NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU

Historical Services Branch

Interview NGB-07

INTERVIEW OF

MAJ ERIC DURR

Executive Officer

1st Battalion, 101st CAV

CONDUCTED BY

MAJ LES’ MELNYK

National Guard Bureau

Wednesday, September 19, 2001

Containing corrections to transcript submitted by MAJ 

Durr, 24 January 2002. Editorial clarifications are 

included in brackets []

TAPE TRANSCRIPTION
2

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 MAJ MELNYK: This is MAJ Les A. Melnyk, Army 

3 National Guard Historian of the National Guard Bureau.

4 Today is the 19th of September 2001, and I am 

5 interviewing MAJ Eric Durr. That is D-u-r-r. He is 

6 the Executive Officer in the 1st Squadron of the 101st 

7 Cavalry, which is headquartered in Staten Island.

8 MAJ Durr, could you begin by briefly 

9 describing where you live, what you do in your civilian 

10 occupation, brief details of your military career?

11 MAJ DURR: Okay. I live outside Albany, New 

12 York, in a suburb called Wynantskill, W-y-n-a-n-t-s-k13 i-l-l. 

14 Currently, I am the Communications Director 

15 for the Independent Power Producers of New York. It's 

16 a trade association.

17 I have been in the Army for 21 years. I 

18 served four years on active duty. I was a tank platoon 

19 leader with the 2nd Battalion, 64th Armor. I was a 

20 public affairs officer for the Schweinfurt military 

21 community while on active duty.
3

1 I went to -- I became a Department of Army 

2 civilian for a year and a half in Germany, after 

3 leaving active duty in 1984. During that period, I was 

4 enrolled in the 3747th USAR School for my advanced 

5 course.

6

7 On return to the United States in 1996, I 

8 joined the 479th Engineers, a Reserve unit, 

9 headquartered in Watertown, New York, moving to the 

10 Albany area in 1988. I joined the 1st Battalion, 210th 

11 Armor. I commanded a tank company there, as well as 

12 their headquarters company.

13 When that unit was disbanded, I joined the 

14 42nd Infantry Division Headquarters as Public Affairs 

15 Officer for two years.

16 I then served as an Assistant G-3, as the TOC 

17 Operations Officer for about a year, and I spent three 

18 years as the Deputy G-3 Plans for the 42nd Infantry 

19 Division, going through division war fighter, corps war 

20 fighter, that kind of thing.

21 Since March of 2000, I have been the Executive 
4

1 Officer of the 101 CAV. 

2 MAJ MELNYK: But given that your location is 

3 in Upstate New York, you've traditionally -- you are 

4 separated from the --

5 MAJ DURR: Right.

6 MAJ MELNYK: -- headquarters by us.

7 MAJ DURR: We have -- the 101 CAV was 

8 basically reorganized in 1993, as the National Guard 

9 downsized.

10 The squadron -- the CAV, which had had a 

11 squadron in -- a squadron on Staten Island and an 

12 aviation squadron in Rochester and some other upstate 

13 units, was reorganized.

14 Line companies that had previously been part 

15 of the 1st Battalion, 210 Armor were assigned to the 

16 101 CAV.

17 Anyway, the battalion has three companies that 

18 go up the Hudson Valley. There is our Delta Company in 

19 Newburg and our Bravo and Charlie Companies in Troy, 

20 New York, and Hoosick Falls, New York, a small town 

21 near the Vermont border, respectively.
5

1 So we have this division, what we normally 

2 sort of refer to as the downstate units and the upstate 

3 units, with Delta Company sort of neutral ground, and 

4 there have been, at times past, sort of culture clashes 

5 between the two elements of the battalion.

6 The upstaters came from a different unit and I 

7 think the sort of 210th versus 101 thing that was there 

8 for a while has started to vanish as time has gone by.

9 But there's still a sort of a difference of 

10 the way people think between people who live in the 

11 Albany area and those from New York City. 

12 MAJ MELNYK: If you would, take it now to the 

13 events on the morning of September 11. How did you 

14 find out about the attack and what were your first 

15 thoughts and your first actions?

16 MAJ DURR: On the morning of September 11, I 

17 came to work. It was just a little bit after 9:00 

18 o'clock. I was getting in a little late. Normally, I 

19 was in at 8:30.

20 I opened the door and the secretary at the 

21 office was just hanging up the phone, saying that our 
6

1 member company in the Brooklyn Navy Yard had called and 

2 that some airplane had hit the World Trade Center.

3 She turned on the television in the office and 

4 we were all watching. My initial thought was that this 

5 was a freak accident, like the B-25 that hit the Empire 

6 State Building.

7 So my initial reaction was, okay, I'm going to 

8 call the armory and let them know I'm here, because we 

9 may be needed for something.

10 So I tried to get through to the armory and at 

11 that time, it was -- the phone lines were very busy. 

12 So I stopped trying to call.

13 I went back and watched the television. At 

14 that point, you know, shortly after 9:00 o'clock, those 

15 of us watching TV watched the second jet fly into the 

16 other tower. At that point, instantly, you know, it 

17 hit me. I knew this was not an accident. This was an 

18 attack. Somebody had done this deliberately.

19 I called the armory again, tried several 

20 different extensions. I got the -- eventually I got 

21 through to SSG Koch, the Headquarters Company Admin 
7

1 Sergeant. I informed him that I had seen what was on 

2 the TV. I assumed we might be mobilized. I gave him 

3 my office number again, told him to let CPT Willis, the 

4 full-time S-1, know that I was there, and I was 

5 standing by the phone. 

6 And I hung up and he said, yeah, you know, he 

7 -- they had realized something was going on, as well. 

8 Later on, you know, watching the news, the situation 

9 progressed.

10 I tried calling the armory again to hear if we 

11 had anymore word. I did not get through. 

12 So I called the 42nd Infantry Division 

13 Headquarters in Troy, where I had been stationed for 

14 many years. I knew people there. I spoke to the 

15 Operations Sergeant, said what are we hearing, what's 

16 going on.

17 He said, you know, we know something has 

18 happened. We have been told to be on standby, but 

19 nothing yet. 

20 So at that point, I called the armory. I got 

21 through to CPT Willis and I relayed that information to 
8

1 him, to pass on to the battalion commander, who I 

2 understood was stuck in traffic trying to get into the 

3 armory.

4 I told him, you know, this is what I have 

5 learned so far, we're in a standby mode and I will try 

6 to keep you informed. 

7 As the events of the morning progressed, I 

8 became convinced that we were going to be called up, 

9 just listening to the TV, and I drove over to -- I 

10 drove over to my house and -- which is about five 

11 minutes away from the armory in Troy. I packed a 

12 duffel bag of uniforms and stuff, threw it in the car, 

13 and I went to the armory in Troy, went into the 

14 operations section and announced that I was here, that, 

15 you know, I was available if they needed me, because I 

16 knew most of the division staff was at Leavenworth, 

17 Kansas, at the war fighter seminar.

18 Normally, the 42nd stands up an EOC when 

19 something like this happens and I knew they would be 

20 needing officers. So I went in to volunteer my 

21 services, saying, you know, because the last time there 
9

1 had been a major National Guard event, the state had 

2 tasked to organize geographically.

3 Downstate units had fallen under the 53rd 

4 Troop Command, mid-state units had come under the 42nd, 

5 and I was thinking that they might not call up the 

6 upstate elements of the 101 CVA.

7 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

8 MAJ DURR: That they would just simply take 

9 what was in Staten Island and maybe Newburg.

10 And at that time, I was still thinking it was 

11 limited response. I mean, I called in after I saw the 

12 building collapse, but I still wasn't sure of the 

13 response.

14 So I went to the division headquarters, said, 

15 you know, I know something is going on, I'm here, 

16 again, left messages, went back to my office.

17 They called and said we're still on standby. 

18 We will need somebody to man the EOC tonight, are you 

19 available. I said yes, I was, I would be there.

20 I went out of the office momentarily to run a 

21 quick errand. When I got back, I was informed somebody 
10

1 had called for MAJ Durr. Tried to call back again. It 

2 turned out to have been the master sergeant at the Troy 

3 Armory, who was telling me that there was no need for 

4 me to volunteer to come in on standby because the 

5 entire Guard was being mobilized and undoubtedly I was 

6 going to be going down to Staten Island. 

7 Also, during one of my visits to the armory, I 

8 touched base with our B Company there, which is located 

9 there, and talked to 1ST Willsey (phonetic,) a full10 time employee, and told him I might need to go down to 

11 the armory, I would need a vehicle, asked if he -- the 

12 guys had been calling in. He informed me that people 

13 had been checking in.

14 At this time, it was probably about 1:00 

15 o'clock in the afternoon and I -- or 1:30. I left my 

16 business. I went to my house. I told my wife we had 

17 been mobilized. My wife is a member of the Army 

18 Reserve, so she understood. 

19 I went to the armory and I got there probably 

20 about 2:45 and sort of established a 101 Battalion 

21 North. We had very spotty communication with the 
11

1 colonel in Staten Island.

2

3 Phones were down. You know, I was trying to 

4 call him to get some direction, what do you want me to 

5 do. So my initial reaction was to get telephonic 

6 communication with the units in Hoosick Falls and 

7 Newburg, figuring the lines were down into New York 

8 City and we could at least talk among the three of us 

9 and coordinate a response.

10 I spoke to the C Company commander. I spoke 

11 to the lieutenant of C Company, the Bravo Company first 

12 sergeant was in.

13 The soldiers were -- they had put out the 

14 alert calls. The soldiers were coming in. We talked -

15 -

16 MAJ MELNYK: How did you find out about the 

17 alert calls?

18 MAJ DURR: My alert call basically came when 

19 the EOC operations sergeant called me and told me they 

20 weren't going to need me to be in the EOC because we 

21 had all been mobilized. So I just headed into the 
12

1 armory.

2 MAJ MELNYK: Who was doing the alerting then? 

3 Were the operations sergeants?

4 MAJ DURR: For the line companies?

5 MAJ MELNYK: Yeah.

6 MAJ DURR: The full-time NCOs had started the 

7 alert chain, calling the company commander.

8 MAJ MELNYK: Okay.

9 MAJ DURR: Calling, you know, and working 

10 down. Plus, of course, I think everybody had -- there 

11 was -- you know, everybody had seen what was the radio, 

12 TV, people had been calling into the armory. People 

13 were just coming in on their own, as well.

14 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

15 MAJ DURR: So we -- you know, I was in Bravo 

16 Company. The command sergeant major came to the Bravo 

17 Company location, Command SGM Gilmore. He lives in the 

18 area, as well.

19 And so we started trying to coordinate by 

20 phone what we were going to do. I made the decision 

21 that we would bring Charlie Company down to Troy and 
13

1 consolidate the two companies, to make for a better 

2 motor march.

3 So they were getting ready. I was basically 

4 trying very hard to get in touch with colonel [LTC 

5 Mario] Costagliola to find out what guidance he had, 

6 what he wanted us to do.

7 I did talk to Delta Company, SFC Wade, the 

8 master gunner and full-timer there, who told me he had 

9 had indirect guidance from the colonel that if he did 

10 not hear from him by 10:00 o'clock, 2200 hours, they 

11 were to bring Delta Company to Staten Island. 

12 And I said okay, you know, unless you hear 

13 from me countermanding that because I've talked to the 

14 colonel, execute that order.

15 At some point, I think it must have been 

16 around 5:00 o'clock, I did talk to the colonel and he 

17 said, yes, he wanted Delta Company to come south, 

18 unless he heard something else. He told -- he directed 

19 me to muster the two companies at Troy and to get them 

20 south, as well.

21 I then began -- I then approached the division 
14

1 and asked for bus transportation, since we didn't have 

2 enough vehicles to move all the soldiers, and I didn't 

3 want to throw the guys in the back of a troop truck for 

4 a four hour drive.

5 Went to the division EOC, talked to the G-4, 

6 said, look, my commander wants a bus; I mean, we want 

7 to go south, I need a bus.

8 And then we got into this frustrating thing 

9 where we were communicating with colonel Costagliola 

10 via phone occasionally and we used the AOL e-mail. You 

11 know, we realized we could get through on AOL.

12 So he was sending us e-mail reports that I was 

13 taking and relaying to the EOC of the situation that 

14 was happening with the battalion coming across from 

15 Staten Island.

16 He was telling us what was going on in 

17 Manhattan, the fact that so many of the firemen and 

18 police officials had been killed. I don't --

19 MAJ MELNYK: The EOC wasn't getting this by 

20 TV?

21 MAJ DURR: I don't think the state 
15

1 headquarters in Latham was actually understanding what 

2 was going on, because they didn't have much 

3 information. I called and spoke to a sergeant there 

4 who, you know, I reported to him what I had heard from 

5 our colonel, and it was like this is great, we haven't 

6 heard anything.

7 MAJ MELNYK: But they didn't even know about 

8 the deaths at the World Trade Center.

9 MAJ DURR: I think -- I think they -- they 

10 knew about the deaths at the World Trade Center, but I 

11 think that the fact that the fire and police 

12 departments had been -- basically had their heads cut 

13 off, I don't think that was general knowledge at that 

14 point.

15 I think the thing is that the colonel was 

16 talking to local officials down here and there are so 

17 many firemen in the unit that they knew when the Trade 

18 Center went down who was likely to be there, and they 

19 were telling, you know, "Sir, these people, there's no 

20 more leadership there."

21 So what the colonel was perceiving, what he 
16

1 relayed to me was that there was nobody talking to the 

2 State of New York to tell them what they needed.

3 The way that the response is supposed to go, 

4 of course, is that the civil officials determine that 

5 they cannot handle an event and then request military 

6 assistance from the National Guard.

7 And I think what was happening, the sense I 

8 got from talking to the colonel was that there was 

9 nobody alive to do this, because what had happened was 

10 my colonel -- the colonel was telling us he needed 

11 these two companies down in Staten Island, because this 

12 was a major disaster and he wanted everybody on the 

13 ground. 

14 But I was going to the division EOC and 

15 saying, "Look, colonel C says he needs us, get me a 

16 bus." And the division EOC G-4 worked the issue and 

17 then he came back to me and said "State headquarters 

18 says you don't have a mission."

19 I said, "What do you mean?" He said, 

20 "Headquarters says they have no request. You know, you 

21 don't have a mission. There's no request for you."
17

1 MAJ MELNYK: The state is awaiting a request 

2 from the city and it's not coming.

3 MAJ DURR: That was my sense of what was going 

4 on. The state -- before the state was going to 

5 dispatch upstate Guardsmen south, they were waiting for 

6 the City of New York to say we need help. 

7 But my sense was that the City of New York 

8 wasn't saying help, asking for help, based on what the 

9 colonel was saying, because they didn't have anybody 

10 who could appreciate the magnitude of the disaster.

11 I mean, I believe the EOC for the city was in 

12 the World Trade Center. So the City of New York 

13 disaster experts were dead. 

14 The National Guard officer in the city, in 

15 this case, colonel Costagliola, was making an 

16 evaluation that he needed more resources and state 

17 headquarters was waiting for the system to work.

18 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

19 MAJ DURR: That is the sense I got. So at 

20 that point, what happened then was the division staff 

21 made clear to me, they explained to me, look, we --
18

1 right now, you come under the 42nd Division. The 53rd 

2 Troop commander is responsible for what is going on in 

3 Manhattan.

4 We are not going to release you until we are 

5 told by state we can. It was frustrating and so I --

6 we got the phone number for the 53rd Troop Command from 

7 somebody, I'm not sure who, and I wound up talking to 

8 BG Klein directly on his cell phone, and he did not

9 realize this was going on. He obviously was still 

10 trying to get information. 

11 I explained to him that I had been in 

12 communication with colonel Costagliola, that the 

13 colonel had sent our medical platoon and some other 

14 soldiers across the Staten Island Ferry to render 

15 assistance, and that he was directing me to bring the 

16 two upstate companies south as rapidly as possible, but 

17 that until -- until the -- the 42nd Infantry Division 

18 was not going to release me to move south and give me a 

19 highway clearance number until state headquarters said 

20 do it.

21 So BG Klein said, "Yes, I understand," he 
19

1 would take care of it. I basically told him, "Sir, you 

2 need to tell them to let us go." 

3 MAJ MELNYK: Yeah.

4 MAJ DURR: So I believe he did that. I was 

5 waiting for the -- he said he would take care of it. I 

6 think I waited another 45 minutes. I went back, where 

7 is the bus. You know, I've got guys coming in.

8 I was bringing the -- C Company was coming in 

9 at 2100. They were to be at the armory in Troy, it's 

10 about a 45 minute drive, at 21000. 

11 We went back again, where is the bus; well, it 

12 hasn't happened yet. So I called the 53rd Troop 

13 Command and got BG Klein directly, this was obviously 

14 his cell phone number, explained the situation again. 

15 He said, "You know, this is unacceptable. I'm 

16 going to take care of it." He made more phone calls, 

17 and about 9:00 o'clock I got a call.

18 I went to see the division -- the secretary of 

19 the general staff, who was the ranking officer.

20 MAJ MELNYK: You physically went to the EOC.

21 MAJ DURR: Well, I was in division 
20

1 headquarters. The two units, where our B Company and 

2 the division headquarters are located, share the same 

3 armory.

4 MAJ MELNYK: Okay.

5 MAJ DURR: I'm sorry. Yes. The division --

6 in the Glenmore Road Armory in Troy, there is the 42nd 

7 Infantry Division Headquarters, B Company 101 CAV, and 

8 642 MI Battalion. These units share the armory.

9 So it was basically a matter of me walking 

10 down to the basement to talk to the division EOC guys, 

11 walking down the hall to the SGS office. And, again, I 

12 had a relationship with most of these soldiers, because 

13 I had been on the division staff for five years.

14 So they knew me. You know, I wasn't some 

15 yahoo. They would listen to me.

16 Because COL Atwood, the SGS, had made it 

17 clear, in a conversation with myself and the sergeant 

18 major, that he understood what we were trying to do, 

19 but until he had a clear directive, he could not 

20 release us, because we were part of the --

21 geographically, part of the 42nd Infantry Division's 
21

1 task force, as these things were normally broken down. 

2

3 At some point, though, the dam broke. I wound 

4 up on the phone with general Taluto, BG Taluto, the 

5 ADC-M with the 42nd Division, who was driving back from 

6 Leavenworth.

7 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

8 MAJ DURR: And he said, "Okay, Eric, I'm going 

9 to let you go." At this time, I think it was almost 

10 10:00 o'clock. 

11 He said, "It's late now. I" -- because we had 

12 been thinking, you know, we could go at nine, when the 

13 other -- we were sort of anticipating the other unit 

14 would roll out, there would be a 15 minute break, we 

15 would get organized and we'd go south, and we would be 

16 in Staten Island maybe 1:00 o'clock in the morning.

17 The advantage, we figured, was obviously the 

18 roads were going to be jammed, but at 12:00, as we 

19 started getting into the New York City area, traffic 

20 should be very minimal and we should be able to make it 

21 in.
22

1 As we got on towards 10:00 o'clock, though, it 

2 became obvious that if we tried to move, our soldiers 

3 were already tired, people had been up early for work. 

4 The general said, "Okay, you can go, but I want you to 

5 go in the morning."

6 So we put the soldiers to bed at about 11:00 

7 o'clock, sleeping in the armory. Nobody was released 

8 to go home. And then we woke them up at 4:00 o'clock, 

9 formed up the convoy of about 16 military vehicles, 

10 four POVs [Privately-owned Vehicles].

11 We still had not gotten a clearance on the 

12 bus. We got a road clearance for the New York City 

13 Thruway. We were waiting for the bus.

14 We had 40 individuals in the two companies who 

15 were not -- could not fit in the military vehicles, 

16 and, under the charge of 2LT Walsh from B Company, they 

17 were -- we were told a bus would be arranged. He was 

18 to coordinate for the bus, put the soldiers on the bus, 

19 bring them down to Staten Island. 

20 We kicked off the convoy and at that point, at 

21 5:00 o'clock in the morning, I talked to the colonel on 
23

1 the cell phone and he redirected us to South and Pike 

2 in Manhattan, where the police had established a 

3 headquarters.

4 And I was hesitant about bringing the convoy 

5 into Manhattan. I figured, you know, it might be tough 

6 to get all this stuff in there. He said, "No, no. You 

7 do it. You can do it. Don't worry."

8 So we set off, had about a four hour motor 

9 march, refueled, because we weren't sure where we could 

10 get fuel, refueled commercially, reorganized at the end 

11 of the south end of the Thruway, and then we went down 

12 Route 17 New Jersey, Route 80.

13 The New Jersey State Police had set aside a 

14 special lane for emergency vehicles. We were able to 

15 get through easily. And we were down at South and Pike 

16 about, I guess, 11:30, 11:00 or 11:30 we were at South 

17 and Pike, with our convoy.

18 We came through the Holland Tunnel. It was 

19 closed to everything but emergency vehicles, and it was 

20 kind of eerie, because as we drove in on the 

21 expressway, leaving the Holland Tunnel, there was just 
24

1 this giant mushroom like cloud of smoke hanging over 

2 the city. 

3 It was just our vehicles, a few other 

4 emergency vehicles, the road all to ourselves. So we -

5 -

6 MAJ MELNYK: Describe the scene when you come 

7 out of the Holland Tunnel.

8 MAJ DURR: When we came out of the tunnel, it 

9 was -- you know, there wasn't a lot of destruction, 

10 but it was just quiet. I mean, obviously, everything 

11 had been abandoned.

12 I was kind of expecting to see some --

13 something. And it was just the roads were -- there 

14 were vehicles abandoned and everything was shut down.

15 We came down Canal Street, which, it turns 

16 out, runs through Chinatown. I had never been there 

17 before. And it was like everybody was out watching us. 

18 There were police roadblocks up along the 

19 intersections to keep people from going south, but the 

20 whole community had turned out and there was no traffic 

21 on the road and they just watched us as we rolled 
25

1 through Manhattan.

2 Part of the -- I was following the convoy. I 

3 was in a government sedan and I was trailing the 

4 convoy, to try to round up stragglers. 

5 What we had done is the outgoing commander of 

6 our Charlie Company, CPT Art Govin (phonetic,) is a 

7 state trooper and, in fact, he is a state trooper on 

8 the Governor's security detail, and CPT Govin had 

9 basically commandeered an unmarked troop car.

10 And what I did is, we made the decision, as we 

11 were getting off the Thruway, that we might start to 

12 hit some traffic, and I told him, "Okay, Art, you go in 

13 front and if we hit some traffic, do the lights, do the 

14 siren. You're not legit in New Jersey, but you know 

15 what? It will get us through."

16 So that's essentially what he was doing. He 

17 was using his lights and siren to get traffic out of 

18 the way and expedite our movement, until we were picked 

19 up by the New Jersey State Police.

20 And so anyhow, we came in. A couple of the 

21 vehicles at he rear got lost. We were rerouted by a 
26

1 New York City Police Officer, but we wound up at South 

2 and Pike, which is just under the Manhattan Bridge --

3 MAJ MELNYK: Brooklyn Bridge.

4 MAJ DURR: Brooklyn Bridge. No, actually, 

5 it's the Manhattan Bridge, because Brooklyn Bridge is 

6 farther south.

7 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

8 MAJ DURR: And we linked up with the colonel 

9 there. He then directed us to Battery Park, brought us 

10 into Battery Park, and that's when we started to --

11 that's when we started to see stuff happening when we 

12 came down towards --

13 We came down South Street with the convoy and 

14 came up around the ferry terminal and pulled into 

15 Battery Park, and that's when we started to see that --

16 we saw something had happened.

17 The streets were deserted. There was dust 

18 everywhere, papers everywhere, cars crushed with rocks. 

19 The place was abandoned. It looked like a war zone at 

20 that point. 

21 And we pulled into Battery Park, where the --
27

1 where Alpha and Delta and Headquarters Company were 

2 assembling, and pulled up and the commander put me to 

3 work to go up and he wanted me to go and talk to the 

4 EOC at Park Avenue and bring up some figures on what we 

5 had.

6 MAJ MELNYK: So the EOC this time was the 

7 military.

8 MAJ DURR: We had now -- yeah. We had now 

9 come under the control of the 107th Support Group of 

10 the 53rd Troop Command. They had established an EOC at 

11 the Park Avenue Armory.

12 The commander asked me to go up there to make 

13 a face-to-face with them, get some phone numbers. I 

14 brought information, our strength, equipment. 

15 MAJ MELNYK: Where did you hook up with your 

16 battalion commander?

17 MAJ DURR: The commander, at South and Pike. 

18 He was waiting for us there with a Humvee, when the 

19 convoy from the north arrived, because I had been 

20 calling him on the phone, you know, we're coming in, 

21 we're getting close, that kind of thing. 
28

1 One of the lessons learned here was the first 

2 couple days, we were all living on our personal cell 

3 phones. 

4 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

5 MAJ DURR: The regular land lines were down. 

6 We were operating without -- FM communication was 

7 spotty. So we were using cell phones to talk to each 

8 other, and that was spotty, because, especially when 

9 the tower came down, because the antennas had been on 

10 top of the Twin Towers. 

11 So I hooked up with him at South and Pike and 

12 he directed me to go up to the EOC and make a face-to13 face. I brought information, you know, here is where 

14 we are, here is how many soldiers we have, here is our 

15 equipment we have, you know, do you have any 

16 instructions.

17 MAJ MELNYK: What was the EOCs response? How 

18 did you find the 107 Support Group's response?

19 MAJ DURR: I thought the 107th had a pretty 

20 shitty hand on it. I had been involved in EOCs and the 

21 42nd Division staff and I had a good sense of how an 
29

1 EOC is supposed to work.

2 And I found it was -- I was just shocked. I 

3 walk in there. I'm right from one of the line 

4 battalions. I've got information and the lieutenant 

5 colonel in charge of the thing ignored me. "Sir," you 

6 know, I go up, and he's too busy trying to figure out 

7 how his briefing slide is going to look. 

8 I couldn't believe it. I was appalled. I'm 

9 like, "You know, I have information here. I'm here to 

10 tell you what our capabilities are and what do you want 

11 to know? I'll go see the G-4."

12 I was so pissed. I couldn't believe it. I 

13 thought this is just -- this guy is an idiot. This is 

14 absolutely unprofessional. So I gave the -- and when I 

15 went to see the G-4, they pawned me off on some, you 

16 know, E-5. 

17 I mean, you know, I just couldn't -- you know, 

18 this is information -- information flow is what an 

19 emergency operations center is all about. 

20 You have to know what's there, what are they 

21 doing, what are their capabilities, so you have a sense 
30

1 of what you can task them for.

2 And quite frankly, I don't think the 107th --

3 they weren't interested at the time. I was appalled, 

4 and I think part of it was, you know, they were setting 

5 up here and the interesting thing about this 

6 circumstance is when you went north of Canal Street, it 

7 was life as usual in Manhattan.

8 I mean, not totally that day, because we went 

9 up on the FDR and it was blocked off and we got up and 

10 back very quickly, it was for emergency vehicles only.

11 But these guys were sitting in this plush 7th 

12 Regiment Armory and I don't think they had any handle 

13 on it. They didn't know what was going on three miles 

14 south of them and they didn't seem to be interested.

15 That was a real falling down on the part of 

16 this unit and I'm not sure if it's because they're not 

17 a combat arms unit, I'm not sure if it's because this 

18 is something they've never been called on to do.

19 I mean, the 42nd Infantry Division 

20 Headquarters had been well practiced in EOCs. When New 

21 York State was struck by an ice storm in 1999, the 42nd 
31

1 EOC was up and running and ran a large chunk of the 

2 state.

3 The EOC had been exercised in a hurricane, in 

4 the blow-down in the Adirondacks. So there was a lot 

5 of experience there on, you know, what had to happen, 

6 and maybe the 107th didn't have that experience.

7 MAJ MELNYK: So you left the 107th.

8 MAJ DURR: Yeah. I left the 107th.

9 MAJ MELNYK: With a --

10 MAJ DURR: With a bad taste in my mouth, came 

11 back south, and, at that point, I just -- I needed to 

12 see personally what was going on and I -- so I -- the 

13 S-1, CPT Dave Willis, took me, you know, showed me 

14 where our soldiers were posted on the security details.

15 We walked up along the line, saw what the 

16 soldiers were doing. At that time, we had, you know, a 

17 few cops, a few soldiers in intersections trying to 

18 keep people away, and we went to the site of the World 

19 Trade Center, where soldiers from the Support Platoon 

20 were guarding the morgue and helping to carry out 

21 bodies in some cases, along with our Medical Platoon.
32

1 MAJ MELNYK: Had the 107th given you any 

2 guidance or instructions when you were up there? 

3 MAJ DURR: The basic guidance had been, you 

4 know, just do what you think you have to do, and that 

5 seemed to be sort of the scheme from them, you know, do 

6 what you think you need to do. 

7 Obviously, the commander on the ground knows 

8 best, but there was some frustration, I think, that we 

9 didn't have any sort of guidance as to what exactly the 

10 mission was.

11 I know the colonel probably told you how the 

12 soldiers at Staten Island had collected digging 

13 equipment, emergency supplies, and we thought we would 

14 be put to work doing that. But that wasn't happening 

15 and there was some frustration.

16 The other thing I think was that just 

17 confusion over should we be armed, should we not be 

18 armed.

19 MAJ MELNYK: And how had you made that 

20 decision with the upstate company? 

21 MAJ DURR: What we had done is we had brought 
33

1 our weapons with us. I told -- I talked to the 

2 colonel, I said "Look, you know, we're going to bring 

3 weapons. Obviously, crowd control stuff. What else?" 

4 He said bring your MOPP suits, bring what you need to 

5 live on.

6 So we brought weapons, riot control gear, 

7 protective vests, face shields, and I thought even if 

8 we didn't have a crowd control situation, the face 

9 shields would be useful in a recovery situation as 

10 protection.

11 MAJ MELNYK: Did the soldiers deploy with the 

12 face shields?

13 MAJ DURR: No. The soldiers deployed 

14 basically wearing protective vests, LBE, helmets. 

15 We did not arm the soldiers at that point. We 

16 kept the weapons handy, though. We did not know what 

17 the situation was.

18 There were some times during the course of 

19 those days when we were told that there was a terrorist 

20 -- you know, there was a threat of some other attack. 

21 And at that point, the colonel armed some select -- you 
34

1 know, told some selected personnel to carry weapons, 

2 and we did have some ammunition that we acquired. It 

3 wasn't issued, but there was some there.

4 There was also ammunition present for our 

5 machine guns, which we had initially mounted on top of 

6 the scout Humvees. But we were told to take them off 

7 because the civil officials didn't want to, you know, 

8 portray that image.

9 MAJ MELNYK: So those instructions came from 

10 the civilian authorities.

11 MAJ DURR: At some point, there was somebody 

12 from the Governor's office was telling the -- as I 

13 understand it, was telling BG Klein to tell the colonel 

14 to get those weapons off.

15 What had happened was, of course, a Humvee 

16 with a .50 on top is very photogenic. And so those 

17 were the images that were going out to the world of 

18 soldiers with .50 caliber machine guns mounted on 

19 Humvees. In fact, we also -- the first day, we also 

20 had an M-113 here, as well.

21 The colonel had basically come with 
35

1 everything. We had --

2 MAJ MELNYK: He didn't come with his tanks.

3 MAJ DURR: Well, we only have one tank in 

4 Staten Island and, very frankly, that one couldn't get 

5 off the island if it tried. It's pretty -- it was out 

6 of commission.

7 MAJ MELNYK: Okay.

8 MAJ DURR: But we brought the -113, wreckers, 

9 HEMMTS, fuellers, anything we thought we might need and 

10 brought over. And the upstate units had brought their 

11 fuellers, their wreckers, all their -- all the vehicles 

12 they had.

13 We have a support slice with each of the 

14 remote companies. So all that came.

15 MAJ MELNYK: In general, could you describe 

16 what liaison with the civilian authorities was like? 

17 Who took charge? How was the cooperation or lack of 

18 cooperation? Where did you generally get your 

19 instructions from?

20 MAJ DURR: You know, I mostly just turned to 

21 the colonel, since he was talking to people. But our 
36

1 basic -- our basic point of contact was MAJ Bob 

2 Magnanini, who is on the G-2 staff of the 42nd 

3 Division.

4 He lives in New Jersey. He had responded on 

5 Tuesday and was pressed into service as a police 

6 liaison by the 107th. So MAJ Magnanini was going up to 

7 One Police Plaza and other police headquarters to find 

8 out what they wanted us to do, and that information was 

9 very spotty.

10 When I arrived, the mission was set up the 

11 security cordon to keep people out of the area. We 

12 split that with the 69th Infantry, basically along 

13 Broadway. The 69th, with greater manpower, held a line 

14 on the west side of Broadway, a long array of 

15 intersections, while the 101 held a line along the east 

16 side of Broadway at various intersections.

17 And at night, we were spelled off by 258 Field 

18 Artillery, which was beefed up with the 642nd Aviation. 

19 They're an aviation support battalion. I'm not sure -

20 -

21 MAJ MELNYK: Division Aviation Support.
37

1 MAJ DURR: Right.

2 MAJ MELNYK: Okay. What did you see of the 

3 soldiers? How -- what was their initial reaction? 

4 What was their behavior like on the ground? How did 

5 you assess their morale?

6 MAJ DURR: Well, I think everybody knew that 

7 we had been whacked. The United States had been 

8 attacked. And we had guys showing up at the armories 

9 we hadn't seen, guys who were going to AWOL out, they 

10 hadn't come to drill. They were there. Guys were 

11 there. 

12 People responded. People came in. I didn't 

13 hear any bitching, you know, nobody complained we got 

14 to sleep on the armory floor. Nobody complained it's 

15 early. 

16 I mean, I think guys realized, okay, this is 

17 what we're here for. This is it. This isn't AT, this 

18 isn't a drill, this isn't -- you know, this isn't 

19 playing. We are really committed, and there could be 

20 people down there with guns and we may need to get 

21 these guns we've got in the truck out, and I think the 
38

1 soldiers realized that. 

2 Everybody was really businesslike and 

3 purposeful. There was, you know -- you know, you 

4 usually have some guys bitching, but nobody was --

5 nobody was complaining. Everybody was there, and I 

6 thought that was -- I thought the response was great. 

7 MAJ MELNYK: What happened? Did that change 

8 at all when they showed up on-site?

9 MAJ DURR: No. I think it -- I think it was 

10 just everybody was -- I think they were just awestruck. 

11 You know, as we came in, at first, it was -- when we 

12 came in Canal Street, it's like look at this, the 

13 streets are empty, isn't that crazy. It's New York 

14 City.

15 And then we came down here to Battery Park and 

16 as you moved uptown and you saw these cars crushed with 

17 blocks of concrete and everything was covered with a 

18 layer of dust, I mean it must have been an inch thick, 

19 and it looked like there had been a volcano erupted, 

20 like a pyroclastic flow had just spewn away from this 

21 point.
39

1 And there were scraps of paper everywhere, 

2 paper from the towers everywhere. 

3 And I think that hit people. This is a war 

4 zone, you know, and even though we didn't have weapons 

5 in our troops, I think the guys realized that, you 

6 know, okay, you're a soldier.

7 And the thing that I found is at AT, we always 

8 have a problem keeping people in uniform. People want 

9 to take off their helmet and they don't want to wear 

10 their web gear because it's a pain getting up and down 

11 off the tank.

12 But I think everybody was -- kept their 

13 uniform on and I think they realized that it's part of 

14 the psychology is that you may be Joe Schmo, but when 

15 you're standing there with a flak vest on and your 

16 Kevlar and your LBE, you look pretty damn intimidating, 

17 and they realized this is part of the thing, to just 

18 look like we mean business.

19 MAJ MELNYK: Even if you're not carrying 

20 weapons.

21 MAJ DURR: Even if we're not carrying weapons, 
40

1 although I think -- you know, my feeling was, once --

2 especially once we started to get this, you know, 

3 there's a terrorist in the vicinity shit, it was like 

4 why won't they let us carry weapons.

5 The cops have weapons. We're being asked to 

6 do the same thing the cops are. Now, obviously, I 

7 realize that part of it is that, you know, a private is 

8 trained what? Halt, halt, halt, shoot. And in an 

9 urban environment like this, in New York City, that's 

10 not going to make it.

11 But I felt we should have been able to arm, 

12 and we did arm some key people. I mean, some key 

13 people carried weapons.

14 MAJ MELNYK: But you did that without 

15 instructions from higher.

16 MAJ DURR: We did that without -- there was no 

17 real guidance. The thing was that there was -- the 

18 THREATCON was D, on the order that the colonel 

19 received, which means you go in armed. So that's what 

20 he took it to mean.

21 The colonel was basically ready for anything. 
41

1 He said "I want everything, bring everything. I don't 

2 know what's going to happen here. We're going to bring 

3 weapons. We're going to bring everything we can think 

4 of." And we did that.

5 He told us bring our tanker bars, because we 

6 might have to pry something off. 

7 I think the biggest frustration for me as a 

8 soldier was that they were not allowed to go up to the 

9 site of the World Trade Center and dig. You know, they 

10 -- they would see the papers and see in the news, you 

11 know, the story about Joe Schmo from East Succotash, 

12 Illinois, who was up there digging out people because 

13 it was the right thing to do, and it was like, you 

14 know, well, we're an organized unit, you know, we will 

15 not be just freelancers, why aren't we up there.

16 And the only answer we had was the fire 

17 department doesn't want us there.

18 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

19 MAJ DURR: And it really just pissed people 

20 off. I mean, it was the sense of let's just go. The 

21 hell with them, let's just go. But, again, being in 
42

1 the military is taking orders and we were -- you know, 

2 our instructions were we were assisting the civil 

3 authorities and we did what they wanted us to do, and 

4 they did not want us on that pile.

5 At least they did not want the 101 CAV on the 

6 pile, and it really frustrated a lot of guys.

7 MAJ MELNYK: As the executive officer, one of 

8 your primary concerns is logistics.

9 Could you address what kind of logistical 

10 difficulties you faced here or lack of difficulties? 

11 How much of a problem was it for you to feed your men, 

12 care for your men?

13

14 MAJ DURR: Actually, it wasn't a big problem. 

15 We have a couple things. Because we had the Staten 

16 Island Armory as a home base, it was cramped, but it 

17 gave us a place where the soldier could be dry. There 

18 are showers. There are toilets.

19 So we had a home base. There was room -- you 

20 know, the two upstate companies were sleeping in the 

21 mess hall. So they were crammed in there.
43

1 But we basically used the armory as our life 

2 support center. We had maintenance assets there, we 

3 had water. 

4 I also am blessed with a really good S-4, CPT 

5 Richard Abbott, and a really good S-4 NCO, our full6 timer, SFC Mike Tenneriello and they can be really 

7 frustrating individuals at times, because they don't 

8 want to play Army. They're like "Screw this military 

9 shit. I don't need to be in the field. My job is the 

10 real world. I got to get you food and fuel and all 

11 this," which they do very well.

12 It's just it's always a stressor to try to get 

13 them to play the game. 

14 But in this instance, they had -- everything 

15 was taken care of. SGT Tenneriello instantly 

16 established catering contracts, so our soldiers were 

17 being fed. He went -- the local dry cleaner said I'll 

18 clean your clothes. He said, "No. We're going to pay 

19 you, because the state will do that. If you don't want 

20 the money, give it to a charity."

21 He -- you know, they immediately -- you know, 
44

1 we had fuel on the site. 

2 He went -- Home Depot, they contacted Home 

3 Depot. Home Depot had said come on down, take what you 

4 want. They took a HEMMT down there. They loaded on 

5 generators, picks, shovels, gloves, dust masks, 

6 anything we could think of, from that situation.

7 So the immediate needs of the battalion were 

8 well in hand. I mean, I didn't have to worry about 

9 that because I knew these guys -- I knew these two guys 

10 were going to feed these soldiers and I knew the 

11 soldiers were going to -- they were going to be taken 

12 care of and they were going to get fed, and our mess 

13 section did a -- you know, our mess section worked 

14 almost round the clock making sure the soldiers were 

15 fed.

16 Not to mention the fact that local merchants 

17 just came to the armory and just dropped stuff off. I 

18 mean, we had a contract caterer and the guy -- you 

19 know, they were coming down and dropping off cakes and 

20 bread and just anything.

21 MAJ MELNYK: I would like for you to go 
45

1 chronologically now from your arrival on the first day. 

2 How did the battalion's missions change? What was you 

3 daily schedule like?

4 You mentioned using the armory as a home base. 

5 What was it like getting there and back? How are 

6 things now eight, nine days later?

7 MAJ DURR: Initially, it was 12 on, 12 off. 

8 We were supposed to shift off with the 258th Engineers 

9 -- I mean, 258th Artillery.

10 And so at the end of the day, about 2000, we 

11 were going 0800 to 2000, the 258th would come in and 

12 occupy the line and we would try to do some 

13 coordination with them.

14 That didn't always work. There were times 

15 when we missed each other. So that first day was just 

16 on these line and we handed it over to the 258th, which 

17 was late.

18 Then we took all these trucks we had brought 

19 from the Albany area, along with the vehicles that had 

20 come across from Staten Island. We went the Battery 

21 Tunnel, Expressway bears on a bridge back to the 
46

1 armory, occupied the armory. There was chow there, 

2 bedded down the soldiers from B and C Company in the 

3 mess hall upstairs.

4 Very late nights. We were getting maybe four 

5 hours of sleep, because by the time everything was 

6 done, it was midnight, and because the mission was 

7 uncertain. We were having these meetings at night.

8 Initially, the guidance was just the 

9 perimeter. The commander -- the commander's concern 

10 was that the fire department was getting overwhelmed. 

11 The fired department was tired. There were their guys 

12 down there that wanted to do something, but he was, 

13 okay, we're going to go dig because we got to take over 

14 for these guys.

15 So he sent CPT Kevin Riley up to do like a 

16 recon and Riley came back and said they don't want us, 

17 and so he said okay.

18 So that was the first day. 

19 And the second day, the colonel said, "Okay, 

20 we're going to go dig. Get everything together." 

21 Again, they didn't need us.
47

1 Again, it was just a security detail. We were 

2 doing other missions, though. There was a mission on 

3 Wednesday to -- they brought equipment across the 

4 Hudson River to a ferry docking port, jackhammers, and 

5 those were loaded on our trucks and taken up to the 

6 site.

7 Again, our soldiers, on Tuesday night, our 

8 medical platoon was working in the morgue.

9 On Wednesday, our support platoon was guarding 

10 the morgue. We got rid of that mission, though, when 

11 everybody was afraid that the building, One Liberty 

12 Plaza, would collapse.

13 MAJ MELNYK: And that's where the morgue was 

14 initially, right there.

15 MAJ DURR: That was where the morgue was 

16 initially. And I remember being up there that 

17 Wednesday to check on the soldiers and find out what 

18 was going on and heading back, when, you know, suddenly 

19 the call went out that the building was coming down and 

20 to run like hell. 

21 So I think I ran a block and then ducked 
48

1 behind another building, and we started making our way 

2 back.

3 That was one thing we learned very rapidly on. 

4 This happened on Wednesday, Thursday, these concerns 

5 about a building, and the soldiers there on the site 

6 would just, you know, run like hell.

7 And we realized early on we had to set rally 

8 points, places where people would go. You know, you 

9 come to this corner. So that was a lesson learned 

10 after the --

11 (Tape change.)

12 MAJ MELNYK: So continuing on, you learned 

13 right way that rally points were --

14 MAJ DURR: We needed rally points, because 

15 what had happened was this first time that there was 

16 the run like hell, there's a building coming down, we 

17 lost track of where people were.

18 So we established -- we started to require the 

19 companies to establish rally points, let the battalion 

20 know where they were, you know, where is everybody.

21 I remember that first night, we were still 
49

1 where is such and such, where is this guy, trying to 

2 get accountability of everybody.

3 The next days it got better because we kept 

4 control of that better, I think.

5 But the first day, the mission was -- well, 

6 Tuesday, the mission for the battalion, I wasn't here, 

7 was, you know, go to try to recover. They were 

8 prepared for casualties, and they never came.

9 MAJ MELNYK: Actually, your medics and 

10 generator crew got in on Tuesday and --

11 MAJ DURR: Yes, they did.

12 MAJ MELNYK: -- your first day was Wednesday.

13 MAJ DURR: Our first full day, yeah, with 

14 everybody, my first day was Wednesday.

15 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

16 MAJ DURR: That was the security mission and 

17 manning the morgue.

18 On Thursday, we still had the security mission 

19 and then the mission changed Thursday evening.

20 We also moved our expandable van up South and 

21 Pike. We had been down in Battery Park.
50

1 And the battalion, through innovative NCOs, 

2 has acquired a divisional command post expandovan, 

3 which was a headquarters.

4 We were asked by the 107th to relocate that to 

5 South and Pike at a Pathmark Supermarket, where the 

6 107th was going to run a liaison with the police 

7 emergency operations center.

8 We did that.

9 MAJ MELNYK: So you became the -- your 

10 battalion had to provide that.

11 MAJ DURR: We provided that facility.

12 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

13 MAJ DURR: And that facility, we put a staff 

14 in there during our day shift and the 258th used that 

15 during their night shift. So it became like a focal 

16 point.

17 MAJ MELNYK: And there were people from the 

18 107th there, as well.

19 MAJ DURR: Well, again, the 107th really 

20 dropped the ball. They wound up with, like, I was told 

21 the first day there was going to be a colonel -- a MAJ 
51

1 Gimm (phonetic) and a colonel whose name I -- it starts 

2 with a P, I can't remember his name [COL Pete 

3 Pietrowski].

4 And I remember getting the cell phone numbers 

5 and calling this colonel and he said -- I said, "Sir, I 

6 understand you're going to be the liaison with the 

7 police. We've got our TOC set up. We're ready for 

8 you." He said, "I'm not going there. I've been up for 

9 36 hours. BG Klein told me to go to bed. I'll be 

10 there in the morning."

11 So it was like, you know, why are we doing 

12 this. We got it there. Instead, there was a CPT 

13 Lynch, who was working hard to talk to the police, and 

14 the interface just was awful.

15 The 107th was set up on Park Avenue, 

16 insulated, I think, from everything, you know, nice 

17 conference rooms.

18 We were down at Battery Park, which looked 

19 like a combat zone. The 258th was living up in Harlem. 

20 The 69th was operating with us out of Battery Park.

21 And we had this TOC over at the Pathmark 
52

1 Supermarket, next to the police EOC and the police 

2 logistical center. 

3 So what kind of evolved from Wednesday, when 

4 we put this TOC there, to Saturday, when we pulled it 

5 out, was that our TOC was sort of taking -- it became 

6 like a logistics coordination center.

7 The cops would come and say can you do X and Y 

8 and move something, and we'd do it for them.

9 And one of our -- the soldiers that had 

10 volunteered with the battalion, LT O'Buckley 

11 (phonetic), who is part of the 1st Battalion, 127th

12 Armor, formerly a 101 CAV guy, he wound up sort of 

13 shotgunning the organizing of all these donated goods 

14 that were being dumped there by companies.

15 MAJ MELNYK: So he became the depot officer.

16 MAJ DURR: Yeah. He sort of was the czar of 

17 the depot, yeah. And we provided some forklift 

18 operators to move stuff around.

19 And at one time, they asked for a food service 

20 expert. So one of our cooks came over to do that.

21 But the 107th didn't really -- they put in a 
53

1 high frequency antenna so they could talk from there to 

2 Park Avenue and they just didn't seem to operate out of 

3 there too much when I was there. 

4 MAJ MELNYK: And did things finally enter into 

5 a routine?

6 MAJ DURR: Yeah.

7 MAJ MELNYK: When did that happen?

8 MAJ DURR: I think things entered into a 

9 routine probably on Saturday, because we had -- the 

10 42nd Aviation Brigade assumed the mission of command 

11 and control down here.

12 MAJ MELNYK: On Saturday.

13 MAJ DURR: Yes. And I think we started 

14 getting in a routine, because I'm not sure how -- two 

15 battalions during the day, one battalion during the 

16 night, obviously, more people during the day, but the 

17 12 on-12 off battalion shifting thing was not working 

18 real well.

19 We were coordinating with the 1st and 69th, 

20 but when we handed it over to 258, they would miss us, 

21 we would miss them, you know, and there was a little 
54

1 bit of, you know, it's 8:00 o'clock, we're getting our 

2 guys on the bus, because otherwise they'll never get 

3 some sleep.

4 And I think the 42nd Division Aviation 

5 Brigade's commander, COL Meskill, he and his staff had, 

6 I think, the best idea, which is what we should have 

7 done.

8 They realized that we were disjointed, because 

9 we were three battalions, and it was kind of working.

10 And I remember we had this meeting with them 

11 and in many ways, the sense was that they were Christ 

12 come to cleanse the temple here. 

13 You know, you guys have obviously not got this 

14 thing organized and, by God, we're going to get it 

15 organized.

16 So I remember this meeting with myself, I then 

17 representing the colonel, colonel [LTC Geoffrey] Slack 

18 of the 1st of the 69th, and colonel [LTC Frank] 

19 Candiano from the 258th, and colonel Costagliola came 

20 after it started.

21 And these guys are telling us, well, here is 
55

1 what we think we ought to do, and we're telling them 

2 all this stuff like, well, here is what's going on, and 

3 you know the buildings are falling down and if you hear 

4 three horns of the siren, run like hell.

5 And I remember the colonel was like kind of 

6 laughing, you know, these guys had this planned, and 

7 we're like telling them, well, this and this and this, 

8 and we're bombarding them with sort of ground truth.

9 Here is why this is and why we're doing this. 

10 But they had a good plan, which was -- I think part of 

11 it was the police department was finally getting 

12 organized. The police department had originally been 

13 all of Manhattan south and that was a little disjointed 

14 in this kind of situation.

15 So they reorganized into five zones in 

16 Manhattan and their plan -- the 42nd Aviation Brigade's 

17 plan was to give each battalion responsibility for his 

18 own, which -- and that battalion would run at 24 hours 

19 a day, which meant we would no longer have the 

20 difficulty of essentially doing an exchange of 

21 positions with another battalion. 
56

1 We controlled it internally, and I think that 

2 -- the only thing we were worried about was, you know, 

3 well, you know, that's great and we like the idea, but, 

4 you know, we're all beat and if somebody's got to go 24 

5 hours around the clock, we're going to die.

6 So what did happen was, though, that --

7 obviously, the activity at the site had changed from 

8 rescue and frantic and uncertain to more of a recovery, 

9 and so we realized we could start sending people to 

10 sleep so we could transition into the 24 hour 

11 operation, and we did that on Saturday.

12 And that really has worked better. I mean, 

13 it's just, you know, we now are responsible for a zone.

14 MAJ MELNYK: What is your zone?

15 MAJ DURR: Zone 2, which runs from Battery 

16 Park up to Rector Street. 

17 And this is good, because, you know, we're 

18 handling the changeover internally. We've got positive 

19 control. We're not looking -- I mean, it worked a 

20 little bit when I would go up to -- we would go up to 

21 the Pathmark to link up with the 258th, but it's better 
57

1 because the guys in the unit know each other by sight 

2 and you basically went up and did the shoulder tap, 

3 you're relieved, and we filled it in.

4 Essentially, what we've come to at this point 

5 is the line companies operating during the day and 

6 headquarters company operating with a reduced presence 

7 at night when there are fewer people.

8 The other significant mission we took on was 

9 the -- for a few days, the battalion was responsible 

10 for security of the pit.

11 MAJ MELNYK: Right.

12 MAJ DURR: The World Trade Center. I was not 

13 there at the time, but I understand from the colonel 

14 who was on the scene that they were erecting a crane 

15 and the fire department and the firemen and the 

16 policemen, there were just too many of them.

17 They were well meaning, and not to mention 

18 lots of people wanting to volunteer, but it had become 

19 the place to be. Everybody wanted to be there either 

20 because there was a buddy under the pile or because it 

21 was just the place to be.
58

1 So the fire chief requested the National Guard 

2 to come in and kind of restore order, sort it out. So 

3 we sent our -- and I don't know how we got notified. I 

4 mean, the colonel briefed me later. 

5 I know I was doing another mission. I think I 

6 was up at the Pathmark coordinating with the 258th at 

7 the time.

8 But essentially I gather we sent our scout 

9 platoon in there, scouts (inaudible) 26 strong, what 

10 we're calling our Sabre Element, and these guys 

11 basically just sort of, you know, linked arms and 

12 shoulder to shoulder, kind of walked through the crowd, 

13 okay, guys, you got to get back.

14 And they set up a security perimeter, and I 

15 think the issue was that there's a rivalry between the 

16 New York City Fire Department and Police Department, 

17 and the National Guard is a neutral party.

18 If a policeman tells a fireman to get out of 

19 there, the fireman will be pissed. If the fireman 

20 tells the policeman to get out of there, the policeman 

21 will be pissed.
59

1 But we were a third force. And, in fact, one 

2 of the -- we now have some New York Times reporters who 

3 are covering us and they're living with our unit at 

4 this time, and one of the reporters told me, "Well, you 

5 know, I could pretty much get in and out and I was 

6 living on the site, but once you guys came in, 

7 everything locked down."

8 I mean, I think the National Guard, we wound 

9 up handling that Thursday night. We turned that over 

10 to the 258th. I believe Bravo and Charlie Companies of 

11 the 105th Infantry were also up there. 

12 MAJ MELNYK: Right. Yeah.

13 MAJ DURR: Manning part of that.

14 MAJ MELNYK: Yeah.

15 MAJ DURR: But we -- you know, I guess it's a 

16 testament that we did good that this reporter and other 

17 people said we couldn't get in anymore. You know, the 

18 site had been locked down, which is what they wanted. 

19 They wanted to get the people that didn't need to be 

20 there out of the way. 

21 And so we handled that mission til Saturday.
60

1 MAJ MELNYK: What was your -- could you 

2 describe interactions with the civilian population in 

3 New York in general?

4 Did you have, for instance, the escort 

5 mission? What other missions?

6 MAJ DURR: We had the mission of escorting 

7 people to their apartments, to their businesses.

8 MAJ MELNYK: In your zone?

9 MAJ DURR: In our zone, and, before that, 

10 outside, we had an escort mission to run people to 

11 Battery Park City, where they had been told to leave.

12 And I know, talking to some of the soldiers, 

13 some of these soldiers, it was rough. You know, people 

14 would cry, people were very emotional, and that 

15 affected the soldiers.

16 I remember one kid talking about, you know, 

17 how this lady wanted to get her cat or another kid 

18 talking about all these strollers outside covered with 

19 dust, and, you know, we didn't -- these guys weren't 

20 seeing dead bodies, but they saw people's lives on 

21 hold.
61

1 People had been there and they'd just, you 

2 know, get the hell out, your life is just uprooted.

3 And it was a lot of walking. It was 

4 physically tiring. People got blisters on blisters. I 

5 got blisters. You know, we don't usually walk this 

6 much. We're tankers and that shit was hard to walk in, 

7 but everybody was complaining about "my feet hurt."

8 So that was one thing. It was long, tiring 

9 days. 

10 The people, for the most part, have been 

11 great. You know, people come up to you and say "thank 

12 you for being here." It's nice, because, look, you 

13 know, you take your trucks out on the road and most of 

14 the time it's "get the hell out of my way with all 

15 those military vehicles." You're going 45 miles an 

16 hour, go away.

17 And we drive up and we came in on the highway, 

18 you know, truckers would honk their horns and people 

19 would wave. We also used the ferry quite frequently as 

20 a way to get back and forth.

21 The first week, the Staten Island Ferry was 
62

1 closed to all but emergency traffic. So we could drive 

2 our vehicles down to the ferry, put them on the ferry.

3 The commander was joking, we were -- alluding 

4 to the battle of Stalingrad, we went across the Volga, 

5 you know. Stalingrad was one side of the Volga where 

6 the fight was, you went across the Volga to rest and 

7 recuperate.

8 MAJ MELNYK: And the Stukas were dive-bombing 

9 you as you crossed New York Harbor.

10 MAJ DURR: That was the only thing. We didn't 

11 have the Stukas. But he would joke about that. It's 

12 time to go back across the Volga, you know, which 

13 relieves the tension a little bit.

14 But in a way, the ride was nice on the ferry, 

15 because the guys would come out and you'd look at the 

16 Statue of Liberty and, you know, it felt fairly good.

17 But you looked back and you saw this glow 

18 where the World Trade Center had been and you saw the 

19 smoke and, you know, and out in the harbor, there's 

20 Coast Guard vessels, like the one that's going by us 

21 while we speak.
63

1 You know, they brought in all these small boat 

2 guys to pull harbor security. 

3 MAJ MELNYK: You want to take a moment to 

4 describe your reaction and your soldiers' reactions to 

5 what they saw in the pit?

6 MAJ DURR: You know, it's just when I first 

7 saw it, it was Wednesday and it was about 24 hours 

8 later, and it was -- you know, it was just this 

9 skeletal piece of a side of a building sticking up 

10 there and there were people up there digging and there 

11 was equipment moving around, and burned out buildings 

12 and, you know, I didn't want to get in the way, but I 

13 wanted to see it, and I just -- it was like I was drawn 

14 to it.

15 I wanted to know what it was. I knew the 

16 building was down. I don't think that got to me as

17 much as just watching on the streets, the crushed cars 

18 and the dust, but just -- just this -- you know, this 

19 whole building just fallen in, like it had been 

20 collapsed like a toy, like it had been pushed down, and 

21 this pile of rubble and, you know, and you just knew 
64

1 there were people dead in there.

2 And, also, the worst thing was to think that 

3 somebody is alive in there and we're not going to get 

4 them out. There's somebody alive in there and we're 

5 not going to get them out. 

6 And you know, to watch the soldiers helping to 

7 carry the bodies out of the morgue and the firemen and 

8 I know one of the soldiers talked about how he kind of 

9 saw this bag and he thought it was a body part and it 

10 was a five year old girl. 

11 And just guys talked about -- some guys saw 

12 legs. The 1st of the 69th Infantry did a body check on 

13 roofs for parts. 

14 I talked to some guys, people who have been 

15 here in Manhattan, and it was much more horrific what 

16 happened to them. 

17 We were here to clean up. But I think the 

18 thing is we were all so busy. I just remember driving 

19 in and watching the smoke rise.

20 The thing I find interesting is we -- the unit 

21 has a Memorial Day event every year and I usually come 
65

1 down with my family and we make a weekend of it, New 

2 York City, it's fun for the kids.

3 And this past Memorial Day, we had taken the 

4 ferry over from Staten Island and we had come to 

5 Battery Park here. We walked around, look at the 

6 street performers, gone to South Street Seaport, and 

7 here I was setting up my goddamned assembly area in 

8 Battery Park. 

9 It looked like a war zone.

10 MAJ MELNYK: Someplace you never expected to 

11 conduct a military operation.

12 MAJ DURR: Never expected to set up an 

13 assembly area, you're absolutely right. And that was 

14 kind of freaky. And, again, just a pile and 

15 everything.

16 MAJ MELNYK: A lot of people have talked about 

17 the stress, not just of conducting operations and 

18 people getting tired, but of dealing with the fact that 

19 there are 5,500 dead people there. 

20 MAJ DURR: People dead.

21 MAJ MELNYK: What do you -- how is the morale 
66

1 holding up in your battalion now over a week that 

2 you've been here?

3 MAJ DURR: I think it's pretty good. We've 

4 had two AWOLs at this point. Guys have just said to 

5 hell with it, I'm out of here.

6 We've had a couple people -- we've had people 

7 shown signs of psychic stress and I just think the Army 

8 has done a great thing by sending these case workers 

9 down here.

10 They sent us a team of social workers, 

11 psychiatrists, counselor, because we have been using 

12 them, you know.

13 Part of it is -- like I know we have one 

14 soldier who is down here from the Albany area whose 

15 wife has cancer. So he's dealing with that, and he's 

16 dealing with this, and he's a good man and I hope he 

17 makes it.

18 We've got another soldier that we kind of 

19 thought was on edge before AT and he definitely cracked 

20 down here this time.

21 We've got the soldiers in the unit who we got 
67

1 -- our first sergeant, 1SG Raunauro, headquarters 

2 company, as a court officer, security officer. He was 

3 nearby when this happened and got covered with rubble 

4 and his partner was in the building and got killed.

5 We've got firemen in this unit. A lot of 

6 these guys, they didn't come in -- they didn't respond 

7 to the mobilization call because they were already 

8 working as firemen and police officers. But they know 

9 these people.

10 So for me, it's kind of abstract, since I 

11 don't know people, but I have talked to people who have 

12 offices in there on the phone.

13 I remember sitting with colonel Bosco 

14 (phonetic) from the 642 one night, when we went up to 

15 the pit to talk about coordinating him taking over our 

16 security mission.

17 He was saying, you know, "I used to sit" -- we 

18 were sitting on Liberty Plaza. I sat here for lunch. 

19 I worked on the 65th floor until a few months ago.

20 And every now and then, it would just sink 

21 into that you we're really -- we're at war and that is 
68

1 what's going on. This is a war and we're part of this 

2 war, and this is may be a state of active duty, but 

3 it's a military operation and this country is at war 

4 and, goddamn it, we're part of it and that's why we're 

5 here and it isn't fooling around.

6 At this point in time, we're kind of relaxed. 

7 Last week, when everything was still covered in dust 

8 and Manhattan was empty, it was pretty tense, just 

9 because it was covered in dust and Manhattan was empty.

10 MAJ MELNYK: Anything you want to add?

11 MAJ DURR: Just that I think the soldiers have 

12 done a really wonderful job. They have performed in an 

13 outstanding manner.

14 No bitching, no moaning. You know, a little 

15 bitching and moaning, but nothing beyond what you 

16 normally get.

17 I think they're tired. I think we probably 

18 have to have a better system for rotating units in and 

19 out.

20 I think, you know, when the decision was made 

21 to take the 69th out and not the 258th and 101, that 
69

1 ticked a lot of people off. It's like, well, we have 

2 been here just as long as they have, why are they going 

3 home.

4 So that -- these are operational issues that 

5 obviously have to be addressed. I think what this 

6 shows is we need to have -- we probably need to have 

7 like disaster COMEX [Communications Exercise] at every 

8 armory, locked and cocked, full of stuff that you would 

9 need for this kind of situation.

10 I think it shows that we probably need more 

11 full-time manning. We need dollars for full-time 

12 manning, especially if people are going to use the 

13 National Guard. 

14 You know, there's rumors that we'll be called 

15 up to do security missions while this whatever it is 

16 goes on. You know, Guard guys at airports. I don't 

17 know.

18 But obviously these kind of operational 

19 considerations have to happen. Now, we're not 

20 federalized right now, but we need to have some 

21 delineation. When are we armed, when are not armed, 
70

1 what is our authority?

2 I think the biggest thing was -- the biggest 

3 thing I found out was the cops didn't know -- knew less 

4 than we did. Our guys were on street corners and 

5 they'd have a question and say, well, what do we do 

6 about this, and the cops there were like "I thought you 

7 guys knew."

8 So we need to have definite rules of 

9 engagement from the civil authorities. We finally got 

10 those about on Saturday. They gave us sheets, here is 

11 who goes where.

12 Obviously, part of this was them getting their 

13 act together. They weren't sure how to organize it.

14 But we obviously have to have -- we need 

15 direction. We need rules of engagement and we need to 

16 know are we armed, are we not armed, what is our 

17 authority, that kind of thing.

18 MAJ MELNYK: Thank you very much, sir.

19 MAJ DURR: Thanks.

20 (The interview was concluded.)

21 * * * * *