### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON Ja nua ry 6, 200 9 S es sio n

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. JEFF REY SC OTT

Direc t Appeal from the Cr iminal Cou rt f or Shelby Coun ty Nos. 04-04155-56 W. Otis Higgs, Jr., Judge

No. W2007-01630-C CA-R 3-CD - Filed April 20, 2009

The de fenda nt, Jeffr ey Scott, was convicted by a S helby C ounty jury of t wo counts of aggr avate d robbery, a Class B f

el o n y ; conspi rac y to commit aggrava ted robbe ry, a Class C felony; and conspirac y to commit robbery and attempted robbery, both Class D f elonies. He was sente nced by the trial court to concurr ent terms of te n year s for the a ggravat ed robbe ry convic tions, three yea rs for the c onspiracy to c ommit aggravate d robbery conviction, and two ye ars e ach f or the c onspiracy to commit robbery and attempted robbery convictions. In a timely appeal to this court, the de fenda nt challenge s the sufficie ncy of the convicting evide nce a nd argue s that the trial court erre d in denying his moti on to suppr ess his state ment to police and in limiting de fense counsel’s c ross-exa mination of a w itness. Foll owing our re view, we aff irm the judgments of the trial court.
Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgments of the Cr iminal Cou rt A ffirm ed

A LA N E. G LE NN , J. , d e liv e re d th e op ini on of the c ou rt , in wh ic h J .C. M C L IN and C AM I LLE R. M C M ULLEN , JJ., joined.

Bruc e Ke lle y, Jr
., Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lla nt, Je ff

re y Sc ott

.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr
., At torne y G e ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Sop hia S. L e e , A ssi sta nt A tto rn e y G e ne ra l; William L. Gibbons, D istrict A ttorney Gene ral; and Patience Branham a nd Corliss S haw, Assistant District Attorneys Ge nera l, for the a ppellee, State of

Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

FA CT S

This case arises out of the October 10, 2003, arme d robbery of the de fe n dant’s plac e of

e mpl oy me nt, a

Me mph is U -H a ul s tor e . A Cr ime Sto pp e rs tip le d poli c e to que sti on the de fe nd a nt, who eve nt u al l y gave a

statement admitting that he had planne d the robbe ry with three other individuals, whom poli ce ide ntified as S ean Sumerall, Willie Wilson, Jr. and Le on Selmon. The She lby Cou nty Gr a ndJu ry su bs e qu e ntl y r e turne d two se pa rate ind ic tme nts a ga ins t the de fe nd a nt i n
c on ne c tio n w ith the c a se . I n th e fi rs t, the de fe nd a nt wa s c ha rg e d wi th Sum e ra ll wi th c on sp ir a c y to-2-

commit robbery a nd attempted robbery. In the second, the defe ndant was c harge d with Wilson and Selmon with conspirac y to commit aggra vated robbery and two counts of aggr avate d robbery. The State elec ted to try the def endant a lone, and he proce eded to tria l on all the cha rges on Febr

uary 26, 2007.

Suppr e ssi on H e ar ing

The de fenda nt filed pretrial motions t o suppress his s t at em en t, asserting that the police ini tiate d q ue sti on ing be fo re giv ing him Mir a nd a wa rn ing s. A su pp re ssi on he ari ng wa s he ld o n A pr il 12 and July 13, 2006. Sergea nt Michael Brown of the Memphis Police Depa rtment testified that he

was assigned to the Robbery Bureau in Nove mber 2003 a nd assisted Sergea nt Vivian Murra y in the investigation of the U-H aul robbe ry. He said that Sergea nt Murray c alled the de fenda nt and aske d him to come to the robbery offi ce t o be intervie wed a s a witness. Upon his ar rival, the de fenda nt

wa s ta ke n to a n in te rv ie w r oo m, w he re Se rg e a nt B ro wn a ndSe rg e a nt M ur ray f ir st r e a d h im h is righ ts and then ha d him read a few lines aloud t o ensure themselves of his ability to rea d. The de fenda nt appea red to und er s t an d h i s ri ghts, never a sked for a lawye r, and a gree d to talk to them about the robbery. Sergea nt Brow n identified two waiver of rights f orms signed by the def

endant, whic h wer e admitted as exhibits to the hearing: one exec uted on Novembe r 10, 2003, and a second on Novembe r 11, 2003. He testified that the substance of the de fenda nt’s statement wa s that he had planned the r obbery.

On cr oss-exa mination, Sergeant Brown w as aske d to review th e af fi d avit of complaint prepa red by Ser geant Murr ay on November 10, 2003, which stated tha t the defe ndant was a rre sted and brought to the robbe ry off ice on that date. In re sponse, h e t es tified that the def endant wa s “proba bly detained a nd brought” to the robbe ry off ice and place d on a 48-hour investigatory hold. He sa id that he and Ser geant Murr ay did not talk to the d ef endant about the robbery until after he

wa s b ro ug ht i nto the int e rr og a tio n roo m, ad vis e d of his ri gh ts, a nd sig ne d the wa ive r o f h is righ ts. He stated that the defendant’s statement was taken on November 11, if that was the date re flec ted on the s t at em en t , and that he had no re collection of w hat the def endant told them during the November

10 interview. H e did not rec all if he and Ser geant Murr ay told the def endant a bout the tipster who had pr ovided information about the c rime but said i f t hey did so, it would not have bee n
un til a ft e r the de fe nd a nt h a d s ign e d th e wa ive r o f righ ts.
Sergea nt Vivian Murra y testified t hat her investigation led her to develop four suspects: the defe ndant, Sumerall, Wilson, and Selmon. One of the other suspe cts told her that the de fenda nt, a U-Haul employee, ha d set up the robbe ry. She wa s not c erta in if the def endant c ame to the r obbery of fice on his ow n o r w he the r s he se nt p oli c e of fi c e rs to b ri ng him

in. Re ga rd le ss, sh e a sk e d h im wh e n h e go t to he r of

fi c e if he kn e w w hy he wa s th e re . H e ind ic a te d th a t he didno t, a ndsh e tol d him that be fo re sh e c ou ld e xp la in, sh e ha d to f ir st a dv ise him

of his Mir a nd a

ri gh ts. She a dv ise d h im of his rights, and he a gree d to w aive his rights a nd speak with he r about the crime. He then ga ve a statement admitting his invol vement in the robbe ry. She did not ask him a nything about the robbery until after he had waived hi s rights and agree d to speak to her about it. Sergea nt Murray ide ntified the def endant’ s statement, which wa s dated Nove mber 11, 2003.-3-

Upon re viewing her

aff idavit of complaint, Sergea nt Murray a cknowledge d that the defe ndant was br ought to the robbery office by police officer s. She conce ded that he wa s not free to l e a ve , b ut s a id tha t he wa s o nly “ fo rm a lly de ta ine d” a t tha t ti me a ndwa s n ot p la c e d u nd e r a rr e st until after he had given his statement. She had no memory of testifying at the pre liminary hearing that s h e d id n o t a d v is e h im o f h is r ig h ts u n ti l a f te r s h e a s k e d h im w h e th e r h e p ar ti c ip ated in the robbery and he told her he had. After revie wing her pr eliminary hea ring testimony, she explained that she might have be en conf used by def

ense c ounsel’s questions at that hea ring:

A. As confusing as that sounds, I mean, I may have been c onfused whe n you asked

me the qu e sti on

. I f

oll ow the sa me pr oto c ol w ith e ve ry on e . Be fo re I e ve n d isc us s
a ca se with anybody, you’re going to be advised of your Miranda rights befor e I e ven discuss a ca se with you. Every time, for seve nteen ye ars.
Q. But, on thi s particular day you testified that you didn’t?

A. That sounds very c onfusing.

Q. Th a t do e s?

A. It does, it sounds very confusing. I know that whe n [the de fenda nt] was br ought into our office
, befor e I even spoke with him about any details of that ca se, I do the

sa me thi ng e ve ry tim e

. As k him if he is a wa re of wh y h e is the re . I f the a ns we r i s
no , be fo re I ca n disc us s the c a se wi th you , let me a dv ise yo u o f y ou r M ir a nd a ri gh ts.
Sergea nt Murray te stified that the protocol she stric tly followed was to advise a suspec t of his ri gh ts p ri or

to i nit ia tin g a ny qu e sti on ing , a ndsh e wa s c e rt a in she adv is ed the d e fe nd a nt o f h is rights before questioning him. When asked w hether her te stimony wit h respe ct to the proc edure she fo llo we d in the de fe nd a nt’ s c a se wa s ba se d on he r sta nd ard pr oto c ol rathe r than any spec if ic

me mory, sh e re pli e d:

A little of both. Like I say, I don’ t remembe r spec ific deta ils, every little detail about thi s c a se , b ut I do re me mbe r thi s c a se

. I do re me mbe r [the de fe nd a nt] c omi ng int o the offic e. I do reme mber advising him of hi s Miranda rights. I do remembe r taking
a stateme nt from [the defenda nt]. I mea n, I re member c erta in details of the ca se, but I ca n’t reme mber e very spe cific de tail of the ca se.
Sergea nt Murray a cknowledge d that her me mory would have been better a t the preliminary hearing, held approximate ly two months after the de fenda nt’s statement wa s taken, than at the

s u ppression hea

ring held thirty-one months later . Upon furthe r questioning, she stated that she

reme mbere d advising the defe ndant of his rights, “ prior to e ven discussing the case with him.” She advised t h e d ef

en dant of his rights and obtained his written waiver befor e talking to him on November

10 and re- advised him of his rights and obtained the sec ond waiver befor e intervie wing him the follo wi n g d ay

. Sergea nt Murray sa id that the defe ndant was a dvised of his rights at 9:51 a.m. and ga ve his statement at 1:20 p.m. In the interim, the defendant was offe red f ood and drink but declined.-4-

The de fenda nt testified that he was picked up by police office rs and brought to the robbe ry office . He said that Sergea nt Mur ray asked if he knew why he was there , and whe n he re plied that he didno t, s he tol d h im tha t sh e ha d re c e ive d a Cr ime Sto pp e rs tip imp lic a tin g h im i n th e c ri me s. He state d that he told her he did not hav e an y t h i ng to do with the crimes, and she place d Sean Sumerall’s statement on the ta ble for him to read. Afte r he ha d rea d the statement, she a gain aske d him about his invol vement, and he confe ssed hi s role in the crimes, telling her wha t had happe ned. She the n p a sse d h im a

pa pe r a nd tol d him to sig n it. She did no t re a d th e pa pe r t o h im, a ndhe did

“ [n ]o t r e a lly ” re a d it

e ith e r. On c ro ss- e xa min a tio n, he a dmi tte d th a t he kn e w h ow to r e a d a ndwrite and testified that he voluntarily gave the statement.

On Ju ly 2 4, 20 06 , the tr ia l cou rt e nte re d an or de r de ny ing the de fe nd a nt’ s motio n to su pp re ss, noting that both officer s had t estified at the s uppression hearing t hat the def endant “ knowingly and willingly” spoke to the police af ter be ing advised of his Miranda rights.

Trial

Der rick W heatley te stified that he wa s the manage r of the U -Haul store locate d on Shelby Drive in Memphis. The de fenda nt was employed at the store as a c ustomer servic e re prese ntative in October

2003 and, on the day of t he robbery, asked for permission to leave ear ly. He c onsented, and the de fenda nt left the store at about 7:30 p.m

. T en to fifteen minutes later, a s Wheatley was counting the ca sh drawe r while his frie nd, Cori Martin, was waiting for him i n the store, two men
enter ed, wa lked to the front counter, and began asking about boxes. One man, whom Wheatley later learned wa s Wilson, then laid a gun on the counter , told him that he wa s robbing him, and demande d all the money.

Wheatley testified that he told the gunman that the mone y had alr eady be en de posited. In response , the gunman called him a liar, jumped acr oss the counter , hit him in the hea d with the gun, and dema nded that he ope n the safe

. He told the gunman that he did not have the keys to the saf e, and t h e g u n m an h it him i n the hea d with the gun again. At that point, he told the men whe re the money was loc ated, a nd the second man took the money “f rom under the till.” The men then orde red him and Martin into a st orage closet, where they demanded the store’s surve illance tape . The sec ond man took the tape, a nd the men instructed W heatley a nd Martin to lie on the floor a nd be still. When they hea rd the men le ave the store, he a nd Martin got up and ca lled the police.

Wheatley testified that the store’ s surveillance came ras we re only two to three inches in size and the sa me color as the store’s walls. There fore
, while visible to someone who was looking for them, they wer e not re adily obvious to the average person. He said that the s tore safe wa s located out of sight be hind the front counter , but the men appea red to be familiar with its location. He state d that the m en took approximate ly $3,000 to $4,000 in cash f rom the store, his wa llet, and Martin’s wallet and c ell phone. On cross-examination, he acknow ledged that he had pled gui lty to theft of property over $500 in 2001.

Cori Martin testified that he wa s talking on his cell phone and W heatley w as counting t he store’s money when two men enter ed the store. Wheatley shut the cash dr awe r, and the men walke d
to the counter, displayed a gun, a nd demande d money. Martin said that he told the person he w as-5-

talking to that they were being robbed and ended the call. One of the robbers approa ched him and took his cell phone and mone y, while the second one, who had been repeate dly demanding money from Whe atley, jumped over t h e co u n t er , hit Wheatley in the he ad with the gun, and be gan demanding that Wheatley take him to the safe . The c ash re gister was ope ned at some point, and one of the men took the mone y out of it. Next, the men orde red Mart in and Whe atley into the bac k,

re mov e d th e sto re ’s su rv e ill a nc e tape , f or c e d h im a ndW he a tle y to l ie do wn , in str uc te d th e m no t to

mov e , a ndthe n r a n o ut. Ma rt in e sti ma te d th a t th e me n to ok app ro xim a te ly $ 20 0- $3 00 fr om h im during the robbe ry.

Sean Sumera ll testified that he had be en cha rged in the case and was awa iting trial but t hat the State had not promised him anything in excha nge for his testimony. He sa id that the defe ndant called him on October 10, 2003, to a sk if he neede d money and to sugge st tha t he rob the U-H aul store whe re the defe ndant was e mployed. T he def endant c alled him back to tell him that he had

arr anged f or someone e lse to commit the robbery but that those individuals would not arrive in time. The de fenda nt then picked Sumera ll up at his home and dropped him off around the c orner from the store. By t h e time Sumerall rea ched the store, howe ver, the police we re a lrea dy on the sce ne. Sumerall said that he wa s appre hended by police and taken into the store, w here the victim told the office rs that he wa s not one of the men who robbed the s tore. He was later questioned by robbery detec tives and gave a statement consistent with his trial testimony. Sumerall acknow ledged that he had two prior c onvictions for theft.

Offic er A. Hende rson of the Memphis Police Depa rtment, the patrol office r who re sponded to the scene , identified various photographs of the c rime sce ne, wh ich wer e admitted as tria l exhibits.

Sergea nt Vivian Murra y essentially re peate d her suppr ession hearing testimony, describing her inv es t i g ation of the robbe ry, wha t led her to de velop the def endant a s a suspec t, and her interviews with him following the exec ution of his w ritten waiver s. She identified the de fenda nt’s
state me nt, wh ic h w a s su bs e qu e ntl y a dmi tte d a s a n e xh ibi t. T he state me nt r e a ds in p e rt ine nt p art :

The da y befor e the r obbery, I was ove r my daughter ’s house [sic ] and I saw L eon and June Baby. We wer e standing outside talking and they a sked me a bout robbing the U-H aul wher e I worke d at. I told them what days a la rge sum of mone y would be in the store. The next day, I went to work and la ter that da y, my boss let me go home ea

r ly

. I c a ll e d Se a n Su [ ] me r a ll
, a f r ie n d o f mi n e , a n d to ldh im

today would be a good day to r ob the U-Haul store and to c ome on. For some re ason, the

c on ve rs a tio n w ith Se a n didn ’t fe e l r igh t, s o th a t’ s [ sic ] I tol d Se a n I wo uldc a ll h im back a nd I ca lled June Baby. I a sked if they still wanted to go ahead with t he robbe ry
a nd ton igh t wou ld be a go odnig ht. Ju ne Ba by sa id o .k . a ndhu ng up . A lit tle wh ile late r , I s ta

r te d f e e li n g a s if I d id n ’ t w a n t to r o b th e U

- H a u l a n d I trie d to call June Baby to call it off but I c ouldn’t get in touch with him. I ca l l ed Sean ba ck ar ound 7:3 0 pm, a ndhe sa id h e wo ulddo the ro bb e ry , s o I we nt a ndpic ke d h im u p. I t old Sean that I ha d alre ady ca ll ed J u n e B ab y to do the robbery but I would try and ge t him there fir st. I dropped Sea n off at a gas station dow n the street from U-Haul, and I ca me bac k through about 5 minutes later. That’s when I saw the police ther e and-6-

I ca lle d [W he a tle y] to s e e wh a t ha d h app e ne d. Ab ou t a n h ou r l a te r, Se a n c a lle d me to come pick him up and I went and got him. S ean sa id he didn’t get a c hance to do the robbe ry bec ause i t h ad alre ady happe ned. La ter that night, I we nt over to the apartments where we ha ng out at, a nd June [B]aby and Le on said they robbe d the UHaul. One of them said they hi t [Whe atley] the gun [sic]. I aske d them how much

mon e y th e y g ot a ndthe y s a id a bo ut $ 15 00 or $1 60 0 do lla rs

. Th e y of

fe re d me so me of the money but I told them I didn’t want it. Then they we nt their way a nd I we nt home.

Sergea nt Mur

ray testified that afte r the defe ndant confe ssed, Wilson and Selmon eac h gave
a stateme nt impli cating themselve s and the de fenda nt in the robbery. On cross-examination, she testified that she did not use audio or video re cording e quipme n t d u ring her inter views with the defe ndant. She said that she had attended the “Ree d interrogation school” and acknow ledged that it involved a “psychologica l approa ch to how to bre ak people down.”

Sergea nt Michael Brown a lso essentially repe ated his suppre ss i o n hearing testimony. On

c ro ss- e xa min a tio n, he te sti fi e d that the de fe nd a nt de nie d a ny inv olv e me nt in the ro bb e ry du ri ng the ir first interview on N ovember 10

. He s aid the def

endant wa s place d on a forty-eight-hour investigative hold and interview ed again the next day afte r he ha d been r e-a dvised of his rights and had signed a nother wa iver. At that time, the de fenda nt adm i t t ed he ha d planned the r obbery a nd gave the statement deta iling his role in the c rimes.

The de fenda nt electe d not to testify and rested his c ase w ithout presenting any proof

.
AN AL YSI S

I. De nia l of

M ot ion to Suppr e ss

Th e de fe nd a nt fi rs t c on te nd s that the tr ia l c ou rt e rr e d in de ny ing his mot ion to s up pr e ss h is statement. Essentially, he argue s that the t rial court should have found Sergea nt Murray’ s testimony at th e p r e li mi n ar y h e ar in g , w h e r e s h e s a id s h e a s k e d th e d e f e n d a n t ab o u t h is p ar ti c ip a ti o n in the crimes prior to advising him of his Mi ra nda rights, more c redible tha n her te stimony at the

su pp re ssi on he ari ng , w he re sh e te sti fi e d th a t sh e a dv ise d th e de fe nd a nt o f h is righ ts a ndob ta ine d h is written wa iver before asking him any questions. He points out that the gener al sessions court suppressed his stateme nt on the basis of Sergea nt Mur ray’ s preliminary he aring testimony and that Sergea nt Murray he rself a dmitte d at t h e suppre ssion hearing that he r memory would ha ve bee n better at the pre liminary hearing than at the later suppression hea ring. The de fenda nt further argue s that the “illegally obtained initial confe ssion” tainted t he subsequent confe ssion, asserting that “[a ]fter being ar rested a nd giving the unwarne d confe ssion, the defendant was kept i n police custody for 26 hours and

. . . interrogated numbers of time[s] befor e he gave the written statement some 26 hours later.”

When this court review s a trial court’s ruling on a motion to s uppress e vidence , “[q] uestions of c re dib ili ty of the wi tne sse s, the we igh t andva lue of the e vid e nc e , a ndre so lut ion of c on fl ic ts i n the evidenc e ar e matters entrusted to the t rial j udge as the trier of fac t.” State v. Odom, 928 S.W.2d-7-

18 , 2 3 ( Te nn . 1 99 6) . T he pa rt y p re va ili ng a t t he su pp res sion h e ari ng is a ff or de d th e “ str on ge st legitimate view of the evidenc e and all rea sonable and legitimate infere nces that may be drawn fr om that e vid e nc e .” Sta te v. Ke ith , 9 78 S.W .2 d 8 61 , 8 64 (T e nn . 1 99 8) . T he fi nd ing s o f a tr ia l c ou rt

in

a suppression hearing a

re upheld unless the evidenc e preponde rate s against those findings. See id. Ho we ve r, the app lic a tio n o f the la w t o th e fa c ts f ou ndby the tr ia l c ou rt is a qu e sti on of

la w a ndis revie wed de novo

. See State v. Yea rgan, 958 S.W.2d 626, 629 (Tenn. 1997). Testimony presente d at trial m ay be considere d by an appellate court in deciding the propriety of the tria l court’s ruling on a motion to suppress. See State v. He nning, 975 S.W.2d 290, 299 (Tenn. 1998)

.
Both the United States and Tenne ssee Constitutions protec t a d ef en d an t from being compelled to give e vidence against himself. U.S . Const. amend. V; Tenn. Const. art. I, § 9. I n Miranda v. A ri zo n a, 384 U.S. 436, 471-75, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1626-28 (1966), the U nited States Supreme Court held that a defe ndant’s stateme nts made during a cus t o dial interrogation are ina dmi ssi ble a t tria l un le ss the Sta te e sta bli sh es that

the de fe nd a nt w a s in fo rm e d o f h is righ t to

re ma in s ile nt a ndhis ri gh t to c ou ns e l a ndthat he kn ow ing ly a ndvo lun tari ly w a ive d th os e ri gh ts. Whethe r the de fenda nt made a voluntary, knowing, and intelli gent waive r of those rights depends “‘upon the particula

r fa cts and circumstance s surrounding that ca se, including the bac kground, experience , and conduct of the a ccuse d.’” Edw ards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 482, 101 S. Ct. 1880, 1884 (1981) ( quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464, 58 S. C t. 1019, 1023 (1938)).

Sergean t M u rr ay testified re peate dly, both at the suppression hea ring and a t trial, that she

rea d the def

endant his rights and obtaine d his waiver of t hose rights befor e asking him any que stions

abo ut the ro bb e ry . Sh e a lso e xp la ine d h e r p re lim ina ry he ari ng te sti mon y b y s ta tin g th a t sh e mus t have be en conf

used by couns el ’s q u es t ions at that hearing. Sergea nt Brown corr oborate d her

acc ount, unequivocally testifying that neither he nor Ser geant Murr ay talked to the de fenda nt about the robbe ry until after

he had be en inform ed o f h i s ri g h ts and agre ed to waive those rights. In denying the motion to suppress, the trial court acc redited the office rs’ suppression hea ring testimony on the issue, as wa s within it s province. See Odom, 928 S.W.2d at 23.

Furthermore , the re cord doe s not support the defendant’s a ssertion that he made more than
one stateme nt in connection with this case or that he was interviewe d “number s of time[s]” during the 26 hours he spent on investigative hold. Only one st atement was admitted into evidence at the suppres s i o n hearing and at trial, a nd Sergea nt Brown testified that the def endant de nied any involvement in the crimes during their first, November 10, intervie w. The de fenda nt was brought back into the r obbery of

fice the next morning, re- advised of his rights, interviewe d again, a nd gave the state me nt. W e c on c lud e , th e re fo re , th a t th e tr ia l c ou rt didno t e rr

in d e ny in g th e mo ti on to suppress the state ment.

II. Su fficie ncy of the Evidence

The de fenda nt next challenge s the sufficie ncy of the convicting evidenc e. Specifica lly, he

arg ue s th a t th e e vid e nc e tyi ng him to the c ri me s w a s in su ff

ic ie nt be c a us e the Sta te fa ile d to e sta bli sh that th e me n h e re fe rr e d to in h is s ta te me nt a s “ Le on ” a nd“ Ju ne Ba by ” we re the sa me ind ivi du a ls who either

robbed or

attempted to rob the U -Haul store. Presumably
, h e i s challenging only the convictions for the offe nses for which he w as indicted with Selmon and Wilson. The State r esponds-8-

by arguing that the defe ndant has waived the issue by his failure to c ite to any supporting authority. In the a lternative, the State argue s that the evidenc e, which inc luded Serge ant Murray’s testimony that Se lmo n a ndW ils on e a c h impli c a te d th e de fe nd a nt in the c ri me s in th e ir re sp e c tiv e c on fe ssi on s, was suff icient to sustain the defe ndant’s convic tions.

In considering this i ssue, we a pply the rule that wher e suff iciency of the convicting evide nce is challenge d, the re levant question of the r eviewing c ourt is “ whether
, afte r viewing the e vidence in the light mos t favora

ble to the prosec ution, any rational trier of fac t c ould ha ve found the e ssential

e le me nt s o f the c ri me be yo nda re a so na ble do ub t.” Ja c ks on v. Vi rg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 , 9 9 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); see a lso Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e) ( “Findings of guil t i n cr i m i n al actions whether by the trial court or jury shall be s et as i d e i f t he evide nce is insuffic ient to support the findings by the trier of

fac t of gui lt beyond a r easona ble doubt.”); State v. Eva ns, 838 S.W.2d 185, 19 0-92 (Ten n. 19 92 ); Sta te v. An de rs on , 8 35 S.W .2 d 6 00 , 6 04 (T e nn . Crim. Ap p. 19 92 ). Al l questions involving t he cr edibility of witnesses, the weight and value to be given the evidenc e, and all fac tual issues are resolved by the trier of fac t. See State v. Pappas, 754 S .W.2d 620, 623 (Te nn. Crim. App. 1987). “A guilty verdic t by the jury, approve d by the trial judge, a ccr edits the testimony of the witnesse s for the State a nd resolves a ll conflicts in favor of the theory of the State.” State v. Gra ce, 493 S.W.2d 474, 476 ( Tenn. 1973). O ur supre me court stated the rationale for this rule:

This well-settled rule rests on a sound f oundation. The tri al j u d g e and the jury see the witnesses fa ce to f ace , hear their testimony a nd observe their deme anor on the stand. Thus the trial judge and jury are the primary instrumenta lity of justi ce to determine the weight and cre dibilit y to be given to the t estimony of wit nesses. In the t ria l f o ru m a lo n e is th e r e h u ma n a tm o s p h e r e a n d th e to ta li ty o f th e e v id e n ce
c a nn ot b e re pr od uc e d w ith a writt e n r e c or d in thi s Co urt.

Bolin v. S tate, 219 Tenn. 4, 11, 405 S.W.2d 768, 771 (1966) (citing Carroll v. State, 212 Tenn. 464, 370 S.W.2d 523 (1963)) . A jury convic tion removes the pr esumption of innoce n ce w ith which a def en d an t i s i n itially cloaked and r eplac es it with one of guilt, so that on appea l, a convicte d defe ndant has the bur den of demonstrating that the evidenc e is insufficient. See State v. Tuggle, 639 S.W.2d 913, 914 (Tenn. 1982)

. Aggra vated r obbery is the intentional or know in g theft of pr operty fr om the person of another by violence or

putting the person in f

ear and ac complished with a dea dly weapon. T enn. Code Ann. § 39-13-402( a)( 1) (2006) . Conspiracy is committed if

tw o ( 2) or mor e pe op le , e a c h h a vin g th e c ulp able me nta l st a te re qu ir e d f or the of fe ns e that is the object of the c onspiracy, a nd eac h acting for the purpose of promoting or fac ilitating commi ssion of an off ense, a gree that one (1) or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes the off ense.
Id. § 39-12-103(a)

. Finally, a person is criminally responsible f or the c onduct of a nother if, “ [a] cting wi th i nte nt t o p ro mot e or a ssi st the c omm iss ion of the of fe ns e , o r t o b e ne fi t in the pr oc e e ds or re su lts of the off ense, the persons solicits, d i re ct s , aids, or attempts to aid anothe r per son to commit t he offe nse[.] ” Id. § 39- 11-402(2)

.-9-

The e vidence
, viewed in the light mos t favora ble to the State, was suf

ficient to sustain the de fe nd a nt’ s con vic tio ns fo r co ns pir a c y to c omm it a gg ra va te d r ob be ry a nda gg ra va te d r ob be ry . Bo th victims described a n aggra vated r obbery, te stifying that one of the two men who ente red the U-Ha ul store on Oc tober 10, 2003
, d i s p l ay ed a gun, which he used to strike W heatley in the he ad as the robber s took the victims’ and the store’ s money. Whe atley further testified tha t he later learned that the gunman, whom he ha d not known prior to the robbe ry, wa s Wilson. In his statement to police, the def endant c onfesse d that he had se parately arr anged f or both Sumerall and two men he knew as

“ Ju ne Ba by ” a nd“ Le on ” to r ob thesto re on that pa rt ic ula r d a te a ndtim e ; th a t he dr op pe d Su me ra ll off ne ar the store af

ter telli n g h i m that he had a lrea dy arr anged f or “June Baby” to commit the robbery but would try to get Sumerall there first; that Sumerall told him that the robbery had alrea dy been c ommitt ed by the t ime he arrived at the s tore; and that “June Baby” and “ Leon” told him l ater that night they had committed the robbe ry and tha t Wh eatley w as struck in the he ad with a gun during i ts commissi on. Sumerall corr oborate d the def endant’ s statement, testifying that the de fe nd a nt d ro pp e d h im o ff ne ar the sto re a ft e r t e lli ng him that he fe are d th e oth e r i nd ivi du a ls w ith whom he h a d p la n n e d th e r o b b e r y w o u ld arr iv e to o late b u t th a t, w h e n h e arr iv e d a t th e s to re, the robbery had al re ady bee n committed. Finally, S erge ant Murray testified that Wilson and Selmon

eac h g a v e s tate me n ts c o n f e s s in g th e ir

r o le s in th e r o b b e r y a n d imp li c a ti n g th e d e f e n d a n t i n the

c ri me s. W e c on c lud e that thi s e vid e nc e wa s su ff ic ie nt f or a ratio na l ju ry to f

indthe de fe nd a nt g uil ty of conspira cy to comm i t ag g ra v ated r obbery a nd two counts of aggr avate d robbery beyond a

rea sonable doubt.

III . Li mi ta ti on o f C r os s- Exa mi nat ion of Wit ne ss

As his final i ssue, t he defenda nt contends that the tria l court committed reve rsible er ror by limit ing his cross-exa mination of Sergea nt Murray w ith respec t to the “Reed te chnique.” The de fe nd a nt a

rg ue s th a t he sh ou ld h a ve be e n a llo we d to c on tin ue his lin e of qu e sti on ing in or de r “ to show to the jury that the tec hniques . . . u s ed b y the police to obtain a c onfession” c ould lead to a fa lse c on fe ssi on . T he Sta te arg ue s, a lte rn a ti vel y, th at the de fe nd a nt h a s w a ive d th is i ssu e by his fa ilu re to c ite a ny a uth or ity in s up po rt of his arg ume nt a ndthat th e tr ia l c ou rt a c te d w ith in i ts discretion in exc luding the line of questioning, which was both irr eleva nt and ar gumentative. We agre e with the State.

A d e fe nd a nt’ s c on sti tut ional ri gh t to c on fr on t w itn e sse s a ga ins t hi m in c lud e s th e ri gh t to conduct mea ningful cross-e xamination. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51, 107 S. Ct . 989, 998 (1987); State v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 427, 431 (Tenn. 2000). “ The propriety, scope, ma nner a nd control of the cross-e xamination of witnesses, howeve r, rests within the discretion of the trial court.” Sta te v. Di sh ma n, 91 5 S.W .2 d 458 , 463 (T e nn . Crim . App . 199 5) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . T his c ou rt wi ll not, theref

ore, disturb a

trial court’ s limi ts on cross-e xamination unless we f ind that the court ha s pla c e d u nr e a so na

ble re stric tio ns on that r igh t. S ta te v. W yr ic k, 62 S.W .3 d 7 51 , 7 70 (T e nn . Crim. App. 2001); Dishman, 915 S.W.2d at 463.

Th e re c or d r e ve a ls tha t af

te r d e fe ns e c ou ns e l ha d q ue sti on e d Se rg e a nt M ur ray a t so me le ng th about her interview proce dure, including the fac t that she had neither tape- rec orded nor

videotaped the interview s, the following excha nge occ urre d:-10-

[De fense Counsel]: So you don’t keep a r ecor d o f h o w you approache d people or talked to people or

discuss – or what you discuss i n t he intervie w room[? ] Is that

c or re c t?

[S e rg e a nt M ur

ray] : W ha t do yo u me a n by a reco rd of my a pp ro a c h? I j us t be gin
ta lki ng to h im.

[De fense Counsel]: Okay. Do you have – ar e you t au g h t h o w to interview a nd interrogate people?

[Serge ant Murray]: Yes, sir.

[De fense Counsel]: Do you go to classes f or that purpose ?

[Serge ant Murray]: You ca n but not all investigators go t o i n t er v iew and interrogation[] schools.

[De fense Counsel]: Have you?

[Serge ant Murray]: I have been to Ree d interrogation school.

[De fense Counsel]: Reed?

[Serge ant Murray]: Uh-huh.

[De fense Counsel]: That’s the Ree d t ec h n ique, isn’t it? It’s a psyc hological

app ro a c h to ho w t o b re ak d ow n p e op le . I s th a t no t c or re c t?

[Serge ant Murray]: Yes, pr etty much.

[D e fe ns e Cou ns e l] : Pr e tty muc h. An d o ne way is to i so la te the m, i sn ’t it?

[S e rg e a nt M ur

ray] : T o is olate the m?

[De fense Counsel]: Right. Isn’t that one of the things you all are learned to do? Put the m in a ro om w ith ou t a ny wi nd ow s?

[Serge ant Murray]: No, sir, that’s not wha t we we re taught to do.

[De fense Counsel]: That’s not par t of the Reed te chnique?

[S e rg e a nt M ur

ray] : Sir , I c ou ldn ’t

–

Th e pr os e c uto r o bje c te d a t th a t po int , a ndthe tr ial cou rt su sta ine d w ith ou t sp e c if yin g it s
rea sons. We agre e with the S tate, however, that the trial court’s limitation of the cr oss-exa mination-11-

was prope r. The trial court a ffor ded def ense c ounsel wide l at i t u d e i n his cross-e xamination of Sergea nt Murray w ith respec t to her spec ific interr ogation of the de fenda nt and the diffe renc es be tw e e n h e r pr e lim ina

ry he ari ng te sti mon y an d he r te sti mon y at the su pp re ssi on he ari ng a nda t tria l. Gene ral testimony ab o u t t h e “R eed te chnique” was not re levant to whethe r the de fenda nt was prop e r ly M ir a n d iz e d o r w h e th e r h is s tate me n t w a s k n o w in g a n d v o lu n ta r y

. A c c o r d in gly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in its ruling on this issue.

CO NC LU SION

Ba se d o n th e fo re go ing a uth or iti e s a nd re a so nin g, we a ff ir m th e jud gme nts of

the tr ia l c ou rt

.

___________________________________ ALAN E. G LENN, JUD GE