* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### JAN 13 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

PATRICIA A. GROOMS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. KENNETH S. APFEL, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-6218 (D.C. No. CIV-96-2038-A) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO , BALDOCK , and HENRY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a dec ision on the briefs without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Claimant Patricia A. Grooms appeals from the distri ct court’s order affirming the decision of the Commissioner of Socia l Security. In that decision, the Commissioner denied claimant’s applications fordisability benefits under sections 402(d) (adult child’s benefits) and 423(a) (disability benefits) of Title II of the Social Security Act. We exercise jurisdictio n under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and affirm. Claimant alleges disability as of October 12, 1963 (her date of birth) for the disability benefits application, see Appellant’s App. at 58, and disability as of October 12, 1980 (her 17th birthday) for the adult child’s benefits application, see id. at 62. She contends that she is disabled by virtu e of meeting the requirements of 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1, Listi ngs 12.03 (schizophrenic, paranoid and other psychotic disorders) and 12.06 ( anxiety related disorders). See Appellant’s App. at xxxvii. In 1994 an administrat ive law judge (ALJ) determined that claimant met the requirements of th ose listings and was therefore eligible for supplemental security income benefits as of January 8, 1993. See id. at 26. Claimant then filed the applications at bar , asserting that the conditions that qualified her for disability benefits in 1993 also existed prior to that date. On August 25, 1995, a second ALJ reviewed claimant’s m edical records, work history, and testimony and determined that claimantwas not disabled as of-3-

March 31, 1986 and/or October 12, 1985, which were her last dates for eligibility under the respective sections. See id. at 20. Our review is limited to determining whether the AL J’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and comports withrelevant legal standards.
See Casias v. Secretary of Health & Human Serv. , 933 F.2d 799, 800-01 (10th Cir. 1991). The Secretary has established a five-step sequentia l evaluation process for determining whether a claimant is disab led. If a determination can be made at any of the steps that a claimant is or is not disabled, evaluation under a subsequent step is not necessary. Step one determines whether the claimant is present ly engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is, disabil ity benefits are denied. If he is not, the decision maker must proceed to st ep two: determining whether the claimant has a medically se vere impairment or combination of impairments. This determination is governed by the Secretary’s severity regulations, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(c), 416.920(c) (1986), is based on medical factors alon e, and, consequently, does not include consideration of suc h vocational factors as age, education, and work experience. Pu rsuant to the severity regulations, the claimant must make a thre shold showing that his medically determinable impairment or combinatio n of impairments significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities, i.e., “the abilities and aptitudes nece ssary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1521(b), 416.921(b) (1986) . Presumptively, if the medical severity of a claimant’s impairments is so slight that the impairments could not interfere with or have a seri ous impact on the claimant’s ability to do basic work activities, irr espective of vocational factors, the impairments do not prevent the claimant from engaging in substantial gainful activity.

. . . .-4- Step three “determines whether the impairment is eq uivalent to one of a number of listed impairments that the Secr etary acknowledges are so severe as to preclude substanti al gainful activity,” pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 41 6.920(d) (1986). If the impairment is listed and thus conclusively p resumed to be disabling, the claimant is entitled to benefits. I f not, the evaluation proceeds to the fourth step, 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 (e), 416.920(e) (1986), where the claimant must show that the “impa irment prevents [him] from performing work he has performed in the past.” If the claimant is able to perform his previous work, he i s not disabled. Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-51 (10th Cir.1988) (additional quotations and citations omitted). Claimant argues that the ALJ made three errors: (1) at step three he rejected without good cause Dr. Auror a Cortez-Sy’s (claimant’s treating physician) diagnoses in 1993-1995 of menta l impairment and refused to consider whether her diagnosis was pertinent eviden ce of claimant’s mental impairments in 1985 and 1986; (2) at step four he i nterposed his own “medical expertise” regarding claimant’s residual functionin g capacity and his findings in that regard are not supported by substantial eviden ce; and (3) at step four he failed to apply the correct legal standards in deci ding whether claimant had the functional capacity in 1985 to engage in substantia l gainful activity. A review of the ALJ’s decision shows that he did co nsider Dr. Cortez-Sy’s diagnosis. He determined, however, that some of Dr . Cortez-Sy’s findings were not supported in claimant’s medical or historical r ecords, and in fact were contradicted by other medical and psychological reports. See Appellant’s App. at 22-25. Dr. Cortez-Sy’s opinion that claimant has b een disabled because of her1 In order to meet the listing under 12.03, a claimant must have “psychotic

features with deterioration from a previous level o f functioning” with “medically documented persistence” of at least one of the foll owing: delusions; hallucinations; catatonic or other grossly disorgan ized behavior; or incoherence, loosening of associations, illogical thinking, or p overty of content of speech associated with either blunt, flat, or inappropriat e affect or emotional withdrawal or isolation. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1 , Listing 12.03. These symptoms must result in “marked restriction of activities of daily living ; or . . . [m]arked difficulties in maintaining social functioning; or [d]eficiencies of concentration, persistence or pace resulting in frequent failure t o complete tasks in a timely manner; or . . . repeated episodes of deteriorationor decompensation in work or work-like settings . . . .” Alternatively, the clai mant may show “[m]edically (continued...) -5- mental condition since the age of twenty or before arises from her review of a psycho social evaluation for claimant prepared on January 27, 1984. See id. at 239. In that report, a “psychological assistant” e xpressed claimant’s “presenting problem” as “social isolation - no friends, no out- of-house activities, little interaction with family.” See id. at 240. He observed that claimant had “lots of early responsibility in caring for sibs, both afterschool and at night;” that she had graduated from high school and completed a cashier’ s training program; and that she had held a series of jobs that were each of short duration. See id. at 240-41. He reported that she had left those jobs “due to ha ssels [sic], those received and those witnessed.” He found claimant to be “[w]ell -oriented, memory vague, thought context somewhat mature and child like, no evidence of delusions or hallucinations.” Id. at 241. Upon review of the listings, 1 we conclude that the ALJ had good cause to1 (...continued)

documented history of one or more episodes of acute symptoms, signs and functional limitations” that result in repeated epi sodes of deterioration or “two or more years of inability to function outside of a hi ghly supportive living situation.” Id. In order to meet listing 12.06, the claimant must s how “medically documented findings” of generalized persistent anxi ety accompanied by at least one of the following: three out of four of the fol lowing signs or symptoms: motor tension, autonomic hyperactivity, apprehensive expe ctation, or vigilance and scanning; or by “a persistent irrational fear of a specific object, activity, or situation which results in a compelling desire to avoid the dreaded object, activity, or situation”; or by recurrent severe pan ic attacks occurring on the average of at least once a week; or by recurrent ob sessions or compulsions which are a source of marked distress; or by recurrent an d intrusive recollections of a traumatic experience that are a source of marked di stress. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P., App. 1, Listing 12.06. These symptoms must result in at least two of the following: marked restriction of activities of daily living, marked difficulties in maintaining social functions, deficiencies of co ncentration, persistence or pace resulting in frequent failure to complete tasks in a timely manner, or in repeated episodes of deterioration that cause withdrawal fro m the situation or exacerbation of signs and symptoms; or they must result in “comp lete inability to function independently outside the area of one’s home.” Id. -6- reject Dr. Cortez-Sy’s opinion rendered in 1995 that claimant also met the listings for schizophrenic, paranoid, psychotic, oranxiety disorders at age twenty based on the report prepared in 1984. Claimant didnot present any other medical evidence documenting a severe mental disorder in 19 85-86. The ALJ found that, while claimant did have a personality problem which wouldbe classified as severe on or prior to the date that she reached age 22 or the date that she was last insured for disability insurance benef its on March 31, 1986, . . . she was still able to function reasonab ly well in the environment in which she lived . . . including hold ing a variety of-7-

jobs which would have to be classified as engaging in substantial gainful activity even though the claimant worked on ly for short periods. Appellant’s App. at 27-28. Thus, the ALJ actually made a step-two finding thatclaimant failed to make a prima facie showing that she had a mental conditi on in 1985 or 1986 that was so severe that it “significantly limit[ed] h[er] abili ty to do basic work activities.” Williams , 844 F.2d at 751. It is undisputed that claimant worked in a variety of jobs during that time and also babysat for her cous in’s child for two years and took care of her grandparents between 1986 and 1992. See Appellant’s App. at 155. Because claimant failed to make the thresholdshowing that her impairments in 1985-86 were severe enough to interfere with herability to do basic work activities, there was no need for the ALJ to contin ue to the next steps in the evaluative process. See Williams , 844 F.2d at 751 (“If [at step two] the claimant is unable to show that his impairments would have m ore than a minimal effect on his ability to do basic work activities, he is not eligible for disability benefits.”). There is therefore also no need to address claimant ’s assertions of error allegedly made by the ALJ during step four of the process. T he ALJ’s finding that claimant’s personality disorder in 1985-86 did not prevent her from being able to perform basic work activities is supported by subst antial evidence in the record, and we hold that the ALJ used the proper legal stan dards in arriving at that-8-

conclusion. The judgment of the United States District Court fo r the Western District of Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.

Entered for the Court

John C. Porfilio Circuit Judge