PUBLISH UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff - Appellee,

v. CHRISTOPHER COLMAN CHAMBERS, Defendant - Appellant. No. 17-5046

________________ _________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma (No. 16-CR-118-JHP-2)

________________ _________________ Stephen J. Greubel, Senior Litigator (Julia L. O’Connell, Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, with him on the briefs), Tulsa, Ok lahoma, for Defendant - Appellant. Leena Alam, Assistant United Stat es Attorney (Loretta F. Ra dford, Acting United States Attorney, and Janet S. Reincke, Assistant United States Atto rney, with her on the brief), Office of the United States Attorney for th e Northern District of Oklahoma, Tulsa, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff - Appellee.

________________ _________________ Before MATHESON , BALDOCK , and EID, Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ MATHESON , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________ FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 27, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 Christopher Chambers was indicted on on e count of being a felon in possession of firearms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). Law enforcement officers from Rogers C ounty, Oklahoma discovered the firear ms after searching his home pursuant to a search warrant. They had been inves tigating Kevin Chambers (Christopher’s brother) and Char ity Drozd (collectively, “the Pair”), who were suspected of selling methamphetamine and were resid ing at Christopher Chambers’s home. 1 After he was indicted, Mr. Chambers m oved to suppress the firearms evidence. He argued the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant application failed to establish probable cause and that the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply. The district court rejected these arguments and denied the motion. Mr. Chambers pled guilty, reserving the right to appeal the denial of hi s suppression motion, which he has done here. Exercising jurisdiction un der 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. The affidavit established a minimally sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and the suspected criminal activity to make the officers’ reliance on the warrant reasonable.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Investigation and Search Officers’ Investigation of the Pair 1. On August 1, 2016, Rog ers County officers monito red communication between the Pair and a confidential poli ce informant (the “CI”). The Pair told the CI they were

1 We refer to Defendant - Appellant Ch ristopher Chambers as Mr. Chambers.3 returning to Rogers County from Tulsa with methamphetamine. Ms. Drozd said they could not deliver drugs to him that night b ecause they need ed to make other customer deliveries. Officers arranged w ith the CI to make a contro lled buy from the Pair on the next day. The next morning, the Pair texted and called the CI, stating they had awakened and would meet him soon. The three met and the CI bought one gram of methamphetamine from the Pair for $100. Law enforcement officers also monitored their communication before and during the transaction. At the meeting, the Pair bragged to the CI about how much methampheta mine they had. After the transaction, officers met the CI to debrief him and to secure the drugs, which tested positive as methamphetamine. The CI gave directions to where the Pair liv ed. The officers in turn confirmed that the location belonged to Ke vin Chambers’s brother, Mr . Chambers, based on their previous encounters with him. The Search of Mr. Chambers’s Home 2. On August 6, 2016, Rogers County De puty Sheriff Quaint Tucker prepared an affidavit to search 11470 S. 42 10 Road (“the Address”), Mr . Chambers’s residence. A Rogers County District Judge signed the se arch warrant, which au thorized officers to seize methamphetamine and oth er items related to drug dea ling. On August 8, 2016, officers searched Mr. Chambers’s home. They encount ered the Pair and Mr. Chambers and detained them outside. In the home, they discovered seven firearms loaded with ammunition. They also recov ered marijuana, methamphetami ne, and drug paraphernalia.4 Mr. Chambers was indicted for being a fel on in possession of fire arms and ammunition under 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a )(2). He had nine prior felonies.
B. The Affidavit Deputy Tucker’s nine-pag e affidavit listed the Address on the first page and contained aerial photos of the property on th e first two pages, including a label stating “Residence to be searched” and an arrow pointing to th e location. The affidavit addressed four subjects: (1) a description of the property and items to be seized, (2) Deputy Tucker’s training and experience, (3) drug traffick ers’ common practices, and (4) facts to establish probable cause. 2 The fourth part was based mostly on information from two sources: Deputy Tucker and the CI. First, based on “his training and experien ce both formal and informal,” ROA, Vol. I at 85, and information from the investigatio n, Deputy Tucker said the Pair likely:

 are“career criminal [sic] involved in the possession of narcotics.” Id.

 “will keep and store items, like those so ught in this affidavit, at their residence.” Id.

2 The affidavit is reproduced in the Appe ndix. Each part is briefly described below: (1) Description of the property and items to be seized - The address, description, photos, directions, and items to be seized—such as methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. (2) Deputy Tucker’s training and experien ce - Length of employment, hours of training, and number of narcotics investigations. (3) Drug traffickers’ common practices - Officer Tucker stated that “[d]rug distributors/traffickers commonly maintain books, records, receipts, notes, ledgers, and other documents.” ROA, Vol. I at 82. (4) Facts to establish probable cause - Inform ation about the inves tigation, reliability of the CI, and the Pair’s residence.5  “will store evidence, such as that sought in this a ffidavit, throughout their property.” Id.

 “will have in their residence and surro unding property items used to ingest methamphetamine” and items for methamphetamine distribution. Id. at 85- 86. Second, the affidavit included facts about th e CI’s interactions with the Pair on August 1 and 2, 2016. It also included:

 Kevin Chambers’s statemen t to the CI about encount ering the police in July 2016 at a bank drive-thru when he was carrying methamphetamine.

 The following paragraph on the eighth page titled “Res idence Identified”: [The CI] was able to give directions to the residence he knew Kevin and Charity to live. Investigators were able to confirm the address to belong to Kevin’s brother Christopher Chambers from previous encounters with law enforcement. The address is known as. Id. at 85. The paragraph ended without stating the address of the residence. 3 Finally, the affidavit included a statement from officers verifying the reliability of the CI, describing his help in previous cases that led to th e seizure of eight pounds of methamphetamine and other illicit items. 4

3 We refer to this paragraph as th e “Residence Identified paragraph.”

4 The affidavit stated that officers had verified inform ation that the CI provided about the Pair. For example, officers had corroborated from the police log the CI’s statement that “Kevin had brag ged to him about being awoken by a deputy in the month of July 2016 asl eep in a bank drive through.” ROA, Vol. I at 84.6 C. The Motion to Suppress Mr. Chambers moved to suppress the firearms and ammunition evidence. He argued the affidavit did not establish probable cause and the good-fa ith exception did not apply because the affidavit failed to tie eviden ce of the Pair’s crim inal activity to the Address. The magistrate judge conclu ded in a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that the motion should be granted. The Gove rnment objected, sta ting there was enough factual support linking the evidence of criminal activity to the Address. The district court rejected the magistrate judge’s R&R and denied Mr. Chambers’s motion. It concluded the affidavit sufficien tly connected informati on about the criminal activity to the location to be se arched both (1) to provide prob able cause and (2) to justify the application of the good-faith exception. United States v. Chambers , No. 16-CR-118- JHP, 2016 WL 74294 41, at *5 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 23, 2016) Mr. Chambers next entered into a plea agreem ent. He pled guilt y to the sole count of the indictment, but reserved the right to ap peal the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress. II. DISCUSSION Mr. Chambers challenges the district cour t’s rulings regarding probable cause and the good-faith exception. We re view only the latter. “We have previously taken this approach of assuming a defici ency [of probable cause] w ithout deciding the issue and applying Leon [good-faith analysis.]” United States v. Potts , 586 F.3d 823, 832 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Quezada-Enriquez , 567 F.3d 1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 2009).7 As explained below, we affirm the dist rict court’s ruling on the good-faith exception because officers conduc ting the search could have relie d in objective good faith on the search warrant.
A. Standard of Review “Determinations relating to the . . . the applicability of the good-faith exception are conclusions of law . . . which this court reviews de novo.” United States v. Danhauer , 229 F.3d 1002, 1005 (10th Cir. 2000). “In rev iewing the denial of a motion to suppress, this court views the evidence in the light most favorable to the government and upholds the district court’s factual findi ngs unless clearly erroneous.” Id

. 5
B. Legal Background The Exclusionary Rule and the Leon Good-Faith Exception 1. The Fourth Amendment pr otects individuals from “ unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. am end. IV. To authorize a va lid search under the Fourth Amendment, “[a] search warrant must be supported by prob able cause, requiring more than mere suspicion but le ss evidence than is n ecessary to convict.” Danhauer , 229 F.3d at 1005 (quotations omitted). “Ordinarily, courts will remedy a Fourth Amendment viola tion by invoking the exclusionary rule to exclude the Government’s introducti on of the unlawfully seized evidence as direct evidence against the defendant in a criminal prosecution.” United States v. Herrera, 444 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 20 06). But if a search warrant is later

5 Both parties ag ree that there are no facts in dispute. See Aplt. Br. at 5 (“The underlying facts are not in issue. ”); Aplee. Br. at 1 (same).8 found to lack probable cause , evidence seized “does not necessarily have to be suppressed.” United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 863 (10t h Cir. 2005). In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), the Supreme Court reco gnized the “good-faith exception” to the ex clusionary rule. “Under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, if a warrant is not supported by proba ble cause, the evidence se ized pursuant to th e warrant need not be suppressed if the executing offi cer acted with an objective good-faith belief . . . .” United States v. Edwards , 813 F.3d 953, 970 (10th Cir. 2015) (q uotations omitted); see also
Leon , 468 U.S. at 922. Reliance upon a warran t issued by a neutral magistrate creates a “presumption . . . [that] the offi cer is acting in good faith.” United States v. Cardall , 773 F.2d 1128, 1133 (10t h Cir. 1985) (citing Leon , 468 U.S. at 925-26). No Good-Faith Exception wh en the Affidavit Lacks Indicia of Probable Cause 2. The good-faith presumptio n is not absolute. See Danhauer , 229 F.3d at 1007 (noting exceptions to the presumption). An “officer’s reliance on the defective warrant still must be objectively reasonable.” United States v. Russian , 848 F.3d 1239, 1246 (10th Cir. 2017). An officer’s reliance is objectively unreasona ble when the warrant is based on an affidavit “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence enti rely unreasonable.” Leon , 468 U.S. at 923 (quotations omitted). 6

