alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### John HIXON *v.*Hubert DEERING et al

5-5406

460 S. W. 2d 748

Opinion delivered December 21, 1970

*Charles E. Tilmon, Jr.,*for appellant.

*Johnson & Johnson,*for appellees.

*702George Rose Smith, Justice.

This is an action in replevin brought by the appellee Deering to repossess a tractor and related equipment which he had sold to the appellant Hixon. Upon filing the suit Deering obtained possession of the property by making bond in accordance with the statute, that “he shall perform the judgment of the court herein by returning the property, if a return thereof shall be adjudged, and by paying such sums of money as may be adjudged therein against him in this action, not exceeding double the value of the property.” See Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2105 (Repl. 1962). The other two appellees, Cowling and Harris, were sureties on the bond.

By counterclaim Hixon asserted a breach of warranty, for which he sought damages. Upon trial without a jury the circuit court upheld Deering’s title and right to possession of the property, but the court also found a breach of warranty and awarded Hixon net damages of $2,030.02. A writ of execution against Deer-ing having been returned unsatisfied, Hixon asked for a summary judgment against the sureties on the bond. This appeal is from a judgment denying that request.

The court was right. Replevin is a special statutory proceeding in which judgment for the defendant “may be for the return of the property, or its value, in case a return cannot be had, and damages for the taking and withholding of the property.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 34-2116. In this connection we said in a recent case:

> “It must be remembered that an action in replevin is a special proceeding for the possession of property only. . . . Our cases point out that damages for detention are but an incident to the right of return and that there cannot be a judgment for damages where there can be none for return. . . . Furthermore, the cases point out that the sureties on a replevin bond can discharge their liability by returning the property to the person who was dispossessed.” *General Electric Credit Corp.*v. *Bankers Commercial Corp.,*249 Ark. 107, 458 S. W. 2d 143 (1970).

*703In a replevin action the sureties for the plaintiff sign the bond at the outset of the case, before the defendant’s possible defenses or counterclaims have yet been disclosed. Under the statute the sureties guarantee performance of the judgment *in replevin,*which, as we have said, may be for the property or its value, plus damages for the taking and withholding of the property. That is the limit of their liability. Consequently, despite the broad reference in the statute and in the bond to “such sums of money as may be adjudged against” the plaintiff, it is uniformly and properly held that the sureties’ liability does not extend to counterclaims involving matters not falling within the scope of the statute. *Whisenhunt*v. *Sandel,*177 S. C. 207, 181 S. E. 61, 100 A. L. R. 376 (1935); *Apgar*v. *Great American Ind. Co.,*171 Wash. 494, 18 P. 2d 46, 87 A. L. R. 291 (1933); *Wisconsin Live Stock Assn.*v. *Bowerman,*202 Wis. 618, 233 N. W. 639 (1930).

Affirmed.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

SHONDA WILLIAMSON,

Plaintiff,

Vv. . Case No. 3:18-CV-35
INTERNATIONAL QUALITY JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
HEALTHCARE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

ORDER DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR FAILURE TO
PROSECUTE; JUDGMENT TO ENTER IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF; TERMINATION ENTRY

On December 10, 2018, the Court ordered Plaintiff to show cause why this
FLSA collective action should not be dismissed without prejudice for failure to
prosecute. Doc. #19. In response, Plaintiff's counsel has represented to the
Court, via an email message dated December 19, 2018, that Plaintiff does not
object to the dismissal of this action without prejudice, given Defendant’s current
situation.

Accordingly, the above-captioned case is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE
for want of prosecution.

Judgment shall be entered in favor of Defendant and against Plaintiff.


The captioned case is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records
of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western

Division, at Dayton.

J
Date: December 26, 2018 XK a. f—-

WALTER H. RICE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Case: 2:18-md-02846-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 160 Filed: 05/10/19 Page: 1 of 2  PAGEID #: 2389

Case: 2:18-md-02846-EAS-KAJ Doc #: 160 Filed: 05/10/19 Page: 2 of 2  PAGEID #: 2390
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION
)
JONATHAN TERRY, )
Plaintiff, ) Civil Action No.: 2:18-cv-0524
)
v. )
) Judge Sargus
NANCY A. BERRYHILL, )
Acting Commissioner of Social Security, ) Magistrate Judge Vascura
Defendant. )
)

ORDER

This cause coming before the Court on the motion and stipulation of the parties, due
notice having been given, and the Court being fully advised:

The Court grants the parties’ Joint Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees Pursuant to
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, and awards Plaintiff $2,831.00 (two
thousand eight hundred thirty-one dollars) in attorney fees, costs, and expenses. The award of
attorney fees, costs, and expenses will fully satisfy and settle any and all of Plaintiff's claims
under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 that may be payable in this case.

Any fees paid belong to Plaintiff and can be offset to satisfy any pre-existing debt that
Plaintiff owes the United States, pursuant to the decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586, 130
S.Ct. 2521 (2010). After the Court enters this award, if counsel for the parties can verify that
Plaintiff owes no pre-existing debt subject to offset, the Defendant agrees to direct that the award
be made payable to Plaintiff's attorney pursuant to an EAJA assignment duly signed by Plaintiff.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Ye W4- yO!"

DATE EDMUND)A. SARGUS, JR.
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Breakwater Chicago LLC 

1871: Breakwater Chicago, 222 W Merchandise Mart Plaza, Suite 1212, Chicago, IL 60654

May 27, 2015

Secretary of State John Kerry

ATTN: DOS-2015-0016

U.S. Department of State

2201 C Street, NW

Washington, DC 20520

Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx

ATTN: DOT-OST-2015-0082

U.S. Department of Transportation

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE

Washington, DC 20590

Secretary of Commerce Penny S. Pritzker

ATTN: DOC-2015-0001

U.S. Department of Commerce

1401 Constitution Avenue, NW

Washington, DC 20230

Dear Secretaries Kerry, Foxx, and Pritzker:

Open Skies agreements that promote international air travel are essential to economic 

success for U.S. and global companies investing in India. My company supports measures that 

unlock market access and enhance trade and investment between the U.S. and India. Already, 

the two countries enjoy over $100 billion in annual trade and U.S. exports to India support 

170,000 American jobs. With growing opportunities that run the gauntlet from aerospace, 

information technology, and financial services to energy, media, and retail, India represents 

an increasingly important market, one that deserves stellar, competitive air service.

Closing off U.S.-to-India routes currently operated by three key Gulf States airlines (ME3)

would be obstructive. As the major U.S. airlines (US3) have relied on alliance partners to 

reach Indian destinations, the ME3 have developed one-stop routes to cities across the 

country. They offer key alternatives to arriving in Mumbai and Delhi, supplying greater 

convenience to travelers to Ahmedabad, Kochi, Chennai, and numerous other areas. Business 

and first class accommodations on these airlines are notably excellent with features 

unmatched by the US3.

As I can attest to, competing internationally is always fraught with imbalances in labor costs, 

regulation, capitalization, etc., which even the best free trade agreements cannot 

completely eliminate. In the interest of the U.S. leading business development across India, 

the ME3 should be allowed to operate under existing Open Skies agreements. No government 

finger on the scales is required. To the contrary, any efforts by your agencies to restrict air 
 Breakwater Chicago LLC 

1871: Breakwater Chicago, 222 W Merchandise Mart Plaza, Suite 1212, Chicago, IL 60654

travel would be detrimental to what is now a functioning, competitive U.S.-to-India air travel 

market.

I appreciate the opportunity to supply this information and looks forward to continued crossborder cooperation that benefits both countries.

Sincerely,

Ashvin Lad

Vice President and Co-Founder

Breakwater Chicago
Case: 1:18-mj-00403-KLL Doc #: 6 Filed: 08/06/19 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 22
#### Ritholz *v.*Dodge, Chancellor.

4-7993

196 S. W. 2d 479

Opinion delivered September 30, 1946.

*E. Chas. Eichenbaum, Glenn F. Wdither*and *Charles Mehaffy,*for petitioners.

*Carl Langston,*for respondent.

*Guy E. Williams,*Attorney General, for intervenor.

Petition for Prohibition to Pulaski Chancery Court; *Frank II. Doclge,*Chancellor; writ denied.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA No. DA 22 - 0528 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MICHAEL ANTHONY PARKER,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and good cause appearing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension of time to and including March 29, 2023 , within which to prepare, file, and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

February 21 2023

02/21/2023

Case Number: DA 22-0528
### NUMBER 13

- 1 3

- 00 2 04

- CR



## COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI

- EDINBURG

NAN CANION

, A ppellant

,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

, A ppellee

.

On appeal from the 2 4 th District Court

of Calhoun County, Texas.



## ORDER TO FILE APPELLATE BRIEF

Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Rodriguez and Garza

Order Per Curiam

This cause is before the Court on appellant's second unopposed motion for

extension of time to file the brief. Appellant ’ s brief was originally due to be filed on July

15, 2013 , and this Court has previously granted appellant an extension for the filing of

appellant ’ s brief in this cause. Appellant has now filed a second motion requesting2 additional time to file the appellate brief in this cause.

The Court, having fully examined and considered appellant's second motion for

extension of time to file the brief and the extension previously granted in this cause, is of

the opi nion that, in the interest of justice, appellant's second motion for extension of time

to file the brief should be granted with order. The Court, however, looks with disfavor

upon the delay caused by counsel's failure to have filed a brief in this matter.

Appellant's second motion for extension of time to file the brief is hereby

GRANTED, and the Honorable Leslie A. Werner , counsel for appellant, is hereby

ORDERED to file the appellate brief with this Court on or before October 15, 2013

.

Further motions for extension of time will not be favorably entertained by the Court.

The Clerk of this Court is ORDERED to serve a copy of this order on the Hon orable

Leslie A. Werner by certified mail, return receipt requested.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish.

T E X

. R. A PP

. P. 47.2(b).

D elivered and filed the

2 nd day of October , 20 1 3

.
EXHIBIT 23.1



CONSENT OF INDEPENDENT
REGISTERED PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRM



To the Board of Directors and
Stockholders of Lakeland Industries, Inc. and Subsidiaries



We hereby consent to the incorporation
by reference of our report dated April 21, 2016 included in this Amendment No. 2 on Form 10-K/A to the Annual Report on Form 10-K
for the fiscal year ended January 31, 2016, on the consolidated financial statements of Lakeland Industries, Inc., and Subsidiaries
as of January 31, 2016 and for the two years then ended into the Company’s previously filed Registration Statements on Form
S-8 (No. 333-144870, No. 333-176733, No. 333-183882 and No. 333-205836) and Form S-3 (333-200422).





|/s/ Mazars USA LLP (formerly WeiserMazars LLP) | 
|---------------------------------------------- | 
|Mazars USA LLP (formerly WeiserMazars LLP)     | 
|New York, New York                             | 
|March 10, 2017                                 |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

WESTERN DISTRICT

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,

Respondent

v.

AKIL JOHNSON,

Petitioner

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

No. 245 WAL 2017

Petition for Allowance of Appeal from 

the Order of the Superior Court

ORDER

PER CURIAM

AND NOW, this 3rd day of January, 2018, the Petition for Allowance of Appeal is 

DENIED.
EXHIBIT 32.2

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906
OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Universal Health Realty Income Trust (the Trust) on Form 10-K
for the year ended December 31, 2006, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Charles F. Boyle, Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Trust, hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to the best of my knowledge:

(i) the Report fully complies
with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(ii) the information contained in the Report fairly
presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Trust at the end of, and for the period covered by the Report.



/s/ Charles F. BoyleVice President and Chief Financial OfficerMarch 14, 2007


A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Trust and
will be retained and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
Exhibit 31.2

CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

I, Kenneth Y. Tanji, certify that:

1. I have reviewed this Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Prudential Annuities Life Assurance Corporation;

2. Based on my knowledge, this Quarterly Report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3. Based on my
knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periods
presented in this report;

4. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining
disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and we have:

a) Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant is made known to us by others within
such entity, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b) Evaluated the effectiveness of the
registrants disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrants internal control over financial reporting that occurred
during the registrants most recent fiscal quarter (the registrants fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrants internal control
over financial reporting; and

5. The registrants other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent
evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrants auditors and the audit committee of the registrants board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a) All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are
reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrants ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the registrants internal control over financial reporting.

Date: August 14, 2009



/s/ Kenneth Y. TanjiKenneth Y. TanjiExecutive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE LUIS GRIJALVA-FLORES,

 Petitioner,

 v.

ERIC H. HOLDER, Jr., Attorney General,

 Respondent.

No. 12-72885

Agency No. A089-859-524

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted January 21, 2015** 

Before: CANBY, GOULD, and N.R. SMITH, Circuit Judges.

Jose Luis Grijalva-Flores, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ order dismissing his appeal from an

immigration judge’s decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). We have

FILED

JAN 28 2015

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review for substantial evidence the

agency’s factual findings. Zehatye v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1182, 1184-85 (9th Cir.

2006). We deny the petition for review.

Grijalva-Flores does not raise any challenge to the agency’s dispositive

finding that he withdrew his asylum application, or make any arguments regarding

CAT relief. See Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259-60 (9th Cir. 1996)

(issues not specifically raised and argued in a party’s opening brief are waived). 

Thus, we deny the petition as to Grijalva-Flores’s asylum and CAT claims.

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Grijalva-Flores’s

experience did not rise to the level of persecution. See Nahrvani v. Gonzales, 399

F.3d 1148, 1153-54 (9th Cir. 2005) (record did not compel finding of past

persecution). Further, contrary to Grijalva-Flores’s contention, the agency did not

improperly analyze his past persecution claim. Substantial evidence also supports

the agency’s finding that Grijalva-Flores did not establish it is more likely than not

that he will be persecuted, given his relocation without incident within El Salvador,

see Ochave v. INS, 254 F.3d 859, 867-68 (9th Cir. 2001), and the absence of any

evidence of continuing interest in him, see Prasad v. INS, 47 F.3d 336, 339-40 (9th

Cir. 1995). In light of our conclusions, we do not reach Grijalva-Flores’s social

group contentions. Thus, his claim for withholding of removal fails.

2 12-72885
This dismissal is without prejudice to petitioner’s seeking prosecutorial

discretion or deferred action from the Department of Homeland Security. See

Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (AADC), 525 U.S. 471,

483-85 (1999) (stating that prosecutorial discretion by the agency can be granted at

any stage, including after the conclusion of judicial review).

PETITION FOR REVIEW DENIED.

3 12-72885
<PAGE>   1
                                   EXHIBIT 21

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

       New Plan Realty Trust, a Massachusetts business trust
       New Plan Securities Corp., a New York corporation
       New Plan Realty of Alabama, Inc., an Alabama corporation
       Avion Service Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation
       New Plan Realty of Kingsport, Inc., a Tennessee corporation
       New Plan Factory Malls, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Tara, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Fashion Corners, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan Disbursing Corp., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan Realty of Louisiana, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Tennessee, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan Realty of Louisiana, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
       New Plan of Waterford Place, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
       New Plan of Tennessee, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
       New Plan of New Garden, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of New Jersey, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Tinton Falls, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Eastgreen, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Northgate, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       New Plan of Polo Run, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       NC Properties #1, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       NC Properties #2, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       Excel Realty Trust -- NC, a North Carolina partnership
       TX Properties #1, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       TX Properties #2, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       Excel Realty Trust -- TX, L.P., a Texas limited partnership
       Excel Realty -- PA, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       Excel Realty -- NE, Inc., a Nebraska corporation
       Excel Realty Trust-- ST, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       Excel Westminster Marketplace, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       Excel Realty Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
       E.H. Properties, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
       New Plan DRP Trust, a Maryland business trust
       New Plan Hampton Village, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
       NPHV, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       ERPF, Inc., a Delaware corporation
       ERP Financing, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company
       New Plan Financing I, Inc. a Delaware corporation
       NP of Tennessee, L.P, a Delaware limited partnership
       NPTN, Inc., a Delaware corporation
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA F CASE NO. 3:18CR44
v. i JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
TYLER ULM : ORDER TO UNSEAL INDICTMENT

(R.13) FORWARD

Upon motion of the United States, and for the reason that the above captioned defendant
is in custody, the Indictment (R.13) forward in the above captioned case is hereby ordered

unsealed.

DATE: 7-215" [ Kh ’
JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
UNITED TATES DISTRICT COURT
la
Docket Number: FAA-2015-2967