Plaintiffs,

Civil Action No. 07-3406 (JMV)

V.

OPINION

CHIQUITA BRANDS INTERNATIONAL,

INC., CYRUS FREIDHEIM, CHARLES

KESIER, ROBERT KISTINGER,ROBERT OLSON, AND WILLIAM

TSACALIS,

Defendants.

John Michael Vazguez, U.S.D.J.

This matter comes before the Court by way of the motion filed by Plaintiffs John Doe 1,

John Doe 2, Jane Doe 3, and Minor Does 1-4 (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) to transfer the case

pursuant 2$ U.S.C. § 1631. D.E. 42. Defendants Cyrus Freidheim, Charles Kesier, Robert

Kistenger, Robert Olsen, William Tsacalis (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) filed a

cross-motion to dismiss. D.E. 55. The parties also submitted supplemental letters. D.E. 75, 76,

77. The Court reviewed all submissions made in connection the motion,1 and considered the

motion without oral argument pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7$(b) and L. Civ. R. 7$.1(b). For the

Plaintiffs brief in support of their motion for transfer will be referred to hereinafter as “Plfs.

Transfer Br.” D.E. 42, 59 (corrected); the Individual Defendants’ brief in opposition to transfer

and cross-motion to dismiss and will be referred to hereinafter as “mdiv. Defs. Mot. & Opp.”D.E. 56; Plaintiffs’ opposition to the Individual Defendants’ motion to dismiss and reply in

support of Plaintiffs’ motion for transfer will be refelTed to herein as “Plfs. Opp & Reply.” D.E.

5$; Individual Defendants’ reply in support of their cross-motion to dismiss will be referred

hereinafter as “Defs. Reply.” D.E. 63.
transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This case has a long and complicated factual and procedural history, which is unnecessary

to recount in full detail here. In short, this suit is part of a multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) that

arises out of the alleged torture and killing ofthousands of Colombian citizens and residents by

Colombian paramilitary organizations and guerilla groups. This suit alleges that beginning in the

1990s, Chiquita Brands International, Inc. (“Chiquita”) executives were involved in a scheme

pursuant to which Chiquita financed and provided material support to these paramilitary

organizations and guerilla groups. MDL D.E. 5892 Plaintiffs are family members ofsome of the

alleged victims of the torture and killings.

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint against Defendant Chiquita on July 19, 2007. D.E. 1.

The Complaint brought fifleen counts against Chiquita. Among other things, the Complaintalleges violations of the Alien Tort Statute, 2$ U.S.C. § 1350; the Torture Victim Protection Act

(“TVPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note; customary international law; common law ofthe United States;

the statutes and common law of New Jersey; the laws of Colombia; and certain international

treaties, agreements, conventions and resolutions. Compl. at ¶J 85-1 57.

This suit along with a number of related cases were consolidated in the Southern District

of Florida pursuant to the multidistrict litigation (“MDL”) statute, 2$ U.S.C. § 1407. In April2 The MDL is docketed as In re Chiquita Brands mt ‘ZInc. Alien Tort Statute & Shareholder

Litig., No. 08-01916 (S.D. Fla.).

2
On October 4, 2016, the MDL Panel remanded Plaintiffs’ claims against the Individual

Defendants to this Court pursuant to MDL Judge Kenneth A. Marra’s recommendation that the

case be remanded to this Court for the limited purpose of allowing Plaintiffs to seek transfer under

Section 1406 or 1631. D.E. 31. The Clerk of the Court reassigned this case to this Court on

October 4, 2016. D.E. 32.

As noted, there are currently two motions before this Court. Plaintiffs’ filed a motion to

transfer their suit against the Individual Defendants on December 16, 2016. D.E. 42. The

Individual Defendants filed a briefin opposition and a cross-motion to dismiss. D.E. 55. Plaintiffsfiled a reply on February 13, 2017. D.E. 58. The Individual Defendants filed a reply on February

22, 2017. D.E. 63.

II. MOTION TO TRANSFER AND TO SEVER

2$ U.S.C. § 1631 provides as follows:

Whenever a civil action is filed in a court as defined in section 610of this title or an appeal, including a petition for review of

administrative action, is noticed for or filed with such a court and

that court finds that there is a want ofjurisdiction, the court shall, if

it is in the interest ofjustice, transfer such action or appeal to anyother such court in which the action or appeal could have been

brought at the time it was filed or noticed, and the action or appeal

shall proceed as if it had been filed in or noticed for the court to

Plaintiffs’ filed a corrected memorandum in support of their motion to transfer on February 15,

2017. D.E. 59. This memorandum included changes to formatting rather than substantivealterations. See D.E. 42, 59. The Court considers the corrected brief as the operative documentfor this motion.

3
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Covelman v. Hotel St. Regis, 2016 WL 762661, at *1 (D.N.J. Feb. 25, 2016) (citing D’Jamoos v.

Filatus Aircraft Ltd., 566 F.3d 94, 109 (3d Cir. 2009)). Transfer is within the discretion of the

district court. Mellon Bank (F.) FSFS, N.A. v. Di Veronica Bros., 983 F.2d 551, 558 (3d Cir. 1993)

(“The district court may, in its discretion, transfer this case pursuant to 2$ U.S.C. § 1631 if a

motion to do so is seasonably filed.”). Courts have found that “that Congress intended to create a

presumption—albeit a rebuttable one—in favor oftransfer.” Britell v. United States, 31$ f.3d 70,

73 (1st Cir. 2003), cited with approval in Abunasser v. Holder, 343 F. Apptx 756, 759 (3d Cir.

2009); see also Abttnasser, 343 F. App’x at 759 (“Where a district court itself lacks jurisdiction

over a case, it shall transfer the matter to a court that has jurisdiction, an less, after an examination

of the record, the district court determines that it would not be in the interest ofjustice to do so.”(emphasis added)).

While the party seeking transfer bears the burden of establishing that a transferee court

possesses personal jurisdiction over a defendant, “in the preliminary stages of the litigation .that burden is light. Prior to trial, the plaintiff is only required to establish aprimafacie showing

ofjurisdiction.” D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 110 (quoting Doe v. Nat’l Med. Sen’s., 974 F.2d 143, 145

(10th Cir. 1992)). A prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction “requires that tthe movant]establish with reasonable particularity sufficient contacts between the defendant and the forum

state. It is insufficient to rely on bare pleadings alone; rather a plaintiffmust establish facts relevant

to personal jurisdiction by affidavits or other competent evidence.” Covelman, 2016 WE 762661,

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D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 107. “General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has maintainedsystematic and continuous contacts with the forum state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296

(3d Cir. 2007).

A Court may also sever a suit and transfer to multiple districts when appropriate. See Fed.

R. Civ. P. 21 (“On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a

party. The court may also sever any claim against a party.”); see also D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 110

(“[W]here a case could have been brought against some defendants in the transferee district, theclaims against those defendants may be severed and transferred while the claims against the

remaining defendants, for whom transfer would not be proper, are retained.”).

III. ANALYSIS

As discussed, under Section 1631, there are three requirements for transfer: (1) this Court

lacks personal jurisdiction over the party, (2) the actions against the Individual Defendants could

have been brought in the Southern District of Ohio and the Southern District of Florida,respectively, and that (3) transfer to those districts is “in the interest of justice.” The Court

considers each requirement in turn.

a. Personal Jurisdiction Over the Individual Defendants

i. This Court Does Not Possess Personal Jurisdiction Over the Individual

Defendants

As an initial matter, this Court must first determine whether it has personal jurisdiction

over any ofthe Individual Defendants. In order to transfer a case under 2$ U.S.C. § 1631, a district

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argue that the Court has general jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants, so the issue turns on

whether the Court has specific jurisdiction. “Sitting in New Jersey, the Court may exercise

jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant only to the extent authorized by the state’s long-arm

statute. New Jersey’s long-arm statute permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest

extent permissible under the Due Process Clause.” Covelman, 2016 WL 762661, at *2 (citing

IMOInthts., Inc. v. Kiekert, AG, 155 F.3d 254, 259 (3d Cir. 199$)). A court may exercise specific

personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the defendant has “maintained systemic and continuous

contacts with the forum state.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 296 (3d Cir. 2007). The partiesfail to cite any case law in this District or within the Third Circuit to further the position that theIndividual Defendants, as nonresident directors and officers of Chiquita, are subject to the

‘ The Court notes that Plaintiffs make this alternate argument that personal jurisdiction is proper

in this District in direct response to the Individual Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff should

have known that amending their Complaint to include the Individual Defendants was improper inthis District because this District did not possess personal jurisdiction over the Individual

Defendants. See Plfs. Opp & Reply at 4-8 (“This Court need not reconsider the MDL Court’sanalysis [on Plaintiffs’ motivations for filing in this District],” however, “[hf this Court wishes to

revisit Judge Marra’s decisions, it should conclude that personal jurisdiction is proper here.”).

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Next, Plaintiffs must show that Southern District of Ohio has personal ju

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Individual Defendants Kistinger, Olson and Tsacalis and that the Southern District Florida has

personal jurisdiction over Individual Defendants Freidheirn and Keiser. Therefore, the Court

examines whether the Southern District of Ohio and the Southern District of Florida could have

possessed general personal jurisdiction over the respective Individual Defendants in 2007—when

Plaintiffs filed their Complaint.7

The parties focus on whether, in light of Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977), Plaintiffs had

grounds for a reasonable belief that amending their Complaint to include the IndividualDefendants. The Court does not analyze the specific application of Shaffer to the facts here

because Plaintiff has not cited to any case in this Circuit to support its claim that this District

possesses personal jurisdiction over the Individual Defendants.6 The Court notes that Individual Defendant Keiser presents an unusual set of facts as described

below in note 8. Plaintiffs make the argument that ifthe Court finds that no state possessespersonal jurisdiction over Keiser, then under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), this

District may exercise personal jurisdiction over Keiser. Plfs. Transfer Br. at 16. However, as

described below, the Court finds that Plaintiffs’ have made a prima facie showing that the

Southern District of Florida possesses personal jurisdiction over Keiser, and the Individual

Defendant have presented no evidence to rebut this showing. Therefore, the Court finds does not

reach the Rule 4(k)(2) argument.

The Court notes that there is some debate among the parties regarding the operative date — whether it is 2007 when the Complaint was initially filed or 2012 when the Individual

Defendants were added. Both parties cite both dates. However, neither side has provided any

detailed analysis of the issue. Therefore, the Court assumes without deciding that 2007 is the

relevant date for the Section 1631 analysis. See Does 1-144 v. C’hiqttita Brands Int’l, Inc., 2018

WL 369779, at *6 (D.D.C. Jan. 11,2018) (“Chiqitita”) (“As a preliminary matter, the parties

dispute the relevant date for purposes of the ‘at the time it was filed’ clause of Section 1631.

Plaintiffs argue that the naming of the individual defendants in 2012 relates back to the original

2007 filing for statute of limitations purposes and thus assume that 2007 is the relevant date. The

individual defendants, however, raise the specter that the transferee courts might consider the

date that the individual defendants were added—20 12—as the operative date. Given that neither

party has sufficiently briefed this issue, the Court assumes without deciding that 2007 is the

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even if the action is unrelated to the defendant’s contacts with the state.” Arlington Bank v. BEE,

Inc., 2010 WL 5078257 (Oh. Ct. App. Dec. 9, 2010) (“Ohio courts may exercise jurisdiction over

a person who is a resident of Ohio, because a resident of Ohio, or an Ohio corporation, possess the

requisite continuous and systematic contacts with this state.” (internal quotation and citation

omitted)). Plaintiffs point to evidence that Individual Defendants Kistinger, Olson, and Tsacalis

were each a resident of, and domiciled in, Ohio in 2007. Plaintiffs add that each also currently

resides in Ohio. See D.E. 42-3 (Declaration of Sean Michael Powers and Exhibits) (hereinafter

the “Powers Decl.”). In addition, Kistinger, Olson, and Tsacalis are each listed as registered to

vote in Ohio and have owned property in Ohio. Id. at Ex. 4-9. Accordingly, the Court is satisfiedthat Plaintiffs have fulfilled their burden of aprimafacie showing that general personal jurisdiction

would have been proper as to Individual Defendants Kistinger, Olson, and Tsacalis in the Southern

District of Ohio in 2007. See Does 1-144 v. Chiquita Brands Int’l, Inc., 2018 WL 369779, at *7(D.D.C. Jan. 11, 2018) (“Chiquita”) (“[T]he Court concludes that personal jurisdiction likely

would have been proper as to defendants Aguirre, Kistinger, Olson, and Tsacalis in the Southern

District of Ohio in 2007.”). The Individual Defendants also did not present evidence to the

contrary.

operative date for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1631.”). This Court follows the Chiqttita decision and

assumes. without deciding, that 2007 is the relevant date for purposes of the Section 1631

analysis.

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otherwise, is subject to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state, whether or not the claim arises

from that activity.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 48.193 (2016); see Canale v. Rttbin, 20 So. 3d 463, 466 (Fla.

Dist. Ct. App. 2009). Plaintiffs point to evidence that both Freidheim and Keiser are listed as

registered to vote in Florida and have owned property in Florida. Powers Deci., Ex. 1-3, l011.8

Accordingly, the Court is satisfied that Plaintiffs have fulfilled their burden of a prima fade

showing that Individual Defendants Freidheim and Keiser were subject to the general jurisdiction

in the Southern District of Florida in 2007. See Chiqttita, 2018 WL 369779, at *7 (“[T]he Court

As referenced in note 6, supra, Plaintiff notes “Defendant Keiser’s case is slightly more

complex because he may have worked for Chiquita outside the United States in 2007, and for

much ofthe time period relevant to Plaintiffs’ claims he was in Colombia.” Plfs. Transfer Br. at

14. However, in its motion, Plaintiffs argue that “[b]y 2012, however, [Keiser] was clearly

domiciled in Florida; and, it appears that he may have been so in 2007 as well. Thus, the claims

against him should also be transferred to Florida.” Id. (footnote omitted).

Defendants admit that Keiser was “domiciled in Florida when Plaintiffs amended their

complaint in 2012, but not in 2007.” Indiv. Defs. Mot. & Opp.at 18. On the other hand,

Plaintiffs contend that “Keiser appears to have owned his current Florida residence since 2004;he also maintained a P.O. Box in Florida between 2000 and 2014; and, by 2011, was registered

to vote in Broward County. . . . Thus the available evidence suggests that Keiser was domiciled

in Florida.” Plfs. Transfer Br. at 14-15.

The Court finds that Plaintiffs have fulfilled their minimal burden by making a prima

fade showing that the case against Keiser “could have been brought” in the Southern District of

Florida in 2012. See D’Jamoos, 566 f.3d at 109—10 (“While the plaintiff bears the burden of

establishing that a court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over a defendant is proper, in the

preliminary stages of the litigation. . . that burden is light. Prior to trial, the plaintiff is onlyrequired to establish a prima fade showing ofjurisdiction.” (internal quotations, citations, and

brackets omitted)). Yet, once the matter transferred to the Southern District of Florida, Keiser is

not foreclosed from moving to dismiss Plaintiffs’ suit based on lack of personal jurisdiction.

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Defendants Kistinger, Olson, and Tsacalis in the Southern District of Ohio and against IndividualFreidheim and Keiser in the Southern District of Florida in 2007. See D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 109-

10; Chiqttita, 2018 WL 369779, at *7 (describing that in considering transfer of claims against the

same Individual Defendants (plus an additional defendant), “the Court finds that personal

jurisdiction over the individual defendants in the proposed transferee courts [of the Southern

District of Ohio and the Southern District of Florida, respectively,] would have been proper at thetime that plaintiffs filed their original complaint in 2007.”).

b. Transfer to the Southern District of Ohio and the Southern District of Florida,

Respectively, is in the Interest of Justice

The parties focus their arguments on whether Plaintiffs’ requested transfers would be in

the “interest of justice.” Plaintiffs argue that transfer and severance of the suits against the

Individual Defendants is in the interest ofjustice because Plaintiffs would face unnecessary and

additional statute oflimitations arguments ifforced to refile. Plfs. Br. at 9-10. Defendants contend

that transfer is not in the interest ofjustice because Plaintiffs had no reasonable basis to believethat this District was a proper forum to file suit against the Individual Defendants, Defs. Motion

& Opp. at 7-10, and because Plaintiffs chose this forum based on strategic considerations, id. at

10-15. The Individual Defendants request that the Court dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims against the

Individual Defendants because this suit has imposed substantial and unnecessary costs on the

Individual Defendants, Id. at 15-17, and because the claims against the Individual Defendants

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authority from other circuits. In general, among the factors courts often consider are: the cost and

time necessary to file a new suit, Janvey v. Froskaiter Rose, LLP, 59 F. Supp. 3d 1, 7 (D.D.C.2014), whether a plaintiff filed in the wrong district in good faith or as a strategic litigating tactic,

Chicosky, 979 F. $upp. at 32 1-22, and whether “transfer would unfairly benefit the proponent,.

impose an unwarranted hardship on an objector, . . . or unduly burden the judicial system.”

Britell v. United States, 318 F.3d 70, 74 (1St Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted); see, e.g.,

Chiquita, 2018 WL 369779, at *5 (“In deciding whether to transfer a case, courts consider

whether the claims would be time-barred upon refiling, whether transfer would prejudice the

defendants’ position on the merits, and whether transfer would save the plaintiff the time andexpense of refiling in a new district.”).

Here, Plaintiffs articulate a legitimate concern that if dismissed, rather than transferred, the

claims against the Individual Defendants may be time-barred. Plfs. Transfer Br. at 7. The Court

is unable to find, as the Individual Defendants suggest, that the Plaintiffs amended their Complaint

to include the Individual Defendants in in order to gain a strategic advantage in the case by filing

in the wrong district. See mdiv. Defs. Mot. & Opp at 10-15. The Individual Defendants do not

adequately explain the purported strategic advantage that Plaintiffs’ sought. As to the 2012amendment of the Complaint, it appears that Plaintiffs were reacting to the Supreme Court’s

decision in Mohammad. Instead, Defendants primarily contend that Plaintiffs should have knownthat this Court was not the proper forum for their claims against the Individual Defendants.

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incorrect in their assumption that this District possessed personal jurisdiction over the IndividualDefendants, this error does not foreclose transfer pursuant to Section 1631. Moreover, and

importantly, the Individual Defendants have not persuasively argued that the transfers would

prejudice them on the merits. See Chiquita, 201$ WL 369779, at *6 (finding that “[e]ven if

plaintiffs were mistaken in believing that this Court had jurisdiction over the individual defendants,

plaintiffs’ mistakes regarding forum selection do not justify dismissal, particularly where dismissal

might spell the end of these claims and transfer would not prejudice the individual defendants’position on the merits.”). For these reasons, the Court finds that transfer of the suits against the

Individual Defendants pursuant to Section 1631 is in the interest ofjustice.

The Individual Defendants argue that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) should have

infoniied Plaintiffs that this Court could not exercise personal jurisdiction over the IndividualDefendants, this Court finds that the Court’s holding in Shafftr is not dispositive as to whetherPlaintiffs had a good faith basis for claiming that this Court possessed personal jurisdiction over

the Individual Defendants. In Shaffer. the Supreme Court held, in part, that a Delaware court

could not exercise jurisdiction over former officers and directors of a Delaware corporation

because their positions did not result in “minimum contacts” with the state. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at

216. However, the Court caimot find, at this time, that Plaintiffs amended their Complaint in badfaith as opposed to a good faith mistake. See Chicosky, 979 F. Supp. 316, 321.

The Individual Defendants cite to Deleski v. Rayrnarklnthts., h?c., $19 F.2d 377 (3d Cir.

1987), and a number of cases outside this Circuit, in support of their motion for dismissal.

However, in Deleski, the court upheld a district court’s dismissal of claims that were clearly time

haired at the time they were originally filed. Id. at 381. Here, by comparison, the Court is not

finding that Plaintiffs’ claims were time-barred when originally filed. Instead, the Court isconcerned that Plaintiffs’ claims would now be time-barred if the Court dismissed the matter.

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21, a court may sever claims within the same case. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 (“Misjoinder of parties isnot a ground for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court may at any time, on just

tenris, add or drop a party. The coitrt may also sever any claim against a party.” (emphasis

added)). The Third Circuit has held that “before dividing the case, the District Court should weigh

the factors favoring transfer against the potential inefficiency of requiring the similar and

overlapping issues to be litigated in two separate forums.” D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d at 111.

Here, the Court finds that a consideration of all relevant factors weighs in favor of granting

Plaintiffs’ request for transfer and severance of claims. There will undoubtedly be some

overlapping issues in Plaintiffs suits against Chiquita and against the Individual Defendants—but

this is not a dispositive consideration.’0 For example, following the Third Circuit’s guidance, the

The parties dispute the significance of the D ‘Jamoos court’s “see” citation to Sunbelt Corp. v.

Noble, Denton &Assocs., 5 F.3d 28 (3d Cir.1993). In Sttnbelt, the court cautioned that a court

“should not sever ifthe defendant over whom jurisdiction is retained is so involved in the

controversy to be transferred that partial transfer would require the same issues to be litigated in

two places.” 5 F.3d at 3 3—34 (quoting Liaw Sit Teng v. Skaarup Shipping Corp., 743 F.2d 1140,

114$ (5th Cir. 1984)). The Court, however, agrees with Plaintiffs that the inclusion of a “see”

citation is essential to understanding the import of the Third Circuit’s citation to Sunbelt becauseadopting the blanket rule articulated in Sunbelt would bar severance in almost all cases—

rendering the D ‘Jamoos court’s balancing test irrelevant. See D’Jamoos, 566 F.3d 94, 111 (3d

Cir. 2009) (“[B]efore dividing the case, the District Court should weigh the factors favoring

transfer against the potential inefficiency ofrequiring the similar and overlapping issues to be

litigated in two separate forums.”) (emphasis added); The Bluebook: A Uniform System of

Citation (20 ed.) at 5 (defining a “see” signal as showing that “[t]he authority supports, but does

not directly state, the proposition”).

In Sunbelt, the court was ultimately concerned that granting “severance.. . would place

each defendant in the position of being able to defend by asserting the absent party’s

negligence.” Sunbelt, 5 F.3d at 34. Here, neither Plaintiffs nor the Individual Defendants have

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their case be tried in conjunction with [the large corporate entity], they could submit to the

jurisdiction of the district court [where the suit against the large corporate entity is being tried].”

D’Jamoos v. Filatus Aircraft Ltd., No. CIV.A. 07-1153, 2009 WL 3152188, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct.

1, 2009). The court then found that severance was appropriate under Rule 21 because after

“balanc[ing] several considerations, including the convenience of the parties, avoidance of

prejudice to either party, and promotion of the expeditious resolution of the litigation,” all three

factors weighed in favor ofseverance. Id. at *3; see Chiquita, 2018 WL 369779, at *$ (“Although

the individual defendants correctly assert that severance would result in multiple courts assessingthe same set of claims and facts, the prospect of multiple suits in different jurisdictions is

unavoidable here—and not unusual in multidistrict litigation cases—because Chiquita and other

defendants already are facing trial in different districts after pretrial coordination before JudgeMarra is complete.”). Here, the Court finds that severance of Plaintiffs’ claims against theIndividual Defendants pursuant to transfer to the proper jurisdictions is appropriate.signaled that this scenario is a reasonable possibility. The Sunbelt court also stated that it is

generally within a district court’s discretion to determine whether a severance was appropriate.

Id. Therefore, even taking into account the Sunbelt court’s language cautioning district courts

against allowing severance in a blanket fashion, the Court has carefully weighed the referencedfactors and determined that severance is appropriate here.

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Ohio, and Plaintiffs’ claims against Individual Defendants Freidheim and Keiser shall be severedand shall be transferred to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1631. Defendant’s motion to dismiss the Complaint is DENIED (D.E.

55). An appropriate Order accompanies this Opinion.

Dated: January 18, 2017

John’Michael Vazezi\U.S.D.J.

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