In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________ 

No. 20-2719 

CHAD E. MATHIS, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v.

METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 

a.k.a. METLIFE, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees. 

____________________ 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 1:18-cv-01893-JRS-DLP — James R. Sweeney II, Judge. 

____________________ 

ARGUED APRIL 1, 2021 — DECIDED AUGUST 30, 2021 

____________________ 

Before MANION, ROVNER, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges. 

MANION, Circuit Judge. Dr. Chad Mathis served as an orthopedic surgeon in Alabama. He had a disability-insurance 

policy issued by Standard Insurance. This policy provided 

“occupational disability coverage.” It insured his income if he 

became disabled and unable to work as an orthopedic surgeon. This coverage applied even if he obtained (or was able 
2 No. 20-2719 

to obtain) other employment. In other words, it covered Dr. 

Mathis if he was unable to perform his occupation, regardless 

of whether he was otherwise gainfully employed.

Dr. Mathis switched insurance policies. But the new policy 

turned out to be different from what he wanted and expected. 

So he sued Lee Moore (the insurance broker) and Source Brokerage for negligent procurement. Dr. Mathis also sued MetLife (the new insurer) for breach of contract because MetLife 

did not pay him the entire sum he thought even the new, 

wrong policy required.

The district judge dismissed the negligent-procurement 

claim with prejudice and granted summary judgment to MetLife on most of the breach-of-contract claim. A narrow portion 

of the contract claim survived: the claim for the period from 

August 21 to September 30, 2017. Dr. Mathis and MetLife then 

settled this narrow portion. So the case ended below.

Dr. Mathis appeals. He argues Indiana law, not Alabama 

law, should govern his negligent-procurement claim. And he 

argues his breach-of-contract claim is not ripe. We disagree on 

both points and affirm.

I. Background

Moore served as an insurance broker based in Indiana. He 

was Dr. Mathis’s insurance agent. Sometime before November 16, 2006, Moore advised Dr. Mathis to replace his Standard Insurance disability-insurance policy with a MetLife disability-insurance policy with higher limits. Moore told Dr. 

Mathis that the MetLife policy provided occupational disability coverage, like the Standard Insurance policy. So Dr. Mathis 

switched. Moore arranged with Source Brokerage to procure 

the MetLife policy.
No. 20-2719 3

Here’s the problem. The MetLife policy did not provide 

occupational disability coverage. Instead, the MetLife policy 

provided total disability coverage only if Dr. Mathis is not 

gainfully employed. And the MetLife policy provided residual disability coverage only under various limitations. But no 

one recognized the problem for many years.

Dr. Mathis became disabled in March 2017. Neck and arm 

problems prevented him from performing some of his duties 

at various times. He resigned from his practice in April 2017 

and began working as an orthopedic surgeon at a different 

practice. In June 2017, he underwent surgery on his neck. He 

then returned to his work. But by the end of September 2017, 

he could no longer work at his usual level and his income had 

decreased. He left his new practice in March 2018 and began 

working for a device manufacturer in a nonsurgical capacity. 

He has performed no surgeries since then.

Dr. Mathis did not learn that his MetLife policy did not 

provide occupational disability coverage until after he became disabled in 2017. It is undisputed that Dr. Mathis continued to be gainfully employed after his disability onset, so 

he has no claim to payment of benefits under the total disability coverage of the MetLife policy.

The residual disability monthly benefit is calculated by 

comparing earnings during the month claimed with earnings 

before the disability began. The policy requires written proofs 

of loss: “Written proof of loss satisfactory to [MetLife] must 

be sent to [MetLife] within 90 days after the end of each 

monthly period for which You claim benefits. ... After [MetLife receives] Written proof of loss, [MetLife] will pay the benefits due under the policy.”
4 No. 20-2719 

MetLife paid residual disability benefits to Dr. Mathis for 

April through August 20, 2017. But MetLife determined he 

was not entitled to residual disability benefits for the rest of 

August or September 2017. Dr. Mathis admits he did not submit any proof of loss to MetLife for any month after September 2017. MetLife has not paid any benefits to Dr. Mathis for 

any period after September 2017. The policy lapsed in December 2018 due to Dr. Mathis’s failure to pay premiums.

Dr. Mathis sued Moore and Source Brokerage for negligent procurement. He claimed they “negligently failed to become familiar with the MetLife Policy and negligently failed 

to insure [him] for a total disability within his occupation as 

an orthopaedic surgeon (without the need to be gainfully employed).”

Dr. Mathis also brought a breach of contract claim against 

MetLife. He claimed it breached the terms of the policy it issued by failing to pay him the full amount of disability benefits owed under that policy.

On March 28, 2019, the district judge dismissed the negligence claims against all Defendants with prejudice. Sitting in 

Indiana, the district judge applied Indiana’s choice-of-law 

rules and determined that Alabama law, rather than Indiana 

law, applied to the negligence claims. So the district judge applied Alabama law and concluded that Dr. Mathis’s contributory negligence in failing to read the new policy barred his 

negligence claims and that the Alabama statute of limitations 

also barred his negligence claims. The judge dismissed the 

negligence claims with prejudice. He also determined that Alabama law applied to Dr. Mathis’s breach-of-contract claim 

against MetLife. The judge granted Dr. Mathis leave to amend 

his contract claim to try to bring it under Alabama law.
No. 20-2719 5

Dr. Mathis amended his complaint. He claimed he performed all conditions of the MetLife policy but MetLife 

breached the policy by failing to pay total “and/or” residual 

disability benefits.

On July 6, 2020, the judge granted partial summary judgment to MetLife on the breach-of-contract claim. He held that 

Dr. Mathis failed to comply with his contractual obligation to 

submit proofs of loss for any period after September 30, 2017. 

Therefore Dr. Mathis, as a matter of law, could not prove a 

breach-of-contract claim for any period after that date. A portion of Dr. Mathis’s breach-of-contract claim—seeking benefits for the period from August 21, 2017, through September 

30, 2017—survived summary judgment. The parties then settled that portion.

Dr. Mathis appeals. The only claims before us are his negligent-procurement claims against Moore and Source Brokerage and his breach-of-contract claim against MetLife for periods after September 30, 2017.

II. Analysis

A. Negligent procurement

Dr. Mathis claims Moore and Source Brokerage procured 

the wrong policy. Dr. Mathis wanted the same sort of coverage he already had: occupational disability coverage that insured his income as an orthopedic surgeon if he were no 

longer able to be an orthopedic surgeon but were still able to 

work at something else. But his new MetLife policy did not 

provide that coverage. Instead, it conditioned payment of 

benefits on various employment factors and other factors.
6 No. 20-2719 

The district judge faced a conflict of laws. We review his 

resolution of this conflict de novo. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Websolv Computing, Inc., 580 F.3d 543, 546 (7th Cir. 2009).

A federal court sitting in diversity applies state “substantive” law and federal “procedural” law. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938); Horne v. Elec. Eel Mfg. Co., Inc., 987 

F.3d 704, 713 (7th Cir. 2021). 

But does Indiana law or Alabama law apply? Dr. Mathis 

urged the judge to apply the law of Moore’s home, Indiana. 

But Defendants pressed the judge to apply the law of Dr. 

Mathis’s home, Alabama. 

The district judge sits in Indiana, so he applied Indiana’s 

choice-of-law rules. See West Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Arbor Homes 

LLC, 703 F.3d 1092, 1095 (7th Cir. 2013) (“A district court sitting in diversity must apply the choice of law principles of the 

forum state (in this case Indiana) to determine which state’s 

substantive law governs the proceeding.”).

The first step in (or a pre-requisite to) Indiana’s choice-oflaw analysis is to determine whether there is an actual, material conflict of laws. Simon v. United States, 805 N.E.2d 798, 805 

(Ind. 2004).

Here, there is an actual, material conflict. Indiana law 

holds that “reasonable reliance upon an agent’s representations can override an insured’s duty to read the policy.” Filip 

v. Brock, 879 N.E.2d 1076, 1084 (Ind. 2008). But Alabama law 

recognizes contributory negligence (like failing to read your 

own insurance policy) as a complete bar. Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. 

Colza, 159 So.3d 1240, 1253 (Ala. 2014). Dr. Mathis concedes 

that if Alabama law applies, then he loses his negligent-procurement claims.
No. 20-2719 7

When there is an actual, material conflict of laws, as there 

is here, Indiana’s next step in tort cases is to presume that the 

traditional lex loci delicti rule applies and that the applicable 

law is the law of the place of the wrong. Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 

805. In tort cases, the place of the wrong is the place where the 

last event necessary to make an actor liable occurred (or allegedly occurred). Id.

The last event necessary for liability here is the injury. Id.

at 806; see also Allen v. Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co., 766 N.E.2d 

1157, 1164–65 (Ind. 2002) (“[T]he reliance and consequent 

damage incurred by the plaintiffs is the ‘last event’ necessary 

to establish the elements of misrepresentation of a material 

fact reasonably relied upon.”). The claimed injury occurred 

(or allegedly occurred) in Alabama. Dr. Mathis lived in Alabama.1 He earned income in Alabama. He allegedly sustained 

economic loss in Alabama.2 Thus Alabama is the loci delicti, 

and we presume Alabama law applies.

The presumption to apply the law of the State where the 

wrong occurred can be overcome if that State “bears little connection to this legal action.” Simon, 805 N.E.2d at 805 (internal 

quotation mark omitted). 

Here, Dr. Mathis cannot overcome the presumption to apply Alabama law. Alabama bears a significant connection to 

this case. When Dr. Mathis applied for the MetLife policy, he 

lived and worked in Alabama. He held a license to practice in 

1 At some point, Dr. Mathis moved to Massachusetts. But he does not 

claim Massachusetts law applies.

2 He may have conceded below that he first suffered injury in Alabama. (Pl.’s Resp. Def. Moore’s Mot. Dismiss, DE 39 at 7 (“the losses of 

monthly benefits may have started in Alabama”).)
8 No. 20-2719 

Alabama. He lived and worked in Alabama when the policy 

was issued. The policy was delivered to him in Alabama. The 

policy insured the income he earned in Alabama. He sustained at least some of his alleged economic losses in Alabama. Alabama regulates insurance transactions with its residents. Alabama has an interest in protecting Dr. Mathis and 

his income. Thus Alabama bears far more than a “little connection” to this case.

The district judge did not err in applying Alabama law. 

And under Alabama law, the negligent-procurement claims 

fail, as Dr. Mathis concedes.3

B. Breach of contract

Even under the MetLife policy, Dr. Mathis claims he is entitled to more benefits than he received. The only portion of 

the breach-of-contract claim at issue in this appeal is the claim 

for residual disability benefits for periods after September 30, 

2017. But Dr. Mathis concedes he never submitted proofs of 

loss for any periods after September 30, 2017.

Again, Alabama law applies.4 In Alabama, the elements of 

a breach of contract are: (1) the existence of a valid contract 

binding the parties, (2) the plaintiff’s own performance under 

the contract, (3) the defendant’s nonperformance, and (4) 

3 We rest our decision regarding the negligent-procurement claims on 

contributory negligence. We make no comment on the statutes of limitations.

4 On appeal, Dr. Mathis does not argue that Indiana law should apply 

to his breach-of-contract claim. Instead, he concedes that Alabama law applies: “In the instant diversity case, the District Court was obligated to follow the path that an Alabama trial court would have followed.” (Mathis 

Appellant Br., DE 25 at 25.)
No. 20-2719 9

resulting damages. Dupree v. PeoplesSouth Bank, 308 So.3d 484, 

490 (Ala. 2020).

Here, MetLife argues Dr. Mathis must lose his claim because he did not submit any proofs of loss for any periods after September 30, 2017. Thus he cannot prove the second element of his claim. MetLife also argues Dr. Mathis must lose 

this claim because MetLife did not fail to perform since its 

duty to perform is only triggered if Dr. Mathis submits a proof 

of loss. So Dr. Mathis cannot prove the third element of his 

claim either. 

Alabama mandates compliance with an insurance policy’s 

requirements for proof of loss. Baldwin Mut. Ins. Co. v. Adair, 

181 So.3d 1033, 1045 (Ala. 2014). The MetLife policy required 

written proof of loss within 90 days after the end of each 

monthly period claimed. But Dr. Mathis did not submit any 

proofs of loss to MetLife for any month after September 2017. 

Dr. Mathis concedes this.

The heart of Dr. Mathis’s appellate argument on his 

breach-of-contract claim is that it is not ripe. Since it is not 

ripe, the argument goes, it is not a case or controversy under 

Article III of the Constitution. Thus the district court lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction, he argues. 

Dr. Mathis readily admits he flip-flopped on this issue. He 

invoked federal subject-matter jurisdiction by bringing a diversity suit in federal court and purporting to raise an active, 

ripe claim and controversy. And he fended off dismissal with 

prejudice of his breach-of-contract claim by arguing that he 

did perform all conditions the policy required of him. His second amended complaint explicitly alleges his performance: 

“Mathis performed all conditions of the Policy and its riders, 
10 No. 20-2719 

including but not limited to, paying premiums, providing 

timely notice of his claim, completing and sending claims’ 

forms,” et cetera. But now he argues his claim is not ripe.

MetLife also reversed itself on this issue. It moved the district judge to dismiss the breach-of-contract claim for lack of 

ripeness. Now it argues summary judgment on the merits was 

proper.

But Dr. Mathis argues his reversal does not matter because

federal subject-matter jurisdiction is not waiveable. He is right 

about this. Federal courts at all levels must assure themselves 

of their subject-matter jurisdiction. Even if no party contests 

subject-matter jurisdiction, and the district judge assumes 

subject-matter jurisdiction, we must address the issue sua 

sponte even if for the first time on appeal. See Jackson v. Consol. 

Rail Corp., 717 F.2d 1045, 1055 (7th Cir. 1983). If a court lacks

subject-matter jurisdiction, a ruling it issues on the merits is 

void. See Brownback v. King, 141 S. Ct. 740, 749 (2021) (“Ordinarily, a court cannot issue a ruling on the merits when it has 

no jurisdiction because to do so is, by very definition, for a 

court to act ultra vires.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 

In re IKO Roofing Shingle Prods. Liab. Litig., 757 F.3d 599, 600 

(7th Cir. 2014) (“If the problem deprived the court of subjectmatter jurisdiction, then there is nothing for us to do but vacate the order of January 28—and every other order [the 

judge] entered during the preceding four years.”); Pacurar v. 

Hernly, 611 F.2d 179, 181 (7th Cir. 1979).

But here, the district judge had subject-matter jurisdiction 

over the claim for breach of contract. The case was ripe. A case 

is ripe when it is “not dependent on contingent future events 

that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at 

all.” Trump v. New York, 141 S. Ct. 530, 535 (2020); see also Texas 
No. 20-2719 11

v. United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998). A case is not ripe 

“when the parties point only to hypothetical, speculative, or 

illusory disputes as opposed to actual, concrete conflicts.” 

Wisconsin Cent., Ltd. v. Shannon, 539 F.3d 751, 759 (7th Cir. 

2008). We review ripeness de novo, but we defer to the district 

judge’s underlying factual findings absent clear error. Church 

of Our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ v. City of Markham, 913 F.3d 

670, 676 (7th Cir. 2019).

Here, Dr. Mathis alleged he performed the policy’s conditions. He did not allege that he was damaged by a speculative 

future event that might not happen. Rather, he claimed MetLife damaged him by its past conduct, by a completed breach 

of contract. So the case was ripe. The judge faced an actual 

case and controversy. He properly determined that Dr. 

Mathis’s claim “is not an abstract disagreement but rather a 

concrete and actual dispute between the parties over MetLife’s obligation to pay monthly benefits.” (Entry on CrossMots. Summ. J., July 6, 2020, DE 137 at 16–17.) 

The mere fact that Dr. Mathis is unable to prove his case 

does not mean that the judge lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See McCarter v. Ret. Plan for Dist. Managers of Am. Fam. 

Ins. Grp., 540 F.3d 649, 650 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Plaintiffs’ claim 

may be weak, but the shortcomings of a legal theory differ 

from a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.”). Dr. Mathis did 

not and could not waive subject-matter jurisdiction. But he 

did present a live, ripe, actual case and controversy to the 

judge. He lost his claim because he failed to prove its elements. But his failure does not mean the district judge lacked 

subject-matter jurisdiction.
12 No. 20-2719 

III. Conclusion

We also considered other arguments raised by Dr. Mathis 

and found them lacking. The district judge committed no error in disposing of Dr. Mathis’s claims. So we affirm.