### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

ON MOTION F OR RECUSAL

NO. 03-0 5 -00 585 -CR NO. 03-05-00586- CR
Ex pa r te Ja m e s W . El lis

NO. 03-05-00589- CR NO. 03-05-00590- CR NO. 03-05-00591- CR NO. 03-05-00592- CR NO. 03-05-00593- CR NO. 03-05-00594- CR NO. 03-05-00595- CR NO. 03-05-00596- CR NO. 03-05-00597- CR NO. 03-05-00598- CR NO. 03-05-00599- CR NO. 03-05-00600- CR NO. 03-05-00601- CR NO. 03-05-00602- CR NO. 03-05-00603- CR
Ex parte John Dom inick Colyan dro

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 331S T JUDICIAL DISTRICT NOS. D -1-DC -2005 -9041 22, 90 4056 4, 9040 570, 90 4057 1, 9040 572, 90 4057 3, 9040 574, 9040 575, 90 4057 6, 9040 577, 90 4056 5, 9040 566, 90 4056 7, 9040 568, 90 4056 9,

9040 598 & D1 DC -05-90 4121 HO NORAB LE BO B PERK INS, JUDGE P RESIDING2 D I S S E N T I N GO P I N I O N
L itigants ha

ve a ri gh t t o a fair and impar tial judiciary . The State of T exas, as the ste wa rd of th e ju dici a l sy ste m, h a s th e ob lig a tio n to c re a te su c h a fo rum, t o p ro mot e pu

bli c confide nce in the c ourts, and to safe g uar d the cour ts from eve n the appe ara

nce of impartiality

or
corr uption, including political b i as or favoritism. As life and liberty are at issue in a cr iminal pro c e e d in g , a

ju d g e ’ s im

p a rti a li ty

— a n d th e p a rti e s ’ p e r c e p ti o n

o f th a t i mp a rti a li ty

— is o f c r it ic al importance to the parties a nd society . I ndeed, impar tiality and the perc eption of impartiality are a defining feature of the judicial role. B eca use re cusal ser

ves to safe g uard that role, I dissent to the Court ’s de nia l of

the mot ion

fo r r e c us a l. The fa cts are these:

! Th e se a c c e le rate d a pp e a ls w e re fi le d in

thi s Cour

t ov e r t hr e e y e a rs a g o in September 2005.
! The pa

rties filed their brief

s and the c auses we re or igina lly submitt ed to the Court to be decide d on the brief s, without oral argument, in J anuar y 2006.
! Cause No s . 0 3 -0 5 -0 0 5 8 5 -C R an d 0 3 -0 5 -0 0 5 8 6 -C R

(t h e “ E l l i s ” ap p eals) were submitt ed to the pane l consisting of Justi ces B . A. Smith, P atterson and Pur y e a r. Th e re ma ini ngc a

us e s (t he “ Col y a nd ro ” a pp e a ls) we re su

bmi tte d to the pane l consisting of Chief J ustice L aw, J ustices Pemberton a nd Waldrop.
! Six months later, the se submissions were c ance lled without consultation or explanation, and all of the c auses we re r eset for a specia lly schedule d end-of

summer or a l a r g u me n t o n A u g u s t 2 2 , 2 0 0 6 , b e f o r e th e p a n e l c o n s is ti n g of Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop.
! Th e Court ’s no tic e ins tr uc te d th e pa

rt ie s a s f oll ow s: You are hereby notified that this Court has determined that the a bove ref ere nced c auses should be orally argued. Submission on briefs hasBe cause of the une x plained re assig nment of these c ases a nd their appa

rent c onsolidation 1 befor e a dif

fer ent pane l, Idissented from the Court’ s decision not to hear these a ppeals e n banc. I t is questionable whether this communication satisf i es t h e re q uirement of the rule. See 2 T e x . R
. A p p . P
. 1 6
. 3 ( b ) ( r e qu i r i n g c e rt i f i c a t i o n )

. B l a c k ’ s L a w D i c t i o n a r y d e f i n e s t h e t e r

m “ c e rt i f y” to mean “to a

uthenticate or

verify in writing.” See Bla ck’s L aw Dictionary 220 (7th ed. 1999). At least one c ourt of appe als to consider the matter ha s held that the filing of a motion to recuse initiates a “ mo r e f o r ma l p r o c e s s o f c o n s id e r a tion.” S ee W i lliams v. Viswanathan , 65 S.W .3d 685, 687 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2001, no pet.). I n that case , the challeng ed Just ice “ cer tified the re asons why he does not be lieve he should re cuse himself to the t wo m em b ers of the court who a re not the subjects of the r ecusa l motion and has stated i n some detail his rea sons for doingso.” Id. ; se e als o Rogers v. Bradle

y , 909 S.W .2d 872, 873 (Tex. 2004) (Gammag e, J.) (decla ration of r ecusa l). 3 this date bee n canc eled a

nd the ca u s es ar e reset for submission and oral ar gument on Tuesday , Aug ust 22, 2006 at 9:00 AM, before Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Pembe rton and Waldrop.
! Although the se ca ses wer e orig inally assig ned to diffe rent pa nels, no explanation was g iven for the rea ssignment o f the Ellis appeals fr om the Smith, Patte rs on , Pury e a r p a ne l to the L a w, Pe mbe rt on , Wa ldr op pa ne l. 1
! Two y ear s later, the Court issued its opinion in these a c c e le r a ted app e a ls, written by

J ustice Waldrop.
! On re hearing , the State filed a motion to recuse Justi ce Waldrop, a nd on September 25, 2008, Justi ce Wald ro p advised the othe r justices that he declined to r ecuse himself. 2
Th e ru le s o f a

pp e llate pr oc e dure pr ov ide that “ the c ha lle ng e d jud g e or jus tic e mus t
e ith e r r e mov e him se lf

fr om a ll p a rt ic ipatio n in the c a se , o r c e rt if

y th e mat ter

to t he e nti re c ourt , which will decide the m otion by a majority of the re maining judg es sitting en ba nc.” T ex. R . App. P. 16.3(b). For

the first time, on Dec ember 19, 2008, J ustice Waldrop circ ulated to the justices of this Court t he re quired Rule 16.3(b) cer tification.4 Ia sk e d th e c le rk

of thi s Co ur

t on mor e tha n o ne oc c a sio n— in w ri tin g wi th n oti c e to the other justices—to re quest a re sponse to the State’s motion. T h e thre e-judg e majority has opposed the re quest for a

response and, to date, a

response has not bee n reque sted or other wise submitted. Wit hout a re sponse, the fa cts alleg ed in the State’s motion ar e uncontrove rted. The Sta te a sse rt s that, w hil e in p ri vate pr a c tic e be fo re a c c e pti nghis a pp oin tme nt a s a

jus tic e on

thi s Court, J ustice Waldrop serve d as counsel for the g roup Tex ans for L awsuit Reform (TL R) and filed

se v e r a l p l e a d i n g s i n t h e c i v i l c a u s e o f a c t i o n r e l a t e d t o t h e s e c r i m i n a l p r o c e e d i n g s n o w be fo re us . The plaintiffs in the c ivil procee dings se rved TL R with a d ep o s i t i o n by written questions and a

su bp oe na du c e s te c um s e e king do cum ents a nd re c or ds re fl e c tin g TL R’ s c omm un ic a tio ns wi th Te xan s f or a Re pu bli c a n M a jor ity Pol iti c a l Ac tio n Com mit te e (T RMPA C) a nd its re pr e se ntativ e s, including the defe ndants i n these a ppeals John C oly andro a nd J im Elli s. I n April 2004, as TL R’s counsel, Just ice Waldrop sig ned an d fi l ed pleading s on behalf of TL R objecting to the plaintiffs’ re quests, insisti ng that TL R had no information related t o the pl aintiffs’ alleg ations, and ref err ing to the pla intiffs’ ca se as a “politically

motivated lawsuit.” I n later ple ading s, J ustice Wal dr op a rgue d tha t pla int if fs a nd the ir c ouns e l we re “ a tte mpt ingto u se the dis c ov e ry pr oc e ss i n th is lawsuit to harass a

political opponent,” and h e d ec l ar ed that TL R “would resist any attempts by plaintiffs to ha

rass political oppone nts.” All of the pleading s ref ere nced in the State’ s motion were signe d by J ustice Waldrop as c ounsel for TL R. The State asser ts—and it is uncontroverted—that the issues in the civil case cente re d ar o u n d t h e same conduct now be fore us in the instant cr i m i n al proc eeding s and that Jus tice Waldrop filed plea dings “ denig rating the ca se as ‘politically

motivated.’”5 Th e ru le s o f ap pe llate pr oc e dure re qu ir e a pa rt y to f ile a mot ion to r e c us e a n a

pp e llate justice or judg e “promptly afte r the party has rea son to be lieve that the justice or judg e should not pa rt ic ipate in d e c idi ngthe c a se .” Te x. R. A pp . P. 16 .3 (a ). Th e Sta te a sse rt s tha t it ha s c omp lie d w ith the rule to promptly

file a motion to rec use bec ause it “just discover ed in t h e last few w eeks” the g ro un ds it n owur g e s a s th e ba sis fo r Justi c e Wal dr op ’s re c us a l. A lth ou g h th e Sta te a dmi ts that it has known of Justice Waldrop’s repr esentation of TL R, the State seeks to re cuse Justi ce Waldrop only from fur ther pa rticipation in these appe als on a g oing f orwa rd basis. The State ur g es t hat it had

n o re as o n t o qu es t i o n J u s t i ce W al dro p ’s i mp ar t i al i t y u n t i l t h e C o u rt ’s o p i n i o n i n t h es e p ro ce ed i n gs
was re lease d and it then discover ed the plea dings sig ned by J ustice W al d rop t hat ar e the subjec t of this motion. The languag e of our rules is clea

r and stra ightf

orwa rd: the g rounds for r ecusa l of an appellate justice or judg e ar e the same as t hose provided in the rules of civil procedur e. Te x . R. App. P. 16.2. Tex as Rule of Civil Procedure 18b provides t h at “[ a] judge shall rec use himself in any proce eding in which . . . his impartiality might rea sonably be questioned.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 18b(2)( a). This lang uag e is mandatory , and the standa rd i s o b j ec t i v e, not subjective. Id. I t calls upon the jud g e —in

the fi rs t in sta

nc e —to a ssess his imp a rt ia lity . A re a so na ble do ub t is re so lve d in fa vo r o f r e c us a l.

As a s upreme court justice who r ecuse d himself explained in R o g e r s v . B r a d ley , 909 S.W .2d 872, 873 (T ex . 2 0 0 4 ) (Gammag e, J.) (decla ration of r ecusa l), the problem is one of perc eption. When considering a motion to rec use, we should a sk “whe ther a rea sonable member of the p u b l i c a t l a r g e , kn o w i n g a l l o f t h e f a c t s i n t h e p u

b l i c d o m a i n c o n c e r

n i n g t h e j u d g e ’ s c on du c t,Al tho ug h the Sta te ha s no t so ug ht t o d isq ua lif y Justi c e Wal dr op , th is C ourt ha s p re vio us ly 3 held that a judge is subjec t to disqualification if he advised a person who is not a name d party , but whose intere sts are so a ligne d with a named p arty that the one stands in plac e of the other. See W illiams v. Kir ven , 532 S.W .2d 159, 160-61 (Te x . Civ. App.—Austin 1976, writ ref’d n.r .e.). Cf. Te x. R. Pr of

. Con du c t 1. 06 (p ro hib iti ng lawy e rs fr om re pr e se nti ng op po sin g sid e s in 4 the same litig ation); 1.10(e) (re g ardingsucce ssive g overnme nt and priva t e employ ment and prohibiting lawy er serving as public office r fr om participating in matter involving c lient that lawy er repr esente d in private pra ctice)

. 6 would have a

rea sonable doubt that the judg e is ac tually impartial.” See id. at 881 (Enoc h, J ., concur ri n g). Ap ply ing this standar d of re asonable ness, base d on this recor d, Iconclude that Justi c e Wal dr op sh ou ld r e c us e him se lf fr om f ur the r p a rt ic ipatio n in

the se a pp e a ls. Justi c e Wal dr op ’s c on du c t a s a pr ivate lit ig a tor

in t he re la te d c ivi l pr oc e e din g s is

s u f f i c i e n tt o c a s ta

r e a s o n a b l e d o u b ta s t o h i s i mp a rt i a l i t y i n t h e s e a p p e a l s . A s a

p r i v a t e a t t o r

n e y, J ustice Waldrop re prese nted a g roup that wa s align ed wi th and had similar intere sts with the de fe nd a nts
. Fr om the pleading s befor e us, it appea rs that his client was the subje ct of discove ry 3 reque sts in the related civil la wsuit. J ustice Waldrop’s repr esentation wa s not unr elated t o t he proce eding s now befor e us as it oc curr ed in the civil pr ocee dings arising out of the same c onduct at issue in these appe als—namely , the alleg ed money launde ri n g b y

a political ac tion committ ee f or the purp os e of

inf lue nci ng Tex as elec tio ns . I t is Justi c e Wal dr op ’s ro le a s a n a dv oc a te in t

ho se
re la te d p ro c e e din g s— a s w e ll a s th e state me nts ma de in th e pl ead ing s— that c a ll i nto qu e sti on

his imp a rt ia lity

in t he se a pp e a ls. 4 By its mot ion, the S tate challeng es the funda mental leg itimacy

of the a djudication. Whi le th e ti mi n g o f th e St a te ’ s mo ti o n is tr o u b li n g b e c a

u s e it w a s ma d e o n ly a f

te r a d e c is io n was rende red, the rules contemplate t hat the motion must be raised “ promptly afte r the pa

rty has re asonRule 18b(5) provides that parties to a proce eding “may waive any g round for rec usal afte r 5 it is fully disclosed on the re cord.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 18b(5). 7 to be lieve that the justice or judg e should not participate in deciding the ca se.” I n light of the panel

rea ssignments a

nd the inordinate de lay s in this C ourt’s handling of these a cce lerated appe als, and in t he a bs e nc e of a re sp on se c on tr ov e rt ing the Sta te ’s a lle g a tio ns , I c a n only c on c lud e that th e Sta te has complied with the rule ’s re quirement to ra ise its moti on promptly

.

Moreove r, in the abse nce of any disclosure by a judg e of his involvement in re lated lit ig a tio n— e ith e r at th e tim e the pa rt ie s su bmi t th e ir c a se to a pa ne l of jud g e s o r a

t any tim e to h is

c oll e a g ue s to a llo w the m to pr op e rl y a sse ss a ny imp a rt ia lity or a pp e a ra nc e of imp a rt ia lity

—it wo uld

n o t b e a p p r o p r i a t e t o p l a c e t h i s b u r d e n u p o n t h e p a rt i e s . I n d e e d , d i s c l o s u r e a t t h e o u t s e t w ou ld

ensure the transpa

renc y nece ssary for the par ties to assess any

bias and then move for disqualification

or re cusal or to wa ive any objection. Wit hout disclosure of a ny kind, the burden of trac king dow n 5 information fa lls to t he litiga nts. I t is unrea listi c and surely undesirable for a litigant who is notified of the identity

of three members of

an appe llate panel to w hom a ca se is submitt ed to then inv esti ga te any possible gr ound for disqualifica tion or rec usal. I n this case, g iven the re lationship between the parties, sure ly disclosure of pertinent information would have resolved the dilemma befor e us now in some manner—e ither by resolution in a t imely fashion that would have saved the pa rties time and

mon e y , o r b y w a iv e r . A lt h o u g h s u c h d is c lo s u r e is n o t ma n d a to r y , th e A B A M o d e l Co d e of J u d i ci al Conduct provides that a judg e should disclose on the re cord infor mation that the j u d ge believes the parties or

their lawy ers mig ht consider r eleva nt to the que stion of disqualification, eve n if the judg e believe s there is no rea l basis for disqualification. A j udg e’s obligation not to hear or8

decide matters in which there is a r easona ble doubt conce rning his impartiality applies re g ardle ss of whether a motion for re cusal ha s been f iled. One of the hallmarks of our judicial sy stem is judicial integr ity . J udicial dec isions rende red in the f

ace of uncontrove rted alleg ations of bias, pre judice, or f

avoritism, undermine the integ rity of the c ourts and thwar

t th e v er y p ri n cipl es on which our judicial sy stem is based. Sun E xploration & Prod. Co. v. Jac kson , 7 8 3 S. W. 2 d 2 0 2 , 2 0 6 ( T e x. 1 9 8 9 ) ( Sp e a r s , J. , c o n c u rring on reh’ g ). Public policy demands that any judge who s its in a case act with absolute i mpartiality

. See Pe nd e rg ra ss v . B e ale , 59 Tex. 446, 447 (1883). Beyond this, our rules and judicial c anons re quire that a judg e also appear to be impartial, so as not to call into question the fair ness or integ rity

of the court. See Tex. R. C iv. P. 18b(2)(a) ; Texas Code of J udicial Conduct, Canons 1 & 2. Even whe n the circ umstances g iving r ise to the question of impartiality are bey ond the judg e’s volition or control, judg es and c ourts should be vig ilant in protecting the integ rity of our judicial sy stem. The rules do n o t require proof that a judge eng ag ed in any

biased or pr ejudicial conduc t, but they do

r e qu i r e t h e j u d g e t o r e c u s e h i m s e l f i f “ h i s i mp a rt i a l i t y might rea sonably be questioned.” Tex. R. C iv. P. 18b(2)(a ) (e mphasis added) . Thus, the test is not our own subjective impression of the judge ’s ability to discharg e his duties in an im partial manner. Rather , the polestar is a n objective a ssessment
o f i mp a rt i a l i t y a n d

t h e a p p e a r a n c e o f

i mp a rt i a l i t y. Al tho ug h th e Court

ha d w ri tte n n oti c e that I requ este d a re sp on se to t

he mot ion

to
rec use, and that Iwould write in dissent if we wer e not to reque st a response , this Court proceede d to deny the motion in a one sentenc e letter issued to the parties on Oc tober 8, 2008. In the abse nce of a re sp on se , a

nd g ive n th e un c on tr ov e rt e d f a c ts i n the S tat e’s mo tio n to re c us e , I c ome to t

his9

decisi o n re l uctantly , but Imust conclude that on this rec ord Jus tice Waldrop’s impartiality has “re asonably be[en] questioned” and, for these rea sons, I respe ctfully dissent f rom the denial of the motion to recuse.

__________________________________________ J an P. Patterson, J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son, Pury ear , Pemberton and H enson Filed: De cembe r 31, 2008 Pub lis h