Opinion filed January 8, 2015

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals __________

No. 11-13-00056-CR

__________

GORDON STANLEY BLOCKER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court No. 9

Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1266266

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Gordon Stanley Blocker pleaded guilty to driving while intoxicated (DWI).

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The trial court assessed punishment at confinement for ninety days and also 

assessed a $500 fine, but the court suspended Appellant’s confinement and placed 

 1

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.04 (West Supp. 2014).
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him on community supervision for one year. Appellant challenges the trial court’s 

denial of his motion to suppress blood-draw evidence. We affirm.

I. The Charged Offense

The State charged Appellant by information with the offense of DWI. A 

person commits the offense of DWI, a Class B misdemeanor, if he is “intoxicated 

while operating a motor vehicle in a public place.” PENAL § 49.04. A Class B 

misdemeanor is punishable by confinement in jail for a term not to exceed 180 

days and by a fine not to exceed $2,000. Id. § 12.22 (West 2011).

II. Background Facts and Procedural History

Patrick Kyle Truly, a patrol officer with the Hurst Police Department, 

testified at a pretrial hearing that he received a dispatch to go to a parking lot in the 

600 block of East Hurst Boulevard to respond to a report of a hit-and-run accident.

The original accident occurred in the 100 block of Hurstview Drive.

Officer Truly testified that he arrived at the scene and spoke with 

Officer Hull, who was already there. Officer Truly discovered that Appellant was 

the driver of one of the vehicles at the scene. Officer Hull informed Officer Truly 

that Appellant said that he did not realize he had been in an accident and that 

Appellant was “swaying,” “appeared to be off-balance,” and “had watery eyes.” 

Officer Truly testified that, in his experience, those were signs of intoxication. 

Officer Truly spoke with Appellant, and during that conversation, Appellant was 

“stumbling,” “appeared to have difficulty standing straight,” had slurred speech, 

was “thick-tongued,” and said that he was “driving from . . . Grapevine to a hotel 

in Hurst.” Officer Truly said that Appellant was headed in the wrong direction to 

get to the hotel and was unsure of his location.

Officer Truly administered standardized field sobriety tests to Appellant.

Appellant showed six clues out of eight on the “horizontal gaze nystagmus” test, 

seven clues out of eight on the “walk and turn” test, and two clues out of four on 
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the “one leg stand” test. Appellant’s demeanor and his performance on the 

standardized field sobriety tests gave Officer Truly probable cause to arrest 

Appellant for DWI; he arrested Appellant and took him to the Hurst jail. While at 

the jail, Appellant agreed to take a breath test. The breath test results reflected that 

Appellant had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.029 and 0.026. Officer Truly 

obtained a search warrant to draw blood from Appellant, and a sample of 

Appellant’s blood was taken. Appellant moved to suppress the blood-test 

evidence, and the trial court denied the motion. Appellant pleaded guilty and now 

appeals the trial court’s denial of that motion.

III. Issue Presented

Appellant challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress 

evidence because he claims that the affidavit to obtain the search warrant for a 

blood draw failed to show probable cause.

IV. Standard of Review

We examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether facts 

alleged in a probable cause affidavit sufficiently support a search warrant. 

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230–31 (1983). We will interpret the affidavit in a 

common-sense, rather than hyper-technical, manner. Id. at 236. We accord great 

deference to the magistrate, who may draw reasonable inferences from the facts 

and circumstances alleged, and will uphold the magistrate’s probable cause 

determination if he “had a ‘substantial basis for . . . conclud[ing],’ that a search 

would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.” Id. at 236 (alterations in original) 

(quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 271 (1960)). But probable cause is 

not shown where the magistrate has drawn too many inferences and the basis for 

the affidavit is tenuous instead of substantial. Davis v. State, 202 S.W.3d 149, 157 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
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V. Analysis

Police may draw a DWI suspect’s blood for investigation when they obtain a 

search warrant based on an affidavit that presents facts that establish probable 

cause. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 18.01(b), (j) (West Supp. 2014); Beeman v. State, 86 S.W.3d 613, 

616 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Facts establish probable cause if they show that a 

“fair probability” or “substantial chance” exists that contraband or evidence of a 

crime will be found at the specified location. Flores v. State, 319 S.W.3d 697, 702 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 238, 243 n.13). The 

magistrate uses the totality of the facts and circumstances in the affidavit to 

determine whether probable cause exists. Id. (citing Gates, 462 U.S. at 238).

Appellant complains that Officer Truly’s affidavit does not show probable 

cause that Appellant had operated a motor vehicle, that his physical condition was 

due to the introduction of prohibited substances, and that he had refused a blood 

test. The probable cause affidavit, which was prepared by Officer Truly, provided

in part:

5. . . . Defendant was driving southbound in the 100 block of 

Hurstview Drive when defendant’s vehicle was involved in an 

accident with a parked vehicle at a garage sale. Defendant continued 

southbound then turned eastbound onto West Hurst Blvd. (400 West 

Hurst Blvd). The victim then began following defendant until the 

defendant stopped in a parking lot at 600 East Hurst Blvd.

Officer Hull #647 arrived on scene first and advised the 

defendant stated he did not realize he was involved in an accident. 

Defendant was swaying, appeared off-balanced and had watery eyes. 

He appeared to have difficulty comprehending an accident occurred 

and that there was any damage to his vehicle.

I spoke with defendant on scene. Defendant was stumbling and 

appeared to have difficulty standing straight. His speech was slurred 

and was thick-tongued. Defendant advised he was coming from his 
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residence in Grapevine to a hotel in Hurst, located at 800 Thousand 

Oaks (going the wrong direction). Defendant was unsure what street 

he was on. He stated he had not consumed any alcoholic beverages 

and was not on any medication. He also advised he was healthy and 

had no medical conditions.

Due to defendant being involved in an accident and being 

unaware, his slurred speech, watery eyes, and off-balanced 

movements, I requested defendant to perform SFST’s. Defendant 

exhibited six clues on the HGN. On the Walk and Turn, defendant

had difficulty following instructions, exhibited seven clues and never 

fully completed the test. On the One Leg Stand, instructions were 

repeated multiple times and defendant again never fully completed the 

test.

I placed the defendant under arrest for DWI. During the 

interview, defendant agreed to give a sample of his breath. Results 

indicated a sample of 0.029 and 0.026. During the test, defendant 

advised he may have consumed one beverage that contained alcohol. 

Defendant also agreed to give a blood sample, but later refused.

. . . .

I made the following observations about the suspect:

[Under “Balance,” “swaying” and “unsteady” are 

marked; under “Walking,” “staggering” and “swaying” 

are marked; under “Speech,” “slurred” and “thicktongued” are marked; under “Eyes,” “watering” is 

marked; under “Odor of Alcoholic Beverage on breath,”

“slight” is marked; and beside “Suspected impairment 

caused by:” “alcohol & drug” is marked.]

6. I have seen intoxicated persons on many occasions in the 

past. Based on all of the above and my experience and training, I 

determined that the suspect was intoxicated, and I placed the suspect 

under arrest for Driving While Intoxicated. I requested a sample of 

the suspect’s breath and/or blood, which the suspect refused to 

provide.
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Appellant complains that portions of the affidavit are conclusory and that the 

magistrate had to draw too many inferences to find probable cause. The magistrate 

makes his determination of probable cause after a review of the entire affidavit, not 

after a review of isolated statements. See CRIM. PROC. art. 18.01(b); Flores, 319 

S.W.3d at 702. The magistrate could have found the following facts from 

Officer Truly’s affidavit: 

(1) Officer Truly was a peace officer with the Hurst Police Department; 

(2) Appellant was the named suspect, and the Hurst Police Department 

had custody of him; 

(3) Officer Hull relayed to Officer Truly that Appellant was swaying, 

appeared off-balanced, had watery eyes, said he did not realize he was 

involved in an accident, and appeared to have difficulty 

comprehending an accident occurred and there was any damage to his 

vehicle;

(4) Officer Truly spoke with Appellant and observed that he was 

stumbling, appeared to have difficulty standing straight, had slurred 

speech, and was thick-tongued; 

(5) Appellant told Officer Truly that he traveled from Grapevine to Hurst 

and told Officer Truly that he had not consumed any alcoholic 

beverages, was not on any medication, was healthy, and had no 

medical conditions;

(6) Officer Truly, based on his observations of Appellant, administered 

standardized field sobriety tests to Appellant, and Appellant showed 

signs of intoxication, so Officer Truly arrested Appellant for DWI; 

(7) Appellant’s breath test results were 0.029 and 0.026; and 

(8) Officer Truly requested a blood sample, and Appellant refused to give 

one. 

See Gates, 462 U.S. at 236 (explaining that courts review probable cause affidavits 

using common sense). The magistrate also could have inferred that Officer Hull, 

who had spoken to Appellant, and Officer Truly, with his knowledge, training, and 

experience, had deduced that Appellant had operated a vehicle while intoxicated

and that Appellant had caused an accident that damaged Appellant’s vehicle. 
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Furthermore, the magistrate could have determined that Appellant’s blood sample 

was evidence that would confirm Appellant’s intoxication. See id. at 240 

(explaining magistrates may make reasonable inferences from the facts and 

circumstances in the affidavit).

We hold that the affidavit outlined facts that showed a “fair probability” or 

“substantial chance” existed that Appellant’s blood contained evidence of DWI. 

See Flores, 319 S.W.3d at 702. The magistrate did not err when he found probable 

cause based on the affidavit because the totality of the facts and circumstances 

outlined in the affidavit provided the magistrate with a substantial basis for 

concluding that a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing. See Gates, 462 

U.S. at 236, 238, 240. We hold that the affidavit to obtain the search warrant for a 

blood draw showed probable cause. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s sole 

point of error. 

VI. This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

MIKE WILLSON

JUSTICE

January 8, 2015

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., 

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.