[Cite as Mullins v. Liberty Twp., 2022-Ohio-4350.]

Atty. John A. McNally, III, John A. McNally, III, Co., LPA, 100 East Federal Street, Suite 

600, Youngstown, Ohio 44503, for Plaintiffs-Appellants and

Atty. Mel L. Lute, Jr., Baker, Dublikar, Beck, Wiley & Mathews, 400 South Main Street, 

North Canton, Ohio 44720, for Defendants-Appellees.

Dated: November 30, 2022

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO 

SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

MAHONING COUNTY

WILBERT MULLINS ET AL.,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

LIBERTY TOWNSHIP ET AL.,

Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY

Case No. 22 MA 0023

Civil Appeal from the

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio

Case No. 2021 CV 252

BEFORE:

David A. D’Apolito, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

JUDGMENT:

Affirmed.
– 2 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

D’Apolito, J.

{¶1} Appellants, Wilbert Mullins (“Mullins”) and Sherry C. Mullins (“Sherry”) 

(collectively “Mullinses”),appeal the entry of summary judgment based on sovereign 

immunity by the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas in favor of Appellees, Liberty 

Township and Liberty Township Police Officer No. 1 John Doe (“John Doe officer”) in this 

action alleging negligence and loss of consortium. The trial court found that the political 

subdivision was immune from liability because the police officer, sued in his official 

capacity, was performing a governmental function when Leo, a certified police canine with 

the Liberty Township Police Department, jumped on Mullins, causing Mullins to fall to the 

ground, and allegedly bit him. For the following reasons, the judgment entry of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

FACTS

{¶2} Mullins is a former United States Marine, and a captain and thirty-year 

veteran of the Youngstown Fire Department. He is 5’11 and weighs 230 pounds. 

Through his employment with the fire department, Mullins has occasionally worked fire 

scenes where police canines were present, but never encountered one as a part of his 

job. 

{¶3} Mullins testified at his deposition that he has an apprehensiveness around 

dogs, particularly large dogs, based on “the aggressiveness of them” and “how they –

they have to be restrained.” (Deposition of Wilbert Mullins, p. 21.) Mullins further testified 

that when his neighbors, who own large dogs, walk their dogs along the street toward his 

property, he “immediately go[es]to [his] backyard or [he] go[es] to the front porch and 

lock[s] the gate.” (Id., p. 24.) 

{¶4} Officer David Rankin is a certified canine handler with the Liberty Township 

Police Department. Liberty Township is located in Trumbull County. While on routine 

patrol in Liberty Township, with Leo on March 4, 2020, Officer Rankin observed a red 

truck with a loud exhaust, so he initiated a traffic stop. 

{¶5} The red truck continued a short distance into the city of Youngstown, which 

is located in Mahoning County. The red truck stopped on Upland Avenue, roughly two 
– 3 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

blocks south of Gypsy Lane. Liberty Township Police Officer Robert Altier heard the 

dispatch call and travelled to the scene to assist Officer Rankin. 

{¶6} While running the identification information of the driver and the passenger 

of the red truck, Officer Altier recognized the name of the passenger, Clifford Wright, as 

an individual with three outstanding felony warrants and an open case in Trumbull County. 

Officer Altier then observed Wright exit the passenger side of the red truck. 

{¶7} Although Officer Altier commanded Wright to return to the vehicle, Wright 

fled up Upland Avenue. Officer Rankin shouted, “[d]og out,” in order to alert Officer Altier 

that Leo was being released from the cruiser, and Leo exited the police cruiser and began 

his pursuit of Wright. Leo and Officers Altier and Rankin chased Wright into the backyard 

of 922 Upland Avenue, where Mullins and Sherry reside. 

{¶8} In an affidavit filed in support of his opposition brief to the motion for 

summary judgment, Mullins provided the following summary of events:

In my back yard finishing grilling with my kids. The officer and his dog were 

chasing a person up my driveway. I told the officer the person went over 

the fence. He stated something to the dog in a foreign language and the 

dog attacked me, knocking me down, biting my face. He pulled the dog 

back by his back legs while I was pushing him off me. 

He yelled at me to stay in the damn shed. I could hear him giving the dog 

commands while I was holding the doors closed from the inside and the dog 

shaking [sic] the doors of the shed trying to get in. Once I invited him in to 

tell him what the dog did to my face, he showed no concern for my 

wellbeing, only stating that the dog had his shots. He never had control of 

the situation or the dog. I had just took [sic] my daughter in the house 15 

minutes prior, thank goodness, cause [sic] she is disabled and in a wheel 

chair.1

(Affidavit of Wilbert Mullins, ¶ 4.) 

1 Mullins’s daughter Malissa is non-verbal and in a wheelchair. She is unable to move from her 

wheelchair to her bed without assistance, and requires assistance with mobility. 
– 4 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

{¶9} Mullins provided a more detailed account of the events leading to his 

alleged injuries at his deposition. There is no garage on Mullins’s property. An eight-foot 

fence surrounds the entire perimeter of the backyard, with a single gate at the top of the 

driveway.

{¶10} Mullins was cleaning the grill and backyard after having prepared a meal for 

his family including Sherry, their three daughters, and six grandchildren, when he heard 

multiple sirens coming from the direction of Gypsy Lane. He then observed a Liberty 

Township police cruiser initiate a traffic stop in front of his residence on Upland Avenue. 

{¶11} Mullins described the time of day as “kind of twilight.” (Mullins Depo., p. 

28.) The backyard was well lit due to a large area light mounted by the door on Mullins’s 

property, as well as similar fixtures which cast light from the neighboring properties. 

{¶12} Mullins resumed his tasks and entered a plastic 8’ x 10’ shed on his property 

where he stored his grilling utensils. While in the shed, which provides a direct vantage 

point down the driveway, Mullins heard the sound of labored breathing and saw Wright 

running up his driveway, followed by a police officer, Leo, and a second police officer. 

Mullins believed that Wright intended to enter the shed, so Mullins “flagged him off.” (Id., 

p. 34.) Leo was “about halfway up [Mullins’s] driveway” when Mullins confronted Wright 

at the shed entry. (Id., p. 39.) 

{¶13} Instead, Wright ran into Mullins’s backyard, climbed over the perimeter 

fence, and fled down the driveway of the neighboring residence onto Outlook Avenue, the 

street between Gypsy Lane and Upland Avenue. Leo narrowly missed apprehending 

Wright as Wright cleared the fence. After Wright disappeared, Leo sat at the base of the 

fence. 

{¶14} While standing in the doorway of the shed, Mullins shouted to the officer, 

“he went over the fence!” Mullins heard the police officer give Leo a command in a foreign 

language. Then Leo ran the roughly seven feet from the fence to the doorway of the shed 

then lunged at Mullins. 

{¶15} Leo’s upper teeth made contact with Mullins’s face above his left eye and 

Leo’s lower teeth made contact with the roof of Mullins’s mouth. Mullins conceded that 

his eyeglasses remained not only in tact but also in place during the alleged bite to his 

face. (Id.) 
– 5 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

{¶16} Leo’s “whole body” was on Mullins, which caused Mullins to fall backwards 

into the shed onto various objects located on the floor of the shed. The shed contained 

“various tools, rakes, shovels, [a] cast iron stove, just regular gardening equipment,” and 

two adult bikes. (Id., p. 46.) Mullins struck his head on the cast iron stove. 

{¶17} The police officer pulled Leo away from Mullins by grabbing Leo’s back legs, 

while Mullins pushed Leo off with his right arm. The police officer was “screaming” at 

Leo. Based on their combined efforts, Mullins was able to separate himself from Leo and 

close the shed doors. 

{¶18} However, Leo escaped the officer’s grasp and “came at [Mullins] again.” 

(Id., p. 48.) As Leo was “growling and barking and clobbering [sic] at the door as [Mullins] 

was holding it,” Mullins heard the officer speaking in a foreign language. (Id., p. 49.) The 

officer twice commanded Mullins to “stay in the damn shed.” (Id., p. 50.) 

{¶19} Mullins remained in the shed for roughly ten minutes because he was 

“terrified.” When Mullins slowly opened the doors and determined that Leo was “still 

there,” the officer was still speaking to Leo in the foreign language. Mullins quickly 

removed himself to the back door of the residence. 

{¶20} According to the officers, Mullins was in the shed when they entered his 

backyard and they instructed him to stay there. He initially complied, closing the shed 

doors behind him, then opened the doors suddenly and emerged from the shed. As a 

result, Leo lunged at Mullins, making contact with him and causing Mullins to fall 

backwards into the shed. Both officers attested that they did not see Leo bite Mullins. 

{¶21} The officers and Leo then resumed their pursuit of Wright, which led them 

through a fence and several neighboring yards. Leo ultimately apprehended Wright in a 

garage. 

{¶22} Officer Rankin did not observe any injuries on Mullins consistent with a 

police canine apprehension bite. According to Officer Rankin, Leo is trained to bite 

suspects in specific locations to maximize his effectiveness, but he was never trained to 

bite a suspect’s face. Officer Rankin further averred that “[a]t no time was [Leo] either not 

under a leash or an electronic collar.” (Id., ¶ 20.)

{¶23} When Sherry saw Mullins enter the residence, she began to cry and insisted 

that he go to the hospital because his face was bleeding. Mullins testified that he was “in 
– 6 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

shock.” (Mullins Depo. at p. 51.) Later in his testimony, Mullins stated that blood was 

coming from his eye and that he could taste blood in his mouth. 

{¶24} According to Mullins, the officer aggressively entered the residence with a 

flashlight and appeared to be searching for the assailant. Mullins informed the officer that 

he had been bitten by Leo. The officer responded that Leo had “all his shots.” (Id.) The 

conversation between the two men lasted roughly five to ten minutes.

{¶25} Mullins drove himself to the main campus of St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in 

downtown Youngstown. He was there for a little more than an hour and was given 

prescriptions for narcotic pain medication (codeine) and an antibiotic. 

{¶26} Next, Mullins drove himself to the Liberty Township Police Department to 

file a complaint. Initially, Mullins was questioned by the officer from the scene. When 

Mullins asked the officer why the dog did not follow the commands of the officer at the 

scene, the John Doe officer responded, “because sometimes the dog doesn’t hear me.” 

Realizing that the officer questioning him was the canine officer from the scene, Mullins 

immediately terminated the interview and asked to speak to the canine officer’s 

supervisor. 

{¶27} Sergeant Chad McGarry, the canine officer’s supervisor, informed Mullins 

that “[Mullins] just got a half bite.” (Id., p. 59.) The supervisor continued, “[y]ou ought to 

see what he did to the guy when he caught him. He chewed up his left shoulder.” (Id.) 

The supervisor also informed Mullins that Wright lived a few blocks from Mullins’s 

residence, and Wright was trying to run to his house in order to elude the police. 

According to McGarry’s affidavit, he observed no injuries to Mullins’s face or right arm, 

the locations where Mullins claimed to have been bitten by Leo. 

{¶28} Mullins did not work several shifts at the fire department due to severe, 

lingering pain in his back and left knee. He did not return to work for fifteen months 

because he “was not healed physically and mentally able to perform his duties as a fire 

captain” during that time. (Mullins Depo., p. 62.) 

{¶29} Mullins returned to work “because [he] ran out of sick time, and [he] would 

not have gotten any monies to pay [his] bills. So [he] had – pretty much was forced to go 

back to work.” He explained that he had previously called off from work four times in thirty 

years. Mullins was required to provide documentation from his psychiatrist and medical 
– 7 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

doctor stating the reasons for his injuries and explaining the treatment he was receiving 

in order to continue collecting his salary. 

{¶30} Mullins testified that he received no ongoing medical treatment for his 

alleged back injury, but at the end of March he began physical therapy for both his back 

and left knee, which continued for three months. Mullins underwent “needle therapy”2to 

address the pain in his left knee, which was not successful. As a consequence, in 

November of 2020, he underwent arthroscopic surgery to repair a torn meniscus in his 

left knee. Mullins conceded that no physician had opined that the encounter with Leo was 

the cause of Mullins’s meniscal tear.

{¶31} Mullins testified that he is no longer able to perform certain activities 

following his encounter with Leo, which include cycling, walking, and weightlifting. He 

also struggles to help Sherry with Malissa. Her care is the predominant reason that he 

aspired in the past to stay in peak physical condition. 

{¶32} Mullins began treating his mental problems roughly two weeks after the 

encounter with Leo, when he noticed that he became “sweaty and clammy” when he 

watched the neighbors walking their dogs. Further, when he watched police shows that 

featured aggressive dogs, he would have to change the channel. As of the date of the 

deposition, Mullins continued to attend weekly psychiatric appointments. 

{¶33} Mullins testified that he intended to retire with 33 years of service, but was 

forced to retire with only 30 years due to his injuries and the fact that he was currently 

stationed on the east side. Mullins explained the east side contains all of the city’s 

housing projects, (Id., p. 63), and “[n]obody likes [station 6] for that reason * * * [because] 

[y]ou get all these canine incidents.” (Id., p. 71.) 

{¶34} The Mullinses filed their three-count complaint on February 9, 2021 against 

Liberty Township and the John Doe officer. The complaint was never amended to name 

the John Doe officer. 

{¶35} In Count One, the complaint alleges that Mullins was attacked by a police 

dog under the control of Liberty Township and the John Doe officer. Count One further 

2

“Dry needling therapy” is a form of acupuncture and a treatment for osteoarthritis in the knee. 

When successful, the procedure reduces pain and disability and can increase arterial pressure 

around the knee by up to forty percent.
– 8 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

reads, “[i]n addition to negligence, [the John Doe officer]’s acts and/or omissions were 

willful, reckless, and/or were with a malicious purpose, in bad faith, and/or in a wanton or 

reckless manner.” Complt., ¶ 8. Despite the foregoing allegations against the John Doe 

officer in the complaint, Mullins’s counsel warranted at oral argument that the claims in 

Count One are predicated exclusively upon the officer’s negligent supervision of Leo, and 

Mullins is not alleging that Leo reacted to an intentional act of provocation by the John 

Doe officer.

{¶36} In Count Two, the complaint asserts that Liberty Township and the John 

Doe officer are strictly liable for Mullins’s injuries pursuant to R.C. 955.28(B), a statute 

that imposes strict liability on owners for the injuries proximately caused by their dogs. In 

Count Three, Sherry advances a claim for loss of consortium. 

{¶37} Liberty Township and the John Doe officer filed their motion for summary 

judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity on December 15, 2021. The Mullinses filed 

their opposition brief on January 28, 2022. Liberty Township and the John Doe officer 

filed their reply brief on February 4, 2022. The Mullinses filed a surreply on February 10, 

2022.

{¶38} In the motion for summary judgment, Liberty Township and the John Doe 

officer argue a claim for damages against an employee in his official capacity is the 

equivalent of a claim against the political subdivision itself and is governed by R.C. 

2744.02(A) and (B). Next, they argue that Liberty Township is immune from liability 

pursuant to R.C. 2744.02(A) as it is a political subdivision, and the provision of police 

services is a governmental function. Liberty Township and the John Doe officer further 

argue that no R.C. 2744.02(B) exception to the grant of general immunity in R.C. 

2744.02(A) applies, insofar as the John Doe officer was performing a governmental, 

rather than a proprietary, function. Finally, they assert that no liability is imposed on 

political subdivisions in R.C. 955.28. 

{¶39} In the opposition brief, the Mullinses assert that “any alleged statutory 

immunity of the Defendant Police Department [which was not named in the complaint] 

and its officers were [sic] waived” based on the following alleged facts:
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Case No. 22 MA 0023

1. Failure to announce that a dog was being released (citing [Liberty 

Township Police] Manual 309.2.13).

2. Failure to keep the dog under control (citing Mullins’s affidavit)

3. Leo jumped at Mullins (citing Rankin Aff., ¶ 17).

4. Leo made contact with Mullins at about the knee-high level (citing Altier 

Aff., ¶ 12).

5. While Leo allegedly may not have been trained to bite people in the 

face, he did just that (citing Mullins’s affidavit, which, contrary to the 

assertion in his opposition brief, does not have photographs attached).

6. While much has been discussed about biting about the eye, Mullins has 

alleged other injuries to him, proximately caused by Leo (Mullins Aff., ¶ 

5-6).

(Opposition Brf., p. 4.) The Mullinses further assert that “[a]s to issues of immunity, 

applying them to the facts of this case would deprive Plaintiffs of due process and equal 

protection of laws.” (Id.)

{¶40} The Mullinses argue in their opposition brief that the Township is liable 

under R.C. 2744.02(B) for the following reasons:

(a) This case involves the mishandling of a police dog by a Township 

Employee;

(b) Outside the Statutory limits of the police subdivision;

(c) With violations of the Police Manual.

3 Although Mullins’s affidavit alleges violations of Liberty Township’s Police Manual, and cites 

large passages from the manual, he did not attach a copy of the manual to his opposition brief in 

violation of Civ. R. 56(E). See Target Nat’l Bank v. Loncar, 7th Dist. (Mahoning) No. 12 MA 0104, 

2013-Ohio-3350, ¶ 8 (“‘Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts of papers referred to in an 

affidavit shall be attached to or served with the affidavit.’ Id. This requirement is satisfied by a 

statement in the affidavit declaring that the documents attached are true copies.”)
– 10 –

Case No. 22 MA 0023

(Id.) Finally, the Mullinses argue that R.C. 955.28 imposes strict liability against the owner 

of a dog for injury or loss proximately caused by the dog. 

{¶41} On February 24, 2022, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of 

Liberty Township and the John Doe officer for the reasons stated in the motion for 

summary judgment. This timely appeal followed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶42} An appellate court conducts a de novo review of a trial court’s decision to 

grant summary judgment, using the same standards as the trial court set forth in Civ.R. 

56(C). Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996). Before 

summary judgment can be granted, the trial court must determine that: (1) no genuine 

issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated, (2) the moving party is entitled to 

judgment as a matter of law, (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can 

come to but one conclusion, and viewing the evidence most favorably in favor of the party 

against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, the conclusion is adverse to 

that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327, 364 N.E.2d 267 (1977). 

Whether a fact is “material” depends on the substantive law of the claim being litigated. 

Hoyt, Inc. v. Gordon & Assoc., Inc., 104 Ohio App.3d 598, 603, 662 N.E.2d 1088 (8th 

Dist.1995).

{¶43} “[T]he moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the trial court 

of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate 

the absence of a genuine issue of fact on a material element of the nonmoving party’s 

claim.” (Emphasis deleted.) Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 296, 662 N.E.2d 264 

(1996). If the moving party carries its burden, the nonmoving party has a reciprocal burden 

of setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 293, 662 

N.E.2d 264. In other words, when presented with a properly supported motion for 

summary judgment, the nonmoving party must produce some evidence to suggest that a 

reasonable factfinder could rule in that party's favor. Brewer v. Cleveland Bd. of Edn., 122 

Ohio App.3d 378, 386, 701 N.E.2d 1023 (8th Dist.1997).

{¶44} The evidentiary materials to support a motion for summary judgment are 

listed in Civ.R. 56(C) and include the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
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Case No. 22 MA 0023

written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact that 

have been filed in the case. In resolving the motion, the court views the evidence in a light 

most favorable to the nonmoving party. Temple, 50 Ohio St.2d at 327, 364 N.E.2d 267.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

{¶45} The availability of immunity is a question of law properly determined by the 

court prior to trial. Conley v. Shearer, 64 Ohio St.3d 284, 292, 595 N.E.2d 862 

(1992); Hall v. Ft. Frye Local School Dist. Bd. of Edn., 111 Ohio App.3d 690, 694, 676 

N.E.2d 1241 (4th Dist.1996). The burden of proof is initially on the political subdivision to 

establish general immunity, and when established, the burden then shifts to the plaintiff 

to demonstrate one of the exceptions to immunity applies. Horen v. Bd. of Edn. of Toledo 

Pub. Schools, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-09-1143, 2010-Ohio-3631, ¶ 33; Ramey v. Mudd, 

154 Ohio App.3d 582, 798 N.E.2d 57, 2003-Ohio-5170, ¶ 16 (4th Dist.)

{¶46} The determination of whether a political subdivision is immune from liability 

involves a three-tiered analysis. The first tier requires a determination of whether the 

political subdivision is generally immune from liability because the alleged negligent acts 

of its employee occur in connection with a governmental or proprietary function pursuant 

to R.C. 2744.02(A). 

{¶47} If general immunity exists, the second tier provides five exceptions to 

immunity, which are listed in R.C. 2744.02(B). Doe v. Skaggs, 2018-Ohio-5402, 127 

N.E.3d 493, ¶ 18 (7th Dist.). The R.C. 2744.02(B) exceptions include:

(1) the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by an employee who is acting 

within the subdivision’s scope of employment and authority; 

(2) an employee’s negligent performance of acts with respect to the 

subdivision’s proprietary functions; 

(3) the negligent failure to repair public roads and negligent failure to 

remove obstructions from public roads; 
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Case No. 22 MA 0023

(4) negligence of employees that occurs within or on the grounds of, and is 

due to physical defects within or on the grounds of, buildings that are used 

in connection with the performance of a governmental function; and, 

(5) when a section of the Revised Code expressly imposes civil liability on 

the subdivision. 

Bowman at ¶ 7.

{¶48} If one of these exceptions is found to apply, the political subdivision loses 

its immunity. Id. However, immunity may be restored after an analysis of the third tier, 

set forth in R.C. 2744.03(A). 

ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN 

FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT-APPELLEE, LIBERTY TOWNSHIP, ET 

AL.; LEGALLY[.]

{¶49} Having reviewed the evidence in this case, we find that Liberty Township is 

entitled to the grant of general immunity from liability for Mullins’s injuries under the first 

tier of the sovereign immunity analysis. First, there is no dispute that Liberty Township is 

a political subdivision. Second, the John Doe officer was pursuing a suspect when Leo 

encountered Mullins in Mullins’s backyard. 

{¶50} The exercise of law enforcement is a governmental function. R.C. 

2744.01(C)(1)(i). Further, R.C. 2744.01(C)(2)(i) reads, in relevant part: “A governmental 

function includes, but is not limited to, the following: * * *[t]he provision * * * of police * * 

* services.” Last year, the Ninth District Court of Appeals recognized that “the operation 

of a police department and the maintenance, care, training, harboring, and deployment 

of a police dog” is a governmental function. Callaway v. Akron Police Dept., 9th Dist. No. 

29852, 2021-Ohio-4412, 183 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 12. 

{¶51} We further find that none of the exceptions to the grant of general immunity 

have been established in this case. More specifically, we reject Mullins’s argument that 
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Case No. 22 MA 0023

civil liability is expressly imposed upon political subdivisions and their canine handlers for 

injuries proximately caused by certified police canines.

{¶52} R.C. 2744.02(B)(5) reads, in its entirety:

In addition to the circumstances described in divisions (B)(1) to (4) of this 

section, a political subdivision is liable for injury, death, or loss to person or 

property when civil liability is expressly imposed upon the political 

subdivision by a section of the Revised Code, including, but not limited to, 

sections 2743.024 and 5591.375 of the Revised Code. Civil liability shall not 

be construed to exist under another section of the Revised Code merely 

because that section imposes a responsibility or mandatory duty upon a 

political subdivision, because that section provides for a criminal penalty, 

because of a general authorization in that section that a political subdivision 

may sue and be sued, or because that section uses the term “shall” in a 

provision pertaining to a political subdivision.

{¶53} R.C. 955.28, captioned “Dog may be killed for certain acts; owner liable for 

damages,” reads, in pertinent part, “The owner, keeper, or harborer of a dog is liable in 

damages for any injury, death, or loss to person or property that is caused by the dog * * 

*.” R.C. 955.28(B). 

{¶54} We have previously opined that the strict liability provision in R.C. 955.28(B) 

does not fall within the ambit of R.C. 2744.02(B)(5), as R.C. 955.28 is a general liability 

statute and does not expressly impose civil liability on political subdivisions. In re T.B.Y. 

v. Martins Ferry, 7th Dist. No. 16 BE 0002, 2016-Ohio-8482, 78 N.E.3d 242, ¶ 48; see 

also Callaway, supra, at ¶ 15; Jamison v. Stark Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 5th Dist. Stark No. 

2014CA00044, 2014-Ohio-4906, 2014 WL 5586143, ¶ 18; Perry v. East Cleveland, 11th 

Dist. No. 95-L-111, 1996 WL 200558 (Feb. 16, 1996).

4 R.C. 2743.02 codifies the state’s waiver of immunity to be sued in the Court of Claims.

5 R.C. 5591.37, captioned “noncompliance” reads, in its entirety, “Negligent failure to comply with 

section 5591.36 of the Revised Code shall render the county liable for all accidents or damages 

resulting from that failure.”
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Case No. 22 MA 0023

{¶55} Next, as Mullins failed to establish that Liberty Township and the John Doe 

officer lose their immunity in the second tier of the analysis, we need not undertake the 

third tier analysis. 

{¶56} Finally, Mullins’s counsel asserted at oral argument that Liberty Township 

is not immune from liability because the alleged negligent acts occurred outside of 

Trumbull County. At oral argument, Mullins’s counsel conceded that there is no section 

of the sovereign immunity statute that strips a municipality of its sovereign immunity 

where the employee’s conduct occurs outside of the municipality. Appellant’s counsel 

further conceded the John Doe officer had the authority to pursue Wright into Mahoning 

County and arrest him. 

{¶57} Accordingly, we find that Liberty Township is a political subdivision and the 

John Doe officer was performing a governmental function when Leo encountered Mullins. 

Because Mullins has not established any of the exceptions to the general grant of 

immunity, we further find that Mullins’s sole assignment of error has no merit and affirm 

the entry of summary judgment by the trial court in favor of Liberty Township and the John 

Doe officer in his official capacity. 

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.
[Cite as Mullins v. Liberty Twp., 2022-Ohio-4350.]

For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error 

is overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the 

Court of Common Pleas of Mahoning County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be taxed 

against the Appellants.

A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate 

in this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that 

a certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into 

execution.

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

This document constitutes a final judgment entry.