IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

LEV SHAFER, et al., 

Plaintiffs, 

 Case No. 2:17-cv-1098 

 

 v. Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

KARRIC SQUARE PROPERTIES, 

LLC, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

Defendant Karric Square Properties, LLC (“Karric”) obtained a judgment against 

Plaintiffs following default on an agreed judgment entry establishing a payment plan. 

Thereafter, that judgment was placed with Defendant Finance System of Green Bay, Inc. 

(“FSGB”) for collection. Following collection efforts by FSGB, Plaintiffs filed this action, 

asserting claims for alleged violations under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), 15 U.S.C. 

§ 1681, et seq. and state-law claims for defamation. With the consent of the parties (ECF No. 

11), 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), this matter is before the Court for consideration of Karric’s Motion for 

Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) and Motion for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 23). For the reasons 

that follow, the Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED and the Motion for Judicial 

Notice is DENIED AS MOOT. 

I. 

A. The Premises, Lease, and Assignment 

Karric is the present owner of real property located at 5803–5807 Karric Square Drive, 
2 

Dublin, Ohio 43014 (“the Premises”). (Declaration of Sheila Sanders, ECF No. 16-1 (“Sanders 

Declaration”), ¶ 2.)1

 On or about September 19, 1997, Karric’s predecessor owner, Borror 

Realty Company, entered into a lease agreement (“the Lease”) with Dr. Susan E. Richards for 

lease of the Premises. (Id. at ¶ 3; ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID ## 162–84 (copy of the Lease).) 

The Lease provided for, inter alia, the recovery of attorney’s fees and costs under certain 

circumstances. (Lease, ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID # 177.) 

Following a series of assignments not relevant to the matters presently before the Court, 

on or about September 1, 2014, Karric and Natural Health Chiropractic, Inc. entered into the 

“Lease Assignment, Consent, Assumption, Release, and Amendment Agreement” (“the 

Assignment”) through which Natural Health Chiropractic, Inc. assigned the leasehold interest in 

the Premises to Deal Breakers, LLC (“Deal Breakers”). (Sanders Declaration, ¶ 3; ECF No. 16-1 

at PAGEID ## 185–92 (copy of the Assignment).) The Assignment provides in relevant part as 

follows: “Assignee [Deal Breakers] hereby accepts such assignment and assumes all of 

Assignor’s [Natural Health Chiropractic, Inc.] rights, duties, obligations and liabilities as tenant 

under the Lease, whether arising before, on or after the Effective Date [September 1, 2014].” 

(Assignment, ECF No. 16 at PAGEID # 186.) Plaintiffs Lev Shafer and Oleg Razuvayev 

personally guaranteed the Assignment. (Id. at PAGEID # 189.) 

B. The 2015 State Court Action and the Agreed Judgment Entry 

 Sometime thereafter, Deal Breakers defaulted under the Lease. (Sanders Declaration, ¶ 

3.) Karric filed an action in the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas (“the State Court”) 

against Deal Breakers and the instant Plaintiffs, Case Number 15 CV 003249, seeking unpaid 

 

1 Ms. Sanders is the asset manager for Midland Management, LLC (“Midland”), which 

performs management services for Karric. (Id. at ¶ 1.) 
3 

rent in the amount of $46,501.08, plus additional rent, late fees, interest, and other applicable 

fees as set forth in the Lease and the Assignment (“the 2015 State Court Action”). (Id. at ¶ 4.) 

Karric, Deal Breakers, and instant Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev, all represented by 

legal counsel, thereafter resolved the matter in the State Court Action through an Agreed 

Judgment Entry. (Id.) On July 2, 2015, the State Court entered the Agreed Judgment Entry (id.), 

which provides as follows: 

NOW COMES, Plaintiff Karric Square Properties, LLC and Defendants 

Deal Breakers, LLC, Lev Shafer, and Oleg Razuvayev (“Defendants”), through 

counsel, who now represent to the Court that this case has been settled and 

compromised and that Defendants, jointly and severally, agree to confess judgment 

in the amount of $46 ,501.08, plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum from March 

1, 2015, attorney’s fees of $1,736.43, collection costs, court costs, interest at the 

statutory rate from the date of judgment, and any attorney’s fees arising from 

Defendants’ breach of this Agreed Judgment Entry. 

As an accommodation to Defendants, Plaintiff has agreed that it will accept 

Twenty One Thousand and 00/100 Dollars ($21,000.00) as settlement in full of its 

judgment payable as follows: Three Hundred and 00/100 Dollars ($300.00) per 

week beginning on or before Monday, July 13, 2015, and on or before the 

subsequent Monday of each week thereafter until the sum of Twenty One Thousand 

and 00/100 Dollars ($21,000.00) is fully paid which will satisfy this judgment in 

full. 

Plaintiff agrees that it will not cause any executions to issue against 

Defendants, other than Certificates of Judgment to be filed, as long as Defendants 

make each and every payment as agreed upon herein. Should Defendants default 

however, Plaintiff is free to execute at will and without notice. If Defendants 

comply with the terms of this agreement, Plaintiff shall issue satisfactions of this 

judgment to Defendants for filing. 

The Court having no objection to the settlement agreement and terms 

therein, does hereby ADJUDGE, ORDER, AND DECREE that judgment is granted 

against Defendants Deal Breakers, LLC, Lev Shafer, and Oleg Razuvayev, jointly 

and severally, in the amount of $46,501.08, plus interest at the rate of 18% per 

annum from March 1, 2015, attorney’s fees of $1,736.43, collection costs, court 

costs, interest at the statutory rate from the date of judgment, and any attorney’s 

fees arising from Defendants’ breach of this Agreed Judgment Entry and that the 

settlement agreement, the terms, and the payment plan incorporated herein is 

hereby CONFIRMED. 
4 

SO ORDERED. 

(Agreed Judgment Entry, ECF No. 16-1, PAGEID ## 193–94 (emphasis in the original).) 

C. Default and Collection Efforts

 On or about February 1, 2016, Deal Breakers and the instant Plaintiffs Shafer and 

Razuvayev defaulted on their obligations under the Agreed Judgment Entry. (Sanders 

Declaration, ¶ 4.)2

 Karric had an agreement with FSGB “for collection efforts for delinquent 

accounts for a number of tenants, including but not limited to” Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev. 

(Id. at ¶ 5.) Karric furnished to FSGB a copy of the Agreed Judgment Entry (ECF No. 16-1, 

PAGEID ## 193–94), a document entitled “Tenant Listing Sheet” (id. at PAGEID # 197), and a 

copy of Midland’s ledger reflecting Deal Breakers’ transactions (id. at PAGEID ## 198–02.) 

(Sanders Declaration, ¶ 6.) This was the only information that Karric provided to FSGB. (Id.) 

The Tenant Listing Sheet, printed on FSGB letterhead, identifies, inter alia, Karric as the 

creditor, instant Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev as the tenants, and the Property’s address. 

(Tenant Listing Sheet, ECF No. 16, PAGEID # 197.) The Tenant Listing Sheet identifies the 

“Amount of Judgment Past Due” as $16,235.00. (Id.) A section entitled “Comments” on the 

Tenant Listing Sheet includes the following language: “Since they defaulted on the judgment 

payment arrangements – can we collect the full amount originally due of $46,501.08?” (Id.) 

The ledger Karric provided to FSGB reflects an ending balance of $16,235. (ECF No. 16-1 at 

PAGEID # 202.) 

 In a letter addressed to Deal Breakers dated September 2, 2016, FSGB, identifying itself 

as a debt collection agency, advised that Deal Breakers’ creditor was Karric and the account 

number referred to the State Court Action, No. 15-cv-3249. (ECF No.19-1 at PAGEID # 280.) 

 

2 Plaintiffs concede that they “failed to make payments[.]” (ECF No. 19 at 2.) 
5 

FSGB further advised that the principal amount due was $41,736.08 and the interest was 

$11,320.20, for a balance due of $53,056.28. (Id.) FSGB also advised Deal Breakers as follows: 

Your creditor [Karric] has placed your bill for collection. . . . As of the date of this 

letter, you owe $53056.28. Because of interest, late charges, and other charges that 

may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater. 

Hence, if you pay the amount shown above, an adjustment may be necessary after 

we receive your check. For further information, write to the above address or call 

920-431-2121. 

Unless you notify this office within 30 days after receiving this notice that you 

dispute the validity of this debt or any portion thereof, this office will assume this 

debt is valid. If you notify this office in writing that you dispute the debt within 30 

days from receiving this notice, this office will: obtain verification of the debt or 

obtain a copy of the judgment and mail you a copy of such judgment or verification. 

If you request this office in writing within 30 days after receiving this notice, this 

office will provide you with the name and address of the original creditor, if 

different from the current creditor. 

(Id.) 

D. The Present Action 

Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev (who were Defendants in the 2015 State Court Action) 

originally filed the present action in the Court of Common Pleas for Franklin County, Ohio, on 

April 16, 2015, which was removed to this Court on December 15, 2017, on the basis of federal 

question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev assert 

federal claims for alleged violations of the FCRA and state law claims for defamation against 

Karric and FSGB. (ECF No. 5.) 

Karric has moved for summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. (ECF No. 

16.)3

 Plaintiffs oppose Karric’s Motion (ECF No. 19) and Karric has filed a reply memorandum 

(ECF No. 21). On January 15, 2019, the State Court issued a Decision and Entry denying the 

 

3 FSGB has moved for judgment on the pleadings and for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 

12, 15.) 
6 

motion of instant Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev and Deal Breakers for relief from judgment 

and declaratory relief, which is the subject of Karric’s Motion for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 23), 

and which Plaintiffs have opposed (ECF No. 25). Karric has filed a reply. (ECF No. 26.) 

II. 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if 

the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “The moving party has the initial 

burden of proving that no genuine issue of material fact exists, and the court must draw all 

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Stansberry v. Air 

Wisconsin Airlines Corp., 651 F.3d 482, 486 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotations omitted); cf. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)(2) (providing that if a party “fails to properly address another party’s 

assertion of fact” then the Court may “consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion”).

“Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmovant must ‘designate specific 

facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Kimble v. Wasylyshyn, 439 F. App’x 492, 

495–96 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986)); see also 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (requiring a party maintaining that a fact is genuinely disputed to “cit[e] to 

particular parts of materials in the record”). “The nonmovant must, however, do more than 

simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts, . . . there must be 

evidence upon which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the non-moving party to 

create a genuine dispute.” Lee v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., 432 F. App’x 

435, 441 (6th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “When a motion for 

summary judgment is properly made and supported and the nonmoving party fails to respond 
7 

with a showing sufficient to establish an essential element of its case, summary judgment is 

appropriate.” Stansberry, 651 F.3d at 486 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322–23). 

III. 

 Plaintiffs assert claims for defamation, libel, and slander. (ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 22–29.) 

“Under Ohio law, ‘defamation occurs when a publication contains a false statement ‘made with 

some degree of fault, reflecting injuriously on a person’s reputation, or exposing a person to 

public hatred, contempt, ridicule, shame or disgrace, or affecting a person adversely in his or her 

trade, business or profession.’” Kontar v. American Geophysical Union, No. 16-3491, 2017 WL 

3402078, at *2 (6th Cir. Jan. 5, 2017) (quoting Jackson v. City of Columbus, 117 Ohio St. 3d 

328, 331 (2008)). “The manner of publication distinguishes slander, i.e., ‘spoken defamatory 

words,’ from libel, i.e., ‘written or printed defamatory words.’” Kontar, 2017 WL 3402078, at 

*2 (quoting Lawson v. AK Steel Corp., 121 Ohio App.3d 251, 256 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)). 

When the plaintiff is a private figure, “the elements of a defamation claim, whether 

libel or slander, are ‘(a) a false and defamatory statement concerning another; (b) 

an unprivileged publication to a third party; (c) fault amounting at least to 

negligence on the part of the publisher; and (d) either actionability of the statement 

irrespective of special harm or the existence of special harm caused by the 

publication.’” 

Id. (quoting Harris v. Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted)). 

“To survive a motion for summary judgment in a defamation action, the plaintiff must make a 

sufficient showing of the existence of every element essential to his or her case.” Cummerlander 

v. Patriot Preparatory Acad. Inc., 86 F. Supp. 3d 808, 829 (S.D. Ohio 2015) (citing Daubenmire 

v. Sommers, 156 Ohio App.3d 322 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004). 

Here, Plaintiffs specifically allege as follows: 

23. Defendants Karric Square and Finance System [FSGB] have negligently 

published false and misleading statements regarding the financial obligations of the 

plaintiffs. 
8 

24. Defendant Karrie Square negligently published false and misleading statements 

regarding the nature, amount, and terms of plaintiffs’ obligations to Finance 

System, among others. 

25. Defendant Finance System published false and misleading statements regarding 

the nature, amount, and terms of plaintiffs’ obligations to credit reporting agencies, 

among others. 

26. The defendants knew or should have known that the statements were false at 

the time the statements were published. 

27. Defendants were at least negligent in not reviewing the four corners of the 

settlement agreement which was reduced to an Agreed Judgment Entry before 

publishing false information regarding the terms of the debt. 

28. The statements constitute defamation per se as they have affected the plaintiffs 

injuriously in their trade or profession. 

29. The defendants did not possess a privilege to publish these false statements. 

(ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 22–29.) 

 Karric contends that federal law preempts Plaintiffs’ defamation claim. (ECF No. 16 at 

5–6; ECF No. 21 at 4–5.) Karric also contends that even if the defamation claim was not 

preempted, Plaintiffs have failed to establish that the statements were false and defamatory, that 

there was an unprivileged publication to a third party, and that there was special harm. (ECF 

Nos. 16, 19.) 

A. Preemption 

 Karric argues that 15 U.S.C. § 1681h(e) of the FCRA preempts Plaintiffs’ defamation 

claim. (ECF No. 16 at 5–6; ECF No. 21 at 4–5.) Section 1681h(e) provides as follows: 

Except as provided in sections 1681n and 1681o of this title, no consumer may 

bring any action or proceeding in the nature of defamation, invasion of privacy, or 

negligence with respect to the reporting of information against any consumer 

reporting agency, any user of information, or any person who furnishes information 

to a consumer reporting agency, based on information disclosed pursuant to section 

1681g, 1681h, or 1681m of this title, or based on information disclosed by a user 

of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken adverse 
9 

action, based in whole or in part on the report except as to false information 

furnished with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer. 

 Therefore, in order to fall within the Section 1681h(e), a claim must be based on 

information disclosed pursuant to Sections 1681g, 1681h, or 1681m, or “based on information 

disclosed by a user of a consumer report to or for a consumer against whom the user has taken 

adverse action, based in whole or in part on the report except as to false information furnished 

with malice or willful intent to injure such consumer.” Id.; see also Barry v. Experian Info. Sol., 

Inc., No. 2:16-cv-09515, 2018 WL 3341785, at *8 (S.D. W.Va. July 6, 2018) (stating that the 

court must first determine whether the claim falls within the scope of § 1681h(e)) (citations 

omitted). Sections 1681g and 1681h apply only to consumer reporting agencies, which Karric is 

not. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681a (defining “consumer reporting agency” as any person who, for 

monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, regularly engages “in whole or in part 

in the practice of assembling or evaluating consumer credit information or other information on 

consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any 

means or facility of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer 

reports”), 1681g, 1681h; see also Barry, 2018 WL 3341785, at *8 (stating that Sections 1681g 

and 1681h apply to consumer reporting agencies) (citations omitted). Section 1681m applies 

only to “users taking adverse actions on [the] basis of information contained in consumer 

reports[.]” 15 U.S.C. § 1681m. 

In this case, Karric is not a user of consumer reports as to Plaintiffs under Section 1681m. 

Karric did not furnish Plaintiffs’ credit reports nor did it take adverse action based on 

information contained in such reports. As previously noted and as set forth in more detail below, 

Karric relied on the Agreed Judgment Entry, Tenant Listing Sheet, and ledger. Because the 

allegations against Karric do not fall within the scope of Section 1681h(e), this section of the 
10 

FCRA does not preempt Plaintiff’s defamation claim as to Karric. Accordingly, the Court need 

not and does not consider whether Karric acted with malice or willful intent. 

B. False and defamatory 

 Having concluded for purposes of the present motions that Section 1681h(e) does not 

preempt Plaintiffs’ defamation claim, the Court next considers the substance of Plaintiffs’ claim. 

As set forth above, Karric provided FSGB with the Agreed Judgment Entry, the Tenant Listing 

Sheet, and ledger regarding Deal Breakers’ transactions. (Sanders Declaration, ¶ 6.) Karric 

contends that the information reflected in these documents is true. (Id. at ¶¶ 6–7 (citing 

information provided); ECF No. 16 at 4; ECF No. 21 at 1–2.) Plaintiffs disagree, arguing that 

the Agreed Judgment Entry “states that Karric Square will accept ‘($21,000.00) as settlement in 

full of its judgment,’ with no clear indication that the full amount would become due in the event 

of default, or even what would constitute default.” (ECF No. 19 at 2.) However, as previously 

discussed, the Agreed Judgment Entry specifically provides as follows: 

NOW COMES, Plaintiff Karric Square Properties, LLC and Defendants 

Deal Breakers, LLC, Lev Shafer, and Oleg Razuvayev (“Defendants”), through 

counsel, who now represent to the Court that this case has been settled and 

compromised and that Defendants, jointly and severally, agree to confess judgment 

in the amount of $46,501.08, plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum from March 

1, 2015, attorney’s fees of $1,736.43, collection costs, court costs, interest at the 

statutory rate from the date of judgment, and any attorney’s fees arising from 

Defendants’ breach of this Agreed Judgment Entry. 

(ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID # 193.) The Agreed Judgment Entry also detailed that Karric agreed 

to accept a lesser amount ($21,000) as settlement in full of its judgment pursuant to a payment 

plan and that Karric “will not cause any executions against Defendants, other than Certificates of 

Judgment to be filed, as long as Defendants make each and every payment as agreed upon 

herein. Should Defendants default, however, Plaintiff is free to execute at will and without 
11 

notice.” (Id.) The terms of the Agreed Judgment Entry therefore address what happens in the 

event of default.4

Moreover, in its discovery responses, Karric explained the amount due at specific times 

under the Agreed Judgment Entry, including following Plaintiffs’ default: 

5. What amount does Karric Square Properties, LLC claim to be currently due and 

owing to it from Plaintiffs or Deal Breakers, LLC. Delineate between principal, 

interest, and other amounts allegedly owing. 

Answer: $46,501.08, plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 

March 1, 2015, attorney’s fees of $1,736.43, collection costs, court costs, and 

interest at the statutory rate of judgment. 

6. What amount does Karrie Square Properties, LLC claim was due and owing by 

Plaintiffs or Deal Breakers, LLC on September 2, 2016. Delineate between 

principal, interest, and other amounts allegedly owing. 

Answer: Prior to default (and accounting for all payments made) 

Defendants owed a total of $16,234.00. As of September 2, 2016, Defendants 

owed a total of $46,501.08, plus interest at the rate of 18% per annum from 

March 1, 2015, attorney’s fees of $1,736.43, collection costs, court 

costs, and interest at the statutory rate of judgment. 

(ECF No. 19 at PAGEID # 282 (emphasis in original).) 

While Plaintiffs now apparently dispute that the Agreed Judgment Entry provides that the 

full amount of the debt (rather than the reduced amount of $21,000) was due upon their default, 

the terms of the Agreed Judgment Entry speak for themselves. To the extent that Plaintiffs 

attack some of the terms of the Agreed Judgment Entry (see, e.g., id. at 4 (complaining, inter 

alia., that neither Karric nor FSGB “took into consideration the discrepancies within the Agreed 

Judgment Entry as it related to which appropriate interest rate was to be applied”), the record 

reflects that Plaintiffs were represented by counsel at the time of the settlement agreement in the 

 

4 While Plaintiffs now suggest that it is not clear “what would constitute default[,]” 

Plaintiffs concede that they “failed to make payments” under the Agreed Judgment Entry. (ECF 

No. 19 at 2.) 
12 

State Court Action and the Agreed Judgment Entry. (Sanders Declaration, ¶ 4 (averring Deal 

Breakers and instant Plaintiffs Shafer and Razuvayev were represented by counsel); Agreed 

Judgment Entry, ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID # 193 (same).) If Plaintiffs, however, seek to vacate 

or alter the Agreed Judgment Entry itself, that position is also unavailing as “[f]ederal district 

courts do not stand as appellate courts for decisions of state courts.” Hall v. Callahan, 727 F.3d 

450, 453 (6th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts 

from exercising jurisdiction over a claim alleging error in a state court decision) (citing, inter 

alia Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. 

Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). 

Plaintiffs argue, however, that Karric must have provided false information because the 

Tenant Listing Sheet reflected “a past due amount of $16,000 . . . [which] is vastly different than 

the amount reported to the credit reporting bureaus, and the response to Karric from FSGB which 

mentions pursuing $46,501 from the Agreed Judgment Entry” and because neither Defendant 

“took into consideration the amount the Plaintiffs had paid to Karric when pursuing the 

$46,501.48 from the Agreed Judgment Entry.” (ECF No. 19 at 4.) Plaintiffs’ argument is not 

well taken. As a preliminary matter, the uncontroverted Sanders Declaration establishes that no 

representative of Karric furnished information relating to Plaintiffs (or Deal Breakers) to a credit 

reporting agency. (Sanders Declaration, ¶ 8.) Next, Plaintiffs’ assertion that the Tenant Listing 

Sheet apparently contains false information because it reflects differing amounts (see Tenant 

Listing Sheet, ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID # 197 (compare “Amount of Judgment Past Due 

$16,235.00[,]” with “Comments[:] Since they defaulted on the judgment payment arrangements 

– can we collect the full amount originally due of $46,501.06?”) and failed to account for 

payments made by Plaintiffs is also unavailing. As previously discussed, $16,235.00 was the 
13 

amount Plaintiffs owed (accounting for all of Plaintiffs’ payments) prior to default (see ledger, 

ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID # 202), while $46,501.08 was the amount Plaintiffs confessed to and 

owed under the Agreed Judgment Entry (plus interest of 18% annum, attorney’s fees, collection 

costs, and court costs). (ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID ## 193–94; ECF No. 19 at PAGEID # 282.) 

Plaintiffs have provided no evidence establishing that the Tenant Listing Sheet contains false 

information. 

Plaintiffs also contend that the Agreed Judgment Entry “does not indicate when the 18% 

per annum would be calculated from in the event the Plaintiffs ‘defaulted.’” (ECF No. 19 at 2.) 

Plaintiff’s argument is not well taken. The Agreed Judgment Entry specifically states that the 

18% per annum rate will run from March 1, 2015, and that the statutory rate of interest would 

begin to run from the date of judgment, namely, July 2, 2015. (ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID ## 

193–95.) 

In short, there is no evidence in the record that Plaintiffs did not confess to judgment in 

the amount of $46,501.08 (plus interest, attorney fees, collection costs, and court costs) or that 

Karric provided false information under the terms of the Agreed Judgment Entry. Having failed 

to show that Karric provided false information, Plaintiffs cannot establish a claim of defamation. 

See Cummerlander, 86 F. Supp. 3d at 829 (stating that a plaintiff must make a sufficient showing 

of the existence of every element essential to a defamation claim in order to survive summary 

judgment). 

C. Special harm 

 Even if Karric’s statements were false and were published without privilege, Plaintiffs 

have still failed to establish another element of their defamation claim, special harm. Plaintiffs 

contend on summary judgment that special harm “is not at issue because the credit reporting 
14 

bureaus having obtained evidence from FSGB and Karric involving the alleged debt undoubtedly 

hinders the Plaintiffs from obtaining business loans, personal financing, and will continue to do 

so for the indefinite future.” (ECF No. 19 at 3.) 

 Plaintiffs’ argument is not well taken. “Defamation falls into two categories, defamation 

per quod or per se. In defamation per quod, a publication is merely capable of being interpreted 

as defamatory and the plaintiff must allege and prove damages. Defamation per se occurs if a 

statement, on its face, is defamatory.” Kendel v. Local 17-A United Food and Commercial 

Workers, 835 F. Supp. 2d 421, 433 (N.D. Ohio 2011) (internal citations omitted)). A publication 

is actionable per se and a plaintiff need not show special harm if it contains the following: “‘(1) 

written statements which falsely charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime, or (2) oral 

declarations which falsely charge the plaintiff with the commission of a crime involving moral 

turpitude which subjects the offender to infamous punishment[.]’” Shepard v. Griffin Servs., 

Inc., No. 19032, 2002 WL 940110, at *9 (Ohio Ct. App. May 10, 2002) (citations omitted). 

“[W]hether a statement is defamatory per se is a question of law for the trial court to determine.” 

Northeast Ohio Elite Gymnastics Training Ctr., Inc. v. Osborne, 183 Ohio App. 3d 104, 112 

(Ohio Ct. App. 2009) (citations omitted). 

 Here, Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that Karric’s statements “constitute defamation per se 

as they have affected the plaintiffs injuriously in their trade or profession.” (ECF No. 5 at ¶ 28.) 

However, nothing in the Agreed Judgment Entry, Tenant Listing Sheet, or ledger falsely charges 

Plaintiffs with “the commission of a crime involving moral turpitude which subjects the offender 

[Plaintiffs] to infamous punishment[.]” Shepard, 2002 WL 940110, at *9 (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted); see also Agreed Judgment Entry, ECF No. 16-1 at PAGEID ## 

193–94; Tenant Listing Sheet, id. at PAGEID # 197; ledger, id. at PAGEID ## 198–202; ECF 
15 

No. 19 at 3 (implicitly conceding in opposing summary judgment that their claim is defamation 

per quod as they assert special harm exists as they are “undoubtably hinder[ed] . . . from 

obtaining business loans, personal financing, and will continue to do so for the indefinite 

future”). Accordingly, Karric’s statements do not constitute defamation per se. Northeast Ohio 

Elite Gymnastics Training Ctr., Inc., 183 Ohio App. 3d at 109. 

 In the absence of defamation per se, Plaintiffs must prove special damages. Id. “Special 

damages are damages of such a nature that they do not follow as a necessary consequence of the 

[complained injury].” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). As previously 

discussed, Plaintiffs simply assert without evidentiary support that special damages are not at 

issue because “the credit reporting bureaus having obtained evidence from FSGB and Karric 

involving the alleged debt undoubtedly hinders the Plaintiffs from obtaining business loans, 

personal financing, and will continue to do so for the indefinite future.” (ECF No. 19 at 3.) 

Plaintiffs’ unsupported assertions are insufficient to show special damages and withstand 

summary judgment. Jones v. City of Franklin, 677 F. App’x 279, 282 (6th Cir. 2017) 

(“Additionally, conclusory allegations, speculation, and unsubstantiated assertions are not 

evidence, and are not sufficient to defeat a well-supported motion for summary judgment. . . . 

Therefore, in order to defeat summary judgment, the party opposing the motion must present 

affirmative evidence to support its position[.]”) (internal citations omitted). 

For all of these reasons, Karric is entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ defamation 

claim. 

 
16 

D. FCRA 

Plaintiffs also allege that Karric violated the FCRA as follows: 

31. Karric Square and Finance System [FSGB] have furnished information relating 

to a [sic] plaintiffs to a consumer reporting agency while knowing or having 

reasonable cause to believe that the information is inaccurate. 

32. Karric Square and Finance System [FSGB] have negligently and recklessly 

violated various provisions of the Fair Credit Report Act. 

(ECF No. 5 at ¶¶ 31–32.) Although not cited in the Complaint, when opposing summary 

judgment, Plaintiffs refer to 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(b) as the basis for their cause of action. (ECF 

No. 19 at 8.) 

 “The FCRA exists ‘to ensure fair and accurate credit reporting, promote efficiency in the 

banking system, and protect consumer privacy.’” Boggio v. USAA Federal Sav. Bank, 696 F.3d 

611, 614 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Safeco Ins. Co. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 52 (2007)). “The FCRA 

imposes liability on both consumer reporting agencies and furnishers of information to those 

agencies for willful or negligent violations under the FCRA.” Shaw v. Equifax Info. Sols., Inc., 

204 F. Supp. 3d 956, 959 (E.D. Mich. 2016) (citing Nelski v. Trans Union, LLC, 86 F. App’x 

840, 844 (6th Cir. 2004)). “To that end, § 1681s-2 is designed to prevent ‘furnishers of 

information’ from spreading inaccurate consumer-credit information.” Boggio, 696 F.3d at 614. 

As set forth above, a “consumer reporting agency” is defined as 

any person which, for monetary fees, dues, or on a cooperative nonprofit basis, 

regularly engages in whole or in part in the practice of assembling or evaluating 

consumer credit information or other information on consumers for the purpose of 

furnishing consumer reports to third parties, and which uses any means or facility 

of interstate commerce for the purpose of preparing or furnishing consumer reports. 

15 U.S.C. § 1681a(f). “While § 1681s-2 does not define ‘furnisher,’ courts have defined the 

term as ‘any entity which transmits information concerning a particular debt owed by a particular 

customer to consumer reporting agencies.’” LaBreck v. Mid-Mich Credit Bur., No. 1:16-cv-
17 

1160, 2016 WL 6927454, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 28, 2016) (quoting Carney v. Experian Info. 

Sol., Inc., 57 F. Supp. 2d 496, 501 (W.D. Tenn. 1999)); see also Dominguez v. Capital One, 

N.A., No. 16-12896, 2017 WL 3097801, at *2 (E.D. Mich. June 27, 2017) (same) (citations 

omitted), adopted by 2017 WL 3085779 (E.D. Mich. July 20, 2017). 

 While the FCRA does not create a private cause of action for a violation of Section 

1681s-2(a), “a consumer may recover damages for a willful violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1681s2(b).” Ogle v. BAC Home Loans Serv. LP, 924 F. Supp. 2d. 902, 912 (S.D. Ohio 2013). “To 

bring a claim against a furnisher of information under § 1681s–2(b), the plaintiff must ‘show that 

the furnisher received notice from a consumer reporting agency, not the plaintiff, that the credit 

information is disputed’” and that “upon receiving this notice, the furnisher of information acted 

with a ‘reckless disregard’ in performing its duties under § 1681s–2(b)[.]” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). 

 Here, as previously discussed, Karric has submitted uncontroverted evidence that no 

representative of Karric furnished information relating to Plaintiffs or Deal Breakers to a credit 

reporting agency. (Sanders Declaration at ¶ 8.) Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that “Karric had 

constructive notice of the disputes with the debts with FSGB because FSGB was the agent of 

Karric” and that Karric thereafter “made no effort to provide accounting for the alleged debts.” 

(ECF No. 19 at 8.) Plaintiffs, however, do not explain or cite to evidence in the record to support 

their argument. This conclusory and speculative assertion is therefore insufficient to oppose 

summary judgment. See Kyle-Eiland v. Neff, 408 F. App’x 933, 943 (6th Cir. 2011) (explaining 

that the summary judgment standard “does not require that all bald assertions, opinions, or even 

genuinely held beliefs asserted by the nonmoving party be adopted wholeheartedly by a court, 

even when such assertions are completely unsupported by the record”); Shockley v. Corr. 
18 

Healthcare Cos., Inc., No. 1:16cv599, 2018 WL 1565614, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2018) 

(“Conclusory allegations are not evidence and are not adequate to oppose a motion for summary 

judgment.”); cf. Mitchell v. Toledo Hosp., 964 F.2d 577, 584 (6th Cir. 1992) (“It is now quite 

well-established that, in order to withstand a motion for summary judgment, the party opposing 

the motion must present ‘affirmative evidence’ to support his/her position; a mere ‘scintilla of 

evidence’ is insufficient.”) (citations omitted). Accordingly, Karric is entitled to summary 

judgment on Plaintiffs’ FCRA claim. 

Finally, having concluded that Karric’s Motion for Summary Judgment is meritorious, 

Karric’s Motion for Judicial Notice is moot and the Court need not address it. 

IV. 

For the foregoing reasons, Karric’s Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 16) is 

GRANTED and Karric’s Motion for Judicial Notice (ECF No. 23) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment in favor of Defendant Karric Square Properties, 

LLC on Plaintiffs’ claims against it. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: March 21, 2019 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

 CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE