Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before 

any court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE:

DELMAR P. KUCHAES STEVEN D. GROTH

Smithville, IN Bose McKinney & Evans LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

DELMAR P. KUCHAES, )

)

Appellant-Respondent, )

)

vs. ) No. 53A04-1206-MF-304

)

JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE MONROE CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable E. Michael Hoff, Judge

Cause No. 53C01-0702-MF-295

October 30, 2013

OPINION ON REHEARING- NOT FOR PUBLICATION

ROBB, Chief Judge
2

Case Summary and Issues

Delmar Kuchaes, pro se, petitions this court for rehearing following our dismissal of 

his appeal for failure to timely file the notice of appeal. Because Kuchaes certified that he 

deposited the notice of appeal in the mail on the date it was due, albeit after hours, we grant 

rehearing and consider this case on the merits. Kuchaes presents several issues on appeal, 

which we consolidate and restate as: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying Kuchaes’s motion to continue; 2) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

certain evidentiary rulings; 3) whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying 

Kuchaes’s motion to amend the pleadings; 4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying Kuchaes’s motion to reopen; and 5) whether the trial court abused its discretion in 

the award of attorney’s fees. Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in on 

these issues, we affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

In February 2007, JP Morgan Chase Bank (“Chase”) filed a foreclosure action against 

Kuchaes. Kuchaes filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, arguing that Chase was not the 

proper party in interest. Chase then amended the complaint and attached as an exhibit the 

assignment of Kuchaes’s mortgage to Chase. In September 2007, Kuchaes filed an answer to 

the complaint with affirmative defenses, claim for setoff, and counterclaim. That same 

month, Kuchaes served a request for production of documents on Chase. In April 2010, 

Kuchaes filed a motion to compel discovery.
3

In July 2011, the parties stipulated to certain matters, resulting in an agreed order 

providing that:

1. The loan which is the subject of [Chase’s] Complaint has been in default 

since September, 2006, has been accelerated, and is due and payable to 

[Chase] in full.

2. The Mortgage currently held by [Chase] is a valid and enforceable first 

priority lien against the mortgaged property.

***

4. Any interest which [Kuchaes] has in the mortgaged property shall be 

extinguished, and the equity of redemption of [Kuchaes] shall be 

foreclosed and barred after the redemption period has expired, which shall 

be at the foreclosure sale, which is agreed to be no sooner than one 

hundred twenty (120) days from the date of his Order.

Appellant’s Appendix at 73-74. In October 2011, at a pretrial conference, the parties entered 

further stipulations to which the court agreed, including that: the bench trial, then scheduled 

for November 2011, would be continued to no sooner than February 2012; Kuchaes’s 

counterclaim would be dismissed with prejudice; and Kuchaes agreed to the entry of a 

foreclosure judgment in an amount to be determined at a subsequent hearing, no sooner than 

late February 2012.

On February 28, 2012, one day before trial was set to begin, Kuchaes filed a verified 

emergency motion for continuance, citing the unexpected hospitalization and incapacity of 

his counsel, Delmar Kuchaes II, who was also his son. Chase objected and the trial court 

denied the motion that same day. In its order denying the motion, the court noted that 

Kuchaes, an attorney, “appears more able to present his case,” and that it would not grant the 

motion as it was based on the incapacity of an attorney who had not entered an appearance in 

the case. Appellant’s App. at 17. Before trial commenced on February 29, 2012, Kuchaes 
4

asked the court to reconsider its ruling and argument was held on the motion, with Kuchaes 

arguing that he had hired his son to represent him in this case in October or November of 

2011. The court denied Kuchaes’s motion in an order that included the following:

The court finds that attorney Delmar P. Kuchaes, II has never been counsel of 

record in this case, and has never participated in proceedings in this Court. 

[Kuchaes’s] motion to continue this case based on the unavailability of Delmar 

P. Kuchaes, II is denied.

[Kuchaes] also suggests that a settlement reached by the Federal Government 

and State Attorneys General with five leading mortgage services regarding 

mortgage loans servicing and foreclosure abuses is relevant to this case. 

[Kuchaes] requested a continuance of the trial to evaluate the effect of that 

settlement.

