NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE

LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION ONE

GLENNA COVINO, Plaintiff/Appellant,

v.

TERRY FORREST and DEBORAH A. FORREST, husband and wife; 

JEFFREY COVINO and JUDY COVINO, husband and wife, 

Defendants/Appellees.

No. 1 CA-CV 13-0433

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CV2010-070608

The Honorable Eileen S. Willett, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Morris Law Firm PLLC, Surprise

By Richard W. Morris

Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant

Charles M. Giles Attorney at Law, Tucson

By Charles M. Giles

Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in 

which Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Donn Kessler joined.

J O N E S, Judge:

¶1 Glenna Covino, in both her individual and trustee capacity 

(collectively, Glenna), brought an action against her step-children, Jeffrey

Covino and Deborah Forrest, and their spouses (collectively, Defendants), 

for, inter alia, conversion and unjust enrichment. The conversion claim

was tried to a jury, which found for Glenna and awarded $15,000 in 

damages. The unjust enrichment claim was submitted to the trial court, 

which found against Glenna. Following the jury’s verdict, she filed a 

comprehensive motion attacking the damages award, which the trial court 

denied in full. 

¶2 Glenna appealed, asserting: 1) the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying her motion for partial summary judgment on the 

conversion claim; 2) the trial court erred in denying her numerous postverdict motions attacking the sufficiency of the conversion damages; and 

3) the trial court erred by finding in favor of Defendants on her unjust 

enrichment claim. Finding no error, we affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶3 Charles Covino, Jeffrey and Deborah’s father, decided to 

move to Arizona, where Jeffrey and Deborah lived, in or around 2003,

following the death of his first wife. To this effect, he sold two real estate 

properties located in New York and New Jersey, and used the proceeds to 

purchase a house in Arizona (Arizona house); he also purchased 300 

Krugerrands.1

¶4 In May 2006, Charles married Glenna. Shortly thereafter, the 

couple began establishing their estate plan. On January 18, 2007, they 

 1 Krugerrands are South African one ounce gold bullion coins. USA Gold, 

http://www.usagold.com/gold/coins/krugerrand.html (last visited May 

21, 2014). 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

3

executed the Covino Family Living Trust (Covino Trust). The Covino 

Trust provided that in the event Charles predeceased Glenna, Glenna 

would become the Trustee of her trust assets in a revocable living trust 

known as “Trust A.” Also, Glenna was to then serve as Trustee of 

Charles’s trust assets under the newly formed “Trust B,” created within 

the Covino Trust. The Covino Trust further provided: 

From this TRUST B the Trustee shall allow GLENNA L. 

COVINO the use and enjoyment of [the Arizona house] 

during her lifetime. Also, the Trustee shall allow GLENNA 

L. COVINO to drawn [sic] on the income and/or principal 

of the remaining corpus of TRUST B for her health, 

maintenance and support needs as the Trustee deems 

appropriate. If GLENNA L. COVINO determines that her 

continued use and enjoyment of the home is unreasonable, 

then she can direct the Trustee to sell the home and 

thereafter the Trustee shall pay to GLENNA L. COVINO, 

from the sale proceeds of the home, a monthly allowance of 

three thousand dollars . . . until her death.

Upon the death of GLENNA L. COVINO, the Trustee shall 

divide the remainder of Trust B assets equally among JOHN 

A. COVINO, DEBOARH A. FORREST AND JEFFERY [sic] 

C. COVINO.

¶5 That same day, the couple executed several other ancillary 

documents to effectuate the purpose of the Covino Trust. The first 

document was a “Community Property Agreement,” in which they 

converted any property they had acquired as joint tenants into community 

property. They also executed an “Assignment of Personal Property,” 

which assigned to the Covino Trust “[a]ll of our present and future 

interest in and to all of our personal property and household goods, 

furnishings located in any home we might own or have an interest in now 

or hereafter.” Charles also executed a will. The will provided that Glenna 

was to receive “any interest [Charles] may have in all personal 

automobiles, clothing, jewelry, china, silver, books, pictures and other 

works of art, household furniture and furnishings and all other items of 

domestic, household or personal use.” If Glenna did not survive Charles, 

these items were directed to be placed in the Covino Trust. Charles’s will 

also contained a residuary clause, whereby Charles devised the rest of his 

separate and community property to the Covino Trust. 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

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4

¶6 Charles died on August 15, 2010, predeceasing Glenna. Five 

days later, Jeffrey and Deborah went to the Arizona property and 

removed numerous items, including four safes (which held the 

Krugerrands and various other coins), guns, and other sentimental items 

they contended Charles had gifted them during his lifetime.2 After 

Glenna told them the items belonged to the Covino Trust and requested, 

to no avail, the items be returned, Glenna filed this action on November 5, 

2010, against the Defendants, alleging claims of: 1) conversion, 2) trespass, 

3) unjust enrichment, 4) infliction of emotional distress, and 5) breach of 

duty to a vulnerable adult. The Defendants answered and filed counter 

claims for breach of duty to a vulnerable adult and reformation of the 

trust. 

¶7 Following discovery, Glenna moved for partial summary 

judgment on her conversion and unjust enrichment claims, arguing the 

removed items became part of the Covino Trust upon Charles’s signing of 

his “Assignment of Personal Property,” or alternatively upon Charles’s 

death by way of his the residuary clause of his will. In response, 

Defendants asserted summary judgment was inappropriate as questions 

of material fact existed concerning whether they had been gifted the items 

by Charles, which would have removed the items from the purview of 

either document Glenna relied upon. The Defendants also cross-moved 

for summary judgment, arguing Glenna had not provided competent 

evidence the safes and guns had not been gifted to them. The trial court 

denied both motions without comment. 

¶8 A three day jury trial commenced in late February 2013. 

Glenna testified twenty-four different items were taken from her residence 

 2 At trial, Glenna admitted into evidence a list of items she believed the 

Defendants removed. The full list includes: 210 Krugerrand gold coins, 

other miscellaneous gold coins, 100 ounce silver ingot, a bronze cannon, 

109 grams of 18 carat gold, Carl Zeiss Binoculars, an Orbis Batton Kill [sic] 

fly rod, 2 Waltham pocket watches, miscellaneous Civil War relics and 

replicas, a car phone, 350 Morgan Brilliant Uncirculated Silver Dollars, 110 

“silver dimes,” 125 “silver quarters,” an ASM 44 cal. black powder 

firearm, a Ruger 223 firearm, a Weatherby 30/06 firearm, a Winchester 12 

gauge shotgun, 2 field binoculars, a 4.21 bore cannon, an 80 cal. Cannon, 5 

swords and their rack, 5 battle axes, “1557 Kennedy Half Dollars 1964,” 

and 350 Liberty Half Dollars. The Defendants admitted removing all of 

the items on the list, except for the 100 ounce silver ingot, the 350 Morgan 

Silver Dollars, and the Kennedy and Liberty Half Dollars. 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

5

and that it was her understanding they belonged to the Covino Trust. She 

admitted several items had been returned to her,3 but estimated the value 

of the outstanding items taken approached $432,000, with the 210 

Krugerrands, alone, estimated to be worth approximately $349,000. She 

retrieved her estimated values from the internet.

¶9 Each defendant also testified. The gist of their collective 

testimony was that the guns, safes and the safes’ contents, including the 

210 Krugerrands they contended were purchased as an investment for 

them, were purchased by Charles before he married Glenna and gifted by 

Charles to Jeffrey and Deborah many years before his death. At the close 

of testimony, Glenna moved for a directed verdict on her conversion 

claim, which was denied. 

¶10 Subsequently, only Glenna’s conversion claim was 

submitted to the jury, as the parties agreed to submit the unjust 

enrichment and reformation of trust claims to the court; the balance of the 

claims were dismissed with prejudice at some point during the 

proceedings. The jury received two general verdict forms: one to be used 

in the event the jurors found in favor of Glenna, the other if the jurors

found in favor of Defendants. The form to be used if they found in favor 

of Glenna allowed the jury to determine which of the four defendants, if 

not all, were liable and allowed the jury a line upon which to insert an 

amount reflecting “the full damages.”4 Ultimately, the jury found Jeffrey

 3 Prior to trial, upon Glenna’s motion, the trial court ordered the disputed 

items be stored at T & T Estate Service for safekeeping during the 

proceedings. It was T & T Estate Service that returned the items to 

Glenna, rather than the Defendants. 

4 The general verdict form at issue here reads:

(Use if you find for the Plaintiff on Conversion Claim)

We, the Jury, duly empanelled and sworn in the aboveentitled action, upon our oaths, do find in favor of Plaintiff 

on her claim of conversion and find the full damages to be 

$__________.

We find one or more of the Defendants caused and liable for 

these damages (check only one box for each Defendant)
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

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6

and Deborah liable for conversion and awarded Glenna $15,000 in 

damages. 

¶11 Thereafter, the parties submitted briefs to the trial court on 

Glenna’s unjust enrichment claim. After taking into account the trial 

testimony, the admitted exhibits, and the jury’s verdict, the trial court 

found Glenna had an appropriate remedy at law (her conversion claim) 

for the relief she sought in her unjust enrichment claim, and determined 

Glenna failed to meet her burden of proof. Also, it dismissed Defendants’ 

reformation of trust claim with prejudice because neither side pursued the 

claim in the presented briefs. 

¶12 Glenna then filed a “Motion for Judgment as a Matter of 

Law, or Alternatively for a New Trial, or Alternatively for Additur, or 

Alternatively for Correction of the Verdict’s Damages Amount; Motion for 

Stay Pending Final Decision on All Post Trial Motions and Appeals.” The 

crux of Glenna’s motion was her belief that the jury’s verdict in her favor 

meant it found Jeffrey and Deborah had converted all of the items Glenna 

asserted had been converted, and that since the parties had allegedly 

stipulated to those items’ values, and the damages award ($15,000.00) was 

inconsistent with the allegedly stipulated values and the evidence 

admitted at trial, the verdict was in error. In an unsigned minute entry, 

the trial court denied the motion, finding that damages were disputed, 

that the jury resolved the dispute, and the award was justified by the 

evidence presented at trial. Thereafter, Glenna filed a notice of appeal. 

We suspended the appeal to allow Glenna to obtain a signed order from 

the trial court, which she did. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona 

Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 12-2101(A)(1), (5)(a). 

 

Terry Forrest _______ Liable ______ Not Liable

Deborah A. Forrest _______ Liable ______ Not Liable

Jeffrey Covino _______ Liable ______ Not Liable

Judy Covino _______ Liable ______ Not Liable

The jury placed $15,000 in the damages blank, and found Jeffrey and 

Deborah liable, while finding Judy and Terry not liable. 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

7

DISCUSSION

¶13 Glenna essentially raises four issues on appeal. First, she 

argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying her partial motion 

for summary judgment on her conversion claim. Second, she argues the 

trial court erred by denying her motion for judgment as a matter of law. 

Third, she contends the trial court erred by denying her other post-verdict 

motions regarding the amount of damages awarded on her conversion 

claim. Finally, she asserts the trial court erred by finding in favor of the 

Defendants on her unjust enrichment claim. 

I. Denial of Summary Judgment 

¶14 “Generally, the denial of a summary judgment motion is not 

reviewable on appeal from a final judgment entered after a trial on the 

merits.” John C. Lincoln Hosp. & Health Corp. v. Maricopa Cnty., 208 Ariz. 

532, 539, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d 530, 537 (App. 2008); see Sorenson v. Farmers Ins. Co. 

of Ariz., 191 Ariz. 464, 465, 957 P.2d 1007, 1008 (App. 1997) (“A denial of a 

motion for summary judgment is an intermediate order deciding simply 

that the case should go to trial.”). In a case that has gone to trial, a party 

that wishes to preserve the summary judgment issue, “with a possible

exception for a purely legal issue,” must reassert the issue in an Arizona

Rule of Civil Procedure 50 motion for judgment as a matter of law (JMOL)

or other post-trial motion. John C. Lincoln, 208 Ariz. at 539, ¶ 19, 96 P.3d at 

537. Failure to do so results in a waiver of the party’s right to appeal the 

denial. Id. In this instance, the trial court denied Glenna’s partial 

summary judgment motion without further comment. Nonetheless, 

Glenna did make an unsuccessful Rule 50(a) motion at the conclusion of 

the trial’s evidentiary phase and has preserved the issue for appeal. 

¶15 While Glenna asserts the standard of review of the denial of 

a motion for summary judgment to be abuse of discretion, Sonoran Desert 

Investigators, Inc. v. Miller, 213 Ariz. 274, ¶ 5, 276, ¶ 5, 141 P.3d 754, 756 

(App. 2006), and alternative case authority holds that same denial 

requires us to review the matter de novo, Bernal v. Loeks, 196 Ariz. 363, 364, 

¶ 6, 997 P.2d 1192, 1993 (App. 2000) (grant or denial of summary 

judgment reviewed de novo), we need not address the distinction as we 

find the trial court did not err under either standard. Pursuant to the 

specific language Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment 

is warranted if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving 

party demonstrates it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Ariz. R. 

Civ. P. 56(a); Nat’l Bank of Ariz. v. Thruston, 218 Ariz. 112, 115, ¶ 14, 180 

P.3d 977, 980 (App. 2008). The trial court should grant summary 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

8

judgment if “the facts produced in support of the claim or defense have so 

little probative value, given the quantum of evidence required, that 

reasonable people could not agree with the conclusion advanced by the 

proponent of the claim or defense.” Orme Sch. v. Reeves, 166 Ariz. 301, 

309, 802 P.2d 1000, 1008 (1990). 

¶16 Although Glenna moved for summary judgment on both the 

conversion and unjust enrichment claims, on appeal she only contends the 

trial court erred by denying her summary judgment motion on her 

conversion claim. The tort of conversion is defined as “an act of wrongful 

dominion or control over personal property in denial of or inconsistent 

with the rights of another.” Case Corp v. Gehrke, 208 Ariz. 140, 143, ¶ 11, 91 

P.3d 362, 365 (App. 2004) (quoting Sears Consumer Fin. Corp. v. Thunderbird 

Prods., 166 Ariz. 333, 335, 802 P.2d 1032, 1034 (App. 1990)); Autoville, Inc. v. 

Friedman, 20 Ariz. App. 89, 91, 501 P.2d 400, 402 (1973) (noting the 

gravamen of conversion is the wrongful interference with another’s 

ownership or right of possession). To bring a conversion claim, a plaintiff 

must have had “the right to immediate possession” of the personal 

property “at the time of the alleged conversion.” Universal Mktg. & Entm’t

Inc. v. Bank One of Ariz., N.A., 203 Ariz. 266, 268, ¶ 6, 53 P.3d 191, 193 (App. 

2002). 

¶17 A review of the parties’ motions reveals the existence of 

genuine issues of material fact, and that the trial court did not err by 

denying Glenna’s motion for partial summary judgment. Glenna alleged 

the Covino Trust owned the items in dispute at the time Jeffrey and 

Deborah removed them from the property as a result of Charles’s 

assignment of personal property to the trust in 2007. Alternatively,

Glenna argued the disputed personal property “poured over” into the 

Covino Trust at Charles’s death by virtue of the specific provisions of his 

will. 

¶18 In response, the Defendants provided signed declarations 

from Jeffrey, Deborah, and Deborah’s husband, Terry, alleging that the 

guns, safes, and the safe’s contents, including the coins, were given to 

them well before the Covino Trust was created, and prior even to 

Charles’s marriage to Glenna, and were, therefore, not a part of Charles’s 

estate. The Defendants also argued the language of the Covino Trust 

documents and Charles’s will bolstered their position, as none of those

documents specifically listed, within their inventories, the guns, safes or 

coins; that is to say, Charles did not purport to include those items within 

the res of the trust as their disposition had already been addressed

through gifting them to his children. Moreover, the Defendants attached 
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Decision of the Court

9

an estate valuation form completed by both Glenna and Charles in 

December 2008, nearly two years following the formation of the Covino 

Trust, which listed the value of all household items at $100,000; a sum 

clearly inconsistent with the value Glenna attached to what she asserted to 

be the converted property.

¶19 Viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences 

in the light most favorable to Defendants as the non-moving party, a 

genuine issue of material fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary 

judgment existed as to whether Charles had made a valid inter vivos gift of 

the items to Jeffrey and Deborah. This, in turn, created a question of fact 

as to who the owner(s) of the items at issue was/were at the time 

Defendants removed them. Ownership, of course, is central to the issue of 

conversion. See Case Corp., 208 Ariz. at 143, ¶ 11, 91 P.3d at 365. When 

questions of material fact exist, summary judgment is inappropriate. 

Orme Sch., 166 Ariz. at 306, 802 P.2d at 1005. Accordingly, the trial court 

did not abuse its discretion in denying Glenna’s motion for partial 

summary judgment on her conversion claim. 

II. Motion for Judgment as a Matter of Law

¶20 Following the jury’s verdict, Glenna filed a motion for 

JMOL, pursuant to Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 50(b). The trial court 

denied that motion, and Glenna now argues it erred in doing so. 

¶21 We review the denial of a motion for a JMOL de novo. 

Goodman v. Physical Res. Eng’g, Inc., 229 Ariz. 25, 27, ¶ 6, 270 P.3d 852, 854 

(App. 2011). We will uphold the court’s denial unless “the facts produced 

in support of the claim or defense have so little probative value, given the 

quantum of evidence required, that reasonable people could not agree 

with the conclusion advanced by the proponent of the claim or defense.”

Id. at 28, ¶ 6, 270 P.3d at 855 (quoting A Tumbling-T Ranches v. Flood Control 

Dist. of Maricopa Cnty., 222 Ariz. 515, 524, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d 1220, 1229 (App. 

2009)). In our review, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to 

upholding the jury’s verdict, and will affirm “if any substantial evidence 

exists permitting reasonable persons to reach such a result.” A Tumbling-T 

Ranches, 222 Ariz. at 524, ¶ 14, 217 P.3d at 1229. 

¶22 Glenna moved for JMOL only upon the issue of the damages 

award, arguing the jury’s verdict in her favor on the conversion claim 

demonstrated, as addressed above, that the jury rejected Defendants’ gift 

theory as to all of the items, and, therefore, the jury was required to return 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

10

a damages award consistent with the allegedly stipulated values of all of 

the items. We disagree. 

A. Evidence of Gift

¶23 First, we note Defendants’ gift defense does not fail as a 

matter of law as there was sufficient evidence provided at trial to allow a 

reasonable jury to find gifts had been made to Defendants. A valid inter 

vivos gift requires donative intent, delivery, and vesting of irrevocable title 

in donee. Armer v. Armer, 105 Ariz. 284, 289, 463 P.2d 818, 823 (1970). The

purported donee must prove the gift with clear and convincing evidence. 

O’Hair v. O’Hair, 109 Ariz. 236, 240, 508 P.2d 66, 70 (1973). However, a 

lesser burden of proof is required for a gift between a parent and child. 

Armer, 105 Ariz. at 289, 463 P.2d at 823; Stewart v. Damron, 63 Ariz. 158, 

167, 160 P.2d 321, 325 (1945). The jury was properly instructed on each of 

these points. 

¶24 Here, Jeffrey, Deborah, and Terry all testified that Charles 

specifically told them the safes and the contents of the safes, which 

included the Krugerrands and various guns, were his children’s. Deborah 

and Terry testified that Charles re-affirmed the items belonged to his 

children on several occasions in Glenna’s presence. Although Glenna 

testified Charles never told her he had given the gold coins to anybody, 

such a conflict in evidence is to be resolved by the jury. Lashonda M. v. 

Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 210 Ariz. 77, 82, ¶ 16, 107 P.3d 923, 928 (App. 

2005). 

¶25 Contrary to Glenna’s contention, evidence was also 

presented to support the inference that the safes and their contents were 

delivered to the Defendants. What constitutes a sufficient delivery for 

purposes of a valid gift “will depend very largely upon the nature of the 

subject-matter of the gift, and the situation and circumstances of the 

parties.” Ariz. Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Wagner, 75 Ariz. 82, 88, 251 

P.2d 897, 901 (1952). Delivery may be made through actual delivery of 

the subject matter of the gift, or through constructive delivery. Id. at 89, 

251 P.2d at 902. “The traditional understanding is that a delivery is 

constructive if the donor gives the donee the means of obtaining 

possession or control of the subject of the gift, for example by giving the 

donee the key to the place where the property is located.” Restatement 

(Third) of Property (Wills & Don. Trans.) § 6.2 cmt. g (2003).

¶26 Deborah testified Charles had given Jeffrey and her the safe 

combinations and told her they were the only persons with that 
COVINO v. FORREST et al.

Decision of the Court

11

knowledge. In conformity with this statement, she also testified Charles 

had not given the combinations to Glenna. Glenna testified that she did 

not know the combinations off-hand, and in an earlier interrogatory stated 

she had known them at one point, but could no longer remember them. 

With this testimony, the jury could have reasonably determined the safes, 

and the items contained within, were delivered to the Defendants through 

Charles’s delivery of the combinations. As to the third element required

for a valid gift, no evidence was provided that would contradict the 

assertion Charles had vested irrevocable title of the items in his children

or that he acted inconsistent with having provided the items as a gift to his 

children. With that, we turn to Glenna’s argument that the jury finding in 

her favor necessarily meant it found the Defendants converted every item 

taken from the property.

B. “All or Nothing” Defense

¶27 Glenna argues the jury’s general verdict in her favor 

precluded the possibility the jury could have found some of the items 

were gifted to Defendants while others were not. Given this, she argues 

she was entitled to a damages award equal to the sum of the values

(which she contends were stipulated) of all of the items. Essentially, she 

argues that because the jury found the Defendants liable for conversion

generally, the jury must have necessarily found the Defendants converted 

each and every item they took from the Arizona house.

¶28 First, the record does not support Glenna’s contention the 

exact values of the items had been stipulated to by the parties. The 

general rule is parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved from 

them by the court. Harsh Bldg. Co. v. Bialac, 22 Ariz. App. 591, 593, 529 

P.2d 1185, 1187 (1975). “A stipulation is an agreement, admission or 

concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties thereto or their 

attorneys, in respect to some matter incident thereto, for the purpose, 

ordinarily, of avoiding delay, trouble and expense.” Id. (quoting Bekins 

Van & Storage Co. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ariz., 4 Ariz. App. 569, 570, 422 P.2d 

400, 401 (1967)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

¶29 The joint pre-trial statement, within a section entitled 

“Stipulations of material fact and law,” contained a table listing “[t]he 

descriptions and estimated values of the personal property items that are

an issue in this litigation.” As Defendants note, the values contained 

within the pre-trial statement were merely estimates. Although the jury 

was instructed to consider any stipulated facts as proven, the record on 
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Decision of the Court

12

appeal is devoid of any indication the jury was actually provided the 

allegedly stipulated values from the pre-trial statement.5 

¶30 Regardless, the Defendants did not dispute Glenna’s stated 

values, or the previously referenced exhibit, which placed the collective 

value of the contested items in excess of $430,000. From this, based upon 

her argument that the jury’s general verdict necessarily meant the jury 

rejected the Defendants’ gift theory as to each item, Glenna argues she is

entitled to a damages award consistent with the aggregate value of the 

items taken. 

¶31 In support of her argument, Glenna cites Kaman Aerospace v. 

Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 217 Ariz. 148, 156, ¶ 32, 171 P.3d 599, 607 (App. 2007), 

which states “[a] general verdict implies a finding by the jury on every 

essential fact in favor of the prevailing party.” Id. (quoting Lohmeier v. 

Hammer, 214 Ariz. 57, ¶ 14, 148 P.3d 101, 106 (App. 2006)). Without 

further developing this argument, Glenna contends this proposition 

means the jury found that Jeffrey and Deborah converted every single item 

they removed from the property. We disagree.

¶32 Generally, in the absence of special interrogatories, we will 

uphold a jury’s verdict if supported by any theory presented at trial. See 

State ex rel. Corbin v. United Energy Corp. of Am., 151 Ariz. 45, 52, 725 P.2d 

752, 759 (App. 1986); Reese v. Cradit, 12 Ariz. App. 233, 238, 469 P.2d 467, 

472 (1970). General verdicts have been reversed when the jury was 

presented with multiple theories — some invalid and some valid — upon

which it could base its award and the reviewing court was unable to 

discern whether the jury’s general verdict was rendered upon a properly 

or improperly submitted theory. See Bruce Church, Inc. v. United Farm 

Workers of Am., AFL-CIO, 169 Ariz. 22, 34, 816 P.2d 919, 931 (App. 1991); S. 

Cas. Co. v. Hughes, 33 Ariz. 206, 218-19, 263 P. 584, 588-589 (1928). 

 5 Rather, the record illustrates that no stipulation was made. Glenna 

testified at trial as to her belief of the items’ values. She also submitted 

into evidence, without objection, another table listing the contested items 

that contained values differing from the values stated in the pre-trial 

statement. Also, her counsel, during closing arguments, told the jury, 

“You’ll have to decide . . . what is the value of the things that [the 

Defendants] took, that they converted . . . . You will have to make the 

determination yourself as to what the value is. And in that regard, you 

can take into account [Glenna’s] opinion.” Moreover, the trial court stated 

that the “damages were in fact disputed.” 
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13

Likewise, general verdicts have been disturbed when they were 

potentially based upon impermissible, speculative evidence. See Lewin v. 

Miller Wagner & Co., 151 Ariz. 29, 34-35, 725 P.2d 736, 741-42 (App. 1986). 

Neither of these situations exist in the case at bar. 

¶33 Here, although twenty four items were removed from the 

Arizona house, Glenna submitted only the all-encompassing, general 

verdict form addressing conversion to the jury. See infra ¶ 9 n.3. During 

trial, Defendants presented a single theory in their defense of the 

conversion claim: some of the items they had taken were already theirs by 

virtue of having been gifted to them by their father. Both the conversion 

theory and gift defense were valid grounds upon which the jury could 

find liability, in toto or in part. At the close of trial, the jury was properly 

instructed as to its role as the fact-finder, the tort of conversion, and the 

applicable law regarding inter vivos gifts. Further, no objections were 

interposed by either party regarding the verdict form or the jury 

instructions. 

¶34 Glenna argues the Defendants presented their gift defense as 

an “all or nothing” proposition, and at times the Defendants asserted as 

much. However, a majority of the Defendants’ testimony related only to 

the guns, safes, and coins being the subject of the gifting, with no explicit 

mention of the other items taken. As is a part of the standard instructions, 

the jury was instructed it could “accept everything a witness says, or part 

of it, or none of it.” It was well within the purview of the jury to 

determine Charles gifted the guns, safes, and coins to his children, but

find the remainder of the items — such as swords, battle axes, binoculars

and cannons — were not, and award damages accordingly. The 

ownership of all of the items was contested throughout the trial, and it fell 

to the jury to resolve the conflict, which it did. To find otherwise would 

be to detract from the jury’s function. See Standard Chartered PLC v. Price 

Waterhouse, 190 Ariz. 6, 39, 945 P.2d 317, 350 (App. 1996) (recognizing a 

reviewing court’s obligation to search for a reasonable way to view the 

jury’s verdict “as expressing a coherent view of the case”). 

¶35 In arguing the Defendants are unable to claim the jury could 

have found they converted some, but not all, of the items, Glenna relies 

upon Kansas City Power & Light Co. v. Bigg & Assocs., Inc., 197 S.W.3d 147

(Mo. App. 2006). Her reliance, however, is misplaced and somewhat in 

derogation of her own argument. 

¶36 In Kansas City Power, Kansas City Power & Light (KCPL) 

sued numerous defendants, including Rockwell, after a natural gas 
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Decision of the Court

14

explosion destroyed a boiler at its power plant. Id. at 150. Specifically as

to Rockwell, KCPL alleged defects in design and manufacturing of the 

programmable logic controller utilized in conjunction with the burner 

management system that failed to adequately prevent the explosion; 

KCPL also alleged design defects in the Troubleshooting Guide that 

Rockwell published for use with the programmable logic controller. Id. 

In response, Rockwell denied liability and asserted thirty affirmative 

defenses, including that KCPL’s damages were restricted by a “limitation 

of liability” provision contained within the documents given to KCPL 

when it purchased the programmable logic controller. Id.

¶37 The case was submitted to the jury with multiple verdict 

directing instructions concerning the Troubleshooting Guide and the 

programmable logic controller. Id. at 151. Along with the instructions, a 

general verdict form was provided to the jury, which directed it to 

apportion the percentage of fault between KCPL and Rockwell, and 

provide a total amount of damages. Id. at 152. Rockwell offered two 

alternative verdict forms which the trial court rejected. Id. Rockwell did 

not otherwise object to the general verdict form, or ask for an alternative 

verdict form requesting the jury be specific as to which claim or claims it 

assessed fault against Rockwell. Id. The jury rendered a verdict in favor 

of KCPL, apportioning it 70% fault, and to Rockwell 30%, and awarded 

damages of $452,000,000. Id. Rockwell objected to the entry of judgment 

prior to resolution of its affirmative defense that KCPL’s damages were 

contractually limited, as it had to be determined as a matter of law by the 

trial court; this affirmative defense only applying to KCPL’s design and 

manufacturing defect claims regarding the programmable logic controller, 

and not to the claims based upon the Troubleshooting Guide. Id. at 152, 

154. The trial court, thereafter, accepted Rockwell’s affirmative defense 

and limited KCPL’s damages award to $190,867. Id. at 152.

¶38 On appeal, KCPL argued the trial court, in reaching its 

decision to apply the affirmative defense, must have determined the jury’s 

award was premised upon the programmable logic controller claims and 

excluded the Troubleshooting Guide claims altogether, and that this 

presumption was unfounded by the general verdict. Id. at 154. The 

Missouri Court of Appeals agreed, concluding:

Application of the contractual provision to limit Rockwell’s 

liability was Rockwell’s affirmative defense. Rockwell bore 

the burden of prosecuting the defense. Specifically, 

Rockwell bore the burden of ensuring that the basis of the 

jury’s verdict was known so that the contractual provision 
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could be applied to the appropriate claims. Yet, Rockwell 

failed to object to the general verdict form either before it 

was submitted to the jury or after it was returned by the 

jury. “[A]n objection to a verdict form must be raised either 

at the instruction conference or when the verdict is returned 

by the jury before it is accepted by the court.” Rockwell 

neither objected to the general verdict form nor did it offer 

its own form to allow application of its affirmative defense. 

Furthermore, it did not request clarification of the verdict for 

purposes of applying its affirmative defense before the trial 

court received the verdict and the jury was discharged. 

Rockwell’s failure to take any action to determine the basis 

of its liability under the general verdict resulted in 

abandonment of its affirmative defense.

Id. at 157 (internal citation omitted). 

¶39 Unlike Kansas City Power, here there was only one theory of 

liability submitted to the jury; i.e. conversion, so there does not exist the 

issue that the affirmative defense of gifting applied to one theory upon 

which the jury could have decided but not another theory simultaneously 

before the jury. Also unlike Kansas City Power, the Defendents’ affirmative

defense of ownership through gifting was dispositive as to whether they 

had engaged in conversion, rather than merely being secondarily

applicable as a limitation upon their damages once liability was 

established. 

¶40 Moreover, in this case, the Defendants’ affirmative defense 

had already been decided and applied within the verdict. In Kansas City 

Power, Rockwell’s affirmative defense was to be ruled upon and applied 

by the trial court following the jury’s verdict. Rockwell’s affirmative 

defense, however, necessarily depended upon the jury basing its decision 

upon a specific theory, and if Rockwell wished to preserve its defense, it 

was incumbent upon Rockwell to ensure the trial court knew the specific 

theory upon which the jury rendered its verdict so as to be able to 

determine if the affirmative defense could be applied. Here, both the 

conversion claim and the affirmative defense were presented to, and 

resolved by, the jury. The Defendants did not have a post-verdict duty to 

ensure the jury clarified its verdict.

¶41 As sufficient evidence was provided to the jury in support of 

Defendants’ gift defense and the personal property values, a fortiori, the 

record must also be found to contain substantial support for the jury’s 
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ultimate damages award in favor of Glenna. Thus, the trial court did not 

err by denying Glenna’s motion for judgment as a matter of law. Dawson 

v. Withycombe, 216 Ariz. 84, 98-99, ¶¶ 35-36, 163 P.3d 1034, 1048-49 (App. 

2007). 

III. Motions for New Trial, Additur, and Arithmetic Correction of the 

Verdict

¶42 Along with her motion for JMOL, Glenna alternatively 

moved for: A) a new trial solely on damages under Arizona Rule of Civil 

Procedure 59(a)(8), B) additur, and C) arithmetic correction under Arizona 

Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). The trial court denied each motion, and 

Glenna alleges it erred in doing so. We disagree. 

A. Denial of New Trial 

¶43 Rule 59(a)(8) allows a trial court to vacate a “verdict, 

decision or judgment,” when it “is not justified by the evidence or is 

contrary to law.” Glenna’s argument for a new trial tracks her JMOL: the 

general verdict established Defendants’ full liability for all of the items 

taken, and a new trial on the issue of damages is warranted as the jury’s 

damages award was against the weight of the evidence provided at trial. 

¶44 We review the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse 

of discretion. Sandretto v. Payson Healthcare Mgmt., Inc., 682 Ariz. Adv. 

Rep. 10, ¶ 8, 322 P.3d 168, 172 (App. 2014). When considering a motion 

for new trial, the trial court must ask “whether the jury verdict is so 

‘manifestly unfair, unreasonable and outrageous as to shock the 

conscience.’” Hutcherson v. City of Phx., 192 Ariz. 51, 55, ¶ 23, 961 P.2d 449, 

453 (1998) (quoting Young Candy & Tobacco Co. v. Montoya, 91 Ariz. 363, 

370, 372 P.2d 703, 707 (1962)). When ruling on such a motion, the trial 

court must pass upon the weight of the evidence and determine if 

“substantial justice has not been done between the parties.” Walsh v. Adv. 

Cardiac Specs. Chartered, 229 Ariz. 193, 197, ¶ 15, 273 P.3d 645, 649 (2012) 

(citation omitted). If no evidence exists in the record to justify the verdict, 

it must be set aside. Styles v. Ceranski, 185 Ariz. 448, 450, 916 P.2d 1164, 

1166 (App. 1996).

¶45 In denying Glenna’s Rule 59(a) motion, the trial court found 

simply, “that the verdict [was] justified by the evidence and [was] not 

contrary to law.” At trial, Glenna produced evidence of the items taken 

and their values, and Defendants admitted taking the items but produced 

evidence supporting their theory some of the items had been gifted. As 

previously stated, the jury may well have found certain items taken 
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belonged to the Covino Trust, and other items taken were owned by the 

Defendants as the result of gifting. As substantial evidence existed to 

support the verdict, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it 

denied Glenna’s motion for new trial. Hutcherson, 192 Ariz. at 53, ¶¶ 12-

13, 961 P.2d at 451. 

B. Denial of Additur

¶46 Glenna also contends the trial court should have granted her 

motion for additur. “An ‘additur’ is an order by the trial court increasing 

a damage award as a condition to denying a motion for new trial” on the 

grounds of inadequate damages. Warne Inv., Ltd. v. Higgins, 219 Ariz. 186, 

189 n.1, ¶ 5, 195 P.3d 645, 648 n.1 (App. 2008) (citing Black’s Law 

Dictionary 41 (8th ed. 2004)); see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 59(i). “The question of 

additur is left to the greatest possible discretion of the trial court, and its 

decision will not be disturbed on appeal except for a case of clear abuse.”

Bustamante v. City of Tucson, 145 Ariz. 365, 366, 701 P.2d 861, 862 (App. 

1985).

¶47 As with her previous motions, Glenna contends additur is 

appropriate because the jury established the Defendants’ full liability, the 

damages amount was undisputed, and the verdict rendered a damages 

amount inconsistent with the undisputed amount. However, the trial 

court specifically noted “[d]amages were in fact disputed, and the jury 

resolved the dispute.” It then determined damages were not insufficient 

or inadequate as to warrant additur. Given the evidence contained in the 

record and reflected above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

when it denied Glenna’s additur motion.

C. Rule 60(b)

¶48 Glenna, citing Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2), also 

moved for the trial court to arithmetically correct the verdict. Rule 

60(b)(2) states: “Where there is a mistake, miscalculation or misrecital of a 

sum of money [in a judgment] . . . and there is among the records of the 

action a verdict or instrument of writing whereby such judgment may be 

safely corrected, the court shall on application and after notice, correct the 

judgment accordingly.” 

¶49 Glenna contends the pre-trial statement containing 

“stipulated values” constitutes such an “instrument of writing” so as to 

safely correct the judgment amount of $15,000. As with her other postverdict motions, Glenna’s argument is flawed as it rests upon the incorrect 

assumption the jury found Defendants converted each item complained of 
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in this case; it also rests upon the unsupported conclusion the values were,

in fact, stipulated. See infra ¶¶ 28-29 & n.5. 

¶50 Moreover, the cases Glenna relies upon for a court’s ability 

to correct an award of damages, Banner Realty, Inc. v. Turek, 113 Ariz. 62, 

546 P.2d 798 (1976) and Ward v. Johnson, 72 Ariz. 213, 232 P.2d 960 (1951), 

are inapplicable to the facts of this case. For instance, the recovery of 

damages in Banner Realty was specifically set by contract. 72 Ariz. at 64, 

546 P.2d at 800. Likewise, Ward noted a court may compute the proper 

amount of damages if the damages are fixed or undisputed, and found, in 

that case, that a claim for $10,000 for a willful tort, alone, was insufficient 

to justify the court’s correction of a jury award for less than the claimed

amount. Here, the record demonstrates, as the trial court found, that 

damages were disputed. Therefore, the trial court did not commit error 

when it declined Glenna’s invitation to arithmetically correct the jury’s 

verdict. 

IV. Unjust Enrichment 

¶51 Glenna finally contends the trial court erred when it found 

against her on her unjust enrichment claim. Unjust enrichment is an 

equitable remedy, and we review its availability de novo. Loiselle v. Cosas 

Mgmt. Group, LLC, 224 Ariz. 207, 210, ¶ 8, 228 P.3d 943, 946 (App. 2010); 

Murdock-Bryant Const., Inc. v. Pearson, 14 Ariz. 48, 53, 703 P.2d 1197, 1202 

(1985) (citation omitted). 

¶52 A claim for unjust enrichment arises “when one party has 

and retains money or benefits that in justice and equity belong to

another.” Loiselle, 224 Ariz. at 210, ¶ 9, 228 P.3d at 946. To prevail on an 

unjust enrichment claim, a plaintiff must prove: “(1) an enrichment, (2) an 

impoverishment, (3) a connection between the enrichment and 

impoverishment, (4) the absence of justification for the enrichment and 

impoverishment, and (5) the absence of a remedy provided by law.” 

Wang Elec., Inc. v. Smoke Tree Resort, LLC, 230 Ariz. 314, 318, ¶ 10, 283 P.3d 

45, 49 (App. 2012). As noted, to succeed on an unjust enrichment claim, “a 

party must show ‘the absence of any remedy at law.” Loiselle, 224 Ariz. at 

211, ¶ 14, 228 P.3d 943, 947 (quoting Mousa v. Saba, 222 Ariz. 581, 588, ¶ 

29, 218 P.3d 1038, 1045 (App. 2009)). The trial court found against Glenna 

because it determined, as a matter of law, “an adequate remedy exist[ed] 

at law” — her successful conversion claim — for the relief Glenna sought 

under her unjust enrichment claim. We agree with the trial court that 

Glenna’s conversion claim constituted an adequate remedy at law. 
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¶53 In Arizona, the measure of damages for conversion includes 

the value of the property taken, as well as “other damage suffered because 

of the wrongful detention or deprivation of the property, such as damages 

for loss of use.” Collins v. First Fin. Servs., Inc., 168 Ariz. 484, 486, 815 P.2d 

411, 413 (App. 1991); see Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965) 

cmt. c (“In conversion the measure of damages is the full value of the 

chattel, at the time and place of the tort. When the defendant satisfies the 

judgment in the action or conversion, title to the chattel passes to him, so 

that he is in effect required to buy it at a forced judicial sale.”). Therefore, 

Glenna was able to pursue damages to satisfy the full value of the items 

taken from her, making her whole, and requiring the Defendants to pay 

the full value of only the items the jury found the Defendants to have 

wrongfully taken.

¶54 However, having already been made whole through the 

jury’s verdict, Glenna continued to seek a constructive trust over the items 

taken. A constructive trust is an equitable remedy imposed to compel one 

who unfairly holds a property interest to convey it to the person to whom 

it justly belongs. Harmon v. Harmon, 126 Ariz. 242, 244, 613 P.2d 1298, 1300 

(App. 1980). Essentially, through her conversion and unjust enrichment 

claims, Glenna sought a double recovery, whereby she would receive 

payment for the full value of what she believed to be the converted items,

along with the return of those converted items. Such a result does not 

obtain in equity as plaintiff is not entitled to the value of the items 

converted along with the return of those same items. Cf. Hall v. Schulte, 

172 Ariz. 279, 284, 836 P.2d 989, 994 (App. 1992) (“A plaintiff is entitled to

be made whole in damages, and that is all.”); Zeckendorf v. Steinfeld, 15 

Ariz. 335, 340, 138 P. 1044, 1046 (1914) (“As we understand it, the general 

rule, both at law and in equity, is that the owner is entitled to the return of 

his property or its value at the time of its wrongful conversion.”) (emphasis 

added).

¶55 Glenna argues, relying upon Hill v. Hill, 345 P.2d 1015, 1025 

(Kan. 1959), which was cited within Loiselle, that “[t]he existence of a 

remedy at law does not deprive equity of jurisdiction unless such remedy 

is clear, adequate and complete.” Hill, 345 P.2d at 1025; Loiselle, 224 Ariz. 

at 211, ¶ 14, 228 P.3d at 947. Glenna does not, however, demonstrate the 

manner by which her conversion remedy was insufficiently “clear, 

adequate and complete.” Rather, she merely relies upon her belief of 

being entitled to the full value of all of the items she claimed were 

converted, and as she was awarded a lesser amount, the remedy was 

incomplete or inadequate. Obvious to the point of a truism is the trial 

court’s assessment of this argument: “That [Glenna] was unsuccessful in 
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receiving the full amount of the damages she sought [on her conversion 

claim] does not mean that she did not have an adequate remedy at law.” 

¶56 As an adequate remedy at law existed, we find no error in 

the trial court’s finding against Glenna on her unjust enrichment claim. 

CONCLUSION

¶57 We affirm the trial court’s denial of Glenna’s motions for 

partial summary judgment, judgment as a matter of law, new trial, 

additur, and arithmetic correction of the verdict; we also affirm the trial 

court’s ruling on Glenna’s unjust enrichment/constructive trust claim.