IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

MAGGIE DICKERSON, : 

 : Case No. 2:18-cv-807 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 v. : 

 : Magistrate Judge Deavers 

STATE OF OHIO, : 

 : 

 Defendants. : 

OPINION & ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the Magistrate Judge’s Order and Report and 

Recommendation, recommending that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint. (ECF No. 3). 

Plaintiff, Ms. Maggie Dickerson, objects to the Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 4). Upon 

independent review by the Court, and for the reasons set forth below, Ms. Dickerson’s objections 

are hereby OVERRULED and the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and 

Recommendation. The complaint is hereby DISMISSED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Ms. Dickerson filed a complaint on August 9, 2018, bringing claims against the state of 

Ohio and the Ohio Navel Militia for an alleged conspiracy to deprive her of her civil rights under 

18 U.S.C. § 241. (ECF No. 2). Ms. Dickerson alleges that she was subjected to laser treatment 

from the 1990’s to 2015, which led to her being held against her will, tortured, mutilated, and 

trafficked into bonded labor. Id. at 3. Additionally, Ms. Dickerson alleges she suffered burns, 

knife wounds, and other severe injuries as a result of the laser treatment. Id. Moreover, Ms. 

Dickerson alleges unwanted people lived in her house and “trafficked large sums of narcotics,” 

“people left leads for employers and forced [her] labor regarding the leads,” people “altered and 

broke medical equipment,” and she was forced to watch “nicotine adds.” 
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Ms. Dickerson filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Magistrate Judge 

granted. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). Because Ms. Dickerson was proceeding in forma pauperis, the 

Magistrate Judge conducted an initial screen of the complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). After 

reviewing the complaint, the Magistrate Judge concluded the complaint should be dismissed for 

failure to state a claim and issued a Report and Recommendation to that effect on August 9, 2018. 

(ECF No. 3). Ms. Dickerson objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation on 

August 16, 2018. (ECF No. 4). 

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 The court requires litigants to file “specific and timely objections to a magistrate judge’s 

report and recommendation.” Fields v. Lapeer 71-A Dist. Court Clerk, 2 F. App’x 481, 482–83 

(6th Cir. 2001). Objections that are “vague, general or conclusory does not meet the requirement 

of a specific objection” and constitutes a failure to object. Id. A party that fails to file timely 

objections in the district court “waives subsequent review in the court of appeals.” Thomas v. Arn, 

474 U.S. 140, 144 (1985). The Court must then “determine de novo any part of the magistrate 

judge’s disposition that has been property objected to” and can “accept, reject or modify” the 

magistrate judge’s findings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing the pleader is 

entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, a complaint fails to state a claim upon which 

relief can be granted when, accepting all well-pleaded allegations as true, it does not contain 

“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 

U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A plaintiff’s claim is plausible when the court is able “to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009). A well-pleaded complaint will survive dismissal even if “actual proof of those facts 
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is improbable and recovery is remote and unlikely.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. Thus, a plaintiffs’ 

claims must cross “the line from conceivable to plausible” otherwise, their complaint will be 

dismissed. Id. at 570. 

A pro se complaint is held to a “less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by an 

attorney.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). Nevertheless, the court will not “abrogate 

basic pleading essentials in pro se suits.” Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). 

Moreover, the less stringent standard for a pro se litigant will not “compel the court to conjure up 

unpleaded facts to support conclusory allegations. Leisure v. Hogan, 21 F. App’x 277, 278 (6th 

Cir. 2001). 

II. ANALYSIS 

The Magistrate Judge found that Ms. Dickerson’s Complaint provides no factual content 

or context from which the Court may reasonably infer that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to 

violate her right. (ECF No. 3). Ms. Dickerson filed a timely objection to the Magistrate Judge’s 

Report and Recommendation. Upon consideration of Ms. Dickerson’s objection and de novo 

review of her Complaint, this Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. 

 Ms. Dickerson has not pled sufficient facts to make it plausible that the Defendants are 

liable for any harm she suffered. Her Complaint details injuries she allegedly suffered because of 

laser treatment, but states only that “several law enforcement members and others” were involved 

in a conspiracy against her. (ECF No. 2). Ms. Dickerson is not required to prove her case in her 

pleadings but must provide enough facts to “nudge[] [her] claims across the line from conceivable 

to plausible.” This she has not done. She offers only conclusory statements. Even under the less 

stringent standards for pro se litigants a complaint with “unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-
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harmed me accusations” will not suffice. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 67. Therefore, Ms. Dickerson fails to 

state a claim on which relief can be granted. 

In her Objection, Ms. Dickerson offers to send a report, under seal, that contains a single 

date and time of an instance where she was harmed. (ECF No.4). The Court finds, however, that 

even with additional filing, the Complaint would not be plausible. Ms. Dickerson also asks the 

Court to find her counsel. While the court sympathizes with her lack of access to counsel, there is 

no constitutional right to an appointed counsel in a civil case. Edwards v Simpson, 833 F. 2d 1012 

(6th Cir. 1987). In general, “counsel will only be appointed under 1915(d) in exceptional 

circumstances.” Id. The court’s decision to appoint counsel “is a fact-specific inquiry turning 

upon the merits of the claims, the nature and complexity of the case, and the indigent’s ability to 

present the case.” Id. Moreover, a court “need not appoint counsel when it considers the litigants 

chance of success to be extremely slim.” Id. (Circuit court affirmed district court’s decision 

denying Plaintiff’s request in part due to conclusory allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint). Here, 

Ms. Dickerson’s complaint contains conclusory allegations that the defendants harmed her without 

any factual allegations to support her claims. Moreover, the absence of well-pleaded factual 

allegations significantly decreases the likelihood Ms. Dickerson will succeed on the merits of her 

claims. Therefore, the Court denies Ms. Dickerson’s request for counsel. 

III. CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, Ms. Dickerson’s Objections (ECF No.4) are hereby OVERRULED. 

The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 3). This case 

is hereby DISMISSED. 

 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

DATED: September 14, 2018