NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 

23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, 

as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties 

and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's 

decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire 

court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. 

A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 

2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted 

above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 

n.4 (2008).

COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

APPEALS COURT

22-P-289

CAITLIN SCHIFFER

vs.

BRENDAN REID.1

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

The underlying action arises from a dispute among three 

siblings over the proceeds of their mother's estate.2 The 

plaintiff filed the action in Norfolk County Superior Court, 

alleging that the defendant wrongfully took funds from the 

estate, contrary to the instructions in their mother's will. 

After the defendant failed to comply with multiple discovery 

orders, a judge imposed on him a sanction of default on all of 

the plaintiff's claims (for fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, 

conversion, and tortious interference with inheritance). The 

judge then held an evidentiary hearing on assessment of damages, 

following which judgment entered for the plaintiff in the amount 

1 Individually and as personal representative of the estate of 

Claire F. Reid.

2 One sibling, who was originally a plaintiff, was dismissed from 

the case upon the filing of a suggestion of death. 
2

of $42,319.03 in damages and $30,900 in attorney's fees, plus 

interest and costs. The defendant now appeals from the judgment 

and from the denial of his later motion to vacate.3

We begin by noting that the record appendix submitted by

the defendant is inadequate to permit meaningful appellate 

review. Among other deficiencies it does not contain the docket 

entries, the hearing transcript, the pertinent decisions of the 

judge, the judgment, or the notices of appeal. See Mass. 

R. A. P. 18 (a), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1637 (2019). As the 

appealing party, the defendant had the obligation to produce an 

appendix containing all relevant portions of the record; that he 

is pro se did not excuse him from this obligation. See Davis v. 

Tabachnick, 425 Mass. 1010, 1010 (1997). For this reason alone, 

we decline to overturn the judgment.

For completeness, however, we will address the defendant's 

arguments, as we understand them. The defendant first asserts

that the plaintiff served him with a complaint that was "never 

3 The defendant filed multiple motions to vacate. His first 

motion was allowed in part as to the computation of damages, and 

a revised judgment entered. After appealing from the revised 

judgment, the defendant filed a second motion to vacate, which 

was denied by a second judge, the original judge having retired. 

Although the defendant filed an appeal from the second judge's 

decision, he does not raise any separate argument with respect 

to it and has thus waived his right to appellate review of that 

ruling. See Abate v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 470 Mass. 821, 833 

(2015). He did not appeal from the denials of any of his later 

motions.
3

part of the official record" and that his "entire defense" was 

based on this complaint. Evidently, the defendant is referring 

to a duplicative action that the plaintiff filed in Plymouth 

County Superior Court, which was eventually dismissed with 

prejudice by stipulation. From what we can tell, the complaint 

filed in Plymouth County is identical to the one that initiated 

the underlying case in Norfolk County, except that the former is 

missing paragraphs seven and twelve.4 Although this appears to 

have caused momentary confusion at the evidentiary hearing, the

defendant has not demonstrated how he was thereby prejudiced. 

Absent a showing of substantial prejudice, the defendant is not 

entitled to relief. See G. L. c. 231, § 119; Care & Protection 

of Frank, 409 Mass. 492, 499 (1991).

Next, the defendant contends that damages should not have 

been awarded on the claims of fraud and tortious interference 

with inheritance because the factual predicates of those claims, 

as pleaded in the complaint, were either contradicted by 

evidence adduced at the evidentiary hearing or were insufficient 

to state a claim on which relief could be granted. See Nancy P. 

v. D'Amato, 401 Mass. 516, 519 (1988) ("When . . . a defendant 

4 Paragraph seven of the underlying complaint states,

"Immediately following Ms. Reid's death, Brendan, the oldest 

sibling, represented to Bryan and Caitlin that their Mother had 

passed away intestate." Paragraph twelve states, "The June 7, 

1999 will also provided that Ms. Reid's estate was to pay all 

costs associated with her funeral."
4

is defaulted, well-pleaded facts are deemed to be admitted, but 

a plaintiff may recover only to the extent the complaint states 

a claim for relief"). To the extent this argument relies on the 

evidence adduced at the hearing, we cannot consider it because 

the defendant failed to provide us with a copy of the

transcript. See Cameron v. Carelli, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 81, 84 

(1995). That aside, the argument does not support any reduction 

of damages, given the judge's finding that "the plaintiff would 

have been entitled to recover damages under any or all of her 

four claims." As the defendant does not separately challenge 

the judgment with respect to the claims of breach of fiduciary 

duty and conversion, we have no basis to vacate the damages 

award.

Nor do we have a basis to vacate the default judgment. The 

defendant asserts that a default judgment was a disproportionate 

sanction for his discovery violation because the discovery 

requests were "never served upon" him yet he "complied with what 

he could anyway." But the record flatly contradicts this 

assertion. The attorney representing the defendant at the time 

attested in an affidavit that he received the discovery requests

by e-mail. In addition, as the judge stated in her decision

imposing the sanction, "[t]he defendant was provided with a copy 

of the [discovery requests] on the record and in the presence of 

the Court." The judge's decision also describes how the 
5

defendant willfully and repeatedly violated her discovery 

orders, despite multiple warnings and extensions of the 

deadline. In these circumstances the judge was within her 

discretion to impose the sanction of default. See Short v. 

Marinas USA Ltd. Partnership, 78 Mass. App. Ct. 848, 852-853 

(2011).

The judge was also within her discretion to award the 

plaintiff her reasonable attorney's fees. The defendant 

challenges the award on the ground that it was in essence a 

second sanction for his failure to comply with discovery. As 

the defendant acknowledges, however, the award was based only 

"in part" on the discovery violation. The primary basis was 

that the defendant engaged in "bad faith conduct that 

constituted contempt"; specifically, as the judge found, the 

defendant concealed information from the Probate and Family 

Court during the probate of the estate -- forcing the plaintiff 

"to file this lawsuit to recover the assets to which she was 

clearly entitled" -- and he then "continued to maintain that the 

[e]state was insolvent and refused to produce discovery that 

demonstrated the falsity of that assertion up until the eve of 

trial." Given the defendant's bad faith, the judge determined 

that this was one of those "rare and egregious cases" in which 

an award of attorney's fees was warranted. Police Comm'r of 

Boston v. Gows, 429 Mass. 14, 19 (1999). The defendant has not 
6

demonstrated, or even argued, that this was an abuse of 

discretion. See id. at 18 (judge has discretion to award 

attorney's fees based on conduct amounting to contempt of court, 

including where litigant acted in bad faith, where "litigant's 

conduct [was] unreasonably obdurate or obstinate," and "where it 

should have been unnecessary for a successful litigant to have 

brought the action").5

Judgment affirmed.

Order dated September 21, 

2020, denying motion to 

vacate judgment, affirmed.

By the Court (Sacks, Shin & 

D'Angelo, JJ.6),

Clerk

Entered: June 26, 2023.

5 We deny the plaintiff's request for appellate attorney's fees, 

as she has offered no basis for such an award.

6 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.