IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

JOSEPH LEE SLIDER, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-255

Judge Michael H. Watson

Magistrate Judge Jolson

CAPTAIN HOWELL, et al, 

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

AND ORDER

Plaintiff Joseph Lee Slider, a pro se prisoner, initiated this action and filed a Motion for 

Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) on November 9, 2017, in the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Ohio, against Belmont Correctional Institution (“BeCI”) 

Captain Howell, BeCI Case Manager Mr. Ruiz, BeCI Warden Ms. Potter, BeCI Investigator 

Bungardnel, the BeCI Institutional Inspector (collectively, “the BeCI Defendants”), and various 

Defendants employed at Mansfield Correctional Institution (“MANCI”). (See Doc. 1). All of 

Plaintiff’s allegations stem from physical altercations he allegedly experienced at both BeCI and 

at MANCI. (Id.). On March 23, 2018, United States District Judge Solomon Oliver, Jr. issued a 

Memorandum of Opinion and Order, dismissing Plaintiff’s claims against the MANCI 

Defendants pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). (Doc. 4). Judge Oliver transferred Plaintiff’s 

remaining claims against the BeCI Defendants to this Court, explaining that those claims 

occurred at BeCI, which is located in the Southern District of Ohio. (Id.).
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Consequently, this matter is before the undersigned for consideration of Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) and the initial screen of Plaintiff’s 

remaining claims against the BeCI Defendants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).

For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is 

GRANTED. Furthermore, having performed an initial screen and for the reasons that follow, it 

is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to 

state a claim on which relief may be granted.

I. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis under 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) and (2) (Doc. 3), Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED. Plaintiff is required 

to pay the full amount of the Court’s $350 filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). Plaintiff’s 

certified trust fund statement reveals that he has an insufficient amount to pay the full filing fee. 

(Doc. 3).

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), the custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account at the 

Madison Correctional Institution is DIRECTED to submit to the Clerk of the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio as an initial partial payment, 20% of the greater 

of either the average monthly deposits to the inmate trust account or the average monthly balance 

in the inmate trust account, for the six-months immediately preceding the filing of the 

Complaint. After full payment of the initial, partial filing fee, the custodian shall submit 20% of 

the inmate’s preceding monthly income credited to the account, but only when the amount in the 

account exceeds $10.00 until the full fee of $350.00 has been paid to the Clerk of this Court. 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997). Checks 

should be made payable to Clerk, United States District Court and should be sent to:
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Prisoner Accounts Receivable

260 U.S. Courthouse

85 Marconi Boulevard

Columbus, Ohio 43215

The prisoner’s name and this case number must be included on each check.

Consequently, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff be allowed to prosecute his action without 

prepayment of fees or costs and that judicial officers who render services in this action shall do 

so as if the costs had been prepaid. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this 

Order to Plaintiff and the prison cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a 

copy of this Order to the Court’s financial office in Columbus.

II. INITIAL SCREEN

A. Relevant Standard 

Because Plaintiff is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court must dismiss the Complaint, 

or any portion of it, that is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(e)(2). Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to set 

forth “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In 

reviewing a complaint, the Court must construe it in Plaintiff’s favor, accept all well-pleaded 

factual allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A 

claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to 

draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). On the other hand, a 

complaint that consists of “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 

cause of action” is insufficient. Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Although pro se
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complaints are to be construed liberally, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), “basic 

pleading essentials” are still required. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989).

B. Plaintiff’s Complaint

Plaintiff asserts that his claims “consist of failure to access, due process, 1st Amendment 

right to redress all grievances, 8th Amendment cruel and unusual punishment, combined with 5th, 

6th, and 14th equal protection, - failure to protect claim.” (Doc. 1 at 3). The allegations in 

Plaintiff’s Complaint relating to the BeCI Defendants are as follows:

While at BeCI prison, Slider requested P.C. [protective custody]. Captain Howell 

and Mr. Ruiz (denied it). They refused to lock up Slider to even investigate the 

claim. Slider filed (ICR) – sent to Inspector of BeCI, filed with Warden Potter 

and notified Investigator Bungardenel. –They all refused to act, Slider was 

assaulted, jaw injury, ribs, face, etc. After that assault they transferred slider to 

MANCI. Slider tried to continue the (ICR) process, the BeCI Inspector Refused 

to mail back grievances. 

(Id. at 5). No dates are provided in the Complaint.

In terms of relief, Plaintiff seeks to have his enemies “properly placed on list,” 

“protection from staff and enemy’s [sic],” “the opportunity to complete grievances to fulfill 

PLRA,” and $1,000,000.00 for physical and emotional trauma. (Id. at 6). Plaintiff does not 

specify whether Defendants are sued in their official capacities, individual capacities, or both.

C. Discussion

As Judge Oliver explained in his Memorandum of Opinion and Order, there is no 

inherent constitutional right to an effective prison grievance procedure under the First, Fifth, or 

Fourteenth Amendments. (Doc. 4 at 4 (citing Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 467 (1983); 

Walker v. Michigan Dept. of Corr., No. 04B1347, 2005 WL 742743, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 1, 

2005)). Judge Oliver further explained:

The First Amendment is implicated in the prison grievance process only to the 

extent that prison officials may not retaliate against a prisoner for filing non-
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frivolous grievances. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 472 (6th Cir. 2010); Herron v. 

Harrison, 203 F.3d 410, 415 (6th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff does not allege any of the 

Defendants retaliated against him for filing grievances. He asserts that the process 

itself is ineffective. This, alone, does not state a claim for violation of his 

constitutional rights.

(Doc. 4 at 4). This Court agrees. Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under the First, Fifth, or 

Fourteenth Amendments regarding the prison grievance process against the BeCI Defendants.

Consistent with Judge Oliver’s Opinion, the undersigned also finds that Plaintiff has 

failed to allege any facts to suggest a plausible basis for a claim under the Sixth Amendment. 

(See id. at 4–5). Indeed, although the standard of review is liberal for pro se pleadings, 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to give the BeCI Defendants fair notice of what the Sixth Amendment

claims are and the factual grounds upon which they rest to satisfy the minimum pleading 

requirements under Rule 8. (Id. (citing Lillard v. Shelby Cty. Bd. of Educ., 76 F.3d 716, 726 (6th 

Cir. 1996); Bassett v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 528 F.3d 426, 437 (6th Cir. 2008))).

Finally, Plaintiff brings a claim under the Eighth Amendment due to the BeCI 

Defendants’ alleged failure to protect him from other inmates. “To establish liability under the 

Eighth Amendment for a claim based on a failure to prevent harm to a prisoner, Plaintiff must 

show that the prison officials acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk.” Adams v. 

Louisville Metro Corr. Dep’t, No. 3:13-CV-P1086-S, 2014 WL 1117982, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 

20, 2014) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994); Woods v. Lecureux, 110 F.3d 

1215, 1222 (6th Cir. 1997); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 506 (6th Cir. 2001)). “[D]eliberate

indifference describes a state of mind more blameworthy than negligence.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 

835.

In analyzing deliberate indifference, Plaintiff must satisfy both an objective and 

subjective component to demonstrate a constitutional violation occurred. See Richko v. Wayne 
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Cty., 819 F.3d 907, 915 (6th Cir. 2016); Morgan v. Lamneck, No. 2:09-cv-218, 2011 WL 

1114415, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 24, 2011) (holding that “the test for deliberate indifference 

contains both a subjective and an objective component”). Looking first at the subjective 

component, it “requires a showing that prison officials knew of, and acted with deliberate 

indifference to, an inmate’s health or safety.” Flanory v. Bonn, 604 F.3d 249, 254 (6th Cir. 

2010).

Here, Plaintiff has alleged no facts to show that the BeCI Defendants knew Plaintiff was 

in danger, or that they acted with deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s health or safety. The sum 

of Plaintiff’s allegations to support this claim are:

While at [BeCI], Slider requested P.C. Captain Howell and Mr. Ruiz. (Denied 

it). They refused to lock up Slider to even investigate the claim. Slider filed 

(ICR)—sent to Inspector of [BeCI]., filed with Warden Potter and notified 

Investigator Bungardnel. They all refused to act. Slider was assaulted, jaw 

injury, ribs, face, etc.

(Doc. 1 at 5) (grammar and capitalization altered).

Plaintiff thus states that he requested protective custody and wanted officials to 

investigate “the claim,” but provides no information on what “claim” he is referring to, what he 

told Defendants, or what circumstances led him to fear for his safety. On top of this, Plaintiff 

fails to identify his alleged assailant, let alone plead that he gave prior notice to prison officials 

about his assailant. “[I]dentification of a prisoner’s enemies is critical to the prison’s ability to 

protect a prisoner because it is the prison officials, not the prisoner, who must determine whether 

there is a substantial risk of harm that warrants a transfer or other action.” Bogan v. Brunsman, 

No. 1:11-CV-259, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12416, 2013 WL 360357, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 

2013) report and recommendation adopted, No. 1:11CV259, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26762, 

2013 WL 754262 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 27, 2013). Put another way, a general request for protection is 
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not enough to trigger eighth amendment liability. See, e.g., Gant v. Campbell, 4 F. App’x 254, 

256 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no eighth amendment violation for failure to protect where the 

plaintiff expressed a general concern about his safety but did not identify any particular gang 

members whom he feared).

Plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to suggest Defendants were aware of any 

specific danger to Plaintiff or acted with deliberate indifference to his safety. Even giving 

Plaintiff every benefit of the doubt, there is no way to read his Complaint as sufficiently 

supporting an eighth amendment claim against the BeCI Defendants. It is too sparse and too 

conclusory. Consequently, this claim also fails. See Gant, 4 F. App’x at 256 (dismissing eighth 

amendment claim because the plaintiff “did not allege that the defendants were deliberately 

indifferent to a specific, known risk to his safety”).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis is 

GRANTED. (Doc 1). Further, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s 

Complaint in its entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A. 

The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to mail a copy of this Order to Plaintiff and the prison 

cashier’s office. The Clerk is further DIRECTED to forward a copy of this Order to the Court’s 

financial office in Columbus. Finally, the Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Order to 

the Ohio Attorney General’s Office, 150 E. Gay St., 16th Floor, Columbus, Ohio 43215.

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those 

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with 
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supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations 

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 3, 2018 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE