1

Filed 7/20/22 P. v. Hoffman CA1/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or 

ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

DAVID L. HOFFMAN, Individually 

and as Trustee, etc. 

Defendants and Appellants.

 A163281

 (Marin County Super. Ct.

 No. CV-15-02647)

This appeal is from an order in a receivership matter initiated by 

respondents the People of the State of California and the County of Marin, 

Community Development Agency (collectively, the County) with respect to 

certain real property (the properties) owned by Hoffman.

1 In October 2015, 

the court appointed a receiver pursuant to Health and Safety Code section 

17980.7 and Code of Civil Procedure2 section 568 to abate nuisances and 

1 The properties are owned by the David L. Hoffman Revocable Trust 

dated December 20, 2002, for which David L. Hoffman is the trustee. The 

notice of appeal in this matter was filed by Mr. Hoffman, both individually

and as trustee of the Hoffman trust. When we refer to Hoffman, we are 

referring to Mr. Hoffman individually, in his role as trustee, and/or to the 

Hoffman Trust, as the context requires.

2 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise specified.
2

oversee remediation, after finding that the violations on the properties were 

“so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety of the 

occupants, neighboring residents, and the general public [was] substantially 

endangered.” After years of receivership proceedings, the superior court 

issued an order in May 2021 instructing the receiver “to retain a real estate 

broker to assess, value, list[,] and market” the properties for potential sale. 

Hoffman, who had been permitted to retain limited use of the properties 

during the pendency of the proceedings, was ordered to vacate the properties 

within 90 days.

After Hoffman appealed, the County moved to dismiss, arguing that the 

interim receivership order was not appealable under the collateral order 

doctrine. We agreed and dismissed the appeal. Thereafter, in February 

2022, the Supreme Court granted review in the case, directed us to vacate 

our dismissal order, and asked us to “show cause” why the order at issue was 

not appealable as a collateral order. Having reconsidered the matter as 

instructed, we again dismiss the appeal.

I.

BACKGROUND

The two properties at issue in these receivership proceedings—the 

Cintura property and the Alta property—are owned by Hoffman and lie 

adjacent to each other in the County of Marin. Hoffman purchased the 1.66-

acre Cintura property in 1973 and, we are told, still resides there pending the 

disposition of this appeal. A 1,368 square foot dwelling unit was built on the 

Cintura property in 1916. The last building permit for the property was 

issued in 1947 for repairs to that structure. Hoffman owned the Alta 

property with Susan Shannon until November 2002, when he became its sole 

owner. The Alta property is approximately 19,500 square feet. An 800 
3

square foot dwelling unit was built on the Alta property in 1910. The only 

permit for the Alta property was issued in May 1994 for an electrical service 

change. The history of multiple code violations and substandard, hazardous 

conditions on the properties spans over 30 years. 

A. The Cintura Property

Starting in 1988, the County received a series of complaints regarding 

unpermitted construction on the Cintura property. The first stop work order 

issued in September 1988 and involved the construction of an unpermitted 

tea pagoda attached to the residence. In a February 1991 letter from the 

County, Hoffman was granted an extension to submit a permit application for 

the tea pagoda, but nothing was done to correct the violation. Another notice 

of violation issued in December 1999, ordering Hoffman to stop all work on a 

new unpermitted “ ‘dome type structure’ ” on the property for use as a tea 

cave. A September 2000 notice of violation ordered Hoffman to stop work on 

certain concrete construction, excavation, and ongoing work.

During a May 2001 site inspection, staff observed an unpermitted 

addition to the house that had been constructed under the deck and from 

which Hoffman was operating a tea business. The garage had been converted 

into a room to store tea. A detached structure, called the tearoom, had been 

built. Near the tearoom, a water storage pond had been fashioned, with 

adjacent outdoor bathing facilities. The tea pagoda was two stories, but still 

incomplete. An outdoor kitchen area with an open fire pit was observed on 

the property near construction for an outdoor shower tower. Across from the 

shower tower, an outdoor bathroom area with a composting toilet and urinal 

was being created. A wastewater pond system had been developed near the 

tea pagoda and the residence. The tea cave was still in existence. Up a 

pathway, a detached bedroom containing a propane heater was being 
4

constructed. Four trailers were also located on the property. Although they 

appeared to be occupied, they had no sewer connections. 

County staff met with Hoffman during a site inspection in January 

2007 to discuss bringing the property into compliance. He was given 30 days 

to take steps towards compliance, but, at a site inspection in February 2007, 

it was noted instead that another building had been constructed adjacent to 

the garage and more work had been done on the tea pagoda. In November 

2009, a notice of violation was issued for construction of a new unpermitted 

retaining wall on the northeast side of the property.

Furthermore, Hoffman was operating a commercial tea business from 

the Cintura property throughout this period. The initial business, Silk Road 

Teas, was sold in 2004. The new business, The Phoenix Collection, was not 

open to the public. To support his commercial tea business, Hoffman stored 

large boxes of tea in various structures on the property and had employed at 

least one employee from time to time. Nevertheless, no use permits were 

ever issued for the property.

During a February 2007 site inspection by County environmental 

health staff, Hoffman admitted that he had disconnected the primary 

residence from the septic tank and that he was constructing outdoor 

composting toilets, an open urinal, and an outdoor shower/bathing area 

which were not connected to the septic system. In addition, neither the 

trailers on the property nor the many detached unpermitted structures 

constructed by Hoffman were plumbed into the septic system. Instead, 

Hoffman had constructed unpermitted holding ponds on the property for 

residential waste and grey water. Such above-ground sewage and 

wastewater holding ponds create both environmental and public health 

hazards. A February 2007 enforcement letter from the County advised 
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Hoffman of the numerous code violations pertaining to his sewage disposal 

system and set forth specific timeframes for correction. As of an August 2011 

site inspection, however, no governmental permitting had been obtained.

Regarding water issues, after a number of site inspections at the 

Cintura property, a civil engineer for the County determined that there is a 

natural watercourse that enters the property and that Hoffman had built 

unpermitted structures—including retaining walls, a boat pond, and a

storage building—within 20 feet of the natural watercourse which altered

and/or interfered with its flow. There were also concerns that the open black 

water and gray water holding ponds could overflow in a significant storm, 

introducing contaminated water into the natural aquatic system. In 

addition, the County determined that Hoffman had constructed and was 

operating an unpermitted well in the boat pond. 

Hoffman was notified by the County in March 2010, June 2010, and 

June 2011, regarding the numerous code violations on the Cintura property. 

Each time he was given a detailed list of the necessary corrective steps and 

10 days to arrange for correction of the violations. None of the violations 

were ever corrected, however. Instead, after a site inspection in October 

2011, a notice of violation was issued for construction of a retaining wall near 

the tea storage structure as well as additional work on the previously 

identified projects. A senior code enforcement specialist for the County sent 

an enforcement letter to Hoffman that same month, characterizing the 

building code violations on the property as “significant” and suggesting he 

“contact a professional, such as an architect or engineer” to review the 

unpermitted structures and help him “prioritize what structures [to] pursue 

for legalization and what structures cannot be legalized and may need to be 

removed.”
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B. The Alta Property

In December 1998, the County received a complaint from co-owner 

Susan Shannon that Hoffman was constructing an unpermitted retaining 

wall out of wooden tea boxes on the Alta property. In January 1999, an 

inspector observed the 30-foot retaining wall, which was six to eight feet tall 

and made out of tea boxes filled with unreinforced concrete. A notice of 

violation was posted on the property for the illegal construction. In response, 

Hoffman inquired about obtaining a permit for the wall and was told several 

times of the need to submit plans and obtain a permit or remove the wall. In 

May 2000, Hoffman submitted a letter from a civil engineer opining that the 

retaining wall was “ ‘sound.’ ” Staff explained the requirements for obtaining 

a building permit, and Hoffman responded he was having financial 

difficulties with complying but was attempting to work with the engineer to 

obtain the permit. At a site inspection in May 2001, the retaining wall was 

observed to have been lowered and lengthened, but still required a building 

permit. Over the years, staff continued to have discussions with Hoffman 

about bringing the retaining wall into compliance.

An inspection of the Alta property in December 2006 disclosed 

numerous unpermitted construction projects at various stages of completion 

similar to those described with respect to the Cintura property, including 

remodeling of the dwelling unit; conversion of the understory into a tea 

storage space; construction of additional retaining walls and detached 

accessory structures; and stonework related to a sewage treatment unit.

Despite posting a notice of violation ordering the stoppage of all work, a 

February 2007 inspection established that the unpermitted projects remained 

on the property and identified additional unpermitted construction. For 

example, the dwelling unit had been substantially remodeled, including the 
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removal of the kitchen and bathroom, and there was no plumbing connection 

to septic or water. In addition, a tea storage building with large wooden 

doors, two equipment storage buildings, and three concrete-block retaining 

walls had been constructed on the property. Two additional mortared stone 

retaining walls had been built to create terraces for agriculture. A follow-up 

letter was sent to Hoffman regarding the need to correct the violations and/or 

obtain building permits for the unpermitted structures. Moreover, zoning 

issues existed with respect to use of the Alta property to store tea for 

Hoffman’s commercial tea business.

Also in February 2007, an inspection by County environmental health

staff disclosed that Hoffman was in the process of constructing a sewage and 

wastewater holding pond system on the Alta property without governmental

approval. The holding pond system was located in the vicinity of a natural 

watercourse which drained into Cintura Creek and San Geronimo Creek.3

Hoffman was sent a letter setting forth the numerous violations on the 

property, with specific, phased timeframes for their correction. At a meeting 

in March 2007, Hoffman was given instructions for obtaining a permit from 

the State Regional Water Quality Control Board for his above-ground sewage 

disposal system. As of October 2007, no changes or corrections had been 

made, and Hoffman admitted he had dug a well on the property. Over the 

next four years, despite continued reminders, Hoffman failed to seek permits 

for his waste disposal system.

3 As with the Cintura property, Hoffman had built unpermitted 

structures within 20 feet of the natural watercourse which altered and/or 

interfered with its flow. Thus, similar issues regarding interference and 

possible contamination of the watercourse were also present and unaddressed 

on the Alta property. 
8

Inspections in August and October 2011 identified additional 

unpermitted construction, including an unreinforced masonry tower built 

over the unpermitted sewage and wastewater holding ponds. Hoffman had 

installed a bathtub, sink, composting toilet, and a gas line in the tower. The 

plumbing fixtures were not connected to an approved sewage system. 

Rather, Hoffman told County staff the holding ponds were for both black 

water and grey water and that he used the grey water for agricultural 

purposes. As previously mentioned, above-ground sewage and wastewater 

holding ponds can create both environmental and public health hazards. 

Hoffman had also built an addition to the dwelling unit; made other 

renovations; constructed a small accessory structure out of unreinforced 

masonry; and built a new 60-foot stone structure which he called a garbage 

enclosure. 

C. Administrative Proceedings

In June 2011, the County issued violation letters to Hoffman stating it 

would refer the Cintura property and the Alta property for code enforcement 

hearings unless Hoffman contacted the County within ten days and arranged

to correct the code violations on the properties. Hoffman did not respond. In 

December 2011, Hoffman was issued nuisance abatement notices and notices 

to appear with respect to both properties.

At hearings in February 2012 before an administrative law judge

(ALJ), Hoffman testified regarding conditions on the properties. According to 

Hoffman, he and his wife were the only residents on the Cintura property. 

There was one trailer on the property, which was occupied occasionally by a 

caretaker or other employee. The Alta property was unoccupied and used to 

store equipment, furniture, clothing, wine, and tea. Hoffman had operated a 

tea business on the Cintura property for 40 years. At that point, he and his 
9

wife were running a mail order tea business called The Phoenix Collection. 

Tea was stored in the tea cave, the converted garage, and in small rooms off 

the garage. The orders were filled on the Cintura property and picked up for 

delivery at the Alta property. Hoffman also used the Alta property to age 

teas he had collected from Thailand and China. Hoffman had a business 

license for the sale of tea at the Cintura property. Hoffman did not have a 

business license for the Alta property. Although the operation was not open 

to the public, Hoffman invited people from “ ‘all over the world’ ” to taste his 

tea.

Hoffman held no professional licenses but had done all of the 

remodeling and construction on the properties himself. He stated that he did 

try to obtain a building permit for the tea pagoda in 1988 but that it proved 

“ ‘unworkable’ ” because the logs he had used were not up to code. Hoffman

admitted he had never obtained a building permit for any of the projects on 

either property. In 2007, he sent a letter to the County suggesting his 

properties were exempt from building permits because they were a “ ‘film 

set,’ ” having been filmed as part of a 2007 documentary by Les Blank called 

All in this Tea. He continued to believe he was exempt from building permits 

on this basis. 

Since at least the 1990’s, Hoffman has been a proponent of sustainable 

living through composting of food and human waste. The earthworm is the 

mainstay of his agricultural system, and he is a proponent of waste disposal 

through bio-digestion. He claimed he attempted to get his alternative waste 

disposal system on the Cintura property permitted 40 years ago but was 

unsuccessful. There was no longer a septic system on the Alta property, and 

his alternative waste disposal system was not completed. The holding ponds 

on the Alta property were being used at that point to store water for 
10

agricultural uses. Hoffman did not believe there is a natural watercourse on 

the Cintura property. He was unaware of a natural watercourse on the Alta 

property, but testified water comes onto the Alta property from the Cintura 

property following rain. He admitted to diverting water to protect the Alta 

dwelling unit. 

In 2011, Hoffman put together a working team, including an architect, 

a geotechnical engineer, and a structural engineer to begin the process of 

bringing the properties into compliance. The architect prepared a hand 

drawing of all of the structures on the properties, and the geotechnical 

engineer wrote a report regarding the foundation of one structure. In 

December 2011, the County deemed the documentation insufficient, as it had 

requested a survey of all of the structures before any permit could be sought. 

At that point, Hoffman stopped all attempts at remediation. He conceded, 

however, that he might “be at fault” and that he has learned after 40 years 

“he cannot simply build what he wants to build.”

In written orders, the ALJ concluded that Hoffman had engaged in

numerous code violations for unpermitted construction, retaining walls, 

composting toilets, and sewage and wastewater holding ponds on both 

properties. Additional violations were found with respect to construction 

within 20 feet of the top of a natural watercourse, the unpermitted 

construction of retaining walls and other structures within a natural

watercourse, and the construction of unpermitted wells. The ALJ rejected 

Hoffman’s argument that the temporary use of the properties as a film set 

exempted him from these requirements. Further, the storage of commercial 

tea products on the properties violated zoning restrictions for home 

occupations, as did use of an employee in conjunction with a home occupation 

without a use permit.
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Thus—over 10 years ago, on May 1, 2012—Hoffman was ordered by the 

ALJ to abate his many violations and public nuisances by, among other 

things, ceasing to discharge any human waste or wastewater to the surface of 

the ground within 24 hours; retaining a septic pumper to pump all

wastewater from the holding ponds within 10 days; contracting with a 

professional to determine whether the existing septic system on the Cintura 

property could be repaired or must be replaced within 30 days; removing 

unpermitted sewage-related ponds within 45 days on the Cintura property 

and 90 days on the Alta property; obtaining a septic permit within 90 days for 

the Cintura property and 120 days for the Alta property; obtaining the 

necessary permits in order to complete demolition of all unpermitted 

buildings and other structures within 90 days; and removing all trailers and 

stored commercial tea.

No occupancy of the properties was permitted until the sewage disposal 

issues were resolved per the ALJ’s orders. In addition, Hoffman was also 

ordered to pay approximately $31,000 in abatement costs and $97,000 in civil 

penalties for the Cintura property and approximately $27,000 in abatement 

costs and $70,000 in civil penalties for the Alta property. Hoffman’s petitions 

for administrative appeal of the ALJ’s decisions were denied by the superior 

court in December 2012, with the court sustaining the ALJ’s orders in their 

entirety.

D. Receivership Proceedings

In September 2014, the County issued a notice to Hoffman with respect 

to the properties, directing him to comply with the ALJ’s orders within 30 

days and informing him that the failure to commence work could lead the 

County to petition the courts for appointment of a receiver with respect to the 
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properties.

4 In October 2015—almost three years after the ALJ’s orders were 

confirmed by the superior court, the court appointed a receiver with respect 

to the properties, finding them to be substandard and maintained in violation 

of state law and local ordinance. Specifically, the court found pursuant to 

Health and Safety Code section 17980.6 that the violations on the properties 

were “so extensive and of such a nature that the health and safety of the 

occupants, neighboring residents, and the general public [was] substantially 

endangered.” Despite being afforded a reasonable opportunity to correct the 

violations cited in the ALJ’s decisions and orders, Hoffman had not done so. 

The court concluded that the substandard conditions and violations would 

likely persist unless it appointed a receiver “to take possession of [the 

properties] and undertake responsibility for [their] rehabilitation.” 

The receiver was granted full powers under section 568 and Healthy 

and Safety Code section 17980.7, subdivision (c), subject only to the 

appointment order and any further orders of the court. Pursuant to the 

appointment order, the receiver was given broad powers “to the extent 

necessary to abate any nuisance, rehabilitate the propert[ies], and bring the 

propert[ies] into compliance with the law,” including the powers to: take full 

and complete possession and control of the properties; to determine the 

economic and practical feasibility of rehabilitating the structures on the 

properties or whether demolition or some other method of abating the 

4 In fact, when the County conducted a follow-up inspection in June 

2014, not only had Hoffman failed to correct any of the violations on the 

properties, he had completed additional construction on the tea pagoda and 

an outdoor shower on the Cintura property and had replaced a trailer with an 

outdoor kitchen, including a stove, refrigerator, and cooking area with a 

stucco enclosure. An inspection in December 2014, disclosed Hoffman’s 

construction of a new water collection area on the Cintura property and a 

new fence on the Alta property. 
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violations was more appropriate; to enter into contracts, including contracts 

with real estate agents or appraisers; to sell the properties “if necessary, 

subject to the prior approval and confirmation of [the] Court,” and to 

“temporarily or permanently relocate” the properties’ occupants “if necessary” 

to implement a rehabilitation plan. 

The County had not sought Hoffman’s immediate removal from the 

properties in its petition requesting appointment of a receiver, but it did 

request the right to seek a removal order from the court if Hoffman interfered 

with the rehabilitation or if the properties became too hazardous to safely

inhabit. In addition, the appointment order expressly instructed the receiver

with respect to the ALJ’s orders—including specifically the orders that the 

properties be vacated—that he should investigate the properties and, “[i]n

the event the [r]eceiver should determine that the [properties] should be 

vacated, the [r]eceiver [should] seek specific instructions from the Court by 

way of a noticed motion.”5 Although orders appointing receivers are made 

specifically appealable pursuant to section 904.1, subdivision (a)(7), no appeal 

was taken from this order.

In December 2017, in response to a request for further instructions 

from the receiver, the court held a hearing with respect to the receiver’s 

mitigation plan for the properties.

6 The court noted that the receiver’s duties 

5 Thus, contrary to arguments made by Hoffman’s appellate counsel 

during oral argument, the receivership order clearly contemplated the 

possibility that the properties might need to be sold to bring them into 

compliance (expressly giving the receiver the power to sell “if necessary,” 

subject to court approval and confirmation) and specifically authorized the 

receiver to seek Hoffman’s removal by noticed motion “[i]n the event the 

[r]eceiver should determine that the [properties] should be vacated.”

6 In preparation for the hearing, the court conducted a site visit.
14

in this case were “vast” and would likely continue for months if not years. It 

stated that its instructions would be centered on certain limited tasks 

immediately confronting the parties and that “clearly” further instructions 

would be “required over time.” The court found the receiver’s request to 

install fences, railings, and gates to remediate “obvious safety hazards” 

generally “reasonable and necessary.” It pointed to one particular structure 

that presented a safety hazard (and which it appeared Hoffman had been 

“continuously modifying” in violation of court order), stating that it should be 

fenced. With respect to two structures on the Alta property that encroached 

on public land, the court was willing to consider allowing Hoffman to modify 

or remove them at his expense prior to the receiver seeking their demolition.

The court’s written order generally authorized the installation of 

fences, railings, and gates on the properties. However, Hoffman and his

employee were authorized to continue to use the residence and one storage

structure on the Cintura property. In addition, the fencing and gates on the 

Alta property were required to be installed to allow Hoffman access to the 

interior of the residence and the garden area on that property. Hoffman was 

prohibited from making the properties open to the general public for “tours or 

visits.” And Hoffman’s continued occupancy of the properties was expressly 

conditioned upon “the termination of construction work” at the properties. 

At a hearing for further instructions in September 2018, the court 

noted that the receivership proceeding was not meant to be punitive. 

Instead, the “primary end goal” was to restore the properties “to legal status 

in a feasible and economical manner.” The court also recognized “that the 

community and the County have stated wishes to preserve the propert[ies], 

and [their] alleged historical architecture, and that such preservation should 

also guide the restoration efforts.” It indicated that it was considering “all 
15

relevant facts, including the community interest in saving historically 

significant structures.” Indeed, given the facts before the court at that time, 

it favored “restoration of the propert[ies] without demolition, if economically 

feasible.” The court expressed openness to an agreement between the County 

and the Marin Architectural Commission to treat the properties as 

historically and architecturally significant but stated it could not mandate 

the relevant governmental entities to do so.

During the September 2018 hearing, the court authorized the receiver 

to move forward with the demolition of the two structures on the Alta 

property that encroached on public land, finding it the only feasible solution. 

Hoffman had been provided with a fair opportunity to address the structures 

in another manner and had failed to do so. The court also ordered the 

receiver to examine the properties on a structure by structure basis and 

prepare recommendations regarding whether the rehabilitation of each such

structure could be conducted through application of the State Historical 

Building Code (Health & Saf. Code, § 18950 et seq.). The receiver was 

ordered to meet and confer with counsel on this issue and prioritize 

structures.

At a hearing in March 2019, the court noted the thoroughness of the 

receiver’s “comprehensive report.” The report set forth in detail how the 

State Historical Building Code could be utilized to legalize some or all of the 

structures on the properties and how the violations of federal, state, and local 

laws arising from Hoffman’s unpermitted diversion of the watercourses 

running over the properties could be resolved through off-site mitigation.

Hoffman requested 90 days to review the report, but stated he was willing to 

give up the properties. The People’s attorney stated she had no objection to 
16

the properties being considered historical. The County’s primary concern, 

according to its attorney, was bringing the properties into compliance.

By August 2019, representatives of the Lagunitas Project, a local 

nonprofit formed to acquire and preserve the properties, appeared in court at 

a status conference, and the parties discussed progress with respect to a 

possible compliance agreement and settlement. In December 2019, the court 

set a mandatory settlement conference for March 2020. At the conclusion of 

the March 2020 hearing, the court ordered the receiver to file a report 

discussing the highest and best use of the properties; the value of the 

properties; and the cost for rehabilitation and restoration of the properties.

Hoffman requested and was given the opportunity to file a proposal for 

bringing the properties up to code but did not do so.

The matter was then continued several times in an attempt to reach a 

feasible solution for the properties. Hoffman was given another chance to 

propose an alternate plan for the properties in July 2020, but he did not 

submit anything to the court. In October 2020, the court expressed the need 

for this case to be resolved given conditions on the properties. The receiver 

addressed the court, stating that he had no faith any significant money would 

be raised to save the properties and that there were no practical solutions to 

save them. He noted that he had already advanced $20,000 of his own money 

with respect to the properties and that the waterway issued had not even 

been addressed. The court advised the receiver to file a request for 

instructions to bring the properties into compliance, whether by sale or 

rehabilitation. The court was not optimistic the properties could be 

rehabilitated and advised Hoffman to prepare to vacate the properties.

The receiver’s April 2021 request for instructions asked for authority to 

take sole possession of the properties and to employ a real estate broker to 
17

market the properties for sale.7 According to the receiver—while technically

feasible—a preservation-based rehabilitation approach for the properties was 

simply not financially feasible. The receiver would need access to funds to 

pay for “the significant amount of technical work needed to inspect, analyze 

and document the structures and improvements” at the properties and to 

prepare the necessary “surveys, reports and plans.”

There was little, if any, equity in the properties to fund such an 

approach. As of mid-2020, the fair market value of the properties was 

estimated at up to $650,000 (Alta property) and $525,000 (Cintura property), 

valuations which had likely increased. However, the receiver detailed 

approximately one million dollars in liens, defaulted taxes, and 

administrative creditors’ claims with respect to the properties. It appeared 

Hoffman was either unwilling or unable to provide for the rehabilitation

costs. Moreover, despite “considerable efforts” through a “sophisticated 

fund[]raising and education program,” the Lagunitas Project had raised only 

a small percentage of the over one million dollars it acknowledged it would 

need to preserve the properties. Finally, although Hoffman had been given 

several chances to submit an alternate rehabilitation plan, he had not done 

so and had not been in communication with the County or the receiver since 

October 2020.

The receiver opined that he had done everything reasonably possible to 

facilitate a preservation-based rehabilitation plan for the properties with 

Hoffman and the Lagunitas Project and that that there was no significant 

public funding available for such an approach. He believed his proposed plan 

7 Mindful of Hoffman’s age and health, the receiver had delayed filing 

the request until after the local COVID stay-at-home order expired, Marin 

County moved to orange COVID status, and vaccinations were available.
18

of seeking a buyer for the properties was not just preferable, it was the only

viable plan for their rehabilitation. With respect to Hoffman’s continued 

presence on the properties, the receiver stated it would be “entirely 

unrealistic” to assess, list, and show the properties with Hoffman in 

residence. The receiver noted that he had never inspected the interiors of 

several unpermitted structures on the properties because Hoffman declined 

to give him access. Moreover, Hoffman continued to construct improvements 

on the properties despite court orders enjoining him from doing so. The 

receiver, real estate agents, consultants, demolition contractors, and 

potential purchasers would require unfettered access to the properties.

Hoffman opposed the requested orders on a plethora of grounds, 

including that they were premature because there was no receivership plan, 

rehabilitation plan, or financing plan in place for the properties. He 

acknowledged, however, that a feasible compliance plan could not be 

developed by the receiver “until data regarding rehabilitation work, 

valuation, sale pricing, finances, and funding [could] at least be estimated.”

Hoffman also argued that the receiver had not established it was necessary to 

evict him from the properties and stop him from conducting his tea business 

there, although he recognized “there may eventually come a time when [he] 

must vacate the propert[ies] (either temporarily or permanently).” And he 

expressed concern regarding the solvency of the receivership and the 

financial feasibility of a sale-based plan. According to Hoffman, the 

Lagunitas Project remained committed to developing a preservation-based 

plan for the properties.
19

On May 21, 2021, the superior court held a hearing which culminated 

in the order appealed from in this case.8 It was noted throughout the hearing

that any proposed sale of the properties would be subject to further court 

order. Hoffman’s attorney stated that the Lagunitas Project remained 

involved and might “at the end of the day, wind up being the buyer that 

comes in.” The court agreed that, given the complexities of the properties, 

the receiver might not find a buyer, and the Lagunitas Project could “come in 

and offer pennies on the dollar and maybe get a bargain,” but that they 

wouldn’t know the options without listing the properties. With respect to 

Hoffman’s continued occupancy, his attorney commented he had so many 

possessions at the properties it would take 5 months for him to move out, and 

the receiver stated it was infeasible to try to market the properties with 

Hoffman and all of his possessions there.

The court commented that it felt deeply for Hoffman and had 

throughout the proceedings. It addressed him directly, stating: “[Y]ou have 

been before me for more than five-and-a-half years now. You have come 

before me wearing your heart on your sleeve begging for me to exercise 

discretion to allow you to stay and to try and find every possible way to 

preserve the property that you built.” The court opined, however, that it and 

the receiver had “done all humanly possible, but for taking out a checkbook 

8 Both parties cite to the reporter’s transcript for this hearing in their 

supplemental briefing filed after this case was remanded to us by the 

Supreme Court. We did not have the benefit of this transcript when we 

initially dismissed this appeal because it had not yet been filed as part of the 

appellate record. However, we find it relevant to the issues involved in this 

motion and therefore, to the extent not automatically included it the record 

before us, we take judicial notice of the reporter’s transcript as well as the 

portions of record below which have been provided to us by the parties in 

their motion pleadings. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subds. (c) & (d), 459, subd. (a).)
20

and writing you a check for $1 million to be able to save the propert[ies].” It 

concluded its choices at that point were limited and it “would be foolish to 

suggest that it’s not time to sell the propert[ies] and that we can do 

something else.” And it stated that, in ordering him to leave, it was simply 

effectuating the orders that had been in place for years. The court reflected 

that, when it did its site visit in 2017, there was wet cement, new redwood 

fencing, and construction going on in the tea house despite those orders.

While it expressed hope that the Lagunitas Project could “enter into the mix,” 

the court stated it could “barely see the line in the sand” because the line was 

so far behind it. 

In its written order, the court found that it was “reasonable and 

necessary” for the receiver to take “full and sole physical possession” of the 

properties and “to retain a real estate broker to assess, value, list and 

market” the properties. Thus, pursuant to the order, the receiver was 

instructed to take full and sole physical possession of the properties; Hoffman 

was ordered to vacate the properties, and to cause all other persons to vacate, 

within 90 days of the entry of the order; and the receiver was instructed “to 

retain a real estate broker to assess, value, list and market” the properties in 

order to “secure sales of them for approval and confirmation by the Court.” 

Hoffman filed a timely notice of appeal from this order.

The County moved to dismiss, arguing that Hoffman was challenging a 

non-appealable interim order. After opposition, we agreed with the County 

and dismissed the appeal, finding the collateral order doctrine inapplicable 

on these facts. In February 2022, the Supreme Court granted review in the 

case, directed us to vacate our dismissal order, and asked us to “show cause” 

why the order at issue was not appealable as a collateral order. Having 
21

reviewed the matter a second time, we reaffirm our prior conclusion and 

again dismiss the appeal.

II.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Framework

“[Health and Safety Code] [s]ection 17980.7 authorizes the judicial

appointment of a receiver in situations where substandard conditions on a

property substantially endanger the health and safety of the public, and the

property owner has been unable or unwilling to remediate those conditions.

The law permits the appointment of a receiver to assume control of the

property and abate the nuisance conditions or to take other appropriate

actions as may be authorized by the court.” (County of Sonoma v. Quail

(2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 657, 671–672.) A superior court’s orders in

receivership proceedings rest upon that court’s “ ‘sound discretion exercised 

in view of all the surrounding facts and circumstances and in the interest of

fairness, justice[,] and the rights of the respective parties. [Citation.] The 

proper exercise of discretion requires the court to consider all material facts 

and evidence and to apply legal principles essential to an informed, 

intelligent, and just decision. [Citation.] Our view of the facts must be in the

light most favorable to the order[,] and we must refrain from exercising our

judgment retrospectively.’ [Citations.] Where there is no evidence of fraud,

unfairness, or oppression, the court has wide discretion in approving the

receiver’s proposed actions.” (City of Santa Monica v. Gonzalez (2008) 43

Cal.4th 905, 931 (Gonzalez); accord, Quail, at p. 671; City of Sierra Madre v.

SunTrust Mortgage, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 648, 657–658, 660.) Indeed,
22

“[s]uch deference is the rule, even where the court confirms extraordinary

action by the receiver, such as a sale of real property.” (Gonzalez, at p. 931.)

Here, however, we are considering whether a particular order in a 

receivership proceeding is appealable pursuant to the collateral order 

doctrine. “[W]e are ‘dutybound to consider’ appealability.” (Pacific Fertility

Cases (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 568, 576.) And, if jurisdiction is lacking, we 

“ ‘must dismiss.’ ” (Ibid.) Such a jurisdictional question, when based on 

undisputed facts, is subject to our de novo review. (Saffer v. JP Morgan 

Chase Bank (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1239, 1248; Dial 800 v. Fesbinder (2004) 

118 Cal.App.4th 32, 42 [“Where the evidence is not in dispute, a 

determination of subject matter jurisdiction is a legal question subject to de 

novo review”].) Nevertheless, we must necessarily consider the context in 

which the challenged order arose in the exercise of our independent review of 

this legal question.

“The right to appeal in a civil case is conferred exclusively by statute.” 

(Smith v. Smith (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1074, 1083 (Smith), quoting Powers 

v. Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 109.) Generally, only final judgments are 

appealable. (See Sullivan v. Delta Airlines (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 304.) “A 

judgment is the final determination of the rights of the parties in an action or 

proceeding.” (§ 577.) “Under the final judgment rule, ‘ “ ‘There can be but

one final judgment in an action, and that is one which in effect ends the suit

in the court in which it is entered, and finally determines the rights of the

parties in relation to the matter in controversy’ [citations]. A judgment is

final ‘when it terminates the litigation between the parties on the merits of

the case and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has

been determined.’ ” ’ ” (San Joaquin County Dept. of Child Support Services

v. Winn (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 296, 300 (Winn).) “It is the substance and 
23

effect of the judgment which determines its finality. (Brown v. Memorial 

Nat.’l Home Foundation (1958) 158 Cal.App.2d 448, 453.)

As this District summarized decades ago in Kinoshita v. Horio (1986) 

186 Cal.App.3d 959 (Kinoshita), numerous policy considerations undergird 

the one final judgement rule. For instance, there is “the obvious fact that

piecemeal disposition and multiple appeals tend to be oppressive and costly. 

(Id. at p. 966.) Moreover, “[i]nterlocutory appeals burden the courts and

impede the judicial process in a number of ways: (1) They tend to clog the

appellate courts with a multiplicity of appeals. Whether or not the earlier

ruling is appealed, later ones will certainly be appealable. [Citations.] (2)

Early resort to the appellate courts tends to produce uncertainty and delay in

the trial court. . . . (3) Until a final judgment is rendered the trial court may 

completely obviate an appeal by altering the rulings from which an appeal 

would otherwise have been taken. [Citations.] (4) Later actions by the trial 

court may provide a more complete record which dispels the appearance of 

error or establishes that it was harmless. (5) Having the benefit of a complete 

adjudication by the trial court will assist the reviewing court to remedy error 

(if any) by giving specific directions rather than remanding for another round 

of open-ended proceedings.” (Id. at pp. 966–967.)

In contrast, “[t]hose whose rights and obligations depend on the 

judgment are best served by a single complete and final resolution of the 

issues presented. A right to an interlocutory appeal permits a party who

benefits from delay to frustrate the goals of promptness and certainty of

adjudication. The possibility that an order is appealable can produce delay

even where no one wants to impede the litigation. If the ruling is appealable,

the aggrieved party must appeal or the right to contest it is lost. [Citations.] 

Thus every exception to the final judgment rule not only forges another
24

weapon for the obstructive litigant but also requires a genuinely aggrieved

party to choose between immediate appeal and the permanent loss of possibly

meritorious objections.” (Kinoshita, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 967.) “For 

all these reasons, exceptions to the one final judgment rule should not be 

allowed unless clearly mandated.” (Ibid.)

Section 904.1 codifies the one final judgement rule. (§ 904.1, subd. (a) 

[an appeal may be taken from the superior court “[f]rom a judgment, except 

an interlocutory judgement.”] The provision also contains a list of statutory 

exceptions to that rule. (§ 904.1, subds. (a)(1)-(14).) “Section 904.1 serves to 

avoid piecemeal litigation by limiting appeals to final judgments, 

postjudgment orders, and certain enumerated orders.” (Smith, supra, 208 

Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.) As mentioned above, for instance, pursuant to 

subdivision (a)(7) of section 904.1, an appeal may be taken from an order 

appointing a receiver, even though it is not a final judgment. The 

receivership order at issue here, in contrast, is not a final judgment; nor is it 

one of the orders specifically made appealable by section 904.1. (Smith, 

supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1083.)

However, the collateral order doctrine exists as a common law 

exception to the one final judgment rule pursuant to which “some interim 

orders are deemed appealable ‘judgments’ because they are essentially the 

same as a final judgment.” (Reddish v. Westamerica Bank (2021) 

68 Cal.Ap.5th 275, 278; see Smith, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1084 [the 

collateral order doctrine is a well-recognized “exception to the ‘one final 

judgment’ rule codified in . . . section 904.1”].) Pursuant to the doctrine, an 

interim order is appealable if: (1) it is collateral to the subject matter of the 

litigation; (2) it is final as to the collateral matter; and (3) it directs the 

payment of money by the appellant or the performance of an act by or against 
25

the appellant. (Marsh v. Mountain Zephyr (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 289, 297–

298, citing Sjoberg v. Hastorf (1948) 33 Cal.2d 116, 119; accord, Reddish, at 

p. 278; (Koshak v. Malek (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1545 (Koshak).) In

other words, under the collateral order rule, “ ‘an appeal will lie from [a]

collateral order even though other matters in the case remain to be

determined,’ but that exception applies only ‘[w]here the trial court’s ruling

on a collateral issue “is substantially the same as a final judgment in an

independent proceeding” [citation], in that it leaves the court no further

action to take on ‘a matter which . . . is severable from the general subject of

the litigation.’ ” ’ (Winn, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) 

“A matter is collateral when it is ‘distinct and severable from the 

general subject of the litigation.’ ” (Steen v. Fremont Cemetery Corp. (1992) 

9 Cal.App.4th 1221, 1227 (Steen).) In contrast, “[i]f an order is ‘ “important

and essential to the correct determination of the main issue” ’ and ‘ “a

necessary step to that end,” ’ it is not collateral.” (Winn, supra,

163 Cal.App.4th at p. 300.) An interim order is not final if further judicial

action is required with respect to the matters addressed by the order. 

(Koshak, supra, 200 Cal.App.4th at p. 1545.) In other words, the order must

be “ ‘dispositive of the rights of the parties in relation to the collateral 

matter.’ ” (Ibid.) As this Division noted almost a century ago, “ ‘A judgment 

that is conclusive of any question in a case is final as to that question.’ ” 

(Colma Vegetable Assoc. v. Superior Court (1925) 75 Cal.App. 91, 95, italics 

added.)

For example, in Winn, an alleged father appealed from a superior court

order in a child support proceeding requiring him to submit to genetic

testing. (Winn, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 298-299.) The appellate court

concluded that the collateral order doctrine did not apply because the genetic
26

testing order was “not severable from the general subject matter of the 

litigation, which is to establish whether Winn is the father of the children 

and to obtain an order that he pay child support.” (Id. at p. 300.) As to 

finality, Gunder v. Gunder (1929) 208 Cal. 559 is instructive. In that case, 

the Supreme Court dismissed an appeal from an order settling the basic 

issues in a marriage dissolution proceeding and referring the matter to a 

referee for an accounting. (Id. at pp. 559–561.) In finding the referral order 

non-appealable, the Court reasoned: “It is apparent upon the showing made 

in this case that the judgment is not and was not intended by the court to be 

a final determination of the controversy in the trial court but that final 

judgment as to the issues adjudicated was reserved by the court to be entered 

upon the submission of the referee’s report, which would then be subject to 

‘the court's approval,’ and at which time the court would also render its ‘final 

judgment in favor of said plaintiff and against said defendant in such amount 

as the court may find that the plaintiff is entitled to.’ ” (Id. at p. 562; see also 

Kinoshita, supra, 183 Cal.App.3d at p. 964 [noting the “ ‘now settled rule’ ” 

that the types of orders at issue in Gunder are not appealable].)

B. The Order at Issue is not Appealable

There is little disagreement between the parties regarding the law 

applicable to this dispute. Nevertheless, the County argues that the 

receivership order at issue is not appealable pursuant to the collateral order 

doctrine because it does not deal with a collateral matter, it does not require 

the payment of money or performance of an act by Hoffman, and it is not a 

final disposition of the matters covered in the order. Hoffman, on the other 

hand, asserts that the collateral order doctrine does authorize this appeal 

because the order requires him to perform an act, moving off the properties;

involves matters collateral to the main issue in the proceedings, possession 
27

and sale of the properties; and is a final resolution of those matters. As 

discussed below, we agree with the County that the challenged receivership 

order is neither collateral to the main purpose of the underlying receivership 

nor final with respect to the issues it addresses. We therefore again dismiss 

this appeal. Although we tend to agree with Hoffman that the receivership

order—by requiring him to move off the properties, at least temporarily—

does require the performance by him of an act, we need not reach this issue 

because Hoffman has failed to persuade on the other two factors necessary for 

application of the collateral order doctrine.9

1. The Order is not Collateral

As the superior court made clear at a hearing for further instructions in 

September 2018, the “primary end goal” of these receivership proceedings is 

to restore the properties “to legal status in a feasible and economical 

manner.” Hoffman concedes as much. He argues, however, that the court’s 

order instructing the receiver “to retain a real estate broker to assess, value, 

list and market” the properties in order to “secure sales of them for approval 

and confirmation by the Court” is collateral to the issue of abatement. To the 

contrary, the possibility that the properties might need to be sold in order to 

effect their remediation has been contemplated since the court appointed the 

receiver back in 2015. In its appointment order, the court granted the 

9 The County argues at length that Hoffman was not directed to take 

any “new” action by the challenged receivership order because he had already 

essentially been deprived of possession of the properties through existing 

court orders, subject only to notice of physical removal by the court. We do 

find the fact that Hoffman had only contingent and limited rights to physical 

possession of, and/or access to, portions of the properties relevant to the 

question before us. However, we consider it in the context of our finding 

below that the receivership order was not collateral to the main subject 

matter of this litigation, the remediation of the properties.
28

receiver numerous powers “to the extent necessary to abate any nuisance, 

rehabilitate the propert[ies], and bring the propert[ies] into compliance with 

the law,” including the power to sell the properties “if necessary, subject to 

the prior approval and confirmation of [the] Court.” 

It can hardly be said that the court’s order instructing the receiver to

explore the parameters of a possible sale was unrelated or somehow ancillary

to the underlying goal of abatement. Rather, it was a critical step towards

remediation, taken only after the court and the receiver—over the course of

years—took numerous actions attempting to prioritize a preservation-based

remediation plan for the properties. As the court remarked at the May 2021

hearing, both it and the receiver had “done all humanly possible, but for 

taking out a checkbook and writing [Hoffman] a check for $1 million to be 

able to save the propert[ies].” Exploring remediation through sale thus 

became essential to restoring the properties “to legal status in a feasible and 

economical manner.” 

Similarly, from the beginning of this receivership action, Hoffman’s

physical possession and use of the properties has always been tied to, and 

contingent on, the need for their remediation. Although it did not ask that

Hoffman be immediately removed from the properties in its receivership

petition, the County did request the right to seek a removal order from the 

court if Hoffman interfered with their rehabilitation or if the properties 

became too hazardous to safely inhabit. And the court expressly instructed 

the receiver to investigate the properties and seek specific instruction if he 

“determine[d] that the [properties] should be vacated.” Thereafter, Hoffman’s 

ability to use the properties was substantially reduced for health and safety 

reasons while the receiver and the court pursued a feasible remediation plan. 

Once it was determined that sale of the properties should be explored, 
29

ordering Hoffman (and his extensive possessions) to be removed from the 

properties so that they could be effectively marketed for a possible sale was 

simply the next step in the underlying abatement goals of the receivership 

action. As the court, itself, stated, ordering Hoffman to leave was simply 

effectuating the orders that had been in place for years. We thus conclude 

that decisions regarding Hoffman’s occupancy of the properties were not 

“ ‘distinct and severable from the general subject of the litigation.’ ” (Steen, 

supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p. 1227.) 

2. The Order is not Final as to Either Possession or Sale

Even more evident, the receivership order is not final as to either of the 

two issues it addresses. As stated above, the possibility that the properties

might need to be sold in order to effect their remediation had long been 

contemplated, and the court’s order simply instructed the receiver “to retain a 

real estate broker to assess, value, list and market” the properties in order to 

“secure sales of them for approval and confirmation by the Court.” (Italics 

added.) As its comments during the May 2021 hearing made clear, the court 

fully expected to revisit the issue before settling on a specific plan with 

respect to the ultimate disposition of the properties. 

The court first identified options which might come before it, including

a buyer who wants to buy empty lots, a buyer who wants the properties “as 

is” with plans to level them, a buyer who wants to preserve them, and/or a 

buyer who wants to work with the County on their remediation and post a 

bond. But the court did not know what options would be available and “it 

would be silly for [it] to flip a coin and decide which option [the receiver] 

should go with before we know what buyers are out there.” The court went 

on to state: “I would presume that if [the receiver] finds a buyer who says, ‘I 

want this property for X number of dollars, clear lot,’ [the receiver] is going to 
30

come to me and say, ‘I [have] a buyer and we need instruction to clear the lot,’ 

or if he comes to me and says, ‘I have a buyer who wants the property as is 

and the buyer is committed to bringing the buildings up to historical building 

code and has met with the County, and they are in agreement as to what 

needs to be done to bring it up to historical building code, and the buyer is 

prepared to post a bond to convince the County that it’s going to be brought 

up to building code,’ then [the receiver] will bring me in a request to approve 

that.” It later reiterated: “I have to approve it before it’s sold, anyway, so I 

would have to approve any sale.”

In this way, these proceedings are distinguishable from those in both 

Fish v. Fish (1932) 216 Cal.14 (Fish) and City of Riverside v. Horspool (2014) 

223 Cal.App.4th 670 (Horspool). In Fish, the petitioner had appealed from an 

order “settling the receiver's account, fixing his compensation and that of his 

attorney, directing a named commissioner to sell, subject to confirmation, 

certain property in the receiver’s hands to pay said fees, directing the 

disposition to be made of the balance of the proceeds derived from such sale, 

and ordering the discharge of the receiver and the release of his surety.” 

(Fish, at p. 15.) In an opinion granting a petition for writ of supersedeas, the 

court noted that the commissioner was reportedly threatening to sell the 

property while the appeal was pending. (Ibid.) The court found the order 

appealable as a collateral order, opining: “The order for the sale of the 

receivership property, for the purpose designated, is certainly an order ‘for 

the doing of an act against’ petitioner, because, if carried into execution, it 

will deprive her of a portion of the property or the proceeds derived from the 

sale thereof.” (Id. at p. 16.) Under the circumstances, the court did not find 

the fact the sale was still subject to court confirmation dispositive, noting:

“Obviously, such a reservation does not affect the finality of that portion of 
31

the order fixing the compensation of the receiver and his attorney and 

directing a sale of the property to pay the same.” (Id. at p. 17.)

Like this case, Horspool involved a nuisance abatement action in 

which the appointment of a receiver was sought pursuant to Health and

Safety Code section 17980 et seq. (Horspool, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 673.) The receiver requested an order approving the sale of the property. 

The owners’ actions had made it impossible for the receiver to obtain 

financing for the rehabilitation of the property. Thus, “an as-is sale to an 

investor-buyer with the personal resources and willingness to complete 

repairs was the best option.” (Id. at p. 677.) The receiver had identified a 

buyer who was “willing to purchase the . . . property, ‘as is,’ for $75,000, and 

to fund the cost of repairs, under the oversight of the receiver.” The court 

approved the sale of the property “ ‘as is,’ free and clear of all liens and 

encumbrances.” (Ibid.) On appeal, the appellate court opined that the sale

order was appealable as a collateral matter involving the sale of assets. (Id.

at p. 683.) The matter was also moot because the sale of the property had 

become final due to the appellant’s inaction in obtaining an undertaking to 

stay the trial court proceedings. (Id. at p. 685.)

The receivership order in this case is much more preliminary than 

those at issue in Fish and Horspool. No sale has been approved by the court, 

and there are multiple possibilities regarding the terms and consequences of 

any such future sale. Indeed, there is a question, given the complexities of 

the properties, whether a buyer can even be found at all. Since it is clear 

that further judicial action must still be taken with respect to the approval 

and permitted terms of any sale, the challenged receivership order is not final 

as to sale of the properties.
32

For similar reasons, the order that Hoffman vacate the properties is not 

final on the issue of possession. As we noted above, Hoffman’s physical 

possession and use has always been contingent on the remediation plans for 

the properties. The court made its May 2021 order because it concluded that 

the time had come to ready the properties for possible sale and that it was 

not feasible to market the properties with Hoffman in residence. But the 

future of the properties is entirely unclear. As the court itself noted, the 

receiver might not find a buyer, and the Lagunitas Project could “come in and 

offer pennies on the dollar and maybe get a bargain.” Or the receiver might 

be unable to find any buyer. Under either scenario, Hoffman might be able to 

regain physical possession of at least portions of the properties as an artist in 

residence or as the owner. Since it is not clear that the order removing 

Hoffman from the properties is dispositive regarding his rights to possession, 

it is not final for purposes of the collateral order doctrine. 

Having concluded that the receivership order is neither final nor 

collateral, we dismiss the appeal. In taking this action, we recognize that we 

could treat this appeal as a petition for extraordinary writ and reach the 

merits of Hoffman’s challenges to the receivership order. We decline to do so 

for all of the reasons discussed herein. “ ‘The interests of clients, counsel, and

the courts are best served by maintaining, to the extent possible, bright-line

rules which distinguish between appealable and nonappealable orders. To

treat the instant appeal as a writ application would obliterate that bright line

and encourage parties to knowingly appeal from nonappealable orders, safe

in the knowledge that their appeal will be “saved by the appellate courts.” 

We cannot condone or encourage such practice.’ ” (Winn, supra, 163 

Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) 
33

Hoffman is, beyond doubt, an exceedingly sympathetic individual who 

has achieved many extraordinary things in his lifetime. However, as stated 

above, in receivership proceedings such as this, the superior court is required 

to weigh the equities of the case based on all materials facts and relevant 

legal principles, exercising its discretion to make “informed, intelligent, and 

just” decisions. (Gonzalez, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 931.) We see no valid 

reason to interfere prematurely in this complex, equitable process, and many 

reasons such an unduly proactive approach could interfere with the superior 

court’s ability to reach the best and timeliest solution “in the interest of 

fairness, justice[,] and the rights of the respective parties.” (Ibid.) 

III.

DISPOSITION

The appeal is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs on 

appeal.
34

WISS, J.

WE CONCUR:

MARGULIES, ACTING P.J.

BANKE, J.

A163281N



Judge of the San Francisco Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.