UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4455

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JOSE DELORES VANEGAS, a/k/a Chivito,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District 

Judge. (1:12-cr-00255-LO-6)

Submitted: February 27, 2014 Decided: March 10, 2014

Before DUNCAN, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Lawrence H. Woodward, Jr., SHUTTLEWORTH, RULOFF, SWAIN, HADDAD & 

MORECOCK, PC, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Dana J. 

Boente, Acting United States Attorney, Richard D. Cooke, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Following a jury trial, Jose Delores Vanegas was 

convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(2012), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug 

trafficking offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012). The district 

court sentenced him to a total of 120 months’ imprisonment. 

Vanegas appeals, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to 

support the jury’s verdict on the firearm charge and that the 

district court erred in its instruction regarding the “in 

furtherance” element of the firearm offense.*

 We affirm. 

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a conviction, this court must determine whether, viewing 

the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, 

there is substantial evidence to support the conviction. United 

States v. Stewart, 256 F.3d 231, 249 (4th Cir. 2001). To 

sustain the § 924(c) conviction, the jury was required to 

conclude that Vanegas possessed a firearm in furtherance of a 

drug trafficking crime. This court has enumerated several 

factors that a jury might consider to determine whether the 

possession of the firearm “furthered, advanced, or helped 

forward a drug trafficking crime.” United States v. Lomax, 293 

 * Vanegas does not challenge his conspiracy conviction or 

the sentence imposed.
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F.3d 701, 704 (4th Cir. 2002). Those factors include “the type 

of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the 

firearm, the type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the 

status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the 

gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time 

and circumstances under which the gun is found.” Id. (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Considering these factors in conjunction with the 

evidence produced at Vanegas’ trial, we conclude that the 

evidence was sufficient to support his conviction. Notably, 

the firearm possessed was a handgun, which is “uniquely suited 

for drug transactions.” See United States v. Lipford, 203 F.3d 

259, 267 n.7 (4th Cir. 2000). The serial number on the firearm 

had been filed off, making possession of the weapon illegal, see

18 U.S.C. § 922(k) (2012); the firearm and two magazines, as 

well as extra ammunition, cocaine, digital scales, and baggies 

were discovered in a closet near the front door of Vanegas’ 

apartment.

Although there was no evidence presented that Vanegas 

carried the firearm during drug transactions or that he 

conducted any drug transactions in the apartment in which the 

gun was found, Vanegas did offer to trade the firearm to his 

supplier for drugs, an action that may satisfy the “in 

furtherance of” requirement of § 924(c). See United States v. 
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Robinson, 627 F.3d 941, 955 (4th Cir. 2010). We conclude that 

the evidence, as a whole, is sufficient for the jury to have 

found that Vanegas’ possession of the firearm “furthered, 

advanced, or helped forward” his drug trafficking offense. See

Lomax, 293 F.3d at 704.

Vanegas also argues that the district court erred in 

instructing the jury on the “in furtherance of” element of 

§ 924(c). This court reviews the content of the district 

court’s specific jury instructions for an abuse of discretion, 

United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 923 (4th Cir. 1997); see

United States v. Whitfield, 695 F.3d 288, 305 (4th Cir. 2012) 

(affording district court “considerable discretion in choosing 

the specific wording of its instructions”), cert. denied, 133 S. 

Ct. 1461 (2013), and will not reverse this decision if “the 

instructions, taken as a whole, adequately state the controlling 

law.” United States v. Ryan-Webster, 353 F.3d 353, 364 n.17 

(4th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The district court’s instruction to the jury on the 

“in furtherance of” requirement was as follows: 

a firearm is possessed “in furtherance 

of” a drug trafficking offense when the 

firearm possession furthered, advanced, or 

helped forward the drug trafficking offense. 

Mere possession of a firearm is not 

sufficient, but the government is not 

required to prove that the firearm was 

actively employed.
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A jury may find that a firearm 

furthered, advanced, or helped forward drug 

trafficking in a number of ways, such as by 

enabling a drug trafficker to collect during 

a drug deal, by reducing the chance that the 

drugs or drug profits would be stolen, by 

preventing drug transactions from going 

sour, or by defending the drug trafficker’s 

turf.

In deciding whether a firearm furthered

drug trafficking, the jury may consider 

factors such as the proximity of the firearm 

to drugs or drug profits, the accessibility 

of the firearm, whether the gun was loaded, 

the type of firearm, the type of drug 

activity being conducted, whether the weapon 

was stolen, whether the possession of the 

gun was legal, and the time and 

circumstances under which the gun was found.

(JA at 187). Vanegas contends that the last paragraph of this 

instruction is unnecessary and therefore erroneous. The factors 

that the jury was instructed that they may consider were 

enumerated in Lomax, 293 F.3d at 704-05 and applied in United 

States v. King, 628 F.3d 693, 701 (4th Cir. 2011). The district 

court’s instruction provided an accurate statement of the law 

and provided the jury with guidance in applying the law. We 

find no abuse of discretion by the district court in giving the 

challenged instruction. See Whitfield, 695 F.3d at 305; RyanWebster, 353 F.3d at 364 n.17. Accordingly, we affirm Vanegas’ 

conviction, and we affirm the district court’s judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and 

legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials 
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before this court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process.

AFFIRMED