UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

MISTI COUCH, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:17-cv-90 

District Judge Walter H. Rice 

Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff Misti Couch applied for period of disability, Disability Insurance 

Benefits, and Supplemental Security Income in September 2013, asserting that as of April 

14, 2012, she could no longer work a substantial paid job. The Social Security 

Administration denied her claims initially and upon reconsideration. After a hearing, 

Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Gregory G. Kenyon concluded that Plaintiff was not 

eligible for benefits because she is not under a “disability” as defined in the Social 

Security Act. Plaintiff brings this case challenging the Social Security Administration’s 

denial of her applications for Social Security benefits. 

 

1

 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations. 
2

The case is presently before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 

#7), the Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. #9), Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. 

#10), the administrative record (Doc. #6), and the record as a whole. 

II. Standard of Review 

The Social Security Administration provides Disability Insurance Benefits and 

Supplemental Security Income to individuals who are under a “disability,” among other 

eligibility requirements. Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42 

U.S.C. §§ 423(a)(1), 1382(a). The term “disability”—as defined by the Social Security 

Act—has specialized meaning of limited scope. It encompasses “any medically 

determinable physical or mental impairment” that precludes an applicant from 

performing a significant paid job—i.e., “substantial gainful activity,” in Social Security 

lexicon. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 469-70. 

Judicial review of an ALJ’s non-disability decision proceeds along two lines: 

“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ 

are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 

406 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 

2007). Review for substantial evidence is not driven by whether the Court agrees or 

disagrees with the ALJ’s factual findings or by whether the administrative record 

contains evidence contrary to those factual findings. Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 

F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 

2007). Instead, the ALJ’s factual findings are upheld if the substantial-evidence standard 

is met—that is, “if a ‘reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to 
3

support a conclusion.’” Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)). Substantial evidence consists of “more than a 

scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance . . . .” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722. 

The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal 

criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 

651 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. “[E]ven if supported by substantial 

evidence, ‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to 

follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting in part 

Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746, and citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 

(6th Cir. 2004)). 

III. Background 

Plaintiff asserts that she has been under a “disability” since April 14, 2012. She 

was thirty-one years old at that time and was therefore considered a “younger person” 

under Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1563(c), 416.963(c). She 

earned a GED—equivalent to high school education. See id. §§ 404.1564(b)(4), 

416.964(b)(4). 2 

 

2

 The remaining citations will identify the pertinent Disability Insurance Benefits Regulations with full 

knowledge of the corresponding Supplemental Security Income Regulations. 
4

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing before ALJ Kenyon that she suffers from bipolar 

disorder. Id. at 91, 94. She experiences paranoia constantly—“[e]very time I go out of 

the house I think something is going to happen to me ....” Id. at 95. And, ‘I’m always 

thinking that something is going to happen in the middle of the night.” Id. at 97. 

She is irritable on a daily basis and “go[es] off” every day. Id. at 95-96. She 

curses and yells at her children, husband, and strangers. Id. She assaulted her husband 

once. Id. at 96. 

 Plaintiff has trouble concentrating because her mind is constantly racing. Id. She 

cannot focus for long enough to watch an entire movie. Id. Her racing thoughts also 

inhibit her ability to sleep. Id. She only sleeps for two or three hours a night and does 

not nap during the day. Id. 

 Plaintiff struggles with post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. She has flashbacks a 

couple times a day every day. Id. at 105. She has panic attacks “a couple times a week.” 

Id. at 104. 

 Further, Plaintiff is depressed. Id. at 97. Twice a week, she has crying spells. Id.

at 98. She isolates herself in her home and, a couple times a week, she will lock herself 

in her room to get away from her children. Id. at 97-98, 103.. She only leaves her house 

to go grocery shopping and she does that at two or three in the morning to avoid other 

people. Id. at 98. She “eliminated all of [her friends].” Id.

 Plaintiff sees her psychiatrist, Dr. Rahman, once a month and he prescribes four 

medications: Lexapro, trazodone, Klonopin, and Adderall. Id. at 100. She thinks he is 
5

“[s]omewhat” helpful but that her medications need to be changed. Id. at 99. 

 Plaintiff has migraine headaches three to four times a week. Id. at 91. They 

usually last half of the day. Id. She has sensitivity to both bright light and loud noises. 

Id. at 92. She believes they are brought on by “[a] lot of stress.” Id. On a scale from one 

to ten, she rated her pain from migraines at seven. Id. at 91. She takes Tylenol and 800-

milligram ibuprofen. Id. at 92. 

 Plaintiff also has neck, lower back, and hip pain as the result of an automobile 

accident in 2011 or 2012. Id. at 92-93. She described her lower back pain as a constant 

shooting or sharp pain. Id. at 93. On a scale from one to ten, she rated her pain as six. 

Id. She used to take Vicodin but her doctors took her off of it. Id. In the past, she tried 

cortisone injections and physical therapy but neither helped. Id. Her neck pain, by 

comparison, is an achy pain—four or five on the ten-point scale. Id. at 94. 

Plaintiff lives in a house with her three children—ages 16, 11, and newborn. Id. at 

89. At the time of the hearing, she had recently separated from her husband. Id. 

However, he still came to her house to help her with the children. Id. But “[i]f he 

doesn’t do it right then I get upset with him and go off.” Id. at 101. 

Plaintiff is able to drive when she needs to but sometimes forgets where she is 

going. Id. at 89. She sometimes does not have the energy or motivation to do anything. 

Id. at 102-03. When she is feeling up to it, she still can only do some household chores 

such as dishes and straightening up. Id. at 102. 

Between August 2014 and March 2015, she had a part-time job as a bartender, 

working less than 15 hours a week. Id. at 90. During that short period, she missed 30 
6

days of work. Id. She occasionally went off on customers. Id. at 99. She also screamed 

at her boss and coworkers. Id. Eventually, she became stressed and “couldn’t handle it 

anymore.” Id. at 90. 

B. Medical Evidence 

i. Mahmood Rahman, M.D. 

 Plaintiff began treatment with Dr. Rahman in June 2011, and the record contains 

his treatment notes through September 10, 2015. (Doc. #6 at PageID# 420-27, 630-67). 

In his notes, Dr. Rahman consistently documented Plaintiff’s mood as anxious, guarded, 

and sometimes labile. On occasion, she also exhibited paucity of speech, a distractible 

appearance, circumstantial speech, and/or agitated psychomotor activity. Id. at 424-25, 

636-37. Her symptoms included decreased energy, limited motivation, social 

withdrawal, irritability, angry outbursts, mood swings, racing thoughts, and insomnia. Id.

at 424, 659. Dr. Rahman diagnosed bipolar disorder, attention-deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder (ADHD), posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), and a panic disorder. Id. at 421, 

424, 441, 632-55, 662-67. 

 In addition to his notes, Dr. Rahman provided four opinions regarding Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments. In his first opinion, on September 26, 2013, Dr. Rahman described 

her as having “[a] lot of emotional instability[;] disorganized thoughts[;] [and] 

considerable agitation.” Id. at 421. Further, she had poor concentration, poor memory, 

and a low frustration tolerance. Id. at 421. He opined that she has “problems [with] 

social interactions,” demonstrates poor coping skills, and is unable to tolerate stress. Id. 

Her daily activities are compromised and she decompensates frequently. Id.
7

Less than one week later, on September 30, 2013, Dr. Rahman completed a mental 

impairment questionnaire. Id. at 431-34. He assigned a current Global Assessment of 

Functioning (GAF) score of 50 and noted 60 was her highest score in the past year. Id. at 

431. She has many functional limitations—for instance, marked deficiencies of 

concentration, persistence or pace; marked episodes of deterioration or decompensation; 

and marked abilities to carry out very detailed instructions or maintain attention for 

extended periods. Id. at 433. 

Dr. Rahman explained that she “suffers from scoliosis and back pain, the 

perception of which is considerably exaggerated due to severe underlying depression.” 

Id. at 432. He opined that Plaintiff’s prognosis was guarded and he did “not think she 

can work very productively. Gets overwhelmed very easily [with] stress. 

Decompensates quickly.” Id. In addition, her impairments or treatment would cause her 

to be absent from work more than three times per month. Id. at 433. 

Dr. Rahman completed another mental status questionnaire on May 28, 2014. Id.

at 440-42. He described Plaintiff’s speech as pressured, mood and affect as labile, 

concentration as impaired, and insight and judgment as compromised. Id. at 440. He 

opined that Plaintiff is “unable to tolerate stress.” Id. at 440-42. 

 In his last opinion, on March 30, 2015, Dr. Rahman offered an opinion similar to 

his September 30, 2013 assessment. Id. at 655-58. In addition, he opined that Plaintiff’s 

impairments and/or treatment would cause her to be off task for more than twenty percent 

of a typical work day. Id. at 658. 
8

ii. Karla Voyten, Ph.D., & Courtney Zeune, Psy.D. 

On November 19, 2013, Dr. Voyten reviewed Plaintiff’s records. Id. at 141-50. 

She adopted the mental residual functional capacity assessment from ALJ Amelia G. 

Lombardo’s April 2012 determination. Id. at 147 (citing Acquiescence Ruling 98-4). 

ALJ Lombardo limited Plaintiff to “performing essentially unskilled simple tasks of a 

low-stress nature. She is limited to work with no more than occasional personal contact 

in the workplace with coworkers, supervisors, and the general public with no fast pace or 

having to meet strict assembly line production quotas.” Id. at 127. 

Dr. Zeune affirmed Dr. Voyten’s assessment on April 18, 2014. Id. at 163-72. 

IV. The ALJ’s Decision 

 As noted previously, it fell to ALJ Kenyon to evaluate the evidence of record in 

accordance with the sequential steps set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1520. He reached the following main conclusions: 

 Step 1: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful activity since April 14, 

2012. 

 Step 2: She has the severe impairments of mild degenerative disk disease of 

the cervical spine; residuals of a lumbosacral strain; a history of 

headaches; a bipolar disorder; and anxiety-related disorders. 

 Step 3: She does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

 Step 4: Her residual functional capacity, or the most she could do despite her 

impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 

(6th Cir. 2002), consists of “light work ... subject to the following 

limitations: (1) occasional crouching, crawling, kneeling, stooping, 

and climbing of ramps and stairs; (2) no climbing of ladders, ropes, or 

scaffolds; (3) no work around hazards such as unprotected heights or 
9

dangerous machinery; (4) limited to performing unskilled, simple, 

repetitive tasks; (5) occasional contact with co-workers and 

supervisors; (6) no public contact; (7) no fast-paced production work 

or jobs involving strict production quotas; and (8) limited to 

performing jobs in a relatively static work environment in which there 

is very little, if any, change in the job duties or the work routine from 

one day to the next.” 

 Step 4: She is unable to perform any of her past relevant work. 

 Step 5: She could perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the 

national economy. 

(Doc. #6, PageID #s 45-54). These main findings led the ALJ to ultimately conclude that 

Plaintiff was not under a benefits-qualifying disability. Id. at 53. 

V. Discussion 

Plaintiff contends ALJ Kenyon erred in rejecting multiple, consistent opinions 

from her treating psychiatrist, Dr. Rahman. (Doc. #7, PageID #673). 

Social Security Regulations require ALJs to adhere to certain standards when 

weighing treating physician’s medical opinions. The rule is straightforward: 

Treating-source opinions must be given “controlling weight” 

if two conditions are met: (1) the opinion “is well-supported by 

medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic 

techniques”; and (2) the opinion “is not inconsistent with the 

other substantial evidence in [the] case record.” 

Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 376 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting in part 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)); see Gentry, 741 F.3d at 723. 

If the treating physician’s opinion is not controlling, “the ALJ, in determining how 

much weight is appropriate, must consider a host of factors, including the length, 

frequency, nature, and extent of the treatment relationship; the supportability and 
10

consistency of the physician’s conclusions; the specialization of the physician; and any 

other relevant factors.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (citing Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544). 

 The Regulations also require ALJs to provide “good reasons” for the weight 

placed upon a treating source’s opinions. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. This mandatory 

“good reasons” requirement is satisfied when the ALJ provides “specific reasons for the 

weight placed on a treating source’s medical opinions.” Id. (quoting Soc. Sec. R. 96-2p, 

1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996)). Substantial evidence must 

support the reasons provided by the ALJ. Id. 

 In the present case, ALJ Kenyon set forth the correct criteria for weighing treating 

source opinions. He then concluded that the opinions of Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. 

Rahman, “cannot be given controlling, or even deferential weight,” and instead, assigned 

his opinions “little weight.” (Doc. #6, PageID #51). Plaintiff, however, insists that in 

rejecting Dr. Rahman’s opinions, “ALJ Kenyon entirely fails to apply the correct legal 

framework ....” (Doc. #7, PageID #675). 

 The ALJ did provide some reasons for not giving Dr. Rahman’s opinions 

controlling weight. He found, “On the questionnaire, the claimant reported a Global 

Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 50; however, that is inconsistent with the 

treatment notes, which consistently showed a GAF score of 60, which would not preclude 

competitive employment.” (Doc. #6, PageID #51) (internal citations omitted). The ALJ 

acknowledges that “[a] GAF score of 50 was reported only on September 19, 2013, but 

this appears to have been altered from 50 to 60 after the fact.” Id. (internal citations 

omitted). 
11

 The ALJ’s reliance on these GAF scores is flawed. As an initial matter, 

individuals do not report their GAF scores—“a GAF score is ‘a subjective determination 

that represents the clinician’s judgment of the individual’s overall level of functioning.’” 

Oliver v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 415 F.App’x 681, 684 (6th Cir. 2011) (emphasis added) 

(quoting White v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 572 F.3d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 2009)). Thus, Dr. 

Rahman determined Plaintiff’s GAF scores—Plaintiff did not provide her own lay 

opinion about her GAF scores. 

 Additionally, substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s finding that Dr. 

Rahman’s treatment notes were altered after the fact. While the ALJ is correct that the 

number in Dr. Rahman’s treatment note appears to have been overwritten or changed, the 

ALJ does not provide any support for his conclusion that it was changed “after the fact” 

nor does he identify who would have changed it. And, there is no evidence in the record 

to suggest it was changed after the fact, let alone for an improper purpose. Thus, it is not 

reasonable to infer that Dr. Rahman’s treatment notes were changed to match his opinion. 

 It then follows that the ALJ’s conclusion that the GAF scores were inconsistent is 

also unsupported by substantial evidence. Dr. Rahman’s note from September 19, 2013 

indicating Plaintiff’s GAF score was 50 is consistent with his opinion less than two 

weeks later that her current GAF score was 50. 

ALJ Kenyon also discounted Dr. Rahman’s opinion because “Mental status 

examinations were consistently normal, except for the claimant’s mood.” (Doc. #6, 

PageID #51) (citing Exh. B12F, pgs. 3-9, 13, 15, 19-25 [Doc. #6, PageID #s 632-38, 

642, 644, 648-54]). This statement, however, is misleading. The clinical notes of Dr. 
12

Rahman do not indicate that the specific mental status examination findings were 

“normal;” instead, it appears he simply did not check any box. Plaintiff correctly 

observes that the absence of a checkmark on these treatment notes is not genuinely 

inconsistent with Dr. Rahman’s opinions. Importantly, the treating physician rule does 

not require that an opinion “be consistent with all the other evidence[,] as long as there is 

no other substantial evidence in the case record that contradicts or conflicts with the 

opinion.” Soc. Sec. R. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *3 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996). 

Dr. Rahman’s lack of checkmarks in some of his treatment notes does not contradict or 

conflict with his opinions. 

Further, although the ALJ is quick to discard Dr. Rahman’s notes concerning 

Plaintiff’s mood, it is not reasonable to do so. Dr. Rahman’s diagnosed bipolar II 

disorder—a “mood disorder”3

—and accordingly, his notes concerning her moods are 

particularly relevant. His notes consistently indicated that Plaintiff’s mood was anxious, 

guarded, and/or labile. (Doc. #6, PageID #s 426-27, 435, 632-37, 649-54). Moreover, 

Dr. Rahman documented that Plaintiff exhibited, for example, psychomotor agitation, 

circumstantial speech, and paucity of speech. See id. at 424-25, 633-38, 642-44, 648-54. 

The ALJ provided one last reason for discrediting Dr. Rahman’s opinions: “his 

treatment notes consistently indicate that she was noncompliant with treatment.” Id. at 

51 (internal citations omitted). However, he does not elaborate on how that reflects on 

 

3

 “If you have a mood disorder, your general emotional state or mood is distorted or inconsistent with 

your circumstances and interferes with your ability to function. ...” Mood Disorders, MAYO CLINIC, 

https://www.mayoclinic.org/diseases-conditions/mood-disorders/symptoms-causes/syc-20365057 (last 

visited July 12, 2018). Bipolar disorder is an example of a mood disorder. Id. 
13

Dr. Rahman’s opinions. To the extent the ALJ equates the gaps in treatment to either 

improvement in Plaintiff’s symptoms or the non-restricting impact these impairments 

have on her ability to work, he lacks substantial supporting evidence. “ALJs must be 

careful not to assume that a patient’s failure to receive mental-health treatment evinces a 

tranquil mental state. For some mental disorders, the very failure to seek treatment is 

simply another symptom of the disorder itself.” White, 572 F.3d at 283 (citing Pate-Fires 

v. Astrue, 564 F.3d 935, 945 (8th Cir. 2009)); see Blankenship v. Bowen, 874 F.2d 1116, 

1124 (6th Cir. 1989) (“it is a questionable practice to chastise one with a mental 

impairment for the exercise of poor judgment in seeking rehabilitation”). This is 

particularly so in the present case where the record often indicates that Plaintiff had poor 

insight and judgment. See, e.g., Doc. #6, PageID #s 421, 431, 440. In sum, substantial 

evidence does not support ALJ Kenyon’s reasons for not giving Dr. Rahman’s opinions 

controlling weight and, thus, they do not constitute good reasons. 

However, even if ALJ Kenyon was correct that Dr. Rahman’s opinions are not 

entitled to controlling weight, “in all cases there remains a presumption, albeit a 

rebuttable one, that the opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great deference, its 

non-controlling status notwithstanding.” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242 (citation omitted); see 

Gayheart, 710 F.3d at 376; Soc. Sec. R. 96-2P, 1996 WL 374188, at *4 (Soc. Sec. 

Admin. July 2, 1996) (“Treating source medical opinions are still entitled to deference 

and must be weighed using all of the factors provided in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527 and 

416.927.”). 
14

 ALJ Kenyon did not address the factors. For example, he did not acknowledge 

that Dr. Rahman has treated Plaintiff for several years; he first evaluated Plaintiff in June 

2011 and began regularly treating her in March 2012. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(i). 

Further, since March 2012, he saw her almost once a month. See id. (“When the treating 

source has seen you a number of times and long enough to have obtained a longitudinal 

picture of your impairment, we will give the medical source’s medical opinion more 

weight than we would give it if it were from a nontreating source.”). Although the ALJ 

recognized that Dr. Rahman is a psychiatrist, he does not appear to have considered it in 

assigning his opinions little weight. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(5) (“We generally give 

more weight to the medical opinion of a specialist about medical issues related to his or 

her area of specialty than to the medical opinion of a source who is not a specialist.”). 

Likewise, the ALJ does not recognize that Dr. Rahman not only provided explanations in 

his opinions (when asked for an explanation), he also provided treatment notes that 

identify specific signs and symptoms which support his opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 

404.1527(c)(3) (“The better an explanation a source provides for a medical opinion, the 

more weight we will give that medical opinion.”). 

ALJ Kenyon’s failure to adequately address the treating physician rule combined 

with his failure to address any of the factors constitutes error. “[A]n ALJ’s ‘failure to 

follow the procedural requirement of identifying the reasons for discounting the opinions 

and for explaining precisely how those reasons affected the weight’ given ‘denotes a lack 

of substantial evidence, even where the conclusion of the ALJ may be justified based 

upon the record.’” Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting Rogers, 486 F.3d at 243); see Soc. 
15

Sec. R. 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *5 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 1996) (“[T]he notice of 

the determination or decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the 

treating source’s medical opinion ....”). 

ALJ Kenyon also failed to adequately weigh the record reviewing psychologists’ 

opinions. He correctly observes that they adopted the previous mental residual functional 

capacity assessment of ALJ Lombardo. But he does not assign any weight to their 

opinions and does not address any of the factors. Instead, he concludes that he is not 

bound by the previous ALJ’s mental residual capacity because “there is new and material 

evidence regarding the claimant’s physical and mental impairments that supports the 

need for some additional nonexertional work restrictions.” (Doc. #6, PageID #50). He 

does not, however, identify the new evidence or when it was added to the record. This is 

significant because he also does not indicate whether the evidence was received before or 

after the State agency psychologists’ review. Thus, it is not clear if the ALJ relied on 

their opinions in part or rejected them in part. ALJ Kenyon’s failure to weigh the 

psychologists’ opinion constitutes error because “[u]nless a treating source’s opinion is 

given controlling weight, the administrative law judge must explain in the decision the 

weight given to the opinions of a State agency medical or psychological consultant....” 

20 CFR § 404.1527(e)(2)(ii). And, in this case, where no other examining physician 

provided an opinion on Plaintiff’s mental impairments and only the State agency recordreviewing psychologists’ opinions conflict with Dr. Rahman’s, it is particularly troubling 

that the ALJ devoted so little attention to their opinions. 
16

Accordingly, for the above reasons, Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors is well taken.4

VI. Remand 

A remand is appropriate when the ALJ’s decision is unsupported by substantial 

evidence or when the ALJ failed to follow the Administration’s own regulations and that 

shortcoming prejudiced the plaintiff on the merits or deprived the plaintiff of a substantial 

right. Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. Remand may be warranted when the ALJ failed to 

provide “good reasons” for rejecting a treating medical source’s opinions, see Wilson, 

378 F.3d at 545-47; failed to consider certain evidence, such as a treating source’s 

opinions, see Bowen, 478 F.3d at 747-50; failed to consider the combined effect of the 

plaintiff’s impairments, see Gentry, 741 F.3d at 725-26; or failed to provide specific 

reasons supported by substantial evidence for finding the plaintiff lacks credibility, see 

Rogers, 486 F.3d at 249. 

Under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the Court has authority to affirm, 

modify, or reverse the Commissioner’s decision “with or without remanding the cause for 

rehearing.” Melkonyan v. Sullivan, 501 U.S. 89, 99 (1991). Consequently, a remand 

under sentence four may result in the need for further proceedings or an immediate award 

of benefits. E.g., Blakley, 581 F.3d at 410; Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1041 (6th 

Cir. 1994). The latter is warranted where the evidence of disability is overwhelming or 

where the evidence of disability is strong while contrary evidence is lacking. Faucher v. 

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 17 F.3d 171, 176 (6th Cir. 1994). 

 

4

 In light of the above discussion, and the resulting need to remand this case, an in-depth analysis of 

Plaintiff’s other challenges to the ALJ’s decision is unwarranted. 
17

A judicial award of benefits is unwarranted in the present case because the 

evidence of disability is not overwhelming and the evidence of disability is not strong 

while contrary evidence is lacking. However, Plaintiff is entitled to an Order remanding 

this case to the Social Security Administration pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) due 

to the problems discussed above. On remand, the ALJ should be directed to evaluate the 

evidence of record, including the medical source opinions, under the applicable legal 

criteria mandated by the Commissioner’s Regulations and Rulings and by case law; and 

to evaluate Plaintiff’s disability claim under the required five-step sequential analysis to 

determine anew whether Plaintiff was under a disability and whether her applications for 

Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income should be granted. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. The Commissioner’s non-disability finding be vacated; 

2. No finding be made as to whether Plaintiff Misti Couch was under a 

“disability” within the meaning of the Social Security Act; 

3. This matter be REMANDED to the Social Security Administration under 

sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration consistent 

with this Report and Recommendations, and any decision adopting this 

Report and Recommendations; and 

4. The case be terminated on the Court’s docket. 

July 19, 2018 s/Sharon L. Ovington 

 Sharon L. Ovington 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 
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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after 

being served with this Report and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the 

portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in 

support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part 

upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly 

arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree 

upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge 

otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 

FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof. 

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on 

appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 

949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).