District of Columbia

Court of Appeals

No. 15-CF-819

CHARLES BLAND,

Appellant,

 v. CF2-8770-14

UNITED STATES,

Appellee. 

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the District of Columbia

Criminal Division

BEFORE: GLICKMAN and MCLEESE, Associate Judges; and STEADMAN, Senior 

Judge.

J U D G M E N T 

This case was submitted to the court on the transcript of record and the 

briefs filed, and without presentation of oral argument. On consideration whereof, and 

for the reasons set forth in the opinion filed this date, it is now hereby

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the judgment of the Superior Court is 

affirmed.

 For the Court:

 

Dated: February 16, 2017.

Opinion by Associate Judge Stephen H. Glickman.

FEB 16 2017
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the 

Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the 

Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound 

volumes go to press.

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

No. 15-CF-819

CHARLES BLAND, APPELLANT,

V.

UNITED STATES, APPELLEE.

Appeal from the Superior Court

of the District of Columbia

(CF2-8770-14)

(Hon. Juliet McKenna, Trial Judge)

(Submitted November 18, 2016 Decided December 5, 2016*) 

Marc L. Resnick was on the brief, for appellant. 

Channing D. Phillips, United States Attorney, and Elizabeth Trosman, Sara 

Vanore, and Danielle M. Kudla, Assistant United States Attorneys, were on the 

brief for appellee.

Before GLICKMAN and MCLEESE, Associate Judges, and STEADMAN, Senior 

Judge.

 

*

 The decision in this case originally was issued as an unpublished 

Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. It is now being published upon the court’s 

grant of appellee’s motion to publish. Footnote 8 has been revised to note the 

court’s denial of appellant’s post-decision motion for leave to file a supplemental 

brief raising a new claim.
2

GLICKMAN, Associate Judge: Charles Bland appeals the enhancement of his 

sentence for unlawful possession of a firearm (UPF) under a statutory provision 

requiring a mandatory minimum prison term of three years instead of one year if 

the offender has a prior conviction for a “crime of violence other than 

conspiracy.”1 Bland argues that his constitutional rights under the Fifth and Sixth 

Amendments were violated because the finding that he had qualifying prior 

convictions for armed robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW) was 

made by the trial judge rather than by the jury that found him guilty of UPF. Bland 

further argues that the government failed to present sufficient evidence to support 

this predicate finding. For the following reasons, we reject these contentions and 

affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

First, as the government argues and appellant does not dispute, he waived 

his constitutional claim at trial in order to keep the jury from learning the nature of 

his prior convictions to his potential prejudice. To that end, he entered into a 

stipulation informing the jury only that he had a previous conviction for which the 

penalty was greater than one year. Through counsel, he expressly agreed that (1) 

 

1

See D.C. Code § 22-4503 (a)(1), (b)(1) (2012 Repl. & 2016 Cum. Supp.). 

Mr. Bland also was convicted of possession of an unregistered firearm and 

unlawful possession of ammunition, see D.C. Code §§ 7-2502.01 (a) and 7-

2506.01 (3) (2012 Repl.), but he raises no issue with respect to those convictions.
3

whether his previous convictions were for a crime of violence was “not something 

that the jury has to know about”; and (2) he would “not . . . take the position . . . 

because the jury made no finding that the prior conviction was a crime of violence, 

that the Government is in any way precluded from” seeking a sentencing 

enhancement based on that fact. Appellant cannot take a contrary position in this 

court.2

Second, even if we were to disregard his waiver, appellant cannot prevail on 

his constitutional claim. His premise, that the jury had to find his prior conviction 

for a violent crime in order for his sentence to be enhanced on that basis, is 

erroneous. “The Supreme Court established in Apprendi that the fact of a prior 

conviction does not have to be submitted to the jury’s consideration before the 

judge may enhance the sentence.”3 Moreover, under the UPF statute, whether a 

 

2

See Preacher v. United States, 934 A.2d 363, 368 (D.C. 2007) (“Generally, 

the invited error doctrine precludes a party from asserting as error on appeal a 

course that he or she has induced the trial court to take.”); Brown v. United States, 

627 A.2d 499, 508 (D.C. 1993) (“We have repeatedly held that a defendant may 

not take one position at trial and a contradictory position on appeal.”).

3

Eady v. United States, 44 A.3d 257, 261 (D.C. 2012); see Apprendi v. New 

Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any 

fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 

maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”); 

see also Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151, 2160 & n.1 (2013) (holding that 

“the principle applied in Apprendi applies with equal force to facts increasing the 

(continued...)
4

prior conviction was for a “crime of violence other than conspiracy” for 

enhancement purposes is a legal, not factual, question.4 Thus, the Constitution 

permitted the trial judge to determine whether appellant had such a prior 

conviction, just as it permitted the judge in Almendarez-Torres v. United States

(the case in which the Supreme Court recognized the exception for prior 

convictions) to determine whether a prior conviction was for an “aggravated 

felony.”5

Third, we are satisfied the judge had sufficient grounds for finding that 

appellant was previously convicted of crimes of violence. It is true that the 

government did not provide the court with a certified copy of the judgment of 

 

(continued...)

mandatory minimum,” subject to the same “exception . . . for the fact of a prior 

conviction”).

4

 See D.C. Code § 22-4503 (d)(1) (providing, in pertinent part, that “‘Crime 

of violence’ shall have the same meaning as provided in [D.C. Code] § 23-1331 (4) 

. . . .”); see, e.g., Towles v. United States, 115 A.3d 1222, 1232-34 (D.C. 2015)

(determining as a matter of law that a prior conviction for involuntary 

manslaughter supports the sentencing enhancement in § 22-4503 (b)(1) because it 

is a “crime of violence” within the meaning of § 23-1331 (4)).

5

523 U.S. 224, 235 (1998). Appellant argues that later decisions of the 

Court have raised doubts about the continuing viability of Almendarez-Torres to 

the point that it should no longer be considered good law. This court is not in a 

position to reach such a conclusion. See, e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 

237 (1997) (rejecting proposition “that other courts should ever conclude that [the 

Supreme Court’s] more recent cases have, by implication, overruled an earlier 

precedent”).
5

conviction or equivalent documentation. However, before trial, pursuant to D.C. 

Code § 23-111 (a)(1) (2012 Repl.), the government filed with the court and served 

on appellant’s counsel in open court an information stating that appellant would be 

subject to the enhanced penalties for UPF based on his convictions for armed 

robbery and assault with a dangerous weapon in Superior Court case number 77-

FEL-6483. In addition, the government filed with the court a copy of its letter 

furnishing appellant with a certified copy of the judgment of conviction in that 

case. Armed robbery and ADW are both crimes of violence.6 Thereafter, when 

appellant was preparing to stipulate that he had a prior felony conviction, the 

prosecutor informed the judge that “the defense does not dispute that it was a 

robbery conviction.” Appellant did not contest that representation. When 

appellant appeared for sentencing, his counsel affirmatively acknowledged that the 

presentence report was “substantially accurate” and did not demur when the judge 

then stated that the report writer concluded that appellant had “a prior conviction 

for a crime of violence.”7 Further, appellant implicitly confirmed that his prior 

convictions were for substantive crimes of violence when he argued in the trial 

 

6

See D.C. Code § 23-1331 (4) (2012 Repl.).

7

That the statements were not made by appellant personally does not mean 

they cannot be treated as his admissions. “A party may make an admission by 

adopting or acquiescing in the statement of another.” Tann v. United States, 127 

A.3d 400, 466 (D.C. 2015).
6

court that they could not be found to qualify for purposes of the sentencing 

enhancement only because they might have been based on a theory of conspiracy 

liability (a separate argument we shall discuss below). In all the discussions with 

the judge regarding his stipulation to a prior felony and, at sentencing, over the 

Apprendi issue, appellant never denied that he had been convicted of, specifically, 

armed robbery and ADW. Nor has appellant denied it on appeal. There really 

appears to be absolutely no genuine dispute about it, and that is what we perceive 

the trial judge was given to understand. Considering the totality of these 

circumstances, we are satisfied that the judge had enough before her to find that 

appellant’s prior convictions were for armed robbery and ADW.8

 

8

The judge neglected to address appellant in accordance with the 

requirements of D.C. Code § 23-111 (b) to ask him whether he affirmed or denied 

the convictions and advise him that any challenge to those convictions not made 

before the imposition of sentence could not be raised to attack the sentence. See, 

e.g., Brocksmith v. United States, 99 A.3d 690, 702-03 (D.C. 2014); Sanders v. 

United States, 809 A.2d 584, 600-602 (D.C. 2002); Smith v. United States, 356 

A.2d 650, 652 (D.C. 1976). Our unpublished Memorandum Opinion and 

Judgment in this case noted that appellant did not identify this omission as a 

ground for relief. After the issuance of that opinion, appellant moved for leave to 

file a supplemental brief presenting a claim that the trial judge’s failure to comply 

with D.C. Code § 23-111 (b) was plain error. We denied that motion because even 

if its untimeliness were to be excused, appellant could not satisfy the stringent 

requirements of plain error review. As our Order denying leave to file explained, 

[Appellant] makes no claim that he has any basis on 

which to dispute or challenge his prior convictions for 

crimes of violence. We therefore conclude that the trial 

court’s “error was essentially harmless because appellant 

has not attempted to show any harm, nor do we 

(continued...)
7

Finally, we reject appellant’s argument that his enhanced sentence was 

improper because the record does not rule out the possibility that he was convicted 

of armed robbery and ADW on a conspiracy theory of liability. The enhancement 

provision of the UPF statute applies whenever a defendant has “a prior conviction 

for a crime of violence other than conspiracy” regardless of the particular theory of 

liability on which the conviction was based.9

The judgment of the Superior Court is hereby affirmed.

So ordered.

 

(continued...)

independently glean from the record any injury, caused 

by the trial court’s omission. In such an instance, we will 

not waste scarce judicial resources and remand this case 

for resentencing.” Brocksmith v. United States, 99 A.3d 

690, 703 (D.C. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). 

9 D.C. Code § 22-4503 (b)(1). In excepting conspiracy convictions from the 

class of violent crime convictions triggering a sentence enhancement, subsection 

(b)(1) reflects the fact that D.C. Code § 23-1331 (4) lists conspiracy to commit one 

of the enumerated (substantive) crimes of violence as being another such crime.