UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON 

REBECCA BOWEN, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL 

SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, 

Defendant. 

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Case No. 3:18-cv-48 

District Judge Walter H. Rice 

Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS1

I. Introduction 

Plaintiff Rebecca Bowen brings this case challenging the Social Security 

Administration’s denial of her application for Supplemental Security Income. She 

applied for benefits on October 29, 2014, asserting that she could no longer work a 

substantial paid job. Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Mark Hockensmith concluded that 

she was not eligible for benefits because she is not under a “disability” as defined in the 

Social Security Act. 

The case is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. #6), the 

Commissioner’s Memorandum in Opposition (Doc. #9), Plaintiff’s Reply (Doc. #10), and 

the administrative record (Doc. #5). 

 

1

 Attached is a NOTICE to the parties regarding objections to this Report and Recommendations. 
2

Plaintiff seeks a remand of this case for payment of benefits or, at a minimum, for 

further proceedings. The Commissioner asks the Court to affirm ALJ Hockensmith’s 

non-disability decision. 

II. Standard of Review 

The Social Security Administration provides Supplemental Security Income to 

individuals who are under a “disability,” among other eligibility requirements. Bowen v. 

City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470 (1986); see 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a). The term 

“disability”—as defined by the Social Security Act—has specialized meaning of limited 

scope. It encompasses “any medically determinable physical or mental impairment” that 

precludes an applicant from performing a significant paid job—i.e., “substantial gainful 

activity,” in Social Security lexicon. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); see Bowen, 476 U.S. at 

469-70. 

Judicial review of an ALJ’s non-disability decision proceeds along two lines: 

“whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards and whether the findings of the ALJ 

are supported by substantial evidence.” Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 

406 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 745-46 (6th Cir. 

2007). Review for substantial evidence is not driven by whether the Court agrees or 

disagrees with the ALJ’s factual findings or by whether the administrative record 

contains evidence contrary to those factual findings. Gentry v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 741 

F.3d 708, 722 (6th Cir. 2014); Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 

2007). Instead, the ALJ’s factual findings are upheld if the substantial-evidence standard 

is met—that is, “if a ‘reasonable mind might accept the relevant evidence as adequate to 
3

support a conclusion.’” Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407 (quoting Warner v. Comm’r of Soc. 

Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 390 (6th Cir. 2004)). Substantial evidence consists of “more than a 

scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance . . . .” Rogers, 486 F.3d at 241 

(citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see Gentry, 741 F.3d at 722. 

The other line of judicial inquiry—reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal 

criteria—may result in reversal even when the record contains substantial evidence 

supporting the ALJ’s factual findings. Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 

651 (6th Cir. 2009); see Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746. “[E]ven if supported by substantial 

evidence, ‘a decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to 

follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or 

deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting in part 

Bowen, 478 F.3d at 746, and citing Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 546-47 

(6th Cir. 2004)). 

III. Background 

When Plaintiff filed her application for benefits, she was fifty years old and was 

therefore considered a person “closely approaching advanced age” under Social Security 

Regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.963(d). She went to school through ninth grade—a 

“limited education.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.964(b)(3). 

A. Plaintiff’s Testimony 

Plaintiff testified at the hearing before ALJ Hockensmith that she has back 

problems that affect her ability to stand and walk. Sometimes when she is standing or 

walking, her back gets so weak that she feels like she has to sit down or she will fall 
4

down. (Doc. #5, PageID #88). She can sometimes stand for twenty minutes before she 

has to sit down; other times, she can only stand for five minutes. She believes that it is 

dependent on how much she has already done that day. Id. at 89. 

Plaintiff had surgery to repair three hernias in August 2016. Id. at 90. She still 

has stabbing pains in her right side because of all the scar tissue that was cut out. Id. at 

90-91. If she continues to have problems, her doctor told her he would use a needle to 

drain the area. Id. at 91. 

Plaintiff experiences numbness and tingling in both hands—her left is worse than 

her right. Id. at 81. It happens daily but the frequency and length vary. Sometimes, if 

she shakes her hand, it will get better after just a minute. Id. When Plaintiff is driving, 

one of her hands will sometimes start to tingle and go numb and she’ll have to drive with 

only her other hand. Id. at 80. She has trouble picking things up and holding on to things 

when her hand is numb. Id. at 83. She has medication but does not take it because she is 

worried about how it would interact with her other medication. Id. at 82. She also has 

braces that she is supposed to wear when she is sleeping. Id. But, she does not always 

wear them because it is difficult for her to sleep with them on. 

Plaintiff has “a lot of issues with breathing.” Id. at 92. She has had asthma since 

she was child. Id. at 93. She sometimes starts to cough uncontrollably and coughs up 

phlegm with “something dark in it.” Id. She has an inhaler that she uses depending on 

how she is feeling. Id. at 93-94. 
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She has stage-three kidney disease. Id. at 98. She has to use the bathroom more 

frequently: “quite often, I do go at least once an hour.” Id. at 99. She had not seen a 

specialist but was scheduled to see one in the month after the hearing. Id. at 98. 

Plaintiff struggles with fatigue. She takes a nap almost every day—sometimes 

two. Id. at 94. Some days, she feels okay is able to go see her doctors, wash a dish, or 

make a hamburger. Id. at 94-95. She sometimes has chest pains associated with stress. 

Id. at 96. 

B. Medical Opinions 

i. Harold M. Brown, M.D. 

Plaintiff’s treating physician, Dr. Brown, completed a basic medical questionnaire 

on October 22, 2015. Id. at 458-59. He diagnosed eleven medical conditions: 

uncontrolled hypertension; morbid obesity; left-hand paresthesia; anxiety; asthma; 

dyspnea on exertion; degenerative joint disease of thoracic spine; right-knee pain; 

midline low-back pain without sciatica; hyperlipidemia, and stage-two chronic kidney 

disease. Id. at 458. Dr. Brown opined Plaintiff’s prognosis was poor but stable. Id. She 

could stand/walk for fifteen minutes at a time for a total of fifteen minutes in an eighthour day, could sit for fifteen minutes, and could not lift/carry any weight. Id. at 459. 

Dr. Brown concluded, “She is unable to sit, stand, lift, twist, climb, bend, stoop or crawl 

and is considered temporarily totally disabled, and may ultimately be considered totally, 

permanently disabled. She cannot perform work of any kind at this time ....” Id. 
6

ii. Amita Oza, M.D. 

Dr. Oza examined Plaintiff on December 29, 2014. Id. at 443-48. She noted that 

Plaintiff had decreased breath sounds at the bases of her lungs and prolonged expiratory 

phase. Id. at 448. Upon examination, Dr. Oza found Plaintiff had “tenderness on 

palpation of lower lumbar spine,” and “[r]ange of motion at hips towards extremes 

caused her to have some discomfort.” Id. She opined Plaintiff could perform sedentary 

work with a change in position every fifteen to thirty minutes. Id. 

IV. The ALJ’s Decision 

 As noted previously, it fell to ALJ Hockensmith to evaluate the evidence 

connected to Plaintiff’s application for benefits. He did so by considering each of the 

five sequential steps set forth in the Social Security Regulations. See 20 C.F.R. § 

416.920. He reached the following main conclusions: 

 Step 1: Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial gainful employment since 

October 29, 2014. 

 Step 2: She has the severe impairments of degenerative disc disease, left-hand 

paresthesia, asthma, obesity, dysthymia, anxiety, and somatoform 

disorder. 

 Step 3: She does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that 

meets or equals the severity of one in the Commissioner’s Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 

 Step 4: Her residual functional capacity, or the most she could do despite her 

impairments, see Howard v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 

(6th Cir. 2002), consists of “light work ... with the following 

additional limitations: (1) no climbing of ladders, ropes and scaffolds; 

(2) frequent climbing of ramps and stairs; (3) frequent balancing, 

stooping, kneeling, crouching and crawling; (4) frequent handling and 

fingering with the left upper extremity; (5) avoid concentrated 

exposure to temperature extremes; (6) avoid concentrated exposure to 
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fumes, dusts, gases, odors and poorly ventilated areas; (7) no work at 

unprotected heights or with dangerous machinery; (8) limited to 

simple, routine, repetitive tasks; (9) in a static work environment with 

few changes in routine; (10) no fast paced work or strict production 

quotas; and (11) occasional contact with the public, coworkers and 

supervisors.” 

 Step 4: She is unable to perform any of her past relevant work. 

 Step 5: She could perform a significant number of jobs that exist in the 

national economy. 

(Doc. #5, PageID #s 52-64). These main findings led the ALJ to ultimately conclude that 

Plaintiff was not under a benefits-qualifying disability. Id. at 64. 

V. Discussion 

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical source opinions and 

failed to adequately consider Plaintiff’s obesity. The Commissioner maintains that 

substantial evidence supports both the ALJ’s evaluation of the medical opinions and his 

consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity 

A. Medical Opinions 

Social Security Regulations recognize several different categories of medical 

sources: treating physicians, nontreating yet examining physicians, and nontreating yet 

record-reviewing physicians. Gayheart v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 375 (6th 

Cir. 2013). 

As a general matter, an opinion from a medical source who has 

examined a claimant is given more weight than that from a 

source who has not performed an examination (a 

“nonexamining source”), and an opinion from a medical source 

who regularly treats the claimant (a “treating source”) is 

afforded more weight than that from a source who has 

examined the claimant but does not have an ongoing treatment 
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relationship (a “nontreating source”). In other words, “[t]he 

regulations provide progressively more rigorous tests for 

weighing opinions as the ties between the source of the opinion 

and the individual become weaker.” 

Id. (quoting in part Soc. Sec. R. 96-6p, 1996 WL 374180, *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. July 2, 

1996), and citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502, 404.1527(c)(1)-(2)). 

Regardless of its source, the Regulations require an ALJ to consider and evaluate 

every medical opinion in the record. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.927(b), (c). In deciding what 

weight to assign an opinion, an ALJ must consider the following factors: examining 

relationship; treatment relationship; supportability; consistency; specialization; and other 

factors. Id. at (c). “Unless a treating source’s opinion is given controlling weight, the 

administrative law judge must explain in the decision the weight given to the opinions of 

a State agency medical or psychological consultant or other program physician, 

psychologist or other medical specialist, as the administrative law judge must do for any 

opinions from treating sources, nontreating sources, and other nonexamining sources who 

do not work for us.” Id. at (e)(2)(ii). 

ALJ Hockensmith assigned Dr. Brown’s opinion little weight and provided two 

primary reasons. First, the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Brown’s opinion based on his 

limited treatment history with Plaintiff. (Doc. #5, PageID #61); see 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(2)(i) (“Generally, the longer a treating source has treated you and the more 

times you have been seen by a treating source, the more weight we will give to the 

source’s medical opinion.”). Dr. Brown began treating Plaintiff on the same day he 

completed his opinion. (Doc. #5, PageID #s 61, 1104). Although Dr. Brown eventually 
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became Plaintiff’s treating physician, at the time he completed the assessment, he had 

only examined Plaintiff once. See Blakley, 581 F.3d at 407 (“A physician is a treating 

source if he has provided medical treatment or evaluation and has had an ongoing 

treatment relationship with the claimant... ‘with a frequency consistent with accepted 

medical practice for the type of treatment and/or evaluation [that is] typical for the 

[treated condition(s)].’”) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1502) (alterations in original). 

The ALJ also reasonably discounted Dr. Brown’s opinions because, “there is no 

support in the record for Dr. Brown’s assertion that the claimant is unable to lift and can 

only sit/stand/walk for 15 minutes.” (Doc. #5, PageID #61); see 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(3) (“The more a medical source presents relevant evidence to support an 

opinion, particularly medical signs and laboratory findings, the more weight [the Social 

Security Administration] will give that opinion.”). Previously in his decision, the ALJ 

recognized that Plaintiff’s degenerative disc disease, left-hand paresthesia, and asthma 

limit her ability to perform some work-related functions. (Doc. #5, PageID #54). 

However, these impairments do not support the extreme limitations opined by Dr. Brown. 

For instance, looking at Plaintiff’s back pain, the ALJ recognized that she reported 

chronic back pain, pain in her feet, and weakness. He acknowledged that medical notes 

revealed tenderness to palpation of her lower lumbar spine, discomfort with range of 

motion of the hips at extremes, and restricted range of motion at the lumbar spine. Yet, 

her only treatment consisted of prescribed medication—no physical therapy, chiropractic 

care, surgical intervention, injections, or surgical consultation. Further, she does not 

require an ambulatory device. The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff “has not sought the type 
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of treatment one would expect for an individual claiming to suffer from disabling chronic 

back pain.” Id. at 58. 

The ALJ also identified several treatment notes that he found inconsistent with 

Plaintiff’s statements concerning the severity of her impairments. See id. at 59 (“on 

October 26, 2012, the claimant failed to report pain and/or stiffness in her back”) (citing 

Exh. 6F [Doc. #5, PageID #s 575]); (“The claimant denied having back pain again on 

July 17, 2014”) (citing Exh. 1F, 6F)2

; (“On June 9, 2016, the claimant described 

intermittent low back pain at a 3-4 on a scale of 1-10”) (citing Exh. 9F [Doc. #5, PageID 

#1057]); (“physical examination of July 28, 2016 demonstrated normal movement of all 

extremities”) (citing Exh. 13F [Doc. #5, PageID #1121]); see also 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(4) (“Generally, the more consistent a medical opinion is with the record as a 

whole, the more weight we will give to that medical opinion.”). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ’s reliance on notes from October 26, 2012 and July 

17, 2014 is misplaced, as both notes are from before Plaintiff’s October 2016 application 

date. (Doc. #6, PageID #1141). The Commissioner correctly points out that, although 

Supplemental Security Income benefits are not payable prior to the application-filing 

date, Plaintiff alleged her disability began in July 2006 and the ALJ reasonably 

 

2

 The ALJ’s summary of medical evidence from July 17, 2014 is not accurate. On that day, Plaintiff 

presented to Miami Valley Hospital emergency room reporting “some pain to her back, left-sided medial 

border of the scapula.” (Doc. #5, PageID #393). Further, notes from the physical exam reflect further 

issues: “No tenderness over The midline T. or L. Spine. She does have reproducible tenderness and 

spasm that is palpable to the left side of the thoracic spine to the medial aspect of the left scapular 

border.” Id. at 396. Ultimately, the ER doctor diagnosed thoracic spasm, chest wall pain, and anxiety. 

Id. at 397. Nonetheless, the other treatment notes identified by the ALJ constitute substantial evidence in 

support of his conclusion. 
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considered her complete medical history consistent with the Regulations. (Doc. #9, 

PageID #1166) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.335; 20 C.F.R. § 416.912(d) (“Before we make a 

determination that you are not disabled, we will develop your complete medical history 

for at least the 12 months preceding the month in which you file your application unless 

there is a reason to believe that development of an earlier period is necessary ....”)). 

Turning to her left-hand paresthesia, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s failure to 

comply with her treatment regimen and her minimal treatment were not consistent with 

her allegations about the severity of her symptoms. (Doc. #5, PageID #58). Plaintiff 

admitted that she does not always wear her braces when she is supposed to and stopped 

taking her medication. She did not attend physical therapy or pain management, she did 

not undergo surgical intervention or injections, and she did not seek surgical consultation. 

The ALJ further emphasized that Plaintiff’s reports to her physicians are not consistent 

with her allegations. Substantial evidence supports this. See Doc. #5, PageID #s 58-59 

(“on March 10, 2016, the claimant reported that her left hand paresthesias was 

improving” (citing Exh. 9F [Doc. #5, PageID #1074]); (“The claimant exhibited a strong 

grip strength bilaterally on December 29, 2014”) (citing Exh. 3F [Doc. #5, PageID

#448]); (“the claimant did not report weakness or numbness on October 22, 2015”) 

(citing Exh. 9F [Doc. #5, PageID #1105]); (“the claimant denied weakness and numbness 

again on May 5, 2016”) (citing Exh. 9F [Doc. #5, PageID #1063]). 

Plaintiff insists that even if Dr. Brown is considered an examining source, “his 

opinion is consistent with his own treatment notes and not substantially inconsistent with 

the record as a whole or with the opinion of Dr. Oza—as both Dr. Brown and Dr. Oza 
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found that [Plaintiff] could not perform light exertional work.” (Doc. #6, PageID

#1141). Although Plaintiff is correct that Dr. Brown and Dr. Oza agreed Plaintiff could 

not perform light work, their opinions are not entirely consistent. Indeed, they reached 

different conclusions concerning her ability to work. Dr. Brown found that Plaintiff was 

“temporarily totally disabled” and “[s]he cannot perform work of any kind”; in contrast, 

Dr. Oza opined Plaintiff “should be able to perform sedentary work ....” (Doc. #5, 

PageID #s 448, 459). 

Plaintiff accurately observes that some of Dr. Brown’s treatment notes are 

consistent with his opinion. However, the ALJ reasonably relied on other treatment notes 

that do not support and are not consistent with Dr. Brown’s opinion. Dr. Brown, for 

example, regularly documented her back pain under “review of systems;” yet, he often 

noted, “normal range of motion” under physical exam. See id. at 1052, 1057-58, 1074-

75, 1090. Further, although Dr. Brown routinely noted Plaintiff’s lower back pain, he 

failed to provide any further explanation. Similarly, his basic medical assessment 

contains very little substantive explanation. When asked for the observations or medical 

evidence that led to her findings, he only cites “decreased [range of motion] lumbar spine 

on flexion.” Id. at 458. And, “because the ALJ’s opinion was supported by substantial 

evidence, it must be upheld, despite conflicting evidence.” Rudd v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

531 F. App’x 719, 727 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Ulman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 693 F.3d 

709, 714 (6th Cir. 2012); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)(4), 416.927(c)(4)). 
13

ALJ Hockensmith provided good reasons for the weight he assigned Dr. Brown’s 

opinions, and substantial evidence in the record supports those reasons. Accordingly, 

Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Brown’s opinion lacks merit. 

The ALJ also assigned Dr. Oza’s opinion little weight. He accurately observed the 

Dr. Oza was a consultative examiner. (Doc. #5, PageID #61); see 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(1) (“Generally, we give more weight to the medical opinion of a source who 

has examined you than to the medical opinion of a medical source who has not examined 

you.”). He further found, “there is no support for a sedentary residual functional 

capacity.” (Doc. #5, PageID #62); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(3) (“The more a medical 

source presents relevant evidence to support a medical opinion, particularly medical signs 

and laboratory findings, the more weight we will give that medical opinion.”). The ALJ 

explained, “The claimant did exhibit some tenderness of the lumbar spine and limited 

range of motion in the hips but no evidence of radiculopathy.” (Doc. #5, PageID #62). 

Plaintiff moreover does not require an ambulatory aid and has sought limited treatment. 

Plaintiff asserts that ALJ Hockensmith erred in his evaluation of Dr. Oza’s 

opinion: “The ALJ failed to cite substantial evidence that is inconsistent with the 

opinions of ... Dr. Oza.” (Doc. #6, PageID #1141). But, as discussed above, the ALJ 

reasonably addressed Plaintiff’s impairments and limitations in detail previously in his 

decision. He identified significant evidence that supports his conclusion that Plaintiff’s 

impairments were not as severe as opined by Dr. Oza. 

Turning to the State agency record-reviewing physicians, ALJ Hockensmith 

assigned their opinions “some weight.” (Doc. #5, PageID #62). He found that Plaintiff 
14

was “more limited than determined by these reviewers based on [her] testimony, more 

recent treatment records and issues with her hernia.” Id. Plaintiff agrees that the ALJ 

properly acknowledged that the State agency physicians did not review the entire record. 

Specifically, the record-reviewing physicians did not review an October 2015 x-ray of 

Plaintiff’s lumbar spine that revealed degenerative changes most pronounced at L4-5 

with degenerative facet disease and grade 1 anterior spondylolisthesis. Plaintiff contends, 

“the ALJ is not qualified to interpret this raw medical data in functional terms.” (Doc. 

#6, PageID #s 1141-42). Plaintiff’s argument lacks merit. Importantly, “the ALJ is 

charged with the responsibility of determining the RFC based on her evaluation of the 

medical and non-medical evidence.” Rudd, 531 F. App’x at 728. Although no physician 

who provided an opinion reviewed the x-ray, a radiologist did and his report tends to 

confirm all of the physicians who considered Plaintiff’s back problems. Thus, the x-ray 

results constitute substantial evidence in support of the back problems—and resulting 

limitations—identified by the physicians. 

In summary, although Plaintiff maintains that ALJ Hockensmith should have 

weighed the opinion evidence differently, substantial evidence supports his consideration 

of those opinions. See Jones v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 477 (6th Cir. 2003). 

The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a zone of choice within which 

the decisionmaker can go either way, without interference by the courts. Blakley, 581 

F.3d at 406. The ALJ’s findings that Dr. Brown’s and Dr. Oza’s opinions merited little 

weight and the record-reviewing physicians’ opinions merited some weight was within 

the zone of reasonable choices. 
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B. Obesity 

Plaintiff asserts that ALJ Hockensmith failed to adequately consider Plaintiff’s 

obesity as required by Social Security Ruling 02-1p and Sixth Circuit caselaw. (Doc. #6, 

PageID #s 1142-44). Obesity, as defined in Social Security Ruling 02-1p, “is a complex, 

chronic disease characterized by excessive accumulation of body fat.” 2002 WL 

34686281, *2 (Soc. Sec. Admin. Sept. 12, 2002). The National Institutes of Health’s 

Clinical Guidelines classify an overweight or obese individual based on that person’s 

Body Mass Index (BMI). Id. An adult with a BMI of 30.0 or above is considered 

“obese.” Id. “Obesity is a risk factor that increases an individual’s chances of 

developing impairments in most body systems.” Id. at *3. It “commonly leads to, and 

often complicates, chronic diseases of the cardiovascular, respiratory, and 

musculoskeletal body systems.” Id. It “may also cause or contribute to mental 

impairments such as depression.” Id. 

To account for these increased risks, Social Security Ruling 02-1p requires an ALJ 

to “consider obesity in determining whether: [1] The individual has a medically 

determinable impairment ....; [2] The individual’s impairment(s) is severe ....; [3] The 

individual’s impairment(s) meets or equals the requirements of a listed impairment in the 

listings ....; and [4] The individual’s impairment(s) prevents him or her from doing past 

relevant work and other work that exists in significant numbers in the national 

economy....” Id. 

Although it is clear that an ALJ must consider a claimant’s obesity, it is less 

apparent how an ALJ’s decision should reflect such consideration. “Social Security 
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Ruling 02–01p does not mandate a particular mode of analysis. It only states that 

obesity, in combination with other impairments, ‘may’ increase the severity of the other 

limitations. It is a mischaracterization to suggest that Social Security Ruling 02-1p offers 

any particular procedural mode of analysis for obese disability claimants.” Bledsoe v. 

Barnhart, 165 F. App’x 408, 411-12 (6th Cir. 2006); see Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 

811 F.3d 825, 835 (6th Cir. 2016); Shilo v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 600 F. App’x 956, 959 

(6th Cir. 2015) (We also have recognized that an ALJ must ‘consider the claimant’s 

obesity, in combination with other impairments, at all stages of the sequential 

evaluation.’”) (quoting Nejat v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 359 F. App’x 574, 577 (6th Cir. 

2009)). 

Some courts have found that Social Security Ruling 02-1p is “more than a 

requirement that the ALJ mention the fact of obesity in passing,” Norman v. Astrue, 694 

F. Supp.2d 738, 741 (N.D. Ohio 2010) (citations omitted), but others have found, “Where 

an ALJ has acknowledged the issue, even a cursory reference to obesity may suffice if 

there is no evidence that it causes any limitations.” Bornstein v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

No. 1:17cv220, 2018 WL 3448604, *4 (S.D. Ohio June 20, 2018) (Bowman, M.J.), 

report and recommendation adopted, 2018 WL 3439632 (S.D. Ohio July 17, 2018) 

(Dlott, D.J.). 

In the present case, ALJ Hockensmith considered Plaintiff’s obesity throughout 

his decision. He first identified obesity as one of Plaintiff’s severe impairments: “the 

claimant is overweight at a height of 60 inches and a weight of 204 pounds. With a body 

mass index of 39.8 at minimum, the claimant is considered obese, and that condition 
17

could be expected to aggravate the claimant’s other conditions. This impairment affects 

the claimant’s ability to do basic work-related functions.” (Doc. #5, PageID #54). The 

ALJ recognized at Step Two that although there is no listing for obesity, obesity may be 

disabling and can dramatically worsen other medical conditions. Further, the ALJ 

considered whether Plaintiff’s “obesity is of such a level that it results in an inability to 

ambulate effectively, as defined in sections 1.00B2b or 101.02A of the listings ....” Id. at 

55-56 (quoting Soc. Sec. R. 02-1p, *5). He concluded, “[t]he record ... does not 

document a finding that the claimant was unable to ambulate effectively at any material 

time.” Id. at 56. Last, in assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ considered “the exacerbating 

affect [Plaintiff’s] obesity has on her lumbar condition and asthma.” Id. at 59. 

Together, ALJ Hockensmith’s consideration of Plaintiff’s obesity extends beyond 

a passing reference. Further, as correctly observed by the Commissioner, “The Agency 

recognizes that a claimant’s obesity may create greater limitations in combination with 

her other impairments than would exist by virtue of those other impairments alone. 

However, Plaintiff does not cite any evidence demonstrating that her obesity actually 

caused additional limitations or further impaired her ability to work.” (Doc. #9, PageID 

#1170) (internal citation omitted) (emphasis in original); see Bornstein, 2018 WL 

3448604, *3 (“Plaintiff ultimately is responsible for proving that her obesity caused 

further limitation.”). Moreover, Plaintiff provides no support for speculating that “any 

further reduction in her residual functional ability due to her obesity would be tantamount 

to finding a limitation to sedentary work, which would direct a finding of disability at 

Bowen’s age.” (Doc. #6, PageID #1144). 
18

Accordingly, for these reasons, Plaintiff’s challenge to the ALJ’s evaluation of her 

obesity lacks merit. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT: 

1. The ALJ’s non-disability decision be affirmed; and 

2. The case be terminated on the Court’s docket. 

May 6, 2019 s/Sharon L. Ovington 

 Sharon L. Ovington 

 United States Magistrate Judge 

 
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NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to the proposed findings and recommendations within FOURTEEN days after 

being served with this Report and Recommendations. Such objections shall specify the 

portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in 

support of the objections. If the Report and Recommendation is based in whole or in part 

upon matters occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly 

arrange for the transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree 

upon or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge 

otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections within 

FOURTEEN days after being served with a copy thereof. 

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on 

appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 

949-50 (6th Cir. 1981).