SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3065-15T3

JO ANN SICA PAPPALARDO, 

individually and as 

Executrix of THE ESTATE

OF JOHN E. PAPPALARDO,

Plaintiffs,

v.

PEE WEE PREP, INC., a New

Jersey Corporation,

PAPPALARDO, an alleged

partnership,

Defendants,

NEIL PAPPALARDO and TERESA

PAPPALARDO,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

PENTAX SERVICE, INC., ROBERT

SZMITKOWSKI, tax preparer/

accountant, THE ESTATE OF

LEON SZMITKOWSKI, public 

accountant, CHASE BANK USA

N.A., CITIBANK N.A./CITI 

AT&T UNIVERSAL MASTERCARD,

CAPITAL ONE BANK, ESTATE

INFORMATION SERVICES, LLC,

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-3065-15T3

Defendants,

v.

GARY NORGAARD, FISCAL

AGENT,

Defendant-Respondent.

______________________________________________

Submitted April 25, 2017 – Decided

Before Judges Reisner and Rothstadt.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. L0899-14.

James A. Sylvester, attorney for appellants.

Norgaard O'Boyle attorneys for respondent 

(Cassandra C. Norgaard, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants, Neil Pappalardo and Teresa Pappalardo, appeal 

from the Law Division's February 11, 2016 order1 enforcing the 

parties' written settlement agreement and permitting the fiscal 

agent, Gary K. Norgaard, to obtain a default judgment against 

defendants in the amount of $50,000 based upon their default in 

payment. The motion judge determined that based upon the terms

 

1 Defendants had also appealed from a second order entered by 

the court on the same date. That order entered a judgment in 

favor of plaintiffs, Jo Ann Sica Pappalardo and the Estate of John 

Pappalardo. The parties resolved that appeal and, by stipulation

of partial dismissal filed on June 23, 2016, with this court, they 

agreed to dismiss that appeal. 

June 2, 2017
3 A-3065-15T3

of the written settlement agreement and defendants' testimony 

confirming their acceptance and understanding of its terms, the 

agreement should be enforced, even though a promissory note 

contemplated in the agreement was never signed. On appeal, 

defendants argue that the motion judge's findings were not 

supported by the record and were otherwise erroneous. In addition, 

they contend that, even if the settlement agreement was 

enforceable, the motion judge impermissibly altered its terms, and 

it was a miscarriage of justice for the judge to allow the fiscal 

agent to benefit from his "intransigence and unilateral attempts 

to alter the terms of the settlement agreement." We disagree and

affirm.

"On a disputed motion to enforce a settlement," a trial court 

must apply the same standards "as on a motion for summary 

judgment." Amatuzzo v. Kozmiuk, 305 N.J. Super. 469, 474-75 (App. 

Div. 1997). In reviewing the grant or denial of summary judgment, 

we apply the same standard that governs the trial court, Townsend 

v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015), which requires denial of summary 

judgment if "the competent evidential materials presented, when 

viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are 

sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged 

disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. 

Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
4 A-3065-15T3

The salient facts, drawn from the competent, evidential 

materials and viewed "in the light most favorable to [defendants], 

the non-moving part[ies]," Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 222 N.J. 362, 

367 (2015) (citing Brill, supra, 142 N.J. at 523, 540), were 

substantially undisputed and can be summarized as follows.

The parties' concerns a dispute entered on November 5, 2015. 

On that date, the motion judge and the parties completed jury 

selection for the trial of the underlying corporate dispute that 

led to the appointment of the fiscal agent. After jury selection, 

the parties informed the judge they had settled the matter, entered 

into a settlement agreement, and wished to go over its terms on 

the record, with the parties testifying under oath as to their 

understanding and acceptance of the agreement.

The written settlement agreement provided in paragraph 

thirteen that defendants would deliver to the fiscal agent a 

promissory note in the amount of $50,000 that would require 

payments at the rate of $650 per month with interest at the rate 

of one percent.

2 Payments were to be made by "bank check or money 

order." Paragraph twenty addressed defaults and stated that 

a default as to any provision . . . , including 

without limitation a failure of payment as 

 

2 The fiscal agent was not a signatory to the agreement but was 

instead an intended beneficiary of defendants' agreement with 

plaintiffs to resolve amounts owed for the fiscal agent's fees 

incurred in the litigation.
5 A-3065-15T3

provided herein which is not cured within five 

(5) days of the due date shall constitute a 

default under all terms of this Agreement. 

Upon default [p]laintiff's counsel may seek 

the entry of judgment upon submission of an 

affidavit proving the default.

At the November 5 hearing, defendants and the fiscal agent 

testified that they understood the agreement's terms and accepted 

them. Theresa Pappalardo and the fiscal agent specifically stated

that they understood that the payments would begin on January 1, 

2016.

After the hearing, the parties attempted to agree upon a 

promissory note that incorporated the terms of their settlement. 

When they could not agree and after the January 1 payment due date 

passed, the fiscal agent filed a motion on January 6, 2016, to 

enforce the agreement by entering judgment against defendants for 

the full amount owed. In his supporting certification, the fiscal 

agent asked the court to compel defendants to accept his proposed 

form of promissory note, or some variation of it, or order that 

the entire balance be accelerated. 

Defendants and their attorney filed certifications in 

opposition to the fiscal agent's motion. In their January 13, 

2016 certifications, they each certified that Neil Pappalardo 

tendered the first payment on January 4, 2016, and, according to 

Theresa Pappalardo, the fiscal agent cashed the check.
6 A-3065-15T3

The motion judge considered oral argument on January 22, 

2016. At the hearing, the fiscal agent confirmed that he had not 

received a check from defendants prior to filing his motion to 

enforce, but received it on January 15. He advised that it was a 

personal check dated January 13, 2016, so, unless the check was 

post-dated, defendants had not sent it prior to filing their 

certifications. He asserted that, in any event, the check was 

late and not in proper form. Defendants' counsel responded by

arguing that the parties had not agreed upon a grace period, but 

both forms of proposed notes contained that feature. As a result, 

defendants' delay in sending the check was contemplated by the 

parties. 

On February 11, 2016, the motion judge entered the order 

enforcing the settlement agreement and permitting the fiscal agent 

to obtain a judgment against defendants. On the same date, the 

judge placed his reasons on the record in a comprehensive oral 

decision. In his decision, the judge reviewed the parties' 

testimony from when the settlement was placed on the record, 

including their confirmation that they understood that the first

payment was due to the fiscal agent on January 1, 2016. The judge 

concluded that the settlement agreement should be enforced as the 

parties "knowingly, willingly and purposefully settled the case." 

Based on "the only terms of the debt that were presented to the 
7 A-3065-15T3

[c]ourt," the judge found that the parties did not dispute "the

amount each party was obligated to pay, the amount of the 

defendant[s'] monthly payments, . . . [the] one-percent interest 

rate[, and that payments] "were due on the first day of each 

month." The judge entered the order and this appeal followed.

We begin our review by acknowledging "New Jersey's strong 

public policy in favor of the settlement of litigation," Gere v. 

Louis, 209 N.J. 486, 500 (2012), and the enforcement of settlement 

agreements like any other contract. Nolan v. Lee Ho, 120 N.J.

465, 472 (1990); see also Pascarella v. Bruck, 190 N.J. Super.

118, 124-25 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 94 N.J. 600 (1983).

In furtherance of the strong policy of enforcing settlements, 

"our courts strain to give effect to the terms of a settlement 

wherever possible." Brundage v. Estate of Carambio, 195 N.J. 575, 

601 (2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 

Therefore, an agreement to settle a lawsuit will be honored and 

enforced in the absence of fraud or other compelling circumstances.

Nolan, supra, 120 N.J. at 472. However, unless there is "an 

agreement to the essential terms" by the parties, there is no 

settlement in the first instance. Mosley v. Femina Fashions, 

Inc., 356 N.J. Super. 118, 126 (App. Div. 2002), certif. denied, 

176 N.J. 279 (2003); see also Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan, 128 

N.J. 427, 435 (1992) (holding that if the parties agree on the 
8 A-3065-15T3

essential terms and to be bound by those terms, an enforceable 

contract has been created).

"[A]n agreement to resolve a matter will be enforced as long 

as the agreement addresses the principal terms required to resolve 

the dispute." Willingboro Mall, Ltd. v. 240/242 Franklin Ave., 

L.L.C., 421 N.J. Super. 445, 453 (App. Div. 2011), aff'd, 215 N.J.

242 (2013). "Where the parties agree upon the essential terms of 

a settlement, so that the mechanics can be 'fleshed out' in a 

writing to be thereafter executed, the settlement will be enforced 

notwithstanding the fact the writing does not materialize because 

a party later reneges." Lahue v. Pio Costa, 263 N.J. Super. 575, 

596 (App. Div.) (quoting Bistricer v. Bistricer, 231 N.J. Super.

143, 145 (Ch. Div. 1987)), certif. denied, 134 N.J. 477 (1993).

Applying these guiding principles, we conclude defendants' 

arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant further 

discussion beyond these brief comments. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The 

material terms of their settlement were set forth in the written 

agreement and placed on the record by the parties. We agree with 

the motion judge's conclusion that the settlement agreement was 

enforceable, and that defendants breached their agreement by 

failing to make payment in accordance with those terms. Payment 

was due on January 1, 2016, in the form of a money order or bank 

check and, considering the default provision of the settlement 
9 A-3065-15T3

agreement, payment was made at least five days after the due date

and not in proper form.

Affirmed.