IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

 EASTERN DIVISION

Timothy Doyle Young, :

 Plaintiff, : Case No. 17-cv-194

 v. : JUDGE MICHAEL H. WATSON

 

U.S. Attorney (S.D. OH.), : Magistrate Judge Kemp

et al., 

 :

 Defendants.

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Timothy Doyle Young, a federal inmate in Colorado, filed

this civil rights action against the United States Attorney for

this District and against Karen L. Haas, the clerk of the United

States House of Representatives. His complaint is brief: he

alleges that the United States Attorney for the Southern District

of Ohio violated his rights by not responding to a court order

issued in Case No. 2:13-cv-981, and that Ms. Haas violated his

rights by not accepting a certified letter he sent her. That

letter, a copy of which is part of exhibits filed by Mr. Young on

March 27, 2017 (Doc. 5, page 82) asks the House to begin

impeachment proceedings against Judge Neil Gorsuch, who was at

that time a judge on the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

(Judge Gorsuch is now, of course, Justice Gorsuch). Mr. Young

alleges that failure of both officials to respond has placed his

life in danger, either by “adding to the underlying case in #13-

cv-681" or by “Obstructing Justice which includes life-saving

treatment for Hepatitis-C....” He has moved for leave to proceed

in forma pauperis.

This is not the first case which Mr. Young has filed here

even though he is incarcerated in Colorado. The Court

transferred the earlier case to which the complaint refers to the

District of Colorado. However, it also dismissed a second case
filed here in 2013 on grounds that Mr. Young had accumulated

three “strikes” by having cases dismissed as malicious or

frivolous or for failure to state a claim, making him ineligible

to proceed in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915(g). See Young

v. United States, Case No. 2:13-cv-833 (S.D. Ohio June 4, 2014).

Perhaps because he is a “three strikes” inmate, Mr. Young

has included the statements in his current complaint about his

life being in danger. Such an inmate may be relieved of the

requirement to pay the full filing fee if he can show that he is

facing “imminent danger of serious physical injury.” 28 U.S.C.

§1915(g). Simply repeating those words in a complaint is not

enough to satisfy the statute, however. 

First, the law is clear that the alleged danger which might

justify allowing the prisoner to proceed despite his three prior

“strikes” must be related to claims in the complaint; that is,

“the prisoner's complaint seek to redress an imminent danger of

serious physical injury and that this danger must be fairly

traceable to a violation of law alleged in the complaint.” Pettus

v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 2009). Second, the

threat of serious physical injury “must be real and proximate.” 

Rittner v. Kinder, 290 Fed.Appx. 796, 797 (6th Cir. Aug. 20,

2008). Moreover, “[a]llegations ... that are conclusory,

ridiculous, or clearly baseless do not suffice to allege imminent

harm.” Tucker v. Pentrich, 483 Fed.Appx. 28, 30 (6th Cir. May

15, 2012), citing Rittner, supra. 

Here, the complaint contains no facts from which it could be

plausibly inferred that either the failure of the United States

to respond to an order issued in Case No. 2:13-cv-681 or the

failure of the Clerk of the House of Representatives to accept

Mr. Young’s certified letter endangered his health in any way. 

Neither is there any indication that he is, in fact, in imminent

danger of harm. His allegations are simply insufficient to allow

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the Court to excuse him from the requirement that he pay the full

filing fee for this case. Consequently, it is recommended that

the pending motions for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Docs.

4 and 6) be denied and that Mr. Young be assessed the $400.00

filing fee, to be paid within thirty days. If that

recommendation is accepted, he should also be advised that if he

does not pay the fee, the action will be dismissed and will not

be reinstated even upon subsequent payment of the filing fee. 

See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 609 (6th Cir. 1997).

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that

party may, within fourteen days of the date of this Report, file

and serve on all parties written objections to those specific

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made,

together with supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge

of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper

objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify,

in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein,

may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the

magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1).

 The parties are specifically advised that failure to object

to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the

right to have the district judge review the Report and

Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the

right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the

Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).

 /s/Terence P. Kemp 

 United States Magistrate Judge

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