#### Wilbert WILSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, Roland Wood, Plaintiff, v. STATE FARM FIRE & CASUALTY COMPANY, Debbie Deligan, Claim Representative, Defendants-Appellees.

15-70-cv

United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit.

May 9, 2017

FOR PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT: Wilbert Wilson, pro se, Brooklyn, NY.

FOR DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES: Cheryl F. Korman, Rivkin Radler LLP, Uniondale, NY.

PRESENT: José A. Cabranes, Debra Ann Livingston, Circuit Judges, William H. Pauley III, * District Judge.

*

 Judge William H. Pauley III, of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

SUMMARY ORDER

Plaintiff-appellant Wilbert Wilson, proceeding *pro se,*appeals an order of the District Court denying the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction against State Farm Fire *&*Casualty Company. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

Judge Gleeson, who heard the plaintiffs’ request for preliminary injunctive relief, denied that request because the plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits. Although this contract dispute does not arise under federal law and the complaint lists the amount in controversy as $14,580, Judge Gleeson did not rule on the question of subject-matter jurisdiction at the emergency hearing, instead leaving the matter to Judge Brodie, to whom this case had been assigned in the ordinary course. Subsequently, the case was dismissed without prejudice by Judge Brodie for failure to prosecute, with the result *49that there has not yet been any ruling as to whether subject-matter jurisdiction over the complaint exists.

Because the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “[a]n appellate federal court must satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in a cause under review.” *Mitchell v. Maurer,*293 U.S. 237, 244, 55 S.Ct. 162, 79 L.Ed. 338 (1934). Our jurisdiction to review a district court’s order denying a preliminary injunction is established by 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). But we are not satisfied that the District Court had any jurisdiction over this matter. As noted, the plaintiffs’ contract claim did not arise under federal law, and the only amount in controversy referred to in the complaint is below the $75,000 needed to invoke diversity jurisdiction. *See*28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal question jurisdiction); *id.*§ 1332 (diversity jurisdiction); *Scherer v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y of U.S.,*347 F.3d 394, 397 (2d Cir. 2003) (“A party invoking the jurisdiction of the federal court has the burden of proving that it appears to a reasonable probability that the claim is in excess of the statutory jurisdictional amount. This burden is hardly onerous, however, for we recognize a rebuttable presumption that the face of the complaint is a good faith representation of the actual amount in controversy.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).

Accordingly, we VACATE the January 5, 2015 order on the ground that the District Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant or deny a preliminary injunction, and REMAND without prejudice to the plaintiffs’ re-pleading in good faith the requisite amount in controversy in the District Court, or to their filing a complaint in state court.