Interim Decision #2360 

MATTER OF KONG 

In Visa Petition Proceedings 

A-20282149 

Decided by Board March 21; 1975 

Under Burmese law a Kittima adoption to be valid must be registered pursuant to the 

Registration Act. A registered instrument may operate from the date of its execution if 

such date is prior to the date of registration (Section 47 of the Registration of Kittima 

adoptions Act). AnAppatittha (informal) adoption is not sufficient to confer immigration 

status under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 

ON BEHALF OF PETITIONER: Joe M. Chan, Esquire 

San Francisco Neighborhood Legal 

Assistance Foundation 

250 Columbus Avenue, Suite 200 

San Francisco, California 94133 

The petitioner has moved for reconsideration and reversal of our 

decision dated March 25, 1974, in which we dismissed her appeal from 

the district director's denial of her petition to classify the beneficiary as 

her adopted son under section 203(a)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.' Counsel has submitted additional material pertaining to 

Burmese law, and we have received another memorandum of Burmese 

law from the Far Eastern Law Division of the Library of Congress. The 

motion to reconsider will be denied. 

Initially, counsel challenges our determination that an Appatittha 

(informal) adoption under Burmese law is not sufficient to confer immigration status upon the beneficiary. We have reviewed the contentions 

advanced on appeal, as well as the materials in the record pertaining to 

Burmese law. We are satisfied that our decision not to accept an Appatittha adoption as sufficient for the purpose of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act was correct. We have since reaffirmed that decision in 

Matter of Chang, 14 I. & N. Dec. 720 (BIA 1974). 

Counsel maintains that a Kittima adoption effected under the Burmese law does not give the adopted child the full rights of a natural born 

legitimate child in Burma. While this contention may be true, we do not 

see how it aids the present beneficiary. 

Counsel also argues that registration is not a prerequisite to the 

That decision is Matter of Kong, 14 I. & N. Dee. 649 (BIA 1974). 

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validity of aKittima adoption. However, section 5 of the Registration of 

Kittima Adoptions Act states: • 

No dispute as to the right of any person to inherit as or through a Kittima son or 

daughter shall be entertained by any Court unless the fact of the adoption, if it was 

effected after the 1st April 1911, is evidenced by an instrument:— 

(i) executed by the person making the adoption and (a) by the person who is adopted if 

not less than 18 years of age at the time of such execution aforesaid, or (b) if less than 

that age, then by the person or persons, if any, whose consent to the adoption is 

required by the Burmese Buddhist Law, and 

(ii) attested by at least two witnesses, and 

(iii) registered in Book 4 of the books referred to in sub -section (1) of 51 of the 

Registration Act. 

In Lim Chin Neo v. Lim Geok Soo, f19561 Burma L.R. 248, 251, 261, the 

court held that a claim for inheritance as a Kittima child was barred 

unless the adoption was evidenced by a registered deed of adoption 

conforming to the requirements of section 5 of the Registration of Kittima 

Adoptions Act. We shall not accept less proof of aKittima adoption than a 

Burmese court would require when the question arises in an inheritance 

suit. 

Finally, counsel argues that the registered deed of adoption operates 

from the date of an earlierAppatittha adoption of the beneficiary. There 

is no provision of Burmese law, that would allow an earlier informal 

adoption to operate retroactively as a Kittima adoption. Section 47 of 

the Registration Act of Burma evidently permits a registered instrument to operate from the date of its execution if such date is prior to the 

date of its registration. However, this does not help the present beneficiary, because his deed of adoption was both executed and registered after his fourteenth birthday. 

We are satisfied that our prior decision was correct. The motion to 

reconsider will be denied. 

ORDER; The motion to reconsider is denied. 

Theodore P. Jakaboski, Alternate Board Member, dissenting: 

respectfully dissent. 

The majority opinion relies overly much on the provisions of Section 5 

of the Registration of Kittima Adoptions Act, which went into effect in 

1941. That section merely stipulates that courts will not entertain disputes over inheritance rights arising out of a purported Kittima adoption unless the adoption be evidenced by an instrument (1) executed by 

the adopter, (2) witnessed, and (3) registered in a volume referred to in 

the Registration Act of 1909. 

There is no compelling reason to hold that Section 5 controls with 

validity of a Kittima adoption for purposes of the administration of the 

immigration laws of the United Slates. 

The memorandum of law from the Library of Congress of January 

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1975 relied upon by the majority itself acknowledged that prior to 1941 

"it was held that where a formal ceremony of Kittima adoption could be 

shown to have taken place in the presence of credible witnesses, summoned in order to secure publicity and notoriety to the factum of 

adoption, pro if of adoption was complete." The petitioner claims that 

there was a Ifittima ceremony in 1960, although there was no registration until 1970, when the child was over the 14-year old cut-off date 

provided for in the immigration laws. It seems to me that the late 

registration is a piece of evidence that should be considered as bearing 

upon whether there indeed was an adoption ceremony in 1960. This 

situation may be similar to that in Matter of ittz.e, 12 I. & N. Dec. 747 

(BIA 1968), wherein a customary adoption was subsequently registered 

under the Hong Kong Adoption Ordinance, and the later registration 

was too late for immigration purposes. 

The majority opinion rests upon the underlying premise that recognition of foreign adoptions is dependent upon the existence of full inheritance rights :11 favor of the person adopted. However, there is not 

express requirement to this effect in the immigration laws. Moreover, 

this approach conflicts with this Board's earlier ruling in Matter of 

Ng,14 I. & N. Dec. 135 (BIA 1972), wherein the Board recognized 

adoptions of females according to Chinese customary law in Hong Kong, 

even though adopted girls did not enjoy full rights of inheritance. It is 

difficult to distinguish the issues in the present ease from those in the Ng 

case. 

It seems to me that the ends of justice and sound administration of the 

immigration laws, as well as the purposes behind these laws, would be 

better served if the resolution of an administrative appeal were to 

depend more upon the factual realties of the familial situation than upon 

the interposition of legalistic bars derived from an unrelated area of the 

law such as inheritance. 

That is, what evidence is there that the Burmese authorities who 

enacted Section 5 of the Registration of Kittima Adoptions Act wished 

to invalidate unregistered Kittira adoptions? The simple answer is that 

there is not such evidence. Obviously, the provisions of Section 5 were 

promulgated in order to nudge the general populace into registering 

their unregistered Kittima adoptions, so as to make the work of the 

courts easier n inheritance cases. 

I see no policy that is served by extending these considerations into 

something that bars our recognition of what evidently the ordinary 

Burmese would consider to be a valid adoption -of the higher type. 

A number of factual questions have not been aired. Therefore, I 

believe this case should be remanded to the district director for additional proceedings. 

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