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### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

KENNETH POLLACK, LYNN POLLACK, SUSAN ALDRICH, MARCUS WARREN, LISE WARREN, CHARLES SCHILLING, LYNDA SCHILLING, DOUGLAS TAYLOR, DEBORAH TAYLOR, DAVE DETTLING and EVIE DETTLING,

Plaintiffs/Counter-DefendantsAppellants, UNPUBLISHED May 30, 2017

v No. 330540; 331241
Lenawee Circuit Court JEFFREY B. FRASER, DANIELLE FRASER, SUSAN BROWN and RUSSELL BROWN, LC No. 14-005069-CZ

Defendants/Counter-PlaintiffsAppellees.

Before: R IORDAN , P.J., and R ONAYNE K RAUSE and S WARTZLE , JJ.

P ER C URIAM

.

In Docket No. 330540 , plaintiffs appeal as of ri ght the September 15, 2015 order granting defendants’ motion for sanctions and attorney fees and dismissing all counterclaims. In
Docket No. 331241 , plaintiffs appeal, by leave granted, 1 challenging the trial court’s earlier orders granting defendants’ motio n for summary disposition, dis missing plaintiffs’ complaint, and denying plaintiffs’ motion to a mend their complaint. We af firm.

I. BACKGROUND

The plaintiffs in this action are the current owners of severa l “back lots” near Wamplers Lake in Lenawee County. Plaintiffs’ properties do not contain any lake frontage; rather,

1 Pollack v Fraser , unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 13, 2016 (Docket No. 331241).-2- plaintiffs claim a right to access Wamplers Lake through a ten- foot-wide strip of land upon which has been erected, at least at times, a dock extending int o the lake. The record owners of the ten-foot strip are William and Elizabeth Gentner and Charle s and Mary Lapham, premised on a 1926 deed. It appears uncontested that, sometime before 1980 , all four of the record owners died without conveying away any in terest they had in the ten-fo ot strip. Their inte rest in the strip is therefore presumed to pass to their respective heirs, none o f whom have been located or are parties to the litigation at issue. Defendants—Jeffrey and Dan ielle Fraser and Susan and Russel Brown—are the owners of parcels directly neighboring both sides of that ten-foot -wide strip.

Sometime before 1980, the then-owners of the back lots erected a dock from or near the ten foot strip. The then-owners of defendants’ properties file d suit to enjoin the then-owners of the back lots from encroaching on their property rights via thi s dock and using this dock in any way, including tying up rafts or pontoons. In 1980, the trial court issued the following ruling:

[The back lot owners] have used the strip as an access to Wamp lers Lake for many years. A dock of varying size and shape has been main tained at the end of the strip for many years. Boats have been tied to the dock for many years. Lately pontoon rafts have been moored there also. [The back-lo t owners] have built, maintained and used the dock for boating, fishing, swimm ing, wading, and normal lake recreation usage.

People on the other dead end st reets of this subdivision have similar or larger strips of land as access to the lake extending from thei r streets to the lake.

Our first problem is the ownership of the 10 foot strip. [The neighboring property owners] do not own it. [ The back-lot owners] do not o wn it. . . .

Joseph Scalabrino testified that Gentners and Lapham own the s trip. . . . [W]e conclude Lapham and Gentners are still the record title ho lders. . . .

Next, we go to the usage of the strip by [the back-lot owners] and by their predecessors. It was apparent the lot owners had been told by Gentner they could use the strip to get to the lake. While there was no testimony to that effect, it is more than reasonably possible th at this was one of the factors which made the lots on Oak Street salable. With the number of lakes, summer cottag e subdivisions, right of ways, easements and law suits involving them that we’v e seen down through over a quarter of a century of listening to trials in t his county, we know
“back” lots aren’t of much value without access. In other word s, the owner of the strip did not grant an easement, right of way, or written inter est in the strip. They did grant a type of license and estoppel probabl y would prohibi t the grantors, their heirs, and assigns from revoking th at license should there be a legal contest over
it.

There was no permission from [the neighboring property owners] for the [back-lot owners] to use the st rip, place the dock or moor boat s to any dock.-3- [The back-lot owners] did not feel they had a right to willy n illy place boats, rafts, or docks out in the water in front of [their neig hbors’] shore lines. They did, and do feel they can c ontinue the practice of having a pier and tying
boats and rafts to it.

