1 (Slip Opin i o n) OCTOBER T ERM, 20 08 Sy llabu s N O TE : Wh er e it i s feas ibl e , a s y llab u s (h ead n ot e) wil lbe rel e as ed , as is bein g d o n e incon n ecti onwithth is cas e , a tth e ti meth e op in i o n is is s u ed

. Th e s y ll abu s con s titu tes n o p a rt of th e op in i o nof th eC o u r t bu t h a s be en pre p are dbyt h e Re po rte ro f De ci sio n s fo r t h e co nveni e nce of t h e reade r . Se e United Statesv. Detroit Timbe r& Lumb er Co., 200U. S

. 3 21, 337

. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES
Sy llabu s SAFF OR D UNIFIED S C HOO L DI STRICT #1 ET AL
. v . REDDIN G CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. 08–4 79. Ar g u ed Apr il 21, 200 9—Dec i ded Ju n e25, 200 9 Af

t e r es cort ing 1 3

- yea r -old S ava naR e dding fromhe r m i ddle s c hool c l assr oom to h i s offic e , Assi s t an t Pr in c i palWilsonsh ow ed h e ra day plan n e rc o n t ain i n gkn iv es an d oth e rc o n t raban d. Sh e a d mitte d own

ing the pla nner, b u t s a id tha ts h e ha d lent it to her friend Ma ris s a an d th at th e c o n t r aban d was n o t h e r s . He th enpr odu c ed fourpr e scription-strength, and one over-the-c o unt er, pain relief pill s, a ll o f which are banned under s c hool rule s w i th ou t adv a n c e per m ission

. She denied knowledge of the m , but Wilson said that he had a report that she was giving pills to f e llow st udent s . She denied i tand agreed to let h i m sear c hh e rbelon gin g s . He an d HelenRomer o , anadmin i s tr ativ e as si sta n t, sear c h ed Sav a n a ’ s bac kp ac k, fin d in gnoth in g . Wil

son then had Romer otake Sav a na to the sc hool nurse’ s offic eto s e a rch her cl ot hes for pills

. Aft e r Rom e ro a n d t h e nurs e , Pe ggy Schwallier, had Savana rem o ve her outer clothing, they told her to pu ll h e rbr a ou t an d sh ake it, an d to pu ll ou t th e elasticon h e r un derpa n ts , thus expos i ng herb r ea s t s and pelvic area to some degree. No pill s were found. Sava na’s mother fi led suitagain s t pe tit i oner school district (Safford), Wilson , Romero, and S c hwallier, alleging that the strip search violated Sav a na’ s Four th Amendment r i gh ts. Clai mingqual ified im munity , the indiv i du als (her einafterpetition

er s) mov e d fo rsummar yju dg ment. The Distr i c tCour tgr anted the motion, findingthat ther e was no Fourth Amendment violation, and t h e en b a n c Nint hCircuitre vers ed. Following the proto c ol for evalu

ating qualif ie d immunity cl aims, see Sau c ier v. Katz , 533 U. S. 1 94, 200, th e c o u r th e ld th at th e str i p sear c h was u n j u s tifie du n d er th e Fourth Amendment test for searches of chil dren by schoolofficials se t out in New Je rsey v. T. L. O

. , 469 U. S. 32 5. It th enapplied th e tes t2 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Sy llabu s for qualified immunity. Fi nding th a tS ava na ’s right w a s clea rly es

tabl ished a tt h e time of th e sear c h , it r e v e r s ed the summar yjudg

ment as to Wil s on, but affirmed as to Schwallier and Romero because theywer enot independent dec i sionmaker s . Held: 1. The search of Savana’s u n de rwear viol ated the Fourth Amend

men t

. Pp. 3–11. (a) Forsc h ool sear c h es, “th e pu blicin ter e st i s be st ser v ed bya Fourth Amendment standard of reas onableness that stops short o f pr obable c a u s e.” T. L. O. , 469 U. S., at 34 1

. Un derth e resu ltin gr e a sonable suspic ion stand a rd, a schoolse arch “will be permiss ible

. . . when the measures adoptedare reas onabl y related to the objectives of the search and not excess ively in trusivein light of theage and sex of the student and the natu re of the infraction.” Id. , at 342. Th e r e quired knowle dge component of reas onabl e suspicion for a school ad

m i nis t rat o r’s evidence s e a rch is t h a t itr a is e am o derat echa n ce of fin d in gev idenc eof wr ong d oin g . Pp. 3–5. (b) Wilson had sufficient su spic ion to just ify searching Savana’ s bac kpac k an d ou terc l oth i n g . A week ear l i e r , a stu d en t, Jor d an , h a d told the principal and Wil s o nthat stu d en t s w e r ebr in gi ngdr ug s an d w e apon s to sc h ool an d th at h eh a d g o ttensic kfr om so me pill s. O n the day of the search, Jordan gave Wilsona p illthat he said came fromMa ris s a . Lea r ning t h a tt h e pill was pres cript ion s t rengt h , Wil

s o n ca lled Maris s aout of cla s s a n d was ha nded t h e da y pla nner. Once inhis office, Wils on, wit hRom e ro pres ent , ha d Ma ris s at u rn out her pockets and open h e r wallet, pro d ucing, inter alia , an over the-counter pill that Mariss a claime d was Savana’s. She also denied knowing ab o u tthe da y planner ’ s contents

. Wils on did not a s k her when she rece ived the pill s from Savana or where Savana might be hiding t h em . Aft e r as e a rchof Ma ris s a ’s underwea rb yRom e ro a n d Schwallier revealed no add i t i onal pil l s, Wil s on called S avana into h i s office. He s h owed her t h e da y pla nner a n d confirm e d her rela t i on sh ip w i thM a r i ssa. He kn ewth atthe girls had beenidentified as pa rt of a nunu s u a lly rowdy gr oup a tas c hool da nce, duri ng w h ich a l

cohol a n d ciga ret t e s were found in t h e gi rls ’ b a t hroom

. He ha d ot her r e ason s to c o n n e c tth em withth is c o n t r aban d, forJor d anh a d tol d the pr inc i pal that befor ethe danc e, he h a d a ttended a pa rty a tS a va na ’s hous e where a l coholwa s s e rved. Thus , Ma ris s a ’s s t at em ent that the p ills came from Sav a na wa s sufficiently plausibl e to warrant suspicion thatSavana was involvedin pill distribut i on. A student who is reasonablysuspecte d of giv i ng out contraband pills is rea

s o nab l y s u s p ect e d of ca rrying t h emon her pers on a n d in her b a c k

pack. Looking into Savana’ s bag, inher presence and in the relative privacy of Wilson’s office, was no t excessively intrusive, any more3 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Sy llabu s th anRomer o ’ s su bsequ e n tse ar c hof h e r ou t e rc l oth i ng . Pp. 5–8. (c ) Bec a use the suspec ted fa c t s pointingto Sav a na did not indi

c a te tha tthe dr ug s pr esented adang erto students orw e r ec o nc ealed in her unde r w e a r , Wils on did not have s u fficient s u s p icion to wa rra nt ex tendingthe sear c hto the point of ma king S ava napul lout he r u n derwear. Ro mero and Schwallier sai dthat they did not see anything wh enSav a n apu lled ou th e ru n d er wear, bu t a s t r i p s e ar c han d it s Fourth Amend m ent cons eq uences a r e not defined by who was looking and how muc hwas s een. S avana’s actio n s in their presence neces

sar ilyex posed h e r br easts a n d pelv icar eato some degr ee, an d both su bjec tiv ean d r e ason able soc i etal ex pec t ation s of per s on al pr iv ac y s u pportt h e t r ea t m e nt of s u ch as e a rch as ca t e gorica llydist inct , re quiring distinct elements of j u stific ation onthe part of school authori

t i es for going b e yond as e a rch of out e r clo t hing a n d b e longings

. S a vana’s subjective expectatio n of priv a c y is inherent in her a ccount of ita s em ba rra s s i ng, fr ightening, and humili at ing. The reasonable

nes s of her ex pecta t ion is in dica te d by the common reaction of other youn g people s i m i la rly s e a r ched, w h ose adolescent vulnerabili ty in

tensifies the ex posur e ’ s patent intr usivene ss. Its indignity does not outlaw the sea rch, but itdoe s im plic ate th e r u le that“th e sear c h[be] ‘reasonably re lated in scope to th e ci rcum s tances which justified th e interference i nthe first p l ace.’ ” T. L. O., supra, at 34 1. Her e , th e content of the suspicion f a il ed to match the degree of intrusion. Be

cause Wilson knew that th e pill s were common pa in relievers, he must have known of their nature an d limi t ed th r e at an dh a d n or e a sonto su spec t th at lar g e amou n t s w e r e bein gpassed ar ou n dorth a t individua lstudents ha d grea t q u a n tities

. Nor could he have s u s pected thatSa vana was hidi ng co mmon painkillers in her underwear. Wh ensu spec ted fac t s mu s t su ppor tthe categorically extreme intru

siv e n e ss of a s e ar c hdownto anadolesc e n t ’ s body , petit i o n er s’ g e n e r a l belief th at s t u d en ts h i de c o n t r aban d inth eirc l oth i ngfalls sh or t; a r e ason able se ar c hth at ex ten s iv e c a llsfor suspicion tha tit wil lsuc c eed. Non d ang e r o u s sch ool c o n t r aban d does n o t c o n j u r e u p th e spec terof stashes in intimate pl ac es, an d there is no evidence of such be

havior a tt h e s c hool; neit h e r J o rda nno r Ma ris s as u gges t ed t h at S ava nawas doing t h a t , a n d t h e s e a rch of Ma ris s ayielded not h ing. Wils on als on e ver det e rm ined when Ma ri s s aha d received t h e pills from Savana; had it beena few days before, that would weigh heavily ag ain s t an yr e ason ab le c o n c lu sionth at Sav a n apr ese n tlyh a d th e pills on her person, much les s in her underwear. Pp. 8–11.

2

. Alt h ough t h e s t rip s e a rch vi olated Savana’s Fourth Am endment rights, petitio n ers Wilson, R o mero, and Sc hwallier are p r otected from liab ility by qu alifiedimmun i ty beca use “clearly establi s hed law [did] not show that the sear c h v i ol ated the Fourth Amendment,” Pearso n4 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Sy llabu s
v. Callahan , 555 U. S. ___, _ __. Theintr usiveness of the strip search here ca nnot, underT

. L. O. , be seenas j u stifiablyr e la ted to th e c i r cum s t a nces , b u tlower courtca s e s viewings c hool s t rip s e a rches dif

ferently are numerous enough, with well-reasoned majo rity and dis

s e nting opinions , to couns eldoub t ab o ut the cla r ity with whichthe r i gh t was pr eviou s lystated. Pp. 11–1 3.

3. The issue of petitionerSafford’s liab ili ty under Mon e ll v. New YorkCity De p t . of So cial Se rvs. , 436 U. S. 658, 694, sh ou ld be ad

dres s e d on re mand. P. 13. 531 F. 3d 10 71 , affir m ed inpar t , r e v e r s ed inpar t , an d r e man d ed.

S OUTER , J., d e livered the o p inion of the Cour t, in whic h R OBERTS , C. J., and S CALIA , K ENNED Y , B REYER , an d ALITO , JJ., joined, and in which S TEVENS an d G IN SB U R G , JJ., joined as to Parts I–III. S TEVENS , J., filed an opini o n concurring in partand dissenting in part, in which G IN SB U R G , J., joined. G IN SB U R G , J., filed a nopinion concurring in part and dissentin g in part. T HO MA S , J., filed an opinion co ncurring in the judgment in p a rt and dissen t ing in part._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt
NOTIC E : Th is op i n ionis subjec t to f o rma lrevi si onbef o r e publicat ioninth e p r eli m in ary p rin t of th e U n it edS t at es R e p o rts

. R e ad ers ar e r e qu es ted to n o tif yth e R e p o rt e rof D e c i s i on s , Su p r em e C o u rt of th e U n ited St at es , Wa s h

ington, D. C. 2054 3, of any typ o gra p hical or other f o rmal err o rs , in or der th atc o rr ect i on sm a y b e mad eb e f o r e th ep r e lim in aryp rin t go es t o p r es s . 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S C HOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR I L REDDIN G ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e25, 2009 ] J USTICE S OUTERdelivered the opinion of the C o urt. The issue here is whether a 13-ye ar-old stude n t’s Fourth Amendment right was violated when she was subjected to a search of her bra a n d underpants by school officia l s acting on reasonable s u spicion that she had brought for

bidden prescription and over-the -counter drugs to school

. Because there were n o reasons t o suspect t h e drugs pre

sented a da nger or were concealed in her un derwear, we hold that the searchdid violate the Cons titution, b u t because there is reason to question the clarity with which the right was established, the official who ordered the unconstitutional searc his entitled to qualified immunity from liabilit y. I The events immediatel y prior to the search in question began in 13-year-old Savana Redding’s math class a t Safford Middle School one October day in 2003. The assis

tant princi pal of the school, Kerry Wilson, c a me into th e room and asked Sava na to go to his office. There, he showed her a day plan ner, unzipped and open flat on his desk, in which there were several knives, lighters, a per

-2 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of theCourt manent marker, and acigarette. Wilsonas ked Savan a whether the planner was hers; s h e said it was, but that a few days b e fore she had lent it to her friend, Mariss a Glines. Savana stated that none of the items in the plan

ner belonged to her. Wilson then showed Savana fou rwhite prescription

strength ib uprofen 400-mg pills, and one ov er-the-counter blue naproxen 200-mg pill, all us ed for pain and inflam

mation but banned u n der school rules with out advance permission. He asked Savana if she knew anything about the pills. Savana answered that she did not. Wilson then told Savana that he had received a report that she was giving thes e pills to fel l ow students; Savana denied it and agreed to l e t Wilson search her belongings. Helen Ro

mero, an administrative assistant, came into the office, and together with Wilson they s e arched Savana’s back

pack, findin g nothing. At that poi n t, Wilson ins tructed R o mero to take Savan a to the school nurse’s office to search her clothes for pills. Romero and the nurse , Peggy Schwallier, asked Savana to remove her jacket, soc k s, and shoes, leaving her in stretc h pants and a T-shirt (both without pockets), which she was then asked to remove. Finally, Savana wa s told to pull her bra out and to the side and s hake it, and to pull ou t the elastic on her und erpants, thus exposing her breast s and pelvic area to some degree. No pills were found. Savana’s mother filed suit against Safford Unified School District #1, Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier for conducting a strip search in violat ion of Savana’s Fourth Amendment rights. The individu als (herein a fter petition

ers) moved for summary judg me nt, raising a defense of qualified immunity. The Distric tCourt for the Districtof Arizona granted the motion on the ground that there was no Fourth Amendment violation, and a panelof the Ninth Circuit affirmed. 504 F. 3d 828 (2007). A closely divided Circuit si tting en banc, however, re

-3 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt versed. F o llowing the two-st ep protocol for evaluating claims of qualified im munity, see Saucier v. Katz , 53 3 U. S. 194, 200 (2001), the Ninth Circuit held t hat the stri p search was unjustified under the Fourth Am endment test for searches of children by schoolofficials se t out in Ne w Jersey v. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985). 531 F. 3d 1071, 1081–1087 (2008). Th e Circuit then applied the test for qualified immunity, and found that Savan a ’s righ t was clearly est ablished at the time of the search: “ ‘[t]hese notions of personal privacy ar e “clearly established” i n that they i nhere in all of us, particularly m i ddle school teenagers, and are inherent in the privacy component of the Fourth Amendment’s proscri ption against unreason

able searches.’ ” Id. , at 1088–1089 (quoting Brannum v. Overton Cty. School Bd. , 516 F. 3d 489, 499 (CA6 2008)). The upshot was re versal of summary ju dgment as to Wilson, whi l e affirming the judgments in favor of Schwal

lier, the school nurse, and Romero, the ad ministrativ e assistant, since they h a d not acted as independent deci

sionmakers. 531 F. 3d, at 1089. We granted certiorari , 555 U. S. ___ (2009) , and now affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. II The FourthAmendment “righ t of the people to be secure in their persons .

. . a g ainst unreasonable searches and seizures” generally requires a law enforcement officer to have probable cause f o r conducti ng a search. “Probab le cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstance s within [an officer’s] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustwo rthyinformation [are] sufficient in themselves to warran ta man of reas onable caut ion in the b e lief that’ an offense has been or is being committed,” Brine garv. United S t a t es , 338 U. S. 160, 175–176 (1949) (quoting Carroll v. United States , 267 U. S. 132, 162 (1925)), and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the4 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of theCourt place to be searched. In T. L. O. , we recognized that the school setting “re

quires som e modificati on of the level of suspi c ion of i llici t activity needed to justi f y a search, ” 469 U. S., at 340, an d held that for searches by school officials “a ca reful balanc

ing of governmental and private interests s u ggests tha t the public interest is best served by a FourthAmendment standard of reasonableness that s t ops short of probable cause,” id. , at 341. We have thus applied a standard of reasonable suspicion to determine the legality of a school administrat o r’s search of a student, id. , at 342, 345, and have held that a school search “will be permi ssible in its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the search and not excessively intru

sive in light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction,” id. , at 342. A number of our cases on probable cause have an im

plicit bearing on the reliable k n owledge ele m ent of rea

sonable sus p icion, as we have attempted to flesh out th e k n owledge component by look ing to the degree to which k n own facts imply prohibited conduct, see, e.g. , Adams v. William s , 4 07 U. S. 14 3, 148 (1972); id. , at 160, n. 9 (Mar

shall, J., dissenting), the specificity of the information received, see, e.g. , Spin elliv. Unit ed Stat es , 39 3 U. S. 410, 416–417 (1 969), and the reliabilit y of its sou rce, see, e.g. , Aguilar v. Texas , 378 U. S. 108, 1 14 (1964). At the end of the day, h o wever, we have realized that t h ese factors cannot rigi dly control, Illinois v. Gates , 462 U. S. 213, 2 30 (1983), and we have come back to saying th at the stan

dards are “ f luid concepts that ta ke their substantive con

tent from t h e particul a r contex ts” in which t h ey are being assessed. Ornel asv. UnitedS t a t es , 517 U. S. 690, 69 6 (1996). Perhaps the best thatcan be sa id generally about the required knowledge component of probable ca use for ala w enforcement officer’s e v idence search is tha titraise a “fai r5 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt probability,” Ga tes , 46 2 U. S., at 238, or a “substantial chance,” id. , at 244, n. 13, of discovering evidence of cri mi

nal activity. The lesser standard for school searches could as readily be described as a moderate chance of findin g evidence of wrongdoing. III A In this case, the school’s policies strictly prohibit the nonmedical use, possession, or sale of any drug on schoo l grounds, including “ ‘[a ] ny prescription orover -the-counter drug, e x cept those for which permission to use in school has been granted purs uant to Board policy.’ ” App. to Pet. for Cert. 128a. 1 A week before Savanawas searched, another student, Jordan Romero (no relation of th e school’s administrative assistant), told the principal and Assistant Principal Wilson that “ c ertain students were bringing drugs and we apons on campus,” and that he had been sick after takin gsome pills that “he got from a classmate.” App. 8a. On th e m o rning of October 8, the same boy handed Wilson a white pill that he said Marissa Glines had given him. He told Wi lson that students were

——————

1 When the object of a school searchis the enforcementof a school rule, ava lid s e a rch a s s u m e s , of cours e , th e rule’s legit i m a cy. Butt h e legitimacy of the rule usually goes wi thout saying as it does here. The Court s a id pla i nly in New Jersey v. T. L. O

. , 469 U. S

. 325, 34 2, n

. 9 (198 5), th at st an dar d s of c o n d u c t forsch o ols ar e forschool admin i s t r a tor s to deter m ine without sec o nd-gue s s i ng b ycou r t s la cking t h eexperi

en c eto appr ec iate wh at ma ybe n eeded. Ex c e pt inpaten t lyarbitr ar y in stan c e s, Fou r thAmen dme n t an aly s i s t a kes th e r u le a s a giv e n , as i t obviously should do in this case. Ther e is n oneed here either to explain the imperative of keeping drugs out of schools, or to e x plain the reasons for the school’s rule banning all dr ug s, no matterhow benig n , without adv a n c e per m iss i on . Teac h e r s ar e n o t ph ar mac o l o gi sts tr ain e dto identify pills a n d powders, a n d an e ffective drug ban has to be enforce

able fa st. Th e plen ar yban makes sen s e, an d th er e is no basi s to c l ai m that the searc hwas unreaso nable owin g to some defect or shortcoming of the rule it was ai med at enforcing.6 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of theCourt planning to take the pills at lunch. Wilson lear ned from Peggy Schwa llier, the sc hool nurse, that the pill was Ibu p rofen 400 mg, available only by prescription

. Wilson then called Marissa out of class. Outside th e classroom , Marissa’s teacher handed Wilson the day planner, found within Marissa’s reach, containin g various contraband ite ms. Wilson escorted Marissa back to his office. In the pre s ence of H e len Rom e ro, Wils onrequested Marissa to turn out her pocket s and open her wall et. Marissa produced a blue pill, several white ones, and a razor blade. Wilson a s k e d where the blue pil lcame from, and Marissa answered, “ ‘I guess it slipped i nwhen she gave me the IBU 400s. ’ ” Id. , at 1 3a. Wh en Wilsonasked whom she meant, Marissa replied, “ ‘Savan a Redding.’ ” Ibid. Wilson then enquired about the day pl anner and its contents; Marissa denied knowing anythin g about them. Wilson didnot ask Marissa any followup questions to determine whether th ere was an y likelihood that Sava na presently had pills: nei t her as king when Marissa received the pills from Savana nor where Savana might be hiding them. Schwallier did not im mediately recognize the blue pill, but information provided through apoison cont rol hotline 2 indicated that the pil lwas a 20 0-mg dose of an anti

inflammatory dru g , ge nerically called naproxen, available over the counter. At Wilson’s dir e ction, Marissa was then subjected to a search of her bra and underpants by Ro

mero and Schwallier, as Savana was later on. The search revealed no additional pills.

——————

2 Pois on cont ro l cent ers a cro s s t h e count rym a int a in 24 -hour help hotlines to pr ov ide “immed i ate ac c e ss to poison ex posur emanag e ment instructions a n d informatio n on pote ntialpoisons.” Am erican Associa

tion of Pois on Control Centers , online at http://www .aapcc.org/ dnn/ About/tabid/7 4/Default.aspx(all Inter n et mater i a l s a s v i sited June 19, 200 9, an d av ai lable inCler k of Cou r t’ s c a se file).7 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt It was at this juncture that Wils on called S avana into his office and showed her the day planner. Their conve r sation established th at Savanaand Marissa were on friendly terms: while s h e deniedk n owledge of the contra

band, Sava na admitted that the day planner was hers and that she ha d lent it to Marissa. Wilson hadother repo rts of their friendship from staff members, who had identified Savana and Marissa as part of an unusually rowdy group at the school’s op eni n g dance in August, during which alcohol and cigarettes were fo und in the girls’ bathroom. Wilson had reason to connect the girls with this contra

band, for Wilson knew tha tJordan Romero had told the principal that before th e dance, he had beena ta party at Savana’s h o use where alcohol was served. Marissa’s statement that the pills came from Savana was thus suffi

ciently pla u sible to warrant sus p icion that Savanawas involved in pill distribution. This suspicion of Wilson’s was eno u gh to jus t ify a search of Savana’s backpack and outer clothing. 3If a student is reasonably suspected of giving out contraband pills, she is reasonably suspected of carryi ng them on her person and in the carryall that has become an item of student uniform in most places today. If Wilson’s reasonable suspicion of pill distribution were not under stood to support searche s of outer clothes and backpa c k, i twould not justify an y search worth making. And the look into Sa va na’s bag, in her presence and in the relative p r ivacy of Wilson’s office, was not excessively in trusive, any more than Romero’s subsequent search of her outer clothing.

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3 Thereis no qu estion here th at just ificati o n for the school officials’ s e a rch wa s req u ired in a ccorda n ce wit ht h e T. L. O. standard of reason

able su spic ion , for it is c o mmongr ou n dth at Sav a n ah a d a r e ason ab le expect a t ion of priva c y cove ri ng t h e pe rsonal things she c h ose to carry i n h e rbac kpac k, c f

. 469 U. S., at 33 9, an d t h at Wil s on ’ s d e c i sionto look thr o ugh it was a “sear c h” within the meaningof the Four th Amend

ment.8 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of theCourt B Here it is t hat the parties part company, with Savana’s claim that extending the searcha tWi l s o n ’ s b e h e s tt o t h e point of making herpu ll out her u n derwear was constitu

tionally unreasonable. The exact label for t h is final st ep in the intrusion is not important, t h ough strip search is a fair wayto speak of it

. Romero and Sch w al lier directed Savana to remove her clothes down to her underwear, and then “pull out” her bra and the ela s tic band on her under

pants. Id ., at 23a. Although Romero and Schwallier stated that they did not see anything when Savana fol

lowed their instructions, App. to Pet. for Cert. 135a, we would not define strip search and its Fourth Amendment consequenc es in a wa y that wou l d guarantee litigation about who was looking and how m u ch was seen. The ver y fact of Savana’s pulling her un derwear away from he r body in the presence of the two officials who were able to see her necessarily exp o sed her breasts and pelvic area to some degree, and both subjective and reasonable societa l expectations of personal privac y s u pport the treatment o f such a sear ch as categorically distinct, requiring distinc t elements of justification on the part of school authoritie s for going beyond a search of outer clothing and belongings. Savana’s s ubjective expectation of privacy against such a search is inherent inher account of it as embarrassing, frightening, and humiliating. The reasonabl eness of her expectation (required by the Fourth Amendment stan

dard) is indicated by the consistent experiences of other young people similarly searched, whose adol es cent vulner

ability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the exposure. See Brief for National Association of Social Work e rs et al. as Amici Curiae6–14; Hyman & Perone, The Other Side of School Viol ence: Educator Po licies and Practices that may Contribute to Student Misbehavior, 36 J. Sch ool Psychol

ogy 7, 13 (1998) (strip search can“result in serious em o tional damage”). The common reaction of these adoles

-9 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt cents simply registers the obvious l y different meaning of a search exposing the b o dy from the experien ce of nak e d

ness or n e ar undress in otherschool circumstance s . Changing for gym is getting re ady for play; exposing for a search is r e sponding to an accu sation reserved forsus pected wro n gdoers and fairly understood as so degrading that a nu mber of communities have decided that strip searches in schools are never reasonable and have banned them no matter what the facts may be, see, e.g. , New York City Dep t

. of Edu c ati o n, Reg. No

. A–432, p. 2 (2005), online at http://docs

. nycenet.edu/ docushare/dsweb/Get/Document-21/A-432.pdf (“Under no circumstan ces shall a strip-search of a student be conducted”)

. The indignity of the se arch does not, of course , outlaw it, but it does implicate the ruleof reasonablen ess as state d in T. L. O. , that “the search as actually co nducted [b e] reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.” 469 U. S., at 341 (internal quotation marks o m itted). The scope will be permissible, that is, when it is “notexcessively intrusive i n light of the age and sex of the student and the nature of the infraction.” Id. , at 342. Here, the c o ntent of the suspicion failed to match th e degree of intrusion. Wilson knew b e forehand that the pill s were prescr iption-strength ibuprofen and over-the-counter naproxen, common pain relievers equivalent to two Advi l, or one Alev e. 4He must have been aware of the nature and limited threat of the s p ecific drugs he was searching for, and while just about anything ca n be taken in quantities that will do real harm, Wils on had no rea s on to suspect

——————

4 An Advil tabl et, caplet, or g e l capl et, conta i ns 20 0 mg of ib uprofen. See Physician s ’ Desk Refer e nce fo r Non p res cript ion Dru g s , Diet a r y Supplements, and Herbs 674 (28th ed. 20 06). AnAlev e c a plet c o n t ai n s 200 mgn a pr ox enan d 20 mg sodiu m . See id. , at 675.10 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of theCourt that large a m ounts of the drugs we re being passed around, or that individual students were r e ceiving gr eat number s of pills. Nor could Wilson h ave suspected that Savana was hiding common painkillers in herunderwear. Petitioners suggest, as a tru th u n iversally acknowledged, that “stu

dents .

. . h i d[e] contraband in or under their clothing,” Reply Brief for Petitioners 8, and cite a smattering of cases of stu d ents with contraband in their un derwear, id

. , at 8–9. But when the categorically extreme intrusiveness of a searchdown to the body of an adolesc e nt requires some justification in s u spected facts, general backgroun d possibiliti e s fall short; a reasonabl e search that extensive calls for suspicion that it w ill pay off. But nondangerous school cont raband does not raise the specter of stashes in intimate places, and there is no evidence in the record of any genera l practice among Safford Middle School stu

dents of hiding that s o rt of thing in underwear; neither Jordan nor Marissa suggested to Wilson that Savanawa s doing that, and the preceding search of Marissa that Wilson ordered yielde d nothing. Wilson ne ver even de

termined when Marissa had received the pills from Sa

vana; if it had been afew days b e fore, that would weigh heavily against any reasonable conclusionthat Sava na presently had the pills on her person, much less in h e r underwear. In sum, wh at was missing from the suspected facts that pointed to Savana wa s any indication of da nger to the students from the power of the drugs or th eir quantity, and any reason to sup p ose that Savana was carrying pills in her unde r wear. We think that the combination of these deficiencies was fatal to finding the search reasonable. In so holdi n g, we mean to cast no ill ref l ection on the assistant principal, for the record raises no doubt that his motive throughout was to eliminate drugs fro mhis school and protect students from what Jordan Romero had gon e11 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt through. P a rents are known to overreact to protect thei r children from danger, and a school off i cial w i th respons i

bility for safety may te nd to do the same. The difference is that the Fo urth Amendment plac es limits on the offici al, even with the high degree of deference that courts must pay to the educator’s professi onal j u dgment. We do mean, though, to make it clear that t h e T. L. O

. concern to limit a sch ool s e a rch to reasonable scope re

quires the support of reasonable s u spicion of danger or of resort to underwear for hiding evidence of wrongdoing before a search can reasonably make the quantum leap from outer clothes and backpa c ks to exposure of intimate parts. The meaning of such a search, and the degradation its subject may reasonably feel, place a search that intru

sive in a category of its own demanding its own specific suspicions. IV A school off i cial searching a studen t is “entitled to quali

fied immun i ty where clearly established law does not sho w that the search violatedthe FourthAmendment.” Pe a rs o n v. Callahan , 555 U. S. __, __ (2009 ) (slip op., a t18). To b e established clearly, however, ther e is no need that “the very action in question [have] previ o usly been held unlaw

ful.” Wilso n v. Layne , 526 U. S. 603, 615 (1999). The unconstitutionality of outrageous conduct obviously will b e unconstitutional, this being the r e ason, a s J u dge Posner has said, that “[t]he easiest cases don’t even arise.” K. H. v. Morgan , 914 F. 2d 8 46, 851 (CA7 1990). But even as to action less than an outrage, “officials can still be on notice that their conduct violates established law .

. . in novel factual circumstances.” Ho pe v. Pe lze r , 536 U. S. 730, 741 (2002). T. L. O. dir e cted school officials t o limit the intrusive

ness of a search, “in light of the age and sex of the studen t and the nature of the infraction,” 469 U. S., at 342, and as12 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of theCourt we have just said at some length, the intrusiveness of the strip search here cannot be s eenas justifiably related to the circums tances. Bu t we realiz e that the lower courts have reach e d diverge n t conclusions regardi n g how the T. L. O. sta n dard appli e s to such searches.

A number of judges h ave read T. L. O. as th e en banc minority of the Ninth Circuit did here. The Sixth Circu it upheld a st rip search of a high school student for a drug, without any suspicion that drugs were hidden next to h e r body. Willi ams v. Elli ngton , 936 F. 2d 881, 882–883, 887 (1991). An d other cou rts considering qualified immunity for strip searches have read T. L. O. as “a series of ab

stractions, on the on e hand, and a declaration of seemin g deference to the judgments of s c hool off i cials, onthe other,” Jenkins v. Tall adega Ci ty Bd. of Ed. , 115 F. 3d 821, 828 (CA11 1997) (en banc), whichmade it impossible “t o establish clearly the contours of a Fourth Amendment right .

. . [in] the wide variety of possible sc hool settings different from thoseinvolved in T. L. O. ” itself. Ibid. S e e also Thomas v. Roberts , 323 F. 3d 950 (CA11 2003) (grant

ing qualified immunity to a te acher and police officer who conducted agroup strip search of a fifth grade class when looking for a missing $ 26). We thinkthese differe nces of opi n ion from o u r own are substantial enough to require immunity f o r the sch ool officials in this case. We would not suggestthat entitl e ment to qu alified imm unity is the guaranteed product of disuniform views of the law in the other federal, or state, courts, and the fact tha ta single ju dge, or eve na group of judges, disagrees about the contours of a right does not automatically render the law unclear if we have been clear. Thatsaid, however, the cas e s viewing school strip searches differently from the way we see the mare numer ous enough , with well -reasoned majority a n d dissenting opinions, to counsel doubt that we were sufficiently clear in the priorstatement of law. We conclude that qualified13 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of theCourt immunity is warrante d

. V The strip s e arch of Savana Redding was unreasonable and a viola t ion of the FourthAm endment, but petitioners Wilson, Romero, and Schwallier are neve rtheless pro

tected from liability through qualified im munity. Our conclusions here do not resolv e, however, the question of the liability of petitioner Saffo rd U n ified School District #1 under Monell v. Ne w York City Dept. of Soci al Serv s. , 436 U. S. 658, 694 (1978), a claim th e Ninth Ci rcuit did n o t address. The judgment of the Ninth Circuit is therefore affirmed in part and reversed in part, and this case is remanded for consideration of the Monell claim. It is so orde red._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S C HOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR I L REDDIN G ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e25, 2009 ] J USTICE S T EVEN S , wit hwhom J USTICE G IN SBURGjoins, concurring i npart and dissenting in part. In New Je rseyv. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985), the Court estab lished a two-step inquiry for dete rmining th e reasonableness of as c hool offi cial’s decision to search a student. First, the Court explained, the search must be
“ ‘justified at its inception’ ” by the presence of “reasonabl e grounds for suspecting that the s e arch will turn up evi

dence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of th e school.” Id. , at 342. Second, th e search must be “permissible inits scope,” which is achieved “when the measures adopted are reasonab ly related to t h e objectives of the sea rch and not exce ssiv e ly intrusiv e inlight of theage and s ex of the stu dent and th e natur eof th e infrac tion .” Ibid . (em p hasis added). Nothing th e Court d e cides today alters this basic framework. It simply applies T. L. O. to decla r e unconsti

tutional a s trip search of a 13- year -old honors student that was based on a groundless suspi c ion that s h e might b e hiding medicine in herunderwear. This is, in essence, a case in which clearly e s tablished law meets cl early outra

geous conduct. I ha ve long believed that “ ‘[i]t does not require a constitutional scho lar to conclude that a nude search of a 13-year-old child is an invasion of constitu

tional rights of some magnitud e.’ ” Id. , a t382, n. 252 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of S TEVENS , J. (S TEVENS , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Do e v. Renfro w , 631 F. 2d 91, 92–93 (CA7 1980)). The strip s e arch of Sa vana Reddi ng in this case was both more intrusive and less justified than the search of the student’s purse in T. L. O. Theref ore, whileI join Parts I

– III of the Court’s opinion, I disa gree with its decision to extend qua lified immu nity to the school official who au

thorized this unconstitutional sear ch. The Court reaches a contrary conclusion ab ou t qualified immunity based on the fact that v a rious Courts of Appeals have adopted seemingl y divergent views about T. L. O. ’s application to strip sea rches. Ante , at 12. Bu t the clarit y of a well-es t ablished right should not depend on whether jurists have misread our precedents. And while our cases have previ o usly noted the “d ivergence of views” among courts in deciding wh ether to extend qualified immunity, e.g. , Pea rso n v. Callah a n , (2009) 555 U. S., ___, ___ (sli p op., at 20) (noting the unsettled constitutionality of the so called “consent-once-removed” doc trine); Wils on v. Layne , 526 U. S. 603, 618 (19 99) (considering conflicting views on the constitutionality of law en forcement’s pr actice of al

lowing the media to enter a private home to observe and film attempted arrests), we have r e lied on that considera

tion only to spare officials from having “ ‘to predict th e future courseof constitutional law,’ ” Id., at 617 (quoting Procunier v. Navarette , 434 U. S. 555, 562 (1978); empha

sis added). In this c a se, by contrast, we chart no new constitutional path. We mere ly decide whether the dec i

sion to strip search Savana Redding, on th ese facts, w a s prohibited under T. L. O. Our conclusion leaves th e boundaries of the law undisturbed.*

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* Infact, in T. L. O. we cit e d wit ha pprova l aNint hCircuitca s e , Bil

b rey v. Brown , 738 F. 2d 1 462 (19 84), w h ic hh e ld th at a s t r i p se ar c h per f or med undersimilarc i r c u mstanc es v i olated the Constitut i on. New Jerseyv. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325, 33 2, n

. 2 (198 5); id. , at 341, an d n

. 6 (adopting Bilbrey ’s reasonab le suspicion st andard).3 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of S TEVENS , J. The Court of Appeals properly rejected the school offi

cial’s qualified immunity defense, and I would affirm th at court’s jud g ment in its entirety._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of G IN SB U R G , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S C HOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR I L REDDIN G ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e25, 2009 ] J USTICE G IN S B UR G , concurring in part and di ssenting in part. I agree with the Court that Assistant Principal Wils on’s subjection of 13-year-old Savana Redding to a humiliating stripdown s e arch violated the Fourth Amendm ent. But I also agree with J USTI CE S T EVE N S , ante , at 1–2, that our opinion in New J ers eyv. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985), “clearly established” the law governing this case. Fellow student Marissa Glines, ca ught with pills inher pocket, accused Redding of supplying them. App. 13a. Asked where the blue pill among several white pills in Glines’s pock et came from, Glines answered: “I guess it slipped in when shegave me the IBU 400s.” Ibid

. Asked next “who is she ?”, Glines responded: “Sava na Redding.” Ibid. As the Court observes, ante , at 6, 10 , no follow u p questions w e re asked. Wilson did not test Glines’s accusa

tion for veracity by as king Glines when did Redding gi ve her the pills, where, for what purpose. Any reasonable search for the pills would have e n ded when inspection of Redding’s backpa c k a n d jacket pock ets yielded nothin g. Wilson hadno cause to suspect, based on prior experience at the school or clues in this case, that Redding had hid

den pills—containing the equival e nt of two Advils or on e Aleve—in her underwear or body. To mak e matters worse, Wilson did not release Redding, to return to class2 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of G IN SB U R G , J. or to go home, after the search. Instead, he made her sit on a chair outside his office for over two hours. At no point did he attempt to call he r parent. Abuse of authority of that order should not be shielded by official immunity. In contrast to T. L. O. , where a teacher discovered a student smoking in th e lavatory, and wher e the search was confined to the student’s purs e, the search of Redding involved her body and rested on the bare accusation of another student whose reliability the Assistant Principal had no reason to trust. The Court’s opinion in T. L. O

. plainly stated the controlling Fourth Amendment law: A search ordered by a school officia l , even if “justified at its inception,” crosses the constitutional boundary if i tbe

comes “excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the na ture of the infraction.” 469 U. S., a t 342 (internal quotationmarks omitted). Here, “the nature of the [supposed] infraction,” the slim basis for suspecting Savana Re dding, and her “age and sex,” ibid. , establish beyond doubt that Assistant Principal Wilson’s or der cannot be reconciled with this Court’s opinion in T. L. O. Wilson’s treatment of Redding was abusive an d it was not reasonable for himto believe th at the law permitted it. I join J USTICE S TE VEN Sin dissentin g from the Court’s acceptance of Wilson’s qu alified imm u nity plea, and would affirm the Court of Appeals’ judg

ment in all respects._________________

_________________ 1 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES

No. 08–4 79 SAFF OR D UNIFIED S C HOO L DI STRICT #1, ET AL ., PETITIONERS v. APR I L REDDIN G ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEAL S FOR THE NINT H CIRCUIT [Ju n e25, 2009 ] J USTICE T HOMAS , concurring in the judgment in par t and dissenting in part. I agree with the Court that the judgment a g ainst th e school officials with respect to qualified immunity should be reversed. See ante , at 11–13. Unlike the majority, however, I would hold that the search of Savana Redding did not violate the Fourth Ame n dment. The majorit y imposes a vague and amorphous standard on school a d

ministrators. It also gr ants judge s sweeping authority to second-guess the measures that these officials take to maintain di scipline int h eir school s and ensure the hea l th and safetyof the students in their charge

. This deep intrusion into the administration of public schools exe m plifies why the Court should ret u rn to the common-law doctrine of in loco parentisunder which “the judiciary wa s reluctant to interfere in the ro utine business of school administration, allowing schools and teachers to set and enforce rules and to m a intain order.” Morsev. Frederick , 551 U. S. 3 93, 414 (2007) (T HOMAS , J., concu rring). Bu t even under the prevailing Fourth Amendment test estab

lished by New Jerseyv. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325 (1985), all petitioners, including the school district, ar e entitled t o judgment a s a matter of law in their favor.2 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. I “Although the underlying comm and of the Fourth Amendment is always that search es and seiz ures be rea

sonable, what is reasonable depends on the context within which a search takes p l ace.” Id. , at 337. Th us, although public school students retain Fourth Amendment righ ts under this Court’s precedent, see id. , at 33 3–337, those rights “a re different .

. . than elsewhere; the ‘reasonable

ness’ inquiry cannot di sregard the schools’ custodial and tutelary responsibility f o r children,” Vernonia School Dist. 47J v. Acton , 515 U. S. 646, 656 (1995); see also T. L. O. , 469 U. S., at 339 (ide ntifying “th e substantial interest of teachers and administrators in maintaining discipline i n the classroom and onschool grounds”). For nearly 25 years this Court has understood that “[m]aintaining order in the class r oom has n e ver beeneasy, but in more recent years, school disorderhas often taken parti cularly ugly forms: drug use and violent crime in the schools have become major social pr oblems.” Ibid. In scho ols, “[e]vents calling for discipline a r e frequent occurrence s and some

times require immediate, effective action.” Gossv. Lopez , 419 U. S. 5 65, 580 (1975); see als o T. L. O., 469 U. S., a t 340 (explaining that schools have a “legitimate need to maintain a nenvironment in which learning can ta ke place”). For this reason, school offic i als retain br oadauthority to protect students a n d preserv e “order a n d a prop er educatio nalenvironme n t” under the Fourth Amendmen t. Id., at 339

. This authority requires that sch o ol off i cia l s b e able to eng a ge in the “clos e superv ision of schoolchildr e n, as well as . . . enf o rc[e] rules aga i nst conductthat wou l d be perfectlypermissible if underta ken by an a d ult.” Ibid. Seeking to reconcile the Fourth Amendment with th is uniqu e pub lic school setting, the Court in T. L. O. held that a school search is “reason able” if it is “ ‘justified at its incepti o n’ ” and “ ‘reas o nably re lat e d inscop e to th e cir

-3 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. cumstances which justified the interferenc e in the first place.’ ” Id. , at 341–34 2 (quoting Terryv. Oh io , 392 U. S. 1, 20 ( 1968)). The s e a rch under r e view easily meets th is standard. A A “searchof a student by a teacher or other s c hool offi

cial will be ‘justified at its inception’ when there are rea

sonable grounds for su specting that the sear ch will turn up evidence that the student has violated o ris violati n g either the law or the rules of the school.” T. L. O ., su pra , at 341–342 (footnote omitted). As the majority rightl y concedes, this search was justified at its inception because there were reasonable ground s to suspect that Reddin g possessed medication that violated school rules. See ante , at 7. A finding of reasonable suspicion “does n o t deal with hard certai n ties, but with probabilities.” United States v. Cortez , 449 U. S. 411, 418 (1981); see also T. L. O. , supr a , at 346 (“[T]he requirement of rea s onable sus p icion is not a requirement of absolute certainty” ) . To satisfy this stan

dard, more than a mere “hunch” of wrongdoin gis required, but “considerably” less suspicion is needed th an would be required to “satisf[y] a preponderance of the evidence standard.” United Statesv. Arvizu , 534 U. S. 266, 274 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, in evalu a ting whether there i s a reason able “particularized and objecti ve” basis for conducting a search based on suspected wrongdoing, government offi

cials must consider the “totality of t h e circumst ances.” Id. , at 273 (internal quotation marks omitted). School officials have a spe c ialized un derstanding of the sch ool environ

ment, the h abits of the students, and the concerns of the community, which enables them to “ ‘formul a t[e] certai n common-sense conclusions ab out human behavior.’ ” United Sta t esv. Sokolo w , 490 U. S. 1, 8 (1989) (quoting Cortez , sup ra , at 418). And like police off i cers, school4 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. officials are “entitled to make an assessmentof the situ a tion in l i ght of [this] s p ecialized training and familiarity with the customs of the [school]. ” See Arviz u , supra, at 276. Here, petitioners hadreasonable grounds to suspect that Reddi n g was in possession of prescription and non

prescriptiondrugs in vi olation of t h e school’s prohibition of the “non-medical use, possession , or sale of a drug” o n school prop erty or at school event s . 531 F. 3 d1071, 107 6 (CA9 2008) (en banc); see also id. , at 1107 (Hawkins, J

. , dissenting) (explainin g that the school policy defined “drugs ” to include “ ‘[a]ny prescription orover -the-counter drug, e x cept those for which permission to use in school has beengranted’ ”). A s an initial matter, school officials were aware that a few years earlier, a student had becom e “seriously i ll” and “spent several days in in tensive care” after ingesting prescr iption medication obtained from a classmate. App. 10a. Fourth Am endment searches do n o t occur in a vacuum; ra ther, context must inform the judi

cial inquiry. See Cor t ez , sup ra , a t417–418. In this in

stance, the suspicion of drug possession arose at a middle school that had “a history of problems with students using and distributing prohibited and illegal substances on campus.” App. 7a, 10a. The school’s substance-abuse problems had not abated by the 200 3–2004 school year, which is wh en the chal

lenged search of Redding tookplace. School officials ha d found alcohol and cigarettes in the girls’ bathroom during the first school dance of the year and noticed that a gro u p of students including Redding and Marissa Glines smel l ed of alcohol. Ibid. Several weeks later, another student, Jordan Romero, reported that Re dding had hosted a party before the dance where she serve dwhisk e y, vodk a, and tequila. Id. , at 8a, 11a. Romero had provided this report to school officials as a result of a meeting his mother scheduled with the officials after Romero “bec[a]me vio

-5 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. lent” and “sick to his stomach” one night and admitted that “he had taken some pills th at he had got[ten] from a classmate.” Id., at 7a–8a, 10a–11a. At that meeting, Romero admitted tha t“cer t ain students were bringin g drugs and weapons oncampus.” Id., at 8a, 11 a. One week later, Romero handed the assistant principal a white pill that he said he had received from Glines. Id. , at 11a. H e reported “that a group of students [were] planning on taking the pills at lunch.” Ibid. School officials justifiably t ook quick action in light o f the lunchtime deadline. The assistant principal took the pill to the school nurs e who iden tified it as prescription

strength 40 0-mg Ibuprofen. Id., at 12a. A subsequen t search of Glines and her belongings produced a razor blade, a Naproxen 200-mg pill, and several Ibuprofen 400

- mg pills. Id

. , at 13a. When asked, Glines claimed that she had received the pi lls from Re dding. Ibid. A search of Redding’s planner, which Glines h a d borrowed, then un

covered “several knive s , severa l lighters, a ci garette, an d a permanent marker.” Id

. , at 12a, 14a, 22a. Thus, as the majority ac knowledges , ante , at 7, the totalit y of relevant circumstances justified a search of Redding for pills. 1 B The remaining question is whether the search was reasonable in scope. Under T. L

. O. , “a search will be permissiblein its scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related to the objectives of the sea rch and not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of the

——————

1 To be sure, Redding denied knowle dge of the pills and th e materi al s inh e rplan n e r . App. 14a. Bu t h e rden i al alon e does n o t n e g a te th e reasonable su spicion held by school offi cials. See New J e rseyv. T. L. O. , 469 U. S. 325, 34 5 (19 85) (f in din gsear c hr e ason ab le ev en though “T. L. O. had been accus e d of smoking, and had denied t h e accusation in the strongest possible ter m s w h ensh e stated th at sh e di d not smoke at all”).6 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. student an d the natu r e of the infraction.” 469 U. S., at 342. The majority concludes that the school off i cials’ search of R e dding’s un derwear was not “ ‘re a sonably re

lated in sc ope to the circumsta nces whichjustified t h e interference in the first place,’ ” see ante , at 8–11, notwith

standing th e officials’ reasonable suspicion that Reddin g “was involved in pilldi stribution,” ante, at 7. Accordin g t o the majority, to be rea s onable, this school search required a showing of “danger to the students from the power of the drugs or th eir quantity” or a “reason to suppose that [Red

ding] was c a rrying pill s in her underwear.” Ante , at 10

. Each of these addition al requirem e nts is an unjustifiable departure from bedrock Fourth Amendment law in th e school setti ng, where this Co urt has heretofore read the Fourth Am endment to grant considerable leeway to scho ol officials. Because the school officials searched in a loca

tion where the pills could have been hidden, the sear ch was reasonable in scop e under T. L. O. 1 The majority finds that “subjective and reasonable societal expectations of personal privac y support .

. . treat[ing]” this type of search, which it lab e ls a “strip search,” as “cate gorica lly di stinct, requiring distinct ele

ments of justification on the part of school a u thorities for going beyond a search of clothing and belongings.” Ante , at 8. 2Thus, in the majority’s vie w , althoughthe school officials ha d reasonable suspicion to believe that Reddin g

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2 Like t h e dis s e ntb e low, “ I would res e rve th e t e rm‘s t r ip s e a rch’ for a sear c hth at r e qu ir ed its su bj ec t to fu llydisrobe in view of officials.” 531 F. 3d 107 1, 1 0 91, n

. 1 (CA9 200 8) (opi nionof Hawkins, J.). The distinc

tionbetween a s t r i p se ar c han d th e se ar c hat i ssu e int h is c a se may be slight, but it i s a di stinction that the law has drawn. See, e. g., San d i n v. Conne r , 515 U. S. 47 2, 4 7 5 (1 995) (“Th e offic e rsu bjec t e d Con n e rto a str i p sear c h , c o mplete with inspec tion of the r e c t al ar ea”); Bell v. Wolfish , 441 U. S. 520, 558 , an d n. 39 ( 1979) (desc r ibi n g v i su al in spec tionof bodyc av i ties as “ p ar t of a str i p sear c h”).Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) 7 Opinion of T HO MA S , J. had the pills on her person, see ante , at 7, they needed some greater level of particu larized suspicion to condu c t this “strip s e arch.” Th ere is no support for th is contortion of the Fourth Amendment. The Court has generally held that the reason ableness of a search’s scope depends only on whether it is limited t o the area that is capable of concealing the object of th e search. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton , 52 6 U. S. 295 , 307 (1999) (Police off i cers “may inspect passengers’ be

longings found in the car tha ta r e capable of concealing the object o f the search”); Floridav. Jimeno , 5 00 U. S. 24 8, 251 (1991) (“The scope of asearch is generally defined b y its expressed object”); United S t atesv. Johns , 469 U. S. 478, 487 (1985) (search reasonab le because “there is no plausible argument tha tthe objectof the sear ch could no t have been concealed i nthe pack ages”); United Sta t esv. Ross , 456 U. S. 798, 8 20 (1982) (“A lawful search .

