IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

SPOKANE COUNTY; STATE OF 

WASHINGTON; DEPARTMENT OF 

ECOLOGY,

No. 47158-2-II

Appellants,

v.

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

SIERRA CLUB, and CENTER FOR 

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY,

Respondents.

MELNICK, J. — This case arises out of a permit issued by the Department of Ecology 

(Ecology) to Spokane County for the Spokane Regional Water Reclamation Facility (the Facility). 

It centers on whether Ecology took the proper steps under the National Pollution Discharge 

Elimination System (NPDES) permitting process to ensure the discharge from the Facility did not 

contain unsafe Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCB) levels. The Sierra Club and the Center for 

Environmental Law and Policy (collectively Sierra Club) appealed the NPDES Permit. The 

Pollution Control Hearing Board (PCHB) concluded that portions of the Permit were invalid and 

remanded to Ecology. Spokane County and Ecology appealed the PCHB’s conclusions of law and 

order of remand to Thurston County Superior Court. The superior court affirmed the PCHB. 

Spokane County and Ecology now seek review.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

August 16, 2016
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We hold that the PCHB properly decided Ecology should have conducted a reasonable 

potential analysis. However, we also conclude that the PCHB acted contrary to the law by 

performing its own reasonable potential analysis and determining the Facility had a reasonable 

potential to cause or contribute to a violation of water quality standards for PCB levels in the 

Spokane River. Independent of the PCHB’s own analysis, because Ecology should have 

conducted a reasonable potential analysis, we conclude that remand was proper. We affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand.1

FACTS

The Federal Clean Water Act establishes water quality goals for the United States’ 

navigable waters. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The NPDES is one mechanism for achieving these goals. 

33 U.S.C. § 1342. The Clean Water Act prohibits any discharge of pollutants into the nation’s 

navigable waters, unless the discharge is made according to the terms of a permit issued under the 

NPDES. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) authorized 

Washington State to manage the NPDES permit program in the state. See RCW 43.21A.020; 

WAC 173–226–030(5), –050(1). The Washington State Legislature delegated this authority to 

Ecology. RCW 43.21A.020; ch. 90.48 RCW.

 

1

In addition to the issues we review in this opinion, Ecology also assigns error to the superior 

court’s affirmation of the PCHB’s decision. However, we take the place of the superior court 

when reviewing a PCHB order. Patterson v. Segale, 171 Wn. App. 251, 257-58 n.3, 289 P.3d 657 

(2012). Furthermore, Ecology does not brief the issue. Therefore, we do not review this 

assignment of error. RAP 3.3; Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 

P.2d 549 (1992).
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I. THE FACILITY AND PERMIT

In 2011, Spokane County completed construction of the Facility, a state of the art 

wastewater tertiary treatment plant.2 In phase 1, which began when the Facility opened, the 

Facility was projected to process between 7 and 8 million gallons of water per day. The Facility 

is projected to handle up to 12 million gallons of water per day by the year 2030 and 24 million 

gallons of water per day at its maximum capacity. Prior to its construction, Riverside Park Water 

Reclamation Facility processed wastewater in Spokane County. With the new technology utilized 

by the Facility, it is expected to achieve higher PCB removal from the effluent discharges.3 The 

Facility’s treatment technology will “reduce the discharge of PCBs to the Spokane River at 

potentially undetectable levels.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 24.

In September 2010, Spokane County applied for a NPDES permit for the Facility, and in 

November 2011, Ecology issued the Permit. The Permit’s effective date is December 1, 2011, and 

its expiration date is November 31, 2016. In December 2011, the Facility began discharging 

treated effluent in compliance with the Permit. The Facility does not discharge to a part of the 

Spokane River that is on the 303(d) list.

4

 Pub. L. No. 92-500, § 303(d), 86 Stat. 816, 848-49 (1972) 

(codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)).

 

2 A tertiary treatment process incorporates a “step-feed nitrification/denitrification membrane 

bioreactor with chemical phosphorus removal” and several other key components. Administrative 

Record (AR) at 272. 

3 PCBs are “legacy pollutants that continue to persist in the environment.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 

18. PCBs are in wastewater and are also introduced into the environment from other, sometimes 

unidentified, sources. 

4 The 303(d) list includes those waters not meeting Washington State human health water quality 

criteria for PCBs in edible fish tissue. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1)-(2). Classification under the 303(d) 

list triggers different requirements, such as a Total Maximum Daily Load assessment. 33 U.S.C. 

§ 1313(a)(l); see 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(a), (l). 
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A water quality specialist for Ecology, Richard Koch, reviewed the application, prepared 

a Fact Sheet,5and prepared the Permit. The Fact Sheet stated that Ecology evaluated the Facility’s

potential to violate the water quality standards as required by 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d). It followed 

the procedures published in two guidance documents6to make a reasonable potential 

determination. 

Koch did not estimate a specific PCB concentration for the Facility discharge. According 

to Koch, insufficient data on PCBs existed to conduct a reasonable potential analysis7and to 

determine if a reasonable potential existed for the effluent discharge to contribute to violations of 

 

5 A Fact Sheet is a document prepared by Ecology and includes information about the type of 

facility, the geographical area, the criteria for which coverage under the general permit will be 

approved, effluent characteristics, effluent standards and limitations applied, and other 

information. WAC 173-226-110.

6 The Office of Water, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Technical Support Document for Water QualityBased Toxics Control (Mar. 1991) (EPA/505/2-90-001), 

https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0264.pdf, (TSD), and Ecology’s Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 

Water Quality Program Permit Writer’s Manual (rev. Dec. 2011) (Pub. No. 92-109) (Permit 

Writer’s Manual). 

7 According to Koch a “reasonable potential analysis” is 

a tool to provide first an estimate of the concentrations of a pollutant at the edge of 

the mixing zone. It’s basically using the dilution provided by the river of the 

effluent discharged from the treatment plant. Numbers you need, obviously, the 

flow in the river, the concentration upstream, and the concentration coming out of 

the treatment facility. They both meet in the mixing zone, they combine, they mix, 

and the model is designed to project what that combined concentration would be 

downstream at the edge of the mixing zone.

RP (March 25, 2013) at 120-21.
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the PCB criteria. The Permit did not include numeric permit limitations for PCBs.8 Koch drafted 

permit conditions utilizing best management practices and narrative effluent limitations, or

narrative criteria.9 

One condition of the Permit required Spokane County to prepare an “Annual Toxics 

Management Report” that Ecology would review and approve. CP at 27-28. As a part of the 

condition, Ecology also required Spokane County to prepare a “Quality Assurance Project Plan” 

that detailed water quality sampling and analyzed protocols. CP at 30. Samples were to be 

analyzed using EPA Method 1668, a method that was not approved for compliance purposes, but 

was approved for monitoring purposes.10 

The Permit provided that in the next permitting period, Ecology would conduct a 

reasonable potential analysis from the data collected during the first permit. It would then establish 

a numeric effluent limit. Koch asserted that similar permit conditions had been used in the NPDES 

 

8 According to the Clean Water Act, an “effluent limitation” is “any restriction established by a 

State or the Administrator on quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, 

and other constituents which are discharged from point sources into navigable waters, the waters 

of the contiguous zone, or the ocean, including schedules of compliance.” 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11). 

The federal regulation specifies that an “[e]ffluent limitation means any restriction imposed by the 

Director on quantities, discharge rates, and concentrations of ‘pollutants’ which are ‘discharged’

from ‘point sources’ into ‘waters of the United States,’ the waters of the ‘contiguous zone,’ or the 

ocean.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.2.

9 Best management practices are to control or abate the discharge of pollutants when numeric 

effluent limitations are infeasible. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k). According to the TSD, “[N]arrative 

criteria are statements that describe the desired water quality goal, such as the following: ‘All State 

waters must, at all times and flows, be free from substances that are toxic to humans or aquatic 

life.’” AR at 2638.

10 EPA Method 1668 is a means of assessing compliance and offers lower detection and 

quantification levels for surface water monitoring of PCBs than other methods. However, the 

approved analytical method for surface water monitoring of PCBs at the time this Permit was 

challenged was EPA Method 608, not Method 1668. EPA Method 1668 was only approved for 

monitoring. 
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permits for other dischargers into the Spokane River. The permits for each NPDES discharger in 

Washington’s section of the Spokane River have narrative effluent limitations. 

The Fact Sheet stated, “The Task Force and Ecology’s ‘Spokane River Toxics Reduction 

Strategy’ are intended to avoid the need for a PCB [Total Maximum Daily Load assessment] and 

initiate source reduction and clean up actions sooner than if a [Total Maximum Daily Load 

assessment] came first.” Administrative Record (AR) at 1532. Further, it stated, “If the proposed 

Task Force approach is not successful, other means and methods will be employed including the 

option of a PCB [Total Maximum Daily Load assessment].” AR at 1532.

II. THE PCHB HEARING

Sierra Club appealed the Permit to the PCHB on December 28, 2011, arguing that the 

Permit authorized PCB discharges that would cause or contribute to a violation of water quality 

standards, including violations of 40 C.F.R. § 122.44. 

In March 2013, the PCHB held a hearing on Sierra Club’s appeal of the Permit. During 

the hearing, Sierra Club, Spokane County, and Ecology presented testimony from several experts 

and interested parties. The expert witnesses included Koch, Peter deFur, and Bruce Rawls called 

by Sierra Club, as well as Jim Bellatty and Khalil Abusaba called by Spokane County and Ecology. 

The parties also introduced two reports at the hearing upon which the expert witnesses 

relied. The first was a draft report that resulted from Ecology’s Total Maximum Daily Load 

assessment for PCBs in the Spokane River in 2003-2004. The second report, entitled the 

“Spokane River PCB Source Assessment 2003-2007” (Source Assessment), issued in April 2011. 

In that report, Ecology estimated that PCB load reduction in excess of 99 percent by municipal, 

industrial, and stormwater discharges would be needed for compliance with human health criterion 
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for PCBs. The Source Assessment relied in part on the 2003-2004 data collection from the first 

report. 

Koch testified that at the time of the hearing, based on recent reports, he understood the 

Facility was achieving 99 percent removal of PCBs. deFur testified that lab results from tests of 

the Facility showed how many PCBs were in the influent and one assessment showed the 

percentage removal of PCBs was about 98 percent. He stated, “It’s remarkable. I know that in 

other areas where technical committees have been looking to see what can be done about that, they 

would have said it’s not possible.” Report of Proceedings (RP) (March 26, 2013) at 277. Abusaba 

testified that “we can’t tell the difference between effluent and ultra purified laboratory water.” 

RP (March 27, 2013) at 576. 

Abusaba also stated, “Koch was right, the discharge of effluent from the membrane 

bioreactor system will not cause a measurable change in PCB concentrations of the river.” RP 

(March 27, 2013) at 577. He clarified that while the discharge might actually be diluting the 

concentration of PCBs in the water, “I would not want to make a statement [in] either direction 

because we are beyond the limits of quantitation, and since we are below the limits of quantitation, 

how can we say that there is a measurable change in concentrations or loads?” RP (March 27, 

2013) at 616. He went on to state, “We are not at a level in these measurements we’re making that 

we can make quantitative statements about the concentrations of PCBs.” RP (March 27, 2013) at 

616. He stated the data was sufficient to show Koch’s judgment call that the PCB level would be 

extraordinarily low was correct. 

Koch testified that he did not perform a reasonable potential analysis for PCBs because 

insufficient data existed to perform the analysis. Specifically, no monitoring of PCBs through the 

kind of filter used by the Facility had occurred previously. When asked whether he was aware of 
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and considered the Department of Health’s fish advisory for Spokane County while drafting, he 

stated that he did not because fish migrate and therefore, “may or may not demonstrate” reasonable 

potential. RP (March 25, 2013) at 73. He stated he looked at existing toxic pollutants but did not 

consider the assessment’s conclusion in conducting a reasonable potential analysis. According to 

Koch, the two data points acquired by the time of the PCHB hearing were not adequate to conduct 

an analysis. 

During his testimony, Koch also referred to a recent decision of the EPA in Idaho in a 

comparable situation.11 In response to a comment during the open comment period, the EPA in 

Idaho stated it had determined that “it is currently infeasible to calculate numeric water qualitybased effluent limits for PCBs . . . due to lack of data.” AR at 1536. It also stated, “The lack of 

data also prevents the EPA from determining whether the Idaho publicly owned treatment works 

[] have the reasonable potential to cause or contribute to excursions above any of the affected 

jurisdictions’ water quality standards for PCBs.” AR at 1536. Finally, the EPA stated, “None of 

the [NPDES] permits for [publicly owned treatment works] discharging to the Spokane River in 

Idaho or Washington have numeric effluent limits for PCBs. . . . [BMPs] may be required in lieu 

of numeric effluent limits when numeric effluent limits are infeasible or when they are reasonably 

necessary to carry out the purposes and intent of the Clean Water Act.” AR at 1536.

Koch was asked to explain why in the Fact Sheet, he wrote, “The evaluation showed that 

the discharge has no reasonable potential other than PCBs to cause a violation of water quality 

standards.” AR at 1530. Koch explained that this statement did not mean he found a reasonable 

potential for PCBs; instead, it meant “there is insufficient data on PCBs to make that determination. 

 

11 The EPA is the regulatory agency in Idaho. 
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So [he] [couldn]’t say there’s reasonable potential, no reasonable potential, if [he] d[i]dn’t have 

data to make that determination.” RP (March 25, 2013) at 71.

The PCHB issued findings of fact and conclusions of law in July 2013. The PCHB found 

that Ecology had access to information that a regulatory authority could consider when performing 

a reasonable potential analysis. It found that Ecology had information about the type of facility, 

the available dilution for the effluent, the existing data on toxic pollutants, the State’s list of waters 

not meeting water quality standards, and fish advisories or bans. The PCHB also found that Koch 

testified he was aware of the fish advisory but did not consider the information pertinent because 

fish migrate and that Koch testified he did not use information already collected about Spokane 

River because he wanted more recent data. Further, the PCHB found that Koch testified he did 

not rely on the existing data on toxic pollutants because he did not have monitoring data on PCB 

removal from a tertiary treatment process and “it would be too speculative to include load 

reduction in the Fact Sheet.” CP at 27.

The PCHB concluded “Ecology should have used this data to conduct a reasonable 

potential analysis for PCBs.” CP at 36. It also concluded that “the evidence presented support[ed]

the conclusion that there is a reasonable potential for the discharge from the Facility to cause or 

contribute to a violation of water quality standards.” CP at 37.

The PCHB concurred with Koch and concluded that inadequate data existed to prepare a 

numeric effluent limit for PCBs. It wrote, “The [PCHB] defers to the technical expertise of 

Ecology on this matter and accepts [Koch’s] conclusion that calculation of a numeric effluent limit 

for PCBs was not feasible.” CP at 37. It also concluded that one permit condition failed as a 

narrative effluent limitation for lack of defined and mandatory language, as well as deadlines. 
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The PCHB remanded the Permit to Ecology with directions to incorporate deadlines, 

mandatory requirements, expected reductions, and additional sampling rounds. The PCHB 

directed Ecology to set numeric effluent limitations at the “earliest possible time, including during 

the term of the current permit.” CP at 41. 

Sierra Club filed a motion for reconsideration seeking modification of the Permit to 

“expressly prohibit discharges that cause or contribute to violations of all applicable water quality 

standards related to PCBs.” AR at 2248. The PCHB denied the motion, and in August 2013, 

entered a final order. 

III. SUPERIOR COURT REVIEW

Ecology and Spokane County petitioned Thurston County Superior Court for review of the 

PCHB’s findings of fact and conclusions of law and final order. Both Ecology and Spokane 

County argued the PCHB erred by concluding that Ecology should have conducted a reasonable 

potential analysis and by concluding that the evidence demonstrated that the Facility had a 

reasonable potential to cause or contribute to a violation of water quality standards. 

The superior court heard argument in October 2014. It concluded that “the PCHB did not 

erroneously interpret and apply the law” and affirmed the PCHB. CP at 47. On January 9, 2015, 

the superior court issued an order affirming the PCHB. 

Ecology and Spokane County appeal.

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

We review a PCHB decision under the Washington Administrative Procedures Act, chapter 

34.05 RCW. Cornelius v. Dep’t of Ecology, 182 Wn.2d 574, 584-85, 344 P.3d 199 (2015). We 

sit in the same position as the superior court. Patterson v. Segale, 171 Wn. App. 251, 257-58 n.3, 
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289 P.3d 657 (2012); see also RCW 34.05.526 (“An aggrieved party may secure appellate review 

of any final judgment of the superior court under this chapter by the supreme court or the court of 

appeals.”). Review of the facts is confined to the record before the PCHB, and we apply the 

Washington Administrative Procedures Act standards directly to that record. Port of Seattle v. 

Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 151 Wn.2d 568, 587, 90 P.3d 659 (2004). The burden to demonstrate 

invalid agency action is on the party asserting the challenge, here Spokane County and Ecology. 

RCW 34.05.570(1)(a); Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 587. 

The legislature designated Ecology to regulate the state’s water resources. RCW 

43.21A.020. Ecology is the state’s water pollution control agency, and it reviews NPDES permit 

applications, prepares Fact Sheets, and issues NPDES permits. RCW 90.48.260(1); WAC 173-

220-010, -040, -060; Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t v. Dep’t of Ecology, 149 Wn. App. 830, 

835, 205 P.3d 950 (2009). “The scope and standard of the PCHB review is de novo.” Port of 

Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 592. The PCHB reviews NPDES permits to determine if Ecology issued a 

permit that is “invalid in any respect.” RCW 43.21B.110.

If the PCHB makes this determination, it “shall order the department to reissue the permit 

as directed by the [PCHB] and consistent with all applicable statutes and guidelines of the state 

and federal governments.” WAC 371-08-540(2). In this case, we may grant relief on review of 

the PCHB (1) if PCHB’s order is contrary to the law, (2) if the order is not supported by substantial 

evidence, and (3) if the order is arbitrary and capricious. Cmty Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, 149 

Wn. App. at 840-41. In their appeal, Spokane County and Ecology rely on the first and third 

prongs.
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An order is contrary to the law if it is outside of PCHB’s statutory authority or jurisdiction, 

is an erroneous interpretation or application of the law, or is inconsistent with agency rule. Cmty 

Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, 149 Wn. App. at 840. The courts are the “‘final arbiter[s]’” of 

conclusions of state law and are not bound by agency interpretation of these laws. City of Redmond 

v. Cent. Puget Sound Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Bd., 136 Wn.2d 38, 46, 959 P.2d 1091 (1998) (quoting 

Leschi Improvement Council v. Highway Comm’n, 84 Wn.2d 271, 286, 525 P.2d 774, 804 P.2d 1 

(1974)). We review the PCHB’s legal conclusions de novo. Fort v. Dep’t of Ecology, 133 Wn. 

App. 90, 95, 135 P.3d 515 (2006).

An agency acts in an arbitrary or capricious manner when its action is “‘willful and 

unreasoning and taken without regard to the attending facts or circumstances.’” Cmty. Ass’n for 

Restoration of Env’t, 149 Wn. App. at 841 (quoting Hillis v. Dep’t of Ecology, 131 Wn.2d 373, 

383, 932 P.2d 139 (1997)). Under this prong, even if reasonable opinions vary, we will not disrupt 

the PCHB’s decision “[w]here there is room for two opinions, and the agency acted honestly and 

upon due consideration.” Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 589. 

A. Reasonable Potential Analysis 

Spokane County and Ecology argue the PCHB improperly applied the law by concluding 

Ecology “should have” conducted a reasonable potential analysis to determine whether PCBs from 

the Facility had a reasonable potential to cause or contribute to contamination of the Spokane 

River. Br. of Appellant (SC) at 18; Br. of Appellant (E) at 12. They contend that under the 

guidance provided by the EPA, Ecology had discretion to decide whether to conduct a reasonable 

potential analysis prior to issuing a NPDES permit without facility-specific data. Further, Spokane 
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County opines that the exercise of discretion here involved Ecology’s expertise in administering 

water quality laws and involves scientific issues.12 We disagree.

In reviewing a NPDES permit, the PCHB first assesses whether the permit provides 

reasonable assurances to protect water quality. Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 595. It may create 

additional conditions only after it concludes the permit is inadequate for this purpose. Port of 

Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 595. The legislature empowered Ecology to oversee permit regulation. 

RCW 43.21A.020. Ecology’s interpretations of water resource statutes and regulations are entitled 

to great weight, as long as the interpretation does not conflict with the plain language of the statutes 

and regulations. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark County v. Pollution Control Hr’gs Bd., 137 Wn. 

App. 150, 157, 151 P.3d 1067 (2007). However, even if a PCHB order is found to be inconsistent 

with an agency rule, no relief should be granted if the ‘“[PCHB] provides facts and reasons to 

demonstrate a rational basis for the inconsistency.”’ Cmty. Ass’n for Restoration of Env’t, 149 

Wn. App. at 840 (quoting Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 587-88). 

Here, Ecology interpreted several state and federal statutes and concluded that it did not 

need to conduct a reasonable potential analysis before it issued the initial permit because Koch 

determined insufficient data existed. The main regulation in question is contained in 40 C.F.R. § 

122.44(d)(1), which provides,

(i) Limitations must control all pollutants or pollutant parameters (either 

conventional, nonconventional, or toxic pollutants) which the Director determines 

are or may be discharged at a level which will cause, have the reasonable potential 

to cause, or contribute to an excursion above any State water quality standard, 

including State narrative criteria for water quality.

 

12 Sierra Club argues that the majority of Spokane County’s and Ecology’s assertions revolve 

around substantial evidence for the PCHB’s findings of fact. However, Spokane County and 

Ecology do not challenge any of the PCHB’s findings of fact. They challenge only PCHB’s 

conclusions of law and the resulting order. Applying the law to facts is a question of law and 

therefore, we review de novo. Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 588.
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(ii) When determining whether a discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to 

cause, or contributes to an in-stream excursion above a narrative or numeric criteria 

within a State water quality standard, the permitting authority shall use procedures 

which account for existing controls on point and nonpoint sources of pollution, the 

variability of the pollutant or pollutant parameter in the effluent, the sensitivity of 

the species to toxicity testing (when evaluating whole effluent toxicity), and where 

appropriate, the dilution of the effluent in the receiving water.

(iii) When the permitting authority determines, using the procedures in paragraph 

(d)(1)(ii) of this section, that a discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to 

cause, or contributes to an in-stream excursion above the allowable ambient 

concentration of a State numeric criteria within a State water quality standard for

an individual pollutant, the permit must contain effluent limits for that pollutant.

(Emphasis added).

The Wash. Dep't of Ecology, Water Quality Program Permit Writer’s Manual (rev. Dec. 

2011) (Pub. No. 92-109) (Permit Writer’s Manual), relied on by Koch in preparing the Permit, 

interpreted this federal regulation, and stated, “Federal regulations require the permit manager to 

determine whether a discharge has a reasonable potential to violate water quality standards and if 

so to place a water quality-based effluent limit in the permit.” AR at 2495. Further it stated, “To 

determine this, the permit manager must know the criteria, the background concentration, the point 

of compliance, design flows for the receiving water and effluent flow, how to deal with multiple 

pollutants and effluent variability and the process of developing an effluent limit.” AR at 2495. 

The Permit Writer’s Manual stated that “Ecology has adopted EPA’s (1991) process of 

determining reasonable potential.” AR at 2500. It also stated that it relies on the Office of Water, 

U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Technical Support Document for Water Quality-Based Toxics Control 

(Mar. 1991) (EPA/505/2-90-001), https://www3.epa.gov/npdes/pubs/owm0264.pdf (TSD).

The TSD, also relied on by Koch, “is intended to support the implementation of the [Clean 

Water Act] water quality-based approach to toxics control” and qualifies this support by stating, 
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“As such, the recommendations and guidance found in [the TSD] are not binding and should be

used by regulatory authorities with discretion.” AR at 2606. The TSD provided very specific 

guidance for determining permit limits when no effluent monitoring data for the specific facility 

existed. It stated that “effluent must be characterized and the permitting authority must determine 

the need for permit limits to control the discharge. The purpose of effluent characterization is to 

determine whether the discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to cause or contributes to an 

excursion of numeric or narrative water quality criteria.” AR at 2653 (emphasis added).

Further, it in part paraphrased and in part quoted 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(ii) stating, 

“[T]he regulatory authority is required to consider, at a minimum, existing controls on point and 

nonpoint sources of pollution, the variability of the pollutant or pollutant parameter in the effluent, 

the sensitivity of the involved species to toxicity testing (for whole effluent), and, where 

appropriate, the dilution of the effluent in the receiving water.” AR at 2655. In the context of 

providing two options—setting a permit limit (1) without effluent monitoring data or (2) after 

effluent monitoring data—the TSD stated, 

If the regulatory authority so chooses, or if the circumstances dictate, the

authority may decide to develop and impose a permit limit . . . prior to the 

generation of effluent data. Water quality-based permit limits can be set . . . based 

on the available dilution and the water quality criterion or the State standard in the 

absence of facility specific effluent monitoring data. 

AR at 2656. It went on to state that “the regulatory authority can use a variety of factors and 

information where facility-specific effluent monitoring data are unavailable,” which include but 

are not limited to dilution, type of industry, type of publicly owned treatment works, existing data 

on toxic pollutants, history of compliance problems and toxic impact, and type of receiving water 

and designated use. AR at 2656.

Finally, the TSD stated,
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Regardless, the regulatory authority, if it chooses to impose an effluent limit 

after conducting an effluent assessment without facility-specific monitoring data, 

will need to provide adequate justification for the limit in its permit development 

rationale or in its permit fact sheet. A clear and logical rationale for the need for 

the limit covering all of the regulatory points will be necessary to defend the limit 

should it be challenged. In justification of a limit, EPA recommends that the 

more information the authority can acquire to support the limit, the better a 

position the authority will be in to defend the limit if necessary. In such a case, 

the regulatory authority may well benefit from the collection of effluent monitoring 

data prior to establishing the limit.

If the regulatory authority, after evaluating all available information on the 

effluent, in the absence of effluent monitoring data, is not able to decide whether 

the discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to cause, or contributes to, an 

excursion above a numeric or narrative criterion for whole effluent toxicity or for 

individual toxicants, the authority should require whole effluent toxicity or 

chemical-specific testing to gather further evidence. In such a case, the regulatory 

authority can require the monitoring prior to permit issuance, if sufficient time 

exists, or it may require the testing as a condition of the issued/reissued permit.

AR at 2657.

Ecology contends that the interpretation of federal regulations in the Permit Writer’s 

Manual and the TSD gave it the choice to either conduct a reasonable potential analysis without 

facility specific data, or to wait and collect PCB data. While Ecology’s interpretation of water 

resource statutes and regulations is afforded great deference, the interpretation cannot go against 

the plain language of the statutes and regulations. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 of Clark County, 137 Wn. 

App. at 157.

The federal regulation mandates that “[l]imitations must control all pollutants . . . which 

the [agency] determines are or may be discharged at a level which will cause, have the reasonable 

potential to cause, or contribute to an excursion above any State water quality standard.” 40 C.F.R. 

§ 122.44(d)(1)(i) (emphasis added). To make the determination, the agency “shall use procedures 

which account for existing controls on point and nonpoint sources of pollution, the variability of 

the pollutant or pollutant parameter in the effluent, the sensitivity of the species to toxicity testing 
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(when evaluating whole effluent toxicity), and where appropriate, the dilution of the effluent in 

the receiving water.” 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d)(1)(ii) (emphasis added). The plain language of the 

regulation does not grant Ecology discretion to delay a reasonable potential analysis entirely.

Further, the section of the TSD Ecology relied on, when read in full, did not provide 

Ecology discretion on whether to conduct the analysis, but instead afforded Ecology discretion in 

how it conducted the analysis. In context, the TSD stated that if the agency decided to conduct a 

reasonable potential analysis before it had collected facility-specific data, and after relying on the 

available information to conduct the analysis it could not reach a conclusion, the agency could 

issue a permit that required testing and data collection. 

Spokane County argues that the TSD “cautions Ecology in [making a determination by 

reference to other information], and allows instead the course Ecology choose.” Br. of Appellant 

(SC) at 20. However, this argument again takes the TSD language out of context. The TSD 

generally cautions against creating a permit limit before collecting facility-specific data, not 

against relying on the suggested factors. It recommends that the permitting authority be prepared 

to defend the limit and that it “may well benefit from the collection of effluent monitoring data 

prior to establishing the limit.” AR at 2657 (emphasis added). Following Spokane County’s 

argument to its natural conclusion reveals its tenuousness. The permitting authority would be 

encouraged to avoid and defer analyses meant to protect water quality, so as to not trigger other 

regulation requirements. For these reasons, we reject Spokane County’s argument.

Ecology compares the decision to delay a reasonable potential analysis to the EPA’s similar 

decision in Idaho on nearly identical facts. In response to comments from the Spokane Tribe of 

Indians, the EPA in Idaho wrote, “Numeric toxics control remains an option once we have better 

data, an appropriate test method approved for use in NPDES permits, and in the event that the 
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[Spokane River Regional Toxics Task Force] fails to achieve measurable reductions in PCB 

loads.” AR at 3751. The EPA also responded, “[I]t is currently infeasible to calculate numeric 

water quality-based effluent limits for PCBs . . . due to the lack of data.” AR at 1536. It further 

stated, “The lack of data also prevents the EPA from determining whether the Idaho publicly 

owned treatment works (PTOWs) have the reasonable potential to cause or contribute to 

excursions above any of the affected jurisdictions’ water quality standards for PCBs.” AR at 1536.

These responses do not demonstrate that the EPA believed a reasonable potential analysis 

prior to issuing a permit was discretionary. Instead, the responses show that the EPA agreed that 

there was insufficient data to create a numeric permit limit and that a reasonable potential analysis 

was inconclusive. This construal is in line with our above interpretation of the federal regulation. 

We conclude that federal regulations required Ecology to conduct a reasonable potential 

analysis before issuing the Facility a permit but that it has discretion in how to perform the analysis. 

Because Ecology declared it did not conduct such an analysis, we do not consider whether 

Ecology’s discretion to exercise scientific expertise was usurped by the PCHB in this context. The 

PCHB did not err by concluding Ecology “should have” conducted a reasonable potential analysis.

Spokane County and Ecology also argue that the PCHB should not have ordered Ecology 

to modify a Permit condition because Ecology was not required to include a water quality based 

effluent limitation for PCBs. Spokane County argues the PCHB lacked authority to direct Ecology 

to modify the permit because the PCHB did not make the conclusion that the Permit was invalid. 

We do not reach this issue.
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“In those cases where the board determines that the department issued a permit that is 

invalid in any respect, the board shall order the department to reissue the permit as directed by the 

board and consistent with all applicable statutes and guidelines of the state and federal 

governments.” WAC 371-08-540(2) (emphasis added). Here, the Permit was invalid because 

Ecology failed to conduct a reasonable potential analysis. Therefore, when the PCHB arrived at 

this conclusion, remand was the proper remedy. For this reason, we do not decide whether the 

PCHB properly concluded the Permit conditions flowing from Ecology’s failure to conduct a 

reasonable potential analysis were inadequate. We remand to Ecology to conduct a reasonable 

potential analysis.13

B. Reasonable Potential Conclusion

Spokane County and Ecology argue the PCHB compounded its first error by making its 

own determination about the reasonable potential analysis. Ecology contends that even if we 

conclude the PCHB did not err by deciding Ecology should have conducted a reasonable potential 

analysis, we should reverse the PCHB’s order to remand the Permit because the PCHB erred by 

determining there was a reasonable potential PCB discharges would cause or contribute to a 

violation of water quality standards. We agree with Ecology that the PCHB should not have 

conducted its own reasonable potential analysis.

“‘“[I]n reviewing matters within agency discretion, the court shall limit its function to 

assuring that the agency has exercised its discretion in accordance with law, and shall not itself 

undertake to exercise the discretion that the legislature has placed in the agency.”’” Puget Sound 

 

13 We do note that Ecology cannot avoid setting limits by simply not conducting the reasonable 

potential analysis. Instead, the language Spokane County and Ecology rely on to justify the permit 

conditions is triggered when a reasonable potential analysis is conducted and it is determined there 

is no reasonable potential for contaminating the water, not when Ecology declines to conduct any

analysis .
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Harvesters Ass’n v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 182 Wn. App. 857, 867, 332 P.3d 1046 (2014) 

(quoting Rios v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 145 Wn.2d 483, 502 n.12, 39 P.3d 961 (2002) (quoting 

RCW 34.05.574(1))). ‘“[S]ubstantial judicial deference to agency views [is] appropriate when an 

agency determination is based heavily on factual matters, especially factual matters which are 

complex, technical, and close to the heart of the agency’s expertise.’” Puget Sound Harvesters 

Ass’n, 182 Wn. App. at 867 (quoting Hillis, 131 Wn.2d at 396).

However, our Supreme Court has previously highlighted the special relationship Ecology 

shares with the PCHB as contrasted with other agency and board relationships. See Port of Seattle, 

151 Wn.2d at 594. This relationship results from the EPA’s specific delegation of authority to 

Ecology. Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 594. The PCHB’s role is to review permits and if it finds 

them “invalid in any respect” to remand to Ecology. WAC 371-08-540(2). Ecology, not the 

PCHB, is the agency empowered by the EPA to issue, manage, and regulate permits in Washington 

State. RCW 43.21A.020; see also RCW 90.48.520 (“In order to improve water quality by 

controlling toxicants in wastewater, [Ecology] shall in issuing and renewing state and federal 

wastewater discharge permits review the applicant’s operations and incorporate permit conditions 

which require all known, available, and reasonable methods to control toxicants in the applicant’s 

wastewater.” (Emphasis added.)). “Rule making, interpretive, and enforcement functions remain 

with Ecology, the agency ‘charged with administration’ of water quality statutes and rules.” Port 

of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 592 (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Theodoratus, 135 Wn.2d 582, 589, 957 

P.2d 1241 (1998)).

The PCHB concluded that “the evidence presented support[ed] the conclusion that there is 

a reasonable potential for the discharge from the Facility to cause or contribute to a violation of 

water quality standards.” CP at 36-37. Ecology argues that the PCHB improperly applied the law 
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by using five factors from the EPA’s guidance to conduct a reasonable potential analysis without 

facility-specific data and from those factors, concluding there was a reasonable potential that 

discharge from the Facility would cause or contribute to a violation of water quality standards.14 

We agree.

In Port of Seattle, the PCHB imposed 16 new conditions on a Clean Water Act certification 

after Ecology performed a “reasonable assurance” analysis. 151 Wn.2d at 600-01. The PCHB 

determined that without the new conditions, reasonable assurance would not be met. Port of 

Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 600-01. The appellants argued that the PCHB should have remanded to 

Ecology rather than “‘repairing’ [the Clean Water Act] certification with new conditions.” Port 

of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 601. The Washington Supreme Court held that “[g]iven the PCHB’s 

statutory role requiring it to provide uniform and independent review of Ecology’s actions, it is 

well within the PCHB’s authority to add conditions in order to bring a [Clean Water Act]

certification into the realm of reasonable assurance.” Port of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d at 601.

In contrast, here, the PCHB was not reviewing Ecology’s reasonable potential analysis but 

was conducting its own initial analysis. It could not conduct a de novo review of Ecology’s 

analysis because Ecology acknowledged it did not perform one. The PCHB was not empowered 

to conduct a reasonable potential analysis. See RCW 43.21A.020; see also Port of Seattle, 151 

Wn.2d at 592 (“Rule making, interpretive, and enforcement functions remain with Ecology, the 

agency ‘charged with administration’ of water quality statutes and rules.”). In doing so, we 

conclude the PCHB acted outside its statutory authority. 

 

14 Spokane County does not assert these arguments in its brief. 
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We affirm the PCHB in part, reverse in part, and remand to Ecology.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, 

it is so ordered.

Melnick, J.

We concur:

Worswick, P.J.

Lee, J.