UNITED STATES ARMY

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

INTERVIEW OF

BG EDWARD G. KLEIN

Commander, 53rd Troop Command

126-ORH-I-056

NEIT-126-056

CONDUCTED BY

SGT PATRICK JENNINGS

SFC DAN MORIARTY

The Center of Military History

AT

53rd Troop Command

Valhalla, New York

October 13, 2001

TAPE TRANSCRIPTION
2

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 SFC MORIARTY: Today's date is 13 October 2001. 

3 This is SFC Dan Moriarty of the 126 Military History. 

4 SGT JENNINGS: This is SGT Patrick Jennings of the 

5 126th Military History Detachment.

6 SFC MORIARTY: And this interview is with BG 

7 Edward G. Klein, K-l-e-i-n, commander of 53rd Troop 

8 Command. 

9 SGT JENNINGS: This is the disclaimer. I 

10 understand that the tape and transcript resulting from 

11 this oral history will belong to the U.S. government to 

12 be used in any manner deemed in the best interest of 

13 the U.S. Army as determined by the Chief of Military 

14 History and his representatives.

15 I also understand that subject to security 

16 classification restrictions, I will be given the 

17 opportunity to edit the resulting transcript in order 

18 to clarify and expand my original thoughts.

19 The Army will provide me with a copy of the edited 

20 transcript for my own use, subject to classification 

21 restrictions. 
3

1 Do you have any conditions you want to put on this 

2 pertaining to, or a written request for a copy?

3 BG KLEIN: No.

4 SGT JENNINGS: If you could then initial that 

5 block and sign down here, sir, and date it right there.

6 BG KLEIN: Okay.

7 SGT JENNINGS: Thank you, sir. Okay, we were just 

8 talking briefly about the role that you and your unit 

9 played and you were starting to explain the Y2K plan.

10 BG KLEIN: Okay. Essentially how task 

11 organization works is as a result of our planning, when 

12 I say "our," state headquarter planning for Y2K, it was 

13 decided that they would form a regional task force 

14 because in New York we're kind of unique in that we 

15 have the Army Guard, the Air Guard, the New York Naval 

16 Militia, which is Marine and Navy folks, and also we 

17 have our state defense force, which is the New York 

18 Guard.

19 So for Y2K, they set up regional task forces, Long 

20 Island being Task Force 1, the New York City area being 

21 Task Force 2. Task Force 3 I think might be up in 
4

1 Stuart Air Force Base. Task Force 4 (inaudible) region 

2 and so on across the state.

3 And these people, being a task force, when the 

4 World Trade Center terrorist act took place and this 

5 catastrophe, first we didn't know what it was. We just 

6 first thought it was a plane crash. 

7 That immediately activated, the adjutant general 

8 activated Task Force 1, Task Force 2, which is the New 

9 York City task force, which by design would fall under 

10 my command as the area senior representative of 53rd 

11 Troop Command (inaudible) formed the task force.

12 And that joint task force was made up of Air 

13 National Guard, Army Guard, New York Guard and the New 

14 York Naval Militia were the first units that were 

15 called up. 

16 So that's how the command structure is 

17 established. My headquarters was supplemented by Task 

18 Force 1, which is in Long Island. And that worked out 

19 real well because that's the air rescue unit and that 

20 gave me ability to integrate the knowledge of how the 

21 air units worked and their expertise. So that was the 
5

1 structure.

2 SGT JENNINGS: Now, how were you notified, sir? I 

3 mean, did it come through the chain of command?

4 BG KLEIN: Yeah, I got a call from the adjutant 

5 general, who said that, you know, that at that point it 

6 was a plane crash when the first plane crashed into the 

7 World Trade Center and that they were going to more 

8 than likely, you know, activate the Guard and, you 

9 know, how quickly could I get in.

10 I said, "I'm on my way in now." So I just drove 

11 in. I had a couple of cell phone calls after the 

12 initial notification as to report to Reynolds Island 

13 and where units were going to go. 

14 But I came in here because there was nothing at 

15 Reynolds Island and I couldn't talk, and that was going 

16 to be a staging area. 

17 But because of all our communications and people 

18 were reporting to this location, the decision was made 

19 for me to come here, get organized and then find out 

20 where I could best control the situation. 

21 So what I did is got in here. Once my staff was 
6

1 organized and operating, I spoke with the adjutant 

2 general and I said, "Look, communication is really bad. 

3 I'm not able to speak to the units that we already 

4 were responding to the actual Ground Zero." 

5 I said, "I'd like to go down there." And he said, 

6 "By all means, you know, get yourself down there." So 

7 I got a Humvee and went down, which was probably the 

8 best move I made, because with the breakdown in 

9 communications being one problem, I mean, we had a lot 

10 of alternate means of communicating.

11 We were using personal cell phones because the 

12 World Trade Center communications network, that's where 

13 the antennas are for most of the cell phones.

14 SGT JENNINGS: Right in that building. 

15 BG KLEIN: Exactly. So the fire department 

16 headquarters was destroyed and the New York City 

17 Emergency Management headquarters was destroyed.

18 So I went down to the scene. Quite by 

19 coincidence, I had only been down there about three 

20 months prior to meet with the head of the New York City 

21 Emergency Management, Richard Shearer (phonetic), and 
7

1 some of his deputies.

2 And then with one or two of them just a week 

3 before the incident, I had lunch with them and we had 

4 decided we were going to put a National Guard desk in 

5 there if there's an emergency. 

6 So I already had a rapport going with them. So I 

7 put liaison offices right initially with them. I put 

8 some police officers here. I put them into police 

9 headquarters.

10 And then I assessed the situation on the ground 

11 and was able to communicate that back to the adjutant 

12 general and his staff. That's how we developed what 

13 resources we were going to need, you know, by being 

14 there and being able to see what was going on.

15 Because the thing in this, we have procedures that 

16 we instituted that are called DSOP, domestic, support 

17 of domestic operations; I'm not sure of the exact 

18 nomenclature.

19 But, you know, it tells you how your procedure is 

20 supposed to work. If, for example, if a police officer 

21 or official wants something from the National Guard, 
8

1 what we have to do is refer them to New York State 

2 Emergency Management office or SEMO, which we call it. 

3 And then they would evaluate it and decide whether 

4 or not we could do that mission, and they would give it 

5 to my headquarters (inaudible) who would give me the 

6 mission and then we would go and execute it.

7 In this situation, thank God we had good 

8 commanders on the ground because this was a life and 

9 death situation. In a life and death situation, the 

10 commander on the ground makes the decision. You can't 

11 wait for that process to go through. 

12 You can imagine how bad it would have been if we 

13 had a National Guardsman sitting there afraid to make a 

14 decision and telling some fire official or police 

15 official or hospital official that, "This has to go 

16 through my headquarters and I can't do it; sorry."

17 They didn't do that. Life and death situation; 

18 these commanders took the bull by the horns and 

19 executed. And, you know, that, I think, was one of the 

20 keys to the success of this operation because every 

21 city official that I spoke with had nothing but praise.
9

1 As a matter of fact, my chief of staff is a deputy 

2 chief in the police department. Because of his 

3 critical position with the police department, I excused 

4 him, but that gave me an in.

5 SGT JENNINGS: A liaison. 

6 BG KLEIN: Right, to the police department. But 

7 he said, you know, one of the best sights that his 

8 officers told him was the fact when 600 of the first 

9 unit reporting of Guardsmen showed up in uniform as a 

10 group. 

11 Because the police, they operate in radio cars. 

12 They don't operate in units. So the first thing that 

13 they wanted was to have the crime scene sealed, and 

14 they weren't able to do it. 

15 So when that chief said to me, "This is what we'd 

16 like from you; can you seal off the perimeter?" we did. 

17 It took 2,000 soldiers to get that thing sealed off 

18 because you're talking the size of it and initially it 

19 was four battalions we put on line. 

20 Then we realized that it was too big and we 

21 started shrinking it down. Each day we would shrink it 
10

1 down. But the initial perimeter was 2,000 soldiers 

2 occupying that perimeter. And then, of course, as time 

3 went on we would develop shifts and stuff like that. 

4 Also, that first day all electricity was knocked 

5 out. So not only was it you had the phone and 

6 communications, that night there was no lights. 

7 So fortunately the units, anticipating that, went 

8 and got all their generating equipment and we had 

9 lights and generators going and then whatever the city 

10 has and whatever they were able to beg, borrow and 

11 steal. But we pretty well lit up the area pretty good 

12 that first night to be able to operate. 

13 That's, you know, the initial stages of the 

14 operation. Nobody could have planned for this. I 

15 mean, there was no --

16 SGT JENNINGS: That was going to be my next 

17 question. You mentioned the Y2K plan.

18 BG KLEIN: Right.

19 SGT JENNINGS: How much of that plan were you able 

20 to lift off and place onto this particular situation?

21 BG KLEIN: Well, the administration, the 
11

1 administrative parts played in well. The task force 

2 organization, the command and control, who was going to 

3 be in charge. So, you know, there was no confusion at 

4 the state headquarters. 

5 It happened in New York City. The troop command 

6 has got that area. They're in charge. So everybody, 

7 we all knew that this was our area and we knew that we 

8 were going to get it. 

9 Because that was the whole thing was like when you 

10 have task force, you want to build relationships. We 

11 started this relationship with Flight 800 and then it 

12 just progressed into the Y2K and we've had some snow 

13 storms and things like that.

14 So when that task force was organized, like COL 

15 Jim Scatina (phonetic) was my deputy. Now, he's the 

16 deputy commander of the air rescue unit of the Air 

17 National Guard. So Jim came in and he already had a 

18 working relationship with my staff. 

19 Because when you form a task force, the first few 

20 days is just getting to know each other. So, you know, 

21 there was, you know, an incident where somebody came to 
12

1 me and they said, "COL Scatina threw one of my officers 

2 out of the office." 

3 You know, and I said, "Well, if COL Scatina threw 

4 him out of the office, he deserved to be thrown out of 

5 the office." You know, so there was no argument there, 

6 you know. As a matter of fact, when I found out who he 

7 threw out, I was now going to give him a medal.

8 (Laughter.)

9 BG KLEIN: So that's how the Y2K, for the 

10 structure and organization. All procedures we had, 

11 about what I explained about going through SEMO and 

12 everything.

13 SGT JENNINGS: Right. 

14 BG KLEIN: That later came into play once we 

15 established communications, and that was fine. But for 

16 the first I would say day and a half there's no way 

17 that we could have done that, so we had to develop a 

18 whole new operating procedure, and that's called 

19 commander on the ground makes the decision and 

20 commander on the ground would be held responsible for 

21 that decision. 
13

1 And I told them, "If you make a good common sense 

2 decision, as long as I'm the commander and I'm wearing 

3 the star and I'm in the National Guard, I'll back you."

4 And I said, "If you made decisions, don't worry 

5 about them. Just continue to march ahead because I'm 

6 glad you did something. The worst thing would have 

7 been do nothing."

8 And I said, "And I don't need you distracted 

9 worrying about what may be a decision. Just continue 

10 to march on and do what you're doing." And they did a 

11 great job. The soldiers just responded magnificently.

12 One the things, I mean, you've probably been in 

13 the National Guard for a few years. You know when you 

14 get to (inaudible) the appearance of soldiers 

15 sometimes, you know, there's a couple (inaudible) for 

16 the first sergeant. 

17 SGT JENNINGS: Mm-hmm.

18 BG KLEIN: This didn't happen. You take a look at 

19 any, the newspaper pictures from the first day, those 

20 soldiers looked sharp, they looked professional. And 

21 that's so important when you're dealing with the 
14

1 public.

2 For example, when you set up a perimeter, if you 

3 walk up to a smart looking soldier that looks like he's 

4 in charge and is taking charge, then people will obey 

5 him.

6 SGT JENNINGS: Yeah.

7 BG KLEIN: But if you walk up and the guy looks 

8 sloppy and his appearance is, people are going to 

9 challenge you. And that didn't happen. Throughout my 

10 whole tenure as the two weeks that I was in command of 

11 this, everybody kept saying how smart the soldiers 

12 looked.

13 And there isn't one newspaper clipping of 

14 somebody without his chin strap on or anything. I 

15 mean, just a great thing to the leadership and the 

16 spirit of the people that they reacted to it. 

17 SGT JENNINGS: Going back to that process where 

18 under normal conditions you have to go up to the EEOC 

19 or whatever it was there. And going back to the fact, 

20 too, that the emergency management department --

21 BG KLEIN: Right. Right.
15

1 SGT JENNINGS: -- in New York City had been 

2 destroyed, had been flattened in Building 7.

3 BG KLEIN: That's right. 

4 SGT JENNINGS: They set up on Pier 92 is it? 

5 BG KLEIN: That's right.

6 SGT JENNINGS: At Pier 92. Now, the fact that you 

7 had everybody in the same room together, how did that 

8 work?

9 BG KLEIN: Well, that didn't work the first couple 

10 of days.

11 SGT JENNINGS: It didn't?

12 BG KLEIN: Because we didn't have it.

13 SGT JENNINGS: Okay. 

14 BG KLEIN: It took 72 hours to set that up, which 

15 is, have you been on it?

16 SGT JENNINGS: It's incredible.

17 BG KLEIN: Yes, incredible.

18 SGT JENNINGS: That they did it in 72 hours.

19 BG KLEIN: Yeah. Well, Richie Shearer, who is the 

20 head of emergency management, is, you know, a friend 

21 and who I visited with, and John Ardomat (phonetic) is 
16

1 the deputy. Two outstanding people that put that whole 

2 thing together in the first 72 hours.

3 But the first, what you saw there, we were working 

4 out of a grammar school right across the street from 

5 the Ground Zero. And that's where we operated, right 

6 in the lunch room. 

7 But we had a mini what you saw at 92nd Street, it 

8 was just maybe 50 people in there. But we had two 

9 people from the Guard, two people from the state 

10 police. So what you saw there was a much smaller 

11 group, but the same people. 

12 Then what overflow they had, they had up in the 

13 police academy on 20th Street and then they had some 

14 people working out of One Police Plaza. 

15 Once they were able to get Pier 92 set up, then 

16 everybody moved into Pier 92 and they shut down the 

17 high school and everything. But the first two days, 

18 three days, that was operational but out of the school.

19 SGT JENNINGS: How did you deal with the threat 

20 that there would be continued terrorist attacks, 

21 because during the first two or three days I think 
17

1 that's when everybody was most anxious that there might 

2 be follow-up attacks. You had the rescue going on to 

3 get any survivors, but at the same time you had to have 

4 force protection.

5 BG KLEIN: Well, that was always a concern. We 

6 told our people just, you know, well, one of the things 

7 that I can tell you, for example, the relationship that 

8 I developed with the people in emergency operations and 

9 my, I don't like to use the "I" word but that we 

10 developed.

11 You take the liaison officers that I had in there, 

12 they called me one night and they said, you know, it 

13 was the second day and it was pretty dark down there 

14 and some of the soldiers were concerned at night 

15 because they're by themselves.

16 So I called up John Ardomat, who is the deputy 

17 commissioner for the City of New York. I met him about 

18 1:00 in the morning. We walked the perimeter. We did 

19 it for two reasons. One, for the morale of the 

20 soldiers just, you know, we were out there 1:00 in the 

21 morning.
18

1 But when we saw a situation, for example, like you 

2 may have 10 Guardsmen on duty on one stretch, on a 

3 block let's say, but there was no police officer there. 

4 So as a result of that, we were able to integrate 

5 where we would always have, you know, police officers 

6 with each group of Guardsmen who were unarmed, so that 

7 was definitely a concern. 

8 The danger being down there in the dark, you know. 

9 Even though we had the lights, in some parts of the 

10 perimeter there were no lights. 

11 And being creative, a lot of the soldiers took and 

12 they took chem lights to mark dangerous, like things 

13 hanging off buildings, because there was a lot of fall14 out where let's say pieces of shrapnel fell and there's 

15 a big piece of plate glass hanging out of a window. So 

16 the soldiers would put chem light at night and mark it 

17 off with yellow tape. 

18 In the day yellow tape was fine so you wouldn't 

19 walk under this guillotine, potential guillotine. So 

20 they would mark it with chem lights. So the police 

21 were asking us for chem lights, you know, because they 
19

1 saw it was a great idea for night marking hazardous 

2 areas. 

3 So that's force protection, was marking with chem 

4 lights, getting the police integrated into our 

5 operation. And that's where the, you know, it comes 

6 into play of working with these agencies, keeping the 

7 task force geographically located so that you develop 

8 habitual relationships.

9 SGT JENNINGS: Okay. 

10 BG KLEIN: You know, and you're not going in there 

11 cold. This is just giving an example of the 

12 relationship that we had. When I went off duty, this 

13 is the first deputy commissioner's card, but on the 

14 back is his home phone number, his work phone number, 

15 his cell phone number and his fax. You know, "If you 

16 need anything, give me a call."

17 SGT JENNINGS: Yeah. You can reach out and touch 

18 him with that.

19 BG KLEIN: Right. So what I did is when my relief 

20 came in, who happened to be from Albany, GEN Taluto, I 

21 took him down there and we had lunch with the 
20

1 commissioner. 

2 I introduced him to all my counterparts that I had 

3 been working with and, you know, said, "Hey, he's a 

4 good guy and, you know, if you have any problems he's 

5 the task force commander. If anybody gives you a 

6 problem or if there's anything you need and they're 

7 telling you you can't get, you see him and, you know, 

8 we'll get it fixed." 

9 And that's the type of relationship he has now, so 

10 when his relief comes in hopefully he'll do the same 

11 thing. I'm sure he will. 

12 SGT JENNINGS: Now, you said you had it for about 

13 two weeks?

14 BG KLEIN: Right.

15 SGT JENNINGS: And then they're going to have it 

16 for a period of time. Was that also by plan? 

17 BG KLEIN: Well, I think how that really took 

18 place was most of our soldiers that had come on duty 

19 had just come back from JRTC, so they had just spent 

20 three weeks in JRTC.

21 Then once it stabilized, once it stabilized then 
21

1 what we did is we looked at it and said, "Hey, we need 

2 to get these people some relief." And they worked out, 

3 "Well, how long do you think you can stay?" 

4 Well, I said, this was like a week into it the TAG 

5 said to me. I said, "Probably another week and then, 

6 you know, these people need to get home." So then we 

7 started working (inaudible) the first ones on duty. 

8 This is actually five weeks they've been on duty when 

9 you take the JRTC.

10 SGT JENNINGS: I see. 

11 BG KLEIN: So they had jobs to get back to. We 

12 had about, I guess we downsized some of the units that 

13 we realized we didn't need, like they wouldn't let our 

14 engineers down there because our equipment didn't fit 

15 the mix. So we started dismissing the engineers and 

16 sending them back.

17 And we cut it down from 4,500 soldiers to about 

18 1,500 soldiers. And then now I understand it's even 

19 shrunk some more. 

20 And I explained that to the people when we first 

21 got on board. I said, "Two reasons don't look at us as 
22

1 a permanent fix because this is a part-time thing for 

2 most of us. We're emergency responders. And we're not 

3 just a force of cheap labor. You know, we're here to 

4 help. We're here to do whatever we can. But there 

5 comes a time when we get back just like the old militia 

6 and plow the farms and get back to a life of, you know, 

7 milking our cows and getting back to our real jobs."

8 SGT JENNINGS: (Inaudible.)

9 BG KLEIN: Exactly. Exactly. And just now it may 

10 be operating on a computer or something instead of 

11 taking in the hay.

12 SGT JENNINGS: Right.

13 BG KLEIN: And that's how the militia operates. 

14 So I said, "Don't look at us as a long-term fix. 

15 Besides, the other thing is we may be called up to go 

16 to active duty. So in your planning, wherever you can 

17 bring in civilian contractors or hire people, plan to 

18 do that because we're not going to be here for very 

19 long, especially if we go to war."

20 SGT JENNINGS: Mm-hmm. 

21 BG KLEIN: You know, our unit, I have a lot of --
23

1 (Interruption to proceedings.)

2 SGT JENNINGS: You were talking about the 

3 potential for your people to be --

4 BG KLEIN: Right. We have a lot of (inaudible) 

5 units in 53rd Troop Command. Again, part of what you 

6 said, the threat. We didn't know, you know, if this 

7 was a major attack, we were going to be called up. So 

8 I would expect my aviation units and stuff like that 

9 might be a very high priority. 

10 So they understood that, you know. But one thing 

11 that I was afraid of, that the mission creep and where 

12 we would start doing, you know, if they didn't 

13 understand it right from the get-go, and so it was no 

14 shock to them when I left. 

15 They were kind of, you know, like you're 

16 comfortable working with these people, my staff and my 

17 liaison officers. And some of the liaison officers, 

18 "Hey, I'll stay another week and help the new guy 

19 transition." You know, so I think it really went very 

20 smooth, the switch over to the other unit. 

21 And I know now GEN Garrett is going to take over 
24

1 from GEN Taluto because, you know, two weeks. He's 

2 going to take over. So whether they decide to bring me 

3 back or not, that's fine. 

4 But at least it gave me a breather to get my 

5 business back on track. To find out two weeks from now 

6 that they want to put be back in there for another two 

7 weeks, that's fine. But for me to stay running my own 

8 business would be difficult. 

9 SGT JENNINGS: You were saying you have what, 

10 4,200 troops?

11 BG KLEIN: First day.

12 SGT JENNINGS: First day?

13 BG KLEIN: Yeah.

14 SGT JENNINGS: And that's how many people 

15 responded? I didn't realize there were that many 

16 troops in the greater New York area.

17 BG KLEIN: Oh, yeah. Well, we brought them as far 

18 as Buffalo. We had two engineer units that came down 

19 from Buffalo, so you have 1,000 soldiers right there. 

20 And then most of them, though, were from the New York 

21 metropolitan area but 1,000 of them came from Buffalo.
25

1 SGT JENNINGS: Who took the initial decision not 

2 to arm the soldiers?

3 BG KLEIN: I don't know. That, the initial 

4 responders came armed and that was because we were 

5 called up under the DSOP. Threat com Charlie calls for 

6 arms. And so the first responders, it was the 

7 newspapers and there were pictures in there with 50s 

8 mounted on the Humvees and soldiers had their weapons.

9 The frag order that came down from our state 

10 headquarters that was signed by the adjutant general 

11 said that this is what the soldiers will have as 

12 equipment, and it's not armed. They were not to be 

13 armed. We locked up --

14 SGT JENNINGS: The weapons, yeah. The line where 

15 that word came from was an unknown or --

16 BG KLEIN: Well, it came to me from the adjutant 

17 general in the frag order, but where, I would imagine 

18 he got that from the governor. You know, that was the 

19 governor's decision. He can modify the (inaudible) 

20 order. 

21 And to be perfectly honest with you, I didn't 
26

1 fight it. I mean, any argument that I had, I won, 

2 because I was on the scene and he would do it. So 

3 there was a sufficient amount of police for this 

4 particular mission. I wasn't really that concerned to 

5 be armed. 

6 And we had the weapons right nearby, so if we had 

7 to issue them we could do it in a matter of minutes. 

8 But they were out of sight, out of mind. 

9 SGT JENNINGS: The soldiers on this mission were 

10 not federalized; they're under state orders?

11 BG KLEIN: State orders, correct. Right, and that 

12 was where the confusion was because if you check the 

13 federal, threat com Charlie says they're to be armed. 

14 And under the state threat com Charlie it said 

15 discretion of the governor and he can modify it. 

16 SGT JENNINGS: So now with that, in a sense the 

17 federal relationship not established and being the 

18 state, as you said, a militia relationship. 

19 BG KLEIN: Right.

20 SGT JENNINGS: How have logistics been handled? I 

21 mean, you've lost your traditional logistics lines 
27

1 between the federal government and how you pay 

2 soldiers, how you provide for them in the field. Have 

3 you established kind of a similar logistics line with 

4 the state? 

5 BG KLEIN: Well, that's a good question because 

6 there was a little bit of confusion on that, too. What 

7 we did, we established a state payroll. You know, 

8 where everybody on the federal system had direct 

9 deposit, so we had to pay by the old-fashioned way, 

10 checks. 

11 Because they're not in the state system, so there 

12 was a whole new experience for (inaudible) people. 

13 Being a task force, you know, how to collect that data 

14 from all the different units, and they did a remarkable 

15 job in getting that together because just about 

16 everybody got paid on time. 

17 I think out of the 4,100 there was like 200 people 

18 that didn't get paid, and that was made up in the next 

19 check, a supplemented check. So I think that was 

20 outstanding as far as the payroll went.

21 As far as the logistics went, that was another 
28

1 situation. The first couple of meals were MREs and 

2 then what happened was the civilians came to our aid. 

3 There were so many donations. I mean, if you went down 

4 it looked like a festival by day two.

5 McDonald's set up a booth. Pizza Hut, Burger 

6 King, you name it. They all had given away water, 

7 coffee. You couldn't, it was hard to walk a block 

8 without somebody trying to put a sandwich in your face, 

9 you know, which was from the volunteers. It was 

10 fantastic. 

11 They were delivering crates of water to the 

12 armories. You know, just the outpouring. So there was 

13 never a problem. No one ever came to me and said, 

14 "We're not getting fed." 

15 And then after the (inaudible) established then 

16 the state people got together and started state 

17 contracts to feed like in places like here.

18 Well, we had so much, so many donations that we 

19 were actually shipping a lot of the water and soda and 

20 stuff back to the armories in the outskirts where the 

21 soldiers were sleeping and marshalling. 
29

1 So it was just great that the people responded 

2 that way.

3 SGT JENNINGS: It is. We have been to Ground Zero 

4 and the amount of civilian support is astounding. But 

5 you have established a logistical train, if you will? 

6 Knowing that if this mission continues, even if it's 

7 just --

8 BG KLEIN: Right. Right. 

9 SGT JENNINGS: -- guarding subway stations or 

10 whatnot. You know, the civilian support will gradually 

11 fall off.

12 BG KLEIN: Oh, definitely. That's going to, I 

13 didn't even realize it was still going. I'm amazed 

14 that it's still going as long as it is. 

15 SGT JENNINGS: It is. 

16 BG KLEIN: But no, every unit has a civilian 

17 contractor as far as meals. Just about anything that 

18 they might need, like certain areas they needed cots, 

19 you know. They would call up, get a voucher and maybe 

20 go out and purchase them or they'd make arrangements to 

21 have the Red Cross maybe deliver, would pick them up.
30

1 I know the first night we were going to sleep on 

2 Reynolds Island and they made arrangements, the Red 

3 Cross was to get 2,000 cots. 

4 You know, we were able to pick up a couple of 

5 hundred and then we realized that we weren't going to 

6 go to Reynolds Island and so we were able to get Fort 

7 Hamilton. They had barracks there for 400. And then 

8 eventually Governors Island and then they had the 

9 Comfort, which is a ship. So I had no problem with 

10 housing. 

11 SGT JENNINGS: Did the original Y2K plan have even 

12 a loosely established set of rules of engagement for 

13 soldiers? During the first 48 hours, for example, 

14 there was a lot of questioning going on as to are there 

15 going to be further terrorist attacks. What are the 

16 soldiers supposed to do, were there established rules 

17 of engagement for how we would handle --

18 BG KLEIN: I wouldn't say it was a result of Y2K. 

19 It's a result of DSOP, the domestic, I'm bad on the 

20 nomenclatures. Some guys know them all but I have 

21 trouble with any of them.
31

1 But it's a state regulation for like in a civil 

2 disturbance. That's what we were operating under. 

3 (Interruption to proceedings.)

4 BG KLEIN: I would say that's what we were guided 

5 by, and that gives you all the rules of engagement as

6 you would do in civil disturbance, riot control or 

7 whatever. You know, that's pretty much what we're 

8 operating.

9 SGT JENNINGS: Actually, the National Guard seems 

10 to be more suited for these type, because this is a 

11 civilian-run operation and it seems that the Guard fits 

12 in better. 

13 BG KLEIN: That's my chief of staff. He's a one14 star in (inaudible) department, director of personnel.

15 SGT JENNINGS: Oh, okay. 

16 BG KLEIN: So you talk about habitual 

17 relationships. I mean, you know. So the fellow that I 

18 took the first day I went down to the scene has just 

19 retired from the fire department. So when I went down 

20 there to see what assistance we could render, I took 

21 him with me. 
32

1 So as soon as he went down there, you know, that's 

2 the chief, this is the general, you know. And then we 

3 established a relationship that I had just a couple 

4 weeks before. 

5 And then other people worked in Y2K. So I took, 

6 for example, one of my colonels who retired from the 

7 police department and a lieutenant colonel who retired 

8 from the fire department, put them into the emergency 

9 management office as the liaison and that type of 

10 thing.

11 So definitely more suited, because now already 

12 they know their operating procedures of the police and 

13 fire. We've talked the same language.

14 Now, if you had an active duty unit come in, and 

15 I'm not saying anything bad about the active duty, but 

16 just they wouldn't have those relationships. So in 

17 this situation, you know, we're hitting the ground 

18 running. There's no time to develop those 

19 relationships.

20 That's what's good about the task force that we 

21 work under, that we've already had these relationships. 
33

1 I think that was critical in this situation that 

2 everything went so smoothly the first couple of hours, 

3 the whole operation. 

4 Commanders, local commanders. The commander of 

5 101 Cav has a very good relationship with his 

6 community. It's right in Staten Island. The commander 

7 of the 69th is in Manhattan. So they have a great, 

8 their headquarters is in Lexington Avenue. 

9 The commander of the 107th is in Park Avenue, 

10 which is another, you know. That's the thing of having 

11 the geographical task force. 

12 SGT JENNINGS: In retrospect is there anything 

13 that you would have done differently?

14 BG KLEIN: Oh, a lot of things. A lot of things I 

15 would have done differently. Probably my biggest 

16 critic is myself of myself, you know. 

17 But I don't, in knowing what I knew at that time, 

18 I don't know what I could have done really differently 

19 to make it successful.

20 I think what we did and what we do really well in 

21 the National Guard is we respond to the situation. You 
34

1 know, how many times. We have such resourceful people 

2 here that when you're faced with what seems to be an 

3 insurmountable problem, somebody will come up with a 

4 way to get around it.

5 The people on my staff just amaze me because they 

6 were so proactive. I'm down there and I'm thinking 

7 about this and I say, "Oh, my God, it's raining." And 

8 meanwhile, my staff is already working on getting the 

9 rain gear. You know, they knew the weather forecast. 

10 And I said, "Wow," you know. 

11 So as a commander, if you have a proactive staff 

12 you don't have to be thinking about every possible 

13 thing that could happen. They had the weather report. 

14 They knew rain was forecast. They were in the process 

15 of getting tents set up. 

16 The day before I even, I wasn't thinking about it 

17 until it started raining. So the last guy that had a 

18 raincoat was me, you know. That's the type of thing.

19 SGT JENNINGS: Have you done a formal AR with your 

20 staff?

21 BG KLEIN: Yes, we did.
35

1 SGT JENNINGS: Would it be possible to get a copy 

2 of that? Have you written it up? 

3 BG KLEIN: It's written up. I don't think there 

4 would be a problem getting that. 

5 SGT JENNINGS: Do you have any other?

6 SFC MORIARTY: Just a few quick questions. Within 

7 the flow of command, this is kind of a unique situation 

8 since New York City is almost a state amongst itself, 

9 it's so gigantic. 

10 How did the movement of command and request work 

11 between the mayor, governor and National Guard? Did 

12 you have to go through the governor back down to the 

13 EEOC to the National Guard? 

14 BG KLEIN: Well, there again that emergency 

15 operations center that you saw on Pier 92, there's 

16 representatives in there from just about any, there's 

17 agencies in there I couldn't even think of. They're in 

18 there from the state, from FEMA to, you know, to city.

19 So they're all talking to each other and, you 

20 know, it's one of those things. When I first took over 

21 the battalion command somebody would come in and say, 
36

1 "I need ammunition." 

2 And I would go, "One is personnel, two is 

3 intelligence, three is training and four is the flow of 

4 supplies. So go see the four. What are you coming in 

5 here to see me for?"

6 Well, it would be the same thing. We have a 

7 situation. We need this. So we would go, well, that 

8 sounds like it's a federal thing, so they go to the 

9 FEMA guy. And then they would do whatever networking 

10 FEMA does to get whatever was needed. 

11 But everybody, every agency was proactive. They 

12 were coming to the head of the emergency management or 

13 his people and saying, "I think we could do this for 

14 you," or, "Do you need this?"

15 Some guy would say, "Oh, yes, that's a great 

16 idea." You know, and okay, they'd pick up the phone 

17 and get it. 

18 So whether they did their homework beforehand and 

19 say, "Hey, we have it, it's available, can we give it 

20 to these guys?" Pretty much whatever they asked for, 

21 they got. 
37

1 SFC MORIARTY: As the first general officer on the 

2 ground have you been contacted by the city or 

3 (inaudible) for lessons learned? Hopefully we don't 

4 have to go through this again, but with the potential 

5 threat, you know, even with these anthrax issues and 

6 other issues.

7 Because what you as the first general officer on 

8 the ground down there, what you and your staff did was 

9 remarkable in terms of this is something you never 

10 trained for. 

11 That's what I was getting at before when I asked 

12 you if there was anything you would have done 

13 differently pertaining to lessons learned.

14 BG KLEIN: As far as lessons learned as what we 

15 could have done differently, I think we could have been 

16 better equipped, you know. Things like just for 

17 example, having MBC equipment available, different 

18 things pre-positioned. 

19 You know, in the future all these things that we 

20 needed, to get cots. We should have had cots in the 

21 armories. You know, just different. Anticipate the 
38

1 needs, have it pre-positioned. 

2 Our emergency operations center downstairs, we had 

3 to get fax machines, telephone lines run in. I had to 

4 have like 10 lines run into this building. Where I was 

5 operating down in Park Avenue we had 25 lines run in. 

6 It took like a day or two to get it in. 

7 So the thing that was keeping us operating pretty 

8 much was our own personal cell phones. They finally 

9 contracted for 50 cell phones to give out to my staff 

10 because the radios weren't operating down in Manhattan 

11 with the tall buildings. 

12 And all the radio communications, FM radios that 

13 we would use weren't operating. So we were operating 

14 on our own personal cell phones for the most part. 

15 The cell phones that worked best were like I have 

16 a Jersey number for my business, New Jersey. That was 

17 working. The 914 cell phones were working. The 917, 

18 though, and the 212, which is the New York City phones, 

19 weren't working. 

20 So I think if we would have, you know, fax 

21 machines in our EOC, computers, you know, things like 
39

1 that, we should have those things pre-positioned and 

2 not have to wait a couple days to get the stuff in.

3 SGT JENNINGS: Is there anything you want to add 

4 to this interview, sir, because I know that your staff 

5 is waiting for you. 

6 BG KLEIN: No. I just, you know, I think it's a 

7 good idea what you're doing to keep the historical data 

8 on this, because hopefully if just one thing comes out 

9 of it, if somebody says, "Hey, maybe we could take a 

10 look at the New York model." 

11 It was a situation where they don't, they couldn't 

12 really plan for it, but I guess we did by having some 

13 things that, you know, didn't seem important at the 

14 time, but having the task force established by area and 

15 who was going to be in charge initially. So that 

16 eliminated that kind of confusion.

17 It's in that area, geographically it makes sense 

18 to have that person in that area that knows the area. 

19 The soldiers are familiar with the terrain. 

20 So I guess all those plans, you know, came into 

21 focus. And the other is the fact that we evidently 
40

1 trained our soldiers well because they responded well. 

2 What you do in the time of emergency is what you've 

3 been trained to do. 

4 So they treated people with dignity and respect 

5 and even though they had to be firm in not letting, the 

6 people that wanted to get into the area with real good 

7 intentions had to be kept out. 

8 And yet I didn't have one single formal complaint 

9 against one of our soldiers for like discourtesy. And 

10 I'm sure there was many people that wanted to get into 

11 that area for whatever reason. 

12 I know there were complaints of people, not so 

13 much complaints but people that were upset they 

14 couldn't get in. But once they thought about it, they 

15 understood why they couldn't. And then procedures if 

16 they really needed to get in there, there was 

17 procedures in place to get them there. 

18 SGT JENNINGS: Yeah, because I've heard about 

19 people that got dogs and stuff like that. 

20 BG KLEIN: Sure, which we've established a, once 

21 we had the situation under control we had situations 
41

1 where they would allow them 15 minutes. Just personal 

2 possessions, to get in and get out their possessions. 

3 Escorted them in, escorted them out and that type of 

4 thing.

5 SGT JENNINGS: We talked to a (inaudible) 

6 specialist who spent a lot of time going up and down 

7 stairs, because there was no electricity.

8 BG KLEIN: That's right.

9 SGT JENNINGS: And the elevators weren't working. 

10 So you'd ask what floor and they'd say the 31st and 

11 that was his third escort today.

12 BG KLEIN: And thank God we had the manpower to do 

13 it. 

14 SGT JENNINGS: Could we get your photograph, sir?

15 BG KLEIN: Sure.

16 SFC MORIARTY: I'll come back. The camera is with 

17 --

18 SGT JENNINGS: Oh, I see. Why don't you go see if 

19 you can get that, or do you want me to --

20 SFC MORIARTY: I'll go get it. 

21 (The interview was concluded.)
42

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