ALD-100 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________ No. 16-3224

___________ JUDY THORPE, Appellant

v. STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY JUVENILE JUSTICE COMMISSION; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; THOMAS FLANAGAN; ASHWATH S. TR ASI, DAG; GAIL R. BERAN, DAG

___________________ _________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey (D.C. Civil No. 3-16-cv-02058) District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp

___________________ _________________ Submitted on a Motion to Proceed In Form a Pauperis, a Motion to Reopen, for Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Th ird Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 January 12, 2017 Before: MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges (Opinion filed: February 17, 2017)

_________ OPINION *

_________ PER CURIAM

* This disposition is not an op inion of the full Court and pu rsuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 Judy Thorpe, proceeding pro se, filed a no tice of appeal from th e final judgment of

the United States District Court for the Di strict of New Jersey in her employment discrimination action. The appeal was dismisse d for failure to pay the filing fee. Thorpe has now filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion to reopen the appeal. We hereby reopen the appeal and gr ant her motion to proceed IFP. Because no substantial question is presented by the appe al, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. See LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6. 1 We exercise plenary review of a district court decision, such as this one, which dismisses a complaint un der the Rooker-Feldman 2 doctrine. Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Ci r. 2006). Thorpe’s complaint explicitly

1 We have jurisdiction to consider this a ppeal pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 1291. Although Thorpe was informed that her appeal might be dismissed as untimely, we find that the appeal was timely filed. A District Court’ s judgment must be set out in a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). “[A]n or der is treated as a separate document if it satisfies three criteria: (1) it must be self-contained and se parate from the opinion, (2) it must note the relief granted, and (3) it must om it (or at least substantially omit) the trial court’s reasons for disposing of the claims .” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007). Ordina rily, a notice of appeal in a civil case in which the United States is not a party must be filed “within 30 days after entry of the judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If, however, a separate document is required “and no sepa rate document exists, an appe llant has 180 days to file a notice of appeal—150 for th e judgment to be considered ‘entered,’ plus the usual 30 days from the entry of the judgment.” LeB oon, 503 F.3d at 223; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2). The District Court’s order, date d June 7, 2016, cont ained a substantial discussion of the reasons for di smissing Thorpe’s complaint. Thorpe’s notice of appeal was filed by the District Court on July 25 , 2016, well within the 180-day period.

2 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and Di strict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).3 asked for “judicial review” of two of her employment discrimination cases that were denied in the New Jersey state courts. 3 We agree with the Dist rict Court that under the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine it lack ed jurisdiction over Thorpe’s complaint to the extent she

was a “ ͑ state-court loser[] complaining of inju ries caused by state-court judgments

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced 4 and inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments.’” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (20 05)). Because “a district court is precluded from entertaining an action . . . if the relief requested effectivel y would reverse a state court decision or void its ruling,” see Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 19 2, the District Court correctly dismissed Thorpe’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction to the extent that she sought review of the state court judgments. Thorpe’s complaint might be read to raise claims that are not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; however, we need not remand this matter to the District Court,

3 We take judicial notice of the decision reported at Thorpe v. State, State Juvenile Justice Comm’n, No. A-0104-11T1, 20 15 WL 3602413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 10, 2015), certification denied, 223 N.J. 356 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Thorpe v. New Jersey, 136 S. Ct. 2034, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2549 (2016), describing her cases.

4 While Thorpe’s petition for a writ of certiora ri was still pending in the United States Supreme Court when she filed her co mplaint in District Court, the state proceedings had ended. See Federacion de Maestros de Pu erto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 (“[A] United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in judicial proceedings. Review of such judg ments may be had only in this Court.”).4 as any such claims woul d have been properly dism issed for other reasons. 5 The Supreme

Court has cautioned that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be applied narrowly. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Ba sic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. The doctrine does not apply unless the injury was actually “produced by a state-court judgment and not simply ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Thorpe’s complaint is not a m odel of clarity, we discern two possible allegations that might assert injuries fro m other than the state-court judgment. First, she complains that she experien ced discrimination and an illegal job action violating the Civil Service Reform Act, but t hose allegations are frivolous, as she has not asserted that she was a federal employee subjec t to the protection of that Act. See Elgin v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126 , 2130 (2012) (“The CSRA established a comprehensive system for reviewi ng personnel action taken against federal employees .” (internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis a dded)). Second, she claims that defendants in the state law cases “lied” and “manipulated the rules of evidence and the rules of civil procedures.” Thorpe’s complaint does not asse rt that these allegations form the basis of any federal claim. We find no error in the District Court’ s failure to separately consider such vague and conclusory claims. 6

5 We may affirm a district court judgment for any reason support ed by the record. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F. 3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 6 Under the circumstances of this case, th e District Court was not required to allow amendment of the complaint befo re dismissal. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 2935 For the above reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment. 7

F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002).

7 Thorpe’s motion for appointm ent of counsel is denied.