NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL LEE KROETZ, Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CR 15-0528

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. CR2014-135299-001 SE

The Honorable Jerry Bernstein, Judge Pro Tempore

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael F. Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee

Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix

By Carlos Daniel Carrion

Counsel for Appellant
STATE v. KROETZ

Decision of the Court

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MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani and Judge John C. Gemmill1 joined.

W I N T H R O P, Judge:

¶1 Michael Lee Kroetz (“Appellant”) appeals his convictions and 

sentences for possession or use of narcotic drugs and misconduct involving 

weapons. He argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

pretrial motion to suppress the evidence against him. For the following 

reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 On the morning of November 15, 2013, Officer Joseph Jensen 

of the Mesa Police Department (“MPD”) was on routine patrol, and nearing 

the end of his regular shift. Officer Jensen encountered Appellant driving 

on the road and ran a license plate check on Appellant’s vehicle. Upon

discovering that the vehicle registration had expired, Officer Jensen

initiated a traffic stop and Appellant pulled over.2 During the stop, Officer 

Jensen discovered that Appellant was driving with a suspended license. 

Officer Jensen told Appellant his car would be towed and impounded for 

thirty days.3 Officer Jensen asked Appellant if there was anything illegal in 

the car. Appellant responded that there was not.

 

1 The Honorable John C. Gemmill, Retired Judge of the Court of 

Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant 

to Article VI, Section 3 of the Arizona Constitution.

2 When asked about his expired registration, Appellant told Officer 

Jensen he had recently purchased the vehicle and had not yet registered it 

in his name.

3 “A peace officer shall cause the removal and either immobilization 

or impoundment of a vehicle if the peace officer determines that . . . [a] 

person is driving the vehicle while . . . the person’s driving privilege is 
STATE v. KROETZ

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3

¶3 At some point during the encounter, Officer Jensen called for 

assistance and Officer York arrived at the scene. Upon discovering that 

Appellant had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, Officer York took 

Appellant into custody.

¶4 Pursuant to MPD policy, Officer Jensen conducted an 

inventory search of Appellant’s vehicle prior to having it towed.

4 During 

the search, Officer Jensen found a black handgun under the front driver’s 

seat. Officer Jensen asked Appellant if he knew anything about the gun and 

Appellant said he did not. Officer Jensen also found a prescription pill 

bottle without a label sitting in an open bag in plain view on the floor of the

front passenger side of the vehicle. The bottle had approximately fifty pills 

inside. When Officer Jensen asked Appellant about the pills, Appellant told 

him they belonged to a friend.5

¶5 During the inventory search, Officer Jensen filled out the 

MPD’s “30 Day Impound Tow” form. Officer Jensen completed most of the 

form and signed it, but he failed to indicate whether any property was 

collected from Appellant’s vehicle.6

 

suspended or revoked for any reason.” Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 28-

3511(A)(1)(a).

4 The MPD policy manual states that “motor vehicles which are 

lawfully towed, removed, impounded or stored at the direction of a police 

officer, or placed in custody of the Department shall be inspected and 

inventoried.” The manual also requires officers to “conduct an itemized 

inventory of the vehicle for personal property and place all property of 

value into safekeeping.”

5 Officer Jensen testified that Appellant told him the pills were 

Vicodin; Appellant later denied making such a statement.

6 MPD’s “30 Day Impound Tow” form includes a “Vehicle Inventory 

Section,” on which officers are to indicate the condition of the vehicle and 

information about any vehicle accessories. The section also leaves a blank 

space for officers to comment on any property inside the vehicle, whether 

the property was taken from the vehicle during the inventory search, and 

whether the property was collected as evidence or for the purpose of 

safekeeping.
STATE v. KROETZ

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¶6 After completing the inventory search, Officer Jensen seized 

the pills and gun as evidence, and placed such items in a secured evidence 

locker. Shortly thereafter, Officer Jensen completed a police report, making 

note of the gun and the pills found in Appellant’s car. Subsequent forensic 

testing revealed that the pills contained Hydrocodone.

¶7 In July 2014, the State charged Appellant by indictment with 

Count I, possession or use of narcotic drugs, and Count II, misconduct 

involving weapons (for possessing a gun while being a prohibited 

possessor),7 both class four felonies.

¶8 Before trial, Appellant moved to suppress the evidence 

related to Officer Jensen’s inventory search—including the gun and the 

pills—claiming a violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment to 

the United States Constitution and the Arizona Constitution. The State 

responded that the inventory search was lawful because it was carried out 

in accordance with the standard procedure of the MPD.

¶9 In June 2015, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on 

Appellant’s motion to suppress and received testimony from Officer 

Jensen. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court denied Appellant’s 

motion to suppress, determining that although Officer Jensen’s inventory 

documentation had been “sloppy,” it was not conducted in bad faith. The 

court also alternatively found, sua sponte, that, because Appellant’s vehicle 

was being impounded and towed, the weapon and narcotics would have 

inevitably been discovered.

¶10 After a two-day trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as 

charged on both counts. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a 

“somewhat mitigated” term of four years in the Arizona Department of 

Corrections for Count II, followed by supervised probation for two years 

for Count I.

¶11 Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to the Arizona Constitution, Article 6, Section 9, and 

A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A) (2003), 13-4031 (2010), and 13-4033(A) (2010).

ANALYSIS

¶12 Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his pretrial 

motion to suppress. He contends that Officer Jensen’s inventory search was 

 

7 The parties stipulated before trial that Appellant was a prohibited 

possessor.
STATE v. KROETZ

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unlawful because the officer failed to follow MPD operating procedure by 

not itemizing Appellant’s personal belongings from the vehicle on the “30 

Day Impound Tow” form; accordingly, Officer Jensen’s search was illegal 

and the court should have suppressed the evidence seized.8

¶13 We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress for 

an abuse of discretion if it involves a discretionary issue, but review de novo

constitutional and legal issues. State v. Moody, 208 Ariz. 424, 445, ¶ 62, 94 

P.3d 1119, 1140 (2004). We consider only the evidence presented at the 

suppression hearing and view the facts in the light most favorable to 

sustaining the trial court’s ruling. State v. Wilson, 237 Ariz. 296, 298, ¶ 7, 350 

P.3d 800, 802 (2015). Because the trial court is in the best position to observe 

the demeanor of testifying witnesses, we defer to that court’s credibility 

determinations. See State v. Olquin, 216 Ariz. 250, 252, ¶ 10, 165 P.3d 228, 

230 (App. 2007).

¶14 “Inventory searches are a well-defined community caretaking 

exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth 

Amendment.” State v. Organ, 225 Ariz. 43, 48, ¶ 20, 234 P.3d 611, 616 (App. 

2010). Inventory searches protect the vehicle owner’s property, insure 

against claims of lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and safeguard the

police from danger. See id. (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372, 

107 S.Ct. 738, 741, 93 L.Ed.2d 739 (1987)). The test for whether an inventory 

search is valid is whether (1) law enforcement officials had lawful 

possession or custody of the vehicle and (2) the inventory search was 

conducted in good faith and not used as a subterfuge for a warrantless 

search. Id. “[S]uch a search must be ‘routine,’ and not a ‘pretext concealing 

an investigatory police motive.’” State v. Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 10, 76 

P.3d 429, 432 (2003) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376, 96 

S.Ct. 3092, 3100, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)). Where an officer conducts an 

inventory search pursuant to standard procedures, the search is 

presumptively considered to have been conducted in good faith. Organ, 

225 Ariz. at 48, ¶ 21, 234 P.3d at 616.

¶15 Here, Appellant does not dispute that the first requirement of 

the test was met by Officer Jensen having lawful possession of his car. 

Rather, Appellant contends that Officer Jensen did not act in good faith 

 

8 Appellant also argues that, because the inventory search was illegal, 

the inevitable discovery doctrine is inapplicable. We need not address this 

argument because the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that 

the inventory search was lawful.
STATE v. KROETZ

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6

because his failure to properly complete the inventory section on the “30 

Day Impound Tow” form shows the inventory search was pretextual.

¶16 Although Officer Jensen did not specify on the form that he 

had seized items from Appellant’s vehicle, the record supports the trial 

court’s finding that Officer Jensen’s conduct did not establish a lack of good

faith. During the suppression hearing, Officer Jensen testified that he did 

not make note of the gun and the pill bottle on the “30 Day Impound Tow” 

form because he was “probably anxious to be done with [his] shift.” The 

court found his testimony credible. See id. at 49, ¶ 26, 234 P.3d at 617 (“By 

concluding that the search was a valid inventory search, the trial court 

implicitly found the officer’s testimony credible.”). Because we defer to the 

trial court’s determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the 

reasonableness of the inferences it drew, see State v. Mendoza-Ruiz, 225 Ariz. 

473, 475, ¶ 6, 240 P.3d 1235, 1237 (App. 2010), we do not find that the trial 

court abused its discretion in determining the good faith requirement was 

met.

¶17 Further, nothing in the record suggests that Officer Jensen

intentionally omitted the gun and the pill bottle from the “30 Day Impound 

Tow” form. Although omitted from the form, the police report Officer 

Jensen prepared shortly after filling out the form referenced the items. The 

trial court’s conclusion that the omission in the impound form was merely 

an oversight is therefore supported by the evidence. Moreover, we note 

that a finding of good faith does not require an officer’s intentions to be 

“simplistically pure.” In re One 1965 Econoline, 109 Ariz. 433, 435, 511 P.2d 

168, 170 (1973). Instead, the good faith requirement is met when “the facts 

of the situation indicate that an inventory search is reasonable under the 

circumstances.” Id. Here, the record supports such a finding.

¶18 Because the record supports the conclusion that Officer 

Jensen’s inventory search was conducted in good faith, the trial court did 

not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to suppress.
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CONCLUSION

¶19 Appellant’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.