[PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 22-10742

____________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

HENRY MARTIN STEIGER, 

a.k.a. Henry Matthew Steiger,

a.k.a. H M Steiger, 

a.k.a. Robert Woods, 

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Florida

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D.C. Docket No. 3:17-cr-00043-RV-2

____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and WILSON, JORDAN,

ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, BRANCH, GRANT, LUCK, LAGOA,

BRASHER, and ABUDU, Circuit Judges.

BRASHER, Circuit Judge:

While on federal probation, Henry Steiger was convicted in 

state court of murdering the mother of his infant child on the 

baby’s first birthday. The government moved to revoke Steiger’s 

probation for committing this new offense, and the district court 

agreed. After revoking Steiger’s probation, the district court imposed a modified sentence well above Steiger’s advisory guidelines 

range—the statutory maximum of twenty years’ imprisonment to 

run concurrently with the state court’s murder sentence. The district court did not explain why it chose that sentence, and Steiger 

did not object to the lack of explanation.

Steiger argues that we should vacate his sentence and remand for the district court to explain why it chose twenty years. 

The law requires a district court to state in open court its reasons 

for choosing a particular sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c), and all 

parties agree the district court failed to do that here. We have 

adopted a “per se rule of reversal” that requires us to vacate any 

sentence imposed without an explanation. United States v. Parks, 

823 F.3d 990, 997 (11th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Bonilla, 

463 F.3d 1176, 1181 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v. Williams, 438 

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F.3d 1272, 1274 (11th Cir. 2006). Under those precedents, Steiger’s 

failure to object is irrelevant.

We took this appeal en banc to answer two questions. First, 

we asked whether we should overrule our precedents that impose 

the “per se rule of reversal” and, instead, review unpreserved Section 3553(c) objections for plain error. We conclude that we 

should. Our court stands alone in imposing a “per se rule of reversal,” but there is nothing special about Section 3553(c) errors that 

justifies this different standard of review. Second, we asked 

whether the district court in fact committed a plain error when it 

sentenced Steiger. We conclude it did not. We hold that, when the 

sentencing record makes clear a district court’s reasons for imposing a particular sentence, a district court’s failure to explain its reasons for the chosen sentence does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights. It is abundantly clear on this record that the district 

court sentenced Steiger to the statutory maximum because of the 

nature of the unusually egregious state-law offense he committed 

on probation, so there is no plain error.

In addition to this Section 3553(c) error, Steiger argues that

the district court committed procedural errors in arriving at his sentence and that a twenty-year sentence is substantively unreasonable. We remand to the panel to consider Steiger’s additional arguments.

I.

Henry Steiger pleaded guilty to three counts of wire fraud 

and one count of conspiracy to commit wire fraud. Due to some

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legal technicalities not relevant here, Steiger’s recommended custodial sentence under the United States Sentencing Guidelines was 

only zero to six months’ imprisonment. The district court did not 

impose any prison time, but it did sentence Steiger to three years’ 

probation. A sentence of probation necessarily implies trust that 

the defendant will not reoffend while serving the sentence. See

U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, pt. A, § 3(b). Steiger breached that trust a mere two 

months into his probation, and he did so in a most egregious way—

by committing second-degree murder. After a Florida state jury 

convicted Steiger of that crime, the district court held a hearing to 

revoke Steiger’s probation and to resentence him on the federal 

conspiracy and wire fraud offenses.

The hearing was dedicated almost exclusively to a discussion of Steiger’s heinous conduct underlying his second-degree 

murder conviction. The district court heard evidence that Steiger 

strangled to death the mother of his infant daughter—on the baby’s 

first birthday and while the baby was in her mother’s arms. Steiger 

then hid the woman’s body in a 55-gallon barrel and stowed the 

barrel in a trailer. When interviewed by law enforcement about the 

woman’s disappearance, Steiger disclaimed knowledge of her 

whereabouts. Eventually, police discovered the woman’s body. 

Steiger admits to hiding the body and lying about it to law enforcement, but he maintains that he did not commit murder. As Steiger 

tells it, he found the woman dead and thought she committed suicide. He says he thought the woman’s death would cause him to 

lose custody of his daughter, so he frantically tried to “cover [his] 

tracks,” which made him look “like a guilty person.”

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The district court rejected Steiger’s claim of factual innocence. The district court instead found by a preponderance of the 

evidence what the Florida state jury had already found beyond a 

reasonable doubt—Steiger murdered the mother of his infant 

daughter. Cf. United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 156 (1997). Accordingly, the district court ruled that Steiger “violated the terms 

and conditions of [his] probation” by committing the state law offense of second-degree murder and revoked Steiger’s probation.

Having found that Steiger committed second-degree murder in violation of the terms of his probation, the district court imposed a new sentence for Steiger’s federal conspiracy and wire 

fraud convictions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2). The government argued that a guidelines sentence of twelve to eighteen months’ imprisonment, see U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4, would “greatly understate[] the 

seriousness” of Steiger’s commission of “arguably . . . the most 

egregious of offenses while on probation,” and emphasized the district court’s ability to sentence up to twenty years’ imprisonment 

per count, see 18 U.S.C. § 1343. Steiger requested that he be sentenced to time served. When imposing its sentence, the district 

court began by explaining that it had “carefully considered all the 

evidence presented,” Steiger’s allocution, and “all of the factors set 

out in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)], as well as the applicable guidelines and 

policy statements” and relevant judicial precedents. The district 

court then sentenced Steiger “to be imprisoned for a term of 20 

years on each count, . . . to be served concurrently” with each 

other and the life sentence imposed by Florida in the second-degree

murder case.

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The district court never explicitly said that it was imposing 

a twenty-year sentence because Steiger committed a violent crime 

in a heinous manner. But there’s no doubt everyone was on the 

same page. Immediately after imposing its sentence, the district 

court asked if Steiger had “any objections to any of [the court’s] 

findings or conclusions of law or anything that need[ed] to be amplified on the record with regard to the sentence [the court] imposed.” Steiger said no.

Steiger appealed, arguing that his sentence is an excessively 

harsh upward variance and that the district court did not take the 

steps necessary to calculate an adequate sentence. The three-judge 

panel assigned to the case could not reach those issues, however. 

Under our precedent, any Section 3553(c) error required automatic 

reversal. See United States v. Steiger, 83 F.4th 932, 936–38 (11th Cir.), 

vacated and reh’g en banc granted, 86 F.4th 1337 (11th Cir. 2023). So 

the district court’s omission of an express explanation of its reasoning halted the appeal. See id. Neither the absence of a contemporaneous objection nor the presence of a record that otherwise made 

clear the basis of the sentence mattered. The panel had no choice 

but to reverse and remand so the district court could formally supplement the record with information everyone already knew: Steiger received a long sentence because he committed murder. 

Concurring with the Steiger panel’s application of our precedents, Chief Judge Pryor lamented the incoherence and inconsistency of our “per se rule of reversal” for Section 3553(c) errors. 

Steiger, 83 F.4th at 938–40 (Pryor, C.J., concurring). In any other 

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context and in every other circuit to have addressed the issue, an 

appellate court would review the record only for plain error. See id.

(Pryor, C.J., concurring). 

We voted to take the case en banc and asked the parties to 

brief two questions. First, we asked whether we should overrule in 

part our cases creating the per se rule of reversal for Section 3553(c) 

errors and hold that plain error review applies. Second, we asked 

whether, if plain error review does apply, the district court committed plain error here.

II.

Criminal defendants in federal court have the right to know 

the reason for their sentence so they can understand the process 

and challenge their sentence on appeal. To ensure that a defendant 

has that information, the law requires that a district court “state in 

open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). If the district court imposes a sentence 

within the range recommended by the United States Sentencing 

Guidelines, “and that range exceeds 24 months,” then the district 

court must explain “the reason for imposing a sentence at [the] particular point” that the court chose “within that range.” Id.

§ 3553(c)(1). If the district court imposes a sentence outside the 

guidelines range, then the district court must state orally during the 

sentencing hearing “the specific reason for the imposition of a sentence different from” the guidelines range. Id. § 3553(c)(2). The district court must also “state[] with specificity” those reasons “in a 

[written] statement of reasons.” Id.

