20-35156

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

 v. 

PERCY F. NEWBY, 

Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

LAWN LIMITED; et al., 

Defendants.

No. 20-35156 

D.C. No. 3:18-cv-05978-RBL 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Washington

Ronald B. Leighton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 21, 2021**

Before: SILVERMAN, WATFORD, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

Percy F. Newby appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

FILED

JUN 29 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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for the United States in its action seeking to reduce federal tax assessments to

judgment, set aside fraudulent property transfers, and foreclose on tax liens. We 

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the district court’s 

legal conclusions, McGinest v. GTE Service Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1112 (9th Cir. 

2004), and for clear error its factual determinations, Wolfe v. United States, 798 

F.2d 1241, 1244 n.2 (9th Cir.), amended by 806 F. 2d 1410 (9th Cir. 1986). We 

may affirm on any basis supported by the record. Enlow v. Salem-Keizer Yellow 

Cab Co., 389 F.3d 802, 811 (9th Cir. 2004). We affirm.

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government

regarding Newby’s assessed tax liabilities for the 2002 through 2006 tax years 

because the government introduced evidence of its deficiency determinations, and 

Newby failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the 

determinations were invalid. See Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 

1997) (explaining that the IRS’s deficiency determinations are entitled to the 

presumption of correctness unless the taxpayer submits competent evidence that 

the assessments were “arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); Hughes v. 

United States, 953 F.2d 531, 535 (9th Cir. 1992) (absent contrary evidence, official 

certificates, such as a Form 4340, constitute proof of facts that assessments were 

actually and properly made). 

The district court properly granted summary judgment for the government 
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regarding the attachment of tax liens to the property belonging to Newby, 

including the two properties held by Lawn Limited, because Newby failed to raise

a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Lawn Limited was not his alter 

ego. See 26 U.S.C. § 6321 (imposing a federal tax lien upon “all property and 

rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to [a delinquent taxpayer]”); 

G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 350-51 (1977) (holding that 

the government may “properly regard” an alter ego’s assets as the delinquent 

taxpayer’s assets for purposes of § 6321); Wolfe, 806 F.2d at 1411 (“State law 

governs the determination of whether there exists an alter ego from whom the 

government may satisfy the obligation of a taxpayer.”); Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. 

Symetra Life Ins. Co., 271 P.3d 925, 930 (Wash. 2012) (describing the alter ego 

doctrine under Washington law). 

We reject as meritless Newby’s contention that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7403 (authorizing the government to 

commence civil actions for the recovery of taxes and enforcement of liens). 

We reject as unsupported by the record Newby’s contentions that the district 

court was biased against him.

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued 

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on 
 20-35156

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.