******************************************************

The ‘‘officially released’’ date that appears near the

beginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will

be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the

date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative

date for the beginning of all time periods for filing

postopinion motions and petitions for certification is

the ‘‘officially released’’ date appearing in the opinion.

In no event will any such motions be accepted before

the ‘‘officially released’’ date.

All opinions are subject to modification and technical

correction prior to official publication in the Connecticut Reports and Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the

event of discrepancies between the electronic version

of an opinion and the print version appearing in the

Connecticut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the

latest print version is to be considered authoritative.

The syllabus and procedural history accompanying

the opinion as it appears on the Commission on Official

Legal Publications Electronic Bulletin Board Service

and in the Connecticut Law Journal and bound volumes

of official reports are copyrighted by the Secretary of

the State, State of Connecticut, and may not be reproduced and distributed without the express written permission of the Commission on Official Legal

Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.

******************************************************
JAMES J. BAKER v. LISA WHITNUM-BAKER

(AC 36958)

(AC 36959)

Lavine, Beach and Sheldon, Js.

Argued September 18—officially released November 10, 2015

(Appeal from Superior Court, judicial district of

Stamford-Norwalk, Heller, J.)

Lisa Whitnum, self-represented, the appellant

(defendant).

Norman A. Roberts II, with whom, on the brief, was

Tara C. Dugo, for the appellee (plaintiff).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. These consolidated appeals arise out

of the judgment dissolving the brief marriage of the

plaintiff, James J. Baker, to the defendant, Lisa Whitnum-Baker. The essence of the defendant’s claims in

both appeals is that the trial court abused its discretion

by denying her a new trial.1 We affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

The following facts are relevant to these appeals. On

March 12, 2012, the then fifty-two year old defendant

married the then eighty-six year old plaintiff, and they

lived together for seven to ten days following their

wedding date. Seventy-seven days later, the plaintiff

commenced an action seeking to dissolve his marriage

to the defendant. The defendant filed an answer and

cross complaint on October 23, 2012, and an amended

cross complaint on February 20, 2013. The court,

Munro, J., conducted a dissolution trial on September

9 and 10, 2013. The defendant represented herself and

participated in the proceedings on the morning of September 9, 2013, but she did not return to court for the

afternoon session, nor did she appear in court on the

following day. On September 10, 2013, the court rendered judgment of dissolution, finding that the marriage

of the parties had broken down irretrievably. The court

did not award the defendant alimony.

The defendant subsequently filed several appeals that

were consolidated but later dismissed by this court.

While the consolidated appeals were pending, the

defendant filed in the trial court on separate dates a

‘‘Motion to Open/Petition for a New Trial’’ and a ‘‘Motion

to Open Default Judgment.’’ The trial court, Heller, J.,

conducted separate hearings on each motion and subsequently denied them in separate memoranda of decision. The defendant then filed the two appeals in the

present case, which have been consolidated. In AC

36958, the defendant claims that the court improperly

denied her motion to open the default judgment. In AC

36959, the defendant claims that the court improperly

denied her ‘‘Motion to Open/Petition for a New Trial.’’

We first address the applicable standards of review.

‘‘Whether to grant a motion to open rests in the discretion of the trial court. . . . In reviewing claims that the

trial court abused its discretion, great weight is given

to the trial court’s decision and every reasonable presumption is given in favor of its correctness. . . . We

will reverse the trial court’s ruling only if it could not

reasonably conclude as it did.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Pachaug Marina &

Campground Assn., Inc. v. Pease, 149 Conn. App. 489,

493, 89 A.3d 423 (2014).

The standard of review regarding a trial court’s decision with respect to a petition for a new trial is also

the abuse of discretion standard. See Fitzpatrick v.
Hall-Brooke Foundation, Inc., 72 Conn. App. 692, 697,

807 A.2d 480, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 914, 811 A.2d 1291

(2002). ‘‘In reviewing claims that the trial court abused

its discretion, great weight is given to the trial court’s

decision and every reasonable presumption is given in

favor of its correctness. . . . We will reverse the trial

court’s ruling only if it could not reasonably conclude

as it did. . . . [T]he proceeding is essentially equitable

in nature; the petitioner has the burden of alleging and

proving facts which would, in conformity with our settled equitable construction of the statutes, entitle him

[or her] to a new trial on the grounds claimed . . . .

A petition will never be granted except upon substantial

grounds. It does not furnish a substitute for, or an alternative to, an ordinary appeal but applies only when no

other remedy is adequate and when in equity and good

conscience relief against a judgment should be granted.

. . . In considering a petition, trial judges must give

first consideration to the proposition that there must

be an end to litigation.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Murphy v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 86 Conn.

App. 147, 152, 860 A.2d 764 (2004), cert. denied, 273

Conn. 910, 870 A.2d 1080 (2005).

After a careful examination of the record, we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion in

denying the defendant’s motions at issue in either AC

36958 or AC 36959. The trial court issued thorough and

well reasoned decisions regarding the factual and legal

bases for denying the motions to open and the petition

for a new trial. We therefore adopt the well reasoned

decisions of the trial court as proper statements of the

relevant facts, issues, and applicable law. See Baker v.

Whitnum-Baker, 161 Conn. App. , , , A.3d

(2014) (appendices). It would serve no useful purpose for this court to repeat the discussions contained

in the trial court’s decisions. See Norfolk & Dedham

Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Wysocki, 243 Conn. 239, 241,

702 A.2d 638 (1997).

The judgments are affirmed.

1 The defendant also has raised a variety of claims of judicial bias and

multiple violations of her right to due process. We decline to review these

claims as they are little more than unfounded assertions not supported by

facts in the record. See Konefal v. Konefal, 107 Conn. App. 354, 361, 945

A.2d 484 (appellant bears responsibility of providing adequate record for

review, as well as adequate briefing of claims, and when appellant fails to

do so this court will not review such claims), cert. denied, 288 Conn. 902,

952 A.2d 810 (2008).