UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JOHN P. FOGLE, 

Plaintiff, 

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:18-cv-244 

Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. 

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff, John P. Fogle (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and

1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying his applications for social security disability insurance benefits and 

supplemental security income. This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for a 

Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8), the 

Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 13), Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 14), and

the administrative record (ECF No. 7.) For the reasons that follow, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDS that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social Security’s nondisability finding and REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ under Sentence 

Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Report and Recommendation.

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed his application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits 

and his application for supplemental security income on August 1, 2014, alleging that he had 
2

been disabled since April 18, 2014. (R. 271–81.) On May 30, 2017, following initial 

administrative denials of Plaintiff’s application, a video hearing was held before Administrative 

Law Judge Peter Beekman (the “ALJ”). (Id. at 103–28.) Plaintiff, represented by counsel, 

appeared and testified. Vocational expert Brett Salkin (the “VE”) also appeared and testified at 

the hearing. On July 26, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 13–34.) On January 26, 2018, the Appeals 

Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted the ALJ’s decision as the 

Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff then timely commenced the instant action. 

II. THE ALJ’S DECISION 

On July 26, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within 

the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. 13–34.) At step one of the sequential evaluation 

process,1

 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantially gainful activity since 

April 18, 2014, the alleged onset date. (Id. at 15.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of insulin dependent diabetes mellitus; status post total hip replacement secondary 

1

 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step 

sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive 

finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th 

Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal the 

criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, 20 

C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform his 

or her past relevant work? 

5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the national 

economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); 

Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 
3

to avascular necrosis; low back pain/disorder of the back; discogenic and degenerative disease; 

and an affective disorder. (Id. at 16.) He further found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment 

or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments 

described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. (Id. at 17.) At step four of the 

sequential process, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, [the ALJ] find[s] that the claimant 

has the residual functional capacity to perform light work as defined in 20 CFR 

404.1567(b) and 416.967(b), except the claimant can lift/carry 20 pounds 

occasionally and 10 pounds frequently, stand/walk 6 [hours] out of 8, and sit 4 

[hours] out of 8. The claimant requires a sit/stand option for one hour at a time. 

He can constantly push/pull, but only occasionally foot pedal. He can occasionally 

use a ramp or stairs, but never a ladder, rope, or a scaffold. The claimant can 

occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. There are no manipulative 

limitations, visual limitations, or communication deficits. He should avoid entirely 

dangerous machinery and unprotected heights. The claimant can do simple, routine 

tasks, and, in addition, can do more complex tasks that take 1 to 3 months to learn. 

(Id. at 20.) 

In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the opinion evidence in the record, 

including the opinion of Patrick Goggin, M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician. (Id. at 30.) Dr. 

Goggin opined that Plaintiff was significantly limited in, inter alia, his ability to walk, sit, or 

stand for any length of time. (Id. at 30, 1123.) The ALJ afforded Dr. Goggin’s opinion “no 

weight” because the ALJ found it to be inconsistent both with Dr. Goggin’s own treatment notes 

and with the remaining medical evidence of record. (Id. at 30.) 

At step five of the sequential process, the ALJ, relying on the VE’s testimony, found that 

considering Plaintiff’s age, education, past work experience, and RFC, he can perform jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 32.) The ALJ therefore concluded 

that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id. at 33.) 

In his Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8), Plaintiff raises three contentions of error: (1) the 

RFC is not supported by substantial evidence; (2) the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the 
4

opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician (Dr. Goggin) and treating psychiatrist (Dr. Scrimenti); 

and (3) the ALJ failed to consider Plaintiff’s complex regional pain syndrome as a medically 

determinable impairment. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to 

proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is 

defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must 

“‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the 

Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). 

Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to 

that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an 

opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. 

Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the 

substantial evidence standard, “a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the 

SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits 
5

or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 

746 (6th Cir. 2007). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

Plaintiff raises three issues in his Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8.) The undersigned 

finds that remand is required as to Plaintiff’s second contention of error because the ALJ failed 

to give good reasons for assigning no weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Goggin.

The ALJ must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in evaluating a 

claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). Where a treating source’s opinion is submitted, the 

ALJ generally gives deference to it “since these sources are likely to be the medical professionals 

most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and 

may bring a unique perspective to the medical evidence that cannot be obtained from the 

objective medical filings alone . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). If the treating physician’s opinion is “well supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with 

the other substantial evidence in [the claimant’s] case record, [the ALJ] will give it controlling 

weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). 

If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ 

must meet certain procedural requirements. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 

(6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, if an ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling 

weight:

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors-namely, the length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 

treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion 

with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source-in 

determining what weight to give the opinion. 
6

Id. Furthermore, an ALJ must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] notice of determination 

or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your treating source’s opinion.” 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.927(c)(2). Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning “must be sufficiently specific to make clear 

to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s medical 

opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 543, 550 

(6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 

Circuit has stressed the importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 

disposition of their cases,” particularly in situations where a claimant knows that 

his physician has deemed him disabled and therefore “might be especially 

bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some 

reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 (2d 

Cir. 1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician 

rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule. See

Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. Thus, the reason-giving requirement is “particularly important 

when the treating physician has diagnosed the claimant as disabled.” Germany-Johnson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 313 Fed. App’x 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242).

There is no requirement, however, that the ALJ “expressly” consider each of the Wilson

factors within the written decision. See Tilley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 

(6th Cir. 2010) (indicating that, under Blakley and the good reason rule, an ALJ is not required to 

explicitly address all of the six factors within 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) for weighing medical 

opinion evidence within the written decision). 

Finally, the Commissioner reserves the power to decide certain issues, such as a 

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although the ALJ will 

consider opinions of treating physicians “on the nature and severity of your impairment(s),” 
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opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are generally not entitled to special 

significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007). 

Here, the ALJ noted the following limitations recommended by Dr. Goggin in his 

medical source statement: 

Treating source Patrick Goggin, M.D., opined on March 13, 2017 that the claimant 

can walk 0 city blocks, sit 5 minutes at one time, stand 5 minutes at one time, and 

sit, stand/walk for 0 hours total in an 8-hour workday (Exhibit 35F). Dr. Goggin 

noted the claimant needs a job that permits shifting positions at will from sitting, 

standing, and walking, and needs to walk for 10 minutes every 60 minutes (Id.). 

Dr. Goggin opined that the claimant requires 10 minute unscheduled breaks two to 

three times a day, and requires an assistive device while engaging in occasional 

standing/walking due to imbalance and pain (Id.). Dr. Goggin opined the claimant 

can ever carry even less than 10 pounds, and can never twist, stoop, crouch/squat, 

or climb (Id.). He noted limited reaching, handling, and fingering, consisting of 

only 1–2% of the day with both upper extremities (Id.). Dr. Goggin opined the 

claimant would be off task 25% or more of the time, is incapable of even low stress 

work, experiences good and bad days, and will be absent more than 4 days per 

month (Id.). In support of his opinion, Dr. Goggin noted low back pain, right hip 

pain, other chronic pain, diabetes mellitus with polyneuropathy, and depression, 

with uncontrolled blood sugar levels and use of a cane the majority of the time (Id.).

(R. 30.) Although recognizing that “Dr. Goggin has an extensive treating relationship with the 

claimant,” the ALJ determined that “[Dr. Goggin’s] opinion does not warrant controlling or even 

great weight.” (Id.) The ALJ based this conclusion on the inconsistency of Dr. Goggin’s 

opinion with Dr. Goggin’s own treatment notes: 

First, the extremely limited opinion is inconsistent with Dr. Goggin’s own 

treatment notes, which contain evidence of right hip and low back pain, decreased 

lumbar range of motion, lumbar paraspinal muscle spasm, right hip weakness, 

positive straight leg raising on the right, occasionally decreased right upper 

extremity strength due to pain, a limping gait favoring the right side, occasionally 

abnormal monofilament sensation, and occasional depression related symptoms, 

but a normal, pain-free left hip, with full strength, negative straight leg raising on 

the left, consistently independent ambulation, otherwise generally normal 

sensation, and otherwise generally normal mental status (Exhibit 41F:1–3, 21F; 

26F; 29F; 32F; 38F). In fact, given these inconsistencies, it is likely that Dr. 

Goggin’s opinion was based primarily upon the claimant’s subjective reports, 

rather than [his] own objective findings. 
8

(Id. at 30.) The ALJ also found Dr. Goggin’s opinion to be inconsistent with the rest of the 

record evidence: 

In addition, the opinion is contradicted by the remaining medical evidence of 

record, which confirms chronic lumbar radiculopathy and chronic right hip pain, 

with decreased range of motion and a consistently abnormal gait, but full upper 

extremity strength, normal coordination and reflexes, and consistently independent 

ambulation (Exhibit 4F, 5F, 6F, 7F, 9F, 11F, 13F,14F, 17F, 19F, 21F, 23F, 25F, 

26F, 27F, 29F, 31F, 32F, 34F, 38F, 39F). 

As a result of these inconsistencies, the ALJ gave Dr. Goggin’s opinion “no weight.” (Id. at 30.) 

Plaintiff contends, and the undersigned agrees, that the ALJ’s explanation for discounting 

Dr. Goggin’s opinion is unclear. Although he purportedly rejected Dr. Goggin’s opinion due to 

its inconsistency with Dr. Goggin’s own treatment notes and the remaining medical evidence in 

the record, the record evidence highlighted by the ALJ actually appears to be largely consistent 

with Dr. Goggin’s opinion. In particular, Dr. Goggin’s recommended limitations on sitting, 

standing, and walking appear consistent with Dr. Goggin’s treatment notes, which, as noted by 

the ALJ, confirm right hip and low back pain, decreased lumbar range of motion, lumbar 

paraspinal muscle spasm, right hip weakness, positive straight leg raising on the right, and a 

limping gait favoring the right side. (Id. at 30.) Further, as the ALJ notes, the remaining medical 

evidence confirms chronic lumbar radiculopathy and chronic right hip pain, with decreased range 

of motion and a consistently abnormal gait, which do not appear to be inconsistent with Dr. 

Goggin’s recommendations. (Id.) And the fact that Plaintiff’s left hip is fully-functional and 

pain free is not inconsistent with sitting, standing, and walking restrictions in light of the ample 

evidence of pain, weakness, and range-of-motion limitations in Plaintiff’s right hip. That is, 

many of the inconsistencies relied on by the ALJ do not appear to be inconsistencies at all. 

As a result, the undersigned finds that the ALJ failed to give good reasons for not giving 

controlling weight to the opinion of Plaintiff’s treating physician. The Sixth Circuit Court of 
9

Appeals has stated, “[w]e do not hesitate to remand when the Commissioner has not provided 

‘good reasons’ for the weight given to a treating physician’s opinion and we will continue 

remanding when we encounter opinions from ALJ’s that do not comprehensively set forth the 

reasons for the weight assigned to a treating physician’s opinion.” Hensley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 

263, 267 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wilson, 378 F.3d at 548). The undersigned concludes that 

remand is warranted on this basis.2

This finding obviates the need to analyze and resolve Plaintiff’s remaining contentions of 

error. Nevertheless, on remand, the ALJ may consider Plaintiff’s remaining assignments of error 

if appropriate.

V. DISPOSITION

Due to the error outlined above, Plaintiff is entitled to an order remanding this case to the 

Social Security Administration pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s non-disability finding and REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ 

under Sentence Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Report and 

Recommendation.

VI. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

2

 It may be that some of Dr. Goggin’s recommendations are inconsistent with the record (e.g., his 

opinion that Plaintiff must use a cane whenever standing or walking, given that Dr. Goggin’s 

treatment notes and other medical evidence report that Plaintiff was consistently able to ambulate 

independently). However, this does not account for the ALJ’s wholesale assignment of “no 

weight” to Dr. Goggin’s entire opinion. 
10

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit 

this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE