15-2868 Liang v. Sessions BIA Laforest, IJ A205 235 719 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS **FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT** 

## SUMMARY ORDER

**RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED**  **ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT**  = **S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED**  **WITH THIS**  **COURT, A**  **PARTY MUST**  **CITE EITHER**  **THE FEDERAL**  **APPENDIX OR**  **AN ELECTRONIC**  **DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY**  **OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for**  1 **the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States** 2 **Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the** 3 **13 th**  **day of March, two thousand seventeen.** 4 5 **PRESENT:** 6 **JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,** 7 **PIERRE N. LEVAL,** 8 **JOSÉ A. CABRANES,** 9 Circuit Judges. 10

**_____________________________________** 11 12 **ZHOU HUI LIANG,** 13 Petitioner **,** 14 15 **v. 15-2868** 16 **NAC** 17 **JEFFERSON B.**  **SESSIONS, III,**  **UNITED** 18 **STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,**  19 Respondent **.** 20

**_____________________________________** 21 22 **FOR PETITIONER:** Stuart Altman, New York, N.Y. 23 24 **FOR RESPONDENT:** Benjamin C. Mizer, Principal Deputy 25 Assistant Attorney General; Terri J. 26 Scadron, Assistant Director; Wendy 27

 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions, III, is automatically substituted for former Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch as Respondent.2 Benner-León, Trial Attorney, Office 1 of Immigration Litigation, United 2 States Department of Justice, 3 Washington, D.C. 4 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review is 8

DENIED. 9 Petitioner Zhou Hui Liang, a native and citizen of the 10 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of an August 27, 2015, 11 decision of the BIA, affirming a December 3, 2014, decision of 12 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Liang’s application for 13 asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention 14 Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Zhou Hui Liang, No. A205 235 15 719 (B.I.A. Aug. 27, 2015), aff’g No. A205 235 719 (Immig. Ct. 16 N.Y. City Dec. 3, 2014). We assume the parties’ familiarity 17 with the underlying facts and procedural history in this case. 18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed both 19 the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales , 432 20 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of 21 review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); 22 Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey , 534 F.3d 162, 165-66 (2d Cir. 2008). 233 The agency may base a credibility determination on 1 inconsistencies in an applicant’s testimony and among his 2 testimony, prior statements, and supporting evidence. See 8 3 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 163-64. 4 “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless, 5 from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no 6 reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse credibility 7 ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167. As discussed below, 8 the adverse credibility determination rests on substantial 9 evidence. 10 The agency reasonably relied on an inconsistency 11 concerning the date of Liang’s arrest, an event central to his 12 claim of past persecution. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); 13 Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167; Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland 14
Sec. , 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an 15 inconsistency material to the alleged persecution that is the 16 basis of a claim is substantial evidence). Liang testified 17 that he was arrested on June 3, 2011, during a church service. 18 When prompted by his attorney, Liang changed the date to March 19 6, 2011, explaining that he was “very nervous.” The IJ 20 reasonably rejected this explanation, noting the difference in 21 seasons between March and June and concluding that “[i]nverting 224 the month and day is more likely to be an error committed by 1 someone who has memorized a statement.” See Majidi v. 2 Gonzales , 430 F.3d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 2005) (“A petitioner must 3 do more than offer a plausible explanation for his inconsistent 4 statements to secure relief; he must demonstrate that a 5 reasonable fact-finder would be compelled to credit his 6 testimony.” (quoting Zhou Yun Zhang v. INS , 386 F.3d 77, 76 (2d 7 Cir. 2004))). Nor would the agency be compelled to accept 8 Liang’s current explanation that he ultimately gave the date 9 consistent with his application, as it does not account for the 10 initial inconsistent testimony. Id

. 11 The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies 12 between Liang’s testimony and evidence concerning his church 13 attendance in the United States. Liang’s testimony that he 14 attended church “once a week or once every two weeks” clearly 15 conflicted with a letter from his church that he attended only 16 16 times between April 2012 and November 2014. The IJ was not 17 compelled to accept Liang’s response that he sometimes forgot 18 to sign in when he arrived late, as it did not account for the 19 substantial discrepancy between the 16 times stated in the 20 church’s letter and the 60 to 120 times to which he testified. 21
See Wensheng Yan v. Mukasey , 509 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2007) 225 (“[I]n assessing the credibility of an asylum applicant’s 1 testimony, an IJ is entitled to consider whether the applicant’s 2 story is inherently implausible.”). Moreover, as the IJ 3 pointed out, this inconsistency was particularly troubling 4 because the church’s letter reflected that Liang attended 5 church less frequently following his baptism in April 2012, 6 calling into question the sincerity of his religious beliefs. 7 Liang’s credibility concerning his church attendance in 8 the United States was further undermined by his lack of recall 9 of a sermon he heard two days before he testified. Liang’s 10 argument, that his ability to name the pastor of the church 11 renders his testimony credible, is not compelling because it 12 does not actually explain his failure to testify to any detail 13 regarding the sermon. See Majidi , 430 F.3d at 80. 14 Having questioned Liang’s credibility, the agency did not 15 err in concluding that Liang’s corroborating evidence was 16 insufficient to rehabilitate his testimony. See Biao Yang v. 17 Gonzales , 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An applicant’s 18 failure to corroborate his . . . testimony may bear on 19 credibility, because the absence of corroboration in general 20 makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony that has 21 already been called into question.”). “We defer to the 226 agency’s determination of the weight afforded to an alien’s 1 documentary evidence.” Y.C. v. Holder , 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d 2 Cir. 2013). The agency reasonably accorded diminished weight 3 to letters from Liang’s mother and church friend. The letters 4 were unsworn, prepared for the purpo se of litigation and from 5 interested parties not subject to cross examination. See 6 Matter of H-L-H- & Z-Y- Z- , 25 I. & N. Dec. 209, 215 (B.I.A. 7 2010) (agency may give little weight to document drafted by 8 interested witness not subject to cross examination), rev’d on 9 other grounds by Hui Lin Huang v. Holder , 677 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 10 2012). 11 Liang argues that the agency erred in relying on a purported 12 inconsistency concerning his father’s profession. Liang’s 13 application and testimony reported that his father was a 14 fisherman, but his household registration booklet listed his 15 father’s profession as a “farmer.” On appeal to the BIA, Liang 16 submitted evidence that fishing is a type of farming. Even 17 assuming that the agency erred in relying on this inconsistency, 18 the error is not fatal because the totality of the circumstances 19 outlined above nonetheless supports the adverse credibility 20 determination. See Lianping Li v. Lynch , No. 15-219, 2016 WL 21 5799651, at *3 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2016); Siewe v. Gonzales , 480 227 F.3d 160, 166-67 (2d Cir. 2007). Given the multiple 1 inconsistencies related to the bases of the claims and the lack 2 of reliable corroborating evidence, it cannot be said “that no 3 reasonable fact-finder could make such a credibility ruling.” 4 Xiu Xia Lin , 534 F.3d at 167. The credibility ruling is 5 dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief 6 because all three forms of relief are based on the same factual 7 predicate. Paul v. Gonzales , 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 8 2006). 9 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 10 DENIED. As we have completed our rev iew, any stay of removal 11 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED, 12 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition 13 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument 14 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of 15 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and S econd Circuit Local Rule 16 34.1(b). 17
FOR THE COURT: 18 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk 19