[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-10287

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-00092-TCB-LTW-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

UGOCHUKWU LAZARUS ONEBUNNE,

a.k.a. Policap Tizhe,

a.k.a. Saheed Ademoha,

a.k.a. Ugochukwu Lazarus Onebunne, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

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(August 6, 2020)

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Before WILSON, MARTIN, and ROSENBAUM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Ugochukwu Onebunne appeals his total 120-month above-guideline 

sentence, arguing it was imposed due to the government’s breach of the plea 

agreement and that it is substantively unreasonable. For the following reasons, we 

affirm.

I.

First, the plea-agreement issue. We review de novo the question of whether 

the government breached a plea agreement when the defendant preserved the issue. 

United States v. Copeland, 381 F.3d 1101, 1104 (11th Cir. 2004). A defendant

“must make all [his] objections to a sentencing court’s findings of fact, conclusions 

of law, and the manner in which the sentence was imposed at the initial sentencing 

hearing.” United States v. Ladson, 643 F.3d 1335, 1342 (11th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotation mark omitted). 

But when a defendant fails to preserve an issue, we review only for plain 

error. United States v. Romano, 314 F.3d 1279, 1281 (11th Cir. 2002). Plain error 

exists where (1) there is an error; (2) that is plain; (3) that affected the defendant’s 

substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public 

reputation of the judicial proceedings. Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 

(2009). An error is plain if it is “clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable 

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dispute.” Id. In the context of an alleged plea-agreement breach, the question of 

whether the defendant’s substantial rights were affected is not whether the 

defendant would have entered into the plea, but rather whether his sentence was 

affected by the government’s breach. Id. at 142 n.4. 

To determine whether the government breached a plea agreement, we 

“determine the scope of the government’s promises.” Copeland, 381 F.3d at 1105. 

In doing so, we “apply an objective standard” to determine “whether the 

government’s actions [were] inconsistent with what the defendant reasonably 

understood” when he pled guilty. Id. We will not use a “hyper-technical” or a 

“rigidly literal approach” to interpret the agreement. Id.

Here, Onebunne did not object about an alleged breach of the plea 

agreement at the sentencing hearing. Nevertheless, citing no law, he insists that he 

preserved the breach issue by filing a supplemental objection the day after the 

hearing. But, as we stated in Ladson, those objections must take place “at the 

initial sentencing hearing.” See 643 F.3d at 1342. Therefore, we review this issue 

for plain error. See Romano, 314 F.3d at 1281.

But no matter how we review this issue, we see no reason for resentencing in 

front of a different judge because there was no breach. The government’s 

sentencing arguments were entirely consistent with the plea agreement. In the plea 

agreement, “the Government agree[d] to recommend that the Defendant be 

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sentenced at the high-end of the adjusted guideline range.” It did just that. The 

adjusted guideline range was 57 to 71 months; the government argued repeatedly 

for a sentence of 71 months, the “high-end” of the range. To be sure, the 

government alluded to Onebunne’s codefendant’s sentence and sending a message. 

But context reveals that there was nothing improper about those allusions. In fact, 

the government explicitly distinguished Onebunne from his codefendant: When the 

district court asked the government why Onebunne deserved a lower sentence than 

his codefendant, the government explained how it saw Onebunne as less culpable. 

The government unquestionably fulfilled its promise to Onebunne. And in any 

event, Onebunne fails to show any of the other plain-error elements. See Puckett, 

556 U.S. at 135. Accordingly, we affirm on this issue.

II.

Next, we consider whether Onebunne’s sentence was substantively 

unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence under an 

abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Gomez, 955 F.3d 1250, 1255 (11th 

Cir. 2020) (per curiam). “The party challenging a sentence has the burden of 

showing that the sentence is unreasonable in light of the entire record, the [18 

U.S.C.] § 3553(a) factors, and the substantial deference afforded sentencing 

courts.” Id.; see also United States v. Goldman, 953 F.3d 1213, 1222 (11th Cir. 

2020). The vast discretion the district court enjoys is abused, though, “if it (1) fails 

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to consider relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives an improper 

or irrelevant factor significant weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by 

unreasonably balancing the proper factors.” Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222. “A

sentence imposed well below the statutory maximum penalty is an indicator of 

reasonableness.” Id.

Onebunne has failed to carry his burden to show that his sentence is 

substantively unreasonable. See Gomez, 955 F.3d at 1255; Goldman, 953 F.3d at

1222. The district court did not abuse its discretion here. Both parties referenced 

the § 3553(a) factors in their arguments, as did the court in its explanation for the 

sentence. Beyond that, the court explicitly said it considered all the § 3553(a) 

factors, acknowledged that it was imposing a variance sentence, and explained 

why: The guideline range “does not come close to providing adequate deterrence 

and adequate punishment” because the crime was “pure evil, . . . not accounted for

by the guideline range.” The court explained why it saw Onebunne as an essential 

participant in the crime—a fraud conspiracy that involved lying to gain the trust of 

individuals who were simply looking for love and companionship and then 

violating that trust for monetary gain. The court considered all relevant factors, did 

not give an improper factor significant weight, and did not commit a clear error of 

judgment by improperly balancing the factors. We see no indicia of abuse here. 

See Goldman, 953 F.3d at 1222. For good measure, we note that Onebunne’s 

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sentence of 120 months (i.e., 10 years) was half the statutory maximum of 20 

years, which indicates reasonableness. See id.; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1349. 

Accordingly, we affirm the sentence.

AFFIRMED.

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