alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-11-00850-CR

IN RE Charles TAYLOR, Jr.

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Rebecca Simmons, Justice

Marialyn Barnard, Justice

Delivered and Filed: December 7, 2011

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DENIED

On November 29, 2011, relator filed a petition for writ of mandamus, seeking to compel 

the trial court to rule on his pro se motion for judgment nunc pro tunc. However, in order to be 

entitled to mandamus relief, relator must establish that the trial court: (1) had a legal duty to 

perform a non-discretionary act; (2) was asked to perform the act; and (3) failed or refused to do 

so. In re Molina, 94 S.W.3d 885, 886 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding). When 

a properly filed motion is pending before a trial court, the act of giving consideration to and 

ruling upon that motion is ministerial, and mandamus may issue to compel the trial judge to act. 

See Safety-Kleen Corp. v. Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. 

proceeding). However, mandamus will not issue unless the record indicates that a properly filed 

 1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 1998-CR-4843, styled State of Texas v. Charles Taylor, Jr., in the 227th 

Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas, the Honorable Philip Kazen presiding. 
04-11-00850-CR

- 2 -

motion has awaited disposition for an unreasonable amount of time. See id. Relator has the 

burden of providing this court with a record sufficient to establish his right to mandamus relief. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.7(a) (“Relator must file with the petition [ ] a certified or sworn copy of 

every document that is material to the relator’s claim for relief and that was filed in any 

underlying proceeding”); see also TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(k)(1)(A); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 

833, 837 (Tex. 1992). 

Here, relator asserts he filed his motion on October 17, 2011. However, he has not 

provided this court with a file stamped copy of the motion or any other documents to show that a 

properly filed motion is pending before the trial court and has been brought to the trial court’s 

attention. Additionally, even if relator’s motion has been pending since October 17, 2011, we 

cannot say the motion has awaited disposition for an unreasonable amount of time. Based on the 

foregoing, we conclude relator has not shown himself entitled to mandamus relief. Accordingly, 

relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is DENIED. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). 

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
<PAGE>   1
                                                                      Exhibit 23



                        CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT AUDITORS


The Board of Directors
MASSBANK Corp.:


We consent to incorporation by reference in the Registration Statements (No.
33-11949 and No. 33-82110) on Form S-8 of MASSBANK Corp. of our report dated
January 11, 1999, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of MASSBANK Corp.
and subsidiaries as of December 31, 1998 and 1997, and the related consolidated
statements of income, changes in stockholders' equity and cash flows for each of
the years in the three-year period ended December 31, 1998, which report appears
in the December 31, 1998, annual report on Form 10-K of MASSBANK Corp.


                                                       /s/ KPMG Peat Marwick LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 26, 1999
Corey R. JUDGE, Appellant/Petitioner(s), v. STATE of Florida, Appellee/Respondent(s).

CASE NO.: 2D17-2368

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

February 1, 2018

BY ORDER OF THE COURT:

This appeal is dismissed for appellant's failure to comply with this court's December 4, 2017, order.

NORTHCUTT, CRENSHAW, and MORRIS, JJ., Concur.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 11.1
 
                                INFORMIX CORPORATION
 
                      COMPUTATION OF NET INCOME PER SHARE
                     (IN THOUSANDS, EXCEPT PER-SHARE DATA)
 
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                                                                FOR THE YEARS ENDED DECEMBER 31,
                                                                               ----------------------------------
                                                                                  1996      1995(1)    1994(1)(2)
                                                                               ----------  ----------  ----------
<S>                                                                            <C>         <C>         <C>
Net income used for net income (loss) per-share calculation..................  $  (73,565) $   38,600  $   48,293
Net Income Per Common Share:
  Weighted average outstanding shares........................................     149,310     145,062     137,742
  Net effect of outstanding options..........................................      --           5,565       5,040
  Weighted average common and common equivalent shares outstanding...........     149,310     150,627     142,782
Net income (loss) per-share..................................................  $     (.49) $      .26  $      .34
                                                                               ----------  ----------  ----------
                                                                               ----------  ----------  ----------
</TABLE>
 
    Fully diluted computation not presented since such amounts differ by less
than 3 percent of the net income (loss) per share amounts shown above.
 
Notes:
 
(1) Amounts presented have been restated to reflect the Company's business
    combination with Illustra Information Technologies, Inc. as a
    pooling-of-interests.
 
(2) Share and per-share information has been restated to reflect a two-for-one
    stock split (effected in the form of a stock dividend) which was effective
    June 26, 1995.
<PAGE>

                                                                    Exhibit 32.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                       PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Metretek Technologies, Inc.
(the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2004 as
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
"Report"), I, W. Phillip Marcum, President and Chief Executive Officer of the
Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant
to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      1.    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and

      2.    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and result of operations
            of the Company.

Date: May 17, 2004                         /s/ W. Phillip Marcum
                                           -----------------------------------
                                           W. Phillip Marcum
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

NATIONWIDE AGRIBUSINESS

INSURANCE COMPANY

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 3:18cvl66

JUDGE WALTER H. RICE

V.

DAVID MARTIN CONSTRUCTION

COMPANY, et al.

Defendants.

ORDER OF DISMISSAL; TERMINATION ENTRY

The Court having been advised by counsel for the parties that the above matter has been

settled, IT IS ORDERED that this action is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice as to the parties,

provided that any of the parties may, upon good cause shown within 60 days, reopen the action if

settlement is not consummated.

Parties intending to preserve this Court's jurisdiction to enforce the settlement should be

di^dXQ of Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 114 S.Ct. 1673 (1994), and incorporate

appropriate language in any substituted judgment entry.

The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the terms of the settlement between the parties, if

necessary.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

IX

WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Case: 3:18-cv-00166-WHR Doc #: 119 Filed: 07/26/21 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 2464
Jessie RIGGS v. STATE

CR-15-0707

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

February 3, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Reh. denied.
```

[Federal Register Volume 81, Number 9 (Thursday, January 14, 2016)]
[Proposed Rules]
[Page 1935]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2016-00560]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 52

[EPA-R06-OAR-2015-0647; FRL-9941-20-Region 6]

Approval and Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans; 
Arkansas; Crittenden County Base Year Emission Inventory

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Proposed rule.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is proposing to 
approve a revision to the Arkansas State Implementation Plan (SIP) 
submitted to meet the Clean Air Act (CAA) emissions inventory (EI) 
requirement for the Crittenden County ozone nonattainment area. EPA is 
approving the SIP revision because it satisfies the CAA EI requirement 
for Crittenden County under the 2008 8-hour ozone National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards (NAAQS). The inventory includes emission data for 
Nitrogen Oxides (NOx) and Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs). EPA is 
approving the revisions pursuant to section 110 and part D of the CAA 
and EPA's regulations.

DATES: Written comments should be received on or before February 16, 
2016.

ADDRESSES: Comments may be mailed to Ms. Mary Stanton, Chief, State 
Implementation B, Ozone and Infrastructure Section (6MM-AB), 
Environmental Protection Agency, 1445 Ross Avenue, Suite 1200, Dallas, 
Texas 75202-2733. Comments may also be submitted electronically or 
through hand delivery/courier by following the detailed instructions in 
the ADDRESSES section of the direct final rule located in the rules 
section of this Federal Register.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Colin Schwartz, (214) 665-7262, 
Schwartz.Colin@epa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: In the final rules section of this Federal 
Register, the EPA is approving the State's SIP submittal as a direct 
rule without prior proposal because the Agency views this as 
noncontroversial submittal and anticipates no adverse comments. A 
detailed rationale for the approval is set forth in the direct final 
rule. If no relevant adverse comments are received in response to this 
action no further activity is contemplated. If the EPA receives 
relevant adverse comments, the direct final rule will be withdrawn and 
all public comments received will be addressed in a subsequent final 
rule based on this proposed rule. The EPA will not institute a second 
comment period. Any parties interested in commenting on this action 
should do so at this time.
    For additional information, see the direct final rule which is 
located in the rules section of this Federal Register.

    Dated: December 30, 2015.
Samuel Coleman,
Acting Regional Administrator, Region 6.
[FR Doc. 2016-00560 Filed 1-13-16; 8:45 am]
 BILLING CODE 6560-50-P
```
#### Hunter vs. Gaines et al.

Exceptions to the ruling of the court upon applications for continuances are not to be encouraged — the discretiou of the circuit court will rarely be controled.

(For the principles decided, see *Rector et al. vs. Gaines et al., ante.*

*Appeal from, the Circuit Court of Hot Spring county.*

The Hon. John C. Murray, special Judge, presiding.

Flanagin, and Williams & Williams, for appellant.

Watkins & Gallagher, for appellees.

Mr. Justice Scott

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This was an action of ejectment upon the same certificate *93proceeded upon by the appellees in the case of *Rector et al. vs. Gaines et al.*The evidence introduced by the plaintiffs below was the same that was introduced by them in that case.

The defendant below applied for a continuance for want of evidence to enable him to set up the same New Madrid claim .that Rector offered to set up in the case against him, and by means of the same evidence that he offered; also — alleging that she held under Hale — for want of a certified copy of the proof taken in support of the Perciful claim before the Register and Receiver of the land office at Washington, Arkansas, in January, 1851, which had been mislaid or lost; of which claim Hale was alleged to be the owner; also, because Hale had applied to the proper authorities at Washington, to set aside the certificate of purchase, on which the plaintiffs below proceeded. The Court below overruled the motion, and we think correctly.

To say nothing of the showing as to diligence, the evidence neither as to the New Madrid claim of Langlois, nor as to the pre-emption claim of Perciful, was admissible according to the doctrines of the law applied in the case of *Rector et al. vs. Gaines et al.*The appellant, nevertheless, had the full benefit of the evidence offered in that case in support of the claim of Langlois, as the same was preserved in the bill of exceptions taken, as fully as if it had been presented anew in her case.

There was certainly nothing in the third ground for continuance worthy of notice.

Exceptions to the ruling of the Court upon applications for continuances are not to be encouraged. A large discretion is allowed, which will rarely be controled.

But although the Court ruled correctly as to this motion, and, also, as to all other questions in the progress of the trial, except as to those relating to the recovery of the rents and profits, the ruling as to them was erroneous; and for this error the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded, unless the appellees shall elect to enter a remittitur, as ruled in the case of *Rector et al. vs. Gaines et al.*

Mr. Chief Justice English not sitting in this case.
A00A1346.

#### DUNN v. THE STATE.

(539 SE2d 198)

Barnes, Judge.

Cleveland Dunn appeals his conviction of three counts of burglary (OCGA § 16-7-1). He contends that even though he may have been convicted as a party to a crime under OCGA § 16-2-20, the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction under *Jackson v. Virginia,*443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). We disagree and affirm.

The essence of Dunn’s appeal is that he cannot be convicted as a party to these burglaries because, at most, the evidence showed only that he received stolen property. See *Crumpton v. State,*240 Ga. App. 422 (523 SE2d 624) (1999). Dunn relies on the testimony of two witnesses who earlier pled guilty to committing the burglaries of which Dunn was convicted. According to Dunn, these witnesses testified only that they committed the burglaries and then transferred to Dunn some of the items they stole from the houses they burglarized. Dunn never told them to go to any particular house, and they were not committing the burglaries for Dunn.

Dunn’s argument, however, overlooks certain other testimony that distinguishes this case from *Crumpton v. State,*supra. The witnesses were staying at Dunn’s house, Dunn told them he wanted certain items — including particular types of guns, and they knew that Dunn would give them money and drugs for the stolen goods. Dunn admitted that he knew the items he received from the others were stolen and also admitted supplying the two with drugs. This evidence is sufficient to sustain Dunn’s conviction as a party to these three burglaries.

Under OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (4), a person who “intentionally advises, encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit” a crime may be charged with and convicted of commission of the crime. Dunn’s conduct in this case is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of this Code section. When one counsels and encourages others to commit crimes by promising to buy the fruits of the crime, he is guilty as a principal. *Grant v. State,*47 Ga. App. 234 (1) (170 SE 394) *848(1933). Although Dunn did not specifically select places to be burglarized, that fact is irrelevant. That he counseled and encouraged the others to commit burglaries to obtain the items that he wanted is sufficient to sustain his conviction. *Todd v. State,*189 Ga. App. 538, 540 (2) (376 SE2d 917) (1988).

Decided September 11, 2000.

*Patterson & Patterson, Jackie G. Patterson, Yasma Patterson,*for appellant.

*David McDade, District Attorney, James E. Barker, Assistant District Attorney,*for appellee.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Blackburn, P. J., and Eldridge, J., concur.*
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: 23
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: 24
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: 25
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: 26
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: 27
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: 28
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: 29
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 2 Filed: 07/27/18 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: 30
Filed 8/7/14 P. v. Davis CA2/4 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

WYNTON DAVIS,

Defendant and Appellant. B250773

(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BA405146)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supe rior Court of Los Angeles County, Craig E. Veals, Judge. Affirmed. Melissa A. Fair, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.2 A jury convicted defendant Wynton Davis of one count of receiving aid by misrepresentation of more than $950 in vi olation of Welfare and Institutions Code section 10980, subdivision (c)(2), and two counts of perjury by false application

for aid in violation of Penal Code secti on 118, subdivision (a). The trial court placed him on probation for three years s ubject to various terms and conditions, including that he pay restitution of $7,78 4. He appeals from the judgment (order granting probation). We affirm.

BACKGROUND Between August 2011 and March 2012, defendant submitted applications under penalty of perjury for child care reimbursement to Cal Works. He represented that he had no job and that one of his two sons lived with him. Based on these representations, he received aid in the sum of $7,784 in reimbursements and food stamps. In fact, the son lived with his mother, rendering defendant ineligible for aid.

DISCUSSION After review of the record, defendant ’s court-appointed counsel filed an opening brief asking this court to review the record independently pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 441. We advised appellant th at he had 30 days within which to submit any

contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. No response has been received

to date.

We have examined the entire record a nd are satisfied that no arguable issues exist, and that appellant has, by virt ue of counsel’s compliance with the Wende procedure and our review of the record, re ceived adequate and effective appellate3 review of the judgment entered against him in this case. ( Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278; People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 112-113.)

DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

WILLHITE, J.

We concur:

EPSTEIN, P. J.

EDMON, J.*

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
Order of Documents for the 2023 Bench Package

1. Cover Letter

2. CSS

3. TAG Endorsement

4. Letter of Intent

5. Military Biography

6. Civilian Resume (Optional)

7. Addendum

8. ORB/OSB

9. APFT/Fitness Test

10. OER's/OPR's

*All documents submitted must have the complete Social Security Number (SSN) redacted 

(blacked out). The Bench package documents must be consolidated into a single PDF file. 

DO NOT PUT IN “PDF PORTFOLIO” FORMAT. The PDF file name should be: “Current 

Grade, Last Name, First Name, Middle Initial_2023 Officer Bench”, and submitted no later 

than close of business on 6 January 2023.

Email subject line should also be in the format "Current Grade, Last Name, First Name 

Middle Initial_2023 Officer Bench". 

Email Bench packages to all three addresses below:

ng.ncr.ngb-arng.mbx.gobench@army.mil

alpa.c.ladani.mil@army.mil 

briane.l.mccaslin.mil@army.mil
A Community-Based Force

7/24/2013 UNCLASSIFIED 1