1994 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-1-1994

Fuentes v. Perskie, NJ Casino Control Comm.

Precedential or Non-Precedential:

Docket 93-5561

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Recommended Citation

"Fuentes v. Perskie, NJ Casino Control Comm." (1994). 1994 Decisions. Paper 100.

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2 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 

_____________________________ 

NO. 93-5561 

_____________________________ 

LUIS A. FUENTES, 

 Appellant

v. 

STEVEN P. PERSKIE, CHAIRMAN OF THE NEW JERSEY 

CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION; THE NEW JERSEY 

CASINO CONTROL COMMISSION 

__________________________________________________________ 

On Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the District of New Jersey 

(D.C. Civil No. 92-cv-00190) 

__________________________________________________________ 

Argued: June 23, 1994 

Before: BECKER and HUTCHINSON, Circuit Judges, 

 and PADOVA, District Judge0

(Filed August 1, 1994) 

 LOUIS M. BARONE (Argued) 

 LYNN M. HANDLER 

 JACOBS, BRUSO & BARBONE, P.A. 

 1125 Pacific Avenue 

 Atlantic City, NJ 08401 

 Attorneys for Appellant

 JOHN R. ZIMMERMAN (Argued) 

 CATHERINE A. WALKER 

 Casino Control Commission 

 Tennessee Avenue and the 

Boardwalk 

 Arcade Building, 2nd Floor 

 

0The Honorable John R. Padova, United States District Judge for 

the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
3 

 Atlantic City, NJ 08401-0208 

 Attorneys for Appellee
4 

_______________________________________________ 

OPINION OF THE COURT

_______________________________________________ 

BECKER, Circuit Judge. 

 Plaintiff Luis A. Fuentes appeals from the district 

court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants, the New 

Jersey Casino Control Commission (the "Commission") and 

Commission Chairman Steven Perskie, in this national origin 

employment discrimination suit brought by Fuentes in the district 

court for the District of New Jersey pursuant to Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. 

§§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1981 & Supp. 1994). The question before us 

is the proper standard for granting summary judgment in a claim 

arising under Title VII in the wake of the Supreme Court's 

decision in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 

(1993). In particular, we consider the evidence that a plaintiff, 

who has made out a prima facie case, must adduce to survive a 

motion for summary judgment when the defendant offers a 

legitimate reason for its employment action in a "pretext" 

employment discrimination case. We hold that, to do so, the 

plaintiff generally must submit evidence which: 1) casts 

sufficient doubt upon each of the legitimate reasons proffered by 

the defendant so that a factfinder could reasonably conclude that 

each reason was a fabrication; or 2) allows the factfinder to 

infer that discrimination was more likely then not a motivating 
5 

or determinative cause of the adverse employment action. Because 

Fuentes failed to throw sufficient doubt on any of the 

Commission's proffered reasons, we will affirm the district 

court's grant of summary judgment. 

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY0

 The Commission, an agency of the State of New Jersey, 

see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 5:12-1 et seq. (1988 & Supp. 1994), employed 

Fuentes on May 18, 1987 as Director of Affirmative Action and 

Planning. At that time the Commission was comprised of five 

divisions. Fuentes' position placed him in charge of the 

Division of Affirmative Action and Planning ("AA&P"). Fuentes 

reported directly to the Chairman of the Commission, Walter Read, 

from his initial hiring until Read's retirement in January 1990. 

Read was at all times satisfied with Fuentes' performance. 

Fuentes also developed a close working relationship with 

Commissioner David Waters, who had a special interest in 

affirmative action. Waters was fond of Fuentes, and credited him 

with the turnaround of the Division. 

 

0In reviewing the grant of a motion for summary judgment, we (i) 

resolve conflicting evidence in favor of the nonmovant, (ii) do 

not engage in credibility determinations, and (iii) draw all 

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmovant. The movant has 

the burden of pointing out that evidence cognizable in a motion 

for summary judgment which the movant believes entitles it to 

summary judgment; the nonmovant must then respond by pointing to 

sufficient cognizable evidence to create material issues of fact 

concerning every element as to which the nonmoving party will 

bear the burden of proof at trial. See Davis v. Portline 

Transportes Maritime Internacional, 16 F.3d 532, 536 & n.3 (3d 

Cir. 1994). 
6 

 On August 20, 1990, newly elected Governor James Florio 

appointed defendant Perskie as Chairman of the Commission. In 

the ensuing two months, Perskie undertook an informal review of 

the entire Commission, including its structure. Faced with a 

declining budget and state-issued directives to reduce staffing, 

Perskie requested his Executive Assistant Joseph Papp to develop 

a reorganization plan (the "Plan"). The resulting Plan 

incorporated most of the recommendations made by a private 

consulting firm hired by the Commission to audit its utilization 

of resources. On November 7, 1990, Perskie announced an 

ambitious Plan to the Commission staff, and the Commission 

adopted it two weeks later. 

 The Plan called for the elimination of two divisions, 

including AA&P,0 the creation of a new Compliance Division, and 

the considerable reorganization of two others. The Plan transferred the primary functions of AA&P to a subdivision, entitled 

the Affirmative Action/Equal Employment Opportunity Unit 

("AA/EEO"), within the new Compliance Division. The 

reorganization reduced the Commission's staff from 542 to 446 

employees. 

 The Commission resolved to post and advertise all new 

management positions. Fuentes, along with all other personnel 

whose positions would be eliminated under the Plan, was advised 

to apply for the new positions that interested him, and he, along 

with twenty-five other candidates, applied for the position of 

 

0Fuentes does not contend that illegal discrimination caused the 

elimination of his old position as Director of AA&P. 
7 

Chief of AA/EEO. Fuentes and four others were eventually 

interviewed for that position. The Committee, meeting in an 

executive session, agreed that several of the other interviewees 

were better qualified than Fuentes for that position. Acting on 

the Committee's behalf, Perskie met with Fuentes to inform him 

that he would probably not be hired to fill it.0 Approximately 

one month later, on January 2, 1991, the Committee reached its 

decision to hire Gustave Thomas for that position by a vote of 

four to one.0 Fuentes, who is Latino (Puerto Rican), brought the 

proceedings which led to this action.0

 The district court concluded that Fuentes had made out 

a prima facie case of employment discrimination under the 

McDonnell Douglas/Burdine/Hicks line of cases, see McDonnell 

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 93 S. Ct. 1817 (1973); 

Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 101 S. 

Ct. 1089 (1981); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 

(1993), a conclusion which the defendants have never challenged. 

The court concluded, however, that the plaintiff had not adduced 

sufficient evidence to enable a rational jury to conclude that 

defendants' numerous proffered reasons for failing to hire 

Fuentes were pretextual and that the real reason was discriminatory, and hence it granted summary judgment for the Commission. 

 

0Two other directors, who were similarly approached, tendered 

their resignations. Neither was a member of plaintiff's 

protected class. 

0The Commission voted on all the proposed personnel actions as a 

package. 

0Fuentes is also an African-American, but he does not claim 

racial discrimination, perhaps because Thomas -- the person who 

was hired for the job he sought -- is also an African-American. 
8 

It is from this judgment that Fuentes appeals. We exercise 

plenary review. 

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS

 In a case of failure to hire or promote under Title 

VII, the plaintiff first 

must carry the initial burden under the statute of 

establishing a prima facie case of [unlawful] 

discrimination. This may be done by showing (i) that he 

belongs to a [protected category]; (ii) that he applied 

and was qualified for a job for which the employer was 

seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his 

qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after 

his rejection, the position remained open and the 

employer continued to seek applicants from persons of 

complainant's qualifications. 

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802, 93 S. Ct. at 1824. If the 

plaintiff succeeds, the burden of production shifts to the 

defendant to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory 

reason for the employee's rejection." Id.

 The employer satisfies its burden of production by 

introducing evidence which, taken as true, would permit the 

conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the 

unfavorable employment decision. See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2748. 

The employer need not prove that the tendered reason actually

motivated its behavior, as throughout this burden-shifting 

paradigm the ultimate burden of proving intentional discrimination always rests with the plaintiff. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 

253, 254, 256, 101 S. Ct. at 1093, 1094, 1095. Once the employer 

answers its relatively light burden by articulating a legitimate 

reason for the unfavorable employment decision, the burden of 
9 

production rebounds to the plaintiff, who must now show by a 

preponderance of the evidence that the employer's explanation is 

pretextual (thus meeting the plaintiff's burden of persuasion). 

 At trial, the plaintiff must convince the factfinder 

"both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the 

real reason." Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2752; see id. at 2754 ("It is 

not enough . . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must 

believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional 

discrimination." (emphasis in original)). The factfinder's 

rejection of the employer's proffered, legitimate reason permits, 

but does not compel, a verdict for the plaintiff. See Hicks, 113 

S. Ct. at 2749. The test is whether the plaintiff ultimately 

persuades the factfinder that the employment decision was caused 

by bias, and for that purpose both the plaintiff's prima facie 

case and the factfinder's rejection of the employer's proffered 

evidence are circumstantial evidence of unlawful discrimination. 

See Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749. 

 To prevail at trial, the plaintiff must prove not 

that the illegitimate factor was the sole reason for the 

decision, but that the illegitimate factor was a determinative

factor in the adverse employment decision, that is, that but for 

the protected characteristic, the plaintiff would have been hired 

(or promoted). See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701 

(1993) (holding under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 

("ADEA") that "a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless 

the employee's protected trait actually played a role in [the 
10 

decisionmaking] process and had a determinative influence on the 

outcome").0

 This basic framework under Title VII illustrates that, 

to defeat summary judgment when the defendant answers the 

plaintiff's prima facie case with legitimate, non-discriminatory 

reasons for its action, the plaintiff must point to some 

evidence, direct or circumstantial, from which a factfinder could 

reasonably either (1) disbelieve the employer's articulated 

legitimate reasons; or (2) believe that an invidious discriminatory reason was more likely than not a motivating or 

determinative cause of the employer's action. See, e.g., Hicks, 

113 S. Ct. at 2479; Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 

983 F.2d 509, 523 (3d Cir. 1992) (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 

256, 101 S. Ct. at 1095), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 88 (1993). 

 Because the factfinder may infer from the combination 

of the plaintiff's prima facie case and its own rejection of the 

employer's proffered non-discriminatory reasons that the employer 

unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff and was merely 

trying to conceal its illegal act with the articulated reasons, 

see Hicks, 113 S. Ct. at 2749, a plaintiff who has made out a 

prima facie case may defeat a motion for summary judgment by 

either (i) discrediting the proffered reasons, either circumstantially or directly, or (ii) adducing evidence, whether 

 

0Hazen is an ADEA case but, where appropriate, the analysis used 

in describing the evidentiary burdens in an ADEA case are also 

used in a Title VII case. See e.g., Duffy v. Wheeling Pittsburgh 

Steel Corp., 738 F.2d 1393, 1396 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 

U.S. 1087 (1984). 
11 

circumstantial or direct, that discrimination was more likely 

than not a motivating or determinative cause of the adverse 

employment action. Thus, if the plaintiff has pointed to some 

evidence discrediting the defendant's proffered reasons, to 

survive summary judgment the plaintiff need not also come forward 

with additional evidence of discrimination beyond his or her 

prima facie case. See Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 

F.3d 1120, 1122-24 (7th Cir. 1994). 

 We have stated that a plaintiff may avoid summary 

judgment by pointing to "some" evidence from which a factfinder 

could reasonably conclude that the defendant's proffered reasons 

were fabricated (pretext). Next, we consider what quantum of 

evidence is required. We can reject out of hand the two extreme 

positions: that the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment simply 

by arguing that the jury need not believe the defendant's 

proffered legitimate explanations on the one hand, or that the 

plaintiff must adduce evidence directly contradicting the 

defendant's proffered legitimate explanations on the other. The 

correct solution lies somewhere in between: to avoid summary 

judgment, the plaintiff's evidence rebutting the employer's 

proffered legitimate reasons must allow a factfinder to 

reasonably infer that each of the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reasons, see Logue v. International Rehab. 

Assocs., Inc., 837 F.2d 150, 155 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that 

"the district court erred in failing to consider all of [the 

employer's] proffered evidence of legitimate business reasons for 

[the plaintiff's] termination" (emphasis supplied)), aff'd after 
12 

remand, 866 F.2d 1411 (3d Cir. 1989), was either a post hoc

fabrication or otherwise did not actually motivate the employment 

action (that is, the proffered reason is a pretext). See

Anderson, 13 F.3d at 1124; Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 

F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993).0

 To discredit the employer's proffered reason, however, 

the plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer's decision was 

wrong or mistaken, since the factual dispute at issue is whether 

discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not whether the 

employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent. See Ezold, 983 

F.2d at 531, 533; Villanueva v. Wellesley College, 930 F.2d 124, 

131 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 181 (1991). Rather, the 

non-moving plaintiff must demonstrate such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or 

contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for 

its action that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find 

them "unworthy of credence," Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531, and hence 

infer "that the employer did not act for [the asserted] nondiscriminatory reasons."0 Josey v. John R. Hollingsworth Corp., 

 

0We do not hold that, to avoid summary judgment, the plaintiff 

must cast doubt on each proffered reason in a vacuum. If the 

defendant proffers a bagful of legitimate reasons, and the 

plaintiff manages to cast substantial doubt on a fair number of 

them, the plaintiff may not need to discredit the remainder. 

That is because the factfinder's rejection of some of the defendant's proffered reasons may impede the employer's credibility 

seriously enough so that a factfinder may rationally disbelieve 

the remaining proffered reasons, even if no evidence undermining 

those remaining rationales in particular is available. 

0Of course, a decision foolish, imprudent, or incompetent by 

comparison to the employer's usual mode of operation can render 

it implausible, inconsistent, contradictory, or weak. 
13 

996 F.2d 632, 638 (3d Cir. 1993) (internal quotation omitted); 

see id. at 638 (holding that the proper inquiry is whether the 

plaintiff has proffered sufficient evidence of "inconsistencies 

and implausibilities in the employer's proffered reasons"); 

Ezold, 983 F.2d at 527 ("[A] plaintiff has the burden of casting 

doubt on an employer's articulated reasons for an employment 

decision." (internal quotations omitted)). While this standard 

places a difficult burden on the plaintiff, "[i]t arises from an 

inherent tension between the goal of all discrimination law and 

our society's commitment to free decisionmaking by the private 

sector in economic affairs." Ezold, 983 F.2d at 531. 

III. APPLICATION TO THIS CASE 

 As just developed, to survive summary judgment, Fuentes 

had either (i) to present sufficient evidence to meaningfully 

throw into question, i.e., to cast substantial doubt upon, the 

Commission's proffered reasons for not hiring him (e.g., by 

painting them as weak, implausible, contradictory, or incoherent), or (ii) to come forward with sufficient evidence from which 

a factfinder could reasonably conclude that an illegitimate 

factor more likely than not was a motivating or determinative 

cause of the adverse employment decision (e.g., by showing that 

the employer in the past had subjected him to unlawful 

discriminatory treatment, that the employer treated other, 

similarly situated persons not of his protected class more 

favorably, or that the employer has discriminated against other 

members of his protected class or other protected categories of 
14 

persons). Fuentes has failed to raise a material issue of fact 

on either ground. 

 The Commission has advanced a multitude of reasons for 

not hiring Fuentes. Notably, none of the reasons was that 

Fuentes was unqualified for the job; in the end, the Commission 

elected to hire Thomas instead of Fuentes because it felt that 

Thomas was better qualified. In considering Fuentes for the 

newly created position of Chief of AA/EEO, the Commission faulted 

Fuentes for (i) lacking leadership qualities (Fuentes, in 

response to a request by Perskie for proposals for reorganization 

by each division head, had issued a brief and insubstantial 

recommendation; he failed to arrange to meet with Perskie about 

that memorandum although it was clear Perskie wished to discuss 

it;0 in a report he included issues critical of a casino which he 

had not first discussed with the casino; and he failed to seek a 

meeting with Perskie after the press on two separate occasions 

reported that Perskie publicly criticized Fuentes' Division of 

AA&P); (ii) lacking management ability (Fuentes habitually 

arrived to work late, departed early, and took extended lunches; 

morale in AA&P was declining and the staff was unproductive; and 

despite repeated requests Fuentes declined to participate in 

committees including casino representatives to discuss major 

issues facing the casino industry, including labor and minority 

 

0Although the parties dispute whether Perskie explicitly 

instructed the Directors to arrange a meeting with him or whether 

Perskie was to arrange the meetings, Fuentes' failure to contact 

Perskie for ten weeks is pertinent to his initiative and leadership (we note that every Director besides Fuentes arranged such a 

meeting). 
15 

business set-asides); (iii) lacking developed interpersonal 

skills (Fuentes had a poor working relationship with some of the 

Commissioners; and he lacked a good rapport with casino industry 

affirmative action officers because they felt he considered 

himself too important to meet with them); and (iv) unprofessional 

conduct (Fuentes was observed inside a car in a casino parking 

lot engaging in sexual activities; he got into a brawl at a 

casino, then misrepresented himself to be a police officer and 

used his influence as a Commission employee to receive special 

treatment; and on one occasion he shared confidential casino 

information with the public). The defendants contrast those 

incidents with Thomas' superior qualifications, corroborated by 

his remarkable accomplishments since being hired. Without going 

into each justification in detail, we simply note that Fuentes 

has not succeeded in throwing enough doubt on any of those 

explanations so that a rational factfinder could reject it. 

 Fuentes does make a timing argument, predicated on 

Josey, see id., 996 F.2d at 638-39 (illustrating that, "[o]n 

different occasions, this court has found that factors such as 

the defendant's credibility, the timing of an employee's 

dismissal, and the employer's treatment of the employee could 

raise an inference of pretext which would make summary judgment 

for the employer inappropriate"), namely, that things were going 

well for him until Perskie was appointed to head the Commission. 

But that is not the type of timing evidence Josey was referring 

to, namely, the timing of events which can give rise to an 

inference of improper motivation. The fact that a newly 
16 

appointed chairman, in a time of shrinking budgets state-wide and 

a governor's directive to eliminate staff positions, reorganizes 

a state agency and hires new managers for positions newly created 

by the reorganization who he believes will best perform the tasks 

at hand does not throw real doubt on the employer's proffered 

legitimate reason. 

 Additionally, Fuentes complains of the fact that the 

Commission documented its reasons for not hiring Fuentes after it 

had decided not to hire him (he refers to this as a calculated 

accumulation of all the negative facts and inferences from his 

past experience at the Commission) and argues that this postdecision undertaking leads to a strong inference of coverup 

(i.e., fabrication). As the district court pointed out, however, 

the Commissioners were not unrealistic to anticipate that 

Fuentes, no stranger to employment discrimination laws, would sue 

the Commission, and in this case the Commission's documentation 

can only be described as displaying business acumen. Given the 

frequency of employment discrimination suits, an employer which 

documents its reasons for taking adverse employment actions can 

often be more suitably described as sensible than as devious. 

Absent evidence providing an independent reason to suspect the 

act, the documentation of the reasons for rejecting an applicant 

is insufficient, in and of itself, to give rise to a reasonable 

inference of discriminatory motive. 

 Fuentes also attacks Papp's statement that he received 

complaints from five to ten members of the Division of Licensing 

critical of Fuentes because Papp did not remember their names 
17 

almost three years after the events in question transpired. 

Additionally, he discounts two of the four complaints Papp 

received from members of Fuentes' staff (Papp was able to name 

all four staff members raising the complaints) because two of 

those members were allegedly biased against him and hence not 

credible (we note that Fuentes has not contended that those staff 

members were biased against him because of his national origin). 

These criticisms amount to little more than the schoolground 

retort, "Not so," an approach which, as discussed supra at 11, 

does not create a material issue of fact. In the context at 

hand, the issue is not whether the staff members' criticisms of 

Fuentes were substantiated or valid, or whether Papp was remiss 

to rely upon feedback received from members of Fuentes' staff who 

might be (non-discriminatorily) biased against him. Instead, 

since Papp, not the staff members, was the relevant decisionmaker, the question is whether Papp believed those criticisms to be 

accurate and actually relied upon them, since only if Fuentes can 

prove that Papp in fact did not rely upon them can Fuentes show 

"pretext." We conclude that a factfinder could not reasonably 

find that Fuentes' cross-examination impeached Papp's statements 

to the point of rendering them weak, implausible, or incredible. 

 Instead of throwing doubt on defendants' explanations, 

Fuentes principally tries to go the alternate route by pointing 

to evidence from which a factfinder could reasonably conclude 

that discrimination was the more likely cause of his discharge. 

First, plaintiff argues that Chairman Read, his direct 

supervisor, thought that he was doing a fine job. Commissioner 
18 

Waters, who took a special interest in affirmative action, also 

approved of Fuentes' job performance.0 But, as we stated in 

Ezold, the fact that the relevant decisionmakers disagree about 

the plaintiff's qualifications does not evidence discrimination. 

See id., 983 F.2d at 533. To avoid summary judgment, the 

plaintiff must point to some evidence from which a factfinder 

could reasonably conclude that the plaintiff satisfied the 

criterion that the decisionmakers disapproving of him relied upon 

(e.g., by showing that others no more qualified than he under 

that criterion were not treated adversely), or that the 

decisionmakers did not actually rely upon that criterion. As 

noted in the preceding paragraph, Fuentes' proffered evidence 

does not reasonably permit either conclusion. 

 Second, Fuentes argues that during his interview for 

the Chief of AA/EEO position, he was not questioned but was 

"interrogated" about Perskie's dissatisfaction with his job 

performance. As the district court noted, however, the facts 

that Fuentes had been working at the Commission for over three 

years, and that he was known to the interviewers (if not 

personally, then at least by reputation, opinion, and report), 

justified a departure from the normal interviewing process, and 

hence the "interrogation" does not raise an inference of 

invidious discrimination. It would defy common sense for an 

interviewer to put aside all his or her personal and/or acquired 

 

0While he also cites his positive yearly Commission evaluations, 

Fuentes admits that he himself filled them out without any supervision or review. 
19 

knowledge of the interviewee and to proceed as if the interviewee 

were a stranger, and Title VII does not mandate so much. In any 

event, at his deposition Fuentes described the nature of the 

"interrogatories" directed at him as "[g]eneral questions about 

the industry," hardly an improper or suspicious subject given the 

position for which he was applying. 

 Third, Fuentes complains that, having corrected Commissioner Dodd's mispronunciation of his name some 20 months prior 

to the Commission's failure to hire Fuentes as Chief of AA/EEO 

(Fuentes testified that Dodd had asked to call Fuentes the 

English "Louis" instead of the Latino "Luis" because Dodd 

asserted he had "difficulty" pronouncing "Luis" and felt "more 

comfortable" with "Louis", and that he had responded that he 

would prefer Dodd call him by his Latino name), Dodd thereafter 

referred to him as "Director" instead of by his first name.0 

This evidence shows only that Dodd disliked Fuentes' first name 

because he had difficulty pronouncing it (not because it was a 

Latino name), and may reflect on Dodd's insensitivity and 

unprofessionalism. But we do not think that a jury could 

reasonably construe these incidents, standing alone (as they do), 

as evidencing Dodd's bias against Puerto Ricans or Latinos, or to 

mean that Dodd invidiously discriminated against Fuentes because 

of his national origin. Cf. Ezold, 983 F.2d at 545 ("Stray 

remarks by non-decisionmakers or by decisionmakers unrelated to 

 

0The defendants concede that Dodd referred to other Directors by 

their first names. The record does not give any indication how 

often Dodd and Fuentes had contact or, in particular, how often 

Dodd referred to Fuentes as "Director." 
20 

the decision process are rarely given great weight, particularly 

if they were made temporally remote from the date of decision."). 

 For the foregoing reasons, the district court's order 

granting summary judgment to the defendants will be affirmed.