UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION
SAMI FARRAJ, Case No. 1:18-cv-102
Petitioner,
Dlott, J.
vs. Litkovitz, M.J.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al.
Respondents.
NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party's objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas vy. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION
SAMI FARRAJ, Case No. 1:18-cv-102
Petitioner,
Dlott, J.
vs. Litkovitz, M.J.
ATTORNEY GENERAL, et al. REPORT AND
Respondents. RECOMMENDATION

This habeas corpus action brought pro se pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is before the
Court on respondents’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 4), to which petitioner has not responded. For the
reasons stated below, it is recommended that the motion be granted.

On February 13, 2018, petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus challenging his
continued detention by the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE)
pursuant to a final order of removal. (See Doc. 1 at PageID 4). Petitioner was taken into ICE
custody on or about August 3, 2017. Petitioner argues that his continued detention is unlawful
because he has been detained for more than six months with no significant likelihood of his
actual removal, in violation of Zadvydas v. Davis, 553 U.S. 678 (2001).' In the petition,
petitioner also claims violations of his due process rights. For relief, petitioner seeks immediate
release from custody. (/d. at PageID 9).

On April 3, 2018, respondents filed a motion to dismiss this action. (Doc. 4). According
to respondents, petitioner has been released from ICE custody pursuant to an Order of
Supervision. In support of the motion, respondents include the Declaration of Oscar E. Blair, a

Deportation Officer for the Enforcement and Removal Office of ICE. Blair attests that, on April

"In Zadvydas, the Supreme Court held that indefinite detention of an alien who has been ordered removed was not
authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a) and created a presumptive rule that after six months of custody an alien should be
released if there is “good reason to believe there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable
future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.


1, 2018, petitioner was released from ICE custody pending his removal. (Doc. 4, Ex. 1, Blair
Decl. at PageID 18). The Release Notification is attached to the Declaration. (See id. at PageID
20-21). In light of petitioner’s release from custody, respondents contend that the petition
should be dismissed as moot.

Respondents’ motion should be granted. Article III, § 2 of the United States Constitution
limits the federal judicial power to the adjudication of cases and controversies. In the context of
a habeas corpus petition, a district court generally lacks jurisdiction over the petition if the
petitioner is not in government custody. Therefore, except in limited circumstances not
applicable to the case-at-hand,” a petitioner’s release from custody generally moots a habeas
petition. See Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624, 631-32 (1982).

Petitioner does not challenge his removal order in this case. He instead contests his
indefinite detention pending removal. (See Doc. 1). In these circumstances, petitioner’s April 1,
2018 release pending removal renders this action moot and deprives the Court of jurisdiction.
See Felix v. Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement, No. 3:05-cv-2211, 2007 WL
951452, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 27, 2007) (“When an alien subject to removal challenges only his
detention pending removal, his release pending removal, whether or not conditional, entails no
collateral consequences. It renders the petition moot because he has received all the relief he
sought and would have been entitled to.”); see also Kahn v. Attorney General, Case Nos. 1:15-
cv-2014, 1:16-cv-85, at *2 (N.D. Ohio May 17, 2016) (“As Petitioner has received his requested
relief by being released from custody on an order of supervision, there is no longer an active case
or controversy.”) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2016 WL 4009885 (N.D. Ohio June

25, 2016); Willix v. Holder, No. 1:11-cv-894, 2012 WL 463830, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Jan 24, 2012)

? Petitioner has not alleged nor is the undersigned aware of any basis to find that petitioner will suffer future
collateral consequences as a result of the detention or that the case is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
See Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7-8, 17-18 (1998).


(finding habeas petition moot where petitioner seeking release pending removal is released
pursuant to an order of supervision) (Report and Recommendation), adopted, 2012 WL 463825
(W.D. Mich. Feb. 13, 2012). Therefore, because petitioner has been released and has obtained
the relief requested in the petition, the undersigned recommends that respondents’ motion to
dismiss (Doc. 4) be GRANTED and the petition be dismissed as moot.

IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.

va 4/26/18 Foun. x bib

Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate i)