In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 18-2544

EDWARD L. YOUNGMAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

PEORIA COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the 

Central District of Illinois.

No. 1:16-cv-01005-JBM-JEH — Joe Billy McDade, Judge.

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 11, 2019 — DECIDED JANUARY 24, 2020

Before RIPPLE, ROVNER, and BARRETT, Circuit Judges.

ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Edward Youngman was placed on

medical leave from his job with the Peoria County Juvenile

Detention Center after he informed his supervisor that he

could no longer work shifts in the facility’s control room.

Youngman had rarely worked in the control room during his

tenure with the detention center, but when changes in job
2 No. 18-2544

rotations had resulted in his temporary assignment to the

control room, he experienced headaches, nausea, and dizziness, among other symptoms. Youngman asked that he not be

assigned to the control room in the future as an accommodation, but was told that was not possible; he was instructed that

he could return to work if and when his condition improved.

After Youngman’s leave time expired, his position was filled,

and he found employment elsewhere, he filed this suit under

the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that his employer

had refused to accommodate his disability and forced him out

of his position. The district court granted summary judgment

to the defendants, reasoning that Youngman was responsible

for the breakdown of the interactive process required by the

ADA. Youngman v. Kouri, 2018 WL 3186920 (C.D. Ill. June 28,

2018). We affirm, but on a different ground.

I.

Youngman worked as a youth counselor at the Peoria

County Juvenile Detention Center beginning in 1998; as such,

he was technically an employee of the Chief Judge of the local

circuit court. Youth counselors at the detention center are

responsible for the supervision, care, safety, and counseling of

the juveniles detained at the 63-bed facility.

Youngman was diagnosed with a pituitary tumor and

acromegaly in 1993 and had surgery to remove the tumor and

a portion of his pituitary gland the following year. He subsequently had a thyroidectomy in 2011, resulting in both

hypothyroidism and hypocalcemia. 

After another youth counselor complained in 2010 about

unfairjob assignments at the detention center, an investigation
No. 18-2544 3

was conducted and it was recommended that the center’s

superintendent, Brian Brown, review the rotation of assignments. Brown would later take the position that every youth

counselor needed to be trained in and rotated through all three

assignments at the detention center: (1) control room, (2) living

units, and (3) floaters. Up until that time, assignments had not

been made equally, and it was common knowledge that not all

youth officers knew how to perform the duties associated with

all three assignments. Youngman himself had only worked in

the control room on 10 to 14 occasions overthe course of his 13

years at the detention center. Beginning in 2012, all youth

counselors on the first shift (which Youngman worked) were

required to work in the control room for at least one or two

weeks annually, to ensure they could perform the duties in that

post. 

Youngman was assigned to work in the control room for

the week of July 29, 2012, although he was not told that this

was for training purposes and would only be a temporary

assignment. As Youngman describes it, the control room at

that time was packed with electronic equipment that emitted

various humming, beeping, or buzzing noises and required the

operatorto make rapid turning movements in orderto monitor

multiple video screens, some of which displayed multiple

camera feeds from around the detention center. Youngman

began to experience severe headaches, nausea, dry heaves,

dizziness, and pain that radiated up and down his neck and

head. He took a sick day on July 31, and returned to work on

August 1 with a note from his physician, Dr. Jacob Doering,

indicating that he could not work in the control room due to
4 No. 18-2544

medical concerns. Brown requested further information from

Youngman, advising him that Doering’s note was too vague. 

Youngman worked the remainder of the week in the

control room, taking two hours of sick leave on August 2. He

was then placed on light duty which, ironically, entailed reassignmentto the control room, where he worked from August

5 through 9. On August 5, Youngman provided a follow-up

note from Dr. Doering indicating that Youngman was experiencing motion sickness due to the lights, noise, cameras, and

televisions in the control room and that Youngman should not

be assigned to work in that room.1 Youngman also provided a

written statement of his own indicating that although he was

capable of performing all duties required in the control room,

he experienced the symptoms described above in that assignment due to the confined space of the room coupled with the

large amount of electronics and the activities and noise

associated with them. Youngman requested assignment to the

living units or security unit (a living unit for juveniles on lockdown status) of the detention center or, alternatively, that he

be assigned as a floater. 

Brown ordered Youngman to undergo a fitness for duty

examination with the county’s physician, Dr. Dru Hauter.

Hauter examined Youngman and concluded that he could only

return to work with restrictions: specifically, he said that

Youngman could not view multiple television or monitor

screens, must avoid rapid alternating movements and flashing

1 Consistent with Dr. Doering’s diagnosis, we, like the parties, shall treat

the motion sickness Youngman experienced when assigned to the control

room as the relevant limitation on Youngman’s ability to work.
No. 18-2544 5

lights, and could not engage in commercial driving. Absent

such restrictions, Dr. Hauter indicated, Youngman posed an

imminent risk of injury to himself or others.

After consulting with human resources personnel, Brown

and another detention supervisor advised Youngman that he

was being placed on medical leave until his condition improved. Youngman asked if he could just not be assigned to

the control room, but Brown told him that was not possible.

Neither party proposed an alternative accommodation. In

connection with Youngman’s medical leave, Youngman and

Doering completed paperwork reaffirming that Youngman

was not capable of working in the control room. Youngman

commenced leave underthe Family and Medical Leave Act on

September 6, 2012. Youngman submittedmonthly reports from

Doering indicating that his condition had not changed. 

In February 2013, the county advised Youngman that his

FMLA leave time had expired and that his position would be

filled, but that when he was able to return to work, he would

be placed in the first available opening most comparable to his

previous position. In February 2013, Youngman filed a charge

of discrimination with the Illinois Department of Human

Rights (“IDHR”), alleging inter alia that he had been forced

onto medical leave due to his disability and that his employer

had failed to accommodate that disability. He filed a parallel

charge with the federal Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”).

In April 2013, Youngman obtained a new job elsewhere and

stopped submitting monthly updates to Peoria County. That

led to a series of warnings that he was not in compliance with
6 No. 18-2544

medical leave requirements and needed to submit appropriate

documentation of either his ongoing disability or his readiness

to return to work and/or meet with Brown. Youngman did

neither; on September 29, 2013, he notified the county by fax

that he was resigning his employment, to the extent he was still

considered to be an active employee. Youngman’s resignation

was not accepted: on October 1, 2013, Brown notified him that

he was discharged for insubordination.

Shortly thereafter, an IDHR investigator issued recommended findings concluding that substantial evidence supported Youngman’s allegations that the Chief Judge (as his

nominal employer) had failed to accommodate his disability

and instead had forced him onto medical leave. The EEOC in

turn issued a finding of reasonable cause to believe that the

Chief Judge had discriminated against Youngman in violation

of the ADA on the same grounds. It thereafter issued

Youngman a notice of his right to bring suit against his former

employer.

Youngman proceeded to file suit under the ADA contending that the Chief Judge had not accommodated his disability;

and ultimately the district court entered summary judgment in

favor of the Chief Judge. Judge McDade concluded that the

trier of fact could find that Youngman had a cognizable

disability (hypothyroidism) that substantially interfered with

a major life activity (his endocrine functioning). 2018 WL

3186920, at *8–*9. Judge McDade also concluded that

Youngman was a qualified individual who could perform the

essential duties of a youth counselor at the juvenile detention

facility. Id., at *11. He found that the evidence was mixed as to

whether working in the control room for more than one ortwo
No. 18-2544 7

weeks of the year (for training purposes) was essential, and

noted that Youngman had submitted evidence that he could

work in the control room on an emergency basis and had, in

fact, worked in the control room successfully for nine days

before he was placed on medical leave. Id.

But Judge McDade determined that Youngman was

responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process

required by the ADA to determine whether his disability could

be accommodated. Id., at *13–*14. He reasoned that

(1) Youngman did not provide his employer with the necessary

clarifications concerning his medical restrictions to permit a

determination of what, if any, accommodation was possible,

and (2) while on medical leave, Youngman ultimately stopped

sending updates on his condition to his employer and refused

to appear for a meeting with Superintendent Brown. Id., at

*13–*14. Consequently, “no reasonable trier of fact could hold

the Chief Judge liable for failing to provide reasonable accommodations to Youngman.” Id., at *14.

II.

We review the entry of summary judgment in favor of the

Chief Judge de novo, construing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the non-movant, in this case Youngman. See

Burton v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 851 F.3d 690, 694

(7th Cir. 2017). The Chief Judge was entitled to summary

judgment so long as Youngman failed to present evidence

sufficient to create a dispute of material fact on any essential

(and contested) element of his claim as to which he bears the

burden of proof. See id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.

317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986)). Because our review is de
8 No. 18-2544

novo, we can affirm on any ground fairly presented below and

supported by the record. Costello v. Grundon, 651 F.3d 614,

636–37 (7th Cir. 2011). 

The ADA provides that “[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis

of disability in regard to job application procedures, the hiring,

advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges

of employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Discrimination can take

the form of treating a disabled employee differently from other

workers or failing to make reasonable accommodations to the

known limitations of the employee.See § 12112(b); e.g., Scheidler

v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019). Youngman is

pursuing a failure-to-accommodate claim. To prevail on such

a claim, Youngman must show (1) he was a qualified individual with a disability, (2) his employer was aware of his disability, and (3) the employerfailed to reasonably accommodate his

disability. E.g., Rowlands v. U.P.S. - Ft. Wayne, 901 F.3d 792, 798

(7th Cir. 2018).

When a qualified employee has requested an accommodation, the ADA requires both parties to engage in an informal

interactive process to identify an appropriate accommodation,

29 C.F.R. § 16302(o)(3); e.g., Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr.,

788 F.3d 276, 292 (7th Cir. 2015), and as noted above, Judge

McDade found that Youngman had failed to provide the

necessaryclarifications regardinghis limitations and ultimately

abandoned the interactive process altogether when he ceased

providing status reports and did not respond to his employer’s

inquiries and requests to meet while on leave. 2018 WL
No. 18-2544 9

3186920, at *13–*14. But we believe that Youngman’s claim fails

on a more basic point.

The statute, as we have said, prohibits an employer from

“discriminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability on the basis of disability[.]” § 12112(a) (emphasis ours). It

follows that the failure to accommodate a disabled employee’s

particularlimitation amounts to discrimination “onthe basis of

disability”only if the limitation is caused by the disability. See

Arnold v. County of Cook, 220 F. Supp. 2d 893, 896 (N.D. Ill.

2002). Put a different way, there must be “some causal connection between the major life activity that is limited and the

accommodation sought.” Squibb v. Mem’l Med. Ctr., 497 F.3d

775, 785 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Desmond v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d

944, 959 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Rehabilitation Act); Nuzum v. Ozark

Auto. Distribs., Inc., 432 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2005); Felix v.

New York City Transit Auth., 324 F.3d 102, 106–07 (2d Cir. 2003).

As we have noted, Youngman had a portion of his pituitary

gland and the entirety of his thyroid gland removed, and as a

result of his thyroidectomy, he suffers from both hypothyroidism and hypocalcemia, which in turn require him to take

medication and dietary supplements. A physical or mental

condition must substantially limit one or more major life

activities in order to qualify as a disability under the ADA. 42

U.S.C. § 12102 (1) & (2); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii). The district

court, noting that diseases like diabetes which affect the

functioning of the body’s endocrine system qualify as disabilities, concluded that Youngman’s hypothyroidism should be

treated in the same way. 2018 WL 3186920, at *9. The Chief
10 No. 18-2544

Judge contests that conclusion, but for present purposes, we

may assume that it is correct.

The problem, for Youngman, is the lack of a causal nexus

between his hypothyroidism and the particular limitation for

which he seeks an accommodation. Youngman presumes that

the motion sickness he suffers when assigned to the detention

center’s control room is the result of his hypothyroidism. But

he cites no evidence in the record to support that necessary

causal link.

Youngman’sphysician, Dr. Doering, was questioned on this

point during his deposition. Doering unequivocally stated that

he knew of no connection between motion sickness and

acromegaly, hypothyroidism, hypocalcemia, or the medications and supplements Youngman was taking to treat his

hypothyroidism and hypocalcemia. R. 34-32, Doering Dep.

17–18, 33–37, 42–44. Although Youngman’s counsel indicated

at oral argument that Doering had posited a causal link

between hypothyroidism and motion sickness in the notes he

had submitted to the detention center on Youngman’s behalf,

our own review of the notes reveals no such suggestion. (We

may set aside the fact that Youngman withdrew his designation of Doering as his own expert). The only evidence we can

find in that vein is Youngman’s own statement that when he

was examined by Doering on August 2, 2012, Doering told

him, “The medical conditions you have and the disabilities you

have can be exacerbated by certain stimuli.” R. 37-15,

Youngman Dep. 122. But Dr. Doering’s out-of-court statement

to Youngman amounts to hearsay which is beyond the limited

exception set forth in Federal Rule of Evidence 803(4) for

statements that patients make to their physicians for purposes
No. 18-2544 11

of medical diagnosis or treatment. See Bombard v. Ft. Wayne

Newspapers, Inc., 92 F.3d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1996); accord, Field v.

Trigg Cnty. Hosp., Inc., 386 F.3d 729, 735–36 (6th Cir. 2004); Stull

v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 906 F.2d 1271, 1273–74 (8th Cir. 1990);

Bulthuis v. Rexall Corp., 789 F.2d 1315, 1316 (9th Cir. 1985) (per

curiam). Youngman has pointed to no other evidence from any

other medical expert positing a causal link between

hypothyroidism and motion sickness.2

Without proof that his motion sickness is caused by a

condition that qualifies as a disability under the ADA,

Youngman cannot show that his employer discriminated

against him on the basis of that disability. As that is an essential element of his ADA claim, the detention center was entitled

to summary judgment.

III.

The district court properly granted summary judgment in

favor of the defendant. Assuming that Youngman has a

cognizable disability, he failed to offer evidence indicating a

2

Below and on appeal, Youngman has cited the MERCK MANUAL and

various other medical publications as evidence that certain of the individual

adverse symptoms he experienced while working in the control room

(headache and nausea, for example) could be explained by his underlying

medical conditions or the medications he took to address them. See, e.g.,

R. 37 at 18–22 ¶ 52. But these sources do not establish, so far as we can

discern, a link between Youngman’s conditions and/or medications and the

constellation of symptoms comprising motion sickness, which is the

particular limitation that Dr. Doering cited as the reason why Youngman

could not work in the control room. 
12 No. 18-2544

causal nexus between that disability and the particular limitation (motion sickness) for which he sought an accommodation.

AFFIRMED