UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

JASON L. STUBBS, Case No. 1:17-cv-790
Plaintiff,
Dlott, J.
vs Litkovitz, M.J.
PAUL BRYANT, et al.,
Defendants.
NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written
objections to this Report & Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after
being served with a copy thereof. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely
motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of the
R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the
objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN DAYS after
being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in accordance with this
procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States

vy. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION
JASON L. STUBBS, Case No. 1:17-cv-790
Plaintiff,
Dlott, J.
vs Litkovitz, M.J.
PAUL BRYANT, et al., REPORT AND
Defendants. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, an inmate at the Warren Correctional Institution, has filed a prisoner civil rights
complaint against defendants Paul Bryant and Ivon Scarville.! (Doc. 1).

On October 26, 2017, prior to filing the instant complaint, plaintiff filed a similar
complaint in Stubbs v. Bryant, No. 1:17-cv-721 (Dlott, J.; Bowman, M.J.) (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26,
2017). In both complaints, plaintiff alleges that during his intake interview he requested
protective control from defendant Bryant, but that his request was denied. Plaintiff further alleges
that he was attacked by inmate Scarville shortly after the interview, resulting in a broken jaw. In
both complaints, plaintiff seeks relief in the form of monetary damages and a transfer.

On January 16, 2018, an Order and Report and Recommendation was issued in Case No.
1:17-cv-721, finding that plaintiff should be permitted to proceed with his Eighth Amendment
claim against Bryant. See Stubbs v. Bryant, No. 1:17-cv-721 (Dlott, J.; Bowman, M.J.) (S.D.
Ohio Jan. 16, 2018) (Doc. 10). With respect to defendant Scarville, it was recommended that
plaintiffs claims be dismissed on the ground that plaintiff failed to allege any facts showing that

Scarville acted under color of state law.

1 Tammy Kiss is also listed as a defendant on the electronic docket sheet for this case. However, it is unclear whether
plaintiff intends to name Kiss as a defendant. Kiss is not included as a defendant on the portion of the complaint
form where plaintiff has listed Bryant and Scarville. Plaintiff has submitted a single piece of paper with “Tammy
Kiss (P.O.A.)” and a street address with his complaint. (See Doc. 1 at PageID 2).


As noted above, plaintiff's allegations against defendants in the instant complaint are the
same as those contained in an earlier-filed complaint. The instant complaint should therefore be
dismissed because it is duplicative of the prior complaint.” The Supreme Court has recognized
that “considerations of ‘[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial
resources and comprehensive disposition of litigation,’” have given rise to the general principle
that duplicative litigation in the federal court system is to be avoided. Colorado River Water
Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (quoting Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-
Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)). The District Court, therefore, has the inherent
power to dismiss an action when it is duplicative of another action pending in the federal court.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. Marshall & Ilsley Fin. Corp., No. 1:11cv804, 2011 WL 7499434, at *4 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 23, 2011) (Litkovitz, M.J.) (and numerous cases cited therein), adopted, 2012 WL
869289 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 14, 2012) (Weber, J.). Such power should be exercised in this case. Cf
id.; see also Ball v. Obama, 1:13cv204, 2013 WL 2153967, at *2, *5 (S.D. Ohio May 16, 2013)
(Barrett, J.; Litkovitz, M.J.) (dismissing duplicative complaint at screening stage); Catchings v.
Fry, No. 12-2305-JDT-TMP, 2013 WL 3433145, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. July 8, 2013) (holding that
complaint containing allegations that “were fully addressed in . . . prior orders of dismissal” was
duplicative and thus subject to dismissal at screening stage as frivolous and lacking “an arguable

basis in law or in fact”).

Tt appears that plaintiff may have intended the instant complaint to be filed as an amended complaint in case number
1:17-cv-721. In the body of the complaint, plaintiff states “please disregard my last complaint, for I don’t believe I
properly completed all lines at your request.” (Doc. | at PagelD 9). However, as noted above, plaintiff has been
permitted to proceed with his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim in case number 17-721.

2


Accordingly, in sum, the instant complaint should be dismissed with prejudice on the
ground that plaintiff's allegations are duplicative of claims raised in Case No. 1:17-cv-721. See

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:
1. The complaint be DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
2. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that for the foregoing reasons an
appeal of any Order adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in good faith,
and therefore, deny plaintiff leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See McGore v. Wrigglesworth,

114 F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 1997).

pae_ 31/8 aston they

Karen L. Litkovitz
United States Magistrate Judge