## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth

___________________________ No

. 02

- 17

- 00185

- CV

____________ _______________

On Appeal from the 17th District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court No. 017

- 27 6483

- 15
Before Sudderth, C.J .; Kerr and Bassel , JJ. Opinion by Justice Kerr 

### T H E 

### C ITY OF 

### F O RT 

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### , IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACI TY AS 

### F ORT 

### W ORTH 

### C ITY 

### M ANAGER 

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- App ellees

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### . S TEPHANNIE 

### L YNN 

### R YLIE 

### , T EXAS 

### C&D A MUSEMENTS 

### , I NC 

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### B RIAN AND 

### L ISA 

### S COTT D 

### / B 

### / A 

### TSCA AND D 

### / B 

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### R IVE R 

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### , Appellees /Cross

- Appellants2 OP INI ON ON REMAND
The Texas Co nstitu tion commands that the legislatur e pass laws proh ibi ting
lotteries , s ee Tex. Const. art. III, § 47 (a) , and the legislature has largely done so , see , e.g. , Tex. Penal Code Ann. § § 47.01

– .11. T hat command is at the heart of an issue t he
Texas Su preme Court h as asked u s to decide and that we sideste p ped in thi s app eal ’ s first go

- round : whether the eight

- lin er gambling machi nes at issue here , which are owned and operated by the appellees (the Operators), ar e un constituti onal or il legal

. City of Fort Worth v. Ry lie ( R ylie II ) , 602 S.W.3d 459 , 4 60 , 469 (Tex. 2020) , rev ’ g ( R ylie I ) , 56 3 S .W.3d 3 46 (Tex. Ap p.

— F ort Worth 2018)

. The eight

- liners are unconstitutional if they are lotteries; they are illegal either if not within the Penal C ode ’ s so

- called

“ fuzzy animal ” e xclusion from the definition of outlawed gambling devi ces

— an exclusion on which the Operators rely

— or if the exclusion is itself unconstitutional, as the appellant City of Fort Worth contends. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 47.0 1(4)(B).
A categorization as ei ther unconstitutional or illegal will re solve the underly ing
p r ee m ptio n is sue pitting Texas Occupations Code C hapter 2153 , which regulates

“ skill or pl easure coin

- operated machines, ” see Tex. Occ. Code Ann. § 2153.001, agains t Ci ty l icen sing and zoning ord inance s regulat ing game ro oms t ha t contain

“ a mus ement re demption machines, ” a term that includes eight

- liners

. That is because the Occupations Code “ does not authorize or permit ” the keeping or operating of a
machine or device that is “ prohibited by the co nstitu tion of this state or the P en al
Code. ” Id. § 2 153.003 (emphasis added) . I f either scenario exists , Chapter 2153 of the3 Occupations Code has no preemptive e ffect because it does not apply to the Ope rators ’ machines

. Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d at 468 (observ ing that “ c hapter 2153 does

not a pply to uncons titution al or illegal mac hines ” ).
Bec aus e we conclud e th at these eight

- liner video slot m achines are lotteri es

— a term more exp ansive than most would assume

— they a re unconstit utional. A s a result,
the trial cou rt erred in hold ing that the Occu pations Code p reempts cert ain parts of

t he ordinan ces , and w e will re v erse and render judgmen t in the City ’ s fav or on that part of the Operators ’ claim s . We wil l affirm the trial court ’ s judgment d enying the
rest of the Ope r ators ’ Occupati ons Code preempti on claim s . F inally, Section
2 153.003 ’s disjunctive natur e means that we need not reach the fuzzy

- ani mal
exclusion ’s applicability or constitutionality. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
I
. B ACKGR O UND 1
The Operat ors run game rooms c ontaining eight

- liner machines

. Respondi ng

t o wha t it perc ei ved as suc h establishments ’ deleteri ous e ffects on the community , in
2014 t he Fort W orth City C o unci l passed two ordinances d esi gned to r ein in the
pro liferation of game roo ms . The Ope rato rs chal l en ged the ordinances, seek ing a
decl ar at ion th at the Al coho lic Beverag e Code and the Oc cup ation s Code preempt th e ordinances in certain ways. See Tex. A lco. Be v. C ode A nn. § 1.06 ( “ Code Exclus ively

1 Both the supreme cour t ’ s opini on , Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d a t 464

– 66 , an d o ur earlie r opinion , Rylie I , 5 63 S.W.3d at 35 1

– 5 5 , cont ai n mor e de ta iled factual and pr ocedur al backgroun d s, whic h w e d o n ot r epeat here

.4 Governs ” ); Tex. Oc c. Code A nn. §§ 2153.001

– .45 3 ( “ Coin

- O p e r ated Machines ” ). The
Ci t y count ercl a im ed for a d eclaration th at the P enal Code ’ s fuzzy

- a nimal exc lusio n

— under which the Opera tors claim they can legally possess and oper ate the machines

— is a n unconstitution al end

- run a rou nd the Texas Const itution by att e m pt in g to
auth orize o ther wise

- for bidden lo tteries by sta tute rather tha n by cons tit uti on al
amendment

. S ee Tex. Con st. art . III, § 47; Tex. Pen al Code Ann. § 47.01(4)(B).
T he trial cour t partia lly agreed with the Operators , holding that certain of the City ’ s ordinances were preempted , and denied relie f on the Ci ty ’ s cou ntercl a im, concluding a s a matter of la w t h at t he fu z zy

- animal exclus i on i s const itutional

. We affirmed in part and reve rsed in part, in the process concluding that whether the Operators ’ mac h ines a re consti tutional or leg al was irrelevant to the preemption issu e . The supreme co u rt disagreed. Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d at 469 ( “ We h old the c ou rt o f appeals erred by conclud ing t hat th e is sue whether the Op erat ors ’ machines are
constit utional and lega l is irrelevan t to the question w hether [Occupation s Code]
cha pter 2153 pr eempt s the City ’ s ordinan c es and is th erefore non

- jus tic iable ” and

“ rema nd th e case to t hat court so tha t it c an ad dres s and resolve that iss ue in the first
instance. ” ). We now do so , using the de novo sta ndard of r eview that applies to both
constitutional a nd statutory in terpreta t ion

. E.g. , Patel v. Te x. De p ’ t of Lic ensing & Reg ul

. , 469 S.W.3d 69, 87 (Tex. 2015); Fin. Com m ’ n o f Tex. v. Norwood , 418 S. W.3d 566,
585 (Te x. 20 13).5 I I. A PP LICABL E L AW
A. The Te xas Const itution and lotteries Since 1845, t he T ex as Cons titu tion h as c ontin uousl y prohib ited lotte ries

. 2 As

rat ified in 1 876 and to the present , our cons tit utio n affirm atively requ ire s the legislature to “ pas s la ws prohibiting ” th em . Tex. Const. art. III , § 47. A s t he supreme

court noted in its opinion r emanding this c as e to us , “ [c]ontrary to the term ’ s p o pular

un derst anding, ” t he word lottery includ es a “ wide a rray of activities that involve, at a minimum, (1) t he payment of ‘ con si deration ’ (2) for a ‘ c hance ’ (3 ) t o win a ‘ prize. ’ ” Rylie II , 602 S. W.3d at 4 60

– 61 (c iting Ci ty of Win k v. Griffith Amusement Co. , 100 S.W .2d
6 95, 698 (T ex. 1936)). Texas case law h as refl ected t his broad unders tanding as far
back a s 1 87 4 , sho rtly before Te xas citizens app rove d the 1876 consti tution. See Randle
v. State , 42 Tex. 580, 589 (1 87 4 ) (ob se rving t ha t the activity ’ s name “ make s not the

2 See Tex. Con st. ar t. III, § 47 (amended 2021) (“The Le gis lature shall pas s laws prohibi ting the establishment of l otteries and gi ft enterpris es in t h is State, as we ll as th e s ale o f t i ckets in lotter ies, g ift e nt erprises or other evasion s i n vo lv ing th e lottery princip le, established or ex isting in oth er State s.” ); Te x. Const. o f 1869 , art. I II, § XXVII (“The Legis latu re shall not aut horize any lotter y, and shall prohi bit the s al e o f l o tt ery tick ets.”), art. XII, § XXXVI (“N o lottery shall be aut ho rized by this St ate; a nd the buying a nd sel ling of lotter y ticke ts w ithin this State is prohibite d. ” ) ; Tex. Const. of 18 66 , art. VII, § 1 7 (“ No lottery shall be authorized by t his St at e ; an d t h e b uying or sellin g of lott er y tickets w it hin this State i s pr oh ibit ed.”); Te x. Const . of 1861 , art. VII, § 17 (“No lotter y sha ll be authorized by th is State; a nd t he buying or sellin g of lottery t ick ets w ithin thi s Stat e is prohibited.”); Te x. Co ns t. of 1 8 45 , art. VII , § 17 (“ No l o tt ery shall be au thorized by t h is Sta te ; and the b uying or selling of l ot tery t ickets within thi s St ate, is prohibited.”)

. We address 20t h

- century am endment s au thorizing cha rit abl e bingo , chari table raffles , and th e st at e l ot tery late r in thi s opini on .6 slig htes t di fference ” ; it is a lot tery “ w hen t he elem ent of chance is c onn ected with, or

ente rs i nto th e dis tribu tion of its prizes ” ). A nd a s made clear in Cit y of Wink some 85 years ago , “ [I]t may be said th at chance i s the basic element of a lo ttery. Un less a

sc heme for the awarding of a prize requi res tha t it be awarded by a chance, it is not a
lot ter y . ” 100 S.W.2 d at 701 (referring to the “ i ngre dient of chan ce ” as the “ e vil principle which t he law denounce s and will e radicate, however it may b e clothed , or however it may conceal i tsel f i n a fa ir ex terior ” )

. 3
The tri part it e view of what constit utes a lot tery

— chanc e, p rize , and

c onsideration

— i s ub iquitous

. See , e .g. , Fed. Commc ’ ns Comm ’ n v. Am . Broad. Co. , 3 4 7 U.S.
284 , 290 , 74 S. Ct. 5 93, 598 ( 1954) ( la ying out the “ th ree essent ial ele men ts ” ) ; U.S.
Postal S erv. v . Amada , 20 0 F.3d 647, 651 (9th Cir. 200 0) ( noting th at a bsent a statutory
definit ion , “ the appropri ate definiti o n to apply is the co mmon law lotter y defin itio n consist e ntly use d by the cour ts an d des cribed by the Supreme Court as the ‘ t radit ional

t e sts of chance, pr ize and consideration ’ ” ); Uni ted States v. Tan sley , 986 F.2d 880,
886 ( 5th Cir. 1993) ( sa me ) ; Roberts v. Commc ’ ns Inv. Clu b of Woonsocket , 431 A.2d 1 206, 1211 (R.I. 1 981) ( “ It is well settl ed that a ‘ lottery ’ p roscrib ed in eit her a state

3 Th e 1800s had wit ne ssed a sea

- ch a nge in p ub lic attit udes tow ard lotteries. T h ough widely used in A meri ca ’ s early days as reve nue

- raisin g de vices to compensate for the lack of a strong centr al gov ernmen t and a weak tax ba se , as more matu re forms of tax at ion i nc reased

— along s id e lottery fra u d a nd th e social mi series
a ccompanying gam bli ng addicti ons

— lotter ies became almost universal ly prohibi ted in state constituti ons by the end of the 19th cent ury . R onald J. Rychlack , Lot ter ie s, Re venu e and Social Costs: A Histo ri cal Examinati on of State

- Spo n sor ed Ga mb ling , 34 B.C. L. Rev. 11, 12 , 37

– 38 (1 992).7 c onsti tution or st atute is defined as a sche me or plan havin g t h ree essential elements:

c onsi deration, chan ce, and priz e. . . . If all of th e elements are pr esent, th e scheme is a
lott ery, rega rdless of the p urpose of its sponso r. ” )

. Ev en wit h the b est o f inte ntions, the legislature cannot sanction a lo ttery of a n y

t ype ; a constitutional ame ndmen t is necessar y. See Tusse y v. State , 494 S.W.2 d 866 , 869 (Tex

. Crim. App

. 1973 ). In Tussey , the c ou rt of c r i min al a ppea ls ana l yzed a 1971 amendment to the P enal C ode that e xcepte d from prosecution churches,

re lig ious societ ie s , ve teran s organizations, and other nonprofit charit able organiz ations that conducted lotte ri es for th eir own be nefit. Hold ing th at the
le gi s la ture had exceeded its au thority, the court of c ri minal app e als g ave the back drop
of both the 186 9 a nd 1876 c on sti tut ion s and concluded tha t “an y effort by the Legislature to authorize, lice nse [,] or legal iz e lotteri es i s unconstit utional in l ight of t he

c o nstitutional provi sion ” req uiri ng th e “ pas sage of la w s ag a inst the establishment of
lotteries in va rious f orms . ” Id. at 869. “Fu rther, the Legi slature is likew ise prohibit ed from indirectly doing so by wa y of exempt ion from crimin al prosecuti on. ” Id. (cit i ng City of Wink , 1 00 S.W.2d at 700

– 0 2 ). T h e Tusse y co urt drove the point home : “ It is
clear that th e Legis l atu re wa s not authorized to exe mpt f rom the laws rel ating to
lot teries the s ale or drawin g of a p ri ze at a f air for the ben efit of a ch urch, rel i giou s society, ve te ran ’s org anizati on, e t c. ” I d

. ; s ee als o State v. Amv ets P ost No. 80 , 541 S.W.2d
4 81, 482

– 83 (Te x. App.

— Dallas 1976, no writ ) ( en t ering temporary injunction against8 ve terans

- c lub bi ngo game an d stating tha t “ a lottery is no less a lotter y i f the proceeds
are used for charit able p urpo ses ” ( c iting Tussey ) )

. Se veral year s a fte r Tuss ey and Amv ets , the le gisl a ture proposed and voter s
app r oved a 198 0 con stitutional amendment to allow charita ble bin go . Tex. Co nst. art. III, § 47(b)

– ( c) ( added by Tex. S. J. Res. 18, 66th Leg., R.S. , 1979 Tex. Gen. Law s 3221 ) ( au thorizing legislature to allow and reg ulate “ bin g o ga m es conducted by a
churc h, sy n agog ue, relig ious society, volunte er fire dep a rtm ent, nonprofi t ve terans organi z ation, f ratern al organizatio n, or non profit or ganiz ation su pporting medi cal

resear ch or treat ment progr ams ” ) . A l ater a mendmen t per mit ted “ ch a rita b le raffles ”

t o be held by th e sam e types o f organi zations. Tex. Const. art

. II I, § 47(d) ( a dded by
Tex. H. J

. Res. 3 2, 71s t Leg., R.S. , 1989 Tex. Gen. La ws 6427 ). M ost recen tly, in 1991 , Texa n s authorize d a state l ot tery . Tex. Const. art . II I , § 47(e) ( add ed by Tex. H

. J. Res. 8, 72d L e g., 1st C .S. , 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 1113 ). As i t stands, the se a re the only types
of lotteri es that the Texas Const itution allows

. B. Lotteries and slot machines ( v ide o o r otherwise )
Given the expansiv e commo n

- law definit io n

— ch ance, prize, and
consider atio n

— i t ’ s hard to imagine any circumsta nce under wh ich a slot mach ine is

no t a lot tery . A n d indeed, Texas authoriti es have u nanimous ly so conclud ed : “ A slo t machine i s a lo ttery. ” 4 Queen v. State , 246 S .W

. 384, 386 ( Tex. Crim. App

. 1922 ) (c iting

4 T he supreme co u rt here seems almost to have bur ied the lede by ( approv ingl y) qu oting th at senten ce in a foo tnote
. Ryl ie II , 602 S.W. 3d at 4 61 n .2

.9 P rend er

gast v

. Stat e , 57 S.W. 8 50 , 851 ( Tex. Crim. App. 189 9) ) ; s ee also Tex . Att ’ y Gen. Op. No. DM

- 302 , at *4 ( 1994) ( “ If

. . . the s lot machine pay out is based e n tirely o n

c han ce rather than s ki ll, we ca n say tha t the ope r ati on of th at d evi ce constitutes a

‘ lot tery ’ as a m at ter of law

. ” ) ( citing State v. Fry , 86 7 S .W .2d 3 98 (Tex . App.

— Ho uston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ ); State v . Mende l , 871 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Ap p.

— Houst o n [14 th Dist.] 1994, n o writ ) )

. 5

“ E ight

- li ner s g en erally operate l ike a video slot machine , ” with “ nin e electronic symbols arranged in three columns a nd thre e rows . ” Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d at 462 ; s ee a lso
In re Gamblin g Devices & Proceeds , 496 S .W. 3d 159 , 1 6 1 (Tex . App.

— San Anto nio 20 16, pet. denie d ) ( involvi ng “ electron i c s lot machines c ommonly known a s ‘ ei ght liners ’ ” );
Mendel , 871 S.W.2d at 907 ( descri bing devi ces as “ Lucky 8 Liner video slot
mach ines ” ) ; J a son Johns , Comment, Win, Lo se, or Dra w: The Ri se o f Eigh t

- Liner Video
D evi ces in Texas , 34 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 263, 290 (2003) ( “ Even if som e electr o nic gambling machines [such as draw poker an d pinbal l ] presen t elements of sk ill, eight

liners do not appea r to fall w ithin this category. Their operation is v ery s imilar to a

5 T he Operator s sti pulated th at their eight

- l in ers are al l “ pl aye d s olely or predomin antly by chance , invo lvin g little or no sk ill on the p art of th e player ” an d th at

“ [t] he playe r ha s no control ov er the odds o f winn ing

. ” This stipu lation me ans tha t we need no t ponder s uch metaphysical questions a s whether a device t hat a pl a yer has a mere 1% chance of losing to would be a prohibi ted lottery . We do note tha t a sister
cou rt has consider ed (and rejec ted) a slidin g

- sca le

- type argument advance d i n conne ct io n with a void

- for

- vagueness c hallenge , holding t hat some thing is in deed a
“ ga mbling device ” if it incorporates “ any eleme nt of chan ce, even if the exercise of skill also in fluences the ou tc ome. ” State v. Gambling Devic e , 859 S.W.2d 519, 523 (Tex

. App.

— Ho us ton [1st Dist.] 1993, writ d e nied) (emphasis add ed)

.10 slo t machi ne [ ’ s] with t he o nly dif ference bei n g th e game is played o n a vide o s c ree n

rat her than mechanical columns and reel s . ” ). 6
C. T he Pe nal Code and the fuzzy

- animal exc lusion
In ob eying the c onst itution ’ s lottery

- denou ncing man date , t he legislature
enacted wha t b ec a me Pen al C ode Cha pter 47 , ti t l ed “ Gambling

. ” 7 Tex. Pen al Co de
A nn. § 4 7.01

– .1 1

. Among other things, this ch a pter makes it a criminal offense to

“ own, manufactu re, transf e r, or posse ss a ‘ gambling device. ’ ” Ry lie II , 602 S

. W.3 d at
461.
The term “ga mbling device” in clu d es “any electron i c , ele ctromechanic al, or mechan ic a l contriv ance . . . that for a consideration a f fords the player an opportunity to o btain anything of value, t he award of which is determined solely or parti a lly b y ch ance, eve n though accompa nied by
so me s kill, w hether or n ot th e prize is a utomati cally pa i d by the contrivance.” [Tex. Penal C ode Ann.] § 47.01(4) . This in c ludes, as

6 T he Com ment auth or a ls o opi nes t hat “ eight

- liner machines, ev en if used with i n t he bo unds of the [fuzzy

- animal] excep tion, have all t h e elements of a lottery, and a re thus o nly allowable if t he Texa s L e gislatu re amends the consti t ution to provide fo r th eir use. ” Johns, supra , at 209 ; s ee also T ex. At t ’y G en. Op. No. DM

- 302 , at *3 ( “I t i s c le ar tha t th e term ‘lottery ’ will b e broadly con s trued by the c o ur ts, and tha t an y game ne wly s anctioned by the l egis lature must be c arefull y scrutinized to dete r mine whether it is a ‘lotte ry. ’ I f it is, i t can not be law fully operated w ithout a const itu t io na l amen d men t. ”).

7 The Penal Code a s enacted in i ts modern form in 1973 resul ted fro m the

“ subs ta ntial revision p roce ss con ducted b y the Tex a s Pena l Code Revisio n Pro ject, a collabo rative e ffor t of th e Te x as Ba r Asso ciation and the Te xa s Legislative Cou n ci l , from 196 5 to 1973. This was the first full re c odification sin ce the Code ’ s pre vio us ena ctmen t in 1856. ” Texas Pena l Code Revisio n R esearc h Guide , Legislative R eference Librar y of Texas, https: //lrl.tex as.gov /col lections/ PenalCo deIntro. cfm (last visit ed Mar. 14, 2022).11 exampl es, electronic or me chanical versio ns of “bin g o, keno, bl ackjack, lottery, roulette, [and] vi deo p o ker. ” Id

. § 4 7.01(4)(A )

. Id. (second alter ation in original )

. By the e ar l y 1990s , t he ris e of am us ement cen t ers such as C hu ck E. Chee se, Dave & Busters, and Main Event , w i th t heir “ electr onic and me chanical games that at least argua b ly constit u te lotteries or ga mbling de vices, ” i d. , p o sed a poten tial proble m . W er e tiny birt h day

- party

- go ers complicit in l awbreak ing? W as this merr y mouse a mobs ter in the making ?

TM Alt h ough the City no te s that the games at “ carnival

- like operatio n s (e.g., Ch uck
E. Cheese and Dave & Bu s ter ’ s) ” require ski ll, not chanc e , t o win

— m eanin g th at

m ost family

- fun

- center ga mes prob ably would n ’ t be lotteries or gambling device s in the first pl ac e

— the legislature approached the issue proac tively a nd enac ted the 199 5 8

8 As the sup reme court has e xplai ned,
P aragr aph (B) was introd uced in Senate Bi ll 522, whi ch amen d ed s e ction 47.01(4) and became effectiv e A ugus t 30, 1993 . A c t of May 31, 199 3 , 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 774, § 1, 1 993 Te x. Gen. L aws 3027, 3027

– 28

. Yet when the new Penal C ode became eff ective o n September 1, 1994, it did
n ot c ontai n paragr aph (B). Te x. Penal Cod e § 47

. 01(4) (1994).12 fuzzy

- ani mal e xclu sion by adding S ec tion 47.01( 4)(B) to t he Pen a l C ode

. Se e T ex. Penal Cod e Ann. § 47. 0 1(4)(B); H

. R s ch

. Or g . , Bil l Analysis, Tex. S.B. 52 2, 73 d L e g.,
R .S. (1993) ( “ SB 522 would clear up a gray area in th e l aw b y exempting bona fi de

amus em ent gam es su ch as t he k in d that allow per sons to use ski ll to w i n fuzzy

an ima ls

. . . . ” )

. Under th i s defini t i onal exclus io n , the t erm “ gambling device ”
d oes not i n clud e any elect r onic, electromechanical, or mechani cal
con t rivanc e designed, made, and ad ap ted sol ely f or bona f id e amusement p urposes if t h e contr iva nce r e wards the play er exclusive l y with nonca sh m e rch and ise pr ize s, toys, or noveltie s, or a re presentati o n of value rede e mable for those items, that have a wholesa l e valu e available from a singl e play of the gam e or d ev ic e of not more than 10 t i mes the am ount c harged to play the game or device once o r $ 5 , w hic hever is less. Te x. Penal Co de Ann. § 47.01(4)(B )

. Eight

- li ne r owners began to rely o n the f uzzy

- anima l exclus ion i n argui ng th at
their ma chines are not il l egal gamb li ng devices. Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d at 462. Depending
on how eigh t

- l iners awarded prizes of parti cu l ar type s , that arg ument succe eded or f

ail ed in vary ing m ea sures. See Stat e v. $1 ,760.00 in U.S. Currency , 406 S.W. 3d 177,
181 (Tex . 2013) ( hol ding that eight

- liners in question did “ not fall wit hin t he exclusion
in s ecti on 4 7.01(4)(B) because the dist ri bu t ed tickets were not redeemabl e exclusi vel

y for nonc ash m er cha ndise prizes , toys, or nov e lties ” ); Hardy , 1 02 S. W.3d at Consequently, t he Leg is lature r e

- e n ac te d the amendm e nt in 1 995. Act of May 27, 1995, 7 4th Le g. , R.S. , ch. 318, § 19, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 2734, 2 742

. H ardy v. State , 1 02 S.W.3d 1 23 , 13 1 n.5 (Tex

. 2003 )

.13 132 (affirmi ng forfei tur e of e igh t

- liners that , because they awarde d gift ce rti fi cates as prizes , “ [did] n ot meet the section 47. 01(4)( B) exc lusion a nd were [thus] sub jec t to
f

orf ei ture or des tr uc tio n as gamblin g devi c es ” ) ; see also S tate v. O ne Su per Cherry Master
Vi deo 8

- Lin er Mach

. , 10 2 S.W.3 d 132, 13 3 (Tex. 2003) (ref e rring t o Hardy ’ s sam e

- day holding and reciting tha t person in po ssess i on of alleged gambli ng device has “ the
bu rd en to prove , by a pr ep onderance of th e evide nce, at a show cau se he aring either
that th e machine is not a ga m bling de vice or tha t the exclusio n in P en a l Code section 47.01(4)(B ) app lies ” )

. 9
II I
. D ISCUSSI O N Preced e nt st retching back more than a cen tu ry an d rough ly c onte mpor aneous with the 1876 constitu tion ’ s rati f ic a tion

— and , indeed, reinfo rce d in t he supreme

c ourt ’ s opinion in the ver y c ase at hand

— l ea v es us with no doubt that the O pe rators ’

e ight

- liners are lotte r ies a nd that without a n amend m ent to th e Texas Constitut ion , they are forbidden

. 10 See Tex . Const. ar t
. III, § 47 ; Rylie II , 602 S

. W.3d at 46 0

– 61; Hardy , 1 02 S.W.3d at 13 0 ( “ Our cur rent const it utio n requires that the Legisla ture

9 N one of t hese suprem e

- court case s involve d a n expres s ch allen ge to the fuzzy

animal ex cl usio n ’ s constit ut ionality , and the c ourt has “ neve r address ed that issue. ” Rylie II , 6 02 S.W.3d at 462

– 63.

10 T he several amendments to A rtic le I II, S ection 47 can no t be read as sig n a ling
v o ter app r ov al of eig ht

- liner s , no r do the Operat ors argu e that th e y d o . Cf. T ex. Att ’y Gen. Op. No. GA

- 0103, at * 2

– 7 ( 2003 ) ( explaining that in app rov i ng a state lottery as t he ballot propositio n p h ra sed it , and given the popu lar def i n it ion of that te rm in 19 91 whe n Art ic l e III, Secti on 47 was last a mende d, Tex as voter s did no t also in tend to appr ove state

- run slot machine s).14 prohibit all l otte ries or g ift ent er prises o ther than those t he con s t i tu tion expressly
auth orizes. ” ); City of Wink , 100 S.W.2d at 6 9 8 ; Rand le , 42 T ex. at 589 ; cf. Tusse y , 494 S.W.2 d at 8 69 (holding that legislature can not indirectly authorize lotteri e s by way of ex emp ti on f rom crimi nal pro se cution).
Althou gh t he O perator s gamely put forth what the City has categori zed as three arguments for their eight

- liners ’ constitution ali ty , we are u n persu aded. 11
A. Th e legislatu re can ’ t define arou nd the cons t i t u tion
. C i t ing Willi s v . State , 7 90 S.W.2d 30 7, 314 (Tex. Crim . App. 1 9 90) , t h e Operators assert that because the Texas Cons titu tion does not de fine “ lottery, ” the
le gislature is free to decide

— w

ithin reason

— what the word me ans, a s it can also

es tabli sh and define cr iminal of fen s e s a nd ap plicable def en ses . Thus, they say, the
fuzz y
- animal exclusion r epre sent s nothing mo re tha n a proper exercise of the
l e gisl ature ’ s powe r to establis h the definitional contours of lot teries

. 12 B ut t hat approach does no t comport wit h how we are to c on s true the constitution

.

11 T h e bu l k of t he Oper at ors ’ briefing on reman d deal s with the eight

- liner s ’
a lleged legality under th e fuzzy

- a nimal exclusio n rather t ha n mou n ting a full

- throated defen se of the machines ’ con s tit ut ionality

— that is , as “ n ot

- lotter ies

. ” Particularly i n light of the O pera t ors ’ st i p ul ation s , t h ei r focus isn ’t surprising

.

12 As the Opera t ors put it, “ The Legislatur e gets t o determine that [a] ‘ fu zzy an imal ’ [game] is not a ‘ lottery ’ the Constitut ion meant to prohibi t. ” If that were t rue , thou gh, the le gisl a t ur e ’ s earlier att em pt to exclude lotteri e s with noble pur poses

— ch a ritable bingo, fo r one

— woul d surely no t have bee n held unconsti tutional

. See Tusse y , 494 S.W.2d at 869 ; A mve ts, 541 S.W.2d at 4 82

– 83

.15 In und ertaking such a task , we consider “ t he int ent of the people who adop te d it, ” looking to “ the history of t he times out of which it grew and to whic h it may be

r ationally su pp osed to have dire ct r e lations hip, the evils in tend ed to be re med ied and the g ood to be accomplished

. ” E dgew ood ISD v. K irby , 777 S.W.2d 391, 394 ( Tex. 19 8 9) ( cleaned up). But because d isce rning long

- ago intent is inhe rently diffi c ult, w e must principa l ly g ive effect to th e co n s titutio n ’ s plain languag e , “ re l y[ing] h eavily on its
li teral text

. ” Republica n Pa rty of Tex. v. D ietz , 940 S.W.2d 86, 89 (Tex. 19 97 )

. W e “ strive

T h e history of bingo in the United S tates, incidentall y, refutes b y analogy the Oper a t or s ’ additional a rgument th at the 1 845 con stitution c o u ld not hav e conside r ed slot ma c hines t o be l otteries becaus e sl ot machi nes weren ’ t invented until the mid

1 8 90s

. B ut t he same could have been ar gued more fo rcefully of bi ngo a s a “ not

lottery ” : b ingo was n ’ t played in America until even l ater , in the 1920 s , alth ough t he exact year and pl ace at whi ch it emerged are mu rk y . See , e.g. , Mary Bellis, Bingo: History of the Game , ThoughtCo. , https://www .t ho ug ht co.com/history

- of

- bingo

4077068 (Jun e 24, 20 19) ( “ When the game r e ac hed North America in 1929, it became known as ‘ beano

. ’ It was first pl ayed at a car niv al near Atlanta , Georgia. ” ) ; Bingo (Amer ican v ersion) , Wikipedia , https: / /e n. wiki pedia.or g/wi ki /B ingo_ (Amer ican_ version) (last visited Mar. 14 , 2022) ( “ In the ear ly 1920s, Hugh J. Wa rd cre ated and
s tandardiz ed t he game at carnivals in and a round Pittsburg h an d the Wes tern Pennsy lvania a rea. ” ) ; The Popularity of Bingo : UK vs. USA , The A ntel ope Valley Times (Jan. 2 8, 2021), ht tps:// th eavtim es.com/2021/01/ 28 /th e

- popular ity

- of

- bingo

- uk

- vs

usa/ ( “ O ri ginall y arr iv i n g o n Am erican shores in the 1920 s, the game i nspired by Eu ropean lotto was fir st kn own as ‘ Beano. ’ Th is was down to the fact that players covered the i r cards of numbered squar es with ro ws of beans. ” ) ; Where did Bingo begin? The history for one of the worl d ’s most popular past imes , Ma nche ster Evening News , https://www.m anchestereveningn ews. c o.uk/s pe cial

- featur es/his to ry

- bin go

- look

- one

wor lds

- 6618763 (Jan. 30, 2014, 12:46 P M) ( “ The game travelle d to Nor th America in t he 1 920s where its name evolved to ‘ Beano ’

— p layers used to shout this wh en they fo und a ll nu mb er s in a ro w ” ; “ by th e 1940s people were playing bingo acro s s the
co untry ” ) ; s ee also T ex. Att ’ y Gen. Op. No. DM

- 30 2 , at *1

– 4 (r ej ec ting argument , like the Operators ’ , that “ in 1876, ‘ l ottery ’ could no t have be en in tended to proscrib e s lot
mac hines since that device w as not in vent e d until 189 5 ” ).16 to give consti tu tional provisions the effect their makers and adopters inte nded , ” an d
i n that process “ [w] e p re sum e th e co nstitution ’ s lang ua g e was ca refully se lect e d , and
we int erpret wor ds a s t hey are gener ally u nderstood. ” Garofolo v. O cwen Loan Serv i cing,
L.L.C. , 497 S.W.3d 474, 477 (Tex. 2016) ; s ee also Arm brister v. Morales , 943 S.W

. 2d 2 02,
2 05 (Tex. 19 9 7) ( “ In inte rp re t ing the cons titu ti o n, we gi ve words their natural, obvious, a nd o rdin ary meanings as they a re understood by the citizens who adopted
the m. ” ) ; Mumme v . Mars , 40 S.W.2d 31, 35 (Tex . 1931) ( “Co nstitutional provi sions, li k e

st atutes, are prop e rly t o be in terp r eted in the ligh t o f condit ions existing a t the time of
their ado ptio n . . . . ”) ; Mel linger v. City of Hous ton , 3 S.W. 2 49, 252 (Tex. 1 8 87) ( “ In the
construction of a c onstitutio n, it is to be presumed that t he langua g e in wh ich it is
wri t ten w as care full y selected , an d ma d e to expr ess the will of the people, and tha t in
ado pting it they in te nded to give effect to ev ery one of its provision s. ”).
Certai nly b y 1876 , a lottery was un ders tood to involve the e lemen ts of cha n ce , consi deration, a n d p ri ze . 13 In deed , the Texas S upre me Court ’ s Randle decision of
187 4 , addressin g as it did th ose comm on ly rec ognized elements , rei n forces that courts and voters all kn ew what they had in mind when condemni ng lott eries in 1876

. Ra ndle , 4 2 Te x. at 589 (holdi n g t ha t schem e fo r distributin g pr iz e s by cha nce was a “ lottery within the very let te r and spirit of th e law ” ) ; see Tex . Const. a rt. I II, § 47.

13 T h at und er stand i ng has n ot chan ged. Cf. Rylie II , 602 S.W. 3d at 460

– 6 1, 461 n .2 ( no ti ng th e thr ee elements and that a “wide array of activities ” in v olve them).17 Because t he Operators stip ulated that their eight

- liner s award pr iz es by chance

a nd for co ns i de ration, the machi nes a re lotte ri e s , and the le gisl atu re cannot define
around that fact

. See Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d at 468 (observi ng that the l egi sl at ure “ cann ot change or ign ore th e me aning of the constitution ’ s text ” ) ; cf. Panas v. Tex. Br eeders &
Racin g As s ’

n , 80 S.W.2d 1020 , 1 02 3

– 24 (Tex. App.

— Galvesto n 19 35, writ dism ’ d) ( determi ni ng that legislatu re co uld allow pari

- mu tuel be tt ing on horse ra ces b ecause th at system is not a lottery ); Tex. At t ’ y Gen. Op. DM

- 302 , at * 4

– 5, *5 n.6 (discussing
P

anas a nd n oting th a t “ pa ri

- mutuel be t ting o n horse or dog races is not en ti rely a
ga me of chance. The legislatur e is no t em powered to re move f ro m the definition of

‘ lottery ’ a game which ina rguably co nforms to the c o nstitutiona l meaning of

‘ lottery ’ ” ). 14 “ C ourts need not exe r t the ir ing enuity to f in d reasons to thwart the
int ent io n o f the people clearly expressed in the Con stit ution, which is the s u prem e law
of the land

. ” Carpe nter v. Sheppard , 145 S.W. 2d 562, 567 ( Te x. 1940)

.

14

We are unpe rsuad ed by the Operat or s ’ appeal to Mississippi autho rity. In the
c ase t h ey c ite , the Missi ss ippi S upr em e C ourt held tha t bingo , which th at stat e ’ s legislatur e had ex em pted f rom statutes crim inalizing lotteries and other types of g ambling , was not a “ lotte ry ” u nder the popular u nd erstandi ng of the word and a lso because th e Mi s s issi ppi Constituti on twi ce re fe r s to lotter y “ t ickets , ” something that

“ c learly co n note s a pa rt icu l ar kin d of lottery: on e with tickets. ” Knight v. State ex r el. Moore , 57 4 S o. 2d 662 , 669 (Miss. 1990) ( “ Th e provisio n strongly su ggests a restrictive defi n i tion

— th at not all forms of lo tt ery (assumin g bi ngo is even a form) are ba nned ( i.e. , on ly t ho se with tick ets ).

. . . Few commonly consider bingo as having ti c kets that
are so ld, and a ny at tempt to equate a bi ngo card with a lottery tick et would be
su perf i c ial at best and un persua si ve at wo rst. ” ). T he T exas Constitution is not
c ompa rable to M issi ss ip pi ’ s i n th is regard

.18 A nother c ase on which the Operators r ely deferred to the legislature

— wrong ly,
in our view

— to de fi ne w h at “ lot t ery ” mean s . Owens v. State , 19 S.W.3d 48 0 (T ex. App.

— Amar illo 2000, no pet.). Owens had an establi shment in Lu bbock with over sixty “ vi deo po ker or vid eo lottery machines, commonly known as eight

- l in ers , ” a nd was charged with prom oting ga mbli ng an d wit h po ssessing g ambli ng mach ine s . I d

. at
48 1; s e e Tex. Pe nal Co de Ann. § § 47. 03 , .06

. When she tried to r aise a Secti on 47.01(4 )(B) defense , t he St ate convinc ed the trial court that the fuzzy

- a nimal exclu si on

was unconstitutio nal based o n a then

- rec ent A G op inio n to that effect

. Owens , 19 S.W.3 d a t 48 2 (discussi ng Tex . Att ’ y Gen. Op. No. DM

- 466 (1998))

. Afte r entering a plea deal , Owens a rgu ed on permissiv e appe al 15 that the trial court had erred in
d eclaring the exclu si on

— her o n ly defense

— un cons titut io na l

. A gree i n g with the defendant, our sister c ourt included its vie w that the
pre sumptive validity of the legisl atu re ’ s definiti on of “ gamblin g device ” in Sec tion 47.01(4)(A) a nd (B) m eant that the trial court had erred in h olding the f uzzy

- ani mal

exc lusion to b e un cons titut io nal

. Id. at 484. Among th e court ’ s reasons was that because Article III, Section 47 is not self

- exe cuting, the legislature is to “ implement public policy , ” “ may define terms [s uch as lottery ] which are not def ined in the
Co nstitution it s elf , ” an d “ possess es the power to crea te and define off enses with in its
sound discretion. ” Id.

15 See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2).19 We see this analysis a s flawe d , pr i n cip al ly beca use by deferring to the legislature, the Owens court bypassed its threshold duty t o c onstrue the co nstitution ’ s

m eani ng w ith reference t o 1876 common und erstanding

. See , e.g. , A r mbr ister , 943 S.W.2 d at 2 0 5 ( “ I n inter preting the constitution , we give words their na tural,
obvio us, and ordinary me ani ngs as the y a re understood by the citize ns who adopted
them. ” ). A s we h av e alre ady discussed, by t he late 19t h cent ury everyone unde rsto od
that lotteries c ompri s e ch an ce , prize, and considera tion. The legislature simpl y c an ’ t

“ change o r i gnore the meaning of the con s titution ’ s te xt
. ” R yl ie II , 602 S.W.3d at 468 ;

s ee also Tex . A t t ’ y G en. Op. DM

- 302 , at *5 n.6 ( “ T he legis latu re i s not emp owe r ed to

st at utorily remove from t he definition of ‘ lottery ’ a gam e w hich inarguably con fo rms to th e con stitutional meaning of ‘ lott e ry . ’ ” )

. Although the Owens court ackno wledged
that legisl at ure

- s u pp l i ed def ini tions must “ constitute reasonable i nterp r etatio n s of the

c onstitutional lang uage ” and “ n ot do violence to the p lai n m eaning and inten t o f the
constit utional framers , ” it did not engage in such interpret ation an d constru cti on . Owens , 19 S .W.3 d at 483

– 84. W e thus fin d O wens unhelpful

. B. That not all fo rms of gamb ling a re lotter ies i s ir re levant
. Th e O perators also contend, rig htly, t hat “ while all lotteries are a form of gamblin g, not all forms of gam bl i ng a re lotteries. ” Ind eed, they qu ote f rom a 1938 opinion tha t explains t he dis tinction

— an d expl ain s also wh y lott er ies are the

worst form :20 It is doubt less true th at lotteries occupy a unique place in t he history of legislation ag ainst gam bli ng i n Texas. E very co n stitution of o ur State fro m 1 8 4 5 do wn, has con tained provi sions against lotteries si mila r to tho s e i n our pr esent const itution. And it is true that no othe r form of gambling has been thus single d out, and exp ressly denounc ed.

. . . [O ]n e of the chi ef char a cter istic s of lotteries is that the y infest th e whole
comm unity, reach every class, prey upon th e h a rd

- ear ne d savings o f the poor, and plunder the i gnoran t and simple, whereas, in comparison, ot he r forms of g ambling affect only a f ew in di viduals.
State v. Robb & R owley United , Inc. , 11 8 S. W .2d 917, 9 21 (Tex. App

. — Galveston 1 938, no writ) (op . on reh ’ g). A nd b ec ause the “ p rohibition again st lotteries was pla ced in the constitution, ” the legislatu re “ could not, if it wished, lega lize an y ga mbling de v ice
that would in effe ct amount to a lot tery , while it has inheren t power eithe r to prohibit

or regulate any o ther f orm of gamb ling. ” 16 Id

. T he Operators po int to a case in wh ich

— “ most significantly , ” i n their view

— a marble machine was not fo un d to be a lo ttery
. S tanley v. Stat e , 154 S.W .2d 856 (Tex

. Crim. App. 1941). From that case , th e Op er ator s dedu ce that “ the question o f what is,

an d what is not, a lottery does not distil to a handy three

- pa rt test. ” 17 Yet Sta nley was so light o n f acts as to b e useless in d rawi ng any conclus ions about th e mac hine at

16 Pari

- mu tuel be tting , for example

.
17 The Operators also claim that S tanle y is “ important ” here bec ause a marble
mac hine w a s a device that the legisla ture h ad recently beg un taxing as a “ ‘ skill o r pleas ure coin

- oper at ed machi ne ’ under the pre decessor to current Chap ter 2153 ” of t he Occupatio ns Code. Th ey ha ve no t cited us any autho rity for tha t sta tement
. But more im por tant ly , the sup r e me court ha s alr ea dy told us that Chapt er 2153 “ does no t gi ve l egal au thor ity to unconstitutional or illegal ma chines. ” Ryl ie II , 602 S.W.3d at 467

.21 issu e there a nd ho w th e three

- part test did or didn ’ t fit

. Stanl ey was convicted of keeping a mar ble machine (a “ gaming device ” ) for the purp os e of ga mb ling. Id

. at 857.
Fo r r easons n ot explained, on rehearin g he urg ed that the co urt “ erred in not ho ld ing
that the marb le ma chin e . . . was a slot machine an d came within the ca tegory of a lottery. ” Id. at 859 (op. on reh ’ g) . T he court ’ s only response was, “ We are not fa vo rably i mpres sed with the a ppe llant ’ s contention t hat the mar ble ma chine here
i nvo lved fell within the catego ry of a l ott er y. H en ce we overr u le that contention. ” Id.
The machin e was never des cribed , the triparti te test never mentioned. See id.
In a ny even t, t he Op erators have not exp la ined wh at el ements beyond chance,
considerat io n, an d pr i ze are arguably pert inent when it comes to w h eth er the ir eigh t

liners are unconstitutional lotter ies

. We conclude that , in fact , “ wh a t is, and what is not, a lott ery ” do es “ di s ti l to a h andy three

- p art te st. ” See Rylie II , 6 0 2 S.W.3d at
461 (desc ribin g a lo ttery as i nvolving the t hree e l ements “ at a minimu m ” ) ; City of
Wink , 1 00 S.W. 2d at 698. That addit ional features might be present in a given l ottery does no t mean that a scheme o r machi ne cons isting merely of the t hree

— as t h e Operat o rs have stip ulate d to h ere

— is som ehow not a l ot tery
. C
. T he 1980 constitutional amendment did n ’ t ch a nge the fact that e ig ht

line rs are lotteries. Before 1980, Artic le III, Sec tio n 47 read , “Th e Legis l ature sh a ll p ass laws prohibiting th e est abli s hment of lot teries and gi f t ent e rprises in t his Sta te, a s we ll as the

s al e of tickets in lotteries, gi ft ente rprises or other evas ions involving the lottery principle ,22 establ ished o r ex ist in g in other S tates.” Tex. Con s t. a rt. III, § 47 (emphas e s adde d)

. After voters appro ved c harit ab le bingo in 1 980, an d cha ri tabl e r affles and the state lottery later , the sectio n now reads , “ The Legislature shall pa ss l aws prohib iting
lotteries and gift en ter prises in t his Sta te other t han those authorized by Su b secti ons (b), (d), (d

- 1), and (e ) of t his section. ” Id

. § 47 (a)

. The O per ators see l egal significance in the 19 80 del etion of language about lottery “ evas ions , ” and we suppose it might be sig n ific an t to some hypo thetica l
scheme i n so me hypothetical case

. B ut e i gh t

- liners are not evasions inv o lvin g the
lott ery prin ciple ; th ey ar e lotteri es , plain and simple

. B ecause the c onstitution has required the legisl ature to pro hi bit lotteries both before and af ter 1980 , th e “ as well

as . . . evasio ns ” deletion i s beside th e po int here

. 18
And d espite the O pera tors ’ effort s to parse it f avo r ably , in our view C ity of
Wink d o es not support the ir idea t h at th e supreme court “ did not suggest ” tha t the
three el ements “ are sufficient al one. ” The only rea son the c o urt ther e discussed the
theater ’ s “ ba nk night ” draw ing in terms of a lot tery evas io n , as oppose d to holdi ng that it was a n o utrigh t lottery , wa s that to be entered into the we ekly chance drawing

at the t h ea ter for a cas h prize , one d id not ha ve t o buy a mo vie tick et

— that is, pay

18 The Owens court conclud ed that the amendment s essentially rela xed the
conc eption of lo t te ries, writing that before the “ as well as ” c lause was deleted,

“ lotteries were denounced in an y form. ” 19 S.W.3d at 483

– 84. We resp ectfully disagree that , post

- 1 980 , the legislature was ther eby fre e to define ( or rede fine) the te rm.23 consideration. City o f Wink , 10 0 S.W.2d at 697

. Anyon e co ul d re gister a t the wind ow for free , so the schem e lacked one of the three primal lo ttery elements

. 19 The c o urt denoun ced t h e scheme as “ obv iously a n ev a sion of t he l ottery law s ” becau se it

“ [avo ided] a direct charge for p rize chan c es (all other el ement s o f a lottery bei ng
presen t ), but, nevertheles s, h av ing the obje ct of enrich ing [the theater o pera tor ] by the

‘ chance ’ o f gai n j ust as much as though a di r ect charg e ha d been mad e theref or . ” Id

. at
701. So a lthough the Opera tor s a re technical ly corre ct th at Ci ty of Wink “ h ol ds only for the propo sition that an activity lacking in one of the three el ements is not a
lotter y ” ( but could be a lottery eva sion), in the case before us

— because of the par ties ’ stipul ati ons

— that hol ding is i rrel eva nt
. W e thus see n o thing about the
1980 const itutio n ’ s dropping the “ ev asions ” clause th at is outcome

- determin ative or legal l y significant

. I n su m, the O perators ’ ei gh t

- liners a re lotte ries , and they are unconstitution al

. Accordingly, becaus e Oc cupat ions Code Section 2153.003 provides that Chapter
2153 does not “ authorize ” or “ per mit ” unconstitutional machines, the Cod e ’ s

19 “ Tr ue , no doubt if a ny one h ad applied for a free reg istration to the drawin g , it woul d have bee n given, but hu man n atur e is such that th e average p er son w ould seld o m, if a t all, suff er the natur al em barrassment of aski ng for a free re gistration.

. . . In fac t, the whole pla n i s buil t up and made profitable because no normal perso n likes to ‘ bum ’ his neighbo r for so m et h ing, and by a n app eal to the psychol og y of cupidity whic h ma kes som e t a ke a c hance of ma king large g ain s by a small outla y [that is, th e price of a t heate r tic ket]. T hose w ho invented and formulate d the plan may not have been ‘ lea rned in th e law, ’ but t he i r know le dge o f mass

psychology was n ot want ing. ” City of Wink , 100 S.W .2d at 69 7

– 98.24 preem ptive effect

— argu ed by the Oper ators as a way to avoi d the Ci ty ’ s ordina nces

— falls by the ways ide. And t he further di sjun ctive in Section 2153. 003 , referring to

m a chine s “ prohibited by the constitution of this state or the Penal Code, ” underpins

o ur assign ed ta sk to decide “ whether the Operators ’ machine s ar e uncons titutional or illegal. ” Rylie II , 602 S.W.3d at 466

– 67, 469 (emp h asis added)

. O n these facts and in
this procedural po sture , a nswering one of those questions is enough ; an y thoughts we might offer on the ma chines ’ possible illegality and the fuzzy

- animal e xclusion ’ s

const itutionality woul d be dicta.
I V. C ONCLUSION

B ec a use t he Operators ’ e ight

- liner machines are lotterie s and thus are

uncon stitutional machines , Chapter 2153 of the Occupa tions Code does n ot p re em pt the City ’ s ordinances regulatin g game r oo m s and eight

- liner s . W e thus revers e the tri al

court ’ s j udgmen t ho l ding that the Occupations Code pre empts certain parts of the City ’ s ordinances and render judgment for the C ity on that part of the Opera tor s ’
claims

. 20 We aff irm the trial court ’ s judgment de nying the rest of the Operators ’

20 Left open is what happens now with those o r dinanc es. As the sup reme co ur t n oted , “ Of c ou rse, a find in g that th e mac hines are unconstitutional or illegal would also lead t o the question whether the City could license, regulate, and tax them through t h e City ’ s ordinances . Th at question, h ow ev er, has not be en rai sed in t his
cas e. ” R y lie II , 6 02 S .W .3d at 469 n. 20 ; see also Rylie I , 563 S.W.3d at 357 n.11 ( “ The City fails to e xplain how, if the State may not regulate an allegedly illegal machine , the City itself may nevertheles s validly impose and enforce a c omprehensive regulatory scheme o n tha t same machine

. ” )

.25 Occupations Code preemption cla i m s . In all other respects, our o ri ginal disposition
remains the same.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Eli zabe th K err Ju s tice
Deli ve red: March 17, 2022