1 Filed 9/18/13 P. v. Moore CA4/2 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA FOURTH APPELL ATE DISTRICT DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. DALE BRUCE MOORE, Defendant and Appellant. E056081 (Super.Ct.No . RIF10003079) OPINION

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Ri verside County. Helios J. Hernandez, Judge. Affirmed. Catherine White, under appointment by th e Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Da ne R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Julie L. Garland, A ssistant Attorney General, Jame s D. Dutton and Stephanie H. Chow, Deputy Attorney s General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. Defendant and appella nt Dale Bruce Moore appeals af ter he was found guilty by a jury of two charges of failing to register as a sex offender. At a bifurcated proceeding, he2 admitted allegations that he ha d been convicted of strike priors and had suffered prior prison terms. He now complains that his sentence was improper because the evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the enhancement allegations he admitted to the trial court. We affirm.
FACTS AND PROCED URAL HISTORY As of 1985, defendant was required by cer tain convictions to register as a sex offender within the State of California. By May 2003, defendant was living in a transient camp under a bridge in the riverbed of the Santa Ana River. Many transients lived along the riverbed near the encampmen t where defendant was staying. Part of the riverbed fell into the jurisdiction of the City of Jurupa Valley, while pa rt was within the jurisdiction of the City of Riverside. Some of the transients in the camp registered at the Jurupa Valley police station. Defendant had always regi stered in Riverside County, and had never registered in Jurupa Valley. However, defend ant had registered regularly; he updated his registration 17 times altogether, and had regist ered in Riverside Coun ty nine times. He had registered in the City of Riverside seven times. In Riverside County, registered sex offend ers were also given and required to wear a global positioning system (GPS) tracking de vice. The purpose of the tracking device was to ensure that a registered sex offender did not come with in 2,000 feet of a school or park. In defendant’s case, hi s tracking device was attached to his ankle. It was not removable, and had to be recharged twice a day. In 2009, defendant registered in Riverside. Later that year, he violated his parole and spent a period of time incarcerated. Wh en defendant was rele ased, on January 10,3 2010, he reported to his parole officer. The parole officer informed defendant once more of the registration requirements, including the re quirement to register within five days of his release on parole. Defendant told his parole officer that he was registering in an unincorporated area of Riverside and staying at the Santa Ana riverbed. Defendant was again fitted with a GPS tracking device on hi s ankle, and told about the regulations for wearing and recharging the device. Becaus e defendant was not living where there was a ready source of electricity, he could recharge his device at the local police station. Defendant made two appointm ents with the registration department in Riverside, for January 13 and January 15, 2010, but he failed to ke ep either appointment. Defendant’s parole officer attempted to ge t into contact with defendant, including sending signals to defendant’s GPS tracking device. The signals would cause the device to vibrate, which required the wearer to imme diately get in touch with his parole agent. Defendant did not respond to the signals, however, and di d not otherwise contact his parole agent. Instead, the parole agent received a notific ation that the tracking device was no longer charged. The last tracking in formation on defendant’s device showed that defendant had been in the riverbed area. At the time, January 19, 2010, it had been raining heavily, so defendant’s parole agent allowed some leeway, expecting defendan t to keep his regular parole appointment on January 20. Defendant did not appear for his appointm ent, however, and a warrant was issued for his arrest. The parole agent went to the riverbed area to look for defendant but was unable to find him. Defendant never reported to hi s parole agent thereafter.4 About two months later, in March 2010, a different parole agent saw defendant riding a bicycle in Rubidoux. He left a messa ge for defendant’s parole agent, advising him that he had seen defendant in the commun ity. When the second agent learned of the arrest warrant for defendant, he went ba ck to try to locate defendant but was unsuccessful. A week later, th e second agent again saw defe ndant riding a bicycle in the area, but traffic impeded his efforts to make contact with defendant. A few days later, a deputy sheriff responded to a call about transients in the parking lot of a shopping center; the parking lot was about one-quarter to one-h alf mile from the Santa Ana riverbed. The deputy found defendant rummaging through tras h bins. Defendant ga ve a false name and birth date, and said he had no identification. A records check returned no person with the name and birth date defendant had given. Defendant insisted that the false name was his name, and denied having a criminal record. He also said that his girlfriend had his identification cards, but he co uld not name his girlfriend. A search of defendant’s backpack turned up a check cashing card in defendant’s true name; this time, the record check ran by dispatch returned the informatio n that defendant was subject to an arrest warrant. Defendant was taken into cust ody and his true id entity verified. In September 2010, the Riverside County District Attorney filed an information alleging one count of failure to register as a sex offender (count 1), one count of failing to register upon release from incarceration (count 2), and one count of grand theft (cutting off and disposing of state property, i.e., the GPS ankl e device) (count 3). The information also alleged six prison term prior offenses (2003 conviction of assault with a deadly weapon, 1996 conviction of theft with a pr ior, 1993 conviction of felony5 recklessly evading a police o fficer, 1990 conviction of possession of a controlled substance, 1987 conviction of burglary, and 1978 convicti on of kidnapping), and four strike priors (2003 conviction of assault with a deadly weapon , 1987 conviction of burglary, 1978 conviction of kidnapping, and 1978 conviction of rape). In January 2011, defendant moved to represent himself; the trial court granted this motion. The trial court hear d and denied defendant’s moti on to dismiss the information in April 2011. By August 2011, defendant d ecided that the case was more complex than he had initially realized, and he requested ap pointed counsel. The court appointed the public defender to represent him. Defense counsel asked the trial court to di smiss the strike prior allegations in this case. The court declined to do so, but its ruling was with out prejudice to reconsidering the matter later. The matter proceeded to ju ry trial. Before open ing statements, the People dismissed the grand theft charge in the interest of justice. The ju ry returned verdicts convicting defendant of both failure-to-register charges. Defendant requested a court trial on the prior offense allegations, and the jury was excused. The People presented exhibit evidence of defendant’s prior co nvictions. The minutes record that the court admitted the documents into evidence. Defe ndant then admitted all six pris on term prior offenses and all four strike priors. At the sentencing hearing, defense counse l made an oral request for the court to exercise its discretion under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal. 4th 497, to dismiss one or more of defendant’s strike prio rs. The court declined to dismiss any of the6 strike priors. The court imposed an indetermin ate sentence of 25 year s to life on count 1, and imposed an additional sentence of 25 year s to life on count 2, but stayed that term under Penal Code section 654. The court imposed six one-year terms on the six prison term prior enhancements, to run consecu tively to the sentence on count 1. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
ANALYSIS I. Contentions and Standard of Review Defendant contends that the trial reco rd below does not show that the court admitted the documentary papers concerning his prior offenses into evidence . That is, although the clerk’s minutes note that th e documentary exhibits were admitted into evidence, the reporter’s transcri pt of the proceedings does not show either that the People requested that the documents be adm itted or that the trial court made any such ruling. The reporter’s transcript indicates, rather, that the court may have treated defendant’s admissions of the prior convicti ons as a substitute for documentary proof. Most especially, defendant points out that th e court considered the record of defendant’s out-of-state convictions (rape and kidnapping) to be rather “sparse,” failing to indicate precisely what Washington state statutes were involved, and how they were shown to be the equivalent of California qualifying strike offenses. Defendant urges that the record fails to show that any amplification of th e record was made to satisfy the court’s reservations about the out -of-state convictions. Under these circumstances, defendant conten ds, first, that his “bare admission” of the prior offenses was insuffi cient to prove the prior offe nse allegations because the7 supporting documents were not admitted into evidence, and, second, even if the trial court did admit and consider the documents, th e evidence was still in sufficient to support all the prior allegations. Defendant’s contentions are claims of insu fficiency of the evid ence. The claim of insufficiency of the evid ence to support an enhancement is the same as in other contexts: “[W]e review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains substantia l evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable tr ier of fact could fi nd the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.] We presume every fact in support of the judgment the trier of fact could have reas onably deduced from the evidence. [Citation.] If the circumstances reasonably justify the tr ier of fact’s findings, reversal of the judgment is not warranted si mply because the circumstance s might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding. [Citati on.] ‘A reviewing court neither reweighs evidence nor reevaluate s a witness’s credibili ty.’ [Citation.]” ( People v. Albillar (2010) 51 Cal.4th 47, 59-60.) II. Proof of Sent ence Enhancements As a matter of due process, the People must prove each element of a sentence enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt. ( People v. Tenner (1993) 6 Cal.4th 559, 566.) Some prior convictions under a specified stat ute necessarily qualify as a serious felony. Where, however, the fact itse lf of the conviction does no t show that the conviction constituted a serious felony c onviction, other admissible evid ence from the entire record of the conviction may be considered, in order to resolve the issue. ( People v. Miles8 (2008) 43 Cal.4t h 1074, 1082 ( Miles ).) “This rule applies equally to California convictions and to those from foreign jurisdictions.” ( Ibid .) Such eviden ce may include certified documents from the Penal Code se ction 969b packet. “A court document, prepared contemporaneously with the convicti on, as part of the record thereof, by a public officer charged with th at duty, and describing the natu re of the prior conviction for official purposes, is relevant and admissible on this issue.” ( Miles , supra , 43 Cal.4th 1074, 1082.) If, however, “the prior conviction was for an o ffense that can be committed in multiple ways, and the record of the conviction does not disclose how the offense was committed, a court must presum e the conviction was for the least serious form of the offense.” ( Id . at p. 1083.) “In such a case, if the serious felony nature of the prior conviction depends upon the par ticular conduct that gave ri se to the conviction, the record is insufficient to estab lish that a serious felony convic tion occurred. [¶] (4) On the other hand, the trier of fact may draw reasonable inferences from the record presented. Absent rebuttal evidence, the tr ier of fact may presume that an official government document, prepared contemporaneou sly as part of the judgment record and describing the prior conviction, is truthf ul and accurate. Unless rebutted, such a document, standing alone, is sufficient evidence of the facts it recites about the nature and circumstances of the prior conviction.” ( Ibid .) Inquiry into the facts underlying a prior conviction, to determine whether or not the guilty plea admitted the elements of a seri ous or violent offense “is limited to the terms of the charging documen t, to the terms of the plea agreement . . . or to some comparable judicial record of this information.” ( Shepard v. United States (2005) 5449 U.S. 13, 26 [128 S.Ct. 1254, 161 L.Ed.2d 205] .) In California, the nature of the prior conviction may be established from the char ging documents, the court’s minutes, and the plea form, which are official r ecords admissible to establish the foundational facts of the prior conviction. (See, e.g., People v. Henley (1999) 72 Cal.Ap p.4th 555, 560.) III. The Documentary Proof of the Convi ctions Was Properly Considered as Evidence by the Court We reject defendant’s contention that th e documentary evidence contained in the record cannot be considered, on the alleged ground that there was no express statement that the documents had been admitted into evidence. After taking the verdicts and dismissing th e jurors, the court t ook up the matter of trial on the priors. The court asked the pr osecutor, “Do you have your [Pen. Code, § 969b] package?” The prosecutor had inadvert ently left the documents at her office. The court took a short recess to allow them to be retrieved. When proceedings reconvened, the court announced the appearances of the partie s for the record, and noted, “I just need to glance over th e [Pen. Code, § 969b] package. [¶] Again, everybody. I’ve had a quick glance and looked at it. Everything seems to be in order.” The packet, consisting of Exhibits 6 through 15, incl uded documents for each of defendant’s prior offense convictions. The pa cket documents for Exhibits 6 through 13 are included in the clerk’s transcript and th e supplemental clerk’s transcript on appeal; the clerk’s label on each of these exhibits is marked showing both that the exhibits were marked for identification, and that they were adm itted into evidence. Although defendant complains that the reporter’s transcript does not show explicitly that the documents were10 admitted into evidence, neither does it show, for example, that they were marked for identification. The pause in the proceedings would, howeve r, account for the failure to record the identification and admission of the documents into evidence. The markings on each exhibit in the record cl early indicate that both proce dures were performed. There could be no doubt that the prosecutor pro ffered the documents as evidence, with the intent that the court would review and rely on them, as, in fact, the court did. Generally, “[i]t is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.” (Evid. Code, § 664.) In accordance with this princi ple, we conclude that the exhibits were admitted into evidence and properly consid ered by the trial court. IV. The Evidence Was Sufficien t to Show that Defendant Ha d at Least Two Prior Strike Convictions Defendant’s conviction in 2003 for assau lt with a deadly weapon qualified as a strike prior. Penal Code section 1192.7, su bdivision (c)(31), lists “assault with a deadly weapon . . . in violation of Section 245,” as a serious (strike) felo ny. When defendant admitted his priors in the inst ant case, the trial court stat ed: “And then there’s your strikes. The first one is September 24th, 2003, a violation of 245(a)(1), assault with a deadly weapon. And do you admit - - and you were convicted. Do you admit or deny?” Defendant stated: “Admit.” Penal Code section 245, subdivisions (a)(1 ) and (a)(4), provide that it is a felony to “commit[] an assault upon the pe rson of another with a dead ly weapon or instrument other than a firearm” or “by any means of forc e likely to produce great bodily injury.” It therefore provides two distinct mean s of violating the provision: either committing an11 assault with a d eadly weapon other than a firearm, or committing an assault by means of force likely to produce great bod ily injury. As already noted, Penal Code section 1192.7, subdivision (c)(31), defines “assa ult with a deadly weapon” as a serious (strike) felony, but committing an assault by any force likely to produce great bodily injury (which might, e.g., be accomplished without the use of a weapon) does not qualify as a strike. Defendant argues that neither Penal Code section 1192.7 (serious felony strikes) nor Penal Code section 667.5 (violent felony strikes) “separately lists” the crime of “assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm” as a qualifying strike offense. Defendant argues that the only way to bring the offense w ithin the definition of a strike offense is proof that the offender pers onally used a dangerous or deadly weapon. (Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subd. (c )(23).) A defendant may be convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, other than a firearm, either by personally using the weapon, or as an aider and abettor. (See People v. Williams (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 911, 914-915.) When defendant admitted his convicti on of assault with a deadly weapon under Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), he did not ad mit personal use of th e weapon, nor did he admit the nature of the conv iction as either a serious or violent felony. Defendant therefore urges that his admission alone did not provide sufficient proof that the prior conviction was a strike. On March 7, 2000, the electorate adop ted Proposition 21 (Ballot Pamp., Primary Elect. (Mar. 7, 2000), text of Prop. 21, § 17, pp. 124-125), wh ich deleted personal use as a necessary criterion to establish that an a ssault with a deadly weapon or firearm was a serious felony (strike). (See People v. Luna (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 395, 398 ( Luna ).)12 Penal Code section 1192.7, su bdivision (c)(31), now provides that any “assault with a deadly weapon [or] firearm . . . in violation of Secti on 245” is a serious felony (strike), without regard to whether the c onviction was as a perpetrator or as an aider and abettor. Defendant urges this court to reject Luna on the ground that it partially renders
other subdivisions of Penal Co de section 1192.7 surplusage. 1 (See, e.g., Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds. (c)(11) [assault with a deadly weapon on a peace officer], (c)(13) [assault with a deadly weapon by an inmate], (c)(32) [assa ult with a d eadly weapon against a public transit employee].) However, Luna follows the plain meaning of subdivision (c)(31). That Penal Code sectio n 1192.7, subdivision (c)(31), may have some overlap with other subdivisions is no re ason to disregard its plain language.
In Delgado , supra , 43 Cal.4th 1059, the Californi a Supreme Court held that the notation on the abstract of judgment, “245(A )(1)” as “Asslt w DWpn” was sufficient to support a finding that the convic tion was a serious felony. ( Id . at p. 1065.) That is, the notation on the abstract of judgment was a “contemporaneous, statutorily sanctioned, officially prepared clerical record of the conviction and sentence,” and as such was sufficient to show that the co nviction proceeded under the d eadly weapon prong of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1), and no t the great bodily injury prong. The

1 Luna , supra , 113 Cal.App.4th 395 was partially overruled in People v. Delgado (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1059 ( Delgado ). To the extent that Luna suggested that both prongs of Penal Code section 245, subdivision (a)(1)— assault with a deadly weapon other than a firearm, on the one hand, or a ssault by use of force likely to cause great bodily injury, on the other—would now qualify as a serious felony (strike), the Supreme Court rejected it as to the great bodily injury prong. ( Delgado, supra , 43 Cal.4th at p. 1070, fn. 4.)13 presumption of regularity in the clerk’s record ing of this description of the offense on the abstract of judgment, unrebutted by any contra ry evidence, allowed th e trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the conviction for assault w ith a deadly weapon was a serious felony conviction. ( Delgado , supra , 43 Cal.4th 1059, 1070.) The abstract of judgment for defend ant’s 2003 assault wi th a deadly weapon conviction indicated that he had been convicted of “245(A )(1),” described as “Assault w/ weapon.” The abstract iden tified only one of the two prong s as the applicable ground for defendant’s conviction, an d it so identified the prong th at meets the definition of a serious felony (strike). In addition, the reco rd contains defendant’s plea form for this offense, on which defendant was expressly advised, “This will count as a ‘strike’ in any future cases.” These records, properly considered by the tria l court below, together with the presumption that duty was properly performed, support the inference that defendant was convicted of a qualifying strike prior with respect to his 2003 assault with a deadly weapon conviction. Defendant’s 1987 conviction for first degree burglary also qualified as a strike. Penal Code section 1192.7, su bdivision (c)(18), provides that any conviction of burglary in the first degree is a serious felony. Th e court asked defendant about his “[s]econd strike,” of “November 9th, 1987, County of Riverside, burglary—th at would be burglary in the first degree, as a felony and as a stri ke. Do you admit or deny that?” Defendant stated, “Admit.” Defendant’s oral admission on the record included the admission that the burglary was of the first degree. The r ecord contains two abstracts of judgment relating to this 1987 burglary conviction, including notations that the offense is14 “BURGLARY 1st deg” or “BUR GLARY, 1st deg inhabited bldg.” The evidence in the record was clearly sufficient to sustain the trial court’s determination that the 1987 burglary conviction was a strike prior. (See People v. Myers (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 546, 554 [Trial court may consider the entire record on the prior c onviction to determine whether it satisfies the elements of a serious felony.].) Defendant’s remaining alleged strike prio rs were for convictions in the State of Washington in 1978, for first degree rape and first degree kidnapping. At the time of taking the admissions, the court inquired of defe ndant: “Third strike. That is November 20th, 1978, State of Washington, County of Spokane, convicted of kidnapping, which in California code would be 207. . . . And th at was a felony. To that, do you admit or deny?” Defendant answered, “Admit.” The court continued, “A fourth strike. November 20th, 1978, State of Washington, County of Spok ane, convicted of the crime of rape, which in California would be 261, but they have some other name for it in Spokane, as a felony. Admit or de ny?” Defendant replied, “Admit.” Defendant admitted to suffering two out-of-state felony convictions, for kidnapping and rape, and apparently also admitted that the convictions were equivalent to the California offenses identified in Pena l Code sections 207 (kidnapping) and 261 (rape). Both these California violations w ould qualify as strikes. (See Pen. Code, § 1192.7, subds. (c)(3) & (c)(20).)15 The Washington rape statute, Washin gton Revised Code Annotated, section 9A.44.040, 2 provides that a person is guilty of rape in the first degree “when such person engages in sexual intercourse with another pe rson by forcible compulsion . . . .” This provision meets the elements of the Califor nia rape statute, Penal Code section 261, subdivision (a)(2), defining rape as “(a) . . . an act of sexual intercourse accomplished with a person not the spouse of the perpetrator, . . . [¶] (2) Where it is accomplished against a person’s will by means of force, viol ence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on th e person or another.” The evid ence before the court as to the nature of defendant’s Washington rape conviction was sufficient to find that it constituted a qualifying strike. Washington Revised Code Annot ated section 9A.40.020 (2013) 3 defines first degree kidnapping as, “intentionally abduct[ing] another person with intent . . . [¶] (b) To facilitate commission of any felony or flight thereafter; or [¶] (c) To inflict bodily injury on him or her . . . .” The term “abduct” is defined in Washington Revised Code Annotated section 9A.40.010 as: “to re strain a person by eith er (a) secreting or holding him or her in a place where he or she is not likely to be found, or (b) using or

2 Formerly Washington Revised Code Annotated section 9.79.170 (1977), recodified as section 9A.44. 040 (1998). (See Wash. Adv. Le gis. Serv. (1998), ch. 242, § 1 [eff. June 11, 1998].)

3 Formerly Washington Revised Code Annotated, section 9A.40.020 (1975) and (2011). (See Wash. Adv. Legis. Serv. 1975 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 260, §9A.40.020 [amended 2011]; Wash. Adv. Legis. Serv., ch. 336, § 364.)16 threatening to use deadly force.” (Wash. Rev. Code Ann., § 9A.40.010 (1).) 4 The statutory elements of first degree kidnapping in the State of Washington do not appear to be identical to the elements of the Calif ornia offense, inasmuch as no element of asportation appears to be requi red to be found guilty of fi rst degree kidnapping in Washington. It is uncertain, in the absence of additional ev idence concerning the nature of the Washington offense, whether the record establishes th at the Washington kidnapping conviction constitutes a strike, a lthough arguably defend ant’s admission was tantamount to an admission that the Washingt on kidnapping offense was equivalent to a strike offense in California. We find it unn ecessary to resolve th e matter definitively, however, because, in any case, at least three strike prior offenses were proven, which were sufficient to support impos ition of a third-strike senten ce in the instant case. V. The Evidence Was Sufficien t to Support True Findings for Six Prior Prison Term Enhancements Defendant argues that the evidence was in sufficient to support true findings as to the six prior prison term enhancements, despite defendant’s admissions, because the prosecution failed to establish that the prio r prison terms were separate, or that the five-year “washout” period had no t elapsed. We disagree. Defendant relies on People v. Epperson (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 856, 863, for the proposition that the admissi on of a prior prison term e nhancement allegation must specifically admit that the prio r prison terms occurred within th e past five years in order

4 Formerly Washington Revised Code Annot ated, section 9A.40.010. (See Wash. Adv. Legis. Serv. 2011, ch. 336, § 363 [effective July 22, 2011].)17 to be valid. Defendant misa pprehends the applicability of Epperson . There, it was plain on the record, and the People had conceded , that the defendant did remain free from prison custody, and the commiss ion of a new felony, for more than five years. ( Id . at pp. 863-864.) Under those circumstances, the bare admission that a conviction had occurred was not an admission with respect to th e serving of a prison term, or the failure to remain free of a new convic tion for a period of five year s. Here, the court described the prior prison term enhancem ents, which defendant would be admitti ng, as, “you did time in state prison, and you neve r got out for more than five years, including recently.” The court proceeded to inquire as to each of the prior prison term enhancements, each of
which defenda nt admitted. 5 Defendant admitted to separate felony convictions in 2003

5 The colloquy proceeded as follows: “THE COURT: . . . [¶] Okay. We’ll star t with . . . the one-year priors. Is it true that on or about September 24th, 2003, in the County of Rivers ide, you were convicted of assault with a deadly weapon, a felony, and you did at least some time in state prison? Do you admit or deny? “THE DEFENDANT: Admit. “THE COURT: Second prior. August 30 th, 1996, County of Riverside, convicted of 666, petty theft with a prior, and you did at least some time in st ate prison. Admit or deny? “THE DEFENDANT: Admit. “THE COURT: Okay. Third prior. Ap ril 1st, 1993, County of Riverside, convicted of the crime of 28 00.2 Vehicle Code, recklessly evading a police officer, a felony, and you did some time in state prison. Admit or deny? “THE DEFENDANT: Admit. “THE COURT: Fourth prior. January 23rd, 1990, County of Riverside, a violation of 11377(a) of the Health and Sa fety Code, a felony, possession of a controlled substance, you did so me time in State [ sic ] prison. You admit or deny? “THE DEFENDANT: Admit. “THE COURT: Fifth prior offense. Nove mber 9th, 1987, Coun ty of Riverside, a crime of burglary, a 459 of the Penal Code, a felony, and did you [spend] some time in state prison. Is that admit or deny? [footnote continued on next page]18 (assault with a deadly weapon) (ADW), 1996 (petty theft w ith a prior), 1993 (recklessly evading an officer), 1990 (posse ssion of controlled substance), 1987 (burglary), and 1978 (kidnapping). He directly adm itted to serving a separate pr ison term for each offense. The trial court prefaced the taking of the admi ssions with the statem ent that each prior included the failure to remain free from prison custody for a period of five years. The records before the court also sh owed that defendant was sentenced in Washington State in 1978 to a maximum term of 20 years for the kidnapping offense. With respect to the 19 87 burglary conviction, defendant was sentenced to state prison in 1988 for a term of two years. Defendant was committed to state prison in 1992 for the possession of a controlled substan ce for a term of one year four months. In 1993, he was committed to prison on the evading arrest charge, for a c oncurrent term of three years. Defendant was committed to prison for the petty-t heft-with-a-prior offense for four years, in 1996. He was committed to prison in 2003, for th e assault with a d eadly weapon, for a term of six years. The California Department of Corrections and Rehabilita tion’s (CDCR) record of defendant’s prison service indicated he was r eceived in state prison in January 1988, in connection with case No. CR-81 652, the first degree burglary (fifth prison term prior),

[footnote continued from previous page] “THE DEFENDANT: Admit. “THE COURT: And sixth prior. November 20th, 1978, state [ sic ] of Washington, County of Spokane, convicted of the crime of kidnappi ng, a violation of 207 of the California Penal Code - - which they don’t us e exactly the same numbers. I don’t know what numbers they use, but it’s the equivalent of 207 in California, and it’s a felony. And do you admit or deny? “THE DEFENDANT: Admit.”19 and paroled to Moreno Valley in October 1988. Defendant’ s parole was suspended in January 1989, and he was re-rele ased in March 1989. Defenda nt was received back into prison in April 1989 and re-rel eased in July 1989. Defendant was re turned to custody in May 1990. He was paroled again in August 19 90. Defendant was retu rned to custody in October 1991. He was subject to an in take audit in March 1992, and ultimately discharged on his prior term, but retained in case No. CR-41938 (possession of a controlled substance, fourth prison term prior). Defendant appears to have been parole d on the controlled substance offense in August 1992. The parole audit note of that date recorded th at a restitution fine of $200 was imposed as to the contro lled substance offense. Another file audit in April 1993 noted the imposition of a $1,00 0 fine in case No. 47873, a conviction of vehicle theft on the same date and occasion as the evading-an-officer case. Defendant was received into Soledad state prison in July 1993. Defendant’s parole had been re voked in April 1993, and he wa s apparently discharged on case No. CR-41938 (controlled substance offens e), but retained in case Nos. CR-47873 (vehicle theft) and CR-48136 (evading an officer, third prison term prior). Defendant was paroled in November 1994, and appears to have been discharged from parole by operation of law as of December 1995. In September 1996, defendant was re ceived at Calipatria State Prison in connection with case No. CR-69435 , petty theft with a prior (second prison term prior). He was paroled in August 1 999, but his parole was suspe nded and he was returned to prison in March 2000. Defendant was paro led again in September 2000, and again20 suspended a month later in October 2000. He was released on parole yet again in March 2001, and September 2001, but a hold was place d on him in February 2002, when he was arrested. He spent 300 days in custody on that revocation, until he was paroled in December 2002. Defendant did not long remain out of custody, however, as he suffered a revocation in January 2003, an arrest and reinstatement in May 20 03, and a return to custody in July 2003. Defendant was processed for intake at a state prison facility in connection with case No. RIF110285 (assault with a deadly weapon, first pr ison term prior) in October 2003. Defendant was discharged in case No . CR-69435 as of January 2004, but he was retained on case No. RIF110285 in July 2004. CDCR calculated defendant’s parole release date in February 2008, with an expected release date in April 2008. Defendant was in fact released on parole in April 2008, but wa s returned to prison for suspensions or revocations several times in 2009 and 2010. The instant case was filed in July 2010. The records of defendant’s prison custody clearly show that he did not remain free from custody for a period of five years on any of the California convictions. (See also People v. Cardenas (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 51, 61 [“ [A]n admission of prior convictions where the charging information specifically alleges the convictions resulted in prior separate prison terms is deemed an admi ssion such prison terms were separately served.”].)21 The evidence, whether of defendant’s ad missions alone or together with the documentary evidence, wa s fully sufficient to support the court’s true findings as to all six prison term prior enhancements.
DISPOSITION The issues raised on appeal deal solely with proof of the sentencing enhancement allegations. As noted above, the trial court properly admitted into evidence and considered the documentary ev idence submitted to prove the pr ior conviction allegations. The evidence was sufficient to support findings that defenda nt had suffered at least two prior strike convictions; he was properly sent enced as a third striker. The evidence was also sufficient to support true findings as to each of the six prior prison term one-year enhancements; the prior prison term enha ncements were properly imposed. The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MCKINSTER J. We concur:

HOLLENHORST Acting P. J.

MILLER J.