alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
MDS Energy Ltd.

409 Butler Road Suite A

Kittanning PA, 16201

EPA Hydraulic Fracturing Information Request: C. Edward Dunmire 2-331M

To whom it may concern,

Enclosed is the information requested by the EPA concerning hydraulic fracturing for the C. 

Edward Dunmire 1-331M well that had previously been unidentified. The information regarding 

this well is set up in the similar manner as the previously submitted data. Each topic of interest 

has its own folder, within that folder are folders regarding each question under that topic.

MDS Energy requests that all of the enclosed data remain confidential.

If you have any questions regarding the submitted information please contact MDS Energy Ltd.

Phone: 724-548-2501

Fax: 724-548-2330
MDS Energy Ltd.

409 Butler Road Suite A

Kittanning PA, 16201

EPA Hydraulic Fracturing Information Request

To whom it may concern,

Enclosed is the information requested by the EPA concerning hydraulic fracturing. The 

information is arranged as follows: Inside the folder titled "Requested Wells" are the folders of 

all available wells for which information was requested. Within each well folder are additional 

folders titled by the requested topics, Geological Maps and Cross Sections; Drilling and 

Completion Information; Water Quality, Volume, and Disposition; Hydraulic Fracturing; and 

Environmental Releases. Within the folders of the requested topics are folders titled by number 

for each specific request made under that topic. Each numbered folder contains the relevant 

information to that specific request for that particular well. 

All available information concerning the requested topics has been provided to the best of our 

knowledge. Any requested information that is found absent in the appropriate folders was not 

acquired, available, or the requested information was not applicable to that particular well. The 

following two wells under the EPA title of "Well Identifier" were not found under MSD Energy 

records: 22-026568, 22-026802, it is unclear as to what these numbers pertain to. In addition to 

these two wells, the Gilbert C Querio #1-43 well was a platted well that was never drilled, 

therefore there is no applicable information concerning this well.

MDS Energy requests that all of the enclosed data remain confidential.

If you have any questions regarding the submitted information please contact MDS Energy Ltd.

Phone: 724-548-2501

Fax: 724-548-2330
```

[Federal Register Volume 78, Number 213 (Monday, November 4, 2013)]
[Notices]
[Page 66038]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2013-26246]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC); 
Correction.

AGENCY: National Protection and Programs Directorate, DHS.

ACTION: Committee Management; Notice of an open Federal Advisory 
Committee Meeting; Corrections.

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY: The National Protection and Programs Directorate published a 
document in the Federal Register of September 19, 2013, concerning the 
Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council (CIPAC) Plenary 
Meeting on November 5, 2013. The document contained incorrect dates in 
two locations described below.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Renee Murphy, Critical Infrastructure 
Partnership Advisory Council Alternate Designated Federal Officer, 
telephone (703) 235-3999.

Correction

    In the Federal Register of September 19, 2013, in FR Vol. 78, No. 
182, on page 57644, in the second column, correct the ADDRESSES caption 
to read:

    Written comments are welcome at any time prior to or following 
the meeting. Written comments may be sent to Renee Murphy, 
Department of Homeland Security, National Protection and Programs 
Directorate, 245 Murray Lane, SW., Mail Stop 0607, Arlington, VA 
20598-0607. For consideration in the CIPAC deliberations, written 
comments must be received by Renee Murphy by no later than 12:00PM 
on November 4, 2013, identified by Federal Register Docket Number 
DHS-2013-0050 and may be submitted by one of the following methods:

Correction

    In the Federal Register of September 19, 2013, in FR Vol. 78, No. 
182, on page 57644, in the third column, correct the SUPPLEMENTARY 
INFORMATION caption to read:

    CIPAC represents a partnership between the Federal Government 
and critical infrastructure owners and operators, and provides a 
forum in which they can engage in a broad spectrum of activities to 
support and coordinate critical infrastructure security and 
resilience. The November 5, 2013, meeting will include topic-
specific discussions focused on partnership efforts to enhance 
critical infrastructure resilience. Topics, such as Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience and Cybersecurity, will be 
discussed.

    Dated: October 28, 2013.
Larry May,
Designated Federal Officer for the CIPAC.
[FR Doc. 2013-26246 Filed 11-1-13; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4410-10-P
```
#### Fentress *v.*Sicard.

Opinion delivered March 3, 1930.

*175
      *Iiardin d Barton,*for appellant.

*Daily d Woods,*for appellee.

Kirby, J.,

(after stating the facts). The authorities are well nigh uniform in holding that a mortuary or undertaking establishment of the kind complained of here is not a nuisance *per se.*It may become a. nuisance, however, by reason of its location in a residential district or from the manner iii which it is operated. In 46 *C.*J., p. 726, it is said: “An undertaking establishment or funeral parlor is not a nuisance *per se,*but by reason of surrounding circumstances it may become a nuisance. It may constitute a nuisance by reason of its location, as, for instance, under particular circumstances, when it is located in a residential district, notwithstanding, it has been held, it does not directly affect the health or grossly offend the physical senses; but it is more frequently held that the mere location in a residential section is not sufficient to make such an establishment a nuisance.” If the *176district of the location was an exclusively residential one, its intrusion therein would ordinarily constitute a nuisance, and eould be prevented by injunction. Change is the order of time however, that progress and development may not be hindered or obstructed, and the transition from a residential district into a business district is recognized and has been effected. The great preponderance of the testimony herein shows, that the establishment of the mortuary upon the site selected would enhance the value of the surrounding property as business property, and would not detract from its value for residential purposes, for which it had long since fallen into disuse, so far as new or further development is concerned. The chancellor did not find there would be any depreciation of value in the property because of the location of the mortuary, or that the health or comfort of the residents in the vicinity would be at all imperiled or likely destroyed by the operation of the mortuary there, but held only that its location could not but be a continuing reminder of death, (the dead being there), necessarily producing discomfort and depression of spirit of all people residing within the sight of it, without regard to its proper operation, and the appearance and setting of the modern structure. Its operation would be a necessary business, of course, and since the testimony shows the transition of the district from residential to business has so far progressed, that the property there will be rather enhanced in value because of its location than depreciated in any respect for residential purposes, it would not constitute a nuisance that should be prevented or suppressed by injunction.

The chancellor’s finding otherwise is contrary to the preponderance of the testimony, and the decree must be reversed and the cause remanded with directions to dismiss the complaint for want of equity. It is so ordered.
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4547 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4547

 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 119 Station Road in Cheyney, Pennsylvania, as the ``Captain Luther 
             H. Smith, U.S. Army Air Forces Post Office''.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 27, 2010

 Mr. Sestak (for himself, Mr. Brady of Pennsylvania, Mr. Fattah, Mrs. 
Dahlkemper, Mr. Altmire, Mr. Thompson of Pennsylvania, Mr. Gerlach, Mr. 
    Patrick J. Murphy of Pennsylvania, Mr. Shuster, Mr. Carney, Mr. 
 Kanjorski, Mr. Murtha, Ms. Schwartz, Mr. Doyle, Mr. Dent, Mr. Pitts, 
Mr. Holden, Mr. Tim Murphy of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Platts) introduced 
 the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Oversight 
                         and Government Reform

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located 
 at 119 Station Road in Cheyney, Pennsylvania, as the ``Captain Luther 
             H. Smith, U.S. Army Air Forces Post Office''.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. CAPTAIN LUTHER H. SMITH, U.S. ARMY AIR FORCES POST OFFICE.

    (a) Designation.--The facility of the United States Postal Service 
located at 119 Station Road in Cheyney, Pennsylvania, shall be known 
and designated as the ``Captain Luther H. Smith, U.S. Army Air Forces 
Post Office''.
    (b) References.--Any reference in a law, map, regulation, document, 
paper, or other record of the United States to the facility referred to 
in subsection (a) shall be deemed to be a reference to the ``Captain 
Luther H. Smith, U.S. Army Air Forces Post Office''.
                                 <all>
```
1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION

Jennifer Kay Inlow, 

Plaintiff, 

v. Case No. 1:17cv163 

Commissioner of Social Security, Judge Michael R. Barrett 

Defendant. 

ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation filed by the 

Magistrate Judge on July 16, 2018 (Doc. 12). 

Proper notice has been given to the parties under 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(C), 

including notice that the parties would waive further appeal if they failed to file 

objections to the Report and Recommendation in a timely manner. United States v. 

Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). No objections to the Magistrate Judge=s Report 

and Recommendation have been filed. 

Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. 12) of 

the Magistrate Judge is hereby ADOPTED. The decision of the Commissioner is 

REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings pursuant to Sentence Four of 42 

U.S.C. ' 405(g). 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/Michael R. Barrett 

Michael R. Barrett 

United States District Judge
#### Garrett *v.*Edwards.

Opinion delivered March 16, 1925.

1. Landlord and tenant — purpose op unlawpul detainer action. : — The action of unlawful detainer merely decides the right to the immediate possession of lands and tenements, and not the right or title of the parties to or in them.

2. Landlord and tenant — estoppel.—A tenant cannot. dispute the title of his landlord -while he remains in possession under him, nor acquire possession from the landlord by lease and then dispute his title, but must first surrender possession.

*2443. Landlord and tenant — unlawful detainer — answer.—Where a landlord sued for possession', an answer of the tenant that after he received possession certain third persons claimed to own the premises and rents, and that thereafter defendant deposited the. rents in a bank awaiting, settlement of the question of ownership of rents, with prayer that such third party ibe made defendant and required to litigate the question of ownership of rents', *held*demurrable.

*Appeal*from Conway Circuit Court,- *J. T. Bullock,*Judge;

affirmed.

*E.dward Gordon, f or appellant.*

*Eades dt Eddy,*for appellee.

Smith, J.

Appellee brought an action of unlawful detainer to recover from appellants the■ possession of. a. lot in the town of Blackwell, which he alleged that he had rented them on November 10, 1922, for a monthly rental of $10, to be paid at the end of each month; that default, was made in the payment of'the rents; and a notice in writing'to-vacate was served on defendants. Judgment for-rents and possession was^prayed.

Defendants filed an answer .admitting the tenancy,, but alleging the fact to be that, shortly after :they went, into possession of ,tbe property, they were notified' by..■ Maus and.Berkemeyer, trading'and doing business as Maus *&*Berkemeyer, that they were the owners of the property and were entitled to .the refits; that thereafter, defendants deposited the rents in a -bank, awaiting* a settlement of the question as to- who was entitled, to- the rents. There was a prayer that Maus & Berkemeyer be made parties defendant and required to litigate with plaintiff the question of ownership -of the rents.

A demurrer was -sustained to this answer, and, as defendants declined to plead further, judgment was pronounced .on the pleadings, in favor of the plaintiff.

The demurrer to the answer was properly sustained. In the case of *Dunlap*v. *Moose,*98 Ark. 235, it was said: “The action of unlawful detainer is only-to decide the right to the immediate possession of lands and tené-ments, and fiot to determine the right or titlé of the parties to of in' thém. ’ A tenant 'cannot dispute the title, of . his-*245landlord, while he remains in possession under him, nor, acquire possession from the landlord by lease and then dispute his title, but must first surrender possession and bring his action.” See also *Burton*v. *Gorman,*125 Ark. 141; *Montgomery*v. *Massey,*145 Ark. 336; *Morris*v. *Griffin,*146 Ark. 439.

The judgment of the court below is therefore affirmed.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED August 4, 2005 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 05-50160 Summary Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus VICTOR GUERRERO BOJORQUEZ CARDOZA, also known as Victor Cardoza Bojorquez, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas USDC No. 3:94-CR-134-ALL

-------------------- Before REAVLEY, STEWART and PRADO, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: * Victor Guerrero Bojorquez Cardoza appeals the sentence imposed following his guilty-plea conviction for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. He argues that the district court plainly erred in imposing his sentence pursuant to the then mandatory United States Sentencing Guidelines, which were subsequently held unconstitutional in United States v. Booker , 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).No. 05-50160 -2- Because he did not raise this issue in the district court, review is limited to plain error. See United States v. Mares , 402 F.3d 511, 520 (5th Cir. 2005), petition for cert. filed (Mar. 31, 2005)(No. 04-9517). Under the plain-error standard of review, “reversal is not required unless there is (1) an error; (2) that is clear or plain; (3) that affects the defendant’s substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings. Id. The imposition of Cardoza’s sentence under the mandatory Guidelines was error that was plain. See United States v. Martinez-Lugo , ___ F.3d ___, 2005 WL 1331282 at *2 (5th Cir. June 7, 2005) (No. 04-40478). However, Cardoza has not shown that the error affected his substantial rights as he has not shown that the district court would likely have imposed a lesser sentence under an advisory Guidelines sentencing scheme. See United States v. Bringier , 405 F.3d 310, 317 (5th Cir. 2005). In both the instant case and Bringier , the district courts stated at sentencing that the sentence was the lowest it could give. See id. Therefore, he has not shown that the district court’s imposition of his sentence under the mandatory Guidelines was reversible plain error. See id. Accordingly, Cardoza’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>


                                                                    Exhibit 32.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                               18 U.S.C. ss.1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Annual Report of Velocity Express Corporation (the
"Company") on Form 10-K for the period ended June 29, 2002 as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Mark E.
Ties, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
ss.1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:

         1.  The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a)
             or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2.  The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
             material respects, the financial condition and results of
             operations of the Company.


                                /s/ Mark E. Ties
                                ---------------------------------
                                Mark E. Ties
                                Chief Financial Officer
                                July 28, 2003
#### Johnny WHITE et al *v.*WHITE, INC. et al

81-43

621 S.W. 2d 215

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered September 21, 1981

*Bill W. Bristow*of *Seay & Bristow,*for appellants.

*William B. Howard*of *Howard & Howard,*for ap-pelles.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

A threshold question is whether this appeal was properly filed in the Supreme Court *477rather than in the Court of Appeals. We find that the case should have been filed in the Court of Appeals and therefore transfer it to that court. Rule 29 (3).

The details of the litigation are unimportant, it being enough to say that the case is a stockholders’ suit brought by the appellants to obtain the dissolution of three family corporations. The decree (which appears to be final, not interlocutory) granted some but not all of the relief sought by the plaintiffs. Their notice of appeal recites that the appeal is taken to the Supreme Court pursuant to Rule 29 (1) (k), which pertains to interlocutory appeals, and on the additional basis that the case involves an issue of significant public interest and a legal principle of major importance. The appellants’ jurisdictional statement preceding their abstract and brief asserts that “this matter should be heard in the Supreme Court pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 29 (3) and (4) in that an issue of significant public interest is involved and a legal principle of major importance will be established.” No facts are set forth to support those jurisdictional assertions. The Clerk accepted counsel’s statement and docketed the appeal in the Supreme Court.

We have explained in an earlier case that Rule 29 treats the Court of Appeals as a tribunal of final authority in the particular area of its jurisdiction, not as merely an additional and expensive and time-consuming level in the appellate structure. *Moose*v. Gregory, 267 Ark. 86, 590 S.W. 2d 662 (1979). To that end Rule 29 (1) states that *all*cases shall be appealed to the Court of Appeals *except*those falling within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, as defined in the various subsections of Rule 29 (1).

The appellants’ jurisdictional statement does not invoke Supreme Court jurisdiction under any subsection of Rule 29 (1). Instead, it petitions the Supreme Court to accept the case under Rule 29 (3) and (4) as presenting an issue of significant public interest or a legal principle of major importance. That jurisdictional question, however, must be decided in the first instance by the Court of Appeals, not by counsel nor by the Clerk of the courts. The case must therefore be transferred to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. It is so ordered.
P. 1


# OAR Box 1837 Prepped byKeeia Richards



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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-7261

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

RICHARD JOHN DAVIS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Albert V. Bryan, Jr., Senior

District Judge. (CR-93-256-A, CA-96-642-AM)

Submitted: February 27, 1997 Decided: March 11, 1997

Before MURNAGHAN, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Marvin David Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Thomas

More Hollenhorst, Assistant United States Attorney, Alexandria,

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court's order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

132, 110 Stat. 1214. We have reviewed the record and the district

court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny

Appellant's Motion for Summary Reversal; we deny a certificate of

appealability; and we dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the

district court. United States v. Davis, Nos. CR-93-256-A; CA-96-

642-AM (E.D. Va. June 26, 1996). We dispense with oral argument

because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in

the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED