1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Action No. 12-1249 (CKK)

MEMORANDUM OPINION (February 26, 2014) Plaintiff Gennaro Mattiaccio filed suit on July 30, 2012, alleging defamation by Defendants Amerete Getu, Davi d Hale, and DHA Group, Inc. See Compl. ECF No. [1]. Plaintiff also asserted three claims under the Fair Credit Re porting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. , one count against each Defendant , arising out of a post-employ ment background check of the Plaintiff. On August 9, 2013, Plaintiff sought l eave to bring in several new defendants and eleven new claims, including claims of tortious interference with employment, defamation, and civil conspiracy to defame against new defend ant Karen Fischer—a Systems Analyst and Test Engineer at DHA Group. Pl.’s Mo t. for Enlargement of Time to File Am. Compl., ECF No. [46]. In a September 16, 2013, Order, the Court granted in part a nd denied in part Plaintiff’s Motion. See Order (Sept. 16, 2013), ECF No. [53]. Plaintiff was allowed to amend his Complaint to include the three claims agains t Defendant Fischer because he had learned information relevant to these claims in depositio ns during discovery after the date for amending pleadings had passed. Presently before the Court is Defendant Fischer’s Motion to Dismiss the claims against her for lack of personal juri sdiction and for failure to state a claim. See Def.’s

GENNARO MATTIACCIO II Plaintiff,

v. DHA GROUP, INC., et al. , Defendants.2 Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. [62]. Upon consideration of the pleadings, 1 the relevant legal authorities, and the record for pur poses of a motion to dismiss, th e Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to properly serve Defendant Fischer and faile d to state a claim of to rtious interference and civil conspiracy to defame against Defendant Fisc her. Accordingly, for the reasons stated below, Defendant Fischer’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual Allegations For the purposes of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, the Court presumes the following facts pled in the Second Amended Complaint to be true as the Court must when considering a motion to dismiss. In relevant part, Plaintiff alleges that he was hired as the Lead Proposal Manager for DHA Group in July 2011. Second Am. Compl., ECF No. [ 55], ¶ 17. Prior to Plaintiff’s employment with DHA Group, Plaintiff complete d a document authorizing DHA Group to conduct a pre-employment b ackground check, which he passed. Id . ¶ 27. On or about May 3, 2012, Plaintiff met w ith Amerete Getu, the Manager of Human Resources for DHA Group, to discuss “a compla int against personnel at the company.” Id . ¶ 33. A few weeks later, on or about May 15, 2012, 2 Defendant Fischer provided Ms. Getu information “in the form of a computer sear ch of records that [Plaintiff] was convicted of perjury in the Fredericksburg Circuit Court, Virginia.” Id. ¶ 34; Pl.’s Ex. E (5/17/12 Fi scher Email to Getu).

1 Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mo t.”), ECF No. [62]; Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“ Pl.’s Opp’n”), ECF No. [75]; De fendant’s Reply in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“ Def.’s Reply), ECF No. [76].

2 Plaintiff alleges later in his Complaint that Defendant Fische r communicated this information to Ms. Getu on or about May 17, 2012. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 47, 49. The email correspondence between Defendant Fischer a nd Ms. Getu, which Plaint iff attaches to his Complaint, also shows a date of May 17, 2012. See Pl.’s Ex. E (5/17/12 Fischer Email to Getu). For the purposes of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Fischer, however, these dates are irrelevant.3 In addition, Defendant Fischer communicated the conviction for perjury to her husband, David Fischer. Id. ¶ 47. Plaintiff alleges that this information was false, id. ¶ 34, and that “the defendants knew that the . . . Perjury convict ion [was] incorrect; ye t it was published to numerous individuals within DHA Group,” id. ¶ 47. On May 16, 2012, Plainti ff was placed on “Administrative Leave until further notice” because of “information coming to light that requires additional review a nd investigation.” Id . ¶ 37; Pl.’s Ex. G (5/16/12 Admin. Leave Ltr.). FromMay 16, 2012, to May 30, 2012, DHA Group engaged Nelson Blitz to conduct a postemployment background check on the Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 38; 144. On May 30, 2012, DHA Group terminated Plaintiff’s employment on the grounds that he was “far less than candid with DHA with respect to important and relevant as pects of [his] background and experience.” Id . ¶ 41; Pl.’s Ex. H (5/30/12 Termination Lt r). Specifically, the terminatio n letter, which included a copy of the background investig ation report prepared by Mr. Blitz, asserted th at Plaintiff failed to disclose prior convictions. Pl.’s Ex. H (5/30/ 12 Termination Ltr); Pl.’s Ex. I (Prelim. Invest. Report). Plaintiff alleges that this letter and report were “published to numerous members of the DHA Management Council.” Id ¶ 46. Plaintiff alleges that th is report contained numerous inaccuracies, including that he was convicted of Assault and Battery, which Plaintiff contends was “false and misleading.” Id. ¶¶ 42; 47. In his Second Amended Complaint, Plainti ff brings three counts against Defendant Fischer. Specifically, Plaintiff raises one count of defamation alleging that Defendant Fischer “defamed Plaintiff by falsely alle ging that Plaintiff had been c onvicted of perjury” (Count Six), id . ¶ 129; one count of civil conspiracy to defame on the basis that Defendant Fischer “entered into an agreement [with David Fischer and ot her defendants] to commit an illegal act of defamation against Plaintiff” (Count Five), id. ¶¶ 120, 121, 123; and one count of tortious4 interference with employment alle ging that Defendant Fischer “acting with malice and deliberate intent to injure the Plaintiff,” “caused DHA Group to breach” their “ongoing employment agreement” with Plaintiff (Count Seven), id. ¶¶ 137, 138. B. Procedural History In the Order granting Plainti ff leave to file a Second Amended Complaint and include the counts outlined above, the Court set forth a sc hedule for the filing of the Second Amended Complaint, and stated that Plai ntiff “shall serve . . . Karen Fi scher by no later than October 8, 2013.” Order (Sept. 16, 2013), ECF No. [53]. De fendant Fischer alleges that on September 30, 2013, Plaintiff, through a process server, served Nelson Blitz with a summons and a copy of the Second Amended Complaint directed to Defenda nt Fischer, even th ough Mr. Blitz was not authorized to accept service on her behalf. De f.’s Mot. at 5. On October 21, 2013, Defendant Fischer filed the present Motion to Dismiss for failu re to properly serve and for failure to state a claim of tortious interference, defama tion, or civil conspiracy to defame. II. LEGAL STANDARD A. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) A court ordinarily may not exercise person al jurisdiction over a party named as a defendant in the absence of service of proces s (or waiver of service by the defendant). See Murphy Bros., Inc. v. Mich etti Pipe Stringing, Inc., 526 U.S. 344, 350 (1999) (citing Omni Capital Int'l, Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 104 (1987) (“Before a . . . court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant, the procedural requirement of service of summons must be satisfied.”); Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438, 444–45 (1946) (“[S]ervice of summons is the procedure by which a court . . . asserts jurisdiction over the person of the party served.”)). Pursuant to Fe deral Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), “if the5 plaintiff does not properly effect service on a defe ndant, then the defendant may move to dismiss the complaint” without prejudice. Hilska v. Jones, 217 F.R.D. 16, 20 (D.D.C. 2003); see also Simpkins v. District of Columbia, 108 F.3d 366, 369 (D.C. Cir. 1997). “The party on whose behalf service is made has the burden of establis hing its validity when challenged; to do so, he must demonstrate that the procedure employed satis fied the requirements of the relevant portions of [Federal Rule of Civil Pr ocedure 4] and any other appl icable provision of law.” Light v. Wolf, 816 F.2d 746, 751 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (internal quotation omitted).
B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) provides that a party may challenge the sufficiency of a complaint on th e grounds it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). “[A] co mplaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007)). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual alle gations that, if accepted as true, “s tate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the c ourt to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678. In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court may consider “the facts alleged in the comp laint, documents attached as exhibits or incorporated by reference in the comp laint,” or “documents up on which the plaintiff’s complaint necessarily relies even if the doc ument is produced not by [the parties].” Ward v. D.C. Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs. , 768 F. Supp. 2d 117, 119 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations omitted). III. DISCUSSION A. Failure to Serve Defendant Fischer6 Defendant Fischer contends th at Plaintiff’s three counts against her must be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to properly serve her with the Second Amended Complaint. Def.’s Mot. at 4. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) manda tes that a plaintiff serv e an individual defendant in the United States by one of four means: (1) “following state law for serving a summons in an action brought in courts of genera l jurisdiction in the state where th e district court is located or where service is made;” (2) by “delivering a c opy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally;” (3) by “leaving a copy of each at the individual’s dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discre tion who resides there;” or (4) by “delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive services of process.” Defendant Fischer contends that even though Plaintiff was require d by the Court’s Order to serve her in her individual ca pacity by no later than October 8, 2013, Plaintiff did not serve her or anyone authorized to accept service on her behalf by that date, but instead served Mr. Blitz with a summons and a copy of the Second Amended Comp laint directed to Defendant Fischer. Def.’s
Mot

. at 5 (citing Blitz Decl., Def.’s Exs. A & B). Although Mr. Blitz is the registered agent for DHA Group, he is not the registered agent for Defendant Fischer and Defendant Fischer has never authorized him to accept serv ice on her behalf. Blitz Decl. ¶ 2; Fischer Decl. ¶ 3. Plaintiff concedes that he did not prope rly serve Defendant Fischer. See Pl.’s Opp’n. at 2. However, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Fi scher waived Plaintiff’s defici ent service when her attorney entered a full appearance in court on behalf of all Defendants. Id. But Plaintiff misstates the procedural facts of this case. Attorney Emily C. Harlan entered a limited appearance on behalf of Defendant Fischer on October 21, 2013, for the purpose of filing a motion to dismiss the claims against Defendant Fischer pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). See ECF No. [61]. On November 1, 2013, Attorney Kenneth Nichols entered a full appearance on behalf7 of Defendants DHA Group, Amerete Getu, David Hale , and Karen Fischer, but three days later he filed a notice with the Court on the public docket clarifying hi s appearance on behalf of Karen Fischer and specifying that he was entering only a “limited appearance” on her behalf. See ECF No. [69], [70]. Consequently, c ontrary to Plaintiff’s characteri zation of the record, Defendant Fischer never effectively entered a full appearance in court. In any event, “federal courts have firmly established that a court appearance alone can never waive an otherwise valid Rule 12(b)(5) defense.” Candido v. District of Columbia , 242 F.R.D. 151, 162 (D.D.C. 2007). Plaintiff also appears to argue that Defendant Fischer’s decision to simultaneously move the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on its me rits for failure to state a claim also waived Plaintiff’s deficient service. Ho wever, the Federal Rules of Civ il Procedure clearly allow a party to make multiple Rule 12 defenses at the same time. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(g); see also Wilson v. Prudential Financial , 332 F.Supp.2d 83, 89 (D.D.C. 2004) (rej ecting plaintiff’s argument that defendant waived its service-of-process defense by addressing both sufficiency of service and the merits of the plaintiff’s claims within the same motion); Simpkins , 108 F.3d at 368 (stating that, “a party choosing to file a Rule 12(b) motion mu st include all defenses and objections then available to him that Rule 12 permits to be made by motion”) (quotations omitted). In the alternative, Plaintiff asks the Court fo r ten days to re-serve Defendant Fischer in the event that the Court finds, as it has, that De fendant Fischer did not wa ive Plaintiff’s defective service of process. The Court is not inclined to grant Plaintiff this substantial extension of time to serve Defendant Fischer. Plaintiff amended his Complaint to include Defendant Fischer three months after the deadline for amending pleadings had passed. Plaintiff was given specific orders by the Court to serve Defendant Fischer by Octo ber 8, 2013. Plaintiff has shown that he knows how to effectuate process by successfully serving ot her defendants in this case in their individual8 capacity. Moreover, Mr. Blitz declares that he told the process server who served Mr. Blitz with the Complaint directed at Defendant Fischer that he was not an agent fo r Defendant Fischer. See Blitz Decl. ¶ 4. Plaintiff does not contradi ct this statement and thus was on notice as early as September 30, 2013, that there was a defect in hi s service on Defendant Fischer yet did not make an effort to correct this defect. Plaintiff wa s again put on notice when Defendant Fischer filed her Motion to Dismiss for failure to serve on Oc tober 21, 2013, but Plaintiff still made no effort to properly serve Defendant Fisc her at that time. Now Plaint iff requests in his Opposition pleading that the Court grant him an extension to serve Defendant Fischer, but Plaintiff has not filed a separate motion requesting to reserve De fendant Fischer. This case has been pending since July 2012 and discovery was to be comple ted by December 31, 2013. The original parties in this case have complained of undue prejudice due to the additional time that would be required to conduct discovery related to Pl aintiff’s recently added allega tions against Defendants Fischer and Blitz. See Motion to Strike, ECF No. [59], at 5-6. Th e Court finds that granting Plaintiff an additional extension at this late stage when Pl aintiff previously had multiple opportunities to correctly serve Defendant Fische r would prejudice the defendants by delaying th is case even further. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defenda nt Fischer’s Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). Howeve r, as the Court finds th at Plaintiff has also failed to state a claim with regard s to his tortious interference and civil conspiracy counts against Defendant Fischer, the Court only dismisses without prejudice Plaintiff’s defamation claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Ci vil Procedure 12(b)(5). For th e reasons explained below, the Court dismisses with prejudice Plaintiff’s tortious inte rference and civil conspiracy claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim.
B. Failure to State a Claim9 In the alternative, Defendant Fischer argue s that Plaintiff’s three counts against her should be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. At the out set, the Court notes th at in his Opposition to Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Pl aintiff argues that Virginia la w should govern the claims he alleges against Defendant Fischer. 3 Accordingly, the Court shall first consider the appropriate law to apply in this case before turning to th e viability of each of Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Fischer. i. Choice of Law When determining the applicable law in a diversity case, a federal court applies the choice of law rules of the forum state. Bledsoe v. Crowley, 849 F.2d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (citing Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941)). The District of Columbia employs a “governmental interest analysis.” Id. In a torts case, “[t]his inquiry includes consideration of the fo llowing factors from the Restat ement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145: (1) the place where the injury occurred, (2) the place where th e conduct causing the injury occurred, (3) the domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (4) the place where the relationship is centered.” Hartley v. Dombrowski , 744 F.Supp.2d 328, 336 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Jaffe v. Pallotta TeamWorks, 374 F.3d 1223, 1227 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Generally, for tort claims the jurisdiction in which the injury occurred has the most significant relationship. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 156

3 The Court notes that this is the first tim e in this lengthy litigation, which has already resulted in the publication of se veral opinions, that Plaintiff has argued that Virginia law should apply in addressing Plaintiff’s claims. The partie s have otherwise relied on District of Columbia law and, in fact, Plaintiff conti nues to rely substantially on Di strict of Columbia law in his Opposition to Defendant Fischer’s Motion to Dismiss despite his argument for the applicability of Virginia law.10 comment b (1971). The ultimate goal of a governme ntal interest analysis is to determine the jurisdiction with “the most significant re lationship” to the i ssue in dispute. Long v. Sears Roebuck & Co. , 877 F.Supp. 8, 11 (D.D.C. 1995). Finally, choice of law analysis is performed for each issue adjudicated, therefore a diffe rent law can apply to different issues. 4 Id. Here, Plaintiff argues that Virginia law s hould apply to all of his claims against Defendant Fischer because Defendant Fischer is employed by DHA Group in Virginia and, therefore, “the events complained of must have o ccurred in Virginia.” Pl .’s Opp’n. at 5. The Court finds, however, that the Dist rict of Columbia has the more significant relationship to the allegedly unlawful conduct at i ssue and that the District’s polic ies would be most advanced by having its laws applied to the facts of this case. Hartley , 744 F.Supp.2d at 336. Most importantly, the injury caused by the alleged tor tious interference with employment took place in the District of Columbia. Plaintiff’s empl oyment contract with which Defendant Fischer allegedly interfered was with DHA Group whose prin cipal place of business is in the District of Columbia. See Second Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2, 11. Plain tiff was also employed at DHA Group’s District of Columbia office and was employed at th is location when his contract was terminated.
See Pl.’s Ex. C (Plaintiff Email to Getu). Alt hough one could infer from Plaintiff’s Complaint that the allegedly unlawful c onduct—i.e. the sending of the de famatory email—took place in Virginia since Defendant Fisc her was employed at DHA Group’s Virginia office, Defendant Fischer sent her email to Ms. Getu who was em ployed at DHA Group in the District of Columbia

4 As the law for defamation and civil conspiracy is effectively the same in Virginia and the District of Columbia for the purposes of Plaintiff’s claims, the Court need not conduct a choice of law analysis as to those specific claims. Owens v. Republic of Sudan, 826 F.Supp.2d 128, 154 (D.D.C. 2011) (under District of Columbia choice-of-law rules, “the court must first determine whether a conflict exists between the la w of the forum and the law of the alternative jurisdiction” because “[i]f there is no true confli ct, the court should apply the law of the forum.” (citing USA Waste of Md., Inc. v. Love, 954 A.2d 1027, 1032 (D.C. 2008))).11 and thus Defendant Fischer’s allegedly tortious conduct extended into and was completed in the District of Columbia. See Pl.’s Ex. E (5/17/12 Fischer Email to Getu). Given that the majority of the relevant contacts in this case were with the District of Columbia, the Court finds that the District of Columbia has a greater interest in appl ying the tort laws it has created to protect those employed in the District. See Long , 877 F.Supp. at 12 (“The District of Columbia has an interest in deterring tortious behavior occurring in the District, and that policy is advanced by applying D.C. law.”). ii. Tortious interference To state a claim for tortious interference wi th employment rights in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must allege that: (1) a legal contract existed; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the contract; (3) the defendant intentionally proc ured the contract’s breach; and (4) damages resulted from the defendant’s actions. Terrell v. District of Columbia , 703 F.Supp.2d 17, 22-23 (D.D.C. 2010) (citing Cooke v. Griffiths–Garcia Corp., 612 A.2d 1251, 1256 (D.C. 1992)). While Plaintiff had a legal contract with DHA Group, Plaintiff attaches to his Complaint and “incorporates into [his] complaint as if quoted verbatim” his offer lett er from DHA Group which clearl y states that Plaintiff was employed “at-will” by DHA Group and that his empl oyment relationship with DHA “shall at all times be terminable at any time by you or DHA, with or without advance notice, and with or without cause.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 17; Ex. A. The law in the District of Columbia is that a tortious interference claim ca nnot be predicated on an at-w ill employment relationship. See Riggs v. Home Builders Institute , 203 F.Supp.2d 1, 23 (D.D.C. 2002) (“the highest court of the District of Columbia d ecided authoritatively [in Bible Way Church v. Beards , 680 A.2d 419, 432-33 (D.C. 1996)] that under an at-will arrangement the prerequisite does not exist for the tort12 of interference with an employ ment relationship. A third part y who interferes with such a tenuous relationship is not liable to the employee since no wrongful breach of contract can result from his interference.” (quoting Dale v. Thomason, 962 F.Supp. 181, 184 (D.D.C.1997))). Accordingly, Plaintiff cannot, by law, sustain a cl aim of tortious interf erence with employment against Defendant Fischer and the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Seven. iii. Civil Conspiracy to Defame In order to survive a motion to dismiss for fa ilure to state a claim of civil conspiracy under District of Columbia law, a complaint must allege with some factual support: “ ‘(1) an agreement between two or more persons; (2) to part icipate in an unlawful act, or in a lawful act in an unlawful manner; and (3) an injury caused by an unlawful overt act performed by one of the parties to the agreement (4) pursuant to, and in furtherance of, the common scheme.’ ” Executive Sandwich Shoppe, Inc. v. Carr Realty Corp., 749 A.2d 724, 738 (D.C . 2000) (citation omitted). The question of whether a conspiracy theory has been adequately pled often turns upon the existence of an agreement, which is th e “essential element of a conspiracy claim,” Graves v. United States, 961 F.Supp. 314, 320 (D.D.C. 1997). In pleading that a defendant entered into an agreement the “plaintiff must set forth more than just conclusory allegations of [the] agreement to sustain a claim of c onspiracy against a motion to dismiss.” Brady v. Livingood, 360 F.Supp.2d 94, 104 (D.D .C. 2004) (citing Graves, 961 F.Supp. at 321). In her Motion to Dismiss, Defendant Fisc her argues that Plaint iff has failed to sufficiently plead the existence of an agreement between two or more pe rsons and failed to suffici ently allege that the underlying unlawful act—defamation—was committe d. The Court agrees with Defendant Fischer that Plaintiff’s civil cons piracy claim should be dismissed for failure to sufficiently plead the existence of an agreement.13 Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is not a model of clarity, appears to allege that Defendant Fischer was involved in two conspiracies, the fi rst with her husband, David Fischer, for which Plaintiff alleges that “Defendant Karen Fischer and David Fischer entered into an agreement to commit an illegal act of defamation against Pl aintiff,” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 120, and a second or related conspiracy which “Def endant Karen and David Fischer, 5 authorized, instigated, condoned and/or participated in the conspira cy to commit the defamation of Plaintiff by Defendants and Defendant Getu,” id. ¶ 123. In neither scenario has Plaintiff sufficiently alleged that Defendant Fischer entered into an agreement to defame Plaintiff as Plaintiff’s “allegations are “purely conclusory and de void of any factual support.” Acosta Orellana v. CropLife Intern. , 711 F.Supp.2d 81, 113 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding plaint iff failed to suffici ently plead civil conspiracy where plaintiff made conclusory alle gations that defendants “acted in concert to promote heavy usage of [a fungicide],” and “conspired to provide false and misleading information . . . regarding the dangers of the ch emical.”). In the first conspiracy scenario Plaintiff alleges defendant entered into an agre ement, but provides no “indication of when or how such an agreement was brokered” to buttress this allegation. Id.; see also Bush v. Butler , 521 F.Supp.2d 63, 68-69 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing conspiracy claim where pl aintiff’s allegation of an agreement provided no description of the natu re of the agreement, or what particular acts were taken to form the conspiracy); McCreary v. Heath , 2005 WL 3276257, at *5 (D.D.C. Sept. 26, 2005) (dismissing conspiracy claim when plainti ff’s complaint failed “to allege the existence of any events, conversations, or documents indi cating that there was ever an agreement or ‘meeting of the minds’ between any of the defendants”).

5 David Fischer is not a Defendant in this matter. See Mem. Op. (Sept. 16, 2013), at 7-8 (denying Plaintiff leave to amend complain t to add claims agai nst David Fischer).14 In the second conspiracy scen ario Plaintiff appears to pr opose, it is unclear from Plaintiff’s language if Plaintiff is even alleging that Defendant Fi scher entered into an agreement with “Defendants and Defendant Getu” to defame Plaintiff. See Second Am. Compl. ¶ 123 (“Defendant . . . authorized, instigated, condoned a nd/or participated in th e conspiracy to commit the defamation of Plaintiff by Defendants and Defe ndant Getu.”). Plainti ff’s only related factual allegation is that “[o]n or about May 15, 2012, De fendant Amarete [sic] Getu coordinated with defendant Karen Fisher [sic] at which time Defendant Fisher [sic] provided information . . . that the [Plaintiff] was convicted of perjury.” Id . ¶ 34. But this vague allegation does not support a reasonable inference that there was an agreement or even a “meeting of the minds” between the parties to defame Plaintiff. As Plaintiff has failed to clearly allege that Defendant Fischer entered an agreement to defame Plaintiff with any of the Defendants in the second conspiracy scenario, and failed to sufficiently allege the f acts of a conspiratorial agreement in the first scenario, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Count Five , Plaintiff’s civil conspiracy claim. iv. Defamation Finally, Defendant Fischer moves this Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant defamed Plaintiff by falsely alleging that Plaintiff had been convicted of perjury. Def.’s Mot. at 8-10. Defendant argues that Plai ntiff’s defamation claim must fail because Plaintiff does not allege “that the defendant’s fa ult in publishing the statement am ounted to at least negligence,” nor does Plaintiff allege sufficient facts to show that Defe ndant Fischer published the statement to Ms. Getu “without privilege.” Id. The Court finds that both of Defendant’s arguments must fail because Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that Defendant Fischer published the defamatory statement knowing that the statement was false. Specifically, in paragraph 47 of his Complaint,15 Plaintiff states: “On personal knowledge, the defendants knew that the Assault and Battery, and Perjury conviction were incorrect; yet it was published to numerous indivi duals within DHA Group.” Second Am. Compl. ¶ 47 (emphasis added) . Later in the same paragraph, Plaintiff explains to whom the allegations of assault a nd battery were published a nd then states: “Karen Fisher [sic] communicated the false conviction for perjury to her husband David Fischer and then to Amerete Getu, verbally, and in the fo rm of an email on or about May 17, 2012.” Id. Although Plaintiff’s reference to “t he defendants’” is vague, the Court reads this allegation as directly implicating Defendant Fischer’s knowledge because Defendant Fischer is the only Defendant alleged to have published information about Plaintiff’s perjur y conviction. In other words, by saying the “defendants knew that the A ssault and Battery, and Perjury conviction were incorrect,” Plaintiff is necessa rily talking about Defendant Fi scher because she is the only Defendant to have published anythi ng regarding an alleged perjury conviction. 6 This reading is supported by the fact that Plaintiff talks specifica lly about Defendant Fi scher in the same paragraph after referencing “the defendants.” Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has alleged that “defendant’s fault in publishing the statement amount ed to at least negligence.” Moreover, any qualified privilege de fense that Defendant Fischer might be able to claim at this stage is overcome by the fact that Plaintiff ha s alleged that Defendant Fischer published the defamatory statement knowing it was false. See Hargrow v. Long , 760 F.Supp. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 1989) (“Once a communication is deemed privile ged, the burden of proof to demonstrate malice rests with the plaintiff . . . . To show malice, the plaintiff must show either that the statements were made with knowing falsity, in bad faith, or with reckless disregard of the truth.” (citing Alfred A. Altimont, Inc. v. Chatelain, Smaperton & Nolan, 374 A.2d 284, 290 (D.C. 1977))).

6 The report prepared by Mr. B litz and attached to the termination letter prepared by Ms. Getu only discusses perjury “charges.” See Pl.’s Exs. H & I.16 The Court thus DENIES Defendant ’s Motion to Dismiss Count Six on the merits. However, as explained supra , Plaintiff’s defa mation claim is dismissed without prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedur e 12(b)(5) in light of Plaintiff’s failure to properly serve Defendant Fischer. IV. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiff’s Tortio us Interference (Count Seven) and Civil Conspiracy (Count Five) claims against Defe ndant Fischer are DISM ISSED WITH PREJUDICE for failure to state a claim upon which relief ma y be granted. Plaintiff’s Defamation claim (Count Six) against Defendant Fischer is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJ UDICE in light of Plaintiff’s failure to properly serve Defendant Fischer. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion.
/s/ COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE