Filed 2/5/16 In re H.O. CA2/5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

In re H.O., a Person Coming Under the 

Juvenile Court Law.

 B263389

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. NJ27633)

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

H.O.,

Minor and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, John 

C. Lawson, II, Judge. Affirmed.

Holly Jackson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Minor and 

Appellant.

Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Gerald A. Engler, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Lance E. Winters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Victoria B. Wilson, 

Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General, for 

Plaintiff and Respondent.
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INTRODUCTION

The juvenile court sustained the allegations of a petition filed by the District 

Attorney of Los Angeles County alleging defendant and appellant H.O. committed the 

crime of driving or taking a vehicle without the owner’s consent (Veh. Code, § 10851

subd. (a)1). H.O. argues the order sustaining the petition and declaring H.O. a ward of the 

court (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) should be reversed because the evidence was 

insufficient to prove he had the specific intent to deprive the vehicle’s owner of the 

vehicle. We affirm.

FACTS

Sometime between about 5:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m., on February 8, 2015, 

Armando Lopez’s 2000 Chevy Silverado vehicle was stolen. The vehicle had been 

parked on the street in the front of Lopez’s yard. Lopez did not give H.O. permission to 

take or drive the car. After discovering the vehicle was stolen, Lopez filed a stolen 

vehicle report stating the vehicle’s license plate number. 

At about 3:35 p.m. on February 9, 2015, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD)

Officer Luis Carmona was in the area of Lopez’s home when he observed a Silverado 

drive through a stop sign. Officer Carmona’s partner entered the Silverado’s license plate 

number into the mobile computer and determined the vehicle had been reported stolen. 

The license plate number for the Silverado was the same license plate number as that of 

Lopez’s stolen vehicle. 

Shortly after 3:35 p.m., LAPD Officer Maura Cooney saw the Silverado stopped 

at a red light. Officer Cooney’s attention was attracted to the Silverado because 

“[a]nother [police] unit” determined it was a stolen vehicle. Officer Cooney identified 

H.O. as the driver of the Silverado. 

H.O. parked along a street curb. Officer Cooney stopped the patrol vehicle and, 

with the doors of her vehicle open, she waited for other units to arrive. While H.O. was 

 

1 All statutory citations are to the Vehicle Code unless otherwise noted.
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seated in the driver’s seat of the Silverado, H.O. “kept looking back” over his left 

shoulder. H.O. exited the Silverado, made eye contact with Officer Cooney and her 

partner, and walked away from the vehicle. Officer Cooney and her partner detained 

H.O. 

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

On an appeal challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support a juvenile 

court judgment sustaining the allegations of a petition, the appellate court “‘must apply 

the same standard of review applicable to any claim by a criminal defendant challenging 

the sufficiency of the evidence to support a judgment of conviction on appeal.’” (In re 

Cesar V. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 989, 994.) “[T]he critical inquiry is ‘whether, after 

reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of 

fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ 

[Citation.]” (In re Ryan N. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1359, 1371.) We “‘review the whole 

record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses 

substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid 

value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a 

reasonable doubt.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 1371.)

B. Analysis

The juvenile court found true that H.O. violated section 10851, subdivision (a). 

That section provides, “Any person who drives or takes a vehicle not his or her own, 

without the consent of the owner thereof, and with intent either to permanently or 

temporarily deprive the owner thereof of his or her title to or possession of the vehicle, 

whether with or without intent to steal the vehicle, or any person who is a party or an 

accessory to or an accomplice in the driving or unauthorized taking or stealing, is guilty 

of a public offense . . . .” Thus, the elements of the offense are: the defendant drove or 
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took a vehicle belonging to another person; without the owner’s consent; and with 

specific intent to permanently or temporarily deprive the owner of title or possession. 

(People v. O’Dell (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1569, 1574.) H.O. challenges the sufficiency 

of the evidence as to the third element—whether he had specific intent to deprive the

vehicle’s owner of title or possession. 

Criminal intent “‘“may be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the 

particular case.”’” (People v. O’Dell, supra, 153 Cal.App.4th at p. 1577.) “Once the 

unlawful taking of the vehicle has been established, possession of the recently taken 

vehicle by the defendant with slight corroboration through statements or conduct tending 

to show guilt is sufficient to sustain a conviction of Vehicle Code section 10851. 

[Citation.]” (People v. Clifton (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 195, 200; People v. Green (1995) 

34 Cal.App.4th 165, 181.) “[K]nowledge that the vehicle was stolen is not an element of 

the offense. Such knowledge is merely one of various alternative factors evidencing an 

intent to deprive the owner of title and possession. [Citation.]” (People v. Green, supra, 

34 Cal.App.4th at p. 180.)

Defendant had possession of the vehicle less than 24 hours after it was stolen. 

Defendant drove the vehicle, and then parked it along a street curb. Officer Cooney 

testified that, while her patrol car was parked with the doors open, defendant “kept 

looking back over his left shoulder, [while] still inside the vehicle.” Officer Cooney 

stated H.O. exited the parked vehicle, made eye contact with the officer and her partner, 

and walked away from the vehicle. Defendant’s conduct of repeatedly looking over his 

shoulder and attempting to walk away from the vehicle in the presence of the waiting

officers indicated a consciousness of guilt. Sufficient evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s determination that H.O violated section 10851, subdivision (a).
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DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

KUMAR, J.

We concur:

TURNER, P. J.

BAKER, J.

 



Judge of the Superior Court of the County of Los Angeles, assigned by the Chief 

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.