PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT 

No. 22-2022

MITCHELL GARNET EVANS, Executor of the Estate of Sallie Copeland Evans, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

 v. 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Defendant - Appellee. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at 

Greenville. Louise W. Flanagan, District Judge. (4:21-cv-00045-FL) 

Argued: January 24, 2024 Decided: June 24, 2024 

Before GREGORY, QUATTLEBAUM, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges. 

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Benjamin 

joined. Judge Quattlebaum concurred in the judgment and wrote a concurring opinion. 

ARGUED: Walton Everett Lupton, SLAUGHTER & LUPTON LAW, PLLC, Virginia 

Beach, Virginia, for Appellant. Sharon Coull Wilson, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina; Madison Dunbar, DUKE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL 

OF LAW, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael F. Easley, Jr., United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

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GREGORY, Circuit Judge:

This case arises out of the events surrounding Sallie Copeland Evans’s murder. 

Appellant Mitchell Garnet Evans, Executor of the Estate of Sallie Copeland Evans and 

Sallie’s son, initiated the underlying action against the United States pursuant to the Federal 

Tort Claims Act asserting a claim for wrongful death under North Carolina law. The 

district court dismissed Evans’s claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and this 

appeal followed.

We conclude that the district court erroneously dismissed Evans’s claim under 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) because the jurisdictional question and the merits 

of this case are inextricably intertwined. However, because Evans failed to state a wrongful 

death claim under North Carolina law, the district court’s decision—though procedurally 

incorrect—was substantively proper. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s decision 

on alternative grounds and dismiss the case under Rule 12(b)(6).

I.

Isaiah Evans Ceasar, Sallie’s grandson and Evans’s nephew, was a lance corporal in 

the United States Marine Corps. In March 2018, Ceasar was stationed at Fort Benning, 

Georgia, where he participated in combat school. On or about March 30, 2018, Ceasar left 

Fort Benning without permission. He left behind a note stating that he “was going to end it 

all and kill himself.” J.A. 7 ¶ 10. A classmate found the note and someone informed Ceasar’s 

commander, Marine Corps Captain Smith, of its contents. Ceasar was classified as absent 

without leave (“AWOL”) from his unit or place of required duty sometime thereafter.

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On April 1, 2018, a sergeant in Ceasar’s Marine Corps unit contacted local law 

enforcement officials in Nash County, North Carolina, where Ceasar’s girlfriend and 

friends lived at the time. The sergeant informed local law enforcement that “Ceasar had 

gotten into trouble and left a note indicating that he was going to end it all, but before 

committing suicide, Ceasar wanted to visit his mother.” J.A. 8 ¶ 11. At the time, Ceasar’s 

mother was in an inpatient medical facility in Halifax County, North Carolina.

Sometime after leaving Fort Benning, Ceasar traveled to Halifax County. When 

Ceasar’s family learned that he was there, they called Capt. Smith to advise him that Ceasar 

needed to be picked up by the Marine Corps. Capt. Smith arranged for Ceasar to return to 

Fort Benning unsupervised sometime after that call. On April 5, 2018, Ceasar boarded a 

flight from Raleigh-Durham International Airport (“RDU”) to Atlanta, Georgia, per the 

travel arrangements Capt. Smith made.

On April 10, 2018, Ceasar’s family learned that he had returned to Halifax County 

and was at his grandfather’s home. Ceasar’s family called Capt. Smith to inform him that 

Ceasar had returned and “that they were concerned and afraid something could happen.” 

J.A. 8 ¶ 16. That same day, Sallie asked Capt. Smith “why the Marine Corps had not 

picked up Ceasar” and requested that Capt. Smith arrange for North Carolina law 

enforcement officials to retrieve Ceasar. J.A. 9 ¶ 17. Capt. Smith took no action.

On or about April 11, 2018, Capt. Smith told Ceasar’s family that he found several 

notes from Ceasar that were “disturbing.” J.A. 9 ¶ 18. The notes allegedly “expressed 

Ceasar’s intent of violence” against himself and others. Id. During that conversation, Capt. 

Smith “stated that he was very concerned because of the notes’ contents” and advised Sallie 

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that she “should be careful if she came in contact with Ceasar.” Id. Sallie again requested 

that Capt. Smith have Ceasar detained. In response, Capt. Smith stated that the Marine 

Corps had exhausted significant resources in making the previous travel arrangements for 

Ceasar and “would not commit to making any further effort to find and detain” him. J.A.

9 ¶ 19.

On April 17, 2018, Ceasar’s family called Capt. Smith to inquire about why the 

Marine Corps had not retrieved Ceasar and to inform Capt. Smith that they “found grenade 

parts they believed Ceasar had acquired.” J.A. 9 ¶ 20. They also told Capt. Smith that 

Ceasar’s Facebook posts indicated that he had purchased guns. The family again requested 

that the Marine Corps have local law enforcement detain Ceasar. This time, they noted that 

Ceasar was “acting aggressive” and “easily agitated” and that they were “concerned 

something would happen.” Id. Capt. Smith stated that the information “was concerning” 

and that “he would see what he could do,” but again noted that the Marine Corps had already 

exhausted significant resources in a failed attempt to return Ceasar to Fort Benning. Id.

At some point, the family purchased Ceasar a ticket for a flight from RDU to 

Atlanta. On or about April 22, 2018, Sallie and Evans transported Ceasar to RDU and 

watched him board his flight. They called Capt. Smith to notify him that Ceasar had 

boarded the flight and needed to be detained at the airport. Capt. Smith informed them that 

he did not have the resources to have Ceasar detained at the airport and thus Ceasar would 

need to arrange his own transportation from the airport to Fort Benning.

The next day, Ceasar returned to Halifax County. Sallie again contacted Capt. Smith 

“who refused to take any action to have Ceasar detained” and instructed Sallie to take Ceasar 

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to Marine Corps Base Camp Lejeune (“Camp Lejeune”) near Jacksonville, North Carolina. 

J.A. 10 ¶ 23. Sallie informed Evans of her conversation with Capt. Smith and became 

emotional regarding the Marine Corps’ lack of action. Evans then texted Capt. Smith the 

following message:

We put Isaiah on a plane yesterday flew him back to you once again And you 

didn’t pick him up cause he’s back here in NC at moms house She worried 

I’m worried Y’all need to pick his ASS up before something happens!!

J.A. 10–11 ¶ 24. Capt. Smith did not respond to Evans’s text message.

On or about April 24, 2018, Capt. Smith again suggested that Sallie drive Ceasar to 

Camp Lejeune. As Sallie tried to convince Ceasar to gather his belongings for the trip, 

Ceasar shot her in the back of the head with a 9mm pistol. Sallie’s dead body was located 

several days later. Ceasar was subsequently arrested at a hotel and charged with firstdegree murder. At the time of his arrest, Ceasar had Sallie’s car and credit card, as well as

unidentified “explosive devices,” in his possession. J.A. 11 ¶ 27.

II.

Evans filed a wrongful death claim with the Marine Corps alleging that the agency 

was liable for Sallie’s murder. The Marine Corps denied Evans’s claim on October 13, 2020. 

Evans then filed a timely complaint in federal court, which he later amended with leave from 

the district court. The Government moved to dismiss the amended complaint. In its motion, 

the Government contended that the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because 

Evans’s claim was prohibited under the FTCA, and, alternatively, that Evans failed to state 

a wrongful death claim under North Carolina law. Evans opposed the motion, arguing that 

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his claim is permitted under the FTCA because it is based on Capt. Smith’s negligence, not 

Ceasar’s actions, and that his allegations plausibly stated a claim. The district court referred 

the motion to a magistrate judge for a report and recommendation.

The magistrate judge held a hearing and subsequently recommended that Evans’s 

claim be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See J.A. 72, 108. In making this 

determination, the magistrate judge relied heavily on the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Sheridan v. United States, 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988), which established that the government 

can only be held liable for a federal employee’s negligence that results in a foreseeable 

assault or battery where the basis for imposing government liability is independent of the 

intentional tortfeasor’s federal employment.

The magistrate judge determined that under Sheridan, federal court jurisdiction in 

this case depended on whether Capt. Smith’s alleged negligence was independent of 

Ceasar’s status as a Marine. J.A. 104. The magistrate judge concluded that Evans’s theory 

of liability depended on Ceasar’s status as a Marine because the Marine Corps’ authority 

to control, retrieve, or detain Ceasar derived from Ceasar’s military status, and, absent that 

status, it was unlikely that Capt. Smith would have assisted Sallie. J.A. 103–04, 108. The 

magistrate judge did not address the parties’ arguments regarding the merits of the case.

Evans objected to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. He contended that 

Ceasar’s employment was irrelevant to his claim because Capt. Smith’s instruction to Sallie 

to drive Ceasar to Camp Lejeune was negligent absent Ceasar’s military status. J.A. 112. 

In response, the Government argued that the objections should fail because Capt. Smith’s 

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ability to control Ceasar was based on Ceasar’s status as a Marine, and, absent that 

employment relationship, the Marine Corps did not owe Sallie a duty.

The district court adopted the recommendation. Like the magistrate judge, the 

district court found that Evans’s basis for imposing liability on the government was not 

independent of Ceasar’s employment with the Marine Corps. Evans v. United States, 2022 

WL 3924222, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 30, 2022). On this point, the court noted that Ceasar’s 

family relied on the Marine Corps’ ability to control Ceasar as his employer in requesting 

help from Capt. Smith. Id. The court also found that Evans failed to identify any legal 

authority indicating that Capt. Smith voluntarily assumed a duty to Sallie by telling her to 

drive Ceasar to Camp Lejeune. Id. at *5. Accordingly, the district court concluded that 

Evans’s claim was barred under the FTCA and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction.

III.

We review a district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction de novo. 

Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2013). Under the principle of 

sovereign immunity, the United States cannot be sued without Congress’s consent. United 

States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941). In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort 

Claims Act (“FTCA” or the “Act”), a limited waiver of the United States’s sovereign 

immunity for certain causes of action against the federal government. 28 U.S.C. § 1346. 

The Act grants federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over claims against the United States 

for “personal injury or death caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any 

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employee of the Government while acting within the scope of his office or employment.” 

Id.; see also Levin v. United States, 568 U.S. 503, 507 (2013).

Because the FTCA confers jurisdiction only over claims covered by the Act, district 

courts lack subject-matter jurisdiction over claims against the government that fall outside 

of the statute’s purview. Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 586 (“The terms of the government’s 

consent to be sued in any court define that court’s jurisdiction to entertain suit.”). Thus, 

claims presented in federal court that are not covered under or are explicitly prohibited by 

the FTCA are dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1). Bullock v. Napolitano, 666 F.3d 281, 284 

(4th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 190 (2012) (“Sovereign immunity is not only a bar 

to liability but also a bar to the court in which suits against the United States can be filed”). 

Relevant here, the Act prohibits claims that arise out of an assault or battery committed by 

a federal employee. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h). This is known as the intentional tort exception. 

Levin, 568 U.S. at 507.

The Supreme Court has stated that the phrase “any claim arising out of” as used in 

the context of the intentional tort exception is “unquestionably broad enough to bar all 

claims based entirely on an assault or battery” but that “[t]he import of these words is less 

clear . . . when they are applied to a claim arising out of two tortious acts, one of which is 

an assault or battery and the other of which is a mere act of negligence.” Sheridan v. United

States, 487 U.S. 392, 398 (1988) (emphasis in original). As stated above, the court below 

relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sheridan v. United States, in dismissing Evans’s 

case. Given the import of that case to the court’s decisions and the parties’ arguments on 

appeal, an illustration of Sheridan is warranted.

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In Sheridan, three naval corpsmen encountered an intoxicated man at a hospital on 

a naval base. 487 U.S. 392, 395 (1988). They learned that the man was armed during a 

scuffle that ensued when they attempted to take him to the emergency room. Id. They fled 

and did not alert anyone of the encounter even though the naval base prohibited possession 

of firearms and required personnel to report any violations of the prohibition. Id. at 401. 

Later that day, the intoxicated man, who was later identified as an off-duty serviceman, 

fired several shots into a car near the hospital injuring several passengers. Id. at 395. The 

injured passengers filed suit alleging that their injuries were caused by the corpsmen’s 

negligence in allowing the intoxicated serviceman to leave the hospital with a loaded rifle.

Id. at 394.

The Supreme Court held that because the injured passengers’ claim was predicated 

on the alleged negligence of the corpsmen and not the serviceman’s employment status or 

state of mind, the intentional tort exception was inapplicable. Id. at 403. The Court 

reasoned that because the Navy adopted regulations that prohibited on-base possession of 

firearms and required personnel to report violations, and because the corpsmen undertook 

to provide care to a visibly intoxicated and armed person, the government had “assumed 

responsibility to perform [a] good Samaritan task.” Id. at 401. The Court equated that 

“good Samaritan task” to a voluntarily undertaken duty and concluded that the 

government’s failure to execute its “good Samaritan task” in a careful manner could serve 

as the basis for a negligence claim. Id.

