J-S06044-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: L.F., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.R., FATHER No. 2709 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered August 25, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000629-2013;

CP-51-DP-0001582-2011

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.F.,

A/K/A J.R., A MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: J.R., FATHER No. 2757 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order entered August 25, 2014,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,

Family Court, at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000628-2013;

CP-51-DP-0001583-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, and FITZGERALD*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY FITZGERALD, J.: FILED MAY 11, 2015

Appellant, J.R. (“Father”), appeals from the orders entered in the 

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas involuntarily terminating his 

parental rights to L.F., born in January 2007, and J.F., born in June 2011 

(collectively “the Children”).1 He avers the court erred in finding grounds for 

termination under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 (a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We 

 

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 On the same day, the court terminated the parental rights of the mother, 

R.F. (“Mother”). According to Appellee Philadelphia Department of Human 

Services (“DHS”), Mother did not appeal. DHS’ Brief at 11 n2.
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affirm.

The trial court aptly summarized the factual and procedural history of 

this case as follows.

DHS initially became involved with this family on

January 29, 2007, [upon] a General Protective Services 

report (“GPS”) alleging that [Mother] tested positive for 

phencyclidine (“PCP”) at the time of [L.F.’s] birth. [L.F.] 

remained hospitalized due to his exposure to drugs in 

utero. Mother admitted that she used cigarettes, alcohol, 

and cocaine on an almost daily basis during her pregnancy 

with [L.F.] The family subsequently stabilized and DHS 

closed its case.

The family became involved with DHS again on June 6, 

2011, when DHS received a GPS report which alleged that 

Mother tested positive for PCP at the birth of [J.F. J.F.’s] 

subsequent toxicology screen at the hospital was positive 

for PCP. [J.F.] weighed four pounds and eight ounces at 

the time of his birth.

On July 18, 2011, DHS developed the Initial Family 

Service Plan (“FSP”) and held a meeting. Father did not 

attend or otherwise participate in that meeting. At this 

time, there were no objectives for Father.

On August 9, 2011, DHS received a GPS report alleging 

that Mother was observed attempting to push [J.F., who 

was in a stroller,] into traffic. [J.F. was] not strapped in, 

and only wearing a one-piece infant undergarment. 

Mother was under the influence of PCP at the time of the 

incident. Following this incident, DHS obtained an Order of

Protective Custody (“OPC”) for both children and placed 

them in foster care.

At the time of the [C]hildren’s placement, Father was 

minimally involved in their care. However, Father was 

made aware of Mother’s PCP abuse. Father stated that he 

was unable to care for the [C]hildren because of his work 

schedule. On August 24, 2011, an adjudicatory hearing 

was held for both children. The [trial] court adjudicated 

the [C]hildren dependent and committed them to DHS 
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based on the present inability of the parents.

On September 20, 2011, DHS revised the FSP. [The] 

Children’s goal was to return to parent/guardian/custodian. 

Father’s objectives were to visit [the C]hildren at the office 

of the placement agency on a weekly basis, keep and 

maintain regular contact with [the C]hildren, meet 

regularly with the agency social worker, participate in the 

Healthy Relationships Couples program with Mother, and 

comply with the Individual Service Plan (“ISP”). Father 

attended the meeting and signed the revised FSP. On 

November 29, 2011, DHS referred Father to the Achieving 

Reunification Center (“ARC”). However, ARC deemed the 

referral inappropriate because Father did not speak 

English, and as a result could not participate in the 

services provided by ARC. Further research by ARC 

revealed that all service goals for Father could be achieved 

at Casa de Consejeria Y Salud Integral, Inc. (“CCSI”) in 

Spanish. ARC referred Father to CCSI on November 29, 

2011.

On December 1, 2011, the FSP was again revised. The 

goal for [the C]hildren was to return to 

parent/guardian/custodian and Father’s objectives were to 

visit [the C]hildren at the office of the placement agency 

on a weekly basis, keep and maintain regular contact with 

[the C]hildren, to meet regularly with the agency social 

worker, to comply with the ISP, and attend services at 

CCSI. Father attended the meeting and signed the FSP. 

The FSP was revised again on May 15, 2012 and on 

November 27, 2012. All of Father’s objectives remained 

the same. Father attended and signed the revised FSP. 

During the time the [C]hildren have been in care, Mother 

has resided on and off with Father.

In the ISP quarterly reports for the [C]hildren from El 

Concilio for the period of May 7, 2013 through August 7, 

2013, it was noted that obstacles to reunification 

remained. It was also noted that there were concerns 

about Father’s ability to care for the [C]hildren 

independently, set boundaries for Mother and the 

[C]hildren while Mother attempted to achieve and maintain 

sobriety, and ensure the [C]hildren’s safety with and 

around Mother. Father has stated that he is unable to 
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create boundaries for Mother throughout the life of this 

case. Father is unwilling to put the [C]hildren’s needs 

before Mother’s. Father also attended parenting classes, 

but did not complete the program due to his work 

schedule. Father was given twice a week supervised visits. 

Father only was able to visit once a week. When Father 

attends his visits, Father is reluctant to work on activities, 

such as assisting [L.F.] with homework. Instead, Father 

gives his cell phone to the [C]hildren so they can play 

games on his cell phone instead of spending quality time 

with [the C]hildren. Father brings inappropriate foods for 

the [C]hildren. Father must be prompted to participate in 

daily care activities for [the C]hildren, such as changing 

diapers and setting boundaries. Father always had 

supervised visits. Father struggles to take initiative in 

interacting and maintaining the attention of [the C]hildren. 

[L.F.] attends trauma focused therapy once per week since 

November 2012. [L.F.] becomes extremely upset when 

Father or Mother miss visits. [L.F.] has a lot of anxiety 

about parent’s well-being. Father and Mother stopped 

attending couples counseling. DHS had serious concerns 

about Father’s ability to provide appropriate care and 

supervision for [the C]hildren independently. Although in 

the early part of the case, Father was found substantially 

and fully compliant, at the last review hearing on June 19, 

2013, prior to DHS filing the Goal Change/Termination 

petition, Father was found minimally compliant. . . .

Trial Ct. Op., 10/20/14, at 1-3.

On October 31, 2013, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily terminate 

Mother and Father’s parental rights to the Children. A March 24, 2014 FSP 

indicated the Children were in kinship care. On July 18 and August 25, 

2014, the trial court held hearings. The witnesses were Maria Spencer, a 

DHS caseworker, Damaris Oliveria, a court case manager, Jennifer 

Brerethon, a therapist for L.F., and Father. On August 25, 2014, the trial 

court entered the instant orders terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental 
J-S06044-15

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rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b). Father 

timely filed notices of appeal, along with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) statements 

of errors complained of on appeal.

Father’s first four issues are whether the trial court erred in finding 

clear and convincing evidence for terminatiion under Subsections (a)(1), (2), 

(5), and (8). Because many of his arguments overlap, we summarize his 

arguments together. Father maintains “the children were removed from the 

care of [M]other due to her drug problems,” and that he “has never 

evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing his rights to his children.” 

Father’s Brief at 15, 16. Father asserts he “has remedied his problems,” 

“has cooperated with DHS,” “substantially completed his FSP goals,” 

completed parenting training and couples counselling, “visited regularly with 

both . . . children while continuing to be employed.” Id. at 15, 17. He adds 

his home “was not evaluated for the children to live there,” and “[t]he only 

testimony [about] the adequacy of his housing was the lack of beds for the” 

Children. Id. at 16. Father also asserts he “was a young [f]ather who did 

not speak English and looked to DHS . . . for guidance in reunification,” but 

DHS failed to provide him “with reasonable efforts for reunification.” Id. at 

17. We find no relief is due.

We note the relevant standard of review:

When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating 

parental rights, we are limited to determining 

whether the decision of the trial court is supported 

by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of 
J-S06044-15

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discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary 

support for the trial court’s decision, the decree must 

stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to 

involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court 

must accord the hearing judge’s decision the same 

deference that we would give to a jury verdict. We 

must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the 

record in order to determine whether the trial court’s 

decision is supported by competent evidence.

In addition, the trial court, as fact finder, is the sole 

determiner of the credibility of witnesses and resolves all 

conflicts in testimony.

In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations omitted).

The party seeking termination bears the burden “to establish by clear 

and convincing evidence the existence of grounds for doing so.” Id. at 806.

The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined 

as testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and 

convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise 

facts in issue.” It is well established that a court must 

examine the individual circumstances of each and every 

case and consider all explanations offered by the parent to 

determine if the evidence in light of the totality of the 

circumstances clearly warrants termination.

In re J.L.C. & J.R.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003). “Our 

appellate review, however, does not require us to find clear and convincing 

evidence. We will affirm if the trial court's findings are supported by 

competent evidence, even if the record could also support an opposite 

result.” In re S.H., 879 A.2d at 806. “In addition, we need only find 

competent evidence to support the trial court's decision as to any one 

subsection of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a) to affirm the termination.” Id. 
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Section 2511(a)(1) and (b) provide:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to 

a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of 

the following grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing of 

the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating 

the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors 

such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing

and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

This Court has stated:

To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the 

moving party must produce clear and convincing evidence 

of conduct, sustained for at least the six months prior to 

the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a 

settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a 

refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In addition,

Section 2511 does not require that the parent 

demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental claim to a child and refusal or failure to 

perform parental duties. Accordingly, parental rights 
J-S06044-15

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may be terminated pursuant to [s]ection 2511(a)(1) 

if the parent either demonstrates a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to 

perform parental duties.

Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform 

parental duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing 

parental rights, the court must engage in three lines 

of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation for his or her 

conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between 

parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect 

of termination of parental rights on the child 

pursuant to [s]ection 2511(b).

In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted).

Regarding the definition of “parental duties,” this Court has stated:

There is no simple or easy definition of parental 

duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation 

to the needs of a child. A child needs love, 

protection, guidance, and support. These needs, 

physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely 

passive interest in the development of the child. 

Thus, this Court has held that the parental obligation 

is a positive duty which requires affirmative 

performance.

This affirmative duty encompasses more than a 

financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain 

communication and association with the child.

Because a child needs more than a benefactor, 

parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the 

child’s life.

Parental duty requires that the parent act affirmatively 

with good faith interest and effort, and not yield to every 

problem, in order to maintain the parent-child relationship 

to the best of his or her ability, even in difficult 

circumstances. A parent must utilize all available 

resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must 
J-S06044-15

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exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed 

in the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship. 

Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more 

suitable or convenient time to perform one’s parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. . . .

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

After careful review of the parties’ briefs, the trial court opinion, and 

the record, including the notes of testimony, and the applicable law, we 

conclude that the thorough opinion filed by the Honorable Joseph Fernandes 

on October 20, 2014, addresses Father’s issues and supports the reasons for 

termination under Subsection 2511(a)(1). On appeal, Father ignores the 

findings of the trial court and instead recasts the evidence in a light 

favorable to him. We cannot, however, reweigh the evidence. See In re 

S.H., 879 A.2d at 805, 806. Accordingly, we adopt its analysis and affirm its 

findings under that subsection. See Trial Ct. Op. at 5 (finding Father: was 

“minimally compliant with his FSP objectives” “even though [he] was aware 

of” them; only attended visitation once per week although he was offered 

two visits per week, and thus missed 50% of his visits; failed to attend any 

of Children’s medical visits, although he was invited; “never demonstrated 

his ability to keep the children safe from Mother;” “had to be redirected to 

participate in the daily care activities for his children;” “stopped going to 

couples counselling;” and further finding DHS provided reasonable and 

adequate services, including documents and interpreting services in his 

native Spanish). Because we affirm termination under Subsection 
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2511(a)1), we need not consider the grounds for termination under 

Subsections (a)(2), (5), and (8). See In re S.H., 879 A.2d at 806.

Father’s second claim on appeal is that termination does not serve the 

Children’s physical and emotional needs under Subsection 2511(b). He 

maintains L.F. lived with him “for the first four years of his life and has a

strong bond with” him, and that although [J.F.] only lived with Father for 

part of the first year of his life, Father “kept [their] strong bond through his 

continued visitation.” Father’s Brief at 18, 19. Father asserts he “should 

have been provided with realistic goals that would have permitted him 

unsupervised visitation.” Id. at 18. Finally, he maintains “[t]he social 

worker testified that there was a bond between Father and L.F.” Id. at 19. 

We find no relief is due.

With respect to Subsection 2511(b),

Once the statutory requirement for involuntary 

termination of parental rights has been established under 

subsection (a), the court must consider whether the child's 

needs and welfare will be met by termination pursuant to 

subsection (b). In this context, the court must take into 

account whether a bond exists between child and parent, 

and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship.

When conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not 

required to use expert testimony. Social workers and 

caseworkers can offer evaluations as well.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

This Court has held “the existence of some bond with [a parent] does 

not necessarily defeat termination of her parental rights. The question 
J-S06044-15

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becomes whether the bond between [the child and parent] is the one worth 

saving or whether it could be sacrificed without irreparable harm to” the 

child. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super. 2008). “In cases where 

there is no evidence of any bond between the parent and child, it is 

reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of any bond analysis, 

therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” 

Id. at 762-63.

We summarize that when the Children were adjudicated dependent 

and placed in foster care in August 2011, L.F. was four and a half years old 

and J.F. was two months old. When DHS filed the instant petitions to 

terminate, L.F. was almost seven years old and J.F. was two years and five 

months old. They remain in the same foster home.

At the first termination hearing, when asked whether there was a bond 

between Father and the Children, the prior DHS caseworker, Marcia 

Spencer,2testified that L.F. “knows” Father, as he was four years old when 

he was removed from the home. N.T., 7/18/14, at 38-39. However, Ms. 

Spencer responded “No,” to the questions of whether she believed there was 

“a positive paternal bond” and “there would be irreparable harm to the 

children if [Father’s] rights were terminated.” Id. at 39. Finally, Ms. 

 

2 Ms. Damaris, the current DHS caseworker, assumed supervision of the 

case in June 2014, after DHS had filed the petition to terminate and 

approximately five weeks prior to the July 18, 2014 termination hearing. 

See N.T., 7/18/14, at 56. Ms. Damaris’ first name was not revealed in the 

hearing transcript.
J-S06044-15

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Spencer opined it was in the Children’s best interests for Father’s parental 

rights to be terminated. Id. On cross-examination, Father’s counsel asked 

Ms. Spencer about her knowledge of the bond between Father and the 

Children. Id. at 49. Ms. Spencer testified she had observed three or four 

visits and received reports from DHS and stated, “My observation is that 

very close interactive [sic] with [L.F. J.F.] was an infant, less interaction 

with [J.F.] [sic] because he was a baby. He would play with them and all. 

But to parent on a day to day basis long term, I don’t think it was there.” 

Id. at 49-50. On redirect examination, the following exchange occurred:

[DHS’ counsel:] . . . And even if the interaction between 

father and the child was close, do you think that that 

would cause irreparable harm to [L.F.] to have that bond 

severed?

[Ms. Spencer:] No.

Id. at 55.

Damaris Oliveira, the current DHS caseworker, monitored visits 

between the Children and both parents.3 Id. at 62. When asked if she 

thought there would “be any irreparable harm if the parental rights were 

terminated,” Ms. Oliveira replied, “No, I think it would be more better [sic] 

mentally,” and that termination would provide stability. Id. at 67. Ms. 

 

3 At the July 18, 2014 hearing, DHS’ attorney called her next witness as “the 

current [case]worker, Miss Damaris.” N.T., 7/18/14, at 56. However, the 

next line in the transcript is “(Witness not identified),” and the direct 

examination begins without the witness’ stating her name or occupation on 

the record. Id. at 56. We presume the witness was Damaris Oliveira, who 

also testified at the August 25, 2014 hearing.
J-S06044-15

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Oliveira also stated the Children had “very strong” bonds with their foster 

parents and call their foster mother “mom.” Id. at 66. 

Jennifer Brereton, L.F.’s therapist, testified to the following. L.F. calls 

Father “Dad” and knows he is his biological father. Id. at 76. The following 

exchange occurred:

[Father’s counsel:] Did [L.F.] ever express any feelings 

for his dad?

[Ms. Brereton:] He’s expressed anger about missed 

visits.

Q. Has he ever expressed any kind of love for his 

father?

A. Not, not that I recall.

Q. . . . [D]id [L.F.] ever appear upset if his father didn’t 

come?

A. He’s been upset when both [parents] have no[t] 

showed to the visits and there were no visits he’s become 

upset.

Q. Okay. You’ve never observed his interaction with 

his father?

A. I have not.

Id. at 76-77. When asked by DHS’ counsel whether she believed there 

would be irreparable harm if the parental rights were terminated, Ms. 

Brereton replied,

I’m not minimizing that it would be a significant stressor 

but I believe in the current home and being in therapy 

[L.F.] has enough support to (inaudible). I think with 

what’s more damaging [sic] to [L.F.] right now is his 

inconsistency—just about every session, honestly, [L.F.] 
J-S06044-15

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says, what’s taking the judge so long, when I get an 

answer [sic].

Id. at 77-78. Ms. Brereton further testified L.F. “definitely wants to be 

adopted” and it was in his best interest to be adopted. Id. at 78.

The trial court, citing the above testimony of DHS caseworker Spencer, 

found Father and the Children do not have a parent/child bond. Trial Ct. Op. 

at 8 (citing N.T., 7/18/14, at 39, 49). The court recounted L.F.’s therapist 

Ms. Brereton’s testimony that L.F. “never expressed any kind of love for his 

Father.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8 (citing N.T., 7/18/14, at 76-77). With respect to 

the younger child, J.F., we note that a careful review of the record has 

revealed no specific testimony as to whether there was a bond between him 

and Father. Nevertheless, the trial court noted, “Children barely know their 

Father,” “Father missed 50% of his visits and never attended any of the 

medical visits,” and “[n]ot visiting with their Father would bring emotional 

stability to their lives.” Trial Ct. Op. at 8-9. However, as noted above, J.F. 

was removed from Mother’s care when he was two months old, and by the 

time DHS filed the termination petition, had spent two years and four 

months in foster care. Furthermore, both caseworkers, Ms. Spencer and Ms. 

Oliveira, opined termination would not cause irreparable harm to the 

Children and was in the Children’s best interests. After careful review of the 

record, we agree with the trial court that DHS established grounds for 

termination under Subsection 2511(b). See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); In re 

K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 764 (stating in cases where there is no evidence of any 
J-S06044-15

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bond between parent and child, it is reasonable to infer no bond exists).

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the orders of the trial court 

granting DHS’ petitions to terminate Father’s parental rights.

Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/11/2015
Circulated 04/29/2015 04:12 PM

IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS:!: ': ! . . . FOR THE COUNTY OF PHILADELPHIA 

FAMILY COURT DIVISION 70!1 1 DU 2u Ii\ II.' i·:J 

In Re: In the Interest of J.R and LF. : CP-51-DP-0001582-2011 , , 

CP-5 l-DP-0001583-201 l I ".I' 

CP-5 l-AP-0000628-2013 

CP-5 l-AP-0000629-2013 

2757 EDA 2014 

'f ! : : ,. \ ·, \.) ! ' ' ' 

APPEAL OF: J.R., Father 

2709 EDA 2014 

OPINION 

Fernandes, J.: 

Appellant, J.R. ("Father"), appeals from the Orders entered on August 25, 2014, granting the 

petition filed by the Department of Human Services of Philadelphia County ("DRS") to 

involuntarily tenninate his parental rights to LF. ("Child #1") and J.R. ("Child #2") pursuant to the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.CS.A. §2511 (a)(l), (2), (5), (8), and (b). Lisa M. Visco, Esquire, counsel for 

Father, filed a timely Notice of Appeal with a Statement of Enors Complained Of pursuant to Rule 

1925(b). 

Factual and Procedural Background 

DRS initially became involved with this family on January 29, 2007, when a General Protective 

Services report ("GPS") alleging that R.F. ("Mother") tested positive for phencyclidine ("PCP") at 

the time of Child #1 's birth (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 15). Child #1 remained hospitalized due to his 

exposure to drugs in utero. Mother admitted that she used cigarettes, alcohol, and cocaine on an 

ahnost daily basis during her pregnancy with Child # !. The family subsequently stabilized and 

DRS closed its case. 

The family became involved with DRS again on June 6, 2011, when DRS received a GPS report 

which alleged that Mother tested positive for PCP at the birth of Child #2 (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 16). 

Child #2's subsequent toxicology screen at the hospital was positive for PCP. Child #2 weighed 

four pounds and eight ounces at the time of his birth. 

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On July 18, 2011, DHS developed the Initial Family Service Plan ("FSP") and held a meeting (N.T. 

7/18/14, pgs. 17-18). Father did not attend or otherwise participate in that meeting. At this time, 

there were no objectives for Father (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 18). 

On August 9, 2011, DHS received a GPS report alleging that Mother was observed attempting to 

push Child #2 into traffic (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 18, 25). Child #2 was in a stroller, but not strapped in, 

and only wearing a one-piece infant undergarment. Mother was under the influence of PCP at the 

time of the incident (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 18, 25). Following this incident, DHS obtained an Order of 

Protective Custody ("OPC") for both children and placed them in foster care (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 19). 

At the time of children's placement, Father was minimally involved in their care. However, Father 

was made aware of Mother's PCP abuse (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 24-26, 30-31). Father stated that he 

was unable to care for the children because of his work schedule. On August 24, 2011, an 

adjudicatory hearing was held for both children. The court adjudicated the children dependent and 

committed them to DHS based on the present inability of parents (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 20-21). On 

September 20, 2011, DHS revised the FSP. Children's goal was to return to 

parent/guardian/custodian. Father's objectives were to visit children at the office of the placement 

agency on a weekly basis, keep and maintain regular contact with children, meet regularly with the 

agency social worker, participate in the Healthy Relationships Couples program with Mother, and 

comply with the Individual Service Plan ("ISP"). Father attended the meeting and signed the 

revised FSP. On November 29, 2011, DHS referred Father to the Achieving Reunification Center 

("ARC") (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 28). However, ARC deemed the referral inappropriate because Father 

did not speak English, and as a result could not participate in the services provided by ARC. 

Fmiher research by ARC revealed that all service goals for Father could be achieved at Casa de 

Consejeria Y Salud Integral, Inc. ("CCSI") in Spanish. ARC refe!1'ed Father to CCSI on November 

29, 2011. 

On December I, 2011, the FSP was agam revised. The goal for children was to return to 

parent/guardian/custodian and Father's objectives were to visit children at the office of the 

placement agency on a weekly basis, keep and maintain regular contact with children, to meet 

regularly with the agency social worker, to comply with the ISP, and attend services at CCSI. 

Father attended the meeting and signed the FSP. The FSP was revised again on May 15, 2012 and 

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on November 27, 2012. All of Father's objectives remained the same. Father attended and signed 

the revised FSP (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 27-30). During the time the children have been in care, Mother 

has resided on and off with Father. 

In the ISP quarterly repo11s for the children from El Concilio for the period of May 7, 2013 through 

August 7, 2013, it was noted that obstacles to reunification remained. It was also noted that there 

were concerns about Father's ability to care for the children independently, set boundaries for 

Mother and the children while Mother attempted to achieve and maintain sobriety, and ensure the 

children's safety with and around Mother (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 60). Father has stated that he is unable 

to create boundaries for Mother throughout the life of this case. Father is unwilling to put the 

children's needs before Mother's (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 36, 39-40, 69-70). Father also attended 

parenting classes, but did not complete the program due to his work schedule. Father was given 

twice a week supervised visits. Father only was able to visit once a week. When Father attends his 

visits, Father is reluctant to work on activities, such as assisting Child # 1 with homework. Instead, 

Father gives his cell phone to the children so they can play games on his cell phone instead of 

spending quality time with his children. Father brings inappropriate foods for the children. Father 

must be prompted to participate in daily care activities for his children, such as changing diapers 

and setting boundaries. Father always had supervised visits. Father strnggles to take initiative in 

interacting and maintaining the attention of his children. Child #I attends trauma focused therapy 

once per week since November 2012. Child #1 becomes extremely upset when Father or Mother 

miss visits. He has a lot of anxiety about parents' well-being. Father and Mother stopped attending 

couples counseling. DHS had serious concerns about Father's ability to provide appropriate care 

and supervision for his children independently. Although in the early part of the case, Father was 

found substantially and fully compliant, at the last review healing on June 19, 2013, prior to DHS 

filing the Goal Change/Tennination petition, Father was found minimally compliant. DHS filed 

their Goal Change/Tennination petition on October 31, 2013. The trial comt tenninated Father's 

parental rights on August 25, 2014. The bmTier for Father to reunify the children with him is his 

inability to keep the children safe and protect them from Mother, along with providing appropriate 

care. 

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It should be noted that from a procedural standpoint, the trial comi announced its decision on 

August 25, 2014, but the testimony as to Father was heard on July 18, 2014. The trial court 

required DHS to make reasonable effo1is to provide notice to Mother; therefore, as to Mother only, 

the termination hearing was continued to August 25, 2014. On August 25, 2014, the trial comi 

found DHS made reasonable effo1is to serve Mother, but Mother chose not to appear for the Goal 

Change/Termination hearing. 

Discussion: 

On appeal, Father raised the following issues: 

1. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily 

tenninating Father's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a), where the evidence showed 

that Father substantially complied with the FSP goals established by DHS? 

2. Did the trial court commit an error of law and abuse of discretion by involuntarily 

terminating Father's parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(b), where DHS failed to prove 

by clear and convincing evidence that involuntary terminating Father's parental rights would 

best serve emotional needs and welfare of Children? 

As to the first issue on appeal, the grounds for involuntary tennination of parental rights are 

enumerated in the Adoption Act at 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a). The Adoption Act provides the 

following grounds for involuntary termination: 

(a) General rule - The rights of a parent, in regards to a child, may be terminated after a petition is 

filed on any of the following grounds: 

(1) The parent, by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months innnediately preceding the 

filing of the petition, has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or 

has refused or failed to perfonn parental duties. 

In proceedings to involuntary tenninate parental rights; the burden of proof is on the party seeking 

tennination to establish by clear and convincing evidence of the existence of grounds for 

tennination. /11 re Adoption o(Atencio, 539 Pa. 161, 650 A.2d 1064 (1994). To satisfy section 

(a)(l), the moving paiiy must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct sustained for at 

least six months prior to the filing of the tem1ination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perfonn parental duties. The standard 

of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so clear, direct weighty and 

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convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction without hesitance of the trnth 

of precise facts in issue. !11 re D.J.S., 1999 Pa. Super. 214 (1999). 

Father did not achieve all of his FSP objectives throughout the life of case, even though Father was 

aware of his FSP objectives (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 26-33). At the last permanency review hearing on 

June 19, 2013, before DHS filed their Goal Change/Termination petition, Father was found 

minimally compliant with his FSP objectives. Father was offered twice a week supervised 

visitation, but he only made it for one day a week (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 34, 63-64). Father missed 50 

percent of his visits and never attended any of the medical visits, even though Father was invited 

(N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 63-64, 68). Father's visits were never changed from supervised to unsupe1vised. 

Father never demonstrated his ability to keep the children safe from Mother (N.T. 7/18114, pgs. 34-

36). Father had to be redirected to pmticipate in the daily care activities for his children, such as 

changing diapers and setting boundaries (N.T. 7/18114, pgs. 43-44) and (DHS Exhibit 45). Father 

had to be redirected to bring appropriate foods to the visits (N.T. 7/18114, pgs. 37, 62-63). Father 

and Mother stopped going to couples counseling (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 43) and (DHS Exhibit 45). All 

the se1vices were offered to help Father reunify with his children. The record establishes that DHS 

provided and offered reasonable and adequate se1vices to remedy the conditions that brought the 

children into care and throughout the life of this case, Father was offered documents and 

interpreting se1vices in his native language, which is Spanish. 

On October 31, 2013, DH;S filed the petition for termination. Since 2011, Father continuously fails 

to perform his parental duties toward the children. Father's pattern of non-compliance continued 

for at least six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, as established by the trial comt 

pennanency review order from June 19, 2013. As a result, all the elements of the Adoption Act, 23 

Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(l) have been fully satisfied. 

The Adoption Act at 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(2) also includes, as a ground for involuntary 

termination of parental rights, the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the 

parent that causes the children to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary 

for his physical or mental well-being, and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent. This ground is not limited to 

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affinnative misconduct. It may include acts of refusal to perform parental duties but more 

specifically on the needs of the children. Adoption o(C.A. W., 683 A.2d 911, 914 (Pa. Super. 1996). 

Co mis have further held that the implications of the parent's limited success with services geared to 

remedy the bmTiers to effective parenting can also satisfy the requirements of §2511 (a)(2). !11 the 

matter o(B.L. W., 843 A.2d 380 (Pa. Super. 2004), the court's grave concerns about the Father's 

ability to provide the level of protection, security and stability that his children needed was 

sufficient to warrant termination. Id. at 388. 

Parent's lack of care and supervision of their children led to the children's dependency adjudication 

and to their placement in foster care on August 24, 2011. Father had consistently failed and refused 

to remedy the causes that brought children into care. Father is unable and unwilling to provide the 

level of protection, security and stability that the children need. Because of Father and Mother's 

relationship being on and off, and Father's knowledge that Mother has tested positive for PCP at 

least 16 times tln·oughout the life of this case, Father is unable to protect children from Mother and 

keep them safe (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 30, 36, 39-40, 59-60). Father continues to live with Mother at 

the same address (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 62). Father continuously puts the needs of the Mother before 

the needs of the children (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 36, 69-70). Based on the testimony on the record, the 

trial court had grave concerns about Father's ability to provide the level of protection, security, and 

stability that the children need. For Father, the needs of the children were secondary to Mother's 

needs. The children have been in placement for a period of thirty-six months (N.T. 8/25/14, pg. 23). 

The children need permanency. Father is unable to remediate the causes that brought children into 

care. DRS has met its burden under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(2). 

DRS also requested termination of parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(5), whereby 

children may be removed by court or voluntary agreement and placed with an agency at least six 

months, conditions which led to the placement of the children continue to exist, the parent cannot or 

will not remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services reasonably 

available to the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions leading to placement, and tennination 

best serves the children's needs and welfare. 

DRS, as a child and youth agency, cam1ot be required to extend services beyond the period of time 

deemed as reasonable by the legislature or be subjected to herculean efforts. A child's life cannot 

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be put on hold in hope that the parent will summon the ability to handle the responsibilities of 

parenting. /11 re J. T.. 817 A.2d 509 (Pa. Super. 2001 ). As a consequence, Pennsylvania's Superior 

Cami has recognized that the children's needs and welfare requires agencies to work toward 

termination of parental rights when a children has been placed in foster care beyond reasonable 

temporal limits and after reasonable efforts for reunification have been made by the agency, that 

have resulted unfruitful. This process should be completed within eighteen months. In re NW., 

851 A.2d 508 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

The children have been in care for a period of thirty-six months (N.T. 8/25/14, pg. 23). Father 

continues to be unable to sunl111on the ability to handle his responsibilities of parenting. Hence, 

Father's lack of parental skills and minimal compliance with his FSP objectives compel this court to 

conclude that children are no closer to be reunified with Father. The children's life carmot be put on 

hold any longer in hope that the Father will remedy the conditions that led to placement within a 

reasonable amount of time. Father was aware of his FSP objectives, but was unable to complete 

them within thhiy-six months. Through the life of this case Father was never able to obtain 

unsupervised visitation with his children because based on his supervised visits, Father was unable 

to demonstrate that he had the capacity to parent (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 36, 43-44). For instance, 

Father did not know how to change a diaper and Father had to be prompted to change Child #2's 

diaper (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 44). Father brought junk food to the visits, even after he was told not to 

(N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 62-63). The lack of pennanency for children takes an emotional toll on Child 

#1. The main reason why Child #1 is in therapy is lack ofpemrnnency (N.T. 8/25/14, pgs. 20-21). 

When there are periods of time when Child # 1 does not have visits from his parents, he seems to be 

functioning really well and therapy progresses (N.T. 8/25/14, pg. 21). However, when the visits do 

happen or are inconsistent Child #1 becomes confused and no progress happens in therapy (N.T. 

8/25/14, pg. 21). Child #1 has even expressed anger towards Father when Father missed visits 

(N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 76). Child #2 is not receiving therapy because he is only three years old (N.T. 

8/25/14, pg. 20). The children have been in care for thitiy-six months. The needs and welfare of 

the Children dictate that tennination and adoption would best serve their pennanency needs. DHS 

met its burden under the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(a)(5). 

As to §251 l(a)(8) of23 Pa.C.S.A., DHS met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that the 

children have been out of Father's care for twelve months or more, and the conditions leading to the 

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placement still exist, and tennination would best serve the needs and welfare of the children. The 

children have been continuously under DHS' custody for a period of thitty-six months (N.T. 

8/25/14, pg. 23). The conditions that led to the children's placement still exist. Despite the good 

faith efforts of DHS to make services available, it is in the best interest of the children to te1minate 

Father's parental rights (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 39, 67, 78), (N.T. 8/25/14, pgs. 15-16, 18). 

The trial comt will now consider Father's last issue on appeal, whether the termination of parental 

rights would best serve the emotional needs and welfare of the children under 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§2511 (b ). The party seeking tennination must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the 

termination is in the best interest of the child. The best interest of the child is detennined after 

consideration of the needs and welfare of the child, such as love comfort, security and stability. In 

re Bowman, 436 Pa. Super. 647, A.2d 217 (1994). See also In re Adoption o[T.B.B .. 835 A.2d 387, 

397 (Pa. Super. 2003). Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251l(b), the trial court must also consider what, 

if any bond exists between Father and children. In re Involuntm)I Ter111i11atio11 of C. W.S.M. and 

K.A.L.M .. 839 A.2d 410, 415 (Pa. Super. 2003). The trial comt must examine the status of the bond 

to detennine whether its te1111ination "would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship." In re Adoption o[T.B.B .. 835 A.2d 387 (Pa. Super. 2003). In assessing the parental 

bond, the trial court is pennitted to rely upon the observations and evaluations of social workers. In 

re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753,762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008). Under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §251 l(b), the rights of a 

parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of envit'onmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical, if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

The children will not suffer any irreparable harm by tenninating Father's parental rights (N.T. 

7/18/14, pgs. 55, 67, 77), (N.T. 8/25/14, pgs. 15, 17, 23). Foster parents and children have a strong 

parent/child bond (N.T. 7/18/14, pg. 66), (N.T. 8/25/14, pg. 23). Father and children do not have a 

parent/child bond (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 39, 49), (N.T. 8/25/14, pg. 23). Child #1 has never expressed 

any kind of love for his Father (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 76-77). The children continue to flourish in the 

foster home and the children have bonded with the foster family (DHS Exhibit 45). Terminating 

Father's parental rights would not destroy an existing necessary relationship between Father and 

Child # 1 and Child #2. Children barely know their Father. Not visiting with their Father would 

bring emotional stability to their lives (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 67, 74-75). Father missed 50 percent of 

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his visits and never attended any of the medical visits, even though Father was invited (N.T. 

7/18/14, pgs. 63-64, 68). 

It is in the best interest of children to be adopted (N.T. 7/18/14, pgs. 39, 67, 78), (N.T. 8/25/14, pgs. 

16, 18). DHS has provided reasonable services to Father. The trial comt has found reasonable 

efforts at every pennanency review hearing. The comt detennined that the testimonies of the DHS 

witnesses were credible. Additionally, the record clearly establishes that Father's parental rights are 

being terminated due to his lack of non-compliance with his FSP objectives, no parent/child bond, 

and no irreparable hatm would occur by tenninating Father's parental rights. Tenninating Father's 

parental rights is not due to environmental factors. The children have been in placement for thirtysix months and the children need permanency. Consequently, the trial comt did not err in 

terminating Father's parental rights and changing the goal to adoption, it would best serve the 

emotional needs and welfare of the children. 

Conclusion: 

For the aforementioned reasons, the comt finds that DHS met its statutory burden by clear and 

convincing evidence regarding the termination of the parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§251 l(a) and (b). The court also fmds that it will not cause irreparable harm to the children to sever 

any bond, and it is in the best interest of the children since it would best serve the emotional needs 

and welfare of the children. 

Accordingly, the order entered on August 25, 2014, te1111inating the parental rights of Father, J.R., 

should be affirmed. 

By the court ., 

1~'-£>'-1~ ,~/~ 

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 

I hereby ce1tify that this court is serving a copy of this duly executed Order upon all 

parties or their counsel on October 20, 2014, by regular mail and/or fax. The names and 

addresses of all persons served are as follows: 

Assistant City Solicitor Katherine Holland, Esq. 

City of Philadelphia Law Department 

1515 Arch Street, l 61

h Floor 

One Parkway Building 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19102-1595 

Depaitment of Human Services 

Lisa M. Visco, Esq. 

1800 JFK Blvd. - Suite 300 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 

Attorney for Father 

Mary Cole, Esq. 

1441 Sansom Street, 9th Floor 

Philadelphia, PA 19103 

Child Advocate 

James Martin, Esq. 

1800 JFK Blvd. - Suite 300 

1424 Chestnut Street 

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103 

Attorney for Mother 

BY:~~ I? 

Ana R. Melhor 

Judicial Fellow 

Hon. Joseph L. Fernandes 

Judge Court of Conunon Pleas 

First Judicial District of Pennsylvania 

Family Division 

Vine Street, Room 345 

Philadelphia, Pa. 19103 

Telephone: (215)-686-2660