1 

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 15a0088p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

_________________ 

CARRIE SCHLAUD; EDWARD J. GROSS; NORA I. GROSS;

PEGGY MASHKE; DIANA ORR, and others similarly 

situated, 

Plaintiffs-Appellants, 

 v. 

RICK SNYDER, et al., 

Defendants, 

INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED AUTOMOBILE,

AEROSPACE, AND AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT 

WORKERS OF AMERICA; MICHIGAN COUNCIL 25 OF THE 

AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY AND 

MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO; CHILD CARE 

PROVIDERS TOGETHER MICHIGAN, 

Defendants-Appellees. 

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No. 12-1105 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids. 

No. 1:10-cv-147—Robert J. Jonker, District Judge. 

Decided and Filed: May 12, 2015 

Before: MOORE and COOK, Circuit Judges; and BERTELSMAN, District Judge.*

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ON BRIEF: William L. Messenger, NATIONAL RIGHT TO WORK LEGAL DEFENSE 

FOUNDATION, Springfield, Virginia, for Appellants. John M. West, BREDHOFF & KAISER, 

PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellees. 

 *

The Honorable William O. Bertelsman, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Kentucky, 

sitting by designation.

>
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 2 

_________________ 

OPINION

_________________ 

 PER CURIAM. The named plaintiffs in this case are childcare providers who received 

subsidies from the State of Michigan and who objected to having a portion of these subsidies 

deducted for purposes of paying fees to a union that they did not wish to join. At issue in this 

appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motions for class 

certification. We held in the first instance, Schlaud v. Snyder (Schlaud I), 717 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 

2013), that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification to the 

named plaintiffs’ proposed class and proposed subclass. The named plaintiffs subsequently filed 

a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme Court granted the petition, vacated our judgment, 

and remanded the case back to us “for further consideration in light of Harris v. Quinn.” 

Schlaud v. Snyder, 134 S. Ct. 2899 (2014). 

 In Harris, the Court reviewed a framework substantially similar to the one at issue here: 

i.e., homecare providers, who were not full-fledged state employees, were required, under the 

terms of a collective bargaining agreement either to join a designated union or, in the alternative, 

to pay the union a fee under an agency-fee provision. The Supreme Court held that this agencyfee provision violated the First Amendment as applied to the homecare providers because these 

providers were not full-fledged state employees. The Court did not, however, touch upon the 

issue of class certification, the sole issue that we were presented with deciding in Schlaud I. 

After carefully reviewing the Harris opinion and examining the briefs filed by the parties in this 

court and before the Supreme Court, we conclude that Harris does not affect our initial decision 

in this case regarding class certification. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s 

judgment denying class certification to the plaintiffs. 

I. BACKGROUND

 We have already reviewed the background of this case in detail, see Schlaud I, 717 F.3d 

at 454–56, and take only a moment to summarize the most pertinent facts. Plaintiffs are home 

childcare providers who received subsidies from Michigan’s Child Development and Care 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 3 

Program (“CDC”) for providing childcare services to low-income families. Under the CDC, 

parents choose a childcare provider, and the Michigan Department of Human Services (“DHS”) 

then makes direct payments to that provider. Child Care Providers Together Michigan 

(“CCPTM”), a joint venture of two other unions, was certified as the exclusive bargaining 

representative for home childcare providers in Michigan. In order to obtain such certification, “a 

neutral third party [first] certified CCPTM as the exclusive majority collective bargaining 

representative of home childcare providers in Michigan[] based on the submission of 22,180 

valid provider-signed authorization cards out of a possible 40,532 eligible providers.” Id. at 454. 

CCPTM then petitioned the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (“MERC”) for an 

election under Michigan law. A secret-ballot election of childcare providers was conducted and, 

of the 6,396 ballots cast, 5,921 were in favor of the CCPTM. MERC certified CCPTM as the 

exclusive bargaining representative based on the results of this election. 

 Shortly afterwards, CCPTM began negotiations over a collective bargaining agreement 

with the Michigan Home Based Child Care Council (“the Council”), an organization created 

through an Interlocal Agreement between DHS and Mott Community College. The proposed 

collective bargaining agreement required all home childcare providers receiving subsidies from 

the CDC either to become members of CCPTM or to pay CCPTM an agency fee through a 

subsidy deduction. CCPTM submitted this proposed agreement to its members for ratification. 

In a mail-ballot election, 4,806 home childcare providers voted in favor of the agreement, 

seventy-eight providers voted against it, and twenty-two ballots were spoiled. The collective 

bargaining agreement became effective on January 1, 2008. Id. at 454–55. “In January 2009, 

DHS began deducting 1.15% from subsidy payments made to home childcare providers. The 

deducted funds were sent to the Council, which then forwarded them to [CCPTM].” Id. at 455 

(citations omitted). 

 In February 2010, Carrie Schlaud and five other home childcare workers filed a putative 

class action, alleging that their First Amendment rights had been violated by the collective 

bargaining agreement’s requiring them to pay union dues or agency fees to CCPTM through 

subsidy deductions. Plaintiffs prayed for injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and money 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 4 

damages. A year later, they moved for class certification, requesting that the district court certify 

the following plaintiff class: 

All individuals who: (1) are home childcare providers in the State of Michigan, 

including all those classified as Group Homes, Family Homes, Relative Care 

Providers, or Day Care Aides, and, (2) have had any Union dues or fees deducted 

from the subsidy paid to them by Michigan’s Department of Human Service. 

R. 63 (Mot. for Certification) (Page ID # 634–35). 

 In March 2011, Michigan stopped the subsidy deductions, “after the new legislative and 

executive leaders of the State terminated the [collective bargaining] arrangement and entered into 

a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs, which included a provision prohibiting the state 

defendants from requiring home childcare providers to financially support a union as a condition 

of receiving subsidies for home childcare.” R. 118 (D. Ct. Op. at 1) (Page ID #2589). After the 

parties stipulated to the terms of this settlement agreement, the CCPTM tendered to the named 

plaintiffs the maximum amount of damages they could recover. Id. at 2 (Page ID #2590). Thus, 

the only remaining issues were, as framed by the district court, “1) whether this case is 

appropriate for class certification; and 2) whether the case is moot in any event.” Id. at 2 (Page 

ID #2590). 

 On the first question, the district court denied plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. It 

pointed to the fact that plaintiffs’ proposed class would include those 4,806 providers who had 

reviewed the proposed collective bargaining agreement and had voted in favor of the provisions 

requiring the payment of union dues or agency fees. This would create a conflict of interest 

between the plaintiffs and a substantial part of their proposed class, thus undermining the 

adequacy requirement that parties must comply with in order successfully to bring a federal class 

action. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4) (“[T]he representative parties will fairly and adequately 

protect the interests of the class.”). Because it determined class certification to be unwarranted 

under Rule 23(a)(4), the district court found the case to be moot. It did not reach the merits of 

the plaintiffs’ claims, R. 118 (D. Ct. Op. at 2) (Page ID #2590), and instead entered judgment in 

favor of the defendants and ordered the suit dismissed, R. 119 (J. at 1) (Page ID #2607). 

 The plaintiffs subsequently filed a motion to amend the judgment, pursuant to Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), where they proposed certification of the following subclass: 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 5 

All individuals who: (1) are home childcare providers in the State of Michigan, 

including all those classified as Group Homes, Family Homes, Relative Care 

Providers, or Day Care Aides, (2) had any Union dues or fees deducted from the 

subsidy paid to them by Michigan Department of Human Service, and (3) did not 

sign authorization cards for the Union or vote in elections that regarded Union 

representation or ratification of the Union’s collective bargaining agreement. 

R. 120 (Mot. to Amend J. at 1) (Page ID # 2608). The district court again denied plaintiffs’ 

request, reasoning that “[s]hort of requiring depositions of each provider in the proposed 

subclass, it is impossible to determine the motivations behind each provider’s action (or inaction) 

regarding the Union.” R. 123 (D. Ct. Op. at 5) (Page ID # 2630). 

