alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Roy Lee ROBINSON *v.*STATE of Arkansas

CR 73-96

500 S.W. 2d 929

Opinion delivered November 13, 1973

*Guy H. Jones,*for appellant.

*Jim Guy Tucker,*Atty. Gen., by: *James W. Atkins,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

The appellant’s first trial upon a murder charge resulted in a hung jury. At a second trial he was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter and sentenced to imprisonment for one year. Officer Vonnie Taylor had testified at the first trial, but he was not available at the second. The defense sought to introduce Officer Taylor’s earlier testimony, but the court excluded parts of it as hearsay. Asserted error in that ruling is now relied upon for reversal.

Officer Taylor investigated the homicide, which occurred in a cafe in Conway. The number and type of weapons involved in the affray were critical facts. At the second trial the court excluded certain questions and answers, such as the following excerpt from the record made at the first trial:

> Q. [By Mr. Jones, a defense attorney.] And did you get any information from Gloria Burgess about any weapons?

> *486A. Yes, sir.

> Q. Not what she said, but did you get any information from her?

> A. Yes, sir.

> Q. And from her, how many weapons did you get information about?

> A. Two.

> Q. And what where they?

> A. A knife and a gun.

> Mr. Streett [the prosecutor]: If it please the Court, now Mr. Jones is doing exactly what the Court instructed him not to do. This witness can’t testify what somebody else said.

> Mr. Jones: I did not ask that.

> The Court: Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, disregard any testimony at all of this witness, or any other witness, based upon hearsay. If the defendant did not say it, or if it was not said in the presence of the defendant, forget about it. Go ahead.

No error appears. Counsel seems to have been under the impression that the hearsay rule can be avoided by asking for the substance of an out-of-court statement rather than for an exact quotation. The rule cannot be evaded in that way. McCormick on Evidence, § 249 (2d ed., 1972). The prohibition against hearsay would cease to exist if it could be so easily circumvented.

It is also argued that there was no objection by the State to the testimony when it was given at the first trial. We have quoted the objection and the court’s ruling that the testimony should not be considered by the jury. Even though the witness answered the questions before the objection was made, the delay of a few *487seconds was not sufficient to warrant our holding that the trial court abused his discretion in sustaining the objection. See *Warren*v. *State,*103 Ark. 165, 146 S.W. 477, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 698 (1912), and *Clardy*v. *State,*96 Ark. 52, 131 S.W. 46 (1910).

Affirmed.
Nautical mile

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1 nautical mile =

SI units

1.852 km 1,852 m

US customary / Imperial units

1.151 mi 6,076 ft
Historical definition – 1 nautical mile

A nautical mile (symbol M, NM or nmi) is a unit of distance, set by international agreement as 

being exactly 1,852 meters (about 6,076 feet). Historically, it was defined as the distance 

spanned by one minute of arc along a meridian of the Earth (north-south), and developed from 

the sea mile and the related geographical mile.

Graphic scale from a Mercator projection world map, showing the change with latitude

The nautical mile is also generally used by navigators at sea and in the air,[1] and also in polar 

exploration, and remains in use worldwide because of its convenience when working with 

charts.[2] Most nautical charts use the Mercator projection whose scale varies by about a factor of 

6 from the equator to 80° latitude, so charts covering large areas cannot use a single linear 

scale.

[3] The nautical mile is nearly equal to a minute of latitude on a chart, so a distance 

measured with a chart divider can be roughly converted to nautical miles using the chart's 

latitude scale.

Contents
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-14-00133-CV

IN RE TERRY JUSTIN SMITH

Original Proceeding

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Because a protective order is a final, appealable order, relator had an adequate 

remedy by appeal even if that remedy is no longer available. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. 

§ 81.009 (West 2014); In re Tex. Dep't of Family & Protective Servs., 210 S.W.3d 609, 614

(Tex. 2006); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 839 (Tex. 1992).1

Accordingly relator’s Petition for writ of Mandamus is denied. 

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

 

1 Smith filed a motion for new trial but we express no opinion about whether the time in which to file a 

notice of appeal, or a motion to extend the filing thereof, has expired.
In re Smith Page 2

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Davis, and

Justice Scoggins

Petition denied

Opinion delivered and filed May 9, 2014

[OT06]
#### The TRAVELERS INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Garfield HURST, Appellee.

No. 21740.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

April 1, 1965.

Ernest A. Carrere, Jr., John R. Peters, Jr., New Orleans, La., for the Travelers Ins. Co., defendant-appellant, Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, New Orleans, La., of counsel.

Frank D’Amico, New Orleans, La., for appellee.

Before WOODBURY,* JONES and GEWIN, Circuit Judges.

*

 Senior Judge of the First Circuit, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

In this diversity action instituted under the Louisiana Direct Action Statute, the plaintiff-appellee recovered damages for the death of his son, who received fatal injuries when the car in which he was riding collided with a tractor-trailer owned by Cudahy Packing Co., Inc., Appellant (Cudahy’s insurance carrier) contends that there was insufficient evidence that Cudahy’s negligence was a proximate cause of the collision to submit the case to the jury under Louisiana law. It asserts that the accident was caused solely by the negligence of the driver of the car in which the decedent was riding. We conclude that the evidence on the question of proximate cause was sufficient to warrant jury consideration.

In addition, the appellant complains of the failure of the trial court to *161instruct the jury to discount to its present value any lump sum awarded for loss of future support. We note that no instruction was requested on this point and that no objection was made upon failure to give such an instruction. On oral argument, counsel for the appellant stated, in effect, that he made a tactical decision not to object after the jury had been retired because of his fear of overemphasizing the quantum of damages. In the circumstances of this case and in light of the nature and amount of the damages which were awarded, we do not feel that the absence of such a charge constitutes plain error. '

The judgment is affirmed.
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, January 31, 2017.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, January 31, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A17I0128. WAFFLE HOUSE, INC. v. PAMELA PAVESI IN HER CAPACITY AS 

COURT APPOINTED GUARDIAN AND CUSTODIAN OF BRIAN E. MIKEALS.

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby GRANTED. The Appellant may file a Notice of Appeal within 10 days of the date of 

this order. The Clerk of State Court is directed to include a copy of this order in the record 

transmitted to the Court of Appeals.

LC NUMBERS:

16C02829
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 97-10396 Conference Calendar

JOHNNY DWAYNE STATEN, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus BOB PRUITT; HENDRICK MEDICAL CENTER, HERMAN SCHAFFER, Dr.; JOHN C. VALCIK, Dr., Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - - Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:97-CV-3-C

- - - - - - - - - - October 22, 1997 Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Johnny Dwayne Staten (#682286), a state prisoner, has appealed the dismissal of his civil rights complaint as frivolous. Staten contends that the defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his various medical conditions. We have carefully reviewed the record and Staten’s briefs. Essentially for reasons stated by the district court, Staten v. Pruitt , No. 1:97-CV-003-C (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1997) (unpublished), we hold that Staten has failed to demonstrate that the districtNo. 97-10396 -2- court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint as frivolous. Staten’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is GRANTED. All remaining motions are DENIED. Staten’s appeal is without arguable merit and thus frivolous. See Howard v. King , 707 F.2d. 215, 219-20 (5th Cir. 1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See 5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Staten that any additional frivolous appeals filed by him will invite the imposition of sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Staten is further cautioned to review any pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise arguments that are frivolous. APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED; MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF GRANTED; REMAINING MOTIONS DENIED.
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

STATE OF FLORIDA

_____________________________

No. 1D2024-1066

_____________________________

RICARDO L. JOHNSON,

Appellant,

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Appellee.

_____________________________

On appeal from the Circuit Court for Wakulla County.

J. Layne Smith, Judge.

September 11, 2024

PER CURIAM.

DISMISSED. Jones v. Jones, 845 So. 2d 1012, 1013 (Fla. 5th 

DCA 2003). 

LEWIS, ROBERTS, and BILBREY, JJ., concur.

_____________________________

Not final until disposition of any timely and 

authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 

9.331.

_____________________________
2

Ricardo L. Johnson, pro se, Appellant.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Anne C. Conley, Assistant 

Attorney General, Tallahassee, for Appellee.
Relator seeks a writ of mandamus to compel Margaret Montemayor, District Clerk of Bexar County, to provide 1

him with a copy of his records in cause No. 94-CR-5424.

i i i i i i

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04-08-00589-CR

IN RE Jorge I. QUIROZ

Original Mandamus Proceeding1

PER CURIAM

Sitting: Alma L. López, Chief Justice

Sandee Bryan Marion, Justice

Steven C. Hilbig, Justice

Delivered and Filed: August 27, 2008

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DISMISSED FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Jorge I. Quiroz filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the District Clerk of

Bexar County to provide him with a copy of the records from his criminal conviction for use in

pursuing post-conviction remedies. This court has no mandamus jurisdiction over district clerks

unless the issuance of the writ is necessary to enforce our jurisdiction. In re O’Brian, No. 04-04-

00453-CV, 2004 WL 1562148, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 14, 2004, orig. proceeding)

(mem. op.); In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d 691, 692 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, orig.

proceeding). Because we have no jurisdiction over post-conviction writs of habeas corpus in felony

cases, the district clerk’s alleged refusal to provide Quiroz with a copy of his records does not affect

our jurisdiction. In re O’Brian, 2004 WL 1562148, at *1; In re Coronado, 980 S.W.2d at 692; TEX.
04-08-00589-CR

-2-

CODE CRIM.PROC. art. 11.07. Accordingly, Quiroz’s petition for writ of mandamus is dismissed for

lack of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

DO NOT PUBLISH
Exhibit 32.2

CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 (18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350)

In
connection  with the  accompanying  Quarterly  Report  of  Genta  Incorporated  (the
Company) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended  March 31, 2005 (the  Report),
I,  William P. Keane,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the Company,  certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. Section 1350, as  adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, that:

|(3) |  | The
Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section  13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and
|--- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

|(4) |  | The
information  contained in the Report fairly presents,  in  all material  respects,  the
financial  condition and results  of operations of the Company.
|--- |  | -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: May 10,
2005

|/s/ WILLIAM P. KEANE    | 
|----------------------- | 
|William P. Keane       
|Chief Financial Officer

29

---
<page>		 			  EXHIBIT 31.02

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Jeffrey D. Hahn, Chief Financial Officer of Demeter Management
Corporation ("Demeter"), the general partner of the registrant,
certify that:

1.		I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the
registrant;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for,
the periods presented in this report;

4.		The registrant's other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:

a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others
within those entities, particularly during the period in
which this report is being prepared;

b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this
report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the
disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the
period covered by this report based on such evaluation;
and

c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred
during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting; and


<page>
5.		The registrant's other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of Demeter's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant role
in the registrant's internal control over financial
reporting.





Date:  November 14, 2003    /s/Jeffrey D. Hahn
                               Jeffrey D. Hahn
                               Chief Financial Officer,
                               Demeter Management Corporation,
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM REGISTRANT'S
REPORT ON FORM 10-K FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED APRIL 30, 1999 AND IS QUALIFIED IN
ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>                                   1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                              APR-30-1999
<PERIOD-START>                                 MAY-01-1998
<PERIOD-END>                                   APR-30-1999
<CASH>                                                 2,131
<SECURITIES>                                               0
<RECEIVABLES>                                         10,210
<ALLOWANCES>                                               0
<INVENTORY>                                           13,716
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                      38,136
<PP&E>                                                57,276
<DEPRECIATION>                                        42,057
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                        54,987
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                 62,476
<BONDS>                                                  327
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                      0
<PREFERRED>                                           21,021
<COMMON>                                              28,761
<OTHER-SE>                                            57,598
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                          54,987
<SALES>                                              195,012
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     195,012
<CGS>                                                184,015
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                        184,015
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                           0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                           0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                     4,732
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      (10,342)
<INCOME-TAX>                                             (96)
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  (10,246)
<DISCONTINUED>                                             0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                            0
<CHANGES>                                                  0
<NET-INCOME>                                         (10,246)
<EPS-BASIC>                                          (1.07)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                          (1.07)


</TABLE>
EXHIBIT 32.2



STATEMENT OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER

OF PTEK HOLDINGS, INC.

PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

§ 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In
connection with the Quarterly Report of PTEK Holdings, Inc. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the
undersigned William E. Franklin, Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | 1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | -- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | 2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | -- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/ William E. FranklinWilliam E. Franklin Executive Vice President and Chief Financial Officer PTEK Holdings, Inc. November 14, 2003




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to PTEK Holdings, Inc. and will be retained by PTEK Holdings, Inc. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon request.
- 1 - 

Alexander Van der Bellen 

Managing Director and 

Associate General Counsel 

Delta Air Lines, Inc. 

1212 New York Avenue NW 

Washington, DC 20005 

202.842.4184 

sascha.vanderbellen@delta.com 

May 12, 2010 

via email and regulations.gov 

Ms. Dorothy Beard 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Docket Operations 

West Building Ground Floor 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

 

 RE: Letters of Support for Delta Air Lines 

 Application for Detroit-Sao Paulo Frequencies 

 Docket DOT-OST-2010-0090 

 

 

Dear Ms. Beard: 

Enclosed are letters of support for Delta’s Application for Detroit –Sao Paulo frequencies from 

several major Michigan corporations. 

 

 

Respectfully submitted, 

Alexander Van der Bellen 

cc: Service List 

 

 

 
May 7, 2010 

The Honorable Ray LaHood, Secretary 

United States Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE 

Washington, DC 20590 

Re: Delta Air Lines Application for 

Detroit – Sao Paulo Frequencies 

Docket OST-2010-0090 

Dear Secretary LaHood; 

On behalf of Ford Motor Company, I am writing to express our strong support for the 

application of Delta Air Lines for additional frequencies usable on the Detroit-Sao Paulo 

route. 

Ford Motor Company has an important and growing presence in Brazil, and we are very 

pleased that Delta has announced nonstop Detroit-Sao Paulo service beginning in 

October, 2010. Unfortunately, Delta is restricted to offering just two flights a week. The 

needs of international business travelers and international commerce would be better 

served if Delta were able to operate a daily service. 

I understand that Delta has applied to DOT for authority that will enable the expansion 

of service between Detroit and Sao Paulo as soon as airport infrastructure constraints 

are resolved. I urge you to take this opportunity to provide Detroit with additional 

service on this important new route. 

Thank you for consideration of this request. 

Sincerely, 

KENNETH W. SHARPE 

Global Strategy & Communications Manager 

Ford Motor Company 

1 American Road 

Dearborn, Michigan 48126 


SERVICE LIST 

A copy of the foregoing document has been served this 12th day of May, 2010, upon the 

following persons via email: 

carl.nelson@aa.com 

howard_kass@usairways.com 

benjamin.slocum@usairways.com 

hkamen@coair.com 

dan.weiss@coair.com 

rbkeiner@crowell.com (for Continental) 

mrosia@crowell.com (for Continental) 

jeffrey.manley@united.com 

julie.oettinger@united.com 

robert.land@jetblue.com 

jhill@dlalaw.com (for JetBlue) 

dkirstein@yklaw.com (for Spirit) 

jyoung@yklaw.com (for Spirit) 

paul.gretch@dot.gov 

esta.rosenberg@dot.gov 

brian.hedberg@dot.gov 

byerlyjr@state.gov 

john.allen@faa.gov 

lester.robinson@wcaa.us 

emily.neuberger@wcaa.us 

joe.cambron@wcaa.us 

mike.orr@airlineinfo.com
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

RYAN M. HAYES,
Petitioner, Case No. 3:18-cv-55

Vs - District Judge Walter Herbert Rice
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

WARDEN, Noble Correctional Institution,

Respondent.

ORDER ADOPTING SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Court has reviewed the Supplemental Report and Recommendations of United States
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz (ECF No. 5), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(b), and noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing
such objections under Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) has expired, hereby ADOPTS said Supplemental Report
and Recommendations.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition be DISMISSED with prejudice.
Petitioner is DENIED any requested certificate of appealability and the Court hereby certifies to
the United States Court of Appeals that an appeal would be objectively frivolous and therefore

should not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.

April 3d__, 2018. Ronee

Walter Herbert Rice
United States District Judge