### The Honorable Charles B. Kornmann, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the District of South Dakota.

Language formerly in Rule 32(c)(3)(D) was amended an d 2 

### reloca ted to Rule 32(c)(1) in 1994. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 3 2 Advisory Committee Notes (1996). ___________ No. 96-2805

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * District of South Dakota. William St. John, * * [UNPUBLISHED] Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: February 4, 1997 Filed: February 7, 1997

___________ Before BOWMAN, WOLLMAN, and BEAM, Circuit Judges.

___________ PER CURIAM.
William St. John appeals from the 41-month sentence imposed by th e distri ct court following his guilty plea to theft of property in India n 1 Country, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 661 and 1153. We affirm.

We reject St. John's argument on appeal that, when considerin g im position of an enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manua l § 2B1.1(b)(4)(A) (1995) for more than minimal pl anning, the district court violat ed Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(c)(1). St. John did no t 2 dispute any factual allegation in the

### -2-

presentence report (P SR). Rather, he objected only to the application of the more-than-minimal-planning enhancement basedon the uncontested facts. In such circumstances, Rule 32(c)(1) is not impl icated. See United States

v. Tovar , 27 F.3d 497, 499-500 (10th Cir. 1994). Given the evidence in th e record that St. John took definite precautions to conceal the automobile theft at issue, and that he had an extensive prior history of automobile thefts, we conclude the district court did not c learly err in finding more than minimal planning. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 1B1.1 , comment. (n.1(f)) (1995); United States v. Coney , 949 F.2d 966, 968 (8th Cir. 1991) (standard of review).

We furthe r reject St. John's argument that the district court erred in departing upward under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3 (1995)

. St. Jo hn's 30 criminal-history points placed him in Criminal Histor y Category VI. In departing upward beyond Category VI, the Guidelines direc t the sentencing court to "structure the departure by moving incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Crimina l History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to th e case." The district court's methodology achieved the result of movin g incr ementally six levels down the sentencing table, and we find suc h methodology reasonable. See United States v. Dixon , 71 F.3d 380, 382-83 (11 th Cir. 1995) (district court need not explicitly discuss reason fo r bypassing incremental offense level; departure above Category VI will be reviewed for reasonab leness); cf. United States v. McKinley , 84 F.3d 904, 911 (7th Cir. 1996) (finding district court's methodology reasonable and sufficiently linked to structure of Guidelines where court moved down eigh t levels, or one level for every three criminal history points over number required for placement in Category VI); United States v. Cash , 983 F.2 d 558, 561 n.6 (4th Cir. 1992) (departing above Category VI by movin g vertically to successively higher offense levels will produce roughly same 10-15% increase in guideline range

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as extrapolating horizontally by extending criminal history categories), cert. denied , 508 U.S. 924 (1993).
Moreover, the sentence imposed by the district court was not anabuse of discretion, as St. John had more than double the number of crimina l history points required to reach Category VI, and the sentence was wel l below the five-year statutory maximum. See 18 U .S.C. § 661; United States

v. Poe , 96 F.3d 333, 334 (8th Cir. 1996) (standard of review); Unite d States v. Saffeels , 39 F.3d 833, 838 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v

. Carey , 898 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990).
Accordingly, we affirm.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.