Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 14 / Friday, January 21, 2022 / Notices 3343 

*A I have made minor modifications to the RD. I 

have substituted initials or titles for the names of 

witnesses and patients to protect their privacy and 

I have made minor, nonsubstantive, grammatical 

changes and nonsubstantive, conforming edits. 

Where I have made substantive changes, omitted 

language for brevity or relevance, or where I have 

added to or modified the ALJ’s opinion, I have 

noted the edits with an asterisk, and I have 

included specific descriptions of the modifications 

in brackets following the asterisk or in footnotes 

marked with a letter and an asterisk. Within those 

brackets and footnotes, the use of the personal 

pronoun ‘‘I’’ refers to myself—the Administrator. 

*B I have omitted a section of the RD’s discussion 

of the procedural history to avoid repetition with 

my introduction. 

1Respondent was advised during the Prehearing 

Conference that, under 21 CFR 1316.50, he had the 

right to seek representation by a qualified attorney 

at his own expense. Respondent was also advised 

that, if he continued to represent himself, he would 

be held to the same standards and procedural 

requirements of an attorney, including adherence to 

the procedural orders and rulings of this tribunal 

and to the procedural rules set forth in 21 CFR 

1316.41–1316.68. ALJ Ex. 13 at 2, n.3. During the 

merits hearing, Respondent acknowledged that he 

had been so advised and confirmed that he wanted 

to proceed pro se. Tr. 7–8. 

2Respondent failed to submit a Prehearing 

Statement by the December 29, 2020, deadline set 

out in this tribunal’s Order for Prehearing 

Statements. ALJ Ex. 3. The tribunal then issued an 

Order Directing Compliance, which gave 

Respondent until January 4, 2021, to show good 

cause as to why he did not comply with the Order 

for Prehearing Statements. ALJ Ex. 7. Respondent 

then filed a Prehearing Statement on January 4, 

2021, but did not offer any attempt to show good 

cause for his late filing. ALJ Ex. 8. The tribunal 

issued a Second Order Directing Compliance on 

January 4, 2021, requiring Respondent to show good 

cause. ALJ Ex. 9. Respondent then filed a document 

styled ‘‘Requisite Good Cause for Late Filing,’’ in 

which he purported to show good cause. ALJ Ex. 

10. Thereafter, the tribunal issued an Order 

Regarding Respondent’s Late Filed Prehearing 

Statement, which set out several of Respondent’s 

failures to comply with the Order for Prehearing 

Statements, including late filings and at least two 

failures to serve pleadings on opposing counsel. 

ALJ Ex. 11. The Order also directed Respondent to 

file a Prehearing Statement in compliance with the 

Order for Prehearing Statements by January 11, 

2021. Id. Respondent finally did file a compliant 

Prehearing Statement on January 10, 2021. ALJ Ex. 

12. 

find that there is clear, convincing, and 

unequivocal evidence in the record 

supporting denial of Applicant’s 

application based on his material 

falsification of his application. 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(1). 

C. Sanction 

Here, there is no dispute in the record 

that Applicant is mandatorily excluded 

pursuant to Section 1320a–7(a) of Title 

42, and, further that Applicant 

materially falsified his application for a 

controlled substance registration, and 

therefore, that grounds for the denial of 

Applicant’s application exist. Where, as 

here, the Government has met its prima 

facie burden of showing that grounds 

for denial exist, the burden shifts to the 

Applicant to show why he can be 

entrusted with a registration. Garrett 

Howard Smith, M.D., 83 FR 18,882, 

18,910 (2018) (collecting cases). 

In this case, Applicant failed to 

respond to the Government’s Order to 

Show Cause and did not avail himself 

of the opportunity to refute the 

Government’s case. See RFAA, at 2. 

Therefore, Applicant has not provided 

any remorse or assurances that he 

would implement remedial measures to 

ensure such conduct is not repeated. 

Such silence weighs against the 

Applicant’s registration. Zvi H. Perper, 

M.D., 77 FR at 64,142, citing Medicine 

Shoppe, 73 FR at 387; see also Samuel 

S. Jackson, 72 FR at 23,853. Further, due 

to the lack of a statement or testimony 

from Applicant, it is unclear whether 

Applicant can be entrusted with a DEA 

registration; and therefore, I find that 

sanction is appropriate to protect the 

public from a recurrence of Applicant’s 

unlawful actions in the context of his 

CSA registration. See Leo R. Miller, 

M.D., 53 FR 21,931, 21,932 (1988). 

Consequently, I find that the factors 

weigh in favor of sanction and I shall 

order the sanctions the Government 

requested, as contained in the Order 

below. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

823(f) and 21 U.S.C. 824(a), I hereby 

deny the pending application for a 

Certificate of Registration, Control 

Number H21079595C, submitted by 

Daniel R. Nevarre, M.D., as well as any 

other pending application of Daniel R. 

Nevarre, M.D. for additional registration 

in Utah. This Order is effective [insert 

Date Thirty Days From the Date of 

Publication in the Federal Register]. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–01112 Filed 1–20–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 21–5] 

Stephen E. Owusu, D.P.M.; Decision 

and Order 

On October 22, 2020, a former 

Assistant Administrator, Diversion 

Control Division, of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration 

(hereinafter, DEA or Government), 

issued an Order to Show Cause 

(hereinafter, OSC) to Stephen E. Owusu, 

D.P.M. (hereinafter, Respondent) of 

Brooklyn, New York. Administrative 

Law Judge Exhibit (hereinafter, ALJX) 1 

(OSC), at 1. The OSC proposed the 

denial of Respondent’s application for 

DEA Certificate of Registration No. 

W19061136C (hereinafter, COR or 

registration) and the denial of any 

applications for any other DEA 

registrations pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2) and 824(a)(5) because 

Respondent was convicted of a felony 

related to controlled substances and 

because Respondent has been excluded 

from participation in Medicare, 

Medicaid, and all federal health care 

programs pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1320a– 

7(a). Id. 

On November 23, 2020, the 

Respondent timely requested a hearing, 

which commenced (and ended) on 

February 17, 2021, at the DEA Hearing 

Facility in Arlington, Virginia with the 

parties, counsel, and witnesses 

participating via video teleconference 

(VTC). On April 9, 2021, Administrative 

Law Judge Teresa A. Wallbaum 

(hereinafter, the ALJ) issued her 

Recommended Rulings, Findings of 

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision 

of the Administrative Law Judge 

(hereinafter, Recommended Decision or 

RD). By letter dated May 4, 2021, the 

ALJ certified and transmitted the record 

to me for final Agency action. In the 

letter, the ALJ advised that neither party 

filed exceptions. Having reviewed the 

entire record, I adopt the ALJ’s rulings, 

findings of fact, as modified, 

conclusions of law and recommended 

sanction with minor modifications, 

where noted herein.*A

Recommended Rulings, Findings of 

Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision 

of the Administrative Law Judge 

Teresa A. Wallbaum; Administrative 

Law Judge 

April 9, 2021 

*B Respondent proceeded pro se 

throughout the entire case.1 Respondent 

timely filed a Request for Hearing. A 

Prehearing Conference was conducted 

on January 12, 2021, via VTC. 2A 

hearing on the merits of the OSC 

allegations was conducted on February 

17, 2021, via VTC at the DEA Hearing 

Facility in Arlington, Virginia. The 

Government filed a Post-Hearing Brief 

on March 26, 2021. 

The issue to be ultimately decided by 

the Acting Administrator, with the 

assistance of this Recommended 

Decision, is whether Respondent’s 

application should be denied based 


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3After conducting the merits hearing in this case, 

the tribunal mailed a hard copy of the transcript of 

the hearing to both parties. Despite two separate 

delivery attempts, the hard copy could not be 

delivered to Respondent’s address. Chambers 

reached out to Respondent to confirm his address, 

but delivery was never effectuated. Respondent 

was, however, provided with an electronic version 

of the transcript and had an opportunity to submit 

corrections to the transcript. 

4United States v. Stephen Owusu, No. 2:11–CR– 

0709–001 (LDW) (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017). 

5Respondent has stipulated to the factual basis 

underlying this allegation. See Stip. 5. 

6Respondent has stipulated to the factual basis 

underlying this allegation. See Stip. 5. 

7Specifically, the testimony from the GS laid the 

foundation for Government Exhibits 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 

and 9. Tr. 24–26, 28–29, 31–33, 34–35, 36–39, 40– 

41, 42–43. 

8Respondent also stipulated to this conviction. 

See Stip. 3, infra. 

9Respondent did not object to the admission of 

any exhibit offered by the Government. Tr. 26, 30, 

33, 35, 39, 42, 43–44. 

upon his felony conviction related to 

controlled substances and/or his 

exclusion from participation in a federal 

health care program pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 1320a–7(a). 

After carefully considering the 

testimony elicited at the hearing, the 

admitted exhibits, the arguments of 

counsel, and the record as a whole, I 

have set forth my recommended 

findings of fact and conclusions of law 

below.3

I. Findings of Fact 

A. Allegations 

The Government alleges that the 

denial of Respondent’s application is 

supported by incontrovertible record 

evidence that he has been both 

convicted of a felony related to 

controlled substances and excluded 

from participation in a federal health 

care program. ALJ Ex. 1. The 

Government further alleges that 

judgment was entered against 

Respondent in the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of New 

York after pleading guilty to one count 

of Conspiracy to Distribute Oxycodone, 

a Class C Felony, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. 841(a), (b)(1)(C), and 846.4 The 

Government also alleges that the U.S. 

Department of Health and Human 

Services, Office of Inspector General 

(HHS/OIG) mandatorily excluded 

Respondent from participation in 

Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal 

health care programs pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 1320a–7(a).5 According to the 

Government, this exclusion was 

effective as of October 19, 2017, and 

runs for a period of five years.6 ALJ Ex. 

1. 

B. Stipulations 

The following stipulations were 

mutually agreed upon by the parties and 

are conclusively accepted as fact in 

these proceedings: 

1. On or about June 12, 2019, Respondent 

filed with the DEA an application for 

registration as a practitioner in Schedules II 

through V pursuant to DEA control number 

W19061136C, with a proposed registered 

address of 106 Pennsylvania Ave., Suite 1, 

Brooklyn, NY 11207–2427. 

2. On or about July 19, 2011, Respondent 

surrendered for cause his previous DEA 

registration, No. BO3613331. 

3. On June 13, 2017, Judgment was entered 

against Respondent in the United States 

District Court for the Eastern District of New 

York after Respondent pleaded guilty to one 

count of ‘‘Conspiracy to Distribute 

Oxycodone, a Class C Felony,’’ in violation 

of 21 U.S.C. 841(a), (b)(1)(C), and 846. United 

States v. Stephen Owusu, No. 2:11–CR– 

0709–001 (LDW) (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017). 

4. Based on Respondent’s conviction, the 

New York State Office of the Medicaid 

Inspector General excluded Respondent from 

participation in the New York Medicaid 

program. The exclusion was effective August 

30, 2017. 

5. Based on Respondent’s conviction, the 

U.S. Department of Health and Human 

Services, Office of Inspector General (HHS/ 

OIG), mandatorily excluded Respondent from 

participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all 

federal health care programs pursuant to 42 

U.S.C. 1320a–7(a). The exclusion was 

effective on October 19, 2017, and runs for 

a period of five years. 

6. Reinstatement of eligibility to participate 

in Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal health 

care programs after exclusion by HHS/OIG is 

not automatic. 

7. Respondent is currently excluded from 

participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and all 

federal health care programs. 

C. Government’s Case-in-Chief 

The Government’s case-in-chief 

consisted of the testimony of a single 

witness, a DEA Diversion Group 

Supervisor (hereinafter, the GS). The GS 

testified that her duty station is the New 

York Field Division, located in New 

York City, where she has served in her 

capacity as a group supervisor for 

approximately one year. Tr. 21–22. 

Before the GS was promoted to group 

supervisor, she worked as a Diversion 

Investigator for approximately 24 Years. 

Tr. 22. In her position as a group 

supervisor, the GS is required to 

undergo periodic training as a part of 

her duties. Tr. 23. Further, she has been 

involved in over 200 DEA investigations 

throughout her career. Id. 

Respondent came to the attention of 

the GS when she was assigned his 

application for DEA registration. Tr. 24. 

The GS also testified that she 

interviewed Respondent on two 

occasions. Id. Through the testimony of 

the GS, the Government laid the 

foundation for the introduction of 

multiple exhibits in support of its 

allegations.7

The parties agree, and the evidence 

demonstrates, that, on June 13, 2017, 

Respondent pleaded guilty to one count 

of Conspiracy to Distribute Oxycodone, 

a Class C Felony, in violation of 21 

U.S.C. 841(a), (b)(1)(C), and 846. Gov. 

Ex. 5, 6.8 The Department of Health and 

Human Services, Office of Inspector 

General sent Respondent a letter, 

informing him that he had been 

excluded from Medicare, Medicaid, and 

all federal health care programs for a 

period beginning on October 19, 2017, 

and lasting a minimum of five years. 

Gov. Ex. 8; Tr. 40. The GS also testified 

that the New York State Office of the 

Medicaid Inspector General had sent 

Respondent a letter informing him that 

he had been excluded from the state’s 

Medicaid program. Gov. Ex. 7; Tr. 36– 

37. 

Respondent’s exclusion from 

Medicare, Medicaid, and all federal 

health care programs, along with 

Respondent’s conviction of Conspiracy 

to Distribute Oxycodone, are the bases 

of the Government’s present case 

opposing Respondent’s application for a 

new COR. The GS testified that, on 

February 16, 2021, she ran a new search 

on a web page of the U.S. Department 

of Health and Human Services, Office of 

Inspector General, and confirmed 

through that search that Respondent 

was still excluded from all federal 

health care programs. Tr. 43. 

The GS came across as an objective 

investigator, with no discernable motive 

to mislead, fabricate, or exaggerate. The 

testimony of this witness was primarily 

focused on the uncontroversial 9

introduction of documentary evidence 

and her contact with this case, and was 

sufficiently detailed, plausible, and 

internally consistent to be afforded full 

credibility. 

D. Respondent’s Case 

Respondent, proceeding pro se, 

presented his own testimony and 

offered four exhibits in support of his 

case. According to Respondent, he 

received a Bachelor’s degree from the 

University of New York and thereafter 

studied genetic engineering in a Ph.D. 

program. Tr. 51. He departed that 

program with a Master’s Degree and 

entered Temple University Medical 

School, where he studied Podiatric 

Medicine. Id. Respondent graduated 

from Temple University in 1992 and 

completed his residence at a Veterans’ 

Affairs hospital in Brooklyn, New York. 

Tr. 52. He obtained medical licenses in 

both New York and Pennsylvania and 


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10 Given Respondent’s failure to summarize his 

testimony in his initial Prehearing Statement, this 

tribunal directed that he file a revised Prehearing 

Statement, which he did on January 10, 2021. ALJ 

Ex. 12. 

began practicing medicine in New York 

in 1994. Tr. 53; 57. 

Respondent has worked both as a solo 

practitioner and a clinic physician, 

specializing in wound care at two 

different clinics. Tr. 54; 57–59. In one of 

those clinics, Respondent served as the 

director, specializing in baric 

neuropathy, supervising three to four 

nurses and nurse practitioners, and 

seeing 50 patients a day. Tr. 54–56. For 

nearly ten years, starting in 1998, he 

also worked in a dialysis clinic 

specializing in treating patients in ‘‘endstage renal dialysis’’ who suffered lower 

extremity problems. Tr. 61–63. 

Respondent testified that, prior to 

2011, he never had any disciplinary 

problems in either New York or 

Pennsylvania and had no arrests or 

convictions. Tr. 60; 64; 87. 

Respondent admitted that he pleaded 

guilty to one count of Conspiracy to 

Distribute Oxycodone on June 13, 2017, 

in violation of 21 U.S.C. 841(a), 

(b)(1)(C), and 846. Stip. 3; United States 

v. Stephen Owusu, No. 2:11–CR–0709– 

001 (LDW) (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017). But 

Respondent’s description of the events 

behind that conviction evolved over the 

course of these proceedings. In his 

second Prehearing Statement,10

Respondent referenced ‘‘2 falsified 

prescriptions in [his] name to which 

[he] was called to cooperate with the 

police for prosecution [and] lost 

prescription pads that a pharmacist 

attested to but which [his] lawyers 

would not allow court trial.’’ ALJ Ex. 12 

at 3; see also Tr. 131–32 (affirming 

statement as accurate). In his 

Supplemental Prehearing Statement, 

Respondent stated that he ‘‘never 

conspired to sell or distribute 

oxycodone and [he] will never conspire 

to sell or distribute oxycodone or any 

controlled substance(s).’’ ALJ Ex. 14 at 

5. 

During the hearing, Respondent 

testified that he had prescribed 

oxycodone for one patient (who had 

been referred to him by another, trusted 

patient) on the patient’s third visit. Tr. 

67–70. Specifically, he prescribed the 

oxycodone because the patient had 

brought oxycodone in with him, told the 

Respondent he had taken it from his 

brother, and it was the only medication 

that reduced his pain. Tr. 69–70. 

Respondent refilled the oxycodone 

prescription approximately once a 

month or once every two months for 

two years. Tr. 74. The same patient 

brought in a couple of friends on the 

same construction site where he worked 

and Respondent likewise prescribed 

those patients oxycodone. Tr. 75. 

Respondent explained that he 

prescribed oxycodone because he was 

‘‘very naı ̈ve’’ and sometimes ‘‘too 

helpful’’ or ‘‘too kind.’’ Tr. 64 and 76. 

He also testified that two prescription 

pads were lost from his office and ‘‘a lot 

of guys’’ had come to the pharmacy and 

written prescriptions from his pad. Tr. 

76. According to Respondent, someone 

from the pharmacy would have testified 

for him. Tr. 76; Tr. 108. Respondent’s 

lawyers, however, declined to 

investigate his defense and DEA 

produced only 20 of the 200 it alleged 

were illegal. Tr. 108–109; see also Tr. 

126 (he stated that DEA never showed 

him the other 180 prescriptions). 

On cross-examination, Respondent 

admitted that, on one occasion, he 

delivered multiple oxycodone 

prescriptions to a patient in a parking 

lot at 8:30 p.m. or 9:00 p.m. Tr. 113– 

115. He did so ‘‘from the kindness of 

[his] heart’’ because the patient was 

taking his son to a football practice or 

game and could not make it to the 

medical office in time. Tr. 109–110. At 

the time, Respondent did not realize it 

was a ‘‘setup,’’ and that it was ‘‘staged.’’ 

Id.; see also Tr. 113 (‘‘I would call it 

staged. Why? Because I had no idea 

what was going on.’’). The patient was, 

in fact, an informant or, as Respondent 

testified: ‘‘the very person who they 

accused [Respondent] [of] conspiring to 

distribute oxycodone with was 

somebody . . . [Respondent] didn’t 

know was already a criminal [and] who 

had already been incriminated. And 

then the Court used him . . . as an 

informant, sent him to [Respondent], 

[he] asked [Respondent] for the 

medication, and this is how it began.’’ 

Tr. 65 (cleaned up). 

Respondent insisted that he charged 

the patient $70, even though the patient 

paid him $300 for the prescriptions, and 

testified that ‘‘why [the patient] gave 

[him] $300, [he doesn’t] know.’’ Tr. 115. 

When interviewed by DEA agents, he 

admitted that he made approximately 

$30,000 over the course of two years for 

these patients. Tr. 111–112. He viewed 

the cash payment in the parking lot as 

‘‘almost like a technicality’’ because the 

patient would have paid him the same 

amount had he come into the office. Tr. 

126. 

When asked whether he had 

examined his patients before 

prescribing, Respondent provided an 

evasive answer: 

Q: Dr. Owusu, isn’t it true that you issued 

multiple prescriptions for oxycodone without 

examining the patients? 

A: I examined them, Your Honor. 

Counsellor, I examined them. 

Q: All of them? 

A: Well, the—the initial—the initial 

patients, all of them were examined. 

Tr. 117. 

Respondent emphasized that he was 

hesitant to explain his prior convictions 

because he did not ‘‘want it to be 

misconstrued as a lack of penitence and 

a lack of repentance.’’ Tr. 50; see also 

Tr. 133. Ultimately, however, 

Respondent testified repeatedly that— 

despite his guilty plea—he did not, in 

fact, conspire to distribute oxycodone. 

See, e.g., Tr. 64 (‘‘I was not a coconspirator, and I did not conspire at 

all.’’); id. (‘‘this so-called conspiracy 

case’’); Tr. 65. (‘‘the record will show I 

never had—never was involved in any— 

any infraction of the law. Never, 

never.’’); Tr. 66 (‘‘I was never, myself, 

never, and I would say—I would say 

until my dying day, never conspired to 

distribute drugs. Never. And I never 

will, Your Honor.’’); Tr. 78 (attorney 

believed he was innocent); Tr. 80 (‘‘But 

all those conspiratorial charges that they 

added on, no.’’); Tr. 116 (‘‘I was 

innocent, okay?’’); Tr. 125 (affirming 

statement made in his Prehearing 

Statement that he had accepted 

responsibility ‘‘despite the fact I never 

conspired to sell or distribute 

oxycodone’’); Tr. 134 (at plea hearing, 

under oath, he admitted that he had 

pleaded guilty even though many of his 

statements were ‘‘not only just not true 

. . . I just didn’t feel like a lot of them 

were right.’’). 

Rather, Respondent claimed that he 

was forced, and indeed tricked, into 

pleading guilty by his lawyers. See, e.g., 

Tr. 78 (‘‘I thought I was going for [the 

lawyer] to take me to a DEA office. I 

went to him that day with the 

understanding that we were going to the 

DEA office to help me get my DEA 

license back. And I went to the 

courtroom, and that was the day he 

made me plead guilty.’’); Tr. 79–80 (‘‘I 

had to say yes because my lawyer told 

me to just say yes—yes, yes, and I . . . 

went all along like that’’); Tr. 76 

(attorney forced him to plead guilty 

because he feared a racially unjust trial); 

Tr. 116 (attorney forced him to plead 

guilty because of ‘‘the circumstances, 

the location of the Court, the selection 

of the jury’’). At one point, however, 

Respondent also acknowledged that his 

attorney told him to plead guilty 

because of the incriminating video 

recording. Tr. 112. 

Respondent admitted that he was 

guilty, but just for the ‘‘two 

prescriptions I wrote . . . . [T]hat’s 

what . . . my guilt is about.’’ Tr. 80. He 

acknowledged that he had appeared 


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11 In his revised Prehearing Statement, 

Respondent described his training as: ‘‘One whole 

day OPIOID CRISIS class I attended around Fall 

2011; several other continuing medical educational 

SEMINARS attended in the years; A requisite precertifying OPIOID crisis, addiction and treatment 

course for all NY State Practitioners taken in 2018.’’ 

ALJ Ex. 12 at 4. Although there is some discrepancy 

between this description and Respondent’s 

testimony at trial, I do not question that Respondent 

has taken multiple courses over the years, 

especially as many of those courses were mandatory 

for his continued licensure. 

12This tribunal sustained the Government’s 

objection regarding Respondent’s Exhibit 4, which 

was a ‘‘Certificate of Relief from Disabilities’’ from 

the New York Department of Corrections and 

Supervision. Tr. 104. That document was excluded 

for two reasons. First, this tribunal could not 

ascertain its authenticity given numerous 

inconsistencies, including a docket number that did 

not match the docket number on Respondent’s 

federal conviction. Tr. 99–104. Second, it was not 

relevant because it did not specifically relate to 

Respondent’s medical license. Tr.100. [I agree with 

the ALJ and find that this document is not legally 

relevant to the current matter.] 

13This post-arrest report is also known as a 

DEA–6, which is a report of investigation. Tr. 143. 

The SA testified that this specific DEA–6 was titled, 

‘‘Post Arrest Statements of Dr. Stephen Owusu on 

July 19, 2011, at 175 Pine Lawn Road, Melville, 

New York.’’ Id. At the time the report was made, 

this was the address of the Long Island DEA office. 

Id. 

before a federal district court judge for 

his plea hearing, signed his plea 

agreement, pleaded guilty under oath, 

was sentenced based on the facts he 

admitted, and told the district court 

judge that his guilty plea was voluntary. 

Tr. 130–134. Respondent was sentenced 

to three years’ probation (Tr. 81), which 

he completed early without any 

infractions (Tr. 97–98; Resp’t Ex. 3). 

Indeed, Respondent often cast himself 

as the victim—repeatedly stating that he 

‘‘suffered’’ because of the conviction. 

For example, after recounting the facts 

behind his conviction, Respondent 

stated: ‘‘They were the things I have 

suffered in the past, okay? Some of the 

things I look back on, and I—I’ve 

suffered for the last ten years because.’’ 

Tr. 132; see also Tr. 161 (‘‘I have 

suffered a lot, and I have learned a 

lot.’’). In other instances, Respondent 

described himself as a victim (Tr. 64) 

who had been ‘‘punished enough’’ (Tr. 

105). Indeed, Respondent’s primary 

argument for obtaining his registration 

was ‘‘it’s been enough time for 

punishment. It’s been enough time that 

I have . . . paid the penalty.’’ Tr. 163. 

[Respondent also stated, ‘‘So, I am 

trustworthy. I’ve never been in a 

situation where my credibility ever, ever 

was in question until this situation 

. . . . I can promise you, I can, you 

know, that definitely I have learnt my 

lesson and very, very, well. And this 

will never again be repeated, never. Tr. 

106] 

According to Respondent, he has not 

earned his living from the practice of 

medicine since his arrest, since it is 

impossible to practice without a DEA 

registration. Tr. 61; Tr. 82–83. He 

admitted, however, that it was possible 

to practice without a DEA registration, 

although such practice would be 

limited. Tr. 119–121. 

As for remedial measures, Respondent 

testified that he had taken four classes 

regarding opioid addiction—one in 

September 2011, one in 2019, one in 

July 2020, and one in February 2021. Tr. 

83–86.11 Three of those classes were 

mandated by the New York licensing 

board; the 2019 training was a day of 

specialized training at a general medical 

conference. Tr. 84–85. Respondent still 

has a current medical license in New 

York, valid until September 30, 2023. 

Tr. 86–91; Resp’t Ex. 1. 

Finally, Respondent submitted a letter 

from Dr. B.-A. (doctor of Public 

Administration) regarding Respondent’s 

current work at his clinic supporting his 

character. Resp’t Ex. 2; Tr. 96; 123.12

As noted in more detail in the 

Analysis section, infra, Respondent’s 

testimony did not present as credible on 

the key issue of his culpability because 

he contradicted his representations 

under oath in the federal prosecution, 

his description of events was not 

plausible, and he minimized his own 

responsibility. 

E. Government’s Rebuttal Case 

The Government offered one rebuttal 

witness—a Special Agent of the Drug 

Enforcement Administration 

(hereinafter, the SA). The SA testified 

that he is assigned to the Long Island 

District Office in Central Islip, New 

York. Tr. 138. The Special Agent also 

testified that he has been a Special 

Agent with DEA since 1996, and that his 

job duties include conducting 

investigations, some of which are 

undercover. Tr. 139. In approximately 

2011, The Special Agent became 

familiar with Respondent during an 

investigation involving oxycodone 

distribution. Tr. 139–140. During that 

investigation, Respondent was 

identified and arrested. Tr. 140. 

An individual named B. C.—a patient 

of Dr. Owusu’s—cooperated with the 

Government in this 2011 investigation. 

Id. B.C. specifically provided the SA 

and other agents at DEA with 

information regarding his illegal 

purchase of prescription narcotics from 

Respondent. Id. At the direction of DEA, 

B.C. met with Respondent while 

wearing a concealed video recording 

device. Tr. 140–141. The SA, along with 

several other DEA agents, observed the 

meeting between Respondent and B.C. 

Tr. 142. The SA also later retrieved the 

video recording device from B.C. and 

observed the video recording of the 

meeting. Tr. 143. Respondent and B.C. 

met in the Mercy Hospital parking lot in 

Rockville Center, New York. Tr. 141. 

During the meeting, B.C. purchased 

prescriptions for narcotics from 

Respondent. Id. Initially, when asked 

how many prescriptions B.C. had 

purchased during the meeting, the SA 

testified that he did not remember. Id. 

The SA, relying upon a post-arrest 

report, testified that Respondent had 

issued numerous prescriptions during 

the recorded transaction with B.C., but 

that the report did not specify how 

many.13 Tr. 147–48. The SA also 

testified that Respondent had admitted 

that he had met several times with B.C. 

over a several-year period, and that he 

had sold B.C. oxycodone pills for $300 

cash per prescription. Tr. 144–45. The 

SA testified that, after being read his 

Miranda warning in the SA’s presence, 

Respondent stated that he had made 

approximately $40,000 from selling 

illegal prescriptions to B.C. Tr. 145, 153. 

The SA testified that, after his arrest, 

Respondent stated that he did conduct 

a physical examination of B.C. before 

selling the prescription narcotics, but 

that, once confronted with the video of 

the transaction, Respondent admitted 

that was a lie—that, in fact, no 

examination was conducted—and 

apologized for lying. Id. The SA, when 

asked to summarize the content of the 

video, stated that he had not reviewed 

the video recently, but that he thought 

it showed B.C. getting into Respondent’s 

vehicle for a short period of time, 

paying for the prescriptions for 

narcotics, and then exiting the vehicle. 

Tr. 146. Later, when asked about the 

video recording, The SA testified that he 

was mistaken, and then corrected 

himself and stated that, in fact, B.C. and 

Respondent stayed in their respective 

cars throughout the transaction, and that 

B.C. did not enter Respondent’s vehicle. 

Tr. 154. 

On cross-examination, the SA 

testified that he recalled seeing the 

meeting between Respondent and B.C. 

Tr. 149. He also testified that he was not 

sure if he ever had to move his vehicle 

to get a better view of the transaction, 

and he could not remember if his view 

was obstructed at any time. Id. The SA 

did, however, recall that there were 

multiple DEA agents conducting 

surveillance in the area in order to 

observe the transaction, and he stated 

that he was in constant radio 

communication with those agents. Id. 

He also testified that at least one of 


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*C I have substituted the RD’s language assessing 

the application of the revocation grounds to my 

assessment of an application under 21 U.S.C. 823(f) 

in accordance with recent decisions. 

14 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7b(f). 

15 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(h). 

16 In contrast to subsection (a), subsection (b) of 

42 U.S.C. 1320a–7 provides sixteen discretionary 

grounds of exclusion from health care programs. 42 

U.S.C. 1320a–7(b) (2012). 

those agents would have had a good 

view of the transaction at any given 

time. Id. The SA also could not recall 

how much money B.C. had given 

Respondent during the transaction, but 

testified that any money B.C. had given 

Respondent would have been provided 

by DEA. Tr. 149–150. The SA further 

testified that the interrogation of 

Respondent took place in Melville, New 

York, where the Long Island DEA field 

office was located at the time. Tr. 151. 

The SA came across as an objective 

investigator, with no discernible motive 

to mislead, fabricate, or exaggerate. 

Though at times, the SA did struggle to 

remember certain details, he readily 

admitted what he did not remember, 

and when his recollection was 

refreshed, his testimony was sufficiently 

detailed, plausible, and internally 

consistent to be afforded full credibility. 

II. Discussion 

The Government opposes 

Respondent’s COR application under 

the dual bases that he has been 

convicted of a controlled-substancerelated felony and that he has been 

excluded from participating in a 

specified federal health care program. 

ALJ Ex. 1.*C[In its OSC, the Government 

relies upon grounds Congress provided 

to support revocation/suspension, not 

denial of an application. Prior Agency 

decisions have addressed whether it is 

appropriate to consider a provision of 

21 U.S.C. 824(a) when determining 

whether or not to grant a practitioner 

registration application. For over fortyfive years, Agency decisions have 

concluded that it is. Robert Wayne 

Locklear, M.D., 86 FR at 33744–45 

(collecting cases); see also, William 

Ralph Kincaid. In Robert Wayne 

Locklear, M.D., the former Acting 

Administrator stated his agreement with 

the results of these past decisions and 

reaffirmed that a provision of section 

824 may be the basis for the denial of 

a practitioner registration application. 

86 FR at 33745. He also clarified that 

allegations related to section 823 remain 

relevant to the adjudication of a 

practitioner registration application 

when a provision of section 824 is 

involved. Id. 

Accordingly, when considering an 

application for a registration, I will 

consider any actionable allegations 

related to the grounds for denial of an 

application under 823 and will also 

consider any allegations that the 

applicant meets one of the five grounds 

for revocation or suspension of a 

registration under section 824. Id. See 

also Dinorah Drug Store, Inc., 61 FR 

15972, 15973–74 (1996). 

A. 21 U.S.C. 823(f): The Five Public 

Interest Factors 

Pursuant to section 303(f) of the CSA, 

‘‘[t]he Attorney General shall register 

practitioners . . . to dispense . . . 

controlled substances . . . if the 

applicant is authorized to dispense . . . 

controlled substances under the laws of 

the State in which he practices.’’ 21 

U.S.C. 823(f). Section 303(f) further 

provides that an application for a 

practitioner’s registration may be denied 

upon a determination that ‘‘the issuance 

of such registration . . . would be 

inconsistent with the public interest.’’ 

Id. In making the public interest 

determination, the CSA requires 

consideration of the following factors: 

(1) The recommendation of the appropriate 

State licensing board or professional 

disciplinary authority. 

(2) The applicant’s experience in 

dispensing, or conducting research with 

respect to controlled substances. 

(3) The applicant’s conviction record under 

Federal or State laws relating to the 

manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 

controlled substances. 

(4) Compliance with applicable State, 

Federal, or local laws relating to controlled 

substances. 

(5) Such other conduct which may threaten 

the public health and safety. 

21 U.S.C. 823(f). 

In this case, it is undisputed that 

Respondent holds a valid state medical 

license and is authorized to dispense 

controlled substances in the State of 

New York where he practices. 

Because the Government has not 

alleged that Respondent’s registration is 

inconsistent with the public interest 

under section 823, and although I have 

considered 823, I will not analyze 

Respondent’s application under the 

public interest factors. Therefore, in 

accordance with prior agency decisions, 

I will move to assess whether the 

Government has proven by substantial 

evidence that a ground for revocation 

exists under 21 U.S.C. 824(a).] 

Regarding the two revocation/ 

suspension grounds the Government 

specifically relied on in this case, the 

CSA, in pertinent part, states the 

following: 

A registration pursuant to section 824 of 

this title to . . . dispense a controlled 

substance . . . may be suspended or revoked 

by the Attorney General upon a finding that 

the registrant: 

(2) has been convicted of a felony under 

this subchapter or subchapter II or any other 

law of the United States, or of any State, 

relating to any substance defined in this 

subchapter as a controlled substance . . . [or] 

(5) has been excluded (or directed to be 

excluded) from participation in a program 

pursuant to section 1320a–7(a) of Title 42. 

21 U.S.C. 824(a)(2) and (5). Each ground 

is herein addressed in seriatim. 

B. Exclusion From Participation in a 

Federal Health Care Program 

The Government seeks denial of 

Respondent’s COR application under 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(5) because he has been 

excluded from participation in a federal 

health care program (Mandatory 

Medicare Exclusion or MME). [The 

Agency has] discretion to deny a 

respondent’s application for a COR if 

Respondent ‘‘has been excluded (or 

directed to be excluded) from 

participation in a program pursuant to 

[42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a)].’’ 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(5) (2012). See supra II. Section 

1320a–7 comprises the exclusion of 

individuals or entities by the Secretary 

of the U.S. Department of Health and 

Human Services (HHS) from 

participating in federal health care 

programs. 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7 (2012). A 

federal health care program is (1) a plan 

or program providing health benefits 

and which is funded in some way by the 

U.S. government; 14 or (2) a state health 

care program or plan receiving certain 

approval or funding from the U.S. 

government.15 DEA decisions clearly 

establish that Medicare and Medicaid 

programs are among those federal health 

care programs in which exclusion from 

one of them can constitute a basis for 

denial of a COR application. See, e.g., 

Daniel Ortiz-Vargas, M.D., 69 FR 62095, 

62095–96 (2004); Joseph M. Piacentile, 

M.D., 62 FR 35527, 35527–28 (1997); 

Anibal P. Herrera, M.D., 61 FR 65075, 

65077 (1996); Suresh Gandotra, M.D., 58 

FR 64781, 64782 (1993); George D. 

Osafo, M.D., 58 FR 37508, 37509 (1993). 

Specifically, subsection (a) of 

§ 1320a–7, the part of the statute 

referenced by 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(5), 

dictates when HHS is required to 

exclude individuals or entities.16 Id. 

§ 1320a–7(a) (‘‘The Secretary shall 

exclude the following individuals and 

entities from participation in any 

[f]ederal health care program . . . .’’) 

(emphasis added). There are four 

instances requiring mandatory 

exclusion: (1) conviction of a criminal 

offense ‘‘related to the delivery of an 

item or services under [42 U.S.C. 1395 

et seq.] or under any [s]tate health care 


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*D Per the usual format of Agency decisions, I 

have removed the discussion of the legal standard 

for a respondent’s acceptance of responsibility from 

the prima facie analysis to the Sanction section 

below. Further, in the Sanction section below, I 

have combined the ALJ’s analysis of Respondent’s 

acceptance of responsibility pertaining to the 

mandatory exclusion allegation with the ALJ’s 

analysis of Respondent’s acceptance of 

responsibility pertaining to the controlled substance 

felony conviction allegation. I have also combined 

the former two analysis sections with the brief 

summary regarding the Respondent’s acceptance of 

responsibility that the ALJ had originally included 

in the Sanction section. I have not made substantive 

changes except where noted in brackets. See infra. 

*EAnalysis of Respondent’s acceptance of 

responsibility moved to Sanction section. See supra 

n.*D. 

*F Discussion of the legal standard for a 

respondent’s acceptance of responsibility moved to 

Sanction section. See supra n.*D. 

17United States v. Stephen Owusu, No. 2:11–CR– 

0709–001 (LDW) (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2017). 

*GAnalysis of Respondent’s acceptance of 

responsibility moved to Sanction section. See supra 

n.*D. 

program’’; (2) conviction, ‘‘under 

[f]ederal or [s]tate law,’’ related to 

patient ‘‘neglect or abuse’’ connected 

‘‘with the delivery of a health care item 

or service[;] (3) [f]elony conviction 

related to health care fraud’’; and ‘‘(4) 

[f]elony conviction related to . . . the 

unlawful manufacture, distribution, 

prescription, or dispensing of a 

controlled substance.’’ Id. The 

unambiguous words of the CSA in 21 

U.S.C. 824(a)(5) provide that a 

practitioner’s registration ‘‘may be 

suspended or revoked’’ if the 

practitioner ‘‘has been excluded’’ from 

participating in a program pursuant to 

42 U.S.C. 1320a–7(a). 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(5). DEA has strictly interpreted 

this provision and acknowledged that 

the Administrator has discretionary 

power to suspend or revoke a 

registration only when the practitioner 

has been mandatorily excluded from a 

federal health care program under 

subsection (a) of 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7. See, 

e.g., Terese, Inc., d/b/a Peach Orchard 

Drugs, 76 FR 46843, 46847 (2011); 

Herrera, 61 FR at 65077; Gandotra, 58 

FR at 64782; Nelson Ramirez-Gonzalez, 

M.D., 58 FR 52787, 52788 (1993). As 

specified by the CSA, the misconduct 

mandating exclusion does not need to 

relate to controlled substances in order 

to provide the Administrator with the 

power to suspend or revoke (or in this 

case deny an application for) a COR. 

Jeffrey Stein, M.D., 84 FR 46968, 46973 

(2019); Ortiz-Vargas, 69 FR at 62095–96; 

Melvin N. Seglin, M.D., 63 FR 70431, 

70433 (1998); Osafo, 58 FR at 37509. 

[Omitted for brevity.] 

When DEA alleges that a practitioner 

has been mandatorily excluded from a 

federal health care program under 42 

U.S.C. 1320a–7a, and thus seeks to 

impose a COR sanction, the Government 

bears the burden to prove that such an 

exclusion occurred. Jin, 77 FR at 35023; 

see also, 21 CFR 1301.44(d) (2018) (‘‘At 

[a] hearing for the denial of a [COR], the 

[Government] shall have the burden of 

proving that the requirements for such 

registration . . . are not satisfied.’’). 

However, even a mandatory exclusion 

does not curtail the authority of DEA to 

independently weigh the evidence 

presented and exercise discretion. Stein, 

84 FR at 46970 [omitted parenthetical.] 

Accordingly, DEA is not required to 

deny Respondent’s COR application 

merely because he is subject to a 

mandatory exclusion. Id. 

*D In the instant case, it is undisputed 

that Respondent was excluded from 

participation in federal health care 

programs under the mandatory 

authority of 42 U.S.C. 1320a–7a. Stip. 4; 

Gov’t Ex. 5. Consequently, under 

§ 824(a)(5), it is within the discretion of 

the Agency to determine, based on the 

entire record, whether Respondent’s 

exclusion from federal health care 

programs renders granting his 

application for a COR inappropriate. See 

Narcisco A. Reyes, M.D., 83 FR 61678, 

61681 (2018) (holding that where the 

Government has demonstrated the 

requisite mandatory federal health care 

program exclusion(s) it has satisfied its 

prima facie case, shifting the burden to 

the respondent[]). Inasmuch as the 

parties have stipulated to Respondent’s 

exclusion and the record contains 

evidence establishing as much, the 

Government has met its burden in this 

regard. Stip. 4, 5, 7; See 21 CFR 

1301.44(d) (2018). 

*EAccordingly, in review of the 

evidence of record, including the 

stipulations of the parties, OSC 

Allegation 3 is sustained. 

C. Controlled-Substance-Related Felony 

Conviction 

The Government also alleges that 

Respondent’s application should be 

denied because he has been convicted of 

a felony related to controlled 

substances, pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2). Under that provision, the 

Attorney General may suspend or 

revoke a registration issued under 21 

U.S.C. 823 ‘‘upon a finding that the 

registrant . . . has been convicted of a 

felony under this subchapter or 

subchapter II or any other law of the 

United States, or of any State, relating 

to any substance defined in this 

subchapter as a controlled substance or 

a list I chemical.’’ 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2)(emphasis added). 

*FThe fact of Respondent’s 

conviction in this case has been 

conclusively established. Stip 3. There 

is no question that Respondent pleaded 

guilty to one count of ‘‘Conspiracy to 

Distribute Oxycodone, a Class C 

Felony,’’ in violation of 21 U.S.C. 

841(a), (b)(1)(C) and 846,17 which is a 

felony related to a controlled substance. 

It is thus beyond argument that the 

Government met is prima facie burden 

of proving that Respondent has been 

convicted of a felony related to 

controlled substances. 

*GAccordingly, in review of the 

evidence of record, including the 

stipulations of the parties, OSC 

Allegation 2 is sustained. 

III. Sanction 

Inasmuch as Congress has determined 

that a mandatory health care program 

exclusion constitutes an adequate basis 

for sanction, once the Government has 

demonstrated that a respondent has 

been so excluded, the burden shifts to 

the respondent to show that registration 

should be granted as a matter of 

discretion. See Jin, 77 FR at 35023. This 

burden may be carried by establishing 

an unequivocal acceptance of 

responsibility for the misconduct that 

formed the basis of the exclusion and by 

adequately demonstrating remedial 

measures to ensure against repetition. 

Id.; Stein, 84 FR at 46972–73 

(respondent’s assertion that his 

misdeeds had no effect on his patients 

held to indicate a minimization of his 

acceptance of responsibility rendering it 

less than unequivocal). This acceptance 

of responsibility must be unequivocal; a 

registrant’s dishonesty under oath 

undermines the registrant’s acceptance 

of responsibility and shows that the 

registrant ‘‘cannot be entrusted with a 

registration.’’ Rose Mary Jacinta Lewis, 

M.D., 72 FR 4035, 4042 (2007). Mere 

stipulation to facts without admitting to 

misconduct does not amount to an 

acceptance of responsibility. Ajay S. 

Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR 5479, 5498 n.32 

(2019). Moreover, a respondent’s own 

statements minimizing his or her 

misconduct weigh against any 

acceptance of responsibility. Arvinder 

Singh, M.D., 81 FR 8247, 8249–51 

(2016). 

In Jin, the Agency relied, in part upon 

Melvin N. Seglin, M.D., 63 FR 70431 

(1998), a case in which the Agency 

found that the respondent ‘‘accepted 

responsibility for his misconduct which 

was not likely to recur.’’ Id. at 35026. In 

evaluating the reasonableness of 

sanctions generally, the Agency has also 

required an evaluation of the 

egregiousness of the proven misconduct 

as well as an analysis of considerations 


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18 David A. Ruben, 78 FR 38363, 38364, 38385 

(2013). 

19 Dan Hale, D.O., 69 FR 69402, 69406 (2004) 

(‘‘. . . facts established by criminal convictions are 

res judicata and cannot be re-litigated in a DEA 

administrative forum.’’); Raymond A. Carlson, M.D., 

53 FR 7425, 7426 (1988) (‘‘the conviction alone 

provides sufficient statutory authority to support 

the revocation of Respondent’s DEA Certificate of 

Registration.’’). 

of specific and general deterrence,18 and 

these factors have been specifically 

applied by the Agency in the MME 

context. Arvinder Singh, M.D., 81 FR 

8247, 8248 (2016). The egregiousness of 

the conduct is also considered in the 

MME context, even when a controlledsubstance-related crime does not form 

the basis of the exclusion. Stein, 84 FR 

at 46973. 

Further, the Agency has stated that 

‘‘ordinarily[,] a respondent who has 

been convicted of a felony subject to 

§ 824(a)(2) is entitled to present a case 

as to why his registration should not be 

revoked (or his application denied)’’ 

because conviction of a felony under the 

CSA is not a per se bar to registration. 

William J. O’Brien, III, D.O., 82 FR 

46527, 46529 (2017). As is the case with 

other DEA administrative enforcement 

cases seeking a sanction, once the 

Government has met its prima facie 

case, under § 824(a)(2) by merely 

establishing the existence of the 

requisite conviction,19 a respondent can 

avoid sanction only to the extent he/ 

she/it is able to demonstrate an 

unequivocal acceptance of 

responsibility and remedial steps that 

are tailored to preventing recurrence. 

Singh, 81 FR at 8250 (‘‘[The respondent] 

was required to acknowledge the full 

scope of his criminal behavior and the 

risk of diversion it created . . . .’’); 

Hassman, 75 FR at 8236; Ronald Lynch, 

M.D., 75 FR 78745, 78753 (2010) 

(holding that the respondent’s attempts 

to minimize misconduct undermined 

purported acceptance of responsibility); 

see also Michael A. White, M.D., 79 FR 

62957, 62967 (2014); Steven M. 

Abbadessa, M.D., 74 FR 10077, 10081 

(2009). 

There can be no debate that the 

Government has met its prima facie 

burden of proving that the requirements 

for a sanction pursuant to 21 U.S.C. 

824(a)(2) and (5) are satisfied. It is well 

established that, in cases involving 

Medicare exclusion and prior 

convictions, a respondent must show 

that he unequivocally accepts 

responsibility for his past misconduct if 

he wishes this tribunal to exercise its 

discretionary authority to grant a COR. 

See, e.g., Stein, 84 FR at 46972. 

Accordingly, unequivocal acceptance of 

responsibility for both bases of 

established misconduct stands as a 

condition precedent for Respondent to 

prevail. 

The purpose of this process is to 

determine whether the applicant can 

and should be entrusted with 

responsibly discharging the life and 

death duties of a DEA registrant. For 

this purpose, acceptance of 

responsibility is critical. The Agency’s 

interpretation of its statutory mandate 

on the exercise of its discretionary 

function under the CSA has been 

sustained on review. Jones Total Health 

Care, L.L.C. v. DEA, 881 F.3d 823, 830– 

31 (11th Cir. 2018); MacKay v. DEA, 664 

F.3d 808, 822 (10th Cir. 2011); see also, 

Hoxie v. DEA, 419 F.3d 477, 483 (6th 

Cir. 2005) (holding that admitting fault 

and candor with investigators are both 

important factors in determining 

whether a physician is fit to hold a 

COR). Agency prior decisions are clear 

that a Respondent must ‘‘unequivocally 

admit fault’’ as opposed to demonstrate 

a ‘‘generalized acceptance of 

responsibility.’’ The Medicine Shoppe, 

79 FR 59504, 59510 (2014); see also, Lon 

F. Alexander, M.D., 82 FR 49704, 49728 

(2017). To satisfy this burden, 

Respondent must ‘‘show true remorse’’ 

or an ‘‘acknowledgement of 

wrongdoing.’’ Robert A. Leslie, 68 FR 

15227, 15228 (2003). The Agency has 

made it clear that unequivocal 

acceptance of responsibility is 

paramount for avoiding sanction. Robert 

L. Dougherty, M.D., 76 FR 16823, 16834 

(2011) (citing Jayam Krishna-Iyer, 74 FR 

459, 464 (2009)). However, no legal 

authority holds that such acceptance, 

standing alone, guarantees a favorable 

result for every applicant or registrant. 

A. Acceptance of Responsibility 

To avoid sanction, it is incumbent 

upon Respondent to demonstrate 

acceptance of responsibility for his 

actions and remedial measures taken, 

and Respondent fails to persuade the 

tribunal that granting his application for 

a COR would be consistent with the 

public interest. To begin, Respondent’s 

testimony was not candid. Candor to the 

court is of paramount importance. The 

issue of trust is necessarily a factdependent determination based on the 

circumstances presented by the 

individual respondent; therefore, the 

Agency looks at factors, such as the 

acceptance of responsibility and the 

credibility of that acceptance as it 

relates to the probability of repeat 

violations. A registrant’s candor during 

the investigation and hearing is an 

important factor in determining 

acceptance of responsibility and the 

appropriate sanction; as is whether the 

registrant’s acceptance of responsibility 

is unequivocal. Heavenly Care 

Pharmacy, 85 FR 53402, 53420 (2020); 

see also Fred Samimi, M.D., 79 FR 

18698, 18713 (2014); Robert F. Hunt, 

D.O., 75 FR 49995, 50004 (2010). 

Moreover, throughout his testimony, 

Respondent had ample opportunity to 

take full and unequivocal responsibility 

for his misconduct. Yet repeatedly, 

when pressed on the details of his 

conviction, Respondent failed to do so, 

often deflecting blame to his lawyers, 

who, he says, forced him to accept a 

plea deal. Tr. 76–80; 116; ALJ Ex. 14 at 

2 (referring to ‘‘unscrupulous lawyers 

whose solutions were worse than the 

problem’’). This refusal to accept blame 

is compounded by the inescapable 

conclusion that Respondent’s testimony 

was not credible on the key facts 

surrounding his federal conviction for 

conspiracy to distribute oxycodone. For 

example, when asked about the 

surrender of his previous DEA 

registration, Respondent made a point to 

‘‘clarify’’ by stating, ‘‘I pleaded guilty 

. . . that I wrote those medications. I 

wrote them without . . . an attending. 

But all those conspiratorial charges that 

they added on, no. . . . [I]n the . . . 

two pads I wrote—the two prescriptions 

I wrote, I pleaded guilty for that. . . . 

[T]hat’s what . . . my guilt is about.’’ 

Tr. 80. This is far from true. As outlined 

by the stipulations in these proceedings, 

Respondent pleaded guilty in federal 

court to Conspiracy to Distribute 

Oxycodone. Stip. 3. Although part of the 

indictment against him included 

allegations that Respondent had left 

prescription pads unattended, and those 

pads ended up the source of falsified 

prescriptions, Respondent’s guilt is 

about much more than that. Respondent 

was arrested after an undercover 

operation, detailed by the testimony of 

the SA. Tr. 138–155. This transaction 

amounted to an illegal sale of narcotics 

and had nothing to do with 

Respondent’s lost prescription pads. 

Respondent’s attempt, therefore, to 

direct focus in these proceedings to the 

lost pads, rather than the sale of 

oxycodone prescriptions in a parking 

lot, amounts to a failure to accept 

responsibility for the entirety of his 

criminal conduct. As if that were not a 

poor enough reflection of his credibility, 

Respondent repeatedly and explicitly 

insisted that he never conspired to 

distribute oxycodone—the very conduct 

to which he pleaded guilty before a 

federal judge. Tr. 64–66; 78; 116; 125; 

ALJ 14 at 5. 

Respondent’s failure to acknowledge 

the full scope of his criminal liability 

presents a more significant problem— 

although Respondent admitted that he 

had appeared before a federal district 


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20These examples of inconsistencies are merely 

the most egregious. There were others. For example, 

Respondent insisted he earned only $30,000 from 

the patients to whom he prescribed Oxycodone (Tr. 

111), whereas the SA testified that Respondent told 

DEA he had made $40,000 from these patients (Tr. 

142). [I agree with the ALJ that this statement was 

not as egregious as the other inconsistencies, 

because after SA’s testimony, Respondent appeared 

to admit that he had memory problems; however, 

I do note that the inconsistency further served to 

downplay the egregiousness of his crime. Tr. 155.] 

court judge for his plea hearing, signed 

his plea agreement, pleaded guilty 

under oath, was sentenced based on the 

facts he admitted, and told the district 

court judge that his guilty plea was 

voluntary (Tr. 130–134), Respondent 

also disavowed those proceedings. For 

example, Respondent took the 

implausible position that, on the day he 

pleaded guilty, he showed up to his 

lawyer’s office thinking the two of them 

were going to speak to the prosecutor in 

his case about getting his DEA license 

back. Tr. 78–79. 

Indeed, Respondent testified in this 

hearing that his attorney told him to just 

‘‘follow his orders’’ and ‘‘made [him] 

plead guilty.’’ Tr. 79. Even more 

disturbing, Respondent testified that he 

had to say yes because ‘‘my lawyer told 

me to just say yes—yes, yes, and I—and 

I went all along like that.’’ Tr. 80. Later, 

in these proceedings, Respondent 

admitted that his statements under oath 

at his plea hearing, before a federal 

district court judge, were ‘‘not only just 

not true . . . I just didn’t feel like a lot 

of them were right.’’ Tr. 134. 

Respondent’s claims that he was 

forced or tricked into pleading guilty are 

simply not believable. Respondent’s 

late-night delivery of multiple 

oxycodone prescriptions in a parking lot 

in exchange for $300 in cash was 

captured on video-tape. Tr. 113–115. As 

even Respondent admitted, his attorney 

told him he would have to plead guilty 

because of that incriminating recording. 

Tr. 112. Even when faced with this fact, 

Respondent again diverted blame to his 

lawyers, stating that they discouraged 

him from going to trial because the 

federal court in which he would be tried 

was a ‘‘white Court’’ and that 

Respondent’s race would be a 

disadvantage at trial. Id. See also Tr. 

131–32; ALJ Ex. 12 at 3. 

Ultimately, this tribunal cannot ignore 

that Respondent has changed his 

version of events—under oath—in two 

different judicial proceedings. By 

pleading guilty, Respondent obtained a 

benefit of acceptance of responsibility 

and, ultimately, a sentence of probation 

despite facing a Guideline Sentence of 

57 to 71 months. Tr. 130; Govt Ex. 5. 

Before this tribunal, when faced with 

the consequences of that plea, 

Respondent repeatedly proclaimed his 

innocence of the conspiracy to 

distribute oxycodone, minimizing his 

involvement to two prescriptions. Tr. 

64–66, 80, 125; ALJ Ex. 14. It is hard to 

see how Respondent’s testimony in this 

tribunal, when held up against his plea 

agreement, amounts to anything more 

than Respondent’s attempt to have his 

proverbial cake and eat it too. His guilty 

plea in federal court saved him from 

significant prison time. But now, when 

faced with the consequences of that 

plea, he has changed the story in an 

effort to obtain a DEA registration. 

Either he was dishonest in federal court, 

or he was dishonest in these 

proceedings. Either way, Respondent 

was dishonest and has failed to accept 

full responsibility for his actions. 

Other implausible aspects of 

Respondent’s testimony certainly do not 

assist his request for a COR as they 

demonstrate a lack of candor. For 

example, Respondent’s first instinct 

when speaking with DEA was to lie 

about whether he had performed an 

evaluation of the patient in the car— 

retracting that statement only when 

confronted with the existence of a 

video-recording and apologizing to DEA 

for his lie. Tr. 145. Significantly, 

Respondent’s lie demonstrated clear 

consciousness of guilt—he stated he had 

examined his patient because he knew 

delivering prescriptions at night in a 

parking lot was wrong. Similarly 

unbelievable is Respondent’s statement 

that he only charged his patient $70 for 

the parking lot prescriptions and had no 

idea why he was given $300 in cash. Tr. 

115. This statement is inconsistent with 

the post-arrest statement, in which he 

admitted that he charged his patients 

$300 for the prescriptions. Tr. 142. Nor 

is it plausible that a pharmacy 

representative would have testified that 

multiple people filled out Respondent’s 

prescription pads in front of pharmacy 

staff (Tr. 76, 108)—activity that would 

certainly have imperiled the pharmacy’s 

DEA registration.20

All these inconsistencies are 

accompanied by a final troubling truth 

about Respondent’s testimony: In the 

end, he saw himself as a victim. 

Respondent consistently referred to the 

undercover operation resulting in his 

arrest as ‘‘staged’’ or a ‘‘set-up.’’ Tr. 109– 

110, 113–115. Additionally, Respondent 

repeatedly contended that he had 

‘‘suffered a lot’’ (Tr. 161) and had been 

‘‘punished enough.’’ Tr. 105, 163; ALJ 

Ex. 12 at 3 (‘‘I will acknowledge that the 

length of my punishment has been 

excessive and therefore demands a 

judicial reprieve.’’); ALJ Ex. 14 at 4–5 

(describing the ‘‘windfall repercussions 

from this catastrophe. . . .’’). In his 

Supplemental Prehearing Statement, he 

even asked, ‘‘How much more damage/ 

harm do you suppose is enough to 

satisfy/pacify the arm of the law?’’ ALJ 

Ex 14 at 3. And when Respondent 

claimed that he had accepted 

responsibility for his misconduct, he 

did so only with a caveat that his 

lawyers forced him to plead guilty. Tr. 

161–62 (claiming that he accepts 

responsibility even though that some 

things in the Government’s criminal 

case against him ‘‘were not true’’). This 

conditional acceptance of responsibility 

is a far cry from unequivocal acceptance 

required to be entrusted with a DEA 

registration. See Rose Mary Jacinta 

Lewis, 72 FR at 4042 (affirming an 

immediate suspension when the 

respondent lied under oath to downplay 

her misconduct); see also Singh, 81 FR 

at 8249–51 (denying an application for 

a COR when the respondent repeatedly 

disputed the extent of his misconduct). 

Nor did Respondent’s testimony at any 

point express true remorse for his 

wrongful conduct. See Michael S. 

Moore, M.D., 76 FR 45867, 45868 (2011) 

(requiring a registrant to show ‘‘true 

remorse’’ for wrongful conduct in order 

to find an acceptance of responsibility). 

Having concluded that Respondent 

has failed to prove an unequivocal 

acceptance of responsibility, I need not 

address remedial measures. Ajay S. 

Ahuja, M.D., 84 FR 5479, 5498 n.33 

(2019); Daniel A. Glick, D.D.S., 80 FR 

74800, 74801, 74810 (2015). 

Nevertheless, even if remedial measures 

were considered, they would not change 

the result. 

The burden is on the respondent to 

present sufficient evidence of his 

remedial measures. See Scott D. 

Fedosky, M.D., 76 FR 71375, 71378 

(2011) (declining to give weight to 

remedial measures where the 

respondent testified about them but did 

not present any corroborating evidence 

to support his claim). And even if a 

respondent does introduce specific 

evidence of remedial measures, 

registration will not be granted unless 

such measures demonstrate that he or 

she can be entrusted with a COR. Jeri 

Hassman. M.D., 75 FR 8194, 8237 (2010) 

(denying a COR where the Agency 

found that the respondent had learned 

nothing from the remedial steps she had 

taken). 

Respondent claims that, prior to his 

arrest, he had ‘‘no idea’’ of the severity 

of the opioid epidemic. Tr. 83. He 

testified that he attended a mandatory 

class on opioids, which every prescriber 

must take. Tr. 84. Respondent also 

testified that he would take another 

class on February 28, 2021, but he did 

not provide any level of detail as to the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 14 / Friday, January 21, 2022 / Notices 3351 

21Respondent did, at times, testify as to his love 

of the medical profession and desire to help people. 

Tr. 62–63, 65. In addition, Respondent’s Exhibit 2 

is a letter from Dr. B.-A., the CEO of the American 

Medical Center, which is a clinic that Respondent 

has volunteered at. Resp’t Ex. 2. The letter espouses 

the virtues of Respondent, and details the 

difficulties of finding medical professionals to work 

for clinics in impoverished areas, such as the one 

where Respondent volunteers. [Omitted. The letter 

can be of limited weight in this proceeding, 

however, because I have limited ability to assess the 

actual credibility of the reference given its written 

form. See Michael S. Moore, M.D., 76 FR 45867, 

45873 (2011) (evaluating the weight to be attached 

to letters provided by the respondent’s hospital 

administrators and peers in light of the fact that the 

authors were not subjected to the rigors of cross 

examination). Further, it offers little value in 

assessing the Respondent’s suitability to discharge 

the duties of a DEA registrant. Finally, absent 

Respondent’s unequivocal acceptance of 

responsibility, what little value the letter might 

have offered me in evaluating my ability to trust 

Respondent is nullified by the fact that he himself 

has not shown me that he can be so entrusted. See 

William Ralph Kincaid, 86 FR 40636, 40641 (2021).] 

Respondent’s past service—even his volunteer 

service—is simply not enough to outweigh his lack 

of acceptance of responsibility in these proceedings. 

The letter has no other relevance, as the Agency has 

consistently held that community impact is not a 

relevant consideration under the public interest 

factors. Linda Sue Cheek, M.D., 76 FR at 66972; see 

also Gregory D. Owens, D.D.S., 74 FR 36751, 36757 

(2009). Here, the evidence of community impact 

offered by Respondent does nothing to explain the 

issues of credibility his testimony presents. 

curriculum of the class. Id. According to 

Respondent, these classes are required 

of prescribers every year, and the 

upcoming February 28 class will be his 

fourth class. Id. Respondent also 

testified that he had attended a 

conference in July 2019 on the topic of 

General Medicine, and that the last class 

in the conference focused on the opioid 

pandemic. Tr. 85–86. 

To begin, it is of course troubling that 

a medical professional with a COR 

would not appreciate the severity of the 

opioid drug crisis in this country. See 

Hassman, 75 FR at 8237. And while 

Respondent testified as to several 

classes he has taken on the subject, most 

of those were mandatory. Furthermore, 

Respondent’s testimony does not 

provide a level of detail sufficient for 

this tribunal to evaluate the classes and 

whether they constitute remedial 

measures. On its face, a mandatory class 

that all prescribers are required to take 

does not present as remedial in nature. 

Nor does mere compliance with 

mandatory requirements inspire 

confidence that Respondent has learned 

from his past misconduct and can now 

be entrusted with a COR. See id. Simply 

put, Respondent has not made an 

adequate showing of remedial measures 

[such that I could entrust him with a 

registration.] 

Overall, as Respondent faces the 

hurdle of demonstrating an adequate 

acceptance of responsibility, his 

testimony was just not credible. 

Certainly, it would strain all bounds of 

reasonable jurisprudence to find that 

Respondent has accepted responsibility 

for his actions, despite his trivialization 

of his misconduct, his disavowal of his 

statements under oath in his plea 

hearing in federal district court, his 

implausible testimony, and his own 

view of himself as a victim.21 Here, it 

bears repeating that Respondent did not 

accept responsibility unequivocally. In 

fact, it is hard to imagine a purported 

acceptance more equivocal than the one 

he offered. Respondent’s own testimony 

is riddled with inconsistencies, 

statements that are inconsistent with 

admissions he made under oath in a 

federal criminal proceeding, 

implausible statements, and numerous 

examples of Respondent portraying 

himself as the victim. Indeed, there was 

no real expression of remorse, but a 

view that he had been unfairly targeted 

and ‘‘set up’’ by DEA and accusations of 

impropriety in the criminal 

proceedings. See, e.g., Tr. 109–10 

(describing parking lot transaction as a 

‘‘setup’’); Tr. 126 (suggesting DEA 

improperly withheld 180 of the 200 

prescriptions written on his allegedly 

stolen prescription pads). Respondent’s 

lack of any meaningful acceptance of 

responsibility presents an 

insurmountable barrier to his 

application for a COR. 

In any event, given the limited scope 

of Respondent’s remedial measures, 

those measures do not change the 

outcome. His limited efforts do not 

establish a plan of remedial measures 

that assure the tribunal that he will not 

repeat the established transgressions. 

See Hassman, 75 FR at 8236. This case 

must be decided not merely upon what 

he says, but what he says and does. C.f. 

Alra Laboratories v. DEA, 54 F.3d 450, 

452 (7th Cir. 1995) (sustaining the 

Agency’s conclusion that past 

performance is the best predictor of 

future performance). 

Although he testified that he has 

taken several classes on the opioid 

epidemic, Respondent provided no 

information about these classes. Nor 

does completion of one mandatory class 

per year tend to show that Respondent 

has taken sufficient remedial measures 

to address his past misconduct—or to 

even appreciate the egregiousness of 

this conduct. While Respondent 

claimed that he was naı ̈ve (Tr. 55, 76), 

and did not appreciate the full extent of 

the pandemic, he failed to articulate 

what specific steps he would take to 

ensure that his misconduct resulting in 

diversion would not be repeated. 

Accordingly, I find that, in the face of 

the Government’s prima facie case, 

Respondent has failed to unequivocally 

accept responsibility for his past 

misconduct; therefore, he cannot be 

trusted with a DEA COR. See Singh, 81 

FR at 8250. 

B. Specific and General Deterrence 

In determining whether and to what 

extent imposing a sanction is 

appropriate, consideration must be 

given to the Agency’s interest in both 

specific and general deterrence as well 

as the egregiousness of the offenses 

established by the Government’s 

evidence. David A. Ruben, 78 FR 38363, 

38384, 38385 (2013). The Agency has 

previously found [based on specific 

circumstances] that criminal 

convictions and sanctions by state 

licensing authorities can sufficiently 

deter physicians from engaging in 

misconduct, making the denial of an 

application for, or revocation of, a COR 

unnecessary to achieve the goal of 

general deterrence. Kansky J. Delisma, 

M.D., 85 FR 23845, 23854 (2020). 

Likewise, such punitive measures can 

suffice to deter the registrant or 

applicant from future misconduct, 

making revocation or denial of an 

application unnecessary to achieve 

specific deterrence. Id. 

With respect to specific deterrence, 

Respondent failed in these proceedings 

to portray a registrant who is 

remorseful, and who has worked hard to 

change for the better. Rather, 

Respondent came across as a person 

who says the right thing in order to get 

what he wants, and, when pressed, does 

not own up to his mistakes. Without a 

better indication of remorse, the tribunal 

can only conclude that granting 

Respondent a COR would put the public 

at risk of Respondent’s previous 

diversionary behavior. Moreover, with 

respect to general deterrence, the 

Agency bears the responsibility to deter 

conduct similar to Respondent’s past 

misconduct. Ruben, 78 FR at 38385. 

Granting a COR to an applicant who has 

neither unequivocally taken 

responsibility for his misconduct, nor 

demonstrated sufficient remedial 

measures to ensure such conduct will 

not happen again, would send a 

message to all that, so long as one 

completes a mandatory class or two per 

year, there will be few consequences to 

diverting controlled substances. 

C. Egregiousness 

Finally, this tribunal finds that Dr. 

Owusu’s behavior was egregious. Dr. 

Owusu conducted a transaction that 

differs in no material respect from a 

drug deal. He sold multiple 


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3352 Federal Register / Vol. 87, No. 14 / Friday, January 21, 2022 / Notices 

1The Request for Hearing was filed on October 

13, 2021. Order for Evidence of Lack of State 

Authority and Directing the Government to File 

Evidence Regarding the Service of the Order to 

Show Cause (hereinafter, Briefing Schedule), at 1. 

I find that the Government’s service of the OSC was 

adequate and that the Request for Hearing was 

timely filed on October 13, 2021. See RD, at n.1. 

2 I find that the Office of Administrative Law 

Judges properly served Respondent on all 

occasions. The Certificate of Service for the 

Government’s Motion certifies that the Government 

served Respondent’s counsel at the email address 

provided in Respondent’s Request for Hearing. 

Request for Hearing, at 1–2. 

prescriptions for powerful controlled 

substances at night, in a parking lot, in 

a manner designed to avoid detection. 

Both then and now, Respondent has 

responded with calculated, inconsistent 

statements designed to escape 

culpability. In Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 

U.S. 243, 270 (2006), the Supreme Court 

made clear that DEA has authority 

under the Controlled Substances Act to 

bar illicit drug dealing and trafficking as 

traditionally understood. Respondent, 

in this case, engaged in conduct that 

constitutes drug trafficking as 

traditionally understood, and, 

accordingly, the appropriate sanction is 

denial of his application for a DEA 

registration. 

Accordingly, it is herein respectfully 

recommended that Respondent’s 

application for a DEA registration be 

denied. 

Dated: April 9, 2021. 

Teresa A. Wallbaum, 

Administrative Law Judge. 

Order 

Pursuant to 28 CFR 0.100(b) and the 

authority vested in me by 21 U.S.C. 

823(f), I hereby deny the pending 

application for a Certificate of 

Registration, Control Number 

W19061136C, submitted by Stephen E. 

Owusu, D.P.M., as well as any other 

pending application of Stephen E. 

Owusu, D.P.M., for additional 

registration in New York. This Order is 

effective February 22, 2022. 

Anne Milgram, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2022–01108 Filed 1–20–22; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4410–09–P 

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 

Drug Enforcement Administration 

[Docket No. 22–1] 

Alex E. Torres, M.D.; Decision and 

Order 

On August 11, 2021, the Acting 

Assistant Administrator, Diversion 

Control Division, Drug Enforcement 

Administration (hereinafter, DEA or 

Government), issued an Order to Show 

Cause (hereinafter, OSC) to Alex E. 

Torres, M.D. (hereinafter, Respondent) 

of San Diego, California. OSC, at 1 and 

3. The OSC proposed the revocation of 

Respondent’s Certificate of Registration 

No. BT1734943. Id. at 1. It alleged that 

Respondent is ‘‘without authority to 

handle controlled substances in 

California, the state in which 

[Respondent is] registered with DEA.’’ 

Id. at 2 (citing 21 U.S.C. 824(a)(3)). 

Specifically, the OSC alleged that on 

March 18, 2021, Respondent entered 

into a Stipulated Surrender of License 

and Order (hereinafter, Stipulated 

Surrender) with the Medical Board of 

California (hereinafter, the Board) 

‘‘whereby [Respondent] agreed to 

surrender [his] California state medical 

license.’’ Id. According to the OSC, 

Respondent agreed to the Stipulated 

Surrender after the Board alleged, inter 

alia, that ‘‘[Respondent] negligently 

treated three patients, failed to maintain 

adequate and accurate records, and 

[was] impaired due to mental illness.’’ 

Id. The OSC stated that the Board issued 

its Decision adopting the Stipulated 

Surrender on March 22, 2021, with the 

Decision becoming effective on March 

29, 2021. Id. 

The OSC notified Respondent of the 

right to request a hearing on the 

allegations or to submit a written 

statement, while waiving the right to a 

hearing, the procedures for electing each 

option, and the consequences for failing 

to elect either option. Id. at 2–3 (citing 

21 CFR 1301.43). The OSC also notified 

Respondent of the opportunity to 

submit a corrective action plan. Id. at 3 

(citing 21 U.S.C. 824(c)(2)(C)). 

By letter dated October 12, 2021, 

Respondent timely requested a hearing.1

Administrative Law Judge Exhibit 

(hereinafter, ALJX) 4 (Request for 

Hearing), at 1. According to the Request 

for Hearing, ‘‘[Respondent] never agreed 

to surrender his California DEA license 

. . . [and] the [Board] didn’t make any 

claim against [Respondent’s] DEA 

license.’’ Id. at 2. Further, the Request 

for Hearing states that ‘‘[d]uring [the 

Board] process [Respondent] denied the 

allegations against him.’’ Id. According 

to the Request for Hearing, ‘‘[n]one of 

the allegations against [Respondent] 

were related to drug prescription [sic]’’ 

and ‘‘the patient’s [sic] allegations 

against [Respondent] were made 

because he refused to prescribe them 

controlled pain medications.’’ Id. 

Finally, the Request for Hearing states 

that, ‘‘[t]he mental illness claimed by 

[the Board] was refuted and proved 

wrong with a psychiatric evaluation 

performed to [Respondent] after the 

Board alleged [that] he was mentally 

ill.’’ Id. 

The Office of Administrative Law 

Judges put the matter on the docket and 

assigned it to Administrative Law Judge 

Paul E. Soeffing (hereinafter, the ALJ). 

The ALJ issued the Briefing Schedule on 

October 13, 2021. On October 21, 2021, 

the Government timely filed its Notice 

of Filing of Evidence and Motion for 

Summary Disposition (hereinafter, 

Government’s Motion). Order Granting 

the Government’s Motion for Summary 

Disposition, and Recommended 

Rulings, Findings of Fact, Conclusions 

of Law, and Decision of the 

Administrative Law Judge (hereinafter, 

Recommended Decision or RD), at 2. In 

its Motion, the Government ‘‘request[ed] 

summary disposition and a 

recommendation that Respondent’s DEA 

Certificate of Registration as a 

practitioner be revoked based on his 

lack of authority to handle controlled 

substances in the State of California, the 

state in which he is registered with the 

DEA.’’ Government’s Motion, at 5. 

Respondent did not answer the 

Government’s Motion.2 He did, 

however, address the OSC and the 

Government’s allegations in his Request 

for Hearing. Request for Hearing, at 1– 

2. I have reviewed and considered the 

Request for Hearing as part of, and along 

with, the entire record before me. 

The ALJ issued his Recommended 

Decision on November 2, 2021, granting 

the Government’s Motion and finding 

that ‘‘[a]s the Respondent does not have 

authority as a practitioner in California, 

there is no other fact of consequence for 

[the] tribunal to decide in order to 

determine whether or not he is entitled 

to hold a [DEA registration].’’ RD, at 6. 

Further, the ALJ recommended that 

Respondent’s DEA registration be 

revoked and that any application to 

renew or modify his registration and 

any applications for any other DEA 

registrations in California be denied 

‘‘based on [Respondent’s] lack of state 

authority to practice medicine or handle 

controlled substances in California.’’ Id. 

at 6–7. By letter dated November 29, 

2021, the ALJ certified and transmitted 

the record to me for final Agency action. 

In the letter, the ALJ advised that no 

exceptions were filed by either party. 

Transmittal Letter, at 1. 

I issue this Decision and Order based 

on the entire record before me. 21 CFR 

1301.43(e). I make the following 

findings of fact. 


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