RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-3207-22 

D.E., 

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

A.K.,

 Defendant-Appellant. 

__________________________

Submitted September 11, 2024 – Decided September 25, 2024 

Before Judges Rose and Puglisi. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex County, Docket 

No. FV-07-1502-23. 

A.K., appellant pro se. 

Rutgers Law Associates, attorneys for respondent 

(Vadim Korytny, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-3207-22

 Defendant A.K.1 appeals from a June 19, 2023 final restraining order 

(FRO) entered against him in favor of plaintiff D.E. pursuant to the Prevention 

of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. 

I.

 During the two-day FRO hearing, plaintiff testified that the parties' brief 

intimate relationship began in mid-October 2021 when they met at the wedding 

venue where plaintiff worked. Over the course of the next few weeks, they saw 

each other in person for three dates. By the end of the year, plaintiff believed 

the relationship had run its course and had ended amicably. 

 After six months without communication, defendant contacted plaintiff by 

phone and they had a brief conversation about remaining friends. Plaintiff told 

defendant he had recently married and defendant told plaintiff he was in a 

relationship. Their call was followed by a text message plaintiff described as 

"random" and "confusing," which said, "That sweater and song . . . You know I 

wanted it to work with you right." Although the parties exchanged text 

messages, they attempted to but did not connect for a phone conversation. 

1

 We use initials to protect the parties' privacy and the confidentiality of the 

proceedings in accordance with Rule 1:38-3(d)(10). 
3 A-3207-22

 A few weeks later, the tone of defendant's text messages "changed 

dramatically" to "illogical and . . . very confusing and outlandish and 

hyperbolized." Some text messages were "weirdly sexualized . . . and . . . very 

odd." Plaintiff testified he was "completely caught off guard" by defendant's 

communications and was "in constant bewilderment by the shock value of what 

was going on" because their relationship was very brief and casual, and they had 

not been in contact for months after it ended. Plaintiff repeatedly told defendant 

he wanted nothing more than a friendship with him, and sent him a video 

message explaining he would prefer a friendship because there was a "lack of 

compatibility . . . past a friendship." When defendant's texts persisted, plaintiff 

ceased responding, wanting just to be left alone. Defendant admitted on crossexamination he was "interested in a sexual, intimate, beyond-friendship" 

relationship with plaintiff. 

Following another month without any communication, defendant sent 

plaintiff a "barrage" of "absolutely degrading" text messages containing 

"disgusting comments" about plaintiff. He also sent plaintiff's spouse numerous 

lengthy, rambling text messages that contained similarly inappropriate, intimate 

and invasive comments about plaintiff, the parties' prior sexual relationship and 
4 A-3207-22

plaintiff's marriage. The trial judge aptly described the messages as "deep, and 

personal[] and long." Plaintiff's spouse did not respond to defendant. 

About a month later, in early September 2022, defendant reinitiated 

contact with plaintiff via text message, which again turned lengthy, aggressive 

and derogatory. According to defendant, two weeks later he saw plaintiff had 

posted affirmations2 on his public Facebook page and, although they did not 

reference defendant, he nevertheless believed plaintiff's remarks referred to him. 

In response, defendant sent plaintiff text messages that were "increasingly 

deeper and darker." 

 When he did not receive any response from plaintiff, defendant posted on 

his own Facebook page what the trial judge described as a "long, personal post 

professing love, telling the story, saying personal things to . . . plaintiff, none of 

which [was] appropriate on a public posting." Although defendant did not name 

plaintiff, he tagged3

 the post's location as plaintiff's place of employment, 

2

 The affirmations were: "1) Listen to your body and mind: take a break 

sometimes. 2) For every person who tries and knocks you down, there will be 

another two to life you up. (Don't fixate on the knocker). 3) Patience is a learned 

trait, that takes [. . .] patience [with smiling emoji]. 4) People anywhere can say 

anything they want about you at any point, true or false, so stop worrying. 5) If 

the vibe is negative, cut it out." 

3

 "Tagging" refers to identifying individuals or locations in a post.
5 A-3207-22

specifically naming the restaurant and identifying plaintiff as the "exec/head 

pastry chef." Defendant's tagging the restaurant caused the post to appear on 

the restaurant's public page. 

 Defendant's thirteen-paragraph missive described plaintiff as his 

"superhero" who "turned . . . grandiose, full of rage, and dangerous," someone 

who "took pleasure in trying to deceive . . . , abuse . . . , bait . . . , and string 

[defendant] along, for a long time." Defendant stated "things" plaintiff had done 

"to [him] and others were disturbing, devoid of love." He discussed plaintiff 

and his spouse, saying their attempts to have a baby were "banking on 

[defendant's] silence." 

 The post concluded with the following: 

***Why I won't out my abusers by name is 

simple: this is about me. I won't name them if I might 

be invalidated for seeking attention, or draw more 

attention to them than they deserve—for now. Both are 

surrounded and supported by other morally and 

spiritually bankrupt like-minds, and are out there 

expanding their reach and covertly abusing others. The 

first could spell trouble for my career if I retaliate. The 

second is set to appear on a platform baking 

competition by year's end. Both get by almost 

undetected—almost, [because] while these 

personalities admitted to having done this to those

before me and will continue to do so, the truth is loud 

and always reveals itself, one need only be willing to 

look and to listen. 
6 A-3207-22

 Defendant updated the post twice, stating plaintiff, the "malignant 

abuser," had been fired from his job because of "misconduct with coworkers and 

customers," but surmising plaintiff would "say he quit for mental health 

reasons." The five-paragraph final update to defendant's post ended with: 

All this just to say: What is done in the dark will 

come to light, but in the meantime, always stand up for 

yourself and what you know in your heart to be true and 

good.

And, just a reminder, it's not a smear campaign if 

it's exposing an abuser based on truths. Smear 

campaigns are made on lies, and I don't have to resort 

to lies when everything written here is true.[] 

 When plaintiff's friends brought the posts to his attention, he filed for a 

temporary restraining order, alleging defendant committed acts of criminal 

coercion, harassment, stalking and cyber harassment. 

After hearing testimony from plaintiff's witnesses and the parties, the 

judge found plaintiff credible about his "thoughts and feelings" and noted he 

"clearly exhibited a nervousness due to what he perceived the defendant has 

done, or may be able to do to him." She found defendant not credible because 

his testimony was inconsistent and he "appeared to minimize his responsibility 

for his actions claiming he was wronged in some way by the plaintiff."
7 A-3207-22

The judge determined plaintiff did not establish the predicate acts of 

criminal coercion, stalking or cyber harassment, but found he had proven the 

offense of harassment by a preponderance of the evidence. The judge also 

determined a final restraining order was necessary to protect plaintiff from 

further acts of domestic violence and issued the FRO. 

This appeal follows. 

II. 

Defendant urges us to vacate the FRO on several grounds. First, he argues 

the judge erred in finding the Facebook location tag was an act of harassment 

and was inconsequential. He contends the purpose to harass may not be inferred 

because his conduct was not alarming, annoying or offensive nor was it a course 

of conduct; and even if his conduct was alarming, annoying or offensive, it was 

merely expressive activity. He further argues the judge erred in finding he had 

a purpose to harass, in violation of his First Amendment rights. Defendant also 

claims the judge erred by finding plaintiff needed the protection of an FRO and 

showed bias during the proceedings. We disagree. 

"In our review of a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic 

violence matter, we grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of 

fact and the legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 
8 A-3207-22

N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 

411-12 (1998)). "The general rule is that findings by the trial court are binding 

on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare, 

154 N.J. at 411-12. Reversal is only warranted when a trial court's findings are 

"so wide of the mark that a mistake must have been made." N.J. Div. of Youth 

& Fam. Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (quoting C.B. Snyder Realty 

Inc. v. BMW of N. Am. Inc., 233 N.J. Super. 65, 69 (App. Div. 1989)). 

We also apply a deferential standard in reviewing a judge's factual 

findings. Balducci v. Cige, 240 N.J. 574, 594 (2020); State v. McNeil-Thomas, 

238 N.J. 256, 271 (2019). In an appeal from a non-jury trial, appellate courts 

"give deference to the trial court that heard the witnesses, sifted the competing 

evidence, and made reasoned conclusions." Griepenburg v. Twp. of Ocean, 220 

N.J. 239, 254 (2015) (citing Rova Farms Resort v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 

483-84 (1974)). Deference is likewise given to credibility findings. State v. 

Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 264 (2015) (citation omitted). "Appellate courts owe 

deference to the trial court's credibility determinations as well because it has 'a 

better perspective than a reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a 

witness.'" C.R. v. M.T., 248 N.J. 428, 440 (2021) (quoting Gnall v. Gnall, 222 

N.J. 414, 428 (2015)). 
9 A-3207-22

Our review of a trial court's legal conclusions is de novo. Rowe v. Bell & 

Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. 

Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). 

In an application for an FRO, the judge must determine whether plaintiff 

proved, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, defendant committed one 

or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a). Silver v. Silver, 

387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). 

"Under a preponderance standard, 'a litigant must establish that a desired 

inference is more probable than not. If the evidence is in equipoise, the burden 

has not been met.'" N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. N.S., 412 N.J. Super. 

593, 615 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Land, 186 N.J. 163, 

169 (2006)). "The evidence must demonstrate that the offered hypothesis is a 

rational inference, that it permits the trier[] of fact to arrive at a conclusion 

grounded in a preponderance of probabilities according to common experience." 

Ibid. (quoting In re Estate of Reininger, 388 N.J. Super. 289, 298 (Ch. Div. 

2006)) (citation omitted) (alteration in original). 

A person commits the offense of harassment if, with purpose to harass 

another, the person: 

a. Makes, or causes to be made, one or more 

communications anonymously or at extremely 
10 A-3207-22

inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse 

language, or any other manner likely to cause 

annoyance or alarm; 

. . . . 

c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or 

of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm 

or seriously annoy such other person. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.] 

 "[I]ntegral to a determination of harassment" under either subsection is a 

finding by the trial court "that defendant acted with a purpose or intent to harass 

another." State v. Duncan, 376 N.J. Super. 253, 261 (App. Div. 2005) (citations 

omitted). Subsection (c) requires a course of conduct, rather than a single 

communication. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 477-78 (2011). A course of 

conduct must be demonstrated by objective proof that it is "alarming or . . . a 

series of repeated acts . . . done with the purpose to alarm or seriously annoy the 

intended victim." State v. Burkert, 444 N.J. Super. 591, 600 (App. Div. 2016) 

(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Subsection (c) also requires 

proof that the defendant "reasonably put that person in fear for his safety or 

security or . . . intolerably interfere[d] with that person's reasonable expectation 

of privacy." State v. Burkert, 231 N.J. 257, 284-85 (2017). 
11 A-3207-22

Here, the record supports the judge's finding defendant committed the act 

of harassment under both subsections (a) and (c). Plaintiff's credible testimony 

established defendant periodically sent a barrage of invasive, unwanted text 

messages that escalated to posting the public message, which constituted a 

continuing course of conduct committed with the purpose to seriously annoy 

plaintiff under subsection (c). The posting by itself was also likely to cause 

annoyance or alarm to plaintiff under subsection (a). The judge found 

defendant's conduct under both subsections was purposeful and done with the 

intention to harass plaintiff. 

Under the second prong of Silver, the court must determine whether the 

FRO is necessary to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent 

further abuse. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)). In 

doing so, the court must consider: 

(1) The previous history of domestic violence between 

the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, 

harassment and physical abuse; 

(2) The existence of immediate danger to person or 

property; 

(3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and 

defendant; 

(4) The best interests of the victim and any child; 
12 A-3207-22

(5) In determining custody and parenting time the 

protection of the victim's safety; and 

(6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection 

from another jurisdiction. 

[N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a).] 

The judge considered the relevant factors in this case. She noted there 

was no history of domestic violence between the parties, and defendant testified 

he had obtained a temporary restraining order against plaintiff in New York. 

However, after considering the testimony and evidence, the judge determined 

defendant's harassing conduct would continue absent an FRO because defendant 

"still [did] not understand the significance or the seriousness of his actions in 

this matter." Thus, she found the FRO was necessary to stop the harassment and 

prevent further harm to plaintiff. 

Having reviewed the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in the 

judge's credibility determinations and factual findings, nor any error in her legal 

conclusions that an FRO should issue. 

To the extent we have not expressly addressed any issues raised by 

defendant, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Affirmed.