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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Lonnie Boston,

Case No: 2:18-cv-283

Plaintiff,

Judge Graham

v.

Magistrate Judge Vascura

Nationstar Mortgage, et al.,

Defendants.

Opinion and Order

Plaintiff Lonnie Boston, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit on April 2, 2018 seeking 

injunctive relief to enjoin an April 4, 2018 sheriff’s sale of Boston’s foreclosed home. The complaint 

names as defendants Nationstar Mortgage, the Franklin County Sheriff and Bethany Suttinger, an 

attorney with the law firm of Lerner Sampson & Rothfuss. Defendants have not been served with 

the complaint, and the court construes the requested relief as a motion for a temporary restraining 

order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b).

The complaint alleges that the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas “entered a Decree 

of Foreclosure without serving an indispensable party.” The complaint further alleges that “proper 

notice of the alleged foreclosure” was not given and that there was a failure “to validate the debt.” 

According to the complaint, the foreclosure proceeding is “fraudulent.” The complaint purports to 

assert claims under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

and Truth in Lending Act.

In determining whether to grant or deny a temporary restraining order, the court considers

four factors: “(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether 

the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether issuance of the 

injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether the public interest would be 

served by issuance of the injunction.” City of Pontiac Retired Emps. Ass’n v. Schimmel, 751 F.3d 

427, 430 (6th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (en banc) (internal quotation marks omitted).

The court finds from the sparse factual allegations in the complaint that a temporary 

restraining order should not be granted because there is no likelihood of success on the merits. The 

complaint attacks the validity of the state court proceedings. And on that basis, the complaint seeks 
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to enjoin the sheriff’s sale. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this court cannot exercise 

jurisdiction over the aspect of the complaint seeking to enjoin the sheriff’s sale. See Exxon Mobil 

Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 283 (2005) (discussing Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 

Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 

(1983) and stating that the doctrine precludes a federal district court from entertaining “cases 

brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered 

before the district court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of 

those judgments.”). Where, as here, the alleged source of the plaintiff’s injury is the state court 

decision, Rooker-Feldman prevents the federal district court from exercising jurisdiction. 

McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 393 (6th Cir. 2006).

Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order is DENIED.

s/ James L. Graham

JAMES L. GRAHAM

United States District Judge

DATE: April 3, 2018