COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

August 31, 2021

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal Nos. 2020AP351-CR

2020AP352-CR

2020AP353-CR

Cir. Ct. Nos. 2016CF1837

2016CF3024

2016CF4617

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JESUS M. MEDINA FERNANDEZ,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEALS from judgments of the circuit court for Milwaukee

County: CAROLINA STARK, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Brash, C.J., Dugan and White, JJ. 

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
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¶1 PER CURIAM. Jesus M. Medina Fernandez appeals judgments of 

conviction entered after a jury found him guilty of three counts of first-degree 

sexual assault by use of a dangerous weapon and two counts of second-degree 

sexual assault. Medina1claims that the counts were wrongly joined for trial and 

that the evidence as to one of the counts was insufficient because the State failed 

to corroborate his confession. We reject his claims and affirm. 

Background

¶2 In Milwaukee County Circuit Court case No. 2016CF1837, which 

underlies appeal No. 2020AP351-CR, the State filed a complaint on April 29, 

2016, charging Medina with two counts of first-degree sexual assault by use of a 

dangerous weapon and one count of second degree sexual assault. A.D.G. and 

A.L.E. were the alleged victims of the first-degree sexual assaults, and C.J.M. was 

the alleged victim of the second-degree sexual assault. In Milwaukee County 

Circuit Court case No. 2016CF3024, which underlies appeal No. 2020AP352-CR, 

the State filed a criminal complaint on July 7, 2016, charging Medina with one 

count of first-degree sexual assault by use of a dangerous weapon. K.M.G. was 

the alleged victim. In Milwaukee County Circuit Court case No. 2016CF4617, 

which underlies appeal No. 2020AP353-CR, the State filed a criminal complaint 

on October 14, 2016, charging Medina with one count of second-degree sexual 

assault. A.E.R. was the alleged victim. The following facts regarding the charges 

are relevant to our discussion of the issues raised on appeal.

 

1

 The appellant refers to himself as “Medina” in his appellate briefs. We therefore do so 

as well.
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¶3 A.D.G.: According to the criminal complaint in case 

No. 2016CF1837, A.D.G. told police that on December 11, 2015, a man driving a 

Honda approached her in the 1600 block of South 25th Street in Milwaukee. 

A.D.G. agreed to an act of oral sex with the man in exchange for $50.00. She got 

into his car, and he drove into an alley and displayed his penis. A.D.G. asked for 

payment first, but he ordered her to “suck it,” and she engaged in mouth-to-penis 

intercourse after he reached for a screwdriver that she thought he might use to stab 

her. The man then forced her to remove her pants and have penis-to-vagina sexual 

intercourse with him. He used a condom that he discarded in the alley when he 

was finished. A.D.G. told police that the assailant was a Puerto Rican male with a 

thin build and a tattoo on his face. She also recalled the car’s license plate 

number, which police determined had been issued to Medina. Medina 

subsequently gave a statement to police admitting that he paid A.D.G. for sex. 

Police found a condom in the alley, and at trial, a DNA analyst testified that 

Medina was the source of the sperm fraction on the inside of the condom and that 

A.D.G. was the source of the DNA on the exterior of the condom.

¶4 C.J.M.: According to the criminal complaint in case 

No. 2016CF1837, C.J.M. told police that on the night of April 17, 2016, a man 

approached her in a tavern’s parking lot where she was arguing with a friend. The 

man identified himself as “Jesus Medina” and directed her to get into his car for 

her safety. Medina gave C.J.M. his telephone number before they separated. She 

called him at approximately 3:30 a.m. that same night, when she became 

concerned that she might face a threat from the person with whom she had argued 

earlier. Medina offered to sit with her at her home, and C.J.M. agreed. She met 

Medina and drove him to her home in the 1100 block of South 38th Street, where 

he accosted her and threatened to kill her and her children unless she had sex with 
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him. He then forcibly engaged in penis-to-vagina intercourse with her. When he 

was finished, she drove him to an area near the 3500 block of Lincoln Avenue, 

where he got out of the car. At trial, C.J.M. testified with the assistance of a 

Spanish-language interpreter, and the State showed that C.J.M. and Medina had 

communicated in Spanish. Additionally, the State presented testimony from a 

DNA analyst who said that Medina could not be excluded as the source of male

DNA found in C.J.M.’s vagina several days after the incident.

¶5 A.L.E.: According to the criminal complaint in case 

No. 2016CF1837, A.L.E. told police that on April 21, 2016, she was in the area of 

South 15th Street and Greenfield Avenue when a man lured her into his vehicle by 

offering her marijuana. He then drove with her into an alley, hit her on the head,

and forced her to perform oral sex. Next, the man produced a sharp object, held it 

to her neck, and performed an act of penis-to-vagina intercourse. Medina 

subsequently gave a statement to police acknowledging that he “picked A.L.E. up 

for a prostitution date.” He said that she wanted to leave because he was “taking 

too long” so he grabbed her and forced her to stay in the car. At trial, the State 

played the 911 call that A.L.E. placed after the incident reporting that she was 

raped by a skinny Hispanic male who could not speak English very well; and the 

State presented testimony from a DNA analyst who said that Medina was a 

possible contributor to the DNA collected from A.L.E. later on April 21, 2016.

¶6 K.M.G.: According to the criminal complaint in case 

No. 2016CF3024, K.M.G. told police that in March 2016, she was in the 1300 

block of South 23rd Street working as a prostitute. A Puerto Rican man with a 

thick accent and a teardrop tattoo on his face drove up to her in a car and offered 

her $50.00 for a “date.” When she was in the car, the man produced a 
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screwdriver, held it against her neck, and forcibly engaged in penis-to-vagina 

intercourse with her before she escaped from the vehicle. Police showed K.M.G. a 

photo array, and she identified Medina as the assailant. Medina subsequently gave 

a statement to police and admitted to the incident with K.M.G.

¶7 A.E.R.: According to the criminal complaint in case 

No. 2016CF4617, A.E.R. told police that at approximately 2:30 a.m. on October 

17, 2015, she was walking near the 2500 block of South 10th Street after spending 

the evening at various taverns. A man pulled up in a car that had a Puerto Rican 

flag hanging from the rear view mirror. The man spoke English that “was broken 

with Spanish,” and he offered her a ride. She got into his car, and he drove her 

into an alley, applied pressure to her neck, and forced her to have penis-to-vagina 

intercourse. DNA testing revealed that Medina was a possible major contributor 

to the DNA mixtures collected from her body later that day.

¶8 Over Medina’s objection, the circuit court joined the five sexual 

assault charges for trial. While the trial was underway, the State determined that it 

could not produce K.M.G. to testify. The State advised, however, that it intended 

to continue with the prosecution of the charge involving her and would rely on 

Medina’s confession and physical evidence found in Medina’s car to prove the 

allegation that Medina sexually assaulted K.M.G. After hearing argument and 

considering the State’s offer of proof, the circuit court denied Medina’s motion to 

dismiss the charge involving K.M.G. and permitted the State to proceed without 

her. The jury found Medina guilty of all five charges. He appeals.
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Discussion

¶9 Medina first claims that the five charges were improperly joined for 

trial. Joinder is governed by WIS. STAT. § 971.12 (2019-20).2 The “statute is to be 

broadly construed in favor of initial joinder.” State v. Prescott, 2012 WI App 136, 

¶15, 345 Wis. 2d 313, 825 N.W.2d 515 (citation omitted). Such broad 

construction is warranted to serve the statute’s goals and purposes, namely, to 

promote trial economy and judicial efficiency, and “to eliminate multiple trials 

against the same defendant, which promotes fiscal responsibility.” See State v. 

Salinas, 2016 WI 44, ¶36, 369 Wis. 2d 9, 879 N.W.2d 609. Whether crimes are 

properly joined is a question of law that we review de novo. See id., ¶30.

¶10 Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 971.12(4), two or more complaints or 

informations may be tried together if the crimes alleged could have been joined in 

a single charging document. Pursuant to § 971.12(1), crimes may be charged 

together in the same complaint or information if, as relevant here, they “are of the 

same or similar character.” To be of the same or similar character, “[i]t is not 

sufficient that the offenses involve merely the same type of criminal charge.” 

State v. Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d 130, 138, 430 N.W.2d 584 (Ct. App. 1988). Rather, 

the “crimes must be the same type of offenses occurring over a relatively short 

period of time and the evidence as to each must overlap.” See id.

¶11 The five crimes here were all violent sexual assaults involving penisto-vagina intercourse and were therefore the same type of offense. Further, the 

crimes occurred over a relatively short period of time, specifically, the seven-

 

2

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise 

noted.
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month period from October 2015 through April 2016. We have recognized that 

“acts two years apart can be considered as ‘occurring over a relatively short period 

of time’” See State v. Locke, 177 Wis. 2d 590, 596, 502 N.W.2d 891 (Ct. App. 

1993).

¶12 The evidence supporting the five crimes also overlapped. Medina 

asserts that the overlap was minor, but a minor overlap of evidence is sufficient 

“[i]n light of the broad construction we afford the joinder statute in favor of 

joinder.” See State v. Linton, 2010 WI App 129, ¶¶16-17, 329 Wis. 2d 687, 791 

N.W.2d 222. In this case, Detective Jonathan Mejias-Rivera testified that he 

questioned Medina about all of the victims’ allegations over the course of three 

custodial interviews. Mejias-Rivera also collected DNA from Medina that was

tested in connection with the DNA samples collected from four of the five victims.

¶13 Moreover, when assessing whether evidence overlaps, we have 

considered whether “[t]he similarities between the acts in each incident tended to 

establish the identity of the criminal.” See Hamm, 146 Wis. 2d at 138. We 

concluded that modus operandi, time frame, and geographic area were relevant to 

that evaluation. See id. at 138-39. Here, each of the five charges involved a 

woman who was isolated and then attacked by a Puerto Rican or Spanish-speaking 

male. In each attack, the assailant applied force, usually to the victim’s neck and 

often with a sharp object, and in every case the assailant ultimately engaged in 

violent penis-to-vagina intercourse. Further, all of the crimes occurred on the 

south side of Milwaukee County, a geographic area sufficient to support joinder. 

See State v. Hall, 103 Wis. 2d 125, 139, 307 N.W.2d 289 (1981) (observing that 

crimes were closely connected geographically when they occurred “within the 

confines of the north metropolitan Milwaukee County area”).
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¶14 We therefore reject Medina’s challenge to the joinder decision. We 

conclude that, as a matter of law, the circuit court properly joined the five counts 

for trial.

¶15 We turn to the question of severance. See Locke, 177 Wis. 2d at 

596-97. Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 971.12(3), the circuit court may sever crimes 

that are properly joined if a party is prejudiced by the joinder. The proper joinder 

of criminal offenses, however, is presumptively non-prejudicial, see Linton, 

329 Wis. 2d 687, ¶20, and to rebut that presumption, a defendant seeking 

severance must show “substantial prejudice to his defense; some prejudice is 

insufficient,” see Prescott, 345 Wis. 2d 313, ¶13. The decision to sever matters 

that are properly joined rests in the circuit court’s discretion. See Salinas, 369 

Wis. 2d 9, ¶30.

¶16 Accordingly, we must examine whether the circuit court erroneously 

exercised its discretion by not severing the charges against Medina on the ground 

that he faced substantial prejudice from joinder. “In evaluating the potential for 

prejudice, courts have recognized that, when evidence of the counts sought to be 

severed would be admissible in separate trials, the risk of prejudice arising 

because of joinder is generally not significant.” Locke, 177 Wis. 2d at 597. 

¶17 Admissibility of a person’s other crimes, wrongs, or acts is 

determined under WIS. STAT. § 904.04(2), and involves a three-step test. See State 

v. Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d 768, 771, 576 N.W.2d 30 (1998). First, the evidence 

must be offered for an acceptable purpose. See id. at 772. Second, the evidence 

must be relevant within the meaning of WIS. STAT. § 904.01. See Sullivan, 216 

Wis. 2d at 772. If the evidence satisfies those first two steps, the circuit court 

must determine whether the evidence should nonetheless be excluded because its 
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probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice or other concerns 

enumerated in WIS. STAT. § 904.03. See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 772-73.

¶18 The first step of the Sullivan analysis requires only that the 

proponent of the evidence identify an acceptable purpose for admission to prove 

something other than propensity. See State v. Payano, 2009 WI 86, ¶63, 320 

Wis. 2d 348, 768 N.W.2d 832. This step is “hardly demanding.” See id. (citation 

and emphasis omitted). Here, the circuit court determined that the State’s 

purposes in admitting each charge at a trial of the other charges would be to prove 

identity and a common scheme or plan. These are acceptable purposes for other

the admission of other acts evidence. See id. & n.12. The evidence therefore 

satisfied the first step of the Sullivan analysis.

¶19 The other-acts evidence was also relevant.3 Where, as here, the 

purpose of other-acts evidence includes proof of identity, “ʻ[t]he measure of 

probative value in assessing relevance is the similarity between the charged 

offense and the other act.’ Similarity is demonstrated by showing the ‘nearness of 

time, place, and circumstance’ between the other act and the alleged crime.” See 

State v. Hammer, 2000 WI 92, ¶¶30-31, 236 Wis. 2d 686, 613 N.W.2d 629 

(citations omitted). As we have discussed, each of the acts in this case was near in 

time to the others, and each occurred within the same general geographic area. 

 

3

 The State supports its argument in regard to relevance with a citation to an unpublished 

opinion that the State asserts was recommended for publication. The State’s citation, however, is 

to a per curiam opinion that is ineligible for publication. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(4)(b). 

The opinion includes a notification that the “opinion will not be published” pursuant to RULE

809.23(1)(b)5., and the opinion includes a standard warning that “per curiam opinions may not be 

cited except for the limited purposes specified in [] RULE 809.23(3),” that is, to support claims of 

issue or claim preclusion or law of the case. We remind the State that citation to unpublished

opinions may subject the citing party to a penalty. See WIS. STAT. RULES 809.23(3), 809.83(2).
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Each act was also similar to the others, involving a vulnerable woman—a 

prostitute, a person in fear, a person alone on the street late at night—lured by a 

Hispanic male into a secluded place where he perpetrated a violent penis-to-vagina 

assault. To be sure, some differences among the acts also existed. Nonetheless, 

because the incidents “share[d] common characteristics,” the evidence was 

relevant and had probative value. See id., ¶34.

¶20 As to the third step of the Sullivan analysis, Medina argues that he 

was prejudiced because the other-acts evidence had “too much” probative value. 

He asserts that “there is the overstrong tendency for the jury to find [him] guilty 

because he is apparently some sort of sex fiend who goes around assaulting 

prostitutes.” We are not persuaded by this argument. To show prejudice, Medina 

must demonstrate that “the proffered evidence has a tendency to influence the 

outcome by improper means or ... causes a jury to base its decision on something 

other than the established propositions in the case.” See Sullivan, 216 Wis. 2d at 

789-90. Medina has not identified an improper factor that caused the jury to 

convict him. Rather, he has acknowledged a substantial amount of probative 

evidence that he committed a series of violent sexual assaults. 

¶21 Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence of each assault would 

have been admissible at a trial of the others. Therefore, the decision not to sever 

the five charges constituted a proper exercise of the circuit court’s discretion.

¶22 Medina next argues that the State failed to offer any evidence that 

corroborated his confession to sexually assaulting K.M.G., and his conviction for 

that crime must therefore be reversed. We disagree.
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¶23 A defendant’s confession alone is insufficient to sustain a criminal 

conviction. See State v. Bannister, 2007 WI 86, ¶23, 302 Wis. 2d 158, 734 

N.W.2d 892. Rather, “‘there must be some corroboration of the confession ... to 

produce a confidence in the truth of the confession.’” Id., ¶26 (citation omitted). 

The State’s obligation to offer corroborating evidence is mandatory but not 

onerous. “‘If there is corroboration of any significant fact, that is sufficient.’” Id.

(citation omitted). A claim that a confession was not corroborated is a challenge 

to the sufficiency of the evidence. See id., ¶32. Therefore, we assess the claim by 

considering the evidence “in a light most favorable to the verdict.” Id.

¶24 The State’s evidence in regard to the assault of K.M.G. included 

testimony from Mejias-Rivera, who described Medina’s confession to the crime. 

According to Mejias-Rivera, Medina said that K.M.G. was a prostitute that he 

encountered near 23rd Street and Greenfield Avenue, and that she agreed to have 

sex with him in his car for a fee. She got in his car and he drove into an alley with 

her, where they had penis-to-vagina intercourse. However, she “wanted to leave 

because he was taking too long.... He became upset. That’s when he grabbed a 

screwdriver, put it against her neck.” Medina said that he then completed the 

sexual act.

¶25 As corroboration for the confession, the State presented evidence 

that police found a screwdriver under the seat of Medina’s car during a search 

following Medina’s arrest. Further, Mejias-Rivera testified that he showed 

Medina a picture of that screwdriver, and Medina identified it as the one that he 

used when he sexually assaulted K.M.G.

¶26 Medina argues in his brief-in-chief that the corroboration in this case 

is insufficient to show that a crime occurred. As the State correctly responds, 
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however, the corroboration rule does not require the State to “independently 

establish the specific elements of the crime.” See id., ¶31. Indeed, 

“‘corroboration ... can be far less than is necessary to establish the crime 

independently of the confession.’” See Schultz v. State, 82 Wis. 2d 737, 753, 264 

N.W.2d 245 (1978) (citations omitted). Thus, in Bannister, where the defendant 

faced a charge of delivery of a controlled substance, evidence of morphine in a 

decedent’s body was sufficient to corroborate the defendant’s confession to 

delivering morphine to the decedent. See id., 302 Wis. 2d 158, ¶34. Although the 

corroborating evidence offered by the State in Bannister did not, standing alone, 

show that the defendant committed a crime, the corroboration constituted a 

significant fact that permitted confidence in the confession. See id. Similarly 

here, the discovery of a screwdriver in Medina’s car is a significant fact that 

permitted confidence in his confession to sexually assaulting K.M.G. while armed 

with a screwdriver.

¶27 Medina also argues in his brief-in-chief that a screwdriver is too 

common an item for its discovery to serve as corroboration. He states that 

“probably a majority of persons who own a car keep a screwdriver and other tools 

in the car.” Medina makes these claims without an accompanying citation either 

to any supporting facts in the record or to any legal authority. We normally do not 

consider unsupported propositions. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 

N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992). Moreover, Medina’s reply brief fails to respond to 

the State’s arguments regarding corroboration and instead ignores the 

corroboration question. Accordingly, we conclude that he concedes this issue. 

See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 

738 N.W.2d 578. For all the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
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By the Court.—Judgments affirmed. 

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.