6 The Leon Court also specified three other situ ations when an officer’s reliance would be objectiv ely unreasonable: (1) the affiant knowingly or recklessly misled the issuing magistrate regarding information materi al to the probable cause determination; (2) the magistrate judge “wholly abandoned hi s judicial role;” and (3) the warrant was “so facially deficient—i.e., in failing to particularize the place to be searched or the9 An affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause when it does not contain factual support. “When we consider whether the offi cer relied in good faith upon a warrant, we must look to the underlying docu ments to see whether they are devoid of factual support, not merely whether the facts they contain are legally sufficient.” Cardall , 773 F.2d at 1133; see United States v. Augustine , 742 F.3d 1258, 1263 (10th Cir. 2014). An affidavit devoid of factual support is “one that merely states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions, without providing some underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge.” United States v. Roach , 582 F.3d 1192, 1204-05 (10th Cir. 2009). The affidavit does not have to be a model of specificity. See United States v. Henderson , 595 F.3d 1198, 1202 (10th Cir. 2010). “An affidavit has enough factual support to justify relia nce if it establishes a minimally sufficient nexus between the illegal activity and the place to be searched.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotations omitted).
C. Analysis We review only the district court’s application of the Leon good-faith exception. The court concluded the exception applied be cause the affidavit established a minimally sufficient nexus between evidence of the illegal activity and the place to be searched. On appeal, Mr. Chambers argues the affidavit’s omission of the Address in the Residence Identified paragraph rendered the affidavit de void of factual support and precluded goodfaith reliance on the warrant. things to be seized—that the executing offi cers [could not] reasonably presume it to be valid.” Leon , 468 U.S. at 923.10 To justify a search of the Address, the affidavit needed to present evidence connecting the Pair’s criminal activity and th e Address, which in th is case involved three steps. The affidavit was supposed to show probable cause that (1) the Pair’s home would likely contain evidence of their criminal activ ity, (2) the Pair lived at Mr. Chambers’s home, and (3) Mr. Chambers’s home was located at the Address. Mr. Chambers contests the second and third steps. Although the affidavit listed 114 70 S. 4210 Road on its first page, he argues the Address’s omission from the Residence Identifi ed paragraph severed any connection between the Pair and his home or between his home and the Address. Without such a connection, he contends the affidavit lacked a minimally sufficient nexus between evidence of the Pair’s criminal ac tivity and the place to be searched. We disagree with this argument. De puty Tucker’s affidavit was not devoid of factual support. Contrary to Mr. Chambers’s assertions, the affidavit linked the Pair to Mr. Chambers’s home and linked his home to the Address. It was objectively reasonable for the officers who searched Mr. Chamb ers’s home to rely on the warrant. Deputy Tucker’s Affidavit Was No t Devoid of Factual Support 1. Deputy Tucker’s affidavit established a minimally sufficient nexus between the criminal activity and the place to be searched. Despite its failure to specify the Address in the Residence Identified paragraph, the affidavit adequa tely connected the Pair’s criminal activity to the Add ress because it established th at (1) in Deputy Tucker’s experience, methamphetamine dealers—like the Pair—keep items at their residences related to distributing the drug; (2) the Pair resided in Mr. Chambers’s home; and (3) Mr. Chambers’s home was located at 11470 S. 4210 Road. See ROA, Vol. I at 78-86.11 Mr. Chambers argues the omission of th e Address in the Residence Identified paragraph “rendered the warrant so lacking in any indicia of probable cause that the officers’ belief in its existence was entirely unr easonable.” Aplt. Br. at 10. He contends that the “affidavit . . . lacked any factual basi s whatsoever to support the belief that [the Pair] resided at [Mr. Chambers ’s home].” Aplt. Br. at 32. He further argues “[the Address] is not identified as that of Ch ristopher Chambers.” Aplt. Br. 11-12. Deputy Tucker’s affidavit, however, provided a sufficient factual basis for concluding that the Pair resided with Mr. Ch ambers and that Mr. Chambers’s home was located at the Address, even though it did not explicitly say so in the Residence Identified paragraph. An affidavit is not generally devoid of factual support if it provides “underlying factual circumstances regarding veracity, reliability, and basis of knowledge” to support its assertions. Roach , 582 F.3d at 1204-05. Here, the affidavit did so. The CI, who had been a reliable source for officers in prev ious cases, “was able to give directions to the residence he knew Kevin and Charity to live.” ROA, Vol. I at 85. Officers then verified that this “address . . . belong[ed] to Kevin’s brother Christopher Chambers from previous encounters with law enforcement.” Id. The warrant was not based on an affidavit that “merely states suspicions, beliefs, or conclusions.” Roach , 582 F.3d at 1204-05. It adequa tely linked the Pair’s criminal activity to the place to be searched.12 Deputy Tucker’s Affidavit Had More Fact ual Support than the Affidavit in 2. Gonzales Mr. Chambers argues that this “app eal should be directly controlled by United States v. Gonzales ,” a case in which we d eclined to apply the good- faith exception. Aplt. Br. at 32 (citing United States v. Gonzales , 399 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir. 2005)). We disagree because the affidavit in this case contains more fact ual support than the one in Gonzales

.

a. United States v. Gonzales
In Gonzales , after law enforcement officers found live ammunition in the defendant’s car, they decided to obtain a search warrant for defendant’s home. Id. at 1228. The affidavit (1) stated the defendant was a convicted felon; (2) reported the discovery of ammunition in th e defendant’s car; (3) stated that based on the affiant’s experience and training, the defendant woul d likely keep firearms at his residence; and (4) identified the place to be searched as 321 E. Church. Id. at 1227-28, 1230. We held that the good-faith ex ception did not apply because the affidavit failed to connect the place to be searched with the defendant. Id. at 1231. The panel said the affidav it lacked a “minimal nexus between the place to be searched and the suspecte d criminal activity.” Id. The affidavit “listed the address of the place to be searched . . . . [but] there were no facts explaining how the address was linked to [the defendant] . . . or th e suspected criminal activity.” Id. at 1230. Rather, the “only attempt at a connection was th e detective’s assertion that in his experience” firearms are often kept at residences. Id.13 b. Deputy Tucker’s affidavit compared to the one in Gonzales Unlike the affidavit in Gonzales , Deputy Tucker’s affidavit contained “facts explaining how the address was linked to [the defendant] . . . or the suspected criminal activity.” Id

. In Gonzales , the affidavit included the officer’s opinion that individuals often keep firearms at their residences, a nd it listed an address. Without more “facts explaining how the address was linked to [the defendant],” we rejected an inference that the listed address was the defendant’s residence. Id. Although Deputy Tucker’s affidavit also included his opinion that drug dealers often keep drugs and drug paraphernalia at their residences, this statement was not the affidavit’s “only attempt at . . . connect[ing]” the Pair to the home or the home to Mr. Chambers. Id. Rather, Deputy Tucker’s affidavit stated that the CI provided directions to the Pai r’s residence and that the aut horities verified the address as Mr. Chambers’s from their previous encounters. Deputy Tucker’s affidavit more cl osely resembles the affidavit in United States v. Roach , 582 F.3d 1192 (10th Cir. 20 09), in which we determined that the search warrant affidavit contained indicia of probable cause justifying the application of the good-faith exception. Id. at 1204-05. The affidavit (1) identif ied 1441 N. Minneapolis Street as the place to be searched and (2) stat ed that officers verified the defendant lived at the address “through investigations, which included ch ecking for utilities information, driver’s license records, real estate records, Wich ita Police Department records, tax records, social security records, U.S. Postal Service records, inte rviews and/or surveillance.” Id

. at 1198. Although we determ ined the affidavit lacked proba ble cause because it did not14 specify which one of these methods law enforcement us ed to verify Mr. Roach lived at the address, id. at 1203, 7 “the language of the affidavit indi cates that officers did so using at least one of a list of investigatory meth ods, any one of which would—assuming they were successful—provide a ‘minimal nexus’ co nnecting [the defendant] to the address,” id. at 1204. Like the affidavit in Roach , Deputy Tucker’s affidavit described the investigatory methods used—a reliable CI’s informati on and independent corroboration through officers’ previous encounters with Mr. Chambers—in determining the Pair’s residential address. “[I]t would not be entirely unreas onable, therefore, for officers executing the warrant to rely on the magistra te’s authorization of it.” Id. at 1204.
* * * * Deputy Tucker’s affidavit possessed a minimally sufficient nexus between the place to be searched and the Pair’s criminal activity. Because the affidavit contained a factual basis connecting the Pair to Mr. Ch ambers’s home and the home to the Address, the district court properly applied th e good-faith exceptio n in this case.
III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the di strict court’s denial of Mr. Chambers’s motion to suppress the evidence.

7 In addition to specifying the investig atory method, the affidavit faced other problems that precluded our finding of proba ble cause, such as stale information. Roach , 582 F.3d at 1202.