alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Michigan Supreme Court

Lansing, Michigan

Robert P. Young, Jr.,

 Chief Justice

Michael F. Cavanagh

Marilyn Kelly

Stephen J. Markman

Diane M. Hathaway

Mary Beth Kelly

Brian K. Zahra, Justices

I, Corbin R. Davis, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

 _________________________________________ 

 Clerk

June 22, 2012 

t0619 

Order 

 

June 22, 2012 

145028 & (21) 

DENNIS LaLONE and DIANNE LaLONE, 

Co-Conservators of the Estate of Brandon 

LaLone, 

Plaintiffs-Appellees, 

v SC: 145028 

 COA: 308207 

St Joseph CC: 07-000914-NH 

RIEDSTRA DAIRY LTD., 

 Defendant-Appellant, 

and 

RT ENGINEERING LTD. f/k/a ROTA-TECH 

DAIRY SHEDS INTERNATIONAL LTD., RT 

INTERNATIONAL LTD. f/k/a ROTA-TECH 

DAIRY SHEDS INTERNATIONAL LTD., RT 

INSTALLATIONS LTD., and DeLAVAL, INC., 

Defendants-Appellees. 

_________________________________________/ 

 On order of the Court, the motion to expedite appeal is GRANTED. The 

application for leave to appeal the March 16, 2012 order of the Court of Appeals is 

considered and, pursuant to MCR 7.302(H)(1), in lieu of granting leave to appeal, we 

REMAND this case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. 

 HATHAWAY, J., would deny leave to appeal.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

THE UNITED STATES EX REL. ) 

DSEA SERVICES, INC. ) CASE NO. 3:17-cv-00083 

 ) 

Plaintiff, ) JUDGE THOMAS M. ROSE 

 )

v. ) 

 ) 

BRIGADIER CONSTRUCTION SERVICES, ) 

LLC., ET AL. ) 

 ) 

 Defendants, ) 

ORDER GRANTING JOINT MOTION TO STAY CASE PENDING 

MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION 

 

Pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 3 et seq. upon joint application of the 

parties, the Court orders the case stayed pending mediation and arbitration consistent with the 

subcontract agreement between DSEA Services, Inc. and Brigadier Construction Services, LLC. 

The parties are ordered to provide a status of the arbitration no later than May 10, 2018 if the 

case has not been dismissed prior to that time. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 __________________________________ 

 The Honorable Thomas M. Rose 

*s/Thomas M. Rose

July 13, 2017
#### Larry Ellender WILSON *v.*STATE of Arkansas

620 S.W. 2d 936

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered July 20, 1981

*Donald H. Smith,*for appellant.

*Steve Clark,*Atty. Gen., by: *Alice Ann Bums,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

Per Curiam.

The appellant, Larry Ellender Wilson, by his attorney has filed a Motion for Rule on the Clerk. It is denied because the motion does not state good cause. While the attorney for the appellant says there was a misunderstanding between him and the court reporter, there is no acknowledgement that the sole reason the record was not filed was the negligence of the attorney. If the appellant’s attorney will concede that in an amended motion, then the appellant will be granted a belated appeal. *See Moore*v. *State,*267 Ark. 548, 609 S.W. 2d 894 (1980).
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia Clerk's Office, Atlanta, October 06, 2016. I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes of the Court of Appeals of Georgia. Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto affixed the day and year last above written. , Clerk. 

# Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, October 06, 2016 The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order A17A0167. LEANDO FORD v. DAL-TILE DISTRIBUTION, INC..
The appellant in this case failed to comply with the notice of docketing mailed by this Court and with Court of Appeals Rules 22 (a) and 23 (a), regarding the filing of an enumeration of errors and brief within twenty days after the appeal was docketed. See also Court of Appeals Rule 13. On September 14, 2016, this Court ordered the appellant to file an enumeration of errors and a brief no later than September 23, 2016. As of the date of this order, the appellant's enumeration of errors and brief still have not been filed. Accordingly, this appeal is deemed abandoned and is hereby ordered DISMISSED. Court of Appeals Rules 7, 23 (a).
#### Barry Lee FAIRCHILD v. STATE of Arkansas

CR 83-145

690 S.W.2d 355

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered June 6, 1985

*Joe O’Bryan,*for appellant.

*Steve Clark,*Att’y Gen., by: *Jack Gillean,*Asst. Att’y Gen., for appellee.

Per Curiam.

Petitioner Barry Lee Fairchild was found guilty by a jury of capital murder and sentenced to death by electrocution. We affirmed. *Fairchild*v. *State,*284 Ark. 289, 681 S.W.2d 380 (1984). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. *Fairchild*v. *Arkansas,*No. 84-6284 (United States Supreme Court May 13, 1985). Execution is set for June 21, 1985. Petitioner seeks a stay of execution and permission to proceed in circuit court for postconviction relief pursuant to A.R.Cr.P. Rule 37. The sole ground for relief is that it is cruel and unusual punishment for him to die by electrocution when other prisoners condemned to death are entitled to be executed by lethal injection pursuant to Act 774 of 1983. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1352 et seq. (Supp. 1983). Petitioner does not otherwise question the legality of the judgment or . sentence.

Petitioner concludes that he is excluded from execution by lethal injection because he interprets Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1353 to provide that the provisions allowing for death by lethal injection apply only to capital offenses committed after July 4, *1921983, the effective date of the law. He contends also that § 41-1354, which permitted defendants under sentence of death by electrocution at the time the Act was passed or any defendant sentenced to death by electrocution prior to the effective date of the Act to elect to be executed by lethal injection, does not apply to him because he committed capital murder on February 26, 1983 but was not sentenced until August 2, 1983.

Petitioner has misconstrued the intent of Act 774. Even though a literal reading of the Act might lead to the conclusion he has reached, we have long held that the basic rule of statutory construction, to which all other interpretative guides are subordinate, is to give effect to the legislative intention. *Hice*v. State, 268 Ark. 57, 593 S.W.2d 169 (1980); *Holt*v. *Howard,*206 Ark. 337, 175 S.W.2d 384(1943). Penal statutes are not to be so strictly construed as to produce a result which would lead to consequences which do not reflect the obvious intent of the legislature. *Merrit*v. *No Fence Dist. No. 2, Jefferson County,*205 Ark. 1129, 172 S.W.2d 684 (1943). Common sense must prevail where the result of a literal application of a statute would be to single one person out for disparate treatment as to the method of execution. Since a reasonable interpretation of Act 774 is that the legislature intended to give all condemned persons who would otherwise be sentenced to death by electrocution a choice between death by electrocution and lethal injection, we conclude that petitioner is entitled to elect to be executed by lethal injection in accordance with Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-1354. In all other respects the petition is denied.

Petition granted; stay of execution denied.
EXHIBIT 10.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT



Pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer of Telecomunicações Brasileiras S.A.Telebrás
(the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2002 of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the
Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                     |  |  |  | 
|-------------------- |  |  |  | 
|                     |  |  |  | 
|Date:  July 14, 2003 |  |  |  | 



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.



---

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT



Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (subsections (a) and (b) of Section 1350, Chapter 63 of Title 18, United States Code), the undersigned officer
of Telecomunicações Brasileiras S.A.Telebrás (the Company), does hereby certify, to such officers knowledge, that:



The Annual Report on Form 20-F for the year ended December 31, 2002 of the Company fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and information contained in the Form 20-F fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                    |  |  |  | 
|------------------- |  |  |  | 
|                    |  |  |  | 
|Date: July 14, 2003 |  |  |  | 



A signed original of this written
statement required by Section 906 has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
AO 450 (Rev. 11/11) Judgment in a Civil Action

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

__________ District of __________

)

)

)

)

)

Plaintiff

v. Civil Action No.

Defendant

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL ACTION

The court has ordered that (check one):

u the plaintiff (name) recover from the

defendant (name) the amount of

dollars ($ ), which includes prejudgment

interest at the rate of %, plus post judgment interest at the rate of % per annum, along with costs.

u the plaintiff recover nothing, the action be dismissed on the merits, and the defendant (name)

recover costs from the plaintiff (name)

.

u other:

.

This action was (check one):

u tried by a jury with Judge presiding, and the jury has

rendered a verdict.

u tried by Judge without a jury and the above decision

was reached.

u decided by Judge on a motion for

.

Date: CLERK OF COURT

Signature of Clerk or Deputy Clerk

5/31/19

 Southern District of Ohio

Robert Lyle

3:17-CV-368

Commissioner of Social Security

✔ Judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant; Case remanded to the commissioner and

administrative law Judge under senetnece four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further consideration

✔ Walter H. Rice
[Federal Register Volume 87, Number 9 (Thursday, January 13, 2022)]
[Notices]
[Page 2172]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Publishing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2022-00523]



[[Page 2172]]

-----------------------------------------------------------------------

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

National Institutes of Health


National Institute of General Medical Sciences; Notice of Closed 
Meeting

    Pursuant to section 10(d) of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as 
amended, notice is hereby given of the following meeting.
    The meeting will be closed to the public in accordance with the 
provisions set forth in sections 552b(c)(4) and 552b(c)(6), Title 5 
U.S.C., as amended. The grant applications and the discussions could 
disclose confidential trade secrets or commercial property such as 
patentable material, and personal information concerning individuals 
associated with the grant applications, the disclosure of which would 
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

    Name of Committee: National Institute of General Medical 
Sciences Special Emphasis Panel; Review of NIH Pathway to 
Independence Awards (K99/R00).
    Date: March 14, 2022.
    Time: 9:30 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
    Agenda: To review and evaluate grant applications.
    Place: National Institutes of Health, Natcher Building, 45 
Center Drive, Bethesda, MD 20892 (Video Meeting).
    Contact Person: John J. Laffan, Ph.D., Scientific Review 
Officer, Office of Scientific Review, National Institute of General 
Medical Sciences, National Institutes of Health, Natcher Building, 
Room 3AN18J, Bethesda, MD 20892, 301-594-2773, 
<a href="/cdn-cgi/l/email-protection#4d212c2b2b2c2327220d202c242163232425632a223b"><span class="__cf_email__" data-cfemail="9af6fbfcfcfbf4f0f5daf7fbf3f6b4f4f3f2b4fdf5ec">[email protected]</span></a>.

(Catalogue of Federal Domestic Assistance Program Nos. 93.859, 
Pharmacology, Physiology, and Biological Chemistry Research; 93.859, 
Biomedical Research and Research Training, National Institutes of 
Health, HHS)

    Dated: January 7, 2022.
Miguelina Perez,
Program Analyst, Office of Federal Advisory Committee Policy.
[FR Doc. 2022-00523 Filed 1-12-22; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4140-01-P


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</html>
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 99-40616 Conference Calendar

SAMUEL RODRIGUEZ REYNA, Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus PAUL STWART; ROY CANTU, Jailer; NATHINE COATES; JANET WILLIAM; JIMMY REEVE; SUSAN GIBBANY; ERIC ECHAVARRY; LEROY MOODY, Sheriff, San Patricio County, State of Texas; NINA TRIVINO; WAYNE SCOTT, Director-TDCJ; WILLIAM BROOKS; J. DE LEON; HECTOR GARZA; BOB GILL; JORGE L. FERNANDEZ; DANNY GARCIA; MARY ANN GARZA; OMAR I. SANCHES; ELISEO ZUNIGA; DAVID AKEN, County Attorney, Defendants-Appellees.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas

USDC No. C-97-CV-674

-------------------- April 14, 2000 Before WIENER, DeMOSS, and PARKER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Samuel Rodriguez Reyna, TDCJ #494325, appeals the judgment in favor of the defendants in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights suit. Reyna challenges his conviction and 11 year sentence for burglary, seeks injunctive relief for his release from prison forNo. 99-40616 -2- the burglary conviction, and argues that the jury erred in failing to award damages when it found the defendant was liable. Reyna has moved this court for the appointment of appellate counsel and to supplement the appellate record. Reyna has not demonstrated that his case presents exceptional circumstances warranting the appointment of counsel, and the motion for appointment of counsel is denied. The supplement to the record is unrelated to the arguments raised on appeal, and the motion to supplement is denied. Reyna’s claims regarding his burglary conviction were raised for the first time on appeal and may not be considered. See Leverette v. Louisville Ladder Co. , 183 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. denied , 120 S. Ct. 982 (2000). In addition, the claims may not be raised until Reyna’s burglary conviction has been invalidated. See Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994). Reyna’s final argument is factually frivolous because the jury found that the defendant was not liable. The judgment in favor of the defendants is AFFIRMED.
AFFIRMED. MOTIONS DENIED.
**EXHIBIT      32.2 **

**CERTIFICATION      OF PRINCIPAL FINANCIAL OFFICER PURSUANT TO**

**RULE      13a-14(b)/15d-14(b) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934      AND**

**18      U.S.C. SECTION 1350**

|   | (1) | The                Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d)                of                the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;                and |
|--------|-----|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|   | (2) | The                information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material                respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the                Company. |
|--------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

|                                              |                                         |                                            |
|---------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------|
|                                         |                                    |                                       |
| Date: May              21,              2007 | By:                                | /s/ Jae              Hong              Yoo |
|                                              | Jae                Hong Yoo                  |
|                                              | Chief                Financial Officer       |
|                                              | (Principal                Financial Officer) |

----
11TH COURT OF APPEALS

EASTLAND, TEXAS

JUDGMENT

Julie McLeod, individually and as * From the 104th District Court

independent executor of the Estate of Taylor County,

of Barry McLeod, Trial Court No. 27260-B.

Vs. No. 11-20-00076-CV * April 28, 2022

Wanda McLeod, individually and * Opinion by Bailey, C.J. 

derivatively on behalf of McLeod (Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Property Development, LLC, and Trotter, J., and Williams, J.)

Michel Manfredonia,

This court has inspected the record in this cause and concludes that there is

error in the judgment below. Therefore, in accordance with this court’s opinion, 

we reverse the trial court’s judgment to the extent that it imposed a constructive 

trust on Julie McLeod as the executor of the Estate of Barry McLeod, and we render 

judgment that Wanda McLeod take nothing on her request to impose a constructive 

trust as a remedy. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. The 

costs incurred by reason of this appeal are taxed 70% against Julie McLeod, 

individually and as independent executor of the Estate of Barry McLeod, and taxed 

30% against Wanda McLeod, individually and derivatively on behalf of McLeod 

Property Development, LLC.
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 1 of 7 PAGEID #: 3
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 2 of 7 PAGEID #: 4
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 3 of 7 PAGEID #: 5
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 4 of 7 PAGEID #: 6
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 5 of 7 PAGEID #: 7
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 6 of 7 PAGEID #: 8
Case: 3:18-cr-00015-WHR Doc #: 3 Filed: 10/23/17 Page: 7 of 7 PAGEID #: 9
SUPREME COURT

OF NEVADA

I947A default judgment, which was denied by the district court. These appeals

followed.' The district court has broad discretion in deciding whether to grant or deny an NRCP 60(b) motion to set aside a judgment, and this court will not disturb that decision absent an abuse of discretion. Cook v. Cook, 112 •Nev. 179, 181-82, 912 P.2d 264, 265 (1996); see also NC



### - DSH, Inc. v. Garner, 125 Nev. 647, 657-58, 218 P.3d 853, 861 (2009) (specifying that this court reviews a district court's denial of NRCP 60(b) relief for an abuse of discretion). Having reviewed the parties' briefs and appendices, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court's denial of appellant's NRCP 60(b) motion. The district court found that appellant failed to promptly move to set aside the default judgment, he did not show that he lacked intent to delay by failing to respond to the discovery requests and motions in the case, and he demonstrated inexcusable neglect by willfully failing to respond to or participate in the action. See Kahne 

### v. Orme, 108 Nev. 510, 513-516, 835 P.2d 790, 792-94 (1992) (setting forth the factors a district court must consider in deciding an NRCP 60(b) motion), 

### overruled in part by Epstein v. Epstein, 114 Nev. 1401, 950 P.2d 771 (1997). Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of appellant's NRCP 60(b) motion.

We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney fees and costs to respondent. Although NRS 598.0999(2) addresses public causes of action, NRS 41.600 provides for a private cause of action for deceptive trade practices under NRS
'We elect to consolidate these appeals for disposition. 

### See NRAP 3(b).

2Gibboffs J. Pickering 598.0915 to NRS 598.0925 and mandates the award of attorney fees and costs to the claimant if they are the prevailing party. We further conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding respondent's counsel's hourly rate reasonable. 

### See Gunderson v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 130 Nev., Adv. Op. 9, 319 P.3d 606, 615 (2014) (stating that this court reviews an award or denial of attorney fees and costs for an abuse of discretion); 

### Brunzell v. Golden Gate Nat'l Bank, 85 Nev. 345, 349-50, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). Accordingly, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision and affirm its award of attorney fees and costs.

It is so ORDERED. 

# C-5ithesJ. Saitta

cc: Hon. James Todd Russell, District Judge David Wasick, Settlement Judge Kaempfer Crowell/Carson City Kaempfer Crowell/Reno Watson Rounds Carson City Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA
10) 1947A eo 3
Exhibit 23





                             Accountants' Consent


The Board of Directors
National Bankshares, Inc.


We consent to incorporation  by reference in Registration Statement  No. 333-
79979 on Form S-8 of  National Bankshares, Inc. of our report  dated February
11, 2000, relating to the consolidated balance sheets of National Bankshares,
Inc.  and subsidiaries  as of  December 31,  1999 and  1998, and  the related
consolidated  statements  of  income  and comprehensive  income,  changes  in
stockholders' equity, and cash flows for each of the years  in the three-year
period ended December 31, 1999, which  report is incorporated by reference in
the December 31, 1999 Annual Report on Form 10-K of National Bankshares, Inc.


                                                    KPMG LLP



Roanoke, Virginia
March 28, 2000<PAGE>