J-S41033-20

*Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

 Appellee

 v.

LISA MARIE KRUSKIE,

 Appellant

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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

 

 No. 660 MDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 6, 2020

in the Court of Common Pleas of Snyder County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-55-CR-0000031-2018

 

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., McLAUGHLIN, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.* 

MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.: FILED JANUARY 28, 2021

Lisa Marie Kruskie (Appellant) appeals from her April 6, 2020

judgment of sentence of 28 to 90 days of incarceration followed by one year 

of probation for criminal mischief and harassment. We affirm.

In this case, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with criminal 

mischief and various summary offenses, based on an October 12, 2017 

incident between Appellant and Brian Farrell, who was Appellant’s landlord at 

the time. Briefly, Farrell, accompanied by his friend Dorothy Megan 

Westveer, had driven a car to the property Appellant rented for the purpose 

of serving Appellant with an eviction notice. They encountered Appellant 

outside of the property. During the encounter, Appellant punched Farrell in 

the groin. After Farrell re-entered the car he had driven to the property, 
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Appellant scraped the driver’s side door with her keys, leaving long 

scratches. 

At Appellant’s simultaneous jury and bench trial, the Commonwealth 

presented the testimony of Farrell, Westveer, a cell phone video of the 

incident taken by Westveer, and two photographs depicting the scratch 

damage. See Commonwealth’s Exhibits 1-3. 

Because Appellant was charged with criminal mischief as a 

misdemeanor of the third degree, the Commonwealth was required to prove 

that the damage to the vehicle exceeded $500, but was less than $1000. 18 

Pa.C.S. § 3304(b) (providing that criminal mischief is graded as a 

“misdemeanor of the third degree if [the actor] intentionally or recklessly 

causes pecuniary loss in excess of $500” but less than $1,000); 

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 225 A.3d 590, 595 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(vacating judgment of sentence because Commonwealth failed to produce 

damages evidence sufficient to establish damages between $500 and $1,000 

as required to support third-degree misdemeanor criminal mischief 

conviction); cf. Commonwealth v. Battiato, 619 A.2d 359, 363 (Pa. 

Super. 1993) (holding proof of monetary damage is not required under the 

statute to convict a defendant of criminal mischief as a summary offense).

Initially, the Commonwealth sought to introduce evidence of the 

damage amount through Farrell’s testimony. Farrell testified that he 

obtained an estimate to repair the damage to his car at Keller’s Auto Body. 
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N.T., 1/24/2020, at 30. When shown Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4, Farrell 

identified it as the estimate that he had obtained. Id. at 30-31. Ultimately, 

Farrell opted not to repair the damage to the car. Id. at 34. When Farrell 

testified that Keller’s Auto Body estimated the damage to be $806.66, 

Appellant objected on the basis that the estimate lacked authentication 

because no one from the auto body shop was present to verify the amount. 

Id. The trial court took a half-hour break to research the issue. Upon its 

return, the trial court sustained the objection, ruling that the content of the 

estimate was hearsay and unauthenticated without someone from the body 

shop to testify as to the estimate. Id. at 31-33. 

In response, the Commonwealth stated that it planned to present the 

testimony of Cody Keller, an employee of the body shop, who had not been 

present at trial but was en route to the courthouse. Appellant objected to the 

Commonwealth’s calling of Keller, arguing that Keller was not the person 

who prepared the estimate. Id. at 38. The trial court declined to rule until 

Keller was on the stand, but informed the jury “to disregard any testimony 

by [Farrell] regarding any estimates he’s received at this point or any 

estimates of – that he may have testified to as far at the amounts.” Id. at 

34. 

Farrell’s testimony resumed. The Commonwealth asked Farrell without 

objection whether he went to Keller’s Auto Body to get an estimate to repair 

the damage and whether Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4 was the estimate he 
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received from Keller’s Auto Body, and Farrell responded affirmatively. Id. at 

34. 

Before Keller took the stand, Appellant again objected to the 

Commonwealth’s presentation of Keller. This time Appellant expanded upon 

the previous objection, explaining that the written estimate indicated that it 

was prepared by someone named Josh.1 Appellant also based the objection 

upon Keller’s not being present at the beginning of trial and the delay of trial 

for over an hour due to the Commonwealth’s decision to call him as a 

witness. The trial court again deferred its ruling until it heard from Keller, 

and disagreed with Appellant that the delay was due to the Commonwealth’s 

presentation of Keller as opposed to the trial court’s break for research. Id.

at 48-49.

When Keller took the stand, he indicated he was employed by Keller’s 

Auto Body, and he prepared and filed estimates as part of his duties.2 Id. at 

50. According to Keller, Keller’s Auto Body retains estimates for 

approximately one year as a normal course of its business duties. Id. at 54. 

When shown Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4, Keller testified he recognized the 

“letterhead and ... the estimate itself.” Id. at 51. He confirmed the estimate 

 

1 On the estimate, the name “Josh” is handwritten on the line following the 

typewritten words “ORDER WRITTEN BY.” Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4.

2 Although the district attorney represented to the trial court that Keller was 

the president of Keller’s Auto Body, he did not ask Keller to provide his title 

in his sworn testimony.
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was on the standard form of Keller’s Auto Body and explained that estimates 

typically are not signed until the work is approved. Id. at 54. Keller 

interpreted the “numbers and tallies” and abbreviations on the form, 

explaining that the total came to $806.66 to remove, paint, and reinstall the 

door handle, mirror, and keypad, to repair and paint the front driver’s side 

door, and to blend the paint into the rear door. Id. at 53-55. When asked on 

cross-examination if the auto body shop still had the estimate on file, Keller 

responded, “[p]robably not.” Id. at 54. 

Following Keller’s testimony, Appellant objected to the admission of 

the Commonwealth’s Exhibit 4 on authentication grounds because Keller did 

not personally prepare the estimate, the estimate was not signed, and 

Keller’s Auto Body no longer possessed a copy of the 2017 estimate due to 

its age. Id. at 56. The trial court overruled the objection, stating that the 

estimate was hearsay, but the Commonwealth established the business 

records exception to the hearsay rule set forth in Pa.R.E. 803(6) through 

Keller’s testimony. Id. at 57. Appellant also objected to admission of the 

estimate because it was a copy. After hearing the district attorney’s 

argument that the best evidence rule permits copies, the trial court 

overruled the objection. Id.

Shortly thereafter, the Commonwealth rested, and Appellant moved 

for a judgment of acquittal, arguing the Commonwealth failed to prove 

damages in excess of $500. At that point, the trial court observed sua 
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sponte that the estimate was prepared for Anastasia Construction and not 

Farrell,3 and there was no testimony linking Farrell to Anastasia 

Construction. The court then commented that it thought it “may have erred 

in admitting [the estimate]” for this reason4instead of the reasons advanced 

by the defense. Id. at 63-64. In response, the Commonwealth urged the 

trial court to accept Farrell’s testimony that the car was his and he brought it 

to Keller’s Auto Body for an estimate. It also requested that the trial court 

permit it to recall Farrell to clarify any confusion and indicated that it would 

file an immediate appeal if it could not. Id. at 65. The trial court denied the 

request to reopen the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief. Id. at 66. The 

following exchange then occurred.

 

3 On the line following the typewritten word “NAME,” the words “Anastasia 

Construction” were handwritten. Commonwealth Exhibit 4. The estimate also 

provided a vehicle identification number and make and model of the car. Id.

No testimony was elicited regarding these details from Keller. Additionally, 

Farrell provided no details about the specifics of the car he drove on the day 

in question.

4 The trial court elaborated on this point later in the trial: “Appellant 

damaged Farrell’s car, but the question is whether the Commonwealth 

proved the amount of damages to his car.” Id. at 74. In other words, the 

Commonwealth proved Appellant damaged Farrell’s car, which established at 

least the summary offense of criminal mischief. The Commonwealth also 

proved that Keller Auto Body provided an estimate to Anastasia Construction 

to repair damage at the cost of $806.66. But the trial court questioned 

whether the Commonwealth proved that the car that was the subject of the 

estimate was the same car Appellant damaged, such that the 

Commonwealth proved Appellant caused damage exceeding $500 sufficient 

to prove misdemeanor-level criminal mischief.
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[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: I don’t believe you set that ruling on the 

record yet but if your ruling is a judgment of acquittal on the 

misdemeanor level of the criminal mischief [charge] then I’m 

entitled as of right to appeal.

