PRESENT: All the Justices 

DORIS MOZLEY 

v. Record No. 012884 OPINION BY JUSTICE BARBARA MILANO KEENAN 

 November 1, 2002 

THE PRESTWOULD BOARD OF DIRECTORS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Randall G. Johnson, Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether the Virginia Condominium 

Act, Code §§ 55-79.39 through –79.103 (the Act), requires an award 

of attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing party in a 

declaratory judgment suit brought by a condominium unit owner 

against a unit owners' association to determine whether the 

association properly rendered an assessment for the replacement of 

certain windows, which the association contended were "limited 

common elements" under the Act. 

 The Prestwould Condominium (the Prestwould) is a multi-unit 

condominium located in the City of Richmond. Doris Mozley owns a 

condominium unit in the Prestwould. 

 In August 2000, the Prestwould Board of Directors (the Board), 

the executive organ of the Prestwould Condominium Unit Owners' 

Association, solicited bids to replace 13 windows in four 

individual condominium units at the request of the owners of those 

units. The Board accepted a $42,000 bid from a contractor to 

replace those windows and assessed this cost proportionally against 

all the unit owners of the Association. Mozley, who was not one of 
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the four unit owners who requested replacement windows, was 

assessed an amount for her proportional share of the replacement 

costs. 

 Mozley filed a bill of complaint for declaratory relief in the 

Circuit Court of the City of Richmond asking the chancellor to 

declare, among other things, that she should not be assessed a 

portion of the cost for the replacement windows in the four 

individual units because those windows were not "limited common 

elements" within the meaning of the Act.* She requested a further 

declaration that the cost for these windows should have been 

assessed only against the owners of those individual units. Mozley 

also sought an award of attorneys' fees and costs under the Act. 

 In response, the Board filed an answer and a cross-bill for 

declaratory judgment seeking various relief, including a 

declaration that the replacement windows were "limited common 

elements" for which Mozley was required to pay the proportional 

amount assessed. The Board also asked the chancellor to order 

Mozley to pay the Board's reasonable attorneys' fees and costs. 

 Mozley and the Board filed cross-motions for summary judgment. 

After the Board filed its summary judgment motion, Mozley paid the 

full amount assessed against her and requested a nonsuit of her 

bill of complaint. 

 *

"Limited common elements" are defined in Code § 55-79.41 as "a 

portion of the common elements reserved for the exclusive use of 

those entitled to the use of one or more, but less than all, of the 

units." 
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 At a hearing on the motions, the chancellor denied Mozley's 

motion for nonsuit and her motion for summary judgment. The 

chancellor granted the Board's cross-motion for summary judgment on 

the ground that the replacement windows were "limited common 

elements" within the meaning of the Act. At that hearing, the 

Board also argued that it was entitled to an award of attorneys' 

fees and costs under two different statutes, Code §§ 55-79.53(A) 

and –79.84. 

 Code § 55-79.53(A) states: 

The declarant, every unit owner, and all those entitled 

to occupy a unit shall comply with all lawful provisions 

of this chapter and all provisions of the condominium 

instruments. Any lack of such compliance shall be 

grounds for an action or suit to recover sums due, for 

damages or injunctive relief, or for any other remedy 

available at law or in equity, maintainable by the unit 

owners' association, or by its executive organ or any 

managing agent on behalf of such association, or, in any 

proper case, by one or more aggrieved unit owners on 

their own behalf or as a class action. A unit owners' 

association shall have standing to sue in its own name 

for any claims or actions related to the common elements 

as provided in subsection B of § 55-79.80. The 

prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable 

attorneys' fees and costs expended in the matter. 

Code § 55-79.80(B) provides, in relevant part: 

Except to the extent prohibited by the condominium 

instruments, and subject to any restrictions and 

limitations specified therein, the executive organ of the 

unit owners' association, if any, and if not, then the 

unit owners' association itself, shall have the 

irrevocable power as attorney-in-fact on behalf of all 

the unit owners and their successors in title with 

respect to the common elements, including without 

limitation the right, in the name of the unit owners' 

association, . . . (ii) to assert, through litigation or 

otherwise, defend against, compromise, adjust, and settle 

any claims or actions related to common elements. 
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Code § 55-79.84 states, in relevant part: 

A. The unit owners' association shall have a lien on 

every condominium unit for unpaid assessments levied 

against that condominium unit in accordance with the 

provisions of this chapter and all lawful provisions of 

the condominium instruments. 

. . . . 

E. The judgment or decree in an action brought pursuant 

to this section shall include, without limitation, 

reimbursement for costs and attorneys' fees of the 

prevailing party. 

 The chancellor held that Code §§ 55-79.53(A) and –79.84 each 

mandated an award of attorneys' fees and costs in favor of the 

Board. He further held that the amount requested by the Board for 

attorneys' fees and costs was reasonable and entered final judgment 

for the Board in the amount of $15,855.08. Mozley appeals from the 

chancellor's judgment. 

 Under basic rules of statutory construction, we consider the 

language of these statutes to determine the General Assembly's 

intent from the words contained therein, unless a literal 

construction would yield an absurd result. Vaughn, Inc. v. Beck, 

262 Va. 673, 677, 554 S.E.2d 88, 90 (2001); Cummings v. Fulghum, 

261 Va. 73, 77, 540 S.E.2d 494, 496 (2001). When a statute's 

language is plain and unambiguous, we are bound by the plain 

meaning of that language. Indus. Dev. Auth. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 

263 Va. 349, 353, 559 S.E.2d 621, 623 (2002); Cummings, 261 Va. at 

77, 540 S.E.2d at 496; Earley v. Landsidle, 257 Va. 365, 370, 514 

S.E.2d 153, 155 (1999). Therefore, when the General Assembly has 
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used words of a plain and definite import, courts cannot assign to 

them a construction that would be tantamount to holding that the 

General Assembly intended something other than that which it 

actually expressed. Vaughn, 262 Va. at 677, 554 S.E.2d at 90; see

Advanced Marine Enters., Inc. v. PRC Inc., 256 Va. 106, 125, 501 

S.E.2d 148, 159 (1998). 

 We first consider Mozley's argument that the chancellor erred 

in holding that the Board was entitled to attorneys' fees under 

Code § 55-79.84. She contends that this statute is not applicable 

to the present case but is limited solely to actions brought by a 

unit owners' association to enforce liens for unpaid assessments. 

In responding to this contention during oral argument on appeal, 

the Board conceded that Code § 55-79.84 did not provide express 

authority for the chancellor's award of attorneys' fees. 

 We agree with the parties' conclusion that Code § 55-79.84 

does not authorize an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing 

party in a declaratory judgment suit brought to determine whether a 

particular component part of a condominium is a "limited common 

element" within the meaning of the Act. Instead, the plain 

language of the provision for attorneys' fees in that section 

authorizes such an award only for suits brought by a unit owners' 

association to enforce a lien for unpaid assessments levied against 

a condominium unit owner in accordance with the Act and lawful 

provisions of applicable condominium instruments. Therefore, we 
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hold that the trial court erred in its construction of this 

statutory provision. 

 Mozley also argues that the chancellor erred in relying on 

Code § 55-79.53(A) to support the award of attorneys' fees and 

costs. She asserts that Code § 55-79.53(A) applies only to awards 

of attorneys' fees and costs in actions brought by a unit owners' 

association against an individual unit owner for that owner's 

failure to comply with the provisions of either the relevant 

condominium instruments or the Act. Mozley contends that because 

she paid the full amount assessed for the replacement windows, 

without requiring the Board to obtain a judgment against her, she 

is not liable to pay attorneys' fees and costs as provided by this 

statute. We disagree with Mozley's arguments. 

 The language of Code § 55-79.53(A) is expressed in plain and 

unambiguous terms. This subsection authorizes two types of 

litigation. The first type concerns actions for failure to comply 

with provisions contained in relevant condominium instruments or in 

the Act. Such actions for noncompliance may be brought by a unit 

owners' association, its executive organ or managing agent, or by 

"one or more aggrieved unit owners on their own behalf or as a 

class action." Id.; see also Frantz v. CBI Fairmac Corp., 229 Va. 

444, 450-51, 331 S.E.2d 390, 395 (1985). The present appeal does 

not involve an action of this nature because Mozley did not fail to 

comply with any provision of the Act or of relevant condominium 

instruments. 
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 The second type of litigation addressed by Code § 55-79.53(A) 

authorizes a unit owners' association of a condominium to bring 

suit in its own name for "any claims or actions related to the 

common elements" of a condominium, as set forth in Code § 55-

79.80(B). Such suits are described by Code § 55-79.80(B) to 

include, among other things, the right to assert, through 

litigation or the defense against litigation, "any claims or 

actions related to common elements." 

 The present declaratory judgment suit and cross-bill are 

representative of this second type of litigation authorized by Code 

§ 55-79.53(A). The Board was required to defend against Mozley's 

bill of complaint seeking a declaration that the replacement 

windows were not "limited common elements" as defined by the Act. 

The Board's cross-bill was a separate assertion by the Board, 

through litigation, of its claim that those windows were, in fact, 

"limited common elements." 

 The text of Code § 55-79.53(A), following its authorization of 

these two types of litigation, states that "[t]he prevailing party 

shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorneys' fees and costs 

expended in the matter." By its plain language, this provision 

requires an award of attorneys' fees and costs to the prevailing 

party in both types of litigation authorized by the statute. 

 We find no merit in Mozley's contention that the summary title 

of Code § 55-79.53, "Compliance with condominium instruments," 

restricts application of that section's provision for attorneys' 
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fees and costs to actions brought for noncompliance with the Act or 

applicable condominium instruments. That summary title is not part 

of the statute enacted by the General Assembly and, thus, has no 

effect on the meaning of the body of the statute. See Mason v. 

Commonwealth, 217 Va. 321, 323, 228 S.E.2d 683, 684 (1976); Brown 

v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 143, 146, 207 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1974). 

 Because the chancellor was required by Code § 55-79.53(A) to 

award the Board its reasonable attorneys' fees and costs, we turn 

now to consider Mozley's argument that the amount of the 

chancellor's award was unreasonable under the circumstances of this 

case. Mozley asserts that the award of $15,855.08 was unreasonable 

because she paid the full assessment, thereby obviating the need 

for a noncompliance action against her. She also argues that her 

declaratory judgment action was not a complex matter, and notes 

that no depositions were taken in the case and the parties engaged 

in only one exchange of written discovery requests. Finally, 

Mozley contends that because declaratory judgment suits are 

remedial in nature, as recognized by the General Assembly in Code 

§ 8.01-191, she should not suffer this additional penalty for 

bringing her suit. We disagree with Mozley's arguments. 

 The mandatory provision for attorneys' fees and costs in Code 

§ 55-79.53(A) places the financial burden of the litigation on the 

unsuccessful party. Thus, this provision ensures that all unit 

owners will not have to absorb their association's costs of 

litigation simply because one unit owner brought an unsuccessful 
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suit against the association. The chancellor's award to the Board 

is consistent with the General Assembly's intent reflected in the 

language of this statute. 

 We also conclude that the chancellor did not abuse his 

discretion in setting the amount of the award. As the chancellor 

observed, the Board was confronted with litigation that could have 

had a significant negative impact on its procedures and methods of 

operation. Thus, in the words of the chancellor, "[h]aving 

initiated the proceeding, [Mozley] cannot now complain that 

defendant and its counsel took [the suit] too seriously." Based on 

the record before us, we hold that the Board met its burden of 

proving that the attorneys' fees and costs it incurred were 

reasonable. See Chawla v. BurgerBusters, Inc., 255 Va. 616, 623-

24, 499 S.E.2d 829, 833 (1998); Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & 

Geraldson v. Lake Fairfax Seven Ltd. P'ship, 253 Va. 93, 96, 480 

S.E.2d 471, 473 (1997). 

 We also agree with the Board that it is entitled to have this 

case remanded to the chancellor for an additional award of 

reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending against 

Mozley's appeal. Such fees and costs are recoverable because they 

were incurred in the defense of a suit related to the condominium's 

common elements. See Code §§ 55-79.53(A) and -79.80(B). 

 For these reasons, we will affirm the chancellor's award of 

attorneys' fees and costs to the Board based on the provisions of 

Code § 55-79.53(A), reverse the chancellor's holding interpreting 
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Code § 55-79.84, and enter judgment in the amount of $15,855.08 in 

favor of the Board. We also will remand the case to the chancellor 

for an award of reasonable attorneys' fees and costs incurred by 

the Board in the defense of this appeal, with direction that the 

chancellor enter final judgment for the total amount of attorneys' 

fees awarded in this case. 

Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

 and remanded.