COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton 

BARRIE ALAN GILLIS 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

v. Record No. 2290-95-4 PER CURIAM 

 MAY 14, 1996 

BARBARA SWEENEY GILLIS 

 FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF 

FAIRFAX COUNTY 

Stanley P. Klein, Judge 

 (Daniel J. Glanz, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 (James A. Watson II; Surovell, Jackson, 

Colten & Dugan, on brief), for appellee. 

 Barrie Alan Gillis (husband) appeals the decision of the 

circuit court denying his motion to reduce or terminate spousal 

support paid to Barbara Sweeney Gillis (wife). Husband raises 

three issues on appeal: (1) whether the trial court erred in 

considering wife's expenses relating to the former marital home; 

(2) whether the trial court erred in considering the college and 

other expenses paid by the wife for the benefit of the parties' 

adult son; and (3) whether the trial court erred by awarding 

support which exceed wife's reasonable expenses minus her actual 

and imputed income. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the 

parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit. 

Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
 2 

 Rule 5A:27. 

 Code § 20-109 provides that "upon petition of either party 

the court may increase, decrease or terminate spousal support and 

maintenance that may hereafter accrue . . . as the circumstances 

may make proper." "The moving party in a petition for 

modification of support is required to prove both a material 

change in circumstances and that this change warrants a 

modification of support." Schoenwetter v. Schoenwetter, 8 Va. 

App. 601, 605, 383 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1989). "When a trial court 

hears evidence ore tenus, its findings are entitled to the weight 

of a jury verdict, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless 

plainly wrong or without evidence to support them." Floyd v. 

Floyd, 1 Va. App. 42, 45, 333 S.E.2d 364, 366 (1985). 

 Husband sought a reduction in the monthly spousal support he 

paid to wife, alleging that the decrease in wife's expenses and 

increase in her income constituted a material change in 

circumstances justifying a reduction or termination of spousal 

support. Husband did not allege that he was unable to pay the 

amount of support initially awarded. The trial court found that 

there had been a material change in circumstances, but that this 

change did not warrant a reduction in the amount of spousal 

support. 

Mortgage Expenses

 Husband contends that, by considering wife's expenses 

related to the former marital home, the trial court erroneously 
 3 

held husband responsible for obligations assigned to wife as part 

of the parties' equitable distribution. See Gamble v. Gamble, 14 

Va. App. 558, 576-77, 421 S.E.2d 635, 646 (1992). Husband's 

contention confuses the division of the parties' marital assets, 

under which wife was assigned both the equity and the debt 

associated with the former marital home, with his obligation 

under the final decree to continue to contribute to wife's 

reasonable living expenses. Unlike the situation in Gamble, the 

record does not demonstrate that the amount of spousal support 

"effectively required [husband] to satisfy the mortgage 

obligations on the marital home he was required to convey to 

[wife]." Id. at 577, 421 S.E.2d at 647. 

 The trial court examined the evidence relating to wife's 

expenses, considered the additional statutory factors, and ruled 

that there had not been a material change in circumstances 

warranting a reduction in support. Its decision was supported by 

evidence and is not plainly wrong. 

Expenses Relating to Adult Son

 In its oral ruling on husband's motion, the court noted that 

husband had previously included amounts he paid for his son's 

college education among his debts and expenses, and that "it was 

principally [husband] who testified that he had made a commitment 

to his children to pay for their college educations." The court 

noted that it had considered those costs as an expense to be 

borne by both parties at the time support was initially computed. 
 4 

 Husband discontinued payment of his son's expenses upon entry of 

the final decree of divorce. The court did not find credible 

husband's assertion that he discontinued those payments because 

of the amount of permanent spousal support awarded, noting that 

previously husband was paying support pendente lite. 

 The college expenses of the parties' son were presented to 

the court as a reasonable expense and were considered by the 

court in its initial deliberations. Therefore, we find no error 

in the court's inclusion of these costs as reasonable expenses 

for wife during its review of husband's motion to reduce support. 

 Amount of Support

 The trial court noted in its oral ruling on husband's motion 

that husband had raised many of the same issues in his initial 

motion for reconsideration. In both instances, the court 

rejected husband's attempts to set spousal support based solely 

upon a mathematical calculation rather than upon a consideration 

of the statutory factors as a whole. The court found no material 

change in circumstances warranting a change in the amount of 

support. This decision is supported by evidence and is not 

plainly wrong. 

 Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily 

affirmed. 

 Affirmed.