COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Frank, Beal es and Senior Judge Clements Argued at Richmond, Virginia

CHRISTOPHER WAYNE BUTLER OPINION BY v. Record No. 1213-13-2 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK OCTOBER 28, 2014 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COUR T OF POWHATAN COUNTY Thomas V. Warren, Judge Designate Susan E. Allen (The Law Office of Susan E. Allen, on brief), for appellant. Christopher P. Schandevel, Assi stant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Christopher Wayne Butler, appellant, was c onvicted in a bench trial of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. On appeal, he contends the trial court erred in imposing a mandatory minimum two-year sentence because the indictment failed to allege that his prior fel ony conviction occurred within ten years. Finding no error, we affirm.
BACKGROUND On April 9, 2013, a grand jury returned a true bill charging appellant with unlawfully and feloniously possessing a firearm af ter having been convicted of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2, a Class 6 felony. On May 9, 2013, appell ant was arraigned on the indictment and pled not guilty. At trial, the Commonwealth introduced evidence of a ppellant’s prior felony conviction that occurred within ten years of the current offense. The trial court found appellantPUBLISHED- 2 - guilty as charged and prepared to sentence appellant simultaneously on the firearm charge and other offenses pending before the court. 1 The Commonwealth objected to the consolida tion of the charges for sentencing. Citing Code § 18.2-108.2(A), 2 the Commonwealth argued that the trial court was required to impose a mandatory minimum sentence of two years incarceration on the firearm charge because appellant’s prior felony conviction occurred within ten years of the current offense. The trial

court sua sponte raised the issue of whether the court may impose a mandatory minimum sentence when the indictment failed to allege th e felony conviction occurred within the past ten years. Counsel was asked to submit memoranda on the issue. After considering the memoranda and arguments of counsel, the trial court imposed the manda tory minimum of two years incarceration. This appeal follows.
ANALYSIS “To the extent that determinations regardi ng sentencing involve th e interpretation of a statute or the common law, such an interp retation is a question of law reviewed de novo on appeal.” Commonwealth v. Greer, 63 Va. App. 561, 568, 760 S.E.2d 132, 135 (2014).

1 Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. We, therefore, recite only the facts and incidents of the procee dings relevant to this appeal.

2 Code § 18.2-308.2(A) provides in part: It shall be unlawful for . . . any person who has been convicted of a felony . . . to knowingly and intentionally possess or transport any firearm or ammunition for a firearm . . . . Any person who violates this secti on shall be guilty of a Class 6 felony. . . . Any person who viol ates this section by knowingly and intentionally possessing or transporting any firearm and who was previously convicted of any other felony within the prior 10 years shall be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment of two years.- 3 - ‘“The function of an indictment . . . is to give an accused notice of the nature and character of the accusations agains t him in order that he can ade quately prepare to defend against his accuser.”’ Sloan v. Commonwealt h, 35 Va. App. 240, 246, 544 S.E.2d 375, 378 (2001) (quoting Morris v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. A pp. 664, 668, 536 S.E.2d 458, 460 (2000)) (other citations omitted). Accordi ngly, Code § 19.2-220 provides: The indictment or information shall be a plain, concise and definite written statement, (1 ) naming the accused, (2) describing the offense charged, (3) identifying the county, city or town in which the accused committed the o ffense, and (4) reciting that the accused committed the offense on or about a certain date. In describing the offense, the indictment or information may use the name given to the offense by the co mmon law, or the indictment or information may state so much of the common law or statutory definition of the offense as is suffi cient to advise what offense is charged. When a statute contains more than one grad e of offense carrying different punishments, “‘the indictment must contain an assertion of the facts essential to the puni shment sought to be imposed.’” Sloan, 35 Va. App. at 246, 544 S.E .2d at 378 (quoting Moore v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 192, 198, 497 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1998)). Howe ver, Code § 19.2-220 does not require an indictment to affirmatively set forth th e punishment for the offense. Id. The trial court found that Atkins v. Commonwealth, 57 Va. App. 2, 698 S.E.2d 249 (2010), was “dead on point.” In Atkins, the Court was called upon to decide whether the mandatory sentences prescribed in Code § 18.2-3 08.2 are grades of the offense carrying different punishments, or are they simply different punishments for the same offense. We concluded that they are different punishments for the same offense. In Atkins, appellant was charged with posse ssing a firearm as a convicted felon in violation of Code § 18.2-308.2. 57 Va. App. at 7, 698 S.E.2d at 252. At trial, he asserted that because the indictment omitted the words “within ten years,” the indictment did not plead specific charging information that would dema nd a mandatory sentence upon conviction. In- 4 - relying on our holding in Thomas v. Comm onwealth, 37 Va. App. 748, 561 S.E.2d 56 (2002), this Court concluded, “the mandatory sentencing provisions simply define punishments within the Class 6 felony range.” Atkins, 57 Va. App. at 28, 698 S.E.2d at 262. We explained: “Defendant’s argument, however, is belied by Code § 18.2-308.2(A), a statute intended to ‘prevent[ ] a person, who is known to have committed a serious crime in the past, from becoming dangerously armed, regardless of whether that person uses, displays, or conceals the firearm.’ Jones v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 354, 358, 429 S.E.2d 615, 617, aff’d on reh’g en banc, 17 Va. App. 233, 436 S.E.2d 192 (1993). The proscribed conduct, together with the attendant elements , is clearly define d in the initial sentence of the statute and punish able as ‘a Class 6 felony.’ Consistent with the intendment of the enactment, an accused having been previously convicted of a ‘violent felony’ is subject to a period of mandatory incarceration , a sentence within the range of a Class 6 felony but beyond trial co urt discretion. Contrary to defendant’s contention, such disp arate penalties do not spawn gradations of the offense. The crime is not defined by the penalty.” Id. at 28-29, 698 S.E.2d at 262 (quoting Thomas , 37 Va. App. at 754, 561 S.E.2d at 59 (other citations omitted)). We agree with the trial court that the issue here is identical to the issue presented in Atkins and that decision controls this case. The date of the prior felony conviction is not an element of the underlying offense, i.e., possession of a weapon by a convicted fe lon. The only elements of the offense ar e (1) possession of a weapon, and (2) a prior conviction of a felony. The date of the convictio n is simply a sentencing factor. See Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998) (“An indictme nt must set forth each element of the crime that it charges. But it need not set forth factors releva nt only to the sentencing of an offender found guilty of the charged crime.” (other citation omitted)). Under the interpanel accord doctrine, we l ack the authority to revisit Atkins. That decision, from a panel of this Court, ‘“cannot be overruled except by the Court of Appeals sitting en banc or by the Virginia Supreme Court.’” Clinchfield Coal Co. v. Reed, 40 Va. App. 69, 73,- 5 - 577 S.E.2d 538, 540 (2003) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 252 Va. 425, 430, 478 S.E.2d 539, 541 (1996)). Appellant argues that in li ght of Alleyne v. United Stat es, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013), any reliance on Atkins and Thomas is misplaced. We disagree. In Alleyne, the defendant was convicted by a jury of robbery and “using or car rying a firearm” in the commission of a violent felony. The federal stat ute under which Alleyne wa s convicted prescribed a minimum sentence of five years if the firearm was used or carried, an d a minimum sentence of se ven years if the firearm was brandished. The jury ’s verdict form indicated that it fo und beyond a reason able doubt that Alleyne “[u]sed or carried a fire arm during and in rela tion to a crime of violence,” but did not indicate a finding that the firearm was “[b]randishe d.” Id. at 2156. Nevertheless, pursuant to the recommendation of the presentenc e report, the federal district court sentenced Alleyne to a minimum term of seven years base d on its finding by a preponderanc e of the evidence that Alleyne brandished the firearm. Id. Alle yne appealed, arguing th at the jury did not find the additional fact of brandishing beyond a reasonab le doubt and that ra ising his mandatory minimum sentence based on a sentencing judge’s finding that he brandished a firearm violat ed his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. Relying on Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 46 6 (2000), the Supreme Court found that Alleyne was entitled to have a jury determine whet her he brandished the fi rearm because that fact was an element of the offense. “The touchstone for determining whether a f act must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the f act constitutes an ‘element ’ or ‘ingredient’ of the charged offense.” Alleyne, 133 S. Ct. at 2158 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 56 0 U.S. 218, 224 (2010)). The Court explained that “[w]hen a fi nding of fact alters the legally prescribed punishment so as to aggravate it, the fact necessa rily forms a constituent part of a new offense and must be submitted to the jury.” Id. at 2162.- 6 - We disagree with appellant’s contention that all of the principles stated in Apprendi and Alleyne, which both involve jury tr ials, apply fully to be nch trials. See, e.g. , Mack v. McCann, 530 F.3d 523, 536 (7th Cir. 2008) (“All that Ap prendi requires is that Mack be foun d guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of ever y element of the crime wi th which he was charged. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477. Those findings must be made by a jury unless the defendant has waived his right to a jury.”). As in Apprendi, the Supreme Court decided Alleyn e in the context of the Sixth Am endment’s right to have a jury dete rmine all the factual elemen ts of the offense. In this Commonwea lth, the jury determines both guilt a nd punishment and therefore the jury does decide enhanced factors for sentencing. Moreover, the case at hand does not involve the fa ilure of a jury to decide an aggravating factor for enhanced sent encing, as appellant waived his right to a jury trial and was tried by the court. We conclude that the decisions in Apprendi and Alle yne do not control our resolution of this case. We also conclude that Hall v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 350, 381 S.E.2d 512 (1989), does not change our decision. In Hall, the appellant wa s specifically “indicted fo r the use of a ‘sawed-off shotgun’ in the commission of a ‘c rime,’” a Class 4 felony in violation of Code § 18.2-300(B). Id. at 351, 381 S.E.2d at 51 2. However, the trial court instructed the jury that Ha ll was charged with the more serious crime of “using a ‘sawed-off’ shotgun in the commission of a crime ‘of violence,’” a Class 2 felony in violation of Code § 18.2-300(A ). Id. at 351, 381 S.E.2d at 512-13. We noted that Code § 18.2-300 defined two separate crimes wi th different elements of each offense. Thus, there were two different grades of the offense. Where a statute contains more than one grade of an offense and each grade carries a different punishment the indictment must contain an assertion of the facts essential to the punishment sought to be imposed. This rule stems from the basic guarantee that the accused is entitled to prepare adequately for his defense. Id. at 352, 381 S.E.2d at 513 (other citatio ns omitted).- 7 - Here, however, Code § 18.2-3 08.2 contains only one grade of felony. The indictment correctly informed a ppellant that he was charged with a Clas s 6 felony. Therefore, the principles established in Hall are not relevant to this case. Similarly, appellant’s reliance on McKinley v. Commonwealth, 217 Va . 1, 225 S. E.2d 352 (1976), is misplaced. McKinley affirmed the princi ple that when a second or subsequent offense is charged, the more severe punishmen t cannot be inflicted un less the subsequent of fense is charged in the indictment. Id. at 4, 225 S. E.2d at 354. However, appellan t in McKinley was indicted for abduction with the intent to deprive the victim of her personal liberty but was convicted of abduction with intent to defile. Because each o ffense required proof of tota lly different intents, each were various grades of abduction and not sentencing elements as in the instan t case. Therefore, we do not consider McKinley relevant to the issue presented here.
CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we find the trial court did not err in imposing a mandatory minimum two-year sentence and the judgm ent of the trial court is affirmed. Affirmed.