NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

COREY LAMONT BROWN, JR., )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D18-1892

)

STATE OF FLORIDA, )

)

Appellee. )

)

Opinion filed October 4, 2019.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for 

Hillsborough County; Nick Nazaretian, 

Judge.

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and 

Rachel Roebuck and Maureen Surber, 

Assistant Public Defenders, Bartow, for 

Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, 

Tallahassee, and Chelsea Simms, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tampa, for Appellee.

VILLANTI, Judge.

Corey Lamont Brown, Jr., appeals the order revoking his community 

control and sentencing him to five years in prison. In his sole issue on appeal, Brown 

contends that the trial court abused its discretion by revoking his community control 
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when the State's evidence, which consisted solely of testimony that Brown failed to 

answer his door when his community control officer visited at 6:50 a.m., was legally 

insufficient to prove a willful and substantial violation of community control. Based on 

this court's decision in Brown v. State, 813 So. 2d 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002),1 we reverse 

and remand for reinstatement of Brown to community control. 

The State originally charged Brown with violating his community control by 

committing a new law violation, changing his residence without permission, and failing 

to remain confined to his approved residence except as approved by his community 

control officer; however, at the revocation hearing it proceeded only on the charge of 

failing to remain confined to his approved residence. At the hearing, Brown's 

community control officer, Krystal Shaw, testified that she went to Brown's approved 

residence on September 27, 2017, at 6:50 a.m., a time when Brown was supposed to 

be home. When she arrived, she called Brown's cell phone, but he did not answer. She 

knocked on his apartment door "several times very hard," but no one answered. She 

then left her card wedged into the door jamb of Brown's door with a note for him to call 

her immediately, but she never received a call from Brown. 

In response, Brown testified that he was home at the time but that he was 

asleep. He testified that he did not hear his cell phone ring, did not hear anyone knock 

on the door, and did not find Shaw's card in his door when he left for work later that 

morning. He testified that his bedroom is at the back of his apartment, about seventyfive feet from the front door. He testified that he had to be at work that day at 8:30 a.m. 

1The probationer involved in the 2002 Brown case is not related to the defendant 

in this case. 
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and that he would normally get up between 7:30 and 7:45 a.m. to prepare for work. 

Other than his own testimony, Brown offered no evidence in support of his contention 

that he was home. After considering this testimony, the trial court rejected Brown's 

explanation for his failure to answer the door and found that he had willfully and 

substantially violated the terms of his community control. Brown now appeals the 

revocation. 

When the State charges a violation of community control, it must prove the 

violation by the greater weight of the evidence. See Bravo v. State, 268 So. 3d 193, 

196 (Fla. 2d DCA 2018) (citing Filmore v. State, 133 So. 3d 1188, 1193 (Fla. 2d DCA 

2014)). In reviewing a trial court's decision to revoke community control, this court 

"must determine whether competent substantial evidence supports the trial court's 

finding of a willful and substantial violation of a condition of community control." Id. at 

195. Evidence that gives rise to multiple reasonable inferences, only one of which 

establishes a violation, does not meet this standard. Cf. Thompson v. State, 974 So. 2d 

594, 598 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (holding that evidence that probationer's listed residence 

was undergoing reconstruction and had no running water was insufficient to support the 

single inference that the defendant was not living there so as to support a finding of a 

willful and substantial violation for failure to report a change in residence). 

Here, as he did in the trial court, Brown contends that the State did not 

present competent, substantial evidence to prove that he was not home when Shaw 

arrived and that therefore the evidence was legally insufficient to support the conclusion 

that he willfully and substantially violated his community control. He relies on this 

court's decision in Brown, in which, on virtually indistinguishable facts, this court 
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reversed the revocation of community control when the State's only evidence to support 

that revocation was the testimony of the community control officer that no one answered 

the door in response to her knocks. In so doing, we held that the State's evidence was 

legally insufficient to support a finding of a willful and substantial violation because 

"[e]stablishing that no one answered the door at [2:00 a.m. in] the morning" did not 

prove that Ms. Brown was not home. 813 So. 2d at 203-04. Brown contends that the 

facts here compel the same result. 

In contrast, the State argues that this court should affirm the revocation on 

the basis of the First District's decision in Hurst v. State, 941 So. 2d 1252 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2006). In that case, the State sought revocation of Hurst's sex offender probation based 

on his failure to comply with his curfew. Id. at 1253. Hurst's probation officer testified 

that she went to Hurst's trailer at 11:48 p.m. to ensure that he was there. Id. She 

testified that she pounded on the door, as well as on the wall of the trailer by the 

bedroom where she knew Hurst slept. Id. She testified that she knocked so loudly that 

she woke Hurst's neighbors in the adjoining trailer. Id. Nevertheless, Hurst did not 

answer the door. In response, Hurst testified that he was home, that he had the flu, and 

that he had taken a double dose of cold medicine. Id. The trial court rejected Hurst's 

testimony as not credible and revoked his probation. 

In affirming the revocation, the First District concluded that the trial court 

had made a credibility determination between the two witnesses and that it had no 

authority to revisit that credibility determination. Id. (citing Porter v. State, 788 So. 2d 

917, 923 (Fla. 2001), and Vanstraten v. State, 901 So. 2d 391, 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 

2005)). However, the dissent pointed out that the legal issue presented by the case did 
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not truly turn on a credibility determination. Id. at 1254 (Ervin, J., dissenting). Rather, it 

turned on whether one possible inference from the State's evidence—that no answer to 

the knock meant that Hurst was not home—was sufficient to prove that Hurst was not 

home and so had willfully and substantially violated his probation. Id. at 1255. The 

dissent would have followed this court's decision in Brown and would have held that this 

inference was legally insufficient to support a finding of a willful and substantial violation. 

Id. 

Here, this court is presented with the same issue addressed in Brown and 

Hurst, i.e., whether the State's evidence that no one answered the door in response to a 

knock is legally sufficient to prove that Brown was not home. It is not. Even if the trial 

court rejected Brown's testimony that he was asleep, the record contains no direct 

evidence that Brown was not home. Instead, the only direct evidence was that no one 

answered Brown's door when Shaw knocked. From this evidence, the court could 

certainly infer that Brown was not home. But it could just have reasonably inferred that 

Brown was asleep, in the shower, or otherwise occupied. The State did not present any 

evidence to show how long Shaw stayed outside Brown's door or how long she 

continued to knock. And unlike the knocking in Hurst, there is no indication that Shaw's 

knocking was sufficiently loud to awaken Brown's neighbors. Thus, the inference that 

Brown was absent from his home was simply one of several reasonable inferences that 

could have been made from the State's evidence, rendering the State's evidence legally 

insufficient to prove a violation of community control. 

Finally, we observe that violation cases involving the alleged failure to 

remain confined to an approved residence invariably follow a pattern of the supervising 
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officer appearing at a residence early in the morning or late at night—when the average 

person is typically sleeping. We understand the rationale is to catch those under 

supervision away from their residences at a time when they should be home. But the 

approach of simply knocking on the door and then declaring a violation when no one 

answers provides strong potential defenses to the person being supervised. If the 

supervising officer truly believes that a person under supervision is not home, it would 

behoove that officer to acquire evidence that corroborates the alleged absence from the 

residence. 

In sum, because the inference that Brown was not home is just one of 

several reasonable inferences that arise from the evidence of his failure to answer the 

door, the greater weight of the evidence did not establish a willful and substantial 

violation of the terms of Brown's community control. Therefore, we conclude that the 

trial court abused its discretion by finding Brown in violation and revoking his community 

control, and we reverse and remand for Brown to be reinstated to community control. 

Reversed and remanded with instructions. 

SILBERMAN and SLEET, JJ., Concur.