. . gen erally extends to the entire area in which the object of the search may be found”). 3 In keeping with this longstanding rule, the “nature o f the infracti on” referenced in T. L. O. delineates the proper scope of a search of students in a way that is identical to that permit ted for searches outside the school— i.e. , the search must be limite dto the areas where the object of that infraction could b e concealed

. See Ho rt o nv. Califor

nia , 496 U. S. 128, 141 (1990) (“Police with a warrant for a rifle may search only places where rifles might be” (inter

nal quotation marks omitted)); Ross , su pra , a t82 4 (“[P]robable cause to be lieve that u n documented aliens are being transported in a van will not justify a warrantless

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3 The Courtha s a d opt e d adifferents t a n da rd for s e a rch es involving an “intr u sio[n] into the human body .” Schm erb e rv. California , 384 U. S. 757, 770 (1966). Th e sear c hh e r edoes n o t implic ate th e Cou r t’ s cases governing bodily intrusions, ho wever , b e ca us e it did not involve a “phys i ca l intrus ion, penetra t ing b e nea t h the s k in,” Sk innerv. Railwa y Lab o r Executi ves’ Assn ., 489 U. S. 602, 616 (1989).8 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. search of a suitcase”). A search of a student therefore is permissible in scope under T. L. O. so long as it is objec

tively reasonable to believe that the area sea rched could conceal the contraban d. The di ssenting opinion below correctlyc a ptured th is Fourth Amendment standar d , noting that “if a studen t brought a baseball ba t on campu s in violation of school policy, a search of that s t udent’s shirt pocket woul d be patently unjustified.” 531 F. 3d, at 110 4 (opinion of H a wk ins, J.). The analysis of whether the scope of the search here was permissible under that standard is straightforward. Indeed, the majority does not dispute that “general back

ground possibilities” establis h that students conceal “con

traband in their underwear.” Ante, at 10. It acknowledges that school officials had reasonable suspicion to look in Redding’s b a ckpa ck an d outer clothing because if “Wilson’ s reasonable suspicion of pill distri bution were not unde r stood to su pport searches of outerclothes an d back p ack , it would not justify any search worth making. ” An te , at7. The majority neverthe l ess concludes that pr oceeding any further with the search was unreasonable. See ante , at 8– 10; see also ante , at 1 (G INSBURG , J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Any rea s onable s e a rch for the pills wouldhave end e d when i n spection of Redding’s backpa c k a n d jacket p o ckets yielded nothing”). But ther e is no support for this conclusion. The reasonable suspicion that Redding possessed the pills f o r distribution purposes did not dis s ipate simp ly because the search of her back

pack turne dup nothi n g. It was eminently reasonable to conclude that the backpack was empty becau s e Redding was secreting the pills in a place s h e thought no one woul d look

. See Ross , supra , at 820 (“ Contraband goods rarely are strewn” about in plain view; “by their very nature such goods must be withheld from public view”). Redding wo uld not hav e been the first person to conceal pills in her undergarments. See Hicks, Man Gets 17-Ye ar9 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. Drug Sente n ce, [Corbin, KY] Tim e s-Tribune, Oct. 7, 200 8, p. 1 (Dru g courier “tol dofficials she had the [Ox y contin ] pills concea led in h e r crotch”); Conley, Whiteh aven: Traffic Stop Yields Hydrocodone Pills, [Memphis] Commercial Appeal, Au g. 3, 2007, p. B3 (“An additional 40 hydro

codone pill s were fou n d in her pants”); Ca ywood, Police Vehicle Chase Leads to Dru gAr rests, [Worcester] Tele

gram & Ga zette, June 7, 2008, p. A7 (25-yea r -old “alleg

edly had a cigar tube stuffed with pills tucked into the waistband of his pants”); Hubartt, 23-Year-Old Charge d With Dealing Ecs t asy, The [Fort Wayne] Journal Gazette, Aug. 8, 200 7, p. C2 (“[W]hile he was being pu t into a squ a d car, his pan t s fell down and a plas tic bag containing pink and orange pills fell on the ground”); Sebasti an Residents Arrested inDrug Stin g, Vero Beach Press Journal, Sept. 16, 2006, p. B2 (Arrestee “told them he ha d more pills ‘down my pants’ ”). No r will she b e the last a f ter today’s decision, which annou n ces the s a fest place to secrete contraband in school. 2 The majority compound s its error by reading t h e “natur e of the infraction” aspect of the T. L. O. test a s a license to limit searc h es basedon a judge’s assessmentof aparticu

lar school policy. According to the majority, the scope of the search was impermissible be cause the school offici al “must have been aware of the natu r e and limited threat of the specific drugs he was search ing for” an d because he “had no rea s on to suspect that large amounts of the drugs were being passed around, or that individual students were receiving great numbers of pills.” An te , at 9–10. Thus, in order to locate a ra tionale for finding a Fourth Amendment violation in this case, the majority retreat s from its ob servation that the school’s firm n o -drug policy “makes sense, and th ere is no basis to claim that the search was unreasonable owin g to some defect or short

-10 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. coming of the rule it was aimed at enforcing.” Ante , at 5 , n. 1. Even accep t ing the majority’s as surances that it is not attacking the rule’s reasonablen ess, it certainly is attack

ing the rule’s importan c e. This ap proach dire ctly conflict s with T. L. O. in which the Court was “unwilling to adopt a standard u n der which the legality of a s e arch is dependen t upon a judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of school rules

. ” 469 U. S. , at 342, n. 9. Indeed, the Court i n T. L. O. exp r essly rejected the proposition that the major

ity seemingl y endorses—that “some rules regarding stu

dent conduct are by nature too ‘trivial’ to justify a search based uponreasonable suspicion.” Ibid.; se e a l s o id., at 343, n. 9 (“The promulgation of a rule forbidding specified conduct p r esumably reflects a judgment on the part of school off i cials that su ch cond uct is destructive of school order or of a proper educational environment. Absent an y suggestion that the rul e violates some substantive consti

tutional guarantee, the courts should as a g e neral matter, defer to that judgment” )

. The majority’s decision in this regard also departs from another basic principle of the Fourth Amendment: tha t law enforcement officials can enfor c e with the same vigor all rules and regulations irrespective of th e perceived importance of any of those rul e s. “In a long line of case s, we have said that when an officer has probable cause to believe a person committed even a minorcrime in his presence, the balancin g of private and public interests is not in doub t. The arrest is const i tutionally reasonable. ” Virginiav. Moore , 553 U. S. ___, ___ (2008) (s lip op., at 6)

. The FourthAmendment rule for searches is the same: Police offic e rs are entitled to search rega rdless of the perceived triviality of the underlying law. As we have explained, requiring p o lice to make “sensitive, case-by

case determinations of governmentneed,” Atwater v. La go Vista , 532 U. S. 318, 347 (2001), for a parti cular prohibi

-11 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. tion before conducting a sea rch would “place police in an almost impossibl e spot,” id. , at 350. The majority has placed school officials in this “impossi

ble spot” by questioning whether possessionof Ibuprofen and Napro x en causes a severe enough threat to warran t investigation. Had the suspected infraction involved a street drug, the majority implies that it would have ap

proved the scope of the search. Se eante , at 9 (relying on the “limitedthreat of t h e specific drugs he was searching for”); ante, at 10 (relying on the limited “p ower of the drugs” in volved). In effect, then, th e majority has replaced a school rule that draws no distinction among drugs with a new one that does. As a result, a full search of a student’s person for prohibited drugs will be permitted only if the Court a gre es that the drugin q u estion was sufficiently dangerous. Such a test is unworkable and unsound. School offic i als cannot be expected to halt s e a rches based on the possibility that a court might later fi nd that the particular infraction at issue is not severe enough to war

rant an intrusive investigation. 4

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4 J US TI CE G IN SB U R Gsu g g e sts t h at r e qu ir in g Reddin gto “s i tona c h air outside [the a ssi stant principal’s] o ffice for ove rtwo ho urs” and failing to c a llherpar e nts befor ec o nduc tingthe sear c hc o nstitutes an “[ a]bus e of author ity” that “should not be shielde dbyoffic i al i mmunity .” See ante , at 1–2. Bu t th e sc h ool was u n d er n oc o n s titu tion aloblig ationto ca ll Redding’s pa rent s b e for econduct i n gt h e s e a rch: “ [R]ea s o nab l eness under theFo urth Amendment does not require employing theleast int r us ive m e ans , b e ca us e the logic of s u ch elab o ra t e les s - res t rict ive

alter n ativ e ar g u men t s c o u l d r a ise in superable barriers to the exercise of virt ua lly a l l s e a rch-a nd-s eizure powers .” Board of Ed. of Indepe nd

ent School D i s t . No. 92 of Po ttawatomie Cty. v. Earls , 536 U. S. 8 22, 8 3 7 (200 2) (in t er nal qu otat ionmar k s an d br ac kets omit te d). Forth e same r e ason, the Constitution did not r e quir e school officials to ask “followu p qu estion s ” aft e rth ey h a d alr e adydev e loped r e ason able su spic ionth at Redding posse ssed drugs. See ante , at 6, 10 (m ajor ityo p in ion) ; ante , at 1 (opinion of G IN SB U R G , J.). Inan yev en t, th e su g g e stion th at r e qu ir in g Redding to s i t in acha i r for t w o hou r s a m ounted to adepriva t ion of her c o nstitutional r i gh ts, or that sc hool officials are requiredto engagein12 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. A rule pro m ulgated b ya school board repr esents the judgment of school off i cials that the rule is needed to maintain “school orde r” and “a proper educational envi

ronment.” T. L. O. , 4 69 U. S., at 343, n. 9. Teachers, administrators, and the local school board are called upon both to “p r o tect the .

. . safety of s t udents an d school per

sonnel” and“maintain an environment conducive to learn

ing.” Id. , at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring i njudgment). They are task ed with “watch[ing] over a large number o f students” who “are inclined to test the outer boundaries of acceptable conduct an d to imitate the misb ehavior of a peer if that misbehavior is not dealt with quickly.” Id. , a t 352. In such an environment, something as simple as a “water pistol or peash ooter can wreak [havoc] until it is taken away.” Ibid

. T h e danger posed by unchecked di s tribution and consumption of prescription pills by students certainly needs no elab oration. Judges are not qualified to second-guess the best man

ner for maintaining quiet and order in the school envi

ronment. Such institutional judgments, like those con

cerning the selection of the be st methods for “restrain[ing students] from assaulting one anot h er, abusin g drugs an d alcohol, and committing other cr imes,” id., at 342, n. 9, “involve a host of policy choices that must be made by locally elec ted representatives, r a ther thanby federa l judges inte rpretingth e basic cha rter of Gov e rnment for the entire c o untry.” Collinsv. Ha rker Heigh t s , 503 U. S. 115, 129 (1992); cf. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Ewin g , 4 74 U. S. 214, 226 (1985) (observing that federal courts are n o t “suited to evaluat[ing] the substance of the multitude of academic decisions” or disciplinary decisions “that are

—————— det a iled int e rroga t i ons b e fore conduct i n gs e a rches fo r dru g s , only reinforces theconclusion that the Ju dicia r y is ill-e q uip p ed to second

g u ess th e dail ydec i sion s made bypublicadminis t r a tor s . Cf. Beard v. Banks , 548 U. S. 521, 53 6–5 37 (2 006) (T HOMAS , J

. , con c ur ringin ju dg men t).13 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. made daily by faculty members of publiceducational institutions”). It is a mistake for judges to assume the responsibility for deciding which school rules are impor

tant enough to allow for inva sive searches an d which rules are not. 3 Even if this Court were authorized to second-guess the importance of school r u les, the C o urt’s assessment of the importance of this distri ct’s policy is flawed. It is a crime to possess or use pres cription-strength Ibuprofen without a prescripti o n. See Ariz. Rev. Sta t . Ann. §13–3406(A)(1) (West Supp. 2008) (“A person s hall not knowingly .

. . [p]ossess or use aprescription-only drug unless the perso n obtains the prescription-only drug pursuant to a valid prescriptionof a presc r iber who is licensed pursuant to [state law]” )

. 5By proh ibiting unauthorized prescription drugs on s c hool grounds—and conducting a search t o ensure students abide by that pro h ibition—the school rule here was consistent with a routine provisionof the state criminal code. It hardly seems unreasonab le for school officials to enforce a rule that , in effect, proscr ibes conduc t that amounts to a crime.

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5 Arizona’s lawis notidio syncratic; ma nyS t a t es have s e pa rately crimina lized the una uthoriz e d pos s e s s i onof prescriptio n drugs. See, e.g. , M o . Rev

. Sta t . §577. 6 28(1) ( S u pp. 200 8) (“No pe r s onless th a n tw en ty -on ey e ar s of ag e sh all posses s upon the real prope r ty comprising a public or private elementary or sec o n d ar ysc h ool or sc h ool bu s pre s cript ion m e dica t i on wit h outava lid pres cript ion for s u chm e dica t i on” ) ; Okla. Sta t ., Tit. 59, §3 53.2 4 ( 2) (Su pp. 20 0 8) (“It sh all b eu n l awfu l for a n y pers on, fi r mor corpo r a t ion t o. . . [s ]ell , offer fo r s a le, b a r t e r or give awayan yu n u sed qu an ti tyof dr u g s obtain ed bypr esc r i ption , ex c e pt .

. . as provided by the State Board of Ph ar mac y”); Utah Code An n . §5 8– 17b –5 01(1 2 ) (Lex is 200 7) (“ ‘Unla w ful con d uct’ incl udes : us ing apre s cription drug

. . . for hims elf thatwas no t lawfully pre s cribed for him bya pr ac tit i on er”); see also Ala. Code § 3 4–23 –7 ( 200 2); Del. Code An n ., Tit. 16, §475 4A (a)(4) (Su pp. 200 8); Fl a. St at. §499.0 05( 1 4) (200 7); N. H. Rev

. Stat. An n . §318:42(I) (S u pp. 2008).14 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. Moreover, s c hool distri cts have valid reasons f o r punish

ing the un authorized possession of prescription drugs o n school property as severely as the possessi o nof street drugs; “[t]e e nage abus e of ov er-th e -counter and prescrip

tion drugs poses an in creasingly alarming national crisis.” Get Teens Off Drugs, The Education Digest 75 (Dec. 2006). As one study noted, “m ore young people ages 12–17 abuse prescriptiondrugs than any ill icit drug except mari

juana—more than coca ine, heroin, and metha m phetamine combined.” Executive Office of the Presid ent, Office of National Drug Control Policy ( O NDC P), P r escription f o r Danger 1 (Jan. 2008) (hereinafter Prescription for Da n ger). And a ccording to a 2005 survey of teens, “nearly one in five (19 percent or 4.5 million) admit abu sing prescrip

tion drugs in their lif etime.” Columbia University, The National Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse (CAS A), “You’ve Got Drugs!” V: Pr escription Drug Pusher s on the Internet 2 (July 2008); see also Dept. of Health an d Human Services, National Institut e onDrug Abuse, High School and Youth Tre n ds 2 (Dec. 2008) (“In 2008, 15. 4 percent of 12th-graders reported using a prescription dru g nonmedically within th e past year”). School administrators can reasonab ly conclude that this high rate of drug abuse is being fueled, at leas t in part, b y the increasing presence of prescription drugs on scho ol campuses. See, e.g., Gibson, Grand Fork s Schools See Ris e In Prescription Drug Abuse, Grand Forks Herald, Nov. 16, 2008, p. 1 (explaining that “prescription drug abuse is growing int o a larger problem” as students “bring them to school and sell them or just give them to their friends”). In a 2008 survey, “44 percent of teens sa[id] dru g s are used, k e pt or sold on th e grounds of their schools.” CASA, National Survey of American Attitudes on Substance Abuse XIII: Teens and Parents 19 (Aug. 2008) (hereinafter National Survey). The risk s posed by the abuse of these drugs a r e every bit as serious as the dange r s of using a15 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. typical stre et drug. Teenagers are nevertheless apt to “believe the myth th a t these drugs provide a medicall y safe high.” ONDCP, Teens and Prescripti o n Drugs: An Analysis of Recen t Trends on the Emerging Drug Th reat 3 (Feb. 2007) (here

inafter Teens and Pre s cription Drugs). Bu t since 1999, there has “been a dramatic increase in the number of poisonings and even deaths assoc i ated with the abuse of prescriptiondru g s.” P r escription for Dan g er4; see also Dept. of He alth and Human Servi c es, The NSDUH Report: Trends in Nonmedical Use of Prescription Pain Relievers: 2002 to 200 7, p. 1 (Feb. 5, 2009) (“[ A]pproxima t ely 324,000 emergency department visits in2 006 involved the non

medical use of pain relievers”); CA SA, Un der the Counter: The Diversi o n and Abu s e of Controlled Prescription Dru g s in the U. S., p. 25 (July 2005) (“In 2002, abuse of con

trolled prescription drugs was i m plicated in at least 23 percent of drug-related emergency department admissions and 20.4 percent of all single drug-related emergency departmentdeaths”). At least some of these injuries and deaths are likely due to the factthat “[m ] ost controlled prescriptiondrug abusers are poly- s ubstance abusers,” id. , at 3, a habit that is e s pecially likely to res u lt in deadly drug combinations. Furthermore, even if a child is not immediately harmed by the abuse of prescription dru g s, research suggests th at prescription drugs have become “gatewa ydrugs to oth e r substances of abuse.” Id. , at 4 ; Healy, Skipping the Street, Los Angeles Times, Sept. 15, 2008, p. F1 (“Boomers made marijuana their ‘gateway’ .

. . but a you n ger generation finds prescription drugs an easier scor e”); see a l s o NationalSurvey 17 (noting that teens report “tha tpre s cription d r ugs are e a sier to buy than beer”). Admitte dl y , theIb uprofen an d Na proxe n at iss u e inthi s case are no t the prescriptio npa inkille rs at the forefront of the prescription-drug- abuse proble m. See Pre s cription fo r16 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. Da nge r3 (“Pain relie ve rs li ke Vi co din an d OxyCon tin a r e the prescriptio ndrugs most co m m onl y ab us ed by teens”). Bu t th e y a r e not wi tho u t thei r o w n da nge r s . As no nste r oidal a nti -in f lamm ato ry drugs ( N SAI D s), they pose a ris k of dea th fro moverdose

. The Pil lBoo k 821 , 8 27 (H. Silv e r m an, ed., 13 th e d

. 200 8) (obse rvin g tha tI buprof e n a n d N a p r o x e n are NSAI Ds and “[p]e o ple have died from NSAI D over

doses”). Moreover, the side-effec t s caused by the use o f NSAI Ds can be magnified if they are taken in combination with other drugs. See, e.g., Reacti ons Weekly, p. 18 (Issu e no. 1235, Jan. 17, 2009) (“A 1 7 -year-old girl developed allergic interstitial nephriti s and renal failu re while re

ceiving escitalopram a n d ibuprofen”); id. , at 26 (Issue no. 1232, Dec. 13, 2008) (“A 16-month-old boy developed iron deficiency anaemia a n d hypoalbuminaemiaduring treat

ment with naproxen”); id. , at 15 (Issue no. 1 220, Sept. 2 0 , 2008) (18-year-old “was diagnosedwith pill-i n duced oes o phageal perforation” after ta king ibuprofen “and wa s admitted to the [intensive care unit]”); id. , at 20 (Issue n o . 1170, Sept. 22, 2007) (“A 12-year-old boy developed ana

phylaxis following ingestion of ibu p rofen”). If a studen t with a previously un known intolerance to Ibuprofen or Naproxenwere tota ke either drug and be

come ill, the public outrage would likely be directed to

ward the school for failing to take steps to prevent the unmonitore duse of the drug. In light of the risk s in

volved, a school’s decision to establish and enf o rce a school prohibition on the poss essionof a n y unauthorized drug is thus a reasonable judgment. 6

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6 Sc h ools h av e a sig n ific an t i n ter e st in protecting a ll stu d ents from pres cription drug ab u s e ; yo ung fema le s t udents a r e no exception. S ee Teens and Pr escription Drugs 2 (“Pr esc r iption drugs are the most c o mmon l yabu sed dr u gamo n g12–1 3-y e ar -olds”). Infac t , amon g1 2 - t o 17-y e ar -olds, f e males ar e “ m or e likelyth anboy s to h a v eabu sed pr e s cription drug s ” a n d have “higherra tes o f dependence or abuse involv ing prescription drugs.” Id. , a t 5

. Thus , ra ther tha nundermining the17 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. * * * In determining wheth e r the search’s scope was reason

able under the Fourth Amendment, it is therefore irrele

vant whether officials suspe cted Redding of possessing prescription

- strength I buprofe n, nonprescripti o n-strength Naproxen, or some ha rder str eet drug. Safford prohibite d its possession on school prop erty. Reasonable suspicion that Reddi ng was in possession of drugs in violation of these polici e s, therefor e, justifieda search extending to any area where small pills could be concealed. The sear ch did not violate the Fourth Amendment. II By declarin g the search unreason able in this case, the majority has “ ‘surren d er[ed] control of the American public school system to public school studen ts’ ” by invali

dating school policies that treat all drugs equally and b y second-guessing swift disciplinary decisions made by school offici als. See Morse , 551 U. S., at 421 (T HOMAS , J., concurring) (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist. , 393 U. S. 503, 526 (1 969) (Black, J., dissenting)). The Court’s inte rference in these matters of great concern to teachers, parents, and s t udents illu s trates whythe most constitutionally sound approach t o the question of applyi ng the Fourth Amendment in local public schools would in fact be the complete restoration of the common-law doctri ne of in loco paren tis

. “[I]n the early years of public schooling,” courts applie d the doctrine of in loco paren tisto transfer to teachers the authority of a parent to “ ‘command obedien c e, to control stubbornness, to qu icken diligen ce, and to reform ba d habits.’ ” Morse , supra, at 413–4 14 (T HOMA S , J., concur

-

—————— releva ntgove rnm e nt a lint e res there, R e dding’s a g e a n d s e x, if a n y thing, increased the need f o r a sea r c hto pr ev ent the reasonab lysus pected use of p r escription drugs.18 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. ring) (quoting State v. Pe nde rg ra ss , 19 N. C. 365, 365–366 (1837)). So empowered, school teachers and administrators had almostcomplete discreti on to establishand enfor c e the rules they believed were ne cessary to maintain control over their classrooms. See 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 205 (1873) (“So the power allowed by law to the parent over the person of the c h ild may be delegated to a tutor ori n structor, t h e better to accomplish the pur p ose of education”); 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of En gland 441 (1765) (“He may also delegate part of his parental authority, during his life, to the tutor or schoolmast er of his chi l d; who is then in loco paren tis , an d has such a portion of t h e parent committed to his charge, viz. that of restraint a n d co rrection, as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is employed”). 7T h e perils of judicial policymaking inh e rent in applying Fourth Amendment protections to public schools cou n sel in favo r of a return to the understanding that existed in this Na

tion’s first public schools, which gave teache rs discretion to craft the rules needed to carry out th e disciplinar y responsibilities delegated to them by parents. If the common-law view that par e nts delegate to teach

ers their authority to discipline and maintain order we re to be applied in this case, the search of R e dding wou l d stand. There can be n o doubt that a parent would have had the au thority to c o nduct the search at i ssue in this case. Pare nts have “i mmunity fr om the stri ctures of th e Fourth Am endment” when it comes to sear ches of a child

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7 The o n e aspect of school discipline with respec t to which the judic i

ar yat times b e c a me inv o lv ed was the “imposition of ex cessiv ephy s ic a l punis h ment.” Morse , 551 U. S., at 416 (T HOMA S , J., conc urrin g). S o me ea rly cou r ts found co rpora lpunis h ment proper “a s long a s the tea c her did not ac t wi th leg a l ma lic e orc a use permanent injury;” while other c o ur ts interv ened onlyif the punishment was “c lear lye x c e ssiv e .” Ibi d

. (emphasi s del e ted and inte rnal quot atio n marks omit ted) (collecting dec i sion s).19 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. or that child’s belongings. T. L. O. , 469 U. S., at 337; see also id. , at 336 (A parent’s authority is “not s ubject to the limits of th e Fourth Amendment”); Griffinv. Wis c onsin , 483 U. S. 868, 876 (1987) (“[P]are ntal custodial authority” does not require “judicial approval for [a] search of a minor child’s room”). As ackno w ledged by this Court, this principle is bas ed on the “societal understanding of superior and inferior” with respec t to the “pa r ent and ch ild” relationship. Geor

giav. Ra n d ol p h , 547 U. S. 103, 114 (2006). In light of th is relationship, the Court has indicated that a parent c an authorize a third-part ysearch of a child by consenting to such a search, even if the child denies his consent. See ibid.; see also 4 W. La Fave, Search and Seizure §8.3(d), p. 160 (4th ed. 2004) (“[A] father, as the head of the house

hold with the responsibilit y and the authority for the discipline, training and control of his children, has a supe

rior interest in the fa mily residence to thatof his minor son, so that the father’s consent to search would be effec

tive notwithstanding the son’s contemporaneous on-the

scene obje ction” (internal quo tation marks omitted)). Certainly, a search by the parent himself is no different, regardless of whether or not a ch ild would prefer to be left alone. See id., §8.4(b), at 202 (“[E]ven [if] aminor child

. . . may thi n k of a roo mas ‘his,’ the overall dominance will be in his pa rents” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Restoring t h e common-law doctri ne of in loco paren ti s would not, however, leave public schools entirely free to impose any rule they choose. “If parents do not like the rules impos e d by those schools, they can seek redress in school boar ds or legislatures; they can send their children to private schools or home sch ool th em; or the ycan simply move.” See Morse , 551 U. S., at 419 (T HOMA S , J., concur

ring). Indeed, parents and local government officials have proved themselves quite cap able of challenging overly harsh school rules or the enforcement of sensible rules i n20 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. insensibl e ways. For example, on e com m unity questioned a school policy that resulted in “an 11-year-old [being] arrested, hand

cuffed, and taken to jai lfor bringing a plastic butter knife to school.” Downey, Zero Toleran c e Doesn’t Always Add Up, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Apr. 6, 2009, p. A11. Inanother, “[ a]t least on e school board member was outraged” when 14 elementa ry-school students were suspended for “imitati ng d r ug a c tivity” afte r theycom bined Kool- Aid and sugar in plastic bags. Grant, Pupils Trading Sweet Mix Get Sour Shot of Discipline, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 18, 2006, p. B1. Individuals within yet another sch ool district protested a“ ‘zero-tolerance’ policy toward weapons” that had become “so rigid that it force[d] schools to expel any student wh o belongs to a military organization, a drum-and-bugle corps or any other legiti

mate extra curricular group andis simplytransporti ng what amounts to harmless props.” Richardson, School Gun Case Sparks Cries For “Common Sense,” Washington Times, Feb. 13, 2009, p. A1. 8 These local efforts to change controversial school policies through de mocratic p r ocesses hav e proven successful in

——————

8 See also, e.g. , Smy d o, Allde r dic ePar e n t s D e c rySu spen sion s, Pit t s bu r gh Post-Gazette, Apr

. 16, 2009, p. B1 (Par en ts “bel iev ea on e-day su spen sionfora fir s t-time h a llw ay infraction is anoverreaction”); O’Brien & Bu c k ha m, Girl’s S m ooch onSchool Bu s Leads to Su spen sion , Bu ffalo News, Jan . 6, 2008, p. B1 (Par en ts of 6-y e ar -old sayth e “sc h ool officials overreacted” when they puni shed their daughter for “kissing a s e cond-gra de b o y” ); S t ewa r t , Ca m e raPh one Cont rove rs y: Da d S a ys Sc h ool Ov err e ac ted, Hou s to nCh r o n i c l e, Dec

. 12, 2007 , p. B5 (“Th e father of a 13-year-old .

. . said the school di strict o v erstepped it s b o unds when i ts u s p ended his da ughterfor taking a cell phone photo of another chee rl eader getting out of th e sho w er during a s l eepover in his home”); Dumenig o& M u ell e r , “Cops andRobber s ” Su spension Cr iti

cized at Sayreville School, The [New Jersey] Star-Ledger, Apr. 6, 200 0, p. 15 (“ ‘I think it’s ridiculous,’ saidthe mo ther of one of the [kindergar

t e n] b o ys . ‘Th e y’re lit t l e b o ys pla y in g with each othe r. . . . w h en did a fin g erbec o me a weapon ? ” ).21 Cite as: 55 7 U

. S. ____ (2009) Opinion of T HO MA S , J. many cases. See, e.g., Postal, Schools’ Zero Tolerance Could Lose Some Punch, Orlando Sentinel, Apr. 24, 200 9, p. B3 (“Sta t e lawmake r s want schools to dial back s tri ct zero-tolerance policies so students do not endup in juve

nile detention for some ‘goofy thin g’ ”); Richar dson, Toler

ance Waning for Zero-tolerance Rules, Washin gton Times, Apr. 21, 20 09, p. A3 (“[A] few states have moved to relax their laws. Utah now allows stu d ents to bring asthma inhalers to school without violating the zero-tolerance policy on drugs”); see also Nussb aum, Becoming Fed Up With Zero Tolerance, New York Times, Sep t

. 3, 2000 , Section 14, p. 1 (discus s ing a report that found that “wide

spread use of zero-tole r ance discipline polici e s was creat

ing as many problems as it was solving and that there were many cases around the country in wh ich students were harshly disciplined for infractions where there was no harm intended or done”). In the end, the task of impleme n ting and amending public school policies is beyond this Court’s function. Parents, teachers, school admi nis trators, local politicia ns, and state officials are all better suited th an judges to determine the appropri ate limits on searches conducted b y school officials. Preservation of order, discipline, and safety in public school s is simply not the do main of the Constitution. And, co mmon sense is not a ju dicial monop

oly or a Constitutional imperative. III “[T]he nationwide dru gepidemic makes the war a g ainst drugs a pressing concern in every school.” Board of Ed. of Independen tSchool Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls , 536 U. S. 822, 834 (2002). And yet the Court h a s limited the authority of school offic i als to conduct searche s for the dru g s that the officials believe pose a serious safety risk to their students. By doing so, the majority has con

firmed thata returnt o the doctri ne of in loco paren tisis22 SA FFORD UNIFIED S C HOOL DIS T . #1 v. REDDING Opinion of T HOMAS , J. required to keep the judiciary f r om essentially seizing control of p ublic school s. Only then will teach e rs again b e able to “ ‘govern the[ir] pupils, qui ck en the sl othful, spur the indolent, restrain the impetuous, and control the stubborn’ ” by making “ ‘rules, gi v[ing] com m ands, and punish[ing] disobedience’ ” with out interference from judges. Se e Morse , su pra , at 414. By decidi ng that it i s better equipped to decide whatbehavior shou ld be permit

ted in schools, the Court has undercut stud ent safety and undermined the authority of school admin i strators and local officia l s. Even more troubling, it has done so ina case in whi c h the un derlying res p onse by school adminis

trators was reasonable and justified. I cann ot join this regrettable decision. I, therefore, respectfully dissent fro m the Court’s determination that this search violated th e Fourth Am endment.