UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JANICE GRAVES,

Plaintiff,

v.

KEPHACO CORPORATION, 

et al., 

Defendants.

:

:

Case No. 2:18-cv-682

Judge Sarah D. Morrison

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. 

Jolson

OPINION AND ORDER

Currently pending before the Court is Defendants Kephaco Corporation and 

Robert Robart’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot. for Summ. J., ECF Nos. 14,

together with Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., ECF No. 14-1.) Plaintiff responded 

(Resp., ECF No. 17), and Defendants replied (Reply, ECF No. 18). Accordingly, this 

matter is ripe for review. For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Janice Graves is an African American woman who was employed by 

Defendant Kephaco Corporation d/b/a American Marble Industries (“AMI”) as an 

outside sales representative from July 25, 2016, until June 8, 2017. (Pl. Personnel 

File, ECF No. 17-3 at PAGEID # 368–69.) Ms. Graves commenced this action on 

July 12, 2018, alleging eight claims against both Defendants based on: 1) race 

discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. and Ohio Rev. Code 

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§ 4112.02(A), et seq.; 2) sex discrimination, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.

and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A), et seq.; 3) retaliation, in violation of Ohio Rev. 

Code § 4112.02(I); 4) wrongful termination on the basis of race and sex; and 

5) intentional infliction of emotional distress. (Compl., ECF No. 1.)

A. Defendants AMI and Robart

Defendant AMI is an Ohio corporation that manufactures and fabricates 

cultured marble, solid surfacing, and natural stone for the kitchen and bath 

industry. (Robart Dep. 17:2–14, ECF No. 17-2.) AMI was founded by John Stoffer 

(now the company’s CEO). (S. Stoffer Dep. 13:9, ECF No. 17-1; J. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 1, 

ECF No. 18-1.) John’s son, Steve Stoffer, serves as AMI’s President. (S. Stoffer Aff. 

¶ 1, ECF No. 14-2.) Defendant Robert Robart joined AMI in October 1999 as 

Director of Sales and Marketing. (Robart Dep. 26:11–19.) He now holds the title of 

Vice President, responsible for overseeing marketing and sales and for servicing a 

portion of AMI’s customer base. (Id. 26:10, 29:7–11.) At the time of filing, AMI had 

annual revenues of approximately $6,000,000. (Id. 87-3.)

AMI sells its products primarily through building and plumbing supply 

wholesale dealers. (Id. 33:2–9.) With limited exception, the company does not sell 

directly to contractors, builders, or homeowners. (Id.; Pl. Dep. 47:10–24, ECF No. 

13.) Instead, contractors and builders who are interested in using AMI products 

purchase them through a dealer. (Robart Dep. 33:10–13.) AMI sales representatives 

are paid a base salary, as opposed to commission, in part because the company does 

not sell directly to the end user. (Id. 64:11–23.) As a result, for an AMI sales 

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representative to generate “new” business, they could either (1) enlist a new 

wholesale dealer, or (2) facilitate sales to a new builder/contractor by working with 

and through a dealer already selling AMI wares. (Id. 34:9–35:24.)

B. AMI’s Hiring of Ms. Graves

Immediately prior to working for AMI, Ms. Graves was employed by OnHand Adhesives as a sales account manager. (Pl. Dep. 16:21–25; 39:24–25.) Ms. 

Graves became acquainted when she cold called AMI, and “sold them chemical mold 

release for their manufacturing plant.” (Id. 39:25–40:2.) During this sales call, she 

spoke with Steve Stoffer. (Id. 40:11–15.) Steve Stoffer similarly recalls that he first 

met Ms. Graves when “[s]he was working for On-Hand Adhesives,” and she sold 

AMI a mold release product. (S. Stoffer Dep. 21:4–7.)

Steve Stoffer submits that Ms. Graves first approached him about working 

for AMI approximately six months after their initial meeting. (Id. 21:7–10.) He

states that Ms. Graves contacted him about working for AMI because she was tired 

of the amount of travelling that she was required to do for On-Hand Adhesives and 

she wanted to work more locally. (Id. 21:10–14.) Steve Stoffer testified that Ms. 

Graves told him that she could substantially boost AMI’s Columbus area sales:

Q So there was some testimony about a $500,000 in new business 

goal. Tell me about that. Did she set that for herself?

A Yes. She set that for herself. She told me she worked for a 

pharmaceutical down in Georgia and she doubled her sales to 500,000 

and she could do that for me. And she was very good – she sold herself 

very well, had me convinced, you know.

Q Did she have a plan of how she was going to bring in these new 

sales?

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A She said she had some contractors she knew and she had a good 

relationship with them and she thought she could get them. . . . She 

didn’t say any specific names but we definitely need a person down there 

to help Andy with our existing. So that’s– it seemed like a great fit. . . .

(S. Stoffer Dep. 22:1–18.) Robart testified that Ms. Graves assured Steve Stoffer 

that she would bring in $500,000 in “completely new sales” in three months. (Robart 

Dep. 31:15–32:13.) Steve Stoffer and Robart both acknowledge, however, that Ms. 

Graves’ alleged $500,000 sales goal was neither in writing nor a condition of her 

employment. (S. Stoffer Dep. 22:25–23:5; Robart Dep. 119:10–13.)

Ms. Graves recalls her initial interactions with AMI differently. Ms. Graves

maintains that she did not approach Steve Stoffer about working for AMI but that it 

was a “joint communication” between them. (Pl. Dep. 42:10–21.) Ms. Graves also 

disputes that she promised to generate a certain amount of revenue:

Q. And at some point during these discussions did you tell either 

Steve or John [Stoffer] that you could increase – that you could generate 

$500,000 worth of sales in six months?

A. No, I did not.

Q. You never say [sic] that.

A. No, I did not.

Q. Did you say anything close to that? 

A. I would never say that. As a 20-year sales professional I would 

never tell anyone what I could do before I knew exactly what the 

application could do and the marketplace.

