T h e t rans cri p t ref l ect s t hat t hi s wi t ness ’ nam e i s p ho net i cal l y s p el l ed

. O t her do cum ent s wi t hi n t he reco rd 1 ind ic a te he r la st na m e a s “T e w .” 

### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE

AT NAS HVILLE A ssi gne d onBr ie fs O ct obe r 15, 200 3

STATE OF TENNESS EE v . CARLOS SALVADOR ANGEL , JR.

Direc t Appeal from the Cr im inal Cou rt for Davidson Coun ty No. 2001-B-858 Cher yl Blackb urn, Jud ge

No. M2002- 02982-CCA -R3-C D - F iled Fe bruary 27, 2004

The Appe llant, Carlos Salvador Ang el, J r., wa s convicted of ag g ravated sexual battery by a D a v id son County jury and sentenced to ten y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. On appe al, Ang el ar g ues that: ( 1) the admission of testimony by his f ormer g irlfriend, who was not the victim in thi s case , was irrele vant and unduly

prejudicia l and (2) the ten-y ear sentenc e im posed was excessive. After revie w of the re cord, the judgme nt of conviction and se ntence are aff irmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e ntof t he Cr im ina l C our t A ffirm e d.

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in which J ER R Y L. S MI TH , J . and T HOMAS T. W O O D A LL , J ., joined.
Cy nthia F. B urnes, Na shville, Tennessee , for the A ppellant, Carlos Salvador A ng el, J r. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Gene ral a

nd Report er ; M i chae l Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; Thomas E. Willi a ms, I I I , A ssi sta

nt A tto rn e y

Ge ne ra l; V ic tor

S. (T or ry ) John so n I I I , Di str ic t Attor ne y Ge ne ra l; and B rian Holmg ren, A ssistant District Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound

On the e ve nin g of

June 18 , 2 00 0, Chr ist ina Tu a g re e d to ba

by sit he r f ri e nd’s ten -ye ar- old 1 daug hter. Prese nt at Ms. Tu’s apa rtment that eve ning w as the Appe llant, who was Ms. Tu’s bo y frien d, Ms. Tu ’s tw o c hil dr e n, the Ap pe lla nt’ s tw o c hil dr e n, and

the te n- y e ar- old

vic tim

. Ev e ntu a lly , e ve ryon e re tir e d to the ir be dr oo ms, wi th t he e xce pti on

of the vic tim , w ho re ma ine d in the living r oom watchingtelevision.-2-

Af te r ever y on e we nt t o b e d, the Ap pe lla nt r e tur ne d to the liv ingro om w e ari ngon ly his box ers a nd a shirt. Afte r che cking his computer e- mail , h e l ai d on the couc h. At this ti me, the vic tim wa s lying on a se c on d c ou c h, sti ll watc hin g te le vis ion

. Th e Ap pe lla nt a sk e d th e vic timto s it
o n h i s l ap , an d she complied. The Appellant then a sked if she ha d ever seen a man’s “pr ivates.” She responde d, “no.” H e then a sked the victim if she wa nted to see a man’s “privates.” Ag ain, she responde d, “no.” T he Appe llant then cupped the vi ctim’s chin i n his hand, turne d her he ad towar d him , a nd a sk e d if sh e wa nte d to kis s h im. At

thi s p oin t, t

he vic timtur

ne d a wa y fr om t he Ap pe lla

nt. The Appe llant proce eded to plac e his han d u n der the victim’s shirt and beg an rubbingher sto ma c h. Gr a du a lly , th e Ap pe lla nt mov e d his ha

nd up wa rd un til he wa s f

on dli nghe r b re a sts . T his behavior continued for a

pproxi mately

five minutes. The A

ppellant then re moved his hand and obtained the victim’s promise that she would not repe at what happene d. The victim then re turned to the other c ouch. Eve ntually , Ms. Tu came i n t o the living r oom, and she a nd the Appellant returne d to her be droom.

The ne x t morning the victim informed her mother of the events of the pr ior eve ning. B ased upon the ensuingpolice investig ation, the Appellant was indicted by a Davidson County

g rand jury for one count of ag g ravated sexual battery , a class B felony . After hear ing the evidenc e at tria l, the jury returne d a ver dict of guilty to the char g ed off

ense on Ma

y 21, 2002.
On August 30, 2002, the trial court, a pply ing on ly

the enha nceme nt fac tor for a

previous criminal history

and no mitigating f

actor s, sentence d the Appellant to ten y ear s in the Depa rtment of Corre ction. The Appe lla n t s u b s eq u en tly filed a motion for ne w trial, which w as denie d on November

1, 2002. This appea l followed.

Ana lys is

1. Adm iss ion of Te st im ony The Appe llant challeng es the trial c ourt’s ruling permitting Ms. Tu to testify at trial re g arding the pa rt ic ula r m ann e r i n whi c h the Ap pe lla nt s ome tim e s k iss e d h e r, in v ie w o f t he fa c t th a t th e vic tim te sti fi e d that he ha d att e mpt e d to kiss he r in a simil ar mann e r. Du ri nga jur y out he ari ng , th e wi tne ss descr ibed t h e s p ec i fi c manne r in which the A ppellant would kiss her. In concludingthat the proff ere d testimony

was a dmissibl e, the trial court found that kissing or the method of kissingis “not a cha rac ter tra it, [ but] a beha

vior.” More over, the court c oncluded:

Idon’t quiet honestly see any prejudice here

. There ’s j ust the fact that he had a way of doi ng things. . . . [Victim] descr ibes a c erta in behavior. . . . Ms. Tu de scribes that in list ening to what [Victim] said and found it striking , beca use she ha d witnessed or fe lt the same be havio r. So f or that r e a so n I ’m

g oin g to a llo w i t.

Ms. Tu ’s te sti mony be fo re the jur y e sta bli sh e d that, wh e n k iss inghe r, the Ap pe lla nt “ wo uld take his hand to my

fac e and tur

n it toward him.” She demonstra t ed b ef o re the jury

how the-3-

Appellant would cup her chin with his fing ers when turning her head. She testified that this made he r f e e l “ un c omf

or ta ble .” She a lso e xpla ine d tha t th e Ap pe lla

nt n e ve r k iss e d h e r i n th is m ann e r i n fr on t of the vi ctim. T he Ap pe lla nt a sse rt s th a t Ms . T u’ s te sti mony “ wa s ir re le va nt, and un du ly prejudicia l to th e [ Ap p ellant,] and should not have bee n admitted under Rules 401, 402, 403, a nd 404 of the Te nnessee Rules of Evidence .” Preliminarily , we note t h at “[t] he admissibility of evide nce is g ener ally

within the broad discretion of the trial court

. . . [and that] absent a n abuse of that discretion, the tria l court' s decision wi ll no t b e rev ers ed. " State v. Edison , 9 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 , 7 7 (T en n

. 1 9 9 9 ) ( ci t i n g State v. Mcle od , 937 S.W .2d 867, 871 (Tenn.1996) . Admissible pro of must satisfy the threshold dete rmination of rele vancy mandated by

Tenne ssee Rule of E vidence 401, whi ch d ef ines rele vant evidenc e as that "ha ving any tendenc y

to make the e x istence of

any fac t that is of conseque nce to the de termination of the a ction more proba

ble or less probable than it would be without the evidenc e." Tenn. R. Evid. 40 1. Rul e 40 3 ad ds that re le va nt " e vid e nc e may be e xclu de d if its p ro bativ e va lue is s ub sta nti a lly outweig hed by

the dang er of unfair prejudice , confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury , or by considerations of undue de l ay , waste of time, or nee dless prese ntation of cumulative e vidence ." Te nn . R. Ev id. 40 3. F ina lly , Ru le 40 4 d e a ls w ith" c ha ra c te r e vid e nc e ." Sub se c tio n ( b) of thi s r ule provides that " [e] vidence of other cr i mes, wrong s, or ac ts is not admis sible to prove the c hara cter of a p ers on in ord er t o s ho w act io n i n co nfo rm it y wi th th e char act er t rai t. "

Ge ne rally , ev ide nc e of

c on du c t by

a de fe nd ant i nv olv inga

pe rs on oth e r t ha n th e vic timis inadmissible as being irrele vant. This g ener al ru l e, h o we v er, is not without exception. One such exception involves habit and routine pra ctice e vidence . Rule 406, Tennesse e Rules of Evidence, pr ov ide s in

re le va nt p art :
Evidence of the ha

bit of a pe rson . . . whethe r cor roborated or not and r eg ardle ss of the pre sence of eye-w itnesses is releva nt to prove that the c onduct of the p erson . . . on a par ticular oc casion wa s in conformity with the habit or routine pr actice

.
Tenn. R. Evid. 406(a) . Habit evidenc e is define d under the Rule as “a regular re sponse to a re peate d specific situation.” Tenn. R. Evid. 406(b).

Th e Ap pe lla

nt argue s that the wi tne ss’ te sti mony c on sti tut e d c ha ra c te r e vid e nc e and , th

us , vio late d Ru le 40 4, Te nn e sse e Rul e s o f E vid e nc e . Wh ile the dis tin c tio n be tw e e n c ha ra c te r a nd ha bit evidenc e is often blurr ed, we ag ree with the t rial court that the evidenc e pre sented wa s not chara cter evidenc e but was ha

bit evidence

. Cha ra c te r i s a ge ne ra lize d de sc ri pti on of on e ’s dis po sit ion , or o f o ne ’s dis po sit ion in respe ct to a g ener al trait, such as honesty , tempera nce, or peac efulne ss. ‘Habit’ . . . i s m o re s p ec i fi c.

. . . A h ab i t

. . . i s t h e p er s o n ’s r e g u l a r p r a c t i c e o f m ee t i n g a particula r kind of situation with a specif ic ty pe of c onduct. . . .

F e d. R. E vid . 4 06 , H ist or y ; A nc ill ary

L aws and

Di re c tiv e s.-4-

Nonethele ss, habit evidence must still be relevant. W e conc lude that the witness’ te stimony
re g ard ingthe Ap pe lla

nt’ s me tho d o f k iss ingwa s r e le va nt t o s ho w that th e Ap pe lla nt atte mpt e d to kiss the victim on this oc casion, which was an issue in dispute. At trial, the Appellant denie d ever attempting to kiss the victim or havingany ty pe of se x ual contac t with her. Ac cordingly , we f ind thi s is su e wi tho ut m e ri t. 2. Sentencing

As his se cond issue, the Appellant a sserts that the trial c ourt imposed an excessive se ntence based upon the application of onl y one enhance ment fac tor. When there is a cha lleng e to the leng th, rang e, or manner of service of a sentenc e, it is the duty of this court to conduc t a de novo re vie w w ith a pre sumption t hat the determinations made by the t rial court are corr ect. Te nn. Code Ann. § 40-35- 401(d) ( 2003). The burden is on the Appellant to show the i mpropriety of the sente nce. T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-401, Sente ncing Commi ssion Com ments. The Appe llant was convic ted of a g g ravated s ex u al battery , a cla ss B fe lony , for whic h the appropr iate sentenc e rang e is e ight to twe lve y ear s. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40- 35-112(a )(2) (2003). The presumptive sente nce to be imposed by the trial cour

t for a c lass B f

elony is the minim um sentence within the applicable r ang e unless there are enhanc ement or mitig ating fac tors prese nt. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35 -2 1 0 (c ) (2003). The weig ht give n to eac h fac tor is left to the discre tion of the trial judge

. State v. Shelton , 854 S.W .2d 116,123 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992)

.
I n sentenc ing the Appellant, the sole e nhance ment fac tor found by the trial court wa s that the Appellant had a

previous history of cr iminal convictions or criminal beha vior. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-114( 2) (2003) . Application of this fac tor was ba sed upon the Appe llant’ s one prior conviction for misdeme anor c hild abuse. The rec ord established that the Appellant wa s indicted for felon y chil d abuse, but he enter ed into a neg otiated plea a g ree ment, and wa s convicted of misdemeanor c hild abuse on May 22, 2000. The trial c ourt noted that t h e i n s t an t offe nse wa s c o mm i tte d o nly

tw e nty -s e ve n d ay s a ft e r p le a din g g uil ty to c hil d a bu se and thi s c ha rg e oc c ur re d w hil e the Appellant was on probation. Moreove r, based upon the proof prese nted at t h e sentencing hear ing, reg arding the Appellant’s child abuse conviction, the trial court found the phy sical injuries inflicted by

the Appellant upon his minor son wer e extensive and cha rac terized the conduc t of the Appellant as e g reg ious. Accor dingly , the trial cour t affor ded this enhanc ement fa ctor substantial weig ht and sentenc ed the Appe llant to ten y ear s in the Depa rt m en t o f Correc tion. The Appellant does not dispute that application of this fa ctor wa s prope r. R at h er , he alleg es that the trial c ourt improperly

weig hed the f

actor in enhanc ing the sentenc e by two y ear s.

T h e A p p el l an t ’s ar gu m en ti s m i s p l ac ed

. T h er e i s ce rt ai n l y n o p r o h i b i t i o naga i n s tu s i n g a pr ior mis de me ano r c on vic tio n to e nh anc e a se ntence, and the tri a l c ourt may e xer c ise a

c e rt a in amount of discre tion in setti ng an appr opriate se ntence . When the court fo l l o ws the sentenc ing proce dures, its deter

mination is clothed in a presumption of corr ectne ss. Our revie w of the r ecor d in this case re veals that the tria l court has c omplied with the SentencingAct and that its finding s are adequately

su p p o rt ed b y the re cord. G iven the natur e and c ircumstance s of the Appe llant’s prior-5-

misdemeanor conviction, we conclude , upon de novo revie w, that a se ntence of ten y ear s is just ified in this case. This issue is without merit.

CO NC LU SION

After revie w, we fi n d that the trial cour t did not err in admitting the c omplained of testimon i al ev i d ence or in sentenc ing the Appellant. Ac cording ly , we a ffirm the c onviction and subsequent sente ncing decision.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE