[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14169

Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

KINGSLEY LYDELL WRIGHT, 

Defendant- Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Alabama

D.C. Docket No. 1:07-cr-00415-JB-M-1

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14169

Before LUCK, LAGOA and DUBINA, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Kingsley Wright appeals the revocation of his supervised release. He argues that the district court erred in denying 

his motion in limine because the exclusionary rule should apply in 

revocation proceedings and that the court improperly admitted 

hearsay during his revocation hearing. After reading the parties’ 

briefs and reviewing the record, we affirm the district court’s order 

revoking Wright’s supervised release.

I.

A district court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an 

abuse of discretion. Burchfield v. CSX Transp., Inc., 636 F.3d 1330, 

1333 (11th Cir. 2011). We will not overturn evidentiary rulings unless the district court made a clear error of judgment or applied the 

wrong legal standard. Id. 

The government’s use of evidence seized in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment does not itself violate the Constitution. Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 362, 118 S. Ct. 

2014, 2019 (1998). The exclusionary rule is a judicially created 

means of deterring illegal searches and seizures. Id. at 363, 118 S. 

Ct. at 2019. “[T]he rule does not proscribe the introduction of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all persons but 

applies only in contexts where its remedial objectives are thought 

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most efficaciously served.” Id. at 363, 118 S. Ct. at 2019 (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)

In Scott, the Supreme Court declined to extend the exclusionary rule to state parole revocation proceedings. Id. at 369, 118 

S. Ct. at 2022. The Court explained that “[b]ecause the exclusionary rule precludes consideration of reliable, probative evidence, it 

imposes significant costs: It undeniably detracts from the truthfinding process and allows many who would otherwise be incarcerated 

to escape the consequences of their actions.” Id. at 364, 118 S. Ct. 

at 2020. The Court reasoned that “[t]he likelihood that illegally obtained evidence will be excluded from trial provides deterrence 

against Fourth Amendment violations, and the remote possibility 

that the subject is a parolee and that the evidence may be admitted 

at a parole revocation proceeding surely has little, if any, effect on 

the officer’s incentives.” Id. at 367 118 S. Ct. at 2022.

In United States v. Hill, we followed Scott and held that the 

exclusionary rule does not apply to supervised release revocation 

proceedings. 946 F.3d 1239, 1242 (11th Cir. 2020). Citing the “substantial social costs” of excluding probative evidence, we rejected 

Hill’s argument that the evidence should have been suppressed, explaining that the Supreme Court has “repeatedly declined to extend 

the exclusionary rule to proceedings other than criminal trials.” Id.

at 1242 (citing Scott, 534 U.S. at 363, 118 S. Ct. at 2019). We concluded that “Hill ha[d] not offered anything to indicate why, in light 

of the Supreme Court’s holding in the state parole revocation context, the exclusionary rule should apply to [a] supervised release 

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revocation proceeding.” Id. We thus affirmed the district court’s 

decision that the exclusionary rule did not apply without addressing the admissibility of the challenged evidence. See id. at 1240-42. 

We are bound by a prior panel’s decision until overruled by 

the Supreme Court or by our Court en banc. United States v. 

Steele, 147 F.3d 1316, 1317-18 (11th Cir. 1998). “The prior panel 

precedent rule applies regardless of whether the later panel believes the prior panel’s opinion to be correct, and there is no exception to the rule where the prior panel failed to consider arguments 

raised before a later panel.” United States v. Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 

1198 (11th Cir. 2019). There is not an exception for overlooked or 

misinterpreted Supreme Court precedent. United States v. Fritts, 

841 F.3d 937, 942 (11th Cir. 2016). 

Here, the record shows that the district court did not err in 

denying Wright’s motion in limine because our precedent holds 

that the exclusionary rule does not apply in supervised release revocation proceedings. 

II. 

We review a district court’s evidentiary rulings for an abuse 

of discretion. Burchfield, 636 F.3d at 1333. A district court’s conclusion that a defendant violated the terms of his supervised release

is also reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v. Copeland, 

20 F.3d 412, 413 (11th Cir. 1994). A defendant’s supervised release 

may be revoked if the district court finds by a preponderance of the 

evidence that “the defendant violated a condition of supervised 

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release.” 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3). The preponderance of the evidence standard “simply requires the trier of fact to believe that the 

existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.” United 

States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation 

omitted). 

Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, hearsay is an out-ofcourt statement offered “to prove the truth of the matter asserted 

in the statement.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). The Federal Rules of Evidence generally prohibit hearsay. Id. at 802. 

“Although the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in supervised release revocation hearings, the admissibility of hearsay is 

not automatic.” United States v. Frazier, 26 F.3d 110, 114 (11th Cir. 

1994). A defendant is entitled to “question any adverse witness unless the court determines that the interest of justice does not require the witness to appear.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(b)(2)(C). In 

deciding whether to admit hearsay, the district “court must balance 

the defendant’s right to confront adverse witnesses against the 

grounds asserted by the government for denying confrontation.” 

Frazier, 26 F.3d at 114. The district court must also determine that 

the statement is reliable. Id. 

A district court’s failure to make findings pursuant to the balancing or reliability tests is reviewed for harmless error. See id. 

“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a). To 

show reversible error, a defendant bears the heavy burden of showing that “the court explicitly relied on the information” in reaching 

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its decision. United States v. Taylor, 931 F.2d 842, 847 (11th Cir. 

1991). The defendant must show that the statement is “materially 

false or unreliable” and “that it actually served as the basis” for the 

revocation. Id. 

The record demonstrates that the district court properly 

weighed Wright’s confrontation rights against the government’s 

reasons for not producing the witness, McCovery. The district 

court determined that the officer’s statements regarding what 

McCovery told him during an interview were reliable and overruled Wright’s hearsay objection based on the explanation that 

McCovery was a fugitive who had incriminated herself during the 

interview. Thus, the police officer’s statements were admissible. 

In addition, the district court determined that the police officer’s 

testimony regarding the information provided by the confidential 

informant (“CI”) was reliable. The CI’s information was corroborated by the police’s discovery of drugs, cash, bags normally used 

in the drug trade, and digital scales in Wright’s residence. Thus, 

the district court properly conducted the reliability test to determine that the statements were admissible.

Further, even assuming the district court erred in improperly admitting the evidence, Wright has not shown that the challenged evidence was a factor, much less the determinative factor, 

in the district court’s decision to revoke his supervised release. The 

evidence seized by authorities was sufficient to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Wright violated the terms and 

conditions of his supervised release by committing new crimes, and 

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illegally possessing a controlled substance and distributing it. The 

record demonstrates that the district court had a sufficient basis to 

revoke Wright’s term of supervised release, and we affirm its order 

revoking Wright’s supervised release. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3).

AFFIRMED. 

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