NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LEOCADIO FIGUEROA, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES; et al., 

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 18-56131 

D.C. No. 

2:11-cv-06228-DMG-FFM 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Dolly M. Gee, Chief District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 30, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: CALLAHAN and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges, and RAKOFF,*** District 

Judge.

Mr. Figueroa appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment for 

defendant Sergeant Gonzalez. He alleges that despite our prior determination that 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

*** The Honorable Jed S. Rakoff, United States District Judge for the 

Southern District of New York, sitting by designation.

FILED

AUG 30 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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“no constitutional right had been violated,” Figueroa v. County of Los Angeles, 

651 F. App’x 709, 713 (9th Cir. 2016), summary judgment was inappropriate 

because the jury had found that Deputy Perez used excessive force in violation of 

Mr. Figueroa’s constitutional rights and the prior panel’s determination was 

dictum. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

Neither of Mr. Figueroa’s arguments is persuasive. The question posed to 

the jury was simply “Did any of the Defendants use excessive force against 

Plaintiff Leocadio Figueroa?” The jury checked the “Yes” box. There is no 

indication that the jury was instructed as to what constitutes excessive force in 

violation of the Constitution as contrasted to other definitions of excessive force. 

Indeed, question 6 asked the jury “Did the Defendant prove that at the time he 

arrested Plaintiff it was reasonable for the defendant to believe that the force he 

used in arresting Plaintiff was not excessive.” The jury checked the “Yes” box. 

This ends the matter, as the Supreme Court has held that, to determine whether 

excessive force rises to the level of a constitutional violation, “the question is 

whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and 

circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or 

motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989). Here, it is not clear 

whether the jury’s response indicates that Officer Perez had a sincere but 

objectively unreasonable belief that force was necessary, or whether the 
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surrounding circumstances rendered such a belief reasonable. Accordingly, Mr. 

Figueroa has not shown that the jury’s verdict established that there was a 

constitutionally prohibited use of excessive force.

Mr. Figueroa’s appeal also fails because our determination that “no 

constitutional right had been violated,” Figueroa, 651 F. App’x at 713, was not 

dictum. An underlying issue in the prior appeal was the propriety of the district 

court going “a step further and instruct[ing] the jury on qualified immunity.” Id. 

The more usual approach is for the judge to determine qualified immunity. But we 

concluded that because the jury determined that Perez “reasonably believed the 

amount of force he used was necessary,” this “established that no constitutional 

right had been violated under the circumstances.” Id. Thus, our acceptance of the 

jury’s determination was an important part of our decision and not dictum.

The district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Sergeant 

Gonzalez is AFFIRMED.