IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-60549

CHRISTOPHER DOERR,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAUREN SISSON, ET AL.,

Defendants,

________________________________________________________________________

CHRISTOPHER DOERR,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

OKTIBBEHA COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI,

Defendant–Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 1:09-CV-199

Before STEWART, Chief Judge, and DENNIS and ELROD, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Plaintiff Christopher Doerr (Doerr) appeals from the district court’s 

grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendant Oktibbeha County, 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

April 16, 2014

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 

 Case: 13-60549 Document: 00512597524 Page: 1 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
No. 13-60549

Mississippi (County) in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit for arrest without probable 

cause. Doerr argues that because the alleged victim’s affidavit, which alleges 

rape, quotes the elements of a statutory crime and contains no specific facts, it

is not sufficient probable cause. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM the 

district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the County.

I.

Doerr and Lauren Sisson (Sisson) were students at the Mississippi State 

University at the time of the events that are the basis for this suit. In 

November 2008, Doerr and his roommates hosted a party. Doerr claims that 

this was a “bring your own liquor” party and he himself did not buy any alcohol 

to serve at the party. Sisson came to the party. Sisson spent the night at 

Doerr’s apartment. When she awoke, she discovered soreness to her vagina 

and rectum. She went to the Oktibbeha County Hospital, informing nurses 

that she had been raped by Doerr. Nurses completed an examination and rape 

kit, determining that Sisson suffered from tearing along the vaginal and anal 

walls. 

Oktibbeha County Hospital contacted the Oktibbeha County Sheriff’s 

Department about the incident and Deputy West was dispatched to the 

hospital, where he interviewed Sisson. Sisson was then asked to give a 

complete statement at the Sheriff’s office. 

Later that day, Deputy West appeared at Doerr’s apartment and 

requested that he come to the Sheriff’s office to give a statement regarding the 

events of the night before. Doerr obliged and stated that he and Sisson had 

consensual sex and that he did not administer alcohol to her. 

The next day, Sheriff Bryan and Deputy West met regarding Sisson’s 

rape complaint. Sheriff Bryan instructed Deputy West to see if Sisson wanted 

to press charges, and if so, obtain an affidavit from Sisson. When Sisson and 

2

 Case: 13-60549 Document: 00512597524 Page: 2 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
No. 13-60549

her father went back to the Sheriff’s Department, they spoke with Deputy 

Williams. Sisson and her father told the deputies that they intended to press 

charges. As a result, Deputy Williams typed two affidavits. One charged Doerr 

with a violation of Section 97-3-65(4)(a) Mississippi Codes of 1972, which is

having engaged in sex without Sisson’s consent after having served Sisson 

alcohol, who was a minor at the time of the incident. The affidavit states:

BEFORE ME, the undersigned, a Justice Court Clerk of said 

County, Lauren E. Sisson, makes affidavit that Christopher 

Richard Doerr on or about the 16th of November 2008, in the 

County aforesaid did/was willfully, unlawfully and feloniously 

have sexual intercourse not constituting forcible sexual 

intercourse or statutory rape with Lauren E. Sisson without her 

consent, by administering to her an intoxicating beverage which 

prevented her from effectually resisting the actions of said 

Christopher Richard Doerr by producing such stupor at Campus 

Trail Apartment D-115 in Oktibbeha County, Mississippi, in 

violation of 97-3-65(4)(a) Mississippi Codes of 1972.

Sisson signed this affidavit. The second affidavit charged Doerr with serving 

alcohol to a minor, which was signed by Sisson’s father.1 Deputy Williams took 

these two affidavits and the case file to Oktibbeha County Justice Court to seek 

an arrest warrant. The judge reviewed the files and issued a warrant for 

Doerr’s arrest. Doerr was arrested that same day.

Eventually the charges against Doerr were dismissed by the district 

attorney and a grand jury returned a no bill on the charges of sodomy and 

sexual battery. After the charges were dropped, in August 2009, Doerr filed 

suit against Sisson and her father, alleging causes of action for malicious 

prosecution and negligent infliction of emotional distress. In November 2011, 

1 In this appeal, Doerr challenges only Lauren Sisson’s affidavit and not her father’s 

affidavit. 

3

 

 Case: 13-60549 Document: 00512597524 Page: 3 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
No. 13-60549

Doerr then filed a § 1983 suit against the County, alleging that his 2008 arrest 

on rape charges was without probable cause. He also argues that a County 

policy was the moving force for the factually deficient affidavit. The district 

court consolidated the original Sisson action with the action filed against the 

County. The district court granted summary judgment in the County’s favor. 

II.

The court reviews de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, 

applying the same standard as the district court. Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep’t 

of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 498 (5th Cir. 2001). Summary judgment is proper 

when there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party 

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). 

III.

Summary judgment in favor of the County was proper because Doerr has 

not raised a genuine issue of material fact that Sisson’s affidavit did not 

establish probable cause or that the alleged conclusory nature of Sisson’s 

affidavit was caused by the execution of a County policy. 

Doerr argues that Sisson’s affidavit is merely a recitation of the elements 

of a statutory crime with no specific facts to establish probable cause, thus 

violating his Fourth Amendment rights. We have stated that a “bare bones” 

affidavit is insufficient to establish probable cause. United States v. Brown, 

941 F.2d 1300, 1303 (5th Cir. 1991). The affidavits must supply the magistrate 

with sufficient information to determine that probable cause exists. Id. In the 

instant case, Sisson’s affidavit was not a bare bones affidavit. Her affidavit set 

forth the particular date (November 16, 2008), the particular location (Doerr’s 

apartment address and Oktibbeha County), and the elements of the alleged 

crime (that Doerr supplied alcohol to the alleged victim which caused her to 

become intoxicated to the point that she could not give consent to sex, and that 

4

 Case: 13-60549 Document: 00512597524 Page: 4 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
No. 13-60549

Doerr engaged in sex with her without her consent). Though Doerr asserts 

that more facts needed to be stated, these were sufficient facts to establish 

probable cause.2

Moreover, even if the affidavit were insufficient, Doerr cannot prevail in 

a § 1983 suit against the County because he has not raised a genuine issue of 

material fact that the County’s policy resulted in the alleged violation of his 

rights. Section 1983 does not permit a finding of local government liability 

under a theory of respondeat superior unless the “execution of the government’s 

policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those whose edicts or 

acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts the injury.” Monell 

v. Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978); see also Pineda v. City of 

Houston, 291 F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 2002). In order to hold the County liable, 

Doerr must identify: “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a 

policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a 

constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” Valle v. 

City of Houston, 613 F.3d 536, 541–42 (5th Cir. 2010) (citations omitted).

Doerr invokes the “single-incident” exception to the general Monell rule 

set forth in Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986). Pembaur held 

that “where action is directed by those who establish governmental policy, the 

municipality is equally responsible whether that action is to be taken only once 

or to be taken repeatedly.” Id. at 481. Where a single decision by a policy 

2 Likewise, Doerr’s argument that the Sheriff’s Department “knew [Sisson’s] affidavit 

was probably not true” is unpersuasive. There is nothing in the record to indicate the 

Department should have known definitely that Sisson lied. Though Doerr told the deputy 

that he did not administer any alcoholic beverages to Sisson, it is not uncommon for the police 

to hear differing accounts of the same incident. The Department had two affidavits swearing 

that Doerr served alcoholic beverages to Sisson, one from Sisson and one from her father. 

Her father’s affidavit is not challenged here. 

5

 

 Case: 13-60549 Document: 00512597524 Page: 5 Date Filed: 04/16/2014
No. 13-60549

maker is asserted as a basis of County liability, there must be evidence that 

the offending officer in question was “highly likely to inflict the particular 

injury suffered by the plaintiff.” Brown v. Bryan Cnty., 219 F.3d 450, 461 (5th 

Cir. 2000) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 

397, 412 (1997)). “To succeed, a plaintiff must show that the municipal action 

was taken with the requisite degree of culpability and must demonstrate a 

direct causal link between the municipal action and the deprivation of federal 

rights.” Valle, 613 F.3d at 542 (internal quotations marks and citations 

omitted). 

Doerr argues that because Sheriff Bryan was a County policymaker and 

testified that he made a decision to “direct the arrest,” the County is liable if 

the arrest was made without probable cause. Though Sheriff Bryan may be a 

policymaker, he testified that he was not personally involved in the arrest

other than his instructions to Deputy West to determine whether the Sissons 

wanted to press charges, and, if so, to obtain an affidavit from the Sissons. 

Sheriff Bryan did not procure those affidavits and there is no evidence that he 

approved those affidavits. Moreover, the Oktibbeha County Justice Court 

judge reviewed the affidavits and concluded that there was probable cause. 

Courts “pay great deference to a magistrate’s determination of probable cause.” 

Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 500 F.3d 401, 408 (5th Cir. 2007) (citing

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236, 103 S. Ct. 2317 (1983)). This is not an 

instance in which that deference is not warranted. Doerr therefore did not

demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact that Sheriff Bryan directed the 

arrest or that his actions were a direct causal link between the municipal 

action and the deprivation of federal rights. Valle, 613 F.3d at 542.

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of 

summary judgment in favor of Oktibbeha County.

6

 Case: 13-60549 Document: 00512597524 Page: 6 Date Filed: 04/16/2014