ALD-100 NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

___________ 

No. 16-3224 

___________ 

JUDY THORPE, 

 Appellant 

v. 

STATE OF NEW JERSEY; STATE OF NEW JERSEY JUVENILE 

JUSTICE COMMISSION; OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY; 

THOMAS FLANAGAN; ASHWATH S. TRASI, DAG; GAIL R. BERAN, DAG 

____________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil No. 3-16-cv-02058) 

District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp 

____________________________________ 

Submitted on a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis, a Motion to Reopen, for 

Possible Dismissal Due to a Jurisdictional Defect, 

Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), or 

Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 

January 12, 2017 

Before: MCKEE, JORDAN and RESTREPO, Circuit Judges 

(Opinion filed: February 17, 2017) 

_________ 

OPINION*

_________ 

PER CURIAM 

 

*

 This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 

constitute binding precedent. 
2 

 Judy Thorpe, proceeding pro se, filed a notice of appeal from the final judgment of 

the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey in her employment 

discrimination action. The appeal was dismissed for failure to pay the filing fee. Thorpe 

has now filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and a motion to reopen the 

appeal. We hereby reopen the appeal and grant her motion to proceed IFP. Because no 

substantial question is presented by the appeal, we will summarily affirm the District 

Court’s judgment. See LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6.1

 

 We exercise plenary review of a district court decision, such as this one, which 

dismisses a complaint under the Rooker-Feldman2

 doctrine. Turner v. Crawford Square 

Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 547 (3d Cir. 2006). Thorpe’s complaint explicitly 

 

1

 We have jurisdiction to consider this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Although 

Thorpe was informed that her appeal might be dismissed as untimely, we find that the 

appeal was timely filed. A District Court’s judgment must be set out in a separate 

document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). “[A]n order is treated as a separate document if it 

satisfies three criteria: (1) it must be self-contained and separate from the opinion, (2) it 

must note the relief granted, and (3) it must omit (or at least substantially omit) the trial 

court’s reasons for disposing of the claims.” LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. 

Ass’n, 503 F.3d 217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007). Ordinarily, a notice of appeal in a civil case in 

which the United States is not a party must be filed “within 30 days after entry of the 

judgment or order appealed from.” Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). If, however, a separate 

document is required “and no separate document exists, an appellant has 180 days to file 

a notice of appeal—150 for the judgment to be considered ‘entered,’ plus the usual 30 

days from the entry of the judgment.” LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 223; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 

58(c)(2). The District Court’s order, dated June 7, 2016, contained a substantial 

discussion of the reasons for dismissing Thorpe’s complaint. Thorpe’s notice of appeal 

was filed by the District Court on July 25, 2016, well within the 180-day period. 

2

 See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court 

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). 
3 

asked for “judicial review” of two of her employment discrimination cases that were 

denied in the New Jersey state courts.3

 We agree with the District Court that under the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine it lacked jurisdiction over Thorpe’s complaint to the extent she 

was a “͑state-court loser[] complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments 

rendered before the district court proceedings commenced4

 and inviting district court 

review and rejection of those judgments.’” Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 

F.3d 181, 192 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 

544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Because “a district court is precluded from entertaining an 

action . . . if the relief requested effectively would reverse a state court decision or void 

its ruling,” see Taliaferro, 458 F.3d at 192, the District Court correctly dismissed 

Thorpe’s complaint for lack of jurisdiction to the extent that she sought review of the 

state court judgments. 

 Thorpe’s complaint might be read to raise claims that are not barred by the 

Rooker-Feldman doctrine; however, we need not remand this matter to the District Court, 

 

3

 We take judicial notice of the decision reported at Thorpe v. State, State Juvenile Justice 

Comm’n, No. A-0104-11T1, 2015 WL 3602413 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. June 10, 

2015), certification denied, 223 N.J. 356 (2015), cert. denied sub nom. Thorpe v. New 

Jersey, 136 S. Ct. 2034, reh’g denied, 136 S. Ct. 2549 (2016), describing her cases. 

4

 While Thorpe’s petition for a writ of certiorari was still pending in the United States 

Supreme Court when she filed her complaint in District Court, the state proceedings had 

ended. See Federacion de Maestros de Puerto Rico v. Junta de Relaciones del Trabajo 

de Puerto Rico, 410 F.3d 17, 27 (1st Cir. 2005); see also Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482 (“[A] 

United States District Court has no authority to review final judgments of a state court in 

judicial proceedings. Review of such judgments may be had only in this Court.”). 
4 

as any such claims would have been properly dismissed for other reasons.5

 The Supreme 

Court has cautioned that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be applied narrowly. See 

Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. at 284. The doctrine does not 

apply unless the injury was actually “produced by a state-court judgment and not simply 

ratified, acquiesced in, or left unpunished by it.” Great W. Mining & Mineral Co. v. Fox 

Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 167 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Although Thorpe’s complaint is not a model of clarity, we discern two possible 

allegations that might assert injuries from other than the state-court judgment. 

 First, she complains that she experienced discrimination and an illegal job action 

violating the Civil Service Reform Act, but those allegations are frivolous, as she has not 

asserted that she was a federal employee subject to the protection of that Act. See Elgin 

v. Dep’t of Treasury, 132 S. Ct. 2126, 2130 (2012) (“The CSRA established a 

comprehensive system for reviewing personnel action taken against federal employees.” 

(internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)). Second, she claims that defendants 

in the state law cases “lied” and “manipulated the rules of evidence and the rules of civil 

procedures.” Thorpe’s complaint does not assert that these allegations form the basis of 

any federal claim. We find no error in the District Court’s failure to separately consider 

such vague and conclusory claims.6

 

 

5

 We may affirm a district court judgment for any reason supported by the record. 

Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011). 

6

 Under the circumstances of this case, the District Court was not required to allow 

amendment of the complaint before dismissal. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 
5 

 For the above reasons, we will summarily affirm the District Court’s judgment.7

 

F.3d 103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002). 

7 Thorpe’s motion for appointment of counsel is denied.