SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department

461 

KA 10-02425 

PRESENT: SCUDDER, P.J., FAHEY, LINDLEY, AND MARTOCHE, JJ.

 

 

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, RESPONDENT, 

V MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

THOMAS A. CULVER, JR., DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

 

BRIDGET L. FIELD, ROCHESTER, FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT. 

LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, BATAVIA (WILLIAM G. ZICKL OF

COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT. 

 

Appeal from a judgment of the Genesee County Court (Robert C.

Noonan, J.), rendered July 6, 2010. The judgment convicted defendant,

upon his plea of guilty, of grand larceny in the fourth degree. 

It is hereby ORDERED that the judgment so appealed from is

unanimously affirmed. 

Memorandum: On appeal from a judgment convicting him upon his

plea of guilty of grand larceny in the fourth degree (Penal Law §

155.30 [1]), defendant contends that he was denied effective

assistance of counsel. We reject that contention. Defendant’s

contention “ ‘survives his guilty plea only to the extent that

defendant contends that his plea was infected by the alleged

ineffective assistance’ ” (People v Garner, 86 AD3d 955, 956; see

People v Gleen, 73 AD3d 1443, 1444, lv denied 15 NY3d 773). “In the

context of a guilty plea, a defendant has been afforded meaningful

representation when he or she receives an advantageous plea and

nothing in the record casts doubt on the apparent effectiveness of

[defense] counsel” (People v Ford, 86 NY2d 397, 404), and upon our

review of the record we conclude that defendant was afforded such

meaningful representation here. “ ‘To the extent that defendant

contends that defense counsel was ineffective because he coerced

defendant into pleading guilty, that contention is belied by

defendant’s statement during the plea colloquy that the plea was not

the result of any [force] or coercion’ ” (Garner, 86 AD3d at 956), and

by his statement “that he was satisfied with the representation of

defense counsel” (People v Strasser, 83 AD3d 1411, 1411). Under the

circumstances of this case, we reject defendant’s contention that

defense counsel was ineffective when defense counsel allegedly induced

defendant to plead guilty by misinforming him of his sentence exposure

(see generally Ford, 86 NY2d at 404). Misinformation as to the

possible sentence to which a defendant is exposed “is [a] factor which

must be considered by the court [in determining whether a plea was
-2- 461 

KA 10-02425 

knowing, intelligent and voluntary and thus whether the plea was

infected by the misinformation, rendering defense counsel

ineffective], but it is not, in and of itself, dispositive” (People v

Garcia, 92 NY2d 869, 870; see People v Morrison, 78 AD3d 1615, 1616,

lv denied 16 NY3d 834). Indeed, “[w]hether a plea was knowing,

intelligent and voluntary is dependent upon a number of factors[,]

including the nature and terms of the agreement, the reasonableness of

the bargain, and the age and experience of the accused” (Garcia, 92

NY2d at 870; see Morrison, 78 AD3d at 1616). To the extent that

defendant’s contention that he was denied effective assistance of

counsel is based on matters outside the record, it must be raised by

way of a motion pursuant to CPL article 440 (see People v Johnson, 81

AD3d 1428, 1428, lv denied 16 NY3d 896; People v Joyner, 19 AD3d 1129,

1130). Finally, the sentence is not unduly harsh or severe.

Entered: April 20, 2012 Frances E. Cafarell

Clerk of the Court