In the 

Missouri Court of Appeals 

Western District

STATE OF MISSOURI,

Respondent,

v.

MELISSA ANN GLAZE,

Appellant.

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

WD82708

OPINION FILED: August 18, 2020

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Saline County, Missouri

The Honorable Dennis A. Rolf, Judge

Before Division Four: Cynthia L. Martin, Chief Judge, Presiding, Alok Ahuja, Judge and 

Thomas N. Chapman, Judge

Melissa Glaze ("Glaze") appeals from the trial court's entry of judgment convicting 

her of possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 579.0151and of unlawful 

possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 579.074 following a bench trial. 

Glaze challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support her convictions. Finding no 

error, we affirm. 

 

1All statutory references are to RSMo 2016 as amended through August 10, 2017, unless otherwise 

indicated. 
2

Factual and Procedural Background2

On August 10, 2017, the Missouri State Highway Patrol conducted aerial speed 

enforcement near the 69 mile marker on Interstate 70 in Saline County, Missouri. At 

approximately 1:00 P.M., the pilot notified Corporal Dennis Mathes ("Corporal Mathes"), 

who was staged nearby in his patrol car, that a charcoal Jeep SUV was traveling 84 miles 

per hour. As Corporal Mathes approached the Jeep SUV, he passed a Honda Accord that 

was also speeding. Corporal Mathes activated the patrol car's lights and pulled over the 

Jeep SUV. He exited his patrol car and motioned for the driver of the Honda Accord to 

pull over. However, the Honda Accord kept going. Corporal Mathes approached the Jeep 

SUV and told the driver to stay where he was while Corporal Mathes pursued the Honda 

Accord. While Corporal Mathes was speaking to the driver of the Jeep SUV, he noticed 

that Glaze was leaning forward in the front passenger seat, looking down toward the 

passenger floorboard. 

Corporal Mathes returned to his patrol car to pursue and stop the Honda Accord. 

While Corporal Mathes was speaking to the driver of the Honda Accord, he heard a radio 

report that a vehicle pursuit had begun. Corporal Mathes abandoned the stop of the Honda 

Accord and left to assist in the pursuit, which involved the Jeep SUV. 

The driver of the Jeep SUV had initially followed Corporal Mathes's instruction to 

remain stopped on the side of the road. However, after a few minutes, the pilot of the aerial 

 

2When reviewing a conviction following a bench trial for sufficiency of the evidence, we view the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the verdicts. State v. Martin, 575 S.W.3d 764, 766 n.1 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019). 
3

speed enforcement plane observed the Jeep SUV driving away after making a U-turn 

through a ditch onto the south outer road. 

Trooper Nathan Wallace ("Trooper Wallace") stopped the Jeep SUV at a truck stop. 

Trooper Wallace immediately took the driver and Glaze into custody. Another officer, 

Corporal Liere Dancy ("Corporal Dancy"), arrived at the scene and placed Glaze in her 

patrol car. Corporal Dancy asked Glaze for identification. Glaze advised that her 

identification was in her purse, located on the front passenger floorboard. Glaze also 

indicated that a tote bag containing snacks and beer, which was also located on the front 

passenger floorboard, was hers. Corporal Dancy retrieved the purse from the Jeep SUV's 

passenger floorboard for Glaze. 

Corporal Mathes and Trooper Wallace searched the Jeep SUV. Trooper Wallace 

searched the vehicle's passenger side, where he found a small black bag3 on the front 

passenger floorboard. The black bag was readily visible, and was found with the food and 

beer Glaze had reported as her belongings. Inside the bag, Trooper Wallace found a 

bandana wrapped around a "glass smoking pipe with white crystal residue within it," a 

metal spoon, syringes and syringe caps, and cotton balls. Also in the bag was an Excedrin

bottle containing methamphetamine. 

The State charged Glaze as a prior and persistent offender with one count of 

possession of a controlled substance in violation of section 579.015 and one count of 

 

3The State characterizes the small black bag as a makeup bag. Glaze takes issue with that characterization, 

arguing that there was no makeup found in the bag, and that the State is mischaracterizing the evidence in an effort 

to connect the bag to Glaze rather than the male driver of the vehicle. There is no need to settle this debate, as there 

was sufficient evidence to support Glaze's convictions regardless the bag's characterization. 
4

unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of section 579.074. A bench trial 

was held on July 13, 2018. 

The evidence established that the Excedrin bottle contained 5.58 grams of 

methamphetamine. Corporal Mathes testified that the items found in the small black bag 

were consistent with intravenous injection of methamphetamine, and that approximately 

.25 gram of methamphetamine is typically used to get high. Corporal Mathes testified that 

the driver had been asked about the contents of the vehicle, and had accepted responsibility 

for all items inside the vehicle except Glaze's personal belongings, specifically mentioning 

her purse. 

Corporal Mathes testified about Glaze's appearance on August 10, 2017. He 

described Glaze's appearance as "skin-and-bones," consistent with other heavy 

methamphetamine users with whom he has interacted during his career. He also testified 

that Glaze was wearing a long sleeve shirt, despite the fact it was August, consistent with 

an attempt to cover track marks from the intravenous injection of methamphetamine. 

Corporal Mathes testified that Glaze's face looked fuller at trial than it did at the time of 

her arrest. 

A video of Glaze sitting inside Corporal Liere Dancy's ("Corporal Dancy") patrol 

car during the search of the Jeep SUV was admitted into evidence.4 Corporal Dancy 

testified that Glaze appeared "[e]xtremely nervous" during the search of the vehicle. 

 

4The video was admitted into evidence to assess Glaze's nervousness during the search. 
5

At the conclusion of the State's evidence, Glaze moved for judgment of acquittal, 

arguing that the State failed to prove that Glaze had possession of the black bag found on 

the front passenger floorboard of the Jeep SUV. The trial court denied the motion. The 

trial court found Glaze guilty as charged.

5

 The trial court sentenced Glaze to twelve years' 

incarceration for the possession of a controlled substance charge and ten days in jail for the 

unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia charge. 

Glaze appeals. 

Standard of Review

"When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the standard of review on appeal 

from a bench-tried case is the same as the standard used on appeal of a case tried to a jury." 

State v. Shaw, 592 S.W.3d 354, 357 (Mo. banc 2019). When reviewing the sufficiency of 

the evidence to support a conviction and a trial court's denial of a motion for judgment of 

acquittal, our task is to determine whether sufficient evidence was presented at trial to 

permit a reasonable fact finder to find the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reweigh the evidence, and the test

is not whether we believe the evidence established the defendant's guilt beyond a 

 

5Prior to trial, Glaze filed a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Rule 73.01. Rule 

73.01 is located within the Missouri Rules of Civil Procedure, and there is no parallel rule located in the Missouri 

Rules of Criminal Procedure. See State v. Renfrow, 495 S.W.3d 840, 850 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (Ahuja, J., 

dissenting) (recognizing that "there is no analogue to Rule 73.01(c) in Missouri's rules of criminal procedure"). 

After the pronouncement of its verdict, the trial court noted that Rule 73.01(c) is a rule of civil procedure, not 

criminal procedure. The trial court nevertheless verbally explained its verdict at the renewed request of Glaze's 

counsel. The trial court explained that in determining that Glaze was in possession of the small black bag, it gave 

weight to the fact that Glaze's appearance was consistent with a methamphetamine user; to the fact that the black 

bag was easily accessible to Glaze and next to her belongings; to the fact that Glaze looked at the floorboard when 

the Jeep SUV was first pulled over; to the fact that Glaze appeared nervous and distraught on a video of Glaze in 

Corporal Dancy's vehicle during the search of the Jeep SUV; and to the fact that Glaze did not appear surprised 

when she was arrested but instead acted as though she anticipated being arrested. 

All rule references are to the Missouri Supreme Court Rules (2018), unless otherwise indicated. 
6

reasonable doubt. State v. Gehring, 599 S.W.3d 526, 529 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020). Instead, 

we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, disregarding all contrary 

evidence and reasonable inferences, in order to determine whether "any rational fact-finder 

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. 

Marley, 598 S.W.3d 204, 208-09 (Mo. App. W.D. 2020) (quoting State v. Stewart, 560 

S.W.3d 531, 533 (Mo. banc 2018)). 

Analysis

Glaze presents a single point on appeal, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence 

to support her convictions for possession of a controlled substance and unlawful possession 

of drug paraphernalia. Glaze argues that the trial court erred in overruling her motion for 

judgment of acquittal at the close of the evidence and finding Glaze guilty because the 

State failed to present sufficient evidence that Glaze had knowledge of, and an intent to 

exercise control over, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia found in the vehicle.

6

 

Section 579.015.1 provides that "[a] person commits the offense of possession of a 

controlled substance if he or she knowingly possesses a controlled substance." (Emphasis 

added.) Section 579.074.1 provides: 

A person commits the offense of unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia 

if he or she knowingly uses, or possesses with intent to use, drug 

paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 

compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, 

 

6By challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support two separate convictions in a single point relied 

on, Glaze's point on appeal is multifarious in violation of Rule 84.04(d)(1), and thus is unpreserved for appeal. See 

State v. Leonard, 490 S.W.3d 730, 736 (Mo. App. W.D. 2016) (concluding a point relied on that challenged the 

sufficiency of the evidence to support three convictions was impermissibly multifarious). Nonetheless, we have 

exercised our discretion to review Glaze's claims of error on appeal, despite the violation of Rule 84.04(d)(1), given 

our preference to decide cases on the merits when the argument is readily understandable, as is the case here. See id.
7

store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce into the 

human body, a controlled substance or an imitation controlled substance . . . . 

(Emphasis added.) We "employ the same analysis when reviewing the question of whether 

[a defendant] possessed drug paraphernalia as when determining whether [a defendant] 

possessed a controlled substance." Gehring, 599 S.W.3d at 529 (quoting State v. Phillips, 

477 S.W.3d 176, 179 (Mo. App. E.D. 2015)).

Glaze's point on appeal challenges whether the State presented sufficient evidence 

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she "knowingly possessed" the methamphetamine

and drug paraphernalia found in the small black bag. "Possessed" is statutorily defined:

[A] person, with the knowledge of the presence and nature of a substance, 

has actual or constructive possession of the substance. A person has actual 

possession if he has the substance on his or her person or within easy reach 

and convenient control. A person who, although not in actual possession, 

has the power and the intention at a given time to exercise dominion or 

control over the substance either directly or through another person or 

persons is in constructive possession of it. Possession may also be sole or 

joint. If one person alone has possession of a substance possession is sole. 

If two or more persons share possession of a substance, possession is joint

. . . .

Section 195.010(34). Thus, to prove the essential element of knowing possession, the State 

had to prove Glaze's "conscious and intentional possession of the [methamphetamine and 

drug paraphernalia], either actual or constructive, and awareness of the presence and nature 

of the [methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia]." State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 

801, 807 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting State v. Stover, 388 S.W.3d 138, 146-47 (Mo. banc 

2012)). "'Proof of a defendant's knowledge of the presence and character of a substance is 

normally supplied by circumstantial evidence of the acts and conduct of the accused from 

which it can be fairly inferred he or she knew of the existence of the contraband.'" State v. 
8

Woods, 284 S.W.3d 630, 639 (Mo. App. W.D. 2009) (quoting State v. McCleod, 186 

S.W.3d 439, 444 (Mo. App. W.D. 2006)). "Circumstantial evidence is that which does not 

directly prove a fact in issue but gives rise to a logical inference that the fact exists." State 

v. Fox, 882 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). "[K]nowledge, awareness, and 

possession may be proved by circumstantial evidence." Id. at 217; see also Zetina-Torres, 

482 S.W.3d at 807 ("Possession and knowledge may be proved by circumstantial 

evidence."). 

When an unlawful substance or item is found in a location that is exclusively 

controlled or occupied by a defendant, the defendant is deemed to have knowledge of and 

control over the substance or item. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 807 ("Exclusive control 

of the premises raises an inference of possession and control of the substance."). However, 

where an unlawful substance or item is found in a location that is subject to joint occupation 

or control, "the state is required to demonstrate 'some further evidence or admission 

connecting the accused with the illegal drugs.'" Id. (quoting State v. Purlee, 839 S.W.2d 

584, 588 (Mo. banc 1992)).

There are several additional incriminating circumstances that would support 

an inference of a defendant's knowledge and control of the controlled 

substance when joint possession exists: 

Finding a large quantity of drugs in the vehicle;

Finding drugs having a large monetary value in the vehicle;

Easy accessibility or routine access to the drugs;

The odor of drugs in the vehicle;

The presence of the defendant's personal belongings in close proximity to the 

drugs;
9

Making false statements in an attempt to deceive the police;

The defendant's nervousness during the search;

The defendant's flight from law enforcement;

The presence of drugs in plain view;

Other conduct and statements made by the accused; and

The fact that the defendant rented the vehicle.

Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 807 (citing Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147). "These factors . . . , 

while not exhaustive, guide this Court's analysis of whether additional incriminating 

circumstances sufficiently connect[] [an accused] to the [contraband] in . . . the car." 

Stover, 388 S.W.3d at 147. 

Here, Glaze was a joint occupant in the vehicle. Thus, it is not enough that the black 

bag filled with contraband was found in the vehicle. Additional incriminating 

circumstances in the form of evidence or admissions must connect Glaze with the 

contraband to permit the inference that she had knowledge of and exercised control over 

the contraband. We find that sufficient evidence was presented to permit this inference. 

A sizeable quantity of drugs were found in the black bag--5.58 grams, where only 

.25 gram is typically associated with getting high through intravenous use. The black bag 

was easily accessible to Glaze, as it was located in the front floorboard where she was 

sitting. Glaze thus had superior access to the black bag as between she and the driver of 

the vehicle. The black bag was not hidden and was visible on the front passenger 

floorboard. Glaze was looking at the front passenger floorboard when Corporal Mathes 

initially spoke with the driver. The black bag was on the front passenger floorboard with
10

a purse, food, and beer Glaze admitted were her personal belongings. Glaze's "skin-andbones" appearance and long-sleeved shirt where consistent with the appearance and dress 

of an intravenous methamphetamine user. Glaze appeared extremely nervous during the 

search of the vehicle. Glaze did not react in a surprised manner when she was advised that 

drugs had been found in the black bag located on the front passenger floorboard amongst 

her personal belongings. 

Given this evidence, "the state met its burden to show additional incriminating 

circumstances to support an inference of [Glaze's] knowledge and control over the 

methamphetamine [and drug paraphernalia] after examining the totality of the 

circumstances." Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d at 808. The trial court did not err in overruling 

Glaze's motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis of insufficient evidence to establish 

that Glaze possessed the contraband found in the black bag on the front passenger 

floorboard of the vehicle. 

Glaze disagrees. She argues that the additional incriminating circumstances in this

case do not permit the reasonable inference that she had knowledge of or exercised control 

over the contents of the black bag. She relies on State v. Buford, 309 S.W.3d 350 (Mo.

App. S.D. 2010), for the settled principle that "proximity to . . . contraband, alone, even as 

to a substance in plain sight, [does not] tend to prove ownership or possession as among 

several persons who share the premises." Id. at 356 (quoting State v. Bowyer, 693 S.W.2d 

845, 847 (Mo. App. W.D. 1985)); see also State v. Chavez, 128 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Mo. 

App. W.D. 2004) ("The mere fact that [the defendant] was present in the vehicle where the 

items were found is not sufficient to make a submissible case." (quoting State v. Bristol, 
11

98 S.W.3d 107, 111 (Mo. App. W.D. 2003))). However, Glaze was not merely present in 

the vehicle in proximity to the black bag. Instead, as between Glaze and the driver, Glaze 

had superior access to the black bag given it was found in the front passenger floorboard 

with her admitted personal belongings after she and the driver were simultaneously 

arrested. Buford observed that "[s]uperior access to contraband that is accessible by two 

or more people is an incriminating fact." 309 S.W.3d at 356 (quoting State v. Millsap, 244 

S.W.3d 786, 789 (Mo. App. S.D. 2008)). In Buford, the court concluded there was no 

evidence of superior access, though contraband was found near where the accused had been 

sitting, because a third person in the vehicle had the same access. Id. at 361. Buford is 

therefore distinguishable.

Glaze also relies on Buford for the settled principle that "[w]hile nervous conduct 

may be probative of the defendant's awareness of [illegal] drugs, such conduct alone is not 

sufficient evidence to prove the defendant's unlawful possession." Id. at 358 (quoting State 

v. Villaneuva, 147 S.W.3d 126, 130 (Mo. App. W.D. 2004)). But as Buford noted, 

"'[n]ervousness is one incriminating fact that will support a conviction if consistent with 

the totality of the circumstances.'" Id. (quoting Villaneuva, 147 S.W.3d at 131). Buford

found that observed nervousness of the accused was not consistent with the totality of the 

circumstances where the accused did not have superior access to the contraband located in 

the vehicle, and where there the defendant had an active warrant out for his arrest. Id. at 

360-61. Buford thus held that "[w]hen a defendant has another equally probable reason for 

marked nervousness, there must be evidence of an additional incriminating fact before a 

permissible inference can be drawn [based solely on nervousness] that the defendant had 
12

knowledge of and control over the drugs located in the vehicle." Id. at 358. Because there 

was no evidence of an additional incriminating circumstance, Buford concluded there was 

insufficient evidence to support the accused's conviction. Id. at 360-62. Buford did not 

hold, however, that nervousness that can be explained by another equally probable reason 

is irrelevant to the totality of the circumstances. Instead, Buford merely reiterated the 

settled rule that nervousness alone will not support an inference of possession where an 

accused was a joint occupant in a vehicle, particularly where the nervousness can be 

explained by another equally probable reason. See, e.g., State v. Franco-Amador, 83 

S.W.3d 555, 559 (Mo. App. W.D. 2002) (addressing nervousness that could be equally 

explained by an accused's status as an illegal immigrant, which, without evidence of other 

incriminating factors, could not support a conviction for possession). 

Here, there was no evidence of an equally probable reason for Glaze's extreme 

nervousness during the search of the Jeep SUV. Moreover, Glaze's extreme nervousness 

was not the only incriminating circumstance supporting the inference that she had 

knowledge of, and exercised control over, the methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia

found in the vehicle. As Buford held, "Missouri courts have found sufficient evidence to 

support a conviction for possession of illegal drugs when the defendant had access to the 

drugs that was superior to that of the other occupants in the vehicle and there was additional 

evidence to show that the defendant had exercised some control over the drugs." 309 

S.W.3d at 359-60. That additional evidence has included a defendant's personal belongings 

being found alongside the contraband, id. at 361 (citing Millsap, 244 S.W.3d at 789), and 

evidence the defendant was bending toward the area where the drugs are later located. Id.
13

(citing State v. Ames, 44 S.W.3d 825, 829 (Mo. App. S.D. 2001). In this case, the totality 

of the circumstances supports the reasonable inference that Glaze had knowledge of and 

exercised control over the black bag containing contraband, given it was located in the 

front floorboard where Glaze had superior access, among her personal belongings, in an 

area she was looking at the time of initial contact with law enforcement; and given her 

extreme nervousness during the search of the vehicle. 

Glaze's sufficiency of the evidence challenge does not argue that the additional 

incriminating circumstances, viewed in the totality of the circumstances, fail to support her 

conviction. Instead, Glaze isolates the incriminating circumstances, and urges a contrary 

inference that could have been drawn from each circumstance. This tactic ignores our

requirement to look at all of the evidence collectively to determine whether the totality of 

the circumstances supports an inference of guilt. More importantly, this approach is 

inconsistent with our standard of review, which requires us to view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the verdict, disregarding all contrary evidence and reasonable inferences, 

in order to determine whether "any rational fact-finder could have found the essential 

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Marley, 598 S.W.3d at 208-09 (quoting 

Stewart, 560 S.W.3d at 533). As Buford observed, our standard of review of a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence must "disregard contrary inferences, unless they are such 

a natural and logical extension of the evidence that a reasonable juror would be unable to 

disregard them." Id. at 354 (quoting State v. Grim, 854 S.W.2d 403, 411 (Mo. banc 1993)). 

Buford's reliance on Grim is significant. In that case, our Supreme Court "reject[ed] 

the circumstantial evidence rule as a standard for reviewing the sufficiency of the 
14

evidence." Grim, 854 S.W.2d at 407. Prior to its abrogation, the circumstantial evidence 

rule "originated as a higher standard to which circumstantial evidence cases were held." 

Id. at 405. "In its appellate form the [now abrogated] rule was stated: 'Where the conviction 

rests on circumstantial evidence, the facts and circumstances to establish guilt must be 

consistent with each other, consistent with the guilt of the defendant, and inconsistent with 

any reasonable theory of his innocence.'" Id. (quoting State v. Pritchett, 39 S.W.2d 794, 

796-97 (Mo. 1931)). Our Supreme Court recognized, however, that due process requires 

only that a conviction "be supported by enough evidence that a reasonable juror, taking all 

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, would be convinced beyond a reasonable

doubt," and that the "circumstantial evidence rule" inconsistently turns the inquiry "to 

whether there exists a reasonable theory of innocence that is consistent with all of the 

evidence." Id. at 406. As a result, our Supreme Court concluded that "[n]o reason remains 

to perpetuate [the circumstantial evidence] rule." Id. Thus, even where a case is built 

entirely on circumstantial evidence, "[w]e no longer . . . hold circumstantial evidence cases 

to a higher standard than direct evidence cases. If a jury is convinced beyond a reasonable 

doubt, so long as the evidence meets the minimal appellate standard required by due 

process, we need not disturb the result . . . ." merely because the same evidence could have 

supported an inference of innocence. Id.

Grim's abrogation of the circumstantial evidence rule serves as a critical temper in 

cases involving joint occupants of a vehicle where contraband is found, and where 

circumstantial evidence is the source of proof that an accused knowingly possessed the 

contraband. Grim instructs that incriminating circumstances must be viewed collectively 
15

to determine if the totality of the circumstances meets the minimal appellate standard 

required by due process to permit an inference of knowing possession beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Consistent with this principle, our jurisprudence has established that some 

circumstantial evidence is insufficient standing alone to support an inference of knowing 

possession of contraband found in a vehicle with joint occupants. (See discussion, supra, 

regarding a joint occupant's mere presence in a vehicle in proximity to contraband in the 

absence of superior access to the contraband, and regarding a joint occupant's nervousness 

during a search in the absence of additional incriminating circumstances). That does not 

mean, however, that we are permitted to disregard an embodiment of additional 

incriminating circumstances from which a rational fact-finder could be convinced beyond 

a reasonable doubt that a joint occupant knowingly possessed contraband found in a 

vehicle, merely because each circumstance, viewed in isolation, could be subject to an

equally plausible theory of innocence. Neither Buford, nor any of the other cases cited in 

Buford, nor any case that has since relied on Buford, can be read to suggest to the contrary

without running afoul of Grim's abrogation of the circumstantial evidence rule. 

Glaze's point on appeal is denied. 

Conclusion

The trial court's Judgment is affirmed. 

__________________________________

Cynthia L. Martin, Judge

All concur