alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Darrell PASCHAL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-4789

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

March 9, 2018

Darrell Paschal, pro se, Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Holly N. Simcox, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

Per Curiam.

AFFIRMED .

Rowe, Ray, and Makar, JJ., concur.
Curtis James ROBERTSON, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. Lisa Long STOKES, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2970

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Appeal is dismissed.
### UNPUBLISHED



# UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT



#  C ARNIE N ORRIS , Petitioner-Appellant,

v. S TATE OFS OUTH C AROLINA ; P HILLIP No. 01-6647



#  M C C LOUD , Warden of Perry Correctional Institution; C HARLES M. C ONDON , Attorney General of the State of South Carolina,

Respondents-Appellees. 

# 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston. David C. Norton, District Judge. (CA-00-2333-2-18) Submitted: August 28, 2001 Decided: September 11, 2001 Before MICHAEL and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

COUNSEL Carnie Norris, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, Chief DeputyAttorney General, Jeffrey Alan Jacobs, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellees.Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).

OPINION

PER CURIAM: Carnie Norris, a South Carolina state inmate, appeals the district court’s order adopting the recommendation of the magistrate judge and awarding summary judgment to the Appellees on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (West 1994 & Supp. 2000) petition.
The district court is obligated to conduct a de novo review of every portion of the magistrate judge’s report to which objections have been filed. 28 U.S.C.A. § 636(b)(1) (West 1993 & Supp. 2000); United States v. Schronce , 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984). However, the district court need not conduct de novo review when a party makes general and conclusory objections that do not direct the court to a specificerror in the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendations. Orpiano v. Johnson , 687 F.2d 44, 4748 (4th Cir. 1982).Although Norris requested an enlargement of time to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report, a request granted by the district court, he filed objections within the time permitted by a notice that accompanied the magistrate judge’s report. Nevertheless, the district court’s order adopting the magistrate judge’s report focuses primarily on the consequences of a party’s failure to timely file objections. The order does not state whether the court was aware that Norris filed timely objections or that the court had conducted a de novo review of any matter to which Norris specifically objected. On the present record, then, it is unclear whether Norris’ objections were considered. Therefore, without expressing any view as to the merits, we grant a certificate of appealability, vacate the district court’s order, and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process. VACATED AND REMANDED 2 N ORRIS v. S TATE OF S OUTH C AROLINA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JAREL DEVON SMITH, 

Defendant. 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

: 

:

Case No. 3:18-mj-577 

Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington 

BINDOVER ORDER 

This matter was set for preliminary examination on September 4, 2018. Defendant 

appeared with counsel and waived his right to a preliminary examination. The Court 

found the waiver to be knowing and voluntary and therefore orders that Defendant be 

bound over to the grand jury to answer the charge. 

September 26, 2018 s/Sharon L. Ovington 

 Sharon L. Ovington

 United States Magistrate Judge
Ms. Daniels,

  

Please withdraw my petition No. FAA‐2014‐0073 effective immediately.

  

Thanks,

  

Bill McNease

FAA-2014-0073 

William McNease 

to: 

Nia Daniels 

02/18/2014 02:24 PM 

Hide Details 

From: William McNease <William.McNease@priesterav.com>

To: Nia Daniels/AWA/FAA@FAA, 

Page 1 of 1

file://C:\Users\ARM100ND\AppData\Local\Temp\2\notes9D4F73\~web1409.htm 2/18/2014
1 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Docket No. 45612

STATE OF IDAHO ,
Plaintiff

- Respondent ,

v.

MICHAEL PAUL FRIEL ,
Defendant

- Appellant

. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) Filed: September 25, 2018
Karel A. Lehrman, Clerk

THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED OPINION AND SHALL NOT BE CITED AS AUTHORITY

Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Eric J. Wildman , District Judge.
Judgment of conviction and sentence and denial of Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, affirmed

. Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Andrea W. Reynolds
, Deputy Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant.
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Lori A. Fleming , Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent.

________________________________________________ Before GRATTON, Chief Judge; HUSKEY, Judge; and LORELLO, Judge

________________________________________________ PER CURIAM
Michael Paul Friel was found guilty of grand theft . Idaho Code § 18

- 2407(1)( b )(1) . The
district court sentenced Friel to a u nified fourteen

- year sentence, with six years determinate

. Friel filed an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion, which the district court denied. Friel appeals. Sentencing is a matter for the trial court’s discretion. Both our standard of review and the factors to be considered in evaluating the reas onableness of the sentence are well established. See State v. Hernandez , 121 Idaho 114, 117

- 18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014

- 15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez , 106 Idaho 447, 449

- 51, 680 P.2d 869, 871

- 73 (Ct. App. 1984); State v. Toohill , 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing the length of a sentence,2 we consider the defendant’s entire sentence. State v. Oliver , 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. Next, we review whether the district court erred in denying Friel ’s Rule 35 motion. A motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is essentially a plea for leniency, addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. State v. Knighton , 143 Idaho 318, 319, 144 P.3d 23, 24 (2006);
State v. Allbee , 115 Idaho 845, 846, 771 P.2d 66, 67 (Ct. App. 1989). In presenting a Rule 35 motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the motion. State v. Huffman , 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). Upon review of the record, including any new information submitted with Friel ’s Rule 35 motion, we conclude no abuse of discretion
has been shown. Therefore, Friel ’s judgment of conviction and sentence, and the district court’s order denying Friel ’s Rule 35 motion, are affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                       5,708,953
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  894,455
<ALLOWANCES>                                   (38,833)
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             8,190,789
<PP&E>                                         320,456
<DEPRECIATION>                                (152,945)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              31,720,949
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        6,706,440
<BONDS>                                        980,692
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       131,444
<OTHER-SE>                                  24,061,560
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                31,720,949
<SALES>                                      1,231,202
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,231,202
<CGS>                                          965,464
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  965,464
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,123,259
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               (38,833)
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             856,552
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             14,550,929
<INCOME-TAX>                                 3,100,000
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         11,450,929
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                11,450,929
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.76
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.76
        


</TABLE>
IN the INTEREST OF O.P., a child.

J.P., Appellant, v. Department of Children and Families and Guardian Ad Litem Program, Appellees.

Case No. 2D17-2340

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 28, 2018.

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Lincare Holdings Inc. (the Company) for the quarter ended June 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof
(the Report), I, Paul G. Gabos, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify to the best of my knowledge and belief, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | Information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



By:

/s/    PAUL G.
GABOSPaul G. GabosChief Financial Officer


August 9, 2006
## NUMBER 13
- 20
- 00 397
- C V


## COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI
- EDINBURG

TROY CROWNOVER , A ppel l ant ,

v. PAA CONSULTING, LLC , A ppe llee

.

On a ppeal from the 117th District Court of Nueces County, Texas.



## ORDER OF ABATEMENT

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes Order Per Curiam

This matter is before the Court on its own motion. The record before the Court fails

to illustrate that all claims asserted by or against all parties have been disposed. Appellant attempts to appeal an order entered o n August 10, 2020
, in which

the trial court order ed partial final summary judgment and proports to sever all causes of

action between Plaintiff Troy Crownover and Defendant PAA Consulting Inc. The order,however, fails to provide a new cause number for the severed party

. The record reflects litigation with other parties still pending under the original trial
court cause number; furthermore, there is a line in the order where the new cause number, if any, would be written

. Under these circumstances, a court of appeal s

may abate a cause in order to permit clarification by the trial court. Lehmann v. Har

- Con Corp. , 39 S.W.3d 191 at 206 (stating the appellate court may allow an appealed order that is not final to be modified so as to be made final and may allow the modified order and all proceedings relating to it to be included in a supplemental record); see Tex. R

. App. P. 27.2, 44.3. Accordingly, we ABATE the appeal and REMAND the cause to the trial court for

clarification. Upon remand, the trial court shall address the following:

1. W hether the trial court intended the judgment to be severed , and the new cause numb er;
2. W hether the trial court intended to completely dispose of all claims and all partie s

. The trial court shall cause its findings and recommendations, together with any orders it may enter regarding the aforementioned issues , to be included in a supplemental

clerk's record. Furthermore, the trial court shall cause a supplemental reporter's record of
any proceedings to be prepared. The supplemental clerk's record and supplemental reporter's record, if any, shall be filed with the Clerk of this Cour t on or before the expiration of thirty days from the date of this order. This appeal will be reinstated upon receipt of the foregoing materials and upon further order of this Court

. IT IS SO ORDERED.

P ER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the 19 th day of November, 2 020.
William ELLISON, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-1364

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 7, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Harris *v.*Thackery.

4-6195

147 S. W. 2d 355

Opinion delivered February 10, 1941.

*D. L. Harris, pro se.*

*John E. Coates, Jr.,*and *W. M. Powell,*for appellees.

G-bippiN Smith, C. J.

Appeal is from an order overruling the motion of D. L. Harris1 to dismiss the intervention of Reginald H. Thackery and others in a suit brought by the state against tax-forfeited lands in Pulaski county.2 After the sale had been set aside on the intervention, Thackery and his associates deposited $109.42 in the court registry as a tender. January 19, 1940, Harris receipted for the full amount.3

One cannot, with knowledge of the facts, accept the benefits of a transaction without assuming its burdens, nor can one accept the benefits of a decree without admitting its legality. *Morgan*v. *Morgan,*171 Ark. 173, 283 S. W. 979; *Coston*v. *Lee Wilson*& *Co.,*109 Ark. 548, 160 S. W. 857.

*882Although, appellant insists he did not understand the legal effect of accepting the deposit, he will be conclusively presumed to have known the money was tendered in payment. Appellees had a right to assume that the litigation was at an end when the receipt was executed.

Affirmed.

1

 Although the motion of June 9, 1939, was signed by D. L. Harris by his solicitor, the court order includes “Mr. and Mrs. D. L. Harris.” It also restrains them from prosecuting any claim against the interveners.

2

 Act 119, approved March 19, 1935.

3

 The court found that Harris had paid taxes for 1937 and 1938, amounting to $24.30; that he paid the state $123 for the lands, a total of $147.30. The difference of $37.88 is due from the state.
EXHIBIT 23



                [LETTERHEAD OF ADDISON, ROBERTS & LUDWIG, P.C.]





CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT


We hereby consent to the use of our report dated August 31, 1998, related to the
consolidated  financial  statements of Wavetech  International,  Inc.  (formerly
Wavetech,  Inc. and Subsidiaries),  for the year ended August 31, 1997, included
in or made a part of this Form 10-KSB/A (Amendment number two).


                                        /s/ Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, P.C.

                                        Addison, Roberts & Ludwig, P.C.



Tucson, Arizona
December 4, 1998
SAWGRASS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Terry MONE and Diane Mone, Appellees.

Case No. 5D15-3061

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Opinion filed May 18, 2018

Jack R. Reiter and Robert D. Peters, of GrayRobinson, P.A., Miami, for Appellant.

Mark A. Nation and Paul W. Pritchard, of The Nation Law Firm, Longwood, for Appellees.

*UPON REMAND FROM THE FLORIDA SUPREME COURT*

PER CURIAM.

Our prior opinion of September 2, 2016, was disapproved by the Florida Supreme Court "to the extent it is inconsistent with [the Florida Supreme] Court's opinion in *Joyce v. Federated Nat'l Ins. Co.* , 228 So.3d 1122 (Fla. 2017)," and the case was remanded to this court "for instructions not inconsistent with th[e] Court's opinion in *Joyce* ." *See**Mone v. Sawgrass Mut. Ins. Co.* , 43 Fla. L. Weekly S185, 2018 WL 1895708 (Fla. Apr. 20, 2018). Upon reconsideration, we affirm the final judgment awarding attorney's fees, including the trial court's application of a multiplier to the attorney's fees award. Based upon Appellees' prior concession of error, we reverse the award of $26,918.43 in court costs regarding the services provided by two of Appellees' expert witnesses, Nettles & Associates and Reliable Field Services of Central Florida, Inc. On remand, the trial court is directed to strike this amount from the final judgment.

AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED, with instructions.

COHEN, C.J., LAMBERT, J., and LEMONIDIS, R.C., Associate Judge, concur.
Bobbie Jo CURTIS, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3699

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 28, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Gerry Brannon WALKER v. STATE

CR-16-0063

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Exhibit 31.2





CERTIFICATIONS




I, Peter S. Garcia, Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Acting Chief Accounting Officer, of PDL BioPharma, Inc., certify that:





(1) I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of PDL BioPharma, Inc.; and





(2) Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report.











Date:
May 23, 2013/s/ Peter S. GarciaPeter S. Garcia

Vice President, Chief Financial Officer and Chief Accounting Officer (Principal Financial Officer)
#### Roberts *vs.*Maddox, *Adm’r.*

An infant may sue, by guardian, in an action of assumpsit; and this is expressly recognized by several provisions in our Revised Statutes.

This was an action of assumpsit, determined in the Van Burén Circuit Court, in October, 1842, before the Hon. Thobias Johnson, one of the circuit judges, instituted by the guardian of a person under twenty-one years of age, in the name of the minor. This fact appears on the face of both the declaration and writ. The writ, in point of form, is, in every respect, substantially good. At the return thereof, a motion was made, on behalf of Maddox, the defendant, to quash the writ, on the ground that the “ plaintiff appears to be a minor, under (he age of twenty-one, and cannot sue in his own name.” This motion the Court sustained; and, having quashed the writ, gave judgment that the defendant go hence, without day, and recover his costs of the plaintiff; to reverse which, the plaintiff appealed, and now prosecutes his appeal in this Court.

Linton, for the appellant.

*By ike*Court,

Ringo, C. J.

Several errors have been assigned; but, from the view which we take of the subject, it will only be necessary to notice that which questions the propriety of the decision quashing the writ. From a careful inspection of the writ, we have no doubt that it possesses every requisite necessary to constitute it a valid, legal process, and such as is appropriate to the form of action in this case adopted. Nor does it appear that the Circuit Court considered it as being defective, in this respect; but, on the contrary, that Court appears to have based its decision upon the ground that the suit could ‘not be prosecuted in the name of a person who is a minor, or under the age of twenty-one years. Upon what authority this adjudication was made, we are uninformed, and cannot conceive; for surely no rule of the common law is better established than that which recog*52nizes the right of an infant (o sue, in such case as the present, by guardian or *prochien a*mie, and we have no statutory provision inhibiting the exercise of such right, by minors; but, on the contrary, it appears to us to be expressly recognized by sevéral provisions contained in the Revised Statutes of this State. See *Ch.*122, secs. 38, 41. *Ch.*72, *sec.*21.

We are, therefore, clearly of the opinion, that the Circuit Court erred in quashing the writ on the motion of the defendant, and thereupon entering up a final judgment in his favor, against the plaintiff; and for this error, said judgment is reversed, with costs, and the case remanded to the Court from whence it came, with instructions to overrule the defendant’s motion to quash the writ.
First Amendment to the Employment Agreement for Lee A. Brady



 Exhibit 10.2 
 FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
 EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
 First Amendment, dated as of September 23, 2008 (the “Amendment”), to the Employment Agreement, dated as of February 26, 2008 (as amended,
the “Agreement”), by and between The LaPorte Savings Bank (the “Bank”) and Lee A. Brady (the “Executive”). Capitalized terms which are not defined herein shall have the same meaning as set forth in the Agreement.

 W I T N E S S E T H: 
 WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Agreement to comply with the final regulations issued by the Internal Revenue Service under Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (the “Code”); and 

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, the mutual agreements herein set forth and such other consideration the sufficiency of which is
hereby acknowledged, the Bank and the Executive hereby agree as follows: 
 Section 1. Deletion of Section 4(a)(ii)(D) of the
Agreement. Section 4(a)(ii)(D) of the Agreement, which provides for “a liquidation or dissolution of the Bank”, is hereby deleted in its entirety. 
 Section 2. Effectiveness. This Amendment shall be deemed effective as of February 26, 2008, above written, as if executed on such date. Except as expressly set forth herein, this Amendment shall
not by implication or otherwise alter, modify, amend or in any way affect any of the terms, conditions, obligations, covenants or agreements contained in the Agreement, all of which are ratified and affirmed in all respects and shall continue in
full force and effect and shall be otherwise unaffected. 
 Section 3. Governing Law. This Amendment and the rights and
obligations hereunder shall be governed by and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Indiana. 
 Section 4. Counterparts. This Amendment may be executed in any number of counterparts, each of which shall for all purposes be deemed an original, and all of which together shall constitute but one and the same instrument.

 Section 5. Compliance with Section 409A. This Agreement shall be interpreted and administered consistent with
Section 409A of the Code. 







 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Bank and the Executive have duly executed this Amendment as of the day and year
first written above. 
  

			
	THE LAPORTE SAVINGS BANK
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Joan M. Ulrich

	Name:	 	Joan M. Ulrich
	Title:	 	Chairman of the Board
	
	LAPORTE BANCORP, INC.
		
	By:	 	 /s/ Joan M. Ulrich

	Name:	 	Joan M. Ulrich
	Title:	 	Chairman of the Board
	
	EXECUTIVE
	
	 /s/ Lee A. Brady

	Lee A. Brady