IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

THOMAS SLOANE,

Plaintiff.

v.

GULF INTERSTATE FIELD 

SERVICES, INC.,

Defendant.

No. 4:16-CV-01571

(Judge Brann)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FEBRUARY 26, 2018

Defendant Gulf Interstate Field Services, Inc., moved for summary judgment 

on Plaintiff Thomas Sloane’s complaint. For the reasons that follow, that motion is 

denied.

I. BACKGROUND

When oil and gas companies construct pipelines and related facilities, the 

companies utilize various inspectors to monitor the construction’s progress.1

 

Defendant Gulf Interstate Field Services (“Gulf Interstate”) is a staffing company 

that provides various inspectors to the oil and gas companies for that purpose.2

 In 

2014, Kinder Morgan, Inc., was refurbishing a compressor station along one of its 

 1 ECF No. 210-4 (Declaration of Robert Sprick) ¶¶ 3-5.

2 Id.

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gas lines in Wyalusing, Bradford County, Pennsylvania (the “Station 319 Project”), 

and contracted with Gulf Interstate to obtain several inspectors for that venture.3

 

Gulf Interstate provided several individuals, including Jack Groves as Chief 

Inspector, and Plaintiff Thomas Sloane as Welding Inspector.4

Mr. Sloane worked for Gulf Interstate and Kinder Morgan from April 15 

through October 21, 2014.5

 He was paid a flat rate of $386 for every calendar day 

during that period; for those 190 days, then, his gross pay was $73,340.6

On September 16, 2015, Mr. Sloane initiated a suit against Gulf Interstate, 

alleging that he regularly worked more than forty hours in a week and that Gulf 

Interstate failed to compensate him time-and-a-half pay for those overtime hours.7

 

His complaint argues that this compensation scheme violated the Fair Labor 

Standards Act (“FLSA”) (Count I)8 and the Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act 

(“PMWA”) (Count II),9 and constituted unjust enrichment (Count III).10 After 

discovery, on July 18, 2017, Gulf Interstate moved for summary judgment in its 

favor on all Counts, arguing that Mr. Sloane is exempt from the cited wage laws 

 3 Id. ¶ 23.

4 ECF No. 210-5 (Declaration of Jack Groves) ¶¶ 8-9.

5 ECF No. 201-7, Ex. 4 (Thomas Sloane’s Timesheets).

6 ECF No. 210-7, Ex. 3.

7 ECF No. 1 (Mr. Sloane’s Complaint) ¶ 28.

8 Id. ¶¶ 47-53.

9 Id. ¶¶ 54-62.

10 Id. ¶¶ 63-68.

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because of his pay and job responsibilities.11 Mr. Sloane opposed that motion on 

August 8, 2017.12 The parties filed numerous depositions and declarations with 

their papers; this evidence will be discussed below.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review

Summary judgment is granted when “the movant shows that there is no 

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.”13 A dispute is “genuine if a reasonable trier-of-fact could find in 

favor of the non-movant,” and “material if it could affect the outcome of the 

case.”14 To defeat a motion for summary judgment, then, the nonmoving party 

must point to evidence in the record that would allow a jury to rule in that party’s 

favor.15 When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, a court should draw 

all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.16

 11 ECF No. 210.

12 ECF No. 213.

13 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a).

14 Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Medical Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 300 (3rd Cir. 2012) (citing 

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248, 252 (1986).

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1); Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 249.

16 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citation 

omitted).

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B. The Overtime Provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act

The FLSA requires certain employers to pay certain employees time-and-ahalf pay when the employees work more than forty hours in a week.17 No such 

overtime pay is required, however, when the employee is “employed in a bona fide 

executive, administrative, or professional capacity.”18

The United States Department of Labor (“DOL”) has issued several 

regulations implementing this law. The DOL has, for example, indicated that an 

employee is “employed in a bona fide administrative capacity” if:

(1) he is “[c]ompensated on a salary . . . basis” at a fixed rate or 

higher,

(2) his “primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual 

work directly related to the management or general business 

operations of [his] employer or [his] employer’s customers,” 

and

(3) his “primary duty includes the exercise of discretion and 

independent judgment with respect to matters of 

significance.”19

The DOL has also exempted so-called “highly compensated employees” from the 

time-and-a-half law’s application. To be considered “highly compensated,” an 

employee must:

(1) be paid on a “salary . . . basis” at a fixed rate or higher, and

(2) “customarily and regularly peform[] any one or more of the 

exempt duties or responsibilities of an executive, 

 17 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1).

18 29 U.S.C. § 213(a)(1).

19 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a).

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administrative[,] or professional employee,” as those duties or 

responsibilities are defined elsewhere in the regulations.20

Gulf Interstate argues that Mr. Sloane is exempt from the FLSA overtime 

provision because he was “employed in a bona fide administrative capacity” or, in 

the alternative, because was a “highly compensated employee.” Gulf Interstate 

bears the burden of proving every element of those exemptions, which exemptions 

are construed “narrowly against the employer.”21

C. Whether Mr. Sloane’s Primary Duty Was Either (1) Directly 

Related to the Management or General Business Operations of 

Gulf Interstate or Kinder Morgan, or (2) Included the Exercise of 

Discretion and Independent Judgment

As noted above, to show that Mr. Sloane was “employed in a bona fide 

administrative capacity”—i.e., to show that he qualified for the administrative 

exemption—Gulf Interstate must, inter alia, demonstrate that there is no factual 

dispute over two aspects of Mr. Sloane’s duties a welding inspector. First, it must 

show that his “primary duty [wa]s the performance of office or non-manual work 

directly related to the management or general business operations” of Gulf 

Interstate or Kinder Morgan.22 And second, it must show that this “primary duty 

include[d] the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to 

 20 29 C.F.R. § 541.601(a).

21 Davis v. Mountaire Farms, Inc., 453 F.3d 554, 556 (3d Cir. 2006).

22 29 C.F.R. § 541.209(a)(2).

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matters of significance.”23 To qualify for the “highly compensated employee” 

exemption, Gulf Interstate need only demonstrate that Mr. Sloane “customarily and 

regularly performed” one of those administrative exemption duties. The parties do 

not appear to contest that Mr. Sloane was primarily engaged in “office or nonmanual work” or that his work related to “matters of significance.” They 

vigorously dispute the other aspects of his job, however.

A duty relates to “management or general business operations” when it 

relates to “assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as distinguished, 

for example, from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a product 

in a retail or service establishment.”24 Such work “includes, but is not limited to, 

work in functional areas such as tax[,] finance[,] accounting[,] . . . [and] quality 

control.”25 And a duty includes “the exercise of discretion and independent 

judgment” when it “involves the comparison and the evaluation of possible courses 

of conduct, and acting or making a decision after the various possibilities have 

been considered.”26 One factor to consider under this element is “whether the 

employee has authority to formulate, affect, interpret, or implement management 

 23 29 C.F.R. § 541.209(a)(3).

24 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a).

25 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b).

26 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(a).

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policies or operating practices”;

27 however, an employee does not exercise 

discretion and independent judgment when he “simply appl[ies] well-established 

techniques or procedures described in manuals or other sources within closely 

prescribed limits to determine the correct response to an inquiry or set of 

circumstances.”28 The DOL has signaled that “[o]rdinary inspection work”:

generally does not meet the duties requirements for the administrative 

exemption. Inspectors normally perform specialized work along 

standardized lines involving well-established techniques and 

procedures which may have been catalogued and described in 

manuals and other sources. Such inspectors rely on techniques and 

skills acquired by special training or experience. They have some 

leeway in the performance of their work[,] but only within closely 

prescribed limits.29

Here, the parties have offered different accounts of, and perspectives on, Mr. 

Sloane’s duties as a welding inspector. They both, however, focus their attention 

on two of those duties: Mr. Sloan’s review of potential welders for Kinder 

Morgan’s projects, and his approval vel non of the actual welds done on those 

projects.

Regarding Mr. Sloane’s review of potential welders, Gulf Interstate’s 

Operations Manager Andy Neuberger indicated that

[a] welding inspector is required to test the welders on the client’s job 

to determine whether they are capable of welding in compliance with 

 27 29 C.F.R. § 541.202(b).

28 29 C.F.R. § 541.704.

29 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(g)

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relevant standards and the client’s specifications . . . . If a test weld

fails to pass inspection to the welding inspector’s satisfaction, the 

welding inspector has authority to prevent that welder from working 

on the project. [Further, i]f a welder routinely fails to make good 

quality welds, the welding inspector has the authority to recommend 

that the welder be dismissed from the project.30

Mr. Sloane agrees that he “tested every welder” on the Station 319 Project, but 

insists that his “approval” was based entirely on whether or not the welders “me[t] 

with approval of the code,” which code “determines itself.”31 There was, in his 

words, no “leeway or anything.”32

Regarding Mr. Sloane’s approval of the welds done on Kinder Morgan’s 

projects, Chief Inspector Jack Groves, Jr., stated that

one of Mr. Sloane’s job duties was to . . . ensure that [the welders] 

were using the proper weld procedure. While there are written weld 

procedures that the welders must follow, the procedures allow the 

welding inspector discretion in deciding whether certain parts of the 

procedure have been performed in a satisfactory manner. In fact, 

Kinder Morgan’s weld procedures expressly state that the welding 

inspector can require more restrictive practices than those set forth in 

the weld procedure.”33

Mr. Sloane explains that this aspect of his job simply required him to identify 

“discontinuities” in a given weld—“indications,” in welding terminology—and 

 30 ECF No. 210-9, Ex. G (Declaration of Andy Neuberger) ¶¶ 5-6.

31 ECF No. 210-6, Ex. D (March 24, 2016 Deposition of Thomas Sloane) at 253.

32 Id.

33 ECF No. 210-5 (Declaration of Jack Groves) ¶ 11; see also ECF No. 210-11 (Kinder Morgan 

Welding Procedure Specification) (listing several “minimum practices” while stating that the 

“welding inspector may require more restrictive practices”).

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determine whether a given indication “meets a certain maximum tolerance in the 

code where it becomes a defect.”34 In other words, he would “basically look at the 

indication[ and] measure it,”35 and, when an indication was “out of code,” would

indicate that the defect “ha[d] to be fixed.”36 He admitted that, on paper, Kinder 

Morgan’s weld procedures allowed him to “require more restrictive practices” than 

those listed, but explained that such discretion was largely illusory—i.e., it would 

have been impossible or illogical to deviate from the established standards.37

There is an obvious factual dispute over Mr. Sloane’s job duties, with the 

parties offering vigorously opposing descriptions of it. Reading Mr. Sloane’s 

deposition testimony, one might come away with the impression that he simply 

held up a ruler to various welds, wrote down the measurement he took, and 

determined whether that number fell within the code-prescribed range. His 

description of his review of potential welders suggests a similarly mechanical and 

proscribed role. The statements of Gulf Interstate employees, on the other hand, 

leave the impression that Mr. Sloane was autonomously making decisions about 

whether the welders’ work and qualifications met his personal, subjective whims. 

 34 ECF No. 210-6, Ex. D at 250.

35 Id. at 259.

36 Id. at 251.

37 ECF No. 213-3, Ex. A (Declaration of Thomas Sloane) ¶ 34.

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While one might classify Mr. Sloane’s job as involving “quality control”38—since 

he was, after all, ensuring the “quality” of the welds done on Kinder Morgan’s 

projects—one might just as easily classify it as “ordinary inspection work.”39 

A reasonable jury, then, could find either that Mr. Sloane’s primary duty was 

not “directly related to the management or general business operations” of Gulf 

Interstate or Kinder Morgan, or that his duty did not “include[] the exercise of 

discretion and independent judgment with respect to matters of significance.” This 

factual dispute is not appropriate for resolution at the summary judgment stage. 

Therefore, this Court will deny Gulf Interstate’s motion for summary judgment on 

Count I of Mr. Sloane’s complaint.40

As Gulf Interstate’s brief indicates, Mr. Sloane’s PMWA claim is analyzed 

under the same framework as his FLSA claim.41 Therefore, this Court will deny 

summary judgment on Count II of Mr. Sloane’s complaint. And, since Gulf 

Interstate’s argument on Mr. Sloane’s unjust enrichment claim is based on its 

 38 29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b).

39 29 C.F.R. § 541.203(g).

40 Because this Court holds that Mr. Sloane’s duties do not, as a matter of law, qualify for either 

of the exemptions, it need not—and will not—decide whether Mr. Sloane was paid on a 

“salary basis.”

41 ECF No. 211 at 28-29; see also Jochim v. Jean Maedline Educ. Center of Cosmetology, Inc., 

98 F. Supp. 3d 750, 756 (E.D. Pa. April 8, 2015) (“The Pennsylvania Minimum Wage Act 

mirros the FLSA . . . . Pennsylvania courts employ the same tests used by the federal courts 

and use federal case law to determine the governing standard.”)

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arguments regarding Mr. Sloane’s FLSA and PMWA claims, this Court will 

likewise deny summary judgment on Count III of Mr. Sloane’s complaint.42

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons listed above, Gulf Interstate’s motion for summary judgment 

will be denied. An appropriate Order follows.

BY THE COURT:

s/ Matthew W. Brann

Matthew W. Brann

United States District Judge

 42 Pertaining to its Motion for Summary Judgment, Gulf Interstate filed a Motion to Strike 

Portions of the Declaration of Thomas Sloane. ECF No. 216. Because this Court did not 

reference any of the challenged portions of Mr. Sloane’s declaration in deciding the summary 

judgment motion, the motion to strike will be denied as moot.

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