UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RICHARD WHITE, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

JOSH VANBIBBER, et al., 

 Defendants. 

Case No. 2:18-cv-159 

JUDGE GEORGE C. SMITH 

Magistrate Judge Kimberly A. Jolson 

OPINION AND ORDER 

This matter is before the Court upon Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint 

(Doc. 18).1 The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition. For the following reasons, 

Defendants’ Motion is GRANTED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Richard White alleges that while in the custody of the Southeastern Regional Jail 

following an arrest for a probation violation, he was denied medical and mental health treatment 

over a period of three days. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 11, 21–27). Prior to his arrest, his doctor 

prescribed a detox and tapering program to gradually and safely discontinue the benzodiazepines 

he had been taking. (Id. ¶¶ 8–9, 17). White’s doctor sent a fax to the jail on February 26, 2016, 

the day White was arrested, informing the jail of the prescribed detox and tapering program. (Id. 

 

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 The county commissioners for Hocking, Morgan, and Vinton Counties filed a motion to dismiss White’s 

Complaint on April 13, 2018. (Doc. 10). All Defendants later filed a second Motion to Dismiss on April 26, 2018 

(Doc. 18), and all parties stipulated that the later motion was filed on behalf of all defendants and included the same 

arguments made in the earlier motion. (Doc. 19). The parties further stipulated that White need only respond to the 

later motion filed on behalf of all Defendants. (Id.). 
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¶ 17). The jail sent a fax back to White’s doctor stating that the jail had its own withdrawal 

protocol and that they would monitor White’s vitals. (Id. ¶ 18). However, despite White’s 

repeated requests, the jail never provided White with any medication or allowed him to speak with 

a doctor or mental health professional during his detention. (Id. ¶¶ 21–28). 

On February 28, 2016, while still in the jail’s custody, White alleges that he was distraught, 

confused, and suffering from withdrawal from benzodiazepines. (Id. ¶ 29). He alleges that he 

climbed over a railing to reach a second story ledge as a direct and proximate result of not receiving 

medical attention from the jail. (Id. ¶ 30). After standing on the ledge for approximately 20 

minutes (during which time he received no assistance or attention from jail personnel), White 

jumped from the ledge onto the concrete floor below and suffered extensive injuries. (Id. ¶¶ 30–

35). 

White commenced this action on February 23, 2018 against Josh VanBibber, Warden of 

the Southeastern Ohio Regional Jail, as well as the county commissioners of Hocking, Morgan, 

Vinton, Perry, and Athens Counties, Ohio. (Doc. 1). His Complaint contains twelve claims for 

relief: claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights, 

violation of substantive due process, and supervisor liability (Counts 1–3); conspiracy to interfere 

with civil rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (Count 4); violation of his Eighth Amendment 

rights (Count 5); negligence, gross negligence, and negligent supervision (Counts 6–8); negligent 

and intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts 9–10); violation of Ohio Administrative 

Code § 5120:1-8-09 (Count 11); and punitive damages (Count 12). 

White’s Complaint did not specify whether he was suing each defendant in their individual 

or official capacities. In his memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, White 

clarified that he intended to pursue his federal claims (Counts 1–5) against Defendants in their 
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official capacities and to pursue his state law claims (Counts 6–12) against Defendants in their 

individual capacities. (Doc. 21, Resp. at 2). The Court will treat White’s claims accordingly in 

evaluating Defendants’ Motion. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Defendants bring this motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil 

Procedure, alleging that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 

Under the Federal Rules, any pleading that states a claim for relief must contain a “short 

and plain statement of the claim” showing that the pleader is entitled to such relief. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 8(a)(2). To meet this standard, a party must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is 

“plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A claim will be 

considered “plausible on its face” when a plaintiff sets forth “factual content that allows the court 

to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

Rule 12(b)(6) allows parties to challenge the sufficiency of a complaint under the 

foregoing standards. In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted, the Court must “construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 

plaintiff, accept its allegations as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the 

plaintiff.” Ohio Police & Fire Pension Fund v. Standard & Poor’s Fin. Servs. LLC, 700 F.3d 

829, 835 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). 

However, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is inapplicable to 

threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory statements.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 663. Thus, while a court is to afford plaintiff every inference, the pleading 

must still contain facts sufficient to “provide a plausible basis for the claims in the complaint”; a 

recitation of facts intimating the “mere possibility of misconduct” will not suffice. Flex Homes, 
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Inc. v. Ritz-Craft Corp of Mich., Inc., 491 F. App’x 628, 632 (6th Cir. 2012); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

679. 

III. DISCUSSION 

Defendants have moved to dismiss all of White’s claims. The Court will address each 

claim in turn. 

A. § 1983 claims (Counts 1–3) 

As clarified by White in his opposition brief, he asserts his § 1983 claims against 

Defendants in their official capacities. “[O]fficial-capacity suits ‘generally represent only another 

way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent.’” Hafer v. Melo, 502 

U.S. 21, 25 (1991) (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165 (1985) and Monell v. New 

York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55, (1978)). Where, as here, a plaintiff seeks 

to hold a political entity liable under § 1983 for the actions of its employees, the analysis is 

governed by Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs. 436 U.S. 658. 

In Monell, the Supreme Court explained that municipal liability under § 1983 may attach 

only where the “execution of a government’s policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or 

by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury” 

complained of. Graham ex rel. Estate of Graham v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 358 F.3d 377, 382 (6th 

Cir. 2004) (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Therefore, to prevail on these claims, White must 

show (1) that he suffered a constitutional violation and (2) that a municipal policy or custom 

directly caused the violation. Hardrick v. City of Detroit, Michigan, 876 F.3d 238, 243 (6th Cir. 

2017). 

It is the second requirement that Defendants primarily challenge. The Sixth Circuit has 

explained that a plaintiff asserting a § 1983 claim on the basis of a municipal custom or policy 

must “identify the policy, connect the policy to the [municipal entity] itself and show that the 
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particular injury was incurred because of the execution of that policy.” Graham, 358 F.3d at 382. 

Defendants argue that White has not alleged how any particular policy of the jail caused him any 

injury. The Court agrees. 

All White alleges regarding any putative policy of the jail is that “a nurse from the Jail sent 

a fax to Dr. Bonner informing Dr. Bonner that the Jail had its own withdrawal protocol and that 

they would monitor White’s vitals.” (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶ 18). This paragraph plausibly alleges the 

existence of a withdrawal protocol, but not its contents. White acknowledges as much in his 

opposition brief when he states that “[e]ither the Jail’s withdrawal/detox protocol is no medications 

at all or the Jail did not follow its own protocol.” (Doc. 21, Resp. at 9–10). In other words, White 

has no idea what the Jail’s policies are regarding medication, withdrawal, or detox; he therefore 

also has no idea whether the denial of medication was in conformity with or in violation of those 

policies. As a result, he is not able to plausibly allege that execution of the jail’s policy resulted 

in the denial of his medication and the subsequent injuries he sustained when jumping from the 

ledge. 

This failure is fatal to White’s § 1983 claims. Accordingly, Counts 1–3 will be dismissed. 

B. § 1985 conspiracy claim (Count 4) 

To state a § 1985 claim, a plaintiff must allege “(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of 

depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 

laws, or of equal privileges or immunities of the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 

(4) whereby a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege 

of a citizen of the United States.” Webb v. United States, 789 F.3d 647, 671–72 (6th Cir. 2015) 

(quoting Vakilian v. Shaw, 335 F.3d 509, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2003)). Moreover, the Supreme Court 

has limited § 1985 claims to conspiracies motivated by class-based discrimination: 
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That the statute was meant to reach private action does not, however, mean that it 

was intended to apply to all tortious, conspiratorial interferences with the rights of 

others . . . . The language requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal 

privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or perhaps 

otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' 

action. 

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101–02 (1971). 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s conspiracy allegations are conclusory and speculative, 

and the Court must agree. White has done nothing more than recite the elements of a conspiracy 

claim without alleging any facts in support of those elements. (Doc. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 51–56). 

Moreover, White’s Complaint contains no allegations of any racial or other class-based 

discriminatory animus. This alone is grounds for dismissal. Miller v. Countrywide Home Loans, 

747 F. Supp. 2d 947, 955 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (Sargus, J.); Ohio Inns, Inc. v. Nye, 542 F.2d 673, 679 

(6th Cir. 1976). 

C. Eighth Amendment claim (Count 5) 

Defendants correctly point out that, because White’s alleged injuries occurred prior to trial 

or conviction for the probation violation that occasioned his detention at the jail, the Eighth 

Amendment is simply not implicated. Bass v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 1041, 1048–49 (6th Cir. 1999) 

(citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 n. 40 (1977)). Instead, as a pretrial detainee, 

White’s substantive right to adequate medical care was guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. Spears v. Ruth, 589 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 2009). That White’s right 

to adequate medical care under the Fourteenth Amendment “is analogous to the right of prisoners 

under the Eighth Amendment” does not, as argued by White, provide pretrial detainees such as 

himself with a cause of action under the Eighth Amendment. Estate of Carter v. City of Detroit, 

408 F.3d 305, 311 (6th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, this Count must also be dismissed. 
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D. State law claims (Counts 6–12) 

White asserts his state law claims against Defendants in their individual capacities. (Doc. 

21, Resp. at 2). Individual employees of political subdivisions are statutorily immune from suit 

unless their actions were taken with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless 

manner. Ohio Rev. Code § 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Here, White does not allege the personal 

involvement of any of the Defendants in the events that led to Plaintiff’s alleged denial of medical 

care. Indeed, none of the Defendants’ names are even mentioned in the Complaint outside of the 

case caption. “Put another way, there is no allegation that any named Defendant ever had any 

interaction with or knowledge of Plaintiff.” (Doc. 21, Reply at 5). White has therefore failed to 

make any non-conclusory allegations as to how any named Defendant acted with malicious 

purpose, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly. As a result, White’s state law claims are barred by 

statutory immunity and Counts 6–12 are dismissed. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 

The Clerk shall remove Documents 10 and 18 from the Court’s pending motions list and 

close this case. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ George C. Smith 

GEORGE C. SMITH, JUDGE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT