UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

KATELYNN MARIE COOPER, 

 Plaintiff, 

v. 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL 

SECURITY, 

 Defendant. 

Case No. 2:18-cv-67 

Judge George C. Smith 

Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff, Katelyn Marie Cooper (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. 

§§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security 

(“Commissioner”) denying her application for social security disability insurance benefits. This 

matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 10), the Commissioner’s 

Memorandum in Opposition (ECF No. 15), Plaintiff’s Reply Memorandum (ECF No. 16), and 

the administrative record (ECF No. 7). For the reasons that follow, the undersigned 

RECOMMENDEDS that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social Security’s nondisability finding and REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ under Sentence 

Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Report and Recommendation. 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed her application for Supplemental Social Security Income on January 28, 

2014, alleging that she had been disabled since August 21, 2012. (R. 200–05.) On August 22, 

2016, following initial administrative denials of Plaintiff’s application, a hearing was held before 
2 

Administrative Law Judge Paul E. Yerian (the “ALJ”). (Id. at 59–94.) Plaintiff, represented by 

counsel, appeared and testified. Vocational expert Dr. Jerry Olsheski (the “VE”) also appeared 

and testified at the hearing. On December 30, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that 

Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (Id. at 30–50.) On 

December 1, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted the 

ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff then timely commenced the 

instant action. 

II. THE ALJ’S DECISION 

On December 30, 2016, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled 

within the meaning of the Social Security Act. (R. 30–50.) At step one of the sequential 

evaluation process,1

 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had engaged in substantially gainful activity 

during 2012, but that there has been a continuous 12-month period(s) during which Plaintiff did 

not engage in substantial gainful activity. (Id. at 32.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff has the severe 

impairments of obesity; a history of thyroid cancer with status post thyroidectomy; an affective 

 

1

 Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step 

sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive 

finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th 

Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal the 

criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner’s Listing of Impairments, 20 

C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the claimant perform his 

or her past relevant work? 

5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the national 

economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); 

Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 
3 

disorder; an anxiety disorder; and a history of substance abuse. (Id. at 33.) He further found that 

Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically 

equaled one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

(Id. at 34.) At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ set forth Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, [the ALJ] find[s] that the [Plaintiff] 

has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional 

levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant cannot climb 

ladders, ropes, or scaffolds or work around hazards, such as unprotected heights or 

dangerous machinery. She cannot not engage in commercial driving. [Plaintiff] 

can perform simple, routine, repetitive tasks with infrequent changes in work duties 

or processes that do not involve strict production quotas, fast assembly line pace, 

more than occasional contact with coworkers or supervisors, or direct face-to-face 

interaction with the public. 

(Id. at 37.) 

In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered the opinion evidence in the record, 

including the opinions of the state-agency consultants, Roseann Umana, Ph.D., and David 

Demuth, M.D. The state agency consultants found that Plaintiff “can perform simple tasks in a 

setting with few social demands” (id. at 103) and that Plaintiff “can relate on a superficial basis 

to coworkers and supervisors. She is markedly reduced for public interactions and would work 

best in small groups or alone.” (Id. at 116 (emphasis added).) The ALJ assigned “significant” 

weight to the opinions of the state-agency psychologists, explaining as follows: 

I afford significant weight to the State Agency consultants’ mental assessments 

evidenced at Exhibits 1A and 3A. The consultants opined the claimant 

demonstrated moderate limitations in each area of functioning, noting she was able 

to understand, remember, and follow at least simple 1–3 step directions; could adapt 

to work settings in which duties were routine and predictable; could relate on a 

superficial basis to coworkers and supervisors; would be markedly reduced in 

relation with public interactions; would work best in small groups or alone; and 

would have reduced ability to respond to change, set realistic goals, and make 

independent plans. The consultants’ assessments are generally consistent with the 

mental medical evidence of record, supporting some moderate mental limitations. 

The record supports the claimant receives assistance from her case manager, but 

remains able to independently care for her personal care and administer her own 

medications. She reported some history of interpersonal conflict, but she was able 
4 

to interact appropriately with her family, boyfriend, and neighbor, as well as 

interact with the community to obtain her housing. The claimant reported some 

concentration and focus deficits; however, she remains able to leave her home 

unaccompanied, go shopping, prepare meals, and manage her household. The 

consultants are well qualified by reason of training and experience in reviewing an 

objective record and formulating an opinion as to limitations. The State Agency 

consultants are deemed to possess specific “understanding of our disability 

programs and their evidentiary requirements” (Social Security Ruling 96-6p). 

Therefore, I have afforded their mental assessments significant weight. 

(Id. at 47.) The ALJ further explained his rationale for Plaintiff’s mental RFC as follows: 

I have appropriately considered the claimant’s history of anxiety and affective 

disorders and their accompanying symptoms and has [sic] reasonably reduced the 

claimant to the performance of work at all exertional levels with the following 

nonexertional limitations, performing simple routine, repetitive tasks in a setting 

with infrequent changes in work duties or processes that do not involve strict 

production quotas, fast assembly line pace, more than occasional contact with 

coworkers and supervisors, and no direct face to face interaction with the public. 

(Id. at 40–41.) 

At step five of the sequential process, the ALJ, relying on the VE’s testimony, found that 

considering Plaintiff’s age, education, past work experience, and RFC, she can perform jobs that 

exist in significant numbers in the national economy. (Id. at 48.) The ALJ therefore concluded 

that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (Id.) 

In her Statement of Errors (ECF No. 10), Plaintiff raises three contentions of error. First, 

she contends that the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinions of her treating psychiatric nurse, 

Sue Smith, APRN. For her second contention of error, Plaintiff asserts that, although the ALJ 

gave “significant weight” to the opinions of the state-agency psychologists, the ALJ failed to 

incorporate their recommended limitations into her RFC. Her third contention of error asserts 

that the ALJ improperly determined that her migraines did not constitute a severe impairment. 

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to 
5 

proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) (“[t]he findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is 

defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). 

Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court must 

“‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the 

Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). 

Nevertheless, “if substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to 

that finding ‘even if there is substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an 

opposite conclusion.’” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (quoting Key v. 

Callahan, 109 F.3d 270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the 

substantial evidence standard, “a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the 

SSA fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits 

or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 

746 (6th Cir. 2007). 

IV. ANALYSIS 

The undersigned finds that remand is required because the ALJ assigned significant 

weight to the opinions of the state-agency consultants, but failed to adequately explain why 

certain limitations were altered when incorporated into Plaintiff’s mental RFC. 
6 

The determination of a claimant’s RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). Nevertheless, substantial evidence must support the 

Commissioner’s RFC finding. Berry v. Astrue, No. 1:09CV000411, 2010 WL 3730983, at *8 

(S.D. Ohio June 18, 2010). When considering the medical evidence and calculating the RFC, 

“‘ALJs must not succumb to the temptation to play doctor and make their own independent 

medical findings.’” Simpson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 344 F. App’x 181, 194 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(quoting Rohan v. Chater, 98 F.3d 966, 970 (7th Cir. 1996)); see also Isaacs v. Astrue, No. 1:08–

CV–00828, 2009 WL 3672060, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 4, 2009) (holding that an “ALJ may not 

interpret raw medical data in functional terms”) (internal quotations omitted). An ALJ is 

required to explain how the evidence supports the limitations that he or she sets forth in the 

claimant’s RFC: 

The RFC assessment must include a narrative discussion describing how the 

evidence supports each conclusion, citing specific medical facts (e.g., laboratory 

findings) and nonmedical evidence (e.g., daily activities, observations). In 

assessing RFC, the adjudicator must discuss the individual’s ability to perform 

sustained work activities in an ordinary work setting on a regular and continuing 

basis (i.e., 8 hours a day, for 5 days a week, or an equivalent work schedule), and 

describe the maximum amount of each work-related activity the individual can 

perform based on the evidence available in the case record. The adjudicator must 

also explain how any material inconsistencies or ambiguities in the evidence in the 

case record were considered and resolved. 

S.S.R. 96–8p, 1996 WL 374184, at *6–7 (internal footnote omitted). 

Despite assigning significant weight to the state-agency consultants’ opinions (R. 47), the 

ALJ failed to adequately explain why he limited Plaintiff to “occasional contact with coworkers 

or supervisors” instead of contact “on a superficial basis [with] coworkers and supervisors” as 

recommended by Dr. Demuth. The terms “occasional” and “superficial” are not interchangeable. 

See Lindsey v. Comm’r Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-CV-18, 2018 WL 6257432, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 

30, 2018) (“‘Occasional contact’ goes to the quantity of time spent with [ ] individuals, whereas 
7 

‘superficial contact’ goes to the quality of the interactions.”) (quoting Hurley v. Berryhill, No. 

1:17-CV-421-TLS, 2018 WL 4214523, at *4 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 5, 2018)). Thus, the absence of 

any explanation requires remand. See, e.g., Barker v. Astrue, No. 5:09 CV 1171, 2010 WL 

2710520, at *5–6 (N.D. Ohio July 7, 2010) (finding that the ALJ erred by failing to include in 

plaintiff’s “RFC the prior ALJ’s findings, as adopted by the state agency physicians, that 

Plaintiff have no interaction with the public and only superficial interaction with co-workers and 

supervisors” where the ALJ only “limited Plaintiff to no more than occasional interaction with 

the public (as opposed to no interaction with the public, as in ALJ Hafer’s assessment), and he 

made no mention of whether and to what extent Plaintiff can interact with co-workers and 

supervisors”); Hurley, 2018 WL 4214523, at *4 (explaining that “occasional” and “superficial” 

are not interchangeable terms and finding that the ALJ erred in making no attempt to explain the 

basis of his decision to limit plaintiff to occasional rather than superficial interactions) (citing 

Gidley v. Colvin, No. 2:12-CV-374, 2013 WL 6909170, at *12 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 30, 2013)); Cote 

v. Colvin, No. 16-CV-57-SLC, 2017 WL 448617, at *7 (W.D. Wis. Feb. 2, 2017) (“The ALJ did 

not explain his reasons for only limiting the quantity and not the quality or duration of plaintiff’s 

social interaction, even though several of the physicians whom he credited made clear that 

plaintiff’s difficulties related to the quality of the interaction.”).2 

Certainly, an ALJ is not required to mirror or parrot medical opinions verbatim. Poe v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009). But where, as here, the ALJ 

 

2

 The Commissioner cites Reeves v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., which held that a state-agency 

consultant’s opinion that the claimant could “relate to a few familiar others on a superficial 

basis” was accounted for by limiting the claimant’s RFC to “only occasional interaction with the 

public.” 618 F. App’x 267, 275 (6th Cir. 2015). The Reeves decision, however, did not specify 

the amount of weight given to the state-agency consultant’s opinion and did not analyze the 

distinction between “superficial” and “occasional” contact. The undersigned therefore does not 

find Reeves to require a different result. 
8 

assigns significant weight to a particular opinion and states it is consistent with the record, he 

must incorporate the opined limitations or provide an explanation for declining to do so. See, 

e.g., Queen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-1082, 2017 WL 6523296, at *9-10 (S.D. Ohio 

Dec. 21, 2017) (remanding where the ALJ “failed to include at least one limitation” from an 

opinion he had assigned great weight without explaining the omission). Thus, the ALJ’s failure 

to provide such an explanation requires remand because it prevents this Court from conducting 

meaningful review to determine whether substantial evidence supports his decision. See 

Reynolds v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 424 F. App’x 411, 414 (6th Cir. 2011) (noting that an ALJ’s 

decision “must include a discussion of ‘findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis 

therefor, on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion presented on the record.’” (quoting 5 

U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A))); Allen v. Astrue, No. 5:11CV1095, 2012 WL 1142480, at *8 (N.D. Ohio 

Apr. 4, 2012) (remanding where “the ALJ failed to properly articulate the RFC calculation,” 

explaining that the Court was “unable to trace the path of the ALJ’s reasoning”); Commodore v. 

Astrue, No. 10-295, 2011 WL 4856162, at *4, 6 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 13, 2011) (remanding action 

“with instructions to provide a more thorough written analysis,” where the ALJ failed to 

articulate the reasons for his RFC findings such that the Court could not “conduct a meaningful 

review of whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision”); Cote, 2017 WL 448617, at 

*7 (requiring the ALJ to “build a logical bridge between the evidence and any social functioning 

limitations that he chooses to include in the residual functional capacity assessment”). 

In sum, the undersigned finds that reversal is warranted because the ALJ assigned 

significant weight to the state-agency psychologists’ opinions, but failed to include a limitation 

for “superficial” interaction or offer an adequate explanation for how the RFC he assessed 

accommodated that limitation. 
9 

This finding obviates the need to analyze and resolve Plaintiff’s remaining contentions of 

error. Nevertheless, on remand, the ALJ may consider Plaintiff’s remaining assignments of error 

if appropriate. 

V. DISPOSITION 

Due to the error outlined above, Plaintiff is entitled to an order remanding this case to the 

Social Security Administration pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The 

undersigned therefore RECOMMENDS that the Court REVERSE the Commissioner of Social 

Security’s non-disability finding and REMAND this case to the Commissioner and the ALJ 

under Sentence Four of § 405(g) for further consideration consistent with this Report and 

Recommendation. 

VI. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those specific 

proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with supporting 

authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo determination of those 

portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is 

made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in 

part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further evidence or may recommit 

this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 
10 

/s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE