Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-PL-3016 | June 29, 2020 Page 1 of 15

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Luke L. Tooley, Jr.

Billerica, Massachusetts 

APPELLEE PRO SE

Michael Ghosh

The Ghosh Law Office LLC

Carmel, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Luke L. Tooley, Jr.,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Michael Ghosh, 

Appellee-Petitioner.

June 29, 2020

Court of Appeals Case No.

19A-PL-3016

Appeal from the Hamilton 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jonathan M. 

Brown, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

29D02-1707-PL-6437

Bradford, Chief Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] At some point prior to the initiation of the underlying lawsuit, Michael Ghosh 

and Meleeka Clary-Ghosh divorced. Ghosh initiated a lawsuit against ClaryGhosh and MCM Fashions, LLC (“MCM”), alleging that Clary-Ghosh had 

fraudulently transferred certain assets to MCM. Ghosh subsequently amended 

the complaint to include Luke L. Tooley, Jr.; Andrew L. Clary, Jr.; and TCD 

Productions, LLC (“TCD”), alleging that the additional parties participated in 

the fraudulent transfer of the assets. Ghosh subsequently obtained judgment 

liens against some of the parties, including Tooley, and petitioned for the 

appointment of a receiver to receive, retrieve, manage, protect, and sell all 

property and real estate encumbered by the liens. On December 3, 2019, the 

trial court granted Ghosh’s petition to appoint a receiver. Tooley challenges the 

appointment of the receiver on appeal, arguing that the trial court abused its 

discretion in doing so. Concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to provide Tooley with notice of the hearing on Ghosh’s petition, we 

reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The underlying facts of this case, as set forth in our recent decision in a related 

appeal, are as follows:

On July 11, 2017, Ghosh filed a verified complaint (“initial 

complaint”) against Clary-Ghosh, his former spouse, and MCM 

to set aside fraudulent transfers and to pierce the corporate 

veil/alter ego of MCM pursuant to Indiana Code chapter 32-18-
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2. MCM’s operating agreement shows that it is composed of 

Clary-Ghosh, who served as the business’s registered agent, 

Tooley, and Clary, who is the brother of Clary-Ghosh. Schedule 

II of the MCM operating agreement, titled, “MEMBER 

INFORMATION, CONTRIBUTION & INTEREST 

PERCENTAGE” listed Tooley’s address as follows:

Luke L. Tooley, Jr.

11 Crawfield Street

Dorchester, Massachusetts 02125

Before Ghosh and Clary-Ghosh were married, Tooley and ClaryGhosh had children together and Ghosh and Clary-Ghosh went 

to Tooley’s personal residence in Dorchester, Massachusetts to 

pick up Clary-Ghosh’s daughters from their visitation with 

Tooley. In the initial complaint, Ghosh sought to collect on 

judgments that had been awarded to him against Clary-Ghosh 

arising out of the divorce proceedings between him and ClaryGhosh, alleging that Clary-Ghosh fraudulently conveyed all of 

her property to MCM with the actual intent to hinder, delay, or 

defraud Ghosh. On March 8, 2018, Tooley established a 

revocable trust [(“the Tooley Trust”)] into which he subsequently 

transferred, among other assets, a 2000 Mercedes-Benz CLK 430, 

a 2002 Chevrolet Venture, a 2005 Lexus GX 470, a 2007 BMV 

750i, and a 2005 Mercedes-Benz CLS 500C, vehicles that ClaryGhosh owned and had previously transferred to MCM.

On August 27, 2018, Ghosh filed a motion for leave to amend 

the complaint (“amended complaint”), seeking to add three 

additional defendants, Tooley and Clary, in their individual 

capacities, and [TCD]. TCD was created by Clary-Ghosh and 

identified Tooley as its sole corporate manager. The trial court 

granted Ghosh’s motion to amend on January 3, 2019. The 

amended complaint set forth the amounts of the judgments 

awarded to Ghosh as a result of the divorce proceedings between 

Clary-Ghosh and Ghosh, which totaled $84,567.13. It also set 

forth the vehicles that Clary-Ghosh owned and transferred to 
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MCM, which included the vehicles that Tooley had previously 

transferred to his revocable trust. The amended complaint 

sought, among other things, to hold Tooley personally liable for 

the judgments awarded to Ghosh against Clary-Ghosh in their 

divorce proceeding. Ghosh requested relief, in part, for the trial 

court to order Tooley personally liable for Clary-Ghosh’s debts

and financial obligations due and owing Ghosh and to order 

Tooley (along with MCM, TCD, Clary-Ghosh, and Clary) to pay 

Ghosh punitive damages for their malicious and/or fraudulent 

conduct.

Ghosh engaged a private process server to serve Tooley, a 

resident of Massachusetts, with the summons, amended 

complaint, and the order granting motion for leave to amend at 

the address for the residence listed in the MCM operating 

agreement, 11 Crawfield Street, Dorchester, Massachusetts 

02125 (“11 Crawfield”). It was discovered that 11 Crawfield did 

not exist in Dorchester, but there was an 11 Cawfield Street, 

Dorchester, Massachusetts 02125 (“11 Cawfield”). Ghosh’s 

process server made five unsuccessful attempts to serve Tooley at 

11 Cawfield throughout January 2019 but eventually successfully 

served Tooley on February 4, 2019 at 11 Cawfield with the 

summons, amended complaint, and order granting motion for 

leave to amend. The process server noted that he left the 

documents at [Tooley’s residence] and mailed a copy of the 

documents served via first class United States Mail.

On February 7, 2019, Ghosh filed a verified notice of service of 

process on Tooley and attached the process server’s affidavit of 

service, which the trial court entered into its chronological case

summary (“CCS”). On March 15, 2019, Ghosh filed a motion 

for default judgment against Tooley to which he attached an 

affidavit from his trial counsel in support of his motion. The 

affidavit indicated that Tooley was served with a copy of the 

summons and the amended complaint on February 4, 2019, 

failed to appear, plead, or defend himself before February 27, 

2019, which was the deadline for Tooley to respond to the 
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amended complaint, and that Tooley was not currently in the 

armed forces of the United States. 

On May 1, 2019, the trial court granted Ghosh’s motion and 

entered a default judgment against Tooley. The trial court 

awarded Ghosh a judgment against Tooley in the amount of 

$84,567.13 plus interest, a $75,000 award of punitive damages 

plus interest, and attorney’s fees and costs with the amount to be 

determined at a damages hearing. 

Clary-Ghosh v. Ghosh, 2020 WL 2503929, at *1–2 (Ind. Ct. App. May 15, 2020)

(“Ghosh I”) (internal record quotations and citations omitted).

[3] On May 28, 2019, Tooley filed a motion to vacate the default judgment and to 

dismiss the matter pursuant to Trial Rule 12(b)(5) (“motion to vacate”), 

claiming that he never received a summons or amended complaint either by 

hand-delivery or through the United States Mail. Id. at *2. In response to 

Tooley’s motion, Ghosh, who had been to Tooley’s residence during his 

marriage to Clary-Ghosh, averred that Tooley resided at 11 Cawfield. Id. at *3. 

“On July 2, 2019, the trial court denied Tooley’s motion to vacate, finding that 

Tooley was properly served and that the trial court had personal jurisdiction 

over Tooley.” Id. at *2. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s finding that 

Tooley was properly served with notice of the lawsuit and that the trial court 

had personal jurisdiction over him. Id. at *6. Specifically, we concluded that 

“the default judgment entered against Tooley is valid, and the trial court 

correctly denied Tooley’s motion to vacate.” Id. at *6.
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[4] Contemporaneously, on May 22, 2019, after the trial court entered the default 

judgment against Tooley, Ghosh filed a verified petition requesting the 

appointment of a receiver. The trial court set receivership hearing for July 18, 

2019. On July 17, 2019, Clary-Ghosh filed a notice of bankruptcy and 

automatic stay, listing Clary, TCD, Tooley, and the Tooley Trust as a codebtors. The hearing on Ghosh’s petition was subsequently rescheduled for 

September 9, 2019. The trial court subsequently postponed the hearing until 

either the bankruptcy automatic stay was lifted or the case was dismissed by the 

bankruptcy court. On November 27, 2019, the co-debtor bankruptcy stay was 

lifted.

[5] On December 3, 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on Ghosh’s petition, 

after which it granted Ghosh’s request for the appointment of a receiver. In 

doing so, the trial court found, with respect to Tooley, as follows:

9. Pursuant to Ind. Code § 32-30-5-9, the Court cannot 

appoint a receiver until the adverse party has appeared or had 

reasonable notice of the application for the appointment of a 

receiver.

****

12. [Tooley] was served with notice of the instant cause of 

action on February 4, 2019 and he has filed motions in the 

instant cause of action, and a default judgment was entered in 

favor of [Ghosh] and against [Tooley] on May 1, 2019;

13. [Ghosh] served [Clary], [TCD], and [Tooley] with a copy 

of [Ghosh’s] Verified Petition for Appointment of Receiver via 

U.S. Mail on May 22, 2019;
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14. Defendants [Clary], [TCD], and [Tooley] have either 

appeared or had reasonable notice of the application for the 

appointment of a receiver;

15. It is therefore ordered that [Ghosh’s] Verified Petition for 

Appointment of Receiver is GRANTED. The parties are granted 

seven days to strike from the following panel. Judgment 

Defendants [Clary], [TCD], and [Tooley] shall each strike one (1) 

no later than December 10, 2019, then Plaintiff shall strike one 

(1) no later than December 17, 2019, and the remaining 

individual will be appointed by the Court as the Receiver. 

Should a party not strike within the time allotted, the Court shall 

strike for them. The panel is as follows:

a. James Young (Indianapolis)

b. Debbie Caruso (Indianapolis)

c. Martha Lehman (Indianapolis)

d. Chris Hagenow (Indianapolis)

e. Michael Hebenstreit (Indianapolis)

16. The Receiver, once appointed, shall be able to receive, 

retrieve, manage, protect, and sell all property and real estate 

owned by Defendants, [Tooley] a/k/a [the Tooley Trust], [TCD]

and [Clary] that are encumbered by the judgment liens of 

[Ghosh] and to hold the proceeds of said sales for the benefit of 

the parties until further order of the Court. Said receiver for the 

purposes set forth herein is specifically authorized by Ind. Code § 

32-30-5-7 as follows:

“The receiver may, under control of the court or the 

judge: (1) bring and defend actions; (2) take and keep 

possession of the property; (3) receive rents; (4) 

collect debts; and (5) sell property; in the receiver’s 

own name, and generally do other acts respecting the 

property as the court or judge may authorize.”
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Appellant’s App. Vol. III pp. 30–31. Tooley filed a notice of bankruptcy and 

motion for a stay of the proceedings on December 13, 2019. On December 19, 

2019, the trial court issued an order appointing Hagenow as the receiver with 

respect to TCD and Clary.1

Discussion and Decision

[6] Tooley challenges the trial court’s December 3, 2019 order, contending that the 

trial court abused its discretion in appointing a receiver over both his property 

and the property contained in the Tooley Trust. For his part, Ghosh argues 

that Tooley’s appeal is not ripe as the matter, as it involves Tooley, was stayed 

when Tooley filed a notice of bankruptcy on December 13, 2019. While the 

trial court may not have yet appointed a specific individual to act as the receiver 

over Tooley’s property, the trial court’s December 3, 2019 order granting 

Ghosh’s request for a receiver specifically applied to Tooley and was issued 

prior to Tooley’s request for a stay pending bankruptcy proceedings. We 

therefore conclude that Tooley’s challenge to the trial court’s December 3, 2019 

order is ripe for appeal. 

1

 The trial court’s order made no reference to Tooley, presumably due to stay requested by Tooley pending 

resolution of his bankruptcy proceedings.
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I. Overview of Law Relating to the Appointment of a 

Receiver

[7] Generally, “proceedings for the appointment of a receiver are ancillary in their 

nature and must be supported by a principal action.” State ex rel. Busick v. 

Ewing, 230 Ind. 188, 190, 102 N.E.2d 370, 371 (1951). “Our scope of review of 

an interlocutory order appointing a receiver is limited.” Schrenker v. State, 919 

N.E.2d 1188, 1191 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “We will not weigh the evidence on 

appeal, and we must construe the evidence along with all reasonable inferences 

in favor of the trial court’s decision.” In re Marriage of Gore, 527 N.E.2d 191, 

195 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). “The appointment of a receiver is in the sound 

discretion of the trial court, and therefore our standard of review is that of abuse 

of discretion.” Id.

[8] “[T]he appointment of a receiver is an extraordinary and drastic remedy to be 

exercised with great caution.” Crippin Printing Corp. v. Abel, 441 N.E.2d 1002, 

1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982).

The action affects one of man’s most cherished and sacred rights 

guaranteed by the United States Constitution—the right to be 

secure in his property. This right is fundamental to every society 

in which men are free. For these reasons the statute which grants 

such authority is to be strictly construed.

State ex rel. Makar v. St. Joseph Cty. Circuit Court, 242 Ind. 339, 347, 179 N.E.2d 

285, 289–90 (1962) (footnote omitted). Quoting the Missouri Court of Appeals’
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decision in Lynch v. Lynch, 277 S.W.2d 692 (Mo. App. 1955), we previously 

stated that 

The appointment of a receiver is essentially a prerogative of 

equity, which may be exercised as a means of conserving the 

property or assets for the benefit of all parties in interest. The 

court will be authorized to appoint a receiver if it appears that, 

through fraud, mismanagement, misconduct, or otherwise, there 

is a likelihood that the property will be squandered, wasted, 

misappropriated or unlawfully diverted without the court’s 

intervention. But, absent threatened destruction or dissipation of 

the property, or where there is no good cause to believe that 

benefit would result from the appointment of a receiver, then the 

court should decline to make such an appointment. The power to 

appoint a receiver is a delicate one which is reluctantly exercised 

by the courts.... A receiver should be appointed only when the 

court is satisfied that the appointment will promote the interests 

of one or both parties, that it will prevent manifest wrong, 

imminently impending, and that the injury resulting will not be 

greater than the injury sought to be averted.

Gore, 527 N.E.2d at 196–97 (internal citations, quotations, and emphasis 

omitted). “The appointment of a receiver is a statutorily granted authority that 

must be strictly construed, and it cannot be sustained unless proper statutory 

grounds for the appointment are sufficiently shown.” City of South Bend v. 

Century Indent. Co., 821 N.E.2d 5, 13 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[9] Indiana Code section 32-30-5-1 provides, in relevant part, that a receiver may 

be appointed in the following cases:
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(1) In an action by a vendor to vacate a fraudulent purchase of 

property or by a creditor to subject any property or fund to the 

creditor’s claim.

 

(3) In all actions when it is shown that the property, fund or rent, 

and profits in controversy are in danger of being lost, removed, or 

materially injured.

** **

(5) When a corporation:

(A) has been dissolved;

(B) is insolvent;

(C) is in imminent danger of insolvency; or

(D) has forfeited its corporate rights.

(6) To protect or preserve, during the time allowed for 

redemption, any real estate or interest in real estate sold on 

execution or order of sale, and to secure rents and profits to the 

person entitled to the rents and profits.

(7) In other cases as may be provided by law or where, in the 

discretion of the court, it may be necessary to secure ample 

justice to the parties.

However, “a receiver should not be appointed if the plaintiff has an adequate 

remedy at law or by way of temporary injunction.” Towne & Terrace Corp. v. 

City of Indianapolis, 122 N.E.3d 846, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (internal 

quotation omitted).
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II. Application to Instant Matter

A. General Claims Regarding Tooley’s Status in the 

Underlying Lawsuit

1. Jurisdiction & Validity of Judgment Entered Against Tooley

[10] Tooley argues that the trial court lacks jurisdiction over him because he was 

never served with adequate notice or process of the underlying lawsuit. We 

have previously found this assertion to be without merit. See Ghosh I, 2020 WL 

2503929, at *6 (concluding that Tooley was properly served with notice of the 

underlying lawsuit and that the trial court had personal jurisdiction over him). 

Tooley also argues that the judgment entered against him is invalid. Contrary 

to Tooley’s argument, we concluded in Ghosh I that the default judgment 

entered against Tooley is valid. Id. We will not revisit either of these decisions 

in the instant appeal. 

2. Creditor-Debtor Relationship

[11] Tooley also argues that the appointment of a receiver would be inappropriate 

because he is not a debtor of Ghosh. This argument fails, however, as Ghosh 

holds a valid judgment against Tooley for compensatory damages in the 

amount of $84,567.13 plus interest and punitive damages in the amount of 

$75,000 plus interest. Id. at *2. With respect to the Uniform Fraudulent 

Transfer Act, the term “claim” means “a right to payment” and “debt” means 

“liability on a claim.” Ind. Code § 32-18-2-2(2) & (4). A creditor is “a person 

that has a claim” and a debtor is “a person that is liable on a claim.” Ind. Code 

§ 32-18-2-2(3) & (5). As such, the entry of judgment in Ghosh’s favor against 
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Tooley established a creditor-debtor relationship. See generally, Stroud v. Lints, 

790 N.E.2d 440, 446 (Ind. 2003) (providing that a staggering punitive damages 

award traps the plaintiff and defendant forever in a creditor-debtor 

relationship).

B. Order Appointing Receiver

[12] Tooley contends that the trial court abused its discretion in granting Ghosh’s 

petition for the appointment of a receiver. Tooley raises a number of assertions 

as to how the trial court abused its discretion, one of which we find dispositive. 

[13] Tooley asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide him 

with notice of the December 3, 2019 hearing, during which it heard argument 

relating to Ghosh’s petition. Generally, “[r]eceivers may not be appointed in 

any case until the adverse party has appeared or has had reasonable notice of 

the application for the appointment, except upon sufficient cause shown by 

affidavit.” Ind. Code § 32-30-5-9. However, the Indiana Supreme Court has 

further held that “notice must be given of any interlocutory hearing for the 

appointment of a receiver.” State ex rel. Mammonth Dev. & Const. Consultants, Inc. 

v. Superior Court of Marion Cty., 265 Ind. 573, 576, 357 N.E.2d 732, 733 (1976)

(citing Hawkins v. Aldridge, 211 Ind. 332, 340, 7 N.E.2d 34, 37 (1937) (“Where 

the defendants have entered a general appearance, they are entitled to be 

notified in person, or through their counsel, of any hearing where evidence will 

be taken either on the merits of the case or upon interlocutory motions or 

petitions.”)). Given the Indiana Supreme Court’s decisions in Mammonth and 
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Hawkins, we conclude that Tooley was entitled to notice of the hearing on 

Ghosh’s request for the appointment of a receiver. 

[14] In this case, the trial court found, and the record demonstrates, that while 

Tooley had been given reasonable notice of Ghosh’s request for the 

appointment of a receiver, he had not been given notice of the December 3, 

2019 hearing, during which the trial court considered Ghosh’s request for the 

appointment of a receiver. The trial court acknowledged during the December 

3, 2019 hearing that Tooley had not been given notice of the hearing. Given 

the Indiana Supreme Court precedent indicating that Tooley was entitled to 

notice of this hearing, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion by 

failing to ensure that Tooley was given notice of the hearing. We therefore 

reverse the appointment of the receivership as it applies to Tooley and remand 

for a hearing on Ghosh’s petition, a hearing of which Tooley should be 

provided with adequate notice.2

Conclusion

[15] In sum, we conclude that (1) the trial court has jurisdiction over Tooley, (2) the 

default judgment entered against him is valid, and (3) a debtor-creditor 

2

 Tooley also asserts that the trial court abused its discretion by extending the scope of the receivership to 

cover all of his property and property included in the Tooley Trust and that Ghosh failed to prove that a 

receivership was justified under the strict requirements of Indiana law. However, because we reverse the trial 

court’s order appointing the receiver as it relates to Tooley, we need not consider Tooley’s additional 

challenges to the trial court’s order. 
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relationship exists between Tooley and Ghosh. However, we also conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to provide Tooley with notice 

of the December 3, 2019 hearing on Ghosh’s request for the appointment of a 

receiver. We therefore reverse the appointment of the receiver as it relates to 

Tooley and remand to the trial court for a hearing with specific instructions for 

the trial court to ensure that Tooley is provided with adequate notice of said 

hearing. 

[16] The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded with instructions.

Baker, J., and Pyle, J., concur.