Under Sheridan, whether Evans’s claim is permitted or prohibited under the FTCA 

depends on whether the intentional tort exception applies and thus whether Capt. Smith 

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was negligent on a basis unrelated to Ceasar’s employment with the Marine Corps. The

Government, which characterizes Evans’s claim as one “for injury resulting from murder,”

maintains that the intentional tort exception bars Evans’s claim. Resp. Br. 12. In contrast, 

Evans contends that the intentional tort exception is inapplicable because Sallie’s death 

resulted from two tortious acts—Ceasar’s shooting and Capt. Smith’s negligence—and he 

seeks to impose liability on the Government for only the latter. He maintains that because 

the facts essential to determining the merits (whether Capt. Smith was negligent) and 

jurisdiction are inextricably intertwined, the district court erred in dismissing his claim for 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Admittedly, our jurisprudence appears unclear on its face regarding how we review 

district court dismissals on jurisdictional grounds where, as here, the facts essential to 

determining federal court jurisdiction and the merits are indistinguishable. In some 

instances, we have interpreted the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal as if it were on 

the merits, reviewed the court’s decision for accuracy and affirmed the dismissal on the 

merits. See, e.g., Durden v. United States, 736 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2013); Rivanna Trawlers 

Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988). In others, we have 

determined that the district court’s dismissal on jurisdictional grounds was improper, 

vacated that decision, and remanded for discovery on the jurisdictional issue. See Kerns v. 

United States, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2009). Although we have acknowledged the 

discrepancy in our treatment of the issue, see Durden, 736 F.3d at 301, we have never 

explained the rationale behind our decisions or clarified under what circumstances each 

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approach should be applied. We take the opportunity to do so now and begin with a brief 

discussion of our relevant jurisprudence.

In Rivanna, we reviewed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ federal 

securities law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction following the defendant’s 

motion to dismiss which the court converted into a summary judgment motion. Rivanna 

Trawlers Unlimited v. Thompson Trawlers, Inc., 840 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal 

quotation omitted). We held that the district court properly accepted jurisdiction over these 

claims and considered them on the merits despite the court’s “technically incorrect” 

statements dismissing the claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 239. We 

therefore interpreted the district court’s dismissal as a grant of the defendant’s motion for 

summary judgment and affirmed the dismissal on the merits. Id. at 239, 243.

In Kerns, the plaintiff asserted an FTCA claim alleging that a government 

employee’s negligent driving caused her husband’s death. Kerns v. United States, 534 F. 

Supp. 2d 633, 635 (D. Md. 2008), vacated, 585 F.3d 187 (4th Cir. 2009). The district court 

held that the claim was not cognizable under the FTCA because the driver was not acting 

within the scope of her employment at the time of the accident. Id. at 640. On appeal, the 

plaintiff argued that because whether the negligent driver was acting within the scope of 

her employment was central to the court’s jurisdiction and the merits of her claim the 

district court should have reached the merits. Kerns, 585 F.3d at 192. We agreed. Id. at 

195. In vacating the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal, we said, our “general rule[,]”

is that “[a] district court should assume jurisdiction and assess the merits of the claim when 

the relevant facts—for jurisdictional and merits purposes—are inextricably intertwined.” 

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Id. We remanded the case for discovery on the jurisdictional issue without opining on the 

merits. Id. at 196.

Most recently in Durden, we reviewed another dismissal of an FTCA claim on 

jurisdictional grounds. Durden, 736 F.3d at 298. In our analysis, we acknowledged the 

discrepancy between our treatment of the appeals in Rivanna and Kerns, two cases we said 

arose under the same procedural posture as Durden. Id. Specifically, we noted that we 

vacated the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in Kerns, but 

we treated the district court’s jurisdictional dismissal in Rivanna “as one for failure to state 

a claim that had been converted into a motion for summary judgment.” Id.

We characterized Durden as “more akin to Rivanna than Kerns insofar as the 

government argued” that jurisdiction was lacking even if the allegations in the complaint 

were accepted as true. Id. We concluded that in assessing the motion, the district court 

adequately considered the merits of the plaintiff’s claim despite its “technically incorrect 

statement” purporting to dismiss the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Id. at 302. 

As we had done in Rivanna, we interpreted the district court’s dismissal as a grant of 

summary judgment to the government and affirmed. Id. at 309.

Although we only characterized the facts relevant to the merits and jurisdictional issue 

in Kerns as “inextricably intertwined,” the phrase is equally applicable to Rivanna and 

Durden. In Rivanna, we considered whether a partnership interest qualified as a security, 

which was both an element of the federal claim and federal jurisdiction. Rivanna, 840 F.2d 

at 239. Meanwhile, in Durden, the Army’s alleged negligence undergirded both jurisdiction 

and the merits of Durden’s FTCA claim. Durden, 736 F.3d at 301. Since Kerns, Rivanna, 

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and Durden all involved inextricably intertwining facts, the relevant material difference 

between Kerns on the one hand and Rivanna and Durden on the other was the type of 

jurisdictional challenge the defendants made in each case—a factual challenge in Kerns, and 

facial challenges in Durden and Rivanna. Our approach on appellate review in cases in 

which the merits and jurisdictional questions overlap thus differs depending on the type of 

jurisdictional challenge asserted before the district court. This distinction is logical given the 

difference in the approach district courts employ when assessing each type of challenge.

Where a defendant challenges the factual predicate of subject-matter jurisdiction, 

the district court need not assume the truth of the allegations, may decide disputed issues 

of fact, and may venture outside of the pleadings to resolve the challenge. Kerns, 585 F.3d 

at 192. Considering the standard and the array of evidence the district may review under 

it, we cannot assume on appeal that the district court assessed the merits in making a

jurisdictional determination following a factual challenge. This is especially so at the 

motion to dismiss stage where, on the merits, the district court must limit its consideration 

to the pleadings and accept the facts as true. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Accordingly, as a 

court of review, we refrain from assessing the merits under these circumstances and remand 

for the district court to conduct the appropriate analysis in the first instance. That was the 

approach we applied in Kerns. Id. at 196.

The same concerns regarding the district court’s assessment of the merits are not 

present in the context of facial challenges. Under a facial challenge, where the defendant 

contends that the allegations in the complaint are insufficient to confer subject-matter 

jurisdiction, the district court assesses the motion under the same standard as one brought 

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under Rule 12(b)(6). Id. at 192. In evaluating such a challenge, the district court accepts 

all allegations as true and determines whether those allegations are sufficient to invoke 

jurisdiction. Id. Because the Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) analyses are materially 

identical in this scenario, our review of the district court’s decision (which necessarily 

included an assessment of the merits) does not improperly circumvent the district court’s 

role. Thus, under these circumstances, it is appropriate for us to interpret the district court’s 

dismissal as though it followed a challenge to the merits of the case as we did in Rivanna

and Durden. 

We now apply that approach to the district court’s dismissal in this case. Evans 

brought a wrongful death claim pursuant to the FTCA premised on his assertion that 

Sallie’s death resulted (at least in part) from Capt. Smith’s negligence. If Evans’s assertion 

is correct, Sheridan dictates that the claim is not barred by the intentional tort exception. 

By contrast, if Capt. Smith was not negligent and Ceasar’s act alone caused Sallie’s death 

Evans’s suit is prohibited under the intentional tort exception and the principle of sovereign 

immunity. As such, whether Capt. Smith was legally negligent is determinative of whether

federal courts have jurisdiction over this case. The facts essential to determining 

jurisdiction and assessing the merits of Evans’s claim are therefore inextricably intertwined

and the district court erred in dismissing the case under Rule 12(b)(1).*

*

 In Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021), the Supreme Court addressed whether 

the FTCA’s judgment bar provision prevents a plaintiff whose claim was previously 

dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction from asserting another action against the 

same defendants for the same injuries. In a footnote in that case, the Court stated that in 

(Continued) 

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IV. 

Our determination that the district court erred in dismissing Evans’s claim under 

Rule 12(b)(1) does not end our analysis because the Government facially challenged 

subject-matter jurisdiction. As discussed above, because the standards that district courts 

apply in assessing Rule 12(b)(6) motions and facial jurisdictional challenges are identical, 

the district court necessarily considered the merits of Evans’s claim in deriving its 

jurisdictional conclusion. Accordingly, we now assess the district court’s decision as 

though it occurred under Rule 12(b)(6).

This Court reviews a district court’s dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. See 

Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020). Dismissal is only appropriate where a 

complaint does not “contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to 

relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal 

quotations and citations omitted). To demonstrate plausibility, the complaint must plead 

facts beyond those that are “merely consistent with a defendant’s liability.” Id. In 

assessing the sufficiency of the complaint under this standard we must draw all reasonable 

inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Roane, 948 F.3d at 226. A complaint may only survive 

cases “where a plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an element that is both a merit element of 

a claim and a jurisdictional element, the district court may dismiss the claim under Rule 

12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). Or both.” Id. at 218 n.8. Because that statement is dicta and 

can be read in line with circuit precedent, we proceed to the merits. See Short, 87 F.4th at 

605 (4th Cir. 2023) (“If it is possible for us to read our precedent harmoniously with 

Supreme Court precedent, we must do so.” (internal quotation omitted)); Carrera v. E.M.D. 

Sales Inc., 75 F.4th 345, 352 (4th Cir. 2023) (“We do not lightly presume that the law of 

our circuit has been overturned or rendered no longer tenable”) (internal quotation and 

citation omitted)). 

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a motion to dismiss where its factual allegations “raise a right to relief above the speculative 

level, thereby nudging the claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bazemore 

v. Best Buy, 957 F.3d 195, 200 (4th Cir. 2020) (internal quotations and citations omitted).

V.

The United States may only be held liable for negligence under the FTCA if an 

individual could be held liable for the same actions under the law of the state where the 

alleged negligence occurred. See Kerns, 585 F.3d at 194 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1)). 

Capt. Smith was in Georgia at all relevant times, but Sallie was murdered in North Carolina. 

The parties agree that North Carolina law governs Evans’s claim as the law of the place of 

injury. Opening Br. 8; Resp. Br. 18; see also Wiener v. AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co., 58 

F.4th 774, 779 (4th Cir. 2023) (“We conclude that choice of law is waivable, not 

jurisdictional, and AXA waived the possible application of Connecticut law by 

affirmatively litigating under the substantive law of North Carolina.”).

Under North Carolina law, a personal representative may recover damages a 

decedent would have been entitled to for injuries or death caused by the “wrongful act, 

neglect, or default” of another. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 28A-18-2. We have recognized 

that, in North Carolina, an individual may expose himself to negligence liability by 

assisting or attempting to assist another person when he does not have an obligation to do 

so. See Durden, 736 F.3d at 305. Under that circumstance, the individual has voluntarily 

undertaken a duty and may be held liable for injuries that result from his breach of that 

duty, or failure to exercise reasonable care when executing it. Id.

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Evans maintains that Capt. Smith voluntarily undertook to assist Sallie by 

instructing her to drive Ceasar to Camp Lejeune. Tellingly, Evans failed to identify any 

legal authority indicating that a person or private employer could be held liable under 

similar circumstances. And even if he had, the facts in the complaint do not sufficiently 

allege that Capt. Smith voluntarily undertook a duty to Sallie at any time they were in 

contact. Indeed, even with all inferences drawn in Evans’s favor, the facts suggest the 

opposite. Notably, prior to telling Sallie to drive Ceasar to Camp Lejeune, Capt. Smith 

explicitly informed her on several occasions that the Marine Corps would not take any 

further action to locate or retrieve Ceasar. True to that position, he took no action in 

response to Sallie’s requests for him to involve local law enforcement. With that context, 

their conversations regarding Camp Lejeune are better understood as Capt. Smith

suggesting actions Sallie could take to resolve her issue than him attempting to assist her.

Evans’s allegation regarding Capt. Smith arranging for Ceasar to fly to Georgia 

following the family’s initial call is likewise insufficient. Indeed, nothing in the complaint 

suggests that Capt. Smith arranged Ceasar’s travel to Fort Benning to assist Ceasar’s 

family. Rather, the allegations suggest that Capt. Smith attempted to return an AWOL 

soldier to base after he learned where the AWOL soldier fled to. Our conclusion may have 

been different if Capt. Smith had not repeatedly stated that the Marine Corps would not 

take any further action to assist Ceasar’s family, or if he had traveled to North Carolina to 

retrieve Ceasar or authorized others to detain Ceasar. However, given the absence of any 

facts alleging that Capt. Smith acted to assist or benefit Sallie, Evans cannot state a claim 

premised on a voluntary undertaking.

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Similarly, to the extent Evans’s claim is predicated on a special relationship between 

the Marine Corps and Ceasar, the claim still fails. We have previously stated that FTCA 

claims based on a special relationship may only survive if the government had authority to 

control the tortfeasor independent of the tortfeasor’s employment status. Durden, 736 F.3d 

at 305. Because the complaint is devoid of facts alleging that the Marine Corps had any 

authority to control Ceasar independent of Ceasar’s status as a Marine, Evans has not 

plausibly alleged a special relationship. See id.; see also LaFrancis v. U.S., 66 F. Supp. 2d 

335 (1999) (holding that plaintiff’s FTCA claims were barred by the intentional tort 

exception because any duty allegedly owed to her was dependent upon the alleged 

tortfeasor’s employment with the Navy and “without the employment relationship, the 

Navy would not have had the authority to supervise the conduct of [the tortfeasor]”).

Moreover, even if Capt. Smith had voluntarily undertaken a duty to Sallie or the 

Marine Corps had a special relationship with Ceasar, Evans’s claim would still be 

foreclosed under North Carolina law. In North Carolina, “[n]o legal duty exists unless the 

injury to the plaintiff [or decedent] was foreseeable and avoidable through due care.” Stein 

v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 360 N.C. 321, 328 (2006). Accepting the facts as pleaded

here, we cannot conclude that Sallie’s death was foreseeable under the circumstances. Our 

decision in Durden is instructive.

In Durden, an Army specialist expressed his desire to kill himself and members of 

his unit to his staff sergeant and told a fellow soldier that he was unable to sleep due to 

alcohol and drug use. Durden, 736 F.3d at 299. The specialist later burglarized a civilian 

home and assaulted its occupants with a pellet gun. Id. After serving time in a civilian 

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jail, the specialist returned to the military base where his superiors imposed certain 

restrictions on him because of his crimes. Id. Nearly two months after his return, the 

specialist unlawfully entered a woman’s home on the base while intoxicated and raped her 

in front of her children. Id. at 300.

The woman sued the government alleging that the Army was aware that the 

specialist posed a threat of danger to others, had a duty to protect her from that danger, and 

breached that duty by not continuing to enforce the restrictions imposed because of the 

specialist’s prior crimes. Id. On appeal we concluded that the woman failed to state a 

negligence claim because even if the Army had assumed a duty in monitoring the specialist, 

the woman’s rape was not foreseeable under the circumstances. Id. at 303–04. We said 

that although the woman alleged that the Army had knowledge of the specialist’s prior 

crime, drug and alcohol use, and desires to kill himself and others, those facts did not 

indicate that the specialist had a propensity for rape. Id. As such, we determined that the 

facts were insufficient to indicate that the Army should have recognized that continued 

enforcement of the restrictions imposed was necessary to protect the woman from being 

raped. Id.

In an attempt to distinguish Durden, Evans maintains that unlike the rape in that case, 

Sallie’s murder was foreseeable because, in the days preceding it, (1) Ceasar’s family notified 

Capt. Smith that Ceasar posed an immediate risk of harm to Sallie and others, (2) Capt. Smith

expressed concern about Ceasar’s actions, and (3) Capt. Smith communicated that the Marine 

Corps had exhausted substantial resources to retrieve Ceasar and would not commit to taking 

any additional action. Evans argues that these allegations demonstrate that Capt. Smith knew 

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that Ceasar posed an immediate danger to others when he told Sallie to drive Ceasar to 

Camp Lejune. We disagree.

As a threshold matter, we note that the complaint does not allege that the family told 

Capt. Smith that Ceasar was a danger to Sallie, his family, or anyone else. Rather, at best, 

the allegations indicate that (1) Ceasar’s family was gravely concerned “something could 

happen,” J.A. 9 ¶ 20, (2) Ceasar’s family expressed concern to Capt. Smith about Ceasar’s 

general behavior, actions, weapons possession, and agitated temperament, (3) Ceasar left 

notes at Fort Benning indicating an intent to harm himself and others, and (4) Capt. Smith 

was concerned regarding the information Ceasar’s family provided and the contents of 

Ceasar’s notes. It does not follow from these allegations that Ceasar would murder 

someone, much less a family member.

Further to that point, the timing of events in this case precludes a conclusion that 

Sallie’s murder was foreseeable. Ceasar left Fort Benning in late March, first appeared at 

a family member’s residence in early April and killed Sallie later that month. Over the 

course of several weeks in April, Ceasar visited family members’ residences and rode to 

the airport with family members on at least two occasions without incident. He also 

repeatedly returned to his family in North Carolina each time he was sent to Georgia. Even 

accepting that Ceasar’s behavior during that time was concerning, these facts do not allege 

that he posed an immediate danger to his family, and certainly fall short of alleging that 

any such danger was foreseeable.

Nonetheless, throughout his brief, Evans repeatedly contends that Capt. Smith knew 

or should have known of the “immediate risk of harm” Ceasar posed to himself and others. 

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See e.g. Opening Br. 22. On this basis, he urges this Court to distinguish Durden and apply the

district court’s rationale in Lumsden v. United States, 555 F. Supp. 2d 580, 582 (E.D.N.C. 2008).

In Lumsden, a Marine Corps private had a reputation among government agents for 

inhaling ether, a chemical compound. Id. at 582. On one occasion, the Marine Corps 

discovered that the private had inhaled ether that the Government had stored in his car. Id. 

The government agents impounded the private’s car for several days before returning it to 

the private with the ether still inside. Id. Sometime after receiving his car, the private 

inhaled a “sufficient quantity” of the ether to become “extremely intoxicated.” Id. While 

in an “extremely intoxicated” state, the private drove head-on into a vehicle killing one 

passenger and severely injuring others. Id. The injured passengers filed suit alleging that 

government agents were negligent in returning the car with the ether to the private knowing 

of his propensity to abuse the compound. Id. at 583. The district court held that the 

intentional tort exception was inapplicable because the plaintiffs’ claims were premised on 

the agents’ actions, not the private’s actions or employment status. Id.

Evans’s reliance on Lumsden is misplaced. Unlike in Lumsden, the complaint here 

does not allege that Capt. Smith knew that Ceasar desired to harm his family members or that 

any of his previous conduct suggested that he did. There are also no allegations that Capt. Smith

knew Ceasar had a propensity to kill or harm others, or that Capt. Smith gave Ceasar the gun 

used to kill Sallie knowing of any such propensity. Rather, as alleged, Capt. Smith, who was 

repeatedly contacted by Ceasar’s family for assistance, offered a suggestion that would 

allow the family to procure the relief they sought—Ceasar’s return to the Marine Corps’ 

custody. Thus, this case is unlike Lumsden. Under the circumstances in this case, although 

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the Marine Corps had knowledge that Ceasar engaged in conduct that caused concern, the 

facts do not plausibly allege that Sallie’s death was foreseeable to Capt. Smith.

VI.

For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the district court erroneously dismissed 

Evans’s wrongful death claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. However, because 

we have determined that the conclusion reached by the court below was proper, we affirm 

the judgment on alternative grounds and dismiss the case for failure to state a claim.

AFFIRMED.

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QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judge, concurring in judgment:

I agree with much of the majority opinion. But to me, a recent Supreme Court 

opinion, Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209 (2021), requires us to affirm regardless of 

whether the district court treated the dismissal as one under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). 

In Brownback, the Supreme Court observed that the FTCA is unique in that “all elements 

of a meritorious claim are also jurisdictional.” Id. at 217. The Court continued that “where, 

as here, pleading a claim and pleading jurisdiction entirely overlap, a ruling that the court 

lacks subject-matter jurisdiction may simultaneously be a judgment on the merits.” Id. at 

218. Since the issues are one and the same, a court does not assume jurisdiction by 

disposing of the case on the merits. Accordingly, the Court added: 

In cases such as this one where a plaintiff fails to plausibly allege an element 

that is both a merit element of a claim and a jurisdictional element, the district 

court may dismiss the claim under Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6). Or both. 

The label does not change the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and the 

claim fails on the merits because it does not state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted. However, in other cases that overlap between merits and 

jurisdiction may not exist. In those cases, the court might lack subject-matter 

jurisdiction for non-merits reasons, in which case it must dismiss the case 

under just Rule 12(b)(1).

Id. at 218 n.8. Following Brownback, I would not hold that the district court erred in 

dismissing Evans’ complaint under Rule 12(b)(1) instead of under Rule 12(b)(6). Since I 

would affirm the district court on its own terms and not on alternative grounds, I concur in 

the judgment.

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