[Cite as Wr Steele Co., L.L.C. v. Stone Oak Market , 2020-Ohio-5117.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT LUCAS COUNTY
Wr Steele Company, LLC Court of Appeals No. L-19-1147 Appellee Trial Court No. CVF1500918

v. DECISION AND JUDGMENT Stone Oak Market, and Bonnie Ostrander Decided: October 30, 2020 Appellants * * * * * R. Ethan Davis, for appellee. Bonnie Ostrander, pro se. * * * * * ZMUDA, P.J. I. Introduction {¶ 1} This matter is before the court on appeal from the judgment of the Sylvania Municipal Court, denying the motion of appellant Bonnie Ostrand er to vacate a “paid/satisfied default judgment.” Finding no error, we affirm

.2. II. Facts and Procedural Background {¶ 2} This matter is, in essence, Ostrander’s fourth attempt to overt urn the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate the default judgment ent ered against her in 2015, awarding judgment to appellee Wr Steele Company, LLC (WSC). {¶ 3} On July 17, 2015, WSC filed a complaint in the Sylvania Municip al Court to recover money owed on an account for architectural services ren dered, in the amount of $3,125.98. WSC served appellant at her home and served summons on the business, Stone Oak Market. Additionally, WSC served summons on the stat utory agent for the business. On October 21, 2015, WSC moved for a default judgmen t, which the trial court granted on November 4, 2015. Ostrander filed a motion to vacat e the judgment, and the trial court denied that motion on June 9, 2016. {¶ 4} On December 9, 2016, appellant attempted to appeal the November 2015 judgment. That appeal was untimely. {¶ 5} On December 13, 2016, appellant sought leave to file a delayed appeal of the trial court’s November 2015 judgment, and we denied leave and d ismissed the second appeal. {¶ 6} In the trial court, Ostrander filed a subsequent motion to vaca te the default judgment, which the trial court denied on June 13, 2017. On Ju ly 14, 2017, appellant filed an appeal of the trial court’s judgment. In that third a ppeal, the parties engaged in mediation, and reached an agreement memorialized in writing on September 28, 2017. The written agreement provided that Ostrander would make paymen t of $3,125.98, fully3. satisfying WSC’s judgment, and file a motion to remand the matt er to the trial court. Once the matter was remanded, WSC agreed to file a motion to va cate the default judgment and dismiss the complaint. Ostrander agreed to dismis s the appeal. {¶ 7} Ostrander paid the agreed-upon amount. On November 17, 2017, W SC filed a satisfaction of judgment and a release of judgment lien with the trial court. WSC also provided Ostrander with a proposed joint motion to vacate the d efault judgment and dismiss the case with prejudice, to be filed once the case was remanded. Ostrander disagreed with the proposed motion, and drafted her own joint m otion to vacate, requesting dismissal without prejudice . Ostrander also failed to file a motion, seeking remand to the trial court. {¶ 8} On October 11, 2018, we noted the parties reached settlement th rough mediation, and sua sponte dismissed the third appeal. {¶ 9} On April 23, 2019, Ostrander filed a “motion to vacate paid/sat isfied default judgment for dismissal without prejudice” in the trial court. Ostrander sought to vacate the judgment “pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) and in accordance with t he parties’ mediated agreement.” On June 19, 2019, the trial court denied the motio n as moot, based on the trial court’s Loc.R. 17(A), which provides, “Filing of a satisf action of judgment entry with the Clerk of Court approved by plaintiff or plaintiff’s at torney of record will satisfy judgments of this Court.”4. {¶ 10} On July 18, 2019, Ostrander filed a motion asking the trial cou rt to reconsider its denial of her motion to vacate the default judgm ent and dismiss without prejudice, arguing the parties had agreed to vacate the judgmen t as part of settlement, and WSC’s filing of a satisfaction of judgment and release of lien was “malicious” and in “direct violation” of the parties’ agreement. The trial court denied the motion. {¶ 11} On July 29, 2019, Ostrander filed an appeal of the trial court’ s judgments entered November 4, 2015, November 17, 2017, and June 19, 2019. 1 WSC responded by arguing the 2015 and 2017 judgments are beyond the time for app eal. WSC also requested sanctions against Ostrander, arguing her appeal is fr ivolous and barred by the parties’ mediated settlement. Ostrander filed no response to W SC’s request for sanctions. III. Assignments of Error {¶ 12} Appellant raises the following assignments of error: FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT DENIED DUE PROCESS UNDER THE FOURTEENTH. [sic] AMENDMENTWHEN NOTIFIED OF MAILING ERROR[.] SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DESCRETION [sic] WHEN IT DENIED THE FACTS AND ENTERED A JUDGEMENT [sic] WHILE

1 The notice of appeal indicates appeal of a judgment on June 19 , 2018, but this appears to be a typographical error.5. DEFENDANT OSTRANDER WAS IN CHAPTER 13 BANKRUPTCY PROCEDDINGS [sic]. THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRAIL [sic] COURT GROSSLY ABUSED ITS DESCRETION [sic] WHEN IT STATED THAT DEFENDANT OSTRANDER HAS COME FORWARD WITH NOTHING MORE THAN HER SELF-SERVING ALLEGATIONS. FOURTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO VACATE WHEN PROOF WAS ISSUED THAT THE SERVICE WAS SIGNED BY THE BUSINESS “STOP & GO” LOCATED AT 9140 ANGOLA RD. HOLLAND AND WAS NOT A REPRSENTATIVE [sic] OF DEFENDANT[.] FIFTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO HONOR THE MEDIATED AGREEMENT AND FOUND THE ACTION MOOT. [sic] FOR THIS CAUSED ME LOSS OPPORTUNITIES AS WELL AS FINANICAL LOSS[.] SIXTH ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FORCED THE PLAINTIFF TO FILE A PAID/SATISFIED VS. A VACATE PER THE MEDIATED AGREEMENT[.]6. A. Limitations of the Present Appeal {¶ 13} As an initial matter, we note that Ostrander is attempting to a ppeal judgments from 2015 and 2017, well beyond the time to assert an appeal of those judgments, and after Ostrander and WSC entered into a settlemen t of the issues in dispute, relative to those judgments. Accordingly, even if the appeal were timely, appeal of these judgments is moot. {¶ 14} “Where the court rendering judgment has jurisdiction of the sub ject-matter of the action and of the parties, and fraud has not intervened, and the judgment is voluntarily paid and satisfied, such payment puts an end to the controversy, and takes away from the defendant the right to appeal or prosecute error or even move for vacation of judgment.” Lynch v. Bd. of Ed. of City School Dist. of City of Lakewood , 116 Ohio St. 361, 156 N.E. 188 (1927), paragraph three of the syllabus. {¶ 15} Ostrander’s first, second, third, and fourth assignments of err or challenge the validity of the judgment entered against her in November 20 15. As Ostrander voluntarily paid and satisfied the judgment, ending the controv ersy, she may no longer appeal that judgment. Her voluntary payment rendered the appea l moot. Lynch at paragraph three of the syllabus. Ostrander’s first, second, th ird, and fourth assignments, accordingly, are deemed moot. {¶ 16} Ostrander’s fifth and sixth assignments of error challenge the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate the judgment, pursuant to the pa rties’ mediated settlement7. agreement. Therefore, these assignments of error are the only issues that potentially remain for our review and are the issues that we address. B. Relief from Judgment {¶ 17} The trial court denied Ostrander’s motion to vacate the default judgment after she voluntarily satisfied the judgment, and after WSC fil ed a satisfaction of judgment and release of the judgment lien. We review the denia l of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion seeking relief from judgment for an abuse of discretion. Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174, 637 N.E.2d 914 (1994); Griffey v. Rajan, 33 Ohio St.3d 75, 77, 514 N.E.2d 1122 (1987). An “abuse of discretion” requires a findin g beyond an error of judgment, and contemplates unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconsci onable conduct by the trial court. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). {¶ 18} Here, Ostrander sought to vacate the judgment and dismiss the c ase without prejudice, arguing the judgment was no longer equitable based on her payme nt and satisfaction of the amount in controversy. The trial court dee med the motion moot and denied the requested relief. This decision is supported by law and we find no abuse of discretion. {¶ 19} The provision for relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(4), because the jud gment “is no longer equitable” is intended “to provide relief to those who h ave been prospectively subjected to circumstances which they had no opportunity to for esee or control.” Knapp v. Knapp , 24 Ohio St.3d 141, 146, 493 N.E.2d 1353 (1986). Here, Ostran der controlled the circumstances and voluntarily satisfied the judgment, endin g the controversy between8. the parties. Furthermore, vacating a satisfied judgment and di smissing WSC’s complaint without prejudice would not afford Ostrander the relief she arg uably seeks, redress for any harm to her credit rating resulting from the collection com plaint, which she has now paid in full. {¶ 20} Accordingly, we find Ostrander’s fifth and sixth assignments of error, relative to the trial court’s denial of her motion to vacate th e judgment, not well-taken. IV. Sanctions {¶ 21} Finally, we address WSC’s request for sanctions pursuant to App .R. 23, which permits an award of reasonable expenses, including attorn ey fees and costs, should we “determine that an appeal is frivolous.” “A frivolous appe al under App.R. 23 is essentially one which presents no reasonable question for revie w.” Talbott v. Fountas , 16 Ohio App.3d 226, 475 N.E.2d 187 (10th Dist.1984), paragraph one of the syllabus. {¶ 22} While Ostrander’s attempt to appeal the 2015 and 2017 judgments was untimely and rendered moot by her voluntary payment of the 2015 judgment, the trial court’s 2019 decision on her Civ.R. 60(B) motion constituted a final, appealable order. See e.g. Colley v. Bazell, 64 Ohio St.2d 243, 245, 416 N.E.2d 605 (1980) (“[I[t is well settled that a judgment denying a motion for relief from judgme nt filed pursuant to Civ.R. 60 (B) is itself a final appealable order.”). {¶ 23} Ostrander appealed the trial court’s judgment, denying her Civ. R. 60(B) motion. While Ostrander failed to seek remand to the trial cou rt, WSC agreed with Ostrander in seeking relief in accordance with Ostrander’s moti on to vacate the default9. judgment. Specifically, WSC prepared the initial draft of the parties’ joint motion seeking to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the complain t, and the denial of this relief is the issue Ostrander raised on appeal. To argue frivo lous conduct in reference to an appeal seeking relief for which the parties were in agreemen t seems disingenuous, in the least. We find WSC’s request for sanctions, therefore, not well taken. V. Conclusion {¶ 24} For the forgoing reasons we affirm the judgment of the Sylvania Municipal Court, and deny the request for sanctions pursuant to App.R. 23 . Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant to App.R. 24. Judgment affirmed.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pur suant to App.R. 27. See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Mark L. Pietrykowski, J. ______________________ _________ JUDGE Thomas J. Osowik, J.

_______________________________ Gene A. Zmuda, P.J. JUDGE CONCUR.

_______________________________ JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Cour t of Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing th e final reported version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at: http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.