1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

In re: ) BAP No. NV-15-1137-LDoKi

)

KATHLEEN LYNNE RAY, ) Bk. No. 14-16060-mkn

)

Debtor. )

 )

)

KATHLEEN LYNNE RAY, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) M E M O R A N D U M* 

)

DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL )

TRUST COMPANY, )

)

Appellee. )

 )

Argued and Submitted on October 21, 2016 

at Las Vegas, Nevada

Filed - November 14, 2016

Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court

for the District of Nevada

Honorable Mike K. Nakagawa, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding**

________________________

Appearances: Appellant Kathleen Lynne Ray argued pro se;

Gregory L. Wilde of Tiffany & Bosco PA argued for

Appellee Deutsche Bank National Trust Company.

________________________

FILED

NOV 14 2016

SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK

U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL

OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication.

Although it may be cited for whatever persuasive value it may

have (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1), it has no precedential value. 

See 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.

** One of the matters on appeal was heard by the

Honorable Gary Spraker, United States Bankruptcy Judge for the

District of Alaska. Both of the orders on appeal were entered by

Judge Nakagawa.
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Before: LAFFERTY, DORE,*** and KIRSCHER, Bankruptcy Judges.

INTRODUCTION

In 2010, Appellant’s real property was sold at a foreclosure

sale, and a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale was recorded in favor of

Appellee. Nevertheless, Appellant continued to reside in the

real property at all times relevant to this appeal.1 Appellee

has twice obtained writs of restitution for the real property but

has been unable to execute on those writs due to three bankruptcy

filings and at least three unsuccessful lawsuits filed by

Appellant against Appellee in various courts, along with related

appeals. In those lawsuits, Appellant asserted that she was the

victim of a mortgage scam, that Appellee lacked standing, that

the foreclosure sale was invalid, and that Appellee’s former

counsel had a conflict of interest because he was allegedly

related to the perpetrator of the mortgage scam and had served as

a “clerk” (extern) to another bankruptcy judge.

In the instant bankruptcy case, Appellee moved for relief

from stay to proceed with its eviction action. Appellant did not

file an opposition to the motion but requested additional time to

file one. The bankruptcy court denied the request for an

extension of time and granted Appellee’s motion for relief from

stay on grounds that the real property was not property of the

*** Hon. Timothy W. Dore, United States Bankruptcy Judge for

the Western District of Washington, sitting by designation.

1 After this appeal was filed, Appellant was evicted from

the real property, but according to Appellee, she broke into the

real property and removed personal belongings. Appellee agreed

to allow Appellant limited access. At oral argument, Appellant

indicated she was still residing in the property.

-2-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

estate. Appellant moved for reconsideration, which the

bankruptcy court denied. 

Because the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

denying Appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file an

opposition, granting relief from stay, or denying

reconsideration, we AFFIRM.2

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Appellant Kathleen Ray was the obligor on a promissory note

dated May 6, 2005 in favor of First Franklin, a division of

National City Bank of Indiana, in the principal amount of

$448,000. The note was secured by a deed of trust against Ray’s

real property in Las Vegas, Nevada (the “Property”). Appellee

Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for FFMLT Trust

2005-FF8, Mortgage Pass-Through Certificates, Series 2005-FF8

(“Deutsche Bank”) was the assignee of the beneficial interests

under the note and deed of trust.3 

2 On May 11, 2016, Appellant filed in this appeal a “Notice

of Significant Changed Circumstances.” In that document,

Appellant asserted (1) that Appellee has no colorable claim of

title to the real property; and (2) that the writs of restitution

obtained by Appellee were void due to procedural irregularities

that may have violated Appellant’s rights. Appellant attached to

this document a copy of the amended complaint in her adversary

proceeding filed against Deutsche Bank and others on March 23,

2016, and an undated motion to dismiss the unlawful detainer

actions, apparently intended to be filed with the Las Vegas

Justice Court. Because none of the arguments or attached

documents were before the bankruptcy court when it ruled on

Appellant’s motions, we do not consider them.

