IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION 

RASHIDA KING, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

CINCINNATI PUBLIC SCHOOLS, et al., 

 Defendants. 

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Case No. 1:17-cv-00794 

Judge Susan J. Dlott 

ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS’ 

MOTION IN LIMINE 

 This matter is before the Court on the Defendants’ Motion In Limine to admit evidence 

regarding the option for Plaintiff to transfer to Aiken High School (“Aiken”) (Doc. 20). Plaintiff 

filed a response in opposition and Defendants replied (Docs. 26, 28). For the reasons set forth 

below, the Court will DENY Defendants’ Motion In Limine. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff initiated this action alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Equal Protection), 

the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 2615, et seq., the Rehabilitation Act, 29 

U.S.C. §§ 504, et seq., the Ohio Civil Rights Act, O.R.C. §§ 4112.01, et seq., and the Americans 

with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, et seq. Defendants have moved for 

summary judgment on all claims, which the Court will address by separate order. 

Plaintiff, a social studies teacher at Riverview East Academy, alleges, in part, that 

Cincinnati Public Schools (“CPS”) constructively discharged her based on a disability. Plaintiff 

contacted her union, and she attempted to contact the CPS Director of Human Resources about 

her difficulties at work. (King Dep., Doc. 10 at PageID 103.) When her complaints were not 
2 

investigated or addressed and the Human Resources Director failed to return her call, she 

retained an attorney. 

Plaintiff’s attorney sent a letter to CPS detailing Plaintiff’s complaint and inviting CPS to 

“discuss Ms. King’s future employment with CPS, and the steps CPS is planning to take to 

remedy this unfortunate situation.” (Doc. 16-2 at PageID 600.) In response, counsel for the 

parties discussed three possibilities for King: (1) remain at Riverview in her current position; (2) 

transfer to Aiken in a similar position; or (3) resign, effective the end of August, 2016, thereby 

retaining her salary and benefits for the summer, and CPS would forgive 31 hours of paid time 

off it had advanced while she was on leave. (Hoying Dep., Doc 16 at PageID 575, 587; Butler 

Decl., Doc. 24-1 at ¶ 2, PageID 706.) Defendants filed a motion in limine to admit evidence 

regarding the option for King to transfer to Aiken. 

II. MOTIONS IN LIMINE 

District courts have authority to adjudicate motions in limine pursuant to their “inherent 

authority to manage the course of trials.” Luce v. U.S., 469 U.S. 38, 41 n. 4 (1984). Courts 

should exclude evidence in limine “only when evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential 

grounds.” Gresh v. Waste Servs. of Am., Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 702, 706 (E.D. Ky. 2010) (citation 

omitted). However, the “better practice” is to address questions regarding the admissibility of 

broad categories of evidence “as they arise.” Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 

F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir.1975). “[A] court is almost always better situated during the actual trial 

to assess the value and utility of evidence.” Owner–Operator Independent Drivers Ass’n v. 

Comerica Bank, No. 05–CV–0056, 2011 WL 4625359, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 3, 2011) (citation 

omitted). Moreover, “[m]otions in limine address evidentiary questions and are inappropriate 

devices for resolving substantive issues.” Ohio Oil Gathering Corp. III v. Welding, Inc., 2010 
3 

WL 5135999, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2010) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Rodgers, No. CIV–

S–88–1658, 2005 WL 1388671, at *1, n. 2 (E.D. Cal. June 9, 2005)). Denial of a motion in 

limine does not necessarily mean that the evidence, which is the subject of the motion, will be 

admissible at trial. Ind. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 326 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846 (N.D. Ohio 2004). 

III. DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO ADMIT EVIDENCE REGARDING THE 

OPTION FOR PLAINTIFF TO TRANSFER TO AIKEN 

Defendants seek to admit evidence that Plaintiff had been given the option to transfer to 

Aiken. (Doc. 20 at PageID 653). Defendants contend that this evidence is admissible because 

Federal Rule of Evidence 408—which bars evidence of compromise offers or negotiations—is 

inapplicable and because the evidence is being offered for another purpose. The Court disagrees. 

Rule 408 prohibits either party from offering two types of evidence to prove or disprove 

the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to impeach by a prior inconsistent statement or a 

contradiction: (1) evidence of “furnishing or offering or promising to furnish—or accepting or 

offering or promising to accept—a valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 

compromise a claim;” and (2) evidence of “conduct or statements made in compromise 

negotiations regarding the claim.” Fed. R. Evid. 408(a)(1)-(2); Eid v. St.-Gobain Abrasives, Inc., 

377 F. App’x 438, 444 (6th Cir. 2010). However, a court may admit this evidence for another 

purpose, “such as proving a witness’s bias or prejudice, negating a contention of undue delay, or 

proving an effort to obstruct a criminal investigation or prosecution.” Fed R. Evid. 408(b). 

A. The Offer to Transfer to Aiken was Made as Part of Settlement Negotiations and 

was a Conditional Offer 

Determining whether an offer was made in compromising or attempting to compromise a 

claim can be difficult. Pierce v. F.R. Tripler & Co., 955 F.2d 820, 827 (2nd Cir. 1992). 

However, “where a party is represented by counsel, threatens litigation and has initiated the first 
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administrative steps in that litigation, any offer made between attorneys will be presumed to be 

an offer within the scope of Rule 408.” Id. It is the burden of the party seeking admission of an 

offer in this context to demonstrate convincingly that the offer was not an attempt to compromise 

the claim. Id. at 827. 

Defendants argue that the offer to transfer King to Aiken was not made in compromising 

or attempting to compromise a claim because it was made unconditionally, without any 

requirement for Plaintiff to release or waive her claims. (Doc. 20 at PageID 657.) “By 

definition, an unconditional offer may not require the employee to abandon or modify his suit . . . 

The offer therefore cannot be considered an offer of settlement or compromise.” Geiger v. Kraft 

Foods Glob., Inc., 2008 WL 648192, at *6 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (quoting Lightfoot v. Union 

Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 909 (2nd Cir. 1997)). 

The offer to transfer to Aiken was not made unconditionally. Only after King’s counsel 

sent a letter requesting settlement did the Defendants offer options for Plaintiff.1

 (McDole Dep., 

Doc. 13 at PageID 546.) Defendants presented options only after Plaintiff’s attorney became 

involved and asked the Defendants to assist in “resolving this matter.” (Doc. 16-2 at PageID 

600.) In addition, Defendants offered to compensate Plaintiff for paid time off, salary, and 

benefits for the summer if she chose to resign. On these facts, Defendants have failed to 

convincingly demonstrate that the transfer offer was unconditional. Thus, the Court concludes 

the transfer offer is inadmissible pursuant to Rule 408.2

 

 

1

 By sending the letter, Plaintiff “threaten[ed] litigation and . . . initiated the first administrative steps in that 

litigation[;]” therefore, “any offer made between attorneys will be presumed to be an offer within the scope of Rule 

408.” Pierce, 955 F.2d at 827. 2

 Defendants contend that the offer is admissible to show their engagement in the interactive process for 

accommodating Plaintiff’s disability. However, a Faragher/Ellerth defense does not apply in this case. There is no 

evidence that the employer prevented or acted promptly to correct the harassing behavior, as required to claim such 

a defense. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807–08 (1998). Had the Defendants in this case 

sought accommodation, they could have responded promptly to requests from Plaintiff or her union representative. 

They failed to do so. 
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B. Excluding the Offer Furthers the Purposes of Rule 408 

Defendants also argue that the purposes of Rule 408 would not be furthered by excluding 

evidence of the transfer option. According to Defendants, “[d]isallowing such evidence would 

discourage attempts by employees and employers to resolve matters between them, and prompt 

more litigation, not less.” (Doc. 20 at PageID 661.) The Court disagrees. 

Rule 408 serves a “strong public interest [of] encouraging settlement negotiations . . .” 

Stockman v. Oakcrest Dental Ctr., P.C., 480 F.3d 791, 805 (6th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). “Parties are unlikely to propose the types of compromises that most effectively 

lead to settlements unless they are confident that their proposed solutions cannot be used on 

cross-examination . . . by some future [ ] party . . .” By excluding such evidence, Rule 408 

allows parties to “make hypothetical concessions, offer creative quid pro quos, and generally 

make statements that would otherwise belie their litigation efforts.” Id. (quoting Goodyear Tire 

& Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003)). Parties would 

be deterred from engaging in settlement discussions if there were a risk of their admission at 

trial. 

Rule 408 also serves the purpose of excluding irrelevant evidence because “disputes are 

often settled for reasons having nothing to do with the merits of a claim.” Eid, 377 F. App’x at 

444. Moreover, “statements made in furtherance of settlement are never relevant” because an 

offer may be motivated by a desire for peace rather than a concession. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 

Co., 332 F.3d at 983. 

In this case, Rule 408 is furthered by excluding the Defendants’ offer to transfer King to 

Aiken. Both the Plaintiff and her union representative contacted CPS’ Director of Human 

Resources prior to involving outside counsel, but Defendants failed to take any action to 
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investigate or address Plaintiff’s complaints. As discussed above, the transfer offer was made 

only after Plaintiff retained counsel, and her attorney contacted Defendants’ counsel in 

anticipation of litigation. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the transfer offer falls within the 

scope of Rule 408. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ Motion In Limine (Doc. 20) is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 Dated: March 13, 2019 S/Susan J. Dlott__________________ 

 Judge Susan J. Dlott 

 United States District Court