J-A17005-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

GARY VELORIC AND NANCY VELORIC IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JOHN DOE AND/OR JANE DOE

APPEAL OF: BRAD HEFFLER

No. 2998 EDA 2014 

Appeal from the Order Entered September 10, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2012-19479

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and OTT, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED JULY 30, 2015

Brad Heffler (“Heffler”), a subpoenaed third party, appeals the order 

entered September 10, 2014, in the Montgomery County Court of Common 

Pleas, directing him to answer ten deposition questions posed by counsel for 

plaintiffs, Gary and Nancy Veloric (“the Velorics”). In the underlying action, 

the Velorics filed suit against “John and Jane Doe” (“the Doe defendants”), 

seeking damages for, inter alia, defamation and slander, based upon an 

anonymous telephone call and two e-mails Nancy Veloric received, claiming 

her husband, Gary Veloric, was having an affair. The order at issue was 

entered after Heffler invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination, and refused to answer most of the questions posed to him 

during his deposition. On appeal, Heffler contends the trial court erred in 
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denying his claim of privilege and directing him to answer ten deposition 

questions. For the reasons below, we affirm. 

The facts underlying the order on appeal are aptly summarized by the 

trial court as follows:

 Plaintiff[s] Gary Veloric and Nancy Verloric, husband and 

wife (“the [Velorics]”), filed suit against John Doe and/or Jane 

Doe (“the Doe Defendants”), seeking damages on behalf of Gary 

Veloric for defamation, slander, libel, injurious falsehood, and 

intentional infliction of emotional distress, and, damages for loss 

of consortium on behalf of Nancy Veloric. [The Velorics] aver 

that Nancy Veloric received a phone call on January 18, 2012 

from an unidentified woman (“Jane Doe”) who claimed to be 

Gary Veloric’s girlfriend and she was angry because he was 

having sexual relations with another woman. Nancy Veloric 

questioned her husband regarding the phone call and he denied 

the anonymous caller’s claims. After some research, Nancy 

Veloric determined the phone number of the unidentified caller 

included a Nashville, Tennessee area code, and, was no longer in 

service.

According to the Complaint, on March 9, 2012, Jane Doe 

sent an email to Nancy Veloric claiming her husband told her 

that Gary Veloric was cheating on Nancy with a few different 

women. Gary Veloric denied these allegations. Another email 

was sent to Nancy Veloric on May 3, 2012, claiming that 

“besides other women, he has added hookers, so I’d be really, 

really careful when you are with him.” [The second e-mail also 

stated that the name on the email “Beth Nashton” and the email address “bnasht@gmail.com” were “made up.” Complaint, 

Exhibit A.]. 

[The Velorics] proceeded with discovery, and issued 

subpoenas to third parties Brad and Andrea Heffler to attend and 

testify at depositions.7 Brad Heffler was deposed by [the 

Velorics] on March 14, 2014 (“the Deposition”). Heffler invoked 

the Fifth Amendment, and attorney client privilege, refusing to 

answer several of the questions posed to him during the 

Deposition. [The Velorics] filed a Motion to Compel the 

Testimony of Brad Heffler (“Motion to Compel”), claiming that 

Heffler invoked the Fifth Amendment “to virtually every 
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question.” After hearing and argument (“the Hearing”) on the 

Motion to Compel, and reviewing the Deposition, the Court 

ordered Heffler to answer some of the questions at issue and 

sustained his objections to others (“the Order”). Other questions 

remaining were resolved either by counsels’ agreement to 

withdraw certain questions, or, by Heffler’s agreement to answer 

some of the questions. Continuing to rely upon the Fifth 

Amendment and/or attorney client privilege, Heffler refused to 

answer those questions he was ordered to answer that were not 

otherwise resolved, and, this Appeal ensued.

__________

7

The Velorics and the Hefflers were previously involved in 

litigation before the Montgomery County Court of Common 

Pleas in the matter of Gary Veloric and Nancy Veloric v. 

Brad Heffler and Andrea Heffler, et. al., docketed at 2009-

09902, in which the Velorics[] raised claims of trespass, 

conversion, waste, negligence, and, nuisance. At the time, 

the Veloric and Heffler residences shared a property line 

(“the Trespass Complaint”). There were also related cases 

at Gary Veloric and Nancy Veloric v. Montgomery County 

Lands Trust, docketed at 2010-2140, and Gary Veloric and 

Nancy Veloric v. Whitemarsh Township, docketed at 2009-

42979. Ultimately, a praecipe to settle, discontinue and 

end was docketed in each of these three cases.

 Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/2015, at 1-3 (some footnotes and emphasis 

omitted).1

____________________________________________

1 On October 8, 2014, the trial court ordered Heffler to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). 

Heffler complied with the court’s directive, and filed a concise statement on 

October 24, 2014. 

We note that the Doe defendants have also filed an appeal from a 

pretrial discovery order, namely a December 1, 2014, order of the trial court 

granting the Velorics’ motion to compel discovery and ordering the Doe 

defendants to appear for depositions. That appeal, docketed at No. 121 EDA 

2015, was originally listed consecutively with this appeal, however, counsel 

for the Doe defendants requested, and was granted, a continuance of oral 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Before we address Heffler’s substantive issue, we must first consider 

the Velorics’ claim that the order on appeal is not appealable.2 “We address 

this issue first because the appealability of an order directly implicates the 

jurisdiction of the court asked to review the order.” EMC Mortgage, LLC v. 

Biddle, 114 A.3d 1057, 1060 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation omitted). 

Generally, “[a]n appeal may be taken only from a final order unless 

otherwise permitted by statute or rule. A final order is ordinarily one which 

ends the litigation or disposes of the entire case[.]” Ben v. Schwartz, 729 

A.2d 547, 550 (Pa. 1999). Most “discovery orders are deemed interlocutory 

and not immediately appealable because they do not dispose of the 

litigation.” Dougherty v. Heller, 97 A.3d 1257, 1261 (Pa. Super. 2014) 

(en banc) (citation omitted), appeal granted in part, 109 A.3d 675 (Pa. 

2015). However, certain discovery orders, particularly those involving 

ostensibly privileged material, have been found to be immediately 

appealable as collateral orders pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 313. See

Berkeyheiser v. A-Plus Investigations, Inc., 936 A.2d 1117, 1123-1124 

(Pa. Super. 2007). 

Rule 313 provides, in relevant part:

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

argument. The case is now scheduled to be argued before a panel of this 

Court in mid-July, 2015. 

2 Heffler addresses the appealability of the order sub judice in the second 

issue in his brief. See Heffler’s Brief at 21-25.
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(a) General rule. An appeal may be taken as of right from a 

collateral order of an administrative agency or lower court.

(b) Definition. A collateral order is an order separable from and 

collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is 

too important to be denied review and the question presented is 

such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, 

the claim will be irreparably lost.

Pa.R.A.P. 313.

In the present case, the order on appeal is the discovery order, 

entered September 10, 2014, directing Heffler to answer ten specific 

questions posed by the Velorics’ counsel during his deposition and, implicitly

overruling Heffler’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.3

 Heffler contends the order is appealable as a collateral order. 

We agree.

As noted above, an otherwise interlocutory order may be immediately 

appealable as a collateral order if it satisfies all three prongs of the collateral 

____________________________________________

3 At the conclusion of the September 10, 2014, hearing on the issue, the 

trial court entered a ruling from the bench directing Heffler to answer ten 

specific deposition questions. N.T., 9/10/2014 (Court Order) at 1-7. That 

same day, the court entered the following written order: 

AND NOW, this 10th day of SEPTEMBER, 2014, after 

proceeding in open Court this day, the Order of the Court is as 

recited on the record in open court this day. 

The Court Reporter is directed to transcribe the Notes of 

Testimony which shall constitute the written Order of the Court. 

Costs of the transcript shall be shared equally between the 

parties.

Order, 9/10/2014.
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order test. Dougherty, supra, 97 A.3d at 1261. First, the order must be 

separate and distinct from the main cause of action. Berkeyheiser, supra, 

936 A.2d at 1123. This prong is easily met by the order sub judice. The 

question of whether Heffler properly invoked his constitutional right against 

self-incrimination may be addressed without consideration of the merits of 

the Velorics’ underlying defamation action. 

The second prong of the collateral order test mandates that the order 

“must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the 

particular litigation at hand.” Id. (citations omitted). The courts of this 

Commonwealth have held that discovery orders raising questions of 

executive privilege, attorney/client privilege, and privacy interests all raise 

the type of deeply rooted public policy concerns necessary to qualify as a 

collateral order. See Ben, supra, 729 A.2d at 552 (determination as to 

whether investigative files of Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs 

“are subject to any executive or statutory privilege implicates rights rooted 

in public policy, and impacts on individuals other than those involved in this 

particular litigation.”); Berkeyheiser, supra, 936 A.2d at 1124 (“the issues 

of attorney-client and work-product privileges, as well as privacy concerns, 

[in an order directing defendant to turn over discovery materials,] implicate 

rights deeply rooted in public policy, especially where the disclosure of such 

information affects individuals other than those involved in this particular 

case.”); J.S. v. Whetzel, 860 A.2d 1112, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2004) (order 

directing expert witness “to submit every 1099 form he received from any 
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insurance company and/or attorney from 1999 through 2002,” raised 

“sufficiently important public concern” regarding expert’s privacy interest in 

his income information to qualify as collateral order).

We find the order at issue herein similarly raises a right “deeply rooted 

in public policy.” Berkeyheiser, supra, 936 A.2d at 1123. Indeed, 

Heffler’s privilege against self-incrimination is protected under both the 

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions. See U.S. Const., Amend. V; 

Pa. Const., Art. I, § 9. Although his answers to the requisite deposition 

questions would potentially implicate only himself, the privilege against selfincrimination is so engrained in our nation that it constitutes a right “deeply 

rooted in public policy.” Berkeyheiser, supra, 936 A.2d at 1123. See 

Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444-445 (1972) (“The privilege 

[against self-incrimination] reflects a complex of our fundamental values and 

aspirations, and marks an important advance in the development of our 

liberty[, and t]his Court has been zealous to safeguard the values which 

underlie the privilege.”). 

Lastly, to qualify as an appealable collateral order, the order must be 

such that “if review is postponed until final judgment of the case, the claim 

will be irreparably lost.” Ben, supra, 729 A.2d at 552. The Velorics argue 

that this prong is not met in the instant matter because, if Heffler is 

criminally prosecuted based upon disclosures he makes during his compelled 

deposition, the trial court in a later criminal matter could exclude the 

evidence as violative of his privilege against self-incrimination. See Velorics’ 
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Brief at 2. Therefore, they insist Heffler’s right to review the court’s ruling 

will not be “irreparably lost.” Id. 

However, we find the Velorics’ proposal undermines the purpose of the 

constitutional privilege. First, if Heffler continues to disobey the court’s 

order, he would be subject to sanctions, including contempt proceedings. 

“[T]he option of disobeying a disclosure order and being thus subject to 

discovery or contempt sanctions as a way of obtaining review is so extreme 

as to be no option at all.” Commonwealth v. Harris, 32 A.3d 243, 251 

(Pa. 2011) (holding order overruling claim of doctor/client privilege 

immediately appealable as collateral order). Moreover, Heffler should not be 

subject to the costs and emotional toll of a prosecution based upon his 

privileged answers, even if the answers may later be suppressed. 

Accordingly, we conclude the order at issue is appealable as a collateral 

order, and we now turn to the merits of the appeal.

In his primary claim, Heffler argues the trial court erred in implicitly 

overruling the invocation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination, 

and directing him to answer the following ten questions, posed to him during 

his deposition:4

____________________________________________

4 Heffler includes a third issue in his brief in which he challenges the trial 

court’s determinations that (1) he waived his claim of privilege because he 

did not specify the crime with which he could potentially be charged, and (2) 

he failed to include certain documents necessary for appellate review in the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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1) Have you heard from any other source and learned 

knowledge of the contents of that alleged phone call 

[referring to phone call made to Nancy Veloric on January 

18, 2012]?

2) Have you learned from any other source any information 

concerning the telephone number (615)242-4934?

3) Do you have any knowledge of any kind concerning that 

address [referring to email address “bnasht@gmail.com”]?

4) Are you aware that [the Velorics’ counsel] authored a letter 

to [your counsel] offering to permit you to avoid testifying 

at a deposition if you would execute an affidavit stating that 

you had no knowledge of the telephone number, the alleged 

phone call and the two e-mails and the alleged e-mail 

address?

5) Let’s mark this as P-1 [referring to 10/8/2013 letter from 

the Velorics’ counsel to Heffler’s counsel]. ... I’m going to 

show you what I’ve marked as P-1, and I’m going to ask 

you if you’ve ever seen this before.

6) Let’s mark this as P-2, then [referring to response from 

Heffler’s counsel to Velorics’ counsel]. ... I’m showing you a 

document that I’ve marked as P-2 and I’m going to ask you 

if you’ve ever seen that before.

7) Let’s mark this as P-3 [referring to copy of anonymous emails sent to Nancy Veloric]. ... Do you have any information 

as to who authored the two e-mails on P-3?

8) Do you see on P-3 that the two e-mails that are referenced 

are dated, respectively, March 9, 2012 and May 3, 2012, 

although I think they might be actually reversed on the 

page?

9) I’m going to rephrase that. Are you aware of any 

information concerning the identity of the Doe defendant or 

defendants in this case?

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

certified record. See Heffler’s Brief at 25-27. We will address those 

contentions within this issue.
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10) Do you have any knowledge of any kind that would lead you 

to believe who the Doe defendant or defendants may be?

See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/2015, at 6-10, citing Oral Deposition of Brad 

Heffler, 3/14/2014, at 17, 19, 20, 22-23, 26-27. In response to each of 

these questions, Heffler invoked his right to remain silent under the Fifth 

Amendment.5 

It is well-settled that “the privilege against self-incrimination can be 

asserted ‘in any proceeding, civil or criminal, administrative or judicial, 

investigatory or adjudicatory.’” Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 464, 

(1975) (citation omitted). When the privilege is invoked in state 

proceedings, it is governed by federal standards. Commonwealth v. 

Hawthorne, 236 A.2d 519, 520 (Pa. 1968). “In other words, the standards 

to be [] used in determining whether or not the silence of one questioned 

about the commission of a crime is justified are the same in both state and 

federal proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Carrera, 227 A.2d 627, 629 (Pa. 

1967), superseded by statute on other grounds, Commonwealth v. 

Swinehart, 664 A.2d 957 (Pa. 1995).

____________________________________________

5 With regard to questions four, five and six, Heffler also refused to answer 

based upon attorney/client privilege. See Oral Deposition of Brad Heffler, 

3/14/2014, at 19-23. However, in his concise statement and his brief before 

this Court, Heffler challenges the court’s ruling only with respect to his 

privilege against self-incrimination. Therefore, he has waived any 

attorney/client privilege claim on appeal. See Commonwealth v. ReyesRodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 781 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“Because Appellant has 

failed to develop his argument or cite authority, he is not entitled to relief on 

his first claim.”).
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Our review of a Fifth Amendment claim is governed by the following 

principles:

The Fifth Amendment declares in part that ‘No person * * 

* shall be compelled in any Criminal Case to be a witness 

against himself’. This guarantee against testimonial compulsion, 

like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, ‘was added to the 

original Constitution in the conviction that too high a price may 

be paid even for the unhampered enforcement of the criminal 

law and that, in its attainment, other social objects of a free 

society should not be sacrificed.’ This provision of the 

Amendment must be accorded liberal construction in favor of the 

right it was intended to secure. 

The privilege afforded not only extends to answers that 

would in themselves support a conviction under a federal 

criminal statute but likewise embraces those which would furnish 

a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant 

for a federal crime. But this protection must be confined to 

instances where the witness has reasonable cause to apprehend 

danger from a direct answer. The witness is not exonerated 

from answering merely because he declares that in so 

doing he would incriminate himself—his say-so does not 

of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the 

court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require 

him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is 

mistaken.’ However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, 

were required to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim 

is usually required to be established in court, he would be 

compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is 

designed to guarantee. To sustain the privilege, it need only 

be evident from the implications of the question, in the 

setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to 

the question or an explanation of why it cannot be 

answered might be dangerous because injurious 

disclosure could result. The trial judge in appraising the claim 

‘must be governed as much by his personal perception of the 

peculiarities of the case as by the facts actually in evidence.’ 

Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 485-487 (1951) (internal 

citations omitted and emphasis supplied). See also Carrera, supra. 
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In its opinion, the trial court first concluded Heffler waived his 

challenge to questions five, six, seven and eight because he failed to insure 

that the exhibits referred to in those questions were part of the certified 

record. See Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/2015, at 11. Next, with regard to the 

remaining questions, the court determined Heffler “is mistaken in his 

concerns regarding self-incrimination.” Id. at 13. The court provided the 

following rationale:

Heffler acknowledges that he is not at risk of prosecution based 

upon harassment, because the statute of limitations for 

harassment is only two years and the events at issue occurred 

between January 18, 2012 and May 3, 2012 []. He then argues, 

however, other criminal offenses in Pennsylvania are subject to 

five-year statutes of limitation, citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(b) 

(“Section 5552(b)”). Heffler’s [Memorandum of Law in 

Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel His Testimony], 

however, fails to indicate which of the some twenty-eight major 

offenses listed in Section 5552(b) he could be charged with in 

the event the Order is affirmed. Nor does the Concise 

Statement raise a claim of error regarding any specific offense 

he might be charged with in the event he answers the Questions. 

Without more detail as to which of the crime(s) listed in Section 

5552(b) apply, the Court cannot address this argument. 

Further, upon review, it does not appear that Heffler could be 

charged with any criminal offense under Section 5552(b).

Our Supreme Court explained that when an individual is 

called to testify in a judicial proceeding, “he or she is not 

exonerated from answering questions merely upon the 

declaration that in doing so it would be self-incriminating. It is 

always for the court to judge if the silence is justified, and an 

illusory claim should be rejected.” Carrera, 227 A.2d at 629. 

The U.S. Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution both 

protect an individual from being called as a witness against 

himself in criminal and civil proceedings, formal or informal, 

where the answers to questions might incriminate the individual 

in further criminal proceedings. The Court is hard-pressed, 
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however, to find that the answers to the Question[s] could 

possibly be incriminating.

Id. at 13-14 (footnote omitted).

With regard to the court’s determination that he waived his challenge 

to questions five, six, seven and eight, Heffler acknowledges that the trial 

court is “technically correct” that Exhibits P-1 and P-2, referred to in 

questions five and six, were not made part of the certified record. Heffler’s 

Brief at 26. However, he asserts the exhibits “were described on the record, 

and it appeared as if the court was looking at them[.]”6 Id. Moreover, after 

the appeal was filed, the parties entered into a stipulation whereby they 

agreed that Exhibits P-1 and P-2 “should be included in the original record 

and transmitted to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.” Stipulation, 

3/3/2015. Thereafter, on March 4, 2015, Heffler filed an application in this 

Court for correction of the certified record. On March 30, 2015, we granted 

Heffler’s application, and the trial court later supplemented the certified 

record with the letters that were designated as Exhibits P-1 and P-2 during 

Heffler’s March 14, 2014, deposition. Accordingly, we are not precluded 

from reviewing Heffler’s Fifth Amendment challenge to questions five and 

six. 

____________________________________________

6 See Oral Deposition of Brad Heffler, 3/14/2014, at 22 (identifying Exhibit 

P-1 as a letter from Velorics’ counsel to Heffler’s counsel dated 10/8/2013); 

24 (identifying Exhibit P-2 as a letter from Heffler’s counsel to Velorics’ 

counsel in response to the 10/8/2013 letter).
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With regard to the exhibit P-3, referred to in questions seven and 

eight, our review of Heffler’s deposition transcript reveals that Exhibit P-3 

was a printed copy of the two anonymous emails Nancy Veloric received 

from the sender, “bnasht@gmail.com.” See Oral Deposition of Brad Heffler, 

3/14/2014, at 25-26. Further, these emails were part of the certified 

record, as they are attached to the Velorics’ complaint. See Complaint, 

7/19/2012, Exhibit A. Accordingly, we agree with Heffler that his challenge 

to all ten questions at issue is preserved for our review.

Nevertheless, we find that Heffler’s Fifth Amendment challenge to 

questions four, five, six and eight fails on the merits. With respect to these 

questions, Heffler was asked: (1) if he was aware the Velorics’ counsel 

sent a letter to his attorney offering him the opportunity to execute an 

affidavit in lieu of deposition testimony (Question 4); (2) if he had seen the 

letter from the Velorics’ counsel before the deposition (Question 5); (3) if 

he had ever seen the response sent by his own lawyer (Question 6); and 

(4) if he could see the date of the e-mails on the exhibit (Question 8). 

We can conceive of no answers to these questions that would tend to 

incriminate Heffler, or lead to evidence that might demonstrate his 

culpability for the acts described in the complaint. See Hoffman, supra. 
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Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly overruled his claim of 

privilege with regard to these questions.7 

With regard to the remaining questions, Heffler argues that “[e]ach 

question ... has a possible answer that could lead to evidence that would 

support [his] violation of crimes related to the use of computers, or a 

conspiracy to do so.” Heffler’s Brief at 21. He emphasizes he is not required 

to “prove the hazard, because then he ... would surrender the protection the 

privilege was designed to protect.” Id. at 18, citing Hoffman, supra. 

Moreover, he claims he need not demonstrate “a real danger of prosecution 

exists.” Id. at 17. Although Heffler does not provide any analysis of the 

potential crimes with which he might be charged, he asserts the Velorics’ 

counsel “conceded” that his answers could lead to a charge of unlawful use 

of a computer, a crime that was still within the statute of limitations. Id. at 

20. 

Furthermore, we note that at oral argument for this appeal, Heffler 

again declined to expound on the specific crimes with which he might be 

charged, but referred to the Velorics’ complaint, which stated “whatever 

salacious purpose the sender or senders have, that purpose is both civilly 

and criminally censorable, both under State and under Federal Law.” 

____________________________________________

7 We note Heffler does not differentiate between the questions he was 

directed to answer. Rather, he claims, generally, that all of the questions 

could lead to incriminating answers.
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Complaint, at ¶ 18 (emphasis supplied). Heffler also cited two Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court decisions, to support his contention that the fact that the 

statute of limitations may have expired with regard to a criminal charge is 

not grounds for compelling a witness to testify when he has invoked his Fifth 

Amendment privilege. See McFadden v. Reynolds, 11 A. 638 (Pa. 1887); 

Commonwealth v. Lenart, 242 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1968) (plurality). 

Upon our review, it appears the crux of Heffler’s argument is that once 

he has invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege, he has no further burden to 

prove that his answers may provide incriminating testimony. See Heffler’s 

Brief at 18 (“The witness is not required to prove the hazard, because then 

he or she would surrender the protection the privilege was designed to 

protect.”). Further, he distinguishes a Commonwealth Court decision, cited 

by the Velorics, which places the burden squarely on the witness to establish 

“that he or she has a reasonable ground for asserting the privilege.” 

McDonough v. Com., Dep't of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 18 

A.2d 1258, 1261 (Pa. Commw. 1992). Heffler contends the McDonough

Court relied upon a 1911 Supreme Court decision “which cannot survive the 

adoption of the federal standard” announced in Carrera, supra. Heffler’s 

Brief at 19. 

Our review of the relevant case law, however, confirms that Heffler 

has the burden to demonstrate he has “reasonable cause to apprehend” a 

“real danger of prosecution” should he be compelled to testify. Carrera, 

supra, 227 A.2d at 629. As Heffler asserts, a witness is not “required to 
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prove the hazard” since, in doing so, “he would be compelled to surrender 

the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” Hoffman, 

supra, 341 U.S. at 486. However, we interpret this passage in Hoffman to 

mean the witness need not provide answers to the questions before the 

trial court can determine whether or not the answers might be incriminating. 

The Supreme Court has made clear: 

The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because 

he declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself – his 

say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It 

is for the court to say whether his silence is justified, and to 

require him to answer if ‘it clearly appears to the court that he is 

mistaken.’ 

Id. (citations omitted). Were we to accept Heffler’s contention, that the 

witness asserting the privilege has no burden of proof, we would exonerate a 

witness based solely on his “say-so.” Id. Rather, pursuant to Hoffman, 

and its progeny, the final determination as to whether the privilege was 

properly invoked lies with the trial court. As the Supreme Court explained in 

United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953):

Indeed, in the earlier stages of judicial experience with the

problem, both extremes were advocated, some saying that the 

bare assertion by the witness must be taken as conclusive, and 

others saying that the witness should be required to reveal the 

matter behind his claim of privilege to the judge for verification. 

Neither extreme prevailed, and a sound formula of compromise 

was developed. ... There are differences in phraseology, but in 

substance it is agreed that the court must be satisfied from all 

the evidence and circumstances, and ‘from the implications of 

the question, in the setting in which it is asked, that a 

responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it 

cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious 

disclosure could result.’ If the court is so satisfied, the claim 
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of the privilege will be accepted without requiring further 

disclosure.

Id. at 8-9 (emphasis supplied). Therefore, a witness must demonstrate to 

the court that he has “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct 

answer.” Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. at 486.

Here, the trial court was not satisfied that Heffler’s responsive answers 

might be incriminating. First, the court explained that the one obvious crime 

with which Heffler could be charged was harassment, but that crime has a 

two-year statute of limitations which had expired. See Trial Court Opinion, 

2/20/2015, at 13. The court acknowledged there are several offenses, listed 

in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552(b), which are subject to a five-year statute of 

limitations, but noted that Heffler failed to indicate which of these crimes 

might be implicated by his proposed testimony. Indeed, our review of the 

crimes listed in Section 5552(b) reveals that none apply to the facts alleged 

in the complaint, save for the offense of unlawful use of a computer. See 42 

Pa.C.S. § 5552(b);8 18 Pa.C.S. § 7611 (Unlawful Use of A Computer and 

Other Computer Crimes). However, our review of the elements of that crime 

reveals that it is not implicated by the acts described in the complaint.9

____________________________________________

8 The crime of unlawful use of a computer is listed in Section 5552(b) as 

“section 3933 (relating to unlawful use of a computer).” 42 Pa. C.S. § 

5552(b). However, Section 3933 was repealed in 2002, and replaced by 

Section 7611. See 2002, Dec. 16, P.L. 1953, No. 226, § 3 , effective in 60 

days.

9 The crime of unlawful use of a computer, codified at 18 Pa.C.S. § 7611, 

provides that a person commits the offense if he:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Significantly, Heffler does not specify which crimes might be implicated 

by the acts alleged in the complaint, and provides no analysis establishing 

that his answers might support a charge of unlawful use of a computer as 

delineated in 18 Pa.C.S. § 7611. While Heffler is not required to provide 

potentially incriminating answers to the questions before asserting his Fifth 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(1) accesses or exceeds authorization to access, alters, 

damages or destroys any computer, computer system, 

computer network, computer software, computer program, 

computer database, World Wide Web site or telecommunication 

device or any part thereof with the intent to interrupt the normal 

functioning of a person or to devise or execute any scheme or 

artifice to defraud or deceive or control property or services by 

means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations or 

promises;

(2) intentionally and without authorization accesses or 

exceeds authorization to access, alters, interferes with 

the operation of, damages or destroys any computer, 

computer system, computer network, computer software, 

computer program, computer database, World Wide Web site or 

telecommunication device or any part thereof; or

(3) intentionally or knowingly and without authorization 

gives or publishes a password, identifying code, personal 

identification number or other confidential information about a 

computer, computer system, computer network, computer 

database, World Wide Web site or telecommunication device.

18 Pa.C.S. § 7611(a) (emphasis supplied). Here, the facts alleged in the 

complaint assert that the Does sent two anonymous, defamatory e-mails to 

Nancy Veloric. See Complaint, 7/19/2012, at ¶¶ 7-16. There are no 

allegations that the Does accessed a computer or computer system, or 

knowingly published a password. It is not clear that simply sending a 

defamatory e-mail would constitute a violation of the statute. 
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Amendment privilege, he must demonstrate “reasonable cause to apprehend 

danger[.]” Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. at 486. This, he failed to do.10 

Heffler also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that he cannot 

invoke his Fifth Amendment right when the statute of limitations has expired 

with respect to the potential crime. He cites two decisions of the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court which hold the contrary. We conclude, 

however, that the viability of these decisions is questionable at best.

In the 1887 decision, McFadden, supra, the plaintiff sued the 

defendant for breach of a promise of marriage. The defense called a witness 

to testify whether he had carnal knowledge of the plaintiff on a date two 

years earlier. The witness declined to answer, invoking his Fifth Amendment 

right, although he conceded that any prosecution would be barred by the 

statute of limitations. The trial court declined to compel the witness to 

testify, and on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court explained:

We are not prepared to hold that, where a witness is asked upon 

the stand to say whether he has committed a crime, he shall be 

compelled to do so simply because he may, if a prosecution for 

that crime is subsequently instituted against him, plead the 

statute of limitations in defense. It seems to us he is protected 

against [in]criminating himself in such a manner as to subject 

himself even to a prosecution. 

McFadden, supra, 11 A. at ___. 

____________________________________________

10 We do not find that Heffler’s mere reference to the Velorics’ complaint, in 

which the Velorics assert the Does’ actions were “criminally censorable, both 

under State and Federal Law,” satisfies this burden. Heffler’s Brief at 26.
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The only appellate decision citing McFadden is Lenart, supra. In 

that case, a two-justice plurality,11 rejected the Commonwealth’s argument 

that a government witness should have been compelled to testify when the 

prosecution of any implicated offense was barred by the statute of 

limitations. Lenart, supra, 242 A.2d at 262. Relying on McFadden, the 

plurality stated:

[T]he statute of limitations is not per se a bar to prosecution; it 

is an affirmative defense which must be pleaded. Thus, if not 

pleaded, the prosecution machinery will grind. The privilege 

against self-incrimination is not limited to those cases where the 

witness can be Convicted on the basis of his testimony. The 

privilege protects him regardless as to whether or not the trial 

would result in a conviction.

Id. The plurality declined to overrule McFadden, despite the 

Commonwealth’s claim that the “overwhelmingly favored” rule was that the 

privilege does not attach when the acts are no longer punishable by reason 

of the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. at 262-263.

However, in a concurring opinion, Justice O’Brien, joined by Justice 

Roberts, declared he “would not at this time reaffirm the holding of 

McFadden” which he described as “a case that has not withstood the test of 

time.” Id. at 264 (O’Brien, J., Concurring). Rather, Justice O’Brien noted 

“[i]f the witness cannot be convicted of the crime, the fact that he can be 

____________________________________________

11 Justice Musmanno authored the Opinion of the Court, and was joined by 

Chief Justice Bell. Justice O’Brien authored a Concurring Opinion, joined by 

Justice Roberts. Justices Jones, Cohen and Eagen concurred in the result.
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prosecuted for it is of only academic interest.” Id. However, because he 

found it was not “altogether clear ... that conviction for any crimes revealed 

by [the witness’s] testimony would be barred by the statute of limitations,” 

Justice O’Brien concluded that the witness properly exercised his privilege. 

Id.

Therefore, while McFadden has not been overruled, its continued

vitality is dubious. This is particularly true since in Brown v. Walker, 161 

U.S. 591 (1896), the United States Supreme Court held that a witness may 

not invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege when the offense with which he 

could be charged is barred by the statute of limitations. The Court opined: 

“[I]f a prosecution for a crime, concerning which the witness is interrogated, 

is barred by the statute of limitations, he is compellable to answer.” Id. at 

598. See also Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 620 (2003) (“[The 

Supreme Court] has clearly stated that the Fifth Amendment’s privilege 

against self-incrimination does not apply after the relevant limitations period 

has expired.”), citing Brown, supra.

In light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brown, we 

decline to follow McFadden. Indeed, it is axiomatic that when the Fifth 

Amendment privilege is invoked in state proceedings, it is governed by 

federal standards. Hawthorne, supra; Carrera, supra. Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court properly considered the fact that the only obvious 

crime with which Heffler could have been charged based upon his deposition 

testimony – harassment - was barred by the statute of limitations. 
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Moreover, we find that any other possible indictment based upon unspecified 

state and/or federal crimes was improbable, and Heffler failed to 

demonstrate “reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct 

answer.” Hoffman, supra, 341 U.S. at 486 (emphasis supplied). Indeed, 

we agree with the conclusion of the trial court that “Heffler’s refusal to 

answer the Questions based upon the Fifth Amendment is not supported by 

the record in this case as it is perfectly clear that there is no risk of selfincrimination[.]” Trial Court Opinion, 2/20/2015, at 14. 

Accordingly, we affirm the order of the trial court overruling Heffler’s 

invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege and directing Heffler to answer 

ten deposition questions.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/30/2015