alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_______________________________________ __ Michigan Supreme Court 

# Order

Lansing, Michigan

September 14, 2006 Clifford W. Taylor, Chief Justice 130093 & (22) Michael F. Cavanagh
Elizabeth A. Weaver Marilyn Kelly Maura D. Corrigan PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, Robert P. Young, Jr. Stephen J. Markman, Justices

v SC: 130093 COA: 264096 Oakland CC: 2004-194365-FH KRIS EDWARD THOMAS, Defendant-Appellant.

________________ _______________ __________/

By order of April 26, 2006, the prosecuti ng attorney was direct ed to answer the application for leave to appeal the October 20, 2005 order of the Court of Appeals. On order of the Court, th e answer having been recei ved, the application fo r leave to appeal is again considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be rev iewed by this Court.

s0907 I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Mi chigan Supreme Cour t, certify that the foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court.

September 14, 2006

Clerk
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

DAURIN PATTON, : 

Petitioner, Case No. 3:17-cv-78 

- vs - District Judge Thomas M. Rose 

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz 

WARDEN, Warren Correctional Institution, 

Respondent. : 

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

The Court has reviewed the Report and Recommendations of United States Magistrate Judge 

Michael R. Merz (ECF No. 8), to whom this case was referred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b), and 

noting that no objections have been filed thereto and that the time for filing such objections under 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) has expired, hereby ADOPTS said Report and Recommendations. 

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Petition be DISMISSED with prejudice. 

Petitioner is DENIED any requested certificate of appealability and the Court hereby certifies to the 

United States Court of Appeals that an appeal would be objectively frivolous and therefore should 

not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. 

July 13, 2017. *s/Thomas M. Rose 

 Thomas M. Rose 

United States District Judge
## In the

Court of Appeals

Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________

No. 02

- 21

- 00288

- CV

___________________________

Ori ginal Proceeding

348th District Court of Tarrant County, Texas

Trial Court No. 348

- 326811

- 21

Before Suddereth, C.J.; Womack and Walker, JJ.

Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion 

### I N RE 

### B EVERLY 

### K OTSANIS 

### , Relator2 MEMORANDUM OPINION

The court has considered relator’s petition for writ of mandamu s and is of the

opinion that relief should be denied. Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of

mandamus is d enied.

Per Curiam

Delivered : September 23, 2021
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM STAR GAS
PARTNERS, L.P. AND SUBSIDIARIES CONSOLIDATED BALANCE SHEET AS OF SEPTEMBER 30,
2000 AND CONSOLIDATED STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS FOR THE YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER 30,
2000 AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0001002590
<NAME> STAR GAS PARTNERS, L.P.
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1999
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-2000
<CASH>                                          10,910
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                   68,814
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,956
<INVENTORY>                                     34,407
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               126,990
<PP&E>                                         221,984
<DEPRECIATION>                                  50,684
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 618,976
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          164,796
<BONDS>                                        310,414
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       139,178
<OTHER-SE>                                           0
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   618,976
<SALES>                                        642,712
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               744,664
<CGS>                                          383,828
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  501,589
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                               212,028
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                 2,669
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                              26,784
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  1,594
<INCOME-TAX>                                       492
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              1,353
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     1,353
<EPS-BASIC>                                        .07
<EPS-DILUTED>                                      .07


</TABLE>
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 4182 

To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to limit the number of 

Urban Area Security Initiative grants awarded and to clarify the risk 

assessment formula to be used when making such grants, and for other 

purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

DECEMBER 2, 2009 

Mrs. LOWEY introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 

Committee on Homeland Security 

A BILL 

To amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to limit the 

number of Urban Area Security Initiative grants awarded and to clarify the risk assessment formula to be 

used when making such grants, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. DISTRIBUTION AND AWARDING OF URBAN 

4 AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE GRANTS. 

5 (a) LIMITATION ON NUMBER OF URBAN AREA SECU6 RITY INITIATIVE GRANTS.—Section 2003(b)(1) of the 

7 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 604(b)(1)) is 


TJAMES on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4182 IH

1 amended by inserting ‘‘not more than 35’’ after ‘‘des2 ignate’’. 

3 (b) RISK ASSESSMENT FORMULA.—The Homeland 

4 Security Act of 2002 is amended— 

5 (1) in section 2003(b)(2)(A) (6 U.S.C. 

6 604(b)(2)(A)), in the matter preceding clause (i), by 

7 inserting ‘‘in accordance with section 2007(c)’’ after 

8 ‘‘shall conduct’’; and 

9 (2) in section 2007 (6 U.S.C. 608)— 

10 (A) in subsection (a)(1), in the matter pre11 ceding subparagraph (A), by inserting ‘‘in ac12 cordance with subsection (c)’’ after ‘‘terrorism’’; 

13 and 

14 (B) by adding at the end the following new 

15 subsection: 

16 ‘‘(c) RISK ASSESSMENT FORMULA.—In allocating the 

17 funds referred to in subsection (a), the Administrator 

18 shall, when weighing considerations of threat, vulner19 ability, and consequences from acts of terrorism, assign 

20 to threat a percentage value that is not less than 33.’’. 

21 (c) CLARIFICATION OF MINIMUM ALLOCATION TO

22 APPLY ONLY TO STATE HOMELAND SECURITY

23 GRANTS.—Clauses (i) through (v) of section 

24 2004(e)(1)(A) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 


TJAMES on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
3 

•HR 4182 IH

1 U.S.C. 605(e)(1)(A)) are amended by striking ‘‘and sec2 tion 2003’’ each place it appears. 

3 (d) ABOLITION OF TIER AND RELATED SYSTEMS.— 

4 Notwithstanding any guidance or regulations issued to the 

5 contrary, in carrying out the Urban Area Security Initia6 tive grant program, the Administrator of the Federal 

7 Emergency Management Agency shall disregard the Tier 

8 system used to determine the awarding of such grants, 

9 and may not make use of any such similar system to deter10 mine the awarding of such grants. 

11 (e) EFFECTIVE DATE.—This Act (and the amend12 ments made by this Act) shall take effect on the date of 

13 the enactment of this Act and shall apply to grants made 

14 on or after such date. 

Æ 


TJAMES on DSKG8SOYB1PROD with BILLS
:w1æ#. w.

Keith To MWinek@bccz.com

BarneIURTP/USEPA/US 

cc

05lO1l2OO7 08:25 AM bcc

Subject Fw: Data needs for Portland Cement NESHAP and May 3

meeting

Dear Michael:

This is the latest ICR attachment I sent. We plan to finalize th¡s attachment at the May 3 meeting. At the

current time your facility is not on the list to receive this request. However, this does not preclude your

voluntarily submitting any or all of the information we are going to be requesting if you believe it will

assist in developing a better regulation. I have also attached a revised agenda below.

i'4r1.¡,if-l

:..d

Àg*odu l*t hls¡ l2fû3 t{ìs*tingd*:

Keith W. Barnett

USEPA/OAQPS/SPPD/MMG

MailCode D243-02

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

919-541-5605

barnett.keith@epa. gov

--- Forwarded by Keith BarneIURTP/USEPA/US on 05/01/2007 08:25 AM -----

Keith

BarneIURTP/USEPA/US To Cement List, Andrew T. O'Hare

0412012007 01:13 PM cc Steve Fruh/RTP/USEPA/US@EPA, Steven

Silverman/DC/USEPA/US@EPA,

Blake.Wendy@epamail.epa.gov@EPA, "Michael Laney"

<mnl@rti.org>

Subject Data needs for Portland Cement NESHAP and May 3

meeting

To all:

I haven't rece¡ved any comments on the attachment I sent out on the data needs for the Portland Cement

NESHAP (reattached for your information)

We plan to mail the data collection letters out the middle of next week, so I would really l¡ke to at least get

some industry input by early next week. I will be out Monday and Tuesday at a site visit, but if I get

comments I could look these over and make any appropriate changes before I issue the letter.

lf there are additionalthings we need to add, or additional changes we need to make, we can discuss this

at the May 3 meeting. However, I don't want to wait until then to send the initial data collection letter. I

want to get the letter in everyonê's hands so they will know what we are asking for and get started on

putting together a plan to respond.

iliÍlüir p+li f

. 1äi:Í:i i.-;;i¡

Ittw¡.y [t a þla$J¿."c.üd qg i{'e$¡rrrt(/v}rri]n 2.dâ
I have also developed a tentative agenda for the May 3 meeting, which I assume must of the people

receiving this email will attend 1or witt be sending a ðompany representative). I am assuming that we will

meet from approximately 12:30 until4 or 5 pm.

1. lntroductions and discussion of meeting objectives

2. Portland Cement NESHAP

a. tmplications of the Brick NESHAP decision for the Portland Cement NESHAP ( Steve

Silverman - Office of General Counsel)

b. Discussion if how we plan to proceed with the reconsideration and schedule

c. Presentation of öurrent mercury and total hydrocarbon emissions data in-house

d. Data needs and potential ¡ndustry subcategorization possibilities

e. Wet scrubber testing

3. Portland Cement New Source Performance Standards review

a. Schedule

b. Discussion of facilities most representat¡ve of future new kilns

c. Data Needs

4. lntroduction to the cement sector Poect

Keith W. Barnett

USEPA/OAQPS/SPPD/MMG

MailCode D243-02

Research Triangle Park, NC 27711

919-541-5605

barnett.keith@epa. gov
#### Timothy Ellis McDANIEL v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 84-54

691 S.W.2d 153

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered June 10, 1985

*Appellant,*pro se.

No response.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner Timothy Ellis McDaniel was found guilty by a jury of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment in the Arkansas Department of Correction. We affirmed on October 8, 1984. *McDaniel*v. *State,*283 Ark. 352, 679 S.W.2d 732 (1984).

On February 19, 1985, petitioner filed in the circuit court a petition for writ of error coram nobis and a motion for new trial. The basis of both the petition and motion was the allegation that petitioner’s co-defendant Jaran Gookin had recently signed an affidavit admitting that he, not petitioner, shot the murder victim. The trial court denied the motion for new trial as untimely. It treated the error coram nobis petition as a petition to proceed pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37 and also denied it. The court correctly concluded that since petitioner’s case had been affirmed on appeal, he was required to secure permission from this Court to proceed under Rule 37 in the trial court. Rule 37.2 *247(a). Petitioner McDaniel has not requested or received such permission from this Court.

Petitioner has now filed a motion asking that we grant an extension of time for him to file a petition for writ of certiorari challenging the denial of the petition for writ of error coram nobis. Since the trial court treated his error coram nobis petition as a Rule 37 petition, he has also filed a notice of appeal in the circuit court, apparently because a direct appeal is the proper means to obtain a review of the denial of relief sought under Rule 37.

 The petition for extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari is denied. Petitioner was not entitled to relief on a writ of error coram nobis. Once a conviction has been affirmed on appeal, error coram nobis is not available to secure a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. *Williams*v. *Langston,*285 Ark. 444, 688 S.W.2d 285 (1985); *See also Pickens*v. *State,*284 Ark. 506, 683 S.W.2d 614 (1985); *Penn*v. *State,*282 Ark. 571, 670 S.W.2d 426 (1984). If a petitioner discovers some ground for relief such as that claimed by this petitioner after a judgment is affirmed, he may present that ground in a clemency proceeding. *Williams*v. *State.*As the trial court was correct that it did not have jurisdiction to act on the petition whether the court considered it to be either a petition for writ of error coram nobis or a Rule 37 petition, there is no cause for this Court to consider further petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a petition for writ of certiorari.

Motion denied.
### NUMBER 13 - 14 - 00 431 - CV 

## COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

IN RE STATE FARM LLOYDS , RICHARD FREYMANN ,

AND DIAHANN ARMSTRONG

On Petition for Writ of Mandamus.



## MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Perkes and Longoria

Memorandum Opinion 1 

### Per Curiam Relators, State Farm Lloyds , Ri chard Freymann, and Diahann Armstrong, have filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct respondent, the Honorab le Rose Guerra Reyna, Presiding Judge of the 206th District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas, to withdraw her order denying relators’ verified plea in abatement and to enter an order abating the suit for damages brought agai nst relators by the real part ies i n i nterest, Reyes Banda and Clemencia Banda , u ntil sixty days after they provide relators

1 See T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 52.8(d) ( “ When denying relief, the court may hand down an opinion but is not required to do so. ” ); T EX

. R. A PP

. P . 47.4 (distinguishing opinions and memorandum opinions).2

with a notice letter for their claim stating the specific, separate amounts for the claimed damages and attorney’s fees. See T EX

. I NS

. C ODE A NN . § 541.154 (West, Wes tlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Prior Notice of Action”); id. § 541.155 (West, Westlaw through 2013 3d C.S.) (“Abatement”); T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.1 (“Commencement” of Original Proceedings). By order previously issued in this cause, this Court granted temporary relief and requested that the real part ies in interest file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 52.8(a),(b). The real parties filed a motion for extension of time to file their response, which we hereby grant. Such response has been duly filed.
T he Court, having examined and fully considered th e petition for writ of mandamus, the response, and the applicable law , is of the opinion that th e petition for writ of mandamus should be denied for the reasons expressed in ou r opinion in In re State Farm Lloyds, Richard Freymann, and Nathan Burris , No. 13

- 14

- 00347

- CV, 2014 WL _____ (Tex. App.

— Corpus Christi Aug. 27, 2014, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.), available at http://www.search.txcourts.gov/case.aspx?cn=13

- 14

- 00348

- CV. Ac cordingly, the Court WITHDRAWS its request for the real parties to file a response to the petition for writ of mandamus and DISMISSES the real parties’ motion for extension of time as moot. The Court LIFTS the stay previously imposed by this Court and DEN IES the petit ion for writ of mandamus and request for immediate temporary relief

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P

. 52.8( d ). PER CURIAM

D elivered and filed the 2nd day of September, 2014.
NUMBER 13-21-00366-CR

COURT OF APPEALS

THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG

EMILIO VARGAS, Appellant,

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.

On appeal from the 214th District Court

of Nueces County, Texas.

O R D E R

Before Justices Benavides, Longoria, and Tijerina

Order Per Curiam

Appellant, Emilio Vargas, has filed a notice of appeal with this Court from his 

conviction in trial court cause number 21FC-1613F. The trial court’s certification of the 

defendant’s right to appeal shows that the defendant does not have the right to appeal. 

See TEX. R. APP. P. 25.2(a)(2). The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provide that an 

appeal must be dismissed if a certification showing that a defendant has a right of 
2

appeal is not made a part of the record. Id. R. 25.2(d); see id. R. 37.1, 44.3, 44.4. The 

purpose of the certification requirement is to efficiently sort appealable cases from nonappealable cases so that appealable cases can “move through the system unhindered 

while eliminating, at an early stage, the time and expense associated with nonappealable cases.” Greenwell v. Ct. of Apps. for the Thirteenth Jud. Dist., 159 S.W.3d 

645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 912 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

Within thirty days of this notice, appellant’s lead appellate counsel, Roberto G. 

Vela, is hereby ORDERED to: 1) review the record; 2) determine whether appellant has 

a right to appeal; and 3) forward to this Court, by letter, counsel’s findings as to whether 

appellant has a right to appeal and/or advise this Court as to the existence of any 

amended certification. 

If appellant’s counsel determines that appellant has a right to appeal, counsel is 

further ORDERED to file a motion with this Court within thirty days of this notice, 

identifying and explaining substantive reasons why appellant has a right to appeal. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.3, 44.4; Dears v. State, 154 S.W.3d 610, 614–15 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2005); see also, e.g., Carroll v. State, 119 S.W.3d 838, 841 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 

2003, no pet.) (certification form provided in appendix to appellate rules may be 

modified to reflect that defendant has right of appeal under circumstances not 

addressed by the form). The motion must include an analysis of the applicable case 

law, and any factual allegations therein must be true and supported by the record. See 

Dears, 154 S.W.3d at 614–15; cf. Woods v. State, 108 S.W.3d 314, 316 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2003) (construing former appellate rule 25.2(b)(3) and holding that recitations in 

the notice of appeal must be true and supported by the record). Copies of record 
3

documents necessary to evaluate the alleged error in the certification affecting 

appellant’s right to appeal shall be attached to the motion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 10.1,

10.2.

PER CURIAM

Do not publish. 

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Delivered and filed on the

26th day of October 2021.
Order entered May 13, 2013

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-13-00249-CR

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant

V.

SETH PIERCE, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Criminal Court of Appeals No. 1

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. MC12-B7508

ORDER

The Court GRANTS appellee’s May 9, 2013 motion to extend time to file his brief only 

to the extent that we ORDER appellee to file his brief by MAY 28, 2013.

The appeal remains set for submission on June 7, 2013.

We DIRECT the Clerk to send copies of this order, by electronic transmission, to 

counsel for all parties.

/s/ MICHAEL J. O’NEILL

PRESIDING JUSTICE
Continuing Abatement Order filed January 12, 2012. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-10-00400-CV

____________

KEESHA PERRY, Appellant

V.

HOUSTON HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law No. 1

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 951539

CONTINUING ABATEMENT ORDER

On July 22, 2011 appellee notified this court that the parties were negotiating an 

agreement to settle the issues on appeal. Because of administrative processes in this 

matter, appellee has advised that it will take an extended period of time to finalize any 

settlement. Accordingly, on July 28, 2011, this court abated the appeal for a period of four 

months. To date, the court has not been advised whether the settlement has been 

completed. Accordingly, we issue the following order.

The parties are directed to advise this court in writing of the status of the settlement. 

If the case has settled, an appropriate motion to dismiss the appeal should be filed. The 

appeal remains ABATED, treated as a closed case, and removed from this court=s active 
2

docket until February 13, 2012. The appeal will be reinstated on this court=s active 

docket at that time, or when the parties file a motion to dismiss the appeal or other 

dispositive motion. The court will also consider an appropriate motion to reinstate the 

appeal filed by either party, or the court may reinstate the appeal on its own motion. 

PER CURIAM
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

United States of America

v. 2:17-cr-185

Judge Marbley

Donna Marie Chappell 

ORDER

There being no objections, the court hereby adopts the Report

and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 49) that the

defendant’s guilty plea be accepted. The Court accepts the

defendant’s plea of guilty to Count 1 of the Indictment, and she is

hereby adjudged guilty on these counts. The Court will defer the

decision of whether to accept the plea agreement until the

sentencing hearing.

Date: May 23, 2018 s\Algenon L. Marbley 

 Algenon L. Marbley

 United States District Judge