UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

Deborah S. Hunt 

Clerk

100 EAST FIFTH STREET, ROOM 540 

POTTER STEWART U.S. COURTHOUSE 

CINCINNATI, OHIO 45202-3988 

Tel. (513) 564-7000 

www.ca6.uscourts.gov

Filed: September 14, 2022 

Mr. David John Barthel 

Mr. Timothy Raymond Bricker 

Mr. Michael Hiram Carpenter 

Carpenter, Lipps & Leland 

280 N. High Street, Suite 1300 

Columbus, OH 43215 

Ms. Marissa Benavides 

Ms. Debra L. Greenberger 

Mr. Ilann Margalit Maazel 

Emery Celli Brinckerhoff Abady Ward & Maazel 

600 Fifth Avenue 

Tenth Floor 

New York, NY 10020 

Ms. Alexandra Zoe Brodsky 

Ms. Adele P. Kimmel 

Public Justice 

1620 L. Street, N.W., Suite 630 

Washington, DC 20036 

Mr. Roger A. Cooper 

Ms. Sarah Braude Gutman 

Ms. Charity E. Lee 

Mr. Mitchell A. Lowenthal 

Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton 

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Mr. James Patrick Davy 

P.O. Box 15216 

Pennsylvania, PA 19125 

Mr. Michael L. Dillard Jr. 

Arnold Clifford 

115 W. Main Street, Fourth Floor 

Columbus, OH 43215 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 169 Filed: 09/14/22 Page: 1 of 52 PAGEID #: 2804(1 of 52)
Mr. David A. Lebowitz 

Kaufman Lieb Lebowitz & Frick 

18 E. 48th Street 

Suite 802 

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Mr. Seth Massey 

Ms. Alexandra Rose 

Ms. Arianna M. Scavetti 

Weil, Gotshal & Manges 

2001 M Street, N.W., Suite 600 

Washington, DC 20005 

Mr. Scott E. Smith 

Scott Elliot Smith 

5003 Horizons Drive 

Suite 101 

Columbus, OH 43220 

Mr. Tad Thomas 

Thomas Law Offices 

9418 Norton Commons Boulevard, Suite 200 

Louisville, KY 40059 

Ms. Caroline Hickey Zalka 

Weil, Gotshal & Manges 

767 Fifth Avenue 

New York, NY 10153 

Re: Case Nos. 21-3981/21-3991, Steve Snyder-Hill, et al v. The Ohio State Univ.

Originating Case No. : 2:18-cv-00736 

Dear Counsel, 

 The court today announced its decision in the above-styled case. 

 Enclosed is a copy of the court’s published opinion together with the judgment which has 

been entered in conformity with Rule 36, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Yours very truly, 

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

Cathryn Lovely 

Deputy Clerk

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 169 Filed: 09/14/22 Page: 2 of 52 PAGEID #: 2805(2 of 52)
cc: Mr. Richard W. Nagel 

Enclosures 

Mandate to issue. 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 169 Filed: 09/14/22 Page: 3 of 52 PAGEID #: 2806(3 of 52)
STEVE SNYDER-HILL; RONALD MCDANIEL; DAVID

MULVIN; WILLIAM BROWN; KURT HUNTSINGER;

WILLIAM RIEFFER; STEVE HATCH; KELLY REED;

MELVIN ROBINSON; DOUGLAS WELLS; JAMES KHALIL;

JERROLD L. SOLOMON; JOSEPH BECHTEL; MICHAEL

MURPHY; JOHN DAVID FALER; MATT MCCOY; GARY

AVIS; ROBERT SCHRINER; MICHAEL MONTGOMERY;

JOHN DOES 1–22, 25, 27, 29–37, 39–47, 49, 52, 54, 56–

60, 62–64, and 66–77 (21-3981); TIMOTHY MOXLEY;

RYAN CALLAHAN; JOHN JACKSON, JR.; JAMES

CARROLL; JEFFREY ROHDE; PATRICK MURRAY;

EVERETT ROSS; JOHN DOES 78–95 and 97–105 (21-

3991),

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

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Nos. 21-3981/3991

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.

Nos. 2:18-cv-00736 (21-3981); 2:21-cv-03838 (21-3991)—Michael H. Watson, District Judge.

Argued: July 26, 2022

Decided and Filed: September 14, 2022

Before: GUY, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Ilann M. Maazel, EMERY CELLI BRINCKERHOFF ABADY WARD & 

MAAZEL, New York, New York, for Appellants. Michael H. Carpenter, CARPENTER, LIPPS 

& LELAND, LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Ilann M. Maazel, Debra L. 

>

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 22a0214p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

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Nos. 21-3981/3991 Snyder-Hill, et al. v. Ohio State Univ. Page 2

Greenberger, Marissa R. Benavides, EMERY CELLI BRINCKERHOFF ABADY WARD & 

MAAZEL, New York, New York, Adele P. Kimmel, Alexandra Z. Brodsky, PUBLIC JUSTICE, 

Washington, D.C., Scott Elliot Smith, SCOTT ELLIOT SMITH, LPA, Columbus, Ohio, for 

Appellants. Michael H. Carpenter, Timothy R. Bricker, David J. Barthel, CARPENTER, LIPPS 

& LELAND, LLP, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee. David A. Lebowitz, KAUFMAN LIEB 

LEBOWITZ & FRICK LLP, New York, New York, Caroline Hickey Zalka, Alexandra Rose, 

Seth Massey, WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, New York, New York, Arianna Scavetti, 

WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP, Washington, D.C., Roger A. Cooper, Mitchell A. 

Lowenthal, Charity E. Lee, Sarah B. Gutman, CLEARY GOTTLIEB STEEN & HAMILTON 

LLP, New York, New York, Jim Davy, ALL RISE TRIAL & APPELLATE, Philadelphia, 

Pennsylvania, Tad Thomas, THOMAS LAW OFFICES, Cincinnati, Ohio, for Amici Curiae.

MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which CLAY, J., joined. GUY, J. (pp. 

31–48), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.

_________________

OPINION

_________________

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In his role as university physician and 

athletic team doctor at the Ohio State University, Dr. Richard Strauss allegedly abused hundreds 

of young men under the guise of performing medical examinations. The abuse occurred between 

1978 and 1998, but it did not become public until 2018. After the allegations became public, 

survivors of this abuse—including the plaintiffs in these cases—brought Title IX suits against 

Ohio State, alleging that Ohio State was deliberately indifferent to their heightened risk of abuse. 

The district court found that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations.

The district court erred. The plaintiffs adequately allege that they did not know and could 

not reasonably have known that Ohio State injured them until 2018. Thus, at the motion-todismiss stage, we cannot say that their claims accrued before then. We REVERSE and 

REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations1

1. Strauss’s Conduct

Richard Strauss served on the Ohio State faculty starting in 1978.2 He soon became a 

team physician. In that capacity, he “had regular contact with male student-athletes” in at least 

seventeen different sports.3 He also served as a physician at Ohio State’s Student Health 

Center.4 Strauss served in these roles until 1996, when Ohio State placed him on administrative 

leave, investigated his conduct, and ultimately declined to renew his appointments with Student 

Health Services and terminated his employment agreement with the Athletics Department.5 It 

did not publicly provide reasons for these decisions. Ohio State conducted a hearing but did not 

notify students or give them an opportunity to participate.6

Strauss remained a tenured faculty member. When he retired in 1998, Ohio State gave 

him emeritus status.7 He opened a private men’s clinic near Ohio State to treat “common 

genital/urinary problems,” advertised the clinic in Ohio State’s student newspaper, and continued 

1At the motion-to-dismiss stage, we “accept all plausible well-pled factual allegations as true.” Lutz v.

Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013). We therefore describe the factual allegations as 

they are laid out in the complaints.

2

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 126–27) (Page ID #2012); Moxley R. 16 (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 67–68) (Page ID #217–18).

3

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 131) (Page ID #2012–13); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 72) (Page ID #218).

4

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 132) (Page ID #2013); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 73) (Page ID #218–19).

5

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 133–34) (Page ID #2013); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 74–75) (Page ID

#219).

6

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 133) (Page ID #2013); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 74) (Page ID #219).

7

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 134, 252–56) (Page ID #2013, 2033–34); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 75,

194–98) (Page ID #219, 240–41).

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to see and treat Ohio State students.8 The vice dean for the College of Medicine told Strauss that 

“there would be no problem” with this arrangement.9

In his roles at Ohio State, Strauss regularly abused male students during medical 

examinations, committing at least 1,429 sexual assaults, and 47 rapes.10 He “groped and fondled 

students’ genitalia”11; “performed unnecessary rectal examinations and digitally penetrated 

students’ anuses”12; “pressed his erect penis against students’ bodies”13; “drugged14 and anally 

raped students”15; “masturbated during or after the exams”16; and engaged in other sexually 

abusive behavior. Snyder-Hill R. 123 (Second Am. Compl. (“SAC”) ¶¶ 135–46) (Page ID 

#2013–14); Moxley R. 6 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 81–87) (Page ID #220). Each plaintiff alleges that 

Strauss abused him between 1979 and 2000; all but four were Ohio State students during this 

time.17

An independent investigation commissioned by Ohio State in 2018 and undertaken by the 

law firm Perkins Coie substantiates the plaintiffs’ allegations of abuse. See Caryn Trombino & 

8

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 262–63) (Page ID #2034–35); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 202–05) (Page

ID #241–42).

9

Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 261) (Page ID #2034); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 203) (Page ID #241).

10Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 1, 3) (Page ID #1988–89); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 1, 3) (Page ID

#205).

11See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 309, 345, 374, 405, 435, 468–71, 496–97, 528–30, 554, 651, 669,

706, 749–752, 767–72, 930–31, 982–84, 1026, 1081–84, 1147) (Page ID #2043, 2050, 2054, 2058, 2061, 2065, 

2068, 2071, 2074, 2085, 2087, 2092, 2098, 2100–01, 2121, 2128, 2133, 2139, 2147); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. 

¶¶ 246, 248–50, 253, 268, 271, 298, 336–38, 439) (Page ID #249–251, 254, 258, 263, 279).

12See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 308–09, 710, 733, 748–52, 770, 1516, 1681, 1890–91, 2061, 2117,

2501) (Page ID #2042–43, 2092, 2096–98, 2101, 2194, 2218, 2247–48, 2276, 2285, 2339); Moxley R. 16 (Am. 

Compl. ¶¶ 296–97, 359, 455, 583, 666) (Page ID #258, 266, 281, 300, 313). At least two plaintiffs allege that 

Strauss performed this conduct while the plaintiff was unconscious. See Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 1122, 1947) 

(Page ID #2144, 2256–57).

13See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 311, 1492, 2384, 2523) (Page ID #2043, 2191, 2322–23, 2342);

see also id. ¶¶ 1076–78 (Page ID #2139) (Strauss rubbed his testicles against patient’s thigh).

14See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 937, 1751) (Page ID #2122, 2227).

15See, e.g., id. ¶ 1947 (Page ID #2256–57).

16See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1492, 2395 (Page ID #2191, 2324).

17Id. ¶¶ 30–122 (Page ID #1996–2011); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 30–63) (Page ID #212–17).

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Markus Funk, Perkins Coie LLP, Report of the Independent Investigation: Sexual Abuse 

Committed by Dr. Richard Strauss at The Ohio State University, (May 15, 2019) (hereinafter 

“Perkins Coie Report”). The Perkins Coie Report found that Strauss sexually abused at least 

177 male student patients, the majority of whom were student athletes.18 Perkins Coie Report at 

1, 43.

2. Ohio State’s Conduct

The plaintiffs allege that Ohio State knew about, facilitated, and covered up Strauss’s 

sexual abuse.19 Many students complained to Ohio State about Strauss’s abuse,20 and more than 

50 members of the Athletics Department Staff knew about Strauss’s inappropriate sexual 

conduct.21 Staff at the Student Health Center were also aware of and received many complaints 

about Strauss’s examinations of male students.22 For example, during Strauss’s first year 

working at Ohio State, a wrestler complained to staff at the Student Health Center “that Dr. 

Strauss had examined his genitals for 20 minutes and appeared to be trying to get him excited.”23 

In addition, Dr. Murphy, the head team physician had received at least five written reports about 

Strauss’s misconduct.24

18This number is lower than the number of alleged instances of sexual abuse in the complaint. The

difference is explained by (1) allegations that Strauss abused some athletes more than once; and (2) certain 

limitations of the report, which noted: “it is impossible for us to determine with any certainty the total number of 

students that Strauss sexually abused” but “that Strauss abused additional students whose accounts are not captured 

here.” Perkins Coie Report at 39.

19Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 161–264, 278–79) (Page ID #2017–35, 2037–38); Moxley R. 16 (Am.

Compl. ¶¶ 5–11) (Page ID #205–07).

20See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 162–64, 168, 172, 198, 209, 217) (Page ID #2017–19, 2025,

2027); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 11, 13, 103–09) (Page ID #207–08, 224–25).

21See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 167, 172) (Page ID #2018–19); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6,

113) (Page ID #206, 225).

22See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 174–176, 183–84, 186) (Page ID #2019–23); Moxley R. 16 (Am.

Compl. ¶ 115) (Page ID #226).

23Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 88) (Page ID #220).

24Id. ¶ 117 (Page ID #226–27).

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The plaintiffs allege that, despite this knowledge, Ohio State took no action to prevent the 

abuse.25 At times, Ohio State falsely told student athletes, as well as some staff members, that it 

had not received prior complaints about Strauss or that all complaints were maintained in an 

appropriate file.26 At other times, Ohio State employees had limited conversations with Strauss 

about his behavior but failed to follow up, investigate, report, or meaningfully address the 

concerns.27 Despite the complaints of abuse, Strauss’s supervisors rated Strauss’s performance 

as “exceptional” and “excellent” in his evaluations and had a policy of never mentioning 

allegations of sexual misconduct on evaluations.28 All the while, Ohio State required students to 

be examined and treated by Strauss, often explicitly or implicitly making students feel that they 

risked their scholarships or athletic opportunities if they refused.29

The Perkins Coie Report substantiates the plaintiffs’ claims that Ohio State knew of and 

facilitated this abuse. The report found that although Ohio State received “persisten[t], serious[], 

and regular[]” complaints from students, it took “no meaningful action . . . to investigate or 

address the concerns until January 1996” when it quietly suspended Strauss. Perkins Coie 

Report at 3; see id. at 87–162.

Even after Ohio State completed its perfunctory investigation in 1996, at which time it 

ultimately suspended and terminated Strauss, it “hid the reason why it was investigating Strauss 

and placing him on leave”; “actively concealed Dr. Strauss’ abuse by not investigating or 

25See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 164–66, 173, 177, 184, 187, 210, 216–17, 222) (Page ID #2018–

23, 2027–28); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 118, 163) (Page ID #227, 235).

26See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 162, 221, 230, 319–25) (Page ID #2017–18, 2028, 2030, 2045–

46); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 103, 162) (Page ID #224, 234).

27See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 181–83, 188–91, 193) (Page ID #2021, 2023–25).

28See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 226–29, 231 (Page ID #2029–30); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 167–70) (Page ID

#236).

29See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 199–201, 352–53, 429–30, 476) (Page ID #2025, 2051, 2061,

2065); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 141–42, 633, 720) (Page ID #232, 308, 323).

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attempting to identify the students Dr. Strauss harmed”; “further concealed Dr. Strauss’ abuse by 

destroying medical records”;30 and shredded files related to Strauss’s sexual abuse.31

3. What the Plaintiffs Knew

Because the central issue at this stage is when the plaintiffs’ claims accrued, the most 

relevant allegations relate to what the plaintiffs knew or had reason to know regarding Strauss’s 

and Ohio State’s conduct and when they knew or had reason to know it. These allegations vary 

among the different plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs all allege a significant gap between what they 

know now and what they knew before the allegations about Strauss’s conduct became public.

First, most plaintiffs allege that they did not know they were abused until 2018.32 At the 

time of the abuse, they were teenagers and young adults and did not know what was medically 

appropriate.33 Strauss gave pretextual and false medical explanations for the abuse. For 

example, he stated the abuse was necessary to perform a hernia check;34 check for muscle and 

bone anomalies;35 check for STIs;36 perform a prostate exam;37 perform a rectal exam;38 monitor 

30Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 244, 247–48) (Page ID #2032); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 186, 189–90)

(Page ID #238–39). Ohio State’s policy was to destroy medical records that were more than seven years old unless 

there was a reason to maintain them. Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 248) (Page ID #2032). Although complaints of 

abuse should have given Ohio State a reason to keep the records, Ohio State nonetheless destroyed them. Id.

31Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 2571) (Page ID #2350); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 918) (Page ID #355).

32See Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 153–60) (Page ID #2016–17); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 94–101)

(Page ID #222–23).

33See Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 153–60) (Page ID #2016–17); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 97) (Page

ID #222–23).

34See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 554–55, 897, 993, 1368, 1463–64, 1522, 1569, 2215) (Page ID

#2074–75, 2117, 2129, 2175, 2187, 2195, 2201, 2298); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 248–49, 337–38, 374, 488, 

616, 666, 832) (Page ID #250–51, 263, 268–69, 285, 305, 313, 341).

35See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 554–55) (Page ID #2074–75).

36See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1300, 1552 (Page ID #2166, 2199); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 537) (Page ID #291–

92).

37See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 2211–12) (Page ID #2298); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 583)

(Page ID #300). 

38See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 2061) (Page ID #2276); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 616) (Page ID

#305).

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a patient’s testicles that were different sizes;39 check a patient’s lymph nodes;

40 or treat a skin 

infection on a patient’s penis.41

Thus, the plaintiffs allege, even students who felt “very uncomfortable during Dr. 

Strauss’ examination[s]” often “did not understand or believe that Dr. Strauss had sexually 

abused [them].”42 This was true even of many students who complained about Strauss’s conduct 

at the time.43 Additionally, many students believed that because the conduct was so widely 

known and talked about, it could not have been abuse.44 Similarly, many believed that Ohio 

State would not have made Strauss the athletic team doctor unless his examinations were 

legitimate, and thus, that the conduct was medically appropriate even if it was uncomfortable.45

The plaintiffs allege that Ohio State witnesses, including physicians, conceded in sworn 

testimony that the students could not have known Strauss abused them because “patients do not 

know what is a ‘normal exam’ because patients have a ‘lack of information’ about what is 

medically appropriate.”46 Ohio State witnesses acknowledged that this is due in part to the fact 

that “it is normal for patients to be naked in front of doctors and for doctors to touch them, that 

‘doctors are in a position of superior knowledge and authority’ to patients, and that patients, 

including OSU students, trusted their doctor to do what was medically appropriate.”47

The plaintiffs point to the Perkins Coie Report to support these allegations. Perkins Coie 

decided that “it was essential for the Investigative Team to consult with suitably qualified 

medical experts” “to discern whether, and to what extent, Strauss’ physical examinations of 

39See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 1222, 1224, 2183) (Page ID #2156, 2294).

40See, e.g., id. ¶ 1428 (Page ID #2182); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 752) (Page ID #328–29).

41See, e.g., Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 279) (Page ID #255).

42Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 391) (Page ID #2056); see also id. ¶¶ 444, 477, 542 (Page ID #2062, 2065,

2072); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 256) (Page ID #252).

43See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 391) (Page ID #2056).

44Id. ¶¶ 451–52 (Page ID #2063).

45Id. ¶¶ 450, 480–81 (Page ID #2063, 2066).

46Id. ¶ 156 (Page ID #2016).

47Id.

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student-patients exceeded the boundaries of what was appropriate or medically necessary” 

because the abuse “occurred in the context of a student’s purported medical examination.” 

Perkins Coie Report at 12.48 The Perkins Coie Report also noted that, in general, patients may 

have “confusion as to whether sexual abuse, in fact, occurred.” Perkins Coie Report at 11.49

Although most plaintiffs allege that they did not know that Strauss’s conduct was abuse, 

nine allege that they did. For example, plaintiffs Snyder-Hill and Reed quickly recognized 

Strauss’s conduct as abuse and promptly complained.50 John Doe 9 learned the conduct was 

abusive when his primary care physician told him that Strauss’s actions “were inappropriate and 

not medically necessary.”51 John Doe 19 realized that Strauss had abused him when he learned 

about proper physician-patient conduct while attending medical school.52

Although plaintiffs differ as to whether they knew at the time that Strauss abused them, 

all allege that they could not have known about Ohio State’s responsibility for the abuse.53 They 

did not have reason to know that others had previously complained to Ohio State about Strauss’s 

conduct, let alone how Ohio State had responded to any previous complaints.54 Two Ohio State 

employees—Dr. Ted Grace, who was the director of Ohio State’s Student Health Services, and 

Dr. Miller, who was Strauss’s direct supervisor—stated that they did not know of “any way” that 

“any Ohio State student” could have known that Ohio State knew about Strauss’s abuse and 

nonetheless failed to “get rid of” him.55 Further, each plaintiff alleges that, even if he had 

investigated, further inquiry would have been futile because Ohio State controlled their access to 

48See Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 157) (Page ID #2017); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 98) (Page ID #223).

49See Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 155) (Page ID #2016).

50Id. ¶¶ 313–14, 407–12 (Page ID #2043–44, 2058–59).

51Id. ¶¶ 939–40 (Page ID #2122).

52Id. ¶ 1318 (Page ID #2168).

53See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 265–69, 272, 329 (Page ID #2035–37, 2047); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 258, 260,

285, 304, 323) (Page ID #252, 256–57, 259, 261).

54See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 364, 420, 451, 482, 516, 544, 637) (Page ID #2052, 2060, 2063,

2066, 2070, 2073, 2083); see also id. ¶¶ 320–21, 323 (Page ID #2045–46) (Ohio State falsely informed complainant 

that it had not received any previous complaints about Strauss).

55Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 265–66) (Page ID #2035); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207–08) (Page ID

#242).

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information.56 In short, although plaintiffs allege that Ohio State administrators knew of the 

abuse at the time, the plaintiffs allege that they did not know until 2018 that Ohio State 

administrators knew or that they enabled and perpetuated the abuse.

In addition to the general allegations related to Ohio State’s conduct—such as hiding 

what it knew, falsifying evaluations, and destroying records—some plaintiffs offer further 

specific allegations of concealment. For example, after Snyder-Hill demanded a meeting to 

address Strauss’s conduct, Grace sent him a letter falsely stating that Ohio State had never before 

received a complaint about Strauss.57 It had, in fact, received multiple complaints, including one 

just three days earlier.58 Grace also falsely told Snyder-Hill that all complaints would be kept in 

Strauss’s personnel file.59 In reality, Strauss’s personnel file had no record of Snyder-Hill’s or 

any other complaint.60 And, although Grace agreed to inform Snyder-Hill about any future 

complaints, Grace never did, even in 1996 when the Ohio State investigator determined that 

Strauss had been “performing inappropriate genital exams on male students” “for years.”61

Although the plaintiffs allege that they had no reason to know that Ohio State knew of 

Strauss’s abuse, they allege varying degrees of knowledge about whether others knew of 

Strauss’s conduct. Some had never heard others discuss Strauss’s conduct and did not know that 

Strauss had behaved similarly toward other students.62 Others allege that Strauss’s conduct was 

common knowledge among student athletes, who joked about it and discussed it amongst 

56See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 335, 367, 482, 678, 740, 854, 1066) (Page ID #2048, 2053, 2066,

2088, 2096–97, 2112, 2137); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 324, 350, 366, 388, 405, 426) (Page ID #261, 265, 267, 

271, 274, 277); see also Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 243–48) (Page ID #2031–32) (Ohio State actively concealed 

information).

57Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 320–21, 323) (Page ID #2045–46).

58Id.

59Id. ¶ 323, 334 (Page ID #2046, 2048).

60Id. ¶ 327 (Page ID #2047).

61Id. ¶¶ 319, 328 (Page ID #2045, 2047).

62See, e.g., id. ¶ 674 (Page ID #2088).

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themselves.63 Some discussed Strauss’s conduct only with other student athletes and were not 

aware whether their coaches knew about this conduct.64

Others allege that they knew that coaches or other staff were aware of Strauss’s conduct. 

Tennis coach John Daly “regularly joked about Dr. Strauss’ examinations of male athletes,” and 

“threatened student-athletes that they would have to see Dr. Strauss, if they did not do what the 

coach asked.”65 Members of other teams likewise joked and complained about Strauss’s 

examinations in front of coaches and trainers, who treated Strauss’s methods as “normal.”66

Although most of Strauss’s abuse took place in private exam rooms, Strauss abused some 

athletes in full view of various adults and student bystanders. For example, one plaintiff alleges 

that, in full view of trainers and bystanders, Strauss instructed a player—who came to Strauss for 

a toe infection—to drop his pants, and then Strauss started groping the player’s penis and 

testicles.67 Another plaintiff alleges that “[o]n occasion” training staff saw Strauss perform 

unwarranted “testicular exams” on him that would last around 15–20 minutes.68 Other plaintiffs 

allege that various trainers and staff witnessed Strauss’s examinations, including those in which 

he touched the plaintiffs’ genitals.69 Coaches and trainers also regularly witnessed Strauss 

63See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 170–71, 194, 442, 474, 552, 784, 836, 901, 926, 986–87, 1173, 1483 (Page ID #2019,

2025, 2062, 2065, 2074, 2103, 2110, 2118, 2120–21, 2128, 2150, 2190); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 473, 636, 

673–74, 719, 736) (Page ID #283, 308, 314, 323, 326).

64See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 389) (Page ID #2056).

65Id. ¶ 197 (Page ID #2025); see id. ¶¶ 876–77 (Page ID #2115); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 138) (Page

ID #231).

66See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 501–03, 661, 1297 (Page ID #2068, 2086, 2165) (swim team); id. ¶¶ 552, 572–77, 589,

712 (Page ID #2074, 2076–77, 2093) (track and field team); id. ¶ 690, 694–95 (Page ID #2090) (hockey team); id.

¶ 1005 (Page ID #2130) (fencing team); id. ¶¶ 1028, 1423 (Page ID #2133, 2181–82) (wrestling team); id. ¶ 1129 

(Page ID #2145) (soccer team); id. ¶¶ 1226–30, 1340–41) (Page ID #2156–57, 2171) (gymnastics team); id. ¶¶ 167, 

2581 (Page ID #2018, 2354) (general allegations); see also Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 254, 559, 586, 618 (Page 

ID #251–52, 295, 300, 3055).

67Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 688) (Page ID #2089).

68Id. ¶ 789 (Page ID #2104).

69See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 557–58 (Page ID #2075).

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showering with athletes or sitting in lockers staring at the athletes as they showered or 

changed.70

When student athletes complained, coaches typically dismissed their complaints. For 

example, one swimmer alleges that when he told his coach that Strauss made him uncomfortable, 

the coach told him to “[s]hut the fuck up and get in the water.”71 The same coach told another 

student “that Dr. Strauss’ examinations were appropriate and there was no reason to complain.”72 

Various coaches “laughed off” student complaints,73 made excuses,74 or ignored or brushed 

aside student complaints.75

The plaintiffs who observed Ohio State’s coaches’ and staff’s widespread acceptance of 

Strauss’s conduct allege that their coaches’ normalization of Strauss’s conduct led them to 

reasonably believe that it was not abuse.76 For example, one plaintiff “stopped questioning the 

need for the genital examinations because Dr. Strauss always said they were necessary, and 

coaching staff showed no concern despite the athletes’ frequent comments about the genital 

exams.”77

Many likewise allege that the widespread acceptance of the abuse meant that they had no 

reason to know that other athletes had complained to Ohio State about the abuse or that Ohio 

70See, e.g., Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 540–42) (Page ID #292–93).

71Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 1299) (Page ID #2166); see also Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 419) (Page ID

#276) (trainers were present during examination in which Strauss repeatedly stroked patient’s nipples).

72Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 511) (Page ID #2069).

73Id. ¶¶ 411, 690, 1227–29, 1753 (Page ID #2058, 2090, 2156–57, 2228); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl.

¶¶ 872, 874) (Page ID #347–48).

74See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 501) (Page ID #2068) (trainer told athlete “That’s just what Dr.

Strauss does”); id. ¶ 2085 (Page ID #2280) (trainer told athlete that “some doctors are just really into the human 

body”).

75See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 272, 1894, 1951, 2141, 2281, 2524 (Page ID #2036–37, 2248, 2257–58, 2288, 2308,

2342); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 273, 282–83, 579–80, 618, 637, 759) (Page ID #254–56, 299, 305, 308, 330).

76See, e.g., Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 695, 716–17, 795–96, 821–22, 882–83, 1014–15, 1230, 1341–42,

1758, 2090–91) (Page ID #2090–91, 2093, 2104, 2108, 2115–16, 2132, 2157, 2171–72, 2228, 2281); Moxley R. 16 

(Am. Compl. ¶¶ 283, 348, 586–87, 761, 876) (Page ID #256, 264, 300, 330, 348).

77Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 1429) (Page ID #2183).

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State had covered up any abuse or student complaints.78 They further allege that this widespread 

acceptance of Strauss’s conduct led them to believe that there was no reason to investigate 

further: their coaches’ reactions “reinforce[d] [their] reasonable belief that pursuing the matter 

would not be productive.”79

B. Procedural History

In the years after Strauss’s rampant abuse was publicly exposed, many survivors filed suit 

against Ohio State. This appeal involves two of these lawsuits: Snyder-Hill v. Ohio State 

University, No. 2:18-cv-736 (S.D. Ohio), and Moxley v. Ohio State University, No. 2:21-cv-3838 

(S.D. Ohio). The Snyder-Hill plaintiffs filed their complaint on July 26, 2018. Snyder-Hill R. 1. 

The district court designated the case as related to Garrett v. Ohio State University, No. 2:18-cv692 (S.D. Ohio), a case that had been filed ten days earlier. Snyder-Hill R. 3 (Related Case 

Mem.) (Page ID #57–58). Ohio State moved to dismiss, Snyder-Hill R. 19 (Mot. to Dismiss) 

(Page ID #140–58), and the district court referred the case to mediation, Snyder-Hill R. 42 

(Order) (Page ID #695). After mediation was unsuccessful, the Snyder-Hill plaintiffs filed an 

amended complaint. Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC) (Page ID #1988–2358). Ohio State again moved 

to dismiss. Snyder-Hill R. 128 (Mot. to Dismiss) (Page ID #2377–99).

While the motions to dismiss in Snyder-Hill and the related cases were pending, the 

Moxley plaintiffs filed a separate case on June 28, 2021, and amended their complaint on August 

12, 2021. Moxley R. 1; Moxley R. 16. They designated the Moxley case as related to the SnyderHill case. Moxley R. 1-1 (Civil Cover Sheet) (Page ID #145). The district court consolidated 

Moxley with both Snyder-Hill and Garrett. Moxley R. 10 (Related Case Mem.) (Page ID #172–

73).

The district court granted Ohio State’s motions to dismiss in each of the consolidated 

cases. See Garrett v. Ohio State Univ., 561 F. Supp. 3d 747 (S.D. Ohio 2021); Ratliff v. Ohio 

State Univ., No. 2:19-cv-4746, 2021 WL 7186198 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2021); Snyder-Hill v. 

Ohio State Univ., No. 2:18-cv-736, 2021 WL 7186148 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 22, 2021); Moxley v. 

78 See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 1040–41, 1135–36, 1252–53, 1352–54) (Page ID #2134–35, 2146, 2159, 2173).

79Id. ¶¶ 823, 884, 1899 (Page ID #2108–09, 2116, 2249); see also id. ¶ 1441 (Page ID #2184).

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Ohio State Univ., No. 2:21-cv-3838, 2021 WL 7186269 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 25, 2021). The district 

court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the statute of limitations because the 

abuse happened more than two years ago, and the plaintiffs knew or had reason to know that they 

were injured at the time that the abuse occurred. See Garrett, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 754–62; 

Snyder-Hill, 2021 WL 7186148, at *1; Moxley, 2021 WL 7186269, at *1. The plaintiffs timely 

appealed. Snyder-Hill R. 160 (Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #2778); Moxley R. 28 (Notice of 

Appeal) (Page ID #514).

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

“We review de novo the district court’s order dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint pursuant to 

Rule 12(b)(6).” Lutz v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013). 

“[W]e construe the complaint in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, accept all plausible well-pled 

factual allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.” Id.

Because at the motion-to-dismiss stage, we may consider only the allegations in the 

complaint, a 12(b)(6) motion is generally “an ‘inappropriate vehicle’ for dismissing a claim 

based upon a statute of limitations.” Id. (quoting Cataldo v. U.S. Steel Corp., 676 F.3d 542, 547 

(6th Cir. 2012)). “However, dismissal is warranted if ‘the allegations in the complaint 

affirmatively show that the claim is time-barred.’” Id. (quoting Cataldo, 676 F.3d at 547). 

“[T]he statute of limitations is an affirmative defense,” and it is the defendant’s burden to show 

that the statute of limitations has run. Id. (quoting Campbell v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 238 

F.3d 772, 775 (6th Cir. 2001)).

B. Accrual Date in Title IX Claims

“Title IX does not contain its own statute of limitations.” Lillard v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of 

Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 728 (6th Cir. 1996). Title IX thus borrows from Ohio’s two-year statute of 

limitations for personal injury claims. Id. at 729. Although state law determines the limitations 

period, “federal standards govern when the statute begins to run.” Sharpe v. Cureton, 319 F.3d 

259, 266 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267 (1985)); see Bishop v. 

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Child.’s Ctr. for Developmental Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Wallace 

v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007)). This question—when did the statute start to run—is at the

heart of this appeal.

1. Whether the Discovery Rule Applies

“The general federal rule is that ‘the statute of limitations begins to run when the 

reasonable person knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, both his injury 

and the cause of that injury.’” Bishop, 618 F.3d at 536 (quoting Campbell, 238 F.3d at 775). In 

other words, absent a statutory directive to the contrary, the “discovery rule” applies, and the 

clock starts only when a plaintiff knows or should have known certain facts related to their 

injury. This contrasts with the occurrence rule, under which a claim accrues at the moment of 

injury.

In line with the general principle articulated in Bishop and elsewhere, we have long held 

that the discovery rule applies in the § 1983 context. See, e.g., id. at 536–37; Roberson v. 

Tennessee, 399 F.3d 792, 794 (6th Cir. 2005); Hughes v. Vanderbilt Univ., 215 F.3d 543, 548 

(6th Cir. 2000); Sevier v. Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984). Our application of the 

discovery rule in the § 1983 context guides our analysis here because “[t]he analysis concerning 

when the statute of limitations [for a Title IX claim] began to run is the same as [for a § 1983 

claim].” Haley v. Clarksville-Montgomery Cnty. Sch. Sys., 353 F. Supp. 3d 724, 734 (M.D. 

Tenn. 2018); see King-White v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 759 (5th Cir. 2015) 

(“Title IX should be treated like § 1983 for limitations purposes.” (collecting cases)).

Applying the discovery rule in Title IX cases accords with the discovery rule’s purposes. 

The discovery rule seeks to protect plaintiffs who, through no fault of their own, lacked the 

information to bring a claim. We have explained that “the discovery rule is applied . . . if the 

cause of an injury is not apparent.” Fonesca v. Consol. Rail Corp., 246 F.3d 585, 588 (6th Cir. 

2001); see Hicks v. Hines, Inc., 826 F.2d 1543, 1544 (6th Cir. 1987). This rule “protects 

plaintiffs who are . . . struggling to uncover the underlying cause of their injuries from having 

their claims time-barred before they could reasonably be expected to bring suit.” A.Q.C. ex rel. 

Castillo v. United States, 656 F.3d 135, 140 (2d Cir. 2011).

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The discovery rule recognizes that, without certain information, a plaintiff has no viable 

claim. “That he has been injured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury 

manifests itself; and the facts about causation may be in the control of the putative defendant, 

unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain.” United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 

111, 122 (1979). This lack of knowable information leaves the plaintiff “at the mercy of” the 

defendant and unable to file suit. Id. “To say to one who has been wronged, ‘You had a remedy, 

but before the wrong was ascertainable to you, the law stripped you of your remedy,’ makes a 

mockery of the law.” City of Aurora v. Bechtel Corp., 599 F.2d 382, 387–88 (10th Cir. 1979) 

(citation and emphasis omitted). The discovery rule ensures that plaintiffs in this position still 

have a remedy.

Applying the discovery rule in the Title IX context is also consistent with the remedial 

purposes of Title IX. Title IX “provides relief broadly to those who face discrimination on the 

basis of sex in the American education system.” Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 971 F.3d 553, 557 (6th Cir. 

2020) (citing NCAA v. Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 466 n.4 (1999)). Applying the more restrictive 

occurrence rule would be counter to Title IX’s broad remedial purpose.

Finally, we observe that other circuits that have reached this issue have applied the 

discovery rule in Title IX cases. See, e.g., King-White, 803 F.3d at 762; Doe v. Howe Mil. Sch., 

227 F.3d 981, 988 (7th Cir. 2000); Stanley v. Trs. of Cal. State Univ., 433 F.3d 1129, 1136 (9th 

Cir. 2006); but see Twersky v. Yeshiva Univ., 579 F. App’x 7, 9 (2d Cir. 2014) (order) (declining 

to decide whether the discovery rule applies); Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 

1216 (10th Cir. 2014) (same). In adopting the discovery rule in Title IX cases, we note that any 

contrary holding would create an unnecessary circuit split.

Ohio State’s arguments urging us to reject the discovery rule are not persuasive. Ohio 

State primarily points to the Supreme Court’s decision in Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355 

(2019), a case that addressed the accrual of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) claims. 

Unlike Title IX, the FDCPA’s text contains a statute of limitations: FDCPA actions must be 

brought “within one year from the date on which the violation occurs.” Id. at 358 (quoting 

15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). The Supreme Court held that the discovery rule did not apply to FDCPA 

suits. Id. at 360–61.

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Rotkiske is inapposite. In Rotkiske, the Court’s analysis both started and ended with the 

text of the FDCPA, which expressly states that the statute of limitations starts on “the date on 

which the violation occurs.” Id. at 358 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d)). The Court therefore 

concluded that importing the discovery rule would amount to “[a]textual judicial 

supplementation.” Id. at 361; see also id. at 360 (“We must presume that Congress ‘says in a 

statute what it means and means in a statute what it says there.’” (quoting Conn. Nat’l Bank v. 

Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992))). In short, Rotkiske was a straightforward case of text-based 

statutory interpretation.

Thus, Rotkiske has no bearing on a case about the accrual of Title IX claims because Title 

IX’s text contains no statute of limitations at all. See Lillard, 76 F.3d at 728. We agree with the 

Second Circuit that Rotkiske’s reasoning is limited to the FDCPA’s text, and that Rotkiske does 

not affect “the continuing propriety of the discovery rule.” Sohm v. Scholastic, Inc., 959 F.3d 39, 

50 & n.2 (2d Cir. 2020); see also Navarro v. Procter & Gamble Co., 515 F. Supp. 3d 718, 760 

(S.D. Ohio 2021) (applying the discovery rule in light of pre-Rotkiske precedent because 

“Rotkiske has little to say about which [rule] should apply” when statute is silent). Other circuits 

have likewise continued to apply the discovery rule in other contexts post-Rotkiske. See, e.g., 

Ouellette v. Beaupre, 977 F.3d 127, 136 (1st Cir. 2020) (applying discovery rule to § 1983 

claim); Johnson v. Chudy, 822 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2020) (same); Lupole v. United 

States, No. 20-1811, 2021 WL 5103884, at *1 (4th Cir. Nov. 3, 2021) (applying discovery rule to 

FTCA claim). And, albeit only in nonprecedential decisions, we have done the same. Norton v. 

Barker, No. 21-5893, 2022 WL 837976, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 16, 2022) (order) (§ 1983 case); 

B&P Littleford, LLC v. Prescott Mach., LLC, No. 20-1449/1451, 2021 WL 3732313, at *7 (6th 

Cir. Aug. 24, 2021) (Defend Trade Secrets Act case). No appellate court has held that Rotkiske

did away with the common-law discovery rule when a statute is silent.

True, we have previously speculated, in dicta, that Rotkiske might prompt reconsideration 

of the discovery rule. See Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021).80 

Unfortunately, as is often the case with such musings, our earlier dicta overlooked important 

80To be clear, any discussion of the discovery rule in Dibrell is dicta because Dibrell stated that it “need

not resolve this tension [between the discovery rule and the occurrence rule] now because Dibrell’s claims would be 

untimely either way.” 984 F.3d at 1162.

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context in Rotkiske. Rotkiske did not state that “[a]ny presumption favoring th[e] discovery 

rule . . . represents a ‘bad wine of recent vintage.’” Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Rotkiske, 140 

S. Ct. at 360). Instead, the “bad wine” discussed in Rotkiske was the use of the discovery rule to

override clear statutory text. See Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 360. As we have recognized, applying 

the discovery rule as a common-law accrual principle “says nothing” about how to determine the 

meaning of specific statutory language. See El-Khalil v. Oakwood Healthcare, Inc., 23 F.4th 

633, 636 (6th Cir. 2022). The converse is also true.

Nor do Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384 (2006), or McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 2149 

(2019), change our analysis. In these cases, the Supreme Court applied the occurrence rule to 

§ 1983 claims. No party in these cases raised the discovery rule, and the Court did not discuss

the issue at all. Because the issue is not jurisdictional, the Court’s silence in these two cases does 

not impact our analysis one way or the other. In fact, binding post-Wallace cases—even those 

cases explicitly relying on Wallace—have continued to apply the discovery rule in the § 1983 

context. See, e.g., Cooey v. Strickland, 479 F.3d 412, 416 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Wallace but 

continuing to apply the discovery rule in the § 1983 context); D’Ambrosio v. Marino, 747 F.3d 

378, 384 (6th Cir. 2014) (same). Moreover, McDonough recognized that “[t]he Court has never 

suggested that the date on which a constitutional injury first occurs is the only date from which a 

limitations period may run.” 139 S. Ct. at 2160. Ohio State’s reliance on Wallace and 

McDonough is unavailing.

Likewise, three of our unpublished decisions—Guy v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County 

Government, 488 F. App’x 9 (6th Cir. 2012), Gilley v. Dunaway, 572 F. App’x 303 (6th Cir. 

2014), and Giffin v. Case Western Reserve University, 181 F.3d 100 (6th Cir. 1999) (table)—do 

not move the needle. Guy and Gilley interpret Kentucky law, which is of no use to our analysis 

of when a claim accrues under federal law. And Giffin offers no discussion of the discovery rule 

and no analysis that sheds light on claim accrual.

Ultimately, we conclude that applying the discovery rule aligns with precedent, the rule’s 

purpose, and Title IX’s broad remedial purpose. We therefore agree with every other circuit to 

decide the issue and hold that the discovery rule determines the accrual of Title IX claims.

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2. The Scope of the Discovery Rule

Having concluded that the discovery rule applies, we next examine the precise scope of 

the discovery rule. In line with our earlier cases, we hold that, when the discovery rule applies, a 

claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the defendant injured them: in 

other words, they must discover both their injury and its cause.

We have previously explained that, under the discovery rule, a claim accrues “when the 

reasonable person knows, or in the exercise of due diligence should have known, both his injury 

and the cause of that injury.” Bishop, 618 F.3d at 536 (quoting Campbell, 238 F. 3d at 775); 

accord Amburgey v. United States, 733 F.3d 633, 636 (6th Cir. 2013); Fonesca, 246 F.3d at 588. 

This approach is the same as the seven other circuits to address this issue. See Ouellette, 977 

F.3d at 136; Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller v. United States,

932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991); Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 

2001); In re Copper Antitrust Litig., 436 F.3d 782, 789 (7th Cir. 2006); Bibeau v. Pac. Nw. Rsch. 

Found. Inc., 188 F.3d 1105, 1108 (9th Cir. 1999); Chappell v. Rich, 340 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th 

Cir. 2003).

This approach follows the Supreme Court’s lead in Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111. In Kubrick, 

the Supreme Court distinguished between “a plaintiff’s ignorance of his legal rights,” which did 

not affect the accrual date, and a plaintiff’s “ignorance of the fact of his injury or its cause,” 

which did affect accrual. 444 U.S. at 122. In other words, “the [Supreme] Court was careful to 

distinguish between ignorance of the facts, including an injury and its cause, and ignorance of 

the law.” Ouellette, 977 F.3d at 136 (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122). The “critical facts” that 

start the clock are “that [the plaintiff] has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.” Kubrick,

444 U.S. at 122. If a plaintiff has no reason to know who injured them, their claim has not 

accrued.

Ignoring Kubrick, Ohio State zooms in on a single sentence in Rotella v. Wood, in which 

the Supreme Court stated that it has “been at pains to explain that discovery of the injury, not 

discovery of the other elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000). 

This language, Ohio State argues, means that a claim accrues once a plaintiff knows or has 

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reason to know of their injury, regardless of whether they have reason to know who or what 

caused the injury. But Rotella’s very next sentence points to Kubrick’s explanation that “the 

justification for a discovery rule does not extend beyond the injury” because “a plaintiff’s 

ignorance of his legal rights” is different from “his ignorance of the fact of his injury or its 

cause.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555–56 (emphasis added) (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122). In 

seamlessly transitioning between knowledge of an “injury” and knowledge of the “injury or its 

cause,” the Supreme Court distinguished both injury and cause from a plaintiff learning of their 

legal rights. This discovery—learning of “legal rights”—includes the “other elements of a 

claim” that Rotella tells us do not affect accrual. In other words, discovering that a defendant 

caused an injury is part of discovering the injury. Rotella does not undercut Kubrick’s 

understanding that a plaintiff must have discovered that the defendant harmed them for a claim 

to accrue.

Our precedent supports this understanding of Rotella and Kubrick. Although we have 

been clear that discovery refers to both injury and cause, we have also stated that the clock starts

“when the plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his action.” 

Hughes, 215 F.3d at 548; accord Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 

843 (6th Cir. 2015); Roberson, 399 F.3d at 794. The Fifth Circuit has done the same. 

Explaining that “the [limitations] period begins to run the moment the plaintiff becomes aware 

that he has suffered an injury or has sufficient information to know that he has been injured,” the 

Fifth Circuit emphasized that a plaintiff must be able to know “the facts that would ultimately 

support a claim.” Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Thus, “[a] plaintiff’s awareness encompasses two elements: (1) [t]he existence of the injury; and 

(2) causation, that is, the connection between the injury and the defendant’s actions.” Id.

(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In other words, discovery of injury and cause 

are both a part of discovering the injury that is the basis of the action.

In deciding when a plaintiff discovers the injury that is the basis of their action, “courts 

look ‘to what event should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.’” 

Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843 (quoting Roberson, 399 F.3d at 794); accord Cooey, 479 F.3d at 416; 

Kuhnle Bros., Inc. v. County of Geauga, 103 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 1997). Individuals cannot 

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be alerted to protect their rights without knowledge about causation. For example, a person who 

suffers a latent injury, knowing that they are sick, cannot reasonably be expected to protect their 

rights without knowing what caused their sickness. Just as an employee needs to know that their 

employer exposed them to toxic materials before they can bring suit, a student must know that 

their school exposed them to a heightened risk of harassment before they have a viable claim.81

Moreover, our requirement that a plaintiff discover “the injury which is the basis of 

[their] action,” Hughes, 215 F.3d at 548, necessarily requires us to look at what the basis of their 

action is. In a Title IX case, a plaintiff’s cause of action is against the school based on the 

school’s actions or inactions, not the actions of the person who abused the plaintiff. See Davis ex 

rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999) (“[A] recipient of 

federal funds may be liable in damages under Title IX only for its own misconduct.”); Bose v. 

Bea, 947 F.3d 983, 988 (6th Cir. 2020) (same). The institution’s conduct is therefore the “the act 

providing the basis of” a plaintiff’s legally cognizable Title IX injury. Garza v. Lansing Sch. 

Dist., 972 F.3d 853, 867 n.8 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Collyer v. Darling, 98 F.3d 211, 220 (6th 

Cir. 1996)); see Doe ex. rel. Doe #2 v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 35 F.4th 

459, 466 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[I]n a successful ‘before’ claim, a school’s deliberate indifference to 

known past acts of sexual misconduct must have caused the misconduct that the student currently 

alleges.”). In other words, a plaintiff could not have been “alerted . . . to protect his or her 

rights” through a Title IX suit unless they had reason to believe that the institution did something 

(or failed to do something) that caused their injury. See Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843.

The First Circuit applied similar logic in Ouellette. There, the plaintiff alleged that a 

police officer sexually abused him decades earlier when the plaintiff was a teenager. The 

plaintiff did not know at the time that the police department had received prior complaints that 

the officer had abused other teenagers. 977 F.3d at 132. The plaintiff’s knowledge that the 

officer abused him and that his abuser was employed by the police department did not trigger 

accrual because, as is also true in the Title IX context, “[a] constitutional tortfeasor’s 

81Thus, in the context of the discovery rule, “injury” means something more than “harm.” Although injury

and harm may sometimes be synonymous, that’s not always the case. Here, “injury” means “[t]he violation of 

another’s legal right” or “[a]nything said or done in breach of a duty not to do it, if harm results.” Injury, Black’s 

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

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employment with a municipality or supervision by a superior state officer does not, on its own, 

give rise to a ‘complete and present’ § 1983 cause of action.” Id. at 140. Because there is no 

respondeat superior liability, “[a]ny knowledgeable attorney that Ouellette consulted around the 

time of his alleged abuse” would have told him not to file a lawsuit against the city “in the 

absence of additional information suggesting that they were also a cause of his injury.” Id. 

Thus, his claim had not accrued at that time. Id.; see also Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 

330 (2d Cir. 1982) (“It is illogical to require a party to sue the government for negligence at a 

time when the Government’s responsibility in the matter is suppressed in a manner designed to 

prevent the party, even with reasonable effort, from finding out about it.”).

We are persuaded by Ouellette’s reasoning and adopt it fully. We are also persuaded by 

two sets of well-reasoned district court opinions that adopt similar logic in the Title IX context. 

In Karasek v. Regents of University of California, the court reasoned that the “‘touchstone’ of 

accrual is notice of the ‘injury which is the basis of [the plaintiff’s] action,’” and that, unlike in 

cases with direct respondeat superior liability in which a defendant’s liability is easily 

discernable, an assault does not give a plaintiff knowledge of an institution’s conduct. 500 F. 

Supp. 3d 967, 979 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (quoting Stanley, 433 F.3d at 1136). Thus, the court 

ultimately “conclude[d] that a plaintiff’s Title IX pre-assault claim accrues when the plaintiff 

knows or has reason to know of the school’s policy of deliberate indifference that created a 

heightened risk of harassment.” Id. at 978. Similarly, in a series of cases arising from a sexabuse scandal at Baylor University, the district court reasoned that the plaintiffs’ knowledge that 

their assailants had previously assaulted other women was “insufficient to demonstrate that 

[they] would have been put on notice to look into Baylor’s knowledge of [the assailant]’s history 

or Baylor’s conduct in administering its football program prior to [the] assault[s].” Hernandez v. 

Baylor Univ., 274 F. Supp. 3d 602, 616–17 (W.D. Tex. 2017) (emphasis added); see Doe 1 v. 

Baylor Univ., 240 F. Supp. 3d 646, 663 (W.D. Tex. 2017); Lozano v. Baylor Univ., 408 F. Supp. 

3d 861, 901 (W.D. Tex. 2019). What the plaintiffs knew or had reason to know was an issue of 

fact: “[w]hile it is plausible that Plaintiffs were aware of their heightened-risk claims at the time 

of their assaults, it is also plausible that they did not have reason to further investigate those 

claims until [the allegations became public].” Doe 1, 240 F. Supp. 3d at 663. Thus, the court 

declined to dismiss the pre-assault claims.

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These cases illustrate that a pre-assault heightened-risk claim may not accrue until well 

after a post-assault Title IX claim. A plaintiff will typically know or have reason to know that a 

school mishandles their own report of an assault close to the time of the school’s inadequate 

response. But that same plaintiff may have no reason to know of a school’s deliberate 

indifference that gave rise to their heightened-risk claim. It would be “unreasonable to conclude 

. . . that a plaintiff’s knowledge that [their] individual complaint was mishandled would reveal 

that the University has a broad de facto policy of deliberate indifference generally.” Karasek, 

500 F. Supp. 3d at 981. This difference distinguishes the plaintiffs’ claims from King-White, 

803 F.3d at 763, in which the Fifth Circuit held that the plaintiffs’ post-assault claims accrued 

when their complaints to the school administrations went “unheeded.” In short, even if a 

plaintiff has reason to know that a school responded improperly to their complaint, they may still 

lack reason to know that others had complained before them or that the school was deliberately 

indifferent to any prior complaints.

To summarize, we agree with seven of our sibling circuits, and we expressly hold that, 

pursuant to the discovery rule, a claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know that 

they were injured and that the defendant caused their injury. In the Title IX context, this means 

that the claim does not accrue until the plaintiff knows or has reason to know that the defendant 

institution injured them.

C. Accrual of the Plaintiffs’ Claims

We next must decide whether the plaintiffs adequately allege that their claims did not 

accrue until 2018. We hold that the plaintiffs’ allegations are plausible. Thus, the district court 

erred in dismissing their cases.

Although the plaintiffs need not have known or had reason to know of the legal elements 

of their claims, they must have known or had reason to know of the facts underpinning their 

claims before the statute of limitations begins to run. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122. Thus, the 

plaintiffs’ claims accrued when they knew or had reason to know that Ohio State was 

“deliberately indifferent to sexual harassment, of which [Ohio State had] actual knowledge, that 

is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victims of 

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access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 

650.

The plaintiffs’ allegations that they lacked reason to know that Ohio State injured them 

are plausible. It would be difficult for “typical lay person” in the plaintiffs’ position to know the 

underlying facts about Ohio State’s alleged deliberate indifference. The plaintiffs allege that 

none of them knew or had reason to know that Ohio State administrators were on notice of 

Strauss’s abuse.82 And how could they know? Both Dr. Grace, who was the director of Ohio 

State’s Student Health Services, and Dr. Miller, who was Strauss’s direct supervisor, stated that

they did not know of “any way” that “any [Ohio State] student” could have known that Ohio 

State knew about Strauss’s abuse and nonetheless failed to get rid of him.83 And when Ohio 

State hired Perkins Coie in 2018 to investigate both the allegations of abuse and “whether [Ohio 

State] had knowledge of such allegations against Strauss,” it took $6.2 million and 12 months for 

Perkins Coie to issue its final conclusions.84 Ohio State is a vast institution, and the plaintiffs’ 

allegations underscore how difficult it is for a student to know what appropriate persons within 

the Ohio State administration knew.

A plaintiff’s knowledge that he was abused is not enough to start the clock. See 

Ouellette, 977 F.3d at 140 (knowledge of abuse is not the same as knowledge of institutional 

conduct). Knowledge that Ohio State employed Strauss is not enough. See Gebser v. Lago Vista 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 285 (1998) (no respondeat superior claims for Title IX claims of 

employee-student harassment). Knowledge that other students knew of Strauss’s conduct is not 

enough. See id. at 290 (Title IX requires “notice to an ‘appropriate person’ and an opportunity to 

rectify any violation” (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1682)). Knowledge that coaches or trainers knew is not 

enough. See Kesterson v. Kent State Univ., 967 F.3d 519, 528–29 (6th Cir. 2020) (knowledge of 

abuse by coaches and assistant coaches does not satisfy knowledge requirement of Title IX). 

82Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 267) (Page ID #2035–36); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶ 209) (Page ID #242–

43).

83Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 265–66) (Page ID #2035); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 207–08) (Page ID

#242).

84Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 273–75) (Page ID #2037); Moxley R. 16 (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 215–18) (Page ID

#244).

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Instead, the clock starts only once the plaintiff knows or should have known that Ohio State 

administrators “with authority to take corrective action” knew of Strauss’s conduct and failed to 

respond appropriately. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290.

Should the plaintiffs’ snippets of knowledge “have alerted the typical lay person to 

protect his or her rights” by investigating further? Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843 (quoting Roberson, 

399 F.3d at 794). We cannot say. This is a question of fact—one that is improper to resolve at 

the motion-to-dismiss stage. See Lutz, 717 F.3d at 464 (a motion to dismiss is typically “an 

‘inappropriate vehicle’ for dismissing a claim based upon a statute of limitations”).

But the answer to this question may not ultimately matter because the plaintiffs 

adequately allege that if they had investigated the abuse, they would not have discovered that 

Ohio State injured them. A plaintiff’s duty to investigate does not trigger accrual. Instead, “the 

limitations period does not begin to run until the plaintiff thereafter discovers or a reasonably 

diligent plaintiff would have discovered ‘the facts constituting the violation.’” Merck & Co. v. 

Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 653 (2010). In other words, even if the plaintiffs should have 

investigated, the clock does not start if the plaintiffs would not have learned that Ohio State 

injured them. The plaintiffs allege that Ohio State concealed Strauss’s abuse and Ohio State’s 

knowledge of it, destroyed records, gave Strauss false performance reviews, and actively misled 

students by, for example, telling complainants that no one had ever previously complained about 

Strauss. See Section I.A.2, supra. The plaintiffs plausibly allege a decades-long cover up. 

Given these plausible allegations, the plaintiffs adequately allege that they could not have 

reasonably discovered Ohio State’s conduct. This alone provides sufficient grounds to delay the 

accrual of their Title IX claims.

The above reasons apply to all plaintiffs, and these reasons alone warrant reversal. But 

the Moxley plaintiffs and all but nine of the Snyder-Hill plaintiffs adequately allege an additional 

ground that provides a separate and independent basis for our holding: they did not know they 

were abused. The district court felt that these allegations were implausible, pointing to other 

allegations “that Plaintiffs were concerned by Strauss’s abuse and felt violated by it, discussed 

the abuse with teammates, classmates, or family members, reported the abuse themselves, or that 

the abuse caused them immediate mental and emotional distress.” Garrett, 561 F. Supp. 3d at 

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759 n.7. In the district court’s view, the plaintiffs’ distress belies their claims that they did not 

know Strauss’s conduct was abuse.

At this early stage, the district court was incorrect to dismiss the plaintiffs’ allegations by 

holding that they were implausible as a matter of law. The plaintiffs plausibly allege that 

experiencing distress—even extreme distress—does not mean that they knew or should have 

known that they were abused. Strauss gave pretextual medical explanations for his abuse, such 

as conducting a hernia check or doing an evaluation for sexually transmitted infections. See 

Section I.A.1, supra. The plaintiffs further allege that physician-patient abuse is particularly 

difficult to identify because physicians, unlike other professionals, are expected to touch a 

person’s sexual organs, and laypeople lack the training to know whether an examination is 

medically appropriate. Id. On top of that, the plaintiffs were young, untrained, and 

inexperienced, Ohio State gave Strauss its stamp of approval, and trusted adult professionals 

routinely told the plaintiffs that Strauss’s conduct was normal. Id.

Amici shed light on the plausibility of the plaintiffs’ claims. A significant body of 

literature shows that (1) many people do not recognize that they have been sexually abused, 

particularly if they were abused by someone on whom they depend; and (2) people suffer serious 

harms resulting from their abuse, even if they do not recognize it as abuse. See Psychology & 

Psychiatry Scholars Br. at 10–26. Example after example highlights the unique difficulties of 

recognizing whether a physician’s conduct is abusive. See National Center for Victims of Crime 

Br. at 4–18. And recognizing abuse—especially physician-patient abuse—can be even harder in 

the context of college athletics because of the insular nature of teams, the immense trust and 

authority placed in coaches, and the culture of college athletics, including the role of coaches and 

trainers in setting norms. See National Women’s Law Center Br. at 9–23.

Medical procedures, including necessary ones such as colonoscopies, are often 

uncomfortable. That does not mean that they are abusive. As a result, discomfort does not mean 

that plaintiffs should know that they are being abused. See Doe v. Pasadena Hosp. Ass’n, No. 

2:18-cv-08710, 2020 WL 1244357, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2020) (plaintiffs’ failure to 

discover physician’s abuse was reasonable when physician “touch[ed] their legs in a sexual 

manner, conduct[ed] unexpected vaginal exams, and unnecessary breast exams” because 

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physician misrepresented “that his ‘acts were for a legitimate medical purpose’”). Instead, even 

if a patient is uncomfortable, whether they knew or should have known that they were abused is 

an issue of fact for the jury.

Ultimately, we hold that the plaintiffs’ claims survive Ohio State’s motion to dismiss for 

three independent reasons. First, the plaintiffs plausibly allege that they did not know and lacked 

reason to know that Ohio State caused their injury. Second, they plausibly allege that even if 

they had investigated further, they could not have learned of Ohio State’s conduct. Third, most 

plaintiffs plausibly allege that they did not know that they were abused. Alone, each of these 

grounds is sufficient to delay accrual.

D. Non-Student Plaintiffs

Finally, Ohio State argues that four non-student plaintiffs in the Snyder-Hill case cannot 

bring a Title IX claim. John Doe 30 and John Doe 42 were contract referees; John Doe 47 was a 

fifteen-year-old high-school student visiting Ohio State’s campus; and John Doe 49 was a 

fourteen- or fifteen-year-old high-school student who attended an Ohio State wrestling camp.85

Title IX provides that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 

participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education 

program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis 

added). “Congress easily could have substituted ‘student’ or ‘beneficiary’ for the word ‘person’ 

if it had wished to restrict the scope of [Title IX].” North Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 

512, 521 (1982). It did not limit the statute in this way and thus, Title IX’s plain language 

sweeps more broadly.

Contrary to Ohio State’s assertions, we have never limited the availability of Title IX 

claims to employees or students. The two cases on which Ohio State relies prove this point. In 

Doe v. University of Kentucky, 971 F.3d at 558, the court held that “although Doe[] was not 

enrolled as a student at the University, she has shown that . . . there remain genuine disputes as to 

whether she was denied the benefits of an ‘education program or activity’ furnished by the 

University.” The court pointed to the fact that she paid the University directly for housing in its 

85Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶¶ 1613, 1812, 1903, 1940) (Page ID #2208, 2236, 2250, 2255).

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residence halls, paid for a dining hall and student fees, and alleged that she hoped to enroll at the 

University after beginning her education at the Community college. Id. Although we explained 

that Doe’s relationship with the school was akin to a student, this analysis was relevant only 

because Doe brought a claim for student-on-student sexual harassment. Id. at 557–58. The 

inquiry was not relevant to whether individuals can bring Title IX claims more generally.

In Arocho v. Ohio University, No. 20-4239, 2022 WL 819734, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 18, 

2022), we recognized that “a nonstudent like [the plaintiffs] may bring a Title IX claim, if [they] 

w[ere] excluded from or discriminated against under a[n] ‘education program or activity.’” In 

Arocho, the plaintiff did not have a Title IX claim because “the full extent of Arocho’s 

relationship with Ohio University was her participation in career day” and she did “not allege 

that she intended to partake in any Ohio University education program or activities in the future.” 

Id. at *4. The barrier to Arocho’s suit was not that she was a nonstudent; it was instead that she 

could not point to any education program or activity of which she was denied the benefit.

Because none of these four plaintiffs was a student or regular employee of Ohio State, we 

must decide whether they were discriminated against under an education program or activity. 

We have no binding authority that establishes a framework for this analysis.

Doe v. Brown University, 896 F.3d 127 (1st Cir. 2018), persuasively analyzes the issue. 

Doe, a student at Providence College, was sexually assaulted by three Brown students on 

Brown’s campus. Id. at 128–29. She reported the assault, and later alleged that Brown 

responded inappropriately by abandoning its investigation into the assault. Id. at 129. The First 

Circuit read the Supreme Court’s decision in Bell to “impl[y] that, in order for a person to 

experience sex ‘discrimination under an education program or activity,’ that person must suffer 

unjust or prejudicial treatment on the basis of sex while participating, or at least attempting to 

participate, in the funding recipient’s education program or activity.” Id. at 131. The First 

Circuit held that Doe failed to state a Title IX claim because she did not experience 

discriminatory treatment while participating or attempting to participate in any educational 

program provided by Brown. Id. at 133.

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At the same time, the First Circuit recognized that “members of the public” can bring a 

Title IX claim if they are “avail[ing] themselves of the services provided by educational 

institutions receiving federal funding,” for example by “access[ing] university libraries, 

computer labs, and vocational resources,” or “attend[ing] campus tours, public lectures, sporting 

events, and other activities at covered institutions.” Id. at 132 n.6. Similarly, both the Second 

and Third Circuits have held that something can be considered “an ‘education program or 

activity’ under § 1681(a) if it has ‘features such that one could reasonably consider its mission to 

be, at least in part, educational.” Doe v. Mercy Cath. Med. Ctr., 850 F.3d 545, 555 (3d Cir. 

2017) (quoting O’Connor v. Davis, 126 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 1997)).

We adopt the reasoning of the First Circuit and hold that a non-student and non-employee 

can bring a Title IX claim if they were subject to discrimination “while participating, or at least 

attempting to participate, in the funding recipient’s education program or activity.” Doe v. 

Brown, 896 F.3d at 131. We further hold that “education program or activity” is defined broadly 

and extends to situations in which individuals are, for example, accessing university libraries or 

other resources, or attending campus tours, sporting events, or other activities.

Under this framework, John Doe 49’s claim clearly survives the motion to dismiss. John 

Doe 49 alleges that he “was at OSU for OSU’s summer wrestling camp,” which was “an 

education program or activity offered to young athletes not yet old enough to attend OSU, which 

was staffed by OSU employees and student-athletes.”86 This camp was an educational program 

that provided training for young wrestlers. John Doe 49 was participating in it and was denied 

its benefits when Strauss abused him.

John Does 30 and 42 likewise state Title IX claims. They were contract referees when

Strauss abused them.87 Thus, they were “attending” or participating in “sporting events.” Doe v. 

Brown, 896 F.3d at 132 n.6. And Strauss “gave John Doe 47 a long tour of the athletics 

facilities,” and assaulted him “under the guise that he would show John Doe 47 the types of 

86Snyder-Hill R. 123 (SAC ¶ 1940) (Page ID #2255).

87Id. ¶¶ 1613, 1812 (Page ID #2208, 2236).

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medical exams athletes had to get to be cleared to play for OSU.”88 Even if this was not a bona 

fide education activity because it was merely a guise for Strauss’s abuse, John Doe 47 was 

“attempting to participate in an education program” because he believed that he was receiving a 

bona fide tour of Ohio State’s facilities, offered by an Ohio State employee. Doe v. Brown, 

896 F.3d at 132 (emphasis added).

III. CONCLUSION

We REVERSE the district court’s orders granting Ohio State’s motions to dismiss, and 

we REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

88Id. ¶¶ 1906–11 (Page ID #2251).

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_________________

DISSENT

_________________

RALPH B. GUY, JR., Circuit Judge, dissenting. Today’s decision effectively nullifies 

any statute of limitations for Title IX claims based on sexual harassment. In these two appeals, 

110 male plaintiffs (84 plaintiffs in Snyder-Hill and 33 plaintiffs in Moxley) assert Title IX 

claims against The Ohio State University.1 In the Snyder-Hill plaintiffs’ 371-page complaint and 

the Moxley plaintiffs’ 159-page complaint, each plaintiff describes the obscene details of how 

Dr. Richard Strauss sexually abused them in the school’s locker room or showers, at Strauss’s 

home, or during physical examinations. All agree that the alleged sexual abuse occurred 

between 1978 and 1998. (Maj. Op. 1). And all agree that plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are subject 

to Ohio’s two-year statute of limitations for general personal injury claims. See, e.g., Lillard v. 

Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 729 (6th Cir. 1996); see Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 

250 (1989); Ohio Rev. Code § 2305.10(A); (Maj. Op. 17). 

These two lawsuits were filed in July 2018 and June 2021—more than 20 to 40 years 

after the alleged sexual abuse occurred (1978 to 1998), more than 20 years after Strauss stopped 

working at the university (1998), and more than 13 years after Strauss committed suicide 

(2005).2 As Judge Watson correctly concluded, plaintiffs’ Title IX claims accrued, and the 

statute of limitations expired, long ago. 

In reversing, the majority opinion does not rely on a tolling doctrine to revive plaintiffs’ 

claims. It accepts plaintiffs’ allegations that their Title IX claims did not accrue, and thus the 

two-year limitations period did not start running, until sometime after April 2018—when the 

university announced it had hired the law firm Perkins Coie to conduct an internal “investigation 

1After oral argument, some plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal.

2

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 2, 268); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 2, 210).

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into student athletes’ allegations of sexual misconduct by Dr. Strauss dating back to the late1970s.”3

“Statutes of limitations are not simply technicalities.” Bd. of Regents v. Tomanio, 

446 U.S. 478, 487 (1980). Rather, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained:

Statutes of limitations are intended to “promote justice by preventing surprises 

through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has 

been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared.” Railroad 

Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944).

They provide “security and stability to human affairs.” Wood v. Carpenter, 

101 U.S. 135, 139 (1879). We have deemed them “vital to the welfare of 

society,” ibid., and concluded that “even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that 

their sins may be forgotten,” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985).

Gabelli v. SEC, 568 U.S. 442, 448-49 (2013). The hard reality is that “there comes a point at 

which the delay of a plaintiff in asserting a claim is sufficiently likely either to impair the 

accuracy of the factfinding process or to upset settled expectations that a substantive claim will 

be barred without respect to whether it is meritorious.” Tomanio, 446 U.S. at 487; see also Am. 

Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). Here, the alleged sexual abuse and 

alleged failure of the university to take corrective action are egregious and reprehensible. But 

that is not a license to ignore well-established principles regarding when certain claims accrue. 

Because plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are time-barred, I would affirm.

I.

Start with the full picture of what plaintiffs allege. Plaintiffs recount in graphic detail that 

Strauss’s abuse included: “fondling their testicles and penises,” “often without gloves” for a 

“prolonged” or “extended period of time”;4“masturbating [them] to erection5and ejaculation”;6

3

See, e.g., Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 153, 270; Appellant Br. 10, 19, 28); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 94, 212;

Appellant Br. 11, 18, 26 & n.19).

4

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 309, 647, 651, 733, 787, 1026, 1030, 1392, 1462-65, 1595, 1696, 1875, 1981,

2004, 2082, 2118, 2210, 2337, 2460, 2500, 2516, 2519, 2521); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 246, 248, 253, 268, 271, 275, 279, 

317, 338, 357, 439, 454, 470-71, 488-89, 504, 520, 535, 537, 613-14, 616, 630-31, 651, 666, 668-69, 687, 691, 694, 

697, 713-14, 718, 733, 780, 795, 831, 847, 869). 

5

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 528, 751, 767–72, 951, 1294, 1428, 1571, 1663, 1769, 1926-28, 2138, 2260, 2316,

2356, 2500, 2522, 2540-41); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 336, 374-75, 396-97, 415, 558, 575-78, 598, 733-34, 750, 752, 775, 

781, 815, 887).

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masturbating himself “during or after the exams”;7“drugging8and anally raping them”;9

“unnecessar[ily]” “penetrating their rectums” with his fingers, often for a “prolonged” time and 

without gloves;10 and “rubbing his testicles on” or “press[ing] his erect penis against [plaintiffs’] 

bodies”;11 “touching their bodies in other inappropriate ways, making inappropriate comments 

about their bodies, and asking improper, sexualized questions.” Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 3, 138-

46, 2561); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 3, 79-87, 908). In many cases, plaintiffs experienced a combination 

of these acts on one or more occasions. But the majority opinion does not mention some of the 

most obscene sexual conduct that plaintiffs allege occurred.

Nor is the alleged sexual abuse confined to the context of a medical exam (as the majority 

opinion suggests). The abuse also occurred in the university’s locker room, in the showers, or at 

Strauss’s home. For example, the complaints allege: Strauss came into the locker room wearing 

only a towel and masturbated John Doe 9 (Snyder-Hill R. 123, ¶¶ 949-51); Strauss showered 

with John Doe 17, John Doe 42, and John Doe 98, and masturbated while staring at each plaintiff 

(id., ¶¶ 1815, 1240; Moxley R. 16, ¶ 754); Strauss masturbated while he watched John Doe 8 

shower (Snyder-Hill R. 123, ¶¶ 907, 910); Strauss entered the sauna nude and masturbated, 

sometimes while sitting behind John Doe 98 (Moxley R. 16, ¶ 756); Strauss gave John Doe 19 a 

ride home and attempted to kiss him and repeatedly tried to fondle his genitals, took nude 

photographs of plaintiff at Strauss’s home, followed plaintiff into the locker room, began 

massaging him, and then “kissing John Doe 19’s neck and back” (Snyder-Hill R. 123, ¶ 1307-

10); at Strauss’s home, Strauss gave John Doe 70 a massage, penetrated plaintiff’s anus with his 

finger, and then straddled plaintiff’s lower back, masturbated, and ejaculated onto plaintiff’s 

back. (Id., ¶¶ 2392-95). This is just a sampling.

6

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 1301, 1492, 1667, 1727, 1730, 1855-56, 2164, 2368, 2386, 2408, 2410, 2414,

2436); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 3, 908; id., ¶¶ 298, 396-97, 696).

7

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 1492, 2395).

8

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 937, 1751).

9

Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 1946-48, 1959, 1122).

10Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 309, 609, 710, 752, 770, 1516, 1599-1600, 1681, 1890-91, 2061, 2117, 2213,

2394, 2501); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 616, 249-50, 253, 296, 359, 455, 583, 666, 713-14, 753, 776).

11Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 311, 1076-76, 1492, 2384, 2523, 2360).

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II.

If Congress does not provide a statute of limitations for a federal cause of action, we look 

to “state law for tolling rules, just as we [do] for the length of statutes of limitations”—but the 

“accrual date” of the cause of action “is a question of federal law that is not resolved by 

reference to state law.” Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388, 394 (2007) (claim under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983). When it comes to the accrual question, there are two possible answers under federal

law: the “injury occurrence rule” (which the university argues applies) or the “injury discovery 

rule.” The court’s opinion here, however, adopts an injury-and-deliberate-indifference discovery 

rule that renders meaningless any limitations provision for Title IX claims.

1.

The injury occurrence rule “presumptively” applies. McDonough v. Smith, 139 S. Ct. 

2149, 2155 (2019) (§ 1983 claim); see also, e.g., Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 448; Wallace, 549 U.S. at 

388, 391 (§ 1983); Clark v. Iowa City, 87 U.S. 583, 20 Wall. 583, 589 (1875). But the majority 

concludes otherwise, even while stating that the accrual analysis for Title IX claims should be 

the same as for § 1983 claims. (Maj. Op. 17-18). 

Time and again, the Supreme Court has explained that the “time at which a [federal] 

claim accrues . . . ‘conform[s] in general to common-law tort principles.’” McDonough, 139 S. 

Ct. at 2155 (quoting Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388). “Under those principles, it is ‘the standard rule 

that accrual occurs when the plaintiff has a complete and present cause of action,’ that is, when 

‘the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.’” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388 (cleaned up); see also 

Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 448. As Wallace further explains, “[u]nder the traditional rule of accrual . . . 

the tort cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations commences to run, when the 

wrongful act or omission results in damages. The cause of action accrues even though the full 

extent of the injury is not then known or predictable.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 391 (cleaned up; 

emphasis added).

By that measure, plaintiffs’ claims are untimely. To be sure, the most analogous 

common-law tort is battery, and a “battery is complete upon physical contact, even though there 

is no observable damage at the point of contact.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 899, 

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comment. c (Am. L. Inst. 1979); accord Varnell v. Dora Consol. Sch. Dist., 756 F.3d 1208, 

1215-16 (10th Cir. 2014) (Title IX). Despite what this court’s opinion says, Varnell applied the 

injury occurrence rule, and thus there is at present a “circuit split.” (Maj. Op. 19, 22). Under the 

injury occurrence rule, each plaintiff’s Title IX claim “accrued no later than the last sexual abuse 

by” Strauss (1978 to 1998). Varnell, 756 F.3d at 1216-17.

But even taking the elements of a Title IX claim at face value, the result is the same. 

After all, the cognizable injury or damages is “sexual harassment . . . that is so severe, pervasive, 

and objectively offensive, and that so undermines and detracts from the victims’ educational 

experience, that the victim-students [were] effectively denied equal access to an institution’s 

resources and opportunities.” Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). 

That is, the “Injury” element under Title IX is “the deprivation of ‘access to the educational 

opportunities or benefits provided by the school.’” Kollaritsch v. Mich. State Univ. Bd. of Trs., 

944 F.3d 613, 622 (6th Cir. 2019) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 650); see also Foster v. Bd. of 

Regents, 982 F.3d 960, 965 (6th Cir. 2020) (en banc); Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 590 

(6th Cir. 2018) (Title IX hostile-environment claim). Plaintiffs indeed seek “damages” for inter 

alia the “sexual abuse” and loss of “educational opportunities” that occurred between 1978 and 

1998.12

Accordingly, under the injury occurrence rule, plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are time-barred 

because their claims accrued no later than the last occasion that they were harmed by Strauss 

(1978 to 1998). See Varnell, 756 F.3d at 1216-17. To conclude otherwise, would put “the 

supposed statute of repose in the sole hands of the party seeking relief.” Wallace, 549 U.S. at 

391.

2.

The injury discovery rule applies only in a few well-defined situations. This case is not 

one of them. The so-called injury discovery rule “arose in fraud cases as an exception to the 

general limitations rule,” and the Supreme Court has held that it applies “where a plaintiff has 

been injured by fraud and remains in ignorance of it without any fault or want of diligence or 

12Snyder-Hill (R. 123, PgID 2357); Moxley (R. 16, PgID 361).

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care on his part,” Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559 U.S. 633, 644-45 (2010) (citations omitted; 

emphasis added); see also Rotkiske v. Klemm, 140 S. Ct. 355, 361 (2019); Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 

449-50; Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. 342, 21 Wall. 342, 347-50 (1875). But this is not a fraud case.

The discovery rule also applies when “Congress has enacted statutes that expressly 

include the language . . . setting limitations periods to run from the date on which the violation 

occurs or the date of discovery of such violation.” Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 361 (citing statutes); 

see also, e.g., Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. ANZ Sec., Inc., 137 S. Ct. 2042, 2047, 2050 (2017) 

(discovery rule); Merck, 559 U.S. at 637, 644-48 (discovery rule). On the other hand, where, as 

here, Congress does not provide a statute of limitations that expressly includes “discovery” rule 

language, the Court applies the “standard” injury occurrence rule. See, e.g., Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. 

at 358, 360; Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 448-49, 454; Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 

1962, 1969 (2014); Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388, 391 (§ 1983); McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2155-56 

(§ 1983).

Congress omitted any statute of limitations in Title IX. Thus, it did not silently intend to 

adopt a discovery rule—“a question that, on everyone’s account, [Congress] never faced.” 

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1725 (2017). The Court has 

reiterated that adopting a discovery rule is “particularly inappropriate” because “Congress has 

shown that it knows how to adopt the omitted language or provision.” Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 

361 (emphasis added). “[R]eading in a provision stating that [a] limitations period begins to run 

on the date an alleged [federal law] violation is discovered,” id., is an “expansive approach to the 

discovery rule [and] is a ‘bad wine of recent vintage.’” Id. (quoting TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 

U.S. 19, 37 (2001) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).

It is thus improper to implant a discovery rule into Title IX merely “because Title IX’s 

text contains no statute of limitations at all.” (Maj. Op. 20). This is “[a]textual judicial 

supplementation” all the same. See Rotkiske, 140 S. Ct. at 361. If anything, it is more 

problematic given that we are dealing with a “judicially implied” cause of action. Gebser v. 

Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 284-85 (1998). Title IX is not a blank page for 

politically unaccountable judges to write in whatever rule seems to further “the remedial 

purposes of Title IX.” (Maj. Op. 19). “Indeed, it is quite mistaken to assume . . . that ‘whatever’ 

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might appear to ‘further the statute’s primary objective must be the law.’” Henson, 137 S. Ct. at 

1725 (cleaned up). “Legislation is, after all, the art of compromise, the limitations expressed in 

statutory terms often the price of passage, and no statute yet known ‘pursues its stated purpose at 

all costs.’” Id. (cleaned up).

No less than twice the Supreme Court has told courts what to do when there is no federal 

statute of limitations at all. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 388-91 (false arrest claim under § 1983); 

McDonough, 139 S. Ct. at 2155-56 (malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 based on 

fabricated evidence). The majority opinion admits that in both Wallace and McDonough “the 

Supreme Court applied the occurrence rule to § 1983 claims.” (Maj. Op. 21-22). In both cases, 

the Court explained in detail how the occurrence rule applied and the reasons why. Cf. Ramos v. 

Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1404 & n.54 (2020); see also Direct Mktg. Ass’n v. Brohl, 814 F.3d 

1129, 1148 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). But because the Court did not “discuss” 

the discovery rule or mention whether a party advocated for the discovery rule, the majority 

opinion takes the view that the Court’s application of the occurrence rule was a mere suggestion 

that “does not impact our analysis.” (Maj. Op. 22). It is a mistake, however, to require the Court 

to explicitly state that the discovery rule does not apply to cases under § 1983 or Title IX.

To the extent this court has applied the injury discovery rule to § 1983 claims, Sevier v.

Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 273 (6th Cir. 1984), this court recently questioned whether “our cases 

imbibing this ‘bad wine’ warrant reconsideration in light of the Supreme Court’s recent 

teachings,” Dibrell v. City of Knoxville, 984 F.3d 1156, 1162 (6th Cir. 2021). Dibrell decided 

not to “resolve this tension” because plaintiff’s § 1983 claims were untimely under both accrual 

rules. Id. With this in mind, we should not import the same “bad wine” into the new context of 

Title IX claims.

Other than “the historical exception for suits based on fraud,” the Court has “deviated 

from the traditional rule and imputed an injury-discovery rule to Congress on only one 

occasion.” TRW, 534 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) 

(citing Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-71 (1949) (involving pulmonary silicosis caused by 

inhaling coal dust)). The Court did so in Urie because the Court “could not imagine that 

legislation as ‘humane’ as the Federal Employers’ Liability Act” (FELA) “would bar recovery 

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for latent medical injuries.” Id. Because Urie refused to count “each inhalation of silica dust” as 

“a separate tort giving rise to a fresh ‘cause of action,’” Urie held that “the afflicted employee 

can be held to be ‘injured’ only when the accumulated effects of the deleterious substance 

manifest themselves.” 337 U.S. at 169-70 (citation omitted). “[I]n one other case [the Court] 

simply observed (without endorsement) that several Courts of Appeals had substituted injurydiscovery for the traditional rule in medical-malpractice actions under the Federal Tort Claims 

Act” (FTCA). TRW, 534 U.S. at 37 n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citing United 

States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 120 & n.7 (1979)). “[I]n two other cases” involving civil RICO 

actions, the Court “observed (without endorsement) that lower federal courts ‘generally apply’ 

an injury-discovery rule.” Id. (citing Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 555 (2000); Klehr v. A. O. 

Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, 191 (1997)). This case is not akin to any of those cases.

Yet the court’s opinion here relies on FTCA and FELA cases to justify adopting a 

discovery rule. (Maj. Op. 18, 23). This case is not like one of the “medical-malpractice cases 

[under the FTCA] in which the plaintiff has little reason to suspect anything other than natural 

causes for his injury.” Amburgey v. United States, 733 F.3d 633, 637 (6th Cir. 2013) (cleaned 

up); see also Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 1998); Miller v. United 

States, 932 F.2d 301, 303 (4th Cir. 1991). Nor does this case involve claims for “latent” injuries 

or diseases under FELA. See, e.g., Campbell v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., 238 F.3d 772, 773 

(6th Cir. 2001); Fonseca v. CONRAIL, 246 F.3d 585, 586, 589 (6th Cir. 2001); Hicks v. Hines 

Inc., 826 F.2d 1543, 1544 (6th Cir. 1987).13 Even in FELA cases, we have held that “if greater 

than de minimus harm is discernable at the time of the tortious event,” the “time of event rule” 

(i.e., injury occurrence rule) applies. Fonseca, 246 F.3d at 588 (quoting Hicks, 826 F.2d at 

1544).

13This court stated the injury-and-cause discovery rule in Bishop v. Children’s Center for Developmental

Enrichment, 618 F.3d 533, 536 (6th Cir. 2010), a § 1983 case. But Bishop is quoting Campbell, 238 F.3d at 775, a 

FELA case involving bone joint injuries allegedly caused by using certain equipment for over two decades. Id. at 

773-74. Bishop does not offer any explanation for doing so, and the causation part of the rule that is unique to our

FELA and FTCA cases played no part in the court’s brief analysis. See Bishop, 618 F.3d at 537 (“Plaintiffs’ claims

accrued . . . when they knew that CB had been expelled from [school] . . . . [R]edress was available at the time of the 

injury.”).

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The court’s opinion here, however, makes the leap in logic that a Title IX claim is like a 

“latent injury” claim, asserting that “[j]ust as an employee needs to know that their employer 

exposed them to toxic materials before they can bring suit, a student must know that their school 

exposed them to a heightened risk of harassment before they have a viable claim.” (Maj. Op. 

25). But a Title IX injury is not the result of “the accumulated effects of [a] deleterious 

substance” that only becomes “manifest” decades later. Urie, 337 U.S. at 169-70 (citation 

omitted).

Given there is no textual or historical reason to graft a discovery rule onto the implied 

right of action under Title IX, I would decline to do so.

3.

Even assuming the “injury discovery rule” applies, plaintiffs’ claims are untimely. Under 

the injury “discovery rule,” the statute of limitations will begin to run “only when the injury is or 

reasonably could have been discovered.” Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 451 (emphasis added); accord 

Johnson v. Memphis Light Gas & Water Div., 777 F.3d 838, 843 (6th Cir. 2015). The trigger 

date is the “event” that “should have alerted the typical lay person to protect his or her rights.” 

Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843 (citation omitted). This is a simple, “objective inquiry.” Id.

By that standard, plaintiffs’ claims accrued when plaintiffs admittedly knew Strauss 

injured them between 1978 and 1998. How can it be otherwise? Plaintiffs claim that a 

cognizable Title IX “injury” occurred by virtue of being subjected to “sexual harassment . . . that 

is so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, and that so undermine[d] and detract[ed] from 

the [their] educational experience, that the [plaintiffs were] effectively denied equal access to 

[the university]’s resources and opportunities” between 1978 and 1998. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; 

see also Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 622.14 Plaintiffs cannot, and indeed do not, simultaneously 

claim that at the time of Strauss’s misconduct they did not know or have “reason to know of the 

injury which is the basis of [their] action.” Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843 (citation omitted; emphasis 

added). The majority opinion does not solve this enigma.

14Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 2576, 2588); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 923, 935).

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Lest there is any doubt, plaintiffs allege they were subjected to obscene sexual abuse in 

the school’s locker room or showers, at Strauss’s home, or during physical exams. Supra 

Section I. At least 28 plaintiffs fled from the situation and/or later refused to be examined by 

Strauss or be anywhere near Strauss.15 At least 25 plaintiffs allege that they complained to 

university administration, coaches, trainers, health center staff, and/or other physicians about 

Strauss’s conduct.16 Of the 2 plaintiffs who complained to physicians, one physician replied, 

“That seems really odd . . . It’s not normal.” Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 382-83). The other 

physician responded, “Dr. Strauss’ actions were inappropriate and not medically necessary,” and 

the physician wrote a note “to excuse John Doe 9 from further physicals by Dr. Strauss.” (Id., ¶¶ 

939-40).

Remarkably, 104 plaintiffs claim Strauss’s abuse has caused decades of suffering and 

many other tragedies in life (e.g., drugs, alcohol abuse, emotional disorders, relationship 

problems, intimacy issues, divorce, and attempted suicide).17 And they seek damages for these 

harms. Id. 

It is beyond debate that plaintiffs knew of their “injury” between 1978 and 1998. 

Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 451; Johnson, 777 F.3d at 843. Because the facts on the face of the 

complaint show that plaintiffs’ claims are untimely, “dismissing the claim[s] under Rule 12(b)(6) 

is appropriate.’” Stein v. Regions Morgan Keegan Select High Income Fund, Inc., 821 F.3d 780, 

786 (6th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 

199, 215 (2007); Bishop v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 520 F.3d 516, 520 (6th Cir. 2008).

15Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 562-63, 810, 1003, 1152, 1579, 1713, 2217, 2296-97, 2329, 2358); Moxley (R.

16, ¶¶ 253, 273-80, 318-19, 340, 361, 377, 398, 430, 538, 541, 552, 598, 616-17, 634, 682, 781, 789, 805, 816, 833, 

882).

16Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 314-20, 347-51, 360-62, 382-86, 409-11, 414-16, 501-03, 572-73, 589-90, 690,

792, 814-17, 822-23, 883-84, 1086, 1095, 1226-30, 1311-12, 1429, 1832-33, 1894, 1949-51, 2085-86, 2472); 

Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 273, 361, 579, 618, 715, 872).

17Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 339, 369, 396, 425, 456, 486, 548, 630, 641, 664, 680, 698, 723, 743, 763, 782,

800, 843, 969-72, 1044-45, 1069, 1107, 1140, 1167, 1199, 1257, 1283, 1325, 1358, 1382, 1407, 1452, 1478, 1504, 

1540, 1591, 1611, 1626, 1658, 1675, 1691, 1708, 1721, 1739, 1762, 1780, 1794, 1811, 1825, 1868, 1885, 1902, 

1939, 1959, 1995, 2041, 2057, 2076, 2095, 2112, 2131, 2153, 2177, 2231, 2254, 2276, 2291, 2330, 2347, 2379, 

2402, 2423, 2446, 2468, 2510, 2534); Moxley (R.16, ¶¶ 262, 289, 308, 327, 353, 369, 391, 408-09, 430-32, 482, 

499, 552, 569, 592, 607, 626, 645, 661, 682, 707, 727, 744, 789-90, 805, 826, 841, 863, 882).

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Yet the court’s opinion concludes that all 110 plaintiffs’ Title IX claims are not timebarred for “three independent reasons.” (Maj. Op. 34).

First, the majority is willing to say that only 9 Snyder-Hill plaintiffs “allege that they did 

know that Strauss’s conduct was abuse,” (Maj. Op. 9-10, 32), but that is only because these 9 

plaintiffs concede in their brief that they “knew Strauss abused them.” Snyder-Hill (Appellant 

Br. 28 n.15). The opinion otherwise accepts the bald allegation of the other 75 Snyder-Hill

plaintiffs and all 34 Moxley plaintiffs that, because they “were not trained in medicine and did 

not know what was medically appropriate,” they “did not understand or believe that Dr. Strauss 

had sexually abused” them until sometime after the university publicized its investigation in 

April 2018.18 (Emphasis added); see (Maj. Op. 32-34 (“[P]eople suffer serious harms resulting 

from their abuse, even if they do not recognize it as abuse.”)). As stated, nowhere do plaintiffs 

allege they did not know they were “injured,” nor could they. 

This conflates “injury” with what qualifies as “sexual abuse.” Under the discovery rule, 

it is irrelevant whether plaintiffs labeled Strauss’s conduct as “sexual abuse.” It is “discovery of 

the injury” alone that “starts the clock.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added). For 

example, “identifying professional negligence may also be a matter of real complexity, and its 

discovery is not required before the statute starts running” for a medical malpractice claim. 

Rotella, 528 U.S. at 556 (citing Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122, 124). The same goes for any other 

legal label for conduct, e.g., excessive force, defamation, or sexual abuse. The “‘accrual’ of a 

claim” does not “await awareness by the plaintiff that his injury was . . . inflicted” in a way that 

constitutes sexual abuse. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 123. Plaintiffs, “armed with the facts about the 

harm done to [them], can protect [themselves] by seeking advice in the medical and legal 

community. To excuse [them] from promptly doing so by postponing the accrual of [their] 

claim[s] would undermine the purpose of the limitations statute[.]” Id. (emphasis added); see 

also Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555-56. 

18See, e.g., Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 153-60, 267, 270-72, 390, 448, 454, 480, 484, 514, 518, 542, 546, 588,

591; Appellant Br. 10, 19, 28); Moxley (R. 16, ¶¶ 94-101, 209, 212-14, 256, 260; Appellant Br. 11, 18, 26 & n.19).

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Just as the individual “suffering from inadequate treatment is thus responsible for 

determining within the limitations period then running whether the inadequacy was 

malpractice,” here the limitations period started running decades ago and plaintiffs had two years 

to determine whether Strauss’s conduct was sexual abuse and whether the university was 

deliberately indifferent. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 556 (emphasis added).

The majority then points to the statement that “[g]enerally, a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) 

. . . is an ‘inappropriate vehicle’ for dismissing a claim based upon a statute of limitations.” Lutz 

v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 717 F.3d 459, 464 (6th Cir. 2013). From this, it is inaccurate

to summarily conclude that “whether [plaintiffs] knew or should have known that they were 

abused is an issue of fact for the jury.” (Maj. Op. 31, 34).

That conclusion is also erroneous for another reason, even assuming plaintiffs must 

recognize the misconduct as “sexual abuse.” Plaintiffs detailed and obscene allegations belie 

their assertion that they did not know Strauss’s misconduct was sexual abuse. Only “factual 

allegations in the complaint” are taken as true; “conclusory statements” and “legal conclusions,” 

even if “couched as a factual allegation,” are “not entitled to be assumed true.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 

556 U.S. 662, 678-79, 681 (2009) (cleaned up). Judges cannot throw “judicial experience and 

common sense” out the window simply because plaintiffs assert that they did not know Strauss’s 

conduct was, by definition, sexual abuse. Id. at 679. If that were enough, the statute of 

limitations would be extended indefinitely because the issue would always be consigned to a jury 

trial. “Repose would hinge on speculation about what the [plaintiffs] knew, when [they] knew it, 

and when [they] should have known it.” Gabelli, 568 U.S. at 452; see Jones, 549 U.S. at 215.

Second, the court’s opinion stitches out a new injury-and-deliberate-indifference 

discovery rule: “[T]he clock starts only once the plaintiff knows or should have known that Ohio 

State administrators ‘with authority to take corrective action’ knew of Strauss’s conduct and 

failed to respond appropriately.” (Maj. Op. 31-32) (emphasis added). Recall that the institution 

must somehow make this showing to invoke the statute of limitations defense. How exactly is 

that possible at any stage in litigation, especially decades after the critical events? And even if a 

plaintiff will “know or have reason to know that a school mishandle[d] their own report of an 

assault,” that will not be enough to trigger accrual for a “heightened-risk claim,” so long as the 

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plaintiff claims that they did not “know that others had complained before them or that the 

school was deliberately indifferent to any prior complaints.” (Maj. Op. 28-29).

Third, and relatedly, the opinion adds that even if a plaintiff was alerted to investigate 

further, that will “not ultimately matter,” so long as the plaintiff claims “that if they had 

investigated the abuse, they would not have discovered” the institution’s deliberate indifference. 

(Maj. Op. 31-32). But when will that not be the case? With that, the opinion concludes that all 

110 plaintiffs plausibly allege that they did not “know the underlying facts about Ohio State’s 

alleged deliberate indifference.” Id. at 30, 34.

But the Supreme Court was emphatically clear: “[I]n applying a discovery accrual 

rule, we have been at pains to explain that discovery of the injury, not discovery of the other 

elements of a claim, is what starts the clock.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555 (emphasis added). 

Rotella reminds us yet again that even in the context of “medical malpractice, where the cry for a 

discovery rule is loudest,” the “discovery rule does not extend beyond the injury.” Id. At issue 

in Rotella was the accrual of civil claims under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act (RICO). Id. at 551. The Court rejected plaintiff’s (and this circuit’s thenprevailing) “injury and pattern discovery rule,” “under which a civil RICO claim accrues only 

when the claimant discovers, or should discover, both an injury and a pattern of RICO activity.” 

Id. at 551, 553 (collecting cases). 

Civil “RICO has a unique pattern requirement” to state a claim. Rotella, 528 U.S. at 

556.19 And “a pattern of predicate acts may well be complex, concealed, or fraudulent,” “and 

involve harm to parties wholly unrelated to an injured plaintiff.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555, 559. 

Even so, Rotella refused to adopt plaintiff’s “less demanding” discovery rule. Rotella, 528 U.S. 

at 557. “A RICO plaintiff’s ability to investigate the cause of his injuries is no more impaired by 

his ignorance of the underlying RICO pattern than a malpractice plaintiff is thwarted 

by ignorance of the details of treatment decisions or of prevailing standards of medical practice.” 

Id. at 556-57 (emphasis added). As such, Rotella held that the limitations period began at the 

19To state a civil RICO claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern

(4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985).

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“the point of injury or its reasonable discovery”—not when the plaintiff reasonably “discovered 

the pattern of predicate acts” for his civil RICO claim. Id. at 558-59.

Rotella’s rationale governs here (assuming the discovery rule applies). An institution’s 

deliberate indifference is one of “the other elements” of a Title IX claim, not the “injury” 

element that “starts the clock.” Rotella, 528 U.S. at 555; see, e.g., Kesterson v. Kent State Univ.,

967 F.3d 519, 527 (6th Cir. 2020); Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 619-22. Causation is yet another 

element. Kollaritsch, 944 F.3d at 622; see also e.g., Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 59 n.5 

(2011) (noting that a plaintiff who has “satisfied the deliberate indifference requirement” does 

not automatically “satisfy the causation requirement”); Bd. of Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 

520 U.S. 397, 404-05 (1997).

It makes no difference that an institution’s policy or practice of deliberate indifference to 

prior acts of sexual harassment “might well be complex, concealed, or fraudulent, and involve 

harm to parties wholly unrelated to an injured plaintiff.” See Rotella, 528 U.S. at 559. Of 

course, the “difficulty in identifying” such conduct is “inherent” in deliberate indifference 

claims. See id. These matters often (if not always) involve secret conduct, private disciplinary 

meetings, inaccessible personnel files, and conduct that may not be recorded at all. But that 

“only reinforces” the reasons for refusing to inject the “complexity” of deliberate indifference 

into the injury discovery rule. See id. To hold otherwise, “would bar repose, prove a godsend to 

stale claims, and doom any hope of certainty in identifying potential liability.” Id. 

On that score, plaintiffs’ Title IX claims accrued between 1978 and 1998 when each 

plaintiff possessed the “critical facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury.” 

Twersky v. Yeshiva Univ., 579 F. App’x 7, 9-10 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 

122). Namely, “they were unquestionably aware of (1) their injuries, (2) their [abuser’s] 

identit[y], and (3) their [abuser’s] prior and continued employment at [the university].” Id.

Rotella also put to rest plaintiffs’ objection that without evidence of the university’s 

deliberate indifference, plaintiffs could not file suit at the time of the abuse because they “could 

not overcome Rule 11, let alone Rule 12(b)(6).”20 The Court acknowledged that RICO claims 

20Snyder-Hill (Appellant Br. 49); Moxley (Appellant Br. 44).

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often involve fraud and therefore must be pleaded with “particularity” under Rule 9(b)—unlike 

plaintiffs’ Title IX claims—and yet the Court saw no reason to expand the injury discovery rule. 

Rotella, 528 U.S. at 560. And as in Rotella, plaintiffs’ argument “ignores the flexibility provided 

by Rule 11(b)(3), allowing pleadings based on evidence reasonably anticipated after further 

investigation or discovery.” Id.

In fact, plaintiffs took advantage of Rule 11 in filing suit here. The university announced 

its investigation in April 2018. At that time, plaintiffs knew nothing more about the university’s 

deliberate indifference than they allegedly did for the past several decades. And yet the SnyderHill plaintiffs managed to file suit in July 2018. Under the majority’s reasoning, however, 

plaintiffs’ claims still had yet to accrue. After all, it was not until 12 months later, in May 2019, 

that the Perkins Coie report publicly aired the university’s dirty laundry.21

If there were any lingering doubt that Title IX and § 1983 deliberate indifference claims 

will never accrue until the plaintiff says so decades later, the majority opinion justifies its rule 

because the First Circuit did just that with a § 1983 claim against a city in Ouellette v. Beaupre, 

977 F.3d 127, 130, 139-40 (1st Cir. 2020). (Maj. Op. 27 (“We are persuaded by Ouelette’s 

reasoning and adopt it fully.”)).

But contrary to the majority opinion’s suggestion, “seven of our sibling circuits” have not 

adopted an injury-and-deliberate-indifference discovery rule. (Maj. Op. 23, 29). Ouellette 

stands alone—the other six cases cited do not even discuss the accrual of deliberate indifference 

claims. Nor does the opinion mention the circuits that have refused “to adopt a ‘delayed accrual’ 

rule” for Title IX and § 1983 claims against an institution, even though “the claims against [the 

institution] are necessarily based on official ‘policies or customs’” or deliberate indifference to 

prior misconduct “that could not have been known at the time of [plaintiff’s] abuse.” King-White 

v. Humble Indep. Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 754, 763 (5th Cir. 2015) (Title IX and § 1983); see

Twersky, 579 F. App’x at 9-10 (Title IX); Lawson v. Rochester City Sch. Dist., 446 F. App’x 

21See, e.g., Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 271-75; id., ¶ 25 n.10 (citing Michael V. Drake, A Message from

President Drake: Strauss Investigation Report, The Ohio State University (May 17, 2019), https://president.osu.edu/

presidents/drake/news-andnotes/2019/strauss-investigation-report-campus-wide-email html)).

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327, 329 (2d Cir. 2011) (§ 1983); see also Tengood v. City of Philadelphia, 529 F. App’x 204, 

210 & n.5 (3d Cir. 2013) (§ 1983).

III.

The court’s opinion then goes on to expand the scope of Title IX. Although the 

university argues that four plaintiffs—John Doe 30, John Doe 42, John Doe 47, and John Doe 

49—fail to state a Title IX claim because they were “neither students nor employees” of the 

university, and they were not denied the benefits of any “education program or activity” of the

university, Snyder-Hill (Appellant Br. 51), today’s decision rejects that argument.

This court has explicitly held that the right to bring suit under Title IX is limited to “those 

circumstances where a plaintiff is so closely tied to a university that the individual is essentially a 

student of that university.” Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 971 F.3d 553, 559 n.4 (6th Cir. 2020). In the 

majority opinion’s view, that rule is “not relevant” because that case involved student-on-student 

sexual harassment and this is a case about employee-on-student harassment. (Maj. Op. 35). But 

that does not change Title IX’s coverage. Title IX does not distinguish between students and 

teachers as harassers: The statute prohibits “discrimination under any education program or 

activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (emphasis added).

Satisfied that it is freed from the bonds of precedent, the majority opinion concludes that 

“‘members of the public’ can bring a Title IX claim” if they are subject to discrimination when 

they are, “for example, accessing university libraries or other resources, or attending campus 

tours, sporting events or other activities.” (Maj. Op. 37). That conclusion rests on dictum from a 

footnote in Doe v. Brown University, 896 F.3d 127, 132 n.6 (1st Cir. 2018), a case in which the 

court rejected a Title IX claim brought by “a freshman at Providence College, [who] was 

sexually assaulted by three students of Brown University . . . on Brown’s campus.” Id. at 128.

Here, John Doe 30 and John Doe 42 were contract referees paid by the university, and 

they experienced a single instance of sexual harassment before or after they had refereed a 

wrestling match. Snyder-Hill (R. 123, ¶¶ 75, 87, 1612-13, 1812). John Doe 49 was a high 

school student attending a summer wrestling camp at the university. (Id., ¶¶ 94, 1940). John 

Doe 47 was a high school student and “was on [the university]’s campus visiting his aunt, a 

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university employee.” (Id., ¶ 1903). “While hanging around the athletics department by himself, 

John Doe 47 was approached by Dr. Strauss,” who “gave John Doe 47 a long tour of the athletics 

facilities and subjected him twice during that day to sexually abusive ‘medical exams.’” (Id., ¶¶ 

1904-06) (emphasis added).

Even if any of these four plaintiffs were sufficiently tied to the university, none of them 

alleges that they were “den[ied] . . . equal access to an educational program or activity.” Davis, 

526 U.S. at 652; see also Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 511 (6th Cir. 2021). That is, 

plaintiffs do not allege that they quit refereeing, quit the wrestling camp or intended to attend 

again but did not do so, or had planned to attend the university and decided not to do so. Arocho 

v. Ohio University, 2022 WL 819734, at *3-4 (6th Cir. 2022) (dismissing Title IX claims even

though a university officer “sexually assaulted [a high school student] during his ‘work hours 

and at work-related locations,’ and in his Ohio University police cruiser”). Nor have the four 

plaintiffs even alleged that Strauss’s abuse seriously “undermine[d] and detract[ed] from” their 

experience participating in any university activity. Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; see also Kollartisch, 

944 F.3d at 622 (noting examples of an impaired experience). 

“Emotional harm standing alone is not a redressable Title IX injury.” Kollartisch, 944 

F.3d at 622; see also Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C., 142 S. Ct. 1562, 1569, 1576

(2022).

* * *

In the end, this court’s opinion grants the plaintiffs what the democratic process has 

effectively denied them. In 2019, Ohio legislation was proposed to grant the right to “bring a 

civil action against a land grant university to recover damages for any injury . . . proximately 

caused by sexual misconduct against the victim that was committed between January 1, 1978, 

and December 31, 2000, by a physician who was an employee of the university during that 

period of time.” H.B. 249, 133rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio. 2019). The proposal 

specifically provided that “there is no period of limitations for a civil action brought by [such] a 

victim.” Id. But H.B. 249 failed to pass the introduction stage. Michigan, under similar 

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circumstances, has enacted more measured legislation, and additional legislation is being 

considered.22

I respectfully dissent.

22See 2018 Mich. Pub. Act No. 183, §§ 5805(2)-(6), 5851b(1)-(3) (codified as amended at Mich. Comp.

Laws §§ 600.5805, 600.5851b); see also H.B. 5962, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2022); H.B. 4306, 101st Leg., 

Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2021).

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

Nos. 21-3981/3991

STEVE SNYDER-HILL; RONALD MCDANIEL; DAVID 

MULVIN; WILLIAM BROWN; KURT HUNTSINGER; 

WILLIAM RIEFFER; STEVE HATCH; KELLY REED; 

MELVIN ROBINSON; DOUGLAS WELLS; JAMES 

KHALIL; JERROLD L. SOLOMON; JOSEPH BECHTEL; 

MICHAEL MURPHY; JOHN DAVID FALER; MATT 

MCCOY; GARY AVIS; ROBERT SCHRINER; MICHAEL 

MONTGOMERY; JOHN DOES 1–22, 25, 27, 29–37, 39–47, 

49, 52, 54, 56–60, 62–64, and 66–77 (21-3981); TIMOTHY 

MOXLEY; RYAN CALLAHAN; JOHN JACKSON, JR.; 

JAMES CARROLL; JEFFREY ROHDE; PATRICK 

MURRAY; EVERETT ROSS; JOHN DOES 78–95 and 97–

105 (21-3991),

Plaintiffs - Appellants,

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant - Appellee.

Before: GUY, MOORE, and CLAY, Circuit Judges.

JUDGMENT

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Ohio at Columbus.

THIS CAUSE was heard on the record from the district court and was argued by counsel.

IN CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is ORDERED that the judgment of the district court is 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with the opinion of this court.

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

Deborah S. Hunt, Clerk

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