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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 v. 

DALE PATRICK, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:18-cr-026 

Judge Thomas M. Rose 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTIONS FOR 

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE (ECF 23, 26) WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO 

REFILING. 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

This case is before the Court on the Motion for Compassionate Release (ECF 23) filed by 

Defendant Dale Patrick. Defendant is currently incarcerated and asks this Court for compassionate 

release from his term of imprisonment. Counsel for Defendant filed a supplemental motion. (ECF 

26). The United States filed a Response to the Motion (ECF 27), in which the Government opposes 

the motion and asks the Court to deny it. Because Defendant did not first request relief from the 

warden, the Court will deny Defendant’s motion. 

A district court has limited authority to modify a sentence. “Generally speaking, once a 

court has imposed a sentence, it does not have authority to change or modify that sentence unless 

such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. Hammond, 712 F.3d 333, 335 (6th 

Cir. 2013). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) grants such authority in certain limited circumstances. 

 Section 603(b) of the First Step Act, which was signed into law on December 21, 2018, 

modified Section 18 U.S.C. § 3582 to allow a defendant to bring a motion for compassionate 

release on his or her own behalf either “[1] after the defendant has fully exhausted all 

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administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the 

defendant’s behalf or [2] the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of 

the facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; 

see also United States v. Alam, 960 F.3d 831, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If the Director of the Bureau 

of Prisons does not move for compassionate release, a prisoner may take his claim to court only 

by moving for it on his own behalf. To do that, he must fully exhaust all administrative rights to 

appeal with the prison or wait 30 days after his first request to the prison”) (internal quotation 

marks omitted) (alteration adopted); United States v. Hardin, No. 19-cr-240, 2020 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 90855, at *2-4, 2020 WL 2610736 (N.D. Ohio May 22, 2020) (analyzing whether 30-day 

lapse provision in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) only applies if the warden does not respond to the 

defendant’s request for the BOP to bring such a motion on the defendant’s behalf, and finding that 

the provision is not limited to only applying in such a situation). 

 Defendant requests this consideration based upon concern about the COVID-19 pandemic 

and his health and well-being during his incarceration. The Government argues that Defendant 

has failed to fulfill the administrative exhaustion requirement in 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). (See 

ECF 166.) Defendant’s filing does not assert that he has exhausted his remedies with the Bureau 

of Prisons. 

Section 3582(c)(1)(A) expressly provides that the Court “may not modify a term of 

imprisonment” upon a motion brought by a defendant until “after the defendant has fully 

exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion 

on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request by the warden 

of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier...” 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Given the lack of 

any indication that the Defendant has fully exhausted his Bureau of Prisons remedies, and that he 

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has not otherwise shown that either condition of this statutory exhaustion requirement has been 

fulfilled, the Court cannot grant this motion. Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856-57, 195 L. Ed. 

2d 117 (2016) (a court may not excuse exhaustion requirements mandated by statute because 

“mandatory exhaustion statutes ... establish mandatory exhaustion regimes, foreclosing judicial 

discretion”); see also United States v. Allen, Case No. 1:19-cr-98-10, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

66414 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 15, 2020) (denying defendant’s motion for compassionate release in 

context of COVID-19 pandemic because he failed to comply with the exhaustion and 30-day 

requirements of § 3582(c)(1)(A)); United States v. Alam, Case No. 15-20351, 2020 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 61588, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 8, 2020) (denying emergency motion for compassionate 

release, collecting cases, and concluding that “neither condition described in 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(1)(A) is met, and that this failure to exhaust cannot be excused, even in light of the 

COVID-19 pandemic”). “No one contests that Congress made this change to increase access to 

compassionate release. But it does not follow that Congress meant to excuse prisoners' failure to 

follow an exhaustion requirement that it deliberately added in the same amendment.” Alam, 960 

F.3d, at 835. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant’s Motions for Compassionate Release 

(ECF 23, 26) without prejudice. Defendant must first request relief from the Bureau of Prisons. 

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio, this Thursday, March 18, 2021. 

s/Thomas M. Rose 

 ________________________________ 

THOMAS M. ROSE 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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