* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

** Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designati on.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Filed 12/23/96 FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

TYRONE MCDANIEL YAHWEH,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, Administrations and Staffs,

Defendant-Appellee. No. 95-1515 (D.C. No. 95-S-2094) (D. Colo.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before PORFILIO, ALARCON, ** and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.1 After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined

unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The c ase is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

2 Section 1915 was substantially amended in April of 1996 the Prison Litigation Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), as discussed further herein. Prior to that date, § 1915(d) prov ided in part that the district court “may dismiss the case . . . if satisfied that the a ction is frivolous or malicious.” 2 -2- In this case, 1 plaintiff challenges the district court’s dismissa l of his civil rights suit as legally frivolous pursuant to former28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 2 We conclude the complaint is not frivolous. According ly, we reverse and remand for further proceedings. Plaintiff, a prisoner, filed a pro se suit in distr ict court pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, contending that he was being deni ed access to the courts because prison authorities refused him physical acc ess to the law library. The district court ordered a Martinez report. The Martinez report set out the prison’s policies with regard to access to legal materials, which show that the prison provides several alternatives to physical access to a library, such as borrowing books and other reference materials, and seeking he lp from a legal assistant or an available “access attorney.” Plaintiff filed a ple ading entitled “Motion for Summary Judgment,” which the district court constru ed as his response to the Martinez report. The district court considered both the Martinez report and plaintiff’s response in reviewing the complaint’s l egal sufficiency. See Hall v.3 -3- Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that court may consider Martinez report as attached to plaintiff’s complaint and no ting plaintiff’s response). “It is now established beyond doubt that prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the courts.” Bounds v. Smith , 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977). Nonetheless, physical access to a prison law library is not a right. See Penrod v.
Zavaras , 94 F.3d 1399, 1403 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lewi s v. Casey , 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996)). The right of access to the cou rts may be satisfied by alternative means that allow a prisoner “a reasonab ly adequate opportunity to present claimed violations of fundamental constitut ional rights to the courts.” Bounds , 430 U.S. at 825. Quoting the Martinez report, the district court noted the availability of alternative means, and stated that plaintiff did no t deny the existence of the policies and the facts as set out in the report. T he court recognized plaintiff’s allegations that the access attorney was not a reas onable alternative to physical access to the library, but characterized them as di ssatisfaction “with the manner in which he can obtain legal materials or assistance f rom persons trained in the law.” The district court then dismissed plaintiff’s compl aint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, apparently because it concluded plai ntiff had not challenged the prison’s alternative means of access. We review th e district court’s dismissal of4 -4- the action for abuse of discretion. Green v. Seymo ur , 59 F.3d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1995). “A pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted bylawyers.” Hall , 935 F.2d at 1110 (citing Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972)). Although a liberal reading of plaintiff’s pro se pleadings does not fr ee him of the obligation to plead sufficient facts, “[n]ot every fact must be describ ed in specific detail.” Id. Our review of the record on appeal demonstrates that, w hile plaintiff did not challenge the availability of alternatives to physical access to the library, he did challenge the adequacy of those alternatives. Further, we ca nnot conclude that his allegations are vague or merely conclusory. Cf. Hall , 935 F.2d at 1110 (standards afforded pro se pleadings do not relieve plaintiff of burden to allege sufficient facts); Frazier v. Dubois , 922 F.2d 560, 562 n.1 (10th Cir. 1990) (conclusory allegations insufficient to state a claim). In his response to the Martinez report, plaintiff made the following statements: “The access attorney limits his visit with an inmate to 15 minutes per session and no more than 4 session [sic] per month. The access attorney will not perform legal research for inmates. The access att orney will not prepare legal documents for inmates.” Standing alone, these fact ual allegations may not necessarily state a claim for relief. However, pla intiff also alleges that “the3 On remand, the district court should consider wheth er the amendments to

28 U.S.C. § 1915 apply to this case and, if so, howthey interrelate with Fed. R. Civ. P. 15 and the lenient standards afforded pro s e pleadings. 5 -5- access attorney is not a reasonable alternative to the access to the prison law library.” His citation to various legal authoritie s denouncing other prisons’ book loan policies constitutes a challenge to the adequa cy of that alternative as well. We conclude that plaintiff’s complaint set out a ch allenge to the prison’s policies with regard to access to the courts that should hav e survived summary dismissal for legal frivolousness. Hence, the district courtabused its discretion in sua sponte dismissing plaintiff’s complaint on that bas is. REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings. 3

Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge