RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-2400-22 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

C. P.,

1

 Defendant-Appellant. 

___________________________

Submitted November 8, 2023 – Decided December 15, 2023 

Before Judges Sumners and Smith. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 95-08-0915.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Alison Gifford, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief). 

Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Timothy P. Kerrigan, Jr., Chief 

Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

1

 We employ initials to refer to defendant C.P. as required by N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.51e(e)(4). See also State v. F.E.D., 251 N.J. 505, 524 (2022).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-2400-22

PER CURIAM 

On November 24, 2021, C.P. petitioned the trial court for release pursuant 

to the Compassionate Release Act (CRA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. C.P. currently 

suffers from a combination of debilitating medical conditions including, 

hypertension, hyperlipidemia, chronic kidney disease, diabetes mellitus, chronic 

renal insufficiency requiring dialysis, and gangrene in her right foot. She also 

had her left leg amputated below the knee and suffered a recent heart attack. 

Due to her full-time nursing needs, C.P. currently is living in the infirmary at 

Edna Mahan Correctional Facility for Women (EMCF). She has served twentyeight years of a life sentence and is eligible for parole on March 8, 2025. 

The trial court rejected C.P.'s petition after a plenary hearing, finding the 

presence of certain extraordinary aggravating factors warranted denial. C.P. 

appealed, arguing the trial court abused its discretion. We agree and find the 

trial court misapplied the Supreme Court's guiding principles set forth in State 

v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023). We therefore reverse and order C.P.'s 

compassionate release. 

I.
3 A-2400-22

On May 28, 1997, C.P. pleaded guilty to several charges, including the 

murder of Tara Carter, the murder of her husband A.P.,2 and the attempted 

murder of Eugene Cooper. Carter, eighteen at the time of her death, was living 

in Paterson with C.P., the mother of her close childhood friend. Carter's body 

was discovered in a park on March 4, 1995. Her autopsy revealed the cause of 

death to be blunt force trauma to the head. Once her body was identified, the 

police learned that Carter had been living with C.P., and through further 

investigation found that C.P. was listed as a beneficiary on a $25,000 life 

insurance policy in Carter's name. 

During execution of a search warrant at C.P.'s address, an officer recalled 

that a stabbing victim, Cooper, had previously resided with C.P. When 

interviewed, Cooper confirmed he was living with C.P. and her family when he 

was stabbed. He identified his assailant as Charlie Pinchom, C.P.'s daughter's 

boyfriend, from a photograph. Cooper also said that C.P. had asked him to name 

her as a beneficiary to a life insurance policy, and that C.P. had solicited him to 

murder her husband, A.P., but he refused. The search of C.P.'s residence 

revealed insurance documents related to Cooper. 

2

 A.P.'s initials are used to more effectively preserve C.P.'s confidentiality. 
4 A-2400-22

A.P. died in September 1991 due to mixed drug intoxication involving 

several anti-anxiety and anti-depressant prescription medications. At the time, 

his death was considered accidental. Police initiated an investigation into A.P.'s 

death after interviewing Cooper, and their review of the toxicology report 

revealed prescription medications in A.P.'s system which were also prescribed 

to C.P. Notably, police also learned C.P. had received a life insurance payout 

for her husband's death. 

Pinchom confessed to the attempted murder of Cooper and killing Carter 

and disposing of her body, at the direction of C.P. The police then charged C.P. 

for Carter's murder, A.P.'s murder, and the attempted murder of Cooper, in 

addition to lesser charges. 

In 1997, a trial court sentenced C.P. to concurrent life terms with thirty 

years of parole ineligibility for the murders of A.P. and Carter, and to a 

consecutive prison term of twenty years for the attempted murder of Cooper. At 

sentencing, the judge found three aggravating factors: (1) the offense was 

committed in a heinous, cruel, or depraved manner; (2) the risk defendant will 

commit another crime; and (3) the need to deter defendant and others from 

violating the law. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1), (3), (9). 
5 A-2400-22

Some twenty-four years later, C.P. filed her compassionate release 

petition, resulting in six days of hearings between September 2022 and March 

2023. The State presented multiple witnesses in opposition to release. C.P. 

presented testimony from medical professionals and family members. The court 

considered numerous documents submitted into evidence by both sides, 

including but not limited to letters for and against release. 

Dr. Sandra Braimbridge, the medical director of EMCF and an expert in 

internal medicine, testified that C.P. required assisted living "at a minimum," if 

not placement in a nursing home. Another expert, Candace Lumax from the 

New Jersey Department of Health, Division of Aging Services, testified that 

C.P. would qualify for Medicaid if released, and that C.P. meets a "nursing 

facility level of care." Dr. James Cassidy, the supervisor of mental health at 

EMCF and an expert in forensic psychology, testified concerning C.P.'s mental 

state, opining that C.P. is mentally stable and presents a "very low risk" for 

committing harm to herself or others, or for committing any crimes. 

Four of C.P.'s family members testified for release: her daughter and son, 

as well as two adult granddaughters. C.P.'s proposed release plan, approved by 

the New Jersey State Parole Board, involves living with her daughter, a licensed 

nurse living in Texas who has experience working in the state's prison system. 
6 A-2400-22

C.P.'s daughter testified that she would support C.P. emotionally and physically 

if released. 

Opposing C.P.'s petition, three witnesses related to murder victim Carter 

testified. Rosie Carter, Tara's older sister, spoke about their strong relationship, 

and their plans to move to Georgia. Tara White, a childhood friend of Carter 

also testified in opposition to C.P.'s release, stating she was upset by the petition. 

The last witness to testify in opposition was Benicia Curry, Carter's daughter. 

Curry testified that she was two years old when her mother died, and she has 

no memory of her. She also testified about the emotional challenge of growing 

up without her mother. 

The trial court issued an order denying C.P.'s petition, along with a 

comprehensive statement of reasons. The court found by clear and convincing 

evidence that C.P established both the medical and public safety factors under 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e. The court stated: 

There is no doubt that C.P. . . suffers from permanent 

physical incapacity, as related by the medical witnesses 

herein. She is dependent on others, on a 24/7 basis, for 

transfer, locomotion, bathing, dressing, and needs 

assistance to get to the bathroom. 

With respect to whether she is a danger to society 

if released, this court finds that. . . she is not. . . .The 
7 A-2400-22

AM/Oliver[3] decisions discuss whether the defendant 

is a "realistic danger" to the public. Realistically, I find 

that she is not. 

The court took note of C.P.'s good behavior and work ethic while in prison and 

found the parole plan satisfactory. Next, the court turned to "whether there are 

extraordinary aggravating factors, relating to the original offenses." The court 

found that 

[F]urther harm to the victims would be intense and that 

the aggravating factors surrounding these offenses, two 

deceased victims and a third seriously injured victim, 

the vulnerability of each victim, and the heinous cruelty 

involved, particularly as to Tara Carter who was beaten 

to death with a crowbar, and to Eugene Cooper who was 

stabbed repeatedly, strongly mitigates against release. 

The court rested its decision in part on the manner of the victim's murders, noting 

"these horrible crimes were committed over a substantial period of time. . . . not 

. . . on one date under great stress or turmoil," along with the fact that life 

insurance policies were taken out on each of the victims by C.P. The court found 

C.P.'s testimony lacked sincerity, and stated "[c]andidly, I am simply unable to 

draw any strong conclusion as to her alleged remorse. In this court's view, the 

3

 State v. A.M., 252 N.J. 432 (2023) (companion case, State v. Oliver, 251 N.J. 

209 (2022)) 
8 A-2400-22

most compelling testimony was that of Bernicia Curry, Tara Carter's daughter, 

and of Rosie Carter, Tara's sister." The court found: 

Bernicia's life has been and continues to be profoundly 

and grievously affected by both the death of her mother 

and by the horrible manner in which she died. It has 

been terrible enough for her to cope while C.P. is 

serving her prison sentence. This court concludes that 

releasing C.P. on this petition would cause additional 

profound grief and depression and anger to her. Such 

reaction would, in this court's view, be reasonable and 

expected. 

 

The single issue on appeal is whether the trial court engaged in a proper 

exercise of discretion when it applied the analytical framework established by 

the Supreme Court in A.M., 252 N.J. 432. 

II. 

As background, we briefly examine the CRA and the Supreme Court's 

application of it in A.M. The Legislature enacted the CRA, which "provides for 

the release of inmates who suffer from a medical condition so severe that they 

are incapable of committing a crime and, in certain cases, would not pose a threat 

to public safety if released." Id. at 438. The CRA was designed to replace the 

prior medical parole law4 by "outlin[ing] a streamlined process to obtain relief." 

Ibid. Unlike the previous law, the CRA expands eligibility to inmates convicted 

4

 N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51c (repealed 2020). 
9 A-2400-22

of certain serious crimes. The new statute shifts the forum for initial 

consideration of release applications from the parole board to the courts. Ibid. 

The CRA "reflect[s] the Legislature's intent to show compassion to people with 

serious medical needs, decrease the prison population, and reduce healthcare 

costs for correctional facilities." Ibid. 

Procedurally, the inmate must procure a "Certificate of Eligibility" from 

the Department of Corrections (DOC), before an inmate may petition for release 

under the CRA. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(f)(2). The DOC must "promptly issue" 

the certificate if two department-assigned physicians "determine[] that an 

inmate is suffering from a terminal condition, disease . . . or permanent physical 

incapacity." N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(d)(2). A "permanent physical incapacity" 

is defined as "a medical condition that renders the inmate permanently unable 

to perform activities of basic daily living, results in the inmate requiring 

[twenty-four] hour care[,] and did not exist at the time of sentencing." Ibid. 

Once in possession of a certificate, an inmate may file a petition with the 

court and serve notice to the county prosecutor or attorney general, who then 

must provide notice to the inmate's victims or family of the victim(s) that would 

be entitled to notice regarding the inmate's parole. N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(e)(2). 

The victims as well as friends and family of victims may also testify at the 
10 A-2400-22

hearing concerning "any harm [they]suffered." Ibid. Compassionate release 

"may" be granted only where the court finds by clear and convincing evidence 

that the inmate is so debilitated or incapacitated by the terminal condition, 

disease or syndrome, or permanent physical incapacity as to be permanently 

physically incapable of committing a crime if released. N.J.S.A. 30:4-

123.51e(f)(1). 

The A.M. Court considered the language of the statute and determined 

that "[c]onsistent with the text and history of the statute, trial courts have 

discretion to decide whether to release an inmate who meets the first two 

requirements." A.M., 252 N.J. at 457. In its reasoning, the Court noted that the 

statute's inclusion of the victims, and providing them with an opportunity to 

testify, is instructive in determining the Legislature's intent, "[o]therwise, 

testimony from victims would be little more than a potentially cathartic but 

hollow exercise. . . ." Id. at 453. 

The CRA does not spell out factors for a trial court to consider, but the 

A.M. Court spotted this flaw and provided further instruction. Id. at 456. The 

Court concluded that "unless one or more extraordinary aggravating factors 

exist," an inmate who satisfies "the Act's medical and public safety criteria 

should be granted compassionate release." Id. at 460. The Court then provided 
11 A-2400-22

examples of "extraordinary circumstances" a trial court may consider in 

determining whether extraordinary aggravating factors exist to defeat release. 

Ibid. The examples included: 

(1) particularly heinous, cruel, or depraved conduct; (2) 

a particularly vulnerable victim based on the person’s 

advance age, youth, or disability; (3) an attack on the 

institutions of government or the administration of 

justice; and (4) whether release would have a 

particularly detrimental effect on the well-being and 

recovery process of victims and family members. For 

the fourth factor, courts should apply a standard of 

objective reasonableness. 

[Ibid.] 

We note the bar for finding extraordinary aggravating factors "is a necessarily 

high one," and that "such factors cannot be used as a substitute for all serious 

crimes." Id. at 460-61. 

C.P.'s petition is the first CRA appeal since A.M. was decided. 

III. 

 The record shows C.P. demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence 

that she satisfied both the medical and public safety requirements. See N.J.S.A. 

30:4-123.51e(f)(1). Mindful that murder always is a "most serious" offense, 

A.M. 252 N.J. at 462, we turn to the trial court's "extraordinary aggravating 

factor" findings. 
12 A-2400-22

A.

The court found the murders of A.P. and Carter, as well as the assault on 

Cooper, to be "extraordinarily cruel and vicious," consistent with its conclusion 

that C.P. engaged in particularly heinous, cruel or depraved conduct in line with 

extraordinary aggravating factor one under A.M., In support of its finding, the 

court cited the blunt force trauma sustained by Carter and the repeated stabbing 

of Cooper.5 Finally, the court found C.P.'s crimes did not result from "stress or 

turmoil," but rather were planned crimes which were driven by financial gain, 

as evidenced by the life insurance policies C.P. procured for all three victims. 

These facts represent the totality of the trial court's support for its finding that 

extraordinary aggravating factor one applies to deny release. 

The court next turned to A.M. extraordinary aggravating four, "whether 

release would have a particularly detrimental effect on the well-being and 

recovery process of victims and family members." The court focused on the 

testimony of Curry, Rosie Carter, and White in connection with Carter's death. 

We address the witnesses in ascending order of significance to the analysis. 

5

 We note the court identified Cooper as an autistic victim in its statement of 

reasons, however we find nothing in the record to support this characterization 

of his medical condition. 
13 A-2400-22

White, a friend of Carter's, testified that the victim was "beloved," and the 

court acknowledged White's grief as well as that of other friends and relatives 

who wrote in opposition to release. Rosie Carter testified that the victim was 

preparing to relocate to the family home in South Carolina when she was 

murdered. After hearing Rosie's testimony, the court found she "had suffered 

grievously and would be profoundly affected and emotionally harmed by an 

early release of C.P." The court called Rosie's emotional state "reasonable and 

expected." The trial court took a longer look at the impact of Carter's death on 

her surviving child, Bernicia. It found her "profoundly affected" by her mother's 

death and concluded, without medical expert testimony, that C.P.'s release 

would cause Bernicia "additional profound grief, depression, and anger." The 

trial court acknowledged the ongoing trauma, sense of loss, and pain testified to 

by Carter's friend, sister, and daughter as they opposed C.P.'s release. 

B.

We consider the trial court's aggravating factor analysis in light of the 

Supreme Court's principles set forth in A.M. First, the facts found by the trial 

court undoubtedly establish a basis for a finding of aggravating factor one 

pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1). Indeed, the sentencing court made such a 

finding in 1995, however that is not the statutory framework we are asked to 
14 A-2400-22

apply. Instead, we must examine the record through the lens of the CRA. The 

tragic facts present here—premeditation, blunt force trauma, and monetary 

gain—are often present in first-degree murder cases. This sad reality in no way 

diminishes the seriousness of C.P.'s crimes. However, the A.M. Court instructs 

us that in the context of compassionate release, the standard for evaluating 

aggravating factors is "necessarily" higher. We must ask whether extraordinary 

aggravating factors exist. A.M. at 460. We cannot conclude that these facts, 

common to the crime of murder, rise to the level of extraordinary. In our view, 

characterizing the trial court's findings on this factor as extraordinary would 

create "de facto categorical barriers to release," against the guidance of A.M. 

252 N.J. at 459-60.

We next turn to consideration of aggravating factor four. The trial court's 

findings were primarily grounded in the survivors' testimony. It found that 

C.P.'s release, almost twenty-eight years after her conviction, would cause 

"intense" further harm "to the victims." Although the trial court did not 

expressly state it in these terms, its findings can be reframed in the language of 

A.M. this way: it is objectively reasonable to conclude C.P.'s release would 

have a detrimental effect on the recovery process of the victims' relatives. We 

do not agree. Nearly three decades after C.P's conviction and sentencing, we 
15 A-2400-22

cannot conclude that her compassionate release under the statute would have a 

"particularly detrimental effect" on well-being and recovery. 

When we consider the harm testified to by Curry and Rosie Carter, we 

recognize that such harm is an unfortunate byproduct of the expected trauma 

that survivors of murder victims will experience. Applying a standard of 

objective reasonableness, we cannot conclude the survivors' testimony, which 

evoked great pathos during the hearing, rose to the level of an extraordinary 

aggravating factor. Id. at 460. 

C.

Recognizing the inherent seriousness of C.P.'s crimes, our application of 

the principles established by the Court in A.M. leads us to conclude "there are 

no extraordinary aggravating factors that would bar [C.P.'s] release." We are 

therefore constrained to conclude that the trial court engaged in an inappropriate 

exercise of judicial discretion when it denied C.P.'s compassionate release. Id. 

at 461. 

In closing, we note the Court's final words in A.M.6 are apt: 

6

 We comment briefly on Oliver, the companion case to A.M. In Oliver, the 

defendant shot and killed a detective in the Essex County courthouse. 252 N.J. 

at 446. The Supreme Court denied compassionate release to the defendant solely 

on the ground of extraordinary aggravating factor three, an attack on the 
16 A-2400-22

A.M.'s crime was without question a most serious 

offense. She deliberately murdered her husband, and 

her children offered heartfelt testimony in opposition to 

her release. But the law no longer bars inmates 

convicted of murder from seeking compassionate 

release. Although A.M.'s crime is an inherently serious 

one, there are no extraordinary aggravating factors that 

would bar her release. 

[Id. at 462.] 

We reach the same result. C.P. met the requirements under the CRA, and her 

petition should have been granted. 

Reversed and remanded to the trial court for entry of a prompt order 

granting C.P.'s release. In accordance with N.J.S.A. 30:4-123.51e(g), our 

reversal of the court's order denying C.P.'s petition for compassionate release 

shall not become final for ten days to allow the State to petition the Supreme 

Court for certification or other relief. We note this matter should be addressed 

on an accelerated basis. 

Reversed. 

institution of justice. A.M. at 463. The Court considered no other extraordinary 

aggravating factor in denying release. Ibid.