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NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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RENDERED: AUGUST 26 2021

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Supreme Court of Kentucky

2020-SC-0526-MR

BETTY CAITLIN NICOLE SMITH APPELLANT

ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS

V. CASE NO. 2018-CA-0504-OA

CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT NO. 2020-CI-00165

HONORABLE JASON FLEMING AND 

ZACHARY TAYLOR DANIEL 

APPELLEE

MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

AFFIRMING

This case is an appeal of the denial of a writ of mandamus by the Court 

of Appeals. Betty Caitlin Nicole Smith (Smith), the Appellant, petitions this 

Court to grant the writ and hold that the Commonwealth of Kentucky, 

specifically Christian County, has jurisdiction over custody matters related to 

her minor child and, furthermore, that a Florida judgment of custody is void.

The Court of Appeals denied the writ, finding that Smith presented no 

argument as to why an appeal would be an inadequate remedy in this matter. 

For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Smith has a child with Zachary T. Daniel (Daniel), the real party in 

interest. In 2013, Calloway District Court granted Smith a domestic violence 
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protection order (DVO) against Daniel, which expired on September 5, 2014. In 

2014, Smith filed a petition against Daniel to establish paternity, custody, 

visitation, and support in Calloway Circuit Court. The circuit court established 

that Daniel was the father. The custody order was entered. In 2015, the 

Calloway Circuit Court granted Smith another DVO against Daniel. This DVO 

expired on November 25, 2018 and granted Smith temporary custody of minor 

child. Subsequently, Smith and the minor child moved to Madison County,

Florida. 

In 2016, Daniel, who lived in Tennessee, initiated dissolution 

proceedings in the Madison Circuit Court in Florida. Additionally, he sought a 

child custody determination from the Florida court. Smith contested the filing, 

asserting Kentucky retained exclusive jurisdiction over the child custody issue 

by virtue of the prior orders. Smith also claimed that her residency in Florida 

was only temporary and that she intended to return to Kentucky. 

Citing the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act

(UCCJEA), the Florida court concluded that it had jurisdiction over Daniel’s 

child custody claim because (1) neither parent had remained in Kentucky and 

(2) Smith and the minor child were residents of Florida. The Florida court 

proceeded to enter a dissolution judgment that dealt with child custody and 

visitation orders. Smith promptly appealed, claiming the Florida court did not 

give full faith and credit to the Kentucky DVO. The Florida Court of Appeals 

reversed and remanded the child custody and visitation portion of the 

judgment to the lower court and ordered them to make additional findings
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concerning the Kentucky DVO and the best interest of the child. The Madison 

Circuit Court complied, issuing an amended judgment reasserting its 

determination that Florida did, in fact, have jurisdiction over the child custody 

matter in this case. The Florida court issued new custody and visitation orders. 

Smith once again appealed, but the Florida Court of Appeals affirmed the new 

orders on February 8, 2019. 

In 2020, Smith filed a motion or petition of unknown nature regarding 

child custody in Calloway County, but Smith did not live there. Thus, the 

matter was transferred to Christian County, where Smith now resides. It is this 

action that underlies the petition at issue in this case. Smith’s action in 

Christian Circuit Court is an attempt to get a Kentucky trial court to void the 

Florida custody order and reassert jurisdiction over the minor child’s custody 

matters. The trial court denied Smith’s request, finding that Florida did have 

jurisdiction to issue the child custody determination and related visitation 

orders. Furthermore, the Christian Circuit Judge discovered that a 

“simultaneous” custody proceeding had been previously filed in Maury County, 

Tennessee and was still an open and active case. Thus, pursuant to the 

UCCJEA, the trial court determined that Tennessee would be the proper forum 

for any custody modification. 

On April 3, 2020, Smith petitioned the Court of Appeals for a writ of 

mandamus. On July 22, 2020, the Court of Appeals issued an order denying 

Smith’s request for an extraordinary writ. The Court of Appeals found Smith 
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failed to make a compelling argument as to why an appeal would be inadequate 

in this matter. 

Smith appealed as a matter of right. We now review. 

II. ANALYSIS

The issuance of a writ is an extraordinary remedy. Allstate Prop. & Casu.

Ins. Co. v. Kleinfeld, 568 S.W.3d 327, 331 (Ky. 2016). As explained in Southern 

Fina. Life Ins. Co. v. Combs:

[C]ourts are decidedly loath to grant writs as a specter of 

injustice always hover writ proceedings. This specter is ever 

present because writ cases necessitate an abbreviated record 

which magnifies the chance of incorrect rulings that would 

prematurely and improperly cut off the rights of litigants.

413 S.W.3d 921, 925 (Ky. 2013) (internal citations and quotations omitted.). 

Thus, this Court has a two-class analysis in writ cases. 

Writ cases are divided into two classes, which are 

distinguished by whether the lower court allegedly is (1) acting 

without jurisdiction (which includes beyond its jurisdiction), 

or (2) acting erroneously within its jurisdiction . . . When a 

writ is being sought under the second class of cases, a writ 

may be granted upon a showing ... that the lower court is 

acting or is about to act erroneously, although within its 

jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or 

otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result 

if the petition is not granted. 

Id. at 926. Smith’s allegations fall within the second class of writ, which deals 

with claims that the lower court is acting erroneously. Smith claims that the 

trial court erred in finding that it did not have jurisdiction over the child 

custody matters. 

“[U]ltimately, the decision whether or not to issue a writ of prohibition is 

a question of judicial discretion. So review of a court’s decision to issue a writ 
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is conducted under the abuse-of-discretion standard. That is, we will not 

reverse the lower court’s ruling absent a finding that the determination was 

arbitrary, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Appalachian 

Racing, LLC v. Commonwealth, 505 S.W.3d 1,3 (Ky. 2016) (Internal citations 

and quotations omitted).

In this case, the writ does not meet the elements required for the second

class of writs. Smith fails to show (1) the court acted erroneously; (2) there 

exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise; and (3) great injustice and 

irreparable injury will result. 

Like the Court of Appeals, we focus on the second requirement for a 

second class of writs—adequate remedy by appeal. When a court is acting 

within its subject-matter jurisdiction, the petitioner must show as “an absolute 

prerequisite” to the issuance of a writ by a court that no adequate remedy by 

appeal exists. Indep. Ord. of Foresters v, Chauvin, 175 S.W.3d 610, 615 (Ky. 

2005). “No adequate remedy by appeal means that an injury to [the petitioners] 

could not thereafter be rectified in subsequent proceedings in the case.” Id. at 

614-615 (Internal citations and quotations omitted).

In this case, the trial court’s order is final and appealable. Smith does 

not explain why appealing the order would be inadequate in this matter. 

Furthermore, we do not find that she would suffer great injustice or irreparable 

injury, especially since she has the right to appeal. 

We reiterate that granting a writ is an extraordinary remedy and a writ 

should only be granted when the writ meets the strict requirements listed 
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above. In this case, we hold Smith failed to show a lack of adequate remedy on 

appeal or a great injustice and irreparable harm if the requested writ of 

mandamus was not granted. We hold that the Court of Appeals correctly found 

that Smith was not entitled to a writ. 

III. CONCLUSION

For the forgoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals and deny the 

writ of mandamus.

All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT: 

Betty Caitlin Nicole Smith 

Pro Se 

130 Old Major Lane 

Hopkinsville, KY 52240 

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: 

Zachary Taylor Daniel 

2914 Carters Creek Station Rd. 

Columbia, TN 38401