* After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines o f law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### APR 17 2001 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MICHAEL D. HARDESTY, Defendant-Appellant. No. 00-3298 (D.C. No. 00-CR-10019-01-WEB)

(D. Kan.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before EBEL , KELLY and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
Michael Hardesty pleaded guilty to aiding and abett ing another who traveled in interstate commerce with intent to viol ate the drug laws. (Doc. 30.) In his plea agreement, he admitted possessing for pers onal consumption at least five grams of cocaine base. (Id. at 2.) He further agreed “not to request a sentenc e of less than 60 months which is the statutory maximum sentence available,” although- 2 -

the agreement said nothing about his ability to cha llenge sentencing enhancements. (Id. ) The Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) recomm ended applying the two-level enhancement of Sentencing Guidelines § 2D 1.1(b)(1) because Hardesty possessed a dangerous weapon. (PSR, at 9.) With thi s enhancement, the guidelines range was exactly 60 months’ imprisonment. (Id. at 16.) The PSR recited the following facts to support the enhancem ent: On January 26, 2000, the police arrived at a house to respond to a call about a disturbance with a weapon, apparently invol ving a female. (PSR at 5.) They found Hardesty and another male and handcuffed both. (Id. at 6.) After searching the house twice, officers found the womanhiding in a clothes dryer. (Id. ) She told the officers that Hardesty had forced hi s way into the house, conducted drug transactions, and fired his gun the night before. (Id. ) The woman identified a knapsack in which the police found .35 7 ammunition as belonging to Hardesty. (Id. ) She also directed them to a china cabinet because Hardesty “on other occasions kept the gun there.” (Id. ) The officers found a .357 handgun in plain view on the cabinet. (Id. ) Another individual, who had run barefoot to a nearby liquor store in the snow to make the initial call to the police, stated that Hardesty had previously pulled a weapon and threate ned to shoot him. (Id. at 6-7.)- 3 -

The officers found a second gun on the seat of a pi ckup truck of which Hardesty had care and custody earlier in the day. (Id. ) Hardesty objected to the enhancement for possessing a gun. (PSR at 19.) He asserted that the .357 handgun belonged to the woma n found in the dryer, who owned the house. (Id. ) He also disputed that the gun was in plain view, noting that the police had searched the house twice for th e woman before finding it. (Id. ) Without the enhancement, the guidelines range would be 57-60 months, although Hardesty acknowledged that the change “may be insig nificant since the parties are not requesting a sentence above or below the 60 mon th maximum.” (Id. at 20.) At sentencing, neither party offered any evidence o n the enhancement. (Doc. 46, at 3.) In response to Hardesty’s objectio ns, the district court stated, “It doesn’t make any difference in the sentence I’m goi ng to give. You’ve agreed on the sentence.” (Id. at 5.) In its written order, the court stated, The court finds that the two-level increase for pos session of a gun is appropriate in this case. The statements from eyewi tnesses indicating the defendant had been in possession of the gun, th at he had been conducting drug transactions at the residence befor e he was arrested, and that the knapsack containing ammunition and dru gs belonged to him all persuade the court by a preponderance of th e evidence that the defendant was in possession of the gun and thatit related to his drug trafficking. The court notes that this objection would not affec t the sentence in this case, because the court would impo se the same sentence regardless of whether or not the two-pointincrease was applied. (Doc. 34, at 1-2.)- 4 -

On appeal, Hardesty continues to assert that the tw o-level enhancement was improper. The district court had jurisdiction under18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We need not reach the merits of this appeal because any error would be harmless. The district court unequivocally assertedthat it would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the enhancement. Other courts of appeal have found that when a district court makes such a statement, it is not necessary to resolve which of two guidelines ranges applies if the sente nce imposed falls within both.
See United States v. Fairchild , 189 F.3d 769, 780 (8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Howard , 179 F.3d 539, 545 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Thompson , 994 F.2d 864, 868 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Garrett , 984 F.2d 1402, 1416 (5th Cir. 1993); cf. United States v. Urbanek , 930 F.2d 1512, 1516 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Unless the district court makes it clear during t he sentencing proceeding that the sentence would be the same under either of the appl icable Guideline ranges, we are compelled to remand for resentencing . . . .”). Similarly, we have held that when the record supports one basis for the districtcourt’s enhancement and we are convinced the court would have imposed the same sentence regardless of the status of the other bases, any error is harmless. S ee United States v. Anderson , 189 F.3d 1201, 1214 (10th Cir. 1999); cf. Williams v. United States , 503 U.S. 193, 203 (1992) (“[A] remand is appropriate unless the reviewing court- 5 -

concludes, on the record as a whole, that the errorwas harmless, i.e. , that the error did not affect the district court’s selection of the sentence imposed .” (emphasis added)). We agree that in this case, a re mand would not be warranted even if there was error, given the district court’s statements and Hardesty’s agreement not to seek a sentence of less than 60 mo nths. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s sentence.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel Circuit Judge