Filed 12/11/14 In re Arianna D. CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA

In re Arianna. D. et al., Persons Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
SAN DIEGO COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES AGENCY, Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. TINA G. et al., Defendants and Appellants. D065446
(Super. Ct. No. SJ11357C-E)

APPEAL from orders of the Superior Co urt of San Diego County, Carol Isackson, Judge. Affirmed. Taylor Buck Law and Toni Taylor Bu ck, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant a nd Appellant, Tina G. Cristina Gabrielidis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant, Francisco D.2 Thomas E. Montgomery, County Coun sel, John E. Philips, and Lisa M. Maldonado, Deputies County Counsel. Tina G. (Mother) and Francisco D. (Fat her) appeal from juvenile court orders denying Mother's Welfare and Institutions Code 1 section 388 petiti on and terminating both parents' rights over their three childre n: Arianna D., A. D. and Antonio D. (§ 366.26.) Mother contends the juvenile co urt prejudicially erred by denying her section 388 petition, and finding that th e "beneficial relationship" ex ception to termination of parental rights and adoption does not apply in th is case. (§ 366.26.) Father concedes that he "did struggle with his drug addiction," but conten ds that "when he was sober he was a good parent." We affirm the orders.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDUR AL BACKGROUND On June 7, 2013, the San Diego Coun ty Health and Huma n Services Agency (Agency) filed section 300 petitions alleging th at Arianna (then age 3); A. (then age 2); and Antonio (then age 1) came within the juve nile court's jurisdictio n after police found a methamphetamine pipe and a makeshift bong in the hotel where they were staying, and arrested father for possession of drug paraph ernalia and child abuse. The section 300 petition also alleged the parents have a history of drug use. A social worker reported that on June 1, 2013, someone called a child abuse hotline reporting that the childre n were seen "on the streets w ith parents looking dirty and without shoes." The next day, police located the parents and children at a hotel. Father

1 Statutory references are to th e Welfare and Institutions Code.3 was "passed out" with an adult gang member who was a pa rolee. Mother was not there, but Arianna and Antonio were in the room. Mother later arrived at the hotel and took the children with her to an unkn own destination. Three days later, police and the social worker found the parents and children at a di fferent hotel. Mother's speech was slurred and she stumbled while walking. Father ad mitted using methamphetami ne as recently as the previous Sunday. The hotel room was in disarray. The children were taken into custody and admitted to the Polinsky Children's Center. The social worker noted the parents were unable to provide regular care for the three children and had previously failed to reunify with their two other children. 2 The social worker concluded that since the pare nts' first child was removed in September 2004, the parents had not completed any serv ices or drug treatment programs, and had not shown an ability to provi de a safe, stable and drug free environment for their children. The social worker recommended reunification services for the family and supervised visits between th e parents and the children. At a June 10, 2013, detention hearing, th e juvenile court made prima facie findings on the petition. It ordered the children be detained in out-of-home care, the parents receive services, and that Agency allow the parents visits with the children.

2 A 2004 detention report rega rding the termination of services for the parents' first child stated Mother had te sted positive for methamphetamine and had received little prenatal care; the newborn child tested pos itive for methamphetamine. The parents were offered six months of services but failed to co mply with their case pl ans; therefore, their services were terminated. The second child was born. In 2006 Mother again tested positive for methamphetamine. She did not ther eafter participate in parenting or drug treatment programs; therefore, services we re terminated for the second child. Both children were adopted by th eir paternal grandmother.4 In a June 26, 2013 jurisdiction/dispos ition report, a social worker recommended that neither parent be offered family re unification services ba sed on section 361.5 subdivision (b)(10)11), but that they continue to have reas onable and supervised contact with the children, who were in a confiden tial foster home. The two younger children tested positive for amphetamine and methamphe tamine in their system but the older daughter tested negative. In an interview with the soci al worker, Mother denied that she or father used drugs in front of the children. Mo ther admitted she started usi ng methamphetamine at age 18, and used about 20 to 40 dolla rs worth of it about every tw o days. She had last used methamphetamine two days earlier. Mother claimed her methamphetamine use did not negatively affect her parenting as, under its influence, she paid more attention to the children and made sure they were fed and clea n. She stated she had been diagnosed with attention deficit disorder, and she felt me thamphetamine helped her stay calm and focused. Mother did not have an explanation for the child ren's positive drug tests. Father told the social wo rker he began using methamphetamine at age 13. He described himself as a "functional meth us er," who could attend to his children and provide for his family while under the influence of methamphetamine, which he used before and after the children's removal. At the July 1, 2013 , initial jurisdiction-disposition hearing, the court found Father was the presumed father of the three children. It ordered Agency to provide the parents with services, permitted them supervised visits with the ch ildren, and set the matter for trial.5 The social worker's Ju ly 25, 2013 addendum report recommended that family reunification services not be offered to the parents because they ha d not followed through with voluntary services, including drug treat ment services. Although the parents were ordered to maintain contact w ith Agency, they had not done so or even provided Agency their contact information. The parents ha d only visited the ch ildren twice since the children came into custody. At the end of one visit, Arianna was distraught at being separated from her parents. Agency reco mmended permanent placement that would provide the children a safe and stable home. A social worker stated in a July 2013 addendum report that he met the parents on July 25, 2013, and they admitted they had not followed through with substance abuse services. They had both used methamphetamine two days earlier. The parents failed to complete an on-demand dr ug test, despite the social worker telling them that failure to do so would be deemed as a positive test result. A social worker supervised a visit between the parents and children and noted the children were happy to see the parents, and played with the parents. At the end of the visit, the children cried and screamed for the parents. On August 6, 2013 , the children were placed in the home of the children's maternal uncle, Johnny Gearha rt. Agency's August 29, 2013 jurisdiction-disposition addendum stated that the parents were homele ss, and a social worker was unable to reach them by telephone. At an August 29, 2013 hearing, the cour t found by clear and convincing evidence that the maternal uncle was available, willi ng and able to care for the children, and it approved their placement with him. It terminated reunificati on services for parents, and6 set a section 366.26 hearing. The court subs equently granted educa tional rights to the maternal uncle. On November 27, 2013, Ag ency filed a report in co nnection with the section 366.26 proceedings, reco mmending the termination of pare ntal rights and the children's adoption. Agency pointed out that the parents had visited th e three children only five or six times since the child ren's June 2013 removal from the pa rents. Father had last visited them on September 6, 2013. Approximately one week later, he was arrested for battery of a spouse, possession of unlawful parapherna lia, and grand theft from a person. After that date, father spoke to the children by telephone approximately two times. Mother had not visited the children from Sept ember 6, 2013 to N ovember 9, 2013. She moved to Bakersfield, Ca lifornia on September 7, 2013, and spoke to the children by telephone approximately once a week. She ga ve birth to another child on October 30, 2013. Throughout that last pregnancy, Mother had used methamphetamine, and her newborn was released from the hospital into the care of Mother's relatives. Mother's sister was in the process of filing for guardi anship of the newborn. Mother visited the children on November 10, 2013, and while they were happy to see her, they did not react when she left. Mother entered a drug reha bilitation program on Nove mber 11, 2013, and had not visited the child ren since that date. In August 2013, Arianna and A. receive d full developmental evaluations at a hospital. The evaluator recommended that Aria nna's behavior be monitored for attention problems and hyperactivity, and that she be enrolled in Head Start. A.'s language skills were weak, falling in the low average range, and her gross-mo tor skills were borderline.7 She was referred to a speech and language ther apist, and her uncle was in the process of setting up that appointment. Antonio had a developmental screening in June 2013, and the evaluator was concerned about his comm unication skills. The uncle reported the two girls were doing well in school, and Antoni o was currently on the wait list for the Head Start Program. The girls' uncle reported their mental health had improved in the previous four months. However, Antonio was having problems with overeating and throwing tantrums over food, and his uncle was helping him with those problems. The social worker concluded that the three children were specifically and generally adoptable. Specifica lly, they were already living w ith a "relative caregiver who is the maternal uncle. The maternal aunt, her husband, and their three children also live in the home and help the careg iver with the children." Fu rther, the maternal uncle had met the children's needs over the past 14 months by taking them to all of their medical appointments and enrolling and taking Ariann a and A. to and from school each day. A November 2013 Agency report stated: "The agency ac knowledges that there is in fact some level of strength in the rela tionship between [Mother] and the children as well as [Father] and the children[;] however, it does not appear to be significant enough to indicate detriment if parental rights are term inated." The report adds that the parents had exposed the children to many unhealthy situations, unstable environments, and domestic violence. The report concluded that if parental rights were terminated the emotional distress the children may experience would not outweigh th e detriment of their spending additional years in the foster ca re system; moreover, ad option would provide them needed stability and pe rmanence, which is critical for their development.8 On January 22, 2014, Mother filed a reque st to change the court's order, made under section 361.5, subdiv isions (b)(10) and (11), which had denied the parents reunification services and placed the childre n with their uncle. Mother claimed as changed circumstances that on November 11 , 2013, she had enrolle d in a faith-based drug treatment program, where she partic ipated in daily group sessions addressing various topics, including substance abuse an d anger management. She was also four sessions away from finishing a parenting class. She reported six months of sobriety. Mother claimed the children would be better pl aced with her because she had maintained consistent contact with them and had been visiting them weekly since returning from Bakersfield. She concluded the children would benefit from her demonstrating her commitment to providing them pe rmanence and stability while al so preserving the family unit. Mother supported her petition with a January 23, 2014 letter from a representative of the drug treatment program, stating the pr ogram "is from twelve to eighteen months and we strongly recommend that [Mother] contin ues in our Drug Recovery Program. . . . [She] has taken three sessions of parenting classes, and at least two hours daily of personal growth/recovery classes." A Janua ry 22, 2014 forensic drug testing report showed Mother tested positive for opiates and codeine, but negative for amphetamines. In a January 27, 2014 addendum report, Agency opposed Mother's section 388 petition, after considering three factors: The seriousness of the problem that lead to her drug dependency; the strength of the existin g bond and the relationship between Mother and the children; and the degree to which th e problem leading to her drug dependency9 may be easily removed or ameliorated as well as the degree to which that had actually occurred. Agency obse rved that "[Mother] ha s abused substances the majority of her adult life and has directly exposed all [six] of her children to trauma related to her substance abuse." The social worker reporte d that since the childre n were brought into protective custody in June 2013, Mother's vi sitation had been incons istent. Arianna had become tearful after one visit but later separate d easily from Mother. During one visit, A. appeared "disorganized," firs t approaching Mother but then turning away or becoming distressed when Mother attemp ted to comfort her or hold her. At other times, A. accepted Mother's comfort and rested her head on Mother's shoulder. But at the end of the visits, A. separated easily from Mother. Ac cording to A.'s uncle, since the visits with Mother had resumed, A.'s behavior at sc hool had changed. Further, A. had a more difficult time separating from her uncle when he took her to school, and she was disinterested in school activ ities. Antonio appe ared happy to see Mother and enjoyed playing with her during the vi sits but was not distressed at the end of visits and easily separated from her. Antonio frequently engage d in dangerous behavi or during visits and oftentimes Mother was unaware, which fre quently required th e social worker's intervention. Mother was unable to safely care for all three of the children. Finally, the social worker called into question Mother's claim that she had been sober for six months, noting that the rehab ilitation program did not conduct drug tests. The social worker also stated: "While it appears [Mother] is doing well in her program, it also appears as though the services she is receiving through the pr ogram are minimal. Most significantly, [Mother] has a substance a buse history that is approximately 10 years10 long and she has only recently begun to particip ate in services. [Mother] is still at the very beginning stages of rec overy and the problem that lead to the children's dependency is only at the beginning stage of being addressed." The social worker described three visits she supervised betw een Father and the children in January 2014. In the first visit on January 3, "Arianna asked a few times where her mommy was or if she was coming. [Father] did not resp ond and at one point she asked him, 'Are you and Mommy fighting da ddy?' [Father] then responded 'No we aren't fighting, why you say that?' " The so cial worker noted: "Throughout the visit [Antonio] frequently brought toys to me and asked to sit on my lap." Father tried to tickle A. and throw her in the air to make he r laugh but she whined, flailed and was upset. For the last 30 minutes of the visit, she was di fficult to sooth. Fath er spent the majority of the visit attempting to entertain her a nd improve her mood. A. appeared unsure whether she wanted Father's atte ntion or not. Near the end of the visit, A. and Antonio started crying. When the social worker pi cked her up, A. stopped crying. The social worker noted the children did not cry or appe ar distressed when le aving Father. When the children arrived home , they began to play. In the second visit on January 9, Antonio twice fell and hit his lip. At other times, Antonio risked injuring himself by walking on the edge of a couch, climbing on a shopping cart and on a rocking chair. Only af ter the social worker moved to protect him did Father react to those instances. A. was "unsettled and fussy" for most of the visit. The children separated easily from Father.11 The social worker reported th at during the January 21 vis it, as in the other visits, Father played with th e children and took photos and videos of them with his cell phone. At one point, Father noticed Antonio needed a diaper change and took care of that. "Several times A. tried to climb up a slide. [Father] noticed about half of the time and took her off. While riding a bike around Ar ianna ran her head in to a pole." Antonio cried at the end of the visit, but he stopped shortly afterwards. At a January 30, 2014 proceeding, the cour t first addressed Mother's section 388 petition, which Agency opposed on grounds she had not presented sufficient evidence of changed circumstances or best interests of the children. The co urt denied Mother's petition, noting she had not made a prima faci e showing of changed circumstances: "I can't find that the facts or the information alleged, even if they were supported by admissible evidence, would lead to a favorable outcome on the petition. [¶] And the major concern of the court, first of all is the failure to establish even allegations of changed circumstances. This is the third de pendency, as was noted, for [Mother]." The court noted Mother had been enrolled in the drug rehabilita tion program for only a brief time, and much less than the program's intended duration. The court noted it could not even find there were changing circum stances, much less ch anged circumstances regarding Mother's substance abuse problem. Therefore, the court d eclined to hold an evidentiary hearing on the petition. The court immediately proceeded to condu ct a hearing under section 366.26. Mother testified on direct examination that she had been visiting the children weekly, they recognized her as their mother, and look ed to her for their ne eds. She telephoned12 them every other week as a llowed during her drug rehabilitation program. On crossexamination, Mother agreed th at during the visits she had had difficulty supervising the three children at the same time . Agency pointed out that Mother's weekly visits had started only four weeks earlier. The parents claimed they had satisfied the parent-child bond exception to adoption and should be allowed guardianship of th e children. However, the court adopted Agency's recommendation and terminated pa rental rights, finding by clear and convincing evidence it wa s likely the children would be ad opted if parental rights were terminated, and the parents had not met th eir burden of showing any exception to adoption. The court reasoned the parents' vi sits were inconsistent and interrupted by Father's incarceration and Moth er's move to Bakersfield. The court also summarized the evidence regarding the quality of the visits: "Mother had a good time. She was a playmate of the children. There are repeated references to the social worker's needing to intervene to keep . . . the ch ildren safe." The court stated that although a bond existed between Mother and the children, "[t]here ar e limits to the Mother's ability to meet the needs of the children, and the bond is not such, according to the evidence before the court, that the children will be substantially harmed by loss of this bond. [¶ ] As to the Father, there's minimal evidence of a bond, let alone any injury that the children will suffer if the bond is terminated."
DISCUSSION
I. Denial of Section 388 Petition13 Mother contends the juvenile court a bused its discretion by denying her section 388 petition despite the fact sh e presented substantial eviden ce of changed circumstances including her enrollment in a drug treatment program, where she participated in daily group sessions addressing topics like substanc e abuse and anger management. She points out she also participated in parenting classe s, reported six months of sobriety, and in January 2014, had a month of week ly visits with the children.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review Section 388 allows a parent of a dependent child to petition the court "to change, modify, or set aside any order of court previously made . . . ." (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) On such a modification petition, the juvenile co urt must determine whether the parent has demonstrated by a preponderance of the evid ence both that there was new evidence or a change of circumstances and that it would pr omote the child's best interests to change, modify or set aside the previous order. (See In re Jasmon O. (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 398, 415; In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 38, 47.) " '[I]t is not enough for [the petitioner] to show just a genuine change of circumstances un der the statute. The [petitioner] must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in the best interests of the child.' " ( In re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615; see In re D.B. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1080, 1094 [party moving under section 388 cannot simply rely on new evidence that may often arise under the passage of time; rathe r, the party must show that the change in the order will be in the minor's best interests].) Further, the petition must show change d, not changing, circumstances. ( In re Mickel O. , supra , 197 Cal.App.4t h at p. 615; In re Casey D ., supra , 70 Cal.App.4th at pp.14 45-47.) And "[n]ot every change in circum stance can justify modification of a prior order. [Citation.] The change in circumstances must relate to the purpose of the order and be such that the modificati on of the prior order is appropri ate. [Citations.] . . . The change in circumstances or new evidence mu st be of such significant nature that it requires a setting aside or modifica tion of the challenged order." ( In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) The juvenile court's decision on the pe tition is addressed to its sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a clear abuse. ( In re Jasmon O ., supra , 8 Cal.4th at pp. 415-416.) Under this standard, we do not reverse unless the court's decision exceeds the limits of legal di scretion by being arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (See In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318; In re Katelynn Y. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 871, 881.) " ' "When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' " ( In re Stephanie M. , at p. 319; In re J.C. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 503, 525-526.)
B. Analysis Applying the foregoing principles, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its broad discretion in finding Mother had not demonstrated sufficiently changed circumstances to justify modi fication of the prior order. Taking into account Mother's long-standing drug habit, sh e had spent only a few mont hs in the drug rehabilitation program. Even the program representative' s recommended stay for Mother was between twelve and eighteen months. While in th e program, Mother had tested positive for15 codeine. We conclude that Mother's efforts to improve herself and become a better parent, while commendable, at the most showed the beginning of changing circumstances; but did not show the require d changed circumstances. The changes she was beginning to make were not enough to wa rrant a modification of the court's order. Nor can we conclude the juvenile court erred by ruling Mother had not demonstrated that an order giving her custody was in the children's best interests. "To understand the element of best interests in th e context of a [section] 388 petition filed . . . on the eve of the [section 366. 26] hearing, we turn to th e Supreme Court's language in In re Stephanie M. , supra , 7 Cal.4th 295 . . . : '[A]t this poi nt "the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability" [citation] . . . . A court hearing a motion for change of placement at this stag e of the proceedings must rec ognize this shift of focus in determining the ultimate question before it, that is, the best interests of the child.' " ( In re
J.C. , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 526.) Mother did not show the change she request ed was in the children's best interests. Her argument that the children would benef it from her demonstrating her commitment to providing them permanence and stability while also preserving the family unit is without basis. At the time of the hearing, Mother had resumed visitations with the children for approximately four weeks, after an irregular pattern of previous visits. Mother admitted that she was unable to care for all three children at the same time during the visits. The children did not have a hard time separating from her at the end of the visits. These instances indicated Mother did not make a si gnificantly beneficial contribution to the children's well-being. By cont rast, the evidence established that the children had a stable16 placement with their maternal uncle. After the children were evaluated medically, their uncle followed up to ensure they saw the professionals recommended to address their particular problems. He also enrolled them in educational programs and monitored their
progress. II. The Juvenile Court Properly Concluded Mo ther Failed to Establish the Parental Benefit Exception to Adoption
A. Legal Principles At a section 366.26 permanency planning hearing, the juvenile court determines a permanent plan of care for a dependent child, which may include adoption. ( In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296; In re Casey D. , supra , 70 Cal.App.4th at p. 50.) "If the dependent child is adoptable, there is str ong preference for adoption over the alternative permanency plans." ( In re S.B. , at p. 297; In re Michael G. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 580, 588.) In order to avoid termination of parent al rights and adoption, a parent has the burden of showing that one or more of the stat utory exceptions to termination of parental rights set forth in section 366.26, su bdivision (c)(1)(A) or (B) apply. ( In re Scott B. (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 452, 469.) The court, "in exceptional circumstances ," may "choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption." ( In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) The so-ca lled parental benefit exception applies when there is "a compelling reason for determining that term ination [of parental rights] would be detrimental to the child due to . . . the following circumstances : [¶] . . . The parents have maintained regular visita tion and contact with the child and the child would benefit17 from continuing the relationship." (§ 366. 26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i), italics added.) "The 'benefit' necessary to trigger this exception has been judici ally construed to mean, 'the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a perman ent home with new, adoptive parents. In other words, the court balances the strengt h and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against th e security and the sense of belonging a new family would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attach ment such that the ch ild would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcom e and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' " ( In re J.C. , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at pp . 528-529; see also In re Autumn
H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 575.) The parent asserting the exception has the burden of proving it by a prepondera nce of the evidence. ( In re J.C. , at p. 529.) We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the existence of a beneficial parental relationship, and the abuse of discretion standard to the determination of whether ther e is a compelling reason for fi nding that termination would be detrimental to the child. ( In re J.C. , supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at pp. 530-531; In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314-1315.) The latter determ ination "calls for the juven ile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detr imental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weig h that against the benefit to the child of adoption . . . ." ( In re J.C. , at p. 531.)18 B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juven ile Court's Finding that Mother Did Not Engage in Regular Visitation and Contact with the Children. The record shows Mo ther visited the children sporad ically before she spent two months in Bakersfield, durin g which time she did not visit them. Following her return, she visited the children briefly, but entered a substance abuse program, and did not visit them for approximately two months. At the time of the court's ruling, Mother had only recently resumed weekly visits w ith the children. This court has made clear that sporadic visitation is insufficient to satisfy this prong of the beneficial relationship exception. ( In
re C.F. (2011) 193 Cal.Ap p.4th 549, 554.)
C. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Finding the Benefit of Maintaining the Pare nt-Child Relationship Did Not Outweigh the Benefit of Adoption Mother contends she demonstrated it was in children's best interests to continue their relationship with her, refe rring to evidence that the children cried at the end of her visits with them. She also described one partic ular visit: "[She] was affectionate with the children, and all three hugged her on her arrival. In additi on, the children and [M]other played and laughed. [She] told the children she loved them and asked them for kisses." To meet this prong of the exception, Mother "must show more than frequent and loving contact or pleasant visits," but that sh e "occupies a parental role" in the children's life. ( In re C.F. , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th at pp. 555, 558-559; In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207.) As we have stated, Mo ther must show her "relationship promotes the well-being of [the children] to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being [they] would gain in a permanent home with new, ad optive parents. In other words, the court19 balances the strength and quality of the natu ral parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging a new fam ily would confer. If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child woul d be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natu ral parent's rights are not terminated." ( In re Autumn H. , supra , 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) Additionally, Mother must not only de monstrate the positive aspects of her relationship with the children, but "must show [they] would suffer detriment if [their] relationship with the parent were terminated." ( In re C.F. , supra , 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 555.) Indeed, severing of the relati onship must " 'deprive the child of a substantial , positive emotional attachment su ch that the child would be greatly harmed.' " ( In re Marcelo B. (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 635, 643.) Mother " 'may not derail an adoption merely by showing [the children] would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained dur ing periods of visitation with the parent.' " ( Ibid. ) Substantial evidence supported the court's finding the children were specifically and generally adoptable, and Mother did not sustain her bur den to show the beneficial parent-child exception applied to prevent te rminating her parental rights. Although the children bonded with her, the cour t found based on the social worker's report that Mother was more like a playmate than a parent to them. The children sepa rated easily from her at the end of the visits. The maternal uncle reported that after the children's visits with Mother resumed, A. started having emotiona l and academic problems. Finally, in the case of Antonio, as a one-year old, he tended to get in dangerous s ituations that Mother20 was inattentive to, thus requiring the social worker's intervention. We conclude that Mother failed to re but the presumption that continue d placement with their caretakers was in the children's best interest.
III. Father's appeal Father concedes that his "desire to reuni fy with his children was obviously at odds with his drug addiction, and [he] was unable to couple his actions with his intent in a manner sufficient to justify placement with him, " but contends that "there was enough of a beneficial relationship betw een [him] and the children to justify a lesser permanent plan, such as guardianship." He argues that he had maintained regular visitation with the children as much as circumstances allowed, and they were bonded with him, pointing out they screamed and clinged to him at the end of his visits. Under the applicable law set forth abov e, Father did not meet his burden of showing the beneficial parent-child exception applied to prevent terminating his parental rights under section 366.26. Father's visits wi th the children were not regular. The visits were interrupted by his approximately four -month incarceration. When the visits resumed in January 2014, Fath er spent some fun moments pl aying with the children, but there were also difficulties. The social wo rker reported one daught er hit herself while riding a bicycle, and Father was not atte ntive enough to prevent Antonio from getting injured more than once during a particular vis it. And more than on ce the social worker had to alert Father that Antonio was at risk of further harming himself. In his visits with the children, Father did not form a bond suffici ently strong to outweigh the benefits the21 children would gain from their placement in a permanent home with new, adoptive parents. DISPOSITION The orders are affirmed.

O'ROURKE, J. WE CONCUR:
HALLER, Acting P. J.

AARON, J.