United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 17-2359

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John Ekblad

Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

Independent School District No. 625; Valeria Silva, individually and in her

Official Capacity; Theresa Battle, individually and in her Official Capacity

Defendants - Appellees

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Minnesota Defense Lawyers Association

Amicus on Behalf of Appellee(s)

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - Minneapolis

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Submitted: June 13, 2018

Filed: August 8, 2018

[Unpublished]

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Before GRUENDER, ERICKSON, and GRASZ, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.
On December 4, 2015, John Ekblad, while working as a teacher and lunchroom

supervisor at Central Senior High School in St. Paul, Minnesota, intervened in a

lunchroomfight. Ekblad was assaulted by a student involved in the fight and suffered

injuries. He brought suit against the school district and its employees, alleging

negligence and negligent supervision. He also filed claims against Valeria Silva

(Superintendent for the school district from 2009 through 2016) and Theresa Battle

(Assistant Superintendent since July of 2013) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a

violation of a substantive due process right to a safe work environment. The district

court granted summary judgment to the defendants on all claims, concluding that 1

Ekblad’s negligence claims were preempted by the Minnesota Workers’

Compensation Act (“WCA”) and that he did not adequately support his § 1983

claims. Ekblad appeals, asserting that he falls within recognized exceptions to the

WCA and that his § 1983 claims are viable. We affirm.

I. Background

Ekblad was employed by Central Senior High School as a physical science

teacher and lunchroom supervisor. As a lunchroom supervisor, he tried to maintain

order and discourage student fights. While the school district generally instructed

teachers to intervene in fights if they felt they could do so safely, the district did not

require teachers to intervene. Teachers were not subject to discipline for failing to

break up a fight.

On December 4, 2015, a fight broke out during the lunch period and Ekblad

attempted to break it up. One of the students in the fight responded by attacking

Ekblad and seriously injuring him. After the beating, the student asked onlookers,

The Honorable David S. Doty, United States District Judge for the District of 1

Minnesota.

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“Did you see me slamthat white-ass teacher?” Ekblad required medical treatment for

his injuries. The school district has paid for Ekblad’s medical bills, and he has

received workers’ compensation benefits.

On March 1, 2016, Ekblad filed suit in state court against the present

defendants, alleging: 1) negligence and negligent supervision by the school district

and its employees, and 2) violations by Silva and Battle of his substantive due process

right to a safe work environment. Defendants removed to federal court. 

Ekblad alleged that school administrators deliberately ignored student

misconduct and created an environment that became increasingly dangerous to

students and teachers. He submitted testimony from other teachers that school

administrators, aware of previous racial disparity in discipline rates, intentionally

created a race-conscious policy for student discipline. Under the policy, minority

students were treated leniently, even in cases involving violence, which had the

desired result of decreasing reportable discipline disparity. The teacherstestified that

student misbehavior increased when students realized they would not be disciplined

for misconduct—even violent misconduct. Ekblad claims that his assault was the

direct result of school administration policy regarding minority student misconduct. 

II. Discussion

We review de novo the district court’s grant ofsummary judgment, viewing the

evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the

non-movant. Fu v. Owens, 622 F.3d 880, 882 (8th Cir. 2010). “The court shall grant

summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ.

P. 56(a); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

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Minnesota’s workers’ compensation system is generally the exclusive remedy

for an employee who suffers a job-related personal injury. Minn. Stat. § 176.031. If

the WCA’s exclusive remedy provision is applicable, a court lacks jurisdiction over

any claim seeking redress for an employee’s injuries. McGowan v. Our Savior’s

Lutheran Church, 527 N.W.2d 830, 833 (Minn. 1995) (citing Huhn v. Foley Bros.,

22 N.W.2d 3 (Minn. 1946)). The WCA has three relevant exceptions to the exclusive

remedy provision: the assault exception, the intentional act exception, and the

coemployee liability exception. None are applicable in this case.

The assault exception excludesinjuriesresulting from an attempt “to injure the

employee because of personal reasons.” See Minn. Stat. § 176.011, subdiv. 16. Here

the exception does not apply because stray evidence of racial animus does not qualify

as a “personal reason” when it overlaps with employment-related animus. See Fu,

622 F.3d at 883 (holding that the WCA covered plaintiff’s injuries despite evidence

ofracial animus because the assault occurred due to work-related tension between the

parties). Ekblad’s attacker called him “white-ass,” but he also called him a teacher,

and the context makes clear that Ekblad’s employment played a causal role in the

assault. See McGowan, 527 N.W.2d at 834 (holding that the rape of a homeless

shelter employee by a shelter client in the workplace during work hours did not fall

within the assault exception).

The intentional acts exception excludes injuries resulting from an employer’s 

“conscious and deliberate intent to inflict injury.” Gunderson v. Harrington, 632

N.W.2d 695, 704 (Minn. 2001). “[S]uch intent may not be inferred from mere

negligence, though it be gross.” Id. at 702 (quoting Breimhorst v. Beckman, 35

N.W.2d 719, 730 (Minn. 1949)). The exception does not apply in this case; while

Ekblad alleges that his supervisors’ policies negligently resulted in a workplace

environment where student violence was prevalent,the evidence does not suggest that

they “consciously and deliberately” intended to injure him.

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The coemployee exception applies when a plaintiff can show: 1) that a

coemployee had a personal duty toward the employee, the breach of which resulted

in the employee’s injury, 2) that the activity causing the injury was not part of the

coemployee’s general administrative responsibilities, and 3)that the coemployee was

grossly negligent in performing that personal duty. See Wicken v. Morris, 527

N.W.2d 95, 98 (Minn. 1995) (explaining the same in a two-part test). The

coemployee exception does not apply in this case because the coemployee exception

does not apply to suits against the employer itself, and Ekblad’s negligence claims are

primarily against the school district. 

Even if construed as against the named coemployees, the claims would still fail.

The only duty Ekblad argues was breached is a duty to provide a safe workplace. That

duty is held by the employer and is non-delegable to coemployees. See Stringer v.

Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC, 705 N.W.2d 746, 756 (Minn. 2005) (citing

Dawley v. Thisius, 231 N.W.2d 555, 558 (Minn. 1975)) (explaining that a manager

would be immune from a suit alleging a breach of a duty to provide a safe workplace

because that duty is held by the employer); see also Wicken v. Morris, 527 N.W.2d

95, 99 (Minn. 1995) (explaining that “[t]he seemingly harsh result of holding a

co-employee immune from liability arising from breach of the employer’s duty to

provide a safe workplace is a necessary part of the statutory scheme”). The district

court properly concluded the WCA barred Ekblad’s claims.

Ekblad also alleged violations of a substantive due process right to a safe work

environment. To plead such a claim, Ekblad must allege actions which “violated one

or more fundamental constitutional rights” and were “shocking to the contemporary

conscience.” C.N. v. Willmar Pub. Sch., Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 347, 591 F.3d 624, 634

(8th Cir. 2010) (quoting Flowers v. City of Minneapolis, 478 F.3d 869, 873 (8th Cir.

2007)). The defendants’ alleged actions regarding school policies, however

misguided, do not satisfy our standard for such claims. See Andrews v. Schafer, 888

F.3d 981, 984 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 408 (8th Cir.

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2017)) (internal quotations omitted) (“To shock the conscience the defendants’

conduct must be so severe ... so disproportionate to the need presented, and ... so

inspired by malice or sadism rather than a merely careless or unwise excess of zeal

that it amounted to a brutal and inhumane abuse of official power literally shocking

to the conscience.”).

III. Conclusion

We affirm.

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