# Den Europæiske Unions C 147/2014

| | ISSN 1977-0871 |
| --- | --- |
| Den Europæiske Unions
  Tidende | C 147 |
| | |
| Dansk udgave | Meddelelser og oplysninger | 57. årgang16. maj 2014 |

ISSN 1977-0871

Den Europæiske Unions

Tidende

C 147

Dansk udgave

Meddelelser og oplysninger

57. årgang16. maj 2014

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| Informationsnummer | Indhold | Side |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | II   Meddelelser |
| | MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2014/C 147/01 | Indledning af procedure (Sag M.7000 — Liberty Global/Ziggo (
  1
  ) | 1 |
| 2014/C 147/02 | Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.7145 — Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International) (
  1
  ) | 2 |

Informationsnummer

Indhold

Side

II   Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2014/C 147/01

Indledning af procedure (Sag M.7000 — Liberty Global/Ziggo (
  1
  )

1

1

2014/C 147/02

Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion (Sag M.7145 — Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International) (
  1
  )

1

2

| | IV   Oplysninger |
| --- | --- |
| | OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2014/C 147/03 | Euroens vekselkurs | 3 |
| 2014/C 147/04 | Udtalelse afgivet af Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel- og Monopolspørgsmål på mødet den 17. februar 2014 om et foreløbigt udkast til afgørelse i Sag C.39398 Visa MIF — Referent: Malta | 4 |
| 2014/C 147/05 | Høringskonsulentens endelige rapport — Visa MIF (AT.39398) | 5 |
| 2014/C 147/06 | Resumé af Kommissionens afgørelse af 26. februar 2014 om en procedure efter artikel 101 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde og artikel 53 i EØS-aftalen (Sag AT.39398 Visa MIF) (meddelt under nummer C(2014) 1199 final) | 7 |

IV   Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

2014/C 147/03

Euroens vekselkurs

3

2014/C 147/04

Udtalelse afgivet af Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel- og Monopolspørgsmål på mødet den 17. februar 2014 om et foreløbigt udkast til afgørelse i Sag C.39398 Visa MIF — Referent: Malta

4

2014/C 147/05

Høringskonsulentens endelige rapport — Visa MIF (AT.39398)

5

2014/C 147/06

Resumé af Kommissionens afgørelse af 26. februar 2014 om en procedure efter artikel 101 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde og artikel 53 i EØS-aftalen (Sag AT.39398 Visa MIF) (meddelt under nummer C(2014) 1199 final)

(meddelt under nummer C(2014) 1199 final)

7

| | V   Øvrige meddelelser |
| --- | --- |
| | PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN |
| | Europa-Kommissionen |
| 2014/C 147/07 | Statsstøtte — Republikken Letland — Statsstøttesag SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Ikke-anmeldt støtte ydet af Letland til Citadele og Parex — Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (
  1
  ) | 11 |

V   Øvrige meddelelser

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

2014/C 147/07

Statsstøtte — Republikken Letland — Statsstøttesag SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Ikke-anmeldt støtte ydet af Letland til Citadele og Parex — Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (
  1
  )

1

11

| | |
| --- | --- |
| | (1)   EØS-relevant tekst |

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(1)   EØS-relevant tekst

1

| DA | |
| --- | --- |

DA

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II Meddelelser

MEDDELELSER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/1

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Indledning af procedure

(Sag M.7000 — Liberty Global/Ziggo)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2014/C 147/01

Den 8. maj 2014 har Kommissionen besluttet at indlede procedure i ovennævnte sag, efter at den har fundet, at den anmeldte fusion rejser alvorlig tvivl med hensyn til, om den er forenelig med det indre marked. Indledningen af proceduren åbner anden fase af undersøgelsen af den anmeldte fusion. Dette har ingen indflydelse på den endelige afgørelse i sagen. Beslutningen er baseret på artikel 6, stk. 1, litra c), i Rådets forordning (EF) Nr. 139/2004 (1).

Kommissionen opfordrer hermed andre interesserede til at fremsætte eventuelle bemærkninger til den planlagte fusion.

For at bemærkningerne kan tages i betragtning i forbindelse med proceduren, skal de være Kommissionen i hænde senest 15 dage efter offentliggørelsen af denne meddelelse. Bemærkningerne kan med angivelse af sagsnummer M.7000 — Liberty Global/Ziggo sendes til Kommissionen pr. fax (+32 22964301) eller pr. brev til følgende adresse:

| Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for Fusioner |
| 1049 Bruxelles/Brussel |
| BELGIEN |

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for Fusioner

1049 Bruxelles/Brussel

BELGIEN

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(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1 (»fusionsforordningen«).

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| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/2 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/2

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Beslutning om ikke at gøre indsigelse mod en anmeldt fusion

(Sag M.7145 — Veolia Environnement/Dalkia International)

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2014/C 147/02

Den 7. maj 2014 besluttede Kommissionen ikke at gøre indsigelse mod ovennævnte anmeldte fusion og erklære den forenelig med det indre marked. Beslutningen er truffet efter artikel 6, stk. 1, litra b), i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (1). Beslutningens fulde ordlyd foreligger kun på engelsk og vil blive offentliggjort, efter at eventuelle forretningshemmeligheder er udeladt. Den vil kunne ses:

| — | under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor |
| --- | --- |

—

under fusioner på Kommissionens websted for konkurrence (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/). Dette websted giver forskellige muligheder for at finde de konkrete fusionsbeslutninger, idet de er opstillet efter bl.a. virksomhedens navn, sagsnummer, dato og sektor

| — | i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/da/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32014M7145. EUR-Lex giver online-adgang til EU-retten. |
| --- | --- |

—

i elektronisk form på EUR-Lex-webstedet (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/da/index.htm) under dokumentnummer 32014M7145. EUR-Lex giver online-adgang til EU-retten.

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(1)  EUT L 24 af 29.1.2004, s. 1.

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IV Oplysninger

OPLYSNINGER FRA DEN EUROPÆISKE UNIONS INSTITUTIONER, ORGANER, KONTORER OG AGENTURER

Europa-Kommissionen

| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/3

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Euroens vekselkurs (1)

15. maj 2014

2014/C 147/03

1 euro =

| | Valuta | Kurs |
| --- | --- | --- |
| USD | amerikanske dollar | 1,3659 |
| JPY | japanske yen | 139,17 |
| DKK | danske kroner | 7,4644 |
| GBP | pund sterling | 0,81520 |
| SEK | svenske kroner | 8,9740 |
| CHF | schweiziske franc | 1,2227 |
| ISK | islandske kroner | |
| NOK | norske kroner | 8,1050 |
| BGN | bulgarske lev | 1,9558 |
| CZK | tjekkiske koruna | 27,440 |
| HUF | ungarske forint | 303,62 |
| LTL | litauiske litas | 3,4528 |
| PLN | polske zloty | 4,1792 |
| RON | rumænske leu | 4,4328 |
| TRY | tyrkiske lira | 2,8466 |
| AUD | australske dollar | 1,4589 |
| CAD | canadiske dollar | 1,4845 |
| HKD | hongkongske dollar | 10,5882 |
| NZD | newzealandske dollar | 1,5786 |
| SGD | singaporeanske dollar | 1,7108 |
| KRW | sydkoreanske won | 1 401,78 |
| ZAR | sydafrikanske rand | 14,1337 |
| CNY | kinesiske renminbi yuan | 8,5090 |
| HRK | kroatiske kuna | 7,5910 |
| IDR | indonesiske rupiah | 15 599,43 |
| MYR | malaysiske ringgit | 4,4064 |
| PHP | filippinske pesos | 59,797 |
| RUB | russiske rubler | 47,4450 |
| THB | thailandske bath | 44,333 |
| BRL | brasilianske real | 3,0197 |
| MXN | mexicanske pesos | 17,6440 |
| INR | indiske rupee | 80,9842 |

Valuta

Kurs

USD

amerikanske dollar

1,3659

JPY

japanske yen

139,17

DKK

danske kroner

7,4644

GBP

pund sterling

0,81520

SEK

svenske kroner

8,9740

CHF

schweiziske franc

1,2227

ISK

islandske kroner

NOK

norske kroner

8,1050

BGN

bulgarske lev

1,9558

CZK

tjekkiske koruna

27,440

HUF

ungarske forint

303,62

LTL

litauiske litas

3,4528

PLN

polske zloty

4,1792

RON

rumænske leu

4,4328

TRY

tyrkiske lira

2,8466

AUD

australske dollar

1,4589

CAD

canadiske dollar

1,4845

HKD

hongkongske dollar

10,5882

NZD

newzealandske dollar

1,5786

SGD

singaporeanske dollar

1,7108

KRW

sydkoreanske won

1 401,78

ZAR

sydafrikanske rand

14,1337

CNY

kinesiske renminbi yuan

8,5090

HRK

kroatiske kuna

7,5910

IDR

indonesiske rupiah

15 599,43

MYR

malaysiske ringgit

4,4064

PHP

filippinske pesos

59,797

RUB

russiske rubler

47,4450

THB

thailandske bath

44,333

BRL

brasilianske real

3,0197

MXN

mexicanske pesos

17,6440

INR

indiske rupee

80,9842

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(1)  Kilde: Referencekurs offentliggjort af Den Europæiske Centralbank.

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| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/4

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Udtalelse afgivet af Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel- og Monopolspørgsmål på mødet den 17. februar 2014 om et foreløbigt udkast til afgørelse i Sag C.39398 Visa MIF

Referent: Malta

2014/C 147/04

| (1) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg deler de betænkeligheder, som Kommissionen gav udtryk for i det udkast til afgørelse, som Det Rådgivende Udvalg fik forelagt den 5. februar 2014 efter artikel 101 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (»TEUF«) og artikel 53 i EØS-aftalen. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg deler de betænkeligheder, som Kommissionen gav udtryk for i det udkast til afgørelse, som Det Rådgivende Udvalg fik forelagt den 5. februar 2014 efter artikel 101 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde (»TEUF«) og artikel 53 i EØS-aftalen.

| (2) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg er enigt med Kommissionen i, at proceduren kan afsluttes med en afgørelse efter artikel 9, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg er enigt med Kommissionen i, at proceduren kan afsluttes med en afgørelse efter artikel 9, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003.

| (3) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg er enigt med Kommissionen i, at de tilsagn, Visa Europe har afgivet, er passende, nødvendige og proportionelle og bør gøres juridisk bindende for Visa Europe. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg er enigt med Kommissionen i, at de tilsagn, Visa Europe har afgivet, er passende, nødvendige og proportionelle og bør gøres juridisk bindende for Visa Europe.

| (4) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg er enigt med Kommissionen i, at der i lyset af de afgivne tilsagn ikke længere er grund til, at Kommissionen griber ind over for Visa Europe, jf. dog artikel 9, stk. 2 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg er enigt med Kommissionen i, at der i lyset af de afgivne tilsagn ikke længere er grund til, at Kommissionen griber ind over for Visa Europe, jf. dog artikel 9, stk. 2 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003.

| (5) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg anmoder Kommissionen om at tage hensyn til alle de andre punkter, der blev rejst under drøftelserne. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg anmoder Kommissionen om at tage hensyn til alle de andre punkter, der blev rejst under drøftelserne.

| (6) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg henstiller til, at dets udtalelse offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg henstiller til, at dets udtalelse offentliggøres i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende.

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| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/5 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/5

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Høringskonsulentens endelige rapport (1)

Visa MIF (AT.39398)

2014/C 147/05

Indledning

| (1) | Udkastet til afgørelse efter artikel 9, stk. 1, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (2) er rettet til Visa Europe Limited (»Visa Europe«) og drejer sig om en del af sag AT.39398 — Visa MIF. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Udkastet til afgørelse efter artikel 9, stk. 1, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (2) er rettet til Visa Europe Limited (»Visa Europe«) og drejer sig om en del af sag AT.39398 — Visa MIF.

| (2) | Den 6. marts 2008 indledte Kommissionen efter de undersøgelser, den på eget initiativ havde indledt den 28. november 2006, procedure over for de »multilateralt aftalte interbankgebyrer« (»MIF«), som automatisk anvendes på alle grænseoverskridende og i visse tilfælde også indenlandske salgsstedstransaktioner udført inden for Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (»EØS«) med brug af VISA-betalingskort. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Den 6. marts 2008 indledte Kommissionen efter de undersøgelser, den på eget initiativ havde indledt den 28. november 2006, procedure over for de »multilateralt aftalte interbankgebyrer« (»MIF«), som automatisk anvendes på alle grænseoverskridende og i visse tilfælde også indenlandske salgsstedstransaktioner udført inden for Det Europæiske Økonomiske Samarbejdsområde (»EØS«) med brug af VISA-betalingskort.

| (3) | Efter den første klagepunktsmeddelelse i 2009 vedtog Kommissionen den 8. december 2010 den første afgørelse i sagen efter artikel 9, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003, som gjorde visse tilsagn angående intraregionale og visse indenlandske MIF-gebyrer for transaktioner udført med forbrugerkort med direkte debitering bindende for Visa Europe (3). Derefter fortsatte Kommissionen sine undersøgelser angående MIF-gebyrer for transaktioner med forbrugerkreditkort. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Efter den første klagepunktsmeddelelse i 2009 vedtog Kommissionen den 8. december 2010 den første afgørelse i sagen efter artikel 9, stk. 1, i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003, som gjorde visse tilsagn angående intraregionale og visse indenlandske MIF-gebyrer for transaktioner udført med forbrugerkort med direkte debitering bindende for Visa Europe (3). Derefter fortsatte Kommissionen sine undersøgelser angående MIF-gebyrer for transaktioner med forbrugerkreditkort.

| (4) | Den 31. juli 2012 fremsendte Kommissionen en supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse til Visa Europe, hvori den i alt væsentligt gav udtryk for den foreløbige holdning, at VISA's fastsættelse af MIF-gebyrer og visse regler i tilknytning hertil gældende for transaktioner udført med VISA-forbrugerkreditkort med handlende inden for EØS ikke kunne fritages for forbuddet i EUF-traktatens artikel 101, stk. 1, og EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 1. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Den 31. juli 2012 fremsendte Kommissionen en supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse til Visa Europe, hvori den i alt væsentligt gav udtryk for den foreløbige holdning, at VISA's fastsættelse af MIF-gebyrer og visse regler i tilknytning hertil gældende for transaktioner udført med VISA-forbrugerkreditkort med handlende inden for EØS ikke kunne fritages for forbuddet i EUF-traktatens artikel 101, stk. 1, og EØS-aftalens artikel 53, stk. 1.

Aktindsigt

| (5) | I august 2012 fik Visa Europe aktindsigt på en dvd. Visa Europe anmodede om yderligere indsigt i: 1) resultaterne af en undersøgelse af indløsende banker, som Kommissionen foretog i 2010 (den såkaldte »Acquirer Survey«) og 2) sagsakter angående en undersøgelse, Kommissionen i 2008 havde ladet foretage om omkostninger og fordele for de handlende ved at acceptere forskellige betalingsmåder (den såkaldte »Cost Study«). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

I august 2012 fik Visa Europe aktindsigt på en dvd. Visa Europe anmodede om yderligere indsigt i: 1) resultaterne af en undersøgelse af indløsende banker, som Kommissionen foretog i 2010 (den såkaldte »Acquirer Survey«) og 2) sagsakter angående en undersøgelse, Kommissionen i 2008 havde ladet foretage om omkostninger og fordele for de handlende ved at acceptere forskellige betalingsmåder (den såkaldte »Cost Study«).

Indsigt i Acquirer Survey i et datarum

| (6) | Som svar på Visa Europes anmodning tilbød Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet at indrette særskilte datarum, hvor Visa Europes eksterne juridiske rådgivere kun kunne få adgang til anonymiserede, kvalitative oplysninger, som indløsende banker havde givet i forbindelse med Acquirer Survey, og selskabets eksterne økonomiske rådgivere kun ville få adgang til kvantitative oplysninger. Visa Europe's eksterne juridiske rådgivere fik således i januar 2013 adgang til en del af oplysningerne fra indløsende banker om »grænseoverskridende indløsning«. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Som svar på Visa Europes anmodning tilbød Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet at indrette særskilte datarum, hvor Visa Europes eksterne juridiske rådgivere kun kunne få adgang til anonymiserede, kvalitative oplysninger, som indløsende banker havde givet i forbindelse med Acquirer Survey, og selskabets eksterne økonomiske rådgivere kun ville få adgang til kvantitative oplysninger. Visa Europe's eksterne juridiske rådgivere fik således i januar 2013 adgang til en del af oplysningerne fra indløsende banker om »grænseoverskridende indløsning«.

| (7) | Med hensyn til den resterende del af oplysningerne fra de indløsende banker var Visa Europe imidlertid uenig med Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet om visse vilkår for adgangen til datarummet og henviste disse spørgsmål til mig efter artikel 7 i afgørelse 2011/695/EU. I særdeleshed anmodede Visa Europe mig om a) at give sine eksterne rådgivere indsigt i, i hvilket land de enkelte indløsende banker, som deltog i undersøgelsen, var hjemmehørende, og b) at ændre betingelsen om, at selskabets eksterne juridiske og økonomiske rådgivere kun kunne få indsigt i henholdsvis kvalitative og kvantitative data. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

Med hensyn til den resterende del af oplysningerne fra de indløsende banker var Visa Europe imidlertid uenig med Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet om visse vilkår for adgangen til datarummet og henviste disse spørgsmål til mig efter artikel 7 i afgørelse 2011/695/EU. I særdeleshed anmodede Visa Europe mig om a) at give sine eksterne rådgivere indsigt i, i hvilket land de enkelte indløsende banker, som deltog i undersøgelsen, var hjemmehørende, og b) at ændre betingelsen om, at selskabets eksterne juridiske og økonomiske rådgivere kun kunne få indsigt i henholdsvis kvalitative og kvantitative data.

| (8) | Jeg afviste anmodning a), da der var alvorlig risiko for, at det ville blive afsløret, hvilke banker der havde deltaget i undersøgelsen, hvis der blev givet adgang til oplysninger om, i hvilket land de var hjemmehørende. Desuden havde Visa Europe ikke godtgjort, at oplysninger om disse bankers landetilhørsforhold var tvingende nødvendige for, at selskabet kunne udøve sin ret til forsvar. For anmodning b)'s vedkommende drog jeg den konklusion, at Visa Europes eksterne juridiske og økonomiske rådgivere burde kunne få adgang til alle oplysningerne i datarummene, da jeg i lyset af sagens omstændigheder ikke fandt de foreslåede adgangsbegrænsninger begrundet i fortrolighedshensyn, og da det af hensyn til Visa Europes ret til at forsvare sig var vigtigt, at de økonomiske og juridiske rådgivere kunne drøfte de akter, de fik indsigt i, med hinanden. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Jeg afviste anmodning a), da der var alvorlig risiko for, at det ville blive afsløret, hvilke banker der havde deltaget i undersøgelsen, hvis der blev givet adgang til oplysninger om, i hvilket land de var hjemmehørende. Desuden havde Visa Europe ikke godtgjort, at oplysninger om disse bankers landetilhørsforhold var tvingende nødvendige for, at selskabet kunne udøve sin ret til forsvar. For anmodning b)'s vedkommende drog jeg den konklusion, at Visa Europes eksterne juridiske og økonomiske rådgivere burde kunne få adgang til alle oplysningerne i datarummene, da jeg i lyset af sagens omstændigheder ikke fandt de foreslåede adgangsbegrænsninger begrundet i fortrolighedshensyn, og da det af hensyn til Visa Europes ret til at forsvare sig var vigtigt, at de økonomiske og juridiske rådgivere kunne drøfte de akter, de fik indsigt i, med hinanden.

Indsigt i Cost Study-akterne

| (9) | Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet begrundede sit afslag på indsigt i Cost Study-akterne med, at disse akter ikke indgik i Kommissionens sagsakter, at de ikke blev benyttet eller lagt til grund i den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse, og at de ikke indeholdt noget diskulperende. Men eftersom der i udbudsspecifikationerne til denne Cost Study blev henvist til sagen mod Visa Europe, og under hensyn til definitionen i punkt 8 i meddelelsen om aktindsigt (4), fandt jeg, at Cost Study-akterne indgik i Kommissionens sagsakter. Jeg anførte dog, at Visa Europe ikke skulle have indsigt i alle disse akter. Korrespondance mellem Kommissionen og dennes kontrahenter om evaluering af kontrahentens arbejde og finansielle aspekter ved undersøgelsen, korrespondance angående interne drøftelser mellem Kommissionen og dennes ekspert og andre dokumenter af foreløbig karakter er interne dokumenter, som der ikke gives aktindsigt i (5). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet begrundede sit afslag på indsigt i Cost Study-akterne med, at disse akter ikke indgik i Kommissionens sagsakter, at de ikke blev benyttet eller lagt til grund i den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse, og at de ikke indeholdt noget diskulperende. Men eftersom der i udbudsspecifikationerne til denne Cost Study blev henvist til sagen mod Visa Europe, og under hensyn til definitionen i punkt 8 i meddelelsen om aktindsigt (4), fandt jeg, at Cost Study-akterne indgik i Kommissionens sagsakter. Jeg anførte dog, at Visa Europe ikke skulle have indsigt i alle disse akter. Korrespondance mellem Kommissionen og dennes kontrahenter om evaluering af kontrahentens arbejde og finansielle aspekter ved undersøgelsen, korrespondance angående interne drøftelser mellem Kommissionen og dennes ekspert og andre dokumenter af foreløbig karakter er interne dokumenter, som der ikke gives aktindsigt i (5).

Svarfristen for den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse

| (10) | Visa Europe besvarede dele af den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse i februar 2013, efter at Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet havde forlænget den oprindelige svarfrist på 12 uger. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Visa Europe besvarede dele af den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse i februar 2013, efter at Konkurrencegeneraldirektoratet havde forlænget den oprindelige svarfrist på 12 uger.

Tilsagn

| (11) | Den 10. maj 2013 tilbød Visa Europe en række tilsagn for at imødekomme Kommissionens klagepunkter. Den 14. juni 2013 offentliggjorde Kommissionen en meddelelse efter artikel 27, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (6), hvorefter der indkom bemærkninger fra 17 interesserede tredjeparter. Visa Europe fremsendte et ændret tilbud om tilsagn i november 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Den 10. maj 2013 tilbød Visa Europe en række tilsagn for at imødekomme Kommissionens klagepunkter. Den 14. juni 2013 offentliggjorde Kommissionen en meddelelse efter artikel 27, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (6), hvorefter der indkom bemærkninger fra 17 interesserede tredjeparter. Visa Europe fremsendte et ændret tilbud om tilsagn i november 2013.

| (12) | I udkastet til Kommissionens afgørelse gøres de afgivne tilsagn bindende for Visa Europe i fire år. I afgørelsen konkluderes det i alt væsentligt, at der ikke længere er grund til at skride ind over for de MIF-gebyrer, som Visa Europe har fastsat for transaktioner udført inden for EØS med VISA-forbrugerbetalingskort, og Visa Europes regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

I udkastet til Kommissionens afgørelse gøres de afgivne tilsagn bindende for Visa Europe i fire år. I afgørelsen konkluderes det i alt væsentligt, at der ikke længere er grund til at skride ind over for de MIF-gebyrer, som Visa Europe har fastsat for transaktioner udført inden for EØS med VISA-forbrugerbetalingskort, og Visa Europes regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning.

| (13) | Jeg har ikke modtaget nogen anmodninger eller klager fra nogen af sagens parter i forbindelse med disse tilsagn (7). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

Jeg har ikke modtaget nogen anmodninger eller klager fra nogen af sagens parter i forbindelse med disse tilsagn (7).

| (14) | I lyset af alt det ovenstående finder jeg, at alle parters ret til en effektiv udøvelse af deres rettigheder under sagsbehandlingen er blevet respekteret. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

I lyset af alt det ovenstående finder jeg, at alle parters ret til en effektiv udøvelse af deres rettigheder under sagsbehandlingen er blevet respekteret.

Bruxelles, den 19. februar 2014.

Wouter WILS

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(1)  Jf. artikel 16 og 17 i afgørelse 2011/695/EU vedtaget af formanden for Europa-Kommissionen af 13. oktober 2011 om høringskonsulentens funktion og kompetenceområder under behandlingen af visse konkurrencesager (EUT L 275 af 20.10.2011, s. 29) (»afgørelse 2011/695/EU«).

1

(2)  Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 af 16. december 2002 om gennemførelsen af konkurrencereglerne i traktatens artikel 81 og 82 (EFT L 1 af 4.1.2003, s. 1).

2

(3)  Se min endelige rapport af 26. november 2010 (EUT C 79 af 12.3.2011, s. 6).

3

(4)  Kommissionens meddelelse om regler for indsigt i Kommissionens sagsakter i forbindelse med sager efter EF-traktatens artikel 81 og 82, EØS-aftalens artikel 53, 54 og 57 og Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 139/2004 (EUT C 325 af 22.12.2005, s. 7).

4

(5)  Aktindsigtsmeddelelsen, punkt 12.

5

(6)  Meddelelse fra Kommissionen i henhold til artikel 27, stk. 4, i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 i sag AT.39398 — VISA MIF (EUT C 168 af 14.6.2013, s. 22).

6

(7)  Ifølge artikel 15, stk. 1, i afgørelse 2011/695/EU kan parter i sagen, som tilbyder at afgive tilsagn efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003, på et hvilket som helst tidspunkt i proceduren efter artikel 9 henvende sig til høringskonsulenten for at sikre, at de på effektiv vis kan udøve deres proceduremæssige rettigheder.

7

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| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/7 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/7

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Resumé af Kommissionens afgørelse

af 26. februar 2014

om en procedure efter artikel 101 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde og artikel 53 i EØS-aftalen

(Sag AT.39398 Visa MIF)

(meddelt under nummer C(2014) 1199 final)

(Kun den engelske udgave er autentisk)

2014/C 147/06

Den 26. februar 2014 vedtog Kommissionen en afgørelse om en procedure efter artikel 101 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde og artikel 53 i EØS-aftalen. I overensstemmelse med bestemmelserne i artikel 30 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (1)

  offentliggør Kommissionen hermed parternes navne og afgørelsens hovedindhold, herunder eventuelt pålagte sanktioner. Der tages hensyn til virksomhedernes berettigede interesse i, at deres forretningshemmeligheder ikke afsløres.

| (1) | Denne sag drejer sig om Visa Europe Limiteds (»Visa Europe«) fastsættelse af multilateralt aftalte interbankgebyrer (såkaldte MIF-gebyrer) for intraregionale transaktioner, visse indenlandske (2) transaktioner og visse transaktioner foretaget uden for EØS (3), men inden for Visa Europe-territoriet, med Visa-forbrugerkreditkort og Visa-forbrugerbetalingskort samt regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Denne sag drejer sig om Visa Europe Limiteds (»Visa Europe«) fastsættelse af multilateralt aftalte interbankgebyrer (såkaldte MIF-gebyrer) for intraregionale transaktioner, visse indenlandske (2) transaktioner og visse transaktioner foretaget uden for EØS (3), men inden for Visa Europe-territoriet, med Visa-forbrugerkreditkort og Visa-forbrugerbetalingskort samt regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning.

