alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4626 Engrossed in House (EH)]

111th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 4626

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
    To restore the application of the Federal antitrust laws to the 
   business of health insurance to protect competition and consumers.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Health Insurance Industry Fair 
Competition Act''.

SEC. 2. RESTORING THE APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAWS TO HEALTH SECTOR 
              INSURERS.

    (a) Amendment to McCarran-Ferguson Act.--Section 3 of the Act of 
March 9, 1945 (15 U.S.C. 1013), commonly known as the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act, is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(c) Nothing contained in this Act shall modify, impair, or 
supersede the operation of any of the antitrust laws with respect to 
the business of health insurance. For purposes of the preceding 
sentence, the term `antitrust laws' has the meaning given it in 
subsection (a) of the first section of the Clayton Act, except that 
such term includes section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to the 
extent that such section 5 applies to unfair methods of competition.''.
    (b) Related Provision.--For purposes of section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. 45) to the extent such section applies 
to unfair methods of competition, section 3(c) of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act shall apply with respect to the business of health insurance 
without regard to whether such business is carried on for profit, 
notwithstanding the definition of ``Corporation'' contained in section 
4 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.

            Passed the House of Representatives February 24, 2010.

            Attest:

                                                                 Clerk.
111th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H. R. 4626

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

    To restore the application of the Federal antitrust laws to the 
   business of health insurance to protect competition and consumers.
```
Exhibit 32.2

AMERICAN SUPERCONDUCTOR CORPORATION

CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED
PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of American Superconductor Corporation (the Company) for the period
ended December 31, 2008 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, David A. Henry, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, hereby certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to my knowledge:

(1)
The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                       |  |                        
|---------------------- |  | -----------------------
|Date: February 5, 2009 |  | /S/ DAVID A. HENRY     
|                       |  | David A. Henry         
|                       |  | Chief Financial Officer
<page>

	EXHIBIT 31.02

CERTIFICATIONS

I, Kevin Perry, Chief Financial Officer of Demeter Management
Corporation ("Demeter"), the general partner of the registrant,
certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this quarterly report on Form 10-Q of the
registrant;
2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any
untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light
of the circumstances under which such statements were made,
not misleading with respect to the period covered by this
report;
3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other
financial information included in this report, fairly present
in all material respects the financial condition, results of
operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for,
the periods presented in this report;
4.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I are
responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure
controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules
13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have:
a)	Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or
caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be
designed under our supervision, to ensure that material
information relating to the registrant, including its
consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by
others within those entities, particularly during the
period in which this report is being prepared;
b)	Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant's
disclosure controls and procedures and presented in
this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of
the disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end
of the period covered by this report based on such
evaluation; and
c)	Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant's
internal control over financial reporting that occurred
during the registrant's most recent fiscal quarter (the
registrant's fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an
annual report) that has materially affected, or is
reasonably likely to materially affect, the
<page> registrant's internal control over financial
reporting; and
5.	The registrant's other certifying officer and I have
disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal
control over financial reporting, to the registrant's
auditors and the audit committee of Demeter's board of
directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):
a)	All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in
the design or operation of internal control over
financial reporting which are reasonably likely to
adversely affect the registrant's ability to record,
process, summarize and report financial information;
and
b)	Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves
management or other employees who have a significant
role in the registrant's internal control over
financial reporting.


Date:  August 16, 2004     /s/	Kevin Perry
				    	Kevin Perry
				    	Chief Financial Officer,
		 		    	Demeter Management Corporation,
				    	general partner of the registrant
#### Kim SMITH v. FIGURE WORLD PLUS, INC.

85-291

705 S.W.2d 432

Supreme Court of Arkansas

Opinion delivered March 17, 1986

*The Haskins & Hendricks Law Firm,*for appellant.

*House, Wallace, Nelson & Jewell, P.A.,*by: *Paul W. Stanfield,*for appellee.

Robert H. Dudley, Justice.

Appellant, Kim Smith, entered into a written contract with the appellee, Figure World Plus, Inc., by which appellee agreed to make its health club facilities available for one year, and appellant agreed to pay $30.00 initially and $10.00 per month for one year. The contract also provided for a late charge in the amount of $10.00 for each month in which payment was late. The appellant defaulted on nine of the monthly payments. The appellee filed suit for $180.00 representing $90.00 due for the facilities being available and $90.00 for nine late charges. The appellant defended by arguing that the $90.00 in late charges amounted to usurious interest. The trial court granted judgment for $180.00. We affirm.

A late charge which is in the nature of a penalty will *356not render a transaction usurious. *Harris*v. *Guaranty Financial Corp.,*244 Ark. 218, 424 S.W.2d 355 (1968). However, a charge which is labeled a penalty, but which is really a subterfuge for interest, may render a transaction usurious. *Redbarn Chemicals, Inc.*v. *Bradshaw,*254 Ark. 557, 494 S.W.2d 720 (1973). Although we examine each case of this type on all of its own particular facts, two of the principal factors in determining if the charge is truly a penalty are whether the charge is fixed in amount and whether it is assessed as a one-time charge. *Bunn*v. *Weyerhaeuser Co.,*268 Ark. 445, 598 S.W.2d 54 (1980). We look to those two factors because they are indicators of whether the charge is designed to induce prompt payment and whether the borrower has it in his power to avoid the charges. *Hayes*v. *First National Bank of Memphis,*256 Ark. 328, 507 S.W.2d 701 (1974).

Here, the charges met the test of a penalty because they were fixed in amount and they were charged only one time. They were not compounded.

Appellant contends that the charges are excessive because they do not bear any relationship to the appellee’s added expenses incurred in attempting to collect the past due installments. The argument is without merit because the appellant offered no proof on the subject and the burden was upon her to show usury. *Hayes*v. *First National Bank of Memphis, supra.*

Affirmed.

Purtle, J., not participating.
Table of
Contents


Exhibit
32.02


Certification
of Principal Financial Officer


Pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant To


Section
906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002





In connection
with the Annual Report of Silicon Image, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-K for
the year ended December 31, 2009, as filed with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (the “Report”), I, Noland Granberry, Chief Accounting Officer of the
Company, certify to the best of my knowledge, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section
1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the
      Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company
      for the periods presented therein.









Date:
      February 12, 2010
            
            
            /s/
      Noland GranberryNoland
      GranberryChief
      Accounting Officer(Principal
      Financial Officer)





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided to
the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the Securities
and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
#### William Young RADCLIFF *v.*STATE of Arkansas

5511

457 S. W. 2d 847

Opinion delivered September 21, 1970

*E. V. Trimble,*for appellant.

*Joe Purcell,*Attorney General; *Sam Gibson,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

The appellant, William Young Radcliff, age 17, was convicted of robbery and sentenced to be imprisoned for three years. The only issue argued for reversal is the sufficiency of the evidence.

On September 26, 1969, a disturbance occurred in Little Rock after a high school football game. Randy Alder, 15, testified that a boy whom he was unable to identify put a gun in his back, marched him down the street, and took what money he had, which happened to be only a dime. Robin Gleason, 16, saw the incident and positively identified William Young Radcliff as the youth with the pistol. There was other corroborating *2testimony for the State, including that of a police officer who took a statement (which the trial court found to be voluntary) in which young Radcliff said that he had pulled his .22 caliber pistol on another boy and walked him down the street for half a block.

The defendant, testifying in his own behalf, denied having taken any money from the prosecuting witness. Young Radcliff said that he had taken his gun with him for protection against “some boys who were going to jump me at the stadium.” He admitted having used the gun in the manner described by the State’s witness, but he said that the other boy had a knife, “and I thought he was going to try and hrrm me with it.” Later in his testimony Radcliff said that the gun had been a play gun which he subsequently threw away because he didn’t want it.

The essential element of robbery — a serious crime —is the violent taking of anything of value from the person of another by force or intimidation. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3601 (Repl. 1964). “It is immaterial of what value the thing taken is. A penny as well as a pound thus forcibly extorted makes it robbery.” *Clary*v. *State,*33 Ark. 561 (1878). Upon the record before us we. have no alternative except to hold that the trial court’s judgment is supported by substantial evidence. That finding concludes our inquiry. We should add that the sentence imposed is the minimum fixed by law. Ark. Stat. Ann. § 41-3602.

Affirmed.
Exhibit
4(o)









February
20, 2008




Securities
and Exchange Commission


100 F.
Street, N.E.


Washington,
D.C. 20549




Subject:
            General
      Electric Capital Services, Inc. Annual Report on Form 10-K for the fiscal
      year ended December 31, 2007 – File No.
0-14804







Dear
Sirs:




Neither
General Electric Capital Services, Inc. (the “Corporation”) nor any of its
subsidiaries has outstanding any instrument with respect to its long-term debt
that is not registered or filed with the Commission and under which the total
amount of securities authorized exceeds 10% of the total assets of the
registrant and its subsidiaries on a consolidated basis. In accordance with
paragraph (b) (4) (iii) of Item 601 of Regulation S-K
(17 CFR §229.601), the Corporation hereby agrees to furnish to the
Securities and Exchange Commission, upon request, a copy of each instrument
which defines the rights of holders of such long-term debt not filed or
incorporated by reference as an exhibit to the Corporation’s Annual Report on
Form 10-K for the fiscal year ended December 31, 2007.








Very
      truly yours,
              GENERAL
      ELECTRIC CAPITAL SERVICES, INC.By:
            /s/
      Kathryn A. CassidyKathryn
      A. Cassidy
              Senior
      Vice President Corporate Treasury
              and
      Global Funding Operation
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, :

: Case No. 2:17-cr-277

 Plaintiff, :

: Chief Judge Algenon L. Marbley 

 v. :

: 

:

JOHN PAUL STECKEL, :

: 

 Defendant.

OPINION & ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant John Paul Steckel’s Motion to Amend 

Sentence. (ECF No. 42). For the reasons stated below, Defendant’s Motion is GRANTED.

Defendant was arrested on a gun charge on April 21, 2017 and pled guilty to violating 18 

U.S.C. § 922(g). He was sentenced on June 21, 2018, to 48 months in Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). 

(ECF No. 35). The Court directed that Defendant be given credit for pretrial custody “effective 

April 21, 2017, through present.” (Id.). 

Defendant filed this Motion on February 23, 2020, requesting a modification of his 

sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (ECF No. 42). He alleges the BOP deleted time 

credits for his pretrial custody in the amount of approximately six months and two-and-a-half 

weeks. (ECF No. 42 at 2). Defendant requests an order from this Court amending his sentence and

clarifying he is eligible for home detention on May 17, 2020, a date which would accurately 

account for his pretrial credited time. (Id. at 3). He argues the BOP’s failure to effectuate the 

Court’s Order constitutes an extraordinary and compelling reason to amend his sentence. (Id.). 

This Court agrees. The Court instructed the Government to file a response within fourteen days on 

Case: 2:17-cr-00277-ALM Doc #: 44 Filed: 05/15/20 Page: 1 of 2 PAGEID #: 121
March 25, 2020. (ECF No. 43). The Government did not file a response but indicated orally to the 

Court that it does not object to Mr. Steckel’s Motion.

Given the clear instruction by this Court to credit Mr. Steckel for jail time served pretrial 

and the absence of objection from the Government, Mr. Steckel’s Motion to Amend/Correct 

Sentence is GRANTED and Mr. Steckel is sentenced to 48 months minus credits for the entirety 

of Mr. Steckel’s time in pretrial custody beginning April 21, 2017. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 /s/ Algenon L. Marbley___ 

ALGENON L. MARBLEY

CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

DATED: May 14, 2020

Case: 2:17-cr-00277-ALM Doc #: 44 Filed: 05/15/20 Page: 2 of 2 PAGEID #: 122
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 

CHAPTER 2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 

CHAPTER 3. MARKET AND TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT 

CHAPTER 4. SCREENING ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 5. ENGINEERING ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 6. ENERGY USE CHARACTERIZATION 

CHAPTER 7. PRODUCT PRICE DETERMINATION 

CHAPTER 8. LIFE-CYCLE COST AND PAYBACK PERIOD ANALYSES 

CHAPTER 9. TRIAL STANDARD LEVELS 

CHAPTER 10. SHIPMENTS ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 11. NATIONAL IMPACTS ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 12. LIFE-CYCLE COST SUB-GROUP ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 13. MANUFACTURER IMPACT ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 14. UTILITY IMPACT ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 15. NET NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT IMPACT ANALYSIS 

CHAPTER 16. ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT 

CHAPTER 17. REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS 

APPENDIX AA. ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 

APPENDIX 3A. LIGHTING DEFINITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES CODE AND CODE 

OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 

APPENDIX 3B. XENON AVAILABILITY AND PRICING 

APPENDIX 3C. RARE EARTH PHOSPHOR AVAILABILITY AND PRICING 

APPENDIX 5A. ENGINEERING RESULTS USED IN THE SHIPMENTS, NATIONAL 

IMPACTS, AND LIFE-CYCLE COST SUBGROUP ANALYSES 

APPENDIX 5B. T5 HALOPHOSPHOR MINIATURE BIPIN BASELINE LAMPS 

APPENDIX 5C. MODIFIED-SPECTRUM INCANDESCENT REFLECTOR LAMPS 

APPENDIX 5D. ADVANCED IR COATINGS 

APPENDIX 6A. ENERGY USE CHARACTERIZATION RESULTS USED IN THE 

SHIPMENTS, NATIONAL IMPACTS, AND LIFE-CYCLE COST SUBGROUP 

ANALYSES 

APPENDIX 7A. ADDITIONAL END-USER PRICE RESULTS 

APPENDIX 8A. USER INSTRUCTIONS FOR LCC AND PBP SPREADSHEETS 

APPENDIX 8B. SUPPLEMENTARY LIFE-CYCLE COST AND PAYBACK PERIOD 

RESULTS 

APPENDIX 8C. RESIDENTIAL DISCOUNT RATE DISTRIBUTIONS 

APPENDIX 8D. HOT SHOCK IN INCANDESCENT REFLECTOR LAMPS 

APPENDIX 10A. SUPPLEMENTARY SCENARIO FOR THE SHIPMENTS ANALYSIS 

APPENDIX 10B. MARKET SEGMENT-BASED LIGHTING EXPERTISE ANALYSIS 

APPENDIX 10C. PENETRATION OF EMERGING AND EXISTING TECHNOLOGIES 

APPENDIX 11A. USER INSTRUCTIONS FOR SHIPMENTS AND NIA SPREADSHEETS 

APPENDIX 11B. SUPPLEMENTARY SCENARIOS FOR THE NATIONAL IMPACTS 

ANALYSIS 

1 

EE-2006-STD-0131 COMMENT 101
2 

APPENDIX 13A. MANUFACTURER IMPACT ANALYSIS INTERVIEW GUIDE AND 

GOVERNMENT REGULATORY IMPACT MODEL (GRIM) 

APPENDIX 14A. INTERPOLATION OF UTILITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RESULTS 

FROM NEMS-BT OUTPUT 

EE-2006-STD-0131 COMMENT 101
### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Detention of No. 54986

- 7

- II

BRIAN TAYLOR

- ROSE, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner.

M AXA , J

. – Brian Taylor

- Rose, who was being detained as a sexually violent predator (SVP), appeal ed an order denying his petition for conditional release to a less restrictive alternative (LRA). He filed this petition even though he had a pending petition for unconditional release, which suspended the obligation of the Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS) to conduct an annual review of his mental conditio n. The trial court dismissed Taylor

- Rose’s petition as untimely, reasoning that an SVP can make an LRA petition only in conjunction with an annual review. Taylor

- Rose argue d on appeal that under RCW 71.09.090(2) he has the right to petition for an LRA release at any time without waiting for a DSHS annual review. However, while this appeal was pending, the trial court entered an agreed order directing Taylor

- Rose’s conditional release to a less restrictive alternative. As a result, both parties agree that this appeal is moot. Nevertheless , Taylor

- Rose argues that we should address his appeal because the issues raised involve continuing and substantial public interest. An appeal is mo ot if we no longer can provide effective relief. In re Det. of M.W. , 185
W n .2d 633, 648, 374 P.3d 1123 (2016). However, we have discretion to decide a moot appeal if the case involves a matter of continuing and substantial public interest. Id. In deter mining Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two September 28, 2021No. 54986

- 7

- II

2

whether a moot appeal falls within this exception, we consider the public or private nature of the issue presented, the need for an authoritative determination that will provide future guidance to public officers, and the likelihood that the issue w ill recur in the future. Id. In this case, we decline to exercise our discretion to consider Taylor

- Rose’s moot appeal. Therefore, we dismiss Taylor

- Rose’s appeal as moot. A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.

MAXA, J.

We concur:

WORSWICK , P .J.

CRUSER , J.
Exhibit
10.6

 


	ID
    Global Solutions Corporation
	160
    East Lake Brantley Drive
	Longwood,
    Florida 32779


                


                                                   September
25, 2015








Thomas
R. Szoke


  


		Re:	Employment
                                         Agreement (the “Agreement”) dated February 27, 2014 between ID Global Solutions
                                         Corporation (the “Company”) and Thomas R. Szoke (“Executive”)



 


Dear
Mr. Szoke:


  


Reference
is hereby made to the Agreement. It is hereby agreed to by the parties that Section 2 of the Agreement shall be amended and restated
to state the following:


 


“h.      Additional
Compensation. The Company shall issue to Executive a common stock option (the “Option”) to purchase 10,000,000 shares
of common stock of the Company exercisable at $0.45 per share for a period of five years. The Option may be exercised for cash
or on a cashless baseless.”


  


We
kindly request that you execute this letter below indicating that you agree with the above Amendment and statements.


 





	 	Sincerely,
	 	 
	 	ID Global Solutions Corporation
	 	 
	 	By:/s/ Douglas Solomon
	 	Name: Douglas Solomon
	 	Title: COO







  


AGREED
AND ACKNOWLEDGED:


  


/s/
Thomas R. Szoke


Thomas
R. Szoke
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

PROPOSED ORDER 

This matter is before the Court on the parties’ Joint Status Report, in which the parties 

represent that their negotiations over Plaintiffs’ fee motion remain ongoing and productive. 

The parties are ORDERED to appear for a status conference on August 5, 2021. If the 

parties inform the Court that their discussions have ceased to be productive, the Court will reinstate 

briefing on the fee motion immediately.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_____________________

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

STACIE RAY,

et al.,

Plaintiffs, 

v.

STEPHANIE McCLOUD,

et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 2:18-cv-00272

Judge: Michael Watson

Magistrate Judge: Chelsey Vascura

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

)

Case: 2:18-cv-00272-MHW-CMV Doc #: 97-1 Filed: 07/26/21 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 3327