UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BUDDY STRUCKMAN,

Case No. 1:17-cv-00828

Plaintiff, Black, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

THE VILLAGE OF LOCKLAND

POLICE, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Background

Plaintiff, who proceeds pro se, tendered a complaint against three Defendants on 

December 8, 2017. On December 12, 2017, the undersigned granted Plaintiff leave to 

proceed in forma pauperis and directed service of the complaint against three 

Defendants. (Doc. 3). 

Plaintiff’s complaint alleges that the Village of Lockland Police, Patrolman Drew 

Jones, and Sergeant Patrick Sublet violated Plaintiff’s civil rights, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. Plaintiff alleges that he is a college educated resident of Cincinnati, Ohio with no 

prior criminal record. However, on or about April 20, 2015, he was “unlawfully arrested 

in relation to false and fabricated reports by the defendants” and charged with two 

separate drug offenses in Hamilton County Municipal Court. Plaintiff further alleges that 

the case took more than 800 days to complete and ultimately resulted in his acquittal on 

July 12, 2017. (Doc. 3 at ¶¶7-8). 

The only clue as to the nature of the allegedly “false and fabricated” information is 
2

Plaintiff’s allegation that “Patrolman Drew Jones falsified residency information against 

the Plaintiff.” (Id. at ¶9). Allegations against Defendant Sublet identify him as “the 

supervisor of Patrolman Drew Jones” and allege that in that capacity, he “signed off on 

false information.” (Id. at ¶9). Plaintiff generally alleges that the criminal charges caused 

him stress and mental anguish, and damaged his “schooling, work, social status, 

finances, material, physical well being..., family relationships and faith.” (Id. at ¶10). 

Without identifying whether the Defendants are sued in their individual or official 

capacities, he seeks damages against all Defendants in the amount of 1.2 million dollars. 

On June 8, 2018, all three Defendants collectively moved for judgment on the 

pleadings, arguing that the complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may be 

granted. (Doc. 17). When Plaintiff initially failed to file any timely response in opposition 

to Defendants’ motion, he was ordered to “show cause” why the motion should not be 

construed as unopposed and granted for the reasons stated. (Doc. 20). Thereafter, 

Plaintiff requested additional time in which to file a response in opposition. 

By Order filed August 2, 2018, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s request for an 

additional 90 days, through November 1, 2018, as “excessive” under the circumstances. 

(Doc. 23). Nevertheless, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to extend his time for filing 

a response to the Defendants’ motion until September 17, 2018. (Id.) The same Order 

explicitly warned Plaintiff that “absent extreme good cause shown, no further extensions 

of time to respond will be granted.” (Id.) 

By Order filed September 7, 2018, the undersigned denied Plaintiff’s motion for the 

appointment of counsel, which motion had been filed by Plaintiff in July. The September 
3

7, 2018 Order reminded Plaintiff of his previously extended deadline for responding to 

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings. (Doc. 24). The September 7 Order 

also reiterated the Court’s prior warning that “absent extreme good cause shown, no 

further extensions of time to respond will be granted.” (Doc. 24).

Despite being repeatedly warned that he must file a timely response to 

Defendants’ now long-pending motion for judgment on the pleadings, and despite being 

given a generous extension of time in which to file his response, Plaintiff has failed to file 

any opposition to the Defendants’ dispositive motion. The undersigned has reviewed the 

motion and the arguments contained therein and agrees that all Defendants are entitled 

to judgment as a matter of law on all claims.

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

A district court reviews a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings under 

the same standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. EEOC v. J.H. Routh 

Packing Co., 246 F.3d 850, 851 (6th Cir. 2001). Accordingly, “we construe the complaint 

in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, accept the well-pled factual allegations 

as true, and determine whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of 

law.” Commercial Money Ctr., Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327, 336 (6th Cir.

2007). While such determination rests primarily upon the allegations of the complaint, 

“matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits 

attached to the complaint, also may be taken into account.” Amini v. Oberlin Coll., 259 

F.3d 493, 502 (6th Cir. 2001) (quoting Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1554 (6th Cir.
4

1997)) (emphasis omitted). The court “need not accept the plaintiff's legal conclusions or 

unwarranted factual inferences as true.” Commercial Money Ctr., 508 F.3d at 336. To 

withstand a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, “a complaint must contain 

direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements under some viable 

legal theory.” Id.

The Sixth Circuit has explained the pleading requirements that are necessary to 

survive a Rule 12(c) motion as follows:

In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 167 

L.Ed.2d 929 (2007), the Supreme Court explained that “a plaintiff's 

obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief’ requires 

more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements 

of a cause of action will not do.... Factual allegations must be enough to 

raise a right to relief above the speculative level....” Id. at 1964–65 (internal 

citations omitted). In Erickson v. Pardus, ...127 S. Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 

1081 (2007), decided two weeks after Twombly, however, the Supreme 

Court affirmed that “Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires only ‘a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled 

to relief.’ Specific facts are not necessary; the statement need only ‘give 

the defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which 

it rests.’“ Id. at 2200 (quoting Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1964). ...We read the 

Twombly and Erickson decisions in conjunction with one another when 

reviewing a district court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss for failure 

to state a claim or a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant 

to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12.

Tucker v. Middleburg–Legacy Place, 539 F.3d 545, 549 – 550 (6th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Sensations, Inc. v. City of Grand Rapids, 526 F.3d at 295–96 (6th Cir.

2008) (footnote omitted); see also generally, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

B. Defendants’ Arguments

1. The Village of Lockland Police is not sui juris

Plaintiff identifies the Village of Lockland Police as one of the three Defendants. 
5

However, that entity is not capable of being sued under Ohio law. Therefore, all claims 

against that Defendant must be dismissed as a matter of law. See e.g., Hale v. Vance, 

267 F. Supp.2d 725, 737 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (City of Trotwood Police Department was not 

sui juris and was not capable of being sued).

2. Plaintiff’s First Claim is Time-Barred

Plaintiff’s first claim is captioned “unlawful arrest, searches and confinement in 

custody” and is identified as arising under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Using 

the singular tense without identifying any specific individual or entity, Plaintiff alleges that 

“Defendant caused and/or permitted the violation of plaintiff’s Fourth and Fourteenth 

Amendment rights to be free from unlawful arrest, confinement in custody, thereby 

entitling Plaintiff [to] damages....” (Doc. 3 at ¶15). The preceding paragraphs allege only 

that “Plaintiff was unlawfully arrested in relation to false and fabricated reports by the 

defendants.” (Id. at ¶7). 

The limitations period for the stated claim of false arrest is two years, a time period 

that began to run either on April 20, 2015, the date of Plaintiff’s arrest, or on April 27, 

2015, the date that Plaintiff was arraigned. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 389 

(2007); see also Fox v. DeSoto, 489 F.3d 227, 233 (6th Cir. 2007) (“a claim for wrongful 

arrest under § 1983 accrues at the time of the arrest or, at the latest, when detention 

without legal process ends”). Plaintiff did not tender his complaint to this Court until 

December 8, 2017, more than two years after the last possible date on which his “false 

arrest” claim accrued. Therefore, any such claim is clearly time-barred, and the 

Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
6

3. Plaintiff’s Second Claim Fails to State a Plausible Basis for Relief

Plaintiff’s second claim is captioned as “Violation of Due Process” and refers to the 

Fourteenth Amendment. Plaintiff alleges specifically that “[b]y doing the act described in 

paragraph 8, [unidentified, singular] Defendant caused and/or permitted the violation of 

Plaintiff’s right to Due Process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment....” (Doc. 3 at 

¶17). Paragraph 8 states in full: “The case took over 800 days to complete the trial with 

a final entry entered on 07/12/2017 as ACQUITTED BY COURT.” (Id. at ¶8). 

The bare allegations contained in the complaint suggest that this second claim is 

based upon an alleged speedy trial violation rather than due process. The docket of 

Plaintiff’s underlying criminal case in state court, Hamilton County Municipal Court Case 

No. C/15/CRB/10112, reflects that Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the criminal charges 

against him based upon an alleged violation or Ohio R.C. § 2945.71, Ohio’s Speedy Trial 

Act. As Defendants point out, however, the state court docket sheet also reflects that 

Plaintiff requested and was granted at least eighteen continuances of his criminal trial, 

suggesting waiver of any speedy trial claim. 

Regardless of whether Plaintiff intended to bring a speedy trial or a due process 

claim, however, Plaintiff fails to include any allegations that would tie any of the 

Defendants’ conduct to the length of time that the criminal case remained pending in the 

Hamilton County Municipal Court. Instead, Plaintiff’s minimal allegations against the 

Defendants pertain to actions that they allegedly took in causing his arrest, prior to 

Plaintiff’s arraignment. Because Plaintiff fails to allege any specific bad-faith 

governmental behavior related to the timing of his criminal proceedings by any Defendant, 
7

Plaintiff has failed to state any plausible due process claim. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendants’ motion for judgment on 

the pleadings (Doc. 17) be GRANTED, that Plaintiff’s claims against the Defendants be 

dismissed with prejudice for failure to state any claim, and that this case be closed.

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman 

Stephanie K. Bowman 

United States Magistrate Judge
8

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BUDDY STRUCKMAN,

Case No. 1:17-cv-00828

Plaintiff, Black, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

THE VILLAGE OF LOCKLAND

POLICE, et al.,

Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS

of the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely 

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) 

of the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support 

of the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN 

(14) DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections 

in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 

U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).