J-S32040-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RICKIE JAMES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 776 EDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2019,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0013643-2009.

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 28, 2020

Rickie James appeals from the order denying his petition filed pursuant 

to the Post Conviction Relief Act. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

The PCRA court summarized the pertinent facts from James’ trial as 

follows:

On September 30, 2009, at about 6:27 p.m., Police Officer 

Andrew Jackson was in an unmarked police vehicle in the 

vicinity of 22nd and Dauphin Streets when he was flagged 

down by the [victim]. Officer Jackson testified [the victim] 

exited his Chevrolet Impala screaming and pointing towards 

his left shoulder; he told Officer Jackson that he had been 

shot. Officer Jackson saw the bullet wound and a bit of 

blood right below [the victim’s] left ear. Officer Jackson 

observed that the driver’s side window of the vehicle was 

shot out and there were multiple shots visible on the driver’s 

side of the vehicle. [The victim] told Officer Jackson that he 

was shot by someone named Rickie, who lived in the area 

of 23rd and Norris Streets in a house in front of which a black 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Chrysler Pacifica was parked. [The victim] described two 

shooters: the first male was Rickie, a black male about 6’2’’ 

wearing a black hoodie and riding a bike. The second male 

was described as a black male wearing a black hoodie and 

riding a bike. [The victim’s] children were in the car and 

after they were picked up, [he] was taken to Temple 

University Hospital by Police Officer Robert Dougherty.

***

[The victim] testified that on September 30, 2009, we was 

picking up medicine for the mother of his eight-year old son 

at a Rite Aid Pharmacy located at 22nd Street and Lehigh 

Avenue. His son, seven-year old daughter and eight-year 

old niece were with him in the car. After going to the 

playground at 25th and Diamond Streets, they drove to his 

son’s mother’s house at 22nd and Diamond Streets. As he 

pulled up, he saw two people who started to shoot at him. 

He testified that he could not identify either shooter, that he 

was just grazed by the shots, and that his window was hit. 

[The victim] drove to Dauphin Street and flagged down a 

police officer . . . whom he saw in an unmarked vehicle. He 

did not recall telling the officer who had shot him. [The 

victim] was released from the hospital and was taken to 

Northwest Detectives where he gave a statement to 

Detective Edward Keppol. [The victim] testified that when 

he was interviewed he was under the influence of the drugs 

he had received at the hospital. 

He further testified that he did not recognize anyone in the 

courtroom as the person who shot at him, but in his 

statement to police, he stated that two people came towards 

his vehicle shooting. . . . [The victim] denied telling police 

the information contained in his statement; he testified that 

he told the police some of the information in his statement, 

but that most of it was false. He stated that the detective 

told him whose photos to identify and that he really was not 

sure who had shot him, but he was sure it was neither 

defendant.

The notes of testimony from the preliminary hearing for 

[James] and the notes of testimony from co-defendant 

[Lamar] Harding’s preliminary hearing were read to the 

jury. [The victim] testified that the notes were inaccurate 

and that he did not testify as the notes reflected. He then 
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stated he identified [James] as one of the shooters at the 

preliminary hearing because he “was pissed off” about an 

earlier confrontation with a woman who was in the Rite Aid 

parking lot with [James]. [The victim] identified [Harding] 

and [James] as the shooters numerous times at each of 

their preliminary hearings, but denied at trial knowing who 

had shot at him. He insisted that it was neither defendant 

and insisted that the court reporter transcribed an 

inaccurate report.

Police Officer Robert Dougherty testified that he met Officer 

Jackson in the vicinity of 22nd and Dauphin and transported 

[the victim] to the hospital. On the way to the hospital, [the 

victim] told him that he was possibly shot over an earlier 

confrontation over a parking spot at Rite Aid.

***

After he was released from the hospital, [the victim] was 

formally interviewed. Detective [Edward] Keppol [testified] 

that [the victim] did not appear drowsy or under the 

influence of any drugs . . . Detective Keppol read [the 

victim’s] statement to the jury and denied telling [him] that 

the police had a suspect. Detective Keppol showed [the 

victim] a photograph of [James] after [the victim] said that 

[James] had shot him.

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/28/19, at 2-3 (citation omitted).

James and Harding were tried together. Based on the above evidence, 

on May 13, 2010, a jury convicted James of attempted murder and related 

charges. On July 7, 2010, the trial court sentenced James to an aggregate 

term of seventeen to thirty-four years of imprisonment on his remaining 

convictions. James filed a timely petition for reconsideration. 

On October 13, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on the motion, at 

which James’ mother testified regarding a letter purportedly written by 

Harding. She testified that Harding allegedly “stated in the letter that he is 
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the actual person that shot [the victim] and not [James].” N.T., 10/13/10, at 

5. The Commonwealth argued that nothing in the letter was relevant to the 

post-sentence motion, but the letter could be the basis for a “PCRA after 

discovered evidence” claim. N.T., 10/13/10, at 8. In addition, the prosecutor 

commented that he read the letter and “nothing indicated [James] is innocent, 

it just indicates [Harding] is guilty of more crimes than he was found guilty 

of.” Id.1 For his part, James’ trial counsel stated he agreed that the letter 

allegedly written by Harding would be appropriately considered under the 

PCRA. Id. at 9. Finally, the prosecutor stated that “with regards to the 

authentication of this letter, it could have [been] written by [James.]” Id. 

Trial counsel then confirmed that he received an original copy of the letter 

from James’ mother. Id. Although the letter was marked as a defense exhibit, 

it was not admitted into evidence. Ultimately, the trial court denied James’ 

post-sentence motion.

Trial counsel filed a timely appeal on James’ behalf but later was 

permitted to withdraw, and the trial court appointed new counsel. In an 

unpublished memorandum filed on October 18, 2011, this Court rejected 

James’ challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions, 

as well as his claim challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. 

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1 The jury convicted Harding of only aggravated assault, and the trial court 

sentenced him to an aggregate term of three-and-one-half to ten years in 

prison and a consecutive five-year probationary term. See Commonwealth 

v. Harding, 37 A.3d 1235 (Pa. Super. 2011)(unpublished memorandum).
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Commonwealth v. James, 37 A.3d 1235 (Pa. Super. 2011). Although James 

claimed that he was entitled to a new trial based upon after-discovered 

evidence in the form of Harding’s letter, we found this claim waived because 

the letter did not appear in the certified record. James, unpublished 

memorandum at 15-16. In a footnote, however, we noted that “our review 

of the document attached to [James’] brief reveals that nowhere therein does 

[Harding] state he was solely responsible for shooting [the victim].” Id. at 

16 n.7. Our Supreme Court denied James’ petition for allowance of appeal on 

February 1, 2012. Commonwealth v. James, 37 A.3d 1194 (Pa. 2012).

On March 28, 2013, James filed a pro se PCRA petition, and the PCRA 

court appointed counsel. Thereafter, PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw 

and a “no-merit” letter pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 

(Pa. 1988), and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) 

(en banc). According to PCRA counsel, James’ PCRA petition was untimely 

and alleged not time-bar exception. The PCRA court agreed and, following a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely.

James filed a timely appeal to this Court in which he asserted that his 

PCRA petition was timely. After reviewing the record, we determined that the 

PCRA court erred in concluding James had not filed a petition for permission 

to appeal to our Supreme Court. See Commonwealth v. James, 190 A.3d 

721 (Pa. Super. 2018) (unpublished memorandum). This Court therefore 

reversed the PCRA court’s order denying relief and remanded for the 

appointment of new counsel. Id.
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Following remand, the PCRA court appointed current counsel, who filed 

an amended petition in which he claimed he was entitled to a new trial based 

upon after-discovered evidence, as well as a layered claim of ineffectiveness 

due to prior counsel’s failure to ensure Harding’s letter appeared in the 

certified record. On February 4, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a motion to 

dismiss the amended petition. The next day, the PCRA court issued a 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent to dismiss the petition without merit. 

James filed a response. By order entered March 4, 2019, the PCRA court 

dismissed James’ amended PCRA petition. This timely appeal followed. 

Although the PCRA court did not require James to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 1925, 

the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion.

James raises the following issue on appeal:

Did the [PCRA court] err in refusing to grant [James] an 

evidentiary hearing regarding the question of whether [he] 

was involved with the shooting of the victim, involving the 

testimony of [Harding] and the letter he sent to [James’] 

family at the end of trial?

James’ Brief at 1.

This Court’s standard of review regarding an order dismissing a petition 

under the PCRA is to ascertain whether “the determination of the PCRA court 

is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error. The PCRA 

court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings 

in the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 

(Pa. Super. 2013) (citations omitted).
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The PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without 

a hearing when the court is satisfied that there are no 

genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant 

is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no 

legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. 

To obtain a reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a 

petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he 

raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in 

his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court 

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing. 

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014) (citations 

omitted).

In his issue, James argues that the PCRA court abused its discretion in 

dismissing his PCRA without first affording him a hearing based on the content 

of Harding’s letter. James summarizes his argument in support of his issue 

as follows:

There is enough of an evidentiary cause for [the PCRA 

court] to have granted [James] an evidentiary hearing, 

primarily based upon the testimony of eyewitness and codefendant, [Harding] who has communicated by means of a 

letter to [James’] family that he has knowledge of the fact 

that [James] was not the shooter of [the victim] of this 

incident. Therefore, the [PCRA] court needs to conduct an 

evidentiary hearing so that [Harding’s] testimony can be 

certified and included with the record to be considered by 

this Honorable Court so that it can equitably determine 

whether this case can be remanded back to the [PCRA] court 

for a new trial or a new sentencing.

James’ Brief at 6.

To address this claim, we first note the test applied to after-discovered 

evidence under the PCRA. When discussing the test in the context of a PCRA 

appeal, our Supreme Court summarized:
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[W]e have viewed this analysis in criminal cases as 

comprising four distinct requirements, each of which, if 

unproven by the petitioner, is fatal to the request for a new 

trial. As stated, the four-part test requires the petitioner to 

demonstrate the new evidence: (1) could not have been 

obtained prior to the conclusion of trial by the exercise of 

reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative or 

cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the 

credibility of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a 

different verdict if a new trial were granted. The test applies 

with full force to claims arising under Section 9543(a)(2)(vi) 

of the PCRA. In addition, we have held the proposed new 

evidence must be producible and admissible.

Commonwealth v. Small, 189 A.3d 961, 972 (Pa. 2018) (citations omitted).

Credibility determinations are an integral part of determining whether a PCRA 

petitioner has presented after-discovered evidence that would entitle him to 

a new trial. See, e.g., Small, 189 A.3d at 978-79 (remanding for the PCRA 

court to make relevant credibility determinations). We have stated, prior to 

granting a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, “a court must assess 

whether the alleged after-discovered evidence is of such a nature and 

character that it would likely compel a different verdict if a new trial is 

granted.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 365 (Pa. Super. 

2010). “In making this determination, a court should consider the integrity of 

the alleged after-discovered evidence, the motive of those offering the 

evidence, and the overall strength of the evidence supporting the conviction.” 

Id. 

Here, the PCRA court explained that it denied James’ amended PCRA 

petition without a hearing for several reasons:
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First, [James] fails to proffer a signed certification from 

Harding indicating that he did, in fact, write the letter or that 

he would testify at an evidentiary hearing. Without such a 

certification, the claim must fail. 

Moreover, [James’] claim fails because Harding’s letter 

does not contain, as [James] alleges, the assertion that 

[James] was not the person [who] shot the victim[.] In the 

letter, Harding is addressing a person by the name of 

“Rakim.” The contents of the letter are largely Harding 

accusing Rakim’s mother of telling people that Harding had 

snitched on [James]. In the letter, Harding insists that he 

never “ratted” on [James] and further threatens to kill 

Rakim and his mother when Harding gets out of jail. At one 

point in the letter, Harding acknowledges that he shot an 

unnamed “boy”, but nothing in the letter established that 

Harding is referring to [the victim].

Simply, nothing in Harding’s letter exculpates [James]. 

At no point does Harding’s letter state that [James] did not 

shoot [the victim]. The evidence presented at trial 

established that both [James] and Harding shot at [the 

victim]. Therefore, even if Harding was referring to the 

shooting of [the victim], admitting that he shot the victim 

does not contradict the evidence presented at trial. 

PCRA Court Opinion, 6/28/19, at 7 (citations omitted). In addition, the PCRA 

court noted this Court’s statement on direct appeal, see supra, that nowhere 

in the letter does Harding state that he was solely responsible for shooting the 

victim. Id.

Our review of the record supports the PCRA court’s conclusions. 

Initially, we note that James’ claim fails because Harding did not sign a witness 

certification in which he acknowledges he authored the letter in question and 

was willing to testify at a PCRA hearing. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. 9545(d)(1)(i) 

(providing, “Where a petitioner requests an evidentiary hearing, the petition 

shall include a certification signed by each intended witness stating the 
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witness’s name . . . and substance of testimony and shall include any 

documents material to that witness’s testimony”); see also Pa.R.Crim.P. 

902(A)(15)(providing that a request for an evidentiary hearing shall include 

witness certifications). Indeed, nowhere in this amended petition does James 

even aver that Harding was willing to testify regarding the contents of the 

letter.

In addition, to the extent we can read the handwritten letter, we agree 

with the PCRA court that, even if properly authenticated, the letter in no way 

exculpates James. This is especially true given, the “overall strength of the 

evidence supporting [James’] conviction.” Padillas, supra. Although he 

recanted the identification at trial, in his initial statements to police, and in 

preliminary hearing testimony, the victim identified James—a person he 

knew—as one of the shooters. In addition, ballistic evidence established that 

a bullet fragment recovered from the victim’s car was fired from the same 

handgun police found on James when they arrested him less than two weeks 

after the shooting. See N.T., 5/12/10, at 110-17. 

In sum, because the PCRA court did not err in concluding that the letter 

allegedly written by Harding was not of such a nature and character that it 

would compel a different result, Small, supra, James’ issue fails, and we 

affirm the PCRA court’s order denying him post-conviction relief.

Order affirmed. 
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/28/20