United States Court of Appeals

For the Eighth Circuit 

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No. 23-1796

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United States of America

 Plaintiff - Appellee

v.

Tyler Lewis Gunderson

 Defendant - Appellant

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Appeal from United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Iowa - Western

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Submitted: November 17, 2023

Filed: February 8, 2024

[Unpublished]

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Before COLLOTON, BENTON, and SHEPHERD, Circuit Judges. 

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PER CURIAM.

Tyler Gunderson challenges the substantive reasonableness of the 24-month 

sentence that the district court1 imposed upon revoking his supervised release. 

Having jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 

1

The Honorable Stephanie M. Rose, Chief Judge, United States District Court

for the Southern District of Iowa. 
-2- 

In 2015, Gunderson pled guilty to traveling with the intent to engage in a 

sexual act with a juvenile, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b), and was sentenced to 

60 months’ imprisonment with 10 years of supervised release. Following his 

discharge from federal custody in 2020, Gunderson commenced supervised release 

at a residential reentry facility, where staff soon discovered that he impermissibly 

possessed a smartphone. A search of the device revealed that Gunderson had 

messaged nude photographs of himself to others and visited pornographic websites, 

where he used search terms such as “preteen” and “adolescent.” The Government 

thereafter sought to revoke Gunderson’s supervised release. The district court 

granted the Government’s petition and sentenced Gunderson to an additional eight 

months’ imprisonment with five years of supervised release. 

Gunderson recommenced supervised release in 2021, but the Government 

again filed a petition for revocation after reentry facility staff reported that he had 

used an employment travel pass to visit his girlfriend, refused to obtain an updated 

substance-abuse or mental-health evaluation, and failed to maintain employment. 

The district court granted the Government’s petition and sentenced Gunderson to an 

additional eight months’ imprisonment with four years of supervised release. 

Gunderson commenced supervised release once more in 2022. Months later, 

the Government filed another petition for revocation after reentry facility staff 

reported that Gunderson had failed to attend sex-offender treatment, possessed a 

smartphone and attempted to destroy it, used a hygiene travel pass to rent a motel 

room, and twice failed to report to work. The Government also alleged that 

Gunderson was untruthful with the United States Probation Office. At his revocation 

hearing, Gunderson admitted the allegations, which constituted Grade C violations.

The district court revoked his supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ 

imprisonment—which represented an upward variance from the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines range of 4 to 10 months’ imprisonment—followed by 4 years 

of supervised release. 
-3- 

Gunderson now appeals, arguing that the district court imposed a 

substantively unreasonable sentence. He specifically asserts that the district court 

abused its discretion by affording undue weight to the underlying violations while

undervaluing his mental health history, difficult upbringing, and acceptance of 

responsibility, ultimately imposing a sentence that was “unduly harsh.” 

We review the reasonableness of a revocation sentence for an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Elbert, 20 F.4th 413, 416 (8th Cir. 2021). A district 

court abuses its discretion when it “fails to consider a relevant and significant factor, 

gives significant weight to an irrelevant or improper factor, or considers the 

appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.” 

United States v. Doerr, 42 F.4th 914, 918 (8th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted). 

Although a district court must consider the relevant § 3553(a) factors incorporated 

in 18 U.S.C. §3583(e) when fashioning a revocation sentence, United States v. 

Johnson, 827 F.3d 740, 745 (8th Cir. 2016), it need not make specific factual findings 

for each factor that it considers, United States v. Miller, 557 F.3d 910, 917 (8th Cir. 

2009). Rather, “[a]ll that is generally required to satisfy the appellate court is 

evidence that the district court was aware of the relevant factors.” Id. (citation 

omitted). Moreover, “[i]f [the district court] decides that an outside-Guidelines 

sentence is warranted, [it] must consider the extent of the deviation and ensure that 

the justification is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of the variance.” 

United States v. Clark, 998 F.3d 363, 370 (8th Cir. 2021) (second and third 

alterations in original) (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)). 

Finally, “it will be the unusual case when we reverse a district court sentence—

whether within, above, or below the applicable Guidelines range—as substantively 

unreasonable.” United States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 464 (8th Cir. 2009) (en 

banc) (citation omitted). 

Here, the district court heard argument from both parties regarding an 

appropriate sentence before stating that it had considered all of the § 3553(a) factors, 

noting that it had twice revoked Gunderson’s supervised release but that the 

eight-month sentences accompanying both revocations “clearly had no impact.” The 
-4- 

district court additionally found that Gunderson suffered from mental health issues 

but remarked that his criminal history, coupled with a demonstrable pattern of 

deception, evading supervision, and deviant sexual behavior, counseled in favor of 

“a long and serious restart.” It also recognized that searches for pornography 

depicting “young kid[s]” had been discovered on a smartphone in Gunderson’s 

possession, that an additional cellphone was now missing, and that Gunderson had 

impermissibly rented a motel room with the likely purpose of engaging in sexual 

activity, all of which were “deeply troubling” and indicated that he posed a safety 

risk to the community. In all, the district court found that the circumstances of the 

case warranted an upward variance.

Although Gunderson disagrees with this assessment, a district court has wide 

latitude under § 3553(a) to lend more weight to some sentencing factors than it does 

to others; his mere dissatisfaction in this regard does not indicate an abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Wickman, 988 F.3d 1065, 1067 (8th Cir. 2021). 

Accordingly, we are satisfied that the district court was aware of the relevant 

sentencing factors and conducted an individualized assessment applying those 

factors before varying upward. E.g., Clark, 998 F.3d at 370 (finding that an upward 

variance was substantively reasonable where the district court “justified its decision 

based on [the defendant]’s repeated violations of supervised release, his history and 

characteristics, and the need to protect the public”). Therefore, upon finding no 

abuse of discretion, we conclude that the district court imposed a substantively 

reasonable sentence.2

The judgment of the district court is affirmed. 

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2

Gunderson also argues that the district court improperly relied on USSG 

§ 7B1.4, comment. (n.3), which states that an upward departure may be warranted 

for a “Grade C violation that is associated with a high risk of new felonious conduct.” 

Nowhere does the record indicate or allow this Court to infer that the district court

or the United States Probation Office relied on this application note in fashioning 

Gunderson’s sentence.