Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 62A01-1504-PO-145 | October 23, 2015 Page 1 of 11

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

S. Rod Acchiardo

Tell City, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Larry R. Flanagan,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Mary J. Beckman,

Appellee-Petitioner.

October 23, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

62A01-1504-PO-145

Appeal from the Perry Circuit 

Court

The Honorable M. Lucy Goffinet, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

62C01-1501-PO-27

Riley, Judge.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellant-Defendant, Larry Flanagan (Flanagan), appeals the trial court’s 

issuance of a protective order against him in favor of Appellee-Petitioner, Mary 

Jo Beckman (Beckman).

[2] We reverse. 

ISSUE

[3] Flanagan raises one issue on appeal, which we restate as the following: 

Whether there was sufficient evidence to issue a protective order.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Beckman is Flanagan’s sister. There are eight siblings in total and Flanagan is 

the only son. Their Parents had a farm in Perry County, Indiana, and because 

Beckman and her husband lived close to the Parents, they would, from time to 

time, help the Parents with the farm. In 1994, the Parents were struggling 

financially and it was agreed that Beckman would buy a portion of the farm to 

ease their financial strain. Also, it was decided that Beckman would pay for the 

land over a period of time. All siblings were informed and were on board with 

this arrangement. Four years later, in 1998, Beckman finished paying for the 

first parcel of land, and she proposed buying additional land from the Parents. 

This time, however, Beckman’s and Flanagan’s father (Father) needed the 

money upfront, so Beckman refinanced her house to pay for the land. 
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[5] In February of 2011, ninety-three-year old Father died in his sleep. Weeks after 

the burial, the siblings made a demand for proof of payment of all the land that 

Beckman had purchased from the Parents. The sibling also had a survey 

conducted for the residual land. Beckman’s and Flanagan’s mother (Mother), 

who hated farm life, sought to sell off the farm quickly and move to the city. 

[6] Around the same time, Beckman claims that Flanagan visited her home and 

demanded that she should write a check for $134,000 to purchase the remaining 

farm land and the Parents’ home. Thereafter, on August 9, 2011, averring to 

act as an agent of Mother in accordance with his power of attorney, Flanagan 

sent Beckman a letter captioned, “American Greed.” (Tr. p. 10). In that letter, 

Flanagan claimed that there was a discrepancy in the survey that Beckman had 

conducted when she purchased the first parcel of land in 1994; therefore, the 

property line was incorrect, and it was crucial for that mistake to be rectified. 

In the same letter, Flanagan requested that Beckman sign a deed that he had 

drawn up. Flanagan indicated that if Beckman failed to comply, he would be 

suing her for fraud. 

[7] Beckman did not heed Flanagan’s demands, so on August 24, 2011, Flanagan 

again made contact with Beckman. This time, Flanagan left a telephone voice 

message to Beckman stating, in part, that

Mary Jo, . . . all we are waiting on now is getting the pond 

settled. So we need to get that done. I have got the letter that 

you give (sic) Carol Jean and [] I am going to take it to John 

Werner [on] Friday and let him look at it. But personally[,] I 

think its pretty much a joke. I don’t think it will hold up in court 
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because it is not legal. [] But anyway we need to get the pond 

settled . . . you have [] a legal deed to the pond, land, [] but may I 

remind you that when you bought that land, [] you made it a 

point to tell me that it was a short section, that you was buying x

number of acres, . . . the deal [was] up to the pond []. [] So now 

since you made a mistake on the surveying, [] you think you [] 

got it[?] . . . Other than that, [] if you don’t want to cooperate, 

there is ways to make you cooperate[,] so hopefully we don’t 

have to go that route.

(Tr. p. 15). 

[8] Meanwhile, Beckman acquired a deed for all the land she had purchased from 

the Parents, and reverted the disputed portion—the pond—to Mother. 

According to Beckman, around the same time, Flanagan informed Beckman’s

neighbors about the dispute. Also, Flanagan visited his other sister’s place of 

work, Carol Jean (Jean), with an aerial view of the farm and informed her

about the disagreement. 

[9] According to Beckman, for three years, Flanagan had no contact with her.

However, in January of 2015, Flanagan got wind that Beckman and Jean were 

organizing a Christmas family gathering. Flanagan was not invited to the 

party. As such, on January 5, 2015, Flanagan wrote to Beckman a letter 

stating:

I hear that you are having a little get together. [] I want to thank 

you for doing this because I really want to hear the real story too. 

[] I really want to find out who took (stole) all of Dad’s papers 

(all his Records, Bank Statements etc.) from his bedroom right 

after he passed. And what this person was (or is) covering up. [] 
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Also[,] I am looking forward to hearing this person tell why they 

stole all of his papers. 

So Mary Jo, me [and] my [h]onest sisters are looking forward to 

this meeting. See you on the 10th.

Your honest [b]rother.

P.S. 

Mary Jo, Thanks again for doing this. Because it’s time for 

everybody to know the real truth. 

(Appellant’s App. p. 16). 

[10] On January 16, 2015, Beckman filed a petition for a protective order against 

Flanagan. On March 30, 2015, Beckman and Flanagan appeared pro se, and 

they both argued their cases. After hearing all the evidence, the trial court 

found that Beckman “has shown by preponderance of the evidence that stalking

has occurred” to justify the issuance of a protective order. (Tr. p. 26). 

[11] Flanagan now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary. 

DISCUSSION AND DECISION 

I. Standard of Review

[12] As an initial matter, we note that Beckman did not file an appellee’s brief. 

When an appellee fails to file a brief in response, we need not undertake the 

burden of constructing an argument on the appellee’s behalf. Tisdial v. Young, 

925 N.E.2d 783, 784 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). We will reverse the trial court’s 

judgment if the appellant presents a case of prima facie error, which is defined 
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in this context as “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.” Id. at 

784-85.

[13] In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s judgment 

regarding a protective order, we neither reweigh the evidence nor resolve 

questions of credibility. See Tons v. Bley, 815 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2004). We consider only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that 

support the trial court’s judgment. Maurer v. Cobb-Maurer, 994 N.E.2d 753, 755 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013). We will reverse the trial court’s judgment regarding a 

protective order only if it is clearly erroneous—that is to say, when a review of 

the record leaves us firmly convinced that a mistake has been made. See 

Mysliwy v. Mysliwy, 953 N.E.2d 1072, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied.

[14] The Indiana Civil Protection Order Act (the Act) provides that a protective 

order may be issued when a trial court finds, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, that the respondent represents a credible threat to the safety of the 

petitioner or a member of the petitioner’s household—that is, that domestic or 

family violence has occurred. See Maurer, 994 N.E.2d at 755 (citing Ind. Code § 

34-26-5-9). Except for an act of self-defense, “domestic or family violence” 

means the occurrence of at least one of the following acts committed by a 

family or household member:

(1) Attempting to cause, threatening to cause, or causing physical 

harm to another family or household member.

(2) Placing a family or household member in fear of physical 

harm.

(3) Causing a family or household member to involuntarily 
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engage in sexual activity by force, threat of force, or duress.

(4) Beating [ ], torturing [ ], mutilating [ ], or killing a 

vertebrate animal without justification with the intent to 

threaten, intimidate, coerce, harass, or terrorize a family or 

household member.

For purposes of IC 34-26-5, domestic and family violence also 

includes stalking (as defined in IC 35-45-10-1) or a sex offense 

under IC 35-42-4, whether or not the stalking or sex offense is 

committed by a family or household member.

I.C. § 34-6-2-34.5.

[15] In seeking a protective order against Flanagan, Beckman bore the burden of 

proof by a preponderance of the evidence that Flanagan represents a credible 

threat to her safety. Here, the trial court concluded that the two letters that 

Flanagan had sent to Beckman as well as the voice message, were 

“inappropriate.” (Tr. p. 23). As such, the trial court found that there was 

evidence of stalking and Beckman was entitled to a protective order. 

II. Stalking

[16] Stalking is defined as “a knowing or an intentional course of conduct involving 

repeated or continuing harassment of another person that would cause a 

reasonable person to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or threatened and 

that actually causes the victim to feel terrorized, frightened, intimidated, or 

threatened.” I.C. § 35-45-10-1.4 “Harassment” in turn is defined as “conduct 

directed toward a victim that includes but is not limited to repeated or 

continuing impermissible contact that would cause a reasonable person to suffer 
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emotional distress and that actually causes the victim to suffer emotional 

distress.” I.C. § 35-45-10-2. 

[17] In the present case, Beckman testified that Flanagan’s letter and telephone voice 

message which occurred in 2011, as well as the letter addressed to her in 

January 2015, made her feel threatened and intimidated. In his appellate brief, 

Flanagan argues that the “sporadic contacts are arguably not sufficient to 

constitute a repeated or continuing conduct” that would cause a reasonable 

person to suffer emotional distress. (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). Specifically, he 

posits that the two contacts in 2011 “are too remote in time to constitute a 

sufficient threat to Beckman.” (Appellant’s Br. p. 8). Justifying his contacts 

with Beckman, Flanagan argues that he had “a legitimate business interest over 

which he was attempting to communicate with Beckman[—]i.e. an accounting, 

division and sale of the real property that was part of their father’s estate.” 

(Appellant’s Br. p. 8). 

[18] At trial, Beckman stated:

The survey showed that [] the line was a couple of feet north 

from where [] Flanagan thought it should be. It touched the farm 

pond that was a water source for the barn. I told him that I 

would give them the pond. He is not a lawyer, he is not a 

surveyor and he is not the land owner. I think those are the only 

people who can write deeds. . . . He demanded that I sign this 

illegal deed. [] So [] I refused. Okay, so I proceeded to get [] a 

legal deed [] and I gave them the pond they were screaming 

about. It was 1/10th of an acre. [] After this was done, the 

screaming continued. They wanted me to get a new survey and 

move the line. So I no longer responded to this. He has my 
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mother thinking she is totally incompetent, which she is not.

****

. . . He has always enjoyed teasing and tormenting our kids to 

make them cry. We had to be on guard all the time when he was 

around to protect our kids. . . . my daddy said that my sister was 

kind of like a cow, circling her calf to make sure that her kids 

weren’t tormented by him. Studies have showed that this type of 

personality is that type that goes crazy and does things. Which I 

do not want to be a statistic. I am scared. I have installed 

driveway alarms, I have installed an ADT system in my home. 

He does not act rationally and I don’t want to wait around to see 

what he does next. I don’t want to be a statistic when he goes 

berserk. 

(Tr. pp. 11-12). 

[19] In response to Beckman’s claims, Flanagan pointed out that he was not stalking 

Beckman, but “all I was trying to do was . . . get the place sold and . . . 

Beckman was not cooperative . . . .” (Tr. p. 17). In addition, Flanagan denied 

ever going to Beckman’s house to demand a “check for $134, 000 for the 

remaining land and house”; rather, because Beckman was not cooperating, 

Flanagan instructed his sister “to offer [Beckman] to buy the rest of the property 

at the appraisal price.” (Tr. p. 17). As for the 2015 letter, Flanagan indicated 

that even though he was not invited to the family gathering, it was not at 

Beckman’s house but at Jean’s house.

[20] Viewed from the perspective of our standard of review, we agree with Flanagan 

that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the issuance of the protective order. 

We initially note that Flanagan had Mother’s power of attorney, and after 
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Father’s demise, he had the undertaking of closing the estate. Turning to the 

first “stalking” incident—the American Greed letter of 2011—we find that this 

letter does not give rise to a plausible claim that Beckman felt terrorized, 

frightened, intimidated, or threatened. We note that this letter meant to settle 

the issues regarding the land survey and the fact that Beckman had wrongfully 

acquired the pond. When Beckman failed to respond to Flanagan’s requests, 

Flanagan left Beckman a voice message indicating that the pond issue remained 

unsolved. Furthermore, the record shows that Flanagan’s statement in the 

voice message: “if you don’t want to cooperate, there is ways to make you 

cooperate,” was nothing more than Flanagan’s way of informing Beckman that 

he would engage a lawyer if Beckman failed to comply. (Tr. p. 15). 

[21] Furthermore, no evidence was presented to the trial court that would permit an 

inference that a reasonable person would feel terrorized, frightened, 

intimidated, or threatened by the receipt of the 2015 letter. The evidence 

presented at trial indicates only that, after three years of no contact, separate 

from the land dispute, Flanagan initiated a third contact by informing Beckman 

that he would be attending the family gathering and that his other sisters were

expecting an explanation of Father’s missing documents. As such, we find that 

this letter contained nothing a reasonable person would consider ominous or 

intimidating. 

[22] Here, although Beckman felt that Flanagan’s contacts were unwelcomed, 

Flanagan had every right to contact her on any issues affecting Father’s estate 

as he had Mother’s power of attorney. In this regard, we find that no evidence 
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was presented to the trial court that would permit an inference that Flanagan

intended to stalk Beckman by the three contacts: two in 2011 and one in 2015. 

CONCLUSION

[23] In light of the foregoing, we find that there was insufficient evidence of stalking 

to support the issuance of a protective order. 

[24] Reversed. 

[25] Brown, J. and Altice, J. concur