IN THE UNITED ST ATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION - CINCINNATI 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Case No. 1:18-cr-84 

Plaintiff, 

Judge Matthew W. McFarland 

V. 

ZIDKAIJAH WARREN, 

Defendant. 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS (Doc. 38) 

This case is before the Court on Defendant Zidkaijah Warren's Motion to Suppress 

(Doc. 38). Mr. Warren is charged with one count of being a felon in possession of a 

firearm. In his Motion, Mr. Warren argues that the evidence the Government intends to 

use against him was obtained as a result of an unconstitutional stop and custodial 

interrogation and must be suppressed. The Government filed a response in opposition 

(Doc. 40). On July 7, 2021, the Court held a hearing. Thereafter, the parties submitted 

supplemental post hearing briefs. (See Docs. 48 and 49.) This matter is now ripe for 

review. For the reasons below, Mr. Warren's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 38) is DENIED. 

FACTS 

On March 12, 2018, Cincinnati 9-1-1 received a call from a victim reporting an 

attempted armed robbery. (Transcript, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 137-38, lines 25, 1-9.) This 

attempted robbery occurred on the corner of Gilbert A venue and Chapel Street in 

Cincinnati, Ohio. (Id. at Pg. ID 140, lines 2-6.) Officers responded to the area based on the 

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police broadcast of the 9-1-1 call. (Id. at Pg. ID 141, lines 8-9.) The caller described the 

suspected robber as a black male in his twenties, five feet six inches, wearing a green coat 

with fur around the hood and black pants. (Id. at Pg. ID 140, lines 11-16.) Additionally, 

the caller stated that the suspect had a chrome handgun. (Id.) The caller also indicated 

that the suspect was last seen on foot heading towards McMillan Street on Gilbert 

Avenue. (Id.) The caller left his name and a number to be reached by the police. (Id. at Pg. 

ID 139, lines 17-23.) The police attempted to reach the 9-1-1 caller later in the day but the 

caller did not answer. (Id. at Pg. ID 160, lines 13-24.) The officers never reached the caller. 

(Id. at Pg. ID 160-61, lines 25, 1-2.) 

Approximately ten minutes after receiving the broadcast, and twenty minutes 

since the 9-1-1 call, Officer Manz and Officer Gottrnann spotted Mr. Warren on Gilbert 

Avenue heading towards McMillan Street. (Id. at Pg. ID 143, lines 3-10; Pg. ID 158-59, 

lines 14-16, 13-23.) According to Officer Manz, Mr. Warren, a young black man, was 

approximately the same height as the 9-1-1 caller described, was wearing a green coat 

with fur around the hood, black pants, and was in the area at the time the officers were 

looking for the suspect. (Id. at Pg. ID 146, lines 2-15.) Because Mr. Warren was walking 

outside, in the area and in the direction identified by the caller, and matched the 

description of the suspect, officers pulled their marked police cruiser alongside Mr. 

Warren, with the cruiser directed to where Mr. Warren was standing, and exited the car. 

(Id. at Pg. ID 145-46, lines 22-25, 1; Pg. ID 157, lines 9-14.) The officers, who were in 

uniform, then stopped Mr. Warren. (Id. at Pg. ID 145, lines 22-24; Pg. ID 157, lines 5-9.) 

Upon exiting the police cruiser, Officer Gottrnann ordered him to "show us your hands," 

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and, when Mr. Warren obeyed, a silver handgun fell out of Mr. Warren's coat. (Id. at Pg. 

ID 147-48, lines 20-21, 2-3.) 

The officers then arrested Mr. Warren. (Id. at Pg. ID 169, lines 20-22.) While 

handcuffed, Officer Manz asked Mr. Warren, "What are you doing?" (Id. at Pg. ID 149, 

lines 18-19.) Mr. Warren then told the officers that he had "messed up" and that he had 

the gun for protection. (Id. at Pg. ID 149, lines 20-25.) This interaction occurred before 

Officer Manz gave Mr. Warren his Miranda warnings. (Id. at Pg. ID 169-70, lines 25, 1-3.) 

Immediately thereafter, Officer Manz Mirandized Mr. Warren. (Id. at Pg. ID 150, lines 13-

14). Mr. Warren did not make any statements after being Mirandized. (Id. at 46, Pg. ID 150, 

lines 18-24.) 

ANALYSIS 

Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures 

extend to brief investigatory stops that fall short of traditional arrests. Terry v. Ohio, 392 

U.S. 1 (1968). Officers are permitted to stop and "briefly detain a person for investigative 

purposes," so long as the officer has "reasonable, articulable suspicion that the person 

has been, is, or is about to be engaged in criminal activity." See Gale v. O'Donohue, 824 F. 

App'x 304, 313 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). The touchstone of the analysis under the 

Fourth Amendment is always "the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the 

particular governmental invasion of a citizen's personal security." Maryland v. Wilson, 

519 U.S. 408,411 (1997) (quoting Tern;, 392 U.S. at 19)). 

In determining whether "reasonable suspicion" exists, the Court must look at the 

totality of the circumstances to determine whether the officers had a "particularized and 

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objective basis" to suspect that the defendant was involved in a crime. United States v. 

Payne, 181 F.3d 781, 788 (6th Cir. 1999). The officers must be able to articulate more than 

an "inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch of criminal activity." Illinois v. 

Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123-24 (2000). 

In support of his Motion to Suppress, Mr. Warren argues that the officers lacked 

reasonable suspicion to conduct the stop because it was "premised solely on information 

provided in a 911 call," that was "uncorroborated and not reasonably trustworthy." (Doc. 

38.) He therefore argues that all evidence stemming from the stop must be suppressed, 

and that his statements to the officer prior to receiving his Miranda warning must also be 

suppressed as violative of his Fifth Amendment rights. The Government contends that 

there was no stop, and that, if there were a stop, Mr. Warren had no privacy interest in 

his firearm because it was found on a public sidewalk. Further, the Government contends 

that the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Each of these arguments is 

discussed in turn below. 

I. The Officers Did Stop Mr. Warren. 

The Supreme Court has held that "law enforcement officers do not violate the 

Fourth Amendment by merely approaching an individual on the street or in another 

public place, by asking him if he is willing to answer some questions, [or] by putting 

questions to him if the person is willing to listen[ ... ]." Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497 

(1983). In other words, "because a consensual encounter does not amount to a seizure, a 

police officer does not need reasonable suspicion or probable cause before approaching 

an individual to make an inquiry." U.S. v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949,954 (6th Cir. 2007). The 

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dispositive question in this analysis is whether the interaction was "consensual;" that is, 

based on the police's communication, would a "reasonable person" have believed "that 

he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about his business." Florida v. 

Bostick, 501 U.S. 429,437 (1991). 

The Government argues that Mr. Warren was not seized because the initial 

interaction was a consensual encounter. This Court is unpersuaded. Here, the testimony 

at the hearing revealed that a marked police car drove up to Mr. Warren and was angled 

directly at Mr. Warren. (Transcript, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 145-46, lines 22-25, 1; Pg. ID 157, lines 

9-14.) Upon exiting the vehicle, one officer pointed at Mr. Warren while the other said 

"Show us your hands." (Id. at Pg. ID 147, lines 20-21). A reasonable person in Mr. 

Warren's position would have believed that he was not at liberty to ignore the officers in 

question and "go about his business." See Bostick, 501 U.S. at 437. Therefore, the 

interaction does not constitute a consensual encounter but, rather, a stop. 

II. The Officers Had Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Mr. Warren. 

Because this Court finds that the initial interaction constituted a stop, it must 

determine whether the stop was supported by reasonable suspicion. Here, because the 

officers were acting on a tip, the Court must determine whether the tip demonstrated 

"sufficient indicia of reliability to provide reasonable suspicion to make the investigatory 

stop." Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,270 (2000). The parties point the Court to two Supreme 

Court decisions, Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266,270 (2000) and Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 

393 (2014), arguing that these decisions are dispositive to the issue at hand. Both of these 

decisions analyze the existence of reasonable suspicion arising from an anonymous tip. 

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In this case, however, the tip was not anonymous, as the caller left a name and number. 

(Transcript, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 139, lines 17-23.) Nonetheless,1 the question remains the same: 

did the tip contain sufficient indicia of reliability to provide the officers with reasonable 

suspicion. Having considered this matter carefully, the Court concludes that the facts of 

this case more closely resemble Navarette and demonstrate that the officers had 

reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Mr. Warren. 

In Navarette, an anonymous caller dialed 911 and reported that a Silver Ford 150 

pickup truck, license plate number 8-David-94925, ran her off the highway about five 

minutes prior to the call. 572 U.S. at 395. Police broadcasted the information, and, within 

twenty minutes, officers pulled the truck over. Id. The Supreme Court held that the 

anonymous call was sufficiently reliable to support the stop for several reasons. First, 

"[b]y reporting that she had been run off the road by a specific vehicle ... the caller 

necessarily claimed eyewitness knowledge of the alleged dangerous driving." Id. at 399. 

Second, there was "reason to think that the 911 caller[] was telling the truth," (e.g., precise 

location, timelines of events, use of the 911 emergency system, etc.). Id. at 399-401. And 

third, the 911 caller reported "more than a minor traffic infraction and more than a 

conclusory allegation of drunk or reckless driving. Instead, she alleged a specific and 

dangerous result of the driver's conduct: running another car off the highway." Id. at 403. 

Conversely, in Florida v. ].L., an anonymous caller, from an unknown location, 

reported that a young black male was carrying a gun. 529 U.S. at 268-73. The only other 

1 The Supreme Court in Navarette recognized that, at the suppression hearing, counsel appeared to agree 

that the reporting party identified herself in the 911 call recording, although the prosecution and lower 

courts treated the tip as anonymous. See Navarette, 572 U.S. at 398 n.1. 

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details the caller provided was that the man was standing at a particular bus stop and 

was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. When the officer arrived at the bus stop, the observed three 

men, one of whom was wearing a plaid shirt. Id. Apart from the tip, officers had no 

reason to suspect any of the three of illegal conduct (e.g., officers did not see a firearm, 

none of them made any threatening or otherwise unusual movements, etc.). Id. The 

Supreme Court held that this tip failed to provide reasonable suspicion justifying a stop. 

Id. The Court stated that the anonymous call provided nothing more than "the bare 

report of an unknown, unaccountable informant who neither explained how he knew 

about the gun nor supplied any basis for believing he had inside information about [the 

suspect]." Id. at 271. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that "[t]he reasonable suspicion 

here at issue requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its 

tendency to identify a determinate person." Id. at 272. 

The facts of this case more closely track Navarette. Here, the 9-1-1 caller alleged 

that he had been a victim of armed robbery, a specific and dangerous crime, on the corner 

of Gilbert Avenue and Chapel Street. (Transcript, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 140, lines 2-6.) Second, 

the caller provided particularized facts that made it reasonable to believe that he had 

eyewitness knowledge and was telling the truth. The caller provided the geographic 

location where the armed robbery occurred, the direction the perpetrator was travelling, 

and a description of the perpetrator. (Id. at Pg. ID 140, lines 2-15.) The caller described a 

young black male in his twenties, approximately five foot six inches, wearing a green coat 

with fur around the hood and black pants. (Id.) Additionally, the dispatch included that 

the suspect was on foot walking towards McMillan Street. (Id.) 

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Armed with this information, on Gilbert A venue right before McMillian Street, 

Officer Manz observed and stopped Mr. Warren, who was on foot, because "he fit the 

exact description that was given by the victim in the broadcast by [the] dispatch." (Id. at 

Pg. ID 145-46, lines 20-24, 1.) Mr. Warren is a black male in his twenties and is 

approximately 5'6". (Id. at Pg. ID 146, lines 2-15.) He was also wearing black pants and a 

green coat with fur around the hood. (Id.) Although there were characteristics about him 

that were not reported in the broadcast, Mr. Warren's description and mode and direction 

or travel met all of the points conveyed in the broadcast. And officers cannot assume 

that broadcasts provide a complete description of every detail, as such descriptions are 

usually based on statements from victims or witnesses rushed to provide the most 

pertinent details to officers to locate a suspect. Based on the totality of circumstances, this 

case resembles Navarette and supports a finding of reasonable suspicion. 

Thus, at the time the officers approached Mr. Warren, who matched the 

description given by the caller, they had reasonable suspicion that he was involved in a 

past crime. Accordingly, they had the "ability to briefly stop that person, ask questions, 

or check identification" - to investigate their suspicion. United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 

221, 229 (1985). Here, when the officers ordered Mr. Warren to put his hands up, the 

firearm at issue dropped from his coat and fell onto the public sidewalk-in plain view. 

(Transcript, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 148-49, lines 21-25, 1.) Because the stop was supported by 

reasonable suspicion, the officers were "entitled to seize evidence revealed in plain view 

in the course of the lawful stop." Hensley, 469 U.S. at 234. See also U.S. v. Britton, 335 F. 

App'x. 571, 576 (6th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (quoting United States v. Eubanks, 876 F.2d 

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1514, 1516 (11th Cir.1989)) ("[U]nder the fourth amendment no governmental 'search' 

occurs if the place or object examined is publicly exposed such that no person can 

reasonably have an expectation of privacy."). 

Accordingly, the officers had reasonable suspicion to approach and stop Mr. 

Warren, and they were justified in seizing the firearm when it fell onto the public 

sidewalk in plain view. 

III. The Challenged Statements Are Admissible. 

Based on the above analysis, the statements are not automatically excludable as 

fruit of the poisonous tree because the stop was supported with reasonable suspicion. 

However, Mr. Warren separately argues that the statements made after he was arrested 

but prior to being read his Miranda rights should be suppressed because they were made 

in response to the officer's questions and in violation of Mr. Warren's Fifth Amendment 

right against compulsory self-incrimination. 

A defendant's privilege against compulsory self-incrimination applies only during 

custodial interrogations. See Rhode Island v . Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). A defendant is in 

custody when he "has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of 

action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). An 

interrogation "refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on 

the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the 

police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the 

suspect," Innis, 446 U.S. at 301, and "must reflect a measure of compulsion above and 

beyond that inherent in custody itself." Id. at 300. 

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Here, although Mr. Warren was in custody when the statements in question were 

made, as they occurred while Mr. Warren was being handcuffed and placed under arrest, 

he was not being interrogated. Rather, the record reflects only that Officer Manz asked 

Mr. Warren what he was doing upon being arrested. (Transcript, Doc. 46, Pg. ID 149, lines 

18-19.) The question, taken in context, is more akin to a rhetorical question, like "what 

were you thinking" - than an actual question. Indeed, these words are more akin to 

words that are normally attendant to an arrest. And Officer Manz did not repeat the 

question or otherwise demand an answer. Rather, Mr. Warren immediately admitted he 

"messed up" and then continued to explain why he had the gun in question, stating he 

has it for protection. (Id. at Pg. ID 149, lines 20-25.) Officer Manz's single question does 

not equate to words or actions that an officer should know would reasonably elicit an 

incriminating response. Therefore, Officer Manz's single question does not constitute a 

custodial interrogation, and so Mr. Warren's statements are admissible. 

CONCLUSION 

In short, the 9-1-1 call that prompted Officer Manz and Officer Cottman to stop 

Mr. Warren contained sufficient information for the officers to create a particularized and 

objective basis that Mr. Warren had recently committed a crime. The totality of the 

circumstances establish that the officers had reasonable suspicion to stop Mr. Warren. 

Additionally, Officer Manz's conduct upon arresting Mr. Warren did not constitute a 

custodial interrogation. Accordingly, Mr. Warren's Motion to Suppress (Doc. 38) is 

hereby DENIED. 

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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

UNITED ST A TES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT~ 

By ~IAJ:i4, 

JUDGE MATTHEW W. McFARLAND 

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