1RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATIONPursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2000 FED App. 0071P (6th Cir.)File Name: 00a0071p.06UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSFOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT_________________TYRONEK.HARRIS,Petitioner-Appellant,v.UNITEDSTATES OFAMERICA,Respondent-Appellee.;>1No. 97-4309Appeal from the United States District Courtfor the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.No. 96-01235—James L. Graham, District Judge.Argued: February 4, 2000Decided and Filed: February 25, 2000Before: NELSON, COLE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges._________________COUNSELARGUED:Melynda W. Cook, SCHAD, BUDA & COOK,Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant. Gary L. Spartis,ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbus,Ohio, for Appellee.ON BRIEF:Melynda W. Cook,SCHAD, BUDA & COOK, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Appellant.Gary L. Spartis, ASSISTANT UNITED STATESATTORNEY, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.2Harris v. United StatesNo. 97-4309_________________OPINION_________________DAVID A. NELSON, Circuit Judge. Tyrone Harris wassentenced to imprisonment for 87 months after he pleadedguilty to a charge of possessing more than 500 grams ofcocaine with intent to distribute it, a violation of 21 U.S.C.§§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). On the advice of counsel,Mr. Harris voluntarily dismissed an appeal of his sentence.He later had a change of heart (and a change of lawyers),which led to the filing of a motion to vacate the sentencepursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.The § 2255 motion rested on the proposition that Mr.Harris was denied effective assistance of counsel as a resultof his first lawyer’s failure to object to the manner in whicha presentence investigation report calculated Harris’ criminalhistory score and his base offense level under the UnitedStates Sentencing Guidelines. (The key issue is whether Ohiomisdemeanor convictions should be assigned criminal historypoints where the convictions resulted in “PNC” sentences ofone year or more.) The district court denied the motion, andMr. Harris appeals. We see no merit in the objections Harrissays his lawyer ought to have raised, and we shall affirm thedistrict court’s order.IWith a co-defendant, James Bridges, Mr. Harris maderepeated sales of cocaine powder and cocaine base to agovernment informant during the summer and fall of 1995.Harris was arrested in October of that year. A search of hishouse at the time of the arrest disclosed substantial quantitiesof cocaine powder, cocaine base and marijuana, as well asseveral firearms.A federal indictment handed up against Harris and Bridgesin December of 1995 contained 12 counts naming Harris.Pursuant to a plea agreement, Harris pleaded guilty to a singleNo. 97-4309Harris v. United States3count of possessing cocaine with intent to distribute it; theremaining charges against him were dropped.A probation officer prepared a presentence reportcalculating Mr. Harris’ sentence range – a function of hisoffense level and his criminal history score – under thesentencing guidelines. Mr. Harris did not press an objectionto the calculations, although he was given ample opportunityto do so.In recognition of substantial assistance provided by Mr.Harris to the government in other proceedings, the UnitedStates moved for a six-level downward departure in Harris’base offense level. The district court granted the motion,thereby reducing the guideline sentence range toimprisonment for 87-108 months. (Without the departure, therange would have been 168-210 months.) The court imposeda sentence at the bottom of the revised range.Despite his receipt of a relatively favorable sentence, andafter he had voluntarily dismissed a direct appeal to this court,Mr. Harris moved for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Thedistrict court denied the motion, granted a certificate ofappealability as to Harris’ claim of ineffective assistance, anddenied a certificate of appealability as to two additionalclaims. Harris filed a notice of appeal addressing the latterdenial only, but this court found the notice effective to conferappellate jurisdiction over the denial of the § 2255 motionitself. SeeHarris v. United States, 170 F.3d 607, 608 (6thCir. 1999). We later declined to issue an expanded certificateof appealability, so the ineffective assistance claim is the onlyone now before us.IIMr. Harris argues that he was denied effective assistance ofcounsel insofar as his lawyer failed to object to the inclusionof two Ohio misdemeanor convictions in the calculation ofthe criminal history score. One of the convictions was fordriving with a suspended license and the other was fordisorderly conduct. Under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(c)(1), a4Harris v. United StatesNo. 97-4309conviction for either of those particular offenses should not becounted in calculating a criminal history score for a drugoffender unless the conviction resulted in a sentence ofprobation for at least one year or imprisonment for at least 30days. Mr. Harris contends that neither of his convictionsresulted in such a sentence.The contention is wrong. Although Mr. Harris was notsentenced to supervised probation, he was sentenced to “2years PNC” on one conviction and “1 year PNC” on the other.Ohio courts use “PNC” as shorthand for “provided noconvictions” – a condition on which a sentence ofimprisonment is suspended. SeeCity of Columbus v. Davis,No. 93APC08-1170, 1993 WL 531290, at *1 (Ohio App. Dec.23, 1993). As a form of conditional discharge, a PNCsentence is the “functional equivalent of unsupervisedprobation.”United States v. Gay, Nos. 98-4178, 98-4179,1999 WL 1111517, at **6-7 (6th Cir. Nov. 24, 1999);cf.United States v. Miller, 56 F.3d 719, 721-22 (6th Cir. 1995).A sentence of one or more years “PNC” thus qualifies under§ 4A1.1(c) as a term of probation of at least one year. SeeGay, 1999 WL 1111517, at **7.Because an objection to inclusion of Mr. Harris’misdemeanor convictions in the calculation of his criminalhistory score would have been futile, Harris cannot show thathis attorney was constitutionally “ineffective” in failing tomake such an objection. SeeStrickland v. Washington, 466U.S. 668, 687-96 (1984).IIIMr. Harris also argues that his attorney should haveobjected to the drug quantities used in establishing his baseoffense level under the guidelines. Harris suggests that theprobation officer who prepared the presentence reportimproperly included drug quantities that were based onimmunized statements Harris gave pursuant to his pleaagreement and on statements of a co-conspirator and aconfidential informant. It is plain on the face of thepresentence report, however, that the only drugs used inNo. 97-4309Harris v. United States5calculating Harris’ base offense level were those found in thesearch of his house and those sold to the confidentialinformant in corroborated transactions. The report issubstantively correct, if syntactically inelegant, when it statesthat “[t]he defendant is not being attributed with any amountsthat were referred to by the co-defendant, informant, ordefendant himself.” We have done the arithmetic, and itchecks out.Mr. Harris further suggests that the calculation should haveexcluded drugs associated with charges other than the singlecount on which he was convicted. The governing principle,however, is that “in a drug distribution case, quantities andtypes of drugs not specified in the count of conviction are tobe included in determining the offense level if they were partof the same course of conduct or part of a common scheme orplan as the count of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3, comment.(backg’d); see alsoUnited States v. Partington, 21 F.3d 714,717 (6th Cir. 1994), andUnited States v. Miller, 910 F.2d1321, 1327 (6th Cir. 1990),cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1094(1991). It is clear to us that all of the drugs attributed to Mr.Harris for sentencing purposes were involved in the samerelevant course of conduct – and Harris has not argued to thecontrary.AFFIRMED.