Vacate and Reinstate and Opinion Filed February 4, 2014 

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No. 05-12-00154-CR THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant V. TERRANCE GERMAINE WILKINS, Appellee On Appeal from the Crimin al District Court No. 6 Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10-62224-X OPINION Before Justices Bridges, FitzGerald, and Myers Opinion by Justice FitzGerald A jury convicted appellee of ca pital murder. The court impos ed an automatic sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court granted appellee’s motion for new trial based on newly di scovered evidence. The State of Texa s appeals; appellee asserts seven cross-points of error. Issue The issue presented is whether the trial cour t erred in granting a ppellee’s post-judgment motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Factual Background–2– On October 26, 2010, Officer Timothy Gilliam responded to a burglary call. He knocked on the door of the apartment in question, and the door was opened by Sarah Malesky. Malesky was frantic, crying, and appeared to be in a state of shock. Malesky led the officer to a bedroom. The door was partially open, but there was an object in front of the door that prevented it from being opened completely. When the paramedics pushed the object away, the officer saw the deceden t, Carlon Hellner, lying on the floor between the bed and a chair. Hellner appeared to have be en shot. The paramedics subsequently told the officer they were unable to resuscit ate Hellner and believed he was dead. Detective Will Vick was dispatched to the ap artment, where he met with Malesky and the patrol officers. Vick observed that there was no forced entry into the apartment. As he did an initial walk-through of the apartment, Vick notic ed that the freezer door was open, a closet door was off of its hinges, and a chair was knocked ov er. A glass table near Hellner’s bed had been knocked askew, and held a crack pipe and drug baggie. There was a knife on the nightstand by the bed in Malesky’s bedroom, and three baggies of marijuana, an aluminum container, a digital scale, and a grinder were found in her closet. No weapons were found. Detective Vick also found two empty prescription bottles of hydroc odone and an empty prescription bottle for Alprazolam. There were no blood spa tters or latent fingerprints. Jill Urban, a forensic pathol ogist, testified about the autopsy that was performed on Hellner. There were two gunshot wounds to the right shoulder, with no exit wounds. The gunshot wounds resulted from a contact or close range shot, and it was diffi cult to determine if there had been a struggle. The toxicology report showed no cocaine present but Hellner’s blood contained cocaine metabolites. Urban explai ned that the presence of cocaine metabolites indicates it is likely Hellner smoked or ingested co caine several hours before he died.–3– Although Hellner had a degree of heart func tion when he was transported by the paramedics, Urban opined that he could not have survived longer than thirty minutes after sustaining the gunshot wounds. Hellner also had a normal body temperature, which, according to Urban, indicated that Hellner’s wounds were sustained within minutes of his receiving EMS treatment. Urban further testified that a “head ha ir standard” and fingerna il clippings were taken from Hellner. The fingernail clippings were not examined. A trace evidence examiner testified that she examined Hellner’s clothing and found two holes in the right front shoulder of his t-shirt. The examiner te stified that there was a nitrate reaction, lead wipe, and vaporous lead reaction near the sites, indicating that the shots were within an eighteen to twenty-four inch range. A trace evidence supervisor testified that he examined the gunshot residue te st performed on Hellner. The test showed gunshot residue particles on the back of Hellner’s right hand. Malesky testified Hellner resided with her in the apartment where he was found. She had known Hellner for five years and lived with him for four months before he was killed. Malesky described her relationship with Hellner as a “f ather daughter” type relationship. Malesky and Hellner sold drugs out of the apartment, and he would drive for her, take phone calls for her, and protect her. She sold one or two pounds of marijuana a month. The apartment next door was a “trap hous e” where crack and cocaine were sold. Appellee, whom Malesky had known for about a m onth, sold cocaine out of this apartment and sold some cocaine to Hellner before his death. When the trap house opened, Hellner relapsed and began using crack again. A man named “Nat e” ran the trap house. At one point in her testimony, Malesky recalled telling the police that Nate called he r on the day of the incident. Malesky said appellee had been in the apartm ent with her once. Malesky did not know if appellee spent a lot of time in the apartment with Hellner when she was not there. She said–4– Hellner would give appellee rides to another apartment complex, and appellee would pay him with a nickel rock of crack. Ma lesky had also given appellee a ri de in her car at least once. According to Malesky, Hellner would get upset because appellee showed up and knocked on their door a lot. Malesky testified that on the night Hellner was killed, she was ill with a fever, sore throat, and coughing. She and Hellner kept the front door locked and it was locked on this occasion. She took