SUMMARY

August 26, 2021

2021COA116

No. 20CA0816, In re Marriage of Cerrone — Family Law —

Modification and Termination of Provisions for Maintenance, 

Support, and Property Disposition — Remarriage 

A division of the court of appeals holds that, under 

section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), the inclusion of a nonmodification 

clause in a separation agreement, on its own, is insufficient to 

continue a maintenance obligation after a recipient spouse’s 

remarriage. In reaching this conclusion, the division declines to 

follow In re Marriage of Parsons, 30 P.3d 868, 869 (Colo. App. 2001). 

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions 

constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by 

the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be 

cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. 

Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion 

should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2021COA116

Court of Appeals No. 20CA0816

Jefferson County District Court No. 16DR30029

Honorable Robert Lochary, Judge

In re the Marriage of

Jill Louise Cerrone, 

Appellee,

and

Dennis John Cerrone,

Appellant.

ORDER REVERSED AND CASE

REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division V

Opinion by JUDGE GROVE

J. Jones and Johnson, JJ., concur

Announced August 26, 2021

Ammarell Deasy, LLP, Daniel N. Deasy, Patrick N. Hoover, Greenwood Village, 

Colorado, for Appellee

The Burnham Law Firm, P.C., Aaron Belzer, J.P. Prentiss, Boulder, Colorado, 

for Appellant
1

¶ 1 Dennis John Cerrone (husband) appeals the district court’s 

order adopting a magistrate’s ruling denying his motion for a 

declaratory judgment that his maintenance obligation to Jill Louise 

Cerrone (wife) under the parties’ separation agreement ended 

automatically on wife’s remarriage. Because the separation 

agreement did not expressly provide that maintenance would 

continue after wife remarried, we conclude that husband’s 

maintenance obligation terminated by operation of law once she did 

so. We therefore reverse the order and remand the case to the 

district court with directions to grant husband’s motion and 

determine the amount wife must reimburse him for maintenance he 

paid after the date of her remarriage.

I. Background

¶ 2 The parties’ twenty-four-year marriage ended in 2016. The 

district court approved their separation agreement and incorporated 

it into the decree. 

¶ 3 As relevant here, under a subheading titled “Modification,” the 

agreement states,

This Plan shall not be modified except by its 

own terms or by operation of law or by written 
2

agreement of the Parties with approval by the 

Court.

Under “Maintenance,” the agreement provides that

[c]ommencing July 1, 2016, Husband shall pay 

the Wife maintenance in the amount of 

$2,489.00 per month for a period of 138 

months (totaling 11 1⁄2 years). Payments shall 

be made directly by Husband to Wife. 

Maintenance shall terminate at the end of the 

contractual period of 11 1⁄2 years, December 

31, 2027. 

All maintenance outlined herein is contractual 

in nature and shall be non-modifiable for any 

reason whatsoever by the Court. The Court 

shall not retain jurisdiction to modify the 

maintenance either in amount or duration.

¶ 4 Three years after the court entered the decree, husband moved 

for a declaratory judgment that his maintenance obligation had 

automatically terminated by operation of law as of wife’s May 25, 

2018, remarriage. See § 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), C.R.S. 2020 (“Unless 

otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the decree, the 

obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon . . . [t]he 

remarriage of or the establishment of a civil union by the party 

receiving maintenance.”). 

¶ 5 A district court magistrate denied husband’s motion, 

concluding that, by stating in their separation agreement that 
3

maintenance was contractual and nonmodifiable, the parties had 

“agreed in writing” that husband’s maintenance obligation would 

survive wife’s remarriage. 

¶ 6 Husband petitioned for district court review of the magistrate’s 

order. The district court affirmed and adopted the magistrate’s 

order.

II. Maintenance After the Recipient Spouse Remarries

¶ 7 Husband contends that the magistrate and district court erred 

by ruling that his obligation to pay wife maintenance continued 

after her remarriage rather than automatically terminating under 

section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III). He asserts that In re Marriage of 

Parsons, 30 P.3d 868, 869 (Colo. App. 2001), which the magistrate 

found controlling, was wrongly decided. In the alternative, he 

argues that Parsons is distinguishable from the present case based 

on the specific language of the parties’ separation agreement. 

¶ 8 We agree that the magistrate and district court erroneously 

concluded that husband’s maintenance obligation continued after 

wife’s remarriage. In reaching this conclusion, we decline to follow 

Parsons to the extent it holds that the mere presence of a 

nonmodification clause is, on its own, sufficient under section 
4

14-10-122(2)(a)(III) to continue a maintenance obligation after a 

recipient spouse’s remarriage. See Chavez v. Chavez, 2020 COA 

70, ¶ 13 (noting that divisions of the court of appeals function 

independently and thus “divisions are not bound by the decisions of 

other divisions”). We further conclude that the particular 

separation agreement language at issue is materially 

distinguishable from that in Parsons and is not sufficient to 

continue husband’s maintenance obligation after wife’s remarriage. 

Therefore, we reverse the district court’s order. 

A. Standard of Review

¶ 9 We review de novo the language of the governing statute and 

the parties’ separation agreement. See In re Marriage of Williams, 

2017 COA 120M, ¶ 11. 

B. Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III)

¶ 10 Section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) states, in relevant part, that 

“[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided in the 

decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon 

. . . [t]he remarriage of . . . the party receiving maintenance.” 

Accordingly, the issue, as it was in the district court, is whether the 

parties “agreed in writing” in their separation agreement that 
5

maintenance would continue for the full 138-month term even if 

wife remarried. See id.; cf. Williams, ¶ 10 (determining de novo, 

based on the separation agreement, whether maintenance survived 

the obligor spouse’s death as a continuing obligation of his estate or 

was terminated under section 14-10-122(2)(a)(I)).

C. Early Case Law Interpreting the Statute

¶ 11 A division of this court addressed a predecessor version of 

section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) in Spratlen v. Spratlen, 30 Colo. App. 91, 

93-94, 491 P.2d 608, 609-10 (1971). That statute provided that

“[t]he remarriage of a party entitled to [maintenance] . . . shall 

relieve the other party from further payments of said [maintenance]; 

but nothing in this section shall preclude the parties from providing 

otherwise by written agreement or stipulation.” Id. at 93, 491 P.2d 

at 609 (quoting § 46-1-5(5), C.R.S. 1963). The separation 

agreement at issue in Spratlen provided that the husband would 

pay maintenance to the wife “until the death of his father.” Id. at 

92, 491 P.2d at 609. The division held that the statute “require[d]

an express statement that [maintenance] continue after remarriage, 

and the failure of the agreement in question to specify this point” 

was fatal to the wife’s argument that her maintenance continued 
6

until the death of the husband’s father regardless of her remarriage. 

Id. at 94, 491 P.2d at 610.

¶ 12 Spratlen relied on In re Estate of Kettering, 151 Colo. 202, 

206-07, 376 P.2d 983, 986 (1943), in which the supreme court, 

applying common law principles, held that maintenance ends with 

an obligor spouse’s death unless the agreement otherwise 

“expressly or by clear implication” provides that maintenance 

payments continue. Thus, in Kettering, the agreement’s language 

— which specified only that maintenance would continue “so long 

as the wife may live and remain unmarried” — did not require the 

husband’s estate to continue paying the wife maintenance after his 

death. Id. at 207, 376 P.2d at 986; see also Williams, ¶¶ 9 n.1, 

12-21 (relying in part on Kettering and concluding that similar 

language was insufficient under the provision of section 14-10-

122(2)(a) stating that, “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or 

expressly provided in the decree,” the obligation to pay maintenance 

ends on the obligor spouse’s death); cf. Int’l Tr. Co. v. Liebhardt, 111 

Colo. 208, 218, 139 P.2d 264, 267 (1943) (An agreement providing 

that maintenance would continue “after the death of the husband” 
7

was explicit enough to require his estate to continue paying the wife 

maintenance.).

¶ 13 Ten years after Spratlen, a division of this court decided In re 

Marriage of Hahn, 628 P.2d 175 (Colo. App. 1981), again addressing 

whether particular separation language was explicit enough to 

continue maintenance payments after the recipient spouse’s 

remarriage. The Hahn division interpreted a previous but 

materially similar version of section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III), which 

provided, “[u]nless otherwise agreed in writing or expressly provided 

in the decree, the obligation to pay future maintenance is 

terminated upon the death of either party or the remarriage of the 

party receiving maintenance.” Id. at 176 (quoting § 14-10-122(2), 

C.R.S. 1973). 

¶ 14 The separation agreement in Hahn provided that maintenance 

payments “will not be subject to modification for any reason except 

the death of the wife.” Id. Citing Spratlen, the division noted that 

section 14-10-122(2) had been “construed to require an express 

provision that alimony continue after marriage.” Id. However, the 

division then concluded that
8

the quoted language of the separation 

agreement is such an express provision. 

Although it does not explicitly provide for 

continuation or termination of maintenance in 

the event of remarriage, nevertheless, it 

indicates that it was the contemplation of the 

parties that only the wife’s death would 

absolve the husband of liability for payment of 

maintenance.

Id. 

D. Parsons

¶ 15 This brings us to Parsons, which was decided twenty years 

after Hahn. There, a division of this court also cited Spratlen with 

approval for the proposition that “[g]enerally, to overcome th[e]

statutory termination upon remarriage, an explicit reference to the 

continuation of maintenance after the recipient’s remarriage is 

necessary.” Parsons, 30 P.3d at 869. Regarding the agreed 

ninety-six months of maintenance, the Parsons separation 

agreement stated that 

[i]t is expressly understood and agreed that 

the maintenance . . . is contractual in nature 

and non-modifiable by any court. The 

payment of maintenance to [wife] shall not be 

subject to increase, or decrease, or 

extension due to change of economic 

circumstances of either party or for any other 

reason.
9

Id. at 868.

¶ 16 The obligor spouse argued that this language was materially 

distinguishable from that at issue in Hahn because it did not 

reference a specific event, i.e., the wife’s death, as the only ground 

on which maintenance could be modified. Id. at 869. The division 

rejected this argument and, in doing so, both extended Hahn and 

departed from its own description of Spratlen as requiring “an 

explicit reference to the continuation of maintenance after the 

recipient’s remarriage.” Id. The division held that “express 

language concerning termination is preferable,” but even in the 

absence of express language, “the presence of a nonmodification 

clause is sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that 

maintenance terminates upon the recipient’s remarriage.” Id. 

¶ 17 As support for its holding, Parsons relied on Hahn and on 

Telma v. Telma, 474 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Minn. 1991). Parsons, 30 

P.3d at 869-70. In Telma, however, the separation agreement at 

issue provided that the obligor spouse waived “any right” to petition 

the court for modification under Minnesota’s maintenance 

termination statute and “applicable case law.” 474 N.W.2d at 323. 

Therefore, the Minnesota court found that maintenance did not 
10

terminate under that state’s statute on the wife’s remarriage, 

describing the husband’s waiver of the termination on remarriage 

provision of the statute as “unequivocal.” Id. 

E. Analysis

¶ 18 In our view, the Parsons division diverged from the plain 

language of section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III) when it concluded that “the 

presence of a nonmodification clause” — standing alone — is 

sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that the obligation 

to pay maintenance ends on the recipient spouse’s remarriage. See 

Parsons, 30 P.3d at 869. Specifically, the Parsons division’s 

statement that a nonmodification clause will overcome the 

automatic termination on remarriage provision of the statute went 

far beyond both Spratlen and Hahn, where the agreements provided 

that only one identified event would serve as a basis for modifying 

maintenance. And Parsons’ statement is also inconsistent with that 

division’s description of the requirement from Spratlen that “an 

explicit reference to the continuation of maintenance after the 

recipient’s remarriage is necessary” to overcome the automatic 

termination on remarriage provision. Id. (emphasis added).
11

¶ 19 Further, we do not view as talismanic the terms “contractual” 

and “nonmodifiable.” To the contrary, the language of the 

separation agreement must be read as a whole, and in context, to 

determine the meaning of those terms or any others. See In re 

Marriage of Rother, 651 P.2d 457, 459 (Colo. App. 1982). 

