No. 96-591 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 

1997 

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF 

CATHY LYNN KAYSER, 

Petitioner and Respondent, 11111- I 'J 1111]' r\ ..... <) ; L 1::J::! 

and 

TERRY NEAL KAYSER, 

Respondent and Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District, 

In and for the County of Sanders, 

The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding. 

COUNSEL OF RECORD: 

F or Appellant: 

George T. Radovich, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana 

For Respondent: 

Jean Adele Carter, Attorney at Law, Thompson Falls, Montana 

Submitted on Briefs: May 29, 1997 

Decided: August 12, 1997 

Filed: 
Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion of the Court. 

Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal 

Operating Rules, the following decision shall not be cited as precedent and shall be published 

by its filing as a public document with the Clerk of the Supreme Court and by a report of its 

result to State Reporter Publishing Company and West Publishing Company. 

Cathy Kayser (Cathy) and Terry Kayser (Terry) were married for eighteen years, 

during which time they jointly owned and operated a business consisting of guided hunting 

operations in both western and eastern Montana and an outfitting and guide school 

(collectively "hunting guide business"). The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Sanders 

County, subsequently dissolved Cathy and Terry's marriage, provided for custody and 

support of their two minor children, and valued and distributed the marital estate. Terry 

appeals from the District Court's valuation and distribution of the marital estate. We affirm. 

The issues on appeal are: 

1. Did the District Court err in valuing the hunting guide business and marital 

home? 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

We review a district court's findings of fact regarding the valuation and division of 

marital property to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of Walls 

(1996), 278 Mont. 413, 416, 925 P.2d 483, 485 (citations omitted). A district court may 

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accept any reasonable valuation supported by the record. Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d at 485 

(citation omitted). Further, a district court may assign any value to disputed marital property 

that is within the range of values presented into evidence. In re Marriage of Lopez (1992), 

255 Mont. 238, 243, 841 P.2d 1122, 1125. The division of marital property must be 

equitable, rather than equal, and a district court's judgment in that regard will not be 

disturbed unless it constitutes an abuse of discretion. Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d at 485 

(citations omitted). 

DISCUSSION 

The District Court found that Cathy and Terry's marital estate totaled $482,218.96. 

It valued the western Montana portion ofthe hunting guide business at $250,000, placed no 

value on either the outfitting and guide school or the eastern Montana portion of the hunting 

guide business and valued the marital home at $155,000. In distributing the marital estate, 

the District Court awarded Cathy the marital home, a one-half interest in the western 

Montana portion of the hunting guide business, a vehicle, her personal property, 

miscellaneous household furnishings and other assets totaling $274,950 after the home- and 

vehicle-related debt assigned to her were deducted. Terry received a one-half interest in the 

western Montana portion of the hunting guide business, his personal property, and 

miscellaneous equipment--including vehicles and livestock--relating to the hunting guide 

business. Terry's portion of the marital estate totaled $207,268.96 after deducting debt 

assigned to him. 

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1. Did the District Court err in valuing the hunting guide business and marital 

home? 

Hunting guide business 

Terry argues that the District Court included the "absolute maximum value" of the 

hunting guide business without considering either his own testimony or that given by Cathy 

and Gloria Belcher (Belcher), a stockbroker, investment manager and local land owner. 

Terry further contends that testimony at trial indicated the maximum potential sales price for 

the hunting guide business was "closer to the $200,000 range" rather than the $250,000 

figure the District Court used. The record, however, belies Terry's arguments. Moreover, 

his arguments ignore both the District Court's ability to accept any reasonable value 

supported by the record and this Court's clearly erroneous standard of review of a trial court's 

valuation findings. See Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d at 485 (citations omitted). 

Here, the record contains a range of values for the hunting guide business. Indeed, 

Terry testified that the western Montana operation, with permits, was worth "150 to 

$175,000" and, in addition, that he had received an offer for the hunting guide business, later 

withdrawn, for "between 300 and $350,000." Belcher, who testified as Cathy's expert, stated 

that "a modest evaluation" of the western Montana operation of the hunting guide business 

was $200,000 to $250,000, she was interested in purchasing the western Montana operation 

for "in the $200,000 range," and her purchase price "[did] not include [Terry's] equipment 

or the eastern part of Montana or his guide school." Cathy testified, based on her 

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involvement with the business, that the western portion of the hunting guide business was 

worth $250,000. 

The District Court's finding that the western Montana portion of the hunting guide 

business was worth $250,000 is supported by the record, is well within the range of values 

presented in evidence and is not otherwise clearly erroneous. We hold, therefore, that the 

District Court did not err in this regard. 

We observe that Terry also makes a passing argument relating to the District Court's 

valuation of the equipment associated with the hunting guide business. That equipment was 

valued at $82,268.96 and, as noted above, was awarded to Terry in the distribution of the 

marital estate. Terry does not contest the amount at which the court valued the equipment; 

rather, he contends that the court erred in valuing it separately from the hunting guide 

business. We discern no error in this regard, however, since Belcher's testimony clearly 

separated the equipment from her underlying valuation of the business. In addition, while 

the offer Terry received for the hunting guide business--in the $300,000 to $350,000 range--

may have included the equipment separately valued by the District Court, deducting the 

$82,268.96 equipment value from the high end of that range would leave a value for the 

business--without the equipment--higher than that ultimately used by the District Court. In 

short, Terry has established no error in the District Court's separate valuation of the 

equipment associated with the hunting guide business. 

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Marital home 

Cathy admitted at trial that she had neither formal education in the real estate market 

nor experience in valuing real estate. Based on reading real estate listings in the area for 

properties comparable to the marital home, however, she testified that she believed the home 

was worth "between 100 and $125,000." Terry testified that he "checked around with some 

of the real estate people" and personally compared prices of residences in the area. 

According to Terry, a named real estate professional told Terry the property could be sold 

for $185,000; no written appraisal regarding the value of the marital home was introduced, 

however, and the "real estate professional" did not testify. As set forth above, the District 

Court valued the marital home at $155,000. 

Terry apparently contends that his evidence was more credible than Cathy's "limited 

... general knowledge obtained over a series of years of reading real estate listings" as a 

matter oflaw and, as a result, his $185,000 value should have been accepted. We disagree. 

The only evidence regarding the value of the marital home came from the parties 

themselves, neither of whom had any substantial knowledge or experience in the field of real 

estate and real estate values. Neither valuation was inherently more credible, and we have 

held that the district court has broad discretion in determining the value of property in a 

dissolution action, and" '[i]ts valuation can be premised on expert testimony, lay testimony, 

documentary evidence, or any combination thereof.''' In re Marriage of Robinson (1994), 

269 Mont. 293, 296, 888 P.2d 895,897 (citation omitted). Here, the District Court valued 

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the marital home at $155,000, within the range of values presented at trial. That finding is 

supported by substantial credible evidence and is not otherwise clearly erroneous. We hold, 

therefore, that the District Court did not err in valuing the marital home. 

2. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate? 

Terry argues that, even assuming the court's valuations are correct, as we held above, 

the District Court abused its discretion in distributing the marital estate because Cathy was 

awarded 57% of the estate, compared to the 43% he received. We disagree. 

First and foremost, we reiterate that, in distributing the marital estate, a district court 

must make an equitable distribution, not necessarily an equal distribution. Marriage of 

Walls, 925 P.2d at 485 (citation omitted). Here, the 57% to 43% distribution is close to 

being equal. In addition, the distribution is based on the court's unchallenged finding that 

Terry's income is approximately two and one-half times greater than Cathy's income. 

Furthermore, the District Court's determination that Cathy is not entitled to maintenance was 

premised, in large part, on the distribution to her of property which will be sufficient to meet 

her reasonable needs. 

Nor is Terry's reliance on In re Marriage ofPopp (1983), 206 Mont. 415, 671 P.2d 24, 

III support of his argument that the distribution in this case is inequitable, well placed. 

There, the trial court expressly stated that it was making a 60% to 40% distribution; its 

findings did not effectuate such a distribution, however, in part because of errors in 

underlying valuations. Marriage of Popp, 671 P.2d at 26. In addition, we could not ascertain 

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the basis for the trial court's distribution in the husband's favor. Marriage of Popp, 671 P.2d 

at 27-28. As a result, we remanded for further consideration. Marriage ofPopp, 671 P.2d 

at 28. 

Marriage ofPopp is inapplicable here. As discussed above, the District Court did not 

err in valuing the marital estate and the basis for its 57% to 43% distribution is clear on this 

record. 

We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the 

marital estate. 

Affirmed. 

We concur: 

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