SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0454-16T1

LARISSA TROFIMOVA,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

IGOR TROFIMOV,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted March 7, 2018 – Decided July 12, 2018

Before Judges Alvarez and Nugent.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County, 

Docket No. FM-14-1538-14.

Ianoldi & Edens, LLC, attorneys for appellant 

(Ann M. Edens, of counsel and on the brief; 

Daniel R. Kraft, on the briefs).

Ceconi & Cheifetz, LLC, attorneys for 

respondent (Kimberly A. Rennie, of counsel; 

Lindsay A. Heller, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Igor Trofimov and plaintiff Larissa Trofimova were 

divorced on September 19, 2016, by way of a final dual judgment. 

Defendant appeals virtually every financial aspect of the order. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0454-16T1

After our review of the record, the arguments on appeal, and the 

relevant precedents, we affirm in part, reverse and vacate in 

part, and remand.

The parties married on October 24, 1981, and have one

emancipated child. Plaintiff has a Master's Degree in Mathematics 

and Computer Science and is fully employed. However, the trial

judge found she deferred the development of her own career when 

the couple relocated to advance defendant's career, first from 

Russia to Germany, and then to the United States. Defendant is,

by his own account, a renowned scientist who "has advanced the 

science in his field." 

In 2012, the same year the parties separated, they entered 

into a separation agreement. Plaintiff filed a motion to enforce, 

which resulted in the court issuing two pendente lite orders on 

January 30, 2015. These orders enforced the separation agreement 

in which defendant assumed certain expenses, such as the cost of 

maintaining the marital home until sale. Defendant was ordered 

to pay outstanding payments to plaintiff of his health and car 

insurance. 

In March 2015, the parties participated in a mediation 

session, during which defendant paid $10,000 towards arrears and 

reimbursements on the January 30, 2015 order. Thereafter, on July 

1, 2015, the parties entered into a consent order for pendente 
3 A-0454-16T1

lite support totaling $1832 per month, payable through probation. 

Defendant agreed to produce outstanding discovery to forensic 

accountants, who had been retained to provide expert reports for 

both parties, and provide a personal property list. Defendant did 

neither. 

During the marriage, the parties acquired interests in 

various companies, pension and retirement plans, and other assets. 

Plaintiff has a 401(k) through her employer with a balance in 

excess of $212,000 and a separate IRA. Defendant only acknowledged 

one IRA, despite listing two on his February 2011 Case Information 

Statement (CIS). Defendant was not specific as to the amount in 

the one IRA he acknowledged. 

Defendant's share in a company he created with four friends, 

known as Akela Laser Corporation (Akela), was one of the assets 

subject to equitable distribution. Defendant is the Chief 

Technology Officer and owns a 28.57% ownership interest in the 

company; it is his main source of income. Plaintiff also initially 

held an interest in the company, but sold her shares for $6000 and 

deposited the proceeds into the parties' joint checking account. 

At trial, the court-appointed expert testified the fair market 

value of defendant's interest in Akela was $214,000. 

Plaintiff owns Princeton Technology Advisers Company (PTAC). 

At trial, defendant testified plaintiff could retain PTAC 
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entirely. The court-appointed expert assessed PTAC's value at

$133,000. 

In his August 31, 2016 post-trial findings of fact, the trial 

judge concluded plaintiff was credible and defendant was not. He 

found defendant incredible based on his demeanor and responses 

while testifying, and his lack of compliance with prior court 

orders. The judge described defendant as "cagey rather than 

forthcoming," and cited as an example defendant's reluctance to 

even disclose where he was living——New Jersey or California. 

Additionally, defendant "stonewalled the production of documents 

for examination by the accounting experts." 

As the judge observed, defendant claimed he signed the 

separation agreement, "only under duress and without reading it." 

The judge disbelieved this, given defendant's level of education, 

and the fact he was "used to reviewing contracts and grants."

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

POINT ONE

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 

REFERENCE, ANALYZE OR CONSIDER N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23.1 FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF ITS AWARD OF 

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION FOR THE BUSINESSES, 

RETIREMENT ASSETS AND BANK ACCOUNTS (Absent 

from Dal-Da20).

1

A. MARITAL BUSINESSES

 

1 Defendant failed to cite specific parts of the record in his 

point headings, as required by Rule 2:6-2(a)(6). Instead, 

defendant repeatedly notes "Absent from Dal-Da20."
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B. MARITAL FINANCIAL BANK ACCOUNTS

C. RETIREMENT ACCOUNTS ACQUIRED DURING 

THE MARRIAGE

POINT TWO

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE 

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 

THROUGHOUT THE FINAL DUAL JUDGMENT OF DIVORCE 

(Absent from Dal-Da20).

A. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED 

ESCROW OF PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF THE 

PARTIES' FORMER MARITAL HOME

B. THE COURT ERRED WHEN IT ORDERED 

PTAC, AN ASSET FORMED DURING THE 

MARRIAGE, EXEMP[T] FROM EQUITABLE 

DISTRIBUTION 

C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

CREDIT OF MONIES [PLAINTIFF] SQUANDERED 

POST-SEPARATION

D. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED 

CREDIT OF MONIES [DEFENDANT] PAID 

PENDENTE LITE

POINT THREE

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO STATE 

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND THE 

ISSUES ABSENT FROM THE RECORD OR ADDRESSED IN 

THE COURT'S OPINION LETTER (Absent from DalDa20). 

A. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO MAINTAIN A LIFE 

INSURANCE POLICY FOR SIX (6) YEARS

B. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO PAY HIS SHARE OF 

EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION BY WAY OF THE 

PROBATION DEPARTMENT OF THE FAMILY 

DIVISION
6 A-0454-16T1

C. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO PAY 4% INTEREST 

RATE ON THE OUTSTANDING MONIES OWED ON 

THE EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AWARD 

D. THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT 

ORDERED [DEFENDANT] TO RELEASE 

LITIGATION DOCUMENTATION POST-DIVORCE

POINT FOUR

THE LOWER COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO 

REFERENCE, ANALYZE OR CONSIDER NEW JERSEY 

FACTORS IN SUPPORT OF ITS COUNSEL FEE AWARD 

(Absent from Dal-Da20).

I.

Appellate review of a trial court's decision is limited, as

"findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when supported 

by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998) (citing Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. 

Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). "[M]atrimonial courts 

possess special expertise in the field of domestic relations.

. . . Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and 

expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord 

deference to family court factfinding." Id. at 412-13.

"Only when the trial court's conclusions are so 'clearly 

mistaken' or 'wide of the mark' should an appellate court intervene 

and make its own findings to ensure that there is not a denial of 

justice." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J.

88, 104 (2008) (citing N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 
7 A-0454-16T1

191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). Deference is extended to the family 

court's factual findings because of its ability to make first-hand 

credibility judgments. Ibid. "However, a judge's legal 

conclusions are subject to our plenary review." Milne v. 

Goldenberg, 428 N.J. Super. 184, 197-98 (App. Div. 2012) (citations 

omitted).

The trial court has the discretion to allocate marital assets 

to the parties in matters of equitable distribution. La Sala v. 

La Sala, 335 N.J. Super. 1, 6 (App. Div. 2000) (citing Borodinsky 

v. Borodinsky, 162 N.J. Super. 437, 443-44 (App. Div. 1978); 

Jacobitti v. Jacobitti, 263 N.J. Super. 608, 613 (App. Div. 1993). 

On appeal, these decisions are reviewed, "to determine whether the 

court has abused its discretion." La Sala, 335 N.J. Super. at 6. 

"An abuse of discretion 'arises when a decision is "made without 

a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established 

policies, or rested on an impermissible basis."'" Milne, 428 N.J. 

Super. at 197 (quoting Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 

561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & 

Naturalization Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)). 

We affirm equitable distribution awards "as long as the trial 

court could reasonably have reached its result from the evidence 

presented, and the award is not distorted by legal or factual 

mistake." La Sala, 335 N.J. Super. at 6 (citing Perkins v. 
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Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. 243, 247-48 (App. Div. 1978)). The award 

will be affirmed even if we would not have made the same ruling 

as the trial court. Perkins, 159 N.J. Super. at 247-48. "Reversal 

is warranted only when a trial court's findings reflect a mistake 

must have been made because the factual findings are 'so manifestly 

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and 

reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of 

justice.'" Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61, 70 (App. Div. 

2012) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc., 65 N.J. at 484 (quotation 

omitted)). 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 specifies the factors that a court should 

consider when determining equitable distribution of marital 

assets. These include the duration of the marriage, the 

contribution each party made to the acquisition of assets, the 

standard of living, and the economic circumstances of each party 

at the time of the division of property. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1(a), 

(c), (d), and (f). The statute requires judges to make findings 

of fact on the evidence relevant to the issues being decided. 

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1 We do not agree the judge did not make 

adequate factual findings; he made such findings as to each asset. 

The court must first identify the property eligible for 

distribution, determine the value of those assets, and then decide 

the manner in which equitable allocation should be made. Rothman
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v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 232 (1974). Each case must be examined 

on its own merits and facts. 

II.

Defendant first challenges the trial court's equitable 

distribution of the parties' businesses, retirement assets, and 

bank accounts. The judge gave great weight to the thirty-three 

year length of the marriage. He acknowledged the parties' moves 

from Russia to Germany, and then to the United States——made to 

advance defendant's career——delayed the development of plaintiff's 

career. The judge's reliance on these factors is based on wellestablished precedent and demonstrates one example of the explicit

fact-finding in which he engaged.

In rendering his valuation of the parties' interest in their

respective companies, the judge relied upon the opinion of a courtappointed accounting expert. With regard to PTAC, the judge found 

plaintiff was the sole owner of that $133,000 asset. The judge 

fixed plaintiff's share of Akela at forty percent of defendant's 

equity, or $85,600. We find no basis to disturb the judge's 

decisions with regard to these assets. In making such decisions, 

judges may rely on expert opinions at their discretion. See Carey 

v. Lovett, 132 N.J. 44, 64 (1993) (applying that principle to

malpractice cases); see also Brown v. Brown, 348 N.J. Super. 466, 
10 A-0454-16T1

478 (App. Div. 2002) (applying that principle to expert testimony 

on valuation issues). 

Review of equitable distribution is subject to abuse of 

discretion, and none has been demonstrated here. The judge's 

decisions are not "inexplicably departed from established 

policies, or rest[ing] on an impermissible basis." Milne, 428 

N.J. Super. at 197 (quoting Flagg, 171 N.J. at 571 (quotation 

omitted)). The challenge to the equitable distribution of the 

marital estate lacks merit.

Defendant also asserts he should have received a share of 

PTAC. In his trial testimony, however, defendant acknowledged 

plaintiff owned the company and said "[t]hat's her company, 

whatever she wants to do with it." Defendant had stopped working 

for the company years prior and did "not have time to work there." 

Defendant denied having an interest in PTAC when asked directly 

by the court. When asked if he wanted to be compensated through 

equitable distribution for his share, defendant responded 

"whatever they assessed the value, that's hers." Under these 

circumstances——where defendant explicitly abdicated any interest 

in PTAC——allocation of ownership solely to plaintiff was not an 

abuse of discretion.
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III.

Defendant contends the judge erred when he ordered 

defendant's share of the proceeds from the sale of the marital 

home be held in escrow pending his satisfaction of equitable 

distribution and counsel fee obligations. It is obvious the judge 

did so based on defendant's unjustified failure to comply with 

prior orders and to respond fully and truthfully in the discovery 

process and trial of the matter. Since defendant had seemingly

relocated to another state or intended to do so, the creation of 

a fund with which to make equitable distribution payments seems

an exercise in ordinary prudence. It was not an abuse of 

discretion. Again, defendant refused to identify even his current 

state of residence or disclose plans to relocate. Perhaps if 

defendant had not repeatedly avoided giving such basic 

information, these measures would not have been necessary.

IV.

Defendant wanted to be credited $50,000 for funds plaintiff 

removed from the parties' joint bank account post-separation, and 

reimbursement for all pendente lite payments made to plaintiff

pursuant to Mallamo v. Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. 8 (App. Div. 1995). 

In this regard, the judge stated:

There is no question that [plaintiff] used 

joint funds to maintain the household after

[defendant] left in October 2012. She 
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submitted a spreadsheet setting forth her 

disposition of the money from the joint 

account for joint housing expenses. It also 

appears that [defendant] used money from the 

joint account for his own personal expenses. 

While [defendant] should receive some credit 

for [plaintiff]'s use of funds from the joint 

account, . . . any credit is washed away by 

his failure to pay joint expenses or payments 

pursuant to the Separation Agreement and Court 

Order. 

Based on these findings, the judge properly denied defendant's 

request for reimbursement of the pendente lite support payments 

made. 

The court allocated the proceeds from the sale of the home 

equally, which supports the pendente lite award requiring 

defendant to pay half of the Schedule A "shelter" expenses. 

