1The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the

Western District of Missouri, sitting by designation.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

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No. 97-4392

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United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* District of South Dakota

Leonard David Yankton, *

*

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: May 13, 1998

 Filed: February 23, 1999

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Before McMILLIAN and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges, and

LAUGHREY,1 District Judge.

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McMILLIAN, Circuit Judge.
2The Honorable Richard H. Battey, United States District Judge for the District

of South Dakota. 

3The fine was waived due to appellant’s inability to pay, but the restitution was not

altered.

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Leonard David Yankton appeals from a final judgment in the United States

District Court2 for South Dakota, after he pled guilty to being an accessory after the

fact to larceny, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3. The district court sentenced appellant

to four (4) months imprisonment and one (1) year of supervised release, and assessed

a fine of $100 and restitution of $7,151.68 to be paid in full during the period of

supervised release.3 For reversal, appellant argues (1) that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over the offense to which he pled since it is not enumerated in 18 U.S.C.

§ 1153 and falls within the Indian-against-Indian exception of 18 U.S.C. § 1152; and

(2) that economic hardship prevents appellant from complying with the terms of

payment of restitution. For the reasons discussed below, and in light of our recent

decision in United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831 (8th Cir. 1998), we affirm the

judgment of the district court.

 

Background

The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. On October 26, 1996,

Jason Dorian Apple, an Indian, stole a 1991 pickup truck which belonged to Lonnie

and Sandy Bettelyoun, both Indians, from their home, which is within the exterior

boundaries of the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation. Apple drove the truck to

Manderson, South Dakota, where he picked up appellant, an Indian. After Apple

passed out, appellant drove the truck to Apple’s house, dropped him off at home,

picked up a third person, and drove toward Rapid City, South Dakota. After law

enforcement officers attempted to stop him, appellant fled, drove the truck until it ran

out of gas, and then pushed the truck into a ravine, causing substantial damage to the

truck. Pursuant to a plea agreement, appellant pled guilty to the offense of being an
4The Indian Country Crimes Act grants federal jurisdiction for offenses

committed on federal enclaves, but exempts from federal jurisdiction crimes

committed in Indian country by one Indian against the person or property of another.

See 18 U.S.C. § 1152. The Major Crimes Act grants federal jurisdiction for fourteen

enumerated “major” crimes, such as murder, rape, and burglary, when committed by

Indians against Indians in Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153. 

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accessory after the fact under 18 U.S.C. § 3. As a condition of the plea agreement,

appellant waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence except for issues of

jurisdiction or departure from the guideline sentence.

Jurisdiction

Appellant first argues that the district court erred in determining that it had

jurisdiction over the offense of being an accessory after the fact under the Indian

Country Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152, and/or the Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C.

§ 1153.4 Appellant contends that the district court lacked jurisdiction under the Major

Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153, because his offense of conviction–18 U.S.C. § 3–is not

a crime enumerated in that Act. Furthermore, he argues that the district court lacked

jurisdiction over the offense under § 1152 because it falls within the Indian-againstIndian exception of the Indian Country Crimes Act. 

We recently reaffirmed our holding that federal laws of general

application–those in which the situs of the crime is not an element–apply in Indian

country, even to offenses committed by an Indian against the person or property of

another Indian. See United States v. Wadena, 152 F.3d at 841-42; see also United

States v. Blue, 722 F.2d 383, 385 (8th Cir. 1983); Stone v. United States, 506 F.2d

561, 563 (8th Cir. 1974). In Wadena, we explained that federal laws of general

application are not encompassed within the Indian Country Crimes Act, and therefore

are not subject to the Indian-against-Indian exception. See 152 F.3d at 841. Since

the location of the crime is not an element of the offense of being an accessory after
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8 U.S.C. § 3 states: “Whoever, knowing that an offense against the United

States has been committed, receives, relieves, comforts or assists the offender in order

to hinder or prevent his apprehension, trial or punishment, is an accessory after the

fact.”

6The district court commented that it might extend the period of supervised

release to accommodate appellant’s economic difficulties. See Transcript of

Sentencing at 11 (Dec. 1, 1997). If the extension of the period of release is barred by

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) as appellant claims, the district court might consider imposing

consecutive periods of supervised release until appellant has been able to pay the

restitution order in full. We note that 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(2) grants the district court

flexibility to modify or reduce the terms of the supervised release at any time prior

to the expiration of the period of supervised release.

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the fact under 18 U.S.C. § 3,5 the district court properly exercised jurisdiction over

appellant’s case under 18 U.S.C. § 1152. See id. at 841-42.

Restitution

Appellant also appeals the district court’s order regarding restitution.

Appellant maintains that the requirement that he pay restitution of $7,151.68 within

the one year period of supervised release is economically impossible since he earns

only $6.00 per hour and must devote the majority of his wages to living expenses.

Although we sympathize with appellant’s dilemma, we are constrained by the fact

that appellant waived the right to appeal the amount and terms of restitution in his

plea agreement. See Transcript of Plea Hearing at 3-4 (Sept. 8, 1997). In addition,

the record shows that appellant raised no objection to the restitution amount or time

table at the sentencing hearing. See Transcript of Sentencing at 3-4 & 13 (Dec. 1,

1997).6 

For the reasons outlined above, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

See 8th Cir. Rule 47B.
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A true copy.

Attest:

 U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.