AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF COMPLAINT 

I, Bradley D. Hull, being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows: 

INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND 

1. I am a Special Agent with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and have held this 

position for 7 years. I am currently assigned to one of Cincinnati Field Office's Counterintelligence squads. During my employment with the FBI, I have conducted and participated in 

several investigations involving violations of United States laws relating to espionage and the 

unlawful export from the United States of goods and technology restricted for national security 

and foreign policy reasons. I have participated in the execution of several federal search and 

arrest warrants in such investigations. I have had training in, and through experience I have 

observed, many methods used to smuggle goods and technology out of the United States and 

commit espionage contrary to United States law. I am responsible for investigating violations of 

law related to economic espionage and the theft of trade secrets (18 U.S.C. §§ 1831-1832) and 

export controls (Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. §2778 ("AECA") and the International 

Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C. §§1701-1707 ("IEEPA")). 

2. This affidavit is intended to show only that there is sufficient probable cause for 

the requested complaint and does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter. Where the 

contents of documents and the actions, statements, and conversations of others are reported 

herein, they are reported in substance and in part, except where otherwise indicated. 

3. I am familiar with the facts and circumstances set forth below from my personal 

participation in the investigation, including my review of pertinent documents, and from my 

conversations with others, including other Special Agents with the FBI, and representatives of a 

particular U.S. company ("Victim Company A") with expertise regarding the relevant design, 

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testing, manufacturing data and information related to aviation technology ("Proprietary 

Information"). Based on my training and experience and the facts as set forth in this affidavit, 

there is probable cause to believe that XU YANJUN (a/k/a "QU HUI") has attempted and 

conspired to obtain trade secrets in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(4) and (a)(5) (Economic 

Espionage) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 1832(a)(4) and (a)(5) (Theft of Trade Secrets) in the Southern 

District of Ohio and elsewhere. 

THE DEFENDANT 

4. XU YANJUN ("XU") is a Deputy Division Director, Sixth Bureau of Jiangsu 

Province, Ministry of State Security, for the People's Republic of China ("MSS"). MSS is the 

intelligence and security agency for China, and is responsible for counter-intelligence, foreign 

intelligence, and political security. MSS has broad powers in China to conduct espionage both 

domestically and abroad. 

5. One ofXU's job duties on behalf ofMSS is to obtain technical information, 

including trade secrets, from aviation and aerospace companies in the United States and 

throughout Europe. XU sometimes uses the aliases "Qu Hui" and "Zhang Hui" in connection 

with his duties. He has been known to attempt to conceal the true nature of his employment, by 

representing that he is associated with Jiangsu Science & Technology Promotion Association 

(" JAST"). 

6. Beginning in at least December 2013 and continuing through the present, XU has 

worked, traveled, and communicated with individuals associated with or employed by MSS and 

various Chinese universities and institutions. Xu has also actively targeted specific companies in 

the United States and abroad that are recognized as leaders in the field of aviation and aerospace 

technology, design, and manufacturing ("aviation companies"). Within these aviation 

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companies, XU and other individuals, some of whom are known to law enforcement, would 

identify people whom they deemed potential "experts" who worked for these aviation 

companies, and who could be targeted and recruited to travel to China, initially under the guise 

or false belief that they were traveling to China merely for "an exchange" of ideas and/or to give 

a presentation at a university. XU, and others, would pay the "experts" stipends and would 

arrange for and pay expenses associated with their travel to China. To achieve their objective, 

which was to obtain specific aviation technology documents and information, XU and others 

exchanged messages regarding the types of information that they wanted to obtain, and actively 

discussed methods for obtaining the desired information. Furthermore, communications between 

XU and others who worked for MSS and other institutions in China reveal the methods used in 

order to obtain highly sensitive information from employees of the various aviation companies. 

As mentioned above, and as demonstrated in some of the communications detailed below, XU 

used an alias in his efforts to recruit "experts" and falsely represented his employment, all in an 

effort to conceal his true identity as an officer of MSS. Furthermore, XU and others 

communicated about the best way to protect and conceal the true nature of the information they 

were seeking from aviation companies and their employees, including the use of codes and series 

of letters in place of the technology being discussed and the name of the victim company 

targeted. 

7. XU often communicates, travels, and exchanges information related to aviation 

technology with individuals at the Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronomies 

("NUAA"), a public university located in Nanjing, China. NUAA is operated by the People's 

Republic of China's Ministry oflndustry and Information Technology. NUAA is regarded as 

one of the top engineering universities in China and has significant influence over China's 

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aerospace industry. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology of the Chinese 

government plays a significant role in regulating major industries and approving new industrial 

investments and projects in key areas including information technology, telecommunications, 

and national defense. NUAA is a regular collaborator with Commercial Aircraft Corporation of 

China ("CO MAC") and Aviation Industries of China ("A VIC"), hosting academic and 

commercial seminars and symposium and sponsoring researched published by academics from 

NUAA. 

THE VICTIM COMPANIES AND THE PROPRIETARY INFORMATION 

8. Victim Company A has offices in the Southern District of Ohio. Victim 

Company A is among the world's top aircraft engine suppliers for both commercial and military 

aircraft. Victim Company A has devoted substantial resources to research and development in 

the field of using unique materials to manufacture jet engine fan blades and fan containment 

structures. Worldwide, Victim Company A's exclusive use of certain types of materials, which 

provide greater engine durability, weight reduction and lower costs, provides Victim Company A 

with a significant competitive advantage over its competitors. Victim Company A has spent 

several decades developing its unique jet engines, engaging in costly trial and error testing in 

order to advance the use of its products. This testing, research, and development have led to a 

deep knowledge base that affords Victim Company A a powerful competitive advantage. 

Release of some or all of this information to a competitor or any other entity attempting to 

conduct its own research and development in this field would provide a tremendous economic 

value, because it would enable the other entity to short-circuit its research and development 

efforts and expend significantly fewer resources. 

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9. Victim Company A employs several layers of security to preserve and maintain 

confidentiality and to prevent unauthorized use or disclosure of its trade secrets. These steps 

were enforced to maintain its competitive advantage and to maintain the integrity of years of 

research and development pertaining to Victim Company A's use of unique materials to 

manufacture jet engine fan blades and fan containment structures. 

10. Some of the external physical security measures are: 

a. Limiting physical access to restricted portions of Victim Company A's campus; 

including through the use of manned, gated entrances and requiring identification 

and access badges; and 

b. Mandating visitor sign-in and escorts. 

11. Some of the internal security measures are: 

a. Requiring employee non-disclosure and other confidentiality agreements that 

extend beyond the length of employment at Victim Company A; 

b. Recurrent training and instruction for employees regarding the processes in place 

to safeguard restricted and confidential business information; 

c. Notifying all employees that publication and/or disclosure of restricted or 

confidential company information is prohibited without express company 

authorization; 

d. Various data security policies; and 

e. Limited access to company proprietary information to employees or contractors 

on a need-to-know basis. 

12. Victim Company B, headquartered in the United States, is one of the world's 

largest aerospace companies, and a leading manufacturer of commercial jetliners and defense, 

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space and security systems. Victim Company B provides services, including advanced 

information and communication systems, and products to both commercial and military aircraft. 

13. Victim Company C is a multinational company. Victim Company C produces a 

variety of commercial products and engineering services. In fact, Victim Company C supplies 

engines, wheels, brakes, and other aircraft parts to both civilian and military aircraft. 

Additionally, Victim Company C is a leading U.S. Company in the field of unmanned aerial 

vehicle ("UAV") technology. 

PROBABLE CAUSE 

14. Beginning in at least March 2017, an individual identified as a Deputy Director at 

NUAA ("Co-Conspirator 1 ")began corresponding via email with an individual ("Employee l " ) 

employed by Victim Company A. Employee 1 has been employed by Victim Company A as an 

engineer since 2012. With the assistance of XU, Co-Conspirator l solicited Employee l to come 

to NUAA for an "exchange" based on Employee l's engineering experience at Victim Company 

A. NUAA offered to pay for Employee 1 's travel expenses. 

15. On May 10, 2017, Co-Conspirator 1 emailed Employee 1 that the "Institute of 

Energy and Power" had proposed that Employee l give a report on Victim Company A's 

signature materials design and manufacturing technology. Co-conspirator 1 wanted Employee 1 

to focus on highly-technical topics, including the latest developments in the application of 

Victim Company A's signature material used in aeroengines, as well as engine structure design 

analysis technology and manufacturing technology development. 

16. On May 15, 2017, in preparation for the trip, XU sent a message to Employee l 

from one of XU's email accounts, but signed the email using the name of Co-Conspirator 1. On 

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May 25, 2017, Employee 1 traveled to China. Employee 1 gave a presentation at NUAA on June 

2, 2017. 

17. Following Employee l 's presentation at NUAA, Employee 1 sent messages to 

Co-Conspirator 1, asking that NUAA delete any and all copies of the presentation from the 

university computers. The presentation included details regarding engines that were designed 

and produced by Victim Company A. One of the slides contained the logo of Victim Company 

A. Employee 1 then emailed a second, edited version of the presentation back to NUAA. The 

second version deleted the final page of the presentation, as well as content and images from 

other slides. 

18. NUAA reimbursed Employee 1 for expenses incurred during his visit to Nanjing 

(e.g., meals and hotel expenses). Employee 1 was also paid $3,500 in U.S. currency for the 

presentation. 

19. While in China, Co-Conspirator 1 introduced Employee 1 to XU. During this 

meeting, XU introduced himself using his alias, Qu Hui, and claimed to be from the Jiangsu 

Science & Technology Promotion Association in China. Employee 1 had meals with XU both 

before and after the NUAA presentation. Employee 1 understood from their conversations that 

the money paid to Employee 1 came from JAST. XU gave a business card to Employee 1 that 

contains the name Qu Hui and contact information associated with JAST, which, as explained 

below, are an alias and cover affiliation for XU. 

20. Employee 1 continued to communicate with XU following the trip to China. In 

fact, XU invited Employee 1 to return to NUAA the following year. 

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21. On November 21 , 2017, Co-Conspirator 1 expressed an interest in having 

Employee 1 "come to exchange and instruct again in NUAA." 1 Co-Conspirator 1 informed 

Employee 1 that he had spoken with Qu Hui (XU) from JAST, and that Qu Hui would be able to 

help with travel expenses and handle the details of the "exchange." 

22. On January 23, 2018, XU, using his alias, sent a message to Employee 1 and 

informed him that "domestically, there is more focused on the system code." XU later 

elaborated that the information he wanted pertained to "system specification, design process." 

This term is understood to refer to system code integration -- the application of research data to 

engine production. XU provided an email address for Employee 1 to use to send the requested 

information. Employee 1 informed XU that the email may be blocked if he used his company 

computer. XU responded, "It might be inappropriate to send directly from the company, right?" 

23. In response to the " system integration" reference, on February 3, 2018, Employee 

I emailed an excerpt of a presentation from Victim Company A and asked XU if it included the 

type of information he needed. The attachment was a two-page document from Victim 

Company A. The first page contained the Victim Company A logo, as well as a Proprietary 

Label and Warning from Victim Company A. This Warning reads as follows: 

Victim Company A Proprietary Information - The information contained 

in this document is Victim Company A information and is disclosed in 

confidence. It is the property of Victim Company A and shall not be used, 

disclosed to others or reproduced without the express written consent of 

Company A, including, but without limitation, it is not to be used in the 

creation, manufacture, development, or derivation of any repairs, 

modifications, spare parts, designs, or configuration changes or to obtain 

FAA or any other government or regulatory approval to do so. If consent 

is given for reproduction in whole or in part, this notice and the notice set 

1 Communications in quotation marks are in substance and in part translations from communications that were not 

originally in English. These translations are subject to revision at a later time. 

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forth on each page of this document shall appear in any such reproduction 

in whole or in part. The information contained in this document may also 

be controlled by the U.S. export control laws. Unauthorized export or reexport is prohibited." 

24. XU also sent Employee 1 a list of technical topics that XU's organization was 

interested in. XU wrote, the "attached file is some domestic requirements that I know of, can 

you take a look and let me know if you are familiar with those?" The attached list stated the 

following: 

Regarding the current development situation and future development direction of 

foreign countries' structural materials for fan rotor blades made from composite 

materials: 

[A question followed.} 

Regarding the design criteria for the foreign countries' composite material rotor 

fan blade, stator fan blade, and fan casing: 

[A list of questions followed.] 

25. The questions pertain to composite materials in the manufacture of fan blades and 

fan blade encasements. Victim Company A is the only company in the world that has been 

producing fan blades and encasements constructed of composite materials. Based upon 

information provided to me by technical experts at Victim Company A, these questions pertain 

directly to aspects of Victim Company A's fan blade and containment system, the materials 

involved, and Victim Company A's testing and design systems. For example, according to 

technical experts at Victim Company A, XU's questions regarding the "baseline value" and 

"allowed values" seek proprietary and trade secret information. 

26. Employee 1 directly advised XU that some of the posed questions involved 

Victim Company A's commercial secrets. XU replied they would discuss it when they met in 

person. 

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27. In February 2018, XU also began discussing with Employee I the possibility of 

meeting in Europe during one of Employee I 's business trips. 

28. XU asked Employee I to send a copy of the file directory for his company-issued 

computer. XU sent specific directions for how Employee 1 should sort and save such a 

directory. Following the steps in these directions led to the creation of a document that was 

essentially a menu of files on the Employee l 's Victim Company A-issued computer. Employee 

1 provided a purported file directory to XU. This file directory had been heavily edited to 

remove all sensitive information and was sent with the approval of Victim Company A. 

29. On February 28, 2018, at XU's insistence, XU and Employee 1 spoke on the 

phone. During the phone call, XU referred to the file directory list Employee 1 sent. XU told 

Employee 1 that "they" had looked at it and it is "pretty good stuff." XU asked if Employee 1 

would be able to bring it with him when he traveled to Europe for their meeting. XU further 

stated, "the computer you will bring along is the company computer, right?" XU also asked if the 

material Employee 1 intended to bring could be exported out of the computer. Employee 1 

informed XU that it could be exported onto a portable hard drive. XU said, "Good, good, good." 

XU asked, "So, if possible, we will look over the stuff. Can we do that?" Employee 1 agreed to 

XU's request and XU stated, "Do you understand? Carry the stuff along." 

30. Later in this conversation, XU told Employee 1 that what he was sent so far was 

"good enough." XU continued: "If we need something new later, we can ... talk about that in 

person when we meet. . . What do you think? . . . All right, we really, we really don't need to 

rush to do everything in one time, because, if we are going to do business together, this won't be 

the last time, right?" 

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31. On March 5, 2018, XU sent Employee I a message asking, "Regarding the 

document directory you sent last time, is it possible to dump it to a portable hard drive or USB 

drive from work computer in advance?" 

32. In preparation for the trip to Europe, Employee 1 asked XU where and when he 

was arriving. XU responded that he would be traveling to Greece before meeting up later with 

Employee 1 in another country.2 

ADDITIONAL SCHEMES BY XU TO OBTAIN 

INFORMATION FROM U.S. AVIATION COMPANIES 

33. Between December of2013 and December of2014, XU communicated with an 

individual, believed to be associated with a university in China, regarding attempts to acquire 

sensitive information, including analytical tools, design manuals, and software, rightfully 

belonging to Victim Company B. In these chats, XU discussed plans to travel with another 

individual to conduct an "exchange" with a "customer." In late December of 2013, XU and 

others, believed to be employed by institutions in China, discussed travel arrangements and the 

types of information that XU's contact in China was the most interested in obtaining. This 

information appears to be Victim Company B's design manual that relates to structural analysis 

methods. In these exchanges, XU reminded his contact that "[t]he customer doesn't know our 

identities. I approached him with the identity of QU Hui, the Deputy Secretary-General of 

Science and Technology Association." XU's associate in China responded, "I will make sure 

everybody here knows you are from Nanjing Science and Technology Association." 

2 Employee I has reviewed pictures of XU that were obtained by the FBI. Although Employee I did not identify an 

earlier, younger picture of XU, he did identify XU from a more recent picture. 

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34. In April 2014, XU communicated with two different individuals believed to be in 

China. In these messages, XU stated that he was bringing materials related to electric landing 

gear, deicing, flight control, and electric jet braking. It also appears that some of this material 

related to a specific type of fueling equipment and/or wing design that pertains to a specific type 

of military aerial refueling aircraft designed by Victim Company B. XU's articulated plan was 

to find people in China to read the information, and then review the proposed seminar the 

recruited "expert" was supposed to give. XU mentioned the possibility of obtaining additional 

information or "projects" which would include a type of design specification for certain unique 

technologies, system requirements, and system evaluation, unique to Victim Company B. Once 

again, XU reminded his contacts of the need to keep his true identity hidden, and stated that he 

had approached the "expert" using "the name under Jiangsu Science and Technology 

Association." 

35. Various documents obtained in the course of this investigation indicate that XU 

has contact information pertaining to two individuals believed to be current employees of Victim 

CompanyB. 

36. In November 2014, XU sent a document to an individual believed to be associated 

with a Chinese company that engages in the research, development, production, and sale of 

exhaust turbochargers, engine valves, cooling fans, and other engine parts. The document 

pertains to a specific technology related to diesel engine variable nozzle turbocharging 

technology. In communications with the individual, XU explained specific codes contained in 

the document. For instance, "xxx" meant Ministry of State Security, while "yyy" stood for 

diesel engine VNT turbocharging technology. There was also a specific code found in this 

document that referred to Victim Company C. 

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37. In September 2015, XU received emails from an individual employed as an 

engineer at Victim Company C. This email included an outline of a proposed white paper 

discussing unmanned aerial vehicle technology. The employee of Victim Company C 

subsequently sent his resume to XU, who forwarded it to NUAA. 

LEGAL BACKGROUND 

Economic Espionage: 18 U.S.C. § 1831 

38. Section 1831 punishes economic espionage for the benefit of any foreign 

government, foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent: 

(a) Whoever, intending or knowing that the offense will benefit any foreign government, 

foreign instrumentality, or foreign agent, knowingly --

( 1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or 

conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains a trade secret; 

(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, photographs, 

downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, transmits, 

delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys a trade secret; 

(3) receives, buys, or possesses a trade secret, knowing the same to have been 

stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without authorization; 

(4) attempts to commit any offense described in any of paragraphs (1) - (3); or 

(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense described 

in any of paragraphs (1) through (3 ), and one or more of such persons do any 

act to effect the object of the conspiracy. 

Shall, except as provided in subsection (b ), be fined not more than $5,000,000 or 

imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both. 

18 u.s.c. § 1831. 

39. The term "foreign instrumentality" means "any agency, bureau, ministry, 

component, institution, association, or any legal, commercial, or business organization, 

corporation, firm, or entity that is substantially owned, controlled, sponsored, commanded, 

managed, or dominated by a foreign government." 

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40. The term "foreign agent" means "any officer, employee, proxy, servant, delegate, 

or representative of a foreign government." 

TheftofTrade Secrets: 18 U.S.C. §1832 

41. Section 1832 punishes the commercial theft of trade secrets carried out for 

economic advantage, whether or not it benefits a foreign government, instrumentality or agent: 

(a) Whoever, with intent to convert a trade secret, that is related to a product or 

service used in or intended for use in interstate or foreign commerce, to the 

economic benefit of anyone other than the owner thereof, and intending or 

knowing that the offense will, injure any owner of that trade secret, knowingly-

(1) steals, or without authorization appropriates, takes, carries away, or 

conceals, or by fraud, artifice, or deception obtains such information; 

(2) without authorization copies, duplicates, sketches, draws, 

photographs, downloads, uploads, alters, destroys, photocopies, replicates, 

transmits, delivers, sends, mails, communicates, or conveys such 

information; 

(3) receives, buys, or possesses such information, knowing the same to 

have been stolen or appropriated, obtained, or converted without 

authorization; 

(4) attempts to commit any offense described in paragraphs (1) through 

(3); or 

(5) conspires with one or more other persons to commit any offense 

described in paragraphs (1) through (3), and one or more such persons do 

any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, 

Shall, except as provided in subsection (b) [relating to organizations], be fined under this 

title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both. 

18 U.S.C. § 1832(a). 

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CONCLUSION 

42. Based on the foregoing, I believe there is probable cause to find that XU 

YAN JUN (a/k/a "QU HUI") has conspired to and attempted to obtain trade secrets from Victim 

Company A in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1831(a)(4) and (a)(5) (Economic Espionage) and 

§§ 1832(a)(4) and (a)(5) (Theft of Trade Secrets). 

Subscribed and sworn to before me 

on March 21 , 2018: 

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Respectfully submitted, 

Bradley D. Hull 

Special Agent 

Federal Bureau of Investigation 

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