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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION 

LINDA M. REDMOND, Case No. 1:18-cv-345 

Plaintiff, Barrett, J. 

 Bowman, M.J. 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff Linda M. Redmond filed this Social Security appeal in order to challenge 

the Defendant’s findings that she is not disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g). Proceeding 

through counsel, Plaintiff presents one claim of error, which the Defendant disputes. 

For the reasons explained below, I conclude that the ALJ’s finding of non-disability 

should be AFFIRMED, because it is supported by substantial evidence in the 

administrative record. 

I. Summary of Administrative Record 

 In July 2014, Plaintiff filed for Supplemental Security Income alleging a disability 

onset date of January 8, 2014. (Tr. 143). After Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially and 

upon reconsideration, she requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law 

Judge (“ALJ”). On February 14, 2017, ALJ Thuy-Anh Nguyen held a hearing at which 

Plaintiff appeared with a non-attorney representative. The ALJ heard testimony from 

Plaintiff and an impartial vocational expert. Id. In September 2017, the ALJ determined 

that Plaintiff was not under a disability as defined by the Social Security Act. (Tr. 143-
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157). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review in March 2018. (Tr. 1). 

Plaintiff now seeks judicial review of the denial of her application for benefits. 

 Plaintiff was 45-years-old on the alleged disability onset date. (Tr. 156). She 

holds at least a high school diploma. (Tr. 156). Plaintiff testified that she is married and 

that her daughter-in-law visits her several times a day (Tr. 173). Plaintiff has past 

relevant work as a nurse supervisor/manager (light, skilled work actually performed at 

very heavy exertion by Plaintiff) and as a license practical nurse (medium, skilled work 

actually performed at very heavy exertion by Plaintiff). (Tr. 156). 

 Based upon the record and testimony presented at the hearing, the ALJ found 

that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: “rheumatoid arthritis; disorders of the 

spine; a history of bilateral scleritis with a large refractive shift on the right, bilateral 

uveitis, mild cystoid macular edema on the right, a steroid responder on the right, and 

bilateral nuclear sclerosis; diabetes mellitus; obesity; and a depressive disorder.” (Tr. 

145). Treatment records characterize these conditions as well controlled. Id. The ALJ 

concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments alone or in combination met or medically 

equaled a listed impairment in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subp. P, Appendix 1 (Tr. 146). The 

ALJ determined that Plaintiff retains the following residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to 

perform light work with the following limitations: 

The claimant can stand and/or walk for four hours and sit for six hours in 

an eight-hour workday. The claimant can occasionally operate overhead 

hand controls and reach overhead, and frequently handle and finger. The 

claimant can occasionally climb ramps and stairs, but must never climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. The claimant can occasionally balance, 

stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant must avoid unprotected 

heights and hazardous machinery. The claimant must not work in driving 

jobs. The claimant can carry out simple tasks, but can carry out complex 

tasks occasionally. The claimant can maintain attention for simple tasks 

and decisions, can make simple decisions, and can adequately adhere to 
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a schedule that does not have any strict time limits or production 

standards. The claimant can interact occasionally with the public, 

coworkers, and supervisors. The claimant can adapt to a setting in which 

duties are routine and predictable. Changes in routine should be 

explained in advance. The claimant will be off-task for 10% of the 

workday and absent one day each month. 

(Tr. 148). Based upon the record as a whole including testimony from the vocational 

expert, and given Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, the ALJ 

concluded that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy 

that she can perform, including such jobs as routing clerk, inspector, and mail clerk. (Tr. 

157). Even if more limited, Plaintiff could perform sedentary, unskilled jobs such as 

sorter, bench assembler, and folder. (Tr. 157). Accordingly, the ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff is not under disability, as defined in the Social Security Regulations, and is not 

entitled to DIB. Id. 

 The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Therefore, the ALJ’s 

decision stands as the Defendant’s final determination. On appeal to this Court, Plaintiff 

argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial evidence. Upon close 

analysis, I conclude that none of the asserted errors require reversal or remand. 

 II. Analysis 

 A. Judicial Standard of Review 

 To be eligible for SSI or DIB a claimant must be under a “disability” within the 

definition of the Social Security Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§423(a), (d), 1382c(a). The 

definition of the term “disability” is essentially the same for both DIB and SSI. See 

Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986). Narrowed to its statutory 

meaning, a “disability” includes only physical or mental impairments that are both 
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“medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent the applicant from (1) 

performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial gainful activity” that is 

available in the regional or national economies. See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469-70 (1986). 

 When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, the 

court’s first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported 

by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (additional citation and internal 

quotation omitted). In conducting this review, the court should consider the record as a 

whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence 

supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, then that finding must be affirmed, even if 

substantial evidence also exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. 

Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained: 

The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because 

substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion . 

. . . The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone 

of choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference 

from the courts. If the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial 

evidence, a reviewing court must affirm. 

Id. (citations omitted). 

 In considering an application for disability benefits, the Social Security Agency is 

guided by the following sequential benefits analysis: at Step 1, the Commissioner asks if 

the claimant is still performing substantial gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner 

determines if one or more of the claimant’s impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the 

Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s impairments, singly or in combination, 

meet or equal a Listing in the Listing of Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner 
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determines whether or not the claimant can still perform his or her past relevant work; 

and finally, at Step 5, if it is established that claimant can no longer perform his or her 

past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to the agency to determine whether a 

significant number of other jobs which the claimant can perform exist in the national 

economy. See Combs v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 

2006); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920. 

 A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that he or she 

is entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). Thus, a plaintiff seeking 

benefits must present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, 

he or she suffered impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least 

twelve months, that left him or her unable to perform any job in the national economy. 

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

 B. The ALJ’s Decision is supported by Substantial Evidence 

1. RFC finding 

 Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s RFC finding is not supported by substantial 

evidence. In this regard, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated her ability 

to perform bilateral fingering. Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly evaluated 

the findings of the State Agency physicians. Plaintiff further argues that the ALJ erred in 

assessing her subjective complaints of disability. Plaintiff’s contentions will be 

addressed in turn. 

 In formulating Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ gave significant weight to the findings of 

the state agency reviewing physicians, Edmond Gardner, M.D., and Gerald Klyop, M.D., 

who both opined that Plaintiff could: lift twenty pounds occasionally, and ten pounds 
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frequently; stand and/or walk for four hours out of eight, and sit for six hours out of eight; 

with additional postural, manipulative, and environmental limitations. (Tr. 154-55, 200-

03, 216-18). The ALJ determined that their findings were consistent with the medical 

evidence available during their reviews and that Plaintiff’s “limitations remain largely 

consistent with the record at the hearing level.” (Tr. 154). 

 Plaintiff, however, contends that the ALJ erred in this determination for two 

reasons: (1) Dr. Klyops’ opinion relied on a faulty factual finding and (2) the ALJ 

mistakenly interpreted their findings as limiting Plaintiff to “light” work, when Dr. Gardner 

and Dr. Klyops actually limited Plaintiff to “sedentary work”. Plaintiff contentions will be 

addressed in turn. 

i. Bilateral Fingering

 With regards to Plaintiff’s upper extremity limitations resulting from her 

rheumatoid arthritis, the ALJ relied upon DDS non-examining physician opinions on 

initial and reconsideration in finding that Plaintiff is limited to frequent handling and 

fingering. (Tr. 148, 154). Plaintiff argues that these limitations are not supported by the 

evidence as a whole. The DDS reconsideration determination from April 2015 limits 

bilateral handling to frequent noting “she’s had no active synovitis in almost a year.” (Tr. 

218). However, Plaintiff contends that the record clearly indicates positive synovitis in 

the left hand and wrist throughout much of 2015 and 2016. (Tr. 492, 636, 648, 658, 886, 

891, 902). These findings are consistent with increases in Plaintiff’s Remicade doses 

(Tr. 648, 887). As such, the Plaintiff argues that she should have been limited to 

“occasional” rather than “frequent” handling and fingering. 
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 However, the ALJ’s decision discussed the vast majority of the evidence Plaintiff 

relies on—including findings of positive synovitis (Tr. 150), EMG findings suggesting 

mononeuropathy (Tr. 146), increases in Plaintiff’s medication (Tr. 150), and 

abnormalities observed during Dr. Fritzhand’s examination. (Tr. 151). As noted by the 

ALJ, many of Dr. Burton’s treatment notes indicating synovitis in Plaintiff’s left wrist 

and hand also include a conflicting finding of “no synovitis.” (See Tr. 150, 636, 648, 654, 

685, 902). The ALJ further observed that these physical examination findings were an 

exact duplicate of Plaintiff’s May 2015 treatment notes, and appeared to be 

automatically propagated entries rather than contemporaneous findings. Id.

 Plaintiff has failed to point to any opinion evidence of record to support her 

proposed handling and fingering limitation, or otherwise suggest that additional 

limitations should have been incorporated into the RFC. See Ortman v. Comm'r of Soc. 

Sec., No. 2:14-CV-1900, 2016 WL 2595111, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 2016) 

(“[S]ignificantly, the record contains no medical opinion of greater limitations than those 

that the administrative law judge included in her RFC determination”). It is well 

established that a mere diagnosis or catalogue of symptoms does not indicate 

functional limitations caused by the impairment. See Young v. Sec'y of Health & Human 

Servs., 925 F.2d 146,151 (6th Cir. 1990) (diagnosis of impairment does not indicate 

severity of impairment). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision is substantially supported in 

this regard. 

ii. Light Work 

 Plaintiff also contends that the ALJ improperly determined that Plaintiff was 

capable of performing light work. The Commissioner acknowledges that the ALJ 
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mistakenly concluded that the state agency reviewers limited her to light work. (Tr. 204). 

However, the Commissioner contends such error was harmless. The undersigned 

agrees. 

 Drs. Gardner and Klyops opined that Plaintiff was able to lift/carry twenty pounds 

occasionally and ten pounds frequently, which conforms to the regulatory definition of 

“light work.” (Tr. 201, 216). See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). However, they also found that 

Plaintiff was limited to standing and/or walking for four hours in an eight-hour workday, 

which is inconsistent with a full range of light work. Id.; see also Social Security Ruling 

83-10, 1983 WL 31251 at *5-6 (“[T]he full range of light work requires standing or 

walking, off and on, for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday”). Though 

the ALJ mistakenly states that Drs. Gardner and Klyops limited Plaintiff to light work, he 

included each of the individual functional limitations contained in their opinions—

including the limitation that Plaintiff could only stand and/or walk for four hours in an 

eight-hour workday—in his RFC determination. (Tr. 148). The ALJ also properly 

conveyed the four-hour standing/walking limitation in the hypothetical posed to the VE 

(Tr. 189), Furthermore, the VE testified to the existence of a significant number of 

sedentary jobs in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. (Tr. 191-92). See N. 

L. R. B. v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759, 766 n. 6 (1969) (remand is not required 

when it would be an “idle and useless formality”). Thus, “as long as the VE's testimony 

is in response to an accurate hypothetical, the ALJ may rely on the VE's testimony to 

find that the claimant is able to perform a significant number of jobs.” Anderson v. 

Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 406 F. App'x 32, 35 (6th Cir. 2010). 
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 Plaintiff argues, however, that the sedentary positions the vocational expert 

classified require at least frequent use of the bilateral upper extremities. The vocational 

expert testified that even sedentary work would be precluded by only occasional use of 

the bilateral upper extremities. (Tr. 194). However, as detailed above, the ALJ properly 

determined that Plaintiff was capable of performing frequent fingering as required to 

perform sedentary work. As such, the ALJ did not err in relying on the testimony of the 

vocational expert. 

2. Evaluation of Plaintiff’s Subjective Complaints 

 Plaintiff also claims that the ALJ failed to properly consider her complaints of 

disabling pain. In this regard, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s improperly considered her 

ability to perform certain daily activities in finding her subjective complaints to be 

inconsistent with objective evidence.

 The ALJ's assessment of symptoms, formerly referred to as the “credibility” 

determination in SSR 96-7p, was clarified in SSR 16-3p to remove the word “credibility” 

and refocus the ALJ’s attention on the “extent to which the symptoms can reasonably 

be accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence in the 

individual’s record.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *2 (October 25, 2017) (emphasis 

added). The new ruling emphasizes that “our adjudicators will not assess an 

individual’s overall character or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an 

adversarial court litigation.” See id. at *11. Under SSR 16-3p, an ALJ is to consider all 

of the evidence in the record in order to evaluate the limiting effects of a plaintiff’s 

symptoms, including the following factors: 
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1. Daily activities; 

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms; 

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms; 

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an 

individual takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms; 

5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for 

relief of pain or other symptoms; 

6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve 

pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 

minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and 

7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and 

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms. 

Id., 2017 WL 5180304, at *7–8; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c) and 

former SSR 96–7p. 

Despite clarifying the basis for the analysis of subjective complaints and 

corresponding elimination of the term “credibility” from the text in order to avoid 

“character analysis,” SSR 16-3p was not intended to substantially change existing law. 

See Banks v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 2:18-cv-38, 2018 WL 6060449 at *5 (S.D. 

Ohio Nov. 20, 2018) (quoting explicit language in SSR 16-3p stating intention to “clarify” 

and not to substantially “change” existing SSR 96-7p), adopted at 2019 WL 187914 

(S.D. Ohio Jan. 14, 2019). Thus, it remains the province of the ALJ and not the 

reviewing court, to assess the consistency of subjective complaints about the impact of 

a claimant’s symptoms with the record as a whole. See generally Rogers v. Com'r, 486 

F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007). 
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As stated, the primary distinction between SSR 16-3p and the former SSR 96-7p 

is the elimination of the word “credibility” and clarifying that the focus of the evaluation 

should be on the “consistency” of subjective complaints with the record as a whole. The 

elimination of the word “credibility” from SSR 16-3p is semantically awkward in applying 

prior case law, insofar as virtually all of the case law interpreting the former SSR 96-7p 

uses the catchphrase “credibility determination.” Nevertheless, the essence of the 

regulatory framework remains unchanged. Therefore, courts agree that the prior case 

law remains fully applicable to the renamed “consistency determination” under SSR 16-

3p, with few exceptions. See Duty v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 4442595 at *6 (S.D. 

Ohio Sept. 18, 2018) (“existing case law controls to the extent it is consistent with the 

clarification of the rules embodied in SSR 16-3p’s clarification.”). 

Turning to that case law, an assertion of error in a credibility/consistency 

determination requires a particularly strong showing by a plaintiff. Like the ultimate nondisability determination, the assessment of subjective complaints must be supported by 

substantial evidence, but “an ALJ's findings based on the credibility of the applicant are 

to be accorded great weight and deference, particularly since an ALJ is charged with 

the duty of observing a witness's demeanor and credibility.” Walters v. Com'r of Soc. 

Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Further, a credibility/consistency determination 

cannot be disturbed “absent a compelling reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 

(6th Cir. 2001). Thus, it is proper for an ALJ to discount the claimant's testimony where 

there are inconsistencies and contradictions among the medical records, her testimony, 

and other evidence. Warner v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004). 
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 Here, the ALJ properly set forth several specific reasons in support of his finding 

that Plaintiff’s statements regarding the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her 

symptoms were not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in 

the record. (Tr. 149-155). See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929 (c)(4) (in evaluating the extent to 

which symptoms, such as pain, limit a claimant’s ability to perform work activities, the 

ALJ will compare a claimant’s reported symptoms with the objective medical evidence 

and other evidence to see if there are conflicts or inconsistencies between the two). As 

detailed by the Commissioner, the ALJ reasonably determined that Plaintiff’s complaints 

of disability were unsupported by the objective evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(2) 

(considering objective evidence in weighing claimant’s statements regarding the 

intensity and persistence of symptoms). The ALJ cited to treatment notes including 

those documenting no synovitis (Tr. 150, 403, 410, 431); no active arthritis during the 

latter part of 2014 (Tr. 149, 410, 432); normal range of motion in major joints (Tr. 150, 

461); normal motor functioning (Tr. 152, 664, 674); normal spine range of motion (Tr. 

152, 456, 461, 488, 505, 519, 664); and no edema or swelling. (Tr. 150, 402, 456, 475, 

488, 505, 519, 636, 643, 647, 653, 664, 684, 886, 902). Additionally, the ALJ pointed to 

diagnostic tests suggesting mild or no dysfunction, including a 2015 neck MRI showing 

no significant abnormalities. (Tr. 151, 712-13), and a 2014 lower back x-ray showing 

largely stable degenerative changes. (Tr. 151, 579). 

 The ALJ noted Plaintiff’s activities of daily living, which included cooking, grocery 

shopping with assistance, and housekeeping. (Tr. 154, 321, 446, 597). The ALJ also 

noted that much of Plaintiff’s treatment was conservative in nature, and that she 

seemingly abandoned her physical therapy sessions after a single session. (Tr. 151). 
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Villarreal v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 818 F.2d 461, 463 (6th Cir. 1987) (ALJ 

reasonably relied on Plaintiff’s “conservative treatment” in assessing credibility); 

Ashworth v. Sullivan, No. 91-5699, 1991 WL 278961, at *7 (6th Cir. Dec. 30, 1991) (“We 

also note the conservative treatment . . . given to Ms. Ashworth). 

 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned finds that the ALJ's decision adequately 

sets forth the reasons for his evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. In light of the 

ALJ's opportunity to observe Plaintiff's testimony and the record as a whole, the ALJ's 

finding in this regard is entitled to deference and should not be discarded lightly. Kirk v. 

HHS, 667 F.2d 524, 538 (6th Cir. 1981). See also Cruse v. Commissioner, 502 F.3d 

532, 542 (6th Cir. 2007); Walters v. Commissioner, 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997); 

Gaffney v. Bowen, 825 F.2d 98, 101 (6th Cir. 1987). Accordingly, the Court finds 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of Plaintiff’s subjective complaints. 

 III. Conclusion and Recommendation 

 For the reasons explained herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant’s 

decision be found to be SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and 

AFFIRMED, and that this case be CLOSED.

 s/Stephanie K. Bowman 

Stephanie K. Bowman 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION 

LINDA M. REDMOND, Case No. 1:18-cv-345 

Plaintiff, Barrett, J. 

 Bowman, M.J. 

 v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

NOTICE 

 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of 

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely 

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) 

of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support 

of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN 

(14) DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make 

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas 

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).