* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined th a t

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 97-40185

Summary Calendar

CHARLES SIMMONS; ROLAND CARMEN,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

VERSUS

ROTHE DEVELOPMENT, INCORPORATED,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

G-95-CV-721

November 28, 1997

Before WISDOM, WIENER, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Charles Simmons and Roland Carmen filed suit agai nst their

employer, Rothe Development, Inc., alleging that Rothe

discriminated against them in violation of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §

2000e et seq. and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The district court granted

summary judgment in Rothe’s favor. Simmons and Carmen now appeal.

We affirm.

First, the plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly

dismissed their Title VII claims on the ground that they were filed2 Ringgold v. National Maintenance Corp

., 796 F.2d 769, 770

(5th Cir. 1986); see also Irwin v. Department of Veteran Affairs

, 498 U.S. 89 (1990).

3 The plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1981 claims remained outstanding

after the district court dismissed their Title VII claims.

4 The plaintiffs’ attorney did not request a single deposition

until 13 months after suit was filed.

2 more than 90 days after their counsel received right-to-sue letters

from the EEOC. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that

the suit was untimely filed. The 90-day filing period established

by 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(f)(1) begins to run on the date that the EEOC

right-to-sue letter is delivered to the claimant or to the offices

of formally-designated counsel for the claimant. 2 The

uncontroverted summary judgment evidence shows that the plaintiffs’

attorney file d suit more than 90 days after the right-to-sue

letters issued on behalf of Carmen and Simmons were delivered to

his office. The district court properly dismissed the plaintiffs’

Title VII claims with prejudice.

Second, the plaintiffs argue that the district court abused

its discretion in denying their Motion to Abate and Motion to

Extend Time. In filing these motions, the plaintiffs sought

additional time both to take several depositions and to respond to

the defendant’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment. 3 As the

district court noted, however, the plaintiffs failed to offer any

reasonable expl a nation for not completing enough discovery to

respond adequately to the defendant’s motion. 4 Moreover, the

plaintiffs have failed to show how th e requested discovery would

have defeated the defendant’s motion. The district court did not5 See Olitsky v. Spencer Gifts, Inc.

, 964 F.2d 1471 (5th Cir.

1992).

6 See Singh v. Shoney’s, Inc. , 64 F.3d 217 (5th Cir. 1995).

3 abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiffs’ motions.

Finally, the plaintiffs argue that the district court

i mproperly granted summary judgment in Rothe’s favor on their 42

U.S.C. § 1981 claims. The plaintiffs’ allegations of

discrimination, however, are inadequate to survive summary

judgment. Rothe satisfied its burden of production by proffering

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its allegedly

discriminatory action. 5 The plaintiffs, on the other hand, did not

present compelling evidence to suggest that these reasons were

pretextual. 6 There is no genuine issue of material fact in the

record before us that would preclude summary judgment.

AFFIRMED.