1

Filed 6/20/22 S.F. v. M.J. CA1/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified 

for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for 

publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

S.F.,

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v.

M.J.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A160335

 A160735

 A163530

 (Contra Costa County

 Super. Ct. No. D1705734)

In this matrimonial action, appellant M.J. (husband), appearing 

in propria persona, appeals from several orders and a subsequently 

entered judgment of dissolution that was sought by respondent S.F. 

(wife).

1

In case Nos. A160335 and A160735 (consolidated for briefing), 

husband appeals from (1) a February 26, 2020 order that, among other 

things, determined husband’s child support arrears, recalculated child 

support subject to “retroactive modification,” awarded wife temporary 

1 We refer to the parties by their initials to protect their privacy 

and the privacy of their minor child. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 

8.90(b)(1),(11).)
2

spousal support subject to “retroactive modification,” and reserved

jurisdiction to resolve the sale of the marital residence; (2) a March 4, 

2020 order that granted wife a two-year domestic violence restraining 

order (DVRO) against husband, awarded wife sole legal and physical 

custody of their child, and granted husband supervised visits; and (3) 

an August 10, 2020 order that (a) denied husband’s motion to vacate 

the February 26, 2020 order insofar as it ordered him to pay temporary 

child support and temporary spousal support based on an imputed 

yearly income, (b) awarded wife monetary sanctions in the form of 

attorney fees incurred to defend against husband’s false allegation that 

she had abused the child, and (c) denied husband’s request for an order 

modifying custody and visitation orders.

In case No. A163530, husband appeals from: (1) a June 2, 2021 

order that denied his motions to (a) stop the sale of the marital 

residence, (b) vacate the court’s orders of February 26, 2020 and 

November 9, 2020, and (c) delay the court’s signing of findings and 

order after a hearing on April 8, 2021;

2 (2) a July 12, 2021 order that 

granted wife’s request for attorney fees and sanctions payable from 

husband’s share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital residence 

and reconfirmed that wife was to be paid $66,987.35 from the proceeds 

of the marital residence sale;3 and (3) a judgment entered on September 

29, 2021, which dissolved the marriage as of that date.

2 We deem the notice of appeal from “judgment after court trial” 

entered on “5/28/2021” to be from the June 2, 2021 order entered after 

the May 28, 2021 hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [“notice 

of appeal must be liberally construed”].)

3 We deem the notice of appeal from judgment or order entered on 

“7/9/21” to be from the July 12, 2021 order entered after the 
3

Having considered husband’s arguments, we conclude he has 

failed to demonstrate any basis for reversal. Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The parties were married on July 10, 2012 and lived together. 

They had a child born in 2013. In December 2017, the parties 

separated. That same month, wife obtained a temporary DVRO 

against husband and filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage.

On May 29, 2018, the trial court granted wife a one-year DVRO 

and custody of the child. The court found husband had rebutted the 

presumption in Family Code section 3044 and allowed him 

unsupervised visits with the child.4 Thereafter, on October 25, 2018, 

the parties reconciled and began living together in the marital 

residence after entering into a “Spousal Property Agreement” (SPA). 

As a result of the reconciliation, the trial court issued an order 

terminating the May 29, 2018 DVRO and the related custody and 

visitation orders.

Approximately one year later, on November 18, 2019, the trial 

court issued a temporary DVRO in favor of wife, husband moved out of 

the marital residence, and the parties again separated. After this 

second separation, the trial court issued a series of orders including a

February 26, 2020 order regarding husband’s temporary child support 

and spousal support obligations and a March 4, 2020 permanent twoyear DVRO in favor of wife. 

July 9, 2021 hearing. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2) [“notice of 

appeal must be liberally construed”].)

4 Family Code section 3044 provides a rebuttable presumption that 

it is not in the best interests of a child to be in the custody of a parent 

who has been found to have committed domestic abuse.
4

Over the course of several months spanning November 2020 

through September 2021, the court held a three-day trial on the issues 

of child support, spousal support, and the disposition of the marital 

residence. A judgment dissolving the marriage was entered on 

September 29, 2021.

DISCUSSION

Our review of these consolidated appeals is significantly impaired 

by husband’s submission of an incomplete record and opening briefs 

that fail to comply with our California Rules of Court, which inform 

parties as to the proper format in which they are to present their 

arguments to this court. While we recognize that husband is 

representing himself, our rules of procedure nonetheless apply. “A 

party proceeding in propria persona ‘is to be treated like any other 

party and is entitled to the same, but no greater consideration than 

other litigants and attorneys.’ [Citation.]” (First American Title Co. v. 

Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.) 

Husband has perfected his appeal using the appendix method but 

has filed reporter’s transcripts as to only some of the proceedings 

referenced in his opening briefs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.124 

[appendixes], 8.130 [reporter’s transcript], 8.137 [settled statement].) 

Additionally, his opening briefs contain many factual assertions 

unsupported by any record citations, “in dramatic noncompliance with 

appellate procedures.” (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 

1245–1246; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) [each brief must 

“[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the 

volume and page number of the record where the matter appears;” “[i]f 

any part of the record is submitted in an electronic format, citations to 
5

that part must identify, with the same specificity required for the 

printed record, the place in the record where the matter appears”].) 

Lastly, while the opening briefs include point headings, husband’s 

arguments include factual assertions without any record citations

and/or any legal authority or cogent analysis as to how or why the court 

erred or how he was prejudiced by the court’s rulings.

Hence, when husband makes a legal argument under a point 

heading but fails to support it with record citations and/or cogent 

arguments and citations to legal authority, we will treat the point as 

forfeited. (See, e.g., Tellez v. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 

Cal.App.4th 1052, 1066 [“[w]hen an appellant asserts a point but fails 

to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we 

treat the point as forfeited”]; Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc. (2014) 

224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267 [“plaintiffs make numerous factual 

assertions in their briefs without record citation” but “[w]e are entitled 

to disregard such unsupported factual assertions”]; Duarte v. Chino 

Community Hospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856 [“ ‘[i]t is the duty 

of a party to support the arguments in its briefs by appropriate 

reference to the record, which includes providing exact page citations;’ ” 

“[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to 

the record, that . . . argument [may be] deemed to have been waived”]; 

Kim v. Sumitomo Bank (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 974, 979 [an appellate 

court “ ‘is not required to discuss or consider points . . . which are not 

supported by citation to authorities or the record’ ”].)
6

With these principles in mind, we now address husband’s 

arguments.5

I. Parties’ Prenuptial Agreement

a. Relevant Facts

On July 10, 2012, the day of the marriage, the parties entered 

into a “prenuptial agreement” concerning “(among other things) 

matters of alimony, property settlement, spousal support, and promises 

by one party to transfer money, property or an asset of any kind to the 

other party in the future.” The prenuptial agreement was executed in 

Missouri and, by its terms, was “intended . . . [to] be valid and 

enforceable under the laws of the state of Missouri, and that the laws of 

[Missouri] shall govern the agreement’s interpretation.”

After a hearing on February 13, 2018, the trial court filed an 

order on February 28, 2018 ruling, in pertinent part, that the 

prenuptial agreement was not valid.

b. Analysis

In challenging the court’s February 28, 2018 order invalidating 

the prenuptial agreement, husband cites to Family Code section 1615 

5 Wife’s failure to file any responsive briefs does not inure to 

husband’s benefit. “[W]e do not treat the failure to file a respondent’s 

brief as a ‘default’ (i.e., an admission of error) but examine the record, 

[husband’s] brief[s], and any oral argument by [husband] to see if it 

supports any claims of error made by . . . [him].” (In re Marriage of 

Riddle (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 1075, 1078, fn. 1; Rooz v. Kimmel (1997) 

55 Cal.App.4th 573, 594, fn. 12 [in the absence of a respondent’s brief, 

“we follow the better practice of examining the record on the basis of 

[husband’s] brief[s] and reversing only if prejudicial error is found”]; see 

Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.220(a)(2) [if a respondent does not file a 

brief, the court “may decide the appeal on the record, the opening brief, 

and any oral argument by the appellant”].) 
7

and In re Marriage of Bonds (2000) 24 Cal.4th 1, and then argues the 

court “just simply . . . said” the prenuptial agreement was not valid. 

Husband has forfeited any challenge to the order as he has not 

provided either a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement as to what 

occurred at the February 13, 2018 hearing. (Randall v. Mousseau

(2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 929, 933; see Id. at p. 934, fn. 4 [appellant has

right to secure a settled statement despite decision not to hire a court 

reporter].) In the absence of a record of what occurred at the hearing, 

we presume the trial court considered all relevant facts and correctly 

applied the law when making its order invalidating the prenuptial 

agreement. (See Elena S. v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 576 

[“[i]n the absence of a proper record, which would include either a 

reporter’s transcript or a settled statement (neither of which we have in 

this case), we must presume the trial court acted properly”].) Because 

husband has failed to meet his appellate burden of showing the court 

committed reversible error, his claim fails. 

II. November 7, 2019 Elisor Order

a. Relevant Facts

Before the commencement of the dissolution proceeding, on 

August 1, 2016, wife signed an interspousal transfer grant deed by 

which she granted husband the marital residence, “as his sole and 

separate property.” Thereafter, during the dissolution proceeding, on 

March 20, 2018, the trial court issued an order stating: “The parties 

agree that the house shall be put on the market and sold. [Husband] is 

to provide [wife] with funds allocated for her to move, with the amount 

to be determined. The funds are subject to reallocation.”
8

Several months later, on October 25, 2018, the parties executed 

the SPA, which provided in pertinent part as follows:

“WHEREAS the parties are married, and [acquired] real 

property located at [address of the marital residence];

“WHEREAS it is the intent of the parties to reform title to 

that property from being held in [husband’s] name alone to ‘[wife] 

and [husband], a married couple as joint tenants’; [¶] . . . [¶]

THEY now agree as follows:

“1. Within 30 days of the execution of this agreement 

[husband] shall sign an Interspousal Grant Deed transferring 

title to the property . . . from himself, to the community as joint 

tenants. It is the express intent of [husband] to acknowledge that 

this property is a community property asset and that by signing 

this agreement he is making an express declaration, in writing of 

his intention to alter the character of this real property from 

possible separate property to community property to be held in 

joint tenancy with right of survivorship. The subject real 

property will not be sold without the express written consent of 

both parties. [¶] . . . [¶]

“5. The parties acknowledge and agree that they each 

have had the opportunity to review this document with 

independent counsel prior to affixing their signature hereto.

“6. The parties further acknowledge that the preparer of 

this Agreement, [wife’s counsel], a member in good standing of 

the Bar of the State of California is representing [wife] in the 

preparation of this document, and [wife] has been expressly 

advised of her right to seek legal assistance in its review. 

[Husband] is representing himself. Each party has been 

specifically informed that should he/she fail/refuse to seek legal 

counsel to review this Agreement, absent a showing of intentional 

fraud on the part of [wife] or his [sic] legal representative, she 

[sic] may not challenge this Agreement on the basis of fraudulent 

inducement.
9

“7. The parties further acknowledge and agree that they 

are fully aware of and understand the contents, legal effect and 

consequences of this Agreement, and that they enter into this 

Agreement voluntarily, free from duress, fraud, undue influence, 

coercion or misrepresentation of any kind. [¶] . . . [¶]

“9. In the event that either parent must file a legal 

action to enforce this Agreement, the prevailing party shall be 

awarded reasonable attorney fees and costs from the noncompliant parent.

“10. This Agreement contains the entire understanding 

and agreement of the parties, and there have been no promises, 

representations, warranties, or undertakings by either party as 

to the other, oral or written, of any character or nature, except as 

set forth herein.”

On August 8, 2019, wife filed a request for orders. Among other 

things, she sought an order appointing the clerk of the court to act as 

elisor and sign an interspousal grant deed transferring title of the 

marital residence from husband to the community as joint tenants 

pursuant to the SPA (“Elisor Order”).

6 Husband opposed wife’s request 

for an Elisor Order, asserting that the parties’ interests in the marital 

residence was an issue that “should be reserved for trial. . . . Whoever 

is on the deed is not dispositive, the issue of whether the community 

6 “The use of the term elisor may be technically inaccurate to 

describe the persons appointed to execute deeds for recalcitrant 

litigants who refuse to obey orders of the court. (See [Code Civ. Proc.,] 

§ 262.8 denominating as an elisor one who executes process only under 

certain circumstances having to do with the sheriff or coroner being a 

party.) We recognize, however, that in common legal parlance the term 

elisor is used to designate persons appointed to perform functions such 

as the deed and document execution which is involved in this case.” 

(Rayan v. Dykeman (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 1629, 1635, fn. 2.) 
10

holds an interest in the home is an issue that should be reserved for 

trial.”

The request for an Elisor Order was considered by the trial court 

at a hearing on November 7, 2019. Wife’s counsel argued the parties 

had signed the SPA and, pursuant to that agreement, husband had 

agreed to put wife’s name on the title to the marital residence 

“purchased in 2016 during marriage using community property credit 

and, essentially, paid for by the community that he had put in his name 

alone. . . . He agreed that if he failed to do so he would be liable for 

attorney’s fees. He’s failed, of course, to comply with any of those 

promises that were made because we don’t believe he ever had any 

intention of complying. His intention was to have her drop the 

Domestic Violence Restraining Order, [but she did not vacate or 

dismiss the dissolution action].” Wife’s counsel further asserted 

husband had “failed to make mortgage payments. He refinanced the 

mortgage in 2018. But we need to protect the asset. It is a community 

asset. But mainly, . . . we’re asking the Court to appoint the clerk as 

elisor to sign this document.”7

Husband’s counsel argued that “whether or not there is [a] 

community interest in this house is an issue for trial.” When the court 

noted that the SPA provided husband was to sign an interspousal

7 In his combined opening brief in case Nos. A160335 & A160735, 

at pages 20–21 in footnotes numbered 3 through 9, husband challenges 

the quoted statements made by wife’s counsel, but his factual 

assertions are not supported by any citations to the record, and 

according, we disregard them. (Falcon v. Long Beach Genetics, Inc., 

supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 1267 [where a party has made numerous 

factual assertions in their briefs without record citations, the appellate 

court is entitled to disregard those unsupported factual assertions].) 
11

transfer deed in favor of wife, counsel argued husband had an 

“equitable defense.” The basis for this argument was that husband 

signed the SPA under coercion and duress as he was “living in his car” 

and not seeing his child, and wife said he could return to the home and 

see their child if he signed the SPA. Husband’s counsel asserted the 

court should not condone wife’s use of the outstanding DVRO “to 

achieve some sort of community property leverage,” by communicating 

to husband that he could “come back home and see [his child] if [he 

signed] over the house.” 

Following further argument, the trial court granted wife’s 

request for an Elisor Order as the agreement “was signed by both 

parties over a year ago,” and it made no mention that the consideration 

for husband’s signature was that he would be allowed to return to the 

marital residence.

b. Analysis

Husband makes several arguments in challenging the Elisor 

Order, none of which requires reversal.

We see no merit to husband’s contention that the Elisor Order

should be reversed because the trial court failed to consider the August 

2016 interspousal transfer deed by which the marital residence was 

made husband’s “sole and separate property” (hereinafter “2016 deed”). 

Husband cites no portion of the record indicating the court was asked 

to consider the 2016 deed. He refers us only to a declaration filed on 

February 2, 2018 and a declaration filed on August 4, 2020, documents 

not shown to be before the court at the November 7, 2019 hearing. 

Even assuming the court was made aware of the 2016 deed, husband 

presents no cogent argument supported by legal authority as to how the 
12

court’s knowledge of the 2016 deed would have impacted its ruling on

the request for an Elisor Order.

We also see no merit to husband’s argument that the SPA was 

“invalid” for various reasons, including: (1) the SPA did not contain the 

proper language transmuting the marital residence from husband’s 

separate property to community property; (2) the SPA was given in 

consideration for the removal of the DVRO that was granted based on a 

false allegation; (3) husband paid the down payment on the marital 

residence from funds in his separate bank account; (4) the SPA gave 

unfair advantage to wife in the pending divorce proceeding; (5) wife’s

counsel “committed extortion” when she traded the DVRO for title to

the marital residence but kept the divorce proceeding alive for future 

purposes; and (6) the SPA was not a fair trade because husband 

previously had full ownership of the marital residence, almost 50/50 

custody, and only six months left on the DVRO. At the November 

7, 2019 hearing the trial court considered husband’s arguments, in the 

form of an offer of proof by his counsel, and found them insufficient to 

deny wife’s request for an Elisor Order. 

Husband’s citation to statutory and case law governing spousal 

transmutation of real property is not persuasive. The cited law merely 

holds that whenever there is a transfer from one spouse to another a 

rebuttable presumption of undue influence arises if the transaction 

gives one spouse an unfair advantage over the other. (See In re 

Marriage of Burkle (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 712, 732.) No such unfair 

advantage has been shown, especially given wife’s clear position at the 

hearing that the status of the marital residence would be resolved at a 
13

later trial and, in the interim, wife was only requesting that her name 

be placed on the title. 

Nor do we see any merit to husband’s contention that reversal of 

the Elisor Order is required because he was prejudiced by the court’s 

ruling. Husband makes only the purely speculative argument that

without the “unlawful” Elisor Order, “the parties would have settled 

early in a fair agreement and the induced harm and injuries to the 

child and . . . [husband] would have been prevented.”

III. March 4, 2020 DVRO and Related Child Custody and 

Visitation Orders

Husband challenges the statutory basis and sufficiency of 

evidence to support the trial court’s custody and visitation orders 

issued on March 4, 2020 following the court’s grant of a permanent 

DVRO in favor of wife and the child. We see no merit to these 

arguments. 

a. Applicable Law

In Family Code8 section 3020, “[t]he Legislature finds and 

declares that it is the public policy of this state to ensure that the 

health, safety, and welfare of children shall be the court’s primary 

concern in determining the best interests of children when making any 

orders regarding the physical and legal custody or visitation of 

children. The Legislature further finds and declares that . . . the 

perpetration of . . . domestic violence in a household where a child 

resides is detrimental to the health, safety, and welfare of the child.” 

(Id., subd. (a).) The Legislature has also found and declared that “it is 

8 All undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
14

the public policy of this state to ensure that children have frequent and 

continuing contact with both parents after the parents have separated 

or dissolved their marriage, . . . and to encourage parents to share the 

rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this policy 

. . . .” (Id., subd. (b).) Nonetheless, “[w]hen the policies set forth in 

subdivisions (a) and (b) of [section 3020] are in conflict, a court’s order 

regarding physical and legal custody or visitation shall be made in a 

manner that ensures the health, safety, and welfare of the child and 

the safety of all family members.” (Id., subd. (c).)

Section 3027.1 provides, in pertinent part, that if a court 

determines “an accusation of child abuse or neglect made during a child 

custody proceeding is false and the person making the accusation knew 

it to be false at the time the accusation was made, the court may 

impose reasonable money sanctions, not to exceed all costs incurred by 

the party accused as a direct result of defending the accusation, and 

reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in recovering the sanctions, against 

the person making the accusation. . . .” (Id., subd. (a).) “On motion by 

any person requesting sanctions under this section, the court shall 

issue its order to show cause why the requested sanctions should not be 

imposed. The order to show cause shall be served on the person against

whom the sanctions are sought and a hearing thereon shall be 

scheduled by the court to be conducted at least 15 days after the order 

is served.” (Id., subd. (b).) “The remedy provided by this section is in 

addition to any other remedy provided by law.” (Id., subd. (c).) 

Section 3027.5 provides as follows: “(a) A parent shall not be 

placed on supervised visitation, or be denied custody of or visitation 

with the parent’s child, and custody or visitation rights shall not be 
15

limited, solely because the parent did any of the following: [¶] (1) 

Lawfully reported suspected sexual abuse of the child; [¶] (2) Otherwise 

acted lawfully, based on a reasonable belief, to determine if the child 

was the victim of sexual abuse; [¶] (3) Sought treatment for the child

from a licensed mental health professional for suspected sexual abuse. 

[¶] (b) The court may order supervised visitation or limit a parent’s 

custody or visitation if the court finds substantial evidence that the 

parent, with the intent to interfere with the other parent’s lawful 

contact with the child, made a report of child sexual abuse, during a 

child custody proceeding or at any other time, that the reporting parent 

knew was false at the time it was made. A limitation of custody or 

visitation, including an order of supervised visitation, pursuant to this 

subdivision, or a statute regarding the making of a false child abuse 

report, shall be imposed only after the court has determined that the 

limitation is necessary to protect the health, safety, and welfare of the 

child, and the court has considered the state’s policy of ensuring that 

children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents as 

declared in subdivision (b) of Section 3020.” 

Section 3044 provides, in pertinent part, that after “a finding by 

the court that a party seeking custody of a child has perpetrated 

domestic violence within the previous five years against the other party 

seeking custody of the child . . ., there is a rebuttable presumption that 

an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person 

who has perpetrated domestic violence is detrimental to the best 

interest of the child . . . . This presumption may only be rebutted by a 

preponderance of the evidence.” 
16

b. Relevant Facts9

1. Husband’s Requests for Possession of the Marital 

Residence and Child Custody and Visitation Orders

On July 30, 2019, while the parties were reconciled during the 

pending dissolution proceeding, husband filed a request for “temporary 

emergency orders” seeking sole possession of the marital residence, and 

sole legal and primary physical custody of the child with wife to be 

granted professionally supervised visits. The request was based on 

husband’s allegation that wife had sexually abused the child as 

evidenced by “a thumb drive of the video” recorded on cameras installed 

in the living room of the marital residence.

The court denied husband’s request for immediate temporary 

emergency orders and set the matter for a hearing on September 12, 

2019, later continued to November 7, 2019.

2. Wife’s Request for Section 3027.1 Sanctions Against 

Husband for Making False Allegation of Child Abuse

In response, on August 20, 2019, wife filed a request for section 

3027.1 sanctions on the basis that husband “intentionally made a false 

allegation of sexual molestation against me, in a document now part of 

the public record. My attorney has requested he provide me a copy of 

the alleged ‘video’ at least 5 times. His attorney has failed to provide 

this video.” 

9 Husband’s opening briefs do not present a cogent recitation of the 

facts with record citations. Accordingly, we have endeavored to 

ascertain the facts from the appendixes and reporter’s transcripts 

submitted by husband. 
17

The court ordered the request for sanctions to be considered at 

the November 7, 2019 hearing.

3. November 7, 2019 Hearing

On November 7, 2019, the trial court convened a hearing to 

resolve both husband’s requests for possession of the marital residence 

and custody and visitation orders and wife’s request for section 3027.1 

sanctions.

After hearing argument, the court invoked its authority under

section 3027.1 and set a hearing “within 15 days” for November 26 to 

resolve the parties’ competing requests regarding whether husband had

made a false accusation of child abuse or neglect against wife, whether 

to impose sanctions, and whether to make different custody orders as 

permitted by section 3027.5. Husband’s counsel replied, “we would 

welcome that . . . . I have the video that we’re talking about right here. 

It’s not going to be false. It’s up for interpretation. It looks weird. I 

have seen it myself. She’s on top of this child with her breasts all in his 

face. . . . So you’re going to see that there is a good faith belief here.”

4. Wife’s Request for DVRO, Possession of Marital 

Residence, and Child Custody 

On November 18, 2019, wife filed a DVRO application seeking 

protection for herself and the child based upon a number of incidents

that occurred September through November 2019. For example, on 

October 3, 2019, husband “made a report to San Ramon Police. The 

report stated he showed them a video of me and our son. [Husband] 

had previously attempted, on July 30, 2019, to obtain an Emergency 

Temporary Order by accusing me of sexually molesting our son. This is 

a false and defamatory allegation and he knows it is false. The police 
18

found nothing wrong. I DID NOT SEE THE VIDEO UNTIL 

NOVEMBER 7, 2019 when [husband’s] attorney gave a copy to [my] 

attorney at a hearing. I then realized he had hidden a camera in our 

home. The thought that he was taping me without my consent and 

controlling the video is extremely traumatizing for me. He has invaded 

my privacy in a horrific way.” (Original capitals and bolding.) Further, 

in November 2019, she discovered husband had “secretly installed a 

recording/listening device in a fake ‘smoke detector’ ” “[i]n violation of 

Penal Code [section] 647(j),” and Officer J. Nunn of the San Ramon 

Police Department “came and amended his prior report dated 10/3/19 . . 

. to include this violation.” Wife asserted she was “traumatized, 

horrified and fearful that [husband] has shared personal, intimate 

videos of me from the home with others. This discovery makes me 

extremely fearful.”

5. November 18, 2019 Temporary DVRO 

On November 18, 2019 the trial court issued an order granting 

wife a temporary DVRO pending a hearing set for December 6, 2019. 

The temporary DVRO required husband to move out of the marital 

residence and granted wife sole legal and physical custody of their child 

with no visitation granted to husband.

6. November 26, 2019 Hearing

On November 26, 2019, the trial court convened the scheduled 

hearing that had been ordered on November 7.

The court began by stating it had reviewed “more than once” the

“flash drive which purportedly contain[ed] . . . some clips from a 

surveillance camera in the home of the parties,” which had been 

provided by husband’s counsel at the November 7 hearing. The court 
19

stated that if the only evidence in support of husband’s request for 

custody “is this little video from the household surveillance camera, 

then there was no point in having a hearing because the Court does not 

deem that anything on the video recording constitutes sexual abuse. If 

there were some other evidence that was going to be presented, I will 

hear it. But, if it’s based on this little flash drive with the video, I see 

nothing in that video clip to suggest sexual or physical abuse [of] the 

child. [¶] For the record, it is several minutes of [wife] playing on . . .

the floor with her son, rolling around on the carpet, the son appears to 

be laughing, and I see absolutely no indication that there is abuse going 

on.” Husband’s counsel confirmed he had no further evidence to 

present.

After considering arguments, the court granted wife’s request for 

sanctions in the sum of $5,000 in attorney fees to defend against 

husband’s false allegation that she had sexually abused the child. The 

sanctions were directed to be paid from husband’s equity share in the 

marital residence at the time of the division of that property.

In its November 26, 2019 written order, the court ruled, in 

pertinent part, as follows:

“The court states that it calendared a hearing . . . at 

[husband’s] . . . [request] for hearing pursuant to Family Code 

section[s] 3027.1, 3027.5 regarding false allegations of sexual and 

physical abuse of the minor child . . . . The court further stated 

that concurrent with this request, made by [husband] at the 

hearing held 11.7.19, his then attorney . . . provided the court 

with a [thumb drive] containing video clips of what [husband] 

. . . alleged were incidents of sexual and/or physical abuse 

perpetrated by [wife] . . . on the child. After having reviewed 

several times the contents of the thumb drive, the court made the 

follow[ing] express findings:
20

“The court found no evidence of any sexual or physical 

abuse as alleged. The court noted the video showed several 

minutes of [wife] playing on the floor with the minor child, who 

the court notes was laughing and smiling during the time.

“Based on the above the court found no reasonable basis for 

a belief that [wife] . . . had committed abuse of the child, sexual 

or otherwise and ordered [husband] . . . to pay attorney fees as 

sanctions . . . in the amount of $5,000. These sanctions shall 

constitute a judgment as against [husband] . . . and may be paid 

from his share of the equity in the [marital] home at the time of 

division of that property.” 

The court continued the matter to February 10, 2020 for a

hearing on wife’s request for a permanent DVRO. In the interim, the 

court directed that all orders contained in the temporary DVRO would 

remain in effect, except that husband was granted professionally 

supervised visits (twice weekly, for three hours each), with husband to 

pay 100 percent of the cost for supervision.

7. March 4, 2020 DVRO and Custody Order 

On February 10, 2020 and March 4, 2020, the trial court held 

hearings on wife’s request for a permanent DVRO and custody order. 

Following the testimony of both parties, the court placed on the record

its detailed findings in support of the issuance of a two-year DVRO in 

favor of wife, in pertinent part, as follows:

“Based on the record in front of me, the evidence presented 

by the parties, and including the Court’s credibility 

determinations of the parties – They’ve both testified extensively 

in the Court’s presence, and I’ve had an opportunity to evaluate 

demeanor, and overall . . . credibility.

“I find . . . by a preponderance of the evidence that [wife] 

has met the standard for establishing domestic abuse. It is based 

on . . . [husband’s] planting of the camera and use of that to make 

false accusations against [wife] that she was sexually abusing 
21

their son. [¶] This conduct occurred between approximately May 

2019 and November 2019. This includes the planting of the 

camera, and Judge Mockler’s eventual ruling on that sexual 

abuse motion. [¶] This conduct constitutes abuse within the 

meaning of the Domestic Violence [Prevention] Act. Under 

[Altafulla v. Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571], [p]ages 578 

through 580, the Court of Appeal found that conducting 

surveillance and then distributing information from the 

surveillance in a way that was calculated to cause and did cause 

emotional distress warranted issuance of a domestic violence 

restraining order after hearing.

“The same can be said here. I find that [husband] did 

surveil [wife], and I do find [that] this was done secretly. I credit 

her testimony that she was not informed by him that he was 

planting the camera. He also made it clear that he was planting 

the camera for the purpose of gaining some kind of advantage 

over [wife].

“There was somewhat inconsistent testimony from 

[husband] about the purpose for which he planted the camera. 

He was saying that he did it as a deterrent to ensure that [the 

child] would be protected, as he was clearly intending to use it to 

prevent, to control her conduct, but at the same time, he also 

testified, ‘I did not install the camera to use it against her,’ and 

yet that is precisely what he did when he ultimately filed that 

serious accusation of sexual abuse, which was found to have no 

merit. [¶] He then tried to backtrack and say that in October of 

2019 he told his attorney to dismiss the motion. He said that his 

attorney filed it without his full blessing, and yet he appeared in 

court in November of 2019 after the supposed October 

communication with the attorney not to pursue it, and at that 

juncture, it appears in November he was still apparently 

pursuing the motion against [wife]. [¶] So I find his testimony on 

why he planted the camera, and his purpose for . . . making the 

false accusation to be inconsistent and not credible. I think what 

was happening here was that he planted the camera precisely to 

control [wife], and then used the results of the surveillance in a 

manner that was calculated to cause and did cause [wife] great 

emotional distress.”
22

“As [wife] testified at the last court date, when she saw the 

camera footage, she was horrified, terrified. ‘It was a really bad 

feeling. I don’t think anybody would understand completely my 

situation and how I felt.’ I saw her demeanor. This was a very 

harmful and damaging false accusation. That’s incident number 

one.

“I also base my finding on the October 6th, 2019 incident 

involving her carrying a tray with a watermelon and a large knife 

in which [husband] tripped her. This was an unwanted touching, 

and done in such a fashion that a reasonable person would have 

known it would cause serious harm given the length of the blade 

described credibly by [wife] as approximately eight inches.

“[Husband] disputes that this occurred, however, the Court 

finds [wife] more credible. She acknowledged that she did not 

know 100 percent if he tripped her intentionally, but then 

provided reasons to support her belief that he did. [¶] Her reason 

was that he was in the kitchen as she was leaving. They were 

not walking next to each other. It’s not that he simply tripped 

and stepped on her flip-flop. [¶] Moreover, . . ., he did not react in 

a way a person who accidentally trips someone else would have 

reacted. He didn’t apologize, inquire how she was. Instead . . . 

he went to the sink and splashed water in her face with a smirk 

in a demeaning fashion. [¶] Again, I credit [wife’s] account over 

[husband’s], and this is based on the Court’s assessment of the 

party’s demeanor while testifying in Court as well as [wife’s] 

candid acknowledgement with respect to that issue and 

throughout the proceedings as to what she knew and what she 

didn’t know.”

The March 4, 2020 DVRO included an attached child custody and 

visitation order. That order granted wife sole legal and physical 

custody and granted husband professionally supervised visits (twice 

weekly, for three hours each) and non-professionally supervised visits 

(twice weekly, for up to three hours each). The non-professional 

supervisor was to be mutually agreed upon by the parties; if the parties 
23

could not agree, then wife would propose three persons and husband 

could choose one of those three persons. 

The court explained its reasons for continuing wife as sole legal 

custodian of the child:

“The current custody order is sole legal to [wife], with 

[husband] receiving two, three-hour professionally supervised 

visits per week. I have reviewed the report[s] from the visit 

supervisor, and they show a very positive relationship between 

[husband] and his [child], and I want to be sure that [the child] 

has the benefit of that continued loving bond. [¶] [Husband] 

clearly loves his [child] very much, and I do not want to cut off or 

hamstring that relationship or the continued growth and 

development of that relationship, however, at this juncture, I do 

not believe that the [section] 3044 presumption has been 

rebutted, and sole legal [custody] will remain with [wife].”

The court explained its reasons for allowing both professional and 

nonprofessional supervision of husband’s visits:

“I would like to increase the amount of visitation. . . . [¶] 

On the one hand, I would like to maintain supervision because I 

am concerned about [husband’s] conduct. I know he apologized at 

the outset of [the March 4, 2020] hearing for storming out of the 

court at the last proceeding, but his behavior in that proceeding 

suggests to me, in conjunction with his conduct throughout the 

history of this litigation, that he has not respected the authority 

of this Court to issues orders, and to abide by those orders.

“At the last hearing [on February 26, 2020] the evidence 

also indicated that he’s made cash deposits to pay his credit card, 

which document various trips to China. I’m concerned there is 

potential of flight risk. He’s made a false accusation against 

[wife] of sexual abuse. I’m concerned he may do so in the child’s 

presence and attempt to taint the son’s relationship with [wife], 

so those would be the reasons why we should continue 

supervision. [¶] . . . [¶]

“At the same time and on the other side of the ledger, it’s 

very clear to me that [husband] and his son have a positive and 
24

loving bond, and there’s an artificiality to the environment of the 

supervised visit, and I’m concerned about interfering, again, with 

the natural growth, and strengthening, and continuation of that 

bond. [¶] I also am cognizant of the cost implications and don’t 

want the financial issues to become a barrier to [husband] having 

important and meaningful time with the child.” 

8. August 10, 2020 Denial of Husband’s Request for 

Order Modification

On August 10, 2020, the trial court convened a hearing to 

consider husband’s March 9, 2020 request for an order (RFO) regarding 

custody, visitation and “for property control.”

“[Husband] seeks to move back into the home and to take 

care of the party’s minor son on a full time basis. After a lengthy 

evidentiary hearing, the Court issued a 2-year DVRO on March 4, 

2020. The Court will not require a domestic violence victim to 

move out so that her abuser can have exclusive possession of the 

home. [Husband] raises no issues in his RFO that would warrant 

altering the custody and visitation orders currently in effect. 

Although [husband] is not inappropriate with the minor, 

supervised visits are still necessary as the Court finds [husband] 

to be a flight risk. He has been evasive regarding his 

whereabouts and the address that can be used for service in this 

matter. Based on the entire record in this matter including the 

prior testimony of the parties at the domestic violence trial 

earlier this year, the Court is concerned that [husband] has 

‘weaponized’ the minor son as part of his ongoing emotional 

abuse and harassment of [wife] and presents a substantial risk of 

fleeing with the child. The current custodial arrangement is 

therefore in the best interests of the minor child. Visits shall 

remain supervised.”

9. February 5, 2021 Denial of Request for Order 

Modification

On February 5, 2021, the trial court convened a hearing to 

consider husband’s request to modify legal and physical custody of the 
25

child and the visitation schedule, which had been set by the March 4, 

2020 orders. 

After considering arguments, the court found husband had seen 

the child only a few times since August 13, 2020 despite a visitation 

order that allowed for significantly more visitation. Based on its 

finding, the court denied the request to modify visits unless and until 

husband participated in visits on a regular basis. The court also ruled 

the existing order regarding legal custody would stand based on the 

section 3044 presumption, and that the previously ordered DVRO, put 

in place following an extensive hearing, should continue to be followed 

by the parties.

c. Analysis

Husband presents an amalgamation of arguments that neither 

individually nor collectively provide a basis for reversal of any of the 

challenged orders.

Based upon the order in which the court held the hearings on the 

parties’ various requests for relief, husband avers he did not receive 

appropriate time or notice to rebut wife’s allegation that he made a 

false claim that she sexually abused the child. We disagree. The 

record shows the trial court first resolved husband’s request for custody 

based on his claim that wife was sexually abusing the child, and then 

proceeded to resolve wife’s requests for a DVRO and custody of the 

child. Additionally, the record shows the court’s procedure was 

expressly agreed to by husband’s counsel at the November 7, 2019

hearing, with no contention that section 3027.1 did not apply (the basis 

now asserted on appeal). Nor did husband make any argument to the 

trial court that section 3027.1 was unconstitutional because it 
26

interfered with a parent’s duty to protect the child and results “in 

silencing of concerns due to fear of being stripped of all rights to 

parenthood.” Having failed to make these arguments in the trial court, 

husband’s claims of error are forfeited. (See Fourth La Costa 

Condominium Owners Assn. v. Seith (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 563, 585 

[constitutional issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited on 

appeal].) 

Husband also appears to contend that the November 26, 2019

order awarding sanctions to wife should be set aside because “there was 

no evidence” and the court never made a specific finding, as required 

under section 3027.1, that husband or husband’s counsel knew the 

child abuse allegations were false when “made/filed” and husband knew 

they were false “at the time of filing.” (Original italics and 

underlining.) However, husband does not cite to any portion of the 

record demonstrating that the court was ever asked to make specific 

findings pursuant to section 3027.1. Instead, after the court ruled that 

husband could not reasonably believe the video demonstrated abuse of 

any kind, husband’s counsel informed the court that he had no further 

evidence to offer and did not request that the court make any 

additional findings. Having failed to request the specific findings he 

contends he was entitled to under the statute, husband has forfeited 

his claim of error on appeal. (See County of San Luis Obispo v. Abalone 

Alliance (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 848, 868 [where trial court considered 

all criteria imposed by statute before concluding defendants were 

entitled to relief, plaintiff’s failure to request a specific finding on a 

criterion waived any objection to the lack of a finding].) 
27

Similarly, we see no merit to husband’s contention that the trial 

court misapplied section 3027.5, which prohibits a court from ordering 

supervised visits, or denying custody to a parent, solely because the 

parent did any of the following: (1) lawfully reported suspected sexual 

abuse of the child; (2) otherwise acted lawfully, based on a reasonable 

belief, to determine if the child was the victim of sexual abuse; or (3) 

sought treatment for the child from a licensed mental health 

professional for suspected sexual abuse. Husband’s contention fails

because it is premised on a false assertion. The trial court did not order 

supervised visits and deny him custody based solely on his allegations 

of wife’s sexual abuse of the child. Indeed, the record shows the court’s 

order was based on other factors including that he had not rebutted the 

presumption in section 3044 and he was a flight risk. Consequently, 

husband’s claim of error fails.

In challenging the court’s factual finding that wife was entitled to 

a DVRO, husband contends the court “wrongfully characterized” and 

did not “give proper weight” to his testimony, and wrongfully gave 

credence to wife’s “faulty credibility” and her description of “the 

watermelon and knife story” that could not have occurred as described 

based on “the laws of physics and human reflexes.” We decline to 

address these contentions as husband has not tendered the issue,

“together with a fair summary of the evidence bearing on the 

challenged finding, particularly including evidence that arguably 

supports it.” (Huong Que, Inc. v. Luu (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 400, 409–

410 (Huong Que).) “[W]hen an appellant urges the insufficiency of the 

evidence to support the findings it is his duty to set forth a fair and 

adequate statement of the evidence which is claimed to be insufficient.” 
28

(Hickson v. Thielman (1956) 147 Cal.App.2d 11, 14–15.) As a reviewing 

court we are not required to “undertake an independent examination of 

the record when appellant has shirked his responsibility in this 

respect.” (Ibid.) 

Likewise, we find unavailing husband’s contention that the 

March 4 DVRO is not supported by Altafulla v. Ervin, supra, 238 

Cal.App.4th 571 (Altafulla), which was cited by the trial court. The 

Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA; §§6200 et. seq.) defines 

“ ‘[a]buse’ . . . as intentionally or recklessly causing or attempting to 

cause bodily injury, . . . or engaging in any behavior that has been or 

could be enjoined pursuant to section 6320. (§ 6203.) The behavior 

outlined in section 6320 includes . . . disturbing the peace of the other 

party . . . . (§ 6320.)” (Conness v. Satram (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 197, 

201–202.) Opinions have held that “ ‘the plain meaning of the phrase 

“disturbing the peace” in section 6320’ ” may be properly understood as 

conduct that destroys “ ‘the mental or emotional calm of the other 

party.’ ” (Altafulla, supra, at p. 579, quoting In re Marriage of 

Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495 (Nadkarni).) 

Hence, as a matter of law, the trial court could find that 

husband’s conduct toward wife constituted abuse under the DVPA as it 

involved his attempt to cause physical injury. In addition, his secret 

video recording later used to make a false claim that wife was sexually 

abusing the child caused and no doubt was calculated to cause wife 

grave emotional distress. (See Altafulla, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 575–576, 579 [DVRO supported by evidence that the defendant

distributed emails to third parties complaining of plaintiff’s 

unfaithfulness and attaching photographs of the plaintiff and a man
29

with whom she was having an affair; such distribution “did cause and 

no doubt was calculated to cause, [the plaintiff] grave emotional 

distress”]; Nadkarni, supra, 173 Cal.App.4th at p. 1498 [“the plain 

meaning of the phrase ‘disturbing the peace’ in section 6320 may 

include, as abuse within the meaning of the DVPA,” reading and 

publicly disclosing confidential e-mails].) 

Husband also makes various assertions in support of his 

contention that the trial court erred in awarding sole custody of the 

child to wife based on the rebuttable presumption in section 3044. We

decline to address his arguments as he cites no portion of the record in 

which he presented these arguments in the trial court. Accordingly, we 

deem this claim to be forfeited. (See People v. Saunders (1993) 5 

Cal.4th 580, 590 [“ ‘ “[n]o procedural principle is more familiar to this 

Court than that a constitutional right,” or a right of any other sort, 

“may be forfeited in . . . civil cases by the failure to make timely 

assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to determine 

it” ’ ”].) 

IV. Child Support Arrearages

a. Relevant Facts

On February 28, 2018, following a hearing, the trial court issued 

an order that, among other things, directed husband to pay child 

support in the sum of $1,814 per month commencing February 15, 

2018.

On January 17, 2020, wife filed a request for orders for: (1) child 

support arrearages; (2) a child support security trust account; and (3) 

bifurcation of the issue concerning the sale of the marital residence. 

Wife asserted husband owed the total sum of $18,140 in child support, 
30

accrued over 10 months. Wife also asserted husband had not paid 

support in the past, was extremely secretive about his finances, kept 

documents and cash in a briefcase to which she had no access, and

maintained a business in China and had bank accounts in China that 

she could not access. Wife therefore asked the court to direct the 

creation of a child support security account and that “$100,000” of 

husband’s net share of the proceeds of the sale of marital residence be 

placed in trust as security for future child support.

In seeking bifurcation of the issue of the sale of the marital 

residence, wife asserted the parties’ estimated equity was $297,165 

based on a valuation of $771,965 and outstanding mortgage of 

$474,800. Wife further noted that child support arrearages would 

reduce husband’s share of the equity to $120,000; wife sought $100,000 

of husband’s equity to be held in trust as security for future child 

support, with the balance to be held in trust pending further requests 

for attorney fees or other orders. Wife also requested temporary 

spousal support, which issue had not yet been addressed by the court.

On February 26, 2020, the trial court convened a hearing on 

wife’s request for orders. At that time, the court was aware that 

husband had filed a bankruptcy petition, which operated to stay the

sale of the marital residence. The bankruptcy petition did not impede 

the court’s ability to make orders determining child support arrearages 

or temporary spousal support. When informed that the bankruptcy 

stay would be resolved by April 2, the court agreed not to consider 

wife’s request to bifurcate the issue of the sale of the marital residence. 

The court issued an order determining (1) husband owed child 

support of $14,512 (February 28, 2018 to October 25, 2018) plus 
31

interest of $2,902.40, and (2) husband owed unpaid child support of 

$4,682 accruing interest at the rate of $1.26 per day until paid in full 

for the period November 19, 2019 to February 26, 2020. Commencing 

February 26, 2020, husband was ordered to pay $1,484 per month for 

temporary child support and $1,320 for temporary spousal support. 

The court also directed that the support amounts, including interest, 

were “subject to retroactive modification.” In determining husband’s 

support obligation, the court imputed income of $125,000 per year 

based on its findings that husband had a Ph.D., was previously paid 

$150,000 per year, was a highly skilled employee in a lucrative 

industry, and was likely currently gainfully employed as evidenced by 

his cash payments for his credit cards.

On August 10, 2020, the trial court convened a hearing on 

husband’s request to set aside the February 26, 2020 order. The court 

denied husband’s motion in a written order filed on August 10, 2020, 

which stated, in pertinent part, as follows:

“First, [husband] contends that [wife’s] January 17, 2020 

RFO [Request for Order] did not seek spousal support. Although 

the cover sheet to the RFO (FL-300) did not check the box for 

spousal support, [wife’s] 5-page declaration in support devoted 

two pages to the issue, in a section captioned, in bold, 

‘Petitioner’s Request for Spousal Support.’ Consistent with 

[California Rules of Court, rule 5.92], Petitioner’s RFO ‘set forth 

facts sufficient to notify the other party of the moving party’s 

contentions in support of the relief requested.

“Second, [husband] contends that [wife’s] RFO did not seek 

an income imputation. But [wife’s] declaration regarding spousal 

support discussed at length [husband’s] earning capacity and the 

income that should be attributed to him for purposes of a spousal 

support order.
32

“Third, [husband] contends that [wife’s] RFO did not seek 

child support and that the prior child support order in this 

matter (FOAH [Findings and Order After Hearing] filed 

February 28, 2018) had been terminated when the initial DVRO 

in this matter was terminated on October 26, 2018. The October 

26, 2018 order states: ‘Child custody, visitation (parenting time), 

and child support orders in Restraining Order After Hearing 

[form DV 130] . . . [a]re also terminated.’ But the initial child 

support order was set forth in a FOAH filed February 28, 2018. 

The May 29, 2018 DVRO did not order child support. The order 

terminating that DVRO thus terminated the custody and 

visitation orders set forth in the DVRO – but there were no child 

support orders in the DVRO to terminate. Thus, the February 

28, 2018 child support order had not been terminated and was in 

effect at the time of the hearing on February 26, 2020. While 

[husband] is correct that [wife’s] January 17, 2020 RFO did not 

expressly seek a modification in child support, the Court finds

that [husband] suffered no prejudice from the Court’s February 

26, 2020 order modifying child support. [Wife’s] RFO did seek 

child support arrears, but not for the period after the issuance of 

the February 28, 2018 child support order during which the 

parties reconciled and were living together. The child support 

order in effect at the time of the February 26, 2020 hearing was 

the February 28, 2018 FOAH, ordering [husband] to pay $1,814 a 

month in child support. Upon hearing [wife’s] RFO for spousal 

support in February 2020, the Court adopted inputs for a new 

dissomaster. These inputs resulted in a guideline child support 

amount of $1,484, which is less than the prior operative order of 

$1,814. Thus, [husband] would have been prejudiced had the 

Court left the prior child support order in place (notwithstanding 

the new inputs to the dissomaster). The Court’s order setting a 

new child support amount in the February 26, 2020 FOAH 

benefited [husband] by decreasing his monthly child support 

obligations.

“Fourth, [husband’s] new counsel has recently [substituted]

into this matter and filed a reply brief on August 4, 2020. 

Although this reply brief is untimely . . ., the Court will consider 

it to avoid any meritless procedural objections to this ruling. The 

reply brief raises various factual arguments about payments 

[husband] has purportedly made and that should be credited 
33

towards any support obligations. At the hearing, counsel for 

[husband] also noted that [husband] was making mortgage 

payments. [Husband] was aware in advance of the February 

26, 2020 hearing of any payments he supposedly made. These 

are not new facts and they form no basis for setting aside the 

February 26, 2020 FOAH.[10] 

“Fifth, [husband’s] counsel emphasized at the hearing that 

[husband] was unrepresented at the February 26, 2020 hearing. 

On the morning of the February 26, 2020 hearing, [husband] 

requested a continuance. The Court denied the last minute, 

morning-of request. [Husband] claims he was not aware of the 

hearing but that is untrue. The Court had advised him 

personally of the February 26, 2020 hearing on February 

10, 2020, when the parties were before the Court on the domestic 

violence matter. In addition, [wife’s] January 17, 2020 RFO 

[request for order] had been personally served on [husband’s] 

prior attorney (see Proof of Service, filed January 24, 2020), and 

[husband] admitted that his prior attorney had provided him 

with all the files before substituting out of the case. [Husband’s] 

prior attorney substituted out of the matter, with [husband’s] 

consent on February 7, 2020. [Husband] had almost three weeks 

to find substitute counsel before the February 26, 2020 hearing. 

[Wife] had an immediate need for support and a continuance 

would have prejudiced her. At the same time, the Court did not 

find good cause for [husband’s] eleventh-hour request for a 

continuance of a hearing of which he was fully aware. 

[Husband’s] lack of counsel at the February 26, 2020 hearing 

does not warrant granting the relief requested[.] This is 

particularly so because the main argument articulated by 

[husband’s new] counsel in favor of setting aside the earlier 

FOAH is that [husband] had actually made various payments. 

These factual arguments, as noted above, were arguments that 

10 At this point in the order, the trial court further stated: “Counsel 

for [husband] argued at the hearing that support should not be 

awarded for any period during which the parties reconciled. This is 

legally irrelevant as the order for arrears excluded the period during 

which the parties reconciled.” 
34

[husband] was aware of and required no specialized legal training 

to make.”

b. Analysis

Husband challenges the child support arrearages set forth in the 

February 26, 2020 and August 10, 2020 orders. He complains the 

court: (1) erroneously assumed child support was in effect from 

November 2019 (when the parties separated for the second time) to

February 26, 2020, “but in fact the prior child support order was 

equitably terminated at the time of reconciliation on 10/25/18;” (2) 

failed to accept husband’s testimony and failed to give him additional 

time to provide proof of a cashed check of “$3680” made payable to wife 

as payment of child support; and (3) refused to allow him a continuance 

at the February 26, 2020 hearing to present proof of a cashed check and 

ignored the production of the cashed check at the August 10, 2020 

hearing. Husband also avers wife lied regarding whether she received 

any child support between February 2018 and October 2018. In sum, 

according to husband, “[a]ssuming no other errors, the arrearage 

amount drops from $19,195 to below $10,000. However, [husband] was 

paying the mortgage, property tax and home insurance payments, a 

total of $3,370 per month, when [wife] had the exclusive use of the 

[marital residence] during the time between, Feb. 2018 and October 

25th in 2018, the arrearage was calculated. . . . Such mortgage 

payments should have been credited towards [husband’s] support 

obligation. In re Marriage of Epstein (1979) 24 Cal.3d 76, 85.” 

(Original italics).

Again, we decline to address husband’s arguments as he has not 

tendered the issue, “together with a fair summary of the evidence 
35

bearing on the challenged finding, particularly including evidence that 

arguably supports it.” (Huong Que, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 409–

410.) In support of his argument, husband cites to few and isolated 

portions of the record: two pages of the February 26, 2020 hearing and 

a declaration he filed on August 4, 2020. While we have a copy of the 

reporter’s transcript of the February 26, 2020 hearing, we do not have 

either a reporter’s transcript or settled statement of the August 

10, 2020 hearing. Moreover, husband’s contention that his mortgage 

payments should have been credited towards his support obligation, 

pursuant to In re Marriage of Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 76 (Epstein),

11

is not persuasive. In Epstein, our Supreme Court held that under 

certain circumstances a spouse’s payment of mortgage for the marital 

residence may constitute a discharge in part of the duty to pay child 

support. (Id. at p. 85.) However, husband presents no cogent 

argument demonstrating the trial court committed prejudicial error by 

rejecting his contention that his payment of mortgage payments should 

have been found to be in discharge of his duty to pay child support.

In sum, because husband has not properly briefed the issue, his 

claims of error regarding the awards of child support arrearages are

forfeited. (Landry v. Berryessa Union School Dist. (1995) 39 

Cal.App.4th 691, 699 [appellate court ignores contention supported 

only by citations to general law but no argument applying the law to 

the circumstances of the case].) 

V. Child Support Security Trust Account

a. Relevant Facts

11 Epstein was superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in 

In re Marriage of Walrath (1998) 17 Cal.4th 907 at page 914.
36

In her January 17, 2020 request for orders, wife sought to invoke 

the court’s authority “to create a trust account for the purpose of 

securing future child support,” pursuant to sections 4012 and 4600 et 

seq.12 She asserted husband was then in arrears in the payment of 

child support in excess of 60 days, had not made any partial payments, 

and maintained bank accounts in China outside the reach of any 

enforcement. She also asserted husband had “sufficient equity in the 

[marital] residence” for the requested child support security trust 

account and those funds could be used for future, unpaid support. Wife 

further asserted that “section 4610, subject to sections 4613, 4614, and

4615, grant[ed] the Court the authority to make orders ‘requiring [a 

payor parent] to deposit assets to secure future support payments with 

the deposit holder designated by the Court.’ [¶] The conditions required 

for the court to order the relief . . . are set forth in section 4613,” which 

allows the court to issue such an order if “[t]he job history of the obligorparent shows that an assignment of a portion of salary or wages 

pursuant to Chapter 8 (commencing with Section 5200), would be 

difficult to enforce or would not be a practical means for securing the 

payment of the support obligation, due to circumstances including, but 

not limited to, multiple concurrent or consecutive employers” (id., subd. 

(c)).” (Original italics.) Wife then asserted husband clearly fell within 

12 Section 4012 states: “Upon a showing of good cause, the court 

may order a parent required to make a payment of child support to give 

reasonable security for the payment.” Section 4600 et. seq. provides 

“an extraordinary remedy for cases of bad faith failure to pay child 

support obligations,” allowing the court to require a parent to “deposit 

assets to secure future support payments with the deposit holder 

designated by the court.” (Id., §§ 4600, 4610.) 
37

subdivision (c) of section 4613 “as there are no practical means to 

enforce a support order in China, where [he] is employed and where 

[he] maintains a bank account.”

Following the February 26, 2020 hearing, the trial court issued 

an order directing “the creation of a Child Support Security Trust 

Account as requested by [wife] . . . to be secured by 100% of [husband’s] 

. . . equity in the [marital] residence. . . .” Thereafter, following an

April 8, 2021 hearing, the trial court issued an order that: (1) granted 

wife’s request to have the exclusive right to list and sell the marital

residence; (2) directed husband to cooperate fully with the sale 

(including signing all necessary documents); and (3) if husband failed 

or refused to sign all necessary documents, then the clerk of the court 

was appointed to act as elisor and sign all documents to complete the 

sale. The court found wife was entitled to $66,987.35, which sum 

represented child support and spousal support arrears as of November 

9, 2020. The court further directed that any remaining funds from the

sale of the marital residence were to be placed in a trust account to be 

held pending further order of the court.

On April 15 and 19, 2021, husband made three motions including 

a motion to vacate the February 26, 2020 order directing the creation of 

the child support security trust account. On May 28, 2021, these 

motions were considered at a hearing convened by the trial court. The 

court took the matter under submission and, on June 2, 2021, issued an 

order denying the motions after “review and consideration of the 

moving papers and responses,” “extensive argument by counsel,” and 

County of San Diego v. Gorham (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, as 

requested by husband’s counsel.
38

b. Analysis

Husband challenges the portion of the February 26, 2020 order

directing the creation of a child support security trust account to be 

funded by 100 per cent of his equity in the proceeds of the sale of the 

marital residence. In support of his argument, he contends the order 

(1) improperly issued after the court was informed that husband had 

filed a bankruptcy petition that stayed any actions to obtain the 

debtor’s property or enforce a lien against the debtor’s property, and (2) 

failed to comply with certain threshold findings and procedural 

requirements enumerated in sections 4560, 4561, 4565, and 4613. 

We decline to address husband’s contentions regarding the 

creation of the child support security trust account as he has failed to 

tender the issue, “together with a fair summary of the evidence bearing 

on the challenged finding, particularly including evidence that 

arguably supports it.” (Huong Que, supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at pp. 409–

410.) In support of his contentions, husband asks us to consider three 

pages in the appendixes he filed in case No. A163530, as well as his 

“Nov. 2, 2020, Request for Order” (no record citation), and his “Income 

and Expense Statement of April 2018” (no record citation). He also 

refers us to the hearing held on February 26, 2020, the court’s

February 26, 2020 order, and the June 2, 2021 order following the May 

28, 2021 hearing. However, he cites to no portions of the reporter’s 

transcripts of the February 26, 2020 hearing or the May 28, 2021 

hearing. Because, as an appellate court, we are not “required to search

the record on [our] own seeking error” (Del Real v. City of Riverside

(2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768, we find husband has forfeited his 

challenge to the court’s order directing the creation of a child support 
39

security trust account. (Nwosu v. Uba, supra, 122 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 1246 [appellant court will deem forfeited an argument that is not 

supported with “necessary citations to the record”].) 

VI. August 10, 2020 Order Awarding Sanctions Under Family 

Code Section 271

a. Relevant Facts

On May 20, 2020, wife filed a motion seeking sanctions based, in 

pertinent part, on husband’s filing of a request to set aside the 

February 26, 2020 order without a legal or factual basis, and solely to 

harass her. Sanctions were sought under both Code of Civil Procedure 

section 128.7 and Family Code section 271.

13

13 Section 271 provides: 

“(a) Notwithstanding any other provision of this code, the court 

may base an award of attorney’s fees and costs on the extent to which 

the conduct of each party or attorney furthers or frustrates the policy of 

the law to promote settlement or litigation and, where possible, to 

reduce the cost of litigation by encouraging cooperation between the 

parties and attorneys. An award of attorney’s fees and costs pursuant 

to this section is in the nature of a sanction. In making an award 

pursuant to this section, the court shall take into consideration all 

evidence concerning the parties’ incomes, assets, and liabilities. The 

court shall not impose a sanction pursuant to this section that imposes 

an unreasonable financial burden on the party against whom the 

sanction is imposed. In order to obtain an award under this section, 

the party requesting an award of attorney’s fees and costs is not 

required to demonstrate any financial need for the award.

“(b) An award of attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction pursuant 

to this section shall be imposed only after notice to the party against 

whom the sanction is proposed to be imposed and opportunity for that 

party to be heard.

“(c) An award of attorney’s fees and costs as a sanction pursuant 

to this section is payable only from the property or income of the party 

against whom the sanction is imposed, except that the award may be 

against the sanctioned party’s share of the community property.”
40

The court granted wife’s request for sanctions “pursuant to 

Family Code 271” in its August 10, 2020 order: “The Court agrees that 

[husband’s] conduct throughout this litigation has been sanctionable, 

including the meritless motion to set aside the February 26, 2020 

FOAH [Findings and Order After Hearing]. [Husband’s] RFO [Request 

for Order] seeks to relitigate issues after a contested a[nd] lengthy 

hearing that he ultimately chose to walk out of. The Court agrees that 

[husband’s] conduct has unnecessarily increased the cost of litigation in 

this matter and wasted judicial resources. [Wife] currently has $21,500 

in unpaid attorney’s fees. The Court is concerned . . ., however, that 

[husband] does not have the present ability to pay in light of, among 

other things, his pending bankruptcy action. The Court therefore 

awards sanctions in the amount of $20,000 but stays the requirement 

to pay this amount pending further information from the bankruptcy 

case.” 

In a footnote, the court referenced its authority to rule on the

request for sanctions “as it was made in connection with proceedings 

related to ‘the establishment or modification of an order for domestic 

support obligations’ and thus appears to fall under an express statutory 

exemption from the automatic stay provisions of federal bankruptcy 

law. (11 U.S.C. § 362(b).) Although the Court hereby grants the 

sanctions request, it nevertheless will stay the requirement to pay 

sanctions, pending resolution of the bankruptcy matter.”14

14 After the issuance of the August 10, 2020 order, the Bankruptcy 

Court entered an order on January 11, 2021 granting wife’s motion to 

dismiss husband’s then pending Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition under 

11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(3) as a bad faith filing.
41

b. Analysis

Husband contends the $20,000 sanctions award was made in 

violation of the procedural requirements for an award of sanctions 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. 

Concededly, wife requested sanctions under both Code of Civil 

Procedure section 128.7 and Family Code section 271. However, the 

trial court explicitly chose to award sanctions pursuant to Family Code 

section 271, which request is not governed by the procedural 

requirements for sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7. 

Because husband has made no argument that the trial court committed 

reversible error or abused its discretion in awarding sanctions under 

Family Code section 271, we do not further address his claim of error. 

VII. Husband’s Contentions Regarding His Request for Epstein 

Credits and Watts Reimbursement

Husband requests a remand for further proceedings based on his 

contention that the trial court failed to consider his request for Epstein

credits and Watts reimbursement (hereafter Epstein/Watts request). 

(See, Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 76; In re Marriage of Watts (1985) 171 

Cal.App.3d 366 (Watts).)

15 We decline to review husband’s contention 

15 Epstein, supra, 24 Cal.3d 76, held “ ‘that, as a general rule, a 

spouse, who, after separation of the parties, uses earnings or other 

separate funds to pay preexisting community obligations should be 

reimbursed therefor out of the community property upon dissolution.’ ” 

(Id. at p. 84.) Watts, supra 171 Cal.App.3d 366, held that “ ‘the trial 

court erred in concluding that it had no authority to reimburse the 

community for the value of [a party’s] exclusive use of the [marital] 

residence . . . between the date of separation and the date [on which the 

community itself no longer held an interest in the residence, which, 

was the date on which the marital residence was sold].” (Id. at p. 374.) 

Determinations of whether a spouse is entitled to Epstein credits and 
42

as he has failed to provide us with an adequate record to consider the 

issue.

Husband refers us to the portion of the record showing that on 

two occasions the trial court deferred consideration of his 

Epstein/Watts request. On November 9, 2020, the court deferred 

consideration of the request to the trial on the disposition of the marital 

residence. On April 8, 2021, the court deferred consideration of the 

request to the trial on the distribution of the sale proceeds of the 

marital residence. While husband asserts he raised the Epstein/Watts

request in his trial brief filed for the September 29, 2021 trial when the 

court distributed the sale proceeds of the marital residence, he has not 

submitted a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement of that 

proceeding.16

In the absence of a record as to what occurred at the September 

29, 2021 trial proceeding, we are in no position to evaluate any ruling 

made by the trial court regarding husband’s Epstein/Watts request. 

Watts reimbursement necessarily require the resolution of factual 

issues entrusted to the trial court’s discretionary authority. (In re 

Marriage of Hebbring (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1260, 1272 [“Epstein does 

not mandate full reimbursement in all cases, but allows the trial court 

discretion to order reimbursement in an amount that is equitable”]; 

Watts, supra, at p. 374 [trial court’s award of Watts reimbursement 

should be made “after taking into account all the circumstances under 

which exclusive possession was ordered”].) 

16 In this court, husband filed two notices designating the record on 

appeal from the September 29, 2021 judgment. In both notices, he 

marked boxes indicating he was choosing to proceed with a record of 

the oral proceedings in the superior court by “attach[ing] a certified 

transcript under [California Rules of Court] rule 8.130(b)(3)(C).” 

However, the notices do not have attached a certified transcript of the 

trial held on September 29, 2021.
43

Accordingly, his claim – that the trial court committed prejudicial error 

by failing to consider his Epstein/Watts request – necessarily fails. 

(See Maria P. v. Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1295 [appellants’ 

failure to furnish an adequate record of proceedings requires that their 

claims be resolved against them]; Elena S. v. Kroutik, supra, 247 

Cal.App.4th at p. 576 [“[i]n the absence of a proper record, which would 

include either a reporter’s transcript or a settled statement (neither of 

which we have in this case), we must presume the trial court acted 

properly;” “[t]herefore, the judgment is correct and must be affirmed”].) 

VIII. Husband’s Constitutional Arguments

Husband presents conclusory arguments contending the child 

custody and support orders, along with the November 7, 2019 Elisor 

Order, should be vacated “due to constitutional” violations of his rights 

to equal protection and procedural due process under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. He does 

not cite to any portion of the record showing that he challenged any of 

the described orders on the constitutional grounds he now asserts on 

appeal. Accordingly, we deem his constitutional arguments forfeited. 

(See Jackpot Harvesting Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2018) 26 

Cal.App.5th 125, 154 [“[a]s a general rule, ‘constitutional issues not 

raised in earlier civil proceedings are waived on appeal’ ”]; In re M.H.

(2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 699, 713 [by failing to raise the constitutional 

challenge in the trial court, appellant forfeited the argument that a 

statute violated the First Amendment]; Fourth La Costa Condominium 

Owners Assn. v. Seith, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 585 [constitutional 

issues not raised in the trial court are forfeited on appeal].) 
44

IX. Conclusion

We have made a concerted effort to address husband’s

arguments. Any issue not specifically mentioned is omitted due to his

failure to either present us with a proper record and/or make cogent 

arguments supported by record citations and relevant legal authority.

DISPOSITION

The orders and judgment are affirmed. As no respondent’s briefs 

were filed, no costs are awarded to either party. (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 8.278(a)(5).) 
45

_________________________

Petrou, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Tucher, P.J.

_________________________

Fujisaki, J.

A160335/A160735/A163530