## In The Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06

- 19

- 00197

- CR

JEFFREY MICKENS , Appellant

V. THE STATE OF TEXAS , Appellee

On Appeal from the 123rd District Court Panola County, Texas Trial Court No. 2018

- C

- 083

Befo re Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Burgess2 

### ME MORANDUM OPINION Jeffery Mickens appeals his conviction of murder. 1 Mickens waived a jury and , in a single proceeding, pled guilty to this and four other indictments. A l l indictments alleged offenses from one evening in February 2018. In a single brief, he appeals all five convictions. We affirm this murder conviction and its sentence. 2 I. Points of Error Previously Addressed In our opinion in cause number 06

- 19

- 00 19 5

- CR , we addressed Mickens’s first two points of error , w hich complain th at the trial court did not warn him sufficiently in compliance with Faretta v. California 3 and that the trial court did not insure Mickens’s waiver of a jury trial was mad e knowingly an d v olu ntarily. We refer the reader to our analyses in that case regarding the complaints about Faretta and Mickens’s waiver of his right to a jury trial. We overrule those complaints in this case. We address Micken s’s pleas of guilty ind ependently. II. P le a of Guilty Made Voluntarily and Freely In our opinion in cause number 06

- 19

- 00195

- CR , we described the analysis for determining whether a plea of guilty is made freely and voluntarily. We refer the reader to our op inion in that case for a detailed sum m ary o f the events at Mickens’s trial and the law we applied to those events. In brief, we consider the totality of the circumstances viewed in light of

1 See T EX . P EN AL C ODE A NN . § 19.02
. 2 On even date herewith, we also affir m Mickens ’ s other four convictions in these cause numbers: 06

- 19

- 0019 5

- CR , aggravated kidnapping of Regina ; 06

- 19

- 0019 6

- CR , aggravated kidnapping of Regina’s infant daughter , Barbara ; 06

- 19

- 00 198

- CR , attem pted c apital murder of Deputy Christophe r Welk ; 06

- 19

- 001 99

- C R , aggravated assault by causing serious bodily injury to Regina
. 3 422 U
. S
. 806 (1975).3

the entire record; 4 “the record must affirmatively disclose that the defendant . . . ent ered his plea
u nde rs tandingly and voluntarily
. ” 5 The trial court must admonish the defendant in substantial compliance with the requisites of A rticle 26.13 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 26.13 (Supp.)
. A s in cause number 0 6

- 1 9

- 00195

- CR, the trial court accepted Mickens’s plea of guilty to the instant charge of murder after Mickens stated he pled guilty because he was in fact guilty , he had not been forced o r threatened to plead guilty , his plea was ma de freely and voluntar i ly , and he understood the crime was a first

- degree felony. H owever, the trial court did not articulate the range of punishment, i.e. , five to ninety

- nine years or life i n prison. Mickens, though, told the court he underst ood the range of punish m ent. T he failure of the trial court to literally pronounce the range of punishment, though, does not render Mickens’s plea to this offense involuntary or unknowing. Shortly before his plea to the insta nt indictment for murder, M ickens pled guilty to t w o indict m ents alleging aggravated kidnapping

— first

- degree felonies
. In its admonishments of both of those charges , the court admonished Mic kens that those crimes were first

- degree felonies, bearing punishmen t ranges of five to ninety

- nine years or life i mp risonme nt. “The record contains references to the correct punishment range and there is nothing in the record that shows appellant was unawar e of the consequences of his plea or that he was misled or harm ed.” Aguirre

- M ata v. State , 125 S.W.3d 473, 4 76

– 77 (Tex . C rim. App. 2003). In

4 Griffin v. State , 703 S.W.2d 193, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Fluellen v. State , 443 S.W.3d 365, 36 8 (Tex. A pp.
— Texarkana 2014, no pet.).
5 Br ady v. United State s , 397 U.S. 742, 747 n.4 (1970); see Boykin v. Alabama , 395 U.S. 238, 243

– 44 (1969); see also Davison v. State , 405 S.W.3d 6 82, 687 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).4

Aguirre

- Mata , t he State, during voir dire, had three times “correctly stated the punishment range. Nothing sho w [ed] that [Aguirre

- Mata] did not hear and understand that, that h is interpret er was not present, or that his att or ney ha d not already told him the same thing.” Aguirre

- Mata v. State , 26 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist. ] 2000 , pet. gra nted ). Granted , there was no voir dire in Mickens’s case. But the correct range of pun ishment for two other first

- deg ree felon ies h ad just been recited. Also, a week prior to Mickens’s plea of guilty, an earlier plea offer of forty

- five years’ incarceration was discussed. 6 We find Mickens’s plea to murder was made freely and voluntaril y. This point of error is overrule d. III. Double Jeop ardy Mickens’s double jeopardy argument is only made to his conviction in cause number 06

- 19

- 00199

- CR. We address his complaint in our opinion in that cause. IV. Court Costs The trial court assessed court co sts in this case, after also assess ing them i n ca us e n umber 06

- 19

- 00195

- CR. Where a defendant is convicted of two or more offenses in a single criminal action , court costs may only be assessed once. See T EX . C ODE C RIM . P ROC . A NN . art. 102.073. The Stat e c oncedes this was error on the tri al court’ s par t. “This Court has the power to correct

6 There was an argument between Mickens ’s appointed attorney , Hagan , and two attorne ys for the State a b o ut w h ether such of

fer had been made. The State said that, even if any offer had been extended, it had by that date expired. Cf. Rodriguez v. State , 763 S.W.2d 893, 895 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio 198 8, p et. ref’d) . In the context of a point of error compla i n ing that he had not been suf ficiently admonished about the hazards of self

- representation, Rodriguez complained that the range of punishment had not be en explained to him. Pointing out “the State had at first offered [Rodriguez] forty years on a guil ty p l ea t hat was later ch anged to thir ty years,” Rodriguez “was aware that a finding of guilty could possibly mean the same or a stiffer sentence.” Id. He was ultimately sentence d to forty

- five ye ars’ incarceration. Id.5

and modify the judgment of the trial court for accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the record.” Anthony v. State , 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. Ap p.
— Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citi ng T EX . R
. A P P . P . 43.2(b); Bigley v. State , 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993); Asberry v. State , 813 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. App.

— Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d)). “The authority of an appellate court to reform inco rrect ju dgments is not dependent upon the re quest o f an y party, nor does it turn on the question of whether a party has or has not objected in the trial court.” Id
. (quoting Asberry , 813 S.W.2d at 529

– 30). We modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the inc lusion of court costs. As modifie d, we aff

i rm t he trial court’s judgment and sentence for murder.

Ralph K. Burgess Justice Date Submitted: August 26, 2020 Date Decided: October 9 , 2020 Do Not Publish