alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
1 We also note that the trial court has certified, and the record confirms, that this is a plea bargain

case and Isaac has no right of appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2). 

### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-04-00633-CR

Mark Isaac, Appellant

v. The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 403RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 3041211, HONORABLE BRENDA KENNEDY, JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

Mark Isaac seeks t o appeal from a judgment of conviction for possession of a
controlled substance. Sentence was imposed on July 19, 2004. There was no motion for new trial. The deadline for perfecting appeal was therefore August 18, 2004. Tex. R. App. P. 26.2(a)(1). A

pro se notice of appeal was filed on September 15, 200 4. Under the circumstances, we lack jurisdiction to dispose of the purported appeal in any manner other than by dismissing it for want of jurisdiction. S ee Slaton v. State , 981 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State , 918 S.W.2d 519, 522-23 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). 12 The appeal is dismissed.

__________________________________________ Bob Pemberton, Justice Before Chief Justice Law, Justices B. A. Smith and Pemberton
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction Filed: October 28, 2004
Do Not Publish
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent

except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 99-30967

Summary Calendar

 

EMANUEL JULIEN,

 Petitioner-Appellant,

VERSUS

BURL CAIN, Warden, Louisiana State Penitentiary,

 Respondent-Appellee.

--------------------

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Louisiana 

USDC No.99-CV-41-K

--------------------

August 23, 2000

Before DAVIS, EMILIO M. GARZA, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Emanuel Julien, Louisiana inmate # 110718, appeals the denial

of his petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2254. Julien argues that he was constructively denied the

effective assistance of appellate counsel because his lawyer did

not argue that the trial court erred when it admitted evidence of

an extraneous offense. 
No.99-30967

-2-

The record does not show that Julian was in effect denied any

meaningful assistance at all. Childress v. Johnson, 103 F.3d 1221,

1229 (5th Cir. 1997). Julien’s appellate counsel raised two

appellate issues, one of which was initially successful inasmuch as

the appellate court remanded the case for resentencing. See Sharp

v. Puckett, 930 F.2d 450, 451-52 (5th Cir. 1991). Moreover, Julien

has not demonstrated that the error complained of resulted in

prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689-94

(1984). Jackson v. Johnson, 150 F.3d 520, 525 (5th Cir. 1998);

Bagley v. Collins, 1 F.3d 378, 380 (5th Cir. 1993).

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
<PAGE>   1

                                                                    EXHIBIT 23.1



               CONSENT OF ERNST & YOUNG LLP, INDEPENDENT AUDITORS

     We consent to the incorporation by reference in Registration Statements
(Forms S-8 Numbers 333-86155, 333-86159 and 333-45288) pertaining to the LJL
BioSystems, Inc. 1994 Equity Incentive Plan, the LJL BioSystems, Inc. 1997 Stock
Plan, the LJL BioSystems, Inc. 1998 Directors' Stock Option Plan, the 1995 Stock
Option Plan, the 1995 Non-Employee Directors' Stock Option Plan, and the 1995
Employee Stock Purchase Plan of Molecular Devices Corporation of our report
dated January 23, 2001, with respect to the consolidated financial statements
and schedule of Molecular Devices Corporation included in the Annual Report
(Form 10-K) for the year ended December 31, 2000.




                                     /s/ Ernst & Young LLP


Palo Alto, California
March 27, 2001
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 

YOLANDA A. TREVINO, 

Appellant, 

vs. 

MICHAEL THOMAS BROADWAY, 

Respondent. 

No. 69795 

FILED 

MAR 1 7 2016 

TRACE K LINDEMAN 

CLERK OF SUPREME COURT 

BY 

DEPUTY CLERK 

ORDER DISMISSING APPEAL 

This appeal was docketed in this court on February 19, 2016, 

without payment of the requisite filing fee. On that same day a notice was 

issued directing appellant to pay the filing fee within ten days. The notice 

further advised that failure to pay the filing fee within ten days would 

result in the dismissal of this appeal. To date, appellant has not paid the 

filing fee or otherwise responded to this court's notice. Accordingly, cause 

appearing, this appeal is dismissed. 

It is so ORDERED. 

CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT 

TRACE K LINDEMAN 

BY: /Jai 

cc: The Law Office of Dan M. Winder, P.C. 

Kelleher & Kelleher, LLC 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

CLERK'S ORDER 

(0)-194, 16 - 026 77
IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-22-00239-CR

WILLIAM FRANKLIN ANDREWS, 

Appellant

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, 

 Appellee

From the County Court at Law

Navarro County, Texas

Trial Court No. C40662-CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION

William Franklin Andrews was convicted of the felony offense of evading arrest

or detention with a vehicle, enhanced, see TEX. PENAL CODE § 38.04(b)(2)(A), and 

sentenced to 37 years in prison. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Andrews was convicted of a felony offense in the County Court at Law of Navarro 

County. In Navarro County, a county court at law has jurisdiction concurrently with the 

district court in felony cases for arraignments, pretrial hearing, and accepting guilty 

pleas, and in jury trials on assignment from a district judge presiding in the county and

accepted by the county court at law judge. TEX. GOV'T CODE § 25.1772(a). In his sole issue

on appeal, Andrew contends that because a transfer order signed by the county court at 
Andrews v. State Page 2

law judge was not in the record in his case, the trial court had no jurisdiction to convict

him, and his conviction is void. We disagree with Andrews. 

Regardless of whether or not a transfer order was actually signed by the county 

court at law judge for this case, when a record does not contain a transfer order, such as 

in this case, the error is procedural, not jurisdictional. Lemasurier v. State, 91 S.W.3d 897, 

899 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref'd); Sharkey v. State, 994 S.W.2d 417, 419 (Tex. 

App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.). Thus, the absence of a transfer order in the record does 

not render the actions of the transferee court void. Id. Rather, it merely makes the 

transferee court's action subject to a timely plea to the jurisdiction. Id. If a defendant fails 

to file a timely plea to the jurisdiction, he waives any right to complain that a transfer 

order does not appear in the record. Id.; Garcia v. State, 901 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, pet. ref'd) (citing Daniels v. State, 352 S.W.2d 267, 268 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 1961).

Andrews admits that he did not file a plea to the jurisdiction challenging the 

jurisdiction of the trial court. Thus, Andrews waived any complaint he may have had 

regarding the trial court's jurisdiction due to the alleged absence of the transfer order 

acceptance by the county court at law judge.

Accordingly, Andrews’s sole issue is overruled, and the trial court’s judgment is 

affirmed.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice
Andrews v. State Page 3

Before Chief Justice Gray, 

Justice Johnson, and 

Justice Smith 

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed May 30, 2024

Do not publish 

[CRPM]
[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 15-10368

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:13-cr-00144-SPC-CM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

 versus

CARLOS RODRIGO HERNANDEZ, 

a.k.a. Miguel Angel Leyva-Romero,

a.k.a. Carlos Rodrigo-Hernandez,

a.k.a. Carlos Hernandez-Rodrigo,

a.k.a. Miguel Angel Leiva-Romero, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of Florida

________________________

(September 18, 2015)

Before JORDAN, JULIE CARNES and JILL PRYOR, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Case: 15-10368 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 1 of 2 
2

The Office of the Federal Defender, appointed counsel in this direct criminal 

appeal for Carlos Rodrigo Hernandez, has moved to withdraw from further 

representation of Hernandez and has filed a brief prepared pursuant to Anders v. 

California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967). Our 

independent review of the entire record reveals that counsel’s assessment of the 

relative merit of the appeal is correct. Because independent examination of the 

entire record reveals no arguable issues of merit, counsel’s motion to withdraw is 

GRANTED, and Hernandez’s conviction and sentence are AFFIRMED.

Case: 15-10368 Date Filed: 09/18/2015 Page: 2 of 2
Sl()-l()()2()2-()2() 

January 24, 2010 

Tsune-aki Iki 

8-2-1501 Akashi-cho, 

Chuo-ku, 

Tokyo 104-0044 

Japan 

The Honorable Raymond H. LaHood 

Secretary 

United States Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

RE: DOT-OST-2009-0350 

Dear Secretary LaHood: 

I am writing to express my strong support for the antitrust immunity (ATI) 

application filed by United Airlines. Continental and All Nippon /Mtways (ANA) with the 

U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT). DOT approval will enable these airlines to 

deliver the competKive flight schedules, fares and services consumers demand. 

Your leadership in this matter will ensure that the United States realizes the 

benefits of the recent Open Skies aviation agreement between the governments of the 

United States and Japan, which will not go into effect unless and until DOT grants the 

ATI request. Open Skies with Japan is an enomnous achievement and will produce 

significant benefits for consumers, competition and airline employees. Approval of this 

important application will maximize the benefits to the United States of the Open Skies 

agreement with Japan by providing travelers more airline seats, destinations, routings, 

schedules and prices. 

In this challenging economic environment, airlines need to pursue all 

opportunities to allow them and the communities they serve to stay competitive in an 

increasingly global marketplace. Approval of this application would allow these airlines 

to generate significant price and service benefits for consumers, help preserve and 

enhance service to communities throughout the United States and Japan, and compete 

more efi^ctively with other international airlines and alliances. 

I thank you for your work to achieve the U.S.-Japan Open Skies agreement and 

look fonward to your approval of the pending application. 

Sincerely, 

'^' O^ ^
#### Reid *v.*State.

Crim. 4038.

Opinion delivered June 28, 1937.

*H. U. Williamson*and *Fred M. Pickens,*for appellant.

*Jack Holt,*Attorney General, and *JolmP. Streepey,*Assistant, for appellee.

Humpheejs, J.

Appellant was indicted, tried and convicted in the circuit court of Jackson county under § 2832 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest for failure to pay over $22,682.02 of public funds, belonging to said county which he collected in his official capacity of collector of taxes during the year 1936 for taxes of 1935 which became due and payable during the year 1936. As a punishment for the crime he was adjudged to serve a term of five years in the state penitentiary, from which judgment of conviction he has duly prosecuted an appeal to this court.

His first assignment of error is that the indictment does not sufficiently charge the crime of receiving and failing to pay over public funds in his capacity of collector of taxes of said county under § 2832 of Crawford & Moses’ Digest.

The indictment is couched in the exact language of the indictment returned against Gurley in the case of *Gurley’*v. *State,*164 Ark. 397, 262 S. W. 636. This court ruled in the Gurley case that the indictment was sufficient to charge the crime and was impervious to attack on demurrer,

*423Appellant, also, assigns as reversible error the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the allegations of the indictment. The accounts and books of the collector were audited by two accountants from the state auditorial department of the state of Arkansas. In auditing his accounts he was charged with all the taxes he collected for the county amounting to $134,348.91 and credited with $111,666.89, the total amount paid over by him to the county treasurer and his successor in office, leaving a balance due the county of $22,682.02. When shown the audit he admitted that the auditors had made a fair audit and told them he knew he was about $30,000 short, but while he had not paid the county he had the money with which to pay the amount of., the shortage shown by the audit. When he was checked out of office he lacked $22,-682.02 of having enough with which to pay the county. The auditors testified that the audit was correct and it was introduced in evidence as a part of this record. Then, according to the undisputed evidence, he collected $22,-682.02 more than he paid over. The record is silent as to what became of the money. The only reasonable inference is that in omitting or failing to pay it over to the county and in not having it when checked out, he had converted it to his own use. The audit reflected that in one instance he checked out of his collector’s account on a counter check cash in the sum of $1,500. There can be no question that he got this amount for his own use out of taxes he had collected for the county. There is ample evidence in the record to sustain the charge in the indictment.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
<PAGE>
                                                                     EXHIBIT 4.2





                                   SERIES A

Number                                                                  Shares
  1                             PREFERRED STOCK

             Incorporated under the Laws of the State of Delaware

                           Reunion Industries, Inc.
           Common Stock 20,000,000 Shares - Par Value $.01 Per Share
         Preferred Stock 10,000,000 Shares - Par Value $.01 Per Share


This Certifies that ____________________________________________ is the owner of

________________________________________________________________________________
                     fully paid and non-assessable Shares,
              par value $.01 per share, of the PREFERRED STOCK of

                           Reunion Industries, Inc.

transferable on the books of the Corporation by the holder hereof in person or
by duly authorized Attorney upon surrender of this Certificate properly
endorsed.

        The Corporation will furnish without charge to each stockholder who so
requests, a statement of the powers, designations, preferences and relative,
participating, optional or other special rights of each class of stock or series
thereof and the qualifications, limitations or restrictions of such preferences
and/or rights.


        Witness the seal of said Corporation and the signatures of its duly
        authorized officers.

        Dated ____________________________

        __________________________________   _________________________________
                       Secretary Treasurer            Vice-President President
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff, 

vs. 

JESUS MAYORGA-GONZALEZ, 

Defendant. 

Case No. 3:18cr23(1) 

JUDGE WALTER H. RICE 

DECISION AND ENTRY OVERRULING AS MOOT DEFENDANT'S 

REQUEST FOR AN ORDER TO COMPEL MEDICAL ASSISTANCE (DOC. 

#102) 

Defendant has sought an order of the Court compelling the Federal Bureau of Prisons to 

render him adequate medical attention (Doc. # 102). Said Motion is OVERRULED as moot. 

This Court has made contact with Defendant's Case Manager and a member of the 

medical office at Defendant's designated institution, FCI Oakdale II, following which he 

received a call from Mr. Jason Sickler, legal counsel for the Bureau of Prisons. 

Mr. Sickler related that Mr. Mayorga-Gonzalez had not, as of December 10, 2021 , made 

any medical complaints/requests at the facility nor was the facility personnel aware of the motion 

that this Court is addressing herein. Apparently, Mr. Mayorga-Gonzalez had made two purchases 

of over-the-counter pain medication from the commissary. On December 14, 2021 , members of 

the medical staff at the Institution saw Mr. Mayorga-Gonzalez and reported the following. 

a. Nothing of significance was discovered during and after the December 14th 

meeting with the medical staff; 

Case: 3:18-cr-00023-WHR-PBS Doc #: 107 Filed: 02/02/22 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 492
b. X-rays did show some fragments in his eyes; 

c. A CT scan will be performed but there is nothing that is currently emergent; 

d. Mr. Mayorga-Gonzalez' eyes were dilated and nothing was discovered; and 

e. Mr. Mayorga-Gonzalez will be scheduled to see an optometrist. 

In short, Defendant has received what appears to be a full medical examination, thus, in 

this Court's opinion, mooting Mr. Mayorga-Gonzalez' motion of .June 21 , 2021 (Doc. #102). 

February 1, 2022 WALTER H. RICE 

UNITED ST A TES DISTRICT .JUDGE 

Copies to: 

Counsel of record 

.Jesus Mayorga-Gonzalez, #48959-308, FCI Oakdale II, P.O. Box 5010, Oakdale, LA 71463 

US Marshal 

2 

Case: 3:18-cr-00023-WHR-PBS Doc #: 107 Filed: 02/02/22 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 493
Exhibit 10.8

 

Additional agreement to the Commercial Lease

 

	
Between
    	
IBM Immobilien GbR
    
	
 
    	
Zur Rollers-Au 4
    
	
 
    	
94244 Teisnach / Kaikenried, 
    
	
 
    	
Germany
    
	
 
    	
- hereinafter called the Landlord -
    
	
 
    	
 
    
	
and
    	
congatec AG
    
	
 
    	
Auwiesenstrasse 5
    
	
 
    	
94469 Deggendorf, Germany
    
	
 
    	
– hereinafter called the Tenant -
    


 

the following agreement is made:

 

In addition to the Commercial Lease dated 12/31/2004, an additional 256,62 m2 of office space shall be rented from 1/1/2007 in the office building at Auwiesenstr. 5, 94469 Deggendorf, Germany.

 

The monthly rental payment amounts to €6.00 per square meter plus the current VAT, currently 19%.

 

In addition to Art. 1 Rental payment, paragraph 1 of the Commercial Lease dated 12/31/2004, the following shall be agreed on hereby:

 

For the complete rented space, / proportional parking lots may be used under and around the building. The parking lots in the underground parking garage may be used until revoked.

 

Apart from that, the provisions of the Commercial Lease dated 12/31/2004 shall apply.

 

 

	
Deggendorf,   12/28/2006
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
/s/ Heinz Iglhaut
    	
 
    	
/s/ Gerhard Edi
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
IM Immobilien GbR
    	
 
    	
congatec AG
    
	
 
    	
 
    	
 
    
	
- Landlord – Heinz Iglhaut
    	
 
    	
Tenant – Gerhard Edi
I 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4543 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service located at 

4285 Payne Avenue in San Jose, California, as the ‘‘Anthony J. Cortese 

Post Office Building’’. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 27, 2010 

Ms. ZOE LOFGREN of California introduced the following bill; which was 

referred to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform 

A BILL 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 4285 Payne Avenue in San Jose, California, 

as the ‘‘Anthony J. Cortese Post Office Building’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. ANTHONY J. CORTESE POST OFFICE BUILDING. 

4 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

5 Postal Service located at 4285 Payne Avenue in San Jose, 

6 California, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Anthony 

7 J. Cortese Post Office Building’’. 

8 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg9 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

•HR 4543 IH

1 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

2 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Anthony J. Cortese 

3 Post Office Building’’. 

Æ 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
#### Solomon S. Stambaugh v. Anthony Snoblin.

*JE/jectment: Statute of limitations.*A ruling in ejectment, that the plaintiff •was barred by the act of limitation of 1868, is erroneous in a case -where his right of action accrued before that ¿ict took effect, and where by the law then in force the right of action was not barred when the -suit was brought; the plaintiff’s right depended on the law in force when his right of action accrued.

*Submitted on briefs June 16.*

*Decided June 18.*

Error to Macomb Circuit.

*€. W. Everett*and *R. P. & J. B. Eldredge,*for plaintiff in error.

*Hubbard é Qroclcer,*for defendant in error.

Obaves, Oh. J:

This was ejectment commenced by Stambaugh April 39th, 1874. The case was tried by the court, and the facts found established that the plaintiff held the title derived from the United States; that the defendant acquired tax-titles in 1861, which were invalid for defects; that he cut timber on the premises in the two succeeding years, but made no *297iuclosure till the spring of 1863, wben lie fenced a small portion, and built a house and went into occupation, and has since continued his occupation and paid taxes. The court found as conclusion of law, that by the act of limitation of 1863 the plaintiff was barred, notwithstanding the act of *1869.*— Laws *of 1869, ¶. 218.*

We think the court erred. The right of the plaintiff depended on the law in force when his right of action accrued, and that was previous to the time when the act of 1863 took effect, which was January 1st, 1864, and by the law as it stood before the act of 1863, and when the plaintiff’s right accrued, he was not barred when he began his suit.

The judgment below must be reversed, and judgment entered here for the plaintiff, with costs of both courts, and the cause remanded.

The other Justices concurred.