NUMBER 13-14-00294-CV

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG 

KERSTIN JONES, Appellant,

v.

RODERICK DARRYL JONES, Appellee.

On Appeal from the 267th District Court 

of Victoria County, Texas.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Garza and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion Per Curiam

Appellant, Kerstin Jones, proceeding pro se, appealed a decree of divorce entered 

on March 26, 2014. However, according to our review of a supplemental clerk’s record 

filed in this cause, intervenor Urquhart Law Firm P.L.L.C. (“Urquhart”) timely filed a motion 

to modify the judgment and, alternatively, for new trial on April 25, 2014. Urquhart 

contended that the divorce decree should be modified or a new trial granted because the 
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final decree of divorce purported to dispose of real property that Urquhart owned. By (a)

letter ruling dated and filed on July 8, 2014, the trial court granted Urquhart’s motion for 

new trial:

Pending is the intervention/motion to modify/motion for new trial filed 

by the Urquhart Law Firm in the above-captioned matter. By my 

calculations, the court's plenary power ends tomorrow. After review of the 

file and the arguments of counsel, I find that there is some basis to the 

argument that the acreage in dispute should not have been included in the 

decree of divorce. However, I do not have enough information to 

determine if removing the acreage from the decree would affect the existing 

property division. There is also the claim that the land was fraudulently 

conveyed or that the conveyance was in violation of a prior injunction.

Accordingly, in the interest of justice, I am granting a new trial as to 

the entire case and it is so Ordered. Please forward a copy of this order to 

counsel of record and Ms. Jones. Please also forward a copy of this order 

to the Court of Appeals.

On July 29, 2014, the trial court entered an “Order Confirming Order Granting New Trial,” 

stating that it “is hereby ORDERED that this court's order of July 8, 2014 is the order 

granting a new trial and said order is incorporated herein by reference.”

The trial court retains jurisdiction over a case for a minimum of thirty days after a 

final judgment, during which time the court has plenary power to change its judgment. 

See TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(d); Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc., 10 S.W.3d 

308, 310 (Tex. 2000). Here, the motion for new trial was timely filed and extended the 

trial court’s plenary power for an additional seventy-five days. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 

329b(a),(c),(e),(g). When a motion for new trial is timely filed, the trial court has plenary 

power to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until thirty days after the motion 

is overruled, either by a written order or by operation of law, whichever comes first. See
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TEX. R. CIV. P. 329b(e); Moritz v. Preiss, 121 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. 2003). Thus, the 

court’s plenary power may ultimately be extended 105 days after the judgment was 

signed. Lane Bank Equip. Co., 10 S.W.3d at 310. In this case, the trial court’s period 

of plenary power expired on July 9, 2014. The trial court granted the motion for new trial 

by letter ruling on July 8, 2014, which was within this extended period of time; however, 

the trial court’s formal order, signed on July 29, 2014, was not signed within the trial 

court’s plenary jurisdiction. 

In general, a letter from the trial court to counsel is typically not the type of 

document that constitutes a judgment, decision, or order. See Goff v. Tuchscherer, 627 

S.W.2d 397, 398–99 (Tex. 1982); In re CAS Cos., 422 S.W.3d 871, 874 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi 2014, orig. proceeding); Perdue v. Patten Corp., 142 S.W.3d 596, 603 

(Tex. App.—Austin 2004, no pet.). However, a letter may constitute an order if it 

substantially complies with the requisites of a formal order. See In re CAS Cos., 422 

S.W.3d at 875; In re Newby, 266 S.W.3d 557, 558–59 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, orig. 

proceeding); Schaeffer Homes, Inc. v. Esterak, 792 S.W.2d 567, 569 (Tex. App.—El Paso 

1990, no writ). Specifically, a letter may constitute an order if: (1) it describes the 

decision with certainty as to parties and effect; (2) it requires no further action to 

memorialize the ruling; (3) it contains the name and cause number of the case; (4) the 

court's diction is affirmative rather than anticipatory of a future ruling; (5) it bears a date;

(6) it was signed by the court; and (7) it was filed with the district clerk. See In re CAS 

Cos., 422 S.W.3d at 875; In re Newby, 266 S.W.3d at 558–59; Barron v. Vanier, 190 

S.W.3d 841, 846 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, no pet.); Schaeffer Homes, Inc., 792
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S.W.2d at 569. In examining these factors, we focus on whether the trial court intended 

the letter to serve as an order. In re CAS Cos., 422 S.W.3d at 875; Gen. Elec. Capital 

Auto Fin. Leasing Servs., Inc. v. Stanfield, 71 S.W.3d 351, 355 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2001, 

no pet.). 

In this case, the trial court’s July 8, 2014 letter ruling substantially complies with 

the requisites of a formal order. The letter describes the decision to grant a new trial with 

certainty as to parties and effect; it requires no further action to memorialize the ruling; it 

contains the name and cause number of the case; the diction is affirmative rather than 

anticipatory of a future ruling; it bears a date; it was signed by the court; and it was filed 

with the district clerk. See In re CAS Cos., 422 S.W.3d at 875; In re Newby, 266 S.W.3d 

at 558–59; Barron, 190 S.W.3d at 846; Schaeffer Homes, Inc., 792 S.W.2d at 569. 

Further, as evidenced by the trial court’s subsequent order, the trial court intended the 

letter to serve as an order. See In re CAS Cos., 422 S.W.3d at 875; Gen. Elec. Capital 

Auto Fin. Leasing Servs., 71 S.W.3d at 355.

Accordingly, the trial court granted a new trial in this matter on July 8, 2014. As a 

general rule, an order granting a new trial is an interlocutory order that is not reviewable 

on direct appeal from the order or from a final judgment. See Wilkins v. Methodist Health 

Care Sys., 160 S.W.3d 559, 563 (Tex. 2005) (“Except in very limited circumstances, an 

order granting a motion for new trial rendered within the period of the trial court's plenary 

power is not reviewable on appeal.”); Cummins v. Paisan Constr. Co., 682 S.W.2d 235, 

236 (Tex. 1984). On August 6, 2014, the Clerk of this Court notified appellant that the 

record before the Court contained no appealable order, and requested correction of this 
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defect, if it could be done. The Clerk further advised appellant that the appeal would be 

dismissed for want of jurisdiction if the defect was not corrected within ten days from the 

date of receipt of this notice. See TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(a),(c). Appellant has not 

corrected this defect, and we conclude that we lack jurisdiction over this appeal. The 

appeal is hereby DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION. See TEX. R. APP. P. 

42.3(a). All pending motions are likewise DISMISSED.

PER CURIAM

Delivered and filed the

11th day of September, 2014.