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*********************************************** 
DE ANN MAURICE v. CHESTER HOUSING

ASSOCIATES LIMITED

PARTNERSHIP ET AL.

(AC 40742)

Bright, Moll and Bear, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for, inter alia, negligence from the

defendants, C Co., M Co., and S Co., in connection with injuries she

sustained when she slipped and fell on a patch of snow or ice in the

parking lot of certain property owned by C Co. Following a trial, the

jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. Thereafter, the court

denied the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict, from which the plaintiff appealed

to this court. Held:

1. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in precluding the plaintiff’s

expert witness, T, from testifying as an expert in the field of snow

removal; that court found that the testimony demonstrated that the T’s

knowledge of snow removal was insubstantial and that it was tangential

to his real expertise in building codes and ordinances, T’s testimony

revealed that his experience in snow removal was a minor part of other

jobs and that he had not attended any classes, taught any seminars or

read any materials or books on the topic, and it was reasonable for the

court to conclude from T’s testimony that snow removal was a minor

part of his employment over the years and that his experience in snow

removal was little more than that common in the construction industry,

as the plaintiff’s attorney failed to develop T’s testimony to show that

his vast education in code compliance and ordinance enforcement and

his work experience qualified him as an expert in snow removal.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to render a default

judgment against C Co. as a sanction for the egregious actions of its

general and managing partner, W, in sexually harassing the plaintiff’s

attorney on two occasions: that court, which awarded the plaintiff attorney’s fees and issued an order limiting W’s movement in court, had wide

discretion to impose a sanction that it deemed appropriate under the

circumstances, and although the plaintiff argued that W committed two

egregious acts against R, those acts were brought to the attention of

the court only after the occurrence of the second act, more than one

year following the first act, and R did not ask for a mistrial or an

additional continuance; moreover, even though W’s conduct was egregious, the record revealed that he ceased such conduct immediately

upon the intervention of the court and the court’s imposition of attorney’s

fees and an order limiting W’s movement in court, and there was no

indication that the conduct continued after the court’s intervention.

Argued February 7—officially released May 7, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of, inter alia, the defendants’ alleged

negligence, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of New London, where the

court, Vacchelli, J., granted in part the plaintiff’s motion

for sanctions; thereafter, the matter was tried to the

jury; verdict for the defendants; subsequently, the court

denied the plaintiff’s motion to set aside the verdict

and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict,

from which the plaintiff appealed. Affirmed.

Kelly E. Reardon, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Sarah B. Christie, with whom, on the brief, was
Sarah Tischbein Bold, for the appellee (defendant

Something Natural, LLC).

Jay F. Huntington, with whom, on the brief, was

Kelly R. Wall, for the appellees (named defendant et al.).
Opinion

BRIGHT, J. The plaintiff, De Ann Maurice, appeals

from the judgment of the trial court, rendered in favor

of the defendants, Chester Housing Associates Limited

Partnership, MJKH Property Services, LLC, and Something Natural, LLC, following a jury trial. On appeal,

the plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion

(1) when it did not allow the plaintiff’s expert witness

to testify as an expert in snow removal, and (2) when,

in granting the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions, it denied

the plaintiff’s request that the court render a default

judgment as a sanction against Chester Housing Associates Limited Partnership as a penalty for the egregious

misconduct of its general and managing partner, Douglas H. Williams.1 We affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

The following facts and procedural history inform our

review. The plaintiff filed a second amended complaint

alleging separate counts of negligence and private nuisance against each of the three defendants. In her complaint, she alleged that she lived at the Cherry Hill

Apartments in the town of Chester (property), which

was owned, operated, managed, controlled, and/or

maintained by the defendant Chester Housing Associates Limited Partnership (property owner). The plaintiff

also alleged that the defendant MJKH Property Services,

LLC (property manager), owned, operated, managed,

controlled, and/or maintained the property. Further, she

alleged that, during times of inclement weather, the

defendant Something Natural, LLC (snow removal company), was responsible for the snow and/or ice plowing,

removal, clearing, and maintenance of the property,

including all walkways, parking areas, common areas,

and/or sidewalks.