twice the recommended dose of Theraflu, smoked marijuana, and took Xanax. At around 6:00 p.m., she went to sleep w ith the lights on in her bedroom. She awakened to find appellee standing over her pointing a gun at her. He did not wear a mask or try to hide his identity. Before he woke her up, she hear d the dogs barking. Appe llee demanded money and marijuana and picked up some change she had on her table. Appellee asked Malesky where her stash was, and led her out into the living room . Malesky told appellee there might be some marijuana in the freezer. When he walked to the refrigerator, sh e tried to run, but appellee caught her by the arm and told her to stop playing. He forced her into the bathroom, and as he was closing her door said, “Sorry about [ your] daddy, but he st arted tripping.” When she thought it was safe, Malesky picked up her knife and went to check on Hellner. She could not get into Hellner’s room because the closet door was falling over and barricading the door to the bedroom. She pushed the door open and saw Hellner lying on the floor. She shook him by his left shoulder a nd touched his neck but felt no pulse. When she saw he wasn’t breathing, Malesky pulled a cell phone out of Hellner’s pants pocket and called 911. After she called 911, she took the marijuana that was hidd en under Hellner’s matt ress and put it in her bedroom. Malesky said she di d not see Hellner get shot. Malesky admitted that when she talked with detectives, she tried to cover up the drug activity and did not tell them she was selling and using drugs. Although she initially told the–5– police that cash and other item s were taken from her apartment, she subsequently found everything she had reported missing. In her inte rview with the police, Malesky said she knew nothing about the marijuana and it was something that only Hellner had. When she testified, however, she stated that she bought the pound of ma rijuana for $450 a week before the incident. Malesky recalled telling the detective that Hellner had to have let appellee into the apartment and maybe they had been fighting about money or dope . She thought there had been a struggle in the bedroom. Malesky was tested for gunshot residue at the police station. A trace evidence examiner testified that she examined Malesky’s gunshot re sidue kit and found two primer gunshot residue particles on the back of Malesky’s right hand. The examiner was unable to offer an opinion as to where the particles came from a nd how they were transferred. Appellee was aware that the police were look ing for him, but he was not apprehended until twenty days afte r the incident. When appellee was arrested and brought to Detective Quirk’s office, he said Hellner had called him and he was in the apartment that night to deliver drugs to Hellner. He admitte d to waking up Malesky with a gun in his hand and looking for drugs in the freezer. Appellee said that he did not remain in the apartment because he had drugs on him and wanted to get rid of them that night. Appellee described his gun as a .38 and said he later sold the gun in South Dall as. Appellee repeated ly denied shooting Hellner. Instead, he claimed to have found Hellner on the floor in hi s bedroom when he arri ved at the apartment. Quirk testified there was no DNA, gunshot re sidue, fingerprint, or other physical evidence linking appellee to the offense. Heather Thomas, a firearm and tool mark examiner for the Dallas County Crime lab testified about the bullets that were fired and ex amined as evidence. Thomas stated that there were two bullets, fired by the same gun, cons istent with a .32 ca liber revolver.–6– The day after the medical examiner testified about the autopsy and the fact that fingernail clippings had been taken from Hellner, there wa s discussion among counsel and the court about several evidentiary matters including the fact that the fingernail clippings had not been tested and how to proceed. After discussing the pros and cons of being able to even test the clippings, the parties agreed that the trial should continue wh ile the tests were being performed. The court and both sides agreed. 1 The court tried to expedite the testing process. After the state rested, both sides closed. The test results were reported to the court while the jury was deliberating its verdict. The tests showed that Hellner had biolog ical material under the fingernails of his right hand that did not belong to appellee or Malesky. Motion for New Trial Appellee moved for a new trial based on newl y discovered evidence. The motion recited that during the testimony of the me dical examiner, “it was discovere d that the victim’s fingernail clippings taken from the victim were preserved fo r any future forensic analysis and that no DNA analysis had been performed on this biological ma terial to determine if there was DNA present from any person not the complainant, witness Ma lesky or the defendant that would support the defense theory of the case that the victim was killed by some other thir d party, who was present at the scene, while Malesky was asleep in a drugged state of mind th at prevented her from hearing the gunshots that killed the deceased.” Th e motion stated that the DNA testing that was performed during trial confirmed that the right hand fingernail sample of the victim contained DNA from a third person who had not been identified, which could have been deposited under the fingernail in a struggle between the victim and “an assailant.”

1 Appellee initially testified that he did not want the clippings tested because he wa s concerned about further delay. But appel lee later indicated he was in agreement with the plan to proceed with the trial while the testing was conducted and then pursue a motion for new trial if the results were favorable to his position.–7– At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel st ated he had inadvertently not seen the reference in the autopsy report to the fingern ail clippings and the te stimony of the medical examiner had caught him by surprise. The DNA test report was received into evidence. The trial judge granted the motion for new trial. No findings of fact were requested or made. Standard of Review In a single issue, the Stat e asserts the trial co urt erred in granting appellee’s motion for new trial. The State is entitled to appeal in a criminal case as authorized by law. T EX
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. art. 44.01(a) (West Supp. 2012); State v. Bounhiza , 294 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, no pet.). When the State appeals a trial court’s order that grants a motion for new trial, an appe llate court reviews the trial court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 9, 12 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991), aff’d , 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). An abus e of discretion occurs when the trial court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable. See State v. Read , 965 S.W.2d 74, 77 (Tex. App.—Austin 1998, no pet.). While we must affo rd the trial court wi de discretion when reviewing an order granting a motion for new trial, that di scretion is not without limits. See State v. Herndon , 215 S.W.3d 901, 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Newly Discovered Evidence The motion for new trial at issue here is premised on a claim of newly discovered evidence. Motions on this gr ound are closely scrutinized. Gray v. State , 144 S.W. 283 (Tex.

2 The circumstances in which the State may a ppeal from a trial court order in a crimin al case include when the order: (1) dismis ses an indictment, information, or complaint or an y portion of an indictment, information, or complaint; (2) arrests or modifies a jud gment; (3) grants a new trial; (4) sustains a claim of former jeopardy; (5) grants a motion to suppress evidence, a confession, or an admission, i f jeopardy has not attached in the case and if the prosecuting attorney certifies to the tr ial court that the appeal is not taken for the purpose of delay and that the evidence, confession, or admission is of substantial impor tance in the case; or (6) is issued under Chapter 64. T EX
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. art. 44.01(a).–8– Crim. App. 1912). Motions for new trial based upon newly discovered evidence are controlled by Article 40.001. Keeter v. State , 74 S.W.3d 31 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Article 40.001 of the code of criminal procedure provides that “[a] new trial shall be granted an accused where material evidence favorable to the accuse d has been discovered since trial.” T EX
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. art. 40.001 (West 2006); Wallace v. State , 106 S.W.3d 103, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). A defendant is entitled to have his mo tion for new trial granted if: (1) the newly discovered evidence was unknown to the movant at th e time of trial; (2) the movant’s failure to discover the evidence was not due to his want of diligence; (3) the evidence would probably bring about a different result in another trial; an d (4) the evidence is admissible and not merely cumulative, corroborative, collateral or impeaching. Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108; Keeter , 74 S.W.3d at 37. Relevant Background The record shows the state furnished the au topsy report to defe nse counsel about six months before trial. It cont ained the following notation midway down page three of the six-page report: Evidence Submitted: The following items are collected, seal ed within appropriately-labeled containers, and submitted to the Criminal Investigation Laboratory: Two bullets Two envelopes of fingernail clippings Blood standard Hair standard Gunshot residue kit Clothing–9– Thereafter, the blood was tested as part of the autopsy. The bullets, the gunshot residue kit, and the clothing were sent to the lab and repo rts prepared. The fingernail clippings were sent to the laboratory but not tested. On November 29, 2011, prior to the commencement of testimony at trial, the State made the following statement in open court: “At this point we are going to offer into evidence for record purposes only medical eviden ce as collected during the course of the investigation.” The State referred to specific exhibits includ ing exhibit 105, clothing collected from the complainant’s body, exhibit 107, the gunshot residue test conducted on the complainant, and exhibit 108, biological samples from the complainant . The record shows State’s Exhibit 108 was identified as “Decedent’s samples from autopsy; hair, blood , fingernails .” Exhibit 108 contained the actual fingernail clippings of the decedent refe rred to in the autopsy. These exhibits were admitted without objection, request or comment, be fore the court and late r before the jury. During the afternoon session on November 30, 2011, the medical examiner testified about the fingernail clippings in state’s exhibit 10 8, as reported in the auto psy report. She stated that no testing had been done on the fingernail c lippings. When the testimony concluded for the day, defense counsel did not ma ke a request for DNA testing of the fingernail clippings. The record shows the first discussion about DNA testing of the fingernail clippings occurred the following day, December 1, 2011. Th e fingernail clippings were taken out of exhibit 108 and withdrawn from evidence in or der to permit an analysis to be conducted. Analysis We begin with the first prong of the Keeter test: whether the DNA test results were newly discovered evidence unknown to the appellee at th e time of trial. It is undisputed that the State had furnished defense counsel the autopsy report months before trial, that the report clearly referred to the fingernail clippings taken from th e decedent, and that defense counsel completely–10– overlooked the report’s reference to the fingernail clippings. Couns el advised the court he was shocked when the medical examiner testified about the fingernail clippings. Appellee characterizes the DNA te st results conducted on the fingernail clippings as the newly discovered evidence and argues the test re sults were unknown to him at the time of trial. At trial, however, it is clear that counsel was alarmed on ly after realizing that the autopsy reported the collection of fingernail clippings, a fact counsel admitted overlooking, and that no DNA testing had been conducted. In other words, the evidence which was newly discovered by counsel was the fingernail clippings. Coun sel’s oversight, however, does not render the originally discovered evidence, the fingernail clip pings, or the subsequently developed evidence, the DNA test results, “newly discovered evidence ” simply because counsel belatedly realized the existence of the fingernail clippings and the pot ential significance of DNA testing. The autopsy report and the information regarding the finge rnail clippings were in defense counsel’s possession for months. Such possession imputes counsel with knowledge of the contents of the document. Otherwise, disclosure by the State could be easily undercut by counsel’s failure to examine a document. Nor may appellee advance a claim of “n ewly discovered evidence’ by arguing, as he does, that the DNA test results conducted on th e fingernail clippings were unknown to him at the time of trial. The DNA test results were unknown to appellee but only because counsel failed to take advantage of th e material disclosed and failed to request such testing prior to trial. What appellee ignores is that the DNA testing process was known and available at the time of trial. Appellee simply fa iled to utilize it. The appellee is responsible for his own lack of knowledge and the unavailabi lity of the test results. Appellee had the opportunity to request DNA testi ng after receiving the autopsy report. He had a second opportunity when the State offered exhibit 108, th e actual clippings, into evidence at the outset of the trial because exhibit 108 again placed him on notice of the fingernail clippings. But in–11– each instance, counsel took no action. We, therefor e, find no merit in appellee’s argument that the DNA test results should be characterized as newly discovered evidence unknown to appellee.
See Jones v. State , 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.) (rejecting newly discovered evidence argument because medical records in question “were available, [but] Jones simply failed to procure them”). The second prong of the Keeter test is whether appellee’s failure to discover the evidence resulted from a lack of diligence. The record reflects that an autopsy was pe rformed, and a report prepared. The autopsy report indicates that a number of items were “collected, sealed within appropriately-labeled containers, and submitted to the Criminal Invest igation Laboratory,” including two envelopes of fingernail clippings. Defense counsel admitted he received the autopsy report and completely overlooked the reference to the fingernail clippings in the autopsy report. Diligence requires counsel either to inquire as to the status of the testing when an autopsy report clearly discloses evidence of fingernail clippings or to pursue independent DNA testing. Counsel’s inaction does not meet the Keeter test and clearly demonstrat es “lack of diligence.” The autopsy report in a capital mu rder trial is signifi cant, and it is couns el’s responsibility to review pertinent documents and investigate be fore the trial occurs. On a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence, the defendant has the burden to show that the failure to discover the evidence did not result from a lack of diligence . See Keeter, 74 S.W.3d at 37. Appellee made no such showing here. Further, while the motion for new trial recites each of the four Keeter factors, the motion does not apply these factors. Specifically, the motion provides no factual basis to support a conclusion that counsel was diligent. At the hear ing on the motion for new trial, counsel offered no evidence or explanation as to why he was not aware of the fingernail clippings until the–12– medical examiner testified at trial, given he ha d two separate opportunities. Further, there is no explanation or discussion of this factor in appellee’s brief. Therefore, on this record, we conclude appell ee did not meet his burd en to show that the failure to discover the evidence in question did not result from a lack of diligence. In view of our resolution of the first two prongs of the Keeter test, we need not address and express no opinion on the remaining Keeter factors. No Brady violation Appellee also contends the tr ial court impliedly found the St ate’s failure to test the fingernail clippings constituted a Brady violation. There is nothing in the record to support this contention. Although appellee argued at trial that the State’s failure to notify him of Malesky’s changing version of events constituted a Brady violation, the trial court overruled this objection. There was no argument that the State somehow shoul d have disclosed the re sults of a test that had not been performed, or that there was a Brady violation of any kind in connection with this evidence.
In Brady v. Maryland , the United States Supreme Court he ld that “the suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accu sed upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to gui lt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963); see also Ex parte Miles , 359 S.W.3d 647, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) . To establish a claim under Brady, a defendant must demonstrate “(1) the State failed to disclose evidence, regardless of the prosecution’s good or bad faith; (2) the withheld evidence is favorable to him; [and] (3) the evidence is material, that is, there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been disclosed, the outcome of the trial would have been different.” Hampton v. State , 86 S.W.3d 603, 612 (T ex. Crim. App. 2002). Brady and its progeny do not require the State to c onduct independent investig ations to seek out–13– Brady material on behalf of a defendant. See Harm v. State , 183 S.W.3d 403, 407 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). And there is no duty to disclose evidence of which the defendant was aware or other evidence if the defendant “could ha ve accessed it from other sources.” Pena v. State , 353 S.W.3d 797, 809 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The autopsy report referencing the fingernail clippings was turned over to the defense well in advance of trial. As a result, there was no Brady violation, and we decline appellee’s invitation to hold otherwise. See Jones v. State , 234 S.W.3d 151, 158 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). Finally, appellee argues that the trial cour t granted the motion for new trial “in the interest of justice.” Appellee’s motion for new trial, however, did not seek a new trial on this ground. There was no “interest of justice” argument at the hearing. And the trial court did not state, or even suggest that the new trial was granted for any reason other than the newly discovered evidence. Under these circumstances, we decline to adapt a rationale for the trial court’s ruling that has no support in the record. Appellee did not meet his burden to establish the Keeter factors justified the granting of a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. Ther efore, the trial court erred in granting the new trial. The State’s issue is sustained. Appellee’s Cross-points Appellee also seeks review of seven cross-points of error. The State contends we have no jurisdiction to consider these cros s-points in this state’s appeal. As previously discussed, article 41.02 describe s the circumstances in which the State may appeal. See T EX
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. art. 41.02. With regard to such appeals, subsection (j) provides, in pertinent part that, “N othing in this article is to interf ere with the defendant’s right to–14– appeal under the procedures of Article 44.02 of this code.” 3 But there is not hing in article 41.02 that affords a defendant the right to cross-appeal in a state’s appeal. See id. ; see also State v.
Kost , 785 S.W.2d 936, 940 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, pe t. ref’d) (denying cross-appeal in state’s appeal of motion to suppress); State v. Vogel , 852 S.W.2d 567, 570 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d) (same). Indeed, the sole entitlement to raise a cro ss-point in criminal appeals is found in the provision allowing the State to raise a cross-point on a question of law when the defendant is convicted and appeals. See T EX
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. art. 44.01(c) (West 2012); Gelo v. State , 1 S.W.3d 703, 705 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1999, no pet.). In the instant case, the trial court’s j udgment was signed on December 5, 2011. Appellee filed a generic notice of app eal the same day. On January 25, 2012, the trial court signed the order granting appellee’s motion fo r new trial. An order granting a new trial restores the case to its position before the former trial and there is no longer a judgment in place. See T EX
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. P. 21.9(b); Waller v. State , 931 S.W.2d 640, 643–44 (Tex. App.—Dalla s 1996, no pet.). Thus, when the order granting the new trial was signed, ther e was no longer a judgment in place from which appellee could appeal. In presenting his cross-point s, appellee does not provide a jurisdictional statement or argue his right to cross-appeal under article 44.01. In the absence of a judgment of conviction, we have no jurisdiction over a ppellee’s cross-points on appeal. Waller , 931 S.W.2d at 644. Therefore, we dismiss appellee’s cro ss-points for lack of jurisdiction. CONCLUSION

3 Article 44.02 generally provides that a defendant in a criminal action has a right of appeal. See T EX
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. art. 44.02 (West Supp. 2012).–15– The State’s sole issue is sustained and appell ee’s cross-points are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We vacate the trial court’s order gran ting a new trial and rein state the trial court’s judgment of conviction.

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Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant
No. 05-12-00154-CR V. TERRANCE GERMAINE WILKINS, Appellee On Appeal from the Criminal District Court No. 6, Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. F10-62224-X. Opinion delivered by Justice FitzGerald. Justices Bridges and Myers participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the trial court’s order granting a new trial is VACATED and the judgment of conviction is REINSTATED.
Judgment entered February 4, 2014

/Kerry P. FitzGerald/ KERRY P. FITZGERALD JUSTICE