UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

ABUBAKAR AHMED, 

 

 Plaintiff, Civil Action 2:17-cv-1147 

 v. Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

HART LOGISTICS, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

ORDER AND INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 

Plaintiff, Abubakar Ahmed, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, brings this federal civil rights action against Hart Logistics, Wade Pelletier, Sheila 

Michaud, Steve hill, Dennis Campbell, and Paul LePage, the Governor of Maine (collectively 

“Defendants”). Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. All judicial 

officers who render services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1915(a). 

 This matter is before the United States Magistrate Judge for the initial screen of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to 

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, 

for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this Plaintiff’s 

claims for failure to assert any claim on which relief may be granted. 
2 

I.

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to 

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1

 as part of the 

statute, which provides in pertinent part: 

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- 

* * * 

 (B) the action or appeal-- 

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

 To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the 

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also 

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual 

 

1

Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 
3 

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). 

 Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] 

pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on 

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for 

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the Court 

holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” 

Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., No. 08-3978, 2010 WL 1252923, at *2 (6th Cir. April 

1, 2010) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, 

has limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. 

Gen. Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 

594 (6th Cir. 1989)). 

II. 

 According to the Complaint, Defendants were involved in a conspiracy to racially 

discriminate against Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1-1 at 3.) Plaintiff, who is black, is an independent 
4 

freight carrier working as an independent contractor for Defendant Hart Logistics. (Id. at 4.) 

Plaintiff alleges that subsequent to the Maine Governor’s January 2016 remarks “that the 

majority of people of color were ‘drug traffickers’ with names like ‘D-Money, Smoothy, Shifty’ 

who come to Maine to ‘sell their heroin, then they go back home,” Defendant Hart Logistics 

terminated his independent contractor relationship “with no notice or sanction prior to his 

termination.” (Id.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants denied him work because of his race 

and that “a discriminatory animus motivated the Defendant to terminate [him] without cause.” 

(Id.) Plaintiff avers that the Governor’s statements caused his illegal termination and 

unconstitutionally prevents him from working in the state of Maine. (Id. at 5.) According to 

Plaintiff, Defendant Hart Logistics and its employee-Defendants “act[ed] under color of state law 

and on behalf of the Governor, wrongfully terminated the Plaintiff pursuant to the Governor’s 

racist statements thus causing the Plaintiff a deprivation of his constitutional rights.” (Id.) 

III.

 Plaintiff brings the bulk of his claims against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 

asserting violations of various constitutional rights, which provides as follows: 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 

usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 

be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for redress. 

 

In order to proceed under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead both that (1) the perpetrator acted under 

color of state law; and (2) the conduct deprived the complainant of rights, privileges, or 

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 

527, 535 (1981); Brandon v. Allen, 719 F.2d 151, 153 (6th Cir. 1983), rev’d and remanded sub 
5 

nom, Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985). Plaintiff also brings claims under Title VII of the 

Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000 and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 & 1986. 

A. Section 1983 Claims 

 1. Governor LePage’s Official Capacity Immunity 

 As a preliminary matter, § 1983 does not permit Plaintiff to bring his claim for money 

damages against Defendants in their official capacities. Section 1983 imposes liability only upon 

a “person” who, under color of law, subjects another person to a deprivation of federal rights. 42 

U.S.C. § 1983. In suits for damages, state officials acting in their official capacity are not 

“persons” under § 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 

Plaintiff’s § 1983 claims against Defendants in their official capacities, therefore, is not 

cognizable. See Gean v. Hattaway, 330 F.3d 758, 766 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that § 1983 

claims against agents of the state in their official capacity are not cognizable). 

 2. Personal Liability 

 To establish liability under § 1983, a plaintiff must plead and prove that a defendant is 

personally responsible for the unconstitutional actions which injured him. Monell v. New York 

City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Plaintiff has not pleaded any facts that 

would tend to suggest Governor LePage had any personal involvement in Defendant Hart 

Logistics’ decision to terminate Plaintiff’s independent contractor relationship. Plaintiff has not 

pleaded any facts that suggest Defendant LePage is even acquainted with any of the parties to 

this litigation. The Undersigned finds, therefore, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 

1983 against Defendant LePage in either his official or personal capacity. 

 3. Under Color of State Law 
6 

 To make out a cognizable claim under §1983, Plaintiff must plead sufficient facts that, if 

accepted as true, would demonstrate Defendants’ actions were taken “under color of state law.” 

Parratt, 451 U.S. at 535. It is the nature of an individual’s actions, not any other factor, that 

determines whether a defendant acts under color of law. Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 

(6th Cir. 1975). An defendant acts under color of law when he exercises power “‘possessed by 

virtue of state law and made possible only because [he] is clothed with the authority of state 

law.’” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49 (1988) (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 

326 (1941)). In other words, when a defendant’s acts fall within the ambit of his personal, 

private pursuits, those acts are not actions under color of law for purposes of § 1983. Stengel, 

522 F.2d at 441.; see Waters v. City of Morristown, 242 F.3d 353, 359 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[A] 

defendant’s private conduct, outside the course or scope of his duties and unaided by any indicia 

of actual or ostensible state authority, is not conduct occurring under color of state law.”) 

(citations omitted). 

 Here Plaintiff’s allegations fail to allege that Defendant Hart Logistics and its employeeDefendants exercised any power “possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only 

because [they were] clothed with the authority of state law.” West, 487 U.S. at 49. Governor 

LePage’s public statements, however odious, do not carry the authority of law, nor do they 

imbue private companies with that authority. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations describe 

Defendants’ “private conduct . . . unaided by any indicia of actual or ostensible state authority.” 

Waters, 242 F.3d at 359. The Undersigned finds, therefore, that Plaintiff’s allegations, even if 

accepted as true, do not state a claim under § 1983 against Defendant Hart Logistics or its 

employee-Defendants. 

B. Claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985(3) and 1986 
7 

 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) provides in relevant part that: 

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the 

highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either 

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the 

laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of 

preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from 

giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal 

protection of the laws; . . . in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one 

or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of 

the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or 

property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen 

of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the 

recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or 

more of the conspirators. 

 

 During Reconstruction, Congress passed § 1985(3) in order to provide a cause of action 

against participants in private conspiracies to deprive others “of rights secured by the law to all.” 

Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 101 (1971). “A plaintiff makes out a valid cause of action 

under § 1985(3) by demonstrating: (1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriving, either 

directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of 

equal privileges and immunities under the laws; (3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; and 

(4) an injury to either person or property or a deprivation of any right or privilege of a United 

States citizen.” Volunteer Med. Clinic, Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 948 F.2d 218, 222-23 (6th Cir. 

1991). In order to plead a conspiracy under § 1985(3), Plaintiff must allege facts that, if true, 

would show that Defendants either acted in concert or in furtherance of a common objective to 

injure Plaintiff. Smith v. Thornburg, 136 F.3d 1070, 1078 (6th Cir. 1998). Conspiracy claims 

must be pled with some degree of specificity. Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1538 (6th Cir. 

1987). Vague and conclusory allegations unsupported by material facts are not sufficient to state 

a conspiracy claim. Id. Section 1986 creates a cause of action for a knowing failure to prevent 

wrongful acts pursuant to a conspiracy to interfere with civil rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1986. Any 
8 

defendants with knowledge of a §1985(3) conspiracy who, through negligence, fail to prevent 

the discriminatory acts can be liable under § 1986.1

 In his Complaint, Plaintiffs assert that Defendants’ alleged conduct in terminating his 

independent contractor relationship with Defendant Hart Logistics constitutes a conspiracy to 

deprive him of his rights. (ECF No. 1-1 at 6.) Plaintiff has alleged essentially two acts: 

Governor LePage’s public remarks and Defendant Hart’s termination of Plaintiff’s independent 

contractor relationship. (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff, however, offers nothing more than the conclusory 

allegation that Defendants acted in concert. Plaintiff fails to make sufficient factual allegations 

to establish any sort of “meeting of the minds” or to link the alleged conspirators in a conspiracy 

to deprive him of his constitutional rights. The Undersigned finds, therefore, that Plaintiff, has 

failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 upon which relief can be granted. 

 Because Plaintiff has failed to state a claim under § 1985, his claims under § 1986 

likewise fail. See Braley v. City of Pontiac, 906 F.2d 220, 227 (6th Cir. 1990) (“Where a 

plaintiff has stated no cause of action under § 1985, no cause of action exists under § 1986.”). 

C. Facial Implausibility

“A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the 

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, but 

 

1

 42 U.S.C. § 1986 provides, in relevant part: 

Every person who, having knowledge that any wrongs conspired to be done, and 

mentioned in section 1985 of this title, are about to be committed, and having 

power to prevent or aid in preventing the commission of the same, neglects or 

refuses so to do, if such wrongful act be committed, shall be liable to the party 

injured . . . for all damages caused by such wrongful act, which such person by 

reasonable diligence could have prevented.
9 

need not “accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Twombly, 550 U.S. 

at 555. Although a complaint need not contain “detailed factual allegations,” it must provide 

“more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 

678. A pleading that offers labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of 

a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Nor does a complaint suffice if it 

tenders “naked assertion[s]” devoid of “further factual enhancement.” Id. at 557. The complaint 

must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it 

rests.” Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93 (citations omitted). 

Although Plaintiff recounts Governor LePage’s comments and he states that Defendant 

Hart Logistics, at some later date, terminated his independent contractor relationship, he proffers 

no other facts about the events in question. (ECF No. 1-1 at 4.) Plaintiff does not state any 

circumstances, other than an unrelated public figure’s comments to the media, to support a 

conclusion that his termination was racially motivated or in any way improper. Nor does he 

plead any facts that would tend to show he has been prevented from working in the state of 

Maine generally. Even construed liberally, Plaintiff’s claim against Defendants amounts to a 

mere conclusory allegation. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that 

Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 

1915(e)(2).1

III.

 

1

 Even were Plaintiff capable of curing the many defects in his Complaint, the Undersigned 

doubts the Court could exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants in this matter consistent 

with Defendants’ Due Process rights. Plaintiff alleges no facts that, on their face, would satisfy 

the Ohio long-arm statute, Ohio Rev. Code § 2307.382, and it is doubtful that Defendants have 

sufficient minimum contacts with the state of Ohio such that exercise of personal jurisdiction 

over them would not “offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” Int’l Shoe 

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
10 

For the reasons stated above, the Undersigned finds that Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to 

state a claims upon which relief may be granted. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the 

Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against all Defendants pursuant to Section 1915(e)(2). (ECF No. 

1.) Accordingly, it is also RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Permission for 

Electronic Case Filing be DENIED. (ECF No. 2.) 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge 

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l 

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal 

the district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 

that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely 

object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 
11 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation 

omitted)). 

 IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 

Date: April 2, 2018 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE