F I L E D

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

September 2, 2005

PATRICK FISHER

Clerk

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

ADRIENNE ANDERSON,

Petitioner,

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

OF LABOR,

Respondent,

---------------------------------------------

METRO WASTEWATER

RECLAMATION DISTRICT

Intervenor - Respondent,

PACE 5-477; PAPER, ALLIEDINDUSTRIAL, CHEMICAL AND

ENERGY WORKERS UNION,

LOCAL 5-477 (PACE),

Amicus Curiae.

No. 03-9570

Appeal from the United States Department of Labor

Administrative Review Board

Lee Katherine Goldstein, Senn, Visciano, Kirschenbaum, P.C., Denver, Colorado

(Susan J. Tyburski, Boyle & Tyburski, Denver, Colorado, with her on the briefs),

for Petitioner.
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Mary J. Rieser, Attorney, (Howard M. Radzely, Solicitor of Labor; Steven J.

Mandel, Associate Solicitor; and Paul L. Frieden, Counsel for Appellate

Litigation, United States Department of Labor, Office of the Solicitor with her on

the briefs), Washington, D.C., for Respondent.

Joel A. Moritz, Richard P. Brentlinger, Robert J. Thomas, Inman, Flynn,

Biesterfeld, Brentlinger & Moritz, P.C., Denver Colorado; Donn C. Meindertsma,

Winston & Strawn LLP, Washington, D.C., filed an answer brief for Intervenor.

Donald S. Holmstrom, Denver, Colorado, filed an amicus curiae brief for Paper,

Allied-Industrial, Chemical & Energy Workers Union, Local 5-477 (PACE).

Before HARTZ, McKAY and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.

O’BRIEN, Circuit Judge.

This is a whistleblower action brought by Adrienne Anderson (Anderson)

against Metro Wastewater Reclamation District (Metro) pursuant to various

environmental statutes which prohibit discrimination against “any employee or

any authorized representative of employees.” Pursuant to the recommendation of

one of Metro’s local unions, the City of Denver’s mayor appointed Anderson to

Metro’s Board of Directors (Board) to represent the citizens of Denver. Anderson

contends that during her tenure on the Board, Metro discriminated against her for

speaking out against its plan to treat the effluent from the Lowry Superfund site

on account of her belief that its effluent contained plutonium and other

radionuclides which Metro was incapable of treating. Among other things,
1

 In 1996, the Secretary of Labor created the ARB to inter alia act for the

Secretary in reviewing decisions of Administrative Law Judges pertaining to the

environmental whistleblower statutes. 61 Fed. Reg. 19,978, 19,978 (May 3,

1996).

2

 All citations to the record in this case refer to the administrative record.

Citations to Metro’s Vol. I, II or III and Anderson’s Vol. III-A, III-B or III-C

refer to the volumes of exhibits which were introduced into evidence at the

administrative hearing before Administrative Law Judge David W. Di Nardi. 

3

 Six of the seven environmental statutes at issue in this case provide for

judicial review of the ARB’s decision in the Circuit Court of Appeals in which

either the complainant resides or transacts business or where the environmental

violation occurred. See 15 U.S.C. § 2622(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1367(b),

1369(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9(i)(3)(A), 5851(c)(1), 6971(b), 6976(b),

7622(c)(1). However, one statute, the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

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Anderson alleges Metro discriminated against her by (1) ruling her out of order

and cutting her off at Board meetings, (2) denying her requests to distribute

materials to other directors and to hold a special Board meeting, (3) threatening

her with censure, (4) accusing her of lying, (5) altering the Board’s meeting

minutes, and (6) leading a campaign to defame her and destroy her professional

reputation. 

We are called upon to determine whether Anderson, as a political appointee

to Metro’s Board, was an “authorized representative of employees” during her

tenure as a Board director. The Administrative Review Board (ARB) of the

United States Department of Labor (DOL)1 concluded she was not and therefore

determined she lacked standing to sue under the employee protection provisions

of the environmental statutes.2 We agree.3
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) vests exclusive jurisdiction in the

federal district courts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9610(b), 9613(b). The ninth circuit

confronted a similar conundrum in Ruud v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 347

F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 2003), a case involving the Clean Air Act and CERCLA. It

concluded:

We hold that the court of appeals should entertain a petition to

review an agency decision made pursuant to the agency’s authority

under two or more statutes, at least one of which provides for direct

review in the courts of appeals, where the petition involves a

common factual background and raises a common legal question. 

Consolidated review of such a petition avoids inconsistency and

conflicts between the district and appellate courts while ensuring the

timely and efficient resolution of administrative cases.

Id. at 1090. See also Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Peña, 17 F.3d 1478, 1481-82

(D.C. Cir. 1994) (review of United States Federal Highway Administration’s

implementing rule). We agree and hold we have jurisdiction to review the merits

of this case in its entirety.

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I. Factual Background

Metro Reclamation District

Metro was created in 1961 by the Metropolitan Sewage Disposal Districts Act,

Colo. Rev. Stat. §§ 32-4-501-547, and is a political subdivision of the State of

Colorado. It provides wholesale wastewater treatment to its members, which consist

of over fifty municipalities and sanitation districts in metropolitan Denver. These

members provide retail wastewater services to their constituents, approximately 1.3

million people.

Metro is governed by a policy-setting Board of Directors (Board). Individual

directors are appointed for a two-year term by the chief executive officers of the
4

 During the relevant time period of this suit, the Board consisted of fiftynine directors. The City of Denver, the largest municipal member, had twenty

directors on the Board, including Anderson.

5

 Due to a merger in 1999, OCAW was succeeded by the Paper, AlliedIndustrial, Chemical and Energy Workers Union (PACE). For purposes of this

opinion, we will continue to refer to the union as OCAW. The union has filed an

amicus curiae brief in support of Anderson.

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member municipalities. The number of directors each member has on the Board is

based on its population.4

The Board holds monthly meetings which are open to the public and run by a

chairman. The Board follows Robert’s Rules of Order and a majority vote is

required for Board action. In addition to the directors, members of Metro’s

management team, including the District Manager and Metro’s legal counsel, are

present at the meetings. The meetings are tape-recorded and action minutes are

prepared from those tapes. The tapes are destroyed once the minutes are approved by

the full Board at the next meeting.

Metro has over 330 employees. Approximately 26-27 of those employees

belong to the Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers Union (OCAW)5 and 140-145

belong to the International Union of Operating Engineers. In 1993, OCAW’s

collective bargaining agreement with Metro expired. Despite numerous negotiations,

a new agreement was not reached until December 1997. Because of the lack of a

contract, the relationship between OCAW and Metro was acrimonious in 1996-1997. 
6

 In 1993, Metro began purchasing farmland in Arapahoe and Elbert

Counties. In 2000, Metro owned 51,000 acres of farmland, growing wheat and

other grains.

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Metro’s Treatment and Pretreatment Process

Metro receives approximately 160,000,000 gallons of wastewater a day from

its members. When the wastewater first enters Metro’s treatment plant, large objects

are screened out. The water is then placed into large settling tanks where heavy

solids settle to the bottom. Bacteria and other micro-organisms are added to the

waste water; these “bugs” eat the organic pollutants and nitrogen in the wastewater.

To kill these “bugs,” chlorine is added to the water; to remove the chlorine, sulphur

dioxide is added. The treated wastewater, called wastewater effluent, is then

discharged pursuant to a state permit into the South Platte River.

During the treatment process, solids, called sludge, are removed. Each day,

Metro’s treatment process produces well over a hundred tons of wastewater sludge.

This sludge is placed into tanks where bugs digest a large quantity of it and disinfect

the remainder. Once disinfected, this sludge, now called bio-solids, is applied as

fertilizer to farmland in eastern Colorado, including Metro’s own farmland.6 Metro

produces between 70 to 80 dry tons of bio-solids each day.

In addition to treating wastewater that comes to it from its members, Metro has

a pretreatment program which regulates the wastewater it receives from industry.

This program is mandated by the Clean Water Act and helps maintain the quality of
7

 A site qualifies as a Superfund site and is placed on the National Priorities

List when it is determined that “there may be an imminent and substantial

endangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an

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Metro’s treatment process and its bio-solids program. Metro’s pretreatment program

requires industries, pursuant to the requirements of a pretreatment permit, to remove

certain pollutants from its wastewater prior to sending it to Metro. In addition to

limiting the pollutants that may enter Metro’s treatment facility, these pretreatment

permits contain monitoring and reporting requirements. Metro enforces these

permits by issuing notices of violation, compliance orders, cease discharge orders

and penalties; a failure to enforce these permits could result in action against Metro

by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Lowry Site and Settlement

The Lowry site consists of 480 acres at the intersection of Quincy Avenue and

Gun Club Road, approximately fifteen miles east of the City and County of Denver.

From about 1940 to 1962, the United States Air Force utilized the Lowry site, as well

as surrounding land, as a bombing range. From 1966 until 1980, the City of Denver

operated part of the Lowry site as a landfill. Over 120 million gallons of liquid

wastes were disposed of in waste pits at the Lowry Landfill. Approximately eight

million tires and thirty-seven million gallons of sewage sludge were also disposed of

at Lowry.

In 1984, the Lowry site was named a Superfund site.7

 It was estimated that it
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a).

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would cost 4.5 billion dollars to clean it up. Over 400 entities were designated as

“potentially responsible parties” (PRP) including Adolf Coors Company, Conoco

Inc., Gates Rubber Company, Rockwell International (Rocky Flats Plant) and Shell

Oil Company. In May 1988, Metro was named a PRP based on its application of

sewage sludge at the site. Subsequently, the EPA issued two administrative orders

requiring several PRP’s, including Metro, to perform remedial investigations and

feasibility studies on Lowry. Pursuant to these orders, Metro, along with several

other PRP’s, formed a coalition, called the Lowry Coalition, to study Lowry and

determine how best to clean it up. Metro contributed over $4,700,000 dollars to

demonstrate it was not a responsible party and to perform its obligations under the

administrative orders. Its efforts to disprove its liability were unsuccessful. Based

solely on the volume of sludge it applied to the Lowry site, Metro was considered a

ten percent contributor, which exposed Metro to 450 million dollars in liability.

Metro attempted to look to its general liability insurance carriers but they denied

coverage, eventually leading to litigation between Metro and its insurers in 1988-89. 

In 1994, the City and County of Denver, Waste Management of Colorado and

Chemical Waste Management, the owners/operators of the Lowry Landfill, sued

Metro and several other PRP’s in the United States District Court for the District of

Colorado seeking contribution to the costs they were incurring in cleaning up
8

 Indeed, in late 2000, Metro stopped the discharge because the effluent

failed a test required by the permit.

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Lowry. In early 1996, as trial was approaching, the parties began settlement

negotiations. Denver, Waste Management and Chemical Waste Management

initially sought $30-35,000,000 to settle the matter with Metro. However, the

parties eventually reached a settlement in June 1996, which required Metro to: (1)

pay $1,900,000; (2) contribute $400,000 to the construction of a sewer line from

Lowry to the City of Aurora’s wastewater system; and (3) treat the effluent from the

Lowry Landfill pursuant to the terms and conditions of a pretreatment permit. 

Under the treatment portion of the agreement, called the Publicly Owned Treatment

Works (POTW) treatment option, Lowry’s wastewater would be pretreated at the

site pursuant to a pretreatment permit, discharged into the City of Aurora’s public

sewer system and Metro’s Sand Creek sewer, and then sent to Metro’s facility for

further treatment. If at any time the Lowry effluent failed to satisfy the standards

set forth in the permit, discharge to Metro would be stopped.8 Metro’s Board

unanimously approved the settlement at a special meeting on June 4, 1996.

Anderson’s Appointment to the Board

In late 1995, seeking the appointment of a director sympathetic to OCAW’s

views, Patricia Farmer and Marilyn Ferrari, OCAW Local’s Chief Steward and Vice

President, respectively, contacted Paul Wishard, the labor liaison for Wellington
9

 In the 1980’s, Anderson had served as a consultant to OCAW

International. In 1994, she served as Special Projects Director for OCAW

International in which she assisted the local union at Metro with its health and

safety concerns and lack of a contract. Due to pregnancy complications,

Anderson left this position.

10 In her letter to the Mayor’s office in which she submitted Anderson’s

resume, Farmer stated:

Please accept the enclosed resume of Adrienne Anderson in

consideration for the open position on the [Metro] Board of

Directors. Ms. Anderson is a recognized expert on environmental

issues and is well versed on matters regarding the Lowery [sic]

Landfill. Considering [Metro’s] position to force the City and

County of Denver into litigation rather than live up to [its] obligation

to clean up the landfill, it seems appropriate that someone be

appointed . . . who will hold [Metro] management accountable on this

matter. Ms. Anderson has also been helpful to [Metro] employees . .

., who are represented by [OCAW], in their fight for a fair contract. 

These employees have been working under an expired contract for

three years while [Metro] management refuses to bargain with the

union over any meaningful contract issues.

As a representative for the Metro OCAW bargaining unit, I have

spoken with Mayor Webb . . . about our struggles. The majority of

our members are taxpayers in the city of Denver and we believe the

Denver Directors have a duty to represent the citizens of this city. 

We hope the appointment of Board members like Adrienne Anderson

will lead to a kinder and gentler District management who will put

people and the environment first.

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Webb, then-mayor of the City of Denver. Wishard suggested they submit the names

and resumes of individuals they wished to see appointed to the Board. Thereafter,

Ferrari called Anderson, asking her whether she would be willing to serve as a

director on the Board.9 Anderson agreed and her name and resume were submitted

for Mayor Webb’s consideration.10 On February 22, 1996, Mayor Webb sent
(Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 4.)

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Anderson a letter appointing her to the Board through June 30, 1998. The letter

informed Anderson her appointment would need to be confirmed by the Denver City

Council and would take approximately one month to process.

Prior to her confirmation hearing, Anderson, believing she needed to “get up

to speed on outstanding issues that the union had expressed concern about,” began

reviewing public records concerning Lowry. (Tr., Nov. 7, 2000 hearing, Vol. II at

274.) Through this initial research, she discovered the United States Army Corp of

Engineers had designated the Lowry site as a catastrophic risk zone, meaning “the

chance of somebody being injured or killed was high, by going out to that territory.” 

(Id.) Because she believed the public was unaware of this and because the building

of subdivisions was being planned for the area, Anderson wrote to then-Colorado

Governor Roy Romer expressing her concern. She also appeared on a Denver radio

talk show program to alert the public to the information she had discovered and to

urge full radiological testing be performed at Lowry.

Confirmation Hearing

In May 1996, Anderson appeared before the Public Works Committee of the

Denver City Council. At the hearing, Donna Good from Mayor Webb’s office

sought the Committee’s confirmation of Anderson as a Metro director and informed

the Committee her appointment had been made pursuant to OCAW’s
11 Anderson’s official appointment paper, signed by Mayor Webb on July 8,

1996, stated:

I, Wellington E. Webb, Mayor of the City of Denver, Colorado, by

virtue of the authority vested in me by law, do hereby appoint

Adrienne Anderson as the City of Denver’s representative on the

Board of Directors of Metro Wastewater Reclamation District, to

serve a term of two years . . ., beginning July 1, 1996, and ending

June 30, 1998, in accordance with the laws of the State of Colorado

and the By-laws of the Metro Wastewater Reclamation District.

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recommendation. After Anderson answered the committee’s questions, she was

informed her confirmation would go before the full city council at its next weekly

meeting. Anderson expected to be on the Board by June. However, at the next city

council meeting, Councilman Ted Hackworth, also a Metro Board director, raised

objections to Anderson’s confirmation and wanted to personally question her.

Therefore, in June 1996, Anderson appeared again before the Public Works

Committee.

There, Hackworth questioned Anderson’s association with OCAW and

environmental groups. As to her union association, he questioned whether it

presented a conflict of interest. Anderson explained her past associations and

informed Hackworth her position on the Board would be to craft solutions which are

protective of worker health and safety but also cost effective. Satisfied with her

answers, Hackworth voted for Anderson’s confirmation and she was unanimously

confirmed by the entire City Council.11
(Metro’s Vol. II, Ex. 30.) Anderson testified she believed the “odd” delay in her

confirmation to the Board was to prevent her from being on the Board at the time

it approved the Lowry settlement, what she refers to as the “secret deal[].” (Tr.,

Nov. 8, 2000 hearing, Vol. III at 589-90, 591.)

12 This attorneys’ fee request related to the litigation between Metro and its

insurance carriers.

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Anderson’s Research Prior to First Board Meeting

Before attending her first Board meeting as a director, Anderson received a

package of introductory materials and the meeting agenda. She noticed an item on

the agenda was the approval of approximately $100,000 in attorneys’ fees related to

Lowry.12 Also prior to her first meeting, Anderson had lunch with then-Chairman of

the Board, Richard Plastino, who informed her of the Lowry settlement and what it

generally entailed. Thereafter, she continued her research on Lowry, discovering

that Metro had at one time refused to accept the Lowry effluent and that radioactive

waste had been disposed of at the site.

Anderson’s First Board Meeting

On July 16, 1997, immediately preceding her first Board meeting, Anderson

attended a dinner with the Denver directors at Gaetano’s restaurant. Anderson

brought with her some documents she uncovered in her research which indicated the

presence of radionuclides at Lowry. She informed the other directors of her

concerns and offered to share the documents with them. One of the directors, John

Wilder, became very angry and (according to Anderson) slammed down his fork and
13 Hackworth testified he never attended any dinner where Anderson was

present.

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yelled at her. Thereafter, Wilder, Hackworth and Robert Werner allegedly stood up

and left.13 Directors Al Levin and Steven Foute, also a new director, were shocked

at the treatment Anderson received. Director Foute informed them he would make a

motion at the Board meeting to have the EPA brief the Board on the Lowry

treatment plan.

Later that evening, at the Board meeting, Anderson was sworn in as a

director. District Manager Robert Hite testified that when Anderson introduced

herself, she stated she was there to correct the mistakes they were making at Lowry

and that if she had been on the Board, the Lowry settlement would never have been

reached. Director Levin recalled Anderson introducing herself and indicating she

was appointed by the Denver City Council and Mayor’s office to represent the

concerns and welfare of Metro employees. Chairman Plastino testified Anderson

informed everyone she was appointed to represent environmental interests. Other

individuals present at the meeting testified they thought Anderson was arrogant and

aggressive, especially considering she was a new director. Anderson did not recall

making any introductory statements at her first meeting. However, she did perceive

a cool attitude towards her by certain Board members.

As planned, Director Foute moved to have the EPA brief the Board on Lowry
14 Although Anderson testified Foute made this motion at her first Board

meeting, the meeting minutes show this motion was not made until her second

Board meeting on August 20, 1996. The minutes also reveal Plastino stated he

was open to having the EPA and Colorado Department of Health speak directly to

the Board but wanted Metro personnel to initially sponsor an informational

meeting. Hite stated he was willing to commit Metro’s staff to “all the time it

takes to bring everybody up to speed” on Lowry. (Board’s Aug. 20, 1996 meeting

minutes at 14.)

15 The Board has four standing committees: (1) Future Programs, (2)

Operations, (3) Budget/Finance and (4) Personnel. Each of these committees has

its own chairman and holds monthly meetings. The Board also has an Executive

committee which is composed of the four officers of the Board (Chairman,

Chairman Pro Tem, Secretary and Treasurer), the chairpersons of each standing

committee, and five other members appointed by the Board’s chairman. Except

for the Executive committee, which has limited spending authority, these

committees may only make recommendations to the full Board; they may not take

action on behalf of the Board.

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and Anderson seconded the motion. According to Anderson, Chairman Plastino

stated such briefing was unnecessary because Metro staff could provide such

information.14

Anderson’s First Operations Committee meeting

Anderson was appointed to serve on the Board’s Operations standing

committee.15 At that time, Hackworth was the committee’s chairman. At her first

Operations committee meeting on August 8, 1996, Anderson felt the same cool

reception towards her that she had felt at her first Board meeting. During the

meeting, Anderson requested to go into an executive session in order to discuss the

information she had discovered in her research regarding Lowry. Allegedly,

Hackworth angrily banged his gavel and ruled her out of order. Hackworth testified
16 This incident is not addressed in the August 8, 1996 Operation committee

meeting minutes. Anderson refers to this omission as an example of Metro’s

falsification/alteration of Board minutes.

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he merely informed Anderson the Lowry decision had been made by the Board and

therefore it was inappropriate to discuss it further.16 After that meeting, Anderson

learned that at the prior month’s Operations committee meeting, Hackworth had told

another director that Anderson had lied at her confirmation hearing. In response to

hearing this, Anderson wrote Hackworth a letter, seeking an apology. Hackworth

replied to the letter, indicating he merely told the other director that if Anderson

represented OCAW or environmental extremists, then she had lied to him at her

confirmation hearing.

August 20, 1996 Board Meeting

On August 20, 1996, Don Holmstrom, then-President of OCAW Local, wrote

a letter, with Anderson’s assistance, to Marc Herman of the EPA, requesting a

public comment period be held on the decision to have Metro treat the Lowry

effluent. On that same date, employees of Metro’s laboratory and members of

OCAW conducted an informational picket at the Board meeting, distributing

Holmstrom’s letter. The next day, Plastino telephoned Anderson, informing her he

had received a number of calls from other Board members concerning their belief

that she was a “whacko” and that she had told the employees about the Lowry

settlement. He also informed her they were concerned about her having conducted a
17 Prior to attending this public hearing, Anderson had informed the

Operations committee that she was conducting an extensive review of the Lowry

matter and would be making public statements concerning her findings.

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Colorado Open Records Act (CORA) request while representing herself as a Board

member. Anderson admitted she had told the workers about Lowry, reminding

Plastino she had been put on the Board to represent the workers, and stated she had

made CORA requests in an effort to educate herself about Lowry.

Anderson’s Appearance at EPA Public Hearing

The EPA issued its Record of Decision (ROD) concerning the clean-up of

Lowry on March 10, 1994. The 1994 ROD called for onsite treatment of Lowry’s

wastewater. Because Metro’s agreement to treat the Lowry effluent offsite altered

the 1994 ROD, the EPA issued an “Explanation of Significant Differences” and held

a public comment period from March 24, 1997, to April 22, 1997. On April 2,

1997, Anderson attended a public comment hearing held by the EPA.17

There, Anderson spoke, introducing herself as follows:

My name is Adrienne Anderson. I’m a [B]oard member of the Metro

Wastewater Reclamation District appointed by Mayor Webb of Denver,

which owns the landfill, and I also teach environmental ethics at the

University of Colorado at Boulder.

(Metro’s Vol. I, Ex. 2 at 35.) During her comments, Anderson noted several times

she was a Board member and called for rejection of Metro’s proposed treatment of

the Lowry effluent, claiming it contained plutonium and other radionuclides.
18 Levin introduced himself as follows:

My name is Al Levin. I’m a director at the Metro Wastewater

Reclamation Agency. And I’m here as a concerned citizen,

concerned with the health, safety and welfare of everybody that is

here today and the community at large.

(Metro’s Vol. I, Ex. 2 at 50.)

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Director Al Levin also appeared at the hearing, voicing his concerns.18

Thereafter, on April 9, 1997, Plastino issued a memo to the Board’s directors.

In this memo, he indicated two directors had spoken out against Metro’s plan to

treat the Lowry effluent. While recognizing that the two directors did not claim to

be speaking on the Board’s behalf, Plastino stated “they failed to make a disclaimer

that they were not speaking for or representing the Board.” (Metro’s Vol. I, Ex. 4.) 

He stated that while every director has the right to voice his or her opinion, the

Board’s by-laws provide that the chairman shall be the general spokesperson for the

Board and every director has the obligation to state he or she is not speaking on

behalf of Metro or the Board. To avoid further misrepresentations and to correct

any misrepresentation that may have resulted, Plastino urged the Board to adopt a

proposed resolution reaffirming its position on Lowry and the by-laws’ designation

of the chairman as the Board’s spokesperson.

At the next Board meeting on April 15, 1997, discussion was held on

Plastino’s proposed resolution. Anderson objected to the resolution. She stated she
19 This letter, referred to as the April 16, 1997 letter, was also sent to Hite,

the Executive committee and Joel Moritz, Metro’s legal counsel. Contrary to

Anderson’s assertions during the administrative proceedings, it was not circulated

to the entire Board.

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clearly expressed at the EPA meeting that she held a minority position on the Board

and did not represent the Board. She further expressed her concern that the Lowry

waste stream included plutonium and neither the Lowry on-site treatment plant nor

Metro’s treatment facility had the capability of removing radionuclides. She then

moved to amend the resolution to include language that the Board was fully

informed that the Lowry waste stream contained plutonium and other man-made

radionuclides. Her motion failed. Plastino’s proposed resolution passed with only

two “no” votes, one of which was cast by Anderson, with the caveat that she did

support the by-law’s designation of the chairman as the Board’s spokesperson.

The next day, Plastino issued a letter to Anderson and Levin, indicating the

full Board had passed a resolution re-affirming its position on Lowry and the bylaws’ designation of the chairman as general spokesperson for the Board.19 Plastino

also informed them that if they continued to express their personal opinions related

to Metro without giving a proper disclaimer, “there [was] a potential that the Board .

. . will censure you.” (Metro’s Vol. I, Exs. 6, 7.) Anderson testified she interpreted

this letter as “an attempt at intimidation. That they were attempting to curb my

rights to speak out on this. I was upset that they were trying to isolate me further on
20 Plastino suggested the following disclaimer:

I would like to state that I am not speaking on behalf of the Metro

Wastewater Reclamation District, and the views expressed are my

own personal opinions and not those of the Metro District.

(Metro’s Vol. I, Ex. 10.) Plastino was instructed by the Executive committee to

draft this letter. Prior to receiving it, Anderson became aware Plastino would be

issuing the letter and made a motion at the May 20, 1997 Board meeting that any

issue concerning disclaimers should be referred to the By-Laws Review

committee. Plastino refused to entertain the motion, preferring to answer any

questions once the letter was issued.

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the Board . . . and I felt trivialized, that I would be subject to a letter telling me

what I should say. I felt that [they were] treating me like a child. . . .” (Tr., Nov. 7,

2000 hearing, Vol. II at 366.) In response to Anderson’s belief that she had made a

proper disclaimer, Plastino issued another letter to her on May 20, 1997, informing

her he did not believe she made a proper disclaimer and suggesting one for her.20

May 1997 Board Meeting

Before the May 1997 meeting, Director Levin provided Anderson with a

memorandum which Hite allegedly circulated to all of the Board’s directors except

Anderson. Attached to this memo was a verbatim transcript of an interview

Anderson conducted on a Boulder radio station on May 14, 1997, concerning her

belief that Metro’s treatment of the Lowry effluent would result in plutonium-laced

biosolids being used as fertilizer in eastern Colorado. Anderson interpreted the

memo as a “way for [Hite] to attempt to get the [B]oard concerned and upset about
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the fact that I was continuing to speak out on [the Lowry] issue.” (Tr., Nov. 8, 2000

hearing, Vol. III at 439.) On May 30, 1997, Hite also sent a letter to Denver

Councilman William Himmelmann concerning the campaign “being waged by a

small number of people” against Metro’s proposal to treat the Lowry effluent. 

(Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 55 at 1.) Attached to the letter was a fact sheet

addressing several specific allegations and the scientific and factual information

countering them. This fact sheet was distributed to the Board at the May 1997

hearing; Anderson claims she was not allowed to distribute material at this same

meeting.

The “Smoking Gun”

In June 1997, Anderson uncovered a letter from the Lowry Coalition, dated

December 13, 1991, to the EPA Director of Region VIII, in which it objected to the

EPA reaching any type of settlement with the Department of Energy or any other

entity associated with the Rocky Flats Plant regarding Lowry because “[t]he

information and data . . . demonstrates that man-made radionuclides which only

could have originated from the Rocky Flats Plant are present in significant

quantities at Lowry Landfill.” (Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 28 at 1.) The

information concerning the presence of man-made radionuclides at the Lowry site

was based on a study Harding Lawson Associates had performed at the site. Upon

learning of the document, Anderson informed members of OCAW staff; they were
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shocked and outraged. Thereafter, Anderson and the OCAW held a news

conference at the Metro plant site concerning the Lowry Coalition’s December 13,

1991 letter, which was later referred to as “the smoking gun” during the

administrative proceedings. (Tr., Nov. 8, 2000 hearing, Vol. III at 453-54.)

June 1997 Board Meeting

At the June 17, 1997 Board meeting, the Board suspended the rules to allow

for a public forum. During this forum, residents from eastern Colorado and

representatives of OCAW appeared. In addition to voicing concerns about Metro’s

proposed treatment of the Lowry effluent, individuals raised concerns regarding

Metro’s non-tax paying status, erosion, and the deterioration of the roads used by

Metro’s trucks. Metro’s management briefly responded to these concerns at the

forum and followed up with a more detailed letter dated June 27, 1997.

Anderson’s Request for Special Meeting

On June 25, 1997, Anderson authored a letter to Beverly McAdam, Metro’s

staff assistant, seeking a special Board meeting. She asked McAdam to mail out her

request for a special meeting and a packet of materials to all Board members. This

packet of materials contained evidence that the Lowry site contained plutonium

(including the December 13, 1991 Lowry Coalition letter) and information she had

received from two employees who accused
21 These two employees, Delwin Andrew and Anthony Broncucia, were

terminated in 1997, along with two other individuals, for falsification of records

(falsely punching time cards for other employees) and dishonesty. They contacted

Anderson believing she could assist them in getting their jobs back because they

had heard Anderson represented the workers. They informed Anderson that

Metro had offered to reinstate two of the four fired employees if their union, the

International Union of Operating Engineers, would endorse Metro’s treatment of

the Lowry effluent. Hite admitted that Jose Padilla, a member of Metro’s Human

Resources Department, had approached Jim Smolynsky, the Business Agent for

the Operating Engineers’ Local Union at Metro, with a “deal” whereby two of the

four terminated employees would get their jobs back if the Operating Engineers

wrote a letter to the EPA supporting Metro’s position on Lowry. Hite testified

Padilla acted without his knowledge and was orally reprimanded.

22 The Board’s by-laws state: “Special meetings shall be called by the

Chairman of the Board, whenever, in his opinion, such a meeting is necessary or

desirable, or whenever the same is requested in writing by 20 percent or more of

the members of the Board.” (Metro’s Vol. I, Ex. 1 at 2.)

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 Metro of blackmail.21 This information was mailed out to all directors. Enclosed

with the mailing was a memorandum issued by Chairman Plastino, stating that as

chairman he would not be calling a special meeting and would recommend against

such a meeting.22 Plastino testified he recommended against holding a special

meeting because he believed it was unnecessary as the Lowry issue had already been

settled by the Board. Because it failed to garner the necessary support from the

other directors, Anderson’s request for a special meeting was denied. Based on this

denial, Anderson drafted a letter concerning her allegations and attempted to

distribute it at the July 1997 Board meeting. Her attempts to pass it out were not

well-received. Anderson alleges directors threw it in the trash and one director
23 There was also testimony that Anderson, with Ferrari’s assistance, had

attempted at other meetings to pass out documents. Allegedly, directors threw

these documents at Anderson. Both Ferrari and Anderson admitted they did not

have permission to distribute these documents during the meeting.

-24-

stated “I never read anything she distributes” and “[s]he can go to hell.”23 (Tr.,

Nov. 8, 2000 hearing, Vol. III at 484.) She claims no one censured this director and

in fact, Hite laughed.

Anderson’s Tape-Recording of Meetings

At the July 3, 1997 Operations committee meeting, Anderson brought a tape

recorder and attempted to record the meeting. Hackworth made her turn off the

recorder. A general discussion was had and a vote was taken, the majority opposing

Anderson tape-recording the meeting.

On July 15, 1997, Anderson issued a memorandum to Hackworth alleging

certain errors and misrepresentations in the July 3, 1997 Operations committee

meeting minutes including the omission of her request for a roll call vote on

whether she could record the meeting and Hackworth’s refusal to hold such vote. 

At the next Operations committee meeting in August, Hackworth addressed the

memo, reiterating that meeting minutes are not verbatim. After discussing the

alleged distortion of the July 3 meeting minutes, the majority of the committee voted

not to amend them. At this meeting, there was also discussion concerning the

recording of meetings. Hackworth stated the By-Laws Review committee would be
24 Anderson subsequently did a CORA request to listen to the tapes of

certain meetings of committees of which she was not a member. She listened to a

By-Laws Review committee meeting and an Executive committee meeting. She

claimed that during both meetings there was a discussion about how to prevent

her from being able to tape record future meetings. Allegedly, these committees

admitted they would not object if anybody else was tape-recording meetings but

were concerned about Anderson taping them.

-25-

addressing the tape-recording of meetings. In any event, Anderson was allowed to

tape record the meeting.24 On December 16, 1997, the by-laws were amended; the

amendments contained a specific provision that meetings could be recorded. 

Anderson’s CORA request

On July 9, 1997, Anderson made a CORA request to Metro regarding whether

Metro was receiving wastes from any other Superfund sites. Anderson testified she

asked for this information because the workers had concerns about it. She stated

she felt she had to obtain this information through CORA because she did not

believe Metro would have voluntarily provided her with the information based on

the reactions she received at meetings. On July 11, 1997, Betty Anne Trampe,

Metro’s Records Management Administrator, responded to the request, indicating

Metro was currently receiving wastes from two Superfund sites. Trampe informed

her documents concerning those sites would be available for her to review and

copies would be provided to her “upon payment of 25 cents per page, consistent

with the provisions of [CORA].” (Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 74.) Anderson stated

other directors did not appear to have to pay for copies and Metro could have
25 Hite testified Anderson had asked him for information concerning

whether Metro treated other Superfund site waste at the July 3, 1997 Operations

committee meeting. Hite informed her it did. When Anderson asked for records

concerning those sites, Hite stated he would make them available for her. Before

he was able to retrieve the records from archives, he received Anderson’s July 9

CORA request. Because Anderson made a CORA request, Hite was required to

treat her request like any other CORA request by a citizen, including charging her

for it. He admits he “joked around” about having to charge her. (Tr., Nov. 16,

2000 hearing, Vol. VII at 1412.) He testified that had she allowed him to comply

with her initial request, he would have provided her the information free of

charge.

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responded to her request stating she had a right to the documents without having to

proceed through CORA. She also testified Hite joked about the fact Metro was

billing her for copies.25

“Public Relations War”

After over a year of the Board refusing to listen to her, Anderson took her

opposition to Metro’s treatment of the Lowry effluent and her beliefs that plutonium

and other radionuclides were present at Lowry directly to the media. Between April

23, 1997, and July 24, 1997, she was quoted in several Colorado newspapers,

including the Colorado Daily, the Boulder Weekly, the Boulder Daily Camera and

the Westward, as well as in In These Times, a national publication based in

Chicago, Illinois. In June 1997, Anderson was interviewed by Moneyline, a CNN

television program, for an investigative series concerning the EPA’s policy allowing

sewage sludge to be used as fertilizer. As part of that series, Moneyline focused on

Metro’s plan to treat Lowry’s wastewater and to use the resulting sludge as fertilizer
26 During her tenure on the Board, Anderson was an instructor in the

Environmental Studies Program and Ethic Studies Department at the University of

Colorado.

27 Metro’s Public Information Officer, Steve Frank, testified he and Metro

management decided to take a “low key” approach in response to Anderson’s

statements to the media. (Tr., Nov. 14, 2000 hearing, Vol. V at 890.) He stated:

“Basically, what [we decided] to do is talk about the facts. We [were] not going

to talk about her. We [were] not going to use her name.” (Id.)

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in eastern Colorado. Anderson videotaped this series and presented it to her

students at the University of Colorado,26 Metro employees, OCAW members and the

public.

In response to Anderson taking her concerns public, Metro began its own

“campaign” to defend its position on Lowry by issuing fact sheets, news releases

and letters to the community to educate it about Lowry.27 In addition to distributing

his May 30, 1997 letter to Councilman Himmelmann to the media, Hite authored a

letter on July 23, 1997, to “Interested Parties,” including OCAW officials,

government officials, Metro employees and eastern Colorado residents, addressing

the December 13, 1991 Lowry Coalition Letter. In this letter, Hite stated that a

report by Doty & Associates, dated August 10, 1992, refuted the findings by

Harding Lawson Associates of the presence of radioactivity at Lowry. Specifically,

the Doty & Associates report questioned the science and validity of the Harding

Lawson Associates’ findings and indicated radionuclides “are, at best, questionably

present, and more likely not present at the Lowry Landfill above ‘background’
-28-

levels.” (Metro’s Vol. II, Ex. 43 at 1) (quotations omitted). Metro also sent a

memorandum to Colorado Water Quality professionals alerting them to the

Moneyline program. In this memorandum, Metro asserted its proposed treatment of

the Lowry effluent was protective of the public health and environment. It also

discounted Anderson’s belief that plutonium was present at the Lowry site, stating

“[s]he is not telling the truth, but she is getting her message to the media.” 

(Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 108.)

EPA Approves Lowry Plan

On October 28, 1997, Metro issued a press release informing the public that

the EPA had approved Metro’s plan to treat the Lowry effluent. In this release both

Hite and Steve Pearlman, Director of Metro’s Regulatory & Connector Relations

Department, stated the plan would pose no risk to the public or environment. The

Colorado Department of Health also gave its approval.

Anderson’s Failure to be Re-Appointed to the Board

During the remainder of her term on the Board, Anderson continued to speak

out, both publically and at Board meetings, against Metro’s plan to treat the Lowry

effluent. Anderson’s appointment to the Board expired in June 1998. Anderson

sought reappointment but Mayor Webb did not reappoint her. Anderson believed

her failure to be reappointed was due to her having unveiled the Lowry plan to the

public and her rejection of it. After not being reappointed to the Board, Anderson
28 Earlier, OCAW International had provided Anderson with $5,000 to

assist her in her whistleblower proceedings in gratitude for her “persistent

dedication” in looking out for the interests of OCAW-Local as a Board member. 

(Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 71.)

29 Pearlman testified that the risk associated with radionuclides is their

potential to cause cancer in humans. Pearlman stated that the EPA’s allowable

standard of radionuclides in drinking water is “a level that allows one additional

-29-

was retained by OCAW Local as a part-time consultant to continue to work to block

the Lowry plan. In May 1998, OCAW presented Anderson with an award in

recognition for her work on behalf of Metro workers.

28

July 1999 Lowry Pretreatment Permit

Once the Lowry settlement was reached, Pearlman and other individuals in

Metro’s pretreatment department began to develop a draft pretreatment permit for

the Lowry site. On November 13, 1998, Metro issued its draft permit which limited

fifty-three chemicals and fifteen radionuclides. It also imposed monitoring

requirements on the Lowry operators, including the monitoring of pollutants not

limited by the permit in the event they became present. Metro was also to monitor

all parts of the Lowry treatment plan eight times a year. Metro accepted public

comments on the draft permit for thirty days. After receiving comments from fortythree individuals and groups, including Anderson, Metro published a responsive

summary in June 1999. As a result of the public’s comments, Metro made thirteen

changes to the permit, the most significant being a substantial lowering of allowable

radionuclides Metro would receive from Lowry.29 The final permit was issued on
cancer case per million of population over a 70 year life time.” (Tr., Nov. 15,

2000 hearing, Vol. VI at 1158.) He stated the draft permit established a limit for

plutonium ten times more restrictive than the EPA standard for drinking water.

Due to public concern, the final permit limited plutonium to allow for a cancer

risk of one in one billion over a seventy year life time.

30 James Gilman, President of OCAW Local at the time of the press

conference, testified OCAW’s lawsuit against Metro was filed in February 2000

and the press conference took place in March 2000. However, according to a

statement Gilman made on April 19, 2000, OCAW sued Metro on April 14, 2000.

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July 14, 1999, effective August 1, 1999. However, Metro did not begin to treat the

Lowry effluent until July 2000.

April 2000 Press Conference

On April 14, 2000, OCAW sued Metro and others seeking an injunction “on

behalf of the lab employees of [Metro] who are represented members of [OCAW]”

against Metro’s plan to treat the Lowry effluent. (Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 93.)

On April 18, 2000, OCAW held a news conference at the Metro facility which

Anderson attended.30 Steve Frank, Metro’s Public Information Officer, testified he

first learned of the conference when individuals from the media appeared in Metro’s

lobby inquiring about it. Frank stated no permission was either sought or given to

hold the conference. He admitted he was angry and confronted Anderson, informing

her she had no permission to be there. Nevertheless, Anderson continued to hold

the press conference.

On April 26, 2000, twenty-one Metro laboratory employees belonging to

OCAW authored a letter to OCAW Local President James Gilman, informing him
-31-

they were unaware of the litigation filed on their behalf to enjoin Metro’s treatment

of the Lowry effluent until they read about it in the newspaper. They further stated

they were “confident about the safety issues involved, and [were] willing to treat

groundwater from the Lowry Superfund site.” (Metro’s Vol. II, Ex. 54.) In

conclusion, they stated they did not support OCAW’s actions regarding Lowry and

“[felt] that this issue [was] supportive of the personal agenda of Adrienne Anderson,

and we do not wish to be associated with this fight, nor do we wish to fund this

campaign with our union funds.” (Id.) These employees also issued a letter to the

editor of the Denver Rocky Mountain News expressing a similar sentiment. On

December 20, 2000, a majority of the OCAW union members at Metro voted to decertify OCAW as its collective bargaining agent.

II. Procedural Background

On May 2, 1997, in response to receiving Chairman Plastino’s April 16, 1997

letter threatening her with censure, Anderson filed a pro se complaint against Metro

with the DOL alleging Metro retaliated against her for engaging in protected

activities in violation of the employee protection provisions of seven environmental

statutes: the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability

Act (CERCLA), the Solid Waste Disposal Act (SWDA), the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act (FWPCA), the Energy Restoration Act of 1974 (ERA), the Safe

Drinking Water Act (SDWA), the Clean Air Act (CAA) and the Toxic Substances
31 In her formal statement of charges to Monica Oba, a DOL investigator,

Anderson also complained concerning (1) Hackworth’s accusations that she had

lied at her confirmation hearing, (2) the Board’s attempts to silence her at her

first regular Board meeting, (3) Hackworth angrily ruling her out of order when

she requested to go into executive session at her first Operations committee

meeting, (4) the treatment she received at Gaetano’s restaurant, (5) Plastino’s

telephone call raising other directors’ concerns about her, and (6) the alleged

altering of the Board’s meeting minutes.

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Control Act (TSCA). Specifically, she alleged Metro took the following actions

against her in retaliation for her protected activities: (1) circulating to the Board

Plastino’s April 9, 1997 memorandum containing “unfounded accusations and

insinuations of impropriety,” (2) holding secret sessions of two of the Board’s

committees in her absence and without her knowledge, and (3) sending her the April

16, 1997 letter threatening her with censure. (Anderson’s May 2, 1997 Complaint at

3.) She sought rescission of the “offending threats,” declaratory relief, and “[a]ny

other damages that may be related to this claim, in order to make [her] whole and

protect [her] capacity to advocate for the workers [she] was designated to represent,

as well as the wider public on environmental health and safety issues.” (Id. at 4.)31

On June 6, 1997, David Decker, Regional Supervisory Investigator for the

Occupational Safety and Health Administration of the DOL, upheld Anderson’s

claims under the whistleblower provisions of the CERCLA, FWPCA and SWDA but

made no findings on her claims under the other statutes. Decker determined Metro

had discriminated against Anderson by issuing “intimidating and threatening letters”
32 Anderson retained counsel on August 5, 1997, and continues to be

represented by an attorney.

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as a result of her “protected activities,” failing to “accurately reflect concerns and

comments made by [Anderson] in public records of meetings held by the Board,”

and refusing to “hear motions for amendments which [Anderson] made.” (Letter

from David Decker to Joel Moritz dated June 6, 19907 at 1.) Decker ordered Metro

to publically rescind the April 16 and May 20, 1997 letters and to make clear in the

public record that Metro and its Board cannot discriminate against employees and

their representatives for participation in activities protected by the CERCLA,

FWPCA and SWDA.

Both Metro and Anderson appealed. Anderson did not appeal OSHA’s failure

to make findings under the SDWA, CAA or TSCA but did appeal “the questions of

remedy and relief” and the “denial” of her claim under the ERA. (Letter from

Anderson to Chief ALJ dated June 12, 1997.) Metro appealed “[a]ll adverse

findings and determinations.” (Letter from Joel Moritz to Chief ALJ dated June 11,

1997.) The matter was referred to Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Samuel J.

Smith.

On appeal to ALJ Smith, Metro filed a Motion for Summary Decision, arguing

Anderson lacked standing as an “authorized representative of employees” under the

CERCLA, FWPCA and SWDA. Anderson opposed the motion.32 In support of her
-34-

standing as an “authorized representative of employees,” she attached her own

affidavit as well as affidavits from Ferrari and Holmstrom. On February 19, 1998,

ALJ Smith granted Metro’s motion. He concluded Anderson had failed to provide

any evidence supporting her assertion she was the “authorized representative” of

Metro employees or the OCAW. Specifically, he stated Anderson had produced no

correspondence between herself and OCAW or the Mayor’s office in support of her

claimed representative status or any documentation establishing when and how she

became an authorized representative. Anderson appealed to the Administrative

Review Board (ARB).

On March 30, 2000, the ARB reversed ALJ Smith’s decision and remanded

the case for further proceedings. The ARB first addressed the meaning of

“authorized representative” under the CERCLA, FWPCA and SWDA, determining it

encompassed “any person requested by any employee or group of employees to

speak or act for the employee or group of employees in matters within the coverage

of the environmental whistleblower statutes . . . .” (ARB’s May 30, 2000 Decision

& Remand Order at 7-8.) It further stated that “an individual selected by a union

representing employees covered by the whistleblower protection provisions to speak

or act for the union (and by extension the employees) in matters within the purview

of the environmental statutes . . . is also protected . . . .” (Id. at 8.) Based on the

affidavits of Anderson, Ferrari and Holmstrom, the ARB determined there was a
33 As we discuss below, the ERA, unlike the CERCLA, SWDA, and

FWPCA, limits relief to employees only.

34 ALJ Smith had retired.

35 This allegation was based on Hackworth’s testimony at the hearing that

he had expressed to someone in the Mayor’s office that he hoped Anderson was

not reappointed to the Board. 

36 In support of this allegation, Anderson points to a number of e-mails and

documents in which Frank accuses Anderson of lying. She also points to his

testimony that he provided a fact sheet to Denver Post editor Al Knight which

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genuine issue of material fact as to whether Anderson was an “authorized

representative.” Therefore, it remanded the case for a trial on the merits. As to the

ERA, noting the difference between its statutory language and the other three

statutes,33 the ARB directed the parties on remand to brief, and the ALJ to resolve,

whether Anderson fell within its coverage.

On remand, the case was assigned to ALJ David W. Di Nardi34 and a seven

day hearing was held on November 6-8 and 13-16, 2000. After the hearing,

Anderson filed a second and third whistleblower complaint under all seven

environmental statutes based on alleged retaliatory conduct occurring subsequent to

the hearing. The second complaint, filed on December 15, 2000, alleged Metro

“acted to remove [her] from the [Metro Board] as a workers’ representative after

[she] engaged in protected activity”35 and “acted to defame [her] and . . . destroy

[her] professional reputation in an organized campaign . . . to [Metro employees],

members of the media, state and government officials, legislators and others.”36
resulted in an article by Knight on Easter Sunday 1999. In this article, Knight

states “Given Adrienne Anderson’s record for accuracy it is a wonder that anyone

still listens to this self-appointed ‘environmental activist.’” (Anderson’s Vol. IIIA, Ex. 88.) Anderson claims Frank “set up” Knight to write this article. 

(Anderson’s Vol. III-C, Anderson Aff. ¶ 62.) Anderson also claims Hackworth

defamed her outside the Board, referring to his statement in a July 1997 Westward

article that she is a “troublemaker” who “hurls charges without much validity.”

(Anderson’s Vol III-A, Ex. 66.) Anderson alleges that despite not making a

specific disclaimer in this article that he was not speaking on the Board’s behalf,

Hackworth was not censored or reprimanded by the Board.

37 Anderson alleges Metro’s new rules pertaining to public inspection of

documents made it more difficult for her to obtain information by prohibiting the

use of her own recording equipment, increasing the price of copies from 25 cents

to $1.25 per page, restricting record review to Tuesdays and Thursdays, the days

she teaches classes at the University of Colorado, and requiring her to be

monitored during her review of documents.

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(Anderson’s Dec. 15, 2000 Whistleblower Complaint at 2.) The third complaint,

filed on January 5, 2001, asserted: (1) Frank falsely testified that Metro had not

hired any outside public relations agent and that there were no statements

concerning Anderson in the package of materials he submitted for an award he

received from the Water Environment Federation (WEF), (2) Frank failed to produce

several incriminating documents pursuant to Anderson’s subpoena, (3) Metro altered

its policy allowing access to its public records in direct response to and retaliation

for Anderson’s attempts to obtain health and safety information in 1999 and greatly

restricted her ability to obtain information under CORA,37 (4) Metro circulated false

and defamatory materials concerning Anderson to its workers which resulted in

OCAW employees denouncing their support for her in their April 26, 2000 letter
38 This allegation concerns the materials Frank submitted to the WEF, for

which he won an award. Anderson asserts these materials included defamatory

statements about her.

39 ALJ Di Nardi allowed the parties to conduct additional discovery

concerning Anderson’s second and third whistleblower complaints. However, no

additional hearing was held; all evidence concerning these additional complaints

was presented via affidavits and deposition testimony.

40 ALJ Di Nardi found Metro had taken the following adverse actions

against Anderson based on her protected activities: “(a) cutting her off or ruling

her out of order during Board meetings; (b) keeping her from voting on the Lowry

settlement by delaying her confirmation by the City Council until June 1996; (c)

ordering her off Metro property in March 2000 when she appeared for a press

conference to voice her concerns about the Lowry settlement; (d) denying her

requests to distribute material concerning the Lowry Landfill to the Metro Board

or to put this issue on the Metro Board agenda; (e) denying her June 25, 1997

request for a special Board meeting to investigate public and worker health and

safety concerns raised by Metro employees; (f) forcing her to make Open Records

Act requests for information, and then charging her for such information; (g)

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which Anderson alleges Metro asked its employees to sign, and (5) Metro led an

“award winning” campaign of libel and slander to the media, elected officials and

others in an effort to destroy Anderson’s credibility and professional reputation.38

(Anderson’s Jan. 5, 2001 Whistleblower Complaint at 2-3.) These two complaints

were consolidated with her May 2, 1997 complaint.39

On September 18, 2001, ALJ Di Nardi issued a “Recommended Decision and

Order” in favor of Anderson. As to her initial May 2, 1997 complaint, he

determined Anderson was an “authorized representative” of Metro employees under

the CERCLA, SWDA, and FWPCA and Metro had retaliated against her based on

her protected activities.40 He also determined her second and third whistleblower
monitoring her activities and public statements; (h) circulating derogatory e-mails

and other communications about her; (i) subjecting her, via an April 16, 1997

letter, to a special disclaimer requirement which was not imposed on other Board

members, specifically Ted Hackworth; (j) communicating its desire to the Denver

Mayor’s office that she not be reappointed to the Metro Board, which resulted in

her failure to be reappointed.” (ALJ Di Nardi’s Sept. 18, 2001 Recommended

Decision & Order at 59.)

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complaints were timely. In granting relief on the supplemental complaints, ALJ Di

Nardi determined Anderson could sue under all seven environmental statutes. He

concluded that despite the difference in statutory language between them, all seven

statutes should be interpreted consistently to allow claims by employee

representatives. Based on his finding of discrimination, ALJ Di Nardi ordered

Metro to (1) expunge all negative references from Anderson’s personnel file

including the “highly threatening” April 16, 1997 letter from Plastino to Anderson,

(2) cease and desist from retaliating against Anderson and its employees because of

their protected activity, (3) provide a copy of the “Recommended Decision and

Order” to a number of different agencies and individuals as well as post it on its

website and in its facility, and (4) issue an apology to Anderson in a full page paid

ad in the Denver Post. (ALJ Di Nardi’s Sept. 18, 2001 Recommended Decision &

Order at 77.) Additionally, he awarded Anderson $150,000 in compensatory

damages, $150,000 in punitive damages (pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(2)(B)(iv)

(TSCA) and 42 U.S.C. § 300j-9(i)(2)(B)(ii)(IV) (SDWA)), and $125,000 for

emotional distress. Metro appealed again to the ARB.
41 Despite recognizing that the statutory language of the SDWA, CAA,

TSCA and ERA was similar and did not afford a separate cause of action to

authorized representatives of employees, the ARB actually denied relief under the

SDWA, CAA and TSCA because they “are not applicable to the facts in this

case.” (ARB’s May 29, 2003 Final Decision & Order at 8.) By this statement, it

appears the ARB believed the SDWA, CAA and TSCA were no longer at issue in

the case because Anderson had not appealed Decker’s initial failure to make

findings regarding them. Indeed, Anderson’s brief to the ARB was misleading.

On page six of her brief, Anderson states she seeks relief on appeal under the

CERCLA, SWDA, FWPCA and ERA. However, on page thirty-seven, she seeks

punitive damages under the SDWA and TSCA. It appears that despite any

statements to the contrary in her brief, Anderson’s appeal to the ARB involved all

seven environmental statutes. Nevertheless, the ARB did hold that the SDWA,

CAA and TSCA, like the ERA, did not provide whistleblower protection to nonemployees.

-39-

On May 29, 2003, the ARB issued its “Final Decision and Order,” reversing

ALJ Di Nardi’s decision. It first concluded Anderson was not entitled to relief

under the ERA, SDWA, CAA, and TSCA because, unlike the other three statutes,

these statutes only provided a cause of action to employees not their authorized

representatives.41 As to the CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA, the ARB determined

Anderson had failed to prove she was an “authorized representative” of Metro

employees and therefore, failed to establish a necessary element of her claim under

the whistleblower statutes. This appeal followed. 

III. Standard of Review

We review a decision by the ARB under the Administrative Procedure Act

(APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Trimmer v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 174 F.3d

1098, 1102 (10th Cir. 1999). Consequently, it will only be set aside if it is
-40-

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with

law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The ARB’s factual determinations will only be set

aside if they are not supported by substantial evidence. § 706(2)(E). “Substantial

evidence is such relevant evidence a reasonable person would deem adequate to

support the ultimate conclusion.” Grubb v. F.D.I.C., 34 F.3d 956, 961 (10th Cir.

1994). We review matters of law de novo, providing Chevron deference to the

ARB’s construction of the environmental whistleblower statutes. Trimmer, 174

F.3d at 1102. 

Under Chevron, we must first ask whether Congress has directly spoken to the

precise question at issue. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984). “If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the

matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress.” Id. at 842-43. If we determine Congress has not

directly spoken on the precise question at issue, i.e. the statute is silent or

ambiguous, we do not simply impose our own construction on the statute, but rather,

we must ascertain whether the agency’s interpretation is a permissible construction

of the statute. Id. at 843. 

IV. Discussion

Before addressing the merits of this case, we must first decide whether

Anderson has waived her claims under the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA. In her
42 Because there were two ARB panels involved in this case, we will refer

to the ARB panel which issued the March 30, 2000 “Decision and Remand Order”

as “ARB I” or the “ARB I panel” and the ARB panel which issued the May 29,

2003 “Final Decision and Order” as “ARB II” or the “ARB II panel.”

-41-

opening brief, Anderson expressly states in a footnote that she is seeking relief on

appeal under the CERCLA, SWDA, FWPCA and ERA. Although she includes the

ERA in this footnote, she fails to assert any argument concerning the ARB II

panel’s42 determination that the ERA only provides a cause of action to employees. 

Based on these deficiencies, Metro argues Anderson has waived her claims under

the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA.

After filing her opening brief, Anderson obtained new counsel. Her current

counsel has filed a Motion to Correct and/or Clarify Opening Brief on her behalf. 

In this motion, Anderson contends her former counsel inadvertently omitted the

SDWA, CAA and TSCA and she never intended to waive the relief she was awarded

by ALJ Di Nardi under those statutes. She asserts this is evident in the conclusion

of her opening brief in which she requests affirmance of ALJ Di Nardi’s decision

“in its entirety.” (Anderson’s Amended Opening Br. at 29.) Anderson also points

out that none of the issue statements in her opening brief mention any particular

statute and because the scope of all seven environmental statutes is the same, her

arguments apply to them all. Lastly, as to her claims under the ERA, Anderson

maintains she did not waive them because she specifically stated in her opening
43 The Secretary of the DOL also filed a brief in this appeal. However,

because its position essentially mirrors that of Metro, we will refer to Metro only.

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brief she was seeking relief under the ERA and that the ARB II’s decision

concerning the ERA was erroneous.

Metro opposes Anderson’s motion.43 It notes: (1) citations to the SDWA,

CAA and TSCA were not only omitted from Anderson’s opening brief but also from

the jurisdictional statement of her docketing statement and her statement of issues,

(2) because the ARB II panel’s denial of relief under the ERA, SDWA, CAA and

TSCA was based on a different ground than its denial under the other three statutes,

Anderson’s former counsel apparently made a strategic decision not to appeal under

the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA, and (3) although Anderson raises the ERA in her

opening brief, she fails to identify as an issue or to even superficially challenge the

ARB II’s decision that the ERA does not provide a cause of action to employee

representatives.

The failure to raise an issue in an opening brief waives that issue. State Farm

Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 984 n.7 (10th Cir. 1994). “An issue not

included in either the docketing statement or the statement of issues in the party’s

initial brief is waived on appeal.” Adams-Arapahoe Joint Sch. Dist. No. 28-J v.

Continental Ins. Co., 891 F.2d 772, 776 (10th Cir. 1989). Consistent with these

principles is the general rule that “appellate courts will not entertain issues raised
-43-

for the first time on appeal in an appellant’s reply [brief].” Headrick v. Rockwell

Int’l Corp., 24 F.3d 1272, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 1994). The reasons for this rule are

plain: 

It robs the appellee of the opportunity to demonstrate that the record does not

support an appellant's factual assertions and to present an analysis of the

pertinent legal precedent that may compel a contrary result. The rule also

protects this court from publishing an erroneous opinion because we did not

have the benefit of the appellee's response.

Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). 

Nevertheless, there are “circumstances in which a court may consider, or even raise

sua sponte, arguments ignored or left undeveloped by counsel in the first round of

briefing.” Herbert v. National Acad. of Sciences, 974 F.2d 192, 196 (D.C. Cir.

1992); see also Headrick, 24 F.3d at 1278. For example, we are always obligated to

consider our jurisdiction, regardless of whether or when the parties raise it. 

Herbert, 974 F.2d at 196.

Here, despite Anderson’s failure to address the SDWA, CAA or TSCA or to

present any argument concerning the ERA in her opening brief, we will consider

these statutes on appeal, specifically, whether the ARB II panel erred in determining

they only provide relief to employees, not their authorized representatives. In doing

so, the reasons for our waiver rule will not be defeated. The parties adequately

briefed this issue during the administrative proceedings; thus, we have the benefit of

both parties’ position on the issue. The issue was also addressed by both ALJ Di
44 Consequently, we grant Anderson’s Motion to Correct and/or Clarify

Opening Brief and deny Metro’s Motion to Strike Anderson’s Reply Brief or in

the Alternative to File a Sur-Reply.

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Nardi and the ARB II panel. Further, because we agree with Metro that these

statutes only provide a remedy to employees, which we discuss next, Metro will not

be prejudiced.44

A. Whether Anderson can proceed under the ERA, SDWA, CAA, TSCA 

Before discussing whether Anderson can proceed under the ERA, SDWA,

CAA and TSCA, we pause briefly to address what we are not deciding in this case. 

We are not deciding the propriety of Metro’s agreement to treat the Lowry effluent

or whether there is plutonium or other radionuclides present in the Lowry waste

stream. Our task is limited to ascertaining whether Anderson, as a Board director,

can proceed under the employee protection provisions of the environmental statutes. 

We start with the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA.

The employee protection provision of these statutes provide:

No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate

against any employee with respect to [his or her] compensation, terms,

conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any

person acting pursuant to a request of the employee) [engaged in

protected activity]. 

See 15 U.S.C. § 2622(a)(TSCA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9(i)(1) (SDWA), 5851(a)(1)

(ERA), 7622(a) (CAA) (emphasis added). In contrast, the same provision under the

CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA provide:
45 These statutes provide:

Any employee or a representative of employees who believes that he

has been fired or otherwise discriminated against by any person in

violation of subsection (a) of this section may . . . apply to the

Secretary of Labor for a review of such firing or alleged

discrimination. . . .

See 33 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (FWPCA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971(b) (SWDA), 9610(b)

(CERCLA) (emphasis added).

46 These statutes state:

Any employee who believes that [he or she] has been discharged or

otherwise discriminated against by any person . . . may . . . file (or

have any person file on his behalf) a complaint with the Secretary of

Labor. . . alleging such discharge or discrimination . . . .

See 15 U.S.C. § 2622(b)(1) (TSCA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300j-9(i)(2)(A) (SDWA),

5851(b)(1) (ERA), 7622(b)(1) (CAA) (emphasis added).

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No person shall fire, or in any other way discriminate against, or cause

to be fired or discriminated against, any employee or any authorized

representative of employees by reason of the fact that such employee or

representative [engaged in protected action under this statute].

See 33 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (FWPCA); 42 U.S.C. §§ 6971(a) (SWDA), 9610(a)

(CERCLA) (emphasis added). The remedial provisions of the seven statutes are

also dissimilar. While the CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA provide a remedy for

either an employee or an employee’s representative,45 the ERA, SDWA, CAA and

TSCA expressly provide a remedy only to an employee.

46

 

Although recognizing the difference in their statutory language, ALJ Di Nardi

nevertheless concluded Anderson was covered under all seven environmental
-46-

statutes. He determined all seven statutes should be interpreted consistently based

on (1) Congress’ intent to protect employee representatives, (2) the legislative

history, and (3) the fact the DOL has administered and interpreted all seven statutes

through a single uniform body of regulations, specifically, 29 C.F.R. Part 24.

Therefore, he concluded the language “any person acting pursuant to a request of

the employee” in the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA should be construed to allow

claims by employee representatives. The ARB II panel disagreed. Relying on the

plain meaning of the statutory language, it concluded that even if “any person acting

pursuant to a request of the employee” has the same meaning as “authorized

representative,” the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA do not provide a cause of action

for “any person acting pursuant to a request of the employee” but rather only to the

employee. Therefore, it determined “Congress must have intended that only

employees would be entitled to file a claim” under these statutes. (ARB’s May 29,

2003 Final Decision & Order at 8.) Consequently, it concluded Anderson was

precluded from seeking relief under these statutes.

In her reply brief, Anderson advocates ALJ Di Nardi’s position. She claims

that while the standing provisions of the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSPA are different

from those contained in the CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA, the legislative purpose

behind each is the same and thus all seven statutes should be construed consistently

to permit employee representatives to seek protection under them. She alleges the
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ARB II’s decision to the contrary is unreasonable given the remedial purpose of

these statutes and the DOL’s singular uniform body of regulations implementing

them. Although Metro did not address this issue in its responsive brief (due to

Anderson’s failure to raise it in her opening brief), its position is no mystery given

its briefing during the administrative proceedings. It contends the statutory

language and legislative history of the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSPA demonstrate

that employee representatives are not protected under these acts. Additionally, it

asserts that because of the significantly different language between these statutes

and the CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA, it is clear Congress intended them to have

different meaning.

“Our analysis of statutory construction must begin with the language of the

statute itself, and [absent] a clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary,

that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.” NISH v. Rumsfeld, 348

F.3d 1263, 1268 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted). 

As in all statutory construction cases, we begin with the language of the

statute. If the statutory language is not ambiguous, and the statutory

scheme is coherent and consistent, further inquiry is unneeded. The

plainness or ambiguity of statutory language is determined by reference

to the language itself, the specific context in which that language is

used, and the broader context of the statute as a whole. 

In re Wise, 346 F.3d 1239, 1241 (10th Cir. 2003) (citations and quotations omitted). 

See also Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain , 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992)

(“[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means
47 Anderson argued to the ARB II panel she was Metro’s “employee.” The

ARB II rejected this argument, noting it was in direct conflict with previous

concessions Anderson made. Anderson has not repeated this argument on appeal. 

-48-

in a statute what it says there.”). 

Here, the plain language of the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA is clear – while

the ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA prohibit discrimination based on an employee’s

or his representative’s protected activity, the discrimination must be directed toward

the employee and it is the employee, not his representative, which is clothed with a

cause of action for that discrimination. Anderson was not Metro’s employee. 47

Therefore, further inquiry is inappropriate. Moreover, “[w]here Congress includes

particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the

same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in

the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” Russello v. United States , 464 U.S. 16, 23

(1983) (quotations omitted). Although this rule does not strictly apply here because

the seven whistleblower statutes are not all part of the same Act, its reasoning is

instructive. Based on the language of the CERCLA, SWDA, and FWPCA, Congress

knew how to provide whistleblower protection to employees and “authorized

representatives of employees.” Therefore, the absence of such similar language in

the other four statutes is telling.

In concluding Anderson was covered under the ERA, SDWA, TSCA and

CAA, ALJ Di Nardi relied in part on the uniform regulations applicable to all seven
48 29 C.F.R. § 24.1(a), (b) provides:

(a) This part implements the several employee protection provisions for

which the Secretary of Labor has been given responsibility pursuant to the

following Federal statutes: [SDWA, FWPCA, TSCA, SWDA, CAA, ERA

and CERCLA].

(b) Procedures are established by this part pursuant to the Federal statutory

provisions listed in paragraph (a) of this section, for the expeditious

handling of complaints by employees, or persons acting on their behalf, of

discriminatory action by employers.

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statutes. Although this is true, see 29 C.F.R. § 24.1(a), (b), 48 the regulations only

proscribe discrimination against an employee, § 24.2(a), and only confer a cause of

action for such discrimination on the employee. See § 24.3(a) (“ [A]n employee who

believes he or she has been discriminated against by an employer . . . may file, or

have another person file on his or her behalf, a complaint . . . .”) (emphasis added). 

Indeed, the regulations substantially mirror the language of the ERA, SDWA, CAA

and TSCA. Therefore, the mere fact one set of implementing regulations applies to

all seven statutes does not override the plain language of the ERA, SDWA, TSCA

and CAA which provides relief only to employees.

Based on the above, we affirm the ARB II’s determination that Anderson

cannot proceed under the ERA, SDWA, TSCA or CAA. We now turn to whether

Anderson was an “authorized representative of employees” under the CERCLA,

SWDA, and FWPCA while serving as a director on Metro’s Board. 
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B. Whether Anderson is an “authorized representative of employees” under 

 CERCLA, SWDA, and FWPCA

In order to establish a prima facie claim of discrimination under the employee

protection provisions of the CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA, Anderson must show:

(1) she is an employee or authorized representative of employees, (2) she engaged in

protected activity; (3) Metro knew of the protected conduct; (4) the alleged

discrimination occurred; and (5) a nexus exists making it likely that the protected

activity led to the alleged discrimination. See Simon v. Simmons Foods, Inc. , 49

F.3d 386, 389 (8th Cir. 1995). Applying the parameters set forth by the ARB I

panel to the term “authorized representative of employees,” the ARB II panel

concluded Anderson failed to prove she was an “authorized representative” of Metro

employees or OCAW and therefore, failed to establish an essential element of her

claim under the CERCLA, SWDA, and FWPCA. 

In reaching this decision, the ARB II panel first determined Anderson could

not, as a matter of law, “represent” employees as a Board director because (1) the

Colorado statutes governing Metro only authorize directors to represent the citizens

of the appointing municipality, not a particular interest group or segment of society,

(2) Metro’s by-laws, which define the duties of a director, do not refer to a

director’s representation of employees and specifically require a director’s recusal

on matters in which the director has a personal or private interest, thereby strongly

indicating that a director may not serve two masters, and (3) Mayor Webb appointed
-51-

Anderson to serve on the Board as the City of Denver’s representative and his

motivation for the appointment did not confer on her the legal authority to act as an

authorized representative of employees. The ARB II panel further concluded

Anderson did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that Metro

employees or OCAW officials “authorized” her to be their representative during her

tenure on the Board. It found “Anderson was, at best, self-authorized.” (ARB May

29, 2003 Final Decision & Order at 13.) It also discounted the testimony of Ferrari,

Farmer, Holmstrom and other individuals associated with OCAW that Anderson was

the OCAW’s or its employees’ representative, concluding that “none of [these

individuals’] personal states of mind conferred any authority on Anderson to be

OCAW’s authorized representative.” ( Id. at 16.) In conclusion, the ARB II stated:

“[T]he union’s wishes and public perceptions did not confer ‘authorized

representative’ status [on Anderson], any more than one’s affinity for political

discourse makes one an official representative of a particular point of view or being

sympathetic to a particular point of view gives the sympathizer the authority to act

as an agent for one similarly inclined.” ( Id. at 17-18.)

Anderson challenges the ARB II panel’s decision in several respects. First,

she asserts that by requiring “legal” authority, rather than merely a simple request

by employees to represent them, the ARB II’s decision was unduly narrow, thereby

violating the broad remedial purposes of the statutes and directly conflicting with
-52-

the ARB I panel’s construction of the term “authorized representative of

employees.” Anderson further maintains that nothing in the Colorado statutes or

Metro’s by-laws prohibited her from representing workers’ interests while serving

as a director. Lastly, she asserts the evidence clearly established that individual

Metro employees, groups of Metro employees and OCAW repeatedly requested her

to speak and act on their behalf concerning environmental, public and worker safety

issues. Therefore, she contends the ARB II’s decision to the contrary is not

supported by substantial evidence.

Metro argues we should affirm the ARB II’s decision in its entirety. While

conceding that directors may presumably advocate on behalf of a particular interest,

Metro contends the Colorado statutes and Metro by-laws clearly provide that Board

directors are representatives of the citizens of their appointing municipality. It

contends the mere fact Anderson was sympathetic to OCAW’s position and may

have harbored labor-friendly views did not make her OCAW’s “authorized

representative” any more than a United States Senator endorsed by the AFL-CIO is

that union’s representative. Metro further maintains that substantial evidence

supports the ARB II’s decision that Anderson failed to prove she was an “authorized

representative” of Metro employees or OCAW. It points out that no documentation

from the OCAW identifying her as its representative exists and none of the

communications from OCAW officials to Metro or the public refer to Anderson as
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OCAW’s representative. Metro also contends the ARB I panel’s decision is

irrelevant because it is the ARB II decision which is being reviewed and in any

event, the two decisions are not inconsistent. Lastly, Metro asserts Anderson’s

whistleblower complaints merely represent the friction that existed between her and

her fellow Board members who held contrary views. It maintains the environmental

whistleblower statutes were not intended to encompass claims by political

appointees challenging discord in the legislative and policy-making process. 

Before we can determine whether the ARB II panel correctly found that

Anderson was not an “authorized representative of employees,” we must first define

that term. The statutes and implementing regulations do not define the term nor

does case law provide any guidance. Below, the ARB II panel relied on the ARB I

panel’s interpretation of “authorized representative.” The ARB I panel examined

not only the statutes’ plain language but also their legislative history. Because the

legislative history of the FWPCA (the forerunner of the environmental

whistleblower statutes) indicated its employee protection provision was patterned

after the National Labor Management Act (NLMA) and a similar provision in the

Coal Mine Health and Safety Act (CMHSA), see S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971),

reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3748, the ARB I panel began its analysis with

these statutes. The NLMA’s employee protection provision (29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4))

does not include the phrase “authorized representative of employees.” 
49 The ARB I panel relied on the CMHSA as it existed when it was first

enacted in 1969. See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L.

No. 91-173, § 110(b)(1), 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 823, 841. The current version of the

employee protection provision of the CMHSA does not contain the word

“authorized.” See 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(1), (2). Its implementing regulations,

however, define “representative of miners” as including “[r]epresentatives

authorized by the miners, miners or their representative, authorized miner

representative, and other similar terms as they appear in the act.” 30 C.F.R. §

40.1(b)(2).

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Consequently, the ARB I panel turned to the CMHSA’s employee protection

provision (which did prohibit discrimination against “any authorized representative

of miners”) and its legislative history. 49 This history explained the meaning of

“representative of the miners” as including “any individual or organization that

represents any group of miners at a given mine [and] does not require that the

representative be a recognized representative under other labor laws.” C ONF . REP.

NO. 91-761 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2578, 2582. Relying on this

definition and the remedial nature of the environmental whistleblower statutes, the

ARB I panel concluded “authorized representative of employees” under the

CERCLA, SWDA and FWPCA should be given a comparably broad meaning.

Therefore, it concluded Anderson was an “authorized representative of employees”

if a Metro employee, group of Metro employees or a union requested or selected her

to speak or act for the employee, group of employees or union within the purview of

the CERCLA, SWDA or FWPCA. Although the ARB II relied on the ARB I’s
50 Anderson argues inter alia that the ARB II’s decision should be reversed

because its construction of “authorized representative” directly conflicts with the

ARB I panel’s construction of that term, thereby implying it violates the law of

the case doctrine. However, our review is of the ARB II’s decision and

therefore, its construction of the term is the one we examine. Additionally, we

have found no cases applying the law of the case doctrine between administrative

courts. In any event, the ARB II reasonably construed the ARB I’s use of the

word selection as requiring some tangible act of selection.

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construction of “authorized representative,” it focused on the word “selection,”

concluding that the ARB I’s use of this word suggested there must be some tangible

act of selection by employees in order for one to be an “authorized representative of

employees.”

In reviewing the ARB II’s 50 construction of the term “authorized

representative of employees,” our first step under Chevron is to determine whether

Congress’ intent is clear; if so, we must give effect to that intent. Chevron , 467

U.S. at 842-43. To determine whether Congress had an intent on the precise

question at issue, courts utilize the traditional tools of statutory construction,

including the statutory language and legislative history. Id. at 843 n.9; see also

State of Utah v. Babbitt , 53 F.3d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1995). Here, the plain

meaning of “authorized” is “1: [gave] authority to: empower[ed][;] 2: [gave] legal or

official approval to . . .[;] 3: [established] by or as if by authority: sanction[ed].” 

WEBSTER ’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 59 (2003). Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as:

“1. [gave] legal authority; . . . empower[ed] . . . 2. [] formally approve[d]; . . .
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sanction[ed] . . . .” B LACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 129 (7th ed. 1999). The plain

meaning of “representative” is “standing or acting for another especially through

delegated authority . . . .” W EBSTER ’S COLLEGE DICTIONARY 762 (2003). Black’s

Law Dictionary defines it as “[o]ne who stands for or acts on behalf of another. . . .” 

BLACK ’S LAW DICTIONARY 1304 (7th ed. 1999). Therefore, based solely on the

statutory language used, the term “authorized representative” appears to require

some sort of tangible delegation to act in one’s shoes.

We next turn to the legislative history. The legislative history of the FWPCA,

the forerunner of the CERCLA and SWDA, states the purpose of its employee

protection provision was to “offer[] protection to employees who believe they have

been fired or discriminated against as a result of the fact they have testified or

brought suit under [the FWPCA].” S. R EP. NO. 92-414 (1971), reprinted in 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3748 (emphasis added). It further provides:

[The employee protection provision was] patterned after the [NLMA]

and a similar provision in Public Law 91-173 [the CMHSA of 1969] . .

. . Under this section employees and union officials could help assure

that employers do not contribute to the degradation of our environment. 

Any worker who is called upon to testify or who gives information with

respect to an alleged violation of a pollution control law by his

employer or who files or institutes any proceeding to enforce a

pollution control law against an employer may be subject to

discrimination. The section would prohibit any firing or discrimination

and would provide an administrative procedure under which the

employee or his representative could seek redress for any violation of

this prohibition. . . .

Id. (emphasis added).
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The employee protection provision of the CMHSA of 1969 (Public Law 91-

173) prohibited discrimination against “any miner or any authorized representative

of miners” and provided a remedy for “any miner or a representative of miners.” 

See Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-173, §

110(b)(1), (2), 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 823, 841. Its legislative history defined

“representative of miners” as including “any individual or organization that

represents any group of miners at a given mine [and] does not require that the

representative be a recognized representative under other labor laws.” C ONF . REP.

NO. 91-761 (1969), reprinted in 1969 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2578, 2582. The NLMA

contains a provision describing unfair labor practices by an employer. One such

practice is “to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he

has filed charges or given testimony . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(4) (emphasis added). 

Its definitions section defines “representatives” as “includ[ing] any individual or

labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(4).

Unlike the ARB I panel, we find the legislative history not particularly

helpful in ascertaining Congress’ intent. Although the CMHSA of 1969 utilized the

term “authorized representative of miners,” its legislative history only defined

“representative of the miners.” Additionally, the NLMA does not prohibit

discrimination against employee representatives and its definition of

“representative” does not include the word “authorized.”
51 In her reply brief, Anderson argues for the first time that even if she was

not an “authorized representative” while a director, she was such representative

after she was “removed” from the Board in June 1998. Due to her failure to raise

this argument in her opening brief, we consider it waived. State Farm Fire &

Cas. Co., 31 F.3d at 984 n.7.

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Based on the above, although the plain meaning of the words provides some

guidance, we conclude Congress’ intent in using the term “authorized

representative” is far from clear. For instance, even applying the plain meaning of

the terms, Congress could have intended to protect only individuals employed by a

union or those individuals under contract to represent an employee or group of

employees, i.e. an attorney or union. Therefore, under Chevron , our inquiry

becomes whether the ARB II’s construction of “authorized representative” is a

permissible one. Under this standard, “[t]he agency’s interpretation need not be the

only one it could have adopted, or the one that this court would have reached had

the question initially arisen in a judicial proceeding.” See Salt Lake City v. Western

Area Power Admin. , 926 F.2d 974, 978 (10th Cir. 1991). Based on the statutory

language and the legislative history of the statutes, we conclude the ARB II’s

construction of “authorized representative” to require some sort of tangible act of

selection is a permissible one. 

We now turn to the ARB II’s conclusion that Anderson failed to show she was

an “authorized representative of employees” while serving as a Board director. 51 As

stated previously, the ARB II panel’s decision contained a legal and factual
52 We express no opinion as to whether a letter, similar to the one Ferrari

sent Mayor Webb seeking Anderson’s appointment to the Board, would be

sufficient in a different context to authorize an individual to represent employees. 

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component. Therefore, under the APA, our review of the legal issue is de novo; we

review its factual findings to determine whether they are supported by substantial

evidence. Trimmer , 174 F.3d at 1102 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)).

We agree with the ARB II that as a Board director, Anderson could not, as a

matter of law, “represent” Metro employees or OCAW because she was legally

required to represent the citizens of Denver, not any particular segment of society or

a particular interest group. We further agree that any political motivation behind

her appointment to the Board is irrelevant. We also conclude the ARB II’s factual

conclusion that Anderson failed to prove she was “authorized” to represent Metro

employees or OCAW while on the Board is supported by substantial evidence. As

the ARB II stated, Anderson’s evidence of authorization amounted to selfauthorization at best. Additionally, none of the individuals who testified in favor of

Anderson’s alleged “authorized representative” status could point to any

documentation placing Metro on notice that Anderson’s appointment to the Board

was any different than any other director’s appointment. Indeed, Anderson testified

there was none. Merely seeking a director sympathetic to one’s views is insufficient

to demonstrate a delegation of representative authority. 52

In addition to the ARB II’s well-reasoned conclusions, the nature of
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Anderson’s complaints demonstrate she is not entitled to protection under the

environmental whistleblower statutes. Anderson claims inter alia that Metro

discriminated against her by cutting her off or ruling her out of order at meetings,

denying her requests to distribute material and for a special Board meeting,

subjecting her to a special disclaimer requirement when making public statements

and threatening her with censure if she did not do so, omitting allegedly relevant

actions in Board meeting minutes, seeking that she not be reappointed to the Board,

and defending its position on Lowry to the media and public, which included

defaming her and destroying her personal reputation. We have difficulty

understanding how those complaints amount to “discrimination” from which these

statutes afford protection. While frustrating and unpleasant, the matters about

which she complains appear to be part of the rough and tumble of politics and the

by-product of a minority position on a political board.

A political remedy is best suited to a political wrong. The political process

brought Anderson to the Board and she obviously understands its role in board

dynamics and decision-making. In concert with others she publically advocated her

position, advertised her disagreement with past decisions, and made her differences

with the Board a matter of public debate. Clearly, she hoped to rally public opinion

to her point of view and thereby influence the Board’s decisions. Just as clearly,

that is her right. Public service should encourage, not muzzle, public debate. On
53 For example, in the article “Radioactive Sludge,” which was published

April 26, 1997, in In These Times, Anderson is quoted as saying: “I was chided

for informing workers at Metro about the plan. . . . The board chairman told me

that there were board members who thought I was being devious for looking into

this issue.” (Anderson’s Vol. III-A, Ex. 51 at 1-2 (quotations omitted)). 

Additionally, in the article “Sister Sludge,” which appeared in the Westward on

July 24, 1997, Anderson is quoted as follows: “[Metro] is a cesspool of threats

and intimidation. . . . [It] launched a defamation campaign to portray me as a

wacko.” (Id., Ex. 66 (quotations omitted)).

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the other hand, Anderson should not have been surprised when bare knuckles were

met with bare knuckles. And when the gloves came off bloody knuckles as well as

bloody noses were exposed to public view and comment. Her claims that she

suffered disparate, even disparaging, treatment was rightfully part of her very public

campaign to win the hearts and minds of the greater Denver citizenry. 53 But it does

not follow that her political wounds need be met with healing balm in this forum.

 She has pointed to no case, and we can find none, layering whistle-blower

protections on an overtly political process such as this. That is not surprising. 

Selectively providing the insulating blanket of whistle-blower protection to one

political appointee on a public board might well disadvantage other board members

and alter group dynamics; assuredly it would impact the Board’s decision-making

process. Anderson might embrace that as wholesome. But fairness, like beauty, is

often a matter of perspective.

Our detailed review of the record reveals Anderson’s perspective to be quite

narrow. While complaining that Metro made defamatory remarks against her, she
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fails to acknowledge her own statements to the media accusing Hite of lying and

describing Metro as a “cesspool of threats and intimidation.” (Anderson’s Vol. IIIA, Ex. 66.) Apparently, Anderson believes Metro should have just sat back and

allowed her to make such statements without defending itself, in particular its

position on Lowry. This skewed perspective is readily apparent from Anderson’s

April 20, 2001 deposition, where the following exchange occurred between Metro’s

counsel and Anderson:

Q. Before we broke for lunch, you talked about Mr. [Frank’s] references . . 

. to you as a dissident board member, and he also said that you weren’t 

telling the truth. Do you recall that testimony?

. . .

A. Yes.

Q. And you seem offended by that.

A. Yes.

Q. In the “Sister Sludge” article . . . you say that Marc Herman [from the 

EPA] is lying in an effort to save the government money. Did you tell 

that to [the author]?

A. Yes, I did.

Q. Is that defamation?

A. No.

Q. Because you’re telling the truth, aren’t you?

A. Yes, and he is not.

(Anderson’s Apr. 20, 2001 Depo. at 74-75.)
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The essence of Anderson’s complaints is that the Board would not listen to

her. However, the record demonstrates numerous instances where Anderson was

given the opportunity to be heard by the Board. For instance, Anderson was allowed

to be heard at the December 1996 Operations committee meeting in which she

informed the committee that she would be speaking out against Metro’s treatment of

the Lowry effluent. She was also allowed to speak against Plastino’s proposed

resolution at the April 15, 1997 Board meeting. Additionally, Anderson’s request for

a special Board meeting was mailed to all directors and she frequently distributed

materials to directors at meetings. Anderson was also allowed to be heard at the

August 1997 Operations committee meeting concerning alleged omissions in the

committee meeting minutes and the propriety of tape-recording the meetings. She

was permitted to speak out against the Lowry settlement at the June 17 and July 15,

1997 meetings and again at the November 18, 1997 and June 16, 1998 meetings,

where she voiced her concerns that Metro’s treatment of the Lowry effluent would

affect the quality of its bio-solids. Moreover, Anderson was always allowed to vote

“no” on any issue before the Board with which she disagreed and she exercised this

right on a number of occasions. With boundless energy, and enthusiasm to match,

Anderson appears to believe that one who listens carefully will not only hear, but

also heed, her words. Her unbridled zeal demands attention without regard to

correlative rights; one board member’s right to speak is no more potent than another
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member’s right to lend a deaf ear.

The ARB II panel correctly concluded Anderson lacked standing to sue under

the CERLCA, SWDA, and FWPCA.

V. Conclusion

 We GRANT Anderson’s Motion to Correct and/or Clarify Opening Brief and

the Secretary of Labor’s unopposed Motion to Supplement the Record. Concluding

Anderson has no standing to pursue her whistleblower complaints under the

CERCLA, SWDA, FWPCA, ERA, SDWA, CAA and TSCA, we AFFIRM the ARB II

panel’s May 29, 2003 Final Decision and Order in its entirety. Based on this

conclusion and finding no prejudice to Metro, we DENY Metro’s Motion to Strike

Anderson’s Reply Brief or in the Alternative to File a Sur-Reply.