### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON A ssi gne d onBr ie fs O ct obe r 7, 200 3
AN TON IO L. SA ULS BERRYv. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE Appeal f rom the Cr im inal Cou rt for Shelby Coun ty No. P -23305 Joseph B. Dailey, Jud ge

No. W2002-02538-C CA-R 3-P C - F iled Fe bruary 9, 2004

Antonio L . Saulsberry appea ls f rom the Shelby

County Criminal Court’s denial of his petition for p o s t

- c o n v i c t i o nr e l i e f

, i nw h i c hh e a l l e g e d

th a th e r e c e i v e d th e i n e f

f e c t i v e a s s i s t an c e o f

c o un s e l

. In this appeal, he raises two c halleng es to the lower court’s ruling on the i neff ectivene ss claim. Having revie wed the r ecor d, the brief s of the par

ties, and the a

pplicable law , we hold t h at t he petitioner’ s po st- c onvic tio n p e tit ion

wa s unti me ly

and the re fo re dis mis s th e a

pp e a l.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; A ppe al D ism iss e d.
J A M ES C UR WO OD W I TT , J R ., J ., delivere d the opin i on of the c ourt, in which J OHN E VE R E TT W I L L I AMS , J ., joined. N OR MA M C G EE O G LE , J., c on c ur re d in re su lts

. C h ar l e s W

. G i l c h r i s t , J r
. , M e mp h i s , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e Ap p e l l an t , A n t o n i o L

. S a u l s b e r r y.
Pa ul G . Summe rs , A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l & Re po rt e r; Jenn if e r L

. B le ds oe , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; Wil liam L . Gibbons, Di strict Attorney Gene ral; and Rober

t Carter a nd Terr y Har ris, Assistant District Attorney s Gene ral, for the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION The pe titioner was convic ted by a jury of first degr ee mur der, e specia lly ag g ravated robber y , and conspira cy

to commit aggravated robbe ry
. Sta tev . A nto nio L. S au lsb e rry , No. 02C01- 97 10 -C R- 00 40 6, sli p o p. a t 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. Ap p. , Jac ks on , D e c . 2 1, 19 98 ). On dire c t a pp e a l, t his court re verse d and dismissed the first degr ee murder conviction based upon insufficienc y of proof , aff irmed the re maining two c onvictions, and rema nded for further proce eding s. See id. , slip op. at 8, 34. The petiti oner did not seek supreme c ourt revie w of the c onvictions that this court affirme d.

He then f iled the pre sent post-convic ti o n p e ti ti o n a tt a c k in g th e r o b b e r

y a n d c o n s p ir acy convictions. He a lleg ed in his petition that h e was deprived of the eff ective a ssistance of c ounsel in the conviction proceeding s and that he w as denie d the rig ht to second-tier revie w. The lowe r cour

t conducte d a hear ing, at which it rec eived the te stimoni al evidenc e of the petitioner and his for mer-2-

counsel. The lower c ourt ruled tha t t h e petiti oner ha d been a ffor ded the e ffe ctive assistanc e of
c ouns e l and that he ha d b e e n a de qu a te ly inf or me d o f h is r ig ht t o s e e k s up re me c ourt re vie w o f h is convictions. Thus, the cour t denied post-convic tion relief.
Our re view of this ca se beg ins with a matter not ra ised by the par ties, that beingthe question of timeliness of the petition. The petition repr esents that the pe titi o n er signed the
ve ri fi c ati on on Apr il 6, 20 00 . T he fi le sta mp i s n ot e nti re ly

le g ibl e on

the c op y of the po stconviction petition that is in t he appe llate re cord. The file stamp re veals that the pe tition was filed on the ninth day

of a month in the y ear

2000; the month is not le g ible. This court’s opinion in the petitioner’s dire ct appe al was f iled on Dec ember

21, 1998. Acc ording ly , any date in the year

2000 would be outside the a

pplicable one y ear

statute of limitations for post-con v i ct i on relief

. See ge ne ra lly Te nn . Co de Ann. § 4 0- 30 -1 02 (a ) ( 20 03 ). Th e pe tit ion e r a lle g e d in his pr o s e petition that he had not c omplied with the statute of limitations because his trial c ounsel had not advised him of the limitations period for

seekingpost-conviction re lief. Surprisingly , howeve r, neither the state nor the lower court a ddresse d the issue of timeliness in the proce eding s below.
Given the post-conviction s tatute’s langua g e conferr ing jur isdictional import to t he timely filing of a petition, it is essential that the question of timeliness be resolved be fore any adjudication on the mer i t s o f the pe titioner’s claims may proper ly occur
. See id. § 40-30-102( b) (2003); J oh n P ar k e r R oev . S

tate , No. W200 0

- 0 2 7 8 8

- CC A

- R3

- PC (Tenn. Crim. App., Jackson, Nov. 20, 2002), perm. app. de nied (Tenn. 2003)

. I f a pe tition i s not filed within the one y ear statute of limitations, i t never theless may be c on sid e re d if

its a lle g a tio ns fa ll w ith in t hr e e rathe r n arr owe xce pti on s: ( 1 ) The c la im in th e p e ti ti o n is b a s e d u p o n a f in a l r u li n g o f an a

p p ellate c ourt establishing a constitutional rig ht that was not rec og nized as existi ng at the time of trial, if re trospective a pplication of that rig h t i s require d. Such pe tit ion mus t be fi le d w ith in o ne (1 ) year of th e rulingof the highe st s tate ap p el l at e c o urt o r t h e U n i t edS t at es s u p re m e c o urt e s t ab l i s h i n g a c on sti tut ion a l r ig ht t

hat w a s n ot r e c og nize d a s e xistin g a t th e tim e of tr ia l; (2) The claim in the petition is based upon new scientific evidenc e esta blishing that such petitioner is ac tually innocent of the offe nse or of fense s for whic h the petitioner wa s convicted; or (3) The claim asser

ted in the petition se eks relief from a s en t en ce t h at was e nh anc e d b e c a

us e of a pr e vio us c onvic tio n and su c h c onvic tio n in the c a se in which the cla im is asserted wa s not a g uilty plea with a

n ag ree d sentenc e, a ndth e p r e v i o u s c o n v i c t i o n h a s s u b s e qu e n t l y b e e n h e l d t o b e i n v a l i d , in which ca se the pe tition must be filed within one (1) y ear of the finality of the ruling holding the pr evious conviction to be invalid.

Tenn
. Co d e A n n
. § 4 0

- 3 0

- 1 0 2 ( b ) ( 1 )

- ( 3 ) ( 2 0 0 3 )

. A d d it io n a ll y , d u e p r o c e s s ma

y , in v e r y limited circ umstances, r equire tolling of the post-c onviction statute of limitations

. See ge neral l y S ea l s v.-3-

Sta te , 2 3 S. W.3 d 2 72 (T e nn . 2 00 0) ; Bu rfo rd v . S tate , 845 S.W .2d 204 (Tenn. 1992). The pe titioner
a c kn ow le dg e s in

thi s p e tit io n th at hi s fi lin g wa s o uts ide the on e y e ar s tatut e of lim itatio ns . H is excuse for late f

i l i n g, t h at he wa s unawa

re of the limitations period, ne ither fits within any of the t hree statutory

exceptions nor calls for a due pr ocess- based w aiver of the limitations bar. See,
e .g ., W ill iam s v . S

tate , 44 S.W. 3d

46 4 ( Te nn . 2 00 1) ; State v. Phillips , 904 S.W. 2d 12 3 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1995) (ig noranc e of post-c onviction statute of limitatio n s , even when base d upon attorney ’s failure to rende r advice, does not constitute g rounds for a voiding limitations bar). Thus, his petition sh ou ld h ave be e n d ism iss e d a s unt im ely , in samuc h a s th e low e r c ourt wa s w ith out juri sd ic tio n to enter tain it. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-102(a ), (b) (2003).

In many case s t h at h ave c ome bef ore the appellate courts in which the pe titioner’s compliance with the statute of limitations i s an issue, t h e ap p el l ate c ourts have r emande d for evidentiar y hear ings. See, e .g., Bu tle r v . S tate , 92 S.W .3d 387, 390 (Tenn. 2002) . Unlike the ty pical
case in which there is a question whether the petitioner ha s actua lly complied with t h e s t atute of lim itatio ns or

ha s c on fo rm e d to the pr iso n ma ilb ox ru le s, the pe tit ion e r i n th is c a se a dmi ts t hat hi s filing is untimely

. See J

ohn Parker Roe , slip op. at 4-5 n.2 (question of fa ct whethe r petition has be e n ti me ly

fi le d) ; s ee generally Butler , 92 S.W .3d at 390

. Moreove r, the pe titioner has not articulated fa cts which, if pr oven, would aff ord him a ny relief from the limitations bar. SeeTenn. Cod e Ann. § 40 -3 0- 10 2( b) (1 )- (3 ) ( 20 03 ). L ike wi se , th e re is n o f a c tua l in dic a tio n th a t du e pr oc e ss conce rns are implicated. See W illiams , 4 4 S. W.3 d 4 64 (atto rn e y mis re pr e se ntatio n, a s o pp os e d to neg lige nce, a

bout continuing repre sentation may toll statute of limitations on due process g rounds). As such, his petition was subject to summar y d i s missal. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-106( b) (2 00 3) ; Sta tev . Ni

x , 4 0 S. W.3 d 4 59 , 4 64 (T e nn . 2 001) (co mpl ianc e wi th s tatut e of lim itatio ns is element of

rig ht to file petition f

or post-conviction relief

; inc umbent upon petitioner to alleg e either compliance with or tolling of limitations period). The f act that the lower c ourt did not take that
a c tio n d oe s n ot a llo w the pe tit ion e r, a t thi s jun c tur e , to avo id op e ra tio n of the statut e of

lim itatio ns
. As such, his appe al must be dismissed due to the untimeliness of the under lying pe tition. Thi s court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the ca se.

Para do xica lly , w e mus t a dd re ss t he iss ue ra ise d b y

the pe tit ion e r due to t

he po ssi bil ity of fur ther a ppeal of our dismissal of the ca se. Se e Sta tev . P e nd e rg ra ss , 13 S.W .3d 389, 395 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999).

The pe titioner claims err or in the l ower court’s ruling that he was provide d with the eff ective a ssistance of counsel at trial. In the lower court, the pe titioner had the burde n of proving the claims raised by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 40- 30-110(f ) (2003)

. On appe al, the post-convic tion court’s fa ctual finding s are revie wed de novo with a pre sumption of
corr ectne ss unless the evidenc e preponderates otherwise; however , that court’s c onclusions of law
r e c e i v e p ur e l y de novo revie w with no pr esumption of corr ectne ss. Fi e lds v . S tate , 40 S.W .3d 450, 457-58 (Te nn. 2001).

When a petiti oner challeng es t he effec tive assistance of counse l, he has the bur den
o f e s t a b l i s h i n g ( 1 ) d e f

i c i e n tr e p r e s e n t a t i o nan d ( 2 ) p r e j u d i c e r e s u l t i n g f

r o mth a td e f

i c i e n c y.-4-

Strickland v. W

ashington , 4 6 6 U

. S

. 6 6 8 , 6 8 6 , 1 0 4 S

. C t

. 2 0 5 2 , 2 0 6 4 ( 1 9 8 4 ); Ba x te r v . R os e , 523 S.W .2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975). Def icient represe ntation occur s when c ounsel provides a ssistance that falls below the rang e of competenc e demanded of attorney s in criminal ca ses. Ba nk sto n v . S tate , 815 S.W .2d 213, 215 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991). Prejudice is the rea sonable likelihood that, but for defic ient repr esentation, the outcome of the pr ocee dings w o uld have be en diffe rent. Ove rton v. Sta te , 8 7 4 S. W. 2 d 6 , 1 1 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 4 )

. O n r e v ie w , th e r e is a s tr o n g p r e s u mp ti o nof satisfac tory repr esentation. Ba rr v . S

tate , 910 S.W .2d 462, 464 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1995). Be cause a petitioner must establish both deficient re p rese ntation and pre judice ther efr om, relief ma y be denie d when proof of either is def

icient. Go ad

v . S tate , 938 S.W .2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996)

. The p e ti ti o n e r f

ir s t c la im s in h is p o s t- c o n v ic ti o n a p p e a l th a t tr ia l c o un s el was ineffe ctive in fa iling to pursue vig orous cr oss-examination of a key state’s witness. The lowe r cour t fo un d th a t tr ia l c ouns e l ma de a so un d s tr a te g ic de c isi on no t to purs ue an a g g re ssi ve c ro ssexamination of the witness in question. Indeed, trial counsel testified that ba sed upon the substanc e of t h e wi t n es s ’s t estimony , much of whic h had bee n admitted by the petitioner in an inc ulpatory
s t a t e m e n t , h e b e l i e v e d

th e b e t t e r c o ur s e d i d

n o te n t a i l v i g o r o u s l y a t t a c k i n g th i s w i tn e s s ’ s c r e d i b i l i ty. Upon appe llate re view, we cannot sa y that the evidenc e pre ponderates ag ainst the t rial cour t’s deter mination that counsel’s strateg y was sound. See Strick

land , 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct . at 2065 (post-convic tion petitioner must overcome pr esumption that course c hosen b y counsel wa s sound trial strategy

). The pe titione r al s o cl aims that trial counsel wa s ineffe ctive in fa iling to see k pe rm iss ion

to a pp e a l to the su

pr e me c ourt the c ourt of c ri min a l a pp e a ls’ a ff

ir manc e of his e sp e c ia lly ag g ravated robbe ry

and conspira cy

convictions. Counsel testi fi ed t h at although he a dvised the petitioner of his rig ht to seek per missive appeal to the supreme court, counsel did not give this advice in writing, nor

did counsel file a

motion to wit hdrawfrom the pe titioner’s ca se. Counsel testified, howeve r, that he did not think there was a valid basis for se ekingfurther revie w of the de fenda

nt’s
c onvic tio ns . T he low e r c ourt fo un d th a t th e pe tit ion e r wa s ade qu a te ly a dv ise d o f h is a

pp e a l r ig hts
and de nie d p os t- c onvic tio n re lie f. We d isa g re e that c ou ns e l a de qu a te ly

dis c ha rg e d h is o bli g a tio ns
. Ha d w e no t de te rm ine d th a t th e pe tit ion in thi s c a se wa s no t tim e ly fi le d, the fa c ts p re se nte d w ou ld
war rant post-c onviction relief in t h e fo rm o f a delay ed appe al. See Tenn. R. Sup. Ct. 28, § 9(D); Gi bs on v . S

tate , 7 S.W .3d 47, 48-49 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1998).

In summary , we dismiss the petitioner’s appe al bec ause w e, like the tria l court, lac k jurisdiction due to the petitioner’s untimely filing of his petition for post-conviction relief

.

___________________________________ J AMES CURW OOD WI TT, J R., J UDGE