alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 32.0

                           SECTION 1350 CERTIFICATIONS

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of DutchFork Bancshares, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-QSB for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2004 as filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission (the "Report"), the undersigned
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as added by Section 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company as of and for the period covered by the Report.


                                        /s/ J. Thomas Johnson
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        J. Thomas Johnson
                                        President and Chief Executive Officer

                                        /s/ Steve P. Sligh
                                        -------------------------------------
                                        Steve P. Sligh
                                        Executive Vice President and Chief
                                        Financial Officer

Date: May 13, 2004
| (1)   | The Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and |
|-----------------|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| (2)   | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company. |
|-----------------|------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|

| Date:  August 19, 2010 | By:    | /s/ Bo Huang                                      |   |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                             |   | Name :  Bo Huang                             |   |
|                             |   | Title :    Chief Executive Officer |   |
|                             |   |                                                   |   |

| Date:  August 19, 2010 | By:    | /s/ Shiao Ming Sheng                              |   |
|----------------------------------|--------|--------------------------------------------------------|--------|
|                             |   | Name :  Shiao Ming Sheng                     |   |
|                             |   | Title :    Chief Financial Officer |   |
|                             |   |                                                   |   |
Opinion filed October 6 , 20 1 6



### In The 

# Eleventh Court of Appeals

__________ 

### No. 11

- 1 6

- 00 2 63

- CV

__________ 

### DANIEL FRANKLIN, Appellant

V.
CRYSTAL REYES ET AL. , Appellee s

On Appeal from the 259 th District Court

Jones County, Texas T rial Court Cause No. 023537

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N
On September 12 , 2016
, Daniel Franklin filed in the trial court a notice of appeal in which he sought to appeal an order of dismissal that was signed by the trial court on February 26, 2016

. W hen the appeal was docketed in this court, w e notified Appellant by letter that i t a ppear ed to this court that the notice of appeal was untimely filed , and we requested that A ppellant respond a nd show grounds to
continue th e appeal.2

In his resp onse , Appellant asserts that he did not receive notice of the dismissal until September 7, 2016, and that he diligently filed his notice of appeal
soon aft er receiving notice of the dismissal

. When a party fails to receive timely notice of an appealable order, Rule 306a.4 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure
extends the time in which a notice of appeal may be filed . However, “in no event shall such period s begin more than ninety days after the original judgment or other appealable order was signed.” T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 306a.4.
The documents on file in this case show that, on February 26 , 201 6 , the trial court signed a final, appealable order in which it dismissed Appellant’s cause of
action in its entirety

. Ninety days from that date was May 26, 2016. Thus, e ven if Rule 306a.4 applie d , the latest possible due date for Appellant’s notice of appeal was thirty days after May 26 , which would have been June 27
, 201 6 , since June 25 fell
on a S atur day

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 4.1(a), 26.1. Appellant did not file his notice of appeal until September

— well after the deadline. Absent a timely notice of appeal, this court is without jurisdiction to consider this appe al. See Wilkins v. Methodist Health Care Sys. , 160 S.W.3d 559, 56 4 (Tex. 2005); Garza v. Hibernia Nat’l Bank
, 227 S.W.3d 233 , 233

– 34 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Verburgt v. Dorner , 959 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex. 1997). Because we a re without jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal

. See T EX

. R. A PP

. P. 42.3 (a)

. T h is appeal is dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

PER CURIAM

October 6 , 2016 Panel consists of: Wright, C.J., Willson, J., and Bailey, J.
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

United States of America

vs. Case Number: 1:17cr104-1

Amit Patel

CRIMINAL MINUTES: CHANGE OF PLEA

Defendant appeared with counsel Clyde Bennett

Defendant arraigned and specifically advised of rights

Statement of facts read by FBI Agent Pete Lakes

Defendant pleads GUILTY to Count(s) 1

Plea accepted by the Court

Referred to Probation Department for Presentence Report

O.R. Bond continued and modified on the record

Tim Oakley and Tim Landry AUSA’s present 

Judge: Susan J. Dlott

Courtroom Deputy: William Miller

Court Reporter: Julie Wolfer, Official

Date: May 22, 2018

Case: 1:17-cr-00104-SJD Doc #: 99 Filed: 05/22/18 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 281
#### Helvering *v.*McDougal.

Opinion delivered June 7, 1915.

IS'CHOOL DISTRICTS — FORMATION-—DISMEMBERMENT OF SINGLE SCHOOL DISTRICT. — Tihe loauaty court -has no -power to dis-member a single school district by tailing away a part of its territory and adding it to, or forming a common school district with it and other territory.

'Appeal from ‘White Circuit 'Court; *J. M. Jackson,*Judge;

reversed.

*Eugene Cypert,*for .appellant.

The county -court has no power to detach, or take away, a part of a -single school district and add it to a common school district. 60 Ark. 124; Kirby’s Dig., § *),*7668, 7540-7543.

No brief for appellee.

Hart, J.

Appellants prosecute this appeal to reverse a judgment of the circuit court in the matter of the creation of -School District No. 33 in White County, Arkansas.

The 'County ¡court in creating the district took away from Bradford .Single -School District -a part of its territory -and used it in the formation of District No. 33.

We have heretofore held that the county court has no power to 'dismentber a single school district by taking away a part of its territory and adding it to or forming a common school district with it and other territory. *Cotter Special School District No.*50 v. *District No.*53, 111 Ark. 79.

See, also, *Crow*v. *Special School District No.*2, 102 Ark. 401, where we held that territory once organized and established into a rural special school district, under act of May 31, 1909, * as amended by act of April 7,1911, † can not be cut off and included within another rural special school district.

It follows that the judgment must be reversed; and the petition of appellees will be dismissed.

*

 Act 321, Acts 1909.
#### M. Spinelli & Sons Co., Inc. *v.*City of Cambridge.

Suffolk.

May 9, 1940.

June 25, 1940.

Present: Field, C.J., Lummus, Dolan, Cox, & Honan, JJ.

*Contract,*Building contract, With municipality. *Municipal Corporations,*Contracts.

A contractor, required by a contract with a city for the construction of a school house to obtain and pay for all necessary permits, could not recover from the city the amount of a fee for a building permit which the city had paid and he had then repaid to it under protest unless he proved that do permit was required in the circumstances.

*343Contract. Writ in the Municipal Court of the City of Boston dated April 17, 1939.

There was a finding for the plaintiff in the sum of $272 by *Brackett,*J. The Appellate Division ordered judgment for the defendant. The plaintiff appealed.

A. *M. MacNeil, (J. K. Jerome*with him,) for the plaintiff.

*R. C. Evarts,*City Solicitor, for the defendant.

Lummus, J.

The plaintiff entered into a -contract with the defendant to build a schoolhouse. The record fails to show whether the city by ordinance under G. L. (Ter. Ed.) c. 143, § 3, had required a building permit for the erection of a schoolhouse on land owned by it, and had required payment of a fee in obtaining such a permit, both of which requirements it might lawfully make. *Salem*v. *Maynes,*123 Mass. 372. *Storer*v. *Downey,*215 Mass. 273. *Kilgour*v. *Gratto,*224 Mass. 78. *Commonwealth*v. *Atlas,*244 Mass. 78. *Slack*v. *Inspector of Buildings of Wellesley,*262 Mass. 404. *William W. Drummey, Inc.*v. *Cambridge,*282 Mass. 170. *C. & H. Co.*v. *Building Commissioner of Medford,*303 Mass. 499. *Turner*v. *Board of Appeals of Milton,*305 Mass. 189.

The plaintiff refused to apply for any permit to build. The city applied for a permit, and one was granted by the superintendent of public buildings, upon payment by the city of a fee of $272. Upon demand by the city, the plaintiff under protest repaid it the amount of the fee, and then brought this action to recover it. The trial judge found for the plaintiff, but the Appellate Division ordered judgment for the defendant.

The contract provided that the plaintiff as contractor was to obtain and pay for all required permits. The burden was on the plaintiff to establish its contention that no permit was required where the city was the owner. There was no evidence of that. *Wolbarsht*v. *Donnelly,*291 Mass. 229, 233. The third ruling requested, that the plaintiff cannot recover, should have been given by the trial judge. The order of the Appellate Division was right.

*Order of Appellate Division affirmed.*
17-cv-869

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22251

#### James A. FANNING, Respondent, v. Wayne HICKS, Billy E. Faile, and James Steven Gibson, Defendants, of whom Wayne Hicks is, Appellant.

(327 S. E. (2d) 342)

Supreme Court

*457
      *S. Jackson Kimball,*Rock Hill, *for appellant.*

*Charles B. Burnette, III,*of *Ridley & Ridley,*Rock Hill, *for respondent.*

Heard Jan. 22, 1985.

Decided Feb. 28, 1985.

Ness, Justice:

Respondent Fanning seeks to recover damages for guns converted by appellant Hicks. The jury awarded Fanning $2,900 actual and $15,000 punitive damages. We affirm.

Fanning’s home was burglarized and 21 guns were stolen. Hicks was charged as an accessory before the fact to the housebreaking and grand larceny. He returned eight of the 21 guns and pled *nolo contendré*to one count of receiving stolen goods.

Hicks’ sentence was suspended upon the payment of a fine and two years probation. As a special condition of probation, *458the court ordered Hicks to make immediate restitution to Fanning in the amount of $8,850 for the 13 guns not returned. Fanning was not present during the criminal proceeding.

Several months later Fanning brought this action against Hicks for the conversion of 13 guns and for damage to the 8 guns returned to him. Hicks entered a general denial and alleged the $3,850 restitution was an accord and satisfaction of the claim.

At the conclusion of all the testimony, the trial judge ruled there was no evidence that Fanning agréed to withdraw his claim. He granted Fanning’s motion to strike and directed a verdict in his favor on the defense of accord and satisfaction.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in not submitting the issue of accord and satisfaction to the jury. We disagree.

The elements of an accord and satisfaction are the agreement between the parties to settle a dispute (the accord), and the payment of the consideration expressed in the accord (the satisfaction). *Williams v. Johnson,*244 S. C. 406, 137 S. E. (2d) 410 (1964). There can be no accord without a meeting of the minds. *Redmond v. Strange,*203 S. C. 35, 26 S. E. (2d) 16 (1943).

The record is void of *any*evidence that Fanning agreed with Hicks to settle their dispute for $3,850. Restitution was ordered by the court as a special condition to probation. Respondent was not even present during the taking of the plea. Without an agreement between the parties, there can be no accord and satisfaction.

We hold the trial court properly withdrew the defense from the jury’s consideration.

Affirmed.

Littlejohn, C. J., and Gregory and Harwell, JJ., concur.

Jasper M. Cureton, Acting Associate Justice, concurring in result only.
VIRGINIA ARMY NATIONAL GUARD (VAARNG) DRINKING WATER 

PFAS SNAPSHOT

The Army National Guard is committed to ensuring quality drinking water is provided to its 

Soldiers, and civilians. Proactive sampling is performed by the Army National Guard on its

drinking water systems, as well as, coordination with other purveyors to ensure perfluorooctane 

sulfonate (PFOS) and perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) remains below the Environmental 

Protection Agency (EPA) lifetime health advisory (HA) level of 70 parts per trillion (ppt). The 

EPA HA is not an enforceable or a regulatory standard, and represents a concentration in 

drinking water that is not expected to produce adverse health effects if the water is consumed 

over a lifetime.

Drinking Water Status: Finished drinking water, which is the treated water people drink at 

Emporia NG Recruiting, does not contain PFOS/PFOA above the EPA HA. Additionally, Army 

National Guard-provided drinking water complies with the standards of the Safe Drinking Water 

Act (SDWA), a federal law designed to protect the quality of drinking water supplied to the 

American public. The Army National Guard will continue to monitor on-base drinking water to 

ensure the EPA HA or a properly promulgated state drinking water standard is not exceeded.

Test Date: October 2020

PFOA + PFOS Results: 0.72 ppt (J)i

Future Testing Event: October 2023

Type of Drinking Water System: Army National Guard-owned

For Questions Contact: Virginia National Guard State Public Affairs Office

Office Phone Number: 804-236-7892

Office E-mail Address: ngva.pao@mail.mil

Water Quality Reports: A water quality report is not required for this location

i The reported result is an estimate. Values noted with a ‘J’ flag were detected by the laboratory but the true concentration is 

uncertain.
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EX-10.2



 Exhibit 10.2 

FIRST AMENDMENT TO THE 

CENTRAL FEDERAL CORPORATION 2009 EQUITY COMPENSATION PLAN 

[Approved by the Stockholders of Central Federal Corporation on May 16, 2013] 

THIS FIRST AMENDMENT (this “Amendment”) to the Central Federal Corporation 2009 Equity Compensation Plan (the “Plan”) is
adopted on March 20, 2013. 
 WHEREAS, the stockholders of Central Federal Corporation (the “Company”) approved the Plan at
the annual meeting of stockholders held on May 21, 2009; 
 WHEREAS, the Company desires to amend the Plan to increase the number of
shares of Common Stock (“Common Stock”) of the Company reserved for awards under the Plan; 
 WHEREAS, Section 17 of the Plan
permits the Board of Directors of the Company to amend the Plan at any time without stockholder approval unless stockholder approval is required pursuant to the provisions of Section 17(c) and (d) of the Plan; and 

WHEREAS, stockholder approval is required to increase the maximum number of shares of common stock reserved for awards under the Plan; 

NOW, THEREFORE, the Plan is hereby amended as follows, subject to and effective upon stockholder approval: 

 

	 	1.	Section 5(a) of the Plan is hereby deleted in its entirety and the following is substituted therefor: 

  

	 	(a)	Subject to adjustment as provided in Section 13 of the Plan, the number of shares reserved for Awards under the Plan is 1,500,000. The following limits also apply with respect to Awards granted under the Plan:


  

	 	(i)	The maximum number of shares of Common Stock that may be issued in the form of Incentive Stock Options granted under the Plan is 1,500,000, or the full number of shares of Common Stock available under (a) less the
number of shares of Common Stock issued pursuant to Non-Statutory Stock Options and Restricted Stock Awards. 

  

	 	(ii)	The maximum number of shares of Common Stock that may be delivered pursuant to Restricted Stock Awards granted under the Plan is 1,500,000. 


 

	 	(iii)	The maximum number of shares of Common Stock that may be subject to all Options and SARs granted under the Plan to any one Participant during a calendar year is 500,000. 


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Company has caused this Amendment to be executed by its duly authorized officer effective as of date set forth above.

  

			
	CENTRAL FEDERAL CORPORATION
	
	 /s/ Timothy T. O’Dell

	Name:	 	Timothy T. O’Dell
	Title:	 	Chief Executive Officer
EXHIBIT 32: Rule 13a-14(b) Certification

The undersigned officer certifies that this report fully complies with
the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, and that the information contained in the report fairly presents,
in all material respects, the financial condition and results of
operations of Headliners Entertainment Group, Inc.

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has
been provided to Headliners Entertainment Group, Inc. and will be
retained by Headliners Entertainment Group, Inc. and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

Date: February 21, 2006      /s/ Eduardo Rodriguez
                             -------------------------------------------
                             Eduardo Rodriguez, Chief Executive Officer,
                              and Principal Financial Officer
#### Thorp THOMAS et al *v.*STATE of Arkansas

5266 through 5273

418 S. W. 2d 792

Opinion delivered October 2, 1967

*148
      *Alston Jennings,*for appellants.

*Joe Purcell,*Attorney General; *Don Langston,*Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Conley Byrd, Justice.

The appellants, Thorp Thomas, Chester Boyer, Leon Brents, Charles F. Wells, Everett Hamm Jr., and Gene Wirges, bring their separate appeals, consolidated here, challenging the authority of the trial court to assess court costs against them upon dismissal of criminal charges against them.

Except for the insertion of the individual names of appellants, the orders entered by the trial court read, ‘ ‘... it is by the Court . . . ordered . . .that the indictment against the said Thorp Thomas be dismissed and that Thorp Thomas be discharged, upon payment of costs.”

The order assessing court costs against the defendant upon dismissal of the indictment is void and of no effect, *Melton*v. *State,*(Ala. Ct. of App.) 1 So. 2d 920 (1941), and is a violation of due process of law, *Giaccio*v. *Pennsylvania,*382 U. S. 399 (1966). Nor was any objection necessary since the court exceeded its authority, *Sibley*v. *Leek,*45 Ark. 346 (1885).

Reversed and dismissed.
Exhibit 32.2



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the Form 10-Q of Microtune, Inc. (the
Company) for the quarter ended June 30, 2003 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Rob-Roy J. Graham, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) |  | The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- |  | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

| | (2) |  | The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- |  | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



/s/  ROB-ROY J.
GRAHAM

Rob-Roy J. Graham

Chief Financial Officer

Date: April 29, 2004