IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

JOHN FIELDER,

1

Respondent Below,

Appellant,

v.

AUDREY FIELDER,

Petitioner Below, Appellee.

§

§ No. 325, 2019

§

§ Court Below—Family Court

§ of the State of Delaware

§ 

§ File No. CK17-03962

§ Petition No. 17-35360

§ 

§ 

 Submitted: January 10, 2020

 Decided: March 9, 2020

Before SEITZ, Chief Justice; TRAYNOR and MONTGOMERY-REEVES,

Justices.

O R D E R

Upon consideration of the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal, it appears 

to the Court that: 

(1) The appellant (“Ex-Husband”) filed this pro se appeal from a Family 

Court order resolving matters ancillary to Ex-Husband’s divorce from the appellee 

(“Ex-Wife”). We conclude that the Family Court did not abuse its discretion and 

affirm the judgment of the Family Court.

(2) The parties were divorced by decree of the Family Court on March 27, 

2018. The court retained jurisdiction to resolve the parties’ disputes concerning 

 

1 The Court previously assigned pseudonyms to the parties pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 7(d).
2

property division and alimony. The Family Court held hearings on the ancillary 

matters on March 4, 2019 and March 12, 2019. Both parties were represented by 

counsel at the hearings. After considering the evidence presented and the factors set 

forth in 13 Del. C. §§ 1512 and 1513, the court entered an order dividing the marital 

property and ordering Ex-Husband to pay alimony to Ex-Wife in the amount of 

$1,000 per month for seventy-five months.

(3) In his pro se appeal, Ex-Husband raises several claims of error 

concerning the alimony award. He argues that the Family Court erroneously 

imputed insufficient income to Ex-Wife; excluded certain vehicle expenses and taxdebt payments from the calculation of Ex-Husband’s expenses; and failed to 

consider Ex-Husband’s post-trial loss of employment. He does not challenge the 

property-division award, but he argues that Family Court should have included 

payments for the tax debt when calculating the parties’ expenses for purposes of 

awarding alimony.

(4) Under the alimony statute, 13 Del. C. § 1512, the Family Court must 

consider “all relevant factors,” including the enumerated statutory factors, when 

determining whether a party seeking alimony is dependent and calculating alimony 

if dependency is found.2 In an appeal from an award of alimony, this Court reviews 

the facts and the law, as well as the inferences and deductions made by the Family 

 

2 Glanden v. Quirk, 128 A.3d 994, 1002 (Del. 2015).
3

Court judge.

3 This Court will not disturb findings of fact unless they are clearly 

erroneous.

4

“Moreover, this Court will not substitute its own opinion for the 

inferences and deductions made by the Trial Judge where those inferences are 

supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive 

process.”5 We review conclusions of law de novo, but if the court correctly applied 

the law, then we review the decision for an abuse of discretion.6 “The standard of 

review for an abuse of discretion is whether the Family Court’s decision was 

arbitrary or capricious.”7

(5) Ex-Husband’s first argument on appeal is that the Family Court erred 

by attributing income to Ex-Wife at minimum wage, rather than a higher amount, 

when determining whether Ex-Wife was dependent and determining the amount of 

alimony.

8

 The record reflects that, at the time of trial, Ex-Wife was working parttime at a restaurant, earning approximately $11,000 to $15,000 per year, and that she 

had been seeking other employment. The Family Court found that Ex-Wife was 

 

3 Wright v. Wright, 49 A.3d 1147, 1150 (Del. 2012).

4

Id.

5

Solis v. Tea, 468 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Del. 1983).

6 Wright, 49 A.3d at 1150.

7

Id.

8

See 13 Del. C. § 1512(b) (permitting an award of alimony if the party seeking alimony is 

“dependent” on the party from whom alimony is sought because, among other requirements, the 

requesting party “[i]s unable to support himself or herself through appropriate employment”); id.

§ 1512(c) (setting forth factors for consideration when determining the amount of alimony, 

including “[t]he financial resources of the party seeking alimony, including . . . his or her ability 

to meet all or part of his or her reasonable needs independently”).
4

underemployed and attributed to her full-time, minimum-wage income of $8.75 per 

hour for forty hours per week, or approximately $18,200 per year.9 Ex-Husband 

argues that Ex-Wife’s “potential income in the open market with her skill set is 

between $40,000 to $65,000.”

10

 Although Ex-Wife testified that she had applied for 

one job with a salary in that range, she had not been offered that position at the time 

of trial. The Family Court based its income attribution on the fact that Ex-Wife had 

not worked for years leading up to the parties’ separation, and since the separation 

she had earned less than she would have earned in a full-time position at minimum 

wage. The Family Court’s findings were not arbitrary or capricious, and the court 

did not err in attributing Ex-Wife with full-time income at minimum wage, rather 

than a higher amount.

11

(6) Ex-Husband’s second argument on appeal is that the Family Court 

erred by excluding from his expenses a car payment for a Nissan that he acquired 

after the parties’ separation. The Ex-Husband’s reported expenses at trial included 

payments for a Nissan Sentra, a Chevrolet Colorado, and a Yamaha motorcycle. The 

Family Court excluded the payments on these vehicles because “he is not paying the 

 

9 File No. CK17-03962, Petition No. 17-35360, Mem. Op. at 22 (Del. Fam. Ct. June 24, 2019) 

[hereinafter “Family Court Order”].

10 Opening Brief at 2.

11 See Wright v. Wright, 49 A.3d 1147, 1152 (Del. 2012) (affirming Family Court’s decision not

to attribute ex-husband with higher income based on previous occupation as a field engineer 

because he had changed occupations and had not worked as a field engineer in more than ten 

years).
5

Nissan payment and he acquired the Chevrolet payment and Yamaha payment postseparation despite the preliminary injunction against purchases.”12

 

(7) The court’s statement that Ex-Husband was not making the Nissan 

payment appears to be based on a misapprehension regarding the vehicle at issue. 

The parties had a different Nissan (the “Old Nissan”) before separation, which the 

court determined Ex-Husband had given to Ex-Wife after separation, and which ExWife then sold.13

 After the divorce, Ex-Husband had remarried and acquired another

Nissan (the “New Nissan”), which his new wife drove to work.

14

 The Nissan 

payment that Ex-Husband included in his expenses appears to be for the New Nissan, 

not for the Old Nissan that was sold. 

(8) Despite the misapprehension regarding the Nissan in the Family Court 

order, we conclude that the exclusion of the Nissan payment from Ex-Husband’s 

expenses does not warrant reversal. The Family Court clearly intended to exclude 

from Ex-Husband’s expenses the payments related to vehicles that he acquired postseparation,15 and Ex-Husband acknowledges that he acquired the New Nissan after 

separation. Moreover, as the Family Court noted, Ex-Husband included in his 

expenses the costs of his expanded household, which included his new wife and step-

 

12 Family Court Order, supra note 9, at 27.

13 Id. See also Transcript of Mar. 4, 2019 Hearing, at 34-35; Transcript of Mar. 12, 2019 Hearing, 

at 65-68.

14 Reply Brief at 4. See also Transcript of Mar. 12, 2019 Hearing, at 20, 50, 78-80, 82.

15 Family Court Order, supra note 9, at 27.
6

daughter, without accounting for his new wife’s financial contributions to the 

household.16 Therefore, exclusion of the payment for the New Nissan from ExHusband’s expenses did not constitute reversible error.

17

(9) Ex-Husband’s third argument on appeal is that the Family Court erred 

by excluding from Ex-Husband’s claimed expenses a payment for the parties’ IRS 

tax debt. After considering the evidence regarding this debt, the Family Court 

determined that the debt was marital debt, that Ex-Husband would be responsible 

for 65% of the debt, and that Ex-Wife would be responsible for 35% of the debt. ExHusband does not challenge the Family Court’s apportionment of the debt between 

the parties; rather, he asserts that the Family Court should have included a 

proportionate payment on the debt in the parties’ monthly expenses for purposes of 

determining the alimony award. Ex-Husband did not fairly present this argument to 

the Family Court in the first instance, and we therefore will not consider it for the 

first time on appeal.18 In any event, the Family Court apportioned the debt in the 

property-division portion of its order; the court excluded the payment from ExHusband’s claimed expenses because it found that Ex-Husband had not been paying 

the debt since the parties’ divorce and noted that the court could not control the 

 

16 Family Court Order, supra note 9, at 26-27, 28.

17 See Unitrin v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1390 (Del. 1995) (“[T]his Court may affirm on 

the basis of a different rationale than that which was articulated by the trial court.”).

18 DEL. SUPR. CT. R. 8.
7

Internal Revenue Service’s collection of the debt; and inclusion of a proportionate 

payment in Ex-Wife’s monthly expenses would have increased the amount of the 

discrepancy between her expenses and her income. We find no reversible error on 

this issue.

(10) Finally, Ex-Husband contends that the Family Court erred by not 

considering his post-trial loss of employment. The Family Court’s order is dated 

June 24, 2019 and was docketed June 28, 2019. Ex-Husband claims that his change 

in employment status was effective on June 28, 2019 and that at some unspecified 

time after June 14, 2019, he “approached” Family Court “for guidance on how to 

proceed.” Ex-Husband acknowledges that he did not file any motion addressing his 

employment status before or after the Family Court’s decision. Ex-Husband did not 

fairly present the issue of his loss of employment to the Family Court, and we will 

not consider it for the first time on appeal.19 If Ex-Husband believes that the change 

in his job status warrants a modification of the alimony award, he must first seek 

relief from the Family Court.20

 

19 Id.

20 See 13 Del. C. § 1519 (a)(4) (providing for modification of an alimony award “only upon a 

showing of real and substantial change of circumstances”).
8

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Family 

Court is AFFIRMED.

BY THE COURT:

/s/ Gary F. Traynor 

Justice