[DO NOT PUBLISH]

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Eleventh Circuit

____________________

No. 21-14398

Non-Argument Calendar

____________________

KARLA M. AZMITIA, 

Petitioner,

versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

Respondent.

____________________

Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Agency No. A076-417-155

____________________

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2 Opinion of the Court 21-14398

Before JILL PRYOR, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Karla Azmitia (“Petitioner”), a native and citizen of Guatemala, petitions for review of the order of the Board of Immigration 

Appeals (“BIA”) affirming the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ’s”) denial of 

cancellation of removal. No reversible error has been shown; we 

deny the petition.

Petitioner entered the United States without inspection in 

January 1997. On 2 June 1998, the Immigration and Naturalization 

Service served Petitioner personally with a Notice to Appear 

(“NTA”). The NTA charged Petitioner as removable for being in 

the United States without admission or parole. In writing, the NTA 

ordered Petitioner to appear before an IJ at the Miami Immigration 

Court at 9:00 a.m. on 14 July 1998. 

No hearing was held on 14 July 1998. The hearing was 

moved to a later date. Petitioner’s removal hearing actually took 

place, instead, on 25 August 1998. Petitioner failed to attend the 

hearing; the IJ ordered Petitioner removed in absentia. 

Nearly twenty years later, Petitioner (through counsel) 

moved to rescind her in absentia removal order and to reopen her 

removal proceedings. Petitioner asserted that she never received 

notice of the 25 August 1998 hearing. An IJ granted Petitioner’s 

motion. The IJ noted that the record contained no notice resetting 

the master calendar hearing for 25 August 1998. After Petitioner’s 

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removal proceedings were reopened, Petitioner applied for cancellation of removal. 

At a merits hearing on Petitioner’s application, the government argued that Petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because she did not have -- prior to receiving the written 

NTA in 1998 -- ten years of continuous physical presence in the 

United States. Petitioner responded that the NTA was defective 

and, thus, did not trigger the “stop-time rule”: a rule that stops the 

accrual of continuous physical presence upon service of the NTA. 

According to Petitioner -- although the NTA listed a time for a 

hearing -- the NTA did not specify the time of her actual hearing: a 

hearing for which Petitioner was given no written notice. 

The IJ denied Petitioner’s application and ordered Petitioner 

removed. The BIA later affirmed the IJ’s decision and dismissed 

Petitioner’s appeal. The BIA determined that Petitioner’s period of 

continuous physical presence ended on 2 June 1998: the day Petitioner was served the NTA specifying the time and place set for 

removal hearing. The BIA concluded that Petitioner failed to establish ten years of continuous physical presence preceding the service of the NTA and was, thus, statutorily ineligible for cancellation 

of removal. This appeal followed.

Because the BIA did not adopt expressly the IJ’s decision, we 

review only the BIA’s decision. See Jeune v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 810 

F.3d 792, 799 (11th Cir. 2016). We review de novo the BIA’s conclusions of law. See Kazemzadeh v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 577 F.3d 1341, 

1350 (11th Cir. 2009).

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The Attorney General has discretion to cancel the removal 

of a non-citizen under certain circumstances. See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1229b(b)(1). Our jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of discretionary relief -- including cancellation of removal -- is limited to reviewing “constitutional claims or questions of law.” See 8 U.S.C. 

§ 1252(a)(2)(B), (D); Patel v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 971 F.3d 1258, 1262 

(11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

To demonstrate eligibility for cancellation of removal, a 

non-citizen must show, among other things, that she “has been 

physically present in the United States for a continuous period of 

not less than 10 years immediately preceding the date of [her] application.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A). Under the so-called 

“stop-time rule,” a non-citizen’s period of continuous physical presence is “deemed to end . . . when the alien is served a notice to 

appear under” 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a). See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1); Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2109 (2018).

To trigger the stop-time rule, an NTA must contain -- within 

a single document -- the information specified in section 1229(a)(1). 

See Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1480-86 (2021); Pereira, 

138 S. Ct. at 2113-14. Pertinent to this appeal, the NTA must include “[t]he time and place at which the [removal] proceedings will 

be held.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G); Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2113-

14 (“A putative notice to appear that fails to designate the specific 

time or place of the noncitizen’s removal proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a),’ and so does not trigger the 

stop-time rule.”). 

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The BIA committed no error in concluding that the June 

1998 NTA served on Petitioner was a sufficient event to trigger the 

stop-time rule. The NTA included all the information specified in 

section 1229(a)(1), including the time and place of Petitioner’s thenscheduled hearing. Nothing evidences that -- when the NTA issued 

-- the hearing time specified on the NTA was incorrect: it set out 

the then honestly intended time and date (at least, no one claims 

otherwise). 

That the hearing was later postponed and in fact held on a 

date different from the date listed on the NTA does not render the

NTA non-compliant with section 1229(a)(1). The statute provides 

expressly that a hearing time may be rescheduled. See 8 U.S.C. § 

1229(a)(2)(A) (requiring written notice of “any change or postponement in the time and place of [removal] proceedings”). We accept 

that the government erred by failing to notify Petitioner of the rescheduled hearing date, as required under section 1229(a)(2). That 

error, however, has no bearing on whether the NTA -- when issued 

-- contained the information in section 1229(a)(1) necessary to trigger the stop-time rule. The NTA did contain the triggering information. Moreover, the government’s failure to provide adequate 

notice of the rescheduled hearing was a different issue and was later 

remedied by the rescission of the in-absentia-removal order and the 

reopening of Petitioner’s removal proceedings. 

Because the June 1998 NTA comprised a single document 

listing the required information in section 1229(a)(1), the BIA committed no error in concluding that the NTA was sufficient to trigger 

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6 Opinion of the Court 21-14398

the stop-time rule. Under the stop-time rule, Petitioner’s period of 

continuous physical presence in the United States ran from her date 

of entry in January 1997 until she was served with the NTA in June 

1998. Because Petitioner cannot demonstrate at least ten years of 

continuous physical presence in the United States, the BIA concluded correctly that Petitioner is statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. 

PETITION DENIED.

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