Since the [back-lot owners] are not record title owners, they have no riparian rights as s uch title owners.

Gentner and Lapham were riparian or litterol [sic] owners. Th ey gave permission to the [back-lot owners] to exercise the riparian ri ghts the Gentners and Laphams had. This they could do.

[The neighboring property owners] own out to the middle of the lake. Riparian owners have no right of permanent anchorage on the sub merged land of
others.

The dock, if reasonable, is permissible as it is on the extens ion of the strip. The tying of boat to the dock, if reasonable, is permissible. The mooring of pontoon rafts is another story.

[The back-lot owners] have placed metal poles about 12 feet fr om the dock to tie the lake side of the rafts to. These poles must be in the bottom of the lake in submerged land owned by [the neighboring property owner s]. [The neighboring property owners] gran ted no right to permanent anch orage on their submerged land. Is this permanent anchorage? Yes. While the poles probably are there only during the boating season, if continued for enou gh boating seasons, it would ripen into an easement by adverse use.

Has there been adverse use[] for 15 years? We carefully searc hed the testimony. Boats of all sizes have been tied to the dock for m any years. For a time in the 60’s, small docks were installed at an angle to the main dock and boats, and boat hoists were kept in connection with them. Howe ver, there has been no continuous adverse use[] of permanent anchorage with po sts driven into the [neighboring property owner’s] submerged land for 15 consec utive years. Therefore, [the back-lot owners] have no legal right to maintai n such posts
outside of the extensi on of the strip.

Next we get to the touchy question of the mooring of boats and rafts to the dock. If there is no encroachment on the submerged land of the [neighboring property owners], [the back-lot owners] have a right to tie boa ts and rafts to their dock as possessors of litterol [sic] or riparian rights. Even i f they had no such riparian rights, they would have acquired such rights by advers e use[]. The riparian rights, of course, can be exercised only if they are r easonably used so as not to unreasonably interfe re with others rights.

For the purposes of this law suit, we find that the dock lengt h and the tying of boats and rafts to it, at the far end had been done in a rea sonable exercise of-4- riparian rights. We would theref ore enjoin only the use of anc horage that encroaches directly on and into the [neighboring property owner ’s] submerged
land.

Sometimes we have had to set limits on the number of boats and where they might be placed on the docks. We feel it is unnecessary h ere at this time under the facts of our case. There simply was no evidence of p resent unusually crowded use of the dock. At the most, three or four boats or r afts had been tied to the far end, and these did not cr eate an unreasonable interfere nce with others rights.

The Irish Hills may be the best of all worlds for summer lake fun and recreation—but—with power boats , boat hoists, pontoon rafts and thousands of people all trying to use the surface of the waters for their aq uatic equipment, there simply is not enough room for ever yone without a little give on everyone’s part.

A judgment in accordance to this opinion may be entered. Neit her party having succeeded in full, no costs will be taxed. [Internal ci tations omitted.]

The trial court then entered an order permanently enjoining th e back-lot owners from “the use of any anchorage that encroaches directly on and into the l ands” of the neighboring property

owners.

The parties in the current lawsuit dispute what rights, if any , were granted to the back-lot owners by way of the 1980 ruling. It appears to this Court tha t plaintiffs—the now-owners of the back lots—intended to use the access provided by the ten-foot s trip more extensively than the prior owners via a dock that would allow for the mooring of mor e watercraft. Defendants apparently attempted to thwart this use by erecting two docks o f their own. These docks were
erected on either side of the ten -foot strip and p revent plaint iffs from mooring certain watercraft. Defendants’ docks do appear to sit w ithin defendants’ respectiv e property lines.

As initially considered, plaintiffs’ complaint sought relief u nder the doctrines of trespass and private nuisance. The trial court granted defendants’ moti on for summary disposition on both claims, finding that the 1980 ruling granted plaintiffs a license to use the land. The trial court concluded that plaintiffs were attempting to relitigate t he same issue conclusively determined by the 1980 trial court and dismissed the complaint in its entirety under MCR 2.116(C)(8) and (10). Plaintiffs thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration and to amend their complaint to include various new claims, including claims of ad verse possession and prescriptive
easement. The trial court denie d this motion and plaintiffs fi led the appeals now before us.

II. ANALYSIS

Plaintiffs initially contend that the trial court erred in dis missing their original complaint.
Plaintiffs assert the trial cour t misunderstood or failed to co mprehend the prior 1980 ruling-5- regarding the property currently in dispute and their entitleme nt to riparian rights, 2 which they contend would permit the maintenance of a dock and the mooring of watercraft.

This Court reviews the decision of a trial court on a motion f or summary disposition de

novo. Grosse Pointe Law Firm, PC v J aguar Land Rover North America, LLC , 317 Mich App 395, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016) (Docket No. 326312); slip op at 3 . Defendants moved for summary disposition under both 2.116(C)(8) and (C)(10). MCR 2. 116(C)(8) “tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint,” Wells Fargo Bank, NA v SBC IV REO, LLC , ___ Mich App ___, ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2016) (Docket No. 328186); slip op at 8, whi le (C)(10) considers whether there remains a genuine issue of m aterial fact for trial. In o ther words, a (C)(10) motion “tests the factual support for a party’s claim.” Id

.
Plaintiffs’ original complaint was comprised solely of claims of trespass and private nuisance, both of which fail, a s a matter of law. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly granted summary dis position to defenda nts on both clai ms.

A Mere License Cannot Sustain a Private Nuisance Claim. “A private nuisance is a nontrespassory invasion of another’s interest in the private us e and enjoyment of land.” Adkins v
Thomas Solvent Co , 440 Mich 293, 302; 487 NW2d 715 (1992). In order to maintainan action for private nuisance, a plai ntiff must prove that:

(a) [the plaintiff] has property rights and privileges in respe ct to the use or enjoyment interfered with, (b) the invasion results in signific ant harm, (c) the
actor’s conduct is the l egal cause of the invasion, and (d) the invasion is either (i) intentional and unreasonable, or (ii) unintentional and otherwi se actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless, or ultra hazardous conduct. [ Id . at 304.]

Specifically, “the gist of a private nuisance action is an inte rference with the occupation or use of
land or an interference with s ervitudes relating to land.” Id . at 303. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim for private nuisance fails if they cannot prove that they hold an affected prop erty interest.

Plaintiffs argue that they have a property interest byway of t he 1980 trial court’s purported recognition of their rip arian rights in Wambler Lake. The 1980 trial court, however, did not recognize that the back-lot owners held riparian rights of their own. Indeed, the 1980 trial court ruled that “[s]ince the [back-lot owners] are not r ecord title owners, they have no riparian rights as such title owners.” Rather, the 1980 trial court ruled that the Gentners and

2 We recognize that “[s]trictly speaking, land which includes or abuts a river is defined as riparian, while land which includes or abuts a lake is defined as littoral.” Thies v Howland , 424 Mich 282, 288 n 2; 380 NW2d 463 (1985). Nonetheless, “the term ‘riparian’ is often used to describe both types of land, and will be used in such a manner in this opinion.” 2000 Baum Family Trust v Babel , 488 Mich 136, 138 n 1; 793 NW2d 633 (2010) (internal quotatio n marks and citation omitted).-6- Laphams held riparian rights, and that those parties granted th e back-lot owners a “type of
license” to use the r ights they held.

Indeed, such a ruling comports with our long-held precedent re garding the divisibility of riparian rights from the accompanying land. Our Supreme Court has stated that “riparian rights are not alienable, severable, divisible or assignable apart fro m the land which includes therein or is bounded by a natural water course.” Thompson v Enz , 379 Mich 667, 686; 154 NW2d 473 (1967). Yet, “[w]hile riparian rights may not be conveyed or r eserved—nor do they exist by virtue of being bounded by an artif icial water course—easements , licenses and the like for a right of way for access to a watercourse do exist and ofttimes are gr anted to nonriparian owners.” Id

. Accordingly, because plaintiffs’ predecessors-in-interest did n ot premise their position in the 1980 litigation on any right of ownership to the 10-foot-strip, but rather maintained that the Gentners and Laphams, or their heirs, owned the strip, the 1980 trial court could not have concluded that plaintiffs’ pred ecessors-in-interest enjoyed any riparian rights.

Thus, because they had no ownership interest in the ten-foot s trip, the most the back-lot owners could have held in 1980 was a right of way to access the water via a license or an easement. And, whether the 1980 trial court ruled that plainti ffs’ predecessors-in-interest held a license or an easement is dispositive of plaintiffs’ claim for private nuisance. More specifically, where a plaintiff holds only a license to enjoy another’s land for a limited purpose, the plaintiff
cannot maintain an action for a private nuisance. Licenses are deemed to be “terminable at will by the grantor,” and “because of their revocability, they do no t create an interest in land.”
Kitchen v Kitchen , 465 Mich 654, 659; 641 NW2d 245 (2002). Rather, a license is a mere

“

permission to do some act or series of acts on the land of the licensor without having any permanent interest in it.” Id . at 658 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks and citatio n omitted). Accordingly, because a license creates no interest in land, the license holder cannot maintain an action for a private nuisance. See 2 Restatement T orts, 2d, § 821E, p 103 (“The liability for private nuisance ex ists only for the protection o f persons having property rights and privileges, that is, legally protected interests , in respect to the particular use or enjoyment that has been affected”).

For its part, an easement constitutes “a right to use the land burdened by the easement rather than a right to occupy and possess [the land] as does an estate owner.” Mich Dep’t of Nat’l Resources v Carmody-Lahti Real Estate, Inc , 472 Mich 359, 378; 699 NW2d 272 (2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Although an easement, similar to a license, is “generally confined to a specific purpose,” Id. at 378-379, the defining characteristic of an
easement is that it is a right to use the land, rather than a permission to use the land. For that reason, an easement is defined as “a limited property interest. ” Id . at 378. Accordingly, as an interest holder in the property, the holder of an easement may maintain an action for a private nuisance. See 2 Restatement Torts, 2d, § 821E, p 102-103 (stat ing that an easement owner has a legally protected interest in th e use and enjoyment of the land sufficient to maintain an action for private nuisance).

The plain language of the 1980 trial court’s ruling, recognizi ng a “type of license,” strongly supports a finding that the trial court recognized tha t the back-lot owners held a true license rather than an easement. Additionally, as a property i nterest, an easement must be evidenced by a writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of fra uds. Kitchen , 465 Mich at 661.-7- Because a license is a mere permission, “the statute of frauds is inapplicable.” Id . at 659. As did
the trial court in the instant case, the 1980 trial court found no evidence of any writing sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. This finding is supported by the absence of the 10-foot strip in the plat for plaintiffs’ subdivi sion and the lack of any other writ ing presented to this Court on appeal. Accordingly, we conclude that the 1980 trial court properly rec ognized, as did the trial court in this case, that the back-lot owners held only a license to use the 10-foot strip to access the lake. 3 Because plaintiffs held only a license to access the lake, plai ntiffs therefore could not maintain an action for private nuisance.

A Mere License Also Cannot Support a Trespass Claim. Similarly, that plaintiffs’ hold only a license to use the ten-foot strip prevents them from mai ntaining an action for trespass. “A trespass is an unauthorized invasion upon the private property of another.” American Transmission, Inc v Channel 7 of Detroit, Inc , 239 Mich App 695, 705; 609 NW2d 607 (2000). Therefore, to the extent that pl aintiffs’ have failed to identi fy an unauthorized invasion onto their property, plaintiffs’ are unable to maintain an action for tres pass. Further, it appears to this Court that plaintiffs’ allegations of trespass are largely prem ised on their assertion that defendants’ docks on defendants’ own property, in the manner er ected, precluded plaintiffs from the use of the dock associated with the 10-foot strip to moor b oats or to access the lake because of the resulting space restriction. We note that, even had pla intiffs’ proven ownership of the tenfoot strip, these allegations are insufficient to maintain an a ction for trespass as they do not
indicate an “unauthorized invasi on” onto “private property.” Id.

For these reasons, both of plaintiffs’ initial claims fail as a matter of law. Essentially, to have any viable claim for relief, the claims would have to have been brought by the actual owners of the ten-foot strip. Accordingly, we conclude that th e trial court properly dismissed plaintiffs’ original complaint.

3 Defendants contend that the 1980 ruling does not establish pla intiffs’ right of way, but rather distinguish between the trial c ourt’s written findings and its written judgment, the latter of which failed to indicate that plaintiffs had any entitlement to a doc k or mooring of boats. In support of their position, defendants refere nce the proscription that a tr ial court “speaks [only] through its written orders and judgments,” but fail to include or recognize the remainder of the statement, which further explains that a trial court does not speak “throu gh its oral pronouncements.” In re Contempt of Henry , 282 Mich App 656, 678; 765 NW2d 44 (2009). Hence, there are two problems with defendants’ position with regard to the contentio n that the written findings do not rise to the status of a written order of judgment. First, the trial court’s factual findings were written and were not an “oral pr onouncement.” Second, the tria l court’s written findings indicate that “[a] judgment in accordance to this option may be entered, ” confirming the trial court’s findings are a part of or the basis for the judgment that will ensue. The judgment further confirms this understanding in ref erencing not only the submiss ion of proofs, but recognizing
that it had “filed” its “written findings,” indicating a greate r formality and interrelationship
between the two documents t han intimated by defendants.-8- The Trial Court Did Not Err by Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Amend Their Complaint. Plaintiffs further argue that the trial court erred in denying their request to amend their complaint to add counts pertain ing to adverse possession and pr escriptive easement. Because plaintiffs did not seek to amend their complaint until they fil ed a motion for reconsideration, the issue is not properly preserved. Vushaj v Farm Bureau Gen Ins Co of Mich , 284 Mich App 513, 519; 773 NW2d 758 (2009). This Court reviews unpreserved issue s for plain error affecting substantial rights. King v Oakland Co Prosecutor , 303 Mich App 222, 239; 842 NW2d 403 (2013). “To avoid forfeiture under the plain-error rule, three requirements must be met: (1) an error must have occurred; (2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, and (3) the plain error affected substantial rights.” Rivette v Rose-Molina , 278 Mich App 327, 328- 329; 750 NW2d 603 (2008) (internal citation omitted).

As discussed in Kincaid v City of Flint , 311 Mich App 76, 94-95; 874 NW2d 193 (2015):

A party may amend a pleading once as a matter of course within 14 days after being served with a responsive pleading by an adverse par ty. . . . Except as provided . . ., a party may amend a pleading only by leave of t he court or by written consent of the adverse pa rty. Leave shall be freely gi ven when justice so requires. Because a court should freely grant leave to amend a complaint when justice so requires, a motion to amend should ordinarily be den ied only for particularized reasons. Those reasons include undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments pre viously allowed, undue prejudice, or futility. Further, . . . when the trial co urt summarily disposes of a case under subrules (C)(8), (C)(9), or (C)(10), the trial court shall give the parties an opportunity to amend their pleadings . . . unless th e evidence then before the court shows that amendment would not be justified. [Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.]

The trial court indicated several reasons for its denial of pl aintiffs’ request to amend their complaint. Primarily, the trial court noted that plaintiffs’ p roposed addition of entirely different claims and the inclusion of other parties were more akin to an entirely new pleading rather than an amendment of the current compl aint to conform to the proofs elicited in accordance with MCR 2.118(C)(1). 4 We agree.

An action for advers e possession or prescriptive easement is a n action against the original property owner or his or her heir s and is intended to determine the property rights to the parcel at issue. Accordingly, such an action focuses largely on the cond uct of the purported adverse possessor or prescriptive easement holder and the original owne r. In contrast, an action for trespass or private nuisance largely presumes the plaintiff’s p roperty rights and focuses, instead,

4 “When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they are treated as if they had been raised by the pleadings. In that case, amendment of the pleadings to conform to the evide nce and to raise those issues may be made on motion of a party at any time, even after judgment.” MCR 2.118(C)(1).-9- on the conduct of the defendant trespasser or nuisance creator. Therefore, at least in the context of the instant dispute, especially given that the heirs of the original property holders have presumably not been located and were not listed as defendants i n the initial complaint, these claims are more amenable to an entirely new action.

But, even more fundamentally, the trial court deemed that plai ntiffs’ proposed claims for adverse possession and prescriptive easement would be unavailin g or futile. Again, we agree.

“To establish adverse possession, the party claiming it must show clear and cogent proof of possession that is actual, visible, open, notorious, exclusi ve, continuous and uninterrupted for the statutory period of 15 year s, hostile and under cover of cl aim of right.” Beach v Lima Twp

, 489 Mich 99, 106; 802 NW2d 1 (2011) (internal quotation marks a nd citation omitted). In turn, a party claiming a proscriptive easement must show “use of anot her’s property that is open, notorious, adverse, and continuous for a period of fifteen year s.” Mulcahy v Verhines , 276 Mich App 693, 699; 742 NW2d 393 (2007) (intern al quotation marks and citation omitted).

With the filing of their motion to amend their complaint, plai ntiffs argued that transfer of title to their properties served to revoke the license, renderi ng any continuing use of the 10-foot strip to be adverse or hostile to meet the requisite statutory period, especially with the use of tacking for successive property owners. Kitchen , 465 Mich at 658-659 (“In general, a license is
revocable at will and is automa tically revoked upon transfer of title by either the licensor or licensee.”). Nonetheless, thr oughout this litigation and datin g back to the 1980 litigation, plaintiffs and their predecessors-in-interest asserted permissi ve use of the 10-foot land strip in accordance with the license recognized in that earlier litigati on, as well as that permission to use the property had never been revoked. Additionally, plaintiffs appear to have acted mainly in line with this asserted permission, ut ilizing the ten-foot strip onl y to access the lake and not for a use wholly inconsistent with a license (e.g., building a structure on the land). Moreover, in the motion to amend the complaint, plaintiffs continued to assert permissive use of the 10-foot land strip, undermining their alterna tive assertion that their claim is based on hostility and a claim of right. Therefore, by asserting, seemingly continuously, from a t least 1980, that their claim to access the lake was permissive, plaintiffs are unable to conten d that their use of the ten-foot strip was adverse, hostile, or under a claim of right. Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that plaintiffs’ adverse possessi on and prescriptive easement c laims would be futile.

Purportedly plaintiffs also sought to amend their complaint to include claims of estoppel and acquiescence. Such claims would also be unavailing. Acqui escence has been defined in case law as being established “when a preponderance of the evid ence establishes that the parties
treated a particular boundary line as a property line.” Mason v City of Menominee , 282 Mich App 525, 529-530; 766 NW2d 888 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). This case, however, has never suggest ed a concern or dispute pertain ing to a boundary line, obviating the applicability of the concept of acquiescence. Similarly, a claim of estoppel is also unavailing, as “Michigan law doe s not permit an oral license to ripen into a permanent interest in the use of land on the basis of estoppel alone.” Kitchen , 465 Mich at 663.

For these reasons, we conclude the trial court did not abuse i ts discretion by denying plaintiffs’ motion to am end their complaint.-10- The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Granting Sanctions. Finally, plaintiffs contest the trial court’s grant of sanctions to defendants unde r MCR 2.114, asserting their claims were brought in good faith and not for purposes of harassment a nd that they maintained a viable cause of action for adverse possession. Notably, plaintiffs on ly challenge the trial court’s determination regarding the proprie ty of an award of sanctions and not the amount awarded.

This Court reviews a trial cour t’s decision to award sanctions for an abuse of discretion, Edge v Edge , 299 Mich App 121, 127; 829 NW2d 276 (2012). “An abuse of dis cretion occurs
when the trial court chooses a n outcome falling outside the ran ge of principled outcomes.” Edry
v Adelman , 486 Mich 634, 639; 786 NW2d 567 (2010). The trial court’s fa ctual findings, including a determination of f rivolousness, are reviewed for cl ear error, Kitchen , 465 Mich at 661. “A decision is clearly erroneous where, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction tha t a mistake has been made.” Id. at
661-662.

The 1980 trial court ruling clea rly recognizes that plaintiffs hold only a license to use the ten-foot strip to access the lake. Seemingly continuously sinc e then, plaintiffs have asserted that they had permission to use the ten foot strip. This permission plainly prevented plaintiffs from maintaining the claims in their initial complaint and the main claims in their proposed amendment to that complaint. The remaining claims proposed in plaintiffs’ amended complaint are also clearly without factual or legal basis. Moreover, pla intiffs’ erection of a dock within 24
hours of the trial court’s verba l warning that any such action would be precluded by the trial court, necessitating defendants to seek a permanent injunction and incur additional costs and fees, is evidence of plai ntiffs’ bad faith.

Because the trial court sits in a better position than this Co urt to judge the conduct of the parties throughout the litigation, our ability to reverse the t rial court’s award of sanctions is properly limited to situations where the trial court has chosen an unprincipled outcome or where the record clearly belies the tr ial court’s factual findings. On the record before us, we are unable
to find either and must affirm t he trial court’s award of sanct ions.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle