COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges Humphreys, Beales and Alston Argued at Richmond, Virginia DEAN McCLUSTER, d/b/a McCLUSTER CONSTRUCTION AND AUTO-OWNERS INSURANCE COMPANY MEMORA NDUM OPINION  BY v. Record No. 0414-17-2 J UDGE ROSSIE D. ALSTON, JR. DECEMBER 5, 2017 VIRGILLIO BALTAZAR

FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMISSION Roberta Ann Perko (Christopher M . Kite; Lucas & Kite, PLC, on briefs), for appellants. E. Wayne Powell (Powell Law Group, PC, on brief), for appellee.

Dean McCluster (appellant) argue s in this appeal that the comp osition of the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission review panel was improper when it heard appellant’s first motion to reconsider. Specificall y, appellant contends that be cause a vacancy on the Commission was filled before the motion was heard, Commissioner Rappaport should have served on the review panel. Therefore, according to appellant, the composition of the review panel violated Code § 65.2-705(D). Additionally, appellant all eges that no credible evidence supported the Commission’s finding s that appellee sustained a c ompensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. We disagree an d affirm the decision of the Commission.

 Pursuant to Code § 17.2-413, this op inion is not designated for publication.UNPUBLISHED- 2 - B ACKGROUND For the past seven years, appellant 1 employed appellee at appellant’s construction company, McCluster Construction. Appellant operated McCluster Construction from his property. Appellee performed ma nual labor on the property as appellant’s employee. Appellant was paid $10 per hour during the week for his work. Appellee o ften worked for appellant on weekends - appellant sometimes paid appellee for his weekend wo rk. To ensure appellee’s constant availability, appellant rented a mobile home to appell ee, which was located on appellant’s property. In additi on, appellant fully or partiall y subsidized appellee’s utility and rent payments during months when weather prevented appellee fro m working. Over the years, appellant and appellant’s famil y developed a friendship with ap pellee. Unfortunately, McCluster Construction fell on hard financi al times and app ellant sold th e mobile home and surrounding plot of land. In order to close on the sale, the area needed t o be cleared. The clearing benefitted both appellant and appellee; proceeds of the sale enabled appel lant to pay off McCluster Construction’s debts, and appellee was required to vacate and m ove his belongings to his new home. On April 26, 2014, a sunny Saturday afternoon, appellant and ap pellee attempted to clear the mobile home and surrounding pl ot of land. The pair retriev ed a company-owned forklift to remove a non-working pickup truck from the area. When driving the forklift back to the clearing location, appellant operated the for klift from the cab while ap pellee recline d under the boom, nestled in the frame of the fork lift. Appellant d rove the fork lift with the boom in an upright position, providing him an unobstruc ted view of his path, the f ront of the forklift, and of appellee. After arriving at the ir destination, appellee began to disembark from the forklift. At

1 For the sake of clarity, the s ingular form of appellant will b e used to refer to Dean McCluster. However, please note that the appellants of record include Dean McCluster, d/b/a McCluster Construction and Aut o-Owners Insurance Company.- 3 - this time, appellant lowered t he boom, striki ng appellee on the head, pinning appellee to the forklift, and knocking him uncons cious. Appellant unpinned app ellee from the forklift, placing his limp body beside the machine. Appellee sustained a bloody gash to the head and severe spinal trauma. The spinal inju ry resulted in appellee becoming quadriplegic. In addition, appellee has been diagnosed wit h depression and delirium. Appellee filed a claim for tempor ary total disability benefits commencing on April 26, 2014 and continuing, a lifetime medi cal award, and payment of m edical bills and expenses directly related to his work i njuries. In her opinion, Deputy Commissioner Lee indicated that there was conflicting testimony regarding whether actions taken and items removed from the property were business-related, a nd how exactly appellee sustai ned his injuries. She relied on appellant’s testimony and found tha t appellee did not prove tha t he sustained a compensable injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employme nt. Accordingly, the deputy commissioner found for appellant . Appellee appealed to the Com mission, arguing that there was credible evidence to support th at he sustained an injury by acc ident arising out of and in the course of his employment, inc luding his own testimony, expert t estimony, medical records, emergency phone calls, and additi onal physical evidence. The C ommission found that appellee had met his burden and reversed th e deputy commissioner, awardi ng appellee temporary total disability benefits comme ncing on April 26, 2014 and continuing

. Appellant filed a motion to recons ider the Commission’s review opinion on February 20, 2017. The bases of that motion wer e: 1) that no credible evid ence supported the Commission’s findings that appellee sustained a compensable injury by accide nt arising out of and in the course of his employment, and 2) that the Commission lacked “an employ er representative” pursuant to Code § 65.2-200(D). The review pane l denied the motion. In re sponse, appellant made a second motion to reconsider and a motion to vacate. Appellant based t his second set of motions on the- 4 - same grounds as the first and also argued that the composition of the review panel was improper pursuant to Code § 65.2-705(D). P er Code § 65.2-705(D), the co mposition of the review panel was proper when the review pro cess was initiated. Because ther e was a vacancy on the Commission, the Chairman was aut horized to appoint a deputy com missioner. Code § 65.2-201(E). However, appellant alleges the composition of t he review panel became improper at the time the motion t o reconsider came before the r eview panel. Commissioner Rappaport was sworn in on February 16, 2017, four days before a ppellant filed his first motion to reconsider. Because the vacancy was filled before the review p anel heard the motion, appellant argues that Commissioner Rappaport should have served on the re view panel, not Chief Deputy Commissioner Szablewicz. Ultimately, the Commission found credible evidence to support t he finding that appellee sustained a compensable injur y by accident arising out of and i n the course of his employment. The Commission also found that the composition of the review pa nel complied with the Code. Appellant appealed to this Cour t, arguing that the composition of the review panel violated Code § 65.2-705(D) and that there was no credible evidence to s upport the Commission’s findings.
A NALYSIS I. The Composition of the Review Panel was Proper. Appellant argues that the com position of the review panel was improper when it heard appellant’s first motion to rec onsider. Appellant specifically argues that it was inappropriate for Chief Deputy Commissioner Szablewi cz to sit on the review panel when another commissioner was available per Code § 65.2-705(D). We disagree. Conclusions of the Commission on que stions of law are not bindi ng on review and are reviewed de novo . See Brown v. Fox, 189 Va. 509, 517, 54 S.E.2d 109, 113 (1949 ). “An issue- 5 - of statutory interpretation is a pure question of law,” and thu s, we must conduct a de novo review. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 V a. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citing Crawford v. Haddock, 270 Va. 524, 528, 621 S.E.2 d 127, 129 (2005)). This Court is “required to construe the law as it is written[,] and an err oneous construction by [the Commission] cannot be permitted to override the clear mandates of [the] statu te.” Danville Radiologists, Inc. v. Perkins, 22 Va. App. 454, 458, 470 S.E.2d 602, 604 (1996) (quoting Pavlicek v. Jerabek, In c., 21 Va. App. 50, 56, 461 S.E.2d 424, 427 (1995)). “When the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language.” Conyers, 273 Va. at 104, 639 S.E.2d at 178 (citing Campbell v. Harmon, 271 V a. 590, 597-98, 628 S.E.2d 308, 311-12 (2006)). “[W]e must give e ffect to the legislature’s in tention as expressed by the language used unless a literal interpretation of the language w ould result in a manifest absurdity.” Id. (citing Boynton v. Kilgore, 271 Va. 220, 227, 623 S.E.2d 922, 925-26 (2006)). In conducting this analysis, we first recognize that commissio ners and deputy commissioners derive their sta tutory authority from different s ources. Pursuant to Code § 65.2-200(B) a commissioner is ele cted by the General Assembly and serves a six-year term. Deputy commissioners, on the other hand, are appointed by the c hairman of the Commission pursuant to Code § 65.2-705(D). The c hairman may make such app ointments “when a vacancy on the Commission exists, or when one or more members of the Co mmission are absent or are prohibited from sitting with the f ull Commission to hear a revi ew.” Code § 65.2-705(D). In addition, the General Assembly emp owered review panels comprise d of both commissioners and deputy commissioners to act. U nder Code § 65.2-201(E), “[a] ma jority of the commissioners shall constitute a quorum for the exercise of jud icial, legisla tive, and discretionary functions of the Commission, whether there i s a vacancy in the Commission or not.” (Emphasis added). Achieving a quorum is necessary f or the exercise of those power s. Id.- 6 - In this case, one commissioner was absent. This absence trigg ered the mechanism provided in Code § 65.2-705(D). Thu s, the Chairman appointed adeputy commissioner to the review panel. The review panel consisted of two commissioners and one deputy commissioner. Because a “majority of commissioners” existed, a quorum was ach ieved. Code § 65.2-201(E). Therefore, the review panel wa s authorized to take “judicial, l egislative, and discretionary” action; as such, the composition of the review panel comports w ith the requirements of Code § 65.2-705(D). Id. Considering the plain meaning of the Code, the composition of the review panel was proper. 2

II. Credible Evidence Supported the Commission’s Findings that Appellee’s Injuries Arose out of an Actual Risk of and in t he Course of Employment. Appellant argues that no credible evidence supported the Commis sion’s findings that appellee sustained an injury by accident arising out of and dur ing the course of employment. “A finding that an injury was su stained in an accident arising out of and in the course of employment within the meaning of t he Work[ers’] Compensation Ac t is a mixed conclusion of law and fact and is properly rev iewable by this Court.” Conner v. Bragg, 203 Va. 204, 207, 123 S.E.2d 393, 395 (1962) (citing American Furniture Co. v. Graves , 141 Va. 1, 14, 126 S.E. 213,

2 “An issue of statutory interpr etation is a pure question of la w,” and thus, we must conduct a de novo review. Conyers, 273 Va. at 104, 639 S.E.2d at 178 (citing Cr awford, 270 Va. at 528, 621 S.E.2d at 129). Conclusions of the Commission on questions of law are not binding on review and are reviewed de novo . Brown, 189 Va. at 517, 54 S.E.2d at 113. Code § 65.2-200(D) states that “of the three commission members, onl y one shall represent employees and only one shall represent employers.” Gordon v. Ford Motor Co., 55 Va. Ap. 363, 385, 685 S.E.2d 880, 891 (2009) (citing Code § 65.2-200(D)). Appellant contends that there was no employer representative. Appe llant offers no evidence in suppo rt of this contention other than providing the following labels fo r the review panelists: Commi ssioner Marshall-an employee representative, Commissioner Ne wman-a neutral representative, a nd Chief Deputy Commissioner Szablewicz-“a well- qualified but inferiorly positi oned substitute whose inferior positioning limited the possibility . . . of initiating dissent .” There is no evidence pertaining to the “previous vocation, employmen t or affiliation” of Chief Dep uty Commissioner Szablewicz to determine whether or not he acted as an “employer” representati ve. Code § 65.2-200(D).- 7 - 216 (1925)). “This Court is bound by t he Commission’s factual findings so long as they are supported by credible evidence, ‘ev en if contrary evidence can be found.’” Va. Emp’t Comm’n. v. Hale, 43 Va. App. 379, 385, 598 S.E.2d 327, 330 (2004) (quot ing Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227, 229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991)). “In determining whether credible evidence exists, [this Court] doe s not retry the facts, reweigh the preponderance of the evidence, or make its own determination of the credibility of the witness es.” Wagner Enters., Inc. v. Brooks, 12 Va. App. 890, 894, 407 S.E.2d 32, 35 (1991) (citing Jules Hairsty lists, Inc. v. Galanes, 1 Va. App. 64, 69, 334 S.E.2d 592, 595 (1985)). “If, however, there is no credible evidence to support the Commissi on’s findings of fact, its find ings are not binding on us[,] and the question of the sufficienc y of the evidence becomes one of law.” Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Watson, 219 Va. 830, 833, 252 S.E.2d 310, 312 (1979) (ci ting A & P v. Robertson, 218 Va. 1051, 1053, 243 S.E.2d 234, 235 (1978)). “The scope of a j udicial review of t he fact finding function of a [W]orkers’ [C]omp ensation [C]ommission, therefore , is severely limited, partly in deference to the agency’s expert ise in a specialized field.” S outhside Virginia Training Ctr. v. Ellis, 33 Va. App. 824, 828, 537 S.E.2d 35, 37 (2000) (quoting Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. Robinson, 32 Va. App. 1, 4-5, 526 S.E.2d 267, 268 (2000)). In addition, it is wel l-settled that we adhere to the “presumption of re gularity” with regard to the Co mmission’s findings. Code § 2.2-4027 (noting that the reviewin g “court shall take due acc ount of the presumption of official regularity, the experience and speci alized competence of the ag ency, and the purposes of the basic law under which the agency has acted”). A compensable injury is define d by statute as “only [an] injury by accident arising out of
and in the course of the employmentor occupational disease.” Cod e § 65.2-101 (emphasis added). The phrase “‘arising out of employment and course of e mployment’ is to be read conjunctively and not synonymous ly. Both conditions must be me t before compensation can be- 8 - awarded.” Lucas v. Lucas, 212 Va. 561, 563, 186 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1972) (quoting Brown v. Reed, 209 Va. 562, 564, 165 S.E.2d 394, 396 (1969)). These terms are to be “liberally construed” to carry out “the humane purposes of such laws.” Cohen v. Cohen’s Dep’t Store, Inc., 171 Va. 106, 110-11, 198 S.E. 476, 477 (1938) (citing Holland-St. Louis Suga r Co. v. Shraluka, 116 N.E. 330, 331 (Ind. App. 1917)). In addition, “the [C]ommission, like an y other fact finder, may consider both direct and circumstantial evidence in its disposition of a claim.” City of Waynesboro v. Griffin, 51 Va. App. 308, 313, 657 S.E.2d 782, 784 (2008) (quot ing VFP, Inc. v. Shepherd, 39 Va. App. 289, 293, 572 S.E.2d 510, 512 (2002)). The burden lie s with the claimant “to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the accident ‘arose out of and in the course of his employment.’” Conner, 203 Va. at 207-08, 123 S.E.2d at 396 (qu oting Norfolk & Washington Steamboat Co. v. Holladay, 174 Va. 152, 157, 5 S.E.2d 486, 488 (1939)). A. Arising Out of Employment Appellant contends that no credi ble evidence supported that ap pellee suffered a compensable injury by accident a rising out of an actual risk of his employment. “The words arising out of ha ve been construed . . . to refer t o the origin or cause of the injury.” Id. at 208, 123 S.E.2d at 396 (citing Southern Motor Lines v. Alvis, 200 Va. 168, 170, 104 S.E.2d 735, 737 (1958)). To determine causality, “Virginia employs the ‘actual risk test.’” Dan River, Inc. v. Giggetts, 34 Va. App. 297, 304, 541 S.E.2d 2 94, 297 (2001) (quoting Cty. of Chesterfield v. Johnson, 237 Va. 180, 185, 376 S.E.2d 73, 75 (1 989)). This test states that “the causative danger must be peculiar t o the work, incidental to th e character of t he business[,] and not independent of the master-s ervant relationship.” Id. The actual risk test “necessarily excludes an injury caused by ‘a h azard to which the workman wou ld have been equally exposed apