J-A09017-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: R.N., A MINOR, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

IN THE INTEREST OF: F.N., A MINOR,

APPEAL OF: LUZERNE COUNTY 

CHILDREN AND YOUTH SERVICES

No. 1725 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered September 16, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County

Civil Division at No(s): CP-40-DP-0000012-2013, CP-40-DP-0000013-2013

BEFORE: SHOGAN, OTT, and STABILE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JUNE 05, 2017

Appellant, Luzerne County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”), 

purports to appeal from two orders entered on September 16, 2016, 

regarding the assignment of a caseworker to underlying dependency actions. 

After careful review, we are constrained to quash this appeal.

The trial court summarized the troubling factual and procedural history 

of this matter as follows:

On January 9, 2013, after [a] hearing addressing the 

Dependency Petition filed by Luzerne County Children and Youth 

Services (Children and Youth) the court, by clear and convincing 

evidence, found the minor children, R.N. and F.N., to be 

dependent children pursuant to the Juvenile Act. This case 

involves an appeal taken by Children and Youth pursuant to an 

Order entered by the [c]ourt dated September 12, 2016 

(docketed on September 16, 2016) which ordered that a 

Hazleton caseworker, rather than a Wilkes-Barre caseworker, 

shall be assigned to the case. The case was to be supervised 

from the Wilkes-Barre Office since there were no supervisors 

available in the Hazleton office.
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There are two minor children in this case, R.N. and F.N. 

R.N. is six (6) years old, born [in December of 2009], and F.N. is 

(10) years old[,] born [in July of 2006]. The natural mother, 

K.N. [(“Mother”)] had three (3) children and one of them is 

deceased.

On December 23, 2014, [Mother] filed a Petition for 

Emergency Special Relief requesting that Luzerne County 

Children and Youth and the Guardian Ad Litem for the children 

have no further involvement in the case and that the matter be 

referred to Children & Youth’s regional headquarters. 

Alternatively, the Mother requested that the Dependency 

[proceeding] be dismissed and discontinued and the minor 

children [be] returned to [Mother]. [Mother] averred in her 

Petition that the Guardian Ad Litem had referred the matter 

involving the deceased child to a personal injury attorney in 

order to file a wrongful death action. Mother also averred that 

the Guardian Ad Litem did not disclose her actions concerning 

her referral to the [c]ourt, Master, other attorneys or parties 

involved.

[Mother] also averred that one of the caseworkers from 

Children and Youth also referred the wrongful death action to a 

personal injury lawyer without disclosing her actions concerning 

the referral to the [c]ourt, Master, other attorneys or parties 

involved. Mother further alleged that the caseworker and/or the 

Guardian Ad Litem provided confidential medical records of the 

deceased minor child to a personal injury attorney without the 

consent, knowledge or approval of [Mother] and without 

disclosing that information to the [c]ourt, Master, Attorneys or 

parties involved. [Mother] alleged that the Guardian Ad Litem 

could not hold a neutral position in this case and that her actions 

presented a conflict of interest and further presented an 

appearance of impropriety. [Mother] further alleged in her 

Petition that a wrongful death action was filed and that an 

Administrator of the Estate was appointed which excluded 

[Mother].

On December 30, 2014, Children and Youth filed 

Preliminary Objections to [Mother’s] Petition for Special Relief. 

On January 6, 2015[,] an agreement was reached among 

[Mother], the Guardian Ad Litem of the minor children[,] and 

Children and Youth. [Mother] agreed to withdraw her Petition 

for Special Relief without prejudice in which she requested that 
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the assigned Children and Youth personnel and the Guardian Ad 

Litem be removed from the case. The Guardian Ad Litem agreed 

to withdraw as the Guardian Ad Litem for the two children 

without admission of any wrongdoing or liability. Thus, a new 

Guardian Ad Litem was appointed for the minor children, R.N. 

and F.N. 

Luzerne County Children and Youth agreed to transfer the 

case files to its office in Hazleton, Pennsylvania. It was agreed 

that these files were to be handled by caseworkers, supervisors 

and investigators who had no involvement with this case. More 

specifically, Luzerne County Children and Youth agreed to 

immediately transfer the file of the two minor children to the 

Hazleton office for assignment to a new caseworker. 

Melissa Rogers of the Wilkes-Barre Office was the only individual 

permitted to meet with the Hazleton caseworker to provide the 

case history and transfer of the file. After that initial meeting, 

Ms. Rogers was not to have any further communication with any 

Wilkes-Barre staff regarding the dependency actions of the minor 

children. Furthermore, no other Wilkes-Barre caseworker or 

staff member was to have any contact regarding the case with 

the Hazleton caseworker.[1]

There was also a pending Petition for Contempt against 

Children and Youth filed by [Mother] alleging that Melissa Rogers 

and her supervisor, Donna Domiano, interfered with reunification 

between [Mother] and her children by contacting Cornerstone 

Counseling and advising that agency not to engage in 

reunification services despite a [c]ourt Order which directed 

Cornerstone Counseling to conduct therapeutic sessions between 

Mother and the children. On September 9, 2016, Children and 

Youth filed a Petition to Modify the existing Order relating to the 

above-referenced caseworker and supervisor assignments. As 

indicated, supra., [sic] said Order was entered upon agreement 

of all the parties. The basis of the petition was to advise the 

court that the assigned caseworker in the Hazleton office had left 

her position and the only remaining employee working on the 

case was the supervisor from the Hazleton office. However, at 

____________________________________________

1

 The terms of this agreement were placed on the record and entered as an 

order by the trial court during the January 6, 2015 hearing. N.T., 1/6/15, at 

1-28. 
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the hearing, the court learned that the supervisor was also 

leaving her position. Thus, a new caseworker and supervisor 

would need to be assigned to the family. At the hearing, the 

[c]ourt held that since there were no more supervisors available 

at the Hazleton office, a supervisor from the Wilkes-Barre office 

may be assigned as long as the supervisor had no connection to 

the case or presented no appearance of impropriety. 

Furthermore, the [c]ourt ordered that one of the Wilkes-Barre 

supervisors, Jeanette Rosenau, who is the fiancée of one of the 

caseworkers that originally worked on the case, would not be 

permitted to be the supervisor for the Hazleton caseworker. 

On October 17, 2016, Children and Youth filed an Appeal 

to the Superior Court [from] the Order[s]. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 12/20/16, at 1-4 (internal citations omitted). 

CYS presents the following issue for our review:

Whether the Trial Court erred because it did not have jurisdiction 

to order how Luzerne County Children and Youth Services should 

allocate administrative resources pursuant to a dependency case 

governed by the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301, et seq.?

CYS’s Brief at 1.

Before turning to the merits of CYS’s argument, we must determine if 

we may exercise jurisdiction over this appeal. Initially, we acknowledge that 

issues of jurisdiction may be raised sua sponte. In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 

334 (Pa. Super. 2011). Moreover, “[w]hether an order is appealable as a 

collateral order is a question of law; as such, our standard of review is de 

novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Rae v. Pennsylvania Funeral 

Directors Association, 977 A.2d 1121, 1126 n.8 (Pa. 2009).

First, of relevance is the fact that the September 16, 2016 orders 

issued by the trial court were separate decisions for each child and were filed 
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on separate dockets. Orders, 9/16/16, at 1. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 341 requires that where one or more orders resolves issues 

arising on more than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, an 

appellant must file separate notices of appeal from each order or judgment. 

See Pa.R.A.P. 341, note (citing Commonwealth v. C.M.K., 932 A.2d 111 

(Pa. Super. 2007)) (quashing joint notice of appeal filed by co-defendants 

from separate judgments of sentence entered on different dockets). 

Furthermore, in the civil context, the question of one appeal from multiple 

orders has been specifically disapproved of by courts of this Commonwealth. 

See General Electric Credit Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 263 

A.2d 448, 452–453 (Pa. 1970) (holding that one appeal from several 

judgments is discouraged as unacceptable practice and stating that the 

Supreme Court has quashed such appeals where no meaningful choice 

between them could be made); Egenrieder v. Ohio Casualty Group, 581 

A.2d 937, 940 (Pa. Super. 1990) (holding separate appeals were required to 

be filed by each appellant where trial court entered separate orders denying 

each appellant’s motion on different grounds). Here, CYS filed only one 

notice of appeal from the two separate orders that were entered on separate 

dockets. Thus, quashal on this basis is appropriate. 

Second, CYS has filed an appeal from an interlocutory order. While 

CYS asserts that it is appealing a collateral order, we cannot agree. 

Generally, only appeals from final orders are eligible for 

appellate review. . . . The collateral order rule “permits an 
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appeal as of right from a non-final order if it is separable from 

and collateral to the main action, involves a right too important 

to be denied review and, if the review is postponed, the right will 

be irreparably lost.” The collateral order rule, codified at 

Pa.R.A.P. 313, must be interpreted narrowly. All three elements 

must be satisfied to permit review of an interlocutory appeal 

under the collateral order rule.

Jacksonian v. Temple University Health System Foundation, 862 A.2d 

1275, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal citations omitted). 

“In order to satisfy the second prong of the collateral order doctrine, it 

is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties.” 

Spanier v. Freeh, 95 A.3d 342, 346 (Pa. Super. 2014). “Rather, the issue 

must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular 

litigation at hand.” Id. 

Additionally, we have described the third element for qualification as a 

collateral order as follows:

The third of these requires the appellant to demonstrate 

that the underlying claim will be “irreparably lost” should the 

appellant be forced to forebear from appealing until after final 

judgment in the litigation. To satisfy this element, an issue must 

actually be lost if review is postponed. Orders that make a trial 

inconvenient for one party or introduce potential inefficiencies, 

including post-trial appeals of orders and subsequent retrials, are 

not considered as irreparably lost.

Graziani v. Randolph, 856 A.2d 1212, 1225 (Pa. Super. 2004) (internal 

citations and some quotation marks omitted).

In support of its claim that the September 16, 2016 orders are 

collateral orders, CYS contends first that the orders are separate from the 

main cause of action in the dependency case. CYS’s Brief at 4-5. Second, 
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CYS maintains that the right involved is too important to be denied review 

because “[w]ithout review, the [t]rial [c]ourt can continue to order the 

Agency how to handle [sic] administrative decisions even though it has no 

statutory authority.” Id. at 5. Finally, CYS argues that the question before 

the Court will be irreparably lost if review is postponed because “the decision 

as to which caseworker would be working with this family would never be 

reviewable.” Id. 

We agree that the first prong has been met: the order regarding 

assignment of the caseworker is separate from the main, underlying 

dependency action. We cannot agree, however, that the second and third 

prongs required for a collateral order have been satisfied.

With regard to the second prong, as outlined, CYS asserts that the 

right involved is too important to be denied review because without review, 

the trial court can continue to handle administrative decisions though it has 

no statutory authority to do so. We first note that the parties came to the 

initial agreement to prohibit staff from the Wilkes-Barre office from working 

on Mother’s case in January of 2015. N.T., 1/6/15, at 1-14, 27-28. At that 

point, it was agreed to by all interested parties, including CYS, that staff in 

the Hazleton office would handle the matter. Id. As a result of this 

agreement, Mother agreed to withdraw her petition for emergency special 

relief. Id. at 8. CYS did not challenge the trial court’s authority to enter the 

order reflecting that agreement at that time. N.T., 1/6/15, at 10, 27-28. 
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CYS is now asking for a change in the status quo that was put into 

effect by the order reflecting that agreement. Thus, we cannot agree with 

CYS’s assertion that the court is continuing to “handle” administrative 

decisions without authority. By agreement, the parties allowed the trial 

court to manage this deemed “administrative decision.” CYS did not object 

to or appeal from that order when it was entered. Accordingly, the trial 

court’s authority to designate a caseworker in this matter was conceded by 

all parties, including CYS. Moreover, while the issue may be important to 

CYS in this particular case, we cannot agree that it involves rights deeply 

rooted in public policy going beyond this particular litigation where the 

parties agreed to the trial court’s authority in directing the administrative 

handling of this matter. Spanier, 95 A.3d at 346. Accordingly, the second 

prong is not met. 

Furthermore, the third prong of the collateral order test has not been 

met. Notably, CYS does not make an argument or assert facts relating to 

the importance of a particular caseworker being with this family. Rather, it 

argues that the trial court’s decision hinders CYS’s ability to effectively 

allocate resources, thereby placing a heavy burden on CYS, and if review of 

this issue is postponed, the claim will be irreparably lost. CYS’s Brief at 4, 7. 

We find this argument unconvincing for several reasons. 

First, CYS’s focus appears to be on the allocation of resources. 

Regardless of which office supervises this case, the allocation of resources 
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will be within Luzerne County CYS. As a result, we cannot agree that a 

designation of which office will supervise this case places a “heavy burden” 

on CYS, nor that the postponement of review will result in the claim being 

irreparably lost. Arguably the designation of a Hazleton caseworker and 

Wilkes-Barre supervisor in this matter may result in some inconvenience or 

inefficiency for CYS. Those factors, however, are insufficient to meet the 

criteria for the third prong. Graziani, 856 A.2d at 1225. Moreover, if it 

were subsequently determined that the caseworker who worked with this 

family was inappropriate, and that impacted the dependency determination 

for example, then that issue could be addressed on appeal. Accordingly, the 

third element for a collateral order has not been established, and the current 

appeal lies from an interlocutory order. Thus, we are constrained to quash 

this appeal.

Appeal quashed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 6/5/2017