Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 45A05-1608-PC-1951 | May 30, 2017 Page 1 of 20

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Stephen T. Owens

Public Defender of Indiana

Joanna Green

Deputy Public Defender

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

James B. Martin

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ronnie Rice,

Appellant-Petitioner,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Respondent

May 30, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

45A05-1608-PC-1951

Appeal from the Lake Superior 

Court

The Honorable Diane R. Boswell, 

Judge

The Honorable Natalie Bokota, 

Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No.

45G03-1410-PC-18

Altice, Judge.

Case Summary
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[1] Ronnie Rice appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief 

(PCR Petition). He presents four issues for our review, which we reorder and 

restate as follows: 

1. Was Rice’s guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and 

intelligently made?

2. Did the post-conviction court err in rejecting his claim of 

ineffective assistance of trial counsel?

3. Did the post-conviction court err in rejecting his claim of 

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel?

4. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing him to life

without the possibility of parole (LWOP)?

[2] We affirm.

Facts & Procedural History

[3] Maxine Urbanczyk arrived to work at Kentucky Fried Chicken in Merrillville at 

around 8:30 a.m. on December 10, 2007. A store surveillance video shows Ms. 

Urbanczyk going to the back door, looking through a peephole, opening the 

door, and appearing to be familiar with the person on the other side. She 

handed the person a cordless telephone and then placed a piece of cardboard 

such that the door would not completely close, thus allowing access to the 

restaurant. A short time later, the video shows Rice, who worked at the 

restaurant, entering through the back door wearing a grey colored sweatshirt. 

Another surveillance camera captured Rice crouching down behind the front 
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counter where the safe is located and taking items from the safe. A few minutes 

later, Rice is seen exiting the back door. Our Supreme Court, in considering 

the nature of the offense upon review of Rice’s direct-appeal challenge to his 

LWOP sentence, summarized what transpired while Rice was inside the 

restaurant. 

Rice arrived at work to rob the safe, but he needed Ms. 

Urbanczyk’s help to do it. Not wanting to leave any witnesses to 

his crime, he attacked Ms. Urbanczyk from behind with both a 

chair and a hammer. She sustained 15 head injuries including 

facial lacerations, cranial factures, brain contusions, and cranial 

hemorrhaging; a fractured rib cage; and a bruised left lung. She 

died from “extensive head injuries with chest injuries caused by 

blunt force trauma.”

Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 947 (Ind. 2014) (record citation omitted).

[4] A short time later two employees arrived at the restaurant but were unable to 

gain access through the front door. Rice came from the back of the building, 

approached one of his coworker’s cars, took off his “greyish looking” 

sweatshirt, and put it in the back of her car. Sentencing Transcript at 67-8. Rice 

then asked his other coworker if he could wear his black sweatshirt. 

[5] During one of his interviews with police, Rice admitted that after he took the 

money from the safe, he approached Ms. Urbanczyk from behind and pushed 

her down and then hit her with a chair. At some point he grabbed a hammer 

and “just went berserk.” Sentencing Hearing Exhibit 75A at 29.
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[6] During the investigation, police located a hammer behind a filing cabinet at the 

crime scene. Swabs of blood taken from Rice’s grey sweatshirt and jeans 

matched Ms. Urbancyzk’s DNA profile. Ms. Urbanczyk’s store keys were 

found at the police station where Rice had hidden them while being

interviewed. Ms. Urbancyzk’s jacket and bags of cash totaling $3667.89 were 

recovered from a dumpster near the area from where Rice appeared as he 

approached the front of the restaurant and encountered his coworkers. 

[7] On December 12, 2007, Rice was charged with murder, a felony, and murder in 

the perpetration of a robbery, a felony. Rice’s family hired an attorney to 

represent Rice.1 On February 5, 2008, the State amended the charging 

information to include a charge of robbery as a class B felony. The State also 

filed a request to seek a sentence of LWOP. The LWOP designation listed one 

aggravator—Rice killed the victim while committing or attempting to commit 

robbery. 

[8] On September 18, 2008, Rice filed a motion to suppress his statements to police 

and evidence gathered during a warrantless search of his home. The trial court 

conducted a suppression hearing over three days and issued an order denying 

Rice’s motion to suppress on February 24, 2009. Rice’s belated motion for 

 

1 Attorney King testified at the post-conviction hearing that his first order of business in representing Rice 

was to meet with the prosecutor and try to dissuade the State from seeking the death penalty.
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certification for interlocutory appeal was granted by the trial court, but this 

court denied his motion to accept jurisdiction. 

[9] On February 2, 2010, the trial court granted Rice’s motion to continue the trial 

to afford his mitigation expert additional time to investigate and prepare a 

report. On February 16, 2010, the trial court granted Rice’s petition for public 

fund payment and reimbursement for mitigation-expert expenses. 

[10] On January 18, 2011, six days before his scheduled jury trial, Rice pled guilty as 

charged without the benefit of a plea agreement. Rice submitted a statement of 

facts to serve as the factual basis for his guilty plea and therein acknowledged 

that he faced a sentence of LWOP and that sentencing would be left to the 

discretion of the trial court. After several continuances, a sentencing hearing 

was held January 9 through 12, 2012. The State requested that the court 

impose a sentence of LWOP. As mitigating evidence, Rice’s trial counsel

called his mother and sister as witnesses and submitted three exhibits. At the 

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court sentenced Rice to LWOP. 

[11] Rice exercised his right to directly appeal to our Supreme Court. On appeal, 

Rice argued that the trial court erred in considering non-statutory aggravating 

circumstances in imposing a sentence of LWOP and that his sentence of 

LWOP was inappropriate. After holding oral argument, the Supreme Court 

issued an order directing the trial court to revise its sentencing order to comport 

with case law and to clarify whether it had relied upon non-statutory 

aggravating factors in imposing a sentence of LWOP. Rice v. State, No. 45S00-
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1206-CR-343, Order Remanding for Revised Sentencing Order (Ind. Feb. 12, 

2013). The trial court issued a revised sentencing order imposing a sentence of 

LWOP. Rice again appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the sentencing 

order remained deficient. See Rice v. State, 6 N.E.3d 940, 942 (Ind. 2014). In 

the alternative, Rice requested that the Court revise his sentence to a term of 

years. Id. at 946. The Court found no abuse of discretion by the trial court in 

identifying aggravating factors and concluded that neither the nature of the 

offense nor the character of the offender warranted a revision of Rice’s 

sentence. Id. at 946-47. 

[12] Rice, pro se, filed a PCR Petition on October 8, 2014. This petition was later 

amended by counsel on May 15, 2015. The post-conviction court held an 

evidentiary hearing on January 13, 14, and 15, 2016. The post-conviction court 

denied Rice’s PCR petition on August 2, 2016. Rice now appeals. Additional 

facts will be provided as necessary.

Discussion & Decision

[13] In a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of establishing 

grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. Bethea v. State, 983 

N.E.2d 1134, 1138 (Ind. 2013). “When appealing the denial of post-conviction 

relief, the petitioner stands in the position of one appealing from a negative 

judgment.” Id. (quoting Fisher v. State, 810 N.E.2d 674, 679 (Ind. 2004)). In 

order to prevail, the petitioner must demonstrate that the evidence as a whole 

leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite the post-conviction 
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court’s conclusion. Id. Although we do not defer to a post-conviction court’s 

legal conclusions, we will reverse its findings and judgment only upon a 

showing of clear error, i.e., “that which leaves us with a definite and firm 

conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. (quoting Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 729 

N.E.2d 102, 106 (Ind. 2000)).

1. Guilty Plea

[14] Rice argues that his guilty plea was not knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.2 

Specifically, he asserts that he did not understand that by pleading guilty he was 

also waiving his right to have a jury determine his sentence. He claims that his 

trial counsel misled him into thinking that pleading guilty with no benefit in 

exchange for his plea was in his best interest.3

[15] With regard to sentencing, a guilty-plea defendant may waive his or her Sixth 

Amendment right to have a jury determine, beyond a reasonable doubt, all facts 

legally essential to the sentence so long as the defendant either stipulates to the 

relevant facts or consents to judicial factfinding. Averitte v. State, 824 N.E.2d 

 

2 Rice is correct that post-conviction review is the appropriate mechanism by which to challenge the validity 

of his guilty plea. See Prowell v. State, 687 N.E.2d 563, 564 n.1 (Ind. 1997) (“when a defendant pleads guilty, 

he may challenge only sentencing errors on direct appeal, not alleged errors involving his guilty plea or 

conviction”) (citing Tumulty v. State, 666 N.E.2d 394 (Ind. 1996)) (emphasis in original). The post-conviction 

court erred in finding that Rice had waived his right to challenge the validity of his guilty plea by not raising 

such argument in his direct appeal. The post-conviction court also concluded, however, that even if the issue 

was not waived, Rice’s claim was meritless. 

3 Rice does not dispute that he was advised of and understood that by pleading guilty he waived his right to

trial by jury, his right to confrontation, and his right against self-incrimination. See Griffin v. State, 617 N.E.2d 

550, 552 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993) (noting that before a guilty plea may be considered voluntary and intelligent, 

the record must disclose that the defendant knew he was waiving these particular constitutional rights).
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1283, 1287 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310-

312 (2004)). At the post-conviction relief hearing, Rice’s trial counsel testified 

that he advised Rice that he could have a jury determine his sentence if he did 

not plead guilty. Rice did not present any evidence to dispute this fact.

[16] Additionally, we note that at the guilty plea hearing, the trial court advised Rice 

of his constitutional rights and Rice indicated his understanding that he still 

faced a sentence of LWOP. Rice also submitted a document titled 

“Defendant’s Statement of Facts Re: Guilty Plea” that set forth the factual basis 

for the guilty plea and further provided: 

I [referring to Rice] further understand that I will still face the 

possible penalty for my crimes of life without parole and that by 

pleading guilty, I am giving up my right to have a jury consider 

evidence and recommend the appropriate penalty to the Court. 

Rather, I understand that the Court will conduct a sentencing 

hearing at a future date and that the Court alone will have 

authority to determine my sentence for the crimes I am pleading 

guilty to.

Direct Appeal Appendix Vol. One at 159-60. During the guilty-plea hearing, Rice 

acknowledged his agreement with this statement and also affirmed that he had 

read, understood, and signed the document. Rice was fully aware that even by 

pleading guilty he faced a possible sentence of LWOP and that he was putting 

himself at the mercy of the trial court rather than having a jury determine his 

sentence. 
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[17] To the extent Rice also claimed that he was misled by his trial counsel into 

believing that he would benefit from pleading guilty, the post-conviction court 

disagreed. The post-conviction court first noted that there was no evidence that 

the State was willing to offer Rice a plea agreement with a different outcome. 

Second, the post-conviction court also noted that Rice’s trial counsel explained 

that, in his experience with cases of such a brutal nature, Rice stood a better 

chance of avoiding a sentence of LWOP if he accepted responsibility and 

submitted himself to the mercy of the trial court rather than asking a jury to 

decide his fate. As noted by the post-conviction court, simply because the trial 

court ultimately imposed a sentence of LWOP, does not establish that Rice was 

misled into pleading guilty. 

[18] We agree with the post-conviction court. Rice did not establish that he did not 

knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently enter his guilty plea. The record 

demonstrates that Rice was fully aware of his rights and made the decision to 

follow counsel’s advice to accept responsibility by pleading guilty. He was not 

misled. Rather, he expressly acknowledged that even with pleading guilty and 

leaving sentencing to the trial court’s discretion, he still faced the possibility of 

LWOP. 

2. Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel

[19] A petitioner will prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel only 

upon a showing that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness and that the deficient performance prejudiced the petitioner. 
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Bethea, 983 N.E.2d at 1138. To satisfy the first element, the petitioner must 

demonstrate deficient performance, which is “representation that fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness, committing errors so serious that the 

defendant did not have the ‘counsel’ guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. 

(quoting McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Ind. 2002)). To satisfy the 

second element, the petitioner must show prejudice, which is “a reasonable 

probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would 

have been different.” Id. at 1139. Failure to satisfy either element will cause an 

ineffectiveness claim to fail. Carrillo v. State, 982 N.E.2d 461, 464 (Ind. Ct. App.

2013). Thus, if a petitioner cannot establish prejudice, we need not evaluate the 

reasonableness of counsel’s performance. Id.

[20] There is a “strong presumption” that counsel rendered adequate service. Myers 

v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1089 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Bethea, 983 N.E.2d at 1139). 

“We afford counsel considerable discretion in choosing strategy and tactics, and 

‘[i]solated mistakes, poor strategy, inexperience, and instances of bad judgment 

do not necessarily render representation ineffective.’” State v. Hollin, 970 

N.E.2d 147, 151 (Ind. 2012) (quoting Timberlake v. State, 753 N.E.2d 591, 603 

(Ind. 2001)) (alteration in original). Indeed, “strategic choices made after 

thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to plausible options are 

virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after less than complete 

investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that reasonable professional 

judgments support the limitations on investigation.” Strickland v. Washington, 

466 U.S. 668, 690-91 (1984).
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[21] Rice argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance when he 

advised him to plead guilty and waive his right to have a jury determine his 

sentence. In the context of a guilty plea, a petitioner must establish a 

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pled 

guilty and would have instead insisted on going to trial. Scott v. State, 986 

N.E.2d 292, 296 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). “A reasonable probability is one that is 

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Kubsch v. State, 934 

N.E.2d 1138, 1147 (Ind. 2010) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 

[22] The evidence against Rice was overwhelming. Rice’s trial counsel testified at 

the post-conviction hearing and explained that his strategy in advising Rice to 

plead guilty without the benefit of a plea agreement was for Rice to receive 

some consideration for having wholly accepted responsibility for the crimes. 

Trial counsel further explained that in his experience, presenting a case of this 

nature to a jury would have created a “greater challenge to avoid the ultimate 

penalty sought than going directly to the Court.”4 Post-Conviction Transcript at 

13. Trial counsel stated that he believed that “any consideration that would be 

given was likely to come from a professional, a judge, [rather] than a jury.” Id. 

at 14. 

 

4 Trial counsel noted that a trial court was without discretion if a jury recommended LWOP. See Ind. Code § 

35-50-2-9(e) (providing that “[i]f the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation [with regard to LWOP], the 

court shall sentence the defendant accordingly”) (emphasis supplied).
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[23] Trial counsel’s opinion was based on the circumstances of the crime and the 

evidence thereof, which would have painted a horrific picture of the last 

moments of Ms. Urbancyzk’s life as Rice brutally attacked her with first a chair 

and then a hammer in order to make sure there were no witnesses to his theft of 

money. We agree with the post-conviction court that trial counsel’s decision to 

advise Rice to plead guilty and give up his right to have a jury decide his 

sentence was clearly a strategic decision and wholly reasonable given the 

circumstances and brutal nature of the crime. 

[24] Rice also asserts that the post-conviction court failed to address his argument 

that trial counsel was ineffective because he advised Rice to plead guilty rather 

than further pursue a challenge to the voluntariness of his confession at trial, 

which would have, in turn, preserved the issue for review. Rice, however, does 

not explain how he was prejudiced. Indeed, even if we assume that Rice’s

confession was obtained in violation of his constitutional rights and therefore 

excluded, there was overwhelming independent evidence of his guilt. That 

evidence clearly incriminated Rice in Ms. Urbanczyk’s death and would have 

included details of how Rice bludgeoned her to death with a hammer as well as

gruesome pictures of the aftermath. Given the circumstances of the crime and 

the overwhelming evidence, Rice would be hard pressed to make a plausible 

argument that by not pleading guilty, the result of a trial would have been any 

different. 

[25] Rice argues that the post-conviction court failed to address his claim that trial 

counsel’s argument that a sentence of LWOP would be disproportionate and 
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racially-based was unreasonable and poorly presented. Trial counsel testified 

that he spent a significant amount of time accumulating information about 

other murder cases in Lake County in order to show a racial bias as it 

concerned the decision to seek sentences of death or LWOP. Trial counsel put 

into evidence the probable cause affidavit and charging information from thirtynine other murder cases in Lake County occurring in a five-year period ending 

in August 2011. Trial counsel sought to show that the State pursued the death 

penalty or LWOP in Lake County only when the victim was Caucasian and the 

defendant was a minority, with very few exceptions. Trial counsel testified that 

he was trying to point out that Rice’s crime was “not a particularly heinous 

offense” as compared with other murder cases where the State sought only a 

term of years. Post-Conviction Transcript at 34. In light of the information he had 

gathered, trial counsel argued that a sentence of LWOP was therefore 

inappropriate, especially if based only on the fact Rice is a minority. 

[26] As noted by Rice, the trial court and the State attempted to refute trial counsel’s 

argument by pointing to capital or LWOP cases not included in trial counsel’s 

evidence. Rice faults his trial counsel for not “stand[ing] by the evidence he 

presented and argue its mitigating effect.” Appellant’s Brief at 30. We have 

reviewed the record and reject Rice’s claim that counsel performed deficiently 

in this respect. Rice’s trial counsel adequately presented this argument to the 

court and was able to get his point across even though he did not explicitly 

distinguish those cases referenced by the trial court or the State. Indeed, as 
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acknowledged by Rice, the cases mentioned by the trial court and the State did 

not disprove trial counsel’s point. 

[27] Rice argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance in failing to 

adequately investigate and present available mitigation during the penalty 

phase. At the sentencing hearing, Rice’s trial counsel called two witnesses on 

his behalf and presented the evidence in support of his disproportionatesentence argument. Rice’s mother testified that Rice came from a broken home 

and that his father had been violent at times. She further detailed that Rice had 

been very close with his grandmother and that after her death he became 

depressed and seemed to withdraw. She described her son as a kind-hearted, 

loving person who was never violent. Rice’s sister echoed their mother’s 

sentiments about Rice’s nature and disposition and explained that Rice was 

under stress and was depressed at the time he committed the crimes. Both 

noted that Rice had a gambling problem and money-related issues associated 

therewith. Trial counsel did not present evidence from the mental health expert

he had retained.

[28] Rice called several witnesses at the post-conviction hearing—his sister, who 

testified in greater detail about their dysfunctional family, and five additional 

lay witnesses who each testified as to Rice’s non-violent nature, his rough 

upbringing, and/or his dysfunctional family. Each witness claimed they would 

have testified on Rice’s behalf at his sentencing hearing had his trial counsel 

asked them. Rice also presented the testimony of Dr. Bart Ferraro, a clinical 

psychologist, who evaluated Rice in 2015. Based on a review of the case file
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and interviews with family members, Dr. Ferraro concluded that Rice suffered 

from a depressive disorder not otherwise specified and a mixed personality 

disorder. He further explained the impact Rice’s upbringing had on him 

generally and on the day of the crime. Rice asserts that had trial counsel 

offered the testimony of the lay witnesses and Dr. Ferraro at the sentencing 

hearing, there was a reasonable probability that he would have been sentenced 

to a term of years rather than LWOP.

[29] When questioned at the post-conviction hearing, Rice’s trial counsel explained 

he had reservations about the impact some of the potential witnesses would 

have had at sentencing,5so he did not call them to testify on Rice’s behalf. He 

further explained that he did not call his mitigation expert as a witness because 

he believed that Rice’s mother, who he found to be a “very bright, very 

articulate woman,” would portray the substance of the expert’s findings in a 

“very credible manner” with a measure of emotion that only a mother who 

loves her son could provide. Post-Conviction Transcript at 22. Trial counsel 

believed Rice’s mother “would be impactive in terms of defining Mr. Rice 

beyond the four corners of the charges against him.” Id. at 23. He also noted 

that Rice’s lack of criminal history was a crucial mitigating factor.

 

5 Trial counsel expressed particular concern for calling Rice’s father, noting that after meeting with Rice’s 

father, he “did not form a positive impression” of him and found him to be “verbally combative.” PostConviction Transcript at 22.
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[30] The post-conviction court summarized the testimony of the various witnesses 

Rice submitted as providing possible mitigating evidence for sentencing 

purposes. With regard to Dr. Ferraro’s testimony, the post-conviction court 

noted that although Dr. Ferraro believed Rice suffered from the specified 

disorders, he could not say that Rice was under the influence of an extreme 

mental or emotional disturbance at the time of the crime or that Rice’s capacity 

to conform his conduct was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease 

or defect at the time of the crime. 

[31] The post-conviction court also noted trial counsel’s efforts in terms of 

investigating and presenting mitigating evidence at the sentencing hearing. 

Specifically, Rice’s trial counsel had sought to hire a psychiatric expert without 

beneficial results. Further, the post-conviction court noted that although trial 

counsel did not call the mitigation expert as a witness on Rice’s behalf for 

purposes of sentencing,6trial counsel was privy to all of the information

gathered by the expert, including interviews with fourteen of Rice’s family 

members and friends, and his conclusions based thereon. Finally, the postconviction court noted that trial counsel had personally met with several 

individuals associated with or related to Rice. Ultimately, the post-conviction 

 

6 Rice’s trial counsel retained Dr. George Savarese, a mitigation expert, who researched Rice and Rice’s 

family and consulted with trial counsel. Trial counsel attempted to use Dr. Savarese’s assessment of Rice in 

support of the motion to suppress Rice’s confession to police. Based on his research of Rice and Rice’s 

family, Dr. Savarese concluded that Rice had cognitive deficits manifesting in a propensity for dissociation, 

susceptibility to contrasting extremes, and memory deficits. Dr. Savarese also concluded that Rice suffered 

from depression, dependent personality disorder, and bipolar disorder. 
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court concluded that Rice’s trial counsel adequately investigated mitigating 

circumstances and made a “tactical decision” with regard to how such 

circumstances were presented to the court for its consideration in sentencing. 

Appellant’s Appendix at 112. We have reviewed the record and cannot say that it 

supports a conclusion opposite that reached by the post-conviction court. 

Rice’s trial counsel was not ineffective with regard to his investigation and 

presentation of mitigating circumstances for purposes of sentencing.

3. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

[32] We review claims of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel using the same 

standard applicable to claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Henley v. 

State, 881 N.E.2d 639, 644 (Ind. 2008). Accordingly, to prevail on his claim, 

Rice was required to show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and 

that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Id. Judicial scrutiny is highly 

deferential regarding a claim that counsel was ineffective in failing to raise an 

issue on appeal thus resulting in waiver for collateral review, and the defendant 

must overcome the strongest presumption of adequate assistance. McKnight v. 

State, 1 N.E.3d 193, 204 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 

1189, 1195 (Ind. 2006)). 

[33] On direct appeal to our Supreme Court, appellate counsel challenged whether 

the trial court impermissibly relied on non-statutory aggravators and whether a 

sentence of LWOP was inappropriate for Rice. Rice argues that his appellate 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to sufficiently state the 
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appellate claims in terms of federal constitutional violations, thus failing to 

preserve them for federal habeas review. 

[34] The post-conviction court concluded that Rice failed to prove that he was 

prejudiced by appellate counsel’s advocacy. Rice, citing Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 

U.S. 1, 5 (2010), correctly asserts that federal habeas review exists only for 

violations of federal law. (providing that “it is only noncompliance with federal 

law that renders a State’s criminal judgment susceptible to collateral attack in 

the federal courts”) (emphasis in original)). Specifically, Rice maintains that 

appellate counsel should have argued that his right to due process and equal 

protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 

Constitution were violated when the trial court considered and weighed nonstatutory aggravating factors in violation of state law. 

[35] Rice’s argument itself sets forth why habeas review is not available. Rice

clearly states that his argument is based on a violation of state law. The United 

States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that “‘federal habeas corpus relief 

does not lie for errors of state law.’” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991) 

(quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)). “[I]t is not the province of a 

federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law 

questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S., at 67-68.

[36] Further, the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson, supra, actually 

cuts against his argument. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and vacated 

an opinion of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals granting habeas relief on a 
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claim the Seventh Circuit characterized as whether “the Indiana trial court 

considered non-statutory aggravating circumstances ... in contravention of state

law.” Wilson, 562 U.S. at 5. The Supreme Court noted that the Seventh Circuit 

opinion “contained no hint that it thought the violation of Indiana law it had 

unearthed also entailed the infringement of any federal right.” Id. As noted 

above, Rice’s argument is based on alleged violation of state law. Rice does not 

articulate any specific violation of federal law with regard to his sentencing. 

Rather, he simply reiterates the arguments he made on direct appeal to our 

Supreme Court regarding the trial court’s consideration of non-statutory 

aggravating factors in sentencing Rice to LWOP with a cursory suggestion that 

such violated his right to due process and equal protection under the Fifth and 

Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. 

[37] In light of the Supreme Court’s holding in Wilson, any attempt by appellate 

counsel to “federalize” the argument that his sentence was in violation of state 

law would not have preserved a meritorious claim for habeas review. The postconviction court did not err in concluding that appellate counsel was not 

ineffective.

4. Sentencing 

[38] Rice argues that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing a sentence of 

LWOP. Rice acknowledges that our Supreme Court reviewed his allegations 

that the trial court improperly considered non-statutory aggravating factors and 

concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. Rice now claims that 
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our Supreme Court “side-stepped the fact the trial court explicitly considered 

Rice’s future dangerousness in [the] revised sentencing order.” Appellant’s Brief

at 37.

[39] As a general rule, when a court decides an issue on direct appeal, the doctrine 

of res judicata applies, thereby precluding its review in post-conviction 

proceedings. Ben-Yisrayl, 738 N.E.2d at 258. The doctrine of res judicata

prevents the repetitious litigation of that which is essentially the same dispute. 

Sweeney v. State, 704 N.E.2d 86, 94 (Ind. 1998). Our Supreme Court has 

already reviewed the sentence imposed and held that the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in sentencing Rice to LWOP. Rice’s argument is barred by 

res judicata. 

[40] Judgment affirmed. 

Riley, J. and Crone, J., concur.