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THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

___________________________

Hillsborough-northern judicial district

No. 2021-0462

PETITION OF THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Argued: September 15, 2022

Opinion Issued: January 31, 2023

John M. Formella, attorney general, and Anthony Galdieri, solicitor 

general (Elizabeth C. Woodcock, senior assistant attorney general, on the brief 

and orally), for the State.

Christopher M. Johnson, chief appellate defender, of Concord, on the 

brief and orally, for the juvenile.

HANTZ MARCONI, J. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari 

seeking review of an order of the Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.) declining to 

accept the transfer of a juvenile delinquency case because the superior court

concluded that the circuit court erred when it found that the juvenile was 

competent. The superior court remanded to the circuit court for a new

competency determination. The State argues that RSA 169-B:24 (2022) does 

not authorize the superior court to conduct an appellate review of the circuit

court’s competency ruling. We vacate and remand. 
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I. 

The record supports the following facts. In June 2019, the State filed a 

delinquency petition charging the sixteen-year-old juvenile with attempted

second-degree murder. At arraignment in the circuit court, the State moved to 

certify the juvenile as an adult and to transfer the case to the superior court. 

Before considering transfer, however, the circuit court held a competency 

hearing. After considering expert testimony that the juvenile was not 

competent, the circuit court issued a nine-page order rejecting that testimony 

and finding the juvenile competent. The juvenile then filed a habeas petition in 

superior court challenging the competency finding. The Superior Court

(Anderson, J.) denied the petition because the juvenile had not sought an 

interlocutory appeal of the competency ruling and therefore had not exhausted 

his available remedies. The transfer hearing proceeded, and after considering 

the transfer factors in RSA 169-B:24, I(a)-(h), the circuit court granted the 

State’s transfer petition. 

The Superior Court (Nicolosi, J.) then considered whether to accept 

transfer. It declined, concluding that the circuit court’s earlier competency 

finding was erroneous. It reasoned that the circuit court did not “adequately 

point out the facts upon which it relied,” nor “adequately delineate its reasons 

for rejecting uncontroverted expert testimony.” The court remanded the case to 

the circuit court “for further articulation of any additional facts upon which it 

relied.” The order directed that “[i]f the circuit court upon review finds no 

further factual support for its finding, it shall so state and a finding [of] 

incompetency should be entered.” The State then filed this petition for writ of 

certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 11.

II.

The State argues that the superior court erred by reviewing the circuit

court’s competency finding. It asserts that competency is not a transfer factor 

in RSA 169-B:24, but rather is a “separate and distinct issue addressed under 

RSA 169-B:20.” See RSA 169-B:20 (2022). The State thus argues that the 

superior court exceeded its authority to review the transfer order under RSA 

169-B:24 by reviewing a competency order entered under RSA 169-B:20. In 

opposition, the juvenile argues that the “superior court ha[s] the authority to 

remand the case to the circuit court for a proper application of the competency 

standards governing juveniles.” (Capitalization omitted.) He asserts that he 

has a federal and state constitutional right not to be subjected to a transfer 

hearing unless competent, and that incompetency hampers his defense and 

“render[s] unreliable” the court’s resolution of factual questions. He contends 

that competency falls within the superior court’s authority to review whether 

the circuit court fairly considered the factors of RSA 169-B:24, and whether the 

transfer was erroneous as a matter of law. He argues that the scope of transfer 

review should be construed broadly because of the “statute’s requirement that 
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‘all . . . papers’ filed in the Circuit Court be transferred to the Superior Court”

(quoting RSA 169-B:24, II), and because other transfer cases have reviewed 

questions about the “lawfulness or constitutionality of Circuit Court rulings in 

transfer proceedings.” We agree with the State that review of competency is 

outside the scope of the superior court’s appellate authority under RSA 169-

B:24.

Whether RSA 169-B:24 permits the superior court to review a

competency finding of the circuit court is an issue of statutory interpretation, 

which we review de novo. See Langevin v. Travco Ins. Co., 170 N.H. 660, 664 

(2018). We first look to the language of the statute itself, and, if possible, 

construe that language according to its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. We 

interpret legislative intent from the statute as written and will not consider 

what the legislature might have said or add language that the legislature did 

not see fit to include. Id. We construe all parts of a statute together to 

effectuate its overall purpose and avoid an absurd or unjust result. Id. Absent 

an ambiguity we will not look beyond the language of the statute to discern 

legislative intent. State v. Addison (Capital Murder), 165 N.H. 381, 418 (2013). 

Our goal is to apply statutes in light of the policy sought to be advanced by the 

entire statutory scheme. Id. Accordingly, we interpret a statute in the context 

of the overall statutory scheme and not in isolation. Id.

Under RSA 169-B:24, the decision to transfer a juvenile to superior court 

for adult prosecution falls within the circuit court’s discretion. See RSA 169-

B:24; In re Eduardo L., 136 N.H. 678, 683 (1993). The statute requires the 

circuit court to hold a transfer hearing, and it provides eight factors to guide 

the transfer decision. RSA 169-B:24, I(a)-(h); Eduardo L., 136 N.H. at 683-84. 

Though RSA 169-B:24 does not specify the superior court’s role in accepting 

transfer, we have held that it acts as an appellate court, reviewing the circuit

court’s transfer ruling for an unsustainable exercise of discretion. In re Erik 

M., 146 N.H. 508, 510-11 (2001). In light of the discretionary nature of the 

circuit court’s decision, we have deemed the superior court’s review to be 

limited to whether the circuit court fairly considered all the applicable factors 

of RSA 169-B:24, and whether its decision is supported by the evidence and 

not erroneous as a matter of law. Id. at 510. 

We need not address either the juvenile’s argument that the Federal and 

State Constitutions prohibit conducting a transfer hearing with an incompetent 

juvenile, or the juvenile’s argument that incompetency would undermine the 

reliability of a transfer hearing. Even if we assume that the juvenile is correct, 

these arguments do not affect our analysis. The legislature has recognized the 

importance of juvenile competency, providing statutory safeguards within RSA

169-B:20. Competency is a prerequisite to any delinquency proceeding —

including a transfer hearing. See RSA 169-B:20, VI. If competency is at issue, 

proceedings are suspended until a competency evaluation is performed, and 

the entire petition must be dismissed if competency is not established. RSA 
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169-B:20, VI, VIII. If a juvenile disputes the circuit court’s competency finding, 

the juvenile may seek immediate review in this court by interlocutory appeal

pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 8, or, if the trial court declines to authorize 

such an appeal, by petition for writ of certiorari. See Sup. Ct. R. 8

(interlocutory appeal from ruling); Sup. Ct. R. 11 (petition for original 

jurisdiction). A competency finding may also be reviewed on appeal from a 

final disposition. See, e.g., State v. Moncada, 161 N.H. 791, 793-98 (2011). If 

a juvenile is found to be competent in the circuit court and the case is

transferred, RSA 169-B:20, XI allows the superior court to revisit competency 

and to make its own finding relevant to the adult criminal proceedings. RSA 

169-B:20, XI. Thus, because juvenile competency is protected by a separate 

statute within RSA chapter 169-B and is independently appealable, and 

because RSA 169-B:24 does not include competency as a transfer factor, we 

conclude that transfer review does not include review of the circuit court’s 

competency finding.

Next, the juvenile argues that RSA 169-B:24, II’s requirement that “[a]ll 

original papers” of the circuit court be filed in the superior court supports a 

broad scope of appellate review in the superior court. See RSA 169-B:24, II 

(“All original papers . . . shall be filed with and shall constitute the records of 

the court to which transfer is made.”). The juvenile’s argument effectively asks 

us to consider a single phrase in isolation to support his position that transfer 

review under RSA 169-B:24 includes the circuit court’s competency ruling. We 

do not, however, consider words and phrases in isolation when interpreting 

statutes, but rather within the context of the statute as a whole. Petition of 

Carrier, 165 N.H. 719, 721 (2013). And as described above, review of the 

circuit court’s competency ruling under RSA 169-B:20 is already available.

Given the statutory context of this language, we are not persuaded that it 

supports a broad scope of review. Furthermore, the original records of a 

delinquency proceeding may be relevant to other matters that the superior 

court does have authority to consider. For example, the history of a 

delinquency case may be relevant if the superior court decides to revisit 

competency pursuant to RSA 169-B:20, XI. Thus, this statutory language does 

not support a broad scope of transfer review. 

Nor are we persuaded by the four cases the juvenile cites in support of 

his position that the superior court has the authority to “review[] questions 

about the lawfulness or constitutionality of Circuit Court rulings in transfer 

proceedings.” See Eduardo L. 136 N.H. 678 (reviewing admission of hearsay 

statements during transfer hearing); In re Farrell, 142 N.H. 424 (1997) 

(reviewing evidentiary rulings in the transfer hearing that implicated 

constitutional rights); State v. Gibbs, 126 N.H. 347 (1985) (reviewing circuit 

court’s admission of a confession at the transfer hearing, when it was found at 

trial to violate the right to counsel); and Vernon E., 121 N.H. 836 (reviewing 

whether admission of evidence at transfer hearing violated double jeopardy). 

None of these cases supports a scope of review reaching beyond the transfer
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proceeding itself, because they all dealt with rulings made within transfer 

proceedings. In contrast, competency decisions are made before transfer 

proceedings begin. We decline to extend this line of cases to rulings made 

outside of the transfer hearing.

Lastly, the juvenile contends that “this Court ought bear in mind the 

interpretive principle enacted by the legislature,” namely, that the provisions of 

“RSA 169-B ‘shall be liberally interpreted, construed, and administered to 

effectuate’ the legislature’s purposes, which include . . . encouragement of ‘the 

wholesome moral, mental, emotional, and physical development of each minor 

coming within’ the Chapter’s scope ‘by providing the protection, care, 

treatment, counselling, supervision, and rehabilitative resources which each 

minor needs.’” (Quoting RSA 169-B:1, I.) He argues that including competency 

in transfer review “serves those goals by helping to ensure that courts will not 

transfer for trial in criminal court juveniles who should not be prosecuted in 

that forum.” This policy argument is better made before the legislature. See

Appeal of New England Police Benevolent Ass’n, 171 N.H. 490, 497 (2018) 

(“Because our function is not to make laws, but to interpret them, any public 

policy arguments relevant to the wisdom of the statutory scheme and its 

consequences should be addressed to the General Court.” (quotation omitted)).

As explained above, nothing in RSA 169-B:24 gives the superior court authority 

to review competency findings during a transfer hearing. See RSA 169-B:24. 

For the reasons set forth above, we decline to read such authority into RSA 

169-B:24.

Vacated and remanded.

HICKS, BASSETT, and DONOVAN, JJ., concurred.