The Court finds that [Kuchaes] previously agreed that [Chase] has a valid,

enforceable first priority mortgage lien against [Kuchaes’s] property; that the 

loan which is the subject of [Chase’s] complaint has been in default since 

September, 2006, and is due and payable to [Chase]; and that [Kuchaes’s] 

interest in the mortgaged property shall be extinguished. [Kuchaes] further 

stipulated that his counterclaim shall be dismissed with prejudice, and 

[Kuchaes] agreed to the entry of a foreclosure judgment, no sooner than late 

February, 2012. The only reserved issue was the amount of the judgment.

Under the circumstances, this trial should not be continued because there is a 

chance that [Kuchaes] might benefit from the referenced settlement.

Appellant’s App. at 18-19. The case then proceeded to trial.

At trial, Chase offered, through the testimony of its representative, an exhibit that was 

identified as a payoff quote. Kuchaes questioned the witness as to her personal knowledge 

and involvement in the preparation of the document, and she testified that she was not 

personally responsible for posting payments or generating the payoff quote. Kuchaes 

objected to the admission of the exhibit because the witness did not “have sufficient personal 

knowledge as to the specific business records that were used to generate these amounts . . . .” 
5

Transcript at 50. The court admitted the exhibit over the objection, noting that Kuchaes’s 

objections would go to the weight accorded the testimony, the quote was plainly a business 

record, and that there had been enough time to inquire into the substance of the accounting 

behind the quote and if there were any real issues in the accounting they would have been 

explored by that point.

Following trial, in March 2012, Kuchaes filed a motion to amend pleadings and a 

motion to reopen the case. Both motions were denied by the trial court in its Judgment and 

Decree of Foreclosure in May 2012. The judgment awarded Chase $98,014.52 and noted, in 

relevant part, that:

The payoff statement shows that there was an unpaid principal balance of 

$34,891.34 after the August 1, 2006 payment was applied. No payments have 

been credited after August 1, 2006.

***

[Chase] has proven by the greater weight of the evidence that the current 

balance due to [Chase] from [Kuchaes] on the Note is $53,715.79. That 

balance is comprised of the unpaid principal balance of $34,891.34 after the 

August 1, 2006 payment was applied; interest of $10,976.20 from August 1, 

2006 through March 31, 2012; interest of $122.59 from April 1, 2012 through 

May 11, 2012; escrow advances for taxes of $5,816.41; recording fees of 

$12.00; and “corporate advances” of $1,897.25.

***

[Kuchaes] claims that [Chase] improperly changed the locks on his condo on 

July 10, 2007, and did not remove the locks for ten months. [Kuchaes] seeks 

to setoff against money he owes to [Chase] the sum of $8,000 for the loss of 

use of his condo for ten months.

[Chase] maintains that this loss of use claim was part of [Kuchaes’s] 

counterclaim that was dismissed with prejudice.
6

[Kuchaes] filed a Claim for Setoff and Counterclaim on September 5, 2007. 

That pleading sought damages from [Chase] based on various claims, but also 

claimed the right of setoff against any judgment that might be entered against 

him. Such a claim is a part of [Kuchaes’s] counterclaim against [Chase] for 

wrongful conduct in the administration of [Chase’s] debt recovery process. 

The court finds that the voluntary dismissal of [Kuchaes’s] counterclaim 

precludes a consideration of [Kuchaes’s] claim against [Chase] for the loss of 

use of his condo.

[Kuchaes] filed a Motion to Amend Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence on 

March 23, 2012. He claims that the issue of his entitlement to setoff for the 

loss of use of his condo for [sic] was tried by agreement. Because [Kuchaes’s] 

counterclaim was dismissed before the trial the court finds that the setoff issue 

was not before the court, and it was not tried by agreement. [Chase] objected 

to [Kuchaes’s] evidence regarding setoff. [Kuchaes’s] Motion to Amend 

Pleadings to Conform to the Evidence is denied.

On March 23, 2012 [Kuchaes] filed a motion to reopen case to admit a June 

22, 2009 letter from Chase Home Finance that might assert that [Chase] was 

entitled to a lower principal balance than the August 1, 2006 principal balance 

of $34,891.34. The court has examined the letter and finds that it would not 

change the result if admitted. [Kuchaes] has, in any event, failed to show why 

such evidence was not offered at the trial of this case. The motion to reopen 

the evidence is denied.

[Kuchaes’s] March 23, 2012 motion to reopen also seeks to admit an 

Assignment of [Kuchaes’s] Mortgage from First Chicago NBD Mortgage to 

the Federal National Mortgage Association. [Kuchaes] previously stipulated 

that [Chase] holds a valid and enforceable mortgage that is a first priority lien 

against his real estate. The only possible purpose of admitting the Assignment 

of Mortgage would be to dispute the facts established by the stipulation. 

Given the stipulation, the Assignment of Mortgage is irrelevant to issues the 

court must decide. The motion to reopen the evidence to admit the 

Assignment of Mortgage is denied.

The main issue in dispute is [Chase’s] attorney fees. [Chase] seeks attorney 

fees of $46,104.86 and expenses of $187.51 through February 13, 2012.

The July 15, 1996 Note obligates [Kuchaes] to pay [Chase] back for all of its 

costs and expenses in enforcing the Note, including reasonable attorney’s fees.
7

[Kuchaes] challenges the hourly rates charged by [Chase’s] attorneys. He also 

challendges [sic] the time spent exploring summary judgment motions and 

responding to discovery. He also challenges charges for the time spent by 

[Chase’s] attorneys trying to locate the mortgage and note.

The court has reviewed all of the entries made for time charges. It is true that 

no motion for summary judgment was filed. That does not mean that it was 

not reasonable and proper for [Chase’s] attorneys to investigate and consider 

the efficacy of such a motion, common in mortgage foreclosure suits. There is 

no evidence that an inordinate amount of time was spent evaluating this 

strategic decision. The charges appear to be reasonable and proportionate.

A great deal of discovery apparently was engaged in by the parties. The court 

is not aware of the details of that discovery. [Kuchaes] filed a motion to 

compel discovery, but the issues about discovery responses were agreed to by 

the parties outside of court. From the billing records there appear to have been 

delays in obtaining documents and responses from [Chase]. [Kuchaes] should 

not be required to pay for [Chase] to find its mortgage and loan records. It is 

difficult to identify all of the charges that concern this issue alone. 

[Kuchaes’s] estimate that [Chase’s] attorneys charged $1,993.63 for efforts to 

obtain [Chase’s] loan documents is reasonable. [Chase’s] attorney fees should 

be reduced by that amount.

[Kuchaes] chose to dismiss his counterclaim with prejudice on October 21, 

2011, but until that time [Chase] incurred costs to defend itself against that 

counterclaim. What began as a routine foreclosure case, with specialist 

counsel working for a low flat rate, changed with the counterclaim. [Kuchaes] 

charged serious misconduct under state and federal law in his counterclaim, 

and it was reasonable for [Chase], a national bank, to defend itself. [Chase] 

could have hired counsel in Monroe County, Indiana, but its decision to 

continue its client relationship with Bose McKinney and Evans LLP and to 

hire counsel in Indianapolis was reasonable. The hourly charges for the senior 

attorney responsible for this case are higher than the average charges in 

Monroe County, but are within the range of reasonable charges, considering 

the circumstances of this case. The charges for other attorneys, and for 

paralegals, are also reasonable and customary. 

[Chase] has proven by the greater weight of the evidence that it incurred 

attorney fees of $44,111.22 and costs of $187.51 that should be paid by 

[Kuchaes].

Appellant’s App. at 10-13. This appeal followed. 
8

Discussion and Decision

I. Motion to Continue

A. Standard of Review

The decision to grant or deny a motion for a continuance is within the sound discretion 

of the trial court. F.M. v. N.B., 979 N.E.2d 1036, 1039 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). We will 

reverse the trial court only for an abuse of that discretion. Id. A trial court abuses its 

discretion when it reaches a conclusion which is clearly against the logic and effect of the 

facts or the reasonable and probable deductions which may be drawn therefrom. Id. No 

abuse of discretion will be found when the moving party has not shown that he was 

prejudiced by the denial. Id. 

B. Kuchaes’s Motion to Continue Due to Incapacity of Counsel

Kuchaes filed his motion to continue the day before trial was scheduled to begin, 

citing the hospitalization of his son, an attorney, whom he claimed was representing him in 

the case. The trial court denied his motion, noting that the son had never filed an appearance 

in the case and that Kuchaes, also an attorney, seemed able to represent himself. When 

Kuchaes renewed his motion on the day of trial, he indicated that he began working with his 

son on the case when his own license was suspended, out of an abundance of caution in 

wanting to avoid practicing law without a license. The court said

Delmar Kuchaes the Second has never entered an appearance in this case or 

taken any action and let the Court know that he’s an attorney representing, ah, 

Delmar Kuchaes in this case. And so whatever may have occurred, ah, outside 

of this case by way of preparation, the Court is not gonna continue the case 

based upon the unavailability of a lawyer who’s not, ah, representing someone 

in this case by filing an appearance, which is how, ah, someone becomes an 
9

attorney representing someone in a case. So this case has been pending for, ah, 

five years now and, ah, ah, Delmar P. Kuchaes the Second has never entered 

an appearance in the case that’s been set for trial now . . . since . . . October. . . 

. [W]hatever your status as an attorney, um, you have the right to represent 

yourself, as far as I know, and also have the, ah, ah, knowledge of the law that 

places you in a very different position than most, ah, pro se parties. Ah, I, I 

have to just note that this case has been going on for a long time, and to some 

extent that the Court has considered the, the fact that you apparently continue 

to possess this property without paying for it after having admitted that [Chase] 

has, um, a valid first, ah, an enforceable first priority lien against the property 

and, ah, that you have agreed that there should be a foreclosure judgment. The 

only question is the amount.

Tr. at 32-34. Chase notes that Kuchaes has represented himself throughout this entire 

process and that no other attorney has filed an appearance on his behalf during the pendency 

of the case. Chase also notes that Kuchaes continued to have direct communications with 

Chase’s counsel after he had allegedly hired his son to represent him, and if Kuchaes had 

been represented by his son, he should have directed all communication with Chase through 

his son. 

Kuchaes argues that there was no reason that his son could not file an appearance the 

day of trial. Chase counters with a cite to one of this court’s cases indicating that “attorneys 

are generally obligated to appear.” Appellee’s Brief at 6 (quoting Clements v. Hall, 966 

N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied). Regardless of whether Kuchaes’s son 

was required to file an appearance if he was in fact representing Kuchaes, the court clearly 

considered Kuchaes’s ability to (continue to) represent himself, as well as the overall nature 

and timeline of the case. Kuchaes has represented himself throughout this entire years-long 

suit, and he has not shown that he was prejudiced by the court’s denial of his motion to 

continue. The court was well within its discretion in denying the motion.
10

Kuchaes also takes issue with the court’s denial of his motion to continue regarding 

his argument that continuance was proper to allow him to investigate the national settlement 

agreement. Kuchaes argues that he hired his son not only to engage in trial preparation, but 

that his son 

also spent a lot of time reviewing information regarding the National Mortgage 

Settlement Agreement which had just been announced through the media on 

February 9, 2012 . . . and analyzing how the annouced [sic] termsof [sic] that 

Settlement Agreement might impact on the issues present in this case. 

Kuchaes, II had reached several preliminary conclusions that could reasonably 

be said to impact upon the “damages” determination to be triad [sic] to the 

court because of the poovisions [sic] of the Settlement Agreement pertaining 

to required reductions in princial [sic] owed on defauted [sic] mortgages.

Appellant’s Brief at 14. Regarding investigation into the settlement, Kuchaes argues that

the National Settlement Agreement has made provison [sic] for the reduction 

of principal on mortgsge [sic] loans the amount of which will not be detrmined 

[sic] and executed over the next three years. To poceed [sic] to judgment of 

foreclosure and sherrif’s [sic] sale of Kuchaes’ [sic] property without having 

time to digest these specific parameters of the Settlement is unconscionabe 

[sic].

Appellant’s Br. at 15. We disagree, and conclude that the trial court was acting within its 

discretion when it determined that the trial should not be continued despite a chance that 

Kuchaes might benefit from the settlement.

II. Evidentiary Rulings

A. Standard of Review

The admission or exclusion of evidence is a determination entrusted to the discretion 

of the trial court. Zemco Mfg., Inc. v. Pecoraro, 703 N.E.2d 1064, 1069 (Ind. Ct. App. 

1998), trans. denied. We will reverse a trial court’s decision only for an abuse of discretion, 
11

that is, only when the trial court’s action is clearly erroneous and against the logic and effect 

of the facts and circumstances before it or the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. 

Id. 

B. Payoff Quote and Real Party in Interest

Kuchaes contests two of the trial court’s evidentiary rulings: the court’s exclusion of 

evidence relating to assignment of the mortgage, and the court’s admission of Chase’s loan 

payoff statement. 

Kuchaes contends that Chase has not shown that it was the real party in interest the 

entire time the case was pending because there was an unclear chain of assignment of the 

mortgage. Kuchaes argues that the stipulation, which stated that “[t]he Mortgage currently

held by [Chase] is a valid and enforceable first priority lien against the mortgaged property,” 

only indicated that Chase had a valid lien at the time of the stipulation, but not necessarily 

during the entire litigation. Appellant’s App. at 73 (emphasis added). During the trial, 

Kuchaes cross-examined Chase’s witness and asked whether Chase was the legal holder of 

the note when the litigation commenced. Chase objected to the relevance of the question, 

and Kuchaes replied that it went to attorney’s fees, in that if Chase was not the owner of the 

note when the foreclosure proceedings began, then it had no right to seek attorney’s fees. 

The court responded that

It does seem to me that that argument is foreclosed by the agreement that the 

counterclaim’s dismissed and [Chase] has a valid, ah, first mortgage lien. . . . I 

think, ah, it forecloses this sort of, ah, of an argument, ah, into whether or not 

[Chase] had a valid first mortgage lien at some point in the, in the past. . . . I 

think to give [the stipulation] any sense or import it’s only, ah, ah, it’s 

reasonable to, ah, take it as including this, this case and not, and not just that 
12

particular point in time when the stipulation was entered. . . . So I’m going to 

sustain the objection.

Tr. at 72. We conclude that Kuchaes had agreed to the foreclosure and had stipulated that 

Chase was the proper party in interest, despite his focus now on the word “currently” in the 

agreed order memorializing the stipulations. Evidence relating to the assignment of the 

mortgage was not relevant to the issue on trial—the amount of the foreclosure judgment—

and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence.

Kuchaes also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting Chase’s 

payoff statement. Chase’s witness at trial, Sharon Green, identified the exhibit as a payoff 

statement and testified to the unpaid principal balance, to some of the other charges on the 

payoff sheet—what they included and how they were calculated, and to the fact that the 

payoff statement accurately reflected the current balance due on Kuchaes’s loan. Green also 

testified as to what information a payoff statement would typically contain, including the 

unpaid balance, late charges, escrow balances, and miscellaneous fees. Kuchaes requested to 

voir dire the witness, and questioned her regarding her personal involvement in the 

preparation of the payoff statement. The testimony indicated that she did not personally pull 

the case records to prepare the document, and that various departments were involved in the 

calculations that went into the payoff statement. The court admitted the payoff statement, 

noting that Kuchaes’s objections to Green’s personal knowledge would go to the weight of 

her testimony, the only way to question everyone with personal involvement in the 

preparation of the document would be to bring entire departments into the courtroom, and 

that the document itself was plainly a business record. 
13

Indiana Evidence Rule 803(6) provides an exception to hearsay for records of a 

regularly conducted business activity, specifically, a

memorandum, report, record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, 

conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at or near the time by, or from 

information transmitted by, a person with knowledge, if kept in the course of a 

regularly conducted business activity, and if it was the regular practice of that 

business activity to make the memorandum, report, record, or data 

compilation, all as shown by the testimony or affidavit of the custodian or 

other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or 

circumstances of preparation indicate a lack of trustworthiness. The term 

“business” as used in this Rule includes business, institution, association, 

profession, occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 

profit.

Indiana Evidence Rule 901 requires authentication as a condition precedent to admissibility 

of evidence, and allows authentication by, among other methods, “[t]estimony of a witness 

with knowledge that a matter is what it is claimed to be.” Green authenticated the document 

presented at trial, and her testimony indicated that the payoff statement meets the hearsay 

exception for a business record in that the document was made by people with knowledge 

and is of a type kept and generated in the regular course of Chase’s business.

Moreover, the court noted that there had been enough time for the parties to inquire 

into the substance of the accounting in this case, and that if there had been a real issue with 

the way that Chase calculated the payoff, that would have been explored. We agree with the 

trial court that the payoff statement was admissible as a business record, and therefore that 

any lack of personal involvement in its preparation by Green would go to weight and not 

admissibility. Admission of the payoff statement is not clearly erroneous or against the logic 
14

and effect of the facts and circumstances, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

admitting the exhibit. 

III. Motion to Amend

A. Standard of Review

The trial court holds broad discretion in deciding whether to permit or deny 

amendments to the pleadings. First of Am. Bank, N.A. v. Norwest Bank, Ind., N.A., 765 

N.E.2d 149, 152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), trans. denied. On review, we apply an abuse of 

discretion standard. Id. Parties are not entitled to conform the pleadings at the end of a trial 

to an unlitigated defense. Woodward v. Heritage Constr. Co., Inc., 887 N.E.2d 994, 999 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Amendments of the pleadings to conform to the evidence are not a tool 

to reopen litigation, but rather are permissible only when the parties have consented to and 

litigated issues not originally raised by the pleadings. Id. 

B. Kuchaes’s Motion to Amend

Kuchaes filed a motion to amend pleadings to conform to the evidence after the close 

of trial. Kuchaes argues that the pleadings should be amended to add a defense of 

recoupment, based on the losses he calculates he sustained when Chase changed the locks on 

the property underlying the foreclosure suit, thus denying him access to the property for some 

nine months. Kuchaes argues that this defense of recoupment is separate from the issue of 

setoff that was part of his dismissed counterclaim. Kuchaes further argues that the issue was 

tried by agreement of the parties. The court denied the motion, stating that the issue was not 

in fact tried by agreement of the parties. The record indicates, and we conclude, that the 
15

evidence did not support the motion to amend and the trial court did not abuse its discretion 

in denying the motion.

IV. Motion to Reopen

A. Standard of Review

The trial court’s decision whether to reopen a cause for presentation of additional 

evidence will be disturbed on appeal only if there is a clear abuse of discretion. In re 

Marriage of Ford, 470 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), trans. denied.

B. Kuchaes’s Motion to Reopen

Following the trial, Kuchaes also motioned the court to reopen the case to allow him 

to submit additional evidence. The first piece of evidence that Kuchaes wanted to submit 

was a letter from Chase that Kuchaes found “in reviewing [his] file after resting” that might 

have indicated that Chase was entitled to a lower principal balance than that indicated in the 

payoff statement. Appellant’s App. at 113. In denying the motion, the court noted that it had 

examined the letter and, even if admitted, it would not change the result. The court further 

noted that Kuchaes had failed to show why the evidence was not offered during the trial. The 

second piece of evidence that Kuchaes wished to have admitted was an assignment of the 

mortgage. The court noted that the only possible purpose of admitting that evidence would 

be to dispute the facts established by Kuchaes’s stipulation that Chase held a valid lien on the 

property. Kuchaes has not provided us cause to say that the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion to reopen.
16

V. Attorney Fees

Finally, Kuchaes contests the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees. The decision to 

award attorney’s fees and the amount of the award are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 

Mitchell v. Mitchell, 695 N.E.2d 920, 924 (Ind. 1998). Kuchaes challenges the fees related 

to summary judgment investigation, motion to compel activity, and time spent responding to 

Kuchaes’s request for production. Interwoven with these arguments, Kuchaes continues to 

assert that Chase is not a real party in interest and that it invited his inquiries. We note that 

the trial court appears to have gone over the attorney’s fee request in detail and did exclude 

amounts related to obtaining loan documents. We agree with the trial court that summary 

judgment is appropriate in this area of the law, and it was not unreasonable for Chase to 

spend some time investigating that possible route. Kuchaes challenges the specific number 

of hours that Chase claimed in this area, but the trial court found the charges to be reasonable 

and proportionate, and we do not believe there was any abuse of discretion in that 

determination. Kuchaes also challenges time spent responding to his motion to compel and 

request for production. The court noted that “a great deal of discovery” was engaged in by 

the parties. Appellant’s App. at 13. It appears that Kuchaes’s actions made this case more 

time consuming than many other foreclosure cases, based on his motions and requests 

relating to discovery. We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in its award 

of attorney’s fees.
17

Conclusion

Concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Kuchaes’s 

motion to continue, in its evidentiary rulings, in denying Kuchaes’s motion to amend, in 

denying Kuchaes’s motion to reopen, or in its award of attorney’s fees, we affirm.

Affirmed. 

RILEY, J., and KIRSCH, J., concur.