IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs January 4, 2017

JAMES WILLIAM TAYLOR V. TENNESSEE DEPARTMENT OF

CORRECTION ET AL.

Appeal from the Chancery Court for Davidson County

No. 16-0046-IV Russell T. Perkins, Chancellor

No. M2016-01350-COA-R3-CV

An inmate in the custody of the Department of Correction appeals the dismissal of his 

petition for declaratory judgment. He claims his sentence is calculated incorrectly, and he 

is entitled to custodial parole and safety valve hearings. Upon motion of the Respondents,

the trial court granted summary judgment dismissing the petition. We affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancery Court Affirmed

FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which THOMAS 

R. FRIERSON, II and BRANDON O. GIBSON, JJ., joined.

James William Taylor, Tiptonville, Tennessee, Pro Se.

Herbert H. Slatery, III, Attorney General and Reporter, Andree S. Blumstein, and 

Charlotte Davis, Assistant Attorney General, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, 

Tennessee Department of Correction, Derrick Schofield; Tennessee Board of Parole, 

Commissioner Richard Montgomery; Sentencing Information Service, Manager Jeannetta 

Kimbro; Legal Services Department of Correction, Douglas Stephens.

OPINION

James William Taylor (“Petitioner”), an inmate housed at Northwest Correctional 

Complex, is in the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (“TDOC”) serving 

several consecutive sentences including one life sentence. On January 15, 2016, 

Petitioner filed this declaratory judgment action contending he is entitled to parole 

consideration because his sentence is “calculated incorrectly.” The respondents are 

Derrick Schofield, Richard Montgomery, Jeanetta Kimbro, and Douglas Stephens 

(“Respondents”). 

03/13/2017
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Petitioner filed a “Motion to Add Show of Cause for Damages and Request for 

Relief” on May 24, 2016, in which he contended his constitutional rights had been 

violated due to the incorrect calculation of his sentence. He further argued that he 

qualified for custodial parole and safety valve consideration. On June 6, 2016, 

Respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting Petitioner was not entitled 

to custodial parole or safety valve consideration and that his sentence was calculated 

correctly. Respondents filed with the motion a memorandum of law, a statement of 

undisputed facts, and an affidavit from Candace J. Whisman, Director of Sentence 

Management Services. The trial court found the material facts undisputed, which we 

summarize below. 

On August 19, 1988, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder, second 

degree burglary, and simple robbery in Case #188-108, to which he was sentenced as 

follows:

(1) a life sentence for first degree murder with release eligibility after 

service of 30 years pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501(f) (Supp. 

1987);

(2) a 15-year sentence for second degree burglary (to be served at 35%) to 

run consecutively to the life sentence for first degree murder; and

(3) a 15-year sentence for simple robbery (to be served at 35%) to run 

consecutively to the sentence for second degree burglary.

Four months later, on December 21, 1988, Petitioner pled guilty to several crimes 

and received the following sentences, all of which Petitioner has completed:

(1) a six-year sentence for second degree burglary;

(2) a four-year sentence for second degree burglary;

(3) a four-year sentence for second degree burglary;

(4) a three-year sentence for receiving stolen property; and

(5) a one-year sentence for concealing stolen property.

Following an analysis of the status of each sentence and the effect each had on the 

other sentences, the trial court found that all of Petitioner’s sentences were in accordance 

with Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501 (Supp. 1987), the Tennessee Criminal Reform Act of 

1982. The trial court further noted that “for consecutive sentences, the periods of 

ineligibility for release shall be calculated for each sentence and shall be added together 

to determine the release eligibility date for the consecutive sentences.” Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-55-50l(m). More specifically, the trial court explained the calculation as follows:

The overall release eligibility date is based on 30 years for the life sentence 

plus 10 years and 6 months (35% of 15 plus 15 years). Since [Petitioner] 

has a life sentence, there is no expiration date. He has earned a total of 
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3,767 days of Prisoner Sentence Reduction Credits (“PSRC”) in accordance 

with Tenn. Code Ann. § 41-21-236 and these have been applied to reduce 

the original calculated release eligibility date to the current date of January 

25, 2018. 

After reviewing the calculations as explained in the affidavit of Candace 

Whisman, the trial court concluded that it “demonstrates that he has received all of the 

credit to which he is due and that he has received all sentence credits to which he is 

entitled.” The court subsequently found no error in the TDOC’s calculation of the release 

eligibility date or sentence.

The court then addressed Petitioner’s argument that he was eligible for custodial 

parole under Howell v. State, 569 S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1978). It explained that Howell did 

not apply to Petitioner’s case because the Tennessee Supreme Court decided Howell prior 

to the Tennessee Criminal Reform Act of 1982, the law which governs Petitioner’s case. 

The court further noted that, even if Howell did apply, Petitioner would still be ineligible 

for custodial parole, because Howell only applied to determinate sentences as established 

by the law in effect prior to the Tennessee Criminal Reform Act of 1982. Thus, Petitioner 

did not have a determinate sentence. Additionally, the trial court stated that Petitioner did

not qualify for safety valve release, because the governor had excluded homicide 

sentences from consideration. 

As for the contention that his sentence calculation violated the Ex Post Facto 

Clause, the trial court relied on State v. Pearson, 858 S.W.2d 879, 883 (Tenn. 1993) to 

conclude that the question was “whether the law changes the punishment to the 

[prisoner’s] disadvantage, or inflicts a greater punishment than the law allowed when the 

offense occurred.” Id. The trial court then stated that Petitioner’s sentence had been 

“correctly calculated in accordance with the law at the time of his crimes,” and therefore, 

there was no violation of the ex post facto laws. For the foregoing reasons, the trial court 

summarily dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This court reviews a trial court’s decision on a motion for summary judgment de 

novo without a presumption of correctness. Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, 

MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 2015). Accordingly, this court must make a fresh 

determination of whether the requirements of Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56 have been satisfied. Id.

In so doing, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party 

and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Godfrey v. Ruiz, 90 S.W.3d 692, 

695 (Tenn. 2002).

Summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions, answers 

to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 
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there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a 

judgment as a matter of law.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. When the party moving for 

summary judgment does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it may satisfy its burden of 

production “either (1) by affirmatively negating an essential element of the nonmoving 

party’s claim or (2) by demonstrating that the nonmoving party’s evidence at the 

summary judgment stage is insufficient to establish the nonmoving party’s claim or 

defense.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 264 (emphasis in original).

ANALYSIS

In this appeal, Petitioner contends that the trial court erred when it granted 

Respondents’ motion for summary judgment because his sentence is a determinate 

sentence under Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-211, and thus, he is entitled to custodial parole. 

He also argues that he is entitled to safety valve consideration. 

A convicted person has no constitutional or inherent right to be released before the 

expiration of a valid sentence. Brennan v. Bd. of Parole, No. M2014-01591-SC-R11-CV, 

--- S.W.3d ----, 2017 WL 112820, at *2 (Tenn. Jan. 10, 2017) (citing Greenholtz v. 

Inmates of Neb. Penal & Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)). The TDOC possesses 

sole responsibility for the calculation of a prisoner’s release eligibility date “of any felony 

offender sentenced to the [D]epartment and any felony offender sentenced to 

confinement in a local jail or workhouse for one (1) or more years.” Id. (citing Tenn. 

Code Ann. § 40-35-501(a)(1), (r)).1 Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court limits 

judicial review of a parole decision “to consideration of whether the Board exceeded its 

jurisdiction, acted illegally, arbitrarily, or fraudulently.” Id. Thus, a court cannot 

“reweigh the evidence,” substituting its calculation for that of the TDOC. Id.

 

1

Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-8-201(a)(3) does, however, impose a duty upon Tennessee Sheriffs “to 

enforce the terms of a judgment ordering a sentence of split confinement.” Shorts v. Bartholomew, 278 

S.W.3d 268, 282 (Tenn. 2009). As the court explained in Shorts:

Like the participants in this case, we believe the existing statutes are inconsistent and 

overlapping, while at the same time leaving gaps concerning the responsibility for 

sentence calculation and release in all situations. Nevertheless, we answer the District 

Court's certified question by holding that Tennessee Code Annotated section 8-8-

201(a)(3) does not impose a duty upon a Tennessee sheriff to calculate the release date 

and order the release of a TDOC prisoner. The statute does, however, impose a duty upon 

a Tennessee sheriff to enforce the terms of a judgment ordering a sentence of split 

confinement. This duty includes noting the term of confinement provided for in the 

judgment order, crediting the prisoner for time served as indicated on the judgment 

order, calculating any credits that may be earned, and timely releasing the prisoner at 

the conclusion of the period of confinement ordered.

Id. (emphasis added).
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The trial court engaged in a detailed and thorough review of each sentence. It 

found no evidence that the TDOC acted illegally, arbitrarily or fraudulently. Rather, the 

trial court found that all of Petitioner’s sentences were calculated in accordance with 

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501 (Supp. 1987), the applicable law at the time Petitioner 

committed his crimes. The trial court also correctly determined that Petitioner did not 

qualify for custodial parole consideration, because custodial parole applied only to

determinate sentences imposed prior to the Tennessee Criminal Reform Act of 1982 

(Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-501). Nor did Petitioner meet the eligibility requirements for 

safety valve release, because the governor excluded homicide crimes from consideration.

Having reviewed the record, we agree with the trial court’s findings. We have also 

determined there is no genuine issue as to these material facts. Accordingly, the trial 

court properly granted summary judgment because there is no dispute regarding the 

material facts in this matter, which demonstrate that Petitioner’s sentences were 

calculated in accordance with the applicable law.

IN CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, and this matter is remanded with costs 

of appeal assessed against James William Taylor.

________________________________

 FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., P.J., M.S.