UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

CLYDE YOUNG, 

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.  No. 01-7782

LONNIE M. SAUNDERS; LARRY W.

HUFFMAN, Regional Director,

Defendants-Appellees. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Virginia, at Roanoke.

James C. Turk, District Judge.

(CA-00-837-7)

Submitted: April 23, 2002

Decided: May 20, 2002

Before NIEMEYER, WILLIAMS, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part by unpublished

per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

Clyde Young, Appellant Pro Se. Pamela Anne Sargent, Assistant

Attorney General, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellees. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 
OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Clyde Frank Young, a Virginia inmate, brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (West Supp. 2001), claiming that officials

responsible for policies at the Augusta Correctional Center (ACC)

violated his rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment when they denied him access to items necessary to practice his

religion (Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo). These items include prayer

oil, religious powder, incense, candles, and a lodestone. 

The Supreme Court has held that a neutral, generally applicable

law does not offend the Free Exercise Clause, even if the law has an

incidental effect on religious practice. Employment Division v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872, 876-79 (1990). See also Hines v. South Carolina

Department of Corrections, 148 F.3d 353, 357 (4th Cir. 1998); American Life League, Inc. v. Reno, 47 F.3d 642, 654 (4th Cir. 1995)

(explaining Smith). In the context of regulations that affect inmates,

the Supreme Court has held, prior to Smith, that the regulation must

be reasonably related to legitimate penological interests. O’Lone v.

Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987). In O’Lone, the Supreme

Court provided the following factors for lower courts to weigh when

evaluating constitutional challenges to prison regulations: (1) a regulation must have a logical connection to legitimate governmental

interests invoked to justify it; (2) the inmates should have alternative

means of exercising their religious rights; and, (3) accommodating the

inmates’ rights should not severely impact other inmates, prison officials, and allocation of prison resources generally. Id. at 350-52. Relying heavily upon O’Lone, the district court found that the regulations

restricting Young’s possession of these items were reasonably related

to legitimate penological interests and granted summary judgment to

Saunders. 

The penological interests enumerated by Saunders to limit access

to candles, incense, and a lodestone survive both the Smith and

O’Lone tests. Significantly, the regulations that limit Young’s access

to these items are general in their applicability and do not target the

religious practice of Voodoo. Furthermore, Saunders’ concerns over

the safety and security of the facility and its inhabitants provide ade2 YOUNG v. SAUNDERS
quate support for the conclusion that accommodating Young’s request

for these items would have undesirable results in ACC. O’Lone, 482

U.S. at 353. Accordingly, we affirm the denial of relief as to Young’s

claims for candles, incense, and a lodestone. 

On appeal, however, Young provides several counter-arguments to

the penological interests enumerated by the Appellees in denying

access to prayer oil and religious powder that warrant further review.

Although Appellees claim a compelling interest in protecting the

safety and security of the facility, they have failed to articulate the

manner in which these legitimate goals are advanced by restricting the

purchase of non-flammable prayer oil and religious powder. Second,

although the district court accepted for purposes of decision that

Egyptian Freemasonry Voodoo is a valid religious practice and that

Young needed prayer oils and religious powder to practice that religion, the record fails to provide any information about the demands

of this religion. Without this factual finding, the second prong of the

O’Lone test, whether Young is able to participate in other religious

observances of his faith, cannot be considered. Finally, the record

provides no insight as to how the allowance of non-flammable prayer

oil and religious powder, subject to inspection, would affect other

inmates, prison personnel, or prison resources. 

Because crucial factual issues remain, summary judgment was premature and Young’s claims regarding his requests for prayer oil and

religious powder should be allowed to proceed. For this reason, we

vacate the district court’s order as it relates to prayer oil and religious

powder, and, without indicating any view as to any other procedural

or substantive issue presented by Young, remand the matter for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the facts

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before

the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED IN PART; VACATED AND REMANDED IN PART

YOUNG v. SAUNDERS 3