IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

LITSA R. BRYAN,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-554

Judge James L. Graham

Magistrate Judge Jolson

COMMISIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Litsa R. Bryan, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of a 

final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her application 

for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). For the reasons set forth below, it is 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 11) be OVERRULED and that 

judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed her application for SSI on November 3, 2014, alleging that she was disabled 

beginning September 1, 2014. (Doc. 7, Tr. 540). After her application was denied initially and on 

reconsideration, the Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on March 2, 2017. (Tr. 

418–54). On June 1, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision denying Plaintiff’s application for benefits. 

(Tr. 399–412). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s 

decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 3–6).

Plaintiff filed the instant case seeking a review of the Commissioner’s decision on June 6, 

2018 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the administrative record on August 27, 2018 (Doc. 7). 
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Plaintiff filed her Statement of Errors (Doc. 11), Defendant filed an Opposition (Doc. 12), and

Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 13). Thus, this matter is ripe for consideration.

A. Relevant Hearing Testimony

Plaintiff’s statement of errors concerns her mental health, and as such, the Court examines 

the hearing testimony pertaining to the same. 

At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was 38-years-old. (Tr. 422). Plaintiff lives with two 

of her children, ages 15 and 19. (Tr. 424). Plaintiff also has a son with Asperger’s Syndrome, 

who lives with his father. (Tr. 426). Because of a learning disability, Plaintiff attended special 

education classes in high school. (Id.). Plaintiff had a “bout of depression” and tried to commit 

suicide, though it is not clear from the testimony when this occurred. (Tr. 427). As a result, 

Plaintiff temporarily lost custody of all three of her children. (Id.). Plaintiff elaborated on her 

mental health symptoms:

Q: Okay. So tell me about your mental health. It sounds like from what you’ve said 

already that there was a period where you are more depressed but that maybe you’re 

a little more stable now but maybe just to go over kind of the history - -

A: Sure.

Q: - - of that, because I’m looking at your file from 2004 to the present.

A. Right. I don’t know the exact [time] when everything was diagnosed. I was 

seeing a physician. I had gotten depressed from a relationship that ended badly and 

I tried to commit suicide. So, the hospital sent me to the psyche floor to get 

treatment and the doctor diagnosed me as bipolar, depression, manic episodes. 

Can’t remember everything. OCD and he started me on like a ritual of like three 

different drugs and they were very high dosage and I couldn’t sleep with them, they 

were keeping me awake, so when I would go back in and I would say well, I’m 

having trouble sleeping. They’re making me sick. I’m not feeling well, he would 

give me Ambien. Well he gave me the ambien which then in turn gave me the side 

effect of seeing a woman, riding my daughter’s bike, trying to catch my house on 

fire, books in the oven and I told him that this is - - I’ve never had this before. Like 

this is not normal and he goes it’s fine, let’s just up your dosage and I was like no, 

we’re good at the dosage we’re at and I said I think I’ll find another doctor. I feel 

like I’m getting railroaded here and so I found - - Six County, well they said the 

same thing, that I had everything that he had said and they wanted to keep me on 

the same medications and I didn’t agree with it because I felt the medications were 
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too strong for who I am, as short as I am and stuff and so when I found Dr. I—kes 

[sic], he said you don’t have any of those because I told him like, you know I was 

nauseated all the time. I wouldn’t eat. I was - - I just felt out of it like even if I slept 

14 hours I still couldn’t function in the real world without feeling completely 

drowsy and just overly medicated and that’s when he said that I had PTSD because 

we talked about my history as a child and my anxiety and things like that and he 

put me on Celexa and we started very, very slowly and we worked up to the 

milligram I’m on now and it’s done very, very well. 

Q. Okay. So no more hallucinations?

A. No.

Q. Did he tell you that he thought that the hallucinations were side effects of - -

A. Yes.

Q. - - your medications

A. Yes. 

Q. Okay. So at this point do you think your mental condition would have no impact 

on your ability to go back to work or do you think it still would have an impact?

A. My anxiety would have a lot of impact on it because I’m not a big person when 

it comes to - - like people. I don’t - - I’m not good with it. I try to exclude myself 

from a group of people because I get super nervous. I think everybody’s staring at 

me and things like that. Even when I go to soccer practices with - - when my 

daughter played, I would never sit with the crowd. I always either sat in my car 

with my mom or we brought lawn chairs and I had to sit away. I can’t be - - it 

makes me too nervous. 

(Tr. 438–440). 

In addition to Plaintiff, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified at the hearing. The VE testified 

that Plaintiff could perform the light, unskilled jobs of machine tender feeder and assembler. (Tr. 

449–50). 

B. Relevant Medical Background 

As noted, Plaintiff’s statement of errors concerns her mental health, and as such, the Court 

examines the medical evidence pertaining to the same. 

The ALJ usefully summarized the mental health medical evidence of record. 
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In addition to the claimant’s physical impairments, the medical record also shows 

that the claimant has severe mental impairments. Specifically, the medical record 

shows that the claimant was psychiatrically hospitalized from May 5 through May

8, 2014 due to reported suicidal ideation and auditory hallucinations. The claimant 

was diagnosed with a bipolar disorder (mixed, with psychotic features) (Exhibit 

15F). At the hearing, the claimant explained that these hallucinations were 

medication-induced and she denied any psychosis-based mental disorder. 

Due to her reported hallucinations, the claimant was evaluated at Six County in 

May 2014. The claimant endorsed depression, anxiety, mood swings, 

aggressiveness, and agitation. (Exhibit 12F). However, during an appointment in 

June 2014, the claimant had a normal mood, affect, speech, behavior, judgment, 

thought content, cognition, and memory. She was described as pleasant and 

cooperative. She also denied suicidal and homicidal ideation. (Exhibits 1F and 

13F).

Medical records from Ohio Psych Associates, dated September 2013 through 

November 2014, demonstrate the claimant endorsed irritability, anxiety, a lack of 

motivation, feeling overwhelmed, and feeling tired. She also endorsed some visual 

and auditory hallucinations in May 2014. Her examinations showed she was 

cooperative, alert and oriented, with good eye contact, no agitation, a “stressed” 

mood, a “restricted” affect, goal directed thought process, and intact attention and 

concentration. By November 2014, the claimant reported she had no manic 

symptoms, her anxiety was controlled, and her energy had been fair. Her 

examination at this appointment was normal. (Exhibit 6F). 

Progress notes from Ohio Psych Associates, dated January 2015 through April 

2015, reflect that the claimant complained of some irritability, anxiety, sleep 

disturbance, and OCD tendencies. She denied hallucinations, delusions, and manic 

symptoms. Her mental status exams were normal, except for some irritable and 

depressed mood and restricted affect. (Exhibit 19F). 

The claimant began to receive counseling from Timothy Ickes, PA-C at Family 

Behavioral Health Services in July 2016. Her examinations from July 2016 through 

January 2017 showed she was fully alert and easily engaged. She had a full and 

congruent affect with normal attention and concentration. She appeared neither 

depressed nor anxious. Her memory, insight, and judgment were intact, she had a 

calm and pleasant demeanor, she laughed easily and appropriately, and her eye 

contact was good. (Exhibit 28F). 

(Tr. 403–04). 

C. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful employment since 
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September 18, 2014, the date of her application. (Tr. 401). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff 

suffered from the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; 

bipolar disorder; and obsessive-compulsive disorder (“OCD”). (Id.). The ALJ also concluded that 

Plaintiff’s panic disorder with agoraphobia, mood disorder, psychotic disorder, anxiety and posttraumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) are not medically determinable impairments because “these 

diagnoses were not offered by acceptable medical sources, which is required to establish that the 

claimant has a medically determinable impairment.” (Tr. 402). 

The ALJ then concluded that none of Plaintiff’s impairments, either singly or in 

combination, met or medically equaled a listed impairment. (Id.). 

As to Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ opined:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined 

in 20 CFR 416.967(b) except the claimant can stand and/or walk for 4 hours in an 

8-hour workday. She can occasionally operate foot controls with the right lower 

extremity, climb ramps and stairs, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. The claimant 

can frequently balance. She can also perform work that does not involve climbing 

ladders, ropes or scaffolds or work around hazards (such as unprotected heights and 

exposure to moving mechanical parts). Mentally, the claimant can perform simple 

and moderately complex tasks. She can interact occasionally with others in person, 

but can have unlimited interactions with others on the telephone.

(Tr. 404–05).

After consideration of the evidence, however, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s “statements 

concerning the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of [her] symptoms [were] not entirely 

consistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record.” (Tr. 405). 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or 

applying information (though he noted that he “limited the complexity of tasks to reduce the stress 

of work considering her moderate deficit in concentration, persistence or pace”). (Tr. 404). The 

ALJ then concluded that Plaintiff has moderate limitations in her ability to interact with others, 
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concentrate, persist, or maintain pace. (Id.). And, as for adapting or managing herself, the ALJ 

found that Plaintiff has no limitations. (Id.). 

Turning to the opinion evidence relevant in this case, the ALJ assigned “partial weight” to 

the opinions of the state agency psychological consultants. (Tr. 408). state agency reviewing 

psychologist, Paul Tangeman, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff was capable of flexible time and 

production demands, of occasional and superficial social exchanges, and of working in a static 

environment with infrequent changes. (Tr. 463–64). At the reconsideration level, Dr. Bruce 

Goldsmith, Ph.D., opined that Plaintiff is capable of carrying out single to multiple step tasks that 

allow for flexible time and production demands, of occasional and superficial social exchanges, 

and of working in a static work environment with infrequent changes. (Tr. 478–79). The ALJ 

explained how he reached his decision to afford these opinions “partial weight”: 

I find the claimant is less limited than these consultants given, in part, to the medical 

records from Timothy Ickes, which noted the claimant was no longer overmedicated. He also described her as fully alert and easily engaged. She had a full 

and congruent affect with normal attention and concentration. She appeared neither 

depressed nor anxious. Her memory, insight and judgment were intact, she had a 

calm and pleasant demeanor, she laughed easily and appropriately, and her eye 

contact was good. 

(Tr. 408). 

Finally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s daily activities:

The claimant has reported she cleans all the time (Exhibit 12F). During an 

assessment at Six County in April 2015, the claimant reported she was currently in 

a new relationship with someone she had met online (Exhibit 20F, p. 1). In May 

2015, the claimant reported she had been taking care of her cousin’s or friend’s 

three children (Exhibit 20F, p. 6–7). While the claimant denied this at the hearing, 

it is hard to believe this was not discussed at the appointment, given that the rest of 

the progress note pertains to the claimant and the notation is quite specific. She 

had the care of her own children at times (19f/4, 28F/1, 5, 7). The claimant has also 

been able to attend softball tournaments, soccer games, and senior night, and takes 

drives to relax. These types of activities are commensurate with the claimant’s 

residual functional capacity. 
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(Tr. 409). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[S]ubstantial 

evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must also 

be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). To 

this end, the Court must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight” 

of the Commissioner’s decision. Rhodes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-1147, 2015 WL 

4881574, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff raises three errors to the Court. (Doc. 11). At base, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s 

decision should be reversed because the ALJ improperly evaluated the mental health evidence of 

record. Plaintiff’s argument is essentially a “domino effect” theory broken into three sub-parts. 

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ incorrectly deemed Plaintiff’s psychological impairments as not 

medically determinable impairments. Second, Plaintiff argues that because the ALJ improperly 

found non-medically determinable impairments, she improperly weighed the opinions provided 

by the state agency psychologists. Lastly, Plaintiff argues that all of these errors resulted in a 

flawed mental residual functional capacity. 

Before addressing each argument in turn, it is important first to stress that the ALJ 
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concluded that Plaintiff has two severe mental health impairments—bipolar disorder and OCD. 

(Tr. 401). Therefore, while the ALJ concluded that not all of Plaintiff’s mental health impairments 

were medically determinable impairments, the ALJ engaged in a thorough analysis of Plaintiff’s 

mental health records, found she had two severe mental health conditions, and fashioned an RFC 

tailored to her mental health needs and abilities. 

A. The ALJ’s Step Two Determination 

First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in concluding that her alleged panic disorder with 

agoraphobia, mood disorder, psychotic disorder, anxiety, and PTSD were not medically 

determinable impairments. Plaintiff claims that the record undermines the ALJ’s conclusion and 

argues that the ALJ’s step two determination resulted in other critical errors. (See generally Doc. 

11). 

At step two, the ALJ is required to consider whether Plaintiff’s alleged impairments 

constitute “medically determinable” impairments. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508; 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.920(a)(4)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A medically determinable impairment “must 

result from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which can be shown by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques,” and “must be established by 

medical evidence consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [the 

claimant’s] statement of symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508; 20 C.F.R. § 416.908. Only evidence 

from acceptable medical sources can establish a medically determinable impairment. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1513(a) (“We need evidence from acceptable medical sources to establish whether you have 

medically determinable impairment(s)”). Additionally, an impairment must meet the durational 

requirement, meaning, “it must have lasted or must be expected to last for a continuous period of 

at least 12 months.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1509. And, relevant here, “[i]f an alleged impairment is not 
9

medically determinable, an ALJ need not consider that impairment in assessing the RFC.” See

Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-CV-00428, 2017 WL 540923, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 10, 

2017) (citing Rouse v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-CV-0223, 2017 WL 163384, at *4 (S.D. 

Ohio Jan. 17, 2017) (stating that a “claimed condition which is not ‘medically determinable’ need 

not be considered at all” in determining a claimant’s RFC); 20 C.F.R § 404.1527(a)(1); 20 CFR 

§ 404.1545(a)(2)).

Plaintiff, relying on several pieces of evidence in the record, maintains that her diagnoses 

of panic disorder with agoraphobia, mood disorder, psychotic disorder, anxiety, and PTSD have 

been identified by acceptable medical sources. First, she states that her depression and anxiety 

have been “well-documented by various medical providers.” (Id. at 9 (citing Tr. 917, 1048, 1098, 

1120)). Second, she alleges that Mr. Ickes, a physician’s assistant, “repeatedly diagnosed” her 

mental health conditions. (Id. (citing Tr. 1087–91)). Third, Plaintiff states that the record contains 

“other references to PTSD.” (Id. (citing Tr. 917, 1049, 1120)). Finally, Plaintiff contends that the 

record contains “numerous diagnoses and references to [her] psychotic disorder.” (Id. (citing Tr. 

654, 675, 773, 778, 918, 921, 924)). Having reviewed Plaintiff’s supporting evidence, the Court 

finds that the ALJ properly classified Plaintiff’s diagnoses of panic disorder with agoraphobia, 

mood disorder, psychotic disorder, anxiety, and PTSD as non-medically determinable 

impairments. 

To start, Plaintiff relies heavily on numerous treatment notes, all of which include a section 

titled, “past medical history,” and listing, among others, depression, PTSD, and/or OCD as 

previously diagnosed conditions. However, a record from a doctor’s appointment containing 

merely a list of previous diagnoses does not amount to an “anatomical, physiological, or 

psychological abnormalit[y] which can be shown by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 
10

diagnostic techniques,” nor do these records show that it was “established by medical evidence 

consisting of signs, symptoms, and laboratory findings, not only by [the claimant’s] statement of 

symptoms.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1508; 20 C.F.R. § 416.908.

For example, Plaintiff relies on treatment notes from a January 19, 2015 visit, wherein 

Plaintiff’s “past medical history” diagnoses include, among others, PTSD and depression. 

(Tr. 917). However, the actual diagnoses from that visit were bipolar disorder, mixed with 

psychotic features and OCD, both of which the ALJ considered to be severe impairments. (Id.). 

(See also Tr. 1048–49 (treatment notes pertaining to Plaintiff’s dizziness and chest pain and 

listing, under “past history,” depression and PTSD); 1098 (treatment notes from Plaintiff’s ER 

visit for a puncture wound and listing, under “past history,” depression and PTSD); 1120 

(treatment notes regarding Plaintiff’s complaints of neck pain and noting depression under “past 

medical history”)). These records do not establish medically determinable impairments. Indeed, 

“[d]isability is determined by the functional limitations a condition imposes, not the mere 

diagnosis of a condition.” Denham v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:14-cv-611, 2015 WL 5471435, 

at *11 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2015) (citation omitted). 

Further, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the physician’s assistant, 

Mr. Ickes “repeatedly diagnosed” her mental health conditions. As the Commissioner correctly 

notes, Mr. Ickes is not an acceptable medical source, and, as such, the ALJ was not permitted to 

find medically determinable impairments based solely upon Mr. Ickes’ opinions. Therefore, Mr. 

Ickes’ “diagnosis” of PTSD is not enough. See Stephenson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13-cv397, 2015 WL 7871353, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 4, 2015) (noting that because the licensed social 

worker was “not an ‘acceptable medical source,’ the diagnosis he made does not constitute 

evidence of a ‘medically determinable impairment.’”). 
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Moreover, apart from the fact that Mr. Ickes is not an acceptable medical source, the Court 

finds that his treatment notes are not enough to support a finding of medically determinable 

impairments. For example, Plaintiff relies on records from her July 1, 2016 appointment with Mr. 

Ickes. (Doc. 11 at 9 (citing Tr. 1087)). However, that appointment was only an initial evaluation, 

and besides, at that appointment, Mr. Ickes noted that Plaintiff “appear[ed] neither depressed nor 

anxious,” had a “calm and pleasant demeanor,” and “laugh[ed] easily and appropriate[ly]”). (Tr. 

1087). (See also Tr. 1089 (Mr. Ickes noting that Plaintiff “appear[ed] neither depressed or 

anxious”); 1091(same)). Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to cite objective medical evidence from 

an acceptable medical source that is sufficient to establish medically determinable impairments.

In sum, the ALJ reasonably concluded that Plaintiff’s alleged panic disorder with 

agoraphobia, mood disorder, psychotic disorder, anxiety, and PTSD were not medically 

determinable impairments. 

B. Opinion Evidence

Plaintiff next contends that the ALJ’s failure to classify several of her mental health 

impairments as medically determinable impairments caused the ALJ to err when evaluating the 

state agency psychologists. (See Doc. 11 at 10–13). The ALJ assigned the state agency 

psychologists’ opinions “partial weight,” explaining that Plaintiff is “less limited” than the 

consultants opined. (Tr. 408). The ALJ elaborated as to how she reached her finding:

I find the claimant is less limited than these consultants given, in part, to the medical 

records from Timothy Ickes, which noted the claimant was no longer over-medicated. 

He also described her as fully alert and easily engaged. She had a full and congruent 

affect with normal attention and concentration. She appeared neither depressed nor 

anxious. Her memory, insight, and judgment were intact, she had a calm and pleasant 

demeanor, she laughed easily and appropriately, and her eye contact was good.” 

(Id.). 

Plaintiff theorizes that “[h]ad the ALJ properly classified all of Ms. Bryan’s medically 
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determinable mental health impairments, then the ALJ’s evaluation of the only mental health 

opinion of record may have been different.” (Doc. 11 at 10). Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ 

erred in evaluating the state agency opinions because objective medical evidence supports their 

opinions. (Id. at 12–13). The Court finds several flaws with Plaintiff’s arguments. 

First, as established above, the ALJ did not err in classifying several of Plaintiff’s mental 

health conditions as non-medically determinable impairments. Therefore, to the extent Plaintiff’s 

second stated error turns on the outcome of her first stated error, Plaintiff’s argument fails. 

Second, the Court is not persuaded by Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ erred in comparing 

the state agency opinions with those of Timothy Ickes, rather than with the record as a whole. (See

Doc. 11 at 12). While Plaintiff is correct that the ALJ explicitly compared the state consultants’

opinions with those of Timothy Ickes, the Court finds that the ALJ properly evaluated the opinion 

evidence. Notably, the ALJ stated that she found Plaintiff less limited than the consultants “in 

part” because of Timothy Ickes’ records. (Tr. 408) (emphasis added)). Plaintiff demands more 

than the Regulations require. There is no “reasons-giving” requirement with regard to non-treating 

sources. See Martin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 658 F. App’x 225, 259 (6th Cir. 2016), reh’g denied

(Sept. 20, 2016). While certainly required to develop the record fully, “an ALJ is not required to 

discuss all the evidence submitted, and an ALJ’s failure to cite specific evidence does not indicate 

that it was not considered.” Dykes ex rel. Brymer v. Barnhart, 112 F. App’x 463, 467 (6th Cir. 

2004). 

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that objective medical evidence supports the state agency 

opinions likewise fails. Even if it is true that the record contains some evidence that may support 

Plaintiff’s argument, the ALJ’s findings are “not subject to reversal merely because substantial 

evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion.” Mixon v. Colvin, 12 F. Supp. 3d 
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1052, 1064 (S.D. Ohio 2013). Rather, it is the ALJ’s “function to resolve conflicts in the evidence, 

see Hardaway v. Sec’y of H.H.S., 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir.1987),” and that is exactly what the 

ALJ did here.

C. The ALJ’s RFC Finding

Finally, Plaintiff argues that “[t]he ALJ’s incorrect classification of her mental health 

impairments had a domino affect [sic] on [her] claim.” (Doc. 11 at 14). 

A plaintiff’s RFC “is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and 

mental limitations resulting from her impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 

149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The Social Security 

regulations, rulings, and Sixth Circuit precedent provide that the ALJ is charged with the final 

responsibility in determining a claimant’s residual functional capacity. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(d)(2) (the final responsibility for deciding the residual functional capacity “is reserved 

to the Commissioner”). And it is the ALJ who resolves conflicts in the medical evidence. King v. 

Heckler, 742 F.2d 968, 974 (6th Cir. 1984). In doing so, the ALJ is charged with evaluating several 

factors when determining the RFC, including the medical evidence (not limited to medical opinion 

testimony), and the claimant’s testimony. Henderson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:08-cv-2080, 

2010 WL 750222, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 2, 2010) (citing Webb v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 368 F.3d 

629, 633 (6th Cir. 2004)). Relevant here, “[i]f an alleged impairment is not medically 

determinable, an ALJ need not consider that impairment in assessing the RFC.” See Jones, 2017 

WL 540923, at *6 (citing Rouse, 2017 WL 163384, at *4 (stating that a “claimed condition which 

is not ‘medically determinable’ need not be considered at all” in determining a claimant’s RFC);

20 C.F.R § 404.1527(a)(1); 20 CFR § 404.1545(a)(2)).

Accordingly, because the Court finds that the ALJ did not err in finding that several of 
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Plaintiff’s mental health impairments were not medically determinable impairments, the ALJ was 

not required to consider these impairments when fashioning the RFC. Put simply, Plaintiff’s 

“domino effect” argument fails. While Plaintiff relies on evidence listing her mental health 

diagnoses, she has failed “to present[] evidence to show that the clinical findings and diagnoses 

[she] has listed imposed additional functional limitations that the ALJ failed to take into account 

in formulating the [ ] RFC.” Denham, 2015 WL 5471435, at *11. Indeed, “Plaintiff’s mere 

recitation of clinical findings and diagnoses is meaningless absent evidence showing that the 

findings and diagnoses impose any such limitations.” Id. As such, the ALJ did not err in her 

formulation of the RFC. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 

11) be OVERRULED and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination 

of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1).
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The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 8, 2019 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE