Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1706-JT-1363 | December 19, 2017 Page 1 of 28

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT C.C.,

SR.

Joann M. Price

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT T.C.

Deidre L. Monroe 

Public Defender’s Office

Gary, Indiana 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James D. Boyer

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Termination 

of the Parent-Child Relationship 

of Ad.C. and Al.C., Minor 

Children, C.C., Sr., Father, and 

T.C., Mother

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

December 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A04-1706-JT-1363

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Thomas P. 

Stefaniak, Jr., Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

45D06-1603-JT-73

45D06-1501-JT-1
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Brown, Judge.

[1] C.C., Sr., (“Father”) and T.C. (“Mother,” and together with Father, “Parents”) 

appeal the involuntary termination of their parental rights with respect to their 

daughters Ad.C. and Al.C. (the “Children”). Parents each raise one issue 

which we restate as whether the trial court erred in terminating their parental 

rights. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In March 2011, Parents were married. At some point in 2011, Mother’s autistic 

son A. had bruises on him, and A. stated that Father caused the bruises. DCS 

initiated an informal adjustment and there was a substantiation of abuse by 

Father. At some later point, A.’s biological father obtained full custody of him. 

[3] In October 2012, Mother, Father, their three-month-old son C.C., Jr., their 

fifteen-month-old daughter Ad.C., and Mother’s son A. lived together. On 

October 10, 2012, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received a report 

that C.C., Jr., had some sort of breathing episode and was transported to the 

hospital for further treatment. DCS learned that C.C., Jr., had suffered bilateral 

subdural hematomas, a subarachnoid bleed, and multiple retinal hemorrhages 

in both eyes. 

[4] On October 11, 2012, A. and Ad.C. were removed from the home and Ad.C. 

was placed with her maternal grandparentsOn October 16, 2012, DCS filed a 

petition alleging Ad.C. to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”) and that 

Father had stated that he was sleeping with C.C., Jr., woke up and found C.C., 
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Jr., unresponsive, tried to give him CPR, stuck his finger down his throat, 

gently shook him to try to wake him, and later admitted that he may have 

shaken C.C., Jr., harder than he first indicated and may have tried to help his 

son for ten to fifteen minutes before calling anyone. DCS also alleged that it 

took custody of Ad.C. because Father’s explanations were not consistent with 

the injuries suffered by C.C., Jr., and out of concern for the safety and wellbeing of Ad.C. That same day, Parents admitted the allegations. On October 

17, 2012, C.C., Jr., died after Mother removed life support. 

[5] On November 30, 2012, the court ordered Father to have no contact with 

Ad.C. and complete a clinical assessment and anger management. That same 

day, the court entered a dispositional order which ordered Parents to participate 

in services, treatment, and/or supervision specified in the case plan. 

[6] On May 13, 2013, the court approved DCS’s request for A. and Ad.C. to begin

a trial home visit with Mother. On October 10, 2013, DCS filed a request for 

removal of A. and Ad.C. from Mother’s care due to A.’s report that Mother 

struck him with a butterfly net and DCS observed a circular bruise on A.’s leg 

which appeared to be consistent with his report. The report alleged that during 

the trial home visit, the family resided in the home of the maternal grandparents 

of A. and Ad.C. On October 17, 2013, the court approved the request for 

removal from Mother’s care and ordered A. and Ad.C. be placed with their 

maternal grandparents. That same day, the court ordered Parents to participate 

in parenting education, individual counseling, Batterer Services; ordered them 

to complete clinical assessments and any recommended treatment; ordered 
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Mother to have visitation with A. and Ad.C. supervised by the maternal 

grandparents in their home; and ordered Father to have supervised visitation 

with Ad.C. at Children’s Tree House. 

[7] On February 14, 2014, Father, by counsel, and DCS entered a stipulation for an 

adjudication of Ad.C. as a CHINS, and the court adopted the stipulation. It

stated that the injuries C.C., Jr., suffered would not have occurred but for the 

act or omission of a parent, custodian, or guardian, and that Father was 

currently charged with felony criminal counts of neglect, battery, and murder. 

[8] On August 14, 2014, Laura Rubino, a DCS assessment worker at the time, 

received a report regarding Al.C., born that same day to Parents, due to 

concerns that the family had current involvement with DCS regarding the death 

of C.C., Jr. Mother told Rubino that she planned to give Al.C. to Christina 

Santiago “via legal guardianship while the DCS case for her other children was 

still pending” and that she “wanted to avoid involvement with [Al.C.] with the 

Department of Child Services.” Transcript Volume II at 40. Rubino was 

concerned about the situation because Mother informed her that she did not 

have any belief that Father was involved in the death of their son. DCS could 

not locate relative placement, and Al.C. was discharged from the hospital to a 

foster home. On August 19, 2014, the court held a detention hearing, and Al.C.

was placed with Santiago. At some point, Santiago requested DCS to take 

Al.C. back, and DCS placed Al.C. with foster parents. 
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[9] On December 20, 2014, DCS filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of 

Parents to Ad.C. On January 5, 2015, the court authorized the filing of the 

petition to terminate the parental rights with respect to Ad.C. On March 7, 

2016, it authorized the filing of a petition to terminate the parental rights of 

Parents with respect to Al.C. 

[10] Meanwhile, in October 2015, a jury found Father guilty of murder, reckless 

homicide, battery, and neglect of a dependent. The trial court entered 

convictions for neglect of a dependent and battery resulting in death and 

sentenced Father to an aggregate sentence of twenty-nine and one-half years.1 

[11] On April 5 and May 4, 2017, the court held a hearing on the petitions to 

terminate parental rights. It heard testimony from: Tina Kozlowski, a DCS 

assessment case manager; Rubino, the DCS assessment worker; Karen Sheets, a 

case manager supervisor, parenting educator, and behavior specialist for 

Regional Mental Health; Judith Haney, the executive director of Children’s 

Treehouse; Father’s sister; Jordana Boton, a therapist; DCS family case 

manager Areca Rios (“FCM Rios”); Raisa Mays, a home-based case manager 

employed by Family Focus; Mother; Father; Ad.C.’s maternal grandmother; 

and Al.C.’s foster mother.

 

1

Father appealed his convictions and argued that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain 

hearsay statements into evidence and that his sentence was inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense 

and his character. See No. 45A05-1601-CR-25, slip op. at 2 (Ind. Ct. App. September 20, 2016), trans. denied. 

This Court affirmed. Id.
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[12] Mother testified that she was at work when C.C., Jr., was injured, she has no 

problem with discipline or redirecting Ad.C., her divorce from Father was 

finalized in January 2016, she was not with anyone, and she was still having 

counseling, but contacting her new counselor had been very difficult. She 

testified that she would continue to go to therapy if the Children were returned. 

Mother testified that Father told her at some point that he shook C.C., Jr., but 

she believed that it was not a malicious act. She testified that she took Father to 

visitations because he could not obtain transportation through DCS. 

[13] Father testified telephonically from a correctional facility. He stated that C.C., 

Jr., fell asleep in bed with him, that he eventually woke up to find C.C., Jr., 

making gasping sounds and that he had vomit all over his onesie. He stated 

that C.C., Jr., was not “really responding,” he stuck his finger down his throat 

to determine if there was anything in his airway, grabbed him, and shook him. 

Transcript Volume III at 17. He testified that he called Mother, that Mother 

told him to call 911, and that he did so. He stated that he “completed ever [sic] 

single service that they wanted me to complete.” Id. at 31. He testified that he 

completed batterer’s classes, therapy counseling, and grieving counseling prior 

to his criminal trial, which was held in October 2015. He also testified that he 

had had a job in prison but was not currently doing that job and was not job 

eligible at that point, and that he asked that his sister be considered for 

placement if his rights were terminated. 

[14] On May 19, 2017, the trial court granted the petition to terminate Parents’ 

parent-child relationships. The order states in part:
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There is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in 

the removal of the children from [the] parents’ home will not be 

remedied in that: [Ad.C.] was removed from parental care in 

October 2012 after her sibling, [C.C., Jr.] (3 Months of Age) was 

taken to the hospital in respiratory arrest. [C.C., Jr.,] was found 

to have life threatening non-accidental injuries and he passed 

away from his injuries.

Parents were offered services pursuant to a case plan which 

included substance abuse assessments, parenting assessment, 

home based casework services, initial clinical assessments, 

random drug and alcohol screens, individual therapy, and 

supervised visitations.

The parents have a prior history with an older half-sibling, [A.] 

due to [Father] inappropriately disciplining the child. [A.’s] 

CHINS matter was dismissed after his father obtained legal 

custody of [A.] and is not a part of these termination 

proceedings.

[Father] indicated that he found [C.C., Jr.,] choking and 

vomiting and attempted to help the child for ten to fifteen 

minutes before calling 911. Father had conflicting statements as 

to what happened to the child. Father further indicated that he 

shook the child. The child had severe head trauma due to brain 

swelling from shaken baby syndrome. The child was on life 

support and was eventually removed from life support by the 

mother. [C.C., Jr.] passed away six days after the incident.

[A.] and [Ad.C.] were removed from parental care and placed in 

relative placement with the grandparents. [A.] was eventually 

placed with his father and his CHINS case was dismissed.

[Father] was identified as the perpetrator and was charged with 

Neglect of a Dependent Resulting in Death, Battery Resulting in 

Death, Reckless Homicide and Murder. Father . . . was arrested 

in February 2013. 
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Mother did not believe that [Father] was responsible for the 

injury and death of their child. Mother indicated that [Father] 

was innocent until proven guilty and needed a court to decide his 

guilt or innocence.

Mother initially cooperated and made progress with her services 

and was given liberal visitations with her children at her 

parents[’] home. [Ad.C.] and [A.] were returned to mother’s care 

in May of 2013. However, in October, 2013, the children were 

removed due to inappropriate physical punishment inflicted by

the mother on [A.]. The children remained out of the home since 

that removal in October 2013.

Father was facing criminal charges regarding the death of [C.C., 

Jr.,] and [Mother] continued her relationship with [Father]. 

Mother had another child [Al.C.] in August of 2014. Mother 

indicated that she has given guardianship of the child to another 

person, Ms. Santiago. Father was present at the hospital when 

[Mother] had a conversation with the social worker but 

introduced [Father] as someone else, Ms. Santiago’s husband in 

an attempt to elude the social worker. Even though [Mother] 

indicated that she has given guardianship of this child to another, 

[Mother] was breast feeding the child. Mother was not being 

truthful about the situation. The Department of Child Services 

took custody of that child at birth due to the serious allegations of 

neglect and abuse against [Father]. Mother continued to live 

with [Father] while he was out on bond awaiting trial. [Al.C.] 

was removed from parental care and custody.

Father testified telephonically from prison and indicated that he 

panicked when he found his son not breathing. He testified that 

he shook the child in an effort to get him to breathe. He further 

testified that he called his wife when the child was unresponsive 

and not 911. Father testified that he was sentenced to twentynine years and his earliest year of release is 2030. 

Father testified that the child was born with the umbilical cord 

wrapped around his neck and was placed in the newborn 
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intensive care unit. Father further testified that the child was sick 

and would vomit. Father further stated that the child was taken 

to the doctor numerous times and the child was never diagnosed 

with anything. Father indicated that he was informed at his 

criminal trial that the child was born missing a rib. Father stated 

that the child had an extremely large head, but no diagnosis was 

ever obtained. This court is not in a position to weigh the 

evidence in the criminal trial. The court notes [Father] was 

found guilty of this crime and is currently serving his prison 

sentence.

Father testified that he completed counseling, grief counseling, 

batterer’s classes and visitations through the Department of Child 

Services. 

Father is responsible for the death of the sibling that has been 

proven in a court of law. Father is in no position to parent any 

child and will be unavailable to parent any child until the year at 

least 2030. Father does not have any relationship with his 

children due to his unavailability. 

The child, [Al.C.] became a ward of [DCS]. Relative placement 

was explored for [Al.C.], but there were no available relatives for 

this child’s placement. The child was placed in foster care but 

was eventually placed with Ms. Santiago according to [Mother’s] 

wishes.

[Al.C.] eventually was removed from Ms. Santiago when Ms. 

Santiago requested the removal of the child. [Al.C.] was then 

placed in foster care when no viable relative was available.

Mother and Father completed parenting education in February 

2014. The visitations between the parents and children were not 

progressing well, so hands-on parenting was initiated. 

[Ad.C.] was displaying multiple behaviors including negotiating 

with her parents, demanding her parents what to do, throwing 

tantrums, throwing chairs and hitting her parents and would 

become so emotionally overwhelmed in the visitations that she 
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would self harm. [Ad.C.] was given behavioral management 

therapy that would teach appropriate social skills and help 

children manage their own emotional skills. Parents would not 

use their parenting skills to manage [Ad.C.’s] behaviors. [Ad.C.] 

was very resistant to [Father]. [Ad.C.] would not have anything 

to do with [Father]. [Ad.C.’s] relationship with [Mother] was 

better, but still not on a healthy, parent-child level. Father was 

very dominant and controlling in the visits with the child, and the 

child continued to reject [Father]. Father was dominant and 

controlling with [Mother] which [Mother] allowed. Father spent 

most of the visits with [Al.C.] and [Mother] did not have a 

chance to bond with [Al.C.] due to [Father] controlling the 

visitation with [Al.C.]. Parents continued to power struggle with 

the child and not parent the child. Parents were not consistent 

with their parenting style. The parents were not using the 

parenting skills that were taught. The parents were unwilling to 

consistently use the skills taught. The visitations were not 

consistent, structured or stable. Parenting education was not 

completed successfully for either parent.

[Ad.C.] was placed with the grandparents and the grandparents 

were taught the same skills needed to properly parent and control 

[Ad.C.’s] behaviors. The grandparents utilized the skills and 

[Ad.C.’s] behaviors have subsided.

Service providers had conversations with [Mother] to put more 

effort in her parenting skills and not to support [Father], but 

instead focus on reunifying with her children. Mother refused.

Father was convicted and was sentenced to twenty-nine years in 

prison. Father is and will be unavailable to parent these children.

Mother’s therapist, Ms. Boton testified that she attempted to 

provide therapy for [Mother], but [Mother] would not attend the 

sessions. Mother missed fifteen out of the 24 sessions scheduled 

in a six month time period. Mother only attended nine 

scheduled sessions. The therapy sessions were conducted in 

[Mother’s] home. Mother indicated to the therapist that she has 
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suffered numerous traumas throughout her lifetime that went 

unresolved. Mother suffered from depression from her teenage 

years until present. Mother was very resistant to the therapy and 

did not participate in the sessions. Four[] years into the CHINS 

cases, and [Mother] is still in denial of [Father’s] responsibility in 

the death of her son. Mother’s therapist testified that [Mother] 

was erratic in her emotions. Mother has not addressed her 

therapeutic needs. The therapist testified that on one occasion 

she was in the home and [Mother’s] teenage son made 

inappropriate comments to the therapist. Mother did not redirect 

her son or address the situation. Mother did not utilize any 

parenting skills. The therapist left the home due to the fifteen 

minutes of inappropriate comments that were not being 

addressed.

Mother has a sense of paranoia and a distorted reality. Mother’s 

mental state is in question and is not being adequately addressed. 

Mother indicated that she was diagnosed at an early age with 

bipolar but is not being treated for any mental instabilities. 

Mother was given a psychiatric evaluation to which she was 

again diagnosed with bipolar and was given medication. 

Whether [Mother] actually takes the medication is unknown. 

Mother’s years of unaddressed trauma has [her] at a greater risk 

for harming her children or being unable to keep her children 

safe. Mother is not able to protect her children. Ms. Boton, the 

therapist testified that [Mother] would need years of therapy to 

address all the traumas in her life.

Mother was up and down with her consistency and her 

compliance with the services. Mother was participating in the 

visitations with the children but the visitations were contentious 

and [Mother] would state inappropriate comments to the 

children that would disrupt the stability that they have obtained 

in their lives. Visitations ceased in July of 2016 due to [Mother’s] 

non-compliance and [Mother’s] inconsistency with the services. 

Mother has been receiving services for over four years and 

[Mother] was no closer to reunification than she was when the 
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Department of Child Services first became involved. Mother was 

given the therapeutic services, the psychiatric services, the 

parenting services and [she] has not progressed in any of the 

services.

Mother has never put her children first. Mother did not leave 

[Father] until after he was convicted of the death of their child. 

Mother filed for divorce three days after he was convicted. There 

was a no contact order between [Father] and the children, but 

[Mother] continued a relationship with [Father]. The children 

were unable to be placed with [Mother] as long as [Father] and 

[Mother] were together. Father remained in [Mother’s] life, and 

the children remained in placement.

Mother testified that she now believes that [Father] did create the 

injury to her son. Mother testified that she believes it was poor 

judgment on [Father’s] behalf. Mother has not put her children 

first. Now, that [Father] is in prison and sentenced to twentynine years, [Mother] broke her relationship with [Father], 

although probably not intentionally, got a divorce and now 

indicates she will do anything to be reunified with her children. 

Four years later.

Grandmother, [Mother’s] mother testified that [Mother] has been 

struggling with mental health issues her entire life. Grandmother 

testified that [Mother] was diagnosed with bipolar disorder. 

Grandmother stated that [Mother] herself was a ward of the 

Department of Child Services previously during her youth and 

was residentially placed for two years. Grandmother testified 

that [Mother’s] mental issues have not been addressed.

The Court cannot dismiss the four years of stability and the years 

of bonding and permanency that the children have achieved. 

The Court must put these children first. 

[Al.C.] is two years of age and was placed outside parental care 

at four days old. The child remained in her current home for the 

entire time except for a brief attempt of failed reunification.
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Mother has been offered all services available in an effort for 

[her] to properly and safely parent her children. All services have 

failed. Mother has not taken advantage of the services offered. 

Services were provided to [Mother] for over four years. The 

needs of the children outweighs the right of the parents to parent 

their children. The children deserve permanency and stability 

and the children have obtained it in their current placements. It 

is in the children’s best interest to maintain their placements and 

the bonds they have created. It would be detrimental to the best 

interests of the children to disrupt the stability of their current 

placement.

Neither parent is providing any emotional or financial support 

for the children. Neither parent has completed any case plan for 

reunification. Neither parent is in a position to properly parent 

these children. Father is incarcerated and will be for numerous 

years. The children are in placement and are bonded and 

thriving. [Al.C.] has been in placement since birth and has never 

been in parental care or custody. [Ad.C.] has been in placement 

with her grandparents[] for almost four years. The Court notes 

[Ad.C.] is five years old. [Ad.C.] has spent the majority of her 

life with her grandparents.

There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the 

children . . . for the reasons stated above. Additionally, the 

children deserve a loving, caring, safe and stable home.

It is in the best interest of the children and [their] health, welfare 

and future that the parent-child relationship between the children 

and [their] parents be forever fully and absolutely terminated.

The Indiana Department of Child Services has a satisfactory plan 

for the care and treatment of the children which is Adoption by 

the foster parents . . . for [Al.C.] and adoption by the 

grandparents . . . for [Ad.C.].

Father’s Appendix Volume II at 2-7.
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Discussion

[15] The issue is whether the trial court erred in terminating Parents’ parental rights. 

Father argues that there is a reasonable probability that the reasons for the 

Children’s removal have been remedied and points to his participation in 

services including parenting classes, counseling, and visitation. He asserts that 

he had never been trained in infant CPR prior to his services and such training 

“would have either greatly reduced or eliminated [his] ‘knee-jerk’ response” to 

the health crisis of C.C., Jr., that resulted in his death. Father’s Brief at 12. 

Father argues that he has positioned himself to be a financial support to the 

Children. He contends that he does not pose a threat to the Children’s wellbeing and points to his participation in services and his bond with the Children. 

Father also argues that termination is not in the Children’s best interest, there 

was no satisfactory case plan, and appears to argue that the Children should be 

placed with his sister. 

[16] Mother contends that the court erred in finding that there was a reasonable 

probability the conditions that resulted in removal of the Children would not 

been remedied. She argues that she made progress with her services and, at the 

time of the termination hearing, was divorced from Father, working, residing in 

suitable housing, and continuing to seek therapy for her issues. She asserts that 

the court erred in finding a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the Children and 

that there was no evidence that she ever harmed the Children while they were 

in her care and custody. She also argues that termination is not in the 
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Children’s best interests and they should be afforded the opportunity to be 

raised or at least have a relationship with her. (Mother’s Brief at 14) 

[17] In order to terminate a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to allege and 

prove, among other things:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2).2 If the court finds that the allegations in a petition 

described in Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4 are true, the court shall terminate the parentchild relationship. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8(a).

[18] The State’s burden of proof for establishing the allegations in termination cases 

“is one of ‘clear and convincing evidence.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1260-

 

2

Subsequently amended by Pub. L. No. 42-2017, § 2 (eff. July 1, 2017).
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1261 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Ind. Code § 31-37-14-2), reh’g denied. This is “a 

‘heightened burden of proof’ reflecting termination’s ‘serious social 

consequences.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014) (quoting In re G.Y., 

904 N.E.2d at 1260-1261, 1260 n.1). “But weighing the evidence under that 

heightened standard is the trial court’s prerogative—in contrast to our wellsettled, highly deferential standard of review.” Id. We do not reweigh the 

evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses, but consider only the 

evidence that supports the judgment and the reasonable inferences to be drawn 

from the evidence. Id. We confine our review to two steps: whether the 

evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, and then whether the 

findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment. Id. 

[19] Reviewing whether the evidence clearly and convincingly supports the findings, 

or the findings clearly and convincingly support the judgment, is not a license to 

reweigh the evidence. Id. “[W]e do not independently determine whether that 

heightened standard is met, as we would under the ‘constitutional harmless 

error standard,’ which requires the reviewing court itself to ‘be sufficiently 

confident to declare the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. 

(quoting Harden v. State, 576 N.E.2d 590, 593 (Ind. 1991) (citing Chapman v. 

California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967))). “Our review must ‘give “due 

regard” to the trial court’s opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses 

firsthand,’ and ‘not set aside [its] findings or judgment unless clearly 

erroneous.’” Id. (quoting K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., Dearborn Cty. Office, 

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1229 (Ind. 2013) (citing Ind. Trial Rule 52(A))). “Because a 
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case that seems close on a ‘dry record’ may have been much more clear-cut in 

person, we must be careful not to substitute our judgment for the trial court 

when reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence.” Id. at 640. 

A. Remedy of Conditions

[20] We note that the involuntary termination statute is written in the disjunctive 

and requires proof of only one of the circumstances listed in Ind. Code § 31-35-

2-4(b)(2)(B). Because we find it to be dispositive under the facts of this case, we 

limit our review to whether DCS established that there was a reasonable 

probability that the conditions resulting in the removal or reasons for placement 

of the Children outside the home will not be remedied. See Ind. Code § 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B)(i).

[21] In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the Children’s removal 

will not be remedied, we engage in a two-step analysis. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642-

643. First, we identify the conditions that led to removal, and second, we 

determine whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will 

not be remedied. Id. at 643. In the second step, the trial court must judge a 

parent’s fitness as of the time of the termination proceeding, taking into 

consideration evidence of changed conditions, balancing a parent’s recent 

improvements against habitual patterns of conduct to determine whether there 

is a substantial probability of future neglect or deprivation. Id. We entrust that 

delicate balance to the trial court, which has discretion to weigh a parent’s prior 

history more heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination. Id. 
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Requiring trial courts to give due regard to changed conditions does not 

preclude them from finding that a parent’s past behavior is the best predictor of 

future behavior. Id. 

“The statute does not simply focus on the initial basis for a child’s removal for 

purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be terminated, but 

also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside the home.” In re 

N.Q., 996 N.E.2d 385, 392 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citation and internal quotation 

marks omitted). A court may consider evidence of a parent’s prior criminal 

history, history of neglect, failure to provide support, lack of adequate housing 

and employment, and the services offered by DCS and the parent’s response to 

those services, and, where there are only temporary improvements and the 

pattern of conduct shows no overall progress, the court might reasonably find 

that under the circumstances the problematic situation will not improve. Id. 

“Indiana courts have upheld parental rights of incarcerated parents who still 

had a year or more to serve before possible release,” and the Indiana Supreme 

Court has “not established a bright-line rule for when release must occur to 

maintain parental rights.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 648 

(Ind. 2015). “Because the release date alone is not determinative, we consider 

whether other evidence, coupled with this consideration, demonstrates by clear 

and convincing evidence a reasonable probability that [an incarcerated parent] 

would be unable to remedy the conditions for removal.” Id.

[22] To the extent Parents do not challenge the court’s findings of fact, these 

unchallenged facts stand as proven. See In re B.R., 875 N.E.2d 369, 373 (Ind. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A04-1706-JT-1363 | December 19, 2017 Page 19 of 28

Ct. App. 2007) (failure to challenge findings by the trial court resulted in waiver 

of the argument that the findings were clearly erroneous), trans. denied.

[23] With respect to Father, the record reveals that Father was convicted of neglect 

of a dependent and battery resulting in death and sentenced to an aggregate 

sentence of twenty-nine and one-half years with an earliest release date of 2030. 

We observe that this offense occurred while Ad.C. was fifteen months old and 

resulted in the death of one of Father’s other children. 

[24] As for Mother, Tina Kozlowski, a DCS assessment case manager, testified that 

Mother was devastated following the death of C.C., Jr., and said “I’ll never 

forgive [Father] if he did this.” Transcript Volume II at 25. She testified that 

Mother later began having doubts that Father could have caused the injuries 

and did not want to believe that he did. Rubino testified that she could not 

leave Al.C. with Mother because of a concern regarding Mother’s repeated 

admission that she did not believe Father was the alleged perpetrator in the 

death of C.C., Jr. She also testified that Father, who was out on bond at the 

time of Al.C.’s birth, was introduced by Parents in the hospital following her 

birth as Santiago’s husband to the hospital social worker in an attempt to “fool 

the social worker.” Id. at 42. 

[25] Sheets, the case manager supervisor, parenting educator, and behavior specialist 

for Regional Mental Health, testified that Mother’s lack of success in her 

program was due to Mother’s unwillingness or inability and that Mother did 
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not want to engage in the hands-on parenting portion of education at some 

point. She also stated: 

It became clear that she wasn’t really utilizing the skills and so it 

was kind of was like maybe the focus would be better spent on 

just behavior management for [Ad.C.] rather than the hands-on 

parenting with [Mother], because after all this time, well certain 

things were better, we did not achieve the outcomes that we had 

hoped for.

Id. at 88. She testified that she was not sure that Mother could keep Ad.C. safe 

and expressed concern regarding Mother’s inability to recognize that Father 

harmed their baby intentionally in light of the injuries. 

[26] Haney, the Executive Director of Children’s Treehouse, testified that Mother 

improved “along the way, but it seemed to always go back” and “[r]egress to 

the way it had been prior.” Id. at 103. She also testified that there was very 

little progress. 

[27] Boton, the therapist, testified that she actively attempted to provide services to 

Mother between August 2016 and February 2017. Boton’s goal was to meet 

with Mother twenty-four times, but Mother missed fifteen appointments and 

gave Boton various reasons including her son had different ailments, she had 

different ailments, conflict of scheduling, and she had different appointments. 

Boton testified that Mother had reported being molested by her stepfather, that 

she had been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, and that she had suffered from 

depression. Boton testified that Mother was “very resistant,” “did not actively 

participate in her sessions to get the services what they were meant for, meant 
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for her,” and that her level of resistance was abnormal. Id. at 138. Boton also 

testified that Mother’s emotional stability and her ability to perceive the 

situation accurately concerned her and that she believed Mother was still in 

denial of what happened to C.C., Jr. Boton further stated that Mother alleged 

that DCS was recording her at her home, in her car, on her way to work, and in 

the community setting, and that “paranoia is setting in.” Id. at 144.

[28] When asked why DCS had not been able to place the children back with 

Mother, FCM Rios testified that visitation had become contentious. She also 

stated:

The major concern for the Department is that there was a refusal 

to secure that environment for both of the other children. In 

particular, with the situation with [Al.C.] and knowing that 

[Father] was in the situation that he was in and that the parents 

remained together despite the fact that there was a no contact for 

the children. So, not – [Mother] did not – refusing to believe that 

those are the things that happened, despite a criminal conviction, 

is a concern. It’s a concern for the Department that the needs of 

others came before the needs of her children. And so that 

remains a concern today.

Id. at 159. She testified that, while Mother filed for divorce from Father, this 

did not occur until three days after the conviction and that “[i]t’s important 

because the conversation had happened prior and the conversation had been 

put on the table prior, about the importance of keeping [Father] away from the 

kids, keeping the children safe. And that simply did not happen until it had to 

happen.” Id.
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[29] Based upon the court’s findings and the record, we conclude that clear and 

convincing evidence supports the trial court’s determination that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions leading to the Children’s removal will 

not be remedied. See In re A.H., 832 N.E.2d 563, 570 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) 

(concluding that the trial court properly terminated the parent-child relationship 

where a parent participated in but failed to benefit from services).

B. Best Interests

[30] We next consider Parents’ assertion that DCS failed to demonstrate that 

termination of their parental rights was in the Children’s best interests. In 

determining what is in the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to 

look beyond the factors identified by DCS and to the totality of the evidence. 

McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 203 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2003). In so doing, the court must subordinate the interests of the parent 

to those of the children. Id. Children have a paramount need for permanency 

which the Indiana Supreme Court has called a central consideration in 

determining the child’s best interests, and the Court has stated that children 

cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward preservation or 

reunification and courts need not wait until the child is irreversibly harmed such 

that the child’s physical, mental, and social development is permanently 

impaired before terminating the parent-child relationship. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 

at 647-648. However, “focusing on permanency, standing alone, would 

impermissibly invert the best-interests inquiry . . . .” Id. at 648. 

Recommendations of the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in 
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addition to evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be 

remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination is in the child’s best interests. In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. 

Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[31] When asked about Ad.C.’s best interests, Sheets testified that she witnessed a 

scene that repeated itself several times during visitation in which Ad.C. would 

play with a baby doll, say that the baby threw up in her bed, pick up the baby 

doll, shake it, say “Bad, baby,” throw the baby in the corner, and say “I’ll get a 

new baby.” Transcript Volume II at 75. When asked what observations or 

experience she had that would support adoption as being in Ad.C.’s best 

interest, Sheets answered:

Well, there were several things that occurred during the course of 

the case that I observed. One, was that [Mother] and I had 

conversations about the, you know, maybe it would be in the best 

interest of the children, for [Mother] to not support [Father], 

work harder on her parenting skills, and getting the children 

placed back into her care. [Mother] was not willing to do that. 

She wanted to stay with [Father] and support him through the 

criminal trial, even though that meant not having her children 

with her. [Mother] did not notice [Ad.C.’s] resistance and 

reluctance to have contact or physical touching or even wanting 

to play with [Father]. [Mother] did not notice that until I called

that to her attention. She didn’t seem to think that that was a 

problem. So, my concern there would be that [Mother] is not 

able to recognize what her child needs. Or when someone may 

present a danger or a safety concern to her child. In 

conversations with [Mother], it almost seems as if [Mother] has 

an inability or an ability to change the way she views reality to 

make it fit what she needs or what she wants. That she can’t see 
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things as they really are, as they really present. So, that causes 

me great concern for [Ad.C.]. And [Ad.C.] is, as I said, very 

bright. So, she could be challenging. 

Id. at 78-79. FCM Rios testified that she recommended that the court terminate 

the parental rights of Parents. 

[32] Based on the testimony, as well as the totality of the evidence in the record and 

as set forth in the court’s termination order, we conclude that the court’s 

determination that termination is in the best interests of the Children is 

supported by clear and convincing evidence.

C. Satisfactory Plan

[33] With respect to Father’s argument that the evidence did not demonstrate there 

was a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of the Children, we disagree.3 

This Court has held that adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and 

treatment of a child under the termination of parental rights statute. In re B.M., 

913 N.E.2d 1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citing In re A.N.J., 690 N.E.2d 

716, 722 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)). “This plan need not be detailed, so long as it 

offers a general sense of the direction in which the child will be going after the 

parent-child relationship is terminated.” In re Termination of Parent-Child 

Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 268 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied.

 

3 Mother concedes that DCS provided clear and convincing evidence that they have a satisfactory plan for 

the future care and treatment of the Children. 
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[34] Initially, we observe as to other possible placements for the Children, FCM 

Rios testified that Mother had wanted Al.C. to be placed with Santiago, but 

Santiago actually requested DCS to take Al.C. back because “[i]t was too 

much, she cried a lot, I think she was a colicky baby and she did not wish to 

keep her.” Transcript Volume II at 164. FCM Rios also testified that Father’s 

sister contacted her for the first time in January 2017, that Father’s sister

indicated that Al.C. and Ad.C. were young and they would “get over” being 

removed from their placements, and that she did not know Al.C.’s name. Id. at 

165. 

[35] Ad.C.’s maternal grandmother testified that Ad.C. had been in her home since 

October 2012 when Ad.C. was fifteen months old and that Ad.C. had bonded 

with her and her husband. She testified that Ad.C. was doing fairly well and 

had done very well with her behavior at school. 

[36] Al.C.’s foster mother testified that she had Al.C. in her care since she was four 

days old except for a period of two months early on when Al.C. was placed 

somewhere else. She testified that Al.C. had very much bonded with her and 

her whole family and that Al.C. calls her mommy. She also testified that she 

was in touch with the biological grandparents, that Ad.C. and Al.C. have met, 

and that “we want to make sure we keep that relationship open.” Transcript 

Volume III at 81. 

[37] Sheets testified that Ad.C.’s grandparents were very receptive to using certain 

skills and wording with Ad.C. and were successful in managing Ad.C.’s 
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behaviors at home. Sheets described that Ad.C.’s current placement with her 

grandparents as stable with consistent parenting and a “very good 

environment.” Transcript Volume II at 82. Sheets testified:

And the grandparents are able to be consistent with her. They 

are loving, yet they are firm. They do fun, wonderful things with 

her, but they also make sure that she goes to bed on time, that 

she eats healthy, that she goes to school. That she is not allowed 

to get physically aggressive. If she does try things, negative 

behaviors, there are consequences for those, but they are not 

punitive consequences, they are logical or natural consequences 

for the behaviors. And if they have any kind of concern or, hey, 

what’s going on here, you know, they always call either Areca or 

myself or both of us. Just to let us know what is happening 

within the family, if there is something new going on with 

[Ad.C.]. 

Id. at 79.

[38] FCM Rios testified:

[Al.C.] has been where she is with the exception of a very short 

period of time, I believe for about two and a half months. She 

has been her entire life at the foster home she’s in now. She’s 

developed a very strong bond to the foster family. [Ad.C.] is 

with her grandparents. She identifies them as her family. She 

does very well in that environment. I believe the children are in 

the best possible circumstances that they could be in. Clearly, 

[Ad.C.] will maintain her essential connections being in 

grandma’s house. So she still has access to her family. [Al.C.] is 

in a foster home and they are not blood relatives, but the sisters 

do see each other, so I mean, she’s not been disconnected from 

the family in the way that I think people automatically assume 
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when kids are separated. So, I do believe that the situations that 

they’re in are the best situations for them to achieve permanency. 

Id. at 163-164.

[39] FCM Rios further testified that DCS made attempts to place the children 

together, but “due to a multitude of circumstances and I believe a big part of it 

was that [the maternal grandparents] were just physically unable to take on 

another child, and that was when [Al.C.] went to foster care.” Id. at 175. FCM 

Rios testified that the quality of care in the maternal grandparents’ home where 

Ad.C. was placed was “very good, excellent,” that she has a good relationship 

with grandmother, and that there did not seem to be any issues in the home 

with Ad.C. and her grandparents. Id. at 166. She also described the quality of 

care in Al.C.’s foster home as excellent and that Al.C. was very bonded to her 

foster brother. When asked about maintaining the relationship between Al.C.

and Ad.C., FCM Rios answered:

Well, [the maternal grandmother] and [the foster mother] had 

spoken and they see each other at court and things of that nature 

and they really wanted to get the girls together, so that is 

something that they started doing. That they would like to plan 

on continuing doing with this if this takes the adoption road. 

Both grandma and foster mom feel that the sisters shouldn’t be 

kept from each other, so they intend to keep that relationship 

intact.

Id. at 168. She also testified that the grandparents wish to adopt Ad.C. and the 

foster parents wish to adopt Al.C. The record and the court’s findings support 
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the court’s conclusion that adoption is a satisfactory plan for the care and 

treatment of the Children. 

Conclusion

[40] We conclude that the trial court’s judgment terminating the parental rights of 

Parents is supported by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error and 

affirm.

[41] Affirmed.

Najam, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.