IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JAMIE MILLER

o/b/o C.T. (a minor), 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-514

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff, Jamie Miller, acting on behalf of C.T., a minor, filed this action seeking review 

of a decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying C.T.’s application for supplemental 

security income. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 16) is 

OVERRULED and judgment is entered in favor of Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is C.T.’s mother, who filed an application for supplemental security income on his 

behalf on June 17, 2014, alleging he became disabled on March 13, 2014. (Doc. 11, Tr. 239).

After initial administrative denials of the claim, an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) held a 

hearing on April 5, 2017. (Tr. 38–57). The ALJ issued a decision denying benefits on June 13, 

2017. (Tr. 11–32).

Plaintiff filed this action on May 24, 2018 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the 

administrative record on July 26, 2018 (Doc. 11). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific Errors 

(Doc. 16), the Commissioner responded (Doc. 17), and no reply was filed.
2

A. Hearing Testimony

C.T. was born in 2009 (Tr. 14), and was 7-years-old at the time of the administrative 

hearing. (Tr. 41). The ALJ summarized the relevant hearing testimony:

[T]he claimant’s mother testified that claimant gets good grades but his behavior is 

a problem and he has been expelled more than ten times. She further testified that 

the claimant has household chores of cleaning the washroom, but he does not clean 

it without fighting. The claimant’s mother also testified that the claimant will hit 

other children and he wets the bed at night and will wet his pants during the day. 

She additionally testified that the claimant would get up out of his seat during class 

and leave the classroom. She stated that she would get calls from the school every 

day regarding the claimant’s behavior. Finally, the claimant’s mother testified that 

the claimant is working with a speech therapist however, she cannot always 

understand [her child’s] speech.

(Tr. 17).

B. Educational Evidence

The ALJ also usefully summarized C.T.’s educational records:

On March 14, 2014, the claimant’s mother met with his school to establish an 

Individualized Education Plan (IEP). The claimant’s IEP provided for speech 

therapy services, a specialized learning program with an intervention 

specialist/teacher, and noted that the claimant may benefit from strategies such as 

forced choices to help him feel in control, positive reinforcement, including praise, 

redirection to task, structured environment with clear rules and expectations. The 

claimant’s follow up IEP meeting in March 2016, noted that the claimant still needs 

prompting and redirection in group settings and often times moves out of his seat. 

The March 2016, review also noted that the claimant will access a resource 

classroom focusing on behavior, reading, writing, and math, and be in a general 

education classroom for other areas. The claimant will also continue to receive 

specialized instruction in a speech-language therapy room.

...

The claimant had an Evaluation Team Report (ETR) re-evaluation, which noted 

that the claimant needed additional fine motor practice, as well as guided practice 

responding appropriately to his same-age peers and following directions from his 

teacher. The claimant should be given repeated directions from his teacher, 

additional positive reinforcement when performing correct behavior, reminders to 

stay in his seat, and preferential grouping to limit his distractions. The claimant 

was observed in the classroom on February 9, 2015, and was noted to be moving 

while in his seat and was able to participate in classroom activities. He was able to 
3

move to his assigned group and complete an activity sorting pictures. While he 

moved out of his seat several times during the observation he was easily redirected. 

Testing showed that letter and word recognition, reading comprehension, and 

written expression were all in the average range, while math concepts and 

applications were noted to be in the below average range.

...

On October 4, 2016, the claimant was suspended from school for two days as a 

result of inappropriate language and exposure of his private parts. The claimant 

was suspended for two days in December 2016, for hitting another student, cursing 

at a student, telling his teacher no, and trying to leave the recovery room.

...

The claimant’s third quarter interim report from . . . school noted that he was 

meeting the standards for mathematics, however he needed improvement in 

reading, language arts, and science. The claimant had an annual review of his IEP 

on March 2, 2017, and it was noted that he was in a general education classroom 

and receiving speech services as well as services in the resource room with the 

intervention specialist in the areas of math, reading, behavior, and writing. His 

teacher noted that the claimant was in a general education classroom for the 

majority of the day, with some difficulty, as the claimant had difficulty sitting in a 

whole group setting and could only stay on task for approximately ten to fifteen 

minutes; which is about half the time of his same age peers. The review further 

noted that the claimant would steal food from other students and is often aggressive 

or inappropriate during lunch. The review also noted that the claimant’s social 

interactions were a concern and the claimant has difficulty respecting the personal 

space of others. The claimant was slightly behind his same age peers in reading 

and excels in math. The review noted that the claimant would be given 

accommodations such as: small groups, preferential seating, extended time for 

assignments, positive reinforcement for good behavior, shorter assignments, 

sensory breaks, and the use of a compression vest.

In February 2017, the claimant was suspended on multiple occasions for hitting 

other students, throwing objects, and for inappropriately touching other students. 

The claimant was suspended on April 13, 2017, for one day due to making threats 

with a makeshift gun.

...

[K.K.], early childhood intervention specialist, completed a teacher questionnaire 

on February 24, 2015, noting that the claimant has a pre-school IEP under the 

category of developmental delay. [She] opined that under the category of acquiring 

and using information the claimant has no more than slight problems. She noted 

that the claimant was impulsive and often speaks out of turn and leaves his seat. 
4

She further noted that he misses instructions due to his distractability and needs 

reminders to stay quiet in class until he is called upon. In the area of attending and 

completing tasks, [K.K.] noted obvious problems paying attention when spoken to, 

refocusing to task when necessary, waiting to take turns, and working without 

distracting himself or others. The remaining areas were marked as either a slight 

problem or no problem. [K.K.] noted that the claimant was disruptive to the class 

with talking out of turn and making noises, and he needed many reminders. Under 

the area of interacting and relating with others, [K.K.] opined that claimant had an 

obvious problem with following the rules. All other areas under this section were 

noted to be either no problem or a slight problem. [K.K.] noted under this section 

that the claimant needs adult facilitation for some conflict resolution with peers. 

Positive reinforcement is used in the classroom and have significantly reduced his 

frustrations. No problems were indicated regarding the claimant’s health and 

physical well-being and, other than a slight problem managing his pace of physical 

activities or tasks, no problems were noted moving about or manipulating objects. 

Under the area of caring for himself, [K.K.] noted an obvious problem being patient 

when necessary, however, the remaining areas were noting to have either a slight 

problem or no problems. She noted that the claimant is impulsive and needed 

reminders for asking permission before doing something and for his safety. . . .

. . .

[S.S.], the claimant’s kindergarten teacher, completed a school activities 

questionnaire on December 14, 2015, and noted that the claimant is on an IEP and 

he has a limited attention span and concentration in class, and he struggles to follow 

instructions. [S.S.] noted that he is highly distracted but can work independently 

of teacher supervision sometimes. Further, [S.S.] opined that the claimant can 

usually adapt to a change in his routine but will shut down when criticized. He is 

progressing with learning the skills involved in reading, writing, and mathematics 

although is inattentiveness impedes his progress compared to his peers. [S.S.] also 

opined that the claimant was very distracted and impulsive, always touching, 

struggled with space and reading other people’s reactions to his actions. The 

claimant had age-appropriate self-care, excellent attendance, and was able to keep 

up with his same age peers in extracurricular activities . . .

(Tr. 18–24 (internal citations omitted)).

C. Relevant Medical Evidence

Again, the ALJ’s summary is helpful here:

The claimant received behavioral health counseling at Ohio GuideStone and on 

August 21, 2014, the claimant and his mother met with [H.C.], the claimant’s 

caseworker. During this appointment, [H.C.] helped the claimant develop an 

individualized service plan (ISP) and she noted that the claimant needed extra time 

to understand goals, methods and problems. [L.L.], LISWS completed a medical 
5

necessity determination on August 24, 2014, and stated that the claimant had a 

moderate impairment of functioning and a moderate degree of symptoms. She 

further noted that treatment was medically necessary to help his functioning in the 

areas of family relations and his mood, and would consist of behavioral health 

counseling. [She] . . . stated that without the treatment the claimant would suffer 

prolonged or new symptoms or impairments of functioning and that he had a 

moderate level of symptoms that severely impaired his functioning. . . . On 

September 4, 2014, the claimant met with [H.C.] and she noted that the claimant 

was unable to practice his coping skills as he was too distracted and running around 

during the appointment.

On January 19, 2015, the claimant was seen for a psychiatric evaluation by Leslie 

Markowitz, Psy.D., at the Cleveland Clinic Center for Autism. Elaine Sculte, M.D., 

examined the claimant on January 19, 2015, and she noted that the claimant had no 

regression of developmental milestones, except for toileting, as the claimant is not 

toilet trained. Dr. Schulte’s examination was negative and she diagnosed the 

claimant with autism spectrum disorder and nocturnal enuresis. Dr. Schulte 

concluded that claimant’s daytime wetness is related to his behavioral issues. Dr. 

Markowitz concluded that claimant’s testing, combined with the reported history, 

support a diagnosis of autism spectrum disorder. Furthermore, Dr. Markowitz 

noted that the claimant had impaired speech production skills, reduced speech 

intelligibility, and social/pragmatic language deficits, which supported a diagnosis 

of other developmental speech or language disorders. Dr. Markowitz stated that 

the claimant would benefit from services through the Ohio Department of 

Developmental Disabilities and was advised to follow up with the Cleveland Clinic 

in three months. On January 28, 2015, the claimant had a speech and language 

evaluation as part of his assessment by the Cleveland Clinic Center for Autism 

conducted by Melissa Yusko, M.A., CCC/SLP. Ms. Yusko administered the 

Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals – Preschool; Second Edition (CELF 

Preschool – 2) and the results suggested that the claimant had impairments in his 

communication abilities. Ms. Yusko noted that the claimant had difficulty with 

consistent eye contact, following multi-step commands, and had decreased speech 

intelligibility, as well as difficulty sustaining conversation. The claimant was seen 

at the Cleveland Clinic Center for Autism on February 9, 2015, by Dr. Markowitz 

and was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder and other developmental speech 

or language disorder and was referred out for treatment at that time.

...

The claimant was evaluated at Ohio Guidestone Mental Health on August 26, 2015, 

secondary to aggressive behaviors towards family and strangers. During the 

assessment, the claimant’s mother noted that he had difficulty in school and at home 

with significant impairment of social interaction. [J.P.], a therapist, noted that the 

claimant appeared inattentive and distracted throughout the assessment by not 

responding to questions he was directly asked. The claimant’s mother noted that 

the claimant had a short attention span and he gets overstimulated in a large setting 
6

like a school. Amanda Wattenberg, IMFT, LICDC, completed a form regarding 

the medical necessity of counseling for the claimant on September 4, 2015, and 

noted that without treatment the claimant would be expected to suffer prolonged, 

increased, or new symptoms or impairment of functioning and that the claimant had 

a moderate severity of symptoms and a serious functional impairment. The 

treatment records from 2015 note that the claimant was being seen to improve his 

impulse control and behavior. On October 21, 2015, the claimant reported that he 

was in PEAK for fighting and wanted to do better. During his December 29, 2015, 

visit the claimant reported that he was being good and controlling his behaviors in 

a positive way.

Ohio Guidestone treatment records from 2016 show that the claimant was meeting 

with his therapist to manage his behavior and impulsivity. The claimant’s therapist 

met with school staff to find ways to integrate behavioral expectations with 

educational objectives. During his April 20, 2016, visit, the claimant was noted to 

have a lack of eye contact and a lack of responsiveness to verbal commands. On 

April 26, 2016, the claimant’s teacher and bus driver met with the claimant’s 

therapist and noted that the claimant was “more grabby than usual.” [J.P.], the 

claimant’s therapist, met with the claimant’s teacher on May 26, 2016 who noted 

that the claimant had good behavior during the week, except for the day of the 

appointment where the claimant had an incident with shoving and grabbing. On 

June 21, 2016, the claimant’s mother noted that she felt the claimant was more 

impulsive during the summer. [J.P.] noted during the claimant’s July 12, 2016, 

appointment that the claimant was distracted and that the library security repeatedly 

told the claimant not to run around. During his July 19, 2016, visit, the claimant 

stated that he tried to be good but he would have a bad day if he did not get what 

he wanted. On September 12, 2016, the claimant’s mother noted that the claimant 

had changed his behaviors. During his September 26, 2016, appointment, the 

claimant stated that he was doing well in class, and was making friends. 

...

The claimant had counseling session throughout January 2017, to address 

relaxation and focus skills. The claimant was seen by [C.P.] on January 23, 2017, 

for a counseling session and [C.P.] noted that the claimant was in an impulsive 

mood and was continuously interrupting during play therapy.

On February 2, 2017, the claimant and his teachers talked with [C.P.], his 

caseworker to discuss the claimant’s increased impulsivity and violence toward 

other children. [C.P.] and the teachers identified interventions that can be done to 

positively influence the claimant’s behavior, such as smaller classroom size. The 

claimant and his mother met with [C.P.], his caseworker, several times in February 

2017, to discuss steps to take at school and home to establish support for the 

claimant managing his symptoms and his behavior. On March 15, 2017, the 

claimant met with his caseworker, [C.P.], for a counseling session to work on 

sensory interventions to improve his impulse control. 
7

...

[D.B.], SLP completed an assessment on October 21, 2014, regarding the 

claimant’s speech and opined that the claimant had [80%] intelligibility in 

conversation in a known context versus [60%-65%] in an unknown context. [D.B.]

noted that the claimant had an adequate ability to imitate words and limited 

stimulability of age appropriate phonemes. [She] noted that the claimant was nonverbal at first but quickly started communicating verbally with words and 

sentences. . . .

Christopher Ward, Ph.D., examined the claimant on October 15, 2014, and 

following his examination diagnosed the claimant with an unspecified 

neurodevelopmental disorder as well as an adjustment disorder with mixed 

disturbance of emotions and conduct. Dr. Ward noted that the claimant presented 

with delays completing basic verbal skills and distractions, which may lead to 

difficulty acquiring new information. However, Dr. Ward noted that the claimant 

was able to talk with him in an age appropriate manner during the examination. Dr. 

Ward further opined that the claimant displayed adequate task persistence when 

answering questions, however, he noted that he did have to repeat questions as the 

claimant displayed indications of inattentiveness. Dr. Ward opined that the 

claimant would have difficulty understanding and responding to teacher requests 

due to his difficulty understanding concepts and his history of behavior problems. 

Finally, Dr. Ward opined that the claimant had less than age appropriate 

management of self-care with behavioral outbursts, sexualized behavior problems 

and difficulty carrying out multi-step tasks due to his distraction. . . . 

[J.P.], one of the claimant’s prior therapists, completed a questionnaire regarding 

the claimant’s limitations on January 28, 2016, opining that the claimant had 

moderate limitations acquiring and using information, marked limitations attending 

and completing tasks, marked limitations interacting and relating with others, no 

limitation moving about and manipulating objects, moderate limitations caring for 

himself, and no limitation in his health and physical well-being. . . .

[C.P.], the claimant’s therapist completed an opinion regarding the claimant’s 

limitations on April 5, 2017. [C.P.] opined that the claimant would have a moderate 

limitation acquiring and using information, a marked limitation attending and 

completing tasks, an extreme limitation interacting and relating with others, no 

limitations moving about and manipulating objects, a marked limitation caring for 

himself, and a marked limitation with his health and physical well-being. [C.P.] 

noted that the claimant had been suspended from school, which affected his 

attendance and needed ongoing therapy as well as support at school and home. . . .

State agency medical and psychological consultants reviewed this claim at the 

initial and reconsideration levels. The State agency medical sources opined that the 

claimant had a less than marked limitation: acquiring and using information; 
8

attending and completing tasks; and caring for himself. They further opined that 

the claimant had a marked limitation interacting and relating with others and no 

limitation moving about and manipulating objects or with his health and physical 

wellbeing. . . .

(Tr. at 18–23 (internal citations omitted)).

D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ first found that C.T. was a preschooler when the application was filed and a 

school-age child as of the date of the decision. (Tr. 14). Next, he found that C.T. had not engaged 

in substantial gainful activity since his application date. (Id.). At the next step of the sequential 

evaluation process, the ALJ concluded that C.T. had severe impairments including autism 

spectrum disorder, unspecified neurodevelopmental disorder, speech and language delay, affective 

disorder, and attention deficit disorder/attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADD/ADHD). 

(Id.). The ALJ also found that C.T.’s impairments did not, at any time, meet or equal the 

requirements of any section of the Listing of Impairments, or functionally equal those 

requirements. (Id.).

The ALJ then reviewed C.T.’s educational records, C.T.’s medical records, and the opinion 

evidence contained in the record. (Tr. at 18–25). In reviewing the six domains of functioning that 

are pertinent to a child’s benefits application, the ALJ determined that C.T. had: marked limitations 

in interacting and relating with others; less than marked limitations in acquiring and using 

information, attending and completing tasks, and caring for himself; and no limitations in moving 

about and manipulating objects or in health and physical well-being. (Tr. 25–31). Because a 

finding of one “extreme” limitation or two “marked” limitations is needed in order to support an 

award of benefits, the ALJ denied Plaintiff’s claim. (Tr. 32).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Sixth Circuit has summarized the regulations concerning a child’s application for 
9

disability benefits, stating:

The legal framework for a childhood disability claim is a three-step inquiry 

prescribed in 20 C.F.R. § 416.924. The questions are (1) is the claimant 

working, (2) does the claimant have a severe, medically determinable 

impairment, and (3) does the impairment meet or equal the listings? * * * An 

impairment can equal the listings medically or functionally * * *. The criteria 

for functional equivalence to a listing are set out in § 416.926a. That regulation 

divides function up into six “domains”:

(1) Acquiring and using information;

(2) Attending and completing tasks;

(3) Interacting and relating with others;

(4) Moving about and manipulating objects;

(5) Caring for yourself; and

(6) Health and physical well-being.

§ 416.926a(b)(1). To establish a functional impairment equal to the listings, the 

claimant has to show an extreme limitation in one domain or a marked 

impairment in more than one. § 416.926a(d). Lengthy definitions for marked 

and extreme are set out in § 416.926a(e). Each includes instructions on how to 

use test results:

“Marked” limitation also means a limitation that is “more than moderate” but 

“less than extreme.” It is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to 

find on standardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than three, 

standard deviations below the mean.

§ 416.926a (e)(2)(i).

“Extreme” limitation is the rating we give to the worst limitations. However, 

“extreme limitation” does not necessarily mean a total lack or loss of ability to 

function. It is the equivalent of the functioning we would expect to find on 

standardized testing with scores that are at least three standard deviations below 

the mean.

§ 416. 926a (e)(3)(i).

Kelly v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 314 F. App’x 827, 832 (6th Cir. 2009).

In the context of that legal framework, this Court’s review “is limited to determining 

whether the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant 

to proper legal standards.” Winn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); 
10

see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence 

but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as 

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). The 

Commissioner’s findings of fact must also be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 

756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). To this end, the Court must “take into account whatever in the 

record fairly detracts from [the] weight” of the Commissioner’s decision. Rhodes v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-1147, 2015 WL 4881574, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff appears to assert two assignments of error: (1) the ALJ’s analysis of the opinion 

evidence was erroneous, and (2) substantial evidence supported the finding that C.T. had a marked 

limitation in the domain of caring for self. (Doc. 16 at 12–19).

A. Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff argues that the opinion evidence offered by his treating therapist, intervention 

specialist, and teacher establish that he had marked limitations in caring for himself. (Doc. 16 at 

14–19). According to Plaintiff, the ALJ “failed to provide any meaningful analysis” as to why he 

did not accept their opinions. (Id. at 14–15). 

Under the regulations, therapists, intervention specialists, and teachers are considered 

“other sources,” rather than acceptable medical sources. SSR 06–3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *1–

2.

1

 Although information from other sources cannot establish the existence of an impairment, it

 1 “SSR 06-3p has been rescinded in keeping with amendments to the regulations that apply to claims filed on or after 

March 27, 2017, and the rescission is effective for claims filed on or after that date.” Hoffman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

2019 WL 697788, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2019) (citing 82 FR 15263-01, 2017 WL 1105348 (March 27, 2017)). 

Because Plaintiff’s claim was filed before the effective date of the rescission, SSR 06-3p applies here.
11

“may provide insight into the severity of the impairment,” and how it affects the individual’s ability 

to function. Id. at *2–3. In evaluating the opinions of “other sources,” an ALJ should consider a 

number of factors, including how long the source has known the claimant, how consistent the 

source’s opinion is with other evidence, and how well the source’s opinion is explained. Id. at *5–

6. Further, an ALJ:

generally should explain the weight given to opinions from these “other sources,”

or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination or 

decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the [ALJ’s] reasoning, 

when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case. 

Id. at *6.

The ALJ satisfied those requirements here. First, the ALJ reviewed the opinion evidence 

presented by C.T.’s early childhood intervention specialist, K.K. (Tr. 21–22). He noted that K.K. 

completed a teacher questionnaire regarding C.T.’s functional limitations in which she opined that, 

“[u]nder the area of caring for himself,” he had “an obvious problem being patient when 

necessary,” but that he had “slight or no problem” in the remaining areas. (Tr. 22). The ALJ gave 

“great weight” to K.K.’s questionnaire because, “[a]s the claimant’s intervention teacher,” she was 

“in position to give an independent opinion of the claimant’s limitations” and her opinion was 

“consistent with other medical opinions” and C.T.’s “educational records.” (Id.). In short, the 

ALJ found that K.K.’s opinion was entitled to great weight based on her relationship with C.T. 

and the fact her opinion was consistent with the record as a whole. That is all the regulations 

require. See SSR 06–3p, 2006 WL 2329939, at *5–6.

Plaintiff’s real complaint is not with the weight given to K.K.’s opinion, but rather the 

ALJ’s failure to find that Plaintiff was markedly limited in the domain of caring for himself based 

on K.K.’s opinion. (Doc. 16 at 17). But a fair reading of K.K.’s opinion questionnaire does not 

support Plaintiff’s desired conclusion. (See Tr. 282). K.K. found that C.T. had less than serious 
12

problems in all of the ten categories within the caring for himself domain and that for eight of the 

ten categories he had no problem or a slight problem. (Id.). Indeed, she opined that C.T. had 

“[g]ood self-help skills,” but was “[i]mpulsive” so he needed reminders “for safety.” (Id.). These 

findings are not indicative of a marked limitation. See Kelly, 314 F. App’x at 832 (“Marked

limitation also means a limitation that is more than moderate but less than extreme.” (citation and 

internal quotations omitted)).

Second, the ALJ considered the opinion evidence presented by C.T.’s therapist, C.P. (Tr. 

at 23). In particular, he reviewed C.P.’s questionnaire for health care professionals on medical and 

functional equivalence. (Id.). Finding that C.P.’s opinion was entitled to little weight, the ALJ 

emphasized that C.P’s statement was “not consistent with other evidence in the file, including the 

educational records. Specifically, the teacher questionnaire discussed above opines limitations 

significantly less than [C.P.] has opined.” (Id.). Further, the ALJ observed, “the State agency 

medical and psychological consultants opinions . . . opine limitations less than those stated by 

C.P.” (Id.).

Plaintiff insists that this analysis is insufficient. The Court disagrees. “The consistency of 

a medical opinion with other evidence in the record is one factor that may be considered in 

evaluating medical opinion evidence.” Hale v. Berryhill, No. 18-2484-TMP, 2019 WL 1978477, 

at *3 (W.D. Tenn. May 3, 2019) (citing SSR 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939, at *4). Here, the ALJ’s 

consideration of that factor “was sufficient to allow a subsequent reviewer to follow the ALJ’s 

reasoning where the ALJ made sufficient factual findings elsewhere to support his conclusion.” 

Hale, 2019 WL 1978477, at *3 (citing Crum v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 660 F. App’x 449, 457 (6th 

Cir. 2016)); see also Bowman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 683 F. App’x 367, 374 (6th Cir. 2017) 

(Notwithstanding Bowman’s contentions, the ALJ properly evaluated Williams’s April 2012 
13

opinion under SSR 06-03p. As the ALJ noted, Williams’s opinion was inconsistent with 

Bowman’s treatment history and the record as a whole.”).

Plaintiff relies on Lorman v. Commissioner of Social Security, 107 F. Supp. 3d 829 (S.D. 

Ohio 2015), but it does not suggest otherwise. There, the ALJ discounted the opinion of the 

claimant’s treating therapist based on the opinion of a one-time evaluating physician. Id. at 835–

36. The Court found that was erroneous based on the therapist’s 14-month treatment relationship 

with the claimant and the fact that plaintiff’s alleged mental health symptoms emerged after his 

visit with the one-time evaluating physician. Id. at 836.

Plaintiff has not explained how Lorman is relevant to this case. (See Doc. 16 at 16–17). 

And the facts available make clear that it is not. Unlike Lorman, here, the ALJ discounted C.P.’s 

opinion here because it was inconsistent with C.T.’s educational records and the opinions of the 

state agency consultants. (Tr. at 23). C.P. had a treating relationship with C.T. for six months 

prior to completing the opinion questionnaire. (Tr. 761). C.T.’s educational records from 2014 

through 2017 contradicted C.P.’s opinion as to C.T.’s limitation in the domain of caring for 

himself. See supra, Section II(B). The ALJ, therefore, did not err when he discounted C.P.’s 

opinion in evaluating C.T.’s limitations in caring for himself. See SSR 06-03P, 2006 WL 2329939, 

at *5–6.

Third, the ALJ analyzed the opinion evidence presented by C.T.’s kindergarten teacher, 

S.S. (Tr. at 24). He gave S.S.’ opinion “partial weight,” noting that “she had only known the 

claimant for three months at the time she provided [her] opinion.” (Id.). Nonetheless, he credited 

S.S.’ opinions regarding C.T.’s limitations in the domains of acquiring and using information and 

interacting and relating with others. (Id.).
14

Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in his analysis of S.S.’ opinion because the ALJ

“fail[ed] to identify which portions” of the teacher’s opinion he assigned partial weight to “when 

addressing the domain of caring for self.” (Doc. 16 at 17). Beyond this conclusory assertion, 

Plaintiff does not develop this argument, and the Court is unable to find any authority to support 

it. The ALJ reviewed S.S.’ opinion, noted the limited time S.S. had known C.T., assigned her 

opinion partial weight accordingly, and credited her opinion with respect to C.T.’s limitations in 

acquiring and using information and interacting and relating with others. Implicit in this analysis 

is the conclusion that S.S.’ opinion was either not relevant or not credible with respect to C.T.’s 

ability to care for himself. Because the ALJ explained the weight given to S.S.’ opinion and 

ensured his discussion of the evidence allowed the Court to follow his reasoning, the Court finds 

no error here. 

B. Substantial Evidence

Although Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors focuses primarily on the ALJ’s analysis of the 

opinion evidence, Plaintiff’s cumulative argument is that substantial evidence exists to support a 

finding that C.T. has a marked limitation in the domain of caring for himself. (Doc. 16 at 14–19). 

But this argument misunderstands the standard of review applicable to the ALJ’s decision. 

The question the Court must answer is whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion 

that C.T. had a less than marked limitation in the domain of caring for himself. Winn, 615 F. 

App’x at 320 (holding that courts are “limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision 

is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards”). 

“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip, 25 F.3d at 286). 
15

“If substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s decision, [courts must] defer to that finding 

even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite 

conclusion.” Longworth v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 402 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2005) (citation 

and quotations omitted). 

Because that is what occurred here, the Court must defer to the ALJ’s findings. In his 

decision finding that C.T. had a less than marked limitation in caring for himself, the ALJ cited 

substantial evidence in support of his conclusion. (Tr. at 30 (“The claimant’s mother noted in a 

form that the claimant was able to care for his personal needs. The teacher questionnaire noted an 

obvious problem being patient, however, no more than a slight limitation in any other area under 

this section. Following his examination, Dr. Ward opined that the claimant had less than age 

appropriate management of his self-care. Additionally, the State agency review found at both the 

initial and reconsideration levels found [sic] a less than marked limitation in this area.”)). The 

record confirms that substantial evidence supports this conclusion. See supra, Section I. Although 

Plaintiff has cited evidence purportedly showing a marked limitation in his ability to care for 

himself, he has not shown that the ALJ’s conclusion was outside the ALJ’s permissible “zone of 

choice” that grants the ALJ discretion to make findings without “interference by courts.” Blakely 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009).

C. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 16) is OVERRULED and 

judgment is entered in favor of Defendant.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: June 27, 2019 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE