2019 IL App (1st) 163182 

SIXTH DIVISION

MARCH 29, 2019 

No. 1-16-3182 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, ) Appeal from the 

 ) Circuit Court of 

Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Cook County. 

 ) 

v. ) No. 15 CR 20308 

 ) 

ROBERT SCHULTZ, ) Honorable 

 ) Thaddeus L. Wilson, 

Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge Presiding. 

JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. 

Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Connors concurred in the judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 The defendant-appellant, Robert Schultz, seeks a reduction of his Class 2 conviction for 

unlawful use or possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) to a Class 3 offense, because he 

claims that the State did not prove that he had a prior conviction for a “forcible felony.” For the 

following reasons, we reject the defendant’s argument and affirm the judgment of the circuit 

court of Cook County. 

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 In December 2015, the defendant was charged by indictment with seven counts, 

including two counts of UUWF (counts I and II) and five counts of aggravated unlawful use of a 

weapon (counts III through V). With respect to count I, which is the only relevant count in this 

appeal, the indictment alleged that the defendant “committed the offense of unlawful use or 

possession of a weapon by a felon in that he knowingly possessed on or about his person any 

firearm, after having been previously convicted of the felony offense of felony firearm under 
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case number 12-009438 (Wayne County, Michigan), in violation of Chapter 720 Act 4 Section 

24-1.1(a) of the Illinois Compiled Statutes ***.” The indictment also specified that “The State 

shall seek to sentence him as a Class 2 offender in that he has been previously convicted of 

felony firearm under case number 12-009438 (Wayne County, Michigan).” 

¶ 4 The circuit court conducted a bench trial on October 6, 2016. The State first called a 

witness from the Illinois State Police Firearm Services Bureau, who testified that there was no 

record of the defendant ever having a Firearm Owner Identification Card or concealed carry 

license. The State then called the defendant’s arresting officer, Michael Power. Officer Power

testified that he was driving an unmarked police vehicle when he noticed a number of

individuals, including the defendant, loitering near a van. When Officer Power approached the 

van to conduct a field interview, the defendant removed a handgun from his waistband and 

“tossed it underneath the car onto the ground.” Officer Power arrested the defendant and 

recovered the handgun at the scene. 

¶ 5 In addition to this testimony, the State also offered into evidence the following 

stipulation: “It is hereby stipulated by and through the parties, the defendant, Robert Schultz, has 

prior felony convictions for the offenses of assault with a dangerous weapon and carrying a 

firearm while committing or attempting to commit a felony in Wayne County, Michigan, under 

Case 12-009438.” Defense counsel agreed that this was “So stipulated.” The State rested

following the stipulation. 

¶ 6 The defendant called a single witness, Ronnie Burnett, who testified that he was with the 

defendant at the time of his arrest but denied seeing the defendant with a gun. The defendant 

elected not to testify.
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3 

¶ 7 After closing arguments, the trial court found the defendant guilty of all counts. The court 

ordered a presentencing investigation report (PSI report) and scheduled posttrial motions and 

sentencing. 

¶ 8 The defendant’s PSI report reflected a prior conviction in Michigan for “Assault With a 

Dangerous Weapon” under case No. 1200943801. Attached to the PSI report is a “Criminal 

History Record” from Michigan, reflecting that in January 2013 defendant was convicted of 

felony “assault with a dangerous weapon” under section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal Code. 

Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82 (1994). 

¶ 9 On November 18, 2016, the court denied the defendant’s motion for new trial and 

proceeded to sentencing. In aggravation, the State referenced the two prior Michigan convictions

in the trial stipulation but did not offer specific evidence about the circumstances of either

conviction. The State requested a sentence in the range of three to seven years. 

¶ 10 After hearing evidence in mitigation, the court determined that all counts merged into

count I for UUWF and sentenced the defendant on that count to four years in the Illinois 

Department of Corrections, plus two years of mandatory supervised release. The transcript does 

not reflect that the court orally stated whether it found that the offense was a Class 2 or Class 3 

felony. However, the court’s written sentencing order specified a Class 2 conviction for UUWF. 

¶ 11 After the defendant’s motion to reconsider sentence was denied, defendant filed a timely

notice of appeal. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction. Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014). 

¶ 12 ANALYSIS 

¶ 13 On appeal, the defendant does not dispute that he possessed a firearm on the date of his 

arrest. Rather, he raises a single sentencing issue. He asserts that his Class 2 UUWF conviction 

should be reduced to a Class 3 conviction, because the State failed to prove that either of the 
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prior Michigan convictions referenced in the trial stipulation constituted a “forcible felony.” See 

720 ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2016) (violation of the UUWF statute by a person “who has been 

convicted of a forcible felony” is a Class 2 felony, rather than a Class 3 offense).

¶ 14 The defendant acknowledges the trial stipulation referencing two prior Michigan 

convictions, but he argues that the State failed to prove that either of the stipulated convictions 

was a “forcible felony” as that term is defined by section 2-8 of the Criminal Code of 2012

(Code) (id. § 2-8). He claims that because neither of the prior Michigan offenses is explicitly

named as a “forcible felony” in section 2-8, the State was required to offer additional evidence 

regarding the circumstances of the prior crimes, to prove that either fell within the so-called 

“residual clause” of section 2-8 of the Code. See id. (extending the definition of a forcible felony 

to “any other felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any 

individual”). The defendant thus argues that the State failed to meet its burden to prove a prior 

“forcible felony,” as necessary to warrant a Class 2 UUWF conviction. 

¶ 15 The defendant acknowledges that this issue was forfeited, as he did not raise this 

argument in the trial court. Nonetheless, he urges that we should consider it under the plain-error 

rule, which “bypasses normal forfeiture principles and allows a reviewing court to consider 

unpreserved claims of error in specific circumstances.” People v. Thompson, 238 Ill. 2d 598, 613 

(2010). The defendant relies on the second prong of the plain-error doctrine, which applies if “a 

clear or obvious error occurred and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the 

defendant’s trial and challenged the integrity of the judicial process.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. 

¶ 16 The State responds that there was no error and thus no plain error. See id. (“The first step 

of plain-error review is determining whether any error occurred.”). The State urges that the trial 
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stipulation was sufficient to support his Class 2 UUWF conviction, even without evidence of the

specific facts underlying the prior Michigan convictions, because both Michigan convictions 

were “inherently forcible felonies.” That is, the State contends that either of the prior Michigan 

offenses fell within the residual clause of section 2-8 and, thus, both were forcible felonies

supporting enhancement to a Class 2 conviction.

¶ 17 The sentencing provision of the UUWF statute states: 

“Violation of this Section by a person not confined in a penal 

institution shall be a Class 3 felony for which the person shall be 

sentenced to no less than 2 years and no more than 10 years ***. 

Violation of this Section by a person not confined in a penal 

institution who has been convicted of a forcible felony *** is a 

Class 2 felony for which the person shall be sentenced to not less 

than 3 years and not more than 14 years.” (Emphasis added.) 720 

ILCS 5/24-1.1(e) (West 2016). 

In other words, “the offense of unlawful use of a weapon by a felon is enhanced from a Class 3 

felony to a Class 2 felony when the defendant has previously been convicted of a forcible felony. 

[Citation.]” People v. Carmichael, 343 Ill. App. 3d 855, 859 (2003). 

¶ 18 The term “forcible felony” is defined by section 2-8 of the Code. See 720 ILCS 5/2-8 

(West 2016). Section 2-8 of the Code first sets forth a list of certain enumerated offenses that 

constitute forcible felonies,

1 which is followed by a residual clause that encompasses “any other 

felony which involves the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” Id. 

 1

The enumerated offenses are “treason, first degree murder, second degree murder, predatory 

criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, criminal sexual assault, robbery, 

burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated 
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6 

¶ 19 The parties agree that neither of the Michigan convictions referenced in the stipulation at 

defendant’s trial is included in section 2-8’s list of enumerated offenses. Thus, the crux of this 

appeal is whether either of those prior Michigan convictions falls within the residual clause of 

section 2-8. “Interpretation of the forcible felony statute is an issue of law, which we review 

de novo.” People v. Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141381, ¶ 5 (citing People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 

187, 192 (2003)). 

¶ 20 “An unenumerated felony falls within the residual clause if the defendant ‘contemplated 

that the use of force or violence against an individual might be involved and [was] willing to use 

such force or violence.’ (Emphasis in original.) [Belk, 203 Ill. 2d at 196.] But the defendant need 

not actually inflict physical injury. [Citation.]” Id.

¶ 21 “[C]rimes fall under the residual clause in one of two ways. First, where one of a crime’s 

elements is ‘a specific intent’ to carry out a violent act, every instance of that crime ‘necessarily 

qualifies’ as a forcible felony.” Id. ¶ 6 (quoting People v. Thomas, 407 Ill. App. 3d 136, 139-40 

(2011)). 

Thus, certain crimes, by definition, are necessarily considered forcible felonies, even absent

specific evidence of the circumstances of the prior offense. For example, in Thomas, the 

defendant challenged his conviction under the armed habitual criminal statute (which required 

two predicate forcible felonies) on the grounds that “proof of his previous conviction for 

attempted murder did not prove that he committed a forcible felony.” 407 Ill. App. 3d at 138-39. 

Our court thus “review[ed] de novo the question of law as to whether evidence that a defendant

had a prior conviction for attempted murder, without any details about the crime, proves that he 

 

battery resulting in great bodily harm or permanent disability or disfigurement.” 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 

2016). 
1-16-3182 

7 

committed a forcible felony.” Id. at 139. We held that attempted murder is necessarily a forcible 

felony:

“Because every attempted murder involves a specific intent to 

cause death, the trier of fact who finds a person guilty of attempted 

murder must find that the guilty person contemplated the use of 

sufficient force to cause very serious injury, injury that can lead to

death. Accordingly, we hold that every attempted murder qualifies 

as a forcible felony for purposes of the armed habitual criminal 

statute ***.” Id. at 140. 

¶ 22 Thus, to determine if a crime is inherently a forcible felony, we perform “an analysis of 

the elements of the underlying offense to determine whether proof of those elements necessarily 

entails the use or threat of force or violence against an individual.” Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 

141381, ¶ 6. Under that approach, we have held that attempted armed robbery is an “inherently 

forcible felony” because it “requires evidence that a defendant possessed the specific intent to 

knowingly take property from another by threat or use of force while armed with a firearm.” 

People v. Brown, 2017 IL App (1st) 150146, ¶¶ 19-22. We have also held that vehicular 

hijacking is an inherently forcible felony, because “the act of taking a motor vehicle from a 

person by the use of force or by threatening the imminent use of force necessarily involves at

least the contemplation that violence might be necessary to carry out the crime.” People v. 

Wooden, 2014 IL App (1st) 130907, ¶ 20. 

¶ 23 “The second way a felony can qualify as a forcible felony, even if a crime does not have 

violent intent as an element, is if the State proves that ‘under the particular facts of this case,’ the 

defendant contemplated the use of force and was willing to use it.” Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 
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141381, ¶ 7 (quoting Belk, 203 Ill. 2d at 195). Our supreme court’s decision in Belk illustrates 

this principle. The Belk defendant stole a vehicle and fled from police before crashing the 

vehicle, resulting in two deaths. 203 Ill. 2d at 189. The defendant was convicted of felony 

murder, based on the predicate felony of aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle. Id. at 

191. The defendant argued that the predicate offense was not a forcible felony, as required to 

implicate the felony-murder statute. Id. 

¶ 24 Because aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle was not one of the specifically 

enumerated felonies in section 2-8 of the Code, our supreme court framed the issue as “whether, 

under the facts of this case, Belk’s aggravated possession of a stolen motor vehicle involved the

use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.” Id. at 193. Our supreme court 

discussed whether there was “any evidence which would give rise to an inference that at some 

point during his attempt to elude the police [defendant] contemplated that escape might involve 

the use of force or violence against an individual.” Id. at 195. The court answered in the 

negative, finding that, although Belk may have “acted recklessly,” the evidence “does not 

support an inference that Belk contemplated that the use of force or violence against an 

individual might be necessary in order for him to accomplish his escape.” (Emphasis in original.) 

Id. Thus, our supreme court held that there was not a forcible felony supporting a felony murder

conviction. Id. at 197-98. 

¶ 25 In addition to Belk, defendant relies on more recent decisions of our court holding that, if 

a prior conviction was not inherently a forcible felony, then the State must offer specific

evidence to show that the prior crime involved the use or threat of force. Thus, in Sanderson, 

2016 IL App (1st) 141381, our court reversed a conviction for the offense of being an armed 

habitual criminal, to the extent it was premised upon a prior conviction for attempted residential 
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burglary. We held that the attempted burglary was “not inherently a forcible felony, since its 

elements do not include a specific intent to carry out a violent act.” Id. ¶ 9. Furthermore, the 

State offered “no evidence that, under the particular facts of this case, Sanderson contemplated

the use of force.” Id. ¶ 11. Without such evidence, the State could not prove the defendant’s

“willingness to use violence against another, which would be necessary for his conviction to 

constitute a forcible felony.” Id. ¶ 12. 

¶ 26 The defendant also directs us to Carmichael, 343 Ill. App. 3d 855. Similar to the instant

appeal, Carmichael concerned whether a prior stipulated conviction was a forcible felony that 

supported enhancement of a UUWF conviction to a Class 2 felony. Id. at 857-58. The

Carmichael defendant’s trial counsel stipulated that defendant had a prior conviction for armed 

violence, but the State did not introduce evidence regarding the circumstances of that prior 

offense. Id. at 858. We reasoned that, since the “record [was] silent as to the circumstances 

surrounding the defendant’s armed violence conviction,” we could not assess whether the 

defendant “contemplated that the use or threat of force or violence might be necessary to carry 

out” the prior crime. Id. at 861. We further determined that armed violence was not an

“inherently violent” offense, as it could be “committed by merely possessing a firearm” during 

the commission of a nonviolent felony. Id.2 Thus, we concluded that the trial court erred in 

enhancing the UUWF conviction to a Class 2 felony. Id. 

¶ 27 The defendant’s opening brief relies on Carmichael and Sanderson to urge that the State 

was required to offer proof of the particular facts and circumstances of the prior Michigan 

convictions, beyond the trial stipulation, to prove that either offense was a forcible felony. 

However, the defendant’s argument ignores our precedent holding that such particularized proof 

 2

Further, the parties in Carmichael agreed on appeal that the armed violence conviction was 

“based upon [defendant’s] commission of the predicate felony of possession of a controlled substance.” 

Carmichael, 343 Ill. App. 3d at 860. 
1-16-3182 

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is not necessary, if a defendant’s prior conviction was for an inherently forcible felony. Indeed, 

the Sanderson decision explicitly recognizes that “crimes fall under the residual clause [of 

section 2-8] in one of two ways”; either the elements are such that “every instance of that crime 

necessarily qualifies as a forcible felony,” or the State can prove that “under the particular facts 

of this case, the defendant contemplated the use of force and was willing to use it.” (Internal 

quotation marks omitted.) Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141381, ¶¶ 6-7. 

¶ 28 The State urges that either of the two prior Michigan convictions referenced in the trial 

stipulation inherently constitutes a forcible felony. First, to the extent the stipulation referred to

the defendant’s prior felony conviction for “assault with a dangerous weapon,” the State argues 

that this stipulation (as well as the PSI report and other documents in the record) prove that he 

was convicted under Michigan’s felonious assault statute, section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal 

Code (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82 (1994)). The State urges that the language of that statute, as 

well as Michigan case law defining “assault,” establishes that this conviction necessarily 

qualifies as a forcible felony. 

¶ 29 In response, the defendant’s reply brief first argues that the State cannot rely on any

Michigan statute because “the prosecutor did not refer to the Michigan statutes [the defendant] 

violated” at trial or during sentencing. The defendant does not dispute that the PSI report and 

other record documents reflect that he was, in fact, convicted under section 750.82. However, he 

argues that “[b]ecause the criminal history report was not introduced at trial and the prosecutor

never referred to the particular [Michigan] statutes *** at sentencing, it is improper for the State 

to rely on them” in this appeal. The defendant essentially argues that, since the trial stipulation 

did not cite a specific statute, the State cannot refer to any statute in its argument before our 

court. 
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¶ 30 We disagree. At trial, the defendant stipulated that he was convicted in Michigan of two 

felonies, including “assault with a dangerous weapon.” We recognize that the State was 

somewhat careless in crafting the wording of the stipulation, to the extent that it failed to include 

a citation to the precise Michigan statute underlying that prior conviction. We certainly do not 

mean to encourage that practice, and we admonish the State to be more precise in such 

stipulations, especially when referencing prior out-of-state convictions. Nonetheless, we do not 

find that this omission leads to reversible error in this case, as the defendant does not cite (and 

we are not aware of) any authority that would preclude the trial court from taking notice of the 

Michigan legal authorities that define the stipulated offense. As discussed below, those 

authorities make clear that a felony for “assault with a dangerous” weapon in Michigan would be 

premised under section 750.82. Further, the defendant does not dispute that the trial stipulation 

referred to his prior conviction under section 750.82.3

 

¶ 31 The defendant’s reply otherwise suggests that it is improper for our court to consider 

whether an out-of-state statute describes a “forcible felony” for purposes of the Code section 2-

8’s residual clause. He acknowledges that “Illinois courts have evaluated Illinois statutes” to 

determine if an offense is inherently a forcible felony under section 2-8 but points out that “the 

State cites no cases where out of state statutes were examined.” We reject the defendant’s 

suggestion. Our precedent indicates that we may conduct “an analysis of the elements of the 

 3

We note that other record documents make clear that the defendant was, in fact, convicted under 

section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal Code. The PSI report references a conviction for “Assault with a 

Dangerous Weapon” in case No. 1200943801; the Michigan criminal history records state (under the 

same case number) that he was convicted of “Assault With [a] Dangerous Weapon,” explicitly 

referencing “750.82” as the statutory basis for that conviction. The defendant does not dispute the 

accuracy of these records. We recognize that these sentencing documents could not be relied upon by the 

trial court as evidence that the prior conviction was for a violation of section 750.82; nonetheless, they 

undermine any suggestion that the stipulated conviction at issue could have referred to some other 

offense.

 
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underlying offense to determine whether proof of those elements necessarily entails the use or 

threat of force or violence.” Sanderson, 2016 IL App (1st) 141381, ¶ 6. The defendant does not 

cite any authority suggesting that we are precluded from applying that same analysis to crimes 

committed in other jurisdictions. Moreover, nothing in section 2-8 of the Code suggests that only 

a prior conviction under Illinois law may constitute a “felony which involves the use or threat of 

physical force or violence against any individual.” 720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2016). Similarly, the 

UUWF statute does not suggest that only Illinois forcible felonies may support a sentencing

enhancement to a Class 2 offense. See id. § 24-1.1(e). 

¶ 32 We thus reach the question of whether the defendant’s prior Michigan conviction for 

“assault with a dangerous weapon” constituted a forcible felony. The defendant urges that, even 

assuming that he was “found guilty of felonious assault pursuant to [section 750.82 of the 

Michigan Penal Code], this offense does not inherently constitute a forcible felony.” As set forth 

below, we disagree.

¶ 33 Section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal Code is entitled “Felonious assault; violation in a 

weapon free school zone” and provides, in relevant part: 

“Except as provided in subsection (2),

[4] a person who assaults 

another person with a gun, revolver, pistol, knife, iron bar, club, 

brass knuckles, or other dangerous weapon without intending to 

commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder is 

guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 4 

years or a fine of not more than $2,000.00, or both.” Mich. Comp. 

Laws § 750.82 (1994). 

 4

Subsection (2) refers to a violation of subsection (1) “in a weapon free school zone.” Mich. 

Comp. Laws § 750.82 (1994). 
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¶ 34 We first note, as recognized by the parties, that Michigan lacks a statutory definition for 

the crime of simple “assault.” However, in People v. Gardner, 265 N.W.2d 1 (Mich. 1978), the 

Michigan Supreme Court approved of three separate definitions of criminal assault, derived from 

three different treatises. First, the Michigan Supreme Court stated: “We adopt what Perkins on 

Criminal Law *** says is the majority rule, namely a simple criminal assault is made out from 

either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act which places another in reasonable 

apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” (Internal quotation marks omitted). Id. at 7. 

The Gardner court further approved definitions from two additional treatises. See id. (“We also 

hold that either the Cyclopedia or the Bishop definition *** is an adequate definition of a form of 

assault and that both forms are actionable in the criminal law.”). Thus, the Michigan Supreme 

Court also approved two other definitions: (1) “[a]n assault is any attempt or offer with force or 

violence to do a corporal hurt to another, whether from malice or wantonness, with such 

circumstances as denote at the time an intention to do it, coupled with a present ability to carry

such intention into effect” and (2) “[a]n assault is any unlawful physical force *** creating a 

reasonable apprehension of immediate injury to a human being.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. at 6. 

¶ 35 The State notes that two of the three definitions of assault approved in Gardner include 

the term “force” and thus argues: “The fact that ‘force’ is a defined element of assault shows that 

some measure of violence was not only contemplated but carried out by defendant.” The State 

thus suggests that Gardner establishes that any assault is necessarily a forcible felony.

¶ 36 The defendant’s reply brief emphasizes the remaining definition approved by Gardner, 

i.e., that “a simple criminal assault is made out from either an attempt to commit a battery or an 

unlawful act which places another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate 
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battery.”(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. at 7. The defendant argues that, because this 

definition does not “include either the use or threat of force” as an element, Gardner establishes

“that a Michigan felonious assault conviction does not inherently constitute a forcible felony in 

Illinois.” 

¶ 37 We disagree. First, we are not convinced that the Gardner definition relied upon by 

defendant does not describe an inherently forcible act. That definition states that a simple 

criminal assault is an “either an attempt to commit a battery or an unlawful act which places 

another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. We recognize that this definition does not use the precise terms “threat” or “force.” 

Yet, even under this definition, we fail to see how one can attempt to commit a battery, or place 

another in reasonable apprehension of receiving an immediate battery, without contemplating or 

threatening the use of force. Notably, defendant does not even attempt to argue how one could 

commit an assault under this definition without contemplating or threatening force or violence.

¶ 38 More importantly, whereas Gardner concerned the common-law definition of simple 

assault, in this case, defendant stipulated to a Michigan felony conviction for “assault with a 

dangerous weapon.” As discussed, the record makes clear that this referred to defendant’s

conviction under Michigan’s “felonious assault” statute (Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82 (1994)).5

Michigan authorities make clear that a conviction under this statute requires additional elements 

beyond the commission of the “simple assault” defined in Gardner. 

¶ 39 Significantly, in a decision just one year after Gardner, the Michigan Supreme Court held 

that, in prosecutions for felonious assault under section 750.82, “the jury should be instructed 

that there must be either an intent to injure or an intent to put the victim in reasonable fear or 

 5

Michigan courts refer to this statutory offense as either “assault with a dangerous weapon” or 

“felonious assault.” See, e.g., People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307 (Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (using both terms 

to refer to violations of section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal Code).
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15 

apprehension of an immediate battery.” People v. Johnson, 284 N.W.2d 718, 718-19 (Mich. 

1979). Thus, Michigan courts now recognize that “[t]o perpetrate a felonious assault, a defendant 

must commit ‘(1) an assault, (2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or 

place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate battery.’ [Citation.]” People v. Nix, 

836 N.W.2d 224, 230 (Mich. Ct. App. 2013); see also People v. Bosca, 871 N.W.2d 307, 325

(Mich. Ct. App. 2015) (“ ‘The elements of [assault with a dangerous weapon] are (1) an assault,

(2) with a dangerous weapon, and (3) with the intent to injure or place the victim in reasonable 

apprehension of an immediate battery. [Citation.]”). 

¶ 40 We note that this case law precedent refutes the argument in the defendant’s reply brief 

that relies upon the portion of the felonious assault statute specifying that it is committed 

“without intending to commit murder or to inflict great bodily harm less than murder.” 

(Emphasis added.) Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 750.82 (West 1994). The defendant suggests that 

“it cannot be said that a felonious assault conviction is inherently violent *** where an element

of felonious assault is that the defendant lack an intent to inflict severe bodily harm.” The 

defendant’s argument is without merit, as it confuses the lack of intent to kill or inflict serious 

bodily harm as equivalent to the lack of any intent to use or threaten force. However, the 

Michigan case law precedent clarifies that a conviction under section 750.82 requires a finding 

that defendant intended to injure or place the victim in reasonable apprehension of an immediate 

battery.

¶ 41 Under this precedent, it is apparent that defendant’s stipulated Michigan conviction for

assault with a dangerous weapon included findings that defendant had made “either an attempt to 

commit a battery or an unlawful act which place[d] another in reasonable apprehension of 

receiving an immediate battery,” that he did so with a dangerous weapon, and that he acted with 
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“either an intent to injure or an intent to put the victim in reasonable fear or apprehension of an 

immediate battery.” Johnson, 284 N.W.2d at 718-19; Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.82 (1994). 

Especially considering the requisite intent for this offense, we cannot see, and the defendant does 

not attempt to articulate, how one could violate section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal Code

without “the use or threat of physical force or violence,” within the meaning of section 2-8 of the 

Code (720 ILCS 5/2-8 (West 2016)). Thus, upon considering relevant Michigan authorities, we 

hold that defendant’s prior conviction for violation of section 750.82 of the Michigan Penal Code 

was inherently a forcible felony pursuant to section 2-8 of the Code. 

¶ 42 As the State points out, it needed only to prove that one of the two stipulated prior 

Michigan convictions was a forcible felony, in order to support the enhancement of the 

defendant’s UUWF conviction to a Class 2 offense. See id. § 24-1.1(e). As we have determined 

that the defendant’s stipulated conviction for “assault with a dangerous weapon” constituted a 

forcible felony, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding the other prior Michigan 

conviction referenced in the trial stipulation, for “carrying a firearm while committing or 

attempting to commit a felony.”

¶ 43 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County. 

¶ 44 Affirmed.