* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR

. R. 47.5, the Court has determined that this

opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under

the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For the Fifth Circuit

No. 99-41191

In the Matter of: JOHN A. HILL,

Debtor.

-----------------------

JOHN A. HILL,

Appellant,

VERSUS

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Acting through its agent,

The Internal Revenue Service,

Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Southern District of Texas

(C-98-CV-494)

June 27, 2000

Before GARWOOD, DeMOSS and PARKER, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: *

Appellant John Hill (“Hill”) appeals from an order of the2

district court affirming the bankruptcy court’s grant of summary

judgment to the United States in Hill's adversary proceeding that he

brought to declare that his tax liability for 1978 was uncollectible

as a matter of law. There is essentially one substantive issue in

this appeal, that is, whether the district court properly affirmed

th e bankruptcy court's determination, on reconsideration, that Hill's

1978 income tax liability, which had been reduced to a judgment in

1985, remained collectible despite the alleged running of Florida's

statute of limitations on enforcement of judgments purportedly made

applicable to the 1985 judgment by 26 U.S.C. § 6502(a), prior to the

filing of Hill's bankruptcy petition.

We review the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact for clear

error, but consider questions of law de novo

. S ee Matter of Herby’s

Foods, Inc.

, 2 F.3d 128, 130 (5 th Cir. 1993). Here, the bankruptcy

court’s factual determinations are not in dispute, and the relevant

issue is one of law, that is, a question of statutory interpretation

as to whether § 6502 incorporates state statutes of limitations.

Hill argues simply that his 197 8 tax liability became

uncollectible under § 6502 when the 1985 tax judgment became

“unenforceable” under Florida law. He relies on Florida's five-year

statute of limitations for actions other than for the recovery of

real property found at Section 95.11 of the Florida Statutes. Under

Florida's statute of limitations, Hill argues that the 1985 judgment

became “dormant” and unenforceabl e on March 31, 1990, five years3

after its entry.

While Hill does acknowledge and agree with the government that

g enerally speaking, the United States is not subject to st ate

statutes of limitations with respect to enforcing a judgment in its

favor, he argues that where the United States expressly waives its

immunity, the state statutes govern. It is Hill's contention that

Congress's inclusion of the phrase “until the judgment

. . . becomes

unenforceable,” is an express waiver of immunity because that is the

only possible reason for including such language. Hill contends that

there is nothing other than state statutes of limitations to which

Congress could have been referring when it enacted this language

because expiration of such limitations statutes is the only way a

judgment could become “unenforceable.”

As noted above, the district court and the bankruptcy court both

explicitly rejected the contention that the “becomes unenforceable”

language constitutes a waiver of the United States' immunity from

state statutes of limitations because it “is not a clear statement of

Congressional intent to make judgments in favor of the United States

subject to state-imposed limits on enforceability.”

Having carefully reviewed the issues presented by Appellant Hill

and hav ing fully considered the briefs, the record excerpts, the

record, and the arguments presented at oral a rgument, we are

persuaded that the order of the district court affirming the judgment

of the bankruptcy court should be and the same is hereby AFFIRMED

for the reasons stated therein.