### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT JAC KSON O ct obe r 3, 200 6 S es sio n
STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. STEP HEN D. LA MB
Appeal f romthe Circ uit Court for Madison Cou nty No. 05-309 Roge r A. P age, Judge

No. W2005-02953-C CA-R 3-CD - F iled Dece m ber 18, 2006

Th e Ap pe lla nt, Ste ph e n D . L a mb, wa s con vic te d by a Ma dis on Cou nty jury of bu rg lary , a

Cla ss D fe lon y , a ndthe mis de me a no r o ff e ns e s o f p os se ssi on of bu rgla ry too ls a nde va din g arr e st. L a mb
rec eived a n eig ht-y ear sentenc e for burg lary and an eleve n month and twenty -nine day sentenc e for
e a c h mi sd e me a no r c on vic tio n. Th e mis de me a no r s e nte nc e s we re or de re d to ru n c on c ur re ntl y wi th
eac h other but conse cutively to the felony

conviction. On appea l, L amb ra ises the following issues for our revie w: (1) whe ther the tria l court erred in failing to suppress ce rtain items found in L amb’s possession at the time of his arr est; (2) whe ther the tria l court er red in a dmitti ng a police vide otape; (3) whether the evidenc e is sufficient to support his convictions; and (4) w hether L amb’s sente nce for bur g lary

is ex cessive a nd whether the imposit ion of

consec utive sentenc es is war rante d. After revie w, the judg ments of conviction and r esulting se ntence s are aff irmed.

Te nn. R . A pp. P . 3 ; J udgm e nt s o f the Ci r c uit Co ur t A ffirm e d

D AVI D G. H AYES , J ., delivere d the opinion of the court, in whic h T H O M A S T. W O O D A LL and R O BERT W. W EDEMEYER , J J ., joined. Danny R. Ellis , J ackson, Te nnessee , for the A ppellant, Stephen D. L amb.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., At torne y

Ge ne ra l a ndRe po rt e r; Ra c he l E. Willi s, As sis ta nt At torne y Ge ne ra l; J ames G. ( J erry ) Woodall, District Attorney Gene ral; and James Thompson, Assistant Dist ri ct Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

F ac tu al B ac kgr ound Shortlybefor e midnight on J anuary 23, 2005, L arry Turpin, the owne r of Tur pin’s Wrecke r and Amoco in Ma dison County , rec eived a call fr om the company that monitors his security sy stem no tif y ing him that th e bu rg lar a larm a t his bu sin e ss ha d be e n a c tiv a te d. Tu rp in i ns truc te d th e se c ur ity company to call the she riff’ s department, and Turpin ca lled Alan Kope tzky , a mana g er of a nea rby truck stop. Kopetzky d ro ve to Turpin’s business a nd shined his headlig hts on the building. HeA t t r i al , Ser gea nt St anf i el d, t he hel i copt er pi l ot , ex pl ai ned t hat t he t her mal i nf r ar ed camer a pi cks up “ hea t 1 sig n a tur e s” w h ic h p e rm its the o p e ra to r t o se e w a rm im a g e s in lo w li g h t co n d iti o n s. T h e im a g e s a re the n sim u ltan e o u sly
re c o rd e d o n vid e o ta p e
. -2- ob se rv e d th a t a larg e wi nd ow a t the fr on t of the bu ild ing wa s br ok e n. Th e n K op e tzky sa w a ma n e xit the building throug h the window, car ry ing what appea

red to be a tire iron. The man w as wea ring blue jeans, a dark blue or black swea tshirt, a nd his head wa s cover ed with either a hood or stocking cap. K opetzky

watche d as the man r an fr om the front of the building and “duc ked ar ound the cor ner into the woods.” Approximately two minutes later, Madison County Sheriff’ s Deputy

Chris L ong arrived at the sc ene, followed by other law enfor ceme nt office rs. Kopetzky informed De puty

L ong of the de scription of t he burg lar a nd the direc tion of his flight, and L ong g ave pur suit. Minut es later , a police he licopter, whic h was i n t h e ar ea , beg an assisting in the pursuit. The helicopte r wa s e qu ipp e d w ith a

the rm a l in fr are d c a me ra

a nda sp otl ig ht. 1

I nformation fr om the aerial surveillance indicated the imag e of a m an ru n n ing f

rom the vic ini ty of the bu rg lari zed bu ild ing , a nd that the pe rs on wa s abo ut to c ro ss the int e rs ta te . D e pu ty L ong returne d to his patrol car and drove acr oss the i nterstate. T hroug h the use of the spotlight and following “play

by play ” instructions from the he licopter, the bur g lar, lat er i d en t i fied a s the Ap pe lla nt, wa s app re he nd e d in the wo od e d ar e a . D ur ing the pu rs uit , th e Ap pe lla nt w a s o rd e re d to stop on at least five oc ca s i o n s ; howeve r, he c ontinued to run. Upon ca pture, the A ppellant was
wea ring blue jeans, a

dark ja cket, and “we stern sty le” c owboy boots. A tobogg an c ap wi t h fac e mask, which wa s discarde d b y t h e Appellant, was loca ted three fee t away . The Appe llant was
c arry ing a c ro wb ar, a fl a sh lig ht, a nda larg e sc re wdri ve r. I nv e sti g a tio n o f the bu rg lari zedbu sin e ss reve aled that the cash reg ister door was open, the cover of the ATM machine ha d been pried open, and the sa fe w as exposed; however , nothing wa s taken fr om the building.

At t ri al , t h e Ap p el l an t t es t i fi ed t h at h e w as n o tt h e p er s o n wh o wa s o b s er v ed fl ee i n g t h ro u gh the broke n front window of Turpin’s Wrec ker Ser vice. He rela ted t hat he had stopped that nig ht at the truck stop ac ross the interstate from the bur g larized building only beca use t he brakes on his car wer e “dr ag g ing.” He stated he went for a walk in the woods to let his brake s cool off. The Appellant
was una ble to explain why

he ca rried a crow bar a nd a larg e scre wdriver with him during the w alk. Ba sed upon the proof

, the Appellant wa s convicted of burg lary , po s s es s ion of burg lary tools, and
e va din g arr e st.
Ana lys is

I. M ot ion to Suppr e ss
Be fore trial, the Appellant filed a motion to suppress the burg lary tools which were seized when the A ppellant was a rre sted , s pecif

ically a cr owbar , a scr ewdr iver, a nd a fla shlight. The Ap pe lla nt a sse rt e d th a t th e of fi c e rs didno t ha ve pr ob able c a us e to a rr e st h im; the re fo re , h is a rr e st wa s u nla wf

ul, a ndany evi den c e wa s se ize d in vio la tio n o f the F ou rth, F if th, a ndF ou rt e e nth-3-

Amendments to the Unit ed S tates C onstitut ion and Article I , Sections 7, 8, and 9 of the Te nnessee Constit ution. The proof at the suppression hearing established the f ollowing: (1) Kopetzky

described the burg lar fleeing the bui lding as a white man who was we aring a dar k-colore d swea tshirt, a hood over his h ead, and Texas-sty le cowboy boots, carry ing a

tire iron; (2) the police infra red c amer a in the helicopter picked up a heat imag e of a man running from the are a, and continuous instructions were rela y ed to L ong during the course of the ma n’s flig ht, which ultimately resulted in his appre hension; (3) afte r being order ed to stop, the man continued to f lee from the police; an d (4 ) K o petzky ’s description of the burg lar’s clothing ma tched the ma n’s clothing “to a T,” and burg lary tools were fo un d in the pe rs on ’s po sse ssi on
. Th e tr ia l cou rt fo un d “[t]he [Ap pe lla nt’ s] ar re st wa s with pr ob able
cause , the items lawfully

seized, and the [Appellant’s] moti on is without m erit. . . .”

I n revie wing the trial court’s denial of a mot ion to suppress, we a cce pt the trial court’ s finding s of fact unl ess t he evidence preponde rate s otherwise. State v. Y eargan , 958 S.W .2d 626, 629 ( T e n n
. 1 9 9 7 )

. H o w e v e r , th e la w a s ap p li e d to th o s e f a c ts is subject to de novo revie w. Id . The defe ndant bea

rs t he burden of demonstrating that the evidence preponder ates ag ainst the trial court’s finding s. State v. Odom , 928 S.W .2d 18, 22-23 (Te nn. 1996). As a g ener al principle, w arr antless sea rche s are pe r se un re a so na ble un de r the F ou rth Amendment of the United States Constit ution a nd article I , section 7 of the T ennesse e Constituti on. Howeve r, there are a few specifically established ex ceptions. Katz v. United States , 389 U.S. 347, 35 7, 88 S. Ct . 5 07 , 5 14 (1 96 7) ; State v. Tyler , 598 S.W .2d 798, 801 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980) . The State must establis h b y a pre pondera nce of the evidenc e that the se arc h falls within one of the
na rr ow ly dr a wn e xce pti on s to the wa rr a nt r e qu ir e me nt i n o rd e r f or the fr uit s o f a wa rr a ntl e ss a

rr e st to be admissible as evide nce. State v. Shaw , 603 S.W .2d 741 , 7 4 2 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1980). A
sear ch incident to a va lid arr est is such an exception. United States v. Robinson , 414 U.S. 218, 235, 94 S. Ct . 467, 477 (1973).

An offic er ma y

make a war rantless a rre st “ [w] hen a felony has in fac t been c ommitt ed, and the offic er ha s rea sonable c ause f or believing the person arr ested to ha ve committed it.” T.C.A. § 40-7-103( a)( 3) (2003) . Simpl y stated, the off

icer must have “pr obable c ause to be lieve the pe rson to be arreste d has commi tted the cr ime.” State v. Lawrence , 154 S.W .3d 71, 75 (Tenn. 2005) (citing Sta te v . Le wis , 36 S.W .3d 88, 98 (Tenn. Crim. App

. 2 0 00). Probable c ause to a rre st ex ists if the fac ts and circ umstances within an of fice r’s knowle dg e we re “ ‘suf fi ci en t to warr ant a pr

udent [person] in believing that the [ individual] had committed or wa s committi ng an off ense.’ ” State v. Bridges , 9 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 7 , 4 9 1 (T en n
. 1 9 9 7 ) ( q u o t i n g Be c k v . O hio , 379 U.S. 89, 91, 85 S. Ct. 223, 22 5 ( 19 64 ); State v. Me lson , 63 8 S.W. 2d 34 2, 35 0- 51 (T e nn
. 19 82 ))

. Th e e xiste nc e of p rob able
cause is a question of probabilities, not technica lities. Melson , 6 38 S.W. 2da t 35 1. Pr ob able c a us e must be more than a mer e suspicion. Id

. at 350. After revie w, we conclude that the totality of the circ umstances wa s sufficient in natur e to war rant a prudent pe rson to believe that the Appellant had committed the felony

off en se of bur g lary . Acc ording ly , the Appellant’ s motion t o suppress wa s proper ly denied.-4-

II. Adm iss ion of V ide ot ape The Appe llant asserts the tria l court should have e x cl u d ed the videotape of the thermal ima g e s take n du ri ng the pu rs uit of the Ap pe lla nt. Th e Sta te a sse rt s th a t th e Ap pe lla nt w a ive d th is issue beca use the videota

pe is not included in the re cord on a ppeal. See Tenn. R. App. P. 24(b). The failure to prepa

re a n adequate record ordinarily results in waiver of t hat i ssue. Tho mp so n v . S tat e , 958 S.W .2d 156, 172 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1997)

. The Appe llant objected to t h e admissi on of the videota pe on the g round that it was
c umu la tiv e of the de pu tie s’ te sti mon y re g ard ing the ir c ha se a ndc aptu re of the Ap pe lla nt. Th e Sta te asserted the videotape was re levant. One of t he Appellant’s theories of defe nse wa s that the police did not investigate the possibilit y that the b u rgl ar c ame f

rom one of the businesses nea r Turpin’s Wre c ke r a ndAm oc o. Th e vid e ota pe wa s pro ba tiv e be c a us e it s ho we d th e Ap pe lla nt’ s p ro ximity to the cr ime scene when f light wa s initi ate d , established the e lements of eva ding a rre st, and
c o rr o b o r a t e d p o l i c e t e s t i m o n y.
The a dmissibi lityof re levant videotapes is within the sound discretion of the trial c ourt, and its ruling on the a dmissibi lityof such e vidence will not be overtur n ed without a cle ar showing of ab u s e of discre tion. State v. Van Tran , 8 64 S.W. 2d46 5, 47 7 ( Te nn . 1 99 3) ; State v. Teague , 6 45 S.W .2d 392, 397 (Tenn. 1983). We conclude that the t rial court properly overr uled the Appe llant’s objection.
III. Su ff iciency of the Evid ence The Appe llant also contends ther e wa s insufficient evide nce to support his convic tions for burg lary , pos s es s i o n o f burg lary tools, and evading arr est. Our standa rd of r eview w hen the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence is questioned on appea l is “whether , afte r viewing the evidenc e in the light most favor able to the pr osecution, any rational trier of fa ct coul d have f

ound the essential elements of the crime be y ond a re asonable doubt.” J ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 4 43 U. S. 3 07 , 319 , 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979). W e d o not rewe igh the evidenc e; ra ther, we presume tha t the jury has resolved a ll conflicts in the testimonyand dra wn all re asonable infere nces f rom the evide nce in f

avor of the State. Se e Sta te v . S he ffi e ld , 67 6 S.W. 2d 54 2, 54 7 (T e nn . 1 98 4) ; State v. Cabbage , 571 S.W .2d 832, 835 (Tenn. 1978) . Questions about witness cr edibilityis resolved by the jury

. Sta te v. Bland , 958 S.W .2d 651, 659 (Tenn. 1997)

. The Appe llant asserts that proof of burg lary is lacking beca

use Kope tzkycould not identify him a s th e bu rg lar. He a lso arg ue s tha t the de pu tie s did not fi nd a ny pr op e rt y fr om T ur pin ’s bu sin e ss in his possession. W ith reg ard to his conviction for possession of burglary tools, he emphasizes that none of the witnesses testified tha t they saw him use the tools to commit the burg lary . Finally , he
asserts that his co n v i ct i o n fo r eva ding a rre st is lega lly

insufficient be cause he did not know the of fi c e rs we re a tte mpt ing to e ff e c t a n a rr e st.W e n ot e t h at on Ju n e 7, 2005, t h e G en er al As s embl y a men ded T en n es s ee Code An n ot at ed s ec t i on s 40- 35- 102, 2 -2 1 0 , a n d -4 0 1

. See 2 0 0 5 T e n n . P u b . A c ts c h . 3 5 3 § § 1 , 6 , 8 . H o w e v e r, the a m e n d e d c o d e se c tio n s a re ina p p lica b le to the A p p e llan t’s ap p e a l.

-5- The off ense of burg lary , as applied to the f acts o f this case, is committed when a person e nte rs a bu ild ing , with ou t th e e ff

e c tiv e c on se nt o f the pr op e rt y ow ne r, a nd

c omm its or

a tte mpt s to c omm it a the ft . T .C. A. § 3 9- 14 -4 02 (2 00 3) . T he of fe ns e of po sse ssi on of

bu rg lary too ls i s committed when a pe rson possesses a t o o l o r i m p lement with intent to use the same, or allow the
sa me to b e us e d, to c omm it a bu rg lary
. T. C.A . § 39 -1 4- 70 1 ( 20 03 ). Th e pr oo f at tr ia l in thi s c a se e sta bli sh e d th a t a

pe rs on ma tc hin g the Ap pe lla nt’ s d e sc ri pti on wa s o bs e rv e d e xitin g the bu sin e ss throug h t h e broken store front window, that the c ash dra wer was ope n, and that the c over of the ATM was pr i ed open and, when the Appellant wa s appre hended, f ollowing a

pursuit from the g ener al vi cinity

of the burg larized building, he was c arry ing a crow bar, a

scre wdriver , and a fl a sh lig ht.

The off ense of evading arr est is c ommitt ed when a person intentionally

flee s from a pe rson he knows is a law enfor ceme nt office r and knows the officer is attempting to arre st him. T.C .A. § 39-16-603 (2003). Wit h reg ard to this offe nse, the proof e stablished that the Appellant disre g arde d
re pe a te d o rd e rs by

the de pu tie s to sto p. Mo re ov e r, he str ug g le d wi th th em w he n th e y tr ie d to
app re he ndhim

. After revie w, we c onclude that the e vidence was leg ally suffic i ent t o support a ver dict of g uil ty on a ll c ha

rg e s. Th is i ssu e is w ith ou t me ri t.
IV . Se nt e nc ing The Appe llant was convicted of burglary , a C lass D felony , and the misdemeanor of fense of possession of burg lary tools and evading arr est. The Appe llant arg ues that his sentenc e for burg lary is ex cessive because t he trial court ex ag g erated t he weight for an enhance ment fac tor and minimiz ed the w e ig h t f

o r a mi ti g a ti n g f

a c to r
. A ls o , h e a s s e r ts th e tria l c o u r t e rr e d b y o r d e r in g consec utive
se nte nc e s for his bu rg lary a nd mis de me a no r se nte nc e s. Th e Ap pe lla nt as ks thi s cou rt to r e ma nd his
ca s e f o r a n ew s en t en ci n g h ea ri n g.
I n acc ordanc e with the sente ncing scheme in e ffe ct at the time of the se convic tions, the trial
c ou rt wa s r e qu ir e d to sta

rt a t the min imu m se nte nc e in the ra ng e , the n “ e nh a nc e the se nte nc e wi thi n the ra ng e as appropriate for the enha nceme nt fac tors, then re duce the sentenc e as a ppropriate for the mitigating fac tors.” T.C.A. § 40-35-210( e) ( 2003). Appe llate re view of se ntencing is de novo on the re cord w ith a presumption that the trial cour t ’s deter minations are c orre ct. T.C.A. § 40-35- 40 1( d) (2 00 3)

. I n c on du c tin g its de novo revie w, this court consider s the following fac tors: (1) the

2 evidenc e, if a ny , rec eived at t h e t ri al and sentencing hearing; ( 2) the pre sentenc e re port; (3) the principles of se ntencing and ar g uments as to sentenc ing a lternatives; (4) the nature and char acte ristics of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidenc e and information offe red by the parties-6-

on enhanc ement and mitig ating fac tors; (6) any statement by the Appellant in his own beha lf; and (7 ) the po te nti a l for re ha

bil ita tio n or tr e a tme nt. T. C.A . §§ 40- 35 -1 02 , - 10 3, -2 10 (2 00 3) ; se e als o State v. Ashby , 82 3 S.W. 2d 16 6, 16 8 (T e nn . 1 99 1) . T he bu rd e n is on the Ap pe lla nt t o d e mon str a te the impropriety

of a se ntence . T.C.A. § 40-35-401, Sentenc ing Commission Com ments. Moreove r, if the re cord reve als that the trial court adequately considere d sentenc ing principles and all rele vant fac ts and circ umstances, this court will af fo rd t h e trial c ourt' s determinations a pr esumption of
c or re c tne ss. T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 40 1( d) ; Ashby , 823 S.W .2d at 169. A. Length of

Sentence The Appe llant stip u l at ed that he qualified as a Rang e I I , multipl e off

ender , for se ntencing p u rp o s e s
. A s s u c h , h is s e n te n c e r a n g e f o r b u r g la r y is f o u r to e ig h t y ear s. See T.C.A. §§ 39-14- 402(c) , 40-35-112( b)(4) (2003).

I n arriving a t a sentenc e of eig ht y ear s, the trial court focused primarily upon enhanc ement fac tor (2), a

previous history

of prior criminal convictions or criminal behavior. See T.C.A. § 40-35- 114(2) ( 2003). The trial c ourt found that the Appe llant has four prior felony convictions and five prior misdemeanor convictions. The Appellant’s pr ior criminal history from I llinois and Missouri includes convic tions for robbery of a financ ial instit ution, bur g lary , rec eiving stolen property , and
nu me ro us the ft

c on vic tio ns
. T h e tria l c o u r t a ls o c o n s id e r e d th e mi ti g a ti n g f a c to r th a t th e A p p e ll a n t’ s c o n d u c t ne ither
c a us e d n or

thr e a te ne d s e ri ou s b od ily inj ury bu t f ound thi s f

a c tor “ wo uldha ve to b e c on sid e ra bly
wea k beca use there was a situation where se rious bodily injury could have happene d.” See T.C.A. § 40-35-113( 1) (2003)

. Be ca u s e t h e re co rd re fl ec t s t h at t h e t ri al j u d ge p ro p er l y ap p l i ed t h e p ri n ci p l es o f s en t en ci n g, wi de la titud e is a ff

or de d the tr ia l jud g e ’s se nte nc ing de te rm inatio n a ndbr oa d d isc re tio n is g ive n in making that judgme nt. As our supreme court observ ed i n State v. Gome z , 163 W.W .3d 632, 660 (Tenn. 2005), this state’s sentencing act “direc ts the judge to enhanc e and to mitigate the sente nce ‘as a ppropriate ’ there by

aff ording to the judge discretion to selec t an appropriate se ntence any wher e within the rang e.” A fter de novo re vie w, we fi ndno e rr or in the tr ia l c ou rt ’s imp os iti on of a n e ig hty ear sentenc e for

the cr ime of burg lary

. B. C ons e c ut ive Se nt e nc ing Next, the Appellant contends that the tr i al court improper ly deter mined that he had a n extensive recor d of criminal activity which would justify imposing consec utive sentenc es. The tr ial court orde red the Appellant’s two misdemea nor sentenc es t o run concurre ntly with eac h other but
consec utive to his eight-y ear burg lary sentenc e.
Consecutive sente ncing is guide d by Tenne ssee Code A nnotated § 40-35- 115(b), whic h state s in pe rt ine nt p art :-7- T h e c o u r tm a y o r d e r

s e n t e n c e s t o ru n c o n s e c u t i v e l y i f t h e c o u r tf

i n d s b y a pr e po nd e ra nc e of

the e vid e nc e that:

. . . . (2 ) T h e d e f

e n d a n t i s a n o f

f e n d e r w h o s e r e c o r d o f c r i m i n a l a c t ivi tyis extensive . . . .

Th e tr ia l c ou rt

ru le d a s f oll ow s:
Th e on ly oth e r thi ng I ne e d to con sid e r is whe the r or no t se nte nc ing sh ou ld be conc urre nt or consec utive.

. . . . [W ]e have [convictions] from 1970, 1978, 1980, 1991, 1994 and 1998, which I think are a ll within t he re cord w hich shows there is an extensive crim i n al history here

. I also have to look at whether prior lenienc y

with this Defe n d an t has failed to r e ha bil ita te him , w he the r o r no t the le ng th of se nte nc e that the [co urt] is a bo ut t o impose is reasona

bly rela ted to the seve ri ty

of this offense to make sure it’s not g reater than de serve d.

. . . . There will be two sentenc es of eleve n twenty -nine. They shall be conc urre nt with e ach other but c onsecutive to the felony

. So we have an ef fec tive sentenc e of eig ht y ear s plus eleven twe nty -nine.

We n o t e that nothing in the 1989 Sentenc ing A ct prohibits considera tion of prior criminal
c on vic tio ns a ndc on du c t f or bo th en ha nc e me nt a ndc on se c uti ve se nte nc ing pu rp os e s a s lo ng a s th os e sentenc es comply

with the purposes a nd principles of the 1989 Act. Sta te v . D av is , 825 S.W .2d 109, 113 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1991)

. The re cord supports the trial court’s f inding of an extensive history of criminal conduct by the Appellant. Additionally , the trial court found that prior leniency has had lit tle aff ect in dete rring the Ap pe lla nt’ s u nla wf

ul c on du c t a nd that the a g g re g a te se nte nc e is re a so na bly re la te d to the se ve ri ty of the c rimes committed. Ac cording ly , we c onclude that the r ecor d supports the impositi on of
c on se c uti ve se nte nc e s.
CO NC LU SION

Ba sed upon the for eg oing r easons, the A ppellant’s judg ments of co nviction and sentenc es for bur g lary , possession of burg lary tools, and evading arr est are aff irmed.

___________________________________ DAVI D G. HAY ES, J UDGE