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IN RE AVIREX R.*

(AC 36291)

Sheldon, Prescott and Bear, Js.

Argued May 12—officially released July 16, 2014**

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Hartford, Juvenile Matters, Burgdorff, J.)

Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the

appellant (respondent mother).

Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, with

whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, and Benjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general,

for the appellee (petitioner).

Robert J. Moore, for the minor child.
Opinion

PRESCOTT, J. The respondent mother, Sara M.,

appeals from the judgment of the trial court transferring

guardianship of her minor son, Avirex R., from the petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, to

the child’s paternal aunt, Emma G.1 On appeal, the

respondent claims that the court erred by misapplying

the statute governing revocations of commitment, and

by failing to afford her a presumption of fitness. For

the reasons we will set forth, the judgment is affirmed.

The following facts and procedural history are necessary for our resolution of these claims. Avirex was born

on September 21, 2011. Because Avirex had opiates in

his system at birth, the petitioner placed a ninety-six

hour hold on him.2 On September 29, 2011, within the

period of the ninety-six hour hold, the petitioner filed

a neglect petition on behalf of Avirex and a motion for

an order of temporary custody. The court, Hon. William

L. Wollenberg, judge trial referee, granted ex parte the

motion for an order of temporary custody and ordered

specific steps for reunification for both parents. Upon

the child’s release from the hospital on September 29,

2011, the petitioner placed him with his paternal aunt,

Emma G., and he has remained in her care since his

release.3

On October 7, 2011, after an opportunity for each of

the parties to be heard by the court, Keller, J., the

court’s initial grant of the motion for an order of temporary custody was sustained by the court. Amended specific steps were ordered to facilitate the respondent’s

reunification with Avirex. The respondent did not comply with all of the steps. For example, she did not

comply with the requirement to continue substance

abuse and mental health treatment.

The respondent and the father entered pleas of nolo

contendere as to the neglect petition, which the court

accepted.4 Both parents, however, contested the disposition of commitment, and that matter was tried to the

court, Burgdorff, J., on March 8, 2012. Also on March

8, 2012, the court heard a motion for transfer of guardianship filed by the respondent seeking placement of

Avirex with his maternal grandmother.

On March 14, 2012, the court denied the respondent’s

motion to transfer guardianship to the child’s maternal

grandmother, adjudicated Avirex neglected pursuant to

General Statutes § 46b-120 (6) (B),5 and committed him

to the care and custody of the petitioner. Avirex

remained in the care of Emma G., and on May 24, 2013,

the petitioner authorized a subsidized guardianship for

Emma G., which was later approved by the court.6 The

respondent did not appeal from the denial of her motion

to transfer guardianship or the court’s order of commitment.7

On June 20, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion to
modify disposition pursuant to General Statutes § 46b129 and Practice Book § 34a-1, and a motion to revoke

commitment and transfer guardianship.8 Both motions

sought to end the commitment of Avirex to the petitioner, and to transfer guardianship of him to Emma G.

In response, the respondent filed a motion to revoke

commitment on June 25, 2013, in which she objected

to the petitioner’s request to transfer guardianship. She

also requested in her motion that the court order that

Avirex be returned to her custody.

On November 1, 2013, the court conducted a hearing

on the petitioner’s motion to revoke commitment and

transfer guardianship. The court was prepared to conduct a hearing at the same time on the respondent’s

motion to revoke commitment, but she orally withdrew

her motion at the commencement of the hearing. The

respondent continued to object to the transfer of guardianship to Emma G., and moved the court instead to

delay the transfer of guardianship and order a reunification plan with her. The court did not grant the respondent’s motion for a continuance and the hearing

proceeded.

On November 7, 2013, the court, Burgdorff, J.,

granted the petitioner’s motion to transfer guardianship

to Emma G. In its memorandum of decision, the court

cited subsection (m) of § 46b-129 as the applicable law

and found the following facts. The respondent had a

history of crime and domestic violence. After being

arrested on January 4, 2012, she left Connecticut, without informing the court, to live with her parents and

brother in New Hampshire. The respondent tested positive for illegal substances several times prior to her

move to New Hampshire, and she was discharged from

the Wheeler Clinic and the Women and Children’s Substance Abuse Residential Program at New Life Center

for noncompliance with program rules.

Upon moving to New Hampshire, the respondent did,

to her credit, seek treatment from the Manchester Metro

Treatment Center for opiate dependence in September,

2012, and all of her drug tests since that time were

negative forillegal substances. Although the respondent

reported to the Department of Children and Families

(department) that she was engaging in mental health

treatment, she failed to authorize her mental health

provider to release her records so that the department

could confirm this treatment. Additionally, the department was unable to verify the respondent’s source of

income. She had represented that she had applied for

social security disability benefits, but she failed to disclose the basis of her disability claims or any information as to her current mental health diagnoses or

medications.

While living in New Hampshire, the respondent

engaged in twice monthly visitations with the child, and
traveled to Connecticut with Avirex’s maternal grandmother and half sibling in order to visit with Avirex.9

Significantly, since moving to New Hampshire, the

respondent has failed to inquire independently as to

Avirex’s well-being or to request additional visits.

Avirex, then two years old, had lived with Emma G.

since his discharge from the hospital after his birth. All

of his emotional and medical needs were being met by

Emma G., with whom Avirex had formed a significant

emotional bond.Emma G. had sufficientincome to meet

his needs and provide stable housing. Finally, Emma

G. had been compliant with Avirex’s visits with the

respondent, the child’s father, and the maternal grandmother and siblings.

In light of those findings, none of which the respondent has challenged as clearly erroneous, the court concluded: ‘‘[The petitioner] has met [her] burden of

proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that

the cause for commitment of Avirex no longer exists

in that it is no longer in his best interest to continue

with the commitment. Avirex has resided with his paternal aunt since October 11, 2011, a period of over two

years. Avirex is in a stable and loving home, and the

paternal aunt appears to be devoted to him. She is

committed to providing for Avirex’s psychological,

social emotional and medical needs. He is happy in the

placement. The court further finds that the paternal

aunt, Emma G., is a suitable and worthy guardian, and

that such a disposition is in . . . Avirex’s best interest,

and most appropriately addresses his need for permanency. To disrupt his placement with his paternal aunt

would be contrary to his best interest. . . . [Although]

the court recognizes that [the respondent] has been

successfully engaged in her substance abuse treatment

in New Hampshire, the court is troubled by [the respondent’s] refusal to allow the disclosure of her mental

health diagnoses and medications. Further, [the respondent] is clearly not self-sufficient as she relies completely on [the] maternal grandmother for financial and

housing support. No evidence was presented as to [the

respondent’s] completion of parenting classes. The

court, therefore, further finds that it would not be in

Avirex’s best interest to considerreunification with [the

respondent] at this time.’’

The court granted the petitioner’s motions to open

the disposition of commitment and to transfer guardianship, and ordered that the guardianship of Avirex be

transferred from the petitioner to Emma G. The court

directed Emma G. ‘‘to allow [the respondent] such visitation as she deems to be in Avirex’s best interest,’’ and

referred disputes concerning visitation to the family

court. This appeal followed.

On appeal, the respondent claims that the court misapplied § 46b-129 (m). Specifically, she argues that subsection (m) of § 46b-129 requires the court to make a
finding that the cause for commitment no longer exists,

and that, after making that finding, the court must presume that the parent is fit to regain custody and that

it would be in the best interest of the child to be returned

to the parent. The respondent argues that the court

failed to make the required finding that the cause for

commitment no longer existed and failed to apply the

required presumption of fitness in violation of § 46b129 (m).

We conclude that the court erred by applying subsection (m) of § 46b-129 because the petitioner was not

seeking to revoke commitment and return Avirex to

the respondent, but instead sought to transfer guardianship to a third party. That procedure is properly governed by subsection (j) of § 46b-129. We further

conclude, however, that the court’s judgment need not

be reversed, as the court still engaged in the analysis

otherwise required by subsection (j) of § 46b-129.

We begin our discussion with the standard of review.

In order to resolve the respondent’s claims on appeal,

it is necessary to construe and harmonize various subsections of § 46b-129 and the relevant provisions of our

rules of practice implementing that statute. See Practice

Book §§ 35a-16, 35a-12A and 35a-20. ‘‘[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions of law, over which we

exercise plenary review. . . . The process of statutory

interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of

the case, including the question of whetherthe language

does so apply. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur

fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to

the apparent intent of the legislature. . . . In other

words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner,

the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the

facts of [the] case, including the question of whether

the language actually does apply. . . . In seeking to

determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs

us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its

relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such

text and considering such relationship, the meaning of

such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield

absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of

the meaning of the statute shall not be considered. . . .

The interpretive construction of the rules of practice

is to be governed by the same principles as those regulating statutory interpretation.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.R., 123 Conn.

App. 336, 339, 1 A.3d 1184 (2010).

Accordingly, we turn to the statutory scheme governing the disposition of children who have been found to

be abused or neglected. After a child has been found

to be neglected or abused, § 46b-129 (j) (2) grants a

court four dispositional options: ‘‘[T]he court may (A)

commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of

Children and Families, and such commitment shall
remain in effect until further order of the court, except

that such commitment may be revoked or parental

rights terminated at any time by the court; (B) vest such

child’s or youth’s legal guardianship in any private or

public agency that is permitted by law to care for

neglected, uncared-for or abused children or youths or

with any other person or persons found to be suitable

and worthy of such responsibility by the court, including, but not limited to, any relative of such child or

youth by blood or marriage; (C) vest such child’s or

youth’s permanent legal guardianship in any person

or persons found to be suitable and worthy of such

responsibility by the court, including, but not limited

to, any relative of such child or youth by blood or

marriage in accordance with the requirements set forth

in subdivision (5) of this subsection; or (D) place the

child or youth in the custody of the parent or guardian

with protective supervision by the Commissioner of

Children and Families subject to conditions established

by the court.’’

If the court commits a child to the petitioner, the

petitioner must present to the court a permanency plan

within nine months of placement of the child or youth

in the care or custody of the petitioner. General Statutes

§ 46b-129 (k) (1). ‘‘At a permanency hearing . . . the

court shall approve a permanency plan that is in the

bestinterests of the child or youth and takes into consideration the child’s or youth’s need for permanency. . . .

Such permanency plan may include the goal of (A)

revocation of commitment and reunification of the

child or youth with the parent or guardian, with or

without protective supervision; (B) transfer of guardianship or permanent legal guardianship; (C) longterm foster care with a relative licensed as a foster

parent; (D) filing of termination of parental rights and

adoption; or (E) another planned permanent living

arrangement ordered by the court, provided the Commissioner of Children and Families has documented a

compelling reason why it would not be in the best

interests of the child or youth for the permanency plan

to include the goals in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, of this subdivision. Such other planned permanent

living arrangement may include, but not be limited to,

placement of a child or youth in an independent living

program or long term foster care with an identified

foster parent.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes

§ 46b-129 (k) (2). Thus, two of the separate and distinct

statutory disposition options available to the court are

(1) revocation of commitment and reunification with

the child’s parent or former guardian (with or without

protective supervision), or (2) transfer of guardianship

to a party other than the child’s parent or former

guardian.

In the present case, the substance of the motions filed

by the petitioner sought transfer of legal guardianship of

Avirex from the petitioner to his paternal aunt.10 See
In re Cameron C., 103 Conn. App. 746, 751, 930 A.2d 826

(2007)(court looks at substance of motion to determine

which statute is applicable), cert. denied, 285 Conn.

906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008). The motions, by their terms,

did not seek to revoke the commitment of Avirex to

the petitioner so that Avirex could be reunified with

his parent.11 Accordingly, the only issue before the court

in this case was whether guardianship of Avirex should

be transferred to his paternal aunt. If the court were

to have answered that question in the negative, Avirex

would have remained committed to the petitioner until

some other appropriate disposition could be proposed

and approved by the court as part of a permanency plan.

With this statutory background in mind and in light

of the specific relief sought in the motion before the

court, we next address whether the trial court improperly addressed the petitioner’s motion pursuant to subsection (m) of § 46b-129, or instead, should have

analyzed the motion pursuant to subsection (j) of

§ 46b-129.

Subsection (j) (3) of § 46b-129 provides in relevant

part: ‘‘If the court determines that the commitment

should be revoked and the child’s . . . legal guardianship . . . should vest in someone other than the

respondent parent, parents or former guardian . . .

there shall be a rebuttable presumption that an award

of legal guardianship . . . upon revocation to . . .

any relative who is licensed as a foster parent for such

child or youth, or who is, pursuant to an order of the

court, the temporary custodian of the child or youth at

the time of the revocation . . . shall be in the best

interests of the child or youth and that such relative is

a suitable and worthy person to assume legal guardianship . . . . The presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that an award of legal

guardianship to . . . such relative would not be in the

child’s . . . best interests and such relative is not a

suitable and worthy person. . . .’’

Subsection (m) of § 46b-129 provides in relevant part:

‘‘The commissioner, a parent or the child’s attorney

may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon

finding that cause for commitment no longer exists,

and that such revocation is in the best interests of such

child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment

of such child or youth. . . .’’

An obvious difference between these two subsections

is that subsection (j) contains specific language referencing a transfer of guardianship to a party other than

the child’s or youth’s parent or former legal guardian

and sets forth a presumption as to the individuals, such

as other relatives, who should then be given custody,

while subsection (m) makes no mention of any individual other than the petitioner, a parent or the child’s

attorney. Instead, subsection (m) is focused only on

whether the child’s or youth’s commitment should be
revoked without reference to a transfer of guardianship

to a party other than the parent or former guardian.12

As a matter of logic, if the child’s or youth’s commitment

to the petitioner is revoked by the court without a

concomitant transfer of guardianship to a third party,13

then the child must be reunified with the parent or

formerlegal guardian (with or without protective supervision) as contemplated by the permanency plan option

set forth in § 46b-129 (k)(2)(A)(‘‘revocation of commitment and reunification of the child or youth with the

parent or guardian’’).

Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature

intended that a motion, like the one filed here by the

petitioner, seeking to transfer guardianship of a child

or youth from the petitioner to an individual other than

the parent or former guardian, should be adjudicated

by the court pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129.

This conclusion is buttressed by reference to Practice

Book § 35a-16, which provides in relevant part that

‘‘[u]nless filed by the commissioner of the department

of children and families, any modification motion to

return a child or youth to the custody of the parent

without protective supervision shall be treated as a

motion for revocation of commitment.’’

Our conclusion also finds support in our decision in

In re A.R., supra, 123 Conn. App. 336. One of the issues

in In re A.R. was whether the trial court improperly

treated a motion to transfer guardianship filed by an

intervenor as a motion for revocation of commitment.

Id., 337. In delineating the difference between subsection (j) and subsection (m) of § 46b-129, this court

stated: ‘‘The intervenor claims on appeal that the court

incorrectly treated her motion to transfer guardianship

as a motion to revoke commitment. She argues that

the language of § 46b-129 (j) treats motions to transfer

guardianship as separate and distinct from motions to

revoke commitment. In addition, she argues that Practice Book § 35a-16 indicates that only motions to modify

[disposition] that request that the custody of the child

revert to the custody of the parent are to be construed

as motions to revoke commitment. . . . We agree.’’

Id., 338–39.

Accordingly, it was improperfor the court to treat the

petitioner’s motion to transfer guardianship to Avirex’s

paternal aunt as a motion to revoke commitment filed

pursuant to subsection (m) of § 46b-129. Instead, the

court should have treated the petitioner’s motion as

having been filed pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b129. In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to

reach the respondent’s claim that the trial court did not

properly afford a presumption of fitness under subsection (m) of § 46b-129.14 Although we conclude that the

court improperly treated the petitioner’s motion under

an incorrect subsection of § 46b-129, we further conclude that the court nonetheless engaged in the proper
analysis and made the required findings necessary to

transfer guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G.

pursuant to § 46b-129 (j).

In order to properly grant a motion to transfer guardianship under subsection (j) of § 46b-129, the court must

first determine whether it would be in the best interest

of the child for guardianship to be transferred from the

petitioner to the proposed guardian. See also Practice

Book § 35a-12A; In re Averiella P., 146 Conn. App. 800,

804, 81 A.3d 272 (2013) (applying best interest standard

to motion to transfer guardianship from petitioner to

child’s grandmother). In considering what is in the best

interest of the child, subsection (j) creates a rebuttable

presumption that if the proposed guardian is a member

of one of the enumerated groups of relatives or caregivers, such a transfer is in the child’s best interest. The

court must then find that the third party is a suitable

and worthy guardian. See General Statutes § 46b-129

(j); Practice Book § 35a-12A (‘‘the moving party has the

burden of proof that the proposed guardian is suitable

and worthy’’). Subsection (j) (3) of § 46b-129 also provides a rebuttable presumption that if the proposed

guardian is a relative of the child, and is either licensed

by the department as a foster parent, or has temporary

custody of the child when the motion to transfer guardianship is heard by the court, such a relative is presumed

to be a suitable and worthy person to assume legal

guardianship.

Unlike subsection (m) of § 46b-129, neither subsection (j) of § 46b-129 nor Practice Book § 35a-12A provides a presumption of fitness for a parent or former

guardian (who may be opposing the motion). See footnote 8 of this opinion. This is because a motion to

transfer guardianship is simply dispositional in nature,

and does not require the court to review the underlying

cause for commitment, which has already been judicially determined during an earlier phase of the proceeding. Compare Practice Book § 35a-12A (a)

(‘‘[m]otions to transfer guardianship are dispositional

in nature, based on the prior adjudication’’) with § 46b129 (m) (requiring court to review cause for commitment and conclude that it no longer exists before revoking commitment of child). Accordingly, it is important

to note that a transfer of guardianship pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129 does not terminate the respondent parent’s or former guardian’s relationship with the

child. If a court orders, as it did here, legal guardianship

of a child or youth to be vested in a suitable and worthy

person pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129, the

respondent parents or former guardians of the child or

youth are not left without recourse. Pursuant to § 46b129 (n), the respondent parents or former guardian may

file a petition to reinstate guardianship of the child or

youth in such parent or legal guardian.15 See also Practice Book § 35a-20.
Because Emma G., Avirex’s paternal aunt, was, by

order of the court, his temporary custodian at the time

the court heard both of the petitioner’s motions, there

existed a rebuttable presumption that Emma G. was a

suitable and worthy guardian, and that a transfer of

guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G. was in

Avirex’s best interest.16 See Practice Book § 35a-12A

(b). It was, therefore, the respondent’s burden to rebut

the presumption by demonstrating by a preponderance

of the evidence that Emma G. was not a suitable and

worthy guardian, or that it was not in Avirex’s best

interest for guardianship to be transferred from the

petitioner to Emma G.

Although the court’s memorandum of decision

focuses at least in part on the respondent’s current

fitness to parent, the court also specifically found that

the transfer of guardianship from the petitioner to

Emma G. was in Avirex’s best interest, and that Emma

G. was a suitable and worthy guardian. The respondent

has not challenged these findings, and the record adequately supports them. We, therefore, conclude that the

court made the requisite findings, pursuant to § 46b129 (j), that were necessary to transfer guardianship of

Avirex from the petitioner to Emma G. Accordingly, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142

(b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this

appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers of this case shall be open

for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon

order of the Appellate Court.

** July 16, 2014, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion,

is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.

1 The father, Hector R., is not a party to this appeal. At the hearing before

the trial court, the father’s counsel represented to the court that he did not

object to the petitioner’s motion to modify disposition, and that he agreed

with the transfer of guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G.

2 General Statutes § 17a-101g provides in relevant part: ‘‘(e) If the Commissioner of Children and Families, or the commissioner’s designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in

imminent risk of physical harm from the child’s surroundings and that

immediate removal from such surroundings is necessary to ensure the child’s

safety, the commissioner, or the commissioner’s designee, shall authorize

any employee of the department or any law enforcement officer to remove

the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings

without the consent of the child’s parent or guardian. The commissioner

shall record in writing the reasons for such removal and include such record

with the report of the investigation conducted under subsection (b) of

this section.

‘‘(f) The removal of a child pursuant to subsection (e) of this section

shall not exceed ninety-six hours. During the period of such removal, the

commissioner, or the commissioner’s designee, shall provide the child with

all necessary care, including medical care, which may include an examination by a physician or mental health professional with or without the consent

of the child’s parents, guardian or other person responsible for the child’s

care, provided reasonable attempts have been made to obtain consent of

the child’s parents or guardian or other person responsible for the care of

such child. During the course of a medical examination, a physician may

perform diagnostic tests and procedures necessary for the detection of child

abuse or neglect. If the child is not returned home within such ninetysix-hour period, with or without protective services, the department shall
proceed in accordance with section 46b-129. . . .’’

3 Emma G. is licensed by the department as a foster parent.

4 The respondent entered her plea of nolo contendere on October 7, 2011,

and the father entered his plea of nolo contendere on November 8, 2011.

5 General Statutes § 46b-120 (6) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] child

or youth may be found ‘neglected’ who, forreasons otherthan being impoverished . . . (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally . . . .’’

6 Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-126 (a), the petitioner is authorized

to establish a subsidized guardianship program for the benefit of children

living in foster care with relatives after the child has been in the state’s care

for six months.

7 The court’s order of commitment was that ‘‘[t]he child . . . is committed

until further order of the court to the [petitioner] who shall be the guardian

of the child . . . according to the statutes in such cases. Commitment is

effective 03/14/2012.’’ After the commitment, therefore, neither the respondent nor the father were guardians of Avirex.

8 Although the petitioner brought her motion to modify disposition pursuant to § 46b-129, she did not specify the subsection of the statute upon

which she sought relief. We urge the petitioner to indicate in the future the

specific subsection of § 46b-129 upon which she seeks relief in order to

help prevent confusion over the relief sought and the appropriate legal

standard that should be applied.

9 The respondent also had a documented history with Child Protective

Services in New Hampshire. Guardianship of her other child, Avirex’s half

sibling, previously was transferred to the maternal grandmother through

the Probate Court in New Hampshire due to the respondent’s substance

abuse, prostitution, neglect, transience and domestic violence.

10 The only motions before the court were the petitioner’s motions to

modify disposition, and to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship.

Both motions sought to transfer the guardianship of Avirex from the petitioner to his paternal aunt, Emma G.

11 Indeed, an earlier motion to revoke the commitment of Avirex to the

petitioner so that he could be reunified with the respondent was withdrawn

by the respondent.

12 We have previously held that in order to grant a motion to revoke

commitment under subsection (m) of § 46b-129, ‘‘the respondent must first

prove that no cause for commitment presently exists. Second, [the petitioner]

must fail in her burden to establish that it would be in the best interests of

the [child] to remain committed.’’ In re Patricia C., 93 Conn. App. 25, 31–32,

887 A.2d 929, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 101 (2006).

13 We note that, as a practical matter, upon a finding by the court that

guardianship of a child should be transferred from the petitioner to a third

party, the court must necessarily revoke the commitment of that child to

the petitioner so that the transfer may be effectuated.

14 We do not disagree with the respondent that subsection (m) of § 46b129 and Practice Book § 35a-14A give rise to a rebuttable presumption that,

upon a finding that the cause for the child’s commitment no longer exists,

the court should ordinarily order reunification and return custody of the

child to the parent or former guardian. If a motion to revoke commitment

is properly filed under subsection (m) because it seeks to reunify the child

with a parent or former guardian, the parent or former guardian should

presumptively regain custody if the cause for commitment no longer exists,

unless the department can establish that reunification is not in the best

interest of the child. It is this statutory burden shifting analysis that the

respondent claims the court failed to utilize.

15 The statute also provides that ‘‘[n]o such petition may be filed more

often than once every six months.’’ General Statutes § 46b-129 (n).

16 As we noted previously, Emma G. is licensed by the department as a

foster parent. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Pursuant to Practice Book

§ 35a-12A (b), the court may presume that she was a suitable and worthy

person to assume legal guardianship on this basis as well.