IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-60506

KRISTI DEARMAN, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant

v.

STONE COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT, 

 Defendant - Appellee

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Mississippi

Before REAVLEY, JOLLY, and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

E. GRADY JOLLY, Circuit Judge:

Kristi Dearman sued the Stone County, Mississippi, School District

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the non-renewal of her teaching contract was 

in retaliation for expressing her First Amendment support for a candidate for 

school superintendent. Dearman further contends that her procedural due 

process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment were ignored, saying that she 

was deprived of a hearing to contest her discharge. The district court granted 

summary judgment in favor of the School District. We affirm. Dearman has 

not shown that her protected speech was the cause of her discharge. Nor has 

she shown that she was denied adequate pre-termination process under the 

Fourteenth Amendment.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

August 11, 2016

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I.

Dearman was an employee of the Stone County School District from 

August 2002 until May 2013. During 2011, while serving as a guidance 

counselor at Stone County Middle School, Dearman openly supported fellow 

Stone County Middle School teacher James Nightengale in his candidacy for 

county superintendent. Nightengale was one of six candidates in the race for 

superintendent; he eventually lost the superintendent race to Gwen Miller. 

After Miller took office in January 2012, Dearman and several other teachers 

who had supported Nightengale were reassigned to different schools. 

Dearman was reassigned to Stone County Elementary School, where she 

assumed the identical position of guidance counselor.

In January 2013, Wendy Rogers, the Special Education Director for 

Stone County School District, visited Dearman’s office. Rogers asserts that, 

while visiting Dearman’s office, she noticed on Dearman’s desk a folder 

containing an individualized education program (“IEP”) for one of 

Nightengale’s special education students. Dearman was not authorized to 

view the confidential student information in the IEP folder.1 Dearman met 

informally with Rogers and Superintendent Miller a few days later. During 

the meeting, Dearman told Miller that she had, at Nightengale’s request, 

reviewed the IEP folder to ensure that Nightengale had properly completed the 

evaluation paperwork. She also admitted to using Nightengale’s login and 

password to access a confidential education profile on the School District’s 

electronic database; again, Dearman asserted that she did this merely to 

review whether Nightengale had properly completed students’ evaluation

paperwork.

 

1 Dearman disputes when Rogers visited her office, but does not dispute that, at some 

point, she was in unauthorized possession of the IEP folder for one of Nightengale’s students.

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On February 21, 2013, Miller notified Dearman by letter that she was 

temporarily suspended with pay, and that Miller was recommending that 

Dearman be “terminated” because she violated the Family Educational Rights 

and Privacy Act (“FERPA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g et seq., and the Individuals with 

Disabilities Education Improvement Act (“IDEIA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq., 

when accessing students’ IEP information without the School District’s 

authorization. Miller informed Dearman that she had a right to request a 

hearing before the Stone County School Board concerning the recommendation 

for discharge and interim suspension. Dearman requested a hearing, and on 

March 4, 2013, she addressed the School Board. When speaking to the Board, 

Dearman reiterated that, in accessing the IEP information, she was merely 

seeking to help Nightengale correctly complete and submit his student 

evaluations. She further asserted that, in the past, she had also helped Rogers 

with similar evaluations. 

The Board never voted on Miller’s recommendation for termination. On 

May 3, 2013, Dearman was informed by letter that Miller’s recommendation 

for termination was being withdrawn and that the District would instead 

simply not renew her employment contract at the end of its one-year term. The 

letter informed Dearman that, under Mississippi state law, she was entitled to 

specific reasons for the nonrenewal, as well as a hearing before the School 

Board. See Miss. Code. § 37-9-109(a) (stating that an employee who has 

received notice of non-reemployment is entitled to “[w]ritten notice of the 

specific reasons for nonreemployment, together with a summary of the factual 

basis therefor.”); Miss. Code. § 37-9-109(c) (stating that an employee who has 

received notice of non-reemployment is entitled to “[r]eceive a fair and 

impartial hearing before the board or hearing officer”). Dearman requested 

the reasons for her nonrenewal, and informed the School District that she 

wished to have a hearing. In response, the School District sent a letter, dated 

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May 17 and signed by Superintendent Miller, stating that Dearman’s contract 

was not being renewed because of the FERPA and IDEIA violations. The 

School District also informed Dearman that a hearing before the Board was set 

for June 4, 2013.

Under Mississippi state law, any employee requesting a hearing for a

nonrenewal decision is required to provide the school district in question with 

specific information regarding the employee’s challenge to the nonrenewal; this 

information must be provided within five days of the scheduled date for the 

hearing. See Miss. Code § 37-9-109(d). If the employee fails to submit this 

documentation in a timely fashion, the nonrenewal is deemed final without a 

hearing. See id. On May 27, 2013, Dearman’s counsel mailed Dearman’s

response. On June 3, 2013, however, Dearman received a letter from the 

School District stating that, because it had not received Dearman’s response 

in a timely fashion, the nonrenewal of her employment contract was being

deemed final without a hearing. Dearman requested that the School District 

continue the hearing and allow her to resend the response. The School District 

denied her request.

On April 30, 2013, Dearman filed suit against the School District.2 

Dearman alleged that the School District violated her First Amendment rights 

when the School District fired Dearman for supporting Nightengale’s 

campaign during the 2011 election for superintendent. Dearman also alleged 

that the School District violated her due process rights under the Fourteenth 

Amendment when it decided not to renew her employment contract without 

first holding a hearing on the matter.

 

2 Initially, Superintendent Miller was also named as a defendant in this action. The 

parties, however, stipulated that the claims against Miller were due to be dismissed. On 

March 20, 2015, the district court entered an order dismissing Miller as a defendant.

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On June 22, 2015, the district court granted summary judgment denying

Dearman’s First Amendment and due process claims. The district court 

reasoned that the First Amendment claim was due to be dismissed because 

there was no evidence suggesting that Dearman’s protected conduct (i.e., her 

support of Nightengale’s election campaign) was a “substantial or motivating 

factor in the [School District’s] adverse employment decision.” The district 

court further reasoned that the due process claim was due to be dismissed 

because Dearman failed to comply with the state-law requirement that she 

submit documentation at least five days in advance of the hearing on the nonrenewal of her employment contract. Because, under state law, Dearman’s 

right to a pre-termination hearing was conditioned on her compliance with this 

submission requirement, the district court concluded that Dearman waived her 

right to a nonrenewal hearing.3 Dearman filed a timely appeal.

II.

“We review the grant of a motion for summary judgment de novo, 

applying the same standard as the district court.” Moss v. BMC Software, Inc., 

610 F.3d 917, 922 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing Threadgill v. Prudential Sec. Grp., 

Inc., 145 F.3d 286, 292 (5th Cir. 1998)). “The court shall grant summary 

judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any 

material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED.

R. CIV. P. 56(a). “When considering a motion for summary judgment, the court 

views all facts and evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving 

 

3 The district court also held that Dearman lacked a property interest in continued 

employment. At oral argument, however, the School District conceded that Miss. Code § 37-

9-109’s protections against arbitrary dismissal act to create an expectation in continued 

employment. Moreover we note that, in a previous opinion denying summary judgment to 

Miller on the due process claim, the district court asserted that Miss. Code § 37-9-109 did, in 

fact, create an interest in reemployment. 

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party.” Moss, 610 F.3d at 922 (citing United Fire & Cas. Co. v. Hixson Bros. 

Inc., 453 F.3d 283, 285 (5th Cir. 2006)).

III.

A.

We begin by considering the district court’s dismissal of Dearman’s First 

Amendment retaliation claim. Dearman contends that the School District 

fired her in retaliation for supporting Nightengale’s 2011 campaign for 

superintendent. As stated, Nightengale ultimately lost the race to Miller. 

Miller later recommended to the School Board that Dearman be fired for 

accessing students’ confidential information, and was involved in the 

discussions that ultimately led to the nonrenewal of Dearman’s employment 

contract by the School Board.

To prove a First Amendment retaliation claim, Dearman must show that 

“(1) she suffered an ‘adverse employment decision’; (2) her speech involved ‘a 

matter of public concern’; (3) her ‘interest in commenting on matters of public

concern . . . outweigh[s] the Defendant's interest in promoting efficiency’; and 

(4) her speech motivated the adverse employment decision.” Beattie v. Madison 

Cty. Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 601 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Harris v. Victoria 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 168 F.3d 216, 220 (5th Cir. 1999)). Here, the only contested 

issue is causation. To establish causation, Dearman must show that she 

engaged in protected conduct and that it was a motivating factor in her 

discharge. Then, the burden shifts to the School District to show, by a 

preponderance of the evidence, that it would have come to the same conclusion 

regarding Dearman’s employment, even in the absence of the protected 

conduct. See Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 

287 (1977). 

Also, although wholly unbriefed by the parties, we point out that 

Dearman has not sued Superintendent Miller or any other person in an 

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individual capacity. Instead, she has sued only the School District. In bringing 

her First Amendment claim against the School District directly, Dearman has 

asserted a claim for municipal liability. See Beattie, 254 F.3d at 601–02. 

“Municipal liability for constitutional torts arises when the execution of an 

official policy causes the injury.” Id. at 602 (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.

of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). Under Mississippi law, the 

School Board itself, and not Miller, is the “official policy maker” for the School 

District with respect to personnel decisions. See Miss. Code § 37-7-301(p) 

(granting school boards the authority to “select all school district personnel in 

the manner provided by law”). The School District, however, apparently 

concedes that, with respect to nonrenewal decisions such as this one, the School 

Board has delegated final policy-making authority to Superintendent Miller. 

See Appellee’s Brief, at 13 (“The Board actually made no decision in regards to 

the non-renewal as it is the Superintendent’s decision alone unless the Board 

is asked for a hearing . . . . Since Dearman failed to comply with the statutory 

requirements for hearing on the non-renewal, the hearing did not take place 

and the decision to non-renew Dearman became final and the Board was never 

required to make a decision on the non-renewal.”); see also Beattie, 254 F.3d at 

601–02 (stating that, under Mississippi law, a school district’s board is the 

“official policy maker” with respect to employment decisions, but 

acknowledging that “if, however, the board . . . delegated its policymaking 

authority in the area of at-will employment to [the superintendent], it may be 

liable” for the superintendent’s decisions).

Assuming that the School Board delegated policy-making authority to 

Superintendent Miller, we conclude that Dearman has not met her initial 

burden of demonstrating that her protected speech was a “motivating” or 

“substantial” cause for her discharge. As the district court noted, Dearman 

has offered no evidence that Miller was even aware of Dearman’s support for 

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Nightengale’s rival campaign. It follows that, if Superintendent Miller were 

not aware of Dearman’s support for Nightengale’s campaign, that political 

support could not have been a motivating factor in her decision to fire 

Dearman. See Tharling v. City of Port Lavaca, 329 F.3d 422, 428 (5th Cir. 

2003) (“It is axiomatic that a party cannot be ‘substantially motivated’ by a 

circumstance of which that party is unaware.”).

Although Dearman concedes that she has offered no direct evidence that 

Superintendent Miller knew of Dearman’s support for Nightengale’s 

campaign, she argues that circumstantial evidence of Miller’s knowledge 

exists. Specifically, Dearman points out that, before Miller’s election as 

superintendent, Mike Gavin, the then-principal of Stone County Middle

School, warned Dearman and several other Nightengale supporters that 

showing political support for Nightengale could have adverse employment 

consequences. Dearman further emphasizes that, after Miller’s victory in the 

superintendent election, Dearman and other Nightengale supporters were 

transferred from Stone County Middle School to comparable positions at other 

schools. 

This circumstantial evidence, however, does nothing to suggest that 

Miller had knowledge of Dearman’s support for Nightengale’s campaign. 

Perhaps more importantly, no evidence has shown that Miller held retaliatory 

animus as a result of that support. The statements cautioning Stone County 

Middle School teachers against showing support for Nightengale’s campaign 

were made over a year before Dearman’s discharge, when Miller was not the 

incumbent and there were five other candidates in the race. See Evans v. City 

of Houston, 246 F.3d 344, 354 (5th Cir.2001) (“‘Close timing between an 

employee's protected activity and an adverse employment action can be a 

sufficient basis for a court to find a causal connection required to make out a 

prima facie case of retaliation.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Swanson v. Gen. 

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Servs. Admin., 110 F.3d 1180, 1188 (5th Cir. 1997))). Still further, there is no 

evidence that Miller had any involvement in or knowledge of the warning’s 

issuance. Similarly, Dearman offers no evidence that Miller was behind the 

transfer of Nightengale supporters from Stone County Middle School to other 

schools.4

Finally, Dearman asks us to infer retaliatory animus from the fact that 

Nightengale, Miller’s rival in the superintendent election, also had his 

employment contract non-renewed in early 2013.5 Dearman alleges that the 

close proximity between her and Nightengale’s’ discharge, standing alone, 

creates a dispute of fact over whether she was fired for supporting 

Nightengale’s campaign. That Nightengale was also fired, however, is 

irrelevant unless Dearman can offer some evidence that Miller actually knew 

of Dearman’s support for Nightengale’s campaign; as we have already 

explained, Dearman offers no such evidence. See Thompson v. Somervell Cty., 

Tex., 431 F. App’x 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2011) (“Even at the prima facie stage, 

temporal proximity can only establish a causal link when it is connected to the 

decision maker's knowledge of the protected activity.”). In fact, Dearman 

herself acknowledged in her deposition that she has no evidence that Miller 

knew that she supported Nightengale’s campaign for superintendent. See

Deposition of Kristi Dearman, at 115 (“Q: Do you have any facts to—to make 

you believe that Gwen Miller knew that you supported Jim Nightengale [for 

superintendent]?” A: “No.”).

 

4 Indeed, Dearman does not take issue with the School District’s assertion that the 

decision to transfer Dearman to Stone County Elementary School was made by Rogers, not 

Miller, and that the decision was made solely because the guidance counselor at the 

elementary school had recently retired, leaving a vacancy. She also concedes that these 

transfers, standing alone, are not “adverse employment actions,” and offers no evidence that 

any other transferred teacher was later discharged.

5 Nightengale’s discharge was based, in large part, on the same allegations regarding 

the unauthorized sharing of confidential student information.

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In sum, Dearman has failed to show that there is a genuine dispute of 

fact regarding whether Superintendent Miller knew of Dearman’s support for 

Nightengale’s campaign, and thus whether Dearman’s protected conduct was 

a motivating factor in Miller’s decision not to renew her employment contract. 

Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment 

dismissing Dearman’s First Amendment retaliation claim.

B.

Dearman also alleges that the School District deprived her of a protected 

interest in continued employment without due process of law when the School 

District decided not to renew her employment contract without first providing 

a hearing. The Fourteenth Amendment, standing alone, does not create a 

protectable interest in continued public employment. See Bd. of Regents of 

State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). A government employee may, 

however, possess an interest in continued employment by operation of an 

employment contract or state law. See id. Where such an interest in continued 

employment exists, a public employer may not deprive an employee of 

continued employment without first providing due process of law. See 

McDonald v. Mims, 577 F.2d 951, 952–53 (5th Cir. 1978). 

At oral argument, the School District conceded that, pursuant to Miss. 

Code § 37-9-109, Dearman has a property interest in continued employment. 

See Miss. Code § 37-9-109 (asserting that a non-renewed employee is entitled 

to, among other protections, “written notice of the specific reasons for 

nonreemployment” and the opportunity to receive “a fair and impartial hearing 

before the board or hearing officer” regarding the nonrenewal).6 The School 

 

6 Our precedents also indicate that Miss. Code § 37-9-109, as interpreted by 

Mississippi state courts, creates a property interest in continued employment, 

notwithstanding that its protections are principally procedural in nature. See McDonald, 

577 F.2d at 952 (“Those employee rights guaranteed by [Miss Code § 37-9-109] preclude the 

arbitrary dismissal of school teachers covered by the Act. This protection alone, under 

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District, however, contends that Dearman waived these state-law procedural 

protections when she failed to provide, within five days of the June 4th hearing 

date, a written response to the School District’s reasons for her nonrenewal. 

See Miss. Code § 37-9-109(d) (“Any employee requesting a hearing shall 

provide the district, not less than five (5) days before the scheduled date for the 

hearing, a response to the specific reasons for nonreemployment . . . . If the 

employee fails to submit this documentation in a timely fashion, the 

nonrenewal is deemed final without a hearing.”). In response, Dearman 

asserts that she did provide the School District with a written response within

five days of the June 4, 2013 hearing date, and thus that she did not waive her 

right to a hearing. 

Before arguing whether Dearman waived her state-law right to a 

nonrenewal hearing, the parties must consider what the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s Due Process Clause requires. In the pre-deprivation context, all 

that federal due process requires is “notice and an opportunity to respond.” 

McDonald v. City of Corinth, Tex., 102 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1996). The 

record establishes that Dearman received both. On February 21, 2013, the 

School District notified Dearman that it was considering ending her 

employment. At a regular meeting of the School Board on March 4th, with 

Superintendent Miller in attendance, Dearman was given an opportunity to 

respond to the School District’s reasons for her discharge. Dearman appeared 

before Superintendent Miller and the Board and defended herself from the 

accusations against her. Dearman also submitted a written rebuttal to the 

 

Mississippi decisional law, creates a protectable property interest.”). These cases arguably 

conflict with the general principle that a state law does not create a property interest in 

continued employment simply by conditioning removal on the employer’s compliance with 

certain procedures. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 345–47 (1976).

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allegations against her. In other words, Dearman was afforded the full 

panoply of federal due process protections.

The termination of Dearman’s employment was later recategorized as a 

“nonrenewal” of her contract. Although the state-law procedural requirements

for effecting each termination may differ, at bottom, the deprivation—i.e., an

interest in continued employment—remains the same. See Cleveland Bd. of 

Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541 (1985) (“‘Property’ cannot be defined by 

the procedures provided for its deprivation.”); see also Shows v. Wayne Cty. 

Sch. Dist., 71 F.3d 876, 1995 WL 725765, at *2 (5th Cir. 1995) (unpublished 

decision) (asserting that Miss. Code § 37-9-109 simply creates “an expectation 

in continued employment”). Moreover, the parties agree that, although the 

School District went from “terminating” Dearman’s employment to simply not 

renewing her contract, the School District’s stated reasons for ending 

Dearman’s employment remained identical. Dearman had a full opportunity 

to address the charges against her at the March 4th Board meeting. She does 

not contend that her response to the School District’s reasons for terminating 

her employment would have changed because the School District decided to 

follow “nonrenewal” procedures to end her employment. In short, a second 

hearing would have been redundant in every sense.

Nor does it matter, at least for the purposes of due process analysis, that 

the School District may have failed to comply with the nonrenewal procedures 

set forth in Miss. Code § 37-9-109. The School District may have violated state 

law when denying Dearman an official nonrenewal hearing. Given, however, 

that Dearman did receive both notice and an opportunity to respond, this statelaw violation does not also amount to a violation of federal due process. See 

Whatley v. Philo, 817 F.2d 19, 21 (5th Cir. 1987) (“To sustain the position that 

state-mandated procedures add to the federal constitutional minimum, one 

must show that ‘the procedures promised [were] denied in such a manner that 

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the constitutional minimum is itself denied or an independent constitutional 

deprivation is effected.’” (quoting Levitt v. Univ. of Tex. El Paso, 759 F.2d 1224, 

1230 (5th Cir. 1985))).7

In sum, the School District gave Dearman notice of its intent to end her 

employment. The School District provided her an opportunity to dispute the 

reasons for that decision. Dearman appeared before the Board and defended 

her actions; she also submitted a written response to the charges against her. 

Accordingly, Dearman’s pre-deprivation due process rights were not violated.8

IV.

Because Dearman has not established that her protected speech was the 

cause of her discharge, and because Dearman received the pre-discharge 

 

7 In her reply brief, Dearman hinted at the existence of a separate due process claim 

based on the deprivation of a “liberty interest” in her professional reputation. As counsel 

acknowledged at oral argument, at no point in this case’s three-year history has Dearman 

clearly asserted a separate due process claim based on the violation of a liberty interest. We 

thus decline to address the claim on appeal.

8 The dissenting opinion suggests Dearman was not afforded a “meaningful 

opportunity to respond” because, by the School Board’s own concession, her March 4th 

appearance before the Board was not a formal “hearing.” As we have noted, however, 

whether the March 4th Board meeting was an actual “hearing” under state law is irrelevant 

for the purposes of federal due process analysis. See, e.g., Patterson v. Yazoo City, Miss., 519 

F. App’x 838, 842 (5th Cir. 2013) (“The jury was instructed that ‘due process does not require 

a formal hearing, but it does require that the employee be given notice of the action that may 

be taken against him, and a meaningful opportunity to tell his side of the issue.’ . . . [This 

instruction] accurately summarizes the law in this circuit.”). 

In addition, the dissenting opinion argues the School Board’s decision to reword

Dearman’s discharge from a “termination” to a “nonrenewal” affects due process analysis 

because of the differing levels of protection state law affords employees in each situation.

Under state law, the School Board must show some degree of unfitness when terminating an 

employee during her term of contract, while non-renewals of employment are guarded only 

against arbitrariness. Again, however, Dearman’s interest in continued employment is the 

only property interest at issue, and Dearman has offered no argument regarding how this

state-law distinction adds to her federal due process rights. See Whatley, 817 F.2d at 21. 

Moreover, as the dissenting opinion must acknowledge, not only is the burden on the School 

Board lighter in non-renewal actions, but Dearman is hard-pressed to argue that her 

nonrenewal was arbitrary, in so much as she has asserted no new grounds against dismissal 

that she would have offered had she been granted a second opportunity to go before the School 

Board. 

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process due under the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court’s judgment 

dismissing Dearman’s First Amendment retaliation and procedural due 

process claims is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.

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JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part: 

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s conclusion on Kristi 

Dearman’s claim regarding the non-renewal of her contract. The school district 

conceded at oral argument that Mississippi law conferred on Dearman a 

property interest subject to procedural due process protection in the renewal 

of her contract. The school district acknowledged in its brief and at oral 

argument that “no hearing t[ook] place” before that property interest was 

revoked. With the issues thus narrowed, the parties’ briefing and oral 

argument focused entirely on whether Dearman waived any right to a hearing 

by failing to respond, pursuant to the procedure prescribed by Mississippi law,

to the school district’s stated reasons for non-renewing her contract. See Miss. 

Code § 37-9-109(d). On that question, Dearman has plainly created a genuine 

issue of fact: her counsel’s affidavit indicates that he timely mailed the 

requisite response, and thus that no waiver occurred. Cf. Carter v. Allstate 

Indem. Co., 592 So.2d 66, 73–75 (Miss. 1991) (holding, in the context of 

Mississippi statutory scheme governing notice of insurance cancellation, that 

evidence that a document was mailed creates a rebuttable presumption that it 

was received). 

Instead, the majority opinion affirms summary judgment on a ground 

not considered by the district court and not argued by the school district on 

appeal: that the school board’s March 4, 2013 meeting, at which Dearman 

spoke regarding the then-pending recommendation that she be terminated, 

sufficed as an opportunity to be heard regarding the (as yet non-existent) 

recommendation that Dearman’s contract be non-renewed. This reasoning

side-steps not only the general acknowledgement in the school district’s brief 

that “no hearing t[ook] place” on the non-renewal recommendation, but also a 

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specific concession by the school district’s counsel during a deposition that the 

March 4th meeting was “not a hearing on a termination or nonrenewal.” 

In any event, even putting these concessions aside, the March 4th

meeting did not afford Dearman an opportunity to be heard on her nonrenewal. “The fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to 

be heard ‘at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.’” Matthews v. 

Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 

552 (1965)). Without the use of a crystal ball, the March 4th board meeting 

could not possibly have supplied an opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful 

time” regarding a proposed non-renewal of which Dearman was not even 

notified until May 3, 2013, nearly two months later. 

Nor could the March 4th board meeting have supplied an opportunity to 

be heard “in a meaningful manner,” given that the substantive standards for 

termination and non-renewal are different under Mississippi law. A teacher 

can only be terminated “[f]or incompetence, neglect of duty, immoral conduct, 

intemperance, brutal treatment of a pupil or other good cause.” Miss. Code 

§ 37-9-59. A non-renewal, by contrast, merely must not be “arbitrary.” 

McDonald v. Mims, 577 F.2d 951, 952 (5th Cir. 1978); see Miss. Code § 37-9-

105 (requiring that an employee receive notice “stating the reasons for the 

proposed nonreemployment”). This distinction belies the majority opinion’s 

pronouncement that “Dearman had a full opportunity to address the charges 

against her at the March 4th Board meeting” and therefore that “a second 

hearing would have been redundant in every sense.” I respectfully dissent. 

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