IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

SHAKAIRA L. DAVIS, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-475

 Judge Michael H. Watson

 Magistrate Judge Jolson

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Shakaira L. Davis, filed this action seeking review of a decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for Disability 

Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under Titles II and XVI. For 

the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 13) be 

OVERRULED, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI on December 14, 2011, alleging disability beginning 

February 1, 2009, due to numerous physical and mental impairments. (Doc. 10, Tr. 206). An 

Administrative Law Judge (the “ALJ”) held a hearing on April 5, 2013. (Id., Tr. 42–74) after 

Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and upon reconsideration. The ALJ denied benefits in 

a written decision on June 27, 2013. (Id., Tr. 13–36). That became the final decision of the 

Commissioner when the Appeals Council denied review. (Id., Tr. 1–4). 

On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff filed a case in this Court seeking a review of the final 

decision of the Commissioner. Upon a joint motion of the parties, the District Court remanded the 
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case to the Commissioner. (Tr. 813). The Appeals Council issued a Remand Order on May 6, 

2015 (Tr. 814–15), and a hearing was held on February 12, 2016. (Tr. 711–36). On March 22, 

2016, the ALJ denied benefits in a written decision. (Tr. 822–37). Plaintiff appealed that decision 

on June 14, 2016, which was denied due to a missed deadline. (Tr. 847–48). The Appeals Counsel 

remanded the case on September 16, 2016, after finding her appeal to have been timely filed. (Tr. 

850–55). On February 8, 2017, another administrative hearing was held. (Tr. 691–710). On 

March 17, 2017, the ALJ again denied benefits in a written decision. (Tr. 662–79). The Appeals 

Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the Commissioner. (Tr. 

639–42). 

Plaintiff filed this action on May 14, 2018 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the 

administrative record on August 9, 2018 (Doc. 10). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific Errors 

(Doc. 13), the Commissioner responded (Doc. 16), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 17).

B. Relevant Medical Background

The ALJ usefully summarized the physical and medical evidence of record.

1. Physical

The medical evidence of record shows that the claimant has degenerative arthritis 

of the spine and knees, bilateral trochanteric bursitis, fibromyalgia, and myofascial 

pain syndrome (Exhibits B3F, pp. 2, 4, 5 and B8F, p. 1). The claimant has presented 

to the doctor complaining of body stiffness and neck, low back, hip, right knee, and 

right ankle pain (Exhibits Bl F, p. 11; B3F, pp. 1, 3, 11; B6F, p. 3; B7F, p. 1; B8F, 

p. 10; BlOF, p. 2; B12F, p. 1; B13F, p. 4; B16F, p. 26; B28F, p. 2; B33F, pp. 63; 

and B52F). She has also reported having occasional cramping of the hands and feet 

(Exhibit B3F, p. 18). Upon examination, the claimant has had crepitus of the knees, 

but with no effusion or warmth, and tender points in the trochanteric bursa and 

cervical, thoracic, and lumbar spine (Exhibits 3F, pp. 1, 7, 13; B8F, p. 3; B12F, p. 

1: B16F, p. 38; B19F, p. 2; B23F, pp. 16, 20, 33; B27F, p. 48; B33F, p. 4; B39F, 

pp. 4, 11; and B52F). A magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the lumbar spine in 

September 2011 was unremarkable , as were x- rays of the cervical spine (Exhibits 
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BlF, p. 65 and B8F, p. 41). X-rays of the bilateral hands in August 2012 were also 

unremarkable (Exhibits B8F, pp. 38, 39; and B43F, p. 7).

The claimant has received a number of conservative treatment measures for pain. 

She has received hip and knee injections for pain, which have decreased her pain 

significantly (Exhibits B3F, pp. 1, 3, 6, 9, 11, 15; 8F, pp. 1, 11; B19F, pp. 2, 4, 6; 

B30F, p. 7; B43F, p. 19; and B52F). She has been prescribed Voltaren gel, Lyrica, 

Cymbalta, Neurontin, Flexeril, Naprosyn , Indocin, and other medications for pain 

regulation (Exhibits B3F, pp. 2, 3, 20; B8F, pp. 4, 23; and B52F). The claimant 

has also received therapy, reportedly without significant relief (Exhibit B3F, pp. 8, 

13). The claimant was referred for pain management services, which added Vicodin 

and Mobic to her medication regimen (Exhibits B7F, p. 4 and B25F, p. 8). She has 

also been given a prescription for an exercise transcutaneous electrical nerve 

stimulator (TENS) unit, back brace, and knee braces (Exhibits B19F, p. 2 and B52F, 

p. 9). In December 2014, the claimant began receiving trigger point injections and 

chiropractic treatment, which she reported decreased her pain and muscle tightness 

(Exhibits B39F, pp. 11, 14, 16; B43F, p. 18; and B45F).

The claimant has also made specific complaints of knee pain (Exhibits B4F, p. 2; 

B16F, pp. 1, 18; and B52F). The claimant has reported a significant history of knee 

surgeries on her right knee (Exhibits B8F, p. 22 and B24F, p. 1). X-rays of the 

bilateral knees in September 2010 showed mild narrowing and osteophyte 

formation of the medial compartment of the right knee and a normal left knee 

(Exhibit BlF, p. 62). Upon evaluation by the Ohio State University Department of 

Sports and Medicine in September 2012, the claimant’s bilateral knees 

demonstrated no joint space narrowing (Exhibit B16F, p. 5). She had tenderness in 

the medial joint line, mild swelling, and a positive McMurray’s sign of the right 

knee, but a relatively unremarkable right knee presentation otherwise (Exhibit 

B16F, p. 4). Follow-up x-rays and MRI’s at that time showed an unremarkable left 

knee and tricompartmental arthritis of the right knee, with evidence of a prior ACL 

reconstruction (Exhibit B 16F, pp. 6-9). She was instructed to continue with ice 

and anti-inflammatories (Exhibit B16F, p. 5). The claimant has also been offered 

knee braces, but she stated that they were not helpful (Exhibits B16F, p. 30 and 

B52F, p. 14). In October 2013, the claimant was evaluated by a spine specialist to 

determine if her lower extremity pain was originating in the spine (Exhibit B16F, 

p. 33). Dr. Steward determined that her pain was consistent with diffuse myofascial 

pain and fibromyalgia, thus he encouraged her to continue performing her activities 

of daily living, doing physical therapy exercises, and maintaining her current pain 

regimen (Exhibit B16F, p. 42).

The claimant has been diagnosed with COPD (Exhibit B23F, p. 8). The claimant 

has presented to the doctor complaining of cough, congestion, and shortness of 

breath (Exhibits B3F, p. 19; B23F, pp. 10, 18, 23, 67 and B33F, p. 6). Pulmonary 

function studies performed in July 2010 showed evidence of moderate obstruction 
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(Exhibit B8F, p. 45). The claimant has been treated for bronchitis; however, she 

has not been hospitalized due to an exacerbation of her COPD (Exhibit B40F, p. 

16). The claimant has been prescribed Albuterol to treat this condition (Exhibit 

B30F, p. 8).

The medical record also shows the claimant stands five feet, three inches tall and 

has weighed around 192 pounds (Exhibit B15F, p. 4). That is a body mass index 

of 34, which indicates obesity.

(Tr. 672–73).

2. Mental

Mentally, the claimant has been diagnosed with a major depressive disorder, an 

anxiety disorder, a post-traumatic stress disorder, and a schizoaffective disorder 

(Exhibits B2F, p. 2; B5F, p. 2; B46F; and B54F). The claimant has endorsed 

psychiatric symptoms, such as depressed mood, memory and concentration 

problems, anger, anxiety, sleep disturbance, nightmares, decreased energy, and 

worrying (Exhibits B5F, pp. 2, 8; B9F, p. 4; B22F, pp. 13, 17; B32F, p. 9; B33F, p. 

47; B41F, p. 30; and B54F). The claimant also has history of alcohol and marijuana 

abuse, but has reported rare of use of alcohol more recently (Exhibit B5F, pp. 1, 5). 

The claimant has reported not taking medications in 2010 and 2011 (Exhibit B54F, 

p. 23). She was admitted to the hospital on a psychiatric basis in November 2011 

for four days as a result of suicidal ideation, paranoia, and depressive symptoms 

(Exhibit B2F, p. 2). She acknowledged at that time that she had not taken her 

psychiatric medications for one month prior to this incident (Exhibit B2F, p. 20). 

She was started on Setraline, Clonidine, and Pregabalin and was released in stable 

condition (Exhibit B2F, p. 2). She reported that the change in her medications 

improved her depressive symptoms following her release from the hospital (Exhibit 

B3F, p. 1).

In December 2011, the claimant followed-up for an initial diagnostic evaluation at 

Southeast Inc. (Exhibit B5F, p. 4). The claimant has received counseling on and off 

since that time at multiple agencies, and has been prescribed Zoloft, Clonidine, 

Trazodone, Vistaril, Wellbutrin, and other medications to treat her symptoms 

(Exhibits B5F, p. 2; B9F, p. 2; Bl l F, p. 12; B41F, p. 20; B41F, p. 58; and B54F). 

She has reported having improvement with medication, with decreased depressive 

and anxiety symptoms (Exhibits B9F, p. 2; Bl lF, pp. 2, 4). While the treatment 

notes show mental status examinations that are unremarkable, with a normal mood 

and affect, other examinations show evidence of a depressed and anxious mood 

(Exhibits B9F, pp. 2, 5, 8; Bl lF, pp. 5, 8; B41F, pp. 57, 65, 67; and B44F, pp. 13, 

21). However, the treatment notes show that the claimant’s mental health is stable 

when she is compliant with medication and treatment. Specifically, while receiving 
5

consistent treatment from June 2015 through November 2016, the claimant 

reported that she was doing well, she was mentally stable, and her medication was 

“really effective” for her (Exhibits B41F, pp. 54, 63, 69; B44F, pp. 9, 13, 16, 21, 

36; and B49F).

The claimant had an inpatient hospitalization from March 9 through March 14, 

2016 due to reported worsening anxiety and suicidal ideation. She also reported 

she had been smoking marijuana to help with her symptoms. The claimant’s 

diagnoses included a schizoaffective disorder and a post-traumatic stress disorder 

(Exhibits B46F and B50F).

(Tr. 674).

C. The ALJ’s Decision 

The ALJ found that Plaintiff met the insured status requirements of the Social Security Act 

through March 31, 2015, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 1, 

2009. (Tr. 666). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: 

degenerative arthritis of the spine and knees; bilateral trochanteric bursitis; fibromyalgia; 

myofascial pain syndrome; chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD); obesity; a major 

depressive disorder; an anxiety disorder; a post-traumatic stress disorder; a schizoaffective 

disorder; and a history of alcohol and marijuana abuse. (Tr. 667). The ALJ held, however, that 

there was no medical opinion of record to indicate the existence of an impairment or combination 

of impairments that met or equaled in severity the level of the Listings of Impairments. (Tr. 668). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see also 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 
6

support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

“After the Appeals Council reviews the ALJ’s decision, the determination of the council 

becomes the final decision of the Secretary and is subject to review by this Court.” Olive v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:06 CV 1597, 2007 WL 5403416, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 19, 2007) 

(citing Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 922 (6th Cir. 1990); Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 538 

(6th Cir. 1986) (en banc)). If the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, 

it must be affirmed, “even if a reviewing court would decide the matter differently.” Id. (citing 42 

U.S.C. § 405(g); Kinsella v. Schweiker, 708 F.2d 1058, 1059–60 (6th Cir. 1983)).

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts one assignment of error: that the ALJ failed to follow the treating-physician 

rule when evaluating Dr. Ratliff’s opinions.

Two related rules govern how an ALJ is required to analyze a treating physician’s opinion. 

Dixon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-cv-478, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 7, 2016). 

The first is the “treating physician rule.” Id. The rule requires an ALJ to “give controlling weight 

to a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of the claimant’s 

impairment(s) if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the case 

record.” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Closely associated is “the good reasons rule,” which requires an ALJ always to give “good 

reasons . . . for the weight given to the claimant’s treating source opinion.” Dixon, 2016 WL 
7

860695, at *4 (quoting Blakely, 581 F.3d at 406 (alterations in original)); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2). In order to meet the “good reasons” standard, the ALJ’s determination “must 

be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave 

to the treating source’s medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Cole, 661 F.3d at 937. 

The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 

disposition of their cases, particularly in situations where a claimant knows that his 

physician has deemed him disabled and therefore “might be especially bewildered 

when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for 

the agency’s decision is supplied. The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies 

the treating physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application 

of the rule.

Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 (6th Cir. 2004) (internal citation and quotation 

marks omitted). The treating physician rule and the good reasons rule together create what has 

been referred to as the “two-step analysis created by the Sixth Circuit.” Allums v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 975 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2013).

This is how the ALJ evaluated Dr. Ratliff’s opinions:

The opinion of John E. Ratliff, D.O., the claimant’s treating physician, is given 

partial weight (Exhibit B36F). This opinion indicates that it is premised upon the 

claimant working in a place with “strong fumes, poor ventilation, heavy lifting, or 

chronic lifting and bending” (Exhibit B36F, p. 4). Thus, Dr. Ratliff’s limitations 

regarding the claimant’s ability to stand, walk, or sit are more restrictive because 

of the work environment presumed by Dr. Ratliff. While Dr. Ratliff is a treating 

physician, the opinion of the claimant’s other treating physician, who is also an 

orthopedic specialist, Dr. Kaeding, is more congruent with the totality of medical 

evidence and does not include work environment presumptions. To the extent Dr. 

Ratliff’s opinions are consistent with the residual functional capacity set forth 

above, those opinions are given great weight.

The physical residual functional capacity opinions from Dr. Ratliff that were 

rendered for Franklin County Job and Family Services indicating that the claimant 

is limited to a reduced range of sedentary work are given partial weight because 

they were limited examinations, each based on one physical examination, and a 

determination of who is “disabled” or “unable to work” is an area reserved to the 
8

Commissioner (Exhibits B15F, pp. 2-9, 12-14, 17-18, and B34F, pp. 3- 10, 13-15, 

18-19). Additionally, as discussed above, Dr. Kaeding’s opinion is more consistent 

with the evidence of record.

The mental residual functional capacity opinion from Dr. Ratliff that was rendered 

for Franklin County Job and Family Services indicating that the claimant has 

mostly moderate to marked mental limitations is given little weight because it is a 

limited examination, it is inconsistent with the medical evidence of record, and he 

is not a mental health specialist (Exhibits pp. B15F, pp, 15-16 and B34F, pp. 16-

17). The record shows that the claimant has no more than moderate mental health 

symptoms that are stable when she is taking the appropriate medications (See 

Exhibits B41F, pp. 54, 63, 69 and B44F, pp. 9, 13, 16, 21, 36). When the claimant 

was admitted to the hospital due to psychiatric symptoms, she admitted that she had 

been off her medications, and she stabilized once again with resumption of 

treatment (Exhibits B2F, pp. 2, 20 and B3F, p. 1).

(Tr. 675–76).

Dr. Ratliff addressed Plaintiff’s physical and mental limitations. So too, the 

Undersigned considers both.

A. Physical Impairments

The Undersigned reads the ALJ’s analysis of Dr. Ratliff’s assessment as providing four

primary reasons for assigning partial weight to the doctor’s opinion regarding Plaintiff’s physical 

impairments. First, the ALJ found Dr. Ratliff’s opinion of lesser value because the doctor had 

assumed a certain time of environment—one with “strong fumes, poor ventilation, heavy lifting,

or chronic lifting and bending.” (Tr. 675). That is not an unreasonable interpretation of Dr. 

Ratliff’s opinion because Dr. Ratcliff expressly stated that he was premising his assessment on the 

hypothetical work place having “strong fumes, poor ventilation, heavy lifting or chronic lifting 

and bending.” (Tr. 1813). Given this, the ALJ had discretion to discount the application of Dr. 

Ratliff’s opinion.

Second, the ALJ valued Dr. Kaeding’s opinion more than Dr. Ratliff’s because the ALJ 
9

found that Dr. Kaeding’s opinion was more consistent with the record evidence. For this point, 

the ALJ referred to his previous discussion of Plaintiff’s medical history wherein the ALJ detailed 

a number of Plaintiff’s medical records. (See Tr. 672–73). Although Plaintiff disagrees with the 

ALJ’s ultimate interpretation of the record, the ALJ sufficiently explained why he favored Dr. 

Kaeding’s opinion and offered adequate support for his conclusion. In reply, Plaintiff further 

challenges the ALJ’s decisions to prefer Dr. Kaeding’s opinion over Dr. Ratcliff’s based upon the 

fact that the ALJ ultimately assessed greater restrictions than Dr. Kaeding proposed. Contrary to 

Plaintiff’s assertions, this shows that the ALJ weighed the evidence and thoughtfully crafted the 

RFC. See Ray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 940 F. Supp. 2d 718, 727 (S.D. Ohio 2013) (noting that 

“[i]t is the Commissioner’s function to resolve conflicts in the medical evidence[.]”).

Third, the ALJ discounted Dr. Ratliff’s opinion because it was based upon only one 

physical examination. Plaintiff attempts to challenge this conclusion (Doc. 13 at 11), but it is true 

that Dr. Ratcliff’s treatment notes appear to refer to a single physical examination. (See, e.g., Tr. 

1166, 1169, 1171, 1175, 1181 (generally referring to the same examination)). The ALJ had 

discretion to discount Dr. Ratcliff’s opinion for this reason. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 

416.927(c) (“The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the more weight 

we will give that medical opinion.”). 

Fourth, the ALJ gave only partial weight to the physical residual functional capacity

opinions from Dr. Ratliff that were rendered for Franklin County Job and Family Services for the 

above reasons and because “determination of who is ‘disabled’ or ‘unable to work’ is an area

reserved to the Commissioner.” (Tr. 675). That was a correct application of the law. See, e.g., 

Turner v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 381 F. App’x 488, 493 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that treating 
10

physician’s opinion that plaintiff was “unable to work” was entitled to no deference because that 

issue was “reserved to the commissioner”).

Based upon the above reasons, the Undersigned concludes that the ALJ sufficiently 

explained why he did not credit Dr. Ratliff’s opinions regarding Plaintiff’s physical limitations 

and provided good reasons for doing so.

B. Mental Impairments 

Dr. Ratliff also completed a Medical Functional Capacity Assessment, which addressed 

Plaintiff’s mental impairments. (Tr. 1178). Dr. Ratliff opined that Plaintiff had moderate to 

marked limitations in every area except understanding and remembering simple instructions, 

interacting with the general public, and responding appropriately to supervisors. (Id.). The ALJ 

gave this opinion little weight because, according to the ALJ, the opinion was based upon a limited 

examination, was inconsistent with the medical evidence of record, and Dr. Ratliff is not a mental 

health specialist. (Tr. 676). The ALJ also concluded that the record showed that Plaintiff had no 

more than moderate mental health symptoms and that her condition was stable when she was 

appropriately medicated. (Id.).

First, the ALJ correctly noted that Dr. Ratliff is not a mental health specialist. The law 

makes clear that an “ALJ may discredit the opinion of a physician that is outside her area of 

expertise.” See Adams v. Massanari, 55 F. App’x 279, 284 (6th Cir. 2003); Thacker v. Sec’y of 

Health & Human Servs., No. 90-5546, 1990 WL 200375, *3 (6th Cir. Dec. 12, 1990) (affirming a 

denial of benefits when there was no evidence that the physician was a specialist in the area of 

mental impairments). Here, nothing in the record indicates that Dr. Ratliff has specialized mental 

health training, and the ALJ was permitted to discount his opinion based upon that fact.
11

Second, the ALJ cited to specific clinical findings in order to conclude that Dr. Ratliff’s 

opinion was inconsistent with the evidence. (Tr. 676 (citing Tr. 1920, 1929, 1935, 1985, 1989, 

1992, 1997, 2012)). Those records generally show that Plaintiff’s mental health was stable when 

she was compliant with treatment. For example, on February 11, 2015, Plaintiff reported “no 

mental health issue,” and she stated “she [was] doing well.” (Tr. 1920). She further reported that 

her “medication [was] really effective,” and that she was “managing to be stable mentally.” (Id.) 

Plaintiff offered similarly positive mental health throughout 2015. (Tr. 1927, 1935, 1985, 1989, 

1992, 1997, 2012). Relatedly, the ALJ noted that when Plaintiff was admitted to the hospital due 

to psychiatric symptoms in early 2016, Plaintiff admitted that she had been off her medications, 

and she stabilized when she resumed treatment. (Tr. 676). Again, there is record support for this 

conclusion. (See Tr. 446, 465, 477). In later 2016, when Plaintiff was compliant with treatment, 

she again reported doing well mentally. (See, e.g., Tr. 1985 (reporting that Plaintiff was compliant 

with her medication and “seem[s] to be in a stable mental condition”)).

Plaintiff cites evidence that arguably could support a different conclusion (Doc. 13 at 15), 

but that is not what this Court must consider. Instead, this Court asks whether the ALJ’s conclusion 

has support. See Price v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 172, 175–76 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Where 

the opinion of a treating physician is not supported by objective evidence or is inconsistent with 

the other medical evidence in the record, this Court generally will uphold an ALJ’s decision to 

discount that opinion.”). The Undersigned concludes there is support for the ALJ’s interpretation 

of the evidence, and, consequently, the ALJ did not err.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 
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13) be OVERRULED, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 

made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit 

this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Failure to object to 

the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the district judge review 

the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the 

decision of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140, 152–53 (1985).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: May 1, 2019 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE