish, and 

fryers), commercial table-egg layers, meat-type turkeys, meat-type waterfowl and game birds, and raisedfor-release waterfowl and game birds. Screening tests are performed in 129 NPIP-authorized

laboratories throughout the country [48]. 

Active surveillance is being done for classical swine fever in high-risk states (Florida and Texas) and in 

Puerto Rico, high-risk herds such as waste feeders, feral swine, and in sick pig submissions to veterinary 

diagnostic laboratories [49]. There is currently no active surveillance for END or FMD [50].

e. Laboratory support

The National Veterinary Services Laboratories (NVSL) [14] is an OIE reference laboratory for 13 diseases 

such as vesicular stomatitis, END and HPAI. It received international accreditation to ISO 17025, ISO 

17403 and ISO Guide. NVSL’s responsibilities include diagnosing domestic and FADs; providing 

diagnostic support for disease control, disease eradication, and animal-health monitoring programs; 

testing samples from animals for import and export; training APHIS and other US and international 

personnel; certifying US laboratories to handle the testing for selected diseases; and acting as a 

comprehensive reference laboratory. NVSL is responsible for laboratory certification at state and 

university levels to conduct official testing for certain diseases. The NVSL is the official reference 

laboratory for FAD diagnostic testing and study in the US. The NVSL trains and proficiency tests the 

NAHLN member laboratories either annually or semi-annually. Tests include standardized screening 

methods for the currently targeted diseases in the NAHLN (AI, END, FMD, CSF, PRV, BSE, SIV, CWD, 

scrapie, and VS). NAHLN laboratories perform screening assays and forward any suspect or positive 

samples to the appropriate section of the NVSL for confirmatory testing. The NVSL must perform or 

officially confirm the results of all diagnostic testing and studies related to FAD investigations in the US.

NVSL has a Quality Assurance Program that requires laboratories within NVSL and NAHLN to 

demonstrate technical competence in testing and calibration in accordance with international standards. 

Various external agencies conduct audits on a regular basis, including regulatory agencies and an 

independent accrediting body recognized by the International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation 

(ILAC). NAHLN laboratories participate in yearly validation of testing procedures that include certification 

to monitor the ability of the organizations and staff to conduct these tests.

The National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN) [15] is part of a national strategy to coordinate 

the capabilities of federal, state, and university diagnostic laboratories. It is comprised of 61 state and 

university laboratories. NVSL validates positive or unexpected results. The NAHLN labs can do rapid 

tests such as for CSF, FMD, END, and AI. NAHLN initiated a surveillance program for CSF in 2006. This 

surveillance program targets sick pig submissions to veterinary diagnostic laboratories, slaughter swine 

with high risk of CSF exposure, feral swine, swine populations with high risk of CSF exposure in Florida, 

Texas and Puerto Rico and FAD investigations. NAHLN does not have a surveillance program for HPAI, 

however, many of the NAHLN laboratories are involved in AI testing for VS and state surveillance 

programs. Personnel in AI-approved NAHLN laboratories maintain current training and proficiency testing 

and this is the case for FMD-approved and END-approved NAHLN laboratories. NAHLN Methods 

Technical Working Group, established in July 2006, consists of personnel from NAHLN laboratories and 

NVSL. The working group provides input on various aspects of methods approval and validation. In 

addition, NAHLN is a participating member of the Integrated Consortium of Laboratory Networks, a multi-
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Canadian Food Inspection Agency 31

department and multi-agency effort led by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). This group 

identifies gaps in surveillance and diagnostic efforts of national importance, and develops mechanisms for 

collaborating and sharing information and resources.

The American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians (AAVLD) [51] administers an 

accreditation program for public veterinary diagnostic laboratories in North America. Collaboration is 

being done between US, Mexico, and Canada to harmonize tests.
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PART 1 - CONCLUSIONS

• Emergency response is shared at both federal and state levels. Close collaboration between the 

State Veterinarian and the APHIS Assistant District Director is crucial and fundamental to 

manage a disease incursion. This cooperation between the USDA and the states has been 

occurring for many years with respect to several animal disease eradication, certification, disease 

control, and monitoring programs. 

• The organizational structure of the VS provides for an autonomous, integrated and inclusive 

veterinary services which is highly capable for response to an animal health emergency.

• The VS organization possesses the key functional capabilities for the effective control of the 

animal health status of the US.

• The legislative authority of the Animal Health and Protection Act and Title 9 of the Code of 

Federal Regulations permits the VS to have control over animal health in cooperation with state 

authorities.

• The human and material resources of the VS and state animal health services are adequate to 

respond properly to an FAD incursion and zoning approach.

• The continuing education and training programs of federal, state, and accredited veterinarians in 

the area of FAD preparedness, animal disease control, and eradication are exemplary and the 

basis for competence of the veterinary services.

• The capability to promptly detect incursion of disease is supported by active and passive 

surveillance and a strong laboratory network. The laboratory network in the US is well 

coordinated and can adequately provide high quality support for on-going surveillance, prompt 

detection, and appropriate capacity during an outbreak situation.

• The traceability capability establishes minimum national official identification and documentation 

requirements for the traceability of livestock moving interstate.

• The veterinary infrastructure of the United States has the capability to detect and respond 

promptly to new incursions of highly infectious disease on its territory. Reporting to trading 

partners, including Canada, and to the international community would be done in a timely 

manner.

• Zoning of FAD incursions in the US would be supported by a competent, effective and capable 

veterinary infrastructure.
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PART 2 - PROCEDURES FOR ZONING AND MAINTAINING 

ZONE INTEGRITY

Figure 8. Zones established in the event of an FAD outbreak.

Part 2 reviews the eradication phases which are conducted if a highly infectious foreign animal disease is

detected in part of the country and the zoning procedures applied to differentiate the disease status of the 

infected zone from the disease-free rest of the country.

APHIS defines a Control Area (CA) similar to the OIE definition of infected zone (Figure 8). The CA

includes both an Infected Zone (IZ) and a buffer zone (BZ). The IZ would have its perimeter at least 3 km 

beyond the perimeters of an Infected Premises (IP), whether a presumptive positive or confirmed positive 

premises. The perimeter of the BZ would be at least 7 km beyond the perimeter of the IZ [52]. Numerous

factors, however, are considered in determining the size of a CA as presented in Table 3-1 of the APHIS 

Foreign Animal Disease Framework Response Strategies [52] and Table 5-5 of the USDA APHIS FMD 

Response Plan: The Red Book and the respective documents for CSF, HPAI (Table 5-4) and ND [41-44].

A containment vaccination zone (CVZ) is an emergency vaccination zone inside the CA. The CVZ may

include all of or part of an IZ and/or the BZ [52].

A surveillance zone (SZ) outside and along the border of the CA would be established to ensure the rapid 

and effective containment of disease with a focus on premises with the highest risk of infection. The 

width of the SZ would be at least 10 km [52].

Free area (FA) is defined is a territory not included in the CA and represents an area in which this

subpopulation of animals has a disease free status. The FA contains the SZ [52].

A protection vaccination zone (PVZ) is an emergency vaccination zone outside the CA and may be 

subject to movement control and surveillance requirements as well as biosecurity procedures [52].
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In a highly contagious foreign animal disease (HCFAD) outbreak there are six types of premises 

designations. An infected premises (IP) is a premises where a presumptive positive case or confirmed 

positive case exists as determined by laboratory results, clinical signs, and case definition. A contact 

premises (CP) is a premises with susceptible animals that may have been exposed to the FAD agent. A 

premises that is contiguous to an IP may be classified as a CP. A suspect premises (SP) is a premises 

under investigation due to the presence of susceptible animals reported to have clinical signs of an FAD. 

An at-risk premises (ARP) is a premises with susceptible animals but none have clinical signs of an FAD 

and an ARP is located within an IZ or BZ. A monitored premises (MP) is a premises which is an ARP but 

meets a set of criteria to move susceptible animals or animal products out of a CA by permit. A 

vaccinated premises (VP) is a premises where emergency vaccination has been performed. A free 

premises is a premises outside a CA, it can be located within a SZ or elsewhere in the FA [52].

The diseases of interest for zoning are highly contagious diseases in which rapid response and physical 

containment of infected premises is crucial for the control of the disease. Zoning would be the best 

approach. For that evaluation, four diseases were reviewed, FMD, CSF, HPAI and END. They are 

considered typical examples where zoning would be highly beneficial for disease control and trade 

purposes.

.

1. SUSPECT PHASE

a. Triggers

A highly contagious foreign animal disease (HCFAD) is one that spreads rapidly from animal to animal 

and, if given the opportunity, from herd to herd. Transmission can occur via direct and indirect modes. 

An HCFAD may be recognized by greater than normal morbidity or mortality per unit time (high incidence 

rate or high attack rate), where morbidity could be characterized by a loss of production even without 

overt signs of clinical disease. Foreign animal diseases such as FMD, CSF, END, and HPAI are 

considered highly contagious and would require a rapid and coordinated response to control and 

eliminate the agent. 

A suspect case is an animal that has clinical signs consistent with a highly contagious FAD. Cattle, pigs, 

sheep and goats are susceptible to FMD, pigs to CSF and poultry to END and HPAI. Livestock owners or 

managers, private veterinarians, and federal and state veterinarians are the initial detectors of an 

HCFAD. FMD is typically recognized by vesicular signs whereas mortality may be the prominent sign of 

CSF, END and HPAI.

b. Field investigation

When livestock producers or veterinary practitioners suspect an HCFAD, they notify the State 

Veterinarian or the Assistant District Director (ADD). Depending on whether the suspect case is of high 

suspicion, categorized as Priority 1, the ADD notifies the Veterinary Services (VS) District Office and the 

National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center (NPIC). 

A Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician (FADD) is assigned to conduct an investigation of the disease, 

including animal investigation and laboratory testing. This has to be initiated within 8 hours of receiving 

the initial report. The Director of the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) reports the FAD test 

results to VS, NPICC, ADD for the state of the National Animal Health Laboratory Network (NAHLN), and 

the ADD for the state of sample submission. The FADD informs the owner and veterinarian [7].
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2. INVESTIGATION PHASE

The FAD/EDI investigation period is defined as the time from when the investigation is initiated until the 

FAD/EDI is ruled out by a FADD field investigation, NVSL laboratory diagnostic testing or study results or 

by VS case definitions. The objectives of the investigation includes a veterinary assessment consisting of 

a differential diagnosis, classification as to low, intermediate or high suspicion of an FAD, and designation 

of the priority of the diagnostic sample and provision of the presumptive and definitive diagnostic testing 

results as rapidly as required by the priority designation of the diagnostic sample.

The procedures for investigating an FAD are laid out in a VS Guidance 12001.1 [53, 54]. The Area 

District Director (ADD) and State Animal Health Official (SAHO) will initiate a timely investigation of all 

reported suspect FADs and assign the most readily available FADD to complete an investigation. The 

ADD and/or SAHO will assign a FAD/EDI Case Coordinator(s) to assist with investigation support, 

communications, and Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) data entry, as required by the 

location, scale, complexity, or urgency of the investigation.

During the investigation of a suspected HCFAD or emerging disease incident (EDI), an FADD will use 

clinical signs, history, and professional judgement to determine the likelihood of the existence of an

HCFAD or EDI. The assessment of a suspect HCFAD will include taking a history of clinical and 

epidemiological findings, performing physical examinations, performing necropsies, collecting diagnostic

specimens, investigating trace backs and trace forwards, and recommending intrastate and interstate 

quarantines.

a. Sampling

Sample collection and diagnostics is briefly described in Section 5.4 of the respective Response Plans for 

FMD, CSF, END and HPAI [41-44]. The Foreign Animal Disease (FAD) Investigation Manual, FAD PReP 

Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan [55] provides detailed information on field kit 

components, protective equipment, sample collection, necropsy procedures, investigation procedures, 

diagnostic sample prioritization and preparation of diagnostic specimens for shipping.

b. Diagnosis

The classification of an FAD/EDI investigation as high suspicion indicates that the disease situation is 

consistent with a FAD/EDI and inconsistent with an endemic disease. With an intermediate suspicion, the 

assessments are consistent with either an FAD/EDI or endemic disease. With a low suspicion, the 

assessments are consistent with an endemic disease and inconsistent with a FAD/EDI. Upon

classification to rank and prioritize the differential diagnosis in terms of the magnitude of suspicion for a 

foreign animal disease, the FADD, ADD and SAHO designate the priority of sample submission and 

contact the VS and NPICC. For investigations which are classified as high suspicion, diagnostic sample 

submissions are categorized as priority 1. The sample collection, transportation and diagnostic testing

are conducted rapidly any day of the year and at any time of the day. Priority 2 sample submissions 

which arrive on a weekday or a Saturday during business hours are submitted to testing while 

submissions received after hours are processed the next weekday. Priority 3 designated sample 

submissions are treated as with routine surveillance samples [54].

The NVSL (two locations NVSL Ames (Iowa) and NVSL FADDL (Plum Island, New York) and the NAHLN 

are responsible for the diagnostic testing and studies. Two sets of diagnostics samples may be obtained, 

one set for the NVSL and the other set for the NAHLN laboratory. When a second set of diagnostic 

samples cannot be obtained, then the samples are submitted to the NVSL [54].
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Information collected during the investigation includes, but not limited to, the clinical signs, lesions 

observed, herd/flock morbidity and mortality rates, duration of signs, species affected and the incident 

history of the herd/flock [54].

3. ACTIVATION PHASE

a. Decision to activate Incident Management Team

The APHIS Administrator is the federal executive responsible for the management of an incident such as 

an outbreak of FMD, CSF, END and HPAI. The APHIS Administrator will delegate much of the actual 

management of the incident to the Veterinary Services Deputy Administrator and APHIS Emergency 

Management Leadership Council (EMLC). The VS Deputy Administrator and EMLC will establish an 

APHIS Incident Coordination Group to oversee the staff functions associated with the incident at the 

APHIS headquarters level. The Incident Coordinator will work closely with the personnel in charge of 

establishing operations of the incident response at the Area Command (AC) or Incident Command Post 

(ICP) in the field and coordinate with the APHIS Multiagency Coordinating Group (MAC). The APHIS 

MAC Group provides support, coordination and assistance with policy-level decisions and is formed as 

the incident expands in size requiring off-scene coordination and support (Chapter 3 [56]).

The ADD and the affected state SAHO will initially serve as the Co-Incident Commanders for the unified 

Incident Command Post. The ADD and SAHO may be relieved by a VS Incident Management Team 

Incident Commander if there is a delegation of authority to the VS Incident Management Team. When 

more than one incident is occurring at the same time, more than one Incident Command (IC) may be 

established. An Area Command (AC) may be established. The AC will be responsible for managing 

coordination of all the incidents, along with the ADD and state officials.

Furthermore, the NCAHEM Incident Coordination Group Plan (NCAHEM is now known as NPICC)

provides a framework for incident management, including, elaborating: the procedures and protocols for 

executing APHIS Emergency Operations Center (AEOC) operations; coordination of the process for 

Level I (highest resource requirement), Level II and Level III (events; the organizational structure of the 

APHIS Incident Coordination Group (ICG) and its capabilities for incident response and coordination; the 

procedures for investigating a potential foreign animal disease or emerging disease incident; the roles 

and responsibilities of the ICG and NPICC personnel for incident management and continuity of 

operations; the provisions for delegation of authority for an incident; the relationship of NPICC with other 

Veterinary Services (VS) and APHIS departments, district offices, and Federal agencies involved in the 

response and the interaction among these organizations; and the process for requesting and distributing 

funds to support the incident response (Chapter 1 [56]).

b. Reporting

The NVSL Director, upon positive, suspect or inconclusive laboratory results, immediately contacts the 

VS Deputy Administrator, the VS Associate Deputy Administrator for Emergency Management and 

Diagnostics, the NPICC or VS District Office, the ADD for the state of the NAHLN, and the ADD for the 

state of the sample submission. Upon this notification from the NVSL Director, the NPICC or VS District

Office coordinates a conference call within 2 hours. The FADD notifies the producer, owner and the 

veterinarian [53, 54]. Cases of clinical illness that are found to be presumptive positive, based on the 

current case definition for FMD at NVSL FADDL will be reported to the affected States, other States, 

Tribal Nations, industry, other Federal agencies, trading partners, and the World Organization for Animal 
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Health (OIE) [57] . The Emergency Management Response System (EMRS) FAD/EDI is a web-based 

database to record FAD/EDI investigations. EMRS manages information such as the case information, 

movement controls, permitting actions, epidemiological investigations, disease surveillance, laboratory 

test results, vaccine inventory, and vaccinated animals [58].

c. Movement Controls

The Incident Commander, Disease Surveillance Branch (Operations Section), and Situation Unit 

(Planning Section) coordinate to establish an IZ and BZ within 12 hours of the identification of the index 

case. Controlled movement orders and 24-hour standstill notices are implemented. The movement 

controls within the state are under the SAHO. State officials quarantine susceptible animals, animal 

products, and potentially contaminated fomites such as conveyances, and implement movement control 

in the form of a permit system. Implementation of quarantine and the administration of a permit system 

for movement control would be described in each state’s animal health emergency response plan. 

Federal officials initially quarantine the entire affected state; the quarantine remains in place until the 

disease is eradicated or an effective Control Area smaller than a whole state is implemented. The USDA 

would impose a federal quarantine on interstate commerce from the infected state(s) and request the 

infected and adjoining states to provide resources to enforce the quarantine (Section 5.10 [41-44]). 

The CA, consisting of the IZ and the BZ, would be established to ensure the rapid and effective 

containment of the disease. Initially, multiple counties or the entire state under the authority of the SAHO, 

a Tribal Nation or multiple states would be declared a CA and be subject to movement restrictions. All 

susceptible animal movements would be stopped for a period long enough to determine the scope of the 

disease outbreak. The potential modes of transmission (e.g., aerosol, water, direct contact, fomites, 

vectors, etc.), characteristics of the agent, terrain, the pattern of livestock/ poultry movements, livestock/ 

poultry concentrations, weather, prevailing winds, the distribution and movements of susceptible wild and 

feral birds and animals, and processing options (livestock/poultry and livestock/poultry products), are 

considered when determining the minimum size and shape of the CA (Section 3.1.3 [52]).

In an outbreak of an HCFAD, the CA would encompass the perimeter of all presumptive or confirmed 

positive premises and include as many of the contacts as the situation requires logistically or scientifically. 

The boundary of the CA is at least 10 km beyond the perimeters of the presumptive or confirmed infected 

premises. The boundaries can then be modified (either expanded or reduced) as new information 

becomes available (Section 3.1.3 [52]).

A CA would be established within 12 hours of the identification of the index case, either a presumptive 

positive premises or confirmed positive premises (Section 5.10 [41-44]). Presumptive positive or 

confirmed positive premises are those that have at least one animal that is classified as having a 

presumptive positive or confirmed positive case of the HCFAD in question (Section 5.2.2 [41-44]).

A zoning plan describing free zones and CAs would be developed and implemented during the first week 

of the outbreak. Included would be the process of collecting all relevant information to defend a zoning 

plan to trading partners and the OIE. The zone would be set up and measures to maintain the zones 

established as soon as the disease situation has stabilized adequately.

Animals of the IP, CP and SP are quarantined and controlled movement orders are applied (Section 5.10 

of [41-44]). Movements of susceptible species out of a CA from IP, SP and CP premises is prohibited 

except under circumstances such as to slaughter as determined by the IC. Movements out of the CA of 

non-susceptible livestock from premises with susceptible species, vehicles, equipment and other fomites 

from premises with susceptible species are controlled by permitting and appropriate biosecurity 

procedures. Movements out of the CA for non-susceptible livestock from premises without susceptible 
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species are not controlled. Within a CA, movements of susceptible species are allowed under permit

approved by the IC if the premises is not an infected premises (IP), contact premises (CP), or suspect 

premises (SP). Permitting of susceptible animal movements within the CA is used for any ARP and MP

and for movement out of the CA, a MP is allowed by permit approved by the IC. For movement of 

susceptible animals and animal products out of the CA, the permitting considers national and international 

standards, biosecurity measures and risk assessment recommendations (Tables 5-5 to 5-7 or Tables 5-6 

to 5-8 Section 5.10.2 [41-44]).

4. ACTION PHASE

a. Initial activities

i. Biosecurity

Biosecurity procedures to prevent the spread of diseases such as FMD, CSF, END and HPAI have as a 

response goal to ensure that the biosecurity procedures are implemented within 12–14 hours of 

identifying the index case to prevent the spread of the disease. A biosecurity plan is implemented for all 

infected premises, contact premises, suspect premises, checkpoints and livestock and poultry facilities 

within the CA (Section 9.1 [59-61]).

The Animal Biosecurity and Disease Prevention Group, Disease Support Branch, Operations Section of 

the Incident Management Team is responsible for ensuring that appropriate biosecurity measures are 

implemented during an animal health emergency response to prevent the transmission of the disease 

agent to uninfected premises and/or animals on the same premises. These biosecurity measures are 

employed during the movement of personnel and materials necessary for such animal health activities as 

surveillance, vaccination, appraisal, depopulation and disposal (Sections 1.1 and 3 [62]).

ii. Vector/wildlife control to contain them within the zone

A wildlife management plan is developed as soon as possible after identification of the index case. An 

assessment of risk posed by wildlife is conducted within 7 days of confirmation of the index case (Section 

5.18 [41-44]). A VS animal health policy in relation to wildlife has been elaborated [63].

Diseases such as FMD, CSF, END and HPAI can be transmitted mechanically by mice, vultures, and 

other vectors. Biosecurity measures are put in place to ensure that mechanical vectors do not have 

contact with infected swine herds or flocks or other infected material (Section 5.18.2 [41-44]).

iii. Epidemiological investigation/tracing

A team of advisors is deployed to the incident site to prepare an epidemiological assessment within 24 

hours of arrival. Epidemiological techniques would be used to understand the characteristics of the 

disease and outbreak characteristics, to identify risk factors associated with the disease occurrence, to 

provide information for decisions on control measures, and to evaluate their effectiveness. The FMD, 

CSF and HPAI Epidemiological Investigation and Tracing SOPs [64-66] and the NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Surveillance, Epidemiology and Tracing [58], detail this part of the investigation.

Within 96 hours of identifying the index case, the goal of the epidemiological investigation is to 

characterize the nature of the outbreak, identify the risk factors and develop mitigation strategies. Other 
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goals include a goal of assigning premises classification and priority of investigation within 6 hours of 

identifying potential IPs or CPs through tracing and a goal of identifying all additional CPs within 24 hours 

of identifying the IP or initial CP. Trace-back and trace-forward information is ideally collected for at least 

28 days of FMD and CSF and 21 days for END and HPAI. Tracing includes all movements from the 

premises including susceptible livestock or poultry, non-susceptible species, animal products, vehicles, 

crops and grains and people. Tracing considers the modes of transmission for the disease and any role 

of wildlife. The boundaries of the CA are modified when tracing and other epidemiological information

becomes available (Section 5.5 [41-44]). Epidemiological investigation and tracing SOPs are available 

for FMD, CSF and HPAI [64-66].

Tracing would include all movements from the premises including susceptible livestock, non-susceptible 

livestock, animal products, vehicles, crops/ grains, and people. Tracing would consider potential modes 

of transmission and possible contact with wildlife. The goal is to identify all contact premises within 24 

hours of identifying the infected premises or initial contact premises (Section 5.5.2 [64-66]).

 

The critical period is a minimum of two maximum incubation periods before the onset of clinical signs 

which is 28 days in the case of FMD and CSF and 21 days for poultry infected with HPAI (Section 5.5.3 

[64-66]) or END (Section 5.5.3 [44]).

A case definition would be defined within 24 hours of the first presumptive case or confirmed positive 

case (index case). The case definition is modified on an ongoing basis based on additional information or 

changing needs of the eradication effort, as described in the Case Definition Development Process SOP 

[67]. The nature of the highly contagious disease is characterized, risk factors are identified, and 

mitigation strategies are developed within 96 hours of identifying the index case. Within 6 hours of 

identifying a potential infected premises or contact premises through tracing activities, premises are 

classified and priority of investigation is assigned (Section 5.10.3 Epidemiological Response Procedures 

for FMD and CSF and Section 5.5.2 Epidemiological Investigation for END and HPAI [41-44]).

iv. Initiate surveillance

Surveillance plans are implemented within 48 hours of confirmation of an outbreak. The surveillance plan 

defines the present extent of the outbreak, quickly detects unknown IPs, and considers the susceptible 

wildlife population.

In the initial 72 hours post outbreak, with the objective to detect the IP quickly, three goals are set: 

establish the BZ designation and the boundary of the CA, create a list of premises with susceptible herds, 

flocks and according to species in the CA, and determine the boundary of the SZ and its surveillance 

plan. Surveillance is conducted on each premises within the IZ and BZ for at least 28 days for FMD, CSF 

and END (Appendix F for FMD, Appendix D for CSF and END, [42-44]) and for at least 14 days for HPAI 

(Appendix E for HPAI, [41]). According to these surveillance guidance plans, the frequency of 

surveillance inspections/samplings varies with the disease, whether commercial or non-commercial 

(backyard for HPAI and ND) premises, whether the premises represents either a CP, SP, or MP versus 

an ARP, and in the case of CSF whether the CSF agent is acutely highly pathogenic, mildly pathogenic or 

established mildly pathogenic.

Depending on the availability of resources to intensively survey premises for FMD and CSF, a number of 

questions, which vary with the two diseases, on the disease outbreak, disease epidemiology, susceptible 

species in the CA, agent pathogenicity, livestock operations, and the amount of movements of animals, 

animal products, things, and people on and off premises are answered to indicate the level of sampling 

within herds (Section 5.3.2 and Appendix D (CSF) and F (FMD) [42, 43]). For FMD, sampling schemes 
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Canadian Food Inspection Agency 40

and sampling frequency are elaborated for commercial and non-commercial premises in the IZ and BZ for 

the CP, SP and MP and for the ARP and in the SZ for SP and FP with susceptible species (Appendix F

[42]). For CSF, sampling schemes and sampling frequency are elaborated for both commercial and noncommercial premises for acutely, mildly and established mildly pathogenic virus in the IZ and BZ for the 

CP, SP and MP and for the ARP and in the SZ for SP and FP (Appendix D [43]).

For END and HPAI, specific surveillance schemes for each zone (IZ, BZ and SZ) and premises 

designation for commercial and backyard flocks are elaborated (Section 5.3.2 and 5.3.3 and Appendix D

(END) and Appendix E (HPAI) [41, 44]).

v. Disposal

Disposal of contaminated material and carcasses is to be done in a manner which does not allow the 

disease agent to spread, has a limited effect on the environment, and preserves animal protein, where 

possible. It is done as soon as possible after the depopulation of susceptible animals on the premises. 

The disposal of carcasses, animal and poultry products, litter, bedding, feedstuffs and products of the 

veterinary response efforts, infected with, exposed to, or contaminated with the disease agent may be by 

on-site burial, off-site burial, composting, landfills, rendering, digestion, or incineration (Section 5.14 [41-

44]). An SOP for disposal focuses on the responsibilities of personnel, evaluation of sites, selection and 

execution of methods, and disposal of waste materials for a HCFAD affecting livestock animals and 

poultry [68]. The NAHEMS Guidelines: Disposal, additionally elaborates on disposal methods in the 

event of an HCFAD incursion [69].

b. Containment/Eradication activities

A stamping-out policy is the primary strategy for all HCFAD that would be implemented on all infected 

premises and appropriate contact premises. Stamping-out involves the depopulation of clinically affected 

and in-contact susceptible animals. For FMD there are four response strategies: stamping-out, stampingout modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter, stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination 

to live and emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out. For CSF the strategies are: stamping-out, 

stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill, stamping-out modified with emergency 

vaccination to slaughter and stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live. If emergency 

vaccination is used, a Containment Vaccination Zone (CVZ) would be established in the infected zone, 

the buffer zone, the entire control area or a part of the buffer zone. For the FMD strategies of stampingout modified with emergency vaccination to live and emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out 

and the CSF strategy of stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to live, a Protection 

Vaccination Zone (PVZ) would be established in which targeted vaccination of non-infected animals is

conducted. Vaccinated animal identification, movement controls, traceability and a scalable permitting 

system may all be required (Section 4.3 [42, 43] and [70, 71]). For END and HPAI, emergency 

vaccination to kill and emergency vaccination to live may be considered in specific circumstances. 

Similarly to FMD and CSF, vaccination occurs within a CVZ or a PVZ (Section 5.16 [41, 44] and for HPAI 

[72]).

The time goal is to complete the depopulation or euthanasia within 24 hours of classifying the premises 

as an IP and in many cases the susceptible livestock or poultry on CP (Section 4.3.1.2 for FMD and CSF 

[42, 43] and Section 4.3.1 for END and HPAI [41, 44]).

Given the challenge of an FMD outbreak, the containment and eradication strategies may change over 

the phases of the outbreak and according to the size, location and other characteristics of the outbreak 

and the vaccine availability. Proposed strategies are formulated for six types of outbreak: focal, moderate 

regional, large regional, widespread or national, catastrophic and North American. Phase 1 represents 
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Canadian Food Inspection Agency 41

the time from confirmation of the first FMD case until the extent of the outbreak has been reasonably 

estimated, with a goal of less than 96 hours to transition to Phase 2. During Phase 2, characterization of 

the FMD outbreak as to one of the six types is made [73].

i. Refine boundaries of zone based on epidemiology and tracing

The perimeter of the IZ is at least 3 km beyond perimeters of presumptive or confirmed IP and that of the 

BZ, at least 7 km beyond the perimeter of the IZ. Several factors are considered in determining the size 

of the CA. The IZ and BZ which comprise the CA are redefined as the outbreak continues. The width of 

the SZ is a minimum of 10 km zones (Tables 5-4 and 5-5 for CSF and END [43, 44] and Tables 5-3 and 

5-4 for FMD and HPAI [41, 42]).

ii. Zone boundary controls

Movement out of a CA with respect to susceptible animals/poultry, susceptible animal/poultry products, 

non-susceptible animals from premises with susceptible species, equipment, and vehicles is prohibited or 

under permit (Sections 5.10.2 and 5.10.3 [41-44]).

iii. Surveillance in disease free zone

For FMD and CSF, enhanced passive clinical surveillance with testing of suspect cases, surveillance in 

slaughter plants and enhanced surveillance in markets and shows is conducted in the FA (Attachment 3 

A [74, 75]). With respect to CSF, the existing ongoing targeted active and passive surveillance in the FA 

would be increased (Section 3.1 [74]). For END and HPAI, active investigation of flocks with suspicious 

signs, increased slaughter serological surveillance, and the limited use of sentinel flocks are conducted. 

Doubling of the frequency of testing of flocks for HPAI as stated in the National Poultry Improvement Plan 

surveillance is put in place (Attachment 3A [76, 77]).

iv. Compensation

Regulations support payment of compensation for animals and birds depopulated, articles and means of 

conveyances destroyed, and any restriction on movement of animals, articles and means of conveyances

by the authorities to prevent the spread of animal disease. APHIS appraisal resources, and valuations for 

indemnity, provide fair compensation for losses which helps to ensure the quick and full cooperation of 

the owners of affected livestock. Such cooperation is central to rapid disease control and eradication. 

APHIS appraisal resources include published valuations and an APHIS Emergency Management

Compensation Specialist. The appraisal of animals is based on the fair market and determined by the 

meat, egg production, dairy or breeding value of such animals. Title 9 CFR Part 53 describes the policies 

for providing indemnity to an owner of animals and/or materials requiring destruction as a result of the 

incursion of an animal disease (Section 5.21 [41-44] and [5]).

v. Decontamination of vehicles

Cleaning and disinfection (C&D) of vehicles and heavy machinery that have been used on contaminated 

premises must occur before removal from the premises, as detailed in the FMD and HPAI SOPs on 

cleaning and disinfection (Attachment 15.F [78], Attachment 15.D [79] and Section 7.7 [80]). For an HPAI 

outbreak, instructions for C&D of manure trucks are included (Attachment 15.E [79]).
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vi. Cleaning and disinfection of premises

Cleaning and disinfection is done on any premises on which a highly contagious disease agent is 

presumed or confirmed to exist, within 48 hours of disposal of infected and susceptible animals. The 

goals are to remove, inactivate, reduce or destroy pathogenic agents on the infected premises and to 

prevent the off-site spread of these agents (Section 15.1.2 [78, 79]). Details of the C&D of premises, 

slurry pits, and equipment are given in the FMD and HPAI SOPs on cleaning and disinfection

(Attachments [78, 79] and Sections 7.8 to 8 [80]).

vii. Vaccination

FMD

The SAHO, Tribal Official, and the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator must agree on the decision to 

vaccinate before activating the North American Foot and Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank (NAFMDVB). The 

NAFMDVB Guidelines uses a decision tree and decision matrix of outbreak and mitigation factors to 

assist with the decision on vaccine use versus only stamping-out or stamping-out with additional culling 

measures (e.g., ring or continuous culling, culling of premises to arrest spreading of the outbreak). The 

NAFMDVB Guidelines details the access to the vaccine bank, field use, vaccinate identification and 

records, disease control measures in the vaccination zone, and the distribution or sharing of the vaccine if 

the FMD outbreak involves more than one Tripartite country (Canada, Mexico and United States of 

America). The strategy of stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to slaughter involves the 

depopulation of clinically affected and in-contact susceptible animals and vaccination of at-risk animals 

and subsequent slaughter of the vaccinated animals. The strategy of stamping-out modified with 

emergency vaccination to live involves allowing the vaccinated animals to live out their productive lives 

and the strategy of emergency vaccination to live without stamping-out is used in a situation of a widely 

disseminated outbreak and insufficient resources for the required amount of stamping-out (Sections 4.3.2 

to 4.3.6 and Appendix D [42]).

Emergency vaccination occurs within a CVZ or a PVZ and all animals receiving emergency vaccination 

on a vaccinated premises (VP) may be subject to vaccinated animal identification, vaccinated animal 

traceability and DIVA (Differentiating Infected and Vaccinated Animal) testing. VP is another premises 

designation but is only in use if emergency vaccination is employed. DIVA tests are used to differentiate 

infected herds from vaccinated herds, less suitable for individual animal differentiation. The National 

Veterinary Stockpile, maintained by the Surveillance, Preparedness & Response Services (SPRS) 

Logistics Center provides the logistical support for the NAFMDVB and delivery of the vaccine to the IC. 

The FMD vaccinations are not administered more than 28 days after the last known case of FMD is 

detected (Sections 5.16 and 5.17 [42] and [81]).

CSF

The use of emergency vaccination strategies is determined by the IC, the SAHO and VS Deputy 

Administrator.

The strategy of stamping-out modified with emergency vaccination to kill involves depopulation of the 

clinically affected and in-contact susceptible swine and vaccination of at-risk swine, with subsequent 

depopulation and disposal of vaccinated swine. The other two strategies employing vaccination are 

similar except the vaccinated swine are sent to slaughter or allowed to live out their productive lives

(Sections 4.3.2 to 4.3.6 [43]).

A marker vaccine can be used which permit the use of DIVA diagnostic tests so that field-infected and 

vaccinated swine can be distinguished. In a focal CSF outbreak though, a modified live virus (MLV) 
CFIA Evaluation of the Zoning for FAD Control in the US March 2014

Canadian Food Inspection Agency 43

vaccine is used in an inner ring vaccination program where vaccinates are subsequently depopulated. 

The MLV vaccine can confer immunity within 4 – 5 days whereas the marker vaccine requires 2 doses 

with an effective onset of immunity in 14 – 21 days. All emergency vaccination occurs within a CVZ or a 

PVZ and swine on a VP may be subject to vaccinated animal identification, vaccinated animal traceability 

and DIVA testing. No new vaccinations are given more than 28 days after the last known case of CSF is 

detected (Section 5.16 [43]).

HPAI

The IC evaluates the need for HPAI vaccination. The SAHO, Tribal Official and APHIS VS Deputy 

Administrator make the decision on vaccination and may use a decision matrix. Stamping-out is the 

primary strategy but emergency vaccination to kill or to live can be used. With vaccination, DIVA testing 

is a requirement involving an appropriate choice of vaccine and diagnostic test. The decision to vaccinate 

takes in number of considerations, especially the disease epidemiology and distribution, the poultry 

demographics, proximity of high-value genetic birds, risk of zoonotic infection and impact on international 

trade. A decision tree for emergency vaccination is additional tool. Vaccination occurs in a CVZ or a PVZ 

and the premises are designated VP, all vaccinated birds are identified with specific and permanent 

identification. When vaccine is used, surveillance continues to assess the vaccination effectiveness and 

detect any antigenic change. No new vaccinations are given more than 42 days after the last known new 

case of HPAI is detected (Section 5.16 [41]).

END

The IC evaluates the need for HPAI vaccination. The SAHO, Tribal Official and APHIS VS Deputy 

Administrator make the decision on vaccination and may use a decision matrix. As with HPAI, stampingout is the primary strategy for controlling and eradicating an outbreak of END but emergency vaccination 

to kill or to live may be considered. The decision to vaccinate takes in number of considerations, 

especially the disease epidemiology and distribution, the poultry demographics, proximity of high-value 

genetic birds, risk of zoonotic infection and impact on international trade. Vaccination occurs in a CVZ or 

a PVZ and the premises are designated VP, all vaccinated birds on the VP may be subject to vaccinated 

animal identification and traceability. The decision to cease emergency vaccination is made by the IC, 

SAHO and the APHIS VS Deputy Administrator, based on national and international standards (Section 

5.16 [44]).

NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for 

Contagious Diseases, Appendix A: Foot-and-Mouth Disease, NAHEMS Guidelines: Vaccination for 

Contagious Diseases, Appendix B: Vaccination for Classical Swine Fever and NAHEMS Guidelines: 

Vaccination for Contagious Diseases, Appendix C: Vaccination for High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza 

[70-72, 82] provide the characteristics of the available vaccines, strategies for vaccine use, and factors to 

consider when designing an effective vaccine program. For HPAI, Appendix I [41] describes the available 

AI vaccines and Appendix E [42] provides information on FMD vaccines including that of their potency 

and immunological responses.
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5. RECOVERY PHASE

a. Proof of Freedom Surveillance

Surveillance for proof of disease freedom, starts 21 days after depopulation of the last IP (FMD Appendix 

F, CSF Appendix D, END Appendix D, HPAI Appendix E [41-44]).

In the IZ, BZ and SZ, an inter-herd design prevalence of 1% (census testing of herds if the number of 

premises is small) is employed for FMD and highly pathogenic CSF surveillance of commercial herds. An 

intra-herd design prevalence of 5% in which both clinically sick pigs and randomly selected pigs is 

employed for highly pathogenic CSF whereas for FMD the intra-herd design prevalence depends the 

surveillance methodology, diagnostic sensitivity, and chosen confidence level. The sampling frequency is 

once during a 3 month period (Appendix F for FMD and Appendix D for CSF [42, 43] and the respective 

SOPs Attachment 3A [74, 75]).

For END and HPAI, an inter-flock design prevalence of 5% (census testing of flocks if the number of 

premises is small) and intra-flock testing of 5- or 11-bird pools (5-bird pools in the case of HPAI) selected 

from each group of 50 or less dead birds is employed for commercial premises and with a sampling 

frequency of once during a 3 month period (Appendix D for END, Appendix E for HPAI [41, 44] and the 

respective SOPs Attachment 3A [76, 77]).

b. Release of Quarantine

Quarantine and movement restrictions are maintained until at least 28 days have elapsed since the 

decontamination of all confirmed IP and negative results of surveillance activities (Section 6.1.4 [42, 43]) 

or 21 days have elapsed in the case of END and HPAI (Section 6.1.3 [41, 44] ). The IC develops a plan 

to specify procedures by which quarantined premises are evaluated for disease freedom and how the 

quarantine is released, by sections, risk or in its entirety.

For FMD and CSF, restocking of IPs occurs after the minimum 28 day period, but the period of premises 

vacancy may be longer based on the environmental conditions, the execution of the cleaning and 

disinfection procedures and the outbreak circumstances. Restocking requires that animals are subject to 

clinical inspection every 3 days for the first 14 days and once per week thereafter up to 28 days. At 28 

days after the last animals are introduced, each animal is clinically inspected and samples tested for 

FMDV or CSFV antibodies (Section 6.2 [42, 43]).

For END and HPAI, restocking of IPs occurs after a minimum 21 day vacancy, the period may be 

decreased if external heat is used to raise the temperature of the poultry houses sufficiently to inactivate 

the virus. The restocking with birds requires weekly testing by rRT-PCR (real-time reverse transcriptase 

polymerase chain reaction) for the presence of virus, with the last test conducted at least 21 days after 

placement of the birds. Environmental conditions, a longer vacancy period, and buildings which are not 

amenable to cleaning and disinfection, influences the IC’s restocking timeframe decision (Section 6.2 [41, 

44]).

c. Recovery of Free Status

The United States would declare freedom from the disease once the obligatory waiting period (OIE 

requirements) had elapsed with no new cases and would apply to the OIE for recognition of free status.

FMD, CSF, END and HPAI free status would require a formal submission detailing policy, eradication 
CFIA Evaluation of the Zoning for FAD Control in the US March 2014

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procedures, surveillance, monitoring and tracing of vaccinates, if vaccination was used, and veterinary 

infrastructure (Section 6.1.6 [42, 43] and Section 6.1.5 [41, 44]).

For the recovery of free status in a previously free country where stamping-out is the response strategy, a 

waiting period of 3 months after the last case is an OIE requirement for FMD, CSF, END and HPAI 

(Sections 6.1.1.1 [41, 44] and Section 6.1.2.1 [42, 43]). For CSF, the 3 month waiting period also applies 

where a stamping-out policy with emergency vaccination is practiced, that is, 3 months after the last case 

and the slaughter of all vaccinated animals or without the slaughter of vaccinated animals if such animals 

can be satisfactorily distinguished from infected pigs. Similarly for FMD, a 3 month waiting period is 

required where a stamping-out policy and emergency vaccination is practiced, that is, 3 months after the 

slaughter of all vaccinated animals. The waiting period for FMD is increased to 6 months after the last 

case or the last vaccination in the latter response strategy in which slaughtering of vaccinated animals is 

not done (Section 6.1.2.1 [42, 43]).
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Part 2 - CONCLUSIONS

• Zoning in the event of an FAD incursion has received a high degree of preparedness by the 

USDA through the development of very detailed response plans, SOPs, guidelines, ready 

reference documents, strategic plans, industry manuals and other documentation.

• Upon the identification of a suspected FAD incursion, a rapid response of diagnostic investigation 

is initiated.

• The investigation phase entails sampling and diagnostic procedures, clinical examinations, 

epidemiological assessments, tracing, case definitions, and epidemiological methods to 

characterize the outbreak and the risk factors in a thorough and timely manner.

• Following the identification of a presumptive or a confirmed positive case, zoning is initiated with 

the establishment of a Control Area (CA) comprising infected and buffer zones, and a 

surveillance zone, based on the assessment of epidemiological factors, agent characteristics, 

livestock/poultry demographics, weather, susceptible wildlife, and livestock/poultry marketing.

• The management of the FAD incident is highly organized for maximum control and efficiency of 

the operations put in place.

• The Emergency Management Response System is used to collect and report epidemiological 

data, including movement tracing information, locally and nationally, for timely information 

downloads and data entry. 

• Movement controls into and out of an Infected Zone are effectively enforced by state and federal 

authorities while in the larger CA, movements are allowed under permit if the premises is not an 

Infected Premises, Contact Premises or Suspect Premises.

• The containment and eradication activities within the CA ensure rapid control of the outbreak and 

are accompanied with a vaccination strategy, when it is deemed necessary.

• Epidemiological tracing and surveillance within and outside the CA provides the evidence and 

data to confidently assess any reduction of the CA and to confirm the status of the disease-free 

area.

• Zoning procedures for an FAD incursion in the US are highly rigorous for the prompt containment 

and eradication of the disease and for the protection and maintenance of disease-free areas.

• Proof of freedom and return free status is readily demonstrated through the assessment of the 

eradication measures and the evaluation of the surveillance statistics to show that, at an 

acceptable level of confidence, infection is present in less than a specified proportion of the 

population.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

7 USC - Title 7 United States Code

9 CFR - Title 9 Code of Federal Regulations

AAVLD - American Association of Veterinary Laboratory Diagnosticians

AI - Avian Influenza

AHPA - Animal Health Protection Act

APHIS - Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service

ARP - At-Risk Premises

ASF - African swine fever

AVMA - American Veterinary Medical Association

BSE - Bovine spongiform encephalopathy

BZ - Buffer Zone

C&D – cleaning and disinfection

CA - Control Area

CCC - Commodity Credit Corporation

CDA – Colorado Department of Agriculture

CEAH - Centers for Epidemiology and Animal Health

CFR – Code of Federal Regulations

CP - Contact Premises

CSF – Classical Swine Fever

CSREES - Cooperative State Research, Education and Extension Service

CVB - Center for Veterinary Biologics

CVO - Chief Veterinary Officer of the United States

CVZ - Containment Vaccination Zone

CWD - chronic wasting disease

DF - disease freedom

DIVA - differentiation of infected from vaccinated animals

EDI - emerging disease incident

EMD - Emergency Management and Diagnostics

EMLC - Emergency Management Leadership Council 

EMRS - Emergency Management Response System

END - enzootic Newcastle disease

EOC - Emergency Operations Center

EPP - expected percentage of protection

EQS - Emergency Qualifications System

ESF - Emergency Support Function

FA - Free Area

FAD - foreign animal disease

FAD PreP - Foreign Animal Disease Preparedness and Response Plan

FADD - Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostician

FADDL Foreign Animal Disease Diagnostic Laboratory

FADP - Foreign Animal Disease Practitioner

FEMA - Federal Emergency Management Agency

FMD - foot-and-mouth disease

FMDV - foot-and-mouth disease virus

FP - Free Premises

HCFAD - highly contagious foreign animal disease

HPAI – highly pathogenic avian influenza

IC - Incident Command

ICG - Incident Coordination Group
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ICP - Incident Command Post

ICS - Incident Command System

ICVI – interstate certificate of veterinary inspection

IDALS – Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship

ILAC - International Laboratory Accreditation Cooperation

IMT - incident management team

IP - Infected Premises

IZ Infected Zone

LPAI - low pathogenic avian influenza

MAC - Multiagency Coordinating group

MOU - Memorandum of Understanding

MP - Monitored Premises

NACC - National Chicken Council

NAFMDVB - North American Foot-and-Mouth Disease Vaccine Bank

NAHEMS - National Animal Health Emergency Management System

NAHERC - National Animal Health Emergency Response Corps

NAHLN - National Animal Health Laboratory Network

NAHMS - National Animal Health Monitoring System

NAHRS - National Animal Health Reporting System

NAHSS - National Animal Health Surveillance System

NAI - notifiable avian influenza

NASDA - National Association of State Departments of Agriculture

NCDACS – North Carolina Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs

NCAHEM - National Center for Animal Health Emergency Management (replaced by NPICC)

NIES - National Import Export Services

NIFA - National Institute of Food and Agriculture

NIMS - National Incident Management System

NPICC – National Preparedness and Incident Coordination Center

NPIP - National Poultry Improvement Plan

NRF - National Response Framework

NVAP - National Veterinary Accreditation Program

NVS - National Veterinary Stockpile

NVSL - National Veterinary Services Laboratories

ODAFF – Oklahoma Department of Agriculture, Food and Forestry

OIE - World Organization for Animal Health

PSS – Program Support Services

PVZ - Protection Vaccination Zone

rRT-PCR – real-time reverse transcriptase polymerase chain reaction

SAHO - State Animal Health Official

SPRS – Surveillance, Preparedness and Response Services

STAS – Science, Technology and Analysis Services

SOP - standard operating procedure

SP - Suspect Premises

SZ - Surveillance Zone

TAHC - Texas Animal Health Commission

USDA - United States Department of Agriculture

VMO - Veterinary Medical Officer

VP - Vaccinated Premises

VS - Veterinary Services

VSPS - Veterinary Services Process Streamlining system

VSTA - Virus-Serum-Toxin Act

VZ - Vaccination Zone
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