and awarded fees for work performed by her attorney. However, it 

declined to award fees for work performed by Salvo's attorney's paralegal. 

The district court also awarded costs to Salvo, including $4,875 for one 

expert's fee. 

After this appeal was filed and briefed, Monahan died and was 

replaced by his estate as a party to this lawsuit. Monahan's estate now 

appeals the orders regarding attorney fees and costs. Salvo cross-appeals 

the district court's order denying her motion for attorney fees for her 

attorney's paralegal's work. 

The issues on appeal and cross-appeal are: (1) whether the 

district court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees to Salvo for 

work performed by her attorney, (2) whether the district court abused its 

discretion by refusing to award attorney fees to Salvo for work performed 

by her attorney's paralegal, and (3) whether the district court abused its 

discretion by awarding costs to Salvo. 1 

The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney fees for 

work performed by Salvo's attorney but abused its discretion by refusing to 

award attorney fees for work performed by Salvo's attorney's paralegal 

Monahan's estate argues that the district court abused its 

discretion by awarding attorney fees to Salvo because Salvo did not 

improve upon Monahan's offer of judgment. Alternatively, it contends 

that the district court could not have awarded attorney fees to Salvo 

because NRS 17.115 and NRCP 68 do not allow an offer of judgment in 

1Monahan's estate waived the issue of whether the district court 

abused its discretion when it denied Monahan's motion for attorney fees 

by not briefing that issue on appeal. Powell v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 

127 Nev. , n.3, 252 P.3d 668, 672 n.3 (2011) ("Issues not raised in 

an appellant's opening brief are deemed waived."). 

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cases involving demands for equitable relief. Monahan's estate also 

argues that the district court erroneously found that NRS 116.4117 

authorized the award of attorney fees to Salvo. 

The decision "to award attorney's fees is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court" and one which we review for an abuse of 

discretion. Bergmann v. Boyce, 109 Nev, 670, 674, 856 P.2d 560, 563 

(1993). When a district court "exercises its discretion in clear disregard of 

the guiding legal principles, this action may constitute an abuse of 

discretion." Id. Furthermore, "a court may not award attorney's fees 

unless authorized by statute, rule or contract." State, Dep't of Human Res. 

v. Fowler, 109 Nev. 782, 784, 858 P.2d 375, 376 (1993). 

Salvo was a prevailing party who improved upon Monahan's offer of 

judgment 

A party prevails "if it succeeds on any significant issue in 

litigation which achieves some of the benefit it sought in bringing the 

suit." Hornwood v. Smith's Food King No. 1, 105 Nev. 188, 192, 772 P.2d 

1284, 1287 (1989) (internal quotations omitted); see also Valley Elec. Ass'n 

v. Overfield, 121 Nev. 7, 10, 106 P.3d 1198, 1200 (2005) (stating the same 

when considering prevailing party status in the context of an award of 

attorney fees under NRS 18.010). Here, Salvo obtained most of the 

remedies she sought and received favorable verdicts on the causes of 

action that were decided by the jury. Therefore, she was the prevailing 

party. 

NRS 17.115(1) and NRCP 68(a) each authorize a party in 

litigation to make an offer of judgment to its adversary. If the offeree 

rejects the offer and does not improve upon it, the offeree may not recover 

costs or attorney fees and may be liable for the offeror's attorney fees and 

costs for "the period from the date of service of the offer to the date of 

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entry of the judgment." NRS 17.115(4); see also NRCP 68(f). However, if 

the offeree improves upon the offer of judgment, then NRS 17.115 and 

NRCP 68 do not limit its ability to recover attorney fees or costs. See NRS 

17.115(4)(a)-(b); see also NRCP 88(f). Neither NRS 17.115 nor NRCP 68 

prevents a party from making a monetary offer of judgment when a party 

is seeking both legal and equitable relief. Since Monahan made a 

monetary offer to resolve claims seeking both legal and equitable relief, he 

made a valid offer of judgment. 

Equitable relief can be both hard to appropriately appraise 

and highly valuable. See, e.g., Domanski v. Funtime, Inc., 149 F.R.D. 556, 

558 (N.D. Ohio 1993) (holding in a copyright infringement case that 

"permanent injunctive relief [prohibiting the defendant's unauthorized use 

of copyrighted material], though admittedly difficult to quantify, adds 

considerable value to the judgment finally obtained by [the plaintiff] when 

compared to the judgment offered" (internal quotations omitted)). 

Therefore, it may not be readily apparent if a judgment that includes 

equitable relief is more or less valuable than the monetary offer of 

judgment. 

When a monetary offer is made in a case involving equitable 

relief, the offeror "bears the burden of showing that [an offer of judgment] 

was more favorable than the judgment." Reiter v. MTA N.Y.C. Transit 

Auth., 457 F.3d 224, 231 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying FRCP 68, a rule similar 

to NRCP 68) 2 ; see also Greene v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 115 Nev. 391, 

2Though they are mostly similar, FRCP 68 and NRCP 68 differ in 

one key aspect: FRCP 68 only allows an offeror to recover post-offer costs, 

while NRCP 68 allows an offeror to recover post-offer costs and attorney 

fees. 

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393, 990 P.2d 184, 185 (1999) (holding that federal caselaw interpreting 

federal rules that are analogous to Nevada rules is persuasive authority); 

Danow v. Law Office of David E. Borack, P.A., 367 F. App'x 22, 24 (11th 

Cir. 2010) (holding that because an offeror "failed to show how [an 

offeree's] ultimate recovery. .. . was not more favorable than the [o]ffer of 

bludgment," the offeree was eligible to recover attorney fees (internal 

quotations omitted)). Thus, Monahan had the burden of showing that 

Salvo did not improve upon his offer of judgment. 

In his briefing before the district court, Monahan provided no 

analysis to demonstrate that Salvo failed to improve upon the offer of 

judgment. The district court then found that Salvo improved upon 

Monahan's offer of judgment because the actual judgment included 

significant equitable relief not included in the offer that protected Salvo 

from "recurring problems caused by [Monahan's] trees." Thus, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Salvo improved upon the 

offer of judgment. Accordingly, the penalties for rejecting an offer of 

judgment are inapplicable. 

NRS 116.4117 authorizes the award of attorney fees to Salvo 

NRS 116.4117(2) authorizes an individual or entity that is 

part of a common-interest community to bring "a civil action for damages 

or other appropriate relief for a failure or refusal to comply with any 

provision of [NRS Chapter 116] or the governing documents of [the 

community]," including the community's CC&Rs, against another 

individual or entity affiliated with the community. NRS 116.4117(6) 

provides that in a CC&R-based action, "[Ole [district] court may award 

reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party." Since the verb "may" 

in this statute is permissive, see State of Nev. Emps. Ass'n, Inc. v. Daines, 

108 Nev. 15, 19, 824 P.2d 276, 278 (1992) (providing that the use of the 

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verb "may" in a statute is generally permissive), NRS 116.4117(6) 

authorizes the district court to award attorney fees to a party who prevails 

in a CC&R-based lawsuit. 

Because Salvo was the prevailing party, she could recover 

attorney fees if her lawsuit sought "damages or other appropriate relief for 

a failure or refusal to comply with" the common-interest community's 

CC&Rs. NRS 116.4117(2); see also NRS 116.4117(6). In relevant part, the 

community's CC&Rs provide that "[n]o Owner shall permit or suffer 

anything to be done or kept in any Lot or any portion of the Common Area 

which will obstruct or interfere with the rights of other occupants, or 

annoy them by unreasonable noise or otherwise." Thus, Salvo's 

allegations of nuisance and trespass constituted CC&R-based claims 

brought pursuant to NRS 116.4117(2). Since Salvo prevailed upon these 

claims, NRS 116.4117(6) authorized Salvo's recovery of attorney fees. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney 

fees to Salvo for the work performed by her attorney 

In its order awarding attorney fees, the district court stated 

that it "considered the record in its entirety, and [found that Salvo] 

demonstrated that she brought an action pursuant to NRS 116.4117 

alleging a violation of the common-interest community's 'governing 

documents,' pursuant to which she [was] entitled to attorney's fees." The 

district court reviewed the attorney fee factors set out in Brunzell v. 

Golden Gate National Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969), and 

stated that it considered the documentation of attorney fees that Salvo 

submitted. It then awarded what it found to be reasonable attorney fees. 3 

3Monahan's estate's challenge to the district court's use of the term 

"entitled" in its order awarding attorney fees is without merit. The use of 

continued on next page... 

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Since the district court identified the legally appropriate factors that it 

considered in awarding attorney fees and relied upon the documentation 

in the record, it did not abuse its discretion and we affirm this portion of 

the district court's order. 

The district court abused its discretion by refusing to award attorney 

fees to Salvo for the work performed by her attorney's paralegal 

Recoverable attorney fees can "include [ ] charges for [work 

performed by] persons such as paralegals and law clerks" so long as that 

work was "billed at a lower rate" than the rate charged for the attorney's 

work. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Yeghiazarian, 129 Nev. , 

312 P.3d 503, 510 (2013). This type of work may be recoverable when it 

helps reduce litigation costs by having a non-attorney perform work that 

the attorney would otherwise perform and do so at a lower cost. Id. Thus, 

attorney fees may be awarded for a paralegal's work. 

In its order, the district court did not analyze whether the 

work performed by Salvo's attorney's paralegal was actually unrecoverable 

work when it refused to award attorney fees for this work. Because the 

district court did not apply Yeghiazarian when determining if the 

paralegal's work in this case was recoverable, it abused its discretion with 

regard to Salvo's motion for attorney fees related to this work. Therefore, 

we reverse the district court's denial of Salvo's motion for attorney fees 

and remand this issue for further consideration by the district court. 

...continued 

this term does not show that the district court believed an award of 

attorney fees was mandatory. Instead, it denotes that the district court 

found that Salvo was eligible to recover attorney fees. 

7 
The district court abused its discretion by awarding costs for Salvo's expert 

witness 

Monahan's estate argues that the district court improperly 

awarded costs to Salvo because NRS 18.020 does not authorize an award 

of costs in cases involving equitable claims. Monahan's estate also 

contends that the district court's award of costs for Salvo's expert was 

excessive. It does not challenge the reasonableness of any other costs 

awarded to Salvo. 

Though we review a district court's award of costs for an abuse 

of discretion, Village Builders .96, L.P. v. U.S. Laboratories, Inc., 121 Nev. 

261, 276, 112 P.3d 1082, 1092 (2005), we review its interpretation of a 

statute de novo. Washoe Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court, 122 

Nev. 1298, 1302, 148 P.3d 790, 792 (2006). 

NRS 18.020 authorized the district court to award costs in this case 

NRS 18.020(3) authorizes a district court to award costs to a 

party who prevails in a civil action "where the plaintiff seeks to recover 

more than $2,500." NRS 18.020 does not identify damages as the sole 

relief that must be sought in order for NRS 18.020(3) to apply. Nor does 

this statute preclude the award of costs when a party seeks both legal and 

equitable relief. Thus, NRS 18.020(3) authorizes the award of costs to a 

prevailing party where the plaintiff sought at least $2,500 without regard 

to whether the plaintiff also sought equitable relief. 

Since Salvo sought over $10,000 in compensatory damages, 

NRS 18.020(3) allowed her to recover costs. Therefore, the district court 

did not err in finding that Salvo was eligible to recover costs. 

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The district court abused its discretion by awarding Salvo's expert's 

costs 

NRS 18.005(5) allows an award of costs to include 

"[r]easonable fees . . . in an amount of not more than $1,500 for each 

[expert] witness, unless the court allows a larger fee after determining 

that the circumstances surrounding the expert's testimony were of such 

necessity as to require the larger fee." Therefore, this statute authorized 

the district court to include expert witness fees in excess of $1,500 per 

expert when awarding costs. 4 

To be recoverable, costs "must be actual and reasonable." 

Bobby Berosini, Ltd. v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 114 

Nev. 1348, 1352, 971 P.2d 383, 385 (1998). A party must provide 

documentation to demonstrate that a cost was actually incurred. 1/ill. 

Builders 96, 121 Nev. at 277-78, 112 P.3d at 1093; see also Gibellini v. 

Klindt, 110 Nev.. 1201, 1206, 885 P.2d 540, 543 (1994) (reversing part of an 

order awarding costs because the party failed to document its actual 

costs). Detailed documentation, such as itemization, may be necessary to 

demonstrate the reasonableness of costs. See Bobby Berosini, Ltd., 114 

Nev. at 1353, 971 P.2d at 386. 

Though the district court concluded that Salvo "ha [d] 

demonstrated [that] she reasonably and necessarily incurred expert 

4Monahan's argument that a district court should be required to 

preapprove expert witness fees that are in excess of $1,500 is without 

merit because it would require us to deviate from NRS 18.005's plain 

meaning by reading additional language into this statute. See Williams v. 

United Parcel Servs., 129 Nev. „ 302 P.3d 1144, 1147 (2013) 

(refusing to deviate from the plain meaning of a statute and rejecting 

arguments that would require reading additional language into a statute). 

9 
witness fees in the amount of $4,875," its order did not state that it 

considered any documentation of the expert's fees. While Salvo's 

memorandum of costs presented the amount of her expert's fees and 

stated that the expert's invoices were attached to it, the invoices were not 

included in the appellate record. Nor does the appellate record 

demonstrate that the invoices were actually provided to the district court. 

Even if the expert witness's invoices were submitted to the 

district court, neither the district court's order nor the record on appeal 

show that they contained sufficient detail to demonstrate the 

reasonableness or necessity of the expert's fees. Therefore, the district 

court abused its discretion by not demonstrating that it considered 

adequate documentation of Salvo's expert witness fees when awarding this 

cost. Thus, we reverse and remand this award of costs for further 

consideration and a determination of whether it is supported by adequate 

documentation. 

Conclusion 

Salvo prevailed in a lawsuit based on a community 

association's CC&Rs. Monahan's estate did not demonstrate that Salvo 

failed to improve upon Monahan's offer of judgment. Therefore, Salvo was 

entitled to recover attorney fees pursuant to NRS 116.4117(6). Though 

the district court did not abuse its discretion when awarding attorney fees 

for Salvo's attorney's work, it abused its discretion by not determining if 

the attorney fees relating to the paralegal's work were recoverable before 

denying them. While NRS 18.020(3) authorized the district court to award 

costs in this case because Salvo sought more than $2,500, the district court 

abused its discretion by awarding costs for Salvo's expert since the record 

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does not demonstrate that they were adequately documented. 5Therefore 

we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN 

PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the 

district court for consideration of Salvo's motion for attorney fees for her 

attorney's paralegal's work and a determination of whether adequate 

documentation supports an award of costs for Salvo's expert's fees. 

Pickering 

fTh 

aAlree--cpParraguirre 

Saitta 

cc: Hon. Janet J. Berry, District Judge 

David Wasick, Settlement Judge 

Upson Smith/Reno 

Carole Pope 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

5We have considered the parties' remaining arguments and conclude 

that they are without merit. 

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