IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

STEVE SNYDER-HILL, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY, 

Defendant. 

 Case No. 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD 

 Judge Michael H. Watson 

 Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

PLAINTIFFS’ NOTICE OF SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORITY 

Plaintiffs submit the attached Sixth Circuit opinion as supplemental authority. See Exhibit 

1. Several days ago, the Sixth Circuit decided Doe v. University of Kentucky, No. 4:14-cv002976 (6th Cir. Aug. 19, 2020), reversing one of the district court opinions on which OSU 

relies to claim lack of standing. See OSU Br. at 20 n. 5 (Dkt. 128). When Jane Doe was sexually 

assaulted on campus, she was not a student or employee of the university, but sought to 

participate in school activities and use university facilities. See Slip Op. at 1-2, 7. The Sixth 

Circuit held that Doe had standing because “there remain genuine disputes as to whether she was 

denied the benefits of an ‘education program or activity’ furnished by the University.” See Slip 

Op. at 6-7. Reversing the District Court’s grant of summary judgment, the Circuit explained that 

Title IX standing should not be analyzed “rigid[ly],” but instead turns on “the sum of all [the 

plaintiff’s] relationships to the [defendant],” id. at 67, and it would “defeat” Title IX’s broad 

purpose to “recognize[e] artificial distinctions in the structure or operation of an institution.” Id. 

(citation omitted). 

The Sixth Circuit’s opinion supports Plaintiffs’ position that Title IX’s broad protections 

are not limited to the technical classification of a plaintiff’s connection to a university (e.g., 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 1 of 11 PAGEID #: 2593
2 

student or non-student, employee or independent contractor) but is instead a fact-intensive 

inquiry and that John Does 30, 42, 47, and 49 have standing to assert Title IX claims against 

OSU. See Pls.’ Opp. Br. at 30-34 (Dkt. 133). 

August 24, 2020 EMERY CELLI BRINCKERHOFF ABADY 

WARD & MAAZEL LLP 

By: /s/ Ilann M. Maazel 

Ilann M. Maazel (admitted pro hac vice) 

Debra L. Greenberger (admitted pro hac vice) 

Marissa Benavides (admitted pro hac vice) 

600 Fifth Avenue, 10th Floor 

New York, New York 10020 

Phone: (212) 763-5000 

Fax: (212) 763-5001 

E-Mail: imaazel@ecbawm.com 

E-Mail: dgreenberger@ecbawm.com 

E-Mail: mbenavides@ecbawm.com 

SCOTT ELLIOTT SMITH, LPA 

Scott E. Smith (0003749) 

Michael L. Dillard, Jr. (0083907) 

5003 Horizons Drive, Suite 100 

Columbus, Ohio 43220 

Phone: (614) 846-1700 

Fax: (614) 486-4987 

E-Mail:ses@sestraillaw.com 

E-Mail: mld@sestriallaw.com 

PUBLIC JUSTICE, P.C. 

Adele P. Kimmel (admitted pro hac vice) 

Alexandra Brodsky (admitted pro hac vice) 

 1620 L Street, NW, Suite 630 

Washington, DC 20036 

Phone: (202) 797-8600 

Fax: (202) 232-7203 

E-mail: akimmel@publicjustice.net 

E-mail: abrodsky@publicjustice.net 

Attorneys for Plaintiffs 

 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 2 of 11 PAGEID #: 2594
3 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

It is hereby certified that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was filed and 

served, via the Court’s CM/ECF system on August 24, 2020, on all counsel of record. 

 By: /s/_Ilann M. Maazel 

 Ilann M. Maazel

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 3 of 11 PAGEID #: 2595
Exhibit 1

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 4 of 11 PAGEID #: 2596
RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b) 

File Name: 20a0267p.06 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 

JANE DOE, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

┐

│

│

│

│

│

│

│

┘

No. 19-5126 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Eastern District of Kentucky at Lexington. 

No. 5:15-cv-00296—Joseph M. Hood, District Judge. 

Argued: October 17, 2019 

Decided and Filed: August 19, 2020 

Before: BOGGS, BATCHELDER, and DONALD, Circuit Judges. 

_________________ 

COUNSEL 

ARGUED: Linda M. Correia, CORREIA & PUTH, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. 

Bryan H. Beauman, STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MOLONEY, PLLC, Lexington, 

Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Linda M. Correia, Roshni C. Shikari, CORREIA 

& PUTH, PLLC, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Bryan H. Beauman, Jessica R. Stigall, 

STURGILL, TURNER, BARKER & MOLONEY, PLLC, Lexington, Kentucky, William E. 

Thro, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellee. Demian A. 

Ordway, M. Theodore Takougang, HOLWELL SHUSTER & GOLDBERG LLP, New York, 

New York, Emily Martin, Neena Chaudhry, Sunu Chandy, Shiwalit Patel, NATIONAL 

WOMEN’S LAW CENTER, Washington, D.C., for Amici Curiae. 

>

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 5 of 11 PAGEID #: 2597 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 1
No. 19-5126 Doe v. Univ. of Ky. Page 2 

_________________ 

OPINION 

_________________ 

BERNICE BOUIE DONALD, Circuit Judge. In this matter, we ask whether Plaintiff 

Jane Doe (hereinafter “Doe”) can bring a Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, claim against a university 

based on that university’s alleged deliberate indifference to a sexual assault by a university 

student (i.e., a Title IX Davis claim, Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, 526 U.S. 629 

(1999)). Although not technically enrolled at Defendant University of Kentucky (hereinafter 

“the University”), Doe lived, dined, and participated in student activities on the University’s 

campus. She also hoped to attend the University and was enrolled at a Kentucky community 

college that allows its students to transfer credits to the University and enroll in the University 

through a simpler application process. The district court held that Doe could not bring such a 

claim, finding that Doe was not a student of the University or a participant in any of the 

University’s educational programs or activities. Because we find that Doe has sufficiently 

shown that there remain genuine disputes as to whether the University denied her the benefit of 

an “education program or activity,” she has standing to bring her Davis claim, and we 

REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for further consideration of the merits of Doe’s 

claim in light of this Court’s recent opinion in Kollaritsch v. Michigan State University Board of 

Trustees, 944 F.3d 613, 619-24 (6th Cir. 2019).1 

I. 

Although the facts and procedural history of this case are somewhat complicated, we can 

simplify them for purposes of deciding the narrow issue in this case. In fact, the parties agree on 

most of the facts that are relevant to our decision. Doe attended Bluegrass Community and 

Technical College (“the Community College”). The Community College was previously known 

1In Kollaritsch, this Court, in analyzing several Davis claims, held “that a student-victim plaintiff must 

plead, and ultimately prove, that the school had actual knowledge of actionable sexual harassment and that the 

school’s deliberate indifference to it resulted in further actionable sexual harassment against the student-victim, 

which caused the Title IX injuries.” 944 F.3d at 618. With respect to the plaintiffs in Kollaritsch, this Court found 

that, “[b]ecause none of the plaintiffs in this case suffered any actionable sexual harassment after the school’s 

response, they did not suffer ‘pervasive’ sexual harassment as set out in Davis.” Id. 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 6 of 11 PAGEID #: 2598 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 2
No. 19-5126 Doe v. Univ. of Ky. Page 3 

as Lexington Community College, which was an entity that was wholly owned, governed, and 

managed by the University. Although the administration of the Community College has now 

split off from the University, many of its buildings, grounds, and parking areas are still owned 

and operated by the University. Importantly for this case, students who chose to live on campus 

at the Community College lived in the University’s residence halls, as did Doe. Both parties 

agree that living on campus contributes to learning and leads to more academic success. Doe 

paid various fees directly to the University, including payments for room, board, and fees for the 

student government association, student activities, access to the student center, a student health 

plan, technology, access to the recreation center, and student affairs. The University has two 

programs that allow the Community College’s students to transfer to or earn credits toward a 

degree at the University. Doe did not yet meet the requirements for either program because she 

had only been enrolled at the Community College for a few short weeks, but she alleges that she 

planned to enroll at the University. 

Doe alleges that, while she was living on the University’s campus, a student enrolled at 

the University raped her on October 2, 2014.2 She reported the rape to the University’s police 

department, and the University investigated the allegations. Over the course of two and half 

years, the University held four different disciplinary hearings. Although the alleged perpetrator 

was found responsible for the rape at the first three hearings, the University’s appeal board 

overturned the decisions based on procedural deficiencies. At the fourth hearing, the alleged 

perpetrator was found not responsible. Doe dropped out of her classes and withdrew from the 

University’s housing on October 15, 2014. 

Doe filed suit against the University on October 1, 2015, and has since filed multiple 

amended complaints, asserting that the University’s deliberate indifference to her alleged sexual 

assault violated Title IX. The University moved for dismissal of Doe’s third amended complaint 

on February 20, 2018. In its motion, the University argued, among other things, that Doe was 

not a student at the University and was thus not deprived of an “education program or activity” 

2

We include the following allegations to give context to Doe’s claim, but we do not believe that 

these allegations are necessary to conclude that the district court erred. In this opinion, we address only 

whether the district court properly concluded that Doe lacked standing, and we will not address the other 

arguments presented as alternative grounds for affirming the district court’s grant of summary judgment.

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 7 of 11 PAGEID #: 2599 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 3
No. 19-5126 Doe v. Univ. of Ky. Page 4 

under Title IX. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Because the University attached multiple exhibits to its 

motion to dismiss, the district court treated the motion as a motion for summary judgment and 

allowed limited discovery related to the University’s argument that, as a non-student, Doe could 

not bring suit. Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 357 F. Supp. 3d 620, 623 (E.D. Ky. 2019). The district court 

concluded: 

Accordingly, the [c]ourt finds that while [Doe] was living on [the University]’s 

campus, paying various fees and costs associated with living on campus, and 

utilizing [the University]’s services, such as [the University]’s libraries and 

computer labs, [Doe] has failed to show she was either a [University] student or 

participating in any of [the University]’s educational programs or activities. Since 

[Doe] has failed to show she was either a [University] student or enrolled in a 

[University] education program or activity, [Doe] lacks standing to bring the 

present action under Title IX, and the Court need not consider [the University]’s 

arguments regarding the first three disciplinary hearings and [Doe]’s alleged 

failure to state a Title IX retaliation claim. 

Id. at 633-34. Plaintiff filed a timely appeal challenging the district court’s grant of summary 

judgment. 

II. 

We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Gillis v. Miller, 

845 F.3d 677, 683 (6th Cir. 2017). Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there 

is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The moving party bears the burden of showing that no genuine 

issues of material fact exist. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The nonmoving 

party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” and in turn, the 

reviewing court must determine “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to 

require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter 

of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-52 (1986) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted). 

 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 8 of 11 PAGEID #: 2600 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 4
No. 19-5126 Doe v. Univ. of Ky. Page 5 

III. 

Title IX states that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be 

excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under 

any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 

This statute has spawned various theories of liability and provides relief broadly to those who 

face discrimination on the basis of sex in the American education system. See, e.g., NCAA v. 

Smith, 525 U.S. 459, 466 n.4 (1999) (recognizing that Congress amended Title IX to reject the 

Supreme Court’s earlier attempts to limit Title IX’s coverage to only the specific programs that 

received federal funding); N. Haven Bd. of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 521 (1982) (allowing 

employees to sue under Title IX); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979) (allowing 

applicants to sue under Title IX); Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43 F.3d 265, 271-72 

(6th Cir. 1994) (allowing student-athletes to sue under Title IX based on disparities in athletic 

programming). 

In this case, however, we deal with a specific type of Title IX claim: a Davis claim. In 

Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education, the Supreme Court held that “recipients of federal 

funding may be liable for ‘subjecting’ their students to discrimination where the recipient is 

deliberately indifferent to known acts of student-on-student sexual harassment and the harasser is 

under the school’s disciplinary authority.” 526 U.S. at 646-47 (internal editing marks omitted) 

(emphasis added). In Vance v. Spencer County Public School District, this Court explained that, 

under Davis: 

Title IX may support a claim for student-on-student sexual harassment when the 

plaintiff can demonstrate the following elements: (1) the sexual harassment was 

so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it could be said to deprive the 

plaintiff of access to the educational opportunities or benefits provided by the 

school, (2) the funding recipient had actual knowledge of the sexual harassment, 

and (3) the funding recipient was deliberately indifferent to the harassment. 

231 F.3d 253, 258-59 (6th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added). Our Court also recently emphasized 

that Davis claims “against a school for its response to student-on-student sexual harassment 

[involve] a ‘high standard’ that applies only in ‘certain limited circumstances.’” Kollaritsch, 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 9 of 11 PAGEID #: 2601 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 5
No. 19-5126 Doe v. Univ. of Ky. Page 6 

944 F.3d at 619 (emphasis added) (quoting Davis, 526 U.S. at 643). As emphasized, in each of 

these cases, the courts have spoken in terms of student-on-student sexual harassment. 

Based on this language, the district court found that Doe did not have standing to bring 

her Davis claim because she was not a “student” at the University. We disagree. Although this 

Court does not wish to extend Davis beyond the scope intended by the Supreme Court, we find 

that the district court’s decision was too rigid in this case and that, although Does was not 

enrolled as a student at the University, she has shown that, for purposes of her Davis claim, there 

remain genuine disputes as to whether she was denied the benefits of an “education program or 

activity” furnished by the University.

Although she was not technically enrolled in classes at the University, Doe lived in one 

of the University’s residence halls, she paid the University directly for that housing. She also 

paid for a dining plan from the University. Moreover, Doe paid the University for various 

student fees, including fees for the student government association, student activities, access to 

the student center, a student health plan, technology, access to the recreation center, and student 

affairs. 

Doe also alleges that she hoped to eventually enroll at the University after beginning her 

education at the Community College, and that was certainly a realistic goal. Kentucky’s 

statutory scheme on higher education expressly facilitates the transfer of students from 

community colleges to public universities. Ky. Rev. Stat. § 164.092(2)(e) (Kentucky’s “public 

college and university system [should] focus[] its efforts and resources on the goals of: . . . (e) 

Facilitating credit hour accumulation and transfer of students from [Kentucky community 

colleges] to four (4) year postsecondary institutions.”). To achieve that end, the University has 

two programs that allow the Community College students to transfer to or earn credits toward a 

degree at the University while enrolled at the Community College. 

 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 10 of 11 PAGEID #: 2602 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 6
No. 19-5126 Doe v. Univ. of Ky. Page 7 

 With Doe paying the University directly for much of her educational experience—living 

on the University’s campus, dining on campus, and participating in the University’s student 

activities3—and the close academic relationship between the University and the Community 

College, we find that the sum of all these relationships to the University of Kentucky means that 

Doe has shown that there is a genuine dispute as to whether she was denied the benefit of an 

education program or activity of the University (not the Community College). See Horner, 

43 F.3d at 272 (“Congress has made clear its intent to extend the scope of Title IX’s equal 

opportunity obligations to the furthest reaches of an institution’s programs. We will not defeat 

that purpose by recognizing artificial distinctions in the structure or operation of an 

institution.”).4

IV. 

For these reasons, we REVERSE and REMAND for further proceedings so that the 

district court can rule on the merits of Doe’s Davis claim in light of our decision in Kollaritsch, 

944 F.3d at 619-24. 

3We note that the University espouses the educational benefits of living on campus and participating in 

student activities: 

[The University’s] staff serves as a helpful resource for all residents, from the programs and 

activities run by Resident Advisors to the support of the full-time, live-in Resident Directors. 

Through the efforts of all of our staff members, living on campus is an inclusive, safe, and 

fun learning and living environment for our residents. 

. . . 

The Office of Residence Life’s mission is to create inclusive residential communities that 

promote student learning and personal growth. 

. . . 

Living on campus has a positive impact on a student’s academic success . . . . Students are more 

like[ly] to succeed and return for their sophomore year if they live on campus. 

. . . 

We give students the opportunity to work and live with people from different backgrounds, and in 

the process, we encourage them to learn from one another in an atmosphere of mutual respect. 

4In reaching this decision, we note that our decision is limited in two regards. First, our decision is limited 

to the unique circumstances of this case, and we do not expand Davis standing beyond those circumstances where a 

plaintiff is so closely tied to a university that the individual is essentially a student of that university. Furthermore, 

we also reiterate that Davis claims require that the harasser be “under the school’s disciplinary authority.” Davis, 

526 U.S. at 647. Although that is not an issue here, as the parties agree that Doe’s alleged harasser was a student of 

the University and thus under its disciplinary authority, we wish to re-iterate the importance of that requirement in 

light of our decision in this case. 

Case: 2:18-cv-00736-MHW-EPD Doc #: 136 Filed: 08/24/20 Page: 11 of 11 PAGEID #: 2603 Case: 19-5126 Document: 45-2 Filed: 08/19/2020 Page: 7