J-A33016-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

TYWAN JONES

Appellant No. 437 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Dated March 9, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0000999-2015

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., SOLANO, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY SOLANO, J.: FILED APRIL 11, 2017

Appellant, Tywan Jones, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

imposed after a jury convicted him of aggravated assault, recklessly 

endangering another person, and possession of an instrument of crime.1 We 

affirm.

On March 7, 2015, at the Knotty Pine Tavern in Erie, Appellant and the 

Victim, Yagoub Arounda, “became involved in a verbal altercation, which 

escalated into a physical fight.” Trial Ct. Op., 5/17/16, at 1. “As the victim 

began punching, Appellant began stabbing him multiple times.” Id. Three 

days later, Appellant was arrested and charged.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2702(a)(1), 2705, and 907(b), respectively.
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On January 13, 2016, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. Prior to trial, 

venirepersons were required to complete the written juror information 

questionnaire, as required by Pa.R.Crim.P. 632.2 Pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

632(H), the following questions were included:

8. Would you be more likely to believe the testimony of a 

police officer or any other law enforcement officer because of his 

or her job?

9. Would you be less likely to believe the testimony of a 

police officer or other law enforcement officer because of his or 

her job?

Multiple venirepersons initially answered that they would be more likely to 

believe the testimony of a police officer.3 The record is silent as to what 

transpired next, but subsequently the trial court explained this aspect of the 

questionnaire to the venire, as follows:

There is a question that you’ve all answered on your 

questionnaire, whatever your answer may be – let me say this, 

the question is about a police officer’s testimony, and it says: 

Would you believe a police officer just because he is a police 

officer?

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2 Since no party requested that the jury questionnaires be preserved, they 

were destroyed as part of normal court procedure, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 

632(F).

3

The record is unclear as to the exact number of venirepersons who 

answered this question affirmatively. In his statement of matters 

complained of on appeal, Appellant claimed that “[a]t least ten members of 

the prospective jury answered ‘yes.’” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement at 2. The 

Commonwealth does not dispute that assertion. Appellant does not claim 

that any members of the venire who responded affirmatively to Question 8 

were seated on his jury.
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Under the law, all witnesses are equal when they take this 

witness stand, in terms of the fact that they are entitled to the 

same consideration as to their credibility. That means that just 

because someone is given a badge, a gun and a uniform, when 

they come into court doesn’t mean that they’re to be judged any 

differently in terms of credibility. That is, by any different 

standard. And those are things that I’ll instruct the jurors at the 

end of the trial to consider.

So under the law, a witness is not to be believed just because he 

is a police office[r], he is a doctor, he is a lawyer, he is an auto 

mechanic, it doesn’t make any difference. Those witnesses may 

be truthful, they may not be truthful. They may be mistaken, 

they may not be mistaken. There are considerations that you 

are to apply to all of those witnesses when you determine 

credibility, and with the police officer, you can also consider his 

education, training, experience, et cetera, as you would with any 

other witnesses. But no one is to be, under the law, believed 

just because they hold a certain position.

Is there anyone here who would not be able to follow that 

tenant[4] of our criminal justice system?

N.T. Trial, 1/13/16, at 8-10.5 None of the venirepersons then answered 

affirmatively. Trial Ct. Op., 5/17/16, at 4; see also N.T., 1/13/16, at 10. 

Appellant did not object to this clarification at any point during voir dire.

Shortly thereafter, Appellant asked to examine individually those 

venirepersons who originally answered on their questionnaires that they are 

“more likely to believe the testimony of a police officer,” which counsel 

erroneously referred to as question “number nine.” N.T., 1/13/16, at 13-14, 

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4 We assume this is a mistranscription of “tenet.”

5 The record does not indicate whether the trial court’s explanation was 

unprompted or was the result of a review of the completed questionnaires.
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18. The trial court denied this request. Appellant renewed his request at a 

later time, and the trial court again denied it.

On January 15, 2016, after a three-day trial, Appellant was convicted. 

On March 9, 2016, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence of 6.5 – 15 

years’ incarceration. On March 23, 2016, Appellant filed a timely notice of 

appeal.

Appellant raises a single question for our review:

Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt committed reversible error when it 

denied [Appellant’s] request to individually examine prospective 

[jurors] that indicated bias by answering “yes” to question 

number nine (9) of the Jury Questionnaire.

