NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-83

COMMONWEALTH

vs.

EDDIE ROBLES.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

Following a jury trial in September 2014, Eddie Robles, the 

defendant, was found guilty of trafficking in heroin in 

violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32E, and of committing that crime 

within one hundred feet of a park in violation of G. L. c. 94C,

§ 32J; possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute in 

violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32A; and possession of trazodone in 

violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 34.1 On appeal, the defendant 

argues that the court erred in denying a motion to suppress 

evidence, that his arrest violated the Fourth Amendment to the 

1 With respect to the indictment charging possession of cocaine 

with the intent to distribute, the trial judge allowed the 

defendant's motion for a required finding of not guilty on the

count charging distribution of cocaine within one hundred feet 

of a park in violation of G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. The trial judge 

also dismissed the subsequent offense portion of the indictment, 

because the Commonwealth was not ready to prove that count.
2

United States Constitution and art. 14 of the Massachusetts 

Declaration of Rights, and that there was insufficient evidence 

to prove an intent to distribute, and a violation of G. L. 

c. 94C, § 32J. We affirm.

Discussion. 1. Motion to suppress. a. Background. "We 

summarize the facts as found by the motion judge . . . , 

supplemented by evidence in the record that is uncontroverted 

and that was implicitly credited by the judge" (quotation and 

citation omitted). Commonwealth v. Jones, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 

600, 601-602 (2022). On April 10, 2012, supported by an 

affidavit alleging three controlled buys of either heroin or 

cocaine on April 6, 9, and 10, a search warrant was issued to 

search the defendant's residence in an apartment complex in 

Brockton, as well as "the person or in the possession of: [the 

defendant]." The next day, while preparing to execute the 

warrant, police observed a white Toyota Corolla enter the 

parking lot of the defendant's apartment complex. The 

defendant, who had gotten out of the driver's side of the car,

and two other people left the car and entered the defendant's 

apartment building. Later that evening, officers conducting 

surveillance observed the defendant drive the Corolla away with 

two passengers.

Detective Brian Donahue of the Brockton police department, 

who knew of the defendant's suspended license and had been shown 
3

a picture of the defendant, followed the Corolla onto Oak 

Street. The defendant pulled his car over to the side of the 

road about 100 to 150 feet away from the apartment building; the 

police had not signaled for him to stop his vehicle. Donahue 

pulled up behind the defendant, activated his emergency lights,

and approached the vehicle. The driver identified himself as 

the defendant and stated that he had stopped because an alarm 

was going off in his house. Donahue arrested the defendant for 

operating with a suspended license and, along with other members 

of the Brockton police department, searched him, finding heroin, 

cocaine, and cash. After the arrest, the police executed the 

search warrant for the defendant's home, where additional 

narcotics were found.

Prior to trial, the defendant moved to suppress all items 

seized during the search of the defendant's person.2 After an 

evidentiary hearing, the motion judge denied the defendant's 

motion to suppress on three separate grounds: (1) the search 

warrant authorized a search of the defendant as well as his 

apartment; (2) the officers had probable cause to make a 

2 The defendant argues on appeal that his motion to suppress 

evidence seized from the Corolla should have been granted. 

Because no evidence was seized from the car itself, we treat the 

argument as addressing seizure of evidence from the defendant's 

person when he got out of the Corolla. The defendant also moved 

to suppress evidence found during the search of his apartment. 

He did not press this motion on appeal.
4

warrantless felony arrest of the defendant based on three 

controlled buys and search him incident to arrest; and (3) the 

officers properly arrested the defendant for operating a motor 

vehicle with a suspended license.

b. Probable cause to arrest. The defendant conceded, as 

he should have, at oral argument that the affidavit established 

probable cause to arrest the defendant. The affidavit in 

support of the application for the search warrant indicated that 

two reliable confidential informants purchased cocaine or heroin 

from the defendant in controlled buys on three occasions between 

one to five days prior to the search. See Commonwealth v. 

Charros, 443 Mass. 752, 764-765, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 870

(2005) (buy made by reliable confidential informant within past 

fifteen days provided basis to stop defendant's motor vehicle 

and arrest him, independent of recently issued search warrant).

See also Commonwealth v. Velez, 77 Mass. App. Ct. 270, 274 

(2010), abrogated on other grounds as recognized by Commonwealth

v. Lobo, 82 Mass. App. Ct. 803, 807 (2012) (where at time car 

was stopped, troopers were aware of three controlled buys within 

month of stop with last buy within seventy-two hours, troopers 
5

had probable cause to believe defendant had committed felony,

and initial stop and subsequent warrantless search were valid).3

The fact that the stated basis for the arrest was for 

driving with a suspended license, and not for the underlying 

drug offenses, is not dispositive because an officer's 

subjective intent does not bind the Commonwealth. See 

Commonwealth v. Lawton, 348 Mass. 129, 132 (1964) (search 

incident to arrest was valid where supported by probable cause 

that defendant violated breaking and entering law even if stated 

reason for defendant's arrest was not valid); Commonwealth v. 

Peters, 48 Mass. App. Ct. 15, 21 (1999) (at time of defendant's 

arrest for suspended license, police had probable cause to 

arrest defendant for possession of drugs).4

2. Sufficiency of the evidence. a. Background. We 

summarize the facts the jury could have found, reserving certain 

details for our discussion of the issues. In April 2012, the 

defendant, who was driving a vehicle which he had pulled over to 

the side of the road of his own volition a short distance from 

his apartment building and approximately twenty-five feet from a 

3 The Charros and Velez cases also established that a search 

warrant, even one that authorizes a search of a person, does not 

authorize police to detain that person after the person has 

traveled from the home. Charros, 443 Mass. at 764; Velez, 77 

Mass. App. Ct. at 274.

4 Because there was probable cause to arrest the defendant 

independent of the license suspension, we need not reach the 

other grounds for suppression raised by the defendant. 
6

park, was arrested for driving with a suspended license. 

Members of the Brockton police department searched the defendant 

incident to the arrest and found a bag of heroin (later weighed 

to be 19.62 grams) in his front left interior jacket pocket, 

$200 in cash in the defendant's front left pants pocket, $500 in 

cash in the defendant's wallet in his rear pocket, a second 

small bag of heroin in his front right coat pocket, a cigarette 

pack in his front pants pocket in which there were two bags of 

cocaine, a black digital scale in the defendant's pants pocket,

and another 1.1 grams of cocaine in defendant's pocket.

The defendant was then taken to his residence where the 

police executed a search warrant. When asked if there were 

drugs in the apartment, the defendant directed the police to a 

dresser in the defendant's bedroom, where the police found 

cocaine. In the kitchen, the police found two scales, sandwich 

bags, a hand sifter, latex gloves, a plate containing an offwhite, off-brown residue, and two bags full of cutoff baggies.

In a bedroom closet, the police found a duffel bag with twentynine trazodone pills, and three alprazolam pills. In the dining 

room, the police found a white bowl inside of which was white 

powder residue that field tested positive for cocaine. In 

total, the defendant possessed 24.88 grams of heroin, 12.77 

grams of cocaine, twenty-nine tablets of trazodone, and three

tablets of alprazolam.
7

b. Standard of review. The trial judge denied the 

defendant's motions for required findings of not guilty.5 "We 

review the denial to determine whether the evidence offered by 

the Commonwealth was sufficient to permit the jury to infer that 

the Commonwealth has met its burden of proving the essential 

elements of the crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt." 

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 456 Mass. 578, 582 (2010), citing 

Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 676-677 (1979). "[The] 

question is whether after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a 

reasonable doubt." Latimore, supra at 677, quoting Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). "Our analysis asks not 

whether the evidence requires a finding of guilty, but whether 

it permits such a finding beyond a reasonable doubt."

5 The defendant moved for a required finding of not guilty at the 

close of the Commonwealth's case and at the close of all of the 

evidence. 

"Because the defendant moved for required findings at the 

close of the Commonwealth's case and again at the close of 

all the evidence, [w]e consider the state of the evidence 

at the close of the Commonwealth's case to determine 

whether the defendant's motion should have been granted at 

that time. We also consider the state of the evidence at 

the close of all the evidence, to determine whether the 

Commonwealth's position as to proof deteriorated after it 

closed its case" (quotation omitted). 

Commonwealth v. West, 487 Mass. 794, 799-800 (2021), quoting 

Commonwealth v. O'Laughlin, 446 Mass. 188, 198 (2006).
8

Rodriguez, supra, quoting Commonwealth v. Nolin, 448 Mass. 207, 

215 (2007). 

c. Intent to distribute. The defendant argues that there 

was insufficient evidence to show that he possessed the 

narcotics with an intent to distribute.6 We conclude that, 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth, as we must, the Commonwealth's evidence was 

sufficient for a rational jury to find that the defendant 

harbored the requisite intent to distribute heroin and cocaine.7 

Here, a State police trooper, who testified as an expert in 

how the drug trade operates, testified that the amount of heroin 

and cocaine found was more than is typical for personal 

consumption. See Commonwealth v. Sendele, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 

755, 758 (1984), and cases cited ("Possession of a large 

quantity of an illicit narcotic raises an inference of intent to 

distribute"). See also Commonwealth v. Pratt, 407 Mass. 647, 

653 (1990) (same). Additionally, no paraphernalia for drug 

consumption was found on the defendant or in his apartment. See 

Commonwealth v. Richardson, 479 Mass. 344, 360 (2018) 

("Traditionally, drug possession in the absence of drug 

6 The defendant does not specify whether he means heroin or 

cocaine or both. We address both.

7 The evidence of the controlled buys in the affidavit in support 

of the search warrant were not presented as evidence during the 

trial. 
9

paraphernalia also is probative of intent"). The paraphernalia 

that was found permitted an inference of an intent to 

distribute. See id. at 360-361. The same officer testified 

that scales, sifters, latex gloves, and paper plates and bowls 

with residue on them are typically used for drug distribution, 

and that packaging drugs into the corners of cutoff baggies is a 

common method for heroin and cocaine distribution.8 The police 

found three scales, including one on the defendant's person. In 

addition to items that might be found in any kitchen or 

household, such as the sifter or latex gloves, the police found 

two bags full of cutoff baggies, a paper plate with an offbrown, off-white residue on it, and a bowl with white powder 

residue which field tested positive for cocaine. While some of

the items may be typical kitchen objects, the evidence taken as 

a whole permits a reasonable juror to have concluded that the 

defendant had an intent to distribute.

Considering the case again at the close of the evidence 

does not lead to a different conclusion. At trial, the 

defendant admitted that he possessed the drugs, but argued he 

had no intention to distribute the drugs as they were for 

personal use. The defendant contends that many of the items 

found in the apartment are regular household items, such as the 

8 The officer also testified that the amount of cash found on the 

defendant was not typical for someone who is addicted to drugs.
10

scales, plastic bags, sifter, plate, and latex gloves. He 

claims that the amount of cash found was insignificant in light 

of the fact that there was no evidence of pagers, ledgers, or 

burner phones. The Commonwealth's case did not deteriorate

after the defendant testified, as the jury were entitled to 

discredit his testimony. See Commonwealth v. Nhut Huynh, 452 

Mass. 481, 485-486 (2008).

d. Park zone. General Laws c. 94C, § 32J, provides in 

relevant part: "Any person who violates the provisions of 

[G. L. c. 94C, §§ 32, 32A, 32B, 32C, 32D, 32E, 32F, or 32I,] 

. . . within [one hundred] feet of a public park or playground 

. . . shall be punished by a term of imprisonment . . . ." 

Commonwealth v. Boger, 486 Mass. 358, 359-360 (2020), quoting 

G. L. c. 94C, § 32J. "[I]ntent to commit the underlying drug 

crime is sufficient to violate § 32J, without additional proof 

of scienter of park boundaries." Commonwealth v. Matta, 483 

Mass. 357, 358 (2019).

The defendant argues that the Commonwealth failed to 

introduce sufficient evidence to prove that the defendant 

trafficked heroin within one hundred feet of a park and that the 

distance between the stop and the park was speculative. In 

addition, the defendant cites Commonwealth v. Peterson, 476 

Mass. 163 (2017), arguing that § 32J is not intended to apply to 
11

someone who was in a car and merely traveling on a roadway 

adjacent to a park.

"After the elements of [the predicate] offense have been 

established, one need only take out the tape measure to see if 

[the park zone provision of § 32J] has been violated" (citation 

omitted). Commonwealth v. Roucoulet, 413 Mass. 647, 650-651

(1992). Here, a detective testified that he measured the 

distance between the traffic stop and the fence along the park 

wall with a surveyor's wheel, which he calibrated prior to 

using. The distance measured twenty-five feet. In addition to 

the measuring wheel, the Brockton superintendent of parks 

testified that Oak Street "runs just about through the middle of 

the park." We are satisfied that the Commonwealth's means of 

measuring the distance between the park and where the defendant 

stopped his vehicle permitted a finding that the car was stopped 

within one hundred feet of the park.

Next, the defendant relies on Peterson, 476 Mass. 163, to 

argue that the statute cannot apply here, where he fortuitously 

stopped his own vehicle near a park. In Peterson, the Supreme 

Judicial Court held that it would be "overreaching" to apply 

§ 32J "to a defendant who is located momentarily within one 

hundred feet of a public park solely because he is a passenger 

in a motor vehicle that is driven on a public roadway past the 

park and, fortuitously, stops at a red light." Id. at 163-164. 
12

The Peterson case is distinguishable. Here, the defendant was 

the driver, not a passenger, and the defendant, not the police, 

selected the location for his stop.9 Moreover, the court in 

Peterson limited its holding to the "specific facts presented" 

and did not alter other decisions, including Roucoulet, 413 

Mass. 647, and Commonwealth v. Labitue, 49 Mass. App. Ct. 913 

(2000). Peterson, supra at 169. In Roucoulet, the court 

rejected the argument that a defendant's possession of drugs 

within a school zone, intended for distribution outside the 

zone, is not proscribed by statute. Roucoulet, supra at 650. 

In Labitue, we upheld a § 32J violation where police stopped the 

defendant's automobile in a school zone but a drug transaction 

had taken place more than the statutory distance from that 

school. Labitue, supra at 914-915. Accordingly, we reject the 

defendant's argument.

Judgments affirmed.

By the Court (Wolohojian, 

Henry & Hershfang, JJ.10),

Clerk

Entered: August 14, 2023.

9 The defendant testified that he pulled the car over because the 

alarm company from his apartment was calling his telephone. 

Nothing in the record indicates that the police caused the 

defendant's alarm to sound.

10 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.