J-S34035-18

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court 

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

SEAN JOSE RAIN,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1894 WDA 2017

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 5, 2015

in the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-43-CR-0001010-2014

BEFORE: BOWES, STABILE, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED AUGUST 14, 2018

Sean Jose Rain (Appellant) appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment 

of sentence entered October 5, 2015, after he was found guilty of one count 

of person not to possess a firearm. We are constrained to affirm.

In September 2014, Appellant was charged with several crimes, 

including two counts of person not to possess a firearm, in relation to a 

shooting that occurred in 2013. The victim, Leonard Figgins (Figgins), 

identified Appellant as the shooter. On November 5, 2014, Appellant made 

an application to sever the two counts of person not to possess, which the 

trial court subsequently granted. In February 2015, Appellant proceeded to a 

jury trial on all charges except the two possession counts, and was 

acquitted.
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Based upon, inter alia, the acquittal, Appellant filed a motion to quash 

the two outstanding person not to possess charges. The Commonwealth 

opposed the motion to quash, and subsequently filed its own motion,

seeking to amend the information to add count 12, another person not to 

possess charge, based upon information received from testimony provided 

by a defense witness at Appellant’s earlier trial. On June 4, 2015, the trial 

court granted both Appellant’s motion to quash and the Commonwealth’s 

motion to amend and a count of person not to possess a firearm was added 

to the information. 

Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. At trial, Andre Hailstock 

(Hailstock) testified that on October 9, 2013, Hailstock, Appellant, and 

several other individuals, including Figgins were at a home on the 900 block 

of Fruit Street. N.T., 7/14/2015, at 22. Hailstock testified that he was with 

Appellant in the living room when Figgins approached, grabbed his coat, and 

asked Appellant to hand him a gun that was on a table near where Appellant 

was sitting.

1

 Appellant complied and Figgins left the home. Id. at 23-24. 

Hailstock testified that he and Appellant were aware that Figgins had left the 

home with the firearm “to go rob a dice game.” Id. at 26. Based upon the 

 

1 The firearm belonged to Figgins.
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foregoing,2 on July 15, 2015, Appellant was convicted of one count of person 

not to possess a firearm, and on October 5, 2015, the trial court sentenced 

Appellant to 30 to 60 months of incarceration.3

On October 17, 2017, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro 

tunc.

4 The trial court scheduled a hearing where it heard argument from the 

 

2 Only Hailstock and Alex Glessner, a forensic DNA scientist for the 

Pennsylvania State Police testified. Mr. Glessner testified that Appellant’s 

DNA was found on a Ruger Red Hawk revolver. N.T. 7/14/2015, at 44.

3 At sentencing, it was determined that with Appellant’s prior record score of 

four and an offense gravity score of five, the sentencing guideline range was 

nine to 16 months’ incarceration, plus or minus three. Thus, the trial court

imposed a sentence in excess of the guidelines, but within the statutory 

maximum. See N.T., 10/5/2015, at 8-9; 18 Pa.C.S. § 1104(1) (“A person 

who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be sentenced to 

imprisonment for a definite term which shall be fixed by the court and shall 

be not more than ... [f]ive years in the case of a misdemeanor of the first 

degree.”).

4 After his sentencing hearing, Appellant inquired with the public defender’s 

office, who was appointed to represent him, about filing an appeal on his 

behalf. Despite his inquiry, the deadline for filing an appeal passed without 

action. This prompted Appellant to file his first petition pursuant to the PostConviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§9541-9546, requesting the court

reinstate his appellate rights nunc pro tunc. On July 25, 2016, the PCRA 

court granted Appellant’s petition. Appellant filed an appeal challenging, 

inter alia, the discretionary aspects of his sentence. On appeal, this Court 

found Appellant’s sentencing claim waived for failure to preserve properly his 

issue at sentencing or in a post-sentence motion. Commonwealth v. Rain, 

170 A.3d 1186 (Pa. Super. 2017) (unpublished memorandum). 

Appellant then filed his second PCRA petition contending his appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve properly his sentencing claim. 

On October 10, 2017, the court once again entered an order reinstating his 

appellate rights nunc pro tunc, and Appellant filed the aforementioned postsentence motion. 
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parties, including Appellant’s counsel, who requested the trial court resentence Appellant within the standard range. N.T., 11/27/2017, at 2-4. 

Following the hearing, on November 30, 2017, the trial court denied 

Appellant’s motion. Appellant thereafter timely filed a notice of appeal.5 

Appellant’s sole issue on appeal challenges the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. Appellant’s Brief at 4. Accordingly, we bear in mind the 

following.

Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not 

entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant 

challenging the discretionary aspects of his [or her] sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part 

test:

We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether 

appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 

902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly 

preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and 

modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether 

appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and 

(4) whether there is a substantial question that the 

sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the 

Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 65 A.3d 932, 935 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some 

citations omitted). 

Here, Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc and 

notice of appeal, and included a statement pursuant to Rule 2119(f) in his 

 

5 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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brief.6 We now turn to consider whether Appellant has presented a 

substantial question for our review.

The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be 

evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Paul, 925 A.2d 

825, 828 (Pa. Super. 2007). “A substantial question exists only when the 

appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions 

were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing 

Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the 

sentencing process.” Griffin, 65 A.3d at 935 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted).

In his 2119(f) statement, Appellant states only that the trial court 

“abused its discretion when the [court] sentenced Appellant outside of the 

sentencing guidelines without putting sufficient reasons for said deviation on 

the record.” Appellant’s Brief at 9. Such a claim raises a substantial 

question for our review. See Commonwealth v. Garcia-Rivera, 983 A.2d 

777, 780 (Pa. Super. 2009) (“This [C]ourt has found that a claim the trial 

court failed to state its reasons for deviating from the guidelines presents a 

substantial question for review.”). We address the merits of this claim 

mindful of the following. 

 

6 Despite Appellant’s woefully inadequate 2119(f) statement, see Appellant’s 

Brief at 9, the Commonwealth has not objected, so we will consider whether 

Appellant has raised a substantial question for our review.
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the 

sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an 

abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in 

judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by 

reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored 

or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons 

of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a 

manifestly unreasonable decision.

* * *

When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider 

the particular circumstances of the offense and the character of 

the defendant. In considering these factors, the court should 

refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, age, personal 

characteristics and potential for rehabilitation. 

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760-61 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(emphasis added; internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 

As a general matter, Pennsylvania’s sentencing scheme, with its 

guidelines and suggested minimum sentences, is “indeterminate, 

advisory, and guided” in its nature. Pennsylvania judges retain 

broad discretion to sentence up to and including the maximum 

sentence authorized by statute; “the only line that a sentence 

may not cross is the statutory maximum sentence.” 

Commonwealth v. Gordon, 942 A.2d 174, 182 (Pa. 2007) (citations 

omitted; emphasis added). “Traditionally, the trial court is afforded broad 

discretion in sentencing criminal defendants ‘because of the perception that 

the trial court is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a 

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances 

before it.’” Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 812 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 2002). 

See also Commowealth v. Melvin, 172 A.3d 14, 21 (Pa. Super. 2017) 

(“To be clear, while the court must consider the guidelines, the court is also 
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afforded broad discretion in sentencing matters, as it is in the best position 

to evaluate the individual circumstances before it.”).

In its opinion to this Court, the trial court responded to Appellant’s 

claim as follows.

Th[e trial c]ourt sentenced [Appellant] outside the 

sentencing guidelines and explained its reasoning extensively at 

the [s]entencing h]earing held on October 5, 2015. Th[e 

c]ourt’s sentence and reasoning fully comply with 42 Pa.C.S. 

§ 9721(b) and 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9781(c) and (d). The [c]ourt 

discussed the nature of the offense and the fact that [Appellant]

gave a gun to his friend knowing that the friend intended to 

commit armed robbery. Th[e trial c]ourt also considered 

[Appellant’s] history, characteristics and reviewed his entire 

criminal history. [Appellant’s] [j]uvenile [r]ecord consisted of six 

arrests, four adjudications, two adult arrests, one conviction, and 

two incarcerations, both lasting about nine months. 

The [c]ourt discussed the protection of the public, the 

gravity of the offense, the impact on the community and the 

victim, and [Appellant’s] rehabilitative needs. The [c]ourt noted 

that this is not an offense in which there is a specific victim, 

however the strong impact on the community must be 

considered. The [c]ourt addressed the prevalence of gun 

violence in Mercer County and that [Appellant] contributed to 

this [] problem by handing a gun to a person who was going to 

commit a robbery. The [c]ourt also discussed the need to 

protect the community from gun violence. The [c]ourt

specifically addressed [Appellant’s] rehabilitati[ve] needs 

drawing attention to [Appellant’s] repeat offenses and lack of 

remorse. The [c]ourt did consider the letters sent by members 

of the community speaking positively about [Appellant],

however, the [c]ourt also noted that [Appellant] has a history of 

physical altercations and other violence throughout his past. 

Having considered all of this, the [c]ourt imposed a sentence 

that, while outside of the guidelines, complies fully with the law.

Trial Court Opinion, 2/14/2018, at 5-6 (unnumbered; citations omitted).
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Indeed, at Appellant’s sentencing hearing, on the record, the trial 

court stated the following.

As indicated by the Assistant District Attorney, you were 

found guilty by a jury on July 15[], 2015. And just as I don’t 

take into consideration acquittals, nor am I allowed to, I do take 

into consideration that a jury has spoken in this case. That it 

was not a de minimis matter.

And I do believe that the Assistant District Attorney cited 

the record correctly, that the testimony from [Hailstock] was 

that you passed over the gun to [Figgins] knowing that he was 

going to go out and rob crap[s] games. 

The presentence investigation [report (PSI)] indicates 

you’re twenty-one. You have a GED.

Your co-[d]efendant [Figgins], if we can call him that 

because he’s really not your co-[d]efendant on this charge, but 

he was involved in the underlying situation or the totality of the 

situation, did receive a state sentence. Of course, he was 

convicted on much different charges. 

Juvenile record indicates six arrests, four adjudications; 

two adult arrests, one conviction. Two incarcerations, one lasted 

about nine months and the other maybe a little bit less than 

that.

[A]lthough your attorney has argued, primarily focusing on 

what’s become of you since the last time you got out of jail, I am 

required and I do think it’s important that I consider a --

consider the past. The juvenile supervision adjustment indicates 

you were placed in shelter care from March 27[], 2008 to April 

14[], 2008. You then went to a boot camp from April 14[], 2008 

to July 8[], 2008. You then went home from July 8[], 2008 to 

November 27[], 2008, when you had new charges. You were 

back to shelter care from November 27[], 2008 to March 6, 

2009.

You went into the Adelphoi Village secure facility from 

March 6[], 2009 to July 30[], 2009. And then to ... the Greystone 

Group Home from July 30[], 2009 to December 7[], 2009.

Came back home again on December 7[], 2009 until June 22[], 
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2011, when you had new charges again. Back to shelter care 

from June 22[], 2011 to June 27[], 2011. Placed in the New 

Castle YDC from June 27[], 2011 to January 12[], 2012. Then 

back home again on January 12[], 2012 until January 25[], 

2012, when you had parole violations and back in shelter care 

from July 25[], 2012 to July 27[], 2012.

You then came home on house arrest on July 27[], 2012, 

and finished on house arrest on March 15[], 2012 [], when you 

turned eighteen.

The juvenile offenses were two counts of [d]isorderly 

[c]onduct and [a]ggravated [a]ssault and then another 

[d]isorderly [c]onduct and then an [e]scape from the shelter 

care.

Your adult record, you were acquitted twice and then you 

had your current case where you were convicted. You noted in -

- the PSI notes you had a close family relationship. You have no 

real drug or alcohol issues. You’re single with no children.

You reported to the ... auditor that you’re not a violent 

person and you describe yourself as someone who tries to deescalate a volatile situation. And you had an anger management 

while in juvenile placement.

Your work history indicates you worked for an uncle and 

you then you had the job in Georgia for about three months and 

lately now, it’s been testified here, that you are a bouncer in a 

bar. ... [Y]ou did say you [] clean the bar after it closes as well.

The sentencing guidelines are an [o]ffense [g]ravity 

[s]core of five, [p]rior [r]ecord [s]core of four. Standard range is 

nine to sixteen, plus or minus three.

I’ve noted already and I’ll note again I did consider the 

sentencing memorandum and the various letters, some of whom 

[are] from people I know. And they do report on you regarding 

your past mistakes, noting your past mistakes, and that you’re 

changing your life. And certainly I've heard the witnesses testify 

today, including your mom. 
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I’m required by law to consider the impact of the crime on 

the victim. In essence, there is no victim here because this was 

a possession charge.

The impact on the community. The offense does have a 

great impact on the community. I don’t view it as de minim[i]s. 

Gun violence is prevalent in parts of Mercer County. Everyone 

walks in fear because of the prevalence of guns.

By the testimony in this trial, you were sitting in 

someone’s home and there’s a gun sitting on the table. Just part 

of the décor. You were part of that. That was your life. And 

when someone wanted the gun to go rob crap[s] games, you 

just handed it to him. 

I have to consider the safety of the community. There is a

strong need to protect the community from gun violence. People 

need to be safe from guns everywhere. In their homes, in their

work, and certainly in their neighborhoods. 

Must also consider your rehabilitation needs. Your record 

shows that for a significant period of time you were a regular 

offender. Despite many placements, you re-offended soon after

returning home. Despite juvenile placements and incarceration, 

you offended again. 

I do note the letters that admired your attempt to change

your life and that you try to speak to youth groups about your 

mistakes. 

I also consider your attitude. It appears that the people 

that have written on your behalf certainly believe your attitude 

has changed. You’re trying to become a better person. You 

correctly indicate you recognize your mistakes. 

What I didn’t see anywhere is any suggestion of remorse 

on your part. Maybe that’s implied from the course of conduct 

you’re now trying to follow. None of the letters ever mention[s]

specifically remorse or that you’ve showed remorse. They do 

show you’ve tried to help others avoid what you went through.

You made mistakes, admit to them, but don’t really 

apologize for them. You told the ... PSI auditor that you’re a 

non[-]violent person and you act as a de-escalator, you try to 
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de-escalate a violent situation. Well, let’s talk about that. Were 

you a de-escalator in the first of your two [d]isorderly [c]onducts 

when you were a juvenile? You told the PSI auditor you were 

involved in a physical altercation at Sharon High School. You 

would not calm down, you screamed obscenities at the police 

and were jumping around.[7]

* * *

I've tried to look at everything, []including [Appellant’s] past, 

which I do think is significant; the fact that this involved a gun, a 

gun that was then used, at a minimum, to rob crap[s] games.

I do take seriously the letters that were written and the 

things that have been said upon [Appellant’s] behalf. But I note 

there were periods of time when he came home and then got in 

trouble again. That seemed to be a repetitive situation. He 

hasn’t yet, but, of course, he knew he had -- was facing trial in 

this case and now sentencing on this case. Does that explain 

some of his behavior?

* * *

The [trial court] notes that the sentence is outside the 

standard range of the guidelines, but believes that it is an 

appropriate sentence due to the seriousness of the offense, the 

impact of the crime on the community, the need to keep the 

community safe.

[Appellant has] been in multiple placements, including 

incarceration, but continue[d] to offend. I am not seeing 

remorse. I’m seeing someone who’s telling me they’re trying to 

change their life. I question your credibility. You told the 

auditor you were a de-escalator and I saw no de-escalation in 

any of your conduct.

N.T., 10/5/2015, at 32-42. 

 

7 The trial court then went on to note several other instances in which the 

court found Appellant did not act as a de-escalator. This included other 

crimes of violence, as well as several misconducts Appellant received while 

incarcerated. See N.T., 10/5/2015, at 38-40.
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Here the trial court provided reasons for the sentence imposed 

including, inter alia, the seriousness of the crime, the protection of the public 

against gun violence, which has been a prevalent problem in Mercer County

according to the trial court, and Appellant’s lack of remorse and 

rehabilitation despite several placements, arrests, and incarcerations. Id. 

at 42. The court also acknowledged the sentencing guidelines prior to 

imposing an above the guideline range sentence. Id. at 8.

In addition, the trial court received and reviewed a PSI prior to 

sentencing. “[W]here the sentencing judge had the benefit of a PSI, it will 

be presumed that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding 

the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with 

mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d 149, 

154 (Pa. Super. 2004). The court stated on multiple occasions that it 

considered the mitigating information presented by Appellant and that it

took the letters and statements made on Appellant’s behalf “seriously.” 

N.T., 10/5/2015, at 41. Nonetheless, for the reasons cited supra, the 

sentencing court concluded that the imposition of an above-guideline 

sentence was appropriate. 

We are cognizant that gun violence plagues our society. We are also 

keenly aware that courts must punish individuals who use firearms to break 

the law and help to perpetuate crimes in our communities. However, in this 

case, we are troubled with the imposition of an above-guideline-range 
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sentence based on the facts before us. While we do not find his act “de 

minimis,” Appellant’s actions narrowly meet the definition set forth in 18 

Pa.S.C. § 6105 (a)(1),

8 which makes the imposition of a statutory maximum 

sentence troubling.

Nonetheless, based on the record before us and the limited review this 

Court has when considering sentencing claims, as cited in more detail supra, 

we cannot find, nor has Appellant convinced this Court that, the trial court’s 

determination was manifestly unreasonable, a misapplication of the law or 

was the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.9 “[I]f the sentencing

 

8 A person convicted of an enumerated offense set forth in the statute “shall 

not possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture or obtain a license to 

possess, use, control, sell, transfer or manufacture a firearm in this 

Commonwealth.” 18 Pa.S.C. § 6105 (a)(1).

9 Lastly, we note that although Appellant only raises the aforementioned 

issue in his 2119(f) statement, the argument section of his brief raises 

several additional arguments in support of his contention that an above the 

guideline range sentence was inappropriate. Specifically, Appellant avers 

the trial court failed “to take into consideration the mitigating factors 

presented by Appellant” and found that Appellant lacked remorse. 

Appellant’s Brief at 12. Furthermore, Appellant contends his possession of 

the firearm was de minimis, that the trial court took into consideration 

Figgins’s actions at Appellant’s sentencing hearing, and that he was not 

involved in a crime of violence or gun violence. Id. at 14. With that in 

mind, Appellant avers the trial court erred in relying on the sentence Figgins

received, especially since Figgins was convicted of crimes that varied greatly 

from, and were “far more serious than, the charge for which Appellant was 

convicted.” Id. Lastly, Appellant argues the trial court’s emphasis on the 

protection to the public and his juvenile record were misplaced. Id. at 13-

16.

Assuming arguendo that Appellant preserved properly these claims 

and raised substantial questions for our review, he would still not be entitled 

to relief. At sentencing, the trial court heard and considered statements 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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court, after considering the appropriate [] sentencing factors, states valid 

reasons for its sentence, which are supported by the record, this Court must 

affirm the decision even if the particular panel does not agree with the 

weight the sentencing court accorded them.” Commonwealth v. Marts, 

889 A.2d 608, 616 (Pa. Super. 2005). See also Commonwealth v. 

Stewart, 867 A.2d 589, 592 (Pa. Super. 2005) (“It is not the function of an 

appellate court to determine whether it would have imposed the same 

sentence as the trial court.”). 

In light of the foregoing, we are constrained to affirm.

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

from Appellant, his pastor, and his mother, as well as reviewed various 

letters in support of Appellant. Additionally, the court received and reviewed 

Appellant’s PSI report and as our case law notes, the trial court is in the best 

position to consider these factors and evaluate Appellant’s remorse. See 

Mouzon, supra. Likewise, we find Appellant’s complaint about the court’s 

discussion of Figgins’ actions and sentence at Appellant’s sentencing hearing 

meritless. We find nowhere in the record, and Appellant has failed to 

convince this Court, that the trial court considered improper factors when 

sentencing Appellant. To the contrary, we find the trial court mentioned 

Figgins to highlight that Appellant was aware that the firearm he passed off 

to Figgins was going to be used to commit an armed robbery. To wit, the 

court acknowledged that although Figgins received a lengthy sentence, he 

“was convicted on much different charges.” N.T., 10/5/2015, at 33.

Nor has this Court been convinced that the trial court erred by 

considering Appellant’s juvenile record and emphasizing the impact 

Appellant’s crime had on the community. When sentencing a defendant, the 

trial court “shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed 

should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection of the 

public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the 

victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the 

defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). The aforementioned considerations were 

proper and balanced by the court’s recognition of the mitigating evidence 

presented by Appellant. 
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Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/14/2018