alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
United States District Court

FOR THE

Southern District of Ohio

STEVEN B. BARGER, an individual,

Plaintiff,

-VFIRST DATA CORPORATION, et al..

Defendants,

-VJULIE K. KELLY, an individual.

Third Party Witness.

Civil Case No. EDNY: l:17-cv-04869-FB-LB

Civil Case No. l:18-mc-00010

CX2

CD

O

o

CO

MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION

Iam Julie Kelly and Iam representing myself in case l:18-mc-00010. On October 9, 2018

Judge DIott issued an order (Doc 29). In the body of the OrderJudge DIott states that:

"Ms. Kelly must appearfor a deposition on October 15,2018 at noon to be held at the

United States PotterStewartCourthouse, Room 203,100 EastFifth Street, Cincinnati,

Ohio 45202. Ms. Keiiy must bring any andaiidocuments in herpossession asrequested

in theSubpoena previously issuedfor theAugust 31, 2018deposition. The deposition

wiii conclude no later than 5:00 p.m. Unless otherwise agreed, Ms. Kelly shallbe

allowed twofive minute breaks and onefifteen minute breakduring thefive hour

deposition."

Iam requesting clarificationas soon as possible of the following issues.

1. I need to know specifically ifJudge DIott isgranting docket 1 in its entirety.

Case: 1:18-mc-00010-SJD-SKB Doc #: 31 Filed: 10/10/18 Page: 1 of 4 PAGEID #: 799
Case: 1:18-mc-00010-SJD-SKB Doc #: 31 Filed: 10/10/18 Page: 2 of 4 PAGEID #: 800
Case: 1:18-mc-00010-SJD-SKB Doc #: 31 Filed: 10/10/18 Page: 3 of 4 PAGEID #: 801
Case: 1:18-mc-00010-SJD-SKB Doc #: 31 Filed: 10/10/18 Page: 4 of 4 PAGEID #: 802
Donald Ray MUNDY, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

Case No. 5D16-4387

District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fifth District.

Decision filed February 20, 2018

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

AFFIRMED.
#### Holmes *v.*State.

4419

196 S. W. 2d 922

Opinion delivered October 28, 1946.

*L. DeWoody Lyle*and *Sam M. Levine,*for appellant.

*Guy E. Williams,*Attorney General and *Earl N. Williams,*Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

Smith, J.

Tins appeal is from a death sentence imposed upon appellant following his conviction for the crime of rape committed upon a child only 11 years old whose feelings we spare by omitting the mention of her name. He was defended by eminent and able counsel, under appointment of the court, who interposed such defense as the facts in the case permitted; and, who to be sure they had discharged the duties appertaining to their appointment have perfected this appeal.

When arraigned, as provided for and required by § 3876, Pope’s Digest, and asked if he pleads guilty or not guilty appellant answered, "Yes, sir, Judge, I am guilty and I beg the mercy of the court.”

There was offered in evidence at the trial the written confession of appellant, shown to have been freely and voluntarily made, in which the revolting details of the crime were recited. This statement coincided with the testimony of the assaulted child, whose 'identification of appellant as her assailant was unequivocal. Her testimony was corroborated by much other testimony. The evidence of the doctors who examined the child soon after the assault, as to lacerations sustained leaves no doubt as to the proof of the completed crime. As we have said proof of the commission of the crime is complete and *575its grade may not be reduced to a mere assault with intent to commit the crime.

Tlie child was sent by her mother with a five-gallon can to a suburban grocery, store to buy kerosene. She was unable to cariw that weight and bought only three gallons of oil. Appellant, driving an automobile, met the child in the road and offered to take her to her home. The invitation to be relieved of her burden was accepted, and the child got in' appellant’s car. But instead of driving her home, as he had promised, he drove to a secluded spot and committed his diabolical crime.

The judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Lonnie Boston,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:18-cv-283

Nationstar Mortgage,

et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court for consideration of the

magistrate judge’s April 11, 2018, report and recommendation. The

magistrate judge conducted an initial screen of plaintiff’s

complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2) and recommended that

the court dismiss this action for failure to state a claim on which

relief may be granted. 

The report and recommendation specifically advised plaintiff

that the failure to object to the report and recommendation within

fourteen days of the Report results in a “waiver of the right to

have the District Judge review the Report and Recommendation de

novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and

Recommendation.” Doc. 4 , p. 8. The time period for filing

objections to the report and recommendation has expired, and no

objections have been filed. 

The court has reviewed the report and recommendation and

agrees with the report and recommendation. The court hereby adopts

the report and recommendation (Doc. 4). This action is dismissed

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a
claim on which relief may be granted. The clerk shall enter final

judgment.

Date: April 27, 2018 s/James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge
<PAGE>   1

                                   EXHIBIT 12

RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDEND REQUIREMENTS

        The following table sets forth the ratio of earnings to fixed charges
and preferred stock dividend requirements for the periods indicated:

<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                    Five Months
        Years Ended July 31,     Ended December 31,     Years Ended December 31,
       ----------------------    ------------------     ------------------------
       1996     1997     1998          1998               1999          2000
       ----     ----     ----          ----               ----          ----
       <S>      <C>      <C>           <C>                <C>           <C>
       4:9      3:5      3:0            3:1               2:2           2:1
</TABLE>

        For purposes of computing these ratios, earnings have been calculated by
adding fixed charges (excluding capitalized interest and preferred stock
dividends) to income before extraordinary items. Fixed charges consist of
interest costs, whether expensed or capitalized, preferred stock dividend
requirements, the interest component of rental expense, if any, and amortization
of debt discounts and issue costs, whether expensed or capitalized.


           CALCULATION OF COMBINED RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES
                    AND PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDEND REQUIREMENTS
                          YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 31, 2000
                          (DOLLAR AMOUNTS IN THOUSANDS)


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
      EARNINGS:
      <S>                                                  <C>
      Net income                                           $122,323
      Interest expense (including amortization of debt
      discount and issuing costs)                            92,915
      Equity in loss of affiliate                            17,867
      Other adjustments                                         400
                                                           --------
          Total                                            $233,505
                                                           ========

      FIXED CHARGES:

      Interest expense (including amortization of debt
      discount and issuing costs)                          $ 92,915
      Capitalized interest                                      436
      Preferred stock dividends                              22,635
      Other adjustments                                         400
                                                           --------
          Total                                            $116,386
                                                           ========

      RATIO OF EARNINGS TO FIXED CHARGES AND
        PREFERRED STOCK DIVIDEND REQUIREMENTS                   2:1
</TABLE>
P.S. and D.S. v. B.P. and J.P.

2160037

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.

March 2, 2017

**DECISION WITHOUT PUBLISHED OPINION**

Dismissed.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 118 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.Con.Res.118
                                     Agreed to November 30, 2022        

                    One Hundred Seventeenth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America

                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

           Begun and held at the City of Washington on Monday,
          the third day of January, two thousand and twenty-two

                          Concurrent Resolution

    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),

SECTION 1. USE OF ROTUNDA FOR CEREMONY TO PRESENT CONGRESSIONAL GOLD 
              MEDALS TO UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE AND OTHERS WHO 
              PROTECTED THE CAPITOL ON JANUARY 6, 2021.

    The rotunda of the Capitol is authorized to be used on December 6, 
2022, for a ceremony to present Congressional Gold Medals to the United 
States Capitol Police and others who protected the Capitol on January 
6, 2021. Physical preparations for the ceremony shall be carried out in 
accordance with such conditions as the Architect of the Capitol may 
prescribe.
Attest:

                                 Clerk of the House of Representatives.

Attest:

                                               Secretary of the Senate.
```
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT No. 98-1280

DAVID ALAN BEAR, Plaintiff - Appellant, CATHERINE EVA KEDDIE; KATHREN ELAINE KIBBE; WILLIAM GEORGE KINER; MARY EVELYN SHIELDS; EVA FRANCES CAIL, Appellants, and LYNN HENDERSON BEAR; JAMES LEE SKEEN; PAULA RAE SKEEN; JOSHUA TYLER SKEEN; CORI NICHOLE SKEEN, Plaintiffs, KEITH A. MORRIS; ALICE D. CLINTON; TOMMY ALEXANDER; LOIS JOHNSON; BETTY LOU SAUER; PAULINE CART; CHARLES CART; SHELLEY JOHNSON; ALLEN DODGE; SUSAN R. DODGE; GREGORY B. SUMNER; ESTER SUMNER, Parties in Interest, versus MICHAEL F. EASLEY; HAL D. LINGERFELT, Defendants - Appellees,2 and JOHN D. WYDRA, JR.; ANGELA MARTINEZ; BOB RIDGWAY; CARL HORN, III; DIANE K. VISCOVO; L. A. SCOTT, JR.; MARY E. HUGHES, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert D. Potter, Senior District Judge. (CA-97-500-3-P) Submitted: October 8, 1998 Decided: October 22, 1998 Before WIDENER, NIEMEYER, and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. David Alan Bear, Catherine Eva Keddie, Kathren Elaine Kibbe,William George Kiner, Mary Evelyn Shields, Eva Frances Cail, Appellants Pro Se. Leonidas McNeil Chestnut, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NORTH CAROLINA, Raleigh, North Carolina; James MichaelSullivan, Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).3 PER CURIAM: Appellants appeal the district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Michael F. Easley and Hal D. Lingerfelt but allowing the case to proceed as to several other Defendants. We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the order is not appealable. This court may exercise jurisdictiononly over final orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994), and certain interlocutory and collateral orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). Because the case is still pending in district court as to various other defendants, the order here appealed is neither a final order nor an appealable interlocutory or collateral order. We dismiss the appeal as interlocutory. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
Filed 1/24/14 Gonzalez v. Kuerbiss CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

JONATHAN G. GONZALEZ,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

JERALDIN KUERBISS,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D063410

 (Super. Ct. No. DV036134)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Christine 

K. Goldsmith, Judge. Dismissed.

Jeraldin Kuerbiss, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

Jeraldin Kuerbiss appeals from a one-year restraining order prohibiting her from 

contacting her former boyfriend, Jonathan Gonzalez. In processing the appeal, we noted 

the restraining order expired by its own terms on November 18, 2013. We solicited 

supplemental briefs from the parties on whether the appeal is moot and should be 

dismissed. Neither party responded. 
2

Under well-established principles, this appeal is moot and must be dismissed. "If 

relief granted by the trial court is temporal, and if the relief granted expires before an 

appeal can be heard, then an appeal by the adverse party is moot." (Environmental 

Charter High School v. Centinela Valley Union High School Dist. (2004) 122 

Cal.App.4th 139, 144.) "[A]ppellate courts as a rule will not render opinions on moot 

questions: '[W]hen, pending an appeal from the judgment of a lower court, and without 

fault of the [respondent], an event occurs which renders it impossible for [the reviewing 

court] if it should decide the case in favor of [appellant], to grant [appellant] any effectual 

relief whatever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but will dismiss the 

appeal.' " (Ebensteiner Co., Inc. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178-

1179.) 

The restraining order challenged by Kuerbiss has expired. Thus, her appeal is 

moot and must be dismissed. 

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. The parties to bear their own costs.

HALLER, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MCDONALD, J.

MCINTYRE, J.
#### Gary McCLURE et al *v.*City Council of PARAGOULD et al

73-133

501 S.W. 2d 247

Opinion delivered November 19, 1973

*522
      *L. V. Rhine, Douglas Bradley*and *Jon R. Coleman,*for appellants.

*Robert F. Thompson*and *Kirsch, Cathey, Brown & Goodwin,*by: *Donis B. Hamilton,*for appellees.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

This action was brought by the appellants, as property owners of Water Improvement District No. 3 of Paragould, for a writ of mandamus to compel the city council of Paragould to call an election pursuant to Act 268 of 1969, for the selection of a board of directors for the improvement district. Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 20-141 *et seq.*(Supp. 1971). While the suit was pending Act 268 was repealed by Act 145 of 1973. The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the ground that the controversy had become moot. This appeal is from an ensuing summary judgment in favor of the defendants. For reversal the appellants contend that the repealing act is unconstitutional, as an invasion of the judicial province, because it recites that the act being repealed is a local and special act.

That contention is without merit. The improvement district was creatéd in 1920. The complaint alleges that, owing to the repeal of certain statutes, there was no procedure for the election of a board of directors when Act 268 of 1969 was adopted. That act, by its terms, applied to “any municipal water improvement district, organized and in operation for more than forty years, ... in a city having a population of not less than 9,000 nor more than 12,000 according to the last regular census, and not, being operated by an elected commission or board.” Section 20-141. Section 1 of Act 145, the repealing act, reads: “That Act No. 268 of the Acts of Arkansas of 1969 being a local and special act, is hereby repealed.”

The repealing act is unquestionably constitutional. To begin with, the legislature did not declare the earlier act to be unconstitutional. It merely declared that Act 168 was a local and special act. That declaration was true, because the act did not apply to the entire state. “The *523exclusion of a single county from the operation of the law makes it local.” *Webb*v. *Adams,*180 Ark. 713, 23 S.W. 2d 617 (1929). In the second place, the General Assembly “may repeal any law it enacts . . . and the motive or reason for the legislative action cannot be inquired into by the court.” *Gentry*v. *Harrison,*194 Ark. 916, 110 S.W. 2d 497 (1937). The trial court was right in upholding Act 145 and in finding this case to be moot.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT
32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TOSECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the quarterly report of Apria
Healthcare Group Inc. (the company or Apria) on Form 10-Q for
the quarter ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the SEC on the date hereof (the
Report), I, Amin I. Khalifa, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial
Officer of the company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant
to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

|(1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
          Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
          respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the company.
|--- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

/s/ AMIN I. KHALIFA

 Amin I. Khalifa
Executive Vice President and Chief Financial OfficerAugust 15, 2005

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
Apria and will be retained by Apria and furnished to the Securities and Exhange Commission
or its staff upon request.
[661 NYS2d 753]

#### Emanuel Hernandez, Plaintiff, v Richard S. Yoon, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Queens County,

July 24, 1997

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*McAloon & Friedman, P. C.,*New York City, for defendant. *Stephen R. Krawitz, P. C.,*New York City, for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT

Arnold N. Price, J.

Defendant Richard Sei-Oung Yoon, M.D., has moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint against him.

On November 16, 1989, the defendant performed a vasectomy on plaintiff Emanuel Hernandez, who was an associate professor at the City University of New York. The plaintiff was then married to Carmen Vasquez-Tell, from whom he did not separate until 1995. The plaintiff alleges that as a result of the defendant’s malpractice, he impregnated his girlfriend, Jenny Gonzalez, in early 1990 and that she subsequently had an abortion. The plaintiff seeks to recover for, *inter alia,*psychological injury.

*430This motion was brought on the premise that the plaintiff should not be permitted to recover for injuries that arose from adultery. "[W]hen the plaintiff has engaged in activities prohibited, as opposed to merely regulated, by law, the courts will not entertain the suit if the plaintiff’s conduct constituted a serious violation of the law and the injuries for which he seeks recovery were the direct result of that violation. In this latter instance recovery is denied, not because the plaintiff contributed to his injury, but because the public policy of this State generally denies judicial relief to those injured in the course of committing a serious criminal act” *(Barker v Kallash,*63 NY2d 19, 24). Although adultery is still a crime *(see,*Penal Law § 255.17), it is a class B misdemeanor and, moreover, it is an offense which the Temporary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code recommended be deleted from the revised Penal Law. *(See,*Donnino, Practice Commentaries, McKinney’s Cons Laws of NY, Book 39, Penal Law § 255.17, at 353.) Research has not disclosed any cases which hold adultery to be so serious a crime that recovery is precluded in a civil suit. Cases where recovery has been barred or would be barred because the plaintiff was engaged in criminal activity at the time of injury frequently involve conduct dangerous to physical well-being. *(See, e.g., Barker v Kallash, supra*[plaintiff injured while constructing a pipe bomb]; *Symone T. v Lieber,*205 AD2d 609 [plaintiff allegedly injured by malpractice committed during illegal late-term abortion]; *La Page v Smith,*166 AD2d 831 [estate of plaintiff’s decedent who died as a consequence of operating his vehicle in excess of speed limit while intoxicated denied recovery].) By comparison, the adultery committed by plaintiff Hernandez does not rise to the level of a "serious crime”.

Accordingly, the motion is denied.
```

[Congressional Bills 117th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.J. Res. 49 Introduced in House (IH)]

<DOC>

117th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. J. RES. 49

    Providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed direct 
      commercial sale to Israel of certain weaponry and munitions.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              May 20, 2021

  Ms. Ocasio-Cortez (for herself, Mr. Pocan, Ms. Tlaib, Ms. Bush, Ms. 
    McCollum, Ms. Pressley, Ms. Omar, Mr. Carson, Mr. Grijalva, Ms. 
  Jayapal, Mr. Johnson of Georgia, Ms. Newman, Mr. Danny K. Davis of 
    Illinois, Mr. Garcia of Illinois, and Mr. Bowman) submitted the 
  following joint resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
                            Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION

 
    Providing for congressional disapproval of the proposed direct 
      commercial sale to Israel of certain weaponry and munitions.

    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the issuance of a license 
for the export with respect to any of the following transfers to Israel 
is prohibited:
            (1) The transfer of the following defense articles, 
        including defense services and technical data, described in 
        license document DDTC 20-084, submitted to Congress pursuant to 
        section 36(c) of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2776(c)) on May 5, 2021: The proposed transfer of defense 
        articles, defense services, and technical data to support 
        weapons integration, flight test, and hardware delivery of 
        Joint Direct Attack Munition variants and Small Diameter Bomb 
        Increment I variants for end-use by the Ministry of Defense for 
        Israel.
                                 <all>
```