UNITED STATES CO URT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ URSULA LENHARDT, Pl aintiff - Appellant,

v. MHALSA HOSPITALITY, INC.; RAKESH M. PAI, De fendants - Appellees, and JESSE OJEDA, Defendant. No. 20-3061 (D.C. No. 5:18-CV -04125-SAC-ADM) (D. Kan.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before BACHARACH , Circuit Judge, LUCERO , Senior Circuit Judge, and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judge.

________________ _________________

* We conclude that oral argument would not material ly help us to decide the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). So we have decided the appeal based on the record and th e parties’ briefs. Our order and judgment does not constitute bi nding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But the order and judgmen t may be cited for its persuasi ve value if otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### February 26, 2021 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court2 This appeal grew out of a laws uit for employment discrimination. The plaintiff, Ms. Ursula Lenhardt, is an immi grant who worked for a motel in Kansas. Duri ng her employment, Ms . Lenhardt allegedly experienced sexual harassment, spurri ng her to quit the job in 2015. She later sued the employer under Title VII, claiming employment discrimination. The district court en tered judgment on the pleadings in favor of the employer, bu t allowed Ms. Lenhardt to seek leave to amend the complaint. She tried, beefing up her claim und er Title VII and adding a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Bu t the district court rega rded both claims as deficient even with the additions pr oposed in the amende d complaint, so the court denied leave to amend on the ground of futility. We affirm. 1. We conduct de novo review on the issue of futility.When reviewing denial of leave to amend, we apply the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Castanon v. Cathey , 976 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 2020). Though this standard is deferential, we regard a legal error as an abuse of discretion. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. , 433 F.3d 703, 709 (10th Cir. 2005). And futility involves a legal issue, so we conduct de novo review when th e district court disallows amendment of a complaint based on futility. Peterson v. Grisham , 594 F.3d 723, 731 (10th Cir. 2010).3 2. Title VII: Ms. Lenhardt was late in submitting an administrative claim. The adequacy of Ms. Lenhardt’s Ti tle VII allegations turns on the timing of her administrative complain t. Under Title VII, a victim of employment discrimination can sue only after fili ng an administrative complaint with the Equal Employm ent Opportunity Commission or a similar agency fo r the state or locality. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); Proctor v. United Parcel Serv ., 502 F.3d 1200, 1206 n. 3 (10th Cir. 2007). The administrative complaint is due 300 days after the alleged discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). Ms. Lenhardt filed an administrati ve complaint in 2018. But she had quit the job roughly 2 1⁄2 ye ars earlier. So the ad ministrative complaint would ordinarily be considered late. But the 300-day period can be equitably tolled when an external impediment prevents the victim of employment discrimination from asserting a statutory right. Million v. Frank , 47 F.3d 385, 389 (10th Cir. 1995). Ms. Lenhardt urge s equitable tolling, argu ing that the employer prevented her from asserting a claim after she had quit. She bases this argumen t on harassment by a former coworker, Mr. Jesse Ojeda. According to Ms. Lenh ardt, Mr. Ojeda harassed her at the motel’s direction in a ploy to (1) dist ract her from fili ng a discrimination charge or (2) intimidate her into inaction.4 We must determine whet her this allegation would prevent dismissal. To make this determinati on, we consider whether Ms. Lenhardt has pleaded enough factual content for the court to reasonably infer that the employer impeded her from timely filing an administrative complaint. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). We assume without deciding that Ms. Lenhardt plausibly pleaded the motel’s ultimate responsibility for Mr . Ojeda’s harassmen t. In our view, however, Ms. Lenhardt’s allegations wouldn’t plausi bly suggest an inability to timely file an administrative complaint. We thus agree with the district court that th e proposed amendments wo uld not have prevented dismissal of the claim under Title VII. 3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Ms. Lenhardt failed to plead a plau sible claim. Ms. Lenhardt also tried to add a cl aim under 42 U.S. C. § 1981. This statute prohibits race discri mination in the making of contracts. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a). For this claim, Ms. Lenhardt allege s that a co-o wner of the motel tried to seduce her and retaliate d against her thr ough sexual assault and discrimination rather than providing her with documentation required for lawful employment as an immigrant. Though her allegations do suggest misconduct, Ms . Lenhardt ties the misconduct to race discrimi nation based solely on an assertion that the sexual discrimination had been racially motivated. That bare assertion is5 not enough. We thus c onclude that the propose d amendments would not have prevented dismissal of th e new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Affirmed. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge