### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE

TER RA NC E LOWD ERM ILK v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE
Appeal f romthe Cr im inal Cou rt for Ham ilton Coun ty No. 246750 Rebec ca J. Ster n, Jud ge

No. E2004-00282-CC A-R3- HC - F iled Jul y 22, 2004

Th e pe tit ion e r, Te rr a nc e L ow de rm ilk , a pp e a ls the tr ia l c ou rt ' s d ism iss a l of his pe tit ion fo r p os tconviction re lief. The state has filed a motion requesting that this court affirm the trial court' s denial
o f re l i ef pur suant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R. The petition is barr ed by the statute of limit ations and does not esta blish that the petitioner is alternative l y en t i t l ed to re lief by a writ of ha be a s c or pu s. Ac c or din g ly , th e state ' s mo tio n is g rante d a ndthe jud g me nt of th e tr ial c ou rt is aff irmed.
Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed P ursuan t to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Cr im . App. R.

J OS EP H M. T I PTON , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., and N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J J ., joined.

Terr ance L owdermilk, Edge field, South Carolina, Pro Se.

Paul G. Summers, A ttorney Gene ral and Reporte r; Michelle Chapma n McI ntire, Assistant Attorney Gene ral; Will iam H. Cox , I I I , District Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, State of Te nnessee

.
M EM OR AN DU M OP IN ION

On Dec ember 20, 2000, the petitioner wa s convicted pur suant to a g uiltyplea of ag g ravated assault. The tria l court imposed a suspended six -y ear sentenc e on supervised probation. No direc t appea l was appa

rently taken. Ac cording to the petitioner, probation was revoke d in November 2002
a ndthe se nte nc e or de re d in to e x e c uti on . O n N ov e mbe r 3 , 2 00 3, the pe tit ion e r s ou g ht p os tconviction re lief in the Criminal Court for Ha milton C ounty . I n his petition, he challeng ed the tria l court’s authority

initiallyto impose a

suspended se ntence and ther eaf ter to re voke probation. The petitioner further a lleg ed that the indictment wa s invalid beca use i t was not pre sented to the e ntire g rand jury ; that the composition of the g ra n d j u ry wa s unlawful; that he r ece ived ineff ective assistance of t rial counsel; and that his g uilty plea was unknowing , unintelligent and based on a fa lse,
coer ced c onfession. Th e trial court found that the pe tition for post-conviction relief was filed untimely . Also, the trial court considere d the petition as one for a writ of habea s corpus a nd found-2-

that the claims pre sented we re e ither not cog nizable or lacke d merit. The trial court dismissed the petition.

B e fo re thi s c ou rt , th e pe tit ion e r a sse rt s th a t a trial c ou rt

in this state ha s n o auth ority to suspend a s en t ence afte r imposing a term of imprisonment and that the D ece mber 20, 2000, jud g me nt p la c ing him

on pr ob a tio n is ill e g a l. N oti ng the on e -y e ar l imi ta tio n p e ri od fo r fi lin g a po stconviction re lief petition, the petitioner ar g ues that a “[p] robation orde r is not a ‘judg ment’ whe n the imposit ion of sentenc e is suspended” and that the date of the orde r re voking his probation rather tha n the date of

the orig ina l ju dg ment of con vic tio n is the re le va nt d a te fo r d e te rm ini ng wh e the r h is petition was timely

filed. The pe titioner conclude s, howeve r, that he is entitl ed to habeas cor pus relief

.
Tenne ssee Code A nnotated Section 40-30- 102(a) p rovides that a pe rson must petition for post-convictio n relief

within one y ear

of the date on which the judg ment became final or consideration of the petition will be t i m e- b ar re d. The statute e mphasizes that “[t ]i me is of the
e sse nc e of the ri g ht to f

ile a pe tit ion fo r p os t- c on vic tio n r e lie f o r m oti on to r e op e n e sta bli sh e d b y

thi s c ha pte r, a ndthe on e -y e ar l imi ta tio ns pe ri odis a n elem ent of the ri g ht t o f

ile su c h a n a c tio n a ndis a condition upon its ex erc ise.” I d. I n the pre sent ca se, the pe tition was filed nearly three y ear s after entry of the c halleng ed judg ment, well bey ond the one- y ear limit ations period. None of the limited exceptions the reto apply

. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-102( b). The trial court c orre ctly found that the date of

the revoc ation of probation was irrele vant in determining the timeliness of the petition fo r post-convic tion relief. See State v. Young , 101 S.W .3d 430, 433 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that the Tenne ssee Post-Conviction Procedure s Act does not permit the filing of a petition under its p ro v i sions to attack collater ally the validity

of a pr ocee ding to r evoke the suspension of sentenc e and/or

probation). The trial court pr operly dismiss ed the pe tition for post-conviction relief as untimely

. Th e tr ia l c ou rt

a lte rn a tiv e ly

c on sid e re d th e ple a din g a s o ne fo r h abe a s c or pu s r e lie f. I n th is state, “[a]ny

person imprisoned or

restra ined of his liberty , under any prete nse whatsoever, e x cept [tho se he ld u nd e r f

e de ra l auth ority ], may pr os e c ute a writ of ha be a s cor pu s to in qu ir e int o th e c a us e of such imprisonment and r estraint.” Churc h v. Sta t e, 9 8 7 S

. W .2d 855, 857 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1998); Tenn. Code A nn. § 29-21-101. Ha beas c orpus re lief is available only when it appe ars on the fac e of the judgme nt or the re cord that the trial court wa s without jurisdi ction to convict or sente nce the def endant or that his se ntence has expired. Arc her v. State, 851 S.W .2d 157, 164 (Tenn. 1993) (citing State ex rel. Newsom v. He nderson, 221 Te nn. 24, 424 S.W .2d 186, 189 (1968))

. Th e pe tit ion e r ha s no t e sta bli sh e d that he is e nti tle d to a writ of ha be a s c or pu s. Th e ma

jority of his claims, if prove n, would rende r the challeng ed judgme nt voida ble rather than void, a nd thus do not present c og nizable claims for ha beas c orpus re lief. The trial court c orr ec t l y fo und that the
rema ining c laims challeng ing the valid i t y o f t h e indictment and the initial suspension of the pe tit ion e r’ s se nte nc e , a lth ou g h pr op e rl y c on sid e re d a s c la ims fo r ha be a s c or pu s r e lie f, la c ke d me ri t. First, the pe titioner has not established an invalid indictment. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-13-105 r equire s that only the fore man of the g rand jury sign an indictment. Next, t he initial suspension of the-3-

petitioner’s sente nce w as not illeg al. Pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-3 5 -3 0 3 (c ), i f a c ourt de te rm ine s th a t pr ob a tio n is app ro pria te , “ the c ou rt sh a ll s e nte nc e the de fe nd a nt t o a sp e c if ic sentenc e but shall suspend the e x ecution of all or part there of and pla ce the defe ndant on supervise d or unsuper vised probation either immediately

or af ter a period of c onfinement . . . .” This court conclude s that the trial court proper ly determined that the petitioner is not e ntitled to post -convic tion or habe as cor

pus relief

.
Ac c or din g ly , th e state ’s motio n is g rante d. Th e jud g me nt o f the tr ia l c ou rt is a ff ir me d in
acc ordanc e with Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R.

__________________ _ ____________________ J OSEPH M. TI PTON, J UDGE