THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 

v. 

Jermaine Marquel Bell, Appellant. 

Appellate Case No. 2017-001500 

Appeal From Chester County 

Paul M. Burch, Circuit Court Judge 

Opinion No. 5742 

Heard March 10, 2020 – Filed July 8, 2020 

REVERSED 

Appellate Defender David Alexander and Appellate 

Defender Sarah Elizabeth Shipe, both of Columbia, for 

Appellant. 

Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Deputy Attorney 

General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior Assistant Deputy 

Attorney General Melody Jane Brown, and Senior 

Assistant Attorney General W. Edgar Salter, III, all of 

Columbia; and Solicitor Randy E. Newman, Jr., of 

Lancaster, for Respondent. 

GEATHERS, J.: Jermaine Bell appeals his conviction of murder, for which he was 

sentenced to life imprisonment. Bell argues the circuit court erred in allowing the 

decedent's husband and daughter to testify regarding statements purportedly made 

by the decedent indicating that she believed Bell was stealing from her. We reverse. 
 

 

 

FACTS 

The decedent, Judy Lindsay, and her common law husband, Mitchell 

Mayfield, lived in Chester County. Judy and Mayfield had one son, two daughters, 

and several grandchildren. Their youngest daughter, Jessica, lived at home with 

Judy, Mayfield, and Jessica's children. The family was well known in their 

neighborhood, and people would often gather to socialize on the family's front porch. 

One such person was Jermaine Bell, who was friends with Jessica and her brother. 

The family had a unique relationship with Bell, as they often ran him off or told him 

not to come around, only to invite him over later or allow him back, oftentimes after 

he procured sodas or other drinks for the family. 

During the weekend of Judy's death, Bell, who was transient, spent the night 

of Friday, September 11, 2015, on the family's couch. On Saturday, September 12, 

2015, Bell was gone before anyone else woke up. That same day, Judy and Jessica 

attended a funeral before Judy went to church to sing with the choir. After returning 

from church, Judy changed into a pair of pants and a t-shirt. Judy joined Jessica, 

who had been drinking alcohol,1

 on the porch to smoke a cigarette. Mayfield also 

joined them on the porch before going to bed around 11:00 or 11:30 p.m.2

 At some 

point, Jessica telephoned Bell and invited him to join them on the porch. When Bell 

arrived, Jessica gave him a shot of liquor. 

After socializing on the porch for a while, Jessica called her cousin and asked 

him to take her to get something to eat. When she returned about fifteen to twenty 

minutes later, Judy and Bell were still on the porch, and Bell was still drinking. Upon 

finishing her food, Jessica smoked a cigarette and went to bed around 12:30 or 12:45 

a.m. As Jessica was heading to bed, Judy indicated that she was going to stay on the 

porch until she finished her cigarette. Bell was still on the porch with Judy when 

Jessica went to bed. 

On Sunday, September 13, 2015, Mayfield woke up around 5:00 or 6:00 a.m. 

As part of his usual morning routine, Mayfield made himself some coffee, emptied 

his trash, and burned his trash in a burn barrel. Mayfield did not see Judy that 

morning, but assumed she was sleeping in the room with Jessica. However, while 

he was burning his trash, Mayfield noticed Judy's socks, shoes, and scarf were strewn 

1

 Judy and Mayfield did not drink alcohol. 

2

 Prior to going to bed, Mayfield and Judy got into an argument over whether 

Mayfield would attend a church event with her on Sunday and what he would wear. 

When Mayfield did go to bed, one of the couple's grandchildren slept in the bed with 

him. 
 

around the yard. Believing that the grandkids had thrown Judy's clothes into the 

yard, Mayfield woke Jessica up and told her to get up and have the kids clean the 

yard.3

 Jessica asked Mayfield if he knew where Judy was, and Mayfield responded 

that he did not but indicated that Jessica should get up and try to locate Judy. 

After waking up, Jessica went outside and began panicking when she could 

not find Judy. Jessica started calling family members to ask if they had seen Judy. 

Additionally, Jessica tried to call Bell because she knew he was the last person to 

see Judy. When that proved unsuccessful, Jessica and a family friend drove to 

Herman "Bo" Weldon's house, where Bell was supposedly staying, but no one 

answered the door. However, while on the porch, Jessica spotted the black shoes 

Bell had been wearing the night before and noticed that they were covered in mud. 

At some point, Jessica finally got a hold of Bell and asked if he knew what happened 

to Judy, to which Bell responded, "Ask Mango.[4]" Thereafter, Jessica returned home 

to continue looking. 

When Mayfield and Jessica went back into the yard, Mayfield noticed what 

appeared to be drag marks. He attempted to follow the drag marks but could not 

follow them once they led into the tall grass. Mayfield then looked around the 

neighbor's yard and found one of Judy's shirts and her keys. At that point, Mayfield 

informed Jessica that he was calling the police. 

Around 9:35 a.m., Officer John Kelly of the Chester County Sheriff's Office 

was dispatched to investigate a reported missing person. Officer Kelly arrived on 

the scene at 9:41 a.m. and was met by Mayfield and Jessica, who explained that Judy 

was last seen on the porch with Bell. Mayfield took Officer Kelly to the side of the 

house where he found Judy's clothes. Once in the yard, Officer Kelly noticed the 

drag marks, noting that they went through the dirt, around the back side of the house, 

and into the next-door neighbor's yard. Mayfield then offered to show Officer Kelly 

where he had found Judy's shirt and keys, but Officer Kelly decided to call for 

detectives and a dog. Officer Kelly taped off the crime scene and continued talking 

with Mayfield and Jessica.5

 At some point, Mayfield pointed out that Bell was 

walking down the street towards the crime scene, and Officer Kelly made contact 

3

 On cross-examination, Jessica was presented with her earlier statement in which 

she indicated that she had woken herself up around 7:00 a.m. and subsequently 

roused Mayfield.

