J-A28036-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

ADIL EL-GHARBAOUI

v.

ADEBOWALE AND JIBOLA AJAYI, 

H/W 

Appellants

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 279 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 4, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at 

No(s): 130902458

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MARCH 29, 2018

Appellants, Adebowale and Jibola Ajayi, appeal the December 4, 2015 

Judgment entered in favor of Appellee, Adil El-Gharbaoui (“Contractor”), and 

against Appellants in the amount of $41,500.1 Upon careful review, we

affirm in part and vacate in part. 

The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. On August 

30, 2010, Contractor entered into a contract (“Original Contract”) with 

Appellants to renovate the building they owned at 5531 and 5533 Baltimore 

Avenue, Philadelphia, PA, 19143 (“the Property”), in exchange for $160,000. 

Contractor began work at the beginning of September 2010, after Appellants 

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1 On December 4, 2015, the trial court simultaneously entered an Order 

denying Appellant’s Post-Trial Motion. 
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paid a $25,000 deposit. Contractor completed demolition in September 

2010, at a cost of $28,000. After demolition, the building on the Property 

was an empty shell supported entirely by the partition and exterior walls. 

From September 2010 to January 2011, Contractor ceased work on 

the Property while waiting for a plan from the engineer. On January 29, 

2011, the parties agreed to a supplemental contract (“Supplemental 

Contract”), which included additional masonry work in exchange for an 

additional $18,000. The Supplemental Contract included a payment 

schedule with amounts owed when Contractor met certain construction 

milestones. Between January 29, 2011 and February 14, 2011, Contractor 

sent Appellants multiple emails documenting completion of milestones.

Appellants failed to provide payment to Contractor. 

The Property deteriorated over the winter as lack of funding and 

Contractor’s safety concerns delayed construction. Contractor arranged for 

a structural engineer to visit the Property to address his safety concerns. 

On April 1, 2011, Contractor sent an invoice for $22,000 to Appellants

for completed masonry work. Appellants did not make any payments. The 

building degraded and became extremely hazardous, prompting Contractor 

to contact the Department of Licenses and Inspection (“L&I”) to voice his 

safety concerns. On April 11, 2011, L&I condemned the property. 

On the same day, Contractor sent an email to L&I requesting that they 

remove his name from the Property’s building permit. In the email, 

Contractor stated that he had not worked on the Property in three weeks. 
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Contractor maintained keys to the Property until April 13, 2011, when 

Contractor terminated the Original Contract and Supplemental Contract via 

email.

On September 20, 2011, Contractor filed a Mechanics’ Lien Claim 

against the Property for unpaid work totaling $22,000. On September 22, 

2013, Contractor filed a Complaint to Enforce Mechanics’ Lien Claim. On 

July 1, 2015, after a three-day bench trial, the trial court awarded 

Contractor $41,500, including $22,000 for unpaid work, $11,000 in interest 

and $8,500 in attorney’s fees and costs. The Judgment was entered on 

December 5, 2015. 

Appellants filed a timely Post-Trial Motion to vacate judgment, which 

the trial court denied. Appellants timely appealed. Both Appellants and the 

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Appellants raise the following issues on appeal:

1. [Are] Appellant[s] entitled to a new trial where the [t]rial 

[c]ourt conceded that it erred as a matter of law in applying 

the wrong statute to determine the claims before the court?

2. [Are] Appellant[s] entitled to vacatur of the judgment where 

the [t]rial [c]ourt held that Contractor’s actions in opening the 

building for a building inspector, retrieving tools and 

materials, and “probably patch[ing] a little minute something 

just to keep face” extended the date of completion of 

Contractor’s work under the Mechanics’ Lien Law?

3. [Are] Appellant[s] entitled to a new trial where the judge in a 

bench trial admittedly considered the religious beliefs, race, 

color, and national origin of the only two defense witnesses 

proper evidence of “bias and prejudice,” in violation of 

Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 610?
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4. [Are] Appellant[s] entitled to vacatur of the judgment where 

the [t]rial [c]ourt held that Contractor perfected his 

mechanics’ lien, but where Contractor admitted that he did 

not achieve “completion of the work” required by the 

contracts?

Appellants’ Brief at 2 (reordered for ease of disposition).2 

When we review cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts, we consider 

the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. Wyatt Inc. v.

Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, 976 A.2d 557, 564 (Pa. Super. 2009). 

We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are not supported by 

competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error 

of law. Id. However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope 

of review is plenary. Id. “The trial court's conclusions of law on appeal 

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2 Appellants did not raise their third and fourth issues in their Rule 1925(b) 

Statement. Appellants assert, however, that they raised both issues in 

Paragraph 1 of their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, which states: “Whether 

the Court of Common Pleas erred in denying [Appellants’] Post-Trial Motion 

for the reasons expressed therein?” See Appellants’ Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) 

Statement, ¶ 1; Appellants’ Reply Brief at 1 n.1, 10 n.3. This Court has 

held, “a Concise Statement which is too vague to allow the court to identify 

the issues raised on appeal is the functional equivalent of no Concise 

Statement at all.” Commonwealth v. Dowling, 778 A.2d 683, 686–87 

(Pa. Super. 2001). Instantly, the trial court was unable to identify and 

address either issue in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion. Accordingly, we 

conclude that Appellants’ general reference to their four-page Post-Trial 

Motion in Paragraph 1 of their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement is too vague to 

identify the issues raised on appeal and effectuate meaningful appellate 

review. Thus, Appellant’s third and fourth issues are waived. See 

Commonwealth v. Castillo, 888 A.2d 775, 780 (“Any issues not raised in a 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed waived”); Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(vii). 
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originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court 

because it is the appellate court's duty to determine if the trial court 

correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citation omitted). 

In their first issue, Appellants aver that the trial court erred when it 

applied the Contractor and Subcontractor Payment Act (“CASPA”) rather 

than the Mechanics’ Lien Law of 1963 (“Mechanics’ Lien Law”) to determine 

the claims before the court. Appellants’ Brief at 14. See 73 P.S. §§ 501-

516; 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902. In support, Appellants provide two distinct 

arguments.

First, they argue generally that the trial court applied the wrong 

statute, CASPA, throughout the entire case. See Appellants’ Brief at 14. 

Appellants failed to raise this issue in their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement 

and, therefore, failed to preserve this argument for our review. See 

Castillo, supra at 780; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). 

In their second argument of this issue, Appellants aver that the trial 

court applied the wrong statute when it awarded interest and attorney’s 

fees. Id. at 15. Appellants argue that the trial court erroneously applied 

CASPA when it should have applied the Mechanics’ Lien Law, which does not 
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permit the award of interest and attorney’s fees. Id. We agree, as does the 

trial court.3

Instantly, Contractor filed a Complaint to Enforce Mechanics’ Lien 

Claim pursuant to the Mechanics’ Lien Law, which limits the lien to amounts 

owed for labor and materials only. See Artsmith Dev. Grp., Inc. v. 

Updegraff, 868 A.2d 495, 496 (Pa. Super. 2005). The Mechanics’ Lien Law 

provides, in relevant part:

Except as provided under subsection (b), every improvement 

and the estate or title of the owner in the property shall be 

subject to a lien, to be perfected as herein provided, for the 

payment of all debts due by the owner to the contractor or by 

the contractor to any of his subcontractors for labor or materials 

furnished in the erection or construction, or the alteration or 

repair of the improvement, provided that the amount of the 

claim, other than amounts determined by apportionment under 

section 306(b) of this act, shall exceed five hundred dollars 

($500).

49 P.S. § 1301 (a) (emphasis added). It is well settled that a mechanics' 

lien action is distinct from a breach of contract action seeking remedies 

pursuant to CASPA, which adds penalties, interest, and attorney's fees. 

Wyatt Inc., supra at 570. Consequently, a contractor cannot include 

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3

In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the court acknowledged its error in 

awarding interest and attorney’s fees and requested that this Court remand

the matter for the trial court to enter appropriate judgment. See Trial Court 

Opinion, filed 12/22/16, at 1, 6. 
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attorney's fees, penalties, and interest pursuant to CASPA in a mechanics' 

lien action and a trial court cannot award them. See id.

Here, Contractor did not file an action under CASPA. Rather, he 

sought relief only under the Mechanics’ Lien Law. Accordingly, we find that 

the trial court erred when it awarded interest and attorney’s fees pursuant to 

CASPA in this mechanics’ lien action. As a result, we vacate the portion of 

the judgment that awarded $11,000 in interest and $8,500 in attorney’s fees 

and costs.

In their second issue, Appellants claim that the Mechanics’ Lien Claim 

filed on September 20, 2011, was untimely, and therefore, this Court should 

vacate judgment. Appellants’ Brief at 23. Appellants argue that a claimant 

must file a mechanics’ lien within six months after completion of work but, in 

this case, the last day that Contractor supplied labor and materials under the 

Original and Supplemental Contracts was February 14, 2011, seven months 

prior to filing the Mechanics’ Lien Claim. Therefore, Appellant’s argue, the 

Lien claim was untimely filed. Id. at 20, 23.

In order to perfect a lien, the Mechanics’ Lien Law requires a claimant 

to file a claim within six months after the “completion of his work[.]” 49 P.S. 

§ 1502. Section 1201 defines “completion of the work” as “performance of 

the last of the labor or delivery of the last of the materials required by terms 

of the claimant’s contract or agreement, whichever last occurs.” 49 P.S. § 

1201. Section 1305 explains that a claimant still has a right to lien when it 

is not his fault that he is unable to complete the work, stating: “Except in 
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case of destruction by fire or other casualty, where, through no fault of the 

claimant, the improvement is not completed, the right to lien shall 

nevertheless exist.” 49 P.S. §1305. 

Instantly, Contractor filed his Mechanics’ Lien Claim on September 20, 

2011. The trial court opined that “it was undisputed that [Contractor] 

performed work on March 21, 2011, six months before the lien was filed[,]” 

based on Contractor’s testimony that he sent an email on April 11, 2011 to 

L&I requesting that his name be removed from the building permit and 

informing L&I that he last worked on the Property three weeks prior. Trial 

Court Opinion, filed 12/22/16, at 3, 4. The trial court’s factual finding that 

Contractor performed the last of the labor on March 21, 2011 is supported 

by competent evidence. Contractor had until September 21, 2011, six 

months later, to file a timely Lien claim. Contractor timely filed the Lien

claim on September 20, 2011. Thus, Appellant’s second claim warrants no 

relief. 

In conclusion, we affirm in part and vacate in part. The Mechanics’ 

Lien Law limits Contractor’s Mechanics’ Lien Claim to amounts owed for labor 

and materials only, and, thus, we vacate the portion of the judgment that 

awarded $11,000 in interest and $8,500 in attorney’s fees and costs.

Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/29/18