1 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

PAUL JOE CRAMER, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-51 

 v. Judge George C. Smith 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

STATE OF OHIO, 

 Defendant. 

 

ORDER AND REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON INITITIAL SCREEN

 Plaintiff, an Ohio resident who is prosecuting this matter pro se, brings this civil rights 

action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and moves this court for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 

(ECF Nos. 1.) Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. All judicial 

officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). This matter is before the Court sua sponte for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s 

Complaint as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to 

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, 

for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this Plaintiff’s 

claims for failure to assert any claim on which relief may be granted. 

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I.

 Congress has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim 

upon which relief maybe granted. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A 

complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, 

the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th 

Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure 

to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 

 A federal court has limited subject matter jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of 

federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for 

‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ 

jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006). Federal-question jurisdiction is 

invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws, the Constitution, or 

treaties of the United States. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity 

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which means that 

each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in 

controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 

II. 

 According to the Complaint, Defendant was detained in Ohio on certain federal warrants 

issued in West Virginia. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4, 6.) Although Plaintiff summarizes his appearances 

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in court and his unsuccessful Habeas Corpus petitions, it is unclear from the Complaint what 

conduct Plaintiff believes to have violated any federal law or the Constitution. As such, the 

Undersigned cannot glean a basis for a claim “arising under” any federal law such that the Court 

would have federal-question jurisdiction. Further, Plaintiff names only the State of Ohio as a 

Defendant. Accordingly, because Plaintiff is a citizen of Ohio, the Court lacks diversity 

jurisdiction. 

 Moreover, to the extent Plaintiff names the State of Ohio as the sole Defendant 

and seeks $4,000,000.00 in damages, his claim is barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity. 

The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution precludes a private party from 

bringing suit against a state or any of the state’s agencies unless the state has expressly consented 

to the suit or Congress has properly abrogated the state’s sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe of 

Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 58 (1996); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 , 782 (1978). “Ohio has 

not waived its sovereign immunity in federal court.” Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F. 3d 389, 397 (6th Cir. 

1999). And “Congress did not intend to override well-established immunities or defenses under 

the common law” by enacting § 1983. Will v. Mich. Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 

(1989). Accordingly, there are very limited exceptions to state and state actor immunity here. 

Cady v. Arenac Cnty., 574 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2009). First, a plaintiff may bring a claim 

against a state official acting in his or her official capacity if the plaintiff seeks only “prospective 

injunctive or declaratory relief.” Id. (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 276-78 (1986)). 

Second, a plaintiff may bring a claim for monetary damages against a state official in his or her 

individual capacity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165- 68 (1985); Turker v. Ohio 

Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 157 F.3d 453, 457 (6th Cir. 1998). 

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 Because none of the limited exceptions to Eleventh Amendment immunity apply here, 

the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

III. 

 For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to assert any claim on which 

relief may be granted. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s 

claims pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2). 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge 

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l 

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the 

district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

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specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation 

omitted)). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 

Date: January 24, 2018 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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