1 It

appears Dr. Abdel-Sa

med was inadvert ently referred to as Dr. AbdulSamed in the C ourt of Appe als. B ecaus e she has been id entifie d in this C ourt as Dr. Abdel-Samed, we refer to her by that name. 2 The amended complaint named as defendants eme rgency room doc tor Gihan Abdel-Sa

med, physic ian’s a ssistant Mark Ep ps, and

ACS Primary Ca

re Physici ans Southeast, P .C. , whic h empl oyed E pps and c ontract ed with D r. Abdel-Samed for the provision of professiona l servi ce s at Spalding Regional Medical Center. Claims against the m edical center we re dis mi ssed with prejudice by con sent of the par ties. 294 Ga. 758 FINAL C OPY

S13G0657. ABDEL-SAMED et al. v. DAILEY

et al.

T HOMPSON , Chief Justice. We gran ted a writ of certiorari in Dailey v. Abdul-S amed , 319 Ga . App. 380 (736 SE2d 142) (2012), 1 to determine whether the Court of App eals erred in this me dical mal practi ce ac tion by reversing t he trial court’s grant of

summ ary judgme nt in favo r of the defend ants. 2 Beca use weconclud e there exists a question of fac t for jury determ ination, and the refor e, the def endants were not entitled to summary judgment, we affir m. Viewedin a ligh

t most favorab l e to the

non-moving partie s, Rya n and Cindy Dailey, the

evidenc e shows t

hat Ry an Dai ley a

rrive d at Sp alding Regio nal1

Medical Center (SRMC) just afte r midnig ht on December 1 1, 2005, s eeking treat ment after he ac cident ally s hot paint thinner i nto his fing er with a high pressure paint sprayer . Mark Epps, a physi cian’s assistan t, examined Ryan a nd concluded he ne eded an immediate referral to a hand surgeon and emergency surgery. SRMC did not have a hand surgeon on call , a nd Epps tol d Ryan and his wife, Cindy, tha

t the on-call orthopedic surgeon did not like to be disturb ed during the night. As a result, Epps stated surgery would have to w ait until the

morn ing. Meanw

hile, D r. Abde l-Sam ed, who had been inform ed of Ryan’ s presence in the emergency room a nd of Epps’ d

iagnosis, was talking to Dr . John Seiler , a hand surgeon at Piedmont Hospital, about a different hand s urgery patien tshe wa s transf

erring to him. In the co urse of th is conve rsation, Dr. Abdel-Samed menti oned tha t she might

have a second h and

surgery patient , i.e., R yan, to send him. Dr. Sei ler responded that he would be willing to ta ke an d treat Ryan. Dr. Abdel-Sa

med first exa

mined Ryan a t approximately

1:00 a.m . and agreed with Epp s’ concl usion that

imm ediate

surgery was necessary. Nevert heless , the Daileys state d in deposi tion tes timony that Dr

. Abdel-Samed toldth em surgery would have to wait until the next morning when the on-call2

orthopedic surgeon ar rived. Dr. Abd el-Samed then encoura ged Cindy

to go home and wait, moved R

yan into a small storage

room, and turne d off the l ights. Hospita l st aff che cked on R yan pe riodically throu ghout the e arly morning, noting that he conti nued to complain of pain in h is finger and hand. Hospit al records ind icate a breakfast tray was ord ered for Ryan at 6:3 0 a.m. Epps testifi ed that

he spokewith Dr. Abdel-Sa med a bout Ryan’ s diagn osis before 1:00 a.m ., tha

t he m ade no effort t o transfer Ryan to a han d surgeon, and t hat he spokewith Dr. Abdel-Sa med again at

3:00 a.m . when h is shift wa s end ing, but he had no recoll ection of what w as said

in that c onversa

tion. Dr

. Abdel-Samed testified that aft er she examined Ryan, she gave a gen eral instruct ionto ho spita l staff to transfer him to an available hand surge on. The unit secretary was unable t o recoll ect w hich hospi tals, if any, were c alled o r when. Instead, she testi fied as to her normal practic e, which was to c all Atlanta Medical Center (AMC) and th e Medica l Center of Cent ral Ge orgia (MC CG), hospitals affiliated with S RMC. Dr. Abd el-Samed test ified th at base d on hospital protocol, s he believed AMC and MCCG h ad been called, but nei ther3 It is und isputed that D r. Ab del-S ame d kn ew from her ex perien ce w ith th e firs t

patie nt in nee d of

hand surge ry that AM C d id not have a hand s urgeon on call the morning of December 11, 2005. 4 The Dailey s’ ex pert su gges ted ge neral a nesth esia m ay not ha ve be en us ed bo th because of the i mmediate need for surgery and because Ry an was given breakfast atSRMC.

3 had a hand su

rgeon available. 3 There is other evid ence, however, showi ng that MCCG was not c alled a

nd that it had a hand surgeon on call and availa ble to perform surgery on the m orning in que stion. It is undisput ed that

at 7:33 a .m., seven-a

nd-a-ha lf hours a fter Ry an arrived at SRMC, Dr. Seiler was called and Ryan was ac cepte d for tran sfer. Ryan arrive d at Pie dmont H ospital at approxima tely 9: 45 a.m ., where

e mer gency surgery

was pe rforme d through use of nerveblocks in stead o f general anesthesia. 4 The Daileys file d suit, c laim ing Dr. A bdel-Sa med a ndEpps breached their duties of care

by not tra

nsferrin g R

yan to a hand su

rgeon in a

time ly ma

nner. They contend

the del ay re sulted i n amput ation of the ti p of Ryan’s middle fing er and reduced range of motion and increa sed painand sens itivity in his finge

r and hand. Dr. Abdel-Sam ed and Ep ps moved for summa ry judgment, relying, in part, on their cont ention that the Daileys ’ clai ms are controll ed by O CGA § 51-4

1-29.5, which pl aces a highe r evide ntiary burden on

plaintiffs asserting certa

in health careliabili ty cla

ims a rising out o f the pro visio n of emergency medical

care. The trial court gra

nted sum mary judgme nt in favo r of the de fendant s, and the Court of Appeals reversed, conclud ing that an is sue of fact exists r egardin g the applicability of OCG

A § 51-1-2 9.5 (c). Dailey , supra, 319 Ga. Ap p. at 386. 1. Our review of the gra nt or deni al of sum

mary judgme nt is de no vo, and

we view the evi dence , and a ll rea sonableconclus ions and i nferenc es draw n from it, inthe light most favorableto the nonmov ant. See Johnson v. O mondi , 294 Ga. 74, 75 (751 SE2d 288) (2013); Bonner v. Southern Resta urant Group , 271 Ga. App. 497 (6 10 SE2d 129) ( 2005). Sum mary judgme nt is w arr anted only

w here no g enuine issue of material fact exists a nd the movant is entitled to judgme ntas a matter of law. Once th e movant has made a p rima facie showing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, th e b urden shifts to the responden t to come forward wit h rebuttal evid ence. Id. Rely ing on Crewey v. American Medical Response of Ga. , 303 Ga. App. 258 (692 SE2d 851) (2010), the Court of Appeal s rever sed thetrial c ourt’s gra nt of summ ary judg men t based on its determina tion that a question of fact exists

as to w hether t he me dical p rovider de fendant s’ actions in de laying nece ssary5

treat ment constituted eme rg ency medic al ca re under OCGA § 51-1-29.5 ( c). That subsection provides, in pertinent pa rt: In an ac tion involving a

health careliabili ty cla

im ar ising out of the provi sion

of emergency medical care in a hospital emergency department

. . . no phys ician or health ca re provider shall be held liable unless it is p roven by clear and convincing ev idence that the physician or health care provider’s a ctions showe d gross negligence. OCGA§ 51-1-2 9.5 (c). “Emergency medical care” is defin edin OCGA § 51-1- 29.5 (a) (5) as bona fide emergency servic es provide d after the onse t of

a medical o r traum atic c ondition m anifes ting itse lf by ac ute sym ptoms of sufficie ntseveri ty, inc luding severe pain, s uch that

the abs ence of immedia te medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in placing the patient’s hea lt h in se rious jeo pardy, serious impairment

to bodily

functions , or ser

ious dysf unction of

any bodily organ or part. The term does not in c lude m edical care or treat ment that occurs after the

patient is stabilize d and is capable of rece iving medical treatment as a nonemergency patient o r care that is unrelated to the origin al medical emergency. Consider ing the plain language of the se provisi ons and the uncontr adicted evidence pertaining to Ry an’s m edical condition, we find no dispute as to whether the care provided by the defendants constituted emergency medical

care. The parties and the Dail eys’ medical expert agree that Ryan p resented at the eme rgency

room wi th a high pressure puncture wound to his hand tha t5 Nor can we agree with t he Dailey s’ cont ention t hat although Ry an’s condi tion was worsening as he wa ited fo r surge ry, he wa s stable beca use th e def enda nts did not trea t him l ike he was in cri sis. The definit ion of emergency medical ca re depends on t he actua l medical conditi on of the i ndividualpatie nt, not the manner in which suc h conditi on is t reate d. See Bo nds v . Nes bitt , 322 Ga . Ap p. 85 2, 85 5 (7 47 S E2 d 40 ) (20 13)

. 6 required eme rgency

surgery to mini mize

the degree

of seco ndary

injury in his hand and fore arm. All furt

her agre e that defenda

nts had a duty wit

hin the medic al s tandard

of care to atte mpt to l ocate

an available

hand surge on in a timely manner, including by tra nsfer to another medical facility wit h an available hand surgeon if nec essary. Contrary to the Daileys’ arg

ument , there is no evide nce in t

he rec ord that Ryan’s medical condition had stabilized s o as to render him c apable

of rece iving medical tre atment as a nonemergency patient. See OCGA § 51-1 -29.5 (a) (5). The fact that Ryan’ s need for emergency surgery was “not chang ing or flu ctuating” i s n ot evidence that h is medical condition had sta bilize d to the poi

nt tha t he no l onger requi red emergency treat ment to avoid se rious injury. In fact, the Daileys’ cla

ims are base d on their content ion, a contention not di sputed by defenda nts, th at at all relevant times Ryan remained in need of emergency su rgery. 5 Beca use the evi denceon summ ary judgment establ ishes wi thout

dispute that Dr. Abde l-Sam ed’s and Epps’ actions we re take n after the onse t of a7

medical or traumatic condit ion causing sev ere pain suc h that the absenc e of medical attention could reasonably be expected to result in pla cing Ry an’s health in seriou s jeopa

rdy or in s erious dy sfunction to h is hand, we find t

he Court of Appeals erre d by findi ng a ques tion of fa ct as t o the ap p lica bility o f OCGA § 51-1-2 9.5 (c). The Court of A

ppeals’ relia

nce on Crewey was misplac ed, as that ca se is both factua

lly and substantively d

istinguish abl e. Theplainti ff in Crewey suffered a heart attack and requ ired an emergency transfer f rom the medical centerwherehe pres e nted to another facility. The medical center called an amb ulance c ompany , Ame rican M edical Respon se (AMR ), but AM R had no ambulances availa

ble. Eventual ly, a

nother a mbula nce se rv ic e was c ontact ed, and Crewey was transferred. Crewey s ued AMR, alleging it wa s negligent in its eff orts to transfer him a

nd as a r esult of t

he dela y, he s uffere d severe

heart damage. AMR

sought summary judgme

nt, contending it was imm une from civil liability as an emergency care provider p ursuant to OCGA § 31-11 -8 (a), a statute which grants imm unity to licensed ambulance servi ces and their agents and employees who in good fait h render eme rgency

careto a per son who is t

he victim of an accident or emergency. The trial court gra nted the motion, and the8

Court of Ap peals reversed, con cluding th at “AMR did no t render ‘emergency care’ as contemplated by OCGA § 31 -11-8 (a). To the c ontrary , it wa s AMR’s inability to provide C rewey

with the nece ssary emergency c are . . . tha t led to t he series of event s in question.” ( Footnote om itted. ) Id. at 263. Thus, the statuto ry immunity sought by A

MR and granted by

OCGA § 31-11-8 (a) to those w ho provide ambulance services in an eme rgency situati on did not

apply in Crewey becau se the pl aintif

f’s n eglig ence claims w ere ba sed on al legati ons that t he ambul ance compa

ny provide d no eme

rgency servic es. In contrast, the evi dencein this c ase de monstra tes tha t Dr. Abdel-Samed and E pps provided emergency medical service s to Ryan through their

examination

and diagnosis of his medical cond ition and th eir efforts to transfer him to a hand surgeo n. Moreove r, unlike in Crewey , it is un disputed t hat the se defendants had a duty

under the app licable standard o f medical careto atte mpt to locate an available hand su rgeon to per form the requir edemergency surgery. The Daileys’ claims, therefore, are based on clear allegation s that the pro vided emergency medic al ser

vices f a iled to meet the applicable standar d of care, thereby rendering OCGA§ 51-1-2 9.5 (c) applicabl e. See Bonds v. Nesbitt , 322 Ga. App. 852 (1 ) (747 SE2 d 40) (20 13). See a lso OCG A § 51-1-29. 5 (a) (7)9

(definin g “healt

h care ” as “a

nyact or treat

ment p erform ed or

furnished , or that should have be en perfo rmed o r furnishe d”); OCGA § 51-1-29.5 ( a) (9) (de fining “healt h care liabili ty cla

im” t o include

a cau se of acti on agains t a phys ician o r health care provi der for treatment or lack of treatment). 2. Alth ough n ot addressed b y the Court of Ap peals, the Daileys furt her argued that summary judgmen t wa s not war ranted becau se there exist s a questi on of fa ct as to whether the d efendants pro vided “bo na fide emergency services.” OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (a) (5). They urge us, as they did

the Court of Appeals , to constru e the phrase “bo na fide emergency services” to r en de r OCGA§ 51-1-2 9.5 (c) applicabl e only to thos e cases in which emergency medical s erv ices a

re provide d honestly

or in good faith. Com pleting t he argument, the Daileys posit that Dr . Abdel -Same d and Epps did not provi de the emergency medic al ser

vices in good fait

h, and the refore , they

are not entitled to claim the heightened p rotection set f orth in OCGA § 51-1-29 .5 (c). In the interpreta

tion of al l statut es, the

courts sh all look

diligently for the intenti on of the General As semb ly. OCGA § 1-3-1 (a). Legislative intent is determined from c onsidera tion of the entire statute; thus we c onsider a statuto ry provision not in iso lation, but i n the context o f the other statuto ry provisi ons of10

which it is a part. Hendry v. Hend ry , 292 Ga. 1, 3 (73 4 SE2d 46 ) (2012)

. In this instanc e, the

legisla ture ch ose not to defin e “bona fide” within O CGA § 51- 1- 29.5. Nor is it defined elsewhere in the Torts section of the G e orgia Co d e. It is, however, a phrase of general usag e and m ust be given its ordinary

mea ning. See OC GA § 1-3-1 (

b). The America

n Herit age Di ctiona

rydefines “bo na fide”

as “made or carried out i n good fait h,” “authentic,” or “genuine.” American Herita ge Dictio nary

214 (3 rd ed. 1992). Webster’s Dictio nary similarly defines “bona fide” as “real or genui ne,” “made or done in an honest and s incere way.” Merria m-webst er.com, http://w

ww.m erriam -webster.com /dictio nary/bo nafi de

. Blac k’s Law D ictiona

ry defines theterm

to me an both “in

g ood fait h” or “sincerely” and “truly, actually ” but recognizes that “bona fide” ofte n i s used ambiguously

and ma y desc ribe either something that is rea l or trueor some thing that is “witho ut notice of any fra

ud.” T helaw di ctiona ry.org , http://www.thelawdic tionary.org/b onafi de. See a lso Bla ck’s La w Dictionary 168 (7 th ed. 1999). St rict dictionar y defin itions thus suggest two possible

mea nings for the term “bo na f id e,” e ither “i n good fait h” or “ge nuine” a

nd “true.” In construi ng language used in a statute, however, we also must consider11

the context

in which a phrase is used a

nd the le gislati ve inte nt behind e nactm ent of the statute. See Restin a v. Crawf ord , 205 Ga. App. 887, 888 (424 SE2d 79) (1992). In the context of OCGA § 51-1 -29.5 (a) (5), “bo na fide” is used as an adjec tive to desc ribe the type of eme rgency

medic al ser

vices t o which t

he heightened protections of OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c) shall apply. OCGA § 51-1- 29.5 itself was enacted as part of the Tor t Reform Act of 2005, Ga . L. 200 5, pp. 1 , 11-13, § 10, a legislative e ffort intended to promote affordable li ability insurance for hea l th care providers and hospit als and thereb y prom ote the availability

of quality

healthcare services. Ga. L . 2005, pp. 1-2, § 1. As part of this effort, the foc us of OCG A § 51-1-29. 5 (a) (5) is on the de finition of “emergency medical car e” an d r eflects a legislative in tent to pro vide greater protecti on from li ability

to physic ians an d healt

h care providers who provide genuineemergency medical care. This inte rpreta tion is born e out

by the s econd sentence of

subsection (a) (5) which ad dresses when an “ emergency” dissipat es. In arguing that “bona fide” should be read to m ean “good fait h,” th e Daileys focus e xclusive ly on the action s or inac tions of Dr. A bdel-Sa med a nd Epps, arguing

that their action s or inac tions show that they did not act in good faith. But OCG A § 51-1-29 .5 (a) ( 5) does not once m ention he alth ca re12

providers or their

action s. When the legisla ture wa nts to lim it an individual’s tort liability based o n good fait h actions, it app ears to do so b y descr ibing the individuals in question and by specifically saying that t hey must ac t in good faith. Many

of these Code se ctions a

re in the same chapter of the G eorgia Code

as OCGA § 51-1-29.5. See, e .g., OCGA § 51-1-20 (a) (“A person serving with

or without compensation a s a member, direct or, or trus tee, or as an office r of the board without compensation, of any no nprofit hosp ital or a ssocia tion or of any nonprofit, charit able, or

elee mosyna

ry insti tution or

organization or of any local gov ernmental agenc y, boa rd, auth ority, or entit

y shall be im mune f rom civi l liability for any act or any omissi on to ac t a rising ou t of such serv ice if such person was acting in good faith within the sc ope of his or her officia l action s and duties and unle ss the da

mage or injury was ca used by t he will ful or wa

nton misconduct of such per son.”); OCGA § 51-1-29 (“An y person , inclu ding any person licensed to practi ce m edicine and surge ry pursua nt to Arti cle 2 of Chapter 34 of Titl e 43 and includ ing a ny person licen sed to render s ervices ancill ary theret o, who in g ood fa ith ren ders emergency care at the scene of an acci dent or emergency

to the victim or victi ms the reof wit hout ma king any charge therefor shall not be liable fo r any civil damages as a result of any a ct or13

omissi on by such person in rendering emergency care or as a result of any act

or failure to act to provideor arra

nge for fur

ther m edical trea

tment or c are for the injured person.”); OCGA § 51-1-30 .2 (“Teachers and oth er school pers onnel shall be immune from

any civil liability

for communica

ting information in

good faith conce rning drug a buse by a

ny chil d to t

hat chi ld’ s parents, to law enforcement

officials, or to health

careproviders .”); O CGA § 31- 11-8 (a) (“ Any person, includin g agents and employees, who is li censed to furn ish ambulance service and who i n good faith renders eme rgency

careto a per son who is a victim of an ac cident

or eme rgency shall not be liable for any civil da

mages to such victim

as a result of any a ct or omission by

such per son in rendering such

e mergency care to such victim”). That the Ge neral Assembly

did not use this familiarlanguage in OCGA § 51-1-29 .5 bel ies the notio n that they inten ded “bona fid e” to describe the action s of health care pro viders. Accordingly, considerin g the p hrase “bona fide eme rgency services”

in its proper context, we find “bona f ide e mergency se rvices ” to m ean ge nuine or actual eme rgency

servic es. Be cause

there i s no disputed question of fact in this

casethat the defendan ts provid edactual emergency care, see Division 1, s upra, the heightened evidentiary bur den found in OCGA § 51-1 -29.5 (c) applie s, and14

this issu e did not pr eclude the grant o f summary judgment. 3. H aving de term ined tha t the undi sputed e vidence demons trate s the applicability

of OCGA

§ 51-1-29.5 (c) to t

he Daileys ’ clai ms, w e must determ ine whether there exists a question of fac t regar ding their c laim

of gross negligence. With prop er application o f OCGA § 51-1- 29.5 (c), the Daileys wouldbear

the burden at tr ial of provi ng by clear and conv incing evid ence that the de fendant s w ere gros sly neg ligent by failing to transf er Rya n to a ha nd surgeon in a ti mely

manner. See

OCGA § 51-1-29.5 (c); Johnson , supra. Summ ary judgment in fav or of the defen dants, therefo re, would be appropriate only if, viewing th e record evidence in a li ght most favo rable to t he Dai leys, there was no genuine iss ue of fa ct and t he me dical d efend ants show ed that a

reasona ble ju ry coul d not find gro ss neglig ence by cle ar and c onvincing evidenc e. “Gross negli gence ” is def ined as the absence of even slig ht diligence, and slight dil igence is defined in [OCGA § 51-1- 4] as “that degree of c are wh ich every ma n of comm on sense, howeve r inattentive he may be, e xercis es under

the same or similar circumstances.” [Cit.] Gliemmo v. Cousineau , 287 Ga . 7, 12-13 (694 SE2d 75) (201 0). See OCGA § 51-1-4. Applyin g this def inition in the con text of a medic al ma

lpract ice a ction15

brought pursuant t o OCGA § 51-1-29.5 ( c), li ability would be a

uthorize d where the evidence, includi ng admissible exp ert testimony, would per mit a jury to find byclear and convincin g eviden ce that the defendants cause d harm by grossly deviating from the applicable medical standard of care. See Johnson , supra, 2 94 Ga. at 82-83 (Blac kwell, J., concurring). As a general rule, “[w]hen fac ts alleged as cons tituting g ross negli genceare suc h t hat there i s room fo r d iffe rence of opinion be tween reasona ble [pe ople] a s to whet her or not negligence can be

inferre d, and if so wheth er in degree the neg ligence amounts to gross negl igence, the right t o draw th e inference is within the exc lusive province of the jur

y.” ( Citati on and punc tuation o mitte d.) Trustees of Trinity College v. Ferris , 228 Ga . App. 47 6, 477 (1) (4 91 SE2d 909) (1997). See Currid

v. DeKalb State C ourt Probation Dept. , 274 Ga. App. 704, 709 (2) (618 SE 2d 621) (2005). Viewedin the prop er

manner, the evidence

of reco rd shows that Ryan was diagnosed by Dr. Abdel-Sam ed and Epps before 1:00 a.m . witha high velocity puncture wound tha

t require d emergency

surgery . Dr. Abdel-Sa

med a ndEpps both testified that R

y an required emergency su rgery. The Daileys submitted expert testimo ny that Dr. Abd el-Same d’s and Epps’ actions, if any, in6 The Dailey s’ expert speci fical ly opined tha t the calls Dr. A bdel-Sam ed claims w ere made to other

hospit als would have be en completed wit hin one hour of Ry an’ s 1: 00 a .m. diagn osis and that D r. Abdel-S amed ’s failure to mak e any effort between 2:00 a.m. and 7: 33 a. m. to tr ansfer Ry an to a hand sur geon, espec iall y when she knew of the availability of Dr. Seiler, c onsti tuted gr oss negli gence and a gros s deviat ion from the applic able st andard of me dica l care

.

7 As recentl y st ated i n Johnson , sup ra, 2 94 G a. at 7 7, [w]hen faced with s uch a height ened burden, “a tri al judge must bear i n mind the actu al qu antu m a nd q ualit y of p roo f ne ces sary to sup por t liab ility. . . . [cit.] The app ro pr ia te sum mar y ju dgme nt questi on is ‘whether the e vidence i n the record could support a rea sonable j uryfinding e ither that t he p lai ntiff

has sho wn [the re quired elem ent] by cle ar and conv incing evide nce o r th at th e plaintiff has no t.’” (Citation om itted.)

16 attem pting to transfer Ryan to a hand surgeo n did not meet the medical standa rd of careunder lik e circumst ances because Dr. Abdel-Samed and Epps either made no effort to transf er Rya n to a hand surg eon or waited 5.5 hours to contact Dr. Seiler

after learning that no o ther ha nd surgeon was avai lable. 6 Even applyi ng the hei ghtened

evident iary burden impos edby OCG A § 51-1-29. 5 (c), from this evidence a jury could find clear and convincin g evidence that defendants acted with gross negligence in their efforts to transf

er Rya n to a ha nd surgeon. 7 The defendants arg ue ajury co uld not find gro ss negligen ce because they exercised at

least slight dil igence

in cari ng for Ry an. Th ey point

to Dr. Abdel-8 We note in thi s regar d that t he Da ileys’ expe rt witne ss testified that ha d D r. Ab delSamed used her bes t effort s to l ocat e a hand sur geon but one had not been avail able, her conduct wo uld n ot hav e dev iated f rom the ap plicab le standard of care. Simila rly , he opi ned that he consider ed it wit

hin the appropri ate st andard of car e for a me dical d octor to deleg ate to emergency

room staff t

he responsi bili ty

of call ing other

hospit als i n search of

an av ailable han d su rge on. 17 Same d’s testimony that she d irected the emergency room unit secretary to seek

a transfer to a han d surgeon a nd afte r anothe r hand

surgeon c ould not befound, she contacted Dr. Seiler. There is also evidence , however, that no ca ll was m ade to MC CG, where a

hand surgeon was available on the morning in questio n . Moreove r, as stated, even assuming the telephone c alls were made, this evidence wouldnot contr adict t

he undispu ted eviden ce that Dr . Abdel -Samed at 1:00 a.m. believed that Ryan needed emergency surg ery and that no h and surgeo n was available at MCCG or AMC a nd she knew that Dr. Seiler was available to

acce ptRyan for surg ery, yet she took no additional actio n to effectuate a trans fer until she called Dr. Seil er at 7: 33 a.m. 8 In light of this evidence, we canno t say the evidenc e prec ludes a finding that Dr. Abdel-Same d and/or Epps grossly deviated from

the applicablemedic al sta ndard of c are in t

he trea tment of Rya n’s medical condition

. In summ ary, although w e find no qu estion of fact pe rtaini ng t o the18

applicability

of OCGA § 51-1 -29.5 to th e Daileys’ claims, t he Dailey s have shown facts suffici ent to ra ise a jury question a s to gross ne gligenc e on thepart of the defendants . See Currid , supra, 274 Ga. App. at 709 (2); Trustee s of Trinity Colleg e , 228 Ga. App. at 47 7-478. Accordingly, th e evidence presented

was suff icient to pr eclude t he gran t of su mma ry jud gment

in favor o f the defendants on this groun d, and th e decision of the Court of Appeals is affirm ed.

Judgme nt affir

med. All the

Justice s concur .

Decid ed Marc h 10, 2014. Certio rari to t

he Court of Appeals of Ge orgia – 319 Ga. A pp. 380. Ca rlock, C opeland & Stair , Thomas S. Carlock, Eric J. Fr isch , for appell ants. Reynol ds, Horne & Surv ant, W. C ar l Rey nolds, Bradley

J. Surva nt , for appell ees.