IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS SLOANE, : No. 4:16-CV-01571

:

Plaintiff, : (Judge Brann)

:

v. :

:

GULF INTERSTATE FIELD :

SERVICES, INC., : 

:

Defendant. :

ORDER

JUNE 7, 2017

FINDINGS:

1. Counsel for Plaintiff initiated the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) 

case Hughes v. Gulf Interstate Field Services, Inc., in early 2014 in

the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio.

2. On August 8, 2016, the Honorable Edmund A. Sargus, Jr., to whom 

the Hughes matter was assigned, entered summary judgment in favor 

of the Defendant.

3. In September 2015, counsel for Plaintiff filed the present action in the 

United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, 

prior to its transfer to this Court for purposes of proper venue in late 

2016.

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4. This Court entered a Memorandum and Order denying class and 

collective certification on March 24, 2017. ECF Nos. 192–93.

5. Plaintiff’s counsel now petitions this Court, approximately one month 

before the July 18, 2017 dispositive motions deadline, to stay this 

matter pending the outcome on appeal in Hughes before the United 

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

6. “A stay is an extraordinary measure. The party seeking a stay must 

offer compelling reasons to abridge the opposing party’s right to 

litigate.” Pennsylvania ex rel. Kane v. McGraw-Hill Companies, Inc., 

No. 1:13-CV-605, 2013 WL 1397434, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 5, 2013)

(Conner, J.) (citing CTF Hotel Holdings, Inc. v. Marriot Intern., Inc., 

381 F.3d 131, 139 (3d Cir. 2004)).

7. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has 

explained, “whether to grant a stay . . . is committed to the district 

court’s discretion, since it is a matter of the court’s inherent power to 

conserve judicial resources by controlling its own docket.” Cost Bros. 

v. Travelers Indem. Co., 760 F.2d 58, 60 (3d Cir. 1985).

8. In determining whether to grant a stay, this Court typically considers 

four factors: “(1) the length of the requested stay; (2) the hardship that 

the moving party would face in going forward with the litigation; 

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(3) the injury that a stay would cause the non-moving party; (4) and 

whether a stay will simplify issues and promote judicial economy.” 

Scicchitano v. County of Northumberland, 2015 WL 7568357, at *2 

(M.D. Pa. Nov. 25, 2015) (Brann, J.). See also Toshiba Samsung 

Storage Tech. Korea Corp. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 193 F. Supp. 3d 345, 

348 (D. Del. 2016) (“This Court has typically considered three factors 

when deciding a motion to stay: (1) whether granting the stay will 

simplify the issues for trial; (2) the status of the litigation, particularly 

whether discovery is complete and a trial date has been set; and 

(3) whether a stay would cause the non-movant to suffer undue 

prejudice from any delay, or allow the movant to gain a clear tactical 

advantage.”).

9. Although Hughes, like this case, dealt with certification broadly, it 

involved different circuit law, different plaintiffs, different work sites, 

different postures, and distinct exemptions. See, e.g., Tr. of Nov. 21, 

2016 Oral Arg. at 84– 85 (“MR. JONES: There is one additional 

[exemption] under the FLSA that doesn’t exist under Pennsylvania.”; 

“MR. JONES: It [Hughes] doesn’t control, number one, because there 

is no summary judgment before this Court.”).

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10. Further, this Court made two substantive citations to Hughes in its 

67-page Memorandum denying certification.

(a) The first citation reads: “Because Plaintiffs have engaged in 

significant discovery in the three years since the Hughes case 

was initiated, they must offer something more than a modest 

factual showing to obtain certification.” 2017 WL 1105236, at 

*7. The appeal in Hughes cannot retroactively diminish the 

amount of discovery that has been exchanged here and 

correspondingly, will not alter the applicable standard in this 

matter. Accordingly, a stay is not warranted on that ground.

(b) The second citation reads: “Further, scouring the employment 

circumstances of the putative class reveals that the only other 

potentially viable subclass would perhaps be that comprised of 

individuals who worked at the MarkWest Ohio site. The 

problem with that subclass is, of course, that it was already 

expressly rejected in Hughes.” Id. at *13. Validation of a

MarkWest Ohio subclass in the Hughes appeal would not alter 

my certification decision. In that case, those Ohio class claims 

would be litigated in Hughes as originally brought and not 

duplicated here. Thus, a stay is not warranted on that ground.

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11. Further, as counsel for Defendant sets forth in its brief, the outcome of 

the Hughes appeal would be instructive at best here, given that this 

case involved substantial evidence favoring exempt status and casting

doubt on the propriety of certification. See ECF No. 206 at 2–3.

12. I also note that, for two cases so inextricably linked, appellate counsel 

in Hughes have given remarkably short shrift to my Memorandum 

Opinion denying certification in Sloane. In fact, counsel for Plaintiff 

neglected to cite my decision in either of its briefs before the Sixth 

Circuit, and counsel for Defendant quoted it just twice in its 66-page 

responsive brief, both times for propositions I had reached 

independently of Chief Judge Sargus’s analysis. That is an oddity for 

an appeal whose outcome will “likely impact this Court’s ultimate 

resolution of Sloane’s FLSA claims.” ECF No. 204 at 1.

13. Moreover, the Defendant would suffer significant prejudice from a 

stay that stonewalls this matter’s progression on the literal brink of the 

dispositive motion’s deadline.

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AND NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant’s Motion to Stay Pending Resolution of Hughes Appeal, 

ECF No. 204, is DENIED.

2. The case management deadlines set forth in this Court’s March 24, 

2017 Order, ECF No. 193, remain in FULL FORCE AND EFFECT.

3. The Clerk of Court is directed to docket this Order as a “written 

opinion,” pursuant to the E-Government Act of 2002.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

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