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HOUSE v. HOUSE

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Douglas House, appellant, v. 

Michele House, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed March 21, 2017. No. A-15-1132.

1. Contempt: Appeal and Error. In a civil contempt proceeding where 

a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, 

an appellate court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) 

the trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) the 

trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and (3) the trial 

court’s determinations of whether a party is in contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for abuse of discretion.

2. Child Support. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512 (Supp. 2015) details the procedure by which any dependent child, or any relative or eligible caretaker 

of such dependent child, may file a written application for financial 

assistance to the Department of Health and Human Services.

3. Child Support: Prosecuting Attorneys. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-512(2) (Supp. 2015), following the application for financial assistance, the Department of Health and Human Services investigates to 

see if the child has a parent or stepparent who is able to contribute to 

the support of such child and has failed to do so; upon such a finding, 

a copy of the finding of such investigation and a copy of the application shall immediately be filed with the county attorney or authorized attorney.

4. Actions: Child Support: Prosecuting Attorneys. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. 

Stat. § 43-512.01 (Reissue 2016), it is the duty of the county attorney 

or authorized attorney to immediately take action against the nonsupporting parent and initiate a child support enforcement action. If the 

county attorney initiates an action, he or she shall file either a criminal 

complaint for nonsupport under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-706 (Reissue 2016) 

or a civil complaint against the nonsupporting parent or stepparent under 

Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03 (Reissue 2016).

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

03/21/2017 09:08 AM CDT
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5. ____: ____: ____. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03(4) (Reissue 

2016), the State of Nebraska shall be a real party in interest in any 

action brought by or intervened in by a county attorney to enforce an 

order for child support.

6. ____: ____: ____. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03(1)(c) 

(Reissue 2016), the county attorney or authorized attorney shall enforce 

child support orders by civil actions or administrative actions, citing the 

defendant for contempt, or filing a criminal complaint.

7. Statutes: Appeal and Error. An appellate court will try to avoid, if possible, a statutory construction that would lead to an absurd result.

8. Jurisdiction: Words and Phrases. Subject matter jurisdiction deals 

with a court’s ability to hear a case; it is the power of a tribunal to 

hear and determine a case of the general class or category to which the 

proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general subject matter involved.

9. Courts: Jurisdiction: Contempt. A court that has jurisdiction to issue 

an order also has the power to enforce it; the power to punish for contempt is incident to every judicial tribune.

10. Child Support: Federal Acts: Evidence. Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 43-3342.01 (Reissue 2016), a true copy of the record of payments, balances, and arrearages maintained for services received under title IV-D 

of the federal Social Security Act is prima facie evidence, without further proof or foundation, of the balance of any amount of support order 

payments that are in arrears and of all payments made and disbursed to 

the person or agency to whom the support order payment is to be made; 

such evidence shall be considered to be satisfactorily authenticated, shall 

be admitted as prima facie evidence of the transactions shown in such 

evidence, and is rebuttable only by a specific evidentiary showing to 

the contrary.

11. Child Support: Contempt: Presumptions: Proof. Pursuant to Neb. 

Rev. Stat. § 42-358(3) (Reissue 2016), a rebuttable presumption of 

contempt shall be established if a prima facie showing is made that the 

court-ordered child or spousal support is delinquent.

Appeal from the District Court for Lancaster County: Susan

I. Strong, Judge. Affirmed.

Douglas House, pro se.

Joe Kelly, Lancaster County Attorney, and Jordan M. Talsma 

for appellee.
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HOUSE v. HOUSE

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Riedmann and Bishop, Judges, and McCormack, Retired 

Justice.

Bishop, Judge.

Douglas House appeals from an order of the district court 

for Lancaster County that found him in contempt of court for 

failure to pay child support. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Douglas and Michele House were married in 2007 and 

had one child, born that same year. The parties divorced 

in June 2012. Pursuant to the parties’ parenting plan which 

was approved and adopted in the divorce decree, Michele 

received physical custody of the parties’ minor child, subject 

to Douglas’ reasonable rights of parenting time. Douglas was 

ordered to pay child support in the amount of $346 per month, 

commencing on July 1.

On May 11, 2015, a deputy Lancaster County Attorney 

filed a “Motion for an Order to Show Cause and to Appear,” 

pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-512.03 (Reissue 2016). The 

motion alleged that Douglas was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $346 per month, but according to the 

Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) payment 

history report, he was delinquent “in an amount greater or 

equal to the support due and payable for a one month period 

of time.” The deputy Lancaster County Attorney asked the 

court to order Douglas to show cause as to why he should not 

be held in contempt of court for failure to comply with the 

order directing him to pay child support. An order to show 

cause was entered on May 12, directing Douglas to appear 

on June 18 and show cause why he should not be held in 

contempt; he was ordered to bring income tax returns for the 

past 3 years and his last three wage statements. The court also 

appointed the Lancaster County Attorney to commence contempt proceedings against Douglas. For reasons not apparent 

from our record, the show cause/contempt hearing was not 

held on June 18.
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A hearing on the show cause/contempt action was held on 

November 18, 2015. The deputy county attorney appeared 

on behalf of the State, and shall be referred to as the “State” 

hereafter. Douglas appeared pro se. For his opening statement, 

Douglas said he wanted to “make a statement as to [his] indigence . . . and [his] inability to pay at this time, but, other than 

that, [he would] let the prosecution go forward.”

The State offered into evidence exhibit 1, a certified DHHS 

payment history report dated November 9, 2015. Douglas 

objected, arguing that it “doesn’t have a wet ink signature, it’s 

not sworn to that this is accurate and correct.” The court and 

the State pointed out that the report had a certification stamp 

on it, and the State informed Douglas that “it’s an electronic 

signature.” Douglas responded, “Well, Your Honor, I really 

don’t know if any person has ever really signed this thing, as 

far as an electronic signature. Shouldn’t a — anything be — 

that’s entered on the court record be a wet ink signature?” The 

court said, “This is sufficient for a court record,” then received 

exhibit 1 and overruled Douglas’ objection. Exhibit 1 showed 

that as of November 9, Douglas owed a child support balance 

of $4,112.94 (he had made no child support payments since 

November 2014). After offering exhibit 1 into evidence and 

having it received, the State rested.

After being sworn in, Douglas said that in order for the State 

to bring a claim under § 43-512.03, there has to be a “request” 

assigning power to be a real party in interest to the county 

attorney, “[a]nd the record is absent of a request” from DHHS 

or any other entity that is “authorized.” Douglas argued, “For 

the county attorney to have that authority, he needs to bring 

forth that request. He has no authority right now . . . . So, I 

object to this entire proceeding, this claim being brought forth 

without powers assigned.” The State responded that DHHS had 

requested the claim be brought to enforce the child support 

order because the recipient of the child support was receiving public assistance benefits. The State acknowledged that 

DHHS’ request had not been made part of the record, but the 
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State was not aware of any requirement that the request be 

made part of the record. The court concluded that the State had 

complied with the statute.

The State then argued that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 42-358 

(Reissue 2016), there is a rebuttable presumption of contempt 

upon a prima facie showing that the defendant is behind on 

his child support. When asked if he had anything to rebut the 

evidence that he was behind in his child support payments, 

Douglas continued to object to the State’s authority to bring the 

claim. Douglas then said:

I am indigent. I’ve got, publicly declared, two poverty 

affidavits on the court record. I’m currently in the appellate court with a juvenile case. The custody of my daughter is up in the air. It — the juvenile case has been — my 

brief has just been accepted.

I’m also — currently, the District Court is going to 

receive an appeal in which I was denied a substantial 

right during a special proceeding. I appealed that, also, 

Your Honor. And, you know, so my poverty affidavits in 

itself speak for themselves. I — I — I cannot pay right 

now. That’s just — it’s that simple. I’m indigent. I am 

under — I have nothing.

The district court informed Douglas that there was a rebuttable presumption that he was in willful contempt of court and 

that based on the evidence, it found him in willful contempt. 

Douglas continued to argue that it was an impossibility for him 

to pay at that time.

In its order filed on November 18, 2015, the district court 

found Douglas to be in willful contempt of court. The court 

ordered Douglas to serve 30 days in jail, but suspended 

the sentence as long as he paid $346 per month on current 

child support and $50 per month on arrearages commencing January 1, 2016. If Douglas complied with the payment 

schedule for 24 months, he would be purged of contempt 

and the sentence would be deemed null and void. If Douglas 

failed to comply, he would be imprisoned pursuant to his 
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sentence and would be released and purged of contempt upon 

payment of the lesser of $3,500 or all arrearages then due 

and owing.

On December 1, 2015, Douglas filed a “Motion by 

Affidavit to Modify Judgment,” asking the district court 

to “correct [its] errors” from the November 18 show cause 

hearing. Douglas claimed the following errors: The State did 

not have standing, the “‘payment history’” was not a “valid 

bill of costs for child support without anyone attesting to it 

or signing off on it,” and his poverty was not willful contempt of court. On December 3, the district court overruled 

Douglas’ motion.

Douglas timely appeals the district court’s order.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Douglas assigns, restated: (1) The State did not have standing to enforce a child support order without evidence of proper 

written authority; (2) the district court did not have subject 

matter jurisdiction in this action, since there was already an 

existing support order; (3) the district court erred when it 

admitted into evidence the child support payment history, “a 

wholly defective written instrument”; (4) the district court 

erred when it modified an existing child support order; and (5) 

the district court erred when it found Douglas to be in willful 

contempt despite his impoverished status.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] In a civil contempt proceeding where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of a court order, an appellate 

court employs a three-part standard of review in which (1) the 

trial court’s resolution of issues of law is reviewed de novo, (2) 

the trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, 

and (3) the trial court’s determinations of whether a party is in 

contempt and of the sanction to be imposed are reviewed for 

abuse of discretion. Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, 283 Neb. 369, 808 

N.W.2d 867 (2012).
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ANALYSIS

Standing.

Douglas argues the State lacks standing to bring the contempt action without evidence of a signed, written request by 

DHHS conferring such authority.

[2-4] In response, the State asserts that it has the authority 

to initiate contempt proceedings from a series of Nebraska statutes, see Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 43-512 through 43-512.18 (Reissue 

2016), and that these statutes do not require the State to make 

part of the court record any request from DHHS to initiate such 

proceedings. The State correctly states that § 43-512 (Supp. 

2015) details the procedure by which any dependent child, or 

any relative or eligible caretaker of such dependent child, may 

file a written application for financial assistance to DHHS. 

(Pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-504(1) (Reissue 2016), a 

dependent child includes a child under 19 years of age who has 

received or is in need of state aid.) Following the application, 

DHHS investigates to see if the child has a parent or stepparent 

who is able to contribute to the support of such child and has 

failed to do so; upon such a finding, a copy of the finding of 

such investigation and a copy of the application “shall immediately be filed with the county attorney or authorized attorney.” 

§ 43-512(2). (Section 43-512(6)(a) defines an “[a]uthorized 

attorney.”) Section 43-512.01 states in relevant part that it 

is the duty of the county attorney or authorized attorney to 

“immediately take action” against the nonsupporting parent, 

and initiate a child support enforcement action. “If the county 

attorney initiates an action, he or she shall file either a criminal complaint for nonsupport under section 28-706 or a civil 

complaint against the nonsupporting parent or stepparent under 

section 43-512.03.” § 43-512.01.

In its motion for an order to show cause and to appear, the 

State asserted it was filing the motion under the authority of 

§ 43-512.03, but did not specify under which subsection of 

the statute it was proceeding. Section 43-512.03 provides in 

relevant part as follows:
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(1) The county attorney or authorized attorney shall:

(a) On request by [DHHS] as described in subsection 

(2) of this section or when the investigation or application filed under section 43-512 or 43-512.02 justifies, 

file a complaint against a nonsupporting party in the 

district, county, or separate juvenile court praying for 

an order for child or medical support in cases when 

there is no existing child or medical support order. After 

notice and hearing, the court shall adjudicate the child 

and medical support liability of either party and enter an 

order accordingly;

(b) Enforce child, spousal, and medical support orders 

by an action for income withholding pursuant to the 

Income Withholding for Child Support Act;

(c) In addition to income withholding, enforce child, 

spousal, and medical support orders by other civil actions 

or administrative actions, citing the defendant for contempt, or filing a criminal complaint;

(d) Establish paternity and collect child and medical 

support on behalf of children born out of wedlock; and

(e) Carry out sections 43-512.12 to 43-512.18.

(Emphasis supplied.)

[5] Because the State was attempting to enforce an already 

existing child support order, the State’s action falls under the 

authority of § 43-512.03(1)(c). And § 43-512.03(4) provides 

that “[t]he State of Nebraska shall be a real party in interest 

in any action brought by or intervened in by a county attorney . . . to enforce an order for child, spousal, or medical 

support.” At the show cause/contempt hearing, the State said 

that DHHS had requested an action be brought to enforce the 

child support order because the recipient of the child support was receiving public assistance benefits. Contrary to 

Douglas’ contention, we have found no authority stating that 

the request from DHHS is necessary evidence for the State 

to have standing in a contempt action under § 43-512.03. 

Compare State on behalf of Hopkins v. Batt, 253 Neb. 852, 
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573 N.W.2d 425 (1998) (prenotice-pleading case in which 

court found remedy in § 43-512.03 not applicable because 

there was no allegation child had received or was eligible to 

receive public assistance benefits). Accordingly, the State, as 

the real party in interest, had standing to bring the contempt 

action against Douglas.

Subject Matter Jurisdiction.

Douglas asserts that the district court “only has subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought pursuant to [§] 43-512.03 

when there is no existing child support order.” Brief for appellant at 7. And since there was already an existing child support 

order in this case, Douglas suggests the district court did not 

have subject matter jurisdiction over the present action. In support of his argument, Douglas cites to State ex rel. Gaddis v. 

Gaddis, 237 Neb. 264, 465 N.W.2d 773 (1991), and State ex 

rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, 6 Neb. App. 467, 574 N.W.2d 

530 (1998). However, both of these cases addressed subject matter jurisdiction with regard to only one subsection of 

§ 43-512.03—the subsection dealing with the State initiating a 

child support action, as discussed next.

It is true that in State ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, supra, the 

Nebraska Supreme Court held that “as a prerequisite for an 

action under § 43-512.03, there cannot be an existing child 

support order in any jurisdiction” and that “a court has subject matter jurisdiction for an action under § 43-512.03 only 

‘when there is no existing child support order’ in Nebraska 

or any other jurisdiction.” 237 Neb. at 267-68, 465 N.W.2d at 

775. See, also, State ex rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, supra, 

(relying on State ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, supra, and holding the same). In both cases, the Nebraska Supreme Court and 

this court generally referred to § 43-512.03 in the analysis. 

However, a complete reading of both cases makes it clear that 

their holdings only applied to one subsection of § 43-512.03, 

specifically what is currently § 43-512.03(1)(a), which pertains to initiating a child support action. The holdings did not 
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involve other subsections of the statute permitting, as in this 

case, enforcement of a child support order.

Although the Supreme Court in State ex rel. Gaddis v. 

Gaddis, supra, makes general references to § 43-512.03 

throughout the opinion, it does specifically identify the subsection at issue when it states that “the issue is whether the 

district court had subject matter jurisdiction for the action 

commenced under § 43-512.03(1).” 237 Neb. at 266, 465 

N.W.2d at 775. In that case, it was acknowledged by the 

State, and substantiated at trial, that there was already a child 

support order in effect in Colorado at the time the State initiated a petition in Nebraska seeking a child support order 

against a father who had been making payments pursuant 

to the Colorado order. It was not an action to enforce child 

support as in the case before this court; rather, the State was 

seeking to establish a child support order when such an order 

already existed.

The version of § 43-512.03 (Reissue 1988) in effect at that 

time provided:

The county attorney or authorized attorney shall:

(1) On request by the Department of Social Services 

or when the investigation or application filed under 

[§] 43-512 or 43-512.02 justifies, file a petition against a 

nonsupporting parent or stepparent in the district, county, 

or separate juvenile court praying for an order for child 

support in cases when there is no existing child support 

order. After notice and hearing, the court shall adjudicate 

child support liability of the nonsupporting parent or stepparent and enter an order accordingly;

(2) Enforce child and spousal support orders by an 

action for income withholding pursuant to the Income 

Withholding for Child Support Act;

(3) If income withholding is not feasible, enforce child 

and spousal support orders by other civil actions, citing 

the defendant for contempt, or filing a criminal complaint; and
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(4) Establish paternity and collect child support on 

behalf of children born out of wedlock.

The Supreme Court set forth only the language from subsection 

(1) above in its opinion, and the language of § 43-512.03(1) at 

the time of the Gaddis opinion corresponds to what is currently 

§ 43-512.03(1)(a). Gaddis makes no reference to the other 

subsections of § 43-512.03, which include specific authority 

for the State to enforce child support orders. Accordingly, we 

read Gaddis to apply only to § 43-512.03(1)(a), and not to the 

other subsections of the statute.

Similarly, in State ex rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, 6 Neb. 

App. 467, 574 N.W.2d 530 (1998), the State brought an action, 

pursuant to § 43-512.03 et seq. (Reissue 1993, Cum. Supp. 

1994 & Supp. 1995), seeking child support and medical coverage from a father, even though past orders for child support 

had been entered. This court said, “[i]n relevant part,” the 

version of § 43-512.03 in effect at the time of trial provided 

as follows:

(1) The county attorney or authorized attorney shall:

(a) On request by the Department of Social Services 

. . . file a petition against a nonsupporting parent or 

stepparent in the district, county, or separate juvenile 

court praying for an order for child or medical support 

in cases when there is no existing child or medical support order.

State ex rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, 6 Neb. App. at 470, 574 

N.W.2d at 532. Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in 

State ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, 237 Neb. 264, 465 N.W.2d 773 

(1991), this court held that because there was an existing support order, the State was not authorized to file the petition and 

the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.

In State ex rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, supra, like in State 

ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, supra, this court generally referred 

to § 43-512.03 in its analysis, although notably, the court 

only set forth and addressed one subsection of that statute, 

specifically § 43-512.03(1)(a). A complete reading of State ex 
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rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, supra, makes it clear that the 

holding only applied to § 43-512.03(1)(a). And the language 

of § 43-512.03(1)(a) at the time of the Chambers opinion corresponds to the current version of § 43-512.03(1)(a).

[6,7] Although the State in this case did not specify under 

which subsection of § 43-512.03 it was proceeding, because 

it was seeking to enforce an already existing child support order, the State’s action falls under the authority of 

§ 43-512.03(1)(c), and not § 43-512.03(1)(a). Subsection 

(1)(c) provides in relevant part that the county attorney shall 

enforce child support orders “by other civil actions or administrative actions, citing the defendant for contempt, or filing a 

criminal complaint.” Since a contempt citation presumes the 

violation of a previous court order, the entirety of § 43-512.03 

cannot be read to exclude cases where previous court orders 

already exist. See Adair Asset Mgmt. v. Terry’s Legacy, 293 

Neb. 32, 875 N.W.2d 421 (2016) (appellate court will try to 

avoid, if possible, statutory construction that would lead to 

absurd result). Accordingly, we read the holdings on subject 

matter jurisdiction in State ex rel. Gaddis v. Gaddis, supra, 

and State ex rel. Cammarata v. Chambers, supra, to apply 

only to what is currently § 43-512.03(1)(a), which pertains 

to the State’s authority to initiate child support actions under 

that specific section of the statute, and not to the State’s 

authority to bring child support enforcement actions under 

§ 43-512.03(1)(c).

[8,9] Subject matter jurisdiction deals with a court’s ability to hear a case; it is the power of a tribunal to hear and 

determine a case of the general class or category to which the 

proceedings in question belong and to deal with the general 

subject matter involved. See Anderson v. Wells Fargo Fin. 

Accept., 269 Neb. 595, 694 N.W.2d 625 (2005). In Smeal Fire 

Apparatus Co. v. Kreikemeier, 279 Neb. 661, 675, 782 N.W.2d 

848, 862 (2010), disapproved on other grounds, Hossaini 

v. Vaelizadeh, 283 Neb. 369, 808 N.W.2d 867 (2012), the 

Nebraska Supreme Court said:
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We have stated that a court that has jurisdiction to issue 

an order also has the power to enforce it. A court can 

issue orders that are necessary to carry its judgment or 

decree into effect. Nebraska courts, through their inherent 

judicial power, have the authority to do all things reasonably necessary for the proper administration of justice. 

And this authority exists apart from any statutory grant of 

authority. We have recently explained that the power to 

punish for contempt is incident to every judicial tribune. 

It is derived from a court’s constitutional power, without 

any expressed statutory aid, and is inherent in all courts 

of record.

Because the district court had the power to enforce its previous child support order, it had subject matter jurisdiction over 

this contempt action.

Payment History.

Douglas argues the district court erred when it admitted the 

DHHS payment history report into evidence as a “valid bill 

of costs for child support without anyone attesting to, or signing off on, it.” Brief for appellant at 8. He references several 

provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code in support of his 

argument. However, the Uniform Commercial Code, which 

governs commercial and business transactions, is not applicable here.

[10] The child support payment history received into evidence complied with the necessary requirements. Pursuant 

to § 42-358(3), “[t]he Title IV-D Division of [DHHS] shall 

maintain support order payment records pursuant to section 

43-3342.01 . . . .” Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-3342.01 (Reissue 2016) 

provides:

(1) The responsibilities of the State Disbursement Unit 

shall include the following:

(a) Receipt of payments, except payments made pursuant to subdivisions (1)(a) and (1)(b) of section 42-369, 

and disbursements of such payments to obligees, the 

department, and the agencies of other states;
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(b) Accurate identification of payments;

(c) Prompt disbursement of the obligee’s share of 

any payments;

(d) Furnishing to any obligor or obligee, upon request, 

timely information on the current status of support order 

payments; and 

(e) One location for employers to send income withholding payments.

(2) The Title IV-D Division shall maintain records of 

payments for all cases in which support order payments 

are made to the central office of the State Disbursement 

Unit using the statewide automated data processing and 

retrieval system. . . .

(3) A true copy of the record of payments, balances, 

and arrearages maintained by the Title IV-D Division is 

prima facie evidence, without further proof or foundation, 

of the balance of any amount of support order payments 

that are in arrears and of all payments made and disbursed to the person or agency to whom the support order 

payment is to be made. Such evidence shall be considered 

to be satisfactorily authenticated, shall be admitted as 

prima facie evidence of the transactions shown in such 

evidence, and is rebuttable only by a specific evidentiary 

showing to the contrary.

(4) A copy of support payment records maintained by 

the Title IV-D Division shall be considered to be a true 

copy of the record when certified by a person designated 

by the division pursuant to the rules and regulations 

adopted and promulgated pursuant to this section.

(Emphasis supplied.)

In the instant case, the payment history report received into 

evidence as exhibit 1 contained a “Certification” that it was 

a “true copy of the official record of support order payments, 

balances, and arrearages maintained by the IV-D division, 

pursuant to Neb Rev Stat §43-3342.01.” It was electronically 

signed by a “CSE Payment Records Specialist” on behalf of 
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“Byron Van Patten, IV-D Director.” Accordingly, the payment 

history report was properly authenticated and the district court 

did not err when it received the report into evidence.

Modification.

Douglas also assigns, but does not specifically argue, that 

the district court was without jurisdiction to modify an existing child support order. However, the case did not involve the 

modification of an existing child support order; rather, it was 

a contempt action to enforce an existing child support order. 

And as previously discussed, the district court has jurisdiction 

over such actions.

“Willful” Contempt.

[11] Douglas argues that the district court erred when it 

found him to be in willful contempt despite his impoverished 

status. Pursuant to § 42-358(3), “[a] rebuttable presumption of 

contempt shall be established if a prima facie showing is made 

that the court-ordered child or spousal support is delinquent.” 

The State put into evidence a certified copy of Douglas’ child 

support payment history showing that as of November 9, 2015, 

he had an outstanding child support balance of $4,112.94 

(delinquent, arrears, and interest). Because the State made a 

prima facie showing that Douglas’ child support obligation was 

delinquent, there was a rebuttable presumption of contempt. 

The burden then shifted to Douglas to produce evidence rebutting the statutory presumption.

When a party to an action fails to comply with a court order 

made for the benefit of the opposing party, such an act is ordinarily a civil contempt, which requires willful disobedience as 

an essential element. Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, 283 Neb. 369, 

808 N.W.2d 867 (2012). “‘Willful’ means the violation was 

committed intentionally, with knowledge that the act violated 

the court order.” Id. at 376, 808 N.W.2d at 873. We consider 

now whether Douglas introduced evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption that he was in willful contempt of the 

child support order.
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HOUSE v. HOUSE

Cite as 24 Neb. App. 595

Douglas provided limited factual information to the district 

court regarding why he should not be found in contempt. For 

his opening statement, Douglas said he wanted to “make a 

statement as to [his] indigence . . . and [his] inability to pay at 

this time, but, other than that, [he would] let the prosecution go 

forward.” Later, after the State produced the payment history 

record establishing a prima facie case of contempt, Douglas 

was asked if he had anything to rebut the evidence that he 

was behind in his child support payments. Douglas told the 

district court:

I am indigent. I’ve got, publicly declared, two poverty 

affidavits on the court record. I’m currently in the appellate court with a juvenile case. The custody of my daughter is up in the air. It — the juvenile case has been — my 

brief has just been accepted.

I’m also — currently, the District Court is going to 

receive an appeal in which I was denied a substantial 

right during a special proceeding. I appealed that, also, 

Your Honor. And, you know, so my poverty affidavits in 

itself speak for themselves. I — I — I cannot pay right 

now. That’s just — it’s that simple. I’m indigent. I am 

under — I have nothing.

At the hearing, the court made a verbal finding that, based 

on the evidence, Douglas was in willful contempt of court. 

Douglas responded by saying, “How could I be in willful contempt when it’s beyond my control? I am — I’m in a poverty 

status. I have no money. I have tools to my name. I have no 

property, tools.”

While Douglas claimed to have poverty affidavits on 

“record” in other court cases, he provided no evidence of such 

to the district court in this case. He did not give testimony 

regarding his ability to work, his employment status, or any 

information regarding his income, or lack thereof, or why he 

had made no child support payments for an entire year. He 

simply stated that he could not pay, but provided no reason 

why, other than he has “nothing.” We note that the show cause 
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Nebraska Court of Appeals Advance Sheets

24 Nebraska Appellate Reports

HOUSE v. HOUSE

Cite as 24 Neb. App. 595

order entered on May 12, 2015, ordered Douglas to bring 

income tax returns for the past 3 years and his last three wage 

statements; he failed to do so. In a civil contempt proceeding 

where a party seeks remedial relief for an alleged violation of 

a court order, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its determinations of contempt 

for an abuse of discretion. By finding Douglas in willful contempt of court, the district court implicitly found that Douglas 

had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption 

of contempt. See Hossaini v. Vaelizadeh, supra. We agree and 

affirm the district court’s finding that Douglas was in willful 

contempt of court.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, we affirm the decision of the 

district court.

Affirmed.