IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

IN THE MATTER OF: S. H., DOB: 

04/22/2000, AN ADULT OVER THE AGE 

OF 21. 

No. 82846 

FILED 

FEB 1 7 2022 

ELIZABEIN A. BROWN 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

BY 

S. H., 

Appellant, 

vs. 

THE STATE OF NEVADA, 

Res • ondent. 

ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 

This is an appeal from a juvenile court order adjudicating S.H. 

as a sex offender for purposes of registration and notification. First Judicial 

District Court, Carson City; James Todd Russell, Judge.' 

Appellant admitted to the charge of lewdness with a child under 

14 years of age in the juvenile court and was placed under supervision 

pursuant to a supervision and consent decree and submitted to a residential 

treatment program. After four years and several sporadic consent-decree 

violations, the court adjudicated appellant a delinquent on the underlying 

charge of lewdness with a child under 14 and placed him on formal 

probation. After he turned 21, the court held a hearing to determine 

whether it would require appellant to register as a sex offender pursuant to 

NRS 62F.340. Following that hearing, the court found that appellant was 

not rehabilitated, posed a continuing threat to the community, and should 

be subject to sex offender registration and reporting requirements. 

Appellant raises two contentions on appeal. 

'Pursuant to NRAP 34(f)(1), we have determined that oral argument 

is not warranted in this appeal. 

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First, appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in applying 

a heightened standard of proof during the hearing. We conclude that this 

argument lacks merit. The statute places the burden on the juvenile to 

show by "clear and convincing evidence . . . that the child has been 

rehabilitated to the satisfaction of the juvenile court and that the child is 

not likely to pose a threat to the safety of others." NRS 62F.340(3). The 

court repeatedly referenced the correct burden of proof throughout the 

hearing and its written order. While some evidence showed that appellant 

made progress in therapy, the court's conclusions that the charged crime 

was serious, that some diagnostic instruments indicated appellant had an 

above average risk to reoffend, and that appellant still experienced impulse 

control issues were not manifestly erroneous and did not indicate that the 

court held appellant to a different burden than the one set forth in NRS 

62F.340(3). See NRS 62F.340(5) (listing factors to guide a court's 

determination in an NRS 62F.340 hearing); Bongiovi v. Sullivan, 122 Nev. 

556, 575, 138 P.3d 433, 447 (2006) (affording facts found by clear and 

convincing evidence "great deference" that will not be reversed "absent 

manifest error"). 

Second, appellant argues that the juvenile court abused its 

discretion by not sua sponte continuing the hearing to receive expert 

testimony after it questioned the reliability of one of the assessments used. 

We discern no abuse of discretion. See Sparks v. State, 96 Nev. 26, 28, 604 

P.2d 802, 803-04 (1980) (recognizing that a district court has discretion to 

continue proceedings when good cause exists). Appellant's counsel did not 

request a continuance for additional testimony but instead stated that the 

exhibits presented, including those drafted by the witness who could not 

attend, spoke for themselves. The record does not suggest that the court 

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needed the expert to clarify the reports. Instead, the court relied on the 

generally accepted actuarial assessment described in the reports in 

assessing appellant's risk to reoffend because that assessment has been 

shown to be accurate and appellant's most recent violation occurred when 

he was 18 years old. The court noted the expert's use of another evaluation 

but did not rely upon those findings because the evaluation had been 

described in the expert's report as experimental. Accordingly, appellant 

failed to demonstrate prejudice from the failure to grant a continuance. See 

Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. 1, 9, 222 P.3d 648, 653 (2010) ([I]f a defendant fails 

to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the denial of a continuance, then 

the district court's decision to deny the continuance is not an abuse of 

discretion."). 

Having considered appellant's contentions and concluded that 

they lack merit, we 

ORDER the judgment of the juvenile court AFFIRMED. 

P gjsegii_acarsammo7C.J. 

, J. Sr.J. 

Hardesty 

cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge 

State Public Defender/Carson City 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Carson City District Attorney 

Carson City Clerk 

arraguirre 

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