IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

LYDIA J. STEPP, 

Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-00641 

 Judge Sarah D. Morrison 

 v. Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION, 

 Defendant. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Lydia J. Stepp (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for 

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her 

application for Supplemental Security Income benefits (“SSI”). This matter is before the United 

States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors 

(ECF No. 13), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 18), Plaintiff’s Reply 

(ECF No. 19), and the administrative record (ECF No. 9). For the following reasons, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner’s nondisability finding and 

REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ under Sentence Four of § 405(g). 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income benefits on March 27, 2015. (R. at 

193–98.) Plaintiff’s claim was denied initially and upon reconsideration. (R. at 144–55.) Upon 

request, a hearing was held on April 26, 2017 in which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, 
2 

appeared and testified. (R. at 39–79.) A vocational expert also appeared and testified at the 

hearing. (R. at 71–77.) On November 7, 2017, Administrative Law Judge Timothy Gates (“the 

ALJ”) issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled at any time after February 12, 

2015, the alleged onset date. (R. at 9–35.) On May 11, 2018, the Appeals Council denied 

Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final 

decision. (R. at 1–6.) Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action. (ECF No. 3.) 

II. HEARING TESTIMONY 

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff testified that her boyfriend is Roy Ankrom and she lives with him and his 

mother, Norma Ankrom. (R. at 48, 59.) Plaintiff stated that Norma does the housework, 

cooking, and cleaning. (R. at 57.) Plaintiff further stated that her typical day involves waking 

up, taking her medications, taking a shower, taking the dog outside, and then sitting in front of 

the television for the rest of the day. (R. at 58–59.) She also stated that she has never had a 

driver’s license. (R. at 62.) Plaintiff testified that the highest grade level she completed in 

school was the ninth grade and she did not try to get her GED. (R. at 48.) Plaintiff stated that 

she does not do any reading and that her reading level during school was a second grade level. 

(R. at 48—49.) Plaintiff further stated that she was in special education classes for all school 

subjects. (R. at 49.) Plaintiff testified that she has never worked a day in her life because she 

has “been sick all [her] life and [has] been getting SSI” since she was fifteen-years-old. (Id.) 

Plaintiff stated that at age nineteen she had surgery because her gallbladder and appendix 

ruptured. (R. at 49–50.) Plaintiff testified that her wound from that surgery “came back open.” 

(R. at 50.) Plaintiff further testified she is currently being treated for the wound. (Id.) Plaintiff 

stated that the wound affects her “if [she tries] to get stuff over the top of [her] head or 
3 

something, it stretches it and it pulls the skin more open and it starts bleeding.” (R. at 51–52.) 

Plaintiff also stated that if she lifts more than five or six pounds it is “too heavy” and “stretches 

her wound.” (R. at 54–55.) Plaintiff later testified that there are two holes that remain open in 

her stomach and puss will come out of them. (R. at 67.) 

Plaintiff also testified that her medication makes her “sleep all the time.” (R. at 52.) She 

further testified that she has been using an inhaler for about two years and that her breathing 

problems get worse when she walks. (Id.) Plaintiff stated that she has had problems with her 

knees that affect walking and sitting. (Id.) Additionally, Plaintiff stated that she has back pain 

that “goes down to [her] right knee . . . clear down [her] leg and [her] hip.” (R. at 53.) Plaintiff 

also testified that she has schizophrenia and does not like to be around people or be in elevators. 

(Id.) Plaintiff further testified that she gets migraine headaches three to four times a month. (R. 

at 68.) 

Plaintiff testified that she has six living children and sixteen grandchildren, with the 

sixteenth grandchild still in utero at the time of the hearing. (R. at 70.) Plaintiff further testified 

the fifteenth grandchild was eight months old at the time of the hearing and she could not hold 

him because he was too heavy. (R. at 71.) 

B. Vocational Expert Testimony 

Jerry O’Chesky testified as the vocational expert (“VE”) at the April 2017 hearing. (R. at 

41.) The ALJ asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual with the same age and education 

as Plaintiff who could occasionally climb ramps and stairs; but never climb ladders, ropes or 

scaffolds; who could occasionally balance, kneel, crouch, and crawl; who could frequently stoop; 

who could not have any exposure to workplace hazards such as unprotected heights or moving 

mechanical parts; who is limited to performing simple, routine tasks; who can have occasional 
4 

interaction with supervisors and coworkers but no interaction with the general public; who can 

adapt to routine changes in the workplace; and must have a workplace where there is only 

moderate time and production demands. (R. at 72.) Assuming those limitations, the VE testified 

that the individual could perform light, unskilled work such as a cleaner at the light, unskilled 

level; a light, unskilled hand packer; and a light, unskilled inspector. (R. at 73.) 

The ALJ then asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual with the same age and 

education as Plaintiff who is limited to work at a sedentary exertional level; who can stand and 

walk up to two hours in an eight-hour workday; who can sit for up to six hours in an eight-hour 

workday; who can lift and carry up to ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds 

frequently; with the same postural, environmental, and mental limitations as the previous 

hypothetical. (Id.) Assuming those limitations, the VE testified that the individual could 

perform work in sedentary, unskilled occupations such as an assembler at the sedentary, 

unskilled level; sorter at the sedentary, unskilled level; or inspector at the sedentary, unskilled 

level. (R. at 74.) 

The ALJ then asked the VE to assume a hypothetical individual with the same age and 

education as Plaintiff and the same limitations as in either the first or second hypothetical, but in 

addition the individual would be absent from work two days per month. (Id.) Assuming those 

limitations, the VE testified that the individual could not work because “with that rate of 

absenteeism . . . most employers are eventually going to terminate that worker.” (R. at 75.) 

The VE next testified that assuming a hypothetical individual with the Plaintiff’s age and 

education who in an eight-hour workday could sit for an hour and a half to two hours and would 

only occasionally be able to perform activities within a schedule, this individual would not be 

able to do competitive work. (R. at 75.) The VE further testified that assuming the first or 
5 

second hypothetical, but adding limitations that the individual would not be able to do any 

overhead reaching, would not be able to extend their arms forward, and would have to sit in a 

position that would cause them to either sit back into a chair or in another position to take 

pressure off their abdomen, then this individual would not be able to perform any of the jobs 

provided for the first or second hypotheticals. (R. at 75–76.) 

III. RELEVANT RECORD EVIDENCE 

Norma Ankrom provided a statement regarding Plaintiff on April 20, 2017: 

My name is Norma Ankrom and [I am] the home owner where Lydia Stepp is now 

living. Lydia’s health is getting worse all the time. On Easter Sunday her son 

Bobby came to our house with his 2 children[.] His little Girl wanted to sit on 

grandma’s lap. Lydia couldn’t let her[.] She is three years old, but Lydia couldn’t 

hold her[] as it is too painful on her stomach; where she had surgery last October. 

The wound is still open in a couple of places. Lydia has a hard time reaching up 

into the bathroom and kitchen cupbords [sic] as it pulls on her stomach. The other 

child Bobby brought to the house is a little boy who weights [sic] about 17 pounds. 

Lydia cried when they left because she wanted to hold the baby; but the pain was 

to [sic] much on her back. When we go shopping; Lydia is always asking me to 

get something for her. If she trys [sic] to get it for [herself], she has pains shooting 

up her legs and into her back. 

Lydia can’t be out an[d] about for very long; as her knees give out and she does[n]’t 

want to fall. Lydia fell in the house about three weeks ago[] and [I] couldn’t get 

her up. I called a neighbor man to help get her up off of the floor. 

I am the one who makes sure she takes medication. She goes to therpy [sic] for the 

paines [sic] in her back and legs[.] When ever [sic] she leaves the house I make 

sure she takes her cain [sic]. I also make sure she has pain medication with her. 

(R. at 386.) 

 Roy Ankrom also provided a statement regarding Plaintiff on April 21, 2017: 

I am Roy Ankrom and a friend to Lydia Stepp. She is living with my mother and 

me[] in our home. The only help she gets is food stamps and Medical Help. 

When I first brought her to my house she was being treated for Hepatitis B; and 

Cirrohosis [sic] of the Liver. At that time she was on the list for a liver transplant, 
6 

That was about 4 or 5 years ago. Sence [sic] that time her health has gone down 

hill [sic]. 

When she gets her food stamps; I take her to the grocery store to get what she wants. 

I am with her to bend down or to reach up to get something she can’t. After about 

20 to 25 minutes she has to go back to the car to rest her back and her legs. The 

pain is so bad she is in tears. If she is having a good day, she likes to look around 

in seconed [sic] hand stores; but it never last[s] very long. I will find her sitting 

down some where [sic], because of the pain in her back and legs. If her legs give 

out, she falls down. At this time I have to get her in the car to come home[.] She 

sits a lot; but at 20 to 25 minutes at a time. There is a limit to what she can lift. 

[N]othing over 5 to 10 pounds. 

I also help Lydia keep track of all her medicines. I want to help her any way I can, 

when I can. 

(R. at 392.) 

IV.ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 

On November 2, 2017, the ALJ issued his decision. (R. at 9–35.) At step one of the 

sequential evaluation process,1

 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

gainful activity since February 12, 2015, the alleged onset date. (R. at 14.) The ALJ found that 

 1

 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step 

sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a)(4). Although a dispositive 

finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th 

Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

 1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

 2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

 3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or 

equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

 4. Considering the claimant's residual functional capacity, can the claimant 

 perform his or her past relevant work? 

 5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the national 

economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. §416.920(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); Foster 

v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 
7 

Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: obesity; chronic liver disease; hyperlipidemia; 

mild degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine; osteoarthritis of the right knee; a depressive 

disorder; borderline intellectual functioning; and generalized anxiety disorder. (R. at 15.) The 

ALJ further found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, 

Subpart P, Appendix 1. (R. at 16.) 

At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff’s residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) as follows: 

[Plaintiff] has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 

20 CFR 416.967(b) except her ability to perform the full range of light exertion 

work is compromised by postural limitations that prevent her from climbing 

ladders/ropes/scaffolds and restrict her to performing the following on no more than 

an occasional basis during an eight-hour workday: climbing stairs/ramps, balance, 

kneel, crouch and crawl. The [Plaintiff] is able to perform stooping tasks on a 

frequent basis during an eight-hour day. The [Plaintiff] has environmental 

limitations that prevent her from working around dangerous hazards such as 

unprotected heights or moving machinery. Due to her mental impairments, the 

[Plaintiff] is limited to performing simple routine tasks in an environment with no 

more than moderate pace/production demands, which does not require contact with 

the public, and which requires no more than occasional interactions with 

supervisors and/or coworkers. 

(R. at 21–22.) 

The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff did not have any past relevant work. (R. at 27.) The 

ALJ found that considering Plaintiff’s age, education, work experience, and RFC, there are jobs 

that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff can perform. (R. at 28.) 

He therefore concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act from 

February 12, 2015, through the date of the administrative decision. (R. at 29.) 
8 

V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to 

proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. § 

405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is 

defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must 

“‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the 

Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is 

substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 

1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision 

of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to 

follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives 

the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).
9 

VI. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff puts forth two assignments of error. First, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ 

improperly rejected opinion statements from two third-parties contained in the record. (ECF No. 

13, at pg. 1.) Second, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s finding that her abdominal wound was a 

non-severe impairment is not supported by substantial evidence. (Id.) The Undersigned agrees 

with Plaintiff’s first contention, that the ALJ improperly rejected opinion statements from two 

third-parties contained in the record.2

“As to third-party statements made by Plaintiff’s family and friends, Section 404.1513(d) 

of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations provides that other sources may provide evidence 

to show the severity of a claimant’s impairment and how it impacts a claimant’s ability to work.” 

Allums v. Colvin, No. 1:14-cv-2429, 2015 WL 9282334, at *21 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2015), 

report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:14-cv-2429, 2015 WL 9258507 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 17, 

2015) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)). “‘Other sources’ include non-medical sources such as 

spouses, parents, other care-givers, siblings, relatives, friends, neighbors and clergy.” Id. (citing 

20 C.F.R. § 404.1513(d)). SSR 06–3p3

 provides that an ALJ should consider evidence from nonmedical sources who have not seen a claimant in a professional capacity and the ALJ may 

consider “such factors as the nature and extent of the relationship, whether the evidence is 

consistent with other evidence, and any other factors that support or refute the evidence.” 2006 

WL 2329939, at *6 (Aug. 9, 2006). However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

 2

 This finding obviates the need for in-depth analysis of Plaintiff’s remaining assignment of 

error. The Court, however, encourages the Commissioner to address this contention if the 

Court ultimately remands the case. 

3

 Effective March 27, 2017, SSR 06-03p was rescinded. 82 Fed. Reg. 15263-01 (March 17, 

2017). However, because Plaintiff filed her claims prior to the effective date, SSR 06-03p still 

applies in the instant action. 
10 

Circuit has held that “an ALJ can consider every piece of evidence without addressing [all the 

evidence] in his opinion.” Kornecky v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec, 167 F. App’x 496, 507–08 (6th Cir. 

2006). SSR 06-03p provides as follows: 

Although there is a distinction between what an adjudicator must consider and what 

the adjudicator must explain in the disability determination or decision, the 

adjudicator generally should explain the weight given to opinions from [third 

parties], or otherwise ensure that the discussion of the evidence in the determination 

or decision allows a claimant or subsequent reviewer to follow the adjudicator’s 

reasoning, when such opinions may have an effect on the outcome of the case. 

2006 WL 2329939 at *6. 

 Under the regulations, Norma Ankrom and Roy Ankrom’s statements constitute “other 

source” evidence. As described in SSR 06-03p, “other source” evidence includes health care 

providers who are not “acceptable medical sources,” such as nurse practitioners, physicians 

assistants, licensed clinical social workers, and therapists. 2006 WL 2329939 at *2. It also 

includes, as is the case here, “non-medical sources” such as school teachers, counselors, social 

welfare agency personnel, family, friends, neighbors, clergy, and employers. Id. The 

Commissioner must consider “other source” evidence but may do so only for the purpose of 

determining the severity of a claimant’s impairments. Id. Unlike “acceptable medical source” 

evidence, it cannot be used to establish the existence of a medically determinable impairment. Id. 

Further, the Ruling points out that there are two kinds of “non-medical source” evidence. 

First, there is the “non-medical source” who has seen the claimant in a professional capacity, 

such as a teacher, counselor, or social worker. Id. at *5–6. As described in the Ruling, when 

evaluating the first kind of “non-medical source” evidence, 

it would be appropriate to consider such factors as the nature and extent of the 

relationship between the source and the individual, the source’s qualifications, the 

source’s area of specialty or expertise, the degree to which the source presents 

relevant evidence to support his or her opinion, whether the opinion is consistent 

with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to support or refute the opinion. 
11 

Id. at *5. 

The second kind of “non-medical source” is one who has not seen the claimant in a 

professional capacity in connection with his or her impairments. As described in the Ruling, this 

kind of “non-medical source” evidence includes a claimant’s “spouse, parents, friends, and 

neighbors.” Id. When evaluating the second kind of “non-medical source” evidence, 

it would be appropriate to consider such factors as the nature and extent of the 

relationship, whether the evidence is consistent with other evidence, and any other 

factors that tend to support or refute the evidence. 

Id. 

Here, Plaintiff specifically asserts that the ALJ improperly gave little weight to the 

statements of Norma Ankrom and Roy Ankrom “based on only one expressed basis, that they are 

potentially biased.” (ECF No. 13, at pg. 8.) The ALJ found the following regarding the two 

statements: 

Due to potential bias, the undersigned give[s] little weight to the opinion statements 

from Roy Ankrom (the claimant’s boyfriend) and his mother, Norma Ankrom (who 

owns the home where the claimant resides). 

(R. at 27.) The ALJ, therefore, rejected the two statements solely because they were made by 

people who may potentially be biased in Plaintiff’s favor. This reason is insufficient. “[T]he 

social security regulations and rulings specifically allow for the consideration of such statements 

to show the severity of a claimant’s impairments and the impact of the severity of those 

impairments upon a claimant’s ability to work.” Allums, 2015 WL 9282334 at *21 (citing Teel 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:10-cv-613, 2011 WL 6256952, at *20 n.5 (S.D. Ohio August 22, 

2011)). An ALJ’s “outright rejection of such statements because of undue bias would render the 

social security rulings and regulations superfluous.” Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.913 and SSR 06-

03p). 
12 

The Commissioner offers to explain the ALJ’s reasoning for rejecting the opinions. 

Defendant extensively reviews the ALJ’s discussion of the medical records and argues that 

“[a]lthough the ALJ did not discuss the opinions in detail, he indirectly attacked them when 

evaluating the medical evidence. . . . Thus, the ALJ indirectly explained why he was not 

crediting Ms. Ankrom’s complaints . . . .” (Def’s Mem. in Opp., at p. 9.) She makes the same 

point of Mr. Ankrom’s statements. (Id. at 9-11.) The Commissioner’s attempt to explain the 

omissions made by the ALJ would result in the Court “engaging in post hoc rationalization, 

which is prohibited.” Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 1:13–CV–1872, 2014 WL 3950912, at 

*13 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 12, 2014) (remanding action where, inter alia, “the Court is unable to 

ascertain the ALJ’s intent” because the ALJ “did not discuss her decision to omit the limitation” 

contained in a medical opinion to which the ALJ attributed “full weight”); see also S.S.R. 96-8p; 

Keeton v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 583 F. App’x 515, 524 (6th Cir. 2014) (“In reviewing an ALJ’s 

findings and conclusions, this Court shall not ‘accept appellate counsel’s post hoc rationalization 

for agency action in lieu of [accurate] reasons and findings enunciated by the Board.’ ”) (quoting 

Hyatt Corp. v. N.L.R.B., 939 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1991) ); Garrett v. Berryhill, No. 3:17-cv00049, 2018 WL 1521763, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2018) (remanding where “the 

Commissioner improperly relies on post hoc rationalizations to substitute for the ALJ’s deficient 

consideration of Plaintiff’s Crohn’s disease before May 31, 2014”); Collins v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., Case No. 2:17-cv-1028, 2019 WL 1512539, at *6 (S.D. Ohio, 2019) (collecting cases). 

 Here, the ALJ cited no evidence in support of the alleged potential bias. He did not 

indicate that he considered any factors set forth in SSR 06-03 for the evaluation of “other nonmedical opinions.” Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that the ALJ improperly rejected the 

opinion statements from Norma Ankrom and Roy Ankrom. 
13 

VII. CONCLUSION 

Due to the error outlined above, Plaintiff is entitled to an order remanding this case to the 

Social Security Administration pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Accordingly, it 

is RECOMMENDED that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner’s nondisability finding and 

REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ under Sentence Four of § 405(g) for 

further consideration consistent with this Report and Recommendation. 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and 

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district 

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 
14 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation 

omitted)). 

Date: July 26, 2019 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers_________ 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE