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NON - PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 COMMONWEALTH OF PENN SYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA Appellee

v. TIMOTHY F. BALCHICK, Appellant No. 1720 WDA 2014

Appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered October 8 , 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County, Criminal Division, at No(s): CP

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- 0001120

- 2013
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES, and ALLEN, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY ALLEN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 11, 2015 Timothy F. Balchick (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed after he pled guilty to statutory sexual assault, unlawful contact with a minor, corruption of minors, indecent assault of a person less than sixteen years of age, and disorderly conduct. 1 We affirm. On April 24, 2013, the victim, a fifteen year old female, reported to the Washington Township Police Department in Fayette County that
A ppellant had sexually assaulted her. Affidavit of Probable Cause, 6/5/13.

____________________________________________ 1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3122.1(a)(1), 6318(a)(1), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 3126(a)(8), and 5503(a)(4).J

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Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with the aforementioned
crimes. At a hearing on October 1, 2014, Appellant entered his guilty plea, and on October 8, 2014, the tria l court sentenced Appellant to six (6) to twenty

four (24) months of imprisonment plus a consecutive five (5) years of probation. Appellant was notified of his duty to register as a sex offender for the entirety of his lifetime in accordance with the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9799.10 et seq

. 2 Appellant presents two constitutional issues for our review:
I. IS IT UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO REQUIRE AN APPELLANT TO REGISTER FOR A LIFETIME WHEN SAID REGISTRATION REQUIREMENT EXCEEDS THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM PENALTY FOR APPELLANT’S OFFENSE?

____________________________________________ 2 “The Pennsylvania General Assembly passed SORNA as Act 111 of 2011, signed December 20, 20 11. In so doing, it provided for the expiration of prior registration requirements, commonly referred to as Megan's Law, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9791

– 9799.9, as of December 20, 2012, and for the effectiveness of SORNA on the same date. The General Assembly set for th its purposes in adopting SORNA, which included bringing Pennsylvania into substantial compliance with the Adam Walsh Act and providing a mechanism for the general public and law enforcement to obtain information concerning sexual offenders. Id. § 9799. 10. SORNA also includes legislative findings and a declaration of policy instructing that ‘[t]he Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 provides a mechanism for the Commonwealth to increase its regulation of sexual offenders in a manner which is nonpunitive but offers an increased measure of protection to the citizens of this Commonwealth.’ Id. § 9799.11(a)(2) ...” In re J.B. , --- A.3d

--- , 2014 WL 7369785, at 1 (Pa. 2014).J

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II. IS THE ADAM WALSH STATUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL IN REQUIRING AN APPELLANT TO REGISTER FOR TWENTY FIVE (25) YEARS? 3
Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant’s issues are interrelated. Therefore, we wil l address them together. Appellant argues that SORNA is unconstitutional because the lifetime registration requirement exceeds the statutory maximum sentence for the crimes to which he pleaded guilty, and because the lifetime registration requirement constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. See Appellant’s Brief at 11. Preliminarily, we note that the argument portion of Appellant’s brief in which he asserts that SORNA is unconstitutional consists of less than four full pages, and does not reference the constitutional provisions upon which Appellant bases his argument. Nor does Appellant in his brief direct this Court to the specific provisions of SORNA that he seeks to have declared unconstitutional. It is Appellant’s responsibility to develop arguments in his brief and where h e has not done so we will find the claim waived. See Commonwealth v. Gibbs , 981 A.2d 274, 284 (Pa. Super. 2009), appeal denied , 3 A.3d 670 (Pa. 2010) (“It is Appellant's obligation to sufficiently develop arguments in his brief by applying the relevant law to the facts of the case, persuade this Court that there were errors below, and convince us

____________________________________________ 3 The record indicates that Appellant is subject to lifetime registration and not twenty

- five (25) years as he suggests in his statement of questions. See N.T., 10/8/14, 4

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relief is due because of those er rors [and if] an appellant does not do so, we may find the argument waived.”). Thus, we find that based upon his failure to sufficiently develop his constitutional argument, Appellant has waived his constitutionality claims. Moreover, even if Appellant h ad not waived his claims, they are devoid of merit. With regard to Appellant’s claim that the lifetime registration requirement constitutes excessive punishment and is unconstitutional because it exceeds the statutory maximum sentence, our Courts have fou nd such claims unavailing. Our Supreme Court has repeatedly held, under the

now - expired provisions of Megan’s Law, that lifetime registration requirements are not punitive but remedial in nature, and “[b]ecause we do not view the registration requirements as punitive but, rather, remedial, we do not perceive mandating compliance by offenders who have served their maximum term to be improper.” Commonwealth v. Gaffney , 733 A.2d 616, 622 (Pa. 1999) and Commonwealth v. Williams , 832 A.2d 962 (Pa. 2003). See also Commonwealth v. Benner , 853 A.2d 1068 (Pa. Super. 2004). In reliance on Gaffney , Williams and Benner , this Court in Commonwealth v. McDonough , 96 A.3d 1067, 1070

- 1710 (Pa. Super. 2014) recently explained, “[w]hile Gaffney and Benner were decided prior to the effective date of SORNA, the same principles behind the registration requirements for sexual offenders under Megan's Law apply to those subject to SORNA. Namely, to effectuate, through remedial legislation, the non

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punitive goal of public safety.” Accordingly, because SORNA is a non

punitive remedial scheme, and not a punishment, we concluded in McDonough that the appellant’s claims

– that his registration requirements constituted excessive punishment, and that SORNA was unconstitutional for requi ring an individual to register for many years longer than the maximum penalty

– failed. Id

. In the present case, Appellant advances arguments identical to those raised in McDonough , in which we declined to find SORNA unconstitutional. Although McDonough pertained to a fifteen (15) year registration requirement, the rationale is equally applicable to the lifetime registration requirement at issue in the present case. Consonant with McDonough , Appellant’s constitutional claims fail. For the foregoing reas ons, we affirm the judgment of sentence. Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 2/11/2015