BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

 WASHINGTON, D. C. 

--------------------------------------------- 

2010 U.S.-HANEDA COMBINATION SERVICES : DOT-OST-2010- 

ALLOCATION PROCEEDING : 0018 

--------------------------------------------- 

 

REPLY OF AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. 

 

Communications with respect to this document should be sent to: 

VIRASB VAHIDI WILLIAM K. RIS, JR. 

Senior Vice President - Senior Vice President - 

 Planning Government Affairs 

American Airlines, Inc. American Airlines, Inc. 

P.O. Box 619616, MD 5634 1101 17th Street, N.W. 

DFW Airport, Texas 75161 Washington, D.C. 20036 

 

KENJI C. HASHIMOTO CARL B. NELSON, JR. 

Vice President – Strategic Associate General Counsel 

 Alliances American Airlines, Inc. 

American Airlines, Inc. 1101 17th Street, N.W. 

P.O. Box 619616, MD 5635 Washington, D.C. 20036 

DFW Airport, Texas 75261 (202) 496-5647 

 carl.nelson@aa.com 

ROBERT A. WIRICK 

Director, Regulatory 

American Airlines, Inc. 

P.O. Box 619616, MD 5635 

DFW Airport, Texas 75261 

(817) 963-0394 

robert.wirick@aa.com 

March 8, 2010 
BEFORE THE 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

 WASHINGTON, D. C. 

--------------------------------------------- 

2010 U.S.-HANEDA COMBINATION SERVICES : DOT-OST-2010- 

ALLOCATION PROCEEDING : 0018 

--------------------------------------------- 

 

REPLY OF AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. 

 American Airlines, Inc., under the Department’s 

amended Notice of February 12, 2010, hereby replies to the 

answers submitted on March 1, 2010 by Delta Air Lines, Inc., 

United Air Lines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Hawaiian 

Airlines, Inc., and Continental Micronesia, Inc. 

 American is seeking two of the four daily U.S.-Haneda 

slot pairs the Department will award. American proposes 247-

seat B777 service from New York (JFK) and Los Angeles, the two 

largest Mainland-Tokyo markets. American’s first priority is 

New York. Via New York and Los Angeles, American will serve 

all of the 10 largest Mainland-Tokyo markets, with nonstop 

flights from the two gateways and roundtrip on-line connections from San Francisco, Chicago, Las Vegas, Seattle, 

Washington, Boston, Orlando, and Portland (Exhibit AA-105). 

 

 
2 

 American’s application to serve Haneda from JFK and 

LAX should be granted ahead of the other requests. There is no 

public interest justification for giving all four slots to 

Delta, the world’s largest airline and largest U.S. carrier to 

Japan, with a 52% market share (Exhibit AA-R-102). Delta 

operates a substantial hub at Narita with 16 daily departures 

to U.S. points and 10 daily departures to cities in Asia, and a 

second Asia hub at Seoul where it enjoys ATI with Korean Air. 

 For service to Haneda from New York, the Department 

should choose American (JFK) over Continental (EWR). JFK is 

the preferred airport for international service, and American 

at JFK has better on-time performance than Continental at 

Newark. Newark ranks last in on-time performance among the 31 

reportable airports. Moreover, if United receives SFO authority, American should be selected ahead of Continental to ensure 

balanced competition among the three global alliances. 

 The Department should not award slots for flights 

from Haneda to Honolulu (Hawaiian Airlines) or Guam (Continental Micronesia). These markets are well served today, and 

do not require departures from Tokyo’s close-in airport. Moreover, Hawaiian Airlines has never operated scheduled service to 

Tokyo, and has not operated charter flights to Japan for 20 

years, casting doubt on its credibility as an applicant here. 

 
3 

 1. DELTA

 Delta’s answer repetitively asserts that it should 

have all four of the U.S.-Haneda slot pairs so that Delta (and 

SkyTeam) can compete with the prospective AA/JAL (oneworld) and 

UA/CO/ANA (Star) immunized alliances. Indeed, Delta’s 21-page 

pleading has 20 separate references to JAL, 36 to oneworld, 16 

to ANA, and 37 to Star. It has been observed, however, that 

“mere repetition of arguments . . . is insufficient,” Reliance 

Steel Products Co. v. National Fire Ins. Co., 880 F.2d 575, 577 

(1st Cir. 1989), and that “no amount of pure repetitive assertion can make it so,” United States v. Lynch, 499 F.2d 1011, 

1039 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (MacKinnon, C.J., dissenting). Those 

observations apply to Delta here. 

 American’s potential cooperation with JAL should not 

preclude our own-metal service to Haneda. In past proceedings, 

Delta received limited-entry authority to Colombia, France, and 

Mexico, even though Delta already had access to the identical 

city-pairs by displaying DL* on Air France (JFK-Lyon), Avianca 

(JFK-Bogota), and Aeromexico (LAX-Puerto Vallarta). Delta pronounced that “codeshare service is not a substitute for an 

applicant’s direct service with its own aircraft.” See American’s answer, March 1, 2010, p. 10-11. Similarly, cooperative 

service to Haneda with JAL as the operating carrier is no substitute for American’s direct service. 
4 

 In applying for immunity with JAL, American’s goal is 

to position itself for long-term success in the U.S.-Japan and 

U.S.-Asia markets against Delta and United/Continental/ANA. 

For the benefit of its customers, shareholders, pilots, flight 

attendants, mechanics, and all other employees, American will 

continue to seek route opportunities to Japan, and to operate 

transpacific flights in the context of the metal-neutral joint 

venture. Delta’s view that JAL should be the operating carrier 

in U.S.-Haneda markets to the exclusion of American is contrary 

to the general joint venture model, which contemplates that the 

partners will share equally in opportunities. 

 Delta argues that by obtaining the entire allotment of 

Haneda slots, it would “maximize consumer benefits” (p. 1), 

although it does acknowledge that “a request for all four of 

the available slot pairs at Haneda may appear extraordinary” 

(p. 3). This last point is one on which the other applicants 

are in full agreement, although some describe Delta’s ploy a 

bit differently. See Answers of American, p. 4 (citing Delta’s 

“extraordinary” bid to gain a monopoly U.S. flag position at 

Haneda); Continental, pp. 1, 13 (Delta has “greedily applied 

for” and has “the audacity to seek” every single slot-pair); 

United, p. 11 (Delta “unabashedly demands” four Haneda slots); 

Hawaiian, p. 6 (it is “incongruous” that Delta demands four 

slot pairs after vigorously opposing U.S.-Japan open skies). 
5 

 Delta’s request not merely “appear[s] extraordinary,” 

but is virtually unprecedented in selection cases. When the 

Department has the opportunity to make multiple awards, it does 

not surrender everything to one applicant, particularly an 

applicant such as Delta which is already the largest U.S. 

carrier to Japan and has two hubs in Asia. 

 If the Department were to accede to Delta’s demand, 

Delta would achieve a U.S. flag monopoly at Haneda with four 

slot pairs, while American, United, and Continental would have 

none. Even if the Haneda-U.S. slots yet to be allocated to JAL 

and ANA (presumably two each) were attributed to their U.S. 

partners (a contention which we dispute), Delta would have 

twice the number of U.S.-Haneda operations (four) as AA/JAL 

(two) or UA/CO/ANA (two). That would obviously not “promot[e] 

broad-based alliance competition,” which is how Delta mischaracterizes the result if it runs the table (p. 1). 

 Delta claims there are two precedents for attributing 

(i) JAL’s Haneda slots to American and (ii) ANA’s Haneda slots 

to United/Continental: the obsolete Air-21 slot rule at 49 USC 

41714(k) and the slot divestiture condition in oneworld showcause Order 2010-2-8 (p. 26). Neither is relevant here. 

 
6 

 The Air-21 provision was intended to prevent codeshare 

partners operating at slot-constrained airports such as ORD and 

LGA from posing as “new entrants” by applying for additional 

slots under their separate corporate names and codes. But 

these codeshare carriers, such as United Express, were already 

operating at the restricted airports, in some cases with scores 

of daily flights. Here, by contrast, Delta wants to prevent 

American, United, and Continental from operating to Haneda at 

all. 

 Nor is the oneworld show-cause order instructive for 

Haneda. The oneworld applicants are already operating at 

Heathrow, and the proposed condition pertains to slot divestitures to non-affiliated carriers. The show-cause order is 

not aimed at shutting the oneworld applicants out of Heathrow. 

To the contrary, the issue is quite narrow and deals only with 

the disposition of divested slots to unrelated parties. 

 Delta’s proposed gateways and priorities are not consistent with the public interest. Seattle, Delta’s first 

choice for an award, is only the sixth largest Mainland-Japan 

market, one-fifth the size of Los Angeles, one-fourth the size 

of New York, and one-third the size of San Francisco, which are 

the top three (Exhibit AA-105). Delta’s second choice, Detroit, does not even rank in the top 10 (Exhibit CO-A-100), and 

is a small fraction the size of New York and Los Angeles. 
7 

Delta’s third choice, Los Angeles, clearly merits Haneda service, but the Department should select American, not Delta, in 

light of American’s stronger connecting presence and other 

factors set forth in our answer, p. 12. Delta’s fourth choice 

is Honolulu, which Delta now concedes to Hawaiian Airlines (p. 

3 n. 2). 

 Delta’s Haneda application should be denied. With 

approval of antitrust immunity for American/JAL and United/ 

Continental/ANA, Delta will continue to command a strong 

position in Japan and Asia. On February 9, 2010, after JAL 

announced its decision to remain in oneworld, Delta publicly 

responded by stating that: 

 “Delta is well-positioned as the No. 1 carrier 

 between the U.S. and Asia. Customers can con- 

 tinue to count on Delta for unmatched access to 

 Japan, with nonstop service between 10 U.S. desti- 

 nations and Tokyo. With recently announced plans 

 to invest $1 billion in our product, Delta remains 

 committed to providing a leading option for travel 

 across the Pacific. Delta’s competitive Pacific 

 presence, along with our trans-Atlantic joint ven- 

 ture with Air France/KLM and leading position in 

 global markets, will continue to allow Delta and 

 our SkyTeam partners to meet demand worldwide.” Delta does not need special assistance from the Department to compete in the U.S.-Japan market by being awarded a 

U.S.-flag monopoly at Haneda. The three global alliances are 

competitively balanced as measured by U.S.-Japan O&D market 

share (Exhibit AA-R-116), and can only remain so with an evenhanded distribution of Haneda slots. 
8 

 2. UNITED

 United requests one slot pair to operate between San 

Francisco and Haneda. United’s SFO proposal should not be 

selected at the expense of American’s application to serve 

Haneda from New York and Los Angeles. New York and Los Angeles 

are the two largest O&D markets to Tokyo from the Mainland, and 

each exceeds San Francisco by a substantial margin, New York by 

64%, and Los Angeles by 88% (Exhibit AA-105). 

 As a U.S.-Japan incumbent, United, like Delta, has 

long enjoyed unlimited authority to serve between the two 

countries, as well as a hub at Narita with Fifth Freedom rights 

to beyond points in Asia. Like Delta, United has a base at 

Narita with aircraft and employees dedicated to intra-Asia 

operations. And like Delta, United has antitrust immunity with 

a Korean carrier, in United’s case Asiana, thus giving United 

hubs at both Narita and Seoul. 

 In addition to displaying UA* on ANA and Asiana, 

United engages in non-immunized codesharing in U.S.-Asia markets on Star partners Air China, Shanghai Airlines, and Thai 

International. United also has two U.S. partners in the Star 

alliance, Continental and US Airways. Star is unique in having 

multiple U.S. carrier members. As detailed in our answer (p. 

12), both Continental and US Airways display their codes on 

United and Asiana, and US Airways displays its code on ANA and 
9 

Singapore Airlines. United and Continental are jointly seeking 

ATI with ANA. Star’s multi-carrier access to Japan and Asia 

should not be extended by an award of San Francisco-Haneda 

authority to United to the exclusion of American and oneworld 

at JFK and Los Angeles. 

 3. CONTINENTAL

 Continental proposes daily service between Newark and 

Haneda. American’s New York (JFK)-Haneda application should be 

ranked first, particularly given JFK’s preferred position as an 

international gateway, and JFK’s superiority over Newark in ontime performance, as we showed in our answer. 

 For most business travelers in Manhattan, JFK is more 

convenient than Newark. As we explained in the 2005/2006 U.S.-

China Air Services Case and Designations (DOT-OST-2004-19077), 

JFK is the preferred airport by a wide margin for international 

service to and from the New York metropolitan area. See American’s Brief, November 22, 2004, p. 21 and cited exhibits. 

 Just as JFK is more convenient than Newark, Haneda is 

the closest airport to central Tokyo and is more convenient 

than Narita. Ground transportation between Haneda and central 

Tokyo takes about 30 minutes, compared to about an hour and 30 

minutes for Narita. The public interest would be best served 

by linking the two most convenient airports, JFK and Haneda, 

with nonstop service. 
10 

 Moreover, JFK has better overall on-time performance 

than Newark, and American at JFK has better on-time performance 

than Continental at Newark. Indeed, among the 31 reportable 

airports, Newark ranked last in on-time performance in 2009. 

See Exhibits AA-R-109, AA-R-110, AA-R-111. American’s superior 

on-time performance at JFK is significant not only because 

customers benefit from more reliable service (including fewer 

missed connections), but also because of the 2200 – 0700 

operating window at Haneda for flights to and from the U.S. In 

these circumstances, the applicant and the airport with the 

better on-time record should be favored. 

 In its answer, Continental claims more roundtrip online connections for behind cities via Newark than American 

would offer via JFK (Exhibit CO-R-155). But Continental’s 

array of connections cannot be accepted at face value. As 

shown in Exhibit AA-R-112, 21 of Continental’s connecting 

cities had fewer than five Tokyo passenger bookings per day in 

each direction in CY 2009. Of the remaining 15 cities, four 

would have roundtrip connections on American via JFK (Boston, 

Washington, Raleigh/Durham, and Miami), and two of those cities 

(Washington and Boston, the 7th and 8th largest U.S.-Tokyo 

markets) would have shorter elapsed times on American than on 

Continental (Exhibit AA-R-113). 
11 

 The rest of the connecting cities claimed by Continental via EWR presently have shorter roundtrip elapsed times to 

Tokyo (Narita) on existing flights operated by Delta via ATL, 

United via IAD or ORD, or American via ORD. The time advantage 

of existing service ranges up to 11 hours roundtrip (Exhibit 

AA-R-117). Assuming that Haneda is about an hour closer to 

central Tokyo than Narita, connecting passengers would not 

benefit from Continental’s Haneda service if the time saved on 

ground transportation between Haneda and the city center is 

eclipsed by additional hours of elapsed time spent in the air 

and at the connecting gateway. 

 Continental portrays itself as a small carrier in the 

U.S.-Japan market, with the fewest Mainland gateways, frequencies, departures, and passengers (Exhibits CO-A-117, 118, 119, 

and 120). But Continental does not need Haneda slots to increase its footprint in Japan. Since the 1998 MOU, Continental 

has had ample opportunity to expand its U.S.-Japan presence, 

but has not done so with the exception of adding the CO* code 

to transpacific flights operated by United and other Star 

partners. 

 
12 

 The Department should also consider Continental’s 

pending joint application with United for antitrust immunity 

with ANA. It would be unfair for United and Continental (and 

Star) to receive two of the four Haneda slot-pairs but for 

American (and oneworld) to be left out. If United is selected 

for San Francisco, Continental should not be selected at the 

expense of American’s application and balanced inter-alliance 

competition. See oneworld show-cause Order 2010-2-8, pp. 14, 

28; Exhibit AA-R-116. 

 4. HAWAIIAN 

 Hawaiian’s answer rivals Delta’s in repetition. Just 

as Delta seizes on the ATI applications by American and Continental/United, Hawaiian seizes on the theme that unlike other 

applicants, it does not already serve Japan. Thus, Hawaiian is 

a “new entrant” (p. 1) offering a “new option” (p. 2); “all of 

the other applicants” serve Tokyo (p. 2); Hawaiian is the sole 

“have not” among the applicants (pp. 3, 4); it “does not presently serve Tokyo” and “does not offer any U.S.-Tokyo service” 

(p. 4); Hawaiian will not experience diversion from existing 

Japan service (pp. 1, 16, 17, 18); Hawaiian is the only applicant “with no service to Japan” (p. 11); it has “no operations 

or investment at Narita” (p. 12); Hawaiian operates “no service 

to Tokyo from Honolulu” (p. 25); it is “a new entrant” (p. 26); 

it offers “a new option” (p. 27), etc. 
13 

 Hawaiian’s on-going failure to serve Japan is not a 

factor in its favor. To the contrary, Hawaiian’s failure is a 

demerit that all but extinguishes its credibility. As its 

filings demonstrate, Hawaiian has the time and resources to 

prepare hundreds of pages of route case exhibits to argue that 

it would provide significant public benefits if only it could 

serve Tokyo. But Hawaiian has not used the opportunities it 

has had to enter the Japan market since the 1998 MOU substantially expanded U.S. routes and frequencies. There is nothing 

to stop Hawaiian from serving Tokyo today, as it does not 

require Haneda slots to do so. 

 Hawaiian briefly served Honolulu-Fukuoka 20 years ago 

before selling the route to Northwest, and secured Maui-Tokyo 

authority 10 years ago but never started. Hawaiian could also 

be providing charter service to Japan, but admits in its answer 

that it has not done that for some 20 years (p. 26). 

 Operations to Japan have not been a priority for 

Hawaiian, which has instead chosen to serve Australia, the 

Philippines, Tahiti, and America Samoa (p. 26). The Department 

should not credit Hawaiian’s contention that it is a “have not” 

deserving special treatment simply because, unlike all of the 

applicants, it has failed to take advantage of longstanding 

opportunities provided by the 1998 MOU to fly to Japan. 

 
14 

 6. CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA 

 Continental Micronesia should not be awarded a Haneda 

slot-pair to serve Guam. Like Honolulu, the Guam market is 

highly concentrated with Japan-originating leisure passengers. 

These passengers are well served with existing scheduled and 

charter flights. If there is a need for additional Japan-Guam 

service, Continental Micronesia can provide it by adding to the 

60 weekly scheduled frequencies it currently operates to Guam 

from Tokyo (Narita), Osaka, Nagoya, Sapporo, Fukuoka, Hiroshima, Niigata, Okayama, and Sendai (Exhibit AA-R-114). Continental Micronesia does not require Haneda slots to expand its 

Japan-Guam service. 

CONCLUSION

 The Department should promptly conclude this proceeding by awarding two daily slot pairs to American to serve 

Haneda from New York and Los Angeles, the two largest MainlandTokyo markets. From these gateways, American will provide 

roundtrip on-line Haneda service in the 10 largest MainlandTokyo markets. Selection of American will benefit U.S.-Japan 

passengers and allow American to achieve a stronger competitive 

position for itself and for oneworld versus incumbent airlines 

and their alliance partners. 

 
15 


Respectfully submitted, 

CARL B. NELSON, JR. 

Associate General Counsel 

American Airlines, Inc. 

March 8, 2010 
30.0%

38.1%

31.1%

THE THREE GLOBAL ALLIANCES ARE COMPETITIVELY BALANCED 

AS MEASURED BY U.S. – JAPAN O&D MARKET SHARE

DOT-OST-2010-0018

Exhibit AA-R-116

Page 1 of 1

Source: MIDT Y2009

oneworld

SkyTeam Star
DOT-OST-2010-0018 

Exhibit AA-R-117 

Page 1 of 2 

AT LEAST 11 OF THE CONNECTING CITIES 

CLAIMED BY CONTINENTAL AT NEWARK HAVE 

SHORTER ROUNDTRIP ELAPSED TIMES ON EXISTING 

SERVICE TO NARITA, ECLIPSING ANY TIME SAVED ON 

THE GROUND BETWEEN HANEDA AND CENTRAL TOKYO 

 Continental Existing Svc 

 To/From Haneda To/From Narita Time Saved 

 Via EWR Via Via Narita 

Atlanta 

 Westbound 20:25 ATL/DL 12:00 

 Eastbound 17:39 14:35 

 Roundtrip 38:04 26:35 11:29 

 

Baltimore 

 Westbound 19:07 ORD/UA 16:00 

 Eastbound 16:27 15:58 

 Roundtrip 35:34 31:58 3:36 

Charlotte 

 Westbound 17:25 IAD/UA 16:27 

 Eastbound 17:40 16:15 

 Roundtrip 35:05 32:42 2:23

Cincinnati 

 Westbound 18:10 ORD/AA 14:40 

 Eastbound 18:52 16:00 

 Roundtrip 37:02 30:40 6:22

Cleveland 

 Westbound 17:15 ORD/UA 16:02 

 Eastbound 18:47 15:54 

 Roundtrip 36:02 31:56 4:06

Columbus 

 Westbound 19:09 ORD/AA 14:55 

 Eastbound 17:55 16:10 

 Roundtrip 37:04 31:05 5:59 

Norfolk 

 Westbound 18:08 IAD/UA 15:33 

 Eastbound 16:53 16:10 

 Roundtrip 35:01 31:43 3:18 
DOT-OST-2010-0018 

Exhibit AA-R-117 

Page 2 of 2 

AT LEAST 11 OF THE CONNECTING CITIES 

CLAIMED BY CONTINENTAL AT NEWARK HAVE 

SHORTER ROUNDTRIP ELAPSED TIMES ON EXISTING 

SERVICE TO NARITA, ECLIPSING ANY TIME SAVED ON 

THE GROUND BETWEEN HANEDA AND CENTRAL TOKYO 

Orlando 

 Westbound 18:05 IAD/UA 16:05 

 Eastbound 17:15 17:20 

 Roundtrip 35:20 33:25 1:55

Philadelphia 

 Westbound 18:20 IAD/UA 15:43 

 Eastbound 16:07 16:18 

 Roundtrip 34:27 32:03 2:22 

Pittsburgh 

 Westbound 19:18 IAD/UA 15:45 

 Eastbound 17:48 16:15 

 Roundtrip 37:06 32:00 5:06 

Tampa 

 Westbound 21:05 ATL/DL 16:28 

 Eastbound 20:18 17:35 

 Roundtrip 41:23 34:03 7:20

SOURCE: Exhibits CO-122, CO-123, CO-A-155; OAG February 

 2010. Note: Exhibit CO-A-155 claims Buffalo as 

a roundtrip connection but CO-123 does not show 

service in the eastbound direction
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