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- courts/supreme

- court

THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Hillsborou gh

- northern judicial district

No. 2021

- 0462

PETITION OF THE ST ATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Argued: September 15, 2022 Opinion Issued: January 31, 2023

John M. Formella , attorney general , and Anthony Galdieri , solicitor

general ( Elizabeth C. Woodcock , senior assistant attorney general

, on the brief

and orally), for the State

.

Christopher M. Johnson , chief appellate defender , of Concord, on the

brief and orally , for the juvenile

.

HANTZ MARCONI , J. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of an order of the S uperior C ourt ( Nicolosi , J .) declining to
accept the transfer of a juveni le delinquency case because the superior court concluded that the circuit court erred when it found that the juvenile was competent. The superior court r emanded to the circuit court for a new
competency determination

. The State argues that RSA 169

- B:24 ( 2022 ) does

not authorize the superior court to conduct an appellate review of the circuit

court’s competency ruling

. We vacate and remand

.2 I.

The record supports the following facts. In June 2019, the State filed a delinquency petition charging the sixteen

- year

- old j uvenile with attempted

second

- degree murder. At arraignment in the circuit court, the State moved to certify the juvenile as an adult and to transfe r the case to the superior court. Before considering transfer, however, the circuit court held a competency hearing

. After considering expert testimony that the j uvenile was not
competent , the circuit court issued a nine

- page order rejecting that testimony

and finding the j uvenile competent. The j uvenile then filed a habeas petition in superior court challenging the competency finding

. T he S uperior C ourt ( Anderson , J.) denied the petition becaus e the juvenile had not sought an interlocutory appeal of the competency ruling and therefore had not exhausted

his available remedies

. The transfer hearing proceeded

, a nd after considering

the transfer factors in RSA 169

- B : 24, I (a)

- (h) , th e circuit court granted the

S tate’s transfer petition.

The S uperior C ourt ( Nicolosi , J.) then considered whether to accept
transfer

. It declined, concluding that the circuit court’s earlier competency finding was erroneous. It reasoned that the circuit court did not “ adequately point out the facts upon which it relied,” nor “ adequately delineate its reasons for rejecting uncontroverted expert testimony.” Th e court remanded the case to

the circuit court “ for further articulation of any additional facts upon which it

relied

. ” The order directed that “[i] f the cir cuit court upon review finds no further factual support for its finding, it shall so state and a finding [of] incompetency should be entered.” The State then filed this petition for writ of

certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 11.

II.

The State argues that the superior court erred by reviewing the circuit

court’s competency finding. It asserts that competency is not a transfer factor

in RSA 169

- B:24, but rather is a “separate and distinct issue addressed under

RSA 169

- B:20.” See RSA 169

- B:20 (2022). The Stat e thus argues that the superior court exceeded its authority to review the transfer order under RSA

169

- B:24 by reviewing a competency order entered under RSA 169

- B:20. In opposition, the juvenile argues that the “superior court ha[s] the authority to

rem and the case to the circuit court for a proper application of the competenc y standards governing juveniles

. ” (Capitalization omitted

. ) He asserts that he

has a federal and state c onstitutional right n ot to be subjected to a transfer hearing unless competent, and that incompetency hampers his defense and “render[s] unreliable ” the court’s resolution of factual questions. He contends that competency falls within the superior court’s authority to review whether the circuit court fairly considered the factors of RSA 169

- B:24, and whether the transfer was erroneous as a matter of law. He argues that the scope of transfer review should be construed broadly because of the “statute’s requirement that3

‘all . . . papers’ filed in the Circuit Court be tr ansfe rred to the Superior Court ” ( quoting RSA 169

- B:24, II), and because other transfer cases have reviewed questions about the “lawfulness or constitutionality of Circuit Court rulings in transfer proceedings.” W e agree with the State that review of competenc y is outside the scope of the superior court’s appellate authority under RSA 169

- B:24.

Whether RSA 169

- B:24 permits the superior court to review a competency finding of the circuit court is an issue of statutory interpretation,

which we review de novo

. See Langevin v. Travco Ins. Co. , 170 N.H. 660, 664 (2018). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id

. We interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did

not see fit to include. Id

. We construe all parts of a statute together to effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id . Absent an ambiguity we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern legislative intent. State v. Addison (Capital Murder)

, 165 N.H. 381, 418 (2013). Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the entire statutory scheme. Id

. Accordingly, we interpret a statute in the context of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id

.

Und er RSA 169

- B:24, the decision to transfer a juvenile to superior court for adult prosecution falls within the circuit court’s discretion. See RSA 169

- B:24; In re Eduardo L. , 136 N.H. 678, 683 (1993). The statu t e requires the

circuit court to hold a trans fer hearing, and it provides eight factors to guide

the transfer decision. RSA 169

- B:24, I(a)

- (h) ; Eduardo L. , 136 N.H. at 683

- 84

. Though RSA 169

- B:24 does not specify the superior cou rt’s role in accepting transfer, w e have held that it acts as an appellate court, reviewing the circuit

court’s transfer ruli ng for an unsustainable exercise of discretion

. In re Erik

M. , 146 N.H. 508, 510

- 11 (2001). I n light of the discretionary nature of the

circuit court’s decision, w e have deemed the superior court’s review to be

limited to whether the circuit court fairly considered all the applicable factors

of RSA 169

- B:24, and whether its decision is supported by the evidence and

not erroneous as a matter of law. Id . at 510.

We need not address either the juvenile’s argument that the Federal and

State Constitution s prohibit conducting a transfer hearing with an incompetent juvenile, or the juvenile’s argument that incompetency would undermine the reliability of a transfer hea ring . Even if we assume that the juvenile is correct, these arguments do not affect our analysis. The legislature has recognized the importance of juvenile competency, providing statutory safeguards within RSA

169

- B:20. C ompetency is a prerequisite to a ny delinquency proceeding

— including a transfer hearing

. See RSA 169

- B:20, VI. I f competency is at issue, proceedings are suspended until a competency evaluation is performed, and the entire petition must be dismissed if competency is not established

. RSA4

169

- B:20, VI, VIII. If a juvenile disputes the circuit court’s competency finding, the juvenile may seek immediate review in this c ourt by interlocutory appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 8, or , if the trial court declines to authorize such an app eal, by petition for writ of certiorari

. See Sup. Ct. R. 8 (interlocutory appeal from ruling) ; Sup. Ct. R. 11 (petition for original jurisdiction)

. A competency finding may also be reviewed on appeal from a final disposition. See

, e.g. , State v. Moncada , 161 N.H. 791, 793

- 98 (2011). I f a juvenile is found to be competent in the circuit court and the case is transferred, RSA 169

- B: 20, XI allows the superior court t o revisit competency

and to make its own finding relevant to the adult criminal proceedings

. RSA

169

- B:20, XI. Thus, b ecause juvenile competency is protected by a separate

statute within RSA chapter 169

- B and is independently appealable, and

because RSA 169

- B:24 does not include competency as a transfer factor, we

conclude that transfer review does not include review of the cir cuit court’s competency finding.

Next, the juvenile argues that RSA 169

- B:24, II’s requirement that “[a] ll original papers” of the circuit court be filed in the superior court supports a broad scope of appellate review in the superior court

. See RSA 169

- B:24, II (“All original papers . . . shall be filed with and shall constitute the records of the court to which transfer is made.”). The juvenile’s argument effectively asks us to consider a single phrase in isolation t o support his position that transfer

review under RSA 169

- B:24 includes the circuit court’s competency ruling. W e do not , however, consider words and phrases in isolation when interpreting

statutes , but rather within the context of the statute as a whole

. Petition of

Carrier , 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013 ). And a s described above, review of the circuit court’s competency ruling under RSA 169

- B:20 is already available.

Given the statutory context of this language , we are n ot persuaded that it supports a broad scope of review. Furthermore, t he original records of a delinquency proceeding may be relevant to other matters that the superior court does have authority to consider. For example, the history of a delinquency case may be relevant if the superior court decides to revisit competency pursuant to RSA 169

- B:20, XI. Thus, this statutory language does not support a broad scope of transfer review.

Nor are we persuaded by the four cases the juvenile cites in support of his position that the superior court h as the authority to “review [] questions about the lawfulness or constitutionality of Circuit Court rulings in transfer proceedings. ” See Eduardo L. 136 N.H. 678 (reviewing admission of hearsay statements during transfer hearing); In re Farrell , 142 N.H. 424 ( 1997) (reviewing evidentiary rulings in the transfer hearing that implicated constitutional rights); State v. Gibbs , 126 N.H. 347 (1985) (reviewing circuit court’s admission of a confession at the transfer hearing, when it was found at

trial to violat e the right to counsel); and Vernon E. , 121 N.H. 836 (reviewing whether admission of evidence at transfer hearing violated double jeopardy).

None of these cas es support s a scope of re view reaching beyond the transfer5

proceeding itself

, because they all dealt with rulings made within transfer proceedings

. In contrast, competency decisions are made before transfer proceedings begin. We decline to extend this line of case s to rulings made outside of the transfer hearing.

L astly, the j uvenile contends t hat “this Court ought bear in mind the interpretive principle enacted by the legislature,” namely

, that the provisions of

“RSA 169

- B ‘shall be liberally interpreted, construed, and administered to effectuate’ the legislature’s purposes, which include

. . . encouragement of ‘the wholesome moral, mental, emotional, and physical development of each minor coming within’ the Chapter’s scope ‘by providing the protection, care, treatment, counselling, supervision, and rehabilitative re sources which each

minor need s.’” ( Quoting RSA 169

- B:1, I

. ) He argues that including competency in transfer review “serves those goals by helping to ensure that courts will not transfer for trial in criminal court juveniles who should not be prosecuted in

that forum.” This policy argument is better made before the legislature

. See Appeal of New England Police Benevolent Ass’n , 171 N.H. 490, 497 (2018) (“Because our function is not to make laws, but to interpret them, any public policy arguments relevant to the wisdom of the statut ory scheme and its consequences should be a ddressed to the General Court.” (quotation omitted) )

. As explained above, nothing in RSA 169

- B:24 gives the superior court authority to review competency findings during a transfer hearing. See RSA 169

- B:24.

Fo r the reasons set forth above, w e decline to read such authority into RSA

169

- B:24

.

Vacated and remanded

.

HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.