IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JADE THOMPSON,

Plaintiff,

v.

MARIETTA EDUCATION 

ASSOCIATION, MARIETTA BOARD 

OF EDUCATION,

Defendants. 

Case No.: 2:18-cv-00628

Judge:

COMPLAINT

Jade Thompson, for her Complaint against the Marietta Education Association and 

the Marietta Board of Education (collectively, “Defendants”), alleges as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. This action challenges the Defendants’ unlawful scheme of withholding 

money from the paychecks of public employees to fund the speech and petitioning of a labor 

union without their affirmative consent.

2. The First Amendment protects the individual rights of free speech and 

association, including the rights not to speak and not to associate. Accordingly, public 

employees who do not belong to a labor union “should not be required to fund a union’s 

political and ideological projects unless they choose to do so.” Knox v. Serv. Employees Int’l 

Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 315 (2012). Furthermore, “[b]ecause a public-sector union 

takes many positions during collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic 

consequences, the compulsory fees constitute a form of compelled speech and association 

that imposes a significant impingement on First Amendment rights.” Id. at 311–12 

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(quotations and citations omitted). As the Supreme Court has now made clear in Janus v. 

American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, No. 16-1466, Slip 

Op. (June 2018), that burden is impermissible.

3. In violation of these principles, Ohio law authorizes local governments and 

labor unions to require public employees who are not union members to fund union 

activities. And it authorizes them to deduct fees to fund those activities from public 

employees’ paychecks, absent those employees’ affirmative consent. 

4. That arrangement is unlawful for at least three independent reasons.

5. First, union activities “germane” to collective bargaining are expressive and 

associational activities that public employees have a First Amendment right not to 

subsidize. Janus v. American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, 

No. 16-1466, Slip Op. 7–18 (June 2018). Thus, a union has no right to the money of any 

public employee who does not consent to funding it. The government may not require its 

employees to subsidize a labor union’s speech and petitioning of government.

6. Second, the First Amendment requires that the government obtain the 

affirmative consent of a person before directing her money to subsidize a private 

organization’s speech, petitioning of government, and other political and ideological 

activities. But, as Janus now holds, a waiver of First Amendment rights “cannot be 

presumed”; rather, agency fees cannot be collected from non-union members “[u]nless 

employees clearly and affirmatively consent.” Janus, Slip Op. at 48. Just like any other 

organization—a church, a charity, an activist group—a labor union has no inherent right to 

any individual’s money, and the government therefore may not simply deduct union fees of 

any kind from a public employee’s paycheck absent that employee’s affirmative consent. 

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Requiring public employees to periodically navigate an arduous “opt-out” scheme to avoid 

subsidizing speech with which they disagree—and taking their money if they are unable to 

navigate that regime perfectly every time—is not sufficiently tailored to protect their First 

Amendment rights.

7. Third, “[d]esignating a union as the employees’ exclusive representative 

substantially restricts the rights of individual employees. Among other things, this 

designation means that individual employees may not be represented by any agent other 

than the designated union; nor may individual employees negotiate directly with their 

employer.” Janus, Slip Op. 2. For that reason, and because the union’s advocacy is 

attributed to employees, that designation violates employees’ speech and petitioning rights, 

as well as their associational rights, in contravention of the First Amendment.

8. For these reasons, the agency-fee, “opt-out,” and exclusive representation 

schemes employed by Ohio public employers and unions are unconstitutional. The Plaintiff 

is entitled to a declaration to that effect and to an injunction prohibiting the Defendants 

from continuing to burden the Plaintiff’s First Amendment rights through operation of their 

unconstitutional fee-deduction scheme.

PARTIES

9. The Plaintiff, Jade Thompson, is a Spanish teacher at Marietta High School 

in Washington County, Ohio. 

10. Defendant Marietta Board of Education (the “Board”) manages and controls 

schools in the Marietta School District, including Marietta High School. Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 3313.47. The Board is an Ohio political subdivision, see Ohio Rev. Code § 2743.01(B), and 

a corporate body capable of being sued, Ohio Rev. Code § 3313.17. The Board employs 

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teachers in Marietta public schools, including Ms. Thompson. Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 3319.07(A). 

11. Defendant Marietta Education Association (the “Union”) is an “employee 

organization” as defined in the Ohio public-employees labor-relations code, Ohio Rev. 

