UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

JAHANSHAH KOHANSIMEH, 

 Plaintiff, Case No. 3:18-cv-144 

vs. 

FRANKLIN HALLEY, District Judge Thomas M. Rose 

 Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman 

 Defendant. 

______________________________________________________________________________

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION1 THAT: (1) DEFENDANT’S UNOPPOSED 

MOTION TO DISMISS (DOC. 8) BE GRANTED; AND (2) THIS CASE BE 

TERMINATED ON THE COURT’S DOCKET

______________________________________________________________________________ 

This civil case is before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Doc. 8. Pro se

Plaintiff did not oppose Defendant’s motion, and the time for doing so has expired. Accordingly, 

the undersigned has considered all of the foregoing, and the motion is now ripe for decision. 

I. 

A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) operates to test the 

sufficiency of the complaint and permits dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted.” To show grounds for relief, Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires that the complaint 

contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 

While Fed. R. Civ. P. 8 “does not require ‘detailed factual allegations’ . . . it demands more than 

an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 

678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Pleadings offering mere 

“‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not 

do.’” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In determining a motion to dismiss, “courts ‘are not 

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 Attached hereto is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and 

Recommendation. 
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bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.’” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Further, “[f]actual allegations must 

be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. “[T]he factual allegations 

must be specific enough to justify ‘drag[ging] a defendant past the pleading threshold.’” DM 

Research, Inc. v. Coll. of Am. Pathologists, 170 F.3d 53, 55 (1st Cir. 1999). 

In order “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. In addition to well-pleaded allegations in the complaint, the Court may also consider “matters 

of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the 

complaint,” as well as documents attached to a defendant’s motion to dismiss that are important 

to the plaintiff’s claims or if referred to in the complaint. Amini v. Oberlin College, 259 F.3d 493, 

502 (6th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted); Composite Tech., L.L.C. v. Inoplast Composites S.A. de 

C.V., 925 F. Supp. 2d 868, 873 (S.D. Ohio 2013). 

A claim is plausible where “plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

at 678. Plausibility “is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,’ but it asks for more than a sheer 

possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. “[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not 

permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged -

- but it has not ‘show[n]’ -- ‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’” Id. at 679 (alteration in original) 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). 

II.

 On April 3, 2018, the Probate Court of Montgomery County, Ohio (“Probate Court”) 

found, by clear and convincing evidence, that pro se Plaintiff suffered from a mental illness and, 

therefore, was subject to court ordered hospitalization pursuant to Ohio Rev. Code § 5122.01(B). 

PageID 67. Pursuant to an order issued by the Probate Court on April 3, 2018, Plaintiff was 
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committed for inpatient treatment at the Psychiatric Unit of Miami Valley Hospital for a period 

not to exceed ninety days. PageID 70. Further, the Probate Court granted a motion for forced 

medication or other forced medical treatment. Id. 

 Plaintiff brings this action against Defendant Franklin Halley, M.D., a private psychiatrist 

employed at Miami Valley Hospital, alleging that Dr. Halley provided false testimony in an 

affidavit submitted to the Probate Court. PageID 12. On May 2, 2018, Plaintiff filed this action 

in federal court purporting to assert civil rights claims against Dr. Halley under, presumably, 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. Doc. 3 at PageID 80-83. The Court finds Defendant’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s 

complaint is well-taken for a number of reasons. 

 First, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to invoke the Court’s federal question jurisdiction and 

proceed against Dr. Halley under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, he fails to allege that Dr. Halley is a state 

actor. See Green v. Throckmorton, 681 F.3d 853, 859-60 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that, “[t]o prevail 

on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived 

the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States”). Alternatively, 

insofar as Plaintiff seeks to proceed under the Court’s diversity jurisdiction, he cannot do so 

because, as he alleges, both he and Dr. Halley are Ohio citizens. See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(1). 

Accordingly, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this action. 

Second, insofar as Plaintiff seeks to challenge the Probate Court’s Commitment Order, his 

proper remedy is to file an appeal in the appropriate Ohio Court of Appeals. See McCormick v. 

Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393-96 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding federal district courts lack subject 

matter jurisdiction, under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, over claims that attempt to appeal a state 

court judgment); accord Kinter v. Boltz, No. 3:12-cv-85, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96482, at *5-9 

(S.D. Ohio July 12, 2012), aff’d, No. 12-4167, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 12540 (6th Cir. May 1, 

2013). 
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Finally, insofar as the Probate Court proceedings remain pending, this Court should abstain 

pursuant to the authority of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Under the Younger abstention 

doctrine, federal courts must abstain where “(1) state proceedings are pending; (2) the state 

proceedings involve an important state interest; and (3) the state proceeding will afford the plaintiff 

an adequate opportunity to raise his constitutional claims.” Kelm v. Hyatt, 44 F.3d 415, 419 (6th 

Cir. 1995); see also Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619 

(1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).

III.

Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that Defendant’s 

unopposed motion to dismiss (doc. 8) be GRANTED, and that this case be TERMINATED on 

the Court’s docket.

Date: August 13, 2018 s/ Michael J. Newman 

 Michael J. Newman 

 United States Magistrate Judge 
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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections 

to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after being served with 

this Report and Recommendation. This period is not extended by virtue of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d) if 

served on you by electronic means, such as via the Court’s CM/ECF filing system. If, however, 

this Report and Recommendation was served upon you by mail, this deadline is extended to 

SEVENTEEN DAYS by application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). Parties may seek an extension of the 

deadline to file objections by filing a motion for extension, which the Court may grant upon a 

showing of good cause. 

Any objections filed shall specify the portions of the Report and Recommendation objected 

to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report 

and Recommendation is based, in whole or in part, upon matters occurring of record at an oral 

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such 

portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the 

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. 

A party may respond to another party’s objections within FOURTEEN days after being 

served with a copy thereof. As noted above, this period is not extended by virtue of Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 6(d) if served on you by electronic means, such as via the Court’s CM/ECF filing system. If, 

however, this Report and Recommendation was served upon you by mail, this deadline is extended 

to SEVENTEEN DAYS by application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d). 

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. 

See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 153-55 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 

(6th Cir. 1981).