IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14

- 0933 Filed August 13, 2014

IN THE INTEREST OF B.M., Minor Child,

C.M., Mother, Appellant.

________________________________________________________________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Thomas W. Mo tt

,

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Magdalena Reese of Cooper, Goedicke, Reimer & Reese, P.C., West Des

Moines, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller

- Todd, Assistant

Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Stephanie Brown,

Assistant Cou nty Attorney, for appellee State.

Kimberly Ayotte of the Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and

guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Potterfield, P.J., and Tabor and Mullins, JJ.2

POTTERFIELD, P.J.

A mother appeals 1 from the juvenile court ’ s order terminating her parental

rights to her child, B.M., contending reasonable efforts to reunify the mother and

child were not made, there was not clear and convincing evidence to support

termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(k) (2013), and termination was

not in the best interest of the child. Despite years of intensive services offered to

improve her ability to parent

, and despite the mother ’ s efforts

, she remains

unable to provide safe ty and adequate care for the child. We affirm the

termination of the mother ’ s parental rights b ecause reasonable efforts at

reunification have been made , t here is clear and convincing evidence to support

termination pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g)

, 2 termination will allow the child

safety and permanenc y, and no statutory factor weigh ing against termination

exists

.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings

. The mother comes to the attention of the juvenile court with the following

background. She had prior involvement w ith Visiting Nurse Services (VNS) and

1 The juvenile court also terminated the parental rights of the legal father and the putative father, neither of whom appeal s

. 2 Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) allows the juvenile court to termination parental rights where all the following are found:

(1) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (2) The court has terminated parent al rights pursuant to section 232.117 with respect to a nother child who is a member of the same family or a court of competent jurisdiction in another state has entered an order involuntarily terminating parental rights with respect to another child who is a member of the same family. (3) There is clear and convincing evidence that the parent continues to lack the ability or willingness to respond to services which would correct the situation. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that an additional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situation.3

the Iowa D epartment of Human S ervices (DHS) , and ha s had her parental rights

to other children terminat ed because she was unable to gain the skills necessary

to care for her children safely. In 2008, t he mother had her rights to a child

terminated. See In re C

. W

. M

. - I

. , No. 08

- 1022, 2008 WL 2906631 (Iowa Ct. App.

July 30, 2008). The mother had another child, G.M., born in D ecember 2011

, who was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA) . A n o rder terminating

the mother ’ s parental rights to G.M . was filed on April 4, 2012, eight months

before the birth of B.M., and provides in part:

[The mother] had made some progress with services

. She had her own apartment and was tak ing parenti ng and domestic abuse classes. She was working on budge ti ng. She was meeting w i th a psychiatrist and she was employed. The c ourt declined to wa i ve reasonable efforts.

. . . There is no evidence to support the conclusion that [the mother] has gained insight into the types of abus ive relationsh ips in whi ch she conti nued to i nvolv e herself. She has been in at least four dom e stically

- vio len t relationships.

. . . While [the mother] tries very hard to meet [G.M. ’ s] needs, she has not been able to und er stand h i s developmental stages and delays and needs constant superv i sion when they are together. At the time of the di spos i tion hea rin g , [the mother] believed [ G .M.] was

v i olent because he was head

- butti n g her, scratc hi ng her, and pinching her cheek. Although she had been working with extensive

serv i ces, she continued to need reminders regarding bas ic care, including holding her baby ’ s head. While she had ce rtainly put forth the effort to reunify w i th [G.M.], she lacked the abi lity to care for him safely or provide him with stab i lity

.

. . . . Despite the offer and/or receipt of servi ces specifically designed to r e mediate the protective problems that first brought [ G .M.] to the attention of juvenile co urt , he cannot be returned to the custody of a parent today without fu rt her adjudicatory harm. Despite family contact t hre e times a week with a skilled [Family Safety, Risk, and Permanency] FSRP worker providing

one

- on

- one supervision and trai ning

, [the mother] cont inu es to lack basic parenting skills

. She does not support [G.M. ’ s] head or change his d i aper appropriately. Although [the mother] i s eager to take suggestions from the FSRP worker and the Early Access worker, and does well comfort ing [the child] when he is upset , [she] frequently places [G.M.] at risk even under this close supervis i on.4

For examp le, there have been times where she has left h i m on a changing table and stepped away. She may make progress du rin g one vis i t with a skill such as suppo rt ing [the child ’ s] head properly, but at the next visit it is back to square one. There i s no consist ent growth in her skills.

. . . . [The mother] has made little progress in mental health therapy. She does not believe she needs this help because they only want to talk about her relationships with men, or her past abuse, or prior termination of parent al rights, or her relationship with her family of origin. She wants to focus on the present and future, failing to recognize the role unresolved trauma plays in her ability to take care of herself. . . . She remains on medications for posttraumatic stres s disorder and fetal alcohol syndrome

. Because she b elieves she worked on those i ssues as a child

, she does not need to deal with them again. However, she has known throughout the course of this case that therapy was necessary to support reunification. Yet , [ the mother ] has not engaged in therapy since January 2012.

. . . . Although only four months have passed since this case was filed, four months is the entirety of [G.M. ’ s] life

. Given the prior termination of parental rights with respect to another ch ild who was a member of the same family, this court has no confidence that [the mother] wi ll be able to make the necessary changes in the foreseeable future necessary to support reunification. Although she has the willingness to respond to servi ces that would correct the situation that led to p rior termination of parental rights, she lacks the ability. An addi tional period of rehabilitation would not correct the situat i on regardless of the intensity of

s e rvices p rovided. If l ove were the only measure of the parent ’ s ab ility to care for a child , [G.M.] would have the benefit of flawless parenting. However

, such is not the case . While l ove is a critical ingredient

, it takes much more than love to meet an in fant ’ s n eeds for safety

, per manency, and well

- be ing.

B.M. was born to the mother in December 2013 . During her pregnancy

with B.M. , the mother attended prenatal and parenting classes. The child was

removed from her care from the hospital , however, due to the mother threatening

to leave the hospital against medical advice; the mother ’ s low mental functioning

and unresolved mental health issues, which include anger outbursts, bipolar5

disorder, and schizophrenia; her living with a person required to register as a sex

o ffender; and her “ demonstrated limited parenting skills. ” The child was placed in

foster care with the family that had adopted his two half

- siblings.

On February 11, 2014, B.M. was adjudicated a CINA . The juvenile court

made these specific findings:

[The mother ’ s] parental rights have been recently terminated with respect to two other children who are members of the same family. The protective problems that resulted in those outcomes persist. The mother has recently re

- engaged in therapy, but lacks basic parenting skills to meet the needs of an infant, particularly one with special medical needs. She also lacks appropriate housing. [B.M.] is in a home with siblings. He has ongoing significant health problems (seizure disorder) that the foster parents are able to meet.

The court noted reasonable efforts had been made to eliminate the need for

removal, including prior CINA services, and on

- going family contact, FSRP, and

VNS. The court also stated no additional services were requested.

In M arch, the mother requested she be assigned a different DHS worker

because Ashley McLaughlin had been her FSRP worker in “ another matter. ” A

hearing was held on April 2 and the motion was denied. The court found,

Ms. McLaughlin has provided competent ser vices. Nothing in the evidence justifies changing DHS workers at this juncture. Ms. McLaughlin served as the mother’ s FSRP worker in a prior case, and, therefore, has an advantage in working with [the mother] , as she is familiar with her background and n eeds. The mother’ s rights have previously been terminated with respect to children who are members of the same family. A Petition to Terminate Parental Rights has been filed regarding [ B .M.]

. It is in the child ’ s best interest not to disrupt the relatio nships and stream of services and oversight. Reasonable efforts with respect to the specific social worker are being provided. The Court defers its reasonable efforts finding with respect to services overall until the next hearing.6

On May 2, the State informed the juvenile court that t he m other ’s visits

with the child were suspended in March due to the mother’s “ aggressive and

threatening behaviors. ” Visits were not set to resume until the m other’s therapist

says she is no longer a safety threat to the child or the providers.

A dispositional /termination hearing was held on May 21, 2014. The court

terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code sections

232.116(1)(d) (child adjudicated CINA, parent received corrective services,

circumst ances continue despite services), (g) (see footnote 2), and (k) (child

adjudicated CINA, parent suffers from and has been repeatedly institutionalized

for chronic mental illness and presents danger to herself or others as evidenced

by prior acts, and progn osis indicates child cannot be returned in a reasonable

length of time).

The mother appeals, contending reasonable efforts were not made,

termination under 232.116(1)(k) was improper, termination is not in the child’s

best interest due to the bond betw een the mother and child

.

II. Scope and Standards of Review

. We review proceedings to terminate parental rights de novo. In re A.M

., 843 N.W.2d 100, 110 (Iowa 2014)

. We will uphold an order terminating parental

rights if there is clear and convincing evidence of grounds for termination under

Iowa Code section 232.116. In re D

. W ., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010).

Evidence is clear and convincing when there are no serious or substantial doubts

as to the correctness of conclusions of law draw n from the evidence. Id

.7

III

. Discussion

. The juvenile court made the following findings, which we find in our de

novo review are supported by the evidence and reflect the provision of

reasonable efforts at reunification:

[The mother] . . . has gone through many motions trying to build a record of parenting. The evidence shows, however, depressing recurrence of the facts recited by the Iowa Court of Appeals in the termination of parental rights of an older child. [ In r e C.W.M.

- I. ] Educated, skilled, dedicated, and able, three women working to assist [the mother] in her parenting found her frequently showing mood swings consistent with her diagnosis of a mood disorder. They found her angry and unable to control anger despite multipl e sessions to help her with anger management.

. . .

. . . . [The mother] corroborated the testimony of the service providers that she does not follow the budget that her social worker helped her make. She corroborated testimony that she cannot control her anger. She acknowledges that she cannot think when she gets angry, but testifies that she merely needs to learn to think when she gets angry to deal with that concern. Other witnesses testified to her behavior when angry that includes yelling,

scream ing, threatening, and cursing those trying to help her. This behavior causes stress and harm to the child, as she was informed repeatedly. Her continuing to engage in such behavior while holding B.M.M. led to suspension of her visits with the child in Ma rch 2014. Visits have not resumed because she has not addressed and dealt with those harmful behaviors. [The mother] also corroborated the understanding of social worker, therapist, and FSRP worker that she engages in a series of brief sexual relationshi ps, cohabiting with abusive males, many subject to sex offender registration. Many of them engage in physical violence. Without exception, her choices of male companions would raise suspicion that anywhere she resided would constitute a dangerous place f or a child. Regardless of [her] inabilities to have a residence, to support herself, to support another person, to control her anger, and to do other than associate intimately with assaultive persons and those subject to sex offender registration, the tes timony establishes her inability to simply care for a child’s basic needs. She cannot consistently demonstrate supporting the child’s head, feeding the child, or changing the diaper when needed. Beyond [the mother’s] inability to perform the basic acts o f holding, feeding, and diapering the child, she could not meet the8

child’s special needs. She failed to understand the explanation of the child’s physician on how to deal with a seizure. After the physician explained it to her, she asked the social worker to explain it to her. Coping with her own life overwhelms [the mother]

. She can no more care for a child now than she could when the court terminated rights regarding an older child.

We agree with the finding that “ [t] he passage of more time, how ever, will not

change [the mother ’s ] inability to parent. ”

The mother contends reasonable efforts to reunify her with her child were

not made because visits were suspended. The concept of reasonable efforts

“ covers both the efforts to prevent and elimina te the need for removal. ” In re

C.B. , 611 N.W.2d 489, 493 (Iowa 2000) . While the focus is on services to

improve parenting

, it also “ includes visitation designed to facilitate reunification

while providing adequate protection for the child

. ” Id. (emphas is added). The

record establishes extensive and individualized services have been offered to the

mother in this and prior juvenile proceedings. The mother’s inability to control

her anger continues. The juvenile court found the mother was offered

indivi dualized services but the mother remained unable to care for her child, and

no additional time and services would change her inability to parent. Upon our

de novo review, we determine r easonable efforts were made.

The mother argues termination is not pro per under section 232.116(1)(k).

She does not, however, challenge termination under the other two grounds found

by the juvenile court. “ When the juvenile court terminates parental rights on

more than one statutory ground, w e may affirm the juvenile court ’ s order on any

ground we find supported by the record. ” In re A

. B

. , 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa9

2012)

. There is clear and convincing evidence to support termination under Iowa

Code section 232.116(1)( g ) and we affirm on that ground.

Finally, the mother argues termination was not in the child’s best interests

due to the close bond between the mother and child. We presume she is

invoking Iowa Code section 232.116(3)(c) (providing the court need not terminate

parental rights if “[t] here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination

would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent

child relationship ”)

. Even if this claim is adequately preserved

— and the State

contends it is not

— this record does not support such a finding.

We affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to B.M.

AFFIRMED.