### IN THE S UP REME COURT OF TENNESS EE AT NAS HVILLE Fe bruary12, 200 4 S es sio n
JOSEP H A ND JEAN GON Z ALE Z v. S TAT E OF TEN NES SEE DEP AR TME NT OF CHILD REN ’S S ERV ICES ,

IN TH E MA TTEROF A. J.H.
Int e r loc ut or y A ppe al b y P e r m iss ion fro mth e Co ur t o f Appe als , M iddleSe c ti on

Juvenile Court for Davidson County No. 2219-68191 Bet ty Adam s Gr een, Judge

No. M2003- 02405-SC-S09-JV - F iled Jun e 17, 2004

I n this int erloc utory

appeal, we conside r whe ther and under w hat circ umstances g randpa rents may intervenein proce eding s broug ht to terminate the pa rent-c hild relationship. I n this case, the g randpa re nts fi le d a

motionin the juv e nil e c ou rt to i nte rv e ne in a

te rm inatio n o f parental ri g hts proce eding . The juvenile c o u rt d en i ed the motion, and the g randpa rents moved f

or interlocutory appeal pur s u an t t o Tenne ssee Rule of A ppellate Proc edure9. The trial c ourt g rante d the motion. F oll ow ing theCou rt

of Ap pe a ls’ de nial of

theg randpa

re nts ’ a pp lic a tio n f

or pe rm iss ion to a

pp e a l, they filed an a pplication for pe rmission to appeal to this Court; we gr anted the app l i ca tion. After a tho ro ug h r e vie w o f the re c or d andre le vant l e g a l auth ority , w e c on c lud e that th e motionfi le d in juvenile court seeking intervention i n the t ermination of parenta l rig hts case is to be analy zed under Tenne ssee Rule of Civil Procedur e 24. Using this analy sis, we find no er ror and aff

irm the denial of the motion to intervene. Tenn. R. App . P . 9 Interlocutor y Appeal; Jud gm ent of the Juvenil e Court Aff irm ed; Case Re m anded to the Juvenil e Court for Davidson County
A DOL PH O A. B I RCH , J R
. , J

. , d el ivere d the opinion of the court, in which F RAN K F. D R OW OT A , III , C.J ., and E. R I L EY A NDE R S ON , J ANI CE M. H OL DER , and W I L L I AM M. B ARKE R , J J ., joined.
T h o ma s H

. M il le r , Fr a n k li n , T e n n e s s e e , f o r th e ap p e ll a n ts , Jo s e p h a n dJe a n G o n za le z. Paul G. Summers, Attorney Ge n er al and Reporter; Michae l E. Moore, Solicitor Gene ral; and Eliz abeth C. Dr i ver, A ssistant Attorney Gene ral, for

the appe llee, Te nnessee Depa rtment of Chi ldr e n’ s Se rv ic e s. Opin ion
I. F acts and P roce dural Hi storyT h e re c o rd in this c a se ha s b e e n se a le d , an d the c h ild w ill b e id e n tif ie d b y the initials “A .J .H .” 1

A c c o rd ing to the re c o rd , M a lisa H a ll h a s five c h ild re n : d a u g h te r A .S ., b o rn o n M a y 1 5 , 1 9 9 6 ; d a u g h te r S .S ., 2 b o r n o n J a n u a r y 1 5 , 1 9 9 9 ; d a u g h t e r A

. H. , b o r n o n M a y 10 , 2 0 0 0 ; s o n D. W

. H. , b o r n o n A p r i l 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 ; a n d s o n , A

. J

. H. (the sub je ct o f

t his c ase ) b o rn o n M ay 1 1 , 2 0 0 2 . D o na l d H all w as no t the b i o l o gica l father o f the t w o o l d est d au gh t ers, A

. S. an d S. S. T he t es t i mo ny i s un cl ear , but appare nt l y H al l was ac cus ed of mo l es t i ng A. S. an d S. S. , an d under an agr eement i n w hi ch t he cha r ges wer e n ot pros ecu t ed, he vol un t ar i l y s urrend ere d h i s par ent al r i gh t s t o hi s bi ol ogi cal d a u g h t e r , A

. H. I t a p p e a r s a l s o t h a t Ha l l w a s t h e b i o l o g i c a l f a t h e r o f s o n D. W

. H. a n d t h a t h i s p a r e n t a l r i g h t s t o D. W

. H.
w e re a lso ter m ina te d

.

S inc e h e w a s ta k e n into S ta te c u sto d y, A .J .H . ha s b e e n in the c u sto d y o f f o ste r p a re n ts, E d w a rd a n d C yn thia 3 L aB o nn e. T he L aB o nn es a l so f i l ed a p eti t i o n to i nterv en e in t he t erm i na t i o n p ro ce ed i ng s.

-2- A. J.H. wa s b orn o n M a y 11 , 2 00 2, in D a vid so n Co un ty , T e nn e sse e , to Ma lis a a ndDo na ld 1 Hall. The a

ppellants, J ean and J oseph Gonz alez, are the paternal g randmother and step-g randf

ather , respe ctively , of A.J.H. On May 16, 2002, the Tenne ssee De partment of Children’s Service s (“the a g e nc y ” ) f

ile d inthe Juv e nil e Cou rt of Da vid so n Co un ty a petition for c ustody and eme rg ency remova l of A.J.H. According to the petition, the age ncy had information from a Michig an prote ctive se rv ic e a g e nc y

that Ma lis a

Ha ll’ s p are ntal ri g hts to he r fo ur old e r c hil dr e n h a d b e e n te rm inate d in Michig an base d on alleg ations tha t Do n al d Ha ll had molested two of them. The pe tition allege d 2 also that the Halls had li ved in Michig an and had come to Tenne ssee for A.J.H.’s birth because they believed that they would be able to ke ep the child in the ir car e and custody wer e the birth to occ ur outside of Michig an. B ased on the p et i t ion, the J uvenile Court issued an Eme rg ency Protective Custody Orde r on May 16, 2002, and the child was place d in the foster home i n wh i ch h e now re sid e s.
On M ay 20, 2002, the petit ion was heard. Thecourt found that A.J .H. was a depende nt and neg lected c hild as defined in Te nnessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b) (1), - 102(b)( 12)(B ), - 10 2( b) (1 2) (F ), a nd -1 02 (b )( 12 )( G)

. Th us , the c ou rt fo un d th a t c us tod y

of A. J.H. sh ou ld r e ma in w ith the ag ency

and orde red the ag ency to prepa re a “Plan of Car e.” T his “Plan of Care ,” or pe rmane ncy plan, wa s de ve lop e d on May 31 , 20 02

. It wa s ho pe d th a t th e c hil d w ou ld b e re turne d to thepa re nts

. The plan ma de no ref

ere nce to othe r relatives. A second pe rmane ncy plan was de veloped on May 8, 2003, with the same g oal. Ag ain, therewas no mention of r elatives. On May 15, 2003, the ag ency

filed a pe tition t o terminate pa renta l ri g hts. On Aug ust 18, 2003, the Gonzalezes filed a motion to intervenein the pare ntal termination ca se. I n that motion, 3 theGo nza le zes state d th e ir “ wi shto a do pt the ir

g rand so n. ” At

thehe ari ng on thepe titionto int e rv e ne , Mrs . Gon zal e z te sti fi e d that she did no t know that A .J.H . w a s info ste r c areun til Do na ld Hall, her son and the father of A .J .H., called he r in mid-J une. She acknow ledg ed that she knew that Malisa Hall wa s preg nant and that the Halls had g one to T ennesse e, but she stated that she did not k n o w h o w to r e a c h th e m. A c c o r d in g to G o n za le z, Do na ld Ha ll wou ld ca ll pe ri od ic a lly , but h e did not disclose wher e he w as or that A.J.H. was not in his custody

. At the t ime of t he hearing , she had not seen he r g randson and acknow ledg ed that she ha d not goneto Tennesse e to visit him

.A

. H

. was born on M ay 10, 200 0. A M i chi gan cour t t er mi nat ed D onal d H al l ’ s pare nt al r i gh t s t o A

. H

. by order 4
o n M a rc h 1 2 , 2 0 0 1 . D o n a ld H a ll a lso fi le d a vo lun ta ry “R e le a se o f C h ild b y P a re n t” o n tha t sa m e d a te

. M a lisa H a ll’ s p a re n ta l righ ts w ith re g a rd to A .H . w e re ter m ina te d o n J u ly 1 9 , 2 0 0 1

