Filed 5/2/13 In re R.G. CA2/5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION FIVE 

In re R.G., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law. 

 B239442 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. FJ49167) 

THE PEOPLE, 

 Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

R.G., 

 Defendant and Appellant. 

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Cynthia 

Loo, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed. 

 Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Assistant Attorney General, Margaret E. Maxwell and Tasha 

G. Timbadia, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 

 The minor, Richard G., appeals from the juvenile court’s Welfare and Institutions 

Code section 602 wardship order. The juvenile court sustained felony allegations the 

minor carried a concealed dirk or dagger in violation of former Penal Code1 section 

12020, subdivision (a)(4). (Stats. 2004, ch. 247, § 7, p. 2981.) Section 12020, 

subdivision (a)(4) is now recodified at section 21310. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, §§ 4-5.) The 

minor was placed home on probation. 

The minor contends there was insufficient evidence the weapon he possessed was 

a dirk or dagger. The minor further asserts unauthorized destruction of the knife denied 

him his due process right to review all legally admissible evidence and to an accurate 

record on appeal. We affirm the juvenile court order.

II. DISCUSSION 

A. There Was Substantial Evidence The Minor’s Weapon Was A Dirk Or Dagger 

1. Standard of review 

 The minor contends there was insufficient evidence the knife found on his person 

was a dirk or dagger within the meaning of former section 12020, subdivision (a)(4). The 

standard of review in criminal proceedings involving minors is the same as that involving 

adults. (In re V.V. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1020, 1026; In re Muhammed C. (2002) 95 

Cal.App.4th 1325, 1328.) We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

adjudication and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the minor 

guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. (In re V.V., supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1026; People v. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted. 
3

Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 924-925, fn. 2.) We find substantial evidence supported 

the juvenile court’s determination. 

2. “Dirk or dagger” defined 

 A dirk or dagger is defined in former section 12020, subdivision (c)(24) as 

follows: “[A] ‘dirk’ or ‘dagger’ means a knife or other instrument with or without a 

handguard that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily 

injury or death.” (Italics added.) A “switchblade knife” was defined in former section 

653k. (Stats. 2001, ch. 128, § 1.) A “switchblade knife” can also be a dirk or dagger. 

(People v. Plumlee (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 935, 940; In re Luke W. (2001) 88 

Cal.App.4th 650, 656.) A “switchblade knife” was defined as, “[A] knife having the 

appearance of a pocketknife and includes a spring-blade knife, snap-blade knife, gravity 

knife or any other similar type knife, the blade or blades of which are two or more inches 

in length and which can be released automatically by a flick of a button, pressure on the 

handle, flip of the wrist or other mechanical device, or is released by the weight of the 

blade or by any type of mechanism whatsoever.” (Former § 653k, italics added.) Section 

653k has been recodified as sections 16965, 17235 and 21510. (Stats. 2010, ch. 711, 

§§ 4-5.) The categories of knives expressly prohibited by the language of former section 

653k are not exhaustive. (In re Gilbert R. (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 514, 518; People ex 

rel. Mautner v. Quattrone (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1389, 1395.) As the Court of Appeal 

for the First Appellate District has held, “This language is intended to cover different 

types of knives which operate similarly to those expressly listed.” (People ex rel. 

Mautner v. Quattrone, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 1395.) 

 A knife with a blade that cannot be automatically exposed is a dirk or dagger only 

if its blade is locked in an open position. Former section 12020, subdivision (c)(24) 

provided: “A nonlocking folding knife, a folding knife that is not prohibited by Section 

653k[, i.e., a folding knife that is not a switchblade], or a pocketknife is capable of ready 

use as a stabbing weapon that may inflict great bodily injury or death only if the blade of 
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the knife is exposed and locked into position.” And former section 653k stated, 

“‘Switchblade knife’ does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb 

pressure applied solely to the blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, 

provided that the knife has a detent or other mechanism that provides resistance that must 

be overcome in opening the blade, or that biases the blade back toward its closed 

position.”2 A “detent” is defined as follows, “A ‘detent’ is ‘a device (as a catch, dog, or 

spring-operated ball) for positioning and holding one mechanical part in relation to 

another in a manner such that the device can be released by force applied to one of the 

parts.’ (Merriam-Webster m-w.com Dictionary <http://www.meriamwebster.com/dictionary/detent > (as of November 27, 2012); see also 4 Oxford English 

Dict. (2d ed. 1989) p. 545 [defining ‘detent’ as ‘[a] stop or catch in a machine which 

checks or prevents motion’].)” (In re Gilbert R., supra, 211 Cal.App.4th at p. 518.) 

 The key feature distinguishing a dirk or dagger from other types of knives is its 

being “capable of ready use as a stabbing” weapon or instrument. (Former § 12020, 

subd. (c)(24); see People v. Plumlee, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 939-940.) As the 

Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District, Division One has explained: “[T]he 

prohibition against carrying a concealed dirk or dagger is designed to give third parties 

the opportunity to protect themselves from the risk of a surprise attack by a person 

carrying a weapon. (See In re Luke W., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 653.) . . . [T]he 

folding or pocketknife exception is consistent with the statute’s objective because folded 

 

2 Former, section 653k provided in part: “Every person . . . who carries upon his or 

her person . . . a switchblade knife having a blade two or more inches in length is guilty 

of a misdemeanor. [¶] For the purposes of this section, ‘switchblade knife’ means a 

knife having the appearance of a pocketknife and includes a spring-blade knife, snapblade knife, gravity knife or any other similar type knife, the blade or blades of which are 

two or more inches in length and which can be released automatically by a flick of a 

button, pressure on the handle, flip of the wrist or other mechanical device, or is released 

by the weight of the blade or by any type of mechanism whatsoever. ‘Switchblade knife’ 

does not include a knife that opens with one hand utilizing thumb pressure applied solely 

to the blade of the knife or a thumb stud attached to the blade, provided that the knife has 

a detent[2] or other mechanism that provides resistance that must be overcome in opening 

the blade, or that biases the blade back toward its closed position.” 
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knives are not capable of ready use ‘without a number of intervening machinations that 

give the intended victim time to anticipate and/or prevent an attack.’ (Ibid.)” (People v. 

Mitchell (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 1364, 1371-1372.) 

3. Application to the present case 

 We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile court’s findings. 

The minor was carrying a knife concealed in his right front pant pocket. The blades were 

completely closed. The knife was approximately 11 inches long with a 3-inch blade at 

each end. The blades could be opened rapidly to a locked position. There were two ways 

to rapidly expose the blades to a fully open and locked position using only one hand. 

First, thumb screws on either end of the knife allowed the blades to be rapidly exposed. 

Officer Gregorio Rangel testified as to the purpose of a thumb screw on a knife. Officer 

Rangel testified a thumb screw is a screw attached to the blade or the actual body of the 

knife that allows a person to rapidly open the weapon to a fully open, locked position, 

“[The knife] would open rapidly if you just put your thumb on the thumb screw . . . and 

swipe it forward, and it will lock in the fully outward position.” Officer Rangel further 

explained: “You would apply pressure downward [on the thumbscrew] therefore making 

the blades more easily swing out. It would release pressure on [the blades].” Second, the 

minor’s weapon could be opened with one hand by a flick of a wrist. It functioned like a 

gravity knife, that is, the blade could be released automatically. (See former § 653k.) 

The minor’s knife was capable of inflicting serious bodily harm. It was the ability to 

access the blade rapidly that distinguished this switch-blade type weapon from other nonswitchblade knives. Officer Rangel testified, “[This knife is] more dangerous . . . 

because of the double blades on both sides both facing opposite directions [and] because 

[it can] be used [for] stabbing, dragging, and [has a] serrated edge, and also it can be 

easily concealed and retrieved.” 

 This constituted substantial evidence the weapon the minor carried concealed on 

his person was a dirk or dagger within the meaning of former section 12020, subdivision 
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(a)(4). Given the ability to rapidly expose the blades to a fully open and locked position, 

it was “capable of ready use as a stabbing” weapon or instrumentality. Further, it was a 

dangerous weapon capable of inflicting great bodily injury or death. (Former § 12020, 

subd. (c)(24); see People v. Plumlee, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at pp. 940-941; In re Luke 

W., supra, 88 Cal.App.4th at p. 656; 17 Cal.Jur.3d, Criminal Law: Crimes Against 

Administration of Justice and Public Order, § 219.) 

B. There Was No Due Process Violation 

 Officer Rangel testified he tried to retrieve the knife from evidence on the day of 

the adjudication. The knife could not be found. Officer Rangel was told law 

enforcement authorities had disposed of the knife. 

 The minor contends “unauthorized” destruction of the knife prior to adjudication 

denied him his due process right to review all legally admissible evidence and to an 

accurate record on appeal. The minor argues: “[T]he unauthorized destruction of the 

knife prevented the trial court from properly examining the evidence on the crucial issue 

in the case. It also denied [the minor] the opportunity for a fair appellate review of the 

evidence and is therefore a denial of due process.” This issue was not raised in the 

juvenile court. There is no evidence the minor made any attempt to secure the knife as 

evidence prior to trial. The minor did not object to the absence of the knife. He did not 

request a hearing of any kind. He did not seek a showing the knife had in fact been 

destroyed. He made no attempt to reconstruct the missing exhibit. The minor’s due 

process argument has been forfeited. (People v. Skiles (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1178, 1189; 

People v. Williams (1997) 16 Cal.4th 635, 661-662.) 

 Even if the issue had not been forfeited, we would not find any error or 

constitutional deprivation. First, both Officer Rangel and the minor had examined the 

knife. Each testified and described its characteristics in detail. Further, three 

photographs of the weapon were admitted in evidence. The photographs showed the 

knife in fully open, completely closed and partially open positions. The purported 
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destruction of the knife did not prevent the juvenile court from examining evidence on 

the crucial issue—whether the knife in question was a dirk or dagger. (See People v. 

Sassounian (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 361, 394; People v. Tierce (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 

256, 263.) 

 Second, the minor has a due process right to a record on appeal adequate to permit 

meaningful appellate review. (People v. Bennett (2009) 45 Cal.4th 577, 589; People v. 

Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1170; People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 196, fn. 

8.) The appellate record includes exhibits admitted into evidence, refused or lodged. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.320(e); People v. Osband (1996) 13 Cal.4th 622, 663; People 

v. Howard (1992) 1 Cal.4th 1132, 1165.) The burden is on the minor to show the 

absence of the exhibit on appeal is prejudicial to him. (People v. Bennett, supra, 45 

Cal.4th at p. 589; People v. Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at p. 1170; People v. Osband, supra, 

13 Cal.4th at p. 663; People v. Howard, supra, 1 Cal.4th at p. 1165.) The minor cannot 

make that showing. The knife was never introduced in evidence in the juvenile court and 

thereby not considered by the trier of fact. Therefore, it is not part of the record on 

appeal. The absence of evidence before us that was never introduced in the juvenile court 

cannot prejudice the minor’s appeal. And we have examined the photographs of the 

weapons which were received in evidence. The minor has not been denied his due 

process right to an adequate record on appeal. (See People v. Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 

81, 170-171; People v. Peevy (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1207-1208, fn. 4.) 
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III. DISPOSITION 

The wardship order is affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

 TURNER, P. J. 

 We concur: 

 KRIEGLER, J. 

 O’NEILL, J.

 

 Judge of the Ventura Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article I, section 6, of the California Constitution.