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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 2:18-CR-27

JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

WILLIAM G. WEEKLEY, et al.,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

This case is before the Court to determine restitution following the restitution hearing held 

on June 4, 2020. (ECF No. 246.) Defendants Franklin Perry (“Perry”) and Brian Perkins 

(“Perkins”) do not oppose the victim’s (“Jane Doe”) restitution request. Defendant William G. 

Weekley (“Weekley”) has already agreed to restitution with the Government, and the Court has 

authorized the Agreed Order. (Case No. 2:18-cr-0027(1), ECF No. 245.) 

Defendant Timothy Sullivan (“Sullivan”) objects to the restitution requested by Jane Doe 

and the Government. (ECF No. 235.) The Government (ECF No. 238) and Jane Doe (ECF No. 

241) have responded to Sullivan’s objections. Sullivan has replied to both the Government and 

Jane Doe. (ECF Nos. 239, 242.) The Court heard argument from the parties at the June 4, 2020 

restitution hearing. For the following reasons, the Court DENIES Sullivan’s objections.

Defendant Perry is ORDERED to pay restitution in the amount of $111,000. Defendant Perkins 

is ORDERED to pay restitution in the amount of $50,000. Defendant Sullivan is ORDERED to 

pay restitution in the amount of $50,000.

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I. 

This restitution order concerns Defendants Perry, Perkins, and Sullivan. The three codefendants were all convicted after an investigation into the sexual abuse of Jane Doe perpetrated 

by Defendant Weekley. Because the Court has already ordered Weekley to pay restitution, the 

Court will not recount Weekley’s conduct in detail. Weekley pleaded guilty to several sexual 

exploitation and child pornography offenses. The Court sentenced Weekley to 480 months’ 

imprisonment for his convictions. 

Law enforcement arrested Weekley in January 2018, following an investigation into the 

sexual abuse of his minor step-daughter, Jane Doe, who was approximately 11-years-old when the 

sexual abuse occurred. The investigation into Weekley began after Weekley communicated his 

sexual abuse of Jane Doe to an undercover agent, to whom Weekley also sent images of his sexual 

abuse of Jane Doe. Following Weekley’s arrest, law enforcement examined his cellphone and 

discovered that Weekley had communicated his sexual abuse of Jane Doe to his co-defendants: 

Perry, Perkins, and Sullivan. Following an investigation into Defendants, a Grand Jury for the 

Southern District of Ohio returned a Second Superseding Indictment on August 23, 2018, which 

charged the four Defendants with various child pornography and exploitation offenses. 

The Government’s investigation into Perry revealed that Perry first contacted Weekley in 

September of 2017 in response to an ad Weekley posted on Craigslist. Perry and Weekley 

discussed Weekley’s sexual abuse of Jane Doe and made plans for Perry to travel to Weekley’s 

residence to engage in sexual abuse of Jane Doe alongside Weekley. Perry eventually traveled to 

Weekley’s residence and sexually abused Jane Doe one time. A forensic examination of Perry’s 

phone also revealed a pornographic image of Jane Doe that did not resemble any images taken 

from Weekley’s phone. Perry pleaded guilty to Coercion or Enticement of a Minor to Engage in 

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Illegal Sexual Activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The Court sentenced Perry to 288 

months’ imprisonment for this conviction.

The investigation into Perkins revealed that Perkins first contacted Weekley in December 

of 2017 in response to an ad Weekley posted on craigslist. Perkins and Weekley exchanged emails 

in which Perkins solicited photographs of Weekley’s abuse of Jane Doe, requested that Weekley 

take photographs specifically for Perkins, and described in graphic detail other ways in which 

Weekley could abuse Jane Doe. Weekley sent photographs to Perkins depicting his ongoing abuse 

of Jane Doe in December of 2017 and January 2018. Perkins and Weekley also discussed plans 

for Perkins to meet with Weekley and Jane Doe describing the ways the two men would abuse 

Jane Doe together. Perkins pleaded guilty to Receipt of Child Pornography in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). The Court sentenced Perkins to 138 months’ imprisonment for this 

conviction. 

The investigation into Sullivan revealed that he began communicating with Weekley on 

January 17, 2018 after Weekley responded to a craigslist ad Sullivan posted. At Sullivan’s request, 

Weekley sent Sullivan several images depicting his sexual abuse of Jane Doe. Sullivan then 

suggested meeting with Weekley so that he could join Weekley’s abuse of Jane Doe. Sullivan 

described the ways in which the two men could abuse Jane Doe together. Weekley was 

apprehended shortly after, but Sullivan continued to communicate through mid-February 2018 

with an undercover agent whom Sullivan believed to be Weekley. Sullivan repeatedly attempted 

to arrange a meeting with Weekley so that he could sexually abuse Jane Doe. Sullivan pleaded 

guilty to Attempted Coercion or Enticement of a Minor to Engage in Illegal Sexual Activity in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The Court sentenced Sullivan to 138 months’ imprisonment for 

this conviction. 

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The matter is now before the Court for restitution. During this case, the Court appointed 

attorney Lorie L. McCaughan as Jane Doe’s guardian ad litem pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3509(h).1 

After the Court appointed Ms. McCaughan, she retained two psychologists to perform an 

evaluation of Jane Doe, which the Court concluded was necessary and appropriate. (ECF No. 

237.) The psychologists retained by Ms. McCaughan performed a thorough evaluation of Jane 

Doe and concluded that Jane Doe suffers from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder as a result of the 

abuse the Defendants perpetrated. The psychologists also made several recommendations to help 

Jane Doe psychologically recover. The psychologists estimated that the total calculated cost of 

implementing these recommendations amounts to approximately $411,000. Based on this 

calculation, Jane Doe and the Government have requested a total amount of $411,000 in restitution 

from the Defendants. 

Jane Doe and the Government have requested that the Court apportion liability for the 

$411,000 among each Defendant relative to his causal role in Jane Doe’s total damages. All 

Defendants in this case agreed to restitution in their plea agreements, and the Court has already 

authorized an Agreed Order ordering Defendant Weekley to pay $200,000 of this total. (Case No. 

2:18-cr-0027(1), ECF No. 245.) To cover the remaining $211,000, Jane Doe and the Government 

request $111,000 from Perry, $50,000 from Perkins, and $50,000 from Sullivan.

The Court held a hearing on June 4, 2020 to determine restitution regarding Perry, Perkins, 

and Sullivan. Perry and Perkins do not object to the amount of restitution requested. Sullivan has 

objected to restitution. The Court did not order restitution at the hearing and instead indicated that 

an Opinion and Order would follow.

1 Ms. McCaughan’s representation has been exceptional, and the Court commends her for her 

admirable work representing Jane Doe in this difficult case. 

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II.

. Only Defendant Sullivan objects to the restitution Jane Doe and the Government have 

requested. Thus, the Court will address Sullivan’s objections before ordering restitution for all 

three remaining Defendants.

A. Sullivan’s Objections

Sullivan makes two objections. First, Sullivan disputes whether the Court has authority to 

order him to pay restitution. Second, Sullivan objects to the amount of restitution requested and 

contends that a much lower total is appropriate as to him. 

1. Objection to Court’s Authority to Order Restitution

Federal courts “have no inherent power to award restitution[.]” United States v. Sexton, 

894 F.3d 787, 799 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing United States v. Evers, 669 F.3d 645, 655–56 (6th Cir. 

2012)) (internal quotations omitted). Restitution orders are “proper only when and to the extent 

authorized by statute.” Id. Sullivan points out that the victim and the Government have argued for

restitution under three different statutory provisions: 18 U.S.C § 2259; 18 U.S.C. § 3663A; and 18 

U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3). Jane Doe first requested restitution under § 2259. Section 2259 provides for 

mandatory restitution from defendants convicted of trafficking in child pornography. See id. After 

Sullivan responded in opposition, Jane Doe replied and instead argued that restitution was proper 

under § 3663A, which requires mandatory restitution for victims of, among other crimes, a “crime 

of violence” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 16. (ECF No. 241 at 4.) The Government has requested 

that the Court order Sullivan to pay restitution under § 3663(a)(3), which states that the “court may 

also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.” 

Id.

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Sullivan contends that restitution is not proper through any of these statutory vehicles. The 

Court disagrees. The Court has authority under 18 U.S.C § 3663(a)(3) to order Sullivan to pay 

restitution because Sullivan expressly agreed to pay restitution in his plea agreement. The amended 

Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982 (“VWPA”) provides that a court “may order” a 

defendant convicted of certain enumerated offenses to pay restitution to “any victim of such 

offense[.]” § 3663(a)(1)(A). Sullivan’s offense of conviction—18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)—is not one 

of the offenses covered by § 3663(a)(1)(A). However, the VWPA goes on to state that: “The court 

may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea 

agreement.” § 3663(a)(3).

Sullivan argues that, despite the broad language of § 3633(a)(3) and the plea agreement, 

the court lacks authority to order restitution under the VWPA. (ECF No 235 at 4.) In support, 

Sullivan relies on § 3663(b)(2) of the VWPA, which states: 

“The court may require that such defendant—

(2) in the case of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim including an 

offense under chapter 109A or chapter 110—

(A) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary medical and related 

professional services and devices relating to physical, psychiatric, and 

psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in 

accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place 

of treatment;

(B) pay an amount equal to the cost of necessary physical and occupational 

therapy and rehabilitation; and

(C) reimburse the victim for income lost by such victim as a result of such 

offense;”

Id. Sullivan reads this section as limiting the Court’s authority under the VWPA to order

restitution only for offenses under Chapter 109A or Chapter 110, because those are the only two 

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chapters enumerated in § 3663(b)(2). (ECF No. 235 at 4.) Under Sullivan’s interpretation, then, § 

3663(a)(3) means that plea agreement can only broaden a defendant’s obligation to pay restitution 

for a conviction under Chapter 109A or 110 (Id.) But, because Sullivan was convicted of an 

offense under Chapter 117, § 3663(a)(3) does not give the Court authority to order restitution in 

this case despite Sullivan agreeing to pay restitution in the plea agreement. (Id.)

Despite Sullivan’s arguments to the contrary, the plain meaning of § 3663(a)(3) clearly

confers authority upon this Court to impose restitution. Start with the text. Subsection

3663(a)(1)(A) lists various offenses for which the court “may order ... that the defendant make 

restitution to any victim of such offense[.]” § 3663(a)(1)(A). Stated differently, § 3663(a)(1)(A) 

gives a court discretion to order restitution for the class of enumerated offenses regardless of any 

plea agreement. Subsection (a)(3) then follows: “The court may also order restitution in any 

criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement.” Id. § 3663(a)(3) 

(emphasis added). Nowhere in the statute did Congress restrict or qualify the phrase “any criminal 

case[.]” Id. Thus, the Court has authority to order restitution to the extent Sullivan agreed in his 

plea agreement because Sullivan’s conviction falls within the scope of the phrase “any criminal 

case[.]” Id.; see also United States v. Lexington Wholesale Co., Inc., 71 F. App’x 507, 509 (6th 

Cir. 2003) (Interpreting § 3663(a)(3) and stating that it “unambiguously permits the parties to agree 

that the court may order restitution and imposes no restrictions or qualifications on such 

agreement.”) (emphasis added); United States v. Guthrie, 64 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1995)

(“Congress was very specific when it stated that Subsection (a)(1) applied to ‘offense[s] under this 

title or section 46312, 46502, or 46504 of title 49.’ It placed no such limitations on the application 

of Subsection (a)(3).”) (internal citations omitted); United States v. Soderling, 970 F.2d 529, 534 

(9th Cir. 1992) (“the Soderlings fail to realize the full breadth of new section 3663(a)(3) ... 

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whereas section 3663(a)(1) is limited to restitution for offenses under title 18 or section 1472 of 

title 49, section 3663(a)(3) applies to offenses under any title of the United States Code.”) 

(emphasis added).

Subsection 3663(b)(2) does nothing to alter the plain meaning of § 3663(a)(3). Though 

Sullivan reads the enumeration of Chapters 109A and 110 in that section as excluding restitution

under the VWPA for an offense under Chapter 117, that section contains no such express 

limitation. Subsection 3663(b)(2) reads: “The court may require that such defendant ... in the case 

of an offense resulting in bodily injury to a victim including an offense under chapter 109A or 

chapter 110 ....” Id. § 3663(b)(2) (emphasis added). The use of the term “including” before listing 

“chapter 109A or chapter 110” in this section is most naturally read as expressly including offenses 

within Chapters 109A and 110 but not expressly limiting § 3663(b)(2) to offenses contained in 

those chapters. See, e.g., Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 317 n. 10 (2010) (citing 2A N. Singer 

& J. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction § 47.7, p. 305 (7th ed. 2007) (“[T]he word 

‘includes’ is usually a term of enlargement, and not of limitation”)). Sullivan’s interpretation 

would render the word “including” superfluous. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford

Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc., 563 U.S. 776, 788 (2011) (interpreting a statute to 

avoid treating statutory terms as surplusage). But more importantly, even if § 3663(b)(2) was 

expressly limited to offenses under Chapters 109A and 110, that section still has nothing to say 

about restitution pursuant to a “plea agreement” “in any criminal case.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3).

History is also instructive here. The Sixth Circuit has explained that Congress amended 

the VWPA in 1990 to add what is now § 3663(a)(3) to supersede the Supreme Court’s decision in 

Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411 (1990). United States v. Tunning, 69 F.3d 107, 116 (6th 

Cir. 1995). In Hughey, the Supreme Court held that the VWPA authorized a sentencing court to 

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order restitution “only for losses caused by the conduct underlying the offense of conviction.” 495 

U.S. at 416. Immediately following Hughey, “Congress amended the VWPA to allow sentencing 

courts to order restitution for conduct that was not the basis of the offense of conviction when the 

defendant agreed to this as a term in a plea agreement.” Tunning, 69 F.3d at 116; see also United 

States v. Guardino, 972 F.2d 682, 687 (6th Cir. 1992) (“A House report noted that the 1990 

legislation ‘amends 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a) to permit the court to order restitution to the extent that 

the parties have agreed to restitution in a plea agreement.’ H.Rep. No. 681(I), 101st Cong., 2d 

Sess. 177, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472, 6583 (emphasis added). By inference, prior to 

the amendment, courts were not permitted to order such restitution.”).

In sum, the Court has authority under 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3) to order Sullivan to pay 

restitution “to the extent agreed to by the parties” in the plea agreement. Because the Court’s 

authority under § 3663(a)(3) is apparent, it need not address Sullivan’s arguments regarding 

restitution under § 2259 or § 3663A. 

2. Objection to Amount of Restitution

The Court now turns Sullivan’s objection regarding the amount of restitution he should 

pay. Jane Doe and the Government request that Sullivan be apportioned $50,000 of Jane Doe’s 

total damages, while Sullivan contends that he can only be held responsible for a much lower 

amount. 

The Court will order restitution “to the extent agreed to by the parties” in the plea 

agreement. 18 U.S.C § 3663(a)(3). Orders of restitution under § 3633 “shall be issued and 

enforced in accordance with section 3664.” Id. § 3663(d). Under § 3664(f)(1)(A), “the court shall 

order restitution to each victim in the full amount of each victim’s losses as determined by the 

court and without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.” Id. Because

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this is a case involving more than one defendant, the Court has discretion to either (1) hold Sullivan

jointly and severally liable for the full amount of restitution owed to the victim; or (2) apportion 

restitution and hold Sullivan and the other Defendants responsible only for each’s individual

contribution to the victim’s total losses. Id. § 3664(h). 

The restitution provision in Sullivan’s plea agreements provides:

“Restitution. The defendant understands that he will be required to pay full 

restitution to the victim(s) of the offense to which he is pleading guilty. The 

defendant agrees that, in exchange for the U.S. Attorney’s Office’s compliance with 

its obligations under this agreement, the Court may also order that he pay restitution 

to persons other than the victim(s) of the offense to which the defendant is pleading 

guilty. In particular, the defendant agrees to pay restitution to any victim of any 

other child pornography or child exploitation offenses that became known to the 

government during the course of the investigation into the offense of conviction. 

The defendant further agrees that he will not seek the discharge of any restitution 

obligation, in whole or in part, in any present or future bankruptcy proceeding.”

(ECF No. 124 at ⁋7.) This provision makes clear that Sullivan agreed to pay “full restitution to 

the victim(s)” of his offense. When Sullivan agreed to pay restitution to the “victim(s)” of his 

offense, Sullivan understood that Jane Doe was the sole victim of his offense. Jane Doe now seeks 

the restitution Sullivan agreed to pay in the plea agreement. And § 3663(a)(3) empowers to the 

Court to prevent Sullivan from reneging on this agreement.

Jane Doe and the Government have requested $411,000 in total restitution from the four 

Defendants. Jane Doe and the Government also request that the Court apportion liability for the 

$411,000 among each Defendant relative to his causal role in Jane Doe’s total damages. No 

Defendant objects to this calculation. All defendants in this case agreed to restitution in their plea 

agreements, and the Court has already authorized an Agreed Order ordering Defendant Weekley 

to pay $200,000 of this total. (Case No. 2:18-cr-0027(1), ECF No. 245.) The Court agrees that 

apportionment of the $411,000 among each defendant is appropriate.

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Regarding Sullivan, Jane Doe and the Government argue that $50,000 fairly reflects

Sullivan’s causal role in Jane Doe’s damages. Sullivan does not object to the total amount of 

restitution calculated; however, Sullivan objects that he is responsible for $50,000 of the total 

amount. (ECF No. 235 at 11.) Sullivan instead argues that, if the Court decides to order him to 

pay restitution, a total of between $2000 and $3,500 is more appropriate. (Id. at 24.) The Court 

disagrees with Sullivan.

Sullivan argues that the Court must disaggregate Jane Doe’s injuries resulting from the 

sexual abuse perpetrated by Weekley and Perry from the injuries suffered from Sullivan’s 

attempted coercion/enticement. (Id. at 11–21.) Sullivan’s argument relies on Paroline v. United 

States, 572 U.S. 434 (2014). The Court in Paroline addressed how a district court should calculate 

restitution under § 2259 when “but-for causation cannot” be shown because the defendant is “one 

of thousands of anonymous possessors” of a child-victim’s pornographic images. Id. at 450. In 

cases where the defendant is but one of thousands of anonymous possessors of the same images, 

the defendant cannot be held liable in restitution for “the conduct of thousands of geographically 

and temporally distant offenders acting independently, and with whom the defendant had no 

contact.” Id. at 455. Instead, a defendant in this circumstance can be held responsible for only the 

harm proximately caused by his possession of the illegal images, which a district court must 

determine by referencing several “rough guideposts.” Id. at 457–60.

Paroline is of no consequence here. As a procedural matter, the Court in this case is 

ordering Sullivan to pay restitution under § 3663(a)(3) pursuant to a plea agreement for attempted 

enticement/coercion—Paroline, by contrast, concerned mandatory restitution under § 2259 for 

possession of child pornography. As a practical matter, Sullivan was not one of thousands of 

downstream viewers of Jane Doe’s images. Sullivan had direct contact with Weekley, Jane Doe’s 

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principal abuser. Sullivan acted in concert with Weekley to abuse Jane Doe. Sullivan encouraged 

Weekley to show Jane Doe explicit photos of Sullivan and elicited photos directly from Weekley 

depicting Weekley’s horrific abuse of Jane Doe. Worst of all, Sullivan sought to meet up with 

Weekley to personally join Weekley in sexually abusing Jane Doe in ways Sullivan described in 

graphic detail. And these were not half-hearted attempts. Sullivan told Weekley: “I am committed 

to doing this if you’ll allow me. I am 100% for real and I’m not living in a fantasy world. I want 

to do this.” (Plea Agreement, ECF No. 124 at 10.) Put simply, this case is far cry from the case 

of “anonymous possessors” of child pornography with “thousands of geographically and 

temporally distant offenders acting independently, and with whom the defendant had no contact.” 

Id. at 450, 455. Thus, Paroline does not guide the Court’s apportionment of restitution here. 

Sullivan is responsible for more than a de minimis share of Jane Doe’s harm. 

B. Apportionment of Restitution Among Perry, Perkins, and Sullivan

The Court now turns to apportioning restitution among Perry, Perkins, and Sullivan. Jane 

Doe and the Government recognize that Sullivan and Perkins’ relative role in Jane Doe’s harm is 

less than that of Weekley and Perry, both of whom physically abused Jane Doe. Weekley, Jane 

Doe’s principal abuser is responsible for roughly half of Jane Doe’s damages. As discussed above, 

the Court has already ordered Weekley to pay $200,000 of the $411,000 total requested. That

leaves $211,000 to be apportioned among Perry, Sullivan, and Perkins. 

Perry, who engaged in sexual abuse of Jane Doe on one occasion, is the next step down

from Weekley on the ladder of responsibility. Jane Doe and the Government have requested that 

the Court hold Perry responsible for roughly a quarter of Jane Doe’s total harm. Perry does not 

object. Pursuant to Perry’s plea agreement and § 3663(a)(3), the Court orders Perry to pay 

$111,000 in restitution to Jane Doe.

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That leaves $100,000 remaining, roughly a quarter of Jane Doe’s total damages. The Court 

agrees with Jane Doe and the Government that Sullivan and Perkins should split this amount 

evenly. Sullivan and Perkins actively encouraged Jane Doe’s abuse and sought to join the abuse

but, unlike Perry, were unsuccessful in their attempts. Because Perkins was convicted of Receipt

of Child Pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2), restitution is mandatory under 18 

U.S.C § 2259. Perkins also agreed to restitution in his plea agreement and does not object to 

restitution. Therefore, the Court orders Perkins to pay $50,000 in restitution to Jane Doe. And 

consistent with the Court’s discussion above, the Court orders Sullivan to pay $50,000 in 

restitution to Jane Doe. 

Apportioning restitution is not an exact science. But the Court concludes that the 

apportionment ordered herein best captures the percentage of Jane Doe’s total harm for which each 

Defendant is responsible. The Court also considered each Defendant’s role in the abuse when 

sentencing each Defendant. The following table illustrates how the relative amount of restitution

apportioned to each Defendant is consistent with relative length of sentence the Court imposed:

Defendant Sentence Apportionment Percentage

Weekley 480 months $200,000 48.6%

Perry 288 months $111,000 27%

Perkins 138 months $50,000 12.2%

Sullivan 138 months $50,000 12.2%

III.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants Perry, Perkins, and Sullivan in 

accordance with the terms of their plea agreements, are responsible for a portion of the total 

harm/losses suffered by Jane Doe, which total approximately $411,000. In accordance with each 

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Defendant’s relative causal role in Jane Doe’s total damages, the Court orders Defendants to pay 

restitution in the following amounts:

Defendant Perry is ORDERED to pay restitution to Jane Doe in the amount of $111,000.

(Case No. 2:18-cr-0027(3)).

Defendant Perkins is ORDERED to pay restitution to Jane Doe in the amount of $50,000. 

(Case No. 2:18-cr-0027(4)).

Defendant Sullivan is ORDERED to pay restitution to Jane Doe in the amount of $50,000. 

(Case No. 2:18-cr-0027(2)).

Restitution shall be paid to the Clerk of the United States District Court for the Southern 

District of Ohio, and shall then be distributed to Jane Doe’s representative in the following manner: 

to Margaret Mabie, Marsh Law Firm, PLLC, in trust for “Tina.” The appropriate mailing address 

is: Marsh Law Firm PLLC, ATTN: Tina, Box 4668 #65135 New York, NY 10163-4668.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

11/2/2020 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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