The Honorable Paul L
. Maloney , United S tates C hief District J udg e for the Western District * of Michig an, sitting by

desig nation. -1- NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 09a0833n.06 No. 09-3058 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
BO WAN G, P etitioner -Appellant,
v. ERIC HOLDER, Jr., United States At to r ne y G e ne r al, Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EA L F RO M THE U NI TED STA TES BO AR

D O F IM M IG RA TIO N AP P EA LS

Before: BATCHELDER, Chief Judge, GIBBONS, Circuit Jud ge, and MALONEY, Chief District Judge. * JULIA SMITH GIBBONS , Circuit Judge . Petitioner-appe llant Bo Wang appea ls from a dec ision of the Boa

rd of Immigration Appeals (“ BIA”) deny ing a motion to reopen his petition fo r a sylum . F or

the re a so ns that f

oll ow , w e AF F I RM.

I. Wang, a nat i v e of the Peoples’ Republic of China, applied f or asylum based on alleg ed perse cution by the C hinese gove rnment for his involvement in an under g round taxi drivers’ union. Wang a sserted that he had be en imprisoned for taking part in r elated protests and fled to the United States after

esca ping f rom a prison labor camp. He arrived in the Unit ed S tates on October 24, 2001,T h e ex act nature of the arr ang ement betwe en Wang , Mason, and L ili Yang is not 1 documented. I

n a si g ned declaration by Wang that acc ompanied his October 2008 motion to reopen based on ine ffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, he de scribed the relationship: Ifo un d a n im mig ratio n o ff

ic e . T he pe rs on wh o run s the of fi c e is L ili Ya

ng . . . . L ili Ya ng is not an atto rn e y . Sh e us e s th e name of L a ur e n M a so n E sq . to ru

n b us ine ss. Ig ave L ili Yang around 2,000 dollars to handle my case . L aure n Mason and I have never met eac h other be fore . He ha s never discussed my

case with me. ROA at 26. -2- using a n alias and a

fra udulent passport and visa. Wanghad pre viously but unsuc cessf ully attempted to secure a visa to t h e Un i t ed S t at es under his own name in April 2000. The inconsistencies a nd duplicity evidenc ed by

the two visa applications, and the fra udulent documents used to obtain the 20 0 1 v is a , f

o r me d th e b a s is o f

th e I mm ig r a ti o nJu d g e ’ s ( “ I J” ) n e g a ti v e c r e d ib il it y d e te rmination, denial of a sy lum, and finding that the application had been f rivolous. On April 22, 2005, the BIA u p held the I J ’s adve rse c redibility deter mination and order

of
re mov a l but di d n ot a ff

ir m hi s f ind ingof fr ivo lou s f

ili ng . Wanga

pp e a le d th e B I A’ s o rder to t his court, which “re g rettably” affirmed, finding that “the centra l inconsistency does go t o the hea rt of Wang’ s asylum claim, or, at lea st, substantial eviden ce suppor ts such a conc lusion.” W ang v. Gonzales , 188 F. App’ x 454, 455, 457 (6th Cir. 2006). After the denial of

his application, Wang soug ht repre sentation from L ili Yang , a nonattorney who ra n an immigr ation offi ce i n California. Id. L a ur e n M a so n, an atto rn e y

a pp are ntl y 1

connec ted in some way

with L ili Yang ’s offic e, filed a notice of entry of appe ara nce a s attorney

for Wang o n S ep t em b er 16, 2006, and a motion to reopen “ due to cha ng ed cir cumstance s and new
e vid e nc e ” on

Oc tob e r 3 , 2 00 6. I n th a t mo tio n, Wan g c la ime d th a t be c a us e he se nt a

nti -C omm

un ist article s to friends in Chi na and w as an a ctive member of the China De mocra cy

Party (“CDP”) in theWang doe s not provide a time fr ame f or his involvement i n t h e C DP or the sendingof 2 materia ls to his friends in China. I t is theref o re unclear

whether he wa s an ac tive member of the CD P and a lle g e dly so ug ht b y

the Chi nese aut ho ritie s b e fo re the 90 -d ay de a dli ne fo r a

mot ion to reope n would have e x pired in Jul y 2005. -3- Un ite d St a te s, the Chi ne se a uth or iti e s h a d a

rr e ste d th e recipi e nts of

the ma te ri a ls, ha

ra sse d h is family , and would see k to arre st him as soon as he re turned to China. 2 The BIA reje cted this fir st motion to reope n beca use it lacke d a ce rtificate of ser vice on the op po sin g pa

rt y . T he B I A r e vie we d a

nd de nie d a fu rt he r m otion to accep t the re je c te d mo tio n to
re op e n o n January 4, 20 07 , b e c a us e the mot ion

ha d b e e n f

ile d w e ll a ft e r t

he 90 -d ay de a dli ne to
a pp e a l th e de nia l of

its Ap ri l 22 , 2 00 5, or de r. Th e B I A f ur th er fo un d th a t Wangha d f a ile d to

“ e s ta b li s h a c hang e in cir c u ms ta

n c e s ar is in g in

Ch in a f o r p u r p o s e s o f me e ti n g th e [8 C. F
. R. ] § 1003.2(c) (3)( ii) exception to the filing dea dline.” ROA at 134. The B I A went on to note that the new mate rials submitted by Wang were “not s pecif

ic t o the respondent” and that the asser tions that
wer e spec ific to him were “g ener al and unsupported assertions” by Wang himself a

nd there fore i n s u ff i ci en tt o d em o n s t ra t e t h at , i f t h e ca s e we re re o p en ed , t h e n ew ev i d en ce “w o u l d l i k el y ch an ge t h e r es u l t
. ” R OA at 1 3 4 (c i t i n g Matter of Coelho , 20 I . & N . Dec . 464 (B .I .A. 1992)). Wang the n contac ted frie nds in China to send letters to support his asserti ons, and Mason filed a motion to rec onsider the denial of the motion t o reope n and included “ new e vidence ” to cur e the de fe c ts n ote d b y

the B I A. The new evi den c e inc lud e d d a te sta mps a dd e d to the pr e vio us ly
un date d p ho tog ra

ph s and le tte rs fr om t

hr e e fo rm er col lea g ue s o f Wa ngde sc ri bin g the Chi ne se authorities’ ha

rassment a

nd arr ests of those who ha d rec eived a rticles fr om Wang.-4-

The B I A denied the motion to reconsider a s untimely beca use it had ar

rived one day

afte r the 30-day deadline f

or filing a such a motion had expired. L ili Ya ng had sent the motion by overnig ht express on Frida

y , Fe bruar y 3 , 2006. By

its own admission, t he mail servic e fa iled to deliver the motion on Februa

ry 5 as it had guar antee d and ins tead de livered that motion on Februa ry 6. I n an
a tte mpt to c ur e thi s late st m istake, Ma so n f ile d a mot ion to a c c e pt a

pr e vio us ly

de nie d mo tio n to
rec onsider, which the BIA re jected be cause it did not i nclude a fee or fe e wa iver. Mason the n filed
a sec ond motion to accept by cer tification a rejecte d motion. The BI A denied the motion on J uly 17, 2009, noting that the B I A had made no err or in finding the motion untim ely and that, in any case , 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)( 2) pre cluded jurisdiction over the denial of

a motion to reconsider
. Following the J uly

17, 20 0 7 , o rd er, Wangcontac ted the USA International I mmigration Attorney Center (“USA I nternational”). There he made an arrang ement with Allen Yang , another non-attorne y , to assist him in filing a petition for r eview by this court. Id. Allen Yangdid not enter a noti ce of repr esentation, but did file the pe tition for review pr o s e on be ha lf of Wan g , li sti ngUSA I nternational’s addre ss as Wang ’s contac t addre ss. Howeve r, Allen Yang err oneously sent Wang ’s petition to the Offic e of I mmigration, resulting in its late fili ng with the Six th Circuit clerk. A pa nel of this court conse quently dismiss ed the pe tition for reviewas untimely
. Bo W ang v. Muk

asey , No. 07-4049 (6th Cir. Fe b. 14, 2008). Undeter red, Wanghired y et another immigration attorney , QuiangBjorn b a k , a r o u n d O c tobe r 4 , 2 0 0 8
. B

j o r nb a k h e l p e d t o g i v e n o t i c e t o M a s o nt h a tW an g w o u l d b e f i l i n g a c l a i m b e f o r e t h e B IA on the g rounds of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l and to file complaints ag ains t both Mason andI n his brief be fore this court, in a ddition to appea ling the B I A’s De cembe r 31, 2008, orde r, 3 Wang soug ht ge nera liz ed re lief and r econside ration of the pr ior denied m o t i o ns to reopen a nd rec onsider. Howe ver, be cause we may only revie w the dec ision for which the pe tition of review wa s filed, Sto ne v . I

NS , 514 U.S. 386, 405-06 (1995), our revie w is limi ted to only the Dec ember

31 order
. The g overnme nt argues that there is no constitutional rig ht to eff ective assistance of counse l 4 for a liens in removal proc eeding s. Although this c ourt has re cog nized such a rig ht, see H uicoche aGomez v . I

NS , 2 37 F .3 d 6 96, 69 9 (6t h Cir. 20 01 ) ( “ F if th A me ndme nt gua

ra nte e s o f d ue pr oc e ss extend to aliens in deportation proce edings
. ”) , t h e exis tence of that rig ht continues to be debated. On J anuar

y 7, 2009, the Attorney

Gene ral de cided Matter of Compean , 24 I . & N . Dec . 710 (A.G.

-5- Al le n Ya ngwi th t he Sta te B ar o f C a lif

or nia . B jor nb a k f ile d a se c on d mo tio n to re op e n a nd a re qu e st for a n emer g ency

stay of depor tation on October

20, 2008. Finding no due process vi olation beca use W ang had failed to demonstrate pr ejudice f rom the alleg ed inef

fec tive assistance of counse l, the BIA denied the motion on Decembe r 31, 2008. Without
e xplanatio n, the B I A al so no te d tha t Wang ha d not m e t th e c on dit ion s n e c e ssa ry to f ile an unti me ly and successive mot ion to reope n. Namely , Wang pr esente d no evidenc e of “ chang ed cir cumstance s arising in the country

of nationality [t hat is] materia l a nd was not available a

nd could not have be en discovere d or pre sented at the pre vious hearing .” ROA at 2 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (3)( ii)). The B I A a lso no te d th a t Wangha d n ot d e mon str a te d th e ne c e ssa ry c on dit ion s in his p re vio us mot ion s,
no r h a d h e sh ow n th a t, h a d t he prev io us mot ion s b e e n ti me ly fi le d, the e vid e nc e pr e se nte d w ou ld l i k el y h av e ch an ged t h e re s u l t i n t h e ca s e. R OA at 2

– 3 (c i t i n g Matter of Coelho , 20 I
. & N. Dec . at 473). Wang timely

appea led the De cembe r 31 orde r. 3 II. Wang c halleng es the B I A’s denia l of his motion to r eopen beca use of ineff

ective a ssistance of counse l. He a rgu es t h at t h e BI A er red in c oncluding that he had not suff ere d prejudice from 420 09), wh ic h h e ld t hat “ the re is n o F if

th A me ndme nt r ig ht t o e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l in remova l proce eding s” and ove rruled Matter of Lozada , 19 I
. & N. Dec
. 637 (B
. I
. A. 1 9 8 8 ), and Matter of Assaad , 23 I . & N . Dec . 553 (B
. I
. A. 2 0 0 3 ). Howe ver, on June 3, 2009, the Attorney Gene ral va cate d Matter of Compean “pendingthe outcome of a rulemaking proce ss” and directed the B I A a nd I Js “t o c on tin

ue to a pp ly the pr e vio us ly

e sta bli sh e d s tand ard s f

or re vie wi ngmot ion s to reope n based on c laims of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel.” Matter of Compean , 25 I . & N . Dec
. 1 (A.G. 2009) . There fore , we ne ed not addr ess the q u es t i o n of whe ther a liens in removal proce eding s have a

Fifth Ame ndment rig ht to ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel and will reviewthe BIA’s orde r ac cordingto Lozada and Assaad without refe renc e to Compean
. -6- alleg ed inef

fec tive assistance of counse l and that he ha d failed to de monstrate cha ng ed countr

y conditions in Chi na and ne w mater ial evidenc e suff icient t o o v er come the time- and number -bar s to f ili nga mot ion to r e op en. He a lso argue s th a t he is e nti tle d to e qu ita ble tol lin g of

the tim e limit ation for f

iling such a

motion because of ineff

ective a ssistance of c ounsel. We reviewthe B I A’s denia l of a motion to r eopen f or abuse of discre tion. IN S v . D oh e rty , 50 2 U .S. 31 4, 32 3– 24 (1 99 2) ; Haddad v. Gonz ales , 437 F.3d 515, 517 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Con se qu e ntl y , we mus t a ff ir m an or de r of the B I A un le ss it “ [is] w ith ou t a ratio na l e xplanatio n, [is an] inexpl icable depar

t[ ure] from established policies, or re st[ s] on an impermissi ble basis such a s invidious di scrimination ag ainst a par ticular ra ce or

g roup.” Allabani v. Gonzales , 402 F.3d 668, 675 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 5 ) ( qu o t i n g Ba lan i v . I NS , 669 F.2d 1157, 1161 ( 6th Cir. 1982)) (quotation marks omitted). A claim of ineffe ctive assistance of counsel in a re moval proce eding is an issue of law that is reviewe d de novo
. Sako v. G onzales , 434 F.3d 857, 863 ( 6th Cir. 2006). III
. Wan g c a ta logue s nume ro us a lle g e d in sta nc e s o f i ne ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l by

his
v ar i o u s at t o rn ey s an d n o n -a t t o rn ey re p re s en t at i v es . M an y o f t h o s e e x amp l es ar e i n d ee d co mp el l i n g. Howeve r, in order

for a motion to reopen base d on ineffe ctive assistanc e of counsel to suc cee d, the-7-

p e t i t i o n e r m u s t ( a ) c o mp l y w i t h t h e p r o c e d u r a l r e qu i r e m e n t s e s t a

b l i s h e d b y Matter of Lozada , 1 9 I. & N . Dec . 637, 639 (B. I
. A. 1 9 8 8); and (b) demonstrate that the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel resulted in pre

judice or f

undamental unf

airnes s t o t h e petitioner. Sako , 434 F.3d at 863 (citing Matter of Assaad , 23 I . & N . Dec . 553, 556 (B .I .A. 2003)). We c o n c lu d e th a t b e c a

u s e Wan g f

a il e d to c o mp ly w ith the L o z a d a require ments, he has forf eited his claim of inef

fec tive assistance of counse l. F urthermor e, eve n if he ha d complied, we ag ree with the BIA that he ha s failed to demonstra t e t h at he suff ere d prejudice from the a lleg ed actions and ina ctions of his various re prese ntatives bec ause h e cannot establish that but for the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, his underlying a sy lum claim would have be en g rante d. See Huicoche a-Gome

z , 237 F.3d at 699–700. We therefor e af firm the B I

A’s De cembe r 31 orde r deny ing Wang’ s motion t o reope n. A. “An a lien who fa ils to comply with Lozada ’s re quirements for feits h e r in e f f e c ti v e - a ssistanceof-c ounsel claim.” Pepaj v. M ukasey , 509 F.3d 725, 727 (6th Cir. 2007). Thus, in order to prove ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, a

n a lie n mu st (1 ) s ub mit

an a ff ida vit de sc ri bin g the a g re e me nt f or re pr e se ntatio n e nte re d in to w ith former counsel, (2) inform former counsel of t he charg e for the purpose of allowing him to respond to the complaints being made a g ainst him, and (3) re port whethe r a complaint has bee n filed with the appr opriate disciplinar y authorities. Ha mi d v . A sh c ro

ft , 3 3 6 F. 3 d

4 6 5 , 4 6 8 (6 t h C i r. 2 0 0 3 ) ( qu o t i n g Huicoche a-Gome z , 237 F.3d at 699 (c i t i n g Matter of Lozada , 19 I . & N . Dec . at 637)). As a pre li mi n ar

y matt e r , it is u n c le ar w h e th e r Wa n g c an b r in g an in e f

f e c ti v e a s s is ta

nce of counsel c laim as to the assistance of non-attorney repr esentatives L ili Yang and Allen Ya ng . NeitherWhil e Wang did file a c omplaint ag ainst Allen Yangwith the California B ar, the reby 5 satisfying the third Lozada fa c tor , h e too k n o s uc h a c tio n w ith re g ard s to L ili Ya ng . Wa nga lso did no t c omp ly

wi th t he se con d factor

be c a us e he fa ile d to no tif

y e ith e r r e pr e se ntativ e of

his int e nt t o purs ue an in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l c la im a

nd a llo w the re pr e se ntativ e the op po rt un ity to respond. -8- was a n acc redited r epre sentative, a nd neither filed a noti ce of appea ranc e on beha lf of Wang . Citi ng Hernande z v. Muk asey , 5 2 4 F. 3 d 1014 (9th Cir. 2008), the g overnme nt argues that ineff ective assistance of counse l claims are unavailable to challeng e the perf ormanc e of non-attorney s. See 524 F.3d at 1015–16 (“We hold that know ing relianc e upon the a dvice of a non-attorney

cannot support a cla im a claim for ineffe ctive assist ance of counsel in a remova l proce eding .”). A lthough we have y et to addre ss this issue direc tly , we have sug g ested that c laims reg ardingnon-attorne y assistance may not be barr ed—at least for acc redited r epre sentatives. See A l Roumy v . Mukase y , 290 F. App’ x 856 , 862 (6th Cir. 2008) (noting that we have held at least the first two Lozada re qu ir e me nts obligatory

when alleg ing ineffe ctive assistance of counsel by acc redited r epre sentatives). H oweve r, beca use Wang f

ails to comply

with Lozada as to either L ili Yang or Allen Ya ng , we ne ed not re ach 5 this que stion at this time. We c onclude that Wanghas for feited his cla ims of ineffe ctive assistanc e
o f c o u n s el wi t h re s p ec tt o b o t h L i l i an d Al l en Ya n g. W an g a l s o f

o r f e i t e d h i s c l a i m o f

i n e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t an c e o f

c o u n s e l a s t o M a s o n . F a c i a l l y, Wang attempted to comply with all three Lozada require ments. On his behal f, W an g ’s attorne y notified Mason of the pending claim and provided time—albeit brief—to respond. Wang also filed a complaint ag ainst Mason with the C alifornia Ba r. Wang, theref

ore, did satisfy

the sec ond and third Lozada require ments. Where Wang ’s claim fa ils, however, is the f irst require ment.-9-

I n order to comply

with the first proce dural re quirement, Lozada oblige s an alien to file an aff idavit outlini ng the ag ree ment betwee n counsel a nd petitioner. This aff

idavit “should include a state me nt t

hat se ts f or th i n d e ta il the a g re e me nt t hat w a s e nte red i nt o w ithfo rm e r c ouns e l w ith respe ct to the ac tions to be taken . . . and w hat counse l did or did not repr esent . . . in this reg ard.” Ha mi d , 3 3 6 F. 3 d

at 4 6 8 (c i t i n g Matter of Lozada , 19 I
. & N. Dec . at 639). In Ha mi d , we found that “alleg ations conce rning what his counsel fa iled to do, but [ ] not [] what ac tions his counsel promised to undertake ” fa iled this fir st r equire ment and resulted in for feiture of Hamid’s ineffe ctive assistanc e of counse l claim. Id. ; see also Ljucov ic v. Gonzale s , 144 F. App’x 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2005) (“ Even if we c ou ld inf

e r . . . an imp lic it a g re e me nt wi th re g ard to Ku lic s’ s re pr e se ntatio n, the a ff ida vit sti ll fa lls sh or t. It si mpl y

fa ils to p ro vid e any

de ta il c on c e rn ingwh a t r e pr esent a tio n K uli c s a g re e d to provide be cause the only

information provided is that L jucovic hire d him to represe nt her.” ). I n a n atte mpt to c omp ly

wi th t he fi rs t r e qu ir e me nt, Wan g fi le d an a ff ida vit ou tli nin g his ill

fate d e xpe ri e nc e s w itha ll o f h is atto rn e y s and re pr e se ntativ e s o ve r the pre c e din g e ig ht y e ars . Wang’ s decla

ration, like Hamid’s, conce ntrated on the faults of c ounsel, ra t h er than on what repr esentation they

undertook to provide. I

ndeed, Wang’ s statement demonstrates that he neve r had an agr eeme nt with Mason, wit h whom he never spoke, but rathe r wit h L ili Yang
. The full extent of Wan g ’s de sc ri pti on

of his a g re e me nt w ithMa so n f oll ow s: Ifo un d a n im mig ratio n o ff

ic e . The pe rs on wh o run s the of fi c e is L ili Ya

ng . . . . L ili Ya ngis n ot a

n atto rn e y . Sh e us e s the name of L a ur e n M a so n E sq . to ru

n b us ine ss. Ig ave L ili Yang around 2,000 dollar s to handle my case . L aure n Mason and I have never met eac h other be fore . He ha s never discusses [sic] my

case with me. ROA at 26. This meag er e x planation is no doubt complicated by the less-than- forthcomingnature of L ili Yang ’s business relationship wit h Mason. Wan g ap p ea rs t o h ave be en snar ed in a we b of-10-

inc omp e te nt a

nd po ssi bly un de rh and e d im mig ra

tio n c on su lti ngof

fi c e s th a t are no t un c omm on to those in his situation. Unfortunately , the l ack of descr iption and brevity of his statement constitutes
no nc omp lia

nc e wi th t

he fi rs t Loz a da require ment and, ther efor e, for feiture of his ineffe ctive
a ssi sta nc e of c ouns e l c la im. B. Even if Wang had complied with the proce dural require ments o f Lozada , h is c la im w ou ld fail bec ause he did not demonstrate that any prejudice or fundamental unfa irness re sulted. “When an alien makes a c laim of ineff ective assistance of counsel in a removal proce eding he ‘c arr ies the burd e n o f e sta

bli sh ingtha

t in e ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l pr e

jud ic ed hi m or d e nie d h im fundame ntal fairne ss in order to pr ove that he has suffe red a denial of due pr ocess.’ ” Sako , 434 F.3d at 859 (c itations omi tted). In order to establish prejudice , Wang “ must es t ab l i s h that, but for the ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel, h e wo u ld have be en entitled to continue r esiding in the United States.” Id. a t 86 4. Thus , “th e ke y to due pr oc e ss an a ly sis in the se c a se s is the e ff e c t on the ou tc ome of the unde rlying c laim.” Sako , 434 F.3d at 865. I n De nk o v . I NS , 351 F.3d 717, 724 (6th Cir. 2003), t he attorney alleg edly failed to ensure Denko’ s prese nce at the remova l proce eding s. Denko arg ued that if she had been pre sent, an orde r issued without he r appea

ranc e “w ould not have bee n enter ed ag ainst her.” Id. This court noted that “[w]hi le this may

very well be a ccur ate, this is not equivalent to a showing that if Denko attended

. . . she would have been g rante d the asylum she sought.” Id. Simi larl y , in the ins tant c a se , e ve n if Wan g c ou ld s ho w that, b ut f or the ine ff e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, the B I A w ou ld h a ve g ra nte d h is-11-

motion to reopen base d on chang ed countr y co n d i t i o n s , he also would have to show that asy lum would have the n been g rante d. This he has not done. An alien g ener ally may file onl y one mot ion to reope n a final order of re moval, and must do
so wi thi n 9 0 d ay s o f t

he re nd e ri ngof

the c ha lle ng e d ord e r. 8 U .S. C. § 12 29 a (c )( 7) (C )( i) ; 8 C .F .R. § 1003.2(c) (2). An e x ception to this time and number bar pe rmits an alien “[t]o apply or re apply

for asylum or withholding of de portation based on c hang ed cir cumstance s arising in the country of nationality

. . . if such evide nce is mate rial and w as not ava ilable and could not ha ve been disc overe d
or pr e se nte d at the pr e vio us he ari ng .” 8 C. F .R. § 1 00 3. 2( c )( 3) (i i) ; se e als o Haddad , 437 F.3d at 517; Ha rc he nk o v . I NS , 379 F.3d 405, 410 (6th Cir. 2004). Even if these c onditions are met, howe ver,

“ [ t ] h e S u p r e m e C o u rt h a s m a d e c l e ar t h a tr e o p e n i n g i s d i s c r e t i o n ar y w i t h t h e B IA an d

t h a tt h e B IA reta ins broad discre tion to g rant or deny such motions[ , and] a party seeking reope ning bear s . . . a ‘hea vy burden.’ ” Alizoti v. Gonzales , 477 F.3d 448, 451 ( 6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Do he rty , 5 02 U. S.
a t 32 3) . T hu s, in or de r fo r Wan g to de mon str a te that he is e nti tle d to re ma in i n th e Un ite d St a te s,
and the re by that he ha s suf

fe re d p re jud ic e by any a lle g e d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, h e mus t
e sta bli shtha t h e pro du ced evi de nc e su ff ic ie nt t o s a tis fy

thi s “ he a vy

burd e n, ” and

that th e re su lt would likely

have be en diffe rent ha d the B I A re viewed the evidenc e pre sented a new. The “ heavy

burden” and the lim itation of chang ed cir cumstance s to chang ed c ou ntr y conditions rather

than cha ng ed p e r s o n al circumstances is nec essar y beca use to “[g]rant[] s uch mot ion s to o f

re e ly wi ll p e rm it e nd le ss d e lay of de po rt a tio n b y

a lie ns c re a tiv e and

fe rt ile e no ug h to continuously

produce new and materia l fac ts sufficie nt to establish a prima fac ie case.” INS v. W ang , 45 0 U. S
. 139, 143 n.5 (1981). The evidenc e provide d by Wang to support his under ly ing motion-12-

to r e op e n ba se d on ch ang e d co un tr y c on dit ion s is a t bes t insu ff ic ie nt an d at wo rs t an exe mpl ar of thi s k i n d o f c r e a t i v i t y. An alien se eking “to re open base d on chang ed country conditions ‘cannot r ely

on speculative
c on c lus ion s o r m e re a sse rt ion s f or fe ar o f p os sib le pe rs e c uti on , b ut in ste a d mu st o ff e r r e a so na

bly specific information s howing a real t here at of indi vidual perse cution.’” Harche nko , 379 F.3d at 410 (q u o t i n g Do k

ic v . I NS , No. 92-3592, 1993 WL265166, at *4 (6th Cir. J uly 15, 1993)). I n Lindor v. Holder , 317 F. App’ x 492, 495–96 (6th Cir. 2009), the petitioner ha d published
a bo ok c ri tic a l of

the Ha iti an g ov e rnme nt a ft e r h is a sylum c la im had been den ie d. L ind or a lso conducte d call-in intervie ws with a Ha itian radio station to promote the book, the re sult of which, he alleg es, led to rec eipt of ema il threats from Ha iti. Id. at 496. We ag ree d with the BIA that the fea r of pe rsec ution L indor articulated was cause d by chang ed personal conditi ons and not “c hang ed country condit i o n s arising in the county of nationality .” Id. at 497–98 (c iting 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c )(7) (C)(ii)) ( internal quotation marks omitted). Simi larly , Wang alleg es an “ individualiz ed fe ar of perse cution,” id. , in that he claims that the Chinese authorities are awa re of his pro-democ rac y

activism in the United States and will arr est and harm him on his return. How ever , Wang’ s fea r of p erse cution is due to a cha ng e in per sonal
c ir c ums tance s r a the r t

ha n c ha ng e d c on dit ion s w ith in C hin a . T he c la im o f p e rs e c uti on du e to membership in the C DP and participation in pro-de mocra cy activities in the Unit ed S tates re sulted fr o m choices ma de and a ctions taken while in the U nited States. See Niyibizi v. Mukasey , 3 00 F. App’x 371, 375 (6th Ci r. 2008) ( noting that ch an ges in country conditions do not arise in “c ases deal[ing] solely

with a static country

condition that would now aff ect the applicant due to a per sonal-13-

choice the applica

nt made wh i le in this country ”). We c onclude, ther efor e, that Wang has not demonstrated that had his motions t o reope n and re consider b ased on chang ed countr y conditions been timely

they would have be en g rante d. Ev e n if Wan g ha d o ve rc ome the tim e -b ar, he fa ils to p re se nt e vid e nc e su ff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli sh th at “he wo uld

have be e n e nti tle d to c on tin ue re sid ingin t

he Un ite d St a te s” a s r e qu ir e d to demonstrate prejudice resulting from his ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel claim. Sako , 434 F.3d at 864. The B I A noted that the e vidence that Wang pr ovided is larg ely uncorr oborated and of questionable a

uthenticity . The B I A also noted, in an e arlier order questioning the authenticity of the do c ume nts su

bmi tte d in Wan g ’s fi rs t mot ion to re op e n that the I J had ma de an a dv e rs e c re dib ili ty de te rm inatio n b a se d in

pa rt on W ang ’s su

bmi ssi on of fa lse do c ume nts in h is o ri g ina l vi sa application. Similarly , in Zhang v. Mukase y , 543 F.3d 851, 853, 855 ( 6th Cir. 2008), we a ffirme d a B I A dec ision deny ing a motion to reopen in part be cause it h ad d eclined to c redit evide nce reg arding a fear of individualiz ed persecution by the petit ioner due to the fac t that the petitioner had failed to re habilitate her

cre dibilit y . Although the BI A did not expressly

deny the cr edibility

of the letters Wang provided re g ardingindividualiz ed per secution in China in its De cember 31, 2008, decision, i t is unlikely that they would alter the ear lier determination that the evidenc e pre sented by Wan g in h is o ri g ina l mo tio n to re op e n w a s in su ff ic ie nt t o d e mon str a te c ha

ng e d c ountr

y c on dit ion s. The new evidenc e provided consists larg ely of unsupported state ments by Wang a nd sever al of his friends, poor ly

translated online c ontent (without the orig inals attache d), an undated CDP membership ca

rd, an outdated 2000 Human Rights Watch repor t, and photog raphs of

Wang in f

ront of a CDP flagand in a stre et demonstration (f irst undated, then re submitt ed with date stamps). The-14-

cre dibilit y of the corr oborating letters is particular ly questionable. The letters provide d by Wang a s
corr oboration we re w ritten afte r the BIA criticized the lac k of cor roborating e vidence from China in h is f ir st m oti on

to r e op e n; t

he le tte rs were se nt t og e the r v ia e xpre ss m a il b y

his da ug hte r i n
re sp on se to sp e c if

ic re qu e sts by

Wan g fo r s uc h in fo rm a tio n; a nd Wan g did no t a tte mpt

to r e ha bil itate his c re dib ili ty a ft e r the I J f ound him no t c re dib le in pa rt du e to his us e of fr aud ul ent do cumen ts. Take n a s a

wh ole , th e e vid e nc e is i ns uf fi c ie nt in sc op e and c re dib ili ty to d e mon str a te wi th c e rt a int y that had the B I A found that c hang ed countr y condit ions ex cused the untimely filing a nd there fore g rante d the motion to reopen, Wang would have be en g rante d asylum. See H uicoche a-Gome

z , 237 F.3d at 700 (“I t is too speculative for the Huicoche as to claim that b u t for [their attorne y ’s] lega l advice , they would not be facing deportation or would have be en g rante d the discre tionary relief they
are seeking .”). Wan g a lso ha s n ot d e mon str a te d th a t be c a us e of the a lle g e d in e ff

e c tiv e a ssi sta

nc e of c ouns e l, the proc eeding s were fundame ntally unfair. See Sak

o , 434 F.3d at 863-64 (noting that prejudice and fu nd a me nta l f

a ir ne ss a re “ ana log ou s” in t

he c on te xt of

ine ff e c tiv e a ssi stan ce of couns e l c la ims in
re mov a l pro c e e din g s) . T hu s, “ fo r t he same re a so ns that [Wang ] fa ils to e sta bli shpr e jud ic e , h e a lso fails to establish fu n d am en t al unfairness that would violate due pr ocess.” Chang W en Zhuang v. Holder , 3 35 F . App ’x 54 0, 54 6 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 9) ; se e als o Lju c ov ic , 144 F. App’ x at 506. The B I A thus did not a

buse its discr etion in so deciding and in deny ing Wang ’s Dec ember 31, 2008, motion to reopen. We there fore aff irm the BIA’s orde r deny ing the motion. I V.-15-

Wan g a lso argue d in

his Oc tob e r 2 00 8 mo tio n to re op e n to the B I A, bu t not expli c itl y in h is pro se b r i e f b e f

o r e t h i s c o u rt , t h a t h e i s e n t i t l e d t o e qu i t a b l e t o l l i n g o f t h e f

i l i n g d e a d l i n e s d

u e to ineffe ctive as s istance of

counsel. “ Equitable tolling may apply when a petitioner has r ece ived ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel.” Barry v. M ukasey , 524 F.3d 721, 724 (6th Cir. 2008) (q u o ting Lju c ov ic , 144 F. App’ x at 503) (quotation marks omitted). Howeve r, this c ourt noted in Ba rry that “we . . . have de cli n ed t o eq u i tably toll fili ng periods base d on ineffe ctive assistanc e of c ounsel wher e a pe titioner fails to establish prejudice from former counsel’s unt imely actions.” Id. at 725 (c i t i n g Aj az i , 216 F . App ’x 51 5, 51 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 7) ). B e c a

us e Wan g fa ile d to de mon str a te pr e jud ic e , h is c la im f

or e qu ita ble tol lin g lik e wi se fa ils
.

V. For the fore g oing r easons, we aff irm the order

of the B I A.