J-A10042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

JAMES A. LAWSON 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1727 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 24, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-CR-0000834-2015

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., KING, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 6, 2023

James A. Lawson (“Appellant”) appeals from the order entered by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County dismissing without an 

evidentiary hearing his first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief 

Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Herein, Appellant alleges that prior 

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a post-sentence 

motion asserting that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence and 

by failing to raise an issue on direct appeal challenging the discretionary 

aspects of his sentence. After careful review, we affirm.

This Court’s memorandum decision in Commonwealth v. Lawson, No. 

2832 EDA 2019, (unpublished memorandum) (Pa. Super. filed February 9, 

2021), in which we affirmed judgment of sentence, summarized the facts and 

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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the procedural history associated with Appellant’s trial and direct appeal, as 

follows:

In January of 2015, [the] complainant . . . 19 yearsold was dating Appellant's son . . . . On January 5, 

2015, [the complainant] and [Appellant's son] started 

the evening at [the complainant's] mother's house, 

before leaving for Appellant's house. At Appellant's, 

[the complainant] and [Appellant's son] watched 

television and ate dinner, while Appellant was in his 

room.

After dinner, [the complainant] was in the kitchen 

with [Appellant's] son, who was doing dishes, 

listening to music with his headphones in. Appellant 

called [the complainant] to his room and she went to 

see what he wanted.

When [the complainant] entered the bedroom, 

Appellant said he wanted to talk and told her to sit on 

the couch in the bedroom. He then closed the door, 

locked it, and put something under the door. [The 

complainant] got up and tried to leave the room, but 

Appellant stood between [her] and the door and 

pushed her back. Appellant then pushed [the 

complainant] on to the bed, pinned her down with his 

legs and attempted to put his penis in her mouth, 

whereupon she bit his penis.

At that point, Appellant pulled off [the complainant]'s 

pants and underwear and inserted his penis in her 

vagina. [The complainant] tried to scream, but 

Appellant was covering her mouth with his hand. The 

radio was on in the room, and [the complainant] could 

hear [Appellant's son] in the kitchen doing the dishes.

At some point[,] there was a knock at the door, which 

Appellant ignored. Upon a second knock, Appellant 

got up and opened the door to [Appellant's son]. [The 

complainant] told [Appellant's son] what happened, 

[Appellant and his son argued], then [the 

complainant] and [Appellant's son] returned to [the 
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complainant]'s mother's home. Once at her mother's 

house, [the complainant] told her mother what had 

happened and her mother called the police.

While on patrol on January 6, 2015, at approximately 

2:01 AM, police officers [Thomas] Dempsey and 

[Shawn] Bossert received a radio call for a rape in 

progress . . . . Upon arrival, the officers were met by 

[the complainant's] mother. The officers observed 

[the complainant] sitting on the couch crying. [The 

complainant] told the officers that Appellant . . . had 

raped her, and [she] described the events. Also 

present in the room was [Appellant's son]. Officer 

Dempsey memorialized the information provided by 

[the complainant].

The officers then transported [the complainant] to 

Appellant's home, where she waited while he was 

brought out by police. [The complainant] was then 

taken to the Special Victim's Unit, where she was 

examined, and she gave a statement to Detective 

[Thomas] Martinka. DNA from Appellant was found in 

[the complainant]'s vagina and on her vulva.

Trial Ct. Op., 1/29/20, at 2-3 (record citations omitted).

. . . .

Appellant's first trial ended in a mistrial on August 3, 2018, after 

a jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict. Following a 

second trial, the jury found Appellant guilty of rape by forcible 

compulsion and sexual assault but acquitted him of involuntary 

deviate sexual intercourse (IDSI) on October 18, 2018.[] The trial 

court sentenced Appellant to [an aggravated guideline range 

sentence of seven to fourteen years’ confinement plus 4 years’ 

probation on the rape by forcible compulsion charge and to an 

aggravated guideline range sentence of five to 10 years’ 

confinement on the sexual assault charge, with both sentences 

ordered to run concurrently].[]

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion on September 5, 

2019, seeking modification of his sentence. The trial court denied 

the motion on September 23, 2019.
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Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement challenging the weight of the 

evidence and the Commonwealth's failure to prove the 

complainant's lack of consent beyond a reasonable doubt. In a 

timely supplemental Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant added a 

claim that the trial court erred in denying his pro se Rule 600 

motion to dismiss.

The trial court filed a responsive opinion concluding that: (1) the 

verdicts were not against the weight of the evidence; (2) the trial 

court was under no obligation to consider Appellant's pro se

motions, nor would the court have granted the motion even if 

properly raised; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to establish 

the complainant's lack of consent. The trial court concluded that 

the judgment of sentence should be affirmed.

Lawson, supra.

In Appellant’s direct appeal to this Court, we agreed with the trial court’s 

analysis and opinion on all issues and affirmed judgment of sentence. Id. at 

*7. Relevant for present purposes was our disposition of Appellant’s weight 

of the evidence issue, where we determined that he had failed to preserve it

before the trial court with either a written or oral motion seeking a new trial 

on this basis. Id. at *3 (citing Commonwealth v. Roche, 153 A.3d 1063, 

1071 (Pa. Super. 2017) (recognizing Rule 607(A) of the Pennsylvania Rules of 

Criminal Procedure requires an appellant to preserve a weight of the evidence 

challenge in a timely motion either prior to or post-sentence). Appellant filed 

no petition for allowance of appeal with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

On September 23, 2021, Appellant timely filed a first PCRA petition. The 

PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended PCRA petition on 

February 9, 2022, raising issues alleging that trial counsel had ineffectively 

failed to preserve on direct appeal claims challenging the weight of the 
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evidence and the discretionary aspects of his sentence. On June 24, 2022, 

the PCRA denied relief without a hearing. Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal on June 29, 2022. 

Appellant raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:

1. Whether the PCRA court erred in denying Appellant’s PCRA 

petition without an evidentiary hearing on the issues raised in 

the amended PCRA petition?

2. Whether the PCRA court was in error in not granting relief on 

the issue that counsel was ineffective for the following 

reasons[:] Counsel was ineffective for failure to file a motion 

for reconsideration of sentence[;] . . . and Counsel was 

ineffective for failing to file a post-verdict motion that the 

verdict was against the weight of the evidence.

Brief for Appellant, at 8.1

We review the PCRA court's denial of relief by “examining whether the 

PCRA court's findings of fact are supported by the record, and whether its 

conclusions of law are free from legal error.” Commonwealth v. Busanet, 

54 A.3d 35, 45 (Pa. 2012). We will not disturb the court's decision “unless 

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1 Appellant’s Statement of Questions Involved contains a misstatement of his

ineffective assistance of counsel claim as it relates to the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence. Specifically, at all relevant stages of Appellant’s PCRA action, 

from the filing of his petition to presenting argument in his Brief for Appellant 

in the present appeal, he has challenged direct appeal counsel’s failure to file 

a direct appeal challenging the trial court’s denial of his counseled motion to 

reconsider sentence. In his statement of questions involved, however, the 

issue presented asks whether trial counsel ineffectively failed to file a motion 

for reconsideration of sentence. We disregard this framing of his issue as a 

misstatement, and we proceed to consider his preserved ineffectiveness issue 

directed at direct appeal counsel’s election to forego challenging the trial 

court’s denial of Appellant’s motion to reconsider the discretionary aspects of 

his sentence. 
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there is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Id. (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 355 (Pa. Super. 2020) (en banc)).

 “Our scope of review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and 

the evidence of record, viewed in the light most favorable to the party who 

prevailed in the PCRA court proceeding.” Id.

[T]he PCRA court has the discretion to dismiss a petition 

without a hearing when the court is satisfied “that there are no 

genuine issues concerning any material fact, the defendant is not 

entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no legitimate 

purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” 

Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2). “[T]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court's 

decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must 

show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in 

his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court 

otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.” 

Commonwealth v. D'Amato, 856 A.2d 806, 820 (Pa. 2004).

Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 452 (Pa. 2011).

Appellant raises claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief [for ineffective assistance 

of counsel] only when he proves, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that his conviction or sentence resulted from the 

“[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of 

the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining process 

that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken 

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 9543(a)(2)(ii). “Counsel is presumed 

effective, and to rebut that presumption, the PCRA petitioner must 

demonstrate that counsel's performance was deficient and that 

such deficiency prejudiced him.” Commonwealth v. Colavita, 

993 A.2d 874, 886 (Pa. 2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington,

466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). In Pennsylvania, we have refined the 

Strickland performance and prejudice test into a three-part 

inquiry. See Commonwealth v. Pierce, 786 A.2d 203, 213 (Pa. 

2001). Thus, to prove counsel ineffective, the petitioner must 

show that: (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) 
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counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and (3) 

the petitioner suffered actual prejudice as a result. 

Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 291 (Pa. 2010).

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d at 311-12 (citations modified). 

“[C]ounsel is presumed to be effective, and a PCRA petitioner bears the 

burden of proving otherwise.” Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 1221, 

1226 (Pa. Super. 2022).

“Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing to pursue a baseless or 

meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1042 (Pa. 

Super. 2007) (citation omitted). With respect to ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel, “the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable 

probability that the outcome of the direct appeal proceeding would have been 

different but for counsel's deficient performance.” Commonwealth v. 

Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014).

In Appellant’s first ineffectiveness claim, he argues that direct appeal

counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the discretionary aspects of his 

sentence. Such a claim is cognizable under the PCRA. Commonwealth v. 

Sarvey, 199 A.3d 436, 455 (Pa. Super. 2018).

To succeed on such a claim, a PCRA petitioner must demonstrate that 

the underlying sentencing issue has merit. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 

942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“[I]f the PCRA court can determine 

from the record that the sentence was not excessive ... then there is no 

underlying merit to the ineffectiveness claim and the claim must fail.”). The 

actual prejudice a petitioner must prove with this type of sentencing claim is 
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a showing of reasonable probability that a reviewing court on direct appeal 

would have awarded a reduction in his sentence if prior counsel challenged 

the discretionary aspects of his sentence. Commonwealth v. Paddy, 15 

A.3d 431, 442 (Pa. 2011). 

In this regard, we bear in mind that “[s]entencing is a matter vested in 

the sound discretion of the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth 

v. Barnes, 167 A.3d 110, 122 n.9 (Pa. Super. 2017) (en banc). We will only 

vacate a sentence falling within the guidelines when the application of the 

guidelines would be clearly unreasonable. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(c)(2). An 

“unreasonable” decision is “one that is irrational or not guided by sound 

judgment.” Sarvey, 199 A.3d at 456 (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted). 

Moreover, a court need not undertake a lengthy discourse to satisfy the 

requirement that it state its reasons for imposing sentence. Commonwealth 

v. Rush, 162 A.3d 530, 544 (Pa. Super. 2017). Rather, “the record as a 

whole must reflect the sentencing court's consideration of the facts of the 

crime and character of the offender.” Id. (citation omitted). We presume a 

court that has the benefit of a PSI thus is apprised of all relevant sentencing 

criteria. Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 908 (Pa. Super. 2008).

Appellant contends that his concurrently run, aggravated range 

guideline sentences reflected an abuse of the trial court’s sentencing 

discretion. Specifically, Appellant contends that the court failed to consider 
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various mitigating factors at issue in his case, including his troubled and 

unstable home environment as a youth, where his parents suffered from 

mental health issues and physically abused him, and his own lengthy mental 

health history exacerbated by his chronic use of marijuana, cocaine, pills, and 

abusing alcohol. Although Appellant dropped out of school in eleventh grade, 

he did complete his GED in 1994. Brief for Appellant, at 17.

The record shows, however, that Appellant’s sentencing hearing began 

with the court’s acknowledgement of the mental health evaluation report, a 

presentence investigation (“PSI”) report, and sentencing guideline forms. 

From there, the court entertained lengthy arguments made by both counsel, 

respectively,2 and gave audience to Appellant’s allocution offering continued 

denials of guilt as well as a history of his mental health issues and the claim 

that he led a law-abiding life when his medications were adjusted correctly. 

N.T., 8/27/19, at 1-35. Immediately prior to sentencing, moreover, the court 

acknowledged its contemplation of both the arguments and allocution as well 

as of the particular facts and circumstances of the case and sentencing 

memoranda submitted by both sides. N.T. at 35. 

The trial court then made the following findings regarding mitigating and 

aggravating sentencing factors:

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2 Defense counsel frequently referred to Appellant’s mitigating circumstances, 

including his prior homelessness, mental health issues including his 

schizophrenia, polysubstance abuse, his attainment of a GED despite his 

challenges, and his “relatively” good behavior except for his commission of 

two separate simple assaults in 2002 and 2006, respectively. N.T. at 9-20. 
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The Court: This Court finds as mitigating factors the defendant’s 

history of homelessness, mental health challenges, his history 

from substance abuse and a number of familial crutches that are 

consistent with that. The defendant’s limited number of previous 

convictions is already reflected in the guidelines through the Prior 

Record Score.

As aggravating factors, this Court finds disturbing that the 

defendant was in the position of relative authority when he 

committed this offense, howe he availed himself of this 

opportunity.

This Court also finds as an aggravating factor the defendant’s lack 

of remorse. And I don’t say that because he is not admitting his 

guilt, no one is expecting him to do that, within a number of other 

statements that he makes. This Court also considers as an 

aggravating factor the impact on the victim.

This Court also credits the Presentence Report in particular in its 

finding that the defendant is at significant risk for committing 

future offenses.

Particularly, when compounded with the sexual history as given 

by the defendant himself, wherein he admits to having engaged 

in unwanted touching of other girls by grinding on them without 

their consent at the age [of] 11. While that may not be necessarily 

the most dangerous thing, although inappropriate in many other 

ways . . ., the defendant’s history has borne out in a way that 

confirms all the factors that show him to be a danger to society.

. . . .

We’ll order a statement on health evaluation, dual diagnosis for 

treatment recommendations, which the defendant is to be 

compliant with throughout his incarceration.

And all of the following programming must be completed before 

the defendant is eligible for parole: Individual counsel, anger 

management, vocational training, parenting classes.

N.T. at 35-37.
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This record reflects the trial court’s full and informed consideration of 

mitigating and aggravating circumstances, including Appellant's mental health

history and needs as well as the court's responsibility to protect the public. 

Supported, therefore, is the conclusion that the trial court considered all

relevant sentencing factors and weighed those factors when imposing 

Appellant’s sentence. Boyer, 856 A.2d at 154. Thus, even if direct appeal 

counsel had raised a challenge to the discretionary aspects of Appellant’s 

sentence, we conclude there is not a reasonable probability that the result of 

his direct appeal would have been different. Reed, 42 A.3d at 319. 

Accordingly, Appellant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without 

merit.

In Appellant’s remaining claim, he maintains that trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to file a post-sentence motion challenging the 

weight of the evidence. Regarding challenges to a verdict based on the weight 

of the evidence, we have observed:

The weight of the evidence is a matter exclusively for the finder 

of fact, who is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

and to determine the credibility of the witnesses. A new trial is 

not warranted because of a mere conflict in the testimony and 

must have a stronger foundation than a reassessment of the 

credibility of witnesses. Rather, the role of the trial judge is to 

determine that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal 

weight with all the facts is to deny justice.

On appeal, our purview is extremely limited and is confined to 

whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the jury 

verdict did not shock its conscience. Thus, appellate review of a 

weight claim consists of a review of the trial court's exercise of 
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discretion, not a review of the underlying question of whether the 

verdict is against the weight of the evidence. An appellate court 

may not reverse a verdict unless it is so contrary to the evidence 

as to shock one's sense of justice.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 109 A.3d 711, 723 (Pa. Super. 2015) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Commonwealth v. 

Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1036 (Pa. 2007) (holding that an appellate court 

reviews a trial court's denial of a weight of the evidence claim for an abuse of 

discretion and stating that “the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial 

based on a weight of the evidence claim is the least assailable of its rulings” 

(citation omitted)).

When a weight claim “is predicated on the credibility of trial testimony, 

our review of the trial court's decision is extremely limited. Generally, unless 

the evidence is so unreliable and/or contradictory as to make any verdict 

based thereon pure conjecture, these types of claims are not cognizable on 

appellate review.” Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 981 A.2d 274, 282 (Pa. Super. 

2009) (citation omitted).

Specifically, Appellant’s weight claim centers on the allegedly

inconsistent and incredible statements of Complainant made during the 

investigation and as a witness at trial. His “sampling” of such statements

includes:

Her testimony that she injured her right side during the rape, 

which conflicted with the treating physician’s testimony that his 

notes stated she reported a left side injury;
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Her response of “no" when the detective asked whether she 

was injured, but then following that with a claim of pain in her 

vagina;

Her report to police that her only words during the rape were, 

“no”, which conflicted with her testimony that she also yelled 

her boyfriend’s name three to four times;

Complainant never testified to a struggle, but the investigating 

detective testified it looked like a struggle had taken place;

Complainant testified that she and Appellant had met before, 

but Appellant’s son testified the two had never before met;

Complainant testified Appellant pushed her onto the bed and 

grabbed her wrists, which was inconsistent with a police report 

she completed in which she checked “no” boxes to questions 

asking if she was pushed and if she was grabbed; 

Complainant testified that she bit Appellant’s penis but there is 

no photographic or documentary proof of this;

Complainant told the investigating police officer that Appellant 

ejaculated, told the detective hours later that she was not sure, 

then told the treating physician that Appellant ejaculated;

Complainant gave varied responses as to whether Appellant 

kissed her; and

Complainant had prior convictions involving dishonesty and 

had a motive to lie about the encounter because it involved her 

boyfriend’s father.

Brief of Appellant at 18-19 (paraphrased).

A verdict is against the weight of the evidence where “certain facts are 

so clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight 

with all the facts is to deny justice.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 

245, 258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). Moreover, an en banc panel 

of this Court has stated:
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The finder of fact is the exclusive judge of the weight of the 

evidence as the fact finder is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence presented and determines the credibility of the 

witnesses. 

As an appellate court, we cannot substitute our judgment for 

that of the finder of fact. Therefore, we will reverse a jury’s 

verdict and grant a new trial only where the verdict is so 

contrary to the evidence as to shock one's sense of justice. A 

verdict is said to be contrary to the evidence such that it shocks 

one's sense of justice when “the figure of Justice totters on her 

pedestal,” or when “the jury's verdict, at the time of its 

rendition, causes the trial judge to lose his breath, temporarily, 

and causes him to almost fall from the bench, then it is truly 

shocking to the judicial conscience.”

Commonwealth v. Boyd, 73 A.3d 1269, 1274–1275 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en 

banc). 

Here, Appellant contends that “[h]ad the Superior Court considered this 

issue [on direct appeal], the Court would have found that the evidence was 

so inherently reliable [sic] that a verdict based upon it could amount to no 

more than surmise or conjecture.” Brief for Appellant at 20. The 

Commonwealth counters that the identified inconsistencies are minor at best

and, when viewed against not only the complainant’s account of how Appellant 

isolated her, pinned her down, sexually assaulted and raped her, but also how 

she chose to subject herself to multiple law enforcement interviews, medical 

treatment, and a pelvic exam, such inconsistencies fail to rise to a level 

causing the verdict to shock one’s sense of justice.

For its part, the trial court opines:

The Superior Court “has long recognized that the uncorroborated 

testimony of a sexual assault victim, if believed by the trier of fact, 
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is sufficient to convict a defendant, despite contrary evidence from 

defense witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Diaz, 152 A.3d 1040, 

1047 (Pa. Super. 2016). . . . Assuming that there were 

contradictions or conflicts in the testimony, it is the role of the jury 

“to weigh the evidence and resolve conflicts therein.” 

Commonwealth v. Story, 383 A.2d 155, 167 (Pa. 1978). See 

also Commonwealth v. Ward, No. 109 EDA 2019, 2018 Pa. 

Super. Unpub. LEXIS 4478, at *15 (Nov. 28, 2018). Resolving 

conflicts in the testimony is an “appropriate jury function and [an] 

appellant will not be heard to complain.” Commonwealth v. 

Gardner, 416 A.2d 1007, 1009 (Pa. 1980). Here the jury was 

properly instructed on how to evaluate conflicting evidence. “Our 

law presumes that juries follow the court’s instructions as to the 

applicable law.” Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 701 A.2d492, 503 

(Pa. 1997).

[The trial court] observed the testimony of the complainant and 

heard from the corroborating/prompt complaint witnesses. The 

[trial court] found the complainant credible, and the behavior of 

the complainant and others following the incident supported her 

credibility. Under all the facts and circumstances of the evidence 

presented, [the trial court] is in no way shocked by the verdict, 

which was based upon the credible and not meaningfully 

impeached testimony of complainant.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/29/20, pp. 5-6.

Applying our standard of review, we discern no abuse of discretion in 

the trial court’s reasoning. Finding no error below, therefore, we conclude 

there is no arguable merit to Appellant’s claims that trial counsel provided 

ineffective assistance by failing to file a post-sentence motion raising a weight 

of the evidence claim challenging his convictions.

For the reasons stated herein, we find no abuse of discretion in the PCRA 

court’s order denying Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing. 

Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/6/2023