IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0662

Filed April 22, 2015

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

CARLOS RAFAEL NAVARRETTE,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Mary E. Howes, 

Judge.

A defendant appeals his conviction for sexual abuse in the second degree 

and lascivious acts with a child. AFFIRMED.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Melinda J. Nye, Assistant 

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Katie Fiala, Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Melisa Zaehringer, Assistant 

County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.
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VAITHESWARAN, P.J.

This appeal raises evidentiary issues under an ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel rubric.

The State charged Carlos Navarrette with several sexual crimes involving 

two children. At trial, the State called the children’s mother as a witness. The 

prosecutor asked her what kind of relationship she had with Navarrette. She 

responded that she “had an abusive relationship.” She proceeded to describe 

instances of abuse and explained why she stayed with Navarrette. Navarrette’s 

attorney did not object to this evidence of prior bad acts. See Iowa R. Evid. 

5.404(b), 5.403.1 Navarrette’s attorney also did not object to testimony by the 

younger child that Navarrette was “mean” to her and physically abused and 

threatened her. The district court found Navarrette guilty of four counts of 

second-degree sex abuse and one count of lascivious acts with a child. 

On appeal, Navarrette contends his trial attorney was ineffective in failing

to object to the prior bad acts evidence described above and in failing to object to 

the district court’s findings of fact drawing what he characterizes as unsupported 

inferences from this evidence. To succeed, Navarrette must show (1) counsel 

breached an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted. See Strickland v. 

 

1. Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.404(b) states:

Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to 

prove the character of a person in order to show that the person acted in 

conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, 

such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 

identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

Iowa Rule of Evidence 5.403 states:

Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value 

is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 

waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). While we normally preserve ineffectiveassistance-of-counsel claims for postconviction relief, we find the record 

adequate to address these claims. State v. Bumpus, 459 N.W.2d 619, 627 (Iowa 

1990). 

We find it unnecessary to decide whether Navarrette’s attorney breached 

an essential duty in failing to object to the evidence of prior bad acts. Even if he 

did, Navarrette cannot establish the second prong of his claim—Strickland

prejudice. See State v. Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 196 (Iowa 2008) (“[I]f the 

claim lacks the necessary prejudice, we can decide the case on the prejudice 

prong of the test without deciding whether the attorney performed deficiently.”)

This prong requires the defendant to establish a reasonable probability of 

a different outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695-96. “The most important factor 

under the test for [Strickland] prejudice is the strength of the State’s case.” State 

v. Carey, 709 N.W.2d 547, 559 (Iowa 2006). “A verdict or conclusion only weakly 

supported by the record is more likely to have been affected by errors than one 

with overwhelming record support.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696; see also State v. 

Bayles, 551 N.W.2d 600, 610 (Iowa 1996) (finding no Strickland prejudice based 

on overwhelming evidence in the record).

On our de novo review, we find overwhelming evidentiary support for the 

district court’s findings of guilt. Both children testified at trial. They described 

several incidents of sexual abuse over a lengthy period of time. The district 

court, as fact-finder, found both witnesses credible, citing their demeanor at trial. 

Their testimony was consistent with the testimony of the medical director of a 

child protection response center, who recounted the children’s narratives on 
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being seen by staff. Their testimony also was consistent with their mother’s 

description of the abuse. While the defense attacked the mother’s testimony on 

several fronts, the district court rejected these efforts to impugn her credibility. 

We give weight to the district court’s credibility findings. Ledezma v. State, 626 

N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001).

In light of this overwhelming evidence, there is no reasonable probability 

the outcome of trial would have been different had Navarrette’s attorney objected 

to the prior bad acts evidence or objected to the district court’s inferences drawn 

from the record. Because Strickland prejudice was not established, Navarrette’s 

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims fail. 

We affirm Navarrette’s judgment and sentence for four counts of seconddegree sexual abuse and one count of lascivious acts with a child.

AFFIRMED.