Appellant’s Brief at 1-2.6

“The process of selecting a jury is committed to the sound discretion of 

the trial judge and will be reversed only where the record indicates an abuse 

of discretion, and the appellant carries the burden of showing that the jury 

was not impartial.” Commonwealth v. Noel, 104 A.3d 1156, 1169 (Pa. 

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6

In response, the Commonwealth’s appellate brief merely states: “The 

court did not deny the [A]ppellant right and accurate representation during 

voir dire, nor abuse its discretion in the voir dire process. The jury did not 

disregard its duty to follow the law as instructed.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 

2. Otherwise, the Commonwealth “incorporate[d] the reasoning of the trial 

court in its Opinion, dated May 17, 2016[.]” Id. The trial court’s reasoning, 

in its entirety, is: “Judge Connelly explained to the jury panel the relevant 

law and meaning of question nine. After his explanation, none of the jurors 

responded affirmatively to the question, thereby inferring that the 

empaneled jury was free from bias in favor of a police officer’s testimony 

and thus, no further questioning was necessary. According[ly], Appellant’s 

third claim is meritless.” Tr. Ct. Op., 5/17/16, at 4.
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2014) (plurality) (citing Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 889 A.2d 501, 519 

(Pa. 2005)). “The purpose of voir dire is to ensure the empaneling of a fair 

and impartial jury capable of following the instructions on the law as 

provided by the trial court.” Id. at 1168. Where an appellant “has not 

demonstrated that the process deprived him of a fair and impartial jury, 

neither do we conclude that Appellant suffered actual prejudice.” Id. at 

1172.

The question relevant to a determination of qualification is 

whether any biases or prejudices can be put aside upon the 

proper instruction of the court.

A challenge for cause to service by a prospective juror should be 

sustained and that juror excused where that juror demonstrates 

through his conduct and answers a likelihood of prejudice.

Commonwealth v. Penn, 132 A.3d 498, 502 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation 

omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Briggs, 12 A.3d 291, 333 (Pa.), 

cert. denied, 565 U.S. 889 (2011); Commonwealth v. Cox, 983 A.2d 

666, 682 (Pa. 2009).

Here, the trial court explained to the jury panel the relevant law and 

meaning of the question, “Would you be more likely to believe the testimony 

of a police officer or any other law enforcement officer because of his or her 

job?” The trial court’s explanation was clear and accurate, and it 

appropriately told the venirepersons that they should not make credibility 

determinations solely on the basis of a witness’ status as a police officer. 

Appellant did not object to the trial court’s elucidation during voir dire and 
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does not now contend that the trial court erred in giving the explanation.7 

After receiving the explanation, none of the venirepersons said that he or 

she did not understand it or was unable to follow it. See N.T., 1/13/16, at 

8-10. That fact made any individual interrogation of the members of the 

venire unnecessary. 

Additionally, Appellant does not contend that any of the venireperons 

who originally gave affirmative answers to Question 8 were ultimately 

selected for his jury. In the absence of such evidence, Appellant cannot 

demonstrate a likelihood of prejudice. And because Appellant cannot 

demonstrate that the voir dire process deprived him of a fair and impartial 

jury, we cannot conclude that he suffered actual prejudice. See Noel, 104 

A.3d at 1172; see also Briggs, 12 A.3d at 333; Cox, 983 A.2d at 682; 

Penn, 132 A.3d at 502. 

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7

In his Rule 1925(b) Statement, Appellant claimed that the trial court’s 

explanation was inaccurate because there is a “substantial and material 

difference” between what was asked in Question 8 — “would you more likely 

to believe the testimony of a police officer or any other law enforcement 

officer because of his or her job ?” — and the trial court’s explanation that 

the question asked, “Would you believe a police officer just because he is a

police officer?” Appellant has not included that issue in this appeal, and 

therefore has waived it, but his brief nevertheless repeats the contention 

that the trial court’s explanation was inaccurate. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. 

We see no material inaccuracy in the trial court’s explanation. The court 

made clear that Question 8 was intended to ensure that jurors did not base 

credibility determinations on whether a witness was a police officer. 

Because Appellant did not object to the trial court’s explanation when it was 

made, Appellant may not raise this objection now.
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Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s 

request to individually question members of the venire, and Appellant has 

failed to show that his jury was not fair and impartial. See Noel, 104 A.3d 

at 1168.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judge Lazarus joins the memorandum. 

Judge Strassburger files a concurring memorandum. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 4/11/2017