UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

United States of America, 

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:17-cr-164 (1) 

 Judge Thomas M. Rose 

Damian D. Jones, 

Defendant.

ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR 

COMPASSIONATE RELEASE (ECF 38, 41). 

______________________________________________________________________________ 

Pending before the Court is a motion by Defendant Damian D. Jones for a reduction of 

sentence under the compassionate release provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) and the First 

Step Act of 2018, (ECF 38), and a Supplemental Motion for Compassionate Release. (ECF 41). 

The Government filed a response, (ECF 44), and Jones has filed a reply. (ECF 45). Jones 

requests an order reducing his sentence to time served; or in the alternative, modifying his 

judgment to allow the remainder of his sentence to be served on home confinement. 

I. Background 

In December 2015, the FBI received information that identified Damian Jones as a multikilogram distributor of heroin in the Dayton, Ohio area. Jones worked and conspired with 

Sherwood Howard and others to distribute quantities of heroin and other controlled substances in 

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Dayton. 

 On June 7, 2016, Jones distributed approximately one kilogram of compressed heroin to 

an FBI confidential source. During the transaction, Jones also told the confidential source that he 

was currently in possession of 30 kilograms of heroin. On three separate occasions, the 

confidential source made controlled payments to Jones for the kilogram of heroin. During those 

occasions, Jones continued to state that he was in possession of large quantities of drugs and 

discussed the quality of those drugs. 

 On September 1, 2016, agents executed federal search warrants at Howard’s residence, as 

well as two residences associated with Jones—188 Waldorf Drive and 5510 West Riverview 

Avenue. At the 188 Waldorf Drive residence, agents located $68,800 in cash in a locked safe that 

represented the proceeds of Jones’s drug trafficking activity. At 5510 Riverview Avenue, agents 

located distribution amounts of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine, as well as a handgun. On 

June 20, 2018, Jones pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with conspiracy to 

distribute and possess with intent to distribute heroin. On September 21, 2018, Jones was 

sentenced to 84 months in prison. Jones is currently serving his sentence at FCI Allenwood 

(Medium). 

On March 9, 2021, Jones filed a pro se motion seeking compassionate release. In his 

motion, Jones asserts that he suffers from Type-2 diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol. 

Jones attaches medical records indicating a diagnosis for Type-2 diabetes and medications for 

diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol. In his supplement, Jones also states that he suffers 

from these same illnesses, as well as a calcified spot on his lung and gastro-esophageal reflux. 

Jones submits additional supporting medical documentation in his supplement. He takes several 

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medications daily to attempt to stabilize my medical conditions, including: Metformin 500 mg 

for diabetes, Amlodipine 5 mg for hypertension, and Ranitidine 150 mg for high cholesterol. 

Jones bases his argument for relief on the circumstances at FCI Allenwood and argues that the 

section 3553(a) factors warrant relief. 

 Jones is 44 years old and is scheduled to be released July 5, 2023. Jones has served 

approximately 48 months of his 84-month sentence. During the 48 months of incarceration, he 

has completed numerous programs, and made efforts to assure a successful life in society. His 

release plan includes residing with his fiancée in Dayton, Ohio (with whom Jones has been in a 

relationship for over twenty-four years). Jones has five children who range in age from 6 to 29 

years of age, with whom he has maintained contact during his incarceration. See Affidavit. 

Where Jones is incarcerated, at FCI Allenwood Medium, there are 1,167 inmates. 

(https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/tha/). Full COVID vaccinations have been 

administered to 424 staff employees and 1,575 inmates. Currently no inmates or staff members 

have COVID. (https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/ visited July 29, 2021). No inmates have died 

of the disease, nor have any staff; 495 inmates have recovered, as have 50 staff members. Id. 

Jones has exhausted his administrative remedies to the extent required by law.

On March 27, 2020, the CARES Act was signed into law in response to the COVID-19 

pandemic, expanding the scope of the home confinement statute. The CARES Act authorized the 

Attorney General to remove the time limits on home confinement under 18 U.S.C. §3624(c)(1)-

(2). It permits the BOP to release inmates to home confinement even if they have not served 90% 

of their sentence, or if they have more than six months left to serve. Specifically, the CARES Act 

provides: 

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During the covered emergency period, if the Attorney General 

finds that emergency conditions will materially affect the 

functioning of the Bureau, the Director of the Bureau may lengthen 

the amount of time for which the Director is authorized to place a 

prisoner in home confinement . . ., as the Director deems 

appropriate. 

See H.R. 748 §6002 at Div. B, Tit. II, § 12003(b)(2). 

On April 3, 2020, Attorney General Barr issued a memorandum in which he made the 

requisite finding that emergency conditions will materially affect the functioning of the BOP. 

Attorney General Barr directed the BOP to release inmates from institutions that are already 

overcome by COVID-19, naming three facilities in particular and extending the order to 

“similarly situated facilities where you determine that COVID-19 is materially affecting 

operations.” 

COVID-19 is a viral disease for which there is currently neither treatment nor cure. It is 

highly infectious and particularly likely to spread among populations where individuals are 

incapable of remaining physically distant from one another. Among viral diseases, the mortality 

rate for COVID-19 is high. 

Public health experts have warned that incarcerated individuals “are at special risk of 

infection” and are “less able to participate in proactive measures to keep themselves safe.” 

Achieving a Fair and Effective COVID-19 Response: An Open Letter to Vice-President Mike 

Pence, and Other Federal, State, and Local Leaders from Public Health and Legal Experts in the 

United States (March 2, 2020), at https://bit.ly/2W9V6oS. Prior to the vaccine, the conditions in 

BOP facilities provided a hospitable environment for COVID-19 to spread. Joseph A. Bick, 

Infection Control in Jails and Prisons, Clinical Infectious Diseases 45(8): 1047-1055 (2007), 

available at https://doi.org/10.1086/521910; Vice, Sick Staff, Inmate Transfers, and No Tests: 

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How the U.S. is Failing Federal Inmates as Coronavirus Hits (Mar. 24, 2020), available at 

https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/jge4vg/sick-staff-inmate-transfers-and-no-tests-how-the-usis-failing-federalinmates-as-coronavirus-hits. 

As a result of these concerns, on May 18, 2020, the Department of Justice issued internal 

guidance which directs that the Government concede that defendants who have certain CDC risk 

factors can establish “extraordinary and compelling reasons” that warrant a reduction in 

sentence. (See Government’s Supplemental Response, United States v. Albert M. Firebaugh IV, 

No. 16-20341 (S.D. Fla June 1, 2020), ECF 43. 

II. Analysis

Jones asks the Court to grant him a reduction in sentence as permitted by 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(1)(A)(i) and to consider what he alleges are extraordinary and compelling reasons for 

doing so. Section 603(b) of the First Step Act, which was signed into law on December 21, 2018, 

modified 18 U.S.C. § 3582 to allow a defendant to bring a motion on his or her own behalf either 

“[1] after the defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the 

Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or [2] the lapse of 30 days from 

the receipt of such request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, whichever is earlier.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); Pub L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194; see also United States v. Alam, 960 

F.3d 831, 833-34 (6th Cir. 2020) (“If the Director of the Bureau of Prisons does not move for 

compassionate release, a prisoner may take his claim to court only by moving for it on his own 

behalf. To do that, he must fully exhaust all administrative rights to appeal with the prison or 

wait 30 days after his first request to the prison,” and “[p]risoners who seek compassionate 

release have the option to take their claim to federal court within 30 days, no matter the appeals 

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available to them”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alterations adopted). 

A district court has limited authority to modify a sentence. “Generally speaking, once a 

court has imposed a sentence, it does not have the authority to change or modify that sentence 

unless such authority is expressly granted by statute.” United States v. Hammond, 712 F.3d 333, 

335 (6th Cir. 2013). Section 3582(c)(1)(A) grants such authority in certain limited 

circumstances. It provides in part: 

The court may not modify a term of imprisonment once it has been imposed 

except that—in any case—the court ... may reduce the term of imprisonment (and 

may impose a term of probation or supervised release with or without conditions 

that does not exceed the unserved portion of the original term of imprisonment), 

after considering the factors set forth in [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) to the extent that 

they are applicable, if it finds that extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant 

such a reduction ... and that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy 

statements issued by the Sentencing Commission. 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). 

 Thus, the Court can modify a term of imprisonment if it finds that (1) “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons warrant such a reduction,” (2) “such a reduction is consistent with applicable 

policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission,” and (3) such a reduction is appropriate 

“after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable.” 18 

U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i); see also United States v. Kincaid, 802 F. App’x 187, 188 (6th Cir. 

2020); United States v. Spencer, No. 20-3721, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 28051, at *4, 2020 WL 

5498932 (6th Cir. Sept. 2, 2020). 

While judges “have full discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling’ without 

consulting the policy statement § 1B1.13.” United States v. Jones, No. 20-3701, – F.3d –, 2020 

WL 6817488 at *9 (6th Cir. November 20, 2020), the Court references U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 for 

guidance. Therein, the Sentencing Commission identifies four circumstances in which 

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“extraordinary and compelling reasons” may exist. See 28 U.S.C. § 994(t) (“The Commission, in 

promulgating general policy statements regarding the sentencing modification provisions in § 

3582(c)(1)(A) of Title 18, shall describe what should be considered extraordinary and 

compelling reasons for sentence reduction, including the criteria to be applied and a list of 

specific examples”). United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual, § 1B1.13, at 

cmt. n.1 (Nov. 1, 2018) (Reduction in Term of Imprisonment Under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) 

(Policy Statement)). Those four circumstances are: (A) Medical Condition of the Defendant; (B) 

Age of the Defendant; (C) Family Circumstances; and (D) other extraordinary and compelling 

reasons. Id. Each of the four circumstances has its own parameters. Id. Commentary also 

confirms that, “[p]ursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(t), rehabilitation of the defendant is not, by itself, 

an extraordinary and compelling reason for purposes of this policy statement.” Id. at cmt. n.3; 

see also United States v. Keefer, No. 19-4148, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 32723, at *6-7, 2020 WL 

6112795 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 2020) (“[i]n Application Note 1 to § 1B1.13, the Commission also 

listed the ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ that might entitle a defendant to a sentence 

reduction”). 

The policy statement also encourages the Court to consider whether the defendant is “a 

danger to the safety of any other person or to the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 

3142(g).” Id.; see also Kincaid, 802 F. App’x at 188; Spencer, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 28051, at 

*4 (“[t]he district court must also find that the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other 

person or to the community”) (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 3142(g) provides 

factors to be considered in making that “danger to the safety” determination. 

 Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) states: 

 

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(g) Factors to be considered. The judicial officer shall, in 

determining whether there are conditions of release that will 

reasonably assure the appearance of the person as required and the 

safety of any other person and the community, take into account 

the available information concerning— 

 

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including 

whether the offense is a crime of violence, a violation of § 1591 

[18 USCS § 1591], a Federal crime of terrorism, or involves a 

minor victim or a controlled substance, firearm, explosive, or 

destructive device; 

 

(2) the weight of the evidence against the person; 

 

(3) the history and characteristics of the person, including— 

 

(A) the person’s character, physical and mental condition, family 

ties, employment, financial resources, length of residence in the 

community, community ties, past conduct, history relating to drug 

or alcohol abuse, criminal history, and record concerning 

appearance at court proceedings; and 

 

(B) whether, at the time of the current offense or arrest, the person 

was on probation, on parole, or on other release pending trial, 

sentencing, appeal, or completion of sentence for an offense under 

Federal, State, or local law; and(4) the nature and seriousness of 

the danger to any person or the community that would be posed by 

the person’s release. In considering the conditions of release 

described in subsection (c)(1)(B)(xi) or (c)(1)(B)(xii) of this 

section, the judicial officer may upon his own motion, or shall 

upon the motion of the Government, conduct an inquiry into the 

source of the property to be designated for potential forfeiture or 

offered as collateral to secure a bond, and shall decline to accept 

the designation, or the use as collateral, of property that, because of 

its source, will not reasonably assure the appearance of the person 

as required. 

 

18 U.S.C. § 3142(g); see also United States v. Jones, No. 20-3748, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 

32451, at *4-5 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2020). 

The factors set forth in § 3553(a) “include, among others, ‘the nature and circumstances 

of the offense’; the defendant’s ‘history and characteristics’; the need for the sentence imposed to 

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reflect the seriousness of the offense, provide just punishment, and afford adequate deterrence; 

and the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities.” Jones, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 32451, 

at *6 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2), (6)). 

Moreover, “compassionate release is discretionary, not mandatory.” United States v. 

Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 693 (5th Cir. 2020); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (stating that 

a court “may” reduce the term of imprisonment); Keefer, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 32723, at *7 

(“The statute’s plain text makes evident the discretionary nature of a compassionate-release 

decision,” and “the statute lists factors that, when present, permit a district court to reduce a 

sentence”) (emphasis in original). 

 The Bureau of Prisons has taken significant measures to protect inmates. On March 13, 

2020, in accordance with its Coronavirus (COVID-19) Action Plan, BOP began to modify its 

operations to minimize the risk of COVID-19 transmission into and inside its facilities. Since 

that time, BOP has repeatedly revised the Action Plan to address the crisis. Beginning November 

25, 2020, BOP implemented Phase Nine of the Action Plan, which currently governs operations. 

https://sallyport.bop.gov/co/hsd/infectious disease/COVID19/index.jsp. The current operations 

plan follows all national guidelines and requires that, upon intake, all inmates be secured in their 

assigned quarters for a period of at least 14 days in order to stop the spread of the disease. 

Inmates are required to wear masks at all times except eating and sleeping. Three washable cloth 

masks have been provided to each inmate. Only limited movement is afforded to facilitate 

commissary, laundry, showers, telephone, and computer access. Further, BOP has severely 

limited movement of inmates and detainees among its facilities. All inmates with a risk of 

exposure are placed in quarantine until cleared by medical staff. Social visits, if allowed, are 

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non-contact. (www.bop.gov/coronavirus/COVID19_status.jsp). Telephone minutes have been 

increased from 300 a month to 500, with no charge. Finally, inmates and staff are being 

vaccinated. 

In an effort to assist inmates who are most vulnerable to the disease and pose the least 

threat to the community, BOP is also exercising greater authority to designate inmates for home 

confinement. On March 26, 2020, the Attorney General directed BOP to prioritize transferring 

inmates to home confinement in appropriate circumstances when those inmates are vulnerable to 

COVID-19 under the CDC risk factors. 

As of mid-October 2020, the CDC has concluded that individuals with certain conditions 

such as smoking, Type II diabetes, chronic heart problems, cancer, immuno-compromised due to 

organ transplant, and obesity “are at an increased risk for severe illness from COVID . . .” 

https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extra-precautions/people-with-medicalconditions.html (last accessed July 23, 2021). During the current COVID-19 pandemic, an 

inmate who presents one of the risk factors on that list, as confirmed by medical records, and 

who is not expected to recover from that condition, would satisfy the extraordinary and 

compelling prong of the compassionate release policy statement -- even if that condition in 

ordinary times would not allow compassionate release. 

Conversely, the CDC has opined that “there are limited data and information about the 

impact of [other] underlying medical conditions and whether they increase the risk for severe 

illness from COVID-19.” https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/need-extraprecautions/people-with-medical-conditions.html (last accessed July 23, 2021). People who fall 

into this category and “might be at an increased risk for severe illness” include individuals with 

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diabetes and hypertension. Id. Given the lack of data concerning these conditions, their 

interaction with COVID is speculative and would not at this time satisfy the extraordinary and 

compelling criteria of the policy statement. 

A subsequent memorandum from the Attorney General on April 3, 2020 further directed 

BOP to expand the range of inmates eligible for home confinement, as authorized by the CARES 

Act. See § 12003(b) (2) of the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act (“CARES 

Act”), Pub. L. No. 116-136, enacted March 27, 2020. In assessing whether home confinement is 

appropriate for a particular inmate, BOP weighs numerous factors, including the inmate’s 

medical conditions, age, crime of conviction, and conduct while in prison; conditions in the 

inmate’s particular institution; availability of post-release transportation, housing and supervision 

for the inmate; and the inmate’s risk from COVID-19 if released. Prior to releasing an inmate, 

BOP is directed to implement a fourteen-day quarantine in order to protect the community. 

BOP asserts it is devoting all available resources to executing the Attorney General’s 

directives, and that it is systematically assessing the inmate population to determine which 

inmates are most appropriate for transfer. From the Attorney General's memo on March 26, 2020 

until November 6, 2020, the BOP placed 7,766 inmates on home confinement. See

www.BOP.gov/coronavirus (accessed November 6, 2020). By January 29, 2021, 7,837 were on 

home confinement; but counting those who had completed their home confinement, along with 

those currently on it, that number was 21,069. (id. accessed January 29, 2021). 

BOP claims its home confinement program provides a centralized, consistent mechanism 

for identifying prisoners for whom home confinement is most appropriate. The Court hopes the 

resulting reduction in prison population will benefit all remaining prisoners. The Court hesitates 

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to augment a systematic effort by granting compassionate release to prisoners who may be less 

deserving than others nationally, and without the capacity to conduct the comprehensive and 

consistent review that can be undertaken by BOP. 

The Court may only reduce a sentence pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) if, “after 

considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a) to the extent that they are applicable,” the Court 

“finds that” “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction” “and that such a 

reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 

18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Congress directed that the Sentencing Commission adopt policies 

regarding “what should be considered extraordinary and compelling reasons for sentence 

reduction.” 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(C) & (t). The Sentencing Commission fulfilled Congress’s 

directive by issuing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. The policy statement provides for reduction of a 

sentence, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, if (i) “extraordinary and compelling reasons 

warrant the reduction;” (ii) “the defendant is not a danger to the safety of any other person or to 

the community, as provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g);” and (iii) “the reduction is consistent with 

this policy statement.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 

The policy statement includes an application note that specifies the types of medical 

conditions that qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” First, that standard is met if 

the defendant is “suffering from a terminal illness,” such as “metastatic solid-tumor cancer, 

amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (ALS), end-stage organ disease, [or] advanced dementia.” U.S.S.G. 

§ 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(i). Second, the standard is met if the defendant is: 

(I) suffering from a serious physical or medical condition, 

 

(II) suffering from a serious functional or cognitive 

impairment, or 

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(III) experiencing deteriorating physical or mental health 

because of the aging process, 

 

that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide 

self-care within the environment of a correctional facility and from 

which he or she is not expected to recover. 

 

U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(ii). The application note also sets out other conditions and 

characteristics that qualify as “extraordinary and compelling reasons” related to the defendant’s 

age and family circumstances. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(B)-(C). Finally, the note recognizes 

the possibility that BOP could identify other grounds that amount to “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(D). 

Because the Sentencing Commission’s policy statement defines “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” to include only certain specified categories of medical conditions, to state a 

cognizable basis for a sentence reduction based on a medical condition, a defendant first must 

establish that his condition falls within one of the categories listed in the policy statement. If a 

defendant’s medical condition does not fall within one of the categories specified in the 

application note (and no other part of the application note applies), the motion will be denied. 

The mere existence of the COVID-19 pandemic, which poses a general threat to every 

non-immune person in the country, does not fall into either of those categories and therefore 

could not alone provide a basis for a sentence reduction. The categories encompass specific 

serious medical conditions afflicting an individual inmate, not generalized threats to the entire 

population. “[T]he mere existence of COVID-19 in society and the possibility that it may spread 

to a particular prison alone cannot independently justify compassionate release.” United States v. 

Raia, 954 F.3d 594, 597 (3d Cir. 2020). To classify COVID-19 without further extenuating 

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circumstances as an extraordinary and compelling reason would be wrong and would be 

detrimental to B.O.P.’s organized and comprehensive anti-COVID-19 regimens. 

That does not mean, however, that COVID-19 is irrelevant to a court’s analysis of a 

motion under § 3582(c) (1) (A). If an inmate has a chronic medical condition that has been 

identified by the CDC as elevating the inmate’s risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19, 

that condition may satisfy the standard of “extraordinary and compelling reasons.” Under these 

circumstances, a chronic condition (i.e., one “from which [the defendant] is not expected to 

recover”) reasonably could be found to be “serious” and to “substantially diminish[ ] the ability 

of the defendant to provide self-care within the environment of a correctional facility,” even if 

that condition would not have constituted an “extraordinary and compelling reason” absent the 

risk of COVID-19. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, cmt. n.1(A)(ii)(I). But as part of its analysis of the totality 

of circumstances, the Court should consider whether the inmate is more likely to contract 

COVID-19 if he or she is released than if he or she remains incarcerated. That will typically 

depend on the inmate’s proposed release plans and whether a known outbreak has occurred at his 

or her institution. 

The nature and circumstances of Jones’s crimes and his history and characteristics create 

public safety concerns. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). Jones was not a low-level drug dealer, but an 

individual with access to kilogram quantities of heroin. As discussed in his Presentence 

Investigation Report, Jones was convicted of conspiring to distribute and possess with intent to 

distribute heroin. Jones supplied approximately one kilogram of heroin to a confidential source 

and boasted about having access to several kilograms of that substance. 

 With respect to dangerousness, Jones’s status as an opioid dealer is of particular concern. 

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Heroin and other opioids have caused devastation in this community. Jones and other individuals 

who deal in these dangerous substances contributed greatly to the problem. Additionally, upon 

execution of the search warrant at residences connected to Jones, officers recovered over 

$68,000 in cash, a firearm, and distribution amounts of heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine. 

Jones’s conduct demonstrates that he poses a danger to the community. 

 Jones’s criminal history also counsels against compassionate release. Jones’s criminal 

conduct started as a juvenile with the commission of serious offenses such as aggravated robbery 

and aggravated burglary. As an adult, Jones accrued convictions for trafficking in cocaine, 

possession of crack cocaine, tampering with evidence, trafficking in marijuana, possession of 

cocaine, and attempted trafficking in marijuana. Some of these previous criminal convictions 

also involved the presence of firearms and obstructive conduct. 

 Further, Jones’s criminal history shows that conditions of release will not ensure the 

safety of the community. A review of his previous offenses reveals several probation violations 

in connection with those offenses. Jones has accordingly demonstrated an inability to comply 

with conditions of release that have been imposed upon him. Jones also has had numerous arrests 

related to uncharged conduct. Those arrests involved charges of assault, aggravated arson, 

aggravated menacing, aggravated robbery, felonious assault, and carrying a concealed weapon. 

 In light of Jones’s conduct and history, a reduction in sentence would not reflect the need 

to “protect the public from further crimes of the defendant” under § 3553(a)(2). Jones release 

would not be appropriate pursuant to the § 3553 sentencing factors and he is a danger to the 

community. See § 3582(c)(1)(A). 

Even if Jones satisfied the “extraordinary and compelling reasons” inquiry, relief is 

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unwarranted considering the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See § 3582(c)(1)(A); 

United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 2020). The nature and circumstances of 

Evan’s crime weighs against relief. This Defendant committed a serious offense, attempting to 

traffic a large amount of drugs. 

The Court recognizes it is extraordinarily difficult to combat the spread of COVID-19 

within a prison, as both courts and the CDC have recognized. United States v. Gardner, No. 14-

cr-20735-001, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129160, at *4–*5 (E.D. Mich. July 22, 2020). Even under 

otherwise ideal circumstances, prison conditions prevent the kind of physical distancing 

necessary to prevent the spread of this virus. Id. However, as of July 23, 2021, the BOP 

administered 202,910 doses of the vaccine. One dose has been administered to 7,576 staff and 

5,457 inmates. A completed series of two doses have been administered to 1,027 staff and 1,051 

inmates. (https://www.bop.gov/coronavirus/). 

The need for the sentence imposed to “provide the defendant with...medical care...in the 

most effective manner,” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(D), does not weigh in favor of granting this 

motion to reduce the sentence. The spread of COVID-19 at FCI Terre Haute is shrinking. Cf. 

United States v. Williams-Bethea, No. 18-cr-78, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96651, at *10–*11 

(S.D.N.Y. June 2, 2020); United States v. Rodriguez, No. 2:03-cr-271, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

58718, at *32 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 1, 2020). 

Jones’ continued detention now does not pose danger of serious injury and death, so the 

Court cannot say it is a risk grossly disproportionate to the conduct of conviction. Cf. WilliamsBethea, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96651, at *12. Because of the seriousness of the offense, and 

because it would present a risk to the public, compassionate release is not warranted here. 

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17 

Even when a defendant is able to demonstrate a potentially “extraordinary and 

compelling reason,” compassionate release is not necessarily appropriate. Under the applicable 

policy statement, the Court must deny a sentence reduction unless it determines the defendant “is 

not a danger to the safety of any other person or to the community.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(2). 

Additionally, the Court must consider the § 3553(a) factors, as “applicable,” as part of its 

analysis. See § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Chambliss, 948 F.3d 691, 694 (5th Cir. 2020). 

Here, “the nature and circumstances” of Defendant’s crime weighs against relief at this point. 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1). 

The need for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the offense, afford adequate 

deterrence, and protect the public similarly cuts against relief. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2). In 

view of the § 3553 sentencing factors, compassionate release is improper here. See § 

3582(c)(1)(A). 

III. CONCLUSION 

Jones does not meet the requirements necessary to be granted relief under 18 U.S.C. § 

3582(c)(1)(A). Thus, the Court DENIES Motion for a Reduction of Sentence Under the 

Compassionate Release Provisions Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) and the First Step Act of 

2018. ECF 38, 41. 

DONE and ORDERED in Dayton, Ohio on Friday, August 6, 2021. 

s/Thomas M. Rose 

________________________________ 

THOMAS M. ROSE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

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