UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

FRANKLIN COUNTY MUNICIPAL 

COLUMBUS OHIO, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-358 

 Judge George C. Smith 

v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

 

DONALD L. PARRISH, 

Defendant. 

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 On February 2, 2018, Defendant, Donald Parrish, was charged in the Franklin County 

Municipal Court with driving without an operator’s license and changing lanes without safety, 

violations of the Columbus, Ohio Traffic Code. See City of Columbus v. Donald L. Parrish, 

Franklin M.C. No. 2018 TR D 108463 (Feb. 2, 2018). Defendant removed the action to this Court 

on April 19, 2018. This matter is now before the Court for consideration of Defendant’s Motion 

for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, which is GRANTED. (ECF No. 1.) Accordingly, it is 

ORDERED that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had 

been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

 This matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Defendant’s Notice of Removal 

(ECF No. 1-1) under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons 

that follow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court REMAND this action to the 

Franklin County Municipal Court.
I. 

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to 

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from filing 

frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 

324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1, which provides in 

pertinent part as follows: 

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been paid, 

the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- 

 * * * 

 (B) the action or appeal-- 

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

 When the Notice of Removal provides no basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court may 

dismiss an action as frivolous and for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under both 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3). See Williams v. Cincy Urban Apts., No. 1:10-cv-153, 

2010 WL 883846, at *2 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 9, 2010) (citing Carlock v. Williams, 182 F.3d 916, 

1999 WL 454880, at *2 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (table)). In Defendant’s Notice of Removal, he 

asserts that this Court has jurisdiction over this action under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 

 

1

Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 
1836 A.D., as he is an “Aboriginal Indigenous Moorish-American.” (ECF No. 1-1, at 3.) The 

Treaty of Peace and Friendship on which Defendant relies governs disputes between Moroccan 

citizens and United State Citizens. See Bey v. Ohio, No. 1:11 CV 1306, 2011 WL 4944396, at *3 

(N.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2011). Although Defendant alleges he is of Moroccan descent, he also 

alleges that he was born in the United States. Defendant does not allege he is a Moroccan citizen. 

Therefore, this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction under the Treaty. Moreover, 

Defendant has not pled diversity jurisdiction, and the original traffic ticket filed by the Columbus 

Police Department does not raise a federal question. (See Suppl. Docs., ECF No. 3.) Therefore, 

the undersigned finds that this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. 

II. 

For the reasons discussed above, the undersigned concludes that this Court lacks 

subject-matter jurisdiction over this action. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court 

REMAND this action to the Franklin County Municipal Court. 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may 

recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 
The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

 /s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE