The Honorable Jean C. Hamilton, Chief Judge, United States

1

District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri. 

___________

No. 95-1586

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, * Appeal from the United States

* District Court for the 

v. * Eastern District of Missouri.

*

Forriss D. Elliott, *

*

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: February 14, 1996

 Filed: July 22, 1996

___________

Before BOWMAN, BEAM, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

___________

BOWMAN, Circuit Judge.

Forriss D. Elliott was convicted of seven counts of mail fraud in

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) and one count of

conspiracy to commit mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988) for

submitting fraudulent legal bills to the state of Missouri in connection

with his work as a special assistant attorney general. The District Court1

sentenced him to a term of sixty months of imprisonment. Elliott appeals

his conviction and sentence. For reversal, Elliott raises four issues.

First, he contends that the mail fraud statute does not apply to purely

intrastate mailings. Second, Elliott, who is black, raises an equalprotection challenge to the racial composition of the all-white jury that

convicted him. Third, he claims that the District Court made a number of

evidentiary errors. Fourth, he challenges
 After the first two cases ended with hung juries, a third

2

attempt at trial a few weeks later was unsuccessful when a mistrial

was declared during the first day of jury selection because

reference was made to the fact that Elliott had been tried twice

previously.

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the length of his sentence as calculated under the sentencing guidelines.

We affirm Elliott's conviction and sentence.

I.

In the fall of 1989, Elliott, an attorney in private practice in the

St. Louis area, was appointed a part-time special assistant attorney

general to represent the Second Injury Fund (the Fund) and the State of

Missouri in workers' compensation cases where either the Fund or the state

was being sued. In limited circumstances, the Fund provides additional

compensation to previously compensated employees who suffer a second jobrelated injury. The goal of the Fund is to encourage employers to hire the

partially disabled by limiting the employer's liability in the event that

the employee "receives a subsequent compensable injury resulting in

additional permanent partial disability." Mo. Rev. Stat. § 287.220.1

(1994). As a special assistant attorney general, Elliott was authorized

to bill the state for legal services rendered and expenses incurred in his

work on behalf of the state. Elliott mailed his bills to the state on a

monthly basis. The bills he submitted, however, turned out to be grossly

inflated. 

After the state discovered the fraudulent billing scheme, Elliott was

indicted for mail fraud. He was convicted after a third trial by an allwhite jury. The first two trials, both of which had black jury members,

resulted in hung juries. At trial, the government presented a mountain

2

of documentary evidence that mapped out Elliott's fraudulent billing

scheme. Thirty-six billing entries showed that Elliott or one of his

employees worked more than twenty-four hours a day, sometimes in excess of

fifty hours. 
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On forty occasions, Elliott claimed that he or his associate, Steve Lewis,

had appeared at a Workers' Compensation Division trial, court hearing, or

deposition on behalf of the Fund when, in fact, minute sheets and

deposition transcripts revealed that no one from his law firm was present.

Elliott also billed the state for settlement negotiations supposedly done

on case files that had been closed months or years earlier, some of which

Elliott had closed himself. Numerous times the billing entries showed

Elliott, who billed himself out at seventy dollars an hour, as the person

doing the legal work when, in fact, the work was done by his paralegal or

his associate, both of whom had lower billable rates. The documents

indicated that, on many occasions, instead of billing the thirty-dollar

flat fee that is allowed for handling a partial disability case, Elliott

billed partial disability cases at the much more lucrative hourly rate

reserved for total disability cases. The documentary evidence also

demonstrated that Elliott had grossly exaggerated copying and postage

expenses.

Although the substantial documentary evidence was probably enough to

convict Elliott, the government also presented witness testimony that

showed Elliott was the mastermind of the fraudulent billing scheme. While

representing the Fund, Elliott employed two paralegals at different times

to assist him in preparing the bills that he sent to the state. Elliott

first hired Brenda Leake in August 1990. Leake testified that Elliott

ordered her to make bogus entries on his billing statements. She worked

for Elliott for about twelve months until she was fired in September 1991.

Elliott then hired Connie O'Bryant as a new paralegal to assist in bill

preparation. Even though O'Bryant was called as a defense witness, she

acknowledged that Elliott gave her false entries to put in the bills. Mary

Reinhardt, who worked for the state and received all the bills, also

testified. She stated that while Leake was still employed by Elliott,

Leake telephoned her to warn her about the false entries and recommended

that someone look at the inflated bills. Elliott's former accountant,

Brian Cox, also
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testified. In December 1992, after Elliott saw his picture splashed across

the front page of the Sunday edition of the St. Louis Post-Dispatch

accompanied by a story accusing him of billing fifty-hour work days,

Elliott telephoned Cox. Elliott asked Cox to review his billing

statements. Cox spent two weeks comparing the bills with Elliott's case

files. Cox testified that the bills could not be substantiated. Finally,

the government put on the previous sworn testimony of Elliott himself.

Although denying criminal culpability, Elliott admitted certain bills were

"inflated" or false and that the state was billed for work not done. Trial

Trans. (Dec. 1, 1994) at 23-25 (testimony of court reporter regarding

Elliott's sworn statements). 

II. 

Elliott first argues that the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341,

does not apply to purely intrastate mailings. Although the evidence shows

that Elliott used the United States mails to send his bills to the state,

all were sent and received in Missouri. Relying on United States v. Lopez,

115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), Elliott insists that mail fraud requires some sort

of interstate connection. We disagree. Lopez is a Commerce Clause case

and therefore has no application whatsoever to the mail fraud statute,

which is based on the Postal Power found in Article I, Section 8, Clause

7 of the Constitution. The Postal Power, of course, gives the federal

government the power to deliver mail intrastate. In Lopez, the Supreme

Court struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which made it a

federal offense for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm in a

school zone. Congress had used the Commerce Clause as the source of its

authority to enact the Gun-Free School Zones Act. The Lopez Court

determined that Congress exceeded its Commerce Clause authority when it

passed the Gun-Free School Zones Act because mere possession of a gun in

a school zone did not substantially affect interstate commerce. Unlike the

Gun-Free School Zones Act, the jurisdictional basis of
 The judicially engrafted equal-protection component of the

3

Fifth Amendment is implicated in this case because Elliott is

challenging the actions of a federal prosecutor. See United States

v. Greene, 995 F.2d 793, 795 (8th Cir. 1993) ("An action that

violates the fourteenth amendment guarantee of equal protection

when committed by a state actor violates the due process guarantee

of the fifth amendment when committed by a federal actor."). 

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the mail fraud statute is grounded in the Postal Power and therefore

necessarily encompasses all items passing through the United States mails,

even if their passage is purely intrastate. "It is irrelevant that all of

the mailings in this case may have been intrastate in nature," United

States v. Cady, 567 F.2d 771, 776 n.7 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435

U.S. 944 (1978), because "[t]he focus of the statute is upon the misuse of

the Postal Service . . . and Congress clearly has the authority to regulate

such misuse of the mails," United States v. States, 488 F.2d 761, 767 (8th

Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 909 (1974). See also United States v.

Minkin, 504 F.2d 350, 353 (8th Cir. 1974) (affirming mail fraud conviction

where fraudulent mailing made only twelve-mile intrastate journey), cert.

denied, 420 U.S. 926 (1975); United States v. Mirabile, 503 F.2d 1065, 1067

(8th Cir. 1974) (affirming mail fraud conviction for intrastate mailing),

cert. denied, 420 U.S. 973 (1975).

III.

Elliott next challenges the racial composition of the all-white jury

that convicted him as a Fifth Amendment equal-protection violation. He

3

theorizes that the prosecutor, having been stymied by hung racially mixed

juries in the first two trials, sought to exclude all potential black jury

members from the third trial in the hope of ensuring a conviction. The

court seated an all-white jury after the prosecutor eliminated three

potential black jurors using challenges for cause and struck another three

potential black jurors using peremptory challenges. Elliott argues that

the for-cause strikes as well as the peremptory challenges run afoul of
 There is nothing in the record to indicate which jurors,

4

black or white, were voting against conviction in the first two

trials. Elliott's theory assumes that one or more black jury

members voted to acquit. Such an assumption is unwarranted. Just

as it is wrong for a prosecutor to exclude potential black jurors

on the assumption that they will be unable impartially to consider

the state's case against a black defendant, so it is equally wrong

for Elliott to assume that it was black members of the jury who

caused the first two mistrials. 

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Batson v. Kentucky, in which the Supreme Court held "the Equal Protection

Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on

account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a group

will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black

defendant." 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). 

4

We turn first to Elliott's argument that the prosecutor's use of forcause strikes against three black venire members was a Batson violation.

He insists that with only six peremptory challenges (plus one for alternate

jurors), the prosecutor realized that "he would not be able to rid himself

of all black jurors, unless he was able to strike some black venirepersons

for cause." Appellant's Brief at 19. Consequently, Elliott contends that

the for-cause strikes in combination with the peremptory strikes resulted

in a constitutional violation that deprived him of a fair trial. We

disagree. Batson applies only to peremptory strikes. We know of no case

that has extrapolated the Batson framework to for-cause strikes. There is

simply no legal basis for this argument, which fails to recognize that

peremptory strikes, for which no reasons need be given (absent a Batson

challenge), are different from challenges for cause, which by definition

require a showing of cause. A district court is required to strike for

cause any juror who is shown to lack impartiality or the appearance of

impartiality and, "[a]bsent abuse of discretion, we will not interfere with

the District Court's determination of juror qualifications." United States

v. Tibesar, 894 F.2d 317, 319 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 825

(1990). The district court is
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given broad discretion in determining whether to strike jurors for cause

because it is in the best position to assess the demeanor and credibility

of the prospective jurors. United States v. Graves, 5 F.3d 1546, 1554 (5th

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1829 (1994). After carefully

reviewing the record, we are convinced that the District Court did not

abuse its discretion when it dismissed three of the prospective black

jurors for cause. 

We come, then, to Elliott's arguments concerning the peremptory

challenges. The Batson framework, using a three-stage burden-shifting

analysis, establishes the order and allocation of proof in challenges to

the discriminatory use of peremptory strikes in jury selection. Purkett

v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1770-71 (1995) (per curiam). In the context of

a criminal trial, after the defendant makes a prima facie case of

purposeful discrimination in the government's use of a peremptory

challenge, the burden shifts to the government to offer a race-neutral

explanation for the strike. Id. A prosecutor's explanation for a strike

is deemed race-neutral if discriminatory intent is not inherent in the

stated reason. Id. at 1771. The defendant may then attempt to prove that

the facially valid reason is a mere pretext and that the real reason for

the strike was discrimination. Id. at 1771. The defendant retains at all

times the ultimate burden of persuasion, id. at 1771, and the trial court's

finding on the discrimination issue will be set aside only if clearly

erroneous, United States v. Darden, 70 F.3d 1507, 1531 (8th Cir. 1995),

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1449 (1996) and 64 U.S.L.W. 3855 (U.S. June 24,

1996). On appeal, we are mindful of the fact that "evaluation of the

prosecutor's state of mind based on demeanor and credibility lies

`peculiarly within a trial judge's province.'" Hernandez v. New York, 500

U.S. 352, 365 (1991) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469

U.S. 412, 428 (1985)). After carefully reviewing the trial transcript, we

are persuaded that the District Court did not commit clear error in finding

that Elliott failed to
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prove that the government's race-neutral reasons were mere pretextual

covers for unlawful discrimination.

 

The prosecutor used peremptory challenges to strike three black

jurors: Juror No. 4 (Smith), Juror No. 12 (Johnson), and Juror No. 20

(Harper). After Elliott objected to the use of these peremptory challenges

as a violation of Batson, the District Court found that Elliott had

established a prima facie case of discrimination. This finding required

the prosecutor to come forward with race-neutral explanations for the

striking of the jurors. 

As an initial matter, we conclude that Elliott's Batson challenge

with respect to Harper is procedurally barred. At trial, Elliott's counsel

initially objected to Harper being stricken as a Batson violation, but then

withdrew the objection after the government proffered a race-neutral

explanation for the strike. See Trial Trans. (Nov. 28, 1994) at 218-220A.

Elliott cannot raise an argument on appeal that he explicitly waived at

trial. Accordingly, only the propriety of the strikes against jurors Smith

and Johnson are properly before us. 

The prosecutor proffered three race-neutral reasons for striking

Smith. First, Smith listed "church organization" under the category of

"Hobbies and Activities" on the juror survey form. Smith's church activity

concerned the prosecutor because Elliott's first trial resulted in a hung

jury when one of the jurors had religious convictions that created problems

for him in deliberations. Moreover, the prosecutor also observed that

Elliott was reading a Bible during voir dire. The only other juror who

listed "church" as an activity was a white female, and she also was struck

by the prosecution. Second, Smith was struck because she did not own her

own home, which the prosecutor believed meant that Smith "had less of a

stake in and commitment to the community." Appellee's Brief at 17. The

government also struck any other
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prospective panel members who did not own their own homes, which included

one white and another black. Third, Smith was laughing with defense

counsel during voir dire, and was showing particular interest in his

comments, which, as the prosecutor saw it, meant that Smith had developed

"more of a bond with defense attorney than the government was comfortable

with." Trial Trans. (Nov. 28, 1994) at 214. 

Four race-neutral reasons were proffered for striking Johnson.

First, Johnson did not own her own home, and as already explained, all

potential jurors, white or black, who did not own their own homes were

struck. Second, Johnson had relatives employed by the United States Postal

Service. Postal employees are often subjected to rigorous scrutiny and

secret observation by postal inspectors. Because Elliott was charged with

mail fraud, the government's case agent and key witness was a postal

inspector. The prosecutor felt that postal employees and their relatives

may have negative attitudes toward postal inspectors because of their

watchdog role. To avoid this dilemma, all prospective jurors with

relatives currently employed by the United States Postal Service were

struck, which included a white venireperson who had a relative in the

postal service. Third, Johnson failed to respond to certain voir dire

questions. When the venirepersons were asked whether they thought the

criminal justice system was fair, Johnson failed to raise her hand. When

asked whether they thought the criminal justice system was unfair, Johnson

again failed to raise her hand. When asked if they had no opinion on the

fairness of the criminal justice system, Johnson failed to raise her hand

for a third time. The prosecutor struck Johnson for her unresponsiveness.

Finally, the prosecutor also felt that Johnson "was looking at him in

hostile fashion." Appellee's Brief at 18.

Once the prosecution articulated race-neutral reasons for the

peremptory challenges, the burden then shifted to Elliott to offer evidence

showing that the reasons given by the government--all
 Our caselaw establishes that explanations of the sort offered 5

by the prosecutor in this case are race-neutral. See, e.g.,

Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996) (postal

workers); United States v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171, 175-76 (8th Cir.

1995) (rented home indicating lack of community attachment), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 1285 (1996); United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d

1401, 1406 (8th Cir.) (insufficient attachment to community), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 371 (1994); United States v. Todd, 963 F.2d 207,

211 (8th Cir. 1992) (hostility toward prosecutor); United States v.

Day, 949 F.2d 973, 979 (8th Cir. 1991) (sporadic work history and

lack of property ownership, indicating lack of community

attachment); United States v. Jackson, 914 F.2d 1050, 1052-53 (8th

Cir. 1990) (insufficient commitment to community).

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conceded by Elliott to be facially race-neutral --were a mere pretext for 5

discrimination and that the real reason Smith and Johnson were struck was

because they were black. Although Elliott's appellate counsel makes a

valiant attempt to show that all of the government's proffered reasons were

pretextual, Elliott's trial counsel failed to attack as pretextual several

of the race-neutral reasons proffered by the government to justify the

strikes. At trial, Elliott did not challenge as pretextual the striking

of Smith because of her church activity; he also did not challenge as

pretextual the striking of Johnson because she had relatives in the postal

service. We uphold facially neutral reasons where the opponent of the

strike makes no attempt in the trial court to demonstrate pretext.

Williams v. Groose, 77 F.3d 259, 261 (8th Cir. 1996); see also United

States v. Carr, 67 F.3d 171, 176 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.

1285 (1996). 

Although Elliott did attempt to show that the remaining reasons --

lack of community attachment, unresponsiveness during voir dire, and

hostility toward one party or undue friendliness with one party -- were a

mere pretext for discrimination, he did so only in the most conclusory

fashion. Consequently, the District Court found that Elliott failed to

satisfy his ultimate burden of proving purposeful discrimination. The

District Court was in the best position to evaluate the motives of the

prosecutor, and the record reveals that the court did so meticulously,

painstakingly
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noting the several racially neutral reasons offered for the challenges and

finding that those reasons were not pretextual. We cannot say that the

court clearly erred in making its finding of no discrimination.

 

In a last-ditch effort to show a Batson violation, Elliott makes a

"similarly situated" argument for the first time on appeal. He notes that

while Smith was struck because of her church activity, the prosecutor

failed to strike several similarly situated white jurors. Specifically,

the prosecutor kept a white juror who worked for a Baptist church school

and whose husband had been a minister for six years, a white juror who

listed "Christian concerts" as a hobby, and a white juror who indicated

that he "preach[ed] parttime" as an activity. Similarly, Elliott points

out that while Johnson was struck because, among other reasons, she had

postal service relatives, the prosecutor did not challenge a white juror

who had "a very close friend who is a retired mail man," a white juror

whose uncle was a retired letter carrier, and a white juror whose

grandmother was a postmaster and whose brother "is a postmaster in a small

town." 

Elliott is correct that "the government may not justify peremptory

challenges to venire members of one race unless venire members of another

race with comparable or similar characteristics, are also challenged."

Reynolds v. Benefield, 931 F.2d 506, 512 (8th Cir.) (civil case), cert.

denied, 501 U.S. 1204 (1991). The government must exercise "its challenges

in a consistent manner," United States v. Atkins, 25 F.3d 1401, 1406 (8th

Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 371 (1994), and treat similarly situated

jurors similarly, Davidson v. Harris, 30 F.3d 963, 965 (8th Cir. 1994)

(civil case) (noting otherwise neutral explanation for removal of black

juror may be pretextual if stated reason also applies to white juror who

is not removed), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 737 (1995). Elliott thus may

have had a factual basis for at least a colorable Batson claim based on the

government's failure to strike
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white jurors who arguably were similarly situated to the black jurors who

were struck. This argument, however, is untimely since it is made for the

first time on appeal. See United States v. Dobynes, 905 F.2d 1192, 1196-97

(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 877 (1990). Having failed to raise this

argument before the trial court, Elliott has waived his right to have it

considered by this Court. See Roth v. G.D. Searle & Co., 27 F.3d 1303,

1307 (8th Cir. 1994). 

We hold that the District Court did not err in rejecting Elliott's

Batson claims.

IV.

Elliott also argues that the District Court made several evidentiary

errors when it: (1) limited cross-examination of Brenda Leake, his former

paralegal; (2) excluded as irrelevant evidence concerning the routine

practices of the Office of the Missouri Attorney General and other special

assistant attorneys general; and (3) excluded as irrelevant evidence

relating to the routine practices of the Workers' Compensation Division.

"We review the evidentiary rulings of a district court only for abuses of

discretion, and will reverse only when an improper evidentiary ruling

affects the substantial rights of the defendant or when we believe that the

error has had more than a slight influence on the verdict." United States

v. Ballew, 40 F.3d 936, 941 (8th Cir. 1994) (citations omitted), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 1813 (1995).

A. Cross-Examination of Brenda Leake

Elliott maintains that Leake misrepresented her educational and

employment history on her resume, which he relied on when he hired her as

a paralegal. He claims that these misrepresentations were relevant to his

defense because Leake's "lack of education and experience caused mistakes

and erroneous billings." Appellant's
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Brief at 43. According to Elliott, the jury was entitled to know about

Leake's supposed lies because it was these lies that "lulled" Elliott "into

believing that she was capable of relieving him of much of the work

generated by the thousands of files." Id. Armed with this information,

Elliott contends that the jury would have believed his cries of innocence

and chalked up the over-billings to Leake's mistakes. 

Elliott sought to introduce several documentary exhibits, including

Leake's resume, to show that Leake misrepresented her educational and work

experience. He wanted to use these exhibits to impeach Leake on crossexamination. Trial Trans. (Nov. 30, 1994) at 22. Elliott was not allowed

to use the documentary exhibits, however, because the trial court granted

the government's motion in limine to exclude the exhibits as extrinsic

evidence of Leake's conduct. Federal Rule of Evidence 608(b) prohibits the

use of extrinsic evidence to prove specific instances of a witness's

conduct. United States v. Johnson, 968 F.2d 765, 766 (8th Cir.), cert.

denied, 506 U.S. 980 (1992). Consequently, "[w]hile documents may be

admissible on cross-examination to prove a material fact, or bias, they are

not admissible under Rule 608(b) merely to show a witness' general

character for truthfulness or untruthfulness." United States v. Martz, 964

F.2d 787, 789 (8th Cir.) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1038

(1992). The reason for barring extrinsic evidence "is to avoid holding

mini-trials on peripherally related or irrelevant matters." Id. "To the

extent that such evidence is ever admissible, the introduction of extrinsic

evidence to attack credibility is subject to the discretion of the trial

court." Johnson, 968 F.2d at 766. Given Rule 608(b)'s admonition against

the introduction of such evidence, we conclude that the District Court did

not abuse its discretion when it excluded the exhibits as extrinsic

evidence. 

We note that Elliott fails to mention Rule 608(b) in his opening

brief, relying instead on the general principle that
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criminal defendants are entitled to a "searching cross-examination."

Appellant's Brief at 41. That is exactly what Elliott got. Although the

trial court excluded the extrinsic evidence, it did not place any specific

limitations on areas of cross-examination. Elliott was given a wide berth

to engage in a searching and wide-ranging cross-examination as long as it

did not require the use of extrinsic evidence. Elliott was thus required

to "take his answer" because Rule 608(b) precludes him from using extrinsic

evidence to impeach the witness. United States v. Capozzi, 883 F.2d 608,

615 (8th Cir. 1989) (citations to quoted cases omitted), cert. denied, 495

U.S. 918 (1990). 

Despite the District Court's generous latitude with respect to crossexamination questions, Elliott contends that the government's motion in

limine sought "to bar defendant from using documents and cross-examining

[Leake] as to misrepresentations concerning her educational background and

her job history." Appellant's Brief at 38 (emphasis added). Elliott is

mistaken. The court specifically informed defense counsel that he could

ask Leake questions about her education and work experience. Trial Trans.

(Nov. 30, 1994) at 20-21. The court simply requested that, prior to those

questions being asked, defense counsel approach the bench and proffer the

question to allow the court to make a ruling. Id. (Nov. 29, 1994) at 15-

16; id. (Nov. 30, 1994) at 9-10, 22-23. There were no questions proffered

by the defense that the court did not allow, and Elliott was free to ask

Leake anything he wished concerning misrepresentations by her as to her

education and employment. We are unable to see any abuse of discretion in

the District Court's handling of this matter.

B. Routine Practices of the Attorney General's Office and Other

Special Assistant Attorneys General

Elliott sought to introduce evidence relating to the routine

practices of the Office of the Missouri Attorney General and other
 Because the evidence was irrelevant to any issue in the case, 6

we need not and do not discuss Elliott's arguments based on Federal

Rule of Evidence 406 (evidence of habit or routine practice).

These arguments are meritless in any event.

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special assistants because he "wanted to show that mistakes were common in

the manner in which [the bills] were handled by the Attorney General's

Office and in the manner in which files were routinely reviewed on a

monthly basis by Special Assistants." Appellant's Brief at 45 (citations

omitted). The routine practices ostensibly would have been established by

the proffered testimony of two other special assistant attorneys general.

The special assistants would have testified that (1) special assistants

were told to use their own best judgment when determining whether to

categorize a file as a partial or total disability case, and (2) they had

received closed files without being told that the files were closed and

were paid for work done on the closed files. The District Court excluded

this evidence as irrelevant. See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (stating irrelevant

evidence is inadmissible). After carefully reviewing the record, we

conclude that the District Court properly excluded this evidence as

irrelevant. 

The issue at trial was whether Elliott intentionally defrauded the

state by knowingly submitting false bills. The proffered testimony

concerning the categorization of files or the fact that other special

assistants were paid for work done on closed files had nothing to do with

this issue. On cross-examination, one of the proffered witnesses admitted

that he had no personal knowledge of how Elliott prepared his legal bills,

kept his time, dealt with the courts, or reviewed his files. The proffered

witness could only testify as to how he prepared his own legal bills and

handled cases in which he was involved. Put simply, the proffered

testimony had nothing to do with Elliott and was irrelevant to the question

of his guilt or innocence. The District Court did not abuse its discretion

in excluding this evidence.6
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C. Routine Practice of the Workers' Compensation Division

Elliott also sought to introduce testimony concerning routine

practice at the Workers' Compensation Division. The purpose of the

proffered testimony was to show that court proceedings at the Compensation

Division were rather informal and that the absence of a name on a minute

sheet did not necessarily mean that the special assistant was absent from

the proceeding. Although the District Court excluded this evidence as

being irrelevant, the evidence may have had some relevance because the

government's case included proof that Elliott billed the state for court

appearances at the Compensation Division despite the fact that minute

sheets failed to name him as being present. Elliott argues that the

evidence was admissible for a purpose envisioned by Federal Rule of

Evidence 406--i.e., to show that the Compensation Division was acting in

accordance with its usual laxness when it failed to register on the minute

sheets all attorneys in attendance for the proceedings. We are not

convinced that the proffered testimony established that the allegedly slack

practices at the Compensation Division were sufficiently numerous or

regular to rise to the level of cognizance under Rule 406 as a routine

practice. But even assuming that the laxness did constitute a routine

practice, if the District Court abused its discretion in excluding this

testimony the error amounted to, at most, only harmless error given the

weight of the government's massive case against Elliott. See United States

v. Mihm, 13 F.3d 1200, 1205 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. DeAngelo, 13

F.3d 1228, 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2717 (1994). 

 

V.

Elliott challenges the length of his sentence as calculated under the

sentencing guidelines. Mail fraud carries a base-offense level of 6,

U.S.S.G. § 2F1.1(a) (1995), which, with Elliott's criminal history category

of I, would provide a sentencing range of
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imprisonment of zero to six months. Through a series of enhancements

recommended by the presentence report (PSR), the base-offense level was

raised to 24. The enhancements Elliott received were: (1) an eight-level

increase pursuant to id. § 2F1.1(b)(1)(I) because the "amount of loss" to

the state exceeded $200,000; (2) a two-level increase pursuant to id.

§ 3C1.1 because Elliott obstructed the administration of justice by asking

his paralegal to lie and by lying on the witness stand himself; (3) a twolevel increase pursuant to id. 2F1.1(b)(2)(A) for "more than minimal

planning"; (4) a four-level increase pursuant to id. § 3B1.1(a) for his

extensive "role in the offense"; and (5) a two-level increase pursuant to

id. § 3B1.3 for his abuse of a position of public trust in his capacity as

a special assistant attorney general. As a result of these enhancements,

Elliott received a sentence of sixty months of imprisonment. Elliott

claims the District Court erred in accepting the enhancements contained in

the PSR because the court failed to make "a finding as to the allegations

in the PSR which were disputed by appellant." Appellant's Brief at 51.

"We review the factual findings a district court makes in sentencing for

clear error, and the application of the guidelines to the facts de novo."

Darden, 70 F.3d at 1544. We conclude that the District Court did not

commit any error in making its sentencing determination. 

Where the defendant objects to statements in the PSR, a district

court should neither merely accept the PSR nor require the defendant to

disprove the disputed facts. United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 404 (8th

Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 989 (1993). Instead, the

government bears the burden of proving any disputed enhancement factors.

United States v. Hammer, 3 F.3d 266, 272 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114

S. Ct. 1121 (1994). Elliott complains that the government did not satisfy

its burden with respect to the enhancements because the trial court did not

hold an evidentiary hearing before sentencing. "A formal sentencing

hearing is not, however, the exclusive means by which the government may

meet [its evidentiary burden]." United States
 As noted above, the government provided the sentencing court 7

with two independent grounds to support the obstruction of justice

enhancement. First, the government claimed that Elliott asked his

paralegal to lie. During the first trial, Brian Cox testified that

Connie O'Bryant, the paralegal, told him in Elliott's presence that

Elliott directed her to lie. Second, the government argued that

Elliott himself lied on the witness stand. The District Court

accepted both of these grounds as a basis for the enhancement. On

appeal, Elliott complains that the District Court improperly used

Cox's testimony from the first trial--which resulted in a hung

jury--to enhance his sentence. He argues that it is "wrong to rely

on testimony in an earlier trial in which the issue was certainly

disputed and the jury did not convict appellant." Reply Brief at

6. We need not and do not decide whether it was improper for the

sentencing court to rely on Cox's earlier testimony from the first

trial because the court's finding that Elliott himself lied on the

witness stand provides an independent and sufficient basis for

enhancement. 

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v. Bellrichard, 62 F.3d 1046, 1051 (8th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States

v. Fetlow, 21 F.3d 243, 250 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 456

(1994)) (alteration in Bellrichard), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1425 (1996).

In fact, a district court may base its findings on evidence presented at

trial "even though no additional exhibits or testimony are introduced at

the sentencing phase." Id. (quoting Fetlow). That is what the District

Court did in this case. For each of the enhancements that Elliott

challenges on appeal, the District Court properly based its findings on

evidence adduced at trial. See Trial Trans. (Mar. 3, 1995) at 11 (amount

of loss); id. at 18 (obstruction of justice) ; id. at 21 (more than minimal 7

planning); id. at 26 (role in the offense); id. at 28-29 (abuse of position

of trust). The District Court methodically considered the required grounds

for each enhancement and carefully based its factual findings on the

evidence. We cannot say that any of these factual findings are clearly

erroneous. 

Finally, Elliott claims that he was entitled to a downward departure

because other defendants snared in the Second Injury Fund investigation

received far lesser sentences. Elliott sought access to the sealed PSRs

of these other defendants to bolster his
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argument for a downward departure, but his request was denied by the

District Court. "A district court's failure to grant a defendant a

downward departure is not reviewable on appeal if the court was aware of

its authority to grant a departure." Darden, 70 F.3d at 1549. Elliott

claims that "there is nothing in the record to reflect the Court's

awareness of the authority to depart, because the District Court said

nothing at all with reference to a departure or authority to depart."

Reply Brief at 6. Elliott is simply wrong. The record reveals that the

court was in fact well aware of its authority to grant a departure and

opted not to do so. On at least two occasions during the sentencing

hearing, Elliott's counsel pressed the court to consider the lighter

sentences of the other Second Injury Fund defendants and to use that as a

basis for departing downward in this case. Trial Trans. (Mar. 3, 1995) 4-

7; id. at 41-42. Aware of its discretionary authority to depart downward,

the court exercised its discretion by declining to grant the requested

departure. Its decision is not reviewable. 

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the of the District Court

is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.