[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 13-10253

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A042-250-269

ODIA LAVINA MCDONALD, 

 Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

________________________

(August 19, 2013)

Before MARCUS, PRYOR and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Odia Lavina McDonald, a native and citizen of Jamaica, petitions for review 

of the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals that affirmed an order to 

remove her from the United States, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), (iii), and denied 

her application for cancellation of removal, id. § 1229b(a). We deny McDonald’s 

petition.

McDonald entered the United States lawfully in 1989. After her admission, 

McDonald committed several felonies in Florida and was convicted in 1996 for 

robbery, see Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(c), and in 2007 for felony petit theft, see id.

§ 812.014(3)(c). In 2010, the Department of Homeland Security served McDonald 

with a notice to appear charging that she was removable because she had been 

convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), and an aggravated felony for a theft offense, see id.

§ 1127(a)(2)(A)(iii). McDonald eventually admitted that she was removable, and 

an immigration judge told McDonald that she had 30 days to file an application for 

relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, 

Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and that she would receive a copy 

of the application form by mail. See id. § 1231(b)(3).

McDonald failed to file an application for relief under the Convention, and 

the immigration judge ordered McDonald removed to Jamaica. McDonald 

appealed to the Board and moved to remand her case to apply for deferral of 

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removal. In her motion, which the Department did not oppose, McDonald argued 

that the immigration judge failed to send her an application. The Board granted 

McDonald’s motion and remanded the case for her to apply for relief under the 

Convention with instructions for the immigration judge to conduct “further 

proceedings consistent with [the] opinion.”

On remand, McDonald initially filed an application for withholding of 

removal under the Convention, but she later moved to terminate her immigration 

proceedings on the ground that she was not removable and, in the alternative, for 

waiver and a cancellation of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c) (repealed Sept. 

1996). The Department filed additional charges that McDonald was removable 

because she had been convicted of an aggravated felony for a crime of violence, 

see id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and the notice listed nine additional convictions of 

McDonald in the Florida courts, including a conviction in 2002 for forgery, see

Fla. Stat. § 831.01. The Department submitted records from the Florida courts, 

including several scoresheets reflecting that McDonald had a conviction for felony 

third degree forgery, see id. § 831.01, and an arrest warrant and minutes of 

sentencing establishing that McDonald received a sentence of one year in February 

1996 for robbery, see id. § 812.13.

The immigration judge reconsidered the charges against McDonald and 

again ordered her removed from the United States. The immigration judge found 

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that McDonald was removable on two grounds: (1) she had been convicted of two 

or more crimes of moral turpitude, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii), including 

robbery, see Fla. Stat. § 812.13(2)(c), forgery, see id. § 831.01, and fraudulent use 

of personal identification, see id. § 817.568; and (2) her conviction in 1996 for 

robbery was a crime of violence, see 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). The 

immigration judge also found that McDonald was ineligible for a waiver and 

cancellation of removal because her conviction for robbery constituted an 

aggravated felony for a crime of violence. See id. § 1229b. McDonald moved for

reconsideration and, after the immigration judge denied the motion, McDonald 

withdrew her application for withholding of removal under the Convention and 

appealed to the Board.

The Board affirmed the decision of the immigration judge. The Board found 

that the Department had the authority to file additional charges of removability 

after the remand because McDonald’s “removal proceedings were still pending”

and the immigration judge correctly classified McDonald’s conviction for robbery 

as an aggravated felony for a crime of violence. The Board also found that 

McDonald had a prior conviction for forgery and, because she did not dispute that 

her conviction for fraudulent use of personal identification also was a crime of 

moral turpitude, she was removable on that basis. See id. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(ii). The 

Board further found that McDonald was statutorily ineligible for a waiver and 

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cancellation of removal, see id. § 1229b(a), and, even if she had been eligible, the 

Board would have denied “relief as a matter of discretion given [McDonald’s] 

lengthy criminal history and lack of countervailing positive equities.”

The Board did not err in finding that the Department could lodge additional 

charges against McDonald on remand. The Board did not “qualif[y] or limit[] the

remand for a specific purpose, . . . [and] the remand [was] effective . . . for 

consideration of any and all matters which [the immigration judge] deem[ed] 

appropriate.” See Matter of Patel, 16 I & N Dec. 600, 601 (BIA 1978). Because 

the removal proceedings were not final, the immigration judge had the authority to 

allow the Department to file new charges against McDonald. See Dormescar v. 

U.S. Att’y Gen., 690 F.3d 1258, 1270 (11th Cir. 2012); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.30 (“At 

any time during deportation or removal proceedings, additional or substituted 

charges of deportability and/or factual allegations may be lodged by the Service in 

writing.”). And McDonald received notice of and an opportunity to respond to the 

new charges. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.30, 1240.10(e). After the Department filed the 

additional charges, the immigration judge held three hearings to determine whether 

McDonald was removable and whether she was eligible for cancellation of 

removal.

The Board also did not err in finding that McDonald’s prior conviction for 

forgery was a crime involving moral turpitude. Although the term “moral 

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turpitude” is not defined by statute, we consider an offense involving dishonesty or 

false statements to be a crime of moral turpitude. Itani v. Ashcroft, 298 F.3d 1213, 

1215 (11th Cir. 2002). McDonald’s forgery crime for making a false writing, see

Fla. Stat. § 831.01, qualifies as a prohibited offense. See Cano v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 

709 F.3d 1052, 1053 (11th Cir. 2013) (stating that a crime of moral turpitude 

involves conduct “contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty 

between man and man” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Itani, 298 F.3d at 1215 

(same).

And the Department introduced sufficient evidence of McDonald’s 

conviction for forgery. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.41(d). The 

Department introduced several scoresheets on which the Florida courts relied on 

McDonald’s conviction for forgery to calculate her criminal history score, and 

those scoresheets were, by law, reviewed for accuracy by defense counsel and the 

sentencing judge in each case. See Fla. Stat. § 921.002; Fla. R. Crim. P. 

3.704(d)(1), 3.704(d)(4), 3.992. These official records sufficed as proof of 

McDonald’s forgery conviction. See Fequiere v. Ashcroft, 279 F.3d 1325, 1327 

(11th Cir. 2002) (“[S]ection 1229a(c)(3)(B) does not state that the forms of proof it 

lists constitute the sole means of establishing a criminal conviction; rather, the 

statute merely says that such forms ‘shall constitute proof of a criminal 

conviction.’ Other forms of proof will suffice if ‘probative.’”).

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McDonald argues that she was eligible for cancellation of removal because 

her prior conviction for robbery did not qualify as a crime of violence, but we need 

not address that argument. Even if we were to assume that McDonald’s prior 

conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence, we could not give her any 

meaningful relief. See Al Najjar v. Ashcroft, 273 F.3d 1330, 1336 (11th Cir.

2001). The Board stated that “if [McDonald] was eligible [for cancellation of 

removal], [it] would deny relief as a matter of discretion,” and this Court would not 

have jurisdiction to review that discretionary decision, see 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i).

We DENY McDonald’s petition.

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