NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

No. 14-1541

MICHAEL RAINEY, 

 Appellant

v.

SECRETARY PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; 

SUPERINTENDENT OF THE STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION AT 

GRATERFORD; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF 

PHILADELPHIA; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF 

PENNSYLVANIA

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(District Court No.: 2-10-cv-00891)

District Judge: Honorable Paul S. Diamond

Argued on July 12, 2016

(Opinion filed: September 27, 2016)

Before: SMITH, JORDAN, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges

Ayanna Williams, Esquire (Argued)

Federal Community Defender Office for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

601 Walnut Street

The Curtis Center, Suite 545 West

Philadelphia, PA 19106

Counsel for Appellant 
2

Ryan Dunlavey, Esquire (Argued)

Susan E. Affronti, Esquire

Philadelphia County Office of District Attorney

3 South Penn Square

Philadelphia, PA 19107

Counsel for Appellees

O P I N I O N*

RENDELL, Circuit Judge:

In 1991, Michael Rainey was convicted of first-degree murder in the Philadelphia 

Court of Common Pleas after a joint trial with his co-defendant George Williams. Rainey 

contends that his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was 

violated during his trial when the prosecution introduced an out-of-court statement given 

by Williams, who did not testify at trial. The statement was redacted to replace Rainey’s 

name with an “X.” Rainey seeks habeas relief, claiming that this redaction was 

inadequate and that the use of the statement violated the Sixth Amendment, as established 

by Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968) and Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200 

(1987). We agree but, nevertheless, conclude that Rainey is not entitled to relief, as the 

error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. Rainey also contends 

that his trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to move for a severance of 

 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 

does not constitute binding precedent.
3

his trial from Williams’s. We find that any such error on counsel’s part did not prejudice 

Rainey. We will therefore affirm the District Court’s denial of Rainey’s habeas petition.

I. Background

Rainey and Williams were each charged with first-degree murder for their roles in 

the death of 72-year-old Carroll Fleming. Fleming’s son found him lying face-down on 

the porch to the house they shared. Carroll Fleming was taken to the hospital where he 

was pronounced dead. A medical examination of Fleming’s body revealed that the cause 

of his death was a shotgun wound to his back.

Rainey, Williams, and a third individual, Alvin Morgan, were arrested and 

charged with murder. Morgan accepted a plea deal before trial, agreeing to plead guilty to 

third-degree murder in exchange for his testimony against Rainey and Williams. Rainey

and Williams were tried together.

a. Trial

At the joint trial, two key eyewitnesses testified as to Rainey’s role in the murder: 

Morgan and Kevin Lewis, a neighborhood acquaintance of Rainey, Morgan, and 

Williams. Lewis testified first. He testified that on December 7, 1989, he was walking 

home from his cousin’s house when he came upon Rainey, Morgan, and Williams, who 

were walking down Sprague Street. He saw that the three were talking among themselves

and heard that the conversation involved “something about money.” A264. Lewis began 

talking with Williams. Williams told Lewis that “he was going down the street with 

[Rainey],” A264, and that he “[j]ust wanted his money.” A265. Lewis then handed 
4

Williams a broken .25 gun so that he could use it to scare the person from whom 

Williams wanted money.

Lewis testified that Williams took the broken gun and continued walking down the 

street with Rainey and Morgan. Lewis watched the three arrive at “the house,” where 

Morgan stood a bit back on the sidewalk and Rainey and Williams stood on the porch. 

A272. Lewis saw Rainey approach the door to the house, and Lewis then heard Rainey 

“ask[] for his money.” A272-73. He saw Rainey kick the door to the house. Lewis then 

saw “sparks” come from Rainey’s long black leather trench coat and heard a sound like a 

gunshot. A273, 283. After the shot, Lewis turned away and “started walking up the street 

fast” away from the commotion. A273.

Lewis also testified that when he later saw Rainey in custody, Rainey confronted 

him about his cooperation with the investigation. Specifically, Lewis testified that Rainey 

“said why did I dime on him. Dime means tell on him.” A313.

On cross examination, Lewis was asked about an earlier statement in which he 

said he saw Williams, not Rainey, knocking on the door. Lewis explained “I was scared, 

you know, and I—my story wasn’t straight. I am going to come out and tell the truth and 

I am going to tell what happened. I don’t want no problem. That’s what I’m trying to 

say.” A324. Lewis also affirmed that the government had suggested to him that if he did 

not “say the right thing”—in the words of Rainey’s counsel—he “could be held to be part 

of some type of conspiracy because [he] let somebody hold [his] gun and the gun went 

and got involved in some kind of a incident.” A319.
5

The prosecution next called Morgan. Morgan, who was 14 at the time of the 

shooting, was 16 when he testified. He had not yet been sentenced in connection with his 

guilty plea to third-degree murder, but he knew that his minimum possible sentence 

would be 5-10 years and his maximum possible sentence would be 25-50 years. He 

testified that he had known Rainey (who was four years older) for years and, prior to the 

shooting, would spend time with him every day. He had also known Williams for years

but would see him less frequently than he would see Rainey.

Morgan testified that on the evening of December 7, 1989, he was with Rainey at 

Rainey’s house. Rainey told Morgan that earlier he had been out buying alcohol and saw 

a man pull out “a lot of money.” A337. After this conversation, Rainey brought out a 

sawed-off shotgun and began “playing with it. He had it in his hand, pulling the trigger.”

A339. Later that night, Williams arrived at the front porch of Rainey’s house. Rainey and 

Williams began talking, and Morgan heard Rainey say “if he had to shoot somebody he 

was going to shoot them.” A341. Rainey then went back in the house and came back 

outside, this time walking with one leg remaining stiff and his hand holding that leg.

Morgan observed that Rainey was wearing a long black trench coat. Rainey and Williams 

began to walk down the street and Morgan followed. 

Morgan testified that he then saw Lewis walking the opposite way along the street. 

Williams and Rainey talked briefly with Lewis, and Lewis gave “something shiny” to 

Williams. A345. Williams, Rainey, and Morgan then continued down the street; Lewis 

continued in the opposite direction. 
6

Rainey and Williams then crossed the street away from Morgan. Morgan saw 

Rainey take the shotgun out of his pants and put something “yellow, like a shell,” into the 

shotgun. A347.

Morgan testified that Williams then walked up on the porch of the house and 

knocked on the door. When nobody answered, Williams kicked the door and the door 

came open. A man came running out of the house, and Williams pulled the gun on him. 

Williams pulled the trigger, and the gun clicked but did not fire. Then Rainey, standing 

“[j]ust off the porch,” shot the man in the back. A350. Rainey was about three feet away 

and shot the gun only once. The man fell on the porch. Williams told Rainey to “check 

his pockets.” A353. Morgan heard police sirens shortly after the shot, however, and 

began to run, as did Rainey and Williams before they had checked the man’s pockets.

Morgan saw Rainey throw the gun onto the roof of a school.

Morgan testified that he saw Rainey the next day on Rainey’s porch. Rainey “said 

the man was dead.” A357. Then a week later Morgan saw the shotgun again at Rainey’s 

house. Rainey “said he was going to break it up and throw it in a pond. . . . Because it had 

a murder on; because he killed somebody with it.” A357. 

Morgan also testified that Rainey had made several attempts to dissuade him from 

cooperating with the investigation and prosecution. Morgan had received letters from 

Rainey that encouraged Morgan to “do [his] part” meaning, according to Morgan, that 

Rainey “wanted [him] to blame it on [Williams].” A394. Morgan also said that one letter 

from Rainey had a number for a person named “Capon,”—Capon and Rainey were “like 

best friends,” A396—and when Morgan called Capon, Capon told him to “blame it all on 
7

[Williams].” A395. On the day Morgan testified, when he saw Rainey and Williams in 

their cells outside the courtroom, they told him to “[p]lead the Fifth.” A359. Morgan also 

testified that Rainey had also told two other potential witnesses (Jonathon and Philip, 

who had been at Rainey’s house with him and Morgan the day of the shooting) that “if 

anybody asks any questions, tell them that George [Williams] shot the man.” A372. 

The prosecution’s next witness after Morgan was Detective Joseph Walsh of the 

Philadelphia Police Department. Detective Walsh testified about the arrest of Williams 

and how Williams was taken to into an interview room and read his Miranda rights. 

Williams then agreed to make a statement. As Detective Walsh was preparing to read the

transcript of the interview with Williams to the jury, Rainey’s counsel objected and the 

lawyers and the judge met at sidebar. At sidebar, the lawyers and the judge agreed that 

Rainey’s name should be redacted from the transcript and replaced with “X.”

Detective Walsh then read the transcript of Williams’s interview to the jury. 

Williams said in the transcript that he and “X” and others were standing in front of “X’s”

house when “X” said, “Let’s go stick somebody up.” A411. “X” went into his house and 

came out wearing a long black trench coat and with a rifle down his pant leg, which 

caused him to walk with a limp.

The statement then read:

Then we got to a house and “X” told me to knock on the door, but I said 

“no.” Then “Eyeball” [Morgan] started to knock on the door, and that was 

when “X” pulled out the gun. Then the old man said, “who is it?” and “X”

hollered out, “open the door.” Then the old man said, “We ain’t got 

nothing.” And “Eyeball” started to knock on the door again and told the old 

man, and the old man came rushing out, and when he came rushing out, 

“Eyeball” stepped out in the street and the old man came straight to me, and 
8

I ducked. “X” was behind the old man, and “X” just shot him in the back. 

The old man fell face forward towards me. And I was so scared I just ran. 

A412. 

Detective Walsh continued reading the transcript, which detailed the aftermath of 

the shooting. Williams was asked about his subsequent contact with “X,” and Williams 

described having a conversation with “X” at his house three days later. Detective Walsh, 

reading the transcript of the interview of Williams, read:

Question: “Was there anyone with you when you had this conversation 

with X?”

Answer: My brother-in-law, his name is Mike Williams, Black male, 23. 

He lives in West Philly around that movie, the Capitol.”

. . .

“I can get his phone number from my grandmother.”

Question: “Did you see Mike any other time since the murder?”

A416.

At this point, Rainey’s lawyer objected. The prosecutor said, “Detective, review 

that. You may have read a typ[o].” A416. Detective Walsh corrected himself, saying, 

“Excuse me. ‘Did you see “X” any other time since the murder?’” A416. Detective 

Walsh then continued reading the statement.

After Detective Walsh’s direct examination ended, Rainey’s counsel at sidebar

again raised his objection about the Detective saying “Mike” instead of “X.” Rainey’s 

counsel requested a mistrial. Rainey’s counsel contended that the Detective’s having 

corrected his mistake and replaced “Mike” with “X” made clear that “X” was referring to 

Michael Rainey. The prosecutor contended that a mistrial was unnecessary and that a 
9

curative instruction could mitigate any prejudice from Detective Walsh’s mistake in 

reading “Mike” rather than “X.”

The trial judge announced that he intended to issue a curative instruction that the 

jury was to disregard Detective Walsh’s reading of the “typewritten mistake.” A424. 

Rainey’s counsel objected to this instruction, contending that such an instruction would 

call more attention to the mistake and further prejudice his client. The judge, positing that 

the jury believed the mistake to have been a typo, therefore did not issue a curative 

instruction and denied the mistrial.

The prosecution also presented several witnesses to describe the investigation of 

the crime scene and body. Officer Ross Barnes testified that the plexiglass on the door to 

Fleming’s house had been displaced. The medical examiner testified that he found a fatal

shotgun wound on the left side of Fleming’s back. There were also barrel imprints on 

Fleming’s back, indicating that the “shotgun was pressed right up against [Fleming’s] 

back when it was fired.” A446. There were no signs of a struggle. The examiner found a 

slug and cup in Fleming’s heart. A firearms expert testified that the slug and cup, as well 

as a yellow plastic shell and four lead fragments that were recovered from the scene, were 

fired from a 20-guage shotgun.

Rainey presented three character witnesses in his defense. His sister testified that 

he had a reputation for being a truthful, law-abiding citizen. Rainey also presented two 

neighbors who had each known him for 10-11 years. They each testified that he had a 

reputation for being a truthful, law-abiding citizen. 
10

During closing arguments, Rainey’s lawyer argued that the evidence did not 

support a first-degree murder conviction, because neither of the two eyewitnesses offered 

any testimony about premeditation. He argued that the eyewitnesses only described a 

murder during the course of a robbery, which would only be second-degree murder. He 

also argued that the witnesses were unreliable and inconsistent. Rainey’s counsel noted 

the deals that Morgan and Lewis had received in exchange for their testimony, arguing 

that such deals made them less reliable as witnesses. He pointed out that Lewis and 

Morgan gave inconsistent testimony as to whether Rainey was on the porch or at the 

bottom of the steps to the porch. He argued that if Rainey had been standing at the bottom 

of the steps to the porch, as Morgan testified, Rainey could not have shot Fleming, who 

was on the porch, as the medical evidence was that the shotgun had been placed against 

the back of Fleming before being fired. 

The Prosecutor’s closing statement first recapped the evidence against Rainey. 

The prosecutor then said:

Two things the statement by George Williams consider this when you 

consider the evidence against George Williams. George Williams told 

Detective Walsh and Duffy and then Detective Piree that they said “Let’s 

go stick somebody up[,”] “and then X went in his house and young boy did 

too that left me and eyeball outside th[e]n ‘X’ came out and he had changed 

his coat.[”] When he came out he was wearing a long black leather coat 

corroborative of what Alvin Morgan testified to. [“]I saw the rifle he had it 

like down his pants leg.[”]

A551. 

Rainey’s counsel objected and, at sidebar, moved for a mistrial because the 

prosecutor “said to this jury that the description of ‘X’ being in a black leather coat is 
11

corroborative of what Alvin Morgan says and Alvin Morgan said Michael Rainey was in 

a leather coat.” A552. The trial judge agreed that the prosecutor had indirectly identified 

who “X” was. The judge even told the prosecutor that he “blew the case for the 

Commonwealth.” A553. The judge then adjourned the court for the day.

The trial judge met with counsel in chambers and announced his decision not to 

declare a mistrial but instead to instruct the jury that the statement by Williams could 

only be used against Williams. The judge believed that such an instruction would “cure 

any inferences that there might be some reference to Mr. Rainey by indirection.” A571. 

The prosecutor continued with his closing statement. He argued that there was 

sufficient evidence of premeditation to convict Rainey of first-degree murder. The 

prosecutor argued:

There was no struggle with Michael Rainey. Michael Rainey put the gun to 

the back of [Carroll] Fleming and pulled the trigger and shot him in the 

back. This is not a gun going off subsequently in a struggle when no one 

anticipated it. This was a gun that was loaded moments before with the 

[intent] to use it. Placed in the back of a person and shot. That is not second 

degree murder I submit to you ladies and gentlemen. . . . Based on the 

evidence [that] is murder in the first degree and intentionally premeditated 

whether he had it fully formed in his mind back in the house to kill or just 

formed it when he pushed the gun forth.

A 582-83.

The judge then charged the jury. The judge instructed that Williams’s statement 

was redacted because the law instructs that “if a statement is made by a person, that 

statement can only come in against that person.” A599. The judge instructed that the 

statement could not be used “against anybody at trial except Mr. Williams.” A600. 
12

The jury then began deliberations. During deliberations, the jury sent a message to 

the court, which read, “We would like to hear George’s statement to homicide detectives 

as to the conversation between George and ‘X’ in front of ‘X’s’ house and as to the 

people down the street.” A630. However, the statement was not available, as the court 

reporter who had transcribed the statement was out ill. The jury was instructed to rely on 

their best recollections of the evidence. 

Four hours later, the jury reached a verdict against both defendants, finding 

Williams guilty of murder in the second degree and Rainey guilty of murder in the first 

degree.

b. Post-Trial Proceedings

Rainey appealed his conviction. His appeal reached the Supreme Court of 

Pennsylvania, which issued an opinion in March 1995. See generally Commonwealth v. 

Rainey (Rainey I), 656 A.2d 1326 (Pa. 1995). Rainey argued that his trial counsel was 

constitutionally ineffective in failing to obtain a mistrial after the alleged Bruton

violations. See id. at 1331. The Supreme Court denied that claim, noting that trial counsel 

did object and move for a mistrial, and, at any rate, Rainey’s rights under Bruton were 

not violated. See id. at 1332 n.5. Moreover, the Supreme Court found any such error 

harmless. See id.

Rainey next raised several claims in a petition under the Pennsylvania PostConviction Relief Act (PCRA). His petition was denied, and he appealed that ruling to 

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. In 2001, Rainey’s case was remanded for a more 

detailed PCRA opinion. See Commonwealth v. Rainey (Rainey II), 786 A.2d 942, 942 
13

(Pa. 2001). His petition was again denied and he again appealed to the Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court. In July 2007, his appeal was denied in relevant part. See generally 

Commonwealth v. Rainey (Rainey III), 928 A.2d 215 (Pa. 2007).1 The Pennsylvania 

Supreme Court rejected Rainey’s argument that he was entitled to relief because of the 

introduction of Williams’s redacted statement. Id. at 226. The court also denied Rainey’s 

argument that trial counsel was ineffective in not moving to sever his trial from 

Williams’s. Id. at 230-33. The court reasoned that severance was not likely to be granted, 

given the interests favoring joint trials, and that any prejudice was harmless given the 

overwhelming evidence against Rainey. Id. at 232. 

Rainey filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Eastern District of 

Pennsylvania. He raised three issues: (1) his Sixth Amendment rights were violated by 

the use of Williams’s redacted statement; (2) his counsel was ineffective in not moving to 

sever his trial from Williams’s; and (3) his rights under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 

(1986), were denied. The District Court rejected all three claims and did not issue a 

certificate of appealability.

Our Court granted a certificate of appealability on two issues: (1) whether the 

District Court erred in denying Rainey’s claim that his rights under the Confrontation 

Clause were violated; and (2) whether the District Court erred in denying Rainey’s claim 

that his counsel performed ineffectively by failing to sever his trial from his Williams’s. 

 1 The court did grant Rainey’s appeal as to an aspect of the penalty phase of his 

capital trial. Id. at 220. His case was remanded for resentencing, and the prosecution did 

not seek the death penalty on remand. 
14

II. Discussion

Rainey argues that he is entitled to relief because his Sixth Amendment right to 

confront witnesses against him was violated by the introduction and use of Williams’s 

out-of-court statement, and because his counsel was ineffective in failing to timely move 

to sever his trial from Williams’s. We ultimately agree with the Commonwealth that both 

alleged errors were harmless under the deferential Brecht standard of review.

a. Legal Framework

We review the District Court’s conclusions de novo, applying the same legal 

standard that the District Court should have applied. Brown v. Wenerowicz, 663 F.3d 619, 

627 (3d Cir. 2011). Accordingly, we review the state-court decisions under the AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). Id.

A petitioner under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 must have first exhausted his state-court 

remedies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A). In doing so, he must have “fairly presented” his 

claim for relief to the state courts before a federal court can award relief on that claim.

See Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2007). If a claim has been fairly 

presented to the state courts, we must then, under AEDPA, determine whether the state 

court reached a decision on the merits of a claim. See Collins v. Sec’y of the Pa. Dep’t of 

Corr., 742 F.3d 528, 544 (3d Cir. 2014). If, as here, the state court adjudicated the claim

on its merits, we give substantial deference to that decision, reversing it only if was 

“contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law 

as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or where the state-court 
15

decision involves an “unreasonable determination of the facts.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-

(2). 

Even if a petitioner can demonstrate that his constitutional rights were violated, he 

will still only be entitled to relief if the error “had substantial and injurious effect or 

influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623, 

(1993). In addition to applying the Brecht standard, we must also examine the state 

court’s application of the harmless error standard from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 

18, 24 (1967), which applies on direct appeal and requires the government to show an 

error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2197 

(2015). (citing Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24). In reviewing the state court’s application of the 

Chapman standard, we apply AEDPA deference and ask only whether the state court was 

unreasonable in finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. at 

2198. The Supreme Court has clarified that the Brecht standard “subsumes” AEDPA 

deference. Id. Thus, while a court need not formally apply both Brecht and Chapman, it 

also cannot merely disregard the state court’s conclusions, as “AEDPA nevertheless sets 

forth a precondition to the grant of habeas relief.” See id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).
16

b. Confrontation Clause Claim

1. Merits 

We conclude that, because the Commonwealth’s evidence and arguments so 

obviously and inescapably identified Rainey as “X,” it was unreasonable for the state 

courts to find that the right announced in Bruton had not been violated.

2

As an initial matter, we disagree with the Commonwealth’s position that Rainey 

did not fairly presented his Bruton claim the state courts. The Commonwealth argues that 

Rainey needed to specify that the Bruton and Marsh cases alone—that is, without 

reliance on Gray, see supra note 2—entitled him to relief. But the Commonwealth is 

reading the exhaustion requirement too narrowly. To fairly present a claim, a petitioner 

need only “present a federal claim’s factual and legal substance to the state courts in a 

manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” McCandless v. 

Vaughn, 172 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 1999). Indeed, a “petitioner need not have cited 

 2 It would be even clearer under the law as currently established that Rainey’s 

rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated. See generally Gray v. Maryland, 

523 U.S. 185, 197 (1998) (holding that a co-defendant’s statement “which substituted 

blanks and the word ‘delete’ for the [defendant’s] proper name, falls within the class of 

statements to which Bruton’s protections apply.”). On habeas review, however, with, 

perhaps, limited exceptions that do not apply here, we are limited to the question of 

whether the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable 

application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of 

the United States” at the time that the state court rendered its decision on the merits. 

Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 38, 43-44 (2011). Here, Rainey’s decision became final on 

direct review prior to the rule in Gray being announced. On collateral review, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Gray represented a new rule of law that could not 

be applied retroactively to Rainey. Rainey III, 928 A.2d at 228. Rainey does not 

challenge this ruling. Thus, we cannot rely on the rule established in Gray when 

examining whether Rainey is entitled to relief. Cf. Greene, 132 S. Ct. at 45 (“The Third 

Circuit thus correctly held that Gray was not ‘clearly established Federal law’ against 

which it could measure the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s decision.”). 
17

‘book and verse’ of the federal constitution” to have fairly presented a claim—let alone 

have cited the correct Supreme Court case law. See id. In addition to “reliance on 

pertinent federal cases,” a petitioner can also fairly present a claim through “assertion of 

the claim in terms so particular as to call to mind a specific right protected by the 

Constitution;” or “allegation of a pattern of facts that is well within the mainstream of 

constitutional litigation.” Nara, 488 F.3d at 198. Here, Rainey not only alleged a factual 

pattern well within the mainstream of Confrontation Clause litigation, he also specifically 

invoked the Confrontation Clause as well as Bruton and Marsh. See Initial Brief of 

Appellant at 16, Rainey III, 928 A.2d 215 (Pa. 2007) (Nos. 468 & 469 CPA), 2006 WL 

2643351, at *16 (citing Bruton and Marsh for the propositions, respectively, that the 

admission of a codefendant’s extra-judicial statement inculpating the defendant violates 

the Sixth Amendment and that the Confrontation Clause is violated if the co-defendant’s 

statement is not redacted to remove all reference to the defendant). This was more than 

sufficient to put the state court on notice of his Confrontation Clause claim and we find 

that Rainey fairly presented his claim to the state courts. See Nara, 488 F.3d at 198.3

In assessing Rainey’s claim, the state courts were unreasonable in concluding that 

his rights under the Confrontation Clause, as established by Bruton, had not been 

violated. By the time that Williams’s statement was introduced at trial, the jury had 

 3 Indeed, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, in denying Rainey’s PCRA appeal, 

acknowledged these arguments and found several of them to have been previously 

litigated. See Rainey III, 928 A.2d at 226-30. This finding by the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court that these arguments were previously litigated “provides strong evidence that the 

claim has already been given full consideration by the state courts and thus is ripe for 

federal adjudication.” Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 467 (2009) (emphasis in original). 
18

already heard from Lewis and Morgan. Both had testified that: (1) Rainey, Morgan, and 

Williams were the participants; (2) that Rainey was wearing a black leather trench coat; 

and (3) that Rainey was the shooter. Morgan had further testified that Rainey had, at his 

house, formulated the plot to rob Fleming and had used a sawed-off shotgun to shoot 

Fleming. Thus, by the time the statement from Williams was entered into evidence, there 

could have been no ambiguity as to the identity of the trench coat-wearing, shotgunwielding “X,” who planned the crime at his house, and then, alongside Williams and 

Morgan (whose names were not redacted), went to Fleming’s house and shot Fleming.

Even if there were any remaining doubt as to “X’s” identity, all such doubt was surely 

erased after (1) Detective Walsh broke the redaction and identified “X” as Mike; and (2)

the prosecutor argued that the jury could use the statement’s description of “X” to 

corroborate Morgan’s description of Rainey. 

This went far beyond what the Supreme Court found permissible in Marsh. In 

Marsh, the statement at issue had been redacted to “eliminate not only the defendant’s 

name, but any reference to his or her existence.” 481 U.S. at 211; see also Greene v. 

Palakovich, 606 F.3d 85, 106 (3d Cir. 2010), aff’d sub nom. Greene v. Fisher, 132 S. Ct. 

38 (2011) (finding no Bruton violation where “consistent with Bruton and Marsh, all 

references to the other defendants by proper name or nickname had been removed”). 

Here, on the other hand, “X” was the main focus of Williams’s statement. Moreover, in 

Marsh, unlike here, the statement only implicated the defendant due to the fact that after

the statement was introduced, the defendant herself testified and, by inference, implicated 

herself in the statement. Here, the prosecution itself introduced testimony that made
19

obvious the identity of “X” before the statement was introduced, and then, in closing 

argument, the prosecution again connected “X” to Rainey. 

Given that there was no escaping the conclusion here that “X” was Rainey, the 

jury could not have been expected to follow the instruction not to use Williams’s

statement against Rainey. Cf. Marsh, 481 U.S. at 208 (“[W]ith regard to such an explicit 

statement the only issue is, plain and simply, whether the jury can possibly be expected to 

forget it in assessing the defendant’s guilt; whereas with regard to inferential 

incrimination the judge’s instruction may well be successful in dissuading the jury from 

entering onto the path of inference in the first place, so that there is no incrimination to 

forget.”); Bruton, 391 U.S. at 137 (“Despite the concededly clear instructions to the jury 

to disregard Evans’ inadmissible hearsay evidence inculpating petitioner, in the context 

of a joint trial we cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for 

petitioner’s constitutional right of cross-examination. The effect is the same as if there 

had been no instruction at all.”). We therefore conclude that the Pennsylvania Supreme 

Court was unreasonable in concluding that the use of Williams’s statement here was not a 

violation of Rainey’s clearly established Confrontation Clause rights.

2. Harmless Error

Notwithstanding our determination that the use of Williams’s statement here 

violated Rainey’s right to confront the witnesses against him, however, we must still 

determine whether those errors can be considered harmless. We conclude they were.

When determining whether a Confrontation Clause error was harmless we 

examine several factors, including “the importance of the witness’ testimony in the 
20

prosecution’s case, whether the testimony was cumulative, the presence or absence of 

evidence corroborating or contradicting the testimony of the witness on material points, 

the extent of cross-examination otherwise permitted, and, of course, the overall strength 

of the prosecution’s case.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684 (1986). Weighing 

these factors, we ultimately ask if we are left with “grave doubt about whether [the error] 

had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” See 

Davis, 135 S. Ct. at 2197–98 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Here, although Williams’s statement was important to the prosecution’s case, we 

nevertheless find the error harmless because the evidence of Rainey’s guilt was so 

overwhelming and because Williams’s statement was largely cumulative of the other 

evidence presented. 

Rainey argues that only Williams’s statement provides evidence of the specific 

intent needed for a first-degree murder conviction. We, however, agree with the 

Commonwealth that, absent Williams’s statement, there was still overwhelming evidence 

that Rainey shot Fleming after having formed a specific intent to kill him. Cf.

Commonwealth v. Mikell, 729 A.2d 566, 569 (Pa. 1999) (“To establish murder in the first 

degree, the Commonwealth must prove, inter alia, that the defendant specifically 

intended to kill, which fact is established by proof of premeditation and deliberation.”).

As the Commonwealth notes, “[a] specific intent to kill may be proven by circumstantial 

evidence and can be inferred from the defendant’s use of a deadly weapon on a vital part 

of the victim’s body.” Id. (citation omitted). Morgan’s testimony was clear that Rainey,

after announcing that he would be willing to “shoot somebody,” A341, and within 
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moments after loading a yellow shell into his sawed-off shotgun, fired a single shot, 

unprovoked, into Fleming’s back at close range. Cf. Commonwealth v. Randolph, 873 

A.2d 1277, 1281 (Pa. 2005) (finding that the firing of a gun into a victim’s back qualified 

as use of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim and was sufficient evidence of a 

specific intent to kill). This account was corroborated by the medical examiner’s 

testimony that the shotgun was first pressed against Fleming’s back and then fired and 

that there were no signs of a struggle. It was corroborated also by the firearms expert’s 

testimony that the projectiles and debris found in and around Fleming’s body, including a 

yellow shell, came from a shotgun.

Morgan’s account was also consistent with Lewis’s testimony that it was Rainey 

who fired the only shot. Rainey argues, however, that Morgan’s and Lewis’s accounts 

were inconsistent and unreliable and therefore relatively weak evidence of specific intent. 

We disagree. Although the two accounts differ as to whether it was Rainey or Williams 

who knocked on the door, and as to whether Rainey was standing on the porch or at the 

bottom of the porch when he fired the shotgun, they agree as to the fundamentals: 

Rainey, Williams, and Morgan planned to rob Fleming; Fleming’s door was kicked in; 

Williams’s gun was inoperable; Morgan stood back from the house and witnessed the 

events; and, most crucially, Rainey fired the only shot. Both Morgan and Lewis also 

testified that Rainey had confronted them and encouraged them not to cooperate with the 

investigation or prosecution. Their accounts corroborated each other and were further 

corroborated by the investigatory evidence, including the displaced plexiglass from the 

door and the aforementioned medical and firearms evidence. Lewis and Morgan were 
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both, therefore, powerful witnesses, despite the deals they received in exchange for their 

testimony.

Because Williams’s statement added next to nothing new to the overwhelming 

evidence of Rainey’s guilt, we find that the Bruton violation did not have “substantial and 

injurious” effect on the jury’s verdict, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not act 

unreasonably in finding that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We will 

therefore affirm the judgment of the District Court, and, consistent with the judgment of 

every court to consider the issue, find that the use of Williams’s statement was harmless 

error.4

c. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claim

Rainey also urges that his attorney was constitutionally ineffective in failing to 

move to sever Rainey’s trial from Williams’s. This claim lacks merit for essentially the 

reasons explained by the District Court and the state courts. To find in Rainey’s favor we 

would need to find that his counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of 

reasonableness in failing to move for a severance, and that, but for this failure, there is a 

reasonable probability that the outcome of Rainey’s trial would have been different. See 

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). Leaving aside the first prong—the 

reasonableness of counsel’s decision not to seek a severance—we do not think that,

 4 Rainey notes that the jury requested to review Williams’s statement again and 

argues that it shows that the jury was placing substantial weight on the statement. But this 

conclusion does not necessarily follow. First, the jury requested “the conversation 

between George and ‘X’,” A630, which suggests that they were respecting the redaction 

and not seeking to use the statement against Rainey. Secondly, the more plausible 

explanation for the request is that the jury wanted to use it to try and determine whether 

Williams had formed an intent to shoot Fleming. 
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absent trial counsel’s error, there was a reasonable probability that Rainey would have 

been found not guilty. First, the trial court was unlikely to grant the motion to sever. Cf. 

United States v. Voigt, 89 F.3d 1050, 1095 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that even “fingerpointing and blame-shifting among coconspirators do not support a finding of mutually 

antagonistic defenses” necessitating a severance of trials). More fundamentally, however, 

as we have discussed, the evidence establishing Rainey’s guilt was overwhelming, and he 

would have been convicted regardless of whether he was tried jointly with Williams or 

separately. See Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 147 n.18 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Strickland

prejudice and Brecht harmless error are essentially the same standard.”).

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons we will affirm the District Court’s denial of Rainey’s 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.