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In the United States Court of Federal Claims

No. 21-1934C

(Filed: October 7, 2021)

(NOT TO BE PUBLISHED)

ZACHARY THAYER,

Plaintiff,

 v.

THE UNITED STATES,

Defendant.

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OPINION AND ORDER

SOLOMSON, Judge. 

On September 30, 2021, Plaintiff, Zachary Thayer, a resident of Napa, California, 

proceeding pro se, filed a complaint against Defendant, the United States, in this court.

ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). That same day, Mr. Thayer filed a motion to proceed in forma 

pauperis, ECF No. 2, which this Court granted on October 1, 2021. ECF No. 6.

Although Mr. Thayer’s complaint is almost entirely incomprehensible,

1 the Court 

has attempted to decipher Mr. Thayer’s allegations.

2 First, Mr. Thayer alleges that the 

United States failed to inform him that he is a great-grandson of Gerald R. Ford until he 

was thirty-six years-old, “even though there was evidence of this in the 9/11 trial.” 

Compl. at 1. In that regard, Mr. Thayer also claims that the States of Michigan and 

1 Plaintiff has filed several complaints in other federal courts, with similar intelligibility issues.

See, e.g., ECF No. 9, Thayer v. Uber, Inc. - Uber Eat’s et al., 21-CV-3936 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2021)

(case dismissed with leave to amend, with the court noting that it has “tr[ied] to evaluate the 

complaint but cannot because it makes no sense”).

2 The facts alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint are assumed to be true and do not constitute factual 

findings by the Court. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); Am. Bankers Ass’n 

v. United States, 932 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2019).
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Indiana “denied” Mr. Thayer this information “while [he was] in the[ir] care.” Id. 

Mr. Thayer contends that this failure to disclose his ancestry constitutes “damage, 

negligence and harassment.” Id. Second, Mr. Thayer asserts that California and Napa 

County are liable for “retaliation, harassment, and discrimination,” and that they

“created a deprivation of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution 

and laws.” Id. at 4–5. He further accuses Napa County of tampering with his job 

interviews and denying him a fair valuation of a company he had tried to “pitch.” Id. at 

5, 9. Additional parties named in the complaint include his (possibly adoptive) 

“parental units,” Governor Gavin Newsom, former presidents Jimmy Carter, Barack 

Obama, and Donald Trump, former vice president Mike Pence, the California 

Employment Development Department, “agents of federal jurisdiction,” “judicial 

officers in the county commission,” and a host of “local state actors.” Id. at 3–5. 

Mr. Thayer requests various forms of relief, including: holding the State of Michigan 

“financially liable”; holding his parents “emotionally liable”; obtaining a fair valuation 

of his business; and an admission of negligence by the State of California and Mr. Pence. 

Id. at 3.

Mr. Thayer is proceeding pro se, and this Court holds a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings 

to “less stringent standards.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). 

Nevertheless, “even pro se plaintiffs must persuade the court that jurisdictional 

requirements have been met.” Hale v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 180, 184 (2019). “It is 

well-established that the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the court’s 

jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” Brandt v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 

1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). In the absence of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court must 

dismiss the claim. Kissi v. United States, 493 F. App’x 57, 58 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (sua sponte

dismissal).

Generally, “[t]he jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims is defined by the 

Tucker Act, which gives the court authority to render judgment on certain monetary 

claims against the United States.” RadioShack Corp. v. United States, 566 F.3d 1358, 1360 

(Fed. Cir. 2009). The Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1), provides this Court with 

jurisdiction to decide “actions pursuant to contracts with the United States, actions to 

recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, and actions brought pursuant to 

money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or constitutional provisions.” 

Roth v. United States, 378 F.3d 1371, 1384 (Fed. Cir. 2004). The Tucker Act, however, 

“does not create a substantive cause of action.” Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 

1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc). “A plaintiff must identify a separate source of 

substantive law that creates the right to money damages.” United States v. Mitchell, 463 

U.S. 206, 216 (1983). Moreover, “[n]ot every claim invoking the Constitution, a federal 

statute, or a regulation is cognizable under the Tucker Act.” Id. With respect to 
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“money-mandating” claims, the plaintiff must identify a law that “can fairly be 

interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage 

sustained.” Id. at 217 (quotation omitted).

For the reasons explained below, the Court dismisses, sua sponte, Mr. Thayer’s 

complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of the Rules of 

the Court of Federal Claims. See Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 

2004) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by 

the court sua sponte.”).

First, pursuant to the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a), this Court’s jurisdiction is 

limited to claims against the United States. See Double Lion Uchet Express Tr. v. United 

States, 149 Fed. Cl. 415, 420 (2020) (“[I]n the Court of Federal Claims, ‘the only proper 

defendant . . . is the United States, not its officers, nor any other individual.’” (quoting 

Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003))). Accordingly, this Court has no 

jurisdiction to hear Mr. Thayer’s claims against private parties, individuals (whether in 

their official or personal capacity), or state or local governments. See Moore v. Pub. Defs. 

Off., 76 Fed. Cl. 617, 620 (2007) (“When a plaintiff’s complaint names private parties, or 

local, county, or state agencies, rather than federal agencies, this court has no 

jurisdiction to hear those allegations.”).

Second, even to the extent that Mr. Thayer alleges claims against the United 

States, he “d[oes] not assert any claims deriving from money-mandating sources of law 

not sounding in tort” that would place his claims within this Court’s jurisdiction. 

Lawton v. United States, 621 F. App’x 671, 672 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Mr. Thayer’s allegations 

are based primarily on the failure to inform him of his ancestry, and the putative harms 

that resulted therefrom. Far from being a claim involving “contracts with the United 

States, actions to recover illegal exactions of money by the United States, [or] actions 

brought pursuant to money-mandating statutes, regulations, executive orders, or 

constitutional provisions,” Roth, 378 F.3d at 1384, Mr. Thayer’s allegations are, at best,

tort claims, although the Court doubts that the facts alleged state any cognizable tort 

claim in any jurisdiction. 

Third, even if Mr. Thayer’s vague allegations that he was deprived of his “rights, 

privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” constitute claims that 

his due process or voting rights were somehow violated, see Compl. at 7, this Court 

lacks jurisdiction over such claims, as well. See Trevino v. United States, 557 F. App’x 

995, 998 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“[T]he trial court does not have jurisdiction over . . . claims 

under the due process, equal protection or supremacy clauses of the United States 

Constitution. These claims do not fall within the court’s jurisdiction as defined by the 
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Tucker Act because none of those statutes or constitutional provisions mandate the 

payment of money.”); Crocker v. United States, 125 F.3d 1475, 1476 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 

(finding that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to hear due process claims 

under the Fifth Amendment); Hernandez v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 193, 198 (2010) 

(holding that the Fifteenth Amendment does not support jurisdiction in the Court of 

Federal Claims); LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that 

the Court of Federal Claims lacks jurisdiction over constitutional claims that do not 

mandate the payment of money).

Finally, to the extent Mr. Thayer seeks to hold the United States liable for other 

harm he has allegedly suffered, such claims “sound[] in tort” and are outside this 

Court’s jurisdiction. Rick’s Mushroom Serv., Inc. v. United States, 521 F.3d 1338, 1343 

(Fed. Cir. 2008) (“The plain language of the Tucker Act excludes from the Court of 

Federal Claims jurisdiction claims sounding in tort.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l))).

CONCLUSION

For the reasons explained above, the Court hereby DISMISSES Plaintiff’s 

complaint. The Clerk shall enter JUDGMENT for the government.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Matthew H. Solomson

Matthew H. Solomson

Judge