IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

HOUSTON BYRD, JR., : 

 : 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : Case No. 2:17-CV-981 

 v. : 

 : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

JUDGE W. SCOTT GWIN, :

 : Magistrate Judge Deavers 

 Defendant. : 

 

OPINION & ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 18). 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed a civil case in Licking County, Ohio and appealed the matter to the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 1 at 1). Plaintiff alleged that the Fifth District did not follow 

applicable rules and law when deciding his appeal. (Id.). Specifically, Plaintiff alleged the state 

court’s entries were “against the manifest weight of the evidence.” (Id. at 3). Plaintiff also 

alleged “fraud upon the court” consisting of “fraud perpetrated by officers of the court.” (Id. at 

4). Plaintiff then filed a Motion in this Court to “[r]emand this matter back to the Appellate 

Court,” offering vague claims that the Fifth District Court of Appeal violated his constitutional 

rights and due process of law. (Id. at 3, 9). Plaintiff did not explain exactly how the Fifth District 

Court of Appeals violated his rights, yet asserts that his rights were indeed violated. (ECF No. 15 

at 2). 

On November 6, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant 

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). (ECF No. 3 at 2, 5). On June 25, 2018, this Court granted that 
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motion and dismissed the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). (ECF No. 15 at 4). Because 

this Court found a lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), it did 

not evaluate the merits of Defendant’s 12(b)(6) arguments. (Id.). Following dismissal, Plaintiff 

filed the instant Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 18). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a court will reconsider its own prior 

decision “if the moving party demonstrates: (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered 

evidence that was not previously available to the parties; or (3) an intervening change in 

controlling law.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Arctic Express, Inc., 288 

F.Supp.2d 895, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Courts may also alter or amend a judgment when 

necessary “to prevent manifest injustice.” GenCorp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 

804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Reconsideration due to a finding of manifest injustice or a clear error of 

law requires “unique circumstances,” such as complete failure to address an issue or claim. 

McWhorter v. ELSEA, Inc., 2006 WL 3483964, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing Collison v. Int’l 

Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)). Even for motions to 

reconsider interlocutory orders, courts respect the importance of “grant[ing] some measure of 

finality ... and [of] discourag[ing] the filing of endless motions for reconsideration” in applying 

the relevant criteria. Id. A motion under Rule 59(e) may not be brought to relitigate issues 

previously considered by the Court or to present evidence that could have been raised earlier. See

J.P. v. Taft, 2006 WL 689091, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 

III. LAW & ANALYSIS 

A party requesting this Court reconsider a prior order must argue one of the enumerated 

reasons as the basis for the motion. It is unclear which basis Plaintiff alleges. However, it does 
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not appear he is offering newly discovered evidence, or citing to an intervening change in 

controlling law, or alleging manifest injustice. By process of elimination, this Court will 

understand Plaintiff to be arguing there has been clear error. 

A. Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 

In this Court’s prior Order dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint, this Court agreed with 

Defendant that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction here. (ECF No. 15 at 3-4). 

Generally speaking, “[f]ederal courts are of limited jurisdiction; they are empowered to hear only 

those cases which are within the judicial power of the United States Constitution and as further 

granted to them by Acts of Congress.” Mullins v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, No. 3:16-cv137, 2016 WL 6080286, at*1 (S. D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2016). As noted by this Court, “there is a 

presumption that a federal court lacks jurisdiction until it has been demonstrated.” Id. Facts 

“supporting subject matter jurisdiction must be affirmatively pleaded by the person seeking to 

show it.” Id. Accordingly, the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating that a court has subject 

matter jurisdiction. RMI Titanium Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F. 3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 

1996). 

Functionally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal District and Circuit Courts 

from conducting appellate review of state court judgments. This doctrine is based on two United 

States Supreme Court decisions interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See District of Columbia Court 

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “is based on the negative inference that if appellate court review 

of such state judgments is vested in the Supreme Court [per § 1257(a)], then it follows that such 

review may not be had in the lower federal courts.” Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th 

Cir. 2008). Therefore, if a plaintiff bases his or her federal claim on a state court judgement in 
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federal courts other than the Supreme Court of the United States, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine 

applies, barring the claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 

F. 3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2006). Specifically, a plaintiff is barred from “complaining of an injury 

caused by the state judgment and seeking its reversal. This he [plaintiff] may not do, regardless 

of whether he raised any constitutional claims in state court.” Id. 

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff asks this Court to conduct appellate review of 

a state court decision. (ECF No. 18 at 1). Per the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court will not 

do so. Plaintiff seeks appellate review from this Court for the state appellate court’s alleged 

“failure to perform.” (ECF No. 1 at 1, 9). As Defendant previously noted, “federal appellate 

jurisdiction over a state court decision lies exclusively with the Supreme Court, and not lower 

federal courts.” Durham v. Haslam, 528 F. App’x 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2013). Therefore, only the 

Supreme Court has jurisdiction over state court decisions whereas the United States Circuit 

Courts and United States District Courts do not. Accordingly, this Court, the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, lacks subject matter jurisdiction. 

In addition, Plaintiff offers little to no explanation as to why this Court has jurisdiction 

over this matter. Plaintiff reiterates statutes relevant to subject matter jurisdiction but fails to 

explain how they apply to the present issue. Likewise, Plaintiff reiterates allegations of “fraud 

upon the court” and requests review because the “Court’s reliance on the [D]efendant’s blatantly 

unsupported response [is] incredulous[ly] flawed.” (ECF No. 18 at 1-2). However, Plaintiff 

makes these allegations yet fails to mention why this reasoning is flawed. Plaintiff also fails to 

explain how these allegations confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this Court. Plaintiff quotes 

28 U.S.C. § 1331, but his motion is otherwise lacking any legal basis to permit this Court to 

exercise jurisdiction. Plaintiff has not met the burden established by RMI Titanium Co., which 
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requires that a plaintiff prove that the court in question has subject matter jurisdiction. By failing 

to meet this burden, Plaintiff has not established or demonstrated a clear error of law in these 

proceedings. 

B. Failure to State a Claim for Relief 

This Court did not previously decide whether Plaintiff failed to state a claim for relief 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Plaintiff appears to argue that treatment of his complaint 

was done improperly. However, in his Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff merely alleges that 

“the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction is fraudulent [sic] and disingenuous due to: Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 8: General Rules of Pleading.” (ECF No. 18 at 2-3). Plaintiff proceeds to 

quote Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) and (b) but does not indicate how his complaint states a claim for 

relief. In any event, without subject matter jurisdiction, the question of whether Plaintiff’s 

pleadings are proper would be moot. Plaintiff has not identified any reason under Fed. R. Civ. P. 

59(e) that would persuade this Court to grant his Motion for Reconsideration. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons above, Plaintiff has failed to identify a clear error of law in this Court’s 

prior Order dismissing this case. Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

/s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: March 18, 2019