1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION

KRIS KINSEY,

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

 STATE OF OHIO, et al.

Defendants.

Case No. 2:17-cv-982 

Judge Graham 

Magistrate Judge Vascura 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court for consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment 

filed by Defendants County of Belmont (“Belmont County”), Sheriff David Lucas, and Jail 

Administrator Brent Carpenter (collectively, “Defendants”). (Def.’s Mot. Summ. J., ECF No. 32.) 

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 

I. BACKGROUND 

A. Factual Background

Plaintiff Kris Kinsey was arrested by a City of Elyria Police Officer on August 19, 2017. 

(Am. Compl. ¶ 6, ECF No. 4 at 87.) He was arrested pursuant to an outstanding bench warrant 

issued by the Belmont County Court of Common Pleas. (Pl.’s Ex. B, ECF No. 4 at 106.) Mr. 

Kinsey was transported to the Lorain County Jail. (Kinsey Dep. 28:2–3, ECF No. 31-1 at 248.) 

The details of Mr. Kinsey’s detention at the Lorain County Jail are outlined in Kinsey v. Cnty. of 

Lorain, No. 1:17 CV 2412, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10871 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2019), which is 
2

incorporated by reference. While detained at the Lorain County Jail, Mr. Kinsey was placed on 

suicide watch. Id. at *8–9.

Mr. Kinsey signed a Waiver in Lieu of Criminal Rule 4(E) Hearing. (Defs.’ Ex. D, ECF 

No. 31-3 at 379.) By signing the waiver, Mr. Kinsey waived his right to consult an attorney before 

leaving Lorain County, his right to be taken to a court of jurisdiction for bail to be set, and agreed 

to be transported to Belmont County. (Id.) Mr. Kinsey testified that he understood what he signed. 

(Kinsey Dep. 48:18–24.) Mr. Kinsey was transported to the Belmont County Jail on August 21, 

2017. Kinsey, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10871, at *9.

Upon arriving at the Belmont County Jail, Mr. Kinsey spoke with Nurse Joanne Lucas 

(“Nurse Lucas”) concerning his medical history. (J. Lucas Aff. ¶ 5, ECF No. 32-2 at 417.) Mr. 

Kinsey claims he “told the nurse that . . . he had dental surgery one week prior and . . . takes various 

prescribed medications,” along with a nutrition supplement, Ensure, “because he was unable to eat 

solid foods.” (Am. Compl. ¶ 11.) Nurse Lucas avers that “[a]t no point in time did Mr. Kinsey 

inform [her] that he was prescribed Ensure or needed Ensure.” (J. Lucas Aff. ¶ 8.) Though Mr. 

Kinsey and Nurse Lucas disagree as to whether they discussed Mr. Kinsey’s requirement for 

Ensure, they do agree that Mr. Kinsey relayed his recent dental surgery to Nurse Lucas, that Nurse 

Lucas observed the poor condition of his teeth, and Nurse Lucas thereafter annotated Mr. Kinsey’s 

need for a soft diet. (Kinsey Dep. 56:3–57:1; J. Lucas Aff. ¶ 7; Defs.’ Ex. E, ECF No. 31-4 at 380; 
3

Defs.’ Ex. I, ECF No. 31-6.) Because Lorain County considered Mr. Kinsey a suicide risk, 

Belmont County also placed him on suicide watch. (Id. at ¶ 15; J. Lucas Aff. ¶ 6.) 

While confined to a solitary cell, Mr. Kinsey received a soft diet. Mr. Kinsey ate every 

meal he was offered with the exception of one lunch. (Kinsey Dep. 82:15–16.) He received two 

dinner trays on the day he did not eat lunch. (Id. at 83:19–20.)

Mr. Kinsey claims he received a copy of the bench warrant and offered to pay the $380.00 

bail amount by credit card, but that Belmont County refused to accept any form of payment other 

than cash. (Am. Compl. ¶ 14.) Mr. Kinsey was not given access to an automated teller machine 

(“ATM”). (Id.) Mr. Kinsey alleges that Defendants did not investigate his ability to pay any fines 

or costs. (Id. at ¶ 72.)

Mr. Kinsey later appeared before a judge at 3:00 PM on August 24, 2017 and was released 

from the Belmont County jail later that same day. (Id. at 87:2–5; Am. Compl. ¶ 23.) Upon release, 

Mr. Kinsey signed a document certifying that he received all of his property from the Belmont 

County Jail. (Defs’. Ex. I, ECF No. 31-6 at 384.)

Sheriff Lucas and Jail Administrator Carpenter did not speak or interact with Mr. Kinsey 

either before or while he was detained at the Belmont County Jail, were not involved with either 

Mr. Kinsey’s detention or his release from the Belmont County Jail, and no issues concerning Mr. 

Kinsey were brought to their attention during Mr. Kinsey’s detention at the Belmont County Jail. 

(Carpenter Aff. ¶¶ 7–12, ECF No. 32-1 at 415; D. Lucas Aff. ¶¶ 5–11, ECF No. 32-3 at 414–15.) 

Mr. Kinsey agrees that he had no personal interactions with either Sheriff Lucas or Jail 

Administrator Carpenter during either his arrest or his confinement at the Belmont County Jail. 

(Kinsey Dep. 29:11–30:4, 89:13–90:3.) 
4

B. Procedural Background 

In his amended complaint, Mr. Kinsey brings claims for 1) false arrest; 2) false 

imprisonment; 3) negligent failure to provide medical care; 4) intentional infliction of emotional 

distress (“IIED”); 5) negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”), 6) violations of his First, 

Fourth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 7) violations of 

the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act,1

 9) abuse of process, and 10) malicious 

prosecution. (ECF No. 4.) Defendants move for summary judgment on all of Mr. Kinsey’s claims. 

Defendants’ motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration.

II. LEGAL STANDARD 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, summary judgment is proper if the evidentiary 

material in the record shows that there is “no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Courts consider the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that 

party’s favor.” Quigley v. Tuong Vinh Thai, 707 F.3d 675, 679 (6th Cir. 2013) (internal citation 

omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986)). The critical 

question here is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to 

a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. 

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251–52 (1986). 

 “The moving party has the initial burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact 

exists, and the court must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) 

 

1

 Mr. Kinsey’s claims are ordered according to his amended complaint which goes from a seventh cause of action to 

a ninth cause of action. (ECF No. 4 at 101–02.) 
5

(internal quotations omitted). “Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant 

must ‘designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Kimble v. 

Wasylyshyn, No. 10–3110, 2011 WL 4469612, at *3 (6th Cir. Sept. 28, 2011) (quoting Celotex 

Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party 

maintaining that a fact is genuinely disputed to “cit[e] to particular parts of materials in the 

record”). “The nonmovant must, however, do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. [T]here must be evidence upon which a reasonable 

jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to create a genuine dispute.” Lee v. 

Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). “When a motion for summary judgment is properly made and 

supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond with a showing sufficient to establish an 

essential element of its case, summary judgment is appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 

(citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23). 

III. DISCUSSION 

In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants Belmont County, Sheriff David Lucas, 

and Jail Administrator Brent Carpenter provide several grounds on which they believe summary 

judgment should be granted. 

A. Abandoned Claims 

Defendants first claim that Mr. Kinsey fails to support many of his claims against all three 

Defendants in his response in opposition to their motion for summary judgment. Defendants 

likewise point out that Mr. Kinsey also fails to address his claims against Sheriff Lucas and Jail 

Administrator Carpenter in their individual capacities. Upon reading Mr. Kinsey’s response in 

opposition (ECF No. 35), the Court agrees that Mr. Kinsey failed to respond to Defendants’ 
6

arguments concerning several of his claims. 

The Sixth Circuit’s position on a plaintiff’s abandonment of a claim is well established. 

“[A] plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when a plaintiff fails to address it in response 

to a motion for summary judgment.” Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 372 (6th 

Cir. 2013) (citing Hicks v. Concorde Career Coll., 449 F. App’x 484, 487 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding 

that a district court properly declines to consider the merits of a claim when a plaintiff fails to 

address it in a response to a motion for summary judgment); Clark v. City of Dublin, 178 F. App’x 

522, 524-25 (6th Cir. 2006) (recognizing that the failure to respond properly to motion for 

summary judgment arguments constitutes abandonment of a claim)). 

As Mr. Kinsey never addresses Defendants’ arguments concerning Count One: false 

arrest; Count Two: false imprisonment; Count Three: negligent failure to provide medical care; 

Count Four: IIED; Count Five: NIED; Count Six: as it pertains to violations of his First 

Amendment right to free speech and expression, Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable 

seizures, and Sixth Amendment right to counsel; Count Seven: violations of the Americans with 

Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act; Count Nine: abuse of process; and Count Ten: malicious 

prosecution; and his claims against Sheriff Lucas and Jail Administrator Carpenter in their 

individual capacities, he is deemed to have abandoned those claims. Accordingly, Defendants 

are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on these claims. 

The Court addresses Mr. Kinsey’s remaining claims, which stem from alleged violations 

of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. 
7

A. Claims Against Defendants Sheriff Lucas and Jail Administrator Carpenter

Mr. Kinsey claims that Defendants Belmont County, Sheriff Lucas, and Jail 

Administrator Carpenter violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights to receive 

adequate medical treatment and his right not to be subject to excessive bail.

Defendants highlight that Mr. Kinsey’s only remaining claims against Defendants Sheriff 

Lucas and Jail Administrator Carpenter are against them in their official capacities. Defendants 

point out that since Sheriff Lucas and Jail Administrator Carpenter are employees of Belmont 

County, the official capacity claims against them are actually against their employer, Belmont 

County. “While ‘personal-capacity suits seek to impose personal liability upon a government 

official for actions he takes under color of state law,’ individuals sued in their official capacities 

stand in the shoes of the entity they represent.” Alkire v. Irving, 330 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2003) 

(quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985)); Matthews v. Jones, 35 F.3d 1046, 1049 

(6th Cir. 1994) (“A suit against an individual in his official capacity is the equivalent of a suit 

against the governmental entity.”). “As long as the government entity receives notice and an 

opportunity to respond, an official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated 

as a suit against the entity.” Graham, 473 U.S. at 166. Therefore, the only remaining true 

defendant is Defendant Belmont County. 

B. Section 1983 Claims 

Defendants further declare that Mr. Kinsey fails to allege valid § 1983 claims in his 

amended complaint. The Court agrees. 

In Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), the Supreme Court 

determined that “a local government may not be sued under § 1983 for an injury inflicted solely 

by its employees or agents.” “Instead, it is when the execution of a government’s policy or 
8

custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to 

represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an entity is responsible under 

§ 1983.” Id. As the Sixth Circuit explains, under Monell, “county liability is limited to situations 

in which the deprivation of constitutional rights results from an official policy or custom of the 

county.” Petty v. Cnty. of Franklin, 478 F.3d 341, 347 (6th Cir. 2007).

To establish municipal liability, a plaintiff “must (1) identify the municipal policy or 

custom, (2) connect the policy to the municipality, and (3) show that his particular injury was 

incurred due to execution of that policy.” Alkire, 330 F.3d at 815 (citing Garner v. Memphis 

Police Dep’t, 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir. 1993)). “There must be a ‘direct causal link’ between the 

policy and the alleged constitutional violation such that the County’s deliberate conduct can be 

deemed the moving force behind the violation.” Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. County of 

Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 383 (6th Cir. 2004). 

Defendants argue that Mr. Kinsey’s response in opposition to their motion asserts Monell 

claims that were not pled in his amended complaint. An examination of Mr. Kinsey’s amended 

complaint reveals that Defendants are correct in their assertion. Mr. Kinsey’s amended complaint 

fails to allege that any Belmont County custom or official policy led to a violation of his 

constitutional rights.

“A plaintiff may not amend his complaint through arguments in his brief in opposition to 

a motion for summary judgment.” Shanahan v. City of Chicago, 82 F.3d 776, 781 (7th Cir. 1996). 

See also Guiffre v. Local Lodge No. 1124, United Steelworkers of Am., 940 F.2d 660 (Table), 

[published in full-text format at 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 17698], 1991 WL 135576, at *5 (6th Cir. 

July 24, 1991) (“A party may not rely on wholly new allegations of wrongdoing to resist a motion 
9

for summary judgment.”). Thus, Mr. Kinsey is barred from asserting Monell claims against 

Defendants in his response in opposition to their motion for summary judgment. 

As Mr. Kinsey’s amended complaint fails to allege the existence of a Belmont County 

policy or custom that resulted in a violation of his constitutional rights, his § 1983 claims fail as 

a matter of law. His § 1983 claims against Defendants Belmont County, Sheriff Lucas, and Jail 

Administrator Carpenter for violations of his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights are 

therefore dismissed. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons articulated above, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ Motion for Summary 

Judgment (ECF No. 32). All of Plaintiff Kris Kinsey’s claims against Defendants are 

DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. The Court hereby enters judgment in favor of Defendants. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ James L. Graham 

 JAMES L. GRAHAM 

 United States District Judge 

DATE: March 5, 2020