The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States District

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Judge for the District of South Dakota.

 Language formerly in Rule 32(c)(3)(D) was amended and

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relocated to Rule 32(c)(1) in 1994. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 32

Advisory Committee Notes (1996).

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No. 96-2805

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United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * District of South Dakota.

William St. John, *

 * [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

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 Submitted: February 4, 1997

 Filed: February 7, 1997

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Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

William St. John appeals from the 41-month sentence imposed by the

district court following his guilty plea to theft of property in Indian

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Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 661 and 1153. We affirm.

We reject St. John's argument on appeal that, when considering

imposition of an enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 2B1.1(b)(4)(A) (1995) for more than minimal planning, the district court

violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1). St. John did not

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dispute any factual allegation in the
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presentence report (PSR). Rather, he objected only to the application of

the more-than-minimal-planning enhancement based on the uncontested facts.

In such circumstances, Rule 32(c)(1) is not implicated. See United States

v. Tovar, 27 F.3d 497, 499-500 (10th Cir. 1994). Given the evidence in the

record that St. John took definite precautions to conceal the automobile

theft at issue, and that he had an extensive prior history of automobile

thefts, we conclude the district court did not clearly err in finding more

than minimal planning. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1,

comment. (n.1(f)) (1995); United States v. Coney, 949 F.2d 966, 968 (8th

Cir. 1991) (standard of review).

We further reject St. John's argument that the district court erred

in departing upward under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 (1995).

St. John's 30 criminal-history points placed him in Criminal History

Category VI. In departing upward beyond Category VI, the Guidelines direct

the sentencing court to "structure the departure by moving incrementally

down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal

History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the

case." The district court's methodology achieved the result of moving

incrementally six levels down the sentencing table, and we find such

methodology reasonable. See United States v. Dixon, 71 F.3d 380, 382-83

(11th Cir. 1995) (district court need not explicitly discuss reason for

bypassing incremental offense level; departure above Category VI will be

reviewed for reasonableness); cf. United States v. McKinley, 84 F.3d 904,

911 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding district court's methodology reasonable and

sufficiently linked to structure of Guidelines where court moved down eight

levels, or one level for every three criminal history points over number

required for placement in Category VI); United States v. Cash, 983 F.2d

558, 561 n.6 (4th Cir. 1992) (departing above Category VI by moving

vertically to successively higher offense levels will produce roughly same

10-15% increase in guideline range
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as extrapolating horizontally by extending criminal history categories),

cert. denied, 508 U.S. 924 (1993).

Moreover, the sentence imposed by the district court was not an abuse

of discretion, as St. John had more than double the number of criminal

history points required to reach Category VI, and the sentence was well

below the five-year statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C. § 661; United States

v. Poe, 96 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1996) (standard of review); United

States v. Saffeels, 39 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v.

Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990).

Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.