The district court declined to continue the matter a second 

time, and after the hearing, entered an order terminating appellant's 

parental rights. The court found that appellant had been given sufficient 

opportunity to present evidence and argument in response to the petition, 

but failed to do so. The district court further found that appellant had 

abandoned the child and was an unfit parent, and that the child's best 

interest would be served by termination. This appeal followed. 

In his civil proper person appeal statement, appellant 

contends that he did not have an opportunity to file a response to 

respondent's pre-hearing memorandum, which was filed one day before 

the evidentiary hearing, and that the district court erred in rendering a 

decision without appellant's presence at the hearing. Appellant also 

contends that he did not purposefully abandon the child because 

respondent did not advise him of her whereabouts and his attempts to 

contact respondent's parents were rejected. 

In terminating parental rights, the district court must find by 

clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best 

interest and that at least one factor of parental fault exists. NRS 128.105; 

Matter of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 800, 8 P.3d 126, 132 

(2000). Evidence of parental fault may include neglect, abandonment, and 

parental unfitness. NRS 128.105(2)(a)-(c); Matter of Parental Rights as to 

D.R.H.,120 Nev. 422, 428-30, 92 P.3d 1230, 1234-35 (2004). Additionally, 

parental unfitness may be shown by a parent's felony criminal conviction 

"if the facts of the crime are of such a nature as to indicate the unfitness of 

the parent to provide adequate care and control to the extent necessary for 

the child's physical, mental or emotional health and development." NRS 

128.106(6); see also Matter of Parental Rights as to K.D.L., 118 Nev. 737, 

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746, 58 P.3d 181, 187 (2002). The purpose of terminating parental rights 

is not to punish parents, but to protect the welfare of children. Matter of 

N.J.,116 Nev. at 801, 8 P.3d at 133. This court will uphold the district 

court's termination order if it is supported by substantial evidence. 

Matter of D.R.H.,120 Nev. at 428, 92 P.3d at 1234. 

As an initial matter, we conclude that appellant had an 

adequate opportunity to respond to the petition. The district court allowed 

appellant 30 days to file a response to the petition and specifically 

instructed appellant on how to present documentary and written 

testimonial evidence, but appellant failed to file a response setting forth 

any opposing arguments or evidence. Additionally, due process does not 

require the physical presence of a parent at the termination hearing when 

that parent is incarcerated in another state. See In re Interest of L.V., 482 

N.W.2d 250, 258 (Neb. 1992). Moreover, it is questionable whether 

appellant had a protected liberty interest, for purposes of procedural due 

process, given his lack of involvement in the child's life. See Lehr v. 

Robertson,463 U.S. 248, 261-62 (1983) (recognizing that the mere 

biological connection of the nature father does not establish a protected 

liberty interest when the father has not grasped the opportunity to 

participate in the rearing of his child). 

We further conclude that substantial evidence supports the 

district court's order terminating appellant's parental rights. The district 

court specifically found that appellant made no efforts to contact the child, 

evincing an intention to abandon the child. SeeNRS 128.012. While 

respondent did not advise appellant of her whereabouts because of 

concerns for her safety, respondent provided evidence that appellant knew 

of her parents contact information but made virtually no efforts to inquire 

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about his child or provide for her support. Additionally, the court found 

that appellant, who was incarcerated for armed robbery, was an unfit 

parent because he had not provided in any way for the child's physical, 

mental, and emotional health, and well-being. 

The district court further found that the child's best interest 

would be served by termination. Respondent asserted without opposition 

that the child has no knowledge of or relationship with appellant, that 

respondent is now married, and that respondent's husband wishes to 

adopt the child. Substantial evidence supports the district court's findings 

of parental fault and that termination of appellant's parental rights was in 

the child's best interest. See Matter of N.J.,116 Nev. at 800, 8 P.3d at 

132; Matter of D.R.H., 120 Nev. at 428-30, 92 P.3d at 1234-35. Under 

these circumstances, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 1 

Hardesty 

,J. 

Parraguirre 

'In light of our order, we deny as moot appellant's proper person 

motions for a stay. 

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cc: Tenth Judicial District Court Dept. 1 

Shaun A.W. 

The Law Office of Jacob N. Sommer 

Churchill County Clerk 

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