1

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

____________________

NO. 09-18-00464-CV

____________________

IN THE INTEREST OF H.M.

_______________________________________________________ ______________

On Appeal from the 75th District Court 

Liberty County, Texas

Trial Cause No. CV1712144

________________________________________________________ _____________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother and Father appeal the trial court’s judgment terminating the parentchild relationships between “Beth,”1 her Mother, and her Father. Mother and Father 

each filed appeals. In Father’s appeal, his court-appointed appellate counsel 

submitted a brief that contends no arguable grounds can be advanced to support 

 

1 To protect the identity of the minor child that is discussed in the opinion, we 

have used pseudonyms for her name, as well as her parents and other members of 

her family. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
2

Father’s appeal.2 In Mother’s appeal, Mother’s court-appointed appellate counsel 

filed a brief raising six issues for our review. We affirm the trial court’s judgment 

terminating the parent-child relationships between Beth and her Mother and between 

Beth and her Father.

Background

The Department of Family and Protective Services (the Department) initiated 

the proceedings that resulted in the termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental 

rights in early-June 2017, when Beth was nearly five years old. Two events, both of 

which occurred in late-April 2017, led the Department to investigate Mother’s ability 

to care for Beth.

3

 According to the Department’s investigator, who testified in the 

trial, someone from Beth’s school reported to the Department that Beth had not come 

to school. When a school employee went to Mother’s home, the school employee, 

 

2 See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); see also In re L.D.T., 161 

S.W.3d 728, 731 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (holding that Anders

procedures apply in parental-rights termination cases).

3 Mother, Father, and Beth lived together until Mother and Father were 

involved in some type of altercation with each other that resulted in Father’s arrest, 

which occurred in March 2015. Father was sentenced to prison following the 

altercation, and he was still in prison when the case was tried in mid-October 2019. 

During the trial, Father testified that he was in prison based on his conviction for 

obstruction and retaliation. He also testified he expected to be released, on parole, in 

June 2019. He also agreed that based on his conviction, he received an eight-year 

sentence that ends in 2023, not 2019. 
3

according to the investigator, found that Mother was passed out and that the home 

smelled of marijuana. The second report came from some unidentified law 

enforcement official. According to the investigator, the official reported seeing 

marijuana and open bottles of pills in Mother’s home. 

The same day the Department received these reports, its investigator met with 

Beth and her teacher and arranged to meet with Mother at Mother’s home. During 

the meeting, Mother showed the investigator her prescription bottles. Mother also 

told the investigator that a caregiver was helping her manage her medications. 

Mother told the investigator that she did not have marijuana in her home, and she 

claimed that if anyone saw it there, it belonged to her brother-in-law, who was also 

assisting her in her home. Finally, Mother told the investigator that she obtained 

additional assistance from a neighbor who helped her daily. Based on the 

Department’s initial investigation into whether Mother was caring for Beth, the 

investigator concluded that the Department did not need to remove Beth from 

Mother’s home given the assistance she was getting and because one of Mother’s 

neighbors agreed to monitor the situation and report any concerns to the Department. 

On May 11, 2017, Mother informed the investigator that she no longer had a 

caregiver. On May 31, 2017, the investigator learned that the agency that had been 

providing Mother with a caregiver quit doing so because the agency determined that 
4

Mother required a higher level of care than it could provide. When the investigator 

attempted to contact Mother to discuss whether Mother still had someone to help her 

with her medications, Mother failed to respond to the investigator’s phone calls or

text messages. On June 1, 2017, the investigator met with Beth at her school.

Ultimately, the investigator learned that Beth’s mother was not home and that she 

had been hospitalized. The investigator went to the hospital, where she saw Mother. 

According to the investigator, Mother was “incoherent” at the hospital. The 

investigator stated Mother was “able to say her name[,]” was aware she had been 

hospitalized, and “that was about it.” That same day, the Department decided to 

remove Beth from Mother’s custody because Mother, at that point, could not care 

for Beth and the Department was not able to find another family member who could 

care for her. 

In early-June 2017, the Department sued Mother and Father seeking to 

terminate their respective rights to parent Beth. Three days after the Department 

sued, the trial court signed an emergency temporary order naming the Department 

as Beth’s sole managing conservator. Following an adversarial hearing, the trial 

court signed a temporary order, which established the requirements that Mother and 

Father needed to meet to have Beth returned to their care. The temporary order 
5

required Mother and Father to comply with a parenting plan created by the 

Department. 

In October 2019, the parties tried the case to the bench. Both Mother and 

Father were represented by attorneys. Six witnesses testified during the trial. While 

Father testified in the trial, Mother did not. When the trial ended, the trial court 

terminated Father’s rights under subsections D, E, O, and Q of the Texas Family 

Code.

4 The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under subsections B, D, 

E, N, and O of the Texas Family Code.

5 The court also found that terminating

Father’s and Mother’s respective parent-child relationship with Beth is in Beth’s best 

interest, and it appointed the Department to be Beth’s managing conservator.6

Analysis

I. Father’s Appeal

Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief in Father’s 

appeal.7 We have reviewed the brief, and it complies with the requirements that 

 4 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), (Q) (West Supp. 

2018).

5 See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(B), (D), (E), (N), (O) (West Supp. 2018). 

6 See id. § 161.001(b)(2) (West Supp. 2018). 

7 See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; In re L.D.T., 161 S.W.3d at 731. 
6

apply to such briefs. The brief presents an attorney’s professional evaluation of the 

record and explains why, as it relates to Father, no arguable grounds exist to overturn 

the trial court’s judgment.

8 Father’s court-appointed appellate counsel also 

represented to the Court that she gave Father a copy of the brief that she filed in 

Father’s appeal, notified Father of his right to file a pro se brief, and explained how 

Father could review a copy of the record pertinent to his appeal. Father has not filed 

a pro se response.

After reviewing the record and counsel’s brief, we conclude that no arguable 

grounds exist to support Father’s appeal and that Father’s appeal is frivolous.

9 As to 

Father, we affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating his parent-child relationship 

with Beth.

II. Mother’s Appeal

Mother contends the evidence admitted in the trial is insufficient to support 

terminating her parental rights under all grounds on which the judgment is based. 

She also argues that terminating her rights is not in Beth’s best interest.10 

 

8 See In re D.D., 279 S.W.3d 849, 850 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, pet. denied).

9 See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); see also 

In re K.R.C., 346 S.W.3d 618, 619 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2009, no pet.); In re D.D., 

279 S.W.3d at 850.

10 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(B), (D), (E), (N), (O), (b)(2).
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A. Standard of Review

First, we note the standards of review that apply to legal and factual 

insufficiency issues. To involuntarily terminate a parent’s rights, the factfinder must 

conclude, by clear and convincing evidence, that (1) the parent committed one or 

more of the prohibited acts or omissions listed in section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family 

Code, and that (2) terminating the parent’s rights to her child is in the child’s best 

interest.

11 Section 161.001(b)(1) of the Texas Family Code currently lists twentyone grounds authorizing trial courts to terminate a parent-child relationship when 

terminating the relationship is in the child’s best interest.

12 Nevertheless, the trial 

court need only find one of the statutory grounds exists and that terminating the 

relationship is in the child’s best interest to justify terminating the parent-child

relationship.13 

Under the standards that apply to legal insufficiency claims, appellate courts

must consider the evidence “‘in the light most favorable to the finding to determine 

whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

 

11 See id. § 161.001(b)(1), (b)(2) (West Supp. 2018).

12 See id. § 161.001(b)(1). 

13 See In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d 576, 580 (Tex. 2014).
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its finding was true.’”14 In doing so, appellate courts assume that the factfinder 

resolved disputed facts in a manner that favors its finding, if a reasonable factfinder 

could have done so.

15 Thus, an appellate court must disregard all evidence that a 

reasonable factfinder could have, by inference, disbelieved or found incredible.16

Should the appellate court determine that a reasonable factfinder could reasonably 

form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, it must

conclude that legally sufficient evidence supports the finding that the parent has 

complained about in the appeal.

17

Under the factual sufficiency standard of review, we consider and weigh all 

the evidence in the record, giving deference to the findings the factfinder reached so 

that we do not supplant the verdict the factfinder made with our own.

18 “‘If, in light 

of the entire record, the disputed evidence that a reasonable factfinder could not have 

credited in favor of the finding is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably 

 

14 In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 85 (Tex. 2005) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 

256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).

15 In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266.

16 Id. 

17 See In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d at 85.

18 In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 

105, 108 (Tex. 2006).
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have formed a firm belief or conviction, then the evidence is factually 

insufficient.’”19 When conducting a factual sufficiency review, the appellate court 

must give due deference to the factfinder’s findings, and it must avoid substituting 

its own judgment for that of the factfinder.20

B. Analysis—Statutory Finding 

While the trial court terminated Mother’s rights under five separate sections 

of the Family Code, we will first address the arguments Mother raises in her fifth 

issue, which argues that not enough evidence was admitted in the trial to support the 

trial court’s finding that she violated the requirements of a court order.

21 The 

pertinent statutory subsection authorizing a trial court to terminate a parent’s rights 

for violating a court’s order are found in section 161.001(b)(1)(O) of the Family 

Code.22 Under subsection O, which is the section Mother has challenged in issue 

five, the Department was required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that

Mother:

[1] failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that specifically 

established the actions necessary for the parent to obtain the return of 

 

19 In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345 (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 267).

20 See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d at 108.

21 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O).

22 Id.
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the child [2] who has been in the permanent or temporary managing 

conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective Services 

for not less than nine months [3] as a result of the child’s removal from 

the parent under Chapter 262 for the abuse or neglect of the child[.]23

Mother’s arguments focus entirely on whether she violated a court order, and 

she does not claim the evidence fails to show that Beth was not in the Department’s 

custody for the required nine months or that Beth was not removed due to neglect. 

During the trial, a caseworker who worked for the Department on Mother’s case 

testified that Mother did not complete her court-ordered parenting plan. The 

caseworker testified that she discussed the parenting plan with Mother and explained 

to Mother the actions Mother needed to take to regain custody of Beth. The parenting 

plan, which the trial court admitted into evidence at trial, required Mother to: (1) 

find an appropriate caregiver to help her provide for her daily activities, such as 

housekeeping, meal prep, personal hygiene, medication maintenance, and 

medication reminders; (2) comply with an independent review of proper medications 

by a licensed psychiatrist and medical doctor of the Department’s choosing, as well 

as continued monitoring by the Department’s caseworker; (3) sign a medical release 

form; (4) complete a psychological evaluation and follow the psychologist’s

recommendations; and (5) obtain and maintain appropriate safe and clean housing 

 

23 Id.; see also In re S.M.R., 434 S.W.3d at 582.
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in a drug-free environment with utilities that are operational. When explaining what 

Mother did to comply with these requirements, the caseworker testified that Mother 

signed a medical release, but “that’s pretty much it.” 

In her brief, Mother does not dispute that she failed to comply with each of 

the requirements in her parenting plan. Instead, Mother claims the evidence is legally 

and factually insufficient because the Department failed to comply with the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by tailoring her parenting plan to her 

disability.

24

Under the trial court’s order, which the court signed after the adversarial 

hearing, the Department had the burden to prove that Mother violated the terms of 

the order. We note that the order the trial court signed requiring Mother to follow 

the terms of her parenting plan was never modified after it was signed. Moreover, 

the terms of the order are silent on the Department’s duty to tailor Mother’s plan to 

accommodate any claimed disabilities. 

 

24 42 U.S.C.S. §§ 12101-12213 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-8). Since no 

medically trained experts testified in the trial, there is not much evidence in the 

record to explain what disabilities Mother has or how they interfered with her ability 

to comply with the court’s order. Mother did not testify in the trial, so there is very 

little evidence in the record explaining how her disabilities interfered with her ability 

to meet the requirements of the parenting plan the trial court ordered her to follow. 
12

When evaluating whether that factfinder’s decision is supported by sufficient 

evidence, we measure the evidence admitted in the trial against the requirements in 

the trial court’s order. We do not measure the sufficiency of the evidence in an appeal 

based on some hypothetical order the trial court might have entered had Mother 

asked the trial court to modify the order that the trial court found she violated.25 After 

the trial court ordered Mother to comply with the parenting plan, the record does not 

show that Mother ever made the trial court aware she had a disability that interfered 

with her ability to comply with the trial court’s order.26

 Measuring the sufficiency of the evidence by the terms of what the order 

required Mother to accomplish, the record shows the Department proved by clear 

and convincing evidence that Mother did not obtain a psychological evaluation or 

maintain housing suitable to raise a child. Both were requirements under the order 

the trial court signed following the adversarial hearing. Here, the record contains 

legally and factually sufficient evidence to allow the trial court to form a firm belief 

 25 See generally Osterberg v. Peca, 12 S.W.3d 31, 55 (Tex. 2000) (explaining 

that a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence must be measured against the 

court’s charge as submitted, not some other unidentified law, when the opposing 

party fails to object to the charge). 

26 See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1 (preserving error for appellate review about the 

terms of an order requires the complaining party to show that she presented her 

complaint to the trial court by making a timely request, objection, or motion and that 

the trial court ruled on the request).
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or conviction that Mother failed to comply with the requirements of the trial court’s 

order.

27 For these reasons, we overrule Mother’s fifth issue.

Because we have overruled Mother’s fifth issue challenging the trial court’s 

judgment under subsection O, we need not address issues one through four, which 

challenge the trial court’s findings based on other subsections of section 

161.001(b)(1).

28 Under Texas law, when sufficient evidence supports one of the

findings under section 161.001(b)(1) of the Family Code authorizing the trial court 

to terminate the parent-child relationship, that finding, coupled with the best-interest 

finding, allows the appellate court to affirm the judgment.

29

C. Analysis—Best-Interest Finding 

In her sixth issue, Mother argues the record fails to show that terminating her

parental rights is in Beth’s best interest. In a parental-rights termination case, the 

Department must establish by clear and convincing evidence that terminating a 

parent’s rights to her child is in the child’s best interest.30 There is a “rebuttable 

 27 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(1)(O); In the Interest of J.E.M.M., 

532 S.W.3d 874, 885 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.). 

28 See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1 (requiring the appellate court’s opinion to address 

each issue necessary to the resolution of the appeal).

29 In re S.M.R. 434 S.W.3d at 580.
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presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing 

conservators” will serve the child’s best interest.

31 That said, courts must also 

presume that a prompt and permanent placement of a child in a safe environment is 

in the child’s best interest.32 In reviewing a best-interest finding, we consider the 

nine non-exhaustive factors identified by the Texas Supreme Court in Holley v. 

Adams.

33

 

30 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b)(2); see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 

796, 807 (Tex. 2012). 

31 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 153.131(b) (West 2014); see also In re R.R., 209 

S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006) (noting that a “strong presumption” exists favoring 

keeping a child with its parent).

32 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a) (West Supp. 2018).

33 In Holley, the Texas Supreme Court applied these factors in reviewing a 

best-interest finding:

• the child’s desires;

• the child’s emotional and physical needs, now and in the future;

• the emotional and physical danger to the child, now and in the 

future;

• the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody;

• the programs available to assist the parties seeking custody;

• the plans for the child by the parties seeking custody;
15

During the trial, six-year-old Beth testified that she currently lives with her 

foster parents. The testimony shows that Beth previously lived with the same foster 

parents, for about nine months, after Mother and the Department agreed to allow 

Beth to be placed in a foster home in April 2015. Beth testified that she calls her 

foster parents “Mommy and Daddy,” and that her favorite place to be is with them.

Beth admitted that, while she likes talking to Mother on the phone and spending time 

with Mother when Mother visits, she would prefer to live with her foster parents 

forever.

Both of Beth’s foster parents testified during the trial. Beth’s foster mother 

testified that Beth had been living in the foster parents’ home with their three other 

children since June 1, 2017. According to Beth’s foster father, Beth is “doing 

extremely well.” Both foster parents testified that Beth has bonded with the children 

living in their household, and that the children refer to Beth as their sister. The 

 

• the stability of the home or the proposed placement;

• the parent’s acts or omissions, which may indicate that the 

existing parent-child relationship is improper;

• any excuse for the parent’s acts or omissions.

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976).
16

evidence allowed the trial court to conclude that the foster parents are meeting Beth’s 

emotional and physical needs, and that they can do so in the future. 

On the other hand, the evidence admitted in the trial allowed the trial court to 

conclude that Mother’s lifestyle and physical condition had “deteriorated 

significantly” since the Department sued. When the Department removed Beth from 

Mother’s home, Mother agreed that she was unable to manage Beth’s or her own 

daily needs without a caregiver. Yet, even after Mother admitted she needed a 

caregiver, there is no evidence showing that she obtained someone to assist her with 

caring for herself and Beth. The evidence in the trial shows that Mother has not 

worked since the Department filed suit but receives socialsecurity disability income. 

The record before the trial court does not disclose the nature of her disability except 

to the extent there is testimony showing that Mother was unable to follow directions 

for taking the medications she was being prescribed without someone’s help. Mother 

also failed to follow each of the requirements of her court-ordered parenting plan.

When trial courts engage in a best-interest analysis, the child’s need for a 

prompt and permanent placement in a safe environment is of paramount concern.34 

The testimony in the trial shows that Mother moved at least seven times after the 

Department filed the suit to terminate her rights. During the proceedings before the 

 

34 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 263.307(a).
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trial, the evidence shows that Mother lived with a series of roommates who either 

stole from her or physically abused her. At times, Mother was homeless and sleeping 

in her car. Moreover, the trial court was not required to infer that Mother could have 

provided evidence that contradicted the evidence admitted in the trial had she 

testified. Given the evidence that was probative on Mother’s failure to make 

appropriate arrangements for Beth’s housing, and the number of times Mother 

moved while the proceedings were pending, the trial court could reasonably 

conclude that Mother cannot provide Beth with housing that is appropriate and safe 

for a child. 

The testimony in the trial shows that the Department’s goal for Beth was to 

have her adopted by her foster parents, who expressed a strong interest in adopting

her. Mother’s plan for the child, as described by Beth’s foster mother, was to move 

with Beth to Louisiana. Both the caseworker assigned to Mother’s case and Beth’s 

court-appointed special advocate testified that terminating Mother’s parental rights

so Beth could be adopted by her foster parents would be in Beth’s best interest. We 

conclude the evidence admitted in the trial is legally and factually sufficient to 
18

support the trial court’s finding that terminating Mother’s rights served Beth’s best 

interest.35 We overrule Mother’s sixth issue.

Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment terminating Mother’s and Father’s

parent-child relationship with Beth. Although Father’s court-appointed appellate 

counsel filed a motion to withdraw, we deny that motion because appellate counsel’s 

duty requires court-appointed counsel to represent the client until the client has either 

exhausted or waived any further appeals.

36 Should Father advise his counsel that he 

desires to pursue an appeal, counsel may satisfy the obligation that she has to her 

client “by filing a petition for review that satisfies the standards for an Anders

brief.”37 Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

AFFIRMED.

_________________________

 HOLLIS HORTON

 Justice

 35 See In re J.F.C. 96 S.W.3d at 266 (explaining that the appellate court’s 

analysis should determine whether the factfinder, under a clear and convincing

standard of proof, could have formed a firm belief or conviction about the 

Department’s claims). 

36 See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.016(3)(B) (West Supp. 2018); In re P.M., 

520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016).

37 In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d at 27-28.
19

Submitted on March 26, 2019

Opinion Delivered April 25, 2019

Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.