I 

117TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 1091 

To create a task force within the Department of Education to address the 

threat of foreign government influence and threats to academic research 

integrity on college campuses, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

FEBRUARY 18, 2021 

Mr. BANKS introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee 

on Education and Labor, and in addition to the Committees on Intelligence (Permanent Select), Armed Services, and Science, Space, and 

Technology, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 

in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To create a task force within the Department of Education 

to address the threat of foreign government influence 

and threats to academic research integrity on college 

campuses, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Protect Our Univer5 sities Act of 2021’’. 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 1091 IH

1 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

2 Congress finds the following: 

3 (1) Adversaries of the United States take ad4 vantage of a largely vulnerable academic system. 

5 Academia is a place of uniquely free thought; how6 ever, adversaries take advantage of access to feder7 ally funded sensitive research that takes place on the 

8 campuses of institutions of higher education. 

9 (2) As stated in a 2018 report by the White 

10 House Office of Trade and Manufacturing Policy, 

11 ‘‘More than 300,000 Chinese nationals annually at12 tend U.S. universities or find employment at U.S. 

13 national laboratories, innovation centers, incubators, 

14 and think tanks. Chinese nationals now account for 

15 approximately one third of foreign university and 

16 college students in the United States and about 25 

17 percent of graduate students specializing in science, 

18 technology, engineering, or math (STEM).’’. 

19 (3) International students from nations that are 

20 adversarial to the United States could face undue 

21 pressure or incentives to divulge technology to their 

22 home nation or to use sensitive information to nega23 tively impact the United States. According to the 

24 same 2018 White House Report, ‘‘The national and 

25 economic security risks are that the Chinese State 

26 may seek to manipulate or pressure even unwitting 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 1091 IH

1 or unwilling Chinese nationals into becoming non2 traditional information collectors that serve Beijing’s 

3 military and strategic ambitions.’’. 

4 (4) Technology and information that could be 

5 deemed sensitive to the national security interests of 

6 the United States should be given increased scrutiny 

7 to determine if access should be restricted in a re8 search environment. 

9 (5) An open federally funded research environ10 ment exposes the United States to the possibility of 

11 exchanging research affiliated with current or future 

12 critical military technological systems. 

13 (6) In Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 

14 Director Wray’s view, Chinese non-traditional intel15 ligence collectors ‘‘are exploiting the very open re16 search and development environment that we have, 

17 which we all revere. But they’re taking advantage of 

18 it, so one of the things we’re trying to do is view the 

19 China threat as not just the whole-of-government 

20 threat, but a whole-of-society threat on their end, 

21 and I think it’s going to take a whole-of-society re22 sponse by us.’’. 

23 (7) As stated in the January 2018 China’s 

24 Technology Transfer Strategy report by the Defense 

25 Innovation Unit, ‘‘Academia is an opportune enviVerDate Sep 11 2014 01:59 Mar 16, 2021 Jkt 019200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H1091.IH H1091

ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
4 

•HR 1091 IH

1 ronment for learning about science and technology 

2 since the cultural values of U.S. educational institu3 tions reflect an open and free exchange of ideas. As 

4 a result, Chinese science and engineering students 

5 frequently master technologies that later become 

6 critical to key military systems, amounting over time 

7 to unintentional violations of U.S. export control 

8 laws.’’. 

9 (8) In 2020, Bill Evanina, the senior counter10 intelligence official in the Office of the Director of 

11 National Intelligence, stated ‘‘. . . our ideas, tech12 nology, research, innovation is incubated on those 

13 university campuses. That’s where the science and 

14 technology originates—and that’s why it’s the most 

15 prime place to steal.’’. 

16 (9) David Bowdich, Deputy Director of the 

17 Federal Bureau of Investigation, stated at the 

18 March 2020 Academic Security and Counter Exploi19 tation Annual Seminar that [China] is ‘‘taking ad20 vantage of non-traditional collectors to work on their 

21 behalf, like ostensibly private companies or some 

22 graduate students and researchers. . . . And they 

23 are targeting cutting-edge research at our univer24 sities.’’. 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
5 

•HR 1091 IH

1 (10) The 2020 House of Representatives China 

2 Task Force Report states, ‘‘Research programs at 

3 U.S. colleges and universities are increasingly tar4 geted by students and researchers acting as ‘non5 traditional collectors’. These students, ranging from 

6 undergraduates to postdoctoral researchers, are gen7 erally untrained in espionage techniques but are 

8 asked to actively target sensitive dual-use tech9 nologies and other emerging research during their 

10 time in the U.S. The stated goal for these operations 

11 is to exfiltrate research data from the U.S. to the 

12 PRC.’’. 

13 SEC. 3. TASK FORCE. 

14 (a) TASK FORCE ESTABLISHED.—Not later than one 

15 year after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary 

16 of Education, in consultation with the Secretary of De17 fense and the Director of National Intelligence, shall es18 tablish the National Security Technology Task Force 

19 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘‘Task Force’’) within the 

20 Department of Education to address the threat of espio21 nage at institutions of higher education. 

22 (b) MEMBERSHIP.— 

23 (1) DESIGNATION.—The Task Force shall in24 clude not more than 30 members, of which— 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
6 

•HR 1091 IH

1 (A) at least 1 representative shall be from 

2 the Department of Defense, designated by the 

3 Secretary of Defense; 

4 (B) at least 1 representative shall be from 

5 the intelligence community, designated by the 

6 Director of National Intelligence; 

7 (C) at least 1 representative shall be from 

8 the Department of Justice, designated by the 

9 United States Attorney General; 

10 (D) at least 1 representative shall be from 

11 the Department of Energy, designated by the 

12 Secretary of Energy; and 

13 (E) at least 1 representative shall be from 

14 each of the following offices of the Department 

15 of Education, as appointed and named by the 

16 Secretary of Education: 

17 (i) Office of Postsecondary Education. 

18 (ii) Office of Planning, Evaluation, 

19 and Policy Development. 

20 (iii) Office of the General Counsel. 

21 (iv) Any other office the Secretary of 

22 Education determines to be appropriate. 

23 (2) MEMBERSHIP LIST.—Not later than 10 

24 days after the first meeting of the Task Force, the 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
7 

•HR 1091 IH

1 Task Force shall submit to Congress a list identi2 fying each member of the Task Force. 

3 (c) SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECT LIST.—The 

4 Task Force shall, in consultation with the Office of the 

5 Director of National Intelligence, actively maintain a list 

6 of sensitive research projects. Such list shall— 

7 (1) be referred to as the Sensitive Research 

8 Projects List; and 

9 (2) for each project included on the list, indi10 cate— 

11 (A) the qualified funding agency that is 

12 funding the project; 

13 (B) whether the project is open to student 

14 participation; and 

15 (C) whether the project is related to— 

16 (i) an item listed on the Commerce 

17 Control List (CCL) maintained by the De18 partment of Commerce; 

19 (ii) an item listed on the United 

20 States Munitions List maintained by the 

21 Department of State; or 

22 (iii) technology designated by the Sec23 retary of Defense as having a technology 

24 readiness level of 1, 2, or 3. 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
8 

•HR 1091 IH

1 (d) CONSULTATION WITH OIG.—The Task Force 

2 shall periodically, but no less than annually, consult with 

3 the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of 

4 Education, which shall include annual reports to the Of5 fice of the Inspector General on the activities of the Task 

6 Force, with an opportunity for the Office of the Inspector 

7 General to provide active feedback related to such activi8 ties. 

9 (e) INSTRUCTION TO INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER

10 EDUCATION.—Not less than once every six months, the 

11 Task Force shall provide relevant instruction to institu12 tions of higher education at which research projects on 

13 the Sensitive Research Project List are being carried out. 

14 Such instruction shall provide the institutions of higher 

15 education with information related to the threat posed by 

16 espionage, best practices identified by the Task Force, 

17 and, to the extent possible, any specific risks that the in18 telligence community, the qualified funding agency, or law 

19 enforcement entities determine appropriate to share with 

20 the institutions. 

21 (f) REPORT TO CONGRESS.—Not later than one year 

22 after the date of enactment of this Act, and every six 

23 months thereafter, the Task Force shall provide a report 

24 to the Committee on Education and Labor, the Committee 

25 on Armed Services, and the Permanent Select Committee 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
9 

•HR 1091 IH

1 on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, and to 

2 the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pen3 sions, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select 

4 Committee on Intelligence of the Senate, regarding the 

5 threat of espionage at institutions of higher education. In 

6 each such briefing, the Task Force shall identify actions 

7 that may be taken to reduce espionage carried out through 

8 student participation in sensitive research projects. The 

9 Task Force shall also include in this report an assessment 

10 of whether the current licensing regulations relating to the 

11 International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export 

12 Administration Regulations are sufficient to protect the 

13 security of the projects listed on the Sensitive Research 

14 Project List. 

15 SEC. 4. FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPATION IN SENSITIVE 

16 RESEARCH PROJECTS. 

17 (a) APPROVAL OF FOREIGN STUDENT PARTICIPA18 TION REQUIRED.—Beginning on the date that is one year 

19 after the date of enactment of this Act, for each project 

20 on the Sensitive Research Project List that is open to stu21 dent participation, the head of such project at the institu22 tion of higher education at which the project is being car23 ried out shall ensure that each student participating in 

24 such project shall be required to provide proof of citizen25 ship before the student is permitted to participate in such 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
10 

•HR 1091 IH

1 project. A student who is a citizen of a country identified 

2 in subsection (b) shall be permitted to participate in such 

3 a project only if— 

4 (1) the student applies for, and receives ap5 proval from, the Director of National Intelligence to 

6 participate in such project, based on a background 

7 check and any other information the Director deter8 mines to be appropriate; and 

9 (2) in the case of such a project that is related 

10 to an item or technology described in subparagraph 

11 (C) of section 3(c)(2), the student applies for, and 

12 receives approval from, the head of the qualified 

13 funding agency, to participate in such project. 

14 (b) LIST OF CITIZENSHIP REQUIRING APPROVAL.— 

15 Approval under subsection (a) shall be required for any 

16 student who is a citizen of a country that is one of the 

17 following: 

18 (1) The People’s Republic of China. 

19 (2) The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 

20 (3) The Russian Federation. 

21 (4) The Islamic Republic of Iran. 

22 (5) Any country identified by the head of the 

23 qualified funding agency as requiring approval for 

24 the purposes of this section. 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
11 

•HR 1091 IH

1 SEC. 5. FOREIGN ENTITIES. 

2 (a) LIST OF FOREIGN ENTITIES THAT POSE AN IN3 TELLIGENCE THREAT.—Not later than one year after the 

4 date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National 

5 Intelligence shall identify foreign entities, including gov6 ernments, corporations, non-profit and for-profit organiza7 tions, and any subsidiary or affiliate of such an entity, 

8 that the Director determines pose a threat of espionage 

9 with respect to sensitive research projects, and shall de10 velop and maintain a list of such entities. The Director 

11 may add or remove entities from such list at any time. 

12 The initial list developed by the Director shall include the 

13 following entities (including any subsidiary or affiliate): 

14 (1) Huawei Technologies Company. 

15 (2) ZTE Corporation. 

16 (3) Hytera Communications Corporation. 

17 (4) Hangzhou Hikvision Digital Technology 

18 Company. 

19 (5) Dahua Technology Company. 

20 (6) Kaspersky Lab. 

21 (7) Any entity that is owned or controlled by, 

22 or otherwise has demonstrated financial ties to, the 

23 government of a country identified under section 

24 4(b). 

25 (b) NOTICE TO INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDU26 CATION.—The Director of National Intelligence shall 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
12 

•HR 1091 IH

1 make the initial list required under subsection (a), and 

2 any changes to such list, available to the Secretary of Edu3 cation, the Task Force, and the head of each qualified 

4 funding agency as soon as practicable. The Secretary of 

5 Education shall provide such initial list and subsequent 

6 amendments to each institution of higher education at 

7 which a project on the Sensitive Research Project List is 

8 being carried out. 

9 (c) PROHIBITION ON USE OF CERTAIN TECH10 NOLOGIES.—Beginning on the date that is one year after 

11 the date of the enactment of this Act, the head of each 

12 sensitive research project shall, as a condition of receipt 

13 of funds from a qualified funding agency, provide an as14 surance to such qualified funding agency that, beginning 

15 on the date that is two years after the date of the enact16 ment of this Act, any technology developed by an entity 

17 included on the list maintained under subsection (a) shall 

18 not be utilized in carrying out the sensitive research 

19 project. 

20 SEC. 6. ENFORCEMENT. 

21 The head of each qualified funding agency shall take 

22 such steps as may be necessary to enforce the provisions 

23 of sections 4 and 5 of this Act. Upon determination that 

24 the head of a sensitive research project has failed to meet 

25 the requirements of either section 4 or section 5, the head 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
13 

•HR 1091 IH

1 of a qualified funding agency may determine the appro2 priate enforcement action, including— 

3 (1) imposing a probationary period, not to ex4 ceed 6 months, on the head of such project, or on 

5 the project; 

6 (2) reducing or otherwise limiting the funding 

7 for such project until the violation has been rem8 edied; 

9 (3) permanently cancelling the funding for such 

10 project; or 

11 (4) any other action the head of the qualified 

12 funding agency determines to be appropriate. 

13 SEC. 7. DEFINITIONS. 

14 In this Act: 

15 (1) CITIZEN OF A COUNTRY.—The term ‘‘cit16 izen of a country’’, with respect to a student, in17 cludes all countries in which the student has held or 

18 holds citizenship or holds permanent residency. 

19 (2) INSTITUTION OF HIGHER EDUCATION.—The 

20 term ‘‘institution of higher education’’ means an in21 stitution described in section 102 of the Higher 

22 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1002) that re23 ceives Federal funds in any amount and for any pur24 pose. 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
14 

•HR 1091 IH

1 (3) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

2 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

3 that term in section 3 of the National Security Act 

4 of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003). 

5 (4) QUALIFIED FUNDING AGENCY.—The term 

6 ‘‘qualified funding agency’’, with respect to a sen7 sitive research project, means— 

8 (A) the Department of Defense, if the sen9 sitive research project is funded in whole or in 

10 part by the Department of Defense; 

11 (B) the Department of Energy, if the sen12 sitive research project is funded in whole or in 

13 part by the Department of Energy; or 

14 (C) an element of the intelligence commu15 nity, if the sensitive research project is funded 

16 in whole or in part by the element of the intel17 ligence community. 

18 (5) SENSITIVE RESEARCH PROJECT.—The term 

19 ‘‘sensitive research project’’ means a research 

20 project at an institution of higher education that is 

21 funded by a qualified funding agency, except that 

22 such term shall not include any research project that 

23 is classified or that requires the participants in such 

24 project to obtain a security clearance. 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS
15 

•HR 1091 IH

1 (6) STUDENT PARTICIPATION.—The term ‘‘stu2 dent participation’’ shall not include student activity 

3 in— 

4 (A) a research project that is required for 

5 completion of a course in which the student is 

6 enrolled at an institution of higher education; 

7 or 

8 (B) a research project for which the stu9 dent is conducting unpaid research. 

Æ 


ctelli on DSK11ZRN23PROD with BILLS