alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
**EXHIBIT32.2**

 

**Certificationof**

**Treasurer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer)**

**of TGCIndustries, Inc. Pursuant to**

**Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

 

This certification is furnished solely pursuant to Section 906of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350,Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and accompanies the annual reporton Form 10-K (the “Form 10-K”) for the fiscal year ended December 31,2007, of TGC Industries, Inc. (the “Company”).  I, Kenneth W. Uselton, Secretary/Treasurer(Principal Financial and Accounting Officer) of the Company, certify that, tothe best of my knowledge:

 

(1)                                The Form 10-K fully complies withthe requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the SecuritiesExchange Act of 1934; and

 

(2)                                The information contained in the Form 10-Kfairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and resultsof operations of the Company.

 

The foregoing certification is being furnished as anexhibit to the Form 10-K pursuant to Item 601(6)(32) of Regulation S-K andSection 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) ofSection 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code) and,accordingly, is not being filed as part of the Form 10-K for purposes of Section 18of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and is not incorporated byreference into any filing of the registrant, whether made before or after thedate hereof, regardless of any general incorporation language in such filing.

 

 
| Date: March 14,  2008 | By:    |    /s/  Kenneth Uselton |
|----------------------------|--------|----------------------------------------|
|                       |   | Kenneth Uselton,  Secretary and        |
|                       |   | Treasurer  (Principal Financial and    |
|                       |   | Accounting  Officer)                   |
|                            |        |                                        |  |

 

----
Shameka Lashay JONES, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 2D17-2631

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.

Opinion filed February 23, 2018

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Richard J. Sanders, Assistant Public Defender, Bartow, for Appellant.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Affirmed.

LaROSE, C.J., and KHOUZAM and LUCAS, JJ., Concur.
<PAGE>

EXHIBIT 32.2


               CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                 SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Aethlon Medical, Inc. Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for
the quarter ended September 30, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission on the date hereof, I, James W. Dorst, Chief Financial Officer of the
Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my
knowledge:

1. Such quarterly report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and

2. The information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Aethlon Medical, Inc.

Date: November 13, 2006

By: /s/ James W. Dorst
    -----------------------
    James W. Dorst
    Chief Financial Officer

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other
document authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that
appears in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement
required by Section 906, has been provided to Aethlon Medical, Inc. and will be
retained by Aethlon Medical, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange
Commission or its staff upon request.
### NUMBER 13 - 16 - 00 650 - C V COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN R E ROBERT PENA AND TRADE CARRIERS, L.L.C.

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.


# ORDER
Before Justices Garza, Perkes, and Longoria

Per Curiam Order
Relator s , Robert Pena and Trade Carriers, L.L.C. , f iled a petition for writ of
mandamus and motion for emergency relief in the above cause on November 30, 2016

. Through this original pro ceeding, relator s seek to compel the trial court to vacate its November 16, 2016 nunc pro tunc order

. Through their motion for emergency relief,
relator s seek to stay the trial that is currently set for December 5, 2016. The Court, having examined and fully considered the moti on for emergency relief , is of the opinion that the motion should be granted

. The motion for emergency relief is GRANTED and the trial set for December 5, 2016 is ordered STAYED pending further2

order of this Court, or until the case is finally decided. S ee T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.10(b) (“Unless vacated or modified, an order granting temporary relief is effective until the case is finally decided.”).
T he Court requests that the real party in interest , Liliana Perez Garcia, or any others whose interest would b e directly affected by the relief sought, file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus on or before the expiration of ten days from the date of
this order. See id. R

. 52.2, 52.4, 52.8. IT IS SO ORDERED. PER CURIAM
D elivered and file d the 1 st day of December , 201 6

.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM THE
CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AT MARCH 31, 1998 (UNAUDITED) AND CONSOLIDATED 
INCOME STATEMENT FOR THE THREE MONTHS ENDED MARCH 31, 1998 (UNAUDITED) AND 
IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1998
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1998
<CASH>                                          45,463
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  280,253
<ALLOWANCES>                                    50,497
<INVENTORY>                                     25,269
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               309,256
<PP&E>                                         601,816
<DEPRECIATION>                                 345,191
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 735,280
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          128,010
<BONDS>                                        537,879
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                            52
<OTHER-SE>                                      69,339
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   735,280
<SALES>                                        250,538
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               250,538
<CGS>                                           85,858
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   85,858
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                13,795
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              11,482
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (6,107)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       500
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (6,607)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   (6,607)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.13)
        

</TABLE>
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs.

JESSICA MARTIN (11), 

Defendant.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

Case No. 1:18-cr-109

Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER TO APPEAR ON PENDING CHARGES

IN THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

The Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant Jessica Martin (11), who is currently 

on bond in the Southern District of Florida, SHALL appear in the Southern District of 

Ohio to answer the charge pending. 

Specifically, Defendant Martin SHALL present in person for an initial appearance 

in the Southern District of Ohio on September 24, 2018 at 1:30 p.m., before United 

States Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman, in Courtroom 701 at the Potter Stewart 

U.S. Courthouse, 100 E. Fifth Street, Cincinnati, Ohio 45202. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 9/13/2018

Timothy S. Black

United States District Judge
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 98-30385

USDC No. 97-CV-3435-R

 

REGINALD J. THOMAS,

Petitioner-Appellant,

versus

STATE OF LOUISIANA;

MICHAEL BENOV, Warden,

Respondents-Appellees.

---------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana

---------------------

August 25, 1998

Before DAVIS, WIENER, and STEWART, Circuit Judges.

BY THE COURT:

Reginald J. Thomas, federal prisoner # 09506-112, seeks a

certificate of appealability (“COA”) from the district court’s

denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief, pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 2254. Because his petition was denied on procedural

grounds rather than on the merits, Thomas must first make a

credible showing that the district court erred. Murphy v.

Johnson, 110 F.3d 10, 11 (5th Cir. 1997). Thomas asserts that

the district court erred in determining that it lacked 
O R D E R

No. 98-30385

- 2 -

jurisdiction over the petition as one brought under § 2254; in

construing his petition as a motion to vacate, set aside, or

correct sentence, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissing it

as such; and in denying COA.

Thomas has not demonstrated any error on the district

court’s part. Nevertheless, we grant COA and vacate and remand

to the district court for the purposes of allowing it to consider

in the first instance whether the case should be transferred sua

sponte to the Central District of California as the court of

proper venue in light of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death

Penalty Act’s one-year statute-of-limitations period. See 28

U.S.C. §§ 1406(a) and 2255.

COA GRANTED; VACATED AND REMANDED.
**EXHIBIT
      32.1**





**CERTIFICATION
        OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS
        ADOPTED PURSUANTTO SECTION 906 OF SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF
        2002**






In
      connection with Amendment No. 2 to the Annual Report on Form 10-KSB/A of New World Brands, Inc. (the “Company”) for the year ended December 31, 2007, as filed with the Securities
      and Exchange Commission on the date therein specified (the “Report”), the
      undersigned, M. David Kamrat, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certifies
      pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350 as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the
      Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:




(1)  The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d), as
      applicable, of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and





(2)  The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
      the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.




Date:
                September 24, 2008
            /s/
                M. David
                KamratM.
                David KamratChief Executive Officer and
              President(principal executive officer)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

United States of America

v. 2:18-cr-153

Heather M. Russell 

ORDER

There being no objections, the court hereby adopts the Report

and Recommendation of the magistrate judge (Doc. 23) that the

defendant’s guilty pleas be accepted. The court accepts the

defendant’s pleas of guilty to Counts 1 and 2 of the information,

and she is hereby adjudged guilty on those counts. The court will

defer the decision of whether to accept the plea agreement until

the sentencing hearing.

Date: September 21, 2018 s\James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge
Ex parte Montgomery County Department of Human Resources

(In re: MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES v. In the matter of J.B., a minor child)

2160400

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 21, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Mand. pet. dismissed.
<PAGE>

                                                                      EXHIBIT 23

                          Independent Auditors' Consent

The Board of Directors
MASSBANK Corp.

We consent to the incorporation by reference in the registration statement on
Form S-8 of MASSBANK Corp. of our report dated January 15, 2004, with respect to
the consolidated balance sheets of MASSBANK Corp. as of December 31, 2003 and
2002, and the related consolidated statements of income, changes in
stockholders' equity and cash flows for each of the years in the three-year
period ended December 31, 2003, which report appears in the December 31, 2003,
annual report on Form 10-K of MASSBANK Corp.

/s/ KPMG LLP

Boston, Massachusetts
March 12, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>


<ARTICLE>                     5
                       
                       
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1000

       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              JUL-03-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 JUN-28-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   SEP-30-1998
<SECURITIES>                                   0
<CASH>                                         229
<RECEIVABLES>                                  8,141
<ALLOWANCES>                                   199
<INVENTORY>                                    11,114
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               20,836
<PP&E>                                         43,558
<DEPRECIATION>                                 18,519
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 60,549
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          12,530
<BONDS>                                        0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                          0
<PREFERRED>                                    0
<COMMON>                                       50
<OTHER-SE>                                     13,791
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   60,549
<SALES>                                        20,185
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               20,185
<CGS>                                          16,964
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  16,964
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               2,536
<LOSS-PROVISION>                               0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                             906
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                (221)
<INCOME-TAX>                                   (44)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            (177)
<DISCONTINUED>                                 0           
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                0          
<CHANGES>                                      0         
<NET-INCOME>                                   (177)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                  (0.04)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                  (0.04)
        

</TABLE>
#### Ex parte Clark.

Opinion delivered June 29, 1901.

Liquors — Discretion of Court to Refuse License. — The county court has a discretion in the matter of granting a license to sell liquors, hoth as to the personal character of the applicant and the suitableness of the place at which the sale is proposed to be made, and its decision, if supported by evidence, will not be reversed.

Appeal from Randolph Circuit Court.

Joidt B. Ma Caleb, Judge.

*G. G. Dent,*for Clark.

Conducting a licensed saloon is not *per se*a nuisance. 11 Humph. (Tenn.), 411; Black, Intox. Liquors, § 343. The county judge cannot discriminate between parties as to licenses. 43 Ark. 61; Black, Intox. Liquors, §§ 170, 171; Sand. & H. Dig., §§ 4856, 4857, 4863, 4867, 4868, 4-877.

P. *TI. Crenshaw, Wiii*cf; *Schoonover,*opposing.

Appeals lie only from final decrees, judgments and orders. 26 Ark. 4-52; 26 Ark. 95; 25 Ark. 420; 36 Ark. 200; 30 Ark. 665. The opinion of the judge is not final. 48 Md. 592. The judgment must be rendered and entered before it is final. 32 N\ W. Rep. 42; 1 Wash. T. 153. A final judgment must give relief by its own force, without further action by the court. 61 Ely. 30.

Buxx, C. J.

This is an appeal from an order of the county court refusing to issue a whisky license. The petition was denied by the county court, and On appeal to the circuit court it was denied there also, and the judgment of the county court affirmed, in the following language, to-wit: “It is considered and adjudged by the court that the county judge of Ran*436dolph county, in refusing license, exercised a sound judicial discretion, as shown by the order and judgment refusing the same, and the evidence in the cause.” The county court had a discretion in the matter, not only as to the personal character of the petitioner, but as to the suitableness or unsuitableness of the place at which the sale is proposed to be made. There is not only some evidence to sustain the county judge in his findings, but his findings are supported by the evidence, and we affirm the judgment of the circuit court on its conclusions thereon.
#### B-W Acceptance Corp. *v.*Norman Polk, dba Norm’s Furniture City

5-4166

414 S. W. 2d 849

Original Opinion delivered April 24, 1967, p'. 422.

[Supplemental Opinion delivered May 29, 1967, rehearing denied.]

Lyle Brown, Justice.

On rehearing, B-WAC' urges that the three trust receipts 7, 12, and 13 were in default at the time this action was filed. That fact, so it is argued, would as a matter of law, give B-WAC right of possession “as of the commencement of the action.” It is true they had matured.

Norm Polk contended that with reference to matured trust receipts there was a procedure consistently followed between the parties and explained in this manner : Upon maturity of any trust receipt, B-WAC would send him — not a demand for payment — but a notice. B-WAC’s field representative who serviced Norm’s *750would receive a copy- The affected distributor would also receive a copy of the notice and the distributor would, without notice to Norm’s, pay to B-WAC' a ninety day renewal charge. The representative would call on Norm Polk regularly during the first half of each month, at which time the matured accounts would be settled. Norm Polk testified that he received no notices of maturity with respect to the last due-dates of the three receipts. Appellant’s credit manager and its field representative corroborated Polk’s testimony in a number of respects. The credit manager also testified that the primary reason for filing the lawsuit was because “we were not allowed to check the floor plan.”

Appellant asserts that evidence of this course of dealing was inadmissible because it was at variance with the terms of the contract. The appellant’s position is that non-payment of the trust receipts at maturity caused appellee to be in “default” at the time suit was filed, which in turn entitled appellant to repossess the entire floor plan. The evidence of custom operated to explain the ambiguous term “default” and not to vary the dates at which the trust receipts matured. Where terms in a contract are ambiguous, or are used in a sense other than the ordinary meaning of the words, oral testimony is admissible to explain the meaning of the words used. *Paepcke-Leicht Lbr. Co.*v. *Talley,*106 Ark. 400, 153 S. W. 833 (1913); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 85-1-205 (Add. 1961). This evidence would justify a jury in concluding that appellee was not in “default” at the time a particular trust receipt matured, but rather that further steps were to be taken by both parties before this portion of the contract became operative.

Rehearing denied.
Antuan R. GOLDEN, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 1D17-3459

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

February 9, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
Hermina FORTUNE, Appellant, v. REVERSE MORTGAGE SOLUTIONS, INC., Appellee.

No. 3D17-109

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

Opinion filed February 21, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.
----

----

Neffs Bancorp 10-K/A

| ·   | the report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| ·   | the information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the Corporation’s financial condition and results of operations. |
|--------------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                          |   |
|-----------------------------------------------|--------|
| /s/ Kevin A. Schmidt                |   |
| Kevin A. Schmidt, Principal Financial Officer |   |
LSB INVESTMENT CORP., Appellant(s)/Petitioner(s), v. MIAMI JUICE CORP., Appellee(s)/Respondent(s),

CASE NO.: 3D17-0283, 3D17-0045

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.

OCTOBER 09, 2017

ORDERED that appellant's notice of voluntary dismissal is recognized by the Court, and these consolidated appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Florida are hereby dismissed.
Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/04/21 Page: 1 of 2  PAGEID #: 162

Case: 1:18-cv-00518-MRB-SKB Doc #: 29 Filed: 08/04/21 Page: 2 of 2  PAGEID #: 163
N.D. v. BALDWIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES

2160094

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 24, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Affirmed.