No. 3--02--0238

_________________________________________________________________

							IN tTHE

							APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

							THIRD DISTRICT

							A.D., 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE 			)	Appeal from the Circuit Court

OF ILLINOIS,					)	of the 21st Judicial Circuit, 

							)	Kankakee County, Illinois

	Plaintiff-Appellee,			)	

							)

	v.						)	No. 00--CM--373

							)	

JUDI L. MARCOTTE,				)	Honorable

                                )	Susan S. Tungate,

	Defendant-Appellant.		)	Judge, Presiding.

_________________________________________________________________

	JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE delivered the Opinion of the court:

_________________________________________________________________

	Following a bench trial, the defendant, Judi L. Marcotte,

was found guilty of disorderly conduct by knowingly transmitting

a false report of the sexual abuse of a child to the Department

of Children and Family Services (DCFS) (720 ILCS 5/26--1(a)(7)

(West 1998)).  On appeal, the defendant argues that the State

failed to prove the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt.  We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

	The record of the trial in this case consists of a certified

bystander's report.

	At trial, Detective Gregory Kunce of the Bourbonnais Police

Department testified for the State.  He stated that he

investigated an anonymous telephone call placed to the DCFS

"hotline" on September 3, 1999, alleging that a five-year old child had been sexually abused at the Fortin Villa Daycare Center

(Fortin Villa) in Bourbonnais.  Kunce said that he assisted in

interviewing the child and determined that the child had not been

abused.

	The officer testified that the child's mother, Rachel

Gagnon, told him about a conversation that Gagnon had with Gina

Blanchette in August 1999.  In that conversation, Blanchette said

that the defendant had told her during a phone conversation that

DCFS was investigating Fortin Villa.  At trial, the defendant

objected that the officer's testimony was hearsay.  The court

overruled the defendant's objection and admitted the testimony

for the purpose of establishing Kunce's investigation.

	Kunce said that he went to the defendant's home to interview

the defendant concerning Gagnon's statement.  During this

interview, the defendant denied contacting DCFS.  Kunce stated

that during the interview, the defendant's answers were short and

vague.  While at her home, Kunce noted that the defendant

provided daycare.  He observed other parents coming and going

from the residence.

	Kunce testified that the defendant phoned him at the police

station "a day or so after" he interviewed her at her home.  In

response to one of Kunce's questions, the defendant said that if

a telephone call was made to DCFS from her home, it was not made

by her.  She suggested that such a call may have been made by

Blanchette because Blanchette had access to the defendant's home and telephone.  Blanchette testified that at one time the

defendant provided childcare for Blanchette's child.

	Kunce initiated a second telephone conversation with the

defendant during her daycare business hours.  He told the

defendant that he had a copy of her telephone records which

showed that the call to DCFS originated from her telephone

number.  On cross-examination, Kunce said that, contrary to what

he told the defendant, her phone records did not show a call from

her home to DCFS.  He submitted that "1-800" numbers could not be

traced.  Kunce stated that he did not obtain a copy of the DCFS

"hotline" tape of the phone call, "or any other verbal evidence

or telephone documentation pertaining to the alleged complaint to

DCFS."

	Kunce submitted that this second phone conversation with the

defendant lasted approximately 45 minutes.  He said that in

response to his last question to her she said, "yes[,] I did it." 

According to Kunce, he then told the defendant that he was going

to arrest her.  On cross-examination, Kunce stated that he did

not remember the exact words that the defendant used in her

"claimed 'admission[,]'" but that she used words similar to those

he used in his previous testimony.

	Blanchette testified for the State.  She said that during a

phone conversation she initiated with the defendant in August

1999, the defendant told Blanchette that the defendant heard a

rumor that DCFS was investigating Fortin Villa.  Blanchette said

that she later called Gagnon and Diana Parker, the director of Fortin Villa, and told them of the rumor.  During cross-

examination, Blanchette stated that she did not know who called

DCFS.  She submitted that she did not call DCFS.

	Parker testified that Kunce investigated the child abuse

claim.  She, however, did not recall a phone call regarding the

rumor that DCFS was investigating Fortin Villa.

	The defendant took the witness stand in her own defense. 

She testified that she was a licensed daycare provider since

1998.  The defendant contended that she never made any contact

with DCFS regarding an alleged sexual abuse incident at Fortin

Villa.  She submitted that she did not admit to Kunce that she

made such a phone call to DCFS.

	The defendant stated that the second phone conversation with

Kunce took place while she was providing childcare, when she was

tired, and when a speech therapist was at her home working with

her child.  When she told Kunce that her phone conversation with

him was going on too long, Kunce told her that it would be

against the law for her to hang up on him.  The defendant

testified that out of her exasperation over the length of the

call and because of Kunce's persistence, she sarcastically told

Kunce, "Yes[,] I made a phone call, yeah whatever" in order to

end the call.  She submitted that the phone conversation with

Kunce lasted approximately 11⁄2 hours.

	The defendant testified that her August 1999 phone

conversation with Blanchette involved "vague gossip" the

defendant had heard concerning Fortin Villa.  She stated that she later called Parker at Fortin Villa and told Parker that she did

not make the alleged call to DCFS.

	At the conclusion of the trial, the court found the

defendant guilty.  The bystander's report states, "The Court

believed that [the defendant] was not credible."

	The court sentenced the defendant to 12 months of

conditional discharge, a $300 fine, and 60 hours of public

service.  The defendant filed a motion to reconsider the court's

finding and sentence.  In her motion, the defendant argued that

the State failed to prove the elements of the offense.  Her

motion was denied and she appealed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Reasonable Doubt

	The defendant argues that the State did not prove the

elements of disorderly conduct beyond a reasonable doubt.

	A person commits disorderly conduct when she knowingly

transmits a false report of child abuse to DCFS.  720 ILCS 5/26--

1(a)(7) (West 1998).

	When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we will

reverse a defendant's conviction only if, viewing the evidence in

the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational finder

of fact could have found the crime to have been proved beyond a

reasonable doubt.  People v. Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 761 N.E.2d 1175 (2001).

1. Admission

	The defendant submits that the State's only evidence of her

guilt was her statement that she made the call to DCFS, which she

claims was not an admission, but instead was a sarcastic remark.

	When presented with conflicting versions of events, the

trier of fact is entitled to choose between those versions.  The

fact finder need not accept the defendant's version of events. 

It is not the role of an appellate court to second-guess the

verdict or to retry the defendant.  Villarreal, 198 Ill. 2d 209, 761 N.E.2d 1175.

	In this case, the judge, as trier of fact in a bench trial,

was not required to accept the defendant's version of events. 

The bystander's report specifically stated that the judge did not

find the defendant's testimony to be credible.  The judge was

entitled to choose Kunce's version of events over the defendant's

version.  A rational trier of fact could have inferred that the

defendant admitted to Kunce that she made the call to DCFS.

2. Corpus Delicti

	The defendant submits that assuming, arguendo, she admitted to Kunce that she made the phone call, the corpus delicti of the crime cannot be proved on the basis of her admission alone.  The

defendant contends that the State failed to produce independent

evidence of the phone call.

	The corpus delicti of a crime has two components: (1) proof of the occurrence of the harm, and (2) that the harm was caused

by criminal conduct.  Proof of the corpus delicti may not depend exclusively on a defendant's extrajudicial confession, admission,

or other statement.  The defendant's statement must be

corroborated with independent evidence which tends to show that

the offense occurred.  People v. Wright, 286 Ill. App. 3d 456, 677 N.E.2d 494 (1996).  To establish the corpus delicti, the independent evidence need not prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that the crime was committed.  People v. Furby, 138 Ill. 2d 434, 563 N.E.2d 421 (1990).

	Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered in court to prove the truth of the matter asserted.  People v. Doyle, 328 Ill. App. 3d 1, 765 N.E.2d 85 (2002).  Failure to object to hearsay during the trial allows such evidence to be considered by

the trier of fact and to be given its natural probative effect. 

People v. Williams, 139 Ill. 2d 1, 563 N.E.2d 431 (1990).  The probative effect of such hearsay may range from being given full

weight (see Town of Cicero v. Industrial Commission, 404 Ill.

487, 89 N.E.2d 354 (1949) (cause of death established by hearsay testimony of coroner's physician)), to no weight (see First National Bank & Trust Co. of Rockford v. Illinois National Bank &

Trust Co. of Rockford, 19 Ill. 2d 385, 167 N.E.2d 223 (1960) (self-serving hearsay statement rejected as proof that

transaction was loan)).

	Here, Kunce testified that he was investigating a phone call

to DCFS that a child had been sexually abused at Fortin Villa. 

According to the bystander's report, the defendant did not object

to the admission of Kunce's statement in evidence.

	Kunce's statement consisted of two assertions: (1) that DCFS

received the phone call, and (2) that he was investigating that

phone call.  Kunce's assertion that DCFS received the phone call

was a statement by DCFS, made out of court, offered to prove the

truth of the matter asserted.  Therefore, the statement was

hearsay.

	The defendant, however, did not object to Kunce's statement

as hearsay, or on any other grounds, either in court or in her

posttrial motion.  Because the defendant did not object to its

admission, Kunce's assertion that DCFS received the call could be

considered by the judge and given its natural probative effect. 

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the statement of

a police officer that he was investigating a phone call received

by a state agency should be given less than its full probative

weight.

	The defendant is incorrect that the State failed to produce

evidence independent of her admission that she made the phone

call.  A trier of fact reasonably could have concluded that the

defendant's admission was corroborated by Kunce's assertion that

DCFS had received such a call.

3. Knowledge

	On rehearing, the defendant argues that the State did not

prove she knew the report was false at the time of its

transmission.  She contends that the evidence only showed she

admitted making a report that was found to be unsubstantiated

following Kunce's investigation.

	The knowledge element of a crime rarely can be proved by

direct evidence.  People v. Sanchez, 292 Ill. App. 3d 763, 686 N.E.2d 367 (1997).  The knowledge element ordinarily is inferred

from circumstantial evidence.  People v. Price, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 589 N.E.2d 192 (1992); People v. Holt, 271 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 649 N.E.2d 571 (1995).  Determining whether a defendant

acted with the requisite state of mind is for the trier of fact. 

When facts in a case give rise to more than one inference, a

reviewing court shall not substitute its judgment for the

judgment of the trier of fact, unless that judgment was

inherently implausible or unreasonable.  Price, 225 Ill. App. 3d 1032, 589 N.E.2d 192.

	In the present case, the defendant initially denied to Kunce

that she called DCFS.  Later, she admitted to Kunce that she made

the call, but she did not protest that the call was made in good

faith, i.e., that she believed the statement to be true.  On the witness stand, when given an opportunity to assert a claim tht

she believed the statement to be true, the defendant instead

claimed that her statement to Kunce was not an admission, but was

a sarcastic remark.  From this circumstantial evidence, a

rational trier of fact could have inferred that the defendant

knew the report was false at the time of its transmission. Since

the judge found the defendant had in fact made the call, it was

not unreasonable for the judge to infer from the defendant's

failure to claim that th e call was made in good faith that the

defendant knew the reopprort was false at the time of the transgression.   We will not substitute our judgment for the

judgment of the trier of fact because it is not inherently

implausible or unreasonable to infer that the defendant knew that

her report was false.

III. CONCLUSION

	Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the

prosecution, we conclude that a rational trier of fact could have

found that the State proved the elements of disorderly conduct

beyond a reasonable doubt.  Therefore, we affirm the judgment of

the Kankakee County circuit court.

	Affirmed.

	sSlaterLATER AND Aand LYTTON, jjJJ., concur.