IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-10521

Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

STEVEN ADAM SEGOVIA,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 5:18-CR-117-1

Before SMITH, DENNIS, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Steven Adam Segovia appeals the 175-month sentence imposed after he 

pleaded guilty to possession “with intent to distribute 50 grams and more of 

methamphetamine (actual).” Citing the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 

U.S. 466, 490 (2000), Segovia contends that the district court violated his Fifth 

and Sixth Amendment rights by basing his guideline sentence on a drug 

amount in excess of 300 grams of methamphetamine that was not alleged in 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

January 6, 2020

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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No. 19-10521

2

the indictment and proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. The 

Government moves for summary affirmance, arguing that Segovia’s argument 

is foreclosed by United States v. Tuma, 738 F.3d 681 (5th Cir. 2013), and United 

States v. Bazemore, 839 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2016). 

In Tuma, this court held that a district court may make findings of fact 

that increase a defendant’s sentence if those facts do not expose the defendant 

to an increased mandatory minimum sentence. Tuma, 738 F.3d at 693. 

Otherwise, a court’s “‘broad sentencing discretion, informed by judicial 

factfinding, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.’” Id. (quoting Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99, 116 (2013)); cf. also generally Apprendi, 530 U.S. at

490 (holding that, “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that 

increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum 

must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt”). Segovia 

suggests that the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616, 

619-24 (2016), called Tuma into question by invalidating Florida’s capital 

sentencing scheme to the extent it required the trial judge, not the jury, to find 

sufficient aggravating circumstances to justify the death penalty. He concedes, 

however, that in Bazemore this court rejected a similar argument, explaining 

that Hurst “applies only to statutory schemes in which judge-made findings 

increase the maximum sentence that a defendant can receive.” Bazemore, 839 

F.3d at 392-93. 

Segovia was charged and convicted under a statute providing a 

minimum sentence of 10 years and a maximum sentence of life in prison for a 

crime involving 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. See 21 U.S.C. 

§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). Because the charged drug quantity supported Segovia’s 

175-month sentence, and the sentence did not exceed the statutory maximum, 

the sentence raises no constitutional concerns. See Bazemore, 839 F.3d at 392-

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No. 19-10521

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93; Tuma, 738 F.3d at 693. We also note that, in any event, Segovia stipulated 

that his crime involved more than 300 grams of methamphetamine. 

Segovia’s contention is clearly foreclosed, such that “there can be no 

substantial question as to the outcome of the case.” Groendyke Transp., Inc. v. 

Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1162 (5th Cir. 1969). Accordingly, the Government’s 

motion for summary affirmance is GRANTED, and the judgment is 

AFFIRMED. The Government’s alternative motion for additional time for 

briefing is DENIED. 

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