3 Ray alleges that Deutsche Bank lacked standing because

its claim to an interest in the Property arose “following a

series of suspicious and unperfected transfers.” However, as

discussed below, Deutsche Bank’s standing to seek relief from

(continued...)

-3-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

Ray defaulted on payments due under the note in September

2008. In March 2009 Ray filed a chapter 74 petition in the

U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the District of Nevada. Ray received a

discharge in that case on July 28, 2009. The bankruptcy court

granted Deutsche Bank relief from stay as to any interest

retained by the chapter 7 trustee on March 16, 2010.

On June 25, 2010, the Property was sold at public sale, and

Deutsche Bank recorded its Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale on July 21,

2010. On February 10, 2011, Deutsche Bank commenced an unlawful

detainer proceeding against Ray in Las Vegas Justice Court. 

Deutsche Bank obtained a judgment and a writ of restitution

authorizing Ray’s eviction.5 Ray appealed, and the Nevada

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court.

During the course of her first bankruptcy, and before she

received her discharge, Ray sued Deutsche Bank and others in the

Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County, Nevada,

asserting various claims including breach of contract, breach of

fiduciary duty, fraud, and violations of TILA and RESPA. The

3(...continued)

stay is established by the fact it now holds a Trustee’s Deed

Upon Sale evidencing its ownership interest in the Property.

4 Unless otherwise indicated, all chapter and section

references are to the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1532. 

“Rule” references are to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy

Procedure, and “Civil Rule” references are to the Federal Rules

of Civil Procedure.

5 In Nevada, a judgment for possession in an unlawful

detainer action is referred to as a writ of restitution of the

premises. See NRS 40.360; see also Chapman v. Deutsche Bank

National Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103, 1107-08 (Nev. 2013); Gibby’s

Inc. v. Aylett, 615 P.2d 949, 950-51 and n.2 (Nev. 1980).

-4-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

trial court dismissed the complaint in September 2009 and, on

February 15, 2012, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order

affirming the dismissal.

Ray filed a chapter 13 petition on September 27, 2011. She

converted the case to chapter 7 on October 19, 2011. Deutsche

Bank was granted relief from stay on December 19, 2011. The

chapter 7 trustee moved to dismiss the case on grounds that Ray

was ineligible for a chapter 7 discharge due to her having

received a discharge in a chapter 7 case filed less than eight

years previously. The bankruptcy court granted that motion on

July 30, 2012.

In December 2011 Ray moved to reopen her first chapter 7

case, purportedly to discharge debts to the IRS and to file an

adversary complaint against Deutsche Bank. The motion was

granted on April 23, 2012. 

Meanwhile, on April 10, 2012, Ray sued Deutsche Bank in the

U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada. Ray’s complaint

in that action raised a variety of legal theories and attempted

to assert claims for equitable relief as well as claims for

damages. The district court granted Deutsche Bank’s motion to

dismiss Ray’s claims based on the claim preclusive effect of the

state court rulings against her. Ray appealed the dismissal

order; the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals summarily affirmed.

On July 10, 2012, Ray filed an adversary complaint against

Deutsche Bank in the reopened case. The bankruptcy court

dismissed that complaint on grounds that the claims asserted were

or could have been asserted in the district court proceeding that

was then pending, and such claims were thus precluded.

-5-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On June 4, 2014, Deutsche Bank filed a second unlawful

detainer complaint and was issued a temporary writ of restitution

on August 27, 2014. On September 9, 2014, less than two weeks

later, Ray filed the instant chapter 13 petition. She listed the

Property on Schedule A with a value of $206,000. She did not

list a secured claim against the real property but listed a

“disputed” unsecured debt of $428,490.07 to Specialized Loan

Servicing, which she described as “discharged mortgage on home.”6

On February 5, 2015, Deutsche Bank moved for relief from the

automatic stay (the “Stay Motion”), setting the matter for a

hearing on March 11, 2015. Ray did not file an opposition within

14 days prior to the hearing as required under Rule 9014(d) of

the Local Rules of Bankruptcy Practice of the United States

District Court for the District of Nevada. On February 26 (the

due date for any opposition), through counsel, Ray filed a motion

for an extension of time to respond to the Stay Motion and to

continue the hearing (“Motion to Extend”). Ray asserted, without

providing any admissible evidence, that Deutsche Bank’s then

counsel, Raymond Jereza, had a conflict because he was related to

Sonia Rodis, one of the convicted perpetrators of a mortgage

fraud scheme of which Ray claimed to have been a victim. Ray

also argued that her counsel and Deutsche Bank’s counsel had been

conferring about the fact that Ray was the victim of mortgage

fraud and that there were questions about Deutsche Bank’s

interest in the Property. Ray asserted she needed more time to

6 According to the bankruptcy court docket, Ray has not yet

confirmed a chapter 13 plan.

-6-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

continue due diligence and to make an offer to refinance the

Property. On the hearing date, Ray filed a “Supplement” to the

Motion to Extend, restating those points and indicating that she

could not attend the hearing because she had to be with her ill

mother in California, although her counsel did appear. Ray also

asserted that she had a setoff claim against Deutsche Bank. The

bankruptcy court did not rule on the Motion to Extend prior to

the hearing. 

The matter was heard by a visiting judge, the Honorable Gary

Spraker. Ray’s counsel appeared at the hearing and explained:

That we’re asking for this extension in good

faith, to complete our due diligence, as well as our

client not being here today. She’s also the victim of

a crime, which resulted in one of the perpetrators

recently being sentenced to jail. They’re not in the

first position to lift the stay. An HOA currently has

a super priority lien. The creditor may not even have

a colorable claim to title due to a series of

transactions which occurred subsequent to a purported

change of title involving the Bank of New York Mellon

and two subsidiaries of Bank of America. Three

separate entities have claimed a colorable title after

the super priority lien.

Judge Spraker denied the Motion to Extend and granted the

Stay Motion, finding that the Property was not property of the

estate and that sufficient cause existed to terminate the stay to

proceed with eviction. The bankruptcy court declined to grant

in rem relief under § 362(d)(4) because it determined there was

not enough evidence to support a finding of intent to hinder,

delay, defraud, or a scheme to defraud. The bankruptcy court

also did not waive the 14-day stay period of Rule 4001(a)(3).7 A

7 Ray moved for a seven-day extension of this deadline,

which the bankruptcy court denied, and Ray appealed. A motions

(continued...)

-7-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

written order was entered on March 18, 2015. 

On March 16, 2015, Ray filed a motion for reconsideration

pursuant to Civil Rule 59, incorporated in bankruptcy via

Rule 9023. On March 18, she filed an amended motion for

reconsideration. In the motion, Ray argued that (1) the

bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying Ray’s Motion to

Extend; (2) the bankruptcy court erred in conducting the hearing

because the homeowner’s association, which had a “super priority”

lien, had not been noticed;8 and (3) the court should disqualify

Deutsche Bank’s counsel on the basis of “undisclosed conflicted

familial relations.” Ray did not offer any substantive reason

why the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in granting the

Stay Motion.

On April 7, 2015, the bankruptcy court entered an order

denying the motion to reconsider without prejudice.9 Noting that

Deutsche Bank’s counsel had been served at an incorrect address,

the bankruptcy court’s order explicitly permitted Ray to

recalendar the motion. Ray did not do so; she filed the instant

appeal instead.

JURISDICTION

The bankruptcy court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334

7(...continued)

panel dismissed that appeal as moot on June 18, 2015.

8 In her opening brief, Ray states that the issue of

service on the HOA was “rendered moot by the payment of the

lien.”

9 The order also denied Ray’s motion for declaratory relief

regarding separate matters. That portion of the order is not

part of this appeal.

-8-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(G). We have jurisdiction under

28 U.S.C. § 158.

ISSUES

1. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in

denying Ray’s Motion to Extend?

2. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in

granting the Stay Motion?

3. Did the bankruptcy court abuse its discretion in

denying Ray’s motion for reconsideration?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review for abuse of discretion the bankruptcy court’s

denial of a motion for an extension of time to file an

opposition, its order granting relief from stay, and its order

denying reconsideration. See Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc.,

624 F.3d 1253, 1258 (9th Cir. 2010); Leafty v. Aussie Sonoran

Capital, LLC (In re Leafty), 479 B.R. 545, 550 (9th Cir. BAP

2012). A bankruptcy court abused its discretion if it applied

the wrong legal standard or its findings were illogical,

implausible or without support in the record. TrafficSchool.com,

Inc. v. Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 832 (9th Cir. 2011).

DISCUSSION

A. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Ray’s Motion to Extend.

The bankruptcy court is authorized under Rule 9006(b) at any

time, in its discretion, to extend filing deadlines “for cause

shown.” A bankruptcy court has substantial discretion to control

its own calendar. Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 960-61

(9th Cir. 2001). Four factors are relevant to whether the

-9-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying a continuance:

(1) the extent of Ray’s diligence in her efforts to ready her

defense prior to the date set for hearing; (2) the likelihood

that the need for a continuance could have been met if the

continuance had been granted; (3) the extent to which granting

the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the

opposing party; and (4) the extent to which Ray might have

suffered harm as a result of the bankruptcy court’s denial. 

Berry v. U.S. Tr. (In re Sustaita), 438 B.R. 198, 211 (9th Cir.

BAP 2010), aff’d, 460 F. App’x 627 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing United

States v. 2.61 Acres of Land More or Less, 791 F.2d 666, 670 (9th

Cir. 1985)).10

On appeal, Ray argues that the Stay Motion was filed in bad

faith while counsel were conferring on the issues, leaving her

with an “unusually strained deadline” to respond and that a short

continuance would not have prejudiced anyone. She argues that

the bankruptcy court should have granted the continuance so she

could complete her “due diligence” on the issues.11

10 Ray recites the standard applicable to continuances

under Civil Rule 6 that motions for continuance should normally

be granted in the absence of bad faith or prejudice to the

adverse party. However, this standard is not applicable to

motions brought in bankruptcy under Rule 9006(b). Luxury Jewels,

LLC v. Akers (In re Aroonsakool), 2014 WL 1273696, at *6 (9th

Cir. BAP Mar. 28, 2014).

11 Ray also argues that the bankruptcy court abused its

discretion in denying the request so that Judge Nakagawa could

hear the matter. However, this argument was not raised in

connection with the original motion in the bankruptcy court. 

Thus, we do not consider it. See United Student Funds, Inc. v.

Wylie (In re Wylie), 349 B.R. 204, 213 (9th Cir. BAP 2006)

(continued...)

-10-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

The bankruptcy court did not make explicit findings as to

the relevant factors, but we may affirm on any basis supported by

the record, Caviata Attached Homes LLC v. U.S. Bank

(In re Caviata Attached Homes, LLC), 481 B.R. 34, 44 (9th Cir.

BAP 2012), and the record here supports the conclusion that

denial of the Motion to Extend was not an abuse of discretion. 

Deutsche Bank demonstrated in its moving papers that Ray had no

interest in the Property. As such, the reasons offered for

requesting a continuance – that the parties were working out a

resolution, that an HOA held a superior lien, that Deutsche Bank

lacked colorable title, that Deutsche Bank’s former counsel had a

conflict, and that Ray could not attend the hearing – were

irrelevant to the court’s disposition of the Stay Motion. A

continuance would not have changed the fact that Ray had no

interest in the Property.

Analyzing the factors recited above: (1) as to Ray’s

diligence in preparing a defense, these parties have a lengthy

history of litigation in which Ray has attempted to assert the

same arguments offered here, which have been rejected by other

courts; in other words, Ray has had many opportunities over many

years to formulate a defense; (2) as to whether the need for a

continuance would have been met, a continuance would not have

changed the dispositive fact that Ray had no interest in the

Property; (3) regarding prejudice to Deutsche Bank and the court,

11(...continued)

(Absent exceptional circumstances, the panel generally will not

consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal). In any

event, Ray offers no reason to believe that Judge Nakagawa would

have ruled differently.

-11-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

a short continuance probably would not have substantially

prejudiced either, but Deutsche Bank had spent much of the past

seven years attempting to enforce its security interest in the

Property, with its attendant costs, and some prejudice to

Deutsche Bank may fairly be inferred; and (4) as to prejudice to

Ray, she had no interest in the Property and no plausible defense

to the Stay Motion, thus the denial of a continuance did not

prejudice her.

The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying

the Motion to Extend.

B. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in

granting relief from stay.

Under § 362(d), the bankruptcy court “shall” grant relief

from stay upon a showing of “cause.” If property is not property

of the estate, that is cause for relief. See Edwards v. Wells

Fargo Bank (In re Edwards), 454 B.R. 100, 106 (9th Cir. BAP

2011). Ray had no legal right to occupy the Property, as

Deutsche Bank had obtained a temporary writ of restitution less

than two weeks prior to Ray’s most recent bankruptcy filing. See

Chapman v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., 302 P.3d 1103,

1107-08 (Nev. 2013) (purpose of unlawful detainer action is to

restore possession to one from whom it is being unlawfully

withheld; if court determines that occupant has no legal defense

to unlawful detainer, it will issue a summary order for

restitution of the premises); see also Eden Place, LLC v. Perl

(In re Perl), 811 F.3d 1120, 1130 (9th Cir. 2016), cert. denied

sub nom. Perl v. Eden Place, LLC, 84 USLW 3558 (U.S. Oct. 3,

2016) (under California law, an unlawful detainer judgment and

-12-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

writ of possession bestow legal title and all rights of

possession upon the plaintiff).

Relief from stay proceedings are primarily procedural. Veal

v. American Home Mortgage Serv., Inc. (In re Veal), 450 B.R. 897,

914 (9th Cir. BAP 2011). Hearings on such motions are handled in

a summary fashion: the bankruptcy court need only determine

“whether there are sufficient countervailing equities to release

an individual creditor from the collective stay. . . . a

creditor’s claim or security is not finally determined in the

relief from stay proceeding.” Id. (citing Johnson v. Righetti

(In re Johnson), 756 F.2d 738, 740-41 (9th Cir. 1985)). 

On appeal, Ray does not address the standard to be applied

in ruling on a motion for relief from stay or the fact that she

no longer has any rights in the Property. We find no abuse of

discretion in the bankruptcy court’s rulings. To establish its

standing to move for relief from stay, Deutsche Bank needed to

show only that it had a colorable claim to enforce its rights

against the Property. In re Edwards, 454 B.R. at 104-05 (citing

In re Veal, 450 B.R. at 914) (additional citations omitted).

In re Edwards involved facts nearly identical to those

presented here. The creditor, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells

Fargo”), moved for relief from stay to continue an eviction. 

Prepetition, Wells Fargo had obtained title to the subject real

property pursuant to a trustee’s deed upon sale and had obtained

a writ of possession in an unlawful detainer proceeding in a

California court. The debtor challenged Wells Fargo’s standing

and alleged that Wells Fargo had unlawfully foreclosed and

attempted to evict the debtor. The bankruptcy court rejected

-13-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

these arguments and granted relief from stay. The debtor

appealed, and we affirmed. The Panel held that Wells Fargo was

the “presumptive current record owner” pursuant to the trustee’s

deed upon sale, and that Wells Fargo had acquired additional

rights and remedies when it obtained the unlawful detainer

judgment and writ of possession. 454 B.R. at 105-06. The Panel

thus held that Wells Fargo had established a colorable claim to

an ownership interest in the real property sufficient to

establish standing as a real party in interest. Id. at 105-06.

Here, Deutsche Bank obtained title to the Property under the

Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale in 2010 and obtained a writ of

restitution in state court. Thus, Deutsche Bank is the

presumptive current owner of the Property and obtained a right to

possession in state court before Ray filed the instant bankruptcy

case. As such, Deutsche Bank had a colorable claim to the

Property. As to the merits, Deutsche Bank established “cause”

for relief by showing that neither the estate nor Ray had any

interest in the Property.

At the hearing on the Stay Motion, Ray’s counsel did not

elaborate on how any purported mortgage fraud or relationship

between the convicted fraud perpetrator and Deutsche Bank’s

counsel impacted the issues relevant to whether the stay should

be lifted. Similarly, the HOA’s senior lien had no bearing on

whether the court should lift the stay to permit Deutsche Bank to

proceed with eviction.

Deutsche Bank argues that in rem stay relief was warranted

under § 362(d)(4), but Deutsche Bank did not cross-appeal the

bankruptcy court’s order. In any event, the bankruptcy court

-14-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

correctly denied in rem relief under that section, because, as

the owner of the Property, Deutsche Bank is no longer a creditor

whose claim is secured by an interest in the Property under

§ 362(d)(4). See Ellis v. Yu (In re Ellis), 523 B.R. 673, 678-79

(9th Cir. BAP 2014).

C. The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Ray’s motion for reconsideration.

Civil Rule 59(e) allows for reconsideration if the

bankruptcy court “(1) is presented with newly discovered

evidence, (2) committed clear error or the initial decision was

manifestly unjust, or (3) if there is an intervening change in

controlling law. There may also be other, highly unusual

circumstances warranting reconsideration.” Sch. Dist. No. 1J v.

AC & S, Inc., 5 F.3d 1255, 1263 (9th Cir. 1993) (citation

omitted).

In her motion for reconsideration, Ray presented no argument

that was not or could not have been made in connection with the

Stay Motion. She presented no newly discovered evidence, error,

or intervening change in controlling law. As noted, she argued

that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion in denying an

extension of time to respond and in granting stay relief when the

HOA had not been noticed. Ray also argued that the bankruptcy

court should disqualify Deutsche Bank’s counsel on the basis of

his alleged conflict. As discussed above, the bankruptcy court

did not abuse its discretion in ruling immediately on the Stay

Motion, and the remaining arguments have no bearing on the

propriety of that decision. In short, Ray did not establish any

grounds for reconsideration.

-15-
1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

On appeal, Ray argues that the bankruptcy court should not

have denied the motion because Deutsche Bank’s counsel would have

been served electronically and notice was served on the addresses

listed for counsel by the State Bar of Nevada and Clark County

Business License Dept. Ray also points out that the motion for

reconsideration was unopposed. These arguments are beside the

point: the bankruptcy court denied the motion without prejudice

to Ray’s re-calendaring of the motion upon proper notice, but Ray

chose not to do so.12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the bankruptcy court did not

abuse its discretion in denying Ray’s Motion to Extend, granting

relief from the automatic stay, or denying Ray’s motion for

reconsideration. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.

12 In her brief on appeal, Ray argued that her bankruptcy

case should have been transferred to another court due to the

appearance of impropriety resulting from Deutsche Bank’s former

counsel’s involvement in the case. At oral argument, Ray

indicated she was withdrawing this request. In any event, no

such relief was requested in the bankruptcy court. Thus we would

not have considered this argument. See In re Wylie, 349 B.R. at

213.

-16-