AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed August 29, 2022 

S 

In The 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-20-00945-CV 

CITY OF DENTON, Appellant 

V. 

MICHAEL GRIM AND JIM MAYNARD, Appellees 

On Appeal from the 68th Judicial District Court 

Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08139 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

Before Justices Molberg, Pedersen, III, and Smith 

Opinion by Justice Molberg 

Appellant City of Denton appeals a final judgment entered against it after a 

jury verdict in favor of appellees Michael Grim and Jim Maynard on their claims 

under the Texas Whistleblower Act (the Act).1

 In four issues, the City argues the 

Act does not apply as a matter of law and the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient. We disagree and affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

1 See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 554.001–.010. Under the Act, “[a] state or local governmental entity may 

not suspend or terminate the employment of, or take other adverse personnel action against, a public 

employee who in good faith reports a violation of law by the employing governmental entity or another 

public employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Id. § 554.002(a). 
 –2– 

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The facts are well known to the parties, and we do not detail them except as 

necessary to explain the basic reasons for our decision. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4. 

Grim and Maynard sued the City in July 2017, claiming the City violated the 

Act in various respects regarding their employment. In their live pleading, Grim and 

Maynard claimed the City violated the Act by “terminating [them] on the basis of 

deliberately falsified accusations, and defaming them after the fact” in retaliation for 

their prior reports to City Attorney Anita Burgess about a leak of certain confidential 

information regarding the proposed Denton Energy Center (DEC),2

 information that 

was provided by then-current city council member Keely Briggs to the Denton 

Record-Chronicle (DRC), the local daily newspaper, and was then published online. 

Grim and Maynard claim Briggs’s disclosure to DRC violated the Texas Open 

Meetings Act (TOMA), see TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 551.001–.146, and the Texas 

Public Information Act (TPIA), see id., §§ 552.001–.376. 

In its answer, the City generally denied appellees’ claims and asserted various 

affirmative defenses but did not include a plea to the jurisdiction or mention 

immunity from suit or liability. According to the record before us, the City has not 

challenged jurisdiction or claimed immunity in the trial court or in this Court. 

2

 Grim testified the DEC was “a part of the entire Renewable Denton Plan, which consisted of renewable 

energy for the city and then a backup when the renewables weren’t available.” In their briefs, both parties 

describe the DEC as an electrical generation plant that runs on natural gas. 
 –3– 

The case was tried to a jury. Fifteen witnesses testified, and more than eighty 

exhibits were admitted into evidence at trial. 

At the close of appellees’ case-in-chief, and again after both sides rested, the 

City moved for a directed verdict, arguing appellees failed to put on evidence they 

made a good faith report of a violation of law by the employing governmental entity 

or a public employee, with no mention of whether appellees’ report had been made 

to an appropriate law enforcement authority. The trial court denied both motions. 

During the formal charge conference, no objections were made to the charge, 

which instructed the jury, in part, “[a] party’s conduct includes the conduct of its 

employees or of another who acts with the party’s authority or apparent authority.” 

The City did not object to that language and assigns no error regarding that 

instruction on appeal. 

 Over the City’s objection,3

 the court submitted one broad-form liability 

question for each appellee with related definitions and instructions, and the jury 

answered “yes” to both: 

[Question 1 for Grim; Question 3 for Maynard]: 

Was [appellee’s] report of an alleged violation of law made in good 

faith and a cause of the termination of [his] employment? 

The report was a cause of [his] termination if it would not have occurred 

when it did but for the report being made. [Appellee] does not have to 

3

 Specifically, the City argued questions one and three should not be submitted to the jury because there 

was “no evidence [appellees] reported a violation of law by the employing governmental entity or a public 

employee,” with no discussion of whether appellees’ report had been made to an appropriate law 

enforcement authority. The trial court overruled the objection. 
 –4– 

prove the report was the sole cause of the termination. Rather, he must 

establish that he would not have been terminated had he not made a 

report of an alleged violation of law. 

“Good faith,” means that (1) [appellee] believed that the conduct 

reported was a violation of law and (2) his belief was reasonable in light 

of his training and experience. 

Based on the jury’s “yes” answers to both questions, the jury was also asked 

the following question for each appellee, to which the jury answered “no”: 

[Question 2 for Grim; Question 4 for Maynard]: 

Would the City have taken the same action inquired about in [question 

1 for Grim; question 3 for Maynard] against [appellee] when it did 

based solely on information, observation, or evidence that is not related 

to the fact that [appellee] made a report of violation of law? 

The jury then assessed Grim’s and Maynard’s damages from their firings. 

Both sides filed post-trial motions after the jury’s verdict, and in the course of 

the parties’ briefing, a question arose regarding the constitutionality of section 

554.003(c)’s statutory caps—an issue not presented here. 

The court denied the City’s motion for JNOV, granted appellees’ amended 

motion for judgment, and indicated that, as requested, the court would notify the 

attorney general regarding the question regarding constitutionality of the statutory 

caps.4

 On July 31, 2020, the trial court entered a final judgment against the City and 

in appellees’ favor in an amount totaling $2,759,195.49, plus post-judgment interest 

4

 The docket sheet in the record reflects the court sent that notice about two weeks after the hearing. 

Forty-five days later, the attorney general filed a response, asking, in part, that the court enter judgment 

capping damages as required under government code section 554.003. The court entered judgment sixtysix days after the attorney general’s response. 
 –5– 

at the rate of five percent per annum. The City timely moved for a new trial, arguing 

there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the jury’s findings as 

to the elements that are now at issue in this appeal. After the motion for new trial 

was denied by operation of law, the City timely appealed.

II. ISSUES

The City presents four issues on appeal.5

 Generally, the City maintains the 

Act does not apply as a matter of law because the reported violation of law was 

committed by Briggs, a person the City argues is not the employing governmental 

entity or its equivalent (first issue), and because the report was made to Burgess, a 

person the City argues is not an appropriate law enforcement authority (fourth issue). 

Additionally, the City argues the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to 

support the finding that appellees’ reports caused their firings (second issue) and that 

5

 The City presents the following four issues on appeal: 

I. Did the District Court err in holding that, as a matter of law, an individual member of the 

unpaid Denton City Council acting without the Council’s knowledge or sanction was either 

the “employing governmental entity” or “another public employee” within the meaning of 

the Whistleblower Act, thus rendering the Whistleblower Act applicable to this case?

II. Did the District Court err in concluding that there was legally and factually sufficient 

evidence to sustain the jury’s finding that [appellees’] report of an alleged violation of law 

by an individual member of the Denton City Council caused them to be fired, when such 

firing—not by the City Council, but by the City Manager—occurred almost a year after 

the report and following an unrelated investigation of staff conduct with vendors?

III. Did the District Court err in concluding that there was legally and factually sufficient 

evidence to sustain the jury’s finding that [appellees] had a good faith belief that the 

conduct of the Council Member they reported constituted a violation of law?

IV. Did the District Court err in holding that, as a matter of law, the then-City Attorney 

constituted an “appropriate law enforcement agency” to whom to make a report within the 

meaning of the Whistleblower Act?
 –6– 

they had a good faith belief the conduct they reported was a violation of law (third 

issue). The City asks us to reverse and render judgment in its favor. 

III. APPLICABLE STANDARDS

A. Standard and Scope of Review 

“Statutory construction is a question of law for the court to decide[,]” and we 

“review legal questions de novo.” Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Needham, 82 S.W.3d 

314, 318 (Tex. 2002). Our primary objective when construing a statute “is to 

determine the Legislature’s intent which, when possible, we discern from the plain 

meaning of the words chosen.” Maxim Crane Works, L.P. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 

642 S.W.3d 551, 557 (Tex. 2022) (quoting In re Estate of Nash, 220 S.W.3d 914, 

917 (Tex. 2007)). 

Generally, the “truest manifestation” of that intent is “what lawmakers 

enacted, the literal text they voted on.” Id. (quoting Alex Sheshunoff Mgmt. Servs., 

L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651 (Tex. 2006)). “If a statute is clear and 

unambiguous, we apply its words according to their common meaning without resort 

to rules of construction or extrinsic aids.” Id. (quoting In re Estate of Nash, 220 

S.W.3d at 917). “We use definitions the legislature prescribed and any technical or 

particular meaning the words have acquired.” Id. (quoting City of Rockwall v. 

Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625–26 (Tex. 2008)). “Otherwise, ‘[w]ords not statutorily 

defined bear their common, ordinary meaning unless a more precise definition is 

apparent from the statutory context or the plain meaning yields an absurd result.’” 
 –7– 

Id. (quoting Fort Worth Transp. Auth. v. Rodriguez, 547 S.W.3d 830, 838 (Tex. 

2018)). 

The proper points of error for evidentiary sufficiency challenges depend on 

whether the complaining party had the burden of proof, with legal sufficiency points 

of error designated as “no evidence points” or “matter of law points,” and factual 

sufficiency points of error designated as “insufficient evidence points” or “great 

weight and preponderance points.” See Raw Hide Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Maxus Expl. 

Co., 766 S.W.2d 264, 275 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1988, writ denied). In this case, 

appellees had the burden of proof on the issues the City challenges in this appeal. 

See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a) (public employee who sues under chapter 554 

has burden of proof; except in some cases, a rebuttable presumption may apply); 

compare id. § 554.002(b) (describing employer’s affirmative defense). 

When a party challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an 

adverse finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, the party must 

demonstrate that no evidence supports the finding. Graham Cent. Station, Inc. v. 

Peña, 442 S.W.3d 261, 263 (Tex. 2014) (per curiam).6

 To determine whether legally 

sufficient evidence exists to support the finding, we “must view the evidence in the 

light favorable to the verdict, crediting favorable evidence if reasonable jurors could, 

and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not.” City of 

6

 A party challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it has the burden 

of proof must demonstrate on appeal that the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in 

support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam). 
 –8– 

Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005). “Evidence is legally 

insufficient to support a jury finding when (1) the record discloses a complete 

absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2) the court is barred by rules of law or of 

evidence from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact; (3) 

the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla; or (4) the 

evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.” Crosstex N. Tex. 

Pipeline, L.P. v. Gardiner, 505 S.W.3d 580, 613 (Tex. 2016). The “final test for 

legal sufficiency” is “whether the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and fairminded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 

827; see Office of Att’y Gen. v. Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d 183, 192 (Tex. 2020). 

When a party challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence on an adverse 

finding on which it did not have the burden of proof, the party must demonstrate 

there is insufficient evidence to support the finding. Hoss v. Alardin, 338 S.W.3d 

635, 651 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).7

 When determining the factual 

sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict, we “must consider and weigh 

all the evidence and should set aside the verdict only if it is so contrary to the 

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust.” Cain v. 

Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per curiam) (citations omitted); Harris Cty. 

v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359, 380–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). 

7

 A party challenging the factual sufficiency of an adverse finding on an issue on which it has the burden 

of proof must demonstrate on appeal that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance 

of the evidence. Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. 
 –9– 

Evidence is insufficient for factual sufficiency purposes if, after reviewing all the 

evidence in the record, we determine the evidence supporting the jury finding is so 

weak or the finding is so against the overwhelming weight of the evidence that the 

finding is clearly wrong and unjust. Hoss, 338 S.W.3d at 651. The amount of 

evidence needed to affirm a judgment is far less than the amount necessary to reverse 

one. Shultz v. Shultz, No. 05-20-00819-CV, 2022 WL 336564, at *2 (Tex. App.—

Dallas Feb. 4, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (citing Coats, 607 S.W.3d at 381). If we 

reverse a trial court’s judgment for factual insufficiency, we must “detail all the 

evidence relevant to the issue and clearly state why the jury’s finding is factually 

insufficient or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence that it 

is manifestly unjust” and “how the contrary evidence greatly outweighs the evidence 

supporting the verdict.” Morris v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 334 S.W.3d 838, 842–

43 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.) (citations omitted). 

In applying these sufficiency standards, we remain mindful that this Court is 

not a factfinder. See Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971 S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 

1998). The trier of fact—in this case, the jury—is the sole judge of witness 

credibility and the weight afforded their testimony; we defer to the jury’s 

determination regarding these matters and to its resolution of conflicting evidence. 

See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 819–20; McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 
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694, 697 (Tex. 1986).8

 We “are not free to substitute [our] judgment for that of the 

jury simply because [we] may disagree with [its] verdict.” Herbert v. Herbert, 754 

S.W.2d 141, 144 (Tex. 1988).

B. Texas Whistleblower Act Generally 

Under the Act, “[a] state or local governmental entity may not suspend or 

terminate the employment of, or take other adverse personnel action against, a public 

employeewho in good faithreports a violation of lawby the employing governmental 

entity or another public employee to an appropriate law enforcement authority.” 

TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a) (emphasis added); Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d at 191 

(the Act “prohibits a government employer from taking an adverse personnel action 

against a public employee” who makes such reports); McMillen v. Tex. Health & 

Human Servs. Comm’n, 485 S.W.3d 427, 429 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (noting the 

Act “protects” public employees who make such reports). 

Many of section 554.002’s terms have been specifically defined in the Act. 

See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.001. “Local government entity” includes a 

municipality, see id. § 554.001(2)(B), and “[l]aw” is “a state or federal statute,” “an 

ordinance of a local governmental entity,” or “a rule adopted under a statute or 

ordinance.” Id. § 554.001(1). Also, though not specifically defined by the 

8

 In McGalliard, the court stated: “The trier of fact has several alternatives available when presented 

with conflicting evidence. It may believe one witness and disbelieve others[,] may resolve inconsistencies 

in the testimony of any witness[,] and may accept lay testimony over that of experts.” 722 S.W.2d at 697 

(citations omitted). 
 –11– 

legislature, various courts have interpreted certain other phrases in section 554.002, 

including “good faith,”9

 and “reports a violation of law.”10 

Various courts have also interpreted the phrase “appropriate law enforcement 

authority.”11 

9

 “‘Good faith’ means that (1) the employee believed that the conduct reported was a violation of law 

and (2) the employee’s belief was reasonable in light of the employee’s training and experience.” Wichita 

Cty. v. Hart, 917 S.W.2d 779, 784 (Tex. 1996); see McMillen, 485 S.W.3d at 429 (to be in “good faith,” 

employee’s belief about the reported-to authority’s powers must be “reasonable in light of employee’s 

training and experience”) (quoting Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 321). The second part ensures “the reporting 

employee only receives Whistleblower Act protection if a reasonably prudent employee in similar 

circumstances would have believed that the facts as reported were a violation of law.” Needham, 82 S.W.3d 

at 320 (citing Hart, 917 S.W.2d at 785). 

10 The phrase “reports a violation of the law” has been interpreted as including “any disclosure of 

information regarding a public servant’s employer tending to directly or circumstantially prove the 

substance of a violation of criminal or civil law, the State or Federal Constitution, statutes, administrative 

rules or regulations.” Llanes v. Corpus Christi Indep. Sch. Dist., 64 S.W.3d 638, 642 (Tex. App.—Corpus 

Christi–Edinburg 2001, pet. denied) (citation omitted); see Galveston Cty. v. Quiroga, No. 14-18-00648-

CV, 2020 WL 62504, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 7, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting 

Llanes). While it may not be necessary to prove an actual violation or for a report to specify the law being 

violated, there must be some law prohibiting the complained-of conduct to give rise to a claim under the 

Act. Mullins v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 357 S.W.3d 182, 188 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, pet. denied) (citing 

Llanes, 64 S.W.3d at 642). “Other complaints and grievances, including alleged violations of an agency’s 

internal procedures and policies, will not support a claim.” Id. (citation omitted). Whether the conduct a 

public employee reports constitutes a violation of law is a question of law. See Guillaume v. City of 

Greenville, 247 S.W.3d 457, 461–62 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.) (citation omitted). 

11 A report is made to an appropriate law enforcement authority “if the authority is a part of a state 

or local governmental entity or of the federal government that the employee in good faith believes is 

authorized to: (1) regulate or enforce the law alleged to be violated in the report; or (2) investigate or 

prosecute a violation of criminal law.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(b). The supreme court has explained 

this as follows: 

The Whistleblower Act speaks to an authority statutorily empowered to regulate under or 

enforce the actual law allegedly violated—“the particular law the public employee reported 

violated is critical to the determination”—or to investigate or prosecute a criminal 

violation. The upshot of our prior decisions is that for an entity to constitute an appropriate 

law-enforcement authority under the Act, it must have authority to enforce, investigate, or 

prosecute violations of law against third parties outside of the entity itself, or it must have 

authority to promulgate regulations governing the conduct of such third parties. Authority 

of the entity to enforce legal requirements or regulate conduct within the entity itself is 

insufficient to confer law-enforcement authority status. 

Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Gentilello, 398 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2013) (citation and internal footnote 

omitted); see McMillen, 485 S.W.3d at 429; Needham, 82 S.W.3d at 320. 
 –12– 

The Act “provides a general remedy for retaliation based on the report of any 

violation of law” and “is a broad remedial measure intended to encourage disclosure 

of governmental malfeasance and corruption.” City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 

147, 154 (Tex. 2008) (citations omitted). 

The Act’s underlying purposes are twofold: (1) to enhance open government 

by protecting public employees from retaliation by their employers when an 

employee reports a violation of the law in good faith, and (2) to secure lawful 

conduct by those who direct and conduct the affairs of government. Herrera v. Dall. 

Indep. Sch. Dist., 609 S.W.3d 579, 588 n.15 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. denied).

 The Act requires a “but-for” causation standard, under which the public 

employee “must prove that the adverse action ‘would not have occurred when it did’ 

if the employee had not reported the violation” but “need not prove that the report 

was the ‘sole’ or the ‘substantial’ reason for the adverse personnel action.” 

Rodriguez, 605 S.W.3d at 192 (citing Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. of State of Tex. v. 

Hinds, 904 S.W.2d 629, 634–36 (Tex. 1995)).12 An adverse action “‘based solely’ 

on reasons unrelated to a good-faith report of a legal violation destroys the causal 

link.” Id. (citing City of Fort Worth v. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d 62, 67 (Tex. 2000)). 

Because evidence of but-for causation is often circumstantial, courts are to 

examine all of the circumstances and consider a number of factors in determining 

12 This “best protects employees from unlawful retaliation without punishing employers for legitimately 

sanctioning misconduct or harboring bad motives never acted upon.” Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 636. 
 –13– 

whether the standard has been met, such as temporal proximity between the 

protected activity and the adverse action, knowledge of the protected activity, 

expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s protected activity, failure to 

adhere to relevant established company policies, discriminatory treatment in 

comparison to similarly situated employees, and evidence the employer’s stated 

reason to justify the adverse action is false. Apache Corp. v. Davis, 627 S.W.3d 324, 

325–26 n.3 (Tex. 2021); see Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 

755, 790 (Tex. 2018) (citing Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69); Cont’l Coffee Prods. Co. v. 

Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450–451 (Tex. 1996). However, if the basis for the 

suspension, termination, or other adverse personnel action is undisputed, these 

factors do not support an inference of the necessary but-for causation. See Apache 

Corp., 627 S.W.3d at 337 (stating this in a non-whistleblower case requiring but-for 

causation). 

A public employee who sues under the Act has the burden of proof, except if 

the employee’s suspension, termination, or other adverse personnel action against 

the employee occurs not later than the ninetieth day after the date on which the 

employee reports a violation of law, the suspension, termination, or adverse 

personnel action is presumed, subject to rebuttal, to be because the employee made 

the report. TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.004(a). 

It is an affirmative defense to a chapter 554 whistleblower suit that the 

employing state or local governmental entity “would have taken the action against 
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the employee that forms the basis of the suit based solely on information, 

observation, or evidence that is not related to the fact that the employee made a 

[protected] report.” Id. § 554.004(b). 

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Jurisdiction and Governmental Immunity 

Before we address the City’s issues, we acknowledge “the fundamental 

precept that a court must not proceed on the merits of a case until legitimate 

challenges to its jurisdiction have been decided.” Hillman v. Nueces Cty., 579 

S.W.3d 354, 359 n.5 (Tex. 2019) (emphasis added) (quoting Tex. Dep’t of Parks & 

Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 228 (Tex. 2004)). 

Here, there is no need to decide such challenges, as the merits were reached 

in the trial court, and no such challenges have been raised. Despite this, both the 

City’s amici13 and the dissent focus on jurisdictional and immunity grounds—a 

wayward path based on the procedural posture and issues presented. 

As the Texas Supreme Court recently stated: 

Governmental immunity[14] protects the State’s political subdivisions, 

including its cities, against suits and legal liability. Governmental 

13 The Texas Municipal League and the Texas City Attorney Association filed an amicus curiae brief 

on behalf of the City, generally arguing we should reverse and render judgment dismissing this case for 

want of subject matter jurisdiction because the legislature has not waived immunity for the types of reports 

appellees made here. The City has not raised any issue regarding jurisdiction or immunity, however. In 

fact, in the 28,981 words the City uses in its briefs, the word “jurisdiction” is never used, and “immunity” 

appears a mere five times. As we further explain in this section in the main body of the opinion, we need 

not decide any question regarding jurisdiction or immunity under the circumstances. 

14 Sovereign immunity, usually called governmental immunity when referring to political subdivisions, 

protects governmental entities against suits and legal liabilities. City of Hous. v. Hous. Mun. Emps. Pension 

Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 575 (Tex. 2018); see Rusk State Hosp. v. Black, 392 S.W.3d 88, 93 (Tex. 2012) 
 –15– 

immunity therefore bars suit against the City . . . unless the Legislature 

has waived the City’s immunity. Cities retain immunity unless the 

Legislature clearly and unambiguously waives it. We defer to the 

Legislature in waiving immunity because it is in a better position to 

weigh the conflicting public policy interests associated with subjecting 

the government to liability. 

Governmental immunity encompasses two related but distinct 

concepts: “immunity from liability, which bars enforcement of a 

judgment against a governmental entity, and immunity from suit, which 

bars suit against the entity altogether.” A statute can waive immunity 

from suit, immunity from liability, or both. 

Dohlen v. City of San Antonio, 643 S.W.3d 387, 392 (Tex. 2022) (internal citations 

omitted). Additionally, because only immunity from suit implicates a court’s 

subject-matter jurisdiction,15 “immunity from suit is properly raised in a plea to the 

jurisdiction while immunity from liability[16] is not.” Id. 

 In some cases, the legislature has waived immunity from suit “to the extent of 

liability,” which merges the two concepts and collapses the jurisdictional and merits 

inquiries to some degree. Id. (citations omitted). When a statute does this, the 

inquiry is “direct[ed] . . . to the statute’s elements and may require a court to consider 

those elements at both the jurisdictional and merits stages.” Id. (citing Lueck, 290 

(sovereign immunity embodies two concepts: immunity from suit, which completely bars actions against 

governmental entities unless the legislature expressly consents, and immunity from liability, which protects 

governmental entities from judgments); State v. Lueck, 290 S.W.3d 876, 880 (Tex. 2009) (“Generally, 

governmental entities are immune from suit and liability under the doctrine of sovereign immunity.”). 

Unless otherwise specified herein, our reference to “immunity” refers to immunity from suit, not immunity 

from liability. 

15 Sovereign immunity “implicates subject-matter jurisdiction [but] does not necessarily equate to a 

lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Rusk State Hosp., 392 S.W.3d at 95. 

16 Immunity from liability is an affirmative defense that is waived if not pleaded. Tex. Dep’t of Transp. 

v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex. 1999) (citing, in part, TEX. R. CIV. P. 94) (other citations omitted). 
 –16– 

S.W.3d at 883). Thus, because the Act waives immunity from suit to the extent of 

liability,17 “the elements of section 554.002(a) can be considered to determine both 

jurisdiction and liability.” See Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 883. 

Because of this, and because the City has not challenged jurisdiction or 

claimed immunity in any way, we see no need to consider section 554.002(a)’s 

elements for jurisdictional purposes and focus instead on liability. Cf. Univ. of Hous. 

v. Barth, 313 S.W.3d 817, 818 (Tex. 2010) (per curiam) (remanding case to court of 

appeals for consideration of whether trial court had jurisdiction over Barth’s suit 

under Lueck after noting university had challenged jurisdiction, unlike the situation 

here). Thus, to the extent the City challenges section 554.002(a)’s elements, we 

consider them not to determine jurisdiction, as the dissent does, but to determine 

liability. 

“[W]hile a court is obliged to examine its subject-matter jurisdiction on its 

own in every case,” the Texas Supreme Court has “never suggested that a court 

should raise immunity on its own whenever the government is sued.” Rusk State 

Hosp., 392 S.W.3d at 102 (Hecht, J., concurring). But the dissent would have us do 

just that, and in doing so, would have us take a path that bucks the modern trend of 

17 Under the Act, “[s]overeign immunity is waived and abolished to the extent of liability for the relief 

allowed under [government code chapter 554] for a violation of [chapter 554,]” and “[a] public employee 

who alleges a violation of [chapter 554] may sue the employing state or local governmental entity for the 

relief [chapter 554] provide[s].” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.0035; see City of Celina v. Scott, No. 05-21-

00823-CV, 2022 WL 1101589, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 13, 2022, pet. filed) (mem. op.) (noting the 

Act “waives immunity from suit to the extent a governmental entity is liable under its provisions”). 
 –17– 

reducing the vulnerability of final judgments to attack based on an alleged lack of 

subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Engelman Irrigation Dist. v. Shields Bros., 514 

S.W.3d 746, 752 (Tex. 2017) (discussing trend, citing cases). 

We decline to take that path. Instead, we consider the case on its merits and 

focus on the four issues the City presents. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (we “must hand 

down a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue 

raised and necessary to final disposition of the appeal”); Lueck, 290 S.W.3d at 883 

(section 554.002(a) elements can be considered to determine both jurisdiction and 

liability). 

B. Applicability of the Act 

1. Employing Governmental Entity 

The first question we must decide is whether appellees reported a violation of 

law by “the employing governmental entity.” See TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.002(a).18 

In its first issue, the City argues Briggs—who disclosed the confidential DEC 

18 We need not and do not decide whether Briggs could be considered a “public employee” under the 

Act because the City argues, and appellees agree, Briggs cannot be considered as another public employee 

under the Act because she was not paid for her services as a council member at the time of the alleged 

violation of law. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (our written opinion must be as brief as practicable but address 

every issue raised and necessary to the appeal). We express no opinion on whether this is accurate. The 

Act defines “public employee” as “an employee or appointed officer other than an independent contractor 

who is paid to perform services for a state or local governmental entity.” TEX. GOV’T CODE § 554.001(4). 

We also express no opinion on whether the phrase “who is paid to perform services for a state or local 

governmental entity,” in section 554.001(4) modifies “employee,” “appointed officer,” “independent 

contractor,” or some combination thereof. See id. 
 –18– 

information to DRC—acted personally and not in any official capacity and thus is 

not, as a matter of law, “the employing governmental entity.”19 

Grim and Maynard dispute this and argue Briggs’s conduct was not purely 

personal and was related to her role as a council member or to the public interest. 

To support their positions, the parties cite the same cases20 but emphasize 

different facts, with the City emphasizing Briggs’s status as an unpaid council 

member and its response to her disclosure, and Grim and Maynard focusing on the 

context in which she obtained and disclosed the confidential information to DRC. 

Rangel and Johnson, which both parties cite, are distinguishable. Each 

involved an interlocutory appeal of a denial of a government entity’s plea to the 

jurisdiction and were based on different facts than those in the record before us. See 

Rangel, 131 S.W.3d at 544–45 (interlocutory appeal regarding denial of public 

housing authority’s plea to the jurisdiction on Rangel’s whistleblower claim based 

on reports of violations of law by two unpaid commissioners, one who allegedly 

misappropriated public funds and one who allegedly unlawfully applied for 

increased public benefits for personal purposes); 21 Johnson, 48 S.W.3d at 892, 895 

19 This argument is essentially the same as the City’s “no evidence” arguments in its motions for 

directed verdict and in its objections to the submission to the jury of the two liability questions. 

20 See Hous. Auth. of City of El Paso v. Rangel, 131 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, pet. granted, 

judgm’t vacated w.r.m.); City of Cockrell Hill v. Johnson, 48 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, 

no pet.). 

21 Rangel reported that the commissioner alleged to have unlawfully applied for increased public 

benefits “falsified documentation in order to obtain benefits from the Section 8 new construction and 

voucher programs” and “misrepresented information in order to be moved out of public housing and into a 
 –19– 

(interlocutory appeal regarding denial of plea to the jurisdiction and summary 

judgment motion on Johnson’s whistleblower claim based on request to sheriff’s 

department to investigate alleged sexual assault by Smith, a city alderman, and report 

to the district attorney’s office regarding Smith’s alleged use and sale of narcotics). 

In deciding whether the alleged violations of law were by the “employing 

governmental entity” in those cases, our sister courts examined whether the alleged 

wrongful acts were in the scope of the wrongdoer’s duties based on the facts in each 

case. See Rangel, 131 S.W.3d at 547–48 (concluding actions by two commissioners 

fell within their official duties and the agency’s affairs and should be construed as 

acts of the employing governmental entity); Johnson, 48 S.W.3d at 895–97 

(concluding alderman’s alleged assault, sexual assault, and drug-related activities 

were actions taken in personal capacity and report about those actions was not 

protected under the Act, when actions did not relate to affairs of the City itself, were 

detrimental primarily to the individuals involved, not to society in general, and were 

“not things the public would be concerned about simply because of [his] status as an 

elected official”). 

We agree with this general approach, which is not unlike many situations 

involving agency—situations which often involve a fact-intensive question of the 

extent to which the acts of one can be imputed to a third party in a particular context. 

Section 8 home.” Rangel, 131 S.W.3d at 545. Rangel alleged this violated federal rules and regulations 

and constituted welfare fraud. Id. 
 –20– 

Here, the jury received a wealth of information about the context in which 

Briggs publicly disclosed confidential information about the DEC to DRC. Briggs 

testified she opposed the DEC proposal because of the financial and environmental 

risks to the City and because the City already had a coal plant. She also testified that 

to address these concerns, she posed a lot of questions to city staff, to the public, and 

to anyone she could because she is not an industry leader and looked to others to 

help her understand more information. 

Briggs testified that initially, she requested information about the DEC as a 

steward for the taxpayer’s money and out of a concern regarding a particular 

payment the City had made. Briggs did not use the typical records request process 

members of the public would have used and instead requested “everything related to 

DEC” from the interim city manager. 

Briggs requested the information on or about August 25, 2016, and received 

two stacks of information, one of which was marked confidential. Briggs reviewed 

some of the information with a fellow city council member, Sara Bagheri, who, 

along with Briggs and the mayor, was also opposed to the DEC. Briggs invited the 

DRC reporter to come to her house to get the documents, and once the reporter came 

to get them, Briggs let Bagheri know she had done it. Briggs testified she did not 

intend to provide confidential information to DRC but agreed she did so 

unintentionally. Before providing information to DRC, Briggs redacted certain 
 –21– 

information in an attempt to be “extra careful” but admitted she was “not careful 

enough, by a long shot.” 

On September 13, 2016, the same day Briggs successfully moved to postpone 

a vote on the DEC contracts, the DRC published the information Briggs provided. 

A week later, by a vote of four to three, the city council approved the DEC contracts, 

with Briggs, Bagheri, and the mayor voting against them. 

We disagree with the City’s argument that Briggs’s conduct is more similar 

to the misconduct in Johnson than in Rangel. While we find both cases 

distinguishable, Briggs’s conduct is much more like commissioner Lozano’s alleged 

conduct in Rangel than to alderman Smith’s alleged conduct in Johnson. 

In Johnson, our sister court reasoned that Smith’s alleged violations of law 

were not by the employing governmental entity because they did not relate to the 

affairs of the city itself, were detrimental primarily to the individuals involved, not 

to society in general, and were “not things the public would be concerned about 

simply because of Smith’s status as an elected official.” See Johnson, 48 S.W.3d at 

895–97. In Rangel, our sister court reasoned that Lozano’s alleged violation of law 

was by the employing governmental entity because her alleged misconduct in 

procuring additional benefits could fall within the official duties of a commissioner 

and her misstatement of income would be the type of conduct the public would be 

concerned about if committed by an appointed official. See Rangel, 131 S.W.3d at 

547–48. 
 –22– 

Here, Briggs’s alleged misconduct in providing information to DRC about the 

DEC could fall within her official duties of a city council member, at least insofar 

as it related to her votes regarding the DEC contracts. Moreover, her disclosure of 

confidential information about the DEC to DRC would be the type of conduct the 

public would be concerned about if committed by an appointed city council member, 

as it could jeopardize pending or future contracts with the City or possibly expose 

the City to further liability. 

Based on the record before us, we conclude, as a matter of law, Grim and 

Maynard made a report of a violation of law by the “employing governmental 

entity.” Briggs’s actions related to the public interest and her role as a council 

member, were not purely personal, and should be construed as acts of the City, at 

least for the purpose of determining coverage under the Act.22 See Office of Att’y 

Gen. of Tex. v. Brickman, 636 S.W.3d 659, 672–74, 672 n.13, 673 n.15 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2021, pet. pending) (rejecting arguments similar to those made by the City 

here—that the legislature intended to insert principles of ultra vires into the Act23

implicitly excluding elected officials under the Act and that elected officials cannot 

be considered as employees of the agencies they direct—and stating, in light of the 

broad remedial nature of the Act, “it seems reasonable to conclude that the 

22 We need not decide, and express no opinion on, whether Briggs’s actions would subject the City to 

any liability in any contract or tort claim brought by a third-party against the City regarding the disclosure. 

23 Brickman states, “A suit under the Act is not transformed into an ultra vires suit by virtue of the fact 

that the reported violations of law might also be pled as ultra vires acts against [an elected official] 

personally.” 636 S.W.3d at 672, n.13. 
 –23– 

legislature intended the statute to be more inclusive, sweeping up appointed officials 

whose bad acts might otherwise not fall within the ambit of the Act, rather than 

less”); Rangel, 131 S.W.3d at 547–48 (conclusions regarding Lozano).24

We overrule the City’s first issue. 

2. Appropriate Law Enforcement Authority 

In its fourth issue, the City argues that, as a matter of law, the Act does not 

apply because Burgess was not “an appropriate law enforcement authority” to whom 

to make a report. Grim and Maynard dispute this. 

We need not decide the City’s fourth issue because the City failed to preserve 

error, as the City did not request or receive any ruling on this element, based on the 

record before us. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.25 Also, to the extent the City argues the 

24 See also Magana v. Mills Elec. Contractors, Inc., No. 05-98-01004-CV, 2000 WL 1073610, at *1 

(Tex. App.—Dallas July 24, 2000, no pet.) (mem. op.) (reversing summary judgment after concluding, in 

negligence case, that fact question existed on whether tortfeasor’s acts were committed in course and scope 

of employment). We cite Magana for the sole purpose of showing that course-and-scope evidence can 

create a fact question for a fact-finder. Although we decide the City’s first issue as a matter of law, at a 

minimum, the evidence created a fact question for the jury based on the facts before us. 

25 Rule 33.1 states, in part: 

(a) In General. As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record 

must show that: 

(1) the complaint was made to the trial court by a timely request, objection, or motion 

that: 

(A) stated the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the 

trial court with sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless 

the specific grounds were apparent from the context; and 

(B) complied with the requirements of the Texas Rules of Evidence or the Texas 

Rules of Civil or Appellate Procedure; and 

(2) the trial court: 
 –24– 

evidence on this issue is legally or factually insufficient, those two issues are 

inadequately briefed.26 

We overrule the City’s fourth issue.27

C. Sufficiency of the Evidence 

1. Good Faith Belief of Violation of Law 

In its third issue, the City argues the evidence is legally and factually 

insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that appellees had a good faith belief that 

Briggs’s conduct constituted a violation of law. Specifically, the City contends there 

was no evidence presented that Briggs violated any law or that appellees had a good 

faith belief she violated any law and that no legal actions were brought against 

Briggs. Although the City frames its argument as one challenging the legal and 

factual sufficiency of the evidence, because the City makes no attempt to make the 

(A) ruled on the request, objection, or motion, either expressly or implicitly; or 

(B) refused to rule on the request, objection, or motion, and the complaining party 

objected to the refusal. 

26 In the body of its appellate brief, the City includes a twelve-line paragraph arguing, in conclusory 

fashion, that “to the extent the question of whether city attorney Burgess was an appropriate law 

enforcement authority involves questions of fact, there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to 

support a factual finding that [she] was an appropriate law enforcement authority.” Lacking, however, is 

any analysis of the law or its application to the facts. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (brief must contain a clear 

and concise argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record). 

27 The City did not raise its fourth issue in its motions for directed verdict, in its objections to the 

submission of the two liability questions that were submitted to the jury, or in the joint hearing on its motion 

for JNOV and appellees’ amended motion for judgment. The City’s motion for JNOV is not included in 

the record. 
 –25– 

required showing regarding factual sufficiency, we will limit our review to whether 

the evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding.28

As the City points out in its brief, appellees presented evidence at trial that 

they believed Briggs violated TOMA and TPIA when she disclosed emails 

containing competitive public power utility information, such as costs and pricing, 

to DRC. The City, however, maintains such release is not a violation of law because 

the government code does not prohibit its release but instead provides the 

competitive information is not subject to disclosure under the TPIA and that the 

public power utility governing body is not required to conduct an open meeting to 

discuss such competitive information. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 551.086, 552.133. 

Therefore, the City asserts it is optional to keep the information confidential, but it 

is not illegal to disclose it. 

Appellees argue the evidence shows they believed, based upon their training 

from former City Attorney Burgess, that Briggs’s disclosure of the competitive 

bidding information did violate TOMA and TPIA, constituted official misconduct, 

and was punishable as a misdemeanor. We agree the evidence supports appellees’ 

28 In Lion Copolymer Holdings, LLC v. Lion Polymers, LLC, 614 S.W.3d 729, 733 (Tex. 2020), the 

court stated, “A party attacking the factual sufficiency of a finding on appeal must ‘demonstrate on appeal 

that the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.’” (quoting Dow 

Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam)). In that case, the court concluded the 

appellant did this by discussing both supporting and countervailing evidence to support the challenged 

finding. See Lion Copolymer Holdings, 614 S.W.3d at 733. Unlike the appellant in that case, see id., in 

this case, the City’s analysis is done only in “no evidence” terms, not through any comparison or weighing 

of the evidence and countervailing evidence to support or contradict that finding. 
 –26– 

belief. While the government code may allow the public power utility governing 

body to choose whether to keep its competitive information confidential or release 

it to the public, the City had operated to keep the information confidential. This is 

evidenced by the fact that the City discussed such information in closed sessions 

and, when Briggs received the emails she requested from former interim City 

Manager Howard Martin, she received a stack marked confidential and one marked 

non-confidential. She too believed some information in the non-confidential stack 

was confidential and not subject to release and attempted to redact the information 

before providing it to the newspaper. 

Furthermore, the government code also provides that information submitted 

to a governmental body by a vendor is excepted from release if the vendor shows 

the information would reveal an individual approach to pricing, cost data, and other 

internal information or would give advantage to a competitor. Id. § 552.1101(a). 

The statute further provides, “[a] governmental body shall decline to release [the] 

information” unless the vendor chooses not to assert the exception to its release. Id.

§ 552.1101(c). Here, the two vendors whose information was released had 

confidentiality agreements in place with the City prior to making a bid and never 

authorized a release. Additionally, once the vendors learned of the disclosure, they 

sent letters to the City expressing their concerns that their information had been made 

public. 
 –27– 

Moreover, the evidence at trial showed the city attorney’s office provided 

training to the council and the DME regarding the requirements of TOMA and the 

TPIA. The training warned city council members and city employees violations 

could constitute official misconduct and were punishable as misdemeanors. The 

City also had previously prepared a separate report that could be shared with the 

public regarding the DEC, redacting public utility competitive information from the 

original report. Thus, based on appellees’ experience and training that they received 

from the City, some evidence supports the finding that their belief Briggs violated 

the law was reasonable. See Hart, 917 S.W.2d at 784. 

The City’s actions also support a finding that appellees had a good faith belief 

Briggs violated the law. Former City Attorney Burgess reminded city council 

members about the confidentiality of some of the items they were reviewing and the 

penalty for violating such confidentiality just a few days before Briggs provided the 

documents to the newspaper. And, after reviewing the documents, Burgess informed 

Briggs some of the information she released was the type of confidential information 

Burgess had previously warned the council about releasing, which was punishable 

as a Class B misdemeanor, and the city attorney’s office could not represent her 

because her interests appeared to be adverse to the City’s. The fact that Briggs was 

not ultimately prosecuted does not detract from appellees’ good faith belief she 

violated the law. As a result of appellees’ report, Burgess contacted the newspaper, 

and it removed the confidential documents from its website. 
 –28– 

In viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude 

a reasonable and fair-minded juror could find appellees had a good faith belief 

Briggs violated the law by disclosing confidential information to DRC and, thus, the 

evidence is legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding on this issue. See City of 

Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. 

2. But-For Causation 

In its second issue, the City contends the evidence was also legally and 

factually insufficient to sustain the jury’s finding that appellees’ report of Briggs to 

Burgess was the cause of their termination when it was the city manager who 

terminated them, not Briggs, and their termination occurred almost a year after the 

report and after a separate investigation into their conduct with vendors. The City 

maintains Briggs did not know appellees reported her until they filed this suit against 

the City and Deputy City Manager Langley and City Manager Hileman did not know 

appellees made the report until after their termination. In short, the City asserts there 

was no elaborate termination scheme against appellees. 

Appellees respond that the circumstantial evidence shows otherwise and 

supports the jury’s finding that appellees would not have been terminated but for 

their report of Briggs. Appellees contend the evidence shows they were treated 

differently than similarly situated employees, key individuals involved in the 

investigations leading to their termination knew about their report of Briggs, the 
 –29– 

investigations were designed to entrap appellees rather than truly investigate the 

procurement process, and the City’s reasons for the terminations were pretextual. 

In determining whether appellees presented sufficient evidence of causation, 

we may consider circumstantial evidence such as (1) knowledge of the report of 

illegal conduct, (2) expression of a negative attitude toward the employee’s report, 

(3) failure to adhere to established company policies regarding employment 

decisions, (4) discriminatory treatment in comparison to similarly situated 

employees, and (5) evidence that the stated reason for the adverse employment 

action was false. Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 69. These factors do not replace the 

causation standard “that the employee’s protected conduct must be such that, without 

it, the employer’s prohibited conduct would not have occurred when it did,” nor must 

every factor weigh in favor of the employee; “[s]ome of the factors may actually be 

a distraction.” Apache Corp., 627 S.W.3d at 335–36 (quoting Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 

636). Additionally, an employee is not required to prove his protected conduct was 

the sole reason for his termination. Hinds, 904 S.W.2d at 634. 

There is no dispute Briggs was against the DEC, a project to which appellees 

were dedicated. Approximately six months to a year before the city council 

ultimately voted to approve the DEC, Briggs asked for an independent review of the 

project and the broader Renewable Denton Plan. This review did not uncover any 

unfavorable information regarding the DEC. Shortly before the city council was to 

vote, Briggs requested emails from former interim City Manager Martin regarding 
 –30– 

DME and the DEC. She was concerned there had been improper conduct between 

DME employees and DEC vendors. After she disclosed the emails to the newspaper 

in September 2016, the city council was provided copies of the emails, the vote was 

delayed so that council members could review the emails, and ultimately the city 

council found no issues with the procurement process and approved the DEC. 

In 2017, the City underwent multiple changes. City Manager Hileman was 

hired, and former interim City Manager Martin resigned; former City Attorney 

Burgess retired, and Assistant City Attorney Aaron Leal was promoted to City 

Attorney; and several members of the city council announced they would not be 

running again, causing the new majority of city council to be opposed to the DEC. 

The city council was responsible for hiring and firing the city manager and city 

attorney. 

City Manager Hileman held a meeting on March 31, 2017, which included 

Deputy City Manager Langley and managers from DME, such as Grim, Bill 

Bunselmeyer, and Phil Williams, who was the General Manager of DME. Hileman 

told DME they needed to manage their expectations because the makeup of the city 

council had changed, and the new city council probably would not have approved 

the DEC. He instructed them there needed to be more transparency with the public 

and fewer closed sessions regarding City business. Hileman also encouraged them 

to let the past go and reset their feelings. Later that day, Hileman held a second 

meeting regarding who had authority to execute certain documents, such as 
 –31– 

confidentiality agreements, and was concerned Grim did not have authority to 

execute such agreements with vendors. Langley and Assistant City Attorney 

Collister were present. Hileman also told DME managers there was a lack of trust 

in DME, a lack of civility, and DME staff did not know how to interact with other 

staff. According to Grim, Hileman said legal was “keeping book on DME.” 

The City, with the city council’s approval, then hired outside investigators to 

investigate DME and the procurement process related to the DEC. During the two 

separate investigations, appellees, Williams, and Bunselmeyer were placed on 

administrative leave. According to Grim, he was interrogated for hours, after having 

to wait in Hileman’s office for multiple hours before the interrogation began. 

Ultimately, Williams was forced to resign and Bunselmeyer returned for a short time 

before retiring. Appellees were terminated. The termination letter to Grim provided: 

The investigation has revealed information that has caused me to lose 

confidence in your ability to manage. I find that you were not candid 

and forthright during the interview on June 30, 2017, and this has 

caused me to lose trust in you. 

As a high level manager, this breach of trust cannot be repaired, and 

therefore, you are terminated effectively immediately. 

The termination letter to Maynard provided: 

The investigation has revealed that you did not comply with the order 

given to you on June 28, 2017. This order required you to cooperate 

and be truthful during the investigation. You provided inaccurate and 

misleading responses during the interview. 

As a result, I no longer trust you. Therefore, you are terminated 

effectively immediately. 
 –32– 

Both letters were signed by Deputy City Manager Langley. 

Appellees presented evidence that the investigation into their conduct with 

DEC vendors—the very same vendors whose information was disclosed to the 

newspaper by Briggs—was initiated by City Attorney Leal and Assistant City 

Attorney Collister when they told Hileman about Grim’s hunting trip with one of the 

vendors. Hileman then asked the city attorney’s office and Deputy City Manager 

Langley to investigate. Although Hileman and Langley denied knowing appellees 

were the ones who reported Briggs, Leal and Collister knew of the report as they 

were involved in email discussions immediately following the report regarding the 

confidentiality of the documents. Hileman and Langley also admitted at trial they 

knew the disclosure occurred. Langley learned about it from former interim City 

Manager Martin around the time it occurred. He denied knowing what was disclosed 

and testified he did not remember any city council discussion regarding the emails 

prior to their vote for the DEC. Hileman testified the mayor and former City 

Attorney Burgess told him about it when he became city manager. 

The City relies on Rodriguez to support its argument that knowledge by some 

City employees of appellees’ report is not sufficient to show causation when there is 

no evidence the decision maker had knowledge of the report. See 605 S.W.3d at 193 

(“Evidence of one decisionmaker’s improper motive, however, cannot be imputed 

to all of the decisionmakers—or to the final decision—without evidence that the 
 –33– 

improper motive influenced the final decision.”). We find Rodriguez to be 

distinguishable from the circumstances here. In Rodriguez, the Office of the 

Attorney General had already received numerous complaints from Rodriguez’s 

coworkers about her management before she made her whistleblower report. Id. at 

185–86. Here, there is no evidence there were any issues with appellees until after 

their report of Briggs, after City management changed, and after repeated 

investigations into the procurement process that never amounted to any finding of 

wrongdoing. Furthermore, Rodriguez’s termination had been requested by her new 

manager who knew nothing of Rodriguez’s prior report and who had numerous 

issues with Rodriguez’s ability to carry out her responsibilities. Id. at 190. The 

difference here is that the two people, Leal and Collister, who initiated the 

investigation into the procurement process even after the city council previously 

found no issues, did know about appellees’ report as they were assistant city 

attorneys and were involved in handling the reported violation and reviewing the 

documents Briggs disclosed to the newspaper. It was these repeated investigations 

into appellees that led to Langley’s decision to fire them. 

Interestingly, in the City’s investigation into whether there were issues with 

the procurement process, the City never interviewed Elton Brock, who was the 

City’s former purchasing manager and who was in charge of the procurement 

process. The evidence also showed the city attorney’s office had hired two outside 

counsel that were well versed in the purchasing process to oversee DME during the 
 –34– 

procurement process to prevent any issues from arising. The City’s investigation 

did not reveal any violations of the procurement process by appellees; however, it 

was suggested the procurement process “should have been re-started to resolve 

appearances of impropriety.” There was no evidence of fraud or criminal activity 

with either employees or vendors, and nothing was identified that would invalidate 

the contracts. There was also no evidence the City even had a specific policy 

regarding the procurement process. Instead, the City alleged that during the 

investigation appellees lied and the City lost faith in Grim’s ability to manage despite 

the fact that he had just been given an evaluation rating him at a “5” for “leading 

performance,” the highest level, and despite Langley praising Grim during the 

investigation for being open and honest. The jury was free to believe the City’s 

investigation was a sham and that the decision makers knew more about appellees’ 

report of Briggs than they admitted. 

As to the second factor, the parties agree there is no evidence of a negative 

attitude toward appellees’ report of Briggs, and our review of the record confirms 

no one from the City expressed a negative attitude regarding the report. 

We next turn to whether the City failed to adhere to established City policies 

regarding employment decisions. The City Charter provided: “Neither the council 

nor any of its members shall direct or request the appointment of any person to, or 

his or her removal from, office by any officer appointed by the city council under 

. . . this Charter or by any of his or her subordinates.” Appellees presented evidence 
 –35– 

that would allow a factfinder to make a reasonable inference the city council was 

involved, at least to some extent, in the terminations of appellees despite the City’s 

repeated denial that such occurred. 

Jose Gaytan, who worked at DME with appellees, testified Assistant City 

Attorney Collister, who initiated the investigation, said “that the council got the 

heads on pikes that they wanted” during a meeting that occurred after appellees were 

terminated. Stephen Johnson testified similarly, as he heard Collister say “the 

council has the heads on pikes they were looking for.” Johnson testified he “was a 

little shocked by the statement.” 

Hileman’s response to an email Briggs sent regarding the investigation also 

shows Briggs may have been more involved than she admitted. A non-council 

member emailed Briggs and asked whether Hileman’s announcement about the 

DME investigation was going to come during Tuesday’s meeting. Briggs asked 

Hileman who responded, “I’m thinking this through and will discuss with the council 

on Tuesday. Strategy changed a little bit based on a meeting Friday.” 

And lastly, the reason given to Williams requiring his resignation was also 

linked back to the city council. According to Williams, Hileman told him he no 

longer had any support from the council and he needed to resign that day. Hileman 

said if Williams did not resign Hileman would write a bad review and Williams 

would be terminated. Hileman and Langley testified these comments were not made 

to Williams but, instead, they discussed Williams’s poor performance and gave him 
 –36– 

a choice whether to resign. However, the jury was free to disbelieve Hileman and 

Langley. 

The City also contends appellees were not treated differently than similarly 

situated employees. Appellees presented evidence Williams and Bunselmeyer were 

also investigated for improper conduct with vendors but Williams was given the 

option to resign and Bunselmeyer was allowed to come back to work after he was 

placed on administrative leave. The City argues the four employees are not similarly 

situated because Williams and Bunselmeyer did not lie during the investigation. 

However, whether appellees lied during their interviews was hotly disputed at trial. 

The interviews were admitted as evidence and available for the jury to review. 

Grim repeatedly denied he lied to Langley about the trips with vendors. 

Maynard admitted he lied during the beginning of his interview but that he then told 

the truth. According to appellees, they were never asked about the trips prior to their 

interviews in June. Both characterized the interviews as aggressive interrogations, 

and Maynard testified he believed the interrogation was a witch hunt and there was 

not anything he could do or say in the interrogation to keep his job; the outcome was 

predetermined. 

The jury, as the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight 

to be afforded their testimony, was free to believe the City’s investigation into 

appellees was merely a means to fire them for reporting Briggs. See City of Keller, 

168 S.W.3d at 819–20; McGalliard, 722 S.W.2d at 697. We also disagree with the 
 –37– 

City that appellees were required to show Briggs was directly involved in their 

termination in order to show their report of Briggs caused their termination. See 

Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 422 (2011) (rejecting employer’s argument 

that employer is liable only if the de facto decision maker is motivated by 

discriminatory animus; describing cat’s paw theory and holding, in USERRA case,29

“if [another] supervisor performs an act motivated by [unlawful] animus that is 

intended by the supervisor to cause an adverse employment action, and if that act is 

a proximate cause of the ultimate employment action, then the employer is liable”); 

Zamora v. City of Houston, 798 F.3d 326, 332–33 (5th Cir. 2015) (discussing Staub

and stating, “cat’s paw analysis remains viable in the but-for causation context”); 

see also Zimlich, 29 S.W.3d at 70 (discussing other cases that have approved of 

“conduit” theory but stating court need not consider whether liability could be based 

on such a theory). Although their terminations took place ten months after their 

report of Briggs, the timeline shows once Hileman came on as the new city manager, 

and once the makeup of city council changed to be opposed to the DEC and aligned 

with Briggs, the City began investigating appellees for improper contacts with 

vendors even though such had already been reviewed and discussed at length before 

the prior city council members voted to approve the DEC. The evidence also showed 

appellees were treated differently than other similarly situated employees. A 

29 See Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), 38 U.S.C. § 4311. 
 –38– 

reasonable factfinder could have concluded appellees’ terminations would not have 

occurred but for their report of Briggs. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. 

Therefore, the evidence is legally sufficient to sustain the jury’s finding on this issue. 

We also conclude the evidence is not so contrary to the overwhelming weight 

of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust and is, therefore, factually 

sufficient to support the jury’s finding on causation. Cain, 709 S.W.2d at 176; Coats, 

607 S.W.3d at 380–81. 

We overrule the City’s second issue. 

V. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

Pedersen, III, J., dissenting. 

200945F.P05 

 

/Ken Molberg/

KEN MOLBERG 

JUSTICE 
 –39– 

S 

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

JUDGMENT 

CITY OF DENTON, Appellant 

No. 05-20-00945-CV V. 

MICHAEL GRIM AND JIM 

MAYNARD, Appellees 

 On Appeal from the 68th Judicial 

District Court, Dallas County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. DC-17-08139. 

Opinion delivered by Justice 

Molberg. Justices Pedersen, III and 

Smith participating. 

 In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial 

court is AFFIRMED. 

 It is ORDERED that appellee MICHAEL GRIM AND JIM MAYNARD 

recover their costs of this appeal from appellant CITY OF DENTON. 

Judgment entered August 29, 2022