The plaintiff further alleged that on December 12,

2013, as she walked from her apartment to her vehicle,

which was in the parking lot of the property, she slipped

and fell on a patch of snow and/or ice, and suffered

injuries and an increased risk of future harm. The plaintiff claimed her injuries were caused by the negligence

and the private nuisance caused or created by each of

the defendants. Following a trial, the jury returned a

verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiff, thereafter, filed a motion to set aside the verdict, which the

court denied. The court, subsequently rendered judgment in accordance with the jury’s verdict. This appeal

followed. Additional facts and procedural history will

be set forth as necessary.

I

The plaintiff first claims that the court abused its

discretion when it did not allow the plaintiff’s expert

witness, Mark Tebbets, to testify as an expert in the

field of snow removal. She argues that she established,

during voir dire, that Tebbets ‘‘had engaged in commer-
cial and residential snow removal, including removing

snow from apartment complexes . . . [and that] his

qualifications were sufficient to render him an expert

in the field of snow removal . . . .’’ She further contends that ‘‘the court’s decision to preclude [Tebbets’]

testimony about snow removal, but allow his testimony

regarding building codes, was clearly harmful to the

plaintiff . . . .’’ We are not persuaded.

The following additional facts are relevant to this

claim. The plaintiff disclosed Tebbets as an expert in

the fields of ‘‘building codes, fire codes, [Americans

with Disabilities Act (ADA)] accessibility, fall prevention, and safe snow removal.’’ Tebbets’ resume reveals

that he has a Bachelor of Science degree in education,

with a focus on ‘‘industrial arts, mechanical, electrical,

carpentry and architectural drafting.’’ He also attended

a mechanical engineering program at Thames Valley

State Technical College. Tebbets has additional training

listed on his resume as follows: International Code

Council’s master code professional certification since

1998; Connecticut certified building official; Massachusetts building commissioner; property maintenance and

housing inspector; certified zoning official of the Connecticut Association of Zoning Enforcement Officials;

Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

and Environmental Protection Agency regulations; Connecticut Building Officials and Code Administrators

building code updates; and ADA mandates regarding

asbestos and lead abatement. Tebbets’ resume also lists

his extensive professional experience in: building code

consulting and building, safety, and fire code compliance; ADA consulting and compliance; building energy

code policies; the drafting of model legislation in support of stronger energy codes; teaching professional

development seminars and classes regarding building

code and inspection; and enforcement of OSHA regulations.

After the plaintiff called Tebbets to the witness stand,

Tebbets discussed his extensive education and experience with codes and ordinances. He then testified about

his experience with snow removal. Tebbets testified

that he ‘‘shoveled snow for [his] mom and dad . . .

[and] worked at a marina where . . . [he] plowed

there. Eventually, [he] worked for different . . . contractors, [where] in the middle of winter, there’s not a

whole lot to do except come out in a snowstorm and

shovel snow or plow.’’ He testified: ‘‘If you look around,

in the old days, every carpenter had a plow on the front

of his truck, so I learned to plow when I was still in

high school . . . .’’ He also stated that he had a multifamily dwelling that he owned and plowed and that his

relatives owned a trailer park where he plowed, thereby

‘‘bec[oming] familiar with it just because it was the offseason and it was the thing you did.’’ The plaintiff,

thereafter, offered him as an expert on ‘‘snow removal

and codes and ordinances.’’2 The defendants objected
to his testifying as a snow removal expert on the ground

that Tebbets had not set forth any expertise on the

issue of snow removal. The court stated that, up to that

point, it had not heard anything that would rise to the

level of expertise in snow removal, but permitted the

plaintiff to engage in additional questioning.

The plaintiff then asked Tebbets more questions

about his snow removal background. Tebbets explained

that he was involved with snow removal for the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Nation where, although it had a

public works department that did the actual snow

removal, he, as the chief land use inspector, ‘‘had to

do all the difficult things like figure out where things

were supposed to go.’’ He also testified that he ‘‘was

involved with making sure that the lots, the walks—

especially sidewalks with the people walking around—

were cleared and properly draining.’’ He testified that

he was involved in snow removal while he worked in

the construction industry, but he ‘‘got tired of using a

shovel, so [he] kind of moved more [toward] the technical supervisor roles at that point,’’ and he had begun

supervising others who were removing snow and plowing. Further, he stated that when he was the zoning

enforcement officer in Groton, he was responsible for

reviewing site plans to assess whether plow trucks

could move about without obstruction, as well as the

appropriateness of the drainage systems being

proposed.

The defendants again objected to Tebbets testifying

as an expert in snow removal. The court then explained

to the plaintiff’s attorney that it had not heard anything

that would rise to the level of expertise. It asked counsel

whether Tebbets had gone to school or attended seminars on snow removal, or whether he had read any

books or educational materials on snow removal, or

whether he had taught classes or seminars. Counsel,

again, was permitted to question Tebbets further.

The plaintiff’s attorney then asked Tebbets if he had

any training in snow removal or whether there is training or schooling for snow removal. Tebbets answered:

‘‘[T]he town of Groton had some, but not being a plow

driver there, I didn’t have to take their class on plowing.

We were always more concerned about where they

were plowing and directing them where not to plow.’’

Tebbets then proceeded to explain that he had driven

a pickup truck with a snow plow and had driven a big

truck with a sander on the back. The plaintiff’s attorney

asked him if anyone had taught him how to do those

things, and Tebbets said: ‘‘Well, they showed me how

to drive and then they taught me how to plow and . . .

how to plow routes. They taught me . . . [not to] stick

[my] hand in the snow blower.’’ The plaintiff’s attorney

then said: ‘‘Unless Your Honor wishes to direct some

more questions, I’m not going to waste the jury’s time

any further, so I will offer him as an expert in snow
removal. If Your Honor does not find him to be an

expert, we’ll just move on.’’ The defendants’ attorneys

stated that they still objected. The court stated: ‘‘Okay.

Yeah. I’m not seeing how he has special expertise in it

other than having done a little bit of it, and it’s somewhat

tangential to his real expertise. So I’ll sustain the objection, but I will find him to be an expert in codes and

ordinances.’’ On appeal, the plaintiff claims this was

error. We disagree.

‘‘A witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,

experience, training, education or otherwise may testify

in the form of an opinion or otherwise concerning scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge, if the

testimony will assist the trier of fact in understanding

the evidence or in determining a fact in issue.’’ Conn.

Code Evid. § 7-2. ‘‘The determination of the qualification

of an expert is largely a matter for the discretion of the

trial court.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) United

Aircraft Corp. v. International Assn. of Machinists,

169 Conn. 473, 482–83, 363 A.2d 1068 (1975), cert.

denied, 425 U.S. 973, 96 S. Ct. 2172, 48 L. Ed. 2d 797

(1976); see also Weaver v. McKnight, 313 Conn. 393,

405, 97 A.3d 920 (2014) (‘‘[w]e review a trial court’s

decision to preclude expert testimony for an abuse

of discretion’’).

‘‘We afford our trial courts wide discretion in

determining whether to admit expert testimony and,

unless the trial court’s decision is unreasonable, made

on untenable grounds . . . or involves a clear misconception of the law, we will not disturb its decision. . . .

Although we afford trial courts significant discretion,

[w]here it clearly appears that an expert witness is

qualified to give an opinion, the exclusion of his testimony may be found to be [an abuse of discretion]. . . .

To the extent the trial court makes factual findings to

support its decision, we will accept those findings

unless they are clearly improper. . . . If we determine

that a court acted improperly with respect to the admissibility of expert testimony, we will reverse the trial

court’s judgment and grant a new trial only if the impropriety was harmful to the appealing party.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Fleming v. Dionisio, 317

Conn. 498, 505, 119 A.3d 531 (2015); see also Conn.

Code Evid. § 7-2.

‘‘We also note our standards for admitting expert

testimony. Expert testimony should be admitted when:

(1) the witness has a special skill or knowledge directly

applicable to a matter in issue, (2) that skill or knowledge is not common to the average person, and (3)

the testimony would be helpful to the court or jury in

considering the issues. . . . [T]o render an expert opinion the witness must be qualified to do so and there must

be a factual basis for the opinion.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Weaver v. McKnight, supra, 313

Conn. 405–406.
We conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in precluding Tebbets from testifying as an expert

in the field of snow removal. The court found that the

testimony demonstrated that Tebbets’ knowledge of

snow removal was insubstantial and that it was ‘‘tangential’’ to his real expertise in codes and ordinances. We

agree with this assessment. Tebbets’ testimony revealed

that his experience in snow removal was a minor part

of other jobs, whether in code compliance, ordinance

enforcement, or building construction. He had not

attended any classes or seminars on the topic, although

he admitted that some were available to people who

were employed as snow plow operators by the town

of Groton, he had not read any materials or books on

the topic, and he had not taught any seminars or classes

on the topic. It was reasonable for the court to conclude

from Tebbets’ testimony that snow removal was a minor

part of his employment over the years and that his

experience in snow removal was little more than that

common in the construction industry. The plaintiff’s

attorney simply did not develop Tebbets’ testimony to

show that his vast education in code compliance and

ordinance enforcement and his work experience qualified him as an expert in snow removal. We cannot

conclude, therefore, that the court abused its discretion

when it evaluated the qualifications of Tebbets, as presented, and found that, although he was an expert in

code compliance and ordinance enforcement, the plaintiff failed to establish that Tebbets had the requisite

expertise to be qualified as an expert in the field of

snow removal.3

II

The plaintiff next claims that the court abused its

discretion when, in granting the plaintiff’s motion for

sanctions, it denied the plaintiff’s request that the court

sanction the property owner by rendering a default

judgment against it as a sanction for the egregious

actions of its general and managing partner, Williams,

in sexually harassing the plaintiff’s attorney on two

occasions. The plaintiff argues that, despite the court’s

specific finding that Williams’ purpose was to cause the

plaintiff’s attorney ‘‘distress for a litigation advantage’’

and ‘‘to try to knock her off her ability to proceed in the

case,’’ it ‘‘imposed a sanction that failed to adequately

penalize Williams for his litigation misconduct.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) The plaintiff further

claims that Williams’ actions interfered with her attorney’s ability to represent her. Although we agree that

Williams’ conduct was egregious, we are unable to conclude that the court abused its discretion in declining to

render a default judgment against the property owner.

The following facts inform our review. On January

15, 2016, at 11:02 p.m., Williams sent an e-mail to the

plaintiff’s attorney, Kelly E. Reardon. The e-mail stated

in relevant part: ‘‘Welcome to my web said the spider
to the fly. Am I the fly or are you? I think I’m the fly.

Fare enough! What would like? What would you want

me to do lie? I love women like you because you young

girls have a direction that is 250% of what America is

. . . about.

‘‘Would you like to meet for coffee? Gee never had

that one? Call if you want 860- . . . . The people in

the case are not very nice people. This is not for just

shits and giggles. Coffee would be great! I have nothing

against your people. I think your great. Its just coffee.

Have to dive 75 miles just to in joy a cup.

‘‘Guess who is stupid? Me ok! You make my wheels

turn. You are one sharp women. Bet your on top of

your game. Did some MF say ATTORNEY. Call me to

help me please.

‘‘Thank you.

‘‘beauty is in the eye of me, Oh ya.

‘‘Not suppose to say this stuff so I will not say your

a fox!!!! But you are. You asked me to call you and you

didn’t give me your cell.

‘‘Old Goat

‘‘Doug 860- . . . .’’ (Grammatical and spelling errors

in original.)

After receiving the e-mail, Reardon notified her husband, her father, who also is an attorney in her law

firm, and the police. The police thereafter warned Williams not to contact Reardon again. Reardon later spoke

with the property owner’s attorney about the e-mail.

Neither the plaintiff nor Reardon informed the court

about Williams’ e-mail at that time.

More than one year later, immediately before opening

statements were to begin on April 27, 2017, while Reardon and others were standing in a hallway outside the

courtroom, Williams stated, loud enough to be heard

by those present, including Reardon, her father, and at

least one additional member of the bar who was not

involved in this case, that he wanted Reardon to ‘‘sit

on his fucking head.’’ Almost immediately, Reardon

reported to the court what had transpired, and she made

an oral motion for sanctions. The court immediately

held a hearing on the motion for sanctions, which then

was continued to allow Williams to retain an attorney,

thus delaying the start of trial. The January 15, 2016

e-mail also was discussed at the hearing. The plaintiff

sought sanctions that included: (1) Williams be removed

from the courtroom and sequestered; (2) a default judgment be rendered against the property owner and that

the parties proceed to a hearing in damages; and (3)

the court impose a financial penalty against Williams

in an amount between $10,000 and $50,000.

The court issued an oral decision on May 3, 2017.

The trial court specifically found that the purpose of
Williams’ e-mail to Reardon ‘‘was obviously to threaten

her, harass her, intimidate her, which the court believes

was done for the purposes of getting some advantage

in the case, to rattle her so that she’d do a poor job in

representing her client, to scare her to get her to drop

the case.’’ As to the statement Williams made in the

hallway of the courthouse, the court found that ‘‘considering the context and the purpose, which was essentially a sexual harassment of the plaintiff’s attorney to

try to scare her and rattle her, and obviously had that

exact effect because during the April 27 hearing when

the motion was made . . . Reardon was obviously

very upset . . . and so he accomplished his purpose

to try to knock her off her ability to proceed in the case,

and to cause her distress for a litigation advantage.’’

The court concluded that ‘‘these tactics were without

any color of propriety and they were taken in bad faith

. . . . There is no excuse for it, as obviously a bad faith

tactic which is not condoned or permitted by any stretch

of the imagination in court.’’

The court thereafter granted in part the motion for

sanctions, explaining that ‘‘something is merited here

due to the abusive, egregious behavior, but I don’t think

a default in a slip and fall case would be the appropriate

penalty since we’re trying to penalize the person, not

the corporation really, even though he was doing it

to benefit the corporation.’’ The court then ordered

Williams to sit in the back of the courtroom and to have

no contact with Reardon, and it awarded attorney’s

fees to the plaintiff, in an amount to be decided after

a hearing.4

Another of the plaintiff’s attorneys then objected to

the court’s ruling allowing Williams to remain in the

courtroom and to be in the hallway during recesses.

The court explained that it had considered this issue,

but that it was standing by its ruling. The attorney then

stated that he would ensure that someone, likely security, would be present with Reardon at all times

‘‘because we don’t have marshals any longer in the

courtrooms, which is—unfortunately puts lawyers at

risk.’’

‘‘It has long been understood that [c]ertain implied

powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice

from the nature of their institution, powers which cannot be dispensed with in a Court, because they are

necessary to the exercise of all others. . . . For this

reason, Courts of justice are universally acknowledged

to be vested, by their very creation, with power to

impose silence, respect, and decorum, in their presence,

and submission to their lawful mandates. . . . These

powers are governed not by rule or statute but by the

control necessarily vested in courts to manage their

own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious

disposition of cases. . . .

‘‘[I]t is firmly established that [t]he power to punish
for contempts is inherent in all courts. . . . This power

reaches both conduct before the court and that beyond

the court’s confines, for [t]he underlying concern that

gave rise to the contempt power was not . . . merely

the disruption of court proceedings. Rather, it was disobedience to the orders of the Judiciary, regardless of

whether such disobedience interfered with the conduct

of trial. . . .

‘‘Because of their very potency, inherent powers must

be exercised with restraint and discretion. . . . A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion

an appropriate sanction for conduct which abuses the

judicial process. . . . [O]utright dismissal of a lawsuit

. . . is a particularly severe sanction, yet is within the

court’s discretion. . . . Consequently, the less severe

sanction of an assessment of attorney’s fees is undoubtedly within a court’s inherent power as well.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Maurice v. Chester Housing

Associates Ltd. Partnership, 188 Conn. App. 21, 25–26,

A.3d (2019), quoting Chambers v. NASCO, Inc.,

501 U.S. 32, 43–45, 111 S. Ct. 2123, 115 L. Ed. 2d 27

(1991).

‘‘It is well settled that the imposition of sanctions

. . . rests within the discretion of the trial court and

will not be disturbed on review unless there is an abuse

of discretion. . . . Generally, a sanction should not

serve as a punishment or penalty. Courts should be

reluctant to employ the sanction of dismissal except as

a last resort. Such drastic action is not, however, an

abuse of discretion where a party shows a deliberate,

contumacious or unwarranted disregard for the court’s

authority.’’ (Citations omitted.) Fox v. First Bank, 198

Conn. 34, 39, 501 A.2d 747 (1985); see also Emerick v.

Glastonbury, 177 Conn. App. 701, 736, 173 A.3d 28

(2017), cert. denied, 327 Conn. 994, 175 A.3d 1245

(2018).

In this case, we are not persuaded that the court

abused its discretion in declining to render a default

judgment against the property owner on the basis of

Williams’ misconduct. Although the plaintiff argues that

Williams committed two egregious acts against Reardon, those acts were brought to the attention of the

court only after the occurrence of the second act. Reardon did not bring to the court’s attention the January

15, 2016 e-mail until the end of April, 2017, when Williams made a vile verbal comment to her in the hallway

of the courthouse. Nor did she ask for a mistrial or

an additional continuance. As egregious as Williams’

conduct was, the record reveals that he ceased such

conduct immediately upon the intervention of the court

and the court’s imposition of attorney’s fees and an

order limiting Williams’ movements in court. Because

there is no indication that the conduct continued after

the court’s intervention, we are unable to conclude that

the court abused the wide discretion afforded to it when
it imposed a sanction that it deemed appropriate under

the circumstances.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The plaintiff also makes a passing claim in her appellate brief that the

court erred in denying her motion to set aside the verdict. The plaintiff’s

appellate brief contains no standard of review for the denial of a motion

to set aside the verdict, and it contains no legal analysis regarding such a

claim. Rather, she sets forth the statement that the court erred in denying

the motion to set aside the verdict, with little more. Accordingly, we deem

any claim related to the court’s denial of her motion to set aside the verdict

abandoned. See Stacy B. v. Robert S., 165 Conn. App. 374, 376 n.1, 140 A.3d

1004 (2016) (claim merely raised in passing, deemed abandoned).

2 We note that it is not necessary for a party to ask that the court recognize

the witness as an expert before asking the witness to provide an opinion.

Nicholson v. Commissioner of Correction, 186 Conn. App. 398, 420–21, 199

A.3d 573 (2018), cert. denied, 330 Conn 961, 199 A.3d 19 (2019). The proponent of the expert simply must lay the necessary foundation before asking

the witness a question that calls for an expert opinion. If there is no objection

to the question, the witness may give the opinion. If there is an objection

to the witness’ qualifications or to whether the witness’ testimony will assist

the trier of fact, the court can then rule on the objection in the context of

the specific questions asked. We believe that this procedure has several

advantages over one asking the court to accept or recognize a witness as

an expert. First, asking the court to recognize a witness as an expert suggests

that the court may refuse to do so even in the absence of an objection. It

cannot. Id. Requiring an objection to a question that calls for an opinion

and then a ruling from the court is much more consistent with our adversarial

system and the manner in which virtually all other evidence is admitted or

excluded at trial. Second, accepting counsel’s invitation to recognize or

accept a witness as an expert risks ‘‘influencing the jury in its assessment

of the credibility of the witness by announcing that the court is blessing or

endorsing the witness.’’ E. Prescott, Tait’s Handbook of Connecticut Evidence (6th Ed. 2019) § 7.4.1, p. 449. Third, the court is in a better position

to rule on issues relating to a witness’ qualifications and fitness for a particular case when the objection relates to the specific questions that will elicit

the opinion to which an objection is raised. It would not be unusual at all

for an expert to be qualified to answer one question on a subject, but not

qualified to answer other questions on that subject. Consequently, we suggest

that litigants abandon the practice of asking trial courts to recognize or

accept a witness as an expert. For the same reasons, we encourage trial

court judges to decline any such requests from the parties.

3 We also note that the manner in which the plaintiff presented and the

court resolved whether Tebbets was qualified to testify as an expert on

snow removal would make it impossible, if the court had erred in concluding

that he was not qualified, for us to determine if the plaintiff was harmed

by such an error. The plaintiff never proffered a question about snow removal

that she wanted Tebbets to answer and never made an offer of proof as to

what testimony Tebbets would have offered if permitted to do so. Consequently, there is nothing in the record that would tell us how helpful, if at

all, any testimony from Tebbets regarding snow removal would have been

to the plaintiff. This problem might have been avoided had counsel simply

asked Tebbets for an opinion, requiring the defendants to raise any objection

in the context of the specific question asked. See footnote 2 of this opinion.

4 Williams filed a writ of error after the imposition of the sanctions, which

this court later dismissed. Maurice v. Chester Housing Associates Ltd.

Partnership, 188 Conn. App. 21, A.3d (2019).