If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to 

revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re S. L. JORDAN, Minor. March 10, 2022

Nos. 357590; 357592

Wayne Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 2019-000829-NA

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and BORRELLO and M. J. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

In Docket No. 357590, respondent mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order 

terminating her parental rights to her child, SLJ, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) (parent failed to 

protect child from sexual abuse and there is a reasonable likelihood of future abuse), (g) (parent 

failed to provide care and custody), (i) (parental rights to one or more siblings terminated due to 

neglect or abuse and prior attempts to rehabilitate the parent have been unsuccessful), and (j) 

(reasonable likelihood that child will be harmed if returned to parent). In Docket No. 357592, 

respondent father appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating his parental rights to his 

child, SLJ, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused sexual abuse and the court finds 

likelihood that child may suffer from injury in the foreseeable future if placed in parent’s home), 

(g), (j), (k)(ii) (criminal sexual conduct involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault 

with intent to penetrate committed by parent against child or child’s sibling), and (k)(ix) (sexual 

abuse of a child). This Court consolidated these appeals. In re SLJ, Minor, unpublished order of 

the Court of Appeals, June 29, 2021 (Docket Nos. 357590 and 357592). For the reasons set forth 

in this opinion, we affirm.1 

I. BACKGROUND

Prior to respondent mother giving birth to SLJ, the trial court entered an order terminating 

her parental rights to SLJ’s half-siblings, LCM and ASM, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) and (j) 

for “failing to protect her children from continued sexual abuse and inappropriate contact with 

 

1 This Court received filings solely from respondents. No other party to this action filed any 

documentation with this Court.
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sexual predators.” Respondent father was alleged to have sexually abused LCM and was included 

as a nonparent respondent in the case. Respondent mother appealed, and this Court affirmed the 

trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to LCM and ASM under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) 

and (j). In re Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, 

issued March 17, 2020 (Docket No. 350741), p 1.

Following SLJ’s birth, petitioner filed a permanent custody petition asserting that the trial 

court should exercise jurisdiction over SLJ, enter an order removing SLJ from respondents’ home, 

and terminate respondents’ parental rights. The trial court authorized the petition, and SLJ was 

placed in relative foster care in the home of his paternal grandmother. Following several 

scheduling delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court held a combined adjudicatory 

hearing and termination hearing during which the trial court took judicial notice of the case file in 

the matter regarding the termination of respondent mother’s parental rights to LCM and ASM. 

The trial court also took judicial notice of this Court’s unpublished opinion in In re 

Massey/McIntyre, Minors, unpub op at 1-6. During the hearing, petitioner presented evidence that 

respondent mother and respondent father continued to reside together and failed to attend 

scheduled visits with SLJ on a consistent basis. Ultimately, the trial court held that there were 

grounds to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), (i), 

and (j), and there were grounds to terminate respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). The trial court also held that terminating 

respondents’ parental rights was in SLJ’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). This appeal 

followed. 

II. ANALYSIS

On appeal, respondents argue that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that there 

were statutory grounds to terminate their parental rights to SLJ. 

In order to terminate parental rights, a trial court must find that a statutory ground has been 

established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 

(2013). The trial court’s findings regarding statutory grounds are reviewed for clear error. Id. “A 

finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a 

mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe 

the witnesses.” Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

A. RESPONDENT MOTHER

Respondent mother argues that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that there 

were statutory grounds to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (g), (i), and 

(j). We hold that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that there was a statutory ground 

to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) but did not clearly 

err when it determined that there were statutory grounds to terminate respondent mother’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii), (i), and (j). 

1. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii)
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The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). Termination of parental rights 

is appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii) if the child or sibling2of the child has suffered 

physical injury or sexual abuse, and “[t]he parent who had the opportunity to prevent the physical 

injury or physical or sexual abuse failed to do so and the court finds that there is a reasonable 

likelihood that the child will suffer injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s 

home.” In the present case, the trial court previously determined that respondent father sexually 

abused SLJ’s half-sister, LCM, respondent mother admitted that she was aware of the sexual abuse, 

however respondent mother allowed respondent father to remain in her home with LCM. The trial 

court took judicial notice of the prior case file as well as this Court’s unpublished opinion in In re 

Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpub op at 1-6, and held that relitigation of the issue concerning the 

alleged instances of sexual abuse was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.3 Thus, the record 

reflects that SLJ’s sibling suffered sexual abuse, and respondent mother had the opportunity to 

prevent the sexual abuse but failed to do so. Furthermore, respondent mother acknowledged that 

she maintained a romantic relationship with respondent father after learning of the sexual abuse. 

Respondent mother allowed SLJ to live in the same home with respondent father after her birth. 

Although respondent mother maintained that her romantic relationship with respondent father had 

since ended, multiple witnesses testified that respondent mother still resided with respondent 

father. Considering that “how a parent treats one child is certainly probative of how that parent 

may treat other children[,]” In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 730; 858 NW2d 143 

(2014) (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted), the record reflects that there was a 

reasonable likelihood that SLJ would suffer sexual abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the 

home respondent mother shared with respondent father. Therefore, the trial court did not clearly 

err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). 

Only one statutory ground needs to be established to support termination of parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3). In re Martin, 316 Mich App 73, 90; 896 NW2d 452 (2016). Therefore, 

termination of respondent mother’s parental rights was appropriate based upon MCL 

712A.19b(3)(b)(ii). Nonetheless, we will address the additional statutory grounds for termination.

2. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)

The trial court clearly erred when it terminated respondent mother’s parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). A trial court may terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if 

the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he parent, although, in the court’s 

discretion, financially able to do so, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there 

is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within 

a reasonable time considering the child’s age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). When the trial court 

addressed MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), it made no factual findings regarding respondent mother’s 

 

2 The term “sibling” is not defined in MCL 712A.1. Nonetheless, this Court explained in In re 

Jenks, 281 Mich App 514, 517; 760 NW2d 297 (2008), that MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) “clearly 

encompasses” the sexual abuse of a child’s half-sibling. 

3 Respondent mother does not assert that such actions were erroneous. 
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financial ability to care for SLJ. In fact, much of respondent mother’s appeal focuses on her ability 

and willingness to financially provide for the minor child. Evidence was submitted by respondent 

mother and others indicating that there were ample baby supplies purchased for the minor child. 

However, in the absence of any findings of fact by the trial court, the trial court improperly 

concluded that termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). Nevertheless, this error 

is harmless because only one statutory ground needs to be established to support the termination 

of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3). In re Martin, 316 Mich at 90. 

3. MCL 712A.19b(3)(i)

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). A trial court may terminate 

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i) if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that an 

individual’s “parental rights to [one] or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to 

serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has failed to rectify the 

conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). As 

previously indicated, the trial court determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s halfsister, LCM, respondent mother admitted that she was aware of the sexual abuse, and respondent 

mother allowed respondent father to remain in her home with LCM. Respondent mother’s parental 

rights to LCM were terminated due to respondent mother’s failure to protect LCM from sexual 

abuse committed by respondent father. Respondent mother acknowledged that she maintained a 

romantic relationship with respondent father after learning of the sexual abuse. Additionally, 

respondent mother allowed SLJ to live in the same home with respondent father after her birth. 

Although respondent mother maintained that her romantic relationship with respondent father had 

since ended, multiple witnesses testified that respondent mother still resided with respondent 

father. Although respondent mother contends on appeal, as she did in the trial court, that she is 

“looking for a new home,” it has been nearly three years (April 2019) since DHHS took custody 

of her other minor children because one of them was sexually molested and respondent mother 

continues to leave with the person she admits sexually molested her minor child. Her assertion that 

she is “planning to move” rings hollow and because respondent mother still resided with 

respondent father despite her belief that respondent father sexually abused LCM, respondent 

mother failed to rectify the conditions that led to the prior termination of parental rights. Therefore, 

contrary to respondent mother’s dubious contention that she is planning to move away from 

respondent father, the record clearly reveals that the trial court did not clearly err when it 

determined that there were grounds to terminate respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(i). 

4. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent mother’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). A trial court may terminate 

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if its finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

“[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the 

child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), harm can include either physical or emotional harm. In re Hudson, 

294 Mich App 261, 268; 817 NW2d 115 (2011). As previously indicated, the trial court 

determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s half-sister, LCM, respondent mother 
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admitted she was aware of the sexual abuse, and respondent mother allowed respondent father to 

remain in her home with LCM. Respondent mother acknowledged that she maintained a romantic 

relationship with respondent father after learning of the sexual abuse. Additionally, respondent 

mother allowed SLJ to live in the same home with respondent father after her birth. Although 

respondent mother maintained that her romantic relationship with respondent father had since 

ended, multiple witnesses testified that respondent mother still resided with respondent father. 

Because respondent mother still resided with respondent father despite her belief that respondent 

father sexually abused LCM, there was a reasonable likelihood, based on respondent mother’s 

conduct or capacity as a parent, that SLJ would be harmed if she was returned to respondent 

mother’s home. Moreover, Brownlee testified that respondent mother participated in five out of 

31 scheduled visits with SLJ since Brownlee was assigned to the case in October 2020. 

Respondent mother’s failure to participate in scheduled visitation on a regular basis provides 

evidence that SLJ would be harmed if she were returned to respondent mother’s home. Therefore, 

the record reflects that there were grounds to terminate respondent father’s parental rights under 

MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 

B. RESPONDENT FATHER

We glean from his brief on appeal that respondent father argues on appeal that the trial 

court clearly erred when it determined that there were statutory grounds to terminate his parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (g), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix). For many of the same conclusions 

in respondent mother’s appeal, we hold that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that 

there was a statutory ground to terminate respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 

712A.19b(3)(g) but did not clearly err when it determined that there were statutory grounds to 

terminate respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i), (j), (k)(ii), and (k)(ix).

1. MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i)

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). Termination of parental rights 

is appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) if the child or sibling4of the child has suffered 

physical injury or sexual abuse, and “[t]he parent’s act caused the physical injury or physical or 

sexual abuse and the court finds that there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will suffer from 

injury or abuse in the foreseeable future if placed in the parent’s home.” In the present case, the 

trial court determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s half-sister, LCM. The trial 

court took judicial notice of the prior case file as well as this Court’s unpublished opinion in In re 

Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpub op at 1-6, and held that relitigation of the issue concerning the 

alleged instances of sexual abuse was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.5 Thus, the record 

reflected that respondent father sexually abused LCM. For this same reason, the record reflected 

that there was a reasonable likelihood that SLJ would suffer from abuse in the foreseeable future 

 

4 The term “sibling” is not defined in MCL 712A.1. Nonetheless, this Court explained in In re 

Jenks, 281 Mich App at 517, that MCL 712A.19b(3)(b) “clearly encompasses” the sexual abuse 

of a child’s half-sibling. 

5 Respondent father does not assert that such actions were erroneous. 
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if placed in respondent father’s home. There was no record evidence that respondent father 

received treatment to address his sexually abusive behavior. Furthermore, “how a parent treats 

one child is certainly probative of how that parent may treat other children.” In re LaFrance 

Minors, 306 Mich App at 730 (quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Thus, respondent 

father’s sexual abuse of LCM indicates that SLJ would be at risk of sexual abuse in respondent 

father’s home. Therefore, the record reflected that there were grounds to terminate respondent 

father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). 

Only one statutory ground needs to be established to support termination of parental rights 

under MCL 712A.19b(3). In re Martin, 316 Mich App at 90. Therefore, termination of respondent 

father’s parental rights was appropriate based upon MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). Nonetheless, we will 

address the additional statutory grounds for termination.

2. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)

The trial court clearly erred when it determined that there was a statutory ground to 

terminate respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). A trial court may 

terminate parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if the court finds by clear and convincing 

evidence that “[t]he parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so, fails to 

provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent 

will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child’s 

age.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). When the trial court addressed MCL 712A.19b(3)(g), it made no 

factual findings regarding respondent father’s financial ability to care for SLJ. Thus, the trial court 

could not have properly found that termination was appropriate under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g). 

Nevertheless, this error is harmless because only one statutory ground needs to be established to 

support the termination of parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3). In re Martin, 316 Mich at 90. 

3. MCL 712A.19b(3)(j)

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). A trial court may terminate 

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) if its finds by clear and convincing evidence that 

“[t]here is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child’s parent, that the 

child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.” MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 

Under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j), harm can include either physical or emotional harm. In re Hudson, 

294 Mich App at 268. As already indicated, the trial court previously determined that respondent 

father sexually abused SLJ’s half-sister, LCM. Additionally, there was no record evidence that 

respondent father received treatment to address his alleged sexually abusive behavior. Given 

respondent father’s history of sexual abuse of minor children, there was a reasonable likelihood 

that SLJ would be harmed if she was returned to respondent father’s home. Furthermore, Brownlee 

testified that respondent father participated in four out of 31 scheduled visits with SLJ since 

Brownlee was assigned to the case in October 2020. Respondent father’s failure to participate in 

scheduled visitation on a regular basis provides evidence that SLJ would be harmed if she was 

returned to respondent father’s home. Therefore, the record reflects that there were grounds to 

terminate respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). 

4. MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii)
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The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(k)(ii). A trial court may terminate 

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(k)(ii) if its finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will 

be harmed if returned to the care of the parent, and the abuse included “[c]riminal sexual conduct 

involving penetration, attempted penetration, or assault with intent to penetrate.” As already 

indicated, the trial court previously determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s halfsister, LCM. The trial court took judicial notice of the prior case file as well as this Court’s 

unpublished opinion in In re Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpub op at 1-6, and held that relitigation 

of the issue concerning the alleged instances of sexual abuse was barred by the doctrine of res 

judicata. In the matter regarding the termination of respondents’ parental rights to LCM and ASM, 

the trial court found that respondent father made several attempts to orally penetrate LCM. In re 

Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpub op at 1. Thus, the record reflected that respondent father abused 

LCM, and the abuse included criminal sexual conduct involving attempted penetration. 

Furthermore, there was no record evidence that respondent father received treatment to address his 

sexually abusive behavior. Given respondent father’s history of sexual abuse, there was a 

reasonable likelihood that SLJ would be harmed if she was returned to respondent father’s home. 

Therefore, the record reflects that there were grounds to terminate respondent father’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii). 

5. MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ix)

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that there were grounds to terminate 

respondent father’s parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(k)(ix). A trial court may terminate 

parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(k)(ix) if its finds by clear and convincing evidence that the 

parent abused the child or a sibling of the child, there is a reasonable likelihood that the child will 

be harmed if returned to the care of the parent, and the abuse included “[s]exual abuse as that term 

is defined in . . . MCL 722.622.” Under MCL 722.622(z), sexual abuse is defined as “engaging in 

sexual contact or sexual penetration as those terms are defined in . . . MCL 750.520a, with a child.” 

Under MCL 750.520a(q), sexual contact is defined as “the intentional touching of the victim’s or 

actor’s intimate parts or the intentional touching of the clothing covering the immediate area of 

the victim’s or actor’s intimate parts, if that intentional touching can reasonably be construed as 

being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification . . . .” Under MCL 750.520a(r), sexual 

penetration is defined as “sexual intercourse, cunnilingus, fellatio, anal intercourse, or any other 

intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal 

openings of another person’s body, but emission of semen is not required.” As already indicated, 

the trial court previously determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s half-sister, 

LCM. The trial court took judicial notice of the prior case file as well as this Court’s unpublished 

opinion in In re Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpub op at 1-6, and held that relitigation of the issue 

concerning the alleged instances of sexual abuse was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. In the 

matter regarding the termination of respondents’ parental rights to LCM and ASM, evidence was 

admitted which indicated that respondent father rubbed his penis against LCM’s vaginal area. In 

re Massey/McIntyre Minors, unpub op at 1. Thus, the record reflected that respondent father 

intentionally touched the clothing covering the immediate area of LCM’s intimate parts, and such 

touching could be reasonably construed as being for the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification. 

Therefore, the record reflects that there were grounds to terminate respondent father’s parental 

rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ix). 
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III. BEST INTERESTS

On appeal, respondents argue that the trial court clearly erred when it determined that 

terminating their parental rights was in SLJ’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). 

Whether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the child must be proved 

by a preponderance of the evidence.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. This Court reviews the 

trial court’s ruling that termination is in the child’s best interests for clear error. In re Hudson, 294 

Mich App at 268. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and 

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special 

opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App at 80 (citation and quotation 

marks omitted). 

“If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that 

termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests, the court shall order termination of 

parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be 

made.” MCL 712A.19b(5). “In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the 

court may consider the child’s bond to the parent, the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need 

for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent’s 

home.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 297 Mich App 35, 41-42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012) (citations 

omitted). The trial court may also consider “the parent’s compliance with his or her case service 

plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the children’s well-being while in care, and the 

possibility of adoption.” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 846 NW2d 61 (2014) (citations 

omitted). “Other considerations include the length of time the child was in care, the likelihood 

that the child could be returned to her parents’ home within the foreseeable future, if at all, and 

compliance with the case service plan.” In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson, 311 Mich App 49, 64; 

874 NW2d 205 (2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “[T]he fact that the children are in 

the care of a relative at the time of the termination hearing is an explicit factor to consider in 

determining whether termination was in the children’s best interests.” In re Olive/Metts Minors, 

297 Mich App at 43 (citation and quotation marks omitted). 

A. RESPONDENT MOTHER

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent 

mother’s parental rights was in SLJ’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). Initially, we 

acknowledge that multiple witnesses testified that respondent mother shared a bond with SLJ. 

Nevertheless, the record reflects that respondent mother lacked strong parenting skills. As already 

indicated, the trial court previously determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s halfsister, LCM, respondent mother was aware of the sexual abuse, and respondent mother allowed 

respondent father to remain in her home with LCM. Respondent mother acknowledged that she 

maintained a romantic relationship with respondent father after learning of the sexual abuse and 

allowed SLJ to live in the same home with respondent father after her birth. Furthermore, SLJ’s 

foster home had advantages over respondent mother’s home. Although respondent mother 

maintained that her romantic relationship with respondent father had ended, multiple witnesses 

testified that respondent mother still resided with respondent father. In contrast, there were no 

reported concerns regarding SLJ’s safety in foster care with her paternal grandmother. SLJ’s 

paternal grandmother was willing to adopt her such that termination served SLJ’s need for 
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permanency, stability, and finality. SLJ had been in foster care for more than one year, and as 

previously pointed out, respondent mother failed to participate in a majority of the scheduled visits 

with SLJ during that period. Lastly, the trial court explicitly considered SLJ’s relative placement 

in determining that termination was in SLJ’s best interests. For these reasons, the trial court did 

not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent mother’s parental rights was in 

SLJ’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). 

B. RESPONDENT FATHER

The trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent father’s 

parental rights was in SLJ’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). The record reflects that 

respondent father lacks strong parenting skills. As already indicated, the trial court previously 

determined that respondent father sexually abused SLJ’s half-sister, LCM. Additionally, there was 

no record evidence that respondent father received treatment to address his sexually abusive 

behavior. Thus, it was unlikely that SLJ could be returned to respondent father’s home in the 

foreseeable future. Furthermore, SLJ’s foster home had advantages over respondent father’s 

home. There were no reported concerns regarding SLJ’s safety in foster care with her paternal 

grandmother, and SLJ’s paternal grandmother was willing to adopt her such that termination 

served SLJ’s need for permanency, stability, and finality. SLJ had been in foster care for more 

than one year, and has previously pointed out, respondent father failed to participate in a majority 

of the scheduled visits with SLJ during that period. Lastly, the trial court explicitly considered 

SLJ’s relative placement in determining that termination was in SLJ’s best interests. For these 

reasons, the trial court did not clearly err when it determined that termination of respondent father’s 

parental rights was in SLJ’s best interests under MCL 712A.19b(5). 

Affirmed. 

/s/ Michael F. Gadola 

/s/ Stephen L. Borrello 

/s/ Michael J. Kelly