# FILED
November 5, 1998 Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Cou rt Clerk 

### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENN ESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

YONG MUN CHONG M EADOWS, ) ) Plaintiff/Appellee, ) ) Appeal No. ) 01-A-01-9801-CH-00054 VS. ) ) Montgomery Chancery ) No. 95-11-0118 TOMMY C. MEADOWS, ) ) Defendant/Appellant. )
APPEALED FROM THE CHAN CERY COUR T OF MONTGOM ERY COUNT Y AT CLARKSVILLE, TENNESSEE THE HONORABLE JAMES E. WALTON, JUDGE

YO NG MU N C HO NG ME AD OWS 2177 Powell Road Clarksville, Tenness

ee 37043 Pro Se/Plaintiff/Appellee GREGORY D . SMITH One Public Square, Suite 321 Clarksville, Tenness

ee 37040 Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED AND REMANDED

BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDING JUDGE, M.S. CONCUR: KOCH, J. CAIN, J.- 2 - 

## O P I N I O N

The trial court granted the parties a divorce, di vided themarital p roperty, and awarded the wife permanent alimony. On appeal, the husband contends that the court should ha ve adjusted the property set tlement to take the wife’s post-separ ation dissipation of marital assets into account,and that it should have p laced some limitationson the alimony award. We agree, and w e modify the decree to incorporate the necessary changes.
I. Marriage and Div orce
Tommy Cleveland Meadows, a teacher of Economics , and Yong Mun Chong, a native of Korea, began li ving togeth er in 197 7. In 1985, a son, Daniel Thomas Meadows, w

as born to th em. In 1987 the y married.By that ti me , To mmy Meadows was

a tenured Professor of Economics at Austin Peay State University in Clarksville.

The parties’ marriage pr oduced a daughter, Lucy Rebecca Meadows, who was born in 1992. The parties separated in August of1995. In August of 1996, Yong Meadows went to the R ivergate Shopping Center in Nashville on a shopping trip with her daughter. Lucy di sappeared during that tri p. She is presumed kidnapped, and her whereabouts are cur rently unknown.

On August 12, 1996, Ms. M eado ws filed a complaint for absolute divorce in th e Chanc ery Court of Montgomery County citing ir

reconcilable differences and inappropriatemarital conduct on the part of Mr. Meadows. He answered on August 14, 199 6, denyi ng that he had been guilty of inappropriate marital conduc t, and praying for dismissal of the complaint. After a h earing, thetrial court granted the- 3 -

dis m issal. However, on Mar ch 25, 1997, Mr. Meadows filed a counter-complaint, asking the court to grant him a divorce on the gro un ds of inappropriate marital behavior or adulte ry.

During the hearing of

this case on April 1 and Apr il 16, 1997, the parties stipulated that they both had grounds for d ivorce. At the conclusio n of the hearin g, the court decla r ed the parties divorced pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-129. Yong Meadows wasgranted custody of the chi ldren, and the court expr essed its hope that Lucy would be found safe and healthy. Tommy Meadows w as ordered to pa y child support for one child, pursuantto the guidelines ($750.75, which is 21% of his net monthly income of $3,575), with the support to be increase d if Lucy returns.

The court’s division

of marital property inv

olved real property, financial assets, personalty and debt. The most v aluable marital assetby far was a house and farm in Montgom ery County. Although Ms. Meadow s lived in the house, and wanted to remai n there , the court found itself unable to di vide the equity in

the property without selling it. The court therefore ordered the property sold, wi

th the equity to be divided equally be

tween the parties. Consi dering thetestimony as to the property’s value, and the mortgage e ncumberin g it, this would pr obably result in net pr

oceeds for division of about $160,000.

The court also granted Ms. Meado ws a 25% interest in the $58,844 in vested retirement funds that Mr. Mea dows had accumulated at the time of divorce, to be paid aft er Mr. Mead ows retires and becomes elig ible to collect the funds. In view of Mr. Meadows’ super ior earni ng capacity, he was ordered to pay all the parties’ debts, and hold Ms. Meadows harmless for the same, except for the car pay ments on the Ford Contour that she was awarded . The cou rt also ord ered Mr. Me adows to pay $1,000 per month as permanent spousal sup port and $3,000 in attorney fees. This appeal followed.- 4 - II. Marital Property and Marital Debt

Mr. Mea d ows conten ds in his br ief on ap peal tha t he shou ld not ha ve been held responsible for $36,000 that Yong Meadows sq uandered after the parties’ separation. He also argues that the trial court erred in failing to declare that his alimony obligation would terminate upon the remar riage of thesupported party. Ms. Meadows did not file

a brief i n respon se to Mr. Meadow s’ brie f, so this case must be decided on the basis of the record and the appellant ’s brief alone. Tenn.R.App.P. 29(c).

The record reveal s that M r. Mead ows ga ve his wife

generousfinancial support during the entire peri od of separation, even to the extent of giving her contr

ol of his entire paycheck of $2,80 0 a mont h. Despite t he fact that she was giv en sufficien t cash t o cover the reasonable ex penses of her household, there w as uncontrovertedtesti monythat Ms. Meadows ran u p debt of about $16,000 on her Lowe’s, Discover, and Visa credit cards between August 1995 and Apri l 1997. She did not attempt to account to the cour t for this debt.

The record als o shows tha t in 1995 Mr. Meadows receive d a $2 3,000 checkto retire a

note on a house which he had sold and financed for the purchaser, and which he had owned prior to his marriage. Mr. Meadows endorsed the check to his wife. She w

as unable to a

ccount for her

dispositi on of the mo ney, e xcept for a $3,000 down payment on a car.

We must note that we found it difficult to understand the t estimony of Ms. Meadows, e ven in its tr ancribed form. It must have been even more difficult for the attorneys involv

ed, who had to formulate follow-up questions

to poorly understood
answers. Part of the problem was obviously due to the appellee’s limited command of the English l a nguage, though we note that she has lived in thi s country for over- 5 -

twenty years, and Mr. Meadows testified that her English was actual ly a lot better than she chose to demonstrate.

But a good part of the problem was also due toher

unwillingn ess to give honest answers to direct q uestions about her use of the money given to her. At one point, while on the stand respond ing to questions regarding the $23,0 00 che ck that Mr. Meado ws gave her, she stated that she had spent $7,500 of the $23,000 check
on a car, and had paid North Carolina taxes to Mr. Meadows’ first w ife with a portion of the rest (somethi ng n ever even mentioned durin g her two depositions ). The ap pellant’s attorney impeached her testi mony with excerpts from her depos ition , including the f ollowing:

Q. Whe re do you ha ve the mon ey? A. I don’t have money anymor e. Q. What happened to it? A. Spending. Q. Okay. Let’s back up. You bought a car. What car did you buy? Is that the car you’re now driving? A. Yes. Q. You bought th e car that you are now d riving wh ich is a Ford Contour. You’ve told us that. Do you know how much you paid for it? A. I think so. Two, $3,000.

... Q. What did you do with the other $20,000? A. Buy

clothes, buy groceries, t ake children to games. Raining, movie. Q. How many do llars worth of cloth es did you b uy? A. Oh, some of them expensive. So me of thems very cheaper because I looking for the good sale. Q. How much did you spend? A. I don’t kn ow. Q. Did you spend $1,000?- 6 - A. Many thousand. Q. Many thousand? A. Yes sir, because he never hardly buy me clothes. Q. Are we talking about fiv e thousand, ten thousand? How much do you spend on clothes? A. I don’t remember, I don’t keep the receipt.

In view of her obvious ly wasteful dissipation of valuable assets, M s . Meadows should be required to reimburse her

former husband for the $20,000 that she could not account for. We also believe that the portion of the trial cour t’s order d ealing with marital debt shoul d be modified to require her t o pay up t o $16,000 o n the Lowe’s, Discover

and Visa debt. To the extent that Mr. Meadows has already paid these debts, she should be required to reimburse him or account for these totals if the house and farm have not been sold and th e proceeds divided.
III. Alimony
The alimony portion of the trial court’s opinion reads as follows: In this case, there is a great disparity in the needs and abilitiesof the parties. Mr. Mead ows is well-educated, experienced in business, tenured in hi s teaching position and fullycapable of earning in com e for various sources. Mrs. Meadows, on the other hand , ha s no job skills, speaks very broken English, and has no ability in the foreseeable future of earning any signi

ficant income. Mrs. Meadows has a need forsupport. Mr. Meadows has the ability to prov ide that support. After paymen t of child support, Mr. Meadows will have disposable income of approximately $2700 per month. Mrs. Meadows’ only inc ome will be approximat ely $740 per month child support and what s he may ea rn, if a ny, from investment

of the proceeds from the sale of the farm. It is not likely that she wi ll have any funds to invest if she purchases a home for herself and her childre n. Given these facts, Mr. Meadows will pay

to Mrs. Meadows the s um of $1000 per month as permane nt spous al suppo rt. Wh en Mr. Mead ows retires, this support payment will be reduced b y the amount of retirement paid to Mrs. M eadows.- 7 - Though the opinion, and the fina l decree, speak of permane nt alimo ny, the termsof the award seem to indicate w hat is called alimony i n futuro or periodi c alimony. Ali mony in futuro is permanent in the sense that the obligation is not extinguishedupon the payment of a specific total sum, as is the case of alim ony in solido and reha bilitati ve alimon y. McKee v. McKee , 655 S.W.2d 164, 165 (Tenn. App. 1985). But it is not necessari ly permanent, because the obli gation may be modified
or eliminated upon a showing of a change of circumstances. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(a)(1).

The appellan t argues th at alimo ny i n f uturo is not appropriate in this case, because the legislature has sta ted its preference for the payment of rehabili tative tempor ary s upport and maintenance, where the economically disadvantagedspouse is capable of being r ehabilitated. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5- 101(d)(1). He argues tha t the app ellee’s employment history indicates that she is capable of earning her own liv ing, and that the order of the cou rt gives her no incentive “to stand on her own two feet.”

We disagree. Ms. Meadows may very well be capable of working and earning money, but in view of her age (44 at the ti me of trial), lack of skills, and poor proficiency in the English language, we find it unlikely that she will ever be able to support herself fully by her ow n efforts. We also do not believe that the al im ony award will destroy her incentive to work. Especially after Danie l is grown, and (assuming Lucy does not return) when she is no lo nge r receiving c hild supp ort, we suspect that she will want to work and wil l need to supplement her alimony check. But that check will give her the security of a “floor ” under her income, to protec t her from extreme economic hardship.

It has been customary, however, in cases of alimony in futuro, to state in the decree that the alimony will terminate if the recipient remarries or dies. Such- 8 -

a statement is consistent w ith the legislative intent indicated by Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 5-101(a)(2)(B). We believe that it would be helpful to modify the trial court’s decree to declare that the alimony i t awarded is indeed ali mony in f uturo, and tha t it will terminate upon the death or remarr iage of the recipient.

IV.
The decree of the trial court is affirmed in all respects, e xcept that it is modified in regard to the division of marital pr operty and in the provi sions for the paymentof mar ital debt, as discussed abov e. It is also modified in regard to the per manence of the alimony award. R emand this cause to the Chancery Court of MontgomeryCounty for proceedings con sistent with this opi nion. Tax the costs on appeal equally between the appellant and the appellee.

_____________________________________ BEN H. CANTRELL, PRESIDIN G JUDGE, M.S.

CONCUR:

_____________________________ WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JUDGE

_____________________________ WILLIAM B. CAIN, JUDGE