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KENNETH V. CLARK v. MARY ANN CLARK

(AC 35543)

Sheldon, Keller and Harper, Js.

Argued January 22—officially released May 27, 2014
(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Malone, J. [dissolution judgment];

Emons, J. [orders].)

Mary Ann Clark, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The self-represented defendant, Mary

Ann Clark, appeals from several decisions rendered by

the trial court during postdissolution proceedings.1 The

defendant claims that the trial court erred in (1) appointing a new guardian ad litem for the two minor children

of the marriage and ordering the parties to equally share

in paying the fees owed to the prior guardian ad litem;

(2) modifying prior postdissolution orders delineating

how and when the plaintiff, Kenneth V. Clark, is permitted access to the health and academic records of the

parties’ children; (3) ‘‘forc[ing]’’ her to sign written

authorizations affording the plaintiff access to medical

and educational material related to the children; and

(4) vacating what the defendant claims was an automatically stayed access order pending her appeal.2 We dismiss the appeal as it relates to the first claim raised by

the defendant and, with regard to the remaining claims

raised by the defendant, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

The parties were divorced on August 18, 2009, but

various disputes have continued, unabated, involving

the filing of hundreds of postjudgment motions and

eight appeals.3 This court’s decision in Clark v. Clark,

127 Conn. App. 148, 150–51, 13 A.3d 682, cert. denied,

301 Conn. 914, 19 A.3d 1260 (2011), sets forth some of

the facts and procedural history relevant to this appeal.

‘‘The plaintiff commenced this marital dissolution

action in June, 2006. Following a trial, the court, by

memorandum of decision filed August 18, 2009, dissolved the parties’ marriage. The parties have two minor

children, one of whom has special needs. The court

awarded sole custody of the parties’ two children to the

defendant and ordered the plaintiff to pay the defendant

unallocated alimony and child support in the amount

of $5000 per month. The court ordered, inter alia, that

the plaintiff maintain health insurance for the children

at his expense so long as it was available through his

employer . . . . The court also ordered the parties to

list for sale their marital home in Greenwich and

another property they owned in Boca Raton, Florida

. . . . The net proceeds of the sales, if any, were to be

divided 65 percent to the defendant and 35 percent to

the plaintiff. . . . The court ordered that . . . the parties would share equally the obligation to pay the fees

of the attorney for the minor children . . . and the fees

of the guardian ad litem . . . to be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the parties’ real estate prior to the

parties receiving their respective shares. The plaintiff’s

attorney, the defendant’s former attorney and the attorney for the minor child each hold mortgages on one or

both of the properties to secure payment of their fees.’’4

(Footnotes omitted.)

The dissolution judgment did not afford the plaintiff

a right to visitation, but included orders that the plaintiff
get copies of all school information, medical information, and information related to the children’s activities.

The court also ordered that‘‘[a]ny and all parent-teacher

conferences, counseling sessions or meetings involving

any aspect of the health, education or welfare of either

child, information, scheduling or prepared appointments shall be provided by each parent to the other

parent,’’ and that ‘‘[b]oth parties may attend such

events.’’ The plaintiff, however, was ordered not to

interfere with any of these matters whatsoever. The

plaintiff was ordered to begin parent coaching to assist

him in parenting the two children. The guardian ad

litem was to contact a mental health professional to

see if the professional was willing to begin working

with the children and the plaintiff toward reunification.5

The decree contemplated that the plaintiff should begin

supervised visitation with the children when the mental

health professional determined it was appropriate. A

gradually increasing schedule of supervised visits was

set forth as long as all mental health professionals

agreed that it was in the best interests of the children,

and, at the end of one year, the parties were ordered

to review with the mental health professional future

visitation between the children and the plaintiff and

determine whether unsupervised and/or overnight visits

were in the children’s best interests.

On April 4, 2013, the parties appeared before the

trial court, Emons, J. The plaintiff was represented

by Attorney Kevin Collins and the defendant was selfrepresented. Also present were Attorney Sandra P. Lax,

counsel for the minor children, and Attorney Dori-Ellen

Feltman, guardian ad litem forthe children. The hearing

began with the defendant reporting to the court that

the parties and the attorneys were ‘‘having meetings,’’

and that they would report back to the court after they

finished.6 The same day, the court resumed the hearing

and inquired if anything had been resolved as a result of

the meetings between the parties and counsel. Feltman

began by advising the court of the need to clarify certain

court orders, stating, ‘‘I think it’s important to clarify

the current court orders. I think that there’s some misunderstanding between the parties as to what or what

is not allowed in terms of [the plaintiff’s] contact with

the children.’’

Feltman indicated that the plaintiff had not seen the

children for quite some time, but she did not believe

that there were any court orders in place preventing

him from contacting the children in any way. She then

mentioned a court order from Judge Shay, which she

indicated was issued at a time when the older child

was applying to boarding schools, that ordered the

plaintiff not to contact the school being considered and

not to interfere ‘‘so that the process in boarding school

gets started.’’ She did not, however, ‘‘take that to mean

that at the present time, [the plaintiff] doesn’t have the

right to contact the schools for purposes of checking
in on the status of his children or contacting a physician

to check in on the status of his children.’’7 Lax, agreeing

with Feltman, also indicated a need for clarification.

Lax then referred the court to the ‘‘sole custody statute,’’

General Statutes § 46b-56,8 and indicated that it allowed

the plaintiff contact for information about the academics, the health and the welfare of the children. Lax

stated, ‘‘[T]he fact that there’s sole custody [in the

defendant] cannot and should not preclude the fact that

[the plaintiff] can contact to find out how the children

are doing.’’ She then requested that the court ‘‘just reiterate the order that sole custody does not preclude

the [plaintiff] from getting information pursuant to the

statute.’’ The court responded: ‘‘Ordinarily under most

sole custody orders it would not preclude them.’’

The defendant then indicated to the court that there

was no problem with the plaintiff getting information,

that she was already providing the plaintiff with information from the schools and health providers, and that

there had never been a disruption in his receipt of that

information.9 When the plaintiff’s counsel requested

that the defendant, as sole custodian, be ordered to

sign release authorizations, the defendant expressed a

willingness to sign so that the plaintiff’s counsel could

contact providers directly, stating, ‘‘I’ve already gotten

authorizations. I’ve got contact sheets with names and

numbers, and they’re expecting your call.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel then responded, ‘‘Mr. Clark’s call,’’ to

which the defendant replied, ‘‘I can also add that to it,

but . . . .’’ The court then indicated, ‘‘No, hold on. Mrs.

Clark, I don’t know what it is that you have. I’m going

to order that you sign authorizations for [the plaintiff]

and/or his attorney to contact all therapists that are

involved, all schools, all health providers, anyone who

is providing . . . the [attorney for minor children], the

[guardian ad litem] and anyone who is providing services to the boys.’’ Feltman offered to draft the

release authorizations.

The defendant expressed reservations about the

order and raised an unrelated concern about the plaintiff’s prior access to one former provider that resulted

in a payment issue and the ultimate loss of that provider.

She also raised an unrelated concern that insurance

reimbursements directed to the plaintiff for the children’s medical bills were not being forwarded to her,

although she had advanced payment to the providers

for many of the bills. The court indicated that this issue

was not properly before it, but reassured the defendant

by making it clear to the plaintiff that he must ‘‘do

everything with regard to the payments and the billing

on the up and up.’’

At this point in the proceeding, Feltman informed

the court that she had not been officially retained by

the parties as guardian ad litem for the children and

that there had been no court order with respect to her
fees. Although the defendant argued to the court that

she did not have the means to pay one half of Feltman’s

$7500 proposed retainer or her hourly rate of $375, the

court ordered the parties to split the retainer equally

and pay it no later than May 1, 2013. The court then

indicated it would deal with a ‘‘report back’’ at the next

short calendar on the issue of permitting the plaintiff

contact with the children’s providers.

On April 5, 2013, the defendant filed this appeal from

the court’s orders that she pay one half of Feltman’s

$7500 retainer fee and that she sign release authorizations allowing the plaintiff to obtain information regarding the children directly from their schools, therapists,

and other health care providers.

On April 11, 2013, the parties, the plaintiff’s counsel,

Feltman and Attorney Louise Truax, on behalf of Lax,

the attorney for the minor children, who was unable

to be present, appeared before the court. The court

indicated that it had ‘‘sua sponte called this meeting

today.’’ The court began by indicating its concern about

the likelihood of funding for Feltman’s service as the

guardian ad litem, and vacated Feltman’s appointment.

Feltman was replaced with Attorney Jill Plancher of

Connecticut Legal Services as guardian ad litem for the

limited purpose of communicating between the parties

and a mental health professional, Dr. Sidney Horowitz,

whom the courtindicated would be seeing both children

in order to determine the feasibility of reunification

with the plaintiff and to provide a study to the court.

Feltman then indicated to the court that she had prepared release authorizations for the defendant to sign

pursuant to the court’s order during the prior hearing

on April 4, 2013. The defendant indicated that release

authorizations already were in place, and the court

ordered her to print them and bring them back after a

recess. The plaintiff’s counsel next advised the court

that an appeal had been filed after the April 4, 2013

hearing, but that Feltman ‘‘has done work on this matter. I think that she probably intends to file an affidavit

of fees for her services thus far . . . .’’ The court

responded: ‘‘I have no problem with that. We’ll

straighten that out.’’ The court then noted: ‘‘The appeal

stays only the order that [the defendant] pay half of the

fees for Attorney Feltman. . . . So, I don’t think much

is stayed in light of that appeal.’’

The defendant then argued to the court that she

believed that her appeal of the April 4, 2013 orders also

stayed the court’s order to provide release authorizations to the plaintiff, but the court disputed her position,

indicating, ‘‘[i]t may be on appeal but it’s not subject

to the same type of stay that the other order might be.

. . . I will entertain a motion to terminate the stay if

there is one on that issue; I don’t think there is one.’’

The plaintiff’s counsel and Feltman then indicated to

the court a concern that the defendant had instructed
the children’s schools not to give information to the

plaintiff. The defendant indicated that this was not true,

but admitted that she had given those instructions pursuant to a ‘‘previous order.’’ The court noted, referring

to Judge Shay’s August 8, 2011 order, that ‘‘[t]here was

a previous order in the file relating only, relating only,

it’s my understanding, to [the older child’s] acceptance

. . . [a]nd the . . . [a]dmission process.’’ The court

then asked the plaintiff’s counsel to attempt to communicate with the school that week and, if for any reason,

the schools would not communicate with counsel on

behalf of the plaintiff, the court would order releases

again. The defendant then offered to sign a release for

the plaintiff’s counsel to have access to school information. When the plaintiff’s counsel indicated that he was

going to tell the school that the court had ordered that

counsel could have access, the court stated, ‘‘I have

not issued that order. . . . I’m relying on the court file

itself. I do not believe that based on the document, the

orders of Judge Shay, that your client at this particular

time is precluded from communicating with the

schools, the health care providers of any of those people. I don’t believe that that’s the case; that’s why I

want you to try to communicate with the school. . . .

If for any reason [the defendant] has refused to allow

the school to communicate with you, we will remedy

that on the 22nd of May.’’ The plaintiff’s counsel then

indicated that he intended to file a motion for relief

from the stay and requested that it be written in on

May 22, 2013. The court permitted this.

The court then asked the defendant whether she had

any reason to believe that the plaintiff could not communicate directly with the schools, therapists or treating

doctors. The defendant indicated that it was her belief

that the plaintiff could not contact anyone at the schools

and that the schools had been relying on Judge Shay’s

prior order, which had been provided to them. The

court then stated, ‘‘[The August 8, 2011] order no longer

exists. I am now changing the order, I am modifying the

orderto provide [the plaintiff] with immediate access to

the [older son’s] [s]chool, any school that the younger

son goes to, any and all therapists and anyone related

to the health, education and welfare of both children.’’

After the defendant indicated that she objected to the

plaintiff directly contacting the school, as there had

been a problem in the past, the court stated, ‘‘I am now

changing and modifying that order. I am going to give

[the plaintiff] complete and thorough access to all

schools, all treaters, all therapists, for any and all

reason.’’

After the court indicated that it would provide the

plaintiff with a copy of a transcript, the court reminded

the defendantthat it soon expected to receive the signed

release authorizations that had been discussed previously in the hearing. The following colloquy then

occurred between the defendant, Feltman, and the
court:

‘‘[The Defendant]: [The signed release authorizations]

don’t have a bearing now because you’ve created the

order which negates the need.

‘‘[Feltman]: I do have the authorizations prepared,

Your Honor.

‘‘The Court: Are you prepared to sign them, Mrs.

Clark?

‘‘[The Defendant]: You don’t need it; you gave him

the order.

‘‘The Court: Mrs. Clark, are you prepared to sign—

‘‘[The Defendant]: I have to see them before I can

say that I can.

‘‘The Court: Fine. Take a look at them, please. Take

a look at them, please.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Why are they necessary if the

orders—

‘‘The Court: Ma’am, take a look at them and come

back to this court and tell me, please, whether or not

you will sign them.

‘‘[Feltman]: Your Honor, the authorizations are necessary because, as [the defendant] has legal custody, the

health care providers require them. I spoke to the therapist about that. He wants this authorization because

[the defendant] has sole legal custody.

‘‘The Court: Are you going—I want you to take a look

at them and report back to the court that you either

will or will not sign them. If you do not sign them I

want to know why.

‘‘[The Defendant]: Okay.’’

The court then ordered that no one was to leave until

the defendant either provided the plaintiff with signed

release authorizations or provided an explanation to

the court as to why she was refusing to sign such authorizations. Further discussion then ensued during which

the defendant again expressed concern about health

insurance reimbursements not being forwarded to her

by the plaintiff and about who would pay for copies

that the plaintiff received. The court resolved those

concerns by again reminding the defendant that the

issue of reimbursements was not before the court and

by advising her that the plaintiff was responsible for

paying for his own copies. The court then indicated,

‘‘What we are doing is modifying Judge Shay’s order to

give [the plaintiff] access to all information regarding

health, education and welfare. That means all schools,

all providers, all mental health providers.’’ The defendant again insisted that she had provided the plaintiff

with all information to date. The court stated, ‘‘And I’m

not contesting whether he’s received copies. Now, he

does not have to go through you, he can go directly on
his own.’’ At the end of the hearing, the court concluded,

‘‘So, I’ve made my rulings, I’ll ask you to sign your

releases, provide copies. In the event that the releases

are not signed, please let me know. Only if they’re

signed, you’re free to leave the courthouse. If you have

not signed them, stick around and we’ll have another

round. Okay?’’ The court also reminded all present that

there would be another status conference on May 1,

2013.

No further discussions concerning the release authorizations took place on April 11, 2013. The defendant

admits that she signed the authorizations, but claims

that she was forced to do so. On April 15, 2013, the

defendant amended her appeal to challenge the court’s

April 11, 2013 order that she sign the release authorizations despite the stay that she claims was created by

her appeal from the April 4, 2013 access order, and to

challenge the order that Horowitz conduct an evaluation. Additional facts and procedural history will be set

forth as necessary.

I

First, the defendant claims that the trial court erred

in (1) appointing Feltman as guardian ad litem and (2)

ordering that the parties equally share the cost of her

fees, amounting to $3000, without first having reviewed

the parties’ financial affidavits. We will address each

aspect of the claim in turn.

The facts underlying this claim are as follows. At

the April 11, 2013 hearing, the court vacated Feltman’s

appointment because it was concerned about the likelihood that she would not receive payment for her work

as guardian ad litem. The court replaced Feltman with

a legal aid attorney, and did not discuss payment of

the new guardian ad litem’s fees. After the court was

advised that Feltman might be submitting an affidavit

for fees that were based on the work she had performed

to date, the court indicated that it would address the

issue of what fees she might be owed for her work

prior to her removal by indicating, ‘‘I have no problem

with that. We’ll straighten that out.’’

A

Insofar as the defendant appeals from the decision

of the court to appoint Feltman as the guardian ad litem,

the record reflects that the court vacated that order.

As the trial court already has granted the defendant

the relief she is seeking on appeal, an order vacating

Feltman’s appointment, we dismiss as moot the portion

of the defendant’s appeal challenging Feltman’s

appointment. The court’s order removing Feltman completely displaced any prior order appointing her.

Accordingly, this portion of the defendant’s appeal is

moot because ‘‘there is no action that we can take that

can have any practical effect on the judgment under

appeal.’’ Upjohn Co. v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 224
Conn. 106, 110, 616 A.2d 798 (1992).

B

The defendant also challenges what she characterizes

as an order of the court requiring her to pay one half

of Feltman’s fees, which were incurred before the court

vacated her appointment as guardian ad litem. Specifically, the defendant claims that on April 11, 2013, the

court required the parties each to pay 50 percent of

Feltman’s fees, amounting to $3000. It does not appear

from the record, including the court file and the transcript of proceedings, that the court made any such

order on that date. Rather, the court indicated only that

it was going to address the amount of fees actually owed

to Feltman at some later time.10 In vacating Feltman’s

appointment, the court’s previous, ancillary order to

pay her retainer, which would have covered her fees

for an unspecified time period, became a nullity, and

the court properly indicated that it would only consider

payment for work performed prior to her removal as

guardian ad litem. The defendant is unable to prevail

on this claim because it is based on a mischaracterization of the record.

Additionally, if we view the claim as being based on

the court’s statements made up to and including April

11, 2013, and interpret such statements as indicating

that the defendant was obligated to pay Feltman a portion of her undetermined attorney’s fees incurred until

that date, the claim is not based on a final judgment.

In situations in which a trial court has issued an award

of attorney’s fees, but has not made a finding as to

the amount of the award, we have held that such an

attorney’s fees award does not constitute an appealable

final judgment. See McKeon v. Lennon, 131 Conn. App.

585, 611, 27 A.3d 436 (appeal from order awarding attorney’s fees dismissed for lack of final judgment because,

at time appeal was filed, amount of those fees had not

been conclusively determined), cert. denied, 303 Conn.

901, 31 A.3d 1178 (2011); Sullivan v. Brown, 116 Conn.

App. 660, 663, 975 A.2d 1289 (same), cert. denied, 294

Conn. 914, 983 A.2d 852 (2009). Because the court, on

April 11, 2013, indicated that it would determine the

amount owed to Feltman at some latertime, this portion

of the defendant’s appeal challenging an award of fees

to Feltman is dismissed for lack of a final judgment.

‘‘The lack of [a] final judgment . . . implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of this court. . . . If there is

no final judgment, we cannot reach the merits of the

appeal.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Morgan v.

Morgan, 136 Conn. App. 371, 372, 46 A.3d 255 (2012).

II

Next, the defendant claims that the court improperly

modified postdissolution orders delineating how and

when the plaintiff is permitted access to his children’s

health and academic records. We disagree with the
defendant’s characterization of the court’s rulings concerning these orders.

First, we note that over the course of two days of

hearings, the court twice rephrased the access order

after it was issued on April 4, 2013. The final order,

issued on April 11, 2013, as stated by the court, gave

the plaintiff ‘‘complete and thorough access to all

schools, all treaters, all therapists, for any and all reason.’’ The defendant argues that this order constituted

an abuse of discretion because the court modified prior

orders that had been entered at the time of the dissolution by Judge Malone, and by Judge Shay on August 8,

2011, without allowing argument and ‘‘limiting’’ evidence, ‘‘despite a well documented history of the plaintiff consistently interfering with the children’s academic

and medical care and other activities.’’11

‘‘[T]he standard of review in family matters is well

settled. An appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s

orders in domestic relations cases unless the court has

abused its discretion or it is found that it could not

reasonably conclude as it did, based on the facts presented. . . . In determining whether a trial court has

abused its broad discretion in domestic relations matters, we allow every reasonable presumption in favor

of the correctness of its action. . . . [T]o conclude that

the trial court abused its discretion, we must find that

the court either incorrectly applied the law or could not

reasonably conclude as it did. . . . Appellate review of

a trial court’s findings of fact is governed by the clearly

erroneous standard of review.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Clark v. Clark, supra, 127 Conn. App.

153–54. ‘‘[W]here the legal conclusions of the court are

challenged, we must determine whether they are legally

and logically correct . . . and whether they find support in the facts that appear in the record.’’ (Citation

omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 217, 764 A.2d 739 (2001).

The judgment of dissolution states: ‘‘The [defendant]

shall make sure that the [plaintiff] gets copies of all

school information; medical information and the children’s activities; however, the [plaintiff] shall not interfere with any of these issues whatsoever.’’ The judgment

also states: ‘‘Any and all parent-teacher conferences,

counseling sessions or meetings involving any aspect

of the health, education or welfare of either child, information, scheduling or prepared appointments shall be

provided by each parent to the other parent. Both parties may attend such events.’’ Because the judgment

ordered the defendant to share information with the

plaintiff on any aspects of the children’s health, education or welfare, it necessarily contemplated that the

plaintiff also would be receiving such information

directly. Nowhere in the dissolution judgment did the

court prohibit the plaintiff from making direct contact

with the children’s educational or other providers, nor
did the court make any finding that he should be denied

such contact for good cause shown, pursuant to § 46b56 (g). We construe the noninterference provision as an

affirmation that decisions on educational and treatment

issues were in the sole discretion of the defendant, who

had been awarded sole custody, but not a prohibition

on the plaintiff’s right to direct access to information

concerning school, medical or activities information.

On August 8, 2011, Judge Shay conducted a hearing

and issued orders concerning a dispute about where

the parties’ older son would attend boarding school.

We previously noted that the dispute involved only the

issue of where to enroll the parties’ oldest child in

private school and how much involvement the plaintiff

should have in the making of the admissions decision.12

Judge Shay ordered the plaintiff not to interfere with

the defendant’s process of choosing the school, as the

defendant was the sole custodian, a reiteration, not a

modification, of the previous orders contained in the

dissolution judgment that the plaintiff not interfere with

the defendant’s decisions as sole custodian. Judge Shay

noted that he would regard the orders he was considering to resolve the school enrollment dispute as a clarification and not a modification of the orders contained

in the judgment of dissolution.

At the hearing on April 4, 2013, Feltman indicated to

the court that she did not believe that there were any

court orders in place at the present time preventing

the plaintiff from contacting the children’s schools for

purposes of checking on their status or contacting a

physician to check on their status, but she thought that

the court should clarify the plaintiff’s right to access.

Lax, counsel forthe minor children, added that although

the defendant had sole custody of the children, § 46b56 (g) still permitted the plaintiff to make contact for

information about the academics, health and welfare

of the children, and that the court should ‘‘reiterate the

order that sole custody [to the defendant] does not

preclude the [plaintiff] from getting information pursuant to the statute.’’ The court indicated, ‘‘I’m relying on

the court file itself. I do not believe that based on the

document, the orders of Judge Shay, that [the plaintiff]

at this particulartime is precluded from communicating

with the schools, the health care providers or any of

those people.’’

The defendant argues that the court’s clarification of

the plaintiff’s right of direct access to the children’s

providers was an improper modification of the judgment of dissolution and Judge Shay’s August 8, 2011

orders. We do not agree. ‘‘Motions for interpretation or

clarification, although not specifically described in the

rules of practice, are commonly considered by trial

courts and are procedurally proper. . . . There is no

time restriction imposed on the filing of a motion for

clarification . . . and the court [has] the power to clar-
ify matters not of substance.’’ (Citations omitted.) Holcombe v. Holcombe, 22 Conn. App. 363, 366, 576 A.2d

1317 (1990).13

We conclude, after a thorough review of the record

and the prior orders in the file, that the court was

clarifying, not modifying the prior orders contained in

the dissolution judgment, and that the orders of Judge

Shay with respect to the plaintiff’s noninterference with

the child’s admission to a school in 2011 were moot,

having served their desired purpose.14 In addition, the

court was seeking to enforce the statutory right of

access granted to the noncustodial plaintiff under § 46b56 (g). Although the court used the word ‘‘modify’’ several times, the court actually was granting the requests

of Lax, Feltman, and the plaintiff to clarify and enforce

the plaintiff’s existing right of access pursuant to § 46b56 (g), with reference to the orders in the judgment of

dissolution and the order of Judge Shay, none of which

prevented the plaintiff from contacting the children’s

schools, medical or other providers as of April 11, 2013.

One reason for the clarification, and the court’s several

reiterations of it, was to make clear to the defendant

that her demonstrated determination to prevent direct

access by the plaintiff was not legitimately undertaken

pursuant to any existing order of the court and was no

longer going to be tolerated. The court confirmed that,

as long as the plaintiff did not interfere with the defendant’s decision-making, he was not prohibited from

making direct contact with any of the children’s current

providers to ascertain their educational, medical or

therapeutic status.

