NO. 07-07 -044 8-CV IN THE CO URT OF APPEA LS FO R THE S EVEN TH D ISTRI CT O F TEXAS

AT AM AR ILLO PAN EL D APR IL 20 , 200 9

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___ STEPH EN F IN LEY , Appel lan t

v. JOL Y N C. W ILKI NS , Appel lee

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______ FRO M T HE COU NT Y COUR TAT LAW NO. 3 O F L UB BO CKCOU NT Y; NO. 200 6-59 9,9 78; HON. PAULA LA NEHART , PRESIDING

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____ Memorandum Opinion

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____ Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRT LE, JJ. Pendi ng before the c our t i s a n appea l of a final su mmary j udg ment. Throug h tha t jud g ment, the t ri al cour t c oncl uded t hat l imi tati ons bar re d the l egal m a lp ra cti ce act ion of Stephe n F inl ey

ag ain st Jol y n C . W il ki ns. The for mer had s ued the latter to re cov er

$1800 (w hic h represent ed th e remaind er of the $5000 fee W il ki ns ini ti all y recei v ed from a nd th en re t u r n e d t o F i n l e y ) , i n t e re s t , a n d a tt o r n e y ’ s fe e s fo r re p re s e n t i n g h i ms e l f pro se . W e af f irm the s ummary

j udg ment.T he m i sconductpur por t edl yconsi st ed o fsev er al j ur or s consi der i ng gende r i n r eachi ng t hei rv er di ct 1 and i n sev er al j ur or s i naccur at el yanswer i ng q uest i ons p r opoun ded t o t hem dur i ng v oi rdi r e. 2 Back gr ound Acc ordin g to Fi nle y , he hired W il ki ns to “find w hether and by w hat means a w ro ng ful cus tody v erdict i n D ecember 1997 coul d be cor re cte d, re v ersed, re heard, or remedie d by any othe r me ans av ailable .” T he two agreed to move for a new tr ial citing jury miscon duct as basis fo r th e r e li ef. The mot ion w as ti mely fil ed, t hen den ied on A pr il 3, 1998. 1 Thereafter , t he tr ial co urt ent ered a final di v orce decree i ncor porati ng the jury ’s cust ody v erdict i n Aug ustof 1998. N o appea l w as tak en from t hat fin al jud g ment. Before the d ay

of the h ear ing on t he moti on for new tr ial , F inl ey

di sc o vere d tha t ev ide nce of a ju ry ’s del ibe ra ti ons w as ina dmis si ble

. This ca used him to q uestion the v iability of

the m otio n s in c e, for the m ost pa rt, evi den ce of w hatoccurred du ring tho se del ibe ra ti ons w as pivotal to it s suc ces s. T he matter w as bro ached w it h W il ki ns or one of her employees. W it hin w eeks of t he moti on bei ng deni ed, Fi nle y als o spok e about itw it h several law professors w ho allegedly “expressed am azeme nt tha t any attorne y would f ile such a mot ion, since the do ctrine of ‘jury sanctity’ . . . w as v ery w ell-known and esse ntially inv iol abl e.” They

al so all eg edl y

tol d hi m th a t “t h e re w as no c hance for t he moti on to succee d” or “that [it] w as do om ed f rom th e time you guys starte d talking abo ut it.” B y O ct o b e r of 1 9 9 9 , F i n l e y

ha d re t a i n e d an o t h e r

a tt o r n e y a n d p e t i t i o n e d t o m o d i fy the custod y provisi ons specif ied i n the August 1998 decre e. T hat pet ition w as de nied in 2002, and t he dec is ion to deny it w as aff ir med on Dec ember 9, 2004. F inl ey

then i nit iat ed the current m alpract ice action on July 19, 200 6, con ten ding that “the motio n [for new trial] w as not p ursued compet entl y .”3

Di sc ussion T hata two -ye ar period of limitation s app lies to legal malpra ctice claims is undi sput ed. T EX . C IV . P R AC . & R EM . C OD E A NN . §16.003 (a ) (V er non Su pp. 2 008) ; Par sons v. Tur ley , 109 S. W .3d 804, 807-0 8 (Tex . App.–D all as 2003, pet. deni ed) . Simi lar ly cl ear is thatunl ess the sta tute of li mita ti ons w as tol led , F inl ey ’s su itag ain st W il ki ns w as unti mely

. Thus, Fi n le y p ro f fe re d two the or ies w hic h he bel iev ed to ll ed l imi tati ons. They cons is ted o f the di sc ov er y doctr ine and the a ppl ic ati on of the Hughes ra t i o n a l e . W e cons ide r the for mer firs t. N o r ma l l y , l i mi t a t i o n s b e g i n t o r u n w h e n a c a u s e o f a ct i o n a c cr ues. South Pl ain s Sw itching, Ltd. Co

. v. BN SF R y. Co. , 255 S. W .3d 6 90, 7 07 (T e x. Ap p . - Amar il lo 2008, pet. deni ed)

. A l eg al malpract ic e caus e of acti on g enerall y ac cr ues w hen facts co me i nto ex is tenc e that author iz e a cl ien t to seek a judic ial remedy for a leg al inj ur

y . Apex T owing Co. v. T oli n, 41 S. W .3d 1 18, 1 20 ( Tex . 200 1)

. At t imes , howev er , t he period d o e s not begin to run until the client discove rs o r t hrou gh the exercise of reason able dilig ence shoul d hav e di sc ov ered th e facts es tabl is h in g t h e el ements of a c ause of acti on. Id. at 120- 21. Gi v en that the p ur por ted mi sfeasanc e of W il ki ns involv ed th e moti on for new tr ial f iled in his div orce proce edin g, that Finley ex presse d do ubt s abo ut th e grounds u rg ed in and t he v iab il ity

of the mot ion , and thathe a ls o s poke w it h two la w professors a bout the matter and thei r pur por

ted c omments confirmed his bel iefs, w e c oncl ude, as a matt er of law , tha t Finley knew or reaso nab ly shou ld have kn o wn abo ut th e facts giv ing r ise to his cl aims before entr

y of the A ug ust1998 divorce d e cree. So, hi s c lai m had ac cr ued and li mita ti ons had beg un to r un before the n.4

As fo r th e s e cond arg ument, w e not e tha t i n Hughes v. Ma haney & H iggins , 821 S.W .2d 154 ( Tex . 199 1) our Supreme C our

t hel d tha t “ w hen an attor ney co mmits malpract ic e in the prosec uti on or defense of a cl aim that re sul ts in li ti g ati on, t he s tatut e of limitat ions on the m alpract ice claim .

. . is to lled unt il all app eals on th e un derlyi ng claim are exhauste d.” Id. at 157; acc or d, U nder kof ler v. Vanas ek, 53 S.W .3d 3 43, 3 46 ( Tex . 200 1) (w herein co unsel w as chang ed w hil e the tri al remaine d pending and hol din g that l imi tati ons did no t run un til the trial resulted in a f inal judgme nt th at w entuna ppe aled ). To th e ph rase “u nti l all appeal s on the under ly ing clai m are ex haust ed,” the cour t add ed “ or

the li ti g ati on is othe rw is e final ly conc lud ed” v ia it s d eci si on i n Ape x Towin g Co

. v. Tolin , 41 S.W .3d a t 119. Here, t he pur por ted mi sfeasanc e oc cur re d dur in g t h e l it ig ati on of chi ld cus tody is sues thatarose as par t of F inl ey ’s di v orce. C ust ody had been awarded by

a j ur y to the mother , and Finl ey

did not w ant that deci si on to stand. So, i n effort t o ov ertur n i t, he and W il ki ns filed the moti on for new tr ial , w hic h act F inl ey

co nsi dere d i m p ro per . Onc e tha t mo tion was ov erruled a nd th e results of thatlitig ation w ere incorp ora t e d into the Au gust 199 8 divorce decree, all q uest ion ab outw hich pa rent would have w hatconse rv ato rship rig hts up on d iv orce w ere resolved. By tha t time , Finley had already discussed w ith oth ers w hat h e bel iev ed to be W il ki ns’ defic ien t c onduct. Gi v en th ese ci rc umstan ces , we hol d tha t t h e u n d e r l y i n g c l a i m o r s u i t , fo r p u r p o s e s o f Hug hes , w as the c hil d c ust ody di sput e and li ti g ati on c ulmi n a ting i n the final di v orce decree ent ered i n Aug ustof 1998. Si nce no appeal w as tak en from t hat j udg ment, the two- y ear li mita ti ons per iod beg an w hen itw as si g ned.5

It mayw ell be that Fi nle y and W il ki ns spok e of peti ti oni ng for a modi ficat ion of the cus tody prov is ion s p re v iou sl y

ente re d. It mayw ell be t hat F inl ey al so hired an o th er atto rney to p u rs u e su ch relief once the Au gust 199 8 de cree be cam e f inal. Yet, just becau se the s ubj ectmatte r of those dis cus si ons and a ct s in volve d c hil d c ust ody , t he modific ati on proceed ing di d not become a par t or cont inu ati on of the ini ti al cus tody r uli ng an d l i ti g at i on . N or

d i d th e s i mi l ar i ty

o f t op i c s s om eh ow

ma k e th e proce edin gs or c l ai ms ass erted i n eac h i ndi v is ibl e. The tr uth i s q uit e the co ntrar y si nce two di sti nctproces ses w ere inv olv ed. Indeed, before there coul d be a se cond ( i. e. modify ing the t er ms of a pr ior decree) , th e first ( i. e. the ex ecut ion of a pr ior dec re e) musthav e oc cur re d; l og ic all y , one canno t modi fy someth ing thatnev er happen ed. Fu rt h er more, to modify the ter ms of cons er v atorshi p mandat ed by the pr ior final divorce decree, a tr ial co urt woul d hav e had to find thatthe ci rc umstan ces hav e mater ial ly and s ubst anti all y ch ang ed s inc e the date the decree was re ndered. T EX . F AM . C OD E A NN . §156.10 1( 1) ( Ver non 200 8) ; Zeifm an v. Mi chel s, 212 S. W .3d 5 82, 5 89 ( Tex . Ap p.–A u st in 2006, pet. deni ed) ; Bates v. T esar , 81 S.W .3d 4 11, 4 26- 27 (Tex . App.–El Paso 2002, no pet.) . This in tur n means thatthe focal poi nt of the modi ficat ion proce ss lies not on w hat ex is ted before entr y of the fin al jud g ment but rather

on w hat o cc ur re d or

arose after

entr y of that decree. In v iew of thi s, w e c annot but c onsi der

the two matt ers as di sti nctsu it s o r leg al proceed ing s, ev en th oug h the y may hav e the sa me cau se number

. And, thi s l eads us to c oncl ude here tha t the modi ficat ion suit subse quently prose cute d by Finley did no t toll limitatio ns, pe r Hughes , on a ny c l ai ms ar is ing from t he dec is ion to file the mot ion for n ew tr ial

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In s hor t, w e c annot say

thatth e t ria l cour

t er re d i n g ra nti ng su mmary j udg ment ag ain st Fi nle y

on t he bas is of li mita ti ons. That final su mmary j udg ment i s a ff ir med.

Br ian Qui nn Chief Justice