So, in theory, our development projects should 

cause a steady chain reaction of first, second, and 

third order impacts that 

gradually strengthen the 

Afghan economy, build the 

infrastructure, stimulate 

other types of development, help to legitimize the 

government, and eventually allow us to pull out of 

the process completely. 

 But unfortunately, this 

has not always been the 

case – and solar wells are 

only one of many types of 

development projects that 

have failed to produce these desired results.

 This is not to say that 

ADT, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and 

United States Agency for 

International Development 

(USAID) efforts have not 

stimulated local economies 

and improved prosperity in 

some areas – they have. 

But Afghans, in general, 

have not made much of an 

effort to continue the momentum and take charge of 

their own development. It 

seems that if coalition forces do not fund, manage, 

(Continued on page 2)

T

he Missouri National 

Guard Agri-business 

Development Team’s mission is to coordinate and 

integrate agri-business capacity building activities 

into existing counterinsurg e n c y o p e r a t i o n s i n 

Nangarhar province. 

 We have been at this 

mission for three years 

now and it’s time we take a 

good hard look at what 

we’ve learned along the 

way so we can share these 

lessons with others and 

determine an optimal way 

ahead for ourselves. 

 Until recently, the Missouri ADT’s focus has 

been on agriculture infrastructure development and 

its project of choice has 

been the solar powered 

well. Collectively, we have 

managed the construction 

of over 50 of these wells 

across the province. Solar 

powered wells use the 

sun’s energy to bring underground water to the surface in order to irrigate 

land and grow crops where 

they otherwise could not be 

grown effectively.

 At first glance, solar 

wells seem like an obvious 

choice for building agribusiness capacity in Afghanistan. They make additional water available to 

produce more food, and 

they are not reliant upon an 

electrical grid as a power 

source so they can operate 

even in the most remote 

areas. 

 They appeared to be 

such a good solution initially, that prior ADTs assumed that once the Afghans saw this technology 

in action they would start 

to build these wells themselves. But, in reality, the 

Afghans haven’t built a 

single one. And in many 

cases, they haven’t even 

maintained the wells that 

the ADT has built for 

them. So the question is: 

why has a technology that 

appeared to be so perfectly 

suited to Afghanistan, not 

taken off?

 On a general level, consider that the development 

efforts of coalition forces 

are intended to serve as 

both a stimulus for economic activity and growth, 

and as a catalyst for larger 

scale development efforts 

by the Afghans themselves. 

C omm a n d e r ’ s C o r n e r 

 How and why the ADT mission has evolved

The Muleskinner Report

Mo Agri-Business Development Team IV

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5 O C T O B E R 3 1 , 2 0 1 0

D R I V I N G 

T H E T E A M

Commander 

Col. Fortune

Deputy Commander

Lt. Col. Charles

Senior Enlisted 

Advisor 

Senior Master Sgt. 

Blankenship 

I N S I D E 

T H I S I S S U E :

How and why 

the ADT 

mission has 

evolved

2

Formal 

Assessments

3

CERP as a 

Budget

5

AEA Leadership 

Academy

7

Tuned in to 

information 

Operations 

9

Red Teaming 12

How and why 

the ADT 

mission has 

evolved cont. 

13

www.facebook.com/

MONG.ADTIV
How and why the ADT mission has evolved

P A G E 2

and maintain an infrastructure 

improvement, the Afghans will 

not do so either. 

 And since coalition forces, by 

themselves, don’t have the time, 

resources, or will to develop Afghanistan into a prosperous and 

stable nation, we need to ask ourselves what forces are at work 

here that are keeping Afghans 

from building upon what we have 

given or done for them.

 As an analogy, consider the 

process for starting a handcranked lawn mower engine. If 

we prime the carburetor with the 

right amount of fuel, if the fuel is 

of a high enough quality, if the 

electrical system is capable of 

providing a good enough spark, 

and if we generate enough momentum when we pull the starting 

handle, the lawn mower engine 

takes off into steady-state, selfperpetuating motion. 

 However, if any of these conditions are missing, it doesn’t 

matter how hard we pull the starting handle, the motion of the engine will be temporary and will 

not sustain itself. It may cycle a 

few times depending on how hard 

we pull the starting handle, but the 

end result will be the same. So, 

using the lawn mower analogy as 

a guide, our challenge is to determine what conditions are necessary to set Afghan development 

efforts into self-perpetuating motion, and then establish those conditions.

 The Missouri ADT IV staff has 

developed three theories as to why 

many U.S. government-led development efforts here have fizzled. 

(Continued from page 1) The first is that they have been 

out of balance either technically, 

financially, or culturally; the second 

is that these efforts have not had a 

solid foundation of knowledge, experience, or understanding upon 

which to build; and the third is that 

our approach to development has 

contributed to a pre-existing sense of 

helplessness among the Afghan people. 

 By examining each of these theories in some detail, we hope to get a 

better understanding of how to better 

manage future development efforts 

so they generate the type of chain 

reaction and self-perpetuating motion described above.

 The first theory says that development has not flourished because 

we have not taken an integrated, balanced approach – either from technical perspective, a financial perspective, or a cultural perspective. 

 For instance, if we teach Afghan 

farmers how to triple their tomato 

production but don’t concurrently 

improve their transportation infrastructure to allow them to get their 

produce to market, the excess tomatoes rot and, in reality, we have not 

helped the farmers at all. In such 

cases, they will likely discontinue the 

improved production methods we 

showed them. Likewise, if we teach 

the farmers how to utilize drip irrigation techniques but we don’t ensure 

that they can conveniently purchase 

drip irrigation equipment locally, 

they will be unable to take advantage 

of the training. These are examples 

of development efforts that are technically out of balance.

 As an example of a development 

effort that is financially out of balance, consider, once again, the solar 

powered well. In western societies, 

standards of living are high so labor 

tends to be more expensive than capital, relatively speaking. In Afghanistan, however, the reverse is true. 

 Yet, solar wells represent a capital 

intensive solution to an Afghan problem where labor intensive solutions 

like karize repairs may be better suited because they are more affordable 

and sustainable. Consider that the 

cost of one solar panel is equivalent 

to one or two days wages for an average American worker while that 

same panel costs an Afghan half a 

year’s salary. So when a solar panel 

fails on one of the wells we have 

built for a small group of Afghan 

farmers, the cost to replace the panel 

is financially untenable by Afghan 

standards.

 In addition to development being 

out of balance technically and financially, projects can also be out of 

balance culturally. Prior ADTs have 

built numerous cold storage facilities 

but few of them are being used by 

the Afghans. This is due, in large 

part, to the fact that there are complexities associated with managing 

these facilities with which the Af-

(Continued on page 13)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5

“So the question 

is: why has a 

technology that 

appeared to be so 

perfectly suited to 

Afghanistan, not 

taken off?”
P A G E 3

On O c t o b e r 3 , 

Missouri ADT 

IV conducted a formal 

assessment of our phase 

1 o p e r a t i o n s . T h i s 

f o r m a l a s s e s s m e n t 

reviewed progress made 

in executing tasks from 

the Campaign Plan and 

provided an initial ―grade 

card‖ on agriculture 

reconstruction efforts 

throughout the province. 

 The results of the 

f o r m a l a s s e s s m e n t 

produced changes to our 

Campaign Plan that will 

drive our operations 

during Phase 2. This 

article briefly explains 

how and why ADT IV 

leaders conduct formal 

assessments throughout 

this mission.

 At the core of the 

A r m y ’ s o p e r a t i o n s 

process are three basic 

tasks: Plan, Prepare and 

Execute. Each of these 

p h a s e s i n c l u d e s a n 

e q u a l l y i m p o r t a n t 

requirement to conduct 

ongoing assessments and 

adjust accordingly. 

 Field Manual 5-0, 

― T h e O p e r a t i o n s 

P r o c e s s , ‖ e x p l a i n s , 

―Continuous assessment 

enables organizational 

learning and adaptation 

throughout the conduct 

of operations.‖ 

 The ADT IV faces a 

challenging mission 

here in Nangarhar. The 

best information and 

intelligence that were 

a v a i l a b l e i n e a r l y 

August drove our initial 

p l a n n i n g a n d 

p r e p a r a t i o n . B u t 

A f g h a n i s t a n i s a 

dynamic operational 

e n v i r o n m e n t a n d 

a g r i c u l t u r e 

redevelopment is a nonstandard mission. These 

factors demand rigorous 

and frequent assessments 

to ensure our efforts have 

the intended effects.

 Col. Michael Fortune 

clarified the intent of the 

f o r m a l a s s e s s m e n t 

process in saying, ―We 

need to pause and reflect 

on what we said we 

would do to determine if 

t h o s e a c t i o n s a r e 

achieving our goals of 

l e g i t i m i z i n g 

governance.‖ 

 A wide variety of 

participants assembled 

f o r t h e f o r m a l 

a s s e s s m e n t . A l l 

members of the ADT IV 

agriculture team were 

present. Our civilian 

partners, to include Mr. 

George Roemer from the 

United States Agency for 

I n t e r n a t i o n a l 

Development and Dr. 

G a r y H ar t fr o m th e 

United States Department 

of Agriculture, were onhand. Lt. Col. Max Velte 

represented the Civil 

Affairs staff section of 

Task Force Bastogne. 

Maj. Jocelyn Leventhal 

participated on behalf of 

the Nangarhar Provincial 

Reconstruction Team.

 T o b e g i n t h e 

discussions, the ADT IV 

S2/3, Capt. Ken Huenink, 

presented an updated 

intelligence summary—a 

vital prerequisite to any 

assessment. Huenink 

reviewed activity since 

o u r T r a n s f e r O f 

Authority on August 10 

and presented a best 

guess on likely trends for 

the next 90 days.

 N e x t t h e t e a m 

reviewed our Lines Of 

(Continued on page 4)

By Lt. Col. North Charles

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

Conducting Formal Assessments:

How a disciplined approach to formal assessments shapes 

future operations

1st Lt. Jody McCall, briefs 

information about his 

assigned district to the 

commander and 

agriculture team during 

the Phase 1 assessment 

of the commander’s 

campaign plan.
Operation. As a reminder, issue 4 of 

the Muleskinner Report explained 

ADT IV’s four LOO: Agriculture 

Extension, Agriculture Economics, 

Agriculture Administration and 

Agriculture Education. As a result of 

t h e f o r m a l a s s e s s m e n t , t h e 

commander approved the staff’s 

recommendation to add a fifth LOO, 

Information Operations. 

 In a d d i t i o n , t h e A g T e a m 

convinced the commander that during 

phase 2, the campaign plan should 

devote effort to closing-out projects 

from previous ADTs. The team had 

underestimated the level of effort 

required for this task in Phase 1.

 The commander then allocated 

resources to each LOO. The 

Agriculture Extension LOO remains 

the main effort while significant 

resources are allocated to close out 

projects from previous ADTs. 

Additionally, ADT IV will focus 

agriculture redevelopment efforts on 

ten Key Terrain Districts.

 Next, ADT IV reviewed progress 

made in executing tasks from the 

Campaign Plan. The plan assigns 

specific tasks for each LOO. The 

formal assessment provides a venue 

for closing those tasks that are 

completed, recommending changes to 

those tasks that are not achieving 

their intended effect and nominating 

new tasks for the next phase of the 

operation. 

 The second half of the formal 

assessment focused on developing a 

sight picture that would allow the 

commander to visualize the current 

status of development efforts and 

progress made against the desired end 

state.

 To execute the Agriculture 

E xt en sio n L O O, th e A DT IV 

agriculture team assigns one Soldier 

as the liaison, mentor and point of 

contact for the Agriculture Extension 

Agent in each KTD. That Soldier 

provided a formal assessment of his 

KTD’s AEA using five categories: 

competence, corruption, cooperation, 

perception and project management. 

 A color coding system allows for a 

quick visual understanding. Green 

means the standard is being met in 

90% or more of the measured 

metrics. Amber is from 80% to 89%; 

red indicates 79% or below; black 

s h o w s i n s u f f i c i e n t d a t a f o r 

evaluation. 

 In addition, Lt. Col. Ray Legg and 

his Ag Team staff produced similar 

assessments for all other LOOs. This 

provided an overall provincial 

a s s e s s me n t t h a t a l l o w e d t h e 

commander to quickly visualize 

progress made thus far. Based on this 

information, he was able to determine 

where the team is not achieving its 

goals.

 T h e r e s u l t o f t h e f o r m a l 

assessment was a fragmentary order 

changing our Campaign Plan for 

Phase 2 of our operation. 

 Phase 2 began October 15 and our 

efforts incorporate the lessons we 

learned during the first 75 days on 

mission. After another 60 days, or 

approximately December 15, we will 

c o n d u c t o u r s e c o n d f o r m a l 

assessment to review what we have 

accomplished. ADT IV will continue 

assessing and revising our efforts as 

we conduct this mission. 

 The Army operations process 

recognizes the importance of 

assessing ongoing operations. 

Formal assessments are especially 

important during stability operations, 

when units are conducting nonstandard missions such as agriculture 

r e d e v e l o p me n t i n a c o mp l e x 

operating environment with a number 

of external variables.

(Continued from page 3)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5 P A G E 4

Conducting Formal Assessments

Operational Timeline

Phase 1 Phase 2 Phase 3 Phase 4

Days 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300

Month AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FEB MAR APR MAY
P A G E 5

CERP as a budget

At a recent 

conference 

on the effectiveness of 

d e v e l o p me n t a i d i n 

C o u n t e r i n s u r g e n c y 

Operations, hosted by the 

Feinstein International 

Center, Tufts University, 

there was considerable 

c o n s e n s u s t h a t 

A f g h a n i s t a n c a n n o t 

effectively absorb the 

large increases in aid 

spending earmarked for 

the insecure regions of 

the country. 

 Too much aid money 

spent quickly with little 

o v e r s i g h t c a n b e 

d e l e g i t i m i z i n g a n d 

destabilizing by fueling 

corruption, creating 

destabilizing winnerl o s e r d y n a m i c s i n 

ethnically and tribally 

d i v i d e d s o c i e t i e s , 

c r e a t i n g p e r v e r s e 

incentives among key 

actors to maintain the 

status quo of insecurity 

and bad governance, and 

providing opportunities 

for insurgents to tap into 

these funds. 

 Having to spend large 

s u ms o f a i d mo n e y 

quickly also reduces 

o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 

prioritizing the critically 

important processes of 

effective development, 

a nd i nstea d fo cuse s 

attention primarily on 

generating products. 

 Across Nangarhar 

Province, many projects 

started and completed by 

ADT and international 

donors are underutilized 

or have been abandoned. 

Still others have been 

destroyed or system 

components are missing. 

 In order to address 

t h e s e i s s u e s , U . S . 

m i l i t a r y f o r c e s i n 

A f g h a n i s t a n h a v e 

a m e n d e d t h e 

C o m m a n d e r ’ s 

Emergency Response 

Program – a pool of 

m o n e y p r e v i o u s l y 

available to military 

commanders to fund U.S. 

led development efforts – 

to focus more on building 

t h e c a p a c i t y o f t h e 

Afghan government to 

manage and sustain these 

efforts. The new process 

has also received a new 

n a m e : C E R P a s a 

Budget.

 U n d e r t h e o l d 

program, commanders 

used CERP funds to 

build large-scale projects 

such as cold storage 

facilities, micro-slaughter 

facilities, and solar wells. 

The Afghan government 

provided minimal input 

i n t h e p l a n n i n g , 

p r i o r i t i z a t i o n a n d 

construction of these 

projects. 

 While a large number 

o f p r o j e c t s w e r e 

completed, they are now 

largely unsustainable and 

unused. 

 Because of the rapid 

pace of construction, 

b o t h b y A D T a n d 

international donors, the 

Director of Agriculture, 

Irrigation and Livestock 

was often unaware of the 

full scope of the projects 

undertaken in Nangarhar 

on his behalf. 

 A s a r e s u l t , t h e 

Afghan government did 

n o t b u d g e t f o r t h e 

o p e r a t i o n a n d 

maintenance costs of 

those projects. 

 According to Oxfam 

I n t e r n a t i o n a l -

Afghanistan, donors are 

failing to coordinate 

between themselves or 

w i t h t h e A f g h a n 

g o v e r n m e n t . T h e 

O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r 

Economic Cooperation 

and Development noted 

in 2005 that donors did 

not coordinate their 

programs consistent with 

t h e g o v e r n m e n t ’ s 

strategy, and just onethird of donor work was 

undertaken jointly. 

 Largely due to lack of 

donor coordination and 

c o mmu n i c a t i o n , t h e 

Afghan government does 

not have information on 

how all assistance since 

2001 was spent. 

 Starting October 1, 

t h e U . S . m i l i t a r y 

implemented procedures 

designed to address the 

shortcomings of the 

previous CERP process. 

 W h i l e , i t o n l y 

addresses U.S. military 

development spending, 

C E R P a s a B u d g e t 

(Continued on page 6)

By Lt. Col. Raymond Legg 

― ... U.S. 

military forces 

have amended 

the 

Commander’s 

Emergency 

Response 

Program to 

focus on 

building the 

capacity of the 

Afghan 

government to 

manage and 

sustain projects. 

The new 

process has also 

received a new 

name: CERP as 

a Budget.”

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T
CERP as a Budget

P A G E 6

encourages the Afghan government 

to identify, prioritize and coordinate 

donor efforts. 

 A key component of the new 

funding process is a $100,000 per 

quarter rolling CERP budget for each 

provincial line director. Any money 

not spent in a particular quarter rolls 

over into the next quarter, effectively 

resulting in a $400,000 annual 

budget. 

 This budget restraint not only 

conserves American tax money, but 

also forces the provincial line 

directors to focus on their actual 

needs instead of a project ―wish list.‖ 

 CERP as a Budget seeks to 

prevent the creation of unsustainable, 

poorly thought out projects and 

ensure that a more absorbable 

amount of U.S. aid money flows into 

the Afghan economy. 

 The ultimate goal of the new 

CERP as a Budget process is to work 

toward transitioning development 

and maintenance to the Afghan 

government. 

 CERP as a Budget is a strategic 

building plan that seeks to train the 

Afghan government to work within 

the limits of their provincial budgets, 

reduce inflation, and encourage 

private sector growth. Ultimately, it 

brings the counterinsurgency effort 

one step closer to transitioning the 

fight to the Afghan government. 

 The new process will move the 

Afghan government to a performance 

and outcome based budgeting process 

that works toward achieving a 

strategic end state. It creates clear 

lines of responsibility, reporting, 

authority and functions for each 

provincial line director. 

 CERP as a Budget emphasizes 

budget control at the provincial level 

based upon performance measure 

evaluations.

 B e f o r e A D T c a n b e g i n 

construction of any new project 

under these new CERP rules, the 

DAIL, and every other provincial line 

director, must draft a six-month, oneyear, and five-year strategy. The 

purpose of that strategy is to establish 

a detailed and achievable end state 

and define intermediate results 

essential to achieving that end state. 

Importantly, the development of 

these strategies promotes efficient 

use of resources rather than creation 

of a random list of projects that may 

or may not address needs.

 In addition to his departmental 

strategy, the DAIL must also 

complete an invento ry of all 

agriculture -related assets and 

personnel under his control. The 

inventory includes an estimate of the 

operations and maintenance costs of 

each line item for the next three 

years. 

 With multiple international donors 

having provided a wide range and 

large number of development 

projects over the past several years, 

developing this inventory is a 

complex task. But when completed, 

the inventory will provide the DAIL 

a complete and accurate assessment 

of his assets and the funding required 

to sustain them.

 The on-the -ground work of 

development begins after the DAIL 

has completed his budget and 

strategy. Before ADT can fund an 

agriculture development project, the 

D A IL mu s t c o mp le te pr oj ect 

development steps previously 

accomplished by the ADT. 

 He must prepare a new project 

initiative form, technical drawings 

for the project, a land rights 

memorandum, a statement of work, 

an individual government estimate 

for the cost of the project and a 

sustainment memorandum. These 

documents allow vetting of the 

project through the Provincial 

Development Council process. 

 ADT will fund the project only 

after the vetting process is complete. 

While the new process will slow 

down the rate of development, it will 

result in a well thought out process 

that addresses the real, rather than the 

perceived needs of the people. 

 The new CERP as a Budget 

process is j ust one step that 

transitions the counterinsurgency 

effort to an Afghan led effort and sets 

t h e f r a m e w o r k t o a l l o w t h e 

withdrawal of NATO and American 

forces from Afghanistan. 

(Continued from page 5)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5

A worker tuck points brickwork at the Rodat Agriculture Extension Center. Future construction of 

agriculture extension centers will be approved 

through the CERP as a Budget process.
P A G E 7

ADT I V h a s 

i m p l e m e n t e d a n 

Agriculture Extension 

A g e n t L e a d e r s h i p 

Academy to increase the 

capacity and capability of 

the Nangarhar AEAs. 

The Leadership Academy 

h a s f o u r s e p a r a t e 

components. 

 The first component is 

a s e r i e s o f mo n t h l y 

classes taught by the 

ADT IV Agriculture 

Team at FOB FinleyShields. 

 The second consists of 

c l o s e a n d f r e q u e n t 

mentoring between the 

individual AEA and a 

designated ADT liaison 

officer. 

 The third component 

o f t h e L e a d e r s h i p 

Academy requires the 

AEAs to identify and 

manage a series of small 

projects that provide 

quick and visible impact 

to improve the agriculture 

infrastructure in their 

respective districts. 

 The final component is 

a s e r i e s o f t r a i n i n g 

support packages being 

created by the agriculture 

specialist team members 

 Sgt. 1st Class Dannie 

Thompson developed and 

t a u g h t t h e P r o j e c t 

Management class. The 

class started with the four 

basic elements of project 

ma n a g e me n t : s c o p e , 

re sou rces , ti me , a n d 

money. 

 Thompson explained 

that project size, goals, 

and requirements make up 

the scope. He then told 

the group that resources 

c o n s i s t o f p e o p l e , 

equipment, and material. 

He also reviewed the time 

element, which includes 

tasks, schedules, and the 

critical path. 

 Finally, Thompson told 

t he A E As th at wh e n 

thinking about money, 

they needed to factor in 

costs, contingencies, and 

cost controls. He also 

advised the AEAs that, ―in 

addition to the basic 

e l e m e n t s o f p r o j e c t 

management, people skills 

s u c h a s m o t i v a t i n g , 

coaching, leading, and 

conflict management rank 

as some of the most 

important skill sets that a 

Project Manager must 

have.‖

 Thompson continued 

the class with a discussion 

of the five phases of 

(Continued on page 8)

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R R E P O R T

By Capt. John Paluczak

Jamil Yousif, 

advisor to 

Engineer Safi, 

takes notes and 

translates while 

Eng. Safi, the 

Nangarhar DAIL, 

addresses the 

agriculture 

extension 

agents during 

training held at 

FOB FinleyShields on 

October 18.

Implementing the Agriculture Extension Agent 

Leadership Academy

for use by the AEAs in 

providing agriculture 

specific training to local 

farmers. 

 This article focuses on 

the first component of the 

Leadership Academy –

the monthl y classes 

hosted by the ADT – and 

highlights the classes 

taught during the months 

o f S e p t e m b e r a n d 

October. 

 T h e A DT w or ke d 

with the Director of 

Agriculture, Irrigation, 

and Livestock – the 

provincial line director 

who manages the AEAs 

– to identify topics that 

would have the greatest 

impact while providing a 

solid foundation for 

future training. 

 Project management 

techniques were the 

subject of the first class 

taught in the Leadership 

Academy on September 

15, 2010. Nine AEAs 

from ten of the key 

terrain districts attended 

the training. In addition 

to the AEAs, the DAIL 

a n d h i s E x t e n s i o n 

Manger also attended and 

t h e i r p r e s e n c e 

emphasized to the AEAs 

the importance of the 

event. 
Implementing the Agriculture Extension Agent Leadership Academy

P A G E 8

project management. 

 The first phase of project 

management is initiation; the 

need to develop an idea for the 

project and gather information 

about project needs. The 

second phase is planning. 

During planning, the project 

manager determines the who, 

how, when, and what of the 

project. The third phase is 

execution, or following the 

plan to get the job done. The 

fourth phase, control, consists 

of checking on the work. 

Finally, the project is closed 

when all of the work, including 

the paperwork and payments, 

are completed.

 Following Thompson’s 

class, Col. Michael Fortune, 

A D T I V C o m m a n d e r , 

discussed the important role 

AEAs play in legitimizing the 

government in the eyes of the 

people. 

 He said that AEAs need to 

b e s e e n b y f a r me r s a n d 

villagers as the most honest, 

uncorrupt and transparent 

members of the government. 

Col. Fortune stressed that 

AEAs are the most visible sign 

that the government is working 

for the people in rural areas. 

 Recognizing the importance 

of leadership in the extension 

process, Col. Fortune taught 

ADT IV’s second Leadership 

Academy class on October 18, 

2010. 

 The class started with a 

discussion of the five most 

fundamental characteristics of 

great leaders; integrity, candor, 

selfless service, technical 

competence, and personal 

courage. 

 Fortune told the AEAs that 

i f t h e y e m b r a c e d t h e s e 

concepts and led by example, 

they would be better able to 

inspire the farmers in their 

districts. Col. Fortune also 

talked about standards of 

conduct and the ADT’s anticorruption stance.

 After Fortune finished, 

Engineer Safi – the DAIL, took 

the podium and spent about 30 

minutes discussing leadership 

with his AEAs. In addition to 

reinforcing the points that 

F o r t u n e h a d m a d e , h e 

emphasized time management, 

t e a m b u i l d i n g , t a k i n g 

r e s p o n s i b i l i t y , c o n f l i c t 

r e s o l u t i o n , p l a n n i n g , 

t r a n s p a r e n c y , c a r e f o r 

subordinates, decision-making, 

prioritization skills, and the 

difference between leadership 

and management. 

 T h e A E A s s e e m e d t o 

embrace Safi’s message and 

were proud to see their leader 

take such an active role in their 

trainin g. Safi’s acti ons 

demonstrated all of the signs of 

a great leader with a vision for 

his organization. 

 Col. Fortune said afterward, 

―I didn’t know Eng. Safi was 

going to follow my class with a 

lecture but I’m really glad he 

did because it reinforced the 

importance of leadership to the 

AEAs. I think the AEAs left 

the training inspired to go back 

to their districts and get the 

Afghans to take charge of their 

own development and their 

own future.‖

 Empowering the AEAs to 

provide better services is the 

cornerstone of the ADT’s 

strategy for improving the 

quality of individual farmers’ 

lives in Nangarhar Province. 

The small projects identified, 

managed, and led by the AEAs 

will increase farmers’ ability to 

produce crops while improving 

c o n f i d e n c e i n t h e i r 

government. 

 ADT’s goal is that the 

AEAs lead by example and 

manage these projects in an 

uncorrupt and completely 

transparent manner 

s o t h e villagers know their 

government officials are 

working for them, not for 

themselves. Projects identified, 

managed, and completed by 

Afghan government officials 

without the taint of corruption 

increase security in Nangarhar 

a nd d en y ins ur ge nts th e 

opportunity to criticize the 

government. 

(Continued from page 7)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5
P A G E 9

The Taliban cannot 

m a t c h t h e 

professionalism of our 

Soldiers and Airmen; 

they do not have tanks, 

uniforms, or an Air 

Force. They have killed 

hundreds of Afghan 

c i vi l i a n s , i n cl u d i n g 

women and children this 

year. 

 And yet, many of the 

Afghans are undecided 

a b o u t w h o t h e t r u e 

enemy is, because the 

Taliban understands that 

t h e w a r t o w i n t h e 

support of the people is 

not only fought in the 

mountains or the cities of 

Afghanistan—it is also 

w a g e d a c r o s s t h e 

airwaves where they can 

shape any outcome and 

influence opinions.

 T o help level the 

p l a y i n g f i e l d , t h e 

Missouri Agri-Business 

Development Team has 

decided to take their 

battle to the airwaves in 

Nangarhar. Following 

their assessment of phase 

1 of their operation, ADT 

I V d e t e r m i n e d 

Information Operations 

would stand alone as a 

s e p a r a t e L i n e o f 

Operation. 

 According to Lt. Col. 

North Charles, ―The staff 

recommended, and the 

commander concurred, 

with pulling IO out from the 

agriculture lines of operation 

to give CPT Orlando’s work 

with the DAIL and the media 

more focus and additional 

resources.‖ The DAIL is the 

Director of Agriculture, 

Irrigation and Livestock for 

Nangarhar Province.

 While the team originally 

planned to increase the level 

of Public Affairs activities in 

N a n g a r h a r , i t b e c a m e 

increasingly clear that the 

media in Afghanistan could 

play a key role in supporting 

the commander’s campaign 

plan. 

 The goal of ADT IV IO is 

to work through the DAIL to 

leverage the media in support 

of the agriculture extension 

p r o g r a m ; t o a i d i n 

t r a n s p a r e n c y ; c o m b a t 

corruption; inform the public 

of DAIL programs and 

activities; and to utilize 

agriculture programming to 

inform and educate the 

farmers in Nangarhar as part 

of agriculture extension 

services provided by the 

agriculture extension agents. 

 The decision to make 

Information Operations a 

separate line of operation 

evolved as the operational 

environment came into focus 

for the team. At first, a 

public affairs mindset was 

adopted. According to Joint 

Publication 3-61 ―Joint 

Doctrine for Public Affairs,‖ 

both PA and IO activities 

directly support military 

objectives, counter adversary 

disinformation, and deter 

adversary actions. However, 

their efforts differ with 

respect to audience, scope 

and intent.

 P A h a s t h r e e b a s i c 

functions: public information, 

i n t e r n a l c o m m a n d 

information and community 

relations. The goal is to keep 

U.S. citizens informed with 

timely and factual reports, 

informing unit members of 

the commander’s objectives 

and messages, and keeping 

local communities informed 

within the area of operations. 

 Public affairs activities 

solely focus on ADT mission 

c a p a b i l i t i e s a n d 

accomplishments; but PA 

does not put an ―Afghan 

f a c e ‖ o n t h e 

accomplishments of the 

DAIL or include the Afghan 

themes and messages which 

are an important part of 

communication from the 

DAIL to the citizens for 

which he provides services. 

 While both PA and IO 

operations seek to inform and 

educate, the audiences differ 

in that IO targets Afghans 

rather than U.S. audiences. 

Another difference is that IO 

seeks to influence the local 

population and works to 

change their behaviors and 

opinions, not just inform. 

 T h e d e c i s i o n t o 

incorporate IO into the 

campaign plan was the result 

of much discussion and input 

(Continued on page 10)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5

“ The goal of 

ADT IV IO is to 

work through 

the DAIL to 

leverage the 

media in 

support of the 

agriculture 

extension 

program; to aid 

in transparency; 

combat 

corruption; 

inform the 

public of DAIL 

programs and 

activities; and to 

utilize 

agriculture 

programming to 

inform and 

educate the 

farmers in 

Nangarhar as 

part of 

agriculture 

extension 

service provided 

by the 

agriculture 

extension 

agents. ” 

By Capt. Marie Orlando
V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5 P A G E 1 0

“In the four 

provinces 

managed by 

Task Force 

Bastogne– the 

ADT’s higher 

headquarters–

there are 

approximately 

4.1 million 

people and over 

two million 

listen to the 

radio. In 2007, 

of those that 

listened to radio 

programming, 

98% listened to 

agriculture 

related 

programming.”

from outside information 

sources. 

 A r e p o r t b y t h e 

D e p a r t m e n t f o r 

International Development, 

p r e p a r e d b y D r . 

Mohammad H. Emadi, 

October 2009, for the 

Minister of Agriculture, 

Irrigation and Livestock, 

―Agricultural Extension in 

Afghanistan: Review and 

recommendations‖ spurred 

the ADT commander, Col. 

Mike Fortune, to ask the 

public affairs officer to 

review the report and 

identify solutions to the 

agriculture extension 

problems addressed in the 

report which the ADT 

could implement through 

the media. 

 The report said ―One of 

the major obstacles to 

agriculture development in 

Afghanistan is the limited 

a c c e s s o f f a r me r s t o 

necessary agriculture 

skills, information, and 

technology.‖ 

 Furthermore, the report 

cited poor transportation, 

lack of money, and lack of 

education as a few of the 

barriers to successful 

i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f 

agriculture extension 

services. Radio is a 

communication tool that 

can overcome distance, is 

free to the listener, and 

does not require literacy. 

Afghans are inclined to 

believe what they hear on 

the radio, and radio offers 

a means to counter the 

disinformation broadcast 

by the Taliban. It allows 

the DAIL to reach the 

farmers in all his districts. 

Radio can also give voice 

to the farmers through callin shows and could allow 

the DAIL and AEAs to 

better respond to their 

needs. 

 In the four provinces 

managed by Task Force 

Bastogne – the ADT’s 

higher headquarters – there 

are approximately 4.1 

million people and over 

two million listen to the 

radio. In 2007, of those 

that listened to radio 

p r o g r a m m i n g , 9 8 % 

listened to agriculturerelated programming.

 T F B a s t o g n e h a s 

actively worked to build 

r a d i o p r o g r a m m i n g , 

p r o v i d e t r a i n i n g f o r 

journalists, and has five 

active ―radios in a box‖, 

w hic h brin gs Af gha n 

programs, in the local 

language of Pashto, to 

400,000 listeners that 

would otherwise not have a 

regular source of outside 

news. 

 A d d i t i o n a l l y , t h e 

Nangarhar Provincial 

Reconstruction Team has 

contracts with five local 

r a di o st ati o ns an d i s 

seeking to add another, to 

s u p p o r t s p e c i f i c 

programming aimed at 

education and information, 

and addresses topics such 

a s h u m a n r i g h t s , 

governance, education and 

(Continued from page 9)

(Continued on page 11)

Communication towers in a traditional 

open market. Most Afghan families own 

a phone and the majority listen to radio.
health. However, there is currently little 

emphasis on agriculture sector messaging. 

 Initially, the ADT’s plan was to incorporate 

IO into the other four lines of operation in its 

campaign – Agriculture Extension, Economics, 

Administration, and Education. As the plan 

was mapped out though, it became clear that IO 

needed to be added as a separate line of 

operation. 

 Fortunately, the ADT does not have to start 

from scratch. The efforts of the PRT and the 

IO office at TF Bastogne have already 

established contracts and relationships with the 

media. The Afghans and coalition forces are 

both eager for the ADT to provide agriculture 

messages and programming. 

 The first step is to identify what agriculture 

programming exists, what radio stations the 

farmers prefer, and to further develop 

relationships with the local media. 

 The second step is to work through the 

DAIL to mentor his staff on leveraging the 

media in support of their goals. The ADT plans 

to demonstrate to the DAIL and AEAs by 

example and training, how to conduct public 

affairs and information operations. 

 The commander’s vision is to have the 

DAIL make weekly radio broadcasts to inspire 

far me rs t o ta ke c harge of their o w n 

development, encourage them to experiment 

with new technologies, and to garner their 

support. 

 These weekly broadcasts can serve as a 

springboard for the DAIL to address concerns 

of Nangarhar farmers, share his plans and 

visions for the future, and to talk about 

accomplishments and growth within the 

province.

 To prepare for its information operations 

campaign, the ADT is distributing hand-held 

crank radios with stickers advertising the 

frequency, dates, and times of a popular 

agriculture program, ―Agriculture and 

Livestock‖, which includes market reports on 

25 commodities. The radios are provided to the 

Agriculture Extension Agents for distribution 

within their districts and handed out by team 

members to key personnel.

 Training will also be conducted for the 

AEAs to discuss media interaction and ways to 

leverage the media in support of extension 

services. 

 By adding IO to the campaign plan, the 

commander wields an additional tool which 

will enhance the efforts of the other LOOs, 

build the capacity of the DAIL and AEAs in 

Nangarhar, and multiply the effects of ADT 

projects and programs. 

(Continued from page 10)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5

P A G E 1 1

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R T E A M

Capt. Marie Orlando conducts an impromptu interview with the subgovernor. Voice recordings are used for 

broadcast on local Radio-In-A-Box programs which are intended for Pashto 

audiences. 
P A G E 1 2

T

h e M i s s o u r i A g r i -

Business Development 

Team had the advantage of a 

unique resource during their 

recent assessment of Phase I 

of the team’s campaign plan. 

Dr. Jeffrey Bordin, a political 

and military behavioral scientist, provided a Red Teaming capability as ADT reviewed progress and considered the way ahead.

 According to the University of Foreign Military and 

Cultural Studies, Red Teaming is a structured, iterative 

process, executed by highly 

trained, educated, and practiced team members that provides commanders an independent capability to fully 

explore alternatives to plans, 

operations, concepts, organizations and capabilities in the 

context of the operational 

environment and from our 

partners’ and adversaries’ 

perspective. 

 Dr. Bordin arrived at Forward Operating Base FinleyShields on September 22 and 

stayed with the ADT for a 

week to provide that capability.

 Lt. Col. North Charles, 

the ADT deputy commander, 

prepared the ADT staff for 

the visit by the Red Team 

leader by explaining the purpose of ―red teaming.‖ 

 After his arrival, Dr. Bordin provided an in-brief and 

clarified the concept to ensure the team understood 

what his role and services 

encompassed. 

 Dr. Bordin is uniquely 

qualified as a Red Team 

leader with his military background and professional experience, including over 

three years in Afghanistan. 

He is an officer in the Army 

Reserves, and has served in 

the Air Force and Coast 

Guard in a variety of positions such as a federal law 

enforcement officer, as an 

emergency medical technician engaged in search and 

rescue missions, and also as a 

rescue swimmer. 

 He is currently in a civil 

affairs battalion and he has 

worked as an embedded 

trainer with the Afghan National Police, as a civil affairs 

planner in Kabul, and was 

the officer in charge of psychological operations product 

development in Bagram. 

 Other red teamers usually 

do not have doctorate degrees, and most are not also 

military scientists. He has 

served in ten war zones as 

part of his professional studies of warfare, including war 

crimes and human rights investigations in Sudan, Ethiopia, the Balkans, and Cambodia. 

 Dr. Bordin also previously worked with the Laghman 

Province ADT and he has a 

personal interest in horticulture and animal husbandry; 

he has a small orchard and 

raises goats as a hobby back 

in the States.

 Lt. Col. Raymond Legg, 

agriculture chief for the 

ADT, worked closely with 

Bordin throughout the 

week. He said Dr. Bordin 

provided many insights into 

the realities of Afghan culture and suggested ways to 

facilitate and achieve improved results. 

 Bordin’s experience in 

human terrain collection 

and background as a social 

scientist was brought to the 

table to assist the agriculture chief develop metrics 

for assessing the professional capabilities of the 

agriculture officials they 

work with.

 Bordin said, ―I’m here to 

provide a critical and objective assessment and assist 

in getting to the ground 

truth. I try to give a valid 

and accurate assessment but 

unfortunately cheerleading 

is often much more preferred. 

 Legg concurred and 

commented that ―People 

need to be told what they 

may not want to hear. Otherwise they develop tunnel 

vision and can’t conduct an 

honest assessment of their 

performance.‖

 Bordin said the ADT 

was very responsive, open 

and hospitable, and found it 

a refreshing experience. 

 ―I thought it was a very 

positive experience,‖ said 

Legg. ―Because of the assistance he provided we 

will be able to conduct the 

first effective assessment of 

A D T p r o g r e s s i n 

Nangarhar.‖

Red Teaming the ADT

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5

By Capt. Marie Orlando

“People need 

to be told 

what they may 

not want to 

hear. 

Otherwise 

they develop 

tunnel vision 

and can’t 

conduct an 

honest 

assessment of 

their 

performance .”

Dr. Bordin and Lt. Col. 

Legg listen attentively to 

the concerns and opinions of Nangarhar University Agriculture 

Department faculty 

members. Dr. Bordin 

joined ADT members 

on missions and participated in meetings as 

part of his Red Team 

services. 
How and why the ADT mission has evolved

P A G E 1 3

ghans have little or no experience 

dealing. 

 For instance, these facilities 

need a dedicated manager who 

has some training in food storage 

and preservation, and who can 

perform daily operations and 

maintenance. Because of the time 

required to tend to these tasks, this 

manager must be compensated for 

his efforts, which means that users 

of the facility must be charged, 

records must be kept, etc. Most 

Afghan villages are not ready for 

this level of complexity.

 The second theory says that in 

order for people to embrace a 

technology, they must fully understand it – and in order for them to 

fully understand it, they must 

have been involved in its development from the start. 

 If we look back at the history 

of our own country, we developed 

on our own accord and it was a 

very iterative process that unfolded slowly and deliberately over 

time. Each step in our development was built upon and supported by prior steps. But here in Afghanistan, we are trying to inject 

modern technologies into a culture that has no fundamental base 

of knowledge to support them. 

Using solar wells as an example 

once again, Afghan villagers do 

not necessarily know how to rewire an electric pump, much less 

repair an inoperable solar panel. 

 So with this theory, the gap in 

knowledge, experience, or understanding within the culture, as it 

relates to solar power, serves as a 

barrier to further development 

using this technology.

(Continued from page 2) The third theory says that the Afghan people have been disillusioned 

by a 30-year span of destruction, 

oppression, and corruption which, 

according to Dr. Tom Vermeersch of 

the U.S. Department of Agriculture, 

―...seems to have dashed the hopes, 

dreams, and confidence of the Afghan people and left them reliant 

upon outsiders to do the things they 

have been doing for themselves for 

hundreds or thousands of years.‖ 

 Furthermore, the theory says that 

many of the efforts of coalition forces to help the Afghan people have 

only served to make them feel even 

more helpless. Either we have done 

too much for them while they have 

stood on the sidelines and watched, 

or we have injected technology that 

they simply have not been able to 

maintain for reasons discussed earlier – either they can’t afford the technology, it doesn’t fit into their culture, or they just don’t understand it.

 Discussion of these theories begs 

the question as to which one is correct or most dominant since each 

seems to have merit. However, let’s 

assume for the time being that all 

three theories contribute to the problem and see where that assumption 

leads us. 

 The first theory tells us that if we 

knew more about what the Afghans 

needed, what they could afford, and 

what they would accept, we could 

better balance our efforts. 

 The second theory suggests that 

we should only attempt to inject simple technologies that have a solid 

foundation of knowledge and understanding in the Afghan culture. 

 The third theory implies that we 

must somehow inspire the Afghan 

people, and especially their leaders, 

to once again take charge of their 

own development and their own future – to convince them there is hope 

for a better life if they are willing to 

put forth the effort.

 Fortunately, if we can achieve 

what the third theory tells us we must 

achieve, it is likely that the Afghans 

themselves will fix the problems associated with the first two theories. 

This is because the Afghans know 

what they need, can afford, and will 

accept. They also know, much better 

than we do, what technologies are a 

good fit for their culture and their 

current level of understanding, 

knowledge, and experience. 

 So the obvious course of action is 

to stop doing development for the 

Afghans and encourage, train, and 

empower them to do it for themselves, at their pace, and with technologies that work for them. But to 

make this possible, we must also find 

ways to inspire them and restore in 

them a sense of pride, confidence, 

resourcefulness, and hope.

 Based on lessons learned with 

solar wells and other ADT projects, 

ADT IV is no longer planning to 

build agriculture infrastructure for 

the Afghans. Rather, we are pursuing several lines of operation that we 

(Continued on page 14)

V O L U M E 4 , I S S U E 5

A completed solar well stands unused in Kuz 

Kunar. The solar panels have been removed by 

the villagers.
P A G E 1 4 How and why the ADT mission has evolved

believe will lay the 

groundwork for a chain 

reaction of development 

efforts by the Afghans 

themselves. 

 As our main effort, we 

are e mpowerin g the 

province’s Agriculture 

Extension Agents to be 

good trainers and to manage agriculture-related 

development projects in a 

transparent and uncorrupt 

manner. At the same 

time, we are teaching 

them about leadership 

qualities such as selfless 

service, integrity, and 

candor. We believe that 

if the AEAs consistently 

demonstrate these qualities, they will be in a better position to inspire the 

farmers they serve.

 As a secondary effort, 

we are helping the Director of Agriculture, Irriga-

(Continued from page 13) tion, and Livestock to 

effectively and transparently administer his program so he can continue 

to provide his AEAs the 

resources and training 

they need to succeed after coalition forces have 

left Afghanistan. 

 As part of this process, we are assisting the 

DAIL in developing an 

Operations and Maintenance budget to allow 

him to sustain the agriculture-related infrastructure under his control. 

 As a supporting effort, 

we are working to improve agriculture education within Nangarhar 

Province by developing 

continuing education opportunities for the AEAs 

and hands-on training 

o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r 

Nangarhar University 

students. 

 Finally, we are exploring ways to leverage 

the media to inspire and 

motivate Afghan farmers 

to come together as a 

team and take charge of 

their own development. 

 L t . C o l . N o r t h 

Charles, the ADT deputy 

commander, says that 

―because these lines of 

operation focus on investment in human capital rather than technology 

or material solutions, our 

belief is that they are a 

first step in getting Afghans fully invested in 

their own future – and we 

also believe that this is 

the only way to guarantee 

that development will 

continue after we have 

left.‖

T H E M U L E S K I N N E R T E A M

Contact Information

The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar 

Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you have 

questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. 

Mike Fortune at Mike.Fortune@afghan.swa.army.mil.

The Muleskinner is an unofficial publication authorized by AR 360-1. It is 

published monthly by the Missouri Agribusiness Development Team IV to 

provide important information related to their deployment for the Soldiers 

and Airmen, their Families, units and commands, the Army, DOD and the 

public. Views and opinions expressed in the Muleskinner are not necessarily 

those of the Department of the Army or DOD. 

MONG 

ADT IV