III 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 673 

Affirming that the New START Treaty extension will cover new deployed 

Russian nuclear delivery systems, and supporting additional initiatives 

to engage China that advance the goal of concluding an arms control 

treaty or agreement. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

AUGUST 6, 2020 

Mr. MARKEY (for himself, Mr. VAN HOLLEN, Mrs. FEINSTEIN, Mr. 

MERKLEY, Mr. DURBIN, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Ms. WARREN, Mr. CARDIN, 

Mr. COONS, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. WYDEN, Ms. HIRONO, Mr. MURPHY, Mr. 

LEAHY, Ms. CANTWELL, Mr. SANDERS, and Ms. SMITH) submitted the 

following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Affirming that the New START Treaty extension will cover 

new deployed Russian nuclear delivery systems, and supporting additional initiatives to engage China that advance the goal of concluding an arms control treaty 

or agreement. 

Whereas, on March 1, 2018, President Vladimir Putin of the 

Russian Federation previewed five new Russian nuclear 

delivery systems in his State of the Nation address; 

Whereas two of the new systems, the Sarmat intercontinental 

ballistic missile (ICBM) and the Avangard hypersonic 

glide vehicle, will count under the limits of the Treaty beVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:57 Aug 07, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SR673.IS SR673

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 673 IS 

tween the United States of America and the Russian 

Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and 

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (commonly referred to as the ‘‘New START Treaty’’), as confirmed by 

Sergey Lavrov, Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation; 

Whereas an additional pair of new systems, the Poseidon nuclear-powered torpedo and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile, are not projected to be deployed during the five-year extension of the New START Treaty to 

2026, and even if they were deployed, the United States 

is able to address its concerns about those weapons 

through the Bilateral Consultative Committee; 

Whereas the Russian Federation’s fifth new system, the 

Kinzhal short-range air-launched ballistic missile, is being 

deployed as a theater-strike weapon on MiG–31 aircraft, 

rather than on a heavy bomber, in which case it would 

be automatically accountable under the New START 

Treaty; 

Whereas the advance timing of the Russian Federation’s nuclear modernization cycle may allow it to significantly expand its strategic nuclear arsenal relative to the United 

States in the event that the New START Treaty expires 

on February 5, 2021; 

Whereas the 2020 Annual Report on the Implementation of 

the new START Treaty concluded that the Russian Federation was ‘‘in compliance with the terms of the New 

START Treaty’’; 

Whereas the People’s Republic of China has never entered 

into a treaty or agreement with the United States or any 

other party that places binding limits on its shorterVerDate Sep 11 2014 00:57 Aug 07, 2020 Jkt 099200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6300 E:\BILLS\SR673.IS SR673

kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
3 

•SRES 673 IS 

range, intermediate-, or strategic-range ballistic missiles, 

verified by National Technical Means and by on-site inspections, as the United States and Russian Federation 

did through the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 

(INF) Treaty, the START I and START II Treaties, 

and the New START Treaty, each of which took multiple 

years to successfully negotiate; 

Whereas the People’s Republic of China possesses significantly fewer ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and heavy bombers than the Russian 

Federation or the United States, and according to the 

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), China’s warhead 

stockpile is in ‘‘the low couple of hundreds’’, a fraction 

of the size of the arsenals of the Russian Federation and 

the United States; and 

Whereas the People’s Republic of China has repeatedly declined invitations by the United States to enter into trilateral negotiations on an arms control treaty or other 

agreement regarding its nuclear arsenal: Now, therefore, 

be it 

1 Resolved, That the Senate— 

2 (1) calls on the President to immediately extend 

3 the New START Treaty until 2026; 

4 (2) affirms that, by extending the New START 

5 Treaty until 2026, the President of the United 

6 States can secure limitations on two new types of 

7 Russian Federation strategic weapons beyond those 

8 accountable when the Treaty entered into force in 

9 2011 or at any time thereafter; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
4 

•SRES 673 IS 

1 (3) calls on the Russian Federation to cease the 

2 development of hazardous and provocative new 

3 weapons systems including the Burevestnik cruise 

4 missile, which is powered by a nuclear reactor and 

5 may violate the prohibition in numerous treaties and 

6 military manuals against causing superfluous injury 

7 and unnecessary suffering; 

8 (4) affirms the December 1987 statement by 

9 President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mi10 khail S. Gorbachev of the Soviet Union that ‘‘a nu11 clear war cannot be won and must never be fought’’; 

12 (5) calls on the President to consider the views 

13 of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and other 

14 United States allies and partners who overwhelm15 ingly back extension of the New START Treaty; and 

16 (6) supports, following the extension of the New 

17 START Treaty, a United States initiative to engage 

18 China in negotiations towards the eventual conclu19 sion of an arms control treaty or agreement, starting 

20 with steps to reduce the risk of strategic miscalcula21 tion and the threat of a nuclear exchange, which 

22 may include— 

23 (A) a formal invitation to appropriate offi24 cials from the People’s Republic of China, and 

25 to each of the permanent members of the 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
5 

•SRES 673 IS 

1 United Nations Security Council, to observe a 

2 United States-Russian Federation New START 

3 Treaty on-site inspection in 2020 to dem4 onstrate the security benefits of transparency 

5 into strategic nuclear forces; 

6 (B) an agreement with the People’s Re7 public of China that allows for advance notifica8 tions of ballistic missile launches, through the 

9 Hague Code of Conduct or other data ex10 changes or doctrine discussions related to stra11 tegic nuclear forces; 

12 (C) an agreement not to target or interfere 

13 in nuclear command, control, and communica14 tions (commonly referred to as ‘‘NC3’’) infra15 structure; or 

16 (D) any other cooperative measure that 

17 benefits United States-China strategic stability. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS