UNITED STATES ARMY

CENTER OF MILITARY HISTORY

INTERVIEW OF

BG JOSEPH TALUTO

Joint Task Force 42 Commander

126-ORH-I-037

NEIT-126-037

CONDUCTED BY

MAJ PAUL LANDRY

126 Military History Detachment

AT

Park Avenue Armory

October 5, 2001

TAPE TRANSCRIPTION
2

1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 MAJ LANDY: MAJ Paul Landry, 126th Military 

3 History Detachment. The date is 5 October 2001 at 1210 

4 hours, an oral history interview at the Park Ave. 

5 Armory in New York City.

6 Sir, if I could ask you to state your name and 

7 spell your last name for me, sir?

8 BG TALUTO: Yes. BG Joe Taluto, T-a-l-u-t-o.

9 MAJ LANDY: Sir, what is your current assignment?

10 BG TALUTO: I'm the assistant deputy and the 

11 deputy commander for maneuver of the 42nd Infantry 

12 Division. And I'm currently serving as a Joint Task 

13 Force commander with the World Trade Center disasters.

14 MAJ LANDY: How long have you been on the ground 

15 here now?

16 BG TALUTO: I've been here since the 18th of 

17 September.

18 MAJ LANDY: Okay. When you first heard of the 

19 attack on the World Trade Center where were you and 

20 what were you doing?

21 BG TALUTO: I was with my headquarters at a Battle 
3

1 Command Training Program seminar at Fort Leavenworth, 

2 Kansas. I became aware of the attack when we were 

3 called out of the seminar room and basically to watch 

4 the events unfold on television. 

5 At that point I returned a call to our 

6 headquarters in New York at the Division of Military 

7 Naval Affairs and spoke to the deputy adjutant general, 

8 BG Bill Martin, and discussed with him the events of 

9 what was going on. 

10 He recommended that we return home at least with a 

11 small detachment of people in order to be available for 

12 any duties that might be associated with the disaster. 

13 Once I did that I informed our commanding general 

14 Tom Garrrett, of that requirement and immediately 

15 started to assemble the team to come back to New York 

16 state. That team consisted of myself and nine other 

17 people. 

18 We left Fort Leavenworth at 1:15 eastern standard 

19 time and arrived back at the headquarters in Troy, New 

20 York 21 hours later the next day. GEN Garrett and the 

21 rest of the staff also departed the seminar 
4

1 approximately six hours after we did. 

2 During that trip we were involved in alerting and 

3 mobilizing units that were going to be placed in 

4 support of the unit in charge of the disaster site at 

5 that time, which was the 53rd Troop Command. And we 

6 did so. 

7 We put together a task force out of Buffalo and we 

8 coordinated their assemblage and movement to the 

9 disaster area for the use of the Troop Command. 

10 MAJ LANDY: Sir, do you know which units were 

11 among the first to be called up during the 11th and the 

12 12th of September?

13 BG TALUTO: Well, there was a combination of 

14 several units in the state of New York out of the 42nd 

15 Division, the 27th Brigade and the Troop Command. 

16 Out of the 42nd Division we alerted the 69th 

17 Infantry Battalion, the 258 Field Artillery Battalion, 

18 the 101 Armor Battalion, the 152 Engineer Battalion, 

19 the 642 Division Aviation Support Battalion and the 342 

20 Forward Support Battalion. Those were amongst the 42nd 

21 Division units that were alerted. 
5

1 MAJ LANDY: Now, the higher headquarters prior to 

2 your arrival was the 53rd Troop Command. When did you 

3 do that battle hand-off with them?

4 BG TALUTO: Well, that battle hand-off began on 

5 the 18th of September with leaders in reconnaissance 

6 and interaction with the Troop Command and staff. And 

7 subsequently we were issued orders that we would take 

8 command and control of the operation on the 22nd of 

9 September at noon.

10 MAJ LANDY: This is a Joint Task Force 

11 headquarters. Can you tell me what type of units are 

12 currently involved in this operation?

13 BG TALUTO: Yes. The orders were to form a Joint 

14 Task Force headquarters. And let me just talk about 

15 that, the orders I got on or about the 19th of 

16 September. And the order was to conduct a relief in 

17 place of the units currently in support of the disaster 

18 site and to establish a sustained operation. 

19 We were assigned a force list consisting of Army 

20 National Guard, Air National Guard for New York and New 

21 York Naval Malitia forces as well as a contingent from 
6

1 the New York Guard, which is a state defense force, a 

2 volunteer force that exists in the state of New York. 

3 So we assembled a task force that was not to exceed 

4 2,700 in support of the operations.

5 MAJ LANDY: What is your current estimated 

6 operating strength now?

7 BG TALUTO: We are now currently operating at 

8 1,730. Over the course of the past two and a half 

9 weeks the Task Force has come down from its original 

10 high of something approximately 2,300. These forces 

11 are still consistent of Army, Air, Navy and the state 

12 defense forces from the state of New York. 

13 MAJ LANDY: Your initial mission you stated 

14 earlier was conduct relief in place and to begin 

15 sustainment operations. Here we are now a couple of 

16 weeks into this. Has your mission changed any, and if 

17 so what has that mission become?

18 BG TALUTO: Yes. The relief in place was 

19 accomplished approximately the 24th of September. And 

20 I considered the Task Force to have established a 

21 sustained operation on the approximately 30th of 
7

1 September with the establishment of an installation 

2 base on Governor's Island. 

3 At that time the mission statement was changed 

4 from a relief in place and established sustained 

5 operations to conduct missions until properly relieved 

6 in support of the New York City disaster area.

7 MAJ LANDY: You mentioned Governor's Island. Can 

8 you talk to me a bit about the operation that's going 

9 on there?

10 BG TALUTO: Well, the basing of the force in New 

11 York City was not stable when I arrived. We had troops 

12 in various places sleeping. And a more permanent 

13 solution was sought. When I got here the Governor's 

14 Island option was on the table and being worked. So I 

15 just fell in on that. It did become reality on the 

16 22nd of September. 

17 The Governor's Island thing was approved. And 

18 then we began making our preparations for the 

19 establishment of the base. And this was in order to 

20 house a substantial amount of the Task Force on 

21 Governor's Island so that we would have it for the 
8

1 duration of the support exercise here in New York City.

2 We formed a task force that had exclusive 

3 responsibility for establishing the base and housing 

4 troops on the island. That task force accomplished 

5 that. In approximately four days the island was made 

6 ready by bringing the moth balled buildings, buildings 

7 out of moth ball, bringing the online with hot water, 

8 heat, electricity. 

9 We established other facilities, messing 

10 facilities, medical facilities for the communications 

11 infrastructure and the like and pushed over numerous 

12 amounts of supplies over the island and then moved in 

13 about 750 troops someplace around the -- between the 

14 28th and the 30th of September. And currently that 

15 base is operating now at about that strength.

16 MAJ LANDY: Since you've taken over the operation, 

17 have the soldiers that are on the ground been the same 

18 soldiers that were here, or has there been some sort of 

19 rotational plan? How is that working out?

20 BG TALUTO: After the initial relief in place, 

21 which was relieving the initial, the first responders 
9

1 to the force, we are currently -- it was the 5th and 

2 6th of October going to conduct another turnover of 

3 troops. 

4 So we have basically rotated troops in about two5 week increments and we have changed out command control 

6 headquarters on one weekend and then brought in fresh 

7 troops on the next weekend alternating between sending 

8 the work force home and having the C-2 remain in place 

9 and then alternating one week after the other. 

10 So it's been about a two-week rotation offset by 

11 changing out certain people one week.

12 MAJ LANDY: Have there been any difficulties 

13 making that transition between the different forces?

14 BG TALUTO: The initial relief in place was 

15 difficult because there was no housing available. We 

16 had to scramble around for bed space on the U.S.S. 

17 Comfort, which was used as an outlet to house people 

18 which was a temporary situation. 

19 We had to establish our Joint Task Force 

20 headquarters at the same time as conducting a relief in 

21 place, which was somewhat difficult. We established an 
10

1 intermediate staging base at Camp Smith for receptions, 

2 stationing and (inaudible) integration into the area. 

3 We brought forces in there, mustered them in and 

4 prepared them for moving into the area to assume the 

5 responsibility. 

6 So that relief, the initial relief in place was 

7 difficult. Since then, of course, having the Joint 

8 Task Force headquarters established and fully in 

9 command and in control we've been able to make proper 

10 orders and plans in advance. And that has now made the 

11 operation much smoother and less difficult.

12 MAJ LANDY: So you're basically running sort of a 

13 mobilization station in essence at Camp Smith for these 

14 folks?

15 BG TALUTO: Yes. I wouldn't say it's a 

16 mobilization station. I would just say it was a 

17 reception station for mustering in and making sure we 

18 had the proper troop count and for moving them into the 

19 area in an orderly manner when called for as compared 

20 to having them report right down into the disaster 

21 area, which would be very confusing, until we were 
11

1 ready to receive them. So it serves those purposes.

2 MAJ LANDY: This appears to be a fairly logistics 

3 intense operation. Would that be fair to say?

4 BG TALUTO: Well, the logistics of supporting our 

5 own force is a substantial piece of work. About 16 

6 percent of our force is based on supporting ourselves, 

7 housing our troops, transporting our troops, feeding 

8 them, caring for them, medical, et cetera. And so this 

9 is a fairly substantial deployment. It's a large 

10 number of troops to maintain. And therefore, there is 

11 a logistical tail to it that requires from all the 

12 proper command control and logistical elements to 

13 sustain the force.

14 MAJ LANDY: How has communication been, and what 

15 assets are you using to communicate throughout the 

16 operation?

17 BG TALUTO: Well, the primary communication tool 

18 is a cellular phone system. That has been our mobile 

19 on the street phone communications, I should say. We 

20 have had very little FM organic type communication 

21 systems which has not been necessary. With the use of 
12

1 the cell phones we have established hard-line 

2 communications, telephone systems, to various command 

3 posts, et cetera.

4 MAJ LANDY: How is the relationship going between 

5 the military and the civilian authorities?

6 BG TALUTO: Before I go onto that just let me just 

7 make one more comment about --

8 MAJ LANDY: Sure.

9 BG TALUTO: -- communications. The use of the 

10 cell phones has been very effective. However, in the 

11 early stages they may not have been as effective. But 

12 based on the fact that several of the cellular towers 

13 were taken out in the attack and communications, is at 

14 least in the early stages of the exercise, is a concern 

15 and we need to prepare properly for it. Okay. Onto 

16 the question of --

17 MAJ LANDY: When it comes to dealing with -- it 

18 sounds like you have a pretty tight, in-place command 

19 and control organization from the military side of the 

20 house. How is that working in conjunction with our 

21 civilian counterparts?
13

1 BG TALUTO: The liaisoning in these types of 

2 operations is extremely important. And we must 

3 establish very strong liaisons with the civilian 

4 agencies that you're representing. 

5 In this case we are working security missions with 

6 the New York Police Department so liaisoning with the 

7 New York Police Department is very important from the 

8 very top of the organization all the way through the 

9 operating levels. 

10 The city emergency management office is another 

11 key place and a key customer. We have had to liaison 

12 strongly with them making sure that we were in support 

13 with the Office of Emergency Management of New York 

14 City in the area logistics infrastructure, which we're 

15 supporting, and the security infrastructure, which 

16 we're supporting. 

17 So liaisoning is very important. Our military 

18 chain of command is in tact to control our forces. But 

19 we are always in support of some civilian organization, 

20 be it the -- more than one obviously can be at a time 

21 as in this case with the New York Police Department, 
14

1 New York City Office of the Emergency Management and 

2 various other agencies.

3 Maybe I can talk to you a little bit about the 

4 missions that we are doing. 

5 MAJ LANDY: Sure.

6 BG TALUTO: In this exercise security has been the 

7 main mission. That security mission has numerous tasks 

8 assigned to it. We have been involved under the 

9 security banner in traffic control, pedestrian control, 

10 escort services, escorting people into their homes and 

11 businesses, you know, in the disaster area. 

12 We've been asked to look over key infrastructure 

13 things like electrical cables that were put in to 

14 support the operation after they had been taken out. 

15 We've been asked to monitor trucks in and out of the 

16 site from a security standpoint and a tracking 

17 standpoint. 

18 So site security has been one of our major 

19 missions down here, and the bulk of our work force has 

20 been assigned to doing those types of tasks. We have 

21 also been involved in supporting the logistics 
15

1 infrastructure of the emergency. We have received 

2 supplies. 

3 We have categorized the supplies into essential 

4 and non-essential elements. We have trucked the non5 essential elements out of the city area. We have 

6 reorganized the essential elements into another 

7 warehouse and cataloged them. 

8 We have supported the work site with supply points 

9 bringing tools and equipment to the work site to those 

10 supply points, and the personnel working on the 

11 disaster site itself have been able to access. 

12 We have been involved in a third area which we 

13 call credentialing, which has been to actually 

14 credential people and contractors to enter the site 

15 area. That's been a very difficult mission. But we 

16 have, we've gotten on top of that. And those are the 

17 three major areas that we have supported in this 

18 emergency system. 

19 MAJ LANDY: Now, with all those different missions 

20 going on, how are you finding both yourself, the staff 

21 and soldiers in making the transition from that 
16

1 atypical, you know, the war-fighter scenario that we're 

2 all used to training for into now this support role 

3 where we're conducting multiple missions in support of 

4 civilian authorities? Has it been an easy transition, 

5 has it been difficult, you know, your opinion on that, 

6 sir?

7 BG TALUTO: Well, I think all of our military 

8 training is absolutely applicable in this situation the 

9 way we task organize, establish relationships in 

10 command and control pieces is all what makes us a very 

11 unified and responsive force. 

12 The key tenets of the way we give orders and do 

13 orders and do mission analysis and develop courses of 

14 actions and make decisions and our military decision15 making process are all extremely applicable. We can 

16 handle a wide range of different missions through task 

17 organizing. 

18 We have currently what we would consider to be a 

19 brigade element in support of the site security mission 

20 and a battalion element in support of the logistics 

21 mission and a company team in support of the 
17

1 credentialing mission all with a division headquarters 

2 main CP and rear CP to conduct sustainment of 

3 logistical operations. 

4 So this has not been -- it has not been difficult 

5 to accomplish the missions and using our military 

6 training and doctrine. Actually, the most difficult 

7 part is to integrate with the civilian agencies in a 

8 chaotic situation and really define what the mission 

9 requirements are and what the relationships are with 

10 the civilian. 

11 That is the most difficult part of the operation. 

12 But we could command and control a wide variety of 

13 missions that are well defined. As it is right now, I 

14 would consider that we're really only using about one15 third of the division power on this exercise.

16 MAJ LANDY: Do you feel that it's the strength of 

17 the Guard the fact that they have that ability to be 

18 members of the community and then to be able to step in 

19 having those built-in relationships already that this 

20 has made this truly a mission that the Guard was really 

21 kind of made to take care of?
18

1 BG TALUTO: Yes. I think these folks that stay in 

2 active-duty missions, whether they be natural disaster 

3 or in this case a man-made disaster and an act of war, 

4 is suited for the National Guard organization, in 

5 particular a combat organization like the division or 

6 the brigade. 

7 Our citizen soldiers can use their military 

8 training as I've outlined previously to apply in this 

9 situation. But then they also bring their civilian set 

10 of skills to the operation. 

11 We have several soldiers, air men, marines, et 

12 cetera in military uniforms that are police and law 

13 enforcement officers, master plumbers, electricians, 

14 medical workers, EMS people. 

15 These are all force multipliers for us. And it's 

16 easy for us to define the community and get into the 

17 community because we're part of the community. So this 

18 is a battlefield that is absolutely suited for the 

19 National Guard organization.

20 MAJ LANDY: If there was something that you as the 

21 task force commander would have liked to have done 
19

1 better or gotten a better grasp on initially, what 

2 would that thing have been?

3 BG TALUTO: Well, I think I would say I was not in 

4 charge of the operation from the September 11 timeframe 

5 on. I think that we could certainly learn a lesson in 

6 the initial response of we were very much in a rush to 

7 support the operation, which was understandable and 

8 which was necessary. 

9 However, we probably weren't as prepared as an 

10 organization to establish the proper command and 

11 control of our own force when we first got down here. 

12 We kind of hurriedly threw together a task force to be 

13 down here. We can do that a lot better. 

14 Although, when we entered the -- in this 

15 particular situation this was such a devastating 

16 attack, it caught everyone off guard and it was 

17 certainly a chaotic situation. So there wasn't 

18 probably anything that anybody could have done in this 

19 case to have anticipated the magnitude of this. But we 

20 could have probably figured out a better way to get 

21 into it in the early stages. 
20

1 To our credit, our state National Guard credit, we 

2 quickly improved on that situation as the time went on. 

3 So that's one thing we could have done better. I 

4 think we're all now going to become better prepared as 

5 far as making plans, task organizing for events, being 

6 equipped and trained to get into these operations from 

7 here on out. 

8 MAJ LANDY: Is there any item you'd like to 

9 address that you think is of importance to share?

10 BG TALUTO: Well, I'd like to just probably 

11 reemphasize the fact that the National Guard Army 

12 Division is an excellent choice to be a candidate to 

13 conduct operations such as this because it brings that 

14 vast command and control structure and ability to 

15 sustain itself and sustain the operation. 

16 It also has the leader infrastructure to quickly 

17 learn and understand what the situation is on the 

18 ground. And we use our military training and doctrine 

19 that we learn in exercises like the battle command 

20 training program and the brigade battle command 

21 training programs to do this. 
21

1 So that certainly is applicable doctrine and 

2 applicable when applied and somewhat -- let's use the 

3 word "converted" to civilian terms. We have been able 

4 to conduct and learn training such as things like force 

5 protection, how to do that, how to do our own internal 

6 security, apply principles like unity and command, 

7 doing liaisoning, doing things that we would do in a 

8 peace-keeping scenario or even in a low-intensity 

9 conflict. And for that matter, even in a high10 intensity conflict on a battlefield at some other 

11 place. 

12 So I just want -- as this unfolds in the future 

13 and we study homeland defense, I think our leaders are 

14 going to find that the National Guard combat 

15 organizations like divisions and brigades and 

16 battalions are key for command and control of the 

17 operation while other specialist fields like 

18 engineering, aviation, medical, transportation and 

19 service support operations are always certainly 

20 applicable in these missions but should be commanded 

21 and controlled by leaders that are trained in that 
22

1 military doctrine and in the military decision-making 

2 process. 

3 It is also important for us to understand that 

4 when we get into these things that while we can use our 

5 military training and doctrine and it certainly is 

6 applicable that we need to understand the civilian 

7 structure. 

8 For example, in the New York Police Department 

9 there is an organization, there are burroughs set up, 

10 police burroughs, precincts within those burroughs. 

11 There's a command structure and a leadership structure. 

12 When we're in support of them that's the structure we 

13 have to marry up to and we have to understand. 

14 If we were in support of the sanitization 

15 department or the police department or the Department 

16 of Environmental Protection, we would have to 

17 understand their organization early on so that we can 

18 get in support of it. 

19 And that is another key issue when we get into any 

20 kind of support to civil authorities. So I add that 

21 along with the other issue as a key point. 
23

1 MAJ LANDY: All right, sir. Well, thank you very 

2 much for your time.

3 BG TALUTO: Okay.

4 MAJ LANDY: MAJ Paul Landy, 126th Military History 

5 Detachment. This concludes the oral history interview 

6 with BG Taluto. The time is 12:47. The interview was 

7 conducted at the Park Avenue Armory in New York City.

8 (The interview was concluded at 12:47 p.m.)

9 * * * * *