- 1 -

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS SLOANE, individually : No. 4:16-cv-01571

and on behalf of all persons :

similarly situated, : (Judge Brann)

:

Plaintiff, :

:

v. :

:

GULF INTERSTATE FIELD :

SERVICES, INC., : 

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

May 12, 2017

FINDINGS

1. The Court entered its Memorandum and Order denying class and 

collective certification on March 24, 2017.

2. Since that time, this action has proceeded on an individualized basis.

3. On April 13, 2017, the Court denied a motion for reconsideration of 

its certification decision filed by Plaintiff.

4. On April 26, 2017, Defendant filed the instant motion for a protective 

order against non-party subpoenas.

5. The contested subpoenas, which were served subsequent to my denial 

of class certification, seek documentary and testimonial information 

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 1 of 7 PAGEID #: 5883
- 2 -

regarding a number of contracts between the Defendant and Kinder 

Morgan, as well as compensation processes pertinent to every one of 

Defendant’s employees who worked at Kinder Morgan sites.

6. In addition to receiving written submissions from the parties, the 

Court held a telephonic conference on the motion on May 1, 2017, at 

which time it heard oral argument from counsel.

7. “It is well established that the scope and conduct of discovery are 

within the sound discretion of the trial court . . . and that after final 

judgment of the district court . . . our review is confined to 

determining if that discretion has been abused.” MarroquinManriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983) (Aldisert, J.). 

“To find such abuse it is usually necessary to conclude that there has 

been an interference with a substantial right . . . or that the discovery 

ruling is seen to be a gross abuse of discretion resulting in 

fundamental unfairness in the trial of the case.” Id. Thus, the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has forewarned litigants 

that it “will not interfere with a trial court’s control of its docket 

except upon the clearest showing that the procedures have resulted in 

actual and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” In re 

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 2 of 7 PAGEID #: 5884
- 3 -

Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817–18 (3d Cir. 1982) 

(Aldisert, J.).

8. “Discovery need not be perfect, but discovery must be fair.” 

Boeynaems v. LA Fitness Int’l, LLC, 285 F.R.D. 331, 333 (E.D. Pa. 

2012) (Baylson, J.). “The responses sought must comport with the 

traditional notions of relevancy and must not impose an undue burden 

on the responding party.” Hicks v. Arthur, 159 F.R.D. 468, 470 (E.D. 

Pa. 1995). “[T]he scope of [ ] discovery is not without limits.” 

Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc’ns & Sys. Co., 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 

(D.N.J. 1996). As such, “[d]iscovery should be tailored to the issues 

involved in the particular case.” Id.

9. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c)(1) states that “[a] party or any 

person from whom discovery is sought may move for a protective 

order in the court where the action is pending—or as an alternative on 

matters relating to a deposition, in the court for the district where the 

deposition will be taken.” It further provides that “[t]he court may, for 

good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from 

annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” 

Id.

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 3 of 7 PAGEID #: 5885
- 4 -

10. Moreover, it is axiomatic that “the party seeking discovery must first 

demonstrate the relevance before the party seeking a protective order 

must demonstrate good cause.” Bell v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 270 

F.R.D. 186, 195 (D.N.J. 2010).

11. Chief Judge D. Brooks Smith, writing for the United States Court of 

Appeals for the Third Circuit in Halle v. W. Penn Allegheny Health 

Sys. Inc., 842 F.3d 215, 226 (3d Cir. 2016), stated that “[i]f a 

collective action is decertified at the final stage . . . the court will 

decertify the class, dismiss the opt-in plaintiffs without prejudice, and 

permit the named plaintiffs to proceed to trial.” Judge Smith further 

clarified that “[w]hile a dismissed opt-in plaintiff retains the ability to 

pursue individual claims after a district court decertifies a collective 

action, we have located no authority (nor have the parties cited any) 

discussing the approach taken by Steven Halle in the underlying case 

here—namely, his decision . . . to try to resurrect substantially similar 

collective action allegations.” Id. at n.11.

12. I have reviewed the contested discovery requests and believe that they 

are overbroad, unduly burdensome, and most importantly, irrelevant

in light of the individualized posture of this action following my 

denial of certification. In other words, the requests are not sufficiently 

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 4 of 7 PAGEID #: 5886
- 5 -

tailored so as to obtain relevant information about the only remaining 

Plaintiff, Mr. Sloane. See Flomo v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, 

Inc., 2009 WL 1456736, at *3 (S.D. Ind. May 20, 2009) (“Plaintiffs 

drafted their discovery requests while this case was still a putative 

class action, to be litigated on behalf of all minors who allegedly work 

on the Plantation. Because Roe II denied class certification, many of 

the discovery requests must be narrowed to encompass documents and 

information relating only to Plaintiffs’ claims, not to claims of other 

minors on the Plantation.”); Am. Nurses’ Assoc. v. State of Illinois, 

No. 84 C 4451, 1986 WL 10382, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 1986) (“If 

class certification is denied, the scope of permissible discovery may 

be significantly narrowed.”); In re Rail Freight Fuel Surcharge 

Antitrust Litig., 258 F.R.D. 167, 176 (D.D.C. 2009) (“Plaintiffs will 

have to concede that what may be a king’s ransom will have been 

spent on discovery that may never be used if [a district court] denies 

class certification or narrows the nature of the class.”).

13. Moreover, I believe that production of the requested documents would 

be duplicative, as the Defendant warrants that it “has already 

produced all relevant documents including Plaintiff’s pay letters, 

payroll records, and timesheets, and has been deposed repeatedly on 

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 5 of 7 PAGEID #: 5887
- 6 -

its pay practices over the last 16 months in two separate lawsuits.” 

ECF No. 198 at 2.

14. Finally, I agree, as adroitly conceptualized by counsel for Defendant, 

that the terms of the agreements between Defendant and its clients do 

not bear the requisite attributes of legally relevant evidence, although 

in some tangential fashion, they may economically serve as 

considerations that factor into Defendant’s wage-setting 

determinations. Counsel for Plaintiff has failed to put forth any 

evidence that alters my opinion on that dynamic, as the relationship 

between economically relevant and legally relevant concepts is an 

attenuated one, even in an industry that utilizes mark-up pricing. To 

be precise, the former category is undoubtedly a much larger one in 

cases such as these.

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 6 of 7 PAGEID #: 5888
- 7 -

AND NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s Motion for Protective Order against Non-Party 

Subpoenas, ECF No. 198, is GRANTED.

2. The contested subpoenas are deemed WITHDRAWN.

3. No later than May 15, 2017, counsel for Plaintiff shall formally 

notify each subpoena recipient of this Order and of the subpoenas’

withdrawal.

4. The case management deadlines set forth by this Court’s March 24, 

2017 Order, ECF No. 193, remain in FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.

5. The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this Order as a “written 

opinion,” pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

Case: 2:18-cv-00583-EAS-EPD Doc #: 203 Filed: 05/12/17 Page: 7 of 7 PAGEID #: 5889