J-S64042-16

*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

MOHD THEEB EID

Appellant No. 3795 EDA 2015

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 23, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-23-CR-0001121-2015

BEFORE: STABILE, J., SOLANO, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED SEPTEMBER 28, 2016

Mohd Theeb Eid (“Appellant”) appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered by the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, which, sitting as 

finder of fact in Appellant’s bench trial, found him guilty on two counts of 

Indecent Assault. We affirm.

The trial court aptly sets forth the pertinent history of the case as 

follows:

On January 11, 2014, Paula Teti and her children went into the 

United Furniture Store located at 5300 Baltimore Pike in Clifton 

Heights, Delaware County, Pennsylvania to purchase furniture. 

While inside the store, she was helped by the assistant manager, 

Appellant, Mohammed Eid. She agreed to purchase a bed and 

loveseat and put her first deposit down on the furniture. N.T. 

9/1/15 at 6, 12.

When Ms. Teti arrived home from the furniture store, the 

Appellant was in a black SUV at the foot of her driveway and he 

texted her. She asked how do you know where I live and he 
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responded that he obtained her address from her billing 

statement. She told him he could not come inside. The 

Appellant then drove his SUV down the street and left after 15 

minutes. N.T. at 12-13.

Two weeks later, Ms. Teti went back to the furniture store to 

make a [layaway] payment and the Appellant reached his arms 

out and grabbed her breasts. "He kept nudging me in the 

breasts . . . I said 'Can you stop? . . . You're putting your elbow 

in my breast.' And he said no, I'm not. And then we continued 

on with the furniture." N.T. at 15, 19. Ms. Teti went to the 

store approximately 3 or 4 times to make payments on the 

furniture and "basically paid it all off because of what was 

happening." N.T. at 18.

On the day the furniture was delivered to Ms. Teti's house, the 

two delivery men needed additional assistance because they had 

difficulty transporting the bed up the stairs. So, they contacted 

the Appellant. The Appellant came to the house and dismantled 

the headboard and broke it in the process. The delivery men left 

to retrieve the mattress from the store, and Ms. Teti and the 

Appellant were left alone upstairs except for her children playing 

nearby. The Appellant put the canopy on the bed and then he 

"grabbed my breasts again and he squeezed them. And then I 

grabbed the Defendant's both hands and i got him and I threw 

him down on the floor." N.T. at 23.

Ms. Teti also testified to another incident at the store [when she 

returned after delivery to inquire about the store's intentions 

with respect to the damaged bed] :

But there was an incident when he grabbed my breast in the 

store. I believe I like pushed him away from me. And I don't 

really -- I was trying to leave the store. I was trying to leave 

fast out of the store. And he put his hand between my legs and 

grabbed me between my legs. And I left the store. And I was 

so upset. I didn't know what to do. And I called the police. 

N.T. at 19.

On or about March 11, 2014, Appellant was charged by the 

Upper Darby Police Department inter alia with the crimes of: 

Indecent Assault Without Consent (2 counts), Indecent Assault 

by Forcible Compulsion (2 counts), and Stalking.
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***

On August 31, 2015, Appellant waived his right to a jury trial 

and proceeded to a nonjury trial before the undersigned. On 

September 1, 2015, the Appellant was found Not Guilty -- of 

Indecent Assault by Forcible Compulsion, counts 6 and 7, Not 

Guilty -- of Stalking, count 12, and Guilty -- of Indecent AssaultWithout Consent, counts 1 and 2. [The Commonwealth did not 

go forward on the remainder of the charges].

Prior to sentencing, the Court ordered a County Pre-Sentence 

Investigative Report and a psychiatric evaluation. On November 

23, 2015, the Court sentenced the Appellant [to one year county 

probation on counts one and two, respectively, for an aggregate 

two year county probationary sentence with the additional 

directives that Appellant have no contact with the victim and 

that he register on the Megan's Law registry.

On December 18, 2015, Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal to the 

Superior Court of Pennsylvania from his Judgment of Sentence. 

On January 12, 2016, the Petitioner, through counsel, filed a 

[timely Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement raising one issue 

directed to the sufficiency of the evidence to convict Appellant of 

Indecent Assault Without Consent].

Trial Court Opinion, filed February 18, 2016, at 1-4.

Our standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence challenge is 

well-settled:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant's guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 
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by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

[trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Tucker, ___ A.3d ____, 2016 PA Super 157 (filed 

July 19, 2016) (citation omitted).1 

Specifically, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his convictions for indecent assault under 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126, which 

provides, in relevant part, as follows:

(a) Offense defined.—A person is guilty of indecent assault if 

the person has indecent contact with the complainant, causes 

the complainant to have indecent contact with the person or 

intentionally causes the complainant to come into contact with 

seminal fluid, urine or feces for the purpose of arousing sexual 

desire in the person or the complainant and:

(1) The person does so without the complainant's consent.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant conflates the distinct concepts of weight and sufficiency of the 

evidence challenges in developing his sufficiency claim. Specifically, 

Appellant effectively advances a weight of the evidence claim where he relies 

on the testimony of defense witnesses who contradicted Ms. Teti's account 

to challenge the verdict. In this respect, he argues that both his own denial 

of touching Ms. Teti and the testimony of his co-worker, Gilbert Musa, who 

claimed he never observed inappropriate behavior and related that Ms. Teti 

always insisted on dealing exclusively with Appellant fatally impeached Ms. 

Teti's accusation. Because Appellant has not raised a weight of the evidence 

challenge, however, we do not address this aspect of his argument. In any 

event, the trial court correctly notes that mere conflicts in the testimony of 

the witnesses do not render the evidence insufficient because it is within 

province of the finder of fact to determine the weight to be given to 

testimony. See Commonwealth v. O'Donnell, 740 A.2d 198, 203 n.4 (Pa. 

1999). 
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18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1). “Indecent Contact” is defined by section 3101 of 

the Crimes Code as “[a]ny touching of the sexual or other intimate parts of 

the person for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire in either 

person.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 3101.

The crux of Appellant's sufficiency claim is that the Commonwealth’s 

chief witness, Ms. Teti, failed to supply credible testimony to substantiate 

the charges against him. Other employees and customers on the storeroom 

floor were always nearby, Appellant maintains, and Ms. Teti's own mother 

and children were at the store on more than one occassion, and yet no one 

testified to observing the acts alleged by Ms. Teti. In Appellant's view, "it 

does not make sense that if, in fact, Ms Teti was assaulted as of the second 

visit to the store, she would return on numerous occasions thereafter and 

more importantly, would have this individual [Appellant] come to her home 

to put together and set up furniture." Appellant's brief at 9. There were two 

occasions when Appellant was at the victim's residence, but the police were 

never called, he continues. Overall, Ms. Teti's testimony was "scattered" 

and "confused" as to both dates and events, Appellant posits, and, 

therefore, insufficient to support the verdicts against him. Id.

Here, the court, sitting as finder of fact, credited Ms. Teti's testimony 

that Appellant had, on two separate occasions, touched her breasts and 

reached between her legs without her consent. The court explained:

I find the testimony of Ms. Teti to be credible. Clearly in 

anguish, clearly clear about the behavior that occurred and 

clearly in anguish over it.... I believe that the emotions that she 
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displayed on the stand were real; they were believable.... And I 

don't have a reasonable doubt about whether or not any 

indecent contact took place.

N.T. 9/1/15, at 171, 172.

It is well-settled that the uncorroborated testimony of a sexual assault 

victim, if believed by the trier of fact, is sufficient to convict a defendant. 

See Commonwealth v. Andrulewicz, 911 A.2d162, 166 (Pa.Super. 2007). 

Here, Ms. Teti's testimony, deemed credible by the finder of fact, was, as a 

matter of law, sufficient under the law to support guilty verdicts under 

Section 3126(a)(1). See Commonwealth v. Richter, 676 A.2d 1232, 

1236 (Pa.Super. 1996) (holding Section 3126 indecent assault established 

by testimony that defendant placed hands under complainant's shirt and 

fondled her against her wishes), aff'd 711 A.2d 464 (Pa. 1998). 

Accordingly, we discern no merit with Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence 

challenge.

Judgment of sentence is affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/28/2016