alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 23, 2003

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 02-50946

Conference Calendar

 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

LORENZO HERNANDEZ-ALVAREZ,

also known as Juan Torres-Sanchez,

Defendant-Appellant.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. EP-02-CR-1060-ALL-EP

--------------------

Before DAVIS, BARKSDALE, and STEWART, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM:*

Lorenzo Hernandez-Alvarez appeals the sentence imposed

following his guilty plea conviction of being found in the United

States after deportation/removal in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. 

He contends that the sentence is invalid because it exceeds the

two-year maximum term of imprisonment prescribed in 8 U.S.C.

§ 1326(a). Hernandez-Alvarez complains that his sentence was

improperly enhanced pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b). He argues

that the sentencing provision is unconstitutional. 
No. 02-50946

-2-

Alternatively, Hernandez-Alvarez contends that 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

and 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) define separate offenses. He argues that

the prior conviction that resulted in his increased sentence was

an element of a separate offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) that

should have been alleged in his indictment.

In Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 235

(1998), the Supreme Court held that the enhanced penalties in

8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) are sentencing provisions, not elements of

separate offenses. The Court further held that the sentencing

provisions do not violate the Due Process Clause. Id. at 239-47. 

Hernandez-Alvarez acknowledges that his arguments are foreclosed

by Almendarez-Torres, but asserts that the decision has been cast

into doubt by Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000). 

He seeks to preserve his arguments for further review. 

Apprendi did not overrule Almendarez-Torres. See Apprendi,

530 U.S. at 489-90; United States v. Dabeit, 231 F.3d 979, 984

(5th Cir. 2000). This court must follow Almendarez-Torres

“unless and until the Supreme Court itself determines to overrule

it.” Dabeit, 231 F.3d at 984 (internal quotation marks and

citation omitted). The judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

The Government has moved for a summary affirmance in lieu of

filing an appellee’s brief. In its motion, the Government asks

that an appellee’s brief not be required. The motion is GRANTED. 

AFFIRMED; MOTION GRANTED.
**Exhibit 31.2**

 

**CERTIFICATION—Chief Financial Officer**

 

I, Charles F. Boyle, certify that: 

 

1.    I have reviewed this annual report on Form 10-K of Universal Health Realty Income Trust; 

 

2.    Based on my knowledge, this annual report does not contain anyuntrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this annual report;

 

3.    Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, andother financial information included in this annual report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods presented in this annual report;

 

4.    The registrant’s other certifying officers andI are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have: 

 

a)    designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designedunder our supervision to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this annual report is beingprepared; 

 

b)    evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this annual report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report, based on such evaluation;and 

 

c)    disclosed in this report any change in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or isreasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 

 

5.    The registrant’s other certifying officers and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors andthe audit committee of registrant’s board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent function): 

 

a)    all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect theregistrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and 

 

b)    any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

 

Date: March 12, 2004
D.W. v. D.A.W.

2160058

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

February 24, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
#### Tucker *v.*Leonard.

5-1445

311 S. W. 2d 167

Opinion delivered February 3, 1958.

*Vol T. Lindsey,*for appellant.

*Chester P. Leonard*and *Little*and *Enfield,*for ap-pellee.

Sam RobiNsoN, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal *from*an order of the chancery court sustaining a demurrer to the complaint. Appellants alleged in the complaint filed in chancery court that a fraud had been practiced upon the probate court in obtaining an order to *642sell certain property. We do not reach the question of whether the allegation of fraud is well pleaded.

Courts of equity have jurisdiction to grant relief from judgments and orders fraudulently obtained in probate courts. *Levinson*v. *Treadway,*190 Ark. 201, 78 S. W. 2d 59; *Manning*v. *Manning,*206 Ark. 425, 175 S. W. 2d 982. But there must be no remedy at law. The court said, in *Corney*v. *Corney,*108 Ark. 415, 159 S. W. 20, “In the absence of a statute giving a complete remedy at law, a court of equity is the appropriate forum for granting-relief against fraud in the procurement of judgments.” And in *West*v. *Waddill,*33 Ark. 575, “But when fraud is shown, or such a state of facts or circumstances presented as shows an irreparable injury impending, *against which a prohate court is powerless to grcmt relief,*the courts of equity may interpose.” (Emphasis supplied) The Complaint does not allege there is no remedy at law.

Ark. Stat. § 62-1508, provides that an administrator’s account when confirmed shall never thereafter be subject to investigation except on an allegation of fraud in the chancery court. Se *Beckett*v. *Whittington,*92 Ark. 230, 122 S. W. 633. But the complaint in the case at bar does not allege a final account has been made or confirmed.

Ark. Stat. § 29-506, provides: “The court in which a judgment or final order has been rendered or made, shall have power, after the expiration of the term, to vacate or modify such judgment or order, * * * (Fourth) For fraud practiced by the successful party in the obtaining of the judgment or order.” This provision of the statute applies to probate courts as well as other courts. *Bright*v. *Johnson,*202 Ark. 751, 152 S. W. 2d 540. Hence, it appears that appellants have a eóürplete remedy at law to correct the alleged fraud.

Appellants further contend that upon a finding that jurisdiction was not vested in the chancery court, the chancellor should have transferred the matter to the probate court, but the record does not show that the chancellor was requested to take such action.

Affirmed.
Dominick Lewis EVERSON v. STATE

CR-15-1224

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

January 6, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1997
<CASH>                                          23,801
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,585
<ALLOWANCES>                                     (100)
<INVENTORY>                                      9,283
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                37,405
<PP&E>                                          25,447
<DEPRECIATION>                                (13,426)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  50,993
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            8,072
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                        214
<COMMON>                                         1,684
<OTHER-SE>                                      41,023
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    50,993
<SALES>                                          7,806
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                 7,806
<CGS>                                            6,333
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                    6,333
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (3,993)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (3,993)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.30)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
Deaireon Landondre WHETSTONE v. STATE

CR-15-1147

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

March 17, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
III 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 735 

Designating September 29, 2020, as ‘‘National Urban Wildlife Refuge Day’’. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

SEPTEMBER 30 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 29), 2020 

Mr. GARDNER (for himself, Mr. BENNET, and Mr. UDALL) submitted the 

following resolution; which was considered and agreed to 

RESOLUTION 

Designating September 29, 2020, as ‘‘National Urban 

Wildlife Refuge Day’’. 

Whereas over 80 percent of people in the United States live 

in or near cities, which typically have limited opportunities for residents to access nature and experience outdoor 

recreation; 

Whereas the National Wildlife Refuge System under the 

United States Fish and Wildlife Service manages 568 national wildlife refuges that constitute a national network 

of land and water managed for the conservation of fish, 

wildlife, and plants in the United States; 

Whereas national wildlife refuges provide opportunities for 

people to discover and appreciate nature; 

Whereas there is a refuge located within a 1-hour drive of 

every metropolitan area in the United States; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 735 ATS 

Whereas the Urban Wildlife Conservation Program under the 

United States Fish and Wildlife Service— 

(1) focuses on introducing people living in densely 

populated areas to the more than 100 national wildlife 

refuges near urban areas; and 

(2) promotes wildlife conservation and the enjoyment 

of hunting, fishing, and other wildlife-dependent recreational activities close to where people live; 

Whereas the Urban Wildlife Conservation Program focuses 

on public-private partnerships— 

(1) to improve wildlife conservation; and 

(2) to promote access to recreation on and off national wildlife refuges, including recreational activities 

such as hunting and fishing; and 

Whereas by exploring community-centered approaches to address local needs, engaging the next generation of anglers 

and hunters, and providing infrastructure and safe access, the Urban Wildlife Conservation Program helps 

local organizations, cities, and towns across the United 

States engage in conservation activities: Now, therefore, 

be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) designates September 29, 2020, as ‘‘Na3 tional Urban Wildlife Refuge Day’’; 

4 (2) encourages the United States Fish and 

5 Wildlife Service to increase access to outdoor rec6 reational opportunities for urban communities; and 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•SRES 735 ATS 

1 (3) encourages the people of the United States 

2 to visit and experience the more than 100 urban na3 tional wildlife refuges of the United States. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
EXHIBIT 23.1


INDEPENDENT REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM'S CONSENT


To the Board of Directors New World Brands, Inc.

We have issued our report dated July 27, 2004 accompanying the consolidated
financial statements of New World Brands, Inc. and subsidiaries included in the
Annual Report on Form 10-KSB for the fiscal year ended May 31, 2004, which is
incorporated by reference in the Registration Statement Forms S-8 dated April
23, 2002, May 16, 2002 and July 22, 2003. We consent to the incorporation by
reference in the Registration Statements of the aforementioned report.


                                        /s/ MAHONEY COHEN & COMPANY, CPA, P.C.


New York, New York
March 14, 2005
Exhibit
32.1





Certification
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C Section 1350,


as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended June
30, 2009 (the “Report”), of The Center for Wound Healing, Inc. (the “Company”),
as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof, I,
Andrew G. Barnett, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer and Chief
Accounting Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





1.  The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended: and





2.  The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:  October
13, 2009





/s/ Andrew G. BarnettAndrew
      G. BarnettChief
      Executive Officer,Chief
      Financial Officer andChief Accounting
Officer
MEMORANDUM 

Date: February 12, 2015 

To: Public docket, EPA-R09-OAR-2014-0813 

From: Jeanhee Hong, EPA Region 9, Office of Regional Counsel 

RE: Proposed reclassification of San Joaquin Valley (SJV) to Serious nonattainment for 1997 

PM2.5 standards and requirements of Clean Air Act (CAA) section 188(e). 

On Monday, February 2, 2015, representatives of EPA Region 9’s Air Division and Office of 

Regional Counsel participated in a conference call with staff and managers at the San Joaquin 

Valley Unified Air Pollution Control District (SJVUAPCD or District) to discuss the CAA 

Serious Area planning requirements that the District must address for the 1997 PM2.5 standards. 

During this conference call, David Warner, director of permit services at the SJVUAPCD, noted 

that EPA’s recent proposal to reclassify the SJV area as Serious nonattainment for the 1997 

PM2.5 standards (80 FR 1482, January 12, 2015) had indicated the District would have to submit 

New Source Review (NSR) provisions to implement the major stationary source threshold in 

CAA section 189(b)(3) in order to qualify for an extension of the Serious Area attainment date 

under CAA section 188(e). Mr. Warner asked EPA to explain the Agency’s rationale for treating 

these NSR provisions as required components of a section 188(e) extension request. I responded 

by stating that we could not discuss details given the proposal is pending but that, generally, 

EPA’s position is that the structure of the CAA indicates Congress intended for nonattainment 

areas to first go through the Serious Area planning process and to address the Serious Area 

control requirements before qualifying for an extension of the attainment date under section 

188(e).
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 106 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 106

    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide equitable 
 treatment for residents of Puerto Rico with respect to the refundable 
 portion of the child tax credit and to provide the same treatment to 
    families in Puerto Rico with one child or two children that is 
   currently provided to island families with three or more children.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 4, 2021

Miss Gonzalez-Colon (for herself and Mr. Soto) introduced the following 
      bill; which was referred to the Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
    To amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 to provide equitable 
 treatment for residents of Puerto Rico with respect to the refundable 
 portion of the child tax credit and to provide the same treatment to 
    families in Puerto Rico with one child or two children that is 
   currently provided to island families with three or more children.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Child Tax Credit Equity for Puerto 
Rico Act''.

SEC. 2. EQUITABLE TREATMENT FOR RESIDENTS OF PUERTO RICO WITH RESPECT 
              TO THE REFUNDABLE PORTION OF THE CHILD TAX CREDIT.

    (a) In General.--Section 24(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by inserting ``or section 933'' after ``section 112''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2020.

SEC. 3. SAME TREATMENT OF FAMILIES IN PUERTO RICO WITH ONE CHILD OR TWO 
              CHILDREN THAT IS CURRENTLY PROVIDED TO ISLAND FAMILIES 
              WITH THREE OR MORE CHILDREN.

    (a) In General.--Section 24(d)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 
1986 is amended by adding at the end the following: ``In the case of an 
individual who is a bona fide resident of Puerto Rico during the entire 
taxable year, subparagraph (B)(ii) shall be applied by substituting `1 
or more qualifying children' for `3 or more qualifying children'.''.
    (b) Effective Date.--The amendment made by subsection (a) shall 
apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2020.
                                 <all>
```
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION To be cited only in accordance with F ED

. R. A PP

. P. 32.1 

# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued J anuary 12, 2022

Decided Ju ly 11, 2022

Before

J OEL M. F LAUM , Circuit Judge

F RANK H. E ASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge

D IANE P. W OOD , Circuit Judge

No s

. 21

- 2480 & 21

- 2573

WHOLE WOMAN’S HEALTH ALLIANCE, et al.
, Plaintiffs

- Appellees
,

v

.
TODD ROKITA, Attorney General of Indiana, et al., Defendan ts-Appell ants

. Appea ls from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:18- cv -01904- SEB

- MJD

Sarah Evans Barker, Judge

.

O R D E R

The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization , No. 19– 1392 (U.S. June 24, 2022). This court does not now address the district court’s rulings based on the First Amendment, because they were influenced by pre

- Dobbs decisions holding that abortion is a fundamental right. The District Court should reconsider all claims in this litigation in light of Dobbs and the government

- speech doctrine of Pleasant Grove v. Summum , 555 U.S. 460 (2009), and Walker v. Texas Division, Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc ., 576 U.S. 200 (2015). Any appeals from the decision on remand will return to this panel.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

IN RE: DAVOL, INC./C.R. BARD, 

INC., POLYPROPYLENE HERNIA 

MESH PRODUCTS LIABILITY 

LITIGATION

This document relates to: 

Stinson v. Davol, Inc., et al., 

Case No. 2:18-cv-01022

 Case No. 2:18-md-2846

 JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

 Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

MOTIONS IN LIMINE OPINION & ORDER NO. 58

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and their arguments presented, the Court, in 

accordance with the conclusions made on the record on October 10, 2023, GRANTED Plaintiff’s 

Motions in Limine (“MIL”) Nos. 25 (ECF No. 280) and 30 (ECF No. 285), and DENIED

Plaintiff’s MIL No. 24 (ECF No. 279). The Court, in accordance with the conclusions made on 

the record on October 16, 2023, DENIED Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 315). 

The Court, in accordance with the conclusions made on the record on October 17, 2023, DENIED

Defendants’ MIL No. 10 (ECF No. 338).

As with all in limine decisions, this ruling is subject to modification should the facts or 

circumstances at trial differ from that which has been presented in the motion and memoranda.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

10/19/2023 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Case: 2:18-md-02846-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 790 Filed: 10/19/23 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 8931