alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON

ORDER

Appellate case name: Lawrence Edward Thompson v. The State of Texas

Appellate case number: 01-21-00705-CR

Trial court case number: 1703989 & 1703989A

Trial court: 228th District Court of Harris County

The trial court clerk is ORDERED to file a supplemental clerk’s record containing the 

following:

(1) Judgment dated April 13, 2021 in trial court cause number 1703989 (image no. 

95289678) and

(2) Application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Seeking Relief from Final Felony Conviction 

Under Code of Criminal Procedure Article 11.07 dated September 21, 2021 in trial 

court cause number 1703989A (image no. 98016738).

See TEX. R. APP. P. 34.5(c)(1). The supplemental clerk’s record shall be filed in this Court within 

15 days of this order. 

 

It is so ORDERED.

Judge’s signature: _____/s/ Sherry Radack______

 Acting individually  Acting for the Court

Date: ___March 8, 2022______
# Supreme Court of Florida

____________ No. SC17

- 942

____________ ROBERT JOE LONG, Appellant,

vs. STATE OF FLORIDA, Appellee. [January 29, 2018]

PER CURIAM.
We have for review Robert Joe Long’s appeal of the circuit court’s order denying his mot ion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.851. This Court has jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla. Const. Long’s motion sought relief pursuant to the United Sta tes Supreme Court’s
decision in Hurst v. Florida , 136 S. Ct. 616 (2016), and our decision on remand in
Hurst v. State ( Hurst ), 202 So. 3d 40 (Fla. 2016), cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 2161 (2017). This Court stayed Long’s appeal pending the disposition of Hitc hcock v.
State , 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 513 (2017) . After this- 2

-

Court decided Hitchcock , Long responded to this Court’s order to show cause arguing why Hitchcock should not be dispositive in this case.
After reviewing Long’s re sponse to the order to show cause, as well as the State’s arguments in reply, we conclude that Long is not entitled to relief. Long was sentenced to death following a jury’s unanimous recommendation for death. Long v. State , 610 So. 2d 1268, 1269 (Fla. 1 992). His sentence of death became
final in 1993. Long v. Florida , 510 U.S. 832 (1993). Thus, Hurst d oes not apply retroactively to Long’s sentence of death. See Hitchcock , 226 So. 3d at 217. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of Long’s motion

. The Court having carefully considered all arguments raised by Long , we caution that any rehearing motion containing reargument will be stricken. It is so
ordered. LABARGA, C.J., and POLSTON, and LAWSON, JJ., concur. PARIENTE, J., concurs in result with an opinion. LEWIS and CANADY, JJ., concur in result. QUINCE, J., recused. PARIENTE, J., concurring in result. I concur in result because I recognize that this Court’s opinion in Hitchcock
v. State , 226 So. 3d 216 (Fla. 2017), cert. denied , 138 S. Ct. 513 (2 017), is now final. However, I continue to adhere to the views expressed in my dissenting opinion in Hitchcock

. An Appeal from the Circuit Court in and for Hillsborough County,- 3

-

Michelle Sisco, Judge

- Case No. 291984CF013346000AHC Robert Anthony Norgard of Norgard, Norgard & Chastang, P.A., Bartow , Florida, for Appel lant Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, and Stephen D. Ake , Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, Florida, for Appellee
#### James E. BENTLEY et ux *v.*Thomas W. PARKER et al

74-266

525 S.W. 2d 460

Opinion delivered March 3, 1975

*750*James R. Howard,*for appellants.

*Rose, Nash, Williamson, Carroll & Clay-*by: *Stanley E. Price,*for appellees.

Conley Byrd, Justice.

The only issue here is the right of the mortgagors, appellants James E. Bentley, et ux, to redeem from a foreclosure decree sale to a third party at any time prior to an order of confirmation of the sale. The particular foreclosure decree here involved gave the mortgagors ten days from the date of the foreclosure decree to redeem the property — after the expiration of the ten day period the commissioner in chancery was directed to advertise and sell the property.

On the date of sale appellees Thomas W. Parker and Nell Parker, his wife and Jack B. Carter and Martha G. Carter, his wife were the successful bidders in the amount of $24,500.00. The total judgment of Capital Savings & Loan Association was for only $21,713.91. Before the sgle was submitted to the court for confirmation, the mortgagors tendered the total amount of the judgment and court costs into the registry of the court and asked to redeem the property. The trial court reluctantly denied the redemption and hence this appeal. We agree with the trial court.

In *Martin*v. *Ward,*60 Ark. 510, 30 S.W. 1041 (1895), we stated the matter in this language:

> “The only question in this case is whether a right of redemption remains to the mortgagor of real estate after a decree of foreclosure and a sale of the mortgaged property thereunder. In the absence of a statute giving this right to the mortgagor, his equity of redemption is barred by the decree and sale. The object of the proceeding to foreclose is to cut off the equity of redemption which exists in the mortgagor, and a sale under a valid decree of foreclosure must have this effect unless the legislature has extended the right of the mortgagor, so that he may redeem after sale.”

*751We there held that the Act of March 17, 1879, did not extend the right of redemption to a mortgagor under a foreclosure decree. It was there pointed out, however, that a “...court in its decree may, and usually does, allow a reasonable time for the mortgagor to pay the amount adjudged against him and redeem the property.”

The cases of *Pope*v. *Wylds,*167 Ark. 40, 266 S.W. 458 (1924) and *Jermany*v. *Hartsell,*214 Ark. 407, 216 S.W. 2d 381 (1949), involved cases in which the foreclosure decree had provided that the redemption could be made at any time before confirmation. Of course such cases are not controlling under the decree here which allowed only ten days for redemption after the foreclosure decree.

Obviously the time for redemption must be left to the sound discretion of the trial court. If the redemption is cut off before sale date, it tends to give credence to judicial sales and to prevent collusion between the mortgagors and unsuccessful bidders at the sale who have second thoughts on the value of the property. However, if the redemption is permitted at any time before confirmation of the sale, then there may be some lack of incentive for competitive bidding at the sale.

Affirmed.
EXHIBIT 32.1

                CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


In connection with the Quarterly Report of Marx Toys and Entertainment Corp.
(the "Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2004, as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof ("Report"), I,
Robert Bamberry, President and Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial
Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1350, as adopted pursuant
to 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

      (1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or
15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
Company.


Robert Bamberry
President and Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer
May 21, 2004
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.1

                    CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

I, Donald R. Sellers, Chief Executive Officer of SciClone Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
(the "Registrant"), do hereby certify in accordance with 18 U.S.C. 1350, as
adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, based
on my knowledge:

        (1) the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of the Registrant, to which this
        certification is attached as an exhibit (the "Report"), fully complies
        with the requirements of section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
        1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m); and

        (2) the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
        material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
        the Registrant.

Dated: November 7, 2002                              /s/  Donald R. Sellers
                                                     ---------------------------
                                                     Donald R. Sellers
                                                     Chief Executive Officer
Document Headings

                    Document headings vary by document type but may contain                    the following:                  
                -                       the agency or agencies that issued and signed a document                    
                -                       the number of the CFR title and the number of each part                      the document amends, proposes to amend, or is directly                      related to                    
                -                       the agency docket number / agency internal file number                    
                -                       the RIN which identifies each regulatory action listed in                      the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory                      Actions                    

                    See the                                          Document Drafting Handbook                                        for more details.                  

###### Federal Maritime Commission

# TIME AND DATE:

 January 27, 2022; 10:00 a.m.

# PLACE:

 This meeting will be held by video-conference only.

# STATUS:

                         Part of the meeting will be open to the public and available to view streamed live, accessible from                         *www.fmc.gov.*                         The rest of the meeting will be closed to the public.                    

# MATTERS TO BE CONSIDERED:

## Portions Open to the Public

1. Commissioner Bentzel, Maritime Transportation Data Initiative

2. Staff Update on Vessel-Operating Common Carrier Audit Program

3. Area Representative Regional Activity Updates

## Portions Closed to the Public

1. Staff Update on Vessel-Operating Common Carrier Audit Program

2. Area Representative Regional Activity Updates

3. Staff Briefing on Detention and Demurrage Billing

4. Investigation into Conditions Created by Canadian Ballast Water Regulations in the U.S./Canada Great Lakes Trade

# CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION:

 William Cody, Secretary, (202) 523-5725.

William Cody,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 2022-01351 Filed 1-20-22; 11:15 am]

BILLING CODE 6730-02-P
exv4w13






Exhibit 4.13




Consent of Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP




To the Board of Directors

Fronteer Development Group Inc.




     We hereby consent to the reference to our name and opinions contained under “Certain Canadian
Federal Income Tax Considerations”, “Experts” and “Legal Matters” in the Notice of Meeting and
Management Information Circular of Aurora Energy Resources Inc. dated March 20, 2009 (the
“Circular”) and in the registration statement on Form F-8 relating to the Circular filed by
Fronteer Development Group Inc. with the United States Securities and Exchange Commission.



	 	 	 	 	 
	Dated March 20, 2009

	 	(signed) Davies Ward Phillips & Vineberg LLP	 	 
	Toronto, Canada

	 	 

DAVIES WARD PHILLIPS & VINEBERG LLP
#### Scott *v.*State.

Opinion delvered December 12, 1896.

Accomplice — Corroboration.—The testimony of an accomplice that defendant stole some women’s dresses and underwear is not sufficiently corroborated by proof that, on the day following-the night on which the garments were stolen, defendant offered to sell to two witnesses a woman’s dress and some women’s underwear, without identifying them as part of the stolen goods.

Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court.

Robert J. Lea, Judge.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

The appellant was indicted with one Charles Gow-ens in the Pulaski circuit court for and convicted of grand larceny, and appealed to this court. No exceptions were saved to the instructions of the court. The chief witness against the defendant was the said Charles Gowens, who was an accomplice, and was himself convicted of the offense. He testified that he and the defendant entered a room at the residence of Dr. Ayers, and took and carried away therefrom the goods which they were charged with stealing, consisting of ladies’ 'dresses, gowns and underwear. The goods or part of them were found in the possession of Charles Gowens, after they were stolen, and he confessed that he was guilty, and stated that the defendant wa's also guilty. None of the goods were found in possession of the defendant, or at any place where he had left thém. The only testimony offered to corroborate the testimony of Gowens, the accomplice, was that of two negro women of bad repute, who testified that on Saturday evening, about three o’clock, the day following the night on which the goods were stolen, -the defendant *311passed them at the corner of Fifth and Center streets, and that he had a bundle under his arm, which contained a ladies’ black dress and some ladies’ underwear, which he offered to sell them at $1.50.

There was no description otherwise of these articles, nor was there any evidence identifying- them as part of the stolen goods. This was the substance of all the evidence.

*C. T. Lindsay*for appellant.

*B. B. Kinsworthy,*Attorney General, for appellee.

Hughes, J.,

(after stating the facts.) “A conviction cannot be had in any case of felony upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated by other testimony tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, and the corroboration is not sufficient if it merely shows that the offense was committed and the circumstances thereof.”- Sand. & H. Dig., sec. 3230. • There must be other evidence *tending- to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense. Vaughan*v. *State,*58 Ark. 365; *Polk*v. State, 36 Ark. 117.

As there is no evidence in this case tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, save the statement of the accomplice, which was not corroborated as the law requires, the judgment is reversed, and the cause is remanded for a new trial.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 9
<RESTATED>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          JUN-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JUL-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<CASH>                                          10,686
<INT-BEARING-DEPOSITS>                           5,000
<FED-FUNDS-SOLD>                                     0
<TRADING-ASSETS>                                     0
<INVESTMENTS-HELD-FOR-SALE>                     94,853
<INVESTMENTS-CARRYING>                               0
<INVESTMENTS-MARKET>                                 0
<LOANS>                                        474,083
<ALLOWANCE>                                      8,221
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 604,185
<DEPOSITS>                                     443,545
<SHORT-TERM>                                         0
<LIABILITIES-OTHER>                             20,296
<LONG-TERM>                                     88,876
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        15,154
<OTHER-SE>                                      36,314
<TOTAL-LIABILITIES-AND-EQUITY>                 604,185
<INTEREST-LOAN>                                 30,118
<INTEREST-INVEST>                                4,017
<INTEREST-OTHER>                                     0
<INTEREST-TOTAL>                                34,135
<INTEREST-DEPOSIT>                              15,233
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              18,296
<INTEREST-INCOME-NET>                           15,839
<LOAN-LOSSES>                                    5,299
<SECURITIES-GAINS>                                   3
<EXPENSE-OTHER>                                 19,741
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  3,779
<INCOME-PRE-EXTRAORDINARY>                       3,779
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     2,427
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .57
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .56
<YIELD-ACTUAL>                                    8.31
<LOANS-NON>                                      2,028
<LOANS-PAST>                                     1,499
<LOANS-TROUBLED>                                     0
<LOANS-PROBLEM>                                      0
<ALLOWANCE-OPEN>                                 7,199
<CHARGE-OFFS>                                    4,737
<RECOVERIES>                                       460
<ALLOWANCE-CLOSE>                                8,221
<ALLOWANCE-DOMESTIC>                             8,221
<ALLOWANCE-FOREIGN>                                  0
<ALLOWANCE-UNALLOCATED>                              0


</TABLE>
#### People v Ratliff,

No. 91043;

Court of Appeals No. 133958.
EXHIBIT D 

Case: 1:18-cv-00357-TSB-KNM-MHW Doc #: 237-6 Filed: 03/02/19 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 19790
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REV _00023347 

Plaintiffs' Trial

Exhibit

P601

Case No. 1:18-cv-00357

Case: 1:18-cv-00357-TSB-KNM-MHW Doc #: 237-6 Filed: 03/02/19 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 19791
*

The        defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not

participating in this appeal. After examining appellant’s brief and the record, we have

concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the appellant’s

brief and the record.  See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a); CIR. R. 34(f).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois  60604

Submitted October 30, 2008*

Decided November 6, 2008

Amended November 13, 2008

Before

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

JOHN L. COFFEY, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 08‐2205

BARRY J. SMITH,

Plaintiff‐Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

Defendants‐Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of

Wisconsin.

No. 08‐C‐262

Rudolph T. Randa,

Judge.

O R D E R

Barry Smith, a resident of Milwaukee, Wisconsin, was disqualified from running for

alderman because of a prior conviction.  Smith then tried to sue the United States and the

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 08‐2205 Page 2

State of Wisconsin for damages because, he says, the law that prohibits him from appearing

on the ballot violates his rights under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth

Amendments of the United States Constitution.  Because Smith asked to proceed in forma

pauperis, the district court screened his complaint before service of process.  See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(a)(1), (e)(2)(b)(ii); Rowe v. Shake, 196 F.3d 778, 783 (7th Cir. 1999).  The court

dismissed the suit on the grounds that Smith fails to state an actionable claim and, in any

event, has sued the wrong parties.

We agree that Smith sued the wrong parties.  The State of Wisconsin cannot be sued

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—as Smith tries to do—both because a state is not a “person” for

purposes of that statute, and because a suit against a state for money damages is barred by

the Eleventh Amendment.  See Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989); Porco

v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 453 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2006).  And the United States is immune from

suit unless it consents to be sued.  See Hercules, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 417, 422 (1996);

Parrott v. United States, 536 F.3d 629, 634 (7th Cir. 2008).  Smith points to no statute where

the United States has waived its immunity for these claims.

Instead, Smith purports to correct the defects in his complaint by attaching to his

appellate brief a proposed amended complaint naming the City of Milwaukee as a

defendant.  Smith argues that he should be allowed to amend his complaint, but he never

tried to do so in the district court.  We will not entertain arguments raised for the first time

on appeal.   In re Willett, No. 07‐1850, 2008 WL 4182649, at *4 n.5 (7th Cir., Sept. 12, 2008);

Domka v. Portage County, Wis., 523 F.3d 776, 784 (7th Cir. 2008).  Nor may Smith amend his

complaint on appeal.  See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 406 (7th Cir. 2000); Hamlin v.

Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 583‐84 (7th Cir. 1996).

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.