Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1507-CR-830 | April 4, 2016 Page 1 of 16

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case. 

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Stacy R. Uliana 

Bargersville, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller 

Attorney General 

James B. Martin 

Deputy Attorney General 

Indianapolis, Indiana 

IN THE 

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Darreus Rainwater, 

Appellant-Defendant, 

v. 

State of Indiana, 

Appellee-Plaintiff. 

April 4, 2016

Court of Appeals Case No. 

28A01-1507-CR-830 

Appeal from the Greene Superior 

Court 

The Honorable Dena Martin, 

Judge 

Trial Court Cause No. 

28D01-1503-F5-9 

Vaidik, Chief Judge. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 28A01-1507-CR-830 | April 4, 2016 Page 2 of 16

Case Summary 

[1] Darreus Rainwater and a friend broke into a garage in order to take fourwheelers, but the homeowners came home and thwarted their plans. 

Rainwater’s friend entered into an agreement with the prosecutor and testified 

against Rainwater at trial. Rainwater was convicted of Level 5 felony burglary 

and Class A misdemeanor attempted theft, and the trial court sentenced him to 

an aggregate term of five years with two years suspended. 

[2] Because the State concedes that there is a double-jeopardy violation, we remand 

this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate Rainwater’s conviction 

and sentence for Class A misdemeanor attempted theft. Even assuming that the 

prosecutor committed prosecutorial misconduct during voir dire and closing 

argument, we conclude that Rainwater has failed to establish that the 

instances—either individually or cumulatively—constitute fundamental error. 

Finally, Rainwater has failed to persuade us that his sentence is inappropriate. 

Facts and Procedural History 

[3] In March 2015 Chad Hall lived with his father and fifteen-year-old son in 

Greene County, Indiana. Hall kept four four-wheelers and lawn equipment 

inside a detached garage on the property. 

[4] Hall and his son were returning home around 6:00 p.m. one evening when 

Hall’s son said that he saw something in the detached garage. Hall drove his 

truck to the detached garage and walked toward the service door, which was on 
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the side of the garage. At about the same time, Rainwater and Christopher 

Porter exited the garage and went in opposite directions. Hall recognized 

Porter from an incident a couple years before, but he did not recognize 

Rainwater. Hall grabbed Rainwater, who was closest to him, by the back of his 

shirt, and Porter ran away. As Rainwater turned around, his elbow went up in 

Hall’s direction, so Hall punched him in the face. Rainwater fell to the ground, 

where Hall then kicked him. Hall helped Rainwater find his glasses and then 

told him to “get lost and don’t come back.” Tr. p. 205. Rainwater and Porter 

met back up down the road. 

[5] In order to explain the mark that Hall had left to his face, Rainwater told his 

girlfriend’s mother, with whom he and Porter lived, that he and Porter had 

gotten into a fight with a friend. The girlfriend’s mother then overheard 

Rainwater tell Porter to “not say a fu**ing word” and “keep his fu**ing mouth 

shut.” Id. at 339. Rainwater also told his girlfriend about the earlier events. 

Although Rainwater wavered between whose idea it was to take the fourwheelers, he said that Porter was scared to open the door to the detached 

garage, so he put his sleeve over his hand and opened the door. 

[6] After talking with his father, Hall decided to call the police. The police arrested 

Rainwater and Porter later that night. When the police spoke with Porter, he 

told them that he thought the detached garage was his cousin’s house. But 

when the police did not believe Porter, he changed his story. Porter then told 

the police that it was Rainwater’s idea to go inside the garage and take the fourwheelers. In exchange for a three-year sentence with two years suspended for 
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Level 5 felony burglary, Porter agreed to testify against Rainwater at trial. Ex. 

2 (“The Defendant agrees to testify truthfully at any hearing, deposition or trial 

involving co-defendant.”). 

[7] The State charged Rainwater with Level 5 felony burglary and Class A 

misdemeanor attempted theft. During voir dire, the prosecutor asked the 

prospective jurors if they could give Porter the benefit of the doubt, just like 

they would a police officer, even though he pled guilty to this crime as well. 

Porter testified at trial that he and Rainwater were walking to a friend’s house 

when Rainwater suggested breaking into the detached garage on the Hall 

property and taking the four-wheelers. Porter said that Rainwater used his 

sleeve to open the service door to the garage. Porter testified that they were in 

the garage looking for keys to the four-wheelers for less than five minutes when 

the Halls pulled up. As Hall approached the service door to the garage, 

Rainwater and Porter came out and Porter took off running. Porter testified 

that as he ran away, he saw Hall hit Rainwater. 

[8] Rainwater testified to a different version of events. He claimed that Porter told 

him that the detached garage was his cousin’s house and that he did not know 

about any plan to take the four-wheelers until Porter told him when they met 

back up down the road. During closing argument, the prosecutor implied—

without any evidence in the record—that Porter put himself in danger by 

agreeing to testify for the State and therefore should be believed. The jury 

found Rainwater guilty of Level 5 felony burglary and Class A misdemeanor 

attempted theft. 
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[9] At sentencing, defense counsel did not present any evidence but rather argued 

that—as reflected in the PSI—there were several mitigators, including that 

Rainwater was only nineteen years old; he had several mental-health diagnoses, 

including ADHD, bipolar disorder, and PTSD; he abused Xanax and alcohol; 

and he was abused as a child. The trial court found the following mitigators: 

Rainwater’s age and mental-health diagnoses. The court found the following 

aggravators: Rainwater’s juvenile and adult criminal history, the fact that he 

was on probation when he committed this offense, and his behavior in jail. The 

court then sentenced Rainwater to five years with two years suspended for 

burglary and one year for attempted theft, to be served concurrently 

(notwithstanding the State’s acknowledgement of a double-jeopardy violation, 

see Tr. p. 446). In addition, the court placed Rainwater in the Purposeful 

Incarceration Program, noting that upon Rainwater’s successful completion of 

the program, it “would consider a modification of [his] sentence.” Id. at 453. It 

was the court’s hope that Rainwater would “figure out what [he] need[ed] to do 

to abide by society’s rules.” Id. 

[10] Rainwater now appeals. 

Discussion and Decision 

[11] Rainwater raises three issues on appeal. First, he contends that his convictions 

for burglary and attempted theft violate the actual-evidence test of Indiana’s 

double-jeopardy clause. Second, Rainwater contends that the prosecutor 
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engaged in misconduct during voir dire and closing argument. Last, he 

contends that his sentence is inappropriate. 

I. Double Jeopardy 

[12] Rainwater contends that his convictions for burglary and attempted theft violate 

the actual-evidence test of Indiana’s double-jeopardy clause. The State 

concedes this issue. See Appellee’s Br. p. 14 (“[T]he State’s evidence proving 

Attempted Theft entirely subsumed the proof of Level 5 felony Burglary.”). 

We therefore remand this case to the trial court with instructions to vacate 

Rainwater’s conviction and sentence for Class A misdemeanor attempted theft. 

See Morrison v. State, 824 N.E.2d 734, 741-42 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“[A] double 

jeopardy violation occurs when judgments of conviction are entered and cannot 

be remedied by the ‘practical effect’ of concurrent sentences or by merger after 

conviction has been entered.”), trans. denied. 

II. Prosecutorial Misconduct 

[13] Rainwater next contends that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct during voir 

dire and closing argument. In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

properly raised in the trial court, we determine (1) whether misconduct 

occurred and, if so, (2) whether the misconduct, under all of the circumstances, 

placed the defendant in a position of grave peril to which he would not have 

been subjected otherwise. Ryan v. State, 9 N.E.3d 663, 667 (Ind. 2014), reh’g 

denied. Whether a prosecutor engages in misconduct is measured by reference 
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to case law and the Rules of Professional Conduct. Id. The gravity of peril is 

measured by the probable persuasive effect of the misconduct on the jury’s 

decision rather than the degree of impropriety of the conduct. Id. To preserve a 

claim of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must—at the time the alleged 

misconduct occurs—request an admonishment to the jury and, if further relief is 

desired, move for a mistrial. Id. 

[14] Our standard of review is different where a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

has been procedurally defaulted for failure to properly raise the claim in the trial 

court. Id. The defendant must establish not only the grounds for prosecutorial 

misconduct but also that the prosecutorial misconduct constituted fundamental 

error. Id. at 667-68. Fundamental error is an extremely narrow exception to 

the waiver rule where the defendant faces the heavy burden of showing that the 

alleged errors are so prejudicial to the defendant’s rights as to make a fair trial 

impossible. Id. at 668. In other words, to establish fundamental error, the 

defendant must show that, under the circumstances, the trial judge erred in not 

sua sponte raising the issue because the alleged errors (1) constitute clearly 

blatant violations of basic and elementary principles of due process and (2) 

present an undeniable and substantial potential for harm. Id. 

[15] Rainwater concedes that defense counsel did not object at trial and therefore he 

must establish that the prosecutorial misconduct constituted fundamental error. 

See Appellant’s Br. p. 12. 
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A. Voir Dire 

[16] Rainwater argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during voir dire. 

The purpose of voir dire is not to educate prospective jurors but rather to 

ascertain whether they can render an impartial verdict based upon the law and 

the evidence and “weed out” those who show they cannot be fair to either side. 

Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231, 238 (Ind. 2015) (quotation omitted); Coy v. State, 

720 N.E.2d 370, 372 (Ind. 1999). Accordingly, the parties may inquire into 

jurors’ biases or tendencies to believe or disbelieve certain things about the 

nature of the crime itself or about a particular line of defense. Gibson, 43 

N.E.3d at 238; Hopkins v. State, 429 N.E.2d 631, 634-35 (Ind. 1981) (finding no 

error where jurors were asked whether they would disbelieve a witness who 

entered into a plea bargain). 

[17] But questions should be limited to “testing the capacity and competency of 

prospective jurors.” Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 238 (quotation omitted). Those 

questions that “seek to shape the favorable jury by deliberate exposure to the 

substantive issues in the case” are not permitted. Id.; Davis v. State, 598 N.E.2d 

1041, 1047 (Ind. 1992) (affirming trial court’s disallowing defense counsel from 

essentially asking prospective jurors “how they would vote in the present 

case”), reh’g denied. 

[18] Rainwater first asserts that the prosecutor crossed the line by asking the 

prospective jurors to prejudge Porter’s credibility: 
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[Prosecutor]: . . . Let’s talk a little bit about Mr. Porter. He’s 

already pled guilty. He . . . signed a plea agreement and he 

c[a]me in court and ple[]d guilty. He’s going to come in here and 

testify. Do you think that his testimony should be held to a lesser 

standard? Would you believe him less just because he’s a codefendant in this case? You would, would you believe him less? 

Juror: Probably a little bit. 

[Prosecutor]: Okay, why’s that? 

Juror: Just because he committed [t]he crime as well. 

* * * * * 

[Prosecutor]: Would you agree to at least . . . give him the 

benefit of the doubt? 

Juror: Probably. 

[Prosecutor]: And, and think about . . . what motivation he has 

to lie, if any, in this case, [because he’s] already taken 

responsibility for this case. Does that make sense? 

Juror: I’d want to know . . . if the prosecut[or] made a deal with 

him. 

[Prosecutor]: . . . We have . . . a duty to give you the plea 

agreement . . . . [W]e made a deal with him, just like we do with 

most people. I mean you can’t, you have to get witnesses from 

somewhere, right? Would you agree with that, sir? . . . If I could 

bring in a row of nuns to testify in a criminal case, believe me, I 

would. . . . 
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Tr. p. 26-27. 

[19] Here, the prosecutor properly inquired about the prospective jurors’ 

predispositions to believe or disbelieve Porter because he had made a plea 

bargain with the State. See Gibson, 43 N.E.3d at 238; Hopkins, 429 N.E.2d at 

635 (“We see nothing wrong in inquiring into jurors’ minds about their biases 

in regard to the credibility of witnesses with an eye toward removing 

prospective jurors predisposed to disbelieve those with certain characteristics, 

such as plea bargainers.”). However, the prosecutor went too far by giving the 

prospective jurors his personal take of how the plea agreement affected Porter’s 

credibility. See also Tr. p. 106 (“Do you agree to give [Porter] the same benefit 

of the doubt as you would any other witness? . . . Just like you would a police 

officer . . . .”). Nevertheless, we find that this line of questioning did not place 

Rainwater in a position of grave peril. 

[20] Rainwater next asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by addressing 

the topic of reasonable doubt with the prospective jurors: 

[Prosecutor]: . . . Do you think the State can prove and connect 

all of these dots based upon the testimony of the people that were 

there? 

#658: I believe so. 

* * * * * 

[Prosecutor]: And if the State proves this charge beyond a 

reasonable doubt, you think you can convict Mr. Rainwater? 
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#658: Yes. 

Id. at 43-44; see also id. at 23 (“Do all of you think that if the State proves the 

charge beyond a reasonable doubt that you could vote to convict Mr. 

Rainwater?”); 30 (discussing reasonable-doubt standard); 37 (“If the State 

proves this charge beyond a reasonable doubt, you think you can convict Mr. 

Rainwater?”); 39 (“If I can prove this trial beyond a reasonable doubt, you 

think you could convict the defendant? . . . You promise to do so by proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt?”). 

[21] It is improper to ask prospective jurors how they would vote. See Gibson, 43 

N.E.3d at 238; Davis, 598 N.E.2d at 1047; Perryman v. State, 830 N.E.2d 1005, 

1010 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that it is improper “to examine jurors as to 

how they would act or decide in certain contingencies or in case certain 

evidence should be developed . . . at trial”). However, it is permissible for the 

prosecutor to ask the prospective jurors questions to determine whether they 

understand reasonable doubt and are capable of rendering a verdict in 

accordance with the law. Barber v. State, 715 N.E.2d 848, 850 (Ind. 1999). 

Here, the prosecutor’s questions were directed to whether the prospective jurors 

understood the concept of reasonable doubt, not to how they would vote given 

the evidence. We therefore find no misconduct. 

B. Closing Argument 

[22] Rainwater next argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct during 

closing argument by implying—without any evidence in the record—that Porter 
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put himself in danger by agreeing to testify for the State, which enhanced his 

credibility: 

You think Mr. Porter is a popular guy at the jail right now? You 

think snitches are popular men at the jail? So again, I ask you, 

what possible motivation he has to come in here and lie other 

than if he simply really does want to turn his life around like he 

said. He’s still got to serve several more months in the jail with 

those folks. And you think there’s secrets in the jail? There ain’t 

no secrets in the jail. . . . And it wouldn’t have changed his 

punishment had he come in here and said, it was all my idea, I[] 

masterminded this thing, I masterminded this heist. . . . His life 

would have been so much better off in the jail if he’d said that. 

But he didn’t. 

Tr. p. 411-12. 

[23] The Indiana Rules of Professional Conduct demand that a lawyer “shall not . . . 

in trial[] allude to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is 

relevant or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.” Ind. 

Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(e). Indiana courts have emphasized the 

impropriety of this trial tactic. See, e.g., Benson v. State, 762 N.E.2d 748, 752 

(Ind. 2002). 

[24] Here, there was no evidence in the record about how Porter was treated or 

going to be treated in jail because he agreed to testify for the State.1

 

 

1

 The State tried to admit evidence that Rainwater had attacked Porter in jail, but the trial court excluded this 

evidence. Tr. p. 292. 
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Nevertheless, the prosecutor implied that Porter put himself in danger by 

agreeing to testify for the State, which in turn implied that Porter must be telling 

the truth given the risk to him. This was improper. See id. (“[T]he prosecutor’s 

questions and evidence did not directly allege that the witness was fearful due to 

threats connected to the defendant, but did clearly imply, without any 

substantiating foundation in the record, that the witness’s trial testimony was 

untruthful due to his fear of retribution. . . . [W]e cannot approve of the 

questioning permitted here.”). 

C. Fundamental Error 

[25] Even assuming that these instances amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, 

Rainwater is still not entitled to relief.2

 In evaluating this issue using the 

fundamental-error doctrine, our task is to “look at the alleged misconduct in the 

context of all that happened and all relevant information given to the jury—

including evidence admitted at trial, closing argument, and jury instructions—

to determine whether the misconduct had such an undeniable and substantial effect 

on the jury’s decision that a fair trial was impossible.” Ryan, 9 N.E.3d at 668. We 

do not believe that the prosecutor’s statements—which mostly concerned the 

credibility of Porter—had an undeniable and substantial effect on the jury’s 

 

2

 Rainwater claims that the prosecutor engaged in other instances of misconduct. For example, he argues 

that the prosecutor improperly asked the prospective jurors during voir dire not to get “caught up” with 

matters that did not affect the elements of the crime, such as the weather on the day of the crime. Tr. p. 32. 

He also claims that the prosecutor improperly argued during closing argument that he could have given 

Porter immunity. Id. at 399. We find no misconduct in either example. But even if we found that these 

instances amounted to prosecutorial misconduct, they do not constitute fundamental error. 
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decision such that a fair trial for Rainwater was impossible. This is because 

there was evidence in addition to Porter’s testimony that linked Rainwater to 

the burglary. Hall and his son identified Rainwater as one of the two men 

leaving their detached garage. After being caught, Rainwater raised his elbow 

at Hall. Rainwater then fabricated a story about a fight to his girlfriend’s 

mother in order to explain the mark that Hall had left to his face. Rainwater 

also told Porter not to tell anyone what happened. Finally, Rainwater told his 

girlfriend that he opened the service door to the detached garage by using his 

sleeve; this is precisely how Porter testified at trial that Rainwater opened the 

door. Accordingly, we find that the instances—either individually or 

cumulatively—did not make a fair trial for Rainwater impossible. 

III. Inappropriate Sentence 

[26] Last, Rainwater contends that his five-year sentence with two years suspended 

and placement in the Purposeful Incarceration Program for Level 5 felony 

burglary is inappropriate. A person who commits a Level 5 felony “shall be 

imprisoned for a fixed term of between one (1) and six (6) years, with the 

advisory sentence being three (3) years.” Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). Rainwater 

asks us to “revise his sentence to . . . the advisory sentence of three years.” 

Appellant’s Br. p. 11. 

[27] The Indiana Constitution authorizes independent appellate review and revision 

of the trial court’s sentencing decision. Brown v. State, 10 N.E.3d 1, 4 (Ind. 

2014). We implement this authority through Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), 
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which provides that we may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find that the sentence is 

inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the 

offender. Id. When reviewing the appropriateness of a sentence under 

Appellate Rule 7(B), we may consider all aspects of the penal consequences 

imposed by the trial court in sentencing the defendant, including whether a 

portion of the sentence was suspended or “crafted using any of the variety of 

sentencing tools available to the trial judge.” Davidson v. State, 926 N.E.2d 

1023, 1025 (Ind. 2010). 

[28] There is nothing particularly egregious about this offense. Rainwater and 

Porter broke and entered a detached garage with the intent of taking fourwheelers but ended up taking nothing because the homeowners came home. 

[29] Rainwater’s character, however, supports the trial court’s carefully crafted 

sentence. Since 2011, the nineteen-year-old Rainwater had been adjudged a 

delinquent five times (including one adjudication for theft), was convicted of 

Class A misdemeanor criminal trespass as an adult, and was on probation at the 

time of this offense. In addition, Rainwater violated probation in 2013. While 

in the Greene County Jail for three months awaiting trial in this case, 

Rainwater committed three violations: he attacked Porter and he committed 

two “less serious violations that seem to show a continuing problem of being 

unable to follow . . . the rules . . . .” Appellant’s App. p. 198. Also, while in 

the Monroe County Jail in 2014 for his Class A misdemeanor conviction, 
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Rainwater received thirty days of lock down for tampering with locks. Id. at 

181. 

[30] While we acknowledge that Rainwater is young and has some mental-health 

diagnoses, he has failed to persuade us that his five-year sentence with two 

years suspended and placement in the Purposeful Incarceration Program (with 

a chance to modify his sentence) is inappropriate given his juvenile and adult 

criminal history, probation violations, and behavior in jail. We therefore affirm 

Rainwater’s sentence.3

[31] Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. 

Bailey, J., and Crone, J., concur. 

 

3

 Rainwater appears to tack on a new argument to the end of his inappropriate-sentence argument. See

Appellant’s Br. p. 11. That is, he appears to argue that he was punished for exercising his constitutional right 

to a jury trial because his sentence is longer than Porter’s sentence. Although it is constitutionally 

impermissible for a trial court to impose a more severe sentence because the defendant has chosen to stand 

trial rather than plead guilty, see Walker v. State, 454 N.E.2d 425 (Ind. Ct App. 1983), reh’g denied, there is no 

evidence in the record that suggests such a violation occurred here.