NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

IMRAN HOSSAIN IMON, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

 v. 

CHUCK KEETON, in his official capacity 

as Warden of the La Palma Correctional 

Center; et al., 

Respondents-Appellees.

No. 20-16596 

D.C. No. 

2:20-cv-00037-DWL-JZB 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted April 13, 2021**

San Francisco, California

Before: McKEOWN, RAWLINSON, and BADE, Circuit Judges.

Imran Imon maintains that he was a minor when he entered the United 

States, fleeing Bangladesh, but the Office of Refugee Resettlement (“ORR”) and 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) determined that he was an adult. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision 

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

FILED

APR 15 2021

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 

Contending that he was an unaccompanied alien child on entry and therefore 

subject to certain legal protections even after he turned eighteen, Imon brought a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 and a motion for a 

preliminary injunction, challenging his ongoing detention and ICE’s failure to 

place him in the least restrictive setting available. The district court denied the 

motion and dismissed the petition. We dismiss Imon’s petition as moot.

While this appeal was pending, Imon was released from detention. 

Although he concedes that his prolonged detention claim is moot, he argues that 

claims related to the age determinations are not moot because the age 

determinations have collateral consequences. See Abdala v. INS, 488 F.3d 1061, 

1064 (9th Cir. 2007) (“For a habeas petition to continue to present a live 

controversy after the petitioner’s release . . . there must be some remaining 

‘collateral consequence’ that may be redressed by success on the petition.”). Imon

asserts that the age determinations create collateral consequences for two reasons:

(1) “the Board of Immigration Appeals relied on the immigration judge’s [(“IJ”)]

erroneous findings about [Imon’s] age to affirm his negative credibility 

determination”; and (2) Imon “can pursue Special Immigrant Juvenile Status” in 

New York, but “will be barred from that form of relief because the government 

will insist, incorrectly, that he was born in 1998, not 2001.”

Collateral consequences “create concrete legal disadvantages.” Zegarra-
3 

Gomez v. INS, 314 F.3d 1124, 1125 (9th Cir. 2003). Imon has not identified legal 

disadvantages arising out of the age determinations. The IJ’s adverse credibility 

determination was based on the IJ’s evaluation of the evidence and its 

inconsistencies, not any age determination by ICE or ORR. Similarly, the Special 

Immigrant Juvenile Status process involves evaluation of the evidence by a 

juvenile court. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(27)(J)(i). A noncitizen seeking Special 

Immigrant Juvenile Status must obtain a state-court order prior to obtaining the 

consent of the Secretary of Homeland Security by filing a petition with United 

States Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”), and “‘USCIS relies on the 

expertise of the juvenile court . . . and does not reweigh the evidence,’ but may 

deny relief if it determines that the state court order had no reasonable factual basis 

or was sought ‘primarily or solely to obtain an immigration benefit.’” C.J.L.G. v. 

Barr, 923 F.3d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc) (omission in original) (quoting 6 

USCIS Policy Manual, pt. J, ch. 2(D)(5)). Any claim of collateral consequence is 

speculative and hypothetical.

Imon has already received the relief that he sought through a petition for 

habeas corpus: release from detention. His petition is therefore moot.

DISMISSED.