IMPORTANT NOTICE 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION 

THIS OPINION IS DESIGNATED "NOT TO BE PUBLISHED." 

PURSUANT TO THE RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 

PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C), 

THIS OPINION IS NOT TO BE PUBLISHED AND SHALL NOT BE 

CITED OR.USED AS BINDING PRECEDENT IN ANY OTHER 

CASE IN ANY_COURT OF THIS STATE; HOWEVER, 

UNPUBLISHED KENTUCKY APPELLATE DECISIONS, · 

RENDERED AFTER JANUARY 1, 2003, MAY BE CITED FOR 

CONSIDERATION BY THE COURT IF THERE IS NO PUBLISHED 

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BY THE COURT SHALL BE SET OUT AS AN UNPUBLISHED 

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DOCUMENT TO THE COURT AND ALL PARTIES TO THE 

ACTION. 
RENDERED: AUGUST 24, 2017 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED 

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2016-SC-00413-MR 

BRIAN RAMSEY APPELLANT 

ON APPEAL FROM KENTON CIRCUIT COURT 

V. HONORABLE PATRICIA M. SUMME, JUDGE 

NO. 16-CR-00172 

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY 

. MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT 

AFFIRMING 

APPELLEE 

Appellant, Brian Ramsey, appeals from a judgment of the Kenton Circuit 

Court convicting him of second-degree robbery; two counts of tampering with 

physical evidence; being a first-degree persistent felony offender; and· 

sentencing him to a total of twenty years in prison. As grounds for relief, 

Appellant contends that he is entitled to a reversal of the trial court's judgment 

because the prosecutor made improper statements during the Commonwealth's 

closing arguments. For the reasons stated below, we affirm. 

In December 2015, Appellant entered a bank in downtown Covington and 

passed a note to the teller demanding money and indicating that. h~ had a gun. 

The teller handed over approximately $2,000.00. 
Through a series of eye-witnesses,-police easily traced Appellant's 

getaway path from the bank, and he was captured a short time later at the 

Florence Mall, where he had spent much of the stolen money. A portion of the 

stolen cash was recovered from his person at the time of his arrest. About a 

week after his arrest, and while incarcerated awaiting trial, another $250.00 of 

the robbery proceeds was discovered concealed inside Appellant's anal cavity. 

Appellant was charged with second-degree robbery, two counts of 

tampering with physical evidence, and of being a first-degree persistent felony 

offender. One charge of tampering with evidence involved the money removed 

from Appellant's rectum. 

As his only ground for relief, Appellant contends that the prosecutor 

engaged in misconduct when he said the following during his guilt-phase 

closing argument: 

A week after the robbery, he's still got evidence shoved up his own 

backside. Again, still a week later, after he's been arrested, hiding 

the evidence from police. I can only imagine hoping to take that 

money off so he can spend it in prison somewhere I suppose. 

[Objection overruled.] Whatever he was going to do with it; by 

where he put it, he was hoping no one was going to find it there. 

Appellant contends that this argument is improper because it mentions prison, 

and he further contends, "if [the improper comment] did not lead to his 

conviction, it could have led to the harsh sentence that the jury recommended.". 

In that vein, Appellant points out that he received the maximum available 

sentence for the crimes. 

"The parties have wide-latitude during closing statements to argue their 

respective cases, to comment on the evidence and draw reasonable inferences 

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therefrom, and to draw attention to the weaknesses in the opposing party's 

case." Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762, 796 (Ky. 2013). Further, 

"In order to justify reversal, the misconduct of the prosecutor must be so 

serious as to render the entire trial fundamentally unfair." Stopher v. 

Commonwealth, 57 S.W.3d 787, 805 (Ky. 2001) (citation omitted). In addition, 

"we reverse for prosecutorial misconduct in a closing argument only if the 

misconduct is 'flagrant,' or if each of the following three conditions is satisfied: 

(1) proof of the defendant's guilt is not overwhelming; (2) defense counsel 

objected; and (3) the trial court failed to cure the error with a sufficient 

admonishment to the jury." Eames v. Commonwealth, 91 S.W.3d 564, 568 

(Ky. 2002). 

We are persuaded that the prosecutor's statement.under review falls well 

within the permissible range of commentary on the evidence. We see nothing 

in the statement that rendered the trial fundamentally unfair, and since the 

evidence of Appellant's guilt was overwhelming, we fail to see how the 

prosecutor's comments adversely affected the verdict. 

We adhere to the long-settled standard of our predecessor court that "in 

making their arguments to the jury, [prosecutors] should confine themselves to 

the law and the evidence, and should not go outside of the record for the 

purpose of bringing to the attention of the jury matters which have no bearing 

whatever on the questions at issue, and which are conveyed to the jury for the 

sole purpose of inflaming their passions and exciting their prejudice." Chicago, 

St. L. & N.O.R. Co. v. Rowell, 151 S.W. 950, 955 (Ky. 1912) (citations omitted). 

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As with any matter, prosecutors may not include references to prisori in their 

closing arguments in order to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury. 

However, we have no bright line rule similar to our rule against commenting on 

a defendant's right to remain silent that prohibits the mere mention of "prison" 

in a prosecutor's guilt-phase closing argument. 

In context, the prosecutor was plainly inferring from the evidence a 

plausible motive that might explain why Appellant would.try to conceal and 

retain some of the stolen cash after his arrest. We see nothing unfair or 

improper about the comment. Accordingly, we are persuaded that no error 

occurred. 

In any event, even if the comment were deemed to have crossed the 

bounds of propriety, it was harmless. Eye-witnesses allowed police to quickly 

identify and find Appellant and arrest him with some of the stolen money in 

hand, and more of the stolen money concealed on his person under 

circumstances that he could not plausibly refute. Furthermore, he admitted 

his guilt in a telephone call from the jail. In light of this overwhelming evidence 

of guilt, the prosecutor's fleeting reference to "prison" in Appellant's future 

could not possibly have swayed the verdict in this case. Evidentiary and other 

non-constitutional errors will be deemed harmless if we can say with fair 

assurance that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error. 

· Winstead v. Commonwealth, 283 S.W.3d 678, 689 (Ky. 2009) (citation o_mitted). 

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For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Kenton Circuit Court is 

affirmed. 

All sitting. All concur. 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Linda Roberts Horsman 

Assistant Public Advocate 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Andy Beshear 

Attorney General of Kentucky 

Kenneth Wayne Riggs 

Assistant Attorney General 

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