THE COURT: That would be my intentions to make it clear. I 

don’t know exactly the language.

[DISTRICT ATTORNEY]: I understand.

THE COURT: Is to reduce the grading to a summary offense on 

the criminal mischief [charge] because the amount has not been 

proven as to the damage of [] Farrell’s vehicle. On a practical 

matter though, perhaps the better way of doing it [is to] allow it 

to go to the jury and then I can make my ruling depending on 

the jury’s verdict. If the jury comes back with a guilty verdict, I 

can make whatever the ruling would be to essentially reduce the 

grading [to a summary offense]. If the jury comes back with an 

acquittal, it’s over.

Id. at 66-67 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). The district attorney 

agreed to the trial court’s plan. Appellant’s counsel informed the court that 

Appellant “would prefer” the court proceed with dismissing the misdemeanor 

charge now instead of “wasting” the jury’s time if the trial court just planned 

to dismiss the misdemeanor charge upon a guilty jury verdict, but counsel 

“would leave it at the Court’s discretion.” Id. at 67. The trial court 

responded, “We’ll let it go to the jury. Let the jury decide. Based on what the 

jury comes up with on the verdict slip, it may make it all moot and either 

way it’s preserved in that way for appellate review.” Id.

The trial then resumed. The defense’s only witness was Appellant, who 

testified briefly in her own defense and denied that she keyed the vehicle.

Following the close of all testimony, argument, and the jury charge, the jury 
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returned a verdict of guilty on the criminal mischief charge, and indicated on 

the jury slip that the damage was between $500 and $1,000. The trial court 

found Appellant guilty of summary harassment based upon the hit to 

Farrell’s groin, but found her not guilty of the other charged summary 

offenses. 

Following the jury verdict, Appellant once again moved for a judgment 

of acquittal, this time echoing the trial court’s earlier observation that the 

estimate was under a business name and not Farrell’s name, and arguing 

that the Commonwealth failed to establish the pecuniary value of damages 

caused by Appellant. The Commonwealth opposed the motion, arguing that 

Farrell testified Appellant caused damage to his car and identified the 

estimate as the one provided by Keller’s Auto Body to repair that damage; 

Keller testified the value of the damage was $806.66; and the jury credited 

their testimony. Stating that it had “serious reservations” and was “not 

impressed on how this case was handled at all,” the trial court nevertheless 

determined there was sufficient evidence of damages. Id. at 101. Evidently

the trial court had reconsidered its original belief that the evidence may be 

insufficient, and neither the trial court nor counsel mentioned the court’s 

earlier plan to reduce the grading upon a guilty jury verdict.

Following the trial, Appellant filed a written motion for judgment of 

acquittal. On April 6, 2020, the court held an argument hearing, after which 

the trial court denied the motion on the record. At the same hearing, the 
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court sentenced Appellant to 28 to 90 days of incarceration for criminal 

mischief as a misdemeanor of the third degree, with time credit of 28 days 

and permission for immediate parole upon the expiration of the minimum 

sentence. Appellant was also sentenced to one year of probation for the 

summary harassment conviction consecutive to the incarceration sentence. 

Appellant filed a post-sentence motion, which was denied without hearing. 

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial 

court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. Appellant presents three issues on 

appeal. 

1. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion when it 

allowed testimony regarding an estimate of damage from a 

witness [who] did not conduct the estimate and from a 

document that was not submitted into evidence?

2. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion when it 

allowed testimony from a witness who was not present at the 

start of trial and was not disclosed to defense counsel until 

minutes before he would testify? 

3. Whether the trial court erred/abused its discretion when the 

court suggested during trial [that Appellant’s] criminal trial 

would be declared a mistrial if the jury found the Defendant 

guilty? 

Appellant’s Brief at 19.5

 

5 The issues on appeal mirror the issues Appellant presented in her concise 

statement. Significantly, as framed by Appellant, none of the issues raise a 

sufficiency challenge. In a jumbled discussion intermixing legal doctrines in 

the argument section of her brief, Appellant briefly alludes to an argument 

that the evidence was insufficient to establish the pecuniary value of the 

damage. See Appellant’s Brief at 23-24. Not only is this argument 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Appellant’s first two issues relate to the introduction of evidence 

regarding the amount of damage to the car Farrell was driving. We bear the 

following in mind. “[T]he admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of 

the trial court and will be reversed only if the trial court has abused its 

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 230 A.3d 480, 489 (Pa. Super. 

2020). “An abuse of discretion is not a mere error in judgment but, rather, 

involves bias, ill will, partiality, prejudice, manifest unreasonableness, or 

misapplication of law.” Commonwealth v. McGhee, 230 A.3d 1277, 1283 

(Pa. Super. 2020). 

On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting 

Keller to testify about the estimate because he was not the person who 

prepared the estimate. Appellant’s Brief at 24. “Our rules of evidence 

mandate that a witness may testify to a matter only if ‘the witness has 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

underdeveloped in her brief, Appellant has waived a challenge to the 

sufficiency of the evidence because she did not include it in the concise 

statement or the statement of questions involved. See Commonwealth v. 

Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 281 (Pa. Super. 2009) (holding challenge to 

sufficiency of the evidence is waived when the Rule 1925 concise statement 

fails to specify the element upon which the evidence was insufficient; also 

holding undeveloped argument in brief waived issue); Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(b)(4)(ii) (“The [concise statement] shall concisely identify each error 

that the appellant intends to assert with sufficient detail to identify the issue 

to be raised for the judge.”); Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included 

in the [concise statement] and/or not raised in accordance with the 

provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”); Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No 

question will be considered unless it is stated in the statement of questions 

involved or is fairly suggested thereby.”). 
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personal knowledge of the matter.’” Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. 

Wicker, 206 A.3d 474, 482 (Pa. 2019) (citing Pa.R.E. 602). The estimate 

itself is hearsay because through its introduction the Commonwealth sought 

to prove that Josh from Keller Auto Body valued damage to the car to be in 

the amount of $806.66. See Commonwealth v. Rivera, 238 A.3d 482, 492 

(Pa. Super. 2020) (“Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the 

truth of the matter asserted. Hearsay generally is inadmissible unless it falls 

within one of the exceptions to the hearsay rule delineated in the 

Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence.”); see also In re Gillen, 344 A.2d 706, 

708 (Pa. Super. 1975) (concluding estimate of repair for vehicle damage was 

hearsay). 

However, the trial court admitted the estimate and permitted Keller to 

testify about the estimate based upon the business record exception to the 

hearsay rule set forth at Pa.R.E. 803(6).6 That exception does not require 

 

6 This rule provides as follows.

The following are not excluded by the rule against hearsay, 

regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:

***

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record 

(which includes a memorandum, report, or data compilation 

in any form) of an act, event or condition if:

(A) the record was made at or near the time by - or from 

information transmitted by - someone with knowledge;

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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the author of the document to testify about the document. Boyle v. 

Steiman, 631 A.2d 1025, 1032-33 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding that witness 

authenticating business records need not be the person who created the 

record or “even have personal knowledge of the facts reported in the 

business record”). It simply requires a “custodian or another qualified 

witness” to have knowledge of and to testify about the conditions set forth in 

the exception. Pa.R.E. 806(6)(D).

Moreover, trial courts have broad discretion in applying Rule 803(6) 

“to determine if the witness can provide sufficient information relating to the 

preparation and maintenance of the records to justify a presumption of 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

(B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 

conducted activity of a “business”, which term 

includes business, institution, association, 

profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, 

whether or not conducted for profit;

(C) making the record was a regular practice of that 

activity;

(D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony 

of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a 

certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) 

or with a statute permitting certification; and

(E) the opponent does not show that the source of 

information or other circumstances indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness.

Id.
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trustworthiness subject to the opponent rebutting the evidence with any 

other circumstances indicating a lack of trustworthiness.” Bayview Loan 

Servicing LLC, 206 A.3d at 486. The only indicia of untrustworthiness 

suggested by Appellant is that the exhibit was a copy, Keller’s Auto Body no 

longer retained a copy of the estimate, and it was unsigned. That the 

estimate is a copy does not ipso facto render the estimate untrustworthy. 

See Pa.R.E. 1003 (“A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as the 

original unless a genuine question is raised about the original’s authenticity 

or the circumstances make it unfair to admit the duplicate.”). Both Keller 

and Farrell identified Exhibit 4 as the estimate prepared by Keller’s Auto 

Body to repair damage to the car keyed by Appellant. The trial court relied 

upon Keller’s testimony regarding the business practices of Keller’s Auto 

Body with respect to preparation and retention of estimates, including his 

testimony that the practice of the shop was to keep estimates on file for one 

year only and that customers only sign estimates when they agree to have 

Keller’s Auto Body perform the work; his detailed explanation of the form 

and abbreviations used by Keller’s Auto Body; that the estimate was created 

near the time of the incident between Appellant and Farrell; and that Farrell 

identified the estimate as the one he obtained to fix the damage on the car 

he had been driving.

7 N.T., 1/24/2020 at 58. Appellant has not set forth a 

 

7 The date on the copy of the estimate introduced as Exhibit 4 and contained 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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convincing reason as to why the estimate was untrustworthy and why the 

trial court abused its discretion in permitting Keller to testify about the 

estimate. 

Appellant next argues that the trial court erred by permitting Keller to 

testify about the estimate because the estimate was not admitted into 

evidence. Appellant fails to elaborate, and the record plainly shows that the

estimate was admitted into evidence as Commonwealth Exhibit 4. N.T., 

1/24/2020, at 58. (“Therefore, the objection is overruled. Commonwealth’s 

Exhibit 1 and 4 are admitted.”). Accordingly, this argument also affords 

Appellant no relief.8

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

in the certified record is cut off. During Keller’s testimony, the notes of 

transcript reflect that Appellant’s counsel referred to the estimate as being 

dated October 18, 2019. N.T., 1/24/2020, at 54. However, shortly 

thereafter, Appellant’s counsel refers to the estimate as being from 2017. 

Id. at 56. Given that the trial court found that the estimate was prepared 

near the time of the October 12, 2017 incident, and Keller’s testimony that 

the auto body shop likely did not retain the estimate because more than a 

year had passed, the initial reference to the October 18, 2019 date was 

either a misstatement or typographical error. In either event, Appellant does 

not set forth any argument regarding the date of the estimate. 

8 To the extent that Appellant is arguing that the trial court erred by 

permitting Keller to testify about the estimate without publication of the 

estimate to the jury, she has not preserved this claim. Following Keller’s 

testimony, the Commonwealth initially requested to publish the estimate to 

the jury, and defense counsel had no objection based upon the court’s 

overruling of his authentication objection. The trial court took a break to 

consider the request, and the district attorney stated, “I’ll withdraw my 

request to publish if that helps in some way.” Id. at 59. When it came back 

on the record, the court denied the request to publish without explanation. 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In her second issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by 

permitting Keller to testify because the Commonwealth did not disclose its 

intent to call Keller as a witness until trial was already underway. Appellant 

claims this was a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) and 

Pa.R.Crim.P. Rule 573. Appellant’s Brief at 25-26; see also Brady, 373 U.S. 

at 87 (holding that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence 

favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the 

evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 573(B) (setting forth 

rules for mandatory and discretionary pre-trial disclosure by the 

Commonwealth). 

In general, “[t]he Commonwealth is under no obligation to disclose the 

names of all of its witnesses to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Bey, 

439 A.2d 1175, 1179 (Pa. Super. 1982); see also Commonwealth v. 

Woodell, 496 A.2d 1210, 1212-13 (Pa. Super. 1985) (reversing grant of 

sanctions on Commonwealth for failing to disclose witness list and other 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

Appellant requested an explanation, but the trial court informed him its 

ruling was moot because the Commonwealth withdrew the request to publish 

prior to the court making its ruling. Id. at 60. Appellant did not make a 

contemporaneous objection to admission of Keller’s testimony without 

publication of the estimate to the jury at trial, and therefore such claim is 

waived. See Commonwealth v. Tha, 64 A.3d 704, 713 (Pa. Super. 2013) 

(“We have long held that failure to raise a contemporaneous objection to the 

evidence at trial waives that claim on appeal.”) (citation and quotation 

marks omitted).
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information because evidence was not exculpatory, disclosure was not 

mandatory, and defense failed to make specific pre-trial discovery request). 

Appellant fails to elaborate on why the failure to disclose Keller constituted a 

violation of Brady or Rule 573(B). She does not analyze whether Keller’s 

testimony was exculpatory pursuant to Brady. She does not analyze 

whether disclosure of Keller’s testimony was mandatory pursuant to Rule 

573(B)(1). She does not set forth whether she made a pre-trial request for 

identification of witnesses pursuant to Rule 573(B)(2). In short, her 

argument is undeveloped and inadequate to enable appellate review. See 

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (requiring discussion of cited authority); id. at 2119(c), 

(d) (requiring reference to the record and a synopsis of all evidence relevant 

to the point raised). This Court will not act as counsel for an appellant and 

consider issues that are not fully developed in the brief. Commonwealth v. 

Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 970 (Pa. Super. 2006). Accordingly, we conclude 

Appellant has waived her second issue.9 See Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 281 

(finding claim waived where appellant set forth undeveloped argument 

without discussion of and application of relevant legal authority).

 

9 Even if we addressed Appellant’s second issue on the merits, her analysis 

fails to convince us that the trial court’s ruling was an abuse of discretion.

See N.T., 4/6/2020, at 8-9 (ruling that because the Commonwealth 

provided the written estimate containing the name of the body shop to 

Appellant in discovery, the Commonwealth was not required to disclose

separately the identity of Keller, who merely testified as a custodian of 

records in support of the business record exception to the hearsay rule). 
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Appellant’s final issue questions whether the trial court erred or 

abused its discretion by “suggest[ing]” mid-trial it would declare a mistrial if 

the jury found Appellant guilty. Appellant’s Brief at 26. Appellant neglects to 

provide background and merely points our attention to four pages in the trial 

transcript. She summarily claims that the court’s discussion “materially 

impacted counsel’s strategy for trial as [Appellant] may not have testified” 

but for the trial court’s statements. Id.

Appellant’s three-sentence argument is not supported by any legal 

citations or developed analysis of the law as it relates to the record. Once 

again, we conclude her undeveloped argument renders her third issue 

waived.10 Gibbs, 981 A.2d at 281.

 

10 Furthermore, even if we did not find waiver, Appellant’s argument again 

fails to convince us that she is entitled to relief. Appellant’s framing of the 

issue in her concise statement and brief focuses on the trial court’s initial 

statements that it planned to reduce the grading upon a guilty jury verdict, 

not its later decision that the evidence was sufficient for a third-degree 

misdemeanor or its denial of Appellant’s motion for judgment of acquittal. 

The in-court statements by Appellant’s counsel that Appellant “would prefer” 

that the trial court reduce the grading immediately but that counsel “would 

leave it at the court’s discretion” to proceed with the trial fall short of an 

objection to the court’s plan. Although Appellant asserts in her brief that the 

trial court’s initial statements that it planned to reduce the grading upon a 

guilty jury verdict “materially impacted counsel’s strategy for trial” by 

putting Appellant on the stand, Appellant fails to explain how her decision to 

testify related to the trial court’s initial statements, especially given that 

counsel informed the court that Appellant would testify before the trial court 

made the statements. See N.T., 1/24/2020, at 60 (“I plan on calling 

[Appellant].”), 62 (colloquy regarding Appellant’s decision to testify), and 

66-67 (court’s statements at issue). She also fails to explain how she was 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Based on the foregoing, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/28/2021

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

prejudiced by the statements themselves. Accordingly, no relief is due on 

her third issue.