IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 23-1701

Filed January 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF M.B., A.B., and N.B.,

Minor Children,

S.P., Father,

Appellant.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Clinton County, Kimberly Shepherd, 

District Associate Judge.

A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Jennifer Margret Triner Olsen, Davenport, for appellant father.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Dion D. Trowers, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee State.

Barbara Maness, Davenport, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor 

children.

Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

The father of A.B. and N.B. appeals the order terminating his parental 

rights.1 He challenges each of the three steps in the termination analysis under 

Iowa Code chapter 232 (2023). See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010)

(“Termination of parental rights under chapter 232 follows a three-step analysis.”). 

He also asks for more time. Because the evidence supports termination, we affirm.

We begin our analysis by determining whether a ground for termination 

exists under section 232.116(1). Id. The juvenile court terminated the father’s 

parental rights under section 232.116(1)(d), (e), and (h), but the father only 

challenges termination under section 232.116(1)(e). Because the father does not 

dispute there is clear and convincing evidence showing the grounds for termination 

under section 232.116(1)(d) and (h), we may affirm on those grounds without 

further discussion. See id. at 707 (noting that “we may affirm the juvenile court’s 

termination order on any ground that we find supported by clear and convincing 

evidence”); In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010) (stating that “we do not have 

to discuss [the first step]” when a parent fails to dispute the existence of all grounds 

for termination under section 232.116(1)).

Because the father does not challenge all grounds for termination relied on 

by the juvenile court, we move to the second step of the termination analysis and 

“apply the best-interest framework set out in section 232.116(2) to decide if the 

grounds for termination should result in a termination of parental rights.” D.W., 

791 N.W.2d at 706–07. We must “give primary consideration to ‘the child’s safety, 

1 The mother of M.B., A.B., and N.B. also appealed the termination of her parental 

rights, but the supreme court dismissed her appeal as untimely.
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. . . the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the 

child, and . . . the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” 

Id. at 708 (alterations in original) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)).

We agree with the juvenile court’s determination that termination is in the 

children’s best interests. The children came to the attention of the Iowa 

Department of Health and Human Services after testing positive for 

methamphetamine at birth in October 2021. Days later, the juvenile court removed 

the children from the parents’ custody. The court returned the children home in 

December 2022, but the parents’ ability to provide stability was short-lived; the 

court removed the children less than one month later based in part on the father 

relapsing in his methamphetamine use. By the August 2023 termination hearing, 

almost two years after these proceedings began, the father was still unable to 

resume care for the children. In the termination ruling, the court noted at length 

the specific needs these children have and the upheaval they have endured. We 

agree with the juvenile court that the children “cannot wait any longer for their 

parents to fully address their mental health, substance abuse, and relationship 

concerns, and to guarantee safety and stability for these children.” Clear and 

convincing evidence shows termination is in the children’s best interests. See In 

re C.S., 776 N.W.2d 297, 300 (Iowa Ct. App. 2009) (recognizing that “at some 

point, the rights and needs of the children rise above the rights and needs of the 

parent”)

Having determined that termination is in the children’s best interests, we 

move to the third step of the termination analysis and “consider if any statutory 

exceptions set out in section 232.116(3) should serve to preclude termination of 
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parental rights.” D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. The father claims there is clear and 

convincing evidence of the ground stated in section 232.116(3)(c): that termination 

will hurt the children because of the closeness of the parent-child relationship. As 

the parent resisting termination, the father bears the burden of proving 

section 232.116(3)(c) applies. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 476 (Iowa 2018). 

Even if the father meets this burden, we note that the decision to avoid termination 

under section 232.116(3) is “permissive, not mandatory.” Id. at 475. But 

considering that the father failed to attend visits with the children consistently and 

provided, at most, one month of day-to-day care for these children in the two years 

since they were born, we cannot find that termination will harm the children.

The father wants more time. Under Iowa Code section 232.104(2)(b), the 

court can continue a child’s placement for six months if doing so will eliminate the 

need for the child’s removal. But before doing so, the court must “enumerate the 

specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the 

basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s 

home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code 

§ 232.104(2)(b). On the record before us, we cannot find that giving the father 

more time will change the outcome. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 112 (Iowa 

2014) (“[W]e cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a 

ground for termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will 

learn to be a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” (citation 

omitted)). It will, however, delay the permanency these children require. 

We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights. 

AFFIRMED.