¶ 20 Accordingly, we decline to follow Parsons to the extent it holds 

that a nonmodification clause in a separation agreement is alone 

sufficient to evince the parties’ agreement that the maintenance 

obligation will survive the recipient spouse’s remarriage. Instead, to 

avoid termination of maintenance by operation of law under section 

14-10-122(2)(a)(III), a separation agreement or decree must include 

an “express provision” that maintenance will continue even if the 

recipient spouse remarries. See Hahn, 628 P.2d at 176. And the 

parties must make it unmistakably clear in such a provision that 

they have “otherwise agreed” under the statute, meaning that they 

agree the automatic termination on remarriage provision will not 

apply to their maintenance award. See § 14-10-122(2)(a)(III); see 

also Palmer v. Palmer, 170 P.3d 676, 680 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007) 

(holding that parties seeking to avoid a similar Arizona statute 

“must make their intention unmistakably clear”) (emphasis omitted) 
12

(citation omitted); Cortese v. Cortese, 176 P.3d 1064, 1066-67 

(Mont. 2008) (holding under similar Montana statute that

maintenance terminates by operation of law on the remarriage of 

the recipient party, even if the separation agreement contains a 

nonmodification clause, because an express provision that 

maintenance will not terminate is required); cf. Williams, ¶¶ 12-21 

(requiring that separation agreement language “expressly or by 

clear implication provide that the payments will continue after the 

death of the obligor”).

¶ 21 We further conclude that the particular separation agreement 

language used by the parties here is insufficiently clear, even under 

Parsons, to require husband to continue paying wife maintenance 

after her remarriage. In Parsons, the agreement stated that 

maintenance was nonmodifiable “by any court,” but went on to 

state that “[t]he payment of maintenance to [wife] shall not be 

subject to increase, or decrease, or extension due to change of 

economic circumstances of either party or for any other reason.” 30 

P.3d at 868 (emphasis added). In contrast, the maintenance 

section of the agreement in this case provides that maintenance “is 

contractual in nature and shall be non-modifiable for any reason 
13

whatsoever by the Court.” But the second phrase that appeared in 

the Parsons agreement — providing that the maintenance cannot be 

modified based on a change in economic circumstances “or for any 

other reason” — is absent. 

¶ 22 This omission is crucial to our analysis because, under the 

statute, husband’s obligation to pay wife maintenance 

automatically terminates on her remarriage without any action by 

the court — that is, by operation of law. See § 14-10-122(2)(a)(III); 

Spratlen, 30 Colo. App. at 94, 491 P.2d at 610. The qualifier “by 

the court” suggests that the parties intended that maintenance 

would not be subject to a motion to modify under section 14-10-

122(1)(a) based on substantial and continuing changed 

circumstances. But it does not follow that the automatic 

terminating events in section 14-10-122(2)(a) — which require no 

action by the court — are inapplicable. 

¶ 23 Wife argues, however, that the “miscellaneous” section of the 

agreement suggests otherwise. This section states that if there is 

any fraud, misstatement, or omission in the parties’ financial 

affidavits, the innocent party will have the right to return to court 

for amended orders concerning all agreement provisions “except for 
14

the maintenance provisions which are expressly non-modifiable.” 

However, any modification based on fraud or nondisclosure by a 

party would not be automatic, or “by operation of law,” as under 

section 14-10-122(2)(a) but rather would require action “by the 

court.” See C.R.C.P. 60(b)(1). Thus, prohibiting any such 

modifications is consistent with the agreement’s maintenance and 

modification provisions and also with applying section 14-10-

122(a)(III) on wife’s remarriage.

¶ 24 In sum, we conclude that the magistrate and district court 

erred by interpreting the parties’ separation agreement to require 

husband to continue paying wife maintenance after her remarriage 

despite the automatic termination on remarriage provision of 

section 14-10-122(2)(a)(III). 

III. Conclusion 

¶ 25 The order is reversed, and the case is remanded to the district 

court with instructions to declare that husband’s obligation to pay 

wife maintenance terminated on her remarriage pursuant to section 

14-10-122(2)(a)(III) and to determine the amount she must 

reimburse him accordingly.

JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.