In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2686 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v.

KYLE S. MATTHEWS, 

Defendant-Appellant. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Illinois. 

No. 3:18-cr-30102-NJR-1 — Nancy J. Rosenstengel, Chief Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED MARCH 2, 2021 — DECIDED AUGUST 27, 2021 

____________________ 

Before RIPPLE, HAMILTON, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges. 

RIPPLE, Circuit Judge. The Clinton County, Illinois, Sheriff’s 

Office executed a search warrant on a property where 

Kyle Matthews lived in a camper trailer. The warrant authorized the police to search every structure on the premises in the

belief that Mr. Matthews lived on and had access to the whole 

property. The Sheriff’s Office, however, had not offered the 

issuing judge much information to substantiate this belief. 
2 No. 20-2686 

The evidence found during the search led to a federal indictment, and Mr. Matthews moved to exclude the fruits of 

the search. The district court held that the warrant was not 

supported by probable cause to believe that any of the suspected crimes were linked to the property. The district court 

nevertheless concluded that the good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule applied and therefore denied the motion to 

suppress. Mr. Matthews pleaded guilty to possessing an unregistered short-barreled rifle that had been found at his 

home, but he conditioned his plea on an appeal of the denial 

of the motion to suppress the evidence. 

We affirm the judgment of the district court. An objectively 

reasonable officer, having consulted with the State’s Attorney 

in the preparation of the complaint and affidavit accompanying the application for the warrant, could have relied in good 

faith on the search warrant that he obtained from a judge. The 

warrant here, although incomplete, was not so utterly lacking 

in indicia of probable cause that suppression is justified. 

I 

BACKGROUND

A.

On Saturday, March 31, 2018, Michael Long—an employee at an auto-parts store in Carlyle, Illinois—overheard 

his coworker discussing pipe bombs with Mr. Matthews in 

the store. Long heard the two men share their excitement 

about a bomb that they had detonated the previous day; they 

also discussed where to place another bomb that Mr. Matthews appeared to be carrying with him. They considered a 

local church and a school, as well as a competing auto-parts 

store and a car dealership. 
No. 20-2686 3

Concerned about the danger that these two men and their 

plan posed, Long called the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office 

late on Sunday evening. Detective Sergeant Charles Becherer 

opened an investigation. He interviewed Long, who explained that Mr. Matthews was a frequent customer and that 

he knew Mr. Matthews owned a “highly modified” AR-15 

with a silencer, lived in a camper trailer behind “the old Fin 

& Feather Restaurant,” worked on his cars in the nearby shed, 

and had “free reign of the property.”1

Detective Becherer also 

consulted with his colleagues in the Sheriff’s Office and 

learned that someone living near the Fin & Feather restaurant 

had called about an explosion that past Friday and that 

Mr. Matthews’s public social-media posts showed that he 

possessed explosive materials. Another detective reported 

that he had spoken with a local resident who said “the word 

on the street” was that Mr. Matthews possessed bombs.2

 

Following his regular practice, Detective Becherer 

promptly consulted with the State’s Attorney, who began 

drafting a complaint for a search warrant and a supporting 

affidavit. The affidavit outlined the conversation Long had 

overheard at the store (but not the rest of Detective Becherer’s 

interview) and listed the other officers’ discoveries. The complaint sought authorization to search all buildings and structures on the property of the former Fin & Feather restaurant 

at 21000 North Emerald Road, including the motor home and 

camper trailer behind the restaurant building, for any explosives, explosive materials, firearms, or ammunition. This 

1 R.45 at 1. 

2 R.29-2 at 1.
4 No. 20-2686 

motor home and camper trailer, the complaint asserted, were 

“believed to be occupied by persons including Kyle S. Matthews ... who is also believed to have access to all other structures and building [sic] situated on the premises.”3 Nothing 

in the complaint or affidavit explained specifically how Detective Becherer or the State’s Attorney had come to this belief. Rather, the affidavit stated generally that Detective 

Becherer had, “in the course of [his] investigation ... obtained 

the information contained herein, some by personal interviews and some through other law enforcement officers.”4

On Monday morning, the State’s Attorney and Detective 

Becherer completed the complaint and submitted it to a judge 

of the Circuit Court of Clinton County, Illinois. In his affidavit, Detective Becherer again stated only that the buildings 

pictured were “believed to be the residence of Suspect.”5 Attached to the affidavit were pictures of the Fin & Feather 

property that Detective Becherer had taken earlier that morning, but the pictures included no clearly identifying features, 

such as a street number. After reviewing the exhibits, the 

judge heard testimony from Long, who summarized again 

the conversation he had overheard and identified Mr. Matthews from a photograph. Detective Becherer also testified. 

He reaffirmed and signed his affidavit before the judge, and 

explained his intent to search “the entire property where 

[Mr. Matthews has] been staying which is at the Fin and 

Feather restaurant,” including the several outbuildings, 

3 R.29-1 at 1.

4 R.29-2 at 1.

5 Id. at 2.
No. 20-2686 5

because it was his “understanding [that] Mr. Matthews has 

access to all those places.”6 The judge determined there was 

probable cause to believe Mr. Matthews had materials to commit terrorism, among other crimes, stored at the Fin & Feather 

property and signed the warrant.

Just over an hour later, a joint team including Detective 

Becherer and members of the Clinton County Sheriff’s Office, 

other local law enforcement agencies, the Illinois Secretary of 

State Police Hazardous Device Unit, and the Federal Bureau 

of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms arrived at the old Fin & 

Feather restaurant to execute the search warrant. They found 

multiple firearms, silencers, a pipe bomb, and more explosive 

materials. Mr. Matthews was present at the time of the search, 

as were two other individuals.

B. 

A grand jury later indicted Mr. Matthews for possessing a 

machine gun, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), an unregistered silencer, 26 

U.S.C. § 5861(d), and an unregistered short-barreled rifle, id. 

Mr. Matthews moved to suppress the evidence obtained 

from the search of the Fin & Feather property. The warrant 

was fatally overbroad, he asserted, because it extended to 

every building on the property, and it otherwise failed to establish a nexus between his alleged illegal activity and the 

property. The Government asked the district court to deny the 

motion to suppress solely because Detective Becherer had executed the warrant in good faith. It did not maintain that the 

warrant was supported by probable cause.

6 R.29-3 at 8, 9.
6 No. 20-2686 

Although the Government relied on the good faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule, the district court 

nevertheless determined that it was appropriate to examine 

the probable-cause question and to determine whether the 

warrant was invalid. The evidence convinced the district 

court that the state court judge and Sheriff’s Office had reason 

to suspect that Mr. Matthews might have been involved in 

criminal activity. The district court noted, however, that 

Detective Becherer had offered the state court judge little 

evidence linking either Mr. Matthews or his suspected crimes 

to the Fin & Feather property, let alone to every single 

structure on the property. 

The district court then considered whether the good-faith 

exception to the exclusionary rule applied. This exception 

permits the admission of evidence obtained in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment if the officers conducted the search in 

good-faith reliance on a warrant. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 

897, 918–23 (1984). In finding good faith, the district court 

noted Detective Becherer’s choice to consult with the State’s 

Attorney before filing the complaint. It also emphasized the 

many details Long had given Detective Becherer about 

Mr. Matthews’s living situation. Based on this information, 

the district court concluded that the detective had strong reason to believe that probable cause existed to search Mr. Matthews’s camper, the surrounding land, and the other buildings. The court acknowledged that Detective Becherer never 

“articulated the reasons for that belief in his affidavit or testimony” but thought the “exigency of the situation may have 

contributed to the error.”7

7 R.48 at 16.
No. 20-2686 7

Mr. Matthews promptly sought reconsideration of its ruling. As he saw it, the district court’s analysis rested on facts 

that Detective Becherer knew but never had offered to the 

state court judge who had issued the warrant. He argued that 

the good-faith exception prohibited resort to any evidence not 

presented to the state court judge.

Relying on our decision in United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 

862 (7th Cir. 2002), the district court agreed with Mr. Matthews that it should not have relied on evidence not presented 

to the state court judge. But it determined that the outcome 

was the same. The state court judge had heard Detective 

Becherer’s testimony about intending to search the entirety of 

the Fin & Feather property, saw the pictures identified as that 

property, and knew that Detective Becherer had interviewed 

Long. The failure to connect expressly these pieces of evidence did not render unreasonable Detective Becherer’s reliance on the state court judge’s determination that there was 

probable cause to search the property.

Mr. Matthews pleaded guilty to possessing an unregistered short-barreled rifle, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d), 

but conditioned his plea on his right to appeal the denial of 

his motion to suppress, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). The district court accepted the plea and sentenced Mr. Matthews to 

three years’ probation. 

Mr. Matthews now appeals and challenges the denial of 

his motion to suppress. He maintains that the materials submitted to the state court judge lacked any indicia of probable 

cause, and, consequently, Detective Becherer could not have 

executed the warrant in good faith.
8 No. 20-2686 

II

DISCUSSION

We review de novo whether the good-faith exception to 

the exclusionary rule applies to a search based on a warrant 

later determined to be invalid. See United States v. Adams, 934 

F.3d 720, 725 (7th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 824 (2020).

A.

The basic principles that guide our analysis are well settled. The exclusion of evidence for a violation of the Fourth 

Amendment is a judicial remedy intended to deter police misconduct and thereby protect Fourth Amendment rights. Leon, 

468 U.S. at 906. To tailor this exclusionary rule to the harm it 

seeks to prevent, the Supreme Court held in Leon that, despite 

the exclusionary rule, evidence obtained in violation of the 

Fourth Amendment is admissible if the officer who conducted the search reasonably relied on a warrant. Id. at 913; 

United States v. Woodfork, 999 F.3d 511, 519–20 (7th Cir. 2021).8

The determination of reasonableness, and therefore good 

faith, is an objective inquiry. Leon, 468 U.S. at 922. Although it 

is the Government’s burden to demonstrate that the officer 

was acting in objective good faith, an officer’s decision to obtain a warrant is prima facie evidence of his good faith. Koerth, 

312 F.3d at 868. We therefore presume that an officer with a 

warrant was acting in good faith, and the defendant’s burden 

is to rebut that presumption. Edmond v. United States, 899 F.3d 

8 The exception also applies in other situations not relevant here, including warrantless searches authorized by later-invalidated statutes or binding appellate precedents. See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011); Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987).
No. 20-2686 9

446, 453 (7th Cir. 2018). The burden to show unreasonable reliance on a warrant is heavy by design. See Messerschmidt v. 

Millender, 565 U.S. 535, 547 (2012). A warrant is “a judicial 

mandate to an officer to conduct a search” that “the officer has 

a sworn duty to carry out” in a nearly “ministerial” fashion. 

Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2062–63 (2016) (quoting Leon, 

468 U.S. at 920 n.21) (internal quotation marks omitted). A

magistrate or judge is, moreover, typically far more qualified 

than a police officer to decide whether probable cause exists, 

Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 346 n.9 (1986), and so an officer 

“cannot ordinarily be expected to question a judge’s probable 

cause determination,” United States v. Lickers, 928 F.3d 609, 619 

(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 410 (2019). A magistrate’s erroneous approval of a warrant certainly does not immunize 

an officer’s subsequent search, Malley, 475 U.S. at 345–46 & 

n.9; Owens v. United States, 387 F.3d 607, 608 (7th Cir. 2004), 

but it is still “no small feat” to overcome the presumption of 

good faith, Lickers, 928 F.3d at 619. 

To overcome this heavy burden, a defendant must establish one of four situations:

(1) the affiant misled the magistrate with information the affiant knew was false or would have 

known was false but for the affiant’s reckless 

disregard for the truth; (2) the magistrate 

wholly abandoned the judicial role and instead 

acted as an adjunct law-enforcement officer; (3) 

the affidavit was bare boned, “so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable”; and 

(4) the warrant was so facially deficient in 
10 No. 20-2686 

particularizing its scope that the officers could 

not reasonably presume it was valid.

United States v. Rees, 957 F.3d 761, 771 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting 

Leon, 468 U.S. at 923).9With these principles in mind, we now 

assess Mr. Matthews’s submission. 

B.

Mr. Matthews contends that Detective Becherer’s affidavit 

was so bare boned that he could not reasonably have believed 

it had established probable cause. He admits that “it is clear 

the affidavit established probable cause that [he] was engaged 

in criminal activity.”10 But, Mr. Matthews insists, there was 

nothing substantial to link him or that activity to all the buildings on the Fin & Feather property.

At the outset, we note explicitly the narrow boundaries of 

our inquiry. First, we pretermit the antecedent question of 

whether the warrant was supported by probable cause. The 

district court concluded the warrant was not supported by 

probable cause and therefore invalid. The Government does 

not challenge that ruling on appeal, and we decline to look 

past that concession on our own initiative. Although, as the 

district court recognized, it is often preferable to consider 

whether a warrant is supported by probable cause before 

9 We have restated these four possibilities in various ways, and sometimes 

count them as only three. E.g., Edmond v. United States, 899 F.3d 446, 453 

(7th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v. Pappas, 592 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 

2010)). Any difference in phrasing or organization is immaterial and reflects the significant overlap in the analysis of bare-boned affidavits and 

facially deficient warrants.

10 Appellant’s Br. 21.
No. 20-2686 11

addressing the officer’s good-faith reliance, see Koerth, 312 

F.3d at 866, a court is never obligated to decide the questions 

in that order and can address the officer’s good faith without 

passing on the warrant directly. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 924–25; 

Woodfork, 999 F.3d at 519; see also Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 

223, 241–42 (2009).

We also have no reason to revisit the district court’s original ground for denying the motion to suppress. The Government does not challenge the district court’s decision, on reconsideration, to limit its review to the evidence presented to 

the state court judge. See Koerth, 312 F.3d at 871. We limit our 

own review likewise and do not consider whether the portions of Detective Becherer’s interview with Long that were 

never passed on to the state court judge filled any gaps in the 

affidavit. 

Having articulated these limits to our inquiry, we now examine whether an officer in Detective Becherer’s situation 

could rely reasonably on the warrant issued by the state court 

judge as valid authorization to search the Fin & Feather property. 

As the Government acknowledges, Detective Becherer’s 

supporting affidavit elided important details. On the other 

hand, it was far from boilerplate. It outlined for the judge’s 

consideration the entirety of his investigation. Detective 

Becherer also sought the substantial assistance of the State’s 

Attorney in the preparation of this affidavit and the other material submitted to the state court judge. 

Mr. Matthews sees matters differently. In his view, the 

only pertinent evidence connecting him to the Fin & Feather 

property is Detective Becherer’s conclusory belief that he 
12 No. 20-2686 

lived there and had access to all the buildings. Such a 

“[w]holly conclusory statement[],” he argues, could not reasonably be thought to provide probable cause to search the 

property.11 

Mr. Matthews overstates his case. Detective Becherer’s affidavit cannot fairly be characterized as wholly conclusory. It 

explained, albeit in broad strokes, how the officer came to his 

belief that Mr. Matthews lived on the property—“by personal 

interviews and ... through other law enforcement officers.”12

His crucial omission was in the details, including clarification 

of which of the two identified sources he relied upon for his 

belief, and what articulable facts that source had given him to 

support that belief. This lack of detail is far more than a technicality and undermines substantially the probative weight of 

the affidavit. Nevertheless, the affidavit was more than a conclusion alone and truthfully informed the state court judge of 

the source of Detective Becherer’s suspicions. 

Mr. Matthews identifies a key shortcoming of the affidavit. It not only fails to explain how Detective Becherer knew 

he lived on the Fin & Feather property but fails to identify any 

witness who readily could be assumed to know his address. 

As far as the state court judge knew, Long had met Mr. Matthews only the one time at the store.

Nevertheless, we must agree with the Government that 

the record does support the good-faith finding made by the 

district court. When considering Detective Becherer’s objective good faith we are looking for only “indicia” of probable 

11 Appellant’s Br. 22 (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983)).

12 R.29-2 at 1.
No. 20-2686 13

cause. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923. As Mr. Matthews concedes, an 

indicium is a lesser quantum of evidence.13 Less proof is required to permit good-faith reliance than to demonstrate 

probable cause to search a location in the first instance.

The affidavit here clears this lower good-faith threshold. 

The affidavit references twice “the residence of Suspect,” provides pictures of a camper trailer behind a building (albeit 

without visible street numbers) and seeks authorization to 

search a camper trailer behind the Fin & Feather restaurant 

(among other, secondary locations).14 One reasonable conclusion from these materials is that this camper and Mr. Matthews’s residence are the same location. An officer seeking a 

warrant certainly should offer more and not leave it to rely on 

suppositions. However, we also cannot say that what Detective Becherer provided was so lacking in substance that he 

could not rely reasonably on the warrant that issued. Even 

with the demise of the local phone book that once inhabited a 

kitchen shelf in almost every American home, a person’s address is rarely difficult to determine or the result of intensive 

investigation. 

In short, we conclude that Detective Becherer’s failure to 

specify a source for his knowledge that Mr. Matthews lived 

on the Fin & Feather property at 21000 North Emerald Road 

does not deprive the affidavit of all indicia of probable cause 

to search the property. See United States v. Brown, 832 F.2d 991, 

995 (7th Cir. 1987).

13 See, e.g., United States v. Bynum, 293 F.3d 192, 195 (4th Cir. 2002). 

14 R.29-2 at 2.
14 No. 20-2686 

Mr. Matthews also argues that even if there were an adequate link between him and the Fin & Feather property, that 

link did not extend to every structure on the property. The 

affidavit did not explain why Detective Becherer understood 

Mr. Matthews to have control over all the buildings or show 

probable cause to search each one. He draws an analogy to a 

warrant that purports to authorize a search of an entire 

multi-unit apartment building. We have long recognized that 

an officer must make a distinct probable cause showing to 

search each residence of a multi-unit dwelling unless he presents reason to believe a suspect has control over the whole 

building.

15 Mr. Matthews contends that any reasonable officer 

would know the warrant here therefore failed this test.16

This argument adds little to the strength of Mr. Matthews’s case. The analogy to a multi-unit building limps 

badly. It is common knowledge that the separate residences 

of an apartment building typically belong to different people. 

A reasonable judge or officer still might well assume that, 

here, the person living in a camper has control over the other 

structures on the property in much the same way as the owner 

of a house is most likely to control a shed or detached garage 

in close proximity to the house. An officer could reasonably 

15 See United States v. White, 416 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005); Jacobs v. City 

of Chicago, 215 F.3d 758, 771 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding rule was clearly established); United States v. Hinton, 219 F.2d 324, 326 (7th Cir. 1955).

16 Cf. United States v. Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir. 2002) (recognizing 

that good-faith exception does not apply if “courts have clearly held that 

a materially similar affidavit previously failed to establish probable cause 

under facts that were indistinguishable from those presented in the case 

at hand”).
No. 20-2686 15

defer to the magistrate’s decision to authorize the search of all 

the buildings.17

Detective Becherer’s objective good faith is further 

demonstrated by his decision to consult with the State’s Attorney before preparing the complaint for a search warrant. 

“At its core, Leon is about encouraging responsible and diligent police work.” Lickers, 928 F.3d at 620. Consulting with 

the State’s Attorney or similar prosecutorial officer certainly 

is one step a responsible and diligent officer can take, and 

such consultation is, in many respects, exactly what Leon’s 

good-faith exception expects of law enforcement. See United 

States v. Pappas, 592 F.3d 799, 802 (7th Cir. 2010). The Supreme 

Court has held that attorney (and magistrate) approval of a 

warrant is not “dispositive,” but it is “certainly pertinent in 

assessing whether [an officer] could have held a reasonable 

belief that the warrant was supported by probable cause.” 

Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 554–55. That officers consulted with 

attorneys before seeking a warrant featured prominently in 

both Leon, 468 U.S. at 902, and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Shepard, 468 U.S. 981, 985 (1984). We have repeatedly 

17 Some courts have suggested that no separate showing of probable 

cause is necessary to search outbuildings adjacent to a residence and part 

of its curtilage. See, e.g., United States v. Finnigin, 113 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th 

Cir. 1997). We need not go so far in this case. Cf. United States v. Contreras, 

820 F.3d 255, 261–62 (7th Cir. 2016) (noting that this court has not decided 

whether attached garage is considered “integral part” of home for purpose of warrantless search). It is enough to say that an objectively reasonable officer might view the burden of proving joint control over the outbuildings to be less than that necessary for a multi-unit residence.
16 No. 20-2686 

credited an officer’s choice to confer with an attorney before 

seeking a warrant as evidence of good faith.18

Detective Becherer here provided all the information he 

obtained in his investigation to the State’s Attorney, and the 

State’s Attorney prepared the complaint for a search warrant 

and the affidavit that Detective Becherer eventually signed.19

Mr. Matthews does not dispute the general principle that 

attorney involvement supports a finding of good faith. He argues, however, that attorney involvement cannot “compensate for an affidavit’s glaring omission of information needed 

for probable cause.”20 

We agree. However, such a consultation is a relevant consideration in determining whether the warrant was facially 

deficient—or the supporting affidavit, bare boned—in the 

first place. See Messerschmidt, 565 U.S. at 556 (“The fact that 

18 See, e.g., Edmond, 899 F.3d at 456; Pappas, 592 F.3d at 802; United States 

v. Mitten, 592 F.3d 767, 776 n.4 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. Merritt, 361 

F.3d 1005, 1012 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1099 

(2005). Our court is far from alone in this respect. See, e.g., United States v. 

Conant, 799 F.3d 1195, 1202 (8th Cir. 2015); United States v. Tracey, 597 F.3d 

140, 153 (3d Cir. 2010); United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127, 1134 (10th Cir. 

2009).

19 The Government also asks us to consider the time pressure that Detective Becherer and the State’s Attorney were operating under as reason to 

conclude any errors were good-faith negligence. (About fifteen hours 

elapsed between Mr. Long’s call to the Sheriff’s office and the search.) We 

decline the Government’s invitation and do not decide today whether evidence can be admitted because an invalid warrant was obtained under 

exigent circumstances.

20 Appellant’s Reply Br. 6.
No. 20-2686 17

none of the officials who reviewed the application expressed 

concern about its validity demonstrates that any error was not 

obvious.”). Here, the involvement of the State’s Attorney in 

preparing and approving the warrant and affidavit simply 

bolsters our conclusion that these documents contained sufficient indicia of probable cause to permit Detective Becherer to 

rely on the warrant. 

Conclusion

Mr. Matthews has failed to rebut the presumption that the 

search was undertaken in good faith. The district court therefore applied properly the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial of 

Mr. Matthews’s motion to suppress.

AFFIRMED
18 No. 20-2686 

HAMILTON, Circuit Judge, concurring. I join fully Judge 

Ripple’s opinion for the court. I write separately only to note 

an issue that we need not decide here but that may arise in 

other cases applying the Leon good-faith exception to the 

exclusionary rule. The issue is whether and when a court may 

rely on evidence beyond the search-warrant application to 

decide whether the application was so lacking in indicia of 

probable cause as to make it unreasonable for an officer to rely 

upon the warrant. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 

n.23 (1984) (inquiry is objective and all circumstances may be 

considered). The district court here relied on United States v. 

Koerth, 312 F.3d 862, 869 (7th Cir. 2002), to refuse to consider 

evidence not presented to the issuing state-court judge. The 

government has not challenged that refusal. 

Our opinion in Koerth did not acknowledge that it was 

taking sides on an issue that has divided the circuits. On the 

other side of that question, see, e.g., United States v. McKenzieGude, 671 F.3d 452, 460 (4th Cir. 2011); United States v. Proell, 

485 F.3d 427, 431–32 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Martin, 297 

F.3d 1308, 1318–19 (11th Cir. 2002). Consistent with Koerth on 

this issue, see, e.g., United States v. Knox, 883 F.3d 1262, 1272 

(10th Cir. 2018); United States v. Frazier, 423 F.3d 526, 535–36 

(6th Cir. 2005); and United States v. Hove, 848 F.2d 137, 140 (9th 

Cir. 1988) (inquiry limited to four corners of search-warrant 

application). Finally, note that it is difficult to reconcile 

Koerth’s treatment of this question with United States v. 

Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir. 1992) (affirming 

application of Leon good-faith exception based on knowledge 

of on-scene officers that was not presented in the warrant 

application).