SECOND DI VI SI ON M I LLER, P. J. , M A RKLE and LA ND, JJ.

N O T IC E : M o tions for r e c ons i de r a tion m us t be phy s ic a lly r

e ce iv ed i n our c le r k ’s offic e w ithin te n da y s of the da te of de c is ion to be de e m ed tim e ly file d.

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A pr i l 9, 2024



# In t he C ourt o f A ppe a ls o f G e o r g ia

A 24A 0 344. STRI CK LA N D v . TH E STA TE.
M I L L E R , Presid ing J u d ge. Fo llo w ing a j u ry t r i a l i n A p ril 2003, J essie Stric k land was c o nv ic ted o f o ne

c o u nt o f aggrav ated child mo lestatio n and three c o u nts of c hild mo lestatio n. Trial

c o u nsel f iled a timely mo tio n f

o r new trial. N ew c o unsel ev entu ally f iled an amend ed

mo tio n f o r new trial in A p ril 2022, a hearing o n the mo tio n w as held in M arc h 2023, and the trial c ou r t d enied t he mo t io n in J une 2023. St r i c k l a n d t h en bro u ght this
ap p eal, c laiming that the ev id enc e w as insu ff ic ient to s u p p o r t his c o nv ic tio ns and that the d elay betw een his c o nv ic tio ns and the reso lu t io n o f hi s m o t i o n f o r new trial

v io lated his d u e p ro c ess r ights. W e d isagree and theref ore af f irm Stric k land ’ s

c o nv ic tio ns and sentenc e and the d enial o f his mo tio n f

or new trial.V iew ed in the light mo st f av o rable to the v erd ic ts, 1 the e v id enc e a t trial sho w ed that in 2001 Stric k land liv ed w ith his d au ghter, his c o m mo n- law w if e, 2 and his w if

e’ s d au ghter, a 1 2- year- o ld girl named J

. M

. A 1 2

- ye a r - o l d girl named H

. M

. a nd an 1 1

- year- o ld bo y named B

. M

. l i v e d to gether nearby. Stric k land d ro v e lo ad s of salt f o r a liv ing and o f

ten to o k J

. M . and H

. M

. o n o vernight trip s . B

. M

. testif

ied at trial that bec a use he w as c o nc erned that Stric k land w as hav ing

sexu al relatio ns w ith J

. M

. , he lo o ked thro u gh a small ho le in the w a ll o f J

. M

. ’ s bed ro o m w hen Stric k land and J

. M

. w ere there to gether, and he o bserv e d them hav ing

sex. W hen B

. M

. w as a sk e d to elabo rate o n the mo v ements of Stric k land a nd J

. M

. , he testif ied that it w as d ark and he “ c o u ld n’ t really see no thing,” b u t he maintained that there w as eno u gh light f

o r him to see the sex ac t. B

. M

. to ld hi s m o t h e r ’ s bo yf riend abo u t w hat he saw . J

. M. w as ask e d abo u t the inc id ent and initially d enied that Stric k land mo lested her. H o w ev er, Stric k l a nd w as p resent at the t ime o f this initial d enial, and J

. M

. su bsequ ently d isc lo sed that Stric kland had been hav ing sex w ith her. Stric k land ad mitted to his w if e that he had sex w ith J

. M

. “ o ne time o nly. ”

1 See Pa tch v. S ta te , 337 Ga. A p p . 233, 235 (1 ) (7 86 SE2d 882) (201 6 )

.
2 Stric k land and his w if

e su bsequ ently d iv o rc ed

.

2B

. M

. also to ld his mo ther abo u t sexu al relatio ns b etw een Stric k land and H

. M.

A f ter initially d enying that Stric k land mo lested her, H

. M

. d isc lo sed that he had sex

w ith her, p erf

o rmed oral sex o n her, and sho w ed her a natu ral p ierc ing o r ho le in his
p enis. H

. M

. testif

ied a t trial that she was sleep in g in Stric k land ’ s tru c k when she

aw o ke to him u nd ressing her and p erf o rming oral s ex. H

. M

. a l s o testif ied that Stric k land f

o nd led her a nd had s ex w ith her. Stric k land to ld H

. M

. no t to say anything abo u t their sexu al enc o u nters. J

. M

. testif

ied at t rial that Stric k land had sex w ith her in her bed ro o m and in his
tru c k many times. Stric k land threatened to hu rt J

. M

. and her m o t her i f s h e to ld
anyo ne abo u t the mo lestatio n. H. M

. and J

. M

. testif ied that Stric k land had sex w ith J

. M

. in the same bathro o m where H

. M

. w as tak ing a bath. Stric kland to ld H

. M

. that i f s he to ld anyo ne a bo ut t his inc id ent, she “ w o u ld n’ t see the light o f d ay. ” H

. M

. testif ied that she o bserv ed Stric k land hav e s ex w ith J

. M

. in his t ru c k

. H

. M

. and J

. M. testif ied that Stric k land sho w ed them the natu ral p ierc ing o r ho le in his p enis. A t trial, Stric k land ’ s c o u nsel called s ev eral m embers o f Stric k land ’ s f amily to testif y that they had heard f

ro m v ario u s so u rc es, inc lu d ing H

. M

. and J

. M

. , that the

3ac c usatio ns a gainst him w ere f alse. Trial c o u nsel also : presented ev id enc e t hat J

. M

. ’ s

mo ther rec eiv ed f

inanc ial assistanc e f

ro m the State’ s V ic t im A ssistanc e Pro gram; emp hasiz ed p u rp o rted inc o nsistenc ies in the d isc lo s u res o f abu se by J

. M

. and H

. M

. ; and argu e d that J

. M. and her mo ther w e re f inanc ially mo tiv ated to f

a lsely ac c u se Stric k land and t hat H

. M

. mad e her ac c u satio n s b e c au se of t he attentio n J

. M.

rec eiv ed f ro m her ac c u satio ns. Stri c k land w as charged with o ne c o u nt o f aggrav ated c hild mo lestatio n based

o n so d o my o f H

. M

. , in vio latio n o f OCGA § 1 6

- 6- 4 (c ) (“ Co u nt One” ); o ne c o u nt

o f so d o my o f H

. M

. , in v io latio n o f OCGA § 1 6

- 6- 2 (a) (“ Co u nt Tw o ” ) ; o ne c o u nt

o f c hild mo lestatio n b a sed o n sexu a l interc ou rse w ith J

. M. , in v io latio n of OCGA § 1 6

- 6

- 4 (a) (“ Co u nt Three” ); o ne c o u nt o f statu to ry rap e of J

. M

. , in v io latio n o f OCGA § 1 6- 6

- 3 (a) (“ Co unt Fo u r” ); a n d t w o c o u nts o f c hild m olestatio n based o n

s h o w ing J

. M

. and H

. M

. the natu ral p ierc ing o r ho le in his p enis, in vio lat i o n o f OCGA § 1 6

- 6

- 4 (a) (“ Co u nts Fiv e and Six” ). The j u ry f o u nd Stric k land gu ilty o f all

c harges. On A p r i l 1 8 , 2003, the trial c o u rt merged Co unt Tw o into Co u nt One, merged Co u nt Fo ur into Co u nt Three, and sentenc ed Stric kland to a to tal sentenc e

4o f 30 years, w ith the f irst 25 years to be s erv ed in c o nf inement a nd the remaind er o n p ro batio n. 3 Trial c o unsel f

iled a t i m e l y m o t io n f

or new trial in M ay 2003. I n 2007 , trial

c o u nsel w ithd rew f

ro m rep resentatio n and a p u blic d ef e nd er w a s a p p ointed to rep resent Stric k land

. A p p arently, in 2005, 2006 , and 2009 , Stric kla n d s e n t p ro se letters t o the trial c o u rt and /o r the trial c o u rt c lerk

. H o w ev e r , t h e se letters are no t inc lu d ed in the a p p ellate r e c o r d

. Trial c ou nsel and the trial c o urt clerk hav e sinc e p assed aw ay. T h e next p lead ing in the rec o rd af ter the mo tio n fo r new trial is an a m e n d e d

m o t i o n f o r new t rial, f

iled by new ly retained c o unsel in A p ril 2022. In the amend ed

mo tio n f o r new trial, Stric k land c laimed that: his du e p ro c ess rights had been v io lated by the delay in the p u rsu it a nd reso lu t i o n o f his mo tio n f o r new trial; trial c o u nsel rend e red inef

f e c tiv e assistanc e; the ev id e nc e d id no t su p p o rt his co nv ic tio ns; and the
p ro sec u to r en g a g e d in misc o nd u c t d u ring the trial. A t a Marc h 2023 hearing o n the

mo tio n f o r new t r ial, Stric k land testif i e d abo u t p u rp o rted d ef ic ienc ies in trial

c o u nsel’ s rep resentatio n. H o w ev er, Stric k land p resented no argu m ent or ev id enc e

3 The c ou rt also o rd ered Stric k land to pay a f i ne o f $2,500 and restitu tio n o f $5,000.
5that he had been u nable to ac c ess any e v id enc e d u e t o t he d elay in reso lv ing his mo tio n

f o r new trial. The trial c o u r t issu e d an o rd er d enying the mo tio n f o r new trial in J une 2023. The c ou rt c o nc lu d ed t hat t h e e v i d enc e w as su f fic ient to su p p o r t Stric k land ’ s

c o nv ic tio ns and that any c laims o f inef f ec tiv e a ssistanc e and p ro sec u to r ia l m i s c o nd u ct lac k ed merit. The trial c o u r t also c o nc lu d ed that the d elay in reso lv ing Stric k land ’ s mo tio n f o r new trial d id no t v io late his du e p ro c ess rights. The c o u rt assessed t he fo u r f ac to rs f o r e v a l u ating su c h a c laim — the length o f the d elay, the reaso n f o r the d elay, the d ef end ant’ s assertio n o f his right, and the p r e j u d ic e to the d ef end ant — and d etermined the f

ollo w ing. First, t he c o nsid erable d elay o f 20 years weighed in Stric k land ’ s f

av o r. Sec o nd , the rec o rd d id no t sho w the reaso n fo r the delay. Letters f ro m Stric k land d ated Oc to ber 1 0, 2005, and Sep tember 8 , 2 0 0 6 , ind ic ated that the
matter may hav e been set d o w n by the c o u r t f or a hearing o n the mo tio n f o r new trial
at so m e p o int, bu t inexp lic abl y the hearing w as nev er c o nv ened

. W hile the d elay
ap p eared to be a mixtu re o f the negligenc e o f t r i a l c o u n sel and the State, the d elay sho u ld be attribu ted to the State bec au se it bears u ltimate resp onsibility f o r the d o c k et,

6and this s ec o nd f ac to r w eighed in Stric k land ’ s f av o r. Third , t he rec o rd ref lec ted the f o llo w ing p ro se f

ilings by Stric k land : ( 1 ) a S e p tember 7 , 2005 “ M o tio n to Dismiss A tto rney and to A p p o i n t Co u nsel f o r an A p p eal,” sp ec if

ic ally alleging that [trial co u nsel] f ailed to f ile his ap p eal; (2) a Sep tember 28, 2005 “ M o tio n fo r D el i v e r a n c e o f Petitio ner;” (3) a Dec ember 1 5, 2005 “ Requ e st f o r Statu s o n M o tio n,” seek ing a n u p date o n his p e nd ing m o t io n t o d ismiss his att o rney; ( 4) a Oc to ber 1 0 , 2005 letter to the Clerk o f Co u r t seek ing ap p o intment o f a n atto rney f o r ap peal; (5) a Sep tember 8, 2006 “ Requ est f o r H earing t o be Re- Co nd u c ted ,” s eek ing a hearing o n his mo tio n to d ismiss and citing a d ef end ant’ s right to a meaningf u l ap p eal; and f

inally, (6 ) a J u ne 23, 2009 letter to the Clerk o f Co urt requ esting a co p y o f d o c k et entry lo g sheets to aid in his p rep aratio n o f habeas p lead ings.

W hile Stric k land mad e ef f orts in 2005 and 2006 to o btain the ap p o intment of a p u blic d ef end er and to inv o k e his right to ap p eal, he d id no t assert t h i s right f ro m 2006 thro u gh the filing o f his amend ed m o t io n f o r new trial in 2022, a l a p se o f nearly 1 6
years, and it was n o t u ntil Stric k land retained c u rrent co u nsel that a c lear and

u nequ iv oc al assertio n o f this right was mad e . Thu s, Stric k land ’ s f ailu re to v igo ro u sly assert his ap p ellate rights w eighed against him. The trial co u rt d e termined the f o llo w ing regard ing the f

inal f ac to r o f p rej u d ic e
to the d ef end ant. Stric k land f

ailed to o f f e r any sp ec if

i c e v id enc e of harm d u e to the
7d elay, a nd his v agu e assertio ns o f p rej u d ic e stemming f ro m trial c o u nsel’ s d eath w ere insu f f ic ient. Stric k land had neither id entif ied a ny e v id enc e he was u nable to p ro d u c e

no r established that any d ef e nse o r av enu e of relief he argu ed in his amend e d mo tio n f o r new trial w a s af

f ec ted by the d elay. B ec au se Stric k land ’ s u nd erlying c laims in his

mo tio n f o r new trial lac k ed m e rit, there was no t a reaso nable p ro bability that the resu lt

o f his ap p eal w o uld hav e been d if f erent if no t f

o r the d elay. Thu s, this f

ac to r w eighed heav ily against Stric k land

. Stric k land then f

iled this ap p eal.
1
. Stric k land a r g u e s t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e wa s insu f fic ient to su p p o rt his c o nv ic tio ns bec au se there w as no p hysic al ev id enc e , at o n e p o int J

. M

. and H

. M

. d enied any inap p r o p riate c o nd u c t by him, and the lo ne w itness to inap p ro p riate c o nd u c t, B

. M

. , ad m i t t e d t h a t he c o u ld no t see anything b ec au se it w as d ark

. W e d isagree and

c o nc lu d e that the ev id e nc e su p p o r ted Stric k land ’ s c o nv ic tio ns. W hen a def

end ant c hallenges the su f

f ic ienc y o f the e vid enc e su p p o rting h i s c riminal c o nv ic t io n, t he relev ant qu estio n is w hether, a f ter v iew ing the ev id enc e in the light mo st f a v o rable to the p ro sec u tio n, a ny ratio nal trier o f f ac t c ou ld hav e f

o u nd the essential elements o f the c rime beyo nd
a reaso nable do u bt. I t is the f u nc tio n of the j u ry, no t the r ev iew ing c o u rt, to reso lv e c o nf

lic ts in the testimo ny, to w eigh the ev id enc e, and to d raw

8reaso nable inf erenc es f ro m t h e e v id enc e. A s lo ng as there is s o m e c o mp etent ev id enc e, ev en tho u gh c o ntrad ic t ed , to s u p p o rt eac h f ac t nec essary to mak e o u t the [S]tate’ s c a s e , the j ury’ s v erd ic t w ill be
u p held

. (Citatio ns, p u nc tu atio n, and emp hasis o mitted

. ) Tho ma s v . Sta te , 324 Ga. A p p . 26 (7 48 SE2d 509 ) (201 3). J

. M

. a nd H. M

. t e s tif

ied a t trial abo u t t he inap pro p riate sexu al relatio ns Stric k land had w ith them. Altho u gh Stric k land e mp hasiz es J

. M .’ s and H

. M

. ’ s initial d enial o f mo lestatio n, “ it has been f irmly established that the reso lu t io n o f c o nf lic ts betw een a v ic tim’ s t r ial t e s ti m o ny and her p retrial inc o nsistent statement is f o r the j u ry. ” McC

u rdy v . S ta te , 359 Ga. A p p . 885, 887 -888 (1 ) (d ) (86 0 SE2d 1 72) (2021 ). Fu rther, Stric k land ad mitted to his w if e that he had sex w ith J

. M

. , and B

. M

. testif ied t h a t h e o bserv ed Stric k land hav e sex w ith J

. M

. A ltho u gh Stric k land
emp hasiz es B

. M

. ’ s testimo ny that it w as d ark and that he “ c o u ld n’ t reall y see

no thing,” w hen the testimo ny is v iew ed in c o ntext it i s a p p a r e n t that B. M

. w as merel y e x p l ai ning that he c ou ld no t p ro v id e m any d etails o n the mo v ements o f Stric k land a nd J

. M

. , a nd he maintained that there w as eno u gh light f o r him t o see the

sex ac t. “[I ] t is the ro le o f the j u ry to r e s o l v e c onf lic ts in the ev id enc e and to

9d etermine the c red ibility o f w itnesses, and the reso lu tio n o f su c h c o nf lic ts ad v ersely
t o [Stric k land ] d o es no t rend er the ev id enc e insu f f ic ient. ” (Citatio n o mitted

. ) McC u rdy , su p ra, 359 Ga. A p p . at 887 (1 ) (c ). A d d itio nally, Stric kland ’ s emp hasis on the l ac k o f p hysic al ev id enc e is

u nav ailing. “ [A ]s w e hav e exp lained many times bef ore, the testimo ny o f a single

w itness is generally su f

f ic ient to establish a f

ac t, OCGA § 24- 1 4- 8, i n c l u d ing the elements o f c hild mo lest a t i o n, and p hysic a l o r o ther c o rro b o rating ev id enc e is no t requ ired

. ” (Pu nc t u atio n o mitted

. ) Ta rlto n v . S ta te , 36 8 Ga. A p p . 31 3, 31 5 (2) (89 0 SE2d 1 0) (2023). Ac c o r d ingly, we c o nc lu d e t hat the ev id enc e , inc lu d ing Stric k land ’ s

c o nf essio n and t he testimo ny o f J

. M

. , H. M

. , an d B

. M

. , su p p o rted Stric k land ’ s

c o nv ic tio ns. See Jo hn s o n v . S ta te , 36 7 Ga. A p p . 1 08, 1 09 ( 1 ) ( 8 8 5 SE2d 7 7 ) (2023) (v ic tim’ s p rio r rec antatio n and the lac k o f p hysic al ev id enc e went t o the w eight rather than the su f

f ic ienc y o f the ev id enc e ).
2. Stric k land r eiterates his c laim that the d elay of 20 years in p u rsu ing his ap p eal

v io lated his d u e pro c e ss r ights. W e d isagree and c o nc lu d e that in light o f Stric k land ’ s f ailu re t o v igo ro usly assert his rights and to d emo nstrate prej u d ic e f ro m the d elay, the trial c o u rt d id no t abu se its d isc retio n in rej e c ting this c laim.

10“ [ S]u b s t a ntial d elays d u ring the c r iminal a p p ellate p ro c ess imp lic ate d u e

p ro c ess r ights. ” (Citatio n o mitted

. ) D e La Cru z v . S ta te , 303 Ga. 24, 29 (6 ) (81 0 SE2d 84) (201 8). Geo r gia c o u rts assess an alleged d u e p ro c ess v io latio n b ased o n su c h a d elay p u rsu ant to the f

ou r f a c to r analysis u tiliz ed f

o r sp e ed y trial c laims set f o rth in Ba rker v . W

i ngo , 407 U. S. 51 4 (9 2 SCt 21 82, 33 L E2d 1 01 ) (1 9 7 2). De L a C ru z , su p ra, 303 Ga. at 30 (6 ). These f ou r f ac to rs are “ the length o f t he d elay, the reaso n f o r the d elay, the d ef

end ant’ s assertio n o f his right, and p rej u d ic e to t h e d ef end ant. ” (Citatio n and p u n c tu atio n omitted

. ) G lo ver v . Sta te , 29 1 Ga. 1 52, 154 ( 3) ( 7 28 SE2d
221 ) ( 201 2). I n assessing s u c h a c laim, “ w e mu st ac c ep t the f ac tu al f ind ings o f the trial

c o u rt u nless they are c learly erro neo us, and w e mu st ac c ep t the ultimate c o nc lu sio n

o f the trial co u rt u nless it a mo u nts to an abu se o f disc retio n. ” (Citatio n o mitted

. ) D e La C ru z , su p ra, 303 Ga. at 30 (6 ). (a) W e agree w ith the trial c o u rt that the d elay o f 20 years betw een Stric k land ’ s

c o nv ic tio ns a nd the reso lu tio n o f his mo tio n f o r new trial w as exc e ssiv e and mu s t be

w eighed a gainst the State. See D e La C ru z , su p ra, 303 Ga. at 30 (6 ) ( i) (ac cep ting the trial c o u rt’ s find ing that a d elay o f nearly 21 years betw e en the d ef end ant’ s co nv ic tio n

11and his mo tio n f or new trial hearing w as exc essiv e and need ed to be w eighed against the State). (b) The trial c o u rt p ro p erly balanc ed the sec o nd f a c t o r, t he reaso n f

o r t he d elay, against the State. Sp e c i f

i c ally, t he rec ord d o es no t ind ic ate the reaso n f o r the d elay, and theref

o re w e mu st attribu t e the d elay to the State, see D e La C ru z , su pra, 303 Ga.
at (6 ) (ii), w hic h bears “the u ltimate r esp onsibility” f o r managing t he d o c k et. (Citatio n o mitted .) Hyden v . S ta te , 308 Ga. 21 8, 224 (3) (b) (839 SE2d 506 ) (2020). H o w ev e r, bec au se t here is no ind ic a tio n t hat the d elay was “ d esigned to d eliberately

s a b o tage [Stric k land ’ s] c ase,” t his f ac to r is no t w eighed p a rtic ularly heav ily again s t the State. See D e La C

ru z , su p ra, 303 Ga. at 31 (6 ) (ii). (c ) W e w ill no t d istu rb the trial c ou rt’ s d ec isio n to w eigh the third f ac to r, the d ef end ant’ s assertio n o f his right, against Stric k land

. Fo llo w ing the initial mo tio n f o r

new t rial, Stric kland ’s ef

fo rts to mo v e his c ase alo ng w ere limited to a series o f p ro se f ilings in 2005, 2006 , and 2009
. 4 H o w ev er, these f ilings ap p arently d id no t sp ec if ic a lly
assert that Stric k land ’s d u e p r o c e s s rights had been v io lated by a ny d elay, and Stric k land d id no t tak e any ac tio n f ro m 2009 u ntil the filing o f his amend ed mo tio n f o r

4 A gain, these f

ilings are no t in the ap p ellate rec o rd

.

12new t rial in 2022, w hen he f irst asserted a d u e p ro c ess v io latio n. T hu s, the trial c o urt

w as au tho riz ed t o w eigh Stric k land ’ s f ailu re to v igo r o u sly assert his ap p ellate rights against him. See D e La C ru z , s u p ra, 303 Ga. a t 3 1 ( 6 ) (iii) (bec au s e the d ef end ant f ailed to assert his ap pellate rights f o r mu c h o f

a 21

- year d elay, and he d id no t assert that his d u e p ro cess rights had been v io lated u ntil new c o u nsel amend ed his mo tio n f o r new t rial, this f

ac to r w eighed heav ily against him); Glo ver , su p ra, 29 1 Ga. at 1 55 (3) (bec au se the def

end ant “ f ailed to sho w that he asserted his ap p ellate rights f o r mu c h

o f the m o re than 10- year d elay,” and he did no t assert t hat the d elay v io lated his d u e p ro c ess rights u ntil new c o u nsel raised t he issu e in his amend ed mo tio n fo r new trial, his “ f ailu re to v igo ro u s ly assert his ap p ellate rights f o r sev eral years w eigh[ed ] against him” ) (c itatio ns and p u nc tu atio n o mitted ). (d ) The trial c o u rt p ro p erly w eighed the f inal f ac to r of p rej u d ic e heav ily against Stric k land

. [T]he p rej u d ic e nec essary to establish a d u e p ro c ess v io latio n based o n p o st- c o nv ic tio n d irec t ap p eal d elay is p rej u d ic e to the ability o f the d ef end ant to assert his a rgu ments o n a p p eal and , sho u ld it b e e stablished that the ap p eal w as p rej u d ic ed , w hether the d el a y p r ej u d ic ed the d ef end ant’ s d ef

enses in the ev e nt o f retrial o r resentenc ing.

13(Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) Owen s v . S ta te , 286 Ga. 821 , 826 (2) ( d ) (6 9 3

SE2d 49 0) (201 0), d isap p ro v ed o n o ther gro u nd s, Shelto n v . Lee , 29 9 Ga. 350, 356 (2) (b) n. 7 (7 88 SE2d 36 9) (201 6 ). “A p p ellate d elay is d eemed p rej u d ic ial when there is

a reaso nable pro bability that, b u t f o r t he d elay, the resu lt o f the ap peal w o u l d h a v e been d if f erent. ” Owen s , su p ra, 286 Ga. at 826 (2) (d )

. I n attemp ting to establish p rej u dic e in his a p p ellate brie f , S t r ic k land merely
argu es that the ino rd inate d elay and the d eath o f trial c ou nsel “ greatly hamp ers any inef f ec tiv e assistanc e o f c o u nsel c laim o r p ro o f o f p rej u d i c e , ” and that w itho u t the assistanc e o f t rial c o u nsel it is essentially imp ossible to ev alu ate “ imp ortant ev id enc e

s u ch a s t h e GB I interv iew s and Child Ad v o c ac y Center interv iew s o f the c o mp lainants

w hic h c a n b e s een as e xisting in the transc rip t bu t w ere no t direc tly intro d u c ed

. ”

“ Ho wev er, i n d e t e rmining w hether an ap pellate delay v io lates d u e p ro cess, p rej u d ic e,

u nlik e in the sp eed y trial c o ntext, is no t p resu med bu t mu s t b e s ho w n. ” (Citatio n and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted .) G lo ver , su p ra, 29 1 Ga. at 1 55 (3). Stric k land d o es no t argu e o n ap p eal that c ou nsel rend ered inef f ec tiv e assistanc e at trial, 5 and he has no t s ho w n that he has attemp ted bu t been u nable to ac c ess imp o rtant ev id enc e d ue to the d elay.

5 I nd eed , a rev iew o f the t rial transc rip t sho w s that c o unsel p resented a ro bu st d ef ense. 14[Stric k land ] p ro v id e s no ev id enc e o f p rej u d ic e arising f r o m the d elay a nd d o es no t ad v anc e a ny argu ment t hat the ap p eal he no w p u rsu es has been hamp ered by the d elay in any w ay. . . . [Stric kland ] has f ailed to o f f er the sp ec if ic ev id e n c e requ ired to sho w that the d elay has p rej u d ic ed his ap p eal o r that t he resu lt o f the ap p eal w o u ld hav e been d if f e rent bu t f

o r the d elay. (Citatio ns and p u nc tu a tio n o mitted

. ) I d

. T h e S up reme Co u rt of Geo rgia has held that w here the d e f end a n t ’s “o n l y cl a i m

o f prej ud ic e [w as] the bare assertio n that by the p assage o f time c o u n sel and

w itn e ss e s ’ memo r ies as to t he ev ents of t he c rime [w e re] less c lear,” he “f ailed to

o f f er the sp ec if

ic ev id enc e requ ired to sho w that t he d elay ha[d ] p rej ud ic ed his ap p eal

o r that the r e s u l t o f the ap p eal w o uld hav e been d if f erent bu t f

o r the d elay. ” (Pu nc tu a tio n o mitted

. ) Lo adho lt v . S ta te , 286 Ga. 402, 406 (4) (6 87 SE2d 824) (201 0). The Su p r e m e Co u r t has also rej ec ted a c laim of p rej u d ic e based o n ap p ellate d elay

w here the d ef

end a nt c o mp lained that sev e r al o f the State’ s w itnesses had d ied sinc e
t r ial, bu t he d id no t exp lain ho w the av a ilability o f tho se witnesses w o u ld h a v e b ee n relev ant to his m o t io n f

o r new t rial o r ap p eal. Vea l v . S t a te , 301 Ga. 1 6 1 , 16 8 (3) (800 SE2d 325) (201 7 ), d isap pro v ed o n other gro u nd s, Jo h n s o n v . S ta te , 31 5 Ga. 87 6 , 889 (3) n. 1 1 (885 SE2d 7 25) (2023). Similarly, Stric k land ’s generaliz ed s p ec u latio n abo u t
15the ef

fec t o f the u nav ailability o f trial c o u nsel on his ap p eal “ is no t the kind o f sp ec if ic

ev id enc e requ ired t o sho w p rej u d ic e in the ap p ellate- delay c o ntext. ” See Pa yn e v . S ta te , 289 Ga. 6 91 , 6 9 5 ( 2) ( b) (7 1 5 SE2d 1 04) (201 1) (“ [The d ef end ant’ s] generaliz ed
sp ec u latio n abo u t the d elay’ s e f f ec t o n w itness memo ries and ev id enc e is no t the k ind

o f sp ec if ic ev id enc e requ ired to sho w p rej u d ic e in the ap pellate- d e lay co ntext. ” ) (c itatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted ). A p art f ro m his d u e p ro c ess claim, the o nly c laim Stric k land raises o n ap p eal is his c hallenge to t h e su f

f ic ienc y o f the ev id e nc e, w hic h w e r ej e c ted a s meritless in D iv isio n 1 abo v e. “ [W ]here, as here, w e hav e f o u nd n o merit to the o ther

enu meratio ns raised h erein, [the d ef end ant] canno t sho w prej u d ic e. ” (Citatio n and
p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) Hyden , su p ra, 308 Ga. at 226 (3) (d ). “ This is so b ec a u se there

c an be no p rej u d ic e in d elaying a meritless a p p eal. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n

o m i t ted

. ) I d

. A c c o rd ingly, “ [t]he rec ord su p p o rts the mo tio n f o r new trial c o u r t ’ s f ind ing that [Stric k land ] f ailed to a d d u c e any ev i d e n c e t o sho w ac tu al p rej u d ic e to [his] ability to assert his a rgu ments o n ap p eal s o that t here is a reaso nable p ro bability that, bu t f o r the d elay, the resu lt o f this ap p eal w o u ld hav e been d if f e rent. ” (Citatio n and p u nc tu atio n o mitted

. ) De La C ru z , su p ra, 303 Ga. at 31 (6 ) (iv ).

16B a sed o n the f or ego ing, w e c o nc lu de that the d elay in reso lv ing Stric k land ’ s

mo tio n fo r new trial d id no t v io late his right t o d u e p ro c e s s. Sp e c if ic ally, “ it w as inc u mbent u po n the trial c ou rt t o f ind no c o nstitu tio nal erro r g i v en [Stric k land ’ s] lo ng d elay in asserting his r ight

. . . and his f ailu re to d emo nstrate p rej u d ic e. ” (Citatio n

o mitted .) D e La C

ru z , su pra, 303 Ga. at 31 (6 ). “ [W ]e d o no t ap pro v e o f the d elay

o c c asio ned here,” id

. (c itatio n o mitted ), and w e “ r e iterate t hat it is the d uty o f all tho se inv o lv e d in the c r iminal j u stic e system, inc lu d ing t rial c o u rts and p r o s e c u to rs

as well as d ef

ense c ou nsel and d e f

end ants, to ensu r e that the ap p ro p r iate p o stc o nv ic tio n mo tio ns a re f iled , litigated , and d ec id ed w itho u t unnec essary d elay. ” S ha n k v. S ta t

e , 29 0 Ga. 844, 849 (5) (c ) ( 7 2 5 S E 2 d 246 ) (201 2). N o netheless, w e

c o nc lu d e that the trial c o urt d id no t abu s e its d isc retio n in ru ling that Stric k land ’ s d u e p ro c ess c laim mu s t f

ail. A c c o rd ingly, w e af

f irm Stric k land ’ s c o nv ic t io ns a nd sentenc e and the d enial o f his mo tio n f

o r new trial. Ju dgmen t a

ffi rmed. Ma rkle & La n d, JJ. , co n cu r.

17