In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 18-2517

JA’LIN WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NORFOLK SOUTHERN CORPORATION and NORFOLK SOUTHERN 

RAILWAY COMPANY,

Defendants-Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.

No. 2:15-CV-00283 — John E. Martin, Magistrate Judge.

____________________

ARGUED FEBRUARY 8, 2019 — DECIDED MARCH 19, 2019

____________________

Before FLAUM, BARRETT, and SCUDDER, Circuit Judges.

BARRETT, Circuit Judge. Ja’Lin Williams was struck by a 

train while he and his friends were running away from a police officer. He sued the railway, which he believed was at 

fault for his injuries. But the district court granted summary 

judgment to the railway, concluding that Williams was barred 
2 No. 18-2517

from recovery by Indiana law because he was more than 50% 

at fault for the accident. We agree and affirm.

I.

Seventeen-year-old Ja’Lin Williams was with a group of 

friends on Whihala Beach in Whiting, Indiana when a police 

officer told them that they had to leave or else they would be 

arrested for trespassing. The young men stayed behind for a 

few minutes after the officer left, but when he returned in his 

squad car, they fled on foot.

The young men approached five sets of train tracks as they 

were running. The set of tracks closest to them had warning 

gates on both sides to stop eastbound and westbound road 

traffic. The remaining four sets of tracks shared a pair of 

warning gates that stopped eastbound and westbound road 

traffic. Of those four, the two sets of tracks farthest from the 

young men were owned and operated by Norfolk Southern 

Corporation and the Norfolk Southern Railway Corporation 

(collectively “Norfolk”).

As the young men were making their way across the 

tracks, one of Norfolk’s trains approached from the southeast

on the rail line farthest from them. The first boy, Antwion 

McGee, saw the train and sped up to cross its path before it 

reached him. The second, Javante Toran, saw the train and 

stopped in order to avoid a collision. Williams, on the other 

hand, did not look up and continued running. Unfortunately, 

his timing put him right in the train’s path, and it hit him.

Williams sued Norfolk. Norfolk moved for summary 

judgment. The district court granted Norfolk’s motion, holding that Williams was more than 50% at fault as a matter of 
No. 18-2517 3

law and thus could not recover under Indiana law. Williams 

filed this appeal.

II.

The Indiana Comparative Fault Act governs this diversity 

case, and it bars recovery in actions based on fault if the claimant’s fault exceeds 50% of the total fault. IND. CODE § 34-51-2-

6 (2013). The district court concluded that there was no dispute of material fact because no fact finder could reasonably 

conclude that Williams bore 50% or less of the relative fault.

We agree. 

Williams insists that his own testimony, not to mention the 

testimony of his friends, illustrates that there are material disputes of fact that justify sending this case to a jury. He emphasizes that he did not recall seeing flashing lights ahead of him 

as he ran, nor the light of the train itself. He states that he did 

not hear the train’s horn, bells, or any other sounds indicating 

that a train was approaching. Toran and McGee likewise profess not to have observed various warnings that a train was 

coming.

This testimony might have created a material issue of fact 

if this case were a battle of eyewitnesses. But “[w]hen opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly 

contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could 

believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for 

purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott 

v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). And here, the young men’s

testimony is blatantly contradicted by video evidence. The

video plainly shows that the train’s horn and bells were 

sounding and that its lights were on. It shows that, before 

reaching the train, the young men ran past flashing lights.
4 No. 18-2517

And it shows that the gate on the other side of the track was 

down, that it had lights that faced the young men, and that 

those lights were flashing. We thus treat these facts as established and analyze the extent of Williams’s fault in light of 

them.

Reales v. Consolidated Rail Corp. controls. 84 F.3d 993 (7th 

Cir. 1996). There, a girl was struck by a train and killed. The 

court held that she was more than 50% at fault as a matter of 

law because it was undisputed that the crossing gates were 

down, the flashing lights were activated, witnesses heard the 

train sound, and witnesses saw her hesitate but then proceed 

around the gate. See id. at 997. Like the plaintiff in Reales, Williams had more than sufficient warning of the train’s approach. He simply failed to heed it.

The fault for the collision therefore lies with Williams. He

failed to take even the smallest of precautions—looking up in 

the face of the warnings—to avoid being struck. And Indiana 

law establishes that a train operator has no duty to reduce a 

train’s speed if he sees a person crossing. Ohio & M. Ry. Co. v. 

Walker, 15 N.E. 234, 237 (Ind. 1888). He is entitled to presume

that the person will take the necessary steps to avoid injury, 

unless he has “good reason to suppose that such persons are 

unconsciously in peril, or disabled from avoiding it.” New 

York Cent. R. Co. v. Casey, 14 N.E.2d 714, 717 (Ind. 1938). Williams suffered from no such disability, and given the many 

warnings that were present, the train crew was entitled to presume that he was not unconscious of the train’s approach. It 

didn’t become clear that Williams wouldn’t stop—like his 

friend Toran did—until the moment before the collision, and 

by then it was far too late to meaningfully slow the moving 

train. Under Indiana law, Williams is more than 50% at fault
No. 18-2517 5

for his injuries. We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment to Norfolk.