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Michigan Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 48909 

Chie f Justice Justices 

Maura D. Corrigan Michael F. Cavanagh 

Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Clifford W. Taylor Opinion Robert P. Young, Jr. 

Stephen J. Markman 

FILED APRIL 8, 2003
 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,
 

Plaintiff-Appellee,
 

v No. 121668
 

CHARLES DAVIS,
 

Defendant-Appellant.
 

PER CURIAM
 

This case presents the question whether defendant may be
 

convicted twice of carjacking, MCL 750.529a, one conviction
 

being based on the theft from the driver of the vehicle and
 

the other conviction being based on the theft of the same
 

vehicle from the passenger. We hold that defendant committed
 

only one carjacking offense. Accordingly, we reverse in part
 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals and vacate one of
 

defendant’s two carjacking convictions.
 

I
 

On the afternoon of August 24, 1999, Coy Anderson drove
 

his automobile to his sister’s house. Tiara Hughes was a
 
passenger in the automobile. Anderson parked his car in the
 

street and walked to his sister’s house, while Hughes remained
 

in the car. Anderson left the keys in the ignition and the
 

motor running. As Anderson returned to his car, defendant
 

approached Anderson’s car, pointed a gun at Anderson and
 

warned him to get back, then pointed the gun at Hughes and
 

told her to leave the car. Anderson and Hughes complied.
 

Defendant entered Anderson’s car and drove away. A nder s o n
 

estimated that he was never closer than twelve to fifteen feet
 

from defendant. 


A jury convicted defendant on two counts of carjacking,
 

MCL 750.529a, and one count of possession of a firearm during
 

the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b. Defendant was
 

sentenced to two concurrent prison terms of 120 to 240 months
 

for the carjacking convictions and to the mandatory two-year
 

consecutive term for the felony-firearm conviction. The Court
 

of Appeals affirmed. 250 Mich App 589; 649 NW2d 118 (2002).
 

II
 

This case requires us to consider the meaning of MCL
 

750.529a. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that
 

we review de novo. Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich
 

57, 62; 642 NW2d 663 (2002); Crowe v Detroit, 465 Mich 1, 6;
 

631 NW2d 293 (2001). 


III
 

The goal of judicial interpretation of a statute is to
 

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ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature.
 

People v Pasha, 466 Mich 378, 382; 645 NW2d 275 (2002). To
 

accomplish this objective, we begin by examining the language
 

of the statute. If the language is clear and unambiguous, “no
 

further construction is necessary or allowed to expand what
 

the Legislature clearly intended to cover.” Id. Stated
 

another way, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous
 

statute that is not within the manifest intent of the
 

Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.”
 

Roberts, supra at 63.1
 

Michigan’s carjacking statute, MCL 750.529a, provides:
 

(1) A person who by force or violence, or by


threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear


robs, steals, or takes a motor vehicle as defined


in section 412 from another person, in the presence


of that person or the presence of a passenger or in


the presence of any other person in lawful
 

possession of the motor vehicle, is guilty of


carjacking, a felony punishable by imprisonment for


life or for any term of years.
 

(2) A sentence imposed for a violation of


this section may be imposed to run consecutively to


any other sentence imposed for a conviction that


arises out of the same transaction.
 

A straightforward reading of this language shows that the
 

conduct to which the statute applies is the taking of a motor
 

vehicle under certain circumstances. Those circumstances
 

1
 The analysis of the Court of Appeals relies in part on


a Senate legislative analysis. Such a legislative analysis is


generally not a persuasive tool of statutory interpretation.


See Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578,


587 n 7; 624 NW2d 180 (2001).
 

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include the nature of the taking and from whom the motor
 

vehicle is taken.2 The core and focus of the offense,
 

however, are the taking of a motor vehicle. Because defendant
 

took one motor vehicle, the language of the carjacking statute
 

allows only one carjacking conviction.
 

It is clear that defendant committed the offense of
 

carjacking when, in order to steal Anderson’s car, he forced
 

Hughes at gunpoint to get out of the car. Defendant used a
 

threat of force or violence directed at Hughes, who was a
 

passenger in the car, to steal the car. While the elements of
 

the carjacking offense might also be based on the threat
 

defendant directed at Anderson, it is unnecessary to decide
 

whether the facts regarding Anderson also establish a
 

carjacking, because only one motor vehicle was taken.
 

In concluding that defendant committed two carjacking
 

offenses, the Court of Appeals reasoned in part that both
 

Anderson and Hughes suffered a loss of transportation. While
 

that is true, the language of the carjacking statute does not
 

identify “loss of transportation” as an element of the
 

offense. In effect, the Court of Appeals expanded the
 

language of the statute. Our Legislature could have made it
 

2
 Carjacking must be (1) “by force or violence, or by


threat of force or violence, or by putting in fear” and (2)


must be “from another person, in the presence of that person


or the presence of a passenger or in the presence of any other


person in lawful possession of the motor vehicle . . . .” MCL
 

750.529a.
 

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a crime to deprive a person of transportation, but it did not.
 

Similarly, the fact that both Anderson and Hughes were
 

threatened does not mean that there were two carjackings.3
 

IV
 

The carjacking statute is structured in a manner similar
 

to the armed robbery statute, MCL 750.529,4 but the focus of
 

the armed robbery statute is significantly different. The
 

focus of the armed robbery statute is on the person assaulted.
 

The nature of the assault and the conduct accompanying the
 

assault are then further defined by the statute. This
 

perspective explains the decision in People v Wakeford, 418
 

Mich 95; 341 NW2d 68 (1983), in which the defendant, who took
 

property from two employees of a grocery store, was properly
 

3
 The Court of Appeals noted that a similar California


carjacking statute was found to support multiple convictions


where only one vehicle was stolen. People v Hamilton, 40 Cal


App 4th 1137; 47 Cal Rptr 2d 343 (1995). While it is
 

unnecessary to distinguish the California decision because we


are interpreting the language of the Michigan carjacking


statute, we note that the California decision, like the Court


of Appeals decision, recognized that all occupants of a


carjacked vehicle suffer a loss of transportation.
 

4
 MCL 750.529 provides in relevant part:
 

Any person who shall assault another, and


shall feloniously rob, steal and take from his


person, or in his presence, any money or other


property, which may be the subject of larceny, such


robber being armed with a dangerous weapon, or any


article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the
 

person so assaulted to reasonably believe it to be


a dangerous weapon, shall be guilty of a felony,


punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for


life or for any term of years.
 

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convicted of two counts of armed robbery. 


In contrast, the carjacking statute focuses on the taking
 

of a particular type of property, a motor vehicle, rather than
 

on the person from whom the property is taken. In terms of
 

the language used in Wakeford, for armed robbery the
 

appropriate focus is the person assaulted and robbed, while
 

the appropriate focus for carjacking is the stolen vehicle.
 

V
 

Defendant’s presentation raises four other issues, the
 

first of which is a double jeopardy5 challenge to his multiple
 

convictions for carjacking. Given that we have determined
 

that the carjacking statute does not permit multiple charges
 

arising from a single carjacking, it is unnecessary to reach
 

defendant’s double jeopardy argument. 


In addition, we agree with the Court of Appeals that
 

defendant’s claim that improper prosecutorial comments denied
 

him a fair trial is meritless. Further, because we have
 

vacated one of defendant’s carjacking convictions, and
 

defendant’s claim of prosecutorial misconduct lacks merit,
 

defendant is not entitled to relief on the basis of his
 

particular claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
 

Defendant further contends that he is entitled to be
 

resentenced if one of his carjacking convictions is vacated.
 

5
 US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15.
 

6
 
We find no reason to remand for resentencing. Rescoring of
 

the guidelines to reflect only one carjacking conviction would
 

result in the same recommendation under the guidelines.
 

Moreover, our review of the record indicates that the
 

sentencing judge, who imposed identical concurrent sentences,
 

viewed defendant’s criminal episode as a single event, and
 

sentenced defendant accordingly. No reason exists to believe
 

that defendant’s convictions on two counts of carjacking
 

rather than one affected either sentence.
 

VI
 

Accordingly, we vacate one of defendant’s convictions and
 

the related sentence. In all other respects we affirm the
 

decision of the Court of Appeals. MCR 7.302(F)(1).
 

Maura D. Corrigan


Michael F. Cavanagh


Elizabeth A. Weaver
 

Clifford W. Taylor


Robert P. Young, Jr.


Stephen J. Markman
 

KELLY, J.
 

I concur in the result only.
 

Marilyn Kelly
 

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