Filed 10/26/23

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

SNOWBALL WEST INVESTMENTS 

L.P.,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CITY OF LOS ANGELES,

Respondent.

 B314750

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. 20STCP00771)

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Mitchell L. Beckloff and Robert S. Draper, 

Judges. Affirmed.

Gaines & Stacey, Fred Gaines and Lisa A. Weinberg for 

Plaintiff and Appellant.

Holland & Knight, Daniel R. Golub, William E. Sterling for 

California Building Industry Association as Amicus Curiae on 

behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant. 
2

Zacks, Freedman & Patterson, Ryan J. Patterson, Brian 

O’Neill for Yes In My Back Yard as Amicus Curiae on behalf of 

Plaintiff and Appellant. 

Matthew Gelfand and Allyson Richman for Californians for 

Homeownership as Amicus Curiae on behalf Plaintiff and 

Appellant.

June Babiracki Barlow for Californians Association of 

Realtors as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.

Michael N. Feuer, Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorneys, 

Denise C. Mills, Chief Deputy City Attorney, Terry P. Kaufmann 

Macias, John W. Heath, Assistant City Attorneys, Donna Wong, 

Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent.

I. INTRODUCTION

Snowball West Investments, LP applied to build a housing 

project consisting of 215 homes in the Sunland/Tujunga area of 

the City of Los Angeles. The current zoning for the site is RA and 

A1; the project must be rezoned to RD5 and R1 for the project to

move forward. The City denied Snowball’s zone change request, 

stating that more information was needed before building homes 

in a high wildfire hazard area. Snowball petitioned for a writ of 

mandate, which was denied. Snowball appealed. 

Snowball argues that under the rezoning exemption in the

Housing Accountability Act (HAA), Government Code section 

65589.5, subdivision (j)(4)1 (section 65589.5(j)(4)), its project is

exempt from the need for a zone change. That subdivision states 

that “a proposed housing development project . . . shall not 

1 All further statutory references are to the Government 

Code unless otherwise indicated.
3

require a rezoning” if the housing development project is 

consistent with local requirements “but the zoning for the project 

site is inconsistent with the general plan.” Snowball argues that 

because the current zones for the project site, RA and A1, are not 

expressly listed in the general plan, the zoning for the site is 

“inconsistent” with the general plan. Consequently, the rezoning 

exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) excuses the need for a zone 

change. The City disagrees, asserting that even though zones RA 

and A1 are not expressly listed in the general plan, they are 

nevertheless incorporated by reference, because the general plan 

allows all zones that are “more restrictive” than the ones listed. 

The City argues that because zones RA and A1 are more 

restrictive than the zones listed in the general plan, they are 

therefore “consistent” with the general plan, so the rezoning 

exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not apply. We agree with 

the City that the zoning is consistent based on the language of 

the general plan, and therefore section 65589.5(j)(4) does not 

exempt Snowball’s project from the requirement of a zone change.

Snowball further asserts that when denying the zone 

change, the City was required to make findings required by 

another subdivision of the HAA, section 65589.5, subdivision 

(j)(1) (section 65589.5(j)(1)). However, section 65589.5(j)(1) 

applies only when “a proposed housing development project 

complies with applicable, objective general plan, zoning, and 

subdivision standards and criteria . . . in effect at the time that 

the application was deemed complete.” (§ 65589.5(j)(1).) 

Snowball’s project did not comply with the zoning in effect

because it required a zone change. Therefore, this subdivision 

also does not apply.
4

Finally, Snowball contends the City failed to make findings 

required under the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) when 

denying the zone change and that any such findings were not 

supported by substantial evidence. We hold that the findings 

were sufficient and were supported by substantial evidence. We 

therefore affirm the superior court’s denial of Snowball’s writ 

petition. 

II. BACKGROUND

A. Factual background

1. The proposed project 

Snowball owns eight parcels of land totaling 58 acres at 

6433 La Tuna Canyon Road. From the 1960s to 2016, part of the 

property was the Verdugo Hills Golf Course. The site is bounded 

by a single-family residential development (Tujunga) to the 

north, La Tuna Canyon Road and the Foothill Freeway 

(Interstate 210) to the south, Tujunga Canyon Boulevard to the 

east, and vacant hillside terrain to the west. The site is in a 

“very high fire hazard severity zone.” (See §§ 51177, subd. (i), 

51178.) 

In 2007, Snowball filed an application with the City

requesting a zone change, site plan review, and project permit 

compliance for a development consisting of 229 homes on about 

28 acres of the property (the project). Snowball later revised its 

application, requested a vesting zone change, and converted its 

project to 208 “small lot” units and seven single-family homes, for

a reduced density of 215 homes. 

The zoning for the project area is currently A1 and RA, 

which allows for a maximum density of 19 single-family homes. 
5

Snowball sought to change the zone to RD5, with a small portion 

as R1.

2

The project went through several iterations, and worked its 

way through the approval process. In June 2019, the City 

Planning Commission (City Planning) issued a determination 

letter approving much of the project; a corrected letter was sent 

in July 2019. The letters noted that approval was conditioned on 

a future zoning change: “Approval of zone change to RD5-1 Zone 

and R1-1 Zone is required prior to obtaining clearance from 

Zoning Section.” City Planning’s determination letter also stated

that the “approval of the tract map is conditioned upon the 

approval of” Snowball’s requested zone change: “In the event [the 

zone change] is not approved, the number of dwelling units shall 

be limited to that permitted by the existing A1-1 and RA-1 Zones 

and a revised tract map shall be submitted for approval.” 

2 Zone A1 allows development including one-family 

dwellings, parks, playgrounds, community centers, golf courses, 

and certain agricultural uses. (LAMC § 12.05.) Zone RA includes

one-family dwellings, parks, playgrounds, community centers, 

and golf courses. (LAMC § 12.07.) Zone R1 includes one-family 

dwellings, parks, playgrounds, and community centers. (LAMC 

§ 12.08.) Zone RD5 typically includes one-family dwellings, twofamily dwellings, group dwellings, apartment houses, parks, 

playgrounds, and community centers. (LAMC § 12.09.1.) At the 

project site, however, RD5 zoning is restricted to “detached 

housing.” The zones are sometimes listed as, A1-1, RA-1, R1-1, 

and RD5-1. According to the City, the “‘-1’ is a height district 

reference, and does not impact the uses or density in this case[ ].” 

Part of the area is designated Minimum Low Residential and 

zoned RE40-1. The project designates this area as open space, 

and it is not at issue in this appeal. 
6

The corrected determination letter also stated, “Upon 

approval of the recommended [RD5 and R1] Zones, the respective 

portions of the Project Site will be consistent with the General 

Plan land use designations of Low Medium I and Low 

Residential.” City Planning recommended that the City Council 

approve Snowball’s vesting zone change request. 

The determination letter included a section titled “Fire 

Protection,” addressing concerns expressed by the Los Angeles 

Fire Department (LAFD). In a memorandum to City Planning in 

September 2017, LAFD had stated, “Development of the project 

will expose additional people to local fire hazards. The City of Los 

Angeles Fire Department considers the existing fire fighting [sic] 

facilities in the vicinity inadequate to protect the site. The Fire 

Department also believes that the single access route to the site 

as proposed presents a potential adverse impact.” LAFD

therefore recommended that the project include certain 

mitigation measures to limit potential fire damage, such as 

irrigated greenbelts around buildings, noncombustible roofs on 

structures, regular brush clearance of the area, and the inclusion 

of fire lanes. The LAFD memorandum also stated, “At least two 

different ingress/egress roads for each area, which will 

accommodate major fire apparatus and provide for major 

evacuation during emergency situations, shall be required.” The 

memorandum concluded, “The inclusion of the above 

recommendations, along with any additional recommendations 

made during later reviews of the proposed project[, w]ill reduce 

the impacts to an acceptable level.” 

City Planning’s determination letter to Snowball included 

the LAFD’s recommended mitigation measures, and stated, 

“With implementation of mitigation measures, construction of the 
7

Project would not be expected to affect the LAFD’s ability to 

respond to emergencies. . . .” City Planning also required that 

“[a]t least two different ingress/egress roads shall be provided for 

each area that will accommodate major fire apparatus and 

provide for major evacuation during emergency situations.” 

City Planning’s findings were not appealed to the City 

Council, and therefore became final. The zone change was the 

final approval required for the project to move forward. 

2. The City denies the zone change request

The City Council’s Planning and Land Use Management 

Committee (PLUM) considered Snowball’s zone change request at 

a meeting on December 10, 2019. Before the meeting, Snowball 

submitted a letter to PLUM asking that PLUM recommend 

approval of the zone change request. Snowball also asserted that 

under the HAA, it was “entitled to density allowed by the general 

plan. (Gov. Code Section § 65589.5(a)(j)(4) [sic].)” 

The record also includes hundreds of pages of written 

messages from the public to PLUM regarding the project, some in 

favor and many against. Some of the public comments attached

newspaper articles or other information about wildfire hazards, 

traffic, housing, and the environment. One attachment showed 

more than 2,000 signatures on a change.org petition to “Save 

Verdugo Hills Golf Course open space say no to Snowball West 

Development.” State Senator Anthony J. Portantino, 

representative for the 25th District, in which the project is 

located, submitted a statement that he “join[s] the community in 

preferring that this entire site be preserved as open space.” 

Retired LAFD chief Andrew P. Fox submitted a letter in support 

of Snowball, stating that the current undeveloped condition of the 

property was itself a fire hazard; the community center portion of 
8

the housing project could be used for people to “shelter in place”

during a wildfire; and the project was close to the freeway, which 

is good for rapid evacuations. 

City Council member Monica Rodriguez, representative for 

City District 7, in which the project is located, submitted a letter 

before the meeting recommending that the vesting zone change 

be denied. The letter stated, “I do not believe that the requested 

zone change is consistent with good zoning practices, and I have 

serious concerns regarding the potential public health and safety 

risks posed by the increased density being proposed at this site.” 

She stated that the zone change “would increase the density by 

allowing the construction of 215 units instead of the 19 units that 

could be built by-right. Granting the zone change would be 

inconsistent with the surrounding density of the subject site, and 

is not consistent with good zoning practice. Allowing the 

requested zone change will increase density in a manner that is 

not to scale and is incompatible with the existing environment. 

The proposed density of this development is not appropriate for 

the subject site.” 

Rodriguez’s letter continued, “The subject site, only having 

two ingress/egress points, is located at a critical access point for 

the existing single family residential properties along Tujunga 

Canyon Boulevard north of I-210. That fact, in combination with 

the subject site’s topography and location within the City’s Very 

High Fire Hazard Severity Zone raises real concerns about fire 

and life safety that need to be placed paramount.” 

The letter further stated, “Within the last two years, the 

foothill communities of my district were center stage to what 

were respectively the two largest wildfires in the City’s recent 

history—the Creek and La Tuna Fires. Since this item was heard 
9

at the City Planning Commission in May, the Seventh District 

saw yet another fire erupt within the Very High Fire Hazard 

Severity Zone—the Saddle Ridge Fire.” Rodriguez noted that the 

City Council had recently assembled a “Wildland-Urban Interface 

Hazard Mitigation Task Force to reevaluate several issues, 

including additional development, current building codes and 

standards within the Very High Fire Hazard Severity Zone.” 

Rodriguez’s letter continued, “The proposed project site’s 

absence from the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment 

(RHNA) further highlights the project’s inconsistency with good 

zoning practice. The City of Los Angeles periodically completes a 

RHNA, pursuant to State law. This analysis determines 

strategic and desirable areas to allocate the necessary housing to 

accommodate projected growth throughout the city. The City’s 

RHNA allocation excludes the subject site’s parcels from the 

suitable site selection because they are located within a hillside 

area subject to the Slope Density Ordinance. As such, a positive 

finding cannot be made that the requested zone change is 

consistent with good zoning practice.” Rodriguez asked that the 

zone change request be denied. 

At the PLUM meeting on December 10, 2019, the president 

of the Sunland-Tujunga Neighborhood Council read a community 

impact statement opposing the development, citing the very high 

fire hazard severity zone, the high wind velocity zone, the 

destruction of keystone tree species, and concerns about small 

ingress/egress roads being able to support the evacuation of 215 

families in the presence of firefighting equipment and other 

hazards. Other community members stated that they opposed 

the project for similar reasons. Snowball’s counsel also spoke, 

stating that all approvals except the zone change were final, and 
10

arguing that the current zoning was “illegal” but the new zone 

would comply with the City’s general plan. 

The PLUM members discussed whether the zone change 

was mandatory or discretionary. A person from City Planning 

stated that the zone change was discretionary. 

Councilmember Marqueece Harris-Dawson stated, “[B]ased 

on the comments made by the Council District 7 representative, 

as well as comments made by the public today regarding recent 

wildfires, the site’s topography, ingress and regress [sic] traffic 

issues, more environmental analysis is needed and so I move that 

we deny the request [for a] vesting zone change and adopt the 

findings that have been read into the record by the 

representatives of Council District 7. There’s no objection.” 

Another councilmember seconded the motion, and Harris-Dawson 

stated, “If there’s no objection that will be the order. Thank you.” 

The meeting concluded. PLUM stated in a report that “the 

Committee adopted the findings presented by Council District 7 

as the findings of the PLUM Committee recommended that 

Council adopt the new PLUM Committee findings and not 

present and order filed the Ordinance effectuating the zone 

change [sic].” 

The following morning, December 11, 2019, the City 

Council considered PLUM’s recommendation at a meeting. 

Again, several community members opposed the zone change, 

citing concerns about wildfires and evacuation difficulties. 

Councilmember Rodriguez stated that at issue was “what 

development looks like given our new realities of wildfires and 

the types of density that is created in certain locations [sic].” She 

recommended that the zone change be denied. The City Council 
11

unanimously denied the zone change, stating in its written ruling 

that it was adopting PLUM’s report. 

3. Snowball asks City Planning to clear map conditions 

because no zone change is needed under the HAA

On January 16, 2020, about a month after City Council 

denied Snowball’s zone change request, Snowball sent a letter to 

City Planning requesting that City Planning “accept and process 

the Project’s approved Vesting Tentative Tract Map for clearance 

of conditions required for Final Map approval.” Snowball 

asserted that under part of the HAA, section 65589.5(j)(4), no 

rezoning of the site was required.3

Section 65589(j)(4), which became effective on January 1, 

2019, limits the circumstances in which a local agency may 

require a zone change. That subdivision states, in relevant part, 

“For purposes of this section, a proposed housing development 

project is not inconsistent with the applicable zoning standards 

and criteria, and shall not require a rezoning, if the housing 

development project is consistent with the objective general plan 

standards and criteria but the zoning for the project site is 

inconsistent with the general plan.”

For context, we note that the City’s general plan includes 

multiple community plans.

4 One of these plans is the Sunland3 Snowball also cited section 65589.5(j)(4) in its letter to the 

City Council on December 11, 2019, but it did not assert then

that no zone change was required. 

4 A general plan may be “a single document or . . . a group of 

documents relating to subjects or geographic segments of the 

planning area.” (§ 65302, subd. (b).) Here, the City’s general 

plan includes a Framework Element, which is “a guide for 
12

Tujunga-Lake View Terrace-Shadow Hills-East La Tuna Canyon 

Community Plan (the community plan), which incorporates the 

site of Snowball’s proposed project. For purposes of this case, 

consistency with the community plan equates to consistency with 

the general plan, so these terms are sometimes used 

interchangeably. 

General or community plans typically identify “land use 

designations,” such as commercial, industrial, or open space, 

which are identified on a community plan’s land use map. Here, 

the land use designations for the site of Snowball’s proposed 

project are Low Residential and Low Medium I. 

For each land use designation in the relevant community 

plan, the community plan’s land use map lists “corresponding 

zones.” The corresponding zones listed for Low Residential are 

RE9, RS, R1, and RU; the corresponding zones listed for Low 

Medium I are R2, RD3, RD4, RD5, RD6, RZ3, RZ4, RU, and RW1. 

These lists include Snowball’s requested new zones of R1, which 

allows one-family dwellings (see LAMC § 12.08), and RD5, which 

typically allows one-family, two-family, or multiple-family 

dwellings. (See LAMC § 12.09.1.) However, the community plan 

includes a limitation that development in this hillside area “shall 

be detached housing.” Notably, these lists of corresponding zones 

do not include the current zones for the site—RA and A1.

In its letter to City Planning, Snowball argued that the 

rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) “authorizes proposed 

housing developments like this one to override local zoning codes 

communities to implement growth and development,” and a Land 

Use Element, consisting of 35 community plans based on 

geographic location. 
13

that are inconsistent with the general plan.” It asserted that 

because its project was consistent with the corresponding zones 

in the community plan, it did not require rezoning because “the 

zoning for the Project site is inconsistent with the general plan.” 

On May 8, 2020, City Planning denied Snowball’s request 

in a letter. It noted that Snowball’s project had been approved on 

the condition of a zone change, so in the absence of a zone change, 

the project could only go forward with “the number of dwelling 

units . . . permitted by the existing A1-1 and RA-1 Zones.” City 

Planning rejected Snowball’s assertion that the current zones of 

RA and A1 were “inconsistent” with the community plan. It 

stated that even though zones RA and A1 were not expressly 

listed as corresponding zones on the land use map, they were 

incorporated into the community plan by Footnote 23 of that 

plan, which states that each land use category includes the zones 

expressly listed, as well as any “more restrictive” zones not listed.

Because zones RA and A1 are more restrictive than those listed 

in the community plan according to the LAMC, those zones were 

incorporated by reference through Footnote 23. The City 

therefore concluded that section 65589.5(j)(4) did not exempt the 

project from a zone change, because the zoning for the project site 

was not “inconsistent” with the plan. City Planning therefore 

denied Snowball’s request. 

B. Trial court proceedings

1. Petition for writ of mandate

Snowball filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint 

for damages on February 24, 2020.

5 It asserted five claims: (1) 

5 The writ petition was filed before City Planning responded 

to Snowball’s January 2020 letter. Snowball alleged in the writ
14

Snowball was entitled to a writ of mandate under Code of Civil 

Procedure section 1085 due to City Planning’s refusal to process 

the map clearances; (2) Snowball was entitled to a writ of 

mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085 due to City 

Council’s denial of the zone change; (3) Snowball was entitled to a 

writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 

because City Council violated the HAA in requiring a rezoning; 

(4) a cause of action for inverse condemnation; and (5) a cause of 

action for violation of civil rights under 42 U.S.C. section 1983. 

The two final causes of action are not relevant for purposes of 

this appeal.

Snowball argued that under section 65589.5(j)(4)’s rezoning 

exemption no zone change was required for the project, and 

therefore City Planning’s refusal to clear the map conditions in 

2020 violated the HAA.6 Snowball contended that the project “is 

entitled by law to go forward . . . without a zone change.” It 

argued that the City had a ministerial duty to clear the map 

conditions. Snowball further contended that City Council’s 

denial of the zone change “was arbitrary and capricious and 

petition that City Planning “continue[s] to refuse to process 

clearances for Snowball’s Vesting Map.” 

6 Snowball also argued that the City’s actions violated 

section 65905.5, which addresses how many hearings a city or 

county may hold after a housing project application is deemed 

complete. (§ 65905.5, subd. (a).) Snowball cited language in the

statute identical to section 65589.5(j)(4) in defining 

circumstances in which a housing project “shall not require a 

rezoning.” (Id., subd. (c).) Because the number of hearings after 

approval are not at issue in this case, we do not include this 

statute in our discussion. 
15

totally lacking in evidentiary support.” Snowball argued that 

City Council’s “action violated State law which requires the City 

to bring its zoning into consistency with its general plan. 

Government Code §65860 provides that ‘city zoning ordinances 

shall be consistent with the general plan of the . . . city . . . .’” 

Snowball also asserted that “the City Council’s actions 

constitute abuse of discretion by the City in that the decision of 

the City to deny the Vesting Zone Change was not supported by 

valid findings required by Los Angeles Municipal Code 

§12.32.Q(3)(a)(2)(ii) and the Housing Accountability Act at 

Government Code §65589.5(j)(1)(A) and (B).” Snowball sought a 

writ of mandate under Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 

1094.5, attorney fees, and damages for the two causes of action. 

2. Snowball’s opening brief

In its opening brief supporting the writ petition, Snowball 

argued there had been a “twelve-year entitlement process for a 

housing development project that the City itself stated in express 

written findings complies with all applicable, objective general 

plan and other land use regulations, policies and standards.” 

Snowball noted that section 65589.5(j)(4) states that a project 

“shall not require a rezoning” where “the housing development 

project is consistent with the objective general plan standards 

and criteria but the zoning for the project site is inconsistent with 

the general plan.” (§ 65589.5(j)(4).) Snowball argued that 

because the current zoning for the project site—RA and A1—was

inconsistent with the community plan, and the proposed new 

zoning—RD5 and R1—would be consistent with the community

plan, the project did “not require a rezoning.” 

Snowball relied on the City’s July 2019 corrected 

determination letter, which stated, “The existing Plan designates 
16

the entire subject site with multiple land use designations 

including Low Medium I with corresponding zones of R2, RD3, 

RD4, RD5, RD6, RZ3, RZ4, RU, and RW1, [and] Low with 

corresponding zones of RE9, RS, R1, and RU . . . .” Snowball 

argued that because RA and A1 were not listed as corresponding 

zones in the community plan, changing the zones to RD5 and R1 

would take the property “from a zoning designation inconsistent 

with the General Plan to one that is consistent.” 

Snowball also argued that because it was exempt from 

rezoning, City Planning’s “refusal to perform its ministerial duty 

to process Snowball’s Map clearances” was “in violation of the 

law.” Snowball asserted it was entitled to a writ of mandate 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085. 

Snowball contended in the alternative that the City 

Council’s denial of the zone change request constituted an abuse 

of discretion under the HAA and the LAMC because it “was 

arbitrary and capricious and totally lacking in evidentiary 

support.” Snowball argued that the City was required to make 

certain findings under the HAA, relying on section 65589.5(j)(1), 

which requires a local agency to support denial of a project with 

“written findings” that the project “would have a specific, adverse 

impact upon the public health or safety” and “[t]here is no 

feasible method to satisfactorily mitigate or avoid the adverse 

impact.” (§ 65589.5(j)(1).) Snowball argued that the City failed 

to make these required findings, and the City’s letter 

communicating the denial, which relied on the letter from 

Councilmember Rodriguez, does not “contain any findings of fact

at all.” Snowball further asserted that the City acted in bad faith 

by denying the zone change, and as a result, under the HAA “the 

Court is empowered to enter an ‘order or judgment directing the 
17

[City] to approve the housing development project.’ § 

65589.5(k)(1)(A)(ii).” 

Regarding the LAMC, Snowball argued, “LAMC 

§12.32.Q(3)(a)(2)(ii) requires that, when denying a vesting zone 

change, the City Council must find that ‘the zone change is 

denied because it is not in substantial conformance with the 

purposes, intent or provisions or the General Plan or is not in 

conformance with public necessity, convenience, general welfare 

and good zoning practice and the reason for not conforming with 

the plan.’” Snowball argued that the only “evidence” cited was 

Rodriguez’s letter, which “states only opinion and speculation 

without any attempt to cite to evidence in the record, let alone 

substantial evidence, in support.” Snowball further argued that 

this opinion contradicted evidence in the City’s 2019 

determination letter that the required fire mitigation measures 

adequately addressed any fire safety concerns. 

3. The City’s opposing brief

In its opposing brief, the City argued that Snowball was not 

entitled to the relief it requested under the HAA. The City stated 

that “Section 65589.5(j)(4) excuses a zone change where the zone 

is inconsistent with the General Plan; but no inconsistency exists 

here.” The City stated that the rezoning exemption did not apply

to Snowball’s project, because the current zoning for the project 

site was consistent with the general plan and community plan.

As in its May 2020 letter, the City relied on Footnote 23 of

the community plan. Footnote 23 states in full, “Each Plan 

category permits all indicated corresponding zones as well as 

those zones referenced in the Los Angeles Municipal Code 

(LAMC) as permitted by such zones unless further restricted by 

adopted Specific Plans, specific conditions and/or limitations of 
18

project approval, Plan footnotes or other Plan map or text 

notations. Zones established in the LAMC subsequent to the 

adoption of the Plan shall not be deemed corresponding to any 

particular Plan category unless the Plan is amended to so 

indicate. It is the intent of the Plan that the entitlements 

granted shall be one of the zone designations within the 

corresponding zones shown on the Plan, unless accompanied by a 

concurrent Plan amendment.”

The City explained that according to its interpretation of 

Footnote 23, a land use category’s full range of corresponding 

zones includes not only the zones expressly listed in the 

community plan, but also any “more restrictive zones . . . 

permitted by the municipal code but not listed” on the map. It 

stated that Footnote 23, incorporated into to all community plans 

in 1991, “memorialized long-standing interpretation policy that 

each plan land use category permits all listed corresponding 

zones, as well as those more restrictive zones referenced in the 

LAMC.” 

The City stated that therefore even though RA and A1 were

not expressly listed on the land use map, those zones were 

nonetheless incorporated by reference because they are “more 

restrictive” zones. The City argued that therefore, “Snowball 

fails to demonstrate a zone-General Plan inconsistency here, a 

prerequisite to the HAA excusing a zone change” under section 

65589.5(j)(4). The City continued, “Since the current zones are 

consistent with the Community Plan, the HAA . . . does not 

excuse the zone change required for Snowball’s project. [¶] Zone-
19

plan inconsistency remains an unsatisfied prerequisite to 

Snowball’s claim.”7

Regarding Snowball’s claim that the City failed to make the 

requisite findings under the HAA, the City acknowledged that 

“Section 65589.5(j)(1) requires specified findings to deny a project 

that complies with objective zoning and planning standards.”

However, because Snowball’s project did not comply with zoning 

standards in the absence of a zone change, the restrictions of 

section 65589.5(j)(1) did not apply.

The City further argued that even if written findings had 

been required under either the HAA or the LAMC, “The City 

made findings to deny the zone change on the record at the 

December 9, 2019 [sic] PLUM hearing and in the written decision 

adopted as the City Council’s findings.” The City argued these 

findings complied with all requirements, and the City did not act 

in bad faith. 

4. Snowball’s reply

In its reply, Snowball argued that the City’s reliance on the 

current zoning of RA and A1 violated the HAA. It stated, “[T]he 

HAA was amended effective January 1, 2019 to close the exact 

‘loophole’ that the City claims exempts it from HAA compliance 

in this case. The City has kept the zoning for the Project site 

artificially low at RA-1 and A1-1 zones (which restricts density to 

19 units [ ]) while the Property is designated in the General Plan 

7 The City also argued that because the City conditioned 

approval upon a zone change in July 2019 at the latest, and 

Snowball did not challenge this requirement until it filed its writ 

petition in February 2020, Snowball’s claim was time barred 

under the 90-day statute of limitations in section 66499.37. That 

argument is not at issue in this appeal. 
20

as Low Residential Low Medium I Residential (which permits 

density up to 244 units [ ]) in order to create a situation in which 

Snowball is forced to apply for a re-zoning and the City may use 

that opportunity to reject the housing project. The City’s claim 

that these restrictive zoning designations are consistent with the 

General Plan designation allowing significantly higher density is 

exactly what the amendment to the HAA was designed to 

prevent.” 

Snowball also argued that throughout the application 

process, the City stated that the existing zoning was not

consistent with the general plan. Snowball pointed to several 

instances in the record in which the City stated that the zone 

change would “bring the zoning into conformance” with the 

general or community plan, or would “create consistency with” 

the community plan’s land use designations. Snowball 

characterized the City’s interpretation of Footnote 23 as 

“revisionist,” and “exactly the type of evasion that the 2018 

amendment to the HAA was designed to outlaw.” 

5. The court’s ruling

Following a two-day hearing in March and April 2021, the 

superior court denied Snowball’s petition for a writ of mandamus 

in a written ruling. The court first addressed Snowball’s 

argument under section 65589.5(j)(4). The court discussed the 

parties’ contentions regarding Footnote 23, noting that the City 

interpreted Footnote 23 to mean that “[a]pplicable community 

plan categories include corresponding zones as well as more 

restrictive zones under the City’s municipal code.” The court 

stated, “Snowball does not provide any legal justification 

supporting any authority for the court to disregard Footnote 23.” 

The court rejected Snowball’s arguments about how Footnote 23
21

should be interpreted, and stated, “Snowball has not 

demonstrated zoning inconsistency within the City’s Community 

Plan. As such, the HAA does not preclude the City from 

requiring Snowball to obtain a zone change as a condition of its 

approval of the Project.” 

Turning to the City’s denial of Snowball’s requested zone 

change, the court agreed with the City that a “zone change 

involves a legislative act by a municipality” and therefore judicial 

review was limited. The court relied on its conclusion that the 

HAA did not apply, and found that the City therefore was not 

required to comply with section 65589.5(j)(1). 

The court held that in order for Snowball to succeed on its 

claim that the City did not comply with the LAMC, “Snowball 

must demonstrate the City acted arbitrarily and capriciously in 

denying the zone change” under LAMC standards. The court 

stated that the “record supports the findings set forth in 

[Councilmember Rodriguez’s] letter and adopted by the City 

Council.” The court noted that surrounding areas are zoned at a 

lower density than RD5, and there were concerns about fire 

safety and risks associated with the high-density project. The 

court concluded, “Based on the evidence before the City Council, 

the court finds Snowball has not demonstrated the City’s denial 

of its vested zone change was arbitrary or capricious. . . . [T]here 

is a reasonable relationship between the decision denying the 

zone change and public necessity, convenience, general welfare 

and good zoning practice.” 

The court therefore denied Snowball’s petition for writ of 

mandamus, and transferred the matter to address Snowball’s 

civil causes of action for damages. The parties stipulated to the 
22

entry of judgment in favor of the City, the court entered the

judgment, and Snowball timely appealed. 

III. DISCUSSION

Snowball asserts three arguments. First, it contends the 

HAA’s rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) applied, so its 

project was exempt from the requirement of a zone change. 

Second, it contends the City failed to make the findings required 

by the HAA in section 65589.5(j)(1). Finally, Snowball asserts 

that the City failed to make findings required by the LAMC when 

denying the zone change. We address each of these contentions

below. 

A. Standard of review

Snowball contends it is entitled to a writ of mandate under 

Code of Civil Procedure sections 1085 and 1094.5. Generally 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, “A writ of mandate 

may be issued by any court to any inferior tribunal, corporation, 

board, or person, to compel the performance of an act which the 

law specially enjoins.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085, subd. (a).) “The 

petitioner must demonstrate the public official or entity had a 

ministerial duty to perform, and the petitioner had a clear and 

beneficial right to performance.” (AIDS Healthcare Foundation v. 

Los Angeles County Dept. of Public Health (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 

693, 700.) “Normally, mandate will not lie to control a public 

agency’s discretion, that is to say, force the exercise of discretion 

in a particular manner. However, it will lie to correct abuses of 

discretion.” (County of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles (2013) 

214 Cal.App.4th 643, 654.)

In addition, “‘[t]he “rezoning of property, even a single 

parcel, is generally considered to be a quasi-legislative act” thus 

“subject to review under ordinary mandamus”’” under Code of 
23

Civil Procedure section 1085. (Foothill Communities Coalition v. 

County of Orange (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1309; see also 

Yost v. Thomas (1984) 36 Cal.3d 561, 570 [“the rezoning of land is 

a legislative act”].) Review “is limited to an inquiry into whether 

the action was arbitrary, capricious or entirely lacking in 

evidentiary support.” (Corona-Norco Unified School Dist. v. City 

of Corona (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 985, 992.) 

Following a writ proceeding under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 1094.5, the appellate court “reviews the administrative 

record to determine whether substantial evidence in the record 

supports the agency’s factual findings. The court also determines 

whether the findings support the agency’s decision and whether 

the agency committed any legal error.” (Schafer v. City of Los 

Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1250, 1260-1261.) 

Snowball urges us to apply the standard of review

applicable to certain HAA rulings as articulated in California 

Renters Legal Advocacy & Education Fund v. City of San Mateo

(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 820, 837 (California Renters): “[I]nstead of 

asking, as is common in administrative mandamus actions, 

‘whether the City’s findings are supported by substantial 

evidence’ [citation], we inquire whether there is ‘substantial 

evidence that would allow a reasonable person to conclude that 

the housing development project’ complies with pertinent 

standards. (§ 65589.5, subd. (f)(4).) As the public entity that 

disapproved the project, the City bears the burden of proof that 

its decision conformed to the HAA. (§ 65589.6.).” As discussed 

below, however, Snowball has not demonstrated that the HAA

applies here, and therefore we do not consider whether this 

standard applies. Nevertheless, our conclusion would be the 

same under this standard. 
24

B. Legal background

1. The role of general plans, the community plan, land 

use designations, and zoning

“Land use regulation in California historically has been a 

function of local government under the grant of police power 

contained in article XI, section 7 of the California Constitution.” 

(Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz (2006) 38 Cal.4th 

1139, 1151.) The Legislature has also “recognized that ‘decisions 

involving the future growth of the state . . . are made and will 

continue to be made at the local level.’ ([§ 65030.1].) To ensure 

that localities pursue ‘an effective planning process’ (§ 65030.1), 

each city and county must ‘adopt a comprehensive, long-term 

general plan’ for its own ‘physical development” . . . . (§ 65300.)” 

(Orange Citizens for Parks & Recreation v. Superior Court (2016) 

2 Cal.5th 141, 152 (Orange Citizens).) A general plan is required 

to set forth “objectives, principles, standards, and plan 

proposals.” (§ 65302.) 

The process of adopting a general plan “is structured to 

transcend the provincial. Public participation and hearings are 

required at every stage, in order to obtain an array of 

viewpoints.” (Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors

(1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 571, citing §§ 65351, 65355.) “‘During the 

preparation or amendment of the general plan, the planning 

agency shall provide opportunities for the involvement of citizens, 

California Native American Indian tribes, public agencies, public 

utility companies, and civic, education, and other community 

groups, through public hearings and any other means the 

planning agency deems appropriate.’ (§ 65351.) A legislative 

body must refer its proposal to a number of listed public entities 

before adopting or amending a general plan. (§ 65352.) Planning 
25

commissions must hold at least one public hearing and make a 

written recommendation to the legislative body; legislators must 

hold at least one public hearing before acting on the 

recommendation. (§§ 65353-65356; see § 65354.5 [a planning 

agency authorized to approve or amend a general plan must 

‘establish procedures for any interested party to file a written 

request for a hearing by the legislative body’ and must provide 

public notice of any hearings].)” (Orange Citizens, supra, 2 

Cal.5th at pp. 152-153.) 

“Because of its broad scope, long-range perspective, and 

primacy over subsidiary land use decisions, the ‘general plan has 

been aptly described as the ‘constitution for all future 

developments’ within the city or county.’” (Orange Citizens, 

supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 152.) Thus, “‘“[t]he propriety of virtually 

any local decision affecting land use and development depends 

upon consistency with the applicable general plan and its 

elements.”’” (Id. at p. 153.) This consistency is also imposed by 

statute: “County or city zoning ordinances shall be consistent 

with the general plan of the county or city . . . .” (§ 65860, subd. 

(a).) Notably, a city’s general plan and its zoning need not be 

identical; a zoning ordinance is “consistent with a city or county 

general plan” if the “various land uses authorized by the 

ordinance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general 

land uses, and programs specified in the plan.” (§ 65860, subd. 

(a)(2).)

2. The HAA

The HAA, section 65589.5, reflects the Legislature’s 

attempts to address California’s “housing supply and 

affordability crisis.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(A).) As originally 

enacted in 1982, section 65589.5 made clear that it applies 
26

“[w]hen a proposed housing development project complies with 

the applicable general plan, zoning, and development policies in 

effect at the time that the housing development project’s 

application is determined to be complete.” (See Honchariw v. 

County of Stanislaus (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1066, 1074.) This 

language was later moved into section 65589.5(j)(1) (ibid.), which 

is discussed below. 

In 2018 revisions to the statute, the Legislature stated that 

its “intent in enacting [the HAA] in 1982 and in expanding its 

provisions since then was to significantly increase the approval 

and construction of new housing for all economic segments of 

California’s communities by meaningfully and effectively curbing 

the capability of local governments to deny, reduce the density 

for, or render infeasible housing development projects and 

emergency shelters.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(K).) The statute 

further states, “It is the policy of the state that this section be 

interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest 

possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision 

of, housing.”

8 (Id., subd. (a)(2)(L).)

C. Section 65589.5(j)(4)

Snowball’s primary contention under the HAA is that its 

housing project was entitled to the rezoning exemption in section 

65589.5(j)(4). That subdivision states in relevant part that “a 

proposed housing development project is not inconsistent with 

the applicable zoning standards and criteria, and shall not 

require a rezoning, if the housing development project is 

8 Much of the HAA and related statutes focuses on housing 

for very low, low-, and moderate-income households. The project 

at issue in this case does not involve this type of housing. 
27

consistent with the objective general plan standards and criteria 

but the zoning for the project site is inconsistent with the general 

plan.” (Emphasis added.) The parties agree that aside from the 

rezoning issue, Snowball’s proposed project conforms to objective 

plan standards and criteria. Thus, the crux of the parties’ 

disagreement lies with the italicized portion quoted: whether the 

current zoning for the project site is “inconsistent” with the 

general plan. Snowball argues that the current zoning is 

inconsistent with the general plan, and therefore section 

65589.5(j)(4) exempts it from any rezoning requirement. The 

City disagrees, asserting that the current zoning is consistent

with the general plan, and therefore section 65589.5(j)(4) has no 

effect here. 

1. The community plan and Footnote 23

As noted above, the relevant portion of the general plan, 

the community plan, has various land use designations displayed 

on its land use map; the land use designations for Snowball’s 

project site are Low Medium I (most of the site) and Low 

Residential (a small part of the site). The map includes a list of 

corresponding zones for each land use designation. The Low 

Medium I designation lists as corresponding zones R2, RD3, RD4, 

RD5, RD6, RZ3, RZ4, RU, and RW1; the Low Residential 

designation lists as corresponding zones RE9, RS, R1, and RU. 

The current zones for the site are A1 and RA. Snowball and 

the City agree the community plan does not expressly include 

zones A1 and RA in the list of corresponding zones for the 

relevant land use areas. Snowball argues this means zones RA 

and A1 are inconsistent with the community plan, and that 

“[e]xisting zoning that allows no more than 19 homes is not 

consistent with the Community Plan designation that allows up 
28

to 244 homes,” the amount that would be allowed if the area were 

developed at maximum density under RD5. The City contends 

that even though A1 and RA are not expressly listed as 

corresponding zones, those zones are consistent nevertheless 

because they have been incorporated by reference through the 

text of the community plan and Footnote 23 of the land use map. 

The community plan, under the heading “Plan 

Consistency,” states, “For each plan category, the Plan permits 

all identified corresponding zones, as well as those zones which 

are more restrictive, as referenced in Section 12.23 of the Los 

Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC).”9 Footnote 23, according to the 

City, also “explains that the RA and A1 zones are corresponding 

zones for the Low Medium I and Low Residential land use 

categories.” 

As noted above, Footnote 23 states in part, “Each Plan 

category permits all indicated corresponding zones as well as 

those zones referenced in the Los Angeles Municipal Code 

(LAMC) as permitted by such zones unless further restricted by 

adopted Specific Plans, specific conditions and/or limitations of 

project approval, Plan footnotes or other Plan map or text 

9 LAMC 12.23 (B)(7) states, “Change of Use. (a) Any change 

of use of a building or a portion of a building must conform to the 

current regulations of the zone and other applicable current land 

use regulations. (b) However, in the R, C, or M Zones, a 

nonconforming use may be changed to any use that is permitted 

in a more restrictive zone than the current zone. The sequence of 

these zones, the first being the most restrictive and the last being 

the least restrictive, is as follows: OS, A1, A2, RA, RE, RS, R1, 

RU, RZ, RW1, R2, RD, RMP, RW2, R3, RAS3, R4, RAS4, R5, CR, 

C1, C1.5, C4, C2, C5, CM, MR1, M1, MR2, M2, M3 and PF. . . .”
29

notations.” The trial court aptly commented in its written ruling

that “Footnote 23 is not a model of clarity.” However, the history 

of Footnote 23 offers an explanation as to its intended meaning. 

A version of Footnote 23 was proposed by the City Council 

in 1990 to comply with the requirement that the City’s zoning 

comply with its general plan. To achieve compliance through 

rezoning, zoning for approximately 8,000 parcels in the City 

would have to be changed. Rather than achieving consistency by 

upzoning these 8,000 parcels to higher intensity zones, the City 

effectively amended its community plans to incorporate the

existing zoning.

City Council’s initial proposal in 1990 was that “a plan 

amendment footnote be added to all community plans stating in 

effect that: [¶] The plan categories permit all zoning that is more 

restrictive (as set forth in Sec. 12.23 of L.A.M.C.) than those 

indicated unless otherwise restricted by Zoning Code, specific 

conditions of approval or other provision of the community plan.” 

A City Planning memorandum stated that after the 

original footnote was proposed, staff rewrote it. The 

memorandum stated, “Staff has modified the language contained 

in the motion to be more precise,” and “Staff has reviewed the 

intent of the Council language and redrafted it to read more 

accurately and to take into account various nuances contained in 

the Zoning Code.” The recommended revised footnote constituted 

the first two paragraphs of what eventually became Footnote 23. 

The Planning Department memo noted that the addition of the 

footnote would not effect a material change, stating, “The 

corresponding zones section [in community plan legends] has not 

included all more restrictive zones although the plans have been 

interpreted consistently over the years to mean generally that 
30

the more restrictive zones are consistent with the applicable plan 

category.” 

A January 10, 1991 memorandum from the Director of 

Planning to City Planning stated that “[t]he Commission, after 

some discussion, instructed staff to provide stronger rationale for 

the proposed amendment and to modify the language to establish 

greater certainty about future zoning.” A bullet point list titled 

“Rationale For The Amendment” stated in part, “Zones more 

restrictive than those shown in the Plan category are consistent 

with [the] plan . . .” and “Except in rare instances . . . [a] property 

owner would not apply for downzoning” to a more restrictive 

zone. A proposed third paragraph was therefore added to 

“supplement” the prior version of the footnote: “It is the intent of 

the Plan that the entitlements granted shall be one of the zone 

designations within the corresponding zones shown on the Plan, 

unless accompanied by a concurrent Plan amendment.” 

In a February 12, 1991 letter, then-mayor Tom Bradley 

recommended the City adopt the footnote, which would “clarify 

that zones more restrictive than those shown in the legend are 

consistent with the plan.” In March 1991, the City adopted the 

footnote as recommended. 

Relying on Footnote 23 and its history, the City argues that 

the current zoning of the site—RA and A1—is consistent with the 

general and community plans. The City points out that LAMC 

identifies RA and A1 as “more restrictive” than RD5. (See LAMC 

§§ 12.04.A, 12.23.B.7(b).) The community plan categories

therefore include the listed corresponding zones, as well as more 

restrictive zones, such as RA and A1. And because the rezoning 

exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) applies when “the zoning for 
31

the project site is inconsistent with the general plan,” the 

rezoning exemption does not apply here. 

Snowball disagrees that Footnote 23 can render “all more 

restrictive zones . . . magically consistent.” In essence, Snowball’s 

contention comes down to an argument that the City, in drafting 

its community plan, was required to expressly list each 

corresponding zone for each land use designation, rather than 

incorporate other zones by reference. We are not persuaded. The 

Legislature provides great deference to cities in developing their 

general plans: “The general plan may be adopted in any format 

deemed appropriate or convenient by the legislative body.” 

(§ 65301, subd. (a); see also Orange Citizens, supra, 2 Cal.5th at 

p. 157 [“A city may enact a general plan in any form it chooses”].) 

Moreover, “[t]he adoption or amendment of a general plan is a 

legislative act” which is “presumed valid.” (Federation of Hillside 

& Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles (2004) 126 Cal.App.4th 

1180, 1195, citing § 65301.5.) Even if we disagreed with the 

wisdom or clarity of the City’s choice to incorporate more 

restrictive zones by reference into the community plan rather 

than explicitly listing them, we cannot substitute our judgment 

for the City’s. (See id. at p. 1196 [“the city has broad discretion to 

weigh and balance competing interests in formulating 

development policies, and a court cannot review the wisdom of 

those decisions under the guise of reviewing a general plan’s 

internal consistency and correlation”].)

Snowball also disagrees with the City’s interpretation of 

Footnote 23. It argues that the City is relying on a “revisionist” 

contention that zones RA and A1 are consistent, and is making a

“post-hoc assertion that the HAA does not apply.” Snowball 

argues that “at every stage of the Project’s 14-year entitlement 
32

process,” the City took the position that the existing zoning for 

the site was inconsistent with the general plan. It points to 

numerous documents from the City, such as the Vesting 

Tentative Tract Map Findings of Fact and Vesting Zone Change 

Findings of Fact, which included statements such as, “The zone 

change would bring the zoning into conformance with the 

residential land use designation of Low Medium I,” and “The 

recommended zone change . . . would create consistency with the 

respective land use designations of Low Medium I and Low 

Residential.” Snowball argues that the City therefore “made 

numerous unappealed, unlitigated, final findings” showing that 

“the City itself found that the existing zoning was not consistent 

with the general plan designation.” 

Snowball’s complaints about the City’s “revisionist” and 

“post-hoc” arguments are not supported by the record. Snowball 

requested a zone change in 2007, and section 65589.5(j)(4) 

became effective on January 1, 2019. Snowball first asserted it 

was entitled to the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) 

after the City Council denied the zone change in December 2019. 

Nothing in the record suggests the City had any reason to 

express an opinion as to whether the site’s existing zoning was 

consistent with the community plan before Snowball asserted 

this argument in its letter to City Planning in 2020.

Snowball also points to the language of the third paragraph 

of Footnote 23, which states that “entitlements granted shall be 

one of the zone designations within the corresponding zones 

shown on the Plan.” It argues that this language “supports

Snowball’s argument that zones more restrictive than the 

corresponding zones listed in the plan, such as the existing zones 

on the Property, are not consistent with the general plan 
33

designations, and per Footnote 23’s last paragraph, must be 

upzoned to one of the listed corresponding zones to achieve 

consistency when, as here, a project is proposed.” 

We disagree with Snowball’s interpretation. The fact that 

entitlements, once granted, must be consistent with the general 

plan does not speak to whether more restrictive zones—such as 

RA and A1, which existed at the time the relevant plans were 

adopted—may constitute corresponding zones under the relevant 

plans. Moreover, Footnote 23 does not state that zoning must be 

changed if a project is simply proposed, as Snowball suggests. 

2. Case law

Snowball argues that Lesher Communications, Inc. v. City 

of Walnut Creek (1990) 52 Cal.3d 531 (Lesher), supports its 

position. In that case, the City of Walnut Creek had a general 

plan that was “growth oriented,” which specifically stated that 

traffic congestion should not be an impediment to growth. (Id. at 

p. 536.) An initiative passed by voters, Measure H, created a 

building moratorium linked to certain levels of traffic congestion. 

(Id. at pp. 536-537.) The plaintiffs challenged the validity of 

Measure H on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the city’s 

general plan. (Id. at p. 537.) The Supreme Court held that 

“Measure H is an ordinance in the nature of a zoning ordinance,” 

and “[a] zoning ordinance that conflicts with a general plan is 

invalid at the time it is passed.” (Id. at p. 544.) The court 

concluded, “Since Measure H was inconsistent with the plan in 

effect when Measure H was adopted, the measure is invalid.” (Id. 

at p. 545.) 

Snowball argues that the reasoning of Lesher applies here, 

because the existing zoning of the project site allows 19 homes, 

while the land use designation in the community plan allows up 
34

to 244 homes. However, no conflicting zoning ordinance was 

passed after the adoption of the general plan, which was what 

rendered Measure H invalid in Lesher. To the contrary, the 

project site at issue here apparently was zoned A1 and RA before 

the general and community plans were adopted. 

Snowball also relies on a nonpublished case, Warner Ridge 

Associates v. City of Los Angeles (Dec. 31, 1991, B052835, ordered 

nonpub. Mar. 12, 1992) (Warner Ridge), asserting that it can be 

considered for its collateral estoppel10 effect on the City, and that 

the reasoning of it should apply here. In Warner Ridge, a 21.5-

acre parcel of real property in the Woodland Hills area of Los 

Angeles was zoned RA and A1 in 1969. (Id at p. 308.) In 1984, 

the City adopted a district plan designating the property for 

commercial development as “neighborhood and office,” with 

corresponding zones of CR, C1, C1.5, C4 and P. (Id at p. 309.) A 

portion of the district plan addressed Warner Ridge specifically, 

and authorized “a Specific Plan for Warner Ridge to provide for 

the development of the site with office commercial uses.” (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff WRA purchased the parcel in 1985, proposed a 

project, and sought a zone change to C4. (Warner Ridge, supra,

at p. 309.) After several years of WRA working through the 

approval process, in 1990 the City rejected WRA’s project and 

passed a new zoning ordinance that “designated the property 

(T)RS–1 (residential suburban). That zoning allows single family 

residences on large estate sized lots (minimum 7,500 square 

10 California courts “now refer to ‘claim preclusion’ rather 

than ‘res judicata’ [citation], and use ‘issue preclusion’ in place of 

‘direct or collateral estoppel.’” (Samara v. Matar (2018) 5 Cal.5th 

322, 326.)
35

feet).” (Id. at p. 310.) WRA filed a petition for writ of mandate, 

seeking to compel the City to make the zoning consistent with the 

general plan, as required by section 65860. Relying on Lesher, 

the Court of Appeal reasoned, “Because residential suburban 

zoning prohibits the category of use contemplated in the General 

Plan, it is inconsistent with the General Plan and was invalid 

when passed.” (Id. at p. 315.) In its conclusion, the court again 

stated, “The residential suburban zoning enacted by the City is 

not consistent with the General Plan. The ordinance, therefore, 

was invalid when passed.” (Id. at p. 317)

The Warner Ridge court commented on the City’s 

“hierarchy theory” regarding zoning, in which all less intensive 

land uses are permitted within any zone. (Warner Ridge, supra, 

at p. 315.) As Warner Ridge was decided in 1991, the court 

acknowledged the recent addition of Footnote 23 and others like 

it, stating that the City had “attempted to set its hierarchy theory 

in concrete by adding an amendment to each of the 35 District 

Plans which make up the land use element of the City’s General 

Plan.” (Warner Ridge, supra, at p. 315) The Warner Ridge court

rejected the hierarchy theory, stating, “The hierarchy theory 

would grant the City the authority to prohibit an entire category 

of land use which is specifically permitted and envisioned by the 

General Plan. However, the City cannot pass a zoning ordinance 

which is inconsistent with the General Plan. Such zoning is 

invalid when enacted. Thus, the hierarchy theory improperly 

would allow the City to amend its General Plan through the 

enactment of inconsistent zoning ordinances.” (Ibid.)11

11 Notably, the 1990 zoning ordinance in Warner Ridge also 

may have violated the third paragraph of Footnote 23, which 
36

The Warner Ridge court continued, “A general plan which 

designates property for intense development with the 

contemplation that designation may thereafter be prohibited 

through zoning is, in effect, no general plan . . . . Such a general 

plan certainly does not comport with the concept of a charter for 

land use which should provide guidance, continuity and stability. 

The hierarchy theory, in essence, repeals the consistency 

requirement. [¶] In order for zoning to be consistent with the 

General Plan, at minimum, it cannot prohibit an entire category 

of use which is permitted by the General Plan. Whether a less 

intense use is included within a more intense use, or whether 

such a use may be permitted is beside the point.” (Warner Ridge, 

supra, at pp. 315-316.)

We disagree that the Warner Ridge holding has a 

preclusive effect here. “[I]ssue preclusion applies: (1) after final 

adjudication (2) of an identical issue (3) actually litigated and 

necessarily decided in the first suit and (4) asserted against one 

who was a party in the first suit or one in privity with that 

party.” (DKN Holdings LLC v. Faerber (2015) 61 Cal.4th 813, 

825.) “The ‘identical issue’ requirement addresses whether 

‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two proceedings, 

not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions are the same.” 

(Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 342.) Thus, 

“when an issue of ultimate fact has been determined by a valid 

and final judgment, that issue cannot be relitigated . . . in a 

states that “entitlements granted shall be one of the zone 

designations within the corresponding zones shown on the Plan.” 

The corresponding zones shown on the district plan were CR, C1, 

C1.5, C4 and P, but the new zone was (T)RS—not one of the 

zones listed on the plan.
37

future lawsuit.” (California Logistics, Inc. v. State of California

(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 242, 249.)

The case before us presents a different scenario than that 

in Warner Ridge. Here, the current zoning for the property 

allows single-family residential use at a density of 19 homes for 

the site. The community plan also allows only single-family 

residential use, but at a density of up to 244 homes. Thus, the 

City’s “hierarchy theory” does not “prohibit an entire category of 

use which is permitted by the General Plan,” as in Warner 

Ridge.

12 Instead, it allows the exact same category of use—

single-family residential—but at a lower density. For this reason, 

Warner Ridge does not present an identical issue that was 

actually litigated in the earlier lawsuit. 

Furthermore, the reasoning of Warner Ridge implicitly 

relied on the City’s goals and intentions for the parcel, as 

expressed in the general and district plan, which were to allow 

the area to be developed for commercial use. Here, by contrast, 

there is no suggestion that this area was targeted for growth at a 

particular density. A zoning ordinance is consistent with a 

general plan when “[t]he various land uses authorized by the 

ordinance are compatible with the objectives, policies, general 

land uses, and programs specified in the plan.” (§ 65860, subd. 

12 Although zone A1 is sometimes referred to as 

“agricultural,” chapter 3 of the Framework Element, titled “Land 

Use,” notes that “single family residential” includes all zones at 

issue here: A1, RA, R1, and RD5. (See General Plan, Framework 

Element, p. 3-16.) Over Snowball’s objection, we take judicial 

notice of the Framework Element. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (b), 

(c); 459.) The parties’ remaining requests for judicial notice filed 

on July 31, 2023 are denied.
38

(a)(2).) Here, unlike in Warner Ridge, allowing only limited 

residential density does not sharply contrast with the objectives, 

policies, and land uses specified in the general and community 

plans.

3. Section 65589.5(j)(4) does not mandate maximum 

density

Snowball and amici13 assert that limiting density to 

anything below the maximum permitted in the community plan 

necessarily renders the zoning “inconsistent” or otherwise 

triggers the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4). 

Snowball asserts that “the existing zones that allow only 19 

homes . . . are inconsistent with plan designations allowing up to 

244 homes.” Amicus YIMBY argues, “If the general plan specifies 

a greater density than allowed by the zoning, the zoning is by 

definition inconsistent with the general plan,” so no zone change 

is needed under section 65589.5(j)(4). Amici Californians for 

Homeownership et al. similarly contend that a city should not be 

allowed to “use its zoning to disallow the densities that are 

expressly anticipated in the general plan.” And amicus 

California Building Industry Association asserts that under 

section 65589.5(j)(4), any time a project requires a zone change, 

the zoning should be deemed inconsistent: “[R]equiring a 

rezoning of a plan-consistent project informs whether ‘the zoning 

for the project [site] is inconsistent with the general plan.” 

13 We granted requests to file three amicus briefs submitted 

by (1) the California Building Industry Association; (2) 

Californians for Homeownership and the California Association 

of Realtors; and (3) Yes In My Back Yard (YIMBY). The City 

filed a response brief. 
39

The City counters that these concepts of consistency and 

inconsistency are not supported by law. We agree. First, there is 

no support for defining “inconsistent” to mean any zoning other 

than maximum density. Such a definition would conflict with the 

statement in section 65860, subdivision (a)(2) that zoning is 

“consistent” with a general plan if the “various land uses 

authorized by the ordinance are compatible with the objectives, 

policies, general land uses, and programs specified in the plan.”

In addition, the community plan itself states that development 

standards “applicable to specific areas and parcels of land” will be 

informed by not only “the Zoning Map” but also the applicable 

“Zoning Ordinance.” 

Moreover, under the logic of the maximum density 

arguments, even expressly listed zones could be considered 

“inconsistent” with the community plan. For example, even if the 

site for Snowball’s project was zoned RD4—a corresponding zone 

expressly listed on the land use map—the site zoning would be 

deemed “inconsistent” with the general plan because Snowball’s 

project required a zone change to RD5. We do not agree that a 

zone expressly listed in the community plan is “inconsistent” with 

that same community plan under section 65589.5(j)(4). 

The legislative history of section 65589.5(j)(4) also 

contradicts the maximum density arguments.

14 In Assembly Bill 

14 When the language of a statute is clear, courts must follow 

its plain meaning; courts generally resort to other aids, such as 

legislative history and public policy, only where the statutory 

language permits more than one reasonable interpretation. (See, 

e.g., Los Angeles Unified School Dist. v. Superior Court (2023) 14 

Cal.5th 758, 768.) We find no ambiguity in the first sentence of 
40

3194 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (A.B. 3194), which became section 

65589.5(j)(4), the Legislature proposed—and eventually

rejected—language that would have required local authorities to 

approve projects if they were within the maximum allowable 

density of a general plan. The proposed statute, as introduced on 

February 16, 2018, stated, “For purposes of this section, a 

housing development project shall not be found inconsistent, not 

in compliance, or not in conformity, with the applicable zoning 

ordinance, and the project shall not require a rezoning, if the 

existing zoning ordinance does not allow the maximum residential 

use, density, and intensity allocable on the site by the land use or 

housing element of the general plan.” (Emphasis added.) 

Local government organizations opposed the bill. The 

Rural County Representatives of California, the Urban Counties 

of California, and the California State Association of Counties 

(collectively, RCRC) stated in a letter expressing their opposition, 

“AB 3194 would prohibit a local government from requiring a 

rezoning of a project site if the existing zoning does not allow the 

maximum residential use, density, and intensity allocable on the 

site by the land use or housing element of the General Plan. The 

General Plan and the land use element were never intended to be 

as specific as a zoning ordinance – rather, they are designed to 

provide the flexibility necessary for coherent long-term planning.” 

(Letter from RCRC to Assembly Member Tom Daly, Apr. 18, 

2018.) The letter stated that requiring maximum planned 

densities in all cases “could drastically increase allowed densities 

section 65589.5(j)(4). We refer to its legislative history here only

to address Snowball and amici’s arguments. 
41

in areas that are either inappropriate or not planned for more 

intensive residential development.” (Ibid.) 

Through a series of amendments, the Legislature changed

the bill to exclude the language requiring maximum allowable 

density, replacing it with the language as it exists today—

requiring only consistency with each locality’s general plan. 

RCRC then removed their opposition to the bill, reasoning that

the bill as amended “will be limited to circumstances where the 

jurisdiction has not brought its zoning ordinance into conformity 

with the general plan – which is something that is ultimately 

under the jurisdiction’s control.” (Letter from RCRC to Assembly 

Member Tom Daly, June 13, 2018.) 

We also disagree with the maximum density arguments 

because requiring maximum allowable density at any particular 

site would be inconsistent with the City’s general plan. For 

example, the Framework Element of the general plan states, “[I]f 

all lands were to be developed with the uses at the maximum 

densities permitted, an unrealistic jobs/housing relationship 

would result and supporting infrastructure and public services 

would be unable to support this level of growth.” (General Plan, 

Framework Element, p. 2-1.) The general plan also “proposes 

incentives to encourage whatever growth that occurs to locate in 

neighborhood districts, commercial and mixed-use centers, along 

boulevards, industrial districts, and in proximity to 

transportation corridors and transit stations.” (General Plan, 

Framework Element, p. 3-1.) And as Councilmember Rodriguez 

pointed out in her letter to PLUM, the project site is not within 

the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment.

Thus, we do not read section 65589.5(j)(4) to require the 

highest allowable density for a given site. That interpretation
42

would contradict both the Legislature’s intent and the City’s 

general plan.

15

4. HAA policy and intent

Snowball and amici further assert that the City is violating 

the spirit of the HAA by relying on inconsistent, low-density 

zoning to deny this housing project. Again relying on the 

legislative history of A.B. 3194, Snowball points to an analysis by 

the Assembly Committee on Housing and Community 

Development (Apr. 25, 2018), which states that local authorities 

“can still avoid the HAA . . . by requiring project-by-project rezonings or zoning variances even where a housing project is 

consistent with the housing allowed by the general plan, thus 

rendering housing projects beyond the scope of the HAA’s 

protections because they are technically ‘inconsistent’ with the 

zoning for the site.” Amici refer to an analysis of A.B. 3194 by 

the Senate Committee on Governance and Finance (June 27, 

2018), which noted that “local zoning and other development 

standards must generally be consistent with the applicable 

general plan,” but “some local agencies intentionally maintain 

inconsistencies to gain an additional measure of control over 

development. By maintaining low densities or height limits that 

are inconsistent with the general plan for the express purpose of 

requiring rezoning, even when projects are consistent with 

15 For the first time in its reply brief, Snowball argued that 

the second sentence of section 65589.5(j)(4) should be interpreted 

to mean that the rezoning exemption applies even if the zoning 

for the project site is consistent with the general plan. The City 

moved to strike the portions of Snowball’s reply brief asserting 

new arguments. We granted that motion, and therefore do not 

address this contention. 
43

housing density and other objective standards contained in the 

city or county's general plan, local governments can ensure that 

they maintain discretionary approval over projects. Locals 

sometimes exploit this loophole to evade compliance with the 

HAA, on the grounds that projects are technically inconsistent 

with the existing zoning standards.” 

Snowball and amici argue that this is exactly what the City 

is doing here: Despite the community plan’s higher-density land 

use designations and corresponding zones, the City is playing a 

“shell game” with zoning requirements in order to skirt the 

requirements of the HAA. 

We recognize the HAA’s stated policy that it should be 

“interpreted and implemented in a manner to afford the fullest 

possible weight to the interest of, and the approval and provision 

of, housing.” (§ 65589.5, subd. (a)(2)(L).) But compliance with 

the HAA does not mean that every proposed project must be 

approved or that maximum allowable density must be allowed at 

every site. These arguments highlight the tensions inherent in 

the Legislature’s efforts to solve a statewide problem that lies 

within a realm typically controlled by local authorities. As noted 

in section III(B)(1), supra, land use decisions have historically 

been a function of local government regulation under the 

California Constitution (see Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of 

Santa Cruz, supra, 38 Cal.4th at p. 1151), and as recognized by 

statute (see § 65030.1 [“decisions involving the future growth of 

the state . . . are made and will continue to be made at the local 

level”]). The Legislature has narrowed the criteria local 

authorities may rely upon in denying a project. However, local 

control has not been abrogated by the HAA. Instead, the HAA 

has made clear from its inception in 1982 that it only applies 
44

“[w]hen a proposed housing development project complies” with 

the local “general plan, zoning, and development policies.”

(§ 65589.5(j)(1).) And section 65589.5(j)(4) ties its rezoning 

exemption to the general plan, which is developed and updated 

by local governments based on local needs. 

When the City was required to bring its zoning into 

compliance with the general plan, it did so not by changing the 

existing zoning of individual parcels, but by amending its 

community plans with a footnote to incorporate the existing 

zoning. We might deem it a poor practice to have a community 

plan list certain corresponding zones, yet incorporate others by 

reference in a footnote so opaque that delving into its 30-year 

history is required to parse its meaning. But the question before 

us is not whether the construction of the community plan is 

poorly phrased or unwise. The adoption or amendment of a 

general plan is a legislative act which is presumed valid.

(Federation of Hillside & Canyon Assns. v. City of Los Angeles, 

supra, 126 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195.) “[T]he city has broad 

discretion to weigh and balance competing interests in 

formulating development policies, and a court cannot review the 

wisdom of those decisions under the guise of reviewing a general 

plan’s internal consistency and correlation.” (Id. at p. 1196.)

Instead, our task is to determine whether Snowball is 

entitled to the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) as the 

Legislature has written that subdivision. The current RA and A1 

zoning is consistent with the community plan through the 

language of that plan, including Footnote 23. Because the

rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) only applies when 

“the zoning for the project site is inconsistent” with the applicable

plan, the rezoning exemption in section 65589.5(j)(4) does not 
45

apply here, and Snowball’s project was not exempt from zone 

change requirements.

D. Section 65589.5(j)(1)

Snowball also contends that when the City denied the zone 

change, it failed to make the findings required by section 

65589.5(j)(1), which sets out certain findings a local agency must 

make when denying a housing project. That subdivision states, 

in full, 

“When a proposed housing development project 

complies with applicable, objective general plan, 

zoning, and subdivision standards and criteria, 

including design review standards, in effect at the 

time that the application was deemed complete, but 

the local agency proposes to disapprove the project or 

to impose a condition that the project be developed at 

a lower density, the local agency shall base its 

decision regarding the proposed housing development 

project upon written findings supported by a 

preponderance of the evidence on the record that both 

of the following conditions exist:

“(A) The housing development project would have a 

specific, adverse impact upon the public health or 

safety unless the project is disapproved or approved 

upon the condition that the project be developed at a 

lower density. As used in this paragraph, a “specific, 

adverse impact” means a significant, quantifiable, 

direct, and unavoidable impact, based on objective, 

identified written public health or safety standards, 

policies, or conditions as they existed on the date the 

application was deemed complete.
46

“(B) There is no feasible method to satisfactorily 

mitigate or avoid the adverse impact identified 

pursuant to paragraph (1), other than the 

disapproval of the housing development project or the 

approval of the project upon the condition that it be 

developed at a lower density.”

(§ 65589.5(j)(1).) Snowball argues the City was required to make 

the findings in parts (A) and (B), in “written findings supported 

by a preponderance of the evidence.” 

The City points out that by its express terms, section 

65589.5(j)(1) applies when “a proposed housing development 

project complies with applicable, objective general plan, zoning, 

and subdivision standards and criteria . . . in effect at the time 

that the application was deemed complete.” (§ 65589.5(j)(1), 

emphasis added.) The City asserts that because Snowball’s 

project did not comply with the current zoning—it required a 

zone change—section 65589.5(j)(1) does not apply. Snowball does 

not disagree that section 65589.5(j)(1) includes this requirement, 

but states that under section 65589.5(j)(4), the project should be 

“treated as though it has been rezoned.” 

The plain language of section 65589.5(j)(1) states that a 

local agency is required to make written findings only when the 

proposed project “complies with applicable . . . zoning . . . in effect 

at the time that the application was deemed complete.” 

(§ 65589.5(j)(1).) As noted in section III(C), supra, this language 

was in section 65589.5 when it was originally enacted; the HAA

has always applied only to projects that comply with local zoning. 

Snowball’s project did not meet that criteria because it did not

comply with the applicable zoning; it required a zone change. 

And for the reasons discussed in the previous section, we do not 
47

agree that the project fell under the rezoning exemption in

section 65589.5(j)(4). Snowball therefore has not demonstrated 

that the City was required to comply with section 65589.5(j)(1).

E. LAMC

In a very brief argument, Snowball also contends the City 

abused its discretion in denying Snowball’s zone change request 

“based on invalid findings under its own code which were also 

lacking evidentiary support.” Snowball argues that “the City 

Council’s action was arbitrary and capricious and totally lacking 

in evidentiary support as it was not supported by the valid 

findings required by LAMC §12.32.Q(3)(a)(2)(ii), and the 

inadequate findings by the City were not supported by 

substantial evidence in the record.” Snowball asserts that record 

evidence shows that the planned mitigation measures would 

alleviate any fire safety concerns. Snowball contends it is 

therefore entitled to a writ of mandate under Code of Civil 

Procedure, section 1094.5. The City argues that LAMC section 

12.32(Q)(3)(a)(2) does not require specific findings to deny a 

proposed zone change, and even if it did, the City Council made 

such findings on the record. 

LAMC section 12.32(Q)(3)(a)(2) states that “a vesting zone 

change may be conditioned or denied if the City Planning 

Commission or the City Council determines . . . (ii) the zone 

change is denied because it is not in substantial conformance 

with the purposes, intent or provisions of the General Plan or is 

not in conformance with public necessity, convenience, general 

welfare and good zoning practice and the reason for not 

conforming with the plan. [¶] If the Council does not adopt the 

Commission’s findings and recommendations, the Council shall 

make its own findings.” 
48

The City points out that the LAMC also requires it to make 

affirmative findings to grant a zone change. Under the LAMC

section 12.32(C)(7), the City Council may “approve an ordinance 

only after making findings that its action is consistent with the 

General Plan and is in conformity with public necessity, 

convenience, general welfare and good zoning practice.” 

Councilmember Rodriguez cited this subdivision in her letter, 

stating, “Pursuant to Section 12.32-C of the Los Angeles 

Municipal Code, findings of fact must be made in the affirmative 

in order to recommend an action to be consistent with public 

health and safety, general welfare, and good zoning practice.” As 

discussed above, Rodriguez concluded that such findings could 

not be made. 

As noted above, PLUM stated that it “adopted the findings 

presented by Council District 7 as the findings of the PLUM 

Committee,” and the City Council in its written ruling adopted

PLUM’s report. Snowball argues that the “findings” of the City 

Council therefore consisted only of those in Rodriguez’s letter, 

which were “opinion and speculation,” and were “not based on 

any facts in the record, [so] they are not sufficient to support the 

City’s action.” 

We disagree. The evidence before both PLUM and the City 

Council included City Planning’s findings, Rodriguez’s letter, 

hundreds of pages of written comments and attachments 

submitted by members of the public, a letter from a state senator, 

a petition signed by more than 2,000 people, oral comments made 

by members of the public at the meetings, and written and oral 

comments from Snowball’s counsel. Rodriguez’s letter gave 

multiple reasons, which are supported by the record, for denying

the zone change. For example, Rodriguez stated that the density 
49

of 215 units at the site would be “inconsistent with the 

surrounding density of the subject site”; the density of the 

surrounding area is undisputed. Rodriguez stated that the site is 

not within the City’s Regional Housing Needs Assessment—a fact 

that is easily verified. Many citizens expressed concerns about 

evacuation in the event of a wildfire following recent evacuation

attempts, and Rodriguez cited wildfire concerns in her letter. 

She noted the 2019 Saddle Ridge fire, for example, in which “88 

structures were damaged, 19 were destroyed, one person died of a 

heart attack, and many schools were closed due to poor air 

quality that lingered for weeks. At its peak, more than 100,000 

people were under mandatory evacuation.” Again, this is public 

information that could easily be verified. 

The information before PLUM and City Council therefore 

was not simply “opinion and speculation,” as Snowball asserts. 

Substantial evidence is evidence “‘of ponderable legal 

significance,’” which is reasonable in nature, credible, and of solid 

value. (Schafer v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 

1250, 1260.) Snowball offers no authority supporting its 

suggestion that City Council was required to rely on certain

evidence in the record regarding fire safety, but disregard other 

evidence on the same subject. 

In sum, we find the HAA does not apply, and the City’s 

findings were sufficient under the LAMC and supported by 

substantial evidence. We therefore affirm the trial court’s denial 

of Snowball’s petition.
50

IV. DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. The City is entitled to recover 

its costs on appeal. 

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

COLLINS, ACTING P.J.

We concur:

MORI, J. 

ZUKIN, J.