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Filed 1/9/15 Guy S. v. Superior Court CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

GUY S.,

Petitioner,

v.

THE SUPERIOR COURT OF CONTRA

COSTA COUNTY,

Respondent;

CONTRA COSTA COUNTY CHILDREN

& FAMILY SERVICES BUREAU et al.,

Real Parties in Interest.

A143324

(Contra Costa County Super. Ct.

Case No. J13-01015)

Guy S., C.S.’s biological father, petitions this court to set aside the juvenile court’s 

October 8, 2014 order denying his motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 

388,

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and setting a February 2, 2015 hearing pursuant to section 366.26. The section 388 

motion sought to reverse an earlier order denying petitioner reunification services and 

visitation with C.S. For the reasons stated below, we deny the petition.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

C.S. will turn three years old in March 2015. When she was born, petitioner was 

incarcerated. He remained incarcerated on September 4, 2013, when the Contra Costa 

 

1 Unless otherwise noted, all statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions 

Code.
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County Social Services Bureau (agency) filed a petition, pursuant to section 300, 

subdivision (b), alleging that C.S. was at risk of harm due to her mother’s substance 

abuse and the mother’s having left her with a caregiver for four days with no provisions 

for on-going support or any indication of when she would return. The section 300 

petition contained no allegations regarding C.S.’s father.

After ordering that C.S. be detained on September 5, 2013, the juvenile court 

sustained the allegations of the section 300 petition on September 26 and declared the 

child a dependent of the court.

On November 26, 2013, the caseworker informed the court that petitioner 

anticipated being released from custody on January 20, 2014, and that he requested

family reunification services. On January 29, petitioner appeared in court and the court 

ordered a paternity test.2It also requested information about his criminal history and his 

prior involvement with C.S.

Petitioner’s criminal history began in 1986, when the California Youth Authority 

asserted jurisdiction over him after he committed a burglary. During his incarceration by 

the Youth Authority, he escaped from a juvenile facility. The Youth Authority 

maintained jurisdiction over him until he was 20 years old. In 1991 he was sentenced to 

two years in state prison for first degree burglary. In 1993, 1994 and 1995, he was 

returned to prison for parole violations. In September 1995, he was convicted of being a 

felon in possession of a firearm and sentenced to 32 months in state prison. In 1997, he 

was again convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm and possessing a 

prohibited weapon and sentenced to prison for four years. In 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 

2003, he was returned to prison for parole violations. In 2004, he was convicted of being 

in possession of drugs while armed, possession of a prohibited weapon, and possession of 

a controlled substance and was sentenced to four years in prison. In 2011, he was 

sentenced to five years in state prison after being convicted of automobile theft, 

possession of controlled substances, possession of stolen property, being a felon in 

 

2 No father was listed on C.S.’s birth certificate. The mother reported that petitioner did 

not have a relationship with the child. 
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possession of a firearm, resisting police, trespassing, evading police, and being in 

possession of forbidden ammunition.

On February 13, 2014, the juvenile court requested that the agency recommend 

whether services should be provided to petitioner if his status were raised to that of a

presumed father.3In a February 27, 2014 memorandum, the agency explained that it did 

not yet know whether petitioner was the biological father. It opined, however, that he did 

not meet the criteria to be a presumed father. His only contact with C.S. was visitation 

while he was incarcerated and he had never received her into his home. The 

memorandum continued that even if testing confirmed petitioner is the biological father, 

reunification services would be discretionary. It cited his lack of a relationship with C.S., 

his extensive criminal history, and the fact that he had been incarcerated during the 

child’s “entire life,” having just recently been released. Consequently, the agency 

believed that it would not be in the child’s best interests for reunification services to be 

provided to petitioner. At the March 3, 2014 disposition hearing, the court found by clear 

and convincing evidence that placing C.S. either with her mother or petitioner would be 

detrimental to her safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being. It ordered that 

reunification services not be provided to petitioner unless he was raised to presumed 

father status. Nothing in the record reflects that any party appealed the juvenile court’s 

order at that time.

On April 7, 2014, the juvenile court received the results of the genetic testing,

which confirmed that petitioner is C.S.’s biological father (the probability of paternity is 

99.99 percent). On May 1, the court held a contested hearing concerning petitioner’s 

request to be elevated to presumed father status, his request for visitation, and his request 

 

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For clarity, we provide the following definitions: (1) A man who has assumed a parental 

role is a “de facto father.” (2) A man who may be the biological father is an “alleged 

father.” (3) A man who is established to be the biological father is the “natural father.” 

(4) A man who has held the child out as his own and received the child into his home is a 

“presumed father.” These categories may partially overlap—for example, a natural father 

may also be a presumed father. A presumed father alone is entitled to reunification 

services and custody of the child. (In re Jerry P. (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 793, 801.)
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for reunification services. The agency submitted a memorandum, “cautiously 

recommend[ing] services to” petitioner. In making its recommendation, the agency 

weighed various factors including petitioner’s “incredible history of substance use and 

criminal activity associated with drug use,” the fact that he had “been incarcerated the 

majority of [C.S.’s] life,” his “consistent and regular[] contact” with his daughter—even 

while incarcerated, his efforts to arrange for his daughter’s care when the mother was 

unable to care for her, his initiative in enrolling in a parent education course and in 

contacting the agency, and his expressed desire to provide for his daughter. The report 

noted that the minor “is a young child who has experienced a tremendous amount of loss 

and is struggling emotionally.” Her foster parents were in the process of enrolling her in a 

therapeutic preschool.

The juvenile court found that petitioner is C.S.’s biological father, but denied his 

request for presumed father status. It also declined to follow the agency’s 

recommendation and denied his request for reunification services and did not order 

visitation. Although it advised petitioner orally of his right to appeal and the necessary 

steps to do so, no appeal was taken from that order.

In its September 3, 2014 review hearing report discussing both C.S. and her halfsister, the agency recommended that services to the mother be terminated and that a 

hearing, pursuant to section 366.26, be held to determine a permanent plan. The agency 

reported that C.S. had developed a trusting relationship with her foster parents, calling 

them “mama,” and “daddy.” When her older half-sister was present, C.S. sought her 

constant attention. The foster parents were willing and able to provide the girls with 

permanence.

On or about October 6, 2014, petitioner presented the juvenile court with a section 

388 motion seeking to have the court reverse its earlier order and elevate him to 

presumed father status, order visitation, and order that he be provided with reunification 

services. At the October 8 contested hearing on the section 388 motion and the six- and 

12-month reviews, petitioner testified he had custody of and cared for a half-sibling of 
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C.S.4 He wanted C.S. to be part of his family. He testified that he had been employed for 

the past five months, was in full compliance with the terms of his probation, and that all 

his drug tests had been negative. A letter from petitioner’s probation officer verified that 

through the date of the letter, September 22, 2014, petitioner had complied with the terms 

of his probation “with no issues” and had passed all random drug tests.

C.S.’s counsel opposed the motion. She pointed out that at the time of the hearing 

C.S., who was not yet three years of age, had been detained for 13 months, was enjoying 

a stable placement in a home where she had developed a close relationship with her halfsister, and was bonded with her caregivers. Offering reunification services to petitioner 

would necessarily entail a significant delay in order to assess how his relationship with 

C.S. would develop, as C.S. was not attached to petitioner. Counsel argued that although 

reunification might be in petitioner’s best interests, it was not in the child’s best interests.

The juvenile court denied petitioner’s section 388 motion. It ruled that there was 

not a sufficient change in circumstances to warrant reversing course. It found that 

offering services to petitioner “at this point in time would be detrimental to the child and 

not be in her best interest.” It also found that C.S. “is in dire need of permanency.” Given 

(1) petitioner’s “extensive, uninterrupted criminal history,” (2) “the fact that he doesn’t 

have a relationship with this child, due mostly in part because he was incarcerated at the 

time that she was born and until the time he presented himself here in early 2014,” and 

(3) “the fact that [C.S.] is doing very well,” placed with her half-sister, which was 

important to her, the court denied the motion.

Petitioner filed a notice of intent to file a writ petition on October 15, 2014, and 

filed the petition on November 13. After issuance of an order to show cause, the agency

filed its opposition. All parties have waived oral argument.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by denying him

visitation and reunification services due to his prior incarceration. He cites case law to 

 

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This half-sibling is not the same child as the half-sibling being cared for by C.S.’s foster 

parents.
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support the proposition that the parent-child relationship is critically important. (See e.g., 

Adoption of Kelsey S. (1992) 1 Cal.4th 816, 848, quoting Lehr v. Robertson (1983) 463 

U.S. 248, 256; In re Andrew L. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 178, 195, quoting In re Julia U. 

(1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 532, 544.) In particular, he cites In re Precious J. (1996) 42 

Cal.App.4th 1463, 1476-1478, for the proposition that although a parent’s incarceration 

presents substantial obstacles to arranging visits, it is not by itself sufficient reason to 

deny visitation.

Petitioner’s argument fails for two reasons. Factually, the court did not deny 

visitation or services solely or even primarily because petitioner had been incarcerated.

Admittedly, petitioner’s incarceration was a factor that led to his lack of a relationship 

with his daughter. However, the juvenile court also focused on his extensive criminal 

history, the child’s need for permanence, her bond with her foster family, and her lack of 

a relationship with petitioner. Unlike the situation in In re Precious J., where the issue 

was whether the agency had provided reasonable services when it failed to arrange for 

visitation while the parent was incarcerated, here visitation occurred during petitioner’s 

incarceration. Nonetheless, his daughter did not have a significant relationship with him 

and she was developing a positive familial relationship with her new family, including 

her half-sibling. The court based its ruling on these facts, coupled with petitioner’s 

extensive criminal history. Thus, the court’s order was not based primarily on petitioner’s

prior incarceration.

Secondly, petitioner did not appeal the February 13, 2014 order denying him 

services unless he attained presumed father status, the March 3 order finding that placing 

C.S. with petitioner would be detrimental to her, or the May 1 order denying him 

presumed father status, visitation, and services. Under section 388, subdivision (d), the 

moving party bears the burden of proving that there is new evidence or changed 

circumstances indicating that a modified order is in the child’s best interests. (In re 

Andrew L., supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at p. 190.) Although petitioner made a generalized 

claim that parent-child relationships are very important, he presented absolutely no 

evidence—much less new evidence—that it would be in the best interests of C.S. to visit 
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with him and for him to receive reunification services. Although he presents evidence 

that he has taken steps to become a responsible parent and to hold down a job,

commendable as those steps may be he presents no evidence concerning the needs of C.S. 

or tending to show how she would be affected were he to play a parental role in her life.

The court’s decision to deny the section 388 motion falls well within its sound 

discretion. (In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 398, 415-416.) The determination of the 

child’s best interests when ruling on a section 388 motion requires consideration of

(1) the seriousness of the initial reason for the dependency, (2) the strength of the existing 

bond between the parent and the child, (3) the strength of the child’s bond to the 

caretakers, and (4) the extent to which there has been a change of circumstances. (In re 

Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 530-532.) Here, at the time of the initial 

dependency, petitioner was not a custodial parent and thus was unavailable to mitigate 

the problems with the mother’s caretaking; he has a weak relationship with C.S.; C.S. has 

a solid, trusting relationship with the foster parents and her half-sister; and there has been 

only minimal changed circumstances. While petitioner has made positive strides at selfimprovement, and has shown genuine affection for his daughter, on this record there is no 

basis to conclude that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that the child’s 

best interests preclude the relief that he seeks.

DISPOSITION

The petition for an extraordinary writ is denied. Because the section 366.26 

hearing is set for February 2, 2015, our decision is immediately final as to this court. 

(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.452(i), 8.490(b)(2)(A).)
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_________________________

Pollak, J.

We concur:

_________________________

McGuiness, P. J.

_________________________

Jenkins, J.