alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Marvin Clark, Guardian of the Estate of Thomas Harvey Cage, a minor *v.*Arkansas Democrat Company

5-1440

413 S. W. 2d 629

[Rehearing denied May 1,. 1967.]

[Original opinion delivered March 13, 1967; page 133.]

*Ben .D. Lindsey*and *Spencer*& *Spencer;*By: *Don Gillaspie,*for appellant.

*Robert G. Compton*and Austin McCasHll, for ap-pellee.

*498Lyle .BrowN, Justice.

The original opinion contains this language: “Under the holding in *Terry Dairy,*and reiterated in *Cox,*this case should be reversed, with directions to the trial court to ascertain the damages.” This phraseology could well be interpreted to mean that on retrial the *only*question to. be submitted to the jury is damages. This interpretation does not comport with our case law. We have a long line of cases which hold that on remand for trial of a law case it is tried *de novo.*

In the early pase of *Harrison*v. *Trader and wife*29 Ark. 85 (1874), this court said, quoting with approval from an Alabama case:

> “When a judgment is reversed, the rights of the parties are immediately restored to the same condition in which they were before its rendition; and the judgment is said to be mere waste paper. ’ ’

This holding was approved in *Holt*v. *Gregory, et al,*222 Ark. 610, 260 S. W. 2d 459 (1953). Also, see *Manzo*v. *Boulet,*220 Ark. 106, 246 S. W. 2d 126 (1952) ; *Martin*v. *Street Improvement District No.*349, 180 Ark. 298, 21 S. W. 2d 430 (1929) ; and *Westinghouse Credit Corp.*v. *First National Bank of Green Forest, et al,*241 Ark. 287, 407 S. W. 2d 388 (1966).

Rehearing denied.
1 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI

DARRELL W. STEPHENS, 

Petitioner, : Case No. 1:17-cv-796 

- vs - District Judge Michael R. Barrett 

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz 

Warden, 

 Pickaway Correctional Institution 

 : 

 Respondent. 

TRANSFER ORDER 

 

 With the consent of both of them, the Magistrate Judge reference in the above-captioned 

case is hereby TRANSFERRED from The Honorable Stephanie K. Bowman to The Honorable 

Michael R. Merz. 

February 11, 2019. 

 s/ Michael R. Merz

 United States Magistrate Judge
II 

Calendar No. 394 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4425 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

MAY 18, 2010 

Reported by Mr. LIEBERMAN, without amendment 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 2–116th Street in North Troy, New York, 

as the ‘‘Martin G. ‘Marty’ Mahar Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. MARTIN G. ‘‘MARTY’’ MAHAR POST OFFICE. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 2–116th Street in North Troy, 

6 New York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Martin 

7 G. ‘Marty’ Mahar Post Office’’. 


PWALKER on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4425 RS

1 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg2 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

3 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

4 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Martin G. ‘Marty’ 

5 Mahar Post Office’’. 


PWALKER on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS

PWALKER on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
Calendar No. 394 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4425 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States PostMahar Post Office’’. Troy, New York, as the ‘‘Martin G. ‘Marty’ al Service located at 2–116th Street in North 

MAY 18, 2010 

Reported without amendment 


PWALKER on DSK8KYBLC1PROD with BILLS
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 19-50127

Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

HENRY BARFIELD,

Defendant-Appellant

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas

USDC No. 7:18-CR-193-1

Before CLEMENT, GRAVES, and OLDHAM, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

The attorney appointed to represent Henry Barfield has moved for leave 

to withdraw and has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), and United States v. Flores, 632 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2011). 

Barfield has not filed a response. We have reviewed counsel’s brief and the 

relevant portions of the record reflected therein. We concur with counsel’s 

assessment that the appeal presents no nonfrivolous issue for appellate review. 

 

* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not 

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH 

CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

November 27, 2019

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Case: 19-50127 Document: 00515216023 Page: 1 Date Filed: 11/27/2019
No. 19-50127

2

Accordingly, counsel’s motion for leave to withdraw is GRANTED, counsel is 

excused from further responsibilities herein, and the APPEAL IS DISMISSED. 

See 5TH CIR. R. 42.2.

 Case: 19-50127 Document: 00515216023 Page: 2 Date Filed: 11/27/2019
RMS TITANIC, INC.

                      Computation of Income (Loss) Per Common Share
<TABLE>
<CAPTION>

                                                         For the Years Ended
                                          ------------------------------------------------
                                            February 28,     February 28,      February 29,
                                               1998             1999              2000
                                          --------------    -------------   --------------

<S>                                      <C>             <C>              <C>
Shares  outstanding:                         16,187,128      16,187,128         16,187,128
Weighted average shares outstanding          16,181,868      16,187,128         16,187,128
Net Income (loss)                         $   3,367,000    $  4,063,000    $       (21,000)
Earnings per per common share             $         .21    $        .25    $             -

</TABLE>
AO 450 (Rev. 11/11) Judgment in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION

The court has ordered that (check one):

u the plaintiff (name) recover from the

defendant (name) the amount of

dollars ($ ), which includes prejudgment

interest at the rate of %, plus post judgment interest at the rate of % per annum, along with costs.

u the plaintiff recover nothing, the action be dismissed on the merits, and the defendant (name)

recover costs from the plaintiff (name)

.

u other:

.

This action was (check one):

u tried by a jury with Judge presiding, and the jury has

rendered a verdict.

u tried by Judge without a jury and the above decision

was reached.

u decided by Judge on a motion for

.

Date: CLERK OF COURT

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

4/29/2019

 Southern District of Ohio

Dajuan Darden, Sr.

3: 18-cv-30

Commissioner of Social Security

✔ Report and Recommendation is ADOPTED in full; Commissioner's non-disability determination is

REVERSED; matter is REMAND ED to the Commissioner under the Fourth Sentence

of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further proceedings; case is terminated on the docket of this Court.

✔ Walter H. Rice

Report and Recommendations
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

United States of America

v. 2:17-cr-254-2

Tawnya Writesel 

ORDER

There being no objections, the court hereby adopts the Report

and Recommendation of the magistrate judge (Doc. 56) that the

defendant’s guilty plea be accepted. The court accepts the

defendant’s plea of guilty to Count 1 of the indictment, and she is

hereby adjudged guilty on that count. The court will defer the

decision of whether to accept the plea agreement until the

sentencing hearing.

Date: June 15, 2018 s\James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

No. DA 21-0202

STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee,

v.

SEIDEL PINE,

Defendant and Appellant.

ORDER

Upon consideration of Appellant’s motion for extension of time, and 

good cause appearing,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Appellant is granted an extension 

of time to and including May 30, 2022, within which to prepare, file, 

and serve Appellant’s opening brief on appeal.

Electronically signed by:

Mike McGrath

Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

April 21 2022

04/21/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0202
CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 06 OF THE SABANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
    (SUBSECTION (a) AND (b) OF SECTION 1350, CHAPTER 63 OF TITLE 18, UNITED
                                  STATES CODE)


Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, subsections (a) and
(b) of Section 1350 , chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of Subjex Corporation, a Minnesota corporation (the
"Company"), does certify with respect to the Quarterly Report of the Company on
Form 10-QSB for the three months ended Sept 30, 2005 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (the "10-QSB Report") that: (1) the 10-QSB
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) and 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and (2) the information contained in the 10-QSB
Report fairly presents in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of the Company.


                                  By  /s/ Andrew Hyder

                                  Andrew Hyder, CEO (acting CFO)
                                  November 21, 2005
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> U.S. DOLLARS
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               MAR-31-1999
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          23,799
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  213,756
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                    164,226
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               518,463
<PP&E>                                         736,696
<DEPRECIATION>                                 734,858
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 633,558
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                        8,380,063
<BONDS>                                      1,015,136
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                     30,572
<COMMON>                                         5,713
<OTHER-SE>                                 (7,966,123)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   633,558
<SALES>                                        247,862
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               355,066
<CGS>                                           86,616
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  481,262
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              74,849
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (76,685)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (76,685)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (76,685)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                    (.02)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                    (.02)
        

</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.1
 CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002
  1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
 2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
 /s/ Christopher J. Davino

Christopher J. DavinoPresident and Chief Executive Officer(Principal Executive Officer)May 24, 2011/s/ Samuel S. WeiserSamuel S. WeiserInterim Chief Financial Officer(Interim Principal Financial Officer)May 24, 2011
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Form 10-Q of Microtune, Inc. (the
Company) for the quarter ended June 30, 2005 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Jeffrey A. Kupp, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



|                       
|-----------------------
|/s/ JEFFREY A. KUPP    
|Jeffrey A. Kupp        
|Chief Financial Officer



Date: August 1, 2005
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 

 Plaintiff,

vs.

JUDITH E. BRINSON

aka JUDITH E.GASKELL,

 Defendant.

) 

) 

) 

) 

)

)

)

)

)

)

CASE NO: 2:18-CV-275

COMPLAINT

Now comes the United States of America, by and through its legal representative, the 

United States Attorney for the Southern District of Ohio, and for its cause of action alleges:

1. Jurisdiction is founded on 28 U.S.C. §1345.

2. Defendant resides within this judicial district and division.

3. On the date(s) set forth on the attached "Exhibit A", defendant executed and

delivered one or more promissory notes, disbursed on December 12, 2003 in the amount of 

34,653.76, and agreed to repay said sum as set forth in said note(s). A true copy of each said note 

is attached hereto, marked as "Exhibit A", and by this reference made a part hereof.

4. Although payment has been demanded, payment has not been made by the

defendant in accordance with the terms of said note(s) and the entire balance has become due and 

payable.

5. After all payments on said note(s) have been properly credited, the entire unpaid

balance due and owing to plaintiff from defendant is $31,829.83 principal, and $9,381.58 interest 

accrued through December 27, 2017, with additional interest accruing on the principal balance 

Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 1
from said date at the rate of 3 percent per annum, all of which is evidenced by the Certificate of 

Indebtedness which is attached hereto, marked as "Exhibit B", and by this reference made a part 

hereof.

WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays for judgment against defendant in the amount of $31,829.83

principal, and $9,381.58 interest accrued through December 27, 2017, and additional interest on the 

principal balance from said date at the rate of 3 percent per annum to the date of judgment. Plaintiff 

further prays for its costs and for an award of postjudgment interest at the highest rate allowable by 

law, and for all further just and proper orders.

Respectfully submitted,

BENJAMIN C. GLASSMAN

United States Attorney

s/Bethany J. Hamilton

BETHANY J. HAMILTON (0075139)

Assistant United States Attorney

Attorney for Plaintiff

303 Marconi Boulevard, Suite 200

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Office: (614) 469-5715

Fax: (614) 469-5240

E-mail: Bethany.Hamilton@usdoj.gov

Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 2
Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1-1 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 3
Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1-2 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 1 of 3 PAGEID #: 4
Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1-2 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 2 of 3 PAGEID #: 5
Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1-2 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 3 of 3 PAGEID #: 6
Case: 2:18-cv-00275-EAS-EPD Doc #: 1-3 Filed: 03/29/18 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 7
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 23-4157

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff - Appellee, 

v. 

JOSUE ALDANA, 

Defendant - Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina, at 

Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney, District Judge. (3:21-cr-00196-FDW-DSC-1) 

Submitted: March 13, 2024 Decided: May 29, 2024

Before GREGORY and HARRIS, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge. 

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

ON BRIEF: William D. Auman, AUMAN LAW OFFICES, Asheville, North Carolina, 

for Appellant. Dena J. King, United States Attorney, Julia K. Wood, Assistant United 

States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4157 Doc: 40 Filed: 05/29/2024 Pg: 1 of 3
2

PER CURIAM: 

Josue Aldana was convicted after a jury trial of two counts of possession of a firearm 

by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and possession with intent to 

distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D). The district court 

sentenced him to 78 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Aldana argues that trial counsel 

rendered ineffective assistance in failing: to object to a Drug Enforcement Administration 

special agent being qualified as an expert witness and to his testimony regarding intent to 

distribute; to object to remarks made by Government counsel during rebuttal argument; 

and to move to dismiss the charges against him. 

This court typically will not review a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel made 

on direct appeal, United States v. Maynes, 880 F.3d 110, 113 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018), “[u]nless 

an attorney’s ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record,” United 

States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 2016). To establish ineffective assistance by 

trial counsel, Aldana must satisfy the two-part test set out in Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668 (1984). He “must show that counsel’s performance was [constitutionally] 

deficient” and “that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687. After 

review, we conclude that ineffective assistance by trial counsel does not conclusively 

appear on the face of the record. Aldana’s claims “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2255 motion.” Faulls, 821 F.3d at 508. We therefore decline to address these claims at 

this juncture. 

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4157 Doc: 40 Filed: 05/29/2024 Pg: 2 of 3
3

Accordingly, we affirm the criminal judgment. We dispense with oral argument 

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED

USCA4 Appeal: 23-4157 Doc: 40 Filed: 05/29/2024 Pg: 3 of 3
##### 



Exhibit 32

Certification
Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and
(b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), each of the
undersigned officers of LCA-Vision Inc. (the Company), does hereby certify,
to such officers knowledge, that:

The Annual Report on Form 10-K for the year ended December 31, 2003 of the
Company fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 10-K
fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results
of operations of the Company.

|       |  |               |  |                      |  |                                                                                         
|------ |  | ------------- |  | -------------------- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
|Dated: |  | March 2, 2004 |  | /s/ Stephen N. Joffe |  | Name: Stephen N. Joffe
Title: Chairman and Chief Executive Officer                      
|       |  |               |  |                      |  |                                                                                         
|Dated: |  | March 2, 2004 |  | /s/ Alan H. Buckey   |  | Name: Alan H. Buckey
Title: Executive Vice President/Finance and
Chief Financial Officer
#### Joe David SMOTHERS *v.*STATE of Arkansas

CR 81-32

621 S.W. 2d 475

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered September 28, 1981

*Gene Worsham,*for appellant.

*Steve Clark,*Atty. Gen., by: *Leslie M. Powell,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Frank Holt, Justice.

On April 15, 1977, the appellant, on pleas of guilty, received a 42 year sentence on 21 counts of aggravated robbery and 5 years on two counts of kidnapping. It appears they were concurrent sentences. A commitment was issued that day. On June 10, 1980, he filed a Rule 37 petition to vacate his sentence on the ground his guilty pleas were constitutionally infirm in that they were not knowingly, freely and voluntarily made. After conducting a hearing, the trial court found that appellant’s pleas of guilty on four counts of robbery were not knowingly made and ordered a new trial on them; however, on the remaining counts, he found his pleas were knowingly, freely and voluntarily made. The trial court refused to reduce the 42 *519year sentence since it was within the range of penalties for aggravated robbery and kidnapping. Appellant insists that the trial court erred in its finding that his pleas of guilty to all the charges were not voluntarily made, and his refusal to modify or reduce his sentence should be reversed. We affirm.

A petition for postconviction relief, as here, must be filed within three years from the date of the commitment unless the judgment was absolutely void. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 37.2 (c), Ark. Stat. Ann. Vol. 4A (Supp. 1981). *Collins*v. *State,*271 Ark. 825, 611 S.W. 2d 182 (1981); *Washington*v. *State,*270 Ark. 840, 606 S.W. 2d 365 (1981); *Scott*v. *State,*267 Ark. 536, 592 S.W. 2d 122 (1980); Poe v. *State,*273 Ark. 194, 617 S.W. 2d 361 (1981). Here, there is nothing indicating the judgment is absolutely void.

Affirmed.

Purtle, J., dissents.

John I. Purtle, Justice,

dissenting. I respectfully disagree with the majority in this case primarily because they have apparently placed the appellant in double jeopardy. He originally received a single 42 year sentence on 21 counts. The trial court has granted relief on several of these counts after finding that he did not properly consent to a plea of guilty. The court refused to reduce the 42 year sentence and has placed the appellant in a position of standing trial on several counts which were included in the original conviction. If he is convicted, he will be sentenced again for the same offense. *Marshall*v. *State,*265 Ark. 302, 578 S.W. 2d 32 (1979).

The easiest way to dispose of this case is to declare the action of the trial court in setting aside the guilty pleas to be a nullity. The petition was filed more than three years after the pronouncement of sentence. Therefore, the court was without authority to hear the petition, unless the grounds asserted are such as to render the judgment void. *Collins*v. *State,*271 Ark. 825, 611 S.W. 2d 182 (1981).