NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL ANTHONY LEBOEUF,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 23-443

D.C. No.

4:19-cr-00209-PJH-1

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Phyllis J. Hamilton, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 17, 2024**

San Francisco, California

Before: S.R. THOMAS, CALLAHAN, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

Michael LeBoeuf appeals the district court’s denial of his motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). As the parties are 

familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here. We have jurisdiction under 

28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

MAY 21 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 23-443

We review § 3582(c)(1) sentence reduction decisions for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Aruda, 993 F.3d 797, 799 (9th Cir. 2021) (per curiam). A district 

court abuses its discretion if “it does not apply the correct law or if it rests its 

decision on a clearly erroneous finding of material fact.” Id. (quoting United 

States v. Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013)) (internal quotation mark 

omitted).

1. The district court did not clearly err in any of the three ways LeBoeuf 

asserts. See United States v. Mercado-Moreno, 869 F.3d 942, 959 (9th Cir. 2017)

(factual findings are reviewed for clear error). First, we are not left with “the 

definite and firm conviction” that the district court mistook LeBoeuf to be arguing 

that his medical records were not accurate. Id. (quoting Anderson v. City of 

Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985)). Reading the disputed statement in 

context shows the district court understood LeBoeuf’s argument that he had 

experienced multiple gaps in receiving his prescribed medications.

Second, we are not convinced the district court mistook the impact statement 

by “Victim 2” for an impact statement by one of the minors identified in the plea 

agreement as a victim of the offenses for which LeBoeuf was convicted. 

Notwithstanding the government’s arguably confusing use of similar labels for 

different minors sexually involved with LeBoeuf, Victim 2’s statement clearly 

referred to events surrounding the 2018 search of LeBoeuf’s residence—long after 
3 23-443

the 2012 and 2013 conduct underlying the charged offenses. In denying a previous 

motion for compassionate release by LeBoeuf, the same district court judge 

expressly distinguished between LeBoeuf’s “offense conduct” and his more recent 

“predatory conduct” as described by “another victim.” And in opposing the 

present motion, the government repeatedly reminded the district court that 

Victim 2 served as an example of LeBoeuf’s continued predatory conduct since the 

charged offenses—not one of his original victims. Given this background, we do 

not read the district court’s denial order as revealing a misunderstanding of who 

Victim 2 was.

Third, the district court did not clearly err by relying on the settlement of a 

class action regarding conditions at the Federal Correctional Institution in 

Lompoc—where LeBoeuf has been confined—to reject his argument that his 

sentence had become overly punitive. LeBoeuf concedes that the injunctive relief 

ordered in that settlement incorporated an expert’s recommendations to resolve at 

least one of the conditions LeBoeuf complained of in his motion: punitive medical 

isolation for reporting COVID-19 symptoms. While that was not the only

condition LeBoeuf’s motion complained of, it was not clear error for the district 

court to view the class action settlement as lessening the degree of punishment 

involved in LeBoeuf’s continued imprisonment.

2. The district court sufficiently explained its reasons for denying 
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compassionate release based on its conclusion that a sentence reduction was not 

warranted under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See United States v. 

Wright, 46 F.4th 938, 945, 947 (9th Cir. 2022) (compassionate release may be 

denied under any prong of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) framework).

LeBoeuf argues that the district court procedurally erred in failing to address 

several arguments he raised relating to certain § 3553(a) factors. See United States 

v. Trujillo, 713 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that a district court erred 

in “failing to explain at all its rejection of [the defendant]’s arguments based on the 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors”); United States v. Carty, 520 F.3d 984, 992–93 (9th 

Cir. 2008) (en banc) (“[W]hen a party raises a specific, nonfrivolous argument 

tethered to a relevant § 3553(a) factor . . . then the judge should normally explain 

why [s]he accepts or rejects the party’s position.”). 

Although LeBoeuf’s motion raised “specific, nonfrivolous arguments” 

related to relevant sentencing factors, there was not a “total omission” of these 

arguments in the district court’s denial order. Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1009–10. 

Rather, the district court accurately summarized in detail many of LeBoeuf’s 

arguments and then explained at length why the seriousness of LeBoeuf’s offenses 

and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities supported maintaining the 

high-end Guidelines sentence originally imposed. While the district court did not 

explicitly address and respond point-by-point to each of LeBoeuf’s arguments, its 
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discussion makes clear the reasons the district court rejected those arguments after

“reason[ing] through” them. Concepcion v. United States, 597 U.S. 481, 501 

(2022) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); id. (sentencing court need 

not “expressly rebut each argument made by the parties” (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted)).

In addition, the effect of the denial was to maintain a within-Guidelines 

sentence, which generally requires less explanation. See Chavez-Meza v. United 

States, 585 U.S. 109, 113–14 (2018); cf. Trujillo, 713 F.3d at 1010 n.5 (noting 

result of denial was an above-Guidelines sentence). Furthermore, the overall 

context and record of the case—including the district court’s high level of 

familiarity, having presided over LeBoeuf’s original sentencing and prior 

§ 3582(c)(1) motion—make clear why the court found the § 3553(a) factors did not 

support relief. See Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 118–19; Wright, 46 F.4th at 952; 

United States v. Wilson, 8 F.4th 970, 977 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that a “minimal 

explanation” for denying a § 3582(c)(2) motion suffices “in light of the deference 

due to the judge’s professional judgment and the context of a particular case”).

Finally, we reject LeBoeuf’s contentions that the district court failed to 

address his arguments for enhanced supervision, similar to home confinement, and 

his alternative request to reduce his sentence to the statutory minimum of 60 

months. The district court’s well-explained reasons for maintaining a high-end 
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Guidelines sentence are dispositive of the alternative statutory-minimum request. 

And even though LeBoeuf presented substantive arguments for home confinement, 

his motion did not discuss “the efficacy of those conditions as a mechanism of 

deterrence, or how a condition of home confinement might serve as a ‘substitute 

for imprisonment’ and address the district court’s pronounced penological 

concerns.” Wright, 46 F.4th at 951–52 (emphasis added) (noting that granting a

time-served sentence is a “necessary predicate” to a home confinement request). 

As in Wright and Chavez-Meza, the district court’s “response is made obvious by 

the record” of LeBoeuf’s original sentencing and the district court’s explanation 

for denying sentence reduction. Wright, 46 F.4th at 952 n.13 (analogizing to 

Chavez-Meza, 585 U.S. at 118–19).

Applying the deferential abuse of discretion standard, we conclude that the 

district court’s explanation of its decision is adequate to allow us to review its 

rationale for denying each form of relief LeBoeuf requested. See Rita v. United 

States, 551 U.S. 338, 356–57 (2008). 

AFFIRMED.