alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Hardy's *Exr’s. Ex parte.*

*Practice*— Remittitur.—The rale adopted in *Fowler*«. *Johnson, 11 Ark. %8Qt*affirmed.

Remittitur must be entered before cause disposed of, on appeal or writ of error, by this court.

The judgments of a court, after its adjournment, pass from under its control»

*Motion to enter*Remittitur..

*J. E.*Witherspoon, for petitioners.

■WlLSHIRE, C. J.

At the present term of this court the appellees in the cause of *Ayliff v. Hardy’s*Executors, decided the judgment reversed and the cause remanded at the December term of this court,. 1867, moved for leave to enter a remittitur for the excess of damages found by the jury in the Clark county circuit court,, which was the sole error for which the judgment was reversed,, and the cause remanded.

The rule was adopted by this court in the case of *Fowler v.*Johnson, *11 Ark.*380, that “where a remittitur will cure the only error complained of, it shall be allowed to be entered upon the terms of paying costs, as usual, and also of an abandonment of record of all right to proceed on the recognizance, whereupon the-judgment will be immediately *affirmed.”*This rule has been adhered to by this court in all cases since its. adoption.

It must be observed that the remittitur must be entered before the cause is disposed of, upon the appeal or writ of error by this court. No other conclusion than this can be drawn from the language of the rule. The language of the rule is substantially that, upon the remittitur being entered, the right to proceed upon the recognizance, abandoned of record by the appellee, the judgment will be immediately affirmed. Then, *95by the rule itself, the remittitur must he entered before the final disposition of the case in this court.

If there was any doubt in the language of the rule, it is quite clear to our minds that the motion could not be sustained at this late day. The judgment of the Clark circuit court, in the case of *Ayliff v. Hardy’s*Executors, was brought here by appeal, and decided at the December term, 1867. Three years-since this cause was disposed of by this court has elapsed. It is now too late for the appellees in that cause to avail themselves of the rule; indeed, it was too late after the adjournment of the term of this court, at which the judgment was reversed, etc. It is a rule too well established, to require discussion here, that the judgments of a court, after the adjournment of the term, pass from under its control. See *10 Ark. 186; 13 Ark. 104; 11 Ark.*151, and authorities therein cited.

The motion is overruled.
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 23 (Thursday, February 3, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Pages 6188-6189]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-02234]


-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Federal Emergency Management Agency

[Internal Agency Docket No. FEMA-4630-DR; Docket ID FEMA-2021-0001]


Kentucky; Amendment No. 2 to Notice of a Major Disaster 
Declaration

AGENCY: Federal Emergency Management Agency, DHS.

ACTION: Notice.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: This notice amends the notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the Commonwealth of Kentucky (FEMA-4630-DR), dated December 12, 
2021, and related determinations.

DATES: This amendment was issued December 22, 2021.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dean Webster, Office of Response and 
Recovery, Federal Emergency Management Agency, 500 C Street SW, 
Washington, DC 20472, (202) 646-2833.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: The notice of a major disaster declaration 
for the Commonwealth of Kentucky is hereby amended to include the 
following area among those areas determined to have been adversely 
affected by the event declared a major disaster by the President in his 
declaration of December 12, 2021.

    Barren County for Individual Assistance.
    Barren County for debris removal and emergency protective 
measures [Categories A and B], including direct federal assistance, 
under the Public Assistance program.

    The following Catalog of Federal Domestic Assistance Numbers 
(CFDA) are to be used for reporting and drawing funds: 97.030, 
Community Disaster Loans; 97.031, Cora Brown Fund; 97.032, Crisis 
Counseling; 97.033, Disaster Legal Services; 97.034, Disaster 
Unemployment Assistance (DUA); 97.046, Fire Management Assistance 
Grant; 97.048, Disaster Housing Assistance to Individuals and 
Households In Presidentially

[[Page 6189]]

Declared Disaster Areas; 97.049, Presidentially Declared Disaster 
Assistance--Disaster Housing Operations for Individuals and 
Households; 97.050, Presidentially Declared Disaster Assistance to 
Individuals and Households--Other Needs; 97.036, Disaster Grants--
Public Assistance (Presidentially Declared Disasters); 97.039, 
Hazard Mitigation Grant.

Deanne Criswell,
Administrator, Federal Emergency Management Agency.
[FR Doc. 2022-02234 Filed 2-2-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 9111-23-P
Jose HERRADA, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-5141

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 02, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 (UNAUDITED) AND CONSOLIDATED
INCOME STATEMENT FOR THE NINE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996 (UNAUDITED) AND
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                          25,046
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  437,842
<ALLOWANCES>                                    83,504
<INVENTORY>                                     33,170
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               500,810
<PP&E>                                         581,280
<DEPRECIATION>                                 263,135
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               1,144,937
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          164,738
<BONDS>                                        608,701
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
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<COMMON>                                            51
<OTHER-SE>                                     371,447
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 1,144,937
<SALES>                                        907,908
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               907,908
<CGS>                                          284,951
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  284,951
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                42,976
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              35,927
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 98,406
<INCOME-TAX>                                    35,423
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             62,983
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    62,983
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                     1.20
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     1.20
        

</TABLE>
Daryl L. WALKER, Jr., Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 4D17-2235

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[March 22, 2018]

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          MAR-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                                               0
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                     0
<PP&E>                                               0
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                   3,686
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                0
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        37,522
<OTHER-SE>                                    (33,838)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                     3,686
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     0
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      0
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                         0
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT UNITED STATES OF AM ERIC A, Plaintiff - Appe lle e , v. RENEE GOM EZ, De fe nda

nt - Appe lla

nt. No. 13-30086

D.C . No. 2:11-c r-00108-EFS M EM O R ANDUM *

Appe a l from

the Unite d

Stat e s Distric t C ourt for the Ea ste rn Distric t of W a shington Edwa rd F. She a , Distric t

Judge , Pre siding Subm itte d Fe brua

ry 18, 2014 * * B e fore : ALAR C ÓN, O’ SC ANNLAIN, a nd FER N ANDEZ, C irc uit Judge s. R e ne e Gom e z a

ppe a ls from

the distric t c ourt’ s judgm e nt a nd c ha lle n ge s the 120-m onth se nte nc e im

pose d following her jury -tria l c onvic tion for drug c rim e s involving me tha

m phe tam i ne , in viola

tion of 21 U.S.C . §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 856, a nd 860. W e hav e jurisdic t ion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 1291, a nd we a ffirm . 

# FIL ED

FEB 26 2014 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U . S . CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3. ** The pa

ne l una nim ously c onc lude s this c a se is suita ble for de c ision without oral a

rgum e nt. Se eFe d. R . App. P. 34(a)(2).Gom e z c ha lle nge s the distric t c ourt’ s de nia l of sa fe ty -va lve re lie f. W e

re vie w de novo the distric t c ourt’ s inte rpre tation of 18 U.S.C . § 3553(f), a nd we re vie w for c le ar e rror its fa c tua l de te rm ination tha t a de fe nda nt is ine ligiblefor sa fe ty -va lve re l i e f. Se eUnite d State s v . Me jia-Pime ntal , 477 F.3d 1100, 1103 (9th C ir. 2007). C ontra

ry to Gom e z ’ s c onte ntion, the distric t c ourt m a de its own de te rm i nation, sepa

rate from the jury ’ s finding of guilt, tha t Gom e z ’ s sa fe ty -va lve sta te m e nt wa s not truthful. Se eUnite d State s v . She r pa , 110 F.3d 656, 662 (9th C ir. 1996). Furthe rm ore , the c ourt’ s finding wa s not c le arly e rrone ous. Se eUnite d State s v . Orm Hie ng , 679 F.3d 1131, 1144-45 (9th C ir.) (upholding denia l of sa fe ty -va lve re l i e f whe re the de fe nda nt de n ie d knowing a

nything a bout a m a rijua na growing ope ration, but evide nc e in there c ord sugge ste d othe rwise ), c e rt. de nie d , 133 S. C t. 775 (2012). There fore , Gom e z is not e ntitle d to re lie f from the sta tutory m andatory

m inim um se nte nc e . Se e18 U.S.C . § 3553(f)(5). Gom e z ’ s m otion to ta

ke judic ia l notic e is de nie d. AFFIRM E D.

1 3 - 3 0 0 8 6 2
I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1066 

To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance 

Act to provide flexibility with the cost share for fire management assistance, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 15, 2021 

Mr. NEGUSE (for himself, Mr. CURTIS, Mr. O’HALLERAN, Mr. STEWART, Ms. 

NORTON, Ms. JACKSON LEE, and Mr. SAN NICOLAS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Transportation and 

Infrastructure 

A BILL 

To amend the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act to provide flexibility with the cost 

share for fire management assistance, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Wildfire Recovery 

5 Act’’. 

2 

•HR 1066 IH

1 SEC. 2. FIRE MANAGEMENT ASSISTANCE COST SHARE. 

2 Section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief 

3 and Emergency Assistance Act is amended by adding at 

4 the end the following: 

5 ‘‘(f) FEDERAL SHARE.—The Federal share of assist6 ance under this section shall be not less than 75 percent 

7 of the eligible cost, as set forth in the regulations, of such 

8 assistance.’’. 

9 SEC. 3. RULEMAKING. 

10 Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment 

11 of this Act, the President, acting through the Adminis12 trator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency and 

13 in consultation with the heads of relevant Federal depart14 ments and agencies, including the Department of Agri15 culture and the Department of Interior, shall conduct and 

16 complete a rulemaking to develop guidelines and a rule 

17 that establishes thresholds for cases in which the Federal 

18 cost share for section 420 of the Robert T. Stafford Dis19 aster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. 

20 5187) may be increased. Such thresholds shall use a fire21 specific metric to determine fire damage referred to in 

22 subsection (a) of such section, and recommend a Federal 

23 cost share adjustment for fire damage that meets the es24 tablished thresholds. The Administrator shall follow all noVerDate Sep 11 2014 17:10 Mar 12, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1066.IH H1066
3 

•HR 1066 IH

1 tice and comment requirements set forth in section 553 

2 of title 5, United States Code, for such rulemaking. 

Æ
## I N T H E C O U R T O F C R I M I N A L A P P E A L S O F T E X A S NO. WR-81,150-02

EX P ARTE JEFF REY MCD ONALD, Appli cant
ON AP P LICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORP US CAUSE NO. 963695-A IN THE 182 DISTRICT COURT N D F ROM HARRIS COUNTY
Per curiam . O R D E R
Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Tex as C o d e o f Criminal Procedur e, the cler k of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habea s corpus. Ex parte Y oung , 418 S.W .2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). This Court rema nded the writ application for
a live hear ing. Ex parte McD onal d , No
. WR -81,150-02 (Tex. Crim. App. Fe b. 4, 2015) (not desig nated for publication). The District Clerk forwa rded a supplemental reco rd to this Court containing , among other thi ng s, finding s of fact and conclusions of law in which the habea s court
rec ommends that re lief be denied. The finding s and conclusions ref er to an evidentiar

y hearing conducte d on August 18, 2015. Howeve r, t h i s C o u rt has no transcription or other rec ord of the2

evidentiar y hear ing. T E X . C O D E C R I M . P R O C . art. 11.07 § 3(d)
. The judg e of the 182 District Court of Har ris County shall file a response with this C ourt n d by having the District Cl er k s ub m it the transcript from the evidentiar y hearing perta ining to this habea s corpus application, along with any other pa rts of the re cord tha

t have not been forwa

rded. I f the court did not hold a live h ea ri n g, the court shall cer tify that there was no hearing and enter supplemental finding s of fac t explaining why none was held. The answe r shall be submitt ed within 45 day s of the date of this order. N o extensions of ti me will be enter tained.
Filed: June 29, 2016 Do not publish
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 184 (Friday, September 21, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Pages 58607-58608]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-23360]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

Office of Commercial Space Transportation Safety Approval 
Performance Criteria

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Notification of criteria used to evaluate the National 
Aerospace Training and Research (NASTAR) Center safety approval 
application.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The FAA issued NASTAR a safety approval, subject to the 
provisions of Title 51 U.S.C. Subtitle V, ch. 509, and the orders, 
rules and regulations issued under it. Pursuant to Title 14 Code of 
Federal Regulations (14 CFR) 414.35, this Notice publishes the criteria 
that were used to evaluate the safety approval application.

Background

    NASTAR applied for, and received, a safety approval for the ability 
of its Falcon 12/4 Altitude Chamber to replicate pressures experienced 
at altitude levels. The performance criteria for this safety approval 
are applicant developed per 14 CFR 414.19(a)(4). NASTAR's Falcon 12/4 
Altitude Chamber is capable of replicating any pressure experienced at 
altitudes from zero (0) feet up to 100,000 feet. This includes rapid 
decompression up to equalization altitudes of 30,800 feet.

Criteria Used To Evaluate Safety Approval Application

    The Falcon 12/4 Altitude Chamber was evaluated by the FAA as a 
component of a flight crew qualification and training process. The 
evaluation included the FAA's assessment of the Falcon 12/4 Altitude 
Chamber's ability to accurately replicate the specified pressure 
levels.
    NASTAR submitted the following data to show that the Falcon 12/4

[[Page 58608]]

Altitude Chamber complies with the criteria:

--Acceptance Test Plan,
--Pressure profile demonstrations, and
--Altimeter and pressure gauge test results.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For questions about the performance 
criteria, you may contact Randal Maday, Licensing and Evaluation 
Division (AST-200), FAA Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
(AST), 800 Independence Avenue SW., Room 331, Washington, DC 20591, 
telephone (202) 267-8652; Email randal.maday@faa.gov.

    Issued in Washington, DC, on September 17, 2012.
George C. Nield,
Associate Administrator for Commercial Space Transportation.
[FR Doc. 2012-23360 Filed 9-20-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
```
Nicholas ZADRAVEC, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D16-3954

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed March 7, 2018

Rachael E. Bushey of O'Brien Hatfield, P.A., Tampa, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, and Linsey Sims-Bohnenstiehl, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
#### UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff—Appellee, v. Daniel BINFORD, Defendant—Appellant.

No. 03-30489.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

*160Submitted May 10, 2004.*

Decided May 14, 2004.

St. Clair Frederick Winiker, III, Esq., USSP — Office of the U.S. Attorney, Spokane, WA, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Gerald R. Smith, FPDWA — Federal Public Defender’s Office (Eastern WA & ID), Spokane, WA, for Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CANBY, KOZINSKI, and PAEZ, Circuit Judges.

*

 This panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without oral argument. *See*Fed. R.App. P. 34(a)(2).

MEMORANDUM **

Daniel Binford appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of possession of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(5)(B).

Binford contends that the district court abused its discretion and erred in denying him a downward departure, which he requested on numerous grounds including diminished capacity, aberrant behavior, extraordinary physical condition and age, post-offense rehabilitation, possibility of harm in prison, and a convergence of factors. We lack jurisdiction to review the decision because the district court considered the factors asserted by Binford and determined in its discretion that Binford’s case was not outside the heartland of similar cases. *United States v. Barajas-Avalos,*359 F.3d 1204, 1217-18 (9th Cir.2004) (holding that this court lacked jurisdiction to review the district court’s refusal to depart downward where the district court considered the factors argued by counsel and determined that the case did not fall outside the heartland).

DISMISSED.

**

 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision **

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOFIAN KWEK; et al.,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 08-74612

Agency Nos. A098-648-172

A098-648-173

A098-648-174

A098-648-175

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted March 6, 2012** 

Before: B. FLETCHER, REINHARDT, and TASHIMA, Circuit Judges.

Sofian Kwek and his family, natives and citizens of Indonesia, petition for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing their appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying their application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

FILED

MAR 22 2012

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 08-74612

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo the agency’s legal

determinations and review for substantial evidence factual findings. Wakkary v.

Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1056 (9th Cir. 2009). We grant in part and deny in part the

petition for review, and we remand.

In evaluating Kwek’s asylum and withholding of removal claims, the agency

appears to have concluded the attack that occurred at Kwek’s rice mill and the

attack on Kwek’s son were random acts of violence and not a basis for relief. 

Substantial evidence does not support this finding. See Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d

1015, 1022 (9th Cir. 2009) (“What the IJ described is not random violence, but

violence with a distinct racial slant.”). Accordingly, because the agency did not

consider these incidents in evaluating Kwek’s claim of past persecution and his

fear of future persecution, as a member of disfavored groups, we grant the petition

with respect to petitioners’ asylum and withholding of removal claims, and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this disposition. See INS v. Ventura, 537

U.S. 12, 16-18 (2002) (per curiam). 

With respect to CAT relief, Kwek has failed to establish a clear probability

he faces torture if removed to Indonesia. See, Zheng v. Holder, 644 F.3d 829, 835

(9th Cir. 2011) (“To receive relief under CAT, Petitioner has the burden of
3 08-74612

showing that he is more likely than not to be tortured in the country of removal.”)

(citation and internal quotation omitted).

The government shall bear the costs for this petition for review.

PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED in part; DENIED in part;

REMANDED.