UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

SERICA HADNOT,

Plaintiff,

vs.

PTS OF AMERICA, LLC, et al.,

Defendants.

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Case No. 1:17-cv-655

Judge Timothy S. Black

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION

TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT (Doc. 54)

This civil lawsuit is before the Court on the motion of Plaintiff Serica Hadnot for 

leave to file a Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 54) and the parties’ responsive 

memoranda (Docs. 56, 57). 

I. INTRODUCTION

Defendant Jim Neil is the Hamilton County Sheriff and, at all relevant times, was 

the individual in charge of, inter alia, jailing prisoners, appearing in court on behalf of 

Hamilton County for matters including extraditions of prisoners to out of state prisons, 

and entering into contracts with private persons or entities for the return of Ohio prisoners 

from outside the state. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 5). 

Defendant Jeff Carroll is a captain for the Hamilton County Sheriff and, at all 

relevant times, was the individual in charge of directing the court services, including 

indictments and felony warrants, extradition of fugitives, contacting security services for 
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other County departments, and prisoner transportation. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 6). Sheriff Neil and 

Mr. Carroll are collectively referred to herein as the “HCSO Defendants.” 

Defendant PTS of America, LLC (“PTS”) contracted with Hamilton County, Ohio 

to provide transportation services incident to the extradition of prisoners outside of 

Hamilton County to Hamilton County. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 12). Similarly, PTS contracted with 

Marion County, Indiana to provide Marion County with transportation services incident 

to the extradition of prisoners outside of Marion County to Marion County. (Id. at ¶ 13). 

PTS’s transportation contracts with both Hamilton County, Ohio and Marion 

County, Indiana reserved to PTS the right to refuse to transport prisoners with medical 

conditions where there is “risk of the medical condition worsening as a result of motor 

vehicle transport,” including “pregnancy.” (Doc. 53 at ¶¶ 12, 14). PTS assumed the duty 

to offer alternative transportation services “[w]hen the medical status of the individual is 

prohibitive to ground transport, if a written release for such travel is available from 

licensed medical personnel.” (Id. at ¶ 15). Despite this contractual language, PTS 

routinely transports prisoners with medical conditions that should have made such 

prisoners ineligible for ground transportation pursuant to PTS’s written policies. (Id. at 

¶ 16). At least three such prisoners have died on PTS’s transport vehicles as a result of 

medical conditions that were worsened by motor vehicle transport since 2011 and prior to 

the occurrences set forth herein. (Id. at ¶ 17). 

PTS does not train its employees, agents, or contractors in screening prisoners for 

medical conditions that make such prisoners ineligible for ground transport, including 

pregnancy. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 18). Sheriff Neil was aware of PTS’s unlawful custom or 
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policy when he contracted with PTS for extradition services. (Id. at ¶ 19). Mr. Carroll 

should have also known about PTS’s policies or customs as the person in charge of 

directing the court services, including indictments and felony warrants, extradition of 

fugitives, contract security services for other County Departments, and prisoner 

transportation. (Id.) Sheriff Neil contracted with PTS for extradition services though it 

was obvious PTS would likely accept custody of prisoners with medical conditions that 

should have made them ineligible for ground transport. (Id at ¶ 20). 

On May 14, 2016, Ms. Hadnot discovered she was pregnant. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 22). 

On June 8, 2016, Ms. Hadnot was arrested on charge of felonious assault after she 

had a dispute with one of her neighbors. (Id. at ¶ 24). All charges were ultimately 

dismissed. (Id.) During Ms. Hadnot’s incarceration, Sheriff Neil and/or Mr. Carroll 

became aware of an outstanding warrant for Ms. Hadnot’s arrest which had been issued 

by the Marion County, Indiana, Sheriff’s Office (“MCSO”) in connection with a charge 

for theft/receiving stolen property. (Id. at ¶ 27). 

Pursuant to the HCSO’s normal operating procedures, Sheriff Neil and/or Mr. 

Carroll obtained a waiver of extradition from Ms. Hadnot on June 13, 2016, and alerted 

the MCSO, which arranged for Ms. Hadnot’s transportation by and through PTS. (Doc. 

53 at ¶ 28). On June 14, 2016, the order of extradition issued. (Id. at ¶ 31). Ms. Hadnot 

remained in HCSO’s custody until PTS arrived to transport her to Marion County on June 

23, 2016. (Id.) Ms. Hadnot informed Jane Doe 2, an employee/agent/subcontractor of 

the HCSO in charge of releasing Ms. Hadnot to the custody of PTS, that she was 

pregnant and in need of pre-natal vitamins prior to being transported by PTS. (Id. at 
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¶ 32). Jane Doe 2 processed the release and told Ms. Hadnot that PTS would handle all 

of her medical needs. (Id.)

PTS took custody of Ms. Hadnot and placed her in leg irons and shackles, a 

portion of which were wrapped around her abdomen. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 37). Ms. Hadnot was 

boarded into the transport van and confined to one of three cages on the van. (Id.) Ms. 

Hadnot remained seated and shackled while wedged between two other prisoners over the 

course of the following three days. (Id. at ¶ 39). 

During the transport, Ms. Hadnot was subject to overheating temperatures (id. at 

¶ 40) and denied access to a bathroom for unreasonably long durations (id. at ¶ 41). Male 

prisoners relieved themselves into soda bottles and threw urine on female prisoners, 

including Ms. Hadnot. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 44). PTS agents threatened the male prisoners with 

a shotgun, traumatizing Ms. Hadnot. (Id.) Ms. Hadnot’s feet and ankles became 

significantly swollen because she was forced to maintain a sedentary position and she 

became significantly dehydrated. (Id. at ¶¶ 45-46). Ms. Hadnot reported that she began 

bleeding from her vaginal area, but PTS agents did not address her complaints. (Id. at 

¶ 47). 

Ms. Hadnot arrived at the Marion County, Indiana processing center at about 2:30 

a.m. on June 26, 2016. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 48). The 100-mile journey from Hamilton County, 

Ohio took over 70 hours to complete. (Id. at ¶ 49). On June 29, 2016, Ms. Hadnot was 

released from the Marion County jail three days after being processed. (Id. at ¶ 62). Ms. 

Hadnot’s husband drove her to the hospital, where she was diagnosed as having suffered 

an incomplete miscarriage. (Id.)
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On September 29, 2017, Ms. Hadnot commenced this lawsuit. (Doc. 1). On 

November 16, 2017, Ms. Hadnot filed an Amended Complaint. (Doc. 4). 

On April 9, 2018, the Court put on a Calendar Order that required, inter alia, 

motions directed to the pleadings to be filed by July 8, 2018. (Doc. 42). On June 4, 

2018, the HCSO Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint. (Doc. 

46). Ms. Hadnot did not respond to the HCSO Defendants’ motion, and instead, on June 

25, 2018, filed the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 53) and a motion for leave to file 

the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 54). The Second Amended Complaint asserts one 

claim against the HCSO Defendants for violation of Ms. Hadnot’s constitutional rights 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Doc. 53 at ¶¶ 79-97). 

The HCSO Defendants oppose Ms. Hadnot’s motion for leave on the grounds of 

futility. (Doc. 56). The HCSO Defendants argue Ms. Hadnot’s § 1983 claim fails to 

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The HCSO Defendants subsequently

moved to strike Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint on the grounds that it was filed 

without the Court’s leave in violation of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. (Doc. 61).

II. STANDARD

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a), “leave to amend a pleading shall be freely given 

when justice so requires.” Coe v. Bell, 161 F.3d 320, 341 (6th Cir. 1998) (citing Brooks v. 

Celeste, 39 F.3d 125, 130 (6th Cir. 1994)). Rule 15(a) embodies “a liberal policy of 

permitting amendments to ensure the determinations of claims on their merits.” Marks v. 

Shell Oil Co., 830 F.2d 68, 69 (6th Cir. 1987). In deciding a party’s motion for leave to 

amend, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has instructed that district courts must 
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consider several elements, including “[u]ndue delay in filing, lack of notice to the 

opposing party, bad faith by the moving party, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by 

previous amendments, undue prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendments 

. . . .” Id.

Importantly, delay alone is insufficient to deny a motion to amend. Id. The denial 

of a motion to amend requires “at least some significant showing of prejudice to the 

opponent.” Duggins v. Steak ‘N Shake, Inc., 195 F.3d 828, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). 

A court may deny a motion for leave to amend for futility if the amendment could 

not withstand a motion to dismiss. Riverview Health Inst., LLC v. Med. Mut. Of Ohio, 

601 F.3d 505, 512 (6th Cir. 2010). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, the Court must 

view the complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and take all wellpleaded factual allegations as true. Tackett v. M&G Polymers, 561 F.3d 478, 488 (6th 

Cir. 2009). To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual 

matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Ashcroft v. 

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

Ultimately, determination of whether justice requires the amendment is entrusted 

to the sound discretion of a district court. Moore v. City of Paducah, 790 F.2d 557, 559 

(6th Cir. 1986). 

III. ANALYSIS

The HCSO Defendants argue that Ms. Hadnot should be denied leave to file the 

Second Amended Complaint on the grounds of futility because her § 1983 claim against 
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the HCSO Defendants (Count Two of the Second Amended Complaint) fails to state a 

claim upon which relief can be granted. The Court does not agree. 

To establish a cause of action under § 1983, Ms. Hadnot must establish (1) a 

deprivation of a right secured by the constitution or laws of the United States (2) caused 

by a person acting under color of state law. McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch., 433 F.3d 

460, 463 (6th Cir. 2006). The Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges both 

elements.

A. Constitutional Violation.

First, the Second Amended Complaint asserts a constitutional violation through 

the “state-created danger” doctrine. (Doc. 53 at ¶ 82). Though the Fourteenth 

Amendment’s due process clause does not expressly require the state to protect the life, 

liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors, courts have 

recognized that a governmental actor may violate the due process clause by creating a 

particular danger to the victim. See Hunt v. Sycamore Cmty. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 542 

F.3d 529, 534 (6th Cir. 2008). Under this theory—the “state-created danger doctrine”—a 

governmental actor can be held responsible for an injury committed by a private person 

if:

(1) An affirmative act by the governmental actor either 

created or increased the risk that the plaintiff would be 

exposed to the injurious conduct of the private person; 

(2) The governmental actor’s act especially endangered 

the plaintiff or a small class of which the plaintiff was 

a member; and
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(3) The governmental actor had the requisite degree of 

culpability. 

Id. (citation omitted). 

According to the Sixth Circuit, the level of culpability for the state-created danger 

doctrine is “that level that would suffice to establish a substantive due process violation,” 

in other words, conduct that “shocks the conscience.” Id. at 535. Culpability that 

“shocks the conscience” is something in between negligence and intentional, and depends 

on the particular circumstances:

We can say that mere negligence is definitely not enough and 

that conduct intended to injury in some way unjustifiable by 

any governmental interest is the sort of official action most 

likely to rise to the conscious-shocking level. But the middle 

states of culpability, such as recklessness, gross negligence, 

or deliberate indifference, may or may not be shocking 

depending on the context. Deliberate indifference that shocks 

in one environment may not be so patently egregious in 

another, and our concern with preserving the constitutional 

proportions of substantive due process demands an exact 

analysis of circumstances before any abuse of power is 

condemned as conscience shocking.

Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 

Viewing the allegations of the Second Amended Complaint in a light most 

favorable to Ms. Hadnot, the pleading sufficiently alleges a constitutional violation under 

the state-created danger doctrine. Initially, Ms. Hadnot’s state-created-danger claim is 

premised on an “affirmative act,” to wit, the Second Amended Complaint alleges Sheriff 

Neil entered into a contract with PTS to transport prisoners when he and Mr. Carroll 

(who was in charge of extradition) knew, or should have known, that PTS transports 

prisoners with medical conditions who are not safe to transport. (See Doc. 53 at ¶¶ 12, 
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19, 20). The Second Amended Complaint also alleges the HCSO Defendants took the 

affirmative act of arranging Ms. Hadnot’s transfer to the custody and control of PTS. (Id.

at ¶¶ 31-32).1

Next, the Second Amended Complaint alleges these acts specifically endangered 

Ms. Hadnot and/or other prisoners with medical conditions who were not safe to 

transport. (See Doc. ¶¶ 16-17, 19-20). 

Finally, the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently alleges that the HCSO

Defendants had the requisite culpability. Again, the Second Amended Complaint alleges 

that the HCSO Defendants knew (or should have known) that PTS transported prisoners 

with medical conditions who were not safe to transport at the time they (1) contracted 

with PTS to transport prisoners and (2) made Ms. Hadnot available for transport. At this 

juncture, the Second Amended Complaint plausibly alleges behavior that “shocks the 

conscience.” 

B. State Action.

Because the HCSO Defendants are state actors and Ms. Hadnot’s state-created

danger claim is premised on their affirmative acts, the Second Amended Complaint 

 1 Several paragraphs of the Amended Complaint accuse Sheriff Neil and Mr. Carroll of failing to 

provide adequate training to their subordinates in how to prescreen prisoners for conditions that 

made them ineligible for ground transport. (See ¶ 89). The Court notes that Ms. Hadnot’s claim 

cannot be premised on these allegations because a state-created danger claim must be premised 

on an affirmative act as opposed to an omission. See Waters v. Perkins Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of 

Educ., Case No. 3:12-cv-732, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43660, at ** 59-64 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 

2014) (Plaintiffs’ argument that Defendants failed to take any action to curtail bullying did not 

support a state-created danger claim because “an omission or failure to act will not support a 

state-created danger exception.”). 
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sufficiently alleges the second prong of the § 1983 claim, i.e., that Ms. Hadnot’s alleged 

constitutional deprivation was caused by persons acting under color of state law. 

Accordingly, the Court finds that the Second Amended Complaint sufficiently 

alleges a plausible state-created danger claim and is not futile as to the HCSO. As 

“futility” is the only grounds asserted by the HCSO Defendants in opposition to Ms. 

Hadnot’s request for leave, the Court finds Ms. Hadnot’s motion for leave to amend 

(Doc. 54) well-taken and GRANTS same.2

Additionally, the Court finds that because the Second Amended Complaint is now 

the operative pleading and supersedes the Amended Complaint, the HCSO Defendants’

motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 61) is DENIED, and the HCSO

Defendants’ pending motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint (Doc. 46) is 

DENIED as moot. See Yates v. Applied Performance Techs, Inc., 205 F.R.D. 497, 499 

(S.D. Ohio 2002) (“Because amended complaints supersede the original pleading, the 

filing of the amended complaint in this case did technically render the pending motion to 

dismiss moot.”). 

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Ms. Hadnot’s motion for leave to amend (Doc. 54) is 

GRANTED. The Second Amended Complaint (Doc. 53) shall be Plaintiff’s operative 

pleading. The HCSO Defendants’ motion to strike the Second Amended Complaint 

 2 The HCSO Defendants do not raise any other arguments, such as undue delay, in support of 

their position. The Court finds there is no issue with the timing of Ms. Hadnot’s motion to 

amend, as the motion was filed within the time allotted by the Calendar Order. (See Doc. 42). 
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(Doc. 61) is DENIED. The HCSO’s motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint 

(Doc. 46) is DENIED as moot. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 

Timothy S. Black

United States District Judge

1/29/19