### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00566- CR

Adr ian D. Lag unas , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF COM AL COUNTY , 22ND JUDICIAL DISTRI CT NO. CR2003- 104, HO NORAB LE GARY L. STEEL, JUDGE P RESIDING

O P I N I O N
After a jury trial, appellant Adrian L agunas was convicted of ag g ravated kidnapping and burg lary of a habitation, and the district c ourt sentenc ed him to confine ment of twenty y ear s and thirty -five year s, respe ctively
. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. §§ 20 .0 4( a ), 30 .0 2( a ) (We st 200 3) . In th is appea l, we will consider L agunas’s c laim that he was de nied his Six th Amendment rig ht of confr ontation with reg ard to he arsa y testimony

from the complainant’s four-y ear -old child that the dis tr ic t court a dmi tte d as a n e xcit e d u tte ra

nc e , a c on te nti on

that im pli c a te s Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). L agunas also ar g ues that the trial c ourt abused its discretion in its application of the e xcit e d u tte ra

nc e he ars ay

e xce pti on , th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly ins uf fi c ien t to su pp or

t a conviction for burg lary or for ag g ravated ki dnapping , and that the evidenc e is fac tually insufficient2

to prove L agunas’s identity as the pe rson who commi t t ed t h e ac t s alleg ed. We will affir m the jud g me nt o f t

he dis tr ic t c ourt
. BACK GR OUND The e vents from which L agunas’s convictions arose occur red in the late eve ning of J une 22 or e arly

morning of June 23, 2000, alleg edly beg inning in a

two-bedr oom house owned by I g nacia s and Apolonio Cantu on South Hackber ry in New B raunf

els. The f

ol l o wi n g fa cts are
un dis pu te d. Th e Cantu s o c c up ie d o ne of the tw o b e dr oo ms b ut w e re no t pr e se nt t he e ve nin g in question. M.M., a 22-y ear -old woman and the complainant in this case , was stayi n g i n t h e other be dr oo m a lon g wi th h e r t

wo c hil dr e n, fo ur -ye ar- old D. M. and tw o- y e ar- old

R.M . C. M. , th e Cantu s’ g randson, wa s eng ag ed to M.M. at that time, but was inca rce ra t ed on the nig ht in question. A daug hter of the Cantus, Y olanda L agunas, wa s marrie d to L agunas and w as also C.M.’s aunt. The re was disputed testimony

reg ardingwhether

the L agunases we re a lso stay ing in the living room of the Cantus’ house at the time, but it is undisputed that they wer e keeping some belong ings the re a nd that
a t le a st Y ola

nd a ha d a c c e ss t o th e ho us e . T he Cantu s ke pt a ke y hid de n ou tsi de a sid e do or to e na ble
cer tain family

members to have acc ess to the house. At a pp ro xima te ly

1:4 5 a .m. on

July 23 , N e w B ra

unfe ls p oli c e re c e ive d a

91 1 c a ll from M.M. She had c alled fr o m a h o use at 561 Schmidt Avenue . Shortly there afte r, Off

icer Chr ist op he r P e lti e r a

rr ive d at tha t hous e and re po rt e d fin din g M. M. “ hy ste ri c a l,” “ c ry ing ,” and wi th
c lot hin g and a tow e l kn ott e d a

ro un d h e r n e c k a

nd head, and so c ks tig htl y

tie d a ro un d h e r w ri sts
. Blood flow a

ppear ed to be r estrict ed i n h er ha nds, and she c laimed to be in pain. The knit shirt
aro un d h e r h e a d a

nd ne c k w a s ti e d s o f

ir mly int o h e r h a ir

that E MS late r h a d to c ut h e r h a ir toThe oc casiona l lack of c larity in M.M.’s acc ounts of the incid en t , s u mmarized above, 1 ref lects the e vidence at trial. Ho we ve r, Of

fi c e r P e lti e r te sti fi e d that he ha d n ot r e c or de d in his inc ide nt r e po rt

that M. M. 2 ha d id e nti fi e d L a g un a s. 3 remove i t
. M
. M . did not have a shirt on, but seve ral a rticles of c lothing we re tied to he r bac k brastra ps. She was we aringg rey sweat pants. Her f

ace was swollen, r ed, and disc olored. Of fi c e r P e lti e r f

ur the r r e c ounte d th a t M.M. ha d re po rt e d that sh e wa s awa ke ne d th ir ty minutes after

she we nt to sleep by a man who cover ed her mouth with his hand. She claimed that 1 she did not see the ma

n but rec og nized his voi ce a s that of L agu n as . S h e ini tially thought that 2 Y o la n d a L a g u n a s mi g h t h a v e b e e n p la yin g a jo k e o n h e r b e c a

u s e Y o la n d a w a s a g ood friend a nd liked to play

jokes. But, whe n she re ali z ed t h at t h e episode was not a joke beca use of the ag g ressivene ss of the actions, she kicked to f ree herse lf and ra

n for the bathroom. The man c aug ht her, hit her repe atedly with a closed fist, a nd forc ed her

into the living room. She visually rec og nized the man as L agunas. He then bound M.M.’s hands in socks, re moved her shirt, tied clothes to her brastra ps, tied a plastic sack and a t-shirt over he r hea d, and for ced he r out of her house and into the passeng er se at of he r ca

r. The pair drove off. M.M. told Office r Peltier that, once the ca r stopped, she wa s able to uncove r her head, unloc k the ca

r door, a nd run aw ay . She ran throug h an open door in the house direc tly

acr oss the street a

nd called 911. T his house was the 561 Schmidt location wher e Of fice r Peltier later

found her
. Offic er Peltier never found the plastic bag , but he did testify that he sawM.M.’s car

parke d acr oss the street f rom 561 Schmidt Avenue, fa cing the wrong direc tion on the road. L agunas’s pa rents lived in the house in fr ont of which the c ar w as par ked. Mic ha e l U lbr ic h, a

fi re fi g hte r a

nd pa ra me dic fo r N e w B ra

un fe ls F ir e De pa

rtme nt,
arr ive d at th e 56 1 Sc hmi dt A ve nu e ho us e a t 2: 13 a .m. He e xami ne d M.M. and re c or de d tr a

uma toOn cr oss-examination, Ulbr i ch ad m i t ted that he c ould not determine whe ther or not the 3 wounds wer e self- inflicted. 4 the hea d with swelling a

nd redne ss a

round the head and on both c heeks. U lbrich cla ssified M.M.’s injuries as serious and potentially life-thre atening , indicating sever al blows to the head and fa ce, a nd
e xpre ss e d d ou

bt t hat so me on e c ou ld i nf

lic t su c h s e ri ou s w ound s o n th e mse lf
. Ho we ve r, M. M. 3 ref used trea tment. When M.M. ex presse d conce rn about he r unsuper vised chi l d ren, Office r John Sulli van was dispatched to the Cantu house. Upon ar riving , Sulli van noted that the f ront door wa s slightly ajar . He e ntere d using a flashlig ht a nd sear ched for the bedr oom, where he had be en advise d that the childre n wer e located. Sulli van found two children, D.M., a g irl about four y ear s old, and R.M., a boy of about two y ear s, ly ing in the be d in M.M.’s darke ned bedr oom. R.M. was asleep.

B e fo re Of

fi c e r S ul liv an to ok

the sta nd , L a g un a s’ s c ouns e l ob je c te d to the State
e lic iti ngte sti mony

fr om S ull iva

n r e g ard ingstate me nts ma de by D. M. Couns e l ur g e d th a t “ we wo uld sti ll w ant t o ma

ke sure tha

t th e State do e sn ’t

g o in to t hat, b e c a us e we fe e l th a t th e te sti mony is s til l inhere ntly unreliable that a four-y ear -old g irl makes whe n she is sleepingat nig ht and woken up.” Notin g t h at it had “imposed an in limine on this area ,” the district cour t defe rre d ruling pending further testimony . Sulli van then testified that, when he e ntere d the room,
Of fi c e r Sul liv an: [D. M. ] pu lle d the c ov e rs up to he r c he st, and I c ou ld se e he r c los e

her e y es. As she w as closing her e y es, I could see the skin around the m bu nc hin g up lik e sh e wa s ju st as le e p or p re te nd ingto c los e her ey es. She was phy sically closing her ey es and bunching up the sk in a ro un d it
. State: Okay . Did she abr uptly pull the cover s up?5

Of fi c e r Sull iva

n: She pu lle d th e c ov e rs up to he r ch e st an d s he le ft it at th a t po int
. And s h e d idn’t make a

ny other moveme nts until Iidentified my self to her
. State: Okay . Did y ou tell her you wer e a police office r? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir, I did. State : Di d s he the n o pe n h e r e y e s? Offic er Sullivan: She did. State: Did y ou try to calm her

down? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir, I did. State: When y ou wer e making y our contact with her, you said she wa s

t e r r i f i e d
. D i d s h e c r y? Of fi c e r S ull iva

n: She wa sn ’t

c ry ing , in iti a lly . I

a sk e d h e r what he r n a me wa s. S t a t e : O k ay. B u tw h e nyo uw e r e t a l k i n g t o h e r , d i d s h e c r y? O f f i c e r S u l l i v an : Y e s , s i r , s h e d i d c r y. State : Di d s he a pp e ar u ps e t? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir, she did. State: Okay . The squinting of her e y es and abruptly pulling the c overs over he r and f

aking like she wa s asleep a nd cry ing, did she appe ar to b e un de r t

he str e ss o f s ome tr a

uma tic e ve nt? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir, she did.
Ba sed on this testimony , the di strict court ruled that any statements m ade by D.M. to Offic er Sullivan
wer e excited utteranc es and ove rruled L agunas’s objec tion. The State then elicited the following te sti mony :6

State: Did y ou ask the little g irl her name? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir. State : What di d s he sa y he r n a me wa s? Offic er Sullivan: [D.M.] S t a t e : D i d

yo ua s k h e r w h e t h e r o r n o te v e r yt h i n g w a s o k ay? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir, I did. State: How did she re spond? Offic er Sullivan: No, that it wasn’t. He r mommy was de ad. State: Did she say any thing e lse? Offic er Sullivan: I asked her—I believe my exact word s
— well, I asked her w hat

happene d to her mommy . And she stated t h at “A bad man had kil le d h e r a

nd too k h e r a

wa y .” Th a t’ s w hat th e fo ur -ye ar- old little g irl told me. State : Ok ay . Wa s sh e c ry ingwh e n s he wa s te lli ngy ou thi s? Offic er Sulli van: Yes, sir. As I beg an t o as k h er q u es t i o n s ab o ut what had happene d—about what ha ppened to mommy , she beg an to cr y h ys t e r i c a l l y. State: Did y ou try to—did y ou know the whe rea bouts of her mother ? Offic er Sullivan: Yes, sir, I did.
Officer S u l livan then told D.M. that her mother was “ with other police of fice rs,” a nd she then calmed down. After

other police office rs ar

rived, Of fice r Sullivan looked around the C antus’ house. He notice d bunched- up car pet o n the floor a

nd clothes scattered a cross the living room, whichA has p is a lo ng st ri p o f m e ta l w itha ho le in t he mid dle that f

its ov e r a me ta l bo lt. I t is 4 used to lock doors with a pa dlock. Duringcross-e x amination, L a g u n a s c h a ll e ng ed Of

fice r Sullivan’s statement that the ha sp had bee n found outside, pointing to the office r’s re port that ref lected that he fo un d th e ha sp on

a c ou c h in the liv ingro om. The re cord doe s not refle ct the off ense f or which L agunas wa s issued this citation. 5 7 indicated to him that a strug g le had take n place . I n addition, he found a n unsecur ed but closed r ear door. On t he ground near the door on t he outside, he f ound a hasp that had bee n pried loose f rom the do or . Sul liv an n e ve r f ound a pa dlo c k. He did

no t f ind any oth e r s ig ns of fo rc e d e ntr y , n or did 4 he re cover

any fing erpr ints. I n the l iving room, Sulli van found a citation issued to L agunas by the 5 Ne w B ra u n fe l s P o l i ce De p ar t m en tas we l l as v ar i o u s ar t i cl es o f m en ’s an d wo m en ’s cl o t h i n g. At trial, M.M. te stified that she stay ed in a room in the Cantus’ house whe re she lived wi th h e r t he n- fi anc é , C. M. , a

nd he r c hil dr e n. L a g un a s, his wi fe , a nd his c hil dr e n ha d mo ve d th e ir be lon g ing s in to t

he ho us e bu t w e re no t st ayingthe re and ha d n e ve r s pe nt t

he nig ht. On the nig ht i n question, the Cantus wer e on vacation in L as Ve g as, and M.M. ha d not give n L agunas per mission to enter the premises. To her knowledg e, L agunas was not allowed into the hous e without his wife. There was a

key on the outside patio, which family members used to e nter the house. M.M. testified that she had known L agunas for three y ear s, and that she ha d conver sed with him and hea rd his voice on many occa sions before the incident. M.M. f urther testified that, following a birthday party she attende d with her c hildren, sh e c a m e h o m e ar o u n d

m i dn i g h t , p u th e r

c h i l dr e nt o b e d , an d

w a s h e d a l o a d o f l a u n dr y . S h e l a id down nex t to her c hildren and f ell aslee p, only

to be awa

kened by “someone standing by

the bed.” At first she thought it wa s Yolanda L agunas playing a trick on her , but the person c ame towa rds her and beg an to touch her f

ace and strang le her . She did not scream beca use she wa s conce rned thatOn cr oss-ex am i n at i o n , L agu n as p o i n t edo u tth e d i s cr ep an cy b et we en M
. M
. ’s t estimony that 6 she saw L agunas and he r orig inal statement to the police that she only identified him by

voice. 8 she would aw aken a

nd scar e her

children. A t that point, she recog nized L agunas, eve n though he had not y et s ai d any

thing. M.M. attempted to push him off a nd fled into the living r oom, but L ag unas pursue d her, g rabbe d her, a nd y anked of

f her shirt by the bathroom door. He then ta ckled he r t o th e g ro un d in

the liv ingro om, pinne d h e r, and repe a te dly hit he r i n th e fa c e wi th h is f ist s. After rea ching for c lothes in the l iving room, he ti ed her arms behind her ba ck with a pa ir of socks and cove red he r mouth with clothing. L agunas continued to strike M.M.’s fac e. He then rose, w ent int o th e ki tchen , a

nd se arc he d a

ro un d th e dr awe rs and

c a bin e ts. M. M. a tte mpt e d to take thi s op p o rtu n it y to e s c a p e . H o w e v e r , s h e c o u ld n o t o p e n th e f r o n t d o o r w it

h h e r h an d s r e s tr ic ted, and L a g un a s hur

ri e d b a c k to the liv ing ro om. M. M. te sti fi e s to havin g vis ua lly ide nti fi e d L a g un a s at th is moment; she claimed he was we aringblue jean shor ts, a white tank top and a cap. He a g ain pushed 6 her to the floor and continued to hit her, and M.M. still maintained her silenc e in orde r to protec t her children. L agunas t hen ti ed her hands t og ether tighter and ti ed her fee t to her ar ms so that she was bent bac kwar ds into a “U” position. Over the shirt ar o u n d her he ad, he tied a brown plastic HE B g roce ry bag
. She maintained her ability to breathe by chew ing a hol e throug h the sac k. After poking M.M. in her bac k with a “sha rp, thin object,” w hi ch M
. M
. t h o u gh t to be a knife , L agunas for ced M
. M
. t o t e l l h i m t h e l o c a t i o no f h e r k e ys . H e p i c k e d u

p h e r p u r s e an d

t o o k o u tt h e k e ys an d

m o n e y. M.M. further

testified that L agunas untied her leg s, helped her up, and told her not to “ say any thi ng ” or “ so me thi ng wo uld ha

pp e n. ” At thi s poin t the sa c k ha d loos e ne d, and sh e c ou ld see on the g round whe re she was g oing. H e for ced he r into the passeng er side of her c ar, told her9

to sc oo t ba c k, and to p ut h e r h e a d d ow n. Th e ba g loo se ne d f ur the r, and M. M. te sti fi e d th a t sh e c ou ld
see L ag unas in the car . The two drove to Schmidt Avenue , wher e he stoppe d, g ot out of the ca r, and opened a g ate. She ha d loosened the soc ks around he r hands, a nd, when she hear d the g ate ope n, she ripped the bag and shi rt off of her head, unlocked the door, a nd esca ped running . Havingrec og nized the house in fr ont of which the c ar w as par ked to be that of

L agunas and his parents, she r an to the house ac ross the stree t, 561 Schmidt, s cre aming for he lp. She then phoned the police
.

Offic er Sea

n Gabba rd of the N ew B raunf

els Police Depa

rtment testified that he interviewe d M.M. at the station two day s after the alleg ed kidnapping . M.M. told him that she had seen he r attac ker’ s fac e and he ard his voice , and identified him as L agunas. De spite becoming visibly upset, she also immediately picked L agunas out of a six-man photogr aphic lineup. L a g un a s p re se nte d f

ive wi tne sse s in

his de fe ns e . L a g un a s’ s mo the r, Or a lia L a g un a s, testified that she re sides at 2604 Morning side Drive. That address i s on the corne r of Schmidt and Mornin g s id e , is d ir e c tl y

a c r o s s f r o m 5 6 1 Sc h mi d t, an d

w a s th e h o u s e in

f r o n t o f w h ic h L a g u n as parke d M.M.’s car . On J uly 23, 2000, Ora lia L agu n as ar ri ved home f rom a c hurch c onfer ence at 12:30 a.m. When she initially arr ived, L agunas wa s n ot there but ha d taken his father’s truc k somewher e. B y

th e t i m e s h e had finished putting some pape rwork a way and takinga showe r, at almost 1:00 a . m. , h e r s o n h a d r e tu r n e d h o me an d h a d a c o n v e r s a ti o n w it h h e r a b o u t h e r d ay . She then went to bed. She te stified that at this tim e L agunas wa s livi n g wi t h his wife and not at the Mo rn ing sid e re sid e nc e . L a te r t hat ni g ht, tw o p oli c e me n k no c ke d o n h e r d oo r a

nd a sk e d f or L a g un a s. She told them that “he wa s here a minute a go,” invited them in and did not preve nt them fromOffic er Peltier ha d testified t hat Oralia L agunas prevented the policemen fr om enteringher 7 home. 1 0 enter ing. They

asked he r if she owned the vehicle parke d outside (M.M.’s car), and she replied that 7 she did not. She did not remember the offic ers as k i n g h er to sea rch the premises. When she sa w L ag unas the ne x t day , she told him to “go a nd talk and straig hten this thing out.” He responde d by saying that the police would “put him in jail beca use of child support” and that he ha d an outstanding
war rant. She testified that M.M. and L agunas kneweac h other, a nd that M.M. and her

ex-fiancé had been to he r house “ a couple of times.”

David Busc h, a private investigator, testified that the distance betwee n L agu nas’s pa re nts ’ h ou se on Mo rn ing sid e Dr ive and the Cantu s’ ho us e on

South H a c kb e rr

y wa s a pp ro xima te ly nine-tenths of a

mile. To walk normally

the distance eac h way

would take be tween se ventee n and nineteen minutes, a

nd to drive (accounting for construction at t he ti me and traff ic) would take four minutes. L ieutenant John Vill arr eal of the New Br aunfe ls Police Depa rtment testified that none of the fing erpr ints li fted fr om M.M.’s car matched those of L agunas. Yolanda L agunas, L agunas’s wife , testified that her pare nts, the Cantus, were the
owner s of the house on South Hac kberr y and that she, L agunas, and the ir children w ere living in that house at the time of the incident. They kept pos sessions at t he house, inc luding c lothes, and slept in the living room. Yolanda L agunas asserted that L agunas had pe rmission from her pa rents to be in the house, eve n when she was not there ; in fact, she te stified that normally during the day

she
wo rk e d w hil e he sle pt a t the ho us e and that he wo rk e d th e nig ht s hif t. L a g un a s and

his wi fe us ua lly enter ed the house throug h the s ide door. There was a key for that door under a flower pot that she1 1

and L a g un a s u se d; ho we ve r, sh e c la ime d th e do or wa s u su a lly

ke pt u nlo c ke d. Yo land a

L a g un a s a lso t es t i fi edt h at L agu n as an d M
. M
. w e r e a cq u ai n t ed , h ads p en tt i m e t o get h er i na gr o u

p d u ri n g a campingtrip, and ea ch knew what the other

looked like. She then testified that, duringthe nig ht of the incident, she sa

w L agunas in his father ’s truck w ith a friend. She claimed that M.M. w as staying

“ of f a nd on ” a t the Cantu s’ ho us e bu t tha t she did no t know wh e the r M .M . w a s st ayinga t th e ho us e on the nig ht of the incident.

Finally , L agunas testified in his defe nse. He had known M.M. for approximately

five y e ars ; he kn e w M.M . fr om the c a mpi ng tr ip an d als o c la ime d h e sa w h e r whe n s he ha d f

re qu e ntl y visited his wife when the y wer e living at a

nother home. He testified that, on J uly 23, 2000, he wa s living in the Cantus’ house at 222 South Hac kberr y with his wife and children, that they had lived the re fo r a

pp ro xima te ly four w e e ks , a nd that th e y ke pt p os se ssi on s at th e ho us e , s uc h a s c a sse tte tapes a nd clothing. L agu n as stated that he ha d his father -in-law’ s permission to be at the house. Even thoug h the hous e was usually left unl ocked at all hours, hi s wife kept a key , and he knew of a key located unde r the mat on the side door . He a nd his family

used t oiletry items at the house, use d the shower s, and helpe d clea n up. L agunas further claimed that, when stopped by the policeman a

nd issued a ticket shortly

afte r moving to South Hackber ry , he g ave the office r an olde r re sidence addre ss beca

use he c ould not remember the exact addr ess of his new home
. Re g ard ingthe nig ht i n q

ue sti on , L a g un a s tes tif

ie d that he we nt t o h is f

a the r’ s h ou se and borr owed his truck to pick up his fr iend Gilbert to g o play pool. Around 10:00 p.m., he we nt by the South Hackbe rry

residenc e. He spo k e wi t h h i s wi fe , who told him she was g oing to San Antonio that night and that the children were with her niec e. At this time, L agunas cla imed no oneL agunas has also previously pleade d g uilty to two DWI char g es as well as thef t by chec k. 8 1 2 else wa s there. H e stay ed only fiv e m inutes, and at 10:20 p.m. he we nt to Gilbert’s house for approximately forty -five minutes. L agunas then drove about a mile and a half ba ck to his father ’s house and arr ived t here betwee n 11:15 p.m. and 11:30 p.m. Be cause his mother was at the churc h retre at, L agunas found only his father

at h o m e. Af

t er briefly

speakingwith his father, he went outside to smoke. Around midnight, L agunas allege d that he drove three to four miles to the Texaco on Ruekle R oad in order to buy more ciga rettes, and, when he returne d at 12: 30 a.m., his mother was home. His mother bathe d, and af terwa rds he a nd she talked until 1:00 a.m. when she went to bed. He wa tched te le v is io n w it h h is f a th e r f o r a b it an d th e n w e n t o u ts id e a g a in to s mo k e . H e hear d a
c omm oti on

and saw M .M . r

un nin g tow ard

him sc re a min g , “ Ca ll 9 11 ,” and a pp e ari ngve ry

up se t. When she noticed Lagu n as , s h e ran the other dire ction acr oss the street. He said that he ha d no knowledg e of a

ny kidnapping involving M.M. L agunas testified that he then wanted to lea ve Ne w B ra un fe ls beca

us e he ha d o uts tand ingwa rr ants fo r h is a

rr e st f or c hil d s up po rt

pa y me nts , tr a ff

ic tic ke ts a nd a pr ob a tio n v iol a tio n. He c la ime d th a t, whe n th e po lic e c a me , th e y wo uld qu e sti on him 8

and he wo uld g o to ja il. Whe n h e re tur ne d to his pa

re nts ’ h ou se the ne xt mor nin g , h is m oth e r t old h i m t h at t h e p o l i ce wa n t edt o t al k t o h i m ab o u t M
. M
. ’s k i dn ap p i n g. Be cau s e h e d i d n o t wa n tt o go to jail and had no money

to post bond, he fled to Houston for two y ear s so, as he put it, he could e arn some money . L a g un a s als o sta te d that it wa s impo ssi ble fo r him to have wa lke d f ro m hi s p are nts ’ house to the Cantus’ house in only nineteen minutes due to his phy sical impairments: ankle sc rew sDuring the in c am e ra hear ing, the district court re peate dly as k ed D. M . whether she 9 understood the diff

ere nce be tween a

truth and a lie. Her response eac h time: “I don’t reme mber.” 1 3 from a pr evious foot injury , a knee injury , and re sidual back pain from a pinched nerve and pulled muscles. Apolonio Cantu testified in rebuttal, stating t hat he and his wife lived at the house on 22 2 So uth

Ha c kb err

y . A t th e tim e of

the a lle g e d k idn a

pp ing , M .M ., he r t

he n- fi anc é , a

nd the ir children w ere living in t he sec ond bedroom. Dur ing this time, ac cordingto Mr. Cantu, L agunas wa s not living at the South Hac kberr y h o u s e and ha d permission to enter only with his wife, Yolanda
. A jury convicted L agunas of ag g ravated kidnapping and burg lary of a ha bitation, and the dis tr ic t c ourt

se nte nc e d h im t o th ir

ty -f ive y e ars ’ i nc arc e ratio n f or burg lary and tw e nty y e ars ’ incar cer ation for a g g ravated kidnapping , sentenc es to run conc urre ntly . This appea l followed.
DI SCU SSIO N L a g un a s p re se nts tw o issu e s on app e a l, ch a lle ng ingthe a dmi ssi bil ity of D. M. ’s ou tof-c ourt statements to Off icer Sulli van and the leg al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence supporting his c onvictions.
Adm ission of D.M.’s out-of-court stat em ents

D. M
. d i d n o t t es t i fy at t ri al
. Fo l l o wi n g v oir dir e of D.M., the district cour t refuse d to a llo w the the n- se ve n- y e ar- old to t e sti fy

be c a us e “ sh e ha dn ’t

ans wered enoug h q

ue sti on s to establish her a

bility to know the differ ence betwee n the truth and what is not t he truth at this point.” 9 In s t e a d , o n l y h e r

h e ar s ay s t a t e m e n t s t o O f f i c e r S u l l i v a n w e r e a dm i t t e d , t h r o u g h h i s t e s t i m o n y.1 4

D. M. ’s state me nts , a lon g wi th t he of fi c e rs ’ a c c ounts of the c on dit ion of M. M and the Cantu

ho us e following the incident, co rrobor ated M.M.’s a ccount of being taken f

rom her house by

L agunas fo llo wi nga

vio le nt s tr

ug g le . L a g un a s, in co ntr a st, de nie d an y inv olv e me nt an d att e mpt e d to su g g e st that M.M. had stag ed the incide nt.

I n his first issue, L agunas pre sents two arguments challeng ing the d i s t rict cour t’s admission of Offic er Sullivan’s testimony reg ardingD.M.’s statements. F irst, he arg ues that D.M.’s statements do not q u al i fy as “e x cited uttera nces” so as to be excepted f rom the hea

rsay rule. See T ex . R
. E v i d
. 8 0 3 (2 ). S ec o n d , h e c l ai m s t h at t h e a dm i s s i o no f t h o s e s t at em en t s ex cl u s i v el y t h ro u gh Offic er Sullivan violated his fede ral c o n s ti tu tiona l rig ht of confr ontation and cr oss-examination. See U. S. Co ns t. a

me nd s. VI , X I V; Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004); Pointer v. Texas , 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965).
Excited utterance

We r eview the district c ourt’s admission of D.M.’s hear say statements as ex cited utteranc es under the abuse of discre tion standard. Zul ian i v . S tate , 97 S.W. 3d 58 9, 59 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ). An

a bu se of disc re tio n o c c ur s “ on ly wh e n th e tr ia l ju dg e ’s de c isi on wa s so c le arl y wrongas to l i e o u t s i d e that zone within which re asonable persons mig ht disag ree .” Id . (quoting Can tu v . S

tate , 842 S.W .2d 667, 682 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). Hea rsay is a statement, other

than one made by the decla rant while testifying at a trial or hea ring , offe red in e vidence to prove the truth of the matter a sserted. Te x . R. Evid. 801(d). For hear say to be admissible, it must fit into an exception provided by a statute or the r

ules of evide nce. Tex. R. Evi d. 802. One suc h exception is that for excited utteranc es. T ex . R
. E v i d
. 8 03(2). An1 5

excited utteranc e is “a

statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the de clar ant was under t he st ress of excitement cause d by the eve nt or condition.” Id .; Zuliani , 97 S.W .3d at 595; Sa laz ar v . S tate , 38 S.W .3d 141, 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). The basis for the e x cited uttera nce exception is a psy cholog ical one, na mely , the fa ct that when someone is in “the instant g rip of violent emotion, excitement or pain, he ordina rily loses the ca

pacity for re fl ec t i o n nece ssary to the fabr ication of a

falsehood and t he ‘truth will come out.’” Zuliani , 9 7 S
. W
. 3 d at 5 9 5 (q u o t i n g Evans

v . S tat e , 480 S.W .2d 387, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972)). Unde rlying the exception is the belief that an excited uttera

nce, unlike hear say g ener ally , tends to be trustworthy beca use it repr esents an e vent speakingthroug h the per son rather than the person speaking about the event. Zuliani , 97 S.W .3d at 59 5; Ri c on do v . S

tate , 475 S.W .2d 793, 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971). I n deter mining whe ther a

hear say statement is admissible as an e x cited uttera nce, the ultimate inquiry is “whe ther the decla rant was still dominated by the emotions, excitement, fear , or pain of the e vent or c ondition” when the state ment was made
. Ap oli na r v . S tate , 155 S.W .3d 184, 1 8 6 -8 7 ( T ex . C ri m . Ap p . 2 0 0 5 ) ( ci t i n g Zuliani , 97 S.W .3d at 596). The court may consider f actor s
su c h a s “ the le ng th o f t ime be tw e e n th e oc c urrence and the s tate me nt, the natur e of the de c lara

nt, whether the statem en t was made in response to a question, and whe ther the state ment is selfs er v i n g .” Id . H ow e ve r, no sin g le fa c tor is d isp os iti ve , b ut m e re ly be ars on

our u lti mate d e te rmination. Zuliani , 9 7 S. W.3 d at 59 6; se eals o Lawton v . S tate , 9 1 3 S. W. 2 d

5 4 2 , 5 5 3 ( T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); Pe nr

yv . S tate , 9 03 S.W. 2d 71 5, 75 0- 51 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); McFarland v

. Sta te , 845 S.W .2d 824, 846 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).1 6 Offic er Sul livan testified t hat, although R.M. appea red to be aslee p when he enter ed the room, D.M. wa s only

actinglike she wa s aslee p. She pulled the cove rs up her chest a nd closed her e y es. She appe are d to be “f orcing or squi nting [ her ey es] closed.” She also “a ppear ed ter

rified and she w anted to pre tend like she wa s asleep.” Offic er Sulli van then identified himself and beg an talking to her. During this time, she bega n to cry . He asked her

name a nd whether

“eve ry thing wa s okay .” At this point, she made the state ments we have re cited above
.

D.M. was a

four- y ear -old child at the time of the incident. Considering her be havior
an d th e c ir c u ms ta

n c e s in w h ic h O f

f ic e r Su ll iv an e n c o u n te r e d D
. M
. , w e f in d th a t th e d is tr ic t court did not abuse its discretion in f inding it unlikely

that D.M. had e ng ag ed in “r efle ctive thoug ht” that would have c ompro m i s ed t h e re l i abil ity of her statement. See Zuliani , 97 S.W .3d at 595. To the
c on tr ary , it

is r e a so nab le to c on c lud e tha t D .M . a c te d in

a mann e r c on sis te nt w itha c hil d “ sti ll do min a te d b y

the e mot ion s, e xcit e me nt, fe ar, or pa in o f t he e ve nt o r c on dit ion ” wh e n th e state me nts
wer e made
. Apolinar , 155 S.W .3d at 186-87.

L agunas ar g ues that D.M.’s stat e me nts d o n o t q u a li f y beca use the e x citing e vent—the entry of a strang e man, Offic er Sul livan, into the bedroom late at night—wa s not the same subjec t matter a s her he arsa

y statements, which c oncer ned her mother’s a lleg ed kidnappingsever al hours
ear lier. Se e Gr ah am v . S tate , 486 S.W .2d 92, 94-95 (Te x . Crim. App. 1972). Howe ver, O ffice r Sulli van re counted that D.M. ha d appea red to be upset not only when he enter ed the room, but for some time after

war d, as she continued to express fea r and distre ss reg ardingthe disappea ranc e and, she believe d, death of

her mot her. We c onclude that the district c ourt did not abuse its discretionL agu n as relied on Oh io v . R ob e rts , 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980), in his orig inal brief, which 10 predated Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Where, as here , a defenda nt has prese rved a Confrontation Cl ause issue in a case pending on direc t r eview at the time Cra wfo rd was de cided, w e a r e t o ap p l y Cra wfo rd
. Se e Sc hr iro v . S um me rli n , 542 U.S. 348, 124 S. C t. 2519, 2522-23 (2 00 4) ; see also Griffith v. Kentucky , 479 U.S. 314, 320-28 (1987).

The State contends that L agunas waived his Confr ontation Clause claim at trial. See T e x. R. App
. P . 33. 1; Bu nto n v . S tate , 1 3 6 S. W. 3 d

3 5 5 , 3 6 8

- 6 9 ( T e x. A p p . — A u s ti n2 0 0 4 , p e t. r e f’d)
. Under the circ umstances he re, w e find e rror was pre serve d. Finally , we note that L agunas had r elied exclusively on the fe dera l constituti onal rig ht of confr ontation and makes no suc h claim under article I , section 10 of the T exas Const itution, nor any claim that our state c onstitut ion provides g reater or dif fer ent protec tion than the fede ral c onstitut ion. See Te x. R. A

pp . P. 38 .1 (h ); se e Lag

ro nev . S tate , 9 4 2 S. W. 2 d 6 0 2 , 6 1 3 ( T e x. Cr im
. App. 1997); Da v is v. Sta te , No
. 03 -0 4- 00 01 4- CR, 20 05 Te x. Ap p. L EX I S 37 73 , at *1 n. 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —A us tin May 19 , 2 00 5, no pe t.) ; Ha le v . S tate , 139 S.W .3d 418, 421 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2004, no pet.). We will accor dingly

consider only

the fe dera l provision.

1 7 in co nc lud ing , ba se d o n O ff ic e r S ull iva

n’ s te sti mony , th a t D .M . h a d b e e n “ te rr if ie d” du e to e ve nts oth e r tha n Sul liv an’ s e ntr

y int o the be dr oo m, and thu s a dmi tti ng he r state me nts a s e xcit e d u tte ra nc e s. Righ t of confrontation

Next, L agunas ar g ues t hat t he trial court’s admission of D.M.’s statements violated his right of

confr ontation. See U. S. Co ns t. a me nd s. VI , X I V; Crawf

ord v. W ashington , 541 U.S. 36 (2 00 4) ; Poi n t erv. Texas , 380 U.S. 400, 403-04 (1965). I n decidingthe constitutional issue 10 p re s en t ed , we re v i ew t h e t ri al co u rt ’s ru l i n g de novo
. Da v is v . S tate , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 3773,
a t *9 ; Mu tto ni v . S

tate , 25 S.W .3d 300, 304 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pe t.). The United States Supreme Court has he ld that the Six th Amendment rig ht of confr ontation is applicable to the statesBy virtue of the na

ture of our

inqui ry , we a

re guided and bound by

the dec ision and 11 re a so nin g of

the Un ite d St a te s Su

pr e me Court . U .S. Con st. art . V I , c l. 2 ; s ee also Mc Culloch v. Maryland , 1 7 U .S. (4 Whe a t) 31 6, 42 7 ( 18 19 ); Gu zm an v. S tate , 8 5 S. W. 3 d

2 4 2 , 2 5 8 n . 2 4 ( T e x. Crim. App. 2002). 1 8 thr ou g h the Du e Pr oc e ss Cla us e of the F ourt e e nth

Am e ndme nt. Pointer , 3 80 U. S. at 40 3; Shelby v

. Sta te , 819 S.W .2d 544, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). 11

Be fore Cra wfo rd , h e ars ay state me nts we re a dmiss ib le ag a ins t a de fe nd ant, notwithstanding the Confr ontation Clause, if the statements bore sufficie nt “indicia of r eliability .” Se e Oh io v . R ob e rts , 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). In fac t, hear say was de emed per se re lia

ble i f it fe ll within a “firmly

rooted” exception to the hear say ru l e, such as an excited uttera nce. See W

hite v. Il lin ois , 502 U. S. 346 , 355 n. 8 ( 19 92 ); Gu idr yv . S tate , 9 S.W .3d 133, 149 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). I n Cra wfo rd , the Supreme Court a brog ated Ro be rts an d

d i s c ar d e d i t s “ a d e qu a t e i n d i c i a

o f r e l i a b i l i t y” test insofar a s it applied to “testimonial hearsa y .” Cra wfo rd , 5 41 U.S
. 36 , 61- 65 . E xten siv e ly revie wing t h e h i s t o ri ca l o ri gi n s o f t h e p ro v i s i o n , t h e C o u rt co n cl u d edt h at t h e C o n fr o n t at i o nC l au s e’s primary conce rn is “testimonial hear say ,” that its ultim ate goa l is to ensure the r eliability of evide nce, and that it demands that such r eliability be asc erta ined throug h a par ticular proc edure : “by

testing in the cruc ible of cr oss-examination.” Id
. at 53, 61. “Where testimonial statements are a t issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficie nt to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitut ion actua lly presc ribes: conf

rontation.” Id . at 69. T h e t h r e s h o l d qu e s t i o n i mp o s e d b y Cra wfo rd , then, is whether the proff

ere d out-of-c ourt statement i s “testimonial” i n nature
. Da v is , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 3773, at *12. The Confrontation Clause appl ie s to th o s e wh o “bea r testimony ”—“[a] solemn declar ation or af firmation1 9

made f or the purpose of establishing or provingsome fac t. Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 51 (quoting Noah Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828))
. The Supreme Court dec lined to s pe ll o ut a

c om preh ensive de fi nit ion of “ te sti mon ia l” bu t e xpla ine d th a t it us e d th e te rm

in “ its colloquial, rathe r than any technica l le g al sense.” Id . at 53 n. 4, 68 . T e sti mon ia l st a te me nts c e rt a inl y include testimony

at pre liminary

hear ings, be fore g rand jurie s, and at for mer trials, as we l l as statements elicited dur ing police interrog ations. Id . at 51. The Court ident i fi ed three kinds of statements that might a lso be reg arde d as t est imonial: (1) “ ex parte in- c ourt te sti mony

or its functional e quivalent—that is, materi a l s u c h as af fidavits, custodial examinations, testi mony that the de fe nd ant w a s una

ble to c ro ss- e xami ne , o r s imi lar p re tr ial state me nts that de c lara nts wo uld
re a so na bly e xpe c t to be us e d p ro se c uto ri a lly ,” (2 ) “ e x tr aju di c ia l st a te me nts
. . . c on ta ine d in formalized testimonial materials, such a s aff idavits, depositions, prior testimony , or conf essions,”
and (3 ) “ state me nts that w e re ma de un de r c ir c ums tanc e s whic h w ou ld l e a d a n o bje c tiv e wi tne ss
rea sonably

to believe that the statement would be available f or use at a later

trial.” Id . at 51. The Court stresse d that whether or not a statement wa s sworn is not a deter minative fa ct o r i n fi nding a

statement to be testimonial. Id
. a t 5 2
. Ca s u a l r e ma r k s to a c qu a in ta

n c e s are g ener ally nontestimonial. Id . at 51. A stateme nt is more likely to be testi monial if the per son who hear d, rec orded, and produce d the out-of- court stateme nt at trial is a g overnme nt office r. Id . at 52- 53. I f the per son obtaining the statement is a g overnme ntal employ ee or police off

icer car rying out an investig ation or prose cutional func tions, the statement is “testimonial.” Id . at 52-53.

A ce ntral holding of Cra wfo rd is that the Confrontation Clause is a rule of proce dure,
n o t o f e v i d e n c e . “ I f t h e r e i s o n e t h e m e t h a t e m e r g e s fr om Cr awfor d , it is t hat the Confrontation2 0

Clause conf

ers a power ful and funda

mental rig ht that is no longer subsumed by

the evidentiar

y rules g overning the admissibili ty of hea rsay statements.” United States v. Cromer , 3 89 F .3 d 6 62 , 6 79 (6 th Cir . 2 00 4) . T he c on sti tut ion a l r e qu ir e me nt t hat a te sti mon ia l st a te me nt b e su bje c t to
c ros s-e x ami nat io n i n cri mi nal case s “d oes no t ev apo rat e wh en t est im on y hap pen s t o fal l w it hi n some br o a d mo d e r nh e a r s ay e xc e p ti o n , e v e nif

th e e xc e p ti o nis s u f

f ic ie n t i no th e r

c ir c u ms ta

n c es.” Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 56 n.7. I n this respec t, it is irrele vant that a testimonial stateme nt may meet the excited utteranc e exception test. Se e Da v is , 2 0 0 5 T ex . Ap p . L E XIS 3 7 7 3 , at * 1 8 (c i t i n g Lopez

v . S tat e , 888 So. 2d 693, 697 (Fla. A pp. 1st Dist. 2004)). Mere rel i abil ity is not enoug h to satisfy the Confrontation Clause whe re the extrajudicial statements are of a te stimoni al nature
. Id . (citing United States v. Gonzalez- Marichal , 317 F. Supp. 2d 1200 (S. D. Calif. 2004)) . “L eavingthe
re g ulatio n o f o ut- of

-c ourt state me nts to t

he law o f e vid e nc e wo uld re nd e r the Con fr on tatio n Cl a us e power less to preve nt even the most flag rant inquisitorial prac tices.” Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 51. Thus, under Cra wfo rd , the Confrontation Claus e an aly sis will us ually turn on the question of whether a par ticular stateme nt is testim onial or nontestimonial in nature. Se e Da v is , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 3773, at *1 9
. On the other ha nd, the Ro be rts line of ca ses may rema in instructive or controlling with reg ard to nontestimonial hear say . Se e id
.

State and lower

fede ral c ourts continue to strug g le to d eli neate the par ameter s of “testimonial” statements unde r Cra wfo rd , es p ec i al l y the nature of “[s]t atements take n by police office rs in the cour se of inter rog ations” and othe r “state ments that wer e made under c ircumstance s wh ic h w ou ld l e a d an ob

je c tiv e wi tne ss re a so na

bly to b e lie ve that th e state me nt w ou ld b e a va ila ble for use at a late r trial.” Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 52. I n Da v is , we c onsidered Cra wfo rd ’s applicationSe e Ke yv . S tate , N o . 1 2

- 0 4

- 0 0 0 3 0

- CR, 2005 T e x. A p p . L E X I S 1 5 7 3 , a t * 4

- 5 ( T e x. 12 Ap p. —T y le r, F e b. 25 , 2 00 5, no pe t.) ; se e als o H am mo n v . S

tate , 80 9 N. E. 2d 94 5, 95 2- 53 (I nd . Ct
. Ap p. 20 04 ); Fo wle r v . S

tate , 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), transfer granted , 2004 I nd. L EXI S 1030 (I nd. Dec . 9, 2004). 2 1 wher e police ha d responde d to a 911 call, hea rd a w oman scre aming hy sterica lly , and an of fice r had followed he r out of the house and spoken w ith her conc erningthe incident. Da v is , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 3773, at *3-4. The woma n rec ounted in de tail how the defe ndant had se vere ly beate n and choked her until police arr ived. Id
. at *5. The woman later r efuse d to testify at trial, but the off

icer was pe rmitted to testify , over obje ctio n , concerningher state ments to him. Id . at *4-5. The state me nts a t is su e , li ke D. M’ s h e re , w e re a dmi tte d at tr ia l a s e xcit e d u tte ra nc e s. We survey ed ex tensively the Texas decisions to date r eg ardingthe nature of testimonial statements. See id . at *20-27. We ac knowledg ed that a numbe r of other courts had sug g ested that e x cited uttera nces c ould not be testimonial beca use their disting uishing c hara cter as spontaneous outbursts made under emoti onal di stress, wit hout deliberation or pre meditation, bore littl e re semblance to Cra wfo rd ’s conception of st atements elicited throug h formal, struc tured, police interrog at i o n. See id
. Howeve r, we reje cted a cate g orica l rule that evide nce a dmissibl e as a n 12
e xcit e d u tte ra

nc e is “ ipso facto no nte sti mon ia l he ars ay ou tsi de the sc op e of

the Con fr on tatio n Cl a

us e and ad missibl e into evidenc e.” Id . at *2 8- 29 . Rathe r, “ [e]a c h c a se mus t be e xami ne d o n it s f a c ts t o d e t e r m i n e i f t h e e v i d e n c e i s t e s t i m o n i a l an d c o n t r o l l e d

b y Cra wfo rd .” Id
. a t *2 9; se e als o S c ott
v . S tat e , 1 65 S.W. 3d

27 , 4 6- 47 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 05 , p et. fi le d) (whe the r s tate me nt i sThe Tex arka na C ourt of Appe als has since ag ree d with our Da v is approa ch of a naly zing 13 the testimonial nature of

a statement independe ntly of its a dmissibi lity under the rules of evide nce. Se e Mo or e v . S

tate , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 5777, at *17-18 (Tex. A pp.—Texarkana

J uly 26, 2005, no pet. h.). 2 2 testimonial does not t u rn o n wh ether it qualifies as self- inculpatory within meaning of hea

rsay exception). 13 We then proce eded to identify a number

of issues we c onsidered the office r’s testimony to raise unde r Cra wfo rd

and pr ior Te xas d e c isi on s:
Offic ers Cortez and Canizales re sponded to a 911 c all. Whe n the y arriv e d a t the sc e ne , th e y c oul d e as ily be c harac te riz e d a s “

re sp ond ing of fic e rs. ” How lon

g d id that l abel apply? The off

icer s found appe llant and For d in a house fr om which they hear d scre ams. For d left the house a t Cortez’s inst ructions. As she did, she state d to th e o f f ic e r s : “ [H ]e tr ie d to k il l me ,” a fo r m o f accusation and yet a plea for assistan ce . App e lla

nt w a s ta ke n in to c us tod

y . I t w a s d e te rm ine d th e oth e r m an in the h o u s e h ad nothing to do with the assa ult. Ford ha d rea ched the porch of a neig hbor’s house acr oss the stree t. The sce ne wa s appar ently secur ed. Of

fice r Cortez related that Off

icer Canizales went across t he st ree t to g et Ford’s “side of the story .” Canizales testified that his purpose in “intervie wing ” F ord w as t o deter mine what happene d and who co m m i t t ed the a ssault. He fur ther stated that the “story he g ot from h er wa s t h e re sult of questioning.” At one point, howeve r, he state d that he simply asked w hat happe ned and she told him. H a d C a n i z a l es a t t h i s p o i n t b e c o me an in vestigating officer at the sce ne? F ro m the re c or d, we kn ow that a t thi s t ime Canizales took photog raphs of For d which wer e introduced into evide nce. Ca nizales also made a

n offe nse re port, as he was trained and require d to make, that was used at tr ia l t o r e f

r e s h h is me mo r

y a s to th e d e ta il s o f

w h a t F o r d

to ld h im
. F r equent ref ere nces dur ing tr ial wer e made to pag e six of the off ense r eport. Othe r employ ees of the police depar

tment were summoned to the scene as we l l as an ambulance —steps normally taken unde r similar circ umstances, not only to assist the complainant but with an eye to potential prosec ution. The ora l statements m ad e by For d to the uniformed Of fice r Canizales identified appellant a

nd then, in a ser ies of acc usations a g ainst appellant, detailed blow by blow the assault made upon her. Sure ly , a rea sonab le

51 -y e ar -o ld d e c larant likeFord woul d ha v ekno wn tha t he r a c c usa tio ns made to a unif or med p olic eof

fic e r wo uld be pa sse d o n to pr os e c utorial a utho rit ie s to be use d a ga inst ap pe lla nt. Ford’s sta te ments may s e rv e e ithe r or bo th o f t wo p rimar

y ob je c tiv es— to g

ain imm e dia teSee Sp e nc e r v . S tate , 162 S.W .3d 877, 883 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, no 14 pe t.) (w itn e ss i nit iate d c on ta c t) ; W ils on v . S tate , 1 51 S.W. 3d

69 4, 69 7- 98 (T e x. Ap p. —F or t Wor th 2 0 0 4 , pet. filed) ( finding that admission of non-testifying w itness’s self-initiated stateme nts to poli ce of fi c e rs in r e sp on se to u

ns tr uc tur e d q ue sti on s d

ur ingthe inv e sti g a tio n o f a c ri me did

no t vi olate Cra wfo rd ); Da v is v . S

tate , No. 2-03-305- CR, 2005 Tex . App. L EXI S 712, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Wor th Jan. 27 , 200 5, no pe t. h.) (n ot de sig nate d for pu bli c a tio n) (h old ingthat vo lun tary state me nts to p oli c e ini tiate d by wi tne ss are no t int e rr og a tio n and the re fo re are no nte sti mon ia l) ; se e als o S tate v . F or re st , 5 9 6 S.E.2d 22, 24-25, 27 (N.C. Ct. App. 2004) (kidnappingvictim’s spontaneous statements to police immediately afte r beingresc ued not testimonial). To thi s e xten t, a lth ou g h th e ana ly se s are c on c e ptu a lly dis tin ct, so me of the same 15 underlying f

acts a nd circ umstances may

bear upon the deter

minatio n of both whethe r a he arsa y statement is an excited uttera nce and whether it is testim onial under Cra wfo rd . The State propose s t h at , i n case s where the status of a he arsa y statement as a

n excited utteranc e and C r a w f o rd te sti mon ia l he ars ay

are bo th d isp ute d, we a do pt a n a na ly tic a l f ra me wo rk in whic h w e c on sid e r, fi rs t, whether the statement is an e x cited uttera n ce ; and, if so, then whe ther it is testimoni al. We ag ree that this is a useful fra

mework—a

nd one consistent with Da v is —and apply it here. 2 3 official assi

stance in term inating an exigent sit uation and to provide inform ation to a i d investigation and possibl e prosec ution arisin g from the situ ation
. M e r e ly beca use a de clar ant is excited, the statements made do not lose their char acte r as testimonial statements subject to the Confrontation Clause.
Id. at *29-31 (e mphasis added) . Altho u gh we u ltimately resolved the Confrontation Clause issue
on harmless er ro r grounds, se e id . at *31-35, the c onsiderations we identified whe n pondering Cra wfo rd ’s application are instruc tive here :

! Whe ther

the state me nt w a s sp on tane ou s ( e.g. , a “ple a for assistance ”) or e li c it e d b y o th e r s . A nu mb e r

o f T e xa s c o u rts h a v e r e li e d o ns imilar co n s i d er at i o n s wh en ad dre s s i n g Cra wfo rd
. I mpl ic it i n th is c on sid e ra tio n is 14 a re cog nition that, wh ile excited utteranc es mig ht not categ orica llybe nontestimonial, the chara cter istic of spont an ei t y or lac k of deliber ation that e sta bli sh e s a pa rt ic ula r s tate me nt i s a

n e xcit e d utte ra

nc e mig ht n on e the le ss be a fa c tor in w he the r i t is te sti mon ia l. 15Se e Fl or es v . S tate , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 5190, at *5-6 (Tex. App.—Amar illo J uly 6, 16 2005, no pet. h.) (holding that hear say statement betwee n relatives conce rning the circ umstances of an infa nt ’s d eath wa s not testimoni al); Le e v . S tate , 143 S.W .3d 565, 568-71 (Te x . App.—Dallas 2004, pet. filed) (nontestifying co-de fenda nt’s out-of-c ourt statements to police office rs at sce ne of automobile stop testimoni al); se e als o Lo pe z v . S tate , 888 So. 2d 693, 697, 699 (F la. Ct. App. 2004) (s ta te me nt to re sp on din g of fi c e r te sti mon ia l eve n thou g h it wa s e xcit e d u tte ra nc e ); Pe op le v . V

igi l , 10 4 P. 3d 25 8, 26 5 ( Col o. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ) ( e xcit e d u tte ra nc e c hild mad e to his fathe r i mme diate ly a ft e r s e xua l a ssa

ult no t te sti mon ia l) ; De mo ns v . S tate , 595 S.E.2d 76, 80 (Ga. 2 0 0 4) (e x cited utt e ra nc e ma de to f

ri e nd no t te sti mon ia l) ; State v. Manue l , 6 8 5 N.W.2d 525, 532 (Wi s. Ct. App. 20 04 ) ( state me nt d e c lara

nt m a de to h is g ir lf

ri e nd no t te sti mon ia l) ; bu t see Pe op le v . V igi l , 104 P.3d 258, 262-63 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (child’s videota ped stateme n t t o office r, althoug h in relaxed se tti ng , te sti mon ia l) ; Mo od yv . S tate , 5 9 4 S
. E
. 2 d 3 5 0 , 3 5 3

- 5 4 ( G a . 2 0 0 4 ) ( v i c t i m ’ s sta te me nt t o investigat i ng office r at sce ne shortly afte r eve nt testimoni al); Pe op le v . V ic tor s , 819 N.E.2d 311, 32 0- 21 (I ll. Ap p. Ct. 20 04 ) (v ic tim ’s state me nts to p oli c e of fi c e r at sc e ne te sti mon ia l) ; United States v. Nielsen , 371 F.3d 574, 581 (9th Cir. 2004) (statement by defe ndant’s g irlfriend to of fice r during execution of sear ch wa

rra nt testimoni al). Da v is , 2005 Tex. App. L EXI S 3773, at *30-31. 17 See Spe ncer , 162 S.W .3d at 883 (pre liminary questions when police a

rrive to a ssess and 18 se c ur e c ri me sc e ne do no t c on sti tut e int e rr og a tio n) ; se e als o P e op le v . Co re lla , 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (st at em en t s not “knowing ly g iven in response to structured police qu e sti on ing ,” thu s b e ari ng no ind ic ia c omm on to o ff ic ia l and fo rm a l qu a lity

of va ri ou s st a te me nts d e e m e d t e s t i m o n i a l b y Crawf

ord) ; se e als o s up ra note 16. See Sa ma rro n v . S

tate , 1 50 S.W. 3d

70 1, 70 6- 07 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A nto nio 20 04 , p e t. 19 ref ’d) ( witness ag ree d to go to station, not interviewe d at sce ne; statement testimonial). 2 4 ! To whom the statement wa s made ( e.g. ,“to a unifor med police of

fice r” ve rsus a fr iend or a cquaintanc e). 16
! Th e a g e or

so ph ist ic a tio n o f t

he de c lara

nt ( e.g . , “ a

r e a s o n a b l e 5 1

- y e ar - o ld decla rant like F ord would have known t h at h er a ccusations made to a un if or me d p ol ice of

fi c e r w ou ld b e pa sse d o n to pr os e c uto ri a l a uth or iti e s to be used a g ainst appellant” ). 17
! Th e natur e of any inv olv e me nt b y law e nf or c e me nt ( e.g. , was the state ment mad e during police interr og ation or investig ation, or we re the police attempting to r espond to and g ain control of a situation.). 18
! Related to the pre vious consideration, the temporal proximi ty of the statement to any

emer g ency

or exige nt situation. 19Se e Fl or es v . S tate , 2 00 5 T e x. Ap p. L EX I S 51 90 , at *5 -6 ; see al so Ru th v . S

tate , No. 20 14-03-01158- CR, 2005 Tex . App. L EXI S 4729, at *17- 18 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] J une 21 , 20 05 , no pe t.) (i nv olv ingc omm e nts ma de duri ng91 1 c a ll) ; Spence r , 1 6 2 S. W. 3 d a t 8 7 9

- 81 (p re lim ina

ry qu est io ns at

sc e ne a ft e r 9 11 c a ll) ; Go nz ale z v . S tate , 1 5 5 S. W. 3 d

6 0 3 , 6 1 0 n . 4 ( T e x. Ap p. —Sa n A ntoni o 2 00 4, pe t. d ism ’d ); W ils on v . S tate , 151 S.W .3d 694, 698 (Tex. App.—For t Worth 2004, pet. ref’ d) (witness a pproac hed off

icer s at scene ). 2 5 Subsequent to Da v is , the Amar illo C ourt of Appe als i d en t i fied a simil ar se t of g uideposts for de te rm ini ngwh e the r a

state me nt i s te sti mon ia l: ( 1) to who m th e state me nt w a s ma de , (2) was it volunteere d or sol icited, (3) was it uttered during casua l conver sation, a formal leg al proc eedingor an investig ation, and (4) when it was ma de. Fl or es v. S tate ,

_ _ _ S
. W
. 3 d

_

_ _ , 2 0 0 5 T e x . A p p . LE X IS 5190, at *5-6 (T ex. App.—Amarillo J uly 6, 2005, no pet. h.). More over, a s the Flores c ourt a llu de s, a number of Texas courts have equa ted Cra wfo rd ’s “police inter rog ation” with forma l, structured questioning, sug g esting that statements re sponding to c asual c o nv e r s a ti o n o r p r e li mi n a r y q u e s tioning by law e n f o r c e me n t w o u ld n o t b e te s ti mo n ia l. We e mp h a s iz e th a t th e s e c o n s id e r a ti o n s are not 20 evidentiar y in nature, but mer ely

fac tors that may

be usef ul in ch ar ac terizing whe ther a particula r state me nt i s te sti mon ia l or no n- te sti mon ia l. O nc e a state me nt is de te rm ine d to be t e sti mon ia l, c ourt s must adhere to the proce dural guara ntees of the Confrontation Clause. The fore g oing considerations a re not ne cessa

rily exclusive, and we r ecog nize here,
as we did in Da v is , that some of them may provide ambiguous guidance in some circumstanc es. See Da v is , 2 0 0 5 T ex . Ap p . L E XIS 3 7 7 3 , at * 2 6 -2 7 (d i s cu s s i n g Lop e z v . S tate , 888 So. 2d 693, 697, 699 (F la. Ct. App. 2004)), *30 (notingthe dual ro l es of police offe nse re ports). None theless, they provide at least a star

ting point in our ultimate de termination of whe ther D.M.’ s statement was one “take n by police off

icer s in the course of interr ogat i o n s ” an d “made under c ircumstance s whichSee , e.g. , T.P . v . S tate , CR-03-0574, 2004 Ala. C rim. App. L EXI S 236, at *12-13 (A la. 21 Crim. App. 2004) (stateme nts r e s u lt of interview

conducte d by

social worke r and inve stigator, as par t of c ri min a l in ve sti g a tio n, te sti mon ia l) ; People v . W arner , 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 419, 429 (2004) revie w granted on other grounds , 97 P.3d 811 (2004) (stateme nt of minor to multi -disciplinary interview c e nte r s pe c ia lis t and ob se rv e d by po lic e inv e sti g a tor wa s “te sti mon ia l” be c a us e it w a s in te nd e d to be use d, a t le a st i n p art , a s inve sti g a tiv e too l f or c ri min a l pr os e c uti on ); Pe op le , 1 0 4 P. 3 d at 265 (excited utteranc es made by child to his fathe r and f

ather ’s frie nd wer e not testimonial beca use they wer e not s olemn or formal statements and wer e not made to persons associated with g overnme ntal a c tiv ity ); State v. Gr a ce , 111 P.3d 28, 38 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005) ( police off icer testimony

of her int e rv ie w o f t

wo g ir ls, a g e d te n and e le ve n, c on sti tut e d “ te sti mon ia l” e vid e nc e be c a us e “ state me nts that wer e made under circ umstances which would lead a n objective witness r easona bly to believe that th e state me nt w ou ld b e a va ila ble fo r u se a t a

late r t ri a l” ); Sn owd

e n v . S tate , 846 A.2d 36, 47 (Md. Ct. Spec
. App. 2004) (statements of minors to social worker wer e “te stimoni al” be cause they we re ma de fo r p ur

po se of de ve lop ingthe ir

te sti mony

fo r t ri a l) ; People v . Geno , 683 N.W.2d 6 87, 69 2 ( Mic h. Ct. Ap p. 20 04 ) (s tate me nt ma de by c hil d w a s n ot “ te sti mon ia l” be c a us e it w a s ma de to nong overnme nt employ ee a nd was not statement in natur e of “ ‘ ex parte in- c ourt te sti mony

or its fu nc tio na l e qu iva le nt’ ” ); see ge nerally Robert P. Mosteller, Crawf ord v. Washington : Encouraging and Ensuring the Confront ation of W itnesses , 39 U. Rich. L . Rev. 511, 538 (2005).

2 6 wo uld le a d a n o bje c tiv e wi tne ss re a so na bly to be lie ve that the state me nt wo uld be a va ila ble fo r u se at a later trial.” Cra wfo rd , 541 U. S. at 52. We al so a c kn ow le dg e that su bs e qu e nt d e ve lop me nts in thi s r a pid ly e vo lvi ngare a

of the law m ay

sh e d a dd iti onal li ght on th e iss ue s w e are a tte mpt ingto addre ss here ; as such, we are attempting to hit a “ moving tar g et.”

We beg in with the ag e and sophistication of D .M. D.M. was four y ear s old at the time of her statement to Offic er Sullivan. Court s around the nation have strug g led with the
a p p li c a ti o n of Cr awf

or d to child witnesses, particula rly how cour

ts should apply

the conc ept of “under circ umstances whic h w ould lead an obje ctive witness re asonably to believe that the statement would be ava ilable for use at a late r trial,” see Cra wfo rd , 541 U. S. at 52 , o r whe the r t he pr op e r t e st should be objective or

subjective in na

ture. We ne ed not de cide now whethe r, as a g ener al rule, 21 stat e me n ts b y c h il dr e n ar e inh e r e n tl y n o n - te s ti mo n ia l o r w h e th e r D
. M
. ’ s a g e a lo n e r e nders he rWe a lso do not de cide if we evaluate her statements from an obje ctive or subjec tive point 22 of vie w. I n e ith e r c a se , w e fi nd he re that th e state me nts we re no n- te sti mon ia l.

2 7 state me n ts n o n - te s ti mo n ia l. We d e c id e o n ly th a t D
. M
. ’ s a g e an d h e r e mo ti o n a l s tate are fac tors 22 strong ly sug g esting that her state ments to Office r Sullivan were non-testimonial. Considering the context, D.M.’s statements amounted t o a sm all child’s ex pressions of fea r arising from her mother ’s absenc e. D.M.’ s re ac t i o n was of one seekingcomfort a nd information conc erning her mother , a
rea ction to be expected f rom a fr ighte ned child appr oache d by a police of

fice r under

such circ umstances in the middle of the night.

As fo r l aw e nf

or c e me nt inv olv e me nt, we no te that O ff ic e r S ull iva

n e nte re d th e Cantu hou s e an d M
. M
. ’s bedroom to check on the safe ty of M.M.’s childre n at her reque st after

she appea red in unusual c ircumstance s on Schmidt Ave nue, some distance f rom home. Off

icer Sulli van
rec ounted that his primary conce rn had be en to discer n whether

“eve ry thin g was ok.” When he located D .M. and her brother in be d, he asked her name and told her that he w as a police office r. He then noticed that she was “ terrif ied” a nd cry ing. H e aske d her if e very thing wa s “okay .” He repor ted t h at D.M . responde d that it wasn’t and a dded, “H er mommy was de ad.” A t this poi nt, Office r Sulli van aske d D.M. what happened to her mother. She responde d, “A ba d man had killed her and too k h e r a wa y ” and g re w m or e up se t. Of

fi c e r Sul liv an the n inf

or me d D. M. that he r m oth e r w a s w ith oth e r p oli c e of

fi c e rs , a nd the c hil d ca lme d. On c e oth e r of fi c e rs arr ive d, Of

fi c e r S ull iva

n b e g an to investigate the sce ne. He did not question D.M. further.

The statements Offic er Sulli van elicited lent key support to M.M.’s disputed acc ount that, in fac t, she had be en beaten and violently kidnapped. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 20.04(a )(4)Se e su pra note 20. 23 2 8 (ag g ravated kidnapping ). Howeve r, Offic er Sulli van’s exchang e with D .M. was unlike the sor t of formalized or struc tured interr og ation that has bee n held to g ive rise to testimonial hear say . To the contra ry , it was closer

in nature to a

preliminary

question in which Off

icer Sulli van soug ht to clarify D. M. ’s sp on tane ou s sta te me nt that her mot he r wa s dea d. Th e re wa s n ot t ime to f or mul a te c are fu l, structure d questioning. I nstead, Of fice r Sullivan’s questions were consistent with the behavior of
a re a so na ble a du lt se e kin g (i n so me wa y s su c c e ssf

ull y , in so me wa y s n ot) to c a lm a

fr ig hte ne d c hil d in the m iddle of t he night. Significa ntly , afte r calming D.M., Offic er Sul livan asked he r no fur ther questions reg ardingthe circ umstances of her mother ’s disappea

ranc e. Under Cra wfo rd , excited utteranc es, admissible as hea rsay excepti o n s, may

be testimonial and thus inadmissable absent an oppor tunit y to cross-e x amine. Se e Da v is , 2 0 0 5 T e x. App. L EXI S 3773, at *18. I n this case , Offic er Sul livan elicited som e of D.M.’s statements, a f actor that might other

wise we igh towa

rd a finding that they wer e testimonial. How ever , we c onclude that the child’s stateme nts, when viewe d in light o f h er ag e and state of mind, tog ether with the
c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound inghe r i nte ra c tio n w ithOf fi c e r S ulliv an, la c k th e ind ic ia of so le mn decla rations made t o establish or prove a fa ct. Se e Cra wfo rd , 541 U.S. at 51-52. D.M.’s 23 statements wer e not testimonial in nature as envisioned by the Confrontation Clause a nd Cra wfo rd
. Thus, we hold that the admis sion of D.M.’s statements t hroug h Offic er Sul livan’s t estimony did not violate L ag unas’s rig ht of confr ontation.2 9

Conc lusion c onc e rnin

g D.M .’ s st atements B e c a us e we ha

ve c on c lud e d th a t th e tr ial cou rt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in admitting D.M.’s he arsa

y statements as e x cited utteran ce s and that D.M.’s statements were not testimonial, we overr

ule L agunas’s fir st issue.
Suf fi ciency of the evidence

I n his second issue, L agunas cha lleng es the l egal suff iciency of the e vidence supporting his c onvictions for burg lary and ag g ravated kidnapping
. He also challeng es the fa ctual
s u f f ic ie n c y o f th e e v id e n c e e s ta

b li s h in g h is id e n ti ty

a s th e p e r s o nw h o c o mm itte d th e o f f e n s e s . We wi ll f ir st c on si der his le g a l su ff ic ie nc y argume nts and

the n tu rn to h is f a c tua l in su ff

ic ie nc y c la im. Se e Cle wis v . S

tate , 922 S.W .2d 126, 133 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Legal sufficiency

L agunas bring s two leg al suffic iency challeng es. F irst, he ar g ues that t he evide nce is leg ally insufficient to support a c onviction for burg lary of a habitation beca

use the re cord doe s not contain evide nce that L agu n as l ac k ed consent to enter the house. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 30.02(a) (West 2003). Second, he asser ts that testimony

that a “sha

rp pointy object” w as used d u ri n g t h e al l ege d ev en t s i s l ega l l y i n s u ff i ci en t t o s u

p p o rt a c o n v i ct i o nfo r a ggra v at edk i dn ap p i n g. Se e id . § 20.04(a) (4). We will addre ss eac h in turn. Standard of review When determining whether evidenc e is leg ally sufficie nt to support a conviction, we must view the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the verdic t a

nd deter mine whether

any rational3 0

tr ie r o f f a c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d th e e sse nti a l e le ment s of the c ri me be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 3 19 (1 97 9) ; Curry v. State, 30 S.W .3d 394, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 00 ); J oh ns on v . S

tate , 2 3 S. W.3 d 1 , 1 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). We d o n ot e xami ne the fa c tfinder’ s weig hing o f t h e evide nce but mer ely deter mine whether

there is more than a “ mere modicum” of evidenc e supporting the judg ment. Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 132 n.10; Cog gin v . S tate , 12 3 S. W.3 d 8 2, 89 (T e x. Ap p. —Aus tin 20 03 , p e t. d e nie d) ; Mo re no v . S tate , 755 S.W .2d 866, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Bu rg lar y First, L agunas cha ll e n g e s th e le g a l s u f f ic ie n c y o f h is conviction for burg lary , claiming that the State did not prove that he enter ed the Cantus’ house without effe cti ve conse nt of the
owner s. See Te x. P en. Co de A nn . § 30 .0 2( a ); Mc Du ff v . S tate , 9 39 S.W. 2d

60 7, 62 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 97 ) ( State ha s burd e n to pr ov e e a c h e le me nt be y on d re a so na ble do ub t) . Ape rs on

c omm its burg lary when he , without the ef

fe ct i v e conse nt of the owne r, ente rs a building or habitation and commits or attempts to commit a felony , theft, or a n assault. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 30.02( a). Ow ne rs hip is n ot r e str ic te d to tho se pe rs on s havin g tit le int e re st i n p ro pe rt y , b ut c an in c lud e tho se in possession. E

xP a r t e D av is , 54 2 S .W .2 d 1 92 , 1 95 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 76 ); see also Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 1.07(a )(24) (West 20 0 3 ). “Possession” is “ac tual car e, custody , control or manag ement.” See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 1.07( 39) (West 2003).

I n his argument, L agunas re lies on evidenc e that he a nd his wife had pe rmission from the Cantus, his wife’s pa

rents, to live in the house. How ever , in this case, both Apolonio Cantu and M.M. testified that L agunas did not have permission to enter the South Hackbe rry premises without3 1

his wife. Althoug h evidenc e exists t o the contra ry , our standar d of re view dictate s that we re view the e vid e nc e in the lig ht m os t f a vo ra ble to t he ve rd ic t and

de te rm ine wh e the r a

ratio na l juro r c ou ld have de cided a ccor dingly
. See J ackson , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9; Cur ry , 30 S.W. 3d a t 40 6; Johnson , 23 S.W .3d at 15. I n re v i ew i n g t h e rec ord, we find sufficie nt evidence to support the infere nce that L ag unas did not have pe rmission to enter the house without his wife a nd that, there fore , he lac ked the ef fec tive consent of the Cantus to enter the house
. See Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 30.02( a). Aggravated k

idnapping I n his second leg al suff i ci ency claim, L agunas cha lleng es his conviction for kidnapping , stating the State failed to prove the deadly -we apon element of ag g ravated kidnapping bey ond a re asonable doubt. Se e id . § 20.04(b) ( West 2003). However, L agunas wa s not charg ed under the deadly -we apon sec tion of the ag g ra v at ed k i d n apping statute. Se e id . Rathe r, the State alleg ed that L agunas “intentionally or knowing ly

abduct[ed] another pe rson with the i ntent to inflict bodily injury ,” a dif

fer ent subsection of the statute. Se e id . § 20.04(a) (4). The “ deadly

wea pon” to which L agunas alludes did not appea r i n the indictment, the jury char g e, or the judgme nt. Consist ent wit h the indictment, he wa s convicted only of intentionally

or knowing ly abducting another person with intent to inf lict bodily

injury
. Se e id
. § 2 0
. 0 4 ( a ) ( 4 )
. We
acc ording ly

reje ct L agunas’s a

rg ument.
Factual su

fficie ncy F ina lly , L a g un a s a sse rt s th a t th e e vid e nc e is f a c tua lly ins uff ic ie nt t o e sta

bli shhis identity as the pe rson who committed the alleg ed burg lary and kidnapping
. I n a fa ctual suff iciencyL agunas ar g ues that we should apply a “totality

of the c ircumstance s” s t an d ar d when 24 revie wing his claims conce rning the suffic iency of the e vidence of identification. See Loserth v. Sta te , 9 63 S.W. 2d

77 0, 77 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 98 ); se e als o Ne il v . B igge rs , 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1 97 2) ; Ib arra v . S

tate , 11 S.W .3d 189, 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)
. Bi gge rs and Los e rth conce rned in-court identific ations where it was alleg ed that pre trial identification proc edure s were imp e rm iss ibl y

su g g e sti ve , in

vio latio n o f t

he de fe nd ants ’ d

ue pr oc e ss r ig hts un de r t

he Fou rt een th Amendment. Se e Bi

gge rs , 4 09 U. S. at 19 4- 99 ; Los e rth v . S tate , 963 S.W .2d at 7 7 1 -7 2
. L agu n as makes no such cla im here. We will there fore revie w his claim under our usual fac tual sufficie ncy sta nd ard s. 3 2 revie w, we vie w all of the e vid en ce i n a n eu t ra l light, and w e will set the ver dict aside only if the evidenc e is so wea

k that the verdic t is clea

rly wrong and manifestly unjust, or the contra ry evidenc e is so strong that the sta

ndard of proof be y ond a re asonable doubt could not have be en met. See Zun iga v . S

tate , 144 S.W .3d 477, 484-8 5 (T ex . Crim. App. 2004). We review the fa ct-finde r’s weig hing of

th e e vidence and may

disag ree with the fac t-finder ’s deter mination. Cle wis , 922 S.W .2d at 133. But a fac tual sufficie ncy analy sis c an consider cre dibilit y only on those few matters bea

ring
on cre dibilit y

that can be fully

deter mined from the a

ppellate r ecor d. See J

ohnson , 23 S.W .3d at 8. A f a c tua l su ff

ic ie nc y re vie w mus t e mpl oy a pp ro pr iate de fe re nc e to the fa c t- fi nd e r’ s r ole a s th e so le judge of the we ight a

nd cre dibilit y

to be g iven to witness testimony
. Id . at 7. 24 I n this case, M.M. testified she had known L agunas for about three y ear s. She added that she had r ecog nized his voice when he wa s assaulting her, a nd that she saw him and kne w who he wa s befor e he took he r fr om the house. She also had ide ntified the clothing he wa s wea ring , and she later was a ble to see him throug h a hole in the ba g he had p lace d over he r hea d. I n addition, M.M. had place d L agunas at his par ents’ house a round the time she ha d called the police, a point on which both L agunas and mother ag ree d. Although Off

i cer Peltier did not rec ord in the incident repor t that M.M. had been a

ble to contempora

n eo u s l y i d en tify

L agunas, he te stified that she had3 3

made that identific ation. As well, she told Off icer Gabba rd that she ha d seen he r attac ker and that it was L agunas. She wa s later a ble to pick him out of a photog raphic line-up. The jury was pre sented with all the e vidence concerningthe identity of M.M.’s alleg ed attac ker a

nd was a ble to weig h the cr edibility of the witnesses. Viewingthis evidence in a neutra l light, it is not so wea k to r ender the verdic t c lear ly wrongand manife stly unjust, nor is the contra ry evidenc e so strongthat the standar d of proof bey ond a re asonable doubt could not have be en met. See Zuniga , 144 S.W .3d at 484-85. We re ject L agunas’s fa ctual suff iciency challeng e.
Conclu sion concernin g the sufficiency of the evidence Havingreje cted L agunas’s thre e cha lleng es to t h e s ufficie ncy of the e vidence , we
overr ule his second issue.
CO NC LU SION We have ove rruled L agunas’s issues on appe al. We aff irm the judg ment of the dis tr ic t c ourt
.

__________________________________________ Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces B . A. Smith and Pemberton Affir med Filed: August 26, 2005 Pub lis h