4

 "Mango" is Mayfield's nickname. 

5

 The crime scene comprised Judy and Mayfield's house, their next-door neighbor's 

house, and an abandoned house on the other side of their neighbor. 
 

 

 

with him. Bell gave detectives his version of the night's events, indicating that he 

left the house after Judy went to bed around 12:30 or 1:00 a.m. Bell then agreed to 

be interviewed, and a detective placed him in a squad car and transported him to the 

Chester County Sheriff's Office.6

 Prior to the interview, Bell consented to a buccal 

swab. 

Around 10:55 a.m., Officer Randy Clinton of the York County Sheriff's 

Office's K-9 Division received a call in reference to using a bloodhound to track a 

missing person. Officer Clinton arrived on scene and "scented" the dog off a pair of 

Judy's socks. The dog led Officer Clinton through Judy and Mayfield's yard, past 

their neighbor's house, around a fence and rosebush, past Judy's shirt and keys, and 

to the backyard of an abandoned house. The dog continued to lead Officer Clinton 

to the back side of a tin storage shed behind the abandoned house. Officer Clinton 

then found Judy's naked body lying face down behind the storage shed. 

Following the discovery of Judy's body, the South Carolina Law Enforcement 

Division (SLED) was contacted to assist on the case. Thereafter, three SLED agents 

arrived on scene at 1:31 p.m. While on the scene, the SLED agents collected or 

marked multiple pieces of evidence, including Judy's orange t-shirt and several 

footwear impressions. Additionally, the agents took a buccal swab from Mayfield. 

After spending most of the day on site, law enforcement cleared the scene and took 

down the crime scene tape around 7:20 p.m. 

After clearing the murder scene, law enforcement investigated several other 

locations, including Weldon's house. Once there, officers collected a pair of black 

Coogi shoes based on Jessica's tip that they were the same shoes Bell had worn the 

night before. However, by the time officers found the shoes, they were wet and 

appeared to have been washed. Meanwhile, at the crime scene, Mayfield and his 

sister7

 were walking around the yard to see if they could find any more items. 

Mayfield testified that while walking near the location where Judy's body was found, 

the two found a plastic bag filled with Judy's underwear and a missing ashtray. Upon 

finding the bag, Mayfield contacted law enforcement, and SLED agents arrived back 

on scene around 8:27 p.m. The items were then turned over to law enforcement, 

who did not find any latent fingerprints on the plastic bag or its contents. 

6

 Law enforcement also had the grandchildren who were present at the house on the 

night of the murder sent to Safe Passage for a forensic interview. However, the 

grandchildren were not able to provide any information regarding Judy's death. 

7

 Mayfield testified that his sister used to work for a police department and he asked 

her if she thought it was ok to look around the scene after the tape was removed. 
 

 

During Bell's interview at the Chester County Sheriff's Office, SLED Agent 

Lee Boan used several interview tactics in an attempt to gain information, including 

telling Bell that Judy had died of a heart attack and claiming that officers had 

matched Bell's DNA to evidence on scene. Despite Agent Boan's tactics, Bell 

maintained his innocence throughout the interview. However, during this interview 

and a follow-up interview conducted on September 15, 2015, Bell offered several 

inconsistent statements. 

First, Bell claimed that he spent the night of Judy's death at two different 

houses before finally conceding that he spent the night on Weldon's porch. Second, 

Bell claimed that on the night of the murder, he stepped off the porch and walked 

directly down the road. Bell then indicated that he had gone into the side yard to 

urinate before leaving. Finally, officers asked Bell what he was wearing the night 

of the murder, and Bell indicated that he had worn a black shirt, jeans, and Coogi 

shoes. Bell further claimed that he had slept in his clothes and had not showered or 

changed before walking to the crime scene and agreeing to be interviewed. Despite 

these claims, Bell was not wearing the same clothes during the interview and 

ultimately claimed that he did change clothes and shower. 

On September 14, 2015, Dr. Kim Collins conducted Judy's autopsy. Dr. 

Collins noted that Judy had an abrasion on her forehead and the area from Judy's 

collarbone up had a reddish-purple discoloration resulting from bruising. Dr. Collins 

indicated that such discoloration was consistent with manual strangulation, and 

swabs of Judy's neck area were taken to test for touch DNA. As she continued, Dr. 

Collins discovered blood in Judy's mouth resulting from Judy biting into the deep 

muscle of her tongue, scratches on the inside of her lips resulting from the pressure 

placed onto her teeth from her lips, and pinpoint hemorrhages on her inner lips 

resulting from ruptured blood vessels in her mouth. Additionally, Dr. Collins found 

hemorrhages in Judy's eyes as a result of ruptured blood vessels. Turning to the neck 

area, Dr. Collins discovered more hemorrhages in Judy's strap muscles, further 

indicating that the hemorrhages extended down through several layers of muscle.8 

Dr. Collins also found a massive amount of hemorrhaging on the deep tissue in the 

back of Judy's neck. Dr. Collins explained, "that's a lot of squeezing through the 

skin[,] through the underlying fat, through all those strap muscles and then to cause 

hemorrhage in the back of all these structures around the esophagus, that's very deep 

in the back of the neck." Based on the bruising and hemorrhaging in Judy's neck, 

8

 Dr. Collins explained that such hemorrhages do not always appear when a victim 

has been strangled but their presence suggests a significant amount of pressure on 

the neck. 
 

Dr. Collins determined Judy's cause of death to be homicide by manual strangulation 

and opined that Judy was strangled with "a great deal of force." 

Dr. Collins further noted multiple areas of abrasion and bruises to different 

parts of the body. One such abrasion was a long, linear scratch from Judy's armpit 

area down to her thigh.9 Dr. Collins also found a large area of abrasion on the left 

knee and an area of abrasion on the left buttock. Additionally, Dr. Collins found a 

large area of bruising on the inner aspect of the left arm near the elbow and similar 

bruising on the right arm, further indicating that the bruises were noticeable despite 

Judy's darkly pigmented skin. Dr. Collins opined that the bruising around Judy's 

armpits was consistent with being dragged and, after considering the knee abrasions, 

law enforcement concluded that Judy's body was dragged face down. 

Dr. Collins also performed a sexual assault examination on Judy's body. Dr. 

Collins determined that Judy had an abrasion to her pubic area, a tear and scraping 

to the tissue on the outside of the vagina, and hemorrhaging in the tissue around the 

rectum. However, Dr. Collins did not find any injuries inside the vagina nor did she 

discover anything suggesting the presence of bodily fluids. 

Bell was arrested on October 2, 2015, and the Chester County Grand Jury 

indicted him for murder on February 16, 2016. Bell's trial was conducted on June 

26 through June 30, 2017. At trial, Bell twice objected to the admission of testimony 

at issue on appeal. First, Bell raised the following objection to Mayfield's testimony: 

State: "Now, getting closer to the time of September 2015, 

had any other problems arose regarding the defendant, 

Jermaine Bell, between you and your wife, Judy?" 

Mayfield: "No. Now, at a point in time they - - Judy had 

told me Jermaine was stealing." 

State: "Someone was stealing?" 

Defense: "Objection, Your Honor." 

State: "Goes to the state of mind, Your Honor." 

Defense: "404-B." 

9

 Officers theorized that this abrasion occurred as Judy was being dragged past the 

rose bush. 
 

Court: "I'm going to give her a little leeway on it, I will 

overrule the objection. Go ahead." 

Mayfield went on to testify that Judy believed Bell was stealing glasses, money, 

cigarettes, and clothes from her. However, Mayfield also testified that they had no 

proof that Bell was stealing and they never reported it to the police. 

Similarly, Bell raised the following objection to Jessica's testimony: 

State: "Had she ever explained to you about anything that 

he had done?" 

Jessica: "Yeah, stealing stuff from her." 

Defense: "Objection, Your Honor, same as before, 

403."[10] 

State: "Goes to the state of mind, Your Honor." 

Court: "Overruled." 

Jessica went on to testify that Judy believed Bell was stealing her glasses and 

underwear but indicated that no one had confronted Bell or called the police about 

the issue. Notably, the circuit court did not provide a rationale in overruling either 

objection. 

Following the testimony of Mayfield and Jessica, the State presented several 

witnesses who saw Bell on the night of the murder or the following morning. First, 

Detective Brian Sanders testified without objection regarding a statement given by 

one of Jessica's friends. According to the friend, she had driven over to the house 

around 12:30 a.m. on the night of the murder to pick Jessica up so they could go out. 

She claimed that she blew the horn, nobody came to the door, the lights were off, 

the TV was on, and the front door was open. She further claimed that Bell came 

walking from a house across the street and indicated he did not know the location of 

Jessica or Judy when asked. 

Second, Weldon testified that he woke up around 7:00 a.m. on September 13, 

2015, to find Bell sleeping on the couch on his porch. Weldon walked to the store 

10 We note the circuit court likely interpreted "same as before" to mean that Bell was 

objecting under Rule 404(b), SCRE, which he invoked in objecting to Mayfield's 

testimony regarding Judy's statements. 
 

to buy cigarettes and shared one with Bell when he returned. Weldon claimed that 

he and Bell did not really talk but that Bell kept going back and forth to the road. 

Next, Mayfield's nephew, Darkarious Woods, testified that he was driving by 

Judy and Mayfield's house around 1:00 or 1:30 a.m. on the night of the murder. 

Woods claimed that he saw Bell coming from the side yard between the house 

neighboring Judy's and the abandoned house behind which Judy's body was found. 

According to Woods, Bell walked up to his car and asked if it was new. Woods 

explained that he found this question odd because Bell had previously washed his 

car multiple times. Woods further testified that Bell seemed "jittery" during their 

conversation. 

Finally, Ervin Chalk testified that he had known Bell for a year or two and 

that Bell lived in the abandoned house across the street from his. Chalk indicated 

that on the day of the murder, he and Bell had attended the same birthday party at 

Chalk's aunt's house. Chalk claimed that Bell was drinking at the party, was wearing 

a blue and white striped shirt, and had left around 10:00 or 11:00 p.m. Chalk testified 

that he went to a club after leaving the party but on his way home around 3:30 a.m., 

he saw Bell walking in the direction of Weldon's house and wearing the same blue 

and white striped shirt he had worn to the party. 

The State then presented several experts.11 First, the State offered Jessica 

Stowe as an expert in forensic serology. Stowe explained that while looking at oral, 

vaginal, and rectal swabs from Judy's body, she detected the presence of P30, a 

protein found in high concentrations in male seminal fluid. However, Stowe testified 

that she could not identify any spermatozoa from the swabs. Stowe forwarded the 

swabs testing positive for P30 to SLED's DNA section but the record does not reveal 

whether the P30 samples underwent DNA analysis or what results, if any, were 

obtained. Additionally, Stowe explained that she scraped and swabbed the 

underarms of Judy's orange t-shirt for touch DNA. Stowe also forwarded these 

swabs to SLED's DNA section. 

Following Stowe, the State offered Lilly Gallman as an expert in DNA 

analysis. Gallman testified that the swabs taken from Judy's neck contained a 

mixture of DNA from two individuals and indicated that Judy and Bell could not be 

excluded as contributors to the mixture. Gallman explained that the probability of 

11 These experts included SLED Agent Melinda Worley, an expert in shoe wear 

impression. However, Agent Worley testified that she was not able to conclude that 

Bell's black Coogi shoes made the prints on scene nor was she able to conclude that 

Bell's shoes did not make the prints on scene. 
 

 

selecting an unrelated individual who could have contributed to the mixture was one 

in ten.12 Gallman testified that she also conducted a YSTR-DNA test on the swabs, 

further explaining that a YSTR-DNA test focuses only on the Y-chromosome. 

Gallman indicated that the YSTR test from the swabs "matched" Bell's Y-DNA and 

the probability of randomly selecting an unrelated male individual having a 

matching DNA profile was one in 8,600.13 Furthermore, Gallman asserted that the 

Y-DNA "matched" Bell's DNA profile to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. 

After testing the swabs from Judy's neck, Gallman tested the swabs taken from 

the underarms of Judy's shirt. Gallman determined that these swabs contained a 

mixture of DNA and that Judy and Bell could not be excluded as contributors to the 

mixture. Gallman indicated that the probability of selecting an unrelated individual 

who could have contributed to the mixture was one in 960.14 Gallman then 

performed a YSTR test on the underarm swabs and determined the swabs "matched" 

Bell's Y-DNA and the probability of randomly selecting an unrelated male 

individual having a matching DNA profile was one in 8,600. Conversely, Gallman 

determined that, to a reasonable degree of scientific certainty, Mayfield could be 

excluded as a contributor to the neck and shirt swabs under both the standard DNA 

and Y-DNA tests. However, Gallman testified that she analyzed Judy's fingernail 

clippings and determined that Bell could be excluded as a minor DNA contributor 

but Mayfield could not. 

During its closing arguments, the State made the following references to the 

testimonies of Mayfield and Jessica: 

Now I'm going to talk about that bag and the ashtray that 

was found. Remember, they were saying that Mitchell 

Mayfield and Jessica, that some of their mother's items had 

been missing and she believed that [Bell] was stealing 

from them, Judy did, and so did Jessica. 

12 Gallman explained that the statistical frequency of the DNA was high because she 

was only able to analyze two out of sixteen loci on the chromosome. 

13 Gallman explained that all males sharing the same paternal lineage would share 

the same Y-DNA. Therefore, any such male would be a match under the YSTR-test. 

However, Bell stipulated that his brother was working on the night of the murder 

and was not present at the home of the victim. 

14 Gallman testified that she was only able to analyze four out of sixteen loci on the 

chromosome. 
 

. . . 

[Jessica] said Judy believed the defendant was stealing 

some of her personal items; glasses, underwear[,] ashtray. 

I'm going to tell you something, after I got this case it was 

already too late, but I even went back over here to see this 

area for myself. I wish someone had gone back and looked 

even a little harder, you might have found a pair of glasses 

in there. I submit to you this defendant had his own little 

spots to hang out[,] to put stuff, to hide stuff. Her clothing 

could be anywhere in this area. He knows the woods, he 

knows the back trail, he knows the abandoned houses, he 

knows every single corner of that. 

. . . 

Whoever killed Judy knew where to hide her body. 

Abandoned home, overgrown. . . . This was his hiding 

place, that's where the underwear was, that's where the 

ashtray was. 

. . . 

[Judy] probably confronted [Bell] about her stolen items, 

maybe she was just sick of it, unfortunately we will never 

know because he killed her. Maybe it was a sexual 

rejection . . . . 

Ultimately, the jury found Bell guilty of murder, and the circuit court 

sentenced Bell to life imprisonment. Bell then moved for a new trial, but the motion 

was denied. This appeal followed. 

ISSUE ON APPEAL 

Did the circuit court err in allowing Mayfield and Jessica to testify regarding 

Judy's statements indicating she believed Bell was stealing from her? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

"In criminal cases, the appellate court sits to review errors of law only." State 

v. Wharton, 381 S.C. 209, 213, 672 S.E.2d 786, 788 (2009). As such, "[appellate 
 

 

 

courts are] bound by the [circuit] court's factual findings unless they are clearly 

erroneous." State v. Baccus, 367 S.C. 41, 48, 625 S.E.2d 216, 220 (2006). 

"A [circuit court] has considerable latitude in ruling on the admissibility of 

evidence . . . ." State v. Kelley, 319 S.C. 173, 177, 460 S.E.2d 368, 370 (1995). 

Accordingly, "[t]he admission of evidence is within the discretion of the [circuit] 

court and will not be reversed absent an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court either lack evidentiary support or 

are controlled by an error of law." State v. Goodwin, 384 S.C. 588, 601, 683 S.E.2d 

500, 507 (Ct. App. 2009) (quoting State v. Pagan, 369 S.C. 201, 208, 631 S.E.2d 

262, 265 (2006)). 

"The improper admission of hearsay is reversible error only when the 

admission causes prejudice." State v. Hughes, 419 S.C. 149, 155, 796 S.E.2d 174, 

177 (Ct. App. 2017) (quoting State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 288, 625 S.E.2d 641, 

646 (2006)). Additionally, "[a circuit court]'s decision regarding the comparative 

probative value and prejudicial effect of relevant evidence should be reversed only 

in exceptional circumstances." State v. Sweat, 362 S.C. 117, 129, 606 S.E.2d 508, 

514 (Ct. App. 2004). Finally, "[i]f there is any evidence to support the admission 

of[] bad act evidence, the [circuit court]'s ruling will not be disturbed on appeal." 

State v. Wilson, 345 S.C. 1, 6, 545 S.E.2d 827, 829 (2001). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

Bell argues the circuit court erred in allowing Mayfield and Jessica to testify 

regarding Judy's statements indicating she believed Bell was stealing from her 

because 1) the statements constituted inadmissible hearsay and did not fall within 

the "Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition" exception to the rule 

against hearsay; 2) the risk of unfair prejudice stemming from the statements 

outweighed their probative value; and 3) the statements constituted evidence of prior 

bad acts precluded by Rule 404(b), SCRE. 

Prior bad acts and Rule 404(b)15 

15 Bell's remaining arguments are unpreserved for appellate review because they 

were not raised to and ruled upon by the circuit court or were not raised with 

sufficient specificity. See Staubes v. City of Folly Beach, 339 S.C. 406, 412, 529 

S.E.2d 543, 546 (2000) ("It is well-settled that an issue . . . must have been raised to 

and ruled upon by the [circuit] court to be preserved for appellate review."); State v. 

Patterson, 324 S.C. 5, 19, 482 S.E.2d 760, 767 (1997) (indicating an "[a]ppellant is 
 

Bell argues the circuit court erred in allowing Mayfield and Jessica to testify 

regarding Judy's statements because the statements constituted evidence of prior bad 

acts and were thus inadmissible under Rule 404(b). The State argues the statements 

did not constitute evidence of prior bad acts but, rather, constituted evidence of the 

suspicion of prior bad acts. We agree with Bell. 

Pursuant to Rule 404(b), SCRE, 

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible 

to prove the character of a person in order to show action 

in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible 

to show motive, identity, the existence of a common 

scheme or plan, the absence of mistake or accident, or 

intent. 

In other words, "evidence of prior bad acts is inadmissible to show criminal 

propensity or to demonstrate the accused is a bad person." State v. King, 334 S.C. 

504, 512, 514 S.E.2d 578, 582 (1999). Our courts have explained that, "[p]roof that 

a defendant has been guilty of another crime equally heinous prompts to a ready 

acceptance of and belief in the prosecution's theory that he is guilty of the crime 

charged." State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 416, 118 S.E. 803, 807 (1923). Thus, the 

effect of such evidence "is to predispose the mind of the juror to believe the 

[defendant] guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the presumption of 

innocence." Id. Consequently, "[t]o be admissible, the bad act must logically relate 

to the crime with which the defendant has been charged." State v. Fletcher, 379 S.C. 

17, 23, 664 S.E.2d 480, 483 (2008). Moreover, "[i]f the defendant was not convicted 

of the prior crime, evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing." Id. 

(emphasis added). 

At the outset, the State argues the statements did not constitute evidence of 

prior bad acts but, rather, constituted evidence of a belief or suspicion of prior bad 

acts. We disagree for the following reasons. First, Judy's belief that Bell was 

stealing was, at minimum, evidence of two things: 1) Judy believed her property was 

stolen or lost; and 2) something led Judy to believe Bell was responsible. Thus, we 

find the State elicited Judy's belief that Bell was stealing to demonstrate that Bell 

limited to the grounds raised at trial"); see also State v. Johnson, 363 S.C. 53, 58, 

609 S.E.2d 520, 523 (2005) ("The objection should be addressed to the [circuit] court 

in a sufficiently specific manner that brings attention to the exact error."); State v. 

Dunbar, 356 S.C. 138, 142, 587 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2003) ("[T]o preserve [a legal 

issue], []it must be clear that the argument has been presented on that ground."). 
had previously stolen from her. Cf. Smalls v. State, 422 S.C. 174, 185–86, 810 

S.E.2d 836, 842 (2018) (finding that after the officer indicated on cross-examination 

that a prior burglary involving a stolen gun had not been solved, the State's question 

asking whether the defendant had burglarized the house "did not serve any legitimate 

purpose" but "was an improper effort to introduce evidence that Smalls committed 

another crime"). Second, in its closing argument, the State portrayed Judy's belief 

as conclusive evidence that Bell had been stealing from her and asserted that the 

prior thefts were evidence of Bell's possible motives. Notably, evidence of motive 

is one of the five exceptions to the rule precluding the admission of prior bad acts 

evidence. See Rule 404(b), SCRE ("Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or 

acts . . . may[] be admissible to show motive . . . ."). 

Finally, if this court were to accept the State's distinction between evidence of 

prior bad acts and evidence of the belief of prior bad acts, such a distinction would 

swallow Rule 404(b)'s preclusion of prior bad acts evidence. Pursuant to the State's 

position, Rule 404(b) would not preclude evidence of a belief of prior bad acts, thus, 

the State would not need to invoke an exception to the rule to have such evidence 

admitted. Moreover, under the State's position, evidence that a defendant committed 

an unconvicted prior bad act would require proof of the act by clear and convincing 

evidence, but evidence that someone believes a defendant committed an unconvicted 

prior bad act would not be subject to the same evidentiary burden. See Fletcher, 379 

S.C. at 23, 664 S.E.2d at 483 ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, 

evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing." (emphasis added)). If 

this court were to sanction such a distinction, the State could bypass the rule, as well 

as 404(b) scrutiny when invoking an exception to the rule, by simply having 

witnesses testify that they believe a defendant committed a prior bad act rather than 

putting forth direct evidence of the prior bad act in question. Thus, we conclude that 

Mayfield's and Jessica's statements constitute evidence of prior bad acts, and we will 

scrutinize the circuit court's admission of the statements accordingly. 

In State v. Fletcher, our supreme court found that the circuit court erred in 

allowing the State to present evidence of prior bad acts in a homicide by child abuse 

case. 379 S.C. at 25, 664 S.E.2d at 483–84. At trial, the State called one of the 

defendant's friends and coworkers to testify regarding two events involving the child 

victim. Id. at 21, 664 S.E.2d at 481. Both co-defendants objected to the testimony, 

arguing there was not clear and convincing evidence establishing who committed 

the acts in question. Id. at 21, 664 S.E.2d at 481–82. The circuit court overruled the 

objection and allowed the witness to testify. Id. at 21, 664 S.E.2d at 482. The 

witness testified that on one occasion, he had gone to the co-defendants' house and 

heard a baby crying. Id. After going upstairs, he found the child sitting in a walker 
 

 

in the attic and profusely sweating. Id. On another occasion, the witness indicated 

he had gone to the co-defendants' house and found the child handcuffed by his feet 

to the co-defendants' bed. Id. at 22, 664 S.E.2d at 482. 

On appeal, our supreme court found that, "there is simply not clear and 

convincing evidence in the record that Fletcher committed the prior bad acts testified 

to by [the witness]." Id. at 24, 664 S.E.2d at 483. The court explained that, 

"[a]lthough [the witness] testified he saw [the child] handcuffed to the bed and in 

the walker in the attic, there was no evidence whatsoever introduced at trial that 

Fletcher was either the person who placed [the child] in the attic[] or that he 

handcuffed him to the bed." Id. Ultimately, the court held that the circuit court erred 

in admitting the witness's testimony, concluding "there is simply no evidence, let 

alone clear and convincing evidence[,] that Fletcher was the perpetrator of the prior 

bad acts against [the child]."16 Id. at 25, 664 S.E.2d at 483–84. 

Here, we find the circuit court abused its discretion in allowing Mayfield and 

Jessica to testify regarding Judy's statements because there is no evidence, let alone 

clear and convincing evidence, demonstrating that Bell had previously stolen Judy's 

property. See Goodwin, 384 S.C. at 601, 683 S.E.2d at 507 ("An abuse of discretion 

occurs when the conclusions of the [circuit] court either lack evidentiary support or 

are controlled by an error of law." (quoting Pagan, 369 S.C. at 208, 631 S.E.2d at 

265)). Mayfield and Jessica both testified that Judy believed Bell was stealing from 

her but indicated that the family had no proof of this, had not called the police, and 

had not confronted Bell about the alleged thefts. Assuming some of Judy's property 

16 Consistent with the holding in Fletcher, our courts have routinely held that a 

circuit court errs by admitting evidence of prior bad acts when the defendant cannot 

be established as the perpetrator of the bad acts by clear and convincing evidence. 

See State v. Cutro, 332 S.C. 100, 106, 504 S.E.2d 324, 327 (1998) ("[H]ere, the 

evidence is insufficient to establish that appellant was the actor in Parker's death or 

Asher's injuries[,] and we hold the trial judge erred in admitting this evidence."); 

State v. Pierce, 326 S.C. 176, 178, 485 S.E.2d 913, 914 (1997) ("The State failed to 

offer any proof that appellant inflicted these injuries. Thus, this testimony is 

inadmissible under Lyle[,] and the trial court erred in admitting it."); State v. 

Conyers, 268 S.C. 276, 281, 233 S.E.2d 95, 97 (1977) ("There was very little 

evidence, however, to establish that appellant poisoned her first husband other than 

the fact that she was his wife and he had some life insurance. This evidence alone 

was insufficient to establish the identity of appellant as the actor in poisoning her 

first husband. The admission of this testimony was clearly prejudicial and requires 

that a new trial be granted."). 
 

 

had been stolen, we find this case is similar to Fletcher because neither Mayfield's 

nor Jessica's testimony could definitively establish that Bell was the perpetrator of 

the thefts. See Fletcher, 379 S.C. at 25, 664 S.E.2d at 483–84 ("[T]here is simply 

no evidence, let alone clear and convincing evidence[,] that Fletcher was the 

perpetrator of the prior bad acts . . . ."). Moreover, unlike the acts in Fletcher, there 

is no evidence, beyond her statements of belief, that Judy's property had in fact been 

stolen. There is no evidence in the record indicating that the clothes in the bag 

Mayfield testified he found are the same clothes Judy alleged were stolen. 

Additionally, neither Mayfield nor Jessica testified that Judy believed Bell had stolen 

the ashtray found in the bag. Accordingly, we do not find clear and convincing 

evidence demonstrating that Bell was the perpetrator of the alleged thefts. See id. at 

23, 664 S.E.2d at 483 ("If the defendant was not convicted of the prior crime, 

evidence of the prior bad act must be clear and convincing." (emphasis added)). 

Thus, the circuit court erred in admitting the evidence of prior bad acts. 

Harmless error 

The State argues that any error in admitting Mayfield's and Jessica's 

testimonies was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We disagree. 

An "[e]rror is harmless when it 'could not reasonably have affected the result 

of the trial.'" State v. Mitchell, 286 S.C. 572, 573, 336 S.E.2d 150, 151 (1985) 

(quoting State v. Key, 256 S.C. 90, 93, 180 S.E.2d 888, 890 (1971)). "No definite 

rule of law governs this finding; rather, the materiality and prejudicial character of 

the error must be determined from its relationship to the entire case." State v. 

Thompson, 352 S.C. 552, 562, 575 S.E.2d 77, 83 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting Mitchell, 

286 S.C. at 573, 336 S.E.2d at 151). Accordingly, "our jurisprudence requires us 

not to question whether the State proved its case beyond a reasonable doubt, but 

whether beyond a reasonable doubt the trial error did not contribute to the guilty 

verdict." State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 389–90, 728 S.E.2d 468, 475 (2012) (emphasis 

added). In other words, an error is harmless "when guilt has been conclusively 

proven by competent evidence such that no other rational conclusion can be 

reached." State v. Kirton, 381 S.C. 7, 37, 671 S.E.2d 107, 122 (Ct. App. 2008) 

(emphasis added). 

In State v. King, our supreme court found the erroneous admission of prior 

bad acts evidence constituted reversible error. 334 S.C. at 514–15, 514 S.E.2d at 

583–84. King was accused of the murder of his father-in-law. Id. at 507–09, 514 

S.E.2d at 579–81. At trial, King's ex-wife testified regarding prior incidents in which 

King had stolen items from her. Id. at 511, 514 S.E.2d at 582. On appeal, the 

supreme court found the circuit court erred in admitting the prior bad acts evidence 
 

because the evidence was "not admissible under any theory." Id. at 513, 514 S.E.2d 

at 583. 

In concluding that the error was not harmless, the supreme court determined 

that all of the evidence in the record was circumstantial. Id. at 514, 514 S.E.2d at 

583. The court further found that, "[w]hile this circumstantial evidence pointed to 

appellant's guilt, especially the blood evidence, the evidence was not overwhelming." 

Id. (emphasis added). The court explained that "[t]he admission of this testimony 

allowed the State to insinuate to the jury that appellant had a drug problem[,]" and 

"[t]he [State]'s questions eliminated many legitimate reasons why appellant would 

need money." Id. "This improper evidence suggested to the jury that appellant was 

guilty of committing the charged crimes because of his criminal propensity to 

commit crimes and his bad character." Id. at 514, 514 S.E.2d at 583–84. 

Additionally, the court noted that "[t]he State continuously stressed this improper 

testimony in its closing argument." Id. at 514–15, 514 S.E.2d at 584 (emphasis 

added). "Therefore, it [wa]s impossible under these circumstances to conclude the 

improper evidence did not impact the jury's verdict." Id. at 515, 514 S.E.2d at 584 

(emphases added). Finally, the court determined that the "improper testimony 

permeated the trial and the jury likely used this evidence to infer that since appellant 

had previously stolen from his ex-wife, he probably committed these crimes against 

his father-in-law also." Id. 

We find the case at bar is strikingly similar to King. Here, like in King, all of 

the evidence in the record was circumstantial. Additionally, while we are cognizant 

of the fact that this circumstantial evidence pointed to Bell's guilt, such evidence was 

not overwhelming.17 Given this evidentiary context, we find Mayfield's and Jessica's 

17 In asserting that the error was harmless, the State relies heavily on Gallman's 

testimony indicating the touch DNA taken from Judy's neck and the underarms of 

her shirt "matched" Bell's Y-DNA. However, we note that a "match" is only part of 

the equation in DNA analysis. "After determining that two DNA samples match, 

forensic analysts estimate the statistical frequency of such matches in a reference 

population. The purpose of the statistical estimates is to provide meaning to the 

match by showing the likelihood that an unrelated person in the reference population 

would match by chance." William C. Thompson, Evaluating the Admissibility of 

New Genetic Identification Tests: Lessons from the "DNA War", 84 J. Crim. L. & 

Criminology 22, 61 (1993); see also State v. Phillips, Op. No. 27978 (S.C. Sup. Ct. 

filed June 3, 2020) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 22 at 29–30) ("Random match 

probability is the likelihood that another randomly chosen person—unrelated to the 

suspect—will have a DNA fragment identical to the fragment the analyst found in 
 

 

 

statements regarding Judy's belief were highly prejudicial. First, like the testimony 

in King, the statements tended to establish Bell's criminal propensity by painting him 

as a thief. See id. at 514, 514 S.E.2d at 583–84 ("This improper evidence suggested 

to the jury that appellant was guilty of committing the charged crimes because of his 

criminal propensity to commit crimes and his bad character."); Lyle, 125 S.C. at 416, 

118 S.E. at 807 ("[The] effect [of bad acts evidence] is to predispose the mind of the 

juror to believe the [defendant] guilty, and thus effectually to strip him of the 

presumption of innocence."). Second, the statements allowed the State to insinuate 

to the jury that Bell was a pervert. See King, 334 S.C. at 514, 514 S.E.2d at 583 

("The admission of this testimony allowed the State to insinuate to the jury that 

appellant had a drug problem."). Because Judy's body was found unclothed and with 

injuries to the vaginal and rectal areas of her body, the insinuation that Bell was a 

the touch sample."). Crucially, "[o]ne very important thing to understand about 

touch DNA is that in many cases . . . the DNA analyst is not able to obtain a full 

DNA profile from the 'touch' sample." Phillips, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 22 at 28). 

Therefore, "[t]he probability of a random match in any given case depends on the 

size of the fragment the analyst can obtain from the touch sample." Id. at 30. "Thus, 

the more complete the fragment, the less likely another person could randomly 

match it. The smaller the fragment, on the other hand, the more likely some other 

person will also have the identical fragment, and would then be a 'random match.'" 

Id. (emphases added). Here, the State's DNA expert testified that when examining 

the DNA sample from Judy's neck, the expert was only able to analyze two out of 

the chromosome's sixteen loci. Similarly, when analyzing the DNA sample from 

Judy's underarms, the State's expert was only able to analyze four of the 

chromosome's sixteen loci. The expert further testified that the probability of 

selecting an unrelated individual with a matching DNA profile ranged from one in 

ten to one in 960. Additionally, the expert testified that the probability of randomly 

selecting an unrelated male individual with a matching Y-DNA profile was one in 

8,600. We do not find that the statistical frequencies associated with Bell's DNA 

and Y-DNA tests were so low as to suggest that Bell's guilt was the only rational 

conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. See, e.g., Thompson, 352 S.C. at 556– 

57, 575 S.E.2d at 80 ("The expert further opined that only one in thirty-two 

quadrillion persons have the same genetic marker as Thompson." (emphasis 

added)). Rather, a jury could have reasonably determined that the statistical 

frequencies did not reliably identify Bell as the source of the DNA or Y-DNA on 

Judy's neck and shirt. See State v. Dinkins, 319 S.C. 415, 418, 462 S.E.2d 59, 60 

(1995) ("The jury should be allowed to make its own determination as to whether it 

believes the [DNA] statistics are reliable. The jury is free to believe or disbelieve 

the experts and the statistics."). 
pervert tended to suggest that Bell was capable of and likely engaged in a sexually 

charged attack. In turn, this allowed the State to compensate for the absence of any 

evidence connecting Bell to the sexual injuries. Third, the statements allowed the 

State to establish potential motives for the killing despite Bell's friendly relationship 

with Judy and her family. In fact, in its closing argument, the State relied on Judy's 

belief as evidence of Bell's potential motive, asserting that Bell may have killed Judy 

after she confronted him about the alleged stolen items or after rejecting Bell's sexual 

advances. 

But perhaps the most prejudicial effect was the establishment of a connection 

between Bell and the bag of Judy's underwear Mayfield testified he found on the 

scene. During the trial, law enforcement testified that they did not find any latent 

fingerprints on the bag or its contents, nor did they find anything that would directly 

tie Bell to the bag. However, despite the lack of proof that Bell was stealing, 

Mayfield's and Jessica's testimonies tied Bell directly to the bag of underwear. 

Because the bag was purportedly found near the location of Judy's body, this 

connection tended to place Bell at the scene and suggested that he was familiar with 

the area in which the body was found. Moreover, in its closing argument, the State 

again used the statements against Bell, consistently asserting that the items in the 

bag were the ones Judy believed Bell had stolen, that Bell in fact stole these items, 

and that Bell had "hiding spots" behind the abandoned house. 

Ultimately, we find the statements that Judy believed Bell was stealing from 

her, which could not be proven or disproven, had the same prejudicial effect as 

evidence that would have conclusively established that Bell was stealing. In other 

words, even if Judy was mistaken in her belief that Bell was stealing, her statements 

would have still prejudiced him as if he had been. Furthermore, these statements 

were extremely prejudicial because they provided possible motives for the murder, 

connected Bell to the bag of underwear and Judy's injuries, and demonstrated Bell's 

criminal propensity. Moreover, because the State continuously stressed the 

improper statements in its closing argument, "it is impossible under these 

circumstances to conclude the improper evidence did not impact the jury's verdict." 

King, 334 S.C. at 515, 514 S.E.2d at 584; see also Phillips, (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 

22 at 39) ("If there were any possibility we might find the error of admitting the 

[testimonies] harmless, the assistant solicitor extinguished that possibility with her 

incorrect statements in her closing argument."). Therefore, we find the error in 

admitting Mayfield's and Jessica's testimonies concerning the alleged prior bad acts 

was highly prejudicial and requires that Bell's conviction be reversed. 
 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, Bell's conviction is 

REVERSED. 

LOCKEMY, CJ., and HEWITT, J., concur.