In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 15‐2498

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff‐Appellee,

v.

LESLIE J. WOODS,

Defendant‐Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois.

No. 15‐CR‐30074 — Michael Reagan, Chief Judge.

____________________

ARGUED JANUARY 7, 2016 — DECIDED JULY 1, 2016

____________________

Before EASTERBROOK, MANION, and SYKES, Circuit Judges.

MANION, Circuit Judge. The government filed a juvenile in‐

formation against Leslie Woods III,1 on May 18, 2015, charg‐

                                                 

1The defendant was previously identified solely as LJW pursuant to

18 U.S.C. § 5038, which provides that a juvenile’s name and picture shall

not be made public unless the individual is prosecuted as an adult. Be‐

cause we affirm the district court’s transfer of Woods to adult prosecution,
2 No. 15‐2498

ing him with multiple offenses related to two armed rob‐

beries. At the time the government charged Woods he was 20,

but at the time of the crime he was 15 and thus, under the

Juvenile Delinquency and Protection Act (“Juvenile Act”),

Woods was considered a juvenile. The United States moved

underthe Juvenile Act to transfer Woods’s case for adult pros‐

ecution. After a hearing, the district court granted that motion

and transferred the case against Woods for adult prosecution.

Woods filed this interlocutory appeal. We affirm.

I.

According to the information filed by the government,

when he was 15 years old, Woods and several other gang

members robbed two convenience stores. The firstrobbery oc‐

curred on June 17, 2010, when Woods drove three masked

and armed gang members to the Best Stop convenience store

in Cahokia, Illinois. Woods waited in the car while the other

three entered and robbed the store of over $11,000. During

this robbery one customer was shot and another customer

was grazed by a bullet. Three weeks later, on July 8, 2010,

Woods, the same three gang members, and another accom‐

plice robbed the Mini‐Mart gas station in Cahokia, Illinois.

Woods shot the clerk several times. The clerk survived, but

was in critical condition and permanently injured.

Nearly five years later, on May 18, 2015, the United States

filed a juvenile information against Woods, charging him

with two counts of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by

robbery, two counts of interference with commerce by rob‐

bery, and two counts of using and carrying a firearm during

                                                 

we refer to him by name and the proceedings, previously sealed, shall be

unsealed.
No. 15‐2498 3

a crime of violence. The government charged Woods under

the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Act (“Juvenile Act”), 18

U.S.C. § 5031 et. seq. The Juvenile Act provides that the gov‐

ernment cannot try a juvenile for federal crimes until he is

transferred to adult status pursuant to the Juvenile Act. Ac‐

cordingly, at the same time that the government filed the in‐

formation against Woods, it moved to transfer the case for

adult prosecution.  

Although Woods was 20 years old at the time the infor‐

mation was filed, he was 15 at the time he allegedly commit‐

ted the charged offenses. Under the Juvenile Act, a juvenile is

defined as “a person who has not attained his eighteenth

birthday, or for the purpose of proceedings and disposition

under this chapter for an alleged act of juvenile delinquency

a person who has not attained his twenty‐first birthday.” 18

U.S.C. § 5031. In turn, under the Juvenile Act, “juvenile delin‐

quency” is defined as a violation of federal law “committed

by a person prior to his eighteenth birthday which would

have been a crime if committed by an adult.” Id.

To charge Woods under the Juvenile Act, the Attorney

General was required to certify that the case should be trans‐

ferred for adult prosecution because it meets certain factors,

which are not at issue here. United States v. Jarrett, 133 F.3d

519, 535 (7th Cir. 1998). The Attorney General must also cer‐

tify that “there is a substantial Federal interest in the case or

the offense to warrant the exercise of Federal jurisdiction.” 18

U.S.C. § 5031; see id. Additionally, the government must sub‐

mit the juvenile’s court records as a jurisdictional prerequisite

to a transfer proceeding. Id. at 535–36. Finally, if those three

conditions are met, as they undisputedly are in this case, “the

district court must decide whether the juvenile’s transfer to
4 No. 15‐2498

adult status is ‘in the interest of justice.’” Id. at 536 (quoting 18

U.S.C. § 5031).

Section 5032 of the Juvenile Act sets forth specific factors

the district court must consider in assessing whether the

transfer is in the interest of justice. This section requires the

court to make factual findings on:  

(1) the age and social background of the juvenile;

(2) the nature of the offense;  

(3) any prior delinquency record;  

(4) the present intellectual development and psycho‐

logical maturity;  

(5) past treatment efforts and the juvenile’s response to

such efforts;  

(6) the availability of programs to treat the juvenile’s

behavioral problems.

18 U.S.C. § 5032.   

In this case, the district court held a hearing to receive ev‐

idence concerning these factors. At this hearing, the govern‐

ment presented as evidence a DVD containing video surveil‐

lance of the robberies, as well as an affidavit from an FBI agent

elaborating on the details of the charged robberies. The video

surveillance of the first robbery did not depict Woods because

he was alleged to be the getaway driver, but it showed the

other individuals involved in the offense and showed one of

the gang members shooting a customer. The agent’s affidavit

also noted that a woman who had pulled up in the parking

lot as the gang was fleeing was shot, but luckily only grazed.

The second video showed the robbery of the Mini‐Mart and,

according to the government, depicted Woods entering the

store with a long rifle and shooting the cashier in the chest,

arm and hand.  
No. 15‐2498 5

The government also presented evidence from an officer

familiar with Woods and his gang involvement, as well as tes‐

timony from Woods’s juvenile probation officer. Specifically,

St. Louis County Police Detective Joseph Percich described, in

detail, the Dead End Gang involvement in the area and

Woods’s extensive involvement with the gang. Additionally,

Woods’s state juvenile‐probation officer testified in detail

about Woods’s extensive involvement in the juvenile justice

system and her role in providing court‐ordered supervision

fortwo drug‐related charges. She explained that Woods’s first

juvenile case was for a drug‐related charge and that, while it

was closed, only a few months later a second juvenile petition

was filed against him for drug‐related offenses. She also ex‐

plained that Woods was involved with the Dead End Gang

and would not end that affiliation. She further elaborated on

the various services offered to Woods and that “[h]e never

took accountability at any point.” She added that she recom‐

mended Woods for a residential program to remove him from

the negative influences in his life, but he was rejected because

of his “gang affiliation and his willingness to fight and cause

harm.” The juvenile‐probation officer further testified that

she had concluded “there were no additional resources that I

could afford him,” and at that point she recommended that

he be placed in the custody of the Division of Youth Services,

where minors are detained in a locked, secure, residential fa‐

cility because they are a risk to society and are not benefitting

from juvenile services. She ended her direct testimony by say‐

ing, “in the 15 years that I’ve done this work it is unfortunate

but Leslie was the first child that I truly feared and was con‐

cerned about what harm he could do to the community.”

Following the hearing, the district court found that

Woods’s social background was marked by criminal activity
6 No. 15‐2498

and gang involvement and that at his current age (one week

shy of 21), the juvenile‐rehabilitation programs would not be

of much benefit. The court found the second factor likewise

supported transfer, given that Woods was alleged to have

been involved in two violent armed robberies and had shot

and seriously injured an individual in the second robbery.

The third factor also supported transfer, the district court con‐

cluded, because Woods had an extensive juvenile record

starting at the age of 12 and involving more than 30 separate

incidents that resulted in referrals to juvenile court. The

fourth factor (intellectual development and psychological

maturity) the district court weighed neutrally. But the court

found the fifth factor also weighed in favor of transfer because

Woods had responded poorly to past treatment programs. Fi‐

nally, the court found the sixth factor weighed in favor of

transfer because he was unlikely to benefit from juvenile pro‐

grams given his age. The court then concluded that the total‐

ity of the factors supported transfer, and entered an order

transferring Woods for adult prosecution. Woods appeals.2

II.

On appeal, Woods argues the district court erred in trans‐

ferring him for adult prosecution under the Juvenile Act. At

oral argument, we asked the parties whether Woods was still

considered a juvenile under the Juvenile Act given that he is

now over 21 and his trial had not yet begun. We directed the

parties to address that question in supplemental briefing. In

their supplemental briefs, the government and Woods both

                                                 

2 “[A]n order issued under § 5032 is immediately appealable as a col‐

lateral order...” United States v. J.J.K., 76 F.3d 870, 871–72 (7th Cir. 1996).
No. 15‐2498 7

maintain that such defendants are still considered juveniles

under the Juvenile Act.3  

Every circuit which has considered this issue has held that

the Juvenile Act “permits the district court to continue to ex‐

ercise its juvenile jurisdiction where a defendant is [charged]

while under twenty‐one but attains the age of twenty‐one

during the criminal proceedings.” United States v. Ramirez, 297

F.3d 185, 191–92 (2d Cir. 2002); United States v. Smith, 851 F.2d

706, 710 (4th Cir. 1988); United States v. Martin, 788 F.2d 696,

697–98 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Doe, 631 F.2d 110, 112–

13 (9th Cir. 1980). These courts reasoned that jurisdiction un‐

der the Juvenile Act is determined at the time the case is initi‐

ated, and thus, the fact the defendant later turns twenty‐one

is irrelevant. Ramirez,297 F3d at 191; Smith, 851 F.2d at 709;

Martin, 788 F.2d at 697; Doe, 631 F.2d at 112–13. Further,

Ramirez and Doe explained that retaining jurisdiction under

the Juvenile Act is contemplated by the statute even after a

defendant turns twenty‐one because otherwise, in cases

where the defendant was nearing that milestone, “‘the gov‐

ernment would be forced either to postpone the initiation of

a proceeding ... or to rush the proceeding to its conclusion ...

Neither course is desirable.’” Ramirez, 297 F.3d at 192 (quoting

Doe, 631 F.2d at 113). We see no reason to part ways with these

circuits and, accordingly, we conclude that the Juvenile Act

continues to apply even though Woods is now over twenty‐

one. We therefore consider whether the district court erred in

                                                 

3 We also asked the parties whether it would be appropriate to use

Woods’s name and they agreed that, if we hold transfer was appropriate,

his identity need no longer be sealed.  
8 No. 15‐2498

ordering Woods transferred for adult prosecution under the

Juvenile Act.

We review the district court’s decision to transfer a juve‐

nile for adult prosecution for an abuse of discretion. SeeJarrett,

133 F.3d at 536. In this case, the district court did not abuse its

discretion in transferring Woods to adult court. As discussed

below, the district court thoroughly and conscientiously con‐

sidered the factors Congress laid out for consideration.

The court found that the first factor, Woods’s age and so‐

cial background, weighed strongly in favor of transfer. While

noting that Woods had a close relationship with his parents,

the court added that he was placed under the protection of

the court for more than a year because of threats his mother

had made. The court also looked at Woods’s educational

background and explained that he had been suspended from

school and placed in an alternative learning program, which

he left after incidents with both staff and a fellow student.

However, he did earn his GED at a second alternative school,

but was later incarcerated at the Division of Youth Services.

In evaluating this factor, the court further reviewed Woods’s

juvenile record, which included a history of charges related to

drug possession, as well as his involvement in the Dead End

Gang, which began when he was 13 years old. Additionally,

the court noted that Woods had a long history of criminal ac‐

tivity which also included three adult felony convictions for

offenses which occurred after the robberies alleged in the in‐

formation. Taken together, the court viewed these facts as

supporting transfer, and the court did not abuse its discretion

in reaching this conclusion.  

The district court next considered the nature of the alleged

offenses, which at the transfer stage requires the district court
No. 15‐2498 9

to presume the truth of the allegations. The court found this

factor also weighed heavily in favor of transfer because the

crimes charged were two armed robberies which involved

multiple weapons and resulted in serious injuries. The court

also stressed that, during the second robbery, Woods shot the

store clerk multiple times, resulting in the clerk suffering crit‐

ical injuries and the permanent loss of the use of his right arm

and hand. The district court did not abuse its discretion in

evaluating this factor.

The third factor, the prior juvenile‐delinquency findings,

the district court also found weighed in favor of transfer be‐

cause Woods’s juvenile history demonstrated extensive in‐

volvement with the juvenile system, an escalation of criminal

activity, and the lack of success in rehabilitation. In evaluating

this factor, the district court summarized six juvenile cases in‐

volving Woods, beginning with referrals for burglary and as‐

sault when he was only 13 years old. Again, there was no

abuse of discretion in the court’s evaluation of this factor.

The fourth factor, which looked at the defendant’s present

intellectual development and psychological maturity, the dis‐

trict court found to be neutral. The court noted that Woods

had completed his GED and that there was no indication of

intellectual or psychological deficits. As a result, the court

found his legal issues were “more behavioral than psycholog‐

ical or intellectual.” We see no abuse of discretion in the court

evaluating this factor as neutral.

Next, the district court considered past treatment efforts

and Woods’s response. The district court noted that “the ju‐

venile system has made numerous efforts to assist the De‐

fendant, with little or no success.” The district court noted

that Woods responded poorly to the various programs. The
10 No. 15‐2498

court also stressed that Woods’s escalating behavior demon‐

strated that the numerous prior attempts to rehabilitate him

did not have any positive influence, and accordingly found

this factor weighed in favor of transfer. We also see no abuse

of discretion in this conclusion.  

Finally, the district court considered the availability of

programs to treat Woods’s behavioral problems. Here the

court concluded that the nature of his crimes precluded any

form of juvenile rehabilitation in Illinois, because under the

Illinois Juvenile Act an armed robbery committed with a fire‐

arm was not subject to juvenile proceedings. The Juvenile Act

only provided for treatment for individuals under 21 and be‐

cause Woods was nearly 21 at the time of the hearing, he also

wouldn’t benefit from services. The district court found this

factor weighed in favor of transfer and again we find no abuse

of discretion in this finding.  

Notwithstanding the district court’s thorough and consci‐

entious evaluation of the six factors, Woods argues that the

district court abused its discretion by ordering him trans‐

ferred to adult prosecution. First, Woods posits that the dis‐

trict court wrongly shifted the burden to him to prove he had

a positive response to previous rehabilitative treatment and

would not have responded to current treatment. However,

contrary to his position, the district court did not place the

burden on Woods. Rather, the court considered the evidence

of Woods’s continued criminal behavior and the absence of

available state juvenile programs to conclude that Woods had

not benefitted from, and would not in the future benefit from,

juvenile programs. There was no abuse of discretion in that

analysis.
No. 15‐2498 11

Woods also complains that at the time of the offense he

was 15 years old, and had the government promptly filed

charges against him, he could have benefitted from available

juvenile programs. That is unlikely given that, even though

he had been offered many juvenile programs, his behavior es‐

calated to the point where at age 15 he shot and severely in‐

jured an individual. But in any event, the pertinent question

is whether Woods would now benefit from programs and, in

assessing this factor, it is Woods’s current age that is signifi‐

cant. United States v. Ramirez, 297 F.3d 185, 193‐94 (2d Cir.

2002). The district court found that because he was almost 21,

he would not benefit from any juvenile programs, and there

was no abuse of discretion in the court taking his age into ac‐

count to reach this conclusion.  

Finally, Woods complains that the district court gave little

weight to the fact that his juvenile‐probation officer had rec‐

ommended he be placed in a program outside his mother’s

home, but that no such placement occurred. Woods stresses

that the juvenile‐probation officer had determined that his

mother had played a role in his reluctance to fully engage in

the available juvenile programs. He argues that the district

court should have considered the state’s failure to provide

him with the recommended treatment outside of his mother’s

influence in evaluating his response to treatment. The district

court, though, discussed Woods’s relationship with his

mother and her failure to support the rehabilitative efforts.

The district court did not need to further elaborate on these

facts. Further, any benefit to Woods flowing from considera‐

tion of his mother’s negative influence would be offset by the

reason he was never placed in such a treatment program—

Woods was so violent that no residential program would ac‐

cept him. There was no abuse of discretion here either.
12 No. 15‐2498

In sum, the district court thoroughly analyzed each re‐

quired factor and found that “balancing the possibility of re‐

habilitation for the offender against the threat to the public

posed by juvenile crime ... the transfer of the Defendant to

adult criminal prosecution is in the interest of justice.” This

conclusion was amply supported by the record and, accord‐

ingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the district court’s

decision to transfer Woods for adult prosecution.

III.

The government sought to prosecute Leslie Woods III as

an adult for multiple criminal counts related to two armed

robberies he allegedly committed while he was 15. After a

hearing on the government’s motion to transfer him to adult

prosecution, the district court concluded that transfer was ap‐

propriate. In reaching this decision the district court thor‐

oughly analyzed the required factors and its decision was not

an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we AFFIRM and

REMAND for further proceedings.