IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

New Kensington-Arnold :

School District, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1243 C.D. 2015

: Argued: April 12, 2016

New Kensington-Arnold :

Education-Association, PSEA/NEA :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION 

BY PRESIDENT JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: June 13, 2016

The New Kensington-Arnold School District (School District) appeals 

the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County (trial court) 

denying its petition to vacate an arbitration award. The award sustained the 

grievance filed by the New Kensington-Arnold Education Association, PSEA/NEA 

(Association) on behalf of Joseph Melnick and ordered Melnick reinstated to his 

position as teacher. The School District argues that the award does not draw its 

essence from the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) and that Melnick’s 

reinstatement violates public policy. We affirm.

Background

In 2008, Melnick began employment with the School District as a 

middle school music teacher. He also served as assistant high school band 

director. Until his termination from employment, he received satisfactory ratings 

and had never been disciplined. 
2

On April 3, 2013, Melnick was arrested1for possession of a sawed-off 

shot gun in violation of Section 908 of the Crimes Code, 18 Pa. C.S. §908,2a 

misdemeanor of the first degree; possession of 90 grams of marijuana in violation 

of Section 13(a)(16) of the Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act 

(Drug Act), Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. §780-

 

1 Melnick was arrested at approximately 11:00 p.m. and released on his own recognizance the 

following day. 

2

It provides, in relevant part:

(a) Offense defined.--A person commits a misdemeanor of the first degree if, 

except as authorized by law, he makes repairs, sells, or otherwise deals in, uses, or 

possesses any offensive weapon.

(b) Exceptions.—

(1) It is a defense under this section for the defendant to prove by 

a preponderance of evidence that he possessed or dealt with the 

weapon solely as a curio or in a dramatic performance, or that, 

with the exception of a bomb, grenade or incendiary device, he 

complied with the National Firearms Act (26 U.S.C. § 5801 et 

seq.), or that he possessed it briefly in consequence of having 

found it or taken it from an aggressor, or under circumstances 

similarly negativing any intent or likelihood that the weapon would 

be used unlawfully.

***

(c) Definitions.—As used in this section, the following words and phrases shall

have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

“Firearm.” Any weapon which is designed to or may readily be converted to expel 

any projectile by the action of an explosive or the frame or receiver of any such 

weapon.

“Offensive weapons.” Any bomb, grenade, machine gun, sawed-off shotgun with 

a barrel less than 18 inches, firearm specially made or specially adapted for 

concealment or silent discharge, any blackjack, sandbag, metal knuckles, dagger, 

knife, razor or cutting instrument, the blade of which is exposed in an automatic 

way by switch, push-button, spring mechanism, or otherwise, any stun gun, stun 

baton, taser or other electronic or electric weapon or other implement for the 

infliction of serious bodily injury which serves no common lawful purpose.

18 Pa. C.S. §908(a), (b)(1) and (c).
3

113(a)(16),3an ungraded misdemeanor;4and possession of drug paraphernalia, i.e., 

a water pipe, in violation of Section 13(a)(32) of the Drug Act, 35 P.S. §780-

113(a)(32),5an ungraded misdemeanor. The next day, School District 

Superintendent, John E. Pallone, placed Melnick on unpaid leave, pending further 

investigation and a final determination on the criminal charges. 

On April 10, 2013, Superintendent Pallone learned that a preliminary 

hearing on Melnick’s criminal charges would take place on April 24, 2013. The

School District then scheduled Melnick’s Loudermill hearing6for April 17, 2013. 

The Association, on behalf of Melnick, requested the Superintendent to postpone 

the Loudermill hearing until after the preliminary hearing. In response to the 

Superintendent’s stated concern about postponing the Loudermill hearing, the 

 

3

It prohibits:

Knowingly or intentionally possessing a controlled or counterfeit substance by a 

person not registered under this act, or a practitioner not registered or licensed by 

the appropriate State board, unless the substance was obtained directly from, or 

pursuant to, a valid prescription order or order of a practitioner, or except as 

otherwise authorized by this act.

35 P.S. §780-113(a)(16).

4

“A crime declared to be a misdemeanor, without specification of degree, is of the third degree.” 

18 Pa. C.S. §106(b)(9).

5

It prohibits:

The use of, or possession with intent to use, drug paraphernalia for the purpose of 

planting, propagating, cultivating, growing, harvesting, manufacturing, 

compounding, converting, producing, processing, preparing, testing, analyzing, 

packing, repacking, storing, containing, concealing, injecting, ingesting, inhaling 

or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance in violation 

of this act.

35 P.S. §780-113(a)(32).

6 A Loudermill hearing is a pre-termination hearing given to a public employee that is required 

by due process, as established in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 

(1985).
4

Association acknowledged “that you are not violating any of [Melnick’s] due 

process rights by postponing his Loudermill hearing at our request.” Reproduced 

Record at 214a (R.R. __). Thereafter, the Association requested that the 

Loudermill hearing be continued until Melnick’s criminal trial was concluded, and

Superintendent Pallone agreed.

Melnick’s criminal charges were tried on February 24, 2014. Melnick 

was found not guilty of possession of a prohibited weapon but found guilty of 

marijuana and drug paraphernalia possession. R.R. 222a. The court sentenced 

Melnick to “County Probation Without Verdict” for 12 months on both charges. 

R.R. 223a.7 

Melnick’s Loudermill hearing took place on April 14, 2014. 

Superintendent Pallone recounted the criminal charges and Melnick’s sentence of 

probation on the possession of marijuana and the water pipe. Melnick stated that 

he was the victim of unfortunate circumstances and wanted to get back to teaching. 

On May 14, 2014, Superintendent Pallone sent Melnick a letter. 

School District Exhibit 11; R.R. 225a. The letter stated that the School District 

was seeking to have the Board of School Directors dismiss Melnick and that he 

had “the right to demand a hearing” by May 29, 2014. Id. Superintendent 

Pallone’s letter stated that if Melnick did not so demand by May 29, 2014, his right 

to a hearing would be waived. Id. The letter also stated that Melnick’s conviction 

 

7

In Westmoreland County “Probation Without Verdict” means that the guilty verdicts are 

deferred and if the defendant successfully completes probation the charges are dismissed without 

an adjudication of guilt or conviction. If the terms of probation are violated, the judgment may 

be entered and the defendant resentenced. 

http://www.co.westmoreland.pa.us/index.aspx?NID=271 at “Petition for Probation Without 

Verdict” (last viewed March 18, 2016).
5

for possession of a controlled substance and possession of drug paraphernalia

prompted the School District’s proposed dismissal. On May 22, 2014, Melnick 

informed the School District that he did not desire a hearing before the School 

Board but, instead, would proceed by grievance arbitration.

On May 29, 2014, the School Board terminated Melnick’s 

employment on grounds of immorality. Superintendent Pallone advised Melnick 

of his termination by letter of June 5, 2014. 

On October 14, 2014, the grievance arbitration hearing was held. The 

Association argued that Melnick’s suspension without pay and without a prior 

hearing violated his constitutional right to a hearing before the deprivation of his 

property right in his employment with the School District. The Association also 

argued that the School Board did not give him a valid statement of charges or 

notice of hearing, as required by the Public School Code of 1949, Act of March 10, 

1949, P.L. 30, as amended, 24 P.S. §§1-101 - 27-2702. 

Superintendent Pallone and Melnick testified at the arbitration 

hearing. Superintendent Pallone recounted the procedural history of the matter and 

the notices sent to Melnick, as outlined above. Melnick provided a factual recount

of his arrest.

Melnick testified that he lived with his brother. On April 3, 2013, the 

police appeared at their home to question his brother, who was a suspect in a hitand-run accident. The police searched their home, finding marijuana in a locked 

ammunition box that had belonged to Melnick’s uncle, who had been a police 

officer. Police arrested Melnick and his brother. 
6

Melnick explained that after his uncle died, his aunt gave her 

husband’s guns

8

and a box of ammunition with 700 rounds of loose ammunition to 

Melnick. Melnick testified that he had no idea that marijuana was also in his 

uncle’s box. Melnick also testified that the vaporizer police seized was not drug 

paraphernalia. Melnick stated that he used the vaporizer to ingest powdered 

chamomile as an herbal sleep aid. He also used the vaporizer to infuse damiana, a 

flower, which he believed to be a natural muscle relaxer. All these items were 

lawful to possess. 

Melnick testified that his successful completion of probation will 

expunge his criminal record. His probation requires regular drug screenings, and 

all have been negative. It also requires a consultation with a behavioral health 

specialist, who has determined that Melnick did not need treatment for drug 

dependence. 

The Arbitrator determined that the School District violated Melnick’s 

due process rights by suspending him without pay without first giving him a 

Loudermill hearing. The Arbitrator awarded back pay for the period April 4, 2013, 

through April 16, 2013. Because Melnick asked to postpone the Loudermill

hearing, the Arbitrator did not award back pay from April 17, 2013, through May 

29, 2014. The Arbitrator reinstated Melnick to his former position as of May 29, 

2014, the date by which Melnick had to exercise his right to a School Board 

 

8 At his criminal trial Melnick testified that the sawed-off shotgun had been owned by his uncle. 

Melnick claimed he did not alter the weapon. Because Melnick was found not guilty of the 

weapons charge, this charge was not addressed at the grievance arbitration hearing. 
7

hearing.9 The order of reinstatement included back pay and benefits. The 

Arbitrator concluded the School District’s statement of charges was defective 

because it was issued by Superintendent Pallone, not the School Board, and did not 

specify a time and place for a hearing. To correct the failure to follow the 

procedures in the Public School Code for discharging or suspending a teacher, the 

Arbitrator ordered Melnick’s reinstatement. At that point, the School Board could 

institute the process for dismissal required by the Public School Code, if it so 

desired. 

The School District petitioned to vacate the arbitration award. It 

argued to the trial court that Melnick had waived his Loudermill rights. Further, 

the reinstatement of a teacher convicted of a drug offense violated public policy, 

and, thus, was beyond the power of the Arbitrator to award. The trial court 

rejected these claims. 

The trial court held that the award drew its essence from the CBA, 

which, inter alia, guaranteed Melnick the rights established in the Public School 

Code. These rights include the opportunity to be heard prior to discipline being 

imposed and the right to a notice of a hearing and statement of charges issued by 

the school board before a dismissal. The School District’s deviation from the 

procedures mandated by the Public School Code violated the CBA. 

As to the public policy exception to the essence test, the trial court 

concluded that the School District failed to show there is a public policy requiring 

the dismissal of a teacher, who has been denied due process, because of the 

 

9 Because the Arbitrator held that the School District’s letter was invalid, arguably he could have 

reinstated Melnick to May 14, 2014, i.e., the date of the letter. Melnick does not challenge the 

date of his reinstatement.
8

teacher’s possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. The trial court denied 

the petition to vacate the Arbitrator’s Award.

Issues on Appeal

On appeal, School District raises four issues. First, it argues that the 

arbitration award does not draw its essence from the CBA because once an 

employee elects to pursue a grievance, the procedures in the Public School Code 

become irrelevant. Second, it argues that the award does not draw its essence from

the CBA because Melnick expressly waived his Loudermill rights. Third, it argues 

that Melnick’s due process rights were not violated by his suspension without pay 

because he had been charged with a felony. Fourth, it argues that the award 

violates public policy. We address these issues seriatim.

Standard of Review

The standard of review in a challenge to a labor arbitration award 

under the Public Employe Relations Act (Act 195), Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, 

as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 1101.101–1101.2301, is deferential. State System of 

Higher Education (Cheyney University) v. State College University Professional 

Association (PSEA–NEA), 743 A.2d 405, 413 (Pa. 1999). The so-called “essence 

test” has been articulated as follows:

Pursuant to the essence test as stated today, a reviewing court 

will conduct a two-prong analysis. First, the court shall 

determine if the issue as properly defined is within the terms of 

the collective bargaining agreement. Second, if the issue is 

embraced by the agreement, and thus, appropriately before the 

arbitrator, the arbitrator’s award will be upheld if the 

arbitrator’s interpretation can rationally be derived from the 

collective bargaining agreement. That is to say, a court will 

only vacate an Arbitrator’s award where the award indisputably 
9

and genuinely is without foundation in, or fails to logically flow 

from, the collective bargaining agreement.

Cheyney University, 743 A.2d at 413 (internal footnotes omitted). With these 

principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the School District’s appeal.

Election of Remedies

In its first issue, School District argues that once an employee chooses 

to challenge his dismissal by grievance, the dismissal procedures in the Public 

School Code become irrelevant. Those procedures require the school board to 

issue a written statement of charges and to notify the teacher of the time and place 

of the hearing on those charges. The School District contends that its deviations 

from these procedures became moot once Melnick chose arbitration. The 

Association responds that the Public School Code procedures are mandatory and 

must be followed up to the point that the professional employee makes a choice of 

remedy. It contends that the School District’s deviations from the Public School 

Code procedures violated the CBA. 

We begin with a review of the applicable provisions of the Public 

School Code. Section 1127 states as follows:

Before any professional employe having attained a status of 

permanent tenure is dismissed by the board of school directors, 

such board of school directors shall furnish such professional 

employe with a detailed written statement of the charges upon 

which his or her proposed dismissal is based and shall conduct 

a hearing. A written notice signed by the president and attested 

by the secretary of the board of school directors shall be 

forwarded by registered mail to the professional employe 

setting forth the time and place when and where such 

professional employe will be given an opportunity to be heard 

either in person or by counsel, or both, before the board of 

school directors and setting forth a detailed statement of the 

charges. Such hearing shall not be sooner than ten (10) days nor 
10

later than fifteen (15) days after such written notice. At such 

hearing all testimony offered, including that of complainants 

and their witnesses, as well as that of the accused professional 

employe and his or her witnesses, shall be recorded by a 

competent disinterested public stenographer whose services 

shall be furnished by the school district at its expense. Any such 

hearing may be postponed, continued or adjourned.

24 P.S. §11-1127 (emphasis added). Also relevant is Section 1133 of the School 

Code, which states as follows:

Nothing contained in sections 1121 through 1132 shall be 

construed to supersede or preempt a provision of a collective 

bargaining agreement in effect on July 23, 1970, or on any date 

subsequent thereto, negotiated by a school entity and an 

exclusive representative of the employes in accordance with the 

act of July 23, 1970 (P.L. 563, No. 195), known as the “Public 

Employe Relations Act,” which agreement provides for the 

right of the exclusive representative to grieve and arbitrate the 

validity of a professional employe’s termination for just cause 

or for the causes set forth in section 1122 of this act; however, 

no agreement shall prohibit the right of a professional employe 

from exercising his or her rights under the provisions of this act 

except as herein provided. However, if within ten (10) days 

after the receipt of the detailed written statement and notice as 

required by section 1127, the professional employe chooses to 

exercise his or her right to a hearing, any provision of the 

collective bargaining agreement relative to the right of the 

exclusive representative to grieve or arbitrate the termination of 

such professional employe shall be void. Professional employes 

shall have the right to file a grievance under the collective 

bargaining agreement or request a hearing pursuant to section 

1121 through 1132, but not both.

24 P.S. §11-1133 (emphasis added).

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has long held that a school board 

“must strictly follow the procedure set forth in Section 1127 for dismissal of 

professional employes.” Board of School Directors of Abington School District v. 

Pittenger, 305 A.2d 382, 386 (Pa. 1973) (statement of charges issued by
11

superintendent, not the school board, was invalid, requiring reinstatement of 

employee). The only way to cure a failure to follow the procedure in Section 1127 

is a “do over.” As this Court has explained:

When a governmental body fails to give the required due 

process or statutory hearing, the remedy is not to dismiss the 

charges against the individual but to rescind the action and then 

give the employee any due hearing and statutory hearings 

required. While [the employee’s] initial dismissal was fatally 

flawed, it was cured by the “do over” when he was reinstated 

by the [school district] on October 27, 2004, suspended, 

charges were filed, hearings were held and a de novo review 

was conducted before the Secretary, all of which provided him 

with all the process that he was due before he was terminated. 

Flickinger v. Lebanon School District, 898 A.2d 62, 66 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006)

(citations omitted). See also Neshaminy School District v. Neshaminy Federation 

of Teachers, 84 A.3d 391, 396-97 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (summarizing cases 

imposing strict compliance with procedures in Section 1127 of the Public School 

Code). 

Noting that Section 1127 of the Public School Code, 24 P.S. §11-

1127, expressly states that it does not “supersede or preempt” a collective 

bargaining agreement, the School District argues that Melnick’s grievance left the 

Arbitrator with a narrow issue, i.e., the merits of his dismissal. It argues that the

Arbitrator lacked authority to consider whether Melnick’s Loudermill rights or the 

Public School Code had been violated.

The Association counters that the procedures followed by the School 

District to institute Melnick’s dismissal, including his suspension without a 

Loudermill hearing, fell within the scope of the grievance. In support, it points to 

this Court’s holding that
12

Section 1121 of the [Public] School Code requires that all 

contracts between school districts and professional employees 

contain a clause stating that none of the provisions of the Public 

School Code may be waived by school district employees.

[10]

Mifflinburg Area Education Association v. Mifflinburg Area School District, 724 

A.2d 339, 342 (Pa. 1999). 

Lest there be any doubt, Article IV of the CBA between the School 

District and the Association contains a “Statutory Savings Clause” and a “Just 

Cause Provision” that state as follows:

A. Statutory Savings Clause

Nothing contained herein shall be construed to deny or 

restrict to any professional employee such rights as he may 

have under the Public School Code of 1949, as amended, or 

the Public Employe[] Relations Act, Act 195, or other 

applicable laws and regulations.

B. Just Cause Provision

No professional employee shall be disciplined, reprimanded, 

given disciplinary time off, reduced in rank or 

compensation, furloughed (suspended), discharged, or 

deprived of any professional advantage in connection with 

his/her primary professional assignment without just cause. 

Any such action asserted by the Board or any agent or 

representative thereof, shall be subject to the grievance 

procedure herein set forth. All information forming the 

basis for disciplinary action will be made available to the 

professional employee(s) involved and, with his/her consent, 

the Association. 

 

10 Section 1121(c) provides that all contracts with employees satisfactorily completing three 

years of service contain the following clause:

This contract is subject to the provisions of the “Public School Code of 1949” and 

the amendments thereto.

24 P.S. §11-1121(c).
13

R.R. 178a-79a (emphasis added). 

Because Melnick’s rights under the Public School Code and under the 

United States Constitution were expressly made part of the CBA, the Association 

contends that the award was rationally derived from the CBA and must be 

confirmed by this Court. We agree with the Association.

Article IV, Section B of the CBA prohibits the discipline or discharge 

of any employee without just cause. The Arbitrator found that the School District 

lacked just cause to suspend Melnick without pay in advance of a Loudermill

hearing. This falls within the ambit of Article IV.A of the CBA, which expressly 

preserved Melnick’s constitutional due process rights under “other applicable 

laws.” R.R. 178a.

Likewise, the School District deprived Melnick of his rights under

Section 1127 of the Public School. First, Superintendent Pallone, not the School 

Board, issued the written statement of charges.11 Second, the notice did not set 

forth a hearing date. Instead, it stated that Melnick could request a hearing and that 

his failure to do so would result in a waiver of his rights under the Public School 

Code. These rights were expressly preserved in the Savings Clause of the CBA, 

which does not state they will be waived by choosing a grievance. Third, Section 

1133 of the School Code, which authorizes a teacher to challenge his dismissal by

grievance instead of a School Board hearing, expressly mandates the issuance of a 

Section 1127 written notice of charges and hearing before the choice of remedy is 

made.

 

11 The notice did not specify that Melnick’s conduct constituted “immorality,” a dischargeable 

offense under the Public School Code. However, the Arbitrator found that the listing of the 

criminal charges was sufficient to inform Melnick of the claim being made against him. 
14

The Arbitrator determined that the only way to cure the School 

District’s deprivation of Melnick’s procedural rights under the Constitution and the 

Public School Code was a “do over,” and this determination is fully consonant 

with case law.12 Accordingly, we reject the School District’s contention that the 

Arbitrator lacked authority to compel the School District to comply with the 

dismissal procedures set forth in the Public School Code or that the award does not 

draw its essence from the CBA.

Waiver of Pre-Suspension Hearing

In its second issue, the School District asserts that Melnick knowingly 

waived his Loudermill rights in exchange for having his hearing continued until 

after his criminal trial. The Association responds that it never agreed that the 

School District’s suspension without pay on April 4, 2013, was authorized. 

Rather, the Association agreed only that a delay of Melnick’s Loudermill hearing 

to a later date would not constitute a separate due process violation.

When the Association asked to continue the April 17, 2013, 

Loudermill hearing, the School District responded with the following proviso: 

[Continuing the] meeting to a later date is agreed to so long as 

the [Association] agrees that the [School District] has meet [sic] 

the requirements of a timely and proper Loudermill 

Letter/Notice and that the [Association] further agrees that 

[Melnick’s] right to due process as it relates to this matter has 

not been violated. As you know, a ‘Loudermill hearing’ is part 

of the due process requirement that must be timely provided to 

a government employee prior to removing or impacting the 

 

12 The School District raises an additional argument that Melnick’s election of the grievance 

remedy renders the failure of the School Board to set a hearing date inconsequential. The 

Statement of Charges signed by Superintendent Pallone is a fatal defect necessitating Melnick’s 

reinstatement, regardless of the outcome of this issue. Thus, we need not address this argument.
15

employment property right including but not limited to 

imposing severe discipline and/or severance.

R.R. 215a. To this, the Association responded that it “acknowledges that you are 

not violating any of [Melnick’s] due process rights by postponing his Loudermill 

hearing at our request.” R.R. 214a. 

At issue are two weeks of backpay, i.e., from April 4, 2013, through 

April 16, 2013. The Arbitrator determined that Melnick was entitled to pay for 

that period of time because his pay was suspended without just cause. The 

Arbitrator rejected the School District’s contention that the Association’s 

acknowledgement was a complete waiver of Melnick’s Loudermill rights. Instead, 

the Arbitrator, whose findings are entitled to great deference, found that the waiver 

only applied to the period of time the postponement was sought. We agree.

The Association agreed that due process was not violated “by 

postponing his Loudermill hearing[.]” R.R. 214a. This agreement cannot be 

reasonably construed to mean that the Association waived its contention that 

Melnick’s suspension lacked just cause because it was done without first 

conducting a Loudermill hearing.

Scope of Loudermill Hearing Requirement

In its third issue, the School District contends that Melnick’s 

Loudermill rights were not violated because he was charged with a felony, i.e., the 

prohibited weapons charge. The School District contends it may suspend any 

employee charged with a felony, without pay and without a prior hearing.

Neither of Superintendent Pallone’s letters to Melnick stated that his 

suspension was prompted by a felony charge. Further, the School District offered 

no evidence that the weapons charge, if proved, would constitute a felony. The 
16

weapons charge was brought pursuant to Section 908 of the Crimes Code, which 

identifies the crime as a “misdemeanor of the first degree.” 18 Pa. C.S. §908(a).13 

Further, the weapons charge is listed on the magisterial district criminal docket 

sheet as grade “M1.” School District Exhibit 1.14 It is also listed on the sentencing 

order as “M1.” School District Exhibit 8; R.R. 223a. The School District’s claim 

that Melnick had been charged with a felony is baseless. In any case, Melnick was 

cleared of the weapons charge.

Public Policy

In its final issue, the School District argues that the Arbitrator lacked 

subject matter jurisdiction to determine whether Melnick’s termination was for 

“just cause” because Melnick’s reinstatement eviscerates the ability of the School 

District to enforce the public policy of the Commonwealth. The School District 

contends that there is a well-defined, dominant and compelling policy of removing 

teachers with a drug history from contact with children. In support, it relies upon 

Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 v. Westmoreland Intermediate Unit #7 

Classroom Assistants Educational Support Personnel Association, PSEA-NEA, 72 

A.3d 755 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). 

In Westmoreland, a teacher was found unconscious in a school

restroom as a result of a drug overdose. The teacher was terminated for 

 

13 It states as follows:

(a) Offense [of prohibited offensive weapon] defined.—A person commits a 

misdemeanor of the first degree if, except as authorized by law, he makes repairs, 

sells, or otherwise deals in, uses, or possesses any offensive weapon.

18 Pa. C.S. §908(a).

14 School District Exhibit 1 was not included in the reproduced record. It is located at Item #17 

of the certified record.
17

immorality, and she challenged the termination through grievance arbitration. The 

arbitrator found just cause for her termination but also found the teacher’s 

unblemished 23-year tenure with the school district warranted her reinstatement, 

subject to conditions involving rehabilitation treatment programs. On appeal, this 

Court set aside the award. We held that the arbitrator’s reinstatement violated the 

“public policy of educating our children about the dangers of illicit drugs and drug 

abuse and protecting children from exposure to drugs and drug abuse[.]” 

Westmoreland, 72 A.3d at 759. We concluded that “reinstat[ing] an employee who 

attended work while under the influence, while charged with the duty of 

overseeing young children, with the hope she will overcome her addiction, defies 

logic and violates public policy” and that “an elementary classroom is no place for 

a recovering addict.” Id.

The Association counters the School District’s reliance on the public 

policy exception is completely misplaced. The Arbitrator did not hold that

Melnick could not be dismissed for his criminal convictions. Instead, the 

Arbitrator found that Melnick had to be reinstated because the School District 

deprived him of procedural safeguards mandated by the Public School Code. As 

such, the School District would have to show that there is a public policy that the 

School District need not reinstate a teacher found to possess marijuana and drug 

paraphernalia where the School District has dismissed the teacher in violation of 

due process and the Public School Code. There is no such public policy.

An arbitration award will not be upheld if it contravenes public policy. 

City of Bradford v. Teamsters Local Union No. 110, 25 A.3d 408, 413 (Pa.
18

Cmwlth. 2011). In City of Bradford, we set forth a three-step analysis to be used 

when considering whether an award violates public policy:

First, the nature of the conduct leading to the discipline must be 

identified. Second, we must determine if that conduct 

implicates a public policy which is well-defined, dominant, and 

ascertained by reference to the laws and legal precedents and 

not from general considerations of supposed public interests. 

Third, we must determine if the Arbitrator's award poses an 

unacceptable risk that it will undermine the implicated policy

and cause the public employer to breach its lawful obligations 

or public duty, given the particular circumstances at hand and 

the factual findings of the Arbitrator.

Id. at 414 (internal citations omitted). 

To accept School District’s argument, we would have to find that 

there is a well-defined, dominant public policy against reinstatement of a teacher 

convicted of two misdemeanor charges of possessing marijuana and drug 

paraphernalia. As noted by the trial court, the School District did not show such a 

“clearly articulated” public policy. There was no showing that a teacher in 

Melnick’s situation presents an unacceptable risk to school students. Notably, the

Public School Code expressly lists the criminal offenses that do warrant the 

dismissal of professional employee, and Melnick’s offenses are not included in that 

list.

15

 

15 Section 111 of the School Code provides, in relevant part:

(e) No person subject to this act shall be employed or remain employed in a 

public or private school, intermediate unit or area vocational-technical school 

where a report of criminal history record information or a form submitted by an 

employe under subsection (j) indicates the person has been convicted of any of 

the following offenses:

(1) An offense under one or more of the following provisions of 

Title 18 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes:

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)
19

 

(continued . . .)

Chapter 25 (relating to criminal homicide).

Section 2702 (relating to aggravated assault).

Section 2709.1 (relating to stalking).

Section 2901 (relating to kidnapping).

Section 2902 (relating to unlawful restraint).

Section 2910 (relating to luring a child into a motor 

vehicle or structure).

Section 3121 (relating to rape).

Section 3122.1 (relating to statutory sexual assault).

Section 3123 (relating to involuntary deviate sexual 

intercourse).

Section 3124.1 (relating to sexual assault).

Section 3124.2 (relating to institutional sexual 

assault).

Section 3125 (relating to aggravated indecent 

assault).

Section 3126 (relating to indecent assault).

Section 3127 (relating to indecent exposure).

Section 3129 (relating to sexual intercourse with 

animal).

Section 4302 (relating to incest).

Section 4303 (relating to concealing death of child).

Section 4304 (relating to endangering welfare of 

children).

Section 4305 (relating to dealing in infant children).

A felony offense under section 5902(b) (relating to 

prostitution and related offenses).

Section 5903(c) or (d) (relating to obscene and other 

sexual materials and performances).

Section 6301(a)(1) (relating to corruption of 

minors).

Section 6312 (relating to sexual abuse of children).

Section 6318 (relating to unlawful contact with 

minor).

(Footnote continued on the next page . . .)
20

Westmoreland is distinguishable. In that case, the teacher was found 

unconscious at a time when she was supposed to be in the classroom teaching her 

elementary school students. Her acknowledged drug addiction and drug use at 

school posed a threat to the students. By contrast, there is no evidence that 

Melnick possessed or ingested controlled substances or illegal drugs on school 

property. 

Conclusion

We hold that the Arbitrator’s award drew its essence from the CBA 

and that his reinstatement of Melnick to his teaching position as of May 29, 2014, 

did not violate public policy. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the 

School District’s petition to vacate the arbitration award. 

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

Judge Simpson concurs in the result only.

 

(continued . . .)

Section 6319 (relating to solicitation of minors to 

traffic drugs).

Section 6320 (relating to sexual exploitation of 

children).

(2) An offense designated as a felony under the act of April 14, 

1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as “The Controlled Substance, 

Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act.”

(3) An offense similar in nature to those crimes listed in clauses 

(1) and (2) under the laws or former laws of the United States or 

one of its territories or possessions, another state, the District of 

Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico or a foreign nation, 

or under a former law of this Commonwealth.

24 P.S. §1-111.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

New Kensington-Arnold :

School District, :

Appellant :

:

v. : No. 1243 C.D. 2015

:

New Kensington-Arnold :

Education-Association, PSEA/NEA :

O R D E R

AND NOW this 13th day of June, 2016, the order of the Court of 

Common Pleas of Westmoreland County, dated June 30, 2015, in the abovecaptioned matter, is hereby AFFIRMED.

 _____________________________________

 MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge