Present: Carrico, C.J., Compton, Lacy, Hassell, Keenan and Kinser, 

JJ., and Poff, Senior Justice. 

CORRIE L. JAYNES, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 971959 SENIOR JUSTICE RICHARD H. POFF 

 June 5, 1998 

JON D. BECKER, ET AL. 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH 

A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge 

 In their principal assignment of error, the several appellants 

contend that “[t]he trial court erred in finding that Ford [Motor] 

Credit [Company] is in the business of leasing within the meaning of 

Virginia Code § 38.2-2205 and that the limitation of liability 

coverage provided therein applies.” 

 The appellants, plaintiffs in this action for declaratory 

judgment, include two students injured and the estates of two 

students killed in a collision between the vehicle they occupied and 

a pickup truck driven by John Brian Haigh.1 The appellants are also 

plaintiffs in tort actions seeking damages against Haigh who was 

convicted and incarcerated for involuntary manslaughter of the 

decedents. 

 1

 The appellants are Corrie L. Jaynes, by her next friend and 

guardian, David H. Jaynes, David H. Jaynes, individually, James W. 

Raney, Administrator of the Estate of Brian Kent Raney, deceased, 

John Partilla and Marlise Partilla, Administrators of the Estate of 

Jason Scott Partilla, deceased, and Joseph Allen, individually. 

The appellees, defendants in the declaratory judgment action, 

are Haigh, Jon D. Becker, Haigh’s Committee, Ford Motor Company 

(Ford Motor), Ford Motor Credit Company (Ford Credit), and Michigan 

Mutual Insurance Company (Michigan Mutual). 
 The accident occurred in November 1993 when the Ford pickup 

truck operated by Haigh crossed the center line of the road and 

collided head-on with the car occupied by the four students. Haigh 

had leased that truck on March 11, 1993 for a two-year term from 

Beach Ford, Inc. (Beach Ford), a car dealership. By language and 

signatures incorporated in the body of the lease document, Beach 

Ford assigned “all of Lessor’s right, title and interest in and to 

the Lease and the Vehicle described therein” to Ford Credit. The 

Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles issued an owner’s certificate 

of title to Ford Credit, and Ford Credit paid the property taxes 

assessed upon the truck. 

 At the time of the accident, Ford Motor was the primary named 

insured under an automobile insurance policy issued by Michigan 

Mutual providing a maximum liability coverage of $12 million.2 A 

policy endorsement defined “Named Insured” as “Ford Motor Company, 

its subsidiary, associated and affiliated companies, and its owned 

or controlled companies as are now or may hereafter be constituted.” 

Ford Credit is a wholly-owned subsidiary of Ford Motor. 

 Appellants asked the trial court to declare that “the [Michigan 

Mutual] insurance policy affords liability coverage which would be 

available to satisfy plaintiffs’ claims . . . or to pay any 

 2

 Although the lease agreement required the lessee to maintain 

liability coverage on the pickup, Haigh’s own insurance policy was 

cancelled for failure to pay premiums approximately two months 

before the accident. 

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judgments recovered by plaintiffs against Haigh in the lawsuits”. 

The appellants filed a motion for summary judgment. The appellees, 

having filed their grounds of defense and a cross-motion for summary 

judgment, joined with the appellants in a “STATEMENT OF FACTS NOT IN 

DISPUTE”. 

 Based upon that statement, exhibits related to the several 

stipulations, other exhibits filed with the cross-motions, and oral 

argument by counsel, the trial court issued a letter opinion 

sustaining the cross-motions in part and denying them in part. In a 

final judgment order entered June 20, 1997, the court ruled: (1) 

that “Haigh is an insured under the subject Michigan Mutual . . . 

policy . . . as a permissive user of the vehicle owned by Ford 

Credit, as provided in Va. Code § 38.2-2204”; (2) that, “because 

Haigh was a permissive user, liability coverage under the Policy 

extends to claims of the plaintiffs arising from the accident which 

prompted this suit for declaratory judgment”; and (3) that “the 

Defendants in this case are entitled to the limitation on liability 

set forth in Va. Code § 38.2-2205 and . . . the amount of liability 

coverage under the Policy applicable to any liability of Haigh 

arising from the accident which prompted this suit for declaratory 

judgment is limited to $25,000 per person and $50,000 per accident 

as set forth in, and subject to the provisions of, Va. Code §§ 38.2-

2205 and 46.2-472”. 

I. 

3
 Appellants’ first assignment of error addresses the trial 

court’s third ruling. They contend that the appellees are not 

eligible for the coverage limitation fixed in Code § 46.2-472 

because, they say, Ford Credit is not engaged in the business of 

leasing vehicles within the intendment of Code § 38.2-2205 but only 

in the business of financing leases. In pertinent part, § 38.2-

2205(A)(1) provides: 

Each policy . . . of bodily injury . . . liability 

insurance which provides insurance to a named insured in 

connection with the business of . . . leasing . . . motor 

vehicles, against liability arising from the . . . use of 

any motor vehicle incident thereto shall contain a 

provision that the insurance coverage . . . shall not be 

applicable to a person other than the named insured . . . 

if there is any other valid and collectible insurance 

applicable to the same loss covering the other person 

under a policy with limits at least equal to the financial 

responsibility requirements specified in § 46.2-472. Such 

provision shall apply to motor vehicles which are . . . 

leased to the other person for a period of six months or 

more. . . . 

 In the language of this statute, Ford Credit is a “named 

insured” under Michigan Mutual’s policy covering a vehicle leased to 

the “other person [Haigh] for a period of six months or more” and 

Haigh is the “person other than the named insured” covered under 

that policy because there is no “other valid and collectible 

insurance . . . covering the other person under a policy with limits 

at least equal to the financial responsibility requirements 

specified in § 46.2-472.” 

4
 The dispositive question, then, is whether Michigan Mutual’s 

policy provides insurance to a named insured “in connection with the 

business of . . . leasing”. The appellants insist that Ford 

Credit’s very name identifies it as an entity engaged in the 

business of financing rather than leasing. The trial court ruled 

that “Ford Credit did more than just ‘finance’ the lease of the 

subject truck.” As explained in its letter opinion, the court’s 

ruling was based upon the record and the stipulated facts before it: 

Ford Credit provides the blank lease documents for use by 

Ford dealerships, approves the leases before the 

dealerships enter into them, purchases the vehicles, takes 

assignments of the leases, assumes all of the duties and 

rights of ownership of the leased vehicles, and performs 

administrative duties during the term of the leases. 

Under the terms of the . . . leases, Ford Credit becomes 

the lessor of the vehicles, not just a financial backer. 

 We agree with the trial court’s ruling that Michigan Mutual’s 

policy provides insurance within the intendment of Code §§ 38.2-

2205(A)(1) and 46.2-472. 

II. 

 Yet, appellants maintain that Ford Credit is bound by an 

admission stated in its “Annual Report on Form 10-K” filed in 1993 

with the federal Securities and Exchange Commission that it was in 

the business of financing. In an alternative assignment of error, 

they contend that, if that admission was not sufficient to 

“establish conclusively that Ford Credit is in the business of 

financing rather than leasing, then the trial court erred in 

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granting [the appellees] summary judgment . . . because a material 

fact is genuinely in dispute.” 

 We disagree. Ford Credit’s acknowledgement that it was “in the 

business of financing” is not factually inconsistent with its 

contention that it is a “named insured” in Michigan Mutual’s 

insurance policy issued “in connection with the business of . . . 

leasing . . . motor vehicles”. Consequently, we agree with the 

trial court that Ford Credit was a lessor of the vehicle and that 

“no material facts remain in dispute.” 

 Finding no merit in the appellants’ assignments of error, we 

will affirm the final judgment entered June 20, 1997. 

Affirmed. 

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