1.   FORELØBIG VURDERING AF KONKURRENCEPROBLEMER

| (2) | I sin klagepunktsmeddelelse af 3. april 2009 (»klagepunktsmeddelelsen«) drog Kommissionen den foreløbige konklusion, at Visa Europe ved sin fastsættelse af MIF-gebyrer havde overtrådt traktatens artikel 101 og EØS-aftalens artikel 53. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

I sin klagepunktsmeddelelse af 3. april 2009 (»klagepunktsmeddelelsen«) drog Kommissionen den foreløbige konklusion, at Visa Europe ved sin fastsættelse af MIF-gebyrer havde overtrådt traktatens artikel 101 og EØS-aftalens artikel 53.

| (3) | Den 8. december 2010 vedtog Kommissionen en afgørelse efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (»tilsagnsafgørelsen om betalingskort«). Denne afgørelse gjorde Visa Europe's tilsagn i sagen juridisk bindende for selskabet i fire år. Der var tale om tilsagn om at i) begrænse de vægtede gennemsnitlige MIF-gebyrer for forbrugerbetalingstransaktioner til højst 0,20 %, og at ii) opretholde og/eller indføre en række ændringer af sine netværksregler. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Den 8. december 2010 vedtog Kommissionen en afgørelse efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 (»tilsagnsafgørelsen om betalingskort«). Denne afgørelse gjorde Visa Europe's tilsagn i sagen juridisk bindende for selskabet i fire år. Der var tale om tilsagn om at i) begrænse de vægtede gennemsnitlige MIF-gebyrer for forbrugerbetalingstransaktioner til højst 0,20 %, og at ii) opretholde og/eller indføre en række ændringer af sine netværksregler.

| (4) | I sin supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse af 31. juli 2012 (»den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse«) omformulerede og præciserede Kommissionen sine klagepunkter angående de multilaterale interbankgebyrer for forbrugerkreditkort. Kommissionen udvidede desuden proceduren til også at omfatte den direkte anvendelse af interregionale (eller internationale) MIF-gebyrer, når de handlende er etableret inden for EØS, og gav udtryk for den foreløbige vurdering, at Visa Europe's regler om grænseoverskridende indløsning var i strid med traktatens artikel 101 og EØS-aftalens artikel 53. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

I sin supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse af 31. juli 2012 (»den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse«) omformulerede og præciserede Kommissionen sine klagepunkter angående de multilaterale interbankgebyrer for forbrugerkreditkort. Kommissionen udvidede desuden proceduren til også at omfatte den direkte anvendelse af interregionale (eller internationale) MIF-gebyrer, når de handlende er etableret inden for EØS, og gav udtryk for den foreløbige vurdering, at Visa Europe's regler om grænseoverskridende indløsning var i strid med traktatens artikel 101 og EØS-aftalens artikel 53.

| (5) | Interbankgebyrerne betales reelt af den forretningsdrivendes bank (»indløseren«) til kortindehaverens bank (»udstederen«) for alle transaktioner, der foretages med betalingskort på salgsstedet. Når en kortindehaver bruger et betalingskort til at købe varer eller tjenesteydelser hos en forretningsdrivende, betaler denne reelt et gebyr for denne transaktion til den indløsende bank — den såkaldte »merchant service charge«, i det følgende benævnt »MSC-gebyr«. Indløseren beholder selv en del af dette gebyr (sin avance) og sender en anden del videre til udstederen (MIF-gebyret), mens en tredje (mindre) del går til systemets operatør (i dette tilfælde Visa). I praksis tegner MIF-gebyret sig således for en stor del af det MSC-gebyr, den forretningsdrivende skal betale. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

Interbankgebyrerne betales reelt af den forretningsdrivendes bank (»indløseren«) til kortindehaverens bank (»udstederen«) for alle transaktioner, der foretages med betalingskort på salgsstedet. Når en kortindehaver bruger et betalingskort til at købe varer eller tjenesteydelser hos en forretningsdrivende, betaler denne reelt et gebyr for denne transaktion til den indløsende bank — den såkaldte »merchant service charge«, i det følgende benævnt »MSC-gebyr«. Indløseren beholder selv en del af dette gebyr (sin avance) og sender en anden del videre til udstederen (MIF-gebyret), mens en tredje (mindre) del går til systemets operatør (i dette tilfælde Visa). I praksis tegner MIF-gebyret sig således for en stor del af det MSC-gebyr, den forretningsdrivende skal betale.

| (6) | Kommissionen fandt i sin foreløbige vurdering, at MIF-gebyrerne havde til formål og også til følge at begrænse konkurrencen mellem indløserne betydeligt til skade for de forretningsdrivende og indirekte også for deres kunder. MIF forekommer at resultere i en kunstig forhøjelse af det grundlag, hvorpå indløserne fastsætter MSC-gebyret, ved at skabe et væsentligt omkostningselement, som er fælles for alle indløsere. Ifølge Kommissionens foreløbige vurdering er Visa Europe's MIF-gebyrer ikke objektivt nødvendige. Begrænsningen af konkurrencen mellem indløserne forstærkes yderligere af den virkning, som MIF-gebyrerne har på netværket og konkurrencen mellem kortudstederene, af andre regler og andre former for praksis i nettet (Honour All Cards Rule (»HACR«), No Discrimination Rule (»NDR«), af blending (4) og af segmentering blandt indløserne som følge af restriktive regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning (5). I klagepunktsmeddelelsen og den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse pegede Kommissionen desuden på, at MIF-gebyrerne ikke opfylder betingelserne for fritagelse efter traktatens artikel 101, stk. 3, da de ikke resulterer i effektivitetsgevinster, som i rimelig grad kommer forbrugerne til gode. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

Kommissionen fandt i sin foreløbige vurdering, at MIF-gebyrerne havde til formål og også til følge at begrænse konkurrencen mellem indløserne betydeligt til skade for de forretningsdrivende og indirekte også for deres kunder. MIF forekommer at resultere i en kunstig forhøjelse af det grundlag, hvorpå indløserne fastsætter MSC-gebyret, ved at skabe et væsentligt omkostningselement, som er fælles for alle indløsere. Ifølge Kommissionens foreløbige vurdering er Visa Europe's MIF-gebyrer ikke objektivt nødvendige. Begrænsningen af konkurrencen mellem indløserne forstærkes yderligere af den virkning, som MIF-gebyrerne har på netværket og konkurrencen mellem kortudstederene, af andre regler og andre former for praksis i nettet (Honour All Cards Rule (»HACR«), No Discrimination Rule (»NDR«), af blending (4) og af segmentering blandt indløserne som følge af restriktive regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning (5). I klagepunktsmeddelelsen og den supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse pegede Kommissionen desuden på, at MIF-gebyrerne ikke opfylder betingelserne for fritagelse efter traktatens artikel 101, stk. 3, da de ikke resulterer i effektivitetsgevinster, som i rimelig grad kommer forbrugerne til gode.

| (7) | I Visa Europe-systemet er grænseoverskridende indløsere underlagt en regel om, at de skal anvende de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder i transaktionslandet. Ifølge denne regel skal grænseoverskridende indløsere principielt anvende enten de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder for det pågældende land, intraregionale MIF-gebyrer eller registrerede indenlandske MIF-gebyrer. Visa-udstedere og ‐indløsere i transaktionslandet og grænseoverskridende indløsere kan fravige indenlandske eller landespecifikke MIF-gebyrer ved at indgå bilaterale aftaler om lavere eller ingen interbankgebyrer. Det kan dog være vanskeligt for grænseoverskridende indløsere at indgå sådanne bilaterale aftaler, da de ofte ikke har særlig stærke relationer til indenlandske udstedere. I lande, hvor der er mange bilaterale aftaler mellem indenlandske indløsere, vil grænseoverskridende indløsere typisk være nødt til at beregne de højere landespecifikke, intraregionale eller registrerede indenlandske MIF-gebyrer. Kommissionen fandt, at denne regel havde territorial- og prisbegrænsende formål og virkninger og afskar indløsere i lande med lavere MIF-gebyrer fra at operere i andre lande med deres lavere MIF-gebyrer. I lyset af målet om et indre marked på betalingsområdet er dette en meget alvorlig begrænsning, som forekommer uberettiget. En sådan kunstig opdeling af markederne er til skade for forbrugerne, eftersom de forretningsdrivende påtvinges højere gebyrer for indløsningen. I sin supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse gav Kommissionen derfor udtryk for den foreløbige vurdering, at denne regel tager sigte på at opretholde segmenteringen i nationale markeder ved at lægge hindringer i vejen for priskonkurrence fra grænseoverskridende indløsere. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

I Visa Europe-systemet er grænseoverskridende indløsere underlagt en regel om, at de skal anvende de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder i transaktionslandet. Ifølge denne regel skal grænseoverskridende indløsere principielt anvende enten de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder for det pågældende land, intraregionale MIF-gebyrer eller registrerede indenlandske MIF-gebyrer. Visa-udstedere og ‐indløsere i transaktionslandet og grænseoverskridende indløsere kan fravige indenlandske eller landespecifikke MIF-gebyrer ved at indgå bilaterale aftaler om lavere eller ingen interbankgebyrer. Det kan dog være vanskeligt for grænseoverskridende indløsere at indgå sådanne bilaterale aftaler, da de ofte ikke har særlig stærke relationer til indenlandske udstedere. I lande, hvor der er mange bilaterale aftaler mellem indenlandske indløsere, vil grænseoverskridende indløsere typisk være nødt til at beregne de højere landespecifikke, intraregionale eller registrerede indenlandske MIF-gebyrer. Kommissionen fandt, at denne regel havde territorial- og prisbegrænsende formål og virkninger og afskar indløsere i lande med lavere MIF-gebyrer fra at operere i andre lande med deres lavere MIF-gebyrer. I lyset af målet om et indre marked på betalingsområdet er dette en meget alvorlig begrænsning, som forekommer uberettiget. En sådan kunstig opdeling af markederne er til skade for forbrugerne, eftersom de forretningsdrivende påtvinges højere gebyrer for indløsningen. I sin supplerende klagepunktsmeddelelse gav Kommissionen derfor udtryk for den foreløbige vurdering, at denne regel tager sigte på at opretholde segmenteringen i nationale markeder ved at lægge hindringer i vejen for priskonkurrence fra grænseoverskridende indløsere.

2.   TILSAGN

| (8) | Den 10. maj 2013 afgav Visa Europe en række tilsagn efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 for at imødegå de konkurrenceproblemer, Kommissionen havde påvist. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

Den 10. maj 2013 afgav Visa Europe en række tilsagn efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 for at imødegå de konkurrenceproblemer, Kommissionen havde påvist.

| (9) | Den 14. juni 2013 blev der offentliggjort en meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende, jf. artikel 27, stk. 4 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003, med et resumé af sagen og de afgivne tilsagn, og med en opfordring til interesserede parter til senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen at fremsætte bemærkninger til sagen. Den 30. august 2013 orienterede Kommissionen Visa Europe om de bemærkninger, den havde modtaget fra interesserede parter efter meddelelsens offentliggørelse. Den 5. november 2013 afgav Visa Europe en række ændrede tilsagn. |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Den 14. juni 2013 blev der offentliggjort en meddelelse i Den Europæiske Unions Tidende, jf. artikel 27, stk. 4 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003, med et resumé af sagen og de afgivne tilsagn, og med en opfordring til interesserede parter til senest en måned efter offentliggørelsen at fremsætte bemærkninger til sagen. Den 30. august 2013 orienterede Kommissionen Visa Europe om de bemærkninger, den havde modtaget fra interesserede parter efter meddelelsens offentliggørelse. Den 5. november 2013 afgav Visa Europe en række ændrede tilsagn.

| (10) | Ved afgørelse af 26. februar 2014 efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 gjorde Kommissionen de ændrede tilsagn bindende for Visa Europe i fire år. Et resume af de afgivne tilsagn findes nedenfor.






  a) | Visa Europe har givet tilsagn om, at Visa Europe to måneder efter at have fået meddelt tilsagnsafgørelsen vil lægge et loft på 0,3 % over sine årlige vægtede gennemsnitlige grænseoverskridende MIF-gebyrer på transaktioner foretaget med forbrugerkreditkort inden for EØS. |
| --- | --- | --- |

(10)

Ved afgørelse af 26. februar 2014 efter artikel 9 i forordning (EF) nr. 1/2003 gjorde Kommissionen de ændrede tilsagn bindende for Visa Europe i fire år. Et resume af de afgivne tilsagn findes nedenfor.

a)

Visa Europe har givet tilsagn om, at Visa Europe to måneder efter at have fået meddelt tilsagnsafgørelsen vil lægge et loft på 0,3 % over sine årlige vægtede gennemsnitlige grænseoverskridende MIF-gebyrer på transaktioner foretaget med forbrugerkreditkort inden for EØS.

| b) | Dette loft vil i to år efter meddelelsen af tilsagnsafgørelsen også gælde individuelt i hvert af de EØS-lande, for hvilke Visa Europe direkte fastsætter specifikke indenlandske MIF-gebyrer for forbrugerkreditkort, og i de EØS-lande, hvor der beregnes MIF-gebyrer af indenlandske transaktioner inden for EØS i fravær af andre MIF-gebyrer. |
| --- | --- |

b)

Dette loft vil i to år efter meddelelsen af tilsagnsafgørelsen også gælde individuelt i hvert af de EØS-lande, for hvilke Visa Europe direkte fastsætter specifikke indenlandske MIF-gebyrer for forbrugerkreditkort, og i de EØS-lande, hvor der beregnes MIF-gebyrer af indenlandske transaktioner inden for EØS i fravær af andre MIF-gebyrer.

| c) | Visa Europa tilbød desuden fra 1. januar 2015 at sikre:






  — | at loftet over MIF-gebyrer på 0,3 % for kreditkorttransaktioner gælder for alle MIF-gebyrer fastsat af Visa Europe i forbindelse med transaktioner, der gennemføres med forretningsdrivende etableret inden for EØS med Visa-forbrugerkreditkort udstedt i lande uden for EØS, som hører til Visa Europe-territoriet (6) (»MIF-kreditkortgebyrer for Visa Europe-territoriet uden for EØS«) |
| --- | --- | --- |

c)

Visa Europa tilbød desuden fra 1. januar 2015 at sikre:

—

at loftet over MIF-gebyrer på 0,3 % for kreditkorttransaktioner gælder for alle MIF-gebyrer fastsat af Visa Europe i forbindelse med transaktioner, der gennemføres med forretningsdrivende etableret inden for EØS med Visa-forbrugerkreditkort udstedt i lande uden for EØS, som hører til Visa Europe-territoriet (6) (»MIF-kreditkortgebyrer for Visa Europe-territoriet uden for EØS«)

| — | at loftet over MIF-gebyrer for transaktioner med forbrugerbetalingskort på 0,2 % også gælder for alle MIF-gebyrer fastsat af Visa Europe i forbindelse med transaktioner, der gennemføres med forretningsdrivende etableret inden for EØS med Visa-forbrugerbetalingskort udstedt i lande uden for EØS, som hører til Visa Europe-territoriet (»MIF-betalingskortgebyrer for Visa Europe-territoriet uden for EØS«). |
| --- | --- |

—

at loftet over MIF-gebyrer for transaktioner med forbrugerbetalingskort på 0,2 % også gælder for alle MIF-gebyrer fastsat af Visa Europe i forbindelse med transaktioner, der gennemføres med forretningsdrivende etableret inden for EØS med Visa-forbrugerbetalingskort udstedt i lande uden for EØS, som hører til Visa Europe-territoriet (»MIF-betalingskortgebyrer for Visa Europe-territoriet uden for EØS«).

| d) | Visa Europe har givet tilsagn om at ændre sine regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning fra 1. januar 2015 for at give grænseoverskridende indløsere mulighed for at tilbyde enten de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder for indenlandske betalingstransaktioner, eller de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder for indenlandske kredittransaktioner på den forretningsdrivendes salgssted, eller et MIF-gebyr på 0,2 % for forbrugerbetalingstransaktioner og på 0,3 % for forbrugerkredittransaktioner, dog på visse nærmere betingelser. |
| --- | --- |

d)

Visa Europe har givet tilsagn om at ændre sine regler for grænseoverskridende indløsning fra 1. januar 2015 for at give grænseoverskridende indløsere mulighed for at tilbyde enten de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder for indenlandske betalingstransaktioner, eller de MIF-gebyrer, der gælder for indenlandske kredittransaktioner på den forretningsdrivendes salgssted, eller et MIF-gebyr på 0,2 % for forbrugerbetalingstransaktioner og på 0,3 % for forbrugerkredittransaktioner, dog på visse nærmere betingelser.

| e) | Visa Europe har givet tilsagn om yderligere skridt til at øge gennemskueligheden. Visa Europe har især givet tilsagn om:






  — | at indføre en regel om, at indløsere kan tilbyde de forretningsdrivende MSC-gebyrer på »MIF plus plus«-basis mod et administrationsgebyr (med andre ord skal indløserne, hvis de bliver anmodet herom, i deres kontrakter og fakturaer tydeligt opdele MSC-gebyret i tre dele, nemlig MIF, alle andre betalingssystemsgebyrer og indløserens gebyr). Visa Europe vil kræve, at indløserne indfører denne regel i alle nye aftaler senest 12 måneder efter, at Visa Europe har fået tilsagnsafgørelsen meddelt, og i eksisterende aftaler senest 18 måneder derefter |
| --- | --- | --- |

e)

Visa Europe har givet tilsagn om yderligere skridt til at øge gennemskueligheden. Visa Europe har især givet tilsagn om:

—

at indføre en regel om, at indløsere kan tilbyde de forretningsdrivende MSC-gebyrer på »MIF plus plus«-basis mod et administrationsgebyr (med andre ord skal indløserne, hvis de bliver anmodet herom, i deres kontrakter og fakturaer tydeligt opdele MSC-gebyret i tre dele, nemlig MIF, alle andre betalingssystemsgebyrer og indløserens gebyr). Visa Europe vil kræve, at indløserne indfører denne regel i alle nye aftaler senest 12 måneder efter, at Visa Europe har fået tilsagnsafgørelsen meddelt, og i eksisterende aftaler senest 18 måneder derefter

| — | at indføre en forenklet MIF-struktur for de af Visa Europe fastsatte MIF-gebyrer, således at antallet af gebyrkategorier reduceres med mindst 25 % for derved at øge gennemskueligheden og lette gebyrsammenligninger. |
| --- | --- |

—

at indføre en forenklet MIF-struktur for de af Visa Europe fastsatte MIF-gebyrer, således at antallet af gebyrkategorier reduceres med mindst 25 % for derved at øge gennemskueligheden og lette gebyrsammenligninger.

| (11) | Visa Europe vil udpege en administrator til at føre tilsyn med, at Visa Europe overholder sine tilsagn. Kommissionen vil få mulighed for at godkende eller afvise den foreslåede tilsynsførende administrator inden udpegelsen. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

Visa Europe vil udpege en administrator til at føre tilsyn med, at Visa Europe overholder sine tilsagn. Kommissionen vil få mulighed for at godkende eller afvise den foreslåede tilsynsførende administrator inden udpegelsen.

| (12) | Tilsagnet gælder i fire år fra den dato, hvor Visa Europa får meddelt tilsagnsafgørelsen. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Tilsagnet gælder i fire år fra den dato, hvor Visa Europa får meddelt tilsagnsafgørelsen.

| (13) | De lofter, der ifølge tilsagnene vil blive lagt over det vægtede gennemsnitlige MIF-gebyr, blev vurderet på grundlag af MIT. Det fastslås i afgørelsen, at tilsagnene er passende og nødvendige for at afhjælpe de problemer, der blev påvist i klagepunktsmeddelsen, uden at være urimeligt bebyrdende. |
| --- | --- |

(13)

De lofter, der ifølge tilsagnene vil blive lagt over det vægtede gennemsnitlige MIF-gebyr, blev vurderet på grundlag af MIT. Det fastslås i afgørelsen, at tilsagnene er passende og nødvendige for at afhjælpe de problemer, der blev påvist i klagepunktsmeddelsen, uden at være urimeligt bebyrdende.

| (14) | Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel- og Monopolspørgsmål afgav den 17. februar 2014 en positiv udtalelse om vedtagelsen af afgørelsen. Høringskonsulentens endelige rapport blev afgivet den 19. februar 2014. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

Det Rådgivende Udvalg for Kartel- og Monopolspørgsmål afgav den 17. februar 2014 en positiv udtalelse om vedtagelsen af afgørelsen. Høringskonsulentens endelige rapport blev afgivet den 19. februar 2014.

| (15) | Med denne afgørelse blev proceduren afsluttet med hensyn til Visa Europe's multilateralt aftalte interbankgebyrer for kredittransaktioner inden for EØS, indenlandske MIF-gebyrer for kreditkorttransaktioner fastsat af Visa Europe, MIF-gebyrer for betalings- og kredittransaktioner inden for Visa Europe-territoriet uden for EØS, internationale MIF-gebyrer og Visa Europe's regler om MIF-gebyrer ved grænseoverskridende indløsning. |
| --- | --- |

(15)

Med denne afgørelse blev proceduren afsluttet med hensyn til Visa Europe's multilateralt aftalte interbankgebyrer for kredittransaktioner inden for EØS, indenlandske MIF-gebyrer for kreditkorttransaktioner fastsat af Visa Europe, MIF-gebyrer for betalings- og kredittransaktioner inden for Visa Europe-territoriet uden for EØS, internationale MIF-gebyrer og Visa Europe's regler om MIF-gebyrer ved grænseoverskridende indløsning.

| 16) | Afgørelsen omfatter imidlertid ikke MIF-gebyrer fastsat af Visa Inc. og Visa International Service Association, som Kommissionen fortsætter undersøgelserne af. |
| --- | --- |

16)

Afgørelsen omfatter imidlertid ikke MIF-gebyrer fastsat af Visa Inc. og Visa International Service Association, som Kommissionen fortsætter undersøgelserne af.

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(1)  EFT L 1 af 4.1.2003, s. 1.

(2)  For øjeblikket indenlandske transaktioner i Belgien, Ungarn, Island, Irland, Italien, Luxembourg, Malta, Nederlandene, Letland og Sverige.

(3)  Transaktioner med forretningsdrivende etableret inden for EØS med private Visa-kort udstedt i lande uden for EØS, som hører til Visa Europe-territoriet. Visa Europe-territoriet består af EØS, Andorra, Færøerne, Grønland, Israel, Monaco, San Marino, Svalbard og Jan Mayen, Schweiz, Tyrkiet og Vatikanstaten.

(4)  HACR er en regel i Visa-systemet, som giver de forretningsdrivende pligt til at acceptere betaling med en bestemt kortmærke (f.eks. VISA, VISA Electron eller V PAY) og acceptere alle sådanne korrekt præsenterede kort uden diskrimination og uden hensyn til, hvem der har udstedt kortet, og hvilken type VISA-kort der er tale om. NDR er en regel i Visa-systemet om, at de forretningsdrivende ikke må beregne tillægsgebyrer på transaktioner med VISA-, VISA Electron- eller V PAY-betalingskort, medmindre det i lokal lovgivning udtrykkeligt er fastsat, at de kan beregne et sådant tillægsgebyr. Blending består i, at indløserne beregner det samme MSC-gebyr af de forretningsdrivende for accept af forskellige betalingskort tilhørende det samme betalingssystem (f.eks. VISA-betalingskort og VISA-kreditkort) eller for accept af betalingskort tilhørende forskellige betalingskortsystemer (f.eks. VISA-kreditkort og MasterCard-kreditkort). I sin foreløbige vurdering fandt Kommissionen, at disse regler og forretningsmetoder begrænsede de forretningsdrivendes muligheder for at modvirke en kollektiv udøvelse af markedsstyrke fra Visa Europe-medlemmernes side via MIF-gebyrerne og dermed forstærkede MIF-gebyrernes konkurrenceskadelige virkninger.

(5)  Ved grænseoverskridende indløsning forstås, at indløserne søger at rekruttere forretningsdrivende hjemmehørende i et andet EØS-land end indløserens land til at acceptere kort.

(6)  Visa Europe-territoriet omfatter EØS, Andorra, Færøerne, Grønland, Israel, Monaco, San Marino, Svalbard og Jan Mayen, Schweiz, Tyrkiet og Vatikanstaten.

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V Øvrige meddelelser

PROCEDURER VEDRØRENDE GENNEMFØRELSEN AF KONKURRENCEPOLITIKKEN

Europa-Kommissionen

| 16.5.2014 | DA | Den Europæiske Unions Tidende | C 147/11 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

16.5.2014

DA

Den Europæiske Unions Tidende

C 147/11

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STATSSTØTTE — REPUBLIKKEN LETLAND

Statsstøttesag SA.36612 (2014/C) (ex 2013/NN) — Ikke-anmeldt støtte ydet af Letland til Citadele og Parex

Opfordring til at fremsætte bemærkninger efter artikel 108, stk. 2, i traktaten om Den Europæiske Unions funktionsmåde

(EØS-relevant tekst)

2014/C 147/07

Ved brev af 16. april 2014 der er gengivet på det autentiske sprog efter dette resumé, meddelte Kommissionen Republikken Letland, at den havde besluttet at indlede proceduren efter EUF-traktatens artikel 108, stk. 2, over for ovennævnte støtte.

Interesserede parter kan senest 10 arbejdsdage efter offentliggørelsen af nærværende resumé og det efterfølgende brev sende eventuelle bemærkninger til den ordning, over for hvilken Kommissionen indleder proceduren, til:

| Europa-Kommissionen |
| --- |
| Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence |
| Registreringskontoret for Statsstøtte |
| 1049 Bruxelles |
| BELGIEN |
| Fax +32 22961242 |

Europa-Kommissionen

Generaldirektoratet for Konkurrence

Registreringskontoret for Statsstøtte

1049 Bruxelles

BELGIEN

Fax +32 22961242

Disse bemærkninger vil blive videresendt til Republikken Letland. Interesserede parter, der fremsætter bemærkninger til sagen, kan skriftligt anmode om at få deres navn hemmeligholdt. Anmodningen skal være begrundet.

SAMMENFATNING

Sagsforløb

| 1. | Den 15. september 2010 (1) godkendte Kommissionen omstruktureringsplanen for AS Parex banka. Ifølge omstruktureringsplanen skulle AS Parex banka splittes op i AS Citadele banka og AS Reverta (2). Den 10. august 2012 godkendte Kommissionen ændringer af tre tilsagn, der var omfattet af afgørelsen om godkendelse af omstruktureringsplanen (3). |
| --- | --- |

1.

Den 15. september 2010 (1) godkendte Kommissionen omstruktureringsplanen for AS Parex banka. Ifølge omstruktureringsplanen skulle AS Parex banka splittes op i AS Citadele banka og AS Reverta (2). Den 10. august 2012 godkendte Kommissionen ændringer af tre tilsagn, der var omfattet af afgørelsen om godkendelse af omstruktureringsplanen (3).

| 2. | Kommissionen har siden da i forbindelse med overvågningen af den godkendte omstruktureringsplan og de dermed forbundne tilsagn fundet, at Letland har ydet støtte, der er mere vidtgående end de støtteforanstaltninger, som Kommissionen allerede havde godkendt. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Kommissionen har siden da i forbindelse med overvågningen af den godkendte omstruktureringsplan og de dermed forbundne tilsagn fundet, at Letland har ydet støtte, der er mere vidtgående end de støtteforanstaltninger, som Kommissionen allerede havde godkendt.

Beskrivelse af foranstaltningerne

| 3. | Af de dokumenter, Kommissionen modtog, fremgår det, at Letland har iværksat følgende foranstaltninger uden forhåndsanmeldelse til Kommissionen:






  a) | den 22. maj 2009 ydede Letland AS Parex banka et efterstillet lån (supplerende kapital) med en løbetid på syv år, hvilket overstiger den maksimale løbetid på fem år, som var godkendt af Kommissionen i henhold til statsstøttereglerne |
| --- | --- | --- |

3.

Af de dokumenter, Kommissionen modtog, fremgår det, at Letland har iværksat følgende foranstaltninger uden forhåndsanmeldelse til Kommissionen:

a)

den 22. maj 2009 ydede Letland AS Parex banka et efterstillet lån (supplerende kapital) med en løbetid på syv år, hvilket overstiger den maksimale løbetid på fem år, som var godkendt af Kommissionen i henhold til statsstøttereglerne

| b) | den 27. juni 2013 indrømmede Letland AS Citadele banka en yderligere forlængelse af løbetiden på 18 måneder for det udestående beløb på samme efterstillede lån |
| --- | --- |

b)

den 27. juni 2013 indrømmede Letland AS Citadele banka en yderligere forlængelse af løbetiden på 18 måneder for det udestående beløb på samme efterstillede lån

| c) | siden 2011 har Letland forsynet AS Reverta med likviditetsstøtte, der overstiger den maksimumsgrænse, Kommissionen godkendte i sin afgørelse af 15. september 2010. |
| --- | --- |

c)

siden 2011 har Letland forsynet AS Reverta med likviditetsstøtte, der overstiger den maksimumsgrænse, Kommissionen godkendte i sin afgørelse af 15. september 2010.

| 4. | Desuden fremgår det, at Letland ikke levede op til sit tilsagn om at afhænde AS Citadele bankas formueforvaltningsaktiviteter inden for de givne frister. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Desuden fremgår det, at Letland ikke levede op til sit tilsagn om at afhænde AS Citadele bankas formueforvaltningsaktiviteter inden for de givne frister.

Vurdering af støtteforanstaltningerne

| 5. | AS Parex banka og efterfølgende AS Citadele banka og AS Reverta har modtaget støtte fra Letland udover de støtteforanstaltninger, som Kommissionen havde godkendt i henhold til statsstøttereglerne. |
| --- | --- |

5.

AS Parex banka og efterfølgende AS Citadele banka og AS Reverta har modtaget støtte fra Letland udover de støtteforanstaltninger, som Kommissionen havde godkendt i henhold til statsstøttereglerne.

| 6. | På grundlag af kendsgerningerne, at:






  a) | både den oprindelige løbetid på syv år, den forlængede løbetid på den efterstillede gæld og den øgede likviditetsstøtte tydeligt udgør yderligere fordele sammenlignet med de godkendte støtteforanstaltninger og derfor udgør yderligere støtte (idet alle andre kriterier i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, stadig gælder) samt |
| --- | --- | --- |

6.

På grundlag af kendsgerningerne, at:

a)

både den oprindelige løbetid på syv år, den forlængede løbetid på den efterstillede gæld og den øgede likviditetsstøtte tydeligt udgør yderligere fordele sammenlignet med de godkendte støtteforanstaltninger og derfor udgør yderligere støtte (idet alle andre kriterier i henhold til artikel 107, stk. 1, stadig gælder) samt

| b) | at Kommissionen ikke havde modtaget nogen meddelelse om de yderligere støtteforanstaltninger, anser Kommissionen, at de tre foranstaltninger udgør ulovlig støtte. |
| --- | --- |

b)

at Kommissionen ikke havde modtaget nogen meddelelse om de yderligere støtteforanstaltninger, anser Kommissionen, at de tre foranstaltninger udgør ulovlig støtte.

| 7. | Kommissionen bemærker, at på grundlag af de oplysninger, der er tilgængelige i øjeblikket, har Letland ikke fremsat argumenter til at påvise, at den støtte, der hidrører fra den oprindelige løbetid på syv år på de efterstillede lån og fra den forlængede løbetid på 18 måneder på den efterstillede gæld, er forenelige med statsstøttereglerne. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Kommissionen bemærker, at på grundlag af de oplysninger, der er tilgængelige i øjeblikket, har Letland ikke fremsat argumenter til at påvise, at den støtte, der hidrører fra den oprindelige løbetid på syv år på de efterstillede lån og fra den forlængede løbetid på 18 måneder på den efterstillede gæld, er forenelige med statsstøttereglerne.

| 8. | Kommissionen bemærker også, at Letland ikke har fremsat argumenter til at påvise, at den støtte, der hidrører fra den yderligere likviditetsstøtte ydet til AS Reverta, er forenelig med statsstøttereglerne. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Kommissionen bemærker også, at Letland ikke har fremsat argumenter til at påvise, at den støtte, der hidrører fra den yderligere likviditetsstøtte ydet til AS Reverta, er forenelig med statsstøttereglerne.

| 9. | Letland har bekræftet, at formueforvaltningsaktiviteterne ikke er blevet afhændet inden for de aftale frister. Dette udgør et brud på bestemmelserne i den endelige afgørelse om Parex og udgør således misbrug af støtten. |
| --- | --- |

9.

Letland har bekræftet, at formueforvaltningsaktiviteterne ikke er blevet afhændet inden for de aftale frister. Dette udgør et brud på bestemmelserne i den endelige afgørelse om Parex og udgør således misbrug af støtten.

| 10. | Kommissionen konkluderer i forbindelse med den ovenfor beskrevne ulovlige støtte, at der er rejst tvivl om foreneligheden med det indre marked på grundlag af de oplysninger, der er tilgængelige i øjeblikket. Kommissionen har derfor besluttet at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure i henhold til artikel 13, stk. 1, og artikel 4, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Kommissionen konkluderer i forbindelse med den ovenfor beskrevne ulovlige støtte, at der er rejst tvivl om foreneligheden med det indre marked på grundlag af de oplysninger, der er tilgængelige i øjeblikket. Kommissionen har derfor besluttet at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure i henhold til artikel 13, stk. 1, og artikel 4, stk. 4, i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999.

| 11. | Desuden konkluderer Kommissionen, at den manglende efterlevelse af tilsagnet om at afhænde formueforvaltningsaktiviteterne udgør misbrug af støtte. Kommissionen har derfor besluttet desuden at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure for misbrug af støtte i henhold til artikel 16 i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999. |
| --- | --- |

11.

Desuden konkluderer Kommissionen, at den manglende efterlevelse af tilsagnet om at afhænde formueforvaltningsaktiviteterne udgør misbrug af støtte. Kommissionen har derfor besluttet desuden at indlede en formel undersøgelsesprocedure for misbrug af støtte i henhold til artikel 16 i forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999.

I henhold til artikel 14 i Rådets forordning (EF) nr. 659/1999 kan ulovligt udbetalt støtte tilbagesøges hos støttemodtageren.

BREVETS ORDLYD

‘The Commission wishes to inform Latvia that, having examined the information supplied by your authorities on the aid referred to above, it has decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“the Treaty”).

1.   PROCEDURE

| (1) | On 10 November 2008 Latvia notified to the Commission a package of State aid measures in favour of AS Parex banka (“Parex banka”), designed to support the stability of the financial system. The Commission approved those measures on 24 November 2008 (4) (“first rescue Decision”) based on Latvia’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan for Parex banka within six months. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 10 November 2008 Latvia notified to the Commission a package of State aid measures in favour of AS Parex banka (“Parex banka”), designed to support the stability of the financial system. The Commission approved those measures on 24 November 2008 (4) (“first rescue Decision”) based on Latvia’s commitment to submit a restructuring plan for Parex banka within six months.

| (2) | Following requests from Latvia, the Commission approved two sets of changes to the aid measures concerning Parex banka, the first on 11 February 2009 (5) (“second rescue Decision”) and the second on 11 May 2009 (6) (“third rescue Decision”). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

Following requests from Latvia, the Commission approved two sets of changes to the aid measures concerning Parex banka, the first on 11 February 2009 (5) (“second rescue Decision”) and the second on 11 May 2009 (6) (“third rescue Decision”).

| (3) | On 11 May 2009 Latvia notified a restructuring plan for Parex banka. By decision of 29 June 2009 (7) the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the notified restructuring measures constituted State aid to Parex banka and expressed its doubts that such aid could be found compatible. As a result the Commission decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty and required Latvia to provide information needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 11 May 2009 Latvia notified a restructuring plan for Parex banka. By decision of 29 June 2009 (7) the Commission came to the preliminary conclusion that the notified restructuring measures constituted State aid to Parex banka and expressed its doubts that such aid could be found compatible. As a result the Commission decided to initiate the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty and required Latvia to provide information needed for the assessment of the compatibility of the aid.

| (4) | Between 11 May 2009 and 15 September 2010, several information exchanges and discussions occurred between Latvia and the Commission concerning the restructuring plan for Parex banka. Latvia provided information and clarifications on several occasions throughout the investigation procedure, and the restructuring plan of Parex banka was also updated six times. |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Between 11 May 2009 and 15 September 2010, several information exchanges and discussions occurred between Latvia and the Commission concerning the restructuring plan for Parex banka. Latvia provided information and clarifications on several occasions throughout the investigation procedure, and the restructuring plan of Parex banka was also updated six times.

| (5) | On 1 August 2010, some assets of Parex banka were transferred to a newly established so-called “good bank” named AS Citadele banka (“Citadele”), in line with the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan envisaged a split of Parex banka into Citadele, which would take over all core assets and some non-core assets (8), and a so-called “bad bank” (“Reverta” (9)) which kept the remaining non-core and non-performing assets. |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 1 August 2010, some assets of Parex banka were transferred to a newly established so-called “good bank” named AS Citadele banka (“Citadele”), in line with the restructuring plan. The restructuring plan envisaged a split of Parex banka into Citadele, which would take over all core assets and some non-core assets (8), and a so-called “bad bank” (“Reverta” (9)) which kept the remaining non-core and non-performing assets.

| (6) | By decision of 15 September 2010 (10) (“the Parex Final Decision”), the Commission approved the restructuring plan of Parex banka, based on a commitment paper submitted by the Latvian authorities on 3 September 2010. |
| --- | --- |

(6)

By decision of 15 September 2010 (10) (“the Parex Final Decision”), the Commission approved the restructuring plan of Parex banka, based on a commitment paper submitted by the Latvian authorities on 3 September 2010.

| (7) | On 10 August 2012, at the request of the Latvian authorities, the Commission approved amendments to three commitments included in the Parex Final Decision (“the Amendment Decision”) (11). Those amendments: 1) extended the disposal deadline for the CIS loans (12) until 31 December 2014; 2) increased the limit of minimum capital adequacy requirements allowed for Citadele at the level of the bank and the group before the asset remuneration described in the Parex Final Decision would be triggered; and 3) allowed carry-over of previous years’ unused caps on lending, whilst respecting market share caps. |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 10 August 2012, at the request of the Latvian authorities, the Commission approved amendments to three commitments included in the Parex Final Decision (“the Amendment Decision”) (11). Those amendments: 1) extended the disposal deadline for the CIS loans (12) until 31 December 2014; 2) increased the limit of minimum capital adequacy requirements allowed for Citadele at the level of the bank and the group before the asset remuneration described in the Parex Final Decision would be triggered; and 3) allowed carry-over of previous years’ unused caps on lending, whilst respecting market share caps.

| (8) | On 1 October 2013 Latvia notified a requested for a further amendment of the Parex Final Decision, asking for the postponement of the divestment deadline for one of the divisions of Citadele, the Wealth Management Business (13). While analysing Latvia’s submissions in support of that amendment request, the Commission identified aid that had been granted by Latvia over and beyond the aid measures already approved by the Commission. |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On 1 October 2013 Latvia notified a requested for a further amendment of the Parex Final Decision, asking for the postponement of the divestment deadline for one of the divisions of Citadele, the Wealth Management Business (13). While analysing Latvia’s submissions in support of that amendment request, the Commission identified aid that had been granted by Latvia over and beyond the aid measures already approved by the Commission.

| (9) | Between [...] (14) and 4 March 2014, several information exchanges have taken place between Latvia and the Commission with regard to the additional aid measures. Latvia submitted information and documents on 30 October 2013, 31 January 2014 and 4 March 2014 (including a revised restructuring plan of Parex banka). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

Between [...] (14) and 4 March 2014, several information exchanges have taken place between Latvia and the Commission with regard to the additional aid measures. Latvia submitted information and documents on 30 October 2013, 31 January 2014 and 4 March 2014 (including a revised restructuring plan of Parex banka).

| (10) | Since 11 November 2013, the Commission has also received monthly updates regarding Latvia’s progress in selling Citadele, a process it began in October 2013. |
| --- | --- |

(10)

Since 11 November 2013, the Commission has also received monthly updates regarding Latvia’s progress in selling Citadele, a process it began in October 2013.

| (11) | The Latvian authorities have informed the Commission that for reasons of urgency they exceptionally accept that this Decision is adopted in the English language. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

The Latvian authorities have informed the Commission that for reasons of urgency they exceptionally accept that this Decision is adopted in the English language.

2.   DESCRIPTION

2.1.   The undertaking concerned

| (12) | Parex banka was the second-largest bank in Latvia with total assets of LVL 3,4 billion (EUR 4,9 billion) as of 31 December 2008. It was partially nationalised in November 2008. |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Parex banka was the second-largest bank in Latvia with total assets of LVL 3,4 billion (EUR 4,9 billion) as of 31 December 2008. It was partially nationalised in November 2008.

| (13) | In April 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) acquired 25 % of the share capital of Parex banka plus one share. Following the split of Parex banka into a good bank and a bad bank in 2010 along with subsequent changes in the shareholding structure, the shareholders of Citadele are now Latvia (75 %) and the EBRD (25 %), while the shareholders of Reverta are Latvia (84,15 %), the EBRD (12,74 %) and others (3,11 %). |
| --- | --- |

(13)

In April 2009, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (“EBRD”) acquired 25 % of the share capital of Parex banka plus one share. Following the split of Parex banka into a good bank and a bad bank in 2010 along with subsequent changes in the shareholding structure, the shareholders of Citadele are now Latvia (75 %) and the EBRD (25 %), while the shareholders of Reverta are Latvia (84,15 %), the EBRD (12,74 %) and others (3,11 %).

| (14) | A detailed description of Parex banka up to the time of the Parex Final Decision can be found in recitals 11 to 15 of that decision. Parex banka was authorised to receive a series of aid measures (including liquidity support, guarantees and recapitalisation and asset relief measures) which are specified in the Parex Final Decision. Those measures were approved by the Commission in the first, second and third rescue Decisions (the “Rescue Decisions”) and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(14)

A detailed description of Parex banka up to the time of the Parex Final Decision can be found in recitals 11 to 15 of that decision. Parex banka was authorised to receive a series of aid measures (including liquidity support, guarantees and recapitalisation and asset relief measures) which are specified in the Parex Final Decision. Those measures were approved by the Commission in the first, second and third rescue Decisions (the “Rescue Decisions”) and the Parex Final Decision.

2.2.   The aid measures approved for Citadele and Reverta

| (15) | The restructuring plan approved by the Commission with the Parex Final Decision provided that the rescue aid previously approved by the Commission was to be extended over the restructuring period and split between Citadele and Reverta. The Parex Final Decision also approved additional restructuring aid for Reverta and Citadele. It also laid down a utilisation mechanism for the aid which had been provisionally approved through the Rescue Decisions after Parex banka was split, in regard to: |
| --- | --- |

(15)

The restructuring plan approved by the Commission with the Parex Final Decision provided that the rescue aid previously approved by the Commission was to be extended over the restructuring period and split between Citadele and Reverta. The Parex Final Decision also approved additional restructuring aid for Reverta and Citadele. It also laid down a utilisation mechanism for the aid which had been provisionally approved through the Rescue Decisions after Parex banka was split, in regard to:

| a) | liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele and Reverta (15); |
| --- | --- |

a)

liquidity support in the form of State deposits for both Citadele and Reverta (15);

| b) | State guarantees on liabilities of Citadele and Reverta (16); |
| --- | --- |

b)

State guarantees on liabilities of Citadele and Reverta (16);

| c) | a State recapitalisation for Reverta and Citadele (17); and |
| --- | --- |

c)

a State recapitalisation for Reverta and Citadele (17); and

| d) | an asset relief measure for Citadele (18). |
| --- | --- |

d)

an asset relief measure for Citadele (18).

2.3.   The commitments given by Latvia in the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision

| (16) | In order to enable the Commission to find the restructuring aid compatible with the internal market Latvia provided commitments to ensure full implementation of the restructuring plan and limit distortions of competition that result from the restructuring aid (“the commitments”). |
| --- | --- |

(16)

In order to enable the Commission to find the restructuring aid compatible with the internal market Latvia provided commitments to ensure full implementation of the restructuring plan and limit distortions of competition that result from the restructuring aid (“the commitments”).

| (17) | The main commitments regarding Citadele are described in recitals 73 to 83 of the Parex Final Decision. They include: a commitment to divest the CIS loans; a commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business within fixed deadlines (one which applied to divestment by Citadele itself and another which applied to divestment under the control of a Divestment Trustee); the preservation of viability, marketability and competitiveness; a hold-separate obligation in relation to the Wealth Management Business; a commitment to sell Citadele within a fixed deadline; caps on new lending and deposits in the Baltic countries; caps on the deposits in the German and Swedish branches; no increase in the number of branches; remuneration in respect of the asset relief measure; an acquisition ban; and a ban on making new CIS loans. |
| --- | --- |

(17)

The main commitments regarding Citadele are described in recitals 73 to 83 of the Parex Final Decision. They include: a commitment to divest the CIS loans; a commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business within fixed deadlines (one which applied to divestment by Citadele itself and another which applied to divestment under the control of a Divestment Trustee); the preservation of viability, marketability and competitiveness; a hold-separate obligation in relation to the Wealth Management Business; a commitment to sell Citadele within a fixed deadline; caps on new lending and deposits in the Baltic countries; caps on the deposits in the German and Swedish branches; no increase in the number of branches; remuneration in respect of the asset relief measure; an acquisition ban; and a ban on making new CIS loans.

| (18) | The main commitments regarding Reverta are described in recitals 84 to 87 of the Parex Final Decision. They include commitments that there would be no new activities; there would be a wind-down or divestment of activities; and a cap on the total amount of capital that would be provided by Latvia in whatever form. |
| --- | --- |

(18)

The main commitments regarding Reverta are described in recitals 84 to 87 of the Parex Final Decision. They include commitments that there would be no new activities; there would be a wind-down or divestment of activities; and a cap on the total amount of capital that would be provided by Latvia in whatever form.

| (19) | Recitals 88 to 93 of the Parex Final Decision describe the commitments jointly applying to Reverta and Citadele. They provide for: a dividend and coupon ban; a ban on any reference to State support in advertising; a separation between Citadele and Reverta; and the appointment of Monitoring and Divestiture Trustees. |
| --- | --- |

(19)

Recitals 88 to 93 of the Parex Final Decision describe the commitments jointly applying to Reverta and Citadele. They provide for: a dividend and coupon ban; a ban on any reference to State support in advertising; a separation between Citadele and Reverta; and the appointment of Monitoring and Divestiture Trustees.

| (20) | As recalled in recital 16, the Commission subsequently amended three of the commitments applicable to Citadele under the Parex Final Decision. That approval was based on new commitments undertaken by Latvia and Citadele to compensate for any distortion of competition. |
| --- | --- |

(20)

As recalled in recital 16, the Commission subsequently amended three of the commitments applicable to Citadele under the Parex Final Decision. That approval was based on new commitments undertaken by Latvia and Citadele to compensate for any distortion of competition.

2.4.   The additional measures implemented by Latvia for Parex banka, Citadele and Reverta

| (21) | Based on the report submitted on 29 August 2013 by the Monitoring Trustee (19) and based on documents and information submitted by Latvia since October 2013, it appears that Latvia has put into effect the following measures without prior notification to the Commission:






  (i) | on 22 May 2009, Latvia granted to Parex banka a subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million (qualifying as Tier 2 capital) with a maturity of seven years (i.e. until 21 May 2016). The duration of that subordinated loan exceeds the maximum five-year maturity set in first rescue Decision and confirmed in the Parex Final Decision; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(21)

Based on the report submitted on 29 August 2013 by the Monitoring Trustee (19) and based on documents and information submitted by Latvia since October 2013, it appears that Latvia has put into effect the following measures without prior notification to the Commission:

(i)

on 22 May 2009, Latvia granted to Parex banka a subordinated loan of LVL 50,27 million (qualifying as Tier 2 capital) with a maturity of seven years (i.e. until 21 May 2016). The duration of that subordinated loan exceeds the maximum five-year maturity set in first rescue Decision and confirmed in the Parex Final Decision;

| (ii) | on 27 June 2013, Latvia granted Citadele an additional 18-month extension of the maturity for an amount of LVL 37 million of subordinated debt (out of the total of LVL 45 million held by Latvia at that time) (20). Table 1 gives an overview of the subordinated debt maturity changes, as of 31 December 2013. Latvia did not notify the extension of the maturity of that subordinated debt to the Commission;

  Table 1










  Issuer | Principal (LVL million) | Maturity approved by the Parex Final Decision | Maturity date throughout the restructuring period | Extended Maturity (granted in 2013) |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| LPA (21) | 7,87 | May 2014 (five years starting from 2009) | 8.8.2016 | — |
| LPA | 37,34 | 21.5.2016 | 20.12.2017 |
| [...] | [...] | [...] | [...] |
| Total | 50,27 | | | |

(ii)

on 27 June 2013, Latvia granted Citadele an additional 18-month extension of the maturity for an amount of LVL 37 million of subordinated debt (out of the total of LVL 45 million held by Latvia at that time) (20). Table 1 gives an overview of the subordinated debt maturity changes, as of 31 December 2013. Latvia did not notify the extension of the maturity of that subordinated debt to the Commission;

Table 1

Issuer

Principal (LVL million)

Maturity approved by the Parex Final Decision

Maturity date throughout the restructuring period

Extended Maturity (granted in 2013)

LPA (21)

7,87

May 2014 (five years starting from 2009)

8.8.2016

—

LPA

37,34

21.5.2016

20.12.2017

[...]

[...]

[...]

[...]

Total

50,27

| (iii) | in addition, since 2011 Latvia has provided Reverta with liquidity support in excess of the maximum limit set and approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision, both for the base case and for the worst case scenario (presented in Table 2 (22)). The actual amounts of liquidity support from which Reverta has benefited were communicated by the Latvian authorities through the revised restructuring plan submitted in January 2014 and are reflected in Table 3: |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

in addition, since 2011 Latvia has provided Reverta with liquidity support in excess of the maximum limit set and approved by the Commission in the Parex Final Decision, both for the base case and for the worst case scenario (presented in Table 2 (22)). The actual amounts of liquidity support from which Reverta has benefited were communicated by the Latvian authorities through the revised restructuring plan submitted in January 2014 and are reflected in Table 3:

Table 2

Liquidity caps for Reverta as reflected in the Parex Final Decision

| LVL million | 1.8.10 | 31.12.10 | 31.12.11 | 31.12.12 | 31.12.13 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Base case | 458 | 446 | 419 | 349 | 315 |
| Best case | 458 | 446 | 419 | 356 | 322 |
| Worst case | 458 | 446 | 419 | 344 | 307 |

LVL million

1.8.10

31.12.10

31.12.11

31.12.12

31.12.13

Base case

458

446

419

349

315

Best case

458

446

419

356

322

Worst case

458

446

419

344

307

Table 3

Actual amounts of liquidity from which Reverta has benefited

| Outstanding of liquidity support |
| --- |
| | 1.8.10 | 31.12.10 | 31.12.11 | 31.12.12 | 31.12.13 |
| LVL million | 446,32 | 446,32 | 427,82 | 384,86 | 362,52 |

Outstanding of liquidity support

1.8.10

31.12.10

31.12.11

31.12.12

31.12.13

LVL million

446,32

446,32

427,82

384,86

362,52

In light of those developments and findings, the Commission has asked Latvia to provide additional information and explanations.

| (22) | Latvia has confirmed through the submissions set out in recital 9 that those additional measures have already been put into effect. |
| --- | --- |

(22)

Latvia has confirmed through the submissions set out in recital 9 that those additional measures have already been put into effect.

2.5.   The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele

| (23) | Latvia has failed to comply with its commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by 30 June 2013 without a Divestiture Trustee, or by 31 December 2013 with a Divestiture Trustee, which was recorded in the Parex Final Decision (23). Therefore that commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business by those deadlines has been breached. |
| --- | --- |

(23)

Latvia has failed to comply with its commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business of Citadele by 30 June 2013 without a Divestiture Trustee, or by 31 December 2013 with a Divestiture Trustee, which was recorded in the Parex Final Decision (23). Therefore that commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business by those deadlines has been breached.

3.   POSITION OF THE LATVIAN AUTHORITIES

3.1.   On the un-notified maturity extensions of the subordinated debt

| (24) | In its submissions of information regarding the un-notified aid which are mentioned in recital 9, as well as in the revised restructuring plan, the Latvian authorities submit that the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions. In consequence, Latvia considers that the longer maturity of the subordinated debt does not entail un-notified State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(24)

In its submissions of information regarding the un-notified aid which are mentioned in recital 9, as well as in the revised restructuring plan, the Latvian authorities submit that the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions. In consequence, Latvia considers that the longer maturity of the subordinated debt does not entail un-notified State aid.

| (25) | More specifically, Latvia expresses the view that:






  (i) | the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions, as it was expressly referred to in the restructuring plan and the reports of the Monitoring Trustee; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(25)

More specifically, Latvia expresses the view that:

(i)

the Commission had been informed of the possibility of the maturity extension of the subordinated debt on a number of occasions, as it was expressly referred to in the restructuring plan and the reports of the Monitoring Trustee;

| (ii) | according to the final version of the restructuring plan, it was not planned that the subordinated debt would be fully repaid by 2017. In addition, the restructuring plan assumed when determining the eligible capital for calculating capital adequacy that the maturity of the subordinated financing would be extended to avoid suffering from a 20 % amortisation rate starting from the fifth year and until maturity; |
| --- | --- |

(ii)

according to the final version of the restructuring plan, it was not planned that the subordinated debt would be fully repaid by 2017. In addition, the restructuring plan assumed when determining the eligible capital for calculating capital adequacy that the maturity of the subordinated financing would be extended to avoid suffering from a 20 % amortisation rate starting from the fifth year and until maturity;

| (iii) | in line with those provisions, the Parex Final Decision provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt (24); |
| --- | --- |

(iii)

in line with those provisions, the Parex Final Decision provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt (24);

| (26) | Moreover, Latvia has argued that the payment by Citadele of interest rates in excess of market conditions allays any State aid concerns that could exist. |
| --- | --- |

(26)

Moreover, Latvia has argued that the payment by Citadele of interest rates in excess of market conditions allays any State aid concerns that could exist.

| (27) | Finally, Latvia notes that discussions [...] are currently being held [...]. |
| --- | --- |

(27)

Finally, Latvia notes that discussions [...] are currently being held [...].

3.2.   Regarding the un-notified liquidity support granted to Reverta

| (28) | Latvia explained that it provided Reverta with liquidity in excess of the support limits in the Parex Final Decision because the deposits from the State were not transformed into capital support by capitalising the principal of State treasury deposits to the extent that had been envisaged in that Decision. That transformation did not occur because after Reverta’s banking licence had been revoked the relevant Latvian legislation no longer required statutory capital to be maintained. The Parex Final Decision had mentioned capitalising LVL [40-110] million of principal in the base case, whereas in fact only LVL 12,4 million of principal was capitalised. |
| --- | --- |

(28)

Latvia explained that it provided Reverta with liquidity in excess of the support limits in the Parex Final Decision because the deposits from the State were not transformed into capital support by capitalising the principal of State treasury deposits to the extent that had been envisaged in that Decision. That transformation did not occur because after Reverta’s banking licence had been revoked the relevant Latvian legislation no longer required statutory capital to be maintained. The Parex Final Decision had mentioned capitalising LVL [40-110] million of principal in the base case, whereas in fact only LVL 12,4 million of principal was capitalised.

| (29) | Latvia argues that capitalising less principal benefitted the State because:






  (iv) | Latvia receives interest on liquidity aid but has no income from capital aid; |
| --- | --- | --- |

(29)

Latvia argues that capitalising less principal benefitted the State because:

(iv)

Latvia receives interest on liquidity aid but has no income from capital aid;

| (v) | Latvia remains a senior secured creditor rather than junior equity holder, which ensures higher recoverability of funds in case of insolvency or liquidation, given that the State Treasury will have priority towards proceeds collectable within the insolvency process; |
| --- | --- |

(v)

Latvia remains a senior secured creditor rather than junior equity holder, which ensures higher recoverability of funds in case of insolvency or liquidation, given that the State Treasury will have priority towards proceeds collectable within the insolvency process;

| (vi) | the capital invested as Tier 1 will not be recovered by the State (25); and |
| --- | --- |

(vi)

the capital invested as Tier 1 will not be recovered by the State (25); and

| (vii) | there is more burden-sharing by legacy minority stakeholders as a result of interest payments by Reverta to the State. |
| --- | --- |

(vii)

there is more burden-sharing by legacy minority stakeholders as a result of interest payments by Reverta to the State.

3.3.   Regarding the breach of the commitment for Wealth Management Business divestment

| (30) | Latvia states that the return of Citadele as a stand-alone entity to the private sector would have been put at risk if Citadele had divested the Wealth Management Business by 30 June 2013 as foreseen in the restructuring plan of 2010 or, in any event before Latvia had divested its stake in Citadele. Latvia claims that Citadele without the Wealth Management Business has no viable business model. |
| --- | --- |

(30)

Latvia states that the return of Citadele as a stand-alone entity to the private sector would have been put at risk if Citadele had divested the Wealth Management Business by 30 June 2013 as foreseen in the restructuring plan of 2010 or, in any event before Latvia had divested its stake in Citadele. Latvia claims that Citadele without the Wealth Management Business has no viable business model.

| (31) | The Latvia has therefore requested the Commission to amend the Parex Final Decision in order to allow Citadele to retain the Wealth Management Business until after the entire bank passes to the private sector. |
| --- | --- |

(31)

The Latvia has therefore requested the Commission to amend the Parex Final Decision in order to allow Citadele to retain the Wealth Management Business until after the entire bank passes to the private sector.

| (32) | Such a request was first made in August 2012 in discussions between Latvia and the Commission before the Amendment Decision was taken. During those discussions the Latvian authorities ultimately decided not to request an extended deadline for divesting the Wealth Management Business. |
| --- | --- |

(32)

Such a request was first made in August 2012 in discussions between Latvia and the Commission before the Amendment Decision was taken. During those discussions the Latvian authorities ultimately decided not to request an extended deadline for divesting the Wealth Management Business.

4.   ASSESSMENT

| (33) | Pursuant to Article 13(1) in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (26) the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if it finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of an unlawful aid measure (27). |
| --- | --- |

(33)

Pursuant to Article 13(1) in conjunction with Article 4(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of 22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the application of Article 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (26) the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if it finds that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market of an unlawful aid measure (27).

4.1.   Existence of unlawful aid

| (34) | Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market. |
| --- | --- |

(34)

Article 107(1) of the Treaty provides that, save as otherwise provided in the Treaty, any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain undertakings or the production of certain goods is in so far as it affects trade between Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.

| (35) | As described in recital 21, Parex banka and subsequently Citadele and Reverta have obtained measures from Latvia in addition to the aid measures examined in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(35)

As described in recital 21, Parex banka and subsequently Citadele and Reverta have obtained measures from Latvia in addition to the aid measures examined in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

| (36) | With regard to the subordinated debt, the fact that such a measure contains State aid was established in the first rescue Decision, when the Commission approved the issuance of subordinated debt with five years maturity as a compatible aid measure. The Commission decided at that time that a market economy investor would not have granted subordinated debt with a five-year maturity (28). |
| --- | --- |

(36)

With regard to the subordinated debt, the fact that such a measure contains State aid was established in the first rescue Decision, when the Commission approved the issuance of subordinated debt with five years maturity as a compatible aid measure. The Commission decided at that time that a market economy investor would not have granted subordinated debt with a five-year maturity (28).

| (37) | The measure which was in fact granted by Latvia in favour of Parex banka was identical with the measure approved by the Commission except for the fact that it had a longer maturity. As such, the measure which was in fact granted would also be State aid unless the longer maturity eliminated any advantage to Parex banka. However, subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity would give the borrower a greater advantage since the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended. When the subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity was granted, it would have been even less likely for a market economy investor to grant the subordinated debt under those extended terms than it would for it to have done so for five years. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represented an additional advantage for Parex banka compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(37)

The measure which was in fact granted by Latvia in favour of Parex banka was identical with the measure approved by the Commission except for the fact that it had a longer maturity. As such, the measure which was in fact granted would also be State aid unless the longer maturity eliminated any advantage to Parex banka. However, subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity would give the borrower a greater advantage since the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended. When the subordinated debt with a seven-year maturity was granted, it would have been even less likely for a market economy investor to grant the subordinated debt under those extended terms than it would for it to have done so for five years. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represented an additional advantage for Parex banka compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

| (38) | The maturity of the subordinated debt was later further extended by an additional 18 months. As the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended, a market economy investor would not have granted the subordinated debt under those extended terms in the absence of any countervailing payment fully offsetting the investor’s increased risk. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represents an additional advantage for Citadele compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(38)

The maturity of the subordinated debt was later further extended by an additional 18 months. As the risk perceived by an investor for any given investment increases as the maturity of the investment is extended, a market economy investor would not have granted the subordinated debt under those extended terms in the absence of any countervailing payment fully offsetting the investor’s increased risk. For that reason, the longer maturity of the subordinated debt represents an additional advantage for Citadele compared to the form of the subordinated debt that was approved in the Rescue Decisions and the Parex Final Decision.

| (39) | Latvia justifies granting subordinated loans with a longer maturity than approved by claiming that the Commission had been informed of a possible maturity extension through the restructuring plan and submissions of the Monitoring Trustee. |
| --- | --- |

(39)

Latvia justifies granting subordinated loans with a longer maturity than approved by claiming that the Commission had been informed of a possible maturity extension through the restructuring plan and submissions of the Monitoring Trustee.

| (40) | The Commission does not accept that argument. The possible need to extend the maturity of the subordinated loan was only incidentally mentioned, for information, by the Monitoring Trustee in previous monitoring reports (e.g. that of 30 June 2012) as an option under consideration by Latvian authorities. A mention of the possibility that additional aid may be granted by a Member State does not constitute or substitute for a formal notification of aid measures, within the meaning of Article 108(3) of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(40)

The Commission does not accept that argument. The possible need to extend the maturity of the subordinated loan was only incidentally mentioned, for information, by the Monitoring Trustee in previous monitoring reports (e.g. that of 30 June 2012) as an option under consideration by Latvian authorities. A mention of the possibility that additional aid may be granted by a Member State does not constitute or substitute for a formal notification of aid measures, within the meaning of Article 108(3) of the Treaty.

| (41) | Latvia also contends that the recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision explicitly provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt. |
| --- | --- |

(41)

Latvia also contends that the recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision explicitly provided that the subordinated loans were expected to mature in the period 2015-18, thus envisaging a prospective extension of the subordinated debt.

| (42) | The Commission does not share that interpretation. Recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision refers to the subordinated loans by legacy shareholders in Parex, and not to the subordinated loans granted by Latvia. |
| --- | --- |

(42)

The Commission does not share that interpretation. Recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision refers to the subordinated loans by legacy shareholders in Parex, and not to the subordinated loans granted by Latvia.

| (43) | With regard to the liquidity support granted to Reverta
  , it was initially approved as part of the compatible State aid measures approved in the first rescue Decision, in the form of State deposits. At that time, the Commission noted that Parex banka lacked liquid collateral and that Latvia had deposited the funds, taking into account the bank’s liquidity needs, when no market investor was willing to provide liquidity in view of the fragile situation of Parex banka (29).
  Following the Parex Final Decision (and the split in a good and a bad bank) the liquidity aid was subsequently transferred to Citadele and Reverta. The former has already repaid in full its share of the liquidity support, whereas the latter had to limit the amounts of liquidity support it received, as set out in recital 21(iii). However, the amount of liquidity support actually granted to Reverta exceeds even the worst case scenario level approved within the Parex Final Decision. That additional liquidity support provides a supplementary advantage for Reverta compared to the aid approved by the Rescue Decisions and Parex Final Decision. None of the other features of the liquidity support apart from its quantity have been altered and so the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes State aid. |
| --- | --- |

(43)

With regard to the liquidity support granted to Reverta
  , it was initially approved as part of the compatible State aid measures approved in the first rescue Decision, in the form of State deposits. At that time, the Commission noted that Parex banka lacked liquid collateral and that Latvia had deposited the funds, taking into account the bank’s liquidity needs, when no market investor was willing to provide liquidity in view of the fragile situation of Parex banka (29).

Following the Parex Final Decision (and the split in a good and a bad bank) the liquidity aid was subsequently transferred to Citadele and Reverta. The former has already repaid in full its share of the liquidity support, whereas the latter had to limit the amounts of liquidity support it received, as set out in recital 21(iii). However, the amount of liquidity support actually granted to Reverta exceeds even the worst case scenario level approved within the Parex Final Decision. That additional liquidity support provides a supplementary advantage for Reverta compared to the aid approved by the Rescue Decisions and Parex Final Decision. None of the other features of the liquidity support apart from its quantity have been altered and so the Commission concludes that the measure constitutes State aid.

| (44) | None of those three additional measures (the seven-year subordinated loan; the 18-month extension; and the additional liquidity support) had been notified to the Commission. Latvia has therefore not complied with the standstill obligation under Article 108 of the Treaty. |
| --- | --- |

(44)

None of those three additional measures (the seven-year subordinated loan; the 18-month extension; and the additional liquidity support) had been notified to the Commission. Latvia has therefore not complied with the standstill obligation under Article 108 of the Treaty.

| (45) | Based on the facts that:






  — | both the longer initial maturity and the extended maturity of the subordinated debt and the increased liquidity support clearly represent additional advantages compared to the approved aid measures, and therefore are additional aid (as all of the other criteria under Article 107(1) of the Treaty are still in place), and |
| --- | --- | --- |

(45)

Based on the facts that:

—

both the longer initial maturity and the extended maturity of the subordinated debt and the increased liquidity support clearly represent additional advantages compared to the approved aid measures, and therefore are additional aid (as all of the other criteria under Article 107(1) of the Treaty are still in place), and

| — | the absence of any notification to the Commission for those additional aid measures,
  the Commission therefore considers that the measures described in recital 21 represent unlawful aid. |
| --- | --- |

—

the absence of any notification to the Commission for those additional aid measures,

the Commission therefore considers that the measures described in recital 21 represent unlawful aid.

4.2.   Compatibility of the aid

4.2.1.   The subordinated loans with extended maturity

| (46) | In line with the 2008 Banking Communication (30) which was in force when the subordinated loan was initially granted and when it was subsequently extended, in order for aid to be compatible, it had to comply with several conditions:






  — | appropriateness (to be well targeted to its objective, e.g. to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy, and take the most appropriate form for that purpose to remedy the disturbance), |
| --- | --- | --- |

(46)

In line with the 2008 Banking Communication (30) which was in force when the subordinated loan was initially granted and when it was subsequently extended, in order for aid to be compatible, it had to comply with several conditions:

—

appropriateness (to be well targeted to its objective, e.g. to remedy a serious disturbance in the economy, and take the most appropriate form for that purpose to remedy the disturbance),

| — | necessity (to be necessary to achieve the objective, and remain at the minimum necessary to do that), |
| --- | --- |

—

necessity (to be necessary to achieve the objective, and remain at the minimum necessary to do that),

| — | proportionality (the positive effects of the aid must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measures’ objectives). |
| --- | --- |

—

proportionality (the positive effects of the aid must be properly balanced against the distortions of competition, in order for the distortions to be limited to the minimum necessary to reach the measures’ objectives).

| (47) | The objective of granting a subordinated loan qualifying as Tier 2 capital to Parex banka was to enable it to continue to satisfy the capital adequacy ratio and to ensure that it is sufficiently capitalised so as to better withstand potential losses, in order to avoid a serious disturbance in the Latvian economy. |
| --- | --- |

(47)

The objective of granting a subordinated loan qualifying as Tier 2 capital to Parex banka was to enable it to continue to satisfy the capital adequacy ratio and to ensure that it is sufficiently capitalised so as to better withstand potential losses, in order to avoid a serious disturbance in the Latvian economy.

| (48) | In the first rescue Decision, the Commission noted that the subordinated debt for Parex banka was limited to the minimum necessary in scope and time. Among other elements, the limitation to the minimum necessary was based on the commitment of the Latvian authorities to grant subordinated debt with a maximum maturity of five years. In that regard, the Commission noted in that decision that the minimum maturity for the subordinated debt to qualify as Tier 2 capital under Latvian legislation was five years. The aid measure was therefore qualified as compatible. |
| --- | --- |

(48)

In the first rescue Decision, the Commission noted that the subordinated debt for Parex banka was limited to the minimum necessary in scope and time. Among other elements, the limitation to the minimum necessary was based on the commitment of the Latvian authorities to grant subordinated debt with a maximum maturity of five years. In that regard, the Commission noted in that decision that the minimum maturity for the subordinated debt to qualify as Tier 2 capital under Latvian legislation was five years. The aid measure was therefore qualified as compatible.

| (49) | The second and third rescue Decisions, the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision did not alter the assessment of the first rescue Decision in that respect, concerning the limitation to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(49)

The second and third rescue Decisions, the Parex Final Decision and the Amendment Decision did not alter the assessment of the first rescue Decision in that respect, concerning the limitation to the minimum necessary.

| (50) | The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the extended maturity of the subordinated loans. |
| --- | --- |

(50)

The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the extended maturity of the subordinated loans.

| (51) | Therefore, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the subordinated debt issued with a maturity of seven years instead of five years as initially approved cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensured limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(51)

Therefore, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the subordinated debt issued with a maturity of seven years instead of five years as initially approved cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensured limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility.

| (52) | Equally, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the additional prolongation of the subordinated debt maturity by 18 months cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensures limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility. |
| --- | --- |

(52)

Equally, based on the information available to Commission at this time, the un-notified aid measure concerning the additional prolongation of the subordinated debt maturity by 18 months cannot be qualified as compatible, considering that: a) the existing assessment is that a five-year maturity of the subordinated debt was what ensures limitation to the minimum necessary and b) no new arguments have been presented for justification of compatibility.

| (53) | The Commission invites Latvia and any interested parties to present it with additional elements relevant to whether the seven-year duration of the subordinated loan and its subsequent extension by 18 months constitutes aid which was limited to the minimum necessary. |
| --- | --- |

(53)

The Commission invites Latvia and any interested parties to present it with additional elements relevant to whether the seven-year duration of the subordinated loan and its subsequent extension by 18 months constitutes aid which was limited to the minimum necessary.

4.2.2.   The liquidity support measure

| (54) | The assessment of the restructuring plan in the Parex Final Decision was based on assumptions presented at that time regarding the expected inflows of liquidity into Reverta which would allow it to start repaying the liquidity support granted in the form of State deposits, up to a certain level (31). |
| --- | --- |

(54)

The assessment of the restructuring plan in the Parex Final Decision was based on assumptions presented at that time regarding the expected inflows of liquidity into Reverta which would allow it to start repaying the liquidity support granted in the form of State deposits, up to a certain level (31).

| (55) | The amounts expected to remain unpaid, as described in the Parex Final Decision, ranged from LVL [...] million (the base case scenario) to LVL [...] million (the worst case scenario). As explained in recital 21, the actual amounts from which Reverta has benefited have constantly exceeded those laid out in the Parex Final Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(55)

The amounts expected to remain unpaid, as described in the Parex Final Decision, ranged from LVL [...] million (the base case scenario) to LVL [...] million (the worst case scenario). As explained in recital 21, the actual amounts from which Reverta has benefited have constantly exceeded those laid out in the Parex Final Decision.

| (56) | The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the additional liquidity support. |
| --- | --- |

(56)

The Commission notes that Latvia has not brought forward arguments to demonstrate the compatibility of the aid stemming from the additional liquidity support.

| (57) | In view of this, and considering also the fact that the revised restructuring plan presented by Latvia includes numerous other adjustments compared to the plan approved through the Parex Final Decision, the Commission is not in the position at this time to qualify the additional liquidity support as compatible with the internal market. A more in-depth assessment of the impact the revised levels of liquidity support will have to be carried out, taking into account the revised restructuring plan in its entirety. |
| --- | --- |

(57)

In view of this, and considering also the fact that the revised restructuring plan presented by Latvia includes numerous other adjustments compared to the plan approved through the Parex Final Decision, the Commission is not in the position at this time to qualify the additional liquidity support as compatible with the internal market. A more in-depth assessment of the impact the revised levels of liquidity support will have to be carried out, taking into account the revised restructuring plan in its entirety.

4.3.   The breach of the commitment to divest the Wealth Management Business

| (58) | Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if aid is misused, i.e. if the beneficiary used aid in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3) of that Regulation. |
| --- | --- |

(58)

Pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 the Commission may open a formal investigation procedure if aid is misused, i.e. if the beneficiary used aid in contravention of a decision taken pursuant to Article 7(3) of that Regulation.

| (59) | In the Parex Final Decision (32) Latvia committed that Citadele would divest the Wealth Management Business by certain deadlines. |
| --- | --- |

(59)

In the Parex Final Decision (32) Latvia committed that Citadele would divest the Wealth Management Business by certain deadlines.

| (60) | Latvia confirmed that the Wealth Management Business has not been divested within the agreed deadlines. This constitutes a breach of the terms of the Parex Final Decision and hence a misuse of the aid granted. The Commission invites Latvia and interested parties to comment on that conclusion and to present any elements which would allow the Commission to consider whether aid obtained by Citadele could be considered compatible with the internal market if the Wealth Management Business were not to be divested separately from Citadele. |
| --- | --- |

(60)

Latvia confirmed that the Wealth Management Business has not been divested within the agreed deadlines. This constitutes a breach of the terms of the Parex Final Decision and hence a misuse of the aid granted. The Commission invites Latvia and interested parties to comment on that conclusion and to present any elements which would allow the Commission to consider whether aid obtained by Citadele could be considered compatible with the internal market if the Wealth Management Business were not to be divested separately from Citadele.

5.   CONCLUSION

The Commission concludes, in regard to the unlawful aid described in recital 21, that doubts are raised as to the compatibility with the internal market based on the information available at this time. The Commission therefore has decided to open a formal investigation procedure pursuant to Articles 13(1) and 4(4) of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.

Moreover, the Commission concludes that the breach of commitment described in recital 23 constitutes misuse of aid. The Commission therefore has decided to open a formal investigation procedure also for misuse of aid pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999.

In the light of the foregoing considerations, the Commission, acting under the procedure laid down in Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, requests Latvia to submit its comments and to provide all such information as may help to assess the measures (in particular the compatibility of the un-notified aid), within ten working days of the date of receipt of this letter. It requests your authorities to forward a copy of this letter to the potential recipient of the aid immediately.

The Commission would draw your attention to Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, which provides that all unlawful aid may be recovered from the recipient.

The Commission warns Latvia that it will inform interested parties by publishing this letter and a meaningful summary of it in the Official Journal of the European Union. It will also inform interested parties in the EFTA countries which are signatories to the EEA Agreement, by publication of a notice in the EEA Supplement to the Official Journal of the European Union and will inform the EFTA Surveillance Authority by sending a copy of this letter. All such interested parties will be invited to submit their comments within ten working days of the date of such publication.’

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(1)  Kommissionens afgørelse C 26/09, EUT L 163 af 23.6.2011, s. 28.

1

(2)  Den usunde del af banken (»bad bank«) beholdt i begyndelsen efter opsplitningen, der fandt sted den 1. august 2010, navnet Parex banka, men har siden maj 2012 været registreret under firmanavnet »AS Reverta«.

2

(3)  Kommissionens afgørelse SA.34747, EUT C 273 af 21.9.2013, s. 1.

3

(4)  Commission Decision NN 68/2008, OJ C 147, 27.6.2009, p. 1.

4

(5)  Commission Decision NN 3/2009, OJ C 147, 27.6.2009, p. 2.

5

(6)  Commission Decision N 189/2009, OJ C 176, 29.7.2009, p. 3.

6

(7)  Commission Decision C 26/2009 (ex N 189/2009), OJ C 239, 6.10.2009, p. 11.

7

(8)  In particular, performing loans to borrowers located in the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Lithuanian subsidiary, branches in Sweden and Germany and the wealth management business, with the latter including the Swiss subsidiary.

8

(9)  The bad bank initially kept the name of Parex banka after the split that took place on 1 August 2010, but has been registered since May 2012 under the corporate name “AS Reverta”.

9

(10)  Commission Decision C 26/2009, OJ L 163, 23.6.2011, p. 28.

10

(11)  Commission Decision SA.34747, OJ C 273, 21.9.2013, p. 1.

11

(12)  Meaning loans to borrowers located in the Commonwealth of Independent States.

12

(13)  The Wealth Management Business consists of the private capital management sector of Citadele, asset management subsidiaries and AP Anlage & Privatbank AG, Switzerland.

13

(14)  Confidential information.

14

(15)  Recitals 55-57 of the Parex Final Decision.

15

(16)  Recitals 58-61 of the Parex Final Decision.

16

(17)  Recitals 62-68 of the Parex Final Decision.

17

(18)  Recitals 69-70 of the Parex Final Decision.

18

(19)  The Monitoring Trustee was appointed through a Mandate signed by Reverta, Citadele and the Latvian authorities on 28 February 2011. The Monitoring Trustee has submitted bi-annual monitoring reports covering the preceding semester, starting with the one ending 31 December 2010.

19

(20)  Following the split of Parex banka, Citadele was established on 1 August 2010. The Parex Final Decision approved the transfer to Citadele of all of the subordinated loans previously granted to Parex banka. No Tier 2 capital was provided to Parex banka by Latvia at the time of the split or could have been provided by Latvia after the split.

20

On 3 September 2009 the EBRD agreed to refinance part of the subordinated loan previously granted by Latvia to Parex banka. As of 31 December 2009 the subordinated loans granted by Latvia to Parex banka amounted to LVL 37 million, while the subordinated loan granted by the EBRD amounted to LVL 13 million.

At the time of the split Latvia took over LVL 8 million out of the LVL 13 million subordinated loan held by the EBRD. As of 1 August 2010, the total amount of subordinated loans held by Latvia was LVL 45 million (with different maturities), while that held by the EBRD was LVL 5 million.

(21)  The Latvian Privatisation Agency, owned by Latvia.

21

(22)  That information is contained in Table 6 of the Parex Final Decision.

22

(23)  See recital 73 of the Parex Final Decision.

23

(24)  In that respect, Latvia points to recital 148 of the Parex Final Decision.

24

(25)  Recital 49 of the Parex Final Decision.

25

(26)  OJ L 83, 27.3.1999, p. 1.

26

(27)  Under Article 1 of Regulation (EC) No 659/1999, unlawful aid means new aid put into effect in contravention of Article 108(3) of the Treaty — i.e. without notification to the Commission of aid measures before they are put into effect.

27

(28)  Recital 40 of the first rescue Decision.

28

(29)  Recital 41 of the first rescue Decision.

29

(30)  Communication on the application of State aid rules to measures taken in relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial crisis OJ C 270, 25.10.2008.

30

(31)  Recital 55 of the Parex Final Decision.

31

(32)  See recital 73 of the Parex Final Decision.

32

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