### In the 

# United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit

____________________ Nos. 13

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- 3196

G ABRIEL V. M ENDOZA , Petitioner

- Appellant
,

v.

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA , Respondent

- Appellee

.

____________________ Appeal s from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Indiana
, South Bend Division. No s

. 3:12

- cv

- 00072 & 3:12

- cv

- 00073

— Robert L. Miller, Jr. , Judge

.

____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 22, 2014

— D ECIDED J UNE 18, 2014

____________________

Before P OSNER , W ILLIAMS , and T INDER , Circuit Judges

. T INDER , Circuit Judge

. Gabriel Mendoza was sentenced to multiple terms of life imprisonment after he was convicted of a drug conspiracy and other drug offenses in the Uni ted States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Mendoza appealed, challenging the sufficiency of the ev idence as to the conspiracy conviction and his sentence, and we affirmed. United States v. Mendoza , 401 F. App’x 128 (7th Cir. 2010). Men doza then petitioned for relief from his co n-2 No s

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victions under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, claiming that he was denied due process when the district court moved one of his Spa nish

- speaking interpreters from the defense table to interpret for a Spanish

- speaking witness a t trial. He also argued that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance in failing to object to this interpreter arrangement and failing to translate discovery and adequately review it with him. The district court held an evidentiary hearing at whic h Mendoza, his tr ial counsel, and the three interpreters who participated in the trial all testified. Following the hearing, the court denied Mendoza’s § 2255 petition, concluding that he was not d eprived of due process nor provided ineffective assistance of counsel. We affirm.

**I. BACKGROUND**  Mark Lenyo was appointed as counsel to represent Me ndoza in the district court. Lenyo has been a practicing atto rney since 1984, has represented thousands of clients (both criminal and civil) over the years, and has extensive federal criminal defense experience. Mendoza speaks only Spanish and required an interpreter throughout the court procee dings (although he may understand some spoken English, as we will briefly explain below). Lenyo does not speak or u nderstand m uch Spanish. Shortly after Lenyo’s appointment, the court received a pro se letter from Mendoza asking for “copies of everything in Spanish.” The court declined to take action on the pro se letter because Mendoza was represented by counsel. The government produced thousands of pages of disco very in Mendoza’s criminal case. Mendoza requested that Lenyo have all discovery translated into Spanish. Given the volume of discovery and based on his professional jud g-No s

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ment, Lenyo viewed the request as impractical, if not impo ssible, and did not have any of the discovery translated. However, he spent more than twenty

- one hours reviewing the discovery, summarized the discovery, and later had the
court

- appointed interpreter, Susannah Bueno, orally tran slate the summary fo r Mendoza. Lenyo met with Mendoza five times before trial, for a t otal of more than six hours, at the county jail where Mendoza was being held. During these meetings, they discussed the case, including such matters as defense strategy, and r eviewed discov ery. Bueno was present at each meeting to i nterpret for Mendoza. Lenyo also met with Mendoza and di scussed the case before each of the five court appearances b efore trial and during each of the six days that Mendoza was on trial. And Lenyo arranged for Men doza to view the phy sical evidence against him at the U.S. Attorney’s office several weeks prior to the start of trial. Bueno was present at the time to interpret the agents’ description of the evidence so Mendoza cou ld understand it. On the first day of trial, Mendoza moved for new cou nsel. He complained that Lenyo had not had all the discovery documents translated into Spanish. Lenyo told the district court that he had advised Mendoza that given “the large volume of discovery,” he had decided that not all of it would be translated from English into Spanish. Lenyo further e xplained to the court that given the “sheer volume” of the p aperwork involved, it would have been impractical if not i mpossible to translate each document and review it with Mendoza. After also hearing from the prosecutor, the district court decided that Mendoza’s request for new counsel was untimely, that Lenyo had diligently prepared for trial and4 No s

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that there was no breakdown in communication between Lenyo and Mendoza. Based on these determinations, the court denied Mendoza’s motion for new counsel. Two of three interpreters worked each day of trial, rota ting on the various days of trial: Bueno, Ana Maria Toro

Greiner, and Julia Kurtz. The second day of trial, Bueno and Toro

- Greiner we re the interpreters. When Aurora Virruta, Mendoza’s common law wife was called to testify, the pros ecutor advised the court that Virruta did not speak English and requested a bench conference. The court said, “We don’t have interpreters for witnesses,” and “we’ll have to move our interpreter over for that purpose.” Lenyo did not object. Toro

- Greiner was moved to be near the witness stand to i nterpret for Virruta on direct examination; Bueno also inte rpreted for Virruta on cross and redirect. The trial trans cript does not indicate where Bueno was located during Virruta’s direct examination; nor does it indicate where Toro

- Greiner was located during the cross and redirect. At the end of Virruta’s testimony, the court took a lunch recess before te stimony resume d in the afternoon.

At the conclusion of the six

- day trial, the jury found Mendoza guilty of a criminal drug conspiracy and related offenses. The district court sentenced him to life impriso nment plus twenty years. Mendoza appealed, and we a ffirmed. See M endoza , 401 F. App’x at 128

– 31

. Thereafter Mendoza filed a federal habeas petition under § 2255, raising both a due process argument relating to the interpreter arrangement during Virruta’s testimony and an ineffective

- assistance

- of

- counsel claim. The district court a ppointed new counsel for Mendoza and conducted an evide ntiary hearing on the petition over the course of three days. AtNo s

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the hearing, Mendoza claimed that he had no interpreter a t the defense table to assist him during Virruta’s testimony. He also claimed that he could not hear the Spanish translations of the questions asked Virruta or her answers, and that the interpreters and Lenyo ignored his complaints about being unable to he ar the questions and Virruta’s answers. In contrast, Lenyo testified that when the bench confe rence took place just after Virruta was called to testify, two interpreters were present in the courtroom and that two i nterpreters were in the courtroom througho ut the trial. He testified that at all times during Virruta’s testimony, an i nterpreter was sitting by Mendoza and never left his side. When asked whether Mendoza had any issues regarding Virruta or whether Mendoza wanted him to ask any que stions of Virrut a, Lenyo said that Mendoza did not make him aware of anything. Lenyo added that at no point in the trial, whether during Virruta’s testimony or that of any other wi tness, did he have any problem or difficulty communicating with Mendoza through the interpre ters. When Virruta testified on direct at trial, Lenyo was sea ted at the defense table with Mendoza. At the evidentiary hearing, Lenyo testified that he had no trouble hearing the questions asked or answers given during Virruta’s testimony, in Spanish or in English translation. He stated that at no point during the testimony of any witness did Mendoza i ndicate that he was having difficulty understanding or hea ring the witness or the questions. And Mendoza did not e xpress any displeasure to Lenyo regarding Virruta’s testim ony. Lenyo obtained from Virruta the information that he b elieved as a matter of strategy he needed from her

— that she6 No s

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had not seen Mendoza deal drugs or have drugs in the home or his garage. Lenyo’s testimony was supported by the testimony of the interpreters Bueno and Toro

- Greiner. Although Bueno could not recall where she was during Virruta’s direct examination, she said that she was sitting next to Mendoza or somewhere else in the courtroom, which was consistent with her usual practice o f being in the courtroom when she was not actively interpreting. Bueno did not know where Toro

- Greiner was during Virruta’s cross and redirect examination; Bueno e xplained that her focus was on the witness. Similarly, Toro

Greiner did not recall where Buen o was during Virruta’s d irect examination since her focus, too, was on the witness. But Toro

- Greiner did say that it would be unusual to have only one interpreter in the courtroom during a witness’s testim ony. Bueno testified that she spoke in a voice loud enough so that Mendoza could hear her while she was interpreting for Virruta. Toro

- Greiner spoke in a loud voice so she could be heard as well. Bueno said that she did not recall Mendoza mentioning any problems with hearing or with the audio equipment dur ing Virruta’s testimony. Bueno also stated that Mendoza never expressed any complaints about Virruta’s testimony. Likewise, Toro

- Greiner did not recall Mendoza complaining about any problems or issues with hearing Virruta’s testimony. The district judge’s practice after a break in a jury trial was to inquire whether the prosecution or defense had an ything to raise before the jury was brought into the cour troom. This practice was followed throughout Mendoza’s tr ial. According to the district judge, after the lunch break fo llowing Virruta’s testimony, the court asked whether the d e-No s

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fense had anything to raise before the jury was brought in, and Lenyo said that there was not. (Our own review of the trial transcript confirms this fact.)

The district court denied Mendoza’s § 2255 petition. The court credited Lenyo’s testimony, which it found was “mo destly corroborate[d]” by Bueno’s and Toro

- Greiner’s testim ony, and found that Mendoza’s claim that no interpreter was available for communication with Lenyo during Vir ruta’s testimony lacked credible evidentiary support. Specifically, the court found that two interpreters were in the courtroom the second day of trial; one interpreted for Virruta and the other was at the defense table with Mendoza. The court also observe d that even if the second interpreter had not been at the defense table , Mendoza would not have been denied due process because “[t]he law and the Constitution require that a defendant be able to understand the testimony and be able to communicate with his attorney, but no case has held that a defendant has the right to be able to do both simultaneou sly.” The court reasoned that even if Mendoza had no inte rpreter through whom he could communicate with Lenyo during Virruta’s testimony, “the interpreters were available for that purpose at all other times during trial, including when court was not in session.” It noted that one such time was the lunch break taken after Virruta’s testimony, and when court resumed after the break and asked whether the defense had anything to raise before the jury came in, Lenyo responded in the negative. The district court concluded that there was no showing of ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the inte rpreter arrangement because the arrangement

— whether the

one re membered by Lenyo or the one alleged by Mendoza

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was acceptable under the Sixth Amendment and Court I nterpreters Act (CIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1827. The court also dete rmined that there was no ineffective assistance with respect to the failure to translate the wri tten discovery; nothing su ggested that summarizing discovery for Mendoza rather than translating each page fell below an objective standard of re asonableness. Finally, the court concluded that even if cou nsel’s performance was deficient, Mendoza had not sh own any prejudice as a result, and thus denied his claims. Me ndo za petitioned for our review.

II. ANALYSIS Mendoza claims that he was denied due process when the court moved one of the interpreters near the witness stand to interpret for Virruta because t hat deprived him of the ability to communicate effectively with his counsel du ring her testimony. He argues that if he had had contempor aneous communication with counsel during Virruta’s test imony, the jury would have been exposed to information that the a gents who testified for the government had threatened her that if she failed to cooperate, her children would be ta ken away from her, which would have affected the agents’ credibility. Mendoza also argues that counsel provided ine ffective assistance by fai ling to object to the interpreter a rrangement, failing to have the discovery translated into Spanish, and failing to adequately review the discovery with him. 1

1 Mendoza’s opening brief also complained about an inability to co mprehend Virruta’s testimony. At oral argument, however, his counsel assured us that this was not an issue; instead, the claim is that the inte rpreter was moved from Mendoza’s side, leaving him without the ability to communicate with counsel. And we note that Mendoza’s repl y briefNo s

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When considering an appeal from the district court’s d enial of a § 2255 motion, we review leg al conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error. Blake v. United States , 723 F.3d 870, 879 (7th Cir. 2013), petition for cert. filed
, (U.S. Dec. 20, 2013) (No. 13

- 10126). “A factual finding is clearly erron eous when the reviewing court on the e ntire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Webster v. United States , 667 F.3d 826, 830

– 31 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and omitted).

A. The Interpreter Arrangement A criminal defendant is denied due pr ocess when he is unable to understand the proceedings due to a language di fficulty. See United States v. Johnson , 248 F.3d 655, 663 (7th Cir. 2001); United States v. Cirrincione , 780 F.2d 620, 634 (7th Cir. 1985). And a criminal defendant has a due process right to communicate with counsel. Johnson , 248 F.3d at 664. Ther efore, a criminal defendant lacking a basic understanding of the English language has a due process right to an interpre ter to enable him to understand what is said at trial and to
communica te with counsel. Id. But a defendant does not have a due process right to have an interpreter continuously seated at the defense table. Id. (holding the defendants’ co n-

focuses on the alleged violation of the right to contemporaneous co mmunication with counsel. In any event, the district judge found that Mendoza could understand the questions put to Virruta, his common law wife, when they were translated into Span ish; he could understand Virruta’s testimony, which was given in Spanish; and both interpreters testified that they interpreted loudly enough so Mendoza could hear them; thus Mendoza had no need for translation of Virruta’s testi mony

. See United States v. Sanchez , 928 F.2d 1450, 1455

– 56 (6th Cir. 1991), abr ogated on other grounds by United States v. Jackson

- Randolph , 282 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2002).10 No s

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stitutional right to communicate with counsel was not vi olated where the defendants were able to communicate with counsel through an interpreter during breaks in testimony).

U nder the Court Interpreters Act, which was enacted “to ensure that the defendant can comprehend the proceedings and communicate effectively with counsel,” Johnson , 2 48 F.3d at 661 (quotation marks and citation omitted), a defendant is entitled to the appointment of an interpreter “if the district court determines that the defendant: (1) speaks only or pr imarily a language other than the English language; and (2) this fact inhibits their comprehension of the proceedings or communication with counsel,” id. Like the Constitution, “the CIA does not mandate the appointment of an additional i nterpreter to sit at the defense table.” Id. at 663. As we have explained: “The CIA provides for simultaneous interpret ation of the proceedings, not simultaneous interpretation of attorney

- client communications.” Id. The district judge’s factual findings defeat Mendoza’s due process claim. The judge found that two interpreters were in th e courtroom during Virruta’s testimony; one interpreted for Virruta and the other was at the defense table with Me ndoza and available for communications with counsel. These findings are well

- supported by Lenyo’s testimony and the interpreters’ testimony. T he district judge had the opportun ity to hear and observe the witnesses’ manner and demeanor while testifying and he found Lenyo’s testimony “quite b elievable and persuasive”; by contrast, he found Mendoza “painfully unbelievable, perhaps the least credibl e witness the presiding judge has seen in thirty years.” In fact, the judge noted that, despite Mendoza’s claimed unfamiliarity with the English language, during his § 2255 hearing test i-No s

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mony, he answered questions asked of him in English before they were t ranslated in to Spanish. Having heard the inte rpreters’ testimony, the judge described Mendoza’s claim that he complained to the m about problems he was having with hearing but that they ignored his complaints as “popp ycock.” And the judge characterized othe r parts of Mendoza’s testimony as “hogwash” and “balderdash.” As examples supporting these colorful characterizations, we note that when Mendoza was asked whether the questions put to Virruta were translated into Spanish, he said he didn’t r emember, and wh en asked if her answers were in Spanish, he said , “Maybe they were” and then he claimed not to have heard them. The judge credited Lenyo’s testimony over Mendoza’s testimony “on any point on which they dis agree,” specifically mentioning Lenyo’s testimony a bout what happened during Virruta’s testimony. Credibility determin ations are “especially within the province of the district court and can virtually never be clear error.” United States v. Lon gstreet , 669 F.3d 834, 837 (7th Cir. 2012) (quotation marks and omitted). We have no reason to dispute the experienced trial judge’s credibility determinations. Given his findings that Lenyo was “quite believable” and Mendoza was “painfully unbelievable,” there is no basis to think the judge made a mistake in finding that an interpreter was at the defense t able during Virruta’s testimony. Because an interpreter was available to interpret communications between Mendoza and Lenyo at all times during Virruta’s testimony, Mendoza’s due process claim fails. Mendoza suggest s that the district court’s statement that “[w]e don’t have interpreters for witnesses” shows there was12 No s

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only one interpreter in the courtroom. But the district court found otherwise, and the quoted statement is consistent with the presence of two interpret ers who were appointed to i nterpret for Mendoza. The district judge noted that in lengthy proceedings, including jury trials, interpreters usually work in pairs so one can rest while the other actively translates te stimony. (This is a commendable practice. ) There was only a slight deviation from this practice during Virruta’s testim ony: by having one of the interpreters translate for Virruta, that interpreter was unable to rest as she otherwise would during the testimony.
In addition, Mendoza suggests that the only plausible explanation for the bench conference before Virruta testified was the presence of only one interpreter. However, at the bench conference, the prosecutor explained that he had co ntacted the court, informed its staff that Virruta did not speak English, and asked to be notified if this was a problem; yet he was not notified. It is obvious that there had been some confusion about whether the court would provide an inte rpreter. The fact that government counsel addressed t his co nfusion with the court outside of the presence of the jury says nothing about the number of interpreters present in the courtroom and does not call the trial judge’s finding into question.

But even if Mendoza had shown that the district court’s find ings were clearly erroneous, his claim would fail as a matter of law. As the court properly determined, neither the Constitution nor the CIA guarantees simultaneous interpr etation of attorney

- client communications. See Johnson , 248 F.3d at 663

– 64 (neither the Constitution nor CIA gives a
cri m inal defendant a right to the appointment of an inte r-No s

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preter to sit at the defense table). Even assuming that no i nterpreter had been sitting at the defense table to enable Mendoza to communicate with counsel during Virr uta’s te stimony, Bueno and Toro

- Greiner were available for that pu rpose at all other times that second day of trial. Indeed, inte rpreters were available to interpret for Mendoza throughout the trial, including breaks. The court took a lunch break right aft er Virruta’s testimony; Mendoza could have communica ted with counsel before or during that break. See id. (conclu ding that an arrangement which allowed the defendants to communicate with counsel “during breaks in testimony” sa tisfied the Constitution and C IA). Mendoza apparently did not mention to Lenyo during that break that he had wanted Lenyo to ask Virruta if the government agents had threatened her; when the parties and counsel reconvened after the break, and the judge asked if there was anything eith er side wanted to raise before the j ury was brought into the courtroom, Lenyo said no. In fact, Mendoza never told Lenyo that Virruta had been threatened. Virruta was not a surprise witness; Mendoza was aware that she was going to testify at trial. If Virr uta had been threa tened by the agents, we would expect Mendoza to have me ntioned that to trial counse l at some point along the way. And even if there was a due process violation in the i nterpreter arrangement, we would not vacate Mendoza’s co nviction if the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See, e.g.
, United States v. Dickerson , 705 F.3d 683, 691 (7th Cir.) (“In assessing a claim of constitutional error, we are mindful that an otherwise valid conviction should not be set aside if th e reviewing court may confidently say, on the whole re cord, that the constitutional error was harmless beyond a re a-14 No s

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sonable doubt.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied , 134 S. Ct. 166 (2013). A constitutional error is harmless if it can be shown, beyond a reasonable doubt, “that the error complained of did not contribute to the ve rdict obtained.” Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Mendoza argues that if he had had contemporaneous communication with counsel during Virruta’s testi mony, the jury would have been exposed to information that the agents who testified for the government had threatened Virruta that if she failed to cooperate, her children would be taken away from her, which would have affected the agents’ credibility. Bec ause Virruta did not testify at the evidentiary hearing, there is no evidence that she would have said that the agents had threatened her. Besides, she was not an important wi tness for the prosecution; she claimed to have no knowledge of Mendoza’s drug dea ling. However, there was ample ev idence of Mendoza’s guilt from police participation in Me ndoza’s drug deals, two informants’ drug dealings with Me ndoza, and evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at Mendoza’s residence. See Mendoza , 40 1 F. App’x at 129

– 30. Any error arising from the interpreter a rrangement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Mendoza must show “(1) that his trial counsel’s performance f ell b elow objective standards for reasonably effective represent ation, and (2) that counsel’s deficiency prejudiced the d efense.” Blake , 723 F.3d at 879; see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

– 88 (1984). With respect to the performance prong, he “ must overcome the ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonableNo s

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professional assistance.’” Wyatt v. United States , 574 F.3d 455, 458 (7th Cir. 2009) (quotin g Strickland , 466 U.S. at 689). And with regard to the prejud ice prong, he “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofe ssional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outc ome.” Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694. Regarding counsel’s failure to object to the interpreter a rrangement during Virruta’s testimony, Mendoza runs head

on into the district court’s finding that an interpreter was at the defense table and available to Mendoza for communic ations with counsel. Based on this finding, Mendoza’s rights were not infringed and Lenyo was not deficient in failing to object to the arrangement in which one interpreter was moved near the witness stand. But even if we were to find clear er ror in the district court’s finding as to the second i nterpreter’s location at the defense table, and assume that counsel was deficient in failing to object or ask for an alte rnative arrangement, such as multiple breaks during Virruta’s testimony, the clai m still fails because Mendoza cannot show that counsel’s performance prejudiced the defense. Mendoza’s only claim of prejudice is that because trial counsel failed to object to the interpreter arrangement, the interpreter issue was not preserved for appea l. Mendoza claims that he wanted Virruta questioned about whether the government agents had threatened her, but he offered abs olutely no evidence to substantiate his claim that she had been threatened. Therefore he cannot show prejudice. See United States v. Harris , 394 F.3d 543, 555 (7th Cir. 2005) (den ying ineffectiveness claim based on counsel’s failure to a r-16 No s

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range visit to crime scene because defendant did not “even attempt to demonstrate the value” of such a visit). Since the interpreter arrangement iss ue fails on the merits, the failure to preserve the issue for appeal cannot amount to prejudice. As for the claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to have all discovery translated into Spanish and in failing to adequately review discovery with the defendant, Mendoza has not shown that counsel’s performance was deficient in any way or that any deficiency prejudiced the defense. Me ndoza claims that by not being able to review the evidence against him, he could not participate in meaningful cross

exami nation of the government witnesses. Yet he acknow ledges that Lenyo along with interpreter Bueno reviewed the evidence with him for about six hours. Thus his claim is e ssentially that six hours was not enough time to review the evidence. Lenyo’s testimony and billing records establish that he spent over 21 hours reviewing discovery in the case. He then spent several hours reviewing the summarized discovery with Mendoza. Lenyo even arranged for Mendoza to view the physical evidence against him at the U.S. At torney’s O ffice. Mendoza fails to identify any particular evidence that Lenyo failed to review with him. Nor does Mendoza explain how Lenyo was insufficiently prepared for trial. With not hing other than conclusory allegations, Mendoza cannot e stablish defi cient performance or, for that matter, prejudice. In addition, Mendoza complains that Lenyo did not r eview with him all the audio recordings the government di sclosed as part of its case (Mendoza listened to two of the r ecordings; the government planned to use three recordings at trial but it appears that it only played two for the jury), andNo s

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that transcripts of the recordings were not translated into Spanish for him. As in United States v. Williams , 616 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2010), where the defendant complai ned that his a ttorney did not review with him video recordings before trial, Mendoza’s claim fails. Recognizing that “while standing alone this [the failure to review video recordings] may p otentially give rise to a possibility of deficient performance,” i d. at 690, we concluded that when considered with the a ctions the attorney “ did take, we cannot say that the attorney’s performance was incompetent,” id. We reasoned that the a ttorney “knowledgeably questioned the witnesses ... about the recordings” and demo nstrated his familiarity with the recordings during closing argument. Id. Thus, the evidence showed the attorney’s “preparation and review of the r ecordings.” Id. So it is here. Lenyo told the court that he had reviewed all the evidence and formulated a th eory of d efense informed by his review. Lenyo cross

- examined infor mant Cesar Aguayo about the recordings and during closing argument, Lenyo demonstrated his familiarity with the r ecordings and the transcripts that were “corrected” by Aguayo. Thus, the evid ence showed Lenyo’s preparation and review of the recordings. Mendoza also complains that Lenyo did not have the documents translated into Spanish for him. Due Process does not require that discovery documents be translated into a defendant’s native langu age. Cf. United States v. Celis , 608 F.3d 818, 841 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (concluding there was no su pport for the claim that “the Constitution compels that in every case in which defendant is not fluent in English, all disco very documents must be translated, in written form, into the defendant’s native tongue”); United States v. Gonzales
, 339 F.3d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 2003) (court’s failure to provide written18 No s

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translations of documents involved in legal proceedings was not plain error). At the § 2255 hearing, Lenyo stated that b ecause of the sheer volume of discovery, he determined in his professional judgment that it would have been impractical if not impossible to translate each discovery document into Spanish. By describing the task in this way, we understand him to have meant that based on his own review of the di scovery and evidence against Mendoza, there was nothing to gain by translating the written discovery. Indeed, Lenyo stated that his decision was informed by the fact that Me ndoza had not given him much w ith which to formulate a d efense; Mendoza simply denied having committed the crimes charged. Especially given Mendoza’s testimony at the ev identiary hearing that he could read very little Spanish (which makes sense because at one point he testified that he had no formal education whatsoever), Lenyo’s decision to summarize the documents instead of having them translated for Mendoza was reasonable. Finally, Mendoza has wholly failed to show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged errors rega rding discovery, the result of the trial would have been different. See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 694; Blake , 723 F.3d at 879. There has been no showing of how translating the discovery or counsel’s further review of discovery with Mendoza would have changed Mendoza’s ability to prepare for or participate in his trial or otherwise would have affected the trial’s ou tcome. This inability to show prejudice is fatal to Mendoza’s ineffective

- assistance claim.

III. CONCLUSION We accordingly A FFIRM the district court’s judgment.