- 800 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800



### J e nn ifer 

### T
., appella n t 

### , v



### . L i n dsay 

### P
., appellee



### . ___ N.W.2d ___

Filed February 2, 2018. No. S-17-107.

1. Jurisdiction: Appeal and Error. A jurisdictional question that does not involve a factual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law. 2. Parent and Child: Standing: Words and Phrases. In loco parentis is a common-law doctrine that gives standing to a nonparent to exercise the rights of a natural parent when the evidence shows that the nonparent’s exercise of such rights is in the child’s best interests. 3. Parent and Child. In order to stand in loco parentis, one must assume all obligations incident to the parental relationship. 4. Parent and Child: Parental Rights. A person in loco parentis generally holds the same rights as a lawful parent. However, in loco parentis status does not, by itself, eclipse the superior nature of the parental preference accorded to biological or adoptive parentage. 5. Actions: Parent and Child: Standing. In the face of a natural par

ent’s objection, in loco parentis gives standing to litigate whether the child’s best interests are served by maintaining the in loco parentis relationship. 6. Parent and Child. In loco parentis status is, unlike biological and adop

tive parentage, transitory. 7. Actions: Parent and Child. A litigant cannot seek a declaration of per

manent parental status under the in loco parentis doctrine. 8. Parent and Child. Once the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all duties incident to the parental relationship, the person is no longer in loco parentis. 9. ____. Termination of the in loco parentis relationship also terminates the corresponding rights and responsibilities afforded thereby. 10. Courts: Jurisdiction: Adoption: Minors. An order of consent under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104(1)(b) (Reissue 2016) granted by the district Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/ 03/02/2018 08:13 AM CST- 801 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800

court does nothing more than permit the county court, as the tribunal having exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption matters, to entertain such proceedings. 11. Adoption. An order of consent under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104(1)(b) (Reissue 2016) is not a determination of the child’s best interests or any other issue pertaining to adoption. 12. Courts: Jurisdiction: Adoption. The consent under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104(1)(b) (Reissue 2016) can be understood as a limited deferral to the adoption court of the first court’s jurisdictional priority. 13. Courts: Jurisdiction. Under the doctrine of jurisdictional priority, when different state courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same subject matter, the court whose power is first invoked by proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of all tribunals to adjudicate the rights of the parties. 14. ____: ____. Two courts cannot possess at the same time the power to make a final determination of the same controversy between the same parties. 15. ____: ____. A court with jurisdictional priority can choose to relin

quish it. 16. ____: ____. Jurisdictional priority is a matter of judicial administration and comity. It is not to protect the rights of the parties but the rights of the courts to coordinate jurisdiction to avoid conflicts, confusion, and delay in the administration of justice. 17. Jurisdiction: Final Orders: Appeal and Error. For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction over an appeal, there must be a final order or final judgment entered by the court from which the appeal is taken. 18. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. Having a substantial effect on a substantial right depends most fundamentally on whether the right could otherwise effectively be vindicated through an appeal from the final judgment. 19. ____: ____. Generally, an immediate appeal from an order is justified only if the right affected by the order would be significantly undermined or irrevocably lost by waiting to challenge the order in an appeal from the final judgment. 20. Adoption. Orders of consent under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104(1)(b) (Reissue 2016) do not affect a substantial right, because they do not resolve the issue of adoption. 21. Injunction: Final Orders. Orders staying proceedings to await the ter

mination of related proceedings in another court are usually not final. 22. ____: ____. The finality of an order granting a stay depends upon the practical effect and impact the stay order might have on the relief requested by the litigants.- 802 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800

23. Injunction: Dismissal and Nonsuit. A substantial right is affected by an order granting a stay if its effect is tantamount to a dismissal or to a permanent denial of the requested relief. 24. Final Orders: Appeal and Error. It is the effect on the appellant’s rights, not another’s, that justifies the immediate review of an interlocu

tory order. 25. Dismissal and Nonsuit: Moot Question. The mere possibility of moot

ness is not the functional equivalent of a dismissal or a permanent denial of the requested relief. 26. Injunction: Dismissal and Nonsuit. A temporary stay that merely preserves the status quo pending a further order is not an order that amounts to a dismissal of the action or that permanently denies relief to a party. 27. Courts: Jurisdiction. A litigant’s substantial rights are not affected by the mere fact that one court has determined that the interests of judicial administration are best served by temporarily deferring jurisdictional priority to another court of this state.


### Appeal from the District Court for Douglas County: J. M i c hael 

### C offey 

### , Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Lindsay Belmont, of Koenig Dunne, P.C., L.L.O., for appellant.
Desirae M. Solomon for appellee.

H eavi c a n 

### , C.J., M iller



### - L erma n 

### , C assel 

### , S ta c y 

### , K el c h 

### , and F u n ke 

### , JJ.

F u n ke 

### , J. INTRODUCTION The former partner of a biological mother who conceived via in vitro fertilization brought a custody action in district court based on her alleged in loco parentis status to the child. The biological mother and her wife subsequently filed a peti

tion in county court for stepparent adoption. The district court consented to the adoption and stayed the custody action pend

ing the resolution of the adoption petition. We must determine whether the consent to adoption or the order staying the cus

tody action presents a final order.- 803 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800



### BACKGROUND Lindsay P. and Jennifer T. were in a committed relationship from 2001 to 2012. During the course of that relationship, Lindsay conceived Chase T. by artificial insemination through an anonymous donor. Chase was born in 2010, and Jennifer stayed home to care for him while Lindsay worked outside the home. Lindsay and Jennifer separated in 2012, but they contin

ued to coparent Chase. They agreed to a parenting schedule under which Lindsay had Chase on Mondays and Tuesdays, Jennifer had Chase on Wednesdays and Thursdays, and they alternated weekend parenting time. Lindsay married Jessica P. in 2015. On August 12, 2015, Jennifer filed a complaint in the dis

trict court for Douglas County for initial determination of custody and to establish support. The complaint, as amended, alleged that Jennifer has stood in loco parentis for Chase since his birth, assuming all rights, responsibilities, and obli

gations incident to a lawful parental relationship. Jennifer sought sole legal and physical custody of Chase, with reason

able parenting time to be awarded to Lindsay. Jennifer also sought child support and an order requiring both parties to share in medical, educational, and other expenses relating to Chase’s care. Approximately 1 month after Jennifer’s custody action was filed, Lindsay and Jessica filed a petition for stepparent adop

tion in the county court for Douglas County. Lindsay filed a motion for the district court to consent to the stepparent adop

tion, under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-104 (Reissue 2016). Jennifer filed a motion in county court to intervene in the adoption proceeding and to stay the adoption proceeding pending the custody action. At the same time, Jennifer filed a motion in the district court seeking to enjoin Lindsay from proceeding in the county court adoption matter. Lindsay moved in district court for summary judgment or dismissal of the custody action. Rather than ruling on- 804 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### Lindsay’s motion, the district court stayed the custody action pending resolution of the adoption proceeding. Subsequently, in county court, Jennifer was denied the right to intervene. The county court also overruled her motion to stay the adoption proceedings. Jennifer appealed the county court’s orders, and we reversed. We explained in In re Adoption of Chase T. 1 

### that the county court lacked jurisdiction to issue its order dismissing Jennifer’s complaint to intervene and overruling her motion to stay the adoption proceeding, because the county court had failed to obtain the district court’s consent to the adoption. The county court’s order was vacated. 2 

### While the appeal in In re Adoption of Chase T. was pend

ing, Jennifer moved in district court for a release of its stay. She alleged that per the district court’s instructions, she had requested to intervene in the adoption proceedings, but that the request was denied for lack of standing. She further alleged that her “in loco parentis parental relationship must be estab

lished first, before she has a right to intervene in the adoption action.” Jennifer also asserted that the district court had an obligation to retain its jurisdictional priority over the county court, because the custody action was filed first. The district court sustained the request to release the stay. After our opinion in In re Adoption of Chase T. , Lindsay renewed her request for the district court’s consent to the adoption. Jessica eventually filed a motion to intervene in the custody action. Lindsay then filed a motion asking the court to reissue its stay of the custody action—after ruling on her motion for consent to adoption and Jessica’s motion to intervene. Lindsay argued that a stay was warranted, because a deci

sion in the adoption proceeding was required before the court

1 In re Adoption of Chase T. , 295 Neb. 390, 888 N.W.2d 507 (2016).

2 Id.- 805 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### could make “an informed decision regarding all issues and litigants.” She claimed that a stay would avoid unneeded liti

gation and expense. At a hearing on the motions for consent to adoption, intervention, and stay, Lindsay elaborated that she thought the adoption proceeding should be resolved first in order to protect Chase’s right to be adopted, as well as to establish Jessica’s status vis-a-vis any visitation rights that might ultimately be ordered in the custody action. Jennifer objected to the motions filed by Lindsay and Jessica. On the motion to intervene, Jennifer argued that any in loco parentis rights pertaining to Jessica were irrelevant to her own in loco parentis claim to custody. As for the motions for consent and stay, Jennifer asserted that the district court had jurisdictional priority over the county court. She also argued that a determination of her in loco parentis rights must be made by the district court before the adoption proceeds, because the county court, through its vacated order, had deter

mined that she lacked standing. Finally, she asserted that a stay would cause irreparable harm to her in loco parentis right to parent Chase. On January 27, 2017, the court overruled the motion by Jessica to intervene in the custody action, but it consented to the adoption proceeding. In the same order, the district court granted the motion to stay the custody action “until further order of the Court.” Jennifer appeals the January 27 order.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR Jennifer assigns that the district court erred in (1) granting its consent to the adoption to proceed in county court and (2) staying the custody proceedings in the district court.

STANDARD OF REVIEW [1] A jurisdictional question that does not involve a fac

tual dispute is determined by an appellate court as a matter of law. 3

3 In re Adoption of Amea R. , 282 Neb. 751, 807 N.W.2d 736 (2011).- 806 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800



### ANALYSIS Jessica’s underlying custody action in this case derives from common law. 4 

### We held in Latham v. Schwerdtfeger 5 

### that the former partner to the biological mother of a child conceived via artificial insemination had standing under the doctrine of in loco parentis to seek custody and court-ordered visitation of the child. We recognized a “‘wide spectrum of arrangements [have filled] the role of the traditional nuclear family’” and that a biological parent who “‘voluntarily cre

ated and actively fostered’” a former partner to assume the status of a parent cannot erase that relationship after the par

ties’ separation “‘simply because . . . she regretted having done so.’” 6 

### [2] In loco parentis is a common-law doctrine that gives standing to a nonparent to exercise the rights of a natural par

ent when the evidence shows that the nonparent’s exercise of such rights is in the child’s best interests. 7 

### This standing doc

trine protects the rights of the natural parent from intrusions by third parties except when those third parties have a stature like that of a parent. 8 

### [3-5] In order to stand in loco parentis, one must assume all obligations incident to the parental relationship. 9 

### In turn, a person in loco parentis generally holds the same rights as

4 See Latham v. Schwerdtfeger , 282 Neb. 121, 802 N.W.2d 66 (2011),

disapproved on other grounds, Windham v. Griffin , 295 Neb. 279, 887 N.W.2d 710 (2016).

5 Id.

6 Id. at 130, 134, 802 N.W.2d at 74, 76.

7 See Latham v. Schwerdtfeger, supra note 4.

8 See In re Guardianship of Brydon P. , 286 Neb. 661, 838 N.W.2d 262

(2013).

9 See, In re Interest of Destiny S. , 263 Neb. 255, 639 N.W.2d 400 (2002),

disapproved on other grounds, In re Interest of Enyce J. , 291 Neb. 965, 870 N.W.2d 413 (2015); Weinand v. Weinand , 260 Neb. 146, 616 N.W.2d 1 (2000), disapproved on other grounds, Windham v. Griffin, supra
not e 4.- 807 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### a lawful parent. 10 

### However, in loco parentis status does not, by itself, eclipse the superior nature of the parental prefer

ence accorded to biological or adoptive parentage. 11 

### Rather, in the face of a natural parent’s objection, in loco parentis gives standing to litigate whether the child’s best interests are served by maintaining the in loco parentis relationship. 12 

### [6-9] The parental preference accorded to biological or adoptive parentage is based in part on the fact that in loco parentis status is, unlike biological and adoptive parentage, “transitory.” 13 

### We have held that a litigant cannot seek a dec

laration of permanent parental status under the in loco parentis doctrine. 14 

### Once the person alleged to be in loco parentis no longer discharges all duties incident to the parental relation

ship, the person is no longer in loco parentis. 15 

### Termination of the in loco parentis relationship also terminates the correspond

ing rights and responsibilities afforded thereby. 16



### D istri c t 

### C ourt 

### ’ s 

### C o n se n t



### W

as 

### N ot 

### F i n al 

### O rder 

### The district court in this case has not yet determined whether Jennifer has a right to custody and visitation by virtue of her alleged in loco parentis relationship with Chase. Instead, the court gave its statutory consent to the adoption proceedings and stayed the action. Under § 43-104(1)(b), the county court must have the consent of any other court with jurisdiction over the child’s custody before it has jurisdiction to entertain the merits of any issue in the adoption proceeding. 17

10 See Windham v. Griffin, supra note 4.

11 See id.

12 See In re Guardianship of Brydon P., supra note 8.

13 Id. at 674, 838 N.W.2d at 272. See, also, Windham v. Griffin, supra note 4

. 14 In re Guardianship of Brydon P., supra note 8.

15 In re Interest of Destiny S., supra note 9.

16 Id.

17 See In re Adoption of Chase T., supra note 1.- 808 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### [10-12] The consent granted by the district court does noth

ing more than permit the county court, as the tribunal having exclusive original jurisdiction over adoption matters, to enter

tain such proceedings. 18 

### Such consent is not a determination of the child’s best interests or any other issue pertaining to adoption. 19 

### Indeed, because county courts have exclusive juris

diction over adoption, we have said that a nonadoption court lacks authority to decide such matters. 20 

### The consent under § 43-104(1)(b) can be understood as a limited deferral to the adoption court of the first court’s jurisdictional priority. [13,14] Under the doctrine of jurisdictional priority, when different state courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same subject matter, the court whose power is first invoked by proper proceedings acquires jurisdiction to the exclusion of all tribunals to adjudicate the rights of the parties. 21 

### Logically, two courts cannot possess at the same time the power to make a final determination of the same controversy between the same parties. 22 

### The doctrine of jurisdictional priority usually applies to two pending cases only when they involve the same whole issue. 23 

### In other words, the two actions must be materially the same, involving substantially the same subject matter and the same parties. 24 

### But this is sometimes extended to situations where each action composes part of the whole issue, 25 

### and we have

18 See Klein v. Klein , 230 Neb. 385, 431 N.W.2d 646 (1988).

19 See Smith v. Smith , 242 Neb. 812, 497 N.W.2d 44 (1993).

20 Id.

21 See, Molczyk v. Molczyk , 285 Neb. 96, 825 N.W.2d 435 (2013); State ex rel. Consortium for Economic & Community Dev. for Hough Ward 7 v. Russo , 2017 Ohio 8133, 151 Ohio St. 3d 129, 86 N.E.3d 327 (2017).

22 See id.

23 Charleen J. v. Blake O. , 289 Neb. 454, 855 N.W.2d 587 (2014).

24 See id.

25 See State ex rel. Consortium For Economic & Community Dev. For Hough Ward 7 v. McMonagle , 2016 Ohio 4704, 68 N.E.3d 125 (2016).- 809 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### applied this broader concept of jurisdictional priority to mat

ters of continuing jurisdiction of child custody. 26 

### We have indi

cated that the first court with jurisdiction over a child’s custody has priority over a subsequent court with jurisdiction over the child’s custody, even if the subject matter of the proceedings is not otherwise the same. 27 

### [15,16] A court with jurisdictional priority can choose to relinquish it. 28 

### In Charleen J. v. Blake O.

, 29 

### we explained that we have sometimes referred to the second court as lacking jurisdiction, but this is wrong. “We mean that a subsequent court that decides a case already pending in another court with concurrent subject matter jurisdiction errs in the exercise of its jurisdiction.” 30 

### Jurisdictional priority is a matter of judicial administration and comity. 31 

### It is not to protect the rights of the parties but the rights of the courts to coordinate jurisdiction to avoid conflicts, confusion, and delay in the administration of justice. 32 

### The consent provision of § 43-104(1)(b) contemplates that another court has jurisdictional priority over the custody of the child, and it contemplates that only with the other court’s consent will the adoption be allowed to proceed. Jennifer argues in this appeal that she has been prejudiced by the district court’s deferral of its jurisdictional priority to the county court. She argues that without a prior determination in the custody action of her in loco parentis status, the county court may deny her standing to intervene in the adoption pro

ceeding. Further, she argues that if the county court grants the adoption, her custody action will be moot; she assumes this

26 See Charleen J. v. Blake O., supra note 23 (and cases cited therein).

27 See Charleen J. v. Blake O., supra note 23.

28 Id.

29 See id

. 30 Id . at 463, 855 N.W.2d at 595 (emphasis in original)

. 31 Charleen J. v. Blake O., supra note 23

. 32 See id.- 810 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### because she assumes that three people cannot have joint legal custody over a child. [17] But before reaching the merits of the district court’s decision, we must determine if we have appellate jurisdic

tion. For an appellate court to acquire jurisdiction over an appeal, there must be a final order or final judgment entered by the court from which the appeal is taken. 33 

### The January 27, 2017, order did not dismiss the custody action or make a final determination of its merits; thus, it was not a final judgment. 34 

### The question, therefore, is whether we are presented with a final order. Jennifer asserts that both aspects of the January 27, 2017, order, the consent and the stay, affected a substantial right and were made in a special proceeding. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1902 (Reissue 2016) provides that “an order affecting a substantial right made in a special proceeding . . . is a final order.” We have held that a substantial right is an essential legal right, not a mere technical right. 35 

### It is a right of “substance.” It is not enough that the right itself be substantial; the effect of the order on that right must also be substantial. 36 

### We have said that an order affects a substantial right if it affects the subject matter of the litigation, such as diminishing a claim or defense that was available to the appellant prior to the order from which he or she is appealing. We have also said that whether the effect of an order is substantial depends upon whether it affects with finality the rights of the parties in the subject matter. 37 

### [18,19] Having a substantial effect on a substantial right depends most fundamentally on whether the right could oth

erwise effectively be vindicated through an appeal from the

33 In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al. , 293 Neb. 646, 879 N.W.2d 34 (2016).

34 See id

. 35 Id.

36 Id.

37 Id.- 811 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### final judgment. 38 

### Generally, an immediate appeal from an order is justified only if the right affected by the order would be significantly undermined or irrevocably lost by waiting to challenge the order in an appeal from the final judgment. 39 

### In several cases, we have held that orders involving consent to adoption are not final orders, because they do not affect a substantial right. 40 

### In Klein v. Klein

, 41 

### we held that a district court’s order of consent under § 43-104(1)(b) was not a final order, even if the consent was the last act the court would take in relation to the child. In In re Adoption of Krystal P. & Kile P.
, 42 

### we held that the county court’s order finding that consent was not required from the then Department of Social Services was not final. Finally, in In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al.

, 43 

### we held that the county court’s determination that due to abandonment, a father’s consent was not required, was not a final order. [20] We concluded in these cases that the orders did not affect a substantial right, because they did not resolve the issue of adoption. 44 

### Despite the orders, the county court could ultimately decide to deny the petition for adoption—at which point, the complaining party’s substantial rights would never be affected. 45 

### And, if instead the adoption were permitted, then the rights at issue could be effectively vindicated in an appeal from the final judgment of adoption. 46

38 Id.

39 Id.

40 See, In re Adoption of Krystal P. & Kile P. , 248 Neb. 907, 540 N.W.2d 312 (1995); Klein v. Klein, supra note 18.

41 Klein v. Klein, supra note 18.

42 In re Adoption of Krystal P. & Kile P., supra note 40.

43 In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al., supra note 33.

44 See Klein v. Klein, supra note 18.

45 See In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al., supra note 33.

46 See id.- 812 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### We see no reason to diverge from this precedent here. It is true that in these cases concerning the immediate appeal

ability of consent-related orders, the complaining parties were allowed to participate in the adoption proceedings. Indeed, in In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al. , we emphasized the father’s continued ability to participate in the best interests hearing in the adoption proceeding when we concluded that the order of abandonment and substitute consent did not affect the father’s substantial rights. We understand that it is precisely Jennifer’s ability to inter

vene in the adoption proceedings that she argues is one of the substantial rights at issue. But Jennifer presents no argument that the district court’s consent represented a rejection of the in loco parentis status under which she claims standing in both the custody action and the adoption proceedings. Nor does she assert that a determination in the district court of her in loco parentis status would collaterally estop her claim to standing in the adoption proceeding. While we have held under certain circumstances that an order denying intervention affects a substantial right, 47 

### this is not an appeal from an order denying intervention. The only effect of the consent order is that the county court has juris

diction to consider Jennifer’s motion to intervene and any other issues related to the adoption proceeding. As we have already discussed, the district court’s consent is not a determi

nation of the merits of any matter under the exclusive jurisdic

tion of the county court. 48 

### We conclude that the district court’s order of consent does not affect Jennifer’s alleged right to intervene in the adoption proceedings. The order of consent was not final, and we lack jurisdiction to address its merits. We turn next to the order of stay.

47 See Streck, Inc. v. Ryan Family , 297 Neb. 773, 901 N.W.2d 284 (2017). Compare In re Adoption of Amea R., supra note 3.

48 See Smith v. Smith, supra note 19.- 813 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800



### D istri c t 

### C ourt 

### ’ s 

### S tay 

### W

as 

### N ot 

### F i n al 

### O rder 

### [21] Orders staying proceedings to await the termination of related proceedings in another court are usually not final. 49 

### Stays are often used to regulate the court’s own proceedings or to accommodate the needs of parallel proceedings. 50 

### Regularly allowing immediate appeals from such orders would promote piecemeal appeals, chaos in trial procedure, and a succession of appeals in the same case to secure advisory opinion to gov

ern further actions of the trial court. 51 

### [22,23] But the finality of an order granting a stay depends “‘“upon the practical effect and impact the stay order might have on the relief requested by the litigants.”’” 52 

### We have held that a substantial right is affected by an order granting a stay if its effect is tantamount to a dismissal or to a permanent denial of the requested relief. 53 

### We have recognized orders staying litigation to be final in just two instances, in Sullivan v. Storz 54 

### and in Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co

. 55 

### In 1952, in Sullivan v. Storz , we said that an order grant

ing a continuance for approximately 2 years under the then

49 In re Interest of L.W. , 241 Neb. 84, 486 N.W.2d 486 (1992). See, also,

Kinsey v. Colfer, Lyons , 258 Neb. 832, 606 N.W.2d 78 (2000).

50 15A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 3914.13 (2001).

51 See In re Adoption of Madysen S. et al., supra note 33.

52 In re Interest of L.W., supra note 49, 241 Neb. at 97, 486 N.W.2d at 496.

53 See, Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters , 290 Neb. 640, 861

N.W.2d 425 (2015); Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co. , 280 Neb. 591, 788 N.W.2d 538 (2010); In re Interest of L.W., supra note 49.

54 Sullivan v. Storz , 156 Neb. 177, 55 N.W.2d 499 (1952). See, also, Tongue

v. Lloyd , 92 Neb. 488, 138 N.W. 738 (1912) (adjournment for more than 90 days, which was in violation of statutory maximum, worked dismissal and was therefore final).

55 Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., supra note 53.- 814 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### Soldiers’ and Sailors’ Civil Relief Act affected the plaintiff’s substantial right to trial without unreasonable and unneces

sary delay. 56 

### Though we did not describe it as such, other courts reason that certain delays may be so protracted as to effectively dismiss the action and put the plaintiff out of court. 57 

### More recently, in Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co.

, we held that an order staying an action while the parties engaged in court-ordered arbitration was final. 58 

### We said that the order diminished the party’s alleged entitlement to litigate in court and was tantamount to a dismissal. The substantial right affected was not the delay but the compulsion to arbi

trate and the effective disposition of all the issues presented. 59 

### We explained that the claimed right to litigate implicated by the court’s order “cannot be effectively vindicated after the party has been compelled to do that which it claims it is not required to do.” 60 

### [24] Jennifer relies on the concept of jurisdictional priority in asserting that the district court’s stay of the custody pro

ceeding affected a substantial right. But we have never held that a stay granted in order to defer a court’s jurisdictional priority to another court presents a final order. Jurisdictional priority is not about the rights of parties but the rights of the courts. 61 

### And it is the effect on the appellant’s rights, not

56 See Sullivan v. Storz, supra note 54. See, also, Carmicheal v. Rollins , 280

Neb. 59, 783 N.W.2d 763 (2010).

57 See, King v. Cessna Aircraft Co. , 505 F.3d 1160 (11th Cir. 2007);

Dependable Highway Exp. v. Navigators Ins. Co. , 498 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 2007); 767 Third Ave. v. Consulate General of Yugoslavia

, 218 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2000); American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. v. Edward D. Stone, Jr. , 743 F.2d 1519 (11th Cir. 1984).

58 Kremer v. Rural Community Ins. Co., supra note 53.

59 See id.

60 Id. at 602, 788 N.W.2d at 549.

61 See Charleen J. v. Blake O., supra note 23.- 815 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### another’s, that justifies the immediate review of an interlocu

tory order. 62 

### There is some federal authority holding that a stay is appealable if its practical effect is to permanently surrender federal jurisdiction over the suit to a state court’s judgment by virtue of the res judicata effect of the other judgment precluding any further substantive decision in the federal
court. 63 

### We can find no similar authority pertaining to the surrender of jurisdiction from one court to another within the
same state. [25] Regardless, the custody and the adoption proceed

ings concerning Chase do not have an identity of issues that would unavoidably result in precluding further substantive decisions by the district court. As Jennifer describes her argu

ment, the custody action would be moot only if the county court approved the stepparent adoption. She concedes that her custody action would be unaffected if the county court does not grant the adoption. Without deciding the merits of Jennifer’s underlying mootness assumption, we hold that the mere possibility of mootness is not the functional equiva

lent of a dismissal or a permanent denial of the requested relief. [26] Furthermore, we note that the district court’s order did not stay the custody action pending resolution of the adop

tion proceedings. Instead, the action was stayed merely until further order of the court. Presumably, the district court will monitor the adoption proceedings and will revisit and reassess the stay as it sees fit. We have held that a temporary stay that “merely preserves the status quo pending a further order is not

62 See In re Adoption of Amea R., supra note 3.

63 See, Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 103 S. Ct. 927, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765 (1983); In re Urohealth Systems, Inc. , 252 F.3d 504 (1st Cir. 2001); Spring City Corp. v. American Bldgs. Co. , 193 F.3d 165 (3d Cir. 1999); Granite State Ins. Co. v. Tandy Corp. , 986 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1992).- 816 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### an order that amounts to a dismissal of the action or that per

manently denies relief to a party.” 64 

### This appeal is distinguishable from Jesse B. v. Tylee H. 65 

### Jesse B. presented an appeal from the final judgment dismiss

ing a habeas and declaratory judgment action challenging the legality of the proposed adoption that was pending when the action commenced. Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for a claim that a child is being illegally detained by the county court for adoption. 66 

### Despite this, the district court in Jesse B. stayed the habeas and declaratory judgment action until the adoption proceeding concluded. And, after the adoption was approved, the district court dismissed the habeas and declara

tory judgment action on the ground that it could no longer exercise jurisdiction. On appeal, we reversed the dismissal. We disagreed with any contention that the habeas and declaratory judgment action, inasmuch as it challenged the constitutionality of the certain adoption consent statutes, was moot. We also opined that the district court, as the first court to exercise jurisdiction over the claims in the habeas proceeding, was required to retain it to the exclusion of the county court. But the present custody action, unlike the action in Jesse B.
, does not challenge the legality of the county court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the child to be adopted. Furthermore, Jesse B. did not present an immediate appeal from an interlocutory order. It is thus inapposite to the question before us of whether the stay presents a final order. [27] We conclude that, without more, a litigant’s substan

tial rights are not affected by the mere fact that one court has determined that the interests of judicial administration are

64 Shasta Linen Supply v. Applied Underwriters, supra note 53, 290 Neb. at 648, 861 N.W.2d at 431.

65 Jesse B. v. Tylee H. , 293 Neb. 973, 883 N.W.2d 1 (2016).

66 See id.- 817 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### best served by temporarily deferring jurisdictional priority to another court of this state. We hold this to be true even if the issues presented to the court with jurisdictional priority might be rendered moot by the time the stay is lifted. As with the order of consent, Jennifer asserts that her right to intervene was affected by the deferral of jurisdic

tional priority reflected through the stay. She reasons that the absence of a prior determination by the district court of her in loco parentis status might serve as grounds for the county court to deny her motion to intervene in the adoption proceedings. Jennifer presents no legal argument, however, that a prior determination of her in loco parentis status by the district court would be required for her to intervene in the adoption proceed

ing. Such an argument would run contrary to the transitory nature of in loco parentis status. Neither does Jennifer argue that the county court lacks jurisdiction to determine her in loco parentis status when con

sidering her motion to intervene. As stated, in loco parentis is a concept of standing. Standing ordinarily is determined in the proceeding into which the party wishes to intervene. Finally, Jennifer does not explain how her alleged right to intervene in the adoption proceedings cannot be effectively vindicated through an appeal in that proceeding. If the right allegedly affected is the right to intervene in another proceed

ing, then it is more apt to consider whether it can be effectively vindicated in an appeal in that proceeding rather than in the action before us. Because the district court’s order does not determine the merits of any issue pertaining to Jennifer’s ability to intervene in the adoption proceedings, Jennifer should seek redress of this right in the adoption proceeding—if indeed the county court again denies her motion. The speculative effect of the district court’s stay upon Jennifer’s right to intervene in the adoption proceeding in county court does not rise to the level- 818 - 

### N ebraska 

### S upreme 

### C ourt 

### A dva nc e 

### S heets 

### 298 N ebraska 

### R eports
JENNIFER T. v . LINDSAY P.
Cite as 298 Neb. 800


### of “affecting a substantial right” 67 

### for purposes of a final order analysis.

CONCLUSION Neither the order granting consent to adoption nor the order staying the custody proceedings pending further order of the court present a final, appealable order. Accordingly, we dis

miss Jennifer’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. A ppeal dismissed



### . W right 

### , J., not participating.

67 See § 25-1902.