Code § 4117.01(D), and represents employees of the Marietta School District. The Union is 

affiliated with the Ohio Education Association, an Ohio teachers union, and the National 

Education Association, a national teachers union.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

12. This case raises claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the 

federal Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Jurisdiction is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

13. Ms. Thompson, the Marietta Board of Education, and the Marietta 

Education Association are all residents of Washington County, Ohio. Venue is proper in 

this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

A. Ohio Law Permits Governmental Entities To Exact “Agency Fees” from 

Public Employees to Fund Union Speech Without Employees’ Affirmative 

Consent

14. Under Ohio law, a union may become the exclusive bargaining represented 

for public employees in a bargaining unit, such as a public school district, by submitting 

proof that a majority of the bargaining-unit employees wish to be represented exclusively by 

the union. Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.05; see also Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.04 (providing that 

public employers shall recognize and bargain with a designated “exclusive representative).

15. A public employer must bargain collectively with that union. Ohio Rev. Code 

Ann. § 4117.04(B).

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16. Ohio law sets a broad scope to negotiations, including “[a]ll matters 

pertaining to wages, hours, or terms and other conditions of employment” as well as over 

“the continuation, modification, or deletion of any existing provision of a collective 

bargaining agreement.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.08(A).

17. Permissive subjects of bargaining include: “matters of inherent managerial 

policy,” such as “the functions and programs of the public employer”; “standards of 

services”; the employer’s “overall budget”; its “organizational structure”; hiring, discipline, 

and supervision of employees; methods “by which governmental operations are to be 

conducted”; and other matters related to “the mission of the public employer as a 

governmental unit.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.08(C). 

18. An agreement between a public employer and union on any of these topics 

must be reduced to writing and executed. 

19. Ohio law permits such an agreement to contain a provision requiring the 

public employer to collect a “fair share” fee from employees. Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.09(C). 

Although the statute does not empower public employers to require union membership as a 

condition of employment, it does empower them to deduct fees in the same amount as 

union dues from non-member employees’ paychecks and remit those to the relevant unions. 

Id.

20. The fee is deducted from non-members’ paychecks automatically “and does 

not require the written authorization of the employee.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.09(C).

21. Ohio law requires that, if a collective-bargaining agreement provides for a 

fair-share arrangement, the union establish an internal procedure for issuing rebates to 

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employees who are entitled to withhold all or a portion of the fair-share agreement. Ohio 

Rev. Code § 4117.09(C).

22. A rebate is only required for “expenditures in support of partisan politics or 

ideological causes not germaine [sic] to the work of employee organizations in the realm of 

collective bargaining.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.09(C). The Ohio Administrative Code 

confirms the limited scope of fees subject to rebate. Ohio Admin. Code § 4117-11-01(A) 

(“The internal rebate procedure shall provide for a rebate of expenditures in support of 

partisan politics or ideological causes not germane to the work of employee organizations in 

the realm of collective bargaining. Any employee who has paid to the employee 

organization a fair share fee may apply to the employee organization for a rebate for such 

expenditures.”)

23. By statute, a rebate may be conditioned on the employee’s making “a timely 

demand on the employee organization.” Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.09(C).

24. By statute, the union may determine whether the employee is entitled to a 

rebate, and that determination is subject to review only for “arbitrary and capricious action” 

in an appeal before the Ohio Employment Relations Board. Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.09(C). 

25. An appeal must be filed within 30 days of the determination, and the appeal 

must specify “the arbitrary or capricious nature of the determination.” Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 4117.09(C). A petition must identify the amount of the employee’s fair share fee, include a 

copy of the rebate determination, state the reasons “why the rebate determination was 

arbitrary and capricious,” and contain proof of service on the union. Ohio Admin. Code 

§ 4117-11.01(B). The union may respond to the petition, and it may be subject to a hearing 

by the Employment Relations Board. Ohio Admin. Code § 4117-11.01(C).

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B. The Board Agrees To Exact Agency Fees from Its Employees’ Paychecks 

To Fund the Union’s Speech Without Employees’ Affirmative Consent

26. The Board and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement 

with a term from June 30, 2016, through June 29, 2018. See Exhibit A (the “Agreement”). 

27. The Agreement establishes a bargaining unit of “all full and regular part-time 

certificated personnel employed under contract, including classroom teachers, special 

education teachers, psychologists, guidance counselors, librarians, school nurses, head 

teacher(s), attendance officer, resource teachers, and full-time substitutes employed sixtyone (61) or more consecutive days in the same position in a school year.” Agreement § 1.01.

28. The Agreement recognizes the Union as the “sole and exclusive bargaining 

agent for the members of the bargaining unit.” Agreement § 1.01.

29. The Agreement records the Board’s and Union’s negotiated points of 

agreement, including those pertaining to wages, benefits, grievances, teacher planning time, 

professional meetings, the school day, the school year, student discipline, school activities, 

class size, transfer, leaves of absence, vacancies, teacher lounges, performance appraisals, 

and so forth.

30. The Agreement also includes an Article titled “Association Rights.” 

31. Among its provisions is one requiring that “[a]ll bargaining unit members 

who are not members of the Association shall pay a monthly agency fee equivalent to the 

monthly dues uniformly required of such members.” Agreement § 27.018.

32. It provides that the agency fee amount “be automatically deducted 

commencing the first paycheck on or after January 15th of each year and continue to be 

deducted throughout the remaining paychecks.”

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33. It also provides that the payment “shall be subject to a rebate procedure 

provided by the Association meeting all requirements of applicable state and federal law.” 

Agreement § 27.018.

34. Pursuant to this provision, the Union has adopted an opt-out procedure.

35. Under that procedure, the agency fee amount is deducted from the paychecks 

of bargaining unit members to fund the Union’s activities without their affirmative consent.

36. That procedure presumes that the Board’s non-union employees wish to have 

an agency fee equivalent in amount to union dues deducted each month from their 

paychecks and that such employees wish to fund the Union’s political activities to the same 

extent as a Union member. An employee who does not indicate otherwise through the optout procedure will have that amount automatically deducted each month, and a portion of 

that fee will be used to fund the Union’s political activities.

37. Employees who oppose funding the Union’s political activities must follow 

the opt-out procedure to avoid doing so each year. Among other things, the employee must 

send the opt-out notice via mail or deliver it in person to a Union representative.

38. The employee may only opt out between specific dates in mid-December and 

mid-January of each year (typically December 15 through January 15). 

39. To qualify, the employee’s objection must be received or post-marked by the 

January deadline.

40. If the employee does not comply with the procedure to register an objection, 

the employee’s rights are waived, and the Union proceed to collect the full agency fee for 

the entire year.

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41. If the employee does successfully register an objection, the Union affords a fee 

reduction for that single year. 

42. To assess whether the Union’s calculation of the fee reduction is correct, the 

employee must examine a notice the Union provides, called a Hudson notice, outlining the 

Union’s political spending.

43. Disputes over the calculation are submitted to arbitration.

44. If the employee wishes to challenge the arbitration decision, the employee 

must file a petition with the Ohio Employment Relations Board within 30 days of the 

determination. As described above, the determination is subject to an arbitrary-andcapricious standard of review.

45. The Agreement does not permit an employee to opt-out from paying the 

remainder of the agency fee that is (according to the Union’s calculation) “germane” to 

collective bargaining and not attributable to partisan politics or ideological causes.

46. Even if the Agreement did permit an employee to opt-out from paying agency 

fees altogether, such a scheme would presume that employees wish to have an agency fee 

deducted each month from their paychecks to fund the Union’s activities, including 

collective bargaining.

C. The Board Infringes Ms. Thompson’s First Amendment Rights by 

Withholding Funds from Her Paycheck To Fund the Union’s Speech 

Without Her Affirmative Consent

47. The Union transfers percentages of dues and of agency fee payments to its 

affiliates, the National Education Association and the Ohio Education Association. 

48. The Union and its affiliates advocate on a wide range of issues. 

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49. The National Education Association, for example, has published a 150-page 

handbook of its currently in-force resolutions. These include resolutions on matters ranging 

from education policy, school financing, charter schools, and early childhood learning to 

“social and economic justice,” the constitutional convention process of Article V, voting 

rights, historic preservation, covert operations and counterintelligence activities, and the 

“self-determination of indigenous people,” racial preferences, sex education, the metric 

system, D.C. statehood, U.S. participation in the International Court of Justice and criminal 

court, and gun control.

50. The National Education Association generally adopts such measures at its 

annual “Representative Assembly.” The National Education Association treats its 

Representative Assembly as fully chargeable to non-members. It therefore funds these 

advocacy efforts, in part, through agency fees collected from non-members.

51. The Ohio Education Association also advocates on political issues and has 

adopted a handbook of legislative policies on a swath of issues, including legislative 

redistricting, voter identification laws, minimum wage, asbestos, nuclear waste storage and 

dumping, public-employee retirement. 

52. The Ohio Education Association adopted these and other measures at its 

representative assembly, which it treats as fully chargeable to non-members. It therefore 

funds these advocacy efforts, in part, through agency fees collected from non-members.

53. Both the National Education Association and Ohio Education Association 

encourage members to engage in political advocacy and providing training for that purpose.

54. The Ohio Education Association and National Education Association obtain 

funding for their activities through the dues of members of affiliated local unions, such as 

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the Marietta Education Association, and through agency-fee payments made to such local 

unions.

55. Both the National Education Association and Ohio Education Association 

undertake political and ideological activities that they do not regard as “germane” to 

collective bargaining. These political and ideological activities are funded through dues of 

members of affiliated local unions, such as the Marietta Education Association, and through 

agency-fee payments made to such local unions.

56. The Union’s collective bargaining activities and other activities that it 

regarded as “germane” to collective bargaining are funded through dues of members and 

through agency-fee payments by non-members.

57. Ms. Thompson is a member of the bargaining unit identified in Article 1.01 of 

the Agreement.

58. Ms. Thompson is not a member of the Union.

59. Ms. Thompson disagrees with the Union’s stance on many issues, including 

issues on which the Union and its representatives have taken positions in the course of 

collective bargaining.

60. These disagreements came to a head in 2010, when Ms. Thompson’s 

husband, Andy Thompson, ran for the Ohio House of Representatives.

61. The Ohio Education Association launched an attack campaign against Mr. 

Thompson, through mailers and radio and television advertisements.

62. The president of the Marietta Education Association emailed every teacher at 

Marietta High School, urging them to vote and advocate against Mr. Thompson.

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63. Ms. Thompson’s agency fees fund the activities of the Union, the National 

Education Association, and the Ohio Education Association.

64. To avoid funding union the political and ideological activities that unions 

have identified as not being “germane” to collective bargaining, Ms. Thompson must take 

steps every year to opt out of the portion of the agency fee that Ohio law and the Agreement 

allow her not to pay.

65. These steps take time.

66. These steps cost money.

67. Ms. Thompson must prepare a written notice to the Union.

68. She must research what to say in the notice.

69. She must research how to send the notice.

70. She must research where and when to send the notice.

71. She must prepare the mailing.

72. She must pay the postage.

73. She must travel to a post office to send the notice via certified mail.

74. On receiving the Union’s response, she must independently verify the amount 

the Union calculates as being reimbursable. This requires examination of a detailed Hudson

notice. 

75. Assessing her rights, including under changes in the legal regime, may require 

consultation with an attorney or accountant, and failure to undertake such consultation may 

prevent her from identifying and remediating any infringement of her rights.

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76. If Ms. Thompson fails to undertake any step of this process for any reason or 

fails to navigate the process accurately, the Union collects the full agency fee and uses it to 

subsidize political and ideological causes she opposes.

77. Even if she successfully completes this opt-out procedure, Ms. Thompson is 

still compelled to subsidize activities the Union and its affiliates have identified as 

“germane” to collective bargaining, despite the fact that she opposes positions that the 

Union takes in collective bargaining and other activities and speech that the Union and its 

affiliates regard as “germane” to collective bargaining.

78. She must navigate this opt-out procedure anew each year.

79. Ms. Thompson has in previous years opted out of paying non-chargeable fees.

80. Ms. Thompson opted out of paying non-chargeable fees in January 2018

81. Ms. Thompson has, nevertheless, been required to pay chargeable fees.

D. Ohio’s Opt-Out Scheme Violates the First Amendment

82. Agency-shop arrangements, such as Ohio’s fair-share law, impose a 

“significant impingement on First Amendment rights” because “[t]he dissenting employee is 

forced to support financially an organization with whose principles and demands he may 

disagree.” Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 455 (1984)). This 

“impingement” is quite severe because “public-sector union[s] take[] many positions during 

collective bargaining that have powerful political and civic consequences.” Knox, 132 S. Ct. 

at 2289.

83. Moreover, “any procedure for exacting [union] fees from unwilling 

contributors must be carefully tailored to minimize the infringement of free speech rights.” 

Id. at 2291 (citation omitted). By contrast, “unions have no constitutional entitlement to the 

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fees of nonmember-employees.” Id. (citation omitted). Rather, their “collection of fees from 

nonmembers is authorized by an act of legislative grace.” Id. (citation omitted).

84. The Agreement’s agency-fee provision and the provisions of Ohio law that 

enable it are unconstitutional for two independent reasons.

85. First, Ohio law permits Ohio governmental entities to require employees who 

are not members of a union to fund activities identified by the union as “germane” to 

collective bargaining, including speech on matters of public concerning and petitioning of 

government on matters of public concern.

86. As the Supreme Court held in its recent decision in Janus v. American 

Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, No. 16-1466, Slip Op. (June 

2018), this is unconstitutional.

87. Second, Ohio law’s opt-out procedure is unconstitutional.

88. Requiring public employees to affirmatively opt out to obtain a rebate is an 

unacceptable burden on speech.

89. No compelling government interest supports requiring public employees to 

affirmatively opt out.

90. As the Supreme Court held in its recent decision in Janus v. American 

Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, Council 31, No. 16-1466, Slip Op. (June 

2018), it is unconstitutional to collect agency fees from employees who do not “affirmatively 

consent” as shown “by clear and compelling evidence.” Janus, Slip Op. at 48 (quotations 

omitted).

91. Even if there were a compelling government interest, requiring public 

employees to affirmatively opt out to obtain a rebate is not narrowly tailored. 

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92. The process to affirmatively opt out is arduous. 

93. A public employee must attempt to opt out every year.

94. If a union denies the rebate, the employee must then prosecute an arduous 

administrative appeal with an unfavorable standard of review.

95. There is a more narrowly tailored alternative to all of these onerous 

procedures: requiring that, before the government withholds funds from a public employee’s 

paycheck to fund a labor union’s activities, the employee affirmative consent to the 

withholding. This would remove the burden from those individuals electing not to fund 

union speech and allow those individuals interested in supporting such speech to do so.

COUNT I

Exacting Compulsory Fees to Support

Collective Bargaining Violates the First Amendment

96. The Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges each and every allegation in the 

foregoing paragraphs as though fully set forth herein.

97. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: “Congress 

shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”

98. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution incorporates 

the protection of the First Amendment against the States, providing: “No State shall make 

or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 

States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 

process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 

laws.”

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99. By requiring the Plaintiff to make any financial contributions in support of 

any union, Ohio’s fair-share arrangement violates the Plaintiff’s rights under the First and 

Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.

100. The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

101. The controversy between Defendants and the Plaintiff is a definite and 

concrete dispute concerning the legal relations of parties with adverse legal interests.

102. The dispute is real and substantial, as the Union is continuing to collect fees 

each month from the Plaintiff’s paycheck.

103. The declaratory relief sought is not based on a hypothetical state of facts, nor 

would it amount to a mere advisory opinion, as the parties dispute the legality of ongoing 

seizure of a portion of the Plaintiff’s paycheck. 

104. As a result of the foregoing, an actual and justiciable controversy exists 

between the Plaintiff and the Union regarding their respective legal rights, and the matter is 

ripe for review.

COUNT II

Requiring an Individual To Opt Out from 

Exactions To Subsidize a Labor Union’s Speech and 

Petitioning Violates the First Amendment

105. The Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges each and every allegation contained 

in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.

106. By requiring the Plaintiff to opt-out from funding union speech and 

petitioning activities with which she disagrees, Ohio’s agency-fee arrangement violates the 

Plaintiff’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 

Constitution.

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107. The Supreme Court has now made clear: “Neither an agency fee nor any 

other payment to the union may be deducted from a nonmember’s wages, nor may any 

other attempt be made to collect such a payment, unless the employee affirmatively 

consents to pay.” Janus, Slip Op. at 48.

108. The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

109. The controversy between Defendants and the Plaintiff is a definite and 

concrete dispute concerning the legal relations of parties with adverse legal interests.

110. The dispute is real and substantial, as the Union is continuing to collect fees 

each month from the Plaintiff’s paycheck and will continue to do so in coming months and 

years. 

111. The declaratory relief sought is not based on a hypothetical state of facts, nor 

would it amount to a mere advisory opinion, as the parties dispute the legality of ongoing 

seizure of a portion of the Plaintiff’s paycheck. 

112. As a result of the foregoing, an actual and justiciable controversy exists 

between the Plaintiff and the Union regarding their respective legal rights, and the matter is 

ripe for review.

COUNT III

Designating a Union as Employees’ “Exclusive Representative”

Violates the First Amendment

113. The Plaintiff incorporates and re-alleges each and every allegation contained 

in the foregoing paragraphs of this Complaint, as though fully set forth herein.

114. By designating the Union as the Plaintiff’s exclusive representative, Ohio law 

and the Agreement violate the Plaintiff’s rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments 

to the United States Constitution.

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115. That designation compels the Plaintiff to associate with the Union.

116. That designation attributes the Union’s speech and petitioning to the Plaintiff.

117. That designation restricts the Plaintiff’s speech and petitioning.

118. The Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law.

119. The controversy between Defendants and the Plaintiff is a definite and 

concrete dispute concerning the legal relations of parties with adverse legal interests.

120. The dispute is real and substantial, as the Union continues to hold itself out as 

the Plaintiff’s exclusive representative and its designation as such restricts the Plaintiff’s 

rights. 

121. The declaratory relief sought is not based on a hypothetical state of facts, nor 

would it amount to a mere advisory opinion, as the parties dispute the legality of the 

Union’s designation as the Plaintiff’s exclusive representative. 

122. As a result of the foregoing, an actual and justiciable controversy exists 

between the Plaintiff and the Union regarding their respective legal rights, and the matter is 

ripe for review.

COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES

123. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C § 1988, the Plaintiff seeks an award of costs and 

attorney fees incurred in the litigation of this case.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

For these reasons, Ms. Thompson requests that the Court:

(A) Enter a judgment declaring that Ohio’s fair-share law, codified in Ohio Rev. 

Code § 4117.09(C) and Ohio Admin. Code § 4117-11-01(A), and the 

Agreement impermissibly abridge Ms. Thompson’s First Amendment freeCase: 2:18-cv-00628-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/27/18 Page: 18 of 20 PAGEID #: 18
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speech rights by requiring payment of fees to a union as a condition of public 

employment;

(B) Enter a judgment declaring that Ohio’s fair-share law, codified in Ohio Rev. 

Code § 4117.09(C) and Ohio Admin. Code § 4117-11-01(A), and the 

Agreement impermissibly abridge Ms. Thompson’s First Amendment freespeech rights by requiring Ms. Thompson to opt out of the fair-share process 

to seek reimbursement of fees through a rebate scheme.

(C) Enter a judgment declaring that Ohio’s exclusive-representation law, codified 

in Ohio Rev. Code § 4117.04–05, and the Agreement impermissibly abridge 

Ms. Thompson’s First Amendment speech, petitioning, and associational

rights by designating the Union as Ms. Thompson’s exclusive representative;

(D) Enter an injunction barring Defendants from seeking to require payment of 

agency fees from any employee who has not affirmatively consented to 

financially support the Union;

(E) Enter an injunction barring Defendants from recognizing the Union as Ms. 

Thompson’s exclusive representative or representative;

(F) An award of costs, including reasonable attorney fees, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1988(b); and

(G) Grant to Ms. Thompson such additional or different relief as the Court deems 

just and proper.

 

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Robert D. Alt (0091753)**

Daniel J. Dew (0089502)**

THE BUCKEYE INSTITUTE

88 East Broad Street, Suite 1120

Columbus, OH 43215

(614) 224-4422

Email: robert@buckeyeinstitute.org

Respectfully submitted,

/s/Patrick T. Lewis 

Patrick T. Lewis (0078314)

Trial Attorney

Email: plewis@bakerlaw.com

BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP

Key Tower 

127 Public Square, Suite 2000

Cleveland, OH 44114

(216) 621-0200 / Fax (216) 696-0740 

Andrew M. Grossman*

Mark W. DeLaquil*

Richard B. Raile*

Email: agrossman@bakerlaw.com

Email: mdelaquil@bakerlaw.com

Email: rraile@bakerlaw.com

BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP

1050 Connecticut Ave., N.W.

Washington, DC 20036

(202) 861-1697 / Fax (202) 861-1783 

Counsel for Plaintiff, Jade Thompson

* Pro hac vice motions forthcoming

** Applications for admission forthcoming

111627.000002 4849-9590-2316

Case: 2:18-cv-00628-MHW-CMV Doc #: 1 Filed: 06/27/18 Page: 20 of 20 PAGEID #: 20