J-S25030-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ROBERT JAMES STOUGHTON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 26 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Clarion County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-16-CR-0000437-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED: SEPTEMBER 21, 2022

Appellant, Robert James Stoughton, appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered on December 10, 2021, after the trial court convicted him

of, inter alia, Driving Under the Influence (“DUI”) and DUI—Highest Rate.1

After review, we affirm. 

On September 2, 2020, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with the 

above offenses for driving an all-terrain vehicle (“ATV”) on a highway while 

intoxicated. On March 4, 2021, Appellant filed a pretrial motion to quash the

DUI charges. As discussed in greater detail below, Appellant argued that the 

“general/specific rule” of statutory construction required that the 

Commonwealth charge Appellant with Unsafe Operation of an ATV under 75 

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1 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3802(a)(1) and (c), respectively.
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Pa.C.S. § 7726 and barred it from charging him with DUI under 75 Pa.C.S. § 

3802.

On April 19, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on Appellant’s motion 

to quash. On April 27, 2021, the court denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant’s 

case proceeded to a non-jury trial where, on September 29, 2021, the court 

found Appellant guilty of the above offenses.2 On December 10, 2021, the 

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 72 hours to 6 months’ 

incarceration. Appellant timely filed a Notice of Appeal and both he and the 

trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. 

Appellant presents a single issue for our review:

Whether the trial court committed reversible error by denying 

[Appellant’s] Motion to Quash the information?

Appellant’s Br. at 2 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

“A motion to quash a criminal information or indictment is addressed 

within the sound discretion of the trial judge.” Commonwealth v. Kane, 188 

A.3d 1217, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). We will reverse only 

where the trial court has committed a clear abuse of discretion. 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 860 A.2d 132, 135 (Pa. Super. 2004). “[T]he 

court abuses its discretion if, in resolving the issue for decision, it misapplies 

the law or rules in a manner lacking reason.” Id. (citation omitted). 

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2 The court also convicted Appellant of several summary offenses that do not 

impact our analysis. Additionally, the court found that Appellant’s DUI 

convictions merged for sentencing. 
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Appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to 

quash based on the “general/specific rule” of statutory construction. 

Appellant’s Br. at 9-11. The rule requires that “[w]henever a general provision 

in a statute shall be in [irreconcilable] conflict with a special provision in the 

same or another statute . . . the special provisions shall prevail and shall be 

construed as an exception to the general provision[.]” Id. at 10-11 (citing 1 

Pa.C.S. § 1933).

3 Under this rule, Appellant argues that the Commonwealth 

was required to charge him solely with violating the “more specific” offense of 

Unsafe Operation of an ATV, not the “more general” offense of DUI. Id.

The trial court found that Appellant’s issue lacked merit. Trial Ct. Op., 

4/27/21, at 4-5 (unpaginated). It reasoned that no conflict exists between 

Sections 7726 and 3802 and, therefore, the “general/specific rule” did not 

apply. Id.

While we agree with the trial court’s decision to deny Appellant’s motion, 

we have identified an even more basic error with Appellant’s argument: “the 

‘general/specific rule’ of statutory construction in the context of criminal 

prosecutions has been abrogated.” Commonwealth v. Kriegler, 127 A.3d 

840, 844 (Pa. Super. 2015). In 2002, the legislature enacted 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9303, which specifically provides: 

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3 As recognized by our Supreme Court, “[b]y its terms, Section 1933 does not 

speak to the propriety of government pursuing prosecutions[.] That 

consequence of the provision [arose] solely from the case law.” 

Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 538 (Pa. 2005). 
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Notwithstanding the provisions of 1 Pa.C.S. § 1933 (relating to 

particular controls general) or any other statute to the contrary, 

where the same conduct of a defendant violates more than one 

criminal statute, the defendant may be prosecuted under all 

available statutory criminal provisions without regard to the 

generality or specificity of the statutes.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9303. Therefore, Appellant’s reliance on the “general/specific 

rule” is erroneous, and the trial court properly exercised its discretion in 

denying Appellant’s motion to quash.

Judgment of Sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/21/2022