IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOHN L. GLAZE,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-720

Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

Magistrate Judge Jolson

COMMISIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff John L. Glaze brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his application 

for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”). For the reasons set forth below, it is 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 9) be OVERRULED and that 

judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his application for SSI on July 21, 2015, alleging that he was disabled 

beginning June 26, 2010. (Doc. 7, Tr. 298–304). After his application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration, the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on August 30, 2017. 

(Tr. 167–212). On February 14, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application

for benefits. (Tr. 149–66). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the 

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 2–8). 

Plaintiff filed the instant case seeking a review of the Commissioner’s decision on July 23, 

2018 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the administrative record on October 16, 2018 (Doc. 

7). Plaintiff filed his Statement of Errors (Doc. 9) on November 30, 2018, Defendant filed an
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Opposition (Doc. 10) on January 30, 2019, and Plaintiff filed his Reply (Doc. 14) on February 23, 

2019. Thus, this matter is now ripe for consideration.

A. Hearing Testimony

The ALJ usefully summarized Plaintiff’s hearing testimony:

The claimant testified that he lives by himself and is in the process of selling his 

condominium, though he has a renter in it at the time of the hearing time. He works 

a seasonal job with friends at the Haunted Hoochie Halloween house, reporting that 

he sits and collects 3D glasses from patrons. He enjoys ghost hunting activities and 

engaged in them with others typically in a small group; however, it has gotten 

expensive. He uses Facebook and connects with friends online. He described 

having some issues with paying attention, noting that during a movie, he may drift

off and miss a few scenes and with respect to reading, he noted that noting holds 

his interest. He reported experiencing nightmare[s] and the next day does not want 

to be around others.

(Tr. 153–54).

B. Relevant Medical History 

Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors concerns his use of an assistive device to walk and 

impairments related to his mental health. The Court summarizes medical evidence pertaining to 

the same. With respect to Plaintiff’s use of an assistive device, the record reflects that:

[i]n February 2015, while roller skating, the claimant sustained an ankle fracture 

which required open reduction internal fixation. It is of note that the claimant had 

the procedure in February and by May was doing very well, with minimal swelling 

good strength and a healed fracture confirmed by imaging. He was to wean from 

his walking boot and was released from the orthopedist’s care. It is of note that 

although the claimant received a cane in March 2015 after his surgery, in May 2015, 

he did not wish to pursue physical therapy and there is no evidence in the record to 

document the need for an ambulatory aid beyond the natural healing time for this 

injury. While he was noted to have a pronated gait, he was noted to use no 

ambulatory aid. Additionally, while the claimant reported some morning ankle 

stiffness to his podiatrist, there is only evidence of some reduced plantar flexion of 

his left ankle in August 2015, as well as some diminished protective sensation to 

the left toes and decreased sensation to the left great toe, which could be a residual 

effect from his injury or his poorly controlled diabetes mellitus. However, the rest 

of his sensation examinations were intact and he was noted to have 5/5 strength in 

the lower extremities and no edema.

(Tr. 156 (internal citations omitted)).
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The ALJ also thoroughly summarized evidence related to Plaintiff’s mental health:

Treatment notes from his providers indicate that the claimant at times is depressed 

or anxious, though he is elsewhere [was noted] to be alert, oriented, attentive and 

in no acute distress. His psychologist typically described the claimant as 

maintaining good eye contact, displaying no psychomotor or speech problems, 

being alert and oriented or presenting without signs of psychosis, thought disorder, 

or acute distress. While he described a low mood and reported anxiety, his mood 

was typically within normal limits, he displayed an appropriate range of affect and 

there was no apparent problems with attention, concentration, or remote or recent 

memory. While the claimant reports intermittent auditory hallucinations to both 

his psychiatrist and psychologist at the Veterans Administration Medical Center 

(VAMC), he is not noted to be responding to internal stimuli and he has 

acknowledged that he knows it is not real and his judgment and insight were 

typically noted as adequate or intact. The claimant’s psychiatrist typically noted 

the claimant to have a variable range of mood and affect; though it was typically 

noted that his speech was clearly articulated and non-pressured, this thought 

process is linear, logical, and organized, and his cognition was grossly intact. The 

claimant reported to his treating sources that he enjoyed his seasonal work, engaged 

with others using online sites such as Meet-up and he was able to attend and 

participate in a group therapy setting. At times, he noted that he was not invited to 

celebrations due to other’s anticipation of how he might act. It is of significant note 

that while the claimant’s main mental impairment was anxiety; yet, there is no 

indication by his treating or emergency room doctors that he has not been socially 

appropriate when seeking treatment or that he has had a panic attack or been 

anxious while in the waiting or emergency room.

(Tr. 154 (internal citations omitted)).

This account was consistent with the treatment records from the VA:

With respect to his mental impairments, the record documents intermittent and 

routine medication management follow-up appointments with his psychiatrist at the 

VAMC, until 2013, when he established with a new psychiatrist, James W. Cannon, 

MD, and new psychologist. The records document the claimant has routinely 

follow up since, as recommended, and had attended group therapy as well in 2014, 

where he was able to engage and participate. He routinely advises that although at 

times he feels like being alone, he is able to engage with others, such as friends and 

others that he meets on the internet. He is able to, an enjoys, his seasonal work and 

it seems that his primary exacerbations are a result of psychosocial stressors, such 

as finances.

(Tr. 157 (internal citations omitted)).
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The record shows that although the claimant received psychiatric treatment thought 

the VAMC, he responded well to treatment and his mental status examinations at 

times show him to be anxious or depressed; yet, he is able to adequately function, 

as discussed above. Moreover, in May 2016, five months after the expiration of 

the claimant’s date last insured, a VA examiner did not find any evidence to support 

an increase. 

(Tr. 158 (internal citations omitted).

The ALJ also summarized the records related to Plaintiff’s global assessment of 

functioning:

It is also notable in this case that the claimant’s psychiatrist and psychologist have 

assessed him to have an Axis V global assessment of functioning (GAF) score of 

55-63. The American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 

of Mental Disorders -Fourth Edition (DSM-IV) at page 32 defined a score 51 to 60 

as representing moderate symptoms or moderate difficulty in social, occupational, 

or school functioning, with a score of 61 to 70 as representing some mild symptoms 

or some difficulty in social, occupational, or school functioning. While a GAF 

score was a subjective, rather than an objective measure, and the diagnosis and 

assessment of a mental impairment under the criteria found in the DSM-IV were 

not entitled to great weight in making disability determinations, such scores suggest 

that even when considering additional items that are not considered in the 

determination of disability, such as primary support issues or economic issues, the 

claimant is not as impaired as alleged. For these reasons, the undersigned cannot 

give much weight to the GAF opinions in the record; however, they have been 

considered with the entire record.

(Tr. 159 (internal citation omitted)). 

C. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found that Plaintiff last met the insured status requirements of the Social Security 

Act on December 31, 2015, (Tr. 151), and had not engaged in substantial gainful employment from

his alleged onset date of June 26, 2015 through his date last insured. (Tr. 152). The ALJ 

determined that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: coronary artery disease, 

status post episode of congestive heart failure and bypass; hypertension; diabetes mellitus; status 

post left ankle fracture; sleep apnea; obesity; depressive disorder and anxiety disorder. (Tr. 152). 

The ALJ, however, found that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in combination, 
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met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (Tr. 153). 

As to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ opined:

[T]he claimant had the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined 

in 20 CFR 404.1567(b) except frequent balancing, stooping, kneeling, crouching 

and crawling, occasional climbing ramps and stairs, but no ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds and no hazards such as dangerous machinery or unprotected heights. He 

is able to perform tasks with no fast production pace or strict production demands, 

occasional interaction with others and only occasional changes in the work setting

(Tr. 154–55). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[S]ubstantial 

evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must also 

be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). To 

this end, the Court must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight”

of the Commissioner’s decision. Rhodes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-1147, 2015 WL 

4881574, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises two errors to the Court. (Doc. 9). First, he argues that the ALJ’s decision 

should be reversed because the ALJ failed to properly determine whether Plaintiff required the use 

of an assistive device. (Id. at 6–8). Second, he argues that the ALJ improperly evaluated the 

mental health evidence of record. (Id. at 8–11). The Court will address each argument in turn. 
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A. Use of an Assistive Device

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did not properly address Plaintiff’s use of an assistive 

device to ambulate. (Doc. 9 at 6). According to him, the ALJ “neglected to explain whether or 

not he believed that [he] required the assistive device based on the evidence of record ... [T]he 

evidence documents that the assistive device is medically necessary.” (Id.). The ALJ’s failure 

was not harmless, according to Plaintiff, because, “[i]f the ALJ found that [he] required the use of 

an assistive device, per the vocational expert’s testimony, all light work would be precluded,” and 

“[i]f [he] was limited to sedentary work, ... he would have been automatically found disabled.” 

(Id. at 7).

“To find that a hand-held assistive device is medically required, there must be medical 

documentation establishing the need for a hand-held assistive device to aid in walking or standing.” 

SSR 96–9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7 (1996). Further, the medical documentation must “describ[e] 

the circumstances for which it is needed (i.e., whether all the time, periodically, or only in certain 

situations; distance and terrain; and any other relevant information).” Id. “The adjudicator must 

always consider the particular facts of a case.” Id. “For example, if a medically required handheld assistive device is needed only for prolonged ambulation, walking on uneven terrain, or 

ascending or descending slopes, the unskilled sedentary occupational base will not ordinarily be 

significantly eroded.” Id. 

Here, Plaintiff fractured his left ankle on February 20, 2015. (Tr. 561). Dr. Mark 

Tranovich, an orthopedic surgeon at the Veteran’s Administration, concluded Plaintiff would need 

surgery and prescribed him hydrocodone for the pain. (Id.). Following his surgery, on March 27, 

2015, Plaintiff attended a follow-up appointment at the VA and reported that he was “doing well 

with minimal pain.” (Tr. 552). Notes from that appointment indicate that Plaintiff “was fitted and 
7

issued a straight cane.” (Id.). April 27, 2015 progress notes indicated that Plaintiff had “a boot 

and cane at this point” and still experienced “some pain” with any pressure on his left ankle. (Tr. 

547). 

The ALJ reviewed this evidence and noted “that although the claimant received a cane in 

March 2015 after his surgery, in May 2015, he did not wish to pursue physical therapy and there

is no evidence in the record to document the need for an ambulatory aid beyond the natural healing 

time for this injury.” (Tr. 156). An August 2015 treatment summary from Plaintiff’s podiatrist 

indicated, that “[w]hile he was noted to have a pronated gait, he was noted to use no ambulatory 

aid.” (Id.). The ALJ, therefore, did not include the use of an assistive device in Plaintiff’s RFC. 

(Tr. 154–55).

The ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s use of the assistive device was not erroneous. Plaintiff 

has not cited, and the Undersigned has not been able to find, any medical documentation in the 

record “describing the circumstances for which” Plaintiff’s assistive device was “needed (i.e., 

whether all the time, periodically, or only in certain situations; distance and terrain; and any other 

relevant information).” SSR 96–9p, 1996 WL 374185, at *7. Absent such medical documentation, 

there was no basis for the ALJ to conclude that the assistive device was medically required. See 

id.; see also Miller v. Berryhill, No. 1:18-CV-00140-LLK, 2019 WL 2476743, at *2 (W.D. Ky. 

June 13, 2019) (“As noted by the ALJ, SSR 96-9p, 1996 WL 374185 requires documentation of 

both the need and the circumstances of needing an assistive device.”); Perry v. Berryhill, No. 

1:16CV2970, 2018 WL 1393275, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 20, 2018) (“Dr. Fox did not affirm that 

the walker was medically required and he did not identify any circumstances under which it was 

required. Thus, SSR 96–9p is not satisfied by Dr. Fox’s notation.”). Indeed, the record indicates 

that, during the relevant time period, Plaintiff used a cane only for several months. (Compare Tr. 
8

552 (treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff was fitted and issued a cane on March 27, 2015) with

Tr. 849 (treatment notes indicating that Plaintiff was not using any “ambulatory aids” on August 

18, 2015)).

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. He repeatedly asserts that the ALJ did 

not address why the ALJ did not include the use of an assistive device in his RFC. (See Doc. 9 at 

6 (“The ALJ did omit any requirement of an assistive device from the residual functional capacity, 

but the ALJ never provided any explanation for that omission.”); id. at 7 (“[T]he ALJ neglected to 

provide any sort of analysis on why he left out the need for an assistive device in the residual 

functional capacity. The ALJ could have easily addressed this issue and provided a brief

explanation as to why it was being omitted. He failed to do so.”); id. at 8 (“The ALJ neglected to 

address whether such a device was necessary, and now it cannot be determined whether the ALJ 

properly considered whether the device’s necessity is supported by the record.”); Doc. 14 at 2 (“A 

major part of Mr. Glaze’s argument rests on the fact that the ALJ failed to properly explain why 

Mr. Glaze’s assistive device was not medically necessary.”)). But, as demonstrated above, the 

ALJ did, in fact, provide a reasonable explanation for his decision that the Plaintiff did not require 

the use of an assistive device. (See Tr. 156 (“It is of note that although the claimant received a 

cane in March 2015 after his surgery, in May 2015, he did not wish to pursue physical therapy and 

there is no evidence in the record to document the need for an ambulatory aid beyond the natural 

healing time for this injury. While he was noted to have a pronated gait, he was noted to use no 

ambulatory aid.”)). The ALJ did not err by not including Plaintiff’s use of a cane as a limitation 

as part of his RFC.

Evidence that Plaintiff used an assistive device after his date last insured does not alter this 

conclusion. “In order to qualify for DIB, a claimant must ‘establish the onset of disability prior to 
9

the expiration or his [or her] insured status.’” Kingery v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 142 F. Supp. 3d 

598, 602 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 390 (6th Cir. 1984)). 

“Evidence of disability obtained after the expiration of insured status is generally of little probative 

value.” Strong v. Soc. Sec. Admin., 88 F. App’x 841, 845 (6th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). “To 

be relevant to the disability decision, ‘post-expiration evidence must relate back to the claimant’s 

condition prior to the expiration of her date last insured.’” Kingery, 142 F. Supp. 3d at 602 (quoting 

Wirth v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 87 F. App’x 478, 480 (6th Cir. 2003)); see also McNier v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 166 F. Supp. 3d 904, 911 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (“Such evidence can only [be] considered 

to the extent it illuminates a claimant’s health before the expiration of his or her insured status.”

(citation and quotations omitted)).

Here, Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date was June 26, 2010, (Tr. 149), and his date last 

insured was December 31, 2015, (Tr. 151–52). As Plaintiff notes, (Doc. 9 at 7), in 2017, he was 

“fitted and issued a single point adjustable cane,” (Tr. 938). But Plaintiff does not cite, and the 

Court has not been able to identify, evidence in the record demonstrating that Plaintiff’s use of a 

cane in 2017 relates back to his alleged disability during the relevant time period prior to his date 

last insured. It is, therefore, of little probative value here. Strong, 88 F. App’x at 845.

B. Mental Health 

Second, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s mental residual functional capacity is not 

supported by substantial evidence because the ALJ failed to properly consider all of the mental 

health evidence of record.” (Doc. 9 at 8). In his view, “[t]here are multiple reports and mental 

health evidence that document the presence of significant mental health restrictions that the ALJ 

failed to properly address” when analyzing his RFC. (Id.).
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A plaintiff’s RFC “is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and 

mental limitations resulting from her impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 

149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The Social Security 

regulations, rulings, and Sixth Circuit precedent provide that the ALJ is charged with the final 

responsibility in determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d)(2) (the final responsibility for deciding the residual functional capacity “is reserved 

to the Commissioner”). And it is the ALJ who resolves conflicts in the medical evidence. King v. 

Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984). In doing so, the ALJ is charged with evaluating several 

factors when determining the RFC, including the medical evidence (not limited to medical opinion

testimony), and the claimant’s testimony. Henderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-cv-2080, 

2010 WL 750222, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2010) (citing Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 

629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004)).

Substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s RFC analysis here. In developing his RFC 

analysis, the ALJ reviewed at length Plaintiff’s testimony and the medical evidence related to 

Plaintiff’s mental health impairments. (See Tr. 154, 155–158, 159–60). While the record 

demonstrates that Plaintiff experienced anxiety and depression, (Tr. 154), the ALJ found that any 

limitations resulting from those conditions were mild or moderate in nature, (Tr. 153–54). As he 

explained:

With respect to his mental impairments, the record documents intermittent and 

routine medication management follow-up appointments with his psychiatrist at the 

VAMC, until 2013, when he established with a new psychiatrist, James W. Cannon, 

MD, and new psychologist. The records document the claimant has routinely 

follow up since, as recommended, and had attended group therapy as well in 2014, 

where he was able to engage and participate. He routinely advises that although at 

times he feels like being alone, he is able to engage with others, such as friends and 

others that he meets on the internet. He is able to, an enjoys, his seasonal work and 

it seems that his primary exacerbations are a result of psychosocial stressors, such 

as finances.
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These records support that the has had some difficulty with anxiety and depression, 

but they do not document symptoms or limitations of the severity described in his 

testimony.

(Tr. 157 (internal citations omitted)). To accommodate Plaintiff’s mild or moderate limitations 

related to his mental impairments, the ALJ limited the Plaintiff “to perform[ing] tasks with no fast 

production pace or strict production demands, occasional interaction with others and only 

occasional changes in the work setting[.]” (Id.). Because the ALJ has identified “more than a 

scintilla of evidence” such that “a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a 

conclusion,” Rogers v, 486 F.3d at 241 (citation and quotations omitted), the Court finds that his 

RFC analysis is supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiff’s argument to the contrary is unpersuasive. He argues that the ALJ failed to 

address evidence demonstrating “the presence of significant mental health restrictions,” and that 

his RFC is, therefore, not supported by substantial evidence. (Doc. 9 at 8; see also id. at 8–11 

(developing the argument)). It is well-established that an ALJ is not required to “discuss every 

piece of evidence in the record to substantiate [his] decision.” Conner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 

F. App’x 248, 254 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Thacker v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 99 F. App’x 661, 665 

(6th Cir. 2004)); see also Dykes ex rel. Brymer v. Barnhart, 112 F. App’x 463, 467–68 (6th Cir. 

2004) (“Although required to develop the record fully and fairly, an ALJ is not required to discuss 

all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate that it 

was not considered.” (citations omitted)). Given this well-established precedent, and the ALJ’s 

thorough review of the record as a whole, he cannot be faulted for failing to explicitly address two 

pieces of evidence favorable to Plaintiff. That is particularly true here because Plaintiff’s ultimate 

argument is to ask the Court to reweigh the evidence and find in his favor. But that is the job of 

the ALJ, not this Court. See King, 742 F.2d at 974. The ALJ did not err as a result.
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IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 

9) be OVERRULED and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination 

of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 12, 2019 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE