Plaintiff also brings suit against United States District Judge Rose for actions performed
in his judicial capacity. Judge Rose moves to dismiss Plaintiff's claim as barred by the doctrine
of judicial immunity. As the United States Supreme Court observed, “[f]ew doctrines were more
solidly established as common law than the immunity of judges from liability for acts committed
within their judicial jurisdiction.” Cleavinger v. Sarner, 47 4 U.S. 193, 199 (1985) (quoting
Pierson v. Ray,386 U.S. 547, 55-54 (1967)). Judicial immunity provides absolute immunity
from suit for Judges. This Immunity is only overcome in two limited circumstances. Mireles v.
Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991). The circumstances are as follows: “[flirst, a judge is not
immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial
capacity. Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the
complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Stern v. Mascio, 262 F.3d 600, 607 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing
Mireless, 502 U.S. at 11-12). Ruling on a motion to dismiss is a function normally performed
by a judge; thus it is within a judge’s jurisdiction and official capacity.

At best, Plaintiff's assertion that Judge Rose acted outside of his judicial capacity can be
best understood where he states:

Defendants can prove no basis upon which a motion to dismiss filed on May 30,

2017 would be heard by the court prior to an un-opposed motion for summary

judgment filed on November 10, 2016 except to obstruct justice and deprive one of

rights, leaving the first ripe motion for summary judgment unheard by the court.
(Compl at 2.) Judge Rose’s determination of how to rule on motions before him is a
function within his judicial capacity. Thus, Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that Judge
Rose’s ruling meets either exception to judicial immunity.

Accordingly, Judge Rose is immune from suit and his Motion to Dismiss is

GRANTED. (ECF No. 15.)


Ti.

First, Plaintiff brings suit against Sessions in his official capacity as United States
Attorney General. Sessions moves to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
(Mot. to Dismiss at 3, ECF No. 14.)

The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit unless it consents to be sued, and
the terms of its consent define a court’s jurisdiction to entertain the suit. United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941) (“The United States, as sovereign, is immune from suit save
as it consents to be sued.”) Sovereign immunity extends to federal officials sued in their official
capacity. Whittle v. United States, 7 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1993) (affirming dismissal of suit
against federal agency because federal sovereign immunity “extends to agencies of the United
States” and “[t}he federal question jurisdictional statute is not a general waiver of sovereign
immunity”).. A plaintiff bears the burden of identifying a waiver of sovereign immunity in order
to proceed with a claim against a federal official. Reetz v. United States, 224 F.3d 794, 795 (6th
Cir. 2000).

Plaintiff has not identified a waiver of sovereign immunity applicable to his claim. 42
U.S.C. § 1985 does not provide a statutory waiver. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of
Springboro, 477 F.3d 807, 820 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment to federal
officers on all claims against them in their official capacity, including a claim under § 1985, on
sovereign immunity grounds). Nor is the Bivens doctrine, as Plaintiff claims, a waiver for
official-capacity suits. Ecclesiastical Order of the Ism of Am, Inc. v. Chasin, 845 F.2d 113, 115-
16 (6th Cir. 1988). Absent such waiver this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over

Plaintiff's claims against Sessions. Accordingly, Session’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED.


Iv.
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED. (ECF Nos.
14, 15). Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief (ECF No. 7), Motion to Amend? (ECF No. 9),

and Motion for Summary Judgement (ECF No. 16) are DISMISSED as MOOT. The clerk is

directed to enter judgment for Defendants.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
G=-\N-dol¥ Pn.
DATE EDMUN! SARGUS, JR.

CHIEF ‘D STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

? Plaintiff's Motion to Amend merely adds additional allegations against Judge Rose stemming
from Judge Rose granting a separate motion to dismiss and thus fails to remedy the insufficiency

of his initial Complaint. (ECF No. 9-2.)


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION
WARREN EASTERLING,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:17-cv-328
v. CHIEF JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers
JEFFERSON SESSIONS,
etal,
Defendants.
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Jefferson Session’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction (ECF No. 14), Defendant Judge Thomas Rose’s Motion to Dismiss for
Failure to State a Claim (ECF No. 15), and Plaintiff Warren Easterling’s Memorandum in
Opposition. (ECF No. 18.) For the reasons that follow, both Motions are GRANTED. Asa
result, Plaintiff's Motion for Injunctive Relief, Motion to Amend, and Motion for Summary

Judgment are DISMISSED.

I
Plaintiff Warren Easterling (“Plaintiff”), proceeding without counsel, brings suit against
the United States Attorney General Jefferson Sessions (“Sessions”) in his official capacity and
the Honorable Thomas Rose (“Judge Rose”, together “Defendants”), alleging that Defendants
conspired to interfere with his civil rights when Judge Rose granted a motion to dismiss his

complaint against Sessions in a previous lawsuit. (See Compl. at 2, 4, ECF No. 1.)


On August 29, 2017, Judge Rose adopted a Report and Recommendation granting
defendant United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch’s motion to dismiss in case number
3:16-cv-375, Easterling v. Lynch.' Plaintiff never sought direct appeal from dismissal, but rather
filed the instant action. Plaintiff now asserts that dismissal of his complaint constituted
“obstructing justice and deprivation [stet] of rights granted to all persons by conspiracy where
this filing of the meritless moot motion and the subsequent granting of this motion was a
cooperative effort between the Defendants.” (Jd. at 4.) Plaintiff then asserts that Sessions “as
defendant in case 3:16 cv 375 [sic], is a beneficiary of the illegal act and the motion to dismiss
was filed on his behalf... .” (Id.)

I.

Defendants bring the Motions to Dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
and (6) for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim..
1. Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) may be warranted if a party brings a claim in federal
court that does not satisfy statutory or constitutional jurisdiction requirements. In considering a
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), the Court must construe all allegations in the
Complaint in favor of plaintiff, “which is a similar safeguard employed under 12(b)(6) motions
to dismiss.” Ohio Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 922 F.2d 320, 325 (6th Cir. 1990).

However, plaintiff shoulders the burden of proving jurisdiction in order to survive the motion.

' The Court notes that Easterling is a frequent pro se litigator in the Southern District of Ohio
and in Ohio state courts. See, e.g., Easterling v. Crawford, No. 3:13-cv-430, 2014 WL 667638,
at *4 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 20, 2014), (recommending that, because “Easterling has repeatedly abused
the privilege of proceeding in forma pauperis in this Court, he should be barred from doing so
without the prior written authorization of the Chief Judge”); Easterling v. Crawford, No. 3:14-
cy-226, 2014 WL 5803029, at *2 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7, 2014) (noting in late 2014 that Easterling
had filed “fourteen cases in the last two years[,]” many of which he had “attempted in one way
or another to have this Court interfere with, enjoin, or reverse a state court judgment”).


Nichols v. Muskingum College, 318 F.3d 674, 677 (6th Cir. 2003).
2. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

Rule 12()(6) is an avenue by which defendants can challenge, as a matter of law,
whether a plaintiff is entitled to legal relief even if everything alleged in the complaint is true.
See Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 638 (6th Cir. 1993). In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion
to dismiss, the Court must construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, accepting as true all of plaintiff's factual allegations. Gunasekera v. Irwin, 551 F.3d 461,
466 (6th Cir. 2009).

The Court must nonetheless read Rule 12(b)(6) in conjunction with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8(a), requiring a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief. Ogle v. BAC Home Loans Servicing LP, 924 F. Supp. 2d 902, 908 (S.D. Ohio
2013). Therefore, the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint, assumed to be true, must do
more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show
entitlement to relief. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527
(6th Cir. 2007). Further, “the tenet that a court must accept a complaint’s allegations as true is
inapplicable to threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory
statements.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009). Thus, while Plaintiff is not required to
set forth detailed factual allegations at the pleading stage, the Complaint must contain some basis
upon which relief can be granted; a recitation of facts intimating the “mere possibility of
misconduct” will not suffice. Jd. at 679; Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).

Moreover, the Court must “liberally construe pro se complaints and hold such complaints
to a less stringent standard than pleadings prepared by attorneys.” Frengler v. Gen. Motors, 482
F. App’x 975, 976 (6th Cir. 2012), At the same time, however, such “lenient treatment has
limits” and the Court “should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted...” Id. at 977

(internal quotations omitted).