IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

East Stroudsburg Area School District:

:

v. : No. 529 C.D. 2018

: ARGUED: September 9, 2019

Dallan Acquisitions, LLC, Monroe :

County Board of Assessment :

Revision, Monroe County and Middle :

Smithfield Township, Marshalls :

Creek Group, LLC :

:

Appeal of: Marshalls Creek Group, :

LLC :

BEFORE: HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, Judge

HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

BY JUDGE CEISLER FILED: October 17, 2019

Appellant, Marshalls Creek Group, LLC (Taxpayer), successor in interest to

Dallan Acquisitions, LLC (Dallan),

1 appeals from the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Monroe County (trial court)2 dated February 20, 2018, as modified by the 

order of March 13, 2018. Taxpayer filed a motion to quash a tax assessment appeal 

filed by Appellee, the East Stroudsburg Area School District (School District),

 

1 The caption in this case also lists the Monroe County Board of Assessment Revision 

(Board), Monroe County (County), and Middle Smithfield Township (Township) as parties. The 

Board has filed a notice of non-participation. The record does not reflect any participation by the 

County or the Township.

2 The Honorable Arthur L. Zulick presided.
2

pertaining to real property originally owned by Dallan and subsequently sold to 

Taxpayer. The trial court denied the motion to quash and later granted Taxpayer’s

motion to certify that order for immediate appeal. After thorough review, we affirm

the trial court’s order.

I. Background

A. Selection of Properties for Assessment Appeals

A related tax assessment appeal matter was argued before this Court the same 

day as this case. See E. Stroudsburg Area Sch. Dist. v. Meadow Lake Plaza, LLC

(Pa. Cmwlth., No. 371 C.D. 2018, filed October 17, 2019) (Meadow Lake II). Our 

opinion in Meadow Lake II contains a more detailed recitation of the general

background of the School District’s decision to appeal a number of tax assessments 

on real properties located in the School District.3

Relevant here, the School District retained a consultant, Keystone Realty 

Advisors, LLC (Keystone) to identify properties in the School District that 

potentially were sufficiently under-assessed that each would generate at least 

$10,000 per year in additional real property taxes ($10,000 threshold) in the event 

of a successful assessment appeal. Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 7a, 168a, 1161a62a. The School District did not provide any criteria to Keystone for selection of 

properties, other than the $10,000 threshold. R.R. at 7a. The School District chose 

the $10,000 threshold based on its conclusion that appeals with smaller potential tax 

revenue gains would not be cost-effective to pursue. R.R. at 7a, 169a, 1164a-67a.

 

3 The School District is entitled to pursue assessment appeals to the same extent as a 

property owner: “A taxing district shall have the right to appeal any assessment within its 

jurisdiction in the same manner, subject to the same procedure and with like effect as if the appeal 

were taken by a taxable person with respect to the assessment . . . .” 53 Pa.C.S. § 8855.
3

Applying the $10,000 threshold as instructed by the School District, Keystone 

identified and recommended a number of properties for assessment appeals. Of 

significance here, based on the $10,000 threshold, all of the properties Keystone

identified and recommended for assessment appeals by the School District were 

commercial income-generating properties. R.R. at 1164a-65a. 

After reviewing each of Keystone’s recommendations, R.R. at 1170a-77a, the 

School District pursued assessment appeals concerning all of the properties 

identified by Keystone. R.R. at 168a, 1172a-73a. The School District did not pursue 

assessment appeals of any properties other than those identified and recommended 

by Keystone. R.R. at 1172a-73a. Thus, all of the School District’s assessment 

appeals related to commercial properties. R.R. at 7a.

B. Assessment Appeal Regarding the Property

Taxpayer is the current owner of a shopping center (Property) in Middle 

Smithfield Township, Monroe County, located in the School District. The Property 

was among a number of real properties in the School District identified by Keystone 

as meeting the $10,000 threshold and recommended for assessment appeals.4 The 

School District filed an assessment appeal with the Monroe County Board of 

Assessment Revision (Board) concerning the Property for the 2016 tax year. The 

Board denied the appeal, and the School District filed a petition for review in the 

trial court.

While the School District’s assessment appeal concerning the Property was 

pending, Taxpayer bought the Property from Dallan. Taxpayer filed a motion to 

 

4 The Property is currently assessed as having a fair market value of $4,347,759. Based on 

the County’s established predetermined ratio of 25%, the Property’s current assessed valuation is 

$1,086,940. R.R. at 7a. Taxpayer purchased the Property from Dallan in 2016 for $23,650,000. 

R.R. at 6a.
4

quash the assessment appeal. Taxpayer contended the School District’s application 

of the $10,000 threshold and the resulting selection of only commercial properties 

for assessment appeals violated the tax uniformity requirement of the Pennsylvania 

Constitution (Uniformity Clause).

5

 Further, Taxpayer asserted the School District 

deliberately avoided assessment appeals against residential properties for political 

reasons.6

After discovery and a hearing,7the trial court denied Taxpayer’s motion to 

quash the School District’s assessment appeal concerning the Property. The trial 

court based its factual findings on the evidence presented by the parties. The trial 

court found the evidence did not show the School District intended to appeal only 

commercial property assessments. R.R. at 8a. The trial court also rejected, as 

contrary to the evidence, Taxpayer’s contention that the School District intentionally 

avoided assessment appeals concerning residential properties in order to avoid 

angering voters. Id.

The trial court then applied the same legal analysis as in its decision in East 

Stroudsburg Area School District v. MNA Stroud Realty LLC (No. 8354 CV 2015, 

filed Jan. 30, 2018) (Meadow Lake I), affirmed by Meadow Lake II. R.R. at 8a. 

 

5

“All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of subjects, within the territorial limits 

of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws.” Pa. Const. 

art. VIII, § 1.

6 Taxpayer also alleged the School District engaged in a practice of projecting large budget 

deficits, while maintaining a large surplus balance, in order to increase taxes. Taxpayer does not 

assert this argument on appeal to this Court.

7 The trial court allowed the parties to address the motion to quash at the start of trial on 

the merits, and then held a separate hearing on the motion several months thereafter. R.R. at 5a6a.
5

Based on that analysis, the trial court concluded the $10,000 threshold did not violate 

the Uniformity Clause. Id.

Taxpayer filed a motion requesting certification from the trial court for an 

immediate appeal of its interlocutory order denying Taxpayer’s motion to quash. 

The trial court granted the motion and amended its prior order pursuant to 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 341(c). This appeal by Taxpayer 

followed.

II. Issues on Appeal

On appeal,8 Taxpayer raises both legal and factual arguments. Taxpayer

insiststhe School District’s assessment appeals targeting only commercial properties 

violated the Uniformity Clause, under our Supreme Court’s recent decision in Valley 

Forge Towers Apartments N, LP v. Upper Merion Area School District, 163 A.3d 

962 (Pa. 2017). In a related sub-argument, Taxpayer contends the trial court’s 

analysis also applied an incorrect legal standard in its uniformity analysis, contrary 

to the holding of Valley Forge.

Factually, Taxpayer asserts the evidence in the record supports its position

rather than that of the School District. Taxpayer maintains the trial court failed to 

apply Taxpayer’s purportedly unrebutted and uncontested evidence, as well as 

alleged admissions by the School District. Taxpayer contends the School District 

failed to prove that it ever adopted an assessment appeal program or that it 

implemented the $10,000 threshold evenly among all types of properties. Taxpayer 

further maintains the trial court erred in relying on the testimony of the School 

 

8 This Court’s review of the trial court’s decision in a property tax assessment appeal is 

limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its discretion, committed an error of 

law, or made findings of fact not supported by substantial evidence. Maula v. Northampton Cty. 

Div. of Assessment, 149 A.3d 442 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (en banc).
6

District’s chief financial officer (CFO). Taxpayer also contends the trial court 

improperly relied on evidence outside the record.

III. Discussion

A. Taxpayer’s Legal Arguments

In In re Appeal of Springfield School District, 101 A.3d 835 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

2014), overruled in part on other grounds by Valley Forge, this Court considered a 

tax assessment appeal raising a similar issue to that presented in the instant appeal. 

The school district in Springfield chose to appeal assessments where there was an 

estimated potential tax revenue gain of $9,000 to $11,000 per year – notably 

comparable to the $10,000 threshold here. Like the $10,000 threshold applied by 

the School District, the monetary threshold applied in Springfield resulted in 

assessment appeals affecting commercial properties. However, this Court held that 

such a result did not warrant a conclusion that the selection of properties for 

assessment appeals based on a monetary threshold violated the Uniformity Clause. 

In Springfield, as in this case, the school district asserted it filed an assessment 

appeal against the property at issue based solely on the application of the monetary 

threshold, not on the property’s commercial status. We reasoned, however, that even

a decision to target only commercial properties for assessment appeals would not

have created an impermissibly non-uniform subclass of taxpayers or properties.

Subsequently, in Valley Forge, a group of taxpayers challenged a school 

district’s decision to appeal assessments of commercial properties but not residential 

properties. The school district focused solely on commercial properties, based on a 

general perception that their values were usually higher than the values of residential 

properties, and further, a concern that appeals of assessments on residential 

properties would be politically unpopular. Our Supreme Court agreed with the 
7

taxpayers that such discrimination between property classifications created 

impermissible subclasses that violated the Uniformity Clause. The Court also 

overruled Springfield to the extent that this Court had approved selections of 

properties for assessment appeals based on their commercial or residential character. 

Specifically, the Court held that “a taxing authority is not permitted to implement a 

program of only appealing the assessments of one sub-classification of properties, 

where that sub-classification is drawn according to property type – that is, its use 

as commercial, apartment complex, single-family residential, industrial, or the 

like.”

9

 Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 978 (emphasis added).

Of significance here, however, our Supreme Court in Valley Forge expressly 

noted that unlike a selection based on the commercial or residential character of a 

property, a taxing district’s choice to pursue assessment appeals based solely on 

financial criteria would not necessarily offend the Uniformity Clause:

Our disapproval of Springfield’s interpretation of this Court’s precedent 

should not be equated to disagreement with the result it reached. In 

Springfield, the property owners challenged a school district’s policy of 

using of a monetary threshold to decide which properties to appeal. . . . 

They did not allege a scheme involving disparate treatment of property 

sub-classifications drawn according to property type or the status of its 

owner as a resident or non-resident of the taxing district.

Valley Forge, 163 A.3d at 975 n.13. Further, the Court took pains to observe “that 

nothing in [the Valley Forge] opinion should be construed as suggesting that the use 

of a monetary threshold – such as the one challenged in Springfield – or some other 

selection criteria would violate the Uniformity Clause if it were implemented 

 

9 The school district in Valley Forge had a specific multi-year assessment appeal plan that 

would have targeted apartment complexes in one tax year, shopping centers in another, offices in 

still another, and so on.
8

without regard to the type of property in question or the residency status of its 

owner.” Id. at 979.

In Meadow Lake I, the trial court concluded that our holding in Springfield

and our Supreme Court’s reasoning in the quoted portions of Valley Forge supported 

the School District’s position that the $10,000 threshold is constitutional. We agreed

in Meadow Lake II. Here, the trial court cited and relied on its legal analysis in 

Meadow Lake I and reached the same conclusion. Consistent with our holding in 

Meadow Lake II, we discern no error in that conclusion. Contrary to Taxpayer’s

argument, we find nothing in our Supreme Court’s analysis in Valley Forge that 

precludes application of a reasonable monetary threshold for assessment appeals, 

based on an estimate of the minimum potential revenue gain that will make a tax 

assessment appeal cost-effective. Indeed, a taxing district’s selection of a property 

for an assessment appeal that failed to take into account whether the appeal was 

likely to be cost-effective might be fiscally irresponsible.

Taxpayer also argues the trial court required evidence of wrongful conduct by 

the School District, and thus improperly applied a rational basis analysis in 

concluding that the $10,000 threshold was consistent with the Uniformity Clause. 

Cf. Valley Forge (rejecting rational basis analysis as the standard in assessment 

uniformity cases). We discern no merit in this argument. The trial court properly 

relied on applicable precedents, Valley Forge and Springfield. Both decisions 

support the premise that selecting properties for assessment appeals based on 

financial criteria alone, without regard to property type, does not violate the 

Uniformity Clause.
9

We agree with the trial court that Valley Forge and Springfield support the 

School District’s position that the $10,000 threshold does not violate the Uniformity 

Clause.

B. Taxpayer’s Factual Arguments

The trial court was the finder of fact in this case. As such, it maintained 

exclusive province over the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence. 

In re Penn-Delco Sch. Dist., 903 A.2d 600 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006). The trial court was 

free to believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented, to make all credibility 

determinations, and to resolve all conflicts in the evidence. Boro Constr., Inc. v. 

Ridley Sch. Dist., 992 A.2d 208 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). Notably, the trial court was 

not required to accept even unrebutted evidence from Taxpayer’s expert. Green v.

Schuylkill Cty. Bd. of Assessment Appeals, 772 A.2d 419 (Pa. 2001).

This Court is prohibited from making contrary credibility determinations or 

reweighing the evidence. Penn-Delco. We are bound by the findings of the trial 

court that have adequate support in the record, so long as those findings do not reflect 

capricious disregard of competent and credible evidence. Leon E. Wintermyer, Inc. 

v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Marlowe), 812 A.2d 478 (Pa. 2002). Capricious 

disregard occurs only when the fact-finder deliberately ignores relevant, competent 

evidence. Id.

Here, the trial court obviously credited testimony that the School District CFO 

concluded the $10,000 threshold was the minimum potential gain that would make 

an assessment appeal cost-effective for any property. R.R. at 7a, 169a, 1164a-67a.

10

 

 

10 Notably, Taxpayer’s counsel expressly conceded, “When you look at the School 

District’s minutes, it becomes clear that what happens is their consultants provide 

recommendations, admittedly, based on potential appeals that would result in the highest revenue. 

They submit that to the [School] Board for consideration.” R.R. at 1103a (emphasis added).
10

The trial court evidently credited testimony that the School District relied on 

Keystone to identify properties meeting the $10,000 threshold, R.R. at 1178a, 1180a; 

that Keystone was instructed to search for any and all properties meeting that 

threshold, R.R. at 1162a-63a; and that the School District would have filed 

assessment appeals relating to residential properties as well as commercial 

properties, had Keystone identified any residential properties as meeting the $10,000 

threshold. R.R. at 1162a-63a. That testimony constituted substantial evidence 

supporting the trial court’s factual findings.

Taxpayer’s factual arguments to the contrary are not persuasive.

11

 For 

example, Taxpayer avers that the School District admitted, on the record, to the 

material facts averred in Taxpayer’s motion to quash. Brief for Appellant at 7. 

Actually, the School District specifically denied that it engaged in disparate 

treatment of subclasses of real property, R.R. at 1062a; that it “has an illegal and 

systematic practice” regarding assessment appeals, R.R. at 1063a; that it avoided 

assessment appeals against residential properties for political reasons, R.R. at 1066a, 

1069a; that it targeted properties for assessment appeals in a non-uniform manner or 

without considering uniformity and fairness in taxation, R.R. at 1068a, 1070a; and

that it “concentrated its appeal solely on a subclass of highly-assessed commercial 

property,” R.R. at 1068a.

Contrary to Taxpayer’s insistence, the record demonstrates Taxpayer’s

evidence was both contested and contradicted by the School District. Taxpayer 

 

11 Taxpayer’s recitation of facts in its principal brief consists largely of argument 

advocating Taxpayer’s own version of the facts. We remind counsel for Taxpayer that the Rules 

of Appellate Procedure expressly require exclusion of all argument from the statement of facts: 

“The statement of the case shall not contain any argument. It is the responsibility of appellant to 

present in the statement of the case a balanced presentation of the history of the proceedings and 

the respective contentions of the parties.” Pa. R.A.P. 2117(b).
11

points to testimony by its tax uniformity expert, Reaves C. Lukens, III (Lukens), that 

there were approximately 20 commercial properties and 10 residential properties 

within the School District that fit the $10,000 threshold, but which were not the 

subjects of assessment appeals. R.R. at 1180a. 

Lukens conceded he did not independently confirm the property type of any 

of the properties he listed in his report; he simply accepted the property type code in 

the database he reviewed. R.R. at 1117a. Further, when asked whether his method 

of analysis was similar to that used by Keystone or other consultants to identify 

under-assessed properties, Lukens could only say he “suspect[ed]” it was similar. 

R.R. at 1141a. On cross-examination, he acknowledged he did not investigate the 

actual market value of any of the properties he identified; he merely used each 

property’s sale price as “a stand-in” for market value. R.R. at 1120a. However, he 

admitted that he never even reviewed the property deeds. Id. Further, he stated that 

as an appraiser, “I would not use a sale price and turn that into my opinion of market 

value.” Id. Nonetheless, he testified immediately thereafter that he was “accepting 

sale prices as a reasonable indication of market value . . . [a]nd usually they’re a 

pretty good proxy for market value.” Id. Asked whether he could guarantee that a 

property was under-assessed, based solely on deed price, Lukens responded, “I 

would be reluctant to guarantee anything. This is raw data that got processed. I’m 

a one-trick pony. I don’t want to put my license on the line doing an appraisal.” Id.

at 1122a. Thus, Lukens’s expert opinion cannot reasonably be deemed either 

uncontested or uncontradicted. Moreover, it was not unequivocal.

Taxpayer also argues the trial court erroneously relied on facts and reasoning 

from its decision in Meadow Lake I, “without reference to most of the evidence of 

this record.” Brief for Appellant at 8. Contrary to Taxpayer’s representation, the 
12

trial court never mentioned a single fact from Meadow Lake I; it merely noted –

accurately – that the two cases were similar. More importantly, the trial court did 

not rely on any facts from Meadow Lake I. As for references to this case’s record, 

Taxpayer cites no authority requiring a finder of fact to provide record citations for 

its findings. In any event, as set forth above, the record contains substantial evidence 

to support the trial court’s findings.

Taxpayer’s assertion of facts allegedly supporting an inference of a political 

motive on the part of the School District is likewise without merit. Taxpayer 

contends a school board member asked whether the properties being recommended 

for appeal were commercial or residential, and the School District’s CFO responded 

that “all the properties identified by the School District’s consultant were 

commercial, which he found impressive.” Brief for Appellant at 11. This is a gross 

mischaracterization of the cited school board minutes, which actually stated the 

School District’s CFO and Solicitor “were impressed with the amount of work

Keystone Realty did and time they [sic] spent.” R.R. at 190a (emphasis added).

Taxpayer asserts the School District “agreed” that it “neglected” to appeal the 

assessments of 20 commercial properties and 10 residential properties that met the 

$10,000 threshold. Brief for Appellant at 13. During the cited discussion among 

the court and counsel for both parties, the School District’s counsel conceded that 

Lukens testified to that effect on behalf of Taxpayer. However, counsel for the 

School District also stated, “I don’t believe Mr. Lukens has provided a basis for a 

finding that these are properties that meet [the $10,000] threshold.” R.R. at 1180a.

Taxpayer contends the trial court “ordered the School District to respond to 

[Taxpayer’s] expert reports by producing the School District’s own expert reports” 

but “[t]he School District never produced a rebuttal expert report.” Brief for 
13

Appellant at 14. This assertion by Taxpayer mischaracterizes the trial court’s 

directive. The trial court never ordered the School District to file an expert report; 

it merely imposed a filing deadline for any such report the School District might 

decide to submit. See id. Taxpayer cites no authority for its implicit argument that 

the trial court was required to accept Taxpayer’s expert report as credible in the 

absence of an opposing report. Indeed, that is not the law. As explained above, the 

trial court, as the finder of fact, was free to reject any evidence, including expert 

evidence and unrebutted evidence.

Notably, Taxpayer’s counsel acknowledged the question of whether the 

School District deliberately avoided assessment appeals concerning residential 

properties was a credibility issue. R.R. at 1082a. The record contains substantial 

evidence supporting the trial court’s findings of fact that the School District did not 

act with a political motive in selecting properties for assessment appeals, and did not 

set out with the intent to file assessment appeals solely against commercial 

properties. See R.R. at 8a. We will not disturb those findings on appeal.

IV. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing discussion, we affirm the trial court’s order denying 

Taxpayer’s motion to quash the School District’s assessment appeal.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

East Stroudsburg Area School District:

:

v. : No. 529 C.D. 2018

:

Dallan Acquisitions, LLC, Monroe :

County Board of Assessment :

Revision, Monroe County and Middle :

Smithfield Township, Marshalls :

Creek Group, LLC :

:

Appeal of: Marshalls Creek Group, :

LLC :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 17th day of October, 2019, the February 20, 2018 order of 

the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County is AFFIRMED.

__________________________________

ELLEN CEISLER, Judge