UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

TINA M. DOBBINS, 

Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-725 

 Judge Michael H. Watson 

v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

Plaintiff, Tina M. Dobbins (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for 

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her 

application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. This matter is 

before the United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s 

Statement of Errors (ECF No. 9), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 

12), and the administrative record (ECF No. 8). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDEDS that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social Security’s nondisability finding and REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ under Sentence 

Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Report and Recommendation. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security 

income on October 9, 2014, and October 15, 2014, respectively, alleging disability since 

November 30, 2012. (R. at 315-24.) Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon 
2 

reconsideration. (R. at 231-37, 243-54.) Plaintiff sought a de novo hearing before an 

administrative law judge. Administrative Law Judge Irma Flottman (the “ALJ”) held a hearing 

on June 6, 2017, at which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified. (R. at 145-

70.) On January 10, 2018, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. at 88-113.) On May 23, 2018, the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and affirmed the ALJ’s decision. (R. at 1-7.) 

Plaintiff timely filed this action for review. (ECF No. 1.) 

 Plaintiff asserts that remand is required because the ALJ mistook a treating physician’s 

opinion as that of a physical therapist and as a result weighed the opinion inappropriately. The 

undersigned agrees and finds that remand is necessary. The undersigned limits her discussion of 

the record to evidence bearing on this contention of error. 

II. RELEVANT RECORD EVIDENCE 

A. Dr. Shawn A. Bonner 

Dr. Shawn A. Bonner, D.O., served as Plaintiff’s primary care physician since as early as 

August 2014 through the date of the administrative hearing. (R. at 790-838, 855-64, 960-64.) 

Throughout that period, Dr. Bonner treated Plaintiff for a number of physical and mental health 

complaints. On April 12, 2017, Rhonda Forestal, P.T., completed a physical capacity evaluation 

form setting forth various physical and mental limitations. (R. at 788-89.) When prompted to 

list the name of the doctor completing the form at the top of the first page, Ms. Forestal wrote Dr. 

Bonner’s name. In addition, a second person besides Ms. Forestal signed the form at the bottom 

of the second page. (R. at 789.) Although this second signature is illegible, the letters “D.O.” 

are clearly visible at the end of the signature. This and the fact that Dr. Bonner’s name appears 
3 

at the top of the form suggests the signature is that of Dr. Bonner and that he adopted the 

opinions expressed therein. According to the form, Plaintiff is limited to standing and walking 

no more than two hours total in an eight-hour work day, but she cannot stand for more than 10 

minutes at one time or walk for more than five minutes at one time; she can sit for three hours 

total out of an eight-hour work day, but for no more than 20 minutes at one time; she can engage 

in no lifting; she cannot use her right hand at all for grasping, pushing, pulling, or fine 

manipulation; she cannot bend, squat, crawl, climb steps or climb ladders at all; and she cannot 

reach above shoulder level at all. In addition, according to this form, Plaintiff’s condition would 

likely deteriorate if she were placed under stress, particularly stress associated with a job. 

According to the form, Plaintiff is “unable to do activities [because] of pain and instability,” and 

Plaintiff “did attempt most activities but was unable to complete [them].” (R. at 789.) 

B. The ALJ’s Decision 

On January 10, 2018, the ALJ issued her decision. (R. at 91-107.) At step one of the 

sequential evaluation process,1

 the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful 

 

1. Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step 

sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Although a dispositive 

finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th 

Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

3. Do the claimant's severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal 

the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner's Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

4. Considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, can the claimant 

perform his or her past relevant work? 
4 

activity since November 30, 2012. (R. at 94.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of degenerative joint disease of both acromioclavicular joints, spondylosis and disc 

bulging of the lumbar spine, degenerative disc disease of the thoracic spine, fibromyalgia, and 

obesity. (Id.) She further found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 96.) At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ set 

forth Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to lift and carry up to 20 pounds 

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; stand and walk up to six hours in an eighthour workday; and sit up to six hours in an eight-hour workday. Further, she cannot 

crawl or climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally stoop, kneel, 

crouch, and climb ramps or stairs. She can frequently balance. She should avoid 

all exposure to hazards, including operational control of moving machinery and to 

unprotected heights. 

(R. at 98.) In reaching this RFC, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to the April 12, 2017 

evaluation form completed by Ms. Forestal and adopted by Dr. Bonner, primarily because of her 

mistaken belief that the opinions expressed therein were not those of an acceptable medical 

source. Specifically, the ALJ rejected the evaluation as follows: 

A physical therapist completed a physical capacity evaluation form in April 2017, 

on which she endorsed selections indicating that the claimant was unable to sit, 

stand, and walk for more than seven hours total in an eight-hour workday. She also 

indicated that the claimant was unable to lift or carry anything, could not use her 

hands for repetitive activities at all, and was expected to deteriorate if placed under 

 

5. Considering the claimant's age, education, past work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the 

national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); 

Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 
5 

stress, particularly stress related to a job (Exhibit 18F). A physical therapist’s 

opinions are not entitled to controlling weight under Social Security Rule 96-2p, 

nor are they treated as “medical opinions.” Specifically, Social Security Ruling 96-

2p states, “opinions from sources other than treating sources can never be entitled 

to “controlling weight.” A physical therapist is not a “treating source,” because 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1502 & 416.902, defined a “treating source” as a “physician or a 

psychologist.” Physical therapist’s opinions are not “opinions” of a “medical 

source,” as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1527(a)(2), 416.902 and 

416.927(a)(2), nor are they those of an “acceptable medical source,” as defined in 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513 and 416.913. Because a physical therapist does not qualify 

under either of these definitions, their opinions are, pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 

404.1527 and 416.927, not “medical opinions.” Given this, a physical therapist’s 

opinion is considered only as to how it helps in the understanding of how an 

impairment affects the ability to work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1514(e) and 416.913(e). 

The results of this classification is that their opinions are viewed in the same manner 

as “information from other sources” such as observations of non-medical sources, 

naturopaths, and social welfare agencies. In this case, the claimant has submitted 

no evidence of examination findings, muscle testing, or radiologic studies to 

support the physical therapist’s opinion set forth on the form. Nor is there any 

evidence that the physical therapist saw the claimant except on the single occasion 

of the evaluation, which was performed shortly before the claimant’s disability 

hearing. Her opinion on the claimant’s ability to tolerate stress appears to have 

been offered without the support of any training in mental health assessment or 

treatment. Therefore, this opinion is given minimal weight. 

(R. at 104.) The ALJ did not acknowledge that the form was adopted by Plaintiff’s long-time 

primary care physician, Dr. Bonner. 

Relying on testimony from a vocational expert, the ALJ found that Plaintiff is unable to 

perform any past relevant work, but that there exist jobs in significant numbers in the national 

economy that Plaintiff is able to perform. (R. at 24, 25.) The ALJ therefore concluded that 

Plaintiff was not disabled under Section 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. (R. at 26.) 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to 

proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) 
6 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is 

defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

 Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must 

“‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the 

Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is 

substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 

1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision 

of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and 

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial 

right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 

(6th Cir. 2007)). 

 

IV. ANALYSIS 
7 

 The undersigned finds that remand is appropriate because the ALJ improperly weighed 

the April 12, 2017 evaluation adopted by Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Bonner. The ALJ 

must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in evaluating a claimant’s case. 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(c). The applicable regulations define medical opinions as “statements from 

physicians and psychologists or other acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about 

the nature and severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and 

prognosis, what you can still do despite impairment(s), and your physical or mental restrictions.” 

20 C.F.R. § 416.927(a)(2). 

 The ALJ generally gives deference to the opinions of a treating source “since these 

sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal 

picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical 

evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical filings alone . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(2); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). If the treating 

physician’s opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the claimant's] case 

record, [the ALJ] will give it controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). 

 If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ 

must meet certain procedural requirements. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 

(6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, if an ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling 

weight: 

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors-namely, the length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 

treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion 
8 

with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source-in 

determining what weight to give the opinion. 

Id. Furthermore, an ALJ must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] notice of determination 

or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your treating source's opinion.” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(2). Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning “must be sufficiently specific to make clear to 

any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical 

opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 550 

(6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit has stressed the importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 

disposition of their cases,” particularly in situations where a claimant knows that 

his physician has deemed him disabled and therefore “might be especially 

bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some 

reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d 

Cir. 1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician 

rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule. See 

Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. Thus, the reason-giving requirement is “particularly important 

when the treating physician has diagnosed the claimant as disabled.” Germany-Johnson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 313 F. App’x 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242). 

There is no requirement, however, that the ALJ “expressly” consider each of the Wilson factors 

within the written decision. See Tilley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 

2010) (indicating that, under Blakley and the good reason rule, an ALJ is not required to 

explicitly address all of the six factors within 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) for weighing medical 

opinion evidence within the written decision). 

Finally, the Commissioner reserves the power to decide certain issues, such as a 
9 

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although the ALJ will 

consider opinions of treating physicians “on the nature and severity of your impairment(s),” 

opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are generally not entitled to special 

significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ failed to appreciate that the opinions expressed in the April 12, 2017 

evaluation form were adopted by Dr. Bonner and as a result failed to evaluate the opinions under 

the treating-physician framework set forth above. Instead, the ALJ improperly concluded that 

the opinions expressed in the form were not from an acceptable medical source and rejected 

them on that basis. (R. at 104.) In addition, the ALJ rejected the opinions on the grounds that 

Ms. Forestal only saw Plaintiff once and because her opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to 

withstand stress was rendered even though she provided no mental health treatment to Plaintiff 

and apparently had no mental health training. These reasons would not justify rejecting the 

opinions had the ALJ appreciated that they were endorsed by Dr. Bonner, Plaintiff’s long-time 

treating physician who provided mental health treatment to Plaintiff. Under these 

circumstances, the undersigned finds that remand is necessary. 

The Commissioner advances several arguments to the contrary, none of which is 

persuasive. First, the Commissioner questions whether the form was adopted by Dr. Bonner at 

all, pointing out that the second signature on the form is illegible. (Op. at 10-11, ECF No. 12.) 

Still, there can be no doubt that a second person signed the form or that Dr. Bonner’s name 

clearly appears at the top of the first page in the space provided for the provider completing the 

form to list his or her name. (R. at 788.) Moreover, while one cannot discern a name from the 

second signature, the latter part of the signature clearly consists of the letters “D.O.,” which is 
10 

consistent with Dr. Bonner’s specialty. These circumstances strongly suggest Dr. Bonner is the 

second person who signed the form, thereby adopting the opinions set forth therein. Thus, 

although the undersigned agrees with the Commissioner that, as the fact finder, the ALJ could 

decline to find that Dr. Bonner is the second person that signed the evaluation form, that is not 

what happened here. Rather, the ALJ apparently failed to appreciate that a second person 

endorsed the opinions set forth in the form at all, much less consider who that second person 

might be, and as a result failed to provide a reason for attributing the evaluation solely to Ms. 

Forestal. Cf. Allen v. Astrue, No. 5:11CV1095, 2012 WL 1142480, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 4, 

2012) (remanding where “the ALJ failed to properly articulate the RFC calculation,” explaining 

that the Court was “unable to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning”); Commodore v. Astrue, No. 

10-295, 2011 WL 4856162, at *4, 6 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) (remanding action “with 

instructions to provide a more thorough written analysis,” where the ALJ failed to articulate the 

reasons for his RFC findings such that the Court could not “conduct a meaningful review of 

whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision”); Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that an ALJ’s decision “must include a discussion 

of ‘findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the material issues of fact, 

law, or discretion presented on the record.’” (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A))). 

The Commissioner next contends that any error by the ALJ in failing to weigh the 

evaluation as a treating physician’s opinion was harmless. The Wilson Court considered three 

possible scenarios that could lead the Court to a finding of harmless error. 378 F.3d at 547. 

First, the Court indicated that harmless error might occur “if a treating source’s opinion is so 

patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it . . . .” Id. Second, the Court 
11 

noted that if the ALJ’s decision was “consistent with the opinion, it may be irrelevant that the 

ALJ did not give weight to the treating physician’s opinion, and the failure to give reasons for 

not giving such weight is correspondingly irrelevant.” Id. Finally, Wilson considered the 

possibility of a scenario “where the Commissioner has met the goal of § 1527(d)(2)–the 

provision of the procedural safeguard of reasons–even though she has not complied with the 

terms of the regulation.” Id. For example, the ALJ’s analysis might satisfy the goal of § 

1527(d)(2) by “indirectly attacking” the treating physician’s opinion, even if the ALJ failed to 

fully explain why the opinion was accorded little weight. See Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

195 F. App’x 462, 472 (6th Cir. 2006). Since Wilson, the Sixth Circuit has continued to conduct 

a harmless error analysis in cases in which the claimant asserts that the ALJ failed to properly 

apply the treating physician framework. See, e.g., id. (finding that even though the ALJ failed to 

meet the letter of the good-reason requirement the ALJ met the goal by indirectly attacking the 

consistency of the medical opinions); Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 749 (6th Cir. 

2007) (finding that the facts did not satisfy potential harmless error justifications). 

Here, the Commissioner first contends that any error by the ALJ was harmless because 

the April 12, 2017 evaluation was so patently deficient that the ALJ could not possibly have 

credited it at all. Specifically, the Commissioner asserts that the evaluation consists of only 

conclusory opinions and that “[a]n ALJ can properly reject a treating physician’s opinion that 

lacks any meaningful explanation.” (Op. 16, ECF No. 12.) As an initial matter, however, the 

evaluation form does contain explanation in the last paragraph, namely that the limitations 

resulted from Plaintiff’s “pain and instability.” (R. at 789.) The evaluation form also suggests 

that the limitations were based on observations of Plaintiff attempting to perform certain 
12 

activities. Id. (“P[atient] did attempt most activities but was unable to complete.”). Thus, while 

the evaluation form does not contain detailed analysis after each opined limitation, the 

undersigned cannot conclude that it is so lacking in explanation that the ALJ could not possibly 

credit it at all in her analysis on remand. See Perry v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 17-cv13386, 2019 WL 759289, *6 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2019) (rejecting the assertion that an opinion 

was so patently deficient so as to render error harmless where it contained some explanatory 

analysis). This is particularly the case because Dr. Bonner treated Plaintiff for many years and 

almost every reason that was actually identified by the ALJ for rejecting the opinions set forth in 

the form simply do not apply to Dr. Bonner. 

In addition, the undersigned notes that at least some objective medical evidence could 

support a finding that Plaintiff is limited in the areas set forth on the form. For example, on 

various examinations, Plaintiff presented with abnormal gait and decreased range of motion of 

the cervical and lumbar spine. (See, e.g., R. at 431, 469, 886, 892, 896, 916, 948.) She has also 

presented with tenderness of various areas on exam and has had positive straight-leg raising 

tests. (See, e.g., R. at 452, 469, 906, 911, 916, 921, 926, 931, 940.) Radiological exams have 

yielded abnormal findings of the lumbar spine. (R. at 430, 436.) In addition, Plaintiff has 

consistently complained to Dr. Bonner and others of pain all over her body, including in her 

shoulders, back, neck, knees, and other areas that increases with standing, walking, moving, and 

other activities. (R. at 808, 811, 819, 823, 835, 857, 945, 950, 960.) Although the 

Commissioner contends that Dr. Bonner’s treatment notes fail to support the opinions expressed 

in the form, the undersigned notes that Dr. Bonner consistently treated Plaintiff for fibromyalgia, 

pain, depression, and anxiety with medications. The existence of some consistent evidence 
13 

weighs against a finding that the evaluation form is patently deficient. See Perry, 2019 WL 

759289 at *5 (treating physician’s opinion not patently deficient where “at least some objective 

medical evidence appears to support [the opinion]”); Miller v. Berryhill, No. 3:16-cv-00094, 

2017 WL 1021313, *9 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2017) (finding an opinion was not patently deficient 

where “[t]he record . . . contains evidence consistent with [the] opinion”); Congrove v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-cv-2630, 2016 WL 3097153, *5 (S.D. Ohio June 3, 2016) (“If treatment 

notes support the physician’s findings, an opinion is not patently deficient”); see also Sisk v. 

Astrue, No. 1:09-cv-220, 2010 WL 3522307, at *9 (E.D. Tenn. Aug. 20, 2010) (“[I]f a treating 

physician’s opinion is consistent with the objective medical evidence, the opinion is not patently 

deficient.”). Thus, the undersigned cannot conclude that the April 12, 2017 evaluation is so 

woefully inadequate that it fails to surpass what has been described as a “low ‘patently deficient’ 

threshold.” Perry, 2019 WL 759289 at *5. 

The Commissioner next contends that any error by the ALJ was harmless because the 

ALJ indirectly attacked the April 12, 2017 evaluation form by discussing other record evidence 

that contradicts the opinions set forth therein. (Op. 12-15, ECF No. 12.) The undersigned 

disagrees. Rather, the ALJ directly attacked the evaluation primarily for reasons that would not 

apply to Dr. Bonner. Although the Commissioner correctly points out that the ALJ also stated 

that “[Plaintiff] has submitted no evidence of examination findings, muscle testing, or radiologic 

studies to support the [evaluation],” the ALJ stated in the very next sentence that Ms. Forestal 

had not seen Plaintiff except on that one occasion to complete the evaluation. (R. at 104.) Thus, 

it is not clear from this single sentence if the ALJ considered whether the opinions were 

supported by other provider’s treatment records, including Dr. Bonner’s, or if she was merely 
14 

pointing out that Plaintiff had not provided additional treatment records for Ms. Forestal to 

support her opinions. Nor did the ALJ otherwise analyze the opinions in the context of being 

from Dr. Bonner. Particularly given Dr. Bonner’s lengthy history treating the Plaintiff, the 

undersigned cannot conclude that the ALJ sufficiently addressed the opinion indirectly, such that 

the goal of § 1527(d)(2) has been satisfied. 

 Finally, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ’s error was harmless because the April 

12, 2017the mista evaluation is not supported by the record. Accepting the Commissioner’s 

position, however, would require this Court to weigh the evidence, which is a task reserved to 

the ALJ. Relatedly, the Commissioner contends that “it is clear that the ALJ would never have 

credited Dr. Bonner’s [opinion],” and that “remanding this case simply for the ALJ to explain 

this would be a waste of administrative resources.” (Op. 18, ECF No. 12.) But as the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has recognized: 

A court cannot excuse the denial of a mandatory procedural protection simply 

because, as the Commissioner urges, there is sufficient evidence in the record for 

the ALJ to discount the treating source’s opinion, thus, a different outcome on 

remand is unlikely. A procedural error is not made harmless simply because [the 

aggrieved party] appears to have had little chance of success on the merits anyway. 

To hold otherwise, and to recognize substantial evidence as a defense to noncompliance with [20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d)(2) and 416.927(d)(2)], would afford 

the Commissioner the ability [to] violate the regulation with impunity and render 

the protections promised therein illusory. 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546. 

For all of these reasons, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s failure to appropriately 

weigh the April 12, 2017 medical source opinion, which was adopted by Plaintiff’s long-time 

treating physician, Dr. Bonner, amounts to reversible error. 
15 

V. CONCLUSION

 Due to the error outlined above, Plaintiff is entitled to an order remanding this case to the 

Social Security Administration pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s non-disability finding and REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ 

under Sentence Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Report and 

Recommendation. 

VI. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

 If Plaintiff seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, he 

may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 Plaintiff is specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and 

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex 

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district 

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 
16 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation 

omitted)). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE