UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

RONALD LEE BRINSON,

Case No. 1:18-cv-96

Plaintiff,

Barrett, J.

v. Bowman, M.J.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

By separate Order issued this date, Plaintiff has been granted leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The complaint itself is now 

before the Court for a sua sponte review to determine whether the complaint, or any 

portion of it, should be dismissed because it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is 

immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). For the reasons that follow, 

the undersigned recommends that the complaint be dismissed.

I. General Screening Authority

Congress has authorized federal courts to dismiss an in forma 

pauperis complaint if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious. Denton v. 

Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). A complaint 

may be dismissed as frivolous when the plaintiff cannot make any claim with a rational 

or arguable basis in fact or law. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328-29 (1989); see 

also Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196, 1198 (6th Cir. 1990). An action has no 

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arguable legal basis when the defendant is immune from suit or when plaintiff claims a 

violation of a legal interest which clearly does not exist. Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327. An 

action has no arguable factual basis when the allegations are delusional or rise to the 

level of the irrational or “wholly incredible.” Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Lawler, 898 F.2d at 

1199. The Court need not accept as true factual allegations that are “fantastic or 

delusional” in reviewing a complaint for frivolousness. Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 471 

(6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328).

Congress has also authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints which fail 

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii). 

Although a plaintiff's pro se complaint must be “liberally construed” and “held to less 

stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers,” the complaint must “give 

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. 

Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976), and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 

555 (2007) (internal citation and quotation omitted)). The complaint “must contain 

sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 

570); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th Cir. 2010)(“dismissal standard 

articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure to state a claim” under 

§§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1)).

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows 

the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 

misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The 

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Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but need not “accept as 

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 

(quoting Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Although a complaint need not 

contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide “more than an unadorned, thedefendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 

550 U.S. at 555). A pleading that offers “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic 

recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 

Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual 

enhancement.” Id. at 557.

II. Analysis

A. Allegations Of Complaint

Plaintiff Brinson’s pro se complaint identifies the “Department of Commerce” in 

Columbus, Ohio as the sole Defendant. Plaintiff alleges as follows:

On or about January 26th, 2018, I Ronald Lee Brinson...[received] from 

Greater Cincinnati Behavioral 2525 Victory Parkway 45206 a form from 

the Unclaimed funds w/ the amount of 22.15 Million Dollars and no cents.

At the same time while watching [the] State of the Union speech by 

President Donald Trump I [received] a check for $25.57 cents under gross 

amount.

I have been [waiting] (18) Eighteen Years for this Money I did not even 

know I had it piled like that, but I worked for every Dollar of that money 

and I also earned, the Unclaimed fund Co. found money I did not receive 

off an on [sic] I spent over 36 years in prison for crime I didn’t do. But 

when I set my mind to do something, I Get the Job Done!

(Doc. 1-1 at 3). In the “Relief” section of the complaint form asking Plaintiff to describe 

“exactly what you want the court to do for you,” Plaintiff has written the following:

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No relief was compensated I was suing for 7.7 million for excessive use of 

force seven officers jumped me and, I was released on 4-1-2000 and 

settled for my freedom.

(Id. at 4). 

B. Dismissal Recommended For Lack of Jurisdiction and Failure to State 

Any Claim

Plaintiff has used a pro se civil rights complaint form, and indicates that he is 

suing the Defendant under color of State law, for depriving him of a right secured by 

federal law or the Constitution. However, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 

because Plaintiff does not allege any conduct by the Defendant at all, and/or his 

allegations state no facts that would support any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or any 

other federal law, against the Ohio Department of Commerce. Plaintiff also fails to 

indicate any relief he seeks from this Court. Last, to the extent that he is complaining 

about events that led to his incarceration for a period of 36 years, culminating with his 

release on April 1, 2000, any possible claim would be time-barred.

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons explained above, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT this case be

DISMISSED with prejudice based upon a lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and 

Plaintiff’s failure to state any claim against any Defendant under federal law.

 s/ Stephanie K. Bowman 

Stephanie K. Bowman 

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

RONALD LEE BRINSON,

Case No. 1:18-cv-96

Plaintiff,

Barrett, J.

v. Bowman, M.J.

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE,

Defendant.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of 

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely 

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) 

of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support 

of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN 

(14) DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make 

objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas

v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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