J-A17044-16

_____________________________

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

EILEEN M. VANETT IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

BRUCE B. VANETT

Appellant No. 1792 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered June 12, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Civil Division at No(s): 1997-8655

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., LAZARUS, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED JULY 21, 2016

Appellant, Bruce B. Vanett (“Husband”), appeals from the order1

entered in the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas that denied his 

petition for a declaratory judgment to cease his contractual obligation to 

maintain life insurance for the benefit of the parties’ children, pursuant to a 

divorce-related property settlement agreement (“PSA”).2 We affirm. 

____________________________________________

1 The court entered the order on appeal on Friday, June 12, 2015. Notice 

per Pa.R.C.P. 236 was issued on Monday, June 15, 2015. 

2 Notwithstanding the manner in which this appeal is captioned, throughout 

most of the certified record, Husband is designated as plaintiff and Appellee, 

Eileen M. Vanett (“Wife”) is designated as defendant. Sometimes in the 

course of the current matter, the designations are periodically reversed, 

without explanation. Husband, however, initiated the declaratory judgment 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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The relevant facts and procedural history of this case can be 

summarized briefly as follows. On July 20, 1999, the parties executed a PSA 

in anticipation of their divorce. Under the PSA, Husband was obliged to pay 

alimony, child support, and maintain $950,000.00 in life insurance for the 

benefit of the parties’ children. Contrary to other provisions within the PSA, 

namely, the alimony and child support payments, the life insurance 

obligation did not include a termination date or any circumstance to end the 

insurance obligation. Further, the life insurance topic was covered under a 

separate, non-contiguous section of the PSA; and the PSA drew no 

connection between the life insurance provisions and the child support 

provisions. Importantly, the PSA also contained an integration clause. On 

September 16, 1999, the parties formally divorced and incorporated the PSA 

in the divorce decree. 

On October 12, 2012, the parties entered and filed a stipulation for an 

agreed order to terminate child support, which was approved by court order 

on October 15, 2012. Husband filed a petition for declaratory judgment on 

September 20, 2013, to terminate his life insurance obligation under the 

PSA. On March 21, 2014, Wife filed a motion in limine to preclude parol 

evidence related to the PSA. The court heard argument on the motion on 

March 25, 2104, and granted it on April 10, 2014. The declaratory judgment 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

proceedings. Husband is also a medical doctor, whose professional initials 

(M.D.) were only recently added to his name in some of the court filings. 
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proceedings continued on June 9, 2014, with argument from counsel. 

Husband submitted a pre-trial brief to the court on November 18, 2014, with 

a copy to Wife’s counsel on that date. On November 19, 2014, the court 

heard testimony from the parties, including direct and cross-examination. 

Wife’s counsel asked to file a response to Husband’s pre-trial brief by 

December 5, 2014. Husband’s counsel filed a reply to the response on 

December 12, 2014.3 

On June 12, 2015, the court denied Husband’s petition for declaratory 

judgment, with Rule 236 notice sent on Monday, June 15, 2015. Husband 

did not file post-trial motions; instead, he filed a notice of appeal on June 

18, 2015. On June 22, 2015, the court ordered Husband to file a concise 

statement of errors complained of on appeal per Rule 1925(b); Husband 

timely complied on July 9, 2015. 

Husband raises the following issues for our review:

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY FINDING THAT [HUSBAND] 

IS OBLIGATED TO MAINTAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE 

OBLIGATION UNDER THE JULY 20, 1999 PROPERTY 

SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR [WIFE] AND THEIR 

CHILDREN WHERE THERE IS NO UNDERLYING 

OBLIGATION FOR ALIMONY OR CHILD SUPPORT OWED TO 

EITHER[?]

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR BY PRECLUDING [HUSBAND] 

____________________________________________

3 Husband’s pre-trial brief does not appear as filed of record on the certified 

docket, and it is absent from the certified record on appeal. Wife’s 

responsive brief and Husband’s reply brief, however, are included in the 

certified record on appeal. 
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FROM PRESENTING PAROL EVIDENCE AS TO THE PARTIES’ 

INTENT REGARDING THE DURATION AND TERMINATION 

OF THE LIFE INSURANCE OBLIGATION?

DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN FINDING THAT [HUSBAND] 

IS OBLIGATED TO MAINTAIN HIS LIFE INSURANCE 

OBLIGATION FOR [WIFE] AND THE CHILDREN DESPITE 

THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT THE HEARING, INCLUDING, 

BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE POST-CONTRACT FORMATION 

EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY [HUSBAND]?

(Husband’s Brief at 6). 

Husband argues the life insurance section of the PSA is ambiguous, 

given that the agreement omits a termination date for the obligation, and 

Husband would eventually be required to maintain life insurance even where 

financially impossible or unreasonably burdensome. Husband avers that the 

intent of the parties regarding the duration of the insurance obligation 

necessitated the admission of parol evidence of the parties’ intent at the 

time of contract formation as well as evidence of subsequent performance 

and conduct after contract formation. Even without the parol evidence of 

pre-agreement intent, Husband insists the parties’ post-agreement actions 

clarified that they intended to link the insurance obligation to the child 

support. Specifically, Husband contends the parties intended to terminate 

the insurance obligation when the parties’ children became adults, i.e., when 

the parties agreed to end child support payments; likewise, Wife at no time 

insisted that Husband purchase whole life as opposed to term life insurance. 

Husband concludes the court erred in excluding all extrinsic evidence related 

to the insurance obligation because the extrinsic evidence showed the intent 
J-A17044-16

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of the parties to the PSA; and he is entitled to a new trial. We cannot agree. 

As a prefatory matter, we must determine whether Husband properly 

preserved his issues for review. See Tucker v. R.M. Tours, 939 A.2d 343, 

346 (Pa.Super. 2007), aff’d, 602 Pa. 147, 977 A.2d 1170 (2009) (citing 

Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 588 Pa. 218, 903 A.2d 1178 (2006)) 

(stating: “This Court may sua sponte determine whether issues have been 

properly preserved for appeal”); Hall v. Owens Corning Fiberglass Corp., 

779 A.2d 1167, 1169 (Pa.Super. 2001) (stating: “[P]ost-trial relief may not 

be granted unless the grounds for such relief are specified in the post-trial 

motion. Grounds not specified in the post-trial motion are deemed waived”) 

(internal citations omitted); Borough of Harveys Lake v. Heck, 719 A.2d 

378, 380 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1998) (stating party’s failure to file post-verdict 

motions constitutes waiver of all issues on appeal; whether appellant has 

preserved any issue for appeal can be raised sua sponte by reviewing court). 

Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure sets out the requirements for 

post-trial relief and states in pertinent part: 

Rule 227.1. Post-Trial Relief

* * *

(c) Post Trial motions shall be filed within ten days 

after

(1) verdict, discharge of the jury because of 

inability to agree, or nonsuit in the case of a 

jury trial; or 

(2) notice of nonsuit or the filing of the 
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decision in the case of a trial without a jury.

If a party has filed a timely post-trial motion, any other 

party may file a post-trial motion within ten days after the 

filing of the first post-trial motion.

Note: A motion for post-trial relief may be filed 

following a trial by jury or a trial by a judge without a jury 

pursuant to Rule 1038. A motion for post-trial relief may 

not be filed to orders disposing of preliminary objections, 

motions for judgment on the pleadings or for summary 

judgment, motions relating to discovery or other 

proceedings which do not constitute a trial. See U.S. 

National Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 506 Pa. 622, 

487 A.2d 809 (1985). 

* * *

The filing of a motion for post-trial relief is prohibited by 

the following rules: Rule 1557 (order directing partition) 

and Rule 1930.2 (no post-trial practice in domestic 

relations matters).

Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(1)-(2) and Note. Generally, following a trial, an appellant 

must file post-trial motions to preserve issues for appellate review; issues 

not raised in post-trial motions are waived. Chalkey v. Roush, 757 A.2d 

972, 975 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), aff’d, 569 Pa. 462, 805 A.2d 491 

(2002). 

Declaratory judgment actions, like all others, are subject to post-trial 

practice when resolved after a trial. Crystal Lake Camps v. Alford, 923 

A.2d 482, 488 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citing Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. 

Pinkerton, 574 Pa. 333, 342, 830 A.2d 958, 963 (2003)). 

[T]he Declaratory Judgment Act should not be interpreted 

to undermine the uniform procedures that [the Supreme 

Court of Pennsylvania] has devised with respect to post-
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trial proceedings. [Motorist Mut. Ins. Co.] ultimately 

evinces the Supreme Court’s intent that post-trial practice 

be dictated primarily by the manner in which a case is 

disposed, not merely by the form of the action. Hence, 

declaratory judgment actions, like all others, are subject to 

post-trial practice when resolved after trial, while actions 

resolved by peremptory remedies are not. See [id.]

([stating:] “[W]here a trial court enters a declaratory order 

following a trial, parties must file post-trial motions from 

that order, as they would in any other civil proceeding, 

before the order may be deemed a final order for purposes 

of an appeal. On the other hand, where the trial court 

enters a declaratory order based on a pretrial motion...the 

parties are obviously not required to abide by the post-trial 

practice rules governing civil proceedings”); Pa.R.C.P. 

227.1(c), Note: ([stating:] “A motion for post-trial relief 

may not be filed to orders disposing of preliminary 

objections, motions for judgment on the pleadings or for 

summary judgment, motions relating to discovery or other 

proceedings which do not constitute a trial”). The plain 

language of Pa.R.C.P. 227.4 makes it clear that the Rule’s 

post-trial procedure is inexorably intertwined with posttrial motion practice under Pa.R.C.P. 227.1. Therefore, by 

subjecting declaratory judgment actions to the post-trial 

practice of Pa.R.C.P. 227.4, our decision today is in accord 

with [Motorist Mut. Ins. Co.]’s primary purpose of 

achieving procedural uniformity between actions at law 

and equity. ...[W]e conclude that [Motorist Mut. Ins. 

Co.], considered together with Rules 227.4 and 227.1, is 

controlling authority on the matter and compels the result 

that we reach today. 

Crystal Lake Camps, supra at 488-89 (most internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). But see Jarl Investments, L.P. v. Fleck, 937 

A.2d 1113, 1119 n.3 (Pa.Super. 2007) (distinguishing pre-trial order 

imposing preliminary injunction as immediately appealable under Pa.R.A.P. 

311(a)(4); preliminary injunction in this case “followed a proceeding in the 

nature of a pre-trial evidentiary hearing”; “Only where a declaratory 
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judgment is entered after a jury or non-jury trial, must post-trial motions be 

filed to preserve issues for appellate review”). See also Pa.R.C.P. 1930.2 

(stating: “There shall be no motions for post-trial relief in any domestic 

relations matter”; abolishing all post-trial practice in domestic relations 

cases). 

In the present case, Husband filed for declaratory judgment on 

September 20, 2013. Wife filed a motion in limine, and the court heard oral 

argument on Wife’s motion on March 25, 2014. On June 9, 2014, the court 

conducted a hearing, with argument from counsel for both parties. Husband 

submitted a pre-trial brief on November 18, 2014. A day later, the court 

received testimony from both parties, including direct and crossexamination. Wife’s counsel filed a response to Husband’s pre-trial brief on 

December 5, 2014, and Husband filed a reply to that response on December 

12, 2014. The trial court denied Husband’s request for declaratory relief on 

June 12, 2015, with Rule 236 notice sent to the parties on June 15, 2015. 

Here, the court proceedings consisted of hearings, testimony, and 

arguments, which constituted a trial. The parties exchanged pre-trial briefs. 

Husband even requests relief on appeal in the form of a new trial. The order 

denying declaratory judgment finally resolved the issue before the court. 

Thus, the proceeding was not “in the nature of a pre-trial evidentiary 

hearing.” See Jarl Investments, L.P., supra. As a result, Husband was 

arguably subject to the applicable rules governing post-trial procedure. See
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Pa.R.C.P. 227.1(c)(1). Husband did not file post-trial motions. Yet, to the 

extent this case can be viewed as a domestic relations matter, the absence 

of post-trial motions is not fatal to Husband’s claims because Rule 1930.2 

preempts Rule 227.1 and controls. See Pa.R.C.P. 1930.2(a). 

Nevertheless, after a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the 

parties, the applicable law, and the opinion of the Honorable Ann A. 

Osborne, we conclude Husband’s claims merit no relief. The trial court 

opinion properly discusses and disposes of the questions presented. See

Trial Court Opinion, filed December 31, 2015, at 3-7, 9-10 (concluding: (1-

2) life insurance section of PSA is independent of alimony or child support, 

so Husband’s contention that life insurance obligation is somehow connected 

to support commitment is unfounded; insurance obligation endures until 

Husband’s death; parties added no termination condition to life insurance 

obligation whereas alimony and child support provisions specify conditions 

for payments to end; life insurance clause is detailed, clear, and incapable of 

being understood in more than one reasonable sense; (3) absent any 

ambiguity in life insurance provisions, court saw no need for extrinsic 

evidence to interpret PSA). We agree but add one qualification. We observe 

that a court can look to subsequent conduct of the parties or course of 

performance evidence as an aid to contract interpretation, so long as the 

conduct/performance evidence manifests a common understanding of the 

agreement at issue. See Herzog v. Herzog, 887 A.2d 313 (Pa.Super. 
J-A17044-16

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2005). In this particular context, the agreement does not necessarily have 

to be first deemed ambiguous. Here, however, the court declined to 

consider Husband’s extrinsic evidence, which was the court’s prerogative, 

because Husband’s extrinsic evidence did not manifest a common 

understanding but only his unique understanding of the PSA. Accordingly, 

we affirm on the basis of the trial court opinion with this minor qualification. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 7/21/2016
Circulated 07/08/2016 10:10 AM 

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF DELAWARE COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA 

CIVIL ACTION -LAW 

EILEEN M. VANETT 

Plaintiff /Appellee 

vs. 

BRUCE B. VANETT 

Defendant /Appellant 

DOCKET NUMBER: 1997 -008655 

1792 EDA 2015 

IN CUSTODY 

Mary Cushing Doherty, Esq., Attorney for Plaintiff 

Lynne Z. Gold -Bikin, Esq., Attorney for Defendant 

OPINION 

OSBORNE, S.J. FILED: December 31, 2015 

Procedural History 

Appellant, Bruce B. Vanett, (Husband) appeals from this Court's Order dated 

June 12, 2015 denying his Petition for Declaratory Judgment. In the prayer for relief 

sought, Husband's Petition requested that this Court issue Declaratory Judgment 

directing that he is no longer required to maintain his life insurance obligation 

arising out of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement in this action in divorce. 

The June 12, 2015 Order was entered following hearings conducted on March 25, 

2014, June 9, 2014, and November 19, 2014. On June 18, 2015, Husband, 

through counsel, filed his Notice of Appeal to Superior Court and on June 22, 2015, 

this Court entered its Order Requiring 1925(b) Statement. Appellant filed his 

Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal on July 9, 2015. 

Appellant's Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal raises six 

issues for review. They are presented substantially verbatim as follows. First, 

(5k 

Circulated 07/08/2016 10:10 AM
Husband contends that the Trial Court Court erred in finding that Defendant is 

obligated to maintain his life insurance obligation under the July 20, 1999 Property 

Settlement Agreement for Plaintiff and their children when there is no underlying 

obligation for alimony or child support owed for either. Husband next contends that 

this Court erred by precluding Defendant from presenting parol evidence as to the 

parties' intent regarding the duration and termination of the life insurance 

obligation. Husband also argues this Court erred in failing to consider the 

contradictions between Paragraph 7 and Paragraph 4.1 of the parties' Property 

Settlement Agreement as they pertain to the termination of Defendant's obligation 

for life insurance. Fourth, Husband states that this Court erred in finding the 

Defendant is obligated to maintain his life insurance obligation for the Plaintiff and 

the children despite evidence of the unconscionability to require Defendant to 

continue paying for life insurance when there is no purpose of funding it at a huge 

cost to him at his age. Husband also argues the Trial Court erred in finding that 

Plaintiff had standing to bring this action when the life insurance is ostensibly 

payable to a trust for the parties' children. Finally, Husband contends this Court 

erred in finding that Defendant is obligated to maintain his life insurance obligation 

for Plaintiff and the children despite the evidence presented at the hearing, 

including, but not limited to, the post- contract formation evidence presented by 

Defendant. 

2 
Statement of Law 

As our Superior Court has stated, "The determination of marital property 

rights through prenuptial, postnuptial and settlement agreements has long been 

permitted, and even encouraged. Both prenuptial and post -nuptial agreements are 

contracts and are governed by contract law. Moreover, a court's order upholding the 

agreement in divorce proceedings is subject to an abuse of discretion or error of law 

standard of review. An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear 

and convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow 

proper legal procedures. We will not usurp the trial court's factfinding function." 

Paroly v. Paraly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa. Super. 2005) 

When interpreting a contract, the Court may not consider extrinsic evidence 

unless the terms of the contract are ambiguous. Seven Springs Farm, Inc. v. Croker, 

748 A.2d 740, 744 (Pa. 2000). A contract is ambiguous "if it is reasonably 

susceptible of different constructions and capable of being understood in more than 

one sense. Lang v. Meske, 850 A.2d 737, 739 -40 (Pa. Super. 2004). Where a 

contract fails to provide for a specific contingency, the contract is silent, not 

ambiguous. Seven Springs Farm, Inc., 748 A.2d at 744. 

Discussion 

In his first assignment of error, Husband contends that this Court erred in 

finding that Defendant is obligated to maintain his life insurance obligation under 

the July 20, 1999 Property Settlement Agreement (hereinafter "PSA ") for Plaintiff 

and their children when there is no underlying obligation for alimony or child 

3 
support owed to either. Husband's claim that his obligation to maintain life 

insurance under the Property Settlement Agreement is contingent upon his 

obligation to pay alimony or child support is incorrect and contrary to the plain 

language of the Property Settlement Agreement. This Court found that the plain 

language of the Life Insurance clause of the Property Settlement Agreement was not 

ambiguous and therefore, based on the applicable case law, extrinsic evidence as to 

the intent of the parties was not admissible. The Life Insurance clause makes no 

mention at all of alimony or child support so Father's contention that life insurance 

is connected to the obligation to pay support is completely unfounded. 

Husband has argued that the life insurance was put in the PSA to ensure 

payments of alimony in case Husband were to die before his obligation to pay 

alimony ceased. (N.T. 3/25/14, p. 13 -14) This is simply not the case. The relevant 

portion of Section 4.1 (Alimony) of the PSA states: 

"Commencing on the execution date and terminating on December 31, 

2004, Husband shall pay Wife the sum of Two Thousand Two Hundred 

Fifty Dollars ($2,250.00) per month as alimony, on the first day of each 

month. Husband's obligation to make such payments shall terminate 

upon Wife's death or Husband's death only, provided he has complied 

with the insurance provisions of this Agreement." 

4 
Furthermore, the fact that the parties' Property Settlement Agreement does not 

provide a termination date of Defendant's obligation to maintain a life insurance 

policy does not result in an ambiguity, because the lack of a termination clause is 

not susceptible to different constructions nor is it capable of being understood in 

more than one sense. 

Finally, as was mentioned above, the Life Insurance section lists the terms 

which must be included in the insurance policies. These include that "1) the 

policies shall be automatically renewable; 2) the policies shall not be cancelable on 

account of, and renewal shall not be contingent upon, Husband's health; and 3) The 

policies shall not be cancelable on account of, and renewal shall not be contingent 

upon, Husband's employment or lack thereof" Instead of mentioning a termination 

date, the plain language of this section mentions the continuation of the life 

insurance policies. As the language is clear and unambiguous, this Court did not 

err in choosing not to admit parol evidence. 

Husband's third argument is much like his first. He contends that this Court 

erred in failing to consider the contradictions between Paragraph 7 and Paragraph 

4.1 of the parties' Property Settlement Agreement as they pertain to the termination 

of Defendant's obligation for life insurance. As is stated in the analysis of the first 

issue above, there are not contradictions between Section 4.1 regarding Alimony 

and Section 7 regarding Life Insurance. Therefore the Court need not further 

address this issue here. 

7 
Next, Husband alleges that this Court erred in finding the Defendant is 

obligated to maintain his life insurance obligation for the Plaintiff and the children 

despite evidence of the unconscionability to require Defendant to continue paying 

for life insurance when there is no purpose of funding it at a huge cost to him at his 

age. "In order for a court to deem a contractual provision unconscionable it must 

determine both that the contractual terms are unreasonably favorable to the drafter 

and that there is no meaningful choice on the part of the other party regarding 

acceptance of the provisions." Colonna v. Colonna, 791 A.2d 353, 357 (2001). In the 

present case, Husband has failed to show any evidence of either factor. The PSA for 

Husband and Wife was jointly prepared by their then counsel and was signed by 

each party immediately below the clause stating that "Each party has carefully read 

and fully considered this Agreement and all of the statements, terms, conditions 

and provisions thereof prior to signing below." As the PSA was not drafted by either 

party, it cannot be deemed to be unreasonably favorable to either party. And as was 

found in Colonna, Husband has failed to show that the parties were not of "equal 

bargaining power" when creating and entering the PSA and therefore has failed to 

show there was no meaningful choice regarding acceptance of the provisions. Id. at 

357. 

Appellant's fifth contention is quite puzzling to the Court. Husband argues 

the Trial Court erred in finding that Plaintiff had standing to bring this action when 

the life insurance is ostensibly payable to a trust for the parties' children. This is 

not accurate. Husband is the Plaintiff in this Complaint in Divorce. He filed the 

8 
Petition for Declaratory Judgment at issue in this appeal, designating Wife as the 

opposing party. Husband may not choose the party required to defend the Petition 

and then also claim she does not have standing to defend the claim. Additionally, 

"standing" is a premise that describes "a party's right to make a legal claim or seek 

judicial enforcement of a duty or right." Black's Law Dictionary, p. 1413 (7th ed. 

1999). A plaintiff's challenge to the standing of a defendant plaintiff has selected is 

meritless. Standing does not apply to someone's ability to defend an action, at least 

where the sole plaintiff has selected a sole defendant. Finally, if this were not a 

meritless claim, it was never raised prior to this appeal and is therefore waived. 

Finally, Husband contends this Court erred in finding that Defendant is 

obligated to maintain life insurance for Plaintiff and the children despite the 

evidence presented at the hearing, including, but not limited to, the post- contract 

formation evidence presented by Defendant. It is true that "subsequent conduct of 

the parties, course of performance, is an aid to interpretation," however, a Court 

must first find that the language of the contract is ambiguous before looking to 

extrinsic evidence for interpretation of that language. See, Herzog v. Herzog, 887 

A.2d 313, 316 (2005). Since there was no ambiguity, the Court will not look to 

extrinsic evidence. Additionally, Husband argued at the hearing that since he 

barely had a relationship with his children he would not have entered an agreement 

requiring him to maintain life insurance for his children past the time he was 

required to pay for their other obligations such as child support and education. 

This argument does not make sense when combined with Husband's testimony that 

9 
he barely had a relationship with the children at the time of signing the PSA. (N.T. 

11/19/14, p.42 From the testimony of the parties at the hearing it was apparent to 

the Court that Husband did not have a significant relationship with his children at 

the time of signing the PSA therefore his continued lack of relationship with them in 

the years since signing the PSA is not dispositive in determining the intent of the 

parties or whether or not Husband must continue to maintain life insurance to fund 

the trust which was established solely for the benefit of the parties' children. 

CONCLUSION 

This Court did not make an error or law nor did it abuse its discretion. For 

all of the reasons set forth above, this Court respectfully submits that the Order 

entered on June 12, 2015 denying the Petition for Declaratory Judgment is proper 

and should be affirmed. 

BY THE COURT: 

Ann Osborne, 

10 

S.J. 

C73