IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

August 27, 2001 Session

HOWARD ZOLDESSY v. INGRID DAVIS, ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Anderson County

No. 98CH6737 William E. Lantrip, Chancellor

FILED OCTOBER 31, 2001

No. E2000-02526-COA-R3-CV 

Upon the application of Howard Zoldessy, a temporary injunction was issued by the trial court

against the defendants, Ingrid Davis and Arthur Davis. The Davises are the parents of Zoldessy’s

deceased wife and the grandparents of Zoldessy’s daughter, Rachel. The injunction in question

prohibits the defendants “from coming about [Howard Zoldessy] and his daughter, Rachel Zoldessy,

or contacting him in any manner whatsoever.” Following a bench trial, the trial court found that both

defendants had committed willful criminal contempt by “coming about [Zoldessy’s] residence on

October 4, 1999.” Each defendant was sentenced to 48 hours imprisonment for their contempt. Mr.

Davis was also found in contempt for sending letters to Zoldessy and was sentenced to an additional

term of imprisonment of 48 hours. The defendants appeal the trial court’s findings of contempt, as

well as the sentences imposed. We affirm the finding of contempt as to the letters sent to Zoldessy;

however, we reverse the finding of contempt for the defendants’ purported “coming about” Zoldessy

and his daughter.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court

Affirmed in Part; Reversed in Part; Remanded

CHARLES D. SUSANO,JR.,J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which HOUSTON M. GODDARD,

P.J., and D. MICHAEL SWINEY, J., joined.

Vivian L. Crandall, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, for the appellants, Ingrid Davis and Arthur Davis.

David L. Valone, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Howard Zoldessy.

OPINION

I.

In this appeal, we are asked to review the trial court’s findings of willful criminal contempt

against the defendants, Ingrid Davis and Arthur Davis. On appeal, the defendants are “burdened

with the presumption of guilt, and in order to obtain a reversal, [they] must overturn this presumption
1

The defendants reside in Boca Raton, Florida.

2

Zoldessy argues that his in-law s should be punished b ecause they “inte nded” to violate the injunction. Intent

is only “half of the equation”; there must also be co nduct pro scribed b y the exact langu age of the injun ction. See Harris

v. Corley, C/A No. 01A01-9012-CH-00446, 1991 WL 66708, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., filed May 1, 1991) (citing 43A

C.J.S. Injunctions § 243, p. 537) (holding that where disobedience of an injunction is punishable as a penal offense, the

injunction should be strictly construed in favor of the person alleged to have violated it). In the instant case, the Davises

did not engage in the conduct forbidden by the injunction.

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by showing that the evidence preponderates in favor of [their] innocence.” Robinson v. Air Draulics

Eng’g Co., 214 Tenn. 30, 37, 377 S.W.2d 908, 912 (1964).

At the outset, the defendants contend that the trial court’s findings of contempt are erroneous

because, according to their argument, the record does not indicate that the injunction was issued or

that a copy was ever served upon them. We find otherwise. The record on appeal indicates that it

was supplemented by the agreement of the parties to include the following documents: (1) the

temporary injunction, which was issued on August 26, 1998; (2) a letter from the Secretary of State

indicating that the defendants were served through his office on September 5, 19981; and (3) a return

receipt signed by Mr. Davis on September 5, 1998. Clearly, the record as supplemented reflects that

an injunction was properly issued and served. Their argument to the contrary is without merit. 

While the defendants admit that they drove through the grounds of the apartment complex

in which Zoldessy and his daughter Rachel lived, they argue that their conduct does not violate the

injunction and therefore cannot serve as a basis for a finding of contempt. We agree. Mr. Davis

testified by deposition that when he drove by Zoldessy’s residence to see if Zoldessy was home, he

“found nothing, except looking at the apartment, the blinds were drawn.” Mr. Davis testified that

he did not see Zoldessy’s car in the parking lot of the complex. While this evidence establishes

beyond doubt that the defendants drove through the grounds of the apartment complex on the day

in question, one critical element is missing: there is no proof in the record that Zoldessy or his

daughter were home at the time the defendants drove through the vehicle passageways of the

complex. Without proof to establish that Zoldessy or his daughter were present when the defendants

drove by, there is nothing in this record upon which to base a finding that the defendants “[came]

about the petitioner and his daughter.”2

 Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s finding of contempt

for this conduct.

While not seriously disputing that sending letters to Zoldessy would violate the conduct

prohibited by the injunction, Mr. Davis argues that he should not have been incarcerated for 48 hours

for his conduct, because, so the argument goes, the letters were merely emotional pleas for contact

with his granddaughter and were not threatening. Whether or not the letters sent by Mr. Davis were

threatening in nature, however, is not the issue. The language of the injunction is clear: the

defendants are prohibited from “contacting [Zoldessy] in any manner whatsoever.” (Emphasis

added). Mr. Davis violated the injunction when he contacted Zoldessy in writing. What he

attempted to convey in those letters is, for our purposes, of no consequence.
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The trial court imposed a sentence of 48 hours in jail as punishment for Mr. Davis’ contempt.

We will not disturb this ruling. “Appellate courts are loathe to interfere or modify the punishment

imposed in contempt proceedings because such determinations lie within the sound discretion of the

court.” Herrera v. Herrera, 944 S.W.2d 379, 393 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1996). By statute, a court may

impose a fine or imprisonment up to ten days as punishment for contempt. See T.C.A. § 29-9-103

(2000). Upon reviewing the record, we cannot say that the trial court abused its discretion in

sentencing Mr. Davis to 48 hours in jail for sending letters to Zoldessy. 

II.

The judgment of the trial court finding Ingrid Davis and Arthur Davis in willful criminal

contempt for “coming about” the plaintiff and sentencing each to 48 hours in jail is reversed. Both

the finding of contempt as to Mr. Davis for “contacting” the plaintiff through letters and the sentence

of 48 hours imposed for this contempt are affirmed. This case is remanded for enforcement of the

trial court’s judgment with respect to the latter sentence and for collection of costs assessed below,

all pursuant to applicable law. Exercising our discretion, costs on appeal are taxed against the

appellant, Arthur Davis. 

_______________________________ 

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE