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520 OCTOBER TERM, 1997

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ALASKA v. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE TRIBAL

GOVERNMENT et al.

certiorari to the united states court of appeals for

the ninth circuit

No. 96–1577. Argued December 10, 1997—Decided February 25, 1998

In 1943, the Secretary of the Interior created a reservation for the

Neets’aii Gwich’in Indians on approximately 1.8 million acres surrounding Venetie and another tribal village in Alaska. In 1971, Congress

enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), which,

inter alia, revoked the Venetie Reservation and all but one of the other

reserves set aside for Native use by legislative or Executive action, 43

U. S. C. § 1618(a); completely extinguished all aboriginal claims to

Alaska land, § 1603; and authorized the transfer of $962.5 million in state

and federal funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska land to

state-chartered private business corporations to be formed by Alaska

Natives, §§ 1605, 1607, 1613. Such corporations received fee simple title

to the transferred land, and no federal restrictions applied to subsequent

land transfers by them. § 1613. In 1973, the two Native corporations

established for the Neets’aii Gwich’in elected to make use of an ANCSA

provision allowing them to take title to former reservation lands in return for forgoing the statute’s monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. See § 1618(b). The United States conveyed fee simple title to the land constituting the former Venetie Reservation to the

corporations as tenants in common; thereafter, they transferred title to

respondent Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe). In

1986, Alaska entered into a joint venture with a private contractor to

construct a public school in Venetie. After the contractor and the State

refused the Tribe’s demand for approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting business on tribal land, the Tribe sought to collect in tribal

court. In the State’s subsequent suit to enjoin collection of the tax, the

Federal District Court held that, because the Tribe’s ANCSA lands

were not “Indian country” within the meaning of 18 U. S. C. § 1151(b),

the Tribe lacked the power to impose a tax upon nonmembers of the

Tribe. The Ninth Circuit disagreed and reversed.

Held: The Tribe’s land is not “Indian country.” Pp. 526–534.

(a) As here relevant, “Indian country” means “all dependent Indian

communities within the...United States . . . .” § 1151(b). “[D]ependent Indian communities” refers to a limited category of Indian lands that

are neither reservations nor allotments (the other categories of Indian
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Syllabus

country set forth in § 1151), and that satisfy two requirements—first,

they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use

of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence. See United States v. Sandoval, 231 U. S. 28, 46, United

States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 449, and United States v. McGowan, 302

U. S. 535, 538–539. Those cases held that these two requirements were

necessary for a finding of “Indian country” generally before § 1151 was

enacted, and Congress codified these requirements in enacting § 1151.

Section 1151 does not purport to alter the cases’ definition of Indian

country. Section 1151(b)’s text, moreover, was taken virtually verbatim from Sandoval, supra, at 46, which language was later quoted in

McGowan, supra, at 538. The legislative history states that § 1151(b)’s

definition is based on those cases, and the requirements are reflected in

§ 1151(b)’s text: The federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land

in question is occupied by an “Indian community”; the federal superintendence requirement guarantees that that community is sufficiently

“dependent” on the Federal Government that the Government and the

Indians involved, rather than the States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land. Pp. 526–531.

(b) The Tribe’s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these requirements. The federal set-aside requirement is not met because ANCSA,

far from designating Alaskan lands for Indian use, revoked all existing

Alaska reservations “set aside by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial Order for Native use,” save one. 43 U. S. C. § 1618(a) (emphasis

added). Congress could not more clearly have departed from its traditional practice of setting aside Indian lands. Cf. Hagen v. Utah, 510

U. S. 399, 401. The difficulty with the Tribe’s argument that the

ANCSA lands were set apart for the use of the Neets’aii Gwich’in, “as

such,” by their acquisition pursuant to § 1618(b) is that ANCSA transferred reservation lands to private, state-chartered Native corporations,

without any restraints on alienation or significant use restrictions, and

with the goal of avoiding “any permanent racially defined institutions,

rights, privileges, or obligations,” § 1601(b); see also §§ 1607, 1613.

Thus, Congress contemplated that non-Natives could own the former

Venetie Reservation, and the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian

purposes.

Equally clearly, ANCSA ended federal superintendence over the

Tribe’s lands by revoking all existing Alaska reservations but one, see

§ 1618(a), and by stating that ANCSA’s settlement provisions were intended to avoid a “lengthy wardship or trusteeship,” § 1601(b). Although ANCSA exempts the Tribe’s land, as long as it has not been

sold, leased, or developed, from adverse possession claims, real property

taxes, and certain judgments, see § 1636(d), these protections simply
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522 ALASKA v. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE

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do not approach the level of active federal control and stewardship

over Indian land that existed in this Court’s prior cases. See, e. g., McGowan, supra, at 537–539. Moreover, Congress’ conveyance of ANCSA

lands to state-chartered and state-regulated private business corporations is hardly a choice that comports with a desire to retain federal

superintendence. The Tribe’s contention that such superintendence is

demonstrated by the Government’s continuing provision of health, social, welfare, and economic programs to the Tribe is unpersuasive because those programs are merely forms of general federal aid, not indicia

of active federal control. Moreover, the argument is severely undercut

by the Tribe’s view of ANCSA’s primary purposes, namely, to effect

Native self-determination and to end paternalism in federal Indian

relations. The broad federal superintendence requirement for Indian

country cuts against these objectives, but this Court is not free to

ignore that requirement as codified in § 1151. Whether the concept of

Indian country should be modified is a question entirely for Congress.

Pp. 532–534.

101 F. 3d 1286, reversed.

Thomas, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

John G. Roberts, Jr., argued the cause for petitioner.

With him on the briefs were Gregory G. Garre, Bruce M.

Botelho, Attorney General of Alaska, Barbara J. Ritchie,

Deputy Attorney General, and D. Rebecca Snow and Elizabeth J. Barry, Assistant Attorneys General.

Heather R. Kendall-Miller argued the cause for respondents. With her on the brief was Lloyd Benton Miller.*

*Briefs of amici curiae urging reversal were filed for the State of California et al. by Daniel E. Lungren, Attorney General of California, and

Thomas F. Gede, Special Assistant Attorney General, and by the Attorneys General for their respective States as follows: Bill Pryor of Alabama,

Grant Woods of Arizona, Gale A. Norton of Colorado, Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut, Robert A. Butterworth of Florida, Jim Ryan of Illinois, Jeffrey A. Modisett of Indiana, Richard P. Ieyoub of Louisiana, Scott

Harshbarger of Massachusetts, Frank J. Kelley of Michigan, Mike Moore

of Mississippi, Jeremiah (Jay) W. Nixon of Missouri, Joseph P. Mazurek

of Montana, Frankie Sue Del Papa of Nevada, Dennis C. Vacco of New

York, Michael F. Easley of North Carolina, Heidi Heitkamp of North Dakota, Mike Fisher of Pennsylvania, Betty D. Montgomery of Ohio, Jeffrey

B. Pine of Rhode Island, Mark Barnett of South Dakota, Jan Graham of

Utah, William H. Sorrell of Vermont, and William U. Hill of Wyoming;
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Opinion of the Court

Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.

In this case, we must decide whether approximately 1.8

million acres of land in northern Alaska, owned in fee simple

by the Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government pursuant to the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, is “Indian

country.” We conclude that it is not, and we therefore reverse the judgment below.

I

The Village of Venetie, which is located in Alaska above

the Arctic Circle, is home to the Neets’aii Gwich’in Indians.

In 1943, the Secretary of the Interior created a reservation

for the Neets’aii Gwich’in out of the land surrounding Venetie and another nearby tribal village, Arctic Village. See

App. to Pet. for Cert. 2a. This land, which is about the

size of Delaware, remained a reservation until 1971, when

Congress enacted the Alaska Native Claims Settlement

Act (ANCSA), a comprehensive statute designed to settle

all land claims by Alaska Natives. See 85 Stat. 688, as

amended, 43 U. S. C. § 1601 et seq.

In enacting ANCSA, Congress sought to end the sort of

federal supervision over Indian affairs that had previously

for the Alaska Fish & Wildlife Federation and Outdoor Council, Inc., et al.

by James Martin Johnson and Gregory Frank Cook; and for the Council

of State Governments et al. by Richard Ruda, Charles F. Lettow, and

Michael R. Lazerwitz.

Briefs of amici curiae urging affirmance were filed for the Navajo Nation et al. by Paul E. Frye, Judith K. Bush, and James R. Bellis; for the

Tanana Chiefs Conference by Bertram E. Hirsch, Michael J. Walleri,

Bruce J. Ennis, Jr., and Thomas Perrelli; for Koniag, Inc., by R. Collin

Middleton, William H. Timme, and Timothy W. Seaver; and for Indian

Law Professors by Richard B. Collins, David H. Getches, Raphael J.

Moses, Robert N. Clinton, Carole E. Goldberg, and Ralph W. Johnson.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed for the Alaska Federation of Natives

et al. by Arlinda F. Locklear, David S. Case, Carol H. Daniel, Douglas

Pope, Hans Walker, Jr., and Marsha Kostura Schmidt; for the Metlakatla

Indian Community by S. Bobo Dean and Marsha Kostura Schmidt; and

for Shee Atika, Inc., by Bruce N. Edwards.
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524 ALASKA v. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE

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marked federal Indian policy. ANCSA’s text states that the

settlement of the land claims was to be accomplished

“without litigation, with maximum participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property,

without establishing any permanent racially defined institutions, rights, privileges, or obligations, [and] without creating a reservation system or lengthy wardship

or trusteeship.” § 1601(b) (emphasis added).

To this end, ANCSA revoked “the various reserves set

aside . . . for Native use” by legislative or Executive action,

except for the Annette Island Reserve inhabited by the Metlakatla Indians, and completely extinguished all aboriginal

claims to Alaska land. §§ 1603, 1618(a). In return, Congress authorized the transfer of $962.5 million in state and

federal funds and approximately 44 million acres of Alaska

land to state-chartered private business corporations that

were to be formed pursuant to the statute; all of the shareholders of these corporations were required to be Alaska Natives. §§ 1605, 1607, 1613. The ANCSA corporations received title to the transferred land in fee simple, and no

federal restrictions applied to subsequent land transfers by

them.

Pursuant to ANCSA, two Native corporations were established for the Neets’aii Gwich’in, one in Venetie, and one in

Arctic Village. In 1973, those corporations elected to make

use of a provision in ANCSA allowing Native corporations

to take title to former reservation lands set aside for Indians

prior to 1971, in return for forgoing the statute’s monetary payments and transfers of nonreservation land. See

§ 1618(b). The United States conveyed fee simple title to

the land constituting the former Venetie Reservation to the

two corporations as tenants in common; thereafter, the corporations transferred title to the land to the Native Village

of Venetie Tribal Government (Tribe).
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In 1986, the State of Alaska entered into a joint venture

agreement with a private contractor for the construction of

a public school in Venetie, financed with state funds. In December 1986, the Tribe notified the contractor that it owed

the Tribe approximately $161,000 in taxes for conducting

business activities on the Tribe’s land. When both the contractor and the State, which under the joint venture agreement was the party responsible for paying the tax, refused

to pay, the Tribe attempted to collect the tax in tribal court

from the State, the school district, and the contractor.

The State then filed suit in Federal District Court for the

District of Alaska and sought to enjoin collection of the tax.

The Tribe moved to dismiss the State’s complaint, but the

District Court denied the motion. It held that the Tribe’s

ANCSA lands were not Indian country within the meaning

of 18 U. S. C. § 1151(b), which provides that Indian country

includes all “dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States”; as a result, “the Trib[e] [did] not

have the power to impose a tax upon non-members of the

tribe such as the plaintiffs.” Alaska ex rel. Yukon Flats

School Dist. v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Government, No. F87–0051 CV (HRH) (D. Alaska, Aug. 2, 1995),

App. to Pet. for Cert. 79a.

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 101

F. 3d 1286 (1996). The Court held that a six-factor balancing

test should be used to interpret the term “dependent Indian

communities” in § 1151(b), see id., at 1292–1293, and it summarized the requirements of that test as follows:

“[A] dependent Indian community requires a showing

of federal set aside and federal superintendence. These

requirements are to be construed broadly and should be

informed in the particular case by a consideration of the

following factors:

“(1) the nature of the area; (2) the relationship of the

area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government; (3) the established practice of government agen-
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cies toward that area; (4) the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area; (5) the degree of

cohesiveness of the area inhabitants; and (6) the extent

to which the area was set aside for the use, occupancy,

and protection of dependent Indian peoples.” Id., at

1294.

Applying this test, the Court of Appeals concluded that the

“federal set aside” and “federal superintendence” requirements were met and that the Tribe’s land was therefore Indian country. Id., at 1300–1302.

Judge Fernandez wrote separately. In his view, ANCSA

was intended to be a departure from traditional Indian policy: “It attempted to preserve Indian tribes, but simultaneously attempted to sever them from the land; it attempted

to leave them as sovereign entities for some purposes, but as

sovereigns without territorial reach.” Id., at 1303. Noting

that the majority’s holding called into question the status of

all 44 million acres of land conveyed by ANCSA, he wrote

that “[w]ere we writing on a clean slate, I would eschew the

tribe’s request and would avoid creating the kind of chaos

that the 92nd Congress wisely sought to avoid.” Id., at

1304. He nonetheless concluded that Ninth Circuit precedent required him to concur in the result. Ibid. We

granted certiorari to determine whether the Court of Appeals correctly determined that the Tribe’s land is Indian

country. 521 U. S. 1103 (1997).

II

A

“Indian country” is currently defined at 18 U. S. C. § 1151.

In relevant part, the statute provides:

“[T]he term ‘Indian country’... means (a) all land

within the limits of any Indian reservation under the

jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . , (b)

all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
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the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within

or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the

same.”

Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal

criminal jurisdiction, we have recognized that it also generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction such as the one

at issue here. See DeCoteau v. District County Court for

Tenth Judicial Dist., 420 U. S. 425, 427, n. 2 (1975).1

Because ANCSA revoked the Venetie Reservation, and

because no Indian allotments are at issue, whether the

Tribe’s land is Indian country depends on whether it falls

within the “dependent Indian communities” prong of the

statute, § 1151(b).2 Since 18 U. S. C. § 1151 was enacted

in 1948, we have not had an occasion to interpret the term

“dependent Indian communities.” We now hold that it refers to a limited category of Indian lands that are neither

reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirements––first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land;

second, they must be under federal superintendence. Our

holding is based on our conclusion that in enacting § 1151,

Congress codified these two requirements, which previously

we had held necessary for a finding of “Indian country”

generally.

1 Generally speaking, primary jurisdiction over land that is Indian country rests with the Federal Government and the Indian tribe inhabiting it,

and not with the States. See, e. g., South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe,

ante, at 343. 2 As noted, only one Indian reservation, the Annette Island Reserve,

survived ANCSA. Other Indian country exists in Alaska post-ANCSA

only if the land in question meets the requirements of a “dependent Indian

communit[y]” under our interpretation of § 1151(b), or if it constitutes

“allotments” under § 1151(c).
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Before § 1151 was enacted, we held in three cases that Indian lands that were not reservations could be Indian country and that the Federal Government could therefore exercise jurisdiction over them. See United States v. Sandoval,

231 U. S. 28 (1913); United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442

(1914); United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535 (1938).3

The first of these cases, United States v. Sandoval, posed the

question whether the Federal Government could constitutionally proscribe the introduction of “intoxicating liquor”

into the lands of the Pueblo Indians. 231 U. S., at 36. We

rejected the contention that federal power could not extend

to the Pueblo lands because, unlike Indians living on reservations, the Pueblos owned their lands in fee simple. Id., at

48. We indicated that the Pueblos’ title was not fee simple

title in the commonly understood sense of the term. Congress had recognized the Pueblos’ title to their ancestral

lands by statute, and Executive orders had reserved additional public lands “for the [Pueblos’] use and occupancy.”

Id., at 39. In addition, Congress had enacted legislation

with respect to the lands “in the exercise of the Government’s guardianship over th[e] [Indian] tribes and their affairs,” id., at 48, including federal restrictions on the lands’

alienation.4 Congress therefore could exercise jurisdiction

over the Pueblo lands, under its general power over “all

dependent Indian communities within its borders, whether

within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without the limits of a State.”

Id., at 46.

3 We had also held, not surprisingly, that Indian reservations were

Indian country. See, e. g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 269

(1913). 4 One such law was Rev. Stat. § 2116, 25 U. S. C. § 177, which rendered

invalid any conveyance of Indian land not made by treaty or convention

entered into pursuant to the Constitution, and which we later held applicable to the Pueblos. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U. S. 432,

441–442 (1926).
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In United States v. Pelican, we held that Indian allotments––parcels of land created out of a diminished Indian

reservation and held in trust by the Federal Government for

the benefit of individual Indians––were Indian country. 232

U. S., at 449. We stated that the original reservation was

Indian country “simply because it had been validly set apart

for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government.” Ibid. (emphasis added). After

the reservation’s diminishment, the allotments continued to

be Indian country, as “the lands remained Indian lands set

apart for Indians under governmental care; . . . we are unable

to find ground for the conclusion that they became other than

Indian country through the distribution into separate holdings, the Government retaining control.” Ibid.

In United States v. McGowan, we held that the Reno

Indian Colony in Reno, Nevada, was Indian country even

though it was not a reservation. 302 U. S., at 539. We reasoned that, like Indian reservations generally, the colony had

been “ ‘validly set apart for the use of the Indians . . . under

the superintendence of the Government.’ ” Ibid. (quoting

United States v. Pelican, supra, at 449) (emphasis deleted).

We noted that the Federal Government had created the colony by purchasing the land with “funds appropriated by Congress” and that the Federal Government held the colony’s

land in trust for the benefit of the Indians residing there.

302 U. S., at 537, and n. 4. We also emphasized that the

Federal Government possessed the authority to enact “regulations and protective laws respecting th[e] [colony’s] territory,” id., at 539, which it had exercised in retaining title to

the land and permitting the Indians to live there. For these

reasons, a federal statute requiring the forfeiture of automobiles carrying “intoxicants” into the Indian country applied

to the colony; we noted that the law was an example of the

protections that Congress had extended to all “ ‘dependent

Indian communities’ ” within the territory of the United
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States. Id., at 538 (quoting United States v. Sandoval,

supra, at 46) (emphasis deleted).

In each of these cases, therefore, we relied upon a finding

of both a federal set-aside and federal superintendence in

concluding that the Indian lands in question constituted Indian country and that it was permissible for the Federal Government to exercise jurisdiction over them. Section 1151

does not purport to alter this definition of Indian country, but

merely lists the three different categories of Indian country

mentioned in our prior cases: Indian reservations, see Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243, 269 (1913); dependent

Indian communities, see United States v. McGowan, supra,

at 538–539; United States v. Sandoval, supra, at 46; and allotments, see United States v. Pelican, supra, at 449. The

entire text of § 1151(b), and not just the term “dependent

Indian communities,” is taken virtually verbatim from Sandoval, which language we later quoted in McGowan. See

United States v. Sandoval, supra, at 46; United States v. McGowan, supra, at 538. Moreover, the Historical and Revision Notes to the statute that enacted § 1151 state that

§ 1151’s definition of Indian country is based “on [the] latest

construction of the term by the United States Supreme

Court in U. S. v. McGowan . . . following U. S. v. Sandoval.

(See also Donnelly v. U. S.).... Indian allotments were

included in the definition on authority of the case of U. S. v.

Pelican.” See Notes to 1948 Act, following 18 U. S. C.

§ 1151, p. 276 (citations omitted).

We therefore must conclude that in enacting § 1151(b),

Congress indicated that a federal set-aside and a federal superintendence requirement must be satisfied for a finding of

a “dependent Indian community”––just as those requirements had to be met for a finding of Indian country before

18 U. S. C. § 1151 was enacted.5 These requirements are re5 In attempting to defend the Court of Appeals’ judgment, the Tribe

asks us to adopt a different conception of the term “dependent Indian

communities.” Borrowing from Chief Justice Marshall’s seminal opinions
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flected in the text of § 1151(b): The federal set-aside requirement ensures that the land in question is occupied by an

“Indian community”; 6 the federal superintendence requirement guarantees that the Indian community is sufficiently

“dependent” on the Federal Government that the Federal

Government and the Indians involved, rather than the

States, are to exercise primary jurisdiction over the land in

question.7

in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 5 Pet. 1 (1831), and Worcester v. Georgia,

6 Pet. 515 (1832), the Tribe argues that the term refers to political dependence, and that Indian country exists wherever land is owned by a

federally recognized tribe. Federally recognized tribes, the Tribe contends, are “domestic dependent nations,” Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,

supra, at 17, and thus ipso facto under the superintendence of the Federal

Government. See Brief for Respondents 23–24.

This argument ignores our Indian country precedents, which indicate

both that the Federal Government must take some action setting apart

the land for the use of the Indians “as such,” and that it is the land in

question, and not merely the Indian tribe inhabiting it, that must be under

the superintendence of the Federal Government. See, e. g., United States

v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535, 539 (1938) (“The Reno Colony has been validly

set apart for the use of the Indians. It is under the superintendence of

the Government. The Government retains title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy”); United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442, 449

(1914) (noting that the Federal Government retained “ultimate control”

over the allotments in question). 6 The federal set-aside requirement also reflects the fact that because

Congress has plenary power over Indian affairs, see U. S. Const., Art. I,

§ 8, cl. 3, some explicit action by Congress (or the Executive, acting under

delegated authority) must be taken to create or to recognize Indian

country. 7 Although the Court of Appeals majority also reached the conclusion

that § 1151(b) imposes federal set-aside and federal superintendence requirements, it defined those requirements far differently, by resort to its

“textured” six-factor balancing test. See 101 F. 3d 1286, 1293 (CA9 1996).

Three of those factors, however, were extremely far removed from the

requirements themselves: “the nature of the area”; “the relationship of

the area inhabitants to Indian tribes and the federal government”; and

“the degree of cohesiveness of the area inhabitants.” Id., at 1300–1301.

The Court of Appeals majority, however, accorded those factors virtually
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B

The Tribe’s ANCSA lands do not satisfy either of these

requirements. After the enactment of ANCSA, the Tribe’s

lands are neither “validly set apart for the use of the Indians

as such,” nor are they under the superintendence of the Federal Government.

With respect to the federal set-aside requirement, it is significant that ANCSA, far from designating Alaskan lands for

Indian use, revoked the existing Venetie Reservation, and

indeed revoked all existing reservations in Alaska “set aside

by legislation or by Executive or Secretarial Order for Native use,” save one. 43 U. S. C. § 1618(a) (emphasis added).

In no clearer fashion could Congress have departed from its

traditional practice of setting aside Indian lands. Cf. Hagen

v. Utah, 510 U. S. 399, 401 (1994) (holding that by diminishing

a reservation and opening the diminished lands to settlement

by non-Indians, Congress had extinguished Indian country

on the diminished lands).

The Tribe argues––and the Court of Appeals majority

agreed, see 101 F. 3d, at 1301–1302––that the ANCSA lands

were set apart for the use of the Neets’aii Gwich’in, “as

such,” because the Neets’aii Gwich’in acquired the lands pursuant to an ANCSA provision allowing Natives to take title

to former reservation lands in return for forgoing all other

ANCSA transfers. Brief for Respondents 40–41 (citing 43

U. S. C. § 1618(b)). The difficulty with this contention is that

ANCSA transferred reservation lands to private, statechartered Native corporations, without any restraints on

alienation or significant use restrictions, and with the goal of

avoiding “any permanent racially defined institutions, rights,

the same weight as other, more relevant ones: “the degree of federal ownership of and control over the area,” and “the extent to which the area

was set aside for the use, occupancy, and protection of dependent Indian

peoples.” Id., at 1301. By balancing these “factors” against one another,

the Court of Appeals reduced the federal set-aside and superintendence

requirements to mere considerations.
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privileges, or obligations.” § 1601(b); see also §§ 1607, 1613.

By ANCSA’s very design, Native corporations can immediately convey former reservation lands to non-Natives,

and such corporations are not restricted to using those lands

for Indian purposes. Because Congress contemplated that

non-Natives could own the former Venetie Reservation, and

because the Tribe is free to use it for non-Indian purposes,

we must conclude that the federal set-aside requirement is

not met. Cf. United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S., at 538

(noting that the land constituting the Reno Indian Colony

was held in trust by the Federal Government for the benefit

of the Indians); see also United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S.,

at 447 (noting federal restraints on the alienation of the allotments in question).

Equally clearly, ANCSA ended federal superintendence

over the Tribe’s lands. As noted above, ANCSA revoked

the Venetie Reservation along with every other reservation

in Alaska but one, see 43 U. S. C. § 1618(a), and Congress

stated explicitly that ANCSA’s settlement provisions were

intended to avoid a “lengthy wardship or trusteeship.”

§ 1601(b). After ANCSA, federal protection of the Tribe’s

land is essentially limited to a statutory declaration that the

land is exempt from adverse possession claims, real property

taxes, and certain judgments as long as it has not been sold,

leased, or developed. See § 1636(d). These protections, if

they can be called that, simply do not approach the level of

superintendence over the Indians’ land that existed in our

prior cases. In each of those cases, the Federal Government

actively controlled the lands in question, effectively acting as

a guardian for the Indians. See United States v. McGowan,

supra, at 537–539 (emphasizing that the Federal Government

had retained title to the land to protect the Indians living

there); United States v. Pelican, supra, at 447 (stating that

the allotments were “under the jurisdiction and control of

Congress for all governmental purposes, relating to the

guardianship and protection of the Indians”); United States
522US2 Unit: $U29 [01-28-00 17:41:19] PAGES PGT: OPIN

534 ALASKA v. NATIVE VILLAGE OF VENETIE

TRIBAL GOVERNMENT

Opinion of the Court

v. Sandoval, 231 U. S., at 37, n. 1 (citing federal statute placing the Pueblos’ land under the “ ‘absolute jurisdiction and

control of the Congress of the United States’ ”). Finally, it

is worth noting that Congress conveyed ANCSA lands to

state-chartered and state-regulated private business corporations, hardly a choice that comports with a desire to retain

federal superintendence over the land.

The Tribe contends that the requisite federal superintendence is present because the Federal Government provides

“desperately needed health, social, welfare, and economic

programs” to the Tribe. Brief for Respondents 28. The

Court of Appeals majority found this argument persuasive.

101 F. 3d, at 1301. Our Indian country precedents, however,

do not suggest that the mere provision of “desperately

needed” social programs can support a finding of Indian

country. Such health, education, and welfare benefits are

merely forms of general federal aid; considered either alone

or in tandem with ANCSA’s minimal land-related protections, they are not indicia of active federal control over

the Tribe’s land sufficient to support a finding of federal

superintendence.

The Tribe’s federal superintendence argument, moreover,

is severely undercut by its view of ANCSA’s primary purposes, namely, to effect Native self-determination and to end

paternalism in federal Indian relations. See, e. g., Brief for

Respondents 44 (noting that ANCSA’s land transfers “foster[ed] greater tribal self-determination” and “renounc[ed]

[Bureau of Indian Affairs] paternalism”). The broad federal

superintendence requirement for Indian country cuts against

these objectives, but we are not free to ignore that requirement as codified in 18 U. S. C. § 1151. Whether the concept

of Indian country should be modified is a question entirely

for Congress.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

It is so ordered.