Morrissette next argues that NRS 484C.110 violates the Equal 

Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it provides for 

disparate treatment for those who drink versus those who consume 

prohibited substances. In particular, Morrissette points to trial testimony 

indicating that the presence of drugs in a person's blood can indicate 

impairment while the presence of drugs in a person's urine does not 

indicate impairment but only prior use that could have occurred days 

earlier. He then argues that it is unjust that someone could legally drive 

with a debilitating hangover from overconsuming alcohol the day before 

but could not legally drive even though not impaired 2just because there 

were metabolites of prohibited substances in his urine. 

Morrissette's argument is patently without merit. First, the 

Equal Protection Clause requires "that all persons similarly situated 

receive like treatment under the law." Gaines v. State, 116 Nev. 359, 371, 

998 P.2d 166, 173 (2000). Morrissette fails to demonstrate that those who 

consume prohibited substances are similarly situated as those who legally 

consume alcohol. Second, unless the challenged statute infringes on a 

fundamental right or involves a suspect classification, courts apply 

...continued 

used to convict [him]." However, as there was overwhelming evidence that 

supported the three non-impairment theories of liability, any error under 

an impairment theory would have been harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt. See Cortinas v. State, 124 Nev. 1013, 1015-16, 195 P.3d 315, 317 

(2008) ("[W]e conclude that harmless-error review applies when a general 

verdict may rest on a legally valid or a legally invalid alternative theory of 

liability."). 

2We note that, contrary to Morrissette's claims, a responding police 

officer testified that he conducted a series of field tests and concluded from 

them that Morrissette "was impaired," meaning that it was "unsafe [for 

him] to operate a motor vehicle." 

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rational basis scrutiny. Williams v. State, 118 Nev. 536, 542, 50 P.3d 

1116, 1120 (2002). Morrissette does not allege any suspect classification, 

and although he alleges that the statute infringes on a fundamental right, 

he does not identify what that right is. There is no constitutional right to 

drive or to use illicit drugs. Id. Finally, this court has held that the 

statute in question passes rational basis scrutiny and does not violate the 

Equal Protection Clause. Id. at 545, 50 P.3d at 1122 (evaluating the 

statute which at the time was codified as NRS 484.379). 

Morrissette next argues that NRS 484C.110 violates the Due 

Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Again Morrissette fails to 

support his claim with relevant authority or cogent argument such that 

we need not consider this claim. See Maresca, 103 Nev. at 673, 748 P.2d 

at 6. 

Finally, Morrissette appears to argue in his reply statement 

that "a statute" is void for vagueness. Because this argument was not 

raised in the fast track statement, we need not consider it. See NRAP 

3C(e)(3) ("The reply must be limited to answering matters set forth in the 

Fast Track Response."). Furthermore, Morrissette's argument is without 

merit as the allegedly vague language, "may impair," does not appear in 

either statute relevant to his conviction. See NRS 484C.110; NRS 

484C.430. 

For the foregoing reasons, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

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cc: Hon. Jerome M. Polaha, District Judge 

Kenneth J. McKenna 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

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