. -3- Mrs. Gonzalez testified that she had n o t k n o wn of the pr eg nancy , birth, or voluntary surre nder of

another g randc hild, a g irl, until several months afte r the c hild had been a dopted. She 4 stated that Donald Ha ll had told her that he ha d to sign a way his rig hts to the baby g irl because he ha d b e e n ac c us e d of ch ild mol e statio n. She c la ime d th a t sh e ha d n ot kno wnabo ut that c hil d u nti l afte r t h e child had been plac ed in a f oster home. F inally , she testified that ha d she known a bout A.J .H., she would ha ve come to Tennesse e sooner
. Dona ld H a ll main tain e d th a t f r o m th e ti me th e c h il d w a s r e mo v e d u n ti l th e time the te rm inatio n p e tit ionwa s f ile d, thea g e nc y c a se wo rk e rs did no t a sk him abo ut h is M ic hig a n r e lativ e s. He testified that hedid not want the child to be plac ed with his mother, Mrs. Gonzalez, because he be lie ve d th a t hec ou ld r e g a in c us tod y of A. J.H. by me e tin g thec a se wo rk e r’ s r e qu ir e me nts

. Ad dition a lly , h e state d th a t he wante d to sh ow his pa re nts that hewa s r e sp on sib le by de a lin g wi th thepr ob le m hi mse lf . M or e ov er, an agenc y c a se ma na g e r, An g e la

Hi lli ard , te sti fi e d th a t th e c a se worke r who wa s ini tia lly inv olv e d inthere mov a l of thec hil d f

ro m th e ho sp ita l ha d a sk e d D on a ld Hall to i d en t i fy o t h er f

amily members “ in Nashville,” but he disclose d neither the names nor locations of any

family members in Na shville. (And indeed, there were none in Nashville.) Hilliard never contac ted the Ha l l s ’ M i chigan r elatives be causeshe wa s not awar e of the ir exist ence . She acknow ledg ed that she kne w about an a unt and uncle in Ke ntucky and a non- biological “sister.” She state d, ho we ve r, that D on a ld H a ll n e ve r m e nti on e d M rs . G on zal e z an d th a t sh e ne ve r a sk e d h im ab o u th e r
. A c c o r d i n g t o H i l l i ar d , D o n a l dH a l l s t a t e dt h a th e d i dn o tg e ta l o n g w i t h h i s f a m i l y.
After the hea ring on the motion to int erve ne, the tria l court found that e ven thoug h the ag ency “did not actively

pursue other

relatives,” the c ase w orker s h ad n evertheless met their statutory obligation to seek place ment within the family . Specifica l l y , t h e co u rtstated: “Could the Depa rtment have done more ? Certainly

. Ho we v er , at some point, a pare nt must st ep up and c on tribu te to the pr oc e ss. ” Th e tria l c ou rt no te d th a t a lth ou g h Dona ld Ha ll w a s sp e c if ic a lly questioned about his relatives, he off ere d no names or phonenumbers of individuals who mig ht be abl e to ta k e c ar e o f th e c h il d

. I n a d d itio n , a c c o r d in g to th e trial c o u rt, D o n a ldH a ll s tate dth a t he “didn’t haveanything to do with his pare nts and they did not ge t along .”
The trial c ourt also found that the Gonzalezes had known that Donald Hall did not have the means to ca

re f or the c hild, had done nothing to “follow up with reg ard to the c areof the child,” and ha d p re vio us ly

los t on e g rand c hil d b e c aus e th ey di d no t kn ow abo ut the te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s. T h e co u rt ru l ed that a third pa rty must demonstrate a “ leg ally protec ted intere st” in the ca re and custody of a child befor e interve ntion is allowed in a pare ntal termination proce eding . The trial c ourt conclude d:
The C o u rt w o u ld h a v e p e r mi tt e d th e g r a n d mo th e r to in te rv e n e if s h e had demonstrated e ither that she wa s entitled to intervene by virtue of a statute or priorT en ne ssee C o d e A nn o t ated sec t i o n 3 6

- 1

- 1 1 3 (b ) (2 0 0 1 & S up p
. 2 0 0 3 ) p ro vid es: 5 T he p rosp ect i ve ad o p t i ve p arent or p arent s o f t he c h il d , i ncl ud i ng ext end ed f am i l y m em b ers cari ng for r el at ed ch i l dren , an y l i cen s ed ch i l d- pl aci ng ag enc y ha vi ng cu s t od y of t he chi l d, t he chi l d' s gu ar di an ad l i t em , a co urt ap p o i nt ed s p eci al ad vo cat e (C A SA ) agency, o r t he d ep art m ent shal l have st and i ng to fi le a p e tit io n p u rs u a n t t o this p a rt o r p u rs u a n t t o ti tle 3 7 to ter m ina te p a re n ta l o r g u a rd ia n sh ip rig h ts o f a p erso n a l l eg ed t o b e a p ar e n t o r gua rd i an o f such ch i l d

. T he p ro sp ec t i ve ad o p t i ve p are nts, i nc l ud i ng ex t en d ed f am i l y m em b ers c aring fo r r e la te d ch i l d ren , sha l l ha ve st an d i ng t o req ue st te rm ina tio n o f p a re n ta l o r g u a rd ia n sh ip rig h ts in the a d o p tio n p e tit io n fi le d b y the m p u rs u a n t t o this p a rt.

-4- court orde r or that she had exercised significant control and responsibilityreg arding the child, neither

of which ha s been e stablished. The Gonzalezes immediately filed an a pplication for interlocutory appeal under Rule 9 of the Tenne ssee Rules of Appellate Proce dure. Thetrial court g rante d permission to file the interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appe als denied the application for permissive interlocutory appeal. This Court g rante d an in te rl oc uto ry

app e a l.
II. Stand ard of Review
The issue be fore the Court is whether the t rial court err ed in denying the Gonzalezes’ motion to i nte rv e ne a s o f rig ht. F or de nial of int e rv e nti on a s of ri g ht (f or a re a so n o the r than th e tim e lin e ss of the a pplication), re view is de novo. State v. Br own & Wil liamson Tobacc o Corp., 18 S.W .3d 186, 191 (Tenn. 2000) . Conclusions of law ar e reviewe d de novo upon the re cord w ith no presumption of cor rec tness while our “re view of finding s of fa ct by the trial court in civil actions shall be de novo
u p o n t h e r ec o rd o f t h e tri al co u rt , ac co m p an i ed b y a p re s u m p t i o n o f t h e c o rr ec t n es s o f t h e f i n d i n g, un le ss the pr e po nd e ranc e of thee vid e nc e is o the rw ise .” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3 ( d) (20 03 ); se e a lso J ones v. Ga

rre tt, 92 S.W .3d 835, 838 (Tenn. 2002); I n re Valentine, J r., 79 S.W .3d 539, 546 (Tenn. 2002); Union Carbide Corp. v. H uddleston, 854 S.W .2d 87, 91 (Tenn. 1993)

. III . A nal ys is
To determine whether

the trial court corre ctly

denied the G onzalezes’ motion to i nterve ne, wemus t f ir st d e te rm inewh ic h r

ule s a pp ly to i nte rv e nti on in j uv e nil e c ou rt pr oc e e din g s.
A. T h i rd P ar t y

I n t er v en t i o n i n P ar en t al R i gh t s T er m i n at i o n P ro ce ed i n gs
Th e pe tit ionto te rm inate pa re ntal ri g hts wa s fi le d in Juve nil e Cou rt

. Al tho ug h s ta nd ing to fi le a pe tit ionto t e rm inate pa

re ntal rig hts is s tatut oril y res tr ict e d to tho se pe rs on s d e sig nate d in Tenne ssee Code A nnotat ed section 36-1-113(b) (2001 & Supp. 2003), intervention in such 5T he R ul es of Juveni l e P roce d ure were d esi gned so t hat i ss ues i nvo l vi ng chi l d ren may be q ui ckl y ad d res sed and 6

n o t en c u m b e re d b y the ru le s o f m o re fo rm a l p ro c e e d ing s. S e e T e n n
. R

. J u v
. P . 1 (c ) (2 0 0 3 ). T h e se R u le s o f Ju v e n ile P roce d ure do not, how ever, ad d res s i nt ervent i o n.

T e n n e sse e R u le o f C ivil P ro c e d u re 1 p ro v id e s in p e rtine n t p a rt: 7 Sub ject t o s uch excep t i o ns as s t at ed i n t hem , t hese r ul es s hal l go vern t he p roce d ure i n t he ci rcui t and ch an ce r y c ou r t s o f

T enness ee a n d i n ot h er c ou r t s w h i l e ex er ci s i n g j u r i s di ct i on of t h e ci r cu i t or ch an ce r y c o urt s, in al l c i v i l a ct i on s , w h et h er a t l aw or i n e qu i t y , i n cl u di n g c i v i l a ct i on s a ppea l ed or o t he rw i se transferre d t o t ho se c o urts.
S e e S k e rr e tt v . A ss’n fo r G u id a n c e , N o
. M 2 0 0 2 -0 0 2 1 8 -C O A -R 3 -J V , 2 0 0 3 W L 2 1 6 3 4 4 1 2 , at *2 (T e n n . C t. 8 A p p . J u ly 1 1 , 2 0 0 3 ) (h o ld ing tha t T e n n e sse e R u le o f C ivil P ro c e d u re 2 4 is no t ap p lica b le to p ro c e e d ing s in J u v e n ile C o urt ).

W h e n a c h ild is re m o v e d fro m th e h o m e , “[ t]h e first p re fer e n c e is t o re u n ite th e fam ily b y re tur n ing the c h ild

9 t o hi s p arent s o r pl aci ng t he chi l d wi t h rel at i ves; t he second i s p erm anent placem ent t hrough ad o p t i o n. ” St at e v. Sm i t h, (c o n tinu e d ...) -5- proce eding s is not addressed by statute or by

the Rules of Juvenile Procedure

. 6
Th e le g isl a tur e ha s pr ov ide d, ho we ve r, that jurisd ic tio n to te rm inate pa re ntal or g ua rd ia ns hip rig hts resides conc urre ntly in the chanc ery , circ uit, and juvenil e co urts. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36- 1- 11 3( a ) ( 20 01 ). B e c aus e the Rul e s of Civ il Pr oc e du rec on c e rn ing int e rv e nti on wo uldapp ly in b oth chanc ery and cir cuit cou rt p ro ceeding s to terminate par ental rig hts, and bec ause the ir application would not compromise the ef fica cy of juvenile proc eeding s, we find that standing to intervene in a te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g in j uv e ni le cou rt sh ou ld b e ana ly zedun de r R ule24 of theRul e s o f C ivi l Procedur e. See T enn. R. Civ. P. 1 (2003). Acc ording ly , we e x pressly overr ule any holding to the 7
c o n tr ary. 8
B. Interve ntion as of Right
The Gonzalezes conte nd that they areentitled to intervene as of right in the termination pr oc e e din g s. Rul e 24 of

theTe nn e sse e Rul e s of

Civ il Pr oc e du re(2 00 3) pr ov ide s inpe rtine nt p art :
24.01 I nterve ntion as of Right – Upon timely application any one shall be pe rmitted to in terve ne in an a c tio n: ( 1) wh e n a statut e c on fe rs a n u nc on dition a l rig ht t o intervene ; or (2) w hen the a pplicant claims an inter est relating to t h e p ro p ertyor transac tion which is the s ubject of the action and the applicant is so s ituated that the d i s p o s i t i o n o f t h e ac t i o n m ay as a p ra ct i ca l m at t er i m p ai r o r i m p ed e t h e ap p l i ca n t 's ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant' s interest is adequately repr esente d by e xistin g pa

rtie s; o r ( 3) by

sti pu latio n o f all t

he pa rtie s.
T h e G o n z al ez es s u p p o rtt h ei r c o n t en t i o n t h att h eyh av e ari gh tt o i n t er v en e w i t h t h e f o l l o wi n g:
1. A biologic al conne ction to the child; and 2. Th e a lle g a tio n th a t th e a g e nc y faile d to se arc h f

or re lativ e s. 9(

. . . con t i n u ed) 9 7 8 5 S.W

. 2 d 3 3 6 , 3 3 8 (T enn. 1 9 9 0 ) (ci t i ng T enn. C o d e A nn. § 3 7

- 2

- 4 0 3 (a)( 1 ))

. St at e and Federa l l egi s l at i on r ecogn i ze t hat t he p l acem ent of chi l d ren i n ad o p t i ve ho m es s ho ul d be a las t resort , p urs ued only where res t o rat i o n of a chi l d t o t he bi ol og i ca l f ami l y i s n ot pos s i bl e or a ppr opr i at e. Se e, e. g
. , 42 U

. S. C. A. § 625( a) ( 1) ( W es t 2004) ; T en n
. Code An n
. §§ 3 7

- 2

- 4 0 3 (a)( 1 ), - 4 0 3 (d), - 4 1 4 (a)( 2 ) ( 2 0 0 1 ). -6- Cou rt s h a ve re a c he d v arying c on c lus ion s r e g ard ing theri g ht o f g randpa re nts to int e rv e ne in de pe nd e nc y

a ndte rm inatio n o f p are ntal rig hts pr oc e e din g s. Juri sd ic tio ns a c c or din g g randpare nts a ri g ht t o in te rv e ne inc lud e theSup re me Cou rt of Ne br a sk a , wh ic h no te d that on c e pa re ntal rig hts to a child ar e terminated, the g randpa rents’ relationship would also be terminated. In re K ay le C., 574 N.W.2d 473, 477-78 (Neb. 1998) . Consequently , it found that “g randpa rents [of a juvenile who is the subject of a

depende ncy

proce eding ] h av e a d i re ct leg al intere st in the subject matter of a j u v en i l e d ependency

proce eding which entitles them to interveneas a matter of right . . . .” I d. at 478.
Th e Sup re me Cou rt of I ow a ha s c on c lud e d th a t be c aus e I ow a ’s te rm inatio n s tatut e specific ally

provides that up o n t er m i nation, a court may transfe r g uardianship and custody to a relative, “g randpa

rents ar e s u fficiently

‘intere sted in the subject matter ’ of thesetermination proce eding s so as to have a rig ht to intervene

. . . .” In re J.R., 315 N.W .2d 750, 752 (I owa 1982) , overr uled by I n re B .B.M., 514 N.W.2d 425 (I owa 1994). I n a later case , howeve r, broug ht in the context o f

a v o lu n ta ry te r mi n a ti o n b y

th e b io lo g ic a l p ar e n ts , th e I o w a c o u rt n o te dth a t a llowing g randpa re nts to i nte rv e ne in c a se s inwh ic h th e pa re nts didno t w a nt the ir

c hil d to be a do pte d w ith in t h e family , “would be to e levate the g randpa rents’ inter ests above the interests of the pa rents,” a s well as “delay and disrupt the adoption proce ss.” I n re B .B.M., 514 N.W.2d 425, 429 (I owa 1994)

. Th a t c ou rt

c on c lud e d th a t w he rethenatur a l pa re nts ha ve a g re e d to re lin qu ishthe ir pa re ntal rig hts , “ g randpa re nts ha ve no int e re st t o a sse rt that is e nti tle d to leg a l pro te c tio n. ” I d. a t 430. Ne ve rthe le ss, beca use the c hild’s adoption had failed in that ca s e bec ause of a potential medical condition, the c ou rt ultimate ly

he ld that it

wa s inthebe st i nte res t of thec hil d to a llo w the g randpa re nts to intervene . I d. at 431.
Like wi se , th e Sup re me C ou rt of Arizon a ha s a ddre sse d th e iss ue in the c on te xt of a c hil d w h o s em o th e r

w a s d e c e a s e da n dw h o s e f a t h e r r e l i n q u i s h e dc u s t o d y

o f t h e t h e n e i g h t

- m o n t h

- o l db ab y. B e c hte l v. Ros e , 72 2 P.2 d 23 6, 23 8 (A ri z. 19 86 ). Th e mate rn a l g rand mothe r s ou g ht t o in te rv e ne in thede pe nd e nc y

he ari ng s. I d. Th a t c ou rt c on c luded that “ g randpa re nts sh ou ld b e a llo we d to intervenein their pare ntless gr andchildre n’s depe ndency proce eding s unless it would not be in the child’s best intere st.” I d. at 242.
The Supreme Court of Utah has held in a c ustody petition filed after

termination of par ental ri gh t s , that a g randpa

rent ha s an “inc hoate right or interest in the custody and we lfareof [grandchildren],” State ex rel. Summers v. Wulffenstein, 571 P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1977) , which is a “liberty interest” f

or purpose s of due pr ocess analy sis. St ate e x rel. Summers v. Wulffenstein, 61 6 P.2 d 60 8, 61 0 (U tah 19 80 ). An d, in Mis so uri, g randpa re nts are g ive n the ri g ht to i nte rv e ne in certain custody

proce eding s by

statute, unless the court decides that such intervention is ag ainst the-7-

be st i nte re st o f the c hil d. I n r e M. B., 91 S.W. 3d12 2, 12 5 ( Mo . Ct . A pp . 2 00 2) . N on e the le ss, in c u s t o d y p r o c e e d i n g s t o w h i c h t h e s t a t u t e d o e s n o t ap p l y , a M i s s o u r i c o u rt h a s he ld t ha t a g randpa rent’s “ biological relationship to the child, by itself, does not cons t i t ute the nec essary “intere st” under [the rules of civil proce dure], to require intervention.” In re Adoption of H.M.C., 11 S.W .3d 81, 90 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (c iting Mo. Sup. Ct. R . 52.12(a) (2))

. I n the majority of case s, howeve r, g randpa rents ar e not allowed to intervene in termination case s either because their i ntere sts are a dequate ly repr esente d by

the par ent’s attorne y

or g uardian a d li te m, o r b e c aus e the y

arede e me d to ha ve no int e re st i n th e ou tc ome of the pr oc e e din g s. I n a c a se in which the g randpa

rents soug ht intervention in depende ncy proce eding s after

a child wa s removed from their psy chotic daughte r’s custody , a Missouri court found that “the g randpa rents’ position was ad eq u at el y

p re s en t ed att h e h eari n g” b y t h e m o t h er ’s at t o rn eyan dd en i ed i n t er v en t i o n , ev en t h o u gh the child and mother

had re sided in the g randpa rents’ home. P.W

. v. A.W., 670 S.W .2d 563, 566 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
The S u p re m e C o u rt of Kansas has de nied interve ntion in a pare ntal termination hea ring statin g :
Whil e custody

of the child will eventua lly require determination, that is not the direc t iss ue in a [te rm inatio n] hea

ri ng . [T he g rand mothe r] i s n ot the pa re nt w ho se ri g hts to her child are in question. She is not the object of the court's a ction and, ther efor e should not be permitted to intervene

. Walker v. State, 630 P.2d 1102, 1106-07 (Kan. 1981). A F lorida court has held: [The statute] i s devoid of authority that would allow a g ra n d pare nt to enter an ong oing de pendenc y

action solely in his or her capa city as a g randpa rent. I t was the [age ncy ], not[t he g randmo t h er] , who orig inally petitioned for the a djudication of depende ncy . It is the child's mother , not [ the g randmother ], who is leg al custodian and custodian- in-fac t; it i s she, not [ t h e g randmother ], who stands to l ose a le g al rig ht. As previously

discussed, [the gr andmother] has no rig ht to custody in the event the child is adju d ged d ep endent; under the law, [the g randmother ] wil l not be adver sely aff ecte d by the outcome of

the ca se.
Hamel v. See kell (In re J.S.), 404 S o. 2d 1144, 1146 (F la. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
Ohio has ruled simil arly in In re Schmidt, 496 N.E.2d 952 (Ohio 1986). That court held a s fo llo ws :
Th e rewe reno a lle g a tio ns or e vid e nc e se t f

orth i n th e [grandpa

re nts ’] m oti on to intervenethat wo u l d rea sonably indicate that [they ] had a “rig ht” to custody of, or visitation wit h, their g randson. W h i l e persons “claiming a right” to custody or visitation m ust be joined as parties to custody proce eding s, any

such claim mustbe-8-

colora ble. The recor d in this case reve als only that the [ g randpa rents] had a “ desire” for c ustody

or visitation . . . . I n summation, the [ gra n d p ar en t s] never obtained, throug h statute, court or der, or other means, any leg al rig ht to c ustody or visitation with their g randson.
Like wi se , th e [g randpa

re nts ] ha d n o le g a l in te re st i n th e care andc us tod y of the ir g randson, whic h would have allowed them to intervene as of rig ht pursuant to Civ. R. 24(A) . . . . J ust a s the [grandpare nts’] desire for custody or visitation cannot be construed a s a leg al ri gh t to custody or visitation, the [ g randpa rents’] conce rn for their g randson' s welfa

re cannot be construe d as a le g al intere st that falls within the scope of Civ. R. 24(A).
I d. at 957.
A lth o u g h it is c o n c e iv ab le th a t a g r a n d p ar e n t may a d d u c e e v id e n c e s u f f ic ie n t to support intervention as of

rig ht in a pare ntal termination hearing, we ag ree with the majority of jurisdictions which hold that the g randpa renta l relationship does not alone support interventio n
. Her e, the g randpa rents’ primary

basis for intervention is their biological connec tion. W e find no ba sis in the statutes, constitution, or c ommon law of Tenne ssee for the conclusion that the rig hts and protec tions extended to pare nts ap p l y al s o t o g randpa rents. Additionally , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-1-117( a)( 1) (200 1 ) e xp li c itly li s ts p arties mandatory

to termination proce eding s; gr andpar ents are not included i n this li st. Moreover , Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 36-1-117(d)( 1) provides that “[o] ther biolog ical or le g al re latives of the c hild . . . are not ne cessa ry parties to the pr ocee ding.”
Nor a re w e per suaded by

the g randpa

rents’ c onten tion that the ag ency was slac k in the perf ormanc e of its duties in se eking relative place ment. We have held that the “intere st” requir ed fo r i nterv e nti on a s o f rig ht “ do e s n ot i nc lud e a me rec on tin g e nt , r e mot e , o r c on je c tur a l po ssi bil ity of being aff

ecte d as a result of the suit, but must involve a direc t claim on the subject matter of the suit .

. . . ” St a te v
. B r o w n & Wi ll iams o n T o b a c c o Co rp
. , 1 8 S. W. 3 d 1 8 6 , 1 9 2 ( T e n n
. 2 0 0 0). The Court may

not all o w s p eculative rig hts possibl y g leane d from a my

riad of c ircumstance s to open termination hearings to e very potential custodian. Be y ond that, the trial court st at ed , as we have alre ady noted, “Eve n though the ag ency did not a ctively pursue other

relatives because the father wa s not f orthcoming , the case worke rs had nevertheless met their statutory obligation to seek place ment with the family .” This conclusion of law is fully supported by

the re cord. Additionally , intervention as of rig ht is not appropriate in this case beca use t here is a party in the underly ing suit, the child’s father, who may a de qu a te ly re pr e se nt the Go nza le zes ’ int e re sts

. He re , Ha ll ha s su pp orte d the Gonz ale z e s’ motion to i nterve ne, an d , p re s umably , he will vigor ously pursue a ll of the issues the GonzalezesW e n ot e t hat al t houg h H al l di d not i ni t i al l y i nf orm t he G onzal eze s r ega r di ng A. J. H

. , t he r ecor d i ndi cat es t hat 10 Ha l l n o w s u p p o r t s t h e i r e f fo r t s t o g a i n c u s t o d y o f A

. J

. H. -9- could raise. Particularly in the context of these case s, wheredelay is to be avoided, the unne cessa ry 10 addition of parties and their attendant attorney s may not be allowed w herethe intere sts at stake ar e alre ady adequately

repr esente d.
We h a ve re vie we d th e c on c lus ionof the tria l cou rt that the Go nza le zes we reno t e nti tle d to int e rv e ne a s o f rig ht in th e ter mi nati on pr oc e e din g s. We a g re e that th e Go nza le zes ha ve faile d to demonstrate sufficie nt g rounds for intervention as of rig ht. Acc ording ly , we aff irm the judg ment of the trial court.
This ru l i ng , made at this i nterlocutory stag e of the proce eding s, does not leave the Go nzalez es w ith ou t a

re me dy . T he y

may pa rtic ipate in the te rm inatio n p ro c e e din g s a s w itn e sse s, the y may fi le a pe tit ionfo r c us tod y

or a do pti on , o r the y

may e le c t othe r a

pp ro priate op tio ns
. IV. Conclusion
Ac c or din g ly , th e tria l c ou rt ’s de nial of themotionto i nte rv ene is a ff irme d. Th is c a se is remanded to the Da vidson CountyJ uvenile Court for f urther pr ocee dings a s may be appr opriate. Not h i n g h er ei n shall be construe d as pre venting the Gonzalezes from filing a petition for c ustody and/or a doption. The costs of appe al ar e taxed to the appel l an t s , J oseph and Jean Gonzalez, for w h i c h e x e c u t i o n m a y i s s u e i f n e c e s s ary.

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AD OLPHO A. B I RCH , JR., JUSTI CE