UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

OBIE OBIE MASANGO, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

SINCLAIR COMMUNITY COLLEGE,

Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:18-cv-107 

District Judge Thomas M. Rose 

Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

Plaintiff Obie Obie Masango brings this case pro se challenging the actions of 

Defendant Sinclair Community College. 

The Court previously granted Plaintiff’s Application to Proceed in forma pauperis

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The case is presently before the Court for a sua sponte review to 

determine whether Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, should be dismissed 

because it is frivolous, malicious, or otherwise subject to dismissal at this early stage of 

the case. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). If the Complaint raises a claim with an arguable or 

rational basis in fact or law, it is neither frivolous nor malicious, and it may not be 

dismissed sua sponte. Brand v. Motley, 526 F.3d 921, 923-24 (6th Cir. 2008); see Lawler 

v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). A Complaint has no arguable factual 

basis when its allegations are “fantastic or delusional.” Brand, 526 F.3d at 923 (quoting 

 

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 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations. 
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Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)); see Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1199. A 

Complaint has no arguable legal basis when it presents “indisputably meritless” legal 

theories—for example, when the defendant is immune from suit or when the plaintiff 

claims a violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. See Neitzke, 490 U.S. 

at 327-28; see also Brand, 526 F.3d at 923. The main issue thus presented by a sua 

sponte review at this early stage of the case is “whether [the] complaint makes an 

arguable legal claim and is based on rational facts.” Brand, 526 F.3d at 923-24 (citing 

Lawler, 898 F.2d at 1198). 

“Pro se complaints are to be held ‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings 

drafted by lawyers,’ and should therefore be liberally construed.” Williams v. Curtin, 631 

F.3d 380, 383 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712 (6th Cir. 

2004)). Nonetheless, pro se plaintiffs must satisfy basic pleading requirements. Wells v. 

Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989). Specifically, the complaint “must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 

face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) 

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 

(2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that 

allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). 

 In the present case, Plaintiff’s allegations in his Complaint are sparse: 

Sinclair Community College, February 23[rd], 2018. Curtis 

[T]aylor a psychology teacher, Scott Markland Vice president 

of student affairs. Misinformation about [vio]lation of 
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protection order. I was simply waiting to go to my next class 

and the person in question (Curtis Taylor) happened to be in 

the vi[c]inity. I simply return[ed] a job application that I 

simply filled out to a friend. I was unaware that my friend ... 

was in the person[’s] class. 

(Doc. #1, PageID #6). On the Civil Cover Sheet, Plaintiff described his cause as 

“Discrimination.” Id. And, although Plaintiff did not request any relief in his Complaint, 

he indicated on the Civil Cover Sheet that his demand was $100,000. Id. 

Construing Plaintiff’s allegations liberally in his favor, he seeks to raise a 

constitutional claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “There are two elements to a § 1983 claim. 

First, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant acted under color of state law. Second, a 

plaintiff must allege that the defendant’s conduct deprived the plaintiff of rights secured 

under federal law.” Handy-Clay v. City of Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 

2012) (citing Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 718, 722 (6th Cir. 2010)). 

Defendant Sinclair Community College “is a political subdivision organized 

pursuant to Ohio Revised Code Chapter 3354 and is governed by a Board of Trustees 

empowered by statute to appoint administrative officers, faculty, and staff.” Melendez v. 

Sinclair Cmty. Coll., No. 3:05 CV 338, 2007 WL 81846, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 2007) 

(Merz, M.J.) (citing Ohio Revised Code § 3354.09(D) and (J)); see also Brown v. 

Strickler, 422 F.2d 1000, 1001 (6th Cir. 1970) (“An institution such as this, serving an 

important public function and financed by public funds, is sufficiently linked with the 

state for its acts to be subject to the limitations of the Fourteenth Amendment.”) (citation 

and quotation marks omitted). As a political subdivision, Defendant Sinclair is a 

“‘person[]’ within the meaning of § 1983 and may therefore be sued directly if [it] 
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alleged to have caused a constitutional tort through a policy statement, ordinance, 

regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that body’s officers.” 

Melendez, 2007 WL 81846, at *5 (citing Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs.,

436 U.S. 658, 690, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)). 

Plaintiff did not allege that Defendants’ policy or custom caused his injury. Thus, 

he failed to allege the first element of a § 1983 claim. 

Likewise, Plaintiff did not allege that Defendant’s conduct deprived him of a right 

secured by federal law—the second element of a § 1983 claim. Indeed, he does not 

plausibly allege that any of his rights were violated. Instead, he claims that Defendant 

reported “misinformation” about his accidental violation of a protective order. This does 

not implicate any federal rights. 

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Complaint has no arguable legal basis and is subject to 

dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); 

2. The Court certify under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that Plaintiff’s appeal, if any, 

would not be taken in good faith; and 

3. The case be terminated on the docket of this Court. 

April 25, 2018 s/Sharon L. Ovington 

 Sharon L. Ovington 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 
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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after 

being served with this Report and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), 

this period is extended to SEVENTEEN days because this Report is being served by one 

of the methods of service listed in Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b)(2)(C), (D), (E), or (F). Such 

objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied 

by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report and 

Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring of record at an oral 

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or 

such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, 

unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another 

party=s objections within FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof. 

 Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on 

appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 

949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).