In the Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided: July 2, 2024

S24A0843. GRANT v. THE STATE.

 BETHEL, Justice.

After a jury trial in January 2020, Nelaunte Grant (“Grant”) 

was convicted of felony murder in connection with the January 2018 

shooting death of Shawntray Grant (“Shawntray”).1 In her sole 

1 The record indicates no familial relationship between Nelaunte Grant 

and Shawntray Grant. Shawntray was killed in the early morning hours of

June 15, 2018. In February 2019, a Chatham County grand jury indicted Grant

and co-indictees Osha Dunham, Jahonne Manigo, Malik McKenzie, Cordell 

Richardson, Donnell Richardson, and Jevon Williams, individually and as 

parties to the crime, in a 108-count indictment for crimes related to

Shawntray’s death, as well as additional unrelated crimes. In connection with 

Shawntray’s death, Grant was charged with felony murder predicated on 

armed robbery and armed robbery; Grant was not charged with any 

involvement in the additional crimes. Grant, Dunham, and Donnell 

Richardson were tried jointly before a jury from January 7 to January 15, 2020.

At trial, the jury found Grant guilty of felony murder and armed robbery. 

Dunham was found guilty of malice murder and other crimes in connection 

with Shawntray’s death; Dunham’s case is not part of this appeal. Richardson 

was found not guilty on all counts. The trial court sentenced Grant to serve life 

in prison on the felony murder count, and the armed robbery count merged 

with the felony murder count for sentencing purposes.

Grant filed a timely motion for new trial, which was later amended 
2

enumeration of error, Grant contends that the evidence presented 

at trial was insufficient both as a matter of constitutional due 

process and under Georgia statutory law to support her conviction 

for felony murder.2 Upon reviewing the evidence presented at trial, 

we conclude that the evidence, though not overwhelming, was 

sufficient to support Grant’s conviction. We therefore affirm. 

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdicts, the 

evidence presented at trial showed the following. On June 14, 2018, 

Shawntray invited Erika Street and two others to accompany him 

for an evening of gambling on a boat that departed from Brunswick. 

Grant, a friend of Street’s who was temporarily staying with Street, 

was included in the outing, and Shawntray picked the two of them 

through new counsel. Following a hearing, the trial court denied the amended 

motion on January 23, 2024. Grant then filed a timely notice of appeal, and her

case was docketed to the April 2024 term of this Court and submitted for a 

decision on the briefs.

2 We consider Grant’s argument that the trial evidence was insufficient 

to prove armed robbery only insofar as it bears on her contention that 

insufficient evidence supported her conviction for felony murder predicated on 

armed robbery. Because the armed robbery count merged into the felony 

murder count for sentencing purposes, any separate challenge to the armed 

robbery count is moot. See Morris v. State, 310 Ga. 443, 443 n.2 (851 SE2d 593) 

(2020).
3

up. Street gave Grant money to play some games because Grant did

not have any and “was waiting on some money to come in.” While on 

the boat, Shawntray won about $10,000, which was paid out mostly 

in $100 bills. While Shawntray was accumulating these winnings, 

Grant was sitting at a nearby slot machine but was not playing. 

While observing Shawntray from her seat, Grant questioned 

another patron about the approximate value of Shawntray’s 

winnings, which the patron responded was over $10,000.

Because Shawntray had won such a large amount of money, he 

and the others who had accompanied him, including Grant, were 

permitted to disembark first with a security escort. Shawntray then 

dropped off Grant and Street at Street’s residence. Upon their 

arrival at Street’s house, Grant asked to borrow Street’s car to visit 

a friend, and Street acquiesced. A short time later, Street received a 

call informing her that Shawntray had been shot. Street called 

Grant to return to the house. Upon Grant’s return, Grant, Street, 

Street’s mother, and another person all drove to the scene of the 

shooting where everyone, except Grant, exited the vehicle to see 
4

what had happened.

Shawntray’s body was found lying next to his vehicle in the 

parking lot of his apartment complex. He had suffered multiple 

gunshot wounds and was pronounced dead at the scene. Police 

recovered five shell casings and several spent bullets from around

Shawntray’s body, as well as Shawntray’s empty wallet. 

Shawntray’s Springfield XD 9mm handgun was also missing. 

While investigating Shawntray’s death, police interviewed 

Grant three times. Recordings of these interviews were admitted 

into evidence and played for the jury at trial. In the interviews, 

Grant denied seeing Shawntray the entire night on the boat, denied 

observing him win money, and denied any knowledge of how much 

he had won. Grant also denied being familiar with or ever

communicating with her co-defendant, Osha Dunham, before or

after the shooting.

However, some of Grant’s statements in her interviews with 

police were contradicted by cell phone evidence that was introduced 

at trial. In particular, Grant’s and Dunham’s cell phone records
5

showed that Grant communicated with Dunham multiple times 

before and immediately following the shooting, including when 

Grant and Shawntray were on the boat, though this information had 

been erased from Grant’s phone.3 Dunham’s cell phone records also 

showed that he spoke with Grant shortly before the shooting and 

was in the vicinity of Shawntray’s apartment soon after Shawntray 

dropped off Grant and Street at Street’s home. Shortly after the 

shooting, Dunham changed his cell phone number. 

When responding to the scene of another crime in which 

Dunham had been shot in the arm, police officers collected a gun 

that a suspect had discarded.4 The gun was determined to be 

Shawntray’s firearm, which had been listed as stolen during his 

homicide. The firearm tested positive for Dunham’s DNA, and 

Dunham’s phone showed that, on July 25, 2018 — ten days after 

3 The content of the communications between Grant and Dunham was

not admitted into evidence. 

4 Shell casings from Shawntray’s gun were found at locations for multiple 

other shootings. Dunham was ultimately arrested for Shawntray’s murder and 

other crimes associated with the unrelated shootings, and he was found guilty 

of those other crimes at trial. Grant was not charged with any involvement in 

these additional crimes, which occurred after and were unrelated to 

Shawntray’s murder.
6

Shawntray was killed — Dunham had conducted a Google search on 

a “Springfield XD nine millimeter 30 round magazine.”

Investigators also uncovered a photograph taken the day Shawntray 

was murdered of Dunham holding a large sum of cash. At trial, the 

three people who accompanied Grant and Shawntray on the 

gambling boat all denied knowing Dunham.

2. Grant contends that the evidence presented at trial was 

insufficient both as a matter of federal constitutional due process 

and under Georgia statutory law to support her conviction for felony 

murder. We address these arguments in turn.

(a) In challenging the constitutional sufficiency of the evidence, 

Grant argues that the State failed to prove she was a party to the 

crimes and that the evidence at trial showed only her mere 

association with Dunham, the person directly responsible for 

Shawntray’s death. Grant also complains that the State failed to 

present evidence of the content of her communications with Dunham 

or to show that she financially benefitted from Shawntray’s death. 

We are not persuaded.
7

When we consider the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of 

constitutional due process, we view the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the jury’s verdicts, and our review is limited to whether 

the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to authorize a rational

jury to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the 

crimes of which she was convicted. See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. 

S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). Where, as 

here, the defendant is charged as a party to the crime, conviction 

“requires proof that the defendant shared a common criminal intent 

with the direct perpetrators of the crimes.” Coates v. State, 310 Ga. 

94, 98 (849 SE2d 435) (2020) (citation and punctuation omitted). Of 

course, “mere presence at the scene of a crime is not sufficient 

evidence to convict one of being a party to a crime.” Frazier v. State, 

308 Ga. 450, 453 (2) (a) (841 SE2d 692) (2020) (citation and 

punctuation omitted). But “[a] jury may infer a common criminal 

intent from the defendant’s presence, companionship, and conduct 

with other perpetrators before, during, and after the crimes.” Coates, 

310 Ga. at 98 (citation and punctuation omitted). Applying these 
8

principles, we conclude that the evidence presented at Grant’s trial 

authorized the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Grant 

shared a common criminal intent with Dunham, who the jury was 

also authorized to conclude was the direct perpetrator of 

Shawntray’s death. 

Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence 

showed that Grant had knowledge of Shawntray’s substantial 

winnings, communicated with Dunham several times on the night 

of the crimes both before and after Shawntray’s murder, attempted 

to delete evidence of her communications with Dunham, and lied to 

officers about those communications. From this evidence, the jury 

could reasonably infer that Grant advised Dunham about 

Shawntray’s winnings and whereabouts, hatched a plan with 

Dunham to rob Shawntray, and then attempted to conceal any 

evidence of her participation in the crimes. Moreover, the jury could 

infer that Grant’s refusal to get out of the vehicle with the others at 

the scene of the crime was indicative of her involvement and her 

guilty conscience. Thus, the jury was authorized to find that Grant 
9

shared a common criminal intent with Dunham, at least to commit 

the crime of armed robbery, and that she therefore shared 

responsibility for Shawntray’s death that occurred in the course of 

that crime. See Frazier, 308 Ga. at 453-454 (2) (b) (evidence of 

appellant’s actions before and after the crimes, including 

communicating with the direct perpetrators and lying to 

investigators, supported jury’s finding that appellant was a party to 

the crimes rather than an innocent bystander); Fitts v. State, 312 

Ga. 134, 142-143 (3) (859 SE2d 79) (2021) (evidence of appellant’s 

knowledge and actions before, during, and after the crimes “was 

sufficient to show that [appellant] intentionally participated in the 

criminal plan and was thus sufficient to sustain her convictions”); 

Kim v. State, 309 Ga. 612, 617 (1) (847 SE2d 546) (2020) (noting that 

the finder of fact “could reasonably infer that [appellant] lied to the 

police because he shared a common criminal intent with his 

associate and that the two acted in concert in committing the 

crimes”). See also OCGA § 16-2-20 (b) (4) (“A person is concerned in 

the commission of a crime only if he . . . [i]ntentionally advises, 
10

encourages, hires, counsels, or procures another to commit the 

crime.”). 

As to Grant’s complaints about the absence of certain evidence 

at trial — specifically, evidence showing the content of her 

communications with Dunham and any financial motive for her 

participation in the crimes — the fact that the State did not produce 

certain types of evidence does not mean that the evidence was 

insufficient. Indeed, it is well settled that the State is required “to 

prove its case with competent evidence,” and “there is no 

requirement that it prove its case with any particular sort of 

evidence.” Plez v. State, 300 Ga. 505, 506 (1) (796 SE2d 704) (2017). 

Accordingly, this claim fails.

(b) Grant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support her conviction as a matter of Georgia statutory law, arguing 

that the State’s case was based on circumstantial evidence and 

failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis other than her guilt. 

Specifically, Grant argues that the State failed to exclude the 

“plausible explanation” that Grant “innocently” conveyed 
11

information about Shawntray’s winnings and whereabouts to 

Dunham and later “declined to reveal the communications” out of 

fear “that she might be implicated.” Again, we disagree.

“When a conviction is based on circumstantial evidence, the 

State must present sufficient evidence to ‘exclude every other 

reasonable hypothesis save that of the guilt of the accused.’” Weems

v. State, 318 Ga. 98, 101 (2) (a) (897 SE2d 368) (2024) (quoting OCGA 

§ 24-14-6). Of course, “not every hypothesis is a reasonable one, and 

the evidence need not exclude every conceivable inference or 

hypothesis — only those that are reasonable.” Graves v. State, 306 

Ga. 485, 487 (1) (831 SE2d 747) (2019) (citation and punctuation 

omitted; emphasis in original). Whether alternative hypotheses are 

reasonable “is usually a question for the jury, and this Court will not 

disturb the jury’s finding unless it is insufficient as a matter of law.”

Frazier, 308 Ga. at 453 (2) (a). When assessing whether the 

prosecution excluded every reasonable hypothesis, “we ask whether 

the jury was entitled to discredit alternative theories that could have 

explained the circumstantial evidence and to believe the State’s 
12

theory of the case instead.” Fitts, 312 Ga. at 142 (3). And we bear in 

mind that when considering circumstantial evidence, jurors are 

entitled to draw reasonable inferences “based on their own commonsense understanding of the world that are ordinarily drawn by 

ordinary [people] in the light of their experience in everyday life.” 

Id. (citations and punctuation omitted). The evidence in this case 

meets this standard.

Here, the evidence showed that Grant was the sole link 

between Shawntray and Dunham, as Shawntray’s other companions 

on the night of the crimes testified that they did not know Dunham. 

And the State’s evidence showed that Grant not only communicated 

with Dunham multiple times on the night of the crimes, beginning 

while the group was still aboard the gambling cruise and continuing 

until after Shawntray’s murder. Further, one of those calls took 

place shortly after Shawntray dropped off Grant and Street at 

Street’s house and headed home, and Dunham was shown to be near 

Shawntray’s home at that time. The jury could infer from that 

evidence that Grant told Dunham that Shawntray was on his way 
13

home so that Dunham would be ready to rob Shawntray. 

The evidence also showed that Grant concealed information 

from police officers and, at times, affirmatively misled them. 

Although Grant asserts that she merely “declined to reveal the 

communications” with Dunham to police, the evidence at trial 

showed that she went beyond simply concealing the 

communications. Besides the deletion of her communications with 

Dunham from her phone, Grant told investigators that she did not 

observe Shawntray win money on the boat, that she had no 

knowledge of how much Shawntray won, and that she did not know 

and had never communicated with Dunham before or after the 

shooting — claims that were refuted by direct evidence at trial.

Thus, the jury was authorized to reject as unreasonable the 

hypothesis that Grant “innocently” communicated information 

about Shawntray’s winnings and whereabouts to Dunham and later 

made false statements to investigators out of fear. Instead, as we

discussed above, the jury could have inferred that Grant was trying 

to conceal that she and Dunham had a motive to rob Shawntray and 
14

hatched a plan to do so. Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient as 

a matter of Georgia statutory law to support Grant’s conviction, and 

this claim likewise fails. See OCGA § 24-14-6. See also McCoy v. 

State, 315 Ga. 536, 642 (883 SE2d 740) (2023) (“[W]here the jury is 

authorized to find that the evidence, though circumstantial, 

was sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis save that of 

the guilt of the accused, as [it] did here, we will not disturb that 

finding unless it is insupportable as a matter of law.” (citation and 

punctuation omitted)).

Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.