J-S16002-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

D.R. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 Appellant : PENNSYLVANIA

:

v. : No. 1578 MDA 2014

:

M.A. :

 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 29, 2014 

In the Court of Common Pleas of York County

Family Division, at No. 2006-FC-001521-03

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and OTT, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED APRIL 24, 2015

D.R. (Father) appeals, pro se, the order of the Court of Common Pleas 

of York County, entered August 29, 2014, that awarded shared legal and 

physical custody of his daughter, A.R. (Child), fifteen years of age, to him 

and to M.A. (Mother). We affirm.

Father and Mother had physical custody of A.R. and her sister, E.R., 

according to a schedule of their own making from 2006 until 2012. Under 

that schedule, Father had primary physical custody. E.R. is not subject to 

the order under appeal as she has reached majority. 

Father filed a complaint in custody on January 13, 2012, in which he 

sought shared legal custody and primary physical custody. The parties 

attended a conciliation conference; the conciliator recommended shared 

physical and legal custody. The parties took the matter to trial in June 2012 

and eventually stipulated to shared physical and legal custody.
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Father filed a petition to modify custody on January 28, 2014, in which 

he sought sole legal custody and primary physical custody. After a 

conciliation conference in March 2014, the conciliator recommended that the 

parties abide by the order then in effect. The trial court conducted a hearing 

on Father’s petition and, on August 29, 2014, entered the order complained 

of here that continues shared legal and physical custody. This timely appeal 

followed.

Our scope and standard of review is as follows.

In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type 

and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept 

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent 

evidence of record, as our role does not include making 

independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to 

issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to 

the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses 

first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s 

deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, 

the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable 

as shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the 

conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, 

or are unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the 

trial court.

C.R.F. v. S.E.F., 45 A.3d 441, 443 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation omitted). 

We have stated that 

[T]he discretion that a trial court employs in custody matters 

should be accorded the utmost respect, given the special nature 

of the proceeding and the lasting impact the result will have on 

the lives of the parties concerned. Indeed, the knowledge 

gained by a trial court in observing witnesses in a custody 

proceeding cannot adequately be imparted to an appellate court 

by a printed record. 
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Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation 

omitted). 

The primary concern in any custody case is the best interests of the 

child. “The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, 

considers all factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s 

physical, intellectual, moral, and spiritual wellbeing.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 

A.2d 509, 512 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). Additionally, 

[t]he parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial 

court places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern 

of the trial court is the best interest of the child. Appellate 

interference is unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration 

of the best interest of the child was careful and thorough, 

and we are unable to find any abuse of discretion.

S.M. v. J.M., 811 A.2d 621, 623 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). 

We begin by noting that the trial court entered a comprehensive 

opinion with its order of August 29, 2014. In that opinion, the trial court 

discussed each of the sixteen statutory custody factors in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

5328. On October 20, 2014, the trial court entered a supplemental opinion 

in which it discussed Father’s errors complained of on appeal.

In his first issue, Father complains that the trial court erred when it 

relied on the close proximity of the residences of the parties and awarded 

shared custody because “this distance is conducive to a shared custody 

schedule.” Trial Court Opinion, 8/29/14 (TCO), at 5. In its supplemental 

opinion, the trial court admits that it found the close proximity of the parties’ 

residences conducive to shared custody, but stated, “[t]his Court considered 
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all of the relevant factors pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §5328 in regards to the 

best interests of the [C]hild in making the decision to award shared physical 

custody of the [C]hild to the parties.” Supplemental Opinion, 10/20/14 

(SO), at 5. Father focuses on a single finding. He ignores the fact that the 

trial court conducted a comprehensive evaluation of the facts upon which it

based its decision to award shared custody. We find no error in the trial 

court’s determination to award shared custody. Father’s first issue is 

without merit.

In his second issue, regarding factor seven, the well-reasoned 

preference of the child, Father complains that the trial court did not award 

him primary custody in spite of the fact that Child maintained “a preference 

for his household and that she gave a very good reason for wanting that 

preference: to maintain a good relationship with her sister.” Father’s Brief, 

at 13.

Child did not express a preference to live in Father’s household. She 

expressed a preference to be there when her sister was present. We quote 

the trial court’s explanation, with approval, “[Child’s] preference was focused 

on the maintenance of a relationship with her older sister who is living at 

Father’s residence and the creation of a custody schedule that would allow 

her to be at Father’s residence when her sister would also be present and 

available. As identified in the Opinion, [Child] did not state a preference as 

to whose residence she would like to spend the majority of her time.” SO, 
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at 1-2. Child refused to state a preference for one household over the other, 

and that her only preference was to maximize the time she spent with her 

older sister. The trial court did not err when it found factor seven to be 

neutral. Father’s second issue is without merit.

In his third issue, Father complains that the trial court abused its 

discretion when it found that factor one, which party encourages continued 

contact with the other party, favored Mother. We quote the trial court’s 

analysis with approval:

The [c]ourt weighed “Encouragement of Continued Contact 

between the Other Party” in favor of Mother because the 

evidence at trial established that [Child] has visited Father’s 

residence freely during Mother's custody time. It is true that 

both Mother and Father testified that they encourage contact 

between [Child] and the other party; however, limited testimony 

was presented evidencing [Child] actually visiting Mother’s 

residence during Father’s custody time. Father testified that 

[Child] would be allowed to go to Mother’s during his custody 

time to pick up anything she forgot at her Mother’s residence. 

(Transcript p. 7) However, testimony by Mother established that 

Father is not as willing to allow [Child] to visit Mother’s residence 

during his custody time. Mother testified that on one occasion 

Father refused to let [Child] come over to Mother’s early to pack 

for a vacation. (Transcript p. 111) On another occasion, Mother 

testified that Father was not willing to allow her to exercise her 

entire vacation rental because it cut into his custody time with 

[Child]. (Transcript p. 112) In light of this testimony and the 

lack of testimony regarding [Child] actually visiting Mother’s 

residence during Father’s custody time, the [c]ourt found that 

this factor weighed in favor of Mother.

SO, at 3-4. The record supports the trial court’s determination that it is 

Mother, not Father, who will encourage continuing contact with the other 

party. Father’s third issue is without merit. 
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In his fourth issue, regarding factor eight, attempts to turn child 

against the other parent, Father claims, “[t]he trial court weighed the 

handling of the financial matters in favor of Mother over Father, but it 

expressly ignored testimony that would not put Mother in a favorable 

light[.]” Father’s Brief, at 27.

In support of his claim, Father examines the testimony and the 

evidence presented to the trial court and asks us to reach a different 

conclusion. This we may not do. We are bound to accept the conclusions of 

the trial court if they are supported by the record, even if it were possible to 

reach a different conclusion. See S.M. v. J.M., supra. The record supports 

the trial court’s conclusion that “this factor weighs slightly in favor of 

Mother.” TCO, at 11. 

In his fifth issue, Father complains that the trial court erred when it 

found that Father’s handling of financial affairs created friction with the 

Children where the only significant friction was with the child who had 

reached majority. Father, however, failed to present any argument in his 

brief in support of this claim and has therefore failed to develop a coherent 

legal argument to support it. By failing to develop a coherent legal 

argument, he has waived his claim. “[A]rguments which are not 

appropriately developed are waived.” Lackner v. Glosser, 892 A.2d 21, 

29-30 (Pa. Super. 2006) (internal citations omitted). See Chapman-Rolle 

v. Rolle, 893 A.2d 770, 774 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“It is well settled that a 
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failure to argue and to cite any authority supporting an argument constitutes 

a waiver of issues on appeal”). 

In his sixth issue, Father again claims the trial court erred in favoring 

Mother over Father on the handling of financial matters. Once again, 

though, Father examines the testimony and the evidence presented to the 

trial court and asks us to reach a different conclusion. We again decline to 

do so. See S.M. v. J.M., supra.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/24/2015