## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ N o. 02

- 23

- 00052

- CR

___ __ ______________________

On Appeal from the 355th District Court Hood County, Texas Trial Court No. CR15025

Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ. M emorandum Opinion by Justice Birdwell 

### S ALVADOR 

### R UBIO 

### , Appellant
V


### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellant Salv ador Ru bio appeals his convi ction for first

- degree felony arson of a h abitation. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2)(D) . In his sole issue on appe a l , Rubio contends that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable dou bt that hi s conscious objective or desire was to damage or d estroy the habitation. Bec ause we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to sup port the ju ry ’ s determi nation that Rubi o intended to cause damage or destruction to the habitation,

we a ffirm the conviction. I. Background The Smith family hired Rubio to do remodeling work on their ho use in Granbury, Texas. Over ti me, Rubio b egan exhibiting what Mr . Smith described a s strange behavio r indicative of possible drug use. The Smit hs eventually decided that Rubio could no lo nger work for them

. On December 16, 2020

— t he day before Mr. Smith had planned to termi nate Rubio ’ s employment

— Rubio set the Smiths ’ h ouse on fire using small piles of flammable material and paint thin ner that he had placed in multiple locations throughout the house

. After s tarting the fire, Rubio called 911 and to ld the dispatcher that he had set the house on fire. When officers arrive d at the house , the y heard fi re alarms going off and , through an open win dow, ob served Rubio inside the house

. Rubio then crawled out of the window

— at the off icers ’ directio n
— and his clothing and shoes were melting and smoldering. When Officer Daniel Sween ey , one of the responding3 officers , attempted to render aid to Rubio using water from an ou tdoor faucet , Rubio stated that he did not want to be “ put out. ” He refused any medical treatment , stating,

“ Th is is not what ’ s concerning me right no w . . . . I did this for a reason. ” He told Officer Sweeney that he had used lacquer thinner to set a fire inside the hous e . Officer Sweene y subsequently found two cigarette lighters on Rubio ’ s person, which Rubio told Off icer Sweeney he had use d to ignite the house. Acco rding to Rubio ,
s ome people had shown up to kill him, and he had to set the house on fire to tr y and get away from them. Further e xplaining hi s reason for sett ing the fire, he to ld Officer S weene y that by setting the house on fire, the people that wer e try ing to kill him

w ould run awa y from the fire and stop trying to kill him. He also told Officer Sweeney that he was responsible for setting the fire and that he felt he needed to exp lain to the Smiths why he had done it. At Rubio ’ s trial, the jury heard te sti mony from Mr. Smith and the responding offic e rs and viewed Officer Sweeney ’ s body camera footag e , which captured what he had observed when he res ponded to the Smiths ’ house on the day of the fire. The jury found Rubio guilty and assessed his punishment at forty

- fi v e yea rs ’ confinement , and

t he trial court entered judgment on the verdict

. II. Standard of R eview In o ur e videntiary

- sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational fact find e r could have found th e crime’s essential el ements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia , 44 3 U.S.4 307 , 31 9, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979) ; Queeman v. State , 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)

. This standard gives full play to the factfi nder ’ s responsibi lity to resolve conflicts in th e tes timony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonabl e inferenc es f rom basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Harrell v. State , 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App . 20 2 1)

. To deter mine whether the State has met its burden to prove a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonab le doubt, we c ompare the crime’s elements as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge to the evidence adduced at trial

. Hammack v. State , 622 S. W.3d 910, 914 (Te x. Crim. App. 2021); see also Febus v. State , 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“The ess enti al elements of an offense are determined by state law.”). Such a charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the ind ictm e nt, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant was tried. Hammack , 622 S.W.3d at 914

. The law as authorized by the indi c tment means the statutory elements of the offense as modified by the charging instrument ’s allegat io ns . Curlee v. State , 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) ;

s ee Rabb v. State , 434 S.W.3d 613, 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (“When the State pleads a sp e cific elemen t of a penal offense that has statutory alternatives for that element, the sufficienc y o f the evid ence will be measured by the element that was actually pleaded, and not any alternative statutory elements.”)

.5 II I. Applicable Law As releva nt h e re, a person commits the offense of arson if he starts a fire with intent to destroy or damage a bui lding or h abit ation knowing that it was located on property belonging to another. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 28.02(a)(2) (D)

. A person acts

“ with intent ” wh en he has the “ co nscious obj ective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result. ” Id. § 6

. 03(a). A ju ry may infer intent from any facts that tend to pro ve its existence

. Dues v. State , 634 S.W.2d 304, 305 (Tex. C rim. App. [Panel Op.] 1982); B eltr an v . Sta te , 593 S.W. 2d 688, 689 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980) ; Miller v. State , 566 S.W.2d 614, 618 (Te x. Crim. A pp. [Panel Op.] 1978 ) ; Turne r v. State , No s . 02

- 11

- 00070

- CR, 02

- 11

- 00071

- CR , 2013 WL 530972, at *1 (Tex. App.

— Fort Worth Feb. 14, 20 1 3, p et. ref ’ d

) (mem. op., not designat ed for publication)

. In arson cases, intent “ cannot be inferred from the me re act of burn ing , ” but it may otherwise be found from all the facts in the case, including t he acts, words, and con duct of the accused and th e met hod of co mmitting the crime

. Beltran , 593 S.W.2d at 689; Miller , 566 S.W.2d at 618 ; see Dues , 634 S.W.2d at 3 05; Turner , 20 13 WL 530972, at *1. IV . Analysis Rubio complains that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of only the intent eleme nt. W e conclude that t he jury may have inferred from the evidence bef ore it that Rubio intended to dama ge or dest roy the Smiths ’ house. The jury hea rd testimony and viewed body camera footage of Rubio telling Officer Sween ey that he ha d delibe rately set the h ouse on fire “ for a reason. ” He6 stated that he had used lacquer thinner and cigarette lighters to ignite the hou se in an effort to evade the people who he belie ved had shown up at the house that day to kill him. Explaining his thou ght proce ss to Officer Sw eeney , he believe d that if the house was on fire, the people trying to kill him would run from the fire and stop trying to kill him

. The evidence showed that Rubio had attempted to create a large house fire by using lacquer thinner to set s everal small f ir es in multiple lo cations throughout the house

— as opposed to a single fire

. We a gree with the State that the jury could infer from Rubio ’ s acts th at he had done so to increase the le vel of protection that the smoke and flames from a burning house would ha ve had against the people allegedly trying to kill him

. Evidence of Rubio ’ s words and conduct after he s tarted the fire re flects the same though t pro cess . Specifically, he had to be instructed to exit the burning house, and when Officer Sween ey unsucce ssfu ll y attempted to re nder aid , Rubio was appar ently more concerned about the burning house ’ s deterrent effects o n th ose people ’ s plan to kill him than he was about being on fire himself. Indeed, he state d,

“ This is not what ’ s concerning me righ t no w . . . . I d id this for a rea son. ” Rubio ultimately took responsibility for setting the fire and felt that the Smiths

ne eded to under stand the re ason wh y h e had done it. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury ’ s guilty ver dict, w e conclude that a rational factfi nder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that7 Rubio intended to damage or d estroy the Smi ths ’ house when he deliberately set multiple fires throughout the house. Accordingly, we overrule Rubio ’ s sole issue

. V. Conclu sion Having ov e rruled Rubio ’ s so le issue on appeal, we affirm the conviction. /s/ Wade Birdwell Wade Birdwell Justice Do Not Pu blish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b) Delivered : December 14, 2023