UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

HAKIMAH JABBOR, Case No. 1:18-cv-95

Plaintiff, Dlott, J.

Litkovitz, M.J.

vs.
JAMES GRAHAM,

Defendant.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION
HAKIMAH JABBOR, Case No. 1:18-cv-95
Plaintiff, Dlott, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
JAMES GRAHAM, REPORT AND
Defendant. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Hakimah Jabbor, a resident of Columbus, Ohio, brought a state court action
against United States District Judge James Graham by filing a Petition for Civil Stalking
Protection Order. (Doc. 1-3). The matter was removed to federal court and is now before the
Court on defendant’s motion to dismiss. (Doc. 2). Plaintiff was granted an extension of time
until July 6, 2018 to file a response to the motion to dismiss. (Doc. 8). To date, plaintiff has
failed to file a memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow,
the motion to dismiss should be granted.

Plaintiff's pro se petition alleges that defendant Graham “is avoiding having court, so I
will not receive my property, he has consitantly (sic) use the courts to impede me serving him
cease and desist orders.” (Doc. 1-3 at PAGEID#: 7). Plaintiff's petition arises from a criminal
forfeiture proceeding pending before Judge Graham. See United States v. Deandre Forrest, Case
No. 2:17-cr-158-1 (S.D. Ohio).! Pursuant to a Preliminary Order of Forfeiture entered in that
case, plaintiff file a third-party petition claiming an interest in the property subject to the Order.

(d., Doc. 56). Plaintiff filed numerous motions in connection with the Preliminary Order of

'Federal courts may take judicial notice of proceedings in other courts of record. See Rodic v. Thistledown Racing
Club, Inc., 615 F.2d 736, 738 (6th Cir. 1980) (quoting Granader v. Public Bank, 417 F.2d 75, 82 83 (6th Cir.
1969)). See also National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. VP Bldgs., Inc., 606 F.3d 835, 839 n.2 (6th Cir. 2010); Lyons v.
Stovall, 188 F.3d 327, 333 n.3 (6th Cir. 1999).


Forfeiture, and on January 16, 2018, Judge Graham granted the government’s motion to dismiss
plaintiff's forfeiture petition for failure to comply with 21 U.S.C. § 853(n). (/d., Doc. 77). On
January 19, 2018, three days after Judge Graham’s Order regarding plaintiff's forfeiture petition,
plaintiff filed a Petition for a Civil Stalking Protection Order with the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas. (Petition, ECF No. 1-3, at PagelD#: 7). Defendant then removed the case to
this Court.

Plaintiff's petition should be dismissed because it seeks relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief. Plaintiffs claims against Judge Graham are barred by judicial
immunity. Judges are afforded absolute immunity from liability for acts they commit while
functioning within their judicial capacity. “Like other forms of official immunity, judicial
immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages.” Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Barrett v. Harrington, 130
F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir. 1997). Judges retain absolute immunity from liability even if they act
maliciously or corruptly, as long as they are performing judicial acts and have jurisdiction over
the subject matter giving rise to the suit against them. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57
(1978). See also Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004); Stern v. Mascio, 262
F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2001). It is clear that the decisions made by Judge Graham in the federal
forfeiture proceeding were functions normally performed by judges. Stump, 435 U.S. at 362.
Plaintiff's state court petition related solely to the forfeiture proceedings in Case No. 2:17-cr-
158-1 and did not address any nonjudicial or personal acts by Judge Graham. In addition,
plaintiff has alleged no facts indicating that Judge Graham acted “in the complete absence of all
jurisdiction” in dismissing plaintiff's third-party petition claiming an interest in the property

subject to the Preliminary Order of Forfeiture. See Stern, 262 F.3d at 607. Therefore, Judge


Graham is absolutely immune from civil liability in this matter. Accordingly, defendant’s
motion to dismiss should be granted because plaintiff's petition seeks relief from a defendant
who is immune from suit.

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss be GRANTED.

2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) that for the foregoing reasons an
appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith
and therefore deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Plaintiff remains free to apply to
proceed in forma pauperis in the Court of Appeals. See Callihan v. Schneider, 178 F.3d 800,
803 (6th Cir. 1999), overruling in part Floyd v. United States Postal Serv., 105 F.3d 274, 277

(6th Cir. 1997).

pate:_ 7/31/13 Ken tol

Karen L. Litkovitz, Magistrate Judge
United States District Court