The Honor able Joseph M. Hood, Senior United States District J udg e for the Easter

n * District of Ke ntucky , sitti ng by desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION File Na me: 10a0307n.06 No. 09-5907 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT

SECURI TI ES AND EXCHAN GE COMMI SSI ON, ) ) Plain tif f, ) ) ) BRI AN M. B URR, ) On Appea l from the United States ) Di str ic t Co ur

t f or the Mid dle Defendant-

Appellant , ) District of Tenne ssee ) v. ) ) DOL L AR GENERAL

CORPOR ATI ON, ) ) Defendant-

Appellee

. )

Before: COOK

and McKEAG UE, Circuit Judges; HOOD, Senior District Judge. * HOOD, Seni or Distr ict Judge . This appea l ar i s es fr o m the district court’s g rant of a n inj un c tio n p ro hib iti ngAp pe lla nt B ri an B ur

r ( “ B ur r” ) f ro m pu rs uin g his state c ourt

laws uit a g a ins t Ap pe lle e (a

nd c o- de fe nd ant) Do lla

r G e ne ra l Co rp or a tio n ( “ Do lla r G e ne ra l” ). D o l l a

r G e n e r a l s o u g h t, and obtained, a

n injunction in the federa l court lawsuit which g ives rise to the instant appe al. The district court g ran t ed t h e inj unction based on the enfor ceme nt of the Consent J udg ment it entere d i nt h e ca s e, wh i ch wa s d er i v ed fr o m a c o n s en td ec re e b et we en Bu rr an d t h e S ec u ri t i es an d

E x ch an geNo. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

T h e c it e d c a s e s h e r e in , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt b e lo w , an d th e p arti e s to th is a

p p e a l a ll u ti li ze 1 differ ent names f

or a “ Consent J udg ment,” “F inal J udg ment,” or “ Ag ree d J udg ment.” B lack’ s L aw Dic tionary

states that an “ ag ree d judgme nt” is also termed a “conse nt judgment.” Bla ck’s L aw D ic tio na

ry 85 8- 59 (8 th e d. 20 04 ). F or the pu rp os e of c lari ty , th is o pin ion

wi ll r e fe r t o Record N o. 36, dockete d as the “ Final Judgment a s to Defe ndant B rian B urr,” as “B urr’ s Consent Judg me nt, ” or

“ the Con se nt Jud g me nt, ” be c a us e that is the te rm

the dis tr ic t c ourt

us e d to descr ibe the docume nt in its Memorandum at R. 82, filed in support of its Order ( Orde r, R. 83, J uly 2, 2009.) which is the subjec t of this appeal. In citing or discussing a

pplicable c ase la

w, h o w e v e r , t h e t e r

m s “ A g r e e d

J u d g m e n t , ” an d

“ C o n s e n tJ u d g m e n t ” w i l l b e u s e d i n t e r c h an g e a

b l y, as they wer e in the orig inal decisions to which this opinion cites. The “Consent of D efe ndant Br ian B urr” (Consent Dec ree , R. 33-2, Apr. 10, 2006.) w ill be refe rre d to as it is in t he district court’s Me morandum at R. 82, the “c onsent dec ree .” In its Memorandum at R. 82, the district c ourt re fe rs to t

he c on se nt d e c re e and

B ur r’ s Co ns e nt Jud g me nt i nte rc ha ng e a bly and a s th e same document, but it should be noted that these a re not the same document a nd are not treate d as such for the pur

poses of the a

naly sis herein. 2 Com mis sio n ( “ SEC ” ). B ur r ap pe a ls on se ve ra l gr ound s, inc lud ing , tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt e rr e d in 1 fi nd ingthat D oll ar G e ne ra l ha d sta nd ing to e nf

or c e B ur r’ s Con se nt Judg me nt. B a se d on a pp lic a ble

case law, which clea

rly states that non-par

ties to a consent de cre e do not have standing to enforc e t he dec ree , the district court’s de cision will be REVERSED an d th e in ju n c ti o n it issued VA CA TED

. I. F ac tu al a nd P r oc e dur al B ac kgr ound This app e a l ar is e s f

r o m th e in te r s e c ti o n o f tw o la w s u it s . T h e f

ir s t la w s u it , th e o n e fr om which this appea l is taken, originated from alleg ations of i nsider trading by the SEC ag ainst Bur

r and his co-de fe n d an ts

. I nA p r il 2 0 0 5 , th e SE C f il e d a la w s u it a g a in s t D o ll ar

G e n e r a l, B u r

r , an d o th er de fe nd ants fo r a lle g e d vio la tio ns of the Se c ur iti e s Ac t and the Exc ha ng e Ac t. E a c h o f t

he de fe nd a nts enter ed into a sepa

rate consent de cre e with the SEC. The terms of Burr ’s consent decre e included the pa y me nt o f a

c ivi l pe na lty , d isg or g e me nt p ay me nts , a nd int e re st p ay

me nts , a s w e ll a s aNo. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

3 prohibition from seekingto rec over ag ainst any co-de fenda

nt in a subsequent lawsuit. The district court e ntere d Bur

r’s Consent Judgment in A pril 2006, which incorporated the terms of the c onsent decr ee. I n Fe bruar

y 2006, Bur

r filed suit in Tennesse e Circuit Court ag ainst Dollar Ge nera l based on the fa cts that led to the SEC’s suit aga inst Burr and Dollar Gene ral. I n that action, B urr a lleg ed that Do lla r G e ne ra l de fr a

ud e d h im i n le a din g him to be lie ve that he c ou ld c a sh in h is s toc k o pti on s “ in

c omp lia nc e ” wi th a ll a

pp lic a ble re g ulatio ns . Bur

r s ou g ht t o r e c ov e r d a ma g e s r e la te d to his settlement with the SEC, including the value of the loss of the stock options, loss of i ncome, attorney ’s fe es, punitive damag es, and inter est. Doll ar Gener al contende d that Bur r’s pursuit of a state cour t action was in c ontrave ntion of the terms of Bur r’s Consent Judgme nt, w hich prohibited Bur r fr om seeking indemnification fr om any co -d efendant. Dollar G ener al filed a motion in t he district court to enfor ce B urr’ s Consent J udg ment and enjoin the state court law suit. Burr a rg ued,

a mon g oth e r t

hin g s, tha t D oll ar G e ne ra l w a s n ot a pa rt y to t he c on se nt d e c re e se tti ngfo rt h th e te rm s of the a g ree ment of betwe en B urr a nd the SEC, and incorporated into Burr ’s Consent J udg ment, and, thu s, did no t ha ve sta nd ingto e nf

or c e B ur r’ s Cons e nt Judg me nt. Th e dis tr ic t court dis a g re e d, he ld that Dollar Ge nera l had standing to e nforc e Bur r’s Consent Judgment, g rante d the motion to enforce , and orde red B urr to dismiss his s tate cour t action. The district cour

t summarily

conclude d that “B urr e x pressly ‘re linquishe[ d] all l eg al and equitable r ight, title, and inter est” in the c ivil penalty , disgor g ement, and inter est pay ments that he made unde r the Consent Judgment,” a nd that “‘no pa

rt of the f

unds shal l be re turned,’ the reby prohibiting B urr f

rom seekingto enfor ce his a lleg ed rig ht to the return of those funds.”No. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

4 (Memora ndum, R. 8 2 at 3 , J uly

2, 2009.) Thus, ac cordingto the district court, B urr wa ived any cl a im o f r e c o v e r

y a g a in s t D o ll ar G e n e r a l f o r th e f u n d s p a id to th e SE C p u r s u an t to the Consent J udg ment. The district cour t theref o re gra n ted Dollar G ener al’s motion to enforc e the Consent Judg me nt. Dollar Ge nera l argues on appea l that Bur r i s barr ed from seeking to rec over from it the stock option procee ds, loss of i ncome resulting f rom the five- y ear

employ ment ban, and a

portion of the fu nd s d isg orged to the SE C, w hic h a re dama g e s im

pli c a te d b y

B ur r’ s st a te law c la ims . In it s appellate brief, D ollar Ge nera l asserts that B urr “ further ag ree d that ‘no par

t of the funds shall be returne d’ to him. By these terms, Bur r i s prohibited from see king to e nforc e his alleg ed rig ht to the return of the forf eited amounts. This is espec ially true for the disg org ed amounts.” ( Appellee ’s B r. 20.) According to Dollar Genera l, Bur r wa ived his claim to a portion of the disg org ement pay ment

on a pp e a l be c a

us e thi s c la im i s in c on sis te nt w ithhis ple a din g in the dis tr ic t c ourt , in wh ic h h e did not seek a

ny of the disg org ement pay ment. Wi t h reg ard to B urr’ s claim for lost income, Dollar Gene ral a rg ues that the a g ree d-to employ ment b ar , i n conjunction with Bur r’s “ relinquishment of

a ll l e g a l and

e qu ita ble ri g ht, tit le , a

nd int e re st in his fo rf

e iture s, pr e c lud e s h is c la ims fo r l os t in c ome ag ainst Dollar Ge nera l.” (Appellee’s Br. 21.) Finally , Dollar Genera l contends that the district cour t had the authority to issue the injunction because all of B urr’ s state cour t claims were resolved by

the Con se nt Jud g me nt, and

the re fo re , th e inj un c tio n e ff e c tuate d th e Con se nt Jud g me nt. Bur r ar g ues on appe al that Doll ar Ge n er al did not have standingto enforc e the Consent J udg ment beca

use it was not a pa

rty to the Consent J udg ment. Bur r f u rt h er a rg ues that, with the

e xce pti on of on e c a te g or

y of dama g e s, his state c ourt laws uit a g a ins t anyon e oth e r tha n the SEC isNo. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

5 permitted under

the terms of the Consent Judgme nt. Bur r also argues that the Consent J udg ment did not provide for a

n injunction as a re medy , it was in violation of the Anti-Injunction Act, and e ven if issuing a

n injunction was proper , the s pecif ic t erms of the injunction issued were overly broad. II. Stand ard of Review This Court reviews a

district court’s de termination o f the issue of standing“under the traditional de novo standa rd of r eview

. . . beca

use the issue of w hether

a cla imant has constitutional standing is a question of law.” U. S. v . R e al Pro pe rty , A ll F ur nis hin gs Kno wn a s B rid

we ll's Gr oc e ry , 19 5 F .3 d 8 19 , 8 21 (6 th C ir . 1 99 9) . T he dis tr ic t co urt ’s in ter pre ta tio n o f i ts C on se nt Jud g me nt i s

re vie we d un de r an a

bu se of dis c re tio n sta

nd ard , wh ile the de c isi on a s to wh e the r t

he inj un c tio n in this case c ould leg ally

issue under the Anti-I njunction Act is reviewed u n d er a de novo standard. Huguley v . Gene ral Motors Corp. , 999 F.2d 142, 145- 46 (6th Cir. 1993). III . Ana lys is A. Do lla r G e ne r al L ac ks St andi ng t o Enfo r c e th e Judg m e nt Th e dis tr ic t c ourt

fo un d th a t [a] c on se nt j ud g me nt i s in e sse nc e a

c on tr a c t. A lth ou gh Dollar Ge ne ra l is no t a name d pa rt y to B ur r’ s Con se nt Judg me nt, Do lla r Ge ne ra l wa s a name d D e fe nd ant i n thi s ac tio n. B ur

r’ s Co ns e nt Jud g me nt e xpre ssl y pr oh ibi ts h im f

ro m se e kin g to rec over ag ainst any co-de fenda nt. Although non-parties lack st anding to enforc e a co n s en td ec re e, Do l l ar

Ge n er al i s a c o -d ef

en d an ti nt h i s ac t i o nan d t h u s h as s t an d i n g. B ur r’ s Co ns e nt Jud g me nt c le arl y c on fe rr e d a

be ne fi t on

his c o- de fend ant s in th is action. (M e m., R. 8 2 at 2- 3, July 2, 20 09 .) (c itatio ns omi tte d) . T he dis tr ic t c ourt ’s ana ly sis , h ow e ve r, is i n direc t conflict with controlling Supreme Court and Six th Circuit case la w.No. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

6 Bur r does not conte st that Dollar Gene ral wa s intended to be benef ited by the conse nt decr ee. Th e Sup re me Court

ha s h e ld, ho we ve r, that “ a we ll- se ttl e d li ne of

aut ho ri ty

. . . e sta bli sh e s th a t a consent de cre e is not e nforc eable direc tly or in c ollatera l pr ocee dings by those who ar e not par

ties to it eve n though they wer e intended to be bene fited by it.” Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores , 421 U.S. 723, 750 (1975). The Six th Circuit echoed this holding in Vo ge l v . Cit y of Ci nci nn ati , s t at i n g t h at t h e p l ai n t i ff

, “w h o wa s n o t a p ar t y t o t h e c o n s en td ec re e, l ac k [ ed ] s t an d i n g t o ch al l en ge the City ’s interpre tation of the dec ree .” Vo ge l v . Ci ty of Cinc inn ati , 9 5 9 F. 2 d 5 94, 597 (1992);

ac c or d A ik e n v . Ci ty of M e mp his , 37 F.3d 1155, 1167 ( 1994). Do lla r G e ne ra l argue s th a t e ve n th ou g h it wa s not a pa rt y to t he c on se nt d e c re e , it

wa s a pa rt y to t he lit ig a tio n in

wh ic h B ur

r’ s Co ns e nt Jud g me nt w a s e nte re d, and ther e fo re it “ ha s st and ingto seek a co-de fenda

nt’s compliance with a J udg ment enter ed in that litigation.” ( Appellee ’s B r. 14.) Th e on ly c a se Do lla

r G e ne ra l c ite s in

su pp or t of its po sit ion

is U.S. v. Visa, U.S.A., I

nc. , No. 98 Civ. 7076, 2007 WL 1741885 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. J une 15, 2007), a n unrepor ted dec ision from the Southern Di s trict of Ne w York. (

Id. ) Vi sa , unlike Blue Chip Stamps, Vogel and Aiken , is n o t c o n tr olling authority in this Circuit. Fur thermore , the Court in Vi

sa does not dir ectly addre ss the issue of thirdparty standing to enforc e a Judgme nt and t h er efor e should not be re lied upon as eve n persua sive authority for this point of law. Dollar Ge nera l also argues that B urr’ s p o s i t ion that Dollar Ge nera l cannot enf orce Bur r’s Con se nt Jud g me nt be c a

us e it wa s not a part

y to the c on se nt de c re e is “a bs ur d” be c a

us e the on ly

pa rt y to Burr ’s Consent J udg ment was the district c ourt. This argument has no merit. The Court wa s not

a pa rt y in t his lit ig a tio n. I n s up po rt

of thi s p re po ste ro us a sse rt ion , D oll ar G e ne ra l c ite s Sanders v.No. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

7 Republic Se rvice

s of Ky. , 113 F. App’x 648, 649-50 (6th Cir. 2004) . I n Sa nd e rs , how e ve r, the Sixth Cir c uit he ld t hat be c a us e the pla int if

fs se e kin g to e nf

or c e the Ag re e d Judg me nt we re no t pa rt ie s to it, they could not bring suit to enforce the judg ment under Bl ue Chi p S tam ps and Aiken

. Sanders v. Republic Se rvice

s of Ky. , 113 F. App’ x 648, 650 (6th Cir. 2004). I n fac t, the Sa nd

e rs decision wa s predicated on fac ts ve ry simil ar to those at bar . I n Sa nd e rs , the plaintiffs and pa

rties s eeking to enfor ce the Ag ree d J udg ment wer e interve ning de fenda nts in the underlying la

wsuit, but not parties to the Ag ree d J udg ment betwee n the o ri g inal plaintiff and defe ndant. Id. at 649. Althoug h Dollar Genera l place s considera ble importance on the diffe renc e betwee n being a party to the consent decr ee and beinga par ty in the litigation in which the Judgment

was e ntere d, the Sa nd

e rs Court did not recog nize such a distinction. The Court there he ld: The Ag ree d J udg ment is an ag ree ment only betwee n the [defenda

nt in the underlying lawsuit] and [ the plaintiff in the under ly ing lawsuit]

. . . The dist rict court found that this a ction was mere ly an attempt by plaintiffs [i n the enfor ceme nt suit] to en forc e a judg ment to which they are not parties, and c orre ctly h eld t hat the plaintiffs lac k sta nd ingto e nf

or c e the ir un de rs tand ingof

its te rm s. . . . Followin g B l u e Chip Stamps , we have held that third pa rties, eve n intended third-part y benef iciarie s, lack standing to enforc e their inter pretations of ag r e e d ju d g me n ts

. “ A c o n s e n t d e c r e e ‘ is n o t e n f o r c e a b le

. . . b y th o se who a re not parties to it . . . .’ I t ‘may be cha lleng ed only

on the g roun d t h at i t s substantive provisions unlawfully

infring e upon the r ights of the complainant.’” V o g e l v . Ci ty of Cinc inn ati , 959 F.2d 594, 598 ( 6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted). [P laintiffs] emphasiz e that they wer e par ties to the orig inal action, and the y argue that they

wer e “w ithin t h e s pecif ic ‘zone of inter ests' protec ted under the Ag re e d Jud g me nt. ” Th e fa c t r e ma ins , h ow e ve r, tha t no ne of the pla intif

fs in t his a c tio n w a s a pa

rt y to t he Ag re e d Jud g me nt. No r i s it re le va nt t hat th e y may fa ll w ith in the zone of intere sts protected by the J udg ment. “The plain lang uag e of Bl ue Chi p indicates that ev en int ended third- party benef iciarie s of a c onsent dec ree lack standing to enforc e its terms.” A i k e n v . C i t yo f M e m p his , 37 F.3 d 115 5, 11 68 (6 th Cir. 1994).No. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

8 Sa nd e rs , 113 F. App’ x 648, 65 0 , (6th Cir. 2004). The Sa nd e rs Court clear ly

used ca se law addre ssing third-pa

rty enfor ceme nt of a consent decre e and applied it to a situation in which a thirdpa rt y so ug ht t o e nf

or c e a jud g me nt. Thus, Supreme C o u

r t a nd Six th Circuit prece dent ar e cle ar that nonparties to a c onsent dec ree or, ana logously , an ag ree d or conse nt j u dg ment enter ed by the Court incorporating a settlement ag r e e me n t o r a c o n s e n t d e c r e e , d o n o t h a v e s ta n d in g to e n f

o r c e a ju d g me n t. D o ll ar G ener al has failed to c ite any

case law holding otherwise a nd has g ener ally

failed t o m ak e any

compelling arguments to the contrar

y . The district cour

t, theref ore, e rre d in finding that Dollar Ge nera l had sta nd ingto e nf

or c e B ur r’ s Co ns e nt Jud g me nt. B. The Di st r ic t C our t h ad t he Inhe r e nt Aut hor it y t o Enfo r c e it s J udgm e nt For the re asons stated a

bove, Dollar

Gene ral doe s not have standingto enforc e B u rr’ s C o n s en tJ u d gm en t

. T h e n ex tqu es t i o ni s wh et h er Do l l ar Ge n er al ’s l ac k

o f st an d i n g i s re as o nen o u gh

a lon e to v a c a te the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s inj un c tio n p re c lud ing B ur r f ro m pu rs uin g his state c ourt

c la ims ag ainst Dolla r

G e n e r a l. A lt

h o u g h th e d is tr ic t c o u rt d id n o t e xp r e s s ly

s tate th a t i t w a s is s u in g the injunction based on its inherent a uthority to enforc e its own J udg ment, we a ssume the district court

was e x erc ising its inhere nt power, r eg ardl es s o f t he def ects in Dollar G ener al’s standing

. See Peac ock v . Thomas , 516 U.S. 349, 356 (1996). See also, Shillitani v. United States , 384 U.S. 364, 37 0 (19 66 ) (“ Th e re c an b e no qu e sti on that c ourt s h a ve inh e re nt p ow e r t o e nf or c e c omp lia

nc e wi th their lawf ul orders throug h civil contempt.”) Ha dix v . Ca ru so , 297 F. App’ x 504 (6th Cir. 2008) (not i n g t h e co u rt’s inhere nt power to e nforc e the c onsent dec ree at issue). F urther, the Consent J udg ment at issue explicitl y provides that the district cour t “re tain[s] jurisdiction of t he matter forNo. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

9 the purposes of

enfor cing the terms of this Fina l [ Consent] J udg ment.” (F inal J udg ment, R. 36 at 8. ) T he re fo re , b e c a

us e the dis tr ic t c ourt ha s the inh e re nt pow e r to en fo rc e its ow n ju dg me nt i n th is

case , this Co u rt m u s t consider whe ther the injunction issued wa s proper and within the district

c ourt ’s a uth or ity un de r t he te rm s o f t

he Con se nt Jud g me nt. B ur r doe s not de ny that a fe de ra l court ha s inhe re nt a uth or ity to e nf or c e its ow n ju dg me nts , but r ather , asser

ts that the injunction issued by the district c ourt was contra ry to t h e t er m s o f t he Consent J udg ment, and, furthermore , that the cour t exceeded its authority

by enter ing a

n injunction in the first instance. As to B urr’ s argument that the court did not have the author i t y t o i s s u e t he injun c ti o n , p u r s u an t to th e A n ti

- I n ju n c ti o n A c t, th a t A c t “ g e n e r a ll y p r e c lu d e s f e d e r a l c ourts from interfe ring with state court proce eding s, [but ] t here is an exception to “protec t” or “ eff ectuate” pr ior fe dera l judgments. Huguley v . Gene ral Motors Corp. , 999 F.2d 142, 145 ( 6th Cir. 1993). To the

e xten t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

wa s e njo ini ngthe state c ourt pr oc e e din g to “pr ote c t” or “ e ff e c tuate ” its Consent J udg ment, we a ssume the district court wa s acting within its proper authority to do so. Next, w e m u s t ad d ress the assertion that the district cour t’s injunction was contra

ry to the terms of the Consent Judgment, B urr’ s state law complaint includes four c ounts, asserting claims for misrepre sentation, fra

ud, brea ch of c ontrac t, a

nd punitive da

mag es. For

the first three counts, Bur r seeks c ompensatory

damag es for

the value of

the loss of the stock options; loss of inco m e for a min i mum of five y ear s; loss of future income; a nd attorney ’s fe es. These claimed damag es stem from alleg ed injuries that ar e close ly related to the fac tual basis for the SEC’s a ction alleg ing insider trading ag ainst Bur

r and D ollar Ge nera l. Burr does not deny

the SEC’s alleg ation that he eng ag ed in illega l trades, but he cl ai m s t h at Doll ar G ener al def raude d him into m aking such trade s byNo. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

10 misrepre senting to him that his actions we re le g al. Concer ning the fra

ud claim, B urr a lleg es that but fo r t he mis re pr e se ntatio ns and omi ssi on s of Do lla

r Ge ne ra l, le a din g him to be lie ve that c a sh ingin his stock options was in compliance with all applica ble sec urities re gu l at i o n s , he would not have

ex er ci s ed h i s s t o ck o p t i o n s . T h er ef o re , h e s u ff

er edd am age s i n cl u d i n g l o s s o f r ep u t at i o n , p ay i n g a civil se ttlement to the SEC, and ag ree ing not to be a n office r in a publicly

trade d company

for f ive y ear s. As to Burr ’s claim for misrepre sentation, he a sserts t hat the off icer s and direc tors of Dollar Ge ne ra l br e a c he d the ir

fi du c iary du tie s to B ur

r a s a sh are ho lde r w he n th e y

fa ile d to pr ov ide c e rt a in materia l inf

ormation to B urr reg arding the exercise of his stock options. Thus, ac co rd i n g t o t he complaint, Bur

r i s entitled to the value of the loss of these stock options. I n Bur r’s bre ach of

contra ct claim, he a lleg es that Dollar G ener al bre ache d its im plied duty of g ood faith and f

air deal ing

r e g ar d i n g B u r

r ’ s s e p ar a t i o nf

r o m t h e c o mp an y, an d a s a r e s u l t , B u r r i s e n t i t l e d t o d a m a g e s . F i n a l l y, B ur r s e e ks punit ive dama g e s on the g ro un d that D oll ar G e ne ra l’ s a c tio ns we re “ int e nti on a l, w ilf ul, and re ckless.” T hus, acc ording to Burr , Dollar Genera l owes him damag es for harms arising out of his settlement with the S EC, due to Dollar Genera l’s wrong ful ac tions which prec ipitated the SEC action ag ainst him. By

the terms of the Consent J udg ment and the Consent Ag ree ment, Bur r may be prohibited fr om rec overingdamag es for some harms that wer e included in his settlement pay ment to the SEC. He is not, however, pr ohibited from see king da mag es for other ha rms related t o the

se ttl e me nt. We a c kn ow le dg e the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s inh e re nt a uth ori ty to e nf or c e the Con se nt Jud g me nt. F u rt h e r , a s s u m i n g t h e d i s t r i c tc o u rt ’ s o r d e r c o u l d b e d e e m e d an e x e r c i s e o f t h a ti n h e r e n ta

u t h o r i t y,

as we explained above, the i n j u n ctive orde r may

have be en justified in part but, in enjoiningNo. 09-5907

Burr v. Dollar Gene ral Corp.

11 prosec ution of

th e s tate c o u rt a c ti o na s a w h o le , is b r o a d e r

th ana u th o r iz e d b y th e te r ms o f the Con se nt Jud g me nt. IV. Conclusion F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s de c isi on to i ssu e an in

jun c tio n is RE VE RSE D and the injunction it issued VA CA TED

.