Interim Decision #1811 

MAITRE OF WINTER 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-7917572 

Decided by Board Novnieber 13, 1967 and February 9, 1968 

Respondent's plea of guilts,to charges of larceny in Massachusetts criminal proceedings is not, without more, tantamount to an admission of the commission of 

such crime for immigration purposes where at the conclusion of the Massachusetts court proceedings in 1964 sentence was not imposed and the case was 

placed on file. Hence. respondent who departed and reentered the United States 

subsequent to such criminal proceedings, is not deportable as one excludable at 

entry because of admission of the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

CRAIKIES : 

Order : Aet of 1952--Section 241 (a ) (5) [8 V.S.C. 1251 (a) (5)7—Failure to furnish notification of change of address. 

Act of 1952—Seetion 241(a) (1) [8 U.S.C. 1251(a) (1)3—Excludable at 

entry under section 212(a) (9), as one who admits commission of crimes involving moral turpitude, to wit: 

larceny. 

ON Beams OF RESPONDENT : ON RENALF or Stamm : 

Sam Williamson, Esquire R. A. Tielhaber 

1820 Americana Building Appellate Trial Attorney 

Houston, Texas 77002 Bernabe Q. Maldonado (Brief submitted) Trial Attorney 

(Brief submitted) 

Solomon Isenstein 

Acting General Counsel 

The Service appCals from a decision of the special inquiry officer 

finding respondent not deportable on either of the charges, and terminating proceedings. 

Respondent is a 28-year-old married male alien, a native of England 

and citizen of Great Britain, who was lawfully admitted to the 'United 

States for permanent residence on December 14, 1950. His wife was 

lawfully admitted for permanent residence in 1968, and of their three 

children; two are native born 'United States citizens and one is a law638 
Interim Decision #1841 

ful permanent resident. In 1953, at the age of 19, respondent enlisted 

in the United States Air Force; he served, pursuant to this and two 

-subsequent enlistments, for a period of ten years, until his discharge 

under honorable conditions in the spring of 1963. 

We concur in the special inquiry officer's finding that respondent is 

not deportable under section 241(a) (5) as one who failed to give 

notification of his change of address, and we note that the Service 

does not appeal from this portion of the decision. We need not rule on 

the contention that the special inquiry officer erred in holding that the 

.standard of proof set out in TV ood.by and Sherman.v. Immigration and 

IV aturo2ization Service (385 U.S. 276) was applicable, because it is 

not necessary to our decision. The record establishes that there is no 

real question of deportability on this charge. Respondent's failure to 

furnish notification of his December 9, 1965 change of address on or 

before December 19, 1965 is admitted by him. His testimony that he 

forgot about it in the pressure of external events is completely believable, and sufficient to rule out willfulness and make the omission 

reasonably excusable, when taken in the context of his lawful admission 

for permanent residence 15 years earlier, and the fact that within 20 

days of the missed deadline he furni shed the new address as part of 

his regular January address report. 

The issue here is whether respondent is deportable on the second 

charge. On July 27, 1964, a two count complaint was filed against him 

in the District Court of Southern Essex, Essex County, Massachusetts, charging that on March 21 and March 28, 1964, he stole U.S. 

money of the value of less than $100, from each of two named victims. 

The record does not state under what statutory section he was charged, 

showing only "LARCENY two counts". On July 81, 1964 respondent 

appeared before the court, without counsel, and pleaded guilty to both 

counts. There was no sentence imposed and the record shows the following disposition: 

Therefore, It is considered that the case be placed on file on the payment of 40, 

costs, on the first count and on the second count the case is placed on file. 

On July 21, 1964, the Fourth District Court of Eastern Middlesex, 

Middlesex County, Massachusetts, a complaint was filed charging respondent with having, on March 14, 1964, drawn and uttered a. check 

against a named bank, knowing he had insufficient funds in the bank, 

and with intent to defraud, and having thereby received $30 cash 

which was the property of another. This offense also was not identified 

by any particular statutory section number, but was shown as "larceny by check". On July 28, 1964 respondent appeared in. court, without counsel, and pleaded guilty to the charge. On August 11, 1964, 

likewise without sentencing, the case was placed on file. 

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The procedure of placing a case "on file", employed by the courts 

of the State of Massachusetts, has been considered by the Supreme 

Court of the United States in Pisa v. Landon, 349 U.S. 901, and has 

been held not to have sufficient finality as a conviction to support an 

order of deportation within the contemplation of section 241( a) (4). 

Therefore, these two charges and their disposition did not make respondent deportable. 

Respondent left the United States, without intent to abandon his 

residence, on February 14, 1965. He was readmitted as a returning 

resident alien on December 2, 1965. The Government contends that he 

is now deportable for having been 'excludable when he reentered, in 

that at that time, by virtue of his plea of guilty on July 31, 1964 to the 

two counts of the complaint in the Essex County court, he was an alien 

who admitted having committed a crime involving moral turpitude. 

It should be noted that in these proceedings there is no showing that 

respondent has ever made an independent admission of the commission of any crime, or conceded that he was guilty of the crimes above 

referred to. Instead, he is attempting to attack the validity of his plea 

of guilty upon the ground 'that it was improperly obtained because 

he was not advised of his right to counsel. The only statement which 

can be considered in determining whether a sufficient and valid admission was made, is the plea of guilty to the two count complaint in the 

Essex County court. 

The special inquiry officer's decision that respondent is not deportable on the second charge proceeds from his own determination of the 

actual character of the offenses with which the respondent was 

charged, and the finding that they did not involve moral turpitude. 

Although the court record shows the offenses to be larceny and the 

special inquiry officer cites authority for the proposition that larceny 

involves moral turpitude, he goes on to find, from respondent's testimony at the hearing about the circumstances under which the charges 

arose, and an investigative report by a Service investigator, that the 

actual offenses were larceny by check, as defined in section 37 of Chapter 266 of the Massachusetts General Laws. 

We concur in the Service position that the special inquiry officer 

erred in so holding. Exhibit 5, according to certification by the Clerk 

of the District Court of Southern Essex, is a true copy of respondent's 

record in that court. While no statutory section is mentioned, the record shows the charged offenses to be "LARCENY two counts". The 

factual recitation in each count, that the defendant "did steal United 

States money of the value of less than $100, the property of. . is 

entirely consistent with the statutory definition of larceny contained 

in section 30 of Chapter 266. It is also sufficient under section 41 of 

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Chapter 277 of the Massachusetts General Laws, which reads as 

follows : 

Indictment of larceny. In an indictment for criminal dealing with personal 

property with intent to steal, an allegation that the defendent stole said property 

shall be sufficient; and such an indictment may be supported by proof that thedefendant committed larceny of the property, or embezzled it, or obtained it by 

false pretenses. 

Had the respondent made an independent admission of commission 

of a crime, or of the acts constituting the essential elements of a crime, 

there would be scope for ascertaining what specific acts were admitted 

and whether they constituted a crime under any section of the laws of . 

the jurisdiction where they took place. However, where the admission 

claimed consists entirely of a plea of guilty to the count or counts of 

a complaint in criminal proceedings; where there is no ambiguity or 

inconsistency in the description and denomination of the crime charged 

in the complaint; and where the record shows no evidence of an amendment or correction of the counts in the complaint, then the plea of 

guilty must be deemed to be to the specific crimes named in the complaint, and there is no justification for going outside of the record to 

determine whether, based upon information later supplied by him, respondent was or should have been charged with a different crime,. 

under a different section of the laws of the State of Massachusetts? 

The record herein establishes that respondent pleaded guilty to two 

counts of larceny, and larceny does involve moral turpitude. However,. 

under the ruling in Pino v. Landon, supra, the disposition of the case 

lacks sufficient finality to be deemed a "conviction", and respondent 

was not thereby rendered excludable under section 212(a) (9) as one 

convicted of a crime involling moral turpitude. 

The Government states: 

That a judicial plea of guilty is tantamount to an admission within the immigration laws appears to be settled beyond dispute. Matter of A —, 1. I. & N. Dec. 

671; Matter of V—S—, 2 I. & N. Dec. 703. 

A more accurate statement is contained in Matter of G—, 1 L & 

Dec. 96, wherein we held: 

1 We do not agree with the special inquiry officer that the crime of larceny by 

check, as defined in section 37, Chapter 266 of the Massachusetts General Laws, 

does not involve moral turpitude (see Matter of Vosganian, bit. Dec. No. 1676), 

nor do we consider the cases cited by him to be authority for his conclusion. The 

Massachusetts statute makes intent to defraud an essential element of the crime, 

as distinguished from the statutes considered in the cited eases, and the cited 

decisions specifically state that where intent to defraud is a necessary element, 

then moral turpitude inheres. Further discussion of this point is not warranted,. 

however, because It is not necessary •to the making of our decision herein. 

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If the final outcome of a criminal prosecution was a conviction, we think it well 

settled that a plea of guilty is evidence of the admission of the commission of 

the crime. * * * (Emphasis supplied.) 

In later decisions, it has been spelled out that such a conviction must 

be equal in force and finality to a conviction necessary to sustain a 

finding of deportability or excludability based on conviction of crime. 

In cases where there has been a plea, of guilty in criminal proceedings, 

followed by a conviction, even followed by an independent admission 

of commission of the crime during deportation proceedings, it has been 

found that there was an insufficient admission for excludability purposes where the conviction was followed by a pardon or expungement 

(Mattes. of E—V--, 5 I. & N. Dec. 194), or by a timely judicial recommendation against deportation (Rasmussen v. Robinson, 163 F. 2d 

732). We are aware of no case in which a plea of guilty made in criminal proceedings, which resulted in something less than a conviction, 

or in a conviction with a recommendation against deportation or a 

subsequent pardon or expungement, was found a sufficient admission, 

without more, to sustain a finding of deportability. 

As we pointed out in Matter of G—, supra, the plea to an indictment or complaint is so much an integral part of the entire criminal 

proceeding that it cannot be isolated from the final result of that pro-

-ceeding, and given more force or finality than that result. Under the 

interpretation urged by the Service, the mechanics of the criminal 

proceeding would overshadow the outcome; an alien found guilty 

-after trial, whose case is placed on file, is not excludable, whereas the 

alien found guilty on his plea whose case is placed on file, would be 

excludable. We are not persuaded that it was ever intended the "admission" provisions of section 212(a) (9) should have such a. result. 

-Where, as here, an alien has been the subject of court proceedings on 

-criminal charges and the ultimate disposition of those charges by the 

court, falls short of a conviction, or nullifies that conviction for deportation or exclusion purposes by a recommendation against deportation 

(or the same result is reached thereafter by a pardon), the "admission" 

provisions cannot be called into play to give the intermediate step of 

pleading a stronger effect than the ultimate disposition could have 

under the immigration laws. We find, therefore, that on the facts 

herein respondent is not deportable on the second charge in the order 

to show cause. 

For the reasons set forth herein, the disposition of this case below 

was the proper one, and the appeal will be dismissed. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the appeal. herein be and the same is 

hereby dismissed. 

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BEFORE THE BOARD 

On April 14, 1967, after several hearings, the special inquiry officer 

rendered a decision finding respondent not to be deportable on either 

of the charges in the order to show cause, and terminating proceedings. 

The Service appealed, requesting oral argument; respondent's counsel 

being unable to appear, the Government presented its argument unopposed on July 13, 1967. On November 13, 1967, for reasons set forth 

fully in its opinion, the Board dismissed the appeal and affirmed the 

finding that respondent was not deportable as charged. The Service 

now asks that the Board reconsider and reverse its decision, that it 

find respondent deportable on the second charge, and remand the proceedings for action by the special inquiry officer on applications for 

discretionary relief heretofore filed by respondent. 

The following is a summary of the relevant facts, which have been 

fully set out in the prior decisions: 

On July 31, 1904, in the District Court of Southern Raw; Essex 

County, Massachusetts, respondent, without counsel, pleaded guilty to 

both counts of a two-count complaint charging that he had committed 

larceny on March 21 and March 28, 1964. There was no sentence imposed, and the court disposed of the proceedings thus 

Therefore, it is considered that the case be placed on file on the payment of 

$10, costs, on the first count and on the second count the case is placed on file' 

Under the holding of the United States Supreme Court, in Pao v. 

Landon, '349 U.S. 901, such a disposition has been held not to have 

sufficient finality as a conviction to support an order of deportation 

under section 241(a) (4). Respondent therefore was not rendered 

deportable by the criminal proceedings. He left the United States in 

1965, remained away for about ten months, and was admitted as a 

returning resident alien on December 2, 1965. Inasmuch as the respondent had no "convictions" for crime, he could not be charged with 

having been deportable as excludable on that entry as one previously 

convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Government 

turned to the pleas of guilty in the court proceedings and charged 

that on the basis thereof, respondent was deportable as one who was 

excludable under section 212(a) (9), having admitted commission of 

crimes involving moral turpitude. 

=On July 21, 1964, respondent, also without .counsel, pleaded guilty in the 

Fourth District Court of Eastern Middlesex, Middlesex County, Massachusetts 

to a charge of larceny by cheek on 2,14reh 14, 1084, and that case was also dicrposed of by being placed on file. It is not considered here since it was not urged 

as a ground of excludability or deportability in the order to show >cause, and 

further, baying had the.same disposition as the offenses under consideration, 

it would be controlled by our decision as to the effect of those charges and their 

disposition. 

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In sum, it was the Board's position that if the final outcome of a 

'criminal prosecution was a conviction, then a plea of guilty was 

'evidence of the admission of the commission of the crime; but, where 

the alien had been the subject of court proceedings on criminal charges, 

'and the ultimate disposition of those charges by the court fell short 

'of a conviction, or nullified that conviction for deportation or exclusion purposes by a recommendation against deportation (or the same 

-result was thereafter reached by a pardon, or later expungement or 

'dismissal), the "admission" provisions could not be called into play 

'to give the intermediate step of pleading a stronger effect than the 

ultimate disposition could have under the immigration laws. We are 

-aware of no case in which a guilty plea, followed by something less 

'than a conviction, or in a conviction with a recommendation against 

-deportation or a subsequent pardon or expungement, has been found a 

•sufficient admission, without more, to sustain a finding of deporta,bility. 

The Government, in its motion, urges that we have overlooked or 

misread the import of Man0m v. .Haff, 78 F.ad 833, from which the 

fallowing statement is often separated and quoted: 

We think it clear that a plea of guilty is a confession of guilt within the meaning of the immigration laws. It is an admission under the most solemn einem.. 

stances, a judicial confession. 

In Illwinen v. Hoff, the court had before it a case in which there had 

been a plea of guilty, a conviction that was in every respect final, 

which was never expunged, wiped out by pardon or weakened by a 

-recommendation against deportation, and after which the aliens served 

six years in the penitentiary. They were each thereafter charged with 

-being deportable as one who "had been convicted of or admits the 

commission of a felony or crime or misdemeanor involving moral 

'turpitude, to wit, grand larceny, prior to his entry in August, 1926." 

'They denied that they had admitted commission of a crime, and it 

was in answer thereto that the above statement was made. However, 

taken in the context of what follows, we find it far from clear that this 

-was the controlling or decisive factor in this decision. For the court 

went on to hold: 

Furthermore, as they were convicted of an offense committed before their last 

entry, they were subject to deportation for that reason. U.S. es rel. Karpav v. 

Uhl (GOA.)• 70 F.2d 792, and U.S. ex rel. Rosen v. Williams (GOA) 200 F. 538, 

541; U.S. em rd. 'Volpe v. Smith, 289 U.S. 422, 53 S.Ot. 635, 77 L.Bd. 1298. Also, 

As appellee [the Government] says, "they would have been deportable (8 1:1.S.C.A. 

§ 155), If they had never left the United States, as aliens 'sentenced to imprisonment for a term of one year or more because of conviction in this country of a 

•crime involving moral turpitude, committed within live years after the entry? 

We conclude that the Secretary of Labor was right in ordering the petitioners 

deported. 

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The second argument advanced by the Service is that we may not 

disregard the "convictions" here, because they have in no way been 

set aside, expunged, dismissed, or shown to be inconsistent with the 

guilty pleas. However, this overlooks the important fact that there 

have never been "convictions" in this case. 

The motion does not set forth sufficient basis for a change in the 

Board's decision, and will be denied. 

ORDER: It is ordered that the motion be and the same is hereby 

denied. 

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