UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GREG A. HAMMER,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-223

Judge George C. Smith

Magistrate Judge Jolson

COMMISSIONER OF 

SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Greg A. Hammer, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking review of 

a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his

Supplemental Security Income and Disability Insurance Benefits. For the reasons that follow, it 

is RECOMMENDED that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and AFFIRM

the Commissioner’s decision. 

I. BACKGROUND

A. Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff applied for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) and Disability Insurance 

Benefits (“DIB”) in December 2014, alleging disability due to a number of physical and mental 

impairments. (Doc. 8-5, Tr. 372, PAGEID #: 415). Plaintiff alleged an onset date of August 6, 

2014. (Id.). 

After initial administrative denials of Plaintiff’s claims, Administrative Law Judge 

Timothy G. Keller (“the ALJ”) heard the case on March 16, 2017. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 238–56, PAGEID
2

#: 278–96). On June 12, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 218–28, PAGEID #: 258–68). 

Plaintiff requested a review of the Hearing and the Appeals Council denied review, making the 

ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 1–4, PAGEID #: 41–44).

Plaintiff filed this case on March 16, 2018, and the Commissioner filed the administrative 

record on June 12, 2018. (Doc. 8). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific Errors on August 6, 2018

(Doc. 10), the Commissioner responded on September 20, 2018 (Doc. 13), and Plaintiff filed a 

reply (Doc. 14). Thus, this matter is now ripe for review.

B. Relevant Hearing Testimony

At the hearing, Plaintiff testified about his physical and mental issues. Plaintiff testified 

that he passes out “three or four times a week, if not more.” (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 243, PAGEID #: 283). 

He stated this does not happen when he is sitting, but when he is doing something like washing 

dishes or sweeping his floor, he’s prone to losing consciousness. (Id.) Plaintiff testified that he 

has a pacemaker and that he takes medication for his heart and for blood pressure but that the 

medication has not been able to regulate his blood pressure to keep him from passing out. (Tr. 

244, PAGEID #: 284). Plaintiff also testified that he has neck, shoulder, and lower back pain. 

(Tr. 244–46, PAGEID #: 284–86).

Regarding mental health, Plaintiff testified that he takes medication for depression and 

anxiety. (Tr. 246–47, PAGEID #: 286–87). He stated that he has received counseling at Six 

County. (Tr. 247, PAGEID #: 287). Plaintiff testified that during the day he gets up, tries to eat, 

and watches television. He does not visit people or drive much. (Tr. 250, PAGEID #: 290). 
3

As to work history, plaintiff testified that he worked for 15 years as a machine operator. 

(Tr. 248, PAGEID #: 288). He stated he would stand and walk all day, and lift between 10 and 30 

pounds. (Tr. 249, PAGEID #: 289).

During the hearing, a vocational expert (“VE”) testified that Plaintiff could perform the 

unskilled and light positions of housekeeping cleaner, cashier, and sales attendant. (Tr. 253–54, 

PAGEID #: 293–94). 

C. Relevant Medical Background 

The medical records relevant to the disposition of this case are summarized below.

D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found that Plaintiff remained insured for disability insurance benefits through 

December 31, 2019, and that he had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since his alleged 

onset date of August 6, 2014. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 221, PAGEID #: 261). The ALJ determined that 

Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: heart condition, syncope, back and neck 

issues, and left shoulder problems. (Id.). Additionally, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff suffered 

from non-severe impairments, including headaches, depression, and anxiety. (Id.). 

Upon consideration of the record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff retained the following 

residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to: 

perform light work ... and meaning that the claimant can lift, carry, push, and pull 

20 pounds occasionally and 10 pounds frequently; able to sit, stand, and walk for 6 

hours each in an 8-hour workday; can frequently climb ramps and stairs; can never 

climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; can frequently balance and stoop; can 

occasionally crawl; and can have no exposure to moving machinery or unprotected 

heights.

(Id., Tr. 223, PAGEID #: 263).
4

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “[S]ubstantial 

evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such 

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & 

Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). The Commissioner’s findings of fact must also 

be based upon the record as a whole. Harris v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 431, 435 (6th Cir. 1985). To 

this end, the Court must “take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight”

of the Commissioner’s decision. Rhodes v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:13-cv-1147, 2015 WL 

4881574, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 17, 2015).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff assigns one error: that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because he violated 

the treating source rule in his evaluation of Dr. Keith Brantley’s medical source statements. More 

specifically, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration of Dr. Brantley’s opinion concerning 

Plaintiff’s syncope and mental health.

Two related rules govern how the ALJ was required to analyze Dr. Brantley’s opinion. See 

Dixon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-cv-478, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2016). 

The first is the “treating physician rule.” Id. The rule requires an ALJ to “give controlling weight 

to a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of the claimant’s 

impairment(s) if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case 
5

record.” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Closely associated is “the good reasons rule,” which requires an ALJ always to give “good 

reasons . . . for the weight given to the claimant’s treating source opinion.” Dixon, 2016 WL 

860695, at *4 (quoting Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406 (alterations in original)); see also 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2). The goal underlying the good reasons rule is two-fold. First, it allows a plaintiff 

to understand her case, particularly where a plaintiff knows her physician deemed her disabled and 

thus “might be especially bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, 

unless some reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Blakely, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting

Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004)). Second, “it ensures that the 

ALJ applies the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of 

the rule.” Id. 

The good reasons rule requires an ALJ’s determination to be supported by the evidence in 

the case record and “sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the 

[ALJ] gave to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Cole v. 

Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011). Under the good reasons rule, if an ALJ:

declines to give a treating source’s opinion controlling weight, he must then balance 

the following factors to determine what weight to give it: “the length of the 

treatment relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of 

the treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion 

with the record as a whole, and specialization of the treating source.”

Fletcher v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 9 F. Supp. 3d 817, 828 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (quoting Wilson, 

378 F.3d at 544); see also 20 C.F.R. § 406.1527(c)(2)–(6) (setting forth the relevant 

factors). The treating physician rule and the good reasons rule together create what has 

been referred to as the “two-step analysis created by the Sixth Circuit.” Allums v. Comm’r 
6

of Soc. Sec., 975 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2013); see also Gayheart v. Comm. of 

Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (“If the Commissioner does not give a treatingsource opinion controlling weight, then the opinion is weighed based the length, frequency, 

nature, and the extent of the treatment relationship, as well as the treating source’s area of 

specialty and the degree to which the opinion is consistent with the record as a whole and 

is supported by relevant evidence.”). Defendant argues that the ALJ satisfied the treating 

physician rule here.

In addition, the Sixth Circuit has held that an ALJ’s failure to give good reasons for 

rejecting the opinion of a treating source may constitute de minimis or harmless error in certain 

circumstances. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547. De minimis or harmless error occurs: (1) if a treating 

source’s opinion is so patently deficient that the Commissioner could not possibly credit it; (2) if 

the Commissioner adopts the opinion of the treating source or makes findings consistent with the 

opinion; or (3) if the Commissioner has met the goal of the procedural safeguard of the good 

reasons rule even though an ALJ has not complied with the express terms of the regulation. Id. at 

547. Defendant alternatively argues that the third exception applies here.

A. SYNCOPE

On July 16, 2015, Dr. Brantley saw Plaintiff and noted he had a history of palpitations and 

syncope:

The patient stated he has been “blacking out” 3-4xs a day and more often if he is 

doing something strenuous when this happens. He gets lightheaded or dizzy before 

this occurs before he actually loses consciousness. He also has been having 

palpitations and chest tightness. He states its worse at night when he is laying down 

and it usually lasts about 5 mins when it occurs. He stated that the symptoms 

become more frequent after he was started on a medication the last time he was 

here (probably florinef). He is always tired and this happens many times right after 

the stands up. The interrogation of a loop recorder previously paced by Dr. Megeed 

demonstrated several episodes of bradycardia with heart rates demonstrated in the 

30’s. . . .
7

(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 955, PAGEID #: 1001). Dr. Brantley recommended the placement of a pacemaker. 

Plaintiff took the recommendation, and a pacemaker was implanted during the summer of 2015. 

(Id.).

Later that year, in September of 2015, Dr. Brantley completed a Perry County 

Employability Form. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 572, PAGEID #: 617). The portion of the form entitled workrelated activities was left blank. Dr Brantley noted, however, that Plaintiff “continues to pass out 

despite getting a pacemaker.” Along with that form, Dr. Brantley drafted a one-sentence letter, 

stating: “Mr. Hammer is still passing out since the pacemaker placement and is unable to work.” 

(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 571, PAGEID #: 616). Roughly three months later, Dr. Brantley completed a 

Medical Source Statement, dated December 18, 2015. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 573–75, PAGEID #: 618–

20). That form states that Plaintiff frequently can lift and carry 1–5 pounds, but never more; 

frequently can reach and handle with both right and left extremities; occasionally bend, frequently 

crouch/squat, frequently crawl, and never climb steps or ladders. (Doc. 8-2, Tr., PAGEID #: 618–

19). The form also notes that Plaintiff is able to reach above shoulder level, his condition is likely 

to deteriorate if placed under stress, and he is likely to have more than five unscheduled absences 

from work per month. (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 574–75, PAGEID #: 619–20). Dr. Brantley premised his 

conclusions on his diagnosis of “[r]ecurrent syncope” and “symptomatic orthostatic hypotension.” 

Along with that assessment, Dr. Brantley again included a brief letter, stating” “Mr. Hammer is 

unable to perform any job that will require standing, due to the possibility that he could pass out

at any time.” (Tr. 576, PAGEID #: 621).

In deciding this matter, the ALJ assigned no weight to Dr. Brantley’s work-preclusive 

opinions:
8

The undersigned assigns no weight to the treating physician’s opinion, as it does 

not merit controlling weight (Keith Brantley, M.D., 9/8/2015, Exhibit 7, and 

12/18/2015, Exhibit 8F). [Dr. Brantley] opined that the claimant cannot work due 

to the possibility that he could pass out at any time following the placement of the 

pacemaker, but this is a determination that is reserved for the Commissioner. Also, 

the record shows that he has had syncope since childhood, yet has had a good work 

history ever since becoming an adult. Additionally, Dr. Brantley did not limit the 

claimant from being able to drive or carry hunting weapons.

(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 225–26, PAGEID #: 265–66).

Immediately thereafter, the ALJ assigned great weight to the opinion of treating physician, 

Dr. Paul Mumma:

On April 16, 2016, [Dr. Mumma] opined that, “This patient is very comfortable

with the sick role. I have essentially confronted him with this and also told him

thatthere is nomedicine orprocedure that is goingto deal with his complaints has

they are in today. He needsto adapt to his body And become more functional. I

strongly advising counseling. Regardless, this patient is capable ofsedentary M

physical work. His neck problem remains in question He does have areversal of

the cervical lordotic curve and significant tenderness in the occipital area. I will

be requesting an MRI. I see no reason to send the pain management at thistime”

(Exhibit 24F/22). On May 26, 2016, he opined that, “I have told this patient.

Equivocal relief that I am unable to come up with an explanation that would

account for all of his various complaints. He is clearly doctor shopping. He has

been to chiropractors and numerous other practitioners in an attempt to diagnose

and/ortreat chronic neck pain, headaches, left armpain, low back pain numbness

andtingling in both upper extremities, numbness andtingling inhisthighs aswell

as fatigue and Insomnia. I have told this patient that he is fully employable

capable of just about anyjob duties and has no physical restrictions. I am aware

of other than heavy aerobic activity which may cause problems with his paced

rhythm. He should do no heavy lifting, pushing or pulling because of his

pacemaker module I will be stopping all of his controlled medications.” These

opinions are consistent with the mostly normal physical examinations throughout

the record and the claimant’s actions on a daily basis.

(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 226, PAGEID #: 266).

Dr. Mumma’s notes, which the ALJ cited, state that Dr. Mumma reviewed Dr. Brantley’s 

notes and that they “reveal no medical cause” for Plaintiff’s syncope. (Tr. 897, PAGEID #: 943). 

Dr. Mumma additionally concluded that Plaintiff’s dizzy spells “are probably a consequence of 

polypharmacy,” and consequently stopped Plaintiff’s medications. (Tr. 900, PAGEID #: 946).
9

The undersigned reads the ALJ’s opinion as assigning no weight to Dr. Brantley’s opinions 

because they were inconsistent with the record and great weight to Dr. Mumma’s opinion because 

of record support. Specifically, Dr. Brantley’s opinion that Plaintiff could pass out at any moment 

and thus could not work did not comport with other expected limitations of someone who was 

prone to lose consciousness at any time. In particular, Dr. Brantley expressed no concern about 

Plaintiff driving or hunting. Similarly, the ALJ appears to have expressed skepticism regarding 

how limiting syncope is because Plaintiff was diagnosed as a child but since has had a good work 

history. In contrast, the ALJ stated that Dr. Mumma’s opinions were “consistent with the mostly

normal physical examinations throughout the record and the claimant’s actions on a daily basis.” 

(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 226, PAGEID #: 266). 

Considering these factors, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ’s rejection of Dr. 

Brantley’s opinion with regard to Plaintiff’s syncope was procedurally adequate. Indeed, the Sixth 

Circuit simply requires that the explanation be enough for the Court to understand the basis for the 

ALJ’s decision. See Allen v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 561 F.3d 646, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (affirming after 

concluding that ALJ’s one-sentence rejection of treating physician’s opinion satisfied the “good 

reasons” requirement). In sum, the ALJ gave sufficient reasons for assigning no weight to Dr. 

Brantley’s opinions.

Moreover, elsewhere in the opinion, the ALJ provided additional analysis of Plaintiff’s 

syncope:

In regards to his syncope, the record showsthere is no apparent medical cause for

his syncope (Exhibit 24F/19). Yet, he reported that sometimes when he stands up

too fast, he will black out (Exhibit 3E). However, the results of a tilt table test

performed on November 26, 2012 were normal (Exhibit 15F/l). Also, the results

of a CT Scan of the brain taken on December 1, 2014 showed no radiographic

evidence for acute intracranial process (Exhibit 16F/73). Yet, on July 16, 2015,

he was seen in consultation for follow-up of palpitations and syncope. He stated

he had been “blacking out” 3-4 times a day and more often if he was doing
10

something strenuous. He also had been having palpitations and chest tightness. 

The integration of the loop recorder previously placed inside of him had

demonstrated several episodes of bradycardia with heart rates in the 30’s. A

pacemaker placement was recommended (Exhibit 25F/45). However, the record

showsthat he admitted he has had syncope several times since childhood (Exhibit

15F/1). Also, the record shows that he has only positional syncope (Exhibit

25F/14), as vasovagal syncope was ruled out (Exhibit 15F/l).

(Doc. 8-2, Tr. 224, PAGEID #: 264).

Adding this explanation to the equation, the undersigned additionally concludes that even 

if the discussion of Dr. Brantley’s opinion was too light, any error was harmless. The Sixth 

Circuit’s opinion in Nelson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 195 F. App’x 462 (6th Cir. 2006), supports 

this conclusion. There, the ALJ failed to explain the weight given to two treating physicians. Id.

at 468. Despite this absence, the Sixth Circuit found that the ALJ’s treatment of Plaintiff’s 

impairment “indirectly attack[ed] both the supportability of [the treating sources’] opinions and 

the consistency of those opinions with the rest of the record evidence.” The same is true here. By 

discussing activities and medical assessments that were inconsistent with Dr. Brantley’s opinion, 

the ALJ adequately discussed reasons why Plaintiff was not as limited as Dr. Brantley opined.

Plaintiff also argues that Dr. Mumma “limited” Plaintiff to sedentary work, referring to the 

following record:

[Plaintiff] needs to adapt to his body [a]nd become more functional. I strongly 

advis[e] counseling. Regardless, this patient is capable of sedentary M[sic] physical 

work.

(Tr. 900, PAGEID #: 946). Because elsewhere Dr. Mumma opined that Plaintiff could perform 

any work other than heavy aerobic activity, Plaintiff argues that Dr. Mumma’s opinions were 

internally inconsistent and thus unreliable. (Doc. 14 at 3). First, Plaintiff is overreading Dr. 

Mumma’s opinion regarding sedentary work. To be clear, Dr. Mumma did not expressly limit 

Plaintiff to sedentary work; he simply noted that Plaintiff could perform sedentary work. Second, 
11

a review of all of Dr. Mumma’s records shows that he believes Plaintiff has the ability to perform 

most jobs. Dr. Mumma reviewed Plaintiff’s medical history since 2011, found that he was “doctor 

shopping,” and concluded that Plaintiff was “fully employable[,] capable of just about any job 

duties and has no physical restrictions[] I am aware of[ o]ther than heavy aerobic activity which 

may cause problems with his paced rhythm” and “no heavy lifting, pushing or pulling because of 

his pacemaker module.” (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 893, PAGEID #: 939). Indeed, Dr. Mumma directed 

Plaintiff to “begin progressive daily aerobic exercise.” (PAGEID #: 887, Tr. 933). Accordingly, 

the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s argument unpersuasive.

In sum, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Brantley’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s syncope was 

sufficient. And, in any event, any alleged error was harmless because the ALJ’s opinion makes 

clear why Dr. Brantley’s opined limitations were rejected, and substantial evidence supports the 

ALJ’s conclusion.

B. MENTAL HEALTH

Plaintiff also argues that the ALJ failed to give good reasons for rejecting Dr. Brantley’s

opined mental limitations. The Perry County Employability Form, described above, is relevant

here. In that form, Dr. Brantley checked boxes finding Plaintiff “Not Limited” in his ability to: 

Remember work location and procedures, Carry out instructions, and Interact with the general 

public; but “Extremely Limited in his ability to: Maintain attention and concentration; Perform 

activities within a schedule; and Sustain an ordinary routine.” (Doc. 8-2, Tr. 572, PAGEID #: 

617). Here is the relevant potion of the form in its entirety:
12

(Id.). The form contains no narrative explanation of why Plaintiff would be mentally limited in 

these ways. The other check-box form that Dr. Brantley completed, the Medical Statement Form

described above, contains no mental limitations.

Two starting observations. First, it is the undersigned’s understanding that Dr. Brantley 

has no mental health training, and Plaintiff has not told the Court otherwise. Second, besides the 

check-box form, Plaintiff has not identified any mental health records from Dr. Brantley that would 

support the opined limitations. To the contrary, Dr. Brantley’s notes state that Plaintiff “has a 

normal mood and affect,” his “behavior is normal,” “patient is not nervous/anxious,” and he is 

“oriented to person, place, and time.” (Tr. 957, PAGEID #: 1003).

The undersigned is reluctant to require an ALJ to articulate reasons beyond what the ALJ 

did in this case under such circumstances. But regardless, any failure to reject Dr. Brantley’s 

mental health opinions expressly was harmless. This is so because the ALJ elsewhere made clear 

why Dr. Brantley’s expressed mental limitations were too extreme. First, the ALJ explained why 

he found Plaintiff’s mental limitations nonsevere:

In 2009, [Plaintiff] reported that he became depressed when his biological father

passed away (Exhibit 6F/2). His depressive symptoms continued, and in 2015,he

reported having crying spells a few times a week (Exhibit 3E) as well as lacking

energy and feeling as if he is stuck in tar (Exhibit 2F/5). He also reported of being

anxious (Exhibit 6F/3). By 2016, he had gone through a divorce, lost a custody

battle for his two children, went through cardiac issues that resulted in pacemaker

placement, and felt depressed and traumatized and had problems sleeping due to

having nightmares of performing CPR on a neighbor/friend after she passed and

seeing images of the corpse (Exhibits 9F/1, 17F/1, and 5, and 24F/7). The record
13

shows he was prescribed medications in 2013, and has taken medications that

include Prozac,Zoloft,Remeron,and Xanax (Exhibits 16F/45, and 24F/10). Yet,

the record showsthatthe results ofmental status examinationsroutinely revealed

normal results regarding his mood and affect, and the results of the consultative

examination revealed hehas nomentallimitationsthat prevent himfrom working

(Exhibits 6F, 21F/4, and 25F/47). Also, in 2015, he reported he was notreceiving

medication or counseling for his mental issues (Exhibit 3E). For these reasons,

these impairments are slight abnormalities, and considered singly and in

combination, do not have more than a minimal effect on the claimant’s ability to

perform basic physical/mental work activities. Therefore, these are non-severe

impairments.

In making this finding,the undersigned has considered the four broad areas of

mental functioning set out in the disability regulations for evaluating mental

disorders and in the Listing of Impairments (20 CFR, Part 404, Subpart P,

Appendix 1). These four areas of mental functioning are known as the

“paragraph B” criteria.

The first functional area is understanding, remembering, or applying information.

In this area, the claimant has mild limitation. The next functional area is

interacting with others. In this area, the claimant has mild limitation. The third

functional area is concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace. In this area, the

claimant has mild limitation. The fourth functional area is adapting or managing

oneself. In this area,the claimant has mild limitation. He reported he is able to

lift 5 pounds, such as a gallon of milk or a sack of potatoes, walk 200 feet at a

time, stand and/or walk for 1hour at a time, has no issues with sitting and can sit

for 2 hours at a time, and is able to live in a 2nd-floor apartment, which require use

of stairs. He also reported he is able to take care of his personal needs. He reported

when he was married that he occasionally cooked and cleaned and performed

otherstasks, but had to take breaks and his wife had mainly completed the chores

when they were still married. Now that he is divorced,he admitted that he is able

to perform the tasks and take care of his sons on the weekends when he has them. 

He continuesto drive and use public transportation. He will attend church services,

but is prone to withdraw and does not like crowds. He has a few friends. He

spends time with his sons and takes them hunting, which is his hobby of his. He

will also watch television, read, and use the computer, and has read numerous

medical resources to obtain diagnoses for his chronic/minor medical complains

(Exhibits 3E, lOE, 3F, 6F, and 24F).

Again, becausethe claimant’smedically determinable mentalimpairments cause

nomorethan “mild” limitation in any ofthe functional areas, they are nonsevere

(20 CFR 404.l520a(d)(l) and 416.920a(d)(l)).

(Tr. 221–22, PAGEID #: 261–62).
14

Then, the ALJ explained why he found highly restrictive mental opinions, like Dr. 

Brantley’s opinion, unpersuasive. Specifically, the ALJ relied on Plaintiff’s consultative 

examination with Floyd Sours, MA, which “revealed [Plaintiff] ha[d] no mental limitations that 

prevent[ed] him from working.” (Tr. 221, PAGEID #: 261). The ALJ additionally noted that 

Plaintiff’s mental status examinations “routinely revealed normal results regarding his mood and 

affect. “ (Id.). The ALJ also explained that he gave “great weight” to the state agency 

psychological consultants’ opinions. Those consultants concluded that Plaintiff did not have a 

severe mental impairment and assessed Plaintiff’s mental functioning in the four areas as only 

mildly limited. (See Tr. 222, PAGEID #: 262; Tr. 225, PAGEID #: 265). Finally, the ALJ relied 

on Plaintiff’s daily activities. (Tr. 221–22, PAGEID #: 261–62).

In sum, the ALJ’s treatment of Dr. Brantley’s opinion was sufficient, and substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s mental health conclusions.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s 

Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner’s decision.

V. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed finding or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

authority for the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination 

of those portions of the Report or specific proposed findings or recommendations to which 

objection is made. Upon proper objection, a District Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 
15

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 

636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: November 21, 2018 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE