CONTAINING THE CONFLICT
fter Chinese communist forces
intervened in the Korean War,
the Truman administration

sought to contain the fighting and prevent

the conflict from escalating into another

world war.

It was especially concerned that Soviet
dictator Joseph Stalin would launch an at-
tack on Western Europe while the United
States was preoccupied militarily in Asia.
To counter the larger threat to American
national security in Europe, it accelerated
plans to build up the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO's) conventional mili-
tary strength by sending additional Ameri-
can air and ground forces to the continent.
General Dwight D. Eisenhower was called
out of retirement in January 1951 and re-
turned to the continent as the Supreme Al-
lied Commander, Europe. Mobilized Air
Guard units played an integral role in the
NATO buildup. More Air Guard units went
to Europe and the United Kingdom than to
Korea. 25

For example, Illinois’ 126th Bombard-
ment Wing (Light) and its assigned support
units were mobilized in January 1951. Its
flying squadrons included Illinois 108th and
168th plus Missouri’s 180th. After three
months of reorganization and training at
their home stations, those units and their B-
26 bombers were transferred to Largely
AFB, Virginia for additional preparations.
On October 30, 1950, the first echelon of
B-26s departed from Virginia for Merignac
Air Base, France. Because of the urgency
of the deployment, special long-range bomb-
bay fuel tanks that had been received at Lan-
gley were not installed before the aircraft
departed. Since most of the aircrews had not
flown the Atlantic, each six-ship formation
of B-26s was accompanied by a Navy R-4D

y] TURNING
POINT

wh i
eat sill

mt
ALAA TT

rr reeananrnetnt rent



May 1978.
18. Gross, Prelude To
The Total Force, p 59.
19. NGB, “Oklahoma:
Major General Stanley
FH. Newman,” General

Officers of the Army And
Air National Guar

d,
(Washington, DC: Office
of Public Affairs, NGB,
December 1981); Kenny
A. Franks, Citizen Sol-
diers: Oklahoma’s National
Guard, (Norman, OK:
University of Oklahoma
Press, 1984), p 164.

20. Franks, Citizen
Soldiers, p 165.

21. Ibid.

22. Ibid.

23. NGB, Officers of
the Army And Air National
Guard; Franks, Citizen
Soldiers, p 166.

24. TSgt. Lori Hellis,
Editor, Guardians of the
Pacific Northwest: Oregon
Air National Guard. A
Commemorative History.

Oral History, Brig. Gen.
Joseph Kovacs, [LANG
(Ret.), by TSgt. Melvin M.
Bytnar, 126th Air Refuel-
ing Wing, at Arlington
Heights, IL, 27 Feb 1979,
for the Office of ANG
History, pp 2-4.

27. Student Report No.
84-2170 (U), Maj. Robert
C. Ritchie, “History of the
116th Fighter-Interceptor
Squadron -- 1951 - 1952,”
Maxwell AFB, Alabama,
Air Command and Staff
College, 20 September
1984, pp 4-36; 116th ARW,
Aces and Airships: 60th
Anniversary, 141st Air
Refueling Wing. Washing-
ton Air National Guard,
(Spokane, WA: 141st
ARW, 1983), pp 64-69.

28. Ritchie, “History of
the 116th Fighter-Intercep-
tor Squadron,” p 36.

29. Major Thomas N.
McLean, S.C. A.N.G.: The
First 25 Years, 1946-1971,

1941-1991, (Oregon ANG,
1990), pp 24-25.

25. Walton S. Moody,
“United States Air Forces
in Europe and the Begin-
ning of the Cold War,”
Aerospace Historian,
Summer, June 1976,pp 75-
81; Francillon, The United

(South Carolina ANG, Ca
1971), pp 17-18.

30. Ibid., pp 19-20.

31. Francillon, The
United States Air National
Guard, pp 46-48; Brian
Dexter Fowles, A Guard In
Peace And Wi 1
History of the Kansas

States Air National Guard,

National Guard, 1854-

pp 43-50; Memo (U),
ANG/HO to NGB/XO
(Mr. Metcalf), subj.:
“Nominees for ANG
Heritage Painting -
Korea,” 2 April 1978; Hist
(U), 136th Fighter-
Bomber Wing, | Apr
1951-30 Jun 1951, pp 14-
18; Haulman and Stancik,
Ai rce Aerial Victory
Credits, pp 757, 759;
Francillon, The United
States Air National Guard,
pp 49, 211-212.

33. ADC, The Air
Defense of the U.S.: A
Study of the Work of ADC
and its Predecessors
Through June 1951
(Mitchel AFB, NY: ADC,
1952), pp 132-133.

34. Lieutenant General
Dennis C. Whitehead,
ADC Commander,
Address Before Depart-
ment of the Air Force
Section V Committee, 15
May 1951, Doc #
168.6008-14, Whitehead
Papers, Albert F. Simpson
Historical Research
Center (AFSHRC),
Maxwell AFB, AL.

35. Col. Carl D. Jenson
and CMSgt. Edward W.
Burton, Compilers.,

Flying Yankees: A History
Of The Connecticut Air

pp 48, 211-212.
26. Illinois Air National

ftieth Anniversary,

1927-1977, (Headquarters,
Illinois ANG, August
1978), pp 40-41; Hist.
USAFE, July-December
1952, Volume I, pp 26-27;

1987, (Manhattan, KS:
Sunflower University
Press, 1989), p 138;
Franks, Citizen Soldiers, p

National Guard, (Conn.
ANG, 1993), pp 34-40;
Francillon, The United
States Air National Guard,

164,

32. Gross, Prelude to the

Total Force, pp 22-89;
Francillon, The Air Guard,

pp 111.

36. Francillon, The
United States Air National
Guard, pp 48-49, 111-112.


Maryland Air Guard photo

Maryland Air Guard maintainers with the 104th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron repair an F-86 engine in
November 1958.

strengthened such programs. Greatly in-
creased Air Force budgets during and after
the Korean War provided the additional re-
sources needed to translate reforms into
more effective air reserve component pro-
grams.

For their part, Air Guardsmen had over-
come their initial mobilization shortcomings
during the Korean War and demonstrated
that, if properly trained and equipped, they
could contribute significantly to combat
operations and other critical Air Force mis-
sions during the buildup for the expected
Cold War confrontation with the Soviet
Union.

As in both world wars during the 20th
century, many Guardsmen served as indi-
vidual replacements to help fill out a rap-
idly expanding active force. Reflecting the
growing importance of electronics in mod-
ern warfare, the Air Guard’s AC&W com-
munity made a significant contribution to
the Air Force’s global buildup during the
War.

During the Korean conflict, the Air
Guard’s senior leadership recognized that
realistic training for legitimate military mis-
sions -- closely supervised by the active duty
Air Force -- was essential to guarantee the
Air Guard’s future. The Air Force tacitly
agreed to ignore the Air Guard’s anomalous
dual state-federal status. Guard officers were
very responsive to Air Force organizational,
training, and operational requirements. Air
Guardsmen also achieved an effective voice
in the formulation of plans, programs, bud-
gets, and policies relevant to their reserve
component of the active force. In effect, they
permitted increased Air Force control of the
ANG and greater involvement in the active
force’s operational responsibilities in ex-
change for increased federal support. That
modus vivendi reflected a mutual apprecia-
tion of the political, budgetary, and military
facts of life after the Korean War. 60

TURNING 3 7 |
POINT



BAPTISM UNDER FIRE

weather and the gluttonous appetite of the
F-84s for jet fuel produced marginal air re-
fueling results. 12

In July 1952, the 159th was demobilized.
By that time, many of its original members
had either returned home or were on the way
there. The war was over for Florida’s Air
Guardsmen. 13

During the Korean War, as in previous
conflicts, Air Guardsmen made some of their
most dramatic contributions as individuals.
They demonstrated their combat skills with
four Air Guardsmen achieving the status of
aces, Capts. Robert J. Love and Clifford D.
Jolley of the 196th transferred to the USAF’s
4th Interceptor Wing. While flying F-86
“Sabrejets,” they became the Air Guard’s
first jet aces. Love destroyed six enemy air-
craft while Jolley downed seven. 14

Major James P. Hagerstrom became an
ace in two different wars. During World War
II, he volunteered for duty in the AAF, flew
170 combat missions, and was credited with
destroying six enemy aircraft. After the con-
flict ended, he left active duty and joined
the 111th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the
Texas Air Guard, In October 1950,
Hagerstrom was recalled duty with the 111th
which was equipped with F-5Is. Subse-
quently, he transferred to an active duty Air
Force squadron. Flying F-86 Sabrejets in the
skies over North Korea, Hagerstrom was
credited with 8.5 kills. 15

Captain Robinson Risner was destined to
leave his mark on the Air Force. He had
joined the AAF during World War II and
served in obscurity as a fighter pilot in
Panama. Following the war, Risner left the
service, went into business in Tulsa, Okla.,
and married. Because he was determined to
remain involved with aviation, Risner joined
the Oklahoma Air National Guard and be-
gan flying F-51s in its 185th Fighter Squad-
ron. His squadron was mobilized for the
Korean War and transitioned to the F-80, the
Air Force’s first operational jet fighter. When

1 TURNING
PoINT

Utah Air Guard Capt. Clifford Jolley, 7 kills.

y


National Archives collection

Ground crews with the Air Guard’s 127th Pilot Training Wing
maintain F-84 Thunderjets at Luke AFB, Arizona in March 1951.



FOOTNOTES

37. Major Charles
Whitney, Project Coordi-
nator, Colorado Pride: A
Comme: ive Histor
of the Colorado Air
National 23-
1988, (Colorado ANG,
1989), pp 83-86;
Francillon, The United
States Air National Guard,
pp 49, 211-212.

38. Oral History Inter-
view (U), Maj. Gen. Joe C.
Moffitt, Colorado ANG
(Ret.), by MSgt. Steven L.
Stearns, ANG/CDH and
Sgt. Tom Otto, 140th
TFW/HO, 2 Oct 1986, pp
16-17.

39. Ibid., pp 17, 20.

40. Ibid., p 20; Colorado
Pride, p 87.

41. Francillon, The
United States Air National
Guard, p 211.

42. Francillon, The
United States Air National
Guard, p 166; Oral His-
tory, Brig. Gen. Justin L.
Berger. SD ANG. by
CMSet. William L. Flood,
SD ANG, and TSgt.
Glenda E. Bloom, SD
ANG, 1] January 1992 at
Joe Foss Field, Sioux Falls,
SD, pp 18-19,

43. Berger Interview. p
19.

44. Gross, Prelude to

1991, pp 99-100; Oral
History, Maj. Gen. Duane
L. Corning, SD ANG, by
CMSgt. William L. Flood,
SD ANG, and TSgt.
Glenda E. Bloom, at Joe
Foss Field, Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, 19-20 July
1990, pp 23-27;
Francillon, The United
States Air National Guard,
p 166; Joe Foss, A Proud
American: The Autobiog-

raphy of Joe Foss, (New
York: Pocket Books,

1992), p 205.

45. Hist (S), 15th Air
Force (SAC), Jan-Jun
1951, pp 10-98, info used
is (U); Hist (S). 15th Air
Force (SAC), Jul-Dec
1951, pp 35-38, info used
is (U); Hist (S), 15th Air
Force (SAC), Jan-Jun
1952, pp 56-59, info used
is (S); Hist (S), [Sth Air
Force (SAC), Jul-Dec
1952, p 110, info used is
(U).

46. Francillon, The
United States Air National
Guard, pp 106, 211; Capt.
H. H. Walker and PFC. E.
C. Simmel, “We Jumped
To Jets.” The National

Guardsman, January 1952,

13; VANGUARD/S50: The
146th TAW [Tactical

|

1945-1973, (Washington,
DC: Office of Air Force
History, United States Air
Force, 1988), pp 77-78.

47. Rpt. (U), NGB,
“Annual Report of the
Chief National Guard
Bureau Fiscal Year Ending
30 June 1950,” 1951, p 27;
Paper (U), “Data Concern-
ing Air National Guard
Units Called Into Active
Military Service,” passim,
ND, “Mobilization”
Section, “Korean War -
ANG.” File, NGB-PAI-H
Archives.

48. “Data Concerning
Air National Guard Units
Called Into Active Military
Service,” passim: Article
(U), “Tactical Control: A
New Mission for the
Guardsman, September
1952, p 2; ing Yankees,
pp 36-37; TSgt. Gary
Illingsworth, 152nd ACG

Air Control Group):
Global Jubilee, 1948-1998,

(152nd ACG, New York
ANG, ND), pp 17-23. 26:
History of the North
Carolina Air National
Guard, p 11; TSgt. Lori
Hellis, Editor, Guardians
of the Pacific Northwest:
Oregon Air National

Airlift Wing]. Fiftieth

Guard, A Commemorative

the Total Force, pp 22-23;
Oral History, Brig. Gen.
Joseph J. Foss, SD ANG,
by Capt. Barbara Anderson
and CMSgt. William L.
Flood, SD ANG, at Joe
Foss Field, Sioux Falls,
South Dakota, 7-8 Jan

Anniversary. 1924-1974,

History, 1941-1991,

(Van Nuys, CA: 146th
TAW, 1974), pp 78-79;
Marcelle Sue Knaack,
Encyclopedia of U.S. Air
For ircraft and Missile
Systems. Volume IL. Post-
World War IT Bombers.

(Oregon Air National
Guard, ND), p 25; Guard-
ians in Blue, p 68; South
Carolina Air National
Guard: The First 25 Years.
pp 22-24: Colorado Pride,
pp 88-89; Unit Data Card,


same role for a planned
new military service,
the United States Air
Force. |

By February 1950,
the Air Guard included
72 fighter and 12 light
bomber squadrons as
well as numerous air-
craft control and warn-
ing (AC&W) units and
support organizations.
The Guard’s inventory
boasted 2,401 aircraft
including 21] jet fight-
ers. It provided nearly
70 percent of the Air Force’s total fighter
strength in the continental United States. The
Air Guard’s personnel strength stood at
44,728 including 3,600 pilots. Built from
scratch after World War II, Air Guardsmen
were justifiably proud of their organization.

But it was far from ready to play its in-
tended combat role. In the dawn of the jet
age, most of its fighters were obsolete pro-
peller-driven F-47s and F-51s. Driven by low
budgets as well as Air Force neglect, its train-
ing was grossly inadequate.

Regular Air Force officers could see no
compelling military need for state-controlled
Air Guard organizations whose missions
were almost entirely national. They spent the
immediate postwar period trying to seize
control of the Air Guard and its meager bud-
gets from the states. Those futile efforts cre-
ated high levels of acrimony, distrust, and
political controversy between the Air Force
and the ANG.

Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead
had referred to the Air Guard in 1949 as
“... aircraft in flyable storage.” 2 His attitude
was common among senior Air Force offic-
ers. Whitehead led the Continental Air Com-
mand which, among its many responsibili-
ties, inspected and supervised the peacetime
training of ANG units. Privately, even some

Dave Menard collection

Before the Air Guard was established as a separate reserve
component in Sept.1947, the California Guard flew F-51s (left).

Air Guardsmen considered their units little
better than glorified government-sponsored
flying clubs. Some went public with their
doubts. Idaho Air Guardsman Colonel Tho-

mas G. Lanphier Jr., had com-
piled a distinguished combat
record in the Pacific during
World War I, including shooting
down the aircraft carrying Japa-
nese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto.
In 1949, he publicly advocated
federalizing the Air Guard and
merging it with the Air Force Re-
serve. Lanphier stressed that the
federal government had no way
of standardizing and inspecting
Air Guard training in each of the
states. In his opinion, the states
operated 48 different programs.
The problems created by this lack
of standardization were com-
pounded by the duplication in-
herent in maintaining two sepa-
tate reserve programs for the Air
Force. Lanphier dismissed the ar-
gument that the Air Guard had a
State mission with the caustic
comment that “an air arm is about
as useful to the governor of the
sovereign state of Idaho as a
bombsight to a freight train.” 3
Rejecting Air Guardsmen’s
image of themselves as 20th cen-
tury aerial minutemen, the Air
Force wanted to strip them of
combat missions and convert
their units to less demanding,
lower status tasks like airlift,
close air support of ground
troops, and civil defense. Such
missions implied greatly reduced

an ait amis
about as
useful fo the
governor of
the sovereign
state of Idaho
as a bomb-
sight toa
freight train 9

COL. THOMAS G.
LANPHIER Jr.
Idaho Air Guard

levels of federal support for the Air Guard
and the death knell of its aspirations to be-
come a first line combat reserve force of the
nation’s newest and most glamorous mili-

tary service. 4

TURNING
PoINtT


Indiana Air Guard A1C Joseph Godde (left) and
Airman Donald Richmond, members of the 113th
Fighter Interceptor Squadron, load their aircraft

NGB collection

serve component of the Air Force. 54
Pushed by its reserve components and
their political supporters, the Air Force
adopted several management and training
innovations during and after the Korean War
that promoted the evolution of increasingly-
capable reserve forces. They focused on in-
cluding the air reserve forces in war plans
and the ANG’s participation in the air de-
fense runway alert program. Since it was the
principal beneficiary of the enormous ex-
pansion of American military spending gen-
erated by the Korean War and the
Eisenhower administration’s emphasis on

during annual training in 1955.

nuclear-armed strategic air power under the
latter’s “New Look” defense strategy, the Air
Force was more receptive to the needs and
policy initiatives of its reserve components
during the 1950s than it had been in the late
1940s. 55

In 1951, the Air Force established spe-
cific mobilization requirements for the Air
Guard in its war plans for the first time. The
ANG would train against those require-
ments. Major General George G. Finch,
CONAC’s Deputy for Air National Guard
Matters and a Georgia Air Guardsman, pro-
posed the air defense runway alert program
as a way to combine realistic training and
support of a significant combat mission in
peacetime. 56 Beginning on an experimen-
tal basis in 1953, Finch’s proposal involved
two units -- the 138th Fighter Interceptor
Squadron at Syracuse, New York and the
194th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Hay-
ward, California -- standing alert from an
hour before sunrise to an hour after sunset.
The alert force was manned by five pilots at
each location who signed on for voluntary
tours of active duty for the duration of the
test. During the test, none of the other pilots
in their squadrons obtained any training from
the program. Initially, the experiment was
slated to last 120-days but then was extended
to 169-days. Each site maintained two F-51s
on five-minute alert.

Working with SAC and ADC radar sites,
the Air Guardsmen conducted periodic
scrambles to test the concept. Despite Air
Staff doubts and initial resistance, the ex-
periment was a great success. By 1961, it
had expanded into a permanent, round-the-
clock program that included 25 ANG fighter
squadrons. By 1992, the ANG provided 100
percent of the Air Force’s much smaller air
defense interceptor force based in the conti-
nental United States. 57 The runway alert
program was the first broad effort to inte-

30

TURNING
POINT


Georgia Air Guard Ist Lt. Thomas Temple, a RF-80
pilot with the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing,
listens to a blessing from Chaplain (Capt.) Edward
Masalewicz before flying to France in January 1952.

navigation aircraft. Poor weather conditions
including freezing rain, low visibility, and
sub-zero temperatures forced the aircraft to
fly at very low altitudes over the ocean. The
absence of cockpit heating and de-icing
equipment made the crossing even more
dangerous. Nevertheless, all of the wing's
48 B-26s and 2 C-47s safely island-hopped
to France with their Navy escorts before the
end of November.

The main body of unit personnel and
equipment were moved by sea, arriving at
Merignac on December 7, 1951. Overcom-
ing primitive facilities, poor logistical sup-
port of their aging B-26s, and an unfriendly
local population, they provided air support
to NATO ground troops in a series of exer-
cises across Western Europe and England.
Beginning in April 1952, selected aircrews
from the 126th and other U.S. Air Forces in
Europe (USAFE) wings were sent to Korea
for 60-day combat tours under a training ini-
tiative known as Project 7019. In May 1952,
the 126th moved to another French air base
at Laon. On January 1, 1953, the unit’s des-
ignation was returned to the state of Illinois.
Air Guardsmen who had not signed ex-
tended active duty agreements with the Air
Force returned home over the first three
months of the year. 26

Air Guard fighter units assigned to NATO
during the Korean War were re-equipped
with jets before deploying overseas. Al-
though most received F-84s, Washington’s
116th Fighter Squadron was equipped with
top-of-the-line F-86As after it was called
into federal service in February 1951. Mo-
bilized with 20 other Air Guard fighter units
to strengthen Air Defense Command’s
(ADC's) interceptor force, the squadron
traded in its F-84s for “Sabrejets” that spring.
Originally it was slated to help defend valu-
able targets in the Pacific Northwest includ-
ing the Boeing aircraft factory at Seattle and
SAC’s assets at Fairchild AFB as well as the

National Archives collection TURNING 9 1
POINT


National Archives collection

TN

F-51D aircraft were
transferred to Clovis
AFB, New Mexico. Or-
ganized under the 140th
Fighter-Bomber Wing,
the 120th was joined
there by Wyoming’s
187th Fighter Squadron
and Utah’s 191 st Fight-
er Squadron. Clovis had
been a temporary
bomber base during
WWII and had been
closed in 1948. In addi-
tion to their normal
training activities, the
mobilized Air Guards-
men were forced to play
a leading role in reha-
bilitating the installa-
tion. 37 Major General
Joe C. Moffett, a Colo-
rado Air Guardsman
who commanded the
140th during the Ko-
rean War, recalled that
they “had to clean all of
the sheep manure out of
the officers’ club and
other buildings before
we could use them.
They had pot belly
stoves in every doggone
building. We had a lot
of these kids from Den-
ver who had never seen
a pot belly stove. The
first thing they wanted
to do was to find out
where the thermostat was. The stoves would
get too hot and the first thing you know is
you'd have a burning building.” 38

Moffett stressed that “... we had to redo
all the runways, and completely rehabilitate
the place. It was a great experience ... None
of the 140th went to Korea as a unit, but

Colorado Air Guard Brig. Gen. Joseph Moffitt stands beside an
F-80 Shooting Star at Buckley Field, Colo., in August 1953.

many of its individuals went as replace-
ments. I know an awful lot of the pilots went
to Korea. For all intents and purpose, the
mission of the 140th Fighter [Bomber] Wing
during the Korean Crisis could have better
been described as the 140th CTU [i.e., Com-
bat Training Unit].” 39

While at Clovis AFB, the 140th prima-
rily trained recalled Air Force Reservists as
fighter pilots in F-51s. In addition to fighter
transition training, about 400 members of
the wing served as guinea pigs for an atomic
bomb test at Yucca Flats, Nev., in April 1952
known as “Tumbler Snapper Shot Number
III.” 40 The wing and its units were demobi-
lized on December 31, 1952. 41

South Dakota’s 175th Fighter Squadron
was mobilized at Sioux Falls in March 1951.
When a flood hit their home station, the unit
was transferred to Ellsworth AFB at Rapid
City, South Dakota to provide “spot defense”
with its aging F-51Ds for a B-36 unit at that
installation. Years later Brigadier General
Justin L. Berger recalled that “We worked
with the bomber people. They had tail gun-
ners that needed runs and practice shooting
at fighters ... [Joe] Foss brought back from
the Pacific the overhead pass ... where de-
pending on the type airplane you are in you
would be a couple thousand feet above it
and out in front of him a mile and see him
coming and so you would come up and have
a complete vertical pass on him.” 42

According to Berger, the Air Guardsmen
enjoyed a great deal of success against the
giant B-36s. He stressed that “They would
never see us. We had a lot of fun with those
guys. Finally, they realized that they had to
move gunners in the back and then we would
have some kind of tail pursuit and we would
come in and let the guy get it and break off
and come back in.” 43

Maintaining unit integrity after mobili-
zation became a big issue for members of
the 175th. Their commander, World War II
Marine Corps ace and Medal of Honor re-

27

TURNING
POINT


Menbers of the Illinois Air Guard’s 126th Light
Bomb Wing (left) sit beneath a B-26 Invader as
Ist Lt. William Jackson shows them where they
would deploy using an oversized globe. Wing
members were among the first ‘shooting’ Air
Force units to join NATO defenses in Europe.

were mere formalities that would allow
them to go to France for 12 months
before they were released from active
duty. Some refused to sign the state-
ments. Those who signed were deployed
to Europe in January 1952 along with
support personnel. They crossed the At-
lantic in their RF-80Cs without incident.
South Carolina Air Guardsmen who did
not deploy overseas were released from
active duty on schedule in July 1952.
But, the Air Force refused to release
those who had signed indefinite career
reserve agreements as the end of their
12 months on the continent approached.
The disgruntled South Carolinians then
hired an attorney in Washington, DC
who persuaded the Air Force to release
them in March 1953, approximately 14
months after they had gone overseas. 30

For some Air Guardsmen from other
states, signing indefinite career reserve
agreements did not prove to be a major
barrier to returning to civilian life. Once
they were mobilized in October 1950,
Oklahoma’s 125th, Kansas’s 127th, and
Georgia’s 128th Fighter-Bomber Squad-
rons were organized into the 137th
Fighter Bomber Wing. Some members
of the wing were eventually persuaded
structure delayed deployment of the new _ to sign indefinite career reserve agreements
117th Tactical Reconnaisance Wing to a —_ which made them eligible for overseas ser-
point where its Guard members had less than _ vice. The unit was supplemented by regular
12 months to serve of their 21-month call- _ Air Force personnel and equipped with the
up; with less than a year to serve, the Guards-  F-84G, the most advanced model of the
men could not be sent overseas under Air — Thunderchief, an aircraft capable of in-flight
Force regulations.” 29 refueling and delivering tactical nuclear

Under pressure to send trained units to weapons, The reorganized wing deployed to
NATO as quickly as possible, the wing com- —_ France in May 1952. Two months later, its
mander urged Air Guard officers to sign in- | Guard squadrons returned home and re-
definite career reserve statements so that turned to state control after training new Air
they could be sent overseas. Many signed _ Force fighter pilots how to fly F-84Gs. The
the statements under the impression thatthey Guard left their aircraft on the continent. 31

TURNING 2 3
POINT

National Archives collection


REVAMPING THE RESERVES

grate reserve units into the regular peace-
time operating structure of the American
armed forces on a continuing basis. It was
the genesis of the total force approach to
reserve components’ training and opera-
tional support of the active duty military
establishment. 58

Through the 1950s, stimulated by the
adoption of the air defense runway alert pro-
gram, inclusion in Air Force war plans,
equipment modernization, and more gener-
ous funding, the Air Guard evolved into a
force that was increasingly integrated with
the planning and operations of the Air Force.

By the end of the decade, the Air Guard
had become a larger and more capable or-
ganization involved in an increasingly broad
range of Air Force flying missions includ-
ing airlift, special operations, and aeromedi-
cal evacuation. 59

The Korean conflict was a crucial turn-
ing point in the history of the modern Air
Guard. It reversed the downward slide of the
Guard's relationship with the Air Force and
marked the beginning of the former’s evo-
lution into an effective reserve component
of the latter. That transformation was driven
initially by political expediency, not mili-
tary requirements.

The inequities and military shortcomings
highlighted during the mobilizations of
1950-1951, had generated an avalanche of
public and congressional hostility. In re-
sponse, the Defense Department and the
armed forces had moved to strengthen their
reserve component programs. Senior Air
Force civilian and military officials were
convinced that, unless they developed effec-
tive reserve and Guard programs, the active
force would lose the political support and
additional military capabilities it needed.

Congress encouraged those developments
and passed legislation that significantly

3 TURNING
POINT



CONTAINING

The Air Guard played an intregal role in strength-
ening NATO defenses in Europe, and
trying to prevent another world war

Mm CONFLICL

1 TURNING
POINT



BAPTISM

a
hy
Air Guardsmen flew 39,530 combat sorties 4
and destroyed 39 enemy aircraft. However, f
the Korean War claimed 101 of its members |

UNDER FIRE

pe 0720 iui

iui
wil

il


National Guard Bureau Chief Maj. Gen. Winston
Wilson visits the Idaho Air Guard’s 190th Fighter
Interceptor Squadron. He insisted that Air Guard units
meet active-duty training standards.

tional emergency; reduced the total military
service obligation from 8 to 6 years; required
all those who entered the armed forces after
Aug. 9, 1955 to participate in reserve train-
ing following completion of their active ser-
vice, and authorized specific sanctions for
those who failed to do so; allowed direct
enlistments in the reserve components for
non-prior service youths; and established a
system of continuous screening for mem-
bers of the ready reserve to ensure they were
available for active duty.

The act failed to include provisions au-
thorizing universal military training, man-
datory basic training for all National Guard
recruits, or authority to induct men into the
reserves through the draft if sufficient num-
bers could not be obtained voluntarily. Al-
though concerned by those omissions, Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the bill
into law in August 1955 after vigorous lob-
bying by Secretary of Defense Charles E.
Wilson. While the Reserve Forces Act of
1955 had little direct impact on the ANG, it
reflected a continuing high level of concern
in Washington about the strength of reserve
programs. Sensitive to that political climate
and the desire of the Eisenhower adminis-
tration to cut military spending, the Air Force
continued to strengthen the Air Guard and

NGB collection —_ the Air Force Reserve. 52
politically or diplomatically difficult. 51 With volunteerism as an example, the

Following the Korean War, Congress re- | ANG helped pioneer new approaches to re-
mained concerned about continuing weak- __ serve training and management within the
nesses in reserve programs. In 1955, iten- Air Force during the 1950s and 1960s.
acted two key pieces of legislation to ad- _ Blessed with innovative leaders like Major
dress such problems. The 1955 Amendments Generals Earl T. Ricks and Winston P.
to the Universal Training and Service Act | “Wimpy” Wilson plus a strong political base,
extended the draft until July 1, 1959. Next. _ the Guard traded some of its autonomy as a
it passed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 _ state-federal force for closer integration with
which increased the size of the Ready Re- _ the active duty Air Force.
serve from 1.5 million to 2.9 million men; After World War II, Ricks and Wilson had
authorized the President to mobilize upto 1 left active duty with the AAF and rejoined
million ready reservists in a declared na- _ the Arkansas National Guard. Both were

TURNING 3 3
POINT



The Korean War mobilization fiasco forced the Ait Force

to reach dn accommodation with the Air Guard and

overhaul its reserve system. Congress playeda key tole .

it



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Air Force Historical Roane Agency photo

Members of the Colorado Air Guard's 120th Fighter
Squadron are mobilized on April 1, 1951 for federal
service during the Korean War.


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Eighty percent of the Air Guard was called-up for the Korean
M War, exposing its weaknesses as a reserve program

TURNING
POINT


TM

a"



not before the mobi-
lization of all the
U.S. reserve compo-
nents had created a
tremendous political
uproar. Since Korea
was a limited con-
flict unlike World
War IJ, universal
manpower mobiliza-
tion was not needed.
Unfortunately many
World War II veter-
ans, who had not re-
ceived drill pay for
serving in Guard and
Reserve units after
V-J Day, were called
up for Korea before
many draft-eligible
youths or drill status
Guardsmen and Re-
servists who had
been receiving mon-
etary compensation
for their part-time
military training. The
difficulties encoun-
tered in mobilizing
the Air Guard were
part of the much
larger problem of
adapting in a fair and
equitable manner a

National Air and Space Museum collection

system, designed by
the Department of
Defense for total global war, to provide man-
power for a limited war. 5

The Korean War experience of North
Dakota's fledgling Air Guard unit illustrated
the impact of pre-war neglect. Although the

An airman (left) with the Michigan Air National Guard’ 's
127th Fighter Wing says farewell to his wife and ¢
Wayne Major Airport, Mich., after his unit was mobilized in
January 1951. More than 45,000 Air Guardsmen were called
up for the Korean War, the largest mobilization of citizen-
airmen in the force’s history.

ren at

178th Fighter Squadron was not mobilized
until April 1951, the Air Force had already
stripped the unit of eight badly-needed F-
51s late in the previous year. After a month
at their home station, its officers and men
were transferred to Moody AFB outside
Valdosta, Georgia for assignment with the
Strategic Air Command’s (SAC’s) 146th
Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW). Neither, the
Air Force or the Air Guard were prepared
for mobilization. According to one partici-
pant, it essentially was a case of “fall out in
Fargo and fall in at Georgia.” 6

The 178th’s Commander, Major Robert
M. Johnson, reported that “some difficulty
was encountered in working into an entirely
new wing organization and converting to the
Strategic Air Command Fighter Wing struc-
ture."7

The unit remained in Georgia through
mid-October undergoing intensive training.
After SAC belatedly discovered that its F-
51s could not serve as long range escorts
for the command’s strategic bombers, the
squadron accompanied the 146th to George
AFB at Victorville, Calif., for reassignment
to the Tactical Air Command (TAC). Sub-
sequently, many of the 178th’s pilots and en-
listed members were reassigned to other
units throughout the Air Force.

By April 1952, very few North Dakota
Air Guardsmen remained in the squadron.
Some Guardsmen feared that the Air Force
would not reconstitute the unit in their home
State after it was demobilized. However,
those fears were never realized. In Decem-
ber 1952, the Air Force released the 178th
from federal service and returned it to North
Dakota’s control. At that point, most of the
state’s Air Guardsmen had completed their

active service and returned home. 8

TURNING
POINT


mine

Wi
SOU i

While many Air Guardsmen deployed to
Korea, most remained on duty in the U.S.
where they braced for a possible con-
frontation with the Soviet Union




BAPTISM UNDER FIRE

espite their poor initial readi-
ness, Guard units and indi-
viduals contributed substan-
tially to the air war in Korea. Air Guards-
men flew 39,530 combat sorties and de-
stroyed 39 enemy aircraft. But, the Air Guard
paid a high price in Korea as 101 of its mem-
bers were either killed or declared missing

in action during the conflict.

The Air Guard’s 136th and the 116th
FBWs compiled excellent combat records.
The 136th—composed of the 111th (Texas),
154th (Arkansas) and the 182nd (Texas)
Fighter-Bomber Squadrons -- flew its first
combat mission in the Far East on May 24,
1951 in F-84E “Thunderjets.” While escort-
ing B-29s near “Mig Alley,” Ist Lieutenant
Arthur E. Olinger and Captain Harry
Underwood of the 182nd shared credit for
the Air Guard’s first jet kill. On June 26,
1951, they destroyed one of five Mig-15s
that attacked their formation. The 116th ar-
rived in Japan in late July 1951. Its fighter-
bomber squadrons included the 158th (Geor-
gia), 159th (Florida) and the 196th (Califor-
nia). 9

The experience of Florida’s 159th Fighter
Squadron was typical of ANG units that saw
combat during the Korean “police action.”
The unit was mobilized in October 1950 and
received brand new F-84s to replace its F-
80s. Originally the squadron was slated to
deploy to France to strengthen the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
against the threat of Soviet aggression. Ru-
mors about a possible “European vacation”
stimulated recruiting for the 159th. In June
195), the squadron actually packed its gear
and shipped its aircraft to Europe. At the last

1 TURNING
Point

i i

7
i

i

i

minute its orders were changed. Fears of a
massive buildup of communist air power in
the Far East prompted Lieutenant General
O. P. Weyland, Commander of the Far East
Air Forces, to strengthen Japan’s air de-
fenses. The 159th was given some older F-
84s and shipped out from the west coast on
two Navy escort carriers, arriving in Japan
in late July and early August. 10

The 159th was stationed at Misawa Air
Base. With the rest of the 116th FBW, it was
made responsible for the air defense of
northern Japan -- a role that its F-84s were
poorly suited to, The squadron pulled air
defense alert for a week al a time. When it
was not on alert or training for its air de-



"es Tt’ a7
ye Oe TET,
\ ha i)



AA
AAAI

en
Pilots from the Texas Air Guard’s 182nd Fighter-Bomber
Squadron ike bomber mleston over Korea!

LAYOUT AND DESIGN BY MSGT. JOHN MALTHANER
PA-00-306



REVAMPING THE RESERVES

he initial Korean War mobili-
zation fiasco forced the Air
Force to reach an accommoda-
tion with the Air Guard and to thoroughly

revamp its entire reserve system. 49

Then, as now, Congress played a key role
in placing reserve programs on a sound foot-
ing. Capitol Hill was more willing than ei-
ther the Department of Defense or the mili-
tary services to fund the reserves properly
and reform the policies that governed them.
The Universal Military Training and Service
Act of 1951, passed in June 1951, required
that each man inducted into the armed forces
serve 24 months of active duty and transfer
to the reserve components for six years upon
discharge from active duty. Those who vol-
unteered and were accepted into the reserve
components could be released from active
duty before they completed their 24 months
of service.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952,
the so-called “Magna Carta” of the reserve
components, was enacted in July 1952. It
was designed to rejuvenate the reserve pro-
grams of the armed forces. Each of them was
required to maintain three categories of re-
serves -- ready, standby, and retired -- with
each subject to different degrees of recall to
active duty. For example, all Air Guardsmen
were members of the ready reserve which
could be involuntarily recalled for 24 months
during a war or national emergency. The leg-
islation gave all servicemen -- volunteers or
draftees -- an obligation to serve in the ready
reserve if they had less than four years of
active duty. 50

A little noticed provision of the 1952 leg-
islation proved to be an essential component
of the Air Guard’s future success. While re-
quiring National Guardsmen to mobilize in
units during national emergencies, the act

3 TURNING
POINT

permitted individual Guardsmen and Re-
servists to volunteer for active service. Sub-
sequently, “volunteerism” was employed to
integrate small numbers of ANG members
into active duty Air Force peacetime mis-
sions like airlift and the air defense runway
alert program for relatively short periods of
time. In larger contingencies, it provided a
“silent call-up” option that enabled the Air
Force to draw upon the Air Guard’s re-
sources without requiring that Congress or
the President employ their formal mobili-
zation authority in situations that could be


bili A New i Air Guard pilot with the 138th Fighter alteas
flies his F-51 during a training mission in the early 1950s.

MRE at


MOBILIZED

he Korean War began in June

1950. It proved a turning point

for the U.S. military establish-

ment, including the Air Guard. Over 45,000
Air Guardsmen, 80 percent of the force,
were mobilized. That call-up exposed the
weaknesses of all U.S. military reserve pro-

grams including the ANG.

Unprepared for a limited war in Asia and
fearing a global conflict with the Soviet
Union, the Air Force had to improvise its
responses to the crisis. It needed trained or
partially trained manpower as quickly as
possible. First, it asked Reservists and
Guardsmen to volunteer as individual fill-
ers in active duty units. In July 1950 it be-
gan involuntary recalls of Reservists. The
following month it started to mobilize Air
Force Reserve (AFRES) flying units. Be-
cause its early jet fighters were incapable of
operating from unimproved airfields in
South Korea, the Air Force stripped the Air
Guard of 145 of its 764 propeller-driven F-
51Ds during the summer of 1950 and dis-
patched them to the Far East.

Once Congress and the President autho-
rized a permanent expansion of the service
in September 1950, the Air Force called
upon the Air Guard. On October 10th, 15
Air Guard flying squadrons and numerous
support units were mobilized. The Air Force
saw that move as only temporary expedi-
ent; however, massive Chinese communist
intervention in the war in late October de-
stroyed that assumption. Korea was the Air
Guard’s largest war. Eventually, 67 of its 84
flying squadrons, most of its aircraft con-
trol and warning units, along with many sup-
port organizations, were mobilized.

TURNING
POINT

Before the Ko-
rean War, ANG
units lacked spe-
cific wartime mis-
sions. Their equip-
ment, especially
aircraft, was obso-
lete. Their training
was usually deplor-
able. Once mobi-
lized, they proved
to be almost totally
unprepared for
combat. Guard
units were assigned
almost at random to
various major air
commands regard-
less of their previ-
ous training and
equipment. Many
key Air Guardsmen
were stripped away
from their units and
used as individual
fillers elsewhere in
the rapidly expand-
ing Air Force. Al-
though considered
a necessity for the
active force be-
cause of the na-
tional emergency
created by the war,
it was an anathema
for the unit-oriented
Air Guard which
insisted that its or-
ganizations, which
had trained as
teams in peacetime, would be more effec-
tive if they served together in wartime.

It took three to six months for some ANG
units to become combat ready. Some never
did. Eventually, the mess was sorted out, but

se.

en

mi

|



CONTAINING THE CONFLICT

Atomic Energy Commission’s plants on the
outskirts of Richland and Pasco, Washing-
ton.

However, the 116th was notified in June
that it was be sent to the United Kingdom to
strengthen that island nation’s air defenses
against the Soviets. In August, the unit’s 25
fighter aircraft flew in stages from Wash-
ington state to their new base at Shepards
Grove, England. The unit was neither trained
nor equipped for air refueling which was still
in its infancy. Consequently, the deployment
took 14 days.

The 116th was the first Sabrejet unit to
deploy to Europe. It served under the op-
erational control of the Royal Air Force.
Once bedded down in England, it focused
on high altitude intercept training and exer-
cises. While in the United Kingdom, the unit
also sent several volunteers for combat duty
in Korea. On October 31, 1952, the unit was
relieved from active duty following its
completion of the 21 months of service au-
thorized by federal law. At the point, only a
handful of Guardsmen actually remained in
the squadron because its personnel had been
returning to the United States since April
1952 under an early release plan. They had
been replaced by Air Force personnel. The
unit’s supplies and equipment, including its
aircraft, were transferred to the Air Force’s
78th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at
Shepards Grove. 27 During its federal ser-
vice, “...the 116th accomplished 12,282:15
hours of flying time. This time was accom-
plished in T-33, F-84, and F-86 type aircraft
without a major accident. No pilots or air-
craft were lost during this time, and only
three minor accidents were sustained.” 28

South Carolina’s 157th Fighter Squadron
had a difficult active duty experience dur-
ing the war because of the uncertainties of
changing Air Force requirements. After be-
ing called to active duty in October 1950, it
was sent to Lawson AFB, Georgia and traded
in its F-51s for reconnaissance versions of

9 TURNING
PoINT

the Mustang. Joined by mobilized Air
Guardsmen from Alabama’s 160th Fighter
squadron and Ohio's 112th Fighter Bomber
Squadron, the South Carolinians were con-
solidated into the 117th Tactical Reconnais-
sance Wing. South Carolina and Alabama
Guardsmen trained for day reconnaissance
while their Ohio counterparts prepared for
night operations. In the summer of 1950, the
157th received the RF-80 Shooting Star and
began intensive preparations for a planned
to deployment to France. But, “haggling
over unit assignments and organizational


7

yet

in

NGB Collection



FOOTNOTES

1. Charles J. Gross, The
Air National Guard And
The American Military
Tradition: Militiaman,
Volunteer, And Profes-
sional, (Washington, DC:
Historical Services Divi-
sion, National Guard
Bureau, 1995), pp 26-37,
57-70.

2. Charles J. Gross,
Prelude Ti tal
Force: The Air National
Guard, 1943-1969, (Wash-
ington, DC: Office of Air
Force History, U.S. Air
Force, 1985), pp 22-23.

3. Ibid., pp 23-24, 35-
37.

4. Ibid., pp 23-24.

5. Ibid., pp 22-89; Rene
J. Francillon, The Air
Guard,(Aerofax, ND), pp
43-50; Rene J. Francillon,
The United States Air
National Guard, (London:
Aerospace Publishing,
1993), pp 44-49; Wayne
Thompson and Bernard C.
Nalty, Within Limits: The
U.S. Air Force and the
Korean War, (Washington,
DC: Air Force History and
Museums Program, 1996),
pp 29-31.

6. Jerry Cooper and
Glen Smith, Citizens as
Soldiers: A History of the

Total Force, pp 22- 89;
Francillon, The Air Guard,
pp 43-50; Memo (U),
ANG/HO to NGB/XO
(Mr. Metcalf), subj.:
“Nominees for ANG
Heritage Painting - Korea,”
2 April 1978, NGB-PAH
Archives; Hist (U), 136th
Fighter-Bomber Wing, 1
Apr 1951-30 Jun 1951, pp
14-18; Daniel L. Haulman,
Ph.D. and Col. William C.
Stancik, USAFR, Editors
Air Force Aerial Victory
Credits: World War I
World War Il, Korea, And
Vietnam, (Maxwell AFB,
AL: U.S. Air Force
Historical Research
Center,1988) pp 757, 759.
10. Robert Hawk,
Florida's Air Force: Air
National Guard, 1946-
1990, (St. Augustine, FL:
Florida National, 1946-
1990, 1990), pp 37-39;
Robert F. Futrell, “United
States Air Force Opera-
tions in the Korean Con-
flict, 1 November 1950-30
June 1952,” USAF Histori-
cal Study No. 72, (Wash-
ington, DC: Department of
the Air Force, 1 July
1955), pp 87-88; Robert F.
Futrell, The United States
Air Force in Korea. 1950-

North D: National
Guard, (Fargo, ND:
Institute for Regional
Studies, North Dakota
State University, 1986), p
389.

7. Ibid., pp 389-390.

8. Ibid., p 390.

9. Gross, Prelude to the

1953, (New York: Duell,
Sloan, and Pearce, 1961),
p37l.

11. Hawk, Florida's Air
Force, pp 39-41.

12. Ibid., pp 51-52;
Richard K. Smith, Sev-
enty-Five Years of Inflight

Refueling: Highlights

]923-1998, (Washington,
DC: Air Force History and
Museums Program, 1998),
pp 34-35.

13. Hawk, Florida’s Air
Force, p 52; Futreii,
“United States Air Force
Operations in the Korean
Conflict,” p 22.

14. Gross, Prelude to
the Total Force, pp 22- 89;
Francillon, The Air Guard,
pp 43-50; Memo (U),
ANG/HO to NGB/XO
(Mr. Metcalf), subj.:
“Nominees for ANG
Heritage Painting - Korea,”
2 April 1978; Hist (U),
136th Fighter-Bomber
Wing, 1 Apr 1951-30 Jun
1951, pp 14-18; Haulman
and Stancik, Air Force

Aerial Victory Credits, pp
757, 759.

15. MSgt James T.
Densford, ed., From
Jennies To Jets: The Story
Of The 111th Squadron, 2
June 1923 - 29 June 1973
(Texas ANG, ca 1973), pp
118, 124; Haulman and
Stancik, Aerial Victory
Credits, pp 211, 755.

16. John L. Frisbee,
Editor, Makers Of The
United States Air Force
(McLean, VA.: Pergamon-
Brassey, 1989), pp 310-
326; Haulman and Stancik,
Aerial Victory Credits, p
763.

17. Interview (U),
Brigadier General Paul E.
Hoover, Assistant Adjutant
General for Air, Ohio, by
Charles J. Gross,
Worthington, Ohio, 30


GLOBAL AIR POWER

cipient, Colonel [Brigadier General] Joe
Foss, was reassigned as the operations of-
ficer of an air defense sector at Kansas City,
Missouri which was responsible for fighter
squadrons in 20 states. But the 175th for the
most part successfully resisted Air Force
efforts to reassign most of its experienced
pilots to Korea. However, several of its more
senior officers were transferred to other Air
Force billets in the continental United States.
The squadron was returned to state service
on Dec. 1, 1952. 44 s

Air Guard units assigned to SAC had an
especially difficult time adjusting to active
duty. Fighter units comprised four of the six
ANG wings gained by the command in
1951. After briefly experimenting with the
108th, 131st, 132nd and 146th Fighter
Bomber Wings as escorts for SAC’s bomb-
ers, they were reassigned to TAC. The 106th
and 11] th Light Bomb Wings remained with
SAC until they were returned to state con-
trol. Neither organization was prepared to
switch from flying B-26s to B-29s or RB-
29s which they eventually obtained. The
111th flew RB-36s before it was mobilized.
The experience levels of their personnel
were poorly matched with SAC’s demand-
ing strategic bombing and reconnaissance
missions. Training in those units was ex-
tremely slow. Shortages of aircraft, spare
parts, and supplies as well as excessive per-
sonnel turnover exacerbated their problems.

Unit cohesion and the distinctive Air
Guard character of those organizations were
destroyed. These circumstances lowered
morale and delayed readiness. Many
Guardsmen were cither reassigned to other
units or subjected to administrative action,
including release from active duty, to deal
with morale and associated problems. Nei-
ther wing was rated fully combat-ready prior
to returning to state control. 45

Instability of aircraft and assignments
plagued many mobilized Air Guard units
during the Korean War. The former was es-

9 TURNING
POINT

pecially true of California’s 115th
Bomb Squadron (Light). Called to
duty in April 1951, unit personnel
and their B-26 aircraft were sent
to Langley AFB, Va., that May as
part of the 47th Bombardment
Group. The following September
the unit was outfitted with B-45A
jets, the Air Force’s first atomic-
capable light bombers. However,
five months later the unit was
stripped of its B-45As while still
undergoing transition training and
relieved of its assignment to the
47th Bombardment Group. It was
reassigned as a combat crew train-
ing squadron for B-26 instructors.
The unit stayed in that assignment
until it returned to state control on
Jan. 1, 1953. 46

Although flying squadrons gar-
nered the lion’s share of attention
during the Korean War, almost all of the Air
Guard's Air Control and Warning (AC&W)
units were called into federal service during
that conflict. On the eve of the war, it had
boasted 48 AC&W squadrons plus 12 radar
calibration detachments - all of them orga-
nized in 12 groups. Their wartime mission
was to strengthen the nation’s air defenses.
During the Korean conflict, 11 AC&W
groups, 45 AC&W squadrons, and 12 radar
calibration units were recalled to active duty.
Nearly 11,000 of the approximately 45,000
Air Guardsmen mobilized during the war
were from those units. 47

As elsewhere in the Guard, many indi-
vidual AC&W personnel were transferred to
Air Force units. For example, Alabama's
115th AC&W Squadron was ordered to ac-
tive duty in December 1951 with 13 offic-
ers and 133 enlisted men. By the time that it
was returned to state control in November
1953, the unit consisted of only one officer
and one airman. It was never actually as-
signed an operational site during its active



INTRODUCTION

he Air National Guard (ANG)
was once considered to be a col-
lection of state-sponsored, fed-
erally-funded flying clubs with questionable
combat capabilities. But, during the Cold
War, it became an increasingly-effective re-

serve component of the Air Force.

A combination of political expediency
and military necessity drove that transfor-
mation which began during the Korean War.
During that conflict, the Air Force and the
Air Guard ceased arguing about command
prerogatives. Instead, they established a
pragmatic and flexible working relationship
which integrated the Guard on a daily basis
with the planning, budgeting, training, and
operational activities of the active duty es-
tablishment. The Air Guard traded some of
its historic autonomy for increased federal
resources, and responsibilities. In the pro-
cess, Air Guardsmen accepted professional
military standards and values as the proper
measure of their own performance while
adapting their own distinctive militia culture
and organization to the demanding require-
ments of air warfare in the second half of
the twentieth century.

Although National Guard aviation pre-
dated the American declaration of war
against Imperial Germany in April 1917, the
Air Guard was not established as a separate
reserve component until September 1947. It
was a product of the politics of interservice
rivalry and postwar military planning dur-
ing World War II, especially the competing
drives to create a separate Air Force and pre-
serve the National Guard’s federal mission
as a combat reserve force. Wartime Army
Air Forces (AAF) leaders like General
Henry H. Amold had been determined to
achieve the long-time goal of Army airmen,

TURNING
POINT

a separate military ser-
vice built around the
largest possible stand-
ing force. They were
convinced that future
wars would be short and
highly destructive af-
fairs decided by the
ability of long range
strategic bombers to de-
liver massive firepower
on an enemy’s indus-
trial heartland. The em-
ployment of atomic
bombs against Japan in
1945 reinforced those
convictions.

They were convinced that the National
Guard and Reserves could not operate the
complex modern weapons which air warfare
demanded without extensive post-mobiliza-
tion preparations. Further, they were deter-
mined to avoid the state politics, political
cronyism, and military incompetence that
professional Army officers associated with
the National Guard. But General George C.
Marshall, the Army’s wartime Chief of Staff.
had a more realistic reading of the postwar
political and military possibilities. He forced
the AAF to redraw its plans to include a
scaled-back active force with substantial
resetve programs.

Meanwhile Guardsmen had become
alarmed by the fact that the War Department
had denigrated their wartime military ser-
vice and frozen them out of postwar plan-
ning. Led by Major General Ellard A. Walsh
of Minnesota, President of the National
Guard Association of the United States
(NGAUS), and Major General Milton A.
Record, Maryland’s Adjutant General, they
flexed their considerable political muscle in
Washington, D.C. They compelled the mili-
tary establishment to retain the National
Guard as the Amny’s primary combat reserve
force and created the Air Guard to play the



U.S. Air Force photos
'r Guard Capt. Robinson Risner, 8 kills.

it became clear that the 185th was not going
to the Far East, Risner arranged a series of
voluntary transfers that ultimately landed
him in the Air Force’s 4th Fighter Wing in
Korea. After learning to fly the F-86, he was
credited with destroying eight enemy air-
craft.

Risner completed 108 combat missions
and returned to the United States. Like some
other Air Guard pilots who served during
Korean War, he decided to remain on active
duty with the Air Force. His career pro-
gressed and, as a lieutenant colonel, Risner
was given command of the 67th Tactical
Fighter Squadron based at Korat, Thailand.
While flying against a heavily-defended tar-
get in North Vietnam, his F-105 was shot
down in 1965. Risner was captured and im-
prisoned in the infamous “Hanoi Hilton.”
Despite torture, filth, and isolation, Risner
took charge and played a key role in creat-
ing a disciplined military organization
among his fellow American prisoners of war.
He was released from his horrible ordeal
following the B-52 “Christmas” bombing
offensive in 1972. He returned to the cock-
pit and quickly mastered the F-4, Risner was
then give command of an F-111 wing and
promoted to brigadier general before his last
assignment at the Air Force’s Fighter Weap-
ons’ School. Risner’s captivity in Hanoi
epitomized the courage, professionalism,
and patriotism of Air Force, Marine Corps,
and Navy pilots during the Vietnam War. 16

To the surprise of the Air Force, experi-
ence and maturity, not youth, had proved
essential to the combat effectiveness of
fighter pilots in Korea. World War II com-
bat veterans scored a disproportionate num-
ber of aerial victories. Brigadier General
Paul E. Hoover, who later served as Ohio’s
Assistant Adjutant General for Air, reflected
on his own combat experience in Korea. He
had been there as an Air Guardsman as-
signed to the Air Force’s 49th Fighter-
Bomber Squadron.

TURNING 1 5
PoINT


Four F-84 pilots with the Texas Air Guard’s 136th
Fighter-Bomber Wing -- Capt. Jesse O’Brien (left), Maj.
James Witt, Capt. James Chamberlain and Capt. Nowell
Didear -- map a shategy before a mission in Korea.

National Archives collection

quickly airborne, Newman located the tanks
parked in a valley along with anti-aircraft
guns on the valley floor and in the surround-
ing hills.” 2) It was an extremely dangerous
situation because “The hillside weapons
were able to spread a network of tracer fire
across the valley. Nevertheless, Newman led
two flights of fighter-bombers on their runs
and marked the targets with his machine
guns. After the fighters completed their
work, Newman recorded the destruction
with his reconnaissance camera.” 22
Newman flew 100 combat missions over
Korea. He enjoyed a long and distinguished
career with the Oklahoma Air Guard after

his tour in Korea ended. During the war, his
Guard unit had remained in federal service,
minus many of its original pilots and sup-
port personnel, at Shaw AFB, S.C., until it
was demobilized on December 31, 1952.

After their Korean War service ended, less
than 25 percent of the 185th’s original pi-
lots returned to the Air Guard. The remain-
der stayed on active duty and completed their
military careers with the Air Force. 23

Many Air Guard pilots, assigned to Ko-
rea as individual replacements, flew highly
dangerous ground support missions. Some
never made it back to base.

Unlike many others, Ist Lt. Orval Tandy
lived to recount his harrowing experience.
He was one of nine flyers from Oregon's
142nd Fighter Group who were sent to Ko-
rea as individual replacements after their unit
was mobilized in March 1951. Tandy’s Air
Force unit in Korea focused on attacking
enemy railroads, supply lines, and troop
convoys.

On September 5, 1951, during his 57th
mission, Tandy was shot down while straf-
ing a train near the Yalu River. He spent the
next two years in Chinese prison camps in
North Korea. It was a terrible ordeal for
Tandy and other prisoners of war. Medical
care was non-existent. His only clothing
during the entire period was the summer
flight suit, under-shorts and boots that he was
wearing when shot down. His food usually
consisted of one cup of soupy rice in the
morning and another in the evening. When
Tandy was finally released exactly two years
to the day after he was captured, he weighed
just 128 pounds. And this was after the com-
munists had fattened-up Tandy and other
POWs before releasing them. He had tipped
the scales at 170 pounds when he was shot
down. Like some other recalled Air Guard
pilots, Tandy made the Air Force his career

following the war. 24

TURNING
POINT




Delaware Air Guard maintainers

ABOUT THE AUTHOR with the 142nd Fighter Interceptor

Squadron repair an F-86. M wi

harles J. Gross wrote Turning Point

while serving as Chief of the Air Na- vl
tional Guard history program in the

National Guard Bureau.

He holds a Ph.D. in military history from
The Ohio State University. The degree was
granted in 1979. In addition, he holds bachelors
degrees in political science (1964) and educa-
tion (1970) from the same institution. He was
awarded an MS in American history by Utah
State University in 1973.

From July 1964 until September 1969, Dr
Gross served on extended active duty with the
United States Air Force (USAF). His assign-
ments included three years as an intelligence
watch officer in a NATO air defense command
post in Germany and 12 months as officer-in-
charge, Target Analysis Branch, 12th Recon-
naissance Intelligence
Squadron at Tan Son
Nhut Air Base, Viet-
nam.

The author served
from 1972 to 1976 in \
the Ohio Air National _ |!) " j
Guard’s 179th Tactical i! "4 Mi
Fighter Group. From nh jal
1976 to 1984, he was | IM
assigned to the Air
Force Intelligence
Service Reserve. He
was an Air Force Reserve colonel assigned to
the Air Force Historical Research Agency and
the Office of the Air Force Historian as an
individual mobilization augmentee before
retiring as a colonel in 1994.

Dr Gross joined the USAF history program
in May 1979 at Headquarters Air Force Logis-
tics Command. Subsequently, he served at
Headquarters Air Force Systems Command and
Headquarters USAF.

Dr Gross has written numerous articles and
studies focused primarily on the USAF reserve
components. His award-winning Adapting the
Force, hailed by a newspaper reviewer for its
“unflinching look about the Air National
Guard”, chronicled the Air Guard's struggle to
become a relevant force after the Korean War.

He and his wife, Barbara, live in Crofton,
Md.



GLOBAL AIR POWER

he majority of Air Guard

flying units mobilized during

the Korean War were not de-
ployed to either the Far East or Europe dur-
ing the conflict. Although many of their pi-
lots were transferred to combat assignments
in the Far East and other key personnel were
sent to active duty organizations, their units
remained on duty in the continental United
States where they helped to expand the Air
Force for the expected global confrontation

with the Soviet Union.

For example the 127th Pilot Training
Wing, consisting of Arizona’s 197th as well
as Michigan’s 107th and 171st fighter squad-
rons, trained pilots in F-84s at Luke AFB,
Ariz., for Air Training Command. Other Air
Guard units augmented TAC, SAC and Air
Defense Command at bases in the states.

The major air commands were not im-
pressed with the Air Guard units assigned
to them, at least not at first. 32 According to
ADC, those units “didn’t immediately as-
sume an air defense capability commensu-
rate with that of regular Air Force squad-
rons.” 33 General Whitehead, ADC’s Com-
mander, was even blunter. He commented
that “We have found that most of the Air
Guard units are not in a position to do what
is expected, and the units above the squad-
ron level {i.e., wing headquarters] are not
capable of doing their jobs.” 34

Altogether, 15 Air Guard flying squad-
rons remained with ADC after they were
mobilized. Some of the Guard's air defense
units were hampered by the loss of their
experienced pilots to overseas commands

2

TURNING
POINT

and the retention of
older and less capable
fighter aircraft. For in-
stance, Connecticut’s
118th Fighter Squad-
ron was called into
federal service in Feb-
ruary 1951 and redes-
ignated a fighter-inter-
ceptor unit. Virtually
all of the unit’s air-
crews and support per-
sonnel with World War
Il experience were re-
assigned to combat
units overseas. Retain-
ing its obsolete F-47
Thunderbolts, the unit
was moved to Suffolk
County Airport on
Long Island, N.Y., to
help defend the eastern
United States. On Dec.
1, 1952, the squadron
was returned to state
control. 35

However, other mo-
bilized Air Guard units
including Delaware's
142nd Fighter Squad-
ron and the District of
Columbia’s 12I1st
Fighter Squadron were
equipped with modern
jet aircraft better
suited to their air de-
fense missions. The
142nd and the 121st
were first transitioned
to F-84Cs and then to F-94Bs before being
returned to state service. 36

Personnel from Colorado’s 120th Fighter
Squadron had an unusual active duty tour
after they were mobilized in April 1951.
They remained at their home station until
the following December when they and their

il

Mi

\

i

iH



TABLE of CONTENTS

TURNING POINT

MOBILIZED 6

Eighty percent of the Air Guard was called-
up for the Korean War, exposing its weak-
nesses as a reserve program

BAPTISM under FIRE 10

Air Guardsmen flew 39,530 combat
sorties and destroyed 39 enemy aircraft.
However, the War claimed 101 of its own

CONTAINING 18

the CONFLICT

The Air Guard played an intregal role in
strengthening NATO defenses in Europe;
trying to prevent another world war

GLOBAL AIR Power 24

While some Air Guardsmen deployed to
Korea, most remained in the U.S. bracing
for a possible Soviet attack

REVAMPING 30
the RESERVES

The mobilization fiasco forced the Air
Force to accommodate the Air Guard
and overhaul its reserve system

jabama Air Guard’s
117th Tactical
Reconnaissance
Wing learn about the
‘anti-exposure suit’
prior to their
deployment to

_ Central Europe in

~~ January 1952.



REVAMPING THE RESERVES

brought to Washington by the Air Force to
clean up the mess in the Air Guard revealed
by the Korean War. Wilson had expected to
serve in the National Guard Bureau (NGB)
for 21 months. Instead, he remained for 21
years. Wimpy was appointed acting chief of
the Air Force Division of the NGB in July
1953 after Ricks became ill with cancer, In
January 1954, he was assigned as chief of
the division and promoted to brigadier gen-
eral. Wilson served in that position until
August 1962. He then became the first Air
Guardsmen to be assigned as Chief of the
NGB on a non-acting basis. He held the lat-
ter position from August 1963 until August
1971.

Wilson and Ricks recognized that the Air
Guard faced a dim future unless it became a
thoroughly professional force. For them, that
meant that the ANG had to acquire definite
wartime missions. It also had to be integrated
into Air Force planning, budgeting, exer-
i ind operational missions on a regular
To increase flight safety, the NGB
persuaded the Defense Department to au-
thorize 36 annual flight training periods for
its aircrews after the Korean War. Since the
Air Force could not accommodate all of its
growing training needs, the ANG established
its own permanent field training sites. Ap-
plying an innovation pioneered in Texas and
Arkansas before the Korean War, ANG unit
training assemblies were concentrated on
one weekend per month instead of being
held each week. The Air Guard also added
more full-time technicians. These reforms
were initiated to strengthen the Air Guard
to the point where its units could be ready
for combat the moment they were called into
federal service.

Wilson fought hard to acquire modern
aircraft and facilities. To accommodate high
performance jet aircraft, the ANG launched
a major program to lengthen runways and
construct other facilities at the municipal
airports that hosted its units during 1954. At

34

TURNING
PomnT

installations which could not adapt to jet
fighter operations, the Air Guard began
forming air resupply and air transport squad-
rons starting in 1955. Initially, they were
equipped with C-46s. By the decade’s end,
the C-97 had begun to enter the Guard's in-
ventory. Above all, Wilson was determined
to ensure that the Air Guard met the same
tough professional training standards as the
active force. 53 “Wimpy” was able to sell
these concepts to the ANG, the Air Force,
Congress and the states. Under his leader-
ship, the ANG was transformed from a fly-
ing club into a valued and professional re-


160th AC&W Group,
Washington ANG, in
NGB-PAI-H Archives;
Paper (U), “Korean War
Emergency Data of the
115th Aircraft Control and
Warning Squadron,
Alabama Air National
Guard, ND, in “Mobiliza-
tions” File, “Korean War -
ANG,” Folder, NGB-PAI-
H Archives.

49. Gross, Prelude to the
Total Force. pp 22- 89;
Francillon, The Air Guard,
pp 43-50; Memo (U),
ANG/HO to NGB/XO (Mr.
Metcalf), subj.: “Nominees
for ANG Heritage Painting
-- Korea,” 2 April 1978;
Hist (U), 136th Fighter-
Bomber Wing, | Apr 1951-
30 Jun 1951, pp 14-18;
Haulman and Stancik, Air
Force Aerial Victory
Credits, pp 757, 759.

50. Allan R. Millett and
Peter Maslowski For The
Common Defense: A
Military History of the
United States of America,
(New York: The Free Press,
1984), pp 492-493; Gallo-
way, History of U.S.

Military Policy On Reserve
Forces, 1775-1957,

(Washington, DC, GPO,
1957), pp 471-474; 1990
National Guard Almanac
(Falls Church, VA.:
Uniformed Services
Almanac, Inc., 1990), p 73.

$1. Research Rpt No.
AU-ARI-91-3 (U), Colonel
Michael N. Killworth,
Idaho ANG, “The Silent
Call-up Option,

Volunteerism in the Air
National Guard.” (Maxwell
AFB, Al.: Air University
Press, January 1992), pp
18-37; Plan (U), NGB-CF,
“Air National Guard Long
Range Plan, 1992,” Vol. 2,
March 1992, pp 11-15.

52. Gross, Prelude to the
Total Force, pp 102-103.

53. Interview, Major
General Winston P. Wilson,
ANGUS (Ret.), by Mr.
Charles J. Gross, 17- 18
Dec 1978, at Forrest City,
Arkansas, Air Force
Logistics Command
(AFLC) Oral History #19,
Sep 1981, pp 20- 25:
Gross, Prelude to the Total
Force, pp 58- 89; Charles
J, Gross, “From Jennies to
Jets: Major General
Winston P. Wilson and The
Air National Guard,”
Aerospace Historian. Dec
1986, pp 257-264; Official
Biography (U), Major
General Winston P. Wilson,
Chief, National Guard
Bureau, Jun 1968, in
iBiographyi File, NGB-
PAI-H Archives; Interview,
Major General Francis S.
Greenlief, U.S. Army
National Guard (Ret.),
Executive Vice President of
the National Guard Asso-
ciation of the United
States, by Charles J. Gross,
2 June 1978, at Washing-
ton, DC; Francillon, The
Air Guard, pp 51-57;
Research Rpt # AU-ARI-
89-11, Lt. Col. Thomas E.
Eichhorst, USAF, “Military
Airlift: Turbulence, Evolu-

tion, and Promise for the
Future,” (Maxwell AFB,
AL.: Air University Press,
May 1991), p 36.

54. Gross, “From
Jennies to Jets.” pp 257 -
264.

55. Charles J. Gross, “A
Different Breed of Cats:
The Air National Guard
And The 1968 Reserve
Mobilizations,” Air
University Review, Jan-
Feb 1983, p 93.

56. Ibid., pp 93-94;
Pamphlet, NGB, “General
Officers of the National
Guard,” p 29, undated;
Gross, Prelude to the Total
Force, pp 47-48, 95-96;
Maj. William A. Ridley,
Editor, History of the
116th Tactical Fighter
Wing. 1941-83 (Georgia
ANG, 1983), p 11.

57. Gross. Prelude to
the Total Force, pp 97-98;
Gross, “Different Breed of
Cats,” pp 93-94; USAF
Fact Sheet # 89-20, p 1;
“Scramble,” The National
Guardsman, Sep 1954, p 8;
Telecon, DR Charles J.
Gross, NGB-PAH, with
General Kilpatrick, CA
ANG (Ret.), 26 Oct 1993.

58. Gross, “Different
Breed of Cats,” pp 93- 94.

59. Gross, Prelude to
the Total Force, pp 20, 22,
91, 120, 149, 193;
Francillon, The Air Guard,
pp 65-70.

60. Gross, Prelude to
the Total Force, pp 88-89,
120-121.



| A Michigan Air Guard pilot and crew chief
with the 107th Fighter Squadron talk prior to a
training flight at Wayne Major Airport, Mich.,

P in January 1951.

duty tour. Instead, the 11 Sth’s personnel had
been scattered across the Air Force as indi-
vidual replacements.

Some of the mobilized Air Guard AC&W
organizations managed to maintain a degree
of unit integrity. Several were dispatched to
Europe to strengthen NATO. Others were
sent to Alaska and Newfoundland. At least
four were deployed to French Morocco to
help defend new air bases that were built in
North Africa for SAC bombers.

The experience of Connecticut's 103rd
AC&W Squadron was typical for that type
of Air Guard unit during the war. It was mo-
bilized on Sept. 1, 1951 and then moved to
Camp Edwards on Cape Cod, Mass., later
that month to set up a base of operations.
Korea was the first real taste of extended full-
time military service for almost all of its
members. They constructed an operational
AC&W site in October. The unit was as-
signed to the 151st Tactical Control Group
which consisted of a radar calibration flight
plus three other New England Air Guard

National Archives collection

AC&W squadrons, the 101st,
102nd, and 104th. In November,
members of the 103rd participated
in a combined training exercise
with Army and Air Force units de-
signed to defend Cape Cod from a
mock invasion. The squadron’s
mission during that exercise was
to provide close control of Air
Force fighters and bombers attack-
ing enemy ground positions along
the front lines of the battle area.

In January 1952, the 103rd
moved to Fort Drum, N.Y., to par-
ticipate in winter maneuvers with
air and ground units. Working in
canvas “Quonset Hut” type opera-
tions shelters with temperatures as
low as 40 degrees below zero took
some getting used to but unit mem-
bers made the necessary adjustments. The
squadron returned to Camp Edwards in Feb-
ruary and manned a new radar site. Many
members of the 103rd were transferred to a
new Air Force AC&W squadron that was
organized in May. That fall, they were trans-
ferred to Iceland where they set up a radar
installation at Keflavik.

Back at Camp Edwards, the 103rd had
begun operating a CPS-1 search radar. Some
of the remaining original squadron Guards-
men were transferred to other units around
the U.S. and overseas. From January through
June 1953, some squadron personnel were
released from active duty and returned to the
Connecticut Air Guard. On Sept. 1, 1953,
the 103rd was returned to state control.

Elsewhere, some Air Guard AC&W units
were formally converted to tactical control
groups to help direct Air Force fighters
against enemy ground forces. All of the units
from the Air Guard’s AC&W community
were mobilized in 1951. They were returned
to state service before the end of 1953. 48

29

TURNING
POINT


it TM | TM A crew works on a Florida Air
| ! I Guard F-84 (left) in Korea. Mem-
WH bers of the state’s 159th Fighter
\ i a
Squadron flew combat missions

~ ev
qf wl

a

WI)

MN NI
Hi Hi |

during the war.

The 159th initially deployed
there on November 28th and
began flying interdiction mis-
sions that same day against rail
lines near Woonsan in North
Korea. Each F-84 flew with a
mix of 500 and 1,000-pound
conventional bombs. The
squadron's pilots were very ag-
gressive, flying as low as pos-
sible in poor weather to attack
hard-to-find targets. In addition
to railroads, the 159th also be-
gan attacking enemy infantry
and artillery positions in De-
cember.

The squadron resumed its air
defense alert duties when it re-
turned to Japan the following
month. It continued to lose pi-
lots and other experienced per-
sonnel to Air Force units, a pro-
cess that had begun when it was
mobilized. They were eventu-
ally replaced by less-experi-
enced newcomers. On May 28-

Norm Taylor collection

fense mission, the 159th practiced aerial
gunnery and ground support missions.
Housing conditions and storage facilities at
Misawa were terrible. Enlisted men lived in
a warehouse and officers were billeted in
family housing. Poor living conditions and
the lack of time off produced serious mo-
rale problems. Fights and excessive drink-
ing were common. Those problems were
alleviated by mid-September 1951 when
squadron members moved into more mod-
em housing and they were given more time
off including off-base liberty. 11

Beginning in November 1951, the 116th
FBW maintained one F-84 squadron on
combat rotation at Taegu Air Base in Korea.

29, 1952 the 159th and the other
fighter squadrons assigned to
the 116th FBW participated in an historic
experiment. As part of Operation “High
Tide,” they performed some of the Air
Force’s earliest air refuelings under combat
conditions. The 159th’s role in the opera-
tion was to attack targets near Sariwon,
North Korea. They were refueled near Taegu
on the return flight to Japan by KB-29 tank-
ers. Various problems forced several fight-
ers to land at Taegu. Between June 7th and
July 4th, the squadron flew additional air re-
fueled missions against North Korean tar-
gets. But the test was not considered suc-
cessful. It involved a long and difficult
hookup between a tanker hose and two wing
tip refueling points on each fighter. Poor

13

TURNING
POINT


BAPTISM UNDER FIRE

Hoover stressed that “When we first got
to Korea, we had a lot of youngsters, Air
Force types that had been put through [pi-
lot] training rather rapidly and they were
losing quite a few. Then, as the Reservists
and the Air Guard got there, the average age
climbed quite a bit ... our loss rate decreased
rapidly. We didn’t make silly mistakes like
making three or four passes on the same tar-
get and we plotted our entries into target
areas more efficiently than we did in the
early days. They were young and not aware
of what could happen. Many of us that got
over there came from that World War II ex-
perience and we applied some of that ex-
perience in Korea. It reduced our losses con-
siderably.” 17 The main burden of fighting
the war fell heavily on citizen-airmen. A
Fifth Air Force survey in 1951 found that
approximately 80 percent of its personnel
were recalled Air Guardsmen and Air Force
Reservists. 18

Major General Stanley FH. Newman of
Oklahoma’s 185th Fighter Squadron exem-
plified the importance of combat experience
and the tendency of the Air Force to draw
upon mobilized Air Guard units to provide
a pool of individual replacement pilots for
service in the Far East. During WWII,
Newman had downed one German aircraft
while flying 57 combat missions over Eu-
rope. After the war, he joined the Oklahoma
Air Guard. His unit was mobilized in April
1951 and remained in the continental United
States transitioning first to RF-51Ds and
then to RF-80As. By February 1952, most
of the 185th’s pilots, including Newman, had
been transferred to the Far East. Due to “their
experience the Air Guardsmen were usually
assigned to command or supervisory slots
once they arrived in the battle zone ... Al-
most half of the 185th’s pilots found them-
selves assigned to the Fifth Air Force and
stationed at Kimpo (K-14) Air Base near
Seoul. Here they were once again assigned
RF-51Ds.” 19 Later, those pilots transitioned

1 TURNING
POINT

to RF-80As and F-80Cs. 20

Newman reported to the 45th Tactical
Reconnaissance Wing at Kimpo in March
1952. The greatest drawback that he and
other reconnaissance pilots faced during
their combat missions was that they could
only fire their weapons in self defense. That
restriction made them especially eager to fly
strike missions on the rare occasions when
such opportunities presented themselves.

Newman once “... received word that an-
other reconnaissance pilot had spotted a
group of communist tanks but was running
too low on fuel and had to return to home
base. Hurriedly briefed by intelligence and