NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JULIA P., Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY,1 J.B., J.B., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 14-0278

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JD510478

The Honorable Karen O’Connor, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC, Scottsdale

By Christopher Stavris

Counsel for Appellant

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix

By Michael F. Valenzuela

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety

 

1 Pursuant to S.B. 1001, Section 157, 51st Leg., 2nd Spec. Sess. (Ariz. 

2014) (enacted), the Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) is substituted for 

the Arizona Department of Economic Security in this matter. See ARCAP 

27. For ease of reference, we refer to DCS throughout this decision.
JULIA P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Maurice Portley and Judge John C. Gemmill joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1 Julia P. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her daughter, born in 2012, (“Daughter”)

and her son, born in 2013 (“Son”). For the following reasons, we affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Daughter and Son are the biological children of Mother and 

Jason B. (“Father”).2 In November 2012, DCS received a report that Mother 

and Father were using methamphetamine in Daughter’s presence. DCS

conducted a welfare check, but found no drugs. Several weeks later, DCS 

received two additional reports alleging that Mother and Father were 

homeless and continuing to use drugs around Daughter, and that Mother 

had been asking relatives to take custody of Daughter. 

¶3 DCS took Daughter into temporary custody on January 23, 

2013 and promptly filed a dependency petition alleging Mother had 

neglected Daughter by abusing drugs, engaging in criminal activity, and 

failing to meet Daughter’s needs. Mother denied the allegations but 

submitted the issue of dependency to the juvenile court for determination. 

Mother agreed to participate in parent aide services, substance abuse 

treatment through TERROS, and substance abuse testing. On March 4, 

2013, while the dependency petition was still pending, Mother was arrested 

and jailed based on felony forgery charges. The next day the juvenile court 

found Daughter dependent as to Mother and ordered a case plan of family 

reunification. 

¶4 Mother gave birth to Son while she was in jail awaiting 

sentencing. DCS took temporary custody of Son and filed a dependency 

petition alleging that Son was dependent as to Mother due to her 

 

2 The juvenile court also terminated Father’s parental rights to the 

children; however, he is not a party to this appeal. 
JULIA P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

3

incarceration and her open dependency regarding Daughter. In September 

2013, Mother was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment after pleading 

guilty to two counts of forgery.

¶5 Given Mother’s prison sentence, DCS moved to terminate her 

parental rights as to Daughter, alleging grounds for termination under 

Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 8-533(B)(3) (chronic substance 

abuse) and -533(B)(4) (length of prison sentence). A few months later, 

Daughter was placed with her half-sibling in California. In January 2014, 

the juvenile court found Son dependent as to Mother and set a case plan of 

severance and adoption. Son was also placed in California, with Daughter. 

Soon thereafter, DCS moved to terminate Mother’s parental rights as to Son, 

alleging the same grounds. 

¶6 Mother contested termination of her parental rights to the 

children and appeared telephonically at the termination hearing. DCS 

presented testimony from Deborah Ellis, the case manager assigned to the 

children’s case, as well as documentary evidence consisting of DCS reports 

and minute entries from Mother’s criminal proceedings. According to Ellis, 

Mother reported to the DCS investigator that she had used

methamphetamines a day or two before she was arrested and incarcerated 

in March 2013. Ellis explained that prior to her incarceration, Mother had 

been offered substance abuse testing but did not participate in the service.

Ellis further testified that DCS did not offer Mother substance abuse

treatment or other services in jail, but that DCS does encourage incarcerated 

parents to take advantage of the services offered in jail and offers additional 

parent aide services upon their release. 

¶7 DCS also presented evidence that a few years prior to 

Daughter’s birth, Mother was convicted of burglary, plead guilty to two 

counts of possession of drug paraphernalia and was sentenced to 3.5 years’

imprisonment. Based on Mother’s prior history of arrest for drug-related 

crimes, Ellis opined that, upon her release from prison Mother would be 

unable to parent the children due to her substance abuse and that her 

substance abuse would continue for a prolonged, indeterminate period. 

¶8 Regarding the relationship between Mother and the children, 

Ellis testified that Daughter came into DCS’s care when she was eight 

months old, and that Mother had been consistent with her weekly 

visitations with Daughter until Mother was incarcerated in March 2013. 

However, Ellis explained that the children could not visit Mother in prison 

because they were in an out-of-state placement with their half-sibling. 

When asked whether DCS considered placing the children with Mother’s
JULIA P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

4

or Father’s relatives in Arizona, Ellis explained that the relatives were 

unable to accept the children. DCS also presented evidence that because 

Father had been incarcerated since 2013 and was serving a six-year 

sentence, he could not parent the children. Ellis opined that a parent-child 

relationship between Mother and the children could not be continued while 

Mother was incarcerated, and that, given the children’s young ages, 

Mother’s incarceration would very likely deprive the children of a normal 

home. Ellis further opined that termination was in the children’s best 

interests because an adoptive placement had been identified and the 

children would benefit from the stability and permanency of a loving home.

¶9 Mother testified that she last used an illegal substance in June 

2011 and was not using drugs in prison. She stated that she developed a 

bond with Daughter during the eight months she was in Mother’s care and 

that she felt a bond with Son, although he was removed from her care only 

a few days after his birth. Despite acknowledging that she was permitted 

to have in-person visits and telephonic conversations while in prison, 

Mother testified that she had “never been given [an] opportunity” to have 

visitation or telephonic contact with the children, but wrote to them 

“[p]retty much every single week.” 

¶10 The juvenile court granted the motions to terminate as to both 

children on each of the alleged grounds. Regarding substance abuse, the 

court found that despite Mother denying she used drugs in March 2013 as 

indicated in DCS’s report, Mother was unable to demonstrate that she can 

remain sober outside a prison environment. Based on her history of drugrelated arrests and post-incarceration relapse, the court determined that 

reasonable grounds existed to believe that sobriety remains an issue for 

Mother. Regarding length of sentence, the court found that Mother’s sixyear sentence prevents her from offering a normal home for the children 

and from establishing any meaningful relationship with the children, given 

their young ages. The court also determined that severance was in the 

children’s best interests. Mother timely appealed. 

DISCUSSION

¶11 To terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by 

clear and convincing evidence the existence of at least one of the statutory 

grounds for termination enumerated in A.R.S. § 8–533(B) and must find by 

a preponderance of the evidence that termination would serve the child’s 

best interests. Ariz. R.P. Juv. Ct. 66(C); Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 

196 Ariz. 246, 249, ¶ 12 (2000). We review the evidence and draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to upholding the juvenile 
JULIA P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

5

court’s factual findings. Jesus M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 203 Ariz. 278,

282, ¶ 13 (App. 2002). 

¶12 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred in terminating her 

parental rights to the children based on the length of her incarceration 

because insufficient evidence was presented to support the court’s finding.3 

To establish the statutory ground relating to length of sentence, DCS was 

required to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Mother (1) has 

been deprived of her civil liberties due to a felony conviction; and (2) the 

length of her sentence will deprive the children of a normal home for a 

period of years. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4).

¶13 The length of a parent’s sentence, alone, is not dispositive, 

Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 281, ¶ 9, and the juvenile court must engage in a factintensive analysis of all relevant circumstances, including:

(1) the length and strength of any parent-child relationship 

existing when incarceration begins, (2) the degree to which 

the parent-child relationship can be continued and nurtured 

during the incarceration, (3) the age of the child and the

relationship between the child’s age and the likelihood that 

incarceration will deprive the child of a normal home, (4) the 

length of the sentence, (5) the availability of another parent to 

provide a normal home life, and (6) the effect of the 

deprivation of a parental presence on the child at issue.

Id. (quoting Michael J., 196 Ariz. at 251–52, ¶ 29). However, the juvenile 

court need not make explicit factual findings regarding each factor. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 441, ¶ 14 (App. 2014).

¶14 Reasonable evidence was presented to support each of the six 

Michael J. factors. DCS presented evidence, and Mother admitted, that she 

was given a six-year prison sentence after pleading guilty to forgery. 

Regarding factors one and three, Ellis testified (and Mother does not 

dispute) that Daughter was removed from Mother’s care at eight months 

old and Son, who was born while Mother was incarcerated, was removed 

from her care after only a few days. Despite Mother’s assertions that she 

felt a bond with both her children, the undisputed facts indicate that the 

children remained in her care for a very short period of time. Ellis testified 

that due to the children’s very young age, Mother’s incarceration would 

 

3 Mother does not challenge the juvenile court’s finding that 

termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interests. 
JULIA P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

6

likely deprive them of a normal home. Nor could Father provide a normal 

home to the children, as the evidence showed he is also incarcerated and 

serving a six-year sentence. 

¶15 Regarding factors two and six, relating to the nurturing of the 

parent-child relationships between Mother and the children, Ellis testified 

that Mother initially attended visitation with Daughter but that Mother has 

had no visitation or telephone contact with the children since her 

incarceration. Mother asserted at the hearing and reiterates on appeal that 

she felt a bond with both children and that DCS actively prevented her from 

developing a relationship with the children while incarcerated.

Specifically, Mother argues that if DCS had placed her children with a 

placement in Arizona, she would have been able to continue her 

relationship with the children. However, Mother acknowledged that she 

was allowed to have visitors and to make phone calls while in prison. And

Ellis explained that DCS had investigated the Arizona placements 

suggested by Mother and Father, but those prospective placements were 

unable to take the children, so DCS elected to place the children with their 

half-sibling in California.

¶16 We find reasonable evidence in the record supporting the 

juvenile court’s finding that Mother’s incarceration will deprive her 

children of a normal home for a period of years. The court therefore did 

not err in ordering termination of Mother’s parental rights to the children 

pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(4). Accordingly, we need not address 

Mother’s contention that the court erred in finding that DCS proved by 

clear and convincing evidence that Mother has a chronic history of 

substance abuse that is likely to continue for a prolonged period under 

A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(3). See Jesus M., 203 Ariz. at 280, ¶ 3 (“If clear and 

convincing evidence supports any one of the statutory grounds on which 

the juvenile court ordered severance, we need not address claims 

pertaining to the other grounds.”). 
JULIA P. v. DCS et al.

Decision of the Court

7

CONCLUSION

¶17 We affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating Mother’s 

parental rights.