Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

One Fish Two Fish, LLC v. Struif, 2021 IL App (1st) 191441

Appellate Court 

Caption

ONE FISH TWO FISH, LLC; MK-II LLC; and MICHAEL 

KORNICK, Plaintiffs and Counterdefendants, v. CARYN STRUIF, 

f/k/a Caryn M. Bobrowski, Defendant, Counterplaintiff, and ThirdParty Plaintiff-Appellee and Cross-Appellant (One Fish Two Fish, 

LLC, and Michael Kornick, Plaintiffs and CounterdefendantsAppellants and Cross-Appellees; Lisa Koch, Third-Party Defendant 

and Cross-Appellee).

District & No. First District, Second Division 

No. 1-19-1441

Filed March 16, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 03-CH-2517; the 

Hon. Diane J. Larsen, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Counsel on

Appeal

Peter A. Cantwell and Daniel L. Chapman, of Cantwell & Cantwell, 

of Chicago, for cross-appellant.

David H. Latham, of ASG Law LLC, of Chicago, for cross-appellees.
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Panel JUSTICE PUCINSKI delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Fitzgerald Smith and Justice Lavin concurred in the 

judgment and opinion. 

OPINION

¶ 1 Counterplaintiff, third-party plaintiff, and cross-appellant Caryn Struif appeals from 

several orders entered by the trial court in relation to her claims against counterdefendants One 

Fish Two Fish, LLC (OFTF), and Michael Kornick and third-party defendant Lisa Koch. Struif 

contends that the trial court erred in concluding that her claims against Kornick were barred 

by the one-refiling rule under section 13-217 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 

5/13-217 (West 1994)),1 her claims against Koch were barred by the applicable statute of 

limitations, and her claimed costs must be reduced. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in 

part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 This case arises out of a failed business relationship between Struif and Kornick. In 1998, 

Kornick, a chef, opened mk restaurant in Chicago, with Struif acting as general manager. MKI, LLC, owned mk restaurant. In turn, OFTF owned a membership interest in and was the 

managing member of MK-I. Kornick owned an 81.8% interest in OFTF, while Struif owned 

the remaining 18.2%. Kornick was the sole manager of OFTF. MK-I made distributions of 

revenue from mk restaurant to OFTF, which, in turn, distributed those monies to Kornick and 

Struif.

¶ 4 On July 9, 2002, Kornick terminated Struif’s employment. On July 12, 2002, Kornick sent 

a letter to Struif, indicating his intent to exercise his option to purchase Struif’s interest in 

OFTF pursuant to the OFTF operating agreement. On December 13, 2002, Struif responded to 

Kornick, demanding $181,612.68 for her interest. On January 27, 2003, Kornick sent Struif 

70% of her demanded amount, which reflected a deduction under the OFTF operating 

agreement because Struif was employed for less than five years. Struif rejected this amount.

¶ 5 In February 2003, plaintiffs OFTF, MK-II, and Kornick filed their complaint in this case 

(State Case I). In it, they brought claims for specific performance, declaratory judgment, and 

breach of fiduciary duty. These claims arose out of the dispute over Kornick’s attempted 

purchase of Struif’s interest in OFTF and a separate dispute regarding Struif’s involvement in 

a second restaurant venture, MK North.

¶ 6 In October 2003, Struif filed a nine-count complaint in the federal district court. In addition 

to alleging facts related to her employment at mk restaurant and membership in OFTF, Struif 

also alleged that in 2001 she and Kornick worked together to plan the opening of a second 

restaurant, MK North, in Northfield, Illinois. Similar to the ownership and management 

structure of mk restaurant, MK North was to be owned by MK-II. Red Fish, Blue Fish, LLC 

1This version of section 13-217 of the Code is currently in effect because it predates the 

amendments of Public Act 89-7, § 15 (eff. Mar. 9, 1995), which was found to be unconstitutional in its 

entirety in Best v. Taylor Machine Works, 179 Ill. 2d 367 (1997).
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(RFBF), was to be a member in and managing member of MK-II. In return for overseeing the 

development, management, and operation of MK North, Kornick offered Struif a 14.286% 

ownership interest in RFBF and an additional $25,000 in annual compensation. Struif accepted 

this offer. Struif alleged that, despite this agreement and despite Struif fulfilling her duties 

under the agreement, she was not given her ownership interest in RFBF or paid any additional 

compensation.

¶ 7 In count I of the federal complaint, Struif alleged that Kornick, as an agent of MK-I, OFTF, 

MK-II, and RFBF, created a hostile work environment for Struif and terminated her 

employment because of her sex and intent to have a family, in violation of Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (2000)) and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 

(42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000)). In count II, Struif alleged that Kornick breached his fiduciary duty 

to her by failing to make distributions to her from OFTF, terminating her employment without 

cause and in bad faith, and reducing the cash income of OFTF in order to reduce his purchase 

price of Struif’s interest in OFTF. Count III sought from Kornick an accounting of OFTF’s 

and RFBF’s income and profits. Count IV sought a declaration of the value of Struif’s interest 

in OFTF. Count V alleged breach of contract against MK-I for failing to pay Struif 

compensation for her work at MK North. Count VI against MK-I

2 sought recovery of unpaid 

wages for her work at MK North under the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act (820 

ILCS 115/1 et seq. (West 2000)). In counts VII and VIII, under theories of quantum meruit

and unjust enrichment, Struif sought payment from MK-II and RFBF for work she performed 

at MK North. Finally, in count IX, Struif sought specific performance and an accounting from 

Kornick, MK-II, and RFBF, based on her allegations that she had not been given her promised 

ownership interest in RFBF, her compensation for work performed at MK North, or income

distributions from RFBF.

¶ 8 On April 1, 2004, Struif filed a notice of voluntary dismissal of her state-law claims against 

Kornick in the federal case. In response, on the same day, the federal court entered a minute 

order dismissing Kornick. The order did not state whether it was with or without prejudice. A 

little over a month later, on May 5, 2004, in a separate order, the federal court noted that a 

motion to dismiss previously filed by Kornick was rendered moot by Struif’s voluntary 

dismissal of her claims against Kornick. The federal court then stated, “Accordingly, [Struif’s] 

claims against defendant Kornick are dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice, and counts II, 

III, and IV, which were directed solely towards defendant Kornick, are dismissed in their 

entirety, with prejudice.”

¶ 9 On September 7, 2004, OFTF, MK-II, and Kornick voluntarily dismissed their claims in 

the present case. The trial court permitted Struif to refile her affirmative defenses in this case 

as counterclaims. Over the following two years, Struif filed several versions of her 

counterclaim, which were all dismissed.

¶ 10 In September 2006, Struif filed her fourth amended counterclaim, which contained nine 

counts against Kornick, OFTF, MK-I, RFBF, and MK-II, based on essentially the same facts 

as alleged in her federal complaint. In count I against Kornick, Struif alleged that Kornick 

breached his fiduciary duty by failing to make distributions of income from MK-I to OFTF 

and from OFTF to Struif, terminating Struif’s employment without cause and in bad faith, and 

2

It is unclear why Struif sought recovery from MK-I in counts V and VI for unpaid compensation 

for her work at MK North, rather than MK-II, the owner of MK North.
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artificially reducing the purchase price of Struif’s interest in OFTF. In count II against Kornick, 

Struif alleged that Kornick breached his fiduciary duty in failing to make distributions from 

MK-II to RFBF and from RFBF to Struif, failing to transfer a 14.286% ownership interest in 

RFBF to Struif, and failing to ensure Struif received her share of profits from MK North. Count 

III sought a declaratory judgment of the value of Struif’s interest in OFTF. Count IV sought 

an accounting of the income and profits of OFTF and RFBF. Count V alleged that MK-II, 

RFBF, and Kornick were unjustly enriched by the services performed by Struif. Count VI 

sought specific performance and an accounting from MK-II, RFBF, and Kornick, namely, that 

they transfer a 14.286% ownership interest in RFBF to Struif, that they account for all amounts 

owed to Struif as income distributions pursuant to that ownership interest, and that they pay 

Struif reasonable compensation for her services. In count VII, Struif alleged that MK-II, RFBF, 

and Kornick breached their agreement with her when they failed to pay her the agreed-upon 

additional compensation for the work she performed in relation to MK North. Count VIII also 

sought recovery of her unpaid MK North compensation, just under the Illinois Wage Payment 

and Collection Act. Finally, in count IX, under a theory of quantum meruit, Struif sought 

payment for her services from MK-II, RFBF, and Kornick.

¶ 11 Kornick, MK-I, OFTF, MK-II, and RFBF filed a motion to strike Struif’s fourth amended 

counterclaim. First, they argued that Struif’s claims against Kornick were barred by 

res judicata, because they were previously dismissed with prejudice by the federal court. They 

also argued that Struif’s claims against Kornick in counts I and III were barred by res judicata

and collateral estoppel based on substantive determinations made by the federal court. In 

addition, they argued that Struif’s fourth amended counterclaim did not comply with the trial 

court’s order dismissing Struif’s third amended counterclaim, in that the fourth amended 

counterclaim repleaded a number of claims that had been previously dismissed. 

¶ 12 On March 21, 2007, the trial court granted the motion to strike with respect to the claims 

against Kornick, finding that they were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. More 

specifically, the trial court concluded that all the claims brought against Kornick in Struif’s 

fourth amended counterclaim were identical to or arose out of the same operative facts as the 

claims Struif brought against Kornick in the federal case and, thus, the federal court’s May 5, 

2004, dismissal with prejudice barred any such claims in the present case. The trial court noted 

that its decision did not affect Struif’s claims against MK-I, OFTF, MK-II, and RFBF.

¶ 13 Two months later, in May 2007, Struif filed a motion in the federal court, seeking to amend 

the May 5, 2004, order. In that motion, Struif argued that, because her voluntary dismissal of 

her claims against Kornick in the federal case was done under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

41(a)(1), which allows for a voluntary dismissal of claims without prejudice, the federal court 

lacked the jurisdiction to dismiss her claims with prejudice. Thus, according to Struif, the 

federal court’s order was void in that respect. In addition, Struif argued that the federal court 

had dismissed her claims against Kornick on April 1, 2004, and, accordingly, lacked 

jurisdiction to enter a second dismissal order on May 5, 2004.

¶ 14 On July 2, 2007, while Struif’s motion to amend the May 5, 2004, order was still pending 

in the federal court, Struif filed a second state court case (State Case II) against MK-I, RFBF, 

Kornick, and Lisa Koch. The claims brought by Struif in State Case II were similar to those 

brought by her in State Case I and the federal case.

¶ 15 Shortly thereafter, on July 19, 2007, the federal court granted Struif’s motion and amended 

the May 5, 2004, order to read “without prejudice” instead of “with prejudice.”
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¶ 16 On March 28, 2008, Struif voluntarily dismissed her claims in State Case II.

¶ 17 On May 13, 2008, in the present case, Struif filed a motion to reconsider the dismissal of 

her claims against Kornick. Struif argued that the federal court’s May 5, 2004, order dismissing 

her claims against Kornick with prejudice was void and that the federal court corrected it to 

reflect a dismissal without prejudice. Because the May 5, 2004, order was void, Struif argued, 

it could not be the basis of a res judicata finding. Accordingly, Struif requested that the trial 

court vacate its March 21, 2007, order and reinstate her claims against Kornick.

¶ 18 In response, Kornick, OFTF, and MK-II argued, among other things, that under section 13-

217 of the Code, Struif was permitted only one refiling of her voluntarily dismissed claims and 

that she had refiled hers twice: once in the present case and again in State Case II. Accordingly, 

they argued, even if her claims against Kornick were reinstated, they would have to be 

dismissed again.

¶ 19 Struif argued in reply that the reinstatement of her claims against Kornick in the present 

case would not be an additional filing but instead would simply be a reinstatement of the claims 

she had filed prior to instituting State Case II.

¶ 20 On August 20, 2008, the trial court vacated its dismissal of Struif’s claims against Kornick 

on the basis of res judicata, because the federal court’s May 5, 2004, order, purporting to be a 

dismissal of the federal claims against Kornick with prejudice, was void. The trial court went 

on, however, to deny Struif’s request that her claims against Kornick be reinstated, concluding 

that Struif used her one opportunity to refile her voluntarily dismissed claims under section 13-

217 of the Code when she filed State Case II. Struif filed a motion to reconsider this order, 

which the trial court denied.

¶ 21 In November 2011, Struif was granted leave to file her fifth amended counterclaim. 

Although she was precluded from naming Kornick as a counterdefendant, the trial court 

granted her leave to add third-party claims against Koch.

¶ 22 Despite the trial court’s directives, the fifth amended counterclaim that Struif filed 

contained claims against Kornick. In fact, Kornick was named as a defendant in 11 of the 13 

counts. These claims were essentially the same as those alleged in previous versions of Struif’s 

counterclaims. In addition to these claims directed against Kornick, Struif alleged that in 2002 

Kornick and OFTF, in violation of the OFTF operating agreement, unilaterally transferred 

Struif’s ownership interest in OFTF and its resulting income to Koch, Kornick’s wife. Struif 

also alleged that, instead of transferring to her the promised 14.286% interest in RFBF, Kornick 

and RFBF transferred that interest and its resulting income to Koch. Based on these additional 

factual allegations, Struif brought claims against Koch alleging breach of the OFTF operating 

agreement, specific performance and accounting, unjust enrichment, and conversion/

constructive trust.

¶ 23 On motions filed by Kornick, OFTF, MK-I, RFBF, MK-II, and Koch, the trial court 

dismissed many of the claims contained in the fifth amended counterclaim. The trial court 

dismissed the claims against MK-I and RFBF on the basis that they were barred by the onerefiling rule under section 13-217 of the Code, because the claims arose out of the same 

operative facts as those alleged in the federal case and State Case II. The trial court also 

dismissed all the claims against Kornick with prejudice, on the basis that it had denied Struif 

leave to include claims against Kornick in the fifth amended counterclaim. As for the claims 

against Koch, the trial court concluded that they were barred by the statute of limitations, 
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because Struif knew or should have known of those claims at the time she filed her federal case 

in 2003. In the end, only a few of the original claims against OFTF and MK-II remained.

¶ 24 Struif filed additional amended pleadings before the matter finally proceeded to a bench 

trial on five counts from her seventh amended counterclaim, namely, declaratory judgment and 

accounting claims against OFTF and unjust enrichment, Illinois Wage Payment and Collection 

Act, and quantum meruit claims against MK-II. After hearing the evidence, the trial court 

concluded that Struif was entitled to declaratory relief against OFTF. Specifically, the trial 

court held that OFTF could not continue to allow Struif’s interest in OFTF to be transferred 

until she was offered compensation for it by Kornick in the amount of $127,128.64 plus 

interest. If Kornick made no such offer within 30 days, then OFTF was required to revest Struif 

with her interest and pay her any distributions missed since January 2003. In addition, because 

Struif still held her ownership interest in OFTF in August 2002, she was entitled to her share 

of the distribution made that month—$30,030 plus prejudgment interest. Struif was denied 

relief on her other claims. Finally, the trial court granted Struif leave to file a petition for costs 

under section 2-701(e) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-701(e) (West 2016)).

¶ 25 Shortly thereafter, Struif filed her petition for costs in which she sought total costs in the 

amount of $82,092.54. In the supporting affidavit, Struif’s counsel broke down the costs as 

follows:

Long distance telephone expense $7.87

Postage/proof of service expense $125.14

Photocopying expense $13,856.60

Outside photocopy services $148.44

Telefax expense $287.90

Westlaw research $58,787.23

Court reporters-appearance and transcripts $8144.86

Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County $393.10

Sheriff of Cook County $266.40

Subpoena fees $75

In response, OFTF argued that recoverable costs included only court costs, not long-distance 

telephone, Westlaw research, photocopying, or fax fees. OFTF also argued that Struif failed to 

justify her court reporter, sheriff, and subpoena fees and that she did not submit any 

documentary evidence in support of her claimed fees. 

¶ 26 At an initial hearing on Struif’s petition, the parties argued over whether some of the 

claimed fees were related to the federal case. The trial court directed counsel for OFTF to 

provide Struif’s counsel with a list of specific charges that OFTF claimed were improper. In 

turn, Struif’s counsel was to provide OFTF’s counsel with documentary evidence in support 

of those charges. That documentary evidence was then to be filed with the court under seal, 

and the matter was set for another hearing. The record does not contain OFTF’s specific 

objections, Struif’s responses or supporting evidence, or a transcript of the subsequent hearing 

on Struif’s petition for costs.

¶ 27 On September 24, 2018, the trial court entered its final judgment order, which incorporated 

its trial decision and ruled on Struif’s petition for costs. In that order, the trial court awarded 

Struif costs totaling $69,369.14. The trial court noted that the reductions to the costs were in 
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response to challenges by OFTF to specific line items and were made for reasons stated on the 

record. 

¶ 28 Both Struif and OFTF filed posttrial motions, which the trial court denied. OFTF appealed, 

and Struif cross-appealed. OFTF later voluntarily dismissed its appeal, leaving only Struif’s 

cross-appeal for our consideration.

¶ 29 ANALYSIS

¶ 30 On appeal, Struif argues that the trial court erred in refusing to reinstate her claims against 

Kornick on the basis that they were precluded by the one refiling rule under section 13-217 of 

the Code, dismissing her claims against Koch as time-barred, and reducing her claimed costs 

where OFTF did not file a counteraffidavit. We address each of these contentions in turn.

¶ 31 Reinstatement of Claims Against Kornick

¶ 32 Struif first argues that her claims against Kornick should have been reinstated because 

(1) Kornick engaged in a deliberate scheme to have the claims against him dismissed by taking 

advantage of the scrivener’s error in the federal court’s May 5, 2004, order and (2) the 

reinstatement of her erroneously dismissed claims in the present case did not constitute an 

impermissible refiling under section 13-217 of the Code. Because we agree that reinstatement 

of Struif’s claims against Kornick was not barred by section 13-217 of the Code, we need not 

address Struif’s contention that Kornick acted with ill intent in pursuing the dismissal of those 

claims.

¶ 33 Section 13-217 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/13-217 (West 1994)) provides in relevant part: 

“In the actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or any other act or contract where 

the time for commencing an action is limited, if *** the action is voluntarily dismissed 

by the plaintiff, *** then, whether or not the time limitation for bringing such action 

expires during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff *** may commence a new 

action within one year or within the remaining period of limitation, whichever is 

greater, *** after the action is voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiff ***.”

A plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses his case is entitled to only one refiling of the same cause 

of action under section 13-217. Flesner v. Youngs Development Co., 145 Ill. 2d 252, 254 

(1991). In determining whether a claim is the same cause of action, we look to res judicata

principles, which consider claims to be the same cause of action if they arise from a single 

group of operative facts. Schrager v. Grossman, 321 Ill. App. 3d 750, 755 (2000). “Although 

a single group of operative facts may give rise to the assertion of more than one kind of relief 

or more than one theory of recovery, assertions of different kinds or theories of relief arising 

out of a single group of operative facts constitute but a single cause of action.” Torcasso v. 

Standard Outdoor Sales, Inc., 157 Ill. 2d 484, 490-91 (1993).

¶ 34 Here, there is no dispute that Struif’s claims against Kornick in the federal case and the 

two state cases arise out of a single group of operative facts. There is also no dispute that the 

May 5, 2004, federal court order erroneously stated that Struif’s claims against Kornick in the 

federal case were dismissed with prejudice and that the trial court concluded that Struif’s 

claims against Kornick in the present case were barred by res judicata based on the erroneous 

May 5, 2004, federal court order. Thus, the sole question presented to us is whether, upon 

vacating the res judicata dismissal of Struif’s claims against Kornick, the reinstatement of 
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those claims would constitute the “commence[ment of] a new action” under section 13-217. 

We conclude that it does not, because Struif was not seeking to refile or reinitiate her claims 

anew but instead was simply attempting to correct the erroneous, involuntary dismissal of her 

claims in the present case.

¶ 35 Struif voluntarily dismissed her federal case claims against Kornick in April 2004. In 

September 2004, she refiled those claims as counterclaims in the present case, which 

constituted her one refiling permitted by section 13-217. In March 2007, the trial court 

dismissed Struif’s claims against Kornick on the reasonable but mistaken3 belief that they 

were barred by res judicata. In July 2007, while waiting for the federal court to rule on her 

motion to amend the May 5, 2004, order, Struif refiled her claims against Kornick a second 

time, this time in State Case II. She later voluntarily dismissed those claims in March 2008. In 

May 2008, based on the federal court’s correction of the May 5, 2004, order to read “without 

prejudice,” Struif asked the trial court to reconsider its res judicata dismissal of her claims 

against Kornick in the present case and to reinstate those claims. The trial court vacated the 

dismissal of the claims on the basis that the May 5, 2004, federal court order was void but 

denied Struif’s request to reinstate the claims, because to do so would be tantamount to an 

impermissible refiling under section 13-217, given that she had used her one opportunity to 

refile when she filed State Case II.

¶ 36 First, the trial court was incorrect in its conclusion that State Case II was Struif’s one 

permitted refiling. It is clear that, after Struif voluntarily dismissed her claims against Kornick 

in the federal court, she was entitled to only one refiling of those claims under section 13-217. 

She used that one refiling when she filed her counterclaims in the present case in September 

2004. Accordingly, contrary to the trial court’s conclusion, State Case II was not Struif’s one 

permitted refiling. Rather, State Case II was an improper second refiling and would have been 

subject to dismissal on that basis had Struif not voluntarily dismissed it first. Given that Struif 

had already used her one refiling when she filed her counterclaims in the present case, the fact 

that she had made additional, improper refilings at the time she filed her motion to reconsider 

the dismissal of her claims against Kornick in the present case is completely irrelevant to the 

question of whether the claims should have been reinstated.

¶ 37 More importantly, however, the trial court erred in concluding that reinstatement of Struif’s 

claims against Kornick in the present case would have been tantamount to an impermissible 

second (or third) refiling. Unlike situations where a plaintiff attempts to refile her claims a 

second time after she has voluntarily dismissed them and her one permitted refiling has been 

dismissed, Struif was not, once again, seeking to refile and pursue her claims for a third time 

in the face of such dismissals. Rather, through no fault of her own, Struif’s properly refiled 

claims in the present case were erroneously and involuntarily dismissed, and she was simply 

trying to correct that error when she sought to have the dismissal vacated and her claims 

reinstated. Reinstatement of her claims after correcting that erroneous dismissal would not be 

3

We say reasonable because the trial court relied on an order that stated the dismissal of Struif’s 

claims against Kornick was with prejudice, which would ordinarily bar her refiled claims against 

Kornick on the basis of res judicata. We also say mistaken, however, because the order on which the 

trial court relied—the federal court’s order of May 5, 2004—incorrectly stated that Struif’s voluntary 

dismissal of her claims against Kornick was with prejudice. 
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tantamount to initiating a new case; rather it would simply be a continuation of her already 

filed claims by restoring them to the status they should have had all along.

¶ 38 Our conclusion in this respect is supported by the case of National Underground 

Construction Co. v. E.A. Cox Co., 273 Ill. App. 3d 830 (1995). In that case, the plaintiff filed 

a declaratory judgment action against the defendant. The trial court granted summary judgment 

in favor of the defendant. On appeal, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s grant of 

summary judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. Id. at 832. Nearly two 

years later, the plaintiff filed a motion to reinstate the case pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court 

Rule 369(c) (eff. July 1, 1982). The trial court denied the plaintiff’s motion, and the plaintiff 

appealed. National Underground, 273 Ill. App. 3d at 832-33.

¶ 39 The appellate court ultimately affirmed the trial court’s decision on the basis that the 

plaintiff did not seek to reinstate its case under Rule 369(a) within a reasonable period of time. 

Id. at 836-37. In doing so, however, the appellate court rejected the defendant’s contention that 

the plaintiff’s attempt to reinstate its claims more than one year after remand was barred by 

section 13-217. The court noted that section 13-217 does not specifically address the effect of 

a mandate remanding a case. In addition, it observed that the reinstatement of a case after 

remand does not constitute the filing of a new action and, thus, by its own terms, section 13-

217 did not apply. Id. at 834; see also Richter v. Prairie Farms Dairy, Inc., 2016 IL 119518, 

¶ 48 (“A refiled action pursuant to section 13-217 is not a restatement of the old action, but an 

entirely new and separate action.”); Dubina v. Mesirow Realty Development, Inc., 178 Ill. 2d 

496, 504 (1997) (“We note that the refiled action is an entirely new and separate action, not a 

reinstatement of the old action. *** The original and refiled actions are completely distinct 

actions.”).

¶ 40 Obviously, the situation before us does not involve the reinstatement of claims following 

remand. Nevertheless, we find the reinstatement of claims following the trial court’s vacating 

of an erroneous dismissal to be analogous to the reinstatement of claims following the appellate 

court’s reversal of an erroneous dismissal. In neither situation is the plaintiff filing a new action 

as required for the application of section 13-217. Rather, in both situations, the plaintiff is 

simply seeking to place her already existing claims in the same procedural place as they would 

have been had the trial court not erred in dismissing them. To hold that the reinstatement of 

claims following the correction of an erroneous involuntary dismissal is tantamount to filing a 

new action under section 13-217 would essentially preclude plaintiffs who had used their one 

permitted refiling under section 13-217 from seeking the correction of erroneous involuntary 

dismissals of their refiled claims. Such cannot be the case.

¶ 41 Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying Struif’s request that her 

claims against Kornick be reinstated after the trial court vacated its dismissal based on 

res judicata.

¶ 42 Dismissal of Claims Against Koch

¶ 43 Struif next argues that the trial court erred in dismissing her conversion claim (count XIII 

of the fifth amended counterclaim) against Koch on the basis that it was barred by the statute 

of limitations. Struif contends that, under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations did not 

begin to run until May 2010, when she received a response to a subpoena issued to OFTF’s 

accountant and learned that her 18.2% interest in OFTF had been transferred to Koch. We 

disagree.
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¶ 44 Koch’s motion to dismiss Struif’s claims against her on the basis of the statute of 

limitations was brought pursuant to section 2-619(a)(5) of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(5) 

(West 2010)). A motion to dismiss brought pursuant to section 2-619 of the Code is designed 

to allow for the disposition of issues of law and easily proved issues of fact. O’Hare Truck 

Service, Inc. v. Illinois State Police, 284 Ill. App. 3d 941, 945 (1996). Under such motions, the 

legal sufficiency of the complaint is admitted, as are all well-pleaded facts. Brock v. Anderson 

Road Ass’n, 287 Ill. App. 3d 16, 21 (1997). The relevant question in assessing the propriety of 

a dismissal under section 2-619 is whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact that 

precludes dismissal or, in the absence of such an issue of fact, whether dismissal is proper as a 

matter of law. Id. Our review is de novo. Id.

¶ 45 Neither of the parties disputes that Struif’s conversion claim against Koch is subject to a 

five-year statute of limitations. See 735 ILCS 5/13-205 (West 2002). Under the discovery rule, 

a cause of action accrues, i.e., the statute of limitations begins to run, when “the plaintiff knows 

or reasonably should know of an injury and also knows or reasonably should know that the 

injury was caused by the wrongful acts of another.” Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 

2d 161, 169 (1981). This does not mean that the plaintiff must know of the defendant’s 

negligent conduct before the statute of limitations begins to run. Id. at 170. Rather, “when a 

party knows or reasonably should know both that an injury has occurred and that it was 

wrongfully caused, the statute begins to run and the party is under an obligation to inquire 

further to determine whether an actionable wrong was committed.” Id. at 171. In situations 

where a plaintiff knows or reasonably should know that her injury was caused by one source 

but is unaware of another source of her injury that could not have been discovered through 

diligent inquiry, the statute of limitations does not begin to run with respect to the second 

source of injury until it becomes discoverable through diligent inquiry. Mitsias v. I-Flow Corp., 

2011 IL App (1st) 101126, ¶ 31. It is unnecessary that the plaintiff know the specific identity 

of the tortfeasor before the statute of limitations will begin to run. See Guarantee Trust Life 

Insurance Co. v. Kribbs, 2016 IL App (1st) 160672, ¶ 30 (noting that the notion that knowledge 

of the identity of the tortfeasor is a prerequisite to the running of the statute of limitations has 

been repeatedly rejected by Illinois courts); Wells v. Travis, 284 Ill. App. 3d 282, 287 (1996) 

(“Knowledge that an injury has been ‘wrongfully caused’ does not mean knowledge of a 

specific defendant’s negligent conduct.”). Unless the facts are undisputed and there is only one 

conclusion that may be drawn from them, when a party knew or should have known of the 

injury and its probable wrongful cause is a question of fact. Nolan, 85 Ill. 2d at 171.

¶ 46 Here, the trial court found that Struif knew of or should have known of her injury resulting 

from the transfer of her ownership interest in OFTF no later than the time she filed her claims 

in federal court in October 2003. We assume, based on the trial court’s statement that Struif’s 

loss of income (distributions from her OFTF interest) was a continual effect of an initial 

violation (the divestment of her ownership interest in OFTF), that the trial court believed that 

Struif knew or should have known that she had been divested of her interest in OFTF because 

she had not received her share of distributions from OFTF. 

¶ 47 We do not believe that the fact that Struif did not receive her share of OFTF distributions 

necessarily means, as a matter of law, that she had been completely divested of her ownership 

interest in OFTF. Nevertheless, we do agree that the statute of limitations began to run no later 

than October 2003, when Struif filed her claims in federal court. At that time, there is no dispute 

that Struif knew that she had not received her share of the OFTF distributions. There is also no 
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dispute that she knew that the withholding of her share of the distributions was wrongful. This 

wrongful withholding of her share of the OFTF distributions triggered the running of the statute 

of limitations and Struif’s obligation to investigate further the cause of that wrongful 

withholding (i.e., the transfer of her interest in OFTF to Koch) and whether an actionable 

wrong had been committed. See id. (“[W]hen a party knows or reasonably should know both 

that an injury has occurred and that it was wrongfully caused, the statute begins to run and the 

party is under an obligation to inquire further to determine whether an actionable wrong was 

committed.”). 

¶ 48 Notably, Struif does not argue that she did not or could not have known of her injury or 

that her obligation to investigate further into the cause of her injury was not triggered as of 

October 2003. Instead, Struif focuses on the fact that she did not know that Koch, specifically, 

was the recipient of Struif’s ownership interest in OFTF and the resulting income, arguing that 

there were two sources of her injury: Kornick and Koch. We disagree. First, as discussed 

above, it is unnecessary for Struif to have specifically known Koch’s identity before the statute 

of limitations would begin to run. See Guarantee Trust, 2016 IL App (1st) 160672, ¶ 30; Wells, 

284 Ill. App. 3d at 287. Second, although Kornick and Koch might have been two separate 

tortfeasors, they were not two separate sources of her injuries. The source of her injury was 

the transfer of her ownership interest—whether to Koch or anyone else—which then resulted 

in the injury of Struif not being paid her share of distributions from OFTF. As stated above, no 

later than October 2003, Struif knew of this injury—the wrongful withholding of her share of 

distributions—and had an obligation to investigate its cause—the wrongful transfer of her 

interest in OFTF. 

¶ 49 Struif makes a number of additional arguments in an attempt to avoid the application of 

the statute of limitations: Kornick and OFTF fraudulently concealed Struif’s cause of action 

against Koch by resisting and evading discovery, Kornick transferred Struif’s interest in OFTF 

to Koch in an attempt to insulate himself from judgment and hide Struif’s cause of action 

against Koch, Kornick owed Struif a fiduciary duty to disclose his transfer of Struif’s interest 

to Koch, and Koch was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations defense, 

because she never let on to Struif that Kornick had transferred Struif’s interest to her. These 

arguments do not warrant reversal of the trial court’s decision.

¶ 50 First, the claim that Kornick and OFTF fraudulently concealed Struif’s cause of action 

against Koch by resisting and evading discovery appears to primarily be based on speculation 

regarding Kornick’s and OFTF’s alleged fraudulent intent. Specifically, Struif claims that 

Kornick and OFTF made frivolous objections to discovery requests, refused to produce 

documents, requested substitutions of judge for the sole purpose of delaying proceedings, and 

lulled Struif with “good faith” attempts at mediation. Although the record reflects that Kornick 

and OFTF made objections to discovery requests, filed for substitutions of judge, and requested 

mediation, the characterization of the objections as frivolous, the motions for substitutions as 

being solely for delay, and the requests for mediation as attempts to lull Struif are made only 

by Struif and are not supported by the record on appeal. Moreover, Struif has not included in 

the record on appeal any transcripts of hearings related to the parties’ motions to compel 

discovery, motions for substitution of judge, or requests for mediation. Therefore, there is 

nothing in the record from which we can glean ill intent by Kornick and OFTF. See Foutch v. 

O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984) (“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a 

sufficiently complete record of the proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the 
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absence of such a record on appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court 

was in conformity with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise 

from the incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.”).

¶ 51 Struif’s claim that Kornick fraudulently transferred Struif’s interest in OFTF to Koch for 

the purpose of insulating himself from judgment and to conceal the cause of action against 

Koch also has no bearing on our decision. The reason that Kornick transferred Struif’s interest 

in OFTF to Koch is irrelevant to the determination of when the statute of limitations began to 

run. In addition, we think the defect in Struif’s contention that Kornick transferred Struif’s 

interest to Koch for the purpose of concealing Struif’s cause of action against Koch based on 

the transfer of her interest is readily apparent: she is essentially arguing that Kornick transferred 

her interest to keep her from discovering that her interest had been transferred. This argument 

defies logic and certainly does not warrant reversal.

¶ 52 Struif’s final two contentions—that Kornick owed Struif a fiduciary duty to disclose the 

transfer to Koch and that Koch was equitably estopped from asserting a statute of limitations 

defense—were raised for the first time in Struif’s posttrial motion. Issues raised for the first 

time in a posttrial motion are waived and will not be considered. Obermeier v. Northwestern 

Memorial Hospital, 2019 IL App (1st) 170553, ¶ 132; Zdeb v. Baxter International, Inc., 297 

Ill. App. 3d 622, 630 (1998).

¶ 53 In sum, for the above reasons, we conclude that the statute of limitations on Struif’s 

conversion claim against Koch began to run no later than October 2003. Accordingly, more 

than five years had passed by the time Struif filed her conversion claim against Koch in 

November 2011, and the trial court did not err in dismissing that claim on the basis that it was 

time-barred.

¶ 54 Petition for Costs

¶ 55 Finally, Struif argues that the trial court erred in reducing her costs on the basis that some 

of them were related to the federal case, because OFTF did not file a counteraffidavit refuting 

her claim that all the costs were related to the present case. Struif asserts that, absent a 

counteraffidavit, her assertion that all the costs were related to this case must be taken as true. 

Struif’s contention fails for several reasons.

¶ 56 First, it is not apparent from the record that the trial court reduced Struif’s claimed costs 

solely on the basis that some of them were related to the federal case. Following the filing of 

Struif’s petition and OFTF’s response, the trial court held a hearing on July 20, 2017. At that 

hearing, counsel for OFTF expressed concern that some of the claimed costs were actually 

related to the federal court litigation. Counsel for Struif denied that any of the included costs 

were related to the federal case. The trial court indicated that if any of the claimed costs were, 

in fact, related to the federal case, then it would disallow them. Despite Struif’s contention to 

the contrary, however, at the July 20, 2017, hearing, the trial court did not reduce any of the 

claimed costs based on their relationship to the federal case. Rather, the trial court continued 

the matter and entered an order directing counsel for OFTF to provide Struif’s counsel with a 

list of specific line items OFTF contested, permitting Struif the opportunity to respond to those 

line items and file supporting documentation, and setting the matter for another hearing. In the 

final judgment order entered on September 24, 2018, the trial court awarded Struif a reduced 

amount of costs, “as adjusted by the Court for the reasons stated on the record, after making 

deductions for line items of costs challenged by [OFTF] and allowed by the Court.” The record 
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does not contain OFTF’s specific objections, Struif’s response to those objections, or a 

transcript of the subsequent hearing on the petition. Thus, it is not clear from the record that 

the reason the trial court reduced Struif’s costs was because some of them were related to the 

federal case. Accordingly, the fact that OFTF did not submit a counteraffidavit supporting its 

contention that some of the costs were related to the federal case is not, on the record before 

us, alone sufficient to warrant reversing the trial court’s award of costs.

¶ 57 Second, we observe that, in its initial written response to Struif’s petition for costs, OFTF 

argued that some of the claimed costs were not allowed by law, others were not justified by 

Struif as necessary expenses, and still others were unsupported by documentary evidence. 

Accordingly, not all of OFTF’s arguments against Struif’s claimed costs were based on factual 

disputes. Rather, OFTF argued that a number of claimed costs simply were not allowed by law. 

Because such arguments were based on legal arguments and not factual disputes, the lack of a 

counteraffidavit does not preclude a reduction of costs on those bases.

¶ 58 Finally, Struif’s failure to include in the record on appeal OFTF’s specific objections to the 

claimed costs, Struif’s response to those objections, Struif’s supporting documentation, and a 

transcript of the subsequent hearing at which those objections were addressed and the trial 

court stated its reasons for reducing the claimed costs precludes us from conducting any 

meaningful review of the trial court’s decision to reduce Struif’s claimed costs.

“[A]n appellant has the burden to present a sufficiently complete record of the 

proceedings at trial to support a claim of error, and in the absence of such a record on 

appeal, it will be presumed that the order entered by the trial court was in conformity 

with law and had a sufficient factual basis. Any doubts which may arise from the 

incompleteness of the record will be resolved against the appellant.” Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d 

at 391-92. 

Absent the parties’ supplemental filings regarding Struif’s petition for costs and a transcript of 

the hearing at which the trial court addressed and ruled on OFTF’s specific objections, we have 

no basis on which to conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in reducing Struif’s 

claimed costs. See id. at 392 (“As there is no transcript of the hearing on the motion to vacate 

here, there is no basis for holding that the trial court abused discretion in denying the motion.”); 

see also Riley Acquisitions, Inc. v. Drexler, 408 Ill. App. 3d 397, 408 (2011) (“We review a 

trial court’s order on a petition for costs for abuse of discretion.”).

¶ 59 In sum, we conclude that the absence of a counteraffidavit filed by OFTF is not, alone, 

enough to warrant reversal of the trial court’s award of reduced costs, and the absence of a 

complete record on appeal otherwise precludes us from finding that the trial court abused its 

discretion in making its award.

¶ 60 CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is affirmed in 

part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision.

¶ 62 Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.