alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Clarence GAY v. STATE of Arkansas

707 S.W.2d 320

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered April 21, 1986

*590Appellant, *pro se.*

*Steve Clark,*Att’y Gen., by: *Jack Gillean,*Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee.

Per Curiam.

In October, 1984, Clarence Gay was convicted of rape and sentenced to life imprisonment. He filed a timely *pro se*notice of appeal and the record was prepared for filing with this Court, but it was never lodged here. He now seeks a belated appeal, alleging that he was incompetent to proceed with the appeal *pro se*because of low intelligence and lack of education. Petitioner’s appointed attorney at trial was Joe Villines. In his affidavit in response to the motion, Mr. Villines, who has not been relieved as counsel by either the trial court or this Court, states that he discussed the possibility of an appeal with petitioner after trial and informed him that there was no basis for reversal of the *591conviction. He avers that he did not know that petitioner had filed a notice of appeal.

Criminal Procedure Rule 36.26 states that counsel, whether retained or appointed, shall continue to represent a convicted person throughout appeal unless permitted to withdraw by the trial court or this Court. A convicted defendant may waive his appeal right by failure to communicate to counsel his desire to appeal. *Conley*v. *State,*286 Ark. 388, 691 S.W.2d 868 (1985); *Henderson*v. *State,*278 Ark. 107, 643 S.W.2d 107 (1982). The timely notice of appeal filed by petitioner is proof that he desired an appeal. Even if he did not specifically notify counsel that he had filed the notice, counsel had not been relieved as petitioner’s attorney-of-record and was responsible for knowing what had been filed in regard to the case within the time set for filing a notice of appeal. Moreover, if counsel felt that the appeal had no merit, he was obligated to either obtain permission from the trial court to withdraw before the notice of appeal was filed, *Finnie*v. *State,*265 Ark. 941, 582 S.W.2d 19 (1979), or file a motion to withdraw in this Court after the notice of appeal was filed. Rules of the Supreme Court, Rule 11(h), Ark. Stat. Ann. Vol. 3A (Supp. 1985).

The failure of counsel to perfect an appeal in a criminal case where the defendant desires an appeal constitutes a denial of effective assistance of counsel and is good cause for granting a belated appeal. *Blakely*v. *State,*279 Ark. 141, 649 S.W.2d 187*(1983);Surridge v. State,*276 Ark. 596, 637 S.W.2d 597 (1982). As counsel for petitioner did not withdraw from the case in accordance with the rules of procedure and failed to comply with the obligations set forth by the rules and opinions of this Court, the belated appeal is granted. Counsel Villines is responsible for lodging the record with this Court within thirty days.

Motion granted.

Purtle, J., not participating.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
QUARTERLY REPORT PURSUSANT TO SECTION 13 OR 15(d) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934 FOR THE QUARTERLY PERIOD ENDED JUNE 30, 1997.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                       3,882,041
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  668,240
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<PP&E>                                      51,564,800
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<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                47,901,389
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<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             4,144,931
<CGS>                                                0
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<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,838,327
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<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             805,297
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                501,307
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            501,307
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   501,307
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    13.61<F2>
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    13.61<F2>
<FN>
<F1>REGISTRANT HAS AN UNCLASSIFIED BALANCE SHEET.
<F2>EPS IS NET INCOME PER $1,000 LIMITED PARTNERSHIP UNIT.
</FN>
        

</TABLE>
##### 



EXHIBIT 21
 Carmike Cinemas, Inc.
 List of Subsidiaries
 Subsidiary
    
    State of Incorporation
    
    % OwnedEastwynn Theatres, Inc.
    
    Alabama
    
    
    100
    %George G. Kerasotes Corporation
    
    Delaware
    
    
    100
    %GKC Indiana Theatres, Inc.
    
    Indiana
    
    
    100
    %GKC Michigan Theatres, Inc.
    
    Delaware
    
    
    100
    %GKC Theatres, Inc.
    
    Delaware
    
    
    100
    %Military Services, Inc.
    
    Delaware
    
    
    100
    %Conway Theatres, LLC
    
    South Carolina
    
    
    100
    %
#### Mark STONE v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 84-175

705 S.W.2d 441

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered March 31, 1986

*William A. Lafferty,*for appellant.

No objection filed by Attorney General.

Per Curiam.

In this case the appellant’s brief was originally due on June 8,1985. His attorney, William *A.*Lafferty, filed four motions for extensions of time, the last one extending the time for filing to August 1.

The brief was not filed on August 1. In fact, there was no activity at all in the case until the month of February, 1986, when the Attorney General filed a motion to dismiss the appeal fof failure to file a brief. That motion was not served on opposing counsel, as it should have been. In connection with that motion the Clerk requested that the record be returned by Mr. Lafferty, who had checked it out. The record was promptly returned. On March 14 the present motion to file a belated brief was filed, the *473motion stating that due to illness and severe emotional and financial difficulties the appellant’s attorney had been unable to complete his brief.

The explanation for a delay of more than six months does not appear to be adequate. The motion is granted, because this is a criminal case; but the matter is referred to the Committee on Professional Conduct for whatever investigation and possible action it may deem proper.

Purtle, J., not participating.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 52 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 52

Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 
                                 2020.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 16, 2021

Mr. Gosar submitted the following joint resolution; which was referred 
         to the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
Relating to a national emergency declared by the President on March 13, 
                                 2020.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That, pursuant to section 202 
of the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1622), the national 
emergency declared by the finding of the President on March 13, 2020, 
in Proclamation 9994 (85 Fed. Reg. 15337) is hereby terminated.
                                 <all>
```
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002




In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Acorn Energy, Inc. (the
“Company”) for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2009, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, John A.
Moore, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:




(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and




(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.




/s/John A.
      MooreJohn
      A. MooreChief
      Executive OfficerNovember
      12, 2009
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-6433
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee, versus FRANK LATHAN HINTON, Defendant - Appellant.Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (CR-94-106-2, CA-96-875-2) Submitted: July 24, 1997 Decided: August 7, 1997 Before HAMILTON, LUTTIG, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Frank Lathan Hinton, Appellant Pro Se. Arenda L. Wright Allen, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant filed an untimely notice of appeal. We dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The time periods for filing notices of appeal are governed by Fed. R. App. P. 4. These periods are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (196 0)). Parties to civil actions in which the UnitedStates is a party have sixty days within which to file in the district court notices of appeal from judgments or final orders. Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1). The only exceptions to the appeal period are when the district court extends the time to appeal under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) or reopens the appeal period under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The district court entered its order on December 4, 1996; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on February 14, 1997, which is beyond the sixty-day appeal period. Appellant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period leavesthis court without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Appellant's appeal. We therefore deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. We deny Appellant's motion for an injunctionand dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
H. R. 1002 

One Hundred Seventeenth Congress 

of the 

United States of America 

AT THE FIRST SESSION 

Begun and held at the City of Washington on Sunday, 

the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-one 

An Act 

To amend the Controlled Substances Act to authorize the debarment of certain 

registrants, and for other purposes. 

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 

the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Debarment Enforcement of Bad 

Actor Registrants Act of 2021’’ or the ‘‘DEBAR Act of 2021’’. 

SEC. 2. DEBARMENT OF CERTAIN REGISTRANTS. 

Section 304 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 824) 

is amended by adding at the end the following: 

‘‘(h) The Attorney General may issue an order to prohibit, 

conditionally or unconditionally, and permanently or for such period 

as the Attorney General may determine, any person from being 

registered under this title to manufacture, distribute, or dispense 

a controlled substance or a list I chemical, if the Attorney General 

finds that— 

‘‘(1) such person meets or has met any of the conditions 

for suspension or revocation of registration under subsection 

(a); and 

‘‘(2) such person has a history of prior suspensions or 

revocations of registration.’’. 

SEC. 3. DETERMINATION OF BUDGETARY EFFECTS. 

The budgetary effects of this Act, for the purpose of complying 

with the Statutory Pay-As-You-Go Act of 2010, shall be determined 

by reference to the latest statement titled ‘‘Budgetary Effects of 

PAYGO Legislation’’ for this Act, submitted for printing in the 

Congressional Record by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee, provided that such statement has been submitted prior 

to the vote on passage. 

Speaker of the House of Representatives. 

Vice President of the United States and

President of the Senate.
E.M. v. J.C. and Jefferson County Department of Human Resources

2160145

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

February 28, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Transferred to Jefferson Cir. Ct., Bessemer Div., for trial de novo pursuant to Rule 28(D), Ala.R.Juv.P.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEETS AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENTS OF INCOME FOUND ON
PAGES F-3 THROUGH F-5 OF THE COMPANY'S FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE
30, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                           YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUN-30-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                   JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                           3,637,878
<SECURITIES>                                             0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   40,391,377
<ALLOWANCES>                                             0
<INVENTORY>                                      7,255,289
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                64,911,451
<PP&E>                                         150,492,221
<DEPRECIATION>                                           0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 255,370,966
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           75,400,736
<BONDS>                                        141,674,131
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            1,800,000
<PREFERRED>                                      3,250,000
<COMMON>                                             1,450
<OTHER-SE>                                      27,443,397
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   255,370,966
<SALES>                                         45,500,712
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               253,227,861
<CGS>                                           31,832,734
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  217,694,005
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                         0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                         0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             (14,111,843)
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 (9,389,066)
<INCOME-TAX>                                    (2,343,256)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                      0
<DISCONTINUED>                                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    490,000
<CHANGES>                                                0
<NET-INCOME>                                    (7,535,810)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         (.71)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                            0
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 99
                                Selected Information
                       Relating to Series 1994-1 Certificates, 
                      Series 1995-1 Certificates, Series 1996-1
                    Certificates, Series 1996-2 Certificates, and
                           Series 1997-1 Certificates from 
                         January 1, 1997 through June 30, 1997
                        ----------------------------------------
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

            Series 1992-2    Series 1994-1    Series 1995-1    Series 1996-1    Series 1996-2     Series 1997-1 
            7 3/8% Auto      Floating Rate    6.50% Auto       5.50% Auto       Floating Rate     Floating Rate
            Loan Asset       Loan Asset       Loan Asset       Loan Asset       Loan Asset        Loan Asset
            Backed           Backed           Backed           Backed           Backed            Backed
            Certificates     Certificates     Certificates     Certificates     Certificates      Certificates
            ------------     ------------     ------------     ------------     -------------     -------------



<S>        <C>              <C>              <C>              <C>              <C>                <C>


Interest
Paid       $ 17,208,333.32  $ 29,807,433.87  $ 32,638,888.91  $ 21,636,111.13  $ 27,576,833.36    $  6,588,541.66

Servicing  
Fee Paid   $  1,633,333.33  $  4,999,999.98  $  4,999,999.98  $  4,000,000.02  $  4,800,000.00    $  1,104,166.67








</TABLE>

                                    -12-
NUMBER 13-19-00077-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG ____________________________________________________________

JOHANNA TREJO, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

____________________________________________________________

On appeal from the 319th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

____________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Perkes

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria

Appellant, Johanna Trejo, filed a notice of appeal challenging her conviction for

tampering with or fabricating physical evidence. By order signed March 28, 2019, the 

trial court granted the parties’ agreed motion for new trial.

When the trial court grants a motion for new trial, it restores the case to its position 

before the former trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 21.9(b). Because there is no conviction to 
2

be appealed, we have no jurisdiction to consider this appeal. See Waller v. State, 931 

S.W.2d 640, 643-44 (Tex. App.–Dallas 1996, no pet.).

The Court, having examined and fully considered the documents on file and the 

trial court's order granting a new trial, is of the opinion that the appeal should be dismissed 

for want of jurisdiction. See id. The appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF 

JURISDICTION.

NORA L. LONGORIA

Justice

Do not publish. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed the

11th day of April, 2019.
FOIA Requested Record 

Released by Army National Guard 

Page 1 of 6

Record Posted to NGB Reading Room 

13 June 14
FOIA Requested Record 

Released by Army National Guard 

Page 2 of 6

Record Posted to NGB Reading Room 

13 June 14
FOIA Requested Record 

Released by Army National Guard 

Page 3 of 6

Record Posted to NGB Reading Room 

13 June 14
FOIA Requested Record 

Released by Army National Guard 

Page 4 of 6

Record Posted to NGB Reading Room 

13 June 14
FOIA Requested Record 

Released by Army National Guard 

Page 5 of 6

Record Posted to NGB Reading Room 

13 June 14
FOIA Requested Record 

Released by Army National Guard 

Page 6 of 6

Record Posted to NGB Reading Room 

13 June 14
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>               5

<S>                                        <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                      Dec-31-2000
<PERIOD-END>                           Sep-30-2000
<CASH>                                     491,611
<SECURITIES>                                     0
<RECEIVABLES>                            1,964,936
<ALLOWANCES>                                     0
<INVENTORY>                                      0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         2,662,447
<PP&E>                                  52,868,488
<DEPRECIATION>                          28,013,911
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                          27,512,648
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                    1,470,894
<BONDS>                                          0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                            0
<PREFERRED>                                      0
<COMMON>                                    45,974
<OTHER-SE>                              15,855,821
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>            27,512,648
<SALES>                                 13,211,959
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                        13,593,197
<CGS>                                            0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            2,754,159
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           398,474
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                         125,795
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          7,036,622
<INCOME-TAX>                             2,205,801
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      4,830,821
<DISCONTINUED>                                   0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                  0
<CHANGES>                                        0
<NET-INCOME>                             4,830,821
<EPS-BASIC>                                   1.11
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 1.07



</TABLE>
Gregory HARRIS, a/k/a Jerome K. Lockhart, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-3201

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 21, 2018

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. *See**Carbajal v. State*, 75 So. 3d 258 (Fla. 2011) ; *State v. King*, 426 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1982) ; *Santos v. State*, 380 So. 2d 1284 (Fla. 1980) ; *McDonald v. State*, 133 So. 3d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013) ; *Hughes v. State*, 22 So. 3d 132 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) ; *Shortridge v. State*, 884 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) ; *Brown v. State*, 827 So. 2d 1054 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002) ; *Mosely v. State*, 688 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) ; *Desmond v. State*, 576 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) ; *Budd v. State*, 477 So. 2d 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) ; *Hinson v. State*, 57 So. 3d 865 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) ; *McCutcheon v. State*, 44 So. 3d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) ; *Brown v. State*, 10 So. 3d 1197 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009) ; *Foss v. State*, 834 So. 2d 404 (Fla. 5th DCA 2003) ; *McMillan v. State*, 832 So. 2d 946 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002) ; *Hart v. State*, 761 So. 2d 334 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998).

KHOUZAM, BLACK, and ROTHSTEIN-YOUAKIM, JJ., Concur.