alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
# Rear Admiral Maria "Lore" Aguayo

##                 Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Atlantic/Director, Fleet Installations and Environmental Division (N46), U.S. Fleet Forces Command/Fleet Civil Engineer (N01CE), U.S. Fleet Forces Command            

Rear Adm. Lore Aguayo is a native of Arizona, and received her commission in 1993 through the Naval Reserve Officer Training Program. She holds a Bachelor of Science in Industrial Engineering and a Master of Science in Civil Engineering from Stanford University. She is also a graduate of the University of Pennsylvania’s Wharton Executive Development Program.

Aguayo’s operational tours include company commander/officer in charge, Naval Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) 5, Port Hueneme; executive officer for NMCB 5, Port Hueneme; commanding officer of NMCB 11, Gulfport; and commander of 22nd Naval Construction Regiment/deputy commander Naval Construction Group 2, Gulfport.

Her shore assignments include assistant resident officer in charge of construction at Naval Station Rota; CEC Accessions Officer, Norfolk; director of Facilities West for Commander, Navy Surface Reserve Force, San Diego; deputy public works officer, Public Works Center, San Diego; Energy and Utility Privatization action officer for OPNAV N46 and commander, Navy Installations Command; legislative fellow for Senator Jim Talent; legislative liaison for Navy Base Realignment and Closure Office; military aide to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Installations and Environment; public works officer at Naval Station Pearl Harbor and assistant Regional Engineer for Navy Region Hawaii; and operations officer for Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Southeast, Jacksonville.

Aguayo served as commanding officer, Naval Facilities Engineering Command Europe, Africa, Southwest Asia and regional engineer for Navy Region EURAFSWA. Aguayo most recently completed a tour as the Chief of Staff for NAVFAC Headquarters. \

Aguayo is currently serving as commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command, Atlantic as well as Fleet Civil Engineer and director, Fleet Installations and Environment, U.S. Fleet Forces Command.

Aguayo is a registered Professional Engineer in the state of Arizona, a member of the Acquisition Professional Community, and qualified as a Seabee Combat Warfare officer.

Her decorations include the Legion of Merit (three awards), Meritorious Service Medal (four awards), Navy Commendation Medal (six awards), Navy and Marine Corps Achievement Medal and other unit and service awards.
Exports

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_move_exp_dc_NUS-Z00_mbbl_a.htm 08:38:46 GMT-0500 (Eastern Standard Time) Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration Series Linkhttp://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MCREXUS1&f=A

http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/hist/LeafHandler.ashx?n=PET&s=MTTEXUS1&f=A Series KeyMCREXUS1.A

MTTEXUS1.A Year U.S. Exports of Crude Oil Mbbl

U.S. Exports of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products Mbbl 2012 246931172965 2011 171581089848 2010 15198858685 2009 15985 738803 2008 10464659392 2007 10006522879 2006 8999480561 2005 11619425190 2004 9783 383636 2003 4538374710 2002 3296359077 2001 7386354421 2000 18352 380710 1999 43031 343017 1998 40102 344757 1997 39308366258 1996 40211 358897 1995 34509 346477 1994 36020343896 1993 35834365974 1992 32473 347584 1991 42385 365341 1990 39653 312671 1989 51683 313460 1988 56713 298466 1987 54964278731 1986 56205 286373 1985 74513 285069 1984 66233 264077 1983 59948 269854 1982 86279 297513 1981 83166217024 1980 104935 1979 85707 1978 57728 1977 18255 1976 2941 1975 2146 1974 1074 1973 6971972 187

1971 503 1970 4991 1969 1436 1968 1802 1967 26541 1966 1477 1965 1097 1964 1363 1963 1698 1962 1790 1961 3227 1960 3087 1959 2526 1958 4346 1957 50243 1956 28624 1955 11571 1954 13599 1953 19931 1952 26696 1951 28604 1950 34823 1949 33069 1948 39736 1947 46355 1946 40750 1945 32998 1944 34238 1943 41342 1942 33834 1941 33238 1940 38341 1939 72073 1938 77273 1937 67286 1936 50184 1935 51378 1934 41127 1933 36584 1932 27393 1931 25535 1930 23705 1929 26401 1928 18966 1927 15844 1926 154071925 13337

1924 18239 1923 17385 1922 10163 1921 8940 1920 8757 1919 6019 1918 4901 1917 4098 1916 4096 1915 3768 1914 2969 1913 4630 1912 4493 1911 4806 1910 4288 1909 4056 1908 3552 1907 3007 1906 3525 1905 3004 1904 2647 1903 3012 1902 3458 1901 3024 1900 3290 1899 2802 1898 2736 1897 2893 1896 2641 1895 2650 1894 2903 1893 2660 1892 2486 1891 2303 1890 2299 1889 2028 1888 1846 1887 1920 1886 1818 1885 1939 1884 1897 1883 1405 1882 1072 1881 963 1880 875 1879 6811878 573

1877 685 1876 603 1875 394 1874 344 1873 468 1872 390 1871 269 1870 248
Exhibit 10.28 

FINANCIAL PLANNING ALLOWANCE PROGRAM

SUMMARY 


	
      Participants: 
	           
    	
      Corporate Officers, Division
      Presidents and other executives as may from time to time be approved for
      participation by the Compensation and Management Resources Committee of
      the Board of Directors of Foot Locker, Inc. (the “Compensation Committee”)
      

			 
	
      Allowable
      Expenses: 
		
      Financial planning services with a
      financial planning professional up to a set maximum annual dollar amount,
      as may be determined from time to time by the Compensation
      Committee.

			 
	
      Section 409A:
	 	
      Except as permitted by Section 409A
      of the Internal Revenue Code (the “Code”) and regulations issued
      thereunder, the right to reimbursement (i) shall not be subject to
      liquidation or exchange for another benefit, (ii) the amount of expenses
      eligible for reimbursement during any taxable year shall not affect the
      expenses eligible for reimbursement in any other taxable year, provided
      that the foregoing clause (ii) shall not be violated with regard to
      expenses reimbursed under any arrangement covered by Section 105(b) of the
      Code solely because such expenses are subject to a limit related to the
      period the arrangement is in effect, and (iii) such reimbursements
      payments shall be made on or before the last day of the participant’s
      taxable year following the taxable year in which the expense was incurred.
      



121
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION
EYE CARE PARTNERS, LLC, Case No. 1:18-cv-507
Plaintiff, Dlott, J.

Litkovitz, M.J.

Vs.

LANCE SNARR, et al., ORDER
Defendants.

This matter is before the Court following an informal discovery conference held on
November 30, 2018 with plaintiff Eye Care Partners, LLC, and defendants Lance Snarr and
Visioncare Partners Management, Inc. D/B/A Total Eye Care Partners (TECP). The disputed
discovery matters are resolved as follows:

e Documents will be produced by each side in the following format: Paper documents will be
produced in paper form, Excel spreadsheets will be produced in native format, and all other
electronically stored information will be produced in searchable .pdf format. Plaintiff
reserves the right to raise with the Court any issues that may arise regarding the format of
the documents that are produced in discovery.

e Documents or information related to TECP’s acquisitions and acquisition targets are relevant
to the extent defendant Snarr participated in any such acquisition on behalf of TECP or in
collaboration with TECP. TECP must produce documents or information in response to
requests for discovery related to TECP acquisitions or acquisition targets only to the extent
such documents or information also relate to defendant Snarr. (See, e.g., TECP’s
Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents, Request
for Production No. 8).

e Documents and information related to the formation of TECP are relevant to the extent such

documents and information pertain to defendant Snarr. TECP must produce documents


and information in response to these discovery requests only to the extent such acquisition
documents and information are related to defendant Snarr. (See, e.g., TECP’s
Supplemental Responses to Plaintiff's First Request for Production of Documents, Requests
for Production No. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24; TECP’s Responses to Plaintiff's First Set of
Interrogatories, Interrogatories No. 3, 4).

e Counsel for plaintiff shall prepare a written statement of the chain of custody of the Snarr
laptop computer and provide the statement to defendants no later than December 7, 2018.

e Plaintiff's counsel shall deliver the Snarr laptop to counsel for defendant TECP no later than
December 7, 2018, to give defendant an opportunity to conduct a forensic examination of
the laptop. The parties may bring any additional discovery issues that arise in connection
with the Snarr laptop to the Court’s attention.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: ([/ 30 /1E a

Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge
#### George B. GILES, Appellant, v. PICK HOTELS CORPORATION and Fort Shelby Hotel Company, Appellees.

No. 12438.

United States Court of Appeals Sixth Circuit.

April 27, 1956.

Markle, Markle & Eubank, Detroit, Mich., for appellant.

Ward & Plunkett, Detroit, Mich., for appellees.

Before SIMONS, Chief Judge, and MARTIN and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM.

The appellant was injured while he and a bellboy employed by appellee were engaged in removing luggage from the appellant’s car in front of the appellee’s hotel in Detroit. While the bellboy was taking baggage out of the rear seat of the car, the appellant reached into the front seat to remove a brief case. In doing so he supported himself by placing his left hand on the center pillar to which the rear door was hinged with his fingers in a position to be injured if the rear door was closed. The bellboy closed the rear door, and a part of the appellant’s left index finger was amputated. The district judge found the appellant guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law and directed a verdict for the appellee under what he considered a controlling decision of the Supreme Court of Michigan, Abent v. Mich*888igan Cab Co., 1937, 279 Mich. 617, 273 N.W. 289, 290.

In our opinion the district court’s conclusion was correct. In the Abent case the Michigan Supreme Court held that a passenger alighting from a taxicab who was injured when the driver closed the door on his hand was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, stating that “Ordinarily a dopr jamb or crack is not the place for fingers.” Although obvious factual distinctions exist between the Abent case and the case at bar, they are not such as to lead to a different legal result.

The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS IN THE QUARTERLY REPORT ON FORM 10-Q OF CHEMTRAK
INCORPORATED FOR THE QUARTER ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS
ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                         509,000
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  510,000
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    851,000
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             2,808,000
<PP&E>                                       1,464,000
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               4,338,000
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,550,000
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        15,000
<OTHER-SE>                                   2,103,000
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 4,338,000
<SALES>                                      1,054,000
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             1,054,000
<CGS>                                          941,000
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  941,000
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             1,799,000
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              22,000
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             (2,100,000)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         (2,100,000)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                (2,100,000)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (0.15)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (0.15)
        

</TABLE>
D.Y., a juvenile, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 3D17-0400

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed March 28, 2018

Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Jonathan Greenberg, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Joanne Diez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Before SUAREZ, LAGOA, and LINDSEY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

D.Y., a juvenile, appeals an order placing D.Y. on probation under the supervision of the Department of Juvenile Justice ("DJJ") and withholding adjudication of delinquency. D.Y. had been adjudicated incompetent in a prior case that was ultimately dismissed. Thus, the trial court concluded that D.Y. remained legally incompetent and appointed two doctors to evaluate D.Y. One doctor concluded D.Y. was incompetent, while the second doctor found that D.Y. was competent. The trial court then appointed a third doctor who subsequently found D.Y. to be incompetent, but also opined that D.Y. could be *963malingering and feigning ignorance with regards to his legal competence. The trial court made an oral finding that D.Y. was competent to proceed to the adjudicatory hearing but failed to enter a written order memorializing its findings as to D.Y.'s competency. The case proceeded to an adjudicatory hearing where the trial court found D.Y. delinquent as charged, withheld adjudication, and placed D.Y. on probation.

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.212(b) provides, "If the court finds the defendant competent to proceed, the court shall enter its order so finding and shall proceed." Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.212(b). Thus, a trial court errs when it fails to enter a written order regarding a defendant's competency. *See**Gordon v. State*, 219 So.3d 189, 197 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ("Here, the trial court made an oral finding that defendant was competent to proceed, but failed to render a written order to that effect. This cause must be remanded to the trial court to enter a written order consistent with its oral pronouncement."), *review denied,**Gordon v. State*, SC17-978, 2017 WL 4546004, at *1 (Fla. Oct. 12, 2017).

Where the trial court has entered an oral finding that the defendant is competent, but no written order of competency has been entered, the proper remedy is to remand the case to the trial court for entry of a *nunc pro tunc* order finding the defendant competent to stand trial. *Razuri v. State*, 126 So.3d 261, 261 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (citing *Corbitt v. State*, 744 So.2d 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ).1

Here, the trial court failed to enter a written order reflecting the trial court's determination that D.Y. was competent to proceed to trial. Accordingly, we remand with instructions for the trial court to enter a written order, *nunc pro tunc* , reflecting its oral pronouncement regarding D.Y.'s competency.

1

Moreover, on appeal, both parties request this Court remand the instant case for the trial court to enter a written order of competency. D.Y. has not raised any other objection on appeal to the finding of delinquency or to the disposition withholding adjudication and placing D.Y. on probation.
EXHIBIT 23.1



INDEPENDENT AUDITORS CONSENT



To the Board of Trustees and Shareholders of Universal Health Realty Income Trust:



We consent to the incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (File Nos.
033-56843 and 333-57815) on Form S-8 and the Registration Statements (File Nos. 333-81763 and 333-60638) on Form S-3 of Universal Health Realty Income Trust of our report dated January 20, 2004, with respect to the consolidated balance sheets of
Universal Health Realty Income Trust as of December 31, 2003 and 2002, and the related consolidated statements of income, shareholders equity and cash flows for the years then ended, and the related financial statement schedule, which report
appears in the December 31, 2003 annual report on Form 10-K of Universal Health Realty Income Trust.



/s/ KPMG LLPKPMG LLP




Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

March 12, 2004
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

CHARLES A. WALDREN,

Plaintiff,

“ i Case No. 3:18-cv-290
ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
PROPERTY INSURANCE CO., et
al.,

Defendants.

DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING AS MOOT DEFENDANT
ALLSTATE VEHICLE AND PROPERTY INSURANCE COMPANY’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON PLAINTIFF’S
BAD FAITH CLAIM (DOC. #10)

When the above-captioned case was removed from the Montgomery County
Court of Common Pleas, Defendant Allstate Vehicle and Property Insurance
Company’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Bad Faith Claim,
Doc. #10, was still pending. The parties agreed that Defendant would file a
supplemental motion for summary judgment. See Doc. #19, PagelD#732.

On October 31, 2018, Defendant Allstate filed a Supplemental Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff’s Claims for Bad Faith, Unjust Enrichment,
and Declaratory Judgment. Doc. #20. Given that the Supplemental Motion fully

encompasses the previous motion, the Court OVERRULES AS MOOT Allstate’s


Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiff's Bad Faith Claim, Doc. #10.

crise

Date: November 5, 2018

WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Lewis Ashley SMITH, Appellant, v. Christine M. SMITH, Appellee.

No. 4D16-3442

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.

[February 15, 2018]

Andrew A. Harris of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm Beach, and Linda L. Weiksnar of Crary Buchanan, Stuart, for appellant.

Craig M. Rappel of Rappel Health Law Group, PL, Vero Beach, for appellee.

Per Curiam.

*Affirmed.*

Ciklin, Levine and Klingensmith, JJ., concur.
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
<CIK>                         882860
<NAME>                        Pilgrim America Capital Corp.
<MULTIPLIER>                  1,000
<CURRENCY>                    U.S. Dollars            
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                            SEP-30-1998
<PERIOD-START>                               OCT-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                 MAR-31-1998
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                        1 
<CASH>                                               404
<SECURITIES>                                       5,456
<RECEIVABLES>                                      1,398
<ALLOWANCES>                                           0
<INVENTORY>                                            0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                   7,258
<PP&E>                                             1,221
<DEPRECIATION>                                       465
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                    62,135
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                              3,215
<BONDS>                                                0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                  0
<PREFERRED>                                            0
<COMMON>                                              54
<OTHER-SE>                                        44,041
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                      62,135
<SALES>                                           16,861
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                  16,861
<CGS>                                                  0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                          0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                  10,346
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                       0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   392
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                    6,123
<INCOME-TAX>                                       2,541
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                3,582
<DISCONTINUED>                                         0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                        0
<CHANGES>                                              0
<NET-INCOME>                                       3,582
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                       0.62
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0.54
                                                    

</TABLE>
#### Hanger & Co. *v.*Keating, *Adm’r. etc.*

*Jurisdiction*— Prohibition.—Where there is no final judgment, no appeal! ■will lie. Prohibition is the only remedy before determination, where* courts are proceeding without jurisdiction.

*Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court.*

I-Ion. John Whytock, Circuit Judge.

*Q-arland $*Nash, for appellants.

*Watkins*¿f *Pose,*for appellee.

IIaeRison, J.

Thomas I). Keating, administrator of Milus' Killian, deceased, applied, by petition, in the circuit court of Pulaski county, for an order to sell the lands belonging to- his intestate’s estate, for the payment of its debts.

Peter Hanger & Co., and Fletcher & Hotze, creditors of the estate, as they alleged, appeared in court and demurred to the petition upon the ground that the subject thereof, and the power to make such order, was not within the jurisdiction of the court. The court overruled the demurrer and made an *52order that all persons interested in the estate should be notified to show cause, on the first day of the next term of the court, why the prayer of the petitioner should not be granted. Peter Hanger & Co. and Fletcher & Hotze excepted to the rulings of the court, and without further proceedings being had, prayed an appeal to this court.

It is manifest that there was no final judgment, or order, in the proceeding from which an appeal might be taken. If the court was proceeding in a matter not within its jurisdiction, a prohibition was the only remedy which could be resorted to, before the determination of such proceeding. The ease must therefore be stricken from the docket.