### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

444 444 444 444 444 NO. 03-04-00030- CV

444 444 444 444 444 Cy nt hia Sue Va ughn, App e lla nt

v. Joseph Pat rick Vaughn, Ap pellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 261ST JUDICI AL DISTRICT NO. FM 1015 30, H ONO RAB LE JOH N K. DIETZ, JUDGE PRESI DING

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Th is i s an a

ppeal fr om a

n o rd e r d e nyinga

pp e lla nt C y nth ia Va ug hn ’s pe tit ion

to enfor ce a n ag ree d final divorce decr ee a nd her motion to modify the par ent-c hild relationship. The dis tr ic t c ourt

re nd e re d a

fi na l de c re e of

div or c e on June 22 , 2 00 1, and signe d a qu a lif ie d d ome sti c relations order on September 27, 2002. I n a subseque nt action, Cy nthia Vaug hn complained that the qu a lif ie d d ome sti c re la tio ns or de r i mpe rm iss ibl y a lte re d th e div isi on

of mari ta l pr op e rt

y se t out in the div or c e de c re e and , a s a re su lt, dim ini sh e d he r s ha re of he r f or me r h us ba nd ’s re tir e me nt p lans . She a lso a lle g e d mate ri a l and su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e s in he r fi na

nc ia l status and argue d fo r a n in c re a se in h e r c hil d- su

pp or t pa y me nts . T he dis tr ic t c ourt de nie d h e r p e tit ion s. We w ill a ff ir m.The c ircumstance s conce rning this loan are not a part of this rec ord and a re not at issue on 1 a pp e a l. 2 BACK GR OUND Cy nthia and Joseph Vaug hn wer e mar ried on F ebrua

ry 20 , 1988, and had thr ee
c hil dr e n to g e the r. Cy

nth ia V aughn is se lf

-e mpl oy e d a s a

c hir op ra c tor

and Jose phVa

ug hn is employ ed by

Southwest Airlines. On Marc h 5, 2001, afte r thirteen y ear s of marr iag e, Joseph Vau g hn filed for divorce based on standard no-fa ult gr ounds. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 6.001 ( West 1998). B oth pa rt ie s h a ve sin c e re -m arr ie d to oth e r i nd ivi du a ls. The district c ourt rende red a final decr ee ( “the De cre e”) on J une 22, 2001, g ranting

a d i v o rc e t o the par

ties on the g round of insupportability , se e id

. , a p p o in ti n g th e p arti e s a s joint manag ing c onservators of their thre e childre n, se e id . § 10 1. 01 6 ( West 20 02 ), and div idi ngthe ir marital estate

. T h e De cre e desig nated Cy nthia Vaug hn as the c ustodial parent with the e x clusive rig ht to establish the prim ary residenc e of the children within Travis and c ontiguous c ounties. See id. § 153.134(b)( 1) (West 2002). J oseph Vaug hn would pay $450.00 per month in child support, an amount previously

ag ree d upon by

the par ties. Since J une 22, 2001, the thre e childre n have lived with Cy nthia Vaug hn. The De cre e est ab l i s hed ea ch par ent’s rig hts to possession of the children. Memorializing a pr ev i o u s ag ree ment betwee n the par ties, the Dec ree also provided that Joseph Vaug hn, as par

t of his c hild-support obligation, would pay off a $17,866.90 marital debt from a loan taken a g ainst his Sout hwes t Ai rlines 401(k) pla n. I n exchang e, the pa

rties ag ree d that J oseph 1A QDRO pe rmits a non-employ ee f ormer spou s e t o receive dire ctly his or her sha

re of 2 retire ment benef

its from a re ti re ment plan that is part of the marital estate

. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 804.001(4) ( West 2004). These be nefits would otherw ise be pa id to the plan participa nt (the employ ee f

ormer spouse ). Id. A QDRO is a sig ned cour t order, dir ecte d to a ret i reme nt plan a dmi nis tr a tor , s e tti ngou t in de ta il the inf or ma tio n the a dmi nis tr a tor wo uld ne e d in or de r to c a lc ulate and send to ea ch fo rm er spouse the cor rec t amount of pay

ment. Se e id . § 804.003(f) . An orde r be c ome s “ qu a lif

ie d” by c on ta ini ngstatut or ily

re qu ir e d in fo rm a tio n, su c h a s th e name and a dd re ss of the plan pa

rticipant and the alternate pay ee ( non-employ ee fo rm er spouse), the amount or perc entag e to be pa id to eac h, or t he method for calculatingthe amount to be paid, a nd the number of pay ments or per iod of time to which the orde r applies. Id. A par ty may petition a court to re nder a QDRO if t h e court that re ndere d a fina l decr ee of divorce did not provide a QD RO permitting pay ment of bene fits to an alternate pay ee. T ex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.103 (West 1998). 3 Vaug hn’s obl igation to pay $450.00 per month in child support would not beg in until M ay 1, 2005, at which point the loan would be paid off.

The Southwest Airlines 401(k) plan was one of t wo re tirement ac counts arising out of Jos eph Va

ug hn’s employ

ment with Southwest Airlines that were part of the marital estate ; the other wa s a S o u t h we s t Airlines Profit Sharing Plan. The De cre e aw arde d Cy nthia Vaug hn a pe rc e nta g e of

the c omm

un ity pr op ert y port ion

of e a c h r e tir e me nt a c c ount, to b e mor e sp e c if ic a lly descr ibed in a “qua lified domestic re lations order” (QDRO) : 2

I T I S ORDE RED AN D D ECR EE D that th e wi fe , CY NT HIA SUE VAU GHN , is awa rded the following as her

sole and separ ate proper

ty , and the husband is divested o f a l l r i g h t , t i t l e , i n t e r e s t , an d c l a i m i nan d

t o t h a tp r o p e rt y: * * * 5. A p o rt ion of J OSEPH PATRI CK VAUGH N’s re tirement bene fits in the Southwest Airli n e s 401(k) plan a rising out of

J OSEPH PATRI CK VAUGH N’s employ ment with Southwest Airlines, that portion being 40% and more particula rly define d in a Qualifie d Domestic Relations Orde r. 6. A portion of JOS EPH PATRICK VAUGH N’s re tirement bene fits in the Sou thw e st A ir lin e s Pr of

it Sh ari ngPlan a

ri sin g ou t of

JO S EP H PA TRI CKThe Dec ree confirme d that 1,625.255435 share s of common stock in Southwest Airlines 3 P r o f i tS h ar i n g P l anw e r e J o s e p h V a u g h n ’ s s e p ar a t e p r o p e rty. Alexander testified that Southwest A irlines conver ted from share s to units in the quarte r 4 ended Septe mber 30, 1995, to fa cilitate investment within the fund, cr eatingthe equivale nt of a mutual fund that held all the plan’ s investments as of the date of the c onversion. She fur ther testified that the conve rsion rate betwee n share s and units was not one to one. 4 VAUGH N’s employ

ment with Southwest Air l i n es , that portion being 42.5% of the c omm

un ity po rt ion of the Plan a s of Ma y 31 , 20 01 and mor e pa

rt ic ula rl y define d in a Qualifie d Domestic Relations Orde r.[ ] 3 * * *
Th e pa

rt ie s we re un a

ble to a g re e on

the te rm s o f t

he QD RO fo r o ve r a

y e ar. On July 10, 2002, the district court he ld a contested hear ing on Cy nthia Vaug hn’s motion to enter a Q DRO. The hear ing primarily involved a deter mination of the amount of community p ro p er t y i n J oseph Va ug hn ’s Pr of

it Sh ari ngPlan a s o f M ay

31 , 2 00 1. De bo ra

h Al e xan de r, a c e rt if

ie d pu bli c a c c ounta

nt, testified for Josep h Vaughn. Tr acingthe sepa rate and community

interests in the ac count, she deter mined that the total number of units of the Southwest A irlines Stock Fund on May 31, 2001, was 15,831.866. J oseph Va ug hn’s sepa

rate proper

ty portion, afte r adjustments f or splits and other 4 chang es, wa s 13,113.336 units. S ubtrac ting Joseph Vaug hn’s s ep ar at e proper ty from the total number of units, Alexander de termined that 2,718.530 units of t he S outhwest Airlines Stock Fund
we re c omm

un ity pr op e rt y . App lyingCy

nth ia Va ug hn ’s 42 .5 % int e re st in the Pr of it Shari ngPlan to this amount, Alex ander

conclude d that 1,155.375 units of Southwest Airlines St ock Fund were Cy nthia Vaug hn’s sepa

rate proper

ty
. The P rofit Sharing Plan also included two other f unds, a MAS B a lanc e d Po rt fo lio F un d a nd a Ha rb or Ca pit al App re c ia tio n F un d, tha t w e re e nti re ly

c omm un ity proper ty
.5 Th e di st ri ct cou rt

sig ne d a QD RO on

Se pte mbe r 2 7, 20 02 , w hic h, in r e le va nt p a rt , a ssi g ne d to Cy

nth ia Va ug hn , a s A lte rn a te Pay e e , th e fo llo wi ngbe ne fi ts:

a. SOUTHWEST AI RL I NES CO. PR OFI T SHARI NG PL AN: Al te rn a te Pay e e is h e re by a ssi g ne d 2 .9 75 un its in t

he MA S B a lanc e d Po rt fo lio F un d, 0. 65 7 unit s in the Ha rb or Ca pit a l App re c ia tio n F un d, and 1, 15 5. 37 5 unit s in the Southwest Airlines Stock F und which re prese nts Alternate Pay ee’ s 42.5% perc ent of “ the community proper ty portion” of Par

ticipant’s Profit Sharing Plans Account a s of May

31, 2001. b. SOUTHWEST AI RL I NES CO. 401(k) PL AN: Alternate Pay ee is here by assig ned 40% of Participant’s 401(K) Plan a s of the date of May 31, 2001 befor e re duction for a ny o u t s t an d i n g loan to Participant fr om t he Plan, su c h amou

nt t o b e take n p ro ra

ta fr om e a c h investme nt f

un d in which Participa

nt’s 401(K) Plan a ccount ba lance is invested on May 31, 2001, o t h e r t h ant h e P art i c i p an t ’ s l o anf u n d , i f an y; including e arning s there o n and less losses there on from May 31, 2001, which are seg reg ated, a ssigne d and tra nsfer red to the e x cl u s ive bene ficial intere st of Alternate Pay ee. The QD RO was ac cepte d by the Southwest A irlines plan administrator and beca me final on Oc tober 27, 2002. Be tween Ma y 31, 2001, and Nove mber 2 0 0 2, the stock marke t had experienc ed a devaluation that decr ease d the value of t he plan units that Cy nthia Vaug hn ultimately

rec eived unde r the QDRO. When distributions were ma de in November 2002, she re ceive d $88,842.85 from the plan administrator, $63,643.41 less than the value of her units when the Dec ree wa s enter ed. Contending that she was entitled to the dollar va lue of the units at the time the De cre e wa s entere d, Cy nthia Vaug hn filed a pe tition for enforc emen t o n Dec ember 16, 2002, seekingto amend theSee Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.125( b) (West 2002). 5 6 QDRO to ref

lect the value of retire ment benef its at t he ti me t he Decre e was enter ed rather than the number of sha

res in ea ch plan. At the same tim e , Cy

nth ia Va ug hn fi le d a Pe tit ion to M od if

y Pare nt- Chi ld Relationship seeking to increa se child support pay ments based on alleg ed substantial a nd materia l chang es in her f

inancial status. Se e id . § 15 6. 40 1( a )( 1) (We st 2 00 2)

. She a sk e d the dis tr ic t c ourt to
awa rd her , in lieu of the amount of c hild support in the Decr ee, the amount of statutorily derive d child support to which she would be presumptively entitled —which, bas ed o n J o seph Va ug hn’s 5 salary at that time, w as dete rmined to be $1,176.56 pe r month. Of this amount, $450 would continue to go towa

rd re pay ment o f the mar ital loan on the 401(k) pla n, with $726.56 eac h month going dir e c tly to C y nth ia Va ug hn fo r c hil d s up po rt
. Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

he ld a he ari ngon

bo th p e tit ion s o n O c tob e r 3 , 2 00 3. Cy nth ia Vaug hn testified that, bef

ore the divorce , she had worke d as an associate chiropra ctor in a nother a rea
c hir op ra c tor ’s c lin ic and

ha d r e c e ive d a sa lary . I n 199 8, sh e purc ha se d h e r o wn c lin ic . A t th e tim e of the divorc e, she w as ave rag ing a bout $113,000 in sa lary

per y ear from her prac tice. In October 2001, sever al months after the di vorce , she re located he r clinic. She a dmitted that she failed to do any marke ting f

or this new location. She subsequently experience d a slow but ste ady decline in the
numbe r o f p a tie nts sh e saw b ut c on tin ue d to wo rk

the same numbe r o f h ours . At first, Cy

nthia Vaug hn continued to pay herse lf the salar

y she had be en ac customed to r e c e ivi nga s a

sa lari e d e mpl oy e e , dra

wi ng on a lin e of c re dit

e xten de d to he r c lin ic . A t th e tim e of her testimony , she had r eac hed the limit of this li ne of cr ed i t , as we ll as the cre dit lim its of her7

pers on al c redi t ca rds ; s he o wed $4 2, 00 0 o n t he l in e of c redi t an d $ 40 ,0 00 on her c redi t ca rds . By the time of the he aring , s h e wa s p ay i n g herse lf a sala ry of about $2,462 pe r month. Her ne w h u s b an d , w h o w a s a ls o a c h ir o p r a c to r an d to w h o m s h e h a d s o ld a h a lf

- in te r e s t in th e c li n ic , was
rec eiving half of the net income gene rate d by the pra ctice. T hroug h September 2003, he had ea rned $12,750, and she ha d ear ned $19,700 fr om the clinic’s prof its for the ca lendar

y ear . During the previous y ear , her husba

nd had re ceive d only

$100 from the c linic. Cy nthia Vaug hn had taken sever al measure s to improve marke ting a nd incre ase he r patient base

. She had taken out a larg er advertiseme nt in the phone book, and she and her staff ha d

r e ceive d telephone c oachingand have beg un sending adver tisements to new re sidents of Austin. She joined a mana g ement pra ctice c ompany , which she a nd her s t af

f at t en ded seve ral times a y ear for extensive training. At t h e t ime of the he aring , these c hang es had y ielded a mode st impact on her p ra ct i ce , b u ts h e h ada p o s i t i v e o u t l o o k fo r h er cl i n i c f o r t h e f u t u re . Fu rt h er m o re , h er

av er age monthly expenses had declined from $7,868.78 per month in 2001 to $6,466.77 per month in 2003. Cy nthia Vau gh n t ra v eled out of town on se vera l occa sions between July 26, 2001, and De cembe r 5, 2002. Much of the trave l w as work-r elated and within Te x as. She and her staff attended a wee kend tra ining se ssion held by the manag ement pra ctice c ompany she had joined. She

a lso a tte nd e d c on tin

uin g e du c a tio n cla sse s and too k sev e ra l tr ips in c on ne c tio n w ithhe r m e mbe rs hip on the National B oard of Chiroprac tic Ex aminers. Her chiropra ctic clinic covere d the expenses of any trave l that was work- related or for continuing e d u ca tion. The U.S. Depa rtment of Ve tera

ns Af fa ir s r e imb ur se d h e r f

or tw o tr ips sh e ma de to Wa sh ing ton , D .C.At the hea ring , Cy nthia Vaug hn testified that J oseph Va ug hn had re paid the loan they had 6 taken on his 401(k) plan. 8

She continued to trave l in 2003. I n J anuar y , she and her husband took he r childre n
on a c ru ise to the Wes te rn Carr ibe an. I n F e br ua ry , th e y we nt s kii ng , u sin g Sou thw e st A ir lin e s Ra pid Re wa rd s p oin ts t o p ur c ha se the pla ne tic ke ts. He r ne w hus ba nd pa id mos t of

the e xpe ns e s o f t

he se trips. At the time , h er h u s b an d re ceive d a sala ry of $2,500 per

month from his positi on with the Americ an Chiropra ctic Association. He no long er holds this position, and his only curr ent source of income is his work at the chiropra ctic clinic. When Cy nthia Vaug hn and her husba nd are awa

y f r o m t h e c l i n i c , t h e y h i r e s o m e o n e t o c o v e r t h e p r a c t i c e , w h o m t h e y p ay $ 2 0 0 p e r d ay. J oseph Va

ug hn also testified at the he aring

. At the time of the divorce , he re ceive d

a monthly salary of approximately $5,025 from his employ

ment with Southwest Airlines. J oseph Va ug hn c on tr ibute d $4 69 .5 2 pe r mon th to his 40 1( k) pla n and pa id $7 00 pe r mon th on his ve hic le note. His monthly

expenses exceede d his monthl y income by

about $2,500. 6 Sou thw e st A ir lin e s h a d r e c e ntl y of fe re d h im a

po sit ion tha t wo uld have re qu ir e d h im to relocate. J oseph Vaug hn turned down the pos ition beca use he wanted to stay

in Austin to be near his c hil dr e n. As a

re su lt, Sou thw e st A ir lin e s p la c e d h im i n a n h ourl y po sit ion that pa id s ig nif

ic a ntl y less than what he could have been ma king. I n his new position, he has fe w opportunities to work overtime. At the time of the he aring , J oseph Va ug hn was pa

y ing t em p o ra ry

child support pursuant to a c ourt order . Be fore the tempora ry support pay

ments, he had pr ovided seve ral hundre d9

dollars for his children ea ch month in addition to the $450.00 he paid on the loan on his 401(k) plan. J oseph Va

ug hn visited with his children regularly

. The district cour

t denied Cy

nthia Vaug hn’s petitions. This appeal followe d.
DI SCU SSIO N On appe al, Cy

nthia Vaug hn raises two issues, c halleng ing the district court’s re fusal to g ra nt h e r p e tit ion

fo r e nf or c e me nt s e e kin g to a

me nd the QD RO and

its de nia l of

he r p e tit ion

to mod i fy t h e p ar en t -c h i l d

re l at i o n s h i p s ee k i n g i n cr ea s edch i l d s u p p o rt p ay m en t s . We will address ea ch in turn.
P etition for enforcem ent of f inal d ivorce decre e I n h e r f ir st i ssu e , Cy

nt hi a Vau ghn a

rgue s th a t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in re fu sin g to g rant he r petition for e nforc ement, in which she had aske d the cour t to amend the languag e of the QDRO to ref

lect the va lue of re tirement bene fits at the time of the De cre e’s e ntry . I n particula r, she

a sse rt s th a t th e QD RO imp ro pe rl y c ha ng e d th e pa

rties’ a g re e d d ivi sio n o f t he ir mari ta l e state memorialized in the Dec ree . See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.0 0 7 (a ). S h e claims that the De cre e
u nambig uously

provided that he r shar e in the Southwest Airlines re tirement plans would be deter mined as of Ma

y 31, 2001. She ar g ues that the de cre e ef fec tively established May

31, 2001, as a “ valuation cut-of

f date ,” on which date the plan admini strator would calculate the amounts due to her unde r the plans by applying he r per centa g e intere st in each a ccount to the total value of ea ch plan on that date. She be lieved that any fluctuations in the equity value of these a ccounts oc curr ing afte r May 31, 2001, would not affe ct the dollar a mount d i s t ri b u t ed to her fr om the acc ounts. She10

further contends that the Q DRO, which was acc epted by the plan administrator on O ctober 27, 2002, improperly

included the languag e, “including ear nings there on and less losses theron fr om May 31, 20 01 , w hic h a

re se g re g a te d, a ssi g ne d, and tr ans fe rr e d to the e xclu siv e be nefi cia l us e of ” Cy nth ia Vaug hn. She asser

ts that this lang uag e conflicts with the clea r and una mbiguous ter

ms of the Dec ree and improper ly

alters the substantive division of prope rty made in the De cre e. An ag ree d divorce decr ee implementingan ag ree d proper ty division is controlled by the rules of construction applicable to or dinary contra cts. Allen v. Allen , 7 1 7 S. W. 2 d 3 1 1 , 3 1 2 ( T e x. 19 86 ); Harve

y v. H arvey , 905 S.W .2d 760, 764 (Tex. App.—Austi n 1 9 9 5, no writ). I f a divorc e decr ee is unambiguous, the c ourt has no author ity to alter or modify t h e original disposition of proper ty
. Ha wor th v . H

awo rth , 795 S.W .2d 296, 300 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1990, no writ). Whether a

n ambig uity exis ts in an ag ree ment is a question of law, w hich we r eview de novo

. National Union Fire Ins. v. CBI

Indus., Inc

. , 907 S.W .2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995); Bishop v. Bishop , 74 S. W
. 3 d 8 77, 880 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.). Conflicting interpre tations or expectations of the parties reg arding the contra ct do not cre ate a n ambig uity

. Fo rb au v . A e tna Life I n s . Co. , 87 6 S .W .2 d 13 2, 13 4 ( Te x. 19 94 ). Ra the r, a c on tr a c t is a mbi g uo us if its me anin g is
uncer tain or i t is reasona

bly susceptible to more tha

n one mea ning. Coker v. Cok

er , 650 S.W .2d 391, 393 (Tex. 1983).

Th e fa mil y c od e a uth or ize s a c ti ons to e ith e r e nf or c e a pr ior div or c e de c re e or

to clar ify an ambig uous decr ee. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 9.006-.008 (W est 1998). A court may rende r orde rs to enfor ce the division of property made in the decr ee “to assist in the implementation of or to cla

rify the prior or der.” Id. § 9.006(a) . I f the district cour t fi n d s t h e o ri gi n al division ofOnly para g raph 6 of t he Decre e, relating solely to the Profit Sharing Plan, refe renc ed the 7 May 31, 2001, date. Cy

nthia Vaug hn argues that the De cr ee es t ab l i s hed May 31, 2001, as the
“ va luatio n c ut- of

f d a te ” fo r b oth

pla ns . 11 proper ty ambig uous or not specific enoug h to be enf orce able by

contempt, it may

enter a cla rifying order to enforc e complianc e with orig inal division of the property

. Id. § 9.008(b). Fur thermore , a par

ty may petition a court to rende r a QDRO i f the c ourt that rende red a final decr ee of divorce dividing the marital property did not provide a Q DRO. Id. § 9 .1 03 (We st 1998). Howe ver, a court may not amend, modify , alter, or chang e “the division of property made
or a p p r o v e d

i nt h e d e c r e e , ” a

n d an“ o r d e r t o e n f o r c e t h e d i v i s i o ni s l i m i t e d t o ano r d e r

t o a s s i s tin the implementation of

or to clar ify

the prior or der.” Id. § 9 .0 07 (a ); se e als o Mar sh all v . P rie

ss , 99 S.W. 3d 15 0, 15 7 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14th Di st. ] 200 2, no pe t.) . Su c h o rd e rs may mor e pr e c ise ly specify the manner of car

rying out the proper

ty division pre viously order ed so long a s the substantive d iv is io n o f th e p r o p e rty is n o t a lte red. Dec hon v. De chon , 909 S.W .2d 950, 956 (Tex. App.—El Pa so 19 95 , n o w ri t) . A lte ri ngthe su bs tanti ve div isi on

of pr op e rt y ma de in a f

ina l di vo rc e de c re e is bey ond the power

of the district cour

t, and such a

chang e is unenfor cea

ble. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.0 07 (b ); s e e als o H

awo rth , 795 S.W .2d at 300 (“ Be cause we have found the orig inal decr ee unambig uous, the trial cour t had no authority

to enter a n order modify ing the orig inal dispositi on of proper ty .”). The De cre e itself did not indicate whe ther Cy n t h i a Va ug hn would be aw arde d a p e r c e n ta g e o f

th e u n it s o r

a p e r c e n ta g e o f

th e ma r k e t v a lu e o f

e a c h p la na s o f M ay 3 1 , 2 0 0 1. 7 Moreov er , i t expressly

contemplated that a QDRO would be enter ed to ef fec tuate the division of proper ty specifie d in the decr ee. Specifica lly , it state d that distributions made to Cy nthia Vaug hn12

from the r etireme nt p l ans would be “ more pa rticularly define d in a Qualifie d Domestic Relations Orde r.” The QD RO entere d by the cour t can pr operly

be viewe d as a c larify

ing or der. See Te x. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 9. 00 8( b) ; Al for d v . A lfo rd , 40 S.W .3d 187, 189 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 20 0 1 , n o p e t. )

. T h e Q D RO d id n o t a lt e r th e s u b s ta n ti v e d iv is io n o f p r o p e rty ma d e in the divorce decr ee—it did not chang e the date on which Cy nthia Vaug hn’s intere sts in the p lans would be calc ulated, n o r did it chang e the pe rce ntag e shar e that she w ould rec eived f rom the plans. The QDR O m er el y

clar ified that Cy

nthia Vaug hn was to re ceive units from the Profit Sharing Plan repr esenting 42.5% of the community portion of that plan as of Ma y 31, 2001. The QD RO clarif ied that the va lu e o f Cy

n th ia V a u g h n ’ s aw ar d e d u n it s w o u ld f lu c tu a te w it

h th e ma r k e t a f te r M a y 31, 2001. The QDRO incorpora ted the par

ties’ ag ree ment by

providing that Cy

nthia Vaug hn’s sh are of the re tir e me nt pla ns wo uld be c a lc ulate d by a pp lying a c e rt a in pe rc e nta g e to e a c h a c c ount. Moreove r, the De cre e itself had stipulated tha t a QDRO be entered to effe ctuate a nd “more particula rly define ” this division. The Q DRO there fore serve d its int ended pur pose of implementing

a ndc l ar i f y i n g t h e d i v i s i o no f

b e n e f i t s s e to u ti nt h e o r i g i n a l d e c r e e an d d i d n o ti mp e r

mis sib ly “ame nd, alter, modify , or cha ng e th e d i v i s i o n of prope rty made or approve d in the decr ee of divorce .” See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 9.007( a). We ove rrule Cy nthia Vaug hn’s first issue.
P e ti ti on t o m odi fy pa r e nt -c hild r e lat ion ship

I n her second issue, Cy

nthia Vaug hn argues that the district c ourt err ed i n d en y ing her petition t o modify pare nt-child relationship because the evidenc e adduc ed at tria l13

overw helmingly

proved a materia l and substantial chang e in her economic c ircumstance s since the entry of the last orde r g overning h er ch i l d support. I n particula r, she a rg ues that the district cour t abused its discre tion by

failing to make findings under the t hree -step st atutory proce dure f or setting child support. Se e id . § 154.125(b) ( West 2002); Sanchez v . Sanchez , 9 1 5 S. W. 2 d 9 9 , 102 (Te x. App.—San Antonio 1996, no writ). She also a rg ues that a modification is in the best interest of he r children. Section 154.125(b) findings

First, Cy nthia Vaug hn argues that the district cour t erre d by failing to make statutory finding s when de ny ing he r petition to modify

. By implication, she also argues that the district cour t
a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in fa ili ng to ana ly ze the statut or

y g uid e lin e s f

or se tti ngc hil d- su

pp or t pa y me nts
. See Te x. F a m. C od e Ann. § 1 54 .1 25 (b ); Sanchez , 915 S.W .2d at 102.

When init ia ll y

s e tt in g c h il d

s u p p o rt p ay me n ts , a c o u rt m u s t c o n s id e r

an d make fi nd ing s und e r the statut or y g uid e lin e s. Te x. F a m. Cod e Ann. § 1 54 .1 25 (b ); Sanchez , 915 S.W .2d

a t 10 2. Ho we ve r, pa

rt ie s ma y make an a g re e me nt a s to c hil d- su pp or t amou nts ou tsi de the g uid e lin e s. Tex. Fam. C ode Ann. § 154.124(a) (West 2002). I f a court finds the agr eeme nt to be in t he child’s best interest, it shall enter an orde r in ac corda

nce w ith the ag ree ment. Id. § 154.124(b). I t is within t he district cour t’s discretion whe ther to file f indings whe n order ing or
re nd e ri ngc hil d s up po rt
. In re D.S. , 76 S.W .3d 512, 522 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2002, no pet.) (trial court’s finding s only require d when amount of child support order ed or re ndere d varie s fr om guid e lin e s) ; se e als o Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 154.130 ( West 2002). No finding s of fa ct ar e require d in a modi fication hear ing unless there are disputed fac t questions over ulti mate contr olling14

issues. I n r e S tr ie gler , 915 S.W .2d 629, 635 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1996, writ denied) . A denial of a motion to modify

child support is not an orde r. In re D.S. , 7 6 S. W.3 d at 52 2 ( c ourt me re ly denied motion to modify ag ree d order ; it did not issue or rende r newchild support order ). Ther e ar e no disputed fac t questions reg ardingultimate controlling issues in this ca se. B eca use this appea l arises f rom a de nial of a pe tition t o modify rathe r than fr om an order setting child support, the district
c ourt did no t abu se its dis c re tio n in re fu sin g to ma ke c hil d- su pp or t fin din g s whe n de nying a re qu e st to modify

. Se e id

.

A district c ourt may consider the child support g uidelines to determine w hether there has bee n a mater ial or substantial cha ng e of ci rc u m stance s “that wa rra nts a modification of a

n exis ting c hild support order if the modification is in the best interest of the child.” Te x . Fam. Code Ann. § 156.402(a ) (Wes t 2 0 0 2). I f the amount of support contained in the or der doe s not substantially

confor m with the guide lines for sing le and multiple families under c hapter 154 of the fa mil y c od e , th e c ou

rt “ may modify the orde r to subst an t i al l y co nform with the g uidelines if the modification is in the best intere st of the child.” Id. § 156.402(b) ( Emphasis added.) . A cour t may also consider

other re levant evide nce in a ddition to t he fa ctors listed in the g uidelines. Id

. Gi ve n th e e vid e nc e in t

his c a se , it

wa s w ithin th e di st ri c t c ourt ’s dis c re tio n to de te rm ine that th ere was no t a ma te ri a l and

su bs tanti a l c ha

ng e . T he re fo re , it

wa s w ith in i ts d i s c r e t i o nt o d e n y t h e p e t i t i o nt o m o d i f y. Denial of m odification petiti on

Finally , Cy

nthia Vaug hn argues that the district c ourt err ed bec ause modification would be in the best intere st of the childre n. A district court may modify a child support orde r upon15

a show i n g t h at the cir cumstance s of the childre n aff ecte d by the orde r have materia lly and substantially

chang ed sin ce t h e order wa s signe d. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.401( a)( 1). The dis tr ic t c o u rt i s a c c o r d e d b r o a d d is c r e ti o nin

s e tt in g an d

mo d if y in g c h il d

s u p p o rt p ay me n ts and, absent a clea r abuse of discre tion, the court’s order will not be disturbed on appe al. In re P.J .H. , 25 S.W .3d 402, 405 (Tex. App.—For th Worth 2000, no pet.); Hoffman v. Hoffman , 805 S.W .2d 848, 85 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 19 91 , w ri t de nie d) ; se e als o D uB ois v . D uB ois , 956 S.W .2d 607, 610 (Tex. App.—Ty ler 1997, no pe t.). The test fo r an abuse of discretion is whethe r the district court a cted without re fer ence to any g uiding leg al princip l es, i n other wor ds, whether it acted arbitra rily or unreasonably

. W

orford v. Stamper , 8 01 S.W. 2d 10 8, 10 9 ( Te x. 19 90 ); Pec ht v. Pec ht , 874 S.W .2d 797, 800 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1994, no writ). Under an abuse of discretion standard, le g al and f actua l sufficienc y

of the e vidence
are not independe nt g rounds for err or but are rele vant consider ations in evaluating whether there was
an ab u se of discr etion. Pec ht , 8 7 4 S. W. 2 d a t 8 0 0
. I nma

k in g th a t d e te r

mi n a ti o n , w e v ie w the evidenc e in the lig ht most favorable to the distr i ct court’s decision and indulg e eve ry leg al presumption in fav o r o f t h e d ecision. Tucker v . Tucker , 908 S.W .2d 530, 532 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1995, writ denied). I f there is some probative, substantive evidenc e to support the district court’s de cision, there w as no abuse of discre tion. Id

.

I n a modification proce eding , the court compar es the fina ncial cir cumstance s of the child and the a ffe cted pa

rties at the time the support or der w as ente red with the ir circ umstances at the t ime the m odification is soug ht. Holley v . Holley , 864 S.W .2d 703, 706 (Tex. App.—Houston [ 1 s tDi s t
. ] 1 9 9 3 , wr i t d en i ed ). T h e m o v an t h as th e b u rd en t o s h o w a m at er i al an d s u b s t an t i al ch an ge16

by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. Id . The be st interest of the c hild should alway s be the district court’s pr imary

considera

tion. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 156.402( b). The oblig or’s a bility to pay is also a fa ctor for

the cour t to consider. See , e.g. , Sm ith v . S mi th , 1 43 S.W .3d 206, 2 1 7 ( T e x. Ap p. —Wa c o 2 00 4, no pe t.) (e a c h p are nt s ho uld su pp or t c hil d c omm e ns ur a te wi th h is o r h e r a bil ity to pay , but obligation should not be so g reat as to deny that party nece ssary expenses of living). A pare nt’s reduc tion in income may g ive a court a rea son to modify child support. See I

n re D.S. , 76 S.W .3d at 520 (voluntary undere mploy ment is f actor court may consider i n m o d i fi cation); In re Da v is , 3 0 S. W.3 d 6 09 , 6 16 -1 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —T e xar ka na 20 00 , n o p e t.) ; W

oo dallv. W

oo da ll , 837 S.W. 2d 85 6, 85 8 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14 th Dist. ] 199 2, no wr it) ; Casterline v. Burden , 560 S.W .2d 499, 501 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, no writ).

J oseph Va

ug hn’s income ha s remain ed re l at i vely the same since the time of the decr ee. His monthly expenses exceed his income by more than two thousand dollars. His new w ife helps him w ith these expenses. Cy nthia Vaug hn’s income has decr ease d in larg e par t beca use she
so ld h a lf he r in ter est in the c hir op ra c tic c lin ic to h e r n e w hus ba nd . Sh e a lso se e s f

e we r p a tie nts
. St i ll, her ea

rning s potential from her clinic, in light of both he r pre vious salary and her incre ased marke ting e ffor

ts, is posi tive, and she e x pect s, by her ow n admission, “an upwa rd trend” in her business. The district court wa s able to consider all the evidenc e and w as in the position to observe the demea

nor of the parties in lig ht of the best interests of the children. Given the c omplex nature of the ong oing r elationships in this case and the chang ing financia l situations of all the pa rties, we
are unable to conc lude that the district cour t abused its discretion in de n y i n g C y nthia Vaug hn’s reque st for modification. We over rule Cy nthia Vaug hn’s sec ond issue.17 CO NC LU SION We have ove rruled Cy

nthia Vaug hn’s i ssues on appea l. We affir m the district court’s
o r d e r d e n yi n g t h e p e t i t i o nt o e n f o r c e an d t h e p e t i t i o n

t o m o d i f y.

Bob Pembe rton, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: May

12, 2005