This memorandum opinion was not selected for publi cation in the New Mexico Reports. Please see 1 Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please 2 also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other 3 deviations from the official paper version file d by the Court of Appeals and does not include the 4 filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6

KIM AUDETTE, 7 Petitioner-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 31,221 9 CITY OF TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES 10 COMMISSIONERS: LORI MONTGOMERY, 11 FRED TORRES, EVELYN RENFRO, 12 JERRY STAGNER, and STEVE GREEN, 13 Respondents-Appellees. 14 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SIERRA COUNTY 15 Kevin R. Sweazea, District Judge 16 Kim Audette 17 Truth or Consequences, NM 18 Pro Se Appellant 19 Jaime F. Rubin LLC 20 Jaime F. Rubin 21 Truth or Consequences, NM 22 for Appellees 23 MEMORANDUM OPINION 242 WECHSLER, Judge. 1 Petitioner appeals from the district court’s entry of an award of sanctions 2 against her. This Court issued a calendar notice proposing to affirm. Petitioner has 3 filed a memorandum in opposition, whic h this Court has duly considered. 4 Unpersuaded, we summarily affirm the district court’s award of sanctions. Petitioner 5 has also filed a motion to amend her doc keting statement, which we hereby grant. 6 Petitioner’s main argument is that the award of sanctions is not supported by 7 sufficient evidence. She take s issue with the argument the City allegedly made before 8 the district court that “‘[t]axpayers’ co mplained of ‘harm’ caused by [Petitioner] 9 through attorney fees and costs.” [MIO 2] Petitioner appears to allege that, in order 10 to support a showing of actual harm, th e City would have needed to file 11 “‘[t]axpayers’’ notarized affidavits . . . as required by due process.” [MIO 2] 12 Petitioner cites no authority for this proposition. More to the point, the portions of the 13 record that Petitioner identifies contain no mention of any complaints by “taxpayers.” 14 Rather, the passages Petitioner cites refer only to the C ity having to defend against 15 Petitioner’s frivolous motions at its own expense. [RP 443, 445-46] 16 Petitioner also alleges that the “City had no evidentiary basis for claiming that 17 the ‘[t]axpayers’ had asked for a judgment assessing liability for attorney fees and 18 costs from [Petitioner].” [MIO 2] Thisallegation shows a misunderstanding of the 193 fact that the City is a party in its own ri ght, and moved the district court for an award 1 of sanctions of its own volition, not at th e behest of “taxpayers.” We therefore 2 disregard Petitioner’s argument pertaining to “taxpayers,” given the fact that her use 3 of that term as an issue in this case appears to be entirely generated by her. 4 Petitioner further takes issue with the factthat the City attached to its motion 5 for sanctions a letter sent to Petitioner in an earlier, relate d matter, warning her of the 6 consequences of filing frivolous motions. [MIO 4] Petitioner appears to challenge 7 the introduction of the letter on the bases th at it was not notarized, and was written in 8 the scope of the writer’s employment. [Id.] We certainly see no error in the district 9 court’s accepting the letter as evidence that Petitioner had previously been warned not 10 to file frivolous motions, and can imagine no way in which it is relevant that the 11 letter’s author was paid to write it. 12 In any event, we disagree that there is not a sufficient factual basis for the 13 district court’s ruling. In its motion for costs, the City identified three separate 14 meritless motions filed by Petitioner: a moti on for rehearing file d June 9, 2010, a 15 motion to supplement the record filed July 28, 2010, and a motion for Rule 1- 16 074(X)(4) NMRA relief, file d September 22, 2010. [RP 442-43] Petitioner does not 17 show that those motions were meritorious, th at she had standing to file them, or that 18 the City incurred no expenses in defending against them. We hold that the City made 194 a valid showing that it had incurred expenses defending against Petitioner’s meritless 1 motions, and that Petitioner faile d to overcome that showing. 2 In addition to arguing the sufficiency of the evidence, Petitioner argues that her 3 filing of multiple motions that the district court found frivolous was “constitutionally 4 protected activity.” [MIO 3, 10] But Petitioner identifies no c onstitutional protection 5 for the filing of frivolous motions, or to participate in a case wh ere one lacks standing. 6 The fact that a hearing is open to the public, without more, does not grant every 7 member of the public an automatic right to participatein the hearing. “Whether a 8 plaintiff has standing depends on whether the constitutional or statutory provision on 9 which the claim rests properly can be unders tood as granting persons in the plaintiff’s 10 position a right to judicial relief.” N.M. Gamefowl Ass’n, Inc. v. State ex rel. King , 11 2009-NMCA-088, ¶ 14, 146 N.M. 758, 215 P.3d 67 (citation and internal quotation 12 marks omitted). Accordingly, it follows th at where Petitioner has no standing, she has 13 no right to participate in the action. Pe titioner’s citations to NMSA 1978, §§ 38-2-9.1 14 and 38-2-9.2 (2001) are misplaced. As stated in Section 38-2-9.1, those provisions 15 pertain only to “action[s] seeking money damages against a person for conduct or 16 speech undertaken or made in connection w ith a public hearing or public meeting in 17 a quasi-judicial proceeding before a tribunal or decision-making body of any political 18 subdivision of the state.” Since this is Petitioner’s action against the City, not an 195 action seeking money damages against Petitioner, the statutes she cites are inapposite. 1

So, too, is the lone case Petitioner cites on the issue, Briggs v. Eden Council for 2 Hope & Opportunity , 81 Cal. Rptr.2d 471 (1999). [MIO 10-11] Briggsis an out-of3 state decision on a factually distinguishableissue (whether limitations should be read 4 into an anti-SLAPP statute). Even if Briggsdid stand for the proposition cited, it 5 would contradict New Mexico law. See State ex rel. New Mexico State Highway and 6 Transp. Dep’t v. Baca , 120 N.M. 1, 5, 896 P.2d 1148, 1152 (1995) (recognizing the 7 inherent power of courts to award attorneyfees “for expenses incurred as a result of 8 frivolous or vexatious litigation”). 9 We hold that Petitioner fails to establish that the district court’s award of 10 sanctions against her violated any cons titutional or statutory right. Petitioner 11 identifies no right to file meritless motions or to proceed in a case where standing has 12 already been found lacking. On this basis, too, we see no error in the district court’s 13 ruling. See State ex rel. Bardacke v. Welsh , 102 N.M. 592, 597, 698 P.2d 462, 467 14 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating thatcourt does not unconstitutionallyviolate pro se party’s 15 right to access to courts evenwhen enjoining party from appearing before court “and 16 that a less restrictive method of regulati ng access is not required when the facts show 17 a pattern of conduct which is either vexatious, oppressive or for the purpose of 186 harassment”). 1 Petitioner raises a number of other arguments, which do not change our opinion, 2 and which, we therefore address only briefly. Petitioner claims that the use of the 3 word “grounds,” without a specific defin ition, renders the aforementioned letter 4 “insincere, inaccurate, and unconstitutionally vague.” [MIO 5] Petitioner also alleges 5 error in the “lack of any findings as to anauthorizing statute or ordinance providing 6 standards and guidelines for the terms ‘numerous,’ ‘groundless’ and ‘meritless.’” 7 [MIO 9] Petitioner complains that the “City failed to cite any statute clearly setting 8 forth the definitions of the terms ‘numerous ,’ ‘groundless’ or ‘meritless.’” [MIO 9- 9 10] We hold that, by representing hersel f in this matter, Petitioner assumed the 10 responsibility of understanding at least basi c legal terminology such as “grounds” and 11 “merit,” let alone common English words like “numerous.” Pro se litigants “must 12 comply with the rules and orders of the court, and will not be entitled to greater rights 13 than those litigants who employ counsel .” Bruce v. Lester, 1999-NMCA-051, ¶ 4, 127 14 N.M. 301, 980 P.2d 84 (emphasi s added). Moreover, Pe titioner cites only authority 15 pertaining to vague statutes , not purportedly vague legal terms. [MIO 7, 9] We 16 disregard these citations as inapposite. 17 Finally, Petitioner’s challenge to this Court’s proposed summary disposition 18 evinces a fundamental misunderstandi ng. Petitioner titles her memorandum in 197 opposition to our calendar notice a “response in opposition to proposed summary 1 judgment,” and proceeds to discuss the law of summary judgment set forth in Rule 1- 2 056 NMRA. [MIO 3, 8, 9] This Court’ s notice of proposed summary disposition is 3 unrelated to summary judgment proceedings in district court, and we therefore 4 disregard the inapposite authorities adduced by Petitioner on the point. 5 In her opposition to our calendar notice, Petitioner argues that she “seeks to 6 defend her right to participate in governance at her city of residence.” [MIO 3] But 7 she also acknowledges that she has repeated ly been found to lack standing in her 8 actions against the City. [MIO 1-2] If Pe titioner has no standing to appear before the 9 district court, then she has no “right to participate in governance” through the means 10 she has chosen. See Bardacke , 102 N.M. at 597, 698 P.2d at 467. 11 CONCLUSION 12 We affirm the district court’s orde r awarding sanctions against Petitioner. 13 IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

___________ ___________ __________ 15 JAMES J. WECHSLER, Judge 16 WE CONCUR: 17

____________________________ 18 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 198 ____________________________ 1 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 2