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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

JOSEPH FRICKE, 

Petitioner, : Case No. 3:18-cv-198 

- vs - District Judge Walter H. Rice 

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz 

TIMOTHY BUCHANAN, Warden, 

 Noble Correctional Institution 

 : 

 Respondent. 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

 This is a habeas corpus action under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, brought pro se by Petitioner Joseph 

Fricke. Petitioner seeks relief from his conviction in Case No. 2011-CR-3041 in the Montgomery 

County Common Pleas Court. The case is before this Court for initial review pursuant to Rule 4 

of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings,1 which provides in pertinent part: “[i]f it plainly 

appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the 

district court, the judge must dismiss the petition and direct the clerk to notify the petitioner.” 

Procedural History 

The docket of the Common Pleas Court shows Petitioner was indicted February 17, 2012, 

on one count of rape in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(1)(a), one count of rape in 

 

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 Although Petitioner originally filed the case in the Eastern Division of this Court, it was transferred to the Western 

Division at Dayton because the conviction occurred in one of the Ohio counties served by this location of court. 
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violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2907.02(A)(1)(c), one count of contaminating a substance for 

human consumption in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2927.24(B), and one count of possession 

of criminal tools in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2923.24(A). He was convicted on all counts 

by a jury on February 19, 2014. The trial court merged all of the convictions under Ohio Revised 

Code § 2941.25 and sentenced Petitioner accordingly. 

 Petitioner appealed raising five assignments of error: 

1). Appellant's motion to suppress was improperly overruled 

because his statements were obtained during a custodial 

interrogaton [sic] without being afforded Miranda warnings. 

2) Appellant's motion to suppress was improperly overruled 

because the affidavit for the search warrant lacked probable 

cause. 

3) Appellant's convictions were based upon insufficient evidence 

presented at trial. 

4) Appellant's convictions were against the manifest weight of the 

evidence. 

5) The trial court abused its discretion by overruling Appellant's 

motion for a new trial. 

(Petition, ECF No. 4, PageID 48-49.) The State of Ohio cross-appealed, claiming the rape and 

contaminating a substance for human consumption convictions should not have been merged under 

Ohio Revised Code § 2941.25. 

 The Second District Court of Appeals overruled all of Fricke’s assignments of error, but 

upheld that raised by the State and remanded for re-sentencing. State v. Fricke, Case No. 26126, 

2016-Ohio-2747, 64 N.E.3d 300 (Apr. 29, 2016). He was thereafter conveyed to the Montgomery 

County Common Pleas Court and re-sentenced on May 26, 2016. According to the docket of the 

Montgomery County Clerk of Courts, no appeal was ever taken from that termination entry. Thus 

the conviction became final thirty days later when the time for appeal expired. On March 5, 2018, 
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Fricke filed a motion for delayed direct appeal in the Ohio Supreme Court in its Case No. 2018-

0333. The court denied the motion on April 25, 2018, by its usual form entry (copy at ECF No. 4, 

PageID 59). Petitioner signed the present habeas Petition on May 30, 2018 (ECF No. 4, PageID 

58) and presumably deposited it with the prison authorities on that date, which therefore is deemed 

to be the date of filing. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988); Cook v. Stegall, 295 F.3d 517, 521 

(6th Cir. 2002); Towns v. United States, 190 F.3d 468 (6th Cir. 1999). 

Analysis 

 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) provides: 

(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a 

writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the 

judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the 

latest of — 

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the 

conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for 

seeking such review; 

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an 

application created by State action in violation of the 

Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the 

applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; 

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was 

initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has 

been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made 

retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or 

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or 

claims presented could have been discovered through the 

exercise of due diligence. 

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State postconviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent 
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judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period 

of limitation under this subsection. 

 As noted above, Fricke’s conviction became final June 25, 2016, thirty days after he was 

re-sentenced. The statute of limitations began to run on that date and expired almost a year ago 

on June 26, 2017. Therefore the Petition is barred by the statute of limitations unless Fricke can 

excuse his delay. 

 Fricke claims that he did not learn of the April 29, 2016, decision of the Second District 

until January 5, 2018, when his mother “decided to put her son first instead of drugs” and called 

the Clerk of Courts to retrieve a copy of the April 29, 2016, decision. He asserts his lawyer did 

not tell him about the decision and the Second District’s decision does not require a copy to be 

served on him personally. 

 Petitioner’s factual claims are not credible to this Court. He certainly knew in May 2016 

that he was being re-sentenced in Common Pleas Court. In the exercise of due diligence, he should 

have asked his attorney what he was doing back in front of the trial court when the case had been 

appealed. He does not claim he instructed his trial attorney to appeal from the re-sentencing. Nor 

do his mother’s drug problems, whatever they may be, excuse his lack of diligence. 

Conclusion 

 Because the Petition was filed almost a year after the statute of limitations expired, it should 

be dismissed with prejudice as barred by the statute of limitations. Because reasonable jurists 

would not disagree with this conclusion, Petitioner should be denied a certificate of appealability 

and the Court should certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous 
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and therefore should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. 

June 7, 2018. 

 s/ Michael R. Merz

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report 

and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period is extended to seventeen days 

because this Report is being served by mail. .Such objections shall specify the portions of the 

Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. 

If the Report and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record 

at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or 

such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless 

the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party=s objections 

within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in 

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 

947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-55 (1985).