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Filed 7/7/21 Johnson v. Williams CA3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT

(Placer)

----

MICHAEL JOHNSON et al.,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

JONATHAN WILLIAMS,

Defendant and Respondent.

C088920

(Super. Ct. No. SCV0037100)

Plaintiffs Michael Johnson and Amae El’shloyh brought this negligence action 

seeking compensatory damages against a driver, Jonathan Williams, who rear-ended their 

vehicle at a low speed. After trial, the jury returned a verdict that defendant’s negligence 

was not a substantial factor in causing harm to either plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiffs argue 

substantial evidence does not support the jury’s verdict and the trial court abused its 

discretion in denying their motion for a new trial. These claims fail because plaintiffs 

had the burden of proof and the evidence did not compel a finding in their favor as a 

matter of law. El’shloyh further argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing 

defendant’s counsel to question her about a bioweapon experiment. To the extent she has 
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preserved the issue for appeal, she has failed to establish any error. We will affirm the 

judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

A. The Accident

On December 26, 2013, Johnson left the office of his chiropractor, Dr. Geiger, and

was stopped at an intersection with El’shloyh in his passenger seat when they were rearended by defendant. The jury was told that, if he had testified, defendant would have 

indicated that his best estimate of his speed was 10 to 15 miles per hour at the time he 

struck Johnson’s car. 

The defense expert on accident reconstruction and biomechanics testified that the 

impact speed of defendant’s car was five to nine miles per hour. Johnson never made any

repairs to his car as a result of the accident. 

Both plaintiffs were wearing seatbelts at the time of the collision, and the airbags 

did not deploy. El’shloyh called 911, and plaintiffs were taken to the emergency room. 

CT scans were taken of each plaintiff’s brain and cervical spine before they were 

released. El’shloyh’s scans were normal, and Johnson’s showed no change from prior 

scans. 

B. Evidence of Prior Injuries

To understand plaintiffs’ claim that the accident was a substantial factor in causing 

them harm, we must first summarize the evidence pertaining to their prior injuries.

1. Johnson

Johnson had been involved in several previous traffic accidents. After an accident

in 1995, he had numbness in his arms. 

In 2002 or 2003, Johnson was attacked by his roommate. After this incident, 

Johnson had neck pain, body stiffness, and numbness and tingling in the legs. He was 

diagnosed with degenerative spine disease and a possible spinal cord injury. 
3

In 2008, Johnson was riding a bicycle when he was struck by a car. He lost 

consciousness for several minutes and was later diagnosed with a traumatic brain injury. 

He suffered headaches and had pain in his neck, back, arms, and legs. He also 

complained of numbness in his lower extremities. Johnson began seeing Dr. Geiger after 

this accident. 

In December 2012, Johnson was rear-ended at a stop sign by a vehicle traveling

over 30 miles per hour. After that accident, Johnson had pain in his head, neck, low 

back, arms, legs, and fingers, as well as numbness in his low back and hip. Dr. Geiger 

concluded Johnson would have permanent pain in his neck and back as a result of the 

2012 accident.1 During his visit to Dr. Geiger just before the December 26, 2013 

accident, Johnson complained of neck and back pain, and tingling in his legs. An MRI 

was taken of his lumbar and cervical spine. 

2. El’shloyh

When El’shloyh was six years old, she was hung from a tree, which scarred her 

neck and damaged her trachea such that she was unable to speak for two years. In 1994, 

she suffered a facial fracture in a car accident. In 1997, she fractured her spine in a fall.

In 1998, her skull was fractured when she was assaulted. Dr. Geiger first treated 

El’shloyh in 2009. At that time, she complained of neck pain, right shoulder pain, low 

back pain, and hip pain. 

C. Post-Accident 

1. Johnson

Johnson testified that after his most recent car accident, he had trouble sleeping,

and his arms and legs were numb. Additionally, his neck pain, back pain, joint pain, head 

pain, and soreness all increased after the collision. 

1 Dr. Geiger’s deposition testimony was read for the jury. 
4

The day after the accident, Dr. Geiger examined Johnson again. At that time, 

Johnson complained of neck pain that radiated to the left trapezius muscle, elbow pain, 

mid-back pain, pain in his shoulder joints and sacral base, clicking and popping in his 

jaw, wrist pain, shoulder pain, sleeplessness, difficulty concentrating, difficulty with 

memory, difficulty with balance, and forgetfulness. Dr. Geiger’s tests supported 

Johnson’s complaints, some of which were new, but some of the conditions, “as far as 

neck pain, mid back pain, and lower back pain, were the same, except that the pain 

intensity had increased.” Dr. Geiger opined that the exacerbation of old symptoms and 

the new symptoms, such as jaw issues and neck pain that radiated to the left trapezius 

muscle, were caused by the latest accident. Dr. Geiger stopped treating Johnson in

March 2014. 

Johnson also introduced testimony from a chiropractic radiologist, two additional 

chiropractors, and a neurosurgeon, all of whom examined him at some point after the 

2013 accident. 

The defense played the video deposition testimony of Dr. Eyster for the jury. Dr. 

Eyster is a neurosurgeon, and he examined Johnson in August 2017. Dr. Eyster opined 

there was nothing objective to support any of Johnson’s complaints of new or further 

injury after the accident, though the accident may have caused a cervical strain. A

cervical strain is like a pulled muscle; the cervical muscle is attached to the base of the 

skull. 

2. El’shloyh

El’shloyh testified that after the accident she had problems with her head, jaw, 

neck, mid-back, hip, and shoulder. She also had double vision. 

The day after the accident, El’shloyh saw Dr. Geiger for the first time since 2009. 

She complained of occipital pain that radiated to the right side of her face and jaw, midback pain, pain in both shoulder joints, clavicular pain, headache, hazy vision, neck pain, 

a popping sensation in her right hip, numbness or tingling in her right leg, right wrist 
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pain, and popping in her right wrist. El’shloyh also complained that her bite was off, 

chewing was painful, her balance was off, “her guts and stomach were off, [and] that she 

had these urges to urinate or defecate.” Dr. Geiger indicated his findings supported her 

complaints. He ultimately opined that even though the collision was low-impact, the 

forces were enough to have caused her problems: “My opinion was that she had suffered 

from a low-impact collision; that those forces were enough to cause damage to those 

ligamentous structures; and that forces in hypertension were bad enough, when she hit the 

headrest, it caused her [jaw] problems, which were exacerbated by the fact that she had 

previous injuries and probably weakness in the structures due to the previous injuries.” 

Dr. Geiger did not see El’shloyh after April 2014. 

Starting in March 2014, El’shloyh saw the same additional chiropractors that 

Johnson relied on. They also testified as to their evaluation of El’shloyh. Additionally, a 

dentist testified he first saw El’shloyh in January 2014 and then not again until 2016. 

The dentist testified El’shloyh had limited movement in her right jaw joint from a 

possible dislocation, explaining: “I believe[d] that her pain and her condition were the 

result of the accident because that’s the only thing I have that—from the narrative she 

gave me, from my interrogation of the patient, and my seeking the truth of the condition 

of the patient. She never had any such issues before.” 

When Dr. Eyster examined El’shloyh in September 2017, she complained of neck 

and jaw pain, headaches, double vision, shoulder pain, incontinence, spinal cord damage, 

hip pain, right leg, and back pain. Dr. Eyster testified that nothing in his physical 

examination, El’shloyh’s medical records, or diagnostic films supported her complaints. 

Further, “her exam couldn’t have been more normal.” Additionally, he did not “know 

anything that could cause her symptomatology.” He explained that when he examined 

her, there was no evidence of any chronic cervical strain, but it was possible she had a

whiplash injury at the time of the accident. However, a cervical strain would not have 

explained her complaints of incontinence, weakness in the legs, numbness, or imbalance. 
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A neuropsychologist, Dr. Wicks, also testified for the defense. After reviewing

El’shloyh’s medical records and conducting psychological tests, Dr. Wicks concluded

“there is absolutely no injury, no indication of injury, no follow-up of any injury,” and 

her “psychological testing made absolutely no sense whatsoever” based on its 

inconsistencies. Further, her responses suggested she “[m]ay not have answered in a 

completely forthright manner.” He concluded El’shloyh had borderline personality 

disorder and somatic symptom disorder, the latter of which he described as someone who

reports a lot of physical symptoms from a lot of areas, but no one can find anything 

wrong with them. He further emphasized that “[t]he symptoms she claims as a head 

injury just don’t test out. She tested out normally.” 

C. Verdict

The jury was instructed that defendant “agrees that he was negligent, but denies

that the negligence caused [plaintiffs] any harm.” Further, the jury was instructed that, to 

establish their claim, plaintiffs had to prove they were harmed, and that defendant’s 

negligence was a substantial factor in causing the harm. “A substantial factor in causing 

harm is a factor that a reasonable person would consider to have contributed to the harm. 

It must be more than a remote or trivial factor. It does not have to be the only cause of 

the harm. [¶] Conduct is not a substantial factor in causing harm if the same harm would 

have occurred without that conduct.” The jury was instructed that to prove something, 

plaintiffs “need prove only that it is more likely to be true than not true.” 

The jury returned a special verdict concluding defendant’s negligence was not a 

substantial factor in causing harm to either plaintiff. As this was the first question on the 

special verdict form, the jury made no findings in plaintiffs’ favor. 

Plaintiffs moved for a new trial pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 657. 

The trial court explained that the basis for the motion appeared to be that the 

evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and/or that the damages were inadequate. 
7

The court concluded the motion did not elaborate upon or substantiate any of the other 

statutory grounds for a new trial under Code of Civil Procedure section 657. 

The court denied the motion. With respect to Johnson, the court explained, “The 

starting point in the evidence here is that the accident was a low-speed, approximately 5 

mph rear-end collision that caused very minimal property damage. Well before this 

accident, Johnson suffered the same symptoms and had many of the same subjective 

complaints he had after the 2013 accident. The jury reasonably concluded Johnson did 

not meet his burden of proving his post-accident symptoms and treatment were causally 

connected to the accident—a conclusion the court shares after consideration of all of the 

evidence. In short, the evidence does not support that a different result clearly should 

have been reached by the jury. To the contrary, the jury got it exactly right, and the 

court’s assessment of the evidence yields the same result as the jury.”

As to El’shloyh, the trial court stated her “affect and testimony at trial can be fairly 

characterized as bizarre and incredible. For example, at times, she simply refused to 

answer questions while testifying, despite court orders to do so. As another example, she 

claimed to have been part of a human experiment many years ago at UCLA where she 

was injected with bio-toxins. As a result of this low-speed rear-end collision which 

caused nearly imperceptible property damage, she claimed an entire galaxy of symptoms, 

including various physical limitations, emotional injury and head trauma.” The court 

stated, “the jury rightly disbelieved her testimony and claims—and so does the court.” 

The court also found “there was substantial persuasive evidence refuting her various 

claims.” 

Plaintiffs filed timely notices of appeal. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Where, as here, plaintiffs fail to prove their causes of action, the standard of 

review on appeal is not, as plaintiffs suggest, whether substantial evidence supports the 
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judgment. (Dreyer’s Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 

828, 838.) “We generally apply the familiar substantial evidence test when the 

sufficiency of the evidence is at issue on appeal. Under this test, ‘ “we are bound by the 

established rules of appellate review that all factual matters will be viewed most 

favorably to the prevailing party [citations] and in support of the judgment. . . . ‘In brief, 

the appellate court ordinarily looks only at the evidence supporting the successful party, 

and disregards the contrary showing.’ [Citation.] All conflicts, therefore, must be 

resolved in favor of the respondent.” ’ [Citation.] 

“But this test is typically implicated when a defendant contends that the plaintiff 

succeeded at trial in spite of insufficient evidence. In the case where the trier of fact has 

expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the

burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as 

whether substantial evidence supports the judgment.” (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 

1517, 1527-1528, disapproved on another ground in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 

Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7; accord Estes v. Eaton Corporation (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636, 

651.)

Instead, “where the issue on appeal turns on a failure of proof at trial, the question 

for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the 

appellant as a matter of law. [Citations.] Specifically, the question becomes whether the 

appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such a 

character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was 

insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) 

“This is ‘an onerous standard’ [citation] and one that is ‘almost impossible’ for a losing 

plaintiff to meet, because unless the trier of fact made specific factual findings in favor of 

the losing plaintiff, we presume the trier of fact concluded that ‘plaintiff’s evidence lacks 

sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof.’ ” (Estes v. Eaton 

Corporation, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.) “[I]t was the province of the jury to 
9

disbelieve any testimony which appeared to them to lack verity. They were the exclusive 

judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” 

(Gray v. Southern Pacific Co. (1944) 23 Cal.2d 632, 641.) “We have no power on appeal 

to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence.” (Bookout v. State of 

California ex rel. Dept. of Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486.) 

Plaintiffs also challenge the trial court’s denial of their motion for a new trial. 

“Where the trial court denies a motion for new trial, it is presumed that the verdict is 

correct. [Citation.] It is not our function to reweigh the evidence. [Citation.] The denial 

of a new trial motion based on insufficiency of the evidence will be reversed only if there 

is no substantial conflict in the evidence and the evidence compels the conclusion that the 

motion should have been granted.” (Toste v. CalPortland Construction (2016) 245 

Cal.App.4th 362, 367-368.) 

B. Questions About Bioweapon Experiment

1. Trial Court Proceedings

During trial, El’shloyh was questioned about whether she recalled reporting to a 

professor that she had chest pains and numb hands, and then reported to a police officer 

that subsequently helped her get to a bus stop that she had a lifelong problem of biotoxic 

illness. She replied that she has an immune system impairment, a heart condition, and 

her problem has not been lifelong. She was asked whether she recalled “reporting to the 

officer that [she] had been the subject of a bioweapon experiment conducted by Larry 

Ford at UCLA Medical Center.” El’shloyh said she could not say, did not have to 

answer, and did not have an answer. Finally, she said she did not recall saying that. She 

was then asked if she believed she got her biotoxic illness from this experiment. After 

El’shloyh continued to respond that she had no answer and did not have to answer, there 

was a discussion off the record, and then plaintiffs’ counsel went on the record to say 

El’shloyh indicated she has been in a witness protection program under the federal court 

system, and she was not to reveal certain information. Counsel objected that asking her 
10

about the experiment violated her rights. The court overruled the objection, explaining it 

had not been provided with relevant authority or any verification of this representation. 

Thereafter, El’shloyh continued to state that she had no answers to the questions on this 

subject. At one point, she was asked to describe “the experimentation that [she] 

contend[ed] [she] underwent resulting in this bioweapon experimentation.” The court 

overruled an objection that the question assumed facts not in evidence, and El’shloyh said 

she had no answer, but she could describe the symptoms of her illness. 

As set forth above, plaintiffs’ motion for new trial argued there was insufficient 

evidence to support the verdict. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 657, subd. (6).) The motion also 

included the following statements regarding the bioweapon experiment questioning: 

“Surely the court should have had at least [] an offer of proof of relevance. Counsel 

objected to the questioning. The questioning should have been disallowed under 

[E]vidence [C]ode section 352.” No further elaboration or citation to authority was 

provided, and the trial court’s ruling did not discuss these claims. 

2. Alleged Evidentiary Error

On appeal, El’shloyh argues the trial court abused its discretion in allowing 

defendant’s counsel to question her about her purported involvement in the bioweapon 

experiment. She contends the evidence was irrelevant. Alternatively, she contends the 

evidence should have been excluded under Evidence Code section 352 because its 

probative value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect, and it confused 

and misled the jury. However, at the time the questions were asked, El’shloyh did not 

object based on relevance or Evidence Code section 352. Her objection sounded in a

claim of privilege she did not support. 

Williams argues El’shloyh forfeited her claims of error. We agree.

“A verdict or finding shall not be set aside, nor shall the judgment or decision 

based thereon be reversed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless: [¶] 

(a) There appears of record an objection to or a motion to exclude or to strike the 
11

evidence that was timely made and so stated as to make clear the specific ground of the 

objection or motion.” (Evid. Code, § 353, italics added.) “The reason for the rule is 

clear—failure to identify the specific ground of objection denies the opposing party the 

opportunity to offer evidence to cure the asserted defect. [Citation.] ‘While no particular 

form of objection is required [citation], the objection must be made in such a way as to 

alert the trial court to the nature of the anticipated evidence and the basis on which 

exclusion is sought, and to afford the People an opportunity to establish its 

admissibility.’ ” (People v. Holt (1997) 15 Cal.4th 619, 666-667.) “A general objection 

to the admission or exclusion of evidence, or one based on a different ground from that 

advanced at trial, does not preserve the claim for appeal.” (People v. Marks (2003) 31 

Cal.4th 197, 228.) Further, the “filing of a motion for a new trial did not revive these 

claims that had not been preserved by a timely and specific objection.” (People v. Cowan

(2010) 50 Cal.4th 401, 486.)

El’shloyh also contends the trial court abused its discretion when it did not grant a 

new trial because El’shloyh was questioned on matters that were not in evidence. We 

cannot conclude this was an abuse of discretion because El’shloyh did not raise this issue

in her new trial motion. As we noted, at trial, her counsel did object to a question asking 

her to describe “the experimentation that [she] contend[ed] [she] underwent resulting in 

this bioweapon experimentation” on the basis that it assumed facts not in evidence. The 

authorities she relies upon are inapplicable to this or any other line of questioning related 

to the bioweapon experiment. (See People v. Murillo (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 448, 450 

[cross-examination of witness created the illusion of testimony and thus violated 

defendant’s right of cross-examination]; Smith v. Covell (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 947, 

959-960 [counsel asking witness “whether she had been told by a psychiatrist her 

symptoms were in effect manufactured for various suspect psychological reasons” was 

hearsay].) El’shloyh was asked about her own statements and experiences related to her 
12

prior complaints of injury. To the extent she has not forfeited the issue, El’shloyh has 

failed to demonstrate any of the trial court’s rulings were in error.

C. The Verdict 

1. Johnson

Johnson argues substantial evidence does not support the jury’s verdict because 

the undisputed evidence demonstrated he was injured, and no witness testified he was 

uninjured by the 2013 accident. These arguments misunderstand his burden of proof. 

The jury did not make any specific factual findings in favor of plaintiffs, and thus we 

presume the trier of fact concluded their evidence lacked sufficient weight and credibility 

to carry their burden of proof. (Estes v. Eaton Corporation, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 

651.) “[T]he trier of fact is not required to believe the testimony of any witness, even if 

uncontradicted,” and “[w]e have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses 

or to reweigh the evidence.” (Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of 

Transportation, supra, 186 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1487, 1486.) 

Johnson also contends Dr. Eyster’s testimony does not support the verdict. Again, 

defendant did not have the burden of proof and our inquiry on appeal is limited to 

whether plaintiffs’ “evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’ and (2) ‘of such 

a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was 

insufficient to support a finding.’ ” (In re I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) 

Johnson’s criticisms of Dr. Eyster’s testimony are unpersuasive. As to whether there was 

any corresponding objective findings to support Johnson’s increased complaints after the 

most recent accident, Dr. Eyster stated Dr. Geiger “had objective evidence of muscle 

stiffness and decreased range of motion that increased after the 2013 accident.” But 

when Dr. Eyster examined Johnson in 2017, “his range of motion was totally within 

normal limits without pain.” Dr. Eyster also noted that Dr. McCrory, a chiropractor and 

medical doctor who examined Johnson in October 2014, discussed “some ligament 

difference on his examination, what they palpate . . . on the patient.” But Dr. McCrory 
13

testified he could not apportion any of the injuries he found among Johnson’s various 

accidents. When Dr. Eyster was asked whether he formulated any opinions as to whether 

Johnson suffered any injuries from the 2013 accident, Dr. Eyster explained that “you take 

at face value his complaints, which are myriad and multiple. But then you got to go 

down through it and drill down on the complaints and see if there’s any objective 

findings to support any of those complaints. And what you end up with is no objective 

findings to support all these symptoms that are almost total body, totally incapacitating. 

There’s got to be something objective to hang your hat on. What’s new that’s happened? 

His imaging studies, the same thing was there before the accident. His complaints were 

the same thing before the accident. He’d been worked up extensively for this numbness 

and tingling in upper and lower extremities. And the opinion of the prior treaters, well, 

. . . [h]e could be getting the spinal cord injury from vitamin deficiency. [¶] But there’s 

nothing objective to say that there’s anything new. So the only thing left, well, he had a 

hyperextension injury, and maybe he has chronic cervical strain. So you give him that.” 

(Italics added.) Johnson essentially contends that because Dr. Eyster uttered the phrase 

“So you give him that,” the jury erred because it did not. We disagree. Dr. Eyster used 

the term “hyperextension injury” to describe “whiplash” when the neck is hyperextended. 

The defense expert on accident reconstruction and biomechanics testified that the 

headrests would have prevented hyperextension in this type of accident. He also testified 

there was the potential for a cervical strain, but nothing beyond that would be consistent 

with the forces he analyzed. Dr. Eyster explained that a cervical strain cannot be detected 

on an MRI. Muscle spasms are objective evidence, but Johnson did not appear to have 

any when Dr. Eyster examined him. Additionally, Dr. Eyster later testified there was no 

objective finding that Johnson suffered any further injury after the accident. He added, 

“you don’t have any objective evidence to support this wealth of symptomatology. He 

certainly has got symptoms, total body symptomatology. But when you examine him, 

he’s pretty clean. There’s just nothing there on physical exam and on radiological 
14

studies. There’s some degenerative changes that really look unchanged from what they 

were prior to the accident. So objectively there’s nothing to hang your hat on to say this 

is a new injury, look at this, this wasn’t there before.” Under these circumstances, it was 

reasonable for the jury to conclude Johnson had failed to prove by a preponderance of the 

evidence that the most recent accident was a substantial factor in causing Johnson any

harm. (See Christ v. Schwartz (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 440, 455 [“A jury may conclude that 

a plaintiff who testifies falsely concerning injuries suffered no injuries”]; Carruthers v. 

Cunha (1955) 133 Cal.App.2d 91, 96 [“In this state of the evidence, the jury could 

conclude that plaintiff testified falsely concerning his injuries, and could have concluded 

that he suffered no injury”].) Put differently, though Johnson introduced evidence of 

injury after the 2013 accident, that evidence was sufficiently contradicted and impeached, 

and we cannot conclude that it compels a finding in his favor as a matter of law. (In re 

I.W., supra, 180 Cal.App.4th at p. 1528.) 

Johnson also contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion 

for new trial because “the evidence established that Johnson had been injured by the 2013 

accident” and “[t]he verdict was not supported by the evidence.” These contentions fail 

for all the reasons discussed above. 

2. El’shloyh

El’shloyh similarly contends substantial evidence does not support the jury’s 

verdict. As we have explained, substantial evidence review does not apply to this appeal. 

She also contends that, putting aside her own testimony that the trial court specifically 

found incredible, the undisputed evidence of other witnesses showed she suffered some 

injury from the collision. The general rule that a trier of fact may entirely reject the 

testimony of a witness, even if it is uncontracted, is applied equally to expert and lay 

witnesses. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d 875, 890.) Thus, the fact 

that El’shloyh introduced other witnesses to support her claims is not sufficient to render 

her appeal successful. Again, we must presume the trier of fact concluded plaintiffs’
15

evidence lacked sufficient weight and credibility to carry their burden of proof. (Estes v. 

Eaton Corporation, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651.) Further, as with Johnson, her 

testimony and the other witness testimony that supported her claims was contradicted and 

impeached. 

As Johnson did, El’shloyh argues Dr. Eyster stated she could have sustained a 

cervical strain. For the reasons we have stated above, this point is uncompelling. Dr. 

Eyster explained that when he examined her, there was no evidence of any chronic 

cervical strain, but it was possible she had a whiplash injury at the time of the accident. 

He said, “you would assume that at the time of injury when she was seen by Dr. Geiger 

that he did find some evidence.” Nonetheless, Dr. Eyster stated nothing in El’shloyh’s 

medical records or diagnostic films supported her complaints. 

Additionally, El’shloyh argues Dr. Eyster did not provide substantial evidence that 

she did not sustain a jaw injury caused by the accident. That was neither necessary for 

the defendant to establish nor a fair characterization of the evidence. Dr. Eyster testified 

that she made these jaw joint complaints to him and he reviewed her dental records with 

her other medical records after his examination of her, but he could not substantiate any 

of her complaints through his examination or her medical records.

El’shloyh argues Dr. Wicks’s testimony does not constitute substantial evidence to 

support a finding that she sustained no physical injury because he was not qualified to 

opine on whether she suffered a cervical sprain or a jaw injury and, even if he was, he 

lacked sufficient information on which to base such an opinion. Again, substantial 

evidence review does not apply to this appeal. The import of Dr. Wicks’s testimony was 

that it was further impeachment of El’shloyh’s evidence, and she had the burden of proof. 

Dr. Wicks testified he was not retained to give an opinion as to physical injury, though he 

did conclude after a review of her medical records including dental records and the 

records of one chiropractor, that there was “absolutely no injury, no indication of injury, 

no follow-up of any injury.” To the extent El’shloyh suggests this testimony should have 
16

been disallowed, she waived the issue by failing to object in the trial court. (People v. 

Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 321; Orozco v. WPV San Jose, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 

375, 397.) Her complaint on appeal that Dr. Wicks’s testimony was insufficient to 

constitute substantial evidence fails due to her burden of proof. 

As with Johnson, El’shloyh’s evidence was sufficiently contradicted and 

impeached, and the evidence as a whole compels neither a finding in favor of El’shloyh 

as a matter of law on the question of whether the collision was a substantial factor in 

causing her harm, nor the conclusion that her motion for a new trial should have been 

granted. 

III. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Respondent Jonathan Williams shall recover his costs 

on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).) 

/S/

 

RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

 

HULL, Acting P. J.

/S/

 

MAURO, J.