alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
                            THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION
                    EXTRACTED FROM THE BALANCE SHEET AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND
                                      THE STATEMENT OF INCOME FOR THE YEAR ENDED
                 DECEMBER 31, 1997 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE
                                                   TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK>                         797977
<NAME>                        PARTICIPATING INCOME PROPERTIES 1986, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER>                                              1
<CURRENCY>                                     U.S. DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                         DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                              DEC-31-1997
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                     1
<CASH>                                      2,402,680
<SECURITIES>                                        0
<RECEIVABLES>                                 262,177
<ALLOWANCES>                                        0
<INVENTORY>                                         0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                    0
<PP&E>                                     37,069,375
<DEPRECIATION>                             12,253,903
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             27,480,329
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                               0
<BONDS>                                             0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                               0
<PREFERRED>                                         0
<COMMON>                                            0
<OTHER-SE>                                 25,963,374
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               27,480,329
<SALES>                                             0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                            6,297,173
<CGS>                                               0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                               2,052,340
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                    0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                    0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                  0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                             4,239,903
<INCOME-TAX>                                        0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                         4,239,903
<DISCONTINUED>                                      0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                     0
<CHANGES>                                           0
<NET-INCOME>                                4,239,903
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                   81.21
<EPS-DILUTED>                                       0


</TABLE>
**EXHIBIT 99.2**

**CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C.SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

          I, Blair W. Geddes, certify, pursuant to18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of ActivCard S.A. on Form 10-Q for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2003 fully complies with the requirements ofSection 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects the financial condition and results of operations of ActivCard S.A.

|   | Date: May 14, 2003                     | /s/ BLAIR W. GEDDES |   |
|--------|---------------------------------------------|--------------------------|--------|
|   |                                             |                     |
|   | **Blair W. Geddes Chief Financial Officer** |                     |

          A signed original of this written statement required bysection 906 has been provided to ActivCard S.A. and will be retained by ActivCard S.A. and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission upon request.
EXHIBIT
      21.1







*SUBSIDIARIES
      OF REGISTRANT*










P.A.M.
      Transport, Inc. (Arkansas Corporation)





P.A.M.
      Dedicated Services, Inc. (Ohio Corporation)





P.A.M.
      Logistics Services, Inc. (Arkansas Corporation)





T.T.X.,
      Inc. (Texas Corporation)





Choctaw
      Express, Inc. (Oklahoma Corporation)





Choctaw
      Brokerage, Inc. (Oklahoma Corporation)





Allen
      Freight Services, Inc. (Missouri Corporation)





Decker
      Transport Co., Inc. (Ohio Corporation)





Transcend
      Logistics, Inc. (Indiana Corporation)





East
      Coast Transport and Logistics, Inc. (Arkansas LLC)





McNeill
      Express, Inc. (Arkansas Corporation)





S
&
L
      Logistics, Inc. (Texas Corporation)





P.A.M.
      International, Inc. (Ohio Corporation)





P.A.M.
      Canada, Inc. (Canadian Corporation)
p.1 

OAR Box 1865 

Prepped by Charmelle Mathews 

Document Number: 

187) VIII-K-l-1 

Docket Number: 

A-83-27 

Printed 12/3/2008 3:22:24 PM Sheet 187 of 198 
P.2 

NIPER-146PPS 

86/4 

A-83-27 

l-K-I-l 

HEATING OILS, 1986 

By 

Cheryl L. Dickson and Paul W. Woodward 

IpjQTtjf 

^AlgoCKi T 

Work Performed for the American Petroleum Institute 

and the U.S. Department of Energy 

August 1986 

National Institute for Petroleum and Energy Research 

Bartlesville, Oklahoma 
P.3 

DOE/EIA-0035(89/01) 

Distribution Category UC-98 

A-83-27 

VIII-K-I-2 

Monthly Energy Review 

January 1989 

jj) ii e ii o w is 

JUN 6 I989 

EPA AIR DOCKET 

Energy Information Administration 

Office of Energy Markets and 

End Use 

U.S. Department of Energy 

Washington, DC 20585 

c ^NTENT ^ 

This report was prepared by the Energy Information Administration, the independent statistical and 

analytical agency within the Department of Energy. The information contained herein should not be 

construed as advocating or necessarily reflecting any policy position of the Department of Energy or 

any other organization.
III 

116TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION S. RES. 570 

Opposing and condemning the potential prosecution of United States and 

Israeli nationals by the International Criminal Court. 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

MAY 12, 2020 

Mr. CRUZ submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the 

Committee on Foreign Relations 

RESOLUTION 

Opposing and condemning the potential prosecution of 

United States and Israeli nationals by the International 

Criminal Court. 

Whereas the United States has long objected to any assertion 

of jurisdiction by the International Criminal Court (ICC) 

over nationals of states that are not parties to the Rome 

Statute, including the United States and Israel, absent a 

referral from the United Nations Security Council or the 

consent of such a state; 

Whereas, on December 20, 2019, the Prosecutor of the ICC 

asked the ICC judges to confirm that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the West Bank, East Jerusalem, 

and Gaza, facilitating the potential prosecution of Israeli 

nations; 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
2 

•SRES 570 IS 

Whereas, on March 5, 2020, the ICC authorized an investigation into the actions of United States Armed Forces and 

intelligence officials operating in Afghanistan, facilitating 

the prosecution of United States nationals; and 

Whereas prosecutions of nationals from states that are not 

parties to the Rome Statute, absent a referral from the 

United Nations Security Council or the consent of such 

a state, are illegitimate and terminally endanger the 

credibility of the ICC: Now, therefore, be it 

1 Resolved, That— 

2 (1) the Senate opposes and condemns the po3 tential prosecution of United States and Israeli na4 tionals by the ICC; and 

5 (2) it should be the policy of the United States 

6 to pursue a resolution by the United Nations Secu7 rity Council prohibiting the ICC from prosecuting 

8 nationals of states that are not parties to the Rome 

9 Statute, including the United States and Israel, ab10 sent a referral from the United Nations Security 

11 Council or the consent of such a state. 

Æ 


kjohnson on DSK79L0C42PROD with BILLS
#### The COLLISON SURGICAL ENGINEERING COMPANY, Appellant, v. MURRAY-BAUMGARTNER SURGICAL INSTRUMENT CO., Inc., Appellee.

No. 9722.

United States Court of Appeals Fourth Circuit.

Argued Feb. 4, 1965.

Decided March 4, 1965.

Leonard J. Kerpelman, Baltimore, Md., for appellant.

William D. Hall, Washington, D. C. (Roger A. Clapp, and Hinkley & Singley, Baltimore, Md., and Homer R. Montague, Washington, D. C., on brief), for appel-lee.

Before SOBELOFF and J. SPENCER BELL, Circuit Judges, and CHRISTIE, District Judge.

PER CURIAM:

This appeal involves the validity of patent No. 2,494,229 issued to John G. Col-lison for a surgical bone screw for use in applying an internal fixation plate to a fractured bone. The District Court, in a full and carefully reasoned opinion, reached the conclusion that this patent was invalid for lack of invention over the prior art. 230 F.Supp. 572 (D.Md.1964).

We have carefully examined the record in light of the appellant’s contentions and find ourselves in complete accord with the District Court’s disposition of the case. Concluding that the patent is invalid, we have no occasion to consider alternative defenses raised below and in this court.

Affirmed.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>                     5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
Financial Statements of MSU Corporation and is qualified in its entirety by
reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                        JUN-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                           JUL-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                             JUN-30-2000
<CASH>                                     1,990,207
<SECURITIES>                                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                                345,363
<ALLOWANCES>                                       0
<INVENTORY>                                1,166,347
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                           3,970,060
<PP&E>                                       155,884
<DEPRECIATION>                               225,645
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                             4,344,925
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                      2,660,070
<BONDS>                                            0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                        290,512
<PREFERRED>                                        0
<COMMON>                                           0
<OTHER-SE>                                   889,343
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>               4,344,925
<SALES>                                            0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                             904,695
<CGS>                                              0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                928,255
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                           4,422,948
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                           112,935
<INCOME-PRETAX>                          (4,905,549)
<INCOME-TAX>                                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                      (4,905,549)
<DISCONTINUED>                                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                    0
<CHANGES>                                          0
<NET-INCOME>                             (4,905,549)
<EPS-BASIC>                                   (0.19)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                 (0.19)



</TABLE>
#### Lane, Smith and Barg *v.*State.

4600

230 S. W. 2d 480

Opinion delivered June 5, 1950.

*Per Curiam.*

This Court after having on April 10, 1950, affirmed judgments of conviction against the petitioners herein, issued an order withholding its mandate *429■until June 1, 1950, in order to permit a petition for review by *certiorari*to be filed in tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States. Petitioners now state that tbe United States Supreme Court, due to lack of time, bas not acted upon tbeir request for review by *certiorari*and, due to tbe fact that tbe United States Supreme Court will shortly recess, no action can be taken on tbe petition for *certiorari*until tbe end of tbe recess, wherefore petitioners ask that this Court grant a further stay of its mandate and permit petitioners to remain free on bail pending final action by tbe United States Supreme Court on tbe petition for *certiorari.*

Tbe right to bail pending appeal after conviction is at common law a matter of judicial discretion in tbe individual case. That rule is unchanged by tbe Arkansas Constitution (Art. II, §§ 8, 9), and is changed by our statute, Ark. Stats., § 43-2714, only as to certain appeals in criminal cases pending before tbe Supreme Court of Arkansas. Tbe present case, involving petition for *cer-tiorari*from this Court to tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States, does not come within § 43-2714. Tbe common law rule of judicial discretion is here applicable.

Tbe situation in tbe present case is tbe same as if Buie 46 (a) (2) of tbe Federal Eules of Criminal Procedure were applicable. This reads :

> “Bail may be allowed pending appeal or *certiorari*only if it appears that tbe case involves a substantial question which should be determined by tbe appellate court. Bail may be allowed by tbe trial judge or by tbe appellate court or by any judge thereof or by tbe circuit justice. ’ ’

This rule is of course not applicable in *certiorari*from this Court to tbe Supreme Court of tbe United States, but we quote it as illustrative. of tbe reason for our conclusion in this case.

Tbe majority of this Court are of tbe opinion that tbe record in tbe present case presents no substantial federal question which would justify tbe exercise of our discretion in favor of granting bail after conviction and *430affirmance of conviction. We therefore refuse to stay the mandate further, and defendants are required to surrender themselves in accordance with the prior orders of this Court.
Fourth Court of Appeals

San Antonio, Texas

June 25, 2021 

No. 04-21-00028-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF N.M.B., A CHILD

From the 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas 

Trial Court No. 2016-EM5-06049 

Honorable Antonia Arteaga, Judge Presiding 

ORDER

In the underlying cause, Appellant Channel Beverly filed a petition in intervention in a 

suit affecting the parent-child relationship. On January 20, 2021, the trial court signed an order 

dismissing her suit for lack of standing. On January 27, 2021, she filed a notice of appeal, stating 

her intent to appeal from this order by the trial court. On March 30, 2021, we issued an order 

explaining that the January 20, 2021 trial court order appeared to interlocutory because it did not 

dispose of all pending parties and claims in the underlying suit. Thus, we ordered Appellant 

Channel Beverly to show cause why this appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 

We suspended appellate deadlines pending our determination of jurisdiction. 

On April 15, 2021, Appellant Channel Beverly responded to our show cause order by 

stating that “a hearing to enter a final order” was set for April 21, 2021. On May 21, 2021, 

Appellant Shante Taylor filed a notice of appeal, stating her intent to appeal from the trial court’s 

final order signed on April 21, 2021. On May 24, 2021, a supplement clerk’s record was filed 

containing the trial court’s final order of April 21, 2021. We therefore conclude that we have 

jurisdiction over this appeal and reinstate appellate deadlines. 

At the time we suspended appellate deadlines, the reporter’s record was due. On March 

29, 2021, Appellant Channel Beverly had filed a Statement of Inability to Afford Payment of 

Court Costs or an Appeal Bond. On June 22, 2021, the staff attorney to the Bexar County Civil 

District Courts filed a letter with this court informing us that the trial court held a hearing on

June 15, 2021 regarding Appellant Channel Beverly’s inability to afford costs, and determined 

that she had the ability to afford costs and would be allowed to pay under a payment plan. Given 

that arrangements are being made with the court reporter pursuant to the trial court, we ORDER 

the court reporter responsible for preparing the reporter’s record to file the reporter’s record on 

or before July 26, 2021. 

_________________________________ 

Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 

court on this 25th day of June, 2021. 

___________________________________ 

MICHAEL A. CRUZ, Clerk of Court
#### Lister *v.*First National Bank of Van Buren.

Opinion delivered March 3, 1930.

*142
      *L. E. Lister,*for appellant.

*E. L. Matlock,*for appellee.

Hart, O. J.,

(after stating the facts). There was no error committed by the trial court in finding for the plaintiff. The burden in the case was upon Lister to show the negligence of the plaintiff, as the collecting bank and the damages resulting to him therefrom. *Bank of Keo*v. *Bank of Cabot,*173 Ark. 1008, 294 S. W. 49.

The undisputed evidence shows that the check was handled by the plaintiff as a collecting bank through its correspondents in the usual and customary way that checks handled for collection were handled by it and other banks. The plaintiff as the collecting bank, without any delay or negligence whatever, sent the checks to its correspondent bank which usually handles its Oklahoma business for collection. Then the check was handled without any negligence on the part of the correspondent bank, and was paid by the payee bank by a draft on another bank. This draft was presented in due course for collection; but, in the meantime, the First State Bank of *143Hartshorne, which was the payee hank, had failed; and the check given by it in payment of the draft in question was dishonored on that account.

Prior to the passage of the act of 1921, amending the act creating the establishment of a State Banking Department, it was held that a bank receiving a draft for collection merely is the agent of the drawer or forwarding bank, and could only receive money in payment unless otherwise directed. *Darragh Company*v. *Goodman,*124 Ark. 532, 187 S. W. 673.

Since the passage of the act of 1921 (General Acts of 1921, p. 514, § 14), the collecting bank is only liable for the default or negligence of its correspondent bank. *Farmers’ & Merchants’ Bank*v. *Ray,*170 Ark. 293, 280 S. W. 984; and *Hicks Company, Ltd.,*v. *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis,*174 Ark. 587, 296 S. W. 46.

In the latter case, it was expressly held that a correspondent bank, in forwarding checks sent to it for collection by the' depository bank, was not negligent in accepting from the bank on which the checks were drawn drafts instead of money, where in so doing it followed the banking custom and was without notice of the drawee bank’s insolvency.

In the case at bar, the undisputed evidence shows that, there was no notice on the part of the plaintiff or any of its correspondents that the bank on which the check was drawn was insolvent. The proof also shows that the check was handled in the usual and customary way, and, besides that, the deposit slip given for the check when it was deposited for collection showed on its face that the collecting bank would charge it back to the depositor if it was dishonored.

It follows that the judgment of the circuit court was correct, and it will be affirmed.
1

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

STATE OF OHIO,

 EX REL TED MARCUM,

Petitioner, : Case No. 3:17-cv-437

- vs - District Judge Walter H. Rice

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

SHERIFF DAVE DUCHAK, et al.,

:

Respondents.

ORDER DENYING APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL AND FINDING 

MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION TO BE MOOT

This case is before the Court Petitioner’s Motion for Appointment of Counsel (part of ECF 

No. 3). In support thereof, Mr. Marcum represents (without providing any detail) that he is 

indigent.

Appointment of counsel in criminal cases is mandated by the Sixth Amendment to the 

United States Constitution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932)(capital cases); Gideon v. 

Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963)(felony cases); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 

(1972)(misdemeanor cases where imprisonment is a possibility); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 

654 (2002)(even if sentence is suspended).

However, appointment of counsel in a civil case is not a constitutional right. Mekdeci v. 

Merrell National Laboratories, 711 F.2d 1510, 1522, n. 19 (11th Cir. 1983). It is a privilege that 

is justified only by exceptional circumstances. Lopez v. Reyes, 692 F.2d 15, 17 (5th Cir. 1982); 

Wahl v. McIver, 773 F.2d 1169, 1174 (11th Cir. 1985), cited approvingly in Lavado, Jr. v. Keohane, 
2

992 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1993). A district court has no authority to compel an attorney to accept 

appointment. Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, S.D. Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989). Congress has never

appropriated any funds for compensation of appointed counsel in civil cases generally. Therefore 

the request for appointment of counsel is DENIED.

Perhaps recognizing that the Court cannot certify a class in a case where the class 

representative is not represented by counsel, Mr. Marcum requests class certification only “after 

counsel has been appointed. . .” (ECF No. 3, PageID 2621.) Because appointment of counsel has 

been denied, the request for class certification is MOOT.

January 11, 2018.

 s/ Michael R. Merz

 United States Magistrate Judge

 1 When any document is filed with this Court, the Court’s electronic filing system affixes a unique Page Identification 

Number in the upper right hand corner of every page. The attention of the parties is directed to this Magistrate Judge’s 

Standing Order of May 8, 2014, which provides in pertinent part “All references to the record in this Court must be to 

the filed document by title, docket number, and PageID reference. (E.g., Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, Doc. No. 

27, PageID ___.) The large majority of cases before this Magistrate Judge are habeas corpus cases with large state 

court records and correct citation to the record is critical to judicial economy. Therefore, nonconforming filings will 

be stricken.
#### Lehman Investment Company v Haddad,

No. 90994;

Court of Appeals No. 134130.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

PRISTINE SENIOR LIVING, LLC : CASE NO: 3:18-CV-00007 

 PLAINTIFF : 

VS. : 

LIBERTY NURSING CENTER OF : FINAL DISMISSAL ENTRY 

FREMONT, INC., et al. WITH PREJUDICE 

 : 

 DEFENDANT. 

 : 

_____________________________________________________________________________ 

 Upon agreement of counsel, and for good cause shown, all claims asserted, or 

capable of assertion by all parties herein, are hereby dismissed with prejudice. Costs to be 

paid by the Defendants. 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 s/Thomas M. Rose 

 ______________________________ 

 JUDGE THOMAS ROSE 

Approved by: 

/s/ Wayne E. Waite 

______________________________ 

Wayne E. Waite (0008352) 

Waite, Tomb & Eberly 

124 West Main Street 

Troy, OH 45373 

wwaite@helpinohio.com

Approved by email on 11/7/18 

/s/ Daniel Gibson 

__________________________________ 

Daniel Gibson 

Attorney at Law 

100 South 3rd Street 

Columbus, OH 43215 

gibson@delkmcnally.com