J-S73011-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

CARLOS RUBEN CASTRO, JR. 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 719 MDA 2019

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 11, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-41-CR-0000784-2017

BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 13, 2020

Appellant, Carlos Ruben Castro, Jr., appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on April 11, 2019, in the Lycoming County Court of Common 

Pleas. The judgment of sentence was imposed after a jury found Appellant 

guilty of twenty-nine counts of various sexual offenses and sexually related 

crimes committed against three minor females. After careful review, we 

affirm.

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court provided a summary of

the procedural history in this matter:

By way of background, [Appellant] was charged with 

numerous sexual offenses against several female children. A jury 

trial was held September 11-13, 2018. [Appellant] was convicted 

of three counts of Indecent Assault of a Complainant Less Than 

13 Years of Age, three counts of Corruption of Minors, two counts 

of Endangering the Welfare of Children, one count of Aggravated 

Indecent Assault of a Child, one count of Rape of a Child, one 

count of Solicitation of Rape of a Child, two counts of Criminal 
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Attempt Rape of a Child, and sixteen counts of Sexual Abuse of 

Children.1

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3126(a)(7), 6301(a)(1)(ii), 

4304(a)(1), 3125(b), 3121(c), 902(a), 901(a), and 

6312(b)(1)[, respectively].

On December 27, 2018, the court sentenced [Appellant] to 

an aggregate term of 67 to 189 years’ incarceration in a state 

correctional institution, which consisted of three to seven years’

incarceration on Count 3, Indecent Assault of a Complainant Less 

Than 13 Years of Age; five to ten years’ incarceration on Count 6, 

Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three to seven years’

incarceration on Count 7, Indecent Assault of a Complainant Less 

Than 13 Years of Age; twenty to 40 years’ incarceration on Count 

8, Rape of a Child; two to five years’ incarceration on Count 11, 

Endangering the Welfare of Children; ten to 40 years’

incarceration on Count 12, Solicitation of Rape of a Child; seven 

to 20 years’ incarceration on Count 14, Sexual Abuse of Children; 

seven to 20 years’ incarceration on Count 19, Sexual Abuse of 

Children; and ten to 40 years’ incarceration on Count 22, Criminal 

Attempt Rape of a Child.

[Appellant] filed post sentence motions which consisted of a 

motion for reconsideration of sentence, a motion for a new trial, 

and a motion in arrest of judgment. The court denied the motion 

for a new trial and motion for arrest of judgment, but granted resentencing as Count 3 was improperly graded as a felony of the 

third degree, rather than a misdemeanor of the first degree. 

Otherwise, the court rejected [Appellant’s] claims that his 

sentence was unduly harsh and excessive.

On April [11], 2019, the court reduced the sentence on 

Count 3 to two and one-half to five years’ incarceration and ran 

Count 7 concurrent rather than consecutive to the other 

sentences, which resulted in an aggregate sentence of 631⁄2 to 180 

years.

On April 12, 2019, [Appellant] filed a post sentence motion 

in which he sought reconsideration of sentence. The court 

summarily denied the motion on April 16, 2019. 

[Appellant] filed a notice of appeal on April 30, 2019.
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Pa.R.A.P.(a) Opinion, 8/9/19, at 1-2. Both the trial court and Appellant 

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for this Court’s 

consideration:

I. Did the trial court err by not applying the interest of justice 

exception to an untimely motion to suppress?

II. Did the jury err when they determined there was sufficient 

evidence to establish the penetration element required to convict 

[Appellant] of Count 8, Rape of a Child?

III. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by sentencing the 

[Appellant] to 631⁄2 to 180 years, essentially confining [Appellant] 

to prison for the rest of his life?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the trial court should have 

accepted his untimely suppression motion in “the interest of justice.” 

Appellant’s Brief at 10. We disagree.

As a general rule, a motion to suppress should be contained within a 

criminal defendant’s omnibus pretrial motion, and the omnibus motion must 

be filed within thirty days after arraignment. Pa.R.Crim.P. 578, 579, and 581. 

“The rule is designed to provide one single procedure for the suppression of 

evidence[.]” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581, cmt. A defendant may file a supplemental 

suppression motion, but only when “the opportunity did not previously exist, 

or the interests of justice otherwise require.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). “The 

‘interests of justice’ exception provides a trial judge with discretion to excuse 

a party’s tardy presentation of a suppression motion.” Commonwealth v. 
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Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 560-561 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). 

“The factors to be considered should include the length and cause of the delay, 

the merits of the suppression claim, and the court’s ability, considering the 

complexity of the issues and the availability of the witnesses, to hold the 

hearing promptly.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 378 A.2d 1262, 1266 (Pa. 

Super. 1977). “We review the trial court’s decision on these matters for an 

abuse of discretion.” Johonoson, 844 A.2d at 561 (citation omitted). 

The record reveals that Appellant waived his arraignment on May 5, 

2017. On July 3, 2017, the trial court entered a stipulated order allowing 

Appellant an extension of time in which to file the omnibus motion, and 

Appellant filed the motion within the time allotted by the extension. Omnibus 

Motion, 7/21/17. Therein, Appellant alleged the search warrant was 

overbroad and requested the trial court to suppress video and data evidence 

retrieved from Appellant’s Samsung mobile telephone. Id. at ¶¶ 14-30; N.T., 

8/31/17, at 7. On August 31, 2017, a hearing was held, and the trial court 

denied the omnibus motion on September 26, 2017. Appellant did not move 

the trial court to reconsider its denial of the suppression motion. 

We note that at all relevant times, the Lycoming County Public 

Defender’s Office represented Appellant in this matter. Attorney Joshua 

Bower of the Public Defender’s Office filed Appellant’s omnibus motion. 

Following the denial of the omnibus motion, Attorney William Miele of the 

Lycoming County Public Defender’s Office, entered his appearance. Five 
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months after the trial court denied Appellant’s omnibus motion, Attorney Miele

filed Appellant’s second suppression motion, again asking the trial court to 

suppress the evidence seized from the mobile phone. Motion to Suppress, 

2/20/18, at ¶¶ 13-18. In this motion, Appellant modified his earlier argument 

and claimed that the search of the mobile telephone was conducted without 

his permission, and no exigency existed. Id. 

On February 22, 2018, the Commonwealth filed a response to 

Appellant’s suppression motion. Commonwealth’s Response to Appellant’s 

Second Motion to Suppress, 2/22/18. The Commonwealth asserted that 

Appellant’s issue was previously litigated and that the trial court already had 

ruled against Appellant. Commonwealth’s Response to Appellant’s Second 

Motion to Suppress, 2/22/18, at ¶¶ 4-8. The Commonwealth also cited 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B) and averred that any issues that Appellant failed to raise 

in the omnibus motion were waived, and “the interests of justice and rules of 

criminal procedure compel the court to deny [Appellant’s] motion.” Id. at ¶¶ 

8-12.

On March 21, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s second 

suppression motion. It its opinion and order, the trial court explained as 

follows:

In this case, it certainly would not be fair to the alleged 

victim to continue the trial for months pending the litigation of a 

second suppression motion. In this case, it would not be fair to 

the prosecution to have to expend additional time and resources 

relating to a second suppression motion. In this case, it would not 

be fair to take more judicial time, energy, and resources when 
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those resources should have been consolidated with the time,

effort, and resources spent on the first suppression motion.

In this case, it would not be fair to permit a new, arguably 

more experienced attorney from the Public Defender’s office, to 

review a case and decide to pursue a motion that was not pursued 

by the attorney to whom the case was originally assigned. In this 

case, it would not be fair to simply guess why the first attorney 

chose not to pursue the issue in the first motion to suppress. In 

this case, it would not be fair to essentially open Pandora’s Box

for future litigants and potentially allow an evisceration of the 

timeliness requirements of the Rules of Criminal Procedure.

Finally, in this case, it would not be fair to permit the motion 

to be heard at this time when its merits are not at all obvious. In 

fact, it appears that the merits of the motion are suspect at best. 

There is absolutely no evidence before the court to conclude that

[Appellant] utilized the phone himself to the exclusion of his 

paramour. To the contrary, there is evidence that the paramour 

also used the phone and had [Appellant’s] consent to use the

phone. She had the ability to access the phone and its contents 

and had the apparent authority to do so. As well, all of the factual 

information upon which the motion is based was known to

[Appellant] and his counsel within the timeframes permitted by 

the Rules to timely file the motion. Indeed, ... counsel was granted 

additional time. Lastly, it appears almost certain to the court that 

the evidence would have been obtained and that [Appellant’s] 

motion would be denied based upon inevitable discovery. 

Opinion and Order, 3/21/18, at 5-6.

We discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court concluding that the 

interests of justice did not warrant consideration of Appellant’s untimely 

second suppression motion. Appellant was counseled throughout the 

proceedings and was afforded additional time in which to file the omnibus 

motion. In the omnibus motion, Appellant’s counsel sought to suppress the 

evidence seized from the mobile telephone, and the motion was denied. Upon 

review by separate counsel, a second suppression motion was filed asserting
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a different suppression theory: Appellant’s paramour was not authorized to 

give consent to a search of the telephone; and no exigency existed. Motion 

to Suppress, 2/20/18, at ¶¶ 13-18. 

We cannot conclude that the second suppression motion was borne out 

of lack of opportunity to present the issue in the omnibus motion nor was it 

required in the interests of justice. As the trial court pointed out, allowing this

untimely second suppression motion would eviscerate our rules of procedure 

and permit second-guessing any time an omnibus motion is denied. Opinion 

and Order, 3/21/18, at 5. Rule 581(B) does not allow serial suppression 

motions merely because subsequent counsel enters their appearance after the 

trial court denies original counsel’s omnibus motion; the rule requires more. 

This Court has held “The orderly administration of justice would be ill-served 

if we interpreted Rule 323[1]to be so flexible as to permit an exception 

whenever a defendant obtained a new attorney, and this is especially so where 

that attorney is a member of the same staff as the defendant’s original 

attorney.” Commonwealth v. Page, 371 A.2d 890, 891 (Pa. Super. 1977).

In sum, a defendant may file a supplemental suppression motion only 

when the opportunity did not previously exist, or the interests of justice 

otherwise require. Pa.R.Crim.P. 581(B). Herein, Appellant’s counsel filed an 

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1 Pa.R.Crim.P. 323 was the predecessor to Pa.R.Crim.P. 581 and contained

identical terms. Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 404 (Pa. Super.

2012).
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omnibus motion seeking to suppress evidence gathered from the telephone; 

therefore, there was no absence of an opportunity. Moreover, we cannot 

conclude that this second motion to suppress should be permitted in the 

interests of justice. Subsequent counsel’s motion is merely tangential to the 

original motion; the motion requests suppression of evidence from the mobile 

telephone based only on a different theory.

2

 We discern no abuse of discretion 

in the trial court’s ruling, and Appellant is entitled to no relief.

In his second issue, Appellant avers that the evidence was insufficient 

to prove he committed the crime of rape of a child under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c). 

Appellant’s Brief at 13. Specifically, Appellant asserts that the evidence did 

not establish the element of penetration. Id. We disagree.

The standard for evaluating sufficiency claims is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we 

may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that 

of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

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2

If Appellant concludes prior counsel was so deficient in fashioning the 

omnibus motion, Appellant may pursue that claim in a properly filed collateral 

petition under the Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. 

However, we point out that Appellant does not challenge the ruling on the 

omnibus motion. The trial court found no constitutional infirmity in the search 

warrant or the actual search of the mobile telephone, and Appellant does not 

assail the trial court’s conclusion that the contents of the telephone inevitably

would have been discovered. Opinion and Order, 3/21/18, at 6. 
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evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by 

means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying 

the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all 

evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder 

of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the 

weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none 

of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(citation omitted). 

The relevant statutory language provides: “A person commits the 

offense of rape of a child, a felony of the first degree, when the person engages 

in sexual intercourse with a complainant who is less than 13 years of age.” 

18 Pa.C.S. § 3121(c). In this context, the term “sexual intercourse” is defined 

as follows: “In addition to its ordinary meaning, [sexual intercourse] includes 

intercourse per os or per anus, with some penetration however slight; 

emission is not required.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101. Additionally, we have held the 

term “penetration however slight” is not limited to penetration of the vagina, 

and entrance in the labia is sufficient. Commonwealth v. Hunzer, 868 A.2d 

498, 505-506 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). “[C]ircumstantial 

evidence may be used to prove the element of penetration.” Commonwealth 

v. Stambaugh, 512 A.2d 1216, 1219 (Pa. Super. 1986).

Appellant argues that the video exhibited in court did not show 

Appellant’s penis enter the victim’s vagina. Appellant’s Brief at 15. Appellant 

also states that the Commonwealth’s witness, Detective William Weber, 
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testified that it was “50/50” that Appellant’s penis touched the victim’s labia. 

Id. (citing N.T., 9/11/18, at 75). For these reasons, Appellant asserts the 

guilty verdict is based on mere suspicion. Id. We disagree.

The trial court addressed Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the 

evidence as follows:

[The charge of rape of a child] was based on Video 2. This 

video depicts a portion of the legs and torso of a sleeping child 

clothed in white underwear with pink trim. The child is on a bed 

with child’s sheets with a repeating, heart-shaped pattern. 

[Appellant] is holding his penis in his fingers. He uses his fingers 

to move the child’s underwear to the side and then slides his penis 

inside the child’s underwear. [Appellant] then moves his penis in 

and out at least an inch in between the child’s legs inside her 

underwear. [Appellant’s] penis does not come out [of] the other 

side of the child’s underwear nor does it protrude against the 

underwear; rather, it disappears underneath the underwear and 

in between the child’s legs. When [Appellant] removes his penis 

from inside the child’s underwear, his penis appears wet or moist.

Detective Weber testified that Video 2 had a date and time 

stamp of September 10, 2016 at 3:23 a.m. The following 

exchange took place between [Appellant’s] trial counsel and 

Detective Weber:

Q: And in that video you cannot see whether or not 

[Appellant is] actually penetrating [the child’s] vagina or her 

anus, correct?

A: Well my training and experience says penetration 

however slight. I would agree with you, you cannot see her 

vagina or her anus, but from where I saw his penis go her 

vagina is there. Touching the labia—touching the labia, 

touching the outside.

Q: But it’s fair to say you can’t see whether or not it enters 

into however slight her vagina or her anus at that point in 

that video?

A: I’ll give you 50/50. My-my opinion it touched her labia,
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touched her vaginal lips, yes. Okay, do I see it going in her 

vagina, the tip of his penis? No.

Q: But you can’t tell me with that video. You may believe 

that it could have touched her labia, but you can’t see it in 

the video, correct?

A: Correct.

N.T., 09/11/2018, at 75.

The child’s mother identified her child and [Appellant] in the 

video. N.T., 09/11/2018, at 80-81. The child’s mother also 

testified that the child was five years old at the time. N.T, 

09/11/2018, at 82.

* * *

[Appellant’s t]rial counsel’s questions focused on 

penetration of the vagina and the anus. As previously noted, 

however, there is no requirement that penetration reach the 

vagina; any penetration however slight of the labia is sufficient. 

Hunzer, supra....

Despite moving his penis in and out inside the child’s 

underwear, [Appellant’s] penis did not exit the other side of the 

child’s underwear or protrude against the child’s underwear. When 

[Appellant] removed his penis from inside the child’s underwear, 

it was wet or moist. Both the angle of [Appellant’s] penis and its 

movement inferred that he was slightly penetrating the child’s 

labia. Detective Weber’s opinion, based on his training and

experience, was that there was penetration however slight. 

Therefore, the court finds that when the evidence as a whole is 

considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

the verdict winner, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to 

reasonably conclude that there was penetration however slight of 

the child’s labia.

Opinion and Order, 3/26/19, at 10-12.

We agree with the trial court’s analysis and conclusion. Detective Weber 

testified that the video showed Appellant’s penis was between the victim’s 
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“butt cheeks” and in the “vagina area.” N.T., 9/11/18, at 74. Moreover, the 

detective said that the video, while not showing vaginal penetration, did reveal 

that Appellant’s penis, which had been inserted between the victim’s legs, was 

wet. Id. at 51. 

We reiterate that the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proof by 

means of circumstantial evidence. Estepp, 17 A.3d at 943. As the trial court 

noted, the video showed Appellant place his penis inside the child’s underwear 

and between the child’s legs; there was no indication that Appellant’s penis 

extended out the other side of the underwear, and his penis could not be seen 

moving against the fabric on the inside of the underwear. Opinion and Order, 

3/26/19, at 11. When the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 

the Commonwealth as verdict winner, it was sufficient to prove penetration as 

the circumstantial evidence supports the conclusion that Appellant’s penis was 

in the entrance of the victim’s labia. Hunzer, 868 A.2d at 506. Accordingly, 

no relief is due. 

In his final issue, Appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 4. It is well settled that “[t]he right to appellate 

review of the discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute.” 

Commonwealth v. Zirkle, 107 A.3d 127, 132 (Pa. Super. 2014). When an 

appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence, the appeal 

should be considered a petition for allowance of appeal. Commonwealth v. 

W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 163 (Pa. Super. 2007). 
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As we observed in Commonwealth v. Moury, 992 A.2d 162, 170 (Pa. 

Super. 2010) (citing Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528 (Pa. Super. 

2006)):

An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the 

issue was properly preserved at sentencing or in a 

motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see

Pa.R.Crim.P. [720]; (3) whether appellant’s brief has 

a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether 

there is a substantial question that the sentence 

appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Id. at 170. Whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about 

the appropriateness of a sentence is a question to be evaluated on a case-bycase basis. Commonwealth v. Kenner, 784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 

2001).

Here, the first three requirements of the four-part test are met: 

Appellant filed a timely appeal; Appellant preserved the issue in his postsentence motion; and Appellant included a statement raising this issue in his 

brief pursuant to Rule 2119(f). Moury, 992 A.2d at 170. Therefore, we must 

determine whether Appellant raised a substantial question.

In order to determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial 

question, we examine the Rule 2119(f) statement. Commonwealth v. 

Ahmad, 961 A.2d 884, 886-887 (Pa. Super. 2008). Allowance of appeal will 
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be permitted only when the appellate court determines that there is a 

substantial question that the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing 

Code.3 Commonwealth v. Hartle, 894 A.2d 800, 805 (Pa. Super. 2006). A 

substantial question exists where an appellant sets forth a plausible argument 

that the sentence violates a particular provision of the Sentencing Code or is 

contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Id. 

“[W]e cannot look beyond the statement of questions presented and the 

prefatory 2119(f) statement to determine whether a substantial question 

exists.” Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10 (Pa. Super. 2013).

In his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement, Appellant avers the trial court 

abused its discretion by imposing a manifestly excessive sentence of sixtythree and one-half to 180 years of incarceration which is allegedly “too 

severe.” Appellant’s Brief at 7. Appellant asserts that the consecutive nature 

of the sentences imposed results in a life sentence. Id. 

The Commonwealth counters that Appellant failed to raise a substantial 

question. Commonwealth’s Brief at 25. The Commonwealth further states 

that Appellant failed to provide any analysis on why the sentence was not 

appropriate under the Sentencing Code or how the sentence is contrary to the 

fundamental norms underlying the sentencing process. Id. The 

Commonwealth concludes that although Appellant attempts to characterize 

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3

 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9701-9799.75.
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his sentence as a life sentence and argue that it advances no public interest 

or protection, Appellant “fails to go into further detail.” Id. We agree and 

find that Appellant provided a mere boilerplate argument with no support. 

Appellant’s challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence is merely a 

generic claim of displeasure with the duration and consecutive nature of the 

sentences imposed. Appellant develops no argument and cites no case law.

4

 

For this reason, we conclude that Appellant has failed to present a substantial 

question for review. 

Even if this Court were to review the allegedly excessive duration of 

Appellant’s aggregate sentence and the consecutive terms imposed, we would 

conclude that no relief is due. Our standard of review for challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of sentencing is well settled:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse 

of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather, 

the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the 

sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its 

judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or 

arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

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4 The only cases Appellant mentions in his Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) statement or 

argument section of his brief are Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617

(Pa. 2002), and Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d 910 (Pa. Super 2000). 

Appellant’s Brief at 7, 16. However, Appellant cites these cases as mere 

statements of law. These examples of when and under what standards an 

appellate court may review the discretionary aspects of a sentence provide 

absolutely no support, much less an argument, reflecting any abuse of 

discretion in the sentence imposed.
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Commonwealth v. Conte, 198 A.3d 1169, 1176 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation 

omitted).

It is well settled that when the trial court is imposing more than one 

sentence, the decision to run the sentences consecutively or concurrently is a 

determination left to the discretion of the trial court. See Commonwealth 

v. Gonzalez–Dejusus, 994 A.2d 595, 598 (Pa. Super. 2010) (42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9721 affords the sentencing court discretion to impose its sentence 

concurrently or consecutively to other sentences) (citation omitted); see also 

Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212, 1214 (Pa. Super. 1995) 

(explaining that a defendant is not entitled to a “volume discount” for his 

crimes). Moreover, the record reveals the trial court stated its consideration 

of the Sentencing Guidelines and ranges of applicable sentences. N.T., 

12/27/18, at 10-11. Additionally, the trial court reviewed the presentence 

investigation (“PSI”) report. Id. at 6. When the trial court has the benefit of 

a PSI report, it is presumed that the court was aware of the relevant 

information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those 

considerations in conjunction with mitigating statutory factors. 

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959-960 (Pa. Super. 2019). 

This Court does not re-weigh sentencing factors or impose our judgment 

in place of the sentencing court. Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 

778 (Pa. Super. 2009). Had Appellant properly raised a substantial question, 

we would have concluded that the trial court considered all relevant factors,
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imposed an individualized sentence commensurate with the circumstances

presented, and committed no abuse of discretion in fashioning its sentence. 

For the reasons set forth above, Appellant is entitled to no relief. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Lazarus joins this Memorandum.

Judge Musmanno concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/13/2020