alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

2:16-cv-728 

2:17-cv-143 

2:17-cv-522 

2:17-cv-570 

2:17-cv-1125 

2:18-cv-298 

2:18-cv-319 

2:18-cv-351 

2:18-cv-386 

2:18-cv-403 

2:18-cv-426 

2:18-cv-509 

2:18-cv-589 

2:18-cv-598 

2:18-cv-616 

2:18-cv-706 

2:18-cv-738 

2:18-cv-745 

2:18-cv-958 

2:18-cv-977 

2:18-cv-987 

2:18-cv-991 

2:18-cv-1000 

2:18-cv-1001 

2:18-cv-1004 

2:18-cv-1030 

2:18-cv-1039 

2:18-cv-1099 

2:18-cv-1122 

2:18-cv-1129 

2:18-cv-1190 

2:18-cv-1222 

2:18-cv-1236 

2:18-cv-1240 

2:18-cv-1269 

2:18-cv-1409

ORDER

Each of the above-listed cases has previously been identified as ready for a mediation 

conference during the Court’s June Settlement Week, which is scheduled to occur from June 10, 

2019 to June 14, 2019. Recently, the Court has been forced to vacate or continue more than half 

of the cases initially set for Settlement Week. In order to avoid the administrative costs 

associated with vacating a case after it has been set, the Court is making this inquiry to 

determine if any of the above cases should not be set for a Settlement Week Conference. 

It is therefore ORDERED that, as soon as practicable following of the receipt of this Order, 

counsel confer concerning the readiness of their case for Settlement Week. If all counsel concur 

that the case is not ready to set, counsel shall send an email to the undersigned’s Courtroom 

Deputy, Jessica Rector, at Jessica_Rector@ohsd.uscourts.gov, by May 3, 2019 to advise her that 

the case should not be set. Counsel should include in such advice whether the case should be 

continued to another Settlement Week and, if so, which Settlement Week. If counsel does not have 

access to e-mail, the same communication may be made by telephone to 614-719-3026, but e-mail 

rather than telephonic contact is strongly encouraged. 

Nothing in this Order is intended to preclude a timely motion to vacate or continue a

settlement conference should the grounds for such motion become apparent only after the case is

set for a Settlement Week conference on a specific date and time.

/s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Case: 2:18-cv-00745-ALM-KAJ Doc #: 15 Filed: 04/24/19 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 56
Other

1863.0
Exhibit No. 10.2

 

**AMENDMENT NO. 3 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT**

 

This AMENDMENT NO. 3 made as of the 25th day of August, 2006, to the Employment Agreement made as of the 3rd day of September, 2004 (as amended, the “Agreement”), between **UNITED RETAIL GROUP, INC.**, a Delaware corporation, with principal offices at 365 West Passaic Street, Rochelle Park, New Jersey 07662-6563, and **GEORGE R. REMETA**, residing at 25 Lee Way, Oakland, NJ  07436. 

 

**WHEREAS**, capitalized terms used herein and defined in the Agreement shall have the same meaning as in the Agreement;

 

**WHEREAS**, the Executive has been employed by the Company as its Vice Chairman of the Board and Chief Administrative Officer; 

 

**WHEREAS**, the Company desires to continue the services of the Executive, and the Executive desires to continue to provide such services to the Company, on the terms set forth in the Agreement; 

 

**WHEREAS**, the provisions of the Agreement and the compensation practices of peer companies were discussed by the Compensation Committee of the Company’s Board of Directors on May 26, 2006 and August 17, 2006; and

 

**WHEREAS** on August 25, 2006, this Amendment was recommended by the Compensation Committee and approved by the Company’s Board of Directors in a vote from which the Executive abstained.  

 

**NOW, THEREFORE**, in consideration of the mutual covenants and obligations hereinafter set forth, the parties hereto, intending to be legally bound, hereby agree as follows:

 

1. Section 1(i) of the Agreement is amended to read in its entirety as follows:  

 

“(i)     Contract Term shall mean the period of time commencing on November 20, 1998 and ending on September 3, 2011 or such later date as may be mutually agreed upon by the Company and the Executive. (For the avoidance of doubt, Contract Term as used herein may extend beyond the termination of the Executive’s employment under this Agreement.)”

2. All the other provisions of the Agreement shall remain in force unchanged. 

 

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF**, the parties hereto have duly executed this Agreement in Rochelle Park, New Jersey, in duplicate originals on August 28, 2006.

 

|   | **UNITED RETAIL GROUP, INC.**

 

By: /s/ RAPHAEL BENAROYA

Name:  Raphael Benaroya

Title:    Chief Executive Officer |
|--------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |  

/s/ GEORGE R. REMETA

George R. Remeta                                                                              |

 

 

                

 

 

*KPC:jmt*
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

TAMERA BROWN, et al., 

Plaintiff,

v.

CITY OF CINCINNATI, et al.,

Defendants.

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

CASE NO: 1:18-CV-412

JUDGE: SUSAN J. DLOTT

MAGISTRATE KAREN L. LITKOVITZ

DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO MODIFY 

SCHEDULING ORDER

Now come Defendants, through counsel, and request that the Court enter a modified 

scheduling order. Plaintiffs produced documents responsive to Defendant’s December 3, 2018 

discovery demand on June 7 and June 12. Since the last phone conference with the Court on March 

20, 2019, Defendants now have conflicts that render Defendants unable to meet the Court’s current 

deadlines. This extension is not sought to delay the litigation. 

Plaintiffs are represented by two different firms. Attorney Thumann does not object to the 

extension. Defendants attempted but did not receive a response from the other Plaintiffs’ counsel.

Defendants’ counsel believes Attorney Thumann’s position is that of all Plaintiffs’ counsel but to 

be candid with the Court, Defendants were unable to obtain that clarification prior to filing this 

Motion. 

The parties are in agreement to extend the deadlines and respectfully request an extension 

of the scheduling order as follows:

Defendants’ Answer: August 31, 2019

Defendants’ Motions for Judgment on the Pleadings: September 30, 2019

Plaintiff’s Response: November 1, 2018

Defendants’ Reply: November 18, 2019

Case: 1:18-cv-00412-MWM-KLL Doc #: 31 Filed: 06/26/19 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 464
2

Respectfully Submitted,

/s/ Janaya Trotter Bratton

Jennifer L. Branch (0038893)

Alphonse A. Gerhardstein (0032053)

Janaya Trotter Bratton (0084123)

Gerhardstein & Branch Co. LPA

441 Vine Street, Suite 3400

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202

Tel (513) 621-9100

Fax (513) 345-5543

jbranch@gbfirm.com

agerhardstein@gbfirm.com

jtbratton@gbfirm.com

ATTORNEYS FOR Defendants Pettis and 

Sentinel Police Association

s/ Shuva J. Paul 

Peter J. Stackpole (0072103) 

Shuva J. Paul (0088484) 

801 Plum Street, Suite 214 

Cincinnati, Ohio 45202 

(513) 352-4551 / fax (513) 352-1515 

peter.stackpole@cincinnati-oh.gov 

shuva.paul@cincinnati-oh.gov 

Trial Attorneys for City Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on June 26, 2019, a copy of the foregoing pleading was filed 

electronically. Notice of this filing will be sent to all parties for whom counsel has entered an 

appearance by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system. Parties may access this filing 

through the Court’s system. I further certify that a copy of the foregoing pleading and the Notice 

of Electronic Filing has been served by ordinary U.S. mail upon all parties for whom counsel has 

not yet entered an appearance electronically.

s/ Janaya Trotter Bratton

Janaya Trotter Bratton 

Case: 1:18-cv-00412-MWM-KLL Doc #: 31 Filed: 06/26/19 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 465
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                          5
<LEGEND>                           
<CIK>                              0000797917
<NAME>                             RAYTECH CORP
<MULTIPLIER>                       1,000
<CURRENCY>                         U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                   <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>         12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1995
<PERIOD-START>                     JAN-02-1995
<PERIOD-END>                       DEC-31-1995
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                    1
   
<CASH>                             19,597
<SECURITIES>                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                      18,375
<ALLOWANCES>                       822
<INVENTORY>                        23,573
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   66,113
<PP&E>                             114,437
<DEPRECIATION>                     72,235
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     114,436
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              60,790
<BONDS>                            0
<COMMON>                           5,362
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>              0
<PREFERRED>                        0
<OTHER-SE>                         13,318 
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       114,436
<SALES>                            177,498
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   177,498
<CGS>                              128,799
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      128,799
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 2,647
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    24,186 
<INCOME-TAX>                       9,009
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                14,337
<DISCONTINUED>                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                    0
<CHANGES>                          0
<NET-INCOME>                       14,337
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      4.26
<EPS-DILUTED>                      4.26

        

    

</TABLE>
#### Charles M. Williams v. City of Saginaw.

*TamaMon of partnership property.*

The charter of Saginaw provides for a hoard of review with jurisdiction of appeals from the assessment of city tares, and makes its decision, on such appeals, final. Act 300 of 1875, p. 395. *Held,*that the question whether an assessment is excessive is not for the courts to try.

One is not bound to notice or to appeal from an assessment of personal taxes against him if jurisdiction to assess them did not exist.

Personal property belonging to a partnership is assessable in the locality where it is, if the firm has its place of business there.

Error to Saginaw. (Grage, J.)

June 13.

June 20.

Assumpsit. Defendant brings error.

Reversed.

*D. P. Foote*for appellant.

*Wisn'er & Proper*for appellee.

Cooley, J.

It appeal’s by the finding of facts that the partnership of which plaintiff is the survivor was lawfully assessable in the city for personal property for the year 1879, and that there was no want of jurisdiction in the comptroller in the assessment which he made. The question, then, resolves itself into this: whether the assessment was excessive. - This is not a question for the courts to try: the statute has provided a board of review to which appeals may be taken, and has declared that its decision shall be final. Local Acts 1875, p. 295.

*121Tlie plaintiff contends tliat inasmuch as the partners were not residents of the city they were not bound to take notice 'of any assessment made against them there, or to appeal from it if they deemed it unjust. This would be true if there were no jurisdiction to assess a personal tax against them there. *Bemis v. Boston*14 Allen 366; *Fairbanks v. Kittredge*24 Vt. 9; *Charlestown v. County Com’rs*109 Mass. 270; *Judkins v. Reed*48 Me. 386; *McCoy v. Anderson*47 Mich. 502.

But this, we have seen, was not the case. The partnership had a place of business within the city, and personal property there which confessedly was taxable. Nothing more was necessary to render legal the assessment actually made. No fraud is charged against the comptroller, and it affirmatively appears, though the fact is not legally important, that the partnership was not assessed elsewhere for such of its personalty as wai-j within the city.

The defendant is entitled to judgment on the finding with costs of both courts.

The other Justices concurred.
#### St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company *v.*White Sewing Machine Company.

Opinion delivered June 22, 1901.

Voluntary Nonsuit — Discretion os- Court. — Under Sand. & H. Dig., § 5791, providing that an action may he dismissed without prejudice by the plaintiff before final submission of the case, and that in all other .cases, upon the trial of the action, the decision must be upon the merits, the court, in the interests of justice, may permit a plaintiff to withdraw a submission of his case, and take a nonsuit without prejudice.

*432Appeal from Pulaski Circuit Court.

Robeiit J. Lea, Judge.

*8am II. West*and *J. M. & J. G. Taylor,*for appellant.

The statute (Sand. & H. Dig., § 579) provides for dismissals ■without prejudice only *before*final submission. It was error for the court to allow such dismissal *after*submission. 8 S. E. 806; 10 Wend. 520; 20 Wend. 36; 1 T. R. 52; 11 Johns. 458; 5 Johns. 346; 2 Johns. 181, 191; 10 S. E. 807; 8 la. 462; 23 la. 216; 59 N. W. 1009; 70 lad'. 524.

*J. II.*Ilarrod, for appellee.

Appellant had the right, with leave of the court, to dismiss before the case was decided. 26 Mo. 492; 42 Mo. App. 376; 13 Mo. 588; 48 S. W. 447. The court had the power to allow the dismissal, so long as the discretion was not abused. 23 Kan. 262; 50 Kan. 49.

Wood, J.

The question is, can a court, sitting as a jury, in a cause finally submitted for decision, permit the plaintiff to withdraw the. submission and take a nonsuit without prejudice? The statute is as follows: “An action may he dismissed without prejudice to a future action: *First.*By the plaintiff before the final submission of the ease to the jury or to the court, where the trial is by the court. * * * In all other cases, upon the trial

of the action, the decision must be upon the merits/’’ Sec. 5791, Sand. & H. Dig. Kansas has an exactly similar statute. In *Ashmead*v. Ashmead, 23 Kan. 262, the court, through Judge Brewer, held that “after a case has .been finally submitted to the jury or court the plaintiff has no right to dismiss the action without prejudice to a future action, but, while all legal right on the part of the plaintiff has ended, the court may, in its discretion, and to prevent injustice and wrong, permit the plaintiff to recall the submission and dismiss without prejudice, and in such case the action of the court, unless it has abused its discretion, is no ground of error/’ This is correct. The plaintiff, under the statute, may not demand as his right what is within the discretion of the court, in the interest of justice, to permit. The record shows that the court suggested to plaintiff’s, counsel that the dismissal without prejudice. would be permitted, since the court did not believe that a fair trial of plaintiff’s case could be had upon the record as 'it then stood, and' believed the dismissal.' to be in the interest of justice.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>   1
                                   EXHIBIT 21

                         SUBSIDIARIES OF THE REGISTRANT

New Plan Realty Trust, a Massachusetts business trust
New Plan Securities Corp., a New York corporation
New Plan Realty of Alabama, Inc., an Alabama corporation
Avion Service Corp., a Pennsylvania corporation
New Plan Realty of Kingsport, Inc., a Tennessee corporation
New Plan Factory Malls, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Tara, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Fashion Corners, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan Disbursing Corp., a Delaware corporation
New Plan Realty of Louisiana, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Tennessee, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan Realty of Louisiana, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
New Plan of Waterford Place, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
New Plan of Tennessee, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
New Plan of New Garden, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of New Jersey, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Tinton Falls, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Eastgreen, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Northgate, Inc., a Delaware corporation
New Plan of Polo Run, Inc., a Delaware corporation
NC Properties #1, Inc., a Delaware corporation
NC Properties #2, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Excel Realty Trust - NC, a North Carolina partnership
TX Properties #1, Inc., a Delaware corporation
TX Properties #2, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Excel Realty Trust - TX, L.P., a Texas limited partnership
Excel Realty - PA, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Excel Realty - NE, Inc., a Nebraska corporation
Excel Realty - ST, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Excel Westminster Marketplace, Inc., a Delaware corporation
Excel Realty Partners, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
E.H. Properties, L.P., a Delaware limited partnership
<PAGE>

                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                            SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION

I, Juliet M. Reising, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of
Verso Technologies, Inc. (the "Company"), do hereby certify in accordance with
18 U.S.C.Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

      1.    The Annual Report on Form 10-K of the Company for the year ended
            December 31, 2003 (the "Periodic Report") fully complies with the
            requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange
            Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. Sections 78m or 78o(d)); and

      2.    The information contained in the Periodic Report fairly presents, in
            all material respects, the financial condition and results of
            operations of the Company.

Dated: March 15, 2004

                                           /s/ Juliet M. Reising
                                           ---------------------------------
                                           Juliet M. Reising
                                           Chief Financial Officer and
                                           Executive Vice President
Eleventh Meeting of the Parties (Beijing, 29 November – 3 

December 1999)

Decision XI/5: Further Amendment of the Montreal Protocol

The Eleventh Meeting of the Parties decided in Dec. XI/5 to adopt, in accordance with the procedure laid down in 

paragraph 4 of Article 9 of the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, the Amendment to the 

Montreal Protocol as set out in annex V to the report of the Eleventh Meeting of the Parties.

Decision XI/5: Further Amendment of the Montreal Protocol Eleventh Meeting of the Par... Page 1 of 1

http://ozone.unep.org/new_site/en/Treaties/treaties_decisions-hb.php?nav_id=630 1/2/2014
#### Eddie James BOOKER *v.*The STATE of Arkansas

5331

427 S. W. 2d 177

Opinion delivered April 29, 1968

[Rehearing denied May 27, 1968.]

*George Howard Jr.,*for appellant.

*Joe Purcell,*Attorney General; *Don Langston,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Lyle Brown, Justice.

Appellant Eddie James Booker was convicted of robbery. He asserts error by the trial court (1) in denying bis motion for severance, (2) failing to direct a verdict in Ms favor, and (3) refusing to grant a new trial on newly discovered evidence.

Three teenage boys, residents of Pine Bluff, were on their way to a basketball game. It was December and the hour was approximately 7:15 p.m. They were accosted on a street in Pine Bluff by two young men armed with a gun and a knife. (There was a third con*746federate but he was never identified.) Under threat of violence the teenagers were relieved of a watch,, tvk) coats, and one dollar. As each of the three victims left the scene, one by one, they heard shots coming in their direction. One of the victims, a recent high school graduate, testified he was able to see Booker’s face and to note also that he wore a cap and a blue shirt. On the following.morning the same boy also identified Booker at the jail. The other two victims could not identify Booker.

(1) *Denial of motion for severance..*The basis, of the motion was that Booker was being tried jointly with a convicted felon who had been returned from the penitentiary for the trial. There is not an iota of evidence in the record that the jury had any knoAvledge of the co-defendant’s status as a felon. They were charged jointly. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1801 (Jtepl. 1964). There is no showing of abuse of the trial court’s discretion and we do not disturb the ruling. *Nolan*v. State, 205 Ark. 103, 167 S. W. 2d 503 (1943).

(2) *Court’s failure to direct a verdict.*The robbery was established and one of the three victims identified Booker. The latter testified he was not in the vicinity of the robbery. We hold the State’s evidence was substantial and that it was for the jury to resolve the facts.

(3) *Court’s refusal to grant a new trial on netoly discovered evidence.*The motion was bottomed on the testimony of a witness who testified he was told by one Thomas Miller that Miller in fact committed the robbery with which Booker was charged. The testimony was conflicting; in fact, the State’s evidence raised substantial doubt as to Miller’s veracity. It would border on facetiousness to say that the trial court did not act in sound discretion.

To recount the testimony in detail would be of no *747importance to the bench and bar; suffice it to say that the record has been carefully examined and we find no merit in appellant’s contentions.

Affirmed.
<PAGE>

                                                                   Exhibit 32.1

           SECTION 906 CERTIFICATION OF THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, I, David R. Odenath, Jr., Chief Executive
Officer and President of American Skandia Life Assurance Corporation (the
"Company"), hereby certify that the Company's Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q/A
for the quarter ended March 31, 2005 (the "Report") fully complies with the
requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
and that the information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
Company.

Dated:February 9, 2006

                                           /s/ David R. Odenath, Jr.
                                           -------------------------------------
                                           Name:  David R. Odenath, Jr.
                                           Title: Chief Executive Officer and
                                                  President

The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate
disclosure document.