J-S21001-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 

OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: J.I.A, A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: U.S.A., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 182 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 9, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2022-01046

IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TERMINATION 

OF: U.T.A., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: U.S.A., JR., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 183 MDA 2023

Appeal from the Order Entered January 9, 2023

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County Orphans' Court at 

No(s): 2022-01047

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: AUGUST 9, 2023

U.S.A., Jr. (“Father”) appeals the January 9, 2023 decrees that 

involuntarily terminated his parental rights to his biological sons, J.I.A., born 

in June 2009, and U.T.A., born in March 2011. We affirm.

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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We glean the factual and procedural history of this matter from the 

certified record, which the orphans’ court has aptly summarized, as follows:1

C.LS. (“Mother”) is the natural mother of J.I.A., U.T.A., and 

D.M.M. Father is the biological father of U.T.A. and J.I.A., while 

[t]he father of D.M.M. is unknown . . . . 

[Lebanon County Children and Youth Services (“CYS” or “the 

agency”)] first became involved with the family on August 16, 

2020, due to Mother’s substance use and mental health behavior 

issues. . . . [In connection with these allegations], Mother signed 

over guardianship of J.I.A. and U.T.A. to S.M., a family friend. The 

agency opened a case for all of the children in November 2020. 

At that time, Father was [living apart from the family in New York

and] Mother’s whereabouts were unknown . . . .

[In January 2021,] concerns arose about [S.M.’s] suspected drug 

use, home conditions, and that [she] refused to drug test when 

requested. The agency requested emergency custody of U.T.A. 

on January 26, 2021[, which was granted the same day.] U.T.A. 

was adjudicated dependent on February 8, 2021. [At this time, 

Father’s whereabouts were unknown to the agency, although he 

was suspected to be in New York with Mother.]

Thereafter, during the summer of 2021, the agency received 

reports that J.I.A. was back in Pennsylvania at the maternal 

grandmother’s home; however, the agency could not confirm 

these reports. Father and Mother alleged that J.I.A. was in New 

York with a relative. The relative, however, denied having J.I.A[.]

The agency located J.I.A. at his football game on September 17, 

2021. The same day, the agency was awarded emergency 

custody of J.I.A. He was placed into a kinship foster home with 

his football coaches[.] On November 29, 2021, J.I.A. was 

adjudicated dependent[.]

Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 4-5 (cleaned up).

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1

 On January 9, 2023, the orphans’ court also terminated Mother’s parental 

rights to, inter alia, J.I.A. and U.T.A. She has appealed those determinations 

at 222 and 223 MDA 2023, which we have addressed in a separate writing.
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The orphans’ court initially established a permanency goal of 

reunification with respect to U.T.A. and J.I.A. Father was assigned numerous 

objectives including, inter alia, obtaining suitable housing, finding stable 

employment, submitting to regular drug tests, obtaining a drug and alcohol 

assessment, and participating in visits with U.T.A. and J.I.A. See N.T., 

1/9/23, at 21-22; see also CYS Exhibit 3 (permanency plan for J.I.A.), CYS 

Exhibit 4 (permanency plan for U.T.A.), CYS Exhibit 5 (permanency plan for 

D.M.M.). Father was most recently incarcerated in approximately April 2022. 

In August 2022, he received a sentence of eighteen months to seven years of 

imprisonment. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 21, 24, 34, 63-65.

On December 20, 2022, the agency filed petitions seeking to, inter alia,

involuntarily terminate Father’s parental rights.2 On January 9, 2023, the 

court held a termination hearing, at which point U.T.A. had been in placement 

for approximately twenty-four months while J.I.A. had been in placement for 

approximately sixteen months. At the hearing, the agency adduced testimony 

from CYS foster care supervisor Angelica Farrisi. Father testified on his own 

behalf. The same day as the hearing, the orphans’ court entered decrees 

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2

 On December 20, 2022, the orphans’ court appointed a guardian ad litem 

and separate legal counsel to represent, respectively, the best interests and 

the legal interests of, inter alia, U.T.A. and J.I.A. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a). 

Legal counsel has filed a brief in this Court advocating that the orphans’ court’s 

termination decrees be affirmed.
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involuntarily terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).

On February 1, 2023, Father filed separate, timely notices of appeal 

along with concise statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to 

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(1)(i) and (b). On appeal, this Court sua sponte

consolidated the above-captioned cases pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 513.

Father has raised two claims for our consideration:

A. Whether the [orphans’] court committed an error of law 

and/or abused its discretion by terminating the parental rights of 

[Father]?

B. Whether the [orphans’] court committed an error of law 

and/or abused its discretion in finding the termination of parental 

rights [was proper pursuant to] 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), 

and (8) as to J.I.A. and U.T.A.?

Father’s brief at 4.

Our standard of review in this context is well-settled:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental rights, 

appellate review is limited to a determination of whether the 

decree of the termination court is supported by competent 

evidence. When applying this standard, the appellate court must 

accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact and credibility 

determinations if they are supported by the record. Where the 

orphans’ court’s factual findings are supported by the evidence, 

an appellate court may not disturb the orphans’ court’s ruling 

unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of discretion.

An abuse of discretion does not result merely because the 

reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion or the 

facts could support an opposite result. Instead, an appellate court 

may reverse for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration 

of manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or illwill. This standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial 
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courts, who often observe the parties first-hand across multiple 

hearings.

In considering a petition to terminate parental rights, the orphans’ 

court must balance the parent’s fundamental right to make 

decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of his or her 

child with the child’s essential needs for a parent’s care, 

protection, and support. Termination of parental rights has 

significant and permanent consequences for both the parent and 

child. As such, the law of this Commonwealth requires the moving 

party to establish the statutory grounds by clear and convincing 

evidence, which is evidence that is so clear, direct, weighty, and 

convincing as to enable a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, 

without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.

Interest of M.E., 283 A.3d 820, 829-30 (Pa. Super. 2022) (cleaned up).

The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by 23 

Pa.C.S. § 2511 of the Adoption Act, which necessitates a bifurcated analysis 

that first focuses upon the “eleven enumerated grounds” of parental conduct 

that may warrant termination pursuant to § 2511(a)(1)-(11). Id. at 830. If 

the orphans’ court determines that a petitioner has established grounds for 

termination under at least one of these subsections by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” the court then assesses the petition under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), 

which focuses upon the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare. In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). This Court “need 

only agree with any one subsection of § 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in 

order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” T.S.M., supra at 267. 

In the instant case, the orphans’ court found that termination was 

appropriate pursuant to § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). However, we need 

only agree with one such subsection, in addition to § 2511(b), in order to 
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affirm involuntary termination. Thus, our analysis in this proceeding 

implicates § 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provides as follows:

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may 

be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

Pursuant to section 2511(a)(2), the party petitioning for termination of 

parental rights must establish: (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused 

the child to be without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) 

that the causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not 

be remedied. See In re Adoption of A.H., 247 A.3d 439, 443 (Pa.Super. 
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2021) (citing 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2)). Grounds sufficient for termination 

under section 2511(a)(2) are not limited to affirmative misconduct but may 

also concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. Id.

If a petitioner establishes adequate grounds for termination pursuant to 

§ 2511(a), the court turns to § 2511(b), which requires that it “give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). “Notably, courts should consider the 

matter from the child’s perspective, placing [their] developmental, physical, 

and emotional needs and welfare above concerns for the parent.” In the 

Interest of K.T., ___ A.3d ___, 2023 WL 4092986 at *13 (Pa. June 21, 

2023). This determination “should not be applied mechanically,” but “must 

be made on a case-by-case basis,” wherein “the court must determine each 

child’s specific needs.” Id. at *14. Accordingly, as our Supreme Court has 

recently explained, there is no “exhaustive list” of factors that must be 

considered in this context. Id. at *18 n.28.

Since its holding in In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), our Supreme 

Court has mandated that a court’s § 2511(b) analysis must include 

“consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and child.” T.S.M., 

supra at 267. Thus, the court must determine whether the “trauma” caused 

by sundering the parent-child bond is “outweighed by the benefit of moving 

the child toward a permanent home.” Id. at 253 (cleaned up). Specifically, 

the recognized threshold for this finding is that the court must determine 
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whether termination will sever a “necessary and beneficial relationship,” such 

that the child “could suffer extreme emotional consequences.” K.T., supra 

at *16. Our Supreme Court has emphasized, however, that such 

consequences must constitute more than mere proof of “an adverse or 

detrimental impact from severance of the parental bond” in order to preclude 

termination. Id. at *18. Thus, “courts correctly refine their focus on the 

child’s development and mental and emotional health rather than considering 

only the child’s ‘feelings’ or ‘affection’ for the parent, which even badly abused 

and neglected children will retain.” Id. at *16 (citing T.S.M., supra at 267).

Our case law reflects that a court’s analysis pursuant to § 2511(b) is not 

narrow but must include consideration of “intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability.” T.S.M., supra at 267. Indeed, our Supreme Court 

has affirmed that “the parental bond is but one part of the overall subsection 

(b) analysis.” K.T., supra at *18. Thus, “courts must not only consider the 

child’s bond with the biological parent, but also examine the . . . love, comfort, 

security, and stability the child might have with the foster parent.” K.T., 

supra at *17 (cleaned up; emphasis in original). Our Supreme Court has 

noted that Pennsylvania courts should also consider, where appropriate due

to the particular facts of a case, related factors such as: (1) the child’s need 

for permanency and length of time in foster care; (2) whether the child is in 

a pre-adoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and (3) whether the 

foster home meets the child’s needs. Id. at *18.
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With these overarching legal principles in mind, we turn to Father’s

arguments. Although framed as separate issues, Father’s brief contains only 

a unitary argument that collectively addresses the orphans’ court’s findings 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 

2119(a). We discern that Father is arguing that the orphans’ court 

inappropriately relied solely upon the fact of his incarceration to terminate his 

parental rights. See Father’s brief at 13-14.

While Father argues that the orphans’ court inappropriately focused 

upon his incarceration in rendering this decision, our Supreme Court’s 

jurisprudence indicates otherwise: 

[I]ncarceration, while not a litmus test for termination, can be 

determinative of the question of whether a parent is incapable of 

providing “essential parental care, control or subsistence” and the 

length of the remaining confinement can be considered as highly 

relevant to whether the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the 

parent, sufficient to provide grounds for termination pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 830 (Pa. 2012). This Court has also 

explained:

Each case of an incarcerated parent facing termination must be 

analyzed on its own facts, keeping in mind . . . that the child's 

need for consistent parental care and stability cannot be put aside 

or put on hold[.] Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for 

a more suitable or convenient time to perform one's parental 

responsibilities while others provide the child with his or her 

physical and emotional needs. Rather, a parent must utilize all 

available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and

must exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in 

the path of maintaining the parent-child relationship.
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Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465, 474 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned up).

We emphasize that Father has been an absent parent in the lives of 

U.T.A. and J.I.A. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 61. Indeed, by his own admission, 

Father lived completely apart from the family in New York from at least 

September 2019 until February 2021. Id. In addition to this period of 

voluntary absence, Father has been sporadically imprisoned during the 

agency’s involvement with the family. Id. at 61-62, 67-68. The exact periods 

of, and reasons for, Father’s various terms of confinement are not entirely 

clear from the certified record. However, his most recent term of incarceration 

began in April 2022 and, ultimately, he received a sentence of eighteen 

months to seven years with no release date yet set. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 21, 

24, 34, 63-65. Whether imprisoned or free, however, the orphans’ court found 

that Father demonstrated a continued incapacity in that he has either refused, 

or been unable, to maintain verifiable housing, obtain employment, undergo 

mental health and drug and alcohol evaluations, or participate in visits with 

his sons. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 22. The orphans’ court 

concomitantly found that these incapacities had deprived U.T.A. and J.I.A. of 

essential parental care and subsistence. Id. Finally, the orphans’ court 

concluded that Father’s incapacities would not be remedied. Id.

Our review of the record reveals full support for the court’s findings. Ms. 

Farrisi testified that Father has never maintained appropriate housing or 

employment during the course of the agency’s involvement with the family. 
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See N.T., 1/9/23, at 37. She also testified that Father failed to obtain either 

a mental health evaluation or a drug and alcohol evaluation. Id. at 25-26. 

Ms. Farrisi’s testimony similarly reflected that Father was only able to 

participate in one supervised visit with U.T.A. or J.I.A. during their placements, 

i.e., for periods of twenty-four and sixteen months, respectively. Id. at 21, 

24, 34. Indeed, there is no indication in the record that Father has ever 

provided any relevant parental care or subsistence to U.T.A. and J.I.A.

Finally, competent evidence supports the orphans’ court’s determination 

that Father would not, or could not, remedy his incapacities. Even prior to his 

imprisonment, Ms. Farrisi reported that Father was evasive and noncooperative with the agency. Id. at 21-26, 34-37. Father has now been 

incarcerated since April 2022 and is currently serving a sentence with a 

maximum term of seven years. Id. at 63. Furthermore, as of the termination 

hearing in January 2023, U.T.A. was approximately eleven years old and had 

been in placement for two years, while J.I.A. was approximately thirteen years 

old and had been in placement for sixteen months. Forcing U.T.A. and J.I.A.

to wait for Father’s release at some future, uncertain date would essentially 

hold what little remains of their childhood ransom to an eventuality that may 

never come to fruition. See In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 

(Pa.Super. 2006) (“The court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a 

child's need for permanence and stability to a parent's . . . hope for the 

future.”). Instantly, Father’s repeated and continued incapacity due to his 
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incarceration has caused U.T.A. and J.I.A. to be without essential parental 

care, control, and subsistence necessary for their physical or mental wellbeing. See S.P., supra at 830 (“A parent who is incapable of performing 

parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the 

duties.” (cleaned up)).

Based on the foregoing, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in 

the orphans’ court’s conclusion that involuntary termination of Father’s 

parental rights was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2). 

Father has advanced no colorable argument concerning § 2511(b). The 

statute is neither cited nor discussed with particularity in his brief to this Court. 

See Father’s brief at 7-16. We note that “[i]t is well-settled that this Court 

will not review a claim unless it is developed in the argument section of an 

appellant's brief, and supported by citations to relevant authority.” In re 

M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa.Super. 2017). On this ground, alone, we 

could find that Father has waived any claim regarding the orphans’ court’s 

holding pursuant to § 2511(b). Id. at 466 n.3 (disapproving of a requirement 

that this Court should address § 2511(b) “even where the appellant has made 

no effort to present a challenge regarding that section”).

Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, we review the orphans’ 

court’s needs and welfare analysis. In terminating Father’s parental rights, 

the orphans’ court found that: (1) no parental bond existed between Father 

and either U.T.A. or J.I.A.; and (2) the involuntary termination of Father’s 
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parental rights would serve the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of J.I.A. and U.T.A., particularly with respect to affording them 

permanency and stability. See Orphans’ Court Opinion, 3/3/23, at 27-28. 

The evidence of record supports these conclusions.

As detailed above, the record establishes that Father’s only contact with 

U.T.A. and J.I.A. during this time period have been a single supervised 

visitation and occasional letters, which were not well-received by U.T.A. or 

J.I.A. Id. at 21, 24, 33-34. He has been largely absent from his sons’ lives 

and U.T.A. and J.I.A. have not expressed a desire to have continued contact 

with him. Id. at 72. Overall, we find ample support for the court’s conclusion 

that no parental bond exists. See Matter of M.P., 204 A.3d 976, 984 

(Pa.Super. 2019) (“Where there is no evidence of a bond between the parent 

and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.”). 

Furthermore, Ms. Farrisi reported that U.T.A. and J.I.A. are thriving in 

their respective placements and are bonded with their pre-adoptive foster

families. See N.T., 1/9/23, at 20-21. She also averred that J.I.A.’s and 

U.T.A.’s need for stability and permanency would be best served by 

terminating Father’s parental rights. Id. at 40. Her conclusion on this point 

is further buttressed by the long duration of the respective placements of each 

child in this matter. Id. at 21, 34. Accordingly, the orphans’ court’s 

conclusions with respect to § 2511(b) are supported by sufficient evidence.
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Based upon the review conducted above, we discern no abuse of 

discretion or error law in the orphans’ court’s holding.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 8/9/2023