[Cite as State v. Harris, 2021-Ohio-1431.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

 CLARK COUNTY 

STATE OF OHIO 

Plaintiff-Appellee 

v. 

DAREZ LEON HARRIS 

Defendant-Appellant 

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Appellate Case No. 2020-CA-29 

Trial Court Case Nos. 2019-CR-817 

(Criminal Appeal from 

Common Pleas Court) 

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O P I N I O N 

Rendered on the 23rd day of April, 2021. 

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IAN RICHARDSON, Atty. Reg. No. 0100124, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Clark 

County Prosecutor’s Office, 50 East Columbia Street, Suite 449, Springfield, Ohio 45502

 Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellee 

 

MICHAEL PENTECOST, Atty. Reg. No. 0036803, 117 South Main Street, Suite 400, 

Dayton, Ohio 45422 

 Attorney for Defendant-Appellant 

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WELBAUM, J. 
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{¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Darez Leon Harris, appeals from his conviction in the 

Clark County Court of Common Pleas after he pled guilty to one count of failure to comply 

with the order or signal of a police officer. In support of his appeal, Harris contends that 

the trial court erred by denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea 

without first holding an evidentiary hearing. Because the trial court’s decision denying 

Harris’s motion was based, in part, on the incorrect factual finding that Harris had been 

advised of the maximum possible penalty for his offense before entering his guilty plea, 

we find that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Harris’s motion. Also, because 

the record establishes that the trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a) by not advising Harris of the maximum possible penalty during its plea 

colloquy, Harris’s guilty plea was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered and 

must therefore be vacated. The judgment denying Harris’s post-sentence motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea will be reversed, Harris’s guilty plea will be vacated, and the 

matter will be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. 

Facts and Course of Proceedings 

{¶ 2} On December 16, 2019, a Clark County grand jury returned an indictment 

charging Harris with one count of failure to comply with the order or signal of a police 

officer in violation of R.C. 2921.331(B)/(C)(5), a felony of the third degree. The charge 

arose after law enforcement officers attempted to stop Harris’s vehicle in order to arrest 

Harris on an outstanding warrant. However, instead of complying with the officers’ order 

to turn off his vehicle, Harris fled from the officers at a high rate of speed. This resulted 

in a high-speed pursuit between Harris and the officers that almost caused an accident. 
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For safety reasons, the officers ultimately decided to terminate their pursuit of Harris. 

Harris was later arrested in Franklin County, Ohio. 

{¶ 3} On June 22, 2020, Harris entered a guilty plea to the charged offense. In 

exchange for his guilty plea, the State agreed to dismiss a failure to comply charge against 

Harris in an unrelated case—Clark C.P. No. 2019-CR-754. The parties made no 

agreement as to Harris’s sentence but did agree to have a presentence investigation 

conducted. After conducting a plea colloquy, the trial court accepted Harris’s guilty plea 

as being knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The record of the plea hearing, 

however, indicates that the trial court failed to advise Harris of the maximum possible 

penalty he faced by entering a guilty plea. Nevertheless, upon accepting Harris’s plea, 

the trial court scheduled the matter for sentencing. 

{¶ 4} On July 17, 2020, the trial court held a sentencing hearing and sentenced 

Harris to 36 months in prison with 13 days of jail-time credit. The trial court also 

suspended Harris’s driving privileges for five years and ordered Harris to pay court costs. 

Immediately after the trial court imposed its sentence, Harris orally moved the trial court 

to withdraw his guilty plea. After the following discussion with Harris, the trial court 

denied Harris’s motion. 

DEFENDANT: I’m not understanding. 

THE COURT: What’s not to understand? 

DEFENDANT: I feel like I didn’t really know what I was pleading to. 

There was no substantial evidence. 

THE COURT: Okay. Well, you did know what you were pleading to 

because I went over [it] with you in quite detail. 
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DEFENDANT: And I want — 

THE COURT: Part of the agreement was the State was dismissing 

the other charge pending against you for failure to 

comply. 

DEFENDANT: I would like to withdraw my plea because I feel like

there was no substantial evidence besides a cop 

saying he saw me. There were no cameras. There 

were no [sic] apprehension. There was no – I wasn’t 

arrested. I felt like I just agreed with the system to just 

get the case over, get on probation, get back to my 

children. 

THE COURT: I see. You were not told that you were gonna get 

community control, were you? 

DEFENDANT: No, I was told it was an option. 

THE COURT: You were told what the possible maximum penalty 

would be. All the information you just stated to me you 

knew at the time of your plea. So it appears to the 

Court that all you’re doing is having a change of heart. 

DEFENDANT: I’m not – 

THE COURT: Request for change of plea is denied. You want to 

proceed more formally, you’re certainly welcome to do 

so. 

Sentencing Trans. (July 17, 2020), p. 17-18. 
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{¶ 5} Harris never filed a formal post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Harris instead filed the instant appeal from his judgment of conviction, raising one 

assignment of error for review. 

Assignment of Error 

{¶ 6} Under his sole assignment of error, Harris contends that the trial court erred 

by denying his post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first holding an 

evidentiary hearing. 

{¶ 7} As a preliminary matter, we note that the trial court’s decision denying 

Harris’s post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea can be challenged in this direct 

appeal because the trial court’s decision was an interlocutory order that merged into the 

final judgment of conviction filed by the trial court. See State v. Cochran, 2d Dist. Clark 

No. 09-CA-49, 2010-Ohio-2917, ¶ 13 (trial court’s oral decision overruling motion to 

withdraw guilty plea at a re-sentencing hearing was an interlocutory order that became 

final and appealable as a result of the final judgment of conviction being rendered). See 

also USA Freight, L.L.C. v. CBS Outdoor Group, Inc., 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26425, 

2015-Ohio-1474, ¶ 15. 

{¶ 8} “Under Crim.R. 32.1, a trial court may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea 

after imposition of sentence only to correct a manifest injustice.” (Citations omitted.) 

State v. Ray, 2d Dist. Champaign No. 2019-CA-31, 2020-Ohio-4769, ¶ 11. A defendant 

may establish a manifest injustice “ ‘by showing that he did not enter the guilty plea in a 

knowing, intelligent, or voluntary manner.’ ” State v. Leifheit, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2019-

CA-78, 2020-Ohio-5106, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Riley, 4th Dist. Washington No. 16CA29, 
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2017-Ohio-5819, ¶ 18. (Other citations omitted.) To ensure that a defendant is entering 

a felony plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, the trial court must engage the 

defendant personally and explain the rights set forth in Crim.R. 11(C)(2) before accepting 

the plea. State v. Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, ¶ 27. 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) specifically requires the trial court to explain, among other things, “the 

maximum penalty involved[.]” 

{¶ 9} “ ‘A hearing [on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea] is required 

only if the facts alleged by the defendant, if accepted as true, would require the plea to 

be withdrawn.’ ” State v. Hall, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2011-CA-32, 2012-Ohio-2539, ¶ 12, 

quoting State v. McComb, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 22570, 22571, 2008-Ohio-295, ¶ 19. 

That is, “ ‘[t]he movant must establish a reasonable likelihood that withdrawal of his plea 

is necessary to correct a manifest injustice before a trial court must hold a hearing on his 

motion.’ ” Ray at ¶ 14, quoting State v. Stewart, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2003-CA-28, 2004-

Ohio-3574, ¶ 6. “ ‘[N]o hearing is required on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea 

where the motion is supported only by the movant’s own self-serving affidavit, at least 

when the claim is not supported by the record.’ ” Id.

{¶ 10} “We review a trial court’s decision on a post-sentence motion to withdraw 

guilty plea and on a decision granting or denying a hearing on the motion for an abuse of 

discretion.” State v. Ogletree, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2014-CA-16, 2014-Ohio-3431, ¶ 11, 

citing Xenia v. Jones, 2d Dist. Greene No. 07-CA-104, 2008-Ohio-4733, ¶ 6. Most 

instances of abuse of discretion occur when a trial court makes a decision that is 

unreasonable. AAAA Ents., Inc. v. River Place Community Urban Redevelopment 

Corp., 50 Ohio St.3d 157, 161, 553 N.E.2d 597 (1990). “A decision is unreasonable if 
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there is no sound reasoning process that would support that decision.” Id. “A court’s 

reasoning process is not ‘sound,’ and is therefore unreasonable, when it relies on 

incorrect facts.” (Citations omitted.) Pieczonka v. Pieczonka, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C170173, 2017-Ohio-8899, ¶ 8. Therefore, “[a]n abuse of discretion may be found when 

the trial court ‘* * * relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.’ ” State v. Johnson, 8th 

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107617, 2019-Ohio-2332, 138 N.E.3d 560, ¶ 12, quoting Thomas v. 

Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, 892 N.E.2d 454, ¶ 15 (8th Dist.); State 

v. Selvaggio, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2017-L-128, 2018-Ohio-3532, ¶ 12. 

{¶ 11} As noted above, in support of his oral motion to withdraw his guilty plea, 

Harris generally claimed that he had not understood his plea. Harris also claimed that 

there had been no substantial evidence of his guilt, given that he was never arrested or 

video-recorded fleeing from the police. In denying the motion, the trial court found that 

Harris knew this information at the time of his plea, that the court went over the plea with 

Harris “in quite detail,” and that Harris was “told what the possible maximum penalty would 

be.” Sentencing Trans. (July 17, 2020), p. 17-18. However, the record of the plea 

hearing establishes that the trial court did not advise Harris of the maximum possible 

penalty for his offense before Harris entered his guilty plea. That information was wholly 

omitted from the trial court’s plea colloquy. 

{¶ 12} But for the trial court’s erroneous finding as to the maximum penalty 

advisement, we would have found it reasonable for the trial court to deny Harris’s postsentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea without first holding an evidentiary hearing. 

This is because Harris’s motion was based on a bare, general assertion that he did not 

understand his plea. Furthermore, Harris’s claim that there was no substantial evidence 
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of his guilt was based on information known to Harris before he entered his plea; thus, 

Harris cannot reasonably contend that said information would have caused him not to 

plead guilty. Therefore, the record indicates that Harris did not establish a reasonable 

likelihood that the withdrawal of his guilty plea was necessary to correct a manifest 

injustice. 

{¶ 13} Nevertheless, the record indicates that when ruling on Harris’s motion to 

withdraw his guilty plea, the trial court incorrectly found that it had advised Harris of the 

maximum possible penalty he could receive for his offense. Therefore, because the trial 

court relied on that incorrect factual finding when ruling on the motion, we find, for that 

reason alone, the trial court abused its discretion when it denied Harris’s post-sentence 

motion to withdraw his guilty plea without a hearing. 

{¶ 14} At this juncture, we note that the only relief Harris seeks in his appeal is to 

have the judgment denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea reversed and the matter 

remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Although not explicitly argued on appeal, the 

validity of Harris’s guilty plea is an underlying issue that needs to be addressed under the 

circumstances of this case. 

{¶ 15} “In order to satisfy the requirements of due process, a plea of guilty * * * 

must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the record must affirmatively 

demonstrate” as much. State v. Chessman, 2d Dist. Greene No. 2003-CA-100, 2006-

Ohio-835, ¶ 15, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 

(1969). “In order for a plea to be given knowingly and voluntarily, the trial court must 

follow the mandates of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Brown, 2d Dist. Montgomery Nos. 

24520, 24705, 2012-Ohio-199, ¶ 13. “[T]he rule ‘ensures an adequate record on review 
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by requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the 

consequences of his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily 

made.’ ” State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286, ¶ 11, 

quoting State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168, 331 N.E.2d 411 (1975). 

{¶ 16} Generally speaking, “a defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated 

unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a failure of the trial court to comply with the 

provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” Id. at ¶ 16, citing State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, 108, 

564 N.E.2d 474 (1990). There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. Id. at ¶ 14-16. 

{¶ 17} The first exception is that the trial court must comply strictly with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(c) as it pertains to the waiver of federal constitutional rights. Id. at ¶ 14. “When 

a trial court fails to explain the constitutional rights that a defendant waives by pleading 

guilty or no contest, we presume that the plea was entered involuntarily and unknowingly, 

and no showing of prejudice is required.” Id., citing Clark, 119 Ohio St.3d 239, 2008-

Ohio-3748, 893 N.E.2d 462, at ¶ 31. 

{¶ 18} The second exception is that “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with 

a portion of Crim.R. 11(C) eliminates the defendant’s burden to show prejudice.” 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at ¶ 15, citing State v. Sarkozy, 117 Ohio St.3d 86, 2008-Ohio-509, 

881 N.E.2d 1224, ¶ 22. However, a defendant still must show prejudice if the trial court 

partially complied with Crim.R. 11(C) in regard to a non-constitutional right. State v. 

Bishop, 156 Ohio St.3d 156, 2018-Ohio-5132, 124 N.E.3d 766, ¶ 19. 

{¶ 19} Pursuant to Crim.R.11(C)(2)(a), the trial court was required to personally 

address Harris in order to ensure that Harris understood the maximum possible penalty 

he could receive before pleading guilty. This is a non-constitutional right; therefore, if the 
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trial court completely failed to comply with this rule, Harris’s plea may be vacated without 

his showing any prejudice. 

{¶ 20} As previously discussed, the trial court did not advise Harris of the maximum 

possible penalty he faced during its plea colloquy. The trial court did, however, ensure 

that Harris reviewed and understood the written plea agreement, a form which set forth 

the maximum possible penalty that Harris faced. Some courts have held that discussing 

a written plea form (which contains the maximum possible penalty) at the plea hearing 

and ensuring that the defendant understands its contents amounts to substantial 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). See, e.g., State v. Dorsey, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L15-1174, 2016-Ohio-740, ¶ 11; State v. Williams, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 10AP-1135, 

2011-Ohio-6231, ¶ 39-41. However, since the Supreme Court of Ohio’s decision in 

Dangler, it has been held that simply ensuring that a defendant understands a written 

plea form is not a cure for the trial court’s complete failure to orally advise the defendant 

about the maximum possible penalty at the plea hearing. See State v. Rogers, 2020-

Ohio-4102, 157 N.E.3d 142, ¶ 14-26 (12th Dist.). 

{¶ 21} In Rogers, the Twelfth District Court of Appeals reviewed whether there was 

a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) under circumstances where the trial 

court failed to advise the defendant of a mandatory fine during the plea colloquy. The 

trial court, however, ensured that the defendant reviewed, signed, and understood the 

written plea agreement, which set forth the mandatory fine. Under those circumstances, 

the Twelfth District explained that: 

Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), a trial court’s determination that a 

defendant entering a guilty plea understands the maximum penalty involved 
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must precede the court’s acceptance of the plea. This is accomplished by 

the trial court “addressing the defendant personally.” Neither post-colloquy 

events nor a plea form signed by a defendant are relevant in reviewing 

whether a trial court has complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). The trial court’s 

failure to advise Rogers of the mandatory fine during the plea colloquy does 

not comply with the requirement of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) that a trial court 

“first” determine a defendant’s understanding of the maximum penalty 

before accepting the plea. Neither does Rogers’ mere execution of the 

plea form satisfy the requirement of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) that the trial court 

“personally address” a defendant to determine that the plea is entered with 

an understanding of the maximum penalty involved. 

We note that Rogers and the state both discuss whether the trial 

court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) during the plea colloquy. 

In particular, the state cites a case for the proposition that a trial court’s 

acceptance of a guilty plea without advising the defendant that a fine could 

be imposed constitutes substantial compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) 

where the defendant signs a plea agreement before entering his guilty plea 

that informs him of the fine. See State v. Mohr, 3d Dist. Van Wert No. 15-

98-05, 1999 WL 797048 (Sept. 16, 1999). This reflects the law that was 

applicable at the time the parties filed their briefs. However, a recent 

decision of the Ohio Supreme Court reveals that whether a trial court 

substantially complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) is no longer part of the analysis 

in reviewing a trial court’s plea colloquy. See [State v. Dangler, 162 Ohio 
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St.3d 1, 2020-Ohio-2765, 164 N.E.3d 286]. 

Rogers at ¶ 14-15. 

{¶ 22} Rogers then discussed what constituted a “complete failure to comply” with 

Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and stated that: 

“[A] trial court’s total failure to inform a defendant of a distinct 

component of the maximum penalty during a plea colloquy constitutes a 

complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), thereby requiring the 

vacation of the defendant’s guilty or no contest plea.” [State v. Fabian, 

12th Dist. Warren No. CA2019-10-119, 2020-Ohio-3926, ¶ 20]. “Or stated 

differently, a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) involves a 

trial court’s complete omission in advising about a distinct component of the 

maximum penalty. By contrast, a trial court’s mention of a component of 

the maximum penalty during a plea colloquy, albeit incomplete or perhaps 

inaccurate, does not constitute a complete failure to comply with Crim.R. 

11(C)(2)(a).” Id. 

Id. at ¶ 19. 

{¶ 23} In applying these principles, Rogers held that: 

The trial court did not simply misinform Rogers about the fine, such 

as the amount or whether it was mandatory or discretionary. Rather, the 

court made no mention of the fine during the plea colloquy. Consequently, 

the trial court’s total failure to inform Rogers of the mandatory $7,500 fine, 

which was a part of the maximum penalty, before it accepted the guilty plea 

constituted “a trial court’s complete failure to comply with a portion of 
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Crim.R. 11(C)” pursuant to the second exception to the prejudice 

requirement. (Emphasis sic.) Sarkozy, 2008-Ohio-509 at ¶ 22, 117 Ohio 

St.3d 86, 881 N.E.2d 1224. 

Rogers, 2020-Ohio-4102, 157 N.E.3d 142, at ¶ 23. 

{¶ 24} In reference to the written plea form, Rogers further explained that: 

The record further suggests that Rogers was aware he faced a 

mandatory $7,500 fine based upon the plea form he signed which plainly 

indicated a mandatory fine of $7,500 on Count 2. However, while “[a] 

written acknowledgment of a guilty plea and a waiver of trial rights executed 

by an accused can, in some circumstances, reconcile ambiguities in the oral 

colloquy that Crim.R. 11(C) prescribes, * * * the writing does not substitute 

for an oral exchange when it is wholly omitted.” State v. Dixon, 2d Dist. 

Clark No. 2001-CA-17, 2001 WL 1657836, *3 (Dec. 28, 2001). “Crim.R. 

11(C) requires that form of exchange to insure that the defendant makes a 

voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty.” Id. “This court 

examines compliance with Crim.R. 11 by examining the trial court's 

communication to the defendant, not the defendant’s subjective 

understanding of his rights.” State v. Gipson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C970891, 1998 WL 682153, *3 (Sept. 30, 1998). 

In light of all of the foregoing, we find that the trial court completely 

failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and Rogers' guilty plea was not 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made. 

Id. at ¶ 25-26. 
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{¶ 25} We note that Dixon, 2d Dist. Clark No. 2001-CA-17, 2001 WL 1657836, 

involved the trial court’s failure to advise the defendant of one of the constitutional rights 

under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). However the statement Rogers cited in Dixon is not limited 

to constitutional advisements, as Dixon stated the following: 

A written acknowledgment of a guilty plea and a waiver of trial rights 

executed by an accused can, in some circumstances, reconcile ambiguities 

in the oral colloquy that Crim.R. 11(C) prescribes. However, the writing 

does not substitute for an oral exchange when it is wholly omitted. Crim.R. 

11(C) requires that form of exchange to insure that the defendant makes a 

voluntary and intelligent decision whether to plead guilty. On appellate 

review, “the focus ... is whether the record shows that the trial court referred 

to the right in a manner reasonably intelligible to that defendant.” [State v. 

Ballard, 66 Ohio St.2d 473, 423 N.E.2d 115 (1981), paragraph two of the 

syllabus.] 

Id. at *3. 

{¶ 26} Like the defendant in Rogers, Harris might have been aware of the 

maximum penalty he faced by virtue of reviewing the written plea agreement. However, 

Rogers and Dixon both indicate that simply ensuring that a defendant understands a 

written plea form is not a cure for the trial court’s complete failure to orally advise a 

defendant about the maximum possible penalty during the plea colloquy. In so holding, 

we note that this case is distinguishable from this court’s recent decision in State v. 

Ebbing, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 28823, 2021-Ohio-865, ¶ 20, wherein we found partial 

compliance with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) under circumstances where the trial court advised 
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the defendant of the maximum possible penalty at the plea hearing save for completely 

omitting the fact that the trial court could impose a discretionary five-year license 

suspension, which the court ultimately never imposed. Unlike Ebbing, the trial court in 

this case completely failed to advise Harris about any aspect of the maximum possible 

penalty he faced, i.e. that he could receive 36 months in prison, a $1,000 fine and a threeyear license suspension. Therefore, because the trial court’s plea colloquy completely 

failed to comply with the maximum penalty portion of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), we find that no 

showing of prejudice is required to vacate Harris’s guilty plea. 

{¶ 27} Harris’s sole assignment of error is sustained. 

Conclusion 

{¶ 28} Having sustained Harris’s sole assignment of error, the trial court’s 

judgment denying Harris’s post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is reversed, 

Harris’s guilty plea is vacated, and the matter is remanded to the trial court for further 

proceedings. 

. . . . . . . . . . . 

TUCKER, P.J. and DONOVAN, J. concur. 

Copies to: 

Ian Richardson 

Michael Pentecost 

Hon. Richard J. O’Neill