[Cite as State v. Bryan Hall, 2014-Ohio-1647.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

State of Ohio, : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, : Nos. 13AP-747 

 and 

v. : 13AP-994 

 (C.P.C. No. 12CR-2790) 

Bryan Hall, aka Chance Catudal, : 

aka Bryan Beltran, (REGULAR CALENDAR) 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

 : 

 

D E C I S I O N 

Rendered on April 17, 2014 

 

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Michael P. Walton, 

for appellee. 

Bryan Hall, aka Chance Catudal, aka Bryan Beltran, pro se. 

 

APPEALS from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas 

O'GRADY, J. 

{¶ 1} In these consolidated appeals, defendant-appellant, Bryan Hall, aka Chance 

Catudal, aka Bryan Beltran ("appellant"), appeals a judgment of the Franklin County 

Court of Common Pleas denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea and 

judgment denying his second motion to resolve record conflicts. For the reasons that 

follow, we affirm. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶ 2} In June 2012, appellant was indicted on six counts of tampering with 

records, in violation of R.C. 2913.42, five counts of theft, in violation of R.C. 2913.02, and 

two counts of passing bad checks, in violation of R.C. 2913.11. In the months that 

followed, appellant had a conflict with his attorney, so the trial court appointed new 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 2 

counsel, Larry Thomas, to represent appellant. In November 2012, the trial court ordered 

appellant to submit to a competency evaluation. Ultimately, the trial court found 

appellant competent and, on July 11, 2013, conducted a hearing on appellant's motion to 

have Thomas removed as counsel. During the hearing, appellant decided to keep Thomas 

as counsel and entered a guilty plea to Count 3 of the indictment, i.e., one of the theft 

counts. That same day, the trial court entered a judgment entry finding appellant guilty of 

Count 3 and sentencing him to 188 days community control with credit for time served. 

The court entered a nolle prosequi for the remaining counts of the indictment. Then, on 

August 5, 2013, appellant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea which the trial court 

denied without a hearing via entry on August 21, 2013. 

{¶ 3} Subsequently, appellant filed a motion asking this court for leave to file a 

delayed appeal of the trial court's July 11, 2013 judgment, which we denied. However, we 

granted appellant's alternative request to treat his motion for leave as a notice of appeal 

from the judgment denying his motion to withdraw his plea. This appeal was assigned 

case No. 13AP-747. 

{¶ 4} Appellant also filed a motion asking the trial court to resolve certain record 

conflicts. Namely, he complained the court reporter omitted three words from a 

transcript and did not give him copies of exhibits. The trial court denied the motion. 

Then, on October 18, 2013, appellant filed a motion with this court to supplement the 

record in case No. 13AP-747 complaining several items were missing from it. On 

October 23, 2013, appellant filed an amended motion to supplement with a larger list of 

missing items. We denied the October 18 motion, and found the October 23 motion and 

state's memorandum in opposition would be submitted for determination at such time as 

we addressed the merits of the appeal in case No. 13AP-747. 

{¶ 5} On November 20, 2013, appellant filed a second motion in the common 

pleas court to resolve record conflicts; appellant complained about the same items listed 

in the October 23 motion and asked the administrative judge to resolve the matter under 

Loc.R. 81.04. The trial court denied the motion. Appellant's appeal in case No. 13AP-994 

stems from that decision. 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 3 

II. ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 

{¶ 6} Appellant has filed multiple appellate briefs in case No. 13AP-747. He filed 

a brief on September 30, 2013 which this court struck. Then, he filed a second brief on 

October 1, 2013, and a third brief on November 22, 2013. This court will treat appellant's 

most recent brief filed on November 22, 2013 as his appellate brief for case No. 13AP-747 

and consider the assignments of error therein. Accordingly, we strike the brief filed on 

October 1, 2013. 

{¶ 7} Appellant appeals and assigns seven assignments of error in case No. 13AP747 for our review: 

1. The trial court erred when it failed to hold a proper hearing 

of Defendant-Appellant's Second Motion to Remove Larry W. 

Thomas as Counsel ("Thomas") on 7/11/13. Failing to do this 

was a manifest injustice that resulted in Defendant-Appellant 

believing that his only alternative was to plead guilty. 

2. The trial court erred when it allowed Defendant-Appellant 

to enter into his guilty plea at the very hearing where he had 

just unsuccessfully attempted to have Thomas removed via a 

journalized finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. 

3. Defendant-Appellant suffered ineffective assistance of 

counsel at the hands of Thomas overall and specifically 

regarding the guilty plea that he was forced to enter into on 

7/11/13. 

4. Thomas and the trial court erred when they failed to fully 

inform Defendant-Appellant that pleading guilty would 

jeopardize his 1983 Action against employees of GPD. 

5. The Trial Court erred when it failed to hold an evidentiary 

hearing on Defendant-Appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty 

Plea. 

6. The trial court erred when it did not permit DefendantAppellant's guilty plea to be withdrawn upon learning that 

Thomas gave Defendant-Appellant incorrect legal advice and 

flat-out lied about the plea that Defendant-Appellant had 

entered into. Defendant-Appellant relied upon Thomas's 

advice to his detriment, which constitutes ineffective 

assistance of counsel under the two-prong Strickland Test. 

See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052,

80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984).
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 4 

7. The cumulative effect of the errors committed during the 

proceedings in State of Ohio v. Bryan Hall, Case # 12-CR2790 ("State v. Hall") deprived Defendant-Appellant of even 

the possibility of receiving a fair and/or speedy trial, e.g., the 

Supreme Court of Ohio has held, "[A]lthough violations of the 

Rules of Evidence during trial, singularly, may not rise to the 

level of prejudicial error, a conviction will be reversed where 

the cumulative effect of the errors deprives a defendant of the 

constitutional right to a fair trial." See State v. DeMarco, 31 

Ohio St.3d 191, 509 N.E.2d 1256 (1987).

Appellant filed a brief in case No. 13AP-994 with one assignment of error: 

[8.] The Trial Court erred when it did not allow the 

Administrative Judge to resolve the record conflict(s). 

{¶ 8} For ease of analysis, we will address appellant's assignments of error out of 

order. 

III. DISCUSSION 

A. Denial of Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea

{¶ 9} Crim.R. 32.1 permits a motion to withdraw a guilty plea "only before 

sentence is imposed; but to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set 

aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his or her plea." 

"Manifest injustice relates to some fundamental flaw in the proceedings which results in a 

miscarriage of justice or is inconsistent with the demands of due process." State v. 

Akbari, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-319, 2013-Ohio-5709, ¶ 6, citing State v. Chandler, 10th Dist. 

No. 13AP-452, 2013-Ohio-4671, ¶ 6. Manifest injustice " 'is an extremely high standard, 

which permits a defendant to withdraw his guilty plea only in extraordinary cases.' " State 

v. Tabor, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-1066, 2009-Ohio-2657, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Price, 4th 

Dist. No. 07CA47, 2008-Ohio-3583, ¶ 11. "A defendant seeking to withdraw a guilty plea 

following imposition of sentence bears the burden of establishing manifest injustice with 

specific facts either contained in the record or supplied through affidavits submitted with 

the motion." Akbari at ¶ 6, citing State v. Garcia, 10th Dist. No. 08AP-224, 2008-Ohio6421, ¶ 11. 

{¶ 10} The trial court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a plea. 

State v. Smith, 49 Ohio St.2d 261 (1977), paragraph two of the syllabus; Chandler at ¶ 8. 

Therefore, our review of the trial court's denial of appellant's post-sentence motion to 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 5 

withdraw his guilty plea is limited to a determination of whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. State v. Conteh, 10th Dist. No. 09AP-490, 2009-Ohio-6780, ¶ 16. "Although 

an abuse of discretion is typically defined as an unreasonable, arbitrary, or 

unconscionable decision, * * * we note that no court has the authority, within its 

discretion, to commit an error of law." Akbari at ¶ 7, citing State v. Beavers, 10th Dist. 

No. 11AP-1064, 2012-Ohio-3654, ¶ 8, and State v. Beechler, 2d Dist. No. 09-CA-54, 2010-

Ohio-1900, ¶ 70. 

{¶ 11} Under his first assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court erred 

when it failed to hold a proper hearing on his motion to remove Thomas as counsel, 

causing appellant to believe he had no choice but to plead guilty. Under his second 

assignment of error, appellant contends the court erred by permitting him to enter a 

guilty plea immediately after he unsuccessfully attempted to have Thomas removed via a 

journalized finding of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant claims the court's 

refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance taught him that "if he 

did not plead guilty that he was definitely going to prison." (Appellant's brief, 35.) In 

other words, the court's unwillingness to conduct an evidentiary hearing led him to plead 

guilty under duress. Because these assignments of error are related, we address them 

together. 

{¶ 12} To the extent appellant generally argues the trial court's failure to conduct 

an evidentiary hearing on his motion to remove Thomas was error, appellant could have 

made that argument in a timely direct appeal of the July 11, 2013 judgment entry. Thus, 

res judicata bars appellant from raising the issue now. State v. Smith, 10th Dist. No. 

13AP-129, 2013-Ohio-4674, ¶ 8. However, we will address appellant's argument to the 

extent he contends the court's denial of the hearing led him to plead guilty under duress, 

i.e., his plea was involuntary. 

{¶ 13} At the July 11, 2013 hearing, the trial court informed appellant that he could 

terminate Thomas but refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing on Thomas' faults. 

Appellant requested a recess to speak to Thomas. After the recess, appellant told the 

court he wanted to keep Thomas and enter a guilty plea. Appellant points to no evidence 

in the record showing he made these decisions under duress. Contrary to appellant's 

contention, Thomas never "acknowledged" appellant's duress at the July 11 hearing. 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 6 

Moreover, appellant signed an entry of guilty plea form stating: "I hereby assert that no 

person has threatened me, promised me leniency, or in any other way coerced or induced 

me to plead 'Guilty' as indicated above; my decision to plead 'Guilty[ ]' * * * represents the 

free and voluntarily exercise of my own will and best judgment. I am completely satisfied 

with the legal representation and advice I have received from my counsel." (R. 120, 2.) 

Additionally, during the change of plea hearing, the trial court asked appellant: "Is there 

anybody pressuring you to change your plea?" Appellant responded, "No, sir." Then the 

court asked appellant: "Are you satisfied as of right now with Mr. Thomas as your 

lawyer?" Appellant responded, "Completely and totally satisfied, sir." (July 11, 2013 Tr. 

19.) The record contradicts appellant's claim of duress due to the trial court's refusal to 

conduct an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel; therefore, we reject 

his claim. 

{¶ 14} Accordingly, we overrule the first and second assignments of error. 

{¶ 15} Under his third assignment of error, appellant contends Thomas rendered 

ineffective assistance of counsel overall and specifically with regard to the guilty plea. To 

the extent appellant makes a general ineffective assistance argument, appellant could 

have made that argument in a timely direct appeal of the trial court's July 11, 2013 

judgment entry. Therefore, res judicata bars appellant from raising the issue now. Smith, 

2013-Ohio-4674, at ¶ 8. However, we will address appellant's contention to the extent he 

argues ineffective assistance with regard to his guilty plea. 

{¶ 16} Under Ohio law, " '[i]neffective assistance of counsel can constitute manifest 

injustice sufficient to allow the post-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea.' " State v. 

Miranda, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-271, 2013-Ohio-5109, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Dalton, 153 

Ohio App.3d 286, 2003-Ohio-3813, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). "In order to prevail on a claim of 

ineffective assistance of counsel as applied to the plea process, an appellant must show 

(1) 'that counsel's performance was deficient' and (2) 'that there is a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have entered his plea.' " Id., 

quoting State v. Bird, 81 Ohio St.3d 582, 585 (1998). 

{¶ 17} Appellant fails to explain how the majority of counsel's purported 

deficiencies, such as counsel's decision to allow an "unconstitutional bond to go 

unchallenged," caused appellant to enter a guilty plea. (Appellant's brief, 36.) Appellant 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 7 

only makes a few arguments arguably related to his plea. He complains counsel told him 

if he pleaded guilty to Count 3, the trial court would dismiss the remaining charges with 

prejudice, as opposed to entering a nolle prosequi. Evidently, appellant believes the state 

might try to prosecute him on the nolled charges again in the future. However, appellant 

did not prove counsel lied through specific facts in the record or an affidavit submitted 

with his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In fact, at the change of plea hearing, the 

court stated the remaining charges would be "nolled and dismissed"; the court never said 

the charges would be dismissed with prejudice. (July 11, 2013 Tr. 20.) Appellant did not 

complain about this statement or seek clarification from the court or counsel. 

{¶ 18} Appellant also argues that if Thomas was not deficient, the charges in the 

case would have been severed, the "illegal and unconstitutional" arrest and search and 

seizure would have been "resolved by the Trial Court," and Count 3 would have been 

dismissed. (Appellant's brief, 37.) However, appellant does not elaborate on these 

contentions in his argument, so this court cannot address them. In his reply brief, 

appellant suggests Count 3 could have been dismissed because it mirrored Count 6 and 

this somehow violated his Fifth Amendment rights. Appellant does not support this 

argument with any legal authority. Therefore, appellant has not demonstrated any 

deficiency in counsel's performance. 

{¶ 19} Accordingly, we overrule the third assignment of error. 

{¶ 20} Under his fourth assignment of error, appellant suggests his plea was not 

knowing, voluntary or intelligent because the trial court and Thomas failed to fully inform 

him that pleading guilty would jeopardize his lawsuit against employees of the Groveport 

Police Department. However, appellant provides no analysis or citation to legal authority 

in support of this assigned error, so there is nothing for this court to address. 

Additionally, appellant did not make this argument in his motion to withdraw his guilty 

plea. Even if he did, the transcript of the change of plea hearing contradicts his argument. 

At the hearing, Thomas notified the trial court he warned appellant a guilty plea could 

impact appellant's civil lawsuit. Appellant told the court he understood the warning but 

disagreed with Thomas. Accordingly, we reject appellant's argument. 

{¶ 21} Accordingly, we overrule the fourth assignment of error. 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 8 

{¶ 22} Under his sixth assignment of error, appellant contends the trial court 

should have permitted him to withdraw his plea because Thomas gave incorrect legal 

advice and lied about the plea, which is ineffective assistance of counsel. Though unclear, 

appellant is presumably referring to his claim that counsel advised him the counts he did 

not plead guilty to would be dismissed with prejudice instead of nolled. However, in our 

discussion of the third assignment of error, we already found appellant did not prove this 

contention. Appellant also complains Thomas did not make it "crystal clear" that the plea 

would effect his civil action regarding the Groveport Police Department. (Appellant's 

brief, 42.) But, as we explained in our discussion of the fourth assignment of error, 

appellant did not make this argument in his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. In any 

event, the transcript from the change of plea hearing contradicts his argument. 

{¶ 23} Accordingly, we overrule the sixth assignment of error. 

{¶ 24} Under his fifth assignment of error, appellant contends trial court erred by 

not conducting an evidentiary hearing on his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. "A trial 

court is not automatically required to conduct a hearing on a post-sentence motion to 

withdraw a guilty plea." Miranda at ¶ 11, citing State v. Barrett, 10th Dist. No. 11AP375, 2011-Ohio-4986, ¶ 9. "Rather, '[a] hearing must only be held if the facts alleged by 

the defendant, accepted as true, would require that the defendant be allowed to withdraw 

the plea.' " Id., quoting Barrett at ¶ 9. The decision whether to hold a hearing on a postsentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea is left to the trial court's discretion. State v. 

Spivakov, 10th Dist. No. 13AP-32, 2013-Ohio-3343, ¶ 12, citing Barrett at ¶ 10. 

{¶ 25} Although the assigned error relates to the trial court's decision to not 

conduct a hearing on the motion to withdraw, the majority of appellant's arguments do 

not relate to this issue or the standard set forth above. For instance, he complains the 

trial court ignored affidavits submitted with filings unrelated to the motion to withdraw. 

We will disregard his extraneous arguments and address the assignment of error as 

written. See Anderson v. Preferred Title & Guaranty Agency, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 13AP385, 2014-Ohio-561, ¶ 11 (explaining this court rules on assignments of error and not 

mere arguments). 

{¶ 26} The trial court did not conduct a hearing because appellant had not 

"brought forward anything significant outside the record that existed on July 11, 2013" to 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 9 

support the motion to withdraw the plea. (R. 157, Journal Entry, 5.) Appellant suggests 

he was entitled to a hearing because he attached a copy of a July 12, 2013 e-mail to his 

motion to withdraw. He purportedly sent this e-mail to the trial court on July 12, 2013, 

and in the e-mail indicates his belief from a discussion with Thomas that all but the third 

count would be dismissed with prejudice. However, as we explained in our discussion of 

the third assignment of error, appellant did not support his claim that Thomas lied to him 

in this regard through specific facts in the record or an affidavit submitted with the 

motion to withdraw. Moreover, at the change of plea hearing, the trial court told appellant 

the remaining counts would be nolled, and he did not complain or seek clarification. 

Given the lack of evidentiary support for appellant's contention that counsel lied to him 

about the plea, the trial court's decision to deny a hearing was not unreasonable, arbitrary 

or unconscionable. 

{¶ 27} Accordingly, we overrule the fifth assignment of error. 

{¶ 28} Under his seventh assignment of error, appellant contends the cumulative 

effect of the trial court's errors set forth in the first through sixth assignments of error 

deprived him of the possibility of a fair or speedy trial. Because we failed to find any error 

in our discussion of appellant's first through sixth assignments of error, we discern no 

basis for considering the question of cumulative error. Stanley v. Ohio State Univ. Med. 

Ctr., 10th Dist. No. 12AP-999, 2013-Ohio-5140, ¶ 124, citing State v. Garner, 74 Ohio 

St.3d 49, 64 (1995). Thus, we reject appellant's argument. 

{¶ 29} Accordingly, we overrule the seventh assignment of error. 

{¶ 30} In sum, appellant failed to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion 

by denying the motion to withdraw guilty plea or an evidentiary hearing on the motion.1

B. Denial of the Second Motion to Resolve Record Conflicts 

{¶ 31} Under his eighth assignment of error, appellant complains the trial court 

erred by denying his second motion to resolve record conflicts. Appellant contends the 

trial court should have submitted the motion to the administrative judge for a ruling 

under Loc.R. 81.04. Appellant believes the items at issue in his motion support his appeal 

 

1 In his reply brief, appellant asserts manifest injustice occurred in this case because Bryan Hall is not his 

real name, and he was held in solitary confinement for five months. Appellant does not elaborate on these 

arguments and he raised them for the first time in his reply brief. Therefore, we will not address them. See

State v. Shedwick, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-709, 2012-Ohio-2270, ¶ 6. 
Nos. 13AP-747 and 13AP-994 10 

of the denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Even if we ignore the multitude of 

problems the state highlights with regard to the assigned error, any error by the trial court 

with regard to its denial of appellant's second motion to resolve record conflicts is 

harmless. 

{¶ 32} With the exception of a recording of his January 5, 2013 competency exam, 

appellant did not reference any of the missing items he complains about in his motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea. This court cannot find the trial court abused its discretion by 

denying appellant's motion to withdraw his plea based on materials that were not in the 

record when the trial court ruled on the motion and which appellant made no argument 

about in his motion. See State v. Doyle, 10th Dist. No. 12AP-567, 2013-Ohio-3262, ¶ 27, 

citing Franks v. Rankin, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-934, 2012-Ohio-1920, ¶ 73 ("Appellate 

review is limited to the record as it existed at the time the trial court rendered its 

judgment."). Moreover, appellant only cited the exam recording in his motion to 

withdraw as evidence he was competent to stand trial. There is no question the trial court 

found him competent; therefore, we fail to see the relevance of the recording to the 

motion to withdraw. 

{¶ 33} Accordingly, we overrule the eighth assignment of error. 

C. October 23, 2013 Amended Motion to Supplement the Record

{¶ 34} As a final matter, we deny appellant's October 23, 2013 amended motion to 

supplement the record in case No. 13AP-747. In the motion, appellant fails to prove the 

materials alleged to be part of the record were ever submitted to or considered by the trial 

court. 

IV. CONCLUSION

{¶ 35} For the foregoing reasons, we deny appellant's October 23, 2013 amended 

motion, overrule the eight assignments of error, and affirm the judgments of the Franklin 

County Court of Common Pleas. 

Motion denied; judgments affirmed.

CONNOR and LUPER SCHUSTER, JJ., concur.