PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

DAVID BRYTE, Personal 

Representative of the Estate of Lova

E. Bryte, deceased; DAVID BRYTE;

KATHY B. SMITH; JAMES B. SMITH;

M. E. SMITH, a minor, by and

through her legal guardian, Kathy

B. Smith; DONNA J. MILLER,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.  No. 04-1051

AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD,

INCORPORATED, formerly known as

Sunbeam Corporation; SUNBEAM

PRODUCTS, INCORPORATED,

Defendants-Appellees,

and

SEARS ROEBUCK AND COMPANY,

Defendant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of West Virginia, at Elkins.

Richard L. Williams, Senior District Judge.

(CA-00-93-2)

Argued: May 26, 2005

Decided: November 21, 2005

Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and LUTTIG, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Widener wrote the opinion, in

which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Luttig concurred. 
COUNSEL

ARGUED: William J. Hansen, MCDERMOTT, HANSEN &

MCLAUGHLIN, Denver, Colorado, for Appellants. Stephen Thomas

Moffett, MOFFETT & DILLON, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: George E. McLaughlin, MCDERMOTT, HANSEN

& MCLAUGHLIN, Denver, Colorado, for Appellants. John E. Hall,

John H. Williams, Jr., ECKERT, SEAMANS, CHERIN & MELLOTT, P.L.L.C., Morgantown, West Virginia; Thomas Vitu, MOFFETT & DILLON, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellees. 

OPINION

WIDENER, Circuit Judge:

On October 23, 2000, Lova Bryte died in a fire in her Preston

County, West Virginia apartment. She was using an electrically

heated throw at the time of the fire. Several weeks later, plaintiffs,

Mrs. Bryte’s personal representative and relatives, brought this action

against defendant American Household, Inc. (formerly Sunbeam

Corp.), the manufacturer of the throw. Plaintiffs alleged that the electric throw had a defective safety circuit and that this defect caused the

deadly fire. At trial, the district court excluded various evidence,

including expert testimony, offered by plaintiffs to prove the causation and defect elements of their claims. At the close of plaintiffs’

case, the district court granted defendant’s motion for judgment as a

matter of law on the ground that plaintiffs had not established sufficient evidence of causation. Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s

evidentiary rulings and the ensuing judgment for defendant. We

affirm.

I.

Though the record on appeal is extensive, the basic facts of this

case are not disputed. Mrs. Bryte had begun using the electric throw

in question about two years before the fire occurred, after having suffered a stroke. As a result of her stroke, Mrs. Bryte could not pick

herself up from her recliner without assistance, and her movement

2 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
was limited to shifting in the chair. Also as a result of her stroke, Mrs.

Bryte used the electric throw throughout the year to keep warm when

sitting in her recliner. Typically, she would have had placed over her

a blanket or afghan and the throw would be laid on top of the blanket.

When in use, the electric throw would be plugged directly in to a wall

outlet on Mrs. Bryte’s left. When not in use, the throw was draped

over the back of the recliner or a love-seat. The throw had not malfunctioned and there was no visible damage to it or its power cord.

Other than the recliner, the living room of Mrs. Bryte’s apartment

contained a love-seat, a television and VCR, a coffee table, a telephone, and a small table to the right of the recliner, which table had

a lamp and a candle on it. Mrs. Bryte did not smoke. 

The morning of the fire, Mrs. Bryte and her care-giver, Donna Miller, were in the apartment alone. During the late morning or early

afternoon, Mrs. Miller assisted Mrs. Bryte into the recliner and then

retrieved the electric throw from the back of the love-seat. Mrs. Miller

covered Mrs. Bryte with a blanket, then with the throw, plugged the

throw in to a wall outlet to the left of the recliner, and turned it on

to the low setting. The throw was not tucked in around Mrs. Bryte’s

sides. The power cord extended, at Mrs. Bryte’s feet, from the throw,

and the temperature control rested on the floor to Mrs. Bryte’s left

below her feet. Mrs. Bryte did not adjust the temperature control herself. At around 11 a.m., Mrs. Miller had lighted the candle that sat on

the small table to the right of the recliner. According to Mrs. Miller,

at that time the candle was partly burned, and, as far as she saw, the

flame had not extended above the rim of the glass candle container.

Mrs. Miller also testified that Mrs. Bryte was unable to reach the candle, or the lamp that also was on the table. Mrs. Bryte could, however,

reach a part of the table for such things as a denture cup, a Star magazine, a cookbook, a Bible and her glasses. 

Mrs. Miller left the apartment at 1:55 p.m. to pick up Mrs. Bryte’s

granddaughter from school, leaving the candle lighted and the electric

throw turned on. Mrs. Miller returned to the apartment at, she estimated, 2:08 p.m., at which time she heard Mrs. Bryte calling for help.

Upon entering the apartment, Mrs. Miller saw smoke and fire coming

up the left side of Mrs. Bryte’s recliner and heard "snapping and

cracking." Mrs. Miller did not see any flames related to the power

BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 3
supply cord of the electric throw and she could not identify more specifically the source of the flames, other than the fact that the flame

was "down beside [Mrs. Bryte’s] chair and up on her leg." Mrs. Miller

tried, but was unable, to extinguish the fire. While in the apartment,

however, Mrs. Miller was able to see that the candle was still lighted

and that neither it nor the lamp had been moved or overturned. The

flames and smoke forced Mrs. Miller to flee the apartment to get the

children out. 

Shortly after the fire was extinguished, and before the removal of

Mrs. Bryte’s remains, Assistant State Fire Marshall Mack Dennis was

called to the scene. At that time, Dennis had been employed by the

West Virginia State Fire Marshall’s Office as a cause and origin

investigator for over 20 years. While he was not certified as a fire

investigator, he had attended numerous courses in arson and explosive

investigation. Dennis’ investigation of the fire scene traced the fire’s

path, starting from Mrs. Bryte’s left side and moving around the

room. Dennis took photographs of the fire scene and made a not-toscale diagram of the room where the fire occurred, which located the

large artifacts in the room. Dennis took oral, not written, statements

from the witnesses to the fire. 

Dennis’ diagram did not indicate the wall outlets located in the

room. He did observe, however, that the wall outlet immediately to

Mrs. Bryte’s left "had an electrical service cord plugged into it, and

the remains of that cord came over to Mrs. Bryte and was [sic] laying

across her arm." Dennis’ report later characterized the cord as

"wrapped around" Mrs. Bryte’s left arm. He did not measure the cord

or the exact distance between the wall outlet to her left and Mrs.

Bryte’s body, but approximated the distance to be "two and a half

feet." Dennis did not recover or photograph the service cord that he

saw draped across Mrs. Bryte’s body. Indeed, Dennis did not know

at first what this cord was for; only later, after speaking with family

members and Mrs. Miller, did he learn that Mrs. Bryte had been using

an electric throw at the time of the fire. 

Dennis did not know that there was a lamp, or observe any other

cord, plugged in to the same wall outlet as the cord found on Mrs.

Bryte. But there was another cord, an extension cord running from a

wall outlet behind the chair, to the lamp on the table. Moreover, he

4 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
did not inspect the outlet’s wiring. Dennis nonetheless excluded the

outlet, and also the table, candle, and lamp as potential origins of the

fire based on his discussions with Mrs. Miller and family members.

Also, he made this determination without knowing how the candle

had been lighted. 

Dennis’ only report, issued the day of the fire, concluded that the

cause of the fire was "improper use of an electric blanket." Specifically, Dennis recorded Mrs. Miller as having told him that the electric

throw was "around" Mrs. Bryte. Dennis later may have concluded, for

reasons that are unclear due to interruptions in his testimony, that the

throw may not have been used improperly. But he nevertheless maintained that the throw was the cause of the fire. 

Critically, Dennis did not recover any artifacts or samples from the

scene. Dennis testified that he had no reason to do so, nor did he

advise the Brytes to preserve the fire scene or any of its artifacts, for

the same reason: "I had no reason to believe it [the fire] was other

than accidental." Apparently no one, until his attorney did, instructed

David, Mrs. Bryte’s son, about preserving evidence from the fire

scene, and David removed the debris, including the recliner and electrical devices, and disposed of it at a landfill that he owned.1

Plaintiffs filed this suit about six weeks later, on December 1, 2000.2

In addition to Dennis, plaintiffs retained Dr. W.T. Cronenwett as an

expert witness to offer opinion testimony regarding the specific cause

of the fire. In his first deposition, Dr. Cronenwett opined that the electric throw was the ignition source of the fire. He based that opinion

on "[t]he absence of any other ignition source in the area, the snapping and crackling that was heard, the fact that Mrs. Bryte was confined to her chair, did not smoke and had no opportunity or means to

set herself on fire, and the fact that there are—have been a number

of instances where the Sunbeam electrically heated bedding products

have spontaneously burst into flames." More specifically, Dr. Cronenwett testified that the blanket caused the fire due to defectively

1The magistrate judge credited Mr. Bryte’s explanation for disposing

of the debris, to which exception is not taken. 

2Plaintiffs settled with the other named defendant, Sears Roebuck &

Co., before trial. 

BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 5
designed circuitry. He acknowledged, however, that his opinion that

the defective circuitry in the throw had caused the fire rested wholly

on the conclusion of Dennis.3 Dr. Cronenwett attributed his inability

to independently identify the specific source of ignition to the fact

that there was "no remaining physical evidence" after the fire. 

Dr. Cronenwett was deposed twice, the second time in April 2003.

In addition to repeating his earlier questions, counsel for defendant

repeatedly asked Cronenwett whether he could identify evidence of

a malfunction in the electric throw that could reliably support his conclusion that the electric throw caused the fire. To each such question

with respect to various specific defects, Dr. Cronenwett acknowledged that he could not, explaining, for example, that ". . . I never saw

any physical evidence of the blanket, so I don’t know what specific—

what the specific cause of the ignition was." Moreover, when asked

whether there was "any evidence in this case that can reliably support

a conclusion that there was any defect in any component part of the

electric throw that caused the fire in this case?" Dr. Cronenwett

responded "No." (JA 2019.)

Prior to trial, defendant moved for summary judgment based on

failure of causation and plaintiffs’ spoliation of the physical evidence

of the fire. Defendant also moved to exclude the testimony of Dennis

and Dr. Cronenwett (and Messrs. Dallas and Hull) under Fed. R.

Evid. 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509

U.S. 579 (1993), on the related ground that neither had a reliable basis

for his opinion that the electric throw or a defect therein had caused

the fire. In his Report and Recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended denying defendant’s motions, except as to Dallas, whose

opinion he deemed unreliable. Defendant objected to the Report and

Recommendation; the district court overruled those objections but

treated the motions as pending, took them under advisement, and

instructed the parties that it would rule on them at trial. 

3Dr. Cronenwett also relied on the investigation of David Dallas,

another cause-and-origin witness. The district court did not refer to either

Dallas’ or Hull’s testimony. We do not rely on either. Dallas did not testify at trial. 

6 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
The case was tried on December 8, 2003. At trial, plaintiffs

attempted to offer the expert testimony of Dennis and Dr. Cronenwett

in support of the claims that (1) the electric throw was the cause of

the fire, and (2) a design defect in the blanket was specifically responsible for ignition. Contrary to the Report and Recommendation, the

district court considered plaintiffs’ proffers and determined that,

under Daubert, neither expert had a sufficiently reliable basis for his

opinion, and it thus excluded Dennis’ and Dr. Cronenwett’s testimony

as to causation. The district court also excluded plaintiffs’ evidence

about other, similar accidents and reports of defects. The district court

then concluded that plaintiffs had not introduced evidence sufficient

to permit a jury finding that the electric throw had caused the fire.

Therefore, at the conclusion of plaintiffs’ case the district court

granted defendant’s Rule 50(a)(1) motion for judgment as a matter of

law. This appeal followed. 

II.

Plaintiffs assert five assignments of error: 

I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY

APPLY THE "MALFUNCTION THEORY" OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY CASES WHEN THE PRODUCT IS

DESTROYED. 

II. THE TRIAL COURT MISAPPLIED THE FLEXIBLE

DAUBERT ANALYSIS OF RULE 702 TO

EXCLUDE EXPERT TESTIMONY FROM MACK

DENNIS AND DR. CRONENWETT BECAUSE

THERE WAS NO TESTING. 

III. UNDER THE "MALFUNCTION THEORY" OF CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, OTHER RELEVANT

EVIDENCE OF PRODUCT DEFECT AND SAFETY

SHOULD HAVE BEEN ADMITTED. 

IV. EITHER WITH OR WITHOUT THE IMPROPERLY

EXCLUDED EVIDENCE, THERE WAS SUFFIBRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 7
CIENT CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT THE CASE TO THE JURY. 

V. THE TRIAL COURT’S CONDUCT DURING TRIAL

DEMONSTRATED BIAS, PREJUDGING OF THE

CASE, AND OVERALL MEDDLING IN THE PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE SO AS TO DEPRIVE

PLAINTIFFS OF DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR

TRIAL BEFORE AN IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL.

(Appellants’ Br. i, ii.)

Appellate review of a district court’s interpretation or application

of state law is de novo. See James v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 370

F.3d 417, 421-22 (4th Cir. 2004). Conversely, the district court has

broad latitude in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, including

expert opinion, and we will not overturn Daubert evidentiary rulings

with respect to relevance and reliability absent an abuse of discretion.

See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141-42 (1997). A district

court abuses its discretion if its conclusion is guided by erroneous

legal principles, or if it rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.

See Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi, A.B., 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir.

1999). Finally, we review de novo the district court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law, see Freeman v. Case Corp., 118 F.3d 1011,

1014 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1069 (1998), considering

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, see

Brown v. CSX Transp. Co., 18 F.3d 245, 248 (4th Cir. 1994). 

Taken together, we must determine whether the admissible evidence, viewed most favorably to plaintiffs, would have allowed the

jury to render a verdict in their favor under West Virginia law. 

III.

We first address assignments of error I and II which state plaintiffs’

principal claim on appeal, which is that the district court erred in

applying Daubert rather than substantive West Virginia law as to causation. In essence, plaintiffs rely on several West Virginia cases and

argue that, when a product allegedly causing a fire has been destroyed

by that fire, plaintiffs are allowed to rely on the "Malfunction Theory"

and circumstantial evidence to prove that a defect in that product

8 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
caused the fire. The argument goes that evidence as to causation is not

controlled by Daubert and the Federal Rules of Evidence, rather by

the substantive law of West Virginia which is claimed to embrace the

"Malfunction Theory" of proof of causation. 

Plaintiffs characterize the district court’s decisions on evidence as

reversible disregard for West Virginia law. The following colloquy at

trial succinctly illustrates plaintiffs’ argument and the district court’s

explanation for rejecting it: 

Plaintiffs’ attorney: "[T]he law in the Fourth Circuit and in

West Virginia is that an expert need not review product

remains to arrive at an opinion as to the probable defect in

it." 

Court: "The evidence [law] is the Federal Rules of Evidence." 

As the transcript shows, plaintiffs essentially advocate applying

West Virginia law rather than the Federal Rules of Evidence where,

as here, products-liability claims, destruction of physical evidence,

causation, and expert testimony converge. 

The position of the district court was correct and has been decided

in Cavallo v. Star Enterprises, 100 F.3d 1150 (4th Cir. 1996). In that

case the district court, as here, entered a judgment for the defendant,

having excluded expert testimony as to the cause of the various

chronic illnesses of the plaintiff. The expert witnesses had offered testimony that the plaintiff’s exposure to petroleum vapors from jet fuel

spilled or leaked by the defendant had caused the plaintiff’s illnesses,

upon which she sued. The court excluded the evidence because it was

not supported by appropriate validation, as required by Daubert v.

Merrell Dow, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The position of the Cavallo plaintiffs in Virginia, similar to that taken here by the Bryte plaintiffs in

West Virginia, was that Virginia law should apply as to the admissibility of the testimony:

The Cavallos assert that, because their claims are grounded

in Virginia state law and were originally filed in Virginia

BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 9
state court, the admissibility of expert testimony should be

governed by Virginia law. 

However, we followed our decision in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,

789 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1986) and affirmed the district court, quoting

from Scott, 789 F.2d at 1054:

Unlike evidentiary rules concerning burdens of proof or presumptions, the admissibility of expert testimony in federal

court sitting in the diversity jurisdiction is controlled by federal law. State law, whatever it may be, is irrelevant.

100 F.3d 1150, 1157.

This argument has been rejected by other Courts of Appeals in similar cases dependent on expert testimony. For example, in Ealy v.

Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 897 F.2d 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1990), the defendants appealed the district court’s denial of their motion for judgment

N.O.V. in a Bendectin birth-defects case. Plaintiffs defended the verdict in their favor by arguing that Erie Railway Co. v. Tompkins, 304

U.S. 64, 78 (1938), required the district court to follow an earlier District of Columbia Court of Appeals decision that had affirmed a jury

verdict for different plaintiffs based on the "same four types of expert

data" relied upon by the federal plaintiffs. Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1163. The

D.C. Circuit agreed with defendants that reliance on state (decisional)

law was not required. Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1160 ("[t]he admissibility of

expert testimony [is] a procedural matter which does not implicate the

principles underlying Erie") (citation omitted). The court explained its

holding, that the district court abused its discretion in admitting unreliable expert testimony accepted by the state court, in terms applicable

to this case: 

Unfortunately for [plaintiffs], the only evidence they have

on the issue of scientific causation is the testimony of their

experts. Once that testimony is deemed inadmissible, it is

self-evident that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict for the plaintiffs. Contrary to the [plaintiffs’] assertions,

however, this court is enforcing a procedural rule governing

admissibility; it is not supplanting substantive state rules on

the sufficiency of evidence.

10 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
Ealy, 897 F.2d at 1163; cf. Daubert v. Merrell-Dow Pharms., Inc., 43

F.3d 1311, 1322 (9th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment for

defendants: "[p]laintiffs do not quantify this possibility [of causation],

or otherwise indicate how their conclusions should be weighted, even

though the substantive [state-law] legal standard has always required

proof of causation by a preponderance of the evidence"), on remand

from 509 U.S. 579 (1993). These decisions highlight the application

in the federal courts of the process that plaintiffs argue is a "misapplication" of West Virginia law, rather we are of opinion that it is an

application of the rules of evidence under Daubert. 

Without significant exception, plaintiffs relied on Dennis’ testimony to establish that the throw caused the fire.4

 But Dennis did not

exclude all or even most of the other possible sources of the fire. As

set forth above, it is undisputed that Dennis did not physically examine the lamp, the candle, the cord that remained which he found on

Mrs. Bryte’s arm, or the wall outlet, or its wiring, which supplied

electricity to the throw. Moreover, he was unaware that an extension

cord was plugged into the same outlet as was the blanket, and therefore he obviously did not inspect it. These omissions are particularly

revealing in light of Mrs. Miller’s testimony that she could not unplug

the throw because she "would have gotten burned if [she] tried to pull

[the cord] out," which suggests fire on the left side of the chair near

the outlet, even if not in or on the outlet itself. It is clear that such possibilities have not been excluded in any methodical or reliable fashion. And we are not obliged to credit Dennis’ say-so supporting his

own reliability by way of excluding other causes. See Kumho Tire Co.

v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 at 157 (1999).

Plaintiffs also assert that Dennis adequately excluded the most

likely alternative source of the fire, the candle, based on Mrs. Miller’s

observation that the candle was still lighted when she arrived at the

scene, as well as on the evidence that Mrs. Bryte could not reach the

4As set forth above, Dr. Cronenwett was proffered to testify as to

defective electric circuits, not the fire’s origin. Dennis’ causation testimony was an obligatory support for Dr. Cronenwett’s, as Cronenwett

acknowledged. Because we affirm the district court’s exclusion of Dennis’ opinion, we do not address in great detail the particulars of most of

Dr. Cronenwett’s testimony. 

BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 11
candle. We do not think that Dennis’ explanation is sufficient to

explain away the candle. Our doubt arises not because of Dennis’ reliance on Mrs. Miller’s observations, but because the fact that she saw

the lighted candle on the table in itself cannot exclude it as a cause

of the fire, rather the contrary inference is the more logical. This is

a matter of common sense: for example, the candle’s flame might

have burned the lamp shade above, as defendant suggested when

cross-examining Mrs. Miller, or either the blanket or the throw may

have been ignited upon contact with the candle which may have been

within reach of the decedent. Notably, though Mrs. Miller and Mrs.

Bryte’s daughter testified that the candle was out of Mrs. Bryte’s

reach, Dennis did not independently investigate why what appeared

to be the table’s remains were found close to the recliner, and his only

explanation for this was the implausible one that a fireman had kicked

the debris. The table with the candle on it was described by Dennis

as "immediately to your left of" the recliner, and a photo in evidence

shows the table as adjacent to the recliner. 

Daubert aims to prevent expert speculation, and our review of the

record convinces us that Dennis’ failure to independently evaluate the

open flame in the room cannot be reconciled with the reliability mandate. Dennis was permitted to rely on what Mrs. Miller saw, but not

on her conclusions about the cause of the fire. As to the candle he

essentially did the latter. 

We also note that, at the beginning of the trial, the justifiable

impression of the district court, the depositions of most of the witnesses having been taken, when Mrs. Miller left to get the child,

"there was a candle lighted on a table within reach of the decedent."

Plaintiffs also argue that Dennis performed a methodical walkaround inspection, which led him to the origin of the fire. Dennis’

investigation did indeed determine that the left side of Mrs. Bryte was

the "area of origin" for the fire—but he could not identify the "point

of origin." And, as seen above, Mrs. Miller testified as well that the

fire was on the outside of the chair, and on Mrs. Bryte’s left side as

well. Thus, though both Dennis’ "area of origin" finding and Mrs.

Miller’s testimony implicated the area where the outlet and the two

power cords were located, Dennis did not closely examine this area

and was unaware of a cord lying inches from the recliner, plugged in

12 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
to the same outlet as the throw. This is inconsistent with the NFPA

standards, which require investigators to exclude "[a]ll other reasonable origins and causes." NFPA 921, § 2-3.6 (1999 ed.). 

Furthermore, Dennis’ causation testimony is called into question

by the fact that Dennis may have sought to explain his conclusion

about "improper use" of the throw, based upon the fact he "had information that . . . [the throw] had been tucked down in beside the victim

in the chair and which I later learned the old style electric blankets

. . . " 

While the testimony of Dennis was cut short before he had

explained his use of the phrase "improper use" with respect to the

throw, the proffered testimony of Dr. Cronenwett with reference to

causation is instructive. The "snapping and crackling noises" referred

to throughout and referred to by Mrs. Miller are "characteristic of

burning . . . energized PTC cable" not the burning of an energized

power or service cord, for, "generally, when a service cord shortcircuits it explodes once and opens a circuit breaker. It would not continue to snap and crackle." Thus, "the burning of an energized service

cord for an appliance would be inconsistent with a snapping and

crackling sound described by Ms. Miller." Dr. Cronenwett had no

information that the circuit breaker was tripped in the line into which

the throw had been plugged. But because snapping and crackling

came from the burning PTC cable5, he logically excluded a burning

of the power cord to the throw as the cause of the fire. Apparently

unknown to Dr. Cronenwett, however, the circuit breaker, in the line

into which the throw was plugged, was tripped. When it was tripped

is not shown in the record. That it was tripped is shown by the testimony of David Bryte, the son of the decedent: "[T]he breaker on that

particular circuit was tripped." With the power cord possibly removed

as the origin of the fire, and the burning of the PTC cable as the origin

of the snapping and cracking, it then is relevant to consider the testimony of Dr. Cronenwett that "the PTC wire could also burn from

being attacked by an outside fire source as well." But does, or doesn’t,

the tripped circuit breaker make the various cords (or their appliances)

plugged into the circuit, candidates for the origin of the fire. 

5A PTC cable is the cable containing the heating element and runs

throughout the throw. 

BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 13
All of these reasons serve to support the decision of the district

court in excluding the causation testimony of Dennis, and we are of

opinion the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding that

testimony. It described the record at this point as "so speculative that

a jury has to guess to determine whether there is liability of either the

warranty or negligence for the jury to speculate on." 

IV.

In the third assignment of error, plaintiffs challenge the district

court’s exclusion of other evidence such as "other accidents including

the same product." Here, too, we find no abuse of discretion. See

Westberry, 178 F.3d at 261. 

Plaintiffs rely largely on this court’s decision in Riley v. De’Longhi

Corp., No. 99-2305 (4th Cir. Oct. 30, 2000), in support of their argument regarding other relevant evidence.6

 In Riley, we determined that

four of the five factors applicable to analyzing the sufficiency of evidence of a product defect under Maryland law favored reversing summary judgment for the defendants. 

Under Riley, the rule in Maryland in deciding whether there is sufficient circumstantial evidence of a product defect to proceed to trial,

is that the court considers five factors: (1) expert testimony as to possible causes; (2) the occurrence of the accident a short time after sale;

(3) same accidents in similar products; (4) the elimination of other

causes of the accident; and (5) the type of accident which does not

happen without a defect. 

As to each factor: 

(1) The testimony of Dennis, that the fire originated in the throw,

was inadmissible, so there was no expert testimony as to the possible

cause.

6Our mention of Riley is no indication that we rely on it as binding circuit precedent. See Fourth Circuit Local Rule 36(c); Hogan v. Carter, 85

F.3d 1113, 1118 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). 

14 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.
(2) The fire in this case occurred some two years after the sale, so

there might be a question of fact as to whether the accident occurred

a short time after sale. 

(3) As the district court correctly held, there was no proof that the

facts in this case were the same or similar to what transpired in the

other cases, so there was no showing of the same accident in similar

products. 

(4) In this case the elimination of other causes of the accident has

not been shown, as we have related above, so there has been no showing of the elimination of other causes of the accident. 

(5) Since there is no showing of the cause of the accident, there

has been no showing of a type of accident which does not happen

without a defect. Thus, even under Riley, the evidence of "other accidents involving the same product" is not admissible, only one factor

possibly being favorable. 

A general logical fallacy similar to that mentioned just above

undermines plaintiffs’ theory that the district court was required to

admit evidence of substantially similar incidents and reports implicating a Sunbeam throw. That is, plaintiffs sought to introduce such evidence without establishing their premise: the salient characteristics of

this incident, as well as of the incident to which comparison is sought.

The district court commented:

And I agree with [plaintiffs’ counsel] one hundred percent

[that it is proper to bring evidence of other similar incidents]; and once you get a witness who testifies that this is

similar to what went on in these other cases, I might let it

come in . . . . 

We are of opinion that the district court did not abuse its discretion

in denial of evidence of "other accidents involving the same product."

V.

The fourth issue is plaintiffs’ argument that "with or without the

improperly excluded evidence, there was sufficient circumstantial eviBRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC. 15
dence to submit the case to the jury." We review de novo the district

court’s grant of judgment as a matter of law. See Freeman v. Case

Corp., 118 F.3d at 1011, 1014 (4th Cir. 1997). Though we consider

the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,

Freeman, 118 F.3d at 1014, given our affirmance of the district

court’s decisions as to the admissibility of evidence, the required

result is judgment for the defendant. With no witness as to ignition,

there simply was no evidence of causation other than Dennis,’ and via

that, Dr. Cronenwett’s, testimony. As in Ealy, "the only evidence

[plaintiffs] have on the issue of scientific causation is the testimony

of their experts. Once that testimony is deemed inadmissible, it is

self-evident that the evidence is insufficient to support a verdict for

the plaintiffs." 897 F.2d at 1163 (emphasis added). We are of that

same opinion here and so hold. 

The judgment of the district court is accordingly

AFFIRMED.

7

7We have also considered the plaintiffs’ argument that the trial judge’s

"conduct during trial" demonstrated bias, prejudging of the case, and

overall meddling in the presentation of evidence so as to deprive plaintiffs of due process and a fair trial. We have examined the record and are

of opinion that the argument is without merit, and we so hold. 

16 BRYTE v. AMERICAN HOUSEHOLD, INC.