alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

ORLANDO CARTER, Debtor,

Appellant,
v. . Case No. 3:18-cv-283
PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
GROUP, INC.,
Appellee.

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Appeal

Case No. 06-30086

Adversary Proceeding No. 18-3034
Judge Guy R. Humphrey

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL WITH PREJUDICE
FOR WANT OF PROSECUTION; JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN
FAVOR OF APPELLEE AND AGAINST APPELLANT;
TERMINATION ENTRY

On August 13, 2018, pro se Appellant Orlando Y. Carter filed a timely
Notice of Appeal of the United States Bankruptcy Court’s August 1, 2018, Order
dismissing Adversary Proceeding No. 18-3034. Doc. #1. On October 18, 2018,
the Bankruptcy Court filed its Clerk’s Certification of Record on Appeal, Doc. #2,
noting that no designated items had been filed. This Court ordered Appellant’s
brief to be filed by November 1, 2018. No brief was filed within the time allotted.

The Court directed Appellant to show cause in writing why this appeal
should not be dismissed without prejudice for want of prosecution. Doc. #3.

When no response was filed, the Court dismissed the appeal without prejudice for


want of prosecution. Doc. #4. On December 28, 2018, judgment was entered in
favor of Appellee. Doc. #5.

On January 22, 2019, Appellant filed a Motion for Reinstatement of Appeal,
Doc. #6, which the Court interpreted as a motion for relief from judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). Finding excusable neglect, the Court sustained Appellant's
motion, vacated the Judgment, and reopened the appeal. Doc. #7. The Court
gave Appellant until March 5, 2019, to file with the bankruptcy clerk and serve on
the Appellee a designation of the items to be included in the record on appeal, and
a statement of the issues to be presented. Appellant’s brief was to be filed no
later than April 4, 2019.

Appellant did not comply with any aspect of the Court’s Order. Accordingly,
the Court ordered Appellant to SHOW CAUSE, in writing, by May 1, 2019, why
this appeal should not be dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution.
Appellant has failed to respond to the Show Cause Order within the time allotted.
Therefore, the Court DISMISSES the appeal WITH PREJUDICE for want of
prosecution.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Appellee and against Appellant.

The captioned case is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,

at Dayton.


Date: May 3, 2019 fideidin ti neae

WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
## COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02

- 13

- 00183

- CV

In the Interest of A.J.D., A C hild §

§

§

§ From the 211th District Court

o f Denton County (2011

- 30977

- 211 )

October 24, 2013

Opinion by Chief Jus tice Livingston



### JUDGMENT

This court has considered the record on appeal in this case and holds that

there was no error in the trial court’s judgment. It is ordered that the judgment of

the trial court is affirmed.

SECOND DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

B y

_________________________________ C hief Justice Terrie Livingston
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

vs. CASE NO.: 2:18-cr-166

JUDGE GEORGE C. SMITH

MAGISTRATE JUDGE KING

THOMAS J. ALLEN, 

Defendant.

ORDER

On September 27, 2018, the Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), recommending that the Court accept Defendant’s guilty plea to an

Information charging him with being a felon in possession of firearms, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g) (Count 1), possession with intent to distribute heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Count

2); and possession with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (Count 3). The

Information also contains a forfeiture count. (Doc. 28). Defendant, represented by counsel, waived

his right to appear on the matter before a District Judge. The Magistrate Judge conducted the

colloquy required by Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Defendant’s plea was

knowing, voluntary, free from coercion, and had a basis in fact. 

Defendant was specifically informed of his right to contest the Report and Recommendation

by filing any objections within 14 days of the issuance of the Report and Recommendation pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Defendant did

not file any objections. 
Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Report and Recommendation and ACCEPTS

Defendant’s pleas of guilty to Counts 1, 2, and 3 of the Information. Defendant is hereby adjudged

guilty of these charges. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

-2-
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

JUDGMENT

No. 04

- 22

- 00457

- CR

Douglas Wayne THOMAS

, Appellant

v.

The STATE of Texas,

Appellee

From the 186th Judicial District Court

, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2017CR13170

Honorable Jefferson Moore , Judge Presiding

BEFORE CHIEF JUSTICE MARTINEZ

, JUSTICE ALVAREZ , AND JUSTICE WATKINS

In accordance with this court’s opinion of this date, we MODIFY the trial court’s judgment

to delete the $1,000.00 fine. We AFFIRM the trial court’s ju dgment AS MODIFIED.

SIGNED March 22, 2023.

_____________________________ Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit ____________ 

No. 24-40248 

____________ 

M. D., by next friend Sarah R. Stukenberg; D. I., by next 

friend Nancy G. Pofahl; Z. H., by next friend Carla B. 

Morrison; S. A., by next friend Javier Solis; A. M., by 

next friend Jennifer Talley; J. S., by next friend Anna J. 

Ricker; K. E., as next friend John W. Cliff, Jr.; M. R., as next 

friend Bobbie M. Young; J. R., as next friend Bobbie M. Young; 

H. V., by next friend Anna J. Ricker; P. O., as next friend

Anna J. Ricker; L. H., as next friend Estela C. Vasquez; C. H.; 

S. R., as next friend Bobbie M. Young; S. S., as next friend Estela 

C. Vasquez; A. R., as next friend Tom McKenzie, individually and 

on behalf of all others similarly situated, 

Plaintiffs—Appellees, 

versus

Greg Abbott, in his official capacity as Governor of the State of Texas; 

Cecile Erwin Young, in her official capacity as Executive Commissioner 

of the Health and Human Services Commission of the State of Texas; 

Stephanie Muth, in her official capacity as Commissioner of Texas 

Department of Family and Protective Services, 

Defendants—Appellants. 

______________________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Texas 

USDC No. 2:11-CV-84 

______________________________ 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

April 17, 2024 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

Case: 24-40248 Document: 18-2 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/17/2024
UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Before Elrod, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam: 

 IT IS ORDERED that the contempt order of the district court is 

temporarily administratively STAYED pending further order of this court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the district court proceedings 

are temporarily administratively STAYED pending further order of this 

court. 

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs-Appellees shall have 

until 12:00 PM Central Time on Monday, April 22, 2024 to file a response. 

Defendants-Appellants shall have until 12:00 PM Central Time on 

Wednesday, April 24, 2024 to file a reply. 

 

Case: 24-40248 Document: 18-2 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/17/2024
#### Cameron *v.*State.

4544

216 S. W. 2d 881

Opinion delivered January 31, 1949.

*Martin L. Green*and *Batchelor*& *Batchelor,*for appellant.

*Ike Murry,*Attorney General and *Jeff Duty,*Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

RobiNs, J.

Appellant, with two other persons, was charged in information filed by the prosecuting attorney with the crime of grand larceny for the stealing of a quantity of lumber, the property of Whitney and Ralph Johnson. Before trial the prosecuting attorney asked and was by the court granted permission to amend the information by adding to the property alleged to have been stolen “two chicken laying troughs.” In the original information the value of the property alleged to have been stolen was fixed at $75 and no change in this valuation was made in the amendment.

The case was tried to a jury who, after some deliberation, returned into court and informed the judge that they were unable to agree as to punishment and asked the judge if he might fix the punishment. The judge informed the jury that if they found the defendant guilty and would so state in their verdict and would request the court to fix the punishment it would become the duty of the court to do so. Thereafter the jury returned a verdict by which appellant was found guilty of petit larceny and the punishment left to the court.

*513The court rendered judgment assessing the punishment at a fine of $300 and imprisonment in the county jail for one year. This appeal followed.

Several assignments of error are urged here by appellant ; but in the view we take of the case it is necessary to consider only one of them. During the argument of appellant’s counsel to the jury he severely criti-cised the chief prosecuting witness, declaring that said witness was an admitted embezzler and perjurer and that, if the lumber was stolen, the prosecuting witness, who admitted helping to load the lumber on apellant’s truck, was the one to be convicted. At this juncture the trial judge interrupted appellant’s attorney and said to the jury: “Gentlemen of the jury, do not be swept off your feet, you are trying Mr. Cameron not witness Jef-fers. ’ ’

Under our constitution (Art. 7, § 23) judges are forbidden to charge juries as to the facts; and we have held that for a trial judge to communicate to the jury in any way his opinion, as to the merits of the contention of either party on a fact question, is error. *Hinson*v. *State,*133 Ark. 149, 201 S. W. 811; *Williams*v. *State,*175 Ark. 752, 2 S. W. 2d 36.

The inevitable effect of the above quoted statement of the trial judge was to impress the jury that the trial judge believed the appellant to be guilty and that he was cautioning the jury not to be influenced by argument of appellant’s counsel into returning a verdict of “not guilty.” This was error, for which the judgment below must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Since'under the verdict appellant was acquitted on the charge of grand larceny, on trial anew appellant will be tried for the offense of petit larceny.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                   Exhibit 10.40


                             MODIFICATION AGREEMENT




THIS MODIFICATION AGREEMENT (the "Modification") is made as of the 20th day of
September, 1998 by and between Golf One Industries, Inc., a Delaware
corporation, ("Golf One"), and Norman A. Kunin ("Consultant"), (collectively the
"Parties").

WHEREAS, the Parties have entered into a Consulting Agreement dated as of
November 1, 1997 (the "Agreement") attached as Exhibit A and made an integral
part hereof; and

WHEREAS, the Parties have agreed to modify the Agreement so that the entire
Agreement remains effective including the changes pursuant to this
Modification.

NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises and the mutual covenants herein
contained, Golf One and Consultant agree to the following modifications:

1.       The term of the Agreement shall extend to one (1) year from the closing
         date of the Company's Initial Public Offering, or if an Initial Public
         Offering shall not close by December 31, 1998, then to December 31,
         1999.

2.       In consideration of the services rendered and to be rendered by
         Consultant under the Agreement and this Modification, Golf One hereby
         agrees to pay Consultant compensation as follows: (A) Golf One shall
         pay Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000.00) per month commencing with the
         Month of September, 1998 in payments of $3,000.00 each on the 1st and
         15th of each month for the remainder of the extended term.

3.       The Indemnification Agreement identified as Exhibit B to Consultant's
         prior Employment Agreement with Golf One dated February 27, 1996 shall
         continue through the extended term of the Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the undersigned have executed this Modification as of the
day and year first above written.

GOLF ONE INDUSTRIES, INC.                            CONSULTANT


By: /s/ A.J. Cervantes                               /s/ Norman A. Kunin
   ---------------------------                       --------------------------
                                                     Norman A. Kunin
Its: President
    --------------------------
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE

SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and in connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Carmike Cinemas, Inc. (the Corporation) for the period ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, the Senior Vice President  Finance, Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer of the Corporation, certifies that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Corporation.



|                                     
|-------------------------------------
|/S/  RICHARD B. HARE                 
|Richard B. Hare                      
|Senior Vice President  Finance,     
|Treasurer and Chief Financial Officer
|March 16, 2007
**EXHIBIT      32.2**

**Certification      of Chief Financial Officer**

**Pursuant      to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002**

| (1) | the                Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this                certification is attached as an exhibit (the “Report”), fully complies                with the requirements of section 13(a) or section 15(d) of the Exchange                Act; and |
|-----|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2) | the                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Registrant for the periods covered by the                Report. |
|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                                |                                                                                                                   |                                        |
|-----------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|---------------------------------------------|
|                                                |                                                                                                                   |
|                                           |                                                                                                              |                                   |
| Date: August              9,              2007 | By:                                                                                                          | /s/ Alberto              R. Santa Ines |
|                                                |                                                                                                                        |
|                                                | Alberto              R. Santa Ines Chief                Financial Officer and Vice President of                Finance |

----
exv10w1







Exhibit 10.1




March 23, 2009




Imperium Master Fund, Ltd.

c/o Imperium Advisers, LLC

1120 Avenue of the Americas

New York, NY 10036

Attention: John Michaelson




Dear Mr. Michaelson,




     Reference is made to that certain Securities Purchase and Loan Agreement (as amended to date,
the “Loan Agreement”), dated as of March 24, 2008, by and between Echo Therapeutics, Inc.,
a Delaware corporation (the “Company”), and Imperium Master Fund, Ltd., a Cayman Islands
company (“Imperium”). Reference is also made to that certain Original Issue Discount
Senior Secured Note, dated March 24, 2008 (the “Senior Secured Note”), issued by the
Company to Imperium pursuant to the Loan Agreement. Capitalized terms used herein but not defined
shall have the meanings ascribed thereto in the Loan Agreement and/or the Senior Secured Note.
Pursuant to Section 5(c) of the Senior Secured Note, the terms of the Senior Secured Note may be
amended or waived by a written instrument executed by the Company and Imperium.



     The Company and Imperium hereby agree that, notwithstanding anything in the Senior Secured
Note, the Loan Agreement or the other Transaction Documents to the contrary, the Maturity Date of
the Senior Secured Note shall be extended to April 24, 2009. The purpose of the foregoing
extension is to provide the Company and Imperium sufficient time to amend the Loan Agreement and
the senior secured notes issued by the Company thereunder (the “Notes”), to provide for, subject to
certain conditions, a one-year extension of the maturity of the Notes.



     This letter agreement constitutes the entire agreement between the parties hereto with respect
to the subject matter hereof, superseding all prior and existing written or oral agreements,
negotiations, discussions, undertakings, representations, warranties and understandings. This
letter agreement constitutes a valid and binding obligation of each of the parties hereto,
enforceable against each of them in accordance with law. This letter agreement shall be governed by
and construed in accordance with the laws of the State of New York applicable to contracts made and
to be performed entirely within the State of New York. In the event of a conflict between the
provisions of this letter agreement and the terms of the Loan Agreement or the Senior Secured Note,
this letter agreement shall control.



	 	 	 	 	 
	 	Sincerely,




ECHO THERAPEUTICS, INC.

 	 
	 	By:  	/s/ Patrick T. Mooney
 	 
	 	 	Patrick T. Mooney, CEO and Chairman 	 
	 	 	 	 
	 


Acknowledged and agreed to as of the date first written above:




	 	 	 	 	 
	IMPERIUM MASTER FUND, LTD.

 	 
	By:  	 	 
	 	Name:  	 	 
	 	Title:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>   5
<MULTIPLIER>  1
       
<S>                                      <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                            6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-START>                           JAN-01-1997
<PERIOD-END>                             JUN-30-1997
<CASH>                                   119,190
<SECURITIES>                             0     
<RECEIVABLES>                            7,579,983
<ALLOWANCES>                             90,504 
<INVENTORY>                              586,910
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                         9,406,491
<PP&E>                                   61,314,713
<DEPRECIATION>                           14,342,683
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                           56,378,521
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                    18,916,633
<BONDS>                                  0
<COMMON>                                 18,492
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                    0
<PREFERRED>                              0
<OTHER-SE>                               8,738,698
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>             56,378,521
<SALES>                                  29,493,916
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                         29,493,916
<CGS>                                    0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                            0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                         27,989,707 
<LOSS-PROVISION>                         73,669
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                       1,520,468
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          (89,928)
<INCOME-TAX>                             (34,173)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      (55,755)
<DISCONTINUED>                           0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                          0
<CHANGES>                                0
<NET-INCOME>                             (55,755)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                            (.03)
<EPS-DILUTED>                            (.03)
        

</TABLE>
#### Lawson & Chase vs. State Bank.

Mr. Justice Soott

said: The facts of this case, so far as they affect the only question of law presented, are substantially the same as those in the case of *Luther Chase vs. The State*Bank, just decided, except that in this case there was no proceeding for the production of the books or papers of the Bank for any-purpose, and no order of the court therefor.

Finding no error in the record, the judgment will be affirmed, with costs.
#### Gene Bryan KENNEDY *v.*Helen Ovita KENNEDY

5-4405

421 S. W. 2d 611

Opinion delivered December 18, 1967

*774*Rout, Thaxton*& *Rout,*for appellant.

*Ward & Mooney,*for appellee.

Conley Eyed, Justice.

Appellant, Gene Bryan Kennedy, questions the authority of the chancellor, before entry of a final divorce decree, to reopen the case to permit the wife, Helen Ovita Kennedy, to introduce certified copies of deeds to the real property jointly owned by the parties.

The record shows that at the beginning of the hearing appellant refused to stipulate that the real property was jointly owned, but that he did stipulate to a description of the property. After the close of the hearing the chancellor found that the wife was entitled to a divorce and that no effort had been made to show how the title to the real estate was held. He concluded that he would have to assume that the title was in appellant, entitling the wife to one-third for life. The chancellor hesitated to order a sale of the property for purposes of making a division. Hoping that counsel could work out a division, he gave them until a day certain to do so, with the understanding that if a division had not been worked out by that time, he would take the matter in his own hands and make a distribution.

Before the day certain the wife filed a motion to reopen the case to introduce certified copies of deeds showing the joint ownership of certain real property involved. The chancellor granted the motion, held a hearing and incorporated into the final decree a sale and distribution in accordance with the title as shown by the deeds.

Appellant either mistakes the chancellor’s oral statement dictated into the record after the first hearing as a final decree or misunderstands the nature of a Bill of Review. As to the latter, its function is to permit the chancellor, under certain limited circumstances, to review and reverse a final decree already entered of rec*775ord. A Bill of Review has no application to the discretion vested in a chancellor to reopen a case before the entry of final decree upon the record. *Turner*v. *Tapscott,*30 Ark. 312 (1875); *Tollett*v. *Knod,*210 Ark. 785, 197 S. W. 2d 744 (1946); *McCullough*v. *Leftwich,*232 Ark. 99, 334 S. W. 2d 707 (1960).

Nor can we find any merit to appellant’s contention that the chancellor abused his discretion in reopening the case.

Affirmed.