 We affirmed the district court’s denials of class certification. With respect to the 

proposed class, we substantially concurred with the reasoning of the district court. With respect 

to the proposed subclass, we offered an alternative reason, pointing to the high turnover rate of 

home childcare providers in Michigan. Schlaud I, 717 F.3d at 458–59. We discuss our 

reasoning in greater detail below. 

 Following our decision, plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of certiorari. The Supreme 

Court granted plaintiffs’ petition, vacated our judgment, and remanded this case for further 

consideration in light of its decision in Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 (2014), a case that 

involved a similar compulsory agency-fee regime in Illinois. In Illinois, the salaries of personalcare providers are paid for by the state through various government subsidies. In 2003, the 

Illinois legislature amended the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (“PLRA”) to declare 

personal-care providers “public employees” of Illinois solely for purposes of PLRA coverage. 

134 S. Ct. at 2626 (citing 20 Ill. Comp. Stat. 2405/3(f)). The workers held a vote, and SEIU 

Healthcare Illinois & Indiana was certified as the exclusive bargaining representative of the 

personal-care providers. SEIU and the State of Illinois subsequently entered into a collective 

bargaining agreement that required all personal-care providers who did not want to become 

members of the Union to pay “fair share” agency fees, which (like the fees in this case) were 

deducted directly from their salaries. Id.

A group of personal-care workers filed a putative class action on behalf of all personal 

assistants in Illinois, seeking “an injunction against enforcement of the fair-share provision and a 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 6 

declaration that the Illinois PLRA violate[d] the First Amendment insofar as it require[d] 

personal assistants to pay a fee to a union that they d[id] not wish to support.” Id. The Supreme 

Court agreed with the objecting personal-care providers. In reaching its decision, the Court 

distinguished Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), which held that state 

employees who did not wish to join a union could nonetheless be obligated to pay an agency fee. 

The Court stated that Abood involved “full-fledged public employees,” id. at 2638, while 

personal-care providers in Illinois were, at best, only “partial-public” or “quasi-public” 

employees, id. The Court reached this conclusion because, under the PLRA, personal-care 

providers were considered state employees only for purposes of collective bargaining; the 

customer retained control over most of the other aspects of the employment relationship, such as 

hiring, training, and discipline. Id. at 2634–36. Having distinguished Harris from Abood, the 

Supreme Court then found that the agency-fee provision in Illinois did “not serve a ‘compelling 

state interes[t] . . . that c[ould] [not] be achieved through means significantly less restrictive of 

associational freedoms.’” Id. at 2639 (first alteration in original) (quoting Knox v. Serv. Emps. 

Int’l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289 (2012)). The Court rejected the argument that the 

agency-fee provision promoted labor peace and benefited the personal-care providers in a way 

that could not be achieved through a less restrictive alternative. Id. at 2639–41. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

 On the issue of class certification, we have noted that “[t]he district court maintains 

substantial discretion in determining whether to certify a class, as it possesses the inherent power 

to manage and control its own pending litigation.” Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 559 

(6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the issue of Rule 59(e) motions, we have 

stated that a “[district] court may grant a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend if there is: (1) a 

clear error of law; (2) newly discovered evidence; (3) an intervening change in controlling law; 

or (4) a need to prevent manifest injustice.” Intera Corp. v. Henderson, 428 F.3d 605, 620 (6th 

Cir. 2005) (emphasis added). We review both decisions—the decision to deny class certification 

and the decision to deny a Rule 59(e) motion—under an abuse-of-discretion standard. See 

Beattie, 511 F.3d at 559; Rose v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 766 F.3d 532, 535 (6th Cir. 2014). 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 7 

“An abuse of discretion occurs when we are left with the ‘definite and firm conviction that the 

[district] court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a 

weighing of the relevant factors’ or ‘where it improperly applies the law or uses an erroneous 

legal standard.’” United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002) (alterations in 

original) (quoting Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2000)). 

B. Analysis 

The state framework at issue in Harris closely parallels the one at issue in this case. Like 

the personal-care providers in Harris, childcare providers in Michigan are only loosely affiliated 

with the state: they receive subsidy payments from the state but are otherwise supervised by the 

individual customer. Indeed, unlike the providers in Harris, providers in Michigan are not even 

employed by the state. Schlaud I, 717 F.3d at 454. In other words, were the merits of the 

plaintiffs’ claims before us, we think that Harris would have much to say. But the merits of their 

claims are not in front of us, as made patently clear by the plaintiffs in their own petition for a 

writ of certiorari. 

To refresh: the plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants, seeking injunctive relief, 

declaratory relief, and money damages. R. 1 (Complaint at 13–14) (Page ID #13–14). In their 

petition for a writ of certiorari, the plaintiffs acknowledged that, by 2011, they had “settled their 

claims for injunctive and declaratory relief against the State and stipulated to [their] dismissal 

from the case.” Pet. for Writ of Cert. at *6. This settlement left, as a practical matter,1

 money 

damages as the only remaining claim—a fact that the plaintiffs also conceded when they noted, 

in the very next line of their petition, that “[t]he Providers’ remaining claims are for 

compensatory and nominal damages from the Union for the compulsory fees wrongfully seized 

from providers.” Id. 

We can think of this claim for money damages as comprising two sub-claims: money 

damages owed to the named plaintiffs and money damages that might be owed to other childcare 

 1

Plaintiffs also technically continued to have a claim for declaratory relief against the Union. But the 

district court explained, in its opinion denying class certification, why the viability of this claim rested on the 

viability of plaintiffs’ class certification claim. R. 118 (D. Ct. Op. at 16–17) (Page ID #2604–05). Plaintiffs have 

not meaningfully challenged this finding and have all but acknowledged this point, as evidenced by the arguments 

made in their own filings before the Supreme Court. 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 8 

providers in Michigan. There is no need for us to touch on the first sub-claim, as the plaintiffs 

once again have acknowledged that the Union “tender[ed] checks to the named plaintiffs for all 

of the monetary relief they could individually recover.” Id. “Thus,” according to plaintiffs’ own 

petition for a writ of certiorari, “whether this action presents a live case and controversy depends 

on whether a class [should be] certified.” Id. 

Whether a class should be certified and whether the claims raised by that class have any 

merit are two different questions. It is certainly possible, for instance, for a court to certify a 

class at the beginning of a suit, but then to find ultimately the claims raised by that class to be 

meritless. Likewise, it is possible for a group of named plaintiffs to raise a potentially 

meritorious claim, but nonetheless be denied class certification because their interests conflict 

with the interests of part or all of the proposed class. That is what happened here. 

Plaintiffs’ first “proposed class consists of any home childcare provider in the State of 

Michigan who had union dues or agency fees deducted from a subsidy payment from DHS.” 

Schlaud I, 717 F.3d at 458. We affirmed the district court’s denial of class certification, 

reasoning that the “proposed class includes a substantial number of providers who voted in favor 

of financially supporting the Union in an action that alleges that the entire class was forced to 

support the Union financially.” Id. “This,” we noted, presents “a clear conflict within the 

proposed class.” Id. We observed that the named plaintiffs, who objected to the payment of fees 

under the collective bargaining agreement, had “divergent interests” from class members who 

voted in favor of the collective bargaining agreement. Id. We concluded, therefore, that “[t]he 

district court did not abuse its discretion in denying certification of plaintiffs’ proposed class 

because plaintiffs fail to meet the prerequisite of adequacy of representation under Rule 

23(a)(4).” Id.

We also affirmed the district court’s denial of class certification of the proposed subclass, 

pointing to the high turnover rate among childcare providers and the fact that “the Union 

elections occurred years before DHS made deductions from potential subclass members’ subsidy 

payments.” Id. at 458–59. Together, these circumstances meant that “many of the potential 

subclass members did not vote in the Union elections because they were not then home childcare 

providers receiving subsidy payments (i.e., not eligible voters).” Id. at 459. Therefore, we could 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 9 

not “assume that . . . new home childcare providers [who did not vote in a Union election] [we]re 

uniformly opposed to supporting the Union financially because the record indicates that in each 

Union election, a majority of voters supported the Union.” Id. Under these conditions, we again 

concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ Rule 59(e) 

motion. 

Nothing in Harris changes this analysis. In Harris, the federal district court, the Seventh 

Circuit, and the Supreme Court addressed the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims, but did not reach 

the issue of class certification. See 134 S. Ct. at 2626. On the other hand, in this case, we are not 

addressing the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims. We are reviewing only the district court’s 

decisions to deny class certification with respect to the plaintiffs’ proposed class and subclass. 

And, on this point, even after Harris, plaintiffs continue to fail to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil 

Procedure 23(a)(4). The conflict between the named plaintiffs, who oppose paying the Union an 

agency fee, and many members of the proposed class and subclass, who favor paying fees to the 

Union, means that the named plaintiffs fail to satisfy the requirement that “the representative 

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4). 

In their petition for a writ of certiorari and in their supplemental briefs, plaintiffs make 

another argument: that we should presume that no childcare provider wanted to pay fees to the 

Union because of the Supreme Court’s decision in Knox v. Service Employees International 

Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277 (2012). As an initial matter, we note that we issued our 

original opinion in this case after Knox, and that the Supreme Court did not mention Knox in its 

order granting the plaintiffs’ petition, vacating our decision, and remanding this case back to us 

for further consideration. Nevertheless, we observe that we do not believe that Knox changes the 

result of this appeal. 

As in Harris, Knox also involved a fair-share provision. Under this provision, state 

employees who had opted out of the union were nonetheless required to pay an agency fee, which 

would be “dedicated to [the union’s] chargeable collective-bargaining activities.” Id. at 2285. 

The agency fee, however, would be less than the full amount of regular union dues, because the 

nonunion members’ decision to opt out meant that they could not be compelled to support the 

union’s political and ideological projects. In 2005, the Union began a special campaign to defeat 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 10 

Proposition 75 and Proposition 76, two propositions that would be before California voters in 

2006. Id. at 2285–86. Importantly, the Union sent a letter to both union members and nonunion 

members, informing them of an increase in both union dues and agency fees in order to cover the 

costs of the special campaign. Nonunion members would therefore have to contribute to a 

predominately political effort, even though they had previously expressed a preference to not be 

part of any such efforts, as evidenced by their decision to opt out of the union. The Supreme 

Court held this arrangement to be unconstitutional, reasoning that, “[o]nce it is recognized, as 

our cases have, that a nonmember cannot be forced to fund a union’s political or ideological 

activities, what is the justification for putting the burden on the nonmember to opt out of making 

such a payment? Shouldn’t the default rule comport with the probable preferences of most 

nonmembers?” Id. at 2290 (emphasis added).

It is not apparent why the plaintiffs believe that Knox points in their favor. In Knox, the 

petitioners “filed [a] class-action suit on behalf of 28,000 nonunion employees who were forced 

to contribute money to the Political Fight-Back Fund”—a contribution that likely went against 

the “probable preferences” of these nonunion employees. Id. at 2286, 2290. This “probable 

preferences” argument does not apply to this case. In fact, as we have noted, most childcare 

providers in Michigan who have voted on the question of unionization have voted in favor of 

unionization. Moreover, at least 4,806 providers voted in favor of the collective bargaining 

agreement, which included a provision requiring the payment of either union dues or agency 

fees. For this group, paying union fees is not an instance of compelled speech—it is simply a 

requirement of the union membership to which they affirmatively agreed. That point ends the 

argument with respect to plaintiffs’ proposed class—“any home childcare provider in the State of 

Michigan who had union dues or agency fees deducted from a subsidy payment from DHS.” 

Schlaud I, 717 F.3d at 458 (emphasis added). That proposed class, by plaintiffs’ own admission, 

contains individuals who voted for union representation and paid union dues. These individuals 

are not at all akin to the class of nonunion members certified in Knox. The named plaintiffs here 

have brought suit because they do not want to pay union dues. But their proposed class includes 

individuals who want to pay union dues. That is a conflict of interest. 
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 11 

This point likewise ends the argument with respect to plaintiffs’ proposed subclass. The 

Supreme Court itself made this clear in Harris, a case decided post-Knox, when it noted that “a 

majority of the personal assistants voted to unionize. When they did so, they must have realized 

that this would require the payment of union dues, and therefore it may be presumed that a high 

percentage of these personal assistants became union members and are willingly paying union 

dues.” 134 S. Ct. at 2641 (emphasis added). The plaintiffs have offered nothing to explain why 

we should not apply this same presumption here. In Knox, the probable preferences of the class 

were known—the 28,000 class members had decided not to become members of the Union, and 

it was reasonable to infer that these members would not want to contribute to a special 

assessment to cover the Union’s political and ideological activities. Here, on the other hand, we 

know that (i) plaintiffs’ proposed subclass would include new childcare providers who did not 

have an opportunity to vote in a union-related election, and that (ii) when given an opportunity to 

vote, a significant percentage of childcare providers in Michigan who voted decided to vote in 

favor of union representation. Given these facts, we do not think that the district court abused its 

discretion in denying class certification with respect to the plaintiffs’ proposed subclass. As 

noted above, “[a]n abuse of discretion occurs when we are left with the ‘definite and firm 

conviction that the [district] court . . . committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it 

reached’” or that “‘it improperly applie[d] the law or use[d] an erroneous legal standard.’” 

United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2002) (alterations in original) (quoting 

Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226, 228 (6th Cir. 2000)). That is not the case here. In Knox, all 

members of the certified class indicated that they did not want to be members of the Union. In 

this case, on other hand, some of the members of the proposed subclass would want to be 

members of the Union. These two scenarios are readily distinguishable from one another.2

 2

Our analysis on this point also demonstrates why the plaintiffs’ reliance on our decision in Beattie v. 

CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2007), is unavailing. First, Beattie involved the district court granting class 

certification to the plaintiffs-appellees, and we reviewed the decision to grant (rather than deny) class certification 

for an abuse of discretion. Second, Beattie involved defendant-appellant CenturyTel allegedly violating § 201(b) of 

the Federal Telecommunications Act. Under this provision, “CenturyTel [would have been] liable if it . . . bill[ed] 

for a service under a misleading description, even where the customer requested the service.” Id. at 566 (emphasis 

added). Every CenturyTel customer would, therefore, have had an interest in holding CenturyTel liable; the degree

of their interest (and the damages that CenturyTel would have to pay out to them) would be measured by their 

preferences for the particular service. Yet nowhere in Harris or Knox does the Supreme Court say that individuals 

who want to join a designated union and who willingly consent to paying union dues somehow have a legal interest 

in suing the union for collecting these dues. In fact, Harris appears to direct us towards the very opposite 

conclusion, by presuming that individuals who vote for union representation would be willing to pay for union 

representation, and that such an arrangement would be constitutional. Based on the voting results in prior union-
No. 12-1105 Schlaud et al. v. Snyder et al. Page 12 

To summarize, unlike the petitioners in Knox, plaintiffs here have proposed a class and a 

subclass which would include members whose “probable preferences” would have been in 

conflict with their own. We therefore continue to endorse the analysis we set out in our prior 

opinion in Schlaud I: the interests of part of the proposed class and the proposed subclass 

continue to be in conflict with the interests of the named plaintiffs. Neither Harris nor Knox 

changes our view that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding plaintiffs’ proposed 

class or subclass certification inappropriate under Rule 23(a)(4). 

III. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment denying class certification to the 

plaintiffs on the basis of the plaintiffs’ failure to satisfy the adequacy-of-representation 

requirement in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)(4). 

 related elections, we think that the proposed subclass would include some individuals who would want to join the 

Union and pay union dues. That brings us back to the touchstone of our analysis: the named plaintiffs do not want 

to pay union dues, and they want to represent a class of childcare providers who share their view. But their 

proposed subclass, as well as their proposed class, includes individuals who want to pay union dues. That suggests 

that “the representative parties will [not] fairly and adequately protect the interest of the class,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

23(a)(4), making class certification inappropriate.