NOTICE: NOT FOR PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZ. R. SUP. CT. 111(c), THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT

AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

WILLIAM W., Appellant,

v.

BROOKE S., P.W., Appellees.

No. 1 CA-JV 13-0221

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. JS507174

The Honorable Peter A. Thompson, Judge

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Vierling Law Offices, Phoenix

By Thomas A. Vierling

Counsel for Appellant

Law Office of James E. Holland, P.C., Mesa

By James E. Holland

Counsel for Appellee Mother
WILLIAM W. v. BROOKE S.

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge John C. Gemmill delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Randall M. Howe joined.

G E M M I L L, Judge:

¶1 This is an appeal from a juvenile court order severing a 

father’s parental rights. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2 William W. (“Father”) and Brooke S. (“Mother”) are the 

biological parents of P.W., who was born in 2007. Mother and Father 

were married in January 2007, and a dissolution of the marriage was 

granted in June 2008. Mother and Father received joint legal custody of 

P.W., with Mother designated as the primary residential parent and 

Father ordered to pay child support.

¶3 Mother testified that when Father had custody, he was 

irresponsible and did not adhere to Family Court orders to return P.W. to 

Mother at specified times or locations. In April 2011, the juvenile court 

awarded Mother temporary sole legal custody of P.W. In March 2012, the 

court awarded Mother permanent sole legal and physical custody of P.W. 

and permanently suspended Father’s parenting time. Father last 

exercised parenting time with P.W. in April 2011.

¶4 In June 2011 and November 2011, Father filed petitions to 

reinstate joint custody and to reinstate holiday parenting time, but he 

failed to appear at the scheduled hearing on those petitions in December 

2011, and they were dismissed.

¶5 Mother filed a petition to terminate Father’s parent-child 

relationship in May 2012. On the first day of the severance trial in March 

2013, Mother and Father both appeared and were represented by counsel. 

But Father failed to appear for the second day of the trial in June 2013, and 

the court proceeded in absentia, with Father’s counsel representing him.

¶6 On the first day of trial, Father’s testimony was inconsistent 

and difficult to understand. He testified that he had sent birthday and 

Christmas cards to P.W. He also said he had written emails to P.W. 
WILLIAM W. v. BROOKE S.

Decision of the Court

3

through her mother, but he did not introduce corroborating evidence. He 

further testified that he had bought gifts for P.W. but that they were at his 

home, and no further proof of them was offered.

¶7 Father admitted that he was behind in paying court-ordered 

child support and that he had absconded from work release for almost a 

year, from June 2011 until May 2012. Father testified he was unsure about 

whether he had been paying child support during the time he had 

absconded. When asked about failing to appear at family court 

proceedings, Father testified that he either did not know about the 

hearings or did not learn about them until the day of the hearing.

¶8 Father revealed a general lack of knowledge regarding his 

daughter. At trial, he did not know the name of P.W.’s pediatrician or the 

name of the practice. During an interview with the guardian ad litem, 

Father was not aware of P.W.’s stomach pains, but he did express that he 

missed his daughter. Father never testified, however, about his 

relationship with P.W. nor did he express interest in visitation beyond 

saying that he had tried to contact and visit P.W. through several email 

messages to Mother. Father admitted that, in one of the emails, he called

Mother a sociopath, told Mother that she lied and hurt people with no 

remorse, and that she hated herself.

¶9 Mother testified that P.W. had not received any gifts, calls, 

or text messages from Father during the past two years. Mother also said 

P.W. never spoke about Father. Mother is in a serious relationship with 

her current boyfriend and they have discussed marriage and adoption.

¶10 The juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence

that Father had abandoned P.W. by failing to provide reasonable support 

and to maintain regular contact with the child. The court also found that 

Father made only minimal efforts to support and communicate with P.W. 

and failed, without just cause, to maintain a normal parental relationship.

The court noted that Father used his relationship with P.W. as a tool to 

torment Mother and had presented nothing to refute that the alleged 

incidents of tormenting Mother had occurred. The court further noted 

that Mother had a legitimate order of protection barring Father’s contact 

with her based on his threats to harm her, and the maternal grandparents 

could provide a safe, permanent, and stable environment capable of 
WILLIAM W. v. BROOKE S.

Decision of the Court

4

addressing all of the child’s needs and were ready, willing, and able to 

adopt P.W. in the event of Mother’s death.1

¶11 Father timely appeals. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 

Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and Arizona Revised 

Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-235(A).

DISCUSSION

¶12 A parent’s right to “the companionship, care, custody, and 

management of his or her children” is a fundamental, constitutionally 

protected right. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972). We review a 

juvenile court’s severance order for an abuse of discretion and accept the 

court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 207 Ariz. 43, 47, ¶ 8, 83 P.3d 43, 47 (App. 2004).

Similarly, we view the facts in a light most favorable to affirming trial 

court’s findings. In re Maricopa County Juvenile Action No. JS-8490, 179 

Ariz. 102, 106, 876 P.2d 1137, 1141 (1994).

¶13 Father alleges the juvenile court erred (1) in not making 

jurisdictional findings, (2) by finding the statutory ground of 

abandonment as a basis for terminating his parental rights, and (3) by 

finding severance to be in P.W.’s best interests.

Jurisdictional Findings

¶14 Father argues that the juvenile court erred because its 

findings of fact and conclusions of law did not include determinations that 

the court had jurisdiction, that severance was found by clear and 

convincing evidence, and that the case was not subject to the Indian Child 

Welfare Act, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure for the Juvenile 

Court. Father is correct that the juvenile court’s formal findings, 

conclusions, and severance order filed August 6, 2013, did not include 

these necessary findings. As a result, this court entered an order revesting jurisdiction in the juvenile court to address its jurisdiction. The 

juvenile court then entered supplemental findings by minute entry on 

September 16, 2013, determining that the court had exclusive jurisdiction 

 1 Additionally, Father moved to set aside the severance ruling and to reset 

the second day of trial, claiming that he had undergone an emergency 

medical procedure and could not appear on that day. The Court denied 

the motion when Father provided no confirming medical records after a 

reasonable period of time.
WILLIAM W. v. BROOKE S.

Decision of the Court

5

pursuant to A.R.S. § 8-532, Father was properly served in accordance to 

Rule 64 of Arizona Rules of Juvenile Procedure and Rule 5 of Arizona 

Rules of Civil Procedure, and the case was not subject to the Indian 

Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963. Additionally, the court had 

previously stated that its finding of abandonment was proven “by clear 

and convincing evidence” in its minute entry ruling filed July 3, 2013. On 

the record as a whole, the challenged jurisdictional deficiencies have been 

cured.

Abandonment

¶15 Under A.R.S. § 8-533(B), parental rights may be terminated 

only upon a finding that at least one statutory ground for severance has 

been established by clear and convincing evidence. Abandonment is one 

of these statutory grounds, which is defined in A.R.S. § 8-531(1):

“Abandonment” means the failure of a parent to provide 

reasonable support and to maintain regular contact with the 

child, including providing normal supervision. 

Abandonment includes a judicial finding that a parent has 

made only minimal efforts to support and communicate 

with the child. Failure to maintain a normal parental 

relationship with the child without just cause for a period of 

six months constitutes prima facie evidence of 

abandonment.

The juvenile court found that Father failed to provide reasonable support 

or maintain regular contact with P.W. and that Father had failed to 

maintain a normal parental relationship with the child without just cause. 

The court based these findings on Father’s repeated failure to pay child 

support, Father’s failure to attempt parenting time with P.W. through 

Mother or P.W.’s grandparents, Father’s filing of petitions to reinstate 

joint custody on several occasions but then failing to show up at the 

hearings, Father’s not sending gifts or cards over the past two years other 

than one card in November 2011, and the absence of a meaningful parentchild relationship with P.W.

¶16 Father relies on this Court’s opinion in Calvin B. v. Brittany B.

in which we stated: 

We hold that a parent who has persistently and substantially 

restricted the other parent’s interaction with their child may 

not prove abandonment based on evidence that the other 

has had only limited involvement with the child. 
WILLIAM W. v. BROOKE S.

Decision of the Court

6

232 Ariz. 292, 293, ¶ 1, 304 P.3d 1115, 1116 (App. 2013). The facts in Calvin 

B. are distinguishable from the facts in this case, however. In Calvin B., the 

mother sought protective orders in response to the father’s petitions to 

gain fathering time, effectively using the court system as a way to block 

the father from having any chance to interact with the child. Id. at 294-95, 

¶¶ 3, 7-10, 304 P.3d at 1117-18. Furthermore, the father in Calvin B. made 

continuous efforts to seek visitation by contacting the mother or the 

grandparents until the filing of the petition to terminate his parental 

rights. Id. The father in Calvin B. also had filed several petitions to 

reinstate parenting time and was awarded supervised visits up to and 

throughout the severance trial. Id.

¶17 In contrast, in this case Father provided no evidence to show 

that he has made reasonable efforts to maintain contact with P.W. Mother 

resorted to court action in response to misuse of parenting time by Father.

In December 2012 Father filed a petition to modify child custody but failed 

to appear at the hearing. Father’s actions are more analogous to the facts 

in Matter of Appeal in Pima County Severance Action No. S-1607, 147 Ariz. 

237, 709 P.2d 871 (1985), in which the supreme court upheld a juvenile

court’s severance after noting that although the father had petitioned to 

further his visitation rights, the petition was dismissed by stipulation and 

the father “took no further legal action to ensure his visitation rights.” Id. 

at 239, 709 P.2d at 873.

¶18 Father further asserts that nonsupport or failure to pay child 

support alone is not enough to establish abandonment. Although this 

court has previously concluded that nonsupport is not enough on its own 

to establish abandonment, see In re Yuma County Juv. Ct. Action No. J-87-

119, 161 Ariz. 537, 539, 779 P.2d 1276, 1278 (App. 1989), the juvenile court 

here did not base its decision solely on failure to pay child support.

¶19 We conclude that sufficient evidence supports the juvenile 

court’s findings and conclusions that Father abandoned P.W. within the 

meaning of A.R.S. §§ 8-533(B)(1) and -531(1).

Child’s Best Interests

¶20 To determine whether severance is in the best interests of a 

child, the court balances the “unfit” parent’s rights against the child’s 

rights. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 287, ¶ 37, 110 P.3d 1013, 1021 

(2005). Termination of the parent-child relationship is in the child’s best 

interests if the child would be harmed from continuation of the 

relationship or would benefit from the termination. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. 
WILLIAM W. v. BROOKE S.

Decision of the Court

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at 50, ¶ 19, 83 P.3d at 50. The best interests determination requires a 

preponderance of the evidence, Kent K., 210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22, 110 P.3d at 

1018, and we view the facts in a light most favorable to affirming the trial 

court’s findings. JS-8490, 179 Ariz. at 106 876 P.2d at 1141.

¶21 Father has repeatedly violated court orders regarding 

parenting time and has been unreliable in attending court dates and 

making child support payments. The evidence revealed that Father has 

willingly used P.W. as a means to torment Mother. The juvenile court 

found that the record was almost devoid of evidence that Father had

genuine concern or affection for P.W.

¶22 Furthermore, P.W.’s grandparents have expressed a 

willingness to adopt P.W. in the event of Mother’s death or incapacity, 

and the juvenile court found that P.W. is readily adoptable and that 

severance will further provide opportunity for stability and permanency 

should Mother die or become incapacitated. Although this court recently 

issued a decision explaining that adoptability alone is insufficient to make 

a best interests determination for a child already in a stable and 

permanent environment, see Jose M. v. Eleanor J., __ Ariz. ___, ___ ¶ 23, 316 

P.3d 602, 606-07 (App. 2014), the use of P.W. to torment Mother 

demonstrates an additional factor that supports the juvenile court’s best 

interests finding. On this record, the juvenile court did not abuse its 

discretion in finding that severance was in the best interests of P.W.

CONCLUSION

¶23 We affirm the juvenile court’s judgment.