Filed 1/20/15 In re Michael C. CA2/7

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re MICHAEL C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

 B254124

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. DK02263)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY 

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND 

FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

MONICA C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 

Philip L. Soto, Judge, and Steven R. Klaif, Juvenile Court Referee. Affirmed.

Marissa Coffey, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant 

and Appellant.

Richard D. Weiss, Acting County Counsel, Dawyn R. Harrison, Assistant 

County Counsel, and Stephen D. Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and 

Respondent.
2

INTRODUCTION

Monica C. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s order removing her fouryear-old son, Michael C., from her custody, granting sole legal and physical custody of 

Michael to Michael’s father, V.N. (father), and terminating jurisdiction over Michael’s 

dependency case after the court sustained the Los Angeles County Department of 

Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) supplemental petition filed pursuant to Welfare 

and Institutions Code section 387.

1

 Mother contends the juvenile court erred in refusing 

to order DCFS to provide her reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision 

(a) after Michael was removed from her custody. Mother further contends that she was 

not provided adequate notice that the juvenile court could refuse to order DCFS to 

provide reunification services before terminating jurisdiction over Michael’s dependency 

case. Finally, Mother contends the juvenile court erred in finding the Indian Child 

Welfare Act (ICWA) did not apply to Michael’s dependency case after mother informed 

the court that she believed she was a descendant of the Cherokee tribes. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Pursuant to a family court order, mother and father lived in separate households 

and shared joint legal and physical custody of Michael. On October 25, 2013, DCFS 

received a referral alleging that Michael was being subjected to general neglect and 

emotional abuse by both of his parents. According to the referral, mother had reported 

that there had been incidents of domestic violence between herself and father. The 

referral also alleged that mother would sometimes forget to turn off the stove in her 

apartment while Michael was staying with her, and that she would allow Michael to stay 

up until midnight and watch television all day. The referral also alleged that mother 

would leave Michael alone in her apartment for more than an hour while she went to the 

gym, and that she would yell at him if he was crying when she returned. Finally, the 

referral alleged that mother suffered from mental illness. 

 

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless 

otherwise specified.
3

On November 14, 2013, DCFS filed a non-detained dependency petition pursuant 

to section 300 to declare Michael a dependent of the court. The petition alleged 

Michael’s father had physically abused mother in Michael’s presence. The petition 

further alleged that mother suffered from emotional and mental disorders, and that she 

had failed to properly treat her disorders in the past.

Mother and father each appeared with counsel at the November 14, 2013 detention 

hearing, where the court found that father was Michael’s presumed father. At the

hearing, father claimed no Native American ancestry, and mother claimed Cherokee 

ancestry from her father’s family. The juvenile court inquired whether mother had 

registered her Native American ancestry, to which mother’s counsel responded that she 

had not. Mother then claimed that she was in the process of “getting [her] card.” 

Because mother was not registered, the court found ICWA did not apply to Michael’s 

case. The juvenile court then released Michael to his parents’ custody, with each parent 

to share joint legal and physical custody pursuant to the family court order. The court 

ordered DCFS to provide mother and father with family maintenance services, and it set a 

jurisdiction hearing for January 7, 2014. 

In its January 7, 2014 jurisdiction/disposition report, DCFS noted that ICWA 

“does or may apply” to Michael’s case. In that same report, DCFS recommended that the 

juvenile court declare Michael a dependent of the court and order DCFS to provide 

Michael’s parents with family maintenance services. DCFS did not request to have 

Michael removed from either parent’s custody. 

At the January 7, 2014 disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained in its 

entirety DCFS’s petition filed on Michael’s behalf and declared Michael a dependent of 

the court. The court then ordered Michael placed in his parents’ joint custody under 

DCFS’s supervision. The court also ordered DCFS to provide Michael’s parents with 

family maintenance services. As to father, the court ordered that he stay at least 100 

yards away from mother and participate in domestic-violence-for-perpetrators, angermanagement, and conflict-resolution programs. The court ordered mother to participate 

in a support group for victims of domestic violence. The court further ordered mother to 
4

consult a licensed psychiatrist and comply with any and all prescribed counseling and 

medication regimens prescribed by the psychiatrist. The court ordered both parents to 

participate in a family preservation program. Finally, the court set a section 364 review 

hearing for July 9, 2014. 

On March 11, 2014, the juvenile court issued a removal order authorizing DCFS 

to detain Michael from mother’s custody. According to DCFS’s March 14, 2014 

detention report, mother had failed to comply with the court’s orders issued at the 

January 7, 2014 disposition hearing. For example, mother failed to meet with her 

assigned family-preservation social worker, repeatedly cancelling in-home visits at the 

last minute. Additionally, mother had yet to visit a licensed psychiatrist to address her 

mental-health issues. Further, on several occasions, mother had lodged irrational 

accusations toward several social workers, including her assigned case worker, accusing 

her of being a “mobster” and conspiring with father to remove Michael from her custody. 

The report concluded that Michael was at a “very high” risk of harm due to mother’s

mental-health issues and her failure to address those issues as required by the court’s 

January 7, 2014 disposition order. 

On March 14, 2014, DCFS filed a supplemental petition pursuant to section 387 to 

detain Michael from mother’s custody, alleging that mother had failed to meet with a 

licensed psychiatrist, take her prescribed medication, or participate in any of her courtordered programs and services. 

The juvenile court commenced a detention hearing on the supplemental petition on

March 14, 2014. The court made emergency detention findings and continued the 

hearing to March 19, 2014 for arraignment and detention. 

DCFS filed a last-minute information report on March 19, 2014. In that report, 

DCFS detailed two monitored visits between Michael and mother that occurred on March 

17 and 18, 2014. According to the report, throughout most of both visits, mother tried to 

talk about Michael’s dependency case with her case worker in front of Michael. Despite 

the case worker’s attempts to direct mother’s attention to Michael, mother often 

redirected her focus to the case worker to ask questions about Michael’s case. 
5

On March 19, 2014, the court ordered Michael detained from mother’s custody 

and released to father’s custody, with mother to have monitored visits. The court set a 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing on the supplemental petition for April 16, 2014. 

On March 26, 2014, DCFS sent mother notice of the April 16, 2014 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing entitled “Notice of Hearing on Petition.” The notice 

informed mother that (1) a petition had been filed on Michael’s behalf pursuant to section 

387; (2) a jurisdiction/disposition hearing would be held on April 16, 2014; (3) she had 

the right to be present at the hearing, to be represented by counsel, and to present 

evidence; and (4) the court could proceed in her absence. 

In its April 16, 2014 jurisdiction/disposition report for the supplemental petition, 

DCFS recommended that the juvenile court make the following orders: (1) remove 

Michael from mother’s custody; (2) order mother to undergo a psychological evaluation 

pursuant to Evidence Code section 730 to identify mother’s mental-health issues; (3)

provide mother with family reunification and maintenance services; and (4) continue the 

court’s previous orders and services. The report stated that DCFS had serious concerns 

about mother’s mental health because she did not appear to be taking medication and her 

behavior continued to become increasingly erratic, incoherent, and irrational. 

The juvenile court continued the April 16, 2014 jurisdiction hearing to April 30, 

2014. On April 30, 2014, DCFS filed two last-minute information reports. In the first

report, DCFS changed its recommendation set forth in its April 16, 2014 

jurisdiction/disposition report and requested that the juvenile court grant father sole legal 

and physical custody of Michael. DCFS stated that it appeared unlikely that mother

would be able to successfully reunify with Michael due to her refusal to recognize her 

mental-health issues. The report detailed two monitored visits that occurred in April 

2014, during which mother alternated between periods in which she was calm and paid 

attention to Michael and periods in which she acted belligerently toward her case worker,

accusing the case worker and others of conspiring against her to remove Michael from 

her custody. 
6

At the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, the juvenile court sustained the 

supplemental petition. The court refused to grant mother reunification services because it 

found that reunification would not be in Michael’s best interests. In doing so, the court 

stated as follows: “[B]ased on everything I have read and everything I have seen, the 

court finds that there is -- family reunification, even if the court has discretion, which the 

court does have discretion to grant further reunification to the parents from whom the 

child was removed, even when the child is placed with the non offending parent or has 

been returned to a parent, the court is unable to find that by any standard that 

reunification can be -- reunification would be -- would be a benefit to the child’s best 

interest.” 

After the court refused to grant reunification services, mother spoke up, stating: 

“Your honor, my son and I are Cherokee Indian. The Department is not addressing this 

issue, your honor.” The court responded: “The court finds ICWA did not apply back in 

November.” The court then terminated jurisdiction, granted father sole legal and physical 

custody of Michael, and ordered monitored visitation for mother. 

At the conclusion of the hearing, mother’s attorney requested that the court note 

his objection to the court’s order; however, he did not specify upon which grounds his 

objection was based. The court noted the objection, issued a family law exit order, and 

stayed imposition of its order pending receipt of a juvenile custody order to be filed on 

May 2, 2014. On May 2, 2014, the juvenile court issued its order terminating jurisdiction 

over Michael’s dependency case.2

DISCUSSION

I. The Juvenile Court’s Refusal to Order Reunification Services

Mother contends the juvenile court erred in failing to order DCFS to provide her 

with reunification services pursuant to section 361.5, subdivision (a) after awarding 

 

2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of the juvenile court’s minute order 

from the May 2, 2014 hearing, which was entered after mother filed her notice of appeal.
7

custody of Michael to father. Mother also contends DCFS failed to provide proper notice 

that the court could terminate jurisdiction without ordering reunification services. 

A. Notice

Mother argues DCFS failed to provide adequate notice that the juvenile court 

could terminate jurisdiction and deny ordering reunification services at the April 30, 2014 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing on DCFS’s section 387 supplemental petition. DCFS 

contends mother forfeited any challenge to the court’s rulings because she did not raise a 

notice-based objection at the April 30, 2014 hearing. (In re Wilford J. (2005) 131 

Cal.App.4th 742, 754 [“defective notice and the consequences flowing from it may easily 

be corrected if promptly raised in the juvenile court”].)

“‘[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a ruling if an 

objection could have been but was not made in the trial court. [Citation.] The purpose of 

this rule is to encourage parties to bring errors to the attention of the trial court, so that 

they may be corrected. [Citation.]’ [Citations.] In addition, ‘[g]eneral objections are 

insufficient to preserve issues for review. [Citation.] The objection must state the ground 

or grounds upon which the objection is based. [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (In re Daniel B.

(2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672.) This forfeiture rule applies to challenges based on 

defective notice where the appellant did not raise the issue before the juvenile court. (See 

In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 [father forfeited challenge to defective 

notice of jurisdictional hearing where he failed to raise the issue before the juvenile court 

despite his appearance at several hearings subsequent to the jurisdictional hearing].) 

Here, mother’s counsel objected to the juvenile court’s April 30, 2014 order but 

did not specify upon which grounds the objection was based. However, despite her 

failure to specifically object to DCFS’s notice at the disposition hearing, mother was not 

afforded the opportunity to raise the notice issue at a subsequent hearing. (See In re

Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 754 [“Notwithstanding the juvenile court’s error 

in proceeding with the unscheduled jurisdictional hearing, [appellant] appeared with 

counsel at subsequent disposition hearings and had the opportunity during each one to 

challenge the court’s earlier finding that notice had been properly given. He did not and 
8

thus deprived the juvenile court of the opportunity to correct the mistake. [Citation.] 

Accordingly, he has forfeited that issue on appeal.”].) As a result, mother argues she 

should be permitted to raise the issue for the first time on appeal. We agree and will 

exercise our discretion to consider the issue. (See ibid. [“[f]orfeiture is not automatic, 

and the appellate court has discretion to excuse a party’s failure to properly raise an issue 

in a timely fashion . . . .”].) 

The hearing originally scheduled for April 16, 2014 and continued to April 30, 

2014, was set as a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on DCFS’s section 387 supplemental 

petition. Accordingly, DCFS’s obligation to provide mother with notice of the hearing 

was guided by section 387, subdivision (d). That subdivision provides: “Upon the filing 

of the supplemental petition, the clerk of the juvenile court shall immediately set the 

same for hearing within 30 days, and the social worker shall cause notice thereof to be 

served upon the persons and in the manner prescribed by Sections 290.1 and 291.” (§ 

387, subd. (d).) Section 290.1 establishes the notice requirements that DCFS must follow 

immediately after filing a section 387 supplemental petition seeking to remove custody of 

the child from his or her parent. (§ 290.1.) Section 291 sets forth the notice requirements 

that DCFS must follow after the juvenile court has conducted an initial hearing on the 

supplemental petition. (§ 291; see also In re Wilford J., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p.

749.) 

At the time DCFS issued notice on March 26, 2014, the juvenile court had already 

conducted its initial hearing on DCFS’s supplemental petition on March 14 and 19, 2014. 

Accordingly, the March 26, 2014 notice was governed by section 291. (See § 291.) 

Section 291, subdivision (d) sets forth the content that must be included in a 

written notice of hearing on a section 387 petition following the court’s initial hearing on 

the petition. (§ 291, subd. (d).) Under that subdivision, DCFS must include the 

following information in the notice informing the dependent child’s parent of a scheduled 

hearing on the supplemental petition: (1) the name and address of the person being 

notified; (2) the nature of the hearing for which notice is being issued; (3) each section 

and subdivision under which the proceeding has been initiated; (4) the date, time, and 
9

place of the hearing; (5) the name of the child upon whose behalf the petition has been 

brought; (6) a statement concerning the parent’s right to representation and his or her 

potential liability for the costs of appointed representation and child support; and (7) a 

copy of the supplemental petition. (§ 291, subds. (d)(1)-(7).)

Mother complains DCFS’s notice issued on March 26, 2014 was deficient because 

it did not inform her that the court could refuse to order reunification services or 

terminate jurisdiction at the jurisdiction/disposition hearing on DCFS’s section 387 

petition. We disagree. Section 291 does not require DCFS to provide express notice that 

the court may refuse to order reunification services for the parent of a dependent child in 

the event the court removes the child from that parent’s custody. (§ 291, subds. (d)(1)-

(7).) Further, DCFS’s March 26, 2014 notice complied with the content requirements of 

section 291, subdivision (d). As noted above, the notice stated that a 

“Jurisdiction/Disposition Hearing” would be held on April 16, 2014. (See § 291, subd. 

(d)(2).) The notice also informed mother that DCFS had filed a petition pursuant to 

section 387 on Michael’s behalf. (See § 291, subd. (d)(3).) Finally, the notice informed 

mother of her right to representation and warned her that the court could proceed with the 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing in the event she did not appear. (See § 291, subds. (d)(6)-

(7).) 

Mother’s contention that she was not expressly notified that the court could deny 

her reunification services at the April 30, 2014 hearing is without moment. As noted, 

DCFS’s March 26, 2014 notice informed mother of the nature of the April 30, 2014 

hearing because it listed the hearing as a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on DCFS’s 

supplemental petition. “At [a] section 387 disposition hearing, the court applies the same 

procedures that govern disposition hearings on a section 300 petition as set forth by the 

California Rules of Court. (Cal.[ ]Rules of Court, [rule 5.565(e)(2)].)” (In re Suhey G.

(2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 732, 741, fn. 20.) Whether the juvenile court should grant 

reunification services to an offending parent and whether the juvenile court should 

continue jurisdiction over a dependency matter are issues that may be addressed at a 

disposition hearing. (See ibid.) Accordingly, DCFS did not provide mother defective 
10

notice because the March 26, 2014 notice informed mother that the court would conduct 

a jurisdiction/disposition hearing on the supplemental petition.

B. Denial of Reunification Services

Mother also claims the juvenile court erred in refusing to order DCFS to provide 

her with reunification services. Mother contends the court’s ruling was error because, 

under section 361.5, subdivision (a), the court was required to order DCFS to provide her 

with reunification services once Michael was removed from her custody. DCFS counters 

that the juvenile court’s refusal to order reunification services was proper because 

Michael was returned to the custody of his father. 

Under section 361.5, subdivision (a), “whenever a child is removed from a 

parent’s or guardian’s custody, the juvenile court shall order the social worker to provide 

child welfare services to the child and the child’s mother and statutorily presumed father 

or guardians.” (§ 361.5, subd. (a).) For purposes of section 361.5, child welfare services 

may include both reunification and maintenance services. (In re Pedro Z., Jr. (2010) 190 

Cal.App.4th 12, 19 (Pedro Z.).) Under section 361.5, subdivision (b), the juvenile court 

may deny reunification services in certain enumerated circumstances to those who would 

otherwise be entitled to receive them. “[T]he language of section 361.5, subdivision 

(a)(1)(A) implies that the statute does not apply when, at the disposition hearing, a child 

does not enter foster care, but is returned to a parent.” (Ibid; see also In re A.C. (2008) 

169 Cal.App.4th 636, 650 [“if minors remain in the custody of a parent, section 361.5 

plays no role”]; ibid. [“section 361.5 is inapplicable in the absence of a disposition 

ordering a placement with someone other than a parent”]; see also § 16507, subd. (b) 

[“Family reunification services shall only be provided when a child has been placed in 

out-of-home care, or is in the care of a previously noncustodial parent under the 

supervision of the juvenile court.”].)

Mother contends that despite the court’s placement of Michael in father’s custody,

section 361.5, subdivision (a) was triggered by the court’s dispositional order because 

father was an offending custodial parent and could not have been awarded custody as a 

noncustodial parent pursuant to section 361.2, which would have allowed the court to 
11

bypass ordering DCFS to provide mother reunification services under section 361.5.

(See § 361.2, subd. (b)(1) [after removing child from custodial parent and placing him 

with noncustodial parent under DCFS supervision, the court may terminate jurisdiction]; 

see also Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 [under a section 361.2 placement, 

section 361.5 does not become relevant until the dependent child is removed from the 

custody of both parents].)

We agree that section 361.2 does not apply to Michael’s case because the original 

section 300 petition was sustained against both mother and father, and Michael was 

residing with both mother and father at the time that petition was filed. (See § 361.2, 

subd. (a) [A “noncustodial parent” is “a parent of the child, with whom the child was not 

residing at the time that the events or conditions arose that brought the child within the 

provisions of Section 300.”]; see also In re Adrianna P. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 44, 55, 

fn. 5 [A “custodial parent” is the “parent who had physical custody of the child at the 

time of the events that gave rise to the petition.”].) However, even when the juvenile 

court does not proceed under section 361.2 and grants custody of a dependent child to 

one custodial parent but not the other, the court is not required to order reunification 

services under section 361.5 for the parent from whom the child is removed. (See Pedro 

Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 20; see also § 16507, subd. (b).) Rather, in such a 

situation, the court is afforded broad discretion under section 362 to make any reasonable

orders it “deems necessary and proper” to protect the child’s interests. (See § 362, subd. 

(d); see also Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 309 (Bridget A.).) 

Here, the juvenile court decided to award custody of Michael to father only and 

immediately terminate jurisdiction, as it could have done had section 361.2 applied. (See 

Pedro Z., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 21 [a section 362 placement “should be treated in 

the same manner” as a section 361.2 placement]; see also § 361.2, subd. (b)(1).) Under 

the circumstances of this case, where the court considered mother’s failure to comply 

with the court’s original disposition order that she consult with a licensed psychiatrist and 

address her mental health issues and DCFS’s concerns that mother’s unaddressed mentalhealth issues posed a high risk of harm to Michael’s safety, the court did not abuse its 
12

discretion in denying reunification services. (See Bridget A., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 309 [the juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve the 

child’s interests and enter appropriate orders to protect those interests].)

II. The Juvenile Court’s ICWA Finding

Finally, Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it found that ICWA did not 

apply to Michael’s case. Mother asserts that DCFS was required to provide notice of 

Michael’s dependency case to the Cherokee tribes once she claimed Cherokee descent at 

the original detention hearing. 

ICWA is designed to protect “the interests of Indian children and promotes the 

stability and security of Indian tribes by establishing minimum standards for, and 

permitting tribal participation in, dependency actions. [Citation.]” (In re Holly B. (2009) 

172 Cal.App.4th 1261, 1266; see also 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901, 1902, 1903(1), 1911(c), 1912.) 

“ ‘ICWA presumes it is in the best interests of the child to retain tribal ties and cultural 

heritage and in the interest of the tribe to preserve its future generations, a most important 

resource.’ [Citation.]” (In re H.B. (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 115, 120.)

ICWA applies to dependency proceedings that may result in: an involuntary foster 

care placement; a guardianship or conservatorship placement; an adoptive placement; or, 

the termination of parental rights. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480; see also In re Holly 

B., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) From the outset of a dependency proceeding

described above, the juvenile court and DCFS “have an affirmative and continuing duty 

to inquire whether a child is or may be an Indian child.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

5.481(a).) ICWA defines an “Indian child” as “any unmarried person who is under age 

eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in 

an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe.” (25 U.S.C. § 

1903(4); § 224.1, subd. (a).) If there is reason to know that an Indian child is involved in 

the dependency proceeding, notice of the pending proceeding and the right to intervene 

must be sent to the associated tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs if the child’s tribal 

affiliation is not known. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(b).) 
13

The circumstances that may establish a reason to know the child is an Indian child 

include, but are not limited to, a member of the child’s extended family providing 

information suggesting that the child is a member of, or eligible to be a member of, a 

tribe or one or more of the child’s biological parents are or were members of a tribe. (§ 

224.3, subd. (b)(1).) Once the court or DCFS has reason to know that the child is an 

Indian Child, DCFS must make further inquiry regarding the possible Indian status of the 

child, and to do so as soon as practicable, by interviewing the parents, Indian custodian, 

and the extended family members. (§ 224.3, subd. (c).)

At the November 14, 2013 detention hearing, mother claimed Cherokee ancestry 

from her father’s family. However, the court found ICWA did not apply to Michael’s 

case after mother stated that she had yet to register her alleged Native American ancestry. 

Despite the court’s finding, DCFS noted in its report for the January 7, 2014 jurisdiction 

hearing that ICWA “does or may apply” to Michael’s case. In its subsequent March 14, 

2014 detention report on the supplemental petition, DCFS noted that ICWA does not 

apply to Michael’s case; yet, there is no indication that DCFS ever inquired into 

Michael’s potential Indian-child status after issuing the January 7, 2014 report. When 

mother again raised the issue of Michael’s Indian-child status at the April 30, 2014 

jurisdiction/disposition hearing on the supplemental petition, the court dismissed 

mother’s concerns, stating that the court had already determined at the original detention 

hearing that ICWA did not apply to Michael’s case. 

As section 224.3, subdivision (c) suggests, once mother claimed that she was a 

descendant of the Cherokee tribes, thereby providing the court and DCFS reason to know 

that Michael may be an Indian child for purposes of ICWA, DCFS should have been 

required to inquire into Michael’s potential ancestry beyond the court’s brief questioning 

of mother before the court determined that ICWA did not apply. (See § 224.3, subds. 

(b)(1) & (c).) However, even assuming the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not 

apply to Michael’s case, such error was harmless and does not warrant reversal of the 

court’s order terminating jurisdiction and awarding father sole custody of Michael.

DCFS never sought to have Michael placed in foster care or have mother’s parental rights 
14

terminated, and mother has made no attempt to demonstrate that a different result in 

Michael’s case would have been reached had notice been provided to the Cherokee tribes.

(See In re Alexis H., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 16 [defective ICWA notice harmless 

where DCFS “did not pursue foster care or adoption, instead recommending from the 

beginning that the children remain with their [parent]”]; see also 25 U.S.C. § 1912(a)

[under the federal law, notice required only when foster care placement or termination of 

parental rights sought]; In re S.B. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1162 [“[A]ny failure to 

comply with a higher state standard, above and beyond what the [federal law] itself 

requires, must be held harmless unless the appellant can show a reasonable probability 

that he or she would have enjoyed a more favorable result in the absence of the error.”].)

DISPOSITION

The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.

WOODS, J.

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J. ZELON, J.