1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION 

THOMAS L. MEROS

Plaintiff,

 

Case No.2:18-cv-510

v. CHIEF JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS

Magistrate Judge Deavers

CHRISTA A. DIMON, et al.,

Defendants.

 

OPINION AND ORDER

This action – the latest in a series of lawsuits filed by 

plaintiff in state and federal courts – was originally filed in state 

court and was removed to this Court by defendant Emily Sweeney 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Notice of Removal, ECF No. 1. This 

matter is now before the Court on the motions to dismiss filed on 

behalf of defendants McAllister and James J. Sweeney, ECF No. 9, 

defendant Emily Sweeney, ECF No. 10, defendant Youssef, ECF No. 15, 

defendant Rorapaugh, ECF No. 19,1 defendants Coughlan, Dimon, and 

Hilbert, ECF No. 21, and defendant Sharon Chiappero, ECF No. 25; the 

motion for judgment on the pleadings filed on behalf of defendant 

Rooney, ECF No. 24; and the motion for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11 

filed on behalf of defendants Youssef and Teravec, ECF No. 22.

Plaintiff has filed no response to any of the motions, nor has he 

sought leave to file a response.

 1 Defendant Rorapaugh’s motion also asks that plaintiff be declared a vexatious 

litigator.
2

Allegations in the Complaint

The rambling Complaint, ECF No. 2, consists of more than 452 

paragraphs over 208 pages. The 15 named defendants are former state 

court judges, current or former federal and state officials, private 

attorneys and other private individuals.2 Plaintiff, who was suspended 

from the practice of law in 1998 and was permanently disbarred in 

2000, id. at ¶ 80, alleges that, beginning in the 1990’s, defendants 

have engaged in “a never-ending, open-ended” racketeering organization 

violative of the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act, O.R.C. § 2923.31 et seq. 

(“OCPA”). Id. at ¶ 9. The purpose of the organization, plaintiff 

alleges, is “to destroy the ability of Plaintiff to earn a living 

through the practice of law, and to divest Plaintiff of all of 

Plaintiff’s property.” Id. at ¶ 10. The Complaint seeks monetary 

relief, including treble damages under the OCPA and compensatory and 

punitive damages, as well as “disgorgement” of defendants’ “wages, 

salaries, profits, pensions and other financial gain” resulting from 

the alleged “racketeering enterprise.” Id. at PageID# 207-08. 

Plaintiff also asks that defendant Rooney and his attorney be declared 

“vexatious litigators” within the meaning of O.R.C. § 2323.52. Id. at 

¶ 452.

Specifically, plaintiff alleges that defendant James J. Sweeney

(hereinafter “defendant J. Sweeney”), a state court judge, entered 

judgment against plaintiff in 1993 on two cognovit notes, id. at ¶ 

121, and thereafter “transformed his judgeship into the CEO of a 

 2

The state court docket indicates that service of process has not been 

effected on defendants Miguel Chiappero, W. Martin Midian, or Monica Redman.
3

criminal organization designed to. . . destroy the ability of 

Plaintiff to earn a living through the practice of law, and to divest 

Plaintiff of all of Plaintiff’s property.” Id. at ¶ 10. Plaintiff’s 

1994 appeal from proceedings in that matter was dismissed on the basis 

that plaintiff had failed to file a required praecipe. Id. at ¶ 136.

According to plaintiff, defendant Ranke, at the time a law clerk 

for the state court of appeals and a former law clerk for J. Sweeney,

id., acted in concert with defendant J. Sweeney and “removed and 

retained” plaintiff’s praecipe and tampered with the state court’s 

computerized docket. Id. at ¶¶ 137, 159, 166, 169. “This tampering and 

obstruction of justice set in motion the sequence of events which 

allowed the racketeering enterprise to flourish and to continue to 

take Plaintiff’s property, culminating in the deprivation of 

Plaintiff’s law license.” Id. at ¶ 137. See also id. at ¶ 162, 181.

Plaintiff further alleges that, in 1995, defendant McAllister, a 

retired state court judge, was assigned by defendant J. Sweeney to 

serve as a visiting judge in a case involving a client of plaintiff. 

Defendant McAllister levied sanctions against plaintiff in that 

action, id. at ¶ 196, although the award of sanctions was later 

reversed on appeal. Id. at ¶ 199.

Plaintiff filed for bankruptcy protection, during the course of 

which he was “forced” to sell his home. Id. at ¶¶ 228-29. In 1999, 

defendants Miguel and Sharon Chiappero contracted to purchase the 

house for $160,000.00, id. at ¶ 230, but ultimately paid only $50,000. 
4

Id. at ¶ 254.3 Plaintiff alleges that the Chiapperos fraudulently 

misrepresented financing arrangements for the purchase, id. at ¶¶ 234-

36, and that Miguel Chiappero committed perjury in subsequent 

litigation. Id. at ¶ 236.4 According to plaintiff, the Chiappero 

defendants “directly or indirectly participat[ed] in” defendant J. 

Sweeney’s scheme. Id. at ¶ 238. “The longer that Plaintiff was kept in 

Bankruptcy by the racketeering enterprise, the more it benefitted all 

of the Defendants, particularly Defendants Miguel and Sharon 

Chiappero.” Id. at ¶ 239. In 2006, plaintiff sued the Chiapperos in 

state court in connection with this alleged fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 240. 

Their attorney, defendant Rooney, assisted the Chiapperos in 

“committing perjury” in that litigation. Id. at ¶ 241. According to 

plaintiff, that perjury ultimately resulted in a monetary judgment 

against plaintiff (and which was apparently satisfied in 2013 by 

assets held in plaintiff’s bankruptcy proceedings, id. at ¶ 389) and 

was “material” (in some unspecified fashion) to a tax debt owed by 

plaintiff. Id. at ¶¶ 242, 282.

The Complaint also alleges that other defendants, federal and 

state officials, have obstructed plaintiff’s attempts to petition the 

government for redress of his grievances against defendant J. Sweeney. 

Id. at ¶¶ 286-314. Plaintiff alleges that, in 2016, defendants Dimon, 

an Assistant Ohio Attorney General, Hilbert, the Deputy Director of 

Ohio’s Organized Crime Investigations Commission, Emily Sweeney, 

former United States Attorney for the Northern District of Ohio

 3 Plaintiff explains that “{i}t was important to protect the house so that 

Plaintiff could reacquire it from Defendants Chiappero.” Id. at ¶ 266. 4 As noted supra, it does not appear that Miguel Chiappero has been served with 

process.
5

(hereinafter “defendant E. Sweeney”), and Coughlan, former Ohio 

Disciplinary Counsel, “refused to investigate” plaintiff’s complaints

against defendant J. Sweeney and the alleged racketeering enterprise

“for the purpose of aiding and abetting the racketeering conspiracy. . 

. and allowing [defendant] J. Sweeney the unrestricted opportunity to 

continue his pattern and practice of harassment of Plaintiff.” Id. at 

¶¶ 287. See also id. at ¶ 291, 295. Moreover, defendants E. Sweeney 

and Dimon, along with defendants Midian and Redman (attorneys retained 

by the State of Ohio to collect tax debts)5 retaliated against 

plaintiff when they pursued collection procedures in connection with 

plaintiff’s tax debt that had originated 18 years earlier. Id. at ¶ 

305, 307. The Complaint also appears to assert claims under 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983 against defendants Dimon, Hilbert, J. Sweeney, E. Sweeney, 

Midian and Redman for obstruction of justice, retaliation, and denial 

of equal protection and due process. Id. at ¶¶ 392-409.

As previously noted, plaintiff was suspended from the practice of 

law in 1998 and was permanently disbarred in 2000. The disciplinary 

proceedings were based, in part, on plaintiff’s “harass[ment of]

judges by filing lawsuits. . . .” Id. at ¶ 304. Yet, plaintiff 

alleges, it was he who was the “victim of harassment” by “judges [ ] 

who abused their judicial offices for their own personal ventures. . .

and to manage the racketeering enterprise.” Id. Specifically, 

plaintiff complains that, in 1994, he filed disciplinary complaints 

with defendant Coughlan against defendant J. Sweeney and other state 

 5 As noted supra, it does not appear that defendants Midian and Redman have 

been served with process.
6

court judges. Id. at ¶ 322. Defendant Coughlan forwarded the 

complaints to the judges but allegedly took no action on plaintiff’s 

complaints. Id. at ¶ 324. A 1997 disciplinary hearing against 

plaintiff was, according to plaintiff, all “part of the racketeering 

enterprise’s retaliation” against plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 325.6

Defendant Youssef, plaintiff’s former client, allegedly joined 

the racketeering conspiracy in 1994. Id. at ¶ 340. Plaintiff had 

represented Youssef’s business in an action against its insurer, id. 

at ¶ 348, resulting in a substantial monetary jury verdict in 1997. 

Id. at ¶¶ 348, 349. According to plaintiff, defendant Rorapaugh, inhouse counsel for the insurance company, “sought revenge against 

Plaintiff. . . [and] joined the racketeering conspiracy and obstructed 

justice.” Id. at ¶ 351-52. Although plaintiff had paid all the 

expenses of the litigation, id. at ¶ 364, Youssef, Rorapaugh and 

defendant Tekavec, an attorney who later represented Youssef, caused a 

check issued by the insurer to be made payable to Youssef and his 

business only, omitting plaintiff as co-payee. Id. at ¶¶ 355, 357. 

Defendants Youssef and Tekavec allegedly acted to deprive plaintiff of 

his agreed fees. Id. at ¶ 364. Plaintiff also alleges that defendants 

Youssef and Tekavec later filed a fraudulent claim against plaintiff 

and instituted a fraudulent malpractice action against plaintiff in 

the latter’s bankruptcy proceedings. Id. at ¶¶ 359, 361. In 1999, and 

 6 The body of the Complaint also contains allegations against one Amy Stone, 

who is identified as an Assistant Disciplinary Counsel. Complaint, ¶ 422. 

According to plaintiff, Ms. Stone participated in the racketeering enterprise 

by failing to pursue disciplinary action against defendant J. Sweeney. Id. at 

¶¶ 423, 428. However, Ms. Stone is not named as a defendant in the caption of 

the Complaint and she has not been served with process. The Court concludes 

that she is not a defendant in this action.
7

allegedly in furtherance of the racketeering enterprise, defendant 

Tekavec recovered a fraudulent judgment against plaintiff in state 

court, which formed the basis of collection proceedings and which kept 

plaintiff “under the control of the bankruptcy court.” Id. at ¶ 387.7

Motions to Dismiss and for Judgment on the Pleadings

A number of defendants8 have filed motions to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state 

a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF Nos. 9, 10, 15, 19, 21, 

25. Defendant Rooney has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings 

pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ECF 

No. 24. As noted supra, plaintiff has made no response to the motions, 

nor has he sought leave to respond to the motions. A litigant’s 

failure to respond to a motion to dismiss does not foreclose a court’s 

ability to consider the merits of the motion. Carver v. Bunch, 946 

F.2d 451, 455 (6th Cir. 1991). However, even in the absence of a 

response to the motion, the moving party always bears the burden of 

establishing a right to the relief sought. Id. This Court will 

 7 The Complaint also asks that defendant Rooney, who acted as counsel for the

Chiappero defendants, as well as the attorney who represents defendant Rooney 

in defense against plaintiff’s claims, be declared vexatious litigators 

within the meaning of O.R.C. § 2323.52. Id. at PageID# 425. Plaintiff bases 

this request on his understanding that defendant Rooney and his attorney 

moved, presumably in the action that plaintiff previously filed in this 

Court, that plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigator, but did not serve 

their request on plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 448 (“They have filed a Motion in the 

U.S. District Court to have Plaintiff Meros declared a vexatious 

litigator.”). As plaintiff was advised in the earlier federal action, the 

record establishes that defendant Rooney did not file such a motion in that 

action. Meros v. Dimon, No. 2:17-cv-103, Order, ECF No. 69 (S.D. Ohio July 

20, 2018). The Court will therefore not further consider plaintiff’s request 

to declare defendant Rooney and his attorney to be vexatious litigators. 

8 Defendants J. Sweeney, McAllister, E. Sweeney, Youssef, Rorapaugh, Coughlan, 

Dimon, Hilbert, and Sharon Chiappero.
8

consider the merits of the motions to dismiss, notwithstanding 

plaintiff’s failure to respond to those motions.

Standards

A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) attacks the legal 

sufficiency of the complaint. Roth Steel Prod. v. Sharon Steel Co., 

705 F.2d 134, 155 (6th Cir. 1983); Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc., 

493 F.Supp. 2d 921, 923 (S.D. Ohio 2007). In considering a motion to 

dismiss under the provisions of Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), a court must 

construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, 

accept all factual allegations as true, and determine whether the 

complaint contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 

(2007). Under general pleading standards, the facts alleged in the 

complaint need not be detailed, although “a plaintiff’s obligation to 

provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires more 

than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of a cause of 

action’s elements will not do.” Id. at 555. A complaint must be 

dismissed if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570. However, “[w]hen 

there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume 

their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to 

an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009).

A motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of 

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is governed by the same standard 

as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). Barany-Snyder v. Weiner, 
9

539 F.3d 327, 332 (6th Cir. 2008). “[W]e construe the complaint in the 

light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept the well-pled 

factual allegations as true, and determine whether the moving party is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. 

v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir. 2007). To 

withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a 

complaint must contain direct or inferential allegations respecting 

all the material elements under some viable legal theory.” Id. In 

resolving motions under Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 12(c), a court must 

consider the allegations of the complaint, and may also consider

“matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of 

the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint.” Amini v. Oberlin 

Coll., 259 F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir.2001) (quoting Nieman v. NLO, Inc.,

108 F.3d 1546, 1554 (6th Cir.1997)) (emphasis omitted).

Although pro se complaints are held “to less stringent standards 

than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 

519, 520 (1972), and a document filed pro se is “to be liberally 

construed,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Estelle 

v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)), even a pro se complaint “must 

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim 

to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 

(internal quotation marks omitted).

OCPA Claims: Statute of Limitations

Defendants J. Sweeney, McAllister, E. Sweeney, Youssef, 

Rorabaugh, Coughlan, Dimon, Hilbert, Rooney and Sharon Chiappero move

to dismiss on the basis of untimeliness of the action. “The statute of 
10

limitations defense ‘may be raised on a motion to dismiss under Rule 

12(b)(6) when it is apparent from the face of the complaint that the 

time limit for bringing the claim has passed.’” Korn v. Paul Revere 

Life Ins. Co., 238 Fed. Appx. 109, 111-12, 2007 WL 1892077, at *2 (6th

Cir. 2007)(quoting, in part, Hoover v. Langston Equip. Assoc., Inc.,

958 F.2d 742, 744 (6th Cir. 1992)).

Plaintiff asserts claims under the OCPA, O.R.C. § 2923.31 et 

seq., which is modeled on the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 

Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (“RICO”). Morrow v. Reminger & 

Reminger Co., L.P.A., 183 Ohio App. 3d 40, 55 (Ohio 10th Dist. Ct. App. 

2009). A claim under the OCPA must be commenced “within five years 

after the unlawful conduct terminates or the cause of action accrues. 

. . .” O.R.C. § 2923.34(J). A cause of action under the statute 

accrues when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the injury 

underlying the claim. Meros v. Dimon, Case No. 2:17-cv-103, 2017 WL 

6508723 (S. D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2017) (citing Doe v. Archdiocese of 

Cincinnati, 109 Ohio St. 3d 491, 500 (2006)). The “last predicate act” 

rule for determining when the cause of action accrues is not

applicable. See Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179 

(1997)(Applying the RICO statute of limitations). “[T]he plaintiff 

cannot use an independent, new predicate act as a bootstrap to recover 

for injuries caused by other, earlier predicate acts that took place 

outside the limitations period.” Id. at 190.

The Complaint was filed in state court on April 23, 2018. Docket, 

Exhibit B to Notice of Removal. The claims asserted in this action are 

clearly untimely. The “enterprise” about which plaintiff complains 
11

allegedly originated almost 25 years ago, in 1994, when defendants J. 

Sweeney and Ranke allegedly tampered with a court docket, resulting in 

the dismissal of plaintiff’s appeal. Moreover, the Complaint makes 

clear that plaintiff has known about the alleged scheme and 

defendants’ alleged wrongdoing for many years. For example, he filed 

disciplinary complaints with defendant Coughlan against defendant J. 

Sweeney and other state court judges in 1994. Complaint, ¶ 322. The 

alleged fraud surrounding the purchase of plaintiff’s house by the 

Chiappero defendants allegedly occurred in 1999, id. at ¶¶ 230-36, and 

plaintiff sued these defendants, who were represented by defendant 

Rooney, in connection with that alleged fraud in 2006. Id. at ¶ 240.

Plaintiff’s claims against defendants Youssef, Rorapaugh and Tekavec 

allegedly arose out of litigation in which a jury returned a verdict 

in 1997. Id. at ¶ 348. Tellingly, plaintiff alleges that the 

“racketeering enterprise. . . was made public on the internet on 

January 23, 2003 and has been published continuously since that time.” 

Id. at ¶ 291.

Although plaintiff has neither responded to the motions nor 

sought leave to respond, he contends in the Complaint that the alleged 

racketeering enterprise continues to deprive plaintiff of his property 

and that “the statute of limitation [sic] on the entire enterprise 

cannot lapse.” Id. at ¶ 390. Moreover, plaintiff refers to email 

correspondence between him and certain defendants and to tax 

collection efforts that occurred in 2016. Id., at ¶¶ 409-417. The 

Court rejects both suggested bases for extending the statute of 

limitations in this case.
12

First, to suggest that a series of predicate acts can continue 

indefinitely is inconsistent with the basic objective – i.e., repose –

that underlies limitations periods. See Klehr, 521 U.S. at 180. 

Moreover, the alleged refusal on the part of defendants Dimon, 

Hilbert, E. Sweeney, and Coughlan to investigate plaintiff’s 

complaints against defendant J. Sweeney and the alleged racketeering 

enterprise in 2016, see id. at ¶¶ 287, 291, 295, cannot serve to 

resurrect otherwise lapsed causes of action. In order to begin a new 

statute of limitations period, the new act cannot be “merely a 

reaffirmation of a previous act;” the new act must “inflict new and 

accumulating injury on the plaintiff.” Lehman v. Lucom, 727 F.3d 1326, 

1331 (11th Cir. 2013)(applying RICO). Even efforts allegedly taken in 

2016 by defendants Dimon, Hilbert, Midian, and Redman to collect 

plaintiff’s tax debt that had originated 18 years before, see

Complaint, ¶ 307, cannot serve to resurrect claims arising out of the 

acts that allegedly resulted in that debt.

In short, the Court concludes that plaintiff’s OCPA claims are 

foreclosed by the applicable statute of limitations.9

§ 1983 and Bivens Claims

The Complaint appears to assert claims against defendants Dimon, 

Hilbert, E. Sweeney – who are alleged to have refused to investigate 

plaintiff’s complaints and to have initiated collection efforts 

 9 Defendants Ranke and Tekavec did not file motions to dismiss based on the 

statute of limitations. However, in light of the Court’s conclusion that 

plaintiff’s claims under the OCPA are untimely, the Court will dismiss the 

claims against these defendants on that basis as well. In any event, 

plaintiff’s claims against defendant Ranke, including claims under the OCPA, 

were dismissed with prejudice by this Court in Meros v. Dimon, No. 2:17-cv103, Opinion & Order, ECF No. 63, PageID# 1206 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 20, 2017).
13

arising out of plaintiff’s tax debt, id. at ¶¶ 392-409 - for the 

denial of constitutional rights in the form of obstruction of justice, 

retaliation for plaintiff’s having petitioned for redress of 

grievances, and denial of equal protection and due process.10 Title 42 

of the United States Code, Section 1983, creates a cause of action for 

the deprivation, by a person acting under color of state law, of one’s 

constitutional rights. A victim of a constitutional deprivation by a 

federal agent may recover damages against that federal officer. Bivens 

v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). 

Defendant E. Sweeney is a former federal prosecutor whose 

prosecutorial decisions are cloaked with absolute immunity from 

liability for monetary damages. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 

(1976). To the extent that defendant Dimon and Hilbert qualify as 

state prosecutors, their exercise of prosecutorial discretion is 

similarly immune from liability in this action. Moreover, plaintiff’s 

claims based on an alleged obstruction of justice and denial of due 

process cannot proceed because “a private citizen lacks a judicially 

cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” 

Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Even “a victim of 

a crime has no federal right to have his claim investigated.” Martin 

v. Koljonen, 89 F. App'x 567, 568 (6th Cir. 2004). Plaintiff’s claim 

based on a denial of equal protection cannot proceed because plaintiff 

alleges no facts that would support such a claim. See Johnson v. 

 10Plaintiff also alleges that defendants Midian and Redman violated his 

constitutional rights in connection with their efforts as private attorneys 

retained by the State of Ohio to collect on plaintiff’s 18-year old tax debt. 

Complaint, ¶¶ 392-409. Because it does not appear that service of process has 

been effected on these defendants, the Court will not consider the 

sufficiency of plaintiff’s claims against them.
14

Bredesen, 624 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The Equal Protection 

Clause prevents states from making distinctions that (1) burden a 

fundamental right; (2) target a suspect class; or (3) intentionally 

treat one individual differently from others similarly situated 

without any rational basis.”). Similarly, the conclusory allegations 

regarding First Amendment retaliation, which are devoid of any factual 

support whatsoever, fail to state a plausible claim upon which relief 

can be granted. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Accordingly, the Court 

concludes that the Complaint fails to state a claim for the 

deprivation of constitutional rights by defendants Dimon, Hilbert and 

E. Sweeney upon which relief can be granted.

In short, the Court concludes that the Complaint fails to assert 

a claim upon which relief can be granted.11

Motions to Declare Plaintiff a Vexatious Litigator and for Sanctions

Defendant Rorapaugh’s motion, ECF No. 19, not only seeks the 

dismissal of the claims asserted against him but also asks that 

plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigator. Moreover, defendants 

Youssef and Tekavec move for the imposition of sanctions against 

plaintiff pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 

ECF No. 22. In Meros v. Dimon, 2:17-cv-103, and in the exercise of its 

inherent power, this Court granted the motions of defendants Youseff 

and Ranke to declare plaintiff a vexatious litigator. The Court went 

on to state:

 11 Many of the motions present additional legal challenges to the Complaint. In 

light of the Court’s conclusion that plaintiff’s claims are either untimely 

or substantively insufficient, the Court will not address those other 

challenges.
15

Meros is hereby warned that Rule 11 sanctions will be 

imposed if he continues to file frivolous lawsuits alleging 

that defendants participated in a RICO scheme or caused him 

to lose his law license. Furthermore, it is ORDERED that 

Meros is barred from filing any action in this Court 

without submitting a certification from an attorney that 

his claims are warranted. Finally, if he ever files a 

complaint in this or any other Court concerning his 

dealings with any of the defendants in this case, his 

complaint must include the caption and case number of all 

the prior actions he has filed against the named 

defendants.

Id., Opinion & Order, ECF No. 63, PageID# 1204-05 (Dec. 20, 2017). 

Thus, plaintiff has already been declared a vexatious litigator by 

this Court; it is not apparent that a second such declaration, such as 

that sought by defendant Rorapaugh, will serve any meaningful purpose.

Moreover, the Court concludes that its discretion is better 

exercised in declining to impose Rule 11 sanctions against plaintiff 

at this time. Most of the claims asserted by plaintiff in Meros v. 

Dimon, 2:17-cv-103, were dismissed without prejudice, plaintiff did 

not file this action in this Court, and he does not assert in this 

action any claim under RICO. However, the claims asserted by plaintiff 

against the moving defendants in this action will be dismissed with 

prejudice. This judgment will serve to prohibit a new action by 

plaintiff against those defendants on not only the claims asserted in 

this action but also on claims that could have been litigated in this 

action.

Under federal res judicata, or claim preclusion, “a final 

judgment on the merits bars further claims by parties or 

their privies based on the same cause of action.” See 

Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 99 S.Ct. 970, 59 

L.Ed.2d 210 (1979). The doctrine precludes litigation of 

claims that “were previously available to the parties, 

regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in 

the first proceeding.” Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131, 

99 S.Ct. 2205, 60 L.Ed.2d 767 (1979).
16

E.E.O.C. v. Frank’s Nursery & Crafts, Inc., 177 F.3d 448, 462-63 (6th

Cir. 1999). Thus – and to be absolutely clear – plaintiff may not 

initiate further litigation in this or any other court against these 

defendants on the claims asserted in this action or on claims that 

could have been asserted in this action. Should he do so, he will 

almost certainly be met with a successful motion for sanctions. See

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; Ohio R. Civ. Pro. 11.

Under these circumstances, Defendant Rorapaugh’s request that 

plaintiff be declared a vexatious litigator, ECF No. 19, and the 

motion, filed on behalf of defendants Youssef and Tekavec, for 

sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, ECF No. 22, are DENIED.

WHEREUPON the motions to dismiss filed on behalf of defendants 

McAllister and James J. Sweeney, ECF No. 9, defendant Emily Sweeney, 

ECF No. 10, defendant Youssef, ECF No. 15, defendant Rorapaugh, ECF 

No. 19, defendants Coughlan, Dimon, and Hilbert, ECF No. 21, and 

defendant Sharon Chiappero, ECF No. 25; and the motion for judgment on 

the pleadings filed on behalf of defendant Rooney, ECF No. 24, are 

GRANTED. The claims against these defendants are DISMISSED WITH 

PREJUDICE, as are the claims asserted against defendants Ranke and 

Tekavec. Defendant Rorapaugh’s request that plaintiff be declared a 

vexatious litigator, ECF No. 19, and the motion, filed on behalf of 

defendants Youssef and Tekavec, for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11, ECF 

No. 22, are DENIED.

3/27/2019 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. 

Date Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

 Chief United States District Judge