MAINE	SUPREME	JUDICIAL	COURT Reporter	of	Decisions Decision: 201 7 ME 38 Docket: Sag

- 16

- 100 Argued: October	25,	2016 Decided: March 7,	2017 Corrected: July	25 ,	2017 Panel: SAUFLEY,	C.J.,	and	ALEXANDER , MEAD, GORMAN , JABAR , HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.

DENISE	K.	LYNCH

v. DANIEL	G.	LYNCH

JABAR ,	J. [¶ 1 ] Denise K. Lynch	appeals	 from	a	judgment	 (West	Bath, Dobson,	J. ) dismissing	 her	 divorce	 complaint for	 lack	 of subject matter	 jurisdiction because a	Swedish	judgment	divorcing	 the	parties precluded	litigation	of	 the
action	in	Maine

. Because a	 review	 of	 the	Swedish	judgment ,	which	is	 being appealed	in	Sweden, is	premature ,	we	affirm	in	part,	and vacate in	part.
I.		BACKGROUND [¶ 2 ] The	 following	 facts	are	derived	 from	Denise’s	complaint,	and	 the documents	 submitted	 by	 the	 parties in	 conjunction	 with Daniel	 G.	 Lynch’s motion	to	dismiss. See	Davric	Me.	Corp.	v.	Bangor	Historic	Track,	Inc. ,	2000	ME 102,	¶	6,	751	A.2d	1024

. In	1991,	De nise	and	Daniel	were	married	in	Virginia Beach,	V irginia. At	the	time	of	their	marriage,	Daniel was an	active	member	of2 the	United	States	Navy,	and	 from	1992

- 1995,	1997

- 2000,	and	2003

- 2005,	he served	 tours of	 duty	 in	 Brunswick,	 Maine. While	 on	 these	 tour s	 of	 duty, Denise	 and	 Daniel	 resided	 at	 a	 home in	 Brunswick they	 acquired approximately one year	 after	 they	 were	 married

. The y	 own no	 other	 real

estate. After	completing	his	final	tour	of	duty	in	Maine in 2005,	Daniel	moved with	Denise	and	 their	 two daughters	 to	Belgium,	where	 they	 remained	 until
2008 , when	the y moved	to	Arlington,	Virginia. [¶ 3 ] A year	 after	 returning	 to	 the	 United	 States ,	 Daniel, Denise, and their	 children	 moved	 to	 Sweden when Daniel	 was	 assigned	 as	 the	 n aval attaché there

. Dani el	 retired	 three	 years	 later,	 but	 remained	 in	 Sweden	 to accept	a	teaching	position with the	Swe den	National	Defense	College. [¶ 4 ]		In	the	fall	of	2013	Denise	and	Daniel separated. Denise	returned	to Maine	 in	 October	 2013	 to	 live	 in	 the	 Brunswick	 home th at the	 couple had maintained	 as	 a	 rental	 property	 while	 they	 were	 living	 abroad, and Daniel remained	in	Sweden. [¶ 5 ]	 	 Approximately	 three	 months	 after	 Denise’s	 return	 to	 Maine,	 on January	 27,	 2014,	 Daniel	 initiated	 d ivorce	 proceedings	 in	 Sweden. He executed	 service	 of	 process	 via	mail,	 and	Denise	 received	 the	 summons	 an d complaint	on	March	2,	2014. Denise	responded	to	the	complaint	by	objecting3 to	the	proceedings and	asserting	that	the	Swedish	court	did	not	have	pe rsonal jurisdiction	over	her. A s	p rovided	by	Swedish	law,	the	Swedish	court	stayed the	 action	 for	 a	 six

- month	 “reconsideration	 period , ” which commenced	 on March 14,	2014. [¶ 6 ] O n	 May	 30,	 2014, while	 the	 Swedish	 action	 was	 still	 in	 the reconsideration	 period, Denise	 initiated	 an	 action	 f or	 d ivorce	 in	 the	 District
Court. In her	 complaint, Denise sought:	 (1)	 dissolution	 of	 the	 parties’ marriage;	(2)	a	court	order	distributing	marital	property;	(3)	spousal	support; and	 (4)	 an	 award	 of	 reasonable	 attorney	 fees. 1 Denise listed	 as marital
pro perty the Brunswick	 home, various	 investment	 and	 bank	 accounts ,	 and Daniel ’s military	pension

. [ ¶ 7 ]	 	 In	 response	 to the	initiation	 of Denise’s divorce	 action	in Maine, Daniel	moved	to	dismiss	the	complaint	for forum	non	conveniens ,	arguing	that Sweden, and	not	Maine,	was	the	more	appropriate	forum	to	decide	the	merits of	 the	 case. 2 The	 court ( Ende,	 J .) denied	 Daniel’s	 motion	 to	 dismiss,	 noting that , although	the	Swedish	divorce	action	commenced	first,	the	Swedish	court

1 Denise ’ s	 complaint	 also	 sought	 a	 determination	 of	 “parental	 rights	 and	 responsibilities regarding	 the	minor	child(ren),	including	child	 support.” Since	both	 of the	parties’ children	have reached	the	age	of	majority ,	child	support	is	no	longer	an	issue

.
2 Danie l	 entered	 a	 special	 appearance	 for	 the	 sole	 purpose	 of	 seeking	 dis missal	 of	 Denise’s complaint.4 had	not	yet	entered	a	final	judgme nt	and	that	Maine	was	the	more	convenient forum	 to	determine, inter	alia, “whether	and	how	 to	divide	 the	real	property in	Maine;	and

.	.	. how	to	divide	the	marital	portion,	if	any,	of [Daniel’s]	military pension.” Daniel	 subsequently	 filed	 an	 interlocuto ry	 appeal	 of	 the	 court’s den ial	of	his	motion	to	dismiss. [¶ 8 ] While	 Daniel’s	 appeal was	 pending before	 us ,	 the	 Swedish	 court entered	 an	 order	 divorcing	 the	 parties	 and	 appointing	 an	 administ rator	 to divide	 their	 assets. In	 its	 order,	 the	 Swedish	 court	 acknowledged	 Denise’s claim that	 the	court	lacked	personal	jurisdiction	over	her,	but	it	nonetheless proceeded	 t o	 adju dicate	 Daniel’s	 complaint,	 not ing	 that because	 it	 had jurisdiction	over	Daniel	it	was	“competent	to	ad judi cate	.	.	. the	divorce	case,” and	 that	 “[a]n	 issue	 concerning	 the	 spouses’	 economic	 relationship	 may	 be entertained	 by	a	Swedish	 court	 .	 .	 .	if	 the	issue	is	linked	 to	a	 divorce	 case	in Sweden

. ” Following	the	entry	of	the Swedish divorce	judgment,	Denise	s ought and	 obtained	 leave	 to	 appeal	 the portion of	 the	 judgment	 appointing	 an administrator	to	divide	the	parties’	assets,	but	was	denied	leave	to	appeal	the portion	 of	 the	 judgment	 di ssolving	 the	 marriage	 itself. We	 have	 no information	about	the	status	of that	appeal.5 [¶ 9 ] After	 the	Swedish court	entered	 the	divorce	judgment , and	while Denise	 was	 seeking	 appellate	 review	 of	 that	 judgment	 in	 Sweden ,	 Daniel moved for	 us to	 dismiss	 his	 pending	 interlocutory	 appeal,	 arguing	 that	 the
Sw edish	 court	 had	 entere d	 a	 final judgment divorcing	 the	 parties,	 and therefore	Denise’s	 divorce	action in	 the	Maine	 court	was	moot. We granted Daniel’s	 motion	 to	 dismiss	 his	 appeal,	 but denied	 his	 request	 that	 we “instruct” the	trial	court	to	dismiss Denise’s complaint

. [ ¶ 1 0 ] On	 remand,	 Daniel	 again	 moved	 to	 dismiss	 Denise’s	 comp laint, and	the	court ( Dobson, J .) granted that	motion,	concluding	that “ Denise	had	a full	 and	 fair	 opportunity	 to	 present	 her	 contentions	 concerning	 spousal support	 and	 enforceability	 of	 an	 earlier	 se ttlement	 agreement	 in	 [the Swedish] forum,”	 the	 Swedish	 judgment	 was	 final,	 and	 recognition	 of	 its validity was	“ warranted	pur suant	to	the	doctrine	of	comity. ” In	addition,	the court	stated, [F] urther	litigation	may	be	necessary	either	in	Sweden	or	 the	US or	 both	 to	 fully	 divide	 [the	 parties’]	 property	 or	 at	 a	 minimum, that	a	Swedish	court	will	need	 to	apply	Maine	law	 to	any	 further division	 of	 property	 .	 .	 .	 . It	 is	 unclear	 what	 route(s)	 would	 be available	to	accomplish	this,	[Denise]	may	be	able	to	chal lenge	any unfavorable	property	distribution	order	coming	out	of	Sweden	by challenging	 that	 court’s	 jurisdiction	 over	 her	 and	 the	 Maine property.6 [¶11] Denise	 timely	 appealed	 from	 the Maine court’s judgment. See M.R.	App. P.	2(b)(3).
II.		DISCUSSION [¶1 2 ] Although Denise acknowledged	 at	 oral	 argument	 that	 the Swedish	 court	 had	 sufficient	 jurisdiction	 to	 divorce	 the	 parties,	 she	 argues nonetheless that	the	court	erred	in concluding	that the	Swedish	judgment was

a complete	bar	to	her	divorce	action

. [¶1 3 ] Because	divorces	are	“divisible”	judgments,	and	because	there	is not	yet	a	 final	Swedish	judgment,	our	review	of any	portion	of	 the	judgment that	 goes	 beyond	 the	 granting	 of	 the	 divorce	 itself, including	 whether	 the Swedish	 court	 has	 competent	 juri sdiction 3 to	 appoint	 an	 administrator	 to divide	the	marital	property,	is	premature. [¶1 4 ] As	mentioned	 previously, c laims	 housed	in	a	 divorce	 complaint are	divisible

. See Estin	v.	Estin ,	334	U.S.	541,	549	(1948)

. First	introduced	in
Estin , t he divisible	divorce	doctrine simply	recognizes	 the	court’s	limited	power	where	 the	court	has no	 personal	 jurisdiction	 over	 the	 absent	 spouse. In	 these circumstances	the	court	has	jurisdiction	to	grant	a	divorce	to	one domiciled	 in	 the	 state	 but	 no	 jurisdiction	 to	 adjudicate	 the incidents	 of the marriage,	 for	 example,	 alimony	 and	 property

3 If	the	Swedish	appellate	court	determines	that	a	Swedish	trial	court	does	not	have	jurisdiction over	the	parties’	property,	there	will	be	no	need	for	a	Mai ne	court	to	make	this	determination.7 division.	 	 In	 short,	 the	divisible	divorce	doctrine	 recogn izes	both the	 in	 rem	 and	 in	 personam	 nature	 of	 claims	 usually	 raised	 in dissolution of	marriage proceedings. In	 re	 Marriage	 of	 Kimura ,	 471	 N.W.2d	 869,	 875	 (Iowa	 1991)

. In	 Maine,	 we have	applied	similar	principles	 to	establish	 that	a	 trial	cour t	having	personal jurisdiction	over the plaintiff	spouse but	not over the	defendant may	enter	a judgment dissolving	 the marriage but	leaving	 “all	property,	 spousal	 support, and	parental	issues	 to	 be	litigated	in	a	jurisdiction	 that	might	 have	personal juri sdiction	 over	 both the parties.” Von	 Schack v.	 Von	 Schack ,	 2006	 ME	 30, ¶¶ 4 , 25 ,	893	A.2d	1004 ( quotation	marks	omitted). [¶1 5 ]		Because	the	discrete	portions	of	a	divorce	action	are	divisible and therefore	 the	jurisdictional foundation	 of each	 claim	may	 vary,	 to	determine whether	 the court	erred	in	extending	 comity	 to	 the Swedish judgment	in	its entirety,	 we would	 have	 to determine

— for	 each	 element	 of	 its	 judgment

— whether	 the	 Swedish	 court	 was	 of	 competent	 jurisdiction to	 act

. In conducti ng	this	analysis,	we would utilize the	jurisdictional	standards	applied
in	our	courts.		R.F. Chase ,	Annotation, Domestic	Recognition	of	Divorce	Decree Obtained	in	Foreign	Country	and	Attacked	for	Lack	of	Domicil	or	Jurisdiction of
Parties , 13 A.L.R.	 3d	 141 9,	 1424	 (1967) (“[ T ] he	 tests	 of	 jurisdiction applied are	ordinarily	those	of	the	United	States	rather than the	divorcing	country ”);8

see also Roy v.	Buckley , 1997	ME	155,	¶¶ 12

- 15 ,	698	A.2d	497 (analyzing	 the method	 of	 process	 utilized	 in	 a	 Canadi an proceeding	 under our established principles	of	due	process). [¶1 6 ] The	only	aspect	of	the	parties’	divorce	proceedings that	has	been adjudicated	in	Sweden	is	the	dissolution	of	their	marriage. Insofar	as	we	can discern,	the disposition	of	marital	prope rty and	the	determination	of	whether spousal	 support	 should	 be	 awarded	 have	 not	 yet	 been	 addressed. Whether Sweden even has	jurisdiction	to	divide	the	parties’	marital	property	has	been appealed	and	the	judgment	contains	no	reference	to	any	claim	for	or	d ecision concerning	spousal	supp ort.		Therefore,	although	 the	District	Court	correctly determined	 that	 the	 Swedish	 judgment	 was	 entitled	 to	 comity	 insofar	 as	 it dissolved	 the	 parties’	 marriage,	 it	 was	 premature	 for	 the	 court	 to	 address issues	of	property	di stribution	or	spousal	support. [¶1 7 ]		Accordingly,	we	affirm	the	Maine	court’s	judgment	to	the	extent	it dismisses	 the	 portion	 of	 Denise’s	 complaint	 seeking	 dissolution	 of	 her marriage.		Because	the	claims	set	forth	in	her	divorce	complaint	are	divisible, however,	we	 vacate	 the	judgment	ins ofar	as	it	 dismisses	Denise’s	 remaining claims	 for spousal	 support, division	 of	 marital	 property , and	 reasonable9 attorney	fees. Upon	conclusion	of	the	appeal	in	Sweden,	the	Maine	court	will make	a	determination	of	its	authority	to	address	those	remaining claims. The	entry	is: Judgment	 vacated	 in	 part.	 	 Remanded	 for further	 proceedings	 consistent	 with	 this opinion.

Matthew	C.	Garascia,	Esq

. (orally),	Auburn,	for	appellant	Denise	K.	Lynch Catherine	C.	Miller,	Esq.	(orally),	Miller	Law	and	Med iation,	LLC,	Portland,	for appellee	Daniel	G.	Lynch

West	Bath	District	Court	docket	number	FM

- 2014

- 180 F OR C LERK R EFERENCE O NLY