alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                       4,135,864
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  626,329
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                             4,799,968
<PP&E>                                         847,435
<DEPRECIATION>                                 141,619
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                               6,064,854
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          570,747
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                        21,539
<OTHER-SE>                                   1,379,968
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                 6,064,854
<SALES>                                        906,574
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               906,574
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  549,276
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                             3,145,951
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                            (2,788,653)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                        (2,788,653)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                               (2,788,653)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.13)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.13)


</TABLE>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

ASHLEY DARNELL,
Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 3:18-cv-00022-WHR
v.

SYNCHRONY BANK f/k/a GE
CAPITAL RETAIL BANK,

Defendant.

OD LP 2 CO? CP UD COD 00?

STIPULATION TO DISMISS
TO THE CLERK:
Pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii), counsel for all parties hereto stipulate to the
dismissal of this matter, and each of Plaintiffs claims asserted therein, with prejudice,

each party to bear its own costs and fees.

4s/ Kevin R Feazell__ 4s/ Joseph C. Hoeffel__

Kevin R Feazell, Esq. Joseph C. Hoeffel, Esq.

Cors & Bassett LLC Kimmel & Silverman, P.C.

201 E. Fifth Street, Suite 900 30 E Butler Pike

Cincinnati, OH 45202 Ambler, PA 19002

Phone: (513) 852-8200 Phone: (215) 540-8888

Email: krf@corsbassett.com Fax: (877) 600-2112

Attorney for the Defendant Email: jhoeffel@creditlaw.com
Attorney for the Plaintiff

Date: March 13, 2019

Date: March 13, 2019

BY THE COURT:

LR. hoa



Certificate of Service

Thereby certify that I have served a copy of the foregoing document by Notice of
Electronic Filing on this 13 day of March, 2019:

Kevin R Feazell, Esq.

Cors & Bassett LLC

201 E. Fifth Street, Suite 900
Cincinnati, OH 45202
Phone: (513) 852-8200
Email: krf@corsbassett.com
Attorneys for the Defendant

4s/ Joseph C. Hoeffel__

Joseph C. Hoeffel, Esq.
Kimmel & Silverman, P.C.

30 E Butler Pike

Ambler, PA 19002

Phone: (215) 540-8888

Fax: (877) 600-2112

Email: jhoeffel@creditlaw.com
Attorney for the Plaintiff
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1999
<CASH>                                         4292631
<SECURITIES>                                  26047124
<RECEIVABLES>                                        0
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                              22042498
<PP&E>                                           67696
<DEPRECIATION>                                   27937
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                30409901
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          4623668
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                    6222250
<COMMON>                                        142695
<OTHER-SE>                                    19421288
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                  30409901
<SALES>                                              0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               1628206
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  5866832
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                              (4238626)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                 (4238626)
<EPS-BASIC>                                     (0.33)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                   (0.33)


</TABLE>
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Stephen J. Markman,

 Chief Justice

Brian K. Zahra

Bridget M. McCormack

David F. Viviano

Richard H. Bernstein

Kurtis T. Wilder

Elizabeth T. Clement,

Justices

Order 

May 4, 2018 

156746 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v SC: 156746 

 COA: 331499 

Jackson CC: 15-004596-FC 

DAWN MARIE DIXON-BEY, 

Defendant-Appellee. 

_____________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the application for leave to appeal the September 26, 2017 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is considered. We direct the Clerk to schedule oral 

argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. MCR 7.305(H)(1). 

 The appellant shall file a supplemental brief within 42 days of the date of this 

order, addressing: (1) to what extent the sentencing guidelines should be considered to 

determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in applying the principle of 

proportionality under People v Steanhouse, 500 Mich 453 (2017); and (2) whether, when 

a jury convicted the defendant of second-degree murder, the trial court abused its 

discretion in applying the principle of proportionality if it either (a) sentenced the 

defendant according to an independent finding that she committed first-degree murder; or 

(b) departed upward from the sentencing guidelines for second-degree murder based on 

facts established by a preponderance of the evidence that the jury did not find were 

established beyond a reasonable doubt. See MCL 777.36(2)(a); People v Ewing (After 

Remand), 435 Mich 443 (1990); People v Milbourn, 435 Mich 630, 654 (1990). 

 In addition to the brief, the appellant shall electronically file an appendix 

conforming to MCR 7.312(D)(2). In the brief, citations to the record must provide the 

appendix page numbers as required by MCR 7.312(B)(1). The appellee shall file a 

supplemental brief within 21 days of being served with the appellant’s brief. The 

appellee shall also electronically file an appendix, or in the alternative, stipulate to the use 

of the appendix filed by the appellant. A reply, if any, must be filed by the appellant 
I, Larry S. Royster, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 

 

May 4, 2018 

a0501 

 

2

Clerk 

within 14 days of being served with the appellee’s brief. The parties should not submit 

mere restatements of their application papers. 

 We further direct the Clerk to schedule the oral argument in this case for the same 

future session of this Court when it will hear oral argument in People v Beck (Docket No. 

152934). 

 The Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan and the Criminal Defense 

Attorneys of Michigan are invited to file briefs amicus curiae. Other persons or groups 

interested in the determination of the issues presented in this case may move the Court 

for permission to file briefs amicus curiae.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4228 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4228

To require the Forest Service to accommodate, to the extent consistent 
   with the management objectives and limitations applicable to the 
   National Forest System lands at issue, individuals with mobility 
    disabilities who need to use a power-driven mobility device for 
                    reasonable access to such lands.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            December 8, 2009

Mr. Alexander introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
 Committee on Agriculture, and in addition to the Committee on Natural 
 Resources, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, 
 in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
To require the Forest Service to accommodate, to the extent consistent 
   with the management objectives and limitations applicable to the 
   National Forest System lands at issue, individuals with mobility 
    disabilities who need to use a power-driven mobility device for 
                    reasonable access to such lands.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. ACCOMMODATION OF ACCESS NEEDS OF INDIVIDUALS WITH MOBILITY 
              DISABILITIES UNDER FOREST SERVICE TRAVEL MANAGEMENT RULE.

    (a) Consideration of Access Needs of Individuals With Mobility 
Disabilities.--The Secretary of Agriculture, acting through the Chief 
of the Forest Service, shall require Forest Service personnel, in 
implementing off-road vehicle management under the Forest Service 
Travel Management Rule, to endeavor to accommodate, to the extent 
consistent with the management objectives and limitations applicable to 
the National Forest System lands at issue, individuals with mobility 
disabilities who would need to use a power-driven mobility device for 
reasonable access to such lands.
    (b) Response to Requests for Access.--If, after receiving a request 
by or on behalf of an individual with mobility disabilities for 
permission to use a power-driven mobility device to access specific 
National Forest System lands, Forest Service personnel determine that 
use of such a power-driven mobility device is not appropriate given the 
management objectives and limitations applicable to the National Forest 
System lands at issue, the Forest Service personnel shall provide the 
individual with a written response containing an explanation of the 
reasons for the determination.
                                 <all>
```
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

1

IN THE MATTER OF: 1

i CASE No.

THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE 1

WARRANTS, APPLICATIONS, PEN j CHIEF MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REGISTERS, AND NON- \ ELIZABETH A. PRESTON-DEAVERS

DISCLOSURE ORDERS IN THE |

CASES LISTED IN ATTACHMENT |

A

FILED UNDER SEAL

ORDER TO UNSEAL

Upon the Motion ofthe United States Attorney and for good cause shown, it is

ORDERED that the Search and Seizure Warrants, Applications, Pen Registers, and NonDisclosure Orders and related documents in the cases listed in Attachment A in the above-entitled

matter, be unsealed.

Case: 2:17-mj-00587-EPD Doc #: 15 Filed: 01/29/20 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 49
ATTACHMENT A:

2:17-l\/lJ-434 2:18-MJ-007 2:18-MJ-756 2:19-MJ-001 2:19-MJ-471

2:17-MJ-585 2;18-MJ-8 2:18-MJ-840 2;19-MJ-45 2:19-MJ-481

2;17-MJ-586 2:18-MJ-9 2:19-MJ-121 2:19-MJ-498

2:17-MJ-587 2:18-MJ-10 2:19-MJ-122 2:19-MJ-510

2:17-MJ-588 2:18-MJ-17 2:19-MJ-127 2:19-MJ-512

2:17-MJ-589 2;18-MJ-51 2:19-MJ-153 2:19-MJ-527

2:17-MJ-617 2:18-MJ-61 2:19-MJ-174 2:19-MJ-528

2:17-MJ-644 2:18-MJ-92 2:19-MJ-175 2:19-MJ-553

2:17-MJ-676 2:lS-MJ-205 2:19-MJ -191 2:19-MJ-560

2:17-MJ-677 2:18-MJ-213 2:19-MJ-255 2;19-MJ-561

2:17-MJ-678 2:18-MJ-232 2:19-MJ-265 2:19-MJ-562

2:17-MJ-679 2:18-MJ-326 2:19-MJ-266 2;19-MJ-563

2:17-MJ-696 2;18-MJ-355 2:19-MJ-272 2:19-MJ-564

2:17-MJ-713 2:18-MJ-379 2:19-MJ-273 2:19-MJ-570

2;17-MJ-714 2:18-MJ-397 2:19-MJ-276

2;17-MJ-715 2:18-MJ-398 2:19-MJ-290

2;17-MJ-747 2:18-MJ-404 2:19-MJ-291

2;17-MJ-758 2:18-MJ-411 2:19-MJ-320

2;17-MJ-759 2:18-MJ-429 2:19-MJ-348

2:17-MJ-761 2:18-MJ-434 2:19-MJ-349

2:17-MJ-762 2:18-MJ-460 2:19-MJ-379

2:17-MJ-782 2:18-MJ-498 2:19-MJ-414

2:17-MJ-791 2:18-MJ-512

2:18-MJ-515

2:18-MJ-532

2:19-MJ-460

Case: 2:17-mj-00587-EPD Doc #: 15 Filed: 01/29/20 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 50
C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE

F IRST D ISTRICT OF T EXAS AT H OUSTON



### O RDER ON 

### M OTION

Cause number: 01

- 1 2

- 0 1122

- C R

Style: In re Edward R. Newsome, Relator

Type of motion: Amended m otion for leave to file for a new trial filed April 22, 2013

Part y filing motion: Relator

Relator ’s amended motion leave to file for a new trial, construed as a motion to rehear

relator’s petition for writ of mandamus, is denied

.

Judge’s signature: /s/ Jane Bland

Acting for the Court

Panel consists of Justice s Jennings, Bland, and Massengale

.

Date: May 1 7 , 2013

.
#### Sandra NORTHCUTT *v.*Robert NORTHCUTT

5-5250

458 S. W. 2d 746

Opinion delivered October 19, 1970

*Hodges, Hodges &r Hodges,*for appellant.

*229/. *F. Sloan III,*for appellee.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

In the trial court the appellee husband obtained a divorce on the ground of adultery and was awarded custody of the couple’s two-year-old son, Marty, subject to specified visitation rights in the mother. The appellant, in seeking a reversal on both points, concedes that only questions of fact are presented for review.

We find the decree to be supported by the weight of the evidence. The appellee, his parents, and another witness not related to the parties gave testimony from which the chancellor could and did find that on at least two occasions the appellant spent the night at the home of her alleged paramour. The appellant admitted having spent several nights in the man’s home, but she said that he was not there on those nights. The man himself did not testify. Both instances occurred before the appellee’s counterclaim was filed on December 6, 1968; hence it cannot be said that the asserted misconduct was pleaded prematurely. *Thomas*v. *Thomas,*208 Ark. 20, 184 S. W. 2d 812 (1945); *Spurlock*v. *Spurlock,*80 Ark. 37, 96 S. W. 753 (1906). There was other testimony, which we need not detail, of a corroborative nature.

The issue of custody presents a somewhat closer question, primarily because we are inclined to favor the mother when the child is very young. Nevertheless we cannot say that the chancellor’s award of custody to the father is contrary to the preponderance of the proof. The mother’s unfitness is indicated not only by her illicit association with her paramour but also by her conduct in taking the child along with her when she went to the man’s home or rode with him in his car. There is much evidence to show that the child was not kept as clean as he should have been while he was living with the appellant. On the other hand, the home of the appellee’s parents — where the child will reside —is shown to be a suitable place for his upbringing. In fact, the appellant stated in her testimony that the *230appellee’s mother hád done *“a good*job” in taking care of the child from time to time during the couple’s separation. On the record as a whole we are unable to say that the trial court was wrong in reaching his decision.

Finally, the allowance of an attorney’s fee to the wife is not, as counsel suggests, a matter of right, regardless of the outcome of the case. *Hodge*v. *Hodge,*161 Ark. 299, 255 S. W. 1090 (1923). In the case at bar it does not appear that the chancellor abused his discretion in refusing to make such an allowance.

Affirmed.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

MEMORANDUM OPINION

No. 04

- 23

- 00982

- CV

IN RE RYDER INTEGRATED LOGISTICS, INC. and Arthur McDaniels Moore, Relators

Original Proceeding 1

PER CURIAM

Sitting : Rebeca C. Martinez, Chief Justice

Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

Irene Rios, Justice

Delivered and Filed: May 8, 2024

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS DISMISSED

Relators filed a petition for writ of mandamus on November 11, 2023. On April 29, 2024,

relators filed an agreed motion to dismiss the mandamus petition, informing this court that a

settlement had been reached between the parties in the underlying matter.

After consideration, the court GRANTS the motion. Accordingly, relators ’ petition for writ

of mandamus is DISMISSED

.

PER CURIAM

1 This proceeding arises out of Cause No. 2023

- CI

- 03928, in the 166th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas,

the Honorable John Gabriel presiding.
Jeremie D. Elliott

209 S. Stephanie St. B-118

Henderson, NV 89012

January 4, 2016

U.S. Department of Transportation

Docket Management System

1200 New Jersey Ave., SE

Washington DC 20590

Docket No. FAA−2015−4830 request for additional information

Dear Sir or Madam:

Here is the Additional information requested that was missing from the initial petition. The UAS platforms for 

proposed operations are as follows: 

1. Make- DJI

Model-Phantom3 Advanced

Type- Quadrotor

Weight including Payload camera, battery and Propellers- 1280grams

2. Make DJI 

Model- Phantom2 FC40

Weight including payload camera, battery and propellers- 1000 grams

Please disregard the request for the Motion Picture and Television Operations Manual (MPTOM) which 

is required by Order 8900.1, Volume 3, Chapter 8, Section 1. I wish to proceed without this manual and 

remove closed-set filming from my proposed operation. 

Sincerely,

Jeremie D. Elliott
Court of Appeals

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA,____________________

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:

A16A1245. LAMARCUS LITTLE v. JOHN JEANES, WARDEN.

After the superior court denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Lamarcus

Little filed an appeal to this Court. The Supreme Court, however, has appellate

jurisdiction over all casesinvolving habeas corpus. See Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec.

VI, Par. III (4). This appeal is thus TRANSFERRED to the Supreme Court for

disposition.

Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk’s Office, Atlanta,____________________

I certify that the above is a true extract from

the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court

hereto affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

03/28/2016

March 28, 2016
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-11-00579- CV

In re P ablo T . Caudil lo

ORI GINAL P ROCEEDI NG F ROM CALDWELL CO UNTY

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
Relator Pablo T. Caudillo has filed a petition for writ of mandamus, complaining that the trial cour

t had not enter ed judg ments nunc pro tunc in his two convic tions for drugpossession and criminal non-support. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.8. The judgme nts arise out of ear lier convictions that resulted in probation. The State filed motions to revoke Caudillo’s probation, and he pled true to the alleg ations. The trial court signe d two judgme nts of conviction on Aug ust 2, 2010, sentenc ing Caudillo to serve 700 day s in state jail in eac h cause and setting the sentenc es to run concur rently
. I n the posses s i o n case , the trial court g ave Caudillo time-serve d cre dit for 215 day s. In the nonsupport cause , the court gave him 252 day s of time-serve d cre dit. I n his petition for writ of mandamus, Caudillo argues that beca use his sentenc es are running concur rently , he should rec eive
cre dit for the cumulative total of the time g rante d by

the cour t, 467 day s. We disagr ee. First, we note t hat t he record presente d by Caudillo does not suppo rt h i s ar gu ment beca use it does not show when he ear ned the time-serve d cre d i t s , t h e conditions under which the
cre dits wer e g rante d, or other important information related to how the cre dits acc umulated. Even if the record was complete, however , article 42.03, section 2(a) provides that the t rial court “shallg ive the defe ndant cre dit on his sentenc e for the time that t h e d ef en d an t h as spent in jail for the

cause .” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42
. 0 3 , § 2(a) (West Supp. 2010) (empha sis added)
. Caudillo’s sentenc es are running concur rently but are separ ate and distinct from eac h other. Thus, the time-serve d cre dit ear

ned in the possession case applies only to his sentenc e in that case , and the
cre dit ear ned in the non-support conviction, which was orig inally enter ed several y ear s befor e the possession conviction, applies only to that sentenc e. That C audillo’s sentenc es are running at the
same time does not chang e the fac t that he is serving two sentenc es for two differ ent convictions and does not mean that his two independe nt time-serve d cre dits should be combined. See id. We deny the petition for wr it of mandamus.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Rose and Goodwin Filed: Nove mber 3, 2011

2
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

United States of America

v. 2:18-cr-12

Davonta T. Flood 

ORDER

There being no objections, the court hereby adopts the Report

and Recommendation of the magistrate judge (Doc. 18) that the

defendant’s guilty plea be accepted. The court accepts the

defendant’s plea of guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, and he is

hereby adjudged guilty on that count. The court will defer the

decision of whether to accept the plea agreement until the

sentencing hearing.

Date: November 6, 2018 s\James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge