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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION

HORTONWORKS, INC.,

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

 

ALEXANDER DAHER, 

 Defendant.

Case No. 2:18-cv-516 

 

Judge Graham 

Magistrate Judge Deavers 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Alexander Daher’s “Motion to Compel 

Arbitration and Dismiss or Stay Plaintiff’s Action.” (ECF No. 19). For the reasons that follow, 

Mr. Daher’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED, and the Court will STAY all proceedings 

pending completion of arbitration. 

I. Background 

In the case at issue, Plaintiff Hortonworks, Inc. (“Hortonworks”) alleges that Mr. Daher, a 

former Hortonworks employee, misappropriated and misused Hortonworks’ proprietary and trade 

secret information and breached his employment agreements with the company in violation of the 

Defend Trade Secrets Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836; the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Ohio Rev. 

Code §§ 1333.61–1333.69, Ohio Rev. Code § 2737.01, et seq., and Ohio common law. (Compl. ¶ 

1, ECF No. 1 at 1). Mr. Daher asserts that each cause of action alleged in Hortonworks’ complaint 

is covered by the mutual arbitration agreement between the parties, and this Court should compel 

Hortonworks to submit its claims to arbitration and dismiss this case, or, in the alternative, stay all 

proceedings pending completion of arbitration. (ECF No. 19 at 141, 144). In its opposition to Mr. 

Daher’s motion (ECF No. 22), Hortonworks does not oppose the existence or validity of the 
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parties’ mutual arbitration agreement or whether the agreement extends to its claims. Instead, 

Hortonworks seeks a preliminary injunction against Mr. Daher prior to the Court’s determination 

as to whether to compel arbitration, and should the Court compel arbitration, requests that the 

matter be stayed rather than dismissed. (Id. at 161). 

II. Analysis 

A. Hortonworks’ Preliminary Injunction Motion 

As an initial matter, Hortonworks first urges the Court to address its Motion for Temporary 

Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, and Expedited Discovery (“Preliminary Injunction 

Motion”). (ECF No. 3). The Court declines to do so, because there is no Preliminary Injunction 

Motion currently pending before it. Two months prior to the filing of Hortonworks’ opposition to 

Mr. Daher’s motion, the Court issued a Standstill Order (ECF No. 10) to prevent the loss or 

destruction of evidence relating to Mr. Daher’s alleged acts of misappropriation and misuse of 

Hortonworks’ proprietary and trade secret information. Concurrently with the issuance of the 

Standstill Order, the Court issued another order terminating the Preliminary Injunction Motion as 

moot, without prejudice to renewal. (ECF No. 11). Hortonworks has not moved to renew its 

motion, and as such, there is nothing for this Court to address prior to its consideration of Mr. 

Daher’s motion to compel arbitration. 

The Court further notes that the parties’ mutual arbitration agreement does not contain a 

carveout for seeking such preliminary relief from a court and instead provides that, “Any 

arbitration will be administered by JAMS, Inc. (“JAMS”) pursuant to its employment arbitration 

rules & procedures (the “jams rules”). The arbitrator shall have the power to decide any motions 

brought by any party to the arbitration . . . prior to any arbitration hearing.” (Compl., App. B, ECF 

No. 1 at 26). Rule 24(e) of the JAMS Employment Arbitration Rules and Procedures states that 
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“[t]he Arbitrator may grant whatever interim measures are deemed necessary, including injunctive 

relief and measures for the protection and conservation of property and disposition of disposable 

goods.” As the parties may request injunctive relief from an arbitrator pursuant to JAMS Rule 

24(e) and their agreement contemplates this step, the Court finds arbitration is the appropriate 

forum for preliminary injunctive relief. 

B. Arbitration 

Generally, before compelling an unwilling party to submit its claims to arbitration, “‘the 

court must engage in a limited review to determine whether the dispute is arbitrable.’” Masco 

Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 382 F.3d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 2004) (quoting Javitch v. First Union 

Sec., Inc., 315 F.3d 619, 624 (6th Cir. 2003)). This review includes a determination of (1) the 

existence of a valid arbitration agreement between the parties and (2) whether “the specific dispute 

falls within the substantive scope of the agreement.” Id. (quoting Javitch, 315 F.3d at 624). It is 

the opposing party’s burden to show a genuine issue of material fact as to the validity of the 

agreement. Great Earth Companies, Inc. v. Simons, 288 F.3d 878, 889 (6th Cir. 2002). 

Here, Hortonworks provides no opposition. As to scope, “‘an order to arbitrate the 

particular grievance should not be denied unless it may be said with positive assurance that the 

arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted dispute.’” AT&T 

Techs. v. Communs. Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986) (quoting United Steelworkers of 

Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582–83 (1960)). Hortonworks makes no 

argument against its claims falling within the substantive scope of the parties’ agreement, and a 

reading of the broad agreement informs the Court as to why. 

The parties’ mutual arbitration agreement provides as follows: 

In consideration of your employment with Hortonworks, its promise to arbitrate all 

employment related disputes, and your receipt of the compensation, pay raises, and 

other benefits paid to you by Hortonworks, at present and in the future, you agree 
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that any and all controversies, claims, or disputes with anyone (including 

Hortonworks and any employee, officer, director, or benefit plan of Hortonworks), 

arising out of, relating to, or resulting from your employment with us or the 

termination of your employment with us, including any breach of this agreement, 

shall be subject to binding arbitration under the arbitration rules set forth in 

California code of civil procedure section 1280 through 1294.2, including section 

1281.8 (the “Act”), and pursuant to California law. The Federal Arbitration Act 

shall continue to apply with full force and effect notwithstanding the application of 

procedural rules set forth in the Act. Disputes that you and we agree to arbitrate, 

and thereby agree to waive any right to a trial by jury, include any statutory claims 

under local, state, or federal law, including, but not limited to, claims under title 

VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age 

Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Older Workers Benefit Protection 

Act, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification 

Act, the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, the Family and Medical 

Leave Act, the California Family Rights Act, the California Labor Code, claims of 

harassment, discrimination, and wrongful termination, and any statutory or 

common law claims; provided, however, that any claims that may not be arbitrated 

under applicable law are not subject to this Mutual Arbitration Agreement. You 

expressly understand that this agreement to arbitrate also applies to any disputes 

that Hortonworks may have with you. 

(Compl., App. B, ECF No. 1 at 26). 

The parties’ mutual arbitration agreement applies to the entirety of Mr. Daher’s 

employment relationship with Hortonworks and any claims associated therewith. By entering into 

the agreement, the parties agreed to waive any right to a trial by jury regarding statutory claims 

under state or federal law. (Id.). In the case at bar, Hortonworks asserts statutory claims against 

Mr. Daher under federal and Ohio law. Moreover, the arbitration agreement specifically spells out 

that it “applies to any disputes that Hortonworks may have with you.” 

Here, neither the arbitration agreement itself nor the unwilling party, Hortonworks, 

provides any doubt as to whether the dispute is arbitrable. As the mutual arbitration agreement is 

valid and the parties’ specific dispute falls within the substantive scope of the agreement, the Court 

finds it is the appropriate vehicle by which the parties should resolve their dispute and compels 

this action to arbitration. 
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C. Stay or Dismissal of the Case 

As an additional consideration, the Court must determine whether it is appropriate to stay 

the matter pending completion of arbitration or dismiss the case in its entirety. Hortonworks 

argues, without further explanation, that the Court should retain jurisdiction in this matter to 

“determine whether a permanent injunction should issue following completion of arbitration.” 

(ECF No. 22 at 163). The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) provides that when a court finds any 

issue referable to arbitration, “the court in which such suit is pending . . . shall on application of 

one of the parties stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with 

the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 3. Consistent with this congressional mandate, the Court 

shall stay this case and retain jurisdiction for the purpose of reviewing any post-arbitration 

motions. 

III. Conclusion 

The Court finds arbitration to be the appropriate forum for both preliminary injunctive 

relief and Hortonworks’ claims against Mr. Daher. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Mr. Daher’s 

motion to compel arbitration (ECF No. 19) and STAYS all proceedings pending completion of 

arbitration. Within 30 days of the arbitrator’s decision, the parties must submit to the Court a joint 

status report detailing the status of this case. 

In light of the Court’s decision concerning preliminary injunctive relief, Hortonworks’ 

motion captioned, “Plaintiff Hortonworks, Inc.’s Motion for Leave to Submit Surreply to 

Defendant Alexander Daher’s Reply in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration and Dismiss or 

Stay Plaintiff’s Action, or, In the Alternative, to Treat Defendant’s Reply as an Opposition to 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Deem that Attached Surreply as Plaintiff’s Reply 

Thereton and Certificate of Service” (ECF No. 24) is hereby DENIED as moot. 
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IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ James L. Graham 

 JAMES L. GRAHAM 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: February 26, 2019