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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Case No. 2:18-cr-27(2)

Plaintiff, JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

 

v.

TIMOTHY SULLIVAN,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant Timothy Sullivan’s Motion for 

Compassionate Release and Request to Appoint Counsel (ECF Nos. 289, 290). For the following 

reasons, Defendant’s motions are DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

On April 2, 2019, Defendant pled guilty to Attempted Coercion or Enticement of a Minor 

to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). (Change of Plea Minute 

Entry, ECF No. 126.) Defendant appeared for sentencing on November 7, 2019. (Sentencing 

Minute Entry, ECF No. 207.) This Court sentenced Defendant to a 138-month period of 

incarceration followed by a seven-year term of supervised release. (Id.)

On September 3, 2020, Defendant filed a motion for compassionate release. (ECF No. 

253.) He stated that his hypertension, hyperlipidemia, hematuria, and other medical conditions 

exposed him to a high risk of contracting COVID-19. (Id. at 2-17.) The Court denied his request 

for compassionate release because even if he presented an extraordinary and compelling reason 

for release, he remained a danger to the community and the nature and circumstances of his offense 

were too severe to warrant such an early release. (Op. & Order at 5-7, ECF No. 273.) The Court 

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of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed this Court’s decision denying compassionate release. 

(ECF No. 278.)

On October 28, 2021, Defendant renewed his request for compassionate release and sought 

the appointment of counsel, which the Court denied. (ECF No. 287.) In his renewed request for 

compassionate release, Defendant reiterated his position that his worsening medical conditions and 

lack of care in the in the Bureau of Prisons presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

release. (Id. at 3.) The Court, however, denied his renewed request, explaining that the § 3553(a) 

factors weighed against his release. And in denying his motion to appoint counsel, the Court 

declined to appoint counsel on three grounds: (1) Defendant was represented by counsel for his 

previous motion for compassionate release and the Court still found that he was not entitled to 

compassionate release, (2) the facts at issue were not sufficiently complex to warrant assistance of 

counsel, and (3) Defendant’s motions indicated that he could adequately present his claims for 

relief to the Court. (Id. at 5.)

On May 26, 2023, Defendant, proceeding pro se, once again moved the Court for an order 

granting him compassionate release and counsel. (ECF Nos. 289, 290.) The Government filed a 

response in opposition to these motions. (ECF No. 291.) Defendant’s motions are ripe for review. 

II. STANDARD

Since Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, federal law has authorized 

courts to reduce the sentences of federal prisoners with extraordinary health concerns and other

hardships, but only under very limited circumstances. See United States v. Ruffin, 978 F.3d 1000, 

1005 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Pub. L. No. 98–473, ch. II(D) § 3582(c)(1)(A), 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 

Prior to the passage of the First Step Act of 2018, a district court could grant compassionate release 

sentence reductions only upon motion by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). See id.

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On December 21, 2018, Section 603(b) of the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 

5194, modified 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow a sentencing court to reduce an imposed 

sentence. The statute provides: 

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed except 

that—in any case—the court, upon motion of the Director of the Bureau of prisons, 

or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant has fully exhausted all 

administrative rights to appeal a failure of the Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion 

on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 days from the receipt of such a request 

by the warden of the defendants’ facility, whichever is earlier, may reduce the term 

of imprisonment (and may impose a term of probation or supervised release with 

or without conditions that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term 

of imprisonment), after considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to the 

extent that they are applicable, if it finds that—

(i) extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction . . . and that such 

a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the 

Sentencing Commission.

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i).

As the Court of Appeals explained in Ruffin, the statute contains “three substantive 

requirements for granting relief.” Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1006. First, the court must initially find that 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” Id. (citing § 3582(c)(1)(A)). 

Second, before granting a reduced sentence, the Court must find “that such a reduction is consistent 

with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” Id. at 1007. But district 

courts may skip this second step and have “full discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ 

without consulting the policy statement U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13” when an incarcerated person files the 

motion for compassionate release, because § 1B1.13 is not an “applicable” policy statement when 

an incarcerated person files the motion. United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1109 (6th Cir. 

2020). Third and finally, even if the Court finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist, 

the Court may not grant a release before considering the sentencing factors set forth in § 3553(a). 

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Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1008. This last step gives the Court “substantial discretion” in deciding whether 

to reduce or modify a sentence. Id.

III. MOTION FOR COMPASSIONATE RELEASE 

Defendant moves the Court for a compassionate release. There is no dispute that Defendant 

has satisfied the administrative exhaustion requirement. Defendant submitted his request for 

compassionate release to the warden at his institution, and it was denied on June 1, 2022. (Ex. 105 

to Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 289.) Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to consider Defendant’s 

motion.

Defendant seeks compassionate release on largely similar grounds as his previous motion 

filed on October 28, 2021. Defendant contends that his worsening medical conditions and lack of 

care in the Bureau of Prisons present extraordinary and compelling reasons for release. (ECF No. 

289.) Defendant also argues that compassionate release is appropriate so that he can take care of 

his mother, who is currently in assisted living, as well as his aunt, whose husband is currently 

dying of dementia. (Id.)

The Court previously denied release because the §3553(a) factors weighed against release 

even if there was an extraordinary and compelling reason for release. (Op. & Order at 5, ECF No. 

273.) The Court does so again here.

The § 3553(a) sentencing factors include: 

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics 

of the defendant; 

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, 

and to provide just punishment for the offense; 

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and 

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, 

medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner[.] 

§ 3553(a).

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The nature and circumstances of Defendant’s serious offense and his history and 

characteristics remain unchanged since the Court’s prior opinion. Defendant attempted to coerce 

a minor to engage in sexual activities with him, viewed pictures of the minor’s past abuse, and 

encouraged other adults to further abuse the minor. 

Defendant seeks to minimize the depravity of his offense by distinguishing himself from 

his co-defendant, Mr. Weekley. (ECF No. 289.) While the Court recognizes that Defendant’s text 

messages are not equivalent to Mr. Weekley’s sexual abuse of Jane Doe, this fact does not lessen 

the gravity of Defendant’s conduct. Defendant acted in concert with Mr. Weekley to view pictures 

of past abuse, encouraged further abuse, and made sincere attempts to sexually abuse Jane Doe 

himself.

Nor do Defendant’s personal history and characteristics weigh in favor of release. As the 

Court previously held, Defendant’s history of gainful employment and low recidivism risk do not 

outweigh the severity of his offense. (Op. & Order at 7, ECF No. 273.) And to the extent Defendant 

argues that his medical conditions warrant early release, his medical records reveal that his stage 

3 kidney disease has resolved and his other medical issues are well-controlled with medication and 

supplements. (Ex. A to Gov. Opp’n, ECF No. 291-1.) 

Additionally, Defendant’s early release at this time would not “reflect the seriousness of 

the offense” or “provide just punishment” because Defendant has served only 63 months of his 

138-month sentence—less than half of the 138-month sentence that the Court found appropriate 

at the time of sentencing. Furthermore, Defendant can receive sex offender treatment at FCI 

Elkton, which would serve to rehabilitate Defendant and lower his risk of recidivism upon his 

eventual release. Thus, the § 3553(a) factors weigh strongly against early release, and therefore 

Defendant is not entitled to compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

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IV. MOTION TO APPOINT COUNSEL

Prisoners are not entitled to assistance of counsel for motions for post-conviction relief. 

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987). District courts have discretion whether to 

appoint counsel to a prisoner seeking compassionate release and should appoint counsel only 

where the interests of justice or due process so require. Mira v. Marshall, 806 F.2d 636, 638 (6th 

Cir. 1986). In exercising their discretion, courts should consider factors such as the nature of the 

case, whether issues are legally or factually complex, and the litigant’s ability to present claims 

for relief to the court. Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 1993). 

The Court, once again, finds the absence of compelling reasons for appointing counsel in 

this case. Defendant was represented by counsel for his previous motion for compassionate release 

and the Court still found that he was not entitled to compassionate release. Additionally, the facts 

in the case are not so complex as to warrant assistance of counsel. And Defendant’s motions 

indicate that he is able to present his claims for relief to the Court. Accordingly, the Court will not 

appoint counsel at this time.

V. CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant’s motion for compassionate release and to 

appoint counsel are DENIED. (ECF Nos. 289, 290.)

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

______________________ _______________________________

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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