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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re WALENTOWSKI, Minors. December 20, 2018

No. 343599

Monroe Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 16-023797-NA

Before: CAVANAGH, P.J., and SERVITTO and CAMERON, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Respondent-mother appeals as of right the order terminating her parental rights to her two 

minor children, RW and AW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication 

continue to exist), (c)(ii) (other conditions exist that led to jurisdiction have not been rectified), 

(g) (failure to provide proper care and custody),1 and (j) (reasonable likelihood that children will 

be harmed if returned to parent). The parental rights of respondent-father were also terminated 

by the court, but respondent-father has not appealed the court’s order of termination. On appeal, 

respondent-mother challenges the trial court’s best-interest determination. We affirm.

Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred when it concluded that termination 

was in the best interests of the children because (1) the paternal grandfather who accepted the

relative placement required financial assistance to care for the children, and respondent-mother’s 

parental rights were terminated in part because of her insufficient income; (2) the children did 

not have their own rooms at the paternal grandfather’s home, and respondent-mother’s parental 

rights were terminated in part because the children did not have their own rooms at respondentmother’s home; and (3) the trial court failed to consider each child’s best interests individually. 

We disagree.

 1 MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) has been amended, effective June 12, 2018. See 2018 PA 58. The 

statute, as amended, states “[t]he parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do 

so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation 

that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time 

considering the child's age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) as amended by 2018 PA 58. The revised 

version of the statute is inapplicable because the order was entered on April 24, 2018.
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The lower court must determine whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s best 

interest using the preponderance of the evidence standard. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 

836 NW2d 182 (2013). This Court reviews the lower court’s findings for clear error. MCR 

3.977(K). “[T]he court’s decision regarding [a] child’s best interest” is also reviewed for clear 

error. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). A finding is clearly erroneous if, “ ‘although there is evidence to support it, the 

reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been made.’ ” Id. (citation omitted). Clear error review requires a lower court’s decision to 

strike this Court “as more than just maybe or probably wrong.” Id. Regard also must “be given 

to the special opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses who appeared 

before it.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111 (2011). 

MCL 712A.19b(5) states that “[i]f the court finds that there are grounds for termination 

of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests,” the court 

must terminate the parent’s rights. MCL 712A.19b(5). In making the best interest 

determination, “the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting 

ability, the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster 

home over the parent’s home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 

144 (2012) (citations omitted).

First, respondent-mother argues that the court erred when it terminated her parental rights 

in part because of her insufficient income and because the paternal grandfather, who also had 

insufficient income, would receive an adoption subsidy upon termination of respondent-mother’s 

parental rights. Respondent-mother’s argument misconstrues the trial court’s best-interest 

determination.

The trial court did not weigh the paternal grandfather’s financial difficulties in his favor, 

nor did it terminate respondent-mother’s parental rights because the paternal grandfather needed 

an adoption subsidy to provide for the children. Instead, the trial court acknowledged that the 

paternal grandfather was in “somewhat of a tenuous situation economically,” and found that, 

despite his limited income, the paternal grandfather had managed to provide for all of the 

children’s needs for the duration of the case. Indeed, it was in spite of the paternal grandfather’s 

economic situation that the trial court weighed the advantages of the grandfather’s home over the 

advantages of respondent-mother’s home. For two years, the paternal grandfather had provided 

the “home and the forever home for the children and [had] provided for all of their needs.” 

Furthermore, the trial court found that “[b]etween [the paternal grandfather’s] income and the 

income of his elderly mother and . . . the home that he resides in that currently is owned by her, 

he’s able to provide for the children, [and] maintain suitable housing with everything in working 

order.” While the trial court agreed with petitioner’s argument that the adoption subsidy would 

help “economically,” the trial court also found that by terminating respondent-mother’s parental 

rights and making the children available for adoption, the children would benefit “physically, 

psychologically, [and] emotionally.”

Second, respondent-mother argues the trial court erred because it favored the paternal 

grandfather’s living arrangement over her living arrangement even though neither could provide 

separate rooms for the children. Again, respondent-mother misconstrues the trial court’s 

rationale.
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The trial court did not find that respondent-mother’s home, or more specifically the home 

of respondent-mother’s parents, was unsuitable for the children because the children would not 

each have their own bedroom. Instead, the trial court found that the factor of “permanency, 

stability, and finality” weighed in favor of termination of parental rights because of respondentmother’s “unstable track record.” Particularly, the trial court highlighted respondent-mother’s 

recent return to her parents’ home, and her “unstable track record . . . of housing . . . and bad 

choices in relationships[, which] shows that she’s not able to provide stability for both herself 

and security for herself but most significantly for the kids.” While the foster care worker did 

testify at trial that she believed each child should have their own bedroom, the trial court did not 

appear to rely on this belief because it did not refer to the particular characteristics of the home 

of respondent-mother’s parents whatsoever in its best-interest determination. Regardless, the 

fact remained that the major concern was allowing RW and AW to share a room, which was not 

the arrangement with the paternal grandfather.

Finally, respondent-mother argues that the trial court failed to make separate best-interest 

determinations for AW and RW. Trial courts must consider “the best interests of each child 

individually.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 42. While keeping siblings together is 

typically in the best interests of each child, “if keeping the children together is contrary to the 

best interests of an individual child, the best interests of that child will control.” Id. (quotation 

marks and citations omitted). However, this Court has clarified that “if the best interests of the 

individual children significantly differ, the trial court should address those differences when 

making its determination of the children’s best interests.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 715; 

846 NW2d 61 (2014). The trial court does not err simply because “it fails to explicitly make 

individual and—in many cases—redundant factual findings concerning each child’s best 

interests.” Id. at 716.

On appeal, respondent-mother focuses on the differences in bond, arguing that she has a 

stronger bond with AW than RW. See In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (stating 

that one best interest factor is “the child’s bond to the parent”). The foster care worker stated 

that AW “love[d] spending time with [respondent-mother],” whereas RW and respondentmother’s relationship was “[s]trained” because RW blamed respondent-mother for the family’s 

separation, and believed that respondent-mother favored AW over him. However, the trial court 

weighed the existing parent-child bond of the children in respondent-mother’s favor, concluding 

that “a bond exists” between respondent-mother and both her children. Instead, the remaining 

best-interest factors applied equally to both children, and those factors, such as lack of income, 

housing, failure to comply with the case service plan, advantages of the foster home, and the 

children’s need of permanency and stability—vastly outweighed the favorable parental bond. To 

make separate factual findings on these points would have been redundant and was not necessary 

to the trial court’s best-interest determination.

Additionally, respondent-mother argues that, because her parenting ability differed 

between AW and RW, the trial court should have analyzed that factor separately. See In re 

Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (stating that one best interest factor is “the parent’s 

parenting ability”). The trial court found that respondent-mother’s parenting ability was 

deficient as to both AW and RW because during visitations respondent-mother would focus her 

efforts on RW and his special needs, causing her to neglect AW. Respondent-mother argues that 

this finding suggests that if her parental rights to RW were terminated she would have the 
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requisite parenting ability to appropriately parent AW. However, this argument ignores the other 

aspects of her parenting ability as a best-interest factor.

The trial court’s findings of facts established that respondent-mother was unable to 

“properly parent the children physically, psychologically, emotionally, [and] economically,” all 

of which are encompassed in the parenting-ability factor. Respondent-mother’s inconsistent 

employment history and insufficient income demonstrated that she lacked a “viable substantial 

track record of providing for the children’s economic needs,” and respondent-mother “[had] 

substantially failed to provide for their material needs during this case.” Respondent-mother also 

placed AW at risk of physical, psychological, and emotional harm through her continued “poor 

judgment in maintaining co-dependent romantic relations, most recently with [a boyfriend], who 

victimized [respondent-mother] just this past year.” Respondent-mother’s poor track record 

involving romantic relationships is particularly dangerous for AW, who first came into care 

because respondent-mother’s then live-in-boyfriend physically abused AW and caused her 

“multiple injuries including a broken wrist, a rib fracture, multiple bruises from head to toe[,] 

and [a] subdural bleed in her head.” In sum, the trial court’s findings of fact demonstrate that 

respondent-mother’s parenting ability was deficient as to both children, and requiring the trial 

court to consider her parenting ability individually for each child would have been redundant and 

unnecessary. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that petitioner 

established by a preponderance of the evidence that termination of respondent-mother’s parental 

rights was in the children’s best interests.

Affirmed.

/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh 

/s/ Deborah A. Servitto 

/s/ Thomas C. Cameron