Although the defendant characterizes the court’s

orders as a modification and, in discussing the orders

at issue, the court used the word ‘‘modify’’ several times,

‘‘neither of these factors influences the actual nature

of the motion or the court’s responsive ruling. It has

been recognized by both this court and our Supreme

Court that despite the movant’s or the trial court’s characterization of a motion, a reviewing court examines

the practical effect of the responsive ruling in determining the nature of the pleading. . . . On review, we look

to the substance of the relief sought by the motion

and the practical effect of the trial court’s responsive

ruling.’’ (Citations omitted.) Fewtrell v. Fewtrell, 87

Conn. App. 526, 532, 865 A.2d 1240 (2005). The court’s

clarification order merely determined that the original

judgment and any subsequent court orders had never

prohibited the plaintiff from exercising the statutorily

mandated right to access afforded to him by § 46b-56

(g). The court’s orders did not alter the judgment of

dissolution or result in a modification of the original

judgment or any prior order. We find that the court did

not abuse its discretion or act unreasonably in clarifying

and enforcing the plaintiff’s right of access to his children’s information as part of the court’s determination

that the case move forward with efforts to reunify the
plaintiff with his two children.15

III

The defendant’s next claim is that the court, in seeking to enforce the plaintiff’s right of access to his children’s providers, ‘‘forc[ed]’’ her to sign release

authorizations, thereby giving the plaintiff access to

medical and educational materials related to the parties’

children. We disagree.

The order at issue in this claim was necessitated by

the fact that counsel for the plaintiff disclosed to the

court that the defendant was instructing certain providers, primarily the children’s schools, not to communicate with the plaintiff, and that some of the providers,

knowing that the defendant had been granted sole legal

custody, were insisting on a release from her before

they would have any direct contact with the plaintiff.

Feltman indicated that she had seen an e-mail that the

defendant wrote to the older child’s school with instructions not to speak to the plaintiff. On April 11, 2013,

the court indicated to the defendant that she was not

to leave the courthouse that day until she either signed

release authorizations permitting the plaintiff access to

the children’s providers or reported back to the court

her reasons for not doing so, in which case, the court

would conduct further proceedings. The defendant was

given a clear option to choose not to sign the releases

and return to the court for a further hearing; instead

of opting to pursue the matter during a hearing, she

chose to sign them and raised no further objections,

although she was given the opportunity to do so.

The defendant did not return that day and object to

the court’s order. Furthermore, by failing to return to

the courtroom and express her reasons for refusing

to sign the release authorizations and requesting an

evidentiary hearing to establish her claim that the plaintiff had a history of interference with the children’s

activities, the defendant did not afford the court a timely

opportunity forreconsideration. The record is therefore

devoid of any evidence or deliberation as to why the

release authorizations should not have been signed or

whether the signing of them would have prejudiced the

defendant. ‘‘It is fundamental that claims of error must

be distinctly raised and decided in the trial court. . . .

Practice Book § 60-5 provides in relevant part that our

appellate courts shall not be bound to consider a claim

unless it was distinctly raised at the trial . . . . That

requirement means that it must be so stated as to bring

to the attention of the court the precise matter on which

its decision is being asked. . . . As our Supreme Court

has explained, [t]he reason for the rule is obvious: to

permit a party to raise a claim on appeal that has not

been raised at trial—after it is too late for the trial court

or the opposing party to address the claim—would

encourage trial by ambuscade, which is unfair to both

the trial court and the opposing party.’’ (Citations omit-
ted; emphasis omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) U.S. Bank National Assn. v. Iaquessa, 132 Conn.

App. 812, 814–15, 34 A.3d 1005 (2012).

Furthermore, having acquiesced in the court’s first

suggested option by signing the release authorizations,

the defendant cannot now seek to attack the order

to do so on appeal. Generally, when an appellant has

expressed agreement with or has acquiesced in a court’s

ruling, she cannot obtain appellate review of such ruling

on appeal. See, e.g., Perugini v. Giuliano, 148 Conn.

App. 861, 870–71, A.3d (2014) (court declines

to review unpreserved claim that trial court erred in

suspending deposition when at trial appellant agreed

to terms of court’s order regarding suspension); Menon

v. Dux, 81 Conn. App. 167, 170–71, 838 A.2d 1038 (claim

unpreserved where appealing party expressly acquiesced in court’s evidentiary ruling at trial), cert. denied,

269 Conn. 913, 852 A.2d 743, cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1003,

125 S. Ct. 623, 160 L. Ed. 2d 463 (2004). Accordingly,

we decline to review this unpreserved claim.

IV

The defendant’s final argument is that the trial court

improperly ‘‘lifted’’ an appellate stay that was in effect

with respect to its orders permitting the plaintiff to

directly obtain information from the children’s academic and health providers and requiring her to sign

release authorizations to facilitate that access. She

claims that the court erred in lifting the stay on April

11, 2013, pursuant to Practice Book § 61-11, by classifying its orders as custodial.16 The record is inadequate

to review her claim. There is no indication in the record

that the court vacated a stay on either April 4 or 11,

2013, the two hearings that are the subjects of this

appeal. There are no motions in the record filed by

either party addressing the issue of a stay on appeal.

During the April 11, 2013 hearing, although the court

indicated that it did not believe that anything other than

its orders with respect to the guardian ad litem were

stayed, it then stated that it would entertain a motion

to vacate a stay if one existed, and scheduled a date,

May 22, 2013, for such a motion to be heard as a ‘‘write

on . . . .’’ That is as far as the discussion of the existence of any appellate stay developed.17

Moreover, even if we had been provided with an

adequate record to review this claim, which indicated

when the court vacated the stay and its reasons therefor, such a claim would not be reviewable on direct

appeal. ‘‘Pursuant to Practice Book § 61-14, [t]he sole

remedy of any party desiring the court to review an

order concerning a stay of execution shall be by motion

for review under Section 66-6. . . . Issues regarding a

stay of execution cannot be raised on direct appeal.’’

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Housing Authority

v. Morales, 67 Conn. App. 139, 140, 786 A.2d 1134 (2001);

see also Santoro v. Santoro, 33 Conn. App. 839, 841,
639 A.2d 1044 (1994). Practice Book § 66-6 requires that

‘‘[m]otions for review . . . be filed within ten days

from the issuance of notice of the order sought to be

reviewed. . . .’’ If a party does not file a motion for

review, that party is precluded from challenging the

court’s stay order by means of a direct appeal. See

Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Caldrello, 79 Conn. App.

384, 392 n.6, 830 A.2d 767 (2003). We therefore decline

to review this claim because it has been improperly

presented for resolution on appeal.

The appeal is dismissed with respect to the defendant’s claims that the court improperly appointed Feltman as guardian ad litem and improperly required the

defendant to pay one half of Feltman’s fees. The judgment is affirmed in all other respects.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff did not appear to defend this appeal. Pursuant to Practice

Book § 67-13, ‘‘[i]n family and juvenile matters and other matters involving

minor children, counsel for the minor child . . . shall, within ten days of

the filing of the appellee’s brief, file either: (1) a brief, (2) a statement

adopting the brief of either the appellant or an appellee, or (3) a detailed

statement that the factual or legal issues on appeal do not implicate the

child’s interests.’’

In the present case, the attorney for the minor children filed a § 67-13

statement, indicating, in relevant part, as follows: ‘‘It is the undersigned’s

position that the issues raised in the defendant’s appeal are moot with respect

to the appointment and fees of the guardian ad litem. The undersigned also

believes the issue is moot with respect to [access to information by the

plaintiff, Kenneth V. Clark], as he has been receiving the same pursuant to

a subsequent order of the trial court.’’ This statement is made without any

reference to the date or substance of the subsequent order. The attorney

forthe minor children did not attend oral argument before this court. Accordingly, we consider the appeal on the basis of the appellate brief of the

defendant, the oral arguments advanced by the defendant before this court,

and the statement from the attorney for the minor children.

2 On January 14, 2014, we notified the defendant to be prepared at oral

argument to address the following issues: (1) whether the portion of the

appeal challenging the appointment of the guardian ad litem should be

dismissed as moot because the trial court subsequently vacated that order;

(2) whether this court lacks jurisdiction because the trial court has not yet

set the amount of the guardian ad litem’s fees; and (3) whether the defendant’s claim challenging the trial court’s order regarding an appellate stay

is reviewable on direct appeal.

3 Three earlier appeals have been disposed without any decision on the

merits. An appeal from the judgment of dissolution was the subject of Clark

v. Clark, 127 Conn. App. 148, 13 A.3d 682, cert. denied, 301 Conn. 914, 19

A.3d 1260 (2011). An appeal from postjudgment orders is reported in Clark

v. Clark, 130 Conn. App. 786, 26 A.3d 640 (2011). An appeal filed by the law

firm of the appellant’s former counsel from the denial of counsel’s motion

to intervene is reported in Clark v. Clark, 115 Conn. App. 500, 974 A.2d 33

(2009). In addition to this appeal, there is another pending appeal that was

filed on December 27, 2013, under Docket No. AC 36415.

4 This court reversed the judgment of dissolution ‘‘only insofar as it [failed]

to include the arrearage of pendente lite support’’ and remanded the case

for further proceedings as to that issue. Clark v. Clark, supra, 127 Conn.

App. 160.

5 Reference is made in the defendant’s brief to a pendente lite order issued

by Judge Schofield on July 9, 2007, suspending the plaintiff’s visitation with

the children, but the order cannot be located in the court file. There is no

dispute, however, that the plaintiff has not had visitation with the children

for years.

6 Reference is made during the hearing to the plaintiff’s pending motion

to modify his unallocated child support and alimony, to which the defendant

filed an objection, but the court did not conduct a hearing on that motion.

The court file contains a motion for continuance of a status conference,
granted by Judge Emons on March 18, 2013, and rescheduling a status

conference for April 4, 2013. We will presume that the matter was before the

court on April 4, 2013, for a status conference, which is what the defendant

indicated during oral argument.

7 There is a partial transcript in the file indicating that on August 8, 2011,

Judge Shay held a hearing to resolve the issue of where the older child

would attend school that fall. Judge Shay began the hearing by stating, ‘‘[W]e

all start with a statutory right of both parents to obtain school records and

medical records of their children.’’ After a lengthy discussion of what had

occurred thus far to find the older child a suitable educational placement,

with the defendant providing the court with most of the information, the

plaintiff complained that he was being left out of the admissions process.

Ultimately, the court advised the defendant: ‘‘[I]f there’s something you’re

comfortable sharing with [the plaintiff] with regard to the plans that are

going forward affecting his son and your son, then you need to share them

with him.’’ The court then addressed the plaintiff, stating, ‘‘And you, sir,

need to put your hands in your pockets or sit on them or whatever, and

just take that as information and, like, for instance, if she were to call and

say we believe collectively that [the older son] should be in such and such

a school . . . and she tells you that, I don’t want you calling that school.

I don’t want you interviewing anybody down there. Because we’ll deal with

this, we’ll get to this issue, but you’ve got to do it in a logical manner. So

. . . you’re entitled to know the school, you’re entitled to know the cost.

You’re entitled to know the schedule. . . . But once you get that information

. . . you are not to be calling the school. You are not to be interfering in

any way with that. . . . You can hire a lawyer if you want. You can come

back in and you can file a motion that says, nope, I think it’s in his best

interest that he goes to private school, public school, whatever. . . . That’s

your right. . . . But until a court says otherwise, it’s her decision.’’ In concluding, the court stated: ‘‘So, [the defendant] sends the information to you,

as I said, if she has brochures, it if describes the curriculum, if it describes

the facility, if it describes the overall school, the school year, whatever.

You’re entitled to that information. . . . You’re entitled to know what the

projected costs are for that. You’re entitled to know if and when there are

any scholarship[s] or any programs that would remit tuition or whatever,

you’re entitled to know that. But what you’re not entitled to do at this stage

without further order of the court [is] to contact them in any fashion,

and that would include a personal visit, e-mail, phone call, text, tweet.’’

(Emphasis added.)

8 General Statutes § 46b-56 (g) provides: ‘‘A parent not granted custody

of a minor child shall not be denied the right of access to the academic,

medical, hospital or other health records of such minor child, unless otherwise ordered by the court for good cause shown.’’

9

In addition to his complaint to Judge Shay on August 8, 2011, about not

being provided with information as to the older child’s admission process;

see footnote 7 of this opinion; the plaintiff previously had filed several

motions in which he alleged, inter alia, that the defendant had failed to

provide him with information about the children.

10 During oral argument before this court, the defendant admitted that the

order of which she complains, to pay Feltman one half of a total fee of

$3000, was issued on a date subsequent to April 11, 2013, and that she failed

to amend her appeal or provide the appropriate transcript.

11 At various points in her brief, the defendant claims that testimony and

evidence were presented to the court, but the record reflects that no witnesses were sworn and no exhibits were marked on either April 4 or 11, 2013.

12 Previously in this opinion, we set forth the substance of Judge Shay’s

ruling. See footnote 7 of this opinion. We note that the defendant argues

that the word ‘‘them’’ in the final sentence of the court’s ruling refers to

the parties’ children. It is well settled that ‘‘[t]he construction of an order

is a question of law over which we exercise plenary review.’’ Gianetti v.

Gerardi, 122 Conn. App. 126, 130, 998 A.2d 807 (2010). We disagree with

this interpretation of the order and conclude, upon reviewing the order in

its entirety, that the word ‘‘them’’ refers to the schools being considered

for the parties’ older child. Furthermore, we conclude that the court’s order

precluded the plaintiff only from contacting the school or schools being

considered during the admissions process.

13 In her brief, the defendant also argues that any order should have been

clarified by the judge who first entered it. ‘‘There is no requirement that

the same judge rule on all matters arising after a dissolution judgment. See,

e.g., Barnard v. Barnard, 214 Conn. 99, 100, 570 A.2d 690 (1990); Kolkmeyer

v. Kolkmeyer, 18 Conn. App. 336, 337, 558 A.2d 253 (1989).’’ Holcombe v.

Holcombe, supra, 22 Conn. App. 365.
14 As of April 11, 2013, the older child was enrolled in and attending a

private school in Buffalo, New York.

15 During the course of the hearing, the court stated: ‘‘We need to get off

of the frozen zone and get something done one way or the other. And if

not . . . if we shouldn’t do it immediately, we should put a plan in place

for how to do it.’’

16 Practice Book § 61-11 (c) states in relevant part: ‘‘Unless otherwise

ordered, no automatic stay shall apply to . . . orders of periodic alimony,

support, custody or visitation in family matters brought pursuant to chapter

25 or to any later modification of such orders. . . . Any party may file a

motion to terminate or impose a stay in matters covered by this subsection,

either before or after judgment is rendered, based upon the existence or

expectation of an appeal. . . . The judge who entered the order in a family

matter from which an appeal lies may terminate any stay in that matter

upon motion of a party . . . or sua sponte, after considering the factors

set forth in this subsection or if the judge is of the opinion that an extension

of time to appeal is sought or the appeal is taken only for delay. Whether

acting on a motion of a party or sua sponte, the judge shall hold a hearing

prior to terminating the stay.’’

17 Even if the court had considered the issue of a stay and had determined

that there was no automatic stay because the access order was custodial,

we would decline to review such ruling because the defendant has failed

to brief the issue adequately. ‘‘[W]e are not required to review claims that are

inadequately briefed. . . . [A]nalysis, rather than mere abstract assertion, is

required in order to avoid abandoning an issue by failure to brief the issue

properly. . . . Where the parties cite no law and provide no analysis of

their claims, we do not review such claims.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Russell v. Russell, 91 Conn. App. 619, 634–35, 882 A.2d 98, cert.

denied, 276 Conn. 924, 925, 888 A.2d 92 (2005). Her brief contains nothing

but bald assertions that ‘‘[c]ommunications and getting reports’’ and ‘‘access

to information’’ are ‘‘not custody issues,’’ without providing any legal authority or analysis.