J-A24006-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

DIANE R. GOCHIN IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellant

v.

NORMAN ROSETSKY

No. 3798 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Order Entered December 11, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County

Civil Division at No(s): 2007-12909

BEFORE: BOWES, OTT AND SOLANO, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: Filed January 12, 2017

Diane Gochin (“Wife”) appeals the December 11, 2015 divorce decree 

that ended her marriage to Norman Rosetsky (“Husband”) and resolved all 

outstanding economic claims.1 For the reasons explained infra, we dismiss 

the appeal. 

Husband and Wife married on August 28, 1988. Wife initiated the 

divorce proceedings during 2007, and seven years of contentious equitable 

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1 As it relates to the economic claims, the order directed that the marital 

home be held in custodia legis pending sale or foreclosure and that any 

proceeds and debts be divided equally between the parties. The marital 

estate was divided equally and Wife was directed to pay Husband $5,300 for 

his share of the distribution. Finally, the court denied both parties’ claims 

for alimony pendente lite, alimony, counsel fees and/or costs, and health 

insurance. 
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distribution litigation ensued. As the trial court highlighted, “since [2007], 

there have been over 500 docket entries including those from [a] 

consolidated docket [number].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/16, at 3. The 

matter remained open during October 2014, when a divorce master presided 

over the equitable distribution hearing. The master filed its report and 

recommendation on December 5, 2014, and Husband filed a timely demand 

for a de novo hearing pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 1920.55-3.

2

 The trial court 

scheduled the de novo hearing for 9:00 a.m., on October 29, 2015. The 

court reserved two days for the hearing in anticipation of both parties’ 

protracted testimony, evidence, and argument. 

Wife, who was acting pro se, failed to appear at the de novo hearing. 

Instead, on the morning of October 29, 2015, she telephoned the trial 

court’s chambers and informed it that she would not be present. The trial 

court returned Wife’s call and directed her to attend the hearing. The court 

advised Wife that Husband was present and stated that it would wait for her 

arrival before proceeding. However, the court warned Wife that, if she failed 

to appear, it would proceed with the hearing in absentia. Rather than 

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2 While the trial court referred to Husband’s demand as his “exception” to 

the master’s recommendation, Montgomery County Family Division does not 

employ exceptions. Instead, Montgomery County follows the alternative 

procedure outlined in Rule 1920.55-3, which provides “any party may file a 

written demand for a hearing de novo” within twenty days of the master’s 

report. See Rule 1920.55-1 (Official Note listing Montgomery County as a 

jurisdiction electing the alternative procedure under Rule 1920.55-3).
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comply with the court’s directive to attend the hearing or request a 

continuance for any reason, Wife insisted upon attending only the second of 

the two days that the court had reserved for the hearing. The trial court 

attempted to explain that, if Wife did not attend the hearing as scheduled, 

there would be no need for a second day. Wife did not relent, and the 

hearing proceeded in absentia. After Husband presented his case-in-chief, 

including testimony, exhibits, and argument, the trial court adjourned the de 

novo hearing on October 29, 2015, without Wife’s participation. On 

December 11, 2015, the trial court entered the final order that is the genesis 

of this appeal. 

Wife’s thirty-three page pro se brief seemingly asserts a litany of 

claims for our consideration. Unfortunately for Wife, her brief is an aimless, 

rambling criticism of Husband and the trial that is not only incoherent, but 

utterly fails to comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

Wife’s brief does not contain any of the components of Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1-

11) that are required to be listed separately and distinctly in the proscribed 

order. Specifically, Wife failed to include: 1) a statement of jurisdiction; 2) a 

copy of the order in question; 3) a statement of the scope and standard of 

review; 4) a statement of the questions involved; 5) the statement of the 

case; 7) a summary of the argument; or 8) the statement of errors 

complained of on appeal. While we are able to decipher cryptic references to 

standards of review and what Wife believes is the “relevant procedural 
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history” neither of those references explains Wife’s failure to attend the de 

novo hearing or to request a continuance, nor do they address the trial 

court’s decision to hold the hearing in absentia. 

Moreover, Wife’s brief fails to provide developed arguments in support 

of any of the issues that she apparently wants us to consider. The argument 

section of the brief is not divided into distinct claims as required by Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(a), and while we do not doubt that Wife believes her argument makes 

perfect legal sense, we cannot glean from it any legal reasoning that would 

provide a basis for the relief that she requests, i.e., a remand for a second 

de novo hearing before a different trial court judge, the marital home, and 

restitution totaling $100,000. See Wife’s Brief at 33. Rather than justify 

her absence from the de novo hearing or explain how the trial court’s 

decision to proceed in her absence was tantamount to an abuse of 

discretion, Wife engages in irrelevant, often personal, condemnations of 

Husband, his attorney, and the various trial judges that presided over the 

matter during the course of the seven-year litigation. 

Pa.R.A.P. 2101 grants us the authority to dismiss an appeal where, as 

here, the defects in a brief are substantial and impede our ability to perform 

meaningful review. Specifically, the rule provides, “if the defects are in the 

brief or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or 

other matter may be quashed or dismissed.” Id. The fact that Wife is pro 

se does not excuse her failure to comply with the Rules of Appellate 
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Procedure. See Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 252 (Pa.Super. 

2003). While “this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a 

pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an 

appellant.” Id. at 251-252. Likewise, “[w]hen issues are not properly raised 

and developed in briefs, [and] when the briefs are wholly inadequate to 

present specific issues for review[, this] Court will not consider the merits 

thereof.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 685 A.2d 1011, 1013 (Pa.Super. 

1996). 

The defects in Wife’s brief are substantial and preclude us from 

engaging in meaningful appellate review. Accordingly, we dismiss the 

appeal.

Appeal dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/12/2017