Importantly, the court based the pendente lite order on the 

parties' own separation agreement, where defendant explicitly 

agreed to pay half of the expenses for the house. Defendant 

acknowledges this agreement, but claims since plaintiff was not 

awarded alimony, and the contract is silent as to a refund, he is 

entitled to reimbursement under Mallamo.

It is true "pendente lite support orders are subject to 

modification prior to entry of final judgment and at the time of 

entry of final judgment." Mallamo, 280 N.J. Super. at 12 

(citations omitted). However, the fact that the court did not 

ultimately award alimony does not alone require a refund of 
13 A-0454-16T1

pendente lite support paid. The pendente lite payments in this 

case were not alimony. The payments represented only fifty percent

of plaintiff's Schedule A "shelter" expenses for the former marital 

residence which defendant agreed to pay in the separation 

agreement.

V.

Defendant makes a number of related arguments challenging the 

mechanisms chosen by the trial judge to enforce equitable 

distribution. The court's order that equitable distribution 

payments be made through the probation department was mistaken. 

The probation department has authority over matters involving only

"alimony, maintenance or child support." See R. 5:4-7.

We are uncertain as to the manner in which the language 

requiring defendant to maintain life insurance equivalent to the 

unpaid balance of equitable distribution was included in the final 

judgment of divorce. It is possible plaintiff's attorney added 

that clause without any objection being made by defendant's 

counsel. The judge then signed the final judgment as submitted 

without comment. We are unable to find any indication in the 

record that the provision was required by the judge, as opposed 

to simply being an add-on by counsel to guarantee payment. We 

leave resolution of that question to counsel. 
14 A-0454-16T1

If the court did in fact order the maintenance of life 

insurance in order to ensure payment, the language can remain. 

See generally Claffey v. Claffey, 360 N.J. Super. 240 (App. Div. 

2003). If the paragraph was included solely at plaintiff's 

counsel's initiative, albeit without objection by opposing 

counsel, it must be deleted from the final judgment and defendant 

is thus relieved of that obligation.

The court ordered interest imposed on an annual basis if 

defendant decided to pay the minimum of $1800 a month by way of 

equitable distribution, as opposed to a lump sum satisfaction of 

the decree. The court did not abuse its discretion in doing so. 

The judge's comments regarding defendant's evasiveness, lack of 

cooperation with the discovery process, and lack of credibility 

adequately inform his decision to impose interest. See Heinl v. 

Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 347 (App. Div. 1996) (requiring 

specified, articulate findings of fact and conclusions of law in 

court's decision, not naked conclusions). 

VI.

Defendant challenges the judge's order that he provide 

plaintiff with the financial information and documentation 

regarding PTAC for the 2016 tax year so she can file her 2016 

income tax return. At that time, only defendant was employed by 

the company and had access to the company's records.
15 A-0454-16T1

Defendant's delay in supplying the necessary documents meant 

plaintiff was unable to file her return. The nature of the 

documentation is clearly spelled out. This argument requires no 

further discussion in a written opinion.

VII.

Defendant objects to the court's imposition of a counsel fee 

obligation. The judge made a forty percent across-the-board award, 

resulting in a $31,488.10 obligation. Although the judge did not 

specify the factors he considered pursuant to Rule 5:3-5(c), the 

discussion throughout the opinion made clear he had those very

factors in mind. The court's obligation is to consider the 

factors, not mechanically reiterate them. R. 5:3-5(c). 

The judge did find the requested fees to be "fair and 

reasonable," and that much work was required due to the 

"recalcitrance of [defendant]." Plaintiff faced substantial

difficulties in attempting to enforce the separation agreement, 

enforce subsequent court orders, and prepare for the final hearing. 

A forty percent award was therefore appropriate.

An award of counsel fees rests in the discretion of the court. 

Williams v. Williams, 59 N.J. 229, 233 (1971). The court must 

consider the factors established under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, Rule

5:3-5(c), Rule 4:42-9, and RPC 1.5(a). We find that the judge's 

decision was adequately informed by those factors.
16 A-0454-16T1

Affirmed in part, but reversed as to the requirement that 

equitable distribution payments be made through the probation 

department. The life insurance question must be resolved by 

counsel, and if no agreement is reached on the point, it should 

be submitted to the trial judge for disposition.

Affirmed in part, reversed and vacated in part, and remanded.