UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GARRISON SOUTHFIELD

PARK LLC, 

 

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:17-cv-783

 JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

v. Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

CLOSED LOOP REFINING

AND RECOVERY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

OLYMBEC USA LLC, 

 

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:19-cv-1041

 JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

v. Chief Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

CLOSED LOOP REFINING

AND RECOVERY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Garrison Southfield Park LLC and Plaintiff 

Olymbec USA LLC’s Motion for Rule 54(b) Certification of the Court’s orders approving 24 

settlement agreements. (Garrison ECF No. 613; Olymbec ECF No. 480.)1 Plaintiffs’ motion is 

unopposed. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion. 

I.

These cases arise under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 

Liability Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”). (Second Am. Compl., ECF No. 539.) Plaintiffs allege that 

1 For convenience, the Court will cite to the Garrison docket (2:17-cv-783).

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Defendant Closed Loop and others collaborated in a sham recycling scheme, resulting in 64,000 

tons of hazardous electronic waste at Plaintiffs’ properties that will cost over $17 million to 

remove. (Id. ¶ 2.) Throughout this case, the Court has approved settlement agreements between 

Plaintiffs and settling Defendants (“Settlors”) to facilitate cleanup of the e-waste. Plaintiffs seek 

certification of the Court’s orders approving those settlement agreements as final judgments

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 54(b). (Pls.’ Mot., ECF No. 613, at 2–3.) 

Specifically, Plaintiffs seek certification of the (1) July 16, 2019 Order, (2) the August 23, 2019 

Order, (3) August 3, 2020 Order, and (4) the January 11, 2021 Order. (Id.)

II.

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district “court may direct 

entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court 

expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) 

should not be used routinely but reserved for the infrequent case where certification serves the 

interests of justice and judicial administration. Knafel v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 850 

F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1988). 

Rule 54(b) certification requires two findings. Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 

F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994). First, the district court must expressly “direct the entry of final 

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties in a case.” Id. Second, “the 

district court must ‘expressly determine that there is no just reason’ to delay appellate review.” Id. 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). The Court must “clearly explain why it has concluded that 

immediate review of a challenged ruling is desirable.” Id. (citing Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 

782 F.2d 58, 61–62 (6th Cir. 1986)).

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A. Entry of Final Judgment

At the first step, the Court must dispose of one or more but fewer than all claims or parties 

in a multi-claim/multi-party action. Id. at 1026–27. As Plaintiffs point out, the Court has implicitly 

entered judgment on 24 settlements in this case, disposing of all claims against the Settlors and 

dismissing the Settlors from this litigation. (ECF Nos. 312, 400, 536, 683.)

B. No Just Reason for Delay

At the second step, the Court must determine that there is no just reason for delay in 

certifying a final judgment. Gen. Acquisition, Inc., 23 F.3d at 1027. This step requires the court 

to “balance the needs of the parties against the interests of efficient case management.” Id. To do 

so, the Court must consider five non-exhaustive factors: 

“(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and non-adjudicated claims; (2) the 

possibility that the need for appellate review might become moot due to future 

developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the appellate court might 

be required to hear the same issue twice; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or 

counterclaim that might result in a set-off against the final judgment; and (5) other 

miscellaneous factors, including ‘delay, economic and solvency considerations, 

shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.’”

U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Corrosioneering, Inc. v. 

Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir. 1986)).

First, the orders approving the settlement agreements dismiss only claims asserted against 

the Settlors. The adjudicated claims do not prevent the non-adjudicated claims from being fully 

and fairly adjudicated. The adjudicated claims do affect the liability to be apportioned among the 

remaining Defendants because the settlements all utilize the pro tanto approach, which reduces

the amount of the remaining parties’ liability by the dollar amount of the settlements. (ECF Nos.

312, 400, 536, 683.) However, as the Court discussed in approving those settlement agreements,

such a result facilitates the purposes of CERCLA by “encourag[ing] faster settlements, and a faster 

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clean-up of the e-waste, by shifting the financial risks of an overly lenient settlement to the nonsettling Defendants.” Garrison Southfield Park LLC v. Closed Loop Ref. & Recovery, Inc., No. 

2:17-CV-783, 2019 WL 3997683, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2019). 

As Plaintiffs point out, certifying the orders also facilitates the purposes of CERCLA 

because Plaintiffs have already commenced on-site removal of the 60-plus thousand tons of ewaste using funds from these settlements. (Pls.’ Mot. at 10.) Entry of partial judgment will ensure 

that the Settlors promptly pay, and that Plaintiffs can continue cleanup activities using the 

settlement funds, knowing that the settlements are final. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 

Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 576 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Rule 54(b) certification was appropriate 

because “[t]his is a complex case that has been ongoing for fourteen years, and the entry of partial 

judgment . . . would help ensure that a responsible party promptly pays for the contamination . . .

advancing CERCLA’s goals and easing the Tribes’ burden of financing the litigation effort.”)

Second, there is no prospect of the need for appellate review becoming moot due to future 

developments in the district court. The Settlors have already been dismissed from the case with 

prejudice, and any appellate issues will pertain to the particular settlement agreement between a 

Settlor and Plaintiffs. Third, the appellate review will not be required to hear the same issue twice 

because appellate review would be specific to a Settlor’s agreement with Plaintiffs. These factors 

weigh in favor of Rule 54(b) certification.

Fourth, as the Court discussed above, each settled claim results in a “set-off” against the 

final judgment—it reduces the amount of the reaming liable parties’ liability by the dollar amount 

of the settlements. This is par for the course in CERCLA litigation and furthers CERCLA’s goal 

of effectuating prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by imposing cleanup costs on responsible 

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parties. See Garrison Southfield Park LLC, 2019 WL 3997683, at *4–5. Thus, this factor weights 

in favor of Rule 54(b) certification.

Fifth, the miscellaneous factors also weigh in favor of certification. Providing Plaintiffs 

and Settlors with a measure of finality (which the Court implicitly did in approving the settlement 

agreements) will facilitate faster cleanup if the e-waste at issue in this case and mitigate Plaintiffs’ 

risk that settlement funds will have to be refunded potentially several years down the line. (Pls.’ 

Mot. 10–12.) The Court agrees with Plaintiffs’ assertion that that “no one intended for litigation 

against any of these dismissed Settlors to be resurrected years from now, long after Plaintiffs have 

used those settlement payments to fund the cleanup at the Facility.” (Id. at 7.) Furthermore, none 

of the remaining Defendants in this case have opposed the instant motion for Rule 54(b) 

certification.

Accordingly, all five factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion and the Court 

finds that there is no just reason for delay.

III.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Rule 54(b) 

Certification. (2:17-cv-783 ECF No. 613; 2:19-cv-1041 ECF No. 480.) The Clerk is 

DIRECTED to ENTER JUDGMENT in 2:17-cv-783 (Garrison) and 2:19-cv-1041 (Olymbec)

as to the following Orders:

(1) July 16, 2019 Order (2:17-cv-783 ECF No. 312; 2:19-cv-1041 ECF No. 239).

(2) August 23, 2019 Order (2:17-cv-783 ECF No. 400; 2:19-cv-1041 ECF No. 311).

(3) August 3, 2020 Order (2:17-cv-783; ECF No. 536; 2:19-cv-1041 ECF No. 420).

(4) January 11, 2021 Order (2:17-cv-783 ECF No. 683; 2:19-cv-1041, ECF No. 547).

This case is to remain open.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

4/26/2021 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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