IN THE MISSOURI COURT OF APPEALS

WESTERN DISTRICT

STATE OF MISSOURI, )

)

Respondent, )

)

v. ) WD78448

)

PHILLIP LAMONT RANSBURG, ) Opinion filed: February 16, 2016

)

Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRY COUNTY, MISSOURI

THE HONORABLE JAMES K. JOURNEY, JUDGE

Before Division Three: James E. Welsh, Presiding Judge,

Joseph M. Ellis, Judge and Thomas H. Newton, Judge

In a case involving convictions on numerous additional counts, Phillip Ransburg 

appeals from his convictions on one count of second-degree assault, § 565.060,

1

and 

the related count for armed criminal action, § 571.015. For the following reasons, those 

convictions are reversed, and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

Appellant was involved in a romantic relationship and lived with Tammy Masoner,

on and off, for about a year and a half. In November 2013, he was living with Masoner 

and her daughter in a trailer owned by Masoner in Clinton, Missouri. On November 24,

2013, Appellant brandished a kitchen knife close to Masoner's throat during an 

 

1

All statutory references are to RSMo 2000 as updated through the 2013 Cumulative Supplement.
2

argument, and the police were contacted. On November 25, 2013, Masoner ended her 

relationship with Appellant and sought and obtained a protective order against him. 

Appellant was jailed shortly thereafter and remained there for several months 

until a friend arranged for him to be released on bond on March 3, 2014.2 Sometime 

between 10:00 and 10:30 p.m. on the evening of his release, while Masoner was 

watching television in her trailer with her boyfriend, James Blackman, and her daughter,

Sarah, Appellant appeared and attempted to force open the locked, front door to the 

trailer. Masoner went to the door and attempted to brace it but Appellant was eventually 

able to break open the door and force his way in. As he did so, Appellant was holding a 

four-foot stick resembling a taped-up broomstick. He held the stick across the front of 

his body with clenched fists about a foot and a half apart and charged toward Blackman,

but Blackman was able to flee with Sarah into a bedroom before Appellant could reach 

him. Appellant then turned to Masoner, dropped his stick, grabbed her arm, and 

attempted to pull her out of the trailer. When Masoner resisted, Appellant punched her 

in the face, striking her in the upper, left forehead. At that point, having been coaxed by 

Sarah to defend her mother, Blackman came out of the bedroom to confront Appellant. 

When Blackman appeared, Appellant grabbed his stick and fled. Sarah called the 

police for help.

Officer Patrick Meeks of the Clinton Police Department arrived at the trailer a 

short time later. He noticed that the front door to the trailer had been damaged in a 

manner that indicated it had been forced open from the outside and that Masoner had a 

 

2

The record is unclear whether Appellant was placed in jail because of the November 24 incident or other 

charges against him.
3

"large swelling contusion area on her left forehead." Meeks took statements from the 

trailer's occupants. Later that evening, the police stopped and arrested Appellant. 

With regard to the March 3 incident, Appellant was charged with one count of 

first-degree burglary, § 569.160; one count of second-degree domestic assault, § 

565.073; one count of second-degree assault, § 565.060; one count of armed criminal 

action, § 571.015; and one misdemeanor count of violating an order of protection, § 

455.010. Appellant waived his right to jury trial, and the case was tried to the court.3 

The trial court found Appellant guilty as charged. After obtaining a sentencing 

assessment report, the trial court sentenced Appellant as a prior offender to concurrent 

terms of eight years imprisonment on the burglary count, seven years on the seconddegree domestic assault count, seven years on the second-degree assault count, five 

years on the armed criminal action count, and one year on the violation of an order of 

protection count. In his two points on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his convictions on the second-degree assault count, which was 

based upon his charging toward Blackman with the stick in his hands, and the related 

count for armed criminal action. 

"The standard of review for a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is the 

same in both court-tried and jury-tried cases." State v. Chaney, 460 S.W.3d 13, 16 

(Mo. App. E.D. 2014). This Court's "role is limited to a determination of whether the 

State presented sufficient evidence from which a trier of fact could have reasonably 

found the defendant guilty." State v. Brooks, 446 S.W.3d 673, 674 (Mo. banc 2014)

(internal quotation omitted). In making that determination, "[t]he evidence and all 

 

3

Three other criminal cases against him were tried to the court at the same time, including the case 

related to the November 24, 2013, knife-wielding incident.
4

reasonable inferences therefrom are viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict,

disregarding any evidence and inferences contrary to the verdict." Id.

In his first point on appeal, Appellant contends that the trial court erred in denying 

his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second-degree assault count at the close of 

all evidence because the evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he had attempted to cause physical injury to Blackman by means of a dangerous 

instrument. He argues that the record is insufficient to support a finding that the stick he 

was holding as he charged Blackman was a "dangerous instrument" as defined by § 

556.061(9).

Section 565.060 provides that "[a] person commits the crime of assault in the 

second degree if he . . . [a]ttempts to cause or knowingly causes physical injury to 

another person by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument." With regard to 

the second-degree assault count, Appellant was charged by information with having 

"attempted to cause physical injury to James Blackmon [sic] by means of a dangerous 

instrument by advancing toward Blackmon [sic] with a large stick in defendant's hands." 

"A dangerous instrument is 'any instrument, article or substance, which, under 

the circumstances in which it is used, is readily capable of causing death or other 

serious physical injury.'" State v. Fasnut, 302 S.W.3d 259, 263 (Mo. App. E.D. 2010) 

(quoting § 556.061(9)). "Serious physical injury" is defined as "physical injury that 

creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious disfigurement or protracted 

loss or impairment of the function of any part of the body." § 556.061(28).

"'Unlike a deadly weapon, a dangerous instrument is not designed for use as a 

weapon and may have a normal function under ordinary circumstances.'" State v. 
5

Rousselo, 386 S.W.3d 919, 923-24 (Mo. App. S.D. 2012) (quoting State v. Williams,

126 S.W.3d 377, 384 (Mo. banc 2004)). "The types of objects that may constitute 

'dangerous instruments' are not enumerated by statute and become 'dangerous 

instruments' when used in a manner where the object is readily capable of causing 

death or serious physical injury." State v. Fortner, 451 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Mo. App. 

E.D. 2014). "Missouri courts have found a variety of seemingly innocuous objects to be 

dangerous instruments by analyzing whether the defendant knowingly or purposely 

used the object in a manner in which it was readily capable of causing death or serious 

physical injury." State v. Coram, 231 S.W.3d 865, 868 (Mo. App. S.D. 2007) (internal 

quotation omitted). "The key to determining whether an object is a dangerous 

instrument is whether the object can kill or seriously injure under the circumstances in 

which it is used." Id. (internal quotation omitted). 

The object at issue in this case is a four-foot long, taped-up stick, the diameter of 

a broomstick. Appellant was known by Masoner, the police, and others in the 

community to regularly carry the taped-up stick around with him so that he could dance 

with it in public. As he charged at Blackman, Appellant was clenching that stick across 

his body with both hands, with his fists spaced about a foot and a half apart, and his 

fists were facing Blackman as he charged. Blackman testified that Appellant did not 

swing or jab the stick at him and that he simply charged at him "like a football player 

would to hit another attacker."

In arguing that this evidence established that the way in which Appellant used the 

stick rendered it a dangerous instrument, the State relies on State v. Eoff, 193 S.W.3d 

366, 373-74 (Mo. App. S.D. 2006), wherein the defendant used a 1 x 2 x 18 inch piece 
6

of wood to bludgeon the victim about the head. The victim suffered a laceration to her 

head, resulting in considerable bleeding and requiring five staples to close, and also 

sustained a defensive injury to her hand that doctors were concerned might have 

broken it. Id. at 374. Eoff held that, "when used as bludgeon," a 1 x 2 x 18 piece of 

wood was "readily capable of causing broken bones, severe lacerations, eye injuries,

loss of teeth, etc." and was, therefore, a dangerous instrument. Id. In contrast to Eoff,

in the case at bar, there is no evidence that Appellant used or attempted to use his stick 

as a bludgeon. 

While certainly a four-foot long stick can be used in a manner where it becomes 

a dangerous instrument, the record in this case simply does not support a finding that 

Appellant used or attempted to use his stick in such a manner. Appellant did not 

attempt to swing or jab at Blackman with the stick or otherwise target a vital area of his 

body with it. No evidence was presented establishing that, as utilized by Appellant,

simply holding the stick across his body in front of him as he charged Blackman, the 

stick was readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury if he struck 

Blackman in that manner. See Carter v. State, 933 A.2d 774, 778-79 (Del. 2007)

(holding that a lacrosse stick was not a dangerous instrument under the circumstances 

where it was swung at and struck the victim's hand with the plastic, netted end because 

there was no evidence that the way the lacrosse stick was used or was intended to be 

used rendered it readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury). 

Accordingly, the record does not contain sufficient evidence to prove the dangerous 

instrument element of the charge against Appellant, and his conviction on the seconddegree assault count must be reversed.
7

"Where a conviction of a greater offense has been overturned for insufficiency of 

the evidence, the reviewing court may enter a conviction for a lesser offense if the 

evidence was sufficient for the [trier of fact] to find each of the elements and the [finder 

of fact] was required to find those elements to enter the ill-fated conviction on the 

greater offense." State v. Blair, 443 S.W.3d 677, 684 (Mo. App. W.D. 2014) (quoting 

State v. O'Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1993)). Appellant concedes that,

based on the evidence presented and the applicable law, this Court may enter a 

conviction against him for the lesser-included offense of assault in the third degree, § 

565.070.1.4 Accordingly, we enter judgment against Appellant on one count of assault 

in the third degree and remand the cause to the trial court for sentencing on that count. 

In his second point on appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the 

evidence to support his conviction for armed criminal action related to his assault on 

Blackman. Appellant was charged with armed criminal action for committing the felony 

of assault in the second degree "by, with and through, the knowing use, assistance and 

aid of a dangerous instrument." Because, as noted supra, the evidence failed to 

sufficiently establish that Appellant used a dangerous instrument in his assault on 

Blackman, his conviction for armed criminal action is also not supported by the record 

and must be reversed.

 

4

Section 565.070.1 provides, in pertinent part:

1. A person commits the crime of assault in the third degree if:

(1) The person attempts to cause or recklessly causes physical injury to another 

person; 

Section 556.061(20) defines "physical injury" as “physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical 

condition.” In order to find Appellant guilty of assault in the third degree the trial court would have to find 

the Appellant attempted to cause physical injury to James Blackman. The State’s evidence permits a 

finding that by charging at Blackman as though he was going to tackle him, Appellant was attempting to 

cause Blackman pain. That is the only element needed for a conviction of assault in the third degree.
8

In short, because insufficient evidence was presented to establish that Appellant 

used a "dangerous instrument" in his assault on Blackman, his convictions for seconddegree assault and armed criminal action are reversed. Judgment is entered against 

Appellant on one count of third-degree assault, and the cause is remanded for 

sentencing on that count. Appellant's remaining convictions and sentences are 

affirmed.

________________________________

Joseph M. Ellis, Judge

All concur.