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The district court’s obligation under Section 3553(c) is to 

“adequately explain the chosen sentence to allow for meaningful 

appellate review.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007). The 

adequacy of an explanation necessarily depends “upon the circumstances of the particular case.” Chavez-Meza v. United States, 585 U.S. 

109, 116 (2018). In “conceptually simple” cases in which “the record 

makes clear that the sentencing judge considered the evidence and 

arguments,” a district court’s statement that a within-guidelines 

sentence is “appropriate” can be sufficient. Rita v. United States, 551 

U.S. 338, 358–59 (2007). But “major departure[s]” from the guidelines range require that a district court identify a “more significant 

justification” at the hearing and on the written “statement of reasons form” created by the Sentencing Commission. See Gall, 552 

U.S. at 50; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2). 

Although it isn’t onerous to comply with Section 3553(c), 

the district court here said nothing to explain its sentence. The district court imposed a sentence above the sentencing guidelines 

range but said nothing about why it was varying upward. On the 

other hand, Steiger did not object to the district court’s lack of explanation. The district court expressly asked him whether he 

needed any clarification, and, through counsel, he said no. Thus, 

we are left with our two questions: (1) Should we automatically 

vacate Steiger’s sentence for this unobjected-to error or apply customary plain error review? (2) If we review for plain error, is there 

any reason to believe that the district court’s error affected Steiger’s 

substantial rights or undermined the fairness of the sentencing process? 

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A.

We begin by holding that an unobjected-to Section 3553(c) 

error warrants review for plain error only. In doing so, we overrule 

in part our cases that established the per se rule of reversal.

Two general rules frame the issue here. The first is that we 

don’t reverse based on errors (even preserved ones) that are harmless—that is, if they didn’t affect the outcome of the proceeding. 

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a); United States v. Daniels, 91 F.4th 1083, 

1095 (11th Cir. 2024). The second is that we won’t reverse for any 

error (even an outcome-changing one) when the party claiming error did not object below unless the error is “plain”—meaning that 

it is obvious and it affected substantial rights—and it undermined 

the fairness of the proceeding. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); Puckett v. 

United States, 556 U.S. 129, 134–35 (2009).

We recognized a Section 3553(c) exception to these background rules in United States v. Williams. In Williams, the district 

court violated Section 3553(c)(1) when it imposed a sentence 

within a guidelines range that exceeded twenty-four months without explaining why it picked a particular point within that range. 

438 F.3d at 1274. Despite the defendant’s failure to object, the Williams panel “reject[ed] the government’s argument that this error 

[was] subject only to plain error review.” Id.; see also Bonilla, 463 

F.3d at 1181 n.3. The Williams panel instead applied de novo review, 

creating what we later came to describe as a “per se rule of reversal.” Parks, 823 F.3d at 997. That rule was later extended from Section 3553(c)(1) to Section 3553(c)(2) and, until today, has mandated 

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automatic reversal any time a district court does not explicitly lay 

out the logic behind its sentence. See id. at 995–97 & n.31.

No other circuit has followed Williams. The Second and Seventh Circuits have held that a contemporaneous objection is necessary to preserve a Section 3553(c) issue. See United States v. Villafuerte, 502 F.3d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. Burns, 128 

F.3d 553, 556 (7th Cir. 1997). The Fourth Circuit has reasoned that 

plain error review is all but mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal

Procedure 52 and Supreme Court precedent. See United States v. 

Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 575–77 (4th Cir. 2010). The First, Third, Fifth, 

Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and D.C. Circuits apply plain error to 

unpreserved Section 3553(c) errors without much ado. See United 

States v. Gilman, 478 F.3d 440, 447 (1st Cir. 2007); United States v. 

Merlino, 349 F.3d 144, 161 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. IzaguirreLosoya, 219 F.3d 437, 440–41 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Eversole, 

487 F.3d 1024, 1035 (6th Cir. 2007); United States v. Evans, 272 F.3d 

1069, 1089 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 

(9th Cir. 1999); United States v. Romero, 491 F.3d 1173, 1177–78 (10th 

Cir. 2007); United States v. Ransom, 756 F.3d 770, 773 (D.C. Cir. 

2014). 

We are likewise convinced that Williams was wrong. In departing from the plain error standard, the Williams panel felt itself 

bound by United States v. Parrado, 911 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1990), 

and United States v. Veteto, 920 F.2d 823 (11th Cir. 1991). But those 

precedents do not require that result.

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For starters, neither precedent addressed the standard of review for unobjected-to Section 3553(c) errors. See Veteto, 920 F.2d 

at 826; Parrado, 911 F.2d at 1572–73. In Veteto, the defendant objected; he didn’t understand why he received such a long sentence, 

so he asked for clarification. 920 F.2d at 824. The district court expressly refused to explain itself. Id. We understandably remanded 

for clarification. See id. at 826–27. In Parrado, the district court likewise provided no summary of reasons at the end of the hearing. See 

911 F.2d at 1570. But there was no discussion in Parrado about 

whether the defendant objected, and there was no discussion about 

the standard of review that would apply to unpreserved errors.

If anything, the result in Parrado suggests that we implicitly 

rejected an automatic reversal rule—because we affirmed. Instead 

of reversing based on the district court’s lack of explanation alone, 

the panel in Parrado searched the record for some evidence that the 

district court’s error had affected the defendant’s ability to understand his sentence. In particular, the panel asked whether the district court’s reasoning was evident, even though it had failed to explain itself. Then, because the panel held that the record was sufficiently clear, it reasoned that reversal was unwarranted. See id. at 

1573. 

Obviously, neither precedent mandates reversal for all Section 3553(c) errors. Williams therefore not only broke the general 

rule of plain error review by forgiving a defendant’s failure to object, but Williams also put itself in tension with the precedents it 

relied on for that rule. 

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Other justifications for the Williams rule fare no better. The 

Parks panel, engaging in its duty to reconcile conflicting cases, posited that the Williams rule is justifiable because a Section 3553(c) 

error can be identified “on a silent record.” Parks, 823 F.3d at 995–

96. That is, Section 3553(c) requires a statement of reasons; any 

sentence imposed withoutsuch a statement is clearly unlawful; and 

so, a contemporaneous objection is unnecessary to develop the record for appellate review. See id. 

That justification falls flat for at least two reasons. First, it 

prizes record development at the expense of the timely objection 

rule’s other aims that are fully applicable in the Section 3553(c) context—“foster[ing] finality of judgment[s] and deter[ring] ‘sandbagging,’” United States v. Pielago, 135 F.3d 703, 709 (11th Cir. 1998), 

and giving the district court the chance to “correct or avoid the 

mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate outcome,” 

Puckett, 556 U.S. at 134. Second, the Parks justification creates even 

more tension with our precedents. We regularly review for plain 

error even if the record would not have benefited from a contemporaneous objection. See Steiger, 83 F.4th at 940 (Pryor, C.J., concurring) (noting that plain error review applies to challenges under 

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(3)(B) and to challenges that a district court 

failed to articulate reasons supporting its decision to seal an order). 

That an error may be obvious on a silent record does not answer 

whether we should reverse because of that error—even when a defendant has preserved an objection, we still ask whether the error 

was harmless before we reverse. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a).

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Finally, there is no reason to conclude that a Section 3553(c) 

error is one of the rare “structural errors” that requires us to “revers[e] without regard to the mistake’s effect on the proceeding.” 

United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 81 (2004). The “defining feature of a structural error is that it affects the framework 

within which” the proceeding occurs, as opposed to an error that 

occurs within a structurally sound proceeding. Weaver v. Massachusetts, 582 U.S. 286, 295 (2017) (cleaned up). For example, a district 

court’s failure to adequately instruct a jury on reasonable doubt is 

a structural defect because that trial becomes incapable of producing a constitutional verdict. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 

277–82 (1993). But a district court’s failure to adequately instruct 

the jury on an element of a charged crime is not structural because

it remains possible for us to assess the guilty verdict based on the 

evidence. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8–15 (1999). 

A district court’s failure to explain the reason for a sentence 

is not structural. The federal sentencing framework requires that 

district courts resolve factual disputes, calculate the guidelines 

range, consider the Section 3553(a) factors, impose a reasonable 

sentence, and adequately explain the basis for the sentence imposed. If a district court makes a mistake while performing one of 

those functions, it has erred within the context of a structurally 

sound sentencing proceeding. United States v. Perez, 86 F.4th 1311, 

1319–20 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied 2024 WL 1143718 (U.S. Mar. 

18, 2024). If the defendant timely objects, we review for harmless

error. If not, then plain error applies. 

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In short, there’s simply no basis to depart from the general 

rule of plain error review for unobjected-to errors. We therefore 

hold that an unobjected-to Section 3553(c) error warrants only 

plain error review. To the extent Williams or any of its progeny—

including Bonilla and Parks—conflicts with our decision today, 

those precedents are overruled.

B.

We must now decide whether the district court committed 

plain error by failing to “state in open court . . . the specific reason 

for the imposition of a sentence” outside the guidelines range or 

file a written statement of reasons. 18 U.S.C. 3553(c)(2). The plain 

error test has four elements. An appellate court must find that (1) 

the district court committed an error; (2) the error was “plain”; and

(3) the error “affect[ed] a substantial right.” United States v. Caldwell, 

81 F.4th 1160, 1175 (11th Cir. 2023), cert. denied sub nom. Clayton v. 

United States, 144 S. Ct. 870 (2024) (citation omitted). If all three 

conditions are met, then an appellate court has discretion to correct 

the forfeited error if it (4) “seriously affect[ed] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Johnson v. United 

States, 520 U.S. 461, 466–67 (1997).

The government does not dispute that Steiger satisfies the 

first and second elements. We agree. The district court erred when 

it did not state in open court the specific basis of its upward variance or file a written statement of reasons. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c)(2).

And its obligation to make such explanations is clear from the “explicit language of [the] statute.” United States v. Bankston, 945 F.3d 

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1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). The parties disagree 

about the third and fourth elements, however. So that is where we 

turn. 

For the third element of plain error, Steiger must establish 

that the district court’s Section 3553(c) error “affect[ed] a substantial right.” Caldwell, 81 F.4th at 1175. A district court’s compliance 

with Section 3553(c) ensures that the defendant understands his 

sentence, and it creates a record of the district court’s reasoning. 

Both aims implicate a defendant’s ability to make an informed decision of whether to appeal and, if he does appeal, his ability to 

meaningfully attack the legality of the sentence. Many of our sister 

circuits have held, therefore, that the substantial right at issue in a 

Section 3553(c) challenge is the right to meaningful appellate review of a sentence. See United States v. Lewis, 424 F.3d 239, 247 (2d 

Cir. 2005); United States v. Gore, 298 F.3d 322, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2002); 

United States v. Blackie, 548 F.3d 395, 402–03 (6th Cir. 2008); United 

States v. Brown, 892 F.3d 385, 405 (D.C. Cir. 2018). We agree. The 

primary reason Section 3553(c) requires an oral and written statement is so that a defendant can meaningfully appeal the sentence. 

See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. Accordingly, a Section 3553(c) error does 

not affect a defendant’s substantial rights if the record is clear 

enough to allow meaningful appellate review of the sentence.

Section 3553(c)’s role in the sentencing process also informs 

Steiger’s burden for the fourth element—whether “the error seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 

proceedings.” Caldwell, 81 F.4th at 1175 (citation omitted). Section 

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3553(c) enables district courts imposing sentences to “treat like 

cases alike.” Parrado, 911 F.2d at 1572. It gives “information to criminal justice researchers” and aids “the Sentencing Commission in 

its continuous reexamination of its guidelines and policy statements.” Veteto, 920 F.2d at 826 n.3 (citation omitted). And Section 3553(c) explanations inform the public of the reasons justifying 

criminal sentences. See Parks, 823 F.3d at 997 & n.30. All of these 

purposes are satisfied if the record is clear about a district court’s 

reasons for imposing a sentence, even if it did not make the express 

statements that Section 3553(c) requires.

