J-A16040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

RESPONSE ELECTRIC, INC.

v.

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 

PENN STATE HEALTH LANCASTER 

MEDICAL CENTER

APPEAL OF: ENVIRONMENTAL AIR 

SYSTEMS, LLC.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1389 MDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered September 2, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Civil Division at 

No(s): CI-22-00419

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.: FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

Environmental Air Systems, LLC (EAS) appeals from the order entered 

September 2, 2022, in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas. The 

trial court granted a motion for reconsideration, filed by Response Electric, 

Inc. (REI), of its prior order striking a mechanics’ lien claim, and reinstated 

the mechanics’ lien.1 EAS presents three issues for our review: (1) whether 

this Court has jurisdiction over this appeal; (2) whether the trial court erred 

when it reconsidered its prior order more than 30 days after it was entered; 

and (3) whether the trial court properly struck the mechanics’ lien claim when 

____________________________________________

1 As will be discussed infra, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Penn State 

Health Lancaster Medical Center (Penn State Health) did not participate in 

these proceedings and is not a party to this appeal.
J-A16040-23

- 2 -

REI failed to file an affidavit of service as required by the Mechanics’ Lien Law.2 

Because we conclude the trial court had no authority to reconsider its prior, 

final order after the appeal period expired, we are constrained to vacate the 

order on appeal, and remand for reinstatement of the court’s July 18, 2022, 

order.

We discern the following relevant facts and procedural history from the 

certified record. Penn State Health is the owner of a property located at 2148 

State Road in Lancaster, Pennsylvania, where it is constructing a Central 

Utility Plant (the Project). See REI’s Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim, 1/24/22, at ¶¶ 

2, 4; EAS’s Brief at 4; REI’s Brief at 1. EAS, a subcontractor for the Project, 

entered into a subcontract with REI to provide “electrical work and engineering 

work” for the Project. REI’s Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim at ¶ 4. REI maintains 

that it completed the work requested on September 22, 2021, but that it was 

still due $24,581.43 for labor and materials. See id. at ¶¶ 5-7. Thus, on 

January 24, 2022, REI filed the underlying mechanics’ lien claim against Penn 

State Health in the amount of $24,581.43. Relevant herein, on February 24, 

2022, a signed Sheriff’s Return of Service was docketed, which stated that the 

mechanics’ lien claim was served on Penn State Health the day before, 

February 23rd.

Meanwhile, on February 23, 2022, EAS filed a motion requesting 

permission to file a bond to discharge and release the mechanics’ lien on Penn 

____________________________________________

2 See Mechanics Lien Law of 1963, 49 P.S. §§ 1101-1902.
J-A16040-23

- 3 -

State Health’s property. See EAS’s Motion to File Bond to Discharge 

Mechanics’ Lien, 2/23/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated). EAS asserted, inter alia, “as 

the entity that allegedly failed to pay REI, EAS [was] a ‘party in interest’” 

pursuant to the Mechanics’ Lien Law. Id. at 2. On March 23, 2023, the trial 

court granted the motion and ordered EAS to “enter and post with the court a 

lien bond in the amount of $49,162.86[,]” double the lien amount.3 Order, 

3/23/23. The court further stated, “[w]hen the bond is posted, the lien shall 

discharge as to [Penn State Health’s] property and attach to [EAS’s] bond.” 

Id. (footnote omitted). Thereafter, on April 1, 2022, EAS posted the requisite 

lien bond.

On April 8, 2022, REI filed a civil complaint against EAS, seeking 

damages for breach of contract and quantum meruit in the same amount as

the mechanics’ lien claim. EAS filed preliminary objections asserting, inter 

alia, that REI was prohibited from “filing a breach of contract claim in the same 

action as a mechanics’ lien claim[,]” and, in any event, the parties’ subcontract 

included both an arbitration clause and a forum selection clause, which 

required any civil action be brought in Guilford County, North Carolina.4 EAS’s 

Preliminary Objections to REI’s Complaint, 6/3/22, at 2-4, 6-7. REI filed 

preliminary objections to EAS’s preliminary objections, arguing that EAS’s 

____________________________________________

3 See 49 P.S. § 1510(d) (providing security “may be entered . . . double the 

amount of the required deposit” to have lien discharged).

4 EAS is a limited liability company with a registered business address in High 

Point, North Carolina. See REI’s Complaint, 4/8/22, at ¶ 2.
J-A16040-23

- 4 -

objections were untimely filed and the forum selection clause is unenforceable. 

See REI’s Preliminary Objections to EAS’s Preliminary Objections to REI’s 

Complaint, 6/20/22, at 3-5 (unpaginated).

While the competing preliminary objections to the civil action were 

pending, on July 1, 2022, EAS filed a motion to strike the mechanics’ lien. It 

argued that REI failed to file an affidavit of service within 20 days of the service 

of the lien as required by Section 1502(a)(2) of the Mechanics Lien Law.5 See 

EAS’s Motion to Strike Mechanics’ Lien Claim, 7/1/22, at 2. Further, because 

a mechanics’ lien must be filed within six months after work is completed6 ─ 

which REI acknowledged was in September of 2021 ─ EAS asserted the 

mechanics’ lien action “should be dismissed with prejudice.” Id. at 4.

REI filed a response and supporting brief, averring that the sheriff’s 

return of service, docketed on February 23, 2022, satisfied the requirements 

of Section 1502. See REI’s Brief in Support of Response in Opposition to EAS’s 

Motion to Strike Mechanic[s’] Lien Claim, 7/8/22, at 3. EAS filed a reply, 

disputing REI’s assertion. Thereafter, on July 18, 2022, the trial court entered 

an order which: (1) granted EAS’s motion to strike the mechanics’ lien claim 

due to REI’s failure to file an affidavit of service; (2) sustained EAS’s 

____________________________________________

5 See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(2) (requiring mechanics’ lien claimant to, inter alia, 

file “affidavit of service of notice, or the acceptance of service, . . . within 

twenty (20) days after service [of lien claim] setting forth the date and manner 

of service”).

6 See 49 P.S. § 1502(a)(1) (mechanics’ lien claim must be filed “within six (6) 

months after the completion of [the] work”).
J-A16040-23

- 5 -

preliminary objection to REI’s civil complaint based upon the misjoinder of 

actions; (3) dismissed as moot EAS’s remaining preliminary objections; and 

(4) overruled REI’s preliminary objections to EAS’s preliminary objections. 

See Order, 7/18/22, at 1-2. We note that an order striking a mechanics’ lien 

claim is final and appealable. See Caldwell v. Carter, 23 A. 575 (Pa. 1892). 

Therefore, REI could have filed an appeal from the July 18th order within 30 

days, that is, no later than August 17, 2022.

However, on August 15, 2022 ─ two days before the appeal period 

expired ─ REI instead filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the trial court’s 

July 18th order. See REI’s Motion for Reconsideration of [Trial] Court’s July 

[18], 2022 Order Striking its Mechanics’ Lien Claim & Seeking Reinstatement 

of Said Claim, 8/15/22, 2-3 (unpaginated). Notably, REI did not file a 

supporting brief “concurrently” with the motion, as required by local Lancaster 

County Rule of Civil Procedure 208.3(b)(A).7 Further, although the motion 

was properly docketed, the trial court maintains that it did not receive notice 

of the filing at that time. See Trial Ct. Op. at 2. 

Thereafter, on August 25, 2022, a week after the appeal deadline, EAS 

filed a praecipe to deem REI’s motion for reconsideration withdrawn pursuant 

to local Rule 208. See Lancaster Cty R.C.P. 208.3(b)(A) (“If a brief is not filed 

with the motion, the motion shall be deemed withdrawn, without prejudice, 

____________________________________________

7 See Lancaster Cty R.C.P. 208.3(b)(A) (“The moving party shall file a 

motion, proposed order and supporting brief concurrently.”) (emphasis 

added).
J-A16040-23

- 6 -

upon praecipe of an opposing party.”) (emphasis added). That same day, REI

filed a second, identical motion for reconsideration ─ this time, however, REI

concurrently filed a supporting brief. See REI’s Motion for Reconsideration of 

[Trial] Court’s July [18], 2022 Order Striking its Mechanics’ Lien Claim & 

Seeking Reinstatement of Said Claim, 8/25/22; REI’s Brief in Support of its 

Motion for Reconsideration of [Trial] Court’s July [18], 2022 Order Striking its 

Mechanics’ Lien Claim & Seeking Reinstatement of Said Claim, 8/25/22.

On September 2, 2022, the trial court entered the order on appeal, 

which: (1) granted REI’s motion for reconsideration; (2) reinstated REI’s 

mechanics’ lien claim; and (3) denied EAS’s motion to strike the lien claim. 

See Order, 9/2/22. In a footnote, the court explained that the sheriff’s return 

of service, which was docketed within 20 days of service of the lien claim, 

satisfied the requirements of Section 1502. See id. at n.1. EAS filed this 

timely appeal on September 26, 2022, and complied with the trial court’s 

directive to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal.

On December 6, 2022, this Court directed EAS to show cause as to: (1) 

whether the order on appeal, granting a motion for reconsideration, was final 

and appealable; (2) whether EAS had standing since it did not appear to be a 

party to the mechanics’ lien claim; and (3) whether the appeal should be 

transferred to the Commonwealth Court because the Commonwealth of 

Pennsylvania was a named party. Order, 12/6/22. After EAS filed a timely 

response, we discharged the rule on February 7, 2023. Order, 2/7/23. 
J-A16040-23

- 7 -

EAS presents the following three issues for our review:8

A. Whether the Superior Court may exercise appellate jurisdiction 

over this appeal?

B. Whether the trial court erred in vacating its initial decision to 

strike the mechanics’ lien claim, when it issued its order 

granting reconsideration more than thirty (30) days after 

initially granting EAS’[s] motion to strike the mechanics’ lien 

claim, in violation of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505?

C. Whether the trial court erred in reinstating the mechanics’ lien 

claim, where the Mechanics’ Lien Law and controlling case 

authorities conclusively require a claimant to file an affidavit of 

service within 20 days of service of the mechanics’ lien claim?

EAS’s Brief at 3-4 (some capitalization omitted).

EAS first addresses the concerns raised by this Court in the rule to show 

cause, and “incorporates by reference the arguments contained in its 

[r]esponse[.]” EAS’s Brief at 28-29. This Court’s show cause order raised 

three questions concerning our jurisdiction over this appeal: (1) whether EAS, 

who is not a named party in the action, has standing to appeal; (2) whether 

the appeal should be transferred to the Commonwealth Court since Penn State 

Health is a named party; and (3) whether the order on appeal ─ granting 

reconsideration of a prior order ─ is final and appealable. See Order, 12/6/22.

Preliminarily, we agree that EAS is an “aggrieved” party which has 

standing to appeal the order at issue, and that the matter should not be 

____________________________________________

8 We have reordered EAS’s claims for purposes of disposition.
J-A16040-23

- 8 -

transferred to the Commonwealth Court.9 By way of background, we reiterate 

that Penn State Health is the captioned defendant in this matter because it is 

the owner of the property, and project, at issue. However, EAS is the entity 

that contracted with REI and allegedly failed to pay REI. Therefore, EAS 

posted bond to remove the mechanics’ lien from Penn State Health’s property. 

Moreover, EAS is the named defendant in REI’s breach of contract civil action. 

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501 provides that “any party 

who is aggrieved by an appealable order . . . may appeal therefrom.” 

Pa.R.A.P. 501. Further, the Judicial Code defines a “party” as “[a] person who 

commences or against whom relief is sought in a matter.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 102. 

Here, EAS is clearly the entity “aggrieved” by the trial court’s order reinstating 

the mechanics’ lien claim ─ the lien is attached to the bond EAS posted. 

Indeed, EAS is the entity that will be required to pay REI if, in fact, the action 

is resolved in REI’s favor. Because EAS has “a substantial, direct and 

immediate interest in the outcome of the litigation[,]” we conclude it has 

standing to appeal the court’s order. See Johnson v. Am. Standard, 8 A.3d 

318, 329 (Pa. 2010). 

Further, because the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, while a named 

defendant, is not an aggrieved party, we agree that we are not required to 

transfer this matter to the Commonwealth Court. Pursuant to Section 762 of 

____________________________________________

9 REI agrees with EAS’s position on both of these issues. See REI’s Brief at 

22.
J-A16040-23

- 9 -

the Judicial Code, the Commonwealth Court has “exclusive jurisdiction of 

appeals from final orders” in “Commonwealth civil cases.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 

762(a)(1). However, as explained supra, although Penn State Health is the 

owner of the property and project at issue, EAS entered into a subcontract 

with REI and posted bond to discharge the mechanics’ lien from the property 

─ thus, EAS is the entity that will be liable for any judgment. For this reason, 

we agree that the appeal was properly filed in this Court.

The final jurisdictional issue concerns the appealability of the trial court’s 

September 2, 2022, order, which purported to grant reconsideration of a 

final order more than 30 days after it was entered. Preliminarily, we reiterate 

that an order striking a mechanics’ lien is final and appealable. See Caldwell, 

23 A. at 575. However, an order refusing to strike a mechanics’ lien is 

“interlocutory and unappealable.” H.P. Starr & Sons, Inc. v. Stepp, 211 

A.2d 78, 79 (Pa. Super. 1965). We recognize that the trial court’s September 

2, 2022, order effectively refused to strike the mechanics’ lien claim ─ the 

court granted REI’s motion for reconsideration, reinstated REI’s mechanics’ 

lien claim, and denied EAS’s motion to strike the lien claim. See Order, 

9/2/22. 

Nevertheless, the primary issue on appeal is whether the trial court had 

jurisdiction on September 2nd to grant reconsideration of the final, appealable 

order it had entered more than 30 days prior on July 18th. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

5505 (if no appeal is taken, court may modify or rescind any order within 30 

days of entry); Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co. v. Greenville Gastroenterology, 
J-A16040-23

- 10 -

SC, 108 A.3d 913, 916 (Pa. Super. 2015) (“A court lacks the authority to grant 

reconsideration of a final order more than 30 days after its entry.”); Valley 

Forge Ctr. Assocs. v. Rib-it/K.P., Inc., 693 A.2d 242, 245 (Pa. Super. 

1997) (motion for reconsideration tolls 30-day appeal period only when court 

enters order “expressly granting” reconsideration before expiration of 30-day 

period) (citation omitted).

This Court considered a similar issue in Gardner v. Consolidated Rail 

Corp., 100 A.3d 280 (Pa. Super. 2014). In that case, on February 20, 2013, 

the trial court entered a final, appealable order granting the defendants’ 

motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens. Id. at 282. The 

next day, the plaintiff filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but not a notice 

of appeal. Id. On April 10, 2013, more than 30 days after the entry of its 

order, the court granted the plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration and vacated 

the February 20th order.10 See id. The defendants then appealed to this 

Court. We exercised appellate jurisdiction to consider whether the trial court 

lacked the jurisdictional authority to grant a motion for reconsideration more 

than 30 days after the order at issue was entered. See id. at 282-83. In that 

case, we concluded the trial court had no authority to grant the motion for 

____________________________________________

10 Similar to an order refusing to strike a mechanics’ lien, an order denying a 

motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens is not final or 

appealable. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(c); Ritchey v. Rutter’s Inc., 286 A.3d 248,

253 (Pa. Super. 2022) (interlocutory order denying motion to transfer venue 

appealable upon this Court’s grant of petition for review pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1311).
J-A16040-23

- 11 -

reconsideration, so that its April 10th order was invalid. See id. at 283. Thus, 

based upon our exercise of jurisdiction in Gardner, we likewise conclude that 

we may consider the appeal before us. 

Accordingly, having disposed of the jurisdictional prerequisites, we now 

consider EAS’s second issue on appeal, which directly challenges the trial 

court’s authority to grant REI’s motion for reconsideration of a final, 

appealable order more than 30 days after the order was entered. See EAS’s 

Brief at 12. EAS argues that while Section 5505 of the Judicial Code permits 

a trial court to modify or rescind any final order, it must act within 30 days of 

the entry of the order, or it loses jurisdiction to do so. See id. Here, EAS 

maintains that REI should have filed both a notice of appeal and a motion for 

reconsideration in order to preserve its rights, since a motion for 

reconsideration does not toll the 30-day period for filing an appeal unless the 

trial court expressly grants reconsideration during that time period. See id.

at 13-14. Because REI failed to do so, and the trial court did not expressly 

grant reconsideration until after the expiration of the 30-day appeal period, 

EAS insists the trial court’s September 2, 2022, order is a nullity. See id. at 

18. 

EAS correctly cites the law concerning reconsideration of a final order. 

Section 5505 of the Judicial Code authorizes a trial court to “modify or rescind 

any order within 30 days after its entry, . . . if no appeal from such order has 

been taken or allowed.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505. However, even after a party has 

filed an appeal from a final order, Pa.R.A.P. 1701 authorizes a trial court to 
J-A16040-23

- 12 -

grant reconsideration of a final order if: (1) an application for reconsideration 

is filed within the 30-day appeal period; and (2) the court expressly grants

reconsideration before the expiration of the appeal period. Pa.R.A.P. 

1701(b)(3)(i)-(ii). “A timely order granting reconsideration under [Rule 

1703(b)(3)] render[s] inoperative any such notice of appeal . . . filed or 

docketed with respect to the prior order.” Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3).

As this Court has explained:

Under section 5505, the trial court has broad discretion to modify 

or rescind an order, and this power may be exercised sua sponte

or invoked pursuant to a party’s motion for reconsideration. [T]he 

trial court may consider a motion for reconsideration only if the 

motion for reconsideration is filed within thirty days of the entry 

of the disputed order. The mere filing of a motion for

reconsideration, however, is insufficient to toll the appeal period. 

If the trial court fails to grant reconsideration expressly within the 

prescribed 30 days, it loses the power to act upon both the 

[motion] and the original order.

PNC Bank, N.A. v. Unknown Heirs, 929 A.2d 219, 226 (Pa. Super. 2007) 

(citations & quotation marks omitted). See also Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs., 

693 A.2d at 245 (“[A]lthough a party may petition the court for 

reconsideration, the simultaneous filing of a notice of appeal is necessary to 

preserve appellate rights in the event that either the trial court fails to grant 

the petition expressly within 30 days, or it denies the petition.”). 

Turning to the present matter, on July 18, 2022, the trial court entered 

an order granting EAS’s motion to strike REI’s mechanics’ lien claim. On 

August 15th, REI filed a motion for reconsideration ─ two days before the 

expiration of the appeal period on August 17th. REI did not simultaneously 
J-A16040-23

- 13 -

file a notice of appeal. Thus, the trial court facially exceeded its authority 

pursuant to Section 5505 and Rule 1701, when it granted reconsideration of 

its July 18th order on September 2, 2022, 16 days after the appeal period 

expired.

Nevertheless, in its opinion, the trial court maintains that despite the 

jurisdictional time restrictions cited above, all courts retain the authority to 

open or vacate a final judgment after the 30-day appeal period when there is 

“extraordinary cause” requiring the court’s intervention. Trial Ct. Op. 

11/4/22, at 3. Here, the court opined:

“Extraordinary cause” exists when some action or oversight 

by the court deprives a litigant of its appella[te] rights. See 

Jackson ex rel. Sanders v. Hendrick, 746 A.2d 574, 576 (Pa. 

2000) (plurality opinion) (extraordinary cause where trial court’s 

failure to memorialize and file oral order would force litigant to 

forfeit appellate rights); Mfrs. & Traders Tr. Co.[,] 108 A.3d [at]

921 [ ] (extraordinary cause where court error prevented litigant 

from receiving notice of final order). But see Luckenbaugh v. 

Shearer, 523 A.2d 399, 401 (Pa. Super. 1987) (extraordinary 

cause “generally” where error in judicial process prevents losing 

party from receiving notice). While extraordinary cause generally 

revolves around the litigant’s notice of a final order, the Superior 

Court has historically accounted for other court errors in its 

reasoning. See Great Am. Credit Corp. v. Thomas Mini 

Markets, Inc., 326 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. 1974) (analysis 

including court misplacing appellant’s motion to detriment of 

appellate rights).

Here, [REI] filed their motion for reconsideration on August 

15, 2022, within Section 5505’s thirty-day window. The trial court 

agrees that had it merely failed to act upon [REI’s] timely motion 

for reconsideration, extraordinary cause would not exist. See 

Simpson v. Allstate, 504 A.2d [335, 337-38] (Pa. Super. 1986). 

However, the court was unaware of the filing — or any subsequent 

filings by the parties — until August 30, 2022, when the 

Prothonotary’s Office delivered the file. It is unclear exactly why 
J-A16040-23

- 14 -

fifteen days passed from the date of filing to the date this court 

received the motion for reconsideration, but the Prothonotary’s 

Office is generally known to be chronically understaffed and 

backlogged. The delay prevented the court from knowing of the 

time-sensitive issue and from making a timely decision, thus 

forcing [REI] to forfeit their appellate rights. This failure of the 

judicial process constitutes an “extraordinary cause” worthy of the 

court’s intervention.

The trial court did not err in granting [REI’s] motion for 

reconsideration nor in vacating its initial order, notwithstanding 

the fact that Section 5505’s window for appeal had run, because 

there was an extraordinary cause to justify intervention.

Trial Ct. Op. at 3-4.

Although we recognize that “extraordinary cause” can justify a trial 

court’s decision to reconsider or vacate a final order more than 30 days after 

its entry, we conclude the trial court erred when it determined that such 

“extraordinary cause” was present in this case. 

As this Court explained in Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., supra:

Our cases have referred to several circumstances under which a 

trial court may modify a final order after more than 30 days have 

passed: “extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the subject 

matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some 

other evidence of ‘extraordinary cause justifying intervention by 

the court.’” ISN Bank v. Rajaratnam, 83 A.3d 170, 172 (Pa. 

Super. 2013).

A court may open at any time a judgment procured by fraud. 

For example, in First Union Mortgage Corp. v. Frempong, 744 

A.2d 327, 334–35 (Pa. Super. 1999), we held that a trial court 

had the authority to modify a final in rem judgment five years 

after its entry. Because of the defendant’s use of aliases and 

corporate alter egos, fraudulent court filings, frivolous bankruptcy 

and removal petitions, and dilatory tactics, the original judgment 

amount no longer reflected what he owed to the plaintiffs. Id.

“Extraordinary cause” refers to “an oversight or 

action on the part of the court or the judicial process which 

operates to deny the losing party knowledge of the entry 
J-A16040-23

- 15 -

of final judgment so that the commencement of the running 

of the appeal time is not known to the losing party.” Orie

v. Stone, 601 A.2d 1268, 1271 ([Pa. Super.] 1992) (quotation 

omitted) (emphasis removed), appeal dismissed as

improvidently granted, 622 A.2d 286 ([Pa.] 1993). For 

example, in Estate of Gasbarini v. Medical Center of Beaver

County, Inc., 409 A.2d 343, 344–45 (Pa. 1979), unbeknownst to 

the plaintiff, her attorney had been suspended from the practice 

of law when the defendants successfully argued for dismissal of 

the case on their preliminary objections. Our Supreme Court held 

the trial court could reopen the otherwise final judgment, because 

“it would be harsh, indeed, to hold that [the plaintiff’s] possible 

cause of action be lost forever because of the conduct of an 

attorney this court has deemed unfit for the practice of law in this 

Commonwealth.” Id. at 345.

Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919 (emphasis added).

Nevertheless, we have emphasized that “extraordinary cause” justifying 

a trial court’s decision to modify a final order more than 30 days after its entry 

is “limited in nature.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919; see 

Simpson, 504 A.2d at 337 (stating “the discretionary power of the court over 

[final] judgments is very limited.”). Notably, we have held that “mistakes or 

ordinary neglect by counsel do not constitute extraordinary circumstances.” 

Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919. But see Estate of Gasbarini, 

409 A.2d at 344-45 (plaintiff attorney’s suspension from practice of law at the 

time trial court sustained preliminary objections and dismissed complaint ─ 

unbeknownst to plaintiff ─ constituted extraordinary cause justifying court’s 

order opening judgment). Furthermore, “[w]e have also held that 

extraordinary cause does not exist where a party has notice of the entry of 

a final order.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.3d at 919 (emphasis added).
J-A16040-23

- 16 -

In the present case, REI does not dispute it had notice of the trial court’s 

July 18th final order striking the mechanics’ lien claim; indeed, it filed a motion 

for reconsideration within the 30-day appeal period. Rather, the error here 

was of its own making ─ REI failed to file a notice of appeal concomitant with 

its motion for reconsideration in order to preserve its appellate rights pursuant 

to Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3). See Valley Forge Ctr. Assocs., 693 A.2d at 245. 

Recognizing this Court’s disinclination to find extraordinary cause when 

a litigant received timely notice of the entry of a final order, the trial court 

cites our decision in Great Am. Credit Corp., supra, for the proposition that 

“the Superior Court has historically accounted for other court errors” in 

affirming a trial court’s decision to vacate a judgment after the expiration of 

the appeal period. See Trial Ct. Op. at 4 (emphasis added). However, the 

court’s reliance on Great Am. Credit Corp. to justify its actions herein is 

misplaced. 

First, Great Am. Credit Corp. was decided prior to the enactment of 

both Section 5505, which authorizes a trial court to modify or rescind an order 

within 30 days after its entry, and Pa.R.A.P. 1701. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 

(eff. Jun. 27, 1978); Pa.R.A.P. 1701 (eff. Jul. 1, 1976). 

Second, the relevant facts in that case are distinguishable. In Great 

Am. Credit Corp., the guarantor of an installment note moved for summary 

judgment in an action to recover the balance due. Great Am. Credit Corp., 

326 A.2d at 518. The court granted it as uncontested when the appellee failed 

to file a timely answer. Id. However, the court later learned that the appellee 
J-A16040-23

- 17 -

had requested an extension of time, but it was “inadvertently mislaid in 

transmission through court processes.” Id. (record citation omitted). After 

the appeal period expired, the court vacated the order granting summary 

judgment and dismissed the motion; the guarantor then filed a timely appeal. 

Id. 

In affirming the trial court’s grant of relief to the appellee, a panel of 

this Court highlighted “the inherent power of the courts of this Commonwealth 

to act where equity so demands[,]” and noted that the trial court recognized 

it had “improvidently” granted summary judgment “because of its own error.” 

See Great Am. Credit Corp., 326 A.2d at 519. The panel agreed with the 

trial court’s decision not to “penalize” the appellee for the “court’s oversight” 

particularly when the appellee assumed his extension request had been 

granted and had filed an answer within the extended time period. See id. In 

a footnote, the panel further explained:

[T]he appellee avers that he received a telephone call stating that 

his requested extension had been granted and that a copy of 

appellee’s letter to the court requesting an extension was sent to

[guarantor’s] counsel. Moreover, the delay between the entering 

of the first Order and the second was, in part, occasioned by the 

fact that appellee never received notice that the motion for 

summary judgment had been granted. He had filed an answer 

and was apparently under the impression that the court was 

considering the case on the merits as presented in the motion and 

answer.

Id. at 520 n.5 (emphasis added)

Thus, while at first glance, Great Am. Credit Corp. appears to lend 

support to the trial court’s decision, the trial court overlooks the fact that the 
J-A16040-23

- 18 -

aggrieved party in that case ─ unlike here ─ did not receive timely notice of 

the entry of the final order. Indeed, in subsequent decisions, this Court has

distinguished Great Am. Credit Corp. on that fact. See Mfrs & Traders Tr. 

Co., 108 A.3d at 921 (explaining that in Great Am. Credit Corp., “the trial 

court’s oversight deprived the defendant of notice that it had entered a final 

order, triggering the appeal period[,]” but that the aggrieved party in present 

case “never alleged it was unaware” the trial court entered final, appealable 

order); Luckenbaugh, 523 A.2d at 402 (stating that decision affirming trial 

court’s actions in Great Am. Credit Corp. was “for two main reasons[:]” (1) 

court or staff misplaced appellee’s extension request; and (2) appellee “never 

received notice” of entry of final order) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we 

conclude the trial court erred when it found the existence of “extraordinary 

cause” justifying its decision to vacate its July 18th final order more than 30

days after it was entered.

Because we agree the trial court had no jurisdiction to vacate its final 

order striking REI’s mechanics’ lien claim more than 30 days after the order 

was entered, we are constrained to vacate the court’s September 2, 2022, 

order. Further, we direct the trial court to reinstate its July 18, 2022, order 

striking REI’s mechanics’ lien claim. 

Our disposition of this issue renders EAS’s final claim ─ which challenges 

the substantive merit of the court’s September 2nd order ─ moot. As this 

Court has explained, a trial court’s “inherent authority to correct mistakes or 

errors . . . does not allow a court to make substantive changes after more 
J-A16040-23

- 19 -

than 30 days have passed.” Mfrs & Traders Tr. Co., 108 A.2d at 921. Thus, 

the propriety of the court’s July 18th order is not before us.11

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

____________________________________________

11 Nevertheless, despite the fact that our proverbial hands are tied as a result 

of REI’s failure to file a timely notice of appeal, we agree that the trial court’s 

July 18th order was erroneous. As the trial court subsequently recognized, 

this Court has held that a sheriff’s return of service satisfies the “affidavit of 

service” requirement of Section 1502(a)(2) of the Mechanics’ Lien Law. See 

Trial Ct. Op. at 3 n.4, citing J.H. Hommer Lumber Co., Inc. v. Dively, 584 

A.2d 985, 987 (Pa. Super. 1990). Moreover, EAS’s assertion that “the holding 

in J.H. Hommer was overruled by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in its 

2021 decision,” Terra Firma, Bldrs, LLC v. King, 249 A.3d 976 (Pa. 2021), 

is simply incorrect. See EAS’s Brief at 26 n.5. The Terra Firma Court made 

no mention of the J.H. Hommer decision, nor did the Court address the 

propriety of a sheriff’s return of service as a substitute for an affidavit of 

service ─ in fact, in that case, the aggrieved party “concede[d] it never filed 

an affidavit of service” for the mechanics’ lien claim. See Terra Firma, Bldrs, 

LLC, 249 A.3d at 981. 
J-A16040-23

- 20 -