Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed July 17, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00261-CR

BREALAND DWAYNE COMBS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 178th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1287840

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Appellant was convicted of possessing more than four grams of cocaine with 

intent to deliver. Punishment was assessed at twenty-five years’ imprisonment. On 

appeal, the only question is whether the evidence is sufficient to support the 

conviction. We conclude that it is and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
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BACKGROUND

Appellant was arrested during a “buy-bust” operation. In December 2010, an 

undercover officer with the Houston Police Department made contact with a drug 

dealer, Giovanni Cabrera, at a gas station near Hobby Airport. The officer 

indicated that he was looking to buy crack cocaine. Cabrera agreed to obtain the 

drugs in exchange for forty-five dollars. The officer gave Cabrera the money in 

three marked bills, then Cabrera contacted his supplier.

Ten to fifteen minutes after the call, appellant arrived at the gas station and 

made a hand-to-hand transaction with Cabrera. Cabrera then delivered the officer a 

package containing approximately 0.4 grams of crack. The officer gave the signal 

that drugs had been delivered, which prompted marked patrol units to arrive on 

scene. Uniformed police officers arrested Cabrera without incident, but appellant 

ran off on foot. As he fled, appellant dropped a package near the gas pumps 

containing more than four grams of crack. Appellant was apprehended at a nearby 

motel, where he was hiding on a second floor balcony. The three marked bills were 

found in his possession.

ISSUES PRESENTED

Appellant has filed two briefs in this case, one through his court-appointed 

lawyer, and the other written in his own hand. We do not consider the arguments 

presented in appellant’s self-written brief because appellant is not entitled to hybrid 

representation. See Scheanette v. State, 144 S.W.3d 503, 505 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2004). Looking only at the arguments raised by appellant’s lawyer, we consider the 

following issues presented: whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient 

to support the jury’s verdict.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review factual sufficiency challenges under the same standard for legal 

sufficiency challenges. See Griego v. State, 337 S.W.3d 902, 903 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2011) (per curiam). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we 

examine all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 360 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Although we consider everything presented at trial, we do 

not reevaluate the weight and credibility of the evidence or substitute our judgment 

for that of the fact finder. See Williams v. State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 2007). Because the jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and of 

the weight given to their testimony, any conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence 

are resolved in favor of the verdict. See Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 111 

(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Our review includes both properly and improperly 

admitted evidence. See Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 

2007). We also consider both direct and circumstantial evidence, as well as any 

reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the evidence. Id.

ANALYSIS

To support a conviction for possession with intent to deliver, the State must 

prove each of the following elements: (1) the defendant exercised care, custody, 

control, or management over a controlled substance; (2) the defendant intended to 

deliver the controlled substance to another; and (3) the defendant knew that the 

substance in his possession was a controlled substance. See Tex. Health & Safety 

Code §§ 481.002(38), 481.112(a); Parker v. State, 192 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. ref’d). When the defendant is not in exclusive 

possession of the place where the controlled substance is found, the State must also
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show that the defendant is affirmatively linked to the controlled substance. See 

Haggerty v. State, 429 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d).

Appellant asserts that there is insufficient proof of intent to deliver because 

there was no testimony that the large bag of cocaine was comprised of smaller, 

individualized baggies. But, packaging is not the exclusive means of proving intent 

to deliver. Intent can also be inferred by a person’s conduct and surrounding 

circumstances. See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 524 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

Here, the jury heard testimony that appellant dropped a bag containing more 

than four grams of crack cocaine. The undercover officer testified that the bag 

contained a “very large” quantity of drugs that would be too much for personal use. 

Based on his own experience in narcotics investigations, the officer stated the 

drugs would be divided for sale, and served to approximately twenty-five people. 

From this evidence, a rational jury could have found that appellant possessed the 

drugs with the intent to deliver.

A rational jury could also infer intent to deliver because the record supports 

a finding that appellant actually delivered crack cocaine in this case. The 

undercover officer testified that he gave three marked bills to Cabrera in exchange 

for crack. Cabrera placed a call for the drugs, and minutes later, appellant arrived 

on scene and made a hand-to-hand transaction with Cabrera. Shortly after that, the 

officer received a small 0.4-gram rock of crack cocaine from Cabrera. The jury 

could have determined that appellant delivered the small rock in exchange for the 

three marked bills, which were later recovered on appellant’s person.

Appellant further asserts that the State failed to show that he was 

affirmatively linked to the large bag of crack cocaine. Appellant bases this 

complaint on the State’s failure to obtain appellant’s fingerprints on the bag.
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An affirmative link generates a reasonable inference that the defendant knew 

of the contraband’s existence and exercised control over it. See Olivarez v. State, 

171 S.W.3d 283, 291 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.). Courts 

have identified the following factors that may help to show a defendant’s 

affirmative links to a controlled substance: (1) the defendant’s presence when a 

search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the 

defendant’s proximity to and the accessibility of the controlled substance; 

(4) whether the defendant was under the influence of a controlled substance when 

arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or controlled 

substances when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating 

statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether 

the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; 

(10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether 

the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the controlled 

substance was found; (12) where the location of the controlled substance was 

enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and 

(14) whether the conduct of defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. See 

Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 n.12 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). No set formula 

necessitates a finding of an affirmative link sufficient so support an inference of 

knowing possession. See Hyett v. State, 58 S.W.3d 826, 830 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). Affirmative links are established by the totality of the 

circumstances. See Wootton v. State, 132 S.W.3d 80, 87 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2004, pet. ref’d). The number of factors present is not as important as 

the logical force the factors create to prove the defendant knowingly possessed the 

controlled substance. See Black v. State, 411 S.W.3d 25, 28–29 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.).
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The evidence showed that appellant dropped a plastic bag as he was running 

from police. The jury heard testimony that a plastic bag containing more than four 

grams of crack cocaine was recovered in the exact spot where appellant was 

observed to have dropped something. Even without fingerprints, the evidence was 

sufficient to affirmatively link appellant to the drugs that were recovered. Based on 

the testimony that appellant discarded the plastic bag in his flight from police, the 

evidence was also sufficient to show that appellant knew he was possessing a 

felony quantity of crack cocaine. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 883 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1994) (evidence of flight is circumstantial evidence of guilt). We 

conclude that a rational jury could have found every element of the offense beyond 

a reasonable doubt.

CONCLUSION

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

/s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and McCally.

Do Not Publish — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).