alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Special School District No. 50 *v.*Deason.

Opinion delivered March 3, 1930.

*Bice $ Dickson,*for appellant.

*Bectsley <& Beasley,*for appellee.

McHaney, J.

Based upon a petition signed by a majority of the electors in the territory affected, the county board of education of Benton County made an order changing the boundary lines of Gentry Special School District so as to absorb or consolidate all the territory in appellant district with the Gentry district, and transferring the control, property, and funds of appellant to the Gentry district. From this order an appeal was taken to the circuit court and appeal bond given.

Thereafter, while this appeal was pending in the circuit court, appellants brought this suit in the chancery court to have the order of the county board of education declared void, and its enforcement enjoined. On a hear ing the judge’s docket shows that a decree was granted staying the order of the county board of education and maintaining the *status quo ante*until the matter could be determined by the circuit court. The decree entered by the clerk, however, dissolved the board’s order, which was then pending on anpeal to the circuit court. This decree was entered at the April term, 1929. Thereafter, on October 24, 1929, on the petition of appellees to cor-*209rec.t the foimer decree, an order *nunc pro tunc*was entered correcting the decree so as to speak the truth and conform to the order actually made, but erroneously entered. Appellants have appealed from this latter judgment.

Without deciding the jurisdiction of the chancery court to act in the premises, since it does not appear that appellees raise the question, and appellants have invoked it, we are of the opinion that the court was correct in making the latter order speak the truth as reflected by the notation on the judge’s docket. No decree was entered regarding the merits of the controversy, and apparently no more was accomplished by the order than had already been obtained by the appeal and supersedeas bond filed. Appeals lie to the circuit court from the final orders of the county boards of education by making the necessary affidavit and bond, as provided in Acts 1925, c. 183, p. 546. If the order of the county board is void, certiorari may be resorted to. *McCrory Special School Dist.*v. *Curtis, 174,*Ark. 343, 295 S. W. 971.

We do not feel constrained to enter upon a discussion of the merits of the controversy. We hold, however, that the chancery court had the power to correct his judgment record so as to make it conform to the judgment actually rendered, even after the lapse of the term.

Affirmed.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

, ) STIPULATION OF

Plaintiff(s) ) VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL

) PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P.

v. ) 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

)

) Case No.2:17-CV-919

, )

Defendant(s) )

)

)

STIPULATION OF VOLUNTARY DISMISSAL PURSUANT TO F.R.C.P. 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED AND AGREED by and between the parties and/or their

respective counsel(s) that the above-captioned action is voluntarily dismissed, without prejudice

against all defendant(s) pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). 

s/ JAMES E. KOLENICH______

JAMES E. KOLENICH 

KOLENICH LAW OFFICE 

9435 Waterstone Blvd. 3140 

Cincinnati, OH 45249 

(p) (513) 444-2150 

Fax (513) 297-6065 

Jek318@gmail.com

s/ Michael H. Carpenter________

Michael H. Carpenter

Carpenter Lipps & Leland LLP

280 Plaza, Suite 1300

280 North High Street

Columbus, Ohio 43215

Telephone: 614-365-4100

Direct: 614-365-4103

Facsimile: 614-365-9145

carpenter@carpenterlipps.com

CAMERON PADGETT

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF tOSU ET AL.

ATTORNEY FOR PLAINTIFF

ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT

Each party to

bear their own attorney fees and costs.

Case: 2:17-cv-00919-ALM-KAJ Doc #: 21 Filed: 03/06/18 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 136
#### *James*Westbrook, *Ex’or.*vs. *O. Lanier et al.*

The Commissioner is not entitled to one per cent, for receiving, and one per cent, for paying oiit money, collected by liim on a bond taken by his predecessor, for property sold under the order of the Court.

*At*Lancaster, *July,*1831.

The present Commissioner in Equity, collected and paid out money on a bond taken by his predecessor in office for- property sold under the order of the Court; and charged one per cent, for receiving, and one per cent, for paying it out.

*143The presiding Chancellor rejected the charge; and the Commissioner appealed.

*Per Curiam.*

We concur in opinion with the Chancellor, on the question now raised. His decree is therefore affirmed, and this motion is dismissed.

Johnson, O’Neall and Martin, JJ., concurring.

*Appeal dismissed.*
#### J. N. McKNIGHT *v.*Charles NEWKIRK

73-283

507 S.W. 2d 98

Opinion delivered April 1, 1974

*Murphy, Carlisle & Taylor,*by: *Robert R.*White, for appellant.

*Estes, Storey & Estes,*by: *William A. Storey*and *Peter G. Estes, Jr,*for appellee.

Conley Byrd, Justice.

The issue here is whether a person prosecuted in a Mayor’s court for violation of a municipal ordinance is entitled to take a change of venue under Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-725 (Repl. 1962), to a municipal court. Appellee Charles Newkirk, who was charged in the mayor’s court of West Fork, Arkansas, with violation of a zoning ordinance, obtained a writ of mandamus in the circuit court to compel appellant, J. N. McKnight, mayor of West Fork, to transfer the venue to the Fayetteville Municipal Court. We agree with appellant that the trial court erroneously interpreted the statute.

*343A reading of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 22-725, *supra,*will show that a change of venue is required only when a civil or criminal case is brought before a justice of the peace. In *Russell*v. *Miller,*253 Ark. 583, 487 S.W. 2d 617 (1972), we construed this statute as being applicable to a mayor’s court when it was exercising the jurisdiction of a justice of the peace. However Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-1405 (Repl. 1964), gives mayor courts exclusive jurisdiction “. . .of all prosecutions and actions for infractions of the by-laws or ordinances of the city or town in which they are located. . .”. Consequently, it follows that the writ of mandamus issued by the trial court must be set aside.

Reversed and remanded.
Exhibit
32.2





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of Acorn Energy, Inc. (the
“Company”) for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the
Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Michael
Barth, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certify, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the
      Company.








/s/Michael
Barth


Michael
Barth


Chief
Financial Officer


November
10, 2010
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

DONELLA HOBBS, Individually
And as the Executor of the Estate of
Annette Owens

Plaintiff,
Case No. 3:17-cv-00306

COMMUNITY EMERGENCY
MEDICAL SERVICE, INC., et al.

Judge Walter H. Rice

)
)
)
)
)
)
vy. )
;
) Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington
)

Defendants. )

)

ORDER

Upon consideration of the Joint Stipulation filed by Plaintiff Donella Hobbs (“Plaintiff”)
and Defendants Community Emergency Medical Service, Inc. (“CEMS”) and Parastar, Inc.
(“Parastar”), on this 2\.\day of Areberw , 2017, it is hereby ORDERED that
Plaintiff's Motion for Default Judgment filed on July 12, 2017 against CEMS is hereby
WITHDRAWN. Defendant Parastar is hereby DISMISSED, with prejudice. CEMS’s Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint filed on August 21, 2017 is hereby WITHDRAWN.
CEMS shall have two (2) weeks from today to file an Answer to Plaintiff's Amended Complaint.

LR Shen

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

GARY L. MCCOY,

Plaintiff, Case No. 3:17-cv-432

vs.

DR. RODNEY L. CARLSON, et al., District Judge Thomas M. Rose

Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman

Defendants.

_____________________________________________________________________________________

ORDER: (1) REQUIRING THE PARTIES TO CONFER IN GOOD FAITH AND TO SUBMIT A 

RULE 26(f) REPORT; AND (2) SETTING A PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL CONFERENCE BY 

TELEPHONE ON MARCH 12, 2020 AT 10:30 AM

_____________________________________________________________________________________

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(f), the parties are ORDERED to confer informally 

and in good faith to prepare a Rule 26(f) Report.1 The parties’ Rule 26(f) report shall be filed with the 

Court on or before March 5, 2020. Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties in their Report, initial 

disclosures must be made as required by Rule 26(a)(1). Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures must be served 

upon all parties in the case and should not be filed with the Court unless filed in support of a motion. 

The undersigned sets this case for a preliminary pretrial conference by telephone on March 12, 

2020 at 10:30 am. Counsel shall call: 1-888-278-0296, enter access code 2725365, security code 123456, 

and wait for the Court to join the conference. 

The parties are ADVISED that failure to comply with any provision of this Order may result in 

appropriate sanctions including, but not limited to, dismissal of this action or the entry of a default judgment 

pursuant Rule 16(f) and Rule 37(b)(2)(A).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 12, 2020 s/ Michael J. Newman

Hon. Michael J. Newman

United States Magistrate Judge

 

1 A form Rule 26(f) Report of the Parties (applicable to the Western Division at Dayton) is 

accessible on the Court’s website at: http://www.ohsd.uscourts.gov/ohio-southern-district-forms.
Exhibit 99.2

                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In  connection  with the  Quarterly  Report of Quintek  Technologies,  Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the period ending December 31, 2002, as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), Andrew
Haag,  Chief  Financial  Officer of the  Company,  certifies  to the best of his
knowledge,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1) The Report fully  complies with the  requirements  of Section 13(a) or
  15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2) The  information  contained  in the  Report  fairly  presents,  in all
  material  respects,  the  financial  condition and result of operations of the
  Company.


  /s/ ANDREW HAAG
--------------------------------
      Andrew Haag
      Chief Financial Officer

February 14, 2003

The foregoing  certification  is being  furnished  solely  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Sec.1350  and is  not  being  filed  as  part  of the  Report  or as a  separate
disclosure document.
### In The Matter Of: EPA Bristol Bay Public Hearing - Igiugig v August 15, 2014 Midnight Sun Court Reporters 511 W. 9th Ave. Anchorage, AK 99501 Ph. 907-258-7100 Fax 907-276-6727

To open files, click on the desired file type in bookmark on left. For quick saving or searching multiple files, click attachments tab (or paperclip) on left. For best viewing/searching, use Adobe Reader/Acrobat ver. 9 or higher (www.adobe.com).
**Exhibit 32****CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,****AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**          In connection with the Annual Report of Premier Exhibitions, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Kfor the period ending February 28, 2006 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on May30, 2006, (the “Report”), we, the undersigned, hereby certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“section 906”), that: 1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and  2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all materialrespects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company./s/ Arnie Geller
EX-10.8



 Exhibit 10.8 

SECOND AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT OF SALE AND PURCHASE 

THIS SECOND AMENDMENT TO AGREEMENT OF SALE AND PURCHASE (this “Second Amendment”) is made as of the 14th day of July,
2015, by and between HB Von Karman, LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Seller”), and KBS Capital Advisors LLC, a Delaware limited liability company (“Buyer”). In consideration of the mutual promises and
covenants contained herein, the parties hereto agree as follows: 
 RECITALS 

A.          Seller and Buyer are parties to that certain Agreement of Sale and Purchase
dated as of June 4, 2015, as reinstated and amended by that certain Reinstatement and First Amendment to Agreement of Sale and Purchase, dated as of July 8, 2015 (as reinstated and amended, the “Purchase Agreement”). All
initially-capitalized terms not otherwise defined herein shall have the meanings set forth in the Purchase Agreement unless the context clearly indicates otherwise. 

B.          Seller and Buyer have agreed to modify the terms of the Purchase Agreement as
set forth in this Second Amendment. 
 NOW, THEREFORE, for valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which are hereby
acknowledged, and intended to be legally bound, Seller and Buyer agree as follows: 

1.          Recitals.  The Recitals set forth above are
hereby incorporated herein by reference as if the same were fully set forth herein. 

2.          Additional Due Diligence Date.  The Additional Due
Diligence Date shall be, and hereby is, extended from July 14, 2015, 5:00 p.m. Pacific Time to July 17, 2015, 5:00 p.m. Pacific Time. 

3.          Closing Date.   The Closing Date shall be, and hereby
is, extended from August 5, 2015 to August 12, 2015. 

4.          Effectiveness of Agreement.  Except as modified by this
Second Amendment, all the terms of the Purchase Agreement shall remain unchanged and in full force and effect. 

5.          Counterparts.  This Second Amendment may be executed in
counterparts, and all counterparts together shall be construed as one document. 

6.          Telecopied/Emailed Signatures.  A counterpart of this
Second Amendment that is signed by one party to this Second Amendment and telecopied/emailed to the other party to this Second Amendment or its counsel (i) shall have the same effect as an original signed counterpart of this Second Amendment,
and (ii) shall be conclusive proof, admissible in judicial proceedings, of such party’s execution of this Second Amendment. 

7.          Successors and Assigns.  All of the terms and
conditions of this Second 







 
Amendment shall apply to benefit and bind the successors and assigns of the respective parties. 

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, Seller and Buyer have entered into this Second Amendment as of the date first above stated. 

[SIGNATURES ON NEXT PAGE] 








			
	“SELLER”
	
	HB VON KARMAN, LLC,
	a Delaware limited liability company
	
	By: /s/ Brian Carr
	Name:  Brian Carr
	Title: Authorized Signatory









			
	“BUYER”
	
	KBS CAPITAL ADVISORS LLC,
	a Delaware limited liability company
		
	By:	 	/s/ Charles J. Schreiber, Jr.
		 	Charles J. Schreiber, Jr.,
		 	Chief Executive Officer
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

TIJUANA LAVERN CANDERS, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:17-cv-867 

 v. Judge Algenon L. Marbley 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

FRANKLIN COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF JOB AND FAMILY SERVICES, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

REPORT & RECOMMENDATION 

 This Court’s January 9, 2018, Order and Report and Recommendation, which the Clerk 

mailed to pro se Plaintiff Canders was returned undeliverable. (ECF No. 4.) On January 29, 

2018, the Court issued s Show Cause Order explaining to Plaintiff that she has an affirmative 

duty to notify the Court of any change in address and directing her to do so within twenty-one 

days. (ECF No. 5.) In the Order, the Court also cautioned Plaintiff that failure to comply will 

result in dismissal of this case for failure to prosecute. See Kosher v. Butler Cnty. Jail, No. 1:12-

cv-51, 2012 WL 4808546, *2 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 9, 2012) (citing Buck v. U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, 

Farmers Home Admin., 960 F.2d 603, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1992) (“Without such basic information 

as a Plaintiff’s current address, courts have no recourse but to dismiss a complaint for failure to 

prosecute.”) To date, Plaintiff has not responded to the Court’s Show Cause Order. 

 It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendants WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 
2

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review by the District Judge and 

waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l Latex 

Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the magistrate 

judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal the district 

court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .”) (citation 

omitted)).

 

Date: February 26, 2018 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 
3
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 17-1501

JOHN E. DRISCOLL, III; ROBERT E. FRAZIER; JANA M. GANTT; LAURA 

D. HARRIS; KIMBERLY LANE; DEENA L. REYNOLDS,

Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.

RENEE L. MCCRAY,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. 

George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:16-cv-01791-GLR)

Submitted: August 24, 2017 Decided: August 28, 2017

Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and SHEDD and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Renee L. McCray, Appellant Pro Se. Robert Harvey Hillman, SAMUEL I. WHITE PC, 

Rockville, Maryland, for Appellees.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Renee L. McCray seeks to appeal the district court’s order remanding this 

foreclosure proceeding to the Maryland state court from which it was removed. 

Generally, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is 

not reviewable on appeal or otherwise.” 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012). The Supreme 

Court has instructed that “§ 1447(d) must be read in pari materia with [28 U.S.C.] 

§ 1447(c), so that only remands based on grounds specified in § 1447(c) are immune 

from review under § 1447(d).” Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 127 

(1995). Thus, “§ 1447(d) is tightly circumscribed to cover only remand orders within the 

scope of . . . § 1447(c), based on (1) a district court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction 

or (2) a defect in removal other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction . . . .” Doe v. 

Blair, 819 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Whether a 

district court’s remand order is reviewable under § 1447(d) is not determined by whether 

the order explicitly cites § 1447(c) or not.” Borneman v. United States, 213 F.3d 819, 

824 (4th Cir. 2000). 

Here, the district court remanded on the basis that it lacked subject matter 

jurisdiction. Accordingly, we are without jurisdiction to review the remand order and 

dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument 

would not aid the decisional process. 

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 32.1

CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
                  PURSUANT TO
                  18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                  AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

I, Faraj Aalaei, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that the Quarterly Report of Centillium Communications, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the
quarter ended June 30, 2008 fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
that information contained in such Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q fairly presents in all material respects, the financial condition and
results of operations of the Company.



|Date: August 7, 2008 | Faraj Aalaei Chief Executive Officer
|-------------------- | ------------------------------------

---