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[Congressional Bills 116th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 673 Introduced in Senate (IS)]

<DOC>

116th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. RES. 673

 Affirming that the New START Treaty extension will cover new deployed 
Russian nuclear delivery systems, and supporting additional initiatives 
  to engage China that advance the goal of concluding an arms control 
                          treaty or agreement.

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             August 6, 2020

 Mr. Markey (for himself, Mr. Van Hollen, Mrs. Feinstein, Mr. Merkley, 
  Mr. Durbin, Mrs. Gillibrand, Ms. Warren, Mr. Cardin, Mr. Coons, Ms. 
 Baldwin, Mr. Wyden, Ms. Hirono, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Leahy, Ms. Cantwell, 
 Mr. Sanders, and Ms. Smith) submitted the following resolution; which 
           was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION

 
 Affirming that the New START Treaty extension will cover new deployed 
Russian nuclear delivery systems, and supporting additional initiatives 
  to engage China that advance the goal of concluding an arms control 
                          treaty or agreement.

Whereas, on March 1, 2018, President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation 
        previewed five new Russian nuclear delivery systems in his State of the 
        Nation address;
Whereas two of the new systems, the Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile 
        (ICBM) and the Avangard hypersonic glide vehicle, will count under the 
        limits of the Treaty between the United States of America and the 
        Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation 
        of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as the ``New START 
        Treaty''), as confirmed by Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the 
        Russian Federation;
Whereas an additional pair of new systems, the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo 
        and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, are not projected to 
        be deployed during the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to 
        2026, and even if they were deployed, the United States is able to 
        address its concerns about those weapons through the Bilateral 
        Consultative Committee;
Whereas the Russian Federation's fifth new system, the Kinzhal short-range air-
        launched ballistic missile, is being deployed as a theater-strike weapon 
        on MiG-31 aircraft, rather than on a heavy bomber, in which case it 
        would be automatically accountable under the New START Treaty;
Whereas the advance timing of the Russian Federation's nuclear modernization 
        cycle may allow it to significantly expand its strategic nuclear arsenal 
        relative to the United States in the event that the New START Treaty 
        expires on February 5, 2021;
Whereas the 2020 Annual Report on the Implementation of the new START Treaty 
        concluded that the Russian Federation was ``in compliance with the terms 
        of the New START Treaty'';
Whereas the People's Republic of China has never entered into a treaty or 
        agreement with the United States or any other party that places binding 
        limits on its shorter-range, intermediate-, or strategic-range ballistic 
        missiles, verified by National Technical Means and by on-site 
        inspections, as the United States and Russian Federation did through the 
        Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, the START I and START II 
        Treaties, and the New START Treaty, each of which took multiple years to 
        successfully negotiate;
Whereas the People's Republic of China possesses significantly fewer ICBMs, 
        submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers than 
        the Russian Federation or the United States, and according to the 
        Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China's warhead stockpile is in ``the 
        low couple of hundreds'', a fraction of the size of the arsenals of the 
        Russian Federation and the United States; and
Whereas the People's Republic of China has repeatedly declined invitations by 
        the United States to enter into trilateral negotiations on an arms 
        control treaty or other agreement regarding its nuclear arsenal: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved, That the Senate--
            (1) calls on the President to immediately extend the New 
        START Treaty until 2026;
            (2) affirms that, by extending the New START Treaty until 
        2026, the President of the United States can secure limitations 
        on two new types of Russian Federation strategic weapons beyond 
        those accountable when the Treaty entered into force in 2011 or 
        at any time thereafter;
            (3) calls on the Russian Federation to cease the 
        development of hazardous and provocative new weapons systems 
        including the Burevestnik cruise missile, which is powered by a 
        nuclear reactor and may violate the prohibition in numerous 
        treaties and military manuals against causing superfluous 
        injury and unnecessary suffering;
            (4) affirms the December 1987 statement by President Ronald 
        Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet 
        Union that ``a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be 
        fought'';
            (5) calls on the President to consider the views of the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other United States 
        allies and partners who overwhelmingly back extension of the 
        New START Treaty; and
            (6) supports, following the extension of the New START 
        Treaty, a United States initiative to engage China in 
        negotiations towards the eventual conclusion of an arms control 
        treaty or agreement, starting with steps to reduce the risk of 
        strategic miscalculation and the threat of a nuclear exchange, 
        which may include--
                    (A) a formal invitation to appropriate officials 
                from the People's Republic of China, and to each of the 
                permanent members of the United Nations Security 
                Council, to observe a United States-Russian Federation 
                New START Treaty on-site inspection in 2020 to 
                demonstrate the security benefits of transparency into 
                strategic nuclear forces;
                    (B) an agreement with the People's Republic of 
                China that allows for advance notifications of 
                ballistic missile launches, through the Hague Code of 
                Conduct or other data exchanges or doctrine discussions 
                related to strategic nuclear forces;
                    (C) an agreement not to target or interfere in 
                nuclear command, control, and communications (commonly 
                referred to as ``NC3'') infrastructure; or
                    (D) any other cooperative measure that benefits 
                United States-China strategic stability.
                                 <all>
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