COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

October 13, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2020AP881-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CM53

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

 PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

 V.

KYLE M. KLEINSCHMIDT,

 DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Lincoln County: 

JAY R. TLUSTY, Judge. Affirmed. 

¶1 GILL, J.1 Kyle Kleinschmidt appeals from a judgment of 

conviction for one count of operating a motor vehicle while revoked and one count 

of misdemeanor bail jumping. He contends the circuit court erred by denying his 

 

1

 This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2019-20). All 

references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2020AP881-CR

2

motion to suppress evidence. Kleinschmidt argues that it was unreasonable for the 

arresting officer to stop him, insomuch as the officer’s actions were based on an 

incorrect interpretation of law, and that the Wisconsin Administrative Code was 

inapplicable in this case. Because we agree with the court that the arresting officer 

had reasonable suspicion to believe that Kleinschmidt had committed a traffic 

violation, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Officer Kurt Perra of the City of Merrill Police Department was 

monitoring traffic with his speed gun when he observed Kleinschmidt driving his

vehicle on Riverside Avenue in Merrill. Perra was familiar with Kleinschmidt and 

suspected that Kleinschmidt did not have a valid driver’s license. 

¶3 Perra followed Kleinschmidt’s vehicle in an attempt to get close 

enough to run its license plate. Once Perra was close enough to read the plate 

number, however, Kleinschmidt pulled into a parking lot. When Perra pulled into 

the lot behind Kleinschmidt, he noticed the vehicle’s center high-mount brake 

light (hereinafter, “high brake light”)

2

above the rear window was not illuminated. 

¶4 Based on his observation that the high brake light was not 

functioning, Perra stopped Kleinschmidt’s vehicle. After Perra approached the 

vehicle, he advised Kleinschmidt about the high brake light violation and asked 

 

2

 This feature is also known as a center high-mounted stop lamp. WISCONSIN ADMIN.

CODE § TRANS 305.15(5)(a) (May 2014), states, in relevant part: “The high-mounted stop lamp 

of every motor vehicle originally manufactured with a high-mounted stop lamp shall be 

maintained in proper working condition and may not be covered or obscured by any object or 

material.” All references to the WIS. ADMIN. CODE ch. 305 are to May 2014 register unless 

otherwise noted.
No. 2020AP881-CR

3

for Kleinschmidt’s identification. Kleinschmidt stated that he did not have a valid

driver’s license. When Perra entered Kleinschmidt’s license plate information into 

his computer, he discovered that Kleinschmidt’s license was revoked, and that he 

had eight prior violations for operating after revocation. Kleinschmidt was 

thereafter charged with one count of operating a motor vehicle while revoked and 

one count of misdemeanor bail jumping, based on a pending drug possession 

charge in Lincoln County. 

¶5 Kleinschmidt subsequently filed a motion to suppress, arguing that 

he was unlawfully stopped in violation of his constitutional rights. Specifically, 

Kleinschmidt argued that Perra did not have reasonable suspicion to initiate a stop 

because Perra was not aware of Kleinschmidt’s revoked status until after he was 

stopped. In addition, Kleinschmidt asserted that although his vehicle’s high brake 

light was not operating, its two side brake lights were functioning and thus

Kleinschmidt was in compliance with the law. 

¶6 The circuit court denied Kleinschmidt’s motion, concluding that 

Perra had reasonable suspicion to believe that Kleinschmidt had violated a traffic 

regulation and, therefore, the stop was lawful. Kleinschmidt later filed a motion to 

reconsider, which the court denied. Kleinschmidt subsequently pled no contest to 

the revocation and misdemeanor bail jumping charges. Kleinschmidt now 

appeals, arguing that the court erred by denying his suppression motion.3

 

3

 An order denying a motion to suppress evidence may be reviewed on appeal 

notwithstanding the defendant’s guilty or no-contest plea. WIS. STAT. § 971.31(10). 
No. 2020AP881-CR

4

DISCUSSION

¶7 An officer must have reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been 

or is being violated to justify a traffic stop. State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶30, 

364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143. Reasonable suspicion depends on an officer’s 

ability “to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with 

rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” Terry v. 

Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). The focus is on reasonableness, and we examine 

whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of 

his or her training and experience, to suspect that an individual is committing, is 

about to commit, or has committed an offense. State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 

77, 83-84 & n.1, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990). 

¶8 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of 

constitutional fact. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 Wis. 2d 86, 700 

N.W.2d 899. We will uphold a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are 

clearly erroneous, but we independently review whether those facts meet the 

constitutional standard. State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675, 792 

N.W.2d 182. 

¶9 Here, Kleinschmidt does not argue that Perra lacked reasonable 

suspicion to believe that he violated WIS. ADMIN. CODE § TRANS 305.15. Instead, 

Kleinschmidt contends Perra lacked reasonable suspicion to stop his vehicle 

because Perra relied on WIS. STAT. § 347.14(1) as the basis for the stop, rather 

than § TRANS 305.15. Kleinschmidt argues the undisputed facts establish that he 

did not violate the plain language of § 347.14(1). Kleinschmidt further contends 

that § TRANS 305.15 is inapplicable for two reasons: (1) Perra was not aware of 
No. 2020AP881-CR

5

§ TRANS 305.15 at the time of the stop; and (2) § TRANS 305.15 exceeds the 

authority granted in § 347.15 and is therefore invalid. 

¶10 We reject Kleinschmidt’s contention that Perra lacked reasonable 

suspicion for the stop because Perra did not specifically reference WIS. ADMIN.

CODE § TRANS 305.15 when making the traffic stop and instead cited WIS. STAT.

§ 347.14(1). Law enforcement officers are not required to know the exact statute 

or administrative code provision prohibiting certain conduct before they can make 

a stop based upon that conduct. In State v. Guzy, 139 Wis. 2d 663, 679-80, 407 

N.W.2d 548 (1987), our supreme court stated:

We recognize that a law enforcement officer cannot, in the 

few seconds sometimes available to him or her, always 

articulate at the moment all of the facts and circumstances 

that motivate their action. Instinct based on training, 

experience and circumstances may well lead that officer to 

the correct decision notwithstanding his or her ability to 

articulate either at the time or even after the fact, to him or 

herself or others, the reasons for the action. We cannot 

demand that and we do not. The law expects 

reasonableness, and the courts must take into account the 

factors outlined in this opinion in judging the 

reasonableness of law enforcement officer’s actions.

In this case, Perra testified that while he did not know the exact administrative 

code provision at issue, he had reviewed the traffic code many times during his 

career and had conducted stops pursuant to that provision for fifteen to twenty 

years.

¶11 Additionally, although Perra was mistaken as to whether the code or 

a statute applied, this mistake does not invalidate his reasonable suspicion to 

support a traffic stop. An objectively reasonable mistake of law by a police officer 

can form the basis for reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop. See 

Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶52. Although Perra mistakenly cited WIS. STAT.
No. 2020AP881-CR

6

§ 347.14(1) as a basis to pull Kleinschmidt over instead of the applicable code 

provision, Perra was aware from his long-term experience that the code prohibited 

a motor vehicle from operating with a nonfunctional high brake light. 

¶12 We also reject Kleinschmidt’s assertion that the stop was 

unreasonable because WIS. ADMIN. CODE § TRANS 305.15 exceeds the authority 

granted by WIS. STAT. § 347.14 and is therefore invalid. Perra testified that at the 

time of the stop, he believed Kleinschmidt’s nonfunctioning high brake lamp was 

a violation. An officer may perform an investigatory stop of a vehicle based on a 

reasonable suspicion of a noncriminal traffic violation. See State v. Colstad, 2003 

WI App 25, ¶11, 260 Wis. 2d 406, 659 N.W.2d 394. Perra’s belief in that regard 

was objectively reasonable, based on the language of § TRANS 305.15(5)(a). As 

the State observes, there is no evidence to indicate that Perra had any “reason to 

believe that this administrative code provision was inconsistent with a Wisconsin 

statute.” Thus, even assuming without deciding that § TRANS 305.15 is invalid for 

the reason Kleinschmidt urges, we nevertheless conclude that Perra’s mistaken 

reliance on that administrative code section was objectively reasonable and could 

therefore form the basis for reasonable suspicion to stop Kleinschmidt’s vehicle.

¶13 In summary, when Perra pulled up behind Kleinschmidt, he noticed 

that Kleinschmidt’s high brake light was not illuminated. Perra referred to this as 

a “brake light violation, 347,” which applies to stop lamps, not high brake lights. 

Although Perra mistakenly relied on the statute instead of the administrative code, 

Perra clarified, through testimony, his familiarity with the relevant administrative 

code provision and his previous reliance on it. Based on his training and

experience, Perra had a reasonable belief that the code allowed for the traffic stop

he made. Because we conclude any mistake by Perra in relying on the statute was 
No. 2020AP881-CR

7

objectively reasonable, the stop of Kleinschmidt was lawful. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE

809.23(1)(b)4.