[Cite as State v. Baker , 2021-Ohio-3991.]

STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT )

STATE OF OHIO Appellee

v. JERMAINE C. BAKER Appellant C.A. No. 29943

APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CR 07 01 0186(A)

DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: November 10, 2021

CARR, Presiding Judge. {¶1} Defendant-Appellant Jermaine Ba ker appeals from the judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas . This Court affirms.

I. {¶2} Following a 2007 jury trial, Baker was convicted of multiple fe lonies including kidnapping, aggravated burglary, ag gravated robbery, felonious assault, robbery, and having a weapon while under disability. F irearm, repeat violent offende r, and body armor specifications accompanied several of the charg es. Baker was sentenced April 30, 2007, and multiple nunc pro

tunc entries were issued there after, including one journalized December 14, 2007. Baker appealed his convictions, and th is Court affirmed the trial cou rt’s judgment. See State v. Baker, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23840, 2008-Ohio-1909. {¶3} Subsequently, Baker filed seve ral post-conviction motions. A 2 011 motion resulted in a correction to Baker’s post-release control. In 2 018, Baker filed a motion for2

resentencing arguing that his sen tences were void or contrary t o law and that the December 14, 2007 judgment entry was not a final appealable order. Baker al leged that the trial court was required to impose post-release control as to all of his convic tions, that multiple consecutive sentences for the firearm and body armor specifications were co ntrary to law, and that the trial court failed to merge allied offe nses. The trial court denied the motion. While Baker filed a notice of appeal in the trial c ourt, the appeal was not perfect ed, and an appeal was never

docketed in this Court. {¶4} In December 2020, Baker filed a motion titled: “Defendant’s Mot ion to Strike and Vacate the Supposed Jury Verdicts in this Case, to Vacate the S upposed Conviction and Sentencing Entry of December 14, 2007, and Motion for the Immed iate Release of the Defendant from Prison, all for Cause Shown.” In that motion Baker argued that there was no final appealable order because the trial court failed to sentence Bak er on the repeat violent offender specifications, the trial court imposed multiple consecutive se ntences on multiple firearm and body armor specifications, and the trial court sentenced Baker to a void indefinite prison sentence of 32 years with parole eligibility after 20 years. I n addition, Baker contended that he was never properly charged and never arraigned on the body armo r specifications. Finally, Baker maintained that the trial court was required to determine whether Baker was a repeat violent offender, not the jury. The State opposed the motion. It argued that Baker’s motion was an untimely and successive petiti on for post-conviction relief and that his arguments were unfounded. Ultimately, the trial c ourt denied the motion. {¶5} Baker has appealed, raising thr ee assignments of error for our review. They will be addressed together to facilitate our review.3

II.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND VACATE THE SUPPOSED JURY VERDICTS IN THIS CASE, TO VACATE THE SUPPOSED CONVICTION AND SENTENCING ENTRY OF DECEMBER 14, 2007, AND MOTION FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DEFENDANT FROM PRISON. MR. BAKER’S SENTENCING IS VOID, AND THE DECEMBER 14, 2007 JUDGMENT ENTRY OF SENTENCE IS VOID. DEFENDANT WAS SENTENCED TO AN ILLEGAL HYBRID INDEFINITE SENTENCE, USING THE IMPROPER SENTENCING PACKAGE DOCTRINE, WHERE THE JUDGE DID NOT SENTENCE ON INDIVIDUAL COUNTS, AND WHERE THE JUDGE’S STATEMENTS AT SENTENCING DO NOT MATCH THE SENTENCING ENTRY.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND VACATE THE SUPPOSED JURY VERDICTS IN THIS CASE, TO VACATE THE SUPPOSED CONVICTION AND SENTENCING ENTRY OF DECEMBER 14, 2007, AND MOTION FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DEFENDANT FROM PRISON. MR. BAKER’S SENTENCING IS VOID, AND THE DEFENDANT’S DECEMBER 14, 2007 JUDGMENT ENTRY OF SENTENCE IS VOID. THE RVO “CONVICTIONS” WERE VOID AND TAINTED THE JURY, THE TRIAL COURT THEN FAILED TO DISPOSE OF THE RVO “CONVICTIONS” ATTACHED TO COUNTS 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 23, 24, AND FAILED TO PRO PERLY DISPOSE OF ALL COUNTS IN THE INDICTMENT.

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF DEFENDANT AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE AND VACATE THE SUPPOSED JURY VERDICTS IN THIS CASE, TO VACATE THE SUPPOSED CONVICTION AND SENTENCING ENTRY OF DECEMBER 14, 2007, AND MOTION FOR THE IMMEDIATE RELEASE OF THE DEFENDANT FROM PRISON. MR. BAKER’S SENTENCING IS VOID, AND THE DECEMBER 14, 2007 JUDGMENT ENTRY OF SENTENCE IS VOID. THERE WAS NO SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT FILED IN THIS CASE TO ADD THE BODY ARMOR COUNTS, AND EVEN IF THE COURT DEEMS THE “SUPPLEMENT” THAT FILED AS EQUIVALENT TO A SUPERSEDING INDICTMENT,4

DEFENDANT WAS NEVER ARRAIGNED ON THE COUNTS PRIOR TO TRIAL. {¶6} Baker argues in his first assignm ent of error that the December 14, 2007 sentencing entry is void because his sentence of 32 years in pr ison with parole eligibility after 20 years is contrary to law and the trial court improperly utilize d the sentencing package doctrine in sentencing him. Baker asserts in his second assignment of erro r that his sentence is void because the trial court did not determine the repeat violent offender s pecifications and the trial court

failed to sentence Baker on thos e specifications. Therefore, h e also argues the sentencing entry

is not final. Baker further mai ntains that the entry is not fi nal and appealable because the trial court imposed multiple consecutive sentences on multiple firear m and body armor specifications which renders the sentence contrary to law and void. Finally, Baker argues in his third assignment of error that he was never arraigned on the body arm or specifications, that the supplement which contained the specifications was an improper c harging document, and that the late filing of the specificati ons indicated vindictiveness by t he State. {¶7} To the extent Baker has raised additional arguments other than those he raised in the trial court, this Court will not consider the arguments. See JPMorgan Chase Bank, Natl.

Assn. v. Burden , 9th Dist. Summit No. 27104, 2014-Ohio-2746, ¶ 12 (“Arguments that were not

raised in the trial court cannot be raised for t he first time o n appeal.”). {¶8} This Court must first consider the nature of the motion at issu e in the appeal. Former R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a) provide s in relevant part that [a]ny person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or ad judicated a delinquent child and who claims t hat there was such a denial or infringement of the person’s rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the Ohio Constitution or the Constitution of the United States * * * may file a petition in the court that imposed sentence, stating the grounds for relief relied upon, and asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentenc e or to grant other5

appropriate relief. T he petitioner may f ile a supporting affid avit and other documentary evidence in suppor t of the claim for relief. {¶9} “Courts may recast irregular motions into whatever category nec essary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged .” State v. Little , 9th Dist. Lorain No. 20CA011662, 2021-Ohio-1446, ¶ 6, quoting State v. Schlee , 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008- Ohio-545, ¶ 12. “A vaguely titled motion may be treated as a p etition for post-c onviction relief under R.C. 2953.21(A)(1) when the motion was filed after a dire ct appeal, alleges a denial of constitutional rights, seeks to render the judgment void or voi dable, and requests that the judgment and sentence be vacated.” Little at ¶ 6. Baker’s motion meets these criteria. Further,

it is not the first motion of th is nature that he has filed, an d it is therefore a successive petition. {¶10} Pursuant to former R.C. 2953.21(A)(2), Baker’s petition had to be filed “no later than three hundred sixty-five days after the date on which the trial transcript [was] filed in the court of appeals in the direct appeal of the judgment of convic tion * * *.” Thus, Baker’s petition was clearly unt imely and successive. {¶11} A trial court may not entertain untimely or successive petition s for postconviction relief unless the petitioner satisfies certain requirements. See former R.C. 2953.23(A). Baker’s petition does not satisfy the re quirements in former R.C. 2953. 23(A). “[A] petitioner’s failure to satisfy R.C. 2953.23(A) deprives a trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate the merits of an untimely or successive p ostconviction petition.” Little at ¶ 9, quoting State v. Apanovitch , 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, ¶ 36. Therefore, the trial cou rt lacked authority to entertain Baker’s petition. {¶12} Baker’s arguments that his sent ences are void does not change t his outcome. “A sentence is only void when a sentencing court lacks jurisdictio n over the subject-matter of the case or personal jurisdiction over the accused.” (Internal quo tations omitted.) Little at ¶ 10,6

quoting State v. Brown , 9th Dist. Summit No. 29667, 2020-Ohio-4671, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480, 2020-Ohio-2913, ¶ 42. An argument that th e trial court imposed a sentence not authorized by statute “challenges the exercise of jurisdiction and if true would render [Baker’s] sentence voidable, not void.” State ex rel. Crangle v. Summit Cty. Common

Pleas Court , 162 Ohio St.3d 488, 2020-Ohio-4871, ¶ 10. “If a judgment ent ry is voidable, then it must be challenged on direct appeal, or else principles of r es judicata will apply, whereas a defendant’s ability to challenge an entry at any time is the ve ry essence of an entry being void, not voidable.” (Internal quot ations and citations omitted.) State ex rel. Romine v. McIntosh , 162 Ohio St.3d 501, 2020-Ohio-6826, ¶ 12. Baker has not argued or demonstrated on appeal that the trial court lacked subject matter or personal jurisdiction over him. See App.R. 16(A)(7). Accordingly, Baker has not demons trated that his convictions an d sentences are void. Being voidable, they are subj ect to res judicata. State ex rel. Romine at ¶ 12. {¶13} Finally, to the extent Baker has argued that the December 14, 2 007 judgment entry is not a final appealable order, he has not proven the sa me. See State v. Lester , 130 Ohio St.3d 303, 2011-Ohio-5204, paragraph one of the syllabus (“A ju dgment of conviction is a final order subject to appeal under R.C. 2505.02 when it sets forth ( 1) the fact of the conviction, (2) the sentence, (3) the judge’s signature, and (4) the time stamp indicating the entry upon the journal by the clerk.”); State ex rel. Rodriguez v. Barker , 158 Ohio St.3d 39, 2019-Ohio-4155,¶ 10 (“[A] trial court’s failure to address a specification does not affect the fina lity of the order.”). {¶14} Overall, Baker has not establishe d that the trial court erred i n denying his motion. Baker’s assignments of error are overruled.7

III. {¶15} Baker’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of th e Summit County

Court of Common Pl eas is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, direc ting the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State o f Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof , this document shall consti tute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Cour t of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the pa rties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket , pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant.

DONNA J. CARR FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, J. CALLAHAN, J. CONCUR.8

APPEARANCES: ELIZABETH N. GABA, Attorne y at Law, for Appellant. SHERRI BEVAN WALSH, Prosecuti ng Attorney, and JACQUENETTE S. CO RGAN, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Appellee.