alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION
Orlando Carter,
Plaintiff(s),
Case Number: 1:18cv400

“ Judge Susan J. Dlott

Commissioner Charles Furmon, et al.,
Defendant(s).
ORDER

This matter is before the Court pursuant to the Order of General Reference in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio Western Division to United States
Magistrate Judge Stephanie K. Bowman. Pursuant to such reference, the Magistrate Judge
reviewed the pleadings and filed with this Court on July 11, 2018 a Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 24). Subsequently, the plaintiff filed objections to such Report and Recommendation
(Doc. 30), and defendants filed a response to the objections (Doc. 31). The respondent, the
United States filed a statement of interest (Doc. 32).

The Court has reviewed the comprehensive findings of the Magistrate Judge and
considered de novo all of the filings in this matter. Upon consideration of the foregoing, the
Court does determine that such Recommendation should be adopted.

Accordingly, plaintiff’s claims under Bivens ( Claims One, Two and Three), §1981
(Claim Seventeen), §1983 (Claims Four and Twenty), §1985 (Claim Eight), and §1986 (Claim
Nine), pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A(b)(1), are DISMISSED because

plaintiff has failed to state claim upon which relief may be granted.


The Court DISMISSES without prejudice plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief (Claims
Five and Nineteen) and plaintiff's claim for declaratory relief (Claim Six).

The Court DECLINES to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over plaintiff's remaining
state-law claims (Claims Seven, Ten through Sixteen, Eighteen, and Twenty-One through
Twenty-Four) and DISMISSES these claims without prejudice.

The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that an appeal of any Order
adopting the Report and Recommendation will not be taken in faith, therefore plaintiff is
DENIED leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3.d 601 (6"
Cir. 1997).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

eto, hte

Judge Susan J. Tybee
United States District Court
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

No. 1:18-cv-00357-TSB-KNM-MHW

Judge Timothy S. Black 

Judge Karen Nelson Moore 

Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Karen L. Litkovitz

NOTICE OF FILING OF JOINT UNCONTROVERTED FACTS

The parties hereby give notice that, pursuant to this Court’s notation order of February 

4, 2019, attached hereto as Appendix A are their Joint Uncontroverted Facts.

February 7, 2019 Respectfully submitted,

/s/ Freda J. Levenson

Freda J. Levenson (0045916) 

(Trial Attorney)

American Civil Liberties 

Union of Ohio 

Foundation

4506 Chester Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44103

Tel.: (614) 586-1958

flevenson@acluohio.org

Counsel for Plaintiffs

/s/ Phillip J. Strach

Phillip J. Strach (Trial Attorney)

Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C.

4208 Six Forks Road, Suite 1100

Raleigh, NC 27609

Tel.: (919) 787-9700

phil.strach@ogletree.com

Counsel for Defendants

/s/ Patrick T. Lewis

Patrick T. Lewis (0078314) (Trial Attorney)

Baker Hostetler LLP

127 Public Square, Suite 2000

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

Tel.: (216) 621-0200

plewis@bakerlaw.com

Counsel for Intervenors

OHIO A. PHILIP RANDOLPH 

INSTITUTE, et al.

Plaintiffs, 

v.

LARRY HOUSEHOLDER, Speaker of the 

Ohio House of Representatives, et al.

Defendants.

Case: 1:18-cv-00357-TSB-KNM-MHW Doc #: 212 Filed: 02/07/19 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 11385
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Freda J. Levenson, hereby certify the foregoing document was served upon all counsel 

of record in this case via ECF.

/s/ Freda J. Levenson

Trial Attorney for Plaintiffs

Case: 1:18-cv-00357-TSB-KNM-MHW Doc #: 212 Filed: 02/07/19 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 11386
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary information extracted from the financial
statements of the December 31, 1996 Form 10-K of National Income Fund 6 L.P. and
is qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                       3,481,745
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  274,076
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,015,110
<PP&E>                                      33,986,314
<DEPRECIATION>                              22,509,187
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                              15,492,237
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        1,107,382
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                  14,384,855
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                15,492,237
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             3,228,134
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  708,264
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             2,276,515
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               8,179
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                235,176
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                            235,176
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                   235,176
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
**Exhibit 31.2**

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER 

I, Jerry C. Young, as Chief Financial Officer ofDa-Lite Screen Company, Inc., certify that: 

1. I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of Da-Lite Screen Company, Inc.; 

2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, inlight of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report; 

3. Based on myknowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report; 

4. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls andprocedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: 

(a) Designed such disclosure controlsand procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others withinthose entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared; 

(b) Evaluated the effectiveness of theregistrant’s disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

(c) Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting that occurred during theregistrant’s most recent fiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annual report) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting; and 

5. The registrant’s other certifying officer and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal controlover financial reporting, to the registrant’s auditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors: 

(a) Allsignificant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize and report financialinformation; and 

(b) Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in theregistrant’s internal control over financial reporting. 

Date: October 31, 2006 

 

 

22
COURT OF APPEALS

EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

EL PASO, TEXAS

GABRIEL MARIN

,

Appellant

,

v

.

THE STATE OF TEXAS

,

State

. §

§

§

§

§

§

§ No. 08

- 1 9

- 00 186

- CR

Appeal from the

County Criminal Court No. 4

of El Paso C ounty, Texas

(TC# 20180C03247 )

O R D E R

The Court G R ANTS the Court Reporter’s third request for an extension of time within

which to file the Reporter’s Record until November 30

, 201 9

. NO FURTHER REQUESTS

FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE THE REPORTER’S RECORD WIL BE CONSIDERED

BY THIS COURT.

It is furth er OR DERED that Anita D. Garza

, Roving Court Reporter for the County

Criminal Court No. 4 for El Paso County, Texas , prepare the Reporter’s Record for the a bove

styled and numbered cause and forward the same to this Court on or before November 30

, 2019.

IT IS SO ORDERED this 4 th day of November, 20 1 9

.

PER CURIAM

Before Alley , C.J., Rodriguez and Palafox , JJ.
#### School District No. 26 *v.*School District No. 32.

Opinion delivered June 4, 1928.

*Emmet Vanghan,*for appellant.

*George W. Emerson,*for appellee.

Humphreys, J.

On petition of School District No. 26 to the county board of education of Prairie County, under authority of § 8823 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest, *498the board detached three sections of land from School District 32 and added same to said’ District 26, from which order of the board an appeal was prosecuted to the Southern District of the circuit court of Prairie County. The cause was tried *de novo*in the circuit court upon an amended petition and response and the oral testimony of the witnesses, resulting in a denial of the prayer and a dismissal of appellant’s petition, from which is this appeal.

Appellant contends for a reversal of the judgment upon two’ grounds: First, because contrary to the evidence, and second, ¡because the circuit court is not authorized by statute to try appeals from the county board of education *de novo.*

(1). We are not called upon to determine whether the judgment of the court is supported by the weight of the evidence. The rule is that, if the finding* of the court is supported by any substantial evidence, this court cannot disturb it on appeal. We have read the testimony, and have concluded that the finding and judgment of the court is supported by substantial evidence. We do not understand appellant to seriously contend that, the finding and judgment of the court is not supported by some substantial evidence. It could serve no useful purpose to set out the testimony of the several witnesses, so we will not unnecessarily extend this opinion by doing so'.

(2). It was provided by act 183 of the Acts of the General Assembly of 1925 that a party to the record in a proceeding before any county board of education, who feels aggrieved by any final order or decision of such board, may prosecutexan appeal therefrom within thirty days to the circuit court of the district. The argument is made that, because said act fails to expressly provide for trial *de novo*in the circuit court, the Legislature only intended that errors of law or gross abuse of power by such boards might be corrected on appeal. Had this been the intention of the Legislature, the act would not have provided for a general appeal, but for one limited in scope. No provision is made.in the law for making *499and preserving the record of proceedings before the county hoards of education and for transmitting same to the circuit court. Without such a record it would he impossible for the circuit court to determine whether errors were committed in the proceedings or whether such hoards grossly abused 'the power conferred upon them. It is quite evident that the Legislature intended to allow any party to the record who felt aggrieved to appeal and try his- case upon its merits in the circuit court.

No error appearing, the judgment is affirmed.
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ex rel. JOHN N. KRAMER, D.D.S.,

 Relator,

v.

CDC MARTINS FERRY, LLC, AND 

CDC STEUBENVILLE, LLC,

 Defendants.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:18-cv-373-DRC

Judge Douglas R. Cole

DEFENDANTS CDC MARTINS FERRY, LLC AND CDC STEUBENVILLE, LLC’S 

RESPONSE TO RELATOR’S MOTION TO FILE DOCUMENT UNDER SEAL

Defendants CDC Martins Ferry, LLC and CDC Steubenville, LLC (“Defendants”) hereby 

file this response to relator’s motion to file under seal the Asset Purchase Agreement (“APA”) 

proposed as Exhibit A to his motion to join parties [Doc. 70]. As required by the Stipulated 

Protective Order in this case, Defendants state that the legal basis for the designation of the 

document as “Confidential-Attorneys’ Eyes Only” is that the APA contains sensitive information 

that could cause material competitive disadvantage to both Defendants and the other parties to 

the APA, including non-public and sensitive financial information, agreements between 

Defendants and other entities, and materials or items that relate to proprietary information about 

the Defendants’ and other parties’ business practices. 

As recognized by the Sixth Circuit, agreements like the APA that themselves contain a 

confidentiality obligation, that have been designated as “Confidential” or “Attorneys’ Eyes 

Only,” and that contain contractual provisions that one party to the agreement views as providing 

it with competitive advantages that would, if revealed publicly, give such advantages to 

competitors or future acquisition targets, may be properly filed under seal when offered as an 

exhibit or appendix to a motion or legal brief. Ray v. Found. Risk Partners, Corp., No. 22-3387, 

Case: 1:18-cv-00373-DRC Doc #: 74 Filed: 12/20/22 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 1513
RESPONSE TO MOTION TO FILE UNDER SEAL 2

2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 25954 [WL] at *3 (citing Ohio Rev. Code 1333.61(D) and State ex rel. 

The Plain Dealer v. Ohio Dep’t of Ins., 687 N.E.2d 661 (1997)).

Defendants therefore respectfully request that Relator’s motion to file the APA under seal be 

granted.

December 20, 2022 

 

/s/ Don Screen

Don Screen

Ohio Bar No. 44070

Don.Screen@ChandraLaw.com

TRIAL COUNSEL

THE CHANDRA LAW FIRM, LLC

The Chandra Law Building

1265 W. 6th St., Suite 400

Cleveland, Ohio 44113-1326

Phone: 216-578-1700

Fax: 216-578-1800

 /s/ Elizabeth K. Stepp

 Elizabeth K. Stepp (pro hac vice)

Texas State Bar No. 00788467

eks@federal-lawyer.com

OBERHEIDEN P.C.

440 Louisiana Street, Suite 200

Houston, Texas 77002

(214) 334-7648 (Telephone)

(972) 559-3365 (Facsimile)

ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS

CDC MARTINS FERRY, LLC AND

CDC STEUBENVILLE, LLC 

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on December 20, 2022, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document 

was served on all counsel of record through the Court’s electronic filing system.

/s/ Elizabeth K. Stepp

 Elizabeth K. Stepp

Case: 1:18-cv-00373-DRC Doc #: 74 Filed: 12/20/22 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 1514
October 16, 2015

Mr. Matthew Rude

Free Fun Omaha

16514 Yort Avenue

Omaha, NE 68116

Dear Mr. Rude:

This letter is to inform you that we are unable to process your petition for an exemption from 

Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). It explains why we cannot process your 

request and what you should do in the next 30 days.

Why We Can Not Process Your Request

We entered your exemption request, posted to the public docket on July 24, 2015, on behalf of 

Free Fun Omaha filed in Docket No. FAA−2015−3145, but we are unable to process your 

request any further. Your petition does not comply with the requirements of § 11.81 (copy 

enclosed). For us to consider the request any further, you must send us all of the following:

 The specific section or sections of 14 CFR from which you seek relief and the extent of 

the relief you seek.

 The reasons why granting the request would be in the public interest; that is, how it would 

benefit the public as a whole.

 The reasons why the exemption would not adversely affect safety or how the exemption 

would provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which you 

seek an exemption.

 Any additional information, views, or arguments available to support your request.

For more detailed information relating to submitting petitions for exemption, please visit 

http://aes.faa.gov/petition/index.html. This website helps the petitioner to meet Federal

Aviation Administration (FAA) requirement outlines in § 11.81 and helps answer any 

questions you may have.
2

What You Should Do

If you want us to process your request any further, you must submit the requested information 

within 30 days. Please note that § 11.63(d) requires you to send your petition for exemption 

at least 120 days before the proposed effective date of the exemption. 

If We Do Not Hear From You

If we do not receive the information, we will close the docket without notifying you further. 

If you have any questions you may call the 333 Information Line (202) 267-2999.

Sincerely,

/s/

Brittany Newton

Program Analyst, Airmen and

 Airspace Rules Division

Enclosures
3
4
#### J. B. WILSON *v.*Joan RODGERS et al

73-282

507 S.W. 2d 508

Opinion delivered March 25, 1974

[Rehearing denied April 29, 1974.]

*Milton G. Robinson,*for appellant.

*Macom, Moorhead & Green,*by: *Wm. M. Moorhead,*for appellees.

*277George Rose Smith, Justice.

This is the third appeal in a suit to determine whether certain real property was owned by two brothers as partners or by only one brother individually. Upon the second appeal it did not appear that the chancellor had considered the entire record in deciding disputed issues of fact. We found the evidence to be so evenly balanced that we could not say where the preponderance lay. We therefore remanded the case for the chancellor’s decision upon that point, on the entire record but without additional testimony. *Wilson*v. *Rodgers,*254 Ark. 487, 494 S.W. 2d 484 (1973).

Pursuant to our mandate the chancellor re-examined the issues and concluded that the preponderance of the evidence favors the appellees. Counsel for the appellant now asks us to reconsider all the arguments that were presented upon the second appeal. We must decline that invitation. No principle is more firmly settled by our decisions than the rule that the matters decided upon one appeal become the law of the case and govern this court upon a second appeal, even though we might be inclined to say that we were wrong in the first instance. *International Harvester Co.*v. *Burks Motors,*252 Ark. 816, 481 S.W. 2d 351 (1972). It follows that the chancellor’s decision is now conclusive upon the only issue that was left open by our opinion upon the second appeal. That ends the litigation.

Affirmed.
|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   |                /s/ David F. Hakala                                                                                         |
|--------|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   | David              F. Hakala                                                                                                    |
|   | Acting                Chief Executive Officer, ChiefOperating Officer, Principal Financial                andAccounting Officer |
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

BENITA SCHIRMER, 

 

 Plaintiff, Case No.: 3:18-cv-209 

 

vs. 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, District Judge Thomas M. Rose 

 Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman 

 Defendant. 

ORDER: (1) APPROVING THE PARTIES’ JOINT STIPULATION FOR AN AWARD 

OF ATTORNEY’S FEES UNDER THE EQUAL ACCESS TO JUSTICE ACT (“EAJA”) 

(DOC. 21); AND (2) AWARDING PLAINTIFF $5,300.00 IN EAJA FEES 

 

 This Social Security disability benefits appeal is before the Court on the parties’ joint 

stipulation in which they agree that Plaintiff should be awarded attorney’s fees and costs under the 

Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of $5,300.00. Doc. 21. 

Based upon the parties’ stipulation in which they present no dispute that all requirements are met 

for the reasonable award of EAJA fees, the Court: (1) APPROVES the parties’ joint stipulation 

(doc. 21); and (2) GRANTS Plaintiff EAJA fees and costs in the amount of $5,300.00. As no 

further matters remain pending for review, this case remains TERMINATED upon the Court’s 

docket. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: December 31, 2019 *s/Thomas M. Rose 

 Thomas M. Rose 

 United States District Judge