United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit

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No. 12-4044

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United States of America

lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Marlon Terrell Collins

lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant

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 Appeal from United States District Court 

for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul

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 Submitted: November 18, 2013

Filed: December 5, 2013

[Unpublished]

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Before RILEY, Chief Judge, MELLOY and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Marlon Terrell Collins appeals the sentence he received after pleading guilty

to conspiracy to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine powder and 8 kilograms of

marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), and 846. The district
court imposed a within-Guidelines-range sentence of 246 months, which was also 1

within the range contemplated in Collins's plea agreement. On appeal, his counsel

has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning

the substantive reasonableness of Collins'ssentence, suggesting that the court did not

properly consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) statutory sentencing factors, and arguing

that the sentence imposed was greater than necessary to accomplish the goals of

federal sentencing. Collins submitted a pro se supplemental brief raising

substantially similar issues. Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm.

I.

In September 2010, officials learned that Collins was obtaining narcotics in

Arizona and arranging for their shipment with FedEx to Minnesota. Officials placed

Collins under surveillance and observed him sending a package to an address in

Minnesota. Officials intercepted the package, used a drug-sniffing dog to detect the

presence of drugs, and eventually discovered 8.13 kilograms of marijuana and 1.48

kilograms of cocaine inside. Collins was arrested in Minnesota, and he later entered

into a plea agreement with the United States.

The plea agreement and pre-sentence report both state that Collins's criminal

history was category VI and his offense level was 34, which included a three-level

adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Collins had two previous federal

convictions and was on supervised release at the time of his arrest. Collins'sresulting

guideline range was 262–327 months' imprisonment. During the sentencing hearing,

the government requested a sentence of 296 months and Collins requested 120

months, the mandatory minimum sentence. The district court imposed a sentence of

264 months. On appeal, Collins argues that the district court did not take into account

The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States DistrictJudge for the District 1

of Minnesota.

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all of the § 3553(a) factors, gave insufficient weight to the effects of Collins's

difficult upbringing, and ignored the remorse he expressed at the sentencing hearing. 

II.

We use an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing sentences for

substantive reasonableness. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

"[S]ubstantive appellate review in sentencing cases is narrow and deferential. . . . [I]t

will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—whether within,

above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively unreasonable." 

United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal

quotation marks omitted). On appeal, a circuit court can presume that a sentence

within the guidelines range is reasonable. United States v. Nash, 627 F.3d 693, 697

(8th Cir. 2010) (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 347 (2007)). The district

court abuses its discretion when it, among other things, "fails to consider a relevant

factor that should have received significant weight." Feemster, 572 F.3d at 461

(internal quotation marks omitted).

After a careful, independent review of the record under Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 82–83 (1988), we conclude that the district court properly weighed

appropriate sentencing factors and imposed a substantively reasonable sentence. The

pre-sentence report described Collins's personal background, including a troubled

childhood and absence of a father figure. During Collins's sentencing hearing,

Collins's attorney again presented thisinformation to the court, and Collins expressed

his remorse for having committed the offense and apologized to his family. The

district court addressed the early challenges Collins faced, stating: "[I]t's very hard

to come from the sort of background that you did. . . . There's no question at all that

this—that's a tough way to start out in life."

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The district court based Collins's sentence on his likelihood of recidivism,

demonstrated by Collins's previous drug convictions and the fact that he continued

to commit crimes while on supervised release. The district court acknowledged the

fact that the advisory guidelines range was high for a third offense, stating: "[T]he

fact that the career offender guidelines are so much higher makes sense if you think

about [it] . . . You know you do it, you do it again, you do it again. Sort of makes you

think, . . . from the point of view of community safety and the likelihood that the

person is really going to turn their life around and take advantage of the things that

we're offering you, you know, it's just not a good sign." Weighing Collins's

likelihood of recidivism and the serious nature of his offenses over Collins's personal

characteristics and background was within the court's discretion. See United States

v. Wisecarver, 644 F.3d 764, 774 (8th Cir. 2011).

III.

The district court properly calculated the advisoryGuidelines range for Collins,

took into account Collins's § 3553(a) factors, and sentenced Collins within a range

prescribed by the Guidelines. We conclude that the sentence imposed was not

substantively unreasonable. We affirm the judgment of the district court, and we

grant counsel's motion to withdraw.

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