RENDERED: MAY 20, 2022; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2019-CA-0245-MR

MARK CRANMER APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 17-CR-00003 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 

AND NO. 2020-CA-0795-MR

MARK CRANMER APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM SHELBY CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE CHARLES R. HICKMAN, JUDGE

ACTION NOS. 01-CR-00085, 02-CR-00162, 06-CR-00142,

12-CR-00203, 13-CR-00030, AND 17-CR-00003 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEE 
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OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

CALDWELL, JUDGE: Appellant Mark Cranmer (“Cranmer”) appeals two (2) 

orders from the Shelby Circuit Court. In each order, the circuit court denied his 

request for Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 60.02 relief from a

judgment and sentence imposed upon him for being a persistent felony offender 

predicated upon convictions for failing to register as a sex offender. Having 

reviewed the record and the briefs filed, we affirm. 

FACTS

Cranmer entered a guilty plea to a sexually-based offense in 2002. 

This conviction required that he comply with sex offender registration.1 For some 

time, he did comply with the requirement to register. However, in 2006 he was 

indicted for failure to comply with the requirements of registration. He pleaded

guilty to the charge.

Again, he complied with the requirement he register as a sex offender 

for a period of time, until he again failed to maintain proper registration and was 

1 Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 17.500 et seq.
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indicted in 2012 and again in 2013 for that failure. Cranmer pleaded guilty in a 

combined plea and was sentenced to concurrent sentences of ten (10) years. 

In 2017, he was indicted for trafficking in a controlled substance and 

for being a persistent felony offender (“PFO”) in the first degree. The latter charge 

was predicated, in part, on the convictions for failure to register to which he had 

pleaded guilty. He again pleaded guilty to the trafficking and PFO charges and 

was sentenced to ten (10) years’ imprisonment in 2018. 

As Cranmer had entered guilty pleas to all charges in each case over 

the years, he did not pursue matter-of-right appeals. Rather, he filed a CR 60.02 

motion in the Shelby Circuit Court seeking relief from the last case to which he 

entered a guilty plea, the convictions for trafficking and PFO in 2018. The Shelby 

Circuit Court denied relief. Not satisfied with the result, Cranmer filed a 

successive motion in Shelby Circuit Court seeking to set aside the denial of relief. 

It was likewise denied.

In matter No. 2019-CA-0245-MR, Cranmer, proceeding pro se, insists 

the trial court erred in denying the CR 60.02 motion in which he alleged the PFO 

conviction was infirm because he had not been appropriately informed of his duty 

to register when he pleaded guilty to the sexually-based offense in 2002. In matter

No. 2020-CA-0795-MR, again proceeding pro se, he appeals the denial of his 

motion to set aside the prior order which is the subject of the No. 2019-CA-0245-
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MR appeal. Having reviewed the records, the orders of the Shelby Circuit Court,

and the briefs of the parties, we affirm.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review a trial court’s determination as to whether one is entitled to 

extraordinary relief under CR 60.02 for abuse of discretion. “The test for abuse of 

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, 

or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v. Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 

880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citing Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 

1999) (citations omitted)). 

ANALYSIS

In the first order, the Shelby Circuit Court cited Alvey v. 

Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 858 (Ky. 1983). In Alvey, the Appellant had sought 

post-conviction relief, seeking to collaterally attack the merit of underlying prior 

convictions used to provide a predicate for a present PFO charge. The same day 

Alvey was decided, the Supreme Court issued a companion opinion in Gross v. 

Commonwealth, 648 S.W.2d 853 (Ky. 1983). In Gross, the Kentucky Supreme 

Court explained that it is not proper to wait until post-conviction to launch a 

collateral attack upon predicate offenses:

The structure provided in Kentucky for attacking 

the final judgment of a trial court in a criminal case is not 

haphazard and overlapping, but is organized and 

complete. That structure is set out in the rules related to 
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direct appeals, in [Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure]

RCr 11.42, and thereafter in CR 60.02. CR 60.02 is not 

intended merely as an additional opportunity to raise 

Boykin[2] defenses. It is for relief that is not available by 

direct appeal and not available under RCr 11.42. The 

movant must demonstrate why he is entitled to this 

special, extraordinary relief. Before the movant is entitled 

to an evidentiary hearing, he must affirmatively allege 

facts which, if true, justify vacating the judgment and 

further allege special circumstances that justify CR 60.02 

relief. 

CR 60.02 was enacted as a substitute for the 

common law writ of coram nobis. The purpose of such a 

writ was to bring before the court that pronounced 

judgment errors in matter of fact which (1) had not been 

put into issue or passed on, (2) were unknown and could 

not have been known to the party by the exercise of 

reasonable diligence and in time to have been otherwise 

presented to the court, or (3) which the party was 

prevented from so presenting by duress, fear, or other 

sufficient cause. Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 

487, 1444.

Id. at 856.

Cranmer had opportunities to attack the underlying convictions at 

several occasions but did not avail himself of those opportunities. Instead of 

pleading guilty to the failure to register charges ultimately used as the predicate 

convictions for the PFO charge, he could have challenged the validity of the 

charges rather than pleading guilty beginning in 2006. Then again, he could have 

2 Boykin v. California, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969).
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litigated the propriety of the PFO charge in 2018, but again, he simply pleaded

guilty. He cannot now complain when he wasted these opportunities. 

In situations such as this, where a defendant has been 

convicted of one or more felonies and is subsequently 

tried and convicted as a persistent felon based on the 

earlier convictions, this jurisdiction requires him to raise 

any issues about the validity of those earlier convictions 

at the time he is tried as a persistent felon. If he does not, 

he is precluded from contesting the validity of the earlier 

convictions in subsequent post-conviction proceedings. 

Alvey, 648 S.W.2d at 859.

The second order appealed results from a successive CR 60.02 

motion, essentially raising the same allegations as the first motion. We must first 

note that Cranmer failed to attach a copy of the order which he is appealing, in 

contravention of CR 76.12(4)(c)(vii). 

When a litigant files a brief which fails to conform with the 

requirements of CR 76.12, we can respond in several different ways: 

Our options when an appellate advocate fails to abide by 

the rules are: (1) to ignore the deficiency and proceed 

with the review; (2) to strike the brief or its offending 

portions, CR 76.12(8)(a); or (3) to review the issues 

raised in the brief for manifest injustice only, Elwell v. 

Stone, 799 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Ky. App. 1990).

Hallis v. Hallis, 328 S.W.3d 694, 696 (Ky. App. 2010). 

We note that Cranmer did attach the order to the notice of appeal, and 

while such does not cure the deficiency, it does place the order before this Court. 
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We will ignore the deficiency but caution Cranmer to ensure any future filings 

conform to the rules.

What we will not ignore is the successive nature of this second postconviction motion. “Our interest in the finality of judgments and the timely 

imposition of sentences is axiomatic. Both the patience and resources of this Court 

are stretched by repeated motions for post-conviction relief . . . .” Baze v. 

Commonwealth, 276 S.W.3d 761, 768 (Ky. 2008). “CR 60.02 does not permit 

successive post-judgment motions . . . .” Foley, 425 S.W.3d at 884. Thus, we will 

not review the order denying Cranmer’s successive motion which raises no new or 

additional grounds and simply rehashes the unpersuasive arguments contained in 

his earlier CR 60.02 motion.

CONCLUSION

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying either CR 60.02 

motion. We affirm the trial court. 

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Mark Cranmer, pro se

Burgin, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron

Attorney General of Kentucky

Kenneth Wayne Riggs

Assistant Attorney General

Frankfort, Kentucky