1 (Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017

Syllabus

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE ET AL

. v. MANSKY

ET AL

.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

No. 16–1435. Argued February 28, 2018—Decided June 14, 2018

Minnesota law prohibits individuals, including voters, from wearing a

“political badge, political button, or other political insignia” inside a polling place on Election Day. Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017). This “political apparel ban” covers articles of clothing and accessories with political insignia upon them. State election judg es have the au

thority to decide whether a particular item falls within the ban. Vio

lators are subject to a civil penalt y or prosecution for a petty misde

meanor.

Days before the November 2010 election, petitioner Minnesota Vot

ers Alliance (MVA) and other plainti ffs challenged the ban in Federal District Court on First Amendment gr ounds. In response to the law

suit, the State distributed an Electi on Day Policy to election officials providing guidance on enforcement of the ban. The Election Day Pol

icy specified examples of prohibited apparel to include items display

ing the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a can

didate, items supporting or oppo sing a ballot question, “[i]ssue oriented material designed to in fluence or impact voting,” and “[m]aterial promoting a group with recognizable political views.” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–1 to I–2. On Election Day, some voters ran into trouble with the ban, including petitioner Andrew Cilek, who al

legedly was turned away from the polls for wearing a “Please I. D. Me” button and a T-shirt bearing th e words “Don’t Tread on Me” and a Tea Party Patriots logo.

MVA and the other plaintiffs argued that the ban was unconstitu

tional both on its face and as applied to their particular items of ap

parel. The District Court granted the State’s motion to dismiss, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dism issal of the facial challenge and2 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Syllabus

remanded the case for further proceedings on the as-applied chal

lenge. The District Court granted summary judgment to the State on the as-applied challenge, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. MVA, Cilek, and petitioner Susan Jeffers (collectively MVA) petitioned for review of their facial First Amendment claim only.

Held : Minnesota’s political apparel ba n violates the Free Speech Clause

of the First Amendment. Pp. 7–19.

(a) Because the political apparel ban applies only in a specific loca

tion—the interior of a polling pl ace—it implicates the Court’s “ ‘forum based’ approach for assessing restrictions that the government seeks to place on the use of its property.” International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U. S. 672, 678. A polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a nonpublic forum under the Court’s prece

dents. As such it may be subject to content-based restrictions on speech, see, e.g. , Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U. S. 788, 806–811, so long as the restrictions are “reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public offi

cials oppose the speaker’s view,” Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Edu

cators’ Assn., 460 U. S. 37, 46. Because the text of the statute makes no distinction based on the speake r’s political persuasion, the ques

tion is whether the apparel ban is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum”: voting. Cornelius , 473 U. S., at 806. Pp. 7–9.

(b) Minnesota’s prohibition on po litical apparel serves a permissi

ble objective. In Burson v. Freeman, 504 U. S. 191, the Court upheld a Tennessee law imposing a 100-foot zone around polling place en

trances in which no person could solicit votes, distribute campaign materials, or “display . . . campaign posters, signs or other campaign materials.” 504 U. S., at 193–194 (plurality opinion). In finding that

the law withstood even strict scrutiny, the Burson plurality—whose analysis was endorsed by Justice Sc alia’s opinion concurring in the judgment—emphasized the problems of fraud, voter intimidation, confusion, and general disorder that had plagued polling places in the past. Against that historical backdrop, the plurality and Justice Scalia upheld Tennessee’s determin ation that a campaign-free zone outside the polls was necessary to se cure the advantages of the secret ballot and protect the right to vote.

MVA argues that Burson considered only active campaigning out

side the polling place by campaign workers and others trying to en

gage voters approaching the polls , while Minnesota’s ban prohibits passive self-expression by voters themselves when voting. But alt

hough the plurality and Justice Scalia in Burson did not expressly address the application of the Tenne ssee law to apparel—or consider the interior of the polling place as opposed to its environs—the Ten

nessee law swept broadly to ban ev en the plain “display” of a cam

-3 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Syllabus

paign-related message, and the Burson Court upheld the law in full. The plurality’s conclusion that th e State was warranted in designat

ing an area for the voters as “th eir own” as they enter the polling place, id., at 210, suggests an interest more significant, not less, within that place.

No basis exists for rejecting Minnesota’s determination that some forms of campaign advocacy should be excluded from the polling place in order to set it aside as “an island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their choice s.” Brief for Respondents 43. Casting a vote is a weighty civic act, and the State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect the distinc

tion between voting and campaignin g. And while the Court has not

ed the “nondisruptive” nature of ex pressive apparel in more mundane settings, see, e.g., Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus, Inc. , 482 U. S. 569, 576, those observations do not speak to the unique context of a polling plac e on Election Day. Pp. 9–12.

(c) But the line the St ate draws must be reasonable. The State
therefore must be able to articula te some sensible basis for distin

guishing what may come in from wh at must stay out. The unmoored use of the term “political” in the Minnesota law, combined with hap

hazard interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this Court, ca use Minnesota’s restriction to fail
this test.

The statute does not define the term “political,” a word that can broadly encompass anything “of or relating to government, a govern

ment, or the conduct of governmental affairs.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1755. The State argues that the apparel ban should be interpreted more narrowly to proscribe “only words and symbols that an objectively reasonable observer would perceive as conveying a message about the electoral choi ces at issue in [the] polling place.” Brief for Respondents 13. At the same time, the State argues that the category of “political” apparel is not limited to cam

paign apparel.

The Court considers a State’s authoritative co nstructions in inter

preting a state law. But far from clarifying the indeterminate scope of the provision, Minnesota’s “elect oral choices” construction intro

duces confusing line-drawing proble ms. For specific examples of what messages are banned under that standard, the State points to the Election Day Policy. The first th ree categories of prohibited items in the Policy are clear. But the ne xt category—“issue oriented mate

rial designed to influence or impa ct voting”—raises more questions than it answers. The State takes the position that any subject on which a political candidate or party has taken a stance qualifies as an “issue” within the meaning of th at category. Such a rule—whose4 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Syllabus

fair enforcement requires an electi on judge to maintain a mental in

dex of the platforms and positions of every candidate and party on

the ballot—is not reasonable.

The next broad category in th e Election Day Policy—any item “promoting a group with recognizable political views”—makes mat

ters worse. The State does not conf ine that category to groups that
have endorsed a candidate or taken a position on a ballot question. As a result, any number of associ ations, educational institutions, businesses, and religious organizations could have an opinion on an “issue confronting voters.” The Stat e represents that the ban is lim

ited to apparel promoting groups with “well-known” political posi

tions. But that requir ement only increases the potential for erratic application, as its enforcement may turn in significant part on the background knowledge of the particul ar election judge applying it.

It is “self-evident” that an indete rminate prohibition carries with it “[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where [it] has received a vir

tually open-ended interpretation.” Jews for Jesus , 482 U. S., at 576. The discretion election judges exe rcise in enforcing the ban must be guided by objective, workable standards. Without them, an election judge’s own politics may shape his views on what counts as “politi

cal.” And if voters experience or witness episodes of unfair or incon

sistent enforcement of the ban, the State’s interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction an d disruption would be undermined by the very measure intended to furt her it. Thus, if a State wishes to set its polling places apart as areas free of partisan discord, it must employ a more discernible approach than the one offered by Minneso

ta here. Pp. 12–19.

849 F. 3d 749, reversed and remanded.

R OBERTS , C. J., delivered the opinio n of the Court, in which K ENNEDY

, T HOMAS , G INSBURG , A LITO , K AGAN

, and G ORSUCH , JJ., joined. S O

TOMAYOR , J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which B REYER , J., joined._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash

ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.


## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16–1435

MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE, ET AL

.,

PETITIONERS v. JOE MANSKY, ET AL

.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2018]

C HIEF J USTICE R OBERTS delivered the opinion of the
Court.
Under Minnesota law, voters may not wear a political badge, political button, or anything bearing political insig

nia inside a polling place on Election Day. The question presented is whether this ban violates the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment.

I
A
Today, Americans going to their polling places on Elec

tion Day expect to wait in a line, briefly interact with an election official, enter a private voting booth, and cast an anonymous ballot. Little about this ritual would have
been familiar to a voter in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. For one thing, vote rs typically deposited pri

vately prepared ballots at the polls instead of completing official ballots on-site. These pre-made ballots often took the form of “party tickets”—printed slates of candidate selections, often distinctive in appearance, that political parties distributed to their supporters and pressed upon others around the polls. See E. Evans, A History of the2 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

Australian Ballot System in the United States 6–11 (1917)(Evans); R. Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the MidNineteenth Century 14–15 (2004) (Bensel). The physical arrangement confronting the voter was also different. The polling place often consisted simply of a “voting window” through which the voter would hand his
ballot to an election official situated in a separate room with the ballot box. Bensel 11, 13; see, e.g., C. Rowell, Digest of Contested-Election Cases in the Fifty-First Congress 224 (1891) (report of Rep. Lacey) (considering whether “the ability to reach the window and actually tender the ticket to the [ele ction] judges” is “essential in all cases to constitute a good offer to vote”); Holzer, Elec

tion Day 1860, Smithsonian Magazine (Nov. 2008), pp. 46, 52 (describing the interior voting window on the third floor of the Springfield, Illinois courthouse where Abraham Lincoln voted). As a result of this arrangement, “the actual act of voting was usually performed in the open,” frequently within view of interested onlookers. Rusk, The Effect of the Australian Ballot Reform on Split Ticket Voting: 1876–1908, Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1220, 1221 (1970) (Rusk); see Evans 11–13.
As documented in Burson v. Freeman , 504 U. S. 191 (1992), “[a]pproaching the polling place under this system was akin to entering an open auction place.” Id., at 202 (plurality opinion). The room containing the ballot boxes was “usually quiet and orderly,” but “[t]he public space
outside the window . . . was chaotic.” Bensel 13. Election

eering of all kinds was permitted. See id. , at 13, 16–17; R. Dinkin, Election Day: A Do cumentary History 19 (2002). Crowds would gather to heckle and harass voters who appeared to be supporting the other side. Indeed, “[u]nder the informal conventions of the period, election etiquette required only that a ‘man of ordinary courage’ be able to make his way to the voting window.” Bensel 20–21. “In short, these early elections we re not a very pleasant spec

-3 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

tacle for those who believed in democratic government.” Burson, 504 U. S., at 202 (plurality opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). By the late nineteenth century, States began imple

menting reforms to address these vulnerabilities and improve the reliability of elections. Between 1888 and 1896, nearly every State adopted the secret ballot. See id.,
at 203–205. Because voters now needed to mark their state-printed ballots on-site and in secret, voting moved into a sequestered space where the voters could “deliber

ate and make a decision in . . . privacy.” Rusk 1221; see Evans 35; 1889 Minn. Stat. ch. 3, §§27–28, p. 21 (regulat

ing, as part of Minnesota’s secret ballot law, the arrange

ment of voting compartments inside the polling place). In addition, States enacted “viewpoint-neutral restrictions on election-day speech” in the immediate vicinity of the polls. Burson, 504 U. S., at 214–215 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (by 1900, 34 of 45 States had such restrictions). Today, all 50 States and the District of Columbia have laws curbing various forms of speech in and around poll

ing places on Election Day. Minnesota’s such law contains three prohibitions, only one of which is challenged here. See Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017). The first sentence of §211B.11(1) forbids any person to “display campaign material, post signs, ask, solicit, or in any manner try to induce or persuade a voter within a polling place or within100 feet of the building in which a polling place is situated” to “vote for or refrain from voting for a candidate or ballot question.” The second se ntence prohibits the distri

bution of “political badges, political buttons, or other political insignia to be worn at or about the polling place.” The third sentence—the “political apparel ban”—states that a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia may not be worn at or about the polling place.” Versions of all three prohibitions have been on the books4 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

in Minnesota for over a century. See 1893 Minn. Laws ch. 4, §108, pp. 51–52; 1912 Minn. Laws, 1st Spec. Sess., ch. 3,

p. 24; 1988 Minn. Laws ch. 578, Art. 3, §11, p. 594 (reen

acting the prohibitions as part of §211B.11). There is no dispute that the political apparel ban ap

plies only within the polling place, and covers articles of clothing and accessories with “political insignia” upon them. Minnesota election judges—temporary government employees working the polls on Election Day—have the authority to decide whether a particular item falls within the ban. App. to Pet. for Cert. I–1. If a voter shows up wearing a prohibited item, the election judge is to ask the
individual to conceal or remove it. Id., at I–2. If the indi

vidual refuses, the election judge must allow him to vote, while making clear that the incident “will be recorded and referred to appropriate authorities.” Ibid. Violators are subject to an administrative process before the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings, which, upon finding a violation, may issue a reprimand or impose a civil penalty. Minn. Stat. §§211B.32, 211B.35(2) (2014). That adminis

trative body may also refer the complaint to the county attorney for prosecution as a petty misdemeanor; the maximum penalty is a $300 fine. §§211B.11(4) (Supp. 2017), 211B.35(2) (2014), 609.02(4a) (2016).

B
Petitioner Minnesota Voters Alliance (MVA) is a non

profit organization that “seeks better government through
election reforms.” Pet. for Cert. 5. Petitioner Andrew Cilek is a registered voter in Hennepin County and the executive director of MVA; petitioner Susan Jeffers served in 2010 as a Ramsey County election judge. Five days before the November 2010 election, MVA, Jeffers, and other likeminded groups and individuals filed a lawsuit in
Federal District Court challe nging the political apparel ban on First Amendment grounds. The groups—calling5 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

themselves “Election Integrity Watch” (EIW)—planned to have supporters wear buttons to the polls printed with the words “Please I. D. Me,” a picture of an eye, and a tele

phone number and web address for EIW. (Minnesota law does not require individuals to sh ow identification to vote.) One of the individual plaintiffs also planned to wear a “Tea Party Patriots” shirt. The District Court denied the plaintiffs’ request for a temp orary restraining order and preliminary injunction and allowed the apparel ban to remain in effect for the upcoming election. In response to the lawsuit, officials for Hennepin and Ramsey Counties distributed to election judges an “Elec

tion Day Policy,” providing guidance on the enforcement of the political apparel ban. The Minnesota Secretary of
State also distributed the Po licy to election officials throughout the State. The Policy specified that examples of apparel falling within the ban “include, but are not
limited to”:

“• Any item including the name of a political party in Minnesota, such as the Republican, [Democratic

Farmer-Labor], Independence, Green or Libertarian parties.

• Any item including the name of a candidate at any

election.

• Any item in support of or opposition to a ballot question at any election.

• Issue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting (including specifically the ‘Please

I. D. Me’ buttons).

• Material promoting a group with recognizable po

litical views (such as the Tea Party, MoveOn.org

, and so on).” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–1 to I–2.

As alleged in the plaintiffs’ amended complaint and6 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

supporting declarations, some voters associated with EIW ran into trouble with the ban on Election Day. One indi

vidual was asked to cover up his Tea Party shirt. Another refused to conceal his “Please I. D. Me” button, and an election judge recorded his name and address for possible referral. And petitioner Cilek—who was wearing the
same button and a T-shirt with the words “Don’t Tread on Me” and the Tea Party Patriots logo—was twice turned away from the polls altogether , then finally permitted to vote after an election judge recorded his information. Back in court, MVA and the other plaintiffs (now joined by Cilek) argued that the ban was unconstitutional both on its face and as applied to their apparel. The District Court granted the State’s motions to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 708
F. 3d 1051 (2013). In evaluating MVA’s facial challenge, the Court of Appeals observed that this Court had previ

ously upheld a state law restricting speech “related to a political campaign” in a 100-foot zone outside a polling place; the Court of Appeals determined that Minnesota’s law likewise passed constitutional muster. Id., at 1056–

1058 (quoting Burson , 504 U. S., at 197 (plurality opin

ion)). The Court of Appeals reversed the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ as-applied challenge, however, finding that the District Court had improperly considered matters outside the pleadings. 708 F. 3d, at 1059. Judge Shepherd con

curred in part and dissented in part. In his view, Minne

sota’s broad restriction on political apparel did not “ra

tionally and reasonably” serve the State’s asserted
interests. Id., at 1062. On remand, the District Courtgranted summary judgment for the State on the asapplied challenge, and this time the Court of Appeals
affirmed. Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 849 F. 3d 749 (2017). MVA, Cilek, and Jeffers (h ereinafter MVA) petitioned7 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

for review of their facial First Amendment claim only. We granted certiorari. 583 U. S. ___ (2017).

II
The First Amendment prohibits laws “abridging the freedom of speech.” Minnesota’s ban on wearing any “political badge, political butto n, or other political insig

nia” plainly restricts a form of expression within the pro

tection of the First Amendment. But the ban applies only in a specific location: the inte

rior of a polling place. It therefore implicates our “ ‘forum based’ approach for assessing restrictions that the gov

ernment seeks to place on the use of its property.” Inter

national Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee , 505
U. S. 672, 678 (1992) ( ISKCON ). Generally speaking, our cases recognize three types of government-controlled spaces: traditional public forums, designated public fo

rums, and nonpublic forums. In a traditional public fo

rum—parks, streets, sidewalks, and the like—the gov

ernment may impose reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on private speech, but restrictions based on content must satisfy strict scrutiny, and those based on viewpoint are prohibited. See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum , 555 U. S. 460, 469 (2009). The same standards apply in designated public forums—spaces that have “not traditionally been regarded as a public forum” but which the government has “intentionally opened up for that purpose.” Id., at 469–470. In a nonpublic forum, on the other hand—a space that “is not by tradition or designa

tion a forum for public co mmunication”—the government has much more flexibility to craft rules limiting speech. Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn. , 460 U. S. 37, 46 (1983). The government may reserve such a forum “for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public offi

-8 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

cials oppose the speaker’s view.” Ibid. This Court employs a distinct standard of review to assess speech restrictions in nonpublic forums because the government, “no less than a private owner of property,” retains the “power to preser ve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.” Adderley v. Florida , 385 U. S. 39, 47 (1966). “Nothing in the Constitution requires the Government freely to grant access to all who wish to exercise their right to free speech on every type of Government property without regard to the nature of the property or to the disruption that might be caused by the speaker’s activities.” Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc. , 473 U. S. 788, 799–800 (1985). Accordingly, our decisions have long recognized that the governme nt may impose some contentbased restrictions on speech in nonpublic forums, includ

ing restrictions that exclude political advocates and forms of political advocacy. See id., at 806–811; Greer v. Spock

, 424 U. S. 828, 831–833, 838–839 (1976); Lehman v. Shaker Heights , 418 U. S. 298, 303–304 (1974) (plurality opinion); id., at 307–308 (Douglas, J., concurring in judgment). A polling place in Minnesota qualifies as a nonpublicforum. It is, at least on Election Day, governmentcontrolled property set aside for the sole purpose of voting. The space is “a special enclave, subject to greater re

striction.” ISKCON , 505 U. S., at 680. Rules strictly govern who may be present, fo r what purpose, and for how long. See Minn. Stat. §204C.06 (2014). And while the four-Justice plurality in Burson and Justice Scalia’s con

currence in the judgment parted ways over whether the public sidewalks and streets surrounding a polling place qualify as a nonpublic forum, neither opinion suggested that the interior of the building was anything but. See 504 U. S., at 196–197, and n. 2 (plurality opinion); id. , at 214–216 (opinion of Scalia, J.).
We therefore evaluate MVA’s First Amendment chal

-9 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

lenge under the nonpublic forum standard. The text of the apparel ban makes no distinction based on the speaker’s political persuasion, so MVA does not claim that the ban discriminates on the basis of viewpoint on its face. The question accordingly is whether Minnesota’s ban on politi

cal apparel is “reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum”: voting. Cornelius , 473 U. S., at 806.

III
A
We first consider whether Minnesota is pursuing a permissible objective in prohibiting voters from wearing particular kinds of expressive apparel or accessories while inside the polling place. The natural starting point for evaluating a First Amendment challenge to such a re

striction is this Court’s decision in Burson , which upheld a Tennessee law imposing a 100-foot campaign-free zone around polling place entrances. Under the Tennessee law—much like Minnesota’s buffer-zone provision—no person could solicit votes for or against a candidate, party, or ballot measure, distribute campaign materials, or “dis

play . . . campaign posters, signs or other campaign mate

rials” within the restricted zone. 504 U. S., at 193–194 (plurality opinion). The plurality found that the law with

stood even the strict scrutiny applicable to speech re

strictions in traditional public forums. Id., at 211. In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia argued that the less rigorous “reasonableness” standard of review should apply, and found the law “at least reasonable” in light of the plurality’s analysis. Id. , at 216. That analysis emphasized the problems of fraud, voter intimidation, confusion, and general disorder that had plagued polling places in the past. See id., at 200–204 (plurality opinion). Against that historical backdrop, the plurality and Justice Scalia upheld Tennessee’s determi

nation, supported by overwhelming consensus among the10 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

States and “common sense,” that a campaign-free zone outside the polls was “necessary” to secure the advantages of the secret ballot and protect the right to vote. Id., at 200, 206–208, 211. As the plurality explained, “[t]he State of Tennessee has decided that [the] last 15 seconds before its citizens enter the polling place should be their own, as free from interference as possible.” Id., at 210. That was
not “an unconstitutional choice.” Ibid. MVA disputes the relevance of Burson to Minnesota’s apparel ban. On MVA’s reading, Burson considered only “active campaigning” outside the polling place by cam

paign workers and others trying to engage voters ap

proaching the polls. Brief for Petitioners 36–37. Minnesota’s law, by contrast, prohib its what MVA characterizes as “passive, silent” self-expression by voters themselves when voting. Reply Brief 17. MVA also points out that the plurality focused on the extent to which the restricted zone combated “voter intimidation and election fraud,” 504

U. S., at 208—concerns that, in MVA’s view, have little to do with a prohibition on certain types of voter apparel. Campaign buttons and apparel did come up in the Burson briefing and argument, but neither the plurality nor Justice Scalia expressly addressed such applications of the

law. 1 Nor did either opinion specifically consider the

——————

1 The State of Tennessee represented th at its prohibition on campaign displays extended both to items of apparel and to voters. Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 90–1056, p. 33 (argument of Atty. Gen. Burson) (explaining that the statute banned “[t]ee-shirts ,” “campaign buttons,” and “hats” because such items “implicate and invite the same problems,” and that voters would be “asked to take campaign button[s] off as they go in”);
see Brief for State of Tennessee et al. as Amici Curiae 3, 28–30, and

n. 3 (making the same representati on in the present case). The Burson plaintiff also emphasized that th e Tennessee law would cover apparel, including apparel worn by voters, see Brief for Respondent in No. 90– 1056, p. 3; Tr. of Oral Arg. in No. 90–1056, p. 21, and Justice Stevens in dissent referred to the application of the law to campaign buttons, see Burson, 504 U. S., at 218–219, 224.11 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

interior of the polling place as opposed to its environs, and it is true that the plurality’s reasoning focused on cam

paign activities of a sort not likely to occur in an area where, for the most part, only voters are permitted while voting. At the same time, Tennessee’s law swept broadly to ban even the plain “display” of a campaign-related message, and the Court upheld the law in full. The plural

ity’s conclusion that the Stat e was warranted in designat

ing an area for the voters as “their own” as they enter the polling place suggests an interest more significant, not less, within that place. Id., at 210. In any event, we see no basis for rejecting Minnesota’s determination that some forms of advocacy should be excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as “an island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their choices.” Brief for Respon dents 43. Casting a vote is a weighty civic act, akin to a ju ry’s return of a verdict, or a representative’s vote on a piece of legislation. It is a time for choosing, not campaigning. The State may reasonably decide that the interior of the polling place should reflect
that distinction. To be sure, our decisions have noted the “nondisruptive” nature of expressive apparel in more mundane settings. Board of Airport Comm’rs of Los Angeles v. Jews for Jesus,

Inc. , 482 U. S. 569, 576 (1987) (so characterizing “the wearing of a T-shirt or button that contains a political message” in an airport); Tinkerv. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. , 393 U. S. 503, 508 (1969) (stu

dents wearing black armbands to protest the Vietnam War engaged in “silent, passive expression of opinion, unac

companied by any disorder or disturbance”). But those observations do not speak to the unique context of a poll

ing place on Election Day. Members of the public are brought together at that place, at the end of what may have been a divisive election season, to reach considered decisions about their government and laws. The State12 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

may reasonably take steps to ensure that partisan discord not follow the voter up to th e voting booth, and distract from a sense of shared civic obligation at the moment it counts the most. That interest may be thwarted by displays that do not raise significant concerns in other
situations. Other States can see the matter differently, and some
do. 2 The majority, however, agree with Minnesota that at least some kinds of campaign-related clothing and acces

sories should stay outside. 3 That broadly shared judg

ment is entitled to respect. Cf. Burson , 504 U. S., at 206(plurality opinion) (finding that a “widespread and timetested consensus” supported the constitutionality of cam

paign buffer zones). Thus, in light of the special purpose of the polling place itself, Minnesota may choose to prohibit certain apparel there because of the message it conveys, so that voters may focus on the important decisions immediately at
hand.

B
But the State must draw a reasonable line. Although there is no requirement of narrow tailoring in a nonpublic forum, the State must be able to articulate some sensible

——————

2 See, e.g., Ala. Secretary of State, 2018 Alabama Voter Guide 14 (voters may wear “campaign buttons or T-shirts with political adver

tisements”); 2018 Va. Acts ch. 700, §1 (prohibitions on exhibiting campaign material “shall not be construed” to prohibit a voter “from wearing a shirt, hat, or other appare l on which a candidate’s name or a political slogan appears or from havi ng a sticker or button attached to his apparel on which a candidate’s name or a political slogan appears”);

R. I. Bd. of Elections, Rules and Regulations for Polling Place Conduct 3 (2016) (voters may “display or wear any campaign or political party button, badge or other document or item designed or tending to aid, injure or defeat any candidate for pub lic office or any political party or any question,” but they must “imme diately exit the polling location without unreasonable delay” after voting).

3 See Appendix, infra

.13 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out. See Cornelius , 473 U. S., at 808–809. Here, the unmoored use of the term “political” in the Minnesota law, combined with haphazard interpretations the State has provided in official guidance and representations to this Court, cause Minnesota’s restriction to fail even this for

giving test. Again, the statute prohibits wearing a “political badge, political button, or other politic al insignia.” It does not define the term “political.” And the word can be expan

sive. It can encompass anything “of or relating to govern

ment, a government, or the conduct of governmental af

fairs,” Webster’s Third New In ternational Dictionary 1755 (2002), or anything “[o]f, relating to, or dealing with the structure or affairs of government, politics, or the state,” American Heritage Dictionary 1401 (3d ed. 1996). Under a literal reading of those definitions, a button or T-shirt merely imploring others to “Vote!” could qualify. The State argues that the apparel ban should not be read so broadly. According to the State, the statute does not prohibit “any conceivably ‘political’ message” or cover “all ‘political’ speech, broadly construed.” Brief for Re

spondents 21, 23. Instead, the State interprets the ban to proscribe “only words and sy mbols that an objectively reasonable observer would perceive as conveying a mes

sage about the electoral choices at issue in [the] polling place.” Id., at 13; see id., at 19 (the ban “applies not to any message regarding government or its affairs, but to mes

sages relating to questions of governmental affairs facing voters on a given election day”). At the same time, the State argues that the category of “political” apparel is not limited to campaign apparel. After all, the reference to “campaign material” in the first sentence of the statute—describing what one may not “display” in the buffer zone as well as inside the polling place—implies that the distinct term “political” should be14 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

understood to cover a broader class of items. As the State’s counsel explained to the Court, Minnesota’s law “expand[s] the scope of what is prohibited from campaign speech to additional political speech.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 50.
We consider a State’s “authoritative constructions” in interpreting a state law. Forsyth County v. Nationalist

Movement , 505 U. S. 123, 131 (1992). But far from clarify

ing the indeterminate scope of the political apparel provi

sion, the State’s “electoral choices” construction introduces confusing line-drawing problems. Cf. Jews for Jesus, 482
U. S., at 575–576 (a resolution banning all “First Amend

ment activities” in an airpo rt could not be saved by a “murky” construction excluding “airport-related” activity). For specific examples of what is banned under itsstandard, the State points to the 2010 Election Day Policy—which it continues to hold out as authoritative guid

ance regarding implementation of the statute. See Brief for Respondents 22–23. The first three examples in the Policy are clear enough: items displaying the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a candidate, and items demonstrating “support of or opposition to a ballot question.” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2. But the next example—“[i]ssue oriented material de

signed to influence or impact voting,” id., at I–2—raises more questions than it answers. What qualifies as an “issue”? The answer, as far as we can tell from the State’s briefing and argument, is any subject on which a political candidate or party has taken a stance. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 37 (explaining that the “electoral choices” test looks at the “issues that have been raised” in a campaign “that are relevant to the election”). For instance, the Election Day Policy specifically notes that the “Please I. D. Me” buttons are prohibited. App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2. But a voter identification requirement was not on the ballot in 2010, see Brief for Respondents 47, n. 24, so a Minnesotan would have had no explicit “ele ctoral choice” to make in15 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

that respect. The buttons we re nonetheless covered, the State tells us, because the Republican candidates for Governor and Secretary of State had staked out positions on whether photo identification should be required. Ibid. ; see App. 58–60. 4 A rule whose fair enforcement requires an election judge to maintain a mental index of the platforms and positionsof every candidate and party on the ballot is not reasonable. Candidates for statewide and federal office and major political parties can be expe cted to take positions on a wide array of subjects of local and national import. See,

e.g., Democratic Platform Committee, 2016 Democratic Party Platform (approved July 2016) (stating positions on over 90 issues); Republican Platform Committee, Republi

can Platform 2016 (approved July 2016) (similar). Would a “Support Our Troops” shirt be banned, if one of the candidates or parties had ex pressed a view on military funding or aid for veterans? What about a “#MeToo” shirt, referencing the movement to increase awareness of sexual harassment and assault? At oral argument, the State
indicated that the ban would cover such an item if a can

didate had “brought up” the topic. Tr. of Oral Arg. 64–65. The next broad category in the Election Day Policy—any item “promoting a group wi th recognizable political views,” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2—makes matters worse. The State construes the category as limited to groups with
“views” about “the issues conf ronting voters in a given election.” Brief for Respondents 23. The State does not,

——————

4 The State also maintains that th e “Please I. D. Me” buttons were properly banned because the buttons were designed to confuse other voters about whether they needed photo identification to vote. Brief for Respondents 46–47. We do not do ubt that the State may prohibit messages intended to mislead voters about voting requirements and procedures. But that interest does not align with the State’s construc

tion of “political” to refer to mess ages “about the electoral choices at issue in [the] polling place.” Id., at 13.16 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

however, confine that category to groups that have en

dorsed a candidate or taken a position on a ballot question. Any number of associations, educational institutions, businesses, and religious organizations could have an opinion on an “issue[ ] confronting voters in a given elec

tion.” For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union, the AARP, the World Wildlife Fund, and Ben & Jerry’s all have stated positions on matters of public concern. 5 If the views of those groups align or conflict with the position of a candidate or party on the ballot, does that mean that their insignia are banned? See id., at 24, n. 15 (represent

ing that “AFL–CIO or Chamber of Commerce apparel” would be banned if those organizations “had objectively recognizable views on an issue in the election at hand”). Take another example: In the run-up to the 2012 election, Presidential candidates of both major parties issued public statements regarding the then-existing policy of the Boy
Scouts of America to exclude members on the basis of

sexual orientation. 6 Should a Scout leader in 2012 stop

ping to vote on his way to a troop meeting have been asked

——————

5 See, e.g., American Civil Liberties Un ion, Campaign for Smart Jus

tice (2018), online at http://www.acl u.org/issues/mass-incarceration / smart-justice/campaign-smart-justice (taking positions on criminal justice reform) (all Internet materials as last visited June 11, 2018); AARP, Government & Elections, online at https ://www.aarp.org / politics-society/government -elections/ (listing positions on Social Secu

rity and health care); World Wildlife Fund, A Win on Capitol Hill (Apr. 17, 2018), online at https ://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/a-win

on-capitol-hill (describing the organiza tion’s position on federal funding for international conservation programs); Ben & Jerry’s, Issues We Care About, online at https://www.b enjerry.com/values/issues-we-care

about (sharing the corporation’s views on campaign finance reform, international conflict, and civil rights).

6 C. Camia, Obama, Romney Oppose d to Boy Scouts Ban on Gays, USA Today OnPolitics (updated Aug. 08, 2012), online at http :// content.usatoday.com/communities /onpolitics/post/2012/08/barack

obama-boy-scouts-gays-mitt-romney-/1.17 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

to cover up his uniform? The State emphasizes that the ban covers only apparel promoting groups whose political positions are sufficiently “well-known.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 37. But that requirement, if anything, only increases the potential for erratic appli

cation. Well known by whom? The State tells us the lodestar is the “typical observer” of the item. Brief for Respondents 21. But that measure may turn in signifi

cant part on the background knowledge and media con

sumption of the particular election judge applying it. The State’s “electoral choices” standard, considered together with the nonexclusive examples in the Election Day Policy, poses riddles that even the State’s top lawyers struggle to solve. A shirt de claring “All Lives Matter,” we are told, could be “perceived” as political. Tr. of Oral Arg.

41. How about a shirt bearing the name of the National Rifle Association? Definitely out. Id. , at 39–40. That said, a shirt displaying a rainbow flag could be worn “ un

less there was an issue on the ballot” that “related some

how . . . to gay rights.” Id. , at 38 (emphasis added). A shirt simply displaying the text of the Second Amend

ment? Prohibited. Id. , at 40. But a shirt with the text of
the First Amendment? “It would be allowed.” Ibid. “[P]erfect clarity and precise guidance have never been required even of regulations t hat restrict expressive activ

ity.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism , 491 U. S. 781, 794 (1989). But the State’s difficulties with its restriction go beyond close calls on borderline or fanciful cases. And that is a serious matter when the whole point of the exer

cise is to prohibit the expression of political views. It is “self-evident” that an indeterminate prohibition carries with it “[t]he opportunity for abuse, especially where [it] has received a virtually open-ended interpreta

tion.” Jews for Jesus , 482 U. S., at 576; see Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. , 452
U. S. 640, 649 (1981) (warning of the “more covert forms of18 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Opinion of the Court

discrimination that may result when arbitrary discretion is vested in some governme ntal authority”). Election judges “have the authority to decide what is political” when screening individuals at the entrance to the polls. App. to Pet. for Cert. I–1. We do not doubt that the vast majority of election judges s trive to enforce the statute in an evenhanded manner, nor that some degree of discretion in this setting is necessary. But that discretion must be guided by objective, workable standards. Without them, an election judge’s own politics may shape his views on what counts as “political.” And if voters experience or witness episodes of unfair or inconsistent enforcement of the ban, the State’s interest in maintaining a polling place free of distraction and disruption would be undermined by the very measure intended to further it. That is not to say that Minnesota has set upon an im

possible task. Other States hav e laws proscribing displays (including apparel) in more lucid terms. See, e.g., Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §319.5 (West Cum. Supp. 2018) (prohibit

ing “the visible display . . . of information that advocates for or against any candidate or measure,” including the “display of a candidate’s name, likeness, or logo,” the “display of a ballot measure’s number, title, subject, or logo,” and “[b]uttons, hats,” or “shirts” containing such information); Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §61.010(a) (West 2010) (prohibiting the wearing of “a badge, insignia, emblem, or
other similar communicative de vice relating to a candi

date, measure, or political party appearing on the ballot,
or to the conduct of the electi on”). We do not suggest that such provisions set the oute r limit of what a State may proscribe, and do not pass on the constitutionality of laws
that are not before us. But we do hold that if a State wishes to set its polling places apart as areas free of parti

san discord, it must employ a more discernible approach19 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Opinion of the Court

than the one Minnesota has offered here. 7

* * *
Cases like this “present[ ] us with a particularly difficult reconciliation: the accommodation of the right to engage in political discourse with the right to vote.” Burson , 504
U. S., at 198 (plurality opinion). Minnesota, like other States, has sought to strike the balance in a way that affords the voter the opportunity to exercise his civic duty in a setting removed from the clamor and din of election

eering. While that choice is generally worthy of our re

spect, Minnesota has not supported its good intentions with a law capable of reasoned application. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.

——————

7 The State argues that, in the even t this Court concludes that there is a “substantial question” about the proper interpretation of §211B.11(1), we should postpone our decision and certify that issue to the Minnesota Supreme Court. Brief for Respondents 57; see Minn. Stat. §480.065(3) (2016). The dissent takes up this cause as well. See

post, at 1 (opinion of S OTOMAYOR , J.). The decision to certify, however,
“rests in the sound discretion of the federal court.” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman , 581 U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judgment) (slip op., at 8). We decline to exercise that discretion in this instance. Minnesota’s request for certification comes very late in the day: This litigat ion had been ongoing in the federal courts for over seven years before the State made its certification request in its merits brief before this Court. See Stenberg v. Carhart

, 530 U. S. 914, 945 (2000) (noting, in denying certification, that the State had never asked the lower federal courts to certify). And the
State has not offered sufficient reason to believe that certification

would obviate the need to address the constitutional question. Our analysis today reflects the State’s proffered interpretation; nothing in that analysis would change if the State’s interpretation were also adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court. Nor has the State (or the dissent) suggested a viable alternative construction that the Minnesota Supreme Court might adopt instead. See Brief for Respondents 56–58;

post, at 5–8.Opinion of the Court 20 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Appendix to opinion of the Court

APPENDIX

State Laws Prohibiting Accessories or Apparel in the Polling Place*

Alaska Alaska Stat. §§15.15.170, 15.56.016(a)(2) (2016)

Arkansas Ark. Code Ann. §7–1–103(a)(9) (Supp. 2017)

California Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §§319.5, 18370 (West Cum. Supp. 2018)

Colorado Colo. Rev. Stat. §1–13–714(1) (2017)

Connecticut Conn. Gen. Stat. §9–236 (2017)

Delaware Del. Code Ann., Tit. 15, §4942 (2015)

District of Columbia D. C. Code §1–1001.10(b)(2) (2016); D. C. Munic. Regs., tit. 3, §707, 65 D. C. Reg. 4504 (2018) Georgia Ga. Code Ann. §21–2–414(a) (Supp. 2017)

Hawaii Haw. Rev. Stat. §11–132(d) (2009); Haw. Admin. Rule §3–172–63(a) (2017)

Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat., ch. 10, §5/7–41(c) (West 2016)

Indiana Ind. Stat. Ann. §3–14–3–16 (Lexis 2011)

Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §25–2430(a) (2006)

Louisiana La. Rev. Stat. Ann. §18:1462 (West Cum. Supp. 2018)

——————

* Based on statutory or regulatory language and official resources,

where available.Opinion of the Court 21 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

Appendix to opinion of the Court

Massachusetts Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 54, §65 (West 2007) Michigan Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §168.744 (West Cum. Supp. 2018)

Minnesota Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017) Mississippi Miss. Code Ann. §23–15–895 (Cum. Supp. 2017)

Missouri Mo. Rev. Stat. §115.637(18) (2006)

Montana Mont. Code Ann. §13–35–211 (2017)

Nebraska Neb. Rev. Stat. §32–1524(2) (2016)

Nevada Nev. Rev. Stat. §293.740 (2015) New Hampshire N. H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §659:43(I) (Cum. Supp. 2017) New Jersey N. J. Stat. Ann. §19:34–19 (West 2014)

New Mexico N. M. Stat. Ann. §1–20–16 (2011)

New York N. Y. Elec. Law Ann. §8–104(1) (West 2018)

North Dakota N. D. Cent. Code Ann. §16.1–10–03 (2015)

Ohio Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3501.35(A) (Lexis Supp. 2018)

South Carolina S. C. Code Ann. §7–25–180 (2017 Cum. Supp.)

South Dakota S. D. Codified Laws §12–18–3 (Cum. Supp. 2017)

Tennessee Tenn. Code Ann. §2–7–111(b) (2014)

Texas Tex. Elec. Code Ann. §61.010(a) (West 2010)

Utah Utah Code §20A–3–501 (2017)Opinion of the Court 22 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

Appendix to opinion of the Court

Vermont Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 17, §2508(a)(1) (Cum. Supp. 2017)

Wisconsin Wis. Stat. §12.03 (2011–2012)_________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting



## SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 16–1435

MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE, ET AL

.,

PETITIONERS v. JOE MANSKY, ET AL

.

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

[June 14, 2018]

J USTICE S OTOMAYOR , with whom J USTICE B REYER joins, dissenting.
I agree with the Court that “[c]asting a vote is a weighty civic act” and that “State[s] may reasonably take steps to ensure that partisan discord not follow the voter up to the voting booth,” including by “prohibit[ing] certain apparel [in polling places] because of the message it conveys.” Ante, at 11–12. I disagree, however, with the Court’s decision to declare Minnesota’s political apparel ban un

constitutional on its face because, in its view, the ban is not “capable of reasoned application,” ante, at 19, when
the Court has not first afforded the Minnesota state courts

“ ‘a reasonable opportunity to pass upon’ ” and construe the
statute, Babbitt v. Farm Workers , 442 U. S. 289, 308 (1979). I would certify this case to the Minnesota Su

preme Court for a definitive interpretation of the political apparel ban under Minn. Stat. §211B.11(1) (Supp. 2017), which likely would obviate the hypothetical line-drawing problems that form the basis of the Court’s decision today.

I
As the Court acknowledges, Minnesota adopted its political apparel ban late in the 19th century against the backdrop of often “ ‘chaotic’ ” voting conditions where “[c]rowds would gather to heckle and harass voters who2 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

appeared to be supporting the other side.” Ante, at 2. Polling places became “highl y charged ethnic, religious, and ideological battleground[s] in which individuals were stereotyped as friend or foe,” even “on the basis of cloth

ing.” R. Bensel, The American Ballot Box in the MidNineteenth Century 21 (2004). As a result, States began adopting reforms “to address these vulnerabilities and improve the reliability of elections.” Ante, at 3. Minnesota thus enacted the political apparel ban at issue in this case, which prohibits an individual from wearing “[a] political badge, political button, or other political insignia . . . at or about the polling place.” §211B.11(1). Respondents maintain that this prohibition, together with other election-day regulations, furthers Minnesota’s compelling interests in (1) “maintaining peace, order and decorum in the polling place,” (2) “pro

tecting voters from confusion and undue influence such as intimidation,” and (3) “preserving the integrity of its elec

tion process.” Brief for Respondents 41 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see Burson v. Freeman

, 504 U. S. 191, 193, 199 (1992) (plurality opinion) (recog

nizing such interests as compelling). The majority accords due respect to the weight of these state interests in concluding that there is “no basis for rejecting Minnesota’s determi nation that some forms of advocacy should be excluded from the polling place, to set it aside as ‘an island of calm in which voters can peacefully contemplate their choices.’ ” Ante, at 11. Polling places today may not much resemble the chaotic scenes of the turn of the 20th century, but they remain vulnerable to interpersonal conflicts and pa rtisan efforts to influence
voters.* Even acts of interference that are “undetected or

——————

* See, e.g., J. Johnson, Fight Breaks Out at Polling Place (Nov. 8, 2016) (describing a fight in which a voter sprayed pepper spray at a campaign volunteer who allegedly had been handing out campaign3 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

less than blatant . . . may nonetheless drive the voter away before remedial action can be taken.” Burson

, 504
U. S., at 207; see also Brief for Campaign Legal Center as
Amicus Curiae 9 (noting that, “[a]bsent a ban on political paraphernalia, [poll] workers might unintentionally exhibit unconscious bias against voters who wear the ‘wrong’ paraphernalia”). In holding that a polling place constitutes a nonpublic
forum and that a State must es tablish only that its limita

tions on speech inside the polling place are reasonable, see

ante, at 8–9, the Court goes a long way in preserving States’ discretion to determine what measures are appro

priate to further important interests in maintaining order and decorum, preventing confusion and intimidation, and protecting the integrity of the voting process. The Court errs, however, in declaring Minnesota’s political apparel ban unconstitutional under that standard, without any guidance from the State’s highest court on the proper interpretation of that state law. Ante, at 13, 19, n. 7.

II
The Court invalidates Minnesota’s political apparel ban

—————— materials), http://www.wpbf.com/article/f ight-breaks-out-at -polling-place / 8258506 (all Internet materials as last visited June 8, 2018); R. Reilly, A Guy in a Trump Shirt Carried a G un Outside of a Virginia Polling Place. Authorities Say That’s Fine (Nov. 4, 2016) (describing a man wearing a shirt bearing the name of a candidate and carrying a weapon outside of a polling place), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/trump

supporter

- gun -voter-intimidation-virginia_us_581cf16ee4b0aac624846eb5; Houston Chronicle, Nov. 5, 2012, p. 2 (reporting that individuals wearing shirts bearing the name of a racial equality organization allegedly were “disruptive,” “took over” a polling place, and were “electioneering and voicing support” for a particular candidate); Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 8, 2006, p. A5 (reporti ng arrest of a poll worker who was “charged with assault and interferin g with an election after allegedly choking a voter and push ing him out the door”); Orlando Sentinel, Mar. 2, 2005, p. B1 (reporting “[s]houting matches and rowdy behavior” and “harass[ment] and intimidat[ion] at the polls”).4 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

based on its inability to define the term “political” in §211B.11(1), so as to discern “some sensible basis for distinguishing what may come in from what must stay out” of a polling place. Ante, at 12–13. The majority believes that the law is not “capable of reasoned applica

tion,” ante, at 19, but it reaches that conclusion without taking the preferential step of first asking the state courts to provide “an accurate picture of how, exactly, the statute works,” Expressions Hair Design v. Schneiderman , 581
U. S. ___, ___ (2017) (S OTOMAYOR , J., concurring in judg

ment) (slip op., at 5). It is a “cardinal principle” that, “when confronting a challenge to the constitutionality of a . . . statute,” courts “will first ascertain whether a con

struction . . . is fairly possible that will contain the statute within constitutional bounds,” and in the context of a challenge to a state statute, federal courts should be par

ticularly hesitant to speculate as to possible constructions of the state law when “the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification.” Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona , 520 U. S. 43, 78–79 (1997) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Minn. Stat. §480.065(3) (2016) (authorizing the Minnesota Supreme Court to answer certified questio ns). Certification “save[s] time, energy, and resources and helps build a cooperative judicial federalism.” Lehman Brothers v. Schein , 416 U. S. 386, 391 (1974). Neither of the majority’s proffered rea

sons for declining to certify this case justifies its holding. First, the Court notes that respondents’ “request for certification comes very late in the day,” as the litigation already had been ongoing for more than seven years before the request. Ante, at 19, n. 7. But certification is not an argument subject to forfeiture by the parties. It is a tool of the federal courts that serves to avoid “friction-generating
error” where a federal court atte mpts to construe a statute “not yet reviewed by the State’s highest court.” Arizonans for Official English , 520 U. S., at 79. This Court has5 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

certified questions to a state court “sua sponte, even though the parties had not sought such relief and even though the district court and the court of appeals previ

ously had resolved the disputed point of state law.” S. Shapiro, K. Geller, T. Bishop, E. Hartnett, & D. Himmel

farb, Supreme Court Practice §9.4, p. 611 (10th ed. 2013) (citing Elkins v. Moreno , 435 U. S. 647, 660–663, 668–669 (1978)); see also Massachusetts v. Feeney , 429 U. S. 66 (1976) ( per curiam ) (certifying a question to the Supreme
Judicial Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts “on [the Court’s] own motion”). Respondents’ delay in asking for certification does nothing to alter this Court’s respon

sibility as a matter of state -federal comity to give due deference to the state courts in interpreting their own
laws. Second, the majority maintains that respondents have
“not offered sufficient reason to believe that certification would obviate the need to address the constitutional ques

tion,” as “nothing in [its] analysis would change if [re

spondents’] interpretation were also adopted by the Minne

sota Supreme Court.” Ante, at 19, n. 7. The majority also relies on its view that respondents have not “suggested
a viable alternative construction that the Minnesota Su

preme Court might adopt instead.” Ibid. To presume that the Minnesota Supreme Court would adopt respondents’ interpretation wholesale or that it could not provide a construction of its own that is “capable of reasoned appli

cation,” ante, at 19, however, reflects precisely the “gratui

tous” “ ‘[s]peculation . . . about the meaning of a state
statute’ ” that this Court has discouraged, Arizonans for Official English , 520 U. S., at 79. It is at least “fairly possible” that the state court could
“ascertain . . . a construction . . . that will contain the
statute within constitutional bounds.” Id., at 78 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, the issue comes down to the meaning of the adjective “political,” as used to6 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

describe what constitutes a “political badge, political button, or other political insignia.” §211B.11(1). The word “political” is, of course, not inherently incapable of defini

tion. This Court elsewhere ha s encountered little difficulty discerning its meaning in the co ntext of statutes subject to First Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Civil Service
Comm’n v. Letter Carriers , 413 U. S. 548, 550–551 (1973) (rejecting First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness challenge to §9(a) of the Hatch Act, then codified at 5

U. S. C. §7324(a)(2), which prohibited federal employees from taking “ ‘an active part in political management or in political campaigns’ ”); Broadrick v. Oklahoma , 413 U. S. 601, 602 (1973) (rejecting First Amendment overbreadth and vagueness challenge to a similar Oklahoma law that “restricts the political activities of the State’s classified civil servants”). Even here, the majority recognizes a substantial amount of speech that “clear[ly]” qualifies as “political,” such as “items displaying the name of a political party, items displaying the name of a candidate, and items demonstrat

ing support of or opposition to a ballot question.” Ante, at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted). The fact that the majority has some difficulty deciphering guidance to §211B.11(1) that also proscribes “[i]ssue oriented material designed to influence or impact voting” and “[m]aterial promoting a group with recognizable political views,” App. to Pet. for Cert. I–2; see ante, at 14–17, does not mean that the statute as a whole is not subject to a construction
that falls within constitutional bounds. As this Court has
made clear in the context of the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine, the “mere fact” that petitioners “can conceive of some impermissible applications of [the] stat

ute is not sufficient to rend er it” unconstitutional. United
States v. Williams , 553 U. S. 285, 303 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). That is especially so where the state court is capable of clar ifying the boundaries of state7 Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018)

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

law in a manner that would permit the Court to engage in a comprehensive constitutional analysis. See, e.g., Virginia

v. American Booksellers Assn., Inc. , 484 U. S. 383 (1988) (certifying questions to the Virginia Supreme Court for clarification as to whether a state statute was readily susceptible to a narrowing construction that would not violate the First Amendment); Commonwealth v. Ameri

can Booksellers Assn., Inc. , 236 Va. 168, 372 S. E. 2d 618 (1988) (responding to certifica tion with such a narrowing construction). Furthermore, the Court also should consider the history of Minnesota’s “implementation” of the statute in evaluat

ing the facial challenge here. Forsyth County v. National

ist Movement , 505 U. S. 123, 131 (1992). That history
offers some assurance that the statute has not been inter

preted or applied in an unreasonable manner. There is no evidence that any individual who refused to remove a political item has been prohibited from voting, and re

spondents maintain that no one has been referred for prosecution for violating the provision. See Brief for Re

spondents 4, n. 2. Since the political apparel ban was enacted in the late 19th century, this is the first time the statute has been challenged on the basis that certain speech is not “political.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 44. Even then, petitioners’ as-applied challenge was rejected by the Dis

trict Court and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir

cuit. See Minnesota Majority v. Mansky , 62 F. Supp. 3d 870, 878 (Minn. 2014); Minnesota Majority v. Mansky

, 2015 WL 13636675, *12 (D Minn., Mar. 23, 2015); Minne

sota Majority v. Mansky , 849 F. 3d 749, 752–753 (CA8 2017). Petitioners did not seek review of those claims in this Court. See Pet. for Cert. i. On the whole, the histori

cal application of the law helps illustrate that the statute is not so “indeterminate” so as to “carr[y] with it ‘[t]he opportunity for abuse.’ ” Ante, at 17.8 MINNESOTA VOTERS ALLIANCE v. MANSKY

S OTOMAYOR

, J., dissenting

III
Especially where there are undisputedly many constitu

tional applications of a st ate law that further weighty state interests, the Court should be wary of invalidating a law without giving the State’s highest court an opportunity to pass upon it. See Babbitt , 442 U. S., at 309; Arizonans for Official English , 520 U. S., at 79. Because the Court declines to take the obvious step of certification in this case, I respectfully dissent.