* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R.

47.5.4.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FIFTH CIRCUIT

_________________

No. 98-50105

Summary Calendar

_________________

SANDY ACOSTA,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

KENNETH S. APFEL,

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

(A-95-CV-538)

October 14, 1998

Before EMILIO M. GARZA, DeMOSS, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Sandy Acosta appeals the district court’s decision affirming

the Commissioner’s termination of her Supplemental Security Income

and Disability Insurance benefits. Acosta received benefits based

on a finding that she met the criteria of § 12.05(c) of the Listing

of Impairments in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P., app. 1, because she

had “[a] valid verbal, performance, or full scale I.Q. of 60
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through 70 and a physical or other mental impairment imposing

additional and significant work-related limitation of function.”

Acosta had a performance I.Q. of 68 and a physical impairment of

“status post triple arthrodesis.” Later, an administrative law

judge (“ALJ”) terminated Acosta’s benefits in a continuing

disability review. The denial of Acosta’s request for review made

this the final decision of the Commissioner.

The district court affirmed the decision of the ALJ. We

review the ALJ’s decision of “not disabled” for whether substantial

evidence of record supports the decision and whether the ALJ

applied the proper legal standards in evaluation of the evidence.

See Greenspan v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 232, 236 (5th Cir. 1994). We

review the district court’s ruling de novo. See McDaniel v.

Harris, 639 F.2d 1386, 1388 (5th Cir. 1981). 

The ALJ’s finding that Acosta’s increased I.Q. score showed

improvement in her mental functioning is supported by the

examiner’s statement that her intelligence quotient values are in

the 80s. Specifically, her verbal IQ went from 68 to 84. Acosta’s

achievement scores increased one grade level in reading and math.

Because Acosta no longer meets the criteria of an impairment in the

Listing of Impairments, it is automatically established that the

medical improvement resulted in an increase in her functional

capacity to work. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1594(c)(3)(i),

416.994(b)(2)(iv)(A). Before finding the disability has ended, it

must still be established that Acosta can engage in gainful

activity. See 20 C.F.R. 404.1594(c)(3)(i).
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The ALJ concluded that, although Acosta suffers severe

physical impairments, she is capable of performing sedentary work.

The ALJ found that Acosta had no nonexertional limitations and that

she has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform the

full range of sedentary work. Sedentary work involves lifting or

carrying articles like docket files, ledgers, and small tools. See

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(a), 416.967(a). Substantial evidence

supports the finding that Acosta can perform sedentary work.

Medical evidence and testimony of Acosta’s activities, including

laundry, vacuuming, dishes, and arts and crafts, provide a

sufficient basis for this finding.

Pursuant to the Social Security Administration’s regulations,

the ALJ then applied the Medical-Vocational Guidelines

(“Guidelines”) to show that Acosta is capable of work in the

national economy. A younger, unskilled claimant with the RFC for

sedentary work and a limited education is “not disabled.” See 20

C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2, tbl. No. 1, Rule 201.24.

Acosta argues that the ALJ was precluded from relying solely

upon the Guidelines because her low I.Q. scores are a nonexertional

impairment. If nonexertional impairments significantly affect a

claimant’s RFC, then the ALJ may not rely exclusively on the

Guidelines, but must rely on expert vocational testimony or other

evidence. See Fraga v. Bowen, 810 F.2d 1296, 1304 (5th Cir. 1987).

Acosta’s argument is without merit because borderline I.Q. scores

do not constitute a nonexertional impairment. See Selders v.

Sullivan, 914 F.2d 614, 619 (5th Cir. 1990)(rejecting that I.Q.
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score of 72 supports finding of nonexertional impairment).

Although mental retardation does qualify as a nonexertional

impairment, Acosta’s lowest I.Q. score of 82 does not satisfy the

regulation’s definition of retardation. See 20 C.F.R. pt. 404,

subpt. P, app. 1 § 12.05 (requiring I.Q. score of 70 or less). The

Guidelines were sufficient to meet the burden of proof that Acosta

may perform other work in the national economy. 

We find that the Commissioner’s decision is supported by

substantial evidence, and thus AFFIRM the district court.

AFFIRMED.