No. 96-591 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA 1997
IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF CATHYLYNN KAYSER, Petitioner and Respondent, 11111- I 'J 1111]' r\
..... <) ; L 1::J::! and TERRYNEAL KAYSER, Respondent and Appellant.

APPEALFROM: District Court ofthe TwentiethJudicial District, In and for the County ofSanders, The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.
COUNSEL OF RECORD: ForAppellant: George T. Radovich, Attorney at Law, Billings, Montana ForRespondent: Jean Adele Carter, Attorney at Law, Thompson Falls, Montana

Submitted onBriefs: May 29, 1997 Decided: August 12, 1997 Filed:Justice Karla M. Gray delivered the Opinion ofthe Court.
Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court 1995 Internal OperatingRules, the following decision shallnotbe cited as precedent and shallbe published by its filing as apublic document withthe Clerk ofthe Supreme Court andby a report ofits result to State Reporter Publishing Company and WestPublishing Company. Cathy Kayser (Cathy) and Terry Kayser (Terry) were married for eighteen years, during whichtime theyjointly owned and operated a business consisting ofguided hunting operations in both western and eastern Montana and an outfitting and guide school (collectively "hunting guide business"). The Twentieth Judicial District Court, Sanders County, subsequently dissolved Cathy and Terry's marriage, provided for custody and support oftheir two minor children, and valued and distributed the marital estate. Terry appeals from the District Court's valuation and distribution ofthe marital estate. We affirm. The issues on appeal are: 1. Didthe District Court errin valuing the hunting guide business and marital home? 2. Did the District Courtabuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate?
STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a district court's findings offact regarding the valuation and division of marital property to determine whether they are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage ofWalls (1996), 278 Mont. 413, 416, 925 P.2d 483, 485 (citations omitted). A district court may 2• I


### accept anyreasonable valuation supportedbythe record. Marriage ofWalls, 925 P.2d at485 (citation omitted). Further, adistrict courtmay assign any value to disputedmarital property that is within the range ofvalues presented into evidence. In re Marriage ofLopez (1992), 255 Mont. 238, 243, 841 P.2d 1122, 1125. The division of marital property must be equitable, rather than equal, and a district court's judgment in that regard will not be disturbed unless it constitutes an abuse ofdiscretion. Marriage ofWalls, 925 P.2d at 485 (citations omitted). DISCUSSION The District Court found that Cathy and Terry's marital estate totaled $482,218.96. It

### valuedthe western Montanaportion ofthehunting guide business at $250,000, placed no value on eitherthe outfitting and guide school orthe eastern Montanaportion ofthe hunting guide business and valued the marital home at $155,000. In distributing the marital estate, the District Court awarded Cathy the marital home, a one-half interest in the western Montana portion of the hunting guide business, a vehicle, her personal property, miscellaneous household furnishings and other assets totaling $274,950 after the home- and vehicle-related debt assigned to her were deducted. Terry received a one-halfinterest in the western Montana portion of the hunting guide business, his personal property, and miscellaneous equipment--including vehicles and livestock--relating to the hunting guide business. Terry's portion ofthe marital estate totaled $207,268.96 after deducting debt assigned to him.
31. Didthe District Court errin valuing the hunting guide business and marital home? Hunting guide business Terry argues that the District Court included the "absolute maximum value" ofthe hunting guide business without considering eitherhis own testimony orthat given by Cathy and Gloria Belcher (Belcher), a stockbroker, investment manager and local land owner. Terry further contends thattestimony at trial indicatedthe maximumpotential salesprice for the hunting guide business was "closer to the $200,000 range" rather than the $250,000 figure the District Courtused. The record, however, belies Terry's arguments. Moreover, his arguments ignore both the District Court's ability to accept any reasonable value supportedbythe record andthis Court's clearly erroneous standard ofreview ofatrial court's valuation findings. See Marriage ofWalls, 925 P.2d at 485 (citations omitted). Here, the record contains a range ofvalues for the hunting guide business. Indeed, Terry testified that the western Montana operation, with permits, was worth "150 to $175,000" and, in addition, thathe hadreceived an offerfor the hunting guide business, later withdrawn, for "between 300 and $350,000." Belcher, who testified as Cathy's expert, stated that "amodest evaluation" ofthe western Montana operation ofthe hunting guide business
was $200,000 to $250,000, she was interestedinpurchasingthe western Montana operation for "in the $200,000 range," and herpurchase price "[did] not include [Terry's] equipment
or the eastern part of Montana or his guide school." Cathy testified, based on her

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### involvement with the business, that the western portion ofthe hunting guide business was worth $250,000. The District Court's finding that the western Montana portion ofthe hunting guide business was worth $250,000 is supportedby the record, is well within the range ofvalues presented in evidence and is not otherwise clearly erroneous. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not errin this regard. We observe that Terry also makes apassing argument relating to the District Court's valuation ofthe equipment associated with the hunting guide business. That equipment was valued at $82,268.96 and, as noted above, was awarded to Terry in the distribution ofthe marital estate. Terry does not contest the amount at which the court valued the equipment; rather, he contends that the court erred in valuing it separately from the hunting guide business. We discern no error in this regard, however, since Belcher's testimony clearly separated the equipment from herunderlying valuation ofthe business. In addition, while the offerTerryreceived for the hunting guide business--in the $300,000 to $350,000 range-- may have included the equipment separately valued by the District Court, deducting the $82,268.96 equipment value from the high end ofthat range would leave a value for the business--withoutthe equipment--higherthan thatultimately usedby the District Court. In short, Terry has established no error in the District Court's separate valuation of the equipment associated with the hunting guide business.

5Marital home Cathy admitted at trial that she had neither formal education in the real estate market
nor experience in valuing real estate. Based on reading real estate listings in the area for properties comparableto the marital home, however, she testified that shebelievedthe home
was worth "between 100 and $125,000." Terry testifiedthathe "checked around with some of the real estate people" and personally compared prices of residences in the area. According to Terry, a namedreal estate professional told Terry the property couldbe sold for $185,000; no written appraisal regarding the value ofthe marital home was introduced, however, and the "real estate professional" did not testify. As set forth above, the District Court valued the marital home at $155,000. Terry apparently contends that his evidence was more credible than Cathy's "limited

... general knowledge obtained over a series ofyears ofreading real estate listings" as a matter oflaw and, as aresult, his $185,000 value shouldhavebeen accepted. We disagree. The only evidence regarding the value ofthe marital home came from the parties themselves, neither ofwhomhad any substantialknowledge orexperience inthe field ofreal estate andreal estate values. Neithervaluation was inherently more credible, and we have held that the district court has broad discretion in determining the value ofproperty in a dissolution action, and" '[i]ts valuation canbepremised on experttestimony, lay testimony, documentary evidence, or any combination thereof.''' In re Marriage ofRobinson (1994), 269 Mont. 293, 296, 888 P.2d 895,897 (citation omitted). Here, the District Court valued
6J .t ...

the marital home at $155,000, within the range ofvalues presented attrial. That finding is supportedby substantial credible evidence and is not otherwise clearly erroneous. We hold, therefore, that the District Court did not err in valuing the marital home. 2. Didthe District Court abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate? Terry argues that, even assuming the court's valuations are correct, as weheld above, the District Court abused its discretion in distributing the marital estate because Cathy was awarded 57% ofthe estate, compared to the 43% he received. We disagree. First and foremost, wereiterate that, in distributing the marital estate, a district court must make an equitable distribution, not necessarily an equal distribution. Marriage of Walls, 925 P.2d at 485 (citation omitted). Here, the 57% to 43% distribution is close to being equal. In addition, the distribution is based on the court's unchallenged finding that Terry's income is approximately two and one-half times greater than Cathy's income. Furthermore, the District Court's determination that Cathyis not entitledto maintenance was premised, in largepart, on the distribution to her ofproperty which willbe sufficientto meet herreasonable needs. Noris Terry'sreliance onInre Marriage ofPopp(1983), 206 Mont. 415, 671 P.2d24,
III support ofhis argument that the distribution in this case is inequitable, well placed. There, the trial court expressly stated that it was making a 60% to 40% distribution; its findings did not effectuate such a distribution, however, in part because of errors in underlying valuations. Marriage of Popp, 671 P.2dat 26. In addition, we couldnot ascertain
7the basis for the trial court's distribution inthe husband's favor. Marriage ofPopp, 671 P.2d at 27-28. As a result, we remanded for further consideration. Marriage ofPopp, 671 P.2d at 28. Marriage ofPoppis inapplicable here. As discussed above, the District Court did not
errin valuingthe marital estate and the basis for its 57% to 43% distribution is clear on this record.We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate. Affirmed.

We concur:

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