IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

RICO I. HAIRSTON, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-378

Magistrate Judge Jolson

MRS. MARIA, et al., 

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff commenced this action on April 24, 2018, and he has submitted approximately 

twenty filings in the three months that followed. The Court addresses a number of Plaintiff’s filings 

below. 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is an inmate housed at the Correctional Reception Center (“CRC”) proceeding 

pro se against the following Defendants: Lieutenant Tyler, Lieutenant Shasteen, Correctional 

Officers Eyre, Grimm, and Hitch, Nurse Maria, Mental Health Supervisor Mr. Brown, and Sergeant 

John Doe. (See generally Doc. 8). Plaintiff’s complaint raises a number of different (perhaps 

unrelated) claims and is difficult to follow, particularly with respect to the timing of the alleged

incidents. 

The first incident appearsto have occurred on February 28, 2018, when Plaintiff alleges that 

he was placed in “the hole under investigation for undisclosed reasons.” (Id. at 9). He asserts that, 

on that day, correctional officers informed other inmates of his location, so they could subject him 

to verbal harassment because he was convicted of a sex crime. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff alleges that “for 

3 days[,] inmates on this unit [were] yelling out their doors calling [him] a ‘f***ing chomo’ ‘baby 
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rapist’ ‘toucher’” and telling him he was going to be “touched” and that his sister or daughter would 

be raped. (Id. at 9). Plaintiff also claims that the inmates threatened to hack his J-Pay account and 

“harass [his] family and let [him] know they are going to have [him] ‘touched’ by sending out an 

S.O.S. (stab on sight) to every prison in Ohio.” (Id. at 10). 

Plaintiff later alleges that he received a ticket on March 5, 2018, and went before the Serious 

Misconduct Panel on March 12, 2018, which resulted in him being housed continuously in “the 

hole.” (Id. at 12). He asserts that Lieutenant Tyler told him to “get comfortable,” because he would 

be in the hole for years. (Id.). 

At some point, Plaintiff requested to be on suicide watch and submitted informal complaints 

asking to be separated from the harassing inmates. (Id. at 10). Plaintiff’s cell location was changed 

first to cell 2112, and then to cell 2104. (Id.). Plaintiff states that cell 2104 had no working sink, 

but his complaints about it were disregarded. (Id.). Plaintiff contends that he continued to be 

harassed in this location, with fellow inmates telling him “your sister sent us stamps on J-Pay and 

pictures, we told her we was in here for murder and that we was going to get you touched. I told 

that b***h to send us pictures then I cussed that b***h out.” (Id.). Plaintiff again requested to be 

placed on suicide watch, filed an informal complaint, and asked that he be separated from the 

harassing inmates. (Id. at 11).

Plaintiff alleges that, on March 20, 2018 at approximately 2:30 p.m., he was placed in cell 

1210, which “was covered in black mold, feces, urine, and asbestos” on “the sink walls, and the 

entire ceiling.” (Id. at 3; see also id. at 11). Plaintiff contends that he complained to the prison 

staff, including Defendants, but they took no action in response. (Id. at 3).

Beginning at approximately 9:00 p.m., Plaintiff threatened repeatedly that, if he was not 

removed from the cell, he was going to take his own life. (Id.). Plaintiff alleges that the prison staff 
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ignored his pleas. (Id.). More specifically, Plaintiff avers:

I tell Correctional Officer Mr. Grimm “I’m going to kill myself.” He says, “okay,” 

then walks away. He never reports this to anyone nor does he contact medical, or 

his supervisor.

Time goes by, I’d say about an hour and fifteen minutes by this time it’s 3rd shift; 

about 10:15 p.m. and Correctional Officer Mr. Hitch comes past my cell, and as he 

approaches my cell, I tell him, “Look, I’m going to kill myself, take me out of this 

cell.” I ask him did 2nd shift tell him, and he says “No.” He then says, “Okay, hold 

on,” and leaves to report this to Nurse Maria.

Nurse Maria approached my cell, and as I begin to tell her I’m going to commit 

suicide ... she cuts me off and states, “I don’t give a shit, go ahead and do it, they 

come thru every 20 minutes, your [sic] on a suicide floor, we’ll deal with it when it 

happens.” Then she walks away, comes back about one minute later and says 

something else but I start to yell for the Correctional Officer Mr. Hitch and scream[ ] 

for help.

(Id. at 3–4).

Plaintiff then describes the actions he took in an effort to take his own life. (Id. at 4). He 

alleges:

I then put toilet paper on my window and start planning a way to hang myself with 

my towel. Correctional Officer Mr. Hitch walks up to my cell door, starts to bang 

on the door and then pops the food trap slot open. He then states, “This is the easiest 

way to get sprayed, just wait until a ‘white shirt’ walks around.”

I then proceed to rip my towel, start making a nosse [sic], rig it in the vent above the 

door and hang myself!

(Id.).

Plaintiff does not explain how he survived, but he reiterates that the prison staff ignored 

him:

The Correctional Officer Mr. Hitch walked past my cell door every 30 minutes and 

just looks at me and keeps walking as I’m hanging, choking to death. I had ripped 

my towel, made a nosse [sic] and was attempting to “go ahead and do it” as Nurse 

Maria advised me, and Correctional Officer Mr. Hitch just kept walking past my cell 

door with deliberate indifference, dereliction of duty, and malice.

(Id.). Based on these facts, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his 
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serious medical needs. (Id.).

Plaintiff asserts that he filed an informal complaint on March 23, 2018, but it was not 

resolved to his satisfaction. (Id. at 5). Plaintiff then filed a grievance reasserting the same facts and 

requesting that prison officials check the audio recording. (Id.). This grievance likewise was not 

resolved to Plaintiff’s satisfaction, prompting him to file this lawsuit on April 24, 2018. (Id.). 

Plaintiff completed health services requests before he filed suit, on March 24 and 26, 2018, 

complaining of dizzy spells, migraines, and coughing up blood. (Id.). Plaintiff was examined on 

March 27, 2018, but he nonetheless maintains that Defendants demonstrated deliberate indifference 

to his medical needs and that he was subjected to unsafe conditions. (Id.).

Plaintiff also complains that he was denied the right to make a legal call at the beginning of 

April 2018. (Id. at 11). He alleges that, on April 4, 2018, he received a false conduct report from 

Lieutenant Tyler “where he lies and says I called him a ‘b***h ni**a’ and told him ‘I was going to 

spit in his face’ and that ‘the flood gates are open.’” (Id.). Plaintiff had a Rules Infraction Board 

hearing the same day. (Id.). 

Plaintiff states that, during the hearing, he denied making the statements and called a fellow 

inmate as a witness. (Id.). He also claims that Lieutenant Tyler snuck into the RIB room, despite 

regulations stating that he should not be included in deliberations. (Id. at 5, 13). Plaintiff continues:

[w]hen I was called back into the RIB room, Lieutenant Shasteen states, “because 

you didn’t allow Lieutenant Tyler to be present, we are going to have to find you 

guilty. . . .” I then ask him, “did Lieutenant Tyler just come in here?” He says . . . 

“well . . . yeah . . . , theres two cameras right there . . . one, two, this is his office, I 

can’t stop him from coming in here.

(Id. at 5) (alterations in original). Plaintiff claims that he was improperly given a 30-day phone and 

J-Pay restriction, his mail is not being sent out, and he is being denied legal assistance because 

Lieutenant Tyler seeks to “cut all [his] communication off from the outside world. . . .” (Id. at 12).
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Based upon all of those allegations, Plaintiff sets forth the following as his legal claims:

The harassment, retaliation, deliberate indifference, discrimination, racial slurs, 

denial of access to the court, [and] due process violations, constituted cruel and 

unusual punishment and violated Plaintiff[’s] 1st Amendment, 8th Amendment, and 

14th Amendment rights to the ... United States Constitution.

(Id. at 13). 

II. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR A PERMANENT INJUNCTION AND

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (Doc. 13)

On May 17, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Permanent Injunction and Temporary

Restraining Order. (Doc. 13). Plaintiff claims that he is being “discriminated against by multiple 

staff members,” who are telling inmates that Plaintiff is a “chomo.” (Id. at 1). The remainder of 

Plaintiff’s Motion appears to pertain to his J-Pay account. In particular, Plaintiff claims that he 

has been denied copies of his J-Pay materials, including internal grievances, complaints, and 

appeals. (Id.). He also alleges that an inmate hacked his account on May 13, 2018, exhausting all 

of his 216 stamps worth $36.50, and transferring $72.10 from his trust fund account to his media 

account. (Id. at 1–2).

Plaintiff alleges that he reported the hacking to prison officials, who responded that there

was nothing that they could do about it because J-Pay does not issue refunds. (Id. at 3). According 

to Plaintiff, “[t]his is an act of robbery and fraud; our trust fund accounts are accessible by other 

inmates and staff are allowing it, taking no measures to prevent this or secure our funds.” (Id.). 

Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his life was threatened by prison staff. (Id. at 4). He states, 

“I am trapped in the hole, I’ve been robbed, showed indifference, discriminated against, given no 

redress. . . .” (Id.). Plaintiff explains that he is “respectfully asking for a permanent injunction to 

retrieve all funds stolen out of my account and a temporary restraining order from all named 

defendants and all staff who take orders from the Warden Mrs. Smith.” (Id. at 4). Plaintiff 
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concludes that he has “committed no violations,” but is still improperly “being held in the hole.” 

(Id.). 

Defendants filed a response on July 5, 2018, arguing that: (1) Plaintiff has not established 

a strong likelihood of success on the merits (Doc. 24 at 3–5); Plaintiff will not suffer irreparable 

harm if an injunction is denied (id. at 5); granting Plaintiff’s relief would cause substantial harm 

to penological interests (id. at 6); and the public interest would not be served by granting the relief 

(id.).

A. Legal Standard

The factors to be weighed before issuing a temporary restraining order are the same as 

those considered for issuing a preliminary injunction. See, e.g., Workman v. Bredesen, 486 F.3d 

896, 904–05 (6th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the Court considers the following:

(1) whether the movant has a strong likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether 

the movant would suffer irreparable injury without the injunction; (3) whether 

issuance of the injunction would cause substantial harm to others; and (4) whether 

the public interest would be served by the issuance of the injunction.

Hunter v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Elections, 635 F.3d 219, 233 (6th Cir. 2011) (citation and internal 

quotation marks omitted). These are “factors to be balanced, not prerequisites that must be met.” 

Welch v. Brown, 551 F. App’x 804, 808 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 

1093, 1099 (6th Cir. 1994)). “‘While as a general matter, none of these four factors are given 

controlling weight, a preliminary injunction where there is simply no likelihood of success on the 

merits must be reversed.’” Farnsworth v. Nationstar Mortg., LLC, 569 F. App’x 421, 425 (6th 

Cir. 2014) (quoting Mich. State AFL-CIO v. Miller, 103 F.3d 1240, 1249 (6th Cir. 1997)); see also

Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that “a finding 

that there is simply no likelihood of success on the merits is usually fatal”).
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Additionally, “‘[t]he party seeking a preliminary injunction bears a burden of justifying 

such relief, including showing irreparable harm and likelihood of success.’” Ky. v. U.S. ex rel. 

Hagel, 759 F.3d 588, 600 (6th Cir. 2014); see also Overstreet v. Lexington–Layette Urban Cty. 

Gov’t, 305 F.3d 566, 573 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy 

which should be granted only if the movant carries his or her burden of proving that the 

circumstances clearly demand it”). Further, the “proof required for the plaintiff to obtain a 

preliminary injunction is much more stringent than the proof required to survive a summary 

judgment motion.” Leary v. Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 739 (6th Cir. 2000).

Finally, the Prison Litigation Reform Act imposes certain limitations on the granting of 

prospective relief “in any civil action with respect to prison conditions.” 18 U.S.C. 3626(a)(1). 

That is, such relief “shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal

right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs.” Id.

B. Analysis

The gravamen of Plaintiff’s Motion appears to relate to the alleged robbery or fraud 

concerning Plaintiff’s J-Pay account. Plaintiff must demonstrate more than a mere possibility of 

success concerning this claim. Doe v. The Ohio State Univ., 136 F. Supp. 3d 854, 871 (S.D. Ohio 

2016). Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that post-deprivation tort remedies 

available to him under Ohio law are inadequate to adjudicate his property loss claims. (Doc. 24 at 

4) (citing Martin v. Wilson, No. 2:18-cv-463, 2018 WL 2215917, at *3 (S.D. Ohio May 15, 2018)). 

Hence, this Court agrees that Plaintiff has not demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the 

merits of his claim.

Turning to the second factor, Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot demonstrate 

irreparable harm because he does not claim ongoing access to his J-Pay accounts by other inmates. 
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(Id. at 5). Plaintiff attempted to remedy this issue by filing a “Motion to Amend his Temporary 

Restraining Order Adding New Constitutional Violation of Irreparable Injury.” (Doc. 37). 

However, this document changes the basis for his original Motion entirely and appears to allege 

harm stemming from harassment based on his conviction for rape, including his placement in 

segregation. (Id.). Indeed, Plaintiff concedes that J-Pay reviewed his account and issued him a 

refund. (Id.). Thus, Plaintiff is unable to demonstrate he would suffer irreparable injury without 

the injunction. Alternatively, Plaintiff fares no better pursuing injunctive relief based upon his 

placement in administrative segregation because the due process clause does not “create a liberty 

interest to be free from administrative segregation.” McCullough v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 

1:06-cv-563, 2010 WL 5136133, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2010) (stating that “[a]dministrative 

segregation is the type of confinement that should be reasonably anticipated by inmates at some 

point in their incarceration”). For these reasons, Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction and 

Temporary Restraining Order (Doc. 13) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Temporary 

Restraining Order Adding New Constitutional Violation of Irreparable Injury (Doc. 37) are

DENIED.

III. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL 

COMPLAINTS (Doc. 16)

On July 11, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Leave to File “2 Supplemental Complaints” 

adding new Defendants Mrs. Smith, Mr. Marchand, Mr. Hettinger, and “new events.” (Doc. 16). 

In the Motion, Plaintiff claims that Mrs. Smith improperly instructed the Serious Misconduct Panel 

(“SMP”) to “re-open a case they closed based on no physical evidence . . . .” (Id. at 1). Plaintiff 

states:

I was denied an appeal, until the SMP panel re-heard the case and then recommended 

extended restrictive housing (ERH) where I was told I will be back in the hole for 1 

year or longer, but I have not been sentenced to any specific amount of time. This 
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is a violation of my 14th Amendment rights against cruel and unusual punishments, 

which I am currently faced with as I have been in the house 98 days as of today, 

June 5, 2018.

(Id. at 1–2). 

Plaintiff explains that his “additional complaint” against Mr. Marchand and Mr. Hettinger 

is based on the following:

while out of my cell in a mental health programming class, Mr. Marchand (out of 

malice) placed my food tray on the ground in a corner with the lid slightly off and 

about “100” ants attacked my food! When I slid the tray out of my cell, told him he 

put my tray on the ground and there was ants in my food, he said, “Now I’m going 

to make sure you get a nice breakfast, lunch, and dinner!” laughed and walked away.

(Id. at 2). Plaintiff also alleges that Mr. Marchand denied him a free envelope for a legal matter, 

unnecessarily wrote a “ticket” on him, and instructed Mr. Hettinger to find him guilty and take away 

his J-Pay, phone, and commissary. (Id.).

In an Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion, Defendants argue that leave should be denied 

because “the claims contained in the supplemental complaint and the defendants named in the said 

complaint are not sufficiently related to Plaintiff’s original complaint.” (Doc. 27 at 2). Defendants

explain:

In our case, Plaintiff’s original complaint contains allegations of wrongdoing 

surrounding his placement in the Transitional Program Unit (“TPU”). These 

allegations included inmate access to his inmate trust account, disclosure of the 

criminal offense for which Plaintiff was incarcerated, being placed in the TPU for 

undisclosed reasons and being held there unlawfully, being denied access to the 

courts and inadequate cell conditions. ECF No.8, at 8–15. In his original complaint, 

Plaintiff also alleged wrongdoing by other Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction (“ODRC”) defendants who were assigned to the Crisis Stabilization 

Unit (“CSU”), informally known as “D-1.” These allegations included deliberate 

indifference to his serious medical needs (failing to respond to his suicide threats) 

and substandard cell conditions. 

Plaintiff’s proposed tendered complaint is not properly related to the above 

allegations contained in his original complaint. Plaintiff’s new claims relate to a 

lunch tray which was allegedly placed on his cell floor, allowing ants access to his 

tray. He also claims that Defendant Marchland wrote a false conduct report that 
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stated Plaintiff threw his lunch tray across the unit floor. He also sues Defendant 

Hettinger, alleging that Hettinger improperly oversaw the conduct report 

proceedings related to Marchland’s report.

These new allegations do not relate to the allegations contained in the original 

complaint. In addition, the two proposed defendants are not defendants in the 

original complaint.

(Id. at 4). This Court agrees that Plaintiff’s proposed supplemental complaints appear to have little 

or no relation to the claims raised in the original complaint. See, e.g., Dyess v. Mullins, No. 1:16-

cv-910, 2017 WL 2828642, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2017) (denying Plaintiff’s motion to amend 

to add claims relating to an entirely separate incident and involving three new Defendants). 

Consequently, his Motion for Leave is DENIED. (Doc. 16). To the extent that Plaintiff has 

requested that this Court issue summons and that the proposed supplemental complaints be served, 

those Motions are likewise DENIED for the same reason. (Docs. 20, 39).

IV. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING AFFIDAVIT 

OF MERIT FOR MEDICAL CLAIM AND MOTION FOR INJUNCTION 

TO OBTAIN THIS AFFIDAVIT AND RECORDS (Doc. 17)

On June 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a “Motion for Assistance in Obtaining Affidavit of Merit 

for Medical Liability Claim; Motion for Injunction to Obtain Affidavit and Records.” (Doc. 17). 

In this Motion, Plaintiff sets forth his efforts to obtain counsel, his need for an affidavit from a 

physician, and his need for certain evidence in support of his claim. (Id. at 1–2). Defendants oppose 

Plaintiff’s Motion, arguing that Plaintiff is improperly seeking the appointment of an expert witness 

and fails to state a claim of medical deliberate indifference upon which relief can be granted. (Id. 

at 3–4). Defendants likewise argue that Plaintiff improperly filed a Motion rather than seeking the 

evidence mentioned through discovery. (Id. at 4–5). Plaintiff filed what appears to be a Reply Brief 

but is captioned as a Motion. (Doc. 40).

Upon review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s “Motion for Assistance in Obtaining Affidavit of 
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Merit for Medical Liability Claim; Motion for Injunction to Obtain Affidavit and Records” to be 

premature. In a case such as this, the issue is not whether Defendants are guilty of medical 

malpractice. Rather, the issue is whether Defendants were deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s 

serious medical needs. As the Sixth Circuit has explained, “[t]he issue of calculatedly ignoring the 

medical needs of a prisoner are not so complicated and difficult that an expert is required to present 

or prove the case.” Friend v. Rees, 779 F.2d 50 (6th Cir. 1985). Further, Plaintiff appears to seek 

to obtain material through Court order that he has not sought to obtain through discovery. Based 

upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motions are DENIED as premature. (Docs. 17, 40).

V. FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN THIS CASE

This Court has permitted Plaintiff to proceed as to the claims raised in his original Complaint 

(see Doc. 7) and has issued a scheduling order (Doc. 22). That Order is designed to allow for the 

efficient and orderly resolution of this case. To reiterate, discovery may proceed and shall be 

completed by January 3, 2019, and any motions pertaining to discovery shall be filed before that 

date. (Id.). Further, depositions of any persons who are incarcerated may proceed on such terms 

and conditions as the institution shall impose, and any dispositive motion shall be filed by February 

4, 2019. (Id.). Finally, that case schedule may be modified only upon motion and for good cause 

shown. (Id.) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(b)(4)).

As this Court recognized at the outset, Plaintiff commenced this action on April 24, 2018, 

and he has submitted approximately twenty filings in the three months following. The Court finds 

Plaintiff’s filings to be excessive and warns Plaintiff that, if he continues to engage in an excessive 

filing practice, his conduct could result in sanctions.

IV. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s Motion for Permanent Injunction and Temporary
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Restraining Order (Doc. 13) and Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend his Temporary Restraining Order 

Adding New Constitutional Violation of Irreparable Injury (Doc. 37) are DENIED. Plaintiff’s 

Motion for Leave to File “2 Supplemental Complaints” adding new Defendants Mrs. Smith, Mr. 

Marchand, Mr. Hettinger, and “new events” (Doc. 16) and his related Motions for summons and 

service (Docs. 20, 39) are DENIED. Further, Plaintiff’s Motions pertaining to an affidavit of merit 

and for discovery are DENIED. (Docs. 17, 40). Finally, the Court finds Plaintiff’s filings to be 

excessive and warns Plaintiff that, if he continues to engage in an excessive filing practice, his 

conduct could result in sanctions.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: July 31, 2018 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE