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******************************************************IN RE AVIREX R.* (AC 36291)
Sheldon, Prescott and Bear, Js. Argued May 12—officially released July 16, 2014** (Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Juvenile Matters, Burgdorff, J.)
Joshua Michtom, assistant public defender, for the appellant (respondent mother).
Susan T. Pearlman, assistant attorney general, with whom, on the brief, were George Jepsen, attorney general, andBenjamin Zivyon, assistant attorney general, for the appellee (petitioner).
Robert J. Moore, for the minor child.Opinion PRESCOTT, J. The respondent mother, Sara M., appealsfromthejudgmentofthetrialcourttransferring guardianship ofherminor son, Avirex R., fromthe petitioner, the Commissioner of Children and Families, to the child’s paternal aunt, Emma G.1 On appeal, the respondent claims that the court erred by misapplying the statute governing revocations of commitment, and by failing to afford her a presumption of fitness. For the reasons we will set forth, thejudgment is affirmed.
The following facts andproceduralhistoryare necessaryfor ourresolution ofthese claims. Avirexwas born
on September 21, 2011. Because Avirex had opiates in his system at birth, the petitioner placed a ninety-six hour hold on him.2 On September 29, 2011, within the period of the ninety-six hour hold, the petitioner filed
a neglect petition on behalf ofAvirex and a motion for
anorderoftemporarycustody. Thecourt,Hon. William L. Wollenberg, judge trial referee, granted ex parte the motion for an order oftemporary custody and ordered specific steps for reunification for both parents. Upon the child’s release from the hospital on September 29, 2011, the petitioner placed him with his paternal aunt, Emma G., and he has remained in her care since his release.3
On October 7, 2011, after an opportunity for each of the parties to be heard by the court, Keller, J ., the court’s initial grant ofthe motionforan orderoftemporary custodywas sustained bythe court. Amended specific steps were ordered to facilitate the respondent’s reunification with Avirex. The respondent did not comply with all of the steps. For example, she did not comply with the requirement to continue substance abuse and mental health treatment.
The respondent and the father entered pleas of nolo contendere as to the neglect petition, which the court accepted.4 Both parents, however, contested the disposition of commitment, and that matter was tried to the court, Burgdorff, J., on March 8, 2012. Also on March 8, 2012, the court heard a motion for transfer of guardianship filed by the respondent seeking placement of Avirex with his maternal grandmother.
On March 14, 2012, the court deniedthe respondent’s motion to transfer guardianship to the child’s maternal grandmother, adjudicatedAvirexneglectedpursuantto General Statutes § 46b-120 (6) (B),5 and committed him to the care and custody of the petitioner. Avirex remained in the care ofEmma G., and on May 24, 2013, the petitioner authorized a subsidized guardianship for Emma G., which was later approved by the court.6 The respondentdidnotappealfromthe denialofhermotion to transfer guardianship or the court’s order of commitment.7
On June 20, 2013, the petitioner filed a motion tomodify disposition pursuant to General Statutes § 46b129 and Practice Book § 34a-1, and a motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship.8 Both motions sought to end the commitment of Avirex to the petitioner, and to transfer guardianship ofhim to Emma G.
In response, the respondent filed a motion to revoke commitment on June 25, 2013, in which she objected to the petitioner’s request to transfer guardianship. She also requested in her motion that the court order that Avirex be returned to her custody.
On November 1, 2013, the court conducted a hearing
on the petitioner’s motion to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship. The court was prepared to conduct a hearing at the same time on the respondent’s motionto revoke commitment, but she orallywithdrew her motion at the commencement of the hearing. The respondent continuedto objecttothetransferofguardianship to Emma G., and moved the court instead to delaythetransferofguardianship andorderareunification plan with her. The court did not grant the respondent’s motion for a continuance and the hearing proceeded.
On November 7, 2013, the court, Burgdorff, J ., grantedthepetitioner’smotiontotransferguardianship to Emma G. In its memorandum of decision, the court cited subsection (m) of § 46b-129 as the applicable law and found the following facts. The respondent had a history of crime and domestic violence. After being arrested on January 4, 2012, she left Connecticut, without informing the court, to live with her parents and brotherin NewHampshire. The respondenttestedpositive for illegal substances several times prior to her
move to New Hampshire, and she was discharged from the Wheeler Clinic and the Women and Children’s Substance Abuse Residential Program at New Life Center for noncompliance with program rules. Uponmovingto NewHampshire, the respondent did, tohercredit, seektreatmentfromtheManchesterMetro Treatment Centerfor opiate dependence in September, 2012, and all of her drug tests since that time were negativeforillegalsubstances.Althoughtherespondent reported to the Department of Children and Families (department) that she was engaging in mental health treatment, she failed to authorize her mental health provider to release her records so that the department could confirm this treatment. Additionally, the department was unable to verify the respondent’s source of income. She had represented that she had applied for social security disability benefits, but she failed to disclose the basis of her disability claims or any information as to her current mental health diagnoses or medications.
While living in New Hampshire, the respondent engagedintwice monthlyvisitationswiththe child, andtraveled to Connecticut with Avirex’s maternal grandmother and half sibling in order to visit with Avirex.9 Significantly, since moving to New Hampshire, the respondent has failed to inquire independently as to Avirex’s well-being or to request additional visits. Avirex, then two years old, had lived with Emma G. since his discharge from the hospital after his birth. All ofhis emotional and medical needs were being met by Emma G., with whom Avirex had formed a significant emotionalbond. EmmaG. hadsufficientincometomeet his needs and provide stable housing. Finally, Emma G. had been compliant with Avirex’s visits with the respondent, the child’s father, and the maternal grandmother and siblings.
In light of those findings, none of which the respondenthas challengedas clearlyerroneous, the courtconcluded: ‘‘[The petitioner] has met [her] burden of proving by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the cause for commitment of Avirex no longer exists in that it is no longer in his best interest to continue withthe commitment. Avirexhasresidedwithhispaternal aunt since October 11, 2011, a period of over two years. Avirex is in a stable and loving home, and the paternal aunt appears to be devoted to him. She is committed to providing for Avirex’s psychological, social emotional and medical needs. He is happy in the placement. The court further finds that the paternal aunt, Emma G., is a suitable and worthy guardian, and that such a disposition is in

. . . Avirex’s best interest, and most appropriately addresses his need for permanency. To disrupt his placement with his paternal aunt would be contrary to his best interest.

. . . [Although] the court recognizes that [the respondent] has been successfully engaged in her substance abuse treatment in NewHampshire, the courtistroubledby [the respondent’s] refusal to allow the disclosure of her mental healthdiagnoses andmedications. Further, [therespondent] is clearly not self-sufficient as she relies completely on [the] maternal grandmotherforfinancial and housing support. No evidence was presented as to [the respondent’s] completion of parenting classes. The court, therefore, further finds that it would not be in Avirex’sbestinterestto considerreunificationwith [the respondent] at this time.’’
The court granted the petitioner’s motions to open the dispositionofcommitmentandtotransferguardianship, and ordered that the guardianship of Avirex be transferred from the petitioner to Emma G. The court directed Emma G. ‘‘to allow [the respondent] such visitation as she deems to be inAvirex’s best interest,’’ and referred disputes concerning visitation to the family court. This appeal followed.
On appeal, the respondent claims that the court misapplied § 46b-129 (m). Specifically, she argues that subsection (m) of § 46b-129 requires the court to make afindingthatthe cause for commitment no longer exists, and that, after making that finding, the court must presume that the parent is fit to regain custody and that itwouldbeinthebestinterestofthechildtobereturned to the parent. The respondent argues that the court failed to make the required finding that the cause for commitment no longer existed and failed to apply the required presumption of fitness in violation of § 46b129 (m).
We conclude thatthe court erredby applying subsection (m) of § 46b-129 because the petitioner was not seeking to revoke commitment and return Avirex to the respondent, butinsteadsoughttotransferguardianship to a third party. That procedure is properly governed by subsection (j) of § 46b-129. We further conclude, however, that the court’sjudgment need not be reversed, as the court still engaged in the analysis otherwise required by subsection (j) of § 46b-129.
We begin our discussionwith the standard ofreview. In order to resolve the respondent’s claims on appeal, it is necessary to construe and harmonize various subsections of § 46b-129 and the relevantprovisions ofour rulesofpracticeimplementingthatstatute. SeePractice Book §§ 35a-16, 35a-12A and 35a-20. ‘‘[I]ssues of statutory construction raise questions oflaw, overwhichwe exercise plenary review.

. . . The process of statutory interpretation involves the determination of the meaning of the statutory language as applied to the facts of the case, includingthequestionofwhetherthelanguage does so apply.

. . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the legislature.

. . . In other words, we seek to determine, in a reasoned manner, the meaning ofthe statutory language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including the question of whether the language actually does apply.

. . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs
us first to consider the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning ofthe statute shall not be considered.

. . . The interpretive construction of the rules of practice is to be governed by the same principles as those regulatingstatutoryinterpretation.’’ (Citationomitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re A.R., 123 Conn. App. 336, 339, 1 A.3d 1184 (2010). Accordingly, we turntothe statutoryscheme governing the disposition of children who have been found to be abused or neglected. After a child has been found to be neglected or abused, § 46b-129 (j) (2) grants a court four dispositional options: ‘‘[T]he court may (A) commit such child or youth to the Commissioner of Children and Families, and such commitment shallremain in effect until further order ofthe court, except that such commitment may be revoked or parental rightsterminatedatanytime bythe court; (B) vestsuch child’s or youth’s legal guardianship in any private or public agency that is permitted by law to care for neglected, uncared-for or abused children or youths or with any other person or persons found to be suitable and worthy of such responsibility by the court, including, but not limited to, any relative of such child or youth by blood or marriage; (C) vest such child’s or youth’s permanent legal guardianship in any person
or persons found to be suitable and worthy of such responsibility by the court, including, but not limited to, any relative of such child or youth by blood or marriage in accordance with the requirements set forth in subdivision (5) of this subsection; or (D) place the child or youth in the custody ofthe parent or guardian with protective supervision by the Commissioner of Children and Families subjectto conditions established by the court.’’
If the court commits a child to the petitioner, the petitionermustpresent to the court apermanencyplan within nine months ofplacement of the child or youth inthe care orcustodyofthepetitioner. General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (1). ‘‘At a permanency hearing

. . . the court shall approve a permanency plan that is in the bestinterestsofthechildoryouthandtakesintoconsideration the child’s oryouth’s need forpermanency.

. . . Such permanency plan may include the goal of (A) revocation of commitment and reunification of the child or youth with the parent or guardian, with or withoutprotective supervision; (B) transfer ofguardianship or permanent legal guardianship; (C) longterm foster care with a relative licensed as a foster parent; (D) filing of termination of parental rights and adoption; or (E) another planned permanent living arrangement ordered by the court, provided the Commissioner of Children and Families has documented a compelling reason why it would not be in the best interests ofthe child or youth for the permanency plan to include the goals in subparagraphs (A) to (D), inclusive, ofthis subdivision. Such otherplannedpermanent living arrangement may include, but not be limited to, placement of a child or youth in an independent living program or long term foster care with an identified foster parent.’’ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 46b-129 (k) (2). Thus, two ofthe separate and distinct statutory disposition options available to the court are (1) revocation of commitment and reunification with the child’s parent or former guardian (with or without protective supervision), or (2) transfer ofguardianship to a party other than the child’s parent or former guardian.
Inthepresentcase, thesubstance ofthemotionsfiled bythepetitionersoughttransferoflegalguardianship of Avirex from the petitioner to his paternal aunt.10 SeeInre Cameron C., 103 Conn. App. 746, 751, 930A.2d826 (2007) (courtlooks atsubstance ofmotionto determine which statute is applicable), cert. denied, 285 Conn. 906, 942 A.2d 414 (2008). The motions, by their terms, did not seek to revoke the commitment of Avirex to the petitioner so that Avirex could be reunified with hisparent.11Accordingly, the onlyissuebeforethe court in this case was whether guardianship ofAvirex should be transferred to his paternal aunt. If the court were to have answered that question in the negative, Avirex would have remained committed to the petitioner until
some other appropriate disposition could be proposed andapprovedbythe courtaspartofapermanencyplan.
With this statutory background in mind and in light of the specific relief sought in the motion before the court, we next address whether the trial court improperly addressed the petitioner’s motion pursuant to subsection (m) of § 46b-129, or instead, should have analyzed the motion pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129.
Subsection (j) (3) of § 46b-129 provides in relevant part: ‘‘If the court determines that the commitment should be revoked and the child’s

. . . legal guardianship

. . . should vest in someone other than the respondent parent, parents or former guardian

. . . there shall be a rebuttable presumption that an award of legal guardianship

. . . upon revocation to

. . . any relative who is licensed as a foster parent for such child or youth, or who is, pursuant to an order of the court, the temporary custodian ofthe child or youth at the time of the revocation

. . . shall be in the best interests of the child or youth and that such relative is
a suitable and worthy person to assume legal guardianship

. . . . The presumption may be rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence that an award of legal guardianship to

. . . such relative would not be in the child’s

. . . best interests and such relative is not a suitable and worthy person.

. . .’’
Subsection (m) of§ 46b-129providesinrelevantpart: ‘‘The commissioner, a parent or the child’s attorney may file a motion to revoke a commitment, and, upon finding that cause for commitment no longer exists, and that such revocation is in the best interests ofsuch child or youth, the court may revoke the commitment of such child or youth.

. . .’’
Anobviousdifferencebetweenthesetwosubsections is that subsection (j) contains specific language referencing a transfer of guardianship to a party other than the child’s or youth’s parent or former legal guardian and sets forth apresumption as to the individuals, such
as other relatives, who should then be given custody, while subsection (m) makes no mention ofany individual other than the petitioner, a parent or the child’s attorney. Instead, subsection (m) is focused only on whether the child’s or youth’s commitment should berevokedwithoutreferenceto atransferofguardianship to a party other than the parent or former guardian.12 Asamatteroflogic, ifthechild’soryouth’scommitment to the petitioner is revoked by the court without a concomitant transfer ofguardianship to a third party,13 then the child must be reunified with the parent or formerlegalguardian (withorwithoutprotectivesupervision) as contemplatedbythepermanencyplan option setforthin § 46b-129 (k) (2) (A) (‘‘revocationofcommitment and reunification of the child or youth with the parent or guardian’’). Accordingly, we conclude that the legislature intended that a motion, like the one filed here by the petitioner, seeking to transfer guardianship of a child
oryouth from the petitionerto an individual otherthan the parent or former guardian, should be adjudicated by the court pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129. This conclusion is buttressed by reference to Practice Book § 35a-16, which provides in relevant part that ‘‘[u]nless filed by the commissioner of the department of children and families, any modification motion to return a child or youth to the custody of the parent without protective supervision shall be treated as a motion for revocation of commitment.’’
Our conclusion also finds support in our decision in In reA.R., supra, 123 Conn. App. 336. One ofthe issues in In re A.R

. was whether the trial court improperly treated a motion to transfer guardianship filed by an intervenor as a motion for revocation of commitment. Id., 337. In delineating the difference between subsection (j) and subsection (m) of § 46b-129, this court stated: ‘‘The intervenor claims on appeal that the court incorrectly treated her motion to transfer guardianship
as a motion to revoke commitment. She argues that the language of § 46b-129 (j) treats motions to transfer guardianship as separate and distinct from motions to revoke commitment. In addition, she argues that PracticeBook § 35a-16indicatesthatonlymotionstomodify [disposition] that request that the custody of the child revert to the custody ofthe parent are to be construed
as motions to revoke commitment.

. . . We agree.’’ Id., 338–39. Accordingly, itwasimproperforthe courttotreatthe petitioner’s motion to transfer guardianship to Avirex’s paternal aunt as a motion to revoke commitment filed pursuant to subsection (m) of § 46b-129. Instead, the court should have treated the petitioner’s motion as having been filed pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b129. In light of this conclusion, it is unnecessary to reach the respondent’s claim thatthe trial court did not properly afford a presumption offitness under subsection (m) of § 46b-129.14 Although we conclude that the court improperly treated the petitioner’s motion under
an incorrect subsection of § 46b-129, we further conclude that the court nonetheless engaged in the properanalysis and made the required findings necessary to transfer guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G. pursuant to § 46b-129 (j).
In orderto properly grant amotion to transfer guardianshipundersubsection(j) of§ 46b-129, thecourtmust first determine whether it would be in the best interest ofthe child for guardianship to be transferred from the petitioner to the proposed guardian. See also Practice Book § 35a-12A; In reAveriellaP., 146 Conn. App. 800, 804, 81 A.3d 272 (2013) (applying best interest standard to motion to transfer guardianship from petitioner to child’s grandmother). In considering what is in the best interest ofthe child, subsection (j) creates a rebuttable presumption that ifthe proposed guardian is amember ofone ofthe enumerated groups ofrelatives or caregivers, such a transfer is in the child’s best interest. The court must then find that the third party is a suitable and worthy guardian. See General Statutes § 46b-129 (j); Practice Book § 35a-12A (‘‘the moving party has the burden ofproof that the proposed guardian is suitable and worthy’’). Subsection (j) (3) of § 46b-129 also provides a rebuttable presumption that if the proposed guardian is arelative ofthe child, and is either licensed by the department as a foster parent, or has temporary custody ofthe child whenthe motion to transfer guardianshipisheardbythecourt, sucharelativeispresumed to be a suitable and worthy person to assume legal guardianship.
Unlike subsection (m) of § 46b-129, neither subsection (j) of § 46b-129 nor Practice Book § 35a-12A provides a presumption of fitness for a parent or former guardian (who may be opposing the motion). See footnote 8 of this opinion. This is because a motion to transfer guardianship is simply dispositional in nature, and does not require the court to review the underlying
cause for commitment, which has already been judicially determined during an earlier phase of the proceeding. Compare Practice Book § 35a-12A (a) (‘‘[m]otions to transfer guardianship are dispositional in nature, based on the prior adjudication’’) with § 46b129 (m) (requiring court to review cause for commitmentandconcludethatitnolongerexistsbeforerevoking commitment of child). Accordingly, it is important to note that a transfer ofguardianship pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129 does not terminate the respondentparent’s orformerguardian’s relationship withthe child. Ifacourt orders, as it didhere, legal guardianship ofa child oryouthto be vested in asuitable andworthy person pursuant to subsection (j) of § 46b-129, the respondent parents or former guardians ofthe child or youth are not left without recourse. Pursuant to § 46b129 (n), the respondentparents orformerguardianmay file a petition to reinstate guardianship of the child or youth in such parent or legal guardian.15 See also Practice Book § 35a-20.Because Emma G., Avirex’s paternal aunt, was, by order ofthe court, his temporary custodian at the time the court heard both of the petitioner’s motions, there existed a rebuttable presumption that Emma G. was a suitable and worthy guardian, and that a transfer of guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G. was in Avirex’s best interest.16 See Practice Book § 35a-12A (b). It was, therefore, the respondent’s burden to rebut the presumption by demonstrating by apreponderance of the evidence that Emma G. was not a suitable and worthy guardian, or that it was not in Avirex’s best interest for guardianship to be transferred from the petitioner to Emma G. Although the court’s memorandum of decision focuses at least in part on the respondent’s current fitness to parent, the court also specifically found that the transfer of guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G. was in Avirex’s best interest, and that Emma G. was a suitable and worthy guardian. The respondent has not challenged these findings, and the record adequatelysupportsthem. We, therefore, concludethatthe court made the requisite findings, pursuant to § 46b129 (j), that were necessary to transfer guardianship of Avirex fromthe petitionerto Emma G. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.
The judgment is affirmed.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.

* In accordance with the spirit and intent of General Statutes § 46b-142 (b) and Practice Book § 79a-12, the names of the parties involved in this appeal are not disclosed. The records and papers ofthis case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and upon order of the Appellate Court.

** July 16, 2014, the date that this decision was released as a slip opinion, is the operative date for all substantive and procedural purposes.
1 The father, Hector R., is not aparty to this appeal. At the hearing before the trial court, the father’s counsel represented to the court that he did not object to the petitioner’s motion to modify disposition, and that he agreed with the transfer of guardianship from the petitioner to Emma G.

2 General Statutes § 17a-101gprovides inrelevantpart: ‘‘(e) Ifthe Commissioner ofChildren and Families, orthe commissioner’s designee, has probable cause to believe that the child or any other child in the household is in imminent risk of physical harm from the child’s surroundings and that immediateremovalfromsuchsurroundingsisnecessaryto ensurethechild’s safety, the commissioner, or the commissioner’s designee, shall authorize any employee ofthe department or any law enforcement officer to remove the child and any other child similarly situated from such surroundings without the consent of the child’s parent or guardian. The commissioner shall recordinwritingthe reasons forsuchremoval and include such record with the report of the investigation conducted under subsection (b) of this section. ‘‘(f) The removal of a child pursuant to subsection (e) of this section shall not exceed ninety-six hours. During the period of such removal, the commissioner, or the commissioner’s designee, shall provide the child with all necessary care, including medical care, which may include an examinationbyaphysician ormentalhealthprofessionalwithorwithoutthe consent of the child’s parents, guardian or other person responsible for the child’s care, provided reasonable attempts have been made to obtain consent of the child’s parents or guardian or other person responsible for the care of such child. During the course of a medical examination, a physician may perform diagnostic tests andprocedures necessaryforthe detection ofchild abuse or neglect. If the child is not returned home within such ninetysix-hour period, with or without protective services, the department shallproceed in accordance with section 46b-129.

. . .’’

3 Emma G. is licensed by the department as a foster parent.
4 The respondent entered herplea ofnolo contendere on October 7, 2011, and the father entered his plea of nolo contendere on November 8, 2011.

5 General Statutes § 46b-120 (6) provides in relevant part that ‘‘[a] child

oryouthmaybefound‘neglected’who, forreasonsotherthanbeingimpoverished

. . . (B) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educationally, emotionally, or morally

. . . .’’

6 Pursuant to General Statutes § 17a-126 (a), the petitioner is authorized to establish a subsidized guardianship program for the benefit of children living in foster care with relatives afterthe child has been in the state’s care for six months.

7 The court’s order ofcommitment was that ‘‘[t]he child

. . . is committed until further order ofthe court to the [petitioner] who shall be the guardian of the child

. . . according to the statutes in such cases. Commitment is effective 03/14/2012.’’ After the commitment, therefore, neither the respondent nor the father were guardians of Avirex.

8 Although the petitioner brought hermotion to modify disposition pursuant to § 46b-129, she did not specify the subsection of the statute upon which she sought relief. We urge the petitioner to indicate in the future the specific subsection of § 46b-129 upon which she seeks relief in order to help prevent confusion over the relief sought and the appropriate legal standard that should be applied.

9 The respondent also had a documented history with Child Protective Services in New Hampshire. Guardianship of her other child, Avirex’s half sibling, previously was transferred to the maternal grandmother through the Probate Court in New Hampshire due to the respondent’s substance abuse, prostitution, neglect, transience and domestic violence.

10 The only motions before the court were the petitioner’s motions to modify disposition, and to revoke commitment and transfer guardianship. Both motions sought to transfer the guardianship of Avirex from the petitioner to his paternal aunt, Emma G.

11 Indeed, an earlier motion to revoke the commitment of Avirex to the petitioner so that he could be reunified with the respondent was withdrawn by the respondent.

12 We have previously held that in order to grant a motion to revoke commitment under subsection (m) of § 46b-129, ‘‘the respondent must first provethatnocauseforcommitmentpresentlyexists. Second, [thepetitioner] must fail in her burden to establish that it would be in the best interests of the [child] to remain committed.’’ In rePatricia C., 93 Conn. App. 25, 31–32, 887 A.2d 929, cert. denied, 277 Conn. 931, 896 A.2d 101 (2006).

13 We note that, as a practical matter, upon a finding by the court that guardianship of a child should be transferred from the petitioner to a third party, the court must necessarily revoke the commitment of that child to the petitioner so that the transfer may be effectuated.

14 We do not disagree with the respondent that subsection (m) of § 46b129 and Practice Book § 35a-14A give rise to a rebuttable presumption that, upon a finding that the cause for the child’s commitment no longer exists, the court should ordinarily order reunification and return custody of the child to the parent or former guardian. If a motion to revoke commitment is properly filed under subsection (m) because it seeks to reunify the child with a parent or former guardian, the parent or former guardian should presumptively regain custody ifthe cause for commitment no longer exists, unless the department can establish that reunification is not in the best interest of the child. It is this statutory burden shifting analysis that the respondent claims the court failed to utilize.

15 The statute also provides that ‘‘[n]o such petition may be filed more often than once every six months.’’ General Statutes § 46b-129 (n).

16 As we noted previously, Emma G. is licensed by the department as a foster parent. See footnote 3 of this opinion. Pursuant to Practice Book § 35a-12A (b), the court may presume that she was a suitable and worthy person to assume legal guardianship on this basis as well.