United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant

ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR TRADE 

COMMITTEE,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2017-1117

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:14-cv-00199-TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C. 

Stanceu.

______________________ 

Decided: May 23, 2018

______________________ 

 DONALD HARRISON, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP, 

Washington, DC, argued for plaintiff-appellee. 

 ROBERT E. DEFRANCESCO, III, Wiley Rein, LLP, Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also represented by ALAN H. PRICE, TESSA V. CAPELOTO, DERICK 

HOLT. 

______________________ 
2 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

Before PROST, Chief Judge, MOORE and REYNA,

Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Chief Judge PROST. 

Opinion concurring-in-part, dissenting-in-part filed by

Circuit Judge REYNA. 

PROST, Chief Judge. 

Aluminum Extrusions Fair Trade Committee 

(“AEFTC”) appeals a decision from the U.S. Court of 

International Trade (“the CIT”) affirming a scope ruling of 

the U.S. Department of Commerce. The scope ruling held 

that Whirlpool Corporation’s kitchen appliance door 

handles with end caps (“assembled handles”) do not fall 

within the scope of the antidumping and countervailing 

duty orders on aluminum extrusions from the People’s 

Republic of China (“the Orders”). For the reasons stated 

below, we affirm-in-part, reverse-in-part, vacate-in-part, 

and remand.

BACKGROUND

The instant appeal addresses whether particular 

products fall within the scope of existing antidumping and 

countervailing duty orders. We examine the Orders’ scope 

and the procedural history before turning to the merits.

I 

Commerce published the Orders in 2011. See Aluminum Extrusions from the People’s Republic of China:

Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,650 (Dep’t of 

Commerce May 26, 2011); Aluminum Extrusions from the 

People’s Republic of China: Countervailing Duty Order, 76 

Fed. Reg. 30,653 (Dep’t of Commerce May 26, 2011). The 

scope of the Orders describes the subject merchandise as 

“aluminum extrusions” that “are shapes and forms, 

produced by an extrusion process, made from” specified 

aluminum alloys. Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. 
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 3

at 30,650.1 The subject extrusions “may be described at 

the time of importation as parts for final finished products 

that are assembled after importation.” Id. The scope also 

“includes the aluminum extrusion components that are 

attached (e.g., by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies, i.e., partially assembled merchandise.” Id. 

The Orders’ scope contains several exclusions. Meridian, 851 F.3d at 1379. For example, the scope has a 

finished merchandise exclusion, which “excludes finished 

merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts 

that are fully and permanently assembled and completed 

at the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass, 

doors with glass or vinyl, picture frames with glass pane 

and backing material, and solar panels.” Antidumping 

Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. The scope also has a 

finished goods kit exclusion, which 

excludes finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a “finished goods kit.” A finished goods kit is 

understood to mean a packaged combination of 

parts that contains, at the time of importation, all 

of the necessary parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires no further finishing or 

fabrication, such as cutting or punching, and is 

assembled “as is” into a finished product. 

Id. The next sentence of the Orders includes, however, an 

exception to the finished goods kit exclusion. See Meridian, 851 F.3d at 1385. The exception states that “[a]n 

 

1 The Orders recite the same scope. See Meridian 

Prod., LLC v. United States, 851 F.3d 1375, 1379 n.4 (Fed. 

Cir. 2017). Compare Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. 

Reg. at 30,650–51, with Countervailing Duty Order, 76 

Fed. Reg. at 30,653–54. We refer only to the scope in the 

Antidumping Duty Order for ease of reference.
4 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

imported product will not be considered a ‘finished goods 

kit’ and therefore excluded from the scope of the investigation merely by including fasteners such as screws, 

bolts, etc. in the packaging with an aluminum extrusion 

product.” Id. 

II

On December 20, 2013, Whirlpool submitted a request 

for a scope ruling that its kitchen appliance door handles 

with end caps were not covered by the scope of the Orders. 

Whirlpool’s December 2013 Scope Request was expressly 

based on a claim that its assembled handles were subject 

to the finished merchandise exclusion. 

On August 4, 2014, Commerce issued its Scope Ruling 

for Whirlpool’s assembled handles.2 Commerce found 

that “the handles at issue do not meet the exclusion 

criteria for ‘finished merchandise’ and, therefore, are 

inside the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 340. As a threshold 

issue, Commerce rejected Whirlpool’s argument that the 

fasteners exception language in the scope only applies in 

the context of the finished goods kit exclusion and that it 

should not apply in the finished merchandise exclusion. 

J.A. 342. Commerce found “unconvincing the notion that 

an unassembled product in kit-form that consists solely of 

extruded aluminum, save for fasteners, would . . . fall 

inside the scope while the identical product, entering the 

 

2 This August 2014 Scope Ruling also addressed a 

January 2014 Scope Request from Whirlpool. That request dealt with aluminum extruded appliance handles 

that consisted of a single aluminum extrusion without end 

caps or other components. The January 2014 Scope 

Request is not relevant to the instant appeal, as Whirlpool did not appeal the CIT decision that these handles 

were covered by the Orders.
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 5

United States as an assembled good, would fall outside 

the scope of the Orders.” J.A. 43.

Because Commerce determined that the fasteners exception also applies to the finished merchandise exclusion,

it concluded that “the mere inclusion of fasteners, in this 

case the plastic end caps, does not result in the extruded 

aluminum handles falling outside the scope of the Orders 

as extruded finished merchandise.” J.A. 341. Citing the 

dictionary definition of a washer, Commerce found that 

“the end caps . . . are involved in attaching the handle to 

the refrigerator door in a manner that allows the handle 

to fit tightly to the refrigerator door and relieves friction 

between the door and the handle,” and on that basis found 

“that the plastic end caps are analogous to a washer.” 

J.A. 340. Commerce, in a prior scope ruling, had considered washers to fall within the scope’s reference to fasteners. Accordingly, Commerce found “that the handles at 

issue are comprised entirely of extruded aluminum and 

fasteners (i.e., plastic end caps).” J.A. 340.

Whirlpool appealed Commerce’s August 2014 Scope 

Ruling to the CIT. After briefing and oral argument, the 

CIT issued its February 2016 Remand Order (Whirlpool 

I). The CIT remanded to Commerce for two reasons. 

First, the CIT determined that the general scope language 

of the Orders could not be reasonably interpreted to 

include Whirlpool’s assembled handles at all. The CIT 

noted that “Commerce did not rely on the ‘subassemblies’ 

provision in the general scope language,” which was 

“understandable” based on evidence that “the assembled 

handles are imported in a form in which they require no 

further assembly or processing prior to the intended use.” 

J.A. 45. Second, the CIT determined that, even if the 

assembled handles were described by the general scope 

language, Commerce erroneously determined that the 

assembled handles do not qualify for the finished merchandise exception because the fasteners exception does 

not apply to the finished merchandise exclusion. The CIT 
6 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

also determined that Commerce employed flawed logic 

and ignored record evidence in concluding that the plastic 

end caps in the assembled handles are “washers” and 

therefore “fasteners.” 

With respect to the CIT’s second basis for its remand 

order, it stated that Commerce’s “presum[ption] that the 

exception for fasteners in the finished goods kit exclusion 

applies to the finished merchandise exclusion as well . . . 

is at odds with established principles of construction.” 

J.A. 47–48. According to the CIT, if “Commerce . . . had 

intended to sweep into the scope any assembled good 

consisting solely of aluminum extrusion components and 

fasteners, [it would have] so provide[d] in the scope language. Instead, Commerce expressly confined its ‘fasteners’ exception to the finished goods kit exclusion.” J.A. 48. 

On remand, Commerce determined, “under respectful 

protest,” that the assembled handles were “outside the 

scope of the Orders because, consistent with the [CIT]’s 

interpretation of the scope language, there is no general 

scope language which covers such products.” J.A. 29. 

Commerce declined to provide any further analysis with 

respect to the finished merchandise exclusion, explaining 

that “the issue of whether Whirlpool’s handles with end 

caps are subject to the exclusion for finished merchandise 

is rendered moot by the [CIT]’s findings and our resulting 

determination, under protest, that there is no general 

scope language which covers these products.” J.A. 35.

In its August 2016 Opinion (Whirlpool II), the CIT affirmed Commerce’s April 2016 Redetermination Decision. 

This appeal followed. We have subject matter jurisdiction 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(5).
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 7

DISCUSSION

I 

“We apply the same standard of review as the CIT 

when reviewing a Commerce scope ruling, though we give 

due respect to the CIT’s informed opinion.” Meridian, 851 

F.3d at 1380 (internal quotation marks and citations 

omitted). “Under that standard, we uphold a Commerce 

scope ruling that is supported ‘by substantial evidence on 

the record’ and otherwise ‘in accordance with law.’” Id.

(quoting 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B)(i)). “Substantial 

evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 

might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Eckstrom Indus., Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1068, 1071 

(Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citation 

omitted).

There is no specific statutory provision governing the 

interpretation of the scope of the Orders. Shenyang 

Yuanda Aluminum Indus. Eng’g Co. v. United States, 776 

F.3d 1351, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But Commerce has 

filled this statutory gap with a regulation, 19 C.F.R. 

§ 351.225(k), requiring Commerce to engage in a two-step 

process when determining the scope of an order. Id.; 

Meridian, 851 F.3d at 1381. First, under § 351.225(k)(1), 

Commerce must consider the scope language contained in 

the order, the descriptions contained in the petition, and 

how the scope was defined in the investigation and in the 

determinations issued by Commerce and the ITC. Yuanda, 776 F.3d at 1354. If Commerce concludes the 

product is, or is not, included within the scope of the 

order, Commerce issues a final scope ruling. Id. If a 

§ 351.225(k)(1) analysis is not dispositive, however, then 

Commerce proceeds to an analysis of the Diversified 
8 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

Products criteria under subsection (k)(2) of its regulation.3 

Id. 

Commerce’s inquiry begins with the Orders’ scope to 

determine whether it contains an ambiguity and, thus, is 

susceptible to interpretation. Meridian, 851 F.3d at 1381. 

The question of whether the unambiguous terms of a 

scope control the inquiry, or whether some ambiguity 

exists, is a question of law that we review de novo. Id. at 

1382. If the scope is unambiguous, the plain meaning of 

the Orders’ language governs. Id. at 1381. The question 

of whether a product meets the unambiguous scope terms 

then presents a question of fact reviewed for substantial 

evidence. Id. at 1382. 

Because the meaning and scope of the Orders are issues particularly within Commerce’s expertise and special 

competence, we grant Commerce substantial deference 

with regard to its interpretation of its own Orders. Id. at 

1381–82. While Commerce “enjoys substantial freedom to 

interpret and clarify its antidumping duty orders . . . , it 

may not change them.” Ericsson GE Mobile Commc’ns, 

Inc. v. United States, 60 F.3d 778, 782 (Fed. Cir. 1995), as 

corrected on reh’g (Sept. 1, 1995). Accordingly, a final 

order may not be interpreted “in a way contrary to its 

terms,” Smith Corona Corp. v. United States, 915 F.2d 

683, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1990), nor in a way “so as to change 

the scope of that order,” Eckstrom Indus., 254 F.3d at

1072.

II

This appeal hinges on the interpretation of the Orders. Accordingly, we must determine whether Commerce 

 

3 Here, Commerce found that its § 351.225(k)(1) 

analysis was dispositive and that it was unnecessary to 

consider the additional factors specified in § 351.225(k)(2). 

J.A. 339.
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 9

properly interpreted the relevant portions of the Orders

and, if so, whether Commerce’s findings as to whether the 

product meets the scope terms are supported by substantial evidence. We begin our discussion with the Orders’ 

general scope language followed by the express exclusions 

from that general scope.

A 

According to AEFTC, the CIT erred in its interpretation of the Orders’ general scope language because it 

“ignores that the scope of the order was intended to cover 

all aluminum extrusions produced with aluminum alloys 

commencing with 1, 3, and 6 unless expressly excluded.” 

Appellant Br. 27. AEFTC maintains that “the scope 

expressly includes aluminum extrusions, whether further 

fabricated or not, and even if incorporated into a subassembly, as well as aluminum extrusions which are identified by reference to their end use (such as kitchen 

appliance handles), as Commerce acknowledged in its 

scope ruling.” Id. We agree.

In Whirlpool I, the CIT examined “whether the general scope language reasonably may be interpreted to 

include these handles even though the handles are assemblies containing an extrusion and various other parts 

and even though they are imported in a fully-assembled 

form, ready for use.” J.A. 43. The CIT determined that 

“the term ‘extrusion’ is not defined in the general scope 

language so as to include a good simply because an extruded aluminum component is present within a good 

consisting of an assembly.” J.A. 44. Accordingly, the CIT 

concluded that the general scope language is not reasonably interpreted to include the assembled handles because 

“[t]he handles at issue are not themselves ‘extrusions’ but 

rather are assemblies, each of which contains an extrusion, machined and surface-treated, as the principal 

component.” J.A. 43. This conclusion is incorrect. 
10 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

Although the CIT properly recognized that “the general scope language provides that [an aluminum extrusion] remains in the scope even though it has been 

subjected to one of three specified types of post-extrusion 

processes,” the CIT erred when it stated that assembly 

processes were absent from the specified post-extrusion 

processes. J.A. 44. The general scope language unambiguously includes aluminum extrusions that are part of an 

assembly. The Orders explicitly include aluminum extrusions “that are assembled after importation” in addition to 

“aluminum extrusion components that are attached (e.g., 

by welding or fasteners) to form subassemblies.” Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,650. Therefore, 

the interpretation relied on by the CIT in Whirlpool I was 

improper, and substantial evidence supports Commerce’s 

finding in its August 2014 Scope Ruling that the general 

scope language includes Whirlpool’s assembled handles. 

B 

We must next determine whether Commerce, in its 

August 2014 Scope Ruling, applied the proper interpretation of the exclusions to the Orders and, if so, whether 

substantial evidence supports its finding that the exclusions do not apply.

First, with respect to the finished goods kit exclusion 

we agree with the CIT that “[b]ecause Whirlpool’s assembled door handles are not imported in disassembled form, 

the finished goods kit exclusion is inapplicable.” J.A. 47. 

This exclusion is unambiguous and so the plain meaning 

of the language of the Orders governs. Meridian, 851 

F.3d at 1381. The language of the Orders states that 

“[t]he scope also excludes finished goods containing aluminum extrusions that are entered unassembled in a 

‘finished goods kit.’” Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. 

Reg. at 30,651 (emphasis added). “A finished goods kit is 

understood to mean a packaged combination of parts that 

contains, at the time of importation, all of the necessary 
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 11

parts to fully assemble a final finished good and requires 

no further finishing or fabrication.” Id. (emphasis added). 

Whirlpool’s handles and end caps do not enter unassembled as a packaged combination of parts. They enter 

assembled. Accordingly, Whirlpool’s assembled handles 

do not meet the unambiguous terms of the finished goods 

kit exclusion.

Second, with respect to the finished merchandise exclusion we also agree with the CIT. The Orders define 

finished merchandise as “merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully and permanently 

assembled and completed at the time of entry, such as 

finished windows with glass, doors with glass or vinyl, 

picture frames with glass pane and backing material, and 

solar panels.” Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 

30,651. The next two sentences describe a different 

exclusion to the Orders, which excludes finished goods 

kits, as described above. Id. Following those sentences, 

the Orders state “[a]n imported product will not be considered a ‘finished goods kit’ and therefore excluded from 

the scope of the investigation merely by including fasteners such as screws, bolts, etc. in the packaging with an 

aluminum extrusion product.” Id. 

Commerce, in its August 2014 Scope Ruling, rejected 

Whirlpool’s argument that this fasteners language only 

applies in the context of the finished goods kit exclusion 

and that it did not apply in the separate finished merchandise exclusion. J.A. 342–43. Commerce concluded, 

therefore, that “the mere inclusion of fasteners, in this 

case the plastic end caps, does not result in the extruded 

aluminum handles falling outside the scope of the Orders 

as extruded finished merchandise.” J.A. 341.

According to the CIT in Whirlpool I, Commerce erred 

in its August 2014 Scope Ruling interpretation of the 

Orders’ scope because Commerce’s “presum[ption] that 

the exception for fasteners in the finished goods kit exclu-
12 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

sion applies to the finished merchandise exclusion as well 

. . . is at odds with established principles of construction.” 

J.A. 47–48. We agree with the CIT.

As noted above, although Commerce “enjoys substantial freedom to interpret and clarify its antidumping duty 

orders . . . , it may not change them.” Ericsson, 60 F.3d at 

782. Commerce’s interpretation of the fasteners exception 

and whether it applies to the finished merchandise exclusion is contrary to the terms of the Orders, and is therefore incorrect. Smith, 915 F.2d at 686. 

We first assess whether the plain language of the exception for fasteners is unambiguous. Meridian, 851 F.3d 

at 1383. As we have noted, the question of whether some 

ambiguity exists, is a question of law that we review de 

novo. Id. at 1382. We conclude that the exception for 

fasteners unambiguously applies only to the finished 

goods kit exclusion and not to the finished merchandise 

exclusion for at least three reasons. 

First, the single sentence that describes the fasteners 

exception specifically refers only to a finished goods kit 

and does not mention finished merchandise. See Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. Second, this 

sentence describes how a product will not be considered a 

finished good kit “merely by including fasteners . . . in the 

packaging.” Id. (emphasis added). This reference to “the 

packaging” refers back to the finished good kit exclusion 

where “[a] finished good kit is understood to mean a 

packaged combination of parts.” Id. (emphasis added). 

There is no reference to packaging in the finished merchandise exclusion. Finally, finished merchandise is 

“fully and permanently assembled and completed at the 

time of entry,” whereas finished goods kits enter unassembled as “a packaged combination of parts.” Id. We 

find it reasonable that Commerce, in drafting the Orders, 

would have elected to treat assembled merchandise 

differently from goods entering unassembled in kit form. 
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 13

We therefore agree with the CIT that if Commerce had 

actually intended to sweep into the scope all finished 

merchandise consisting solely of aluminum extrusion 

components and fasteners, it would have done so in the 

scope language rather than expressly confining its fasteners exception to the finished goods kit exclusion.

Because we conclude that the exception for fasteners 

is unambiguous, the plain meaning of its language governs. Meridian, 851 F.3d at 1381. Therefore, the fasteners exception only applies to the finished goods kit 

exclusion and it does not apply to the finished merchandise exclusion. 

Having concluded that Commerce applied an incorrect 

interpretation of the fasteners exception language of the 

Orders, we need not determine whether substantial 

evidence supports its August 2014 Scope Ruling finding 

that Whirlpool’s assembled handles do not meet the 

exclusion criteria for finished merchandise.4

Because, in Commerce’s view, the fasteners exception 

applied to the finished merchandise exclusion, it did not 

reach a determination in its Scope Ruling as to whether 

Whirlpool’s assembled handles actually meet the requirements for the finished merchandise exclusion in the 

first place. In its April 2016 Redetermination Decision, 

 

4 On appeal, the parties also dispute whether substantial evidence supports Commerce’s determination in 

its August 2014 Scope Ruling that the plastic end caps 

contained in Whirlpool’s door handles are fasteners. 

Because we conclude today that the fasteners exception 

does not apply to the finished merchandise exclusion, 

however, the question of whether these end caps fall 

within the scope language’s reference to “fasteners” is not 

relevant to determining whether Whirlpool’s assembled 

handles qualify for the finished merchandise exclusion.
14 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

Commerce also declined to address AEFTC’s argument 

that Whirlpool’s assembled handles should not fall under 

the finished merchandise exclusion because they are 

merely parts of a larger, final finished product (e.g., a 

refrigerator), and that it is only the larger, final finished 

product itself that is included under the finished merchandise exclusion. Commerce stated that the question of 

whether the assembled handles meet the requirements 

for the finished merchandise exclusion was rendered moot 

by the CIT’s determination that there is no general scope 

language which covers these products. 

Because Commerce did not reach this determination, 

the CIT also declined to engage in an analysis of the 

finished merchandise exclusion in Whirlpool II. Accordingly, we do not now, for the first time on appeal, determine whether Whirlpool’s assembled handles meet the 

requirements for the finished merchandise exclusion, 

namely whether the assembled handles are “merchandise 

containing aluminum extrusions as parts that are fully 

and permanently assembled and completed at the time of 

entry.” Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed. Reg. at 30,651. 

On remand, Commerce will be given an opportunity to 

arrive at a legally permissible interpretation of the finished merchandise exclusion and Whirlpool’s assembled 

handles should be reassessed in light of that interpretation. See Ericsson, 60 F.3d at 783. 

CONCLUSION

We conclude that substantial evidence supports 

Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling that the general 

scope language of the Orders describes Whirlpool’s assembled handles. Accordingly, we reverse Whirlpool II

affirming Commerce’s April 2016 Redetermination Decision and instruct the CIT to vacate Commerce’s April 

2016 Redetermination Decision and reinstate the portion 

of Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling finding that the 

assembled handles fall within the general scope language. 
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 15

We also vacate those portions of the CIT’s Whirlpool I

holding that the general scope language of the Orders did 

not describe Whirlpool’s assembled handles.

With respect to the exclusions from the Order’s scope, 

we conclude that the exception for fasteners unambiguously applies only to the finished goods kit exclusion and 

not to the finished merchandise exclusion. Further, 

because the finished goods kit exclusion is inapplicable to 

Whirlpool’s assembled handles, so too is the fasteners 

exception to the finished goods kit exclusion. Accordingly, 

we affirm those portions of Whirlpool I that are consistent 

with these conclusions and instruct the CIT to vacate the 

remainder of Commerce’s August 2014 Scope Ruling.5

Finally, the case is remanded to the CIT for further 

proceedings, in keeping with this opinion, to determine 

whether Whirlpool’s assembled handles meet the requirements for the finished merchandise exclusion.

AFFIRMED-IN-PART, REVERSED-IN-PART

VACATED-IN-PART, AND REMANDED

COSTS

The parties shall bear their own costs.

 

5 These decisions are only reversed or vacated as to 

those portions addressing Whirlpool’s December 2013 

Scope Request pertaining to the assembled handles with 

end caps. The January 2014 Scope Request, which dealt 

with aluminum extruded appliance handles that consisted 

of a single aluminum extrusion without end caps or other 

components, is not addressed by the instant appeal, as 

Whirlpool did not appeal the CIT decision that these 

handles were covered by the Orders.
United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appellee

v.

UNITED STATES,

Defendant

ALUMINUM EXTRUSIONS FAIR TRADE 

COMMITTEE,

Defendant-Appellant

______________________ 

2017-1117

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States Court of International 

Trade in No. 1:14-cv-00199-TCS, Chief Judge Timothy C. 

Stanceu.

______________________ 

REYNA, Circuit Judge, concurring-in-part, dissenting-inpart. 

I concur with the majority that “the interpretation 

relied on by the CIT in Whirlpool I was improper, and 

substantial evidence supports Commerce’s finding in its 

August 2014 Scope Ruling that the general scope language includes Whirlpool’s assembled handles.” Maj. Op. 

at 10. 
2 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

The majority highlights a fundamental error in the

CIT’s holding that the “general scope language is not 

reasonably interpreted to include the assembled handles 

because ‘[t]he handles at issue are not themselves “extrusions” but rather are assemblies, each of which contains 

an extrusion, machined and surface-treated, as the principal component.’” Id. at 9. I agree with the majority that 

“[t]his conclusion is incorrect.” Id. 

The court’s holding that the general scope language is 

reasonably interpreted to include the Whirlpool handles 

drives the remainder of the scope review because a scope 

inquiry first begins by asking whether the good in questions is covered under the general scope language of the 

duty order. The answer here is yes. The next question is 

whether a good covered by the general scope language is 

excluded under an exclusion provision. Here, it is undisputed that the handles are not excluded under the finished goods kit exclusion. The majority concludes that 

Commerce left unanswered the question whether the 

finished merchandise exclusion applies, and, on this basis, 

remands so that Commerce may address the applicability 

of the finished merchandise exclusion. 

The record is clear, however, that Commerce has addressed the question of whether Whirlpool’s handles are 

excluded under the finished merchandise exclusion.1 In 

 

1 This appeal involves the CIT’s judgment on Commerce’s initial scope ruling determination and Commerce’s remand scope ruling determination. We review 

the CIT’s decisions de novo applying to Commerce’s 

determination the same standard of substantial evidence 

review as used by the CIT in review of Commerce’s scope 

ruling determination. See King Supply Co., LLC v. United States, 674 F.3d 1343, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“In reviewing the Trade Court’s decision on the Scope Ruling, 
WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES 3

its initial scope determination, Commerce determined 

that the good in question is a covered good; there are no 

components or parts included, whether loose or attached.2 

Accordingly, it does not fall under either the finished 

merchandise exclusion or the finished goods kits exclusion. See J.A. 340 (“Based on the information provided by 

Whirlpool . . . we find that the handles at issue are comprised entirely of extruded aluminum and fasteners (i.e. 

plastic end caps). Therefore, we find the handles do not 

meet the Department’s first test for determining whether 

a good constitutes a finished good or finished goods kit, as 

established in the Geodesic Domes Scope Ruling.”). 

Commerce explained in its initial scope ruling that 

the difference between “finished goods” and “finished 

goods kits” is that the former is assembled upon entry 

while the latter is unassembled upon entry. J.A. 342–43. 

Commerce found unconvincing the “notion that an unassembled product in kit-form that consists solely of extrud-

 

‘we step into the shoes of the [Trade Court] and apply the 

same deferential “substantial evidence” standard of 

review that it applied to its review of Commerce’s determination.’ We must therefore uphold Commerce’s determination unless the Scope Ruling is unsupported by 

substantial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in 

accordance with law.” (quoting Walgreen Co. v. United 

States, 620 F.3d 1350, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010)) (internal 

citations omitted)).

2 The Orders define “finished merchandise” as merchandise containing aluminum extrusions as parts that 

are fully and permanently assembled and completed at 

the time of entry, such as finished windows with glass or 

vinyl, picture frames with glass plane and backing material, and solar panels. Antidumping Duty Order, 76 Fed.

Reg. at 30,651. 
4 WHIRLPOOL CORPORATION v. UNITED STATES

ed aluminum, save for fasteners, would, per the analysis 

from the Geodesic Domes Scope Ruling, fall inside the 

scope while the identical product entering the United 

States as an assembled good, would fall outside the scope 

of the Orders.” J.A. 343. Commerce determined that if a 

product that only consists of aluminum extrusions and 

fasteners, as in this case, satisfies the finished merchandise exclusion, the exclusion would swallow the scope 

“because any aluminum extrusion products, as long as it 

can be identified by end use, could be considered a finished product.” Id. Commerce reasoned that this cannot 

be the correct interpretation because it is contrary to the 

scope itself, which covers aluminum extrusions. Id. 

Commerce preserved these factual conclusions when it 

filed under protest its remand determination pursuant to 

the CIT’s remand. See J.A. 22. 

I defer to Commerce on interpreting its own antidumping duty orders and would affirm Commerce’s 

August 2014 Scope Ruling on the basis that it is not 

unreasonable and is otherwise supported by substantial 

evidence. See King Supply, 674 F.3d at 1348 (“Commerce 

is entitled to substantial deference with regard to its 

interpretations of its own antidumping duty orders. This 

deference is appropriate because the meaning and scope 

of antidumping orders are issues particularly within the 

expertise and special competence of Commerce.” (internal 

citations and quotations omitted)). Therefore, I respectfully concur-in-part and dissent-in-part from the majority 

opinion.