THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

BRIAN GARRETT, et al.,

Plaintiffs,

v.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY,

Defendant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case No. 2:18-cv-00692

Judge Michael H. Watson

Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. 

Deavers

________________________________________ )

)

STEVE SNYDER-HILL, et al., ) Case No. 2:18-cv-00736

)

 Plaintiffs, ) Judge Michael H. Watson

)

v. ) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. 

) Deavers

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, )

)

 Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

NICHOLAS NUTTER, et al. ) Case No. 2:19-cv-02462

)

Plaintiffs, ) Judge Michael H. Watson

)

v. ) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

) Deavers

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

ROCKY RATLIFF, ) Case No. 2:19-cv-04746

)

 Plaintiff, ) Judge Michael H. Watson

)

v. ) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

) Deavers

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

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IN RE: SUBPOENA TO PERKINS COIE ) Case No. 2:19-mc-00038

LLP, IN THE MATTER OF STEVE )

SNYDER-HILL, et al. v. THE OHIO ) Judge Michael H. Watson

STATE UNIVERSITY )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

) Deavers

________________________________________ )

)

JOHN DOES 151-166, )

) Case No. 2:20-cv-03817

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. 

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

ALONZO SHAVERS, et al., ) Case No. 2:21-cv-02120

)

Plaintiffs, ) Judge Michael H. Watson

)

v. ) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

) Deavers

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

JOHN DOES 172-191, AND JANE DOE 1, ) Case No. 2:21-cv-02121

)

Plaintiffs, ) Judge Michael H. Watson

)

v. ) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

) Deavers

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, )

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

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JOHN DOES 192-217, )

) Case No. 2:21-cv-02527

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

MICHAEL ALF, et al., )

) Case No. 2:21-cv-02542

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

DR. MICHAEL B. CANALES, et al., )

) Case No. 2:21-cv-02562

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

TIMOTHY MOXLEY, et al., )

) Case No. 2:21-cv-03838

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

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1

JOHN DOE, )

) Case No. 2:21-cv-04254

Plaintiff, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

)

JOHN DOES 218-223, )

) Case No. 2:21-cv-04340

Plaintiffs, )

) Judge Michael H. Watson

v. )

) Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, ) Deavers

)

Defendant. )

________________________________________ )

DEFENDANT THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY’S (1) POSITION STATEMENT 

REGARDING RECUSAL AND (2) RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO SHARP LAW’S

MOTION FOR RECUSAL AND TO TRANSFER VENUE WITHIN THE DISTRICT

Defendant The Ohio State University submits this (1) position statement pursuant to the 

Court’s September 10, 2021 instruction directing counsel to notify the Court whether the 

Honorable Presiding Judge should recuse himself from the above-captioned actions, and (2) 

response in opposition to Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Motion for Recusal And To Transfer Venue 

Within The District Per 28 U.S.C. § 1404(b) filed by a group of attorneys led by Sharp Law, pro 

hac vice admitted counsel based in Kansas City representing plaintiffs in the Garrett and Alf

cases (collectively, “Sharp Law”). See Garrett, Motion (Doc. 193). 

Ohio State opposes the request to recuse or disqualify The Honorable Michael H. 

Watson. Ohio State further opposes Sharp Law’s unwarranted attack on the impartiality of all 

the judges of the Eastern Division of this Court, and its transparent eleventh-hour attempt at 

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2

forum shopping. Sharp Law chose to file its lawsuits here. Now, it apparently is secondguessing that strategy and seeking to attack Judge Watson and all the sitting judges of the 

Eastern Division to justify its about-face. That is improper. Neither Judge Watson nor the 

Eastern Division should countenance such conduct. 

As the Preamble to the Ohio Rules of Professional Conduct provides:

“Lawyers play a vital role in the preservation of society. . . . A lawyer should use the 

law’s procedures only for legitimate purposes and not to harass or intimidate others. A 

lawyer should demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who serve it, 

including judges, other lawyers, and public officials. Adjudicatory officials, not being 

wholly free to defend themselves, are entitled to receive the support of the bar 

against unjustified criticism. Although a lawyer, as a citizen, has a right to criticize 

such officials, the lawyer should do so with restraint and avoid intemperate 

statements that tend to lessen public confidence in the legal system. While it is a 

lawyer’s duty, when necessary, to challenge the rectitude of official action, it is also 

a lawyer’s duty to uphold legal process.” Preamble at 5 (emphasis added).

I. BACKGROUND.

On September 15, 2021, Sharp Law filed a strategic motion seeking to disqualify The 

Honorable Michael H. Watson, and transfer venue of the case from this Court’s Eastern Division 

in Columbus to the Court’s Western Division in Cincinnati. These forum shopping efforts 

come:

(1) More than three years after the first complaint in the above-captioned actions was filed on 

July 16, 2018, in Columbus by Sharp Law. See Garrett, Compl. (Doc. 1).

(2) Nearly three years after the Honorable Presiding Judge disclosed to all counsel, including 

Sharp Law, at the first status conference that he has served as an adjunct professor at Ohio 

State’s law school “at one time or another” and was “currently” teaching at Ohio State. See 

Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Tr. (Doc. 52) at 3:23-25. At that time, the Honorable Presiding Judge 

also advised: “I’m letting you know in case you want to raise something.” Id. at 4:2-3. 

Counsel did nothing in response for nearly three years. 

(3) Nearly three years after the Honorable Presiding Judge ordered mediation to facilitate 

settlement, and approximately two years and six months after he referred these matters to 

Senior United States District Judge Michael R. Barrett for mediation.1

 

1 See Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Order (Doc. 50); Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Hearing Tr. (Doc. 52) at 4:5-7; Garrett, Mar. 15, 

2019 Order (69) at 2. 

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(4) Just days prior to the Honorable Presiding Judge’s anticipated ruling on Ohio State’s 

pending motions to dismiss in the above-captioned actions. The Honorable Presiding Judge 

had previously advised all counsel he would rule “no later than the end of September of 2021” 

and after the deadline to participate in the Strauss Individual Settlement Program expired on 

September 4, 2021.

2 Sharp Law’s accusations that the Honorable Presiding Judge has delayed 

these matters is self-contradictory given that Sharp Law itself is seeking to delay a ruling on 

Ohio State’s motions to dismiss on the eve of the ruling. 

(5) Despite the fact that, in January 2019, the Honorable Presiding Judge could have granted 

Ohio State’s motions to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to clear-cut statute of limitations 

and other defenses as the briefing on Ohio State’s motion to dismiss the First Amended 

Complaint in the Garrett case had been completed. See Garrett, OSU Reply to MTD (Doc. 

48). The Honorable Presiding Judge instead ordered the parties to mediate because he wanted 

“to see that the right thing is done here.” See Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Hr’g Tr. (Doc. 52) at 4:24. 

Counsel for certain plaintiffs at the time welcomed the mediation as “a major turning point” 

for the plaintiffs.3 Sharp Law’s motion confirms that “no good deed goes unpunished.” 

(6) Despite numerous other rulings and statements by the Honorable Presiding Judge that 

have not only demonstrated impartiality, but have benefitted plaintiffs, as outlined herein.

Sharp Law’s current attack on the Honorable Presiding Judge is merely a continuation of 

the scorched-earth campaign it has waged on every front throughout the three years these matters 

have been pending. During this time, Sharp Law has:

(1) Retained lobbyist Neil Clark to lobby the Ohio General Assembly for the passage of 

House Bill 249, which the Sharp Group itself has characterized as a “bill which proposed 

removing the statute of limitations for Strauss victims to pursue their civil claims against 

OSU”; legislation necessary to “give[] these victims their long-awaited day in court”; and 

legislation to “specifically lift the unfair statute of limitations[.]” Garrett, Cons. Compl. (Doc. 

157) at ¶ 546-548.

4

In other words, the Garrett complaint admits the claims are time-barred.

(2) Along with Neil Clark and counsel for the Snyder-Hill plaintiffs, misrepresented the 

status of the mediation occurring before Mediator Judge Barrett to the Court, to Ohio 

lawmakers, and to the press in stating that “OSU has not participated in the mediation process 

in good faith”; “OSU will not take Plaintiffs’ claims seriously until OSU’s statute of 

limitations defense is defeated in a motion to dismiss”; mediation “hadn’t resulted in a 

settlement”; and “OSU is whipsawing the Court, Legislature, and victims with the empty 

promise of ‘doing the right thing’ at mediation.” Snyder-Hill, Feb. 24, 2020 Letter to Court

 

2 See Garrett, Transcript (Doc. 179) at 3:21-22; see also https://straussindividualsettlementprogram.com/.

3 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/mediation-eyed-accusers-lawsuits-about-ohio-state-doctor-n959976

4 https://www.dispatch.com/news/20191107/lawsuit-ohio-states-handling-of-strauss-allegations-greatest-scandal-inhistory-of-american-higher-education; https://www.dispatch.com/news/20190925/work-crawls-along-on-billallowing-strauss-victims-to-sue-ohio-state

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(Doc. 113).5 These statements were made despite the fact that the mediation resulted in 

settlements with 185 plaintiffs totaling $46.7 million.

(3) Engaged in a media publicity campaign, including creating a website asking the public to 

(i) stop all donations to Ohio State; and (ii) support letters to the Big Ten Conference and the 

NCAA requesting that they investigate and sanction Ohio State,

6

despite this Court’s prior 

admonition that “I don’t want this case tried in the media.”

7

 

Through it all, the Honorable Presiding Judge has served as a model of judicial 

temperament, compassion toward plaintiffs, patience, commitment to equal justice, and freedom 

from bias. While he could have granted Ohio State’s motions to dismiss immediately, he instead 

referred the cases to Judge Barrett for mediation. As a result, 185 plaintiffs represented by 10

plaintiffs’ firms reached settlements with Ohio State through the successful mediation.

8

 

Additionally, other plaintiffs have settled through the Strauss Individual Settlement Program.9 

At the time of settlement, the settling plaintiffs’ counsel (who are not Sharp Law) stated in their 

court filing that “Ohio State had stepped forward and “done the right thing.”10 

Despite all of the above, and having taken advantage of Judge Watson’s calm efforts to 

facilitate resolution prior to ruling on plaintiffs’ time-barred claims, Sharp Law nevertheless now 

claims it is seeking the Honorable Presiding Judge’s recusal and disqualification based on (1) his 

 

5 https://www.dispatch.com/news/20191107/lawsuit-ohio-states-handling-of-strauss-allegations-greatest-scandal-inhistory-of-american-higher-education

6 https://www.change.org/p/the-ohio-state-university-osu-alumni-to-stop-all-donations-till-there-is-justice-for-thedr-strauss-survio; https://www.change.org/p/ncaa-request-ncaa-big-ten-conference-investigate-ohio-state-sexualabuse-cover-up; https://osumetoo.com/osu-ncaa-big-ten-investigation/

7 See Garrett, May 24, 2019 Hearing Transcript (Doc. 91) at 5:7-8. Despite the Court’s admonition, plaintiffs’ 

counsel continued their public, extra-judicial statements to the press. See, e.g., 

https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/education/2020/10/14/strauss-accusers-call-ncaa-big-ten-investigate-ohiostate/3650036001/; 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4AeaxWspH4&feature=share&fbclid=IwAR2nCKI_GutvsAuTCT6OiWBqkw

lNcKw1fs0HGWLdwcLY3-ggRPggPzG_Ta8; https://www.elevenwarriors.com/the-ohio-stateuniversity/2020/10/117214/former-athletes-students-call-for-ncaa-big-ten-to-investigate-handling-of-sexual-abuseaccusations-against-richard-strauss

8 See DiSabato, Case No. 2:19-cv-02237 (Docs. 39 & 40) (settling claims of 162 plaintiffs); John Does 151-166, 

Case No. 2:20-cv-03817 (Docs. 18 & 19) (settling claims of 23 plaintiffs).

9 See https://straussindividualsettlementprogram.com/; see also Nutter, Case No. 2:19-cv-02462, Notice of Seven 

Pls’ Intent to Settle and Notice of Thirty Nine Pls’ Rejection of Defendant’s Strauss Individual Settlement Program 

(Doc. 47). 

10 DiSabato, (Doc. 39) at ¶ 1; John Does 151-166 (Doc. 18) at ¶ 1.

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previously disclosed position as an adjunct professor at Ohio State and (2) his wife’s arms-length 

business dealings with Ohio State that are completely unrelated to this litigation. 

Regarding the Honorable Presiding Judge’s service as an adjunct professor at Ohio 

State’s law school, if there had ever been a basis for recusal or disqualification (which there was 

not), Sharp Law waived it long ago by failing to raise it. And no such basis ever existed to recuse 

the Honorable Presiding Judge for either teaching at Ohio State or because of his wife’s business 

dealings with Ohio State. The true motive for seeking the Honorable Presiding Judge’s recusal, 

of course, is conceded. As one plaintiffs’ attorney has told the media, it is based on a “belief that 

this judge would throw out [their] cases[s].”11 The Supreme Court has reminded, however, “the 

recusal statute was never intended to enable a discontented litigant to oust a judge because of 

adverse rulings,” Liteky v. U.S., 510 U.S. 540, 549 (1994), let alone predicted adverse rulings.

Sharp Law does not confine its attack to only the Honorable Presiding Judge. Rather, 

Sharp Law seeks to improperly disqualify every federal district judge in the Eastern Division of 

the Southern District of Ohio in Columbus by requesting a transfer of venue to the Western 

Division in Cincinnati. Enough is enough. 

II. A JUDGE SHOULD NOT RECUSE HIMSELF WHERE, AS HERE, RECUSAL IS 

UNWARRANTED.

The Supreme Court and all United States Courts of Appeals, including the Sixth Circuit, 

have unanimously instructed that “a federal judge has a duty to sit where not disqualified which 

is equally as strong as the duty to not sit where disqualified.” Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 

F. App’x 341, 354 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972)). Indeed, 

“where the standards governing disqualification have not been met, disqualification is not 

optional; rather, it is prohibited.” Brautigam v. Damon, No. 1:11-CV-551, 2013 WL 6387500, at 

 

11 https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/judge-presiding-over-ohio-state-sex-abuse-scandal-lawsuits-flaggedn1278935.

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*4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2013); Easley v. Univ. of Michigan Bd. of Regents, 853 F.2d 1351, 1356 

(6th Cir. 1988) (“[t]here is as much obligation upon a judge not to recuse himself when there is 

no occasion as there is for him to do so when there is[,]”); In re Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 839 

F.2d 1226, 1229 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.) (“Judges have an obligation to litigants and 

their colleagues not to remove themselves needlessly . . . because a change of umpire in midcontest may require a great deal of work to be redone . . . and facilitate judge-shopping.”).

“A recusal motion is committed to the sound discretion of the district judge[.]” In re M. 

Ibrahim Khan, P.S.C., 751 F.2d 162, 165 (6th Cir. 1984) 12“The reasons for this are plain. The 

judge presiding over a case is in the best position to appreciate the implications of those matters 

alleged in a recusal motion.” In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc., 861 F.2d 1307, 1312 (2d Cir. 

1988). The judge whose partiality has been called into question “is presumed to be impartial, 

and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise.” Scott 

v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007).

Further, a judge considering whether to recuse himself “must carefully weigh the policy 

of promoting public confidence in the judiciary against the possibility that those questioning his

impartiality might be seeking to avoid the adverse consequences of his presiding over their case.

Litigants are entitled to an unbiased judge; not to a judge of their choosing.” In re Drexel, 861 

F.2d at 1312; In re Allied-Signal Inc., 891 F.2d 967, 970 (1st Cir. 1989) (“the disqualification 

decision must reflect not only the need to secure public confidence through proceedings that 

appear impartial, but also the need to prevent parties from too easily obtaining the 

disqualification of a judge, thereby potentially manipulating the system for strategic reasons[.]”).

 

12 The denial of a motion to recuse is reviewed on appeal for an abuse of discretion. See In re Nat'l Prescription 

Opiate Litig., No. 19-3935, 2019 WL 7482137, at *1 (6th Cir. Oct. 10, 2019). Under this standard, the Sixth Circuit 

“must uphold the district court’s recusal decision unless [it has] a definite and firm conviction that the trial court 

committed a clear error of judgment.” Id. 

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Accordingly, “the grounds asserted in a recusal motion must be scrutinized with care, and judges 

should not recuse themselves solely because a party claims an appearance of partiality.” In re 

Aguinda, 241 F.3d 194, 201 (2d Cir. 2001). Thus, the Honorable Presiding Judge is obligated to 

preside over this action unless recusal is required. As discussed below, no such grounds exist. 

III. SHARP LAW FAILS TO IDENTIFY A BASIS FOR RECUSAL.

Recusal is governed by the Code of Conduct for United States Judges (the “Code”) and 

disqualification is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455, but the terms are used interchangeably. “The 

statutory obligation of a federal judge to recuse found in 28 U.S.C. § 455 is almost word-forword identical, with merely editorial differences, to Canon 3C of the Code of Conduct for United 

States Judges.” Ragozzine v. Youngstown State Univ., 783 F.3d 1077, 1080 (6th Cir. 2015). 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) and Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code, a federal judge must not

recuse himself unless “his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” In addition, a judge 

must not recuse himself under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) and Canon 3(C)(1) of the Code unless the 

judge “knows that [he] . . .or [his] spouse . . . has a financial interest in the subject matter in 

controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest that could be substantially 

affected by the outcome of the proceeding.” 

A. Sharp Law Waived Any Objections To The Honorable Presiding Judge’s 

Service As An Adjunct Professor At Ohio State Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a).

Sharp Law waived any objection to the Honorable Presiding Judge’s service as an 

adjunct professor at Ohio State under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) because Sharp Law failed to promptly 

seek recusal in January 2019 (or at any time since then) when the Honorable Presiding Judge 

disclosed this relationship at the January 17, 2019 status conference. 

If Sharp Law thought recusal were necessary, it was required to raise the issue sooner—

much sooner. By waiting so long—two years and nearly eight months after the January 17, 2019 

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status conference—and by actively participating in the litigation and the successful settlement 

efforts, Sharp Law waived its right to seek disqualification under § 455(a) for the Honorable 

Presiding Judge’s service as an adjunct professor at Ohio State.

A party waives its right to seek disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) by failing to 

timely raise the issue after having knowledge of the pertinent facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e) 

(“Where the ground for disqualification arises only under subsection (a), waiver may be accepted 

provided it is preceded by a full disclosure on the record of the basis for disqualification.”). This 

is the rule throughout the federal judiciary, including the Sixth Circuit. See Goward v. U.S., 569 

F. App’x 408, 410-411 (6th Cir. 2014) (disqualification under § 455(a) was waived because the 

party seeking disqualification failed to timely raise the issue after the evidence became a matter 

of public record.).

13

The Southern District of Ohio has addressed waiver in the specific context of judges’ 

service as adjunct professors at Ohio law schools. See Meng Huang v. Ohio State Univ., No. 

2:19-CV-1976, 2020 WL 8461547, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2020), aff’d, 2020 WL 8461560 

(S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2020); Valente v. Univ. of Dayton, No. 3:08-CV-225, 2008 WL 11352577, at 

*6 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 26, 2008). In Meng Huang and Valente, this Court held that plaintiffs 

waived their right to seek the recusal of judges under Section 455(a) where the plaintiffs were 

aware of teaching activities at the defendant law schools but delayed in seeking recusal. Id.

The requirement that disqualification be timely sought is aimed at the very improper act 

 

13 See also Wright & Miller, Waiver of Disqualification, 13D Fed. Prac. & Proc. Juris. § 3552 (3d ed.) (citing 

Goward as exemplifying the waiver rule); In re Triple S Restaurants, Inc., 131 F. App’x 486, 487 (6th Cir. 2005) 

(“[T]he defendants’ motion to recuse was untimely and was therefore properly denied.”); McKibben v. Hamilton 

Cty., 215 F.3d 1327, at *6 (6th Cir. 2000) (finding recusal motion untimely where the party’s “attorney knew of the 

basis for the recusal motion for almost 11 months” but “nevertheless proceeded with the case, filed an amended 

complaint, and waited until the defendants filed their summary judgment motion before moving for recusal”); In re 

City of Detroit, 828 F.2d 1160, 1167 (6th Cir. 1987) (“Both § 144 and § 455 require that disqualification motions be 

timely[.]”); Scott v. Rubio, 516 F. App’x 718, 723 (10th Cir. 2013) (holding that plaintiffs “did not timely seek 

recusal” where “[m]uch of the conduct of which they have complained throughout these proceedings occurred more 

than five months before they sought recusal.”).

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Sharp Law’s motion commits. As the Second Circuit has explained:

It is important to present recusal applications promptly for at least two reasons. First, a 

prompt application affords the district judge an opportunity to assess the merits of the 

application before taking any further steps that may be inappropriate for the judge to 

take. Second, a prompt application avoids the risk that a party is holding back a recusal 

application as a fall-back position in the event of adverse rulings on pending matters.

United States v. Burke, 756 F. App’x 93, 94 (2d Cir. 2019).

14

The “purpose of the recusal statute is not to enable an unhappy litigant to judge-shop

until he finds a judge” who “rules in his favor.” Twist v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 344 F. Supp. 2d 

137, 142 (D.D.C. 2004), aff’d, 171 F. App’x 855 (D.C. Cir. 2005). This Court’s decisions in 

Meng Huang and Valente are directly on point. Sharp Law waived its right to seek recusal based 

on the Honorable Presiding Judge’s service as an adjunct professor at Ohio State’s law school by 

failing to timely raise the issue after having full knowledge of that fact. 

B. Sharp Law Provides No Objective Basis To Question The Honorable 

Presiding Judge’s Impartiality Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) And Canon 3(C)(1).

Sharp Law’s motion also fails on its substantive merits. The motion does not argue that 

the Honorable Presiding Judge actually harbors bias or prejudice. Nor could it, as there is no 

evidence to support such an allegation. Judge Watson has bent over backwards to be fair and 

respectful to plaintiffs and their counsel. Sharp Law instead relies on a supposed “appearance of 

impropriety.” Garrett, Motion (Doc. 193) at 15.

Disqualification under § 455(a), however, is “not based on the subjective view of a 

party.” Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 615-16 (6th Cir. 2016). Rather, it “imposes an objective 

standard: a judge must disqualify himself where a reasonable person with knowledge of all the 

 

14 See also In re Kensington Intern. Ltd., 368 F.3d 289, 294 (3d Cir. 2004) (noting that the “evil that a timeliness 

requirement is intended to prevent” is “holding in reserve a recusal demand until such time that a party perceives a 

strategic advantage.”); Bosley v. 21 WFMJ Television, Inc., 245 F. App’x 445, 455 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Timeliness is a 

factor that obviously merits consideration by a court that is trying to determine whether a judge is truly biased or a 

litigant is merely trying to avoid an . . . adverse decision.”); United States v. York, 888 F.2d 1050, 1055 (5th Cir. 

1989) (“A timeliness requirement forces the parties to raise the disqualification issue at a reasonable time in the 

litigation. It prohibits knowing concealment of an ethical issue for strategic purposes.”).

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facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” Id. at 616. 

The burden is on the moving party to justify disqualification. Id. Indeed, “a judge is presumed to 

be impartial, and the party seeking disqualification bears the substantial burden of proving 

otherwise....The burden is not on the judge to prove that he is impartial.” Scott v. Metro. Health 

Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 352 (6th Cir. 2007). Sharp Law’s motion fails to meet this burden.

1. The Honorable Presiding Judge’s Rulings Demonstrated Impartiality And Often 

Benefitted Plaintiffs. 

Rather than being biased or prejudiced against Sharp Law and its clients, the Honorable 

Presiding Judge has entered rulings that have not only demonstrated impartiality, but often 

benefitted plaintiffs, as set out below:

a. The Honorable Presiding Judge made statements supportive of the plaintiffs.

i. See Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Hearing Transcript (Doc. 52) at 4:23-24, 5:13-16

(“[T]he Court intends to see that the right thing is done here.”).

ii. See Garrett, Sept. 9, 2021 Hearing Transcript (Doc. 191) at 9:1-3 (“The

plaintiffs in this case have unquestionably been abused and taken advantage of 

by Dr. Strauss.”)

b. Without objection from Sharp Law, the Honorable Presiding Judge delayed 

ruling on Ohio State’s motions to dismiss and ordered the cases to mediation,

which was successful in allowing 185 plaintiffs to achieve settlements totaling 

$46.7 million despite their time-barred claims.

i. See Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Hearing Transcript (Doc. 52) at 4:4-5 (stating, 

without objection from Sharp Law, “[t]he Court does not intend to rule 

anytime soon on [Ohio State’s] motions to stay discovery or the motions to 

dismiss.”).

ii. See Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Hearing Transcript (Doc. 52) at 4:4-5 (stating 

“[t]he Court intends that we will mediate these cases,” without objection from 

Sharp Law).

iii. See Garrett, Jan. 17, 2019 Order (Doc. 50) (stating, without objection from 

Sharp Law, that Ohio State’s motions to dismiss would be “held in abeyance 

pending mediation”).

iv. See Garrett, Mar. 15, 2019 Order (Doc. 69) (referring the cases to Senior 

United States District Judge Michael R. Barrett for mediation, without 

objection from Sharp Law).

v. See Garrett, May 24, 2019 Order (Doc. 90) (“encourag[ing] the parties to 

focus their efforts on mediation,” without objection from Sharp Law). 

vi. See Garrett, Aug. 23, 2019 Order (Doc. 108) (terminating Ohio State’s 

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motions to dismiss “as moot . . . in order to facilitate settlement,” without 

objection from Sharp Law; directing Ohio State to “ask the Court to reactive 

the motions to dismiss, if necessary, at the conclusion of mediation,” without 

objection from Sharp Law).

vii. See Garrett, May 13, 2021 Hearing Transcript (Doc. 179) at 3:17, 24-25, 4:10 

(stating the Strauss Individual Settlement Program was “a good thing”; “it’s 

been my goal from the outset to try to resolve as many of these claims as 

possible through settlement”; and “I encourage settlement early and often, 

folks,” without objection from Sharp Law). 

c. The Honorable Presiding Judge allowed certain discovery requested by 

plaintiffs to facilitate plaintiffs’ settlement negotiations.

i. See Garrett, May 24, 2019 Order (Doc. 90) (permitting discovery that 

facilitated the mediation).

ii. See Garrett, Aug. 23, 2019 Order (Doc. 108) (granting plaintiffs’ motion to 

subpoena and depose certain witnesses).

iii. See Garrett, May 24, 2019, June 14, 2019, and Dec. 20, 2019 Orders (Docs. 

90, 94, 132) (ordering Ohio State to provide plaintiffs’ counsel with the 

unredacted version of the Perkins Coie Report containing confidential 

information sourced from State Medical Board files for use during the 

mediation).

d. The Honorable Presiding Judge granted, over Ohio State’s opposition,

various motions filed by plaintiffs.

i. See Garrett, Aug. 23, 2019 Order (Doc. 108) (granting, over Ohio State’s 

opposition, plaintiffs’ motion to subpoena and depose certain witnesses).

ii. See Garrett, Apr. 17, 2020 Order (Doc. 151) (ordering the non-settling parties 

to proceed simultaneously with litigation and continued mediation as a result 

of the non-settling plaintiffs’ request, stating, “[u]ntil recently, however, the 

Court had not received word from the mediator that the situation warranted 

parallel mediation and litigation efforts.”).

iii. See Garrett, May 20, 2020 Order (Doc. 156) (granting, over Ohio State’s 

opposition, plaintiffs’ motion to use non-cooperating witness deposition 

testimony obtained during the mediation for the litigation).

e. The Honorable Presiding Judge denied various motions filed by Ohio State.

i. See Garrett, May 16, 2019 Order (Doc. 89) (denying Ohio State’s motion for 

an order “permitting Ohio State to publicly release portions of an independent 

investigation report [the Perkins Coie Report] which discuss [confidential] 

information retrieved from files obtained from the State Medical Board of 

Ohio”).

ii. See Garrett, May 24, 2019 Order (Doc. 90) (denying Ohio State’s motions to 

stay discovery).

See Garrett, Aug. 23, 2019 Order (Doc. 108) (denying Ohio State’s request 

for a status conference).

iii. See Garrett, May 20, 2021 Order (Doc. 156) (denying Ohio State’s request for 

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a renewed stay of litigation).

f. The Honorable Presiding Judge assigned mediation- and discovery-related 

matters to other judicial officers. Sharp Law’s motion complains about 

mediation and discovery matters that were being handled by other judges, 

not by the Honorable Presiding Judge.

i. See Garrett, Aug. 23, 2019 Order (Doc. 108) at 2 (ordering the parties to 

mediate discovery disputes with the Court-appointed mediator, Senior United 

States District Judge Michael R. Barrett, and direct such disputes to the 

presiding magistrate judge, Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth Preston Deavers, 

if the parties could not reach agreement).

ii. See Garrett, Dec. 20, 2019 Order (Doc. 132) at 2 (“discourag[ing]” the filing 

of motions unnecessary to the furtherance of mediation unless and until Judge 

Barrett informs the Undersigned that mediation has reached impasse. This 

approach will conserve the resources of the parties and the Court.”).

iii. See Garrett, Mar. 17, 2020 Order (Doc. 143) (ordering that “[a]ny concerns 

Plaintiffs may have with mediation or the mediation process shall be raised 

with Judge Barrett.”).

Given that the Honorable Presiding Judge has acted wholly impartially throughout this litigation, 

Sharp Law’s position that there is an appearance of impropriety is baseless. For the reasons 

below, the Honorable Presiding Judge’s position as an adjunct professor at Ohio State’s law 

school and his wife’s unrelated, arms-length business dealings with Ohio State would not cause a 

reasonable person to question his impartiality. 

2. The Honorable Presiding Judge’s Service As An Adjunct Professor At Ohio

State Does Not Demonstrate An Appearance Of Bias Or Prejudice Against

Plaintiffs.

It should not be lost on the Court that Sharp Law’s motion fails to disclose the previously 

discussed Meng Huang and Valente decisions by the Southern District of Ohio. In addition to 

finding that plaintiffs waived their right to seek the recusal or disqualification of judges who held 

positions as adjunct professors at the defendant universities’ law schools, Meng Huang and 

Valente also held that such teaching activities would not cause a reasonable, objective person to 

question the judges’ impartiality. Meng Huang, 2020 WL 8461560, at *2-4; Valente, 2008 WL 

11352577, at *6. Specifically, the Meng Huang decision further held that:

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 No statutory or judicial authority required the judge to even disclose her position as 

an adjunct professor;

 Disqualification was not appropriate because the judge had “devoted significant time”

on the case and had acquired “valuable background experience concerning the 

parties’ multiple discovery disputes”; and 

 The Guide to Judiciary Policy provision cited in Sharp Law’s motion (see page 11 at 

n.16) for the principle that a judge “should” recuse himself from cases in which the 

law school where he teaches is a party “does not totally restrict the judge’s discretion 

in making a recusal determination,” but allows “the weighing of several factors” to 

determine whether recusal is required. Meng Huang, 2020 WL 8461560, at *2-4.

Consistent with Meng Huang and Valente, the Sixth Circuit held that a judge was not 

required to disqualify herself from a lawsuit brought by a psychology professor who sued his 

university for employment discrimination after he was denied tenure. Ragozzine v. Youngstown 

State Univ., 783 F.3d 1077 (6th Cir. 2015). The professor lost on summary judgment and 

thereafter sought to disqualify the judge based on a previously undisclosed dating relationship 

between the judge and another faculty member within the same college of the university that 

included the psychology department. Id. at 1079. The Sixth Circuit held that the judge was not 

required to disclose the dating relationship; found that “[a] relationship with a tenured member of 

a university faculty, without more, would not necessarily cause a reasonable person to question a

judge’s impartiality regarding all matters involving the university”; and concluded there was no 

evidence that the judge’s partner was involved with the professor’s tenure review or had any 

interest in the outcome of the litigation. Id.

Meng Huang, Valente, and Ragozzine are consistent with decisions by other courts 

outside the Sixth Circuit and Southern District of Ohio interpreting similar facts.

15

 

15 See, e.g., Chalenor v. Univ. of N. Dakota, 291 F.3d 1042, 1049-1050 (8th Cir. 2002) (in case involving male 

wrestlers suing their university for alleged Title IX violation arising from university’s elimination of the men’s 

wrestling program, holding judge who issued summary judgment in favor of university was not required to recuse 

where he “graduated from and is a [financial] contributor to the University”; finding plaintiffs’ position to be 

“wholly without merit” and stating, “[w]e reject it emphatically”); Lunde v. Helms, 29 F.3d 367, 370–71 (8th 

Cir.1994) (“We do not think that the district judge’s having graduated from the university law school, even though 

the university is a party defendant, without more, is a reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.... We 

do not think that making alumni contributions or participating in university educational programs, without more, is a 

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14

3. The Honorable Presiding Judge’s Spouse’s Unrelated, Arms-Length Business 

Dealings With OSU Does Not Demonstrate An Appearance Of Bias or Prejudice

Against Plaintiffs.

“As a general proposition, the fact that the spouse or the spouse’s business has a business 

relationship with an entity that appears in an unrelated proceeding before the judge usually does 

not require the judge’s recusal.” Guide to Judiciary Policy, Committee on Codes of Conduct 

Advisory Opinions § 220, No. 107. The Tenth Circuit has held that “financial contributions 

made by the district judge’s spouse to TU, her alma mater,” did not create an appearance of 

impropriety. Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable, Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228 

(10th Cir. 2020). The district judge’s spouse had purchased a life-insurance policy for $16,000. 

Id. at 1240. “Under the policy, TU would receive $100,000 upon her death to endow a 

scholarship for student athletes in her name.” Id. The Tenth Circuit found that the district judge 

properly rejected the motion for recusal for three reasons: 

(1) The judge or a family member did not have “a financial interest in the litigation. 

The contribution was not an investment. The contribution could imply bias only by 

showing enthusiasm for TU.” Id.

(2) The spouse’s contribution was “not specifically tied to activity related to the 

litigation. The contribution was for scholarships for student athletes.” Id. at 1241.

(3) “[P]erhaps most importantly, the contribution was distinctly made by the judge’s 

spouse, not the judge himself. The enthusiasm was that of the spouse and should not be 

attributed to the judge. In present-day society we do not treat a married couple as singleminded on public issues.” Id.

As in Barnett, Sharp Law does not claim that the Honorable Presiding Judge or his 

spouse have “a financial interest in the litigation” itself. Id. at 1240. In addition, the business 

dealings between Ohio State and the Honorable Presiding Judge’s spouse are “not specifically 

tied to activity related to the [Strauss] litigation.” Id. The Strauss cases concern sexual abuse. 

 

reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1155 (1995); 

Wu v. Thomas, 996 F.2d 271, 272, 275 (11th Cir. 1993) (in retaliation claim brought by professors against 

university, finding the judge’s “status as an [unsalaried] adjunct professor and his past contributions to the 

University” did not warrant recusal). 

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The Honorable Presiding Judge’s spouse sells flags. And, “[p]erhaps most importantly,” the 

business dealings are between the Honorable Presiding Judge’s spouse and Ohio State, not 

between the Honorable Presiding Judge himself and Ohio State. Id. (“In present-day society we 

do not treat a married couple as single-minded on public issues.”); see also Perry v. 

Schwarzenegger, 630 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011) (concluding that motion for recusal based on 

wife’s opinions as executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union of Southern 

California is “based upon an outmoded conception of the relationship between spouses. ... 

Because my wife is an independent woman, I cannot accept Proponents’ position that my 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned under § 455(a) because of her opinions or the views 

of the organization she heads.”).

Barnett cites numerous other opinions which confirm that Sharp Law’s motion lacks 

merit. See Willner v. Univ. of Kan., 848 F.2d 1023, 1026, 1028 (10th Cir. 1988) (refusing to 

disqualify judge from hearing a case involving a university despite the judge being a director of 

that university’s alumni association); Roe v. St. Louis Univ., 746 F.3d 874, 886 (8th Cir. 2014) 

(“Alumni connections are not a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality, even if 

alumni contribute financially or participate in educational activities.”); Lunde v. Helms, 29 F.3d 

367, 371 (8th Cir. 1994) (the court stated it did “not think that making alumni contributions or 

participating in university educational programs, without more, is a reasonable basis for 

questioning the judge’s impartiality.”). 

Contrary to its position, Sharp Law cites cases which either support that recusal is not 

appropriate here or are inapposite:

(1) In Hall v. City of Williamsburg, 768 F. App’x 366 (6th Cir. 2019) (cited on page 10 

of Sharp Law’s motion), the Sixth Circuit held that the district judge was not required to 

disclose the complained of relationships and “none of the three reasons cited by Hall 

show that the judge was required to recuse himself” based on the claimed appearance of 

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impropriety. Id. at 372.

(2) In Roberts v. Bailar, 625 F.2d 125 (6th Cir. 1980) (cited on pages 10-11 of Sharp 

Law’s motion), disqualification was required because the district judge “expressed his 

ardent sentiments about [the defendant’s] character” in an employment discrimination 

case by stating: “I know [the defendant], and he is an honorable man and I know he 

would never intentionally discriminate against anybody.” Id. at 127, 129-130. In contrast 

to Roberts, the Honorable Presiding Judge here expressed support for the plaintiffs who 

are now seeking to disqualify him: “The plaintiffs in this case have unquestionably been 

abused and taken advantage of by Dr. Strauss.” See Garrett, Sept. 9, 2021 Hearing 

Transcript (Doc. 191) at 9:1-3.

(3) This Court itself distinguished Crosby v. Univ. of Kentucky, 863 F.3d 545 (6th Cir. 

2017) and Erlinder v. William Mitchell College of Law, 0:14-CV-01477, ECF No. 3 (D. 

Minn. May 12, 2014) (cited on page 11, footnote 11 of Sharp Law’s motion), in which 

judges recused themselves, stating in Meng Huang that Crosby and Erlinder do not “even 

state a basis for recusal, let alone establish a rule that adjunct teaching at a law school 

requires recusal from all cases involving the law school’s university.” Meng Huang, *2.

C. The Honorable Presiding Judge And His Spouse Do Not Have a Financial 

Interest In Ohio State That Could Be Substantially Affected By The

Outcome Of These Proceedings Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) And Canon

3(C)(1)(c).

Sharp Law also seeks disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) and Canon 3(C)(1)(c) 

on the purported grounds that the Honorable Presiding Judge and his spouse have “a financial 

interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding, or any other interest 

that could be affected substantially by the outcome of the proceeding.” Sharp Law appears to 

base its argument that § 455(b)(4) requires recusal solely on the business dealings between the 

Honorable Presiding Judge’s wife’s flag business and Ohio State, and not on the Honorable 

Presiding Judge’s position as an adjunct professor at Ohio State. See Garrett, Motion (Doc. 193) 

at 13. “Financial interest” means, in relevant part, “ownership of a legal or equitable interest, 

however small, or a relationship as director, adviser, or other active participant in the affairs of a 

party[.]” 28 U.S.C. 455(d)(4); Canon 3(C)(3)(c). Courts have interpreted “financial interest,” 

however, to mean a direct interest, not a “remote, contingent, indirect or speculative interest[].” 

Scott v. Metro. Health Corp., 234 F. App’x 341, 357 (6th Cir. 2007).

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Sharp Law has not met its burden of establishing a financial interest requiring recusal for 

the same reasons discussed previously regarding why the business dealings between the 

Honorable Presiding Judge’s spouse and Ohio State, and his service as an adjunct professor at 

Ohio State, do not establish grounds to conclude that the Honorable Presiding Judge’s 

“impartiality might reasonably be questioned” under Section 455(a). In addition to those 

reasons, which are incorporated by reference herein, Ohio State notes the following:

In Sullivan v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 947 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1991), the plaintiff 

sought to have the judge disqualified, arguing that the judge had a “financial interest” in the case 

because of her attorney spouse’s “prior representation of [defendant] in other matters, her 

daughter’s representation of [defendant] on at least one occasion, and her prior affiliation with 

her husband’s [law] firm.” Id. The Sixth Circuit explained plaintiff’s burden of establishing a 

“financial interest” as follows:

“To meet the burden of showing financial interest, a movant must do more than allege 

that law firms are interested in as many clients as they can get, that [the judge’s 

husband’s firm] would like to keep the defendant as a client, and that if the defendant 

loses this lawsuit, it will take its legal business elsewhere.” Id. at *4 (citations omitted). 

As in Sullivan, Sharp Law’s motion merely asserts, in a conclusory manner, that the 

“financial interest” required for recusal exists here. It does not. There is no reasonable inference 

that Ohio State would take its “business elsewhere,” rather than continuing to do business with 

the Honorable Presiding Judge’s spouse’s flag store if Ohio State were to lose these lawsuits. Id. 

Additionally, the flag business was founded decades before this litigation began by the 

Honorable Presiding Judge’s spouse’s mother; was purchased by his spouse in 2017; is just one 

of 400 businesses around the nation licensed to sell Ohio State merchandise and one of Ohio 

State’s 34,000 vendors; and is required to pay a 12% royalty to Ohio State for each authorized 

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OSU-trademarked product that the business sells.

16

 There is no financial interest. 

Sharp Law cites Hall v. City of Williamsburg, 768 F. App’x 366 (6th Cir. 2019) for the 

principle that judges must “take recusal action without regard to any appearance of impropriety if 

there is such ‘financial interest’” as defined in § 455(b)(4). See Motion at 10. Hall does not 

assist Sharp Law’s position, however, because the Sixth Circuit in Hall affirmed the district 

court’s denial of the motion to recuse. Hall, 768 F. App’x 366 at 373. The Hall Court also 

found that the judge was not even required to disclose that his family members worked at 

the defendant law firm “because there is no ‘statutory or judicial authority requiring a 

judge’ to explain to counsel family connections that would not result in recusal.” Id. at 372 

(citing Ragozzine, 783 F.3d at 1080 (emphasis added). As in Hall, the Honorable Presiding 

Judge here was not required to disclose his wife’s flag store business. Recusal is unwarranted.

IV. A TRANSFER OF VENUE IS NOT WARRANTED.

In furtherance of its judge-shopping mission, Sharp Law’s motion next seeks transfer of 

these matters to Cincinnati pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1404(a)-(b). The motion, however, fails to 

satisfy any of the statutory requirements for transfer. Transfer is only permitted “[f]or the 

convenience of parties and witnesses”; “in the interest of justice”; or where “all parties have 

consented.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The sole ground for transfer argued in Sharp Law’s motion is 

that transfer is required “in the interest of justice, to preserve the integrity of the judiciary in the 

perspective of the public and the parties.” See Motion (Doc. 193) at 17. But, as previously 

discussed, there are no grounds for recusal or disqualification of the Honorable Presiding Judge, 

or for the wholesale recusal or disqualification of the entire Columbus federal bench. 

 

16 https://www.dispatch.com/story/news/2021/09/13/federal-judge-gives-plaintiffs-option-recuse-him-strausscases/8316905002/; https://www.dispatch.com/story/business/2021/01/12/flag-lady-store-passes-mother-daughterexpand-offerings/6638341002/

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In fact, Sharp Law has it backward. The “interest of justice” requires that these cases 

remain in Columbus. It should not be lost on the Court that Sharp Law’s attempt to dictate 

where these matters should be venued is wholly unsupportable because:

(1) Sharp Law admits it chose to file its lawsuits—in fact, the very first lawsuit in these 

matters (Garrett)—in the Eastern Division at Columbus. Sharp Law made a conscious 

decision to select Columbus as the venue for its cases. Sharp Law also knew when it filed 

suit that Ohio State’s main campus is in Columbus and that Columbus judges and potential 

jury members may have connections to Ohio State—the largest land grant university in the 

world. Now, apparently second-guessing the decision to file suit in Columbus, it is not proper 

for Sharp Law to seek a change of venue by wrongly attacking the impartiality of every judge 

and potential jurors in the Eastern Division. 

(2) The Court need look no further than Sharp Law’s assertion that Columbus judge, The 

Honorable Sarah D. Morrison, cannot hear the case solely because she earned her 

undergraduate degree from Ohio State. See Motion (Doc. 193) at ¶ 33. This is not only 

without merit, but underscores the true forum shopping strategy at issue here.

(3) Sharp Law’s forum-shopping motion goes on to broadly target all other Columbus judges

(with the exception of The Honorable James L. Graham). Sharp Law claims they all are 

unacceptable because of their purported “connections” to Ohio State. Id. at ¶ 30. This type 

of forum shopping strategy implicates the cautionary language of the Ohio Rules of 

Professional Conduct Preamble that directs lawyers to “avoid intemperate statements that 

tend to lessen public confidence in the legal system.”

V. RECUSAL OF THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE WOULD PREJUDICE 

OHIO STATE AND ALL OTHER PLAINTIFFS WHO DO NOT SEEK IT.

Sharp Law’s attempt to forum shop further delays the resolution of these matters, causing 

continued prejudice to Ohio State and all other plaintiffs who do not seek recusal. In the 

underlying litigation, plaintiffs assert Title IX claims arising from alleged abuse by former Ohio 

State employee Richard Strauss that occurred between 1978 and 1998—20 to 40 years before 

the filing of the first complaint. Strauss died in 2005. 

As thoroughly discussed in Ohio State’s pending motions to dismiss and related briefing, 

Title IX claims are subject to Ohio’s two-year personal injury statute of limitations. The 

Supreme Court has explained that a statute of limitations is “designed to promote justice by 

preventing surprises through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until 

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evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared. The theory is that 

even if one has a just claim it is unjust not to put the adversary on notice to defend within the 

period of limitation and that the right to be free of stale claims in time comes to prevail over the 

right to prosecute them.” Am. Pipe v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 554 (1974). 

The underlying litigation is a textbook example of the Supreme Court’s stated reasons for 

statutes of limitations. Strauss is dead. Plaintiffs’ medical records for the time period at issue no 

longer exist. Prior to plaintiffs filing suit, witnesses had died or had become incapacitated, and/or 

their memories had faded over the years. 

In addition to the length of time that has passed since the alleged abuse occurred, these 

matters also have been pending for more than three years—since July 16, 2018. See Garrett, 

Complaint (Doc. 1). While Ohio State has reconciled and settled with 185 plaintiffs who asked 

to do so in the mediation and many more through the Strauss Individual Settlement Program,

Ohio State has the clear legal right to be free of the stale claims of the non-settling plaintiffs and 

have its motions ruled on by a Judge familiar with the case. The additional prejudice caused by 

Sharp Law’s eleventh-hour motion is especially acute given the monumental amount of time and 

energy spent on this case over the past three years and two months, during which the parties, 

their counsel, the District Court mediator, and the Court itself have collectively devoted 

thousands of hours—all without any objection by Sharp Law. 

VI. CONCLUSION.

For the above reasons, the Court should not recuse itself and should deny the Sharp Law 

Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Motion for Recusal And To Transfer Venue Within The District Per 28 

U.S.C. § 1404(b). See Garrett, Motion (Doc. 193). 

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21

Respectfully submitted,

DAVID A. YOST

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF OHIO

By: /s/ Michael H. Carpenter

Michael H. Carpenter (0015733) (Trial Attorney)

Timothy R. Bricker (0061872)

David J. Barthel (0079307)

CARPENTER LIPPS AND LELAND LLP

280 Plaza, Suite 1300

280 North High Street

Columbus, OH 43215

Phone: (614) 365-4100

Fax: (614) 365-9145

E-mail:carpenter@carpenterlipps.com

bricker@carpenterlipps.com

barthel@carpenterlipps.com

Special Counsel for Defendant 

The Ohio State University

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I certify that a copy of the foregoing was filed electronically on September 19, 

2021. Notice was sent by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system to all other counsel 

who have entered an appearance and any parties who have entered an appearance through 

counsel. The parties may access this filing through the Court’s ECF system. 

/s/ Michael H. Carpenter

Trial Attorney for 

Defendant The Ohio State University

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