Putting everything together, the third and fourth elements 

of plain error rise and fall, in this context, based on one thing: the 

clarity of the record. An ambiguous record could prevent a defendant from understanding his punishment, impede appellate review, 

and undermine public confidence by making a sentence appear secretive and arbitrary. But if the basis of the sentence is clear on the 

face of the record, then the defendant is not left out of the loop, 

appellate courts can effectively review the legality of the sentence, 

district judges can use the sentence as a comparator, and the public 

won’t be left to guess why the defendant received the sentence he 

did. Accordingly, we hold that a Section 3553(c) error warrants reversal under plain error review only when the district court’s reasoning is unclear on the face of the record. See Dominguez Benitez, 

542 U.S. at 82; see also United States v. Guzman, 603 F.3d 99, 110 (1st 

Cir. 2010); Gore, 298 F.3d at 325–26; Vences, 169 F.3d at 613.

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The government disagrees that a defendant in Steiger’s position can establish plain error if the district court’s reasons for a 

sentence are ambiguous. Instead, the government argues that a defendant in Steiger’s position must establish that he would have 

been sentenced to a lower sentence but for the Section 3553(c) error. The government’s argument is unpersuasive for two reasons. 

First, the government focuses on the wrong outcome. We

often describe an appellant’s burden under plain error review as 

establishing that the “outcome” of the judicial proceeding would 

have changed. See Daniels, 91 F.4th at 1095. But we define the “outcome” that must have been affected by considering the nature of 

the rule violated by the district court and the role that rule plays in 

the judicial process. For example, when a defendant says his guilty 

plea was unknowing or involuntary in violation of Federal Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 11, our focus under plain error review is on the 

“effect of Rule 11 error on the defendant’s decision to plead,” not 

on whether the defendant would have otherwise avoided a guilty 

verdict. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. at 84. Here, Section 3553(c) is 

directed at the “outcome” of whether there is a record for appeal, 

not on the outcome of the sentencing proceeding in the district 

court.

Second, Section 3553(c) is unusual in that it is not a rule that 

guides a legal decisionmaker to a particular result—it is a rule that 

a decisionmaker must comply with after reaching a result. To be 

sure, on plain error review, we usually expect an appellant to prove 

that a better overall result—i.e., a not-guilty verdict or a lesser 

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sentence—would have occurred without an error. But that is because most cases implicate rules that facilitate the overall result of

a proceeding. For example, when the proceeding is sentencing, we 

ask whether the sentence would be different but for erroneous sentencing enhancements or an inaccurate sentencing guidelines 

range. See, e.g., United States v. Malone, 51 F.4th 1311, 1319 (11th Cir. 

2022); United States v. Jones, 743 F.3d 826, 829–30 (11th Cir. 2014).

But Section 3553(c) is different. It doesn’t guide a district court’s 

sentencing discretion; it becomes relevant only after the district 

court has exercised that discretion and made its decision. It makes 

no sense to apply a change-of-result test to a post-result error.

For his part, Steiger argues that this framework for evaluating plain error reads the word “specific” out of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(c)(2). His point is that Section 3553(c)(1) requires only a 

statement of “the reason” behind a guidelines sentence; Section 

3553(c)(2), on the other hand, demands an explanation of “the specific reason” (emphasis added) underlying any non-guidelines sentence. But Steiger’s argument is beside the point. The difference in 

specificity between Section 3553(c)(1) and Section 3553(c)(2) goes 

to whether the district court violated Section 3553(c) in the first 

place, not whether the violation affected a defendant’s substantial 

rights or undermined public confidence. Said differently, a defendant’s substantial rights do not vary between Section 3553(c)(1) and 

Section 3553(c)(2). Nor does the public’s confidence in the fairness 

and integrity in the proceedings. If someone with knowledge of the 

sentencing record can understand the reasons for the sentence 

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imposed, then a district court’s technical violation does not warrant 

reversal under plain error review. 

Applying that view of plain error review here, we cannot say 

the district court plainly erred. A reasonable person familiar with 

the sentencing record would understand that Steiger received an 

above-guidelines sentence because, while he was out on probation, 

he brutally murdered the mother of his infant daughter, hid her 

body, and then lied to law enforcement about it. Steiger’s seconddegree murder conviction and his conduct underlying the conviction were the only topics of discussion at the revocation and sentencing hearing. Nearly all the time spent at that hearing was dedicated to getting straight the gruesome details of the crime. The 

district court found as a matter of fact that Steiger committed the 

crime, quickly dismissing Steiger’s factual-innocence argument. 

And although Steiger asked for a sentence of time served, the government suggested a higher sentence because of Steiger’s disturbing conduct. Because the district court’s reasoning is clear on the 

face of the record, Steiger cannot establish plain error. A remand in 

this circumstance would be a wasteful formality for the district 

court to state on the record what everyone already knows. 

C.

To be clear, this opinion does not address whether the district court’s reasons for varying upward were appropriate or otherwise resolve whether Steiger’s sentence is lawful. He raised multiple procedural and substantive arguments on appeal. The panel initially assigned to this case was foreclosed from reaching those 

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20 Opinion of the Court 22-10742

arguments because of our per se rule of reversal. Today’s holding—

that the district court’s failure to explicitly state its reasons for an 

upward variance was not plain error because those reasons are obvious on the face of the record—simply removes the barrier to review. 

III.

We REMAND to the panel for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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22-10742 Jordan, J., Concurring 1

JORDAN, Circuit Judge, joined by ROSENBAUM and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges, Concurring:

I join Judge Brasher’s well-written opinion in full but write 

briefly to offer some cautionary thoughts. 

Justice Holmes once remarked that “hard cases” can “make 

bad law.” Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400 (1904) 

(Holmes, J., dissenting). But easy cases sometimes bring difficulties 

of their own. Our affirmance in this case, under plain error review, 

is made relatively simple by the fact that Mr. Steiger murdered the 

mother of his child while on probation. But most cases will not be 

so easy. In run of the mill cases—where many different facts and 

arguments may be in play at sentencing—analyzing the substantial 

rights prong of the plain error analysis may not be as straightforward. I doubt very much that many cases in the future will be this 

cut and dry. 

While on federal probation, Mr. Steiger was convicted in 

state court of the second-degree murder of the mother of his child. 

The probation office petitioned the district court to revoke his probation on this one ground, and the conviction was understandably 

the focus of the revocation hearing. At the hearing, Mr. Steiger 

argued that he should be sentenced to time-served because he was 

already facing life imprisonment on the second-degree murder conviction and because—despite the jury verdict—he had not committed the murder. All parties, including Mr. Steiger, understood that 

the advisory guidelines range for the probation violation was 12 to 

18 months. And Mr. Steiger did not object to the government’s 

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2 Jordan, J., Concurring 22-10742

representation that, according to probation, the district court was 

statutorily authorized to sentence him to 20 years for each of his 

four original federal offenses and to run the sentences consecutively, for a maximum sentence of 80 years. 

The district court sentenced Mr. Steiger to four terms of 20 

years, but ran those terms concurrently with each other and with his 

state court life imprisonment sentence. All of this is to say that the 

probation revocation sentence did not come out of left field. Nor 

is it hard to discern the district court’s reasoning—there was only 

one reason for the revocation and for the sentence, and that was 

Mr. Steiger’s commission of murder. 

But sentencing is often a more complicated affair, with opposing recommendations from the parties, competing aggravating 

and mitigating facts, possible enhancements, departures, and variances, and disputed guideline provisions. If a district court does 

not adequately explain its reasons for a sentence, those reasons may 

not be apparent from the record. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 

597 F.3d 794, 805 (6th Cir. 2010) (2-1 decision) (finding plain error 

where the majority (a) “simply [could] not determine whether the 

district [court] considered the disparity between [the co-defendants’] sentences,” and (b) disagreed with the dissent’s contention 

that “it [wa]s clear” that the district court considered the argument, 

which it deemed “conceptually straightforward”). 

We do not provide a benchmark today on when a “district 

court’s reasoning is unclear on the face of the record.” Maj. Op. at 

16. A defendant’s ability to satisfy his or her burden under plain 

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22-10742 Jordan, J., Concurring 3

error review is therefore going to be fact-specific and subject to a 

case-by-case adjudication. This is the right call, as a really easy case 

like this one can make it difficult to provide broad guidance for the 

future. 

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