1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION

54 REALITY, LTD, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-471 

Plaintiffs, 

Dlott, J. 

 vs. Bowman, M.J. 

LANCE HIMES, et al., 

Defendants. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

This civil action is now before the Court on Defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 

23) and the parties’ responsive memoranda. (Docs. 26, 29). Also, before the Court is 

Defendants’ motion to transfer venue. (Doc. 19). The motions will be addressed in turn. 

I. Background and Facts 

 The Plaintiffs bring this civil-rights lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), 

and 1986, and for violations of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Fourteenth 

Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the Declaratory Judgments Act, 28 U.S.C. § 

2201. The Plaintiffs seek compensatory damages, and injunctive and declaratory relief 

against the enforcement of Ohio’s certificate of need requirements with respect to 

improvements to nursing homes and the acquisition of beds, and the policies and 

practices of the Ohio Department of Health and the Ohio Department of Aging, and the 

directors of those agencies, the other Defendants named in this complaint, as well as the 

John and Jane Doe Defendants who have conspired with these directors to effect the 

violations described herein. 
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A. The Parties 

 There are twenty-four Plaintiffs listed in the Amended Complaint, all of whom either 

own or operate nursing facilities in Ohio. Plaintiff’s are identified as follows: 

 Harold Sosna, 72 Ventures Ltd., 54 Reality, Ltd., Avery Road Reality, LLC, Ivy 

Health Realty, LLC, Seminole Avenue Realty, LLC, Keller Road Realty Co., LLC, Steigler 

Road Realty, LLC, Clermont Health Realty, LLC, JZB Realty Holding Co. LLC, Pleasant 

Ridge Reality, LLC, F&H Realty Holding Company LLC, and Shining Knight Reality LLC, 

Avery Road Care Center, Inc., Euclid Health Care, Inc. d/b/a Madeira Health Center, 

Pleasant Ridge Care Center, Inc., Kenwood Terrace Care Center, Inc., Southbrook 

Health Care Center, Inc., Beechwood Terrace Care Center, Inc., Ivy Health Care, Inc., 

Social Row Transitional Care, Inc., Wexford Care Center, Inc., Wexford Place, Inc., and 

Amelia Care Center. 

 Plaintiff Harold Sosna is an Ohio licensed Nursing Home Administrator, and has 

for many years engaged in the business of acquiring, owning, operating, building, and 

improving long term care facilities/nursing homes and other activities related to the 

delivery of care and services to Ohio’s elderly and medically needy citizens in long term 

care facilities. 

 Mr. Sosna owns all issued and outstanding shares or member units of Avery Road 

Realty, Pleasant Ridge Realty, JZB Realty, F&H Realty, Ivy Health Realty, Shining Knight 

Realty, Clermont Health Realty, Pleasant Ridge Care Center, Inc., Beechwood Terrace 

Care Center, Inc., Social Row Transitional Care, Inc., Ivy Heath Care, Inc., Avery Road 

Care Center, Inc., Wexford Care Center, Inc., and The Wexford Place, Inc. Harold Sosna 

owns 50% of the issued and outstanding shares or member units of Steigler Road Realty, 
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Keller Road Realty, Seminole Avenue Realty, 54 Realty, 72 Ventures, Euclid Health Care, 

Inc., Kenwood Terrace Care Center, Inc., and Southbrook Health Care Center, Inc. 

 Plaintiffs assert claims against the following defendants: 

 Defendant Lance Himes, Director of the Ohio Department of Health (“ODH”); 

Beverly L. Lauber, Director of the Ohio Department of Aging (“ODA”); Gay Lynne Gibson, 

Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of Health; Rhoda Elisabeth 

Jones, Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of Health; Amanda Kay 

Fruth, a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of Health; Tammy Lynn 

Lorbach, a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of Health; Sherri Sue 

Edler, a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of Health; Crystal 

Autumn Mullins, a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of Health; 

Lindsey Renee Pasanen, a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department of 

Health; Teresa Lynn Raleigh is a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio Department 

of Health; and Emily Bonita Hester, a Health Care Facilities Surveyor for the Ohio 

Department of Health. 

B. CON denial and Claims 

 The Plaintiff companies all own or operate nursing homes in Ohio. (Doc. 16, 

Amended Complaint (“AC”) ¶¶ 7-18). All of these companies are owned in whole or part 

by Plaintiff Harold Sosna. (AC ¶¶ 6, 19). Mr. Sosna is an Ohio licensed Nursing Home 

Administrator, and his companies have been routinely recognized for excellence in 

delivery of health care and other necessary services. (AC ¶ 6). His homes have been 

rated highly by residents and surveyors alike. (AC ¶ 60). 
4 

 In addition to developing new homes, Mr. Sosna’s companies have also acquired 

older facilities and have invested significant sums to modernize and update them. (AC ¶ 

61). Over the last decade, his companies have spent more than $80 million to improve 

their facilities. 

 All of the Plaintiffs’ significant expenditures have required State approval. A 

company cannot just build a nursing home in Ohio; it must first obtain a Certificate of 

Need (or “CON”) from the Ohio Department of Health (“ODH”). (AC ¶¶ 32-43). A 

“certificate of need” is written approval from the Director of ODH authorizing a “reviewable 

activity.” Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.51(C). “Reviewable activities” include construction or 

replacement of a long-term care facility; renovation of an existing facility that involves a 

capital expenditure of two million dollars or more; an increase in bed capacity; and a 

relocation of beds. See Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.511. Unless Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.59 

applies, as explained below, if the project proposed in a CON application meets all of the 

applicable criteria for approval, the Director of ODH must approve it. See Ohio Rev. Code 

§ 3702.52(C)(1). For a period of five years after implementation of the reviewable activity, 

ODH monitors the entity granted the CON for substantial compliance with the certificate. 

Id. at (E) 

 Another CON is needed to replace an existing facility, or spend more than $2 

million on improvements to an existing facility, or add beds to the facility, or relocate beds 

from one facility to another. (AC ¶ 43).). Until the events giving rise to this litigation, the 

Department of Health has regularly granted applications submitted by Mr. Sosna’s 

companies for Certificates of Need, allowing them to expand and improve their facilities 
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for the benefit of their residents. The Department of Health, however, has announced that 

it will not grant any CON to any of the Plaintiffs for the next five years. 

 This case stems from state action regarding Embassy Bryden Place (“Bryden 

Place”). Bryden Place (which is not a plaintiff) was a skilled nursing facility located in 

Columbus, Ohio. It was owned by Plaintiff 72 Ventures, which is, in turn, half-owned by 

Plaintiff Harold Sosna. 72 Ventures contracted with Embassy Bryden Place, LLC (which 

is not a plaintiff) to operate the Bryden Place facility, and Embassy Bryden Place, LLC 

held a license to operate the facility. The Ohio Department of Health (“ODH”) issued a 

notice to Embassy Bryden Place, LLC proposing to revoke its license to operate Bryden 

Place. That notice triggered application of Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.59(B), which states: 

(1) The director [of ODH] shall not approve an application for a certificate of 

need for the addition of long-term care beds to an existing long-term care 

facility or for the development of a new long-term care facility if any of the 

following apply: 

(b) During the sixty-month period preceding the filing of the application, a 

notice of proposed license revocation was issued under section 3721.03 of 

the Revised Code for the existing long-term care facility in which the beds 

are being placed or a nursing home owned or operated by the applicant or 

a principal participant, unless in the case of such a nursing home the notice 

was issued solely because the nursing home had already closed or ceased 

operations. 

(Emphases added). That is, if a “principal participant” of the CON applicant owns a 

nursing home that has been issued a notice of proposed license revocation in the sixty 

months prior to the applicant’s submission of a CON application for (1) the addition of 

long-term care beds to an existing facility or (2) the development of a new facility, the 
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application shall not be approved.1 There is no prohibition against CONs for any of the 

other “reviewable activities” listed in Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.511. 

 After ODH proposed revocation of Embassy Bryden Place, LLC’s license, Avery 

Road Realty submitted a CON application to construct a new long-term care facility and 

to transfer beds to that facility. Amended Complaint (Doc. 16) at ¶¶ 135, 137. ODH denied 

that application pursuant to O.R.C § 3702.59(B) . (Doc. 16) at ¶ 137. Namely, when Avery 

Road Realty submitted its CON application, Plaintiff Harold Sosna owned Avery Road 

Realty in its entirety. (Doc. 16) at ¶ 19. He was therefore a principal participant of Avery 

Road Realty when it submitted its CON application. Mr. Sosna also owns 50% of Plaintiff 

72 Ventures, which owned the facility Bryden Place. Id. As detailed above, the statute 

prohibits the approval of certificates of need for two specific activities for an applicant who 

is at least 5% owned by someone who has had, within the past five years, a notice of 

revocation issued to a nursing facility that he owns or operates. 

 Avery Road Realty requested a hearing to challenge the denial of its CON 

application. The ODH Hearing Examiner wrote a report and recommendation expressly 

noting that ODH was misapplying the statute and had improperly denied Avery’s 

application. (Doc. 26, Ex. B). The Hearing Examiner concluded that “Avery’s CON 

application should not have been denied under R.C. § 3702.59(B)(1)(b).” (Id. at 3). At the 

time of the filing of the instant motions to dismiss, the administrative case remains 

pending. 

 

1 A “principal participant” is either: (1) A person who has an ownership or controlling interest of at least five 

per cent in an applicant, in a long-term care facility that is the subject of an application for a certificate of 

need, or in the owner or operator of the applicant or such a facility; or (2) An officer, director, trustee, or 

general partner of an applicant, of a long-term care facility that is the subject of an application for a certificate 

of need, or of the owner or operator of the applicant or such a facility. Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.51(R). 
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 This suit followed the denial of Avery Road Realty’s CON application. 

 Plaintiffs allege that due to the revocation of Embassy Bryden Place, LLC’s license 

to operate Bryden Place, Ohio Rev. Code § 3702.59 bars them from having any certificate 

of need application approved for five years and that that bar violates their various rights. 

 Lance Himes, Director of ODH, and Beverley Laubert, Director of the Ohio 

Department of Aging (“ODA”) have been named Defendants in their individual and official 

capacities. Nine nursing home inspectors within ODH (called “surveyors”) have also been 

named Defendants in their official capacities. The Amended Complaint first raises claims 

against all Defendants in their official capacities. It asserts violations of procedural due 

process, substantive due process, and equal protection. Specifically, the Amended 

Complaint claims that all Defendants violated Plaintiffs’ procedural due process rights by 

not giving them an opportunity to participate in an administrative hearing regarding the 

revocation of Embassy Bryden Place, LLC’s license. (Doc. 16 at ¶¶ 145-146, 150, 151). 

It also asserts a violation of Plaintiffs’ substantive due process rights based upon 

Defendants’ alleged deprivation of Plaintiffs’ property rights and their right to earn a living 

in the occupation of their choice. See id. at ¶¶ 155-173. 

 The Amended Complaint then raises an equal protection violation against 

Defendants, arguing that because entities unrelated to Bryden Place are not precluded 

from receiving CONs, it violates equal protection to deny CONs to entities affiliated with 

Bryden Place. Id. at ¶ 178. Plaintiffs also claim that Defendants discriminated against the 

disadvantaged and mentally ill and those who care for them. Id. at 176. The Amended 

Complaint then raises claims only against Directors Himes and Laubert in their individual 

capacities. It asserts, through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, violations of procedural due process, 
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substantive due process, and equal protection. It then claims an unlawful conspiracy, in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985, and an unlawful failure to prevent the alleged harms, in 

violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1986. In furtherance of their § 1983 claim, Plaintiffs re-assert their 

procedural and substantive due process and equal protection arguments. Amended 

Complaint (Doc. 16) at ¶ 185. In furtherance of their § 1985 claim, Plaintiffs argue that 

Directors Himes and Laubert conspired to deprive Plaintiffs of equal protection and use 

of their property through use of the survey process to impose fines, initiate license 

revocations, and force the closure of facilities targeted by ODH and ODA. Id. at ¶¶ 191-

192. 

 Finally, Plaintiffs argue that Directors Himes and Laubert violated § 1986 by being 

aware of the above harms and not preventing them. Id. at ¶ 197. The Amended Complaint 

seeks a declaration that Defendants have violated Plaintiffs’ due process and equal 

protection rights; a declaration that Ohio’s CON program and implementing rules are 

unconstitutional on their face and as applied because they violate due process and equal 

protection; injunctive relief ordering Defendants to comply with federal law; and 

compensatory damages. 

 Defendants now move to dismiss Plaintiff’s amended complaint for the following 

reasons: 1) All Plaintiffs except Mr. Sosna and 72 Ventures lack standing; 2) Younger 

abstention applies to Plaintiff’s claims; 3) The Eleventh Amendment bars Plaintiffs’ 

requested relief from Defendants in their official capacities; 4) The Amended Complaint 

must be dismissed because it is premised on inadmissible evidence; 5) Teresa Raleigh 

and Emily Hester must be dismissed as Defendants; 6) Plaintiffs fail to state claims of 

procedural due process, substantive due process, and equal protection; 7) Plaintiffs’ § 
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1983 claims against Directors Himes and Laubert in their individual capacities must be 

dismissed; 8) Plaintiffs have failed to state claims under §§ 1985 and 1986; 9) declaratory 

judgment is improper. Upon careful review, the undersigned finds that Younger

abstention should be applied and this matter stayed pending the outcome of the state 

administrative proceeding. 

II. Standard of Review 

 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) operates to test the sufficiency of 

the claims. The court is required to construe the complaint in the light most favorable to 

the Plaintiff, and accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true. See 

Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) and Lewis 

v. ACB Business Services, 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th Cir. 1998). A court, however, will not 

accept conclusions of law or unwarranted inferences which are presented as factual 

allegations. Blackburn v. Fisk University, 443 F.2d 121, 124 (6th Cir. 1974). A complaint 

must contain either direct or reasonable inferential allegations that support all material 

elements necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory. Lewis v. ACB, 

135 F.3d at 405 (internal citations omitted). “While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) 

motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires more than labels and 

conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” 

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 

(2007) (citations omitted); Association of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, 

Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007). Even though a complaint need not contain 

“detailed” factual allegations, its “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to 
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relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the 

complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Id. (citations omitted). 

III. Analysis 

Younger abstention derives from a desire to prevent federal courts from interfering 

with the functions of state criminal prosecutions and to preserve equity and comity. 

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) (“This underlying 

reason for restraining courts of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is 

reinforced by an even more vital consideration, the notion of ‘comity,’ that is, a proper 

respect for state functions, a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of 

a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National 

Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their 

separate functions in their separate ways.”). 

 The Supreme Court later clarified that Younger abstention can apply to cases that 

are not criminal prosecutions but noted that such applications are narrow and exist only 

in a few exceptional circumstances. New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of 

New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506, 105 L.Ed.2d 298 (1989) (“NOPSI”) 

(finding that Younger abstention did not apply to state council utility ratemaking procedure 

as it was essentially a legislative act and not judicial in nature). Regarding the situations 

to which Younger applies, first, Younger permits abstention when there is an ongoing 

state criminal prosecution. Id. Next, Younger precludes federal involvement in certain 

civil enforcement proceedings. Id. These are proceedings that “are akin to criminal 

prosecutions.” Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 U.S. 584, 134 S.Ct. 584, 588, 187 

L.Ed.2d 505 (2013). Finally, Younger pertains to “civil proceedings involving certain 
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orders that are uniquely in furtherance of the state courts' ability to perform their judicial 

functions,” such as contempt orders. NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368, 109 S.Ct. 2506 (citations 

omitted). 

 Once the proceeding is found to fit into one of the three NOPSI categories listed 

above, the court evaluates the proceeding using a three-factor test laid out in Middlesex 

County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 73 

L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). See Sprint Commc'ns, Inc., 134 S.Ct. at 593–94 (clarifying that the 

Middlesex factors are only considered by a court after the court decides that one of the 

NOPSI exceptional circumstances is present). The Middlesex test states that abstention 

may occur when three criteria are met: (1) state proceedings are currently pending; (2) 

the proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceedings will 

provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims. 

Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432-34, 102 S.Ct. 2515 (holding that abstention from a state bar 

disciplinary hearing was proper as the state has traditionally exercised control over the 

conduct of attorneys, and the “judiciary as well as the public is dependent upon 

professionally ethical conduct of attorneys and thus has a significant interest in assuring 

and maintaining high standards of conduct of attorneys engaged in practice”); see also 

Habich v. City of Dearborn, 331 F.3d 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2003). 

 Here, Defendants argue that civil enforcement proceedings like Avery’s appeal of 

ODH’s denial of its CON application fit within the exceptionally-narrow circumstances 

warranting abstention here. Namely, Defendants contend that the state proceeding began 

when ODH issued a formal notice denying Avery Road Realty’s application for a CON. 

ODH is a party to the proceeding, which involved the opportunity for presentation of 
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witnesses (including cross-examination) and exhibits. See Ohio Rev. Code §§ 3702.60 

(applying Chapter 119, 119.03(D)). The hearing occurred in October 2018, however an 

administrative decision has not yet been issued. (Dee Doc. 23, Ex. 2). The state 

proceeding is therefore ongoing. 

 Plaintiffs, however, contend that threshold requirement for applying Younger 

abstention is that the state civil enforcement proceeding must be ‘quasi-criminal’ in 

nature.” Acra Turf Club, Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 138 (3d Cir. 2014) 

(quoting Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 593) (emphasis added) 2 Plaintiff argues the administrative 

appeal at issue is not quasi-criminal in nature. Plaintiff’s contention is unavailing. 

 The state proceeding involves the denial of Avery Road Realty’s application for a 

CON. ODH denied the CON application through a formal notice issued to Avery Road 

Realty. See id. That denial is a sanction against Avery Road Realty and is based on its 

affiliation with the owner of a facility whose operator’s license was revoked. See id. ODH 

is a party to the proceeding. See id. Thus, “while the proceeding may lack all the 

formalities found in a trial, it contains enough protections and similarities to qualify as ‘akin 

to criminal prosecutions’ for purposes of Younger abstention.” Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 

F.3d 365, 370 (6th Cir. 2017). Based on the foregoing the undersigned agrees that the 

state administrative proceeding is a civil enforcement proceeding outlined by NOPSI. See 

Sprint Communs., Inc., 571 U.S. at 79-80. 

 

2 The Third Circuit found that when “evaluating whether a state proceeding is quasi-criminal, [a court must] 

consider the factors set out in Sprint, including whether (1) the action was commenced by the State in its 

sovereign capacity, (2) the proceeding was initiated to sanction the federal plaintiff for some wrongful act, 

and (3) there are other similarities to criminal actions, such as a preliminary investigation that culminated 

with the filing of formal charges.” ACRA Turf Club, 748 F.3d at 138. Plaintiffs contend that Avery’s 

administrative appeal of ODH’s denial of its CON application does not fit any of the factors listed above. 

Although instructive, the Court is not bound by holdings from the Third Circuit. 
13 

 Having so concluded, the undersigned must next examine the factors outlined in 

Middlesex to determine of Younger abstention properly applies. As detailed above, under 

the Middlesex test, abstention is proper when “(1) state proceedings are currently 

pending; (2) the proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state 

proceedings will provide the federal plaintiff with an adequate opportunity to raise his 

constitutional claims.” Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 369 (6th Cir. 2017) (citing 

Middlesex at 432-34). Here, the state proceeding remains pending. Moreover, the State 

certainly has an important interest in regulating nursing facilities licensed by ODH, one of 

its agencies. Finally, the proceeding culminates in an available appeal to state court, 

where constitutional challenges may be raised. See, e.g., Kellough v. Ohio State Bd. of 

Edn., No. 10AP-419, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 370, at ¶ 36 (Feb. 1, 2011); Jain v. Ohio 

State Med. Bd., No. 09AP-1180, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 2364, at ¶ 7 (Jun. 22, 2010). 

 In sum, the undersigned finds that the administrative proceeding is judicial in 

nature. The State has an important interest in regulating nursing facilities licensed by 

ODH, one of its agencies. And the proceeding culminates in an available appeal to state 

court, where constitutional challenges may be raised. Notably, Plaintiffs’ claims in the 

Amended Complaint stem from one action: the denial of Avery Road Realty’s CON 

application. Accordingly, the undersigned finds that Younger abstention should be 

applied to this matter. As such, this matter should be stayed pending the resolution of 

Plaintiff Avery’s appeal of ODH’s denial of its CON application at the state administrative 

level.3

 

3 Federal trial courts have the power to stay proceedings, even for an indefinite period of time. See Landis 

v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254–55, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). To determine whether a stay is 

appropriate in this case, the Court must consider the following factors: “the need for a stay, the balance of 

potential hardship to the parties and the public, and the promotion of judicial economy. Dowler v. Med. 
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IV. Conclusion 

Based on the foregoing, it is therefore RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ motion 

to dismiss (Doc 23) be GRANTED in part, such that this matter is STAYED pending the 

outcome of the Plaintiff Avery’s appeal of the ODH’s denial of its CON application; and; 

the remaining pending motions (Docs. 5, 8, 19) be DENIED as MOOT. 

s/Stephanie K. Bowman 

 Stephanie K. Bowman 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 

Shoppe, No. 2:07 CV 848, 2007 WL 2907519, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2007). Younger abstention 

notwithstanding, the undersigned finds this matter should be stayed to further judicial economy and 

eliminate potential conflicting rulings and findings of fact. 
15 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION

54 REALITY, LTD, et al., Case No. 1:18-cv-471 

Plaintiffs, 

Dlott, J. 

 vs. Bowman, M.J. 

LANCE HIMES, et al., 

Defendants. 

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after 

being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on 

timely motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the 

portion(s) of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in 

support of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within 

FOURTEEN DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make 

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas 

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).