UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RICO ISAIH HAIRSTON, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

MR. NELSON EMEAGHARA, 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 2:18-cv-951 

Judge James L. Graham 

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff, Rico Isaih Hairston, a state inmate who is proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, brings this civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendant, Mr. Nelson 

Emeaghara, a chaplain at Correctional Reception Center (“CRC”), alleging that Defendant’s 

failure to provide weekly religious services while he was in segregation violated his First and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act 

(“RLUIPA”). This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); see also McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608 

(6th Cir. 1997). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons that follow, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted and DENY AS MOOT Plaintiff’s Motion for the 

Clerk to Make Service Copies (ECF No. 2). 
2 

This matter is also before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s motions for leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) is GRANTED. (ECF Nos. 1 

and 6.) Plaintiff is required to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s certified trust fund statements reveal that he currently possesses no 

money in his prison account, which is insufficient to pay the filing fee. 

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust accounts 

(Inmate Id Number A741324) at Toledo Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to the 

Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial 

payment, 20% of the greater of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or 

the average monthly balance in the inmate trust account, for the six-months immediately 

preceding the filing of the Complaint. 

After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of the 

inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the 

account exceeds $10.00 until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). 

Checks should be made payable to: Clerk, United States District Court. The checks 

should be sent to: 

 Prisoner Accounts Receivable 

 260 U.S. Courthouse 

 85 Marconi Boulevard 

 Columbus, Ohio 43215 

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check. 

It is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without prepayment of 

fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs 

had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff 
3 

and the prison cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order 

to the Court’s financial office in Columbus. 

I. 

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to 

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the 

statute, which provides in pertinent part: 

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, the 

court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that— 

* * * 

 (B) the action or appeal-- 

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 

 To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements 

set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). Under Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a 
4 

“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . 

. . [a] pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell 

Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Further, a complaint will not “suffice if it 

tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 557). Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct 

alleged.” Id. In considering whether this facial plausibility standard is met, a Court must 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, accept all factual 

allegations as true, and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Total 

Benefits Planning Agency, Inc. v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 552 F.3d 430, 434 (6th Cir. 

2008) (citations omitted). The Court is not required, however, to accept as true mere legal 

conclusions unsupported by factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 

U.S. at 555). In addition, the Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than 

formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 08-3978, 

2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 

(1972)). 
5 

II. 

According to the Complaint, when Defendant made his rounds on July 28, 2018, Plaintiff 

orally requested weekly church services for the segregation unit. Plaintiff alleges that the 

Chaplain responded that he did not have time to accommodate this request. Later that same day, 

Plaintiff filed an informal complaint. Four days later, on August 1, 2018, Plaintiff received a 

response informing him that Defendant would talk with him when he next completes his rounds 

in segregation. Apparently dissatisfied, Plaintiff immediately filed a formal grievance and 

requested monetary compensation. Plaintiff’s grievance was denied, and on August 14, 2018, he 

filed an appeal. Plaintiff filed the instant action on August 24, 2018. 

Plaintiff asserts that he has “a right to attend religious services of [his] faith and was 

denied this right out of bad faith, malice, and deliberate indifference.” (Pl.’s Compl. 5, ECF No. 

1-2.) He also asserts that his “right to exercise was unfairly restricted” in violation of RLUIPA, 

the First Amendment, and the Equal Protection Clause. Plaintiff adds that he suffered 

discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution because he is an 

African American and Cherokee Indian. Plaintiff seeks both injunctive and monetary relief. 

Plaintiff was transferred from CRC to Toledo Correctional Institution (“TCI”) on August 

30, 2018. (See ECF No. 4.) 

Because the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to claim, it is RECOMMENDED 

that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2). The undersigned considers 

Plaintiff’s First Amendment, RLUIPA, and equal protection claims in turn. 

 

 
6 

A. First Amendment 

The First Amendment, made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, 

provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting 

the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. “Prisoners retain the First Amendment 

right to the free exercise of their religion.” Hayes v. Tenn., 424 F. App’x 546, 549 (6th Cir. 

2011). “Under § 1983, a prisoner alleging that the actions of prison officials violate his religious 

beliefs must show that the belief or practice asserted is religious in the person’s own scheme of 

things and is sincerely held.” Barhite v. Caruso, 377 F. App’x 508, 511 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation 

and internal quotation marks omitted). The prisoner must also show that the prison’s action 

substantially burdens his sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. “An action of a prison official will 

be classified as a substantial burden when that action forced an individual to choose between 

following the precepts of his religion and forfeiting benefits or when the action in question 

placed substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.” 

Hayes, 424 F. App’x at 555 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Under § 1983, if 

the action substantially burdens a prisoner’s sincerely held beliefs, the action “is valid if it is 

‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 296 

(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). 

The undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to adequately allege that Defendant 

substantially burdened the free exercise of his religion. Specifically, Plaintiff does not allege that 

the services he requested were central or mandatory for his religion. See Abdur-Rahman v. Mich. 

Dep’t of Corrs., 65 F.3d 489, 491 (6th Cir. 1995) (policy that prevented attendance at service did 

not violate First Amendment where it did not affect “an essential tenet” of inmate’s religious 

beliefs). Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts upon which the Court could rely to 
7 

conclude that the deprivation of weekly services during the short period of time between the 

exhaustion of his grievance and his transfer to TCI “substantially burdened” his sincerely held 

religious beliefs.1

 See Hargrove v. Frisby, No. 1:17-cv-748, 2018 WL 2937466, at *4 (S.D. 

Ohio June 12, 2018), adopted 2018 WL 3437074 (July 17, 2018) (recommending dismissal of 

inmate’s First Amendment claim under the Free Exercise Claim pursuant to § 1915(e)(2), 

concluding that the inmate “failed to allege that his Muslim faith was more than incidentally 

burdened for the three-month period in which he was housed in disciplinary segregation”). 

Because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege a claim under the Free Exercise Clause 

of the First Amendment, it is RECOMMENDED that this claim be dismissed. 

B. RLUIPA 

“RLUIPA . . . applies to prisons that receive federal funds and prohibits state and local 

governments from placing ‘a substantial burden’ on the ‘religious exercise’ of any inmate unless 

they establish that the burden furthers a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and does so in the 

‘least restrictive’ way.” Haight v. Thompson, 763 F.3d 554, 559 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting 42 

U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2)). A Plaintiff bringing a RLUIPA claim may only seek injunctive 

relief. Haight, 763 F.3d at 559 (holding that RLIUPA does not permit money-damages claims); 

Colvin v. Caruso, 605 F.3d 282, 289 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[M]onetary damages are not available 

under RLUIPA.” (citing Cardinal v. Metrish, 564 F.3d 794, 801 (6th Cir. 2009)); see also

 

1 An inmate may not seek legal redress for alleged violations of his rights until he properly 

exhausts his administrative remedies. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (“No action shall be brought 

with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a 

prisoner confined by any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 

remedies as are available are exhausted.”); Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002). Here, 

Plaintiff has not indicated when CRC denied his August 14, 2018 appeal or when he properly 

exhausted the grievance procedures applicable to requests for religious accommodations. But 

even assuming arguendo that Plaintiff properly exhausted his grievance the very same day he 

filed his appeal, only two full weeks passed before his August 30, 2018 transfer to TCI. 
8 

Sossamon v. Texas, 131 S.Ct. 1651, 1663 (2011) (“We conclude that States, in accepting federal 

funding, do not consent to waive their sovereign immunity to private suits for money damages 

under RLUIPA because no statute expressly and unequivocally includes such a waiver.”). 

Because an inmate advancing a RLUIPA claim may only seek injunctive relief, 

Plaintiff’s transfer to TCI on August 30, 2018, rendered his RLUIPA claim premised upon 

Defendant’s actions at CRC moot. See Colvin, 605 F.3d at 289 (holding that inmate’s RLUIPA 

claims and other claims for injunctive relief were moot because he had been transferred to a 

different facility); Berryman v. Granholm, 343 F. App’x 1, at *3 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that 

inmate’s requests for declaratory and injunctive relief, including his RLUIPA claim, were 

rendered moot by his transfer to a different prison) (citations omitted)). 

Because Article III of the United States Constitution limits a federal court’s exercise of 

judicial power to actual, ongoing “Cases” or “Controversies.” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1, it is 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claims be dismissed. 

C. Equal Protection 

Plaintiff’s equal protection claims likewise must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. 

To state an equal protection claim, a prisoner need only allege sufficient plausible facts to show 

“that a state actor intentionally discriminated against [him] because of membership in a protected 

class.” Henry v. Metro. Sewer Dist., 922 F.2d 332, 341 (6th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), abrogated in part on other grounds by King v. Harwood, 853 F.3d 568, 580 n. 4 (6th 

Cir. 2017), reh’g en banc denied, 853 F.3d 568 (6th Cir. 2017), petition for cert. filed, (Aug. 15, 

2017) (No. 17-260); see also Herron v. Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 417 (6th Cir. 2000); Copeland v. 

Machulis, 57 F.3d 476, 480 (6th Cir. 1995) (citing Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. 

Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 255-56 (1995)). These factors have not been established here. 
9 

Specifically, Plaintiff makes no allegations from which the Court could infer that Defendant even 

considered Plaintiff’s race when denying his oral request for weekly religious services. Rather, 

accepting Plaintiff’s allegations as true, it appears that it is his status as an inmate in segregation 

and Defendant’s lack of time to accommodate weekly services for this population that accounts 

for the denial of his request. See Williams v. Pratt, No. 102cv391, 2005 WL 1923594, at *2 

(W.D. Mich. Aug. 11, 2005) (prisoners in segregation do not constitute a protected class for 

purposes of the Equal Protection Clause); Jackson v. Jamrog, 411 F.3d 615, 619 (6th Cir. 2005); 

(“[P]risoners are not considered a suspect class for purposes of equal protection litigation.”). 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege that Defendant intentionally 

discriminated against him because of his membership in a protected class, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS his equal protection claims pursuant to § 

1915(e)(2). 

III.

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) (ECF Nos. 1 and 6) are GRANTED. In addition, it is 

RECOMMENDED this Court DISMISS this action for failure to state a claim pursuant to 

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) and that Plaintiff’s Motion for the Clerk to Make Service Copies (ECF 

No. 2) be DENIED AS MOOT. 

 The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison 

cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s 

financial office in Columbus. Finally, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this order to 

the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, 150 E. Gay St., 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215. 
10 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those 

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with 

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo 

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations 

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE