UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

vs.

DONNA KAY OSBORNE,

Defendant.

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Case No. 1:18-cr-72

Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Doc. 12)

This criminal case is before the Court on Defendant’s motion for reconsideration

of the Court’s sentence. (Doc. 12). 

I. BACKGROUND

On June 7, 2018, Defendant Donna Kay Osborne entered pleas of guilty to a twocount Information charging her with: false bankruptcy declaration, in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 152(3) (Count 1); and use of a false identity/synthetic identity fraud, in violation 

of 42 U.S.C. § 408(a)(7)(B) (Count 2). Her pleas were entered pursuant to an open plea 

agreement. (Doc. 2). The plea agreement contained non-binding sentencing guideline 

stipulations; however, the sentence remained in the Court’s discretion. (Id. at ¶¶ 6, 10).

Defendant’s sentencing hearing was held on October 1, 2019, at which time the 

Court calculated the applicable guideline range, which calculation was consistent with the 

parties’ stipulations. The Court ultimately determined that a sentence of 10 months 

imprisonment was appropriate, but opted to impose only half of the sentence be served in 

the custody of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”), with the remainder to be served on home 
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detention during her period of supervised release. In other words, Defendant was 

sentenced to 5 months imprisonment, followed by 1 year of supervised release with the 

first 5 months on home detention. Defendant was permitted to self-surrender upon her 

designation to a BOP facility. 

On October 4, 2019, Defendant filed the instant motion seeking reconsideration of 

her sentence. (Doc. 12). Defense counsel states in the motion that he erroneously 

informed the Court that Defendant’s son was an “emancipated adult” and that the Court

was accordingly misled in its consideration of Defendant’s son’s custodial status. (Id.) 

Following the sentencing, defense counsel learned that while Defendant’s son is over the 

age of 18, his date of emancipation does not elapse until May 23, 2020, following his 

high school graduation. (Id. at Exs. 1 & 2). Defendant is therefore entitled to continuing 

child support payments from her former spouse until May 2020. (Id. at 2). Defendant 

argues that her sentence may result in the termination of the child support payments, 

leaving her son unable to sustain himself through the remainder of the school year. (Id.)

Defendant acknowledges that “there are many other components that support the 

Court’s sentence, but to the extent that [her son’s] circumstance was an element of the 

Court’s calculous, [Defendant] respectfully moves the Court to reconsider the structure 

and/or timing of the sentence imposed.” (Id. at 3). One such option would be for the 

Court to postpone Defendant’s designation to the BOP until after May 2020. (Id.) 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

“In the sentencing context, there is simply no such thing as a ‘motion to 

reconsider’ an otherwise final sentence.” United States v. Dotz, 455 F.3d 644, 648 (6th 
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Cir. 2006).1 Specifically, “[t]he court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has 

been imposed,” except under the following limited circumstances: (1) upon motion of the 

Bureau of Prisons if “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction or if the 

inmate, having already served at least thirty-years imprisonment for an offense, has 

reached an advanced age and no longer poses a risk to society; (2) modifications pursuant 

to Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, i.e., to correct an error or to 

reflect subsequent substantial assistance; and (3) sentencing reductions for defendants

serving a term of imprisonment imposed based upon a guideline range subsequently

lowered by the United States Sentencing Commission. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c).

III. ANALYSIS

Setting aside the legal impropriety of modifying an imposed sentence, as 

Defendant acknowledges, the Court’s sentence was based on a number of factors. 

Notably, the Court did not impose a term of imprisonment or tailor the length of the 

 

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In United States v. Townsend, the Seventh Circuit explains the limited role of motions for 

reconsideration in criminal cases:

No federal rule or statute allows a motion to reconsider in a criminal case, [though]

reconsideration motions are accepted as a common-law practice. ... But Congress 

long ago abrogated this common-law practice in the sentencing context. The 

Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 explicitly prevents district courts from 

“modify[ing] a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed” except in three 

narrow situations [set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)]. ... [T]he limitation [imposed] 

in § 3582(c), preventing courts from modifying a term of imprisonment except as 

provided by Rule 35 or statute[,] ... addressed Congress’s concern that judges were 

introducing uncertainty into the sentencing process by exercising their commonlaw power to revise sentences.

762 F.3d 641, 645-47 (7th Cir. 2014) (citations omitted).
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sentence based on the belief that Defendant’s son was an “emancipated adult” or that 

child support payments were no longer owed. 

That said, at the time of sentencing, the Court was not asked to consider deferring 

self-surrender until Defendant’s son had completed high school and was fully 

independent. Having now been asked to consider the option, and based upon the 

circumstances Defendant identifies in her motion, the Court is amenable to the request. 

Moreover, the Court does not view simply deferring Defendant’s self-surrender date to be 

akin to a modification of the imposed sentence. Accordingly, the Court finds no 

prohibition to granting relief in that regard.

In short, while the Court finds no basis to reconsider the imposed sentence, the 

Court finds good cause to impose a specific surrender date that would allow Defendant to 

remain on bond through her son’s graduation and scheduled emancipation date. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Defendant’s motion for reconsideration (Doc. 12) is 

DENIED, but the Court will permit Defendant to surrender on a date specific, rather than

surrendering at the direction of the U.S. Marshals, as initially ordered. Accordingly, the 

Court imposes a surrender date of June 30, 2020, which date will be noted in the 

Judgment of Conviction.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 10/4/2019 s/ Timothy S. Black

Timothy S. Black

United States District Judge