United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 13-1020

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Haldon Gilkes

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Little Rock

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 Submitted: August 26, 2013

 Filed: September 10, 2013

[Unpublished]

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Before LOKEN, COLLOTON, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Haldon Gilkes pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute 100 kilograms of

marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. The district court1

 sentenced him to the

1

The Honorable Brian S. Miller, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Eastern District of Arkansas.
mandatory minimum sentence of 60 months in prison with four years of supervised

release. On appeal, Gilkes’s counsel has moved to withdraw and has filed a brief

under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Gilkes has filed a pro se brief. For

the following reasons, we reject the arguments that they have raised.

First, there is no basis for concluding that Gilkes was not mentally competent

to enter a plea, cf. United States v. Denton, 434 F.3d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 2006)

(standard of review for competency determination), and, second, to the extent the

briefs raise ineffective-assistance claims, we decline to consider them, see United

States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872-73 (8th Cir. 2007) (appellate court ordinarily

defers ineffective-assistance claim to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceedings). 

Third, as to the argument that Gilkes was induced to plead guilty through the

misrepresentation that he would receive credit for time served, he did not present the

claim in the district court before this appeal, see United States v. Murphy, 899 F.2d

714, 716 (8th Cir. 1990) (claim of involuntary guilty plea must first be presented to

district court, and is not cognizable on direct appeal), and he has not filed a new or

amended appeal from the district court’s order denying his post-judgment motion

requesting such credit. In the interest of judicial economy, however, we consider the

argument nevertheless, and conclude that Gilkes’s guilty plea was voluntary and not

induced by misrepresentation: once the agreement was reduced to writing, it was clear

that credit for time served was not part of the agreement, and that the terms of the

agreement superseded any prior understandings; Gilkes did not refuse to enter into the

agreement and did not raise the issue during his plea hearing; and Gilkes did not seek

to withdraw his plea at sentencing, when it was made clear that whether he received

credit for time served was at the discretion of the Bureau of Prisons. See Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 755 (1970) (guilty pleas must be voluntary; plea of

guilty entered by one fully aware of consequences must stand unless induced by

misrepresentation); United States v. Lara, 690 F.3d 1079, 1081 (8th Cir. 2012) (plea

agreements are essentially contracts between government and defendant); United

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States v. Raifsnider, 663 F.3d 1004, 1010 (8th Cir. 2011) (integration clause in plea

agreement normally prevents defendant from asserting that government made oral

promises to him not contained in plea agreement itself). Because Gilkes’s plea was

voluntary, his speedy-trial claim is waived. See United States v. Seay, 620 F.3d 919,

922 (8th Cir. 2010) (voluntary plea of guilty constitutes waiver of all nonjurisdictional

defects, and right to speedy trial is nonjurisdictional in nature). 

As to the argument that the district court participated in plea negotiations in

violation of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1), no plain error occurred, as

any error did not affect Gilkes’s substantial rights because the court thoroughly

reviewed and explained his rights, and Gilkes repeatedly confirmed that he wanted to

plead guilty and that he understood that the decision to do so rested with him alone. 

See United States v. Davila, 133 S. Ct. 2139, 2143, 2149-50 (2013) (defendant who

does not object to Rule 11(c)(1) violation in district court must satisfy plain-error rule

on appeal by showing that error affected his substantial rights); United States v. UribeLondono, 409 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2005) (finding no plain error in district court’s

inquiry about plea negotiations).

After reviewing the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), we

have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw, and affirm the judgment. 

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