* * *

Q. My question is very simple, Miss Graves: Did you ever tell Steve 

or John [Stoffer] or anybody from AMI prior to being hired that you could 

generate X amount of dollars of new business? 

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A. No, sir. No. 

(Id. 44:19–45:5, 46:2–6.)

Ms. Graves’ initial discussions about joining AMI were solely with Steve 

Stoffer, though she eventually met with both John and Steve Stoffer for a formal 

interview. (Id. 43:11–19.) Steve Stoffer hired Ms. Graves as the AMI sales 

representative for the Columbus area. (S. Stoffer Dep. 23:16–18.)

Ms. Graves began her job at AMI on July 25, 2016, at an annual salary of 

$55,000. (Pl. Personnel File.) Ms. Graves was also given a car allowance of $350 per 

month (plus fuel), a laptop and health benefits.1 (Id.; S. Stoffer Dep. 15:11–12; 

Robart Dep. 70:16–22.) Ms. Graves was the first and only African American sales 

representative to be hired by AMI. (S. Stoffer Dep. 17:10–12.)

C. Ms. Graves’ Job Responsibilities and Training

An AMI sales representative is expected to “maintain the accounts that you 

have. That’s case number one. Because if you lose your accounts, you’re not doing 

anything. So maintain the accounts you have and then grow ones as you can, grow 

new accounts.” (Robart Dep. 41:10–14.)

Before Ms. Graves joined AMI, there was no sales representative who 

exclusively served the Columbus market. (See Jackson Aff. ¶¶ 5–6, ECF No. 14-3.)

Rather, Andrew Jackson served that market and the rest of Ohio. (Id.) Jackson is a 

1 The Court notes an inconsistency between the parties’ motion papers and the record evidence 

with respect to the amount of the monthly car allowance. (Compare Reply at 2 ($550 monthly car 

allowance) with Robart Dep. 70:16–22 ($350 monthly car allowance, based on review of Exh. C at ECF 

No. 17-3, PAGEID # 371).) The Court further notes that the parties provide no information about the 

cost—to AMI or to Ms. Graves—of the group health insurance benefit. 

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white male employed by AMI for over ten years. (Id. at ¶ 3.)

Robart and Steve Stoffer were Ms. Graves’ supervisors at AMI. (Pl. Personnel 

File.) Because he had been the sales representative for central Ohio, Jackson was 

asked to train Ms. Graves. (Jackson Aff. ¶¶ 4–5.) Jackson “spent quite a bit of time 

with Ms. Graves attempting to prepare her for the position” and he “spent a 

minimum of [twelve] sales presentations with [AMI’s] existing customer base.” (Id.

¶ 6.) Further, “[a]side from field training, [Jackson] spent time in our home office 

training her at the beginning of her employment” and he spoke with her “at least 

three times a week on the phone throughout her employment.” (Id.¶ 7.)

D. Ms. Graves’ Sales at AMI

Robart, Jackson, and Steve Stoffer submit that Ms. Graves struggled after 

the introductory period. Jackson stated that Ms. Graves “was unable to grasp the 

basic knowledge required to sell [AMI’s] products” and “was unable to understand 

the basic concepts of the product line of AMI and what it took to price out a quote.” 

(Id. ¶¶ 8, 10.) These are concepts that Jackson “learned within a month or two of 

[his] hire at AMI.” (Id. ¶ 11.) Yet, after working for AMI for eleven months, Ms. 

Graves “would ask [Jackson] basic questions and continue to ask the same 

questions [that he] had previously answered for her.” (Id. ¶ 12.) Eventually, Jackson 

approached Robart and Steve Stoffer with concerns about Ms. Graves’ “sales style,” 

because “[s]he did most of the talking and did not listen to what the potential 

customers were saying.” (Id. ¶ 13.) In one instance, Jackson had to “take over” Ms. 

Graves’ presentation because she was unable to answer the customers’ questions. 

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(Id. ¶ 14; see also S. Stoffer Dep. 26:10–17.) Another issue was Ms. Graves’

penchant to give potential customers verbal quotes when AMI’s practice—and the 

industry standard—was “to do written quotes so there was no misunderstanding.” 

(Jackson Aff. ¶ 15.)

Robart testified about conversations he and Jackson had following Ms.

Graves’ training: 

After the first couple trainings [Jackson] came to me and said she’s not 

getting it. She’s not – the couple times she got up and actually started 

to speak, he had to stop her because she wasn’t explaining our product 

correctly, the process correctly, and I told him we’ll give it a few more 

times. 

. . . [A]fter the seventh time – the seventh meeting, sales – whatever you 

want to call it, sales meeting, she was supposed to do it on her own, 

completely on her own. And he called me after it was over – because I 

told him to, and he said it was not good. He said he had to get up about 

10 minutes in and take it over. 

(Robart Dep. 43:11–25.) When asked to specify what problems Ms. Graves was 

having, Robart answered that, even after several months of working at AMI and 

touring the company’s factory multiple times, Ms. Graves did not know AMI’s 

product and “she didn’t learn.” (Id. 44:3–19.)

Robart also testified that he gave Ms. Graves written materials to assist her 

with learning about the products she was selling. (Id. 44:20–24.) After Ms. Graves

had been at AMI for five or six months, Robart asked her to explain cultured 

marble; Ms. Graves was unable to do so, leading Robart to determine that “if you’re 

not going to bother to learn it, then I can’t have you continue to sell it.” (Id. 45:22–

46:5.)

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Steve Stoffer testified that he, too, had issues with Ms. Graves and that “she 

did not perform up to [AMI’s] expectations.” (S. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 8.) “[S]he had difficulty

grasping [AMI’s] product line and writing up quotes.” (Id. ¶ 9.) In addition, both 

Robart and Jackson informed Steve Stoffer that some of Ms. Graves’ customers 

were asking to work with Jackson instead. (S. Stoffer Dep. 10:2–5, 9–11.) “After 

several months of no increased sales in the Columbus market[,]” he scheduled a 

meeting with Ms. Graves “to discuss her difficulties.” (S. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 10.)

Ms. Graves, however, asserts that she maintained the Columbus accounts

and acquired new customers. In support of this assertion, Ms. Graves relies on 

AMI’s Columbus area sales records for 2014 through June 2017:

(AMI Sales Rec. 2014–June 2017, ECF No. 13-1, PAGEID # 111.) The sales record 

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reflects that Ms. Graves brought in two new accounts: Bathworks and 

Lumberworks. (Id.) During Ms. Graves’ employment, Bathworks generated $0 in 

sales and Lumberworks generated $1,186.67. (Id.) The Columbus area sales 

increased by $33,619.54 from 2015 to 2016, and appear to have been on track to 

increase more in 2017. (Id.)

Ms. Graves contacted potential customers in an attempt to bring in new 

business. Specifically, Ms. Graves met with the homebuilder Fischer Homes. (Pl. 

Dep. 49:4–50:1.) However, AMI leadership—including Susan Kolleth (AMI’s 

Corporate Secretary and Office Manager), Steve Stoffer, and Robart—were not 

enthusiastic about this potential client. (Id.) Other potential clients that Ms. Graves

spoke with included Floor & Décor, Blazek Hutchinson Builders, Choice Hotels, 

Woda Cooper Companies, and The Ohio State University. (Apr. 14, 2017 Floor & 

Décor Email, ECF No. 17-3, PAGEID # 375; Apr. 18, 2017 Floor & Décor Email, 

ECF No. 17-3, PAGEID # 376; June 5, 2017 Worly Email, ECF No. 17-3, PAGEID # 

386; Pl Dep. 96:13–19.)

Ms. Graves also represents that she had good relationships with her existing 

customers. In support of this, Ms. Graves points to customer emails that praise her:

1) An email dated February 1, 2017, from Carr Supply: “We look 

forward in having you here with your sales experience and 

professionalism. We couldn’t see you not being part of our team and 

as a partner in the coming years.” (Feb. 1, 2017 Carr Email, ECF 

No. 17-3, PAGEID # 373.)

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2) An email dated March 22, 2017, from Carr Supply: “Janice has been 

a great addition to AMI. She is very attentive, has great follow up 

skills and brings a sense of fashion to the cultured marble 

industry!!” (Mar. 22, 2017 Carr Email, ECF No. 17-3, PAGEID # 

381.)

3) An email dated March 24, 2017, from Worly Plumbing Supply: “We

at Worly would like to commend you [Ms. Graves] for all the hard 

work and efforts you’ve provide [sic] with our sales and marketing 

department. We Could Not Have Sustained with A.M.I. without 

your leadership and your commitment in achieving our sales goals!”

(Mar. 24, 2017 Worly Email, ECF No. 17-3, PAGEID # 383.)

Ms. Graves submits that her proficiency is evidenced by a lack of any written 

performance improvement plan or written negative performance reviews. (S. Stoffer 

Dep. 27:7–9; Robart Dep. 45:11–13, 49:21–23.)

E. Ms. Graves’ Problems with Robart

Soon after she started with AMI, Ms. Graves began to have problems with

Robart. Ms. Graves admits that she needed additional training on the new Tyvarian 

product and that she frequently called both Steve Stoffer and Robart with 

questions. (Pl. Dep. 64:22–65:7; S. Stoffer Dep. 42:11–43:11; Robart Dep. 100:2–9.)

However, Steve Stoffer and Robart often redirected her questions to Jackson or 

ignored her phone calls. (S. Stoffer Dep. 43:6–11; Robart Dep. 100:6–9.)

Ms. Graves asserts that Robart’s behavior amounted to more than mere 

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avoidance of her calls and submits the following to support this assertion:

1) Robart often ignored her, failed to speak to her, avoided making eye 

contact with her, rolled his eyes at her, and sometimes refused to 

shake her hand. (Pl. Dep. 71:16–72:19.)

2) Ms. Graves overheard Robart telling someone that “Steve Stoffer 

and [her] had a relationship or/and Steve Stoffer liked [her] and 

there was a personal relationship involved.” (Id. 71:4–8.)

3) During a tour of the AMI facility with a potential client in 

December 2016, the potential client told Ms. Graves: “Janice, I’m 

thinking it’s probably hard for a woman to work in this business, 

being the only woman.” Robart then leaned over and told Ms. 

Graves, “I don’t think it’s a woman thing, I think it’s more of a 

black woman thing.” Ms. Graves is unsure whether the potential 

client or anyone else heard this comment. (Id. 73:18–74:25.)

4) In April 2017, Ms. Graves and Robart led potential clients on a tour 

of the AMI facility. During this tour, Ms. Graves asked, “Can we do 

business based on what you’re seeing here and based on what we 

have to offer and based on your needs with the new upcoming 

hotel?” The potential clients answered affirmatively. After the 

potential clients left, Ms. Graves overheard Robart telling other 

AMI employees “She’s fucking crazy. She’s not getting that deal.” 

When she and Robart were walking out, Ms. Graves confronted 

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Robart and he told her “I’m just joking around” or “I’m just fucking 

around.” (Id. 77:9–79:1, 79:15–80:4.)

Ms. Graves submits that she reported Robart’s actions to Steve Stoffer and 

Kolleth—who acted as the ‘de facto’ human resources representative for AMI—

“countless” times. (Id. 76:2–14.) But when asked to specify one instance that she 

complained, Ms. Graves was unable to give a specific date. (Id. 76:16–21.)

Ms. Graves further avers that Robart’s treatment of her culminated in her 

termination. When asked if Robart engaged in any other behavior that Ms. Graves

believed to be discriminatory, she testified that Robart retaliated against her 

because of conversations she had with John and Steve Stoffer about problems with 

factory operations which led to issues generating Columbus area sales. (Id. 82:23–

83:8.) Ms. Graves was asked to explain how Robart retaliated against her, and she

testified “[b]y firing me” before clarifying that John Stoffer fired her “but it was 

along with, from my understanding, what [Robart] had told John.” (Id. 83:9–13.)

She believes this to be true because, when she asked John Stoffer to explain why 

she was being fired, he responded “I can’t. I can’t tell you for sure why, I just know 

we can’t sustain the market.” (Id. 84:7–14.)

F. Ms. Graves’ Evaluation Meetings and Termination

Ms. Graves met with Steve Stoffer, Robart, and Kolleth on March 20, 2017.

The parties describe what occurred at this meeting differently. Kolleth, in her 

contemporaneous notes, wrote that they “went over [Ms. Graves’] expenses [and] 

sales from start date to current date. [Ms. Graves] was given [two months] to 

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generate $25,000.00 in new sales or position would be terminated.” (Kolleth Notes.

ECF No. 13-1, PAGEID # 113.) In her affidavit, Kolleth swore that Ms. Graves “was 

informed very clearly on March 20 that if she did not improve her sales numbers, 

her employment would be terminated.” (Kolleth Aff. ¶ 10, ECF No. 14-4.)

Steve Stoffer similarly describes this meeting and testified that Robart “gave 

her a number that she had to hit. I don’t recall the number, I think it was [$]25,000 

to start with, to see if you can get that. Didn’t happen.” (S. Stoffer Dep. 30:12–15.)

Steve Stoffer gave conflicting accounts as to whether Ms. Graves would be 

terminated if she failed to meet her sales goal. In his affidavit, he stated that he 

told Ms. Graves “that she needed to call on potential new customers and have 

$25,000 of sales within the next two months or she would be terminated.” (S. Stoffer

Aff. ¶ 11.) Yet, during his deposition, Steve Stoffer did not recall whether he said

that Ms. Graves would be let go if she failed to meet this goal. (S. Stoffer Dep.

30:16–23.) Regardless, Ms. Graves never hit this target. (Id. 30:24–31:1.)

Robart similarly recalls that, during the March 20 meeting, Ms. Graves was 

informed that her sales performance was not up to the expected standard. (Robart 

Dep. 110:7–17.) He says that Ms. Graves was argumentative and that she told him 

that he “didn’t know what [he] was doing and not giving her space.” (Id. 110:22–23.) 

In response, Robart stated that AMI had given her samples and displays to assist 

her and that they “did everything [they] could to help her.” (Id. 110:25–111:7.) Ms. 

Graves was offered further assistance during this meeting and informed that she 

needed to attain either $25,000 in new sales or identify ten new targets to remain in 

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AMI’s employ. (See id. 112:7–12, 55:6–17.) Robart states that Ms. Graves was 

instructed to simply identify ten new targets—not to bring in ten new customers—

and Ms. Graves failed to do so. (Id. 55:19–25.) Rather, Ms. Graves gave Robart “a 

list that she Googled of 100 builders[,]” Robart told her that this was insufficient 

because she would need to “find out if a dealer is already dealing with [those 

companies].” (Id. 56:12–23.)

According to Ms. Graves, at no point during this meeting did they discuss her 

production or that she had not produced any new customer accounts. (Id. 91:20–

92:3.) Rather, she says that, during this meeting, Robart shouted at her that “[she] 

didn’t know what the fuck [she] was doing, didn’t know anything about 

manufacturing, [and] didn’t know anything about marble.” (Pl. Dep. 91:6–10.) Steve 

Stoffer watched Robart’s display in shock and said nothing. (Id. 91:12–17.) After 

Robart shouted at her, Ms. Graves “ended the meeting” and stated that John Stoffer 

needed to be present for the discussion to continue. (Id. 91:14–19.) Ms. Graves

denies that she was told that she had to meet a certain goal within two months or 

face termination. (Id. 86:11–17.)

Ms. Graves, Kolleth, Steve Stoffer, and Robart met again on March 28, 2017.2

The parties also recall this meeting differently. Ms. Graves testified as follows: 

Q. And were you told at [the March 28, 2017] meeting that you had 

to have ten new clients? 

A. No. What I was told at that meeting when I talked to [John] 

Stoffer was that we went over the problems that was in that particular 

2 There is conflicting information as to whether John Stoffer attended the March 28, 2017

meeting. (Compare S. Stoffer Dep. 13:2–5 with see also S. Stoffer Dep. 26:10–17; Robart Dep. 112: 22–

25.) 

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plant, we went over many emails with customers’ feedback on what was 

going on in the Columbus market and why they were not being able to 

not only retain customers but to also grow in their revenue. 

I showed them many emails and feedbacks from the customer, and in 

that meeting at that time Rob Robart stated to me that, “Okay, I’m sorry. 

I misjudged you.” And we ended that meeting saying that should be 

increased, sales, but I said, “What I need from you is for you to clean up 

the manufacturing plant.”

(Pl. Dep. 87:25–88:15.) When asked whether they discussed her job performance 

during this meeting, Ms. Graves testified that they discussed why AMI’s revenue 

was down in the Columbus market and she informed them that there were issues 

with the lead times, scheduling, installation, and the material itself. Ms. Graves 

described the conversation as “a game plan” where they “discussed the productivity 

more so than anything.” (Id. 92:7–14.) According to Ms. Graves, several plant 

managers attended the March 28, 2017 meeting and they discussed the problems 

with the plant. (Id. 88:16–23.)

According to Kolleth’s notes from the March 28, 2017 meeting, another 

meeting was to occur on June 5, 2017, when Ms. Graves was “to have [ten] new 

clients called upon.” (Kolleth Notes.)

At his deposition, Steve Stoffer recalled that the March 28 meeting was 

similar to the one on March 20. (S. Stoffer Dep. 39:14–18.) Following these 

meetings, Ms. Graves tried to meet with Steve Stoffer to show him emails that she 

had collected from current customers instead of increasing sales, so he “reiterated 

that she needed to increase her sales.” (S. Stoffer Aff.¶ 12.)

John and Steve Stoffer ultimately determined that Ms. Graves’ sales could 

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not sustain her salary and they terminated her employment. (Id. ¶ 13.) Robart was 

not involved in this decision. (Id. ¶ 14.) In his sworn affidavit, John Stoffer submits: 

2. I made the decision to terminate Janice Graves on June 7, 2017.

. . .

4. I terminated Graves as her sales did not support her salary and 

expenses to AMI.

. . .

6. Typically[,] AMI only has Rob Robart and one other outside sales 

person, currently Andrew Jackson. The addition of a second outside 

sales associate required additional sales to support the position which 

did not occur. 

(J. Stoffer Aff. ¶¶ 2–6.)

John Stoffer called and fired Ms. Graves on June 7, 2017. She received a 

letter dated June 8, 2017, confirming that her employment at AMI was terminated. 

(Termination Letter, ECF No. 17-3, PAGEID #390–91.) That letter informed her 

that she was “let go from [her] position for cost cutting measures.” (Id.) The letter 

further stated:

5. Andy [Jackson] and Rob [Robart] will be servicing the Columbus area 

as they did before you were hired. 

6. Just to set the record straight, we did have a review of your 

performance in the meeting[s] held on March 20, 2017 and March 28, 

2017.

7. Again, I [John Stoffer] want to apologize for not anticipating what the 

real cost of bringing on a third salesperson would be and for not 

providing, in some cases, the adequate back up.

(Id.) After Ms. Graves’ termination, her job duties were taken over by Jackson.

(Jackson Aff. ¶ 17.)

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G. Procedural Posture

Defendants have now moved for summary judgment on all claims. (Mot. for 

Summ. J.; Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J.) Ms. Graves opposes summary judgment on 

her first seven claims; she did not address Defendants’ arguments on her 

intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. (Resp.) Defendants filed a reply in 

support of their motion. (Reply.) This matter is fully briefed and ripe for review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court may therefore grant a motion for 

summary judgment if the nonmoving party, who has the burden of proof at trial, 

fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element that is 

essential to the party’s case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986).

The “party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility 

of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those 

portions” of the record which demonstrate “the absence of a genuine issue of 

material fact.” Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party who “must 

set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). “The 

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be 

drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255 (citing Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 

158–59 (1970)). A genuine issue of material fact exists “if the evidence is such that a 

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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson, 477 U.S. 

at 248; see also Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 

574, 587 (1986) (concluding that summary judgment is appropriate when the 

evidence could not lead the trier of fact to find for the non-moving party). 

Consequently, “[t]he central issue is ‘whether the evidence presents a sufficient 

disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one 

party must prevail as a matter of law.’” Hamad v. Woodcrest Condo. Ass’n, 328 F.3d 

224, 234–35 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251–52).

III. ANALYSIS

A. Discrimination Claims

Ms. Graves brings race and sex discrimination claims under both state and 

federal law. The United States Code section governing employment discrimination

states, in pertinent part:

It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer–

(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to 

discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, 

terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such 

individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. . . .

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(1). The relevant portion of Ohio’s employment discrimination 

statute states: 

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: 

(A) For any employer, because of the race, color, religion, sex, military 

status, national origin, disability, age, or ancestry of any person, to 

discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise discriminate 

against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or 

privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to 

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employment.

Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(A).

“[F]ederal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 

Section 2000e et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving 

alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.” Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint 

Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ohio 

1981); see also Noble v. Brink Int’l, Inc., 391 F.3d 715, 720 (6th Cir. 2004) (stating 

same). Accordingly, the Court will analyze Ms. Graves’ federal and state law claims 

of discrimination together. 

To establish claims of race or sex discrimination, a party can rely on either 

direct or circumstantial evidence. See Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 

F.3d 555, 561 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Kline v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 128 F.3d 337, 348 

(6th Cir. 1997)). Direct evidence is “evidence that proves the existence of a fact 

without requiring any inferences.” Rowan v. Lockheed Martin Energy Sys., Inc., 360 

F.3d 544, 548 (6th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Here, Ms. Graves has not proffered 

direct evidence of discrimination.

“Where a plaintiff submits only circumstantial evidence of discrimination, 

[the Court] analyze[s] the claim using the familiar McDonnell-Douglas-burdenshifting framework.” Romano v. Hudson City Sch. Dist., 772 F. App’x 258, 264–65 

(6th Cir. 2019) (citing Blizzard v. Marion Tech. Coll., 698 F.3d 275, 283 (6th Cir. 

2012) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973))). The plaintiff 

must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. McDonnell Douglas, 411 

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U.S. at 802. If she does so, the burden then shifts to the defendant to articulate a 

legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the defendant satisfies 

its burden, the plaintiff then has the obligation to prove that the proffered reason is 

pretextual. Id. at 804.

To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must establish 

that: (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) she was subjected to an adverse 

employment action; (3) she was qualified for the position; and (4) similarly situated 

non-protected employees were treated more favorably or that she was replaced with 

an individual outside of the protected class. Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., 

Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 776 (6th Cir. 2016). “The ultimate question in every employment 

discrimination case involving a claim of disparate treatment is whether the plaintiff 

was the victim of intentional discrimination.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 

Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000).

Defendants challenge whether Ms. Graves has sufficiently established the 

third and fourth elements of her prima facie case. However, the Court need not 

address these arguments because, even assuming arguendo that she can establish 

her prima facie case, Ms. Graves has failed to proffer evidence that Defendants’

stated reason for terminating her employment is pretext for discrimination.

Defendants3 submit that “AMI has set forth a valid business justification for 

its actions” in that Ms. Graves “failed to perform the duties required by her 

3 While Robart was Ms. Graves’ formal supervisor (see Pl. Personnel File), Robart did not make 

the decision to terminate Ms. Graves’ employment (see J. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 2; S. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 15; see also

Section III.A.2., infra). Nonetheless, the parties do not argue that a different standard or analysis is 

applicable to Ms. Graves’ claims against Robart as compared to AMI. As a result, the Court refers to 

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position; in short, she did not sell.” (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., 12.) Or, as John 

Stoffer put it, “[Ms. Graves’] sales did not support her salary and expenses to AMI.” 

(J. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 4.) Once Defendants proffer a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason 

for Ms. Grave’s termination, the burden shifts back to her to demonstrate that the

reason is mere pretext for discrimination. 

A plaintiff can establish the pretextual nature of an employer’s stated reason 

for an adverse employment action in three ways: “(1) the reason has no basis in fact, 

(2) the reasons did not actually motivate the [employment action], or (3) the reason 

was insufficient to motivate the [employment action].” Alberty v. Columbus Twp., 

730 F. App’x 353, 361 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. 

Co., 29 F.3d 1078, 1084 (6th Cir. 1994), overruled on other grounds by Gross v. FBL 

Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009)). “In challenging an employer’s action, an 

employee ‘must demonstrate that the employer’s reasons (each of them if the 

reasons independently caused the employer to take the action it did) are not true.’” 

Smith v. Chrysler Corp., 155 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 1998) (alterations omitted)

(quoting Kariotis v. Navistar Int’l Trans. Corp., 131 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 1997)). 

“A reason cannot be pretext for discrimination unless it is shown both that the 

reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Seeger v. Cincinnati 

Bell Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (alterations omitted) (quoting St. Mary’s 

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993)).

“Defendants” in toto when discussing the legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for Ms. Graves’ 

termination, although Robart was not the decisionmaker when it came to her termination. 

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Irrespective of the method a plaintiff uses to rebut a defendant’s reasons, the 

plaintiff “always bears the burden of producing sufficient evidence from which the 

jury could reasonably reject [the defendant’s] explanation and infer that the 

defendant [ ] intentionally discriminated against him.” Id. (quoting Clark v. 

Walgreen Co., 424 F. App’x 467, 474 (6th Cir. 2011) (alterations in original). When 

assessing the evidence provided by the parties, the Court is to be mindful that 

“[p]retext is a commonsense inquiry: did the employer fire the employee for the 

stated reason or not?” Parkhurst v. Am. Healthways Servs., LLC, 700 F. App’x 445, 

449 (6th Cir. 2017) (quoting Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394, 400 n.4 (6th Cir. 

2009)).

Ms. Graves argues that Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for 

firing her was pretext because: 1) it has no basis in fact; and 2) it was not the true 

motivation behind her termination. (Resp. at 15–17.) However, she fails to point the 

Court to record evidence that creates a genuine issue of material fact on either of 

these bases.

1. Defendants’ reason is based in fact

In Joostberns v. United Parcel Servs., Inc., the Sixth Circuit explained that 

an assertion that the defendant’s nondiscriminatory reason for termination is not 

based in fact “is essentially an attack on the credibility of the employer’s proffered 

reason.” 166 F. App’x 783, 791 (6th Cir. 2006) (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084). To 

demonstrate that a defendant’s reason is not based in fact, the plaintiff must show 

“that the employer did not actually have cause to take adverse action against the 

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employee based on its proffered reason, and thus, that the proffered reason is 

pretextual.” Id. (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084).

Ms. Graves argues that Defendants’ proffered reason for firing her (that Ms. 

Graves’ sales were insufficient to support the cost of the position created for her) 

was not based in fact because “the [Columbus area sales] increased from 

$163,240.59 in 2015 to $196,860.13 in 2016, while sales in 2017 (through June) 

were $142,149.05, well on-track to exceed the prior three years’ sales.” (Resp. at 15.)

This argument is incomplete and, therefore, unconvincing. It is foundational in 

business that profit equals revenues less expenses. And while Ms. Graves points to 

evidence indicating that AMI did experience increased revenues during her tenure, 

she ignores that the business also incurred expenses.

Conducting a very simple analysis: Ms. Graves’ total compensation from AMI 

included a $55,000 annual salary, $350 monthly car allowance, and group health 

insurance. AMI also covered Ms. Graves’ incidental expenses, such as travel 

accommodations and gas, and provided her with a laptop and sales aids, including 

samples and displays. Even assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Graves (who was hired 

nearly eight months into the year) is responsible for the entire $33,619 increase in 

year-over-year sales for 2016, her base salary and car allowance alone left little 

room for profit, totaling $26,184 for 2016.4 And while AMI’s 2017 Columbus area 

sales as of June appeared on-track to exceed the previous years, Ms. Graves does 

not provide evidence that the increase in revenues is in excess of the associated 

4 A $55,000 annual salary plus $350 monthly car allowance equals $1,138.46 per week. July 

25 began the thirtieth week of 2016, leaving 23 compensable weeks in the year. 

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increase in expenses—let alone that any excess is so substantial as to undermine 

the credibility of AMI’s stated reason for terminating her employment. It may be 

that, given more time, Ms. Graves would have further increased AMI’s Columbus 

area sales—but the law does not require AMI to wait. See Hartsel v. Keys, 87 F.3d 

795, 801 (6th Cir. 1996) (explaining that “[t]he law does not require employers to 

make perfect decisions, nor forbid them from making decisions that others may 

disagree with. Rather, employers may not hire, fire, or promote for impermissible, 

discriminatory reasons.”). In this case, the sales figures as of the time of Mr. Graves’

termination do not contradict Defendants’ assertion that Ms. Graves was 

terminated because her sales did not support her continued employment.

Furthermore, it is undisputed that after Ms. Graves was fired, her former 

duties were reabsorbed by Andrew Jackson, the same AMI sales representative who 

serviced the Columbus area prior to Ms. Graves’ hire. This fact further supports 

Defendants’ assertion that Ms. Graves’ position was eliminated because the sales 

would not support a salesperson dedicated solely to the Columbus market. 

Finally, while Ms. Graves argues that the Termination Letter did not 

explicitly say she was terminated for lack of sales or her performance (Resp. at 10), 

the letter did refer to cost cutting measures. John Stoffer’s communications with 

Ms. Graves with regard to her termination were entirely consistent: when he 

verbally terminated her, he said that “he couldn’t sustain the marketplace in the 

Columbus area.” Then, in the Termination Letter, he explained that she was being 

terminated “because of cost-cutting measures.” John Stoffer even apologized that 

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they had not anticipated “the real cost of bringing on a third salesperson.” A logical 

reading of the Termination Letter leads to one conclusion: the cost to AMI of 

employing a dedicated Columbus area sales representative was greater than any 

increase in sales attributable to that representative. This reading is confirmed by 

John Stoffer’s affidavit (J. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 4) and Steve Stoffer’s deposition testimony 

(S. Stoffer Dep. 25:14–16, 29:1–2) and affidavit (S. Stoffer Aff. ¶ 13). Thus, Ms. 

Graves has failed to create a genuine dispute that the stated reason for her 

termination was not the real reason.

2. Defendants’ reason actually motivated Ms. Graves’

termination

When arguing that a defendant’s reason did not truly motivate the decision, a 

plaintiff “does not attack the credibility of the employer’s reason. Rather, [she] 

admits that the reason could motivate the employer but argues that the illegal 

reason is more likely than the proffered reason to have motivated the employer.” 

Joostberns, 166 F. App’x at 791 (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1084) (internal citations 

omitted). This involves more than what is demanded to establish the prima facie

case of discrimination and requires additional evidence. Id. (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d 

at 1084). “A plaintiff must offer evidence sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to 

find that the employer was motivated by illegal reasons considering both the 

employer’s stated reasons and evidence the employer offers in support of such 

reasons.” Id. (citing Manzer, 29 F.3d at 1083).

Ms. Graves asserts the following facts demonstrate that Defendants’ actual 

reason for firing her was discriminatory:

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1) Ms. Graves was the first African American salesperson at AMI;

2) Robart ignored and did not speak to Ms. Graves, even though he 

was her supervisor;

3) Robart did not make eye contact with Ms. Graves, refused to shake 

her hand, and rolled his eyes at her;

4) Robart told others that Ms. Graves and Steve Stoffer had a 

“personal relationship” and that she was hired because of this 

personal relationship;

5) During a December 2016 facility tour with a potential customer, the 

potential customer commented: “Janice, I’m thinking it’s probably 

hard for a woman to work in this business being the only woman” to 

which Robart responded: “I don’t think it’s a woman thing, I think 

it’s more of a black woman thing”;

6) After an April 2017 facility tour with potential customers that 

orally agreed to do business with AMI, Ms. Graves overheard 

Robart tell other AMI employees “She’s fucking crazy”; and

7) During her March 20, 2017 meeting with Steve Stoffer and Robart, 

Robart screamed at Ms. Graves stating that “[she] didn’t know 

what the fuck [she] was doing, didn’t know anything about 

manufacturing, didn’t know anything about marble.”

(Resp. at 17.) Ms. Graves also leans on Robart’s testimony that he was involved in 

making the determination to terminate her employment:

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Q. Who was the one that said, “Okay, we’ve got to get rid of her”?

A. That would be a determination of Steve, I and John.

Q. And all three of you made that determination?

A. Yes. Based on the information we had, yes. 

(Resp. at 17; Robart Dep. 36:16–23.) Ms. Graves ultimately acknowledges, however,

that “John Stoffer . . . made the final decision to terminate her employment in June 

2017.” (Resp. at 18 (citation omitted); see also Pl. Dep. 83:11–13.)

Defendants counter that the evidence Ms. Graves has proffered is insufficient 

because there were only “two incidents over 11 months where Robart was ‘mean to 

her.’” (Reply at 4.) Defendants further argue that Robart’s actions, as described by 

Ms. Graves, do not demonstrate that Ms. Graves’ race or sex motivated the decision

to terminate her. (Id.)

The undisputed evidence is that John Stoffer made the final decision to 

terminate Ms. Graves’ employment. Ms. Graves provides neither facts nor analysis

indicating that Robart’s alleged discriminatory animus actually influenced John 

Stoffer’s decision to terminate her employment. Accordingly, Ms. Graves has failed 

to meet her burden to demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory 

reason for firing her was pretext for either race or sex discrimination. As such, 

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Graves’ state and federal sex 

and race discrimination claims is GRANTED.

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B. Retaliation Claim

Ms. Graves asserts her retaliation claim only under Ohio law, which 

provides:

It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:

* * *

For any person to discriminate in any manner against any other person 

because that person has opposed any unlawful discriminatory practice 

defined in this section or because that person made a charge, testified, 

assisted, or participated in any manner in any investigation, proceeding, 

or hearing under sections 4112.01 to 4112.07 of the Revised Code.

Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(I). Retaliation claims under Ohio law mirror their federal 

counterpart. See Braun v. Ultimate Jetcharters, LLC, 828 F.3d 501, 510 (6th Cir. 

2016) (citing Baker v. Buschman Co., 713 N.E.2d 487, 491 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998)); see 

also Plumbers & Steamfitters Joint Apprenticeship Comm. v. Ohio Civil Rights 

Comm’n, 421 N.E.2d 128, 131 (Ohio 1981). Thus, retaliation claims based on 

circumstantial evidence are also subject to the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting 

framework. Mansfield v. City of Murfreesboro, 706 F. App’x 231, 236 (6th Cir. 2017).

In other words, if a plaintiff establishes a prima facie retaliation case, the burden 

shifts to the defendants to provide a legitimate non-retaliatory reason for the 

adverse action taken against the plaintiff. The burden then shifts back to the 

plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendants’ legitimate non-retaliatory reason is 

mere pretext. Id. (quoting Evans v. Prof’l Transp., Inc., 614 F. App’x 297, 300 (6th 

Cir. 2015)). 

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The Court need not determine whether Ms. Graves established a prima facie 

case of retaliation because she has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ 

legitimate nonretaliatory reason for terminating her employment was pretext for 

retaliation. As discussed in detail above, Defendants fired Ms. Graves because her 

level of sales made it financially untenable for the company to sustain a dedicated 

salesperson for the Columbus market. Ms. Graves sets forth no new facts or 

arguments when asserting that Defendants’ reason for firing her was pretext for 

retaliation than those she relied on to assert that Defendants’ reason was pretext 

for discrimination. (Resp. at 20.) Because the Court has already found Ms. Graves’

arguments insufficient, further analysis is not required. Defendants’ Motion for 

Summary Judgment on Ms. Graves’ state law retaliation claim is GRANTED.

C. Wrongful Termination Claims

Generally, in Ohio, employees are at-will and can be fired for any nondiscriminatory reason. See Dohme v. Eurand Am., Inc., 956 N.E.2d 825, 828–29 

(Ohio 2011). However, there is a public policy exception to the at-will employment 

doctrine. Id. at 829. To establish a wrongful termination claim, a plaintiff must 

demonstrate: 1) that a clear public policy existed and was manifested in a state or 

federal constitution, statute or administrative regulation, or in the common law (the 

clarity element); 2) that dismissal under circumstances like those involved in the 

plaintiff’s dismissal would jeopardize the public policy (the jeopardy element); 

3) that the plaintiff’s dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy 

(the causation element); and 4) lack of an overriding legitimate business 

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justification for the dismissal (the overriding justification element). Collins v. 

Rizkana, 652 N.E.2d 653, 657–58 (Ohio 1995). The first two elements are questions 

of law, while the third and fourth elements are questions of fact. Id. at 658.

Defendants submit the same arguments on the insufficiency of Ms. Graves’ 

wrongful termination claims as they put forth on the inadequacy of her 

discrimination claims. (See Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J. at 13.) As discussed supra, 

Ms. Graves has failed to demonstrate that Defendants’ legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her employment was mere pretext for 

discrimination. As such, Ms. Graves has similarly failed to establish the fourth 

element of her wrongful termination claims.5 Therefore, the Court GRANTS

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Graves’ common law wrongful 

termination claims.

5 While Defendants failed to address it, Ms. Graves’ common law wrongful termination claims 

are likely superseded by both federal and state statutory sex and race discrimination causes of action. 

See Carrasco v. NOAMTC Inc., 124 F. App’x 297, 304 (6th Cir. 2004) (“Because Carrasco has a remedy 

available to him under both Title VII and the [Ohio Civil Rights Act], we find that he cannot have that 

same claim under Ohio common law.”); Schirmer v. Enerfab, Inc., No. 1:04-cv-345, 2006 WL 2612894, 

at *13–14 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 8, 2006) (finding that a plaintiff is barred from bringing a public policy 

claim for wrongful discharge where federal statutes provided adequate remedy); Barton v. Air Express 

Int’l USA, Inc., No. 1:06-cv-1885, 2007 WL 851882, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 19, 2007) (dismissing public 

policy claim where plaintiff had an adequate remedy under federal and state law, including Title VII 

and Ohio Rev. Code § 4112); Dillbeck v. Huntington Nat’l Bank, No. 2:03-cv-689, 2005 WL 1266690, at 

*7 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2005) (holding that “[t]he statutory remedies that existed under the ADA and 

O.R.C. § 4112 are adequate to protect society’s interest in discouraging employers from engaging in 

discrimination and further provide sufficient compensation to the victims of such discrimination”); 

Kolcun v. Nationwide Ins. Co., No. C2-04-cv-1079, 2006 WL 1447299, at *10 (S.D. Ohio May, 24, 2006) 

(same).

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D. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

Ms. Graves’ final claim is one for intentional infliction of emotional distress 

(“IIED”) under Ohio law. The four factors that plaintiff must demonstrate to 

establish an IIED claim are: 

(1) that the actor either intended to cause emotional distress or knew or 

should have known that actions taken would result in serious emotional 

distress to the plaintiff;

(2) that the actor’s conduct was so extreme and outrageous as to go 

beyond all possible bounds of decency and was such that it can be 

considered as utterly intolerable in a civilized community;

(3) that the actor’s actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s 

psychic injury; and 

(4) that the mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff is serious and of a 

nature that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.

Chisholm v. St. Marys City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 947 F.3d 342, 353 (6th Cir. 2020) 

(quoting Burkes v. Stidham, 668 N.E.2d 982, 989 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)).

Defendants assert that Ms. Graves failed to satisfy the second and fourth

elements, and no reasonable jury could find otherwise. (Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., 

16.) Ms. Graves failed to oppose Defendants’ argument. (See generally Resp.)

Looking to the unrebutted facts, Defendants are entitled to summary 

judgment. “Only conduct that is truly outrageous, intolerable, and beyond the 

bounds of decency is actionable; persons are expected to be hardened to a 

considerable degree of inconsiderate, annoying, and insulting behavior.” Stewart v. 

Suarez Corp. Indus., No. 5:15-cv-1425, 2015 WL 8272951, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 

2015) (quoting Petrarca v. Phar-Mor, Inc., No. 2000-T-0121, 2001 WL 1117015 (Ohio 

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Ct. App. Sept. 21, 2001)). Ms. Graves has failed to demonstrate that Defendants 

engaged in conduct that was extreme and outrageous outside the bounds of the 

everyday annoyances that society is expected to weather, or that her mental 

anguish is serious and of a nature that no reasonable person could be expected to 

endure. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment on Ms. Graves’

IIED claim is GRANTED.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated herein, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

(ECF No. 14) is GRANTED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor 

of the Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Sarah D. Morrison 

SARAH D. MORRISON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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