UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

SHAMAR W. MONTGOMERY, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-187 

 v. Judge Michael H. Watson 

 Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

 

CITY OF COLUMBUS, et al., 

 

 Defendants. 

 

ORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, Shamar W. Montgomery, an Ohio resident proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, has submitted a request to file a civil action in forma pauperis. (ECF No. 1.) The Court 

GRANTS Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis. All judicial officers who render 

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). This 

matter is also before the Court for the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as required by 28 

U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

Amended Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons 

that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s Complaint. 

I. 

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to 

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 
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assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1, which 

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- 

 * * * 

 (B) the action or appeal-- 

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

 To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the 

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also 

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual 

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). 

 

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Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 
3 

 Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] 

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on 

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for 

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the 

Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has 

limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. 

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 

(6th Cir. 1989)). 

II. 

Plaintiff identifies the following defendants in his Complaint: City of Columbus, Judge 

Lynch, “the public,” “the owners of businesses,” “the nation of the United States,” “courthouse 

in Columbus Ohio,” and “Any person to harm me for my feedom [sic] of religion [sic].” (Pl.’s 
4 

Compl. 2, ECF No. 1-1.) The entirety of Plaintiff’s “Statement of Claim” in his Amended 

Complaint provides as follows: 

I’m mental! But in school all my life because that what I was taught from brith 

[sic] to serve my Lord to monopolize [sic] over my understand[ing] of a man as a 

boy up. 

 

(Id. at 3) In the relief section of his Complaint, Plaintiff states as follows: 

Pay me my 25,000 which was my money from Columbus from Judge Lynch and 

the city jail in Columbus Ohio and pain and suffering for being stronger than 

norm on earth. 

 

(Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff’s Complaint provides insufficient factual content or context from which the 

Court could reasonably infer that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s rights. Thus, he has failed to 

satisfy the basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Rule 8(a). Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Moreover, the allegations Plaintiff sets forth in his Amended Complaint are so nonsensical as to 

render his Amended Complaint frivolous. A claim is frivolous if it lacks “an arguable basis 

either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The former occurs when 

“indisputably meritless” legal theories underlie the complaint, and the latter when it relies on 

“fantastic or delusional” allegations. Id. at 327–28. This Court is not required to accept the 

factual allegations set forth in a complaint as true when such factual allegations are “clearly 

irrational or wholly incredible.” Ruiz v. Hofbauer, 325 F. App’x 427, 429–30 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(citing Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992)). For these reasons, it is 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 
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III. 

 For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this 

action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those 

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with 

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo 

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or 

recommendations to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court 

may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made 

herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with 

instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision 

of the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 /s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE