RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)

File Name: 22a0052p.06

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

LABORERS’ INTERNATIONAL UNION OF NORTH 

AMERICA, LOCAL 860, on behalf of itself and its 

members, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

TEREASE Z. NEFF; HON. THOMAS F. O’MALLEY;

CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO COMMON PLEAS COURT,

JUVENILE DIVISION,

Defendants-Appellees.

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No. 21-3653

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.

No. 1:20-cv-02714—Pamela A. Barker, District Judge.

Argued: March 10, 2022

Decided and Filed: March 23, 2022

Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, Circuit Judges.

_________________

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Austin T. Opalich, MANGANO LAW OFFICES CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for 

Appellant. Max V. Rieker, WALTER ǀ HAVERFIELD LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. 

ON BRIEF: Austin T. Opalich, Joseph J. Guarino III, Ryan K. Hymore, MANGANO LAW 

OFFICES CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Max V. Rieker, R. Todd Hunt, 

Alejandro V. Cortes, WALTER ǀ HAVERFIELD LLP, Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees.

SUTTON, C.J., delivered the opinion of the court in which GIBBONS and GRIFFIN, JJ., 

joined. SUTTON, C.J. (pp. 13–15), also delivered a separate concurring opinion.

>
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 2

_________________

OPINION

_________________

SUTTON, Chief Judge. When contract negotiations broke down between an Ohio 

juvenile court and the union that represents the court’s employees, the union took the court to 

federal court. Because the juvenile court is an arm of the State, the district court correctly held 

that sovereign immunity bars most of the union’s claims. And because the union’s remaining 

contentions fail to state a claim for relief, we affirm across the board.

I.

Ohio’s third branch of government is divided into three courts: the Ohio Supreme Court, 

the intermediate courts of appeals, and the courts of common pleas. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 1. 

There are twelve courts of appeals, each broken down into geographical districts, with some 

districts covering just one heavily populated county (e.g., the Eighth District Court of Appeals, 

which covers Cuyahoga County) but most of them covering several counties. Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 2501.01. There are 88 courts of common pleas, the State’s courts of general jurisdiction, one 

for each county in the State. See id. § 2301.01. Most courts of common pleas contain subject 

matter divisions for juvenile, probate, or domestic relations matters only. See id. § 2301.03. In 

addition to the courts that the Ohio Constitution creates, the Ohio legislature has established 

municipal and county courts, which possess jurisdiction within their territorial limits over certain 

criminal matters and over civil matters where the amount in controversy does not exceed 

$15,000. Id. §§ 1901.02, 1907.01, 1901.17, 1907.03, 1901.20, 1907.02.

Cuyahoga County has a Juvenile Court with six judges. Id. § 2153.02. Other than the 

limitation on subject matter, the judges have the same authority as other common pleas judges. 

Id.; In re Z.R., 44 N.E.3d 239, 242 (Ohio 2015).

In 2012, the employees of the Juvenile Court certified labor union Local 860 as their 

exclusive collective bargaining representative. The union represents 136 employees who work 

in a range of positions, including as legal services clerks, as probation officers, and as custodial 

and food service workers in juvenile detention facilities. It does not represent judges.
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 3

In 2016, the union and the Juvenile Court renewed their collective bargaining 

agreements. The new contracts dealt with wages, holidays, sick leave, health insurance, and 

other conventional topics. The parties agreed that the new contracts would extend from January 

1, 2017, through December 31, 2019. Each contract added that the Court would respect its terms 

until the parties reached a new agreement, the union disclaimed interest in the contract, or the 

employees decertified the union.

In 2019, the relationship soured. Attempts to negotiate a new agreement stalled. 

Consensus continued to elude them in 2020. On December 1, 2020, the union alleges, the 

Juvenile Court “unilaterally proclaimed” the contracts invalid. R.1 at 7. That day, the Juvenile 

Court filed a lawsuit in state court asking it to declare the agreements void or expired. The union 

counterclaimed for breach of contract. In the days that followed, the union alleges, relations 

continued to spiral, as the Juvenile Court treated the union’s members as nonunion employees, 

announced a plan to stop deducting union dues from paychecks, imposed new work schedules, 

and eliminated grievance procedures.

The union sued the Juvenile Court in federal court. In addition to naming the court, it 

filed the lawsuit against Judge Thomas O’Malley, the court’s administrative judge, and Terease 

Neff, the court administrator, in their personal and official capacities. As relevant here, the 

union claimed the Juvenile Court and the administrators violated the Contracts Clause and the 

Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution by breaching the collective bargaining agreements.

The Juvenile Court moved to dismiss, and the district court granted the motion. 

It reasoned that sovereign immunity bars the union’s claims against the Juvenile Court because it 

is an arm of the State of Ohio. It reasoned that § 1983 does not provide a cause of action for the 

union’s Contracts Clause claims against O’Malley and Neff. It reasoned that the union’s request 

for an injunction under the Takings Clause failed because the union failed to plead an inadequate 

remedy at law. And it reasoned that qualified immunity barred the money-damages claims 

against the administrators under the Takings Clause.
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 4

II.

“When the States entered the federal system, they did so with their sovereignty intact.” 

PennEast Pipeline Co. v. New Jersey, 141 S. Ct. 2244, 2258 (2021) (quotation omitted). One 

feature of sovereignty is immunity from suit. Id. Whether reflected in the words of the Tenth or 

Eleventh Amendments or background principles to the Convention, sovereign immunity protects 

States and the Federal Government from litigation except in “limited circumstances.” Id. That 

remains true for the States whether the case is filed in state or federal court, whether the plaintiff 

is a citizen of the defendant State or not, and whether the lawsuit’s target is the State or an 

official acting on its behalf. Ernst v. Rising, 427 F.3d 351, 358 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

Broadly though these principles sweep, exceptions exist. Waiver by a State is one. Port 

Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990). Authorized abrogation by 

Congress is another. Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 517 (2004). A lawsuit by the federal 

government is a third. West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 (1987). On top of these 

and other exceptions, immunity applies only to lawsuits against the State or “an arm of the 

State,” not to those against political subdivisions like counties. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of 

Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).

Familiar considerations shape the application of the arm-of-the-State inquiry to the 

Juvenile Court. Among them are: (1) the State of Ohio’s “potential liability” for a judgment 

against the Juvenile Court; (2) the way in which state law describes the Juvenile Court and “the 

degree of state control and veto power over the [Court’s] actions”; (3) the extent to which state 

officials control membership on the Juvenile Court; and (4) the extent to which the Juvenile 

Court’s “functions fall within the traditional purview of state or local government.” Ernst, 

427 F.3d at 359. While the first factor—the potential impact on the state treasury of any 

judgment—is undoubtedly important, it does not control the inquiry. Id. at 364; see also Pucci v. 

Nineteenth Dist. Ct., 628 F.3d 752, 761–62 (6th Cir. 2010). Sovereign immunity after all guards 

against money-damages and injunction actions. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 364–65. It not only protects a 

State’s treasury, but it also “pervasively . . . emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in 

our federal system,” a consideration that applies to money-damages and injunction actions. 

Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 39 (1994).
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 5

Consider each factor in turn. First, everyone agrees that Cuyahoga County would pay 

any judgment against the Juvenile Court. That consideration favors treating the Juvenile Court 

as a component of the County.

Second, the State treats the common pleas courts and their subdivisions as segments of 

state government. The Ohio Constitution creates a “unified state judicial system,” Pucci, 

628 F.3d at 762, providing that the “judicial power of the state is vested in a supreme court, 

courts of appeals, [and] courts of common pleas and divisions thereof,” Ohio Const. art. IV, § 1; 

see Mumford v. Basinski, 105 F.3d 264, 268 (6th Cir. 1997). The legislature filled in the details, 

enacting “comprehensive state legislation” governing the State’s courts. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 360; 

Pucci, 628 F.3d at 762; see Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2151.07, 2153.01, 2153.16. State officials are 

responsible for creating new courts and adding judgeships, Ohio Const. art. IV, § 15, and the 

legislature has the “exclusive constitutional authority to define” the common pleas courts’ 

jurisdiction, State v. Aalim, 83 N.E.3d 883, 887 (Ohio 2017). The courts may constitutionally 

exercise “statewide subject-matter jurisdiction.” Cheap Escape Co. v. Haddox, LLC, 900 N.E.2d 

601, 604 (Ohio 2008). And a judge of a subdivision of the court of common pleas, including a 

juvenile court judge, is a judge of the State, complete with authority to serve temporarily 

throughout Ohio’s lower court system if circumstances require. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(A)(3).

The State also exercises considerable control over the courts. The “fundamental law of 

Ohio imparts supervisory authority over all courts of that state, and the authority to promulgate 

rules for all courts of that state, to the Ohio Supreme Court.” Mumford, 105 F.3d at 268. The 

State Constitution also “dictates standards controlling the election, residency, tenure, 

compensation, and eligibility of every Ohio common pleas judge.” Id. State statutes play a role 

too. See Ohio Rev. Code § 2153.02. Although the counties fund the courts’ day-to-day 

operations, they do so at the behest of the legislature. Mumford, 105 F.3d at 269. The board of 

commissioners in Cuyahoga County, for example, “shall provide suitable accommodations, 

facilities, and equipment for the [Juvenile Court], its officers, and employees.” Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 2153.07; see also id. § 307.01(B). The State itself pays the bulk of judges’ salaries. Id. 

§§ 141.04, 141.05. Whether as a matter of Ohio’s Constitution, its statutes, or its fisc, the State 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 6

exercises considerable control over juvenile courts, just as it does over its courts of general 

jurisdiction, courts of common pleas.

Third, the State exercises substantial influence over Juvenile Court membership. This 

factor favored “granting sovereign immunity” to the state trial courts of Michigan given that state 

officials controlled the removal of judges and the governor filled any vacancies. Pucci, 628 F.3d 

at 763. That was true even though Michigan voters elected the judges and the City in which each 

trial court was located oversaw its staff’s employment. Id. The Ohio courts of common pleas 

and juvenile courts warrant the same treatment. The Ohio governor fills any vacancy. Ohio 

Const. art. IV, § 13; Ohio Rev. Code § 2153.05. And the legislature may remove judges by a 

two-thirds vote. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 17. As in Pucci, this factor supports finding immunity.

Fourth, state courts quintessentially fall within the “traditional purview of state 

government.” Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764. The state judiciary is “one of three essential branches of 

state government.” Ernst, 427 F.3d at 361. The Federal Constitution “recognizes and preserves 

the autonomy and independence of the states . . . in their judicial departments.” Erie R.R. Co. v. 

Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938) (quotation omitted); see S.J. v. Hamilton County, 374 F.3d 

416, 421 (6th Cir. 2004); Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764. The state courts serve as the State’s 

“adjudicative voice.” S.J., 374 F.3d at 421 (quotation omitted); Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764. Their 

functions not only overlap with the “traditional purview of state government,” but they also fall 

“exclusively” within it. Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764. If any entity qualifies as an arm of the State, a 

state court does.

Valuable as multi-factor tests may be in the abstract, they rarely beat case decisions in the 

concrete. In case after case, we have held and said that the courts in a State’s third branch of 

government count as arms of the State. See Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764; Ernst, 427 F.3d at 365; S.J., 

374 F.3d at 421–24; Mumford, 105 F.3d at 260–70; Popovich v. Cuyahoga Cnty. Ct. of Common 

Pleas, 276 F.3d 808, 810 (6th Cir. 2002) (en banc); Wellman v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, No. 18-3260, 

2018 WL 9651499, at *2 (6th Cir. Nov. 13, 2018); Smiles v. Royster, No. 18-1440, 2018 WL 

4998196, at *2 (6th Cir. Oct. 1, 2018); Vaughn v. Common Pleas Ct. of Montgomery Cnty., 

No. 16-4282, 2017 WL 5514436, at *1 (6th Cir. May 4, 2017); Ward v. City of Norwalk, 640 F. 

App’x 462, 465 (6th Cir. 2016); Smith v. Leis, 407 F. App’x 918, 932 (6th Cir. 2011); Dolan v. 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 7

City of Ann Arbor, 407 F. App’x 45, 46–47 (6th Cir. 2011); Triplett v. Connor, 109 F. App’x 94, 

96 & n.4 (6th Cir. 2004); Meyers v. Franklin Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 81 F. App’x 49, 55 

(6th Cir. 2003); Williams v. Leslie, 28 F. App’x 387, 389 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Howard v. 

Virginia, 8 F. App’x 318, 319 (6th Cir. 2001); Oswald v. Lucas Cnty. Juv. Det. Ctr., 234 F.3d 

1269, 2000 WL 1679507, at *2 (6th Cir. 2000) (per curiam) (unpublished table opinion); Lazirko 

v. Parma Mun. Ct., 181 F.3d 101, 1999 WL 282635, at *1 (6th Cir. 1999) (unpublished table 

opinion). The same conclusion applies here.

Other circuits, indeed all circuits addressing the question to our knowledge, have come to 

similar conclusions. See, e.g., Brown v. Newberger, 291 F.3d 89, 92 (1st Cir. 2002); Gollomp 

v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 367–68 (2d Cir. 2009); Benn v. First Jud. Dist. of Pa., 426 F.3d 233, 

240–41 (3d Cir. 2005); Wash. Legal Found. v. Tex. Equal Access to Just. Found., 94 F.3d 996, 

1005 (5th Cir. 1996); Kelly v. Mun. Cts. of Marion Cnty., 97 F.3d 902, 907–08 (7th Cir. 1996); 

Clark v. Clark, 984 F.2d 272, 273 (8th Cir. 1993); Simmons v. Sacramento Cnty. Superior Ct., 

318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); Collins v. Daniels, 916 F.3d 1302, 1316 (10th Cir. 2019); 

Simmons v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996); see also 13 Charles Alan Wright et al., 

Federal Practice & Procedure § 3524.2 (3d ed. 2008) (“As a general matter, state courts are 

considered arms of the state.”).

The union resists this conclusion and this authority, claiming that the Juvenile Court is a 

county entity, not a state entity. It emphasizes that Cuyahoga County, not the State of Ohio, 

would pay any judgment in this case, invoking our observation that “the state-treasury inquiry 

will generally be the most important” factor in the inquiry. Ernst, 427 F.3d at 364. But this case 

shows why the who-pays-the-judgment inquiry is “not the sole criterion,” a point we clarified in 

our en banc decision in Ernst. Id. (quotation omitted). That the state court system is one of the 

three branches of state government offers a compelling reason for treating it as the State in 

federal-court litigation. That explains why we treat the Michigan trial courts as the State and 

why the source of payment of any judgment does not change things. Pucci, 628 F.3d at 764. 

“[I]n the context of a court system that . . . is mandated by the state constitution to be uniform 

and to be supervised by one supreme court,” we explained, it would be a “particular affront” to 

the State to subject the court to suit. Id. (quotation omitted). We strongly suggested the same 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 8

was true for another Ohio court, the Hamilton County Juvenile Court, in a case where we noted 

that “one would expect” respect for Ohio’s third branch of government would “weigh heavily” in 

favor of finding that a state court is an arm of Ohio. S.J., 374 F.3d at 421.

This question and answer defeat the union’s reliance on Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802 

(6th Cir. 2003). In that case, we questioned whether Mumford was correctly decided because 

it omitted any discussion of who would pay a judgment against the Lorain County 

Domestic Relations Court—perhaps because the point was not argued. Id. at 812–13. But as 

just shown, Mumford’s holding—that the Lorain County Domestic Relations Court is an arm of 

the State—remains good law. Ernst and Pucci at a minimum confirm as much.

The union separately pushes back on the idea that the State exercises control over the 

Juvenile Court, pointing out that the County has some control as well. The County, it notes, pays 

for court accommodations, facilities, and equipment and exercises some discretion in 

appropriating funds and setting employee compensation. But this funding occurs only because a 

state statute says that the County “shall” provide “suitable” resources. Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 2153.07. The Ohio Constitution’s separation-of-powers principles also preclude the County 

from limiting funding if it interferes with the “free and untrammeled exercise” of the court’s 

functions. Zangerle v. Ct. of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga Cnty., 46 N.E.2d 865, 871–72 (Ohio 

1943) (quotation omitted). That the State has delegated some funding responsibility to a local 

government does not cancel out the State’s extensive authority over the Juvenile Court. The 

courts of common pleas remain creatures of the Ohio Constitution and state statute and remain 

the third branch of state government. All in all, the Ohio state courts in general and the Juvenile 

Court in particular remain state entities for sovereign immunity purposes. See Pucci, 628 F.3d at 

764.

The union falls back on a distinct argument—that, even if the Juvenile Court counts as 

the State for some purposes, it does not count as the State for employment purposes. Court staff, 

it points out, are county employees, suggesting that sovereign immunity should not apply when 

the Juvenile Court makes employment decisions with respect to those individuals. But this 

dividing and conquering does not work. For one, court staff still answer to the administrative 

juvenile judge. The “authority to hire personnel” for the Juvenile Court “is delegated by state 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 9

statute” to the court itself rather than to county administrators. Mumford, 105 F.3d at 269. The 

administrative juvenile judge is responsible for hiring. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 2151.13, 

2153.08. He or she fixes compensation in the first instance and has the ultimate responsibility 

for firing employees. Id. §§ 2151.13, 2153.08, 2153.09; see also Abbott v. Stepanik, 582 N.E.2d 

1082, 1083–84 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).

For another, the administrative juvenile judge does not answer to the county board of 

commissioners. Voters select juvenile judges. Ohio Rev. Code § 2153.03. And those judges 

select one of their number to fill the administrative judge role. Id.; see Ohio Sup. R. 3(B). 

Juvenile judges may serve across the State. Ohio Const. art. IV, § 5(A)(3). Ohio pays most of 

their compensation. Ohio Rev. Code §§ 141.04, 141.05. And they take an oath to support the 

Ohio Constitution. Id. § 3.23. When acting as an employer, then, the Juvenile Court principally 

acts through a state official, offering one more reason among many for continuing to treat it as a 

state entity. All of this explains why we have rejected a similar argument before. See Lowe v. 

Hamilton Cnty. Dep’t of Job & Fam. Servs., 610 F.3d 321, 331 (6th Cir. 2010) (rejecting county 

agency’s argument that we should only consider those agency functions related to the plaintiff’s 

claims).

For still another reason, this kind of functional argument does not work with a state court. 

A federal court’s interference with a state court’s employees, at the instance of a private entity, is 

no less an affront to the integrity of the court than a claim against the court itself. See Pucci, 

628 F.3d at 764. It might be a different case if the governmental entity shared qualities of a 

protected court entity and an unprotected county entity. See S.J., 374 F.3d at 420–22 (permitting 

claims against a juvenile detention facility). In that setting, it might make sense to consider the 

function being exercised. But here it does not. This coequal branch of state government is the 

State, no less than the legislature or the governor—pulling all of its employees within its 

authority for immunity purposes.

III.

Our conclusion that the Juvenile Court is an arm of the State resolves many of the union’s 

claims. The union cannot sue the court itself or recover damages from the administrators in their 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 10

official capacities. McCormick v. Miami Univ., 693 F.3d 654, 661–62 (6th Cir. 2012). But that 

still leaves the possibility that the union may bring injunctive-relief claims under the Contracts 

Clause and Takings Clause against the administrators in their official capacity, Ernst, 427 F.3d at 

358, and bring money-damages claims under the same Clauses in the administrators’ individual 

capacity, Pucci, 628 F.3d at 765.

Contracts Clause. States may not “pass any . . . Law impairing the Obligation of 

Contracts.” U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that this prohibition 

bars States from “imposing a substantial impairment on a contractual relationship . . . unless that 

impairment amounts to a reasonable and appropriate means of achieving a significant and 

legitimate public purpose.” Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Schuette, 847 F.3d 800, 804 (6th Cir. 2017) 

(quotations omitted). We have held, however, that “an alleged Contracts Clause violation cannot 

give rise to a cause of action under § 1983.” Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347 (6th Cir. 

2017). Accordingly, the union’s request for relief under § 1983 cannot proceed.

The union asks us to “reconsider” Kaminski. Appellant’s Br. at 21. But a prior published 

opinion binds our panel “unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court 

requires modification” of our opinion, the en banc court overrules it, or it conflicts with an even 

earlier case. Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301, 309–10 (6th Cir. 2001) (quotation 

omitted). The union does not identify a Supreme Court case since Kaminski. While it points to a 

pre-Kaminski decision in which we affirmed an injunction against enforcement of a Michigan 

law on Contracts Clause grounds, nowhere in that opinion did we suggest we were allowing the 

plaintiffs to proceed under § 1983 or that the defendants had objected that the plaintiffs lacked a 

cause of action. Mich. State AFL-CIO, 847 F.3d at 803–05.

Takings Clause—Injunction. The Juvenile Court’s status as an arm of the State would 

not prevent us from enjoining the administrators from future violations of the Takings Clause. 

Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159–60 (1908). Still, to obtain an injunction, the union must 

establish not only that the challenged conduct qualifies as a taking, but that it also has no 

“adequate remedy at law.” Knick v. Township of Scott, 139 S. Ct. 2162, 2176 (2019). In other 

words, it must show that no acceptable “provision for obtaining just compensation exists.” Id.
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 11

The union cannot do so. Ohio allows it to pursue the rights allegedly secured under the 

collective bargaining agreements by filing in state court. The Ohio Supreme Court has explained 

that the “proper vehicle” for resolving “whether a contractual obligation exists between” a state 

court and a union representing its employees is “a declaratory judgment action in the court of 

common pleas.” State ex rel. Ohio Council 8, Am. Fed. of State, Cnty. & Mun. Emps. v. 

Spellacy, 478 N.E.2d 229, 232 (Ohio 1985) (plurality opinion). That tracks the union’s path so 

far. It has already asked a state court to declare that the Juvenile Court breached the agreements 

and award damages, and its complaint contains no allegations suggesting that route is 

inadequate. Because the claimed rights can be “vindicated through a suit in contract upon the 

disputed collective-bargaining agreements,” Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 349, the union cannot show 

its allegations warrant injunctive relief.

The union pushes back, arguing that this last analysis conflicts with Knick. After Knick, 

it claims, it need not plead that it exhausted state-law procedures before bringing a takings claim, 

and the district court erred in thinking so. But it is the union that has its wires crossed. Knick

authorized property owners to seek damages in federal court without first resorting to state law 

remedies. 139 S. Ct. at 2172–73. But in the next breath, the Court noted that so “long as an 

adequate provision for obtaining just compensation exists, there is no basis to enjoin the 

government’s action effecting a taking.” Id. at 2176. The availability of a legal remedy does not 

on its own bar the damages claims. But it does preclude an injunction.

Takings Clause—Damages. That leaves the union’s individual-capacity damages claims 

under the Takings Clause. Qualified immunity protects the administrators from these claims 

“insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of 

which a reasonable person would have known.” Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 

2003) (quotation omitted). They can invoke that protection unless “any reasonable public 

official” in their shoes would have understood that their “conduct violated the right.” Id.

But we have not found a case, as an initial matter, in which a government official merely 

breached a contract and a cognizable Takings Clause claim arose from the breach. To the 

contrary, our cases suggest that where a party claims that a governmental entity breached rights 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 12

guaranteed by a contract, “the proper recourse would be a breach-of-contract claim, not a takings 

claim.” B&B Trucking, Inc. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 406 F.3d 766, 769 (6th Cir. 2005) (en banc).

But even if state officials breaching a contract somehow violate the Takings Clause, no 

precedent clearly establishes the point. Officials of “reasonable competence could disagree” on 

whether a breach occurred here. Humphrey v. Mabry, 482 F.3d 840, 847 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(quotation omitted). The administrators could have reasonably concluded that the agreements no 

longer applied. The contracts specified that they would “remain in full force and effect until 

December 31, 2019,” R.1-1 at 37; R.1-2 at 43, nearly a year before the alleged breach on 

December 1, 2020.

In response, the union points to the agreements’ preambles, which state that the court 

agrees to “abide by the terms of this Agreement until such time as a successor agreement is 

negotiated between the parties, the Union disclaims interest, or the employees elect to decertify 

the Union as their exclusive bargaining representative.” R.1-1 at 5; R.1-2 at 5. But in the face of 

the tension between those terms and the agreements’ explicit expiration dates, it was not 

unreasonable for the administrators to conclude that the more specific duration term controlled.

We affirm.
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 13

_________________

CONCURRENCE

_________________

SUTTON, Chief Judge, concurring. Section 1983 says that, when state officials deprive 

individuals and entities “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws” of the United States, they may sue the relevant state actor. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Among 

other questions presented by today’s dispute is this one: Does the statute create a right of action 

for claims premised on violations of the Contracts Clause, which bars the States from “impairing 

the Obligation of Contracts”? U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. 

There are two schools of thought. Under one of them, the Supreme Court limited 

§ 1983’s reach to the “confines of racial problems.” Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: 

Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 Cornell L. Rev. 482, 485 (1982); Michael G. 

Collins, “Economic Rights,” Implied Constitutional Actions, and the Scope of Section 1983, 77 

Geo. L.J. 1493, 1500–07 (1989). Two relatively early examples confirm the point, each of them 

dealing with successful challenges to interference with African Americans’ voting rights. See 

Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 269, 277 (1939); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368, 378, 383 

(1915). Consistent with this approach, the Court was skeptical of applying the law beyond this 

setting. See, e.g., Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885) (seeming to reject the statute’s 

application to a Contracts Clause claim); Holt v. Ind. Mfg. Co., 176 U.S. 68 (1900) (rejecting the 

statute’s application to constitutional challenges to a state tax provision); Comment, The Civil 

Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil Remedy?, 26 Ind. L.J. 361, 363 (1951) 

(finding only 21 cases decided under the statute from 1871 to 1920). This approach prevailed for 

the first 90 years or so of the statute’s existence.

More recently, a second school of thought has taken hold. Ever “since the 1960s, § 1983 

has emerged as easily the most important statute authorizing suits against state officials for 

violations of the Constitution,” Richard H. Fallon, Jr., et al., Hart and Wechsler’s The Federal 

Courts and the Federal System 986–87 (7th ed. 2015), becoming “the general federal remedy for 

violations of all constitutional rights,” Eisenberg, supra, at 486; see Collins, supra, at 1537. 

Actionable rights under § 1983 changed from including only “civil” rights, Holt, 176 U.S. at 72, 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 14

to adding “personal” rights, Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 531–32 (1939) 

(opinion of Stone, J.), to abolishing unmanageable distinctions between “personal” and 

“property” rights, Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 542 (1972).

Under this “broad construction” of the statute, “compelled” by its sweeping reference to 

“any rights” in “the Constitution and laws” of the United States, the statute has been applied to 

all manner of constitutional rights, including structural guarantees such as the dormant 

Commerce Clause. Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 440, 443 (1991). After the U.S. Supreme 

Court determined that § 1983 provides a cause of action for violations of federal statutes, Maine 

v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980), the statute has vindicated all manner of statutory rights. See, 

e.g., Wos v. E.M.A. ex rel. Johnson, 568 U.S. 627 (2013) (Medicaid’s anti-lien provision); Wilder 

v. Va. Hosp. Assoc., 496 U.S. 498 (1990) (Medicaid’s reimbursement rates); Golden State 

Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989) (National Labor Relations Act); 

Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 4 (Social Security Act). Even as he resisted this trend, Judge Friendly 

noted that the statute had been transformed from dealing with “the kind of case that was at the 

core of congressional concern in 1871” to reaching the “full extent of [§ 1983’s] language.” 

Eisen v. Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 565–66 (2d Cir. 1969). 

Our court has one foot in the past and one foot in the present with respect to today’s 

question. In Kaminski v. Coulter, 865 F.3d 339, 347 (6th Cir. 2017), we addressed whether 

§ 1983 provides a right of action to enforce a claim under the Contracts Clause. In holding that it 

does not, we felt bound by Carter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 317 (1885), which seemed to reject a 

similar claim. Kaminski, 865 F.3d at 347. At the same time, we acknowledged the force of the 

intervening precedent. Id. at 346. One member of the panel took a different view. See id. at 

350–51 (Moore, J., dissenting) (determining that Carter did not resolve the question and 

concluding that the statute covered a Contracts Clause claim). That division mirrors a division in 

the courts of appeals. Compare S. Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Santa Ana, 336 F.3d 885, 887 (9th Cir. 

2003) (per curiam) (allowing a § 1983 action to vindicate a claim under the Contracts Clause), 

with Crosby v. City of Gastonia, 635 F.3d 634, 639–43 (4th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the right of 

action). While this case may not present an ideal vehicle for resolving the divide between these 
No. 21-3653 Laborers’ Int’l Union of N.A. v. Neff, et al. Page 15

two schools of thought—because the impairment does not appear to arise from a legislative act—

it would seem appropriate at some point for the U.S. Supreme Court to address the issue.