IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA

PABLO GONZALEZ, ET AL.,

Plaintiffs/Appellants,

v.

QUOC NGUYEN, ET AL.,

Defendants/Appellees.

No. CV-17-0117-PR

Filed April 12, 2018

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

The Honorable Brian S. Rees, Commissioner

No. CV2014-052846

AFFIRMED

Memorandum Decision of the Court of Appeals, Division One

1 CA-CV 16-0141

Filed March 21, 2017

VACATED

COUNSEL:

William G. Caravetta, III, Kevin K. Broerman, Justin M. Ackerman (argued),

Jones, Skelton & Hochuli, P.L.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for Quoc Nguyen, et 

al.

Susan M. Freeman, (argued), Justin J. Henderson, Lewis Roca Rothgerber 

Christie LLP, Phoenix; and Gregg Clarke Gibbons, Gregg Clarke Gibbons, 

P.C., Scottsdale, Attorneys for Pablo Gonzalez, et al.
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

2

JUSTICE BOLICK authored the opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF 

JUSTICE BALES, VICE CHIEF JUSTICE PELANDER, and JUSTICES

BRUTINEL, TIMMER, GOULD, and LOPEZ joined.

JUSTICE BOLICK, opinion of the Court:

¶1 We consider here whether a defendant must submit 

additional evidence outside the existing record to establish a “meritorious 

defense” in a motion to set aside a default judgment under Arizona Rule of 

Civil Procedure 60(c) (now 60(b)).1 We hold that a defendant may rely on 

the existing record and that a trial court has broad discretion to determine 

whether a matter should be decided on the merits.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On April 9, 2012, Quoc Nguyen was driving a van owned by 

his employer, Dysart Hotel, and rear-ended a truck driven by Pablo

Gonzalez. The police report indicated the crash occurred at ten miles per 

hour and “no injury” occurred. However, Gonzalez contended the accident 

was more severe, causing extensive injuries requiring surgery and physical 

rehabilitation and forcing him to retire from the Maricopa County Sheriff’s 

Office.

¶3 Dysart Hotel notified its insurance claims administrator, 

Precision Risk Management, about the accident. A claims adjuster (Bill 

Sim) instructed Gonzalez’s attorneys to direct communications to him. 

Gonzalez filed this negligence action against Nguyen and Dysart Hotel 

(collectively “Dysart”) seeking compensatory damages. Gonzalez later sent 

Sim a detailed demand letter seeking $716,242.50, including $600,000 for 

pain and suffering, and offering to settle for $695,000.

 1 The Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure changed in 2016, reorganizing Rule 

60(c) as Rule 60(b), without substantive change. As most of the cases and 

the court of appeals’ decision refer to the prior version, we will reference 

Rule 60(c), which was in effect when the motion here was filed. Compare 

Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c) (1987), with Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(b) (2016).
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

3

¶4 Despite repeated inquiries by Gonzalez’s lawyers, Dysart did 

not file a responsive pleading to the complaint. On February 20, 2015, 

Gonzalez applied for an entry of default, again served Dysart, and also sent 

copies to Sim and Companion Commercial Insurance (“Companion”), 

Dysart’s insurer. After a hearing on June 23, 2015, at which Gonzalez

presented evidence and Defendants failed to appear, the trial court entered 

a default judgment in the amount of $667,279.56.

¶5 On August 11, 2015, Defendants filed a Rule 60(c) motion to 

vacate the judgment’s damage award, and Companion moved to intervene. 

At oral argument on the motions, Dysart’s attorney told the court Dysart 

would admit liability and only contest damages if the motion was granted. 

The trial court denied Companion’s intervention motion because no 

coverage issues existed, but it granted the motion to vacate the default 

judgment. The court observed that although it seemed unfair for the 

insurance company “to have handled the claim in such a casual or 

indifferent manner . . . and then plead the injustice after the fact,” it 

acknowledged it had “doubts about the fairness of the amount of the 

judgment,” which seemed “too large.” The proper course “in such a ‘tie,’” 

the court concluded, “is to allow the case to be decided on the merits.”

¶6 The court of appeals reversed and reinstated the default 

damages judgment. Gonzalez v. Nguyen, 1 CA-CV 16-0141, 2017 WL 1057307 

(Ariz. App. Mar. 21, 2017) (mem. decision). The court noted that the only 

support for the motion to vacate was an affidavit from Companion’s claims 

manager attesting to an oversight or error in responding to the application 

for entry of default but offering no substantive defense. Id. at *3 ¶ 18. Citing 

Rule 60(c)(6), Dysart argued that it wanted to examine whether the amount 

of damages was reasonable. Id. ¶ 19. The court of appeals concluded, as 

had the trial court, that Defendants had shown no excusable neglect, id. at 

*5 ¶ 23; see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), but overturned the trial court’s decision 

vacating the judgment because Dysart had not presented a “meritorious 

defense” to support the motion. Gonzalez, 1 CA-CV 16-0141, at *4 ¶ 22.

¶7 We granted review to consider the important and recurrent 

issue of the standards for relief from a default judgment under Rule 60(c)(6). 
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

4

We have jurisdiction under article 6, section 5(3) of the Arizona 

Constitution and A.R.S. § 12-120.24.

DISCUSSION

¶8 We review a trial court’s decision to grant a Rule 60(c) motion

for abuse of discretion. Moreno v. Jones, 213 Ariz. 94, 97 ¶ 15 (2006). We 

review interpretation of our rules de novo. Spring v. Bradford, 243 Ariz. 167, 

170 ¶ 11 (2017).

¶9 Rule 60(c) (now slightly modified as Rule 60(b)) states:

Mistake; inadvertence; surprise; excusable neglect; newly 

discovered evidence; fraud, etc.

On motion and upon such terms as are just the court may 

relieve a party or a party’s legal representative from a final 

judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: 

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; 

(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could 

not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial 

under Rule 59(d); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated 

intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct 

of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment 

has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment 

on which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, 

or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have 

prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying 

relief from the operation of the judgment.

We construe our rules according to their words in the context in which they 

are used and look to secondary construction tools only if the language is 

subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. See Rasor v. Nw. Hosp.,

LLC, 243 Ariz. 160, 164 ¶ 20 (2017).

¶10 Dysart does not argue here that any of the first five Rule 60(c) 

grounds, including excusable neglect, applies. Rather, it relies solely on 
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

5

Rule 60(c)(6), allowing relief from a default judgment for “any other reason 

justifying relief.”

¶11 Our Rule 60(c)(6) jurisprudence is not a model of clarity or 

consistency. We have noted that application of Rule 60(c) should serve two 

different objectives. First, the “law favors resolution on the merits, and 

therefore if the trial court has doubt about whether to vacate a default 

judgment, it should rule in favor of the moving party.” Daou v. Harris, 139 

Ariz. 353, 359 (1984). “There is also, however, a principle of finality in 

proceedings which is to be recognized and given effect.” Id. Those 

objectives can be in considerable tension. The rule does not take a position 

between them, instead creating a very broadly worded ground for relief, 

which we construe as investing extensive discretion in trial courts. See id.

(noting that “trial courts are given broad discretion” under Rule 60(c)); 

accord Webb v. Erickson, 134 Ariz. 182, 186 (1982) (noting Rule 60(c)(6)’s 

“broad equitable power”).

¶12 In addition to requiring adherence to Rule 60(c)’s timeliness 

requirements and that an “other” ground for relief from a default judgment 

cannot be one of the reasons set forth in Rule 60(c)(1)–(5), we have 

consistently bounded a trial court’s discretion under Rule 60(c)(6) by 

requiring a defendant to assert a meritorious defense. See, e.g., Union Oil 

Co. of Cal. v. Hudson Oil Co., 131 Ariz. 285, 289 (1982) (requiring the movant 

to show “facts which, if proven at trial, would constitute a meritorious 

defense”); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 55(c) (“The court may set aside an entry 

of default for good cause . . . .”). This burden is “minimal,” United States v. 

Aguilar, 782 F.3d 1101, 1108 (9th Cir. 2015), requiring only “some legal 

justification for the exercise of the power, some substantial evidence to 

support it,” Richas v. Superior Court, 133 Ariz. 512, 514 (1982) (quoting Lynch 

v. Ariz. Enter. Mining Co., 20 Ariz. 250, 252 (1919)). To the extent that some 

of our decisions suggest a higher standard, we disavow such statements. 

See, e.g., Panzino v. City of Phoenix, 196 Ariz. 442, 445 ¶ 6 (2000) (Rule 60(c)(6) 

“applies only when our systemic commitment to finality of judgments is 

outweighed by extraordinary circumstances of hardship or injustice.”

(quoting Bickerstaff v. Denny’s Rest., Inc., 141 Ariz. 629, 632 (1984) (internal 

quotation marks omitted))).
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

6

¶13 Some Arizona decisions have indicated that the meritorious 

defense supporting the motion to vacate must be established by evidence 

extraneous to the existing record. See, e.g., United Imp. & Exp., Inc. v. Superior 

Court, 134 Ariz. 43, 46 (1982) (“A showing of a meritorious defense requires 

a showing by affidavit, deposition or testimony of some facts which, if 

proved at trial, would constitute a defense.”); Hawke v. Bell, 136 Ariz. 18, 19 

(App. 1983) (holding that a trial court may not “set aside a default judgment 

because of the amount of damages awarded absent new evidence that the 

amount of the award was not justified” (emphasis added)). We do not find 

any such requirement in the language or purpose of the rule. Such a 

requirement elevates form over the relevant substance, which is to 

determine if there is a justifiable basis to set aside the default judgment. 

Rather, if the motion relies on evidence of a meritorious defense that 

appears in the record, the rule plainly vests authority in the trial court to 

grant relief, and we disavow language in prior decisions that suggests 

evidence outside the extant record is necessary.

¶14 Citing United Imports, the court of appeals focused on the 

adequacy of the affidavit by Companion’s claims manager in support of the 

motion, concluding it was legally insufficient because it “said nothing about 

potential defenses.” Gonzalez, 1 CA-CV 16-0141, at *3 ¶¶ 17–18. However, 

the record provided a basis for Dysart’s assertion—and the trial court’s 

conclusion—that the amount of damages might be excessive when tested at 

trial. The police reports (which were also appended to Dysart’s motion) 

stated that the collision occurred at ten miles per hour and that either no

injury or possible injury occurred; nothing suggested serious injuries. 

Dysart also presented an affidavit from Gonzalez’s counsel attesting that 

Gonzalez incurred $68,683.58 in medical bills and $42,558.92 in lost wages, 

far less than the default judgment amount. When it entered the default 

judgment, the trial court expressed concerns about the amount of damages, 

and the motion to vacate the judgment provided an opportunity for the 

court to revisit the issue by ordering resolution of the judgment amount on 

the merits. Although a possibly excessive judgment does not automatically 

entitle a defendant to vacate a default judgment, the trial court here acted 

within its discretion.
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

7

¶15 The court of appeals further found that the absence of

excusable neglect by Dysart “also cuts against granting relief to 

Defendants.” Id. at *5 ¶ 23. Although some cases suggest that a defendant’s 

failure to satisfy the excusable neglect standard of Rule 60(c)(1) can be used

to defeat relief under Rule 60(c)(6), see, e.g., Panzino, 196 Ariz. at 448 ¶ 19 

(“We cannot consistently hold that although Rule 60(c)(1) allows relief for 

judgment only for excusable neglect, Rule 60(c)(6) allows relief from 

inexcusable neglect . . . .”), the grounds for relief in each of the subsections 

are separate and distinct. “Clause 6 and the first five clauses are mutually 

exclusive.” Webb, 134 Ariz. at 186. Rule 60(c)(6), on its face, contemplates 

circumstances that do not fit into the other Rule 60(c) subsections. See id.

¶16 Although “the showing of a meritorious defense need not be 

strong, . . . it must be greater than mere speculation.” Richas, 133 Ariz. at 

517. But where, as here, the record suggests that the judgment amount is 

excessive, a trial court appropriately may provide Rule 60(c)(6) relief. Daou, 

139 Ariz. at 361. For example, in Roll v. Janca, the court of appeals ruled that 

where the defendant moved for Rule 60(c)(6) relief expeditiously after a 

default judgment, and “where a large judgment of $25,000 has been entered 

on default on a trip and fall case where the injury sustained was allegedly 

merely a twisted knee and torn ligaments, serious consideration must be 

given to the presumption of resolution of cases on their merits.” 22 Ariz. 

App. 335, 338 (1974); accord Daou, 139 Ariz. at 361 (“[I]t is not the size of the 

damage award alone that is conclusive, but whether it is excessive for the 

injuries sustained.”); Beal v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 151 Ariz. 514, 521 

(App. 1986) (concluding that a party raised a “substantial defense” by 

showing “debatable issues” as to the “nature and extent of the injuries and 

damages” and a “discrepancy” between the amount of special damages and 

the default judgment that “calls into question the validity of the damages 

award”).

¶17 The court of appeals observed that the trial court “did not 

mention the meritorious defense requirement” in granting the motion to 

vacate. Gonzalez, 1 CA-CV 16-0141, at *3 ¶ 17. Although the trial court did 

not use that term, its order clearly rested on its view that the damage 
GONZALEZ, et al., V. NGUYEN, et al.

Opinion of the Court

8

amount was potentially unwarranted, which under Daou and Roll

constitutes a meritorious defense. As we held in Daou, “if the trial court has 

doubt about whether to vacate a default judgment, it should rule in favor 

of the moving party.” 139 Ariz. at 359.

CONCLUSION

¶18 We vacate the court of appeals’ decision, affirm the trial 

court’s order, and deny Gonzalez’s motion for attorney fees.