# United States Court of Appeals **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N, Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant

ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR TRADE COMMITTEE, Defendant

- Appellant

______________________

2017

- 1117

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in No. 1:14

- cv

- 00199

- TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C.
Stanceu.

______________________

Decided: May 23, 2018

______________________

D ONALD H ARRISON , Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff -appellee.

R OBERT E. D E F RANCESCO

, III, Wiley Rein, LLP, Was hington, DC, argued for defendant

- appellant. Also repr esented by A LAN H. P RICE

, T ESSA V. C APELOTO

, D ERICK H OLT

.

______________________WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 2

Before P ROST

, Chief Judge, M OORE and R EYNA

, Circuit Judges

. Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge P ROST

. Opinion c oncur ring

- in

- part, dissent ing

- in

- part filed by
C ircuit Judge R EYNA

.
P ROST

, Chief Judge

. Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee (“AEFTC”) appeals a decision from the U.S. Court of International Trade (“the CIT”) affirming a scope ruling of the U.S. Department of Commerce. The scope ruling held that Whirlpool Corporation’s kitchen appliance door handles with end caps (“assembled handles”) do not fall within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing duty orders on aluminum extrusions from the People’s Republic of China (“the Orders”). For the reasons stated below, we affirm

- in

- part, reverse

- in

- part, vacate

- in

- part, and remand.

B ACKGROUND

The instant appeal addresses whether particular products fall within the scope of existing antidumping and countervailing duty orders. We examine the Orders’ scope and the procedural history before turn ing to the merits.

I

Commerce published the Orders in 2011. See Alum inum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China : Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China : Countervailing Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011). The scope of the Orders describes the subject merchandise as “aluminum extrusions” that “are shapes and forms, produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified
aluminu m alloys. Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 3

at 30,650. 1 The subject extrusions “may be described at the time of importation as parts for final finished products that are assembled after importation.” Id. The scope also “includes the aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subasse mblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise.” Id.

The Orders’ scope contains several exclusions. Meri dian , 851 F.3d at 1379. For example, the scope has a
finished mercha ndise exclusion, which “excludes finished merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with g lass pane and backing material, and solar panels.” Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. The scope also has a finished goods kit exclusion, which

excludes finished goods containing aluminum e xtrusions that are entered unassembled in a “fi nishe d goods kit.” A finished goods kit is understood to mean a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final fi nished good and requires no further finishing or fabrication, such a s cutting or punching, and is assembled “as is” into a finished product.

Id. The next sentence of the Order s include s , however, an exception to the finished goods kit exclusion. See Merid ian , 851 F.3d at 1385. The exception states that “[a]n

1 The Orders recite the same scope. See Meridian Prod., LLC v. United States , 851 F.3d 1375, 1379 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Compare Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650

– 51, with Countervailing Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,653

– 54

. We refer only to the scope in the Antidumping Duty Order for ease of reference.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 4

imported product will not be considered a ‘finished goods kit’ and therefore excluded from the scope of the invest igation merely by including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an aluminum extrusion product.” Id.

II

On December 20, 2013, Whirlpool submitted a request for a scope ruling that its kitchen appliance door handles with end caps were not covered by the scope of the Orders. Whirlpool’s December 2013 S cope R equest was expressly
based on a claim that its assem bled handl es were subject
to the finished merchandise exclusion.

On August 4, 2014, Commerce issued its Scope Ruling for Whirlpool’s assembled handles. 2 Commerce found that “the handles at issue do not meet the exclusion criteria for ‘finished merchandise’ and, therefore, are inside the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 340. As a threshold issue, Commerce rejected Whirlpool’s argu ment that the
fasteners excep tion language in the scope only applies in the context of the finished goods kit exclusion and t hat it should not apply in the finished merchandise exclusion. J.A. 342. Commerce found “unconvincing the notion that an unassembled product in kit

- form that consists solely of extruded aluminum, save for fasteners, would .

. . fall inside the scope while the identical product, entering the

2 This August 2014 Scope Ruling also addressed a January 2014 Scope Request from Whirlpool. That r equest dealt with aluminum extruded appliance handles
that consisted of a single aluminum extrusion without end caps or other components. The January 2014 Scope Request is not relevant to the instant appeal, as Whir lpool did not appeal the CIT decision that these handles were covered by the Orders.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 5

United States as an assembled good, would fall outside the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 43.

Becaus e Commerce determined that the fasteners e xceptio n also applies to the finished merchan dise exclusion, it concluded that “the mere inclusion of fasteners, in this case the plastic end caps, does not result in the extruded aluminum handles falling outside the scope of the Orders

as extruded finished merchandise.” J.A. 341. Citing the dictionary definition of a washer, Commerce found that “the end caps .

. . are involved in attaching the handle to the refrigerator door in a manner that allows the handle to fit tightly to the refrig erator door and relieves friction between the door and the handle,” and on that basis found “that the plastic end caps are analogous to a washer.” J.A. 340. Commerce, in a prior scope ruling, had consi dered washers to fall within the scope ’s reference to faste ners. Accordingly, Commerce found “that the handles at issue are comprised entirely of extruded aluminum and fasteners (i.e., plastic end caps).” J.A. 340.

Whirlpool appealed Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling to the CIT. After briefing and oral argument, the CIT issued its February 2016 Remand Order ( Whirlpool
I

). The CIT remanded to Commerce for two reasons. First, the CIT determined that the general scope language of the Orders could not be reasonably interpreted to include Whirlpool’s assemb led handles at all. The CIT noted that “Commerce did not rely on the ‘subassemblies’ provision in the general scope language,” which was “understandable” based on evidence that “the assembled handles are imported in a form in which they require no
further assembly or processing prior to the intended use.”
J.A. 45. Second, the CIT determined that, even if the assembled handles were described by the general scope language, Commerce erroneously determined that the assembled handles do not qualify for the fi nished me rchandise exception because the fasteners exception does not apply to the finished merchandise exclusion

. The CITWHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 6

also determined that Commerce employed flawed logic and ignored record evidence in concluding that the plastic end caps in the assembled handles are “washers” and
therefore “fasteners.”

With respect to the CIT’s second basis for its remand order, it stated that Commerce’s “presum[ption] that the exception for fasteners in the finished goods kit exclusion applies to the finished merch andise exclusion as well .

. . is at odds with established principles of construction.”
J.A. 47

– 48. According to t he CIT

, if “Commerce .

. . had intended to sweep into the scope any assembled good consisting solely of aluminum extrusion components and
fa steners, [it would have] so provide[d] in the scope la nguage. Instead, Commerce expressly confined its ‘ faste ners ’ exception to the finished goods kit exclusion.” J.A. 48.

On remand, Commerce determined, “under respectful protest,” that the assembled h andles were “outside the scope of the Orders because, consistent with the [CIT]’s interpretation of the scope language, there is no general scope language which covers such products.” J.A. 29. Commerce declined to provide any further analysis with

respec t to the finished merchandise exclusion, explaining that “the issue of whether Whirlpool’s handles with end caps are subject to the exclusion for finished merchandise is rendered moot by the [CIT]’s findings and our resulting determination, under protest, that there is no general scope language which covers these products.” J.A. 35.

In its August 2016 Opinion ( Whirlpool II ), the CIT a ffirmed Commerce’s April 2016 Redetermination Decision. This appeal followed. We have subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 7

D ISCUSSION

I

“We apply the same standard of review as the CIT when reviewing a Commerce scope ruling, though we give due respect to the CIT’s informed opinion.” Meridian , 851 F.3d a t 1380 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “Under that standard, we uphold a Commerce scope ruling that is supported ‘by substantial evidence on
the record’ and otherwise ‘in accordance with law.’” Id. (quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)). “Substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Ec kstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States , 254 F.3d 1068, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

There is no specific statutory provision governing the interpretation of the scope of the Orders. Shenyang Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States , 776 F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But Commerce has filled this statutory gap with a regulation, 1 9 C.F.R. § 351.225(k), requiring Commerce to engage in a two

- step process when determining the scope of an order. Id. ; Meridian , 851 F.3d at 1381. First, under § 351.225(k)(1), Commerce must consider the scope language contained in
the o rder, the descrip tions contained in the petition, and how the scope was defined in the investigation and in the determinations issued by Commerce and the ITC. Yuanda , 776 F.3d at 1354. If Commerce concludes the product is, or is not, included within the scope of the
orde r, Commerce issues a final scope ruling. Id. If a § 351.225(k)(1) analysis is not dispositive, however, then Commerce proceeds to an analysis of the DiversifiedWHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 8

Products c riteria under subsection (k)(2) of its regulation. 3
Id.

Commerce’s inquiry begins with the Orders’ scope to determine whether it contains an ambiguity and, thus, is susceptible to interpretation. Meridian , 851 F.3d at 1381. The question of whether the unambiguous terms of a scope control the inquiry, or whether some ambiguity exists, is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 1382. If the scope is unambiguous, the plain meaning of
the Orders’ language governs. Id. at 1381. The question of whether a product meets the unambiguous scope terms then presents a question of fact reviewed for substantial
evidence. Id. at 1382.

Because the meaning and scope of the Orders are i ssues particularly within Commerce’s expertise and special competence, we grant Commerce substantial deference with regard to its interpretation of its own Orders. Id. at
1381

– 82. While Commerce “enjoys substantial freedom to interpret and clarify its antidumping duty orders .

. . , it may not change them.” Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns,
Inc. v. United States , 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995), as corrected on reh’g (Sept. 1, 1995). Accordingly, a final order may not be interpreted “in a way contrary to its terms,” Smith Corona Corp. v. United States , 915 F.2d 683, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1990), nor in a way “so as to change the scope of that order,” Eckstrom Indus.

, 254 F.3d at
1072.

II

This appeal hinges on the interpretation of the O rders

. Accordingly, we must determine whether Commerce

3 Here, Commerce found that i ts § 351.225(k)(1) analysis was dispositive and that it was unnecessary to consider the additional factors specified in § 351.225(k)(2).
J.A. 339.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 9

proper ly interpreted the relevant portions of the Orders and, if so, whether Commerce’s findings as to whether the product meets the scope terms are supported by substa ntial evidence

. We begin our discussion with the Orders’ general scope language followed by the express exclusions from that general scope.

A

According to AEFTC, the CIT erred in its i nterpret ation of the Orders’ general scope language because it “ignores that the scope of the order was intended to cover all aluminum extrusions produced with aluminum alloys commencing with 1, 3, and 6 unless expressly excluded.” Appellant Br. 27. AEFT C maintains that “the scope expressly includes aluminum extrusions, whether further fabricated or not, and even if incorporated into a suba ssembly, as well as aluminum extrusions which are ident ified by reference to their end use (such as kitchen appliance handles), as Commerce acknowledged in its scope ruling.” Id. We agree.

In Whirlpool I , t he CIT examined “whether the ge neral scope language reasonably may be interpreted to include these handles even though the handles are a ssemblies containing an extru sion and various other parts and even though they are imported in a fully

- assembled form, ready for use.” J.A. 43. The CIT determined that “the term ‘extrusion’ is not defined in the general scope language so as to include a good simply because an e xtrud ed aluminum component is present within a good consisting of an assembly.” J.A. 44. Accordingly, the CIT concluded that the general scope language is not reason ably interpreted to include the assembled handles because “[t]he handles at issue are not them selves ‘extrusions’ but rather are assemblies, each of which contains an extr usion, machined and surface

- treated, as the principal component.” J.A. 43. This conclusion is incorrect

.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 10

Although the CIT properly recognized that “the ge neral scope language p rovides that [an aluminum extr usion] remains in the scope even though it has been subjected to one of three specified types of post -extrusion processes,” the CIT erred when it stated that assembly processes were absent from the specified post -extrusion

pro cesses. J.A. 44. The general scope language unambi guously includes aluminum extrusions that are part of an assembly. The Orders explicitly include aluminum extr usions “that are assembled after importation” in addition to “aluminum extrusion components t hat are attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies.” Ant idumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650. Therefore,
the interpretation relied on by the CIT in Whirlpool I was improper, and substantial evidence supports Commerce’s finding in its August 2014 Scope Ruling that the general scope language includes Whirlpool’s assembled handles.

B

W e must next determine whether Commerce, in its August 2014 Scope Ruling

, applied the proper interpret ation of the exclusions to the Orders and, if so, whether substantial evidence supports its finding that the excl usions do not apply.

First, with respect to the f inished goods kit exclusion we agree with the CIT that “[b]ecause Whirlpool’s asse mbled door handles are not imported in disassembled form, the finished goods kit exclusion is inapplicable.” J.A. 47. This exclusion is unambiguous and so the plain meaning of the language of the Orders governs. Meridian , 851 F.3d at 1381. The language of the Orders states that “[t]he scope also excludes finished goods containing al uminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a ‘finished goods kit.’” Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651 (emphasis added). “A finished goods kit is
understo od to mean a packaged combination of parts that contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessaryWHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 11

parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or fabrication.” Id. (emphasis added). Whirlpool’s handles and end caps do not enter unasse mbled as a packaged combination of parts . T hey enter assembled. Accordingly, Whirlpool’s assembled handles do not meet the unambiguous terms of the finished goods
kit exclusion.

Second, with respect to the finished merchandise e xc lusion we also agree with the CIT. The Orders define finished merchandise as “merchandise containing alum inum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and solar panels.” Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. The next two sentences describe a different
exclusion to the Orders

, which excludes finished goods kits, as described above. Id. Following those sentences, the Orders state “[a]n imported product will not be co nsidered a ‘finished goods kit’ and therefore excluded from the scope of the investigation merely by including faste ners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packag ing with an aluminum extrusion product.” Id.

Commerce, in its August 2014 Scope Ruling, rejected Whirlpool’s argument that this fasteners language only applies in the context of the finished goods kit exclusion and that it did not apply in the separate finished me rchandise exclusion. J.A. 342

– 43. Commerce concluded, therefore, that “the mere inclusion of fasteners, in this case the plastic end caps, does not result in the extruded aluminum handles falling outside the scope of the Orders
as extruded finished merchandise.” J.A. 341.

According to the CIT in Whirlpool I

, Commerce erred in its August 2014 Scope Ruling interpretation of the Orders’ scope because Commerce’s “presum[ption] that the exception for fasteners in the finished goods kit excl u-WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 12

sion ap plies to the finished merchandise exclusion as well

. . . is at odds with established principles of construction.”
J.A. 47

– 48. We agree with the CIT.

As noted above, although Commerce “enjoys substa ntial freedom to interpret and clarify its antidumping d uty orders .

. . , it may not change them.” Ericsson , 60 F.3d at 782. Commerce’s interpretation of the fasteners exception and whether it applies to the finished merchandise excl usion is contrary to the terms of the Order s , and is ther efore incorrect. S mith , 915 F.2d at 686.

We first assess whether the plain language of the e xception for fasteners is unambiguous. Meridian , 851 F.3d at 1383. As we have noted, the question of whether some ambiguity exists, is a question of law that we review de

novo. Id. at 1382. We conclude that the exception for fasteners unambiguously applies only to the finished goods kit exclusion and not to the finished merchandise
exclusion for at least three reasons.

First, the single sentence that describes the fasteners

ex ception specifically refers only to a finished goods kit
and does not mention finished merchandise. See Ant idumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. Second, this sentence describes how a product will not be considered a finished good kit “merely by in cluding fasteners .

. . in the packaging .” Id. (emphasis added). This reference to “the packaging” refers back to the finished good kit exclusion where “[a] finished good kit is understood to mean a packaged combination of parts.” Id. (emphasis added). There is no reference to packaging in the finished me rchandise exclusion. Finally, finished merchandise is “fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry,” whereas finished goods kits enter una ssembled as “a packaged combination of p arts.” Id. We find it reasonable that Commerce, in drafting the Orders,
would have elected to treat assembled merchandise differently from goods entering unassembled in kit form.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 13

We therefore agree with the CIT that if Commerce had actually intended to sweep into the scope all finished merchandise consisting solely of aluminum extrusion components and fasteners, it would have done so in the scope language rather than expressly confining its faste ners exception to the finished goods kit exclusion.

Because we conclude that the exception for fasteners is unambiguous, the plain meaning of its language go verns. Meridian , 851 F.3d at 1381. Therefore, the faste ners exception only applies to the finished goods kit
exclusion and it does not apply to the finished mercha ndise exclusion

. Having concluded that Commerce applied an incorrect interpretation of the fasteners exception language of the
Orders , we need not determine whether substantial evidence supports its August 2014 Scope Ruling finding
that Whirlpool’ s assembled handles do not meet the
exclusion criteria for finished merchandise

. 4

B ecause , i n Commerce’s view, the fasteners exception applied to the finished merchandise exclusion, it did not reach a determination in its Scope Ruling as to whether Whirlpool’s assembled handles actually meet the r equirements for the finished merchandise exclusion in the first place. In its April 2016 Redetermination Decision,

4 On appeal, the parties also dispute whether su bstantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination in
its August 2014 Scope Ruling that the plastic end caps contained in Whirlpool’s door handles are fasteners. Because we conclude today that the fastener s exception does not apply to the finished merchandise exclusion, however, the question of whether these end caps fall within the scope language’s reference to “fasteners” is not relevant to determining whether Whirlpool’s assembled handles qualify for the finished merchandise exclusion.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 14

Commerce also declined to address AEFTC’s argument that Whirlpool’s assembled handles should not fall under
the finished merchandise exclusion because they are merely parts of a larger, final finished product (e.g., a refrigerator), and that it is only the larger, final finished

pr oduct itself that is included under the finished me rchandise exclusion. Commerce stated that the question of whether the assembled handles meet the requirements for the finished merchandise exclusion was rendered moot by the CIT’s determination that there is no general scope language which covers these products.

Because Commerce did not reach this determination, the CIT also declined to engage in an analysis of the
finished merchandise exclusion in Whirlpool II . Accor dingly, we do not now, for the first time on appeal, dete rmine whether Whirlpool’s assembled handles meet the requirements for the finished merchandise exclusion, namely whether the assembled handles are “merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry.” Antidumping Duty Order , 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. On remand, Commerce will be given an opportunity to arrive at a legally permissible interpretation of the fi nished merchandise exclusion and Whirlpool’s assembled
handles should be reassessed in light of that interpret ation. See Ericsson , 60 F.3d at 783.

C ONCLUSION

We conclude that substantial evidence supports Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling that the general scope language of the Orders describes Whirlpool’s a ssembled handles. Accordingly, we reverse Whirlpool II affirming Commerce’s April 2016 Redetermination Dec ision and instruct the CIT to vacate Commerce’s April
2016 Redetermination Decision and reinstate the portion of Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling finding that the
assembled handles f a ll within the general scope language

.WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 15

We also vacate those portions of the CIT’s Whirlpool I holding that the general scope language of the Orders did

n ot describe Whirlpool’s assembled handles.

With respect to the exclusions from the Order’s scope, we conclude that the exception for fasteners unambig uously applies only to the finished goods kit exclusion and
not to the finished merchandise exclusion. Fu rther, because the finished goods kit exclusion is inapplicable to Whirlpool’s assembled handles, so too is the fasteners exception to the finished goods kit exclusion. Accordingly, we affirm those portions of Whirlpool I that are consistent
with these co nclusions and instruct the CIT to vacate the
remainder of Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling. 5

Finally, the case is remanded to the CIT for further proceedings, in keeping with this opinion, to determine whether Whirlpool’s assembled handles meet the r equ irements for the finished merchandise exclusion.

AFFIRMED

- IN

- PART, REVERSED

- IN

- PART
VACATED

- IN

- PART, AND REMANDED

C OSTS

The parties shall bear their own costs.

5 These decisions are only reversed or vacated as to those portions addressing Whirlpool’s December 2013 Scope Request pertaining to the assembled handles with end caps. The January 2014 Scope Request, which dealt with aluminum extruded appliance handles that consisted of a single aluminum extrusion without end caps or ot her components, is not addressed by the instant appeal

, as Whirlpool did not appeal the CIT decision that these handles were covered by the Orders.

# United States **Court of Appeals**  **for the Federal Circuit**

______________________

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N, Plaintiff

- Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES, Defendant

ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR TRADE COMMITTEE, Defendant

- Appellant

______________________

2017

- 1117

______________________

Appeal from the United States Court of International
Trade in No. 1:14

- cv

- 00199

- TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C.
Stanceu.

______________________

R EYNA

, C ircuit Judge

, concurring

- in

- part, dissenting

- in

part

. I concur with the majority that “the interpretation relied on by the CIT in Whirlpool I was improper, and substantial evidence supports Commerce’s finding in its August 2014 Scope Ruling that the general scope la nguage includes Whirlpool’s assembled handles. ” Maj. Op.

at 10

.2 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES

The majorit y highlights a fundamental error in the
CIT’s holding that the “ general scope language is not reasonably interpreted to include the assembled handles because ‘[t] he handles at iss ue are not themselves “extr usions ” but rather are assemblies, each of which contains an extrusion, machined and surface

- treated, as the pri ncipal component. ’” Id

. at 9. I agree with the majority that “[t]his conclusion is incorrect.” Id

. The court’s holding that the general scope language is reasonably interpreted to include the Whirlpool handles drives the remainder of the scope review because a scope inquiry first begins by asking whether the good in que stions is covered under the general scope language of the duty order

. The answer here is yes. The next question is
whether a good covered by the general scope language is
excluded under an exclusion provision

. Here, it is un di spute d that the handles a r e not excluded under the fi nished goods k it exclusion. T he majority concludes that Commerce left unanswered the question whether the
finished merchandis e exc lusion applies

, and

, on this basis

, remands so that Commerce may address the applicability
of the finished merchandise exc lusion.

The record is clear, however, that Commerce has a ddressed the question of whether Whirlpool’s handles are
excluded under the finished merchandise exclusion. 1 In

1 This appeal involves the CIT’s judgment on Co mmerce’s initial scope ruling determination and Co mmerce’s remand scope ruling determination. We review
the CIT’s decisions de novo applying to Commerce’s
de termination the same standard of substantial evidence review as used by the CIT in review of Commerce’s scope ruling determination. See King Supply Co., LLC v. Uni ted States , 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In r eviewing the Trade Court’s decision o n the Scope Ruling,WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES 3

its initial scope determination, Commerce determined
that the good in question is a covered good; there are no components or parts included, whether loose or attached. 2 Accordingly, it does not fall under either the finished
merchandise exclusion or the finished goods kits excl usion. See J.A. 34 0 (“ Based on the information provided by Whirlpool . . . we find that the handles at issue are co mprised entirely of extruded aluminum and fasteners ( i.e

. plastic end caps). Therefore, we find the handles do not meet the Department’s first test for determining whether a good constitutes a finish ed good or finished goods kit, as established in the Geodesic Domes Scope Ruling .”).

Commerce explained in it s initial scope ruling that
the difference between “ finished goods ” and “ finished goods kits ” is that the former is assembled upon entry
whil e the latter is unassembled upon entry. J.A. 342

– 43. Commerce found unconvincing the “notion that an una ssembled product in kit

- form that consists solely of extru d-

‘ we step into the shoes of the [ Trade Court ] and apply the
same deferential “ substantial evidence ” standard of review that it applied to its review of Commerce’s dete rmination. ’ We must therefore uphold Commerce’s dete rmination unless the Scope Ruling is unsupported by substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” (quoting Walgreen Co. v. United
States , 620 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (internal citations omitted) ).

2 The Orders define “finished merchandise” as me rchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass plane and backing mat erial, and solar p anels. Antidumping Duty Order

, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651

.4 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATIO N v. UNITED STATES

ed aluminum, save for fasteners, would, per the analysis from the Geodesic Domes Scope Ruli ng, fall inside the scope while the identical product entering the United States as an assembled good, would fall outside the scope
of the Orders .” J.A. 343. Commerce determined that if a product that only consists of aluminum extrusions and fasteners, as in this case, satisfies the finished mercha ndise exclusion, the exclusion would swallow the scope “because any aluminum extrusion products, as long as it can be identified by end use, could be considered a fi nished product.” Id . Commerce reasoned that this cannot be the correct interpretation because it is contrary to the scope itself, which covers aluminum extrusions. Id

. Commerce preserved these factual conclusions when it filed under protest its remand determination pursuant to
the CIT’s remand

. S ee J.A. 22.

I defer to Commerce on interpreting its own ant idumping duty order s and would affirm Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling on the basis that it is not unreasonable and is otherwise supported by substantial
evidence

. See King Supply

, 674 F.3d at 1348 ( “Commerce is entitled to substantial deference with regard to its interpretations of its own antidumping duty orders. This deference is appropriate because the meaning and scope of antidumping orders are issues particularly within the

ex pertise and special competence of Commerce.” (internal citations and quotations omitted) ). Therefore, I respec tfully concur

- in

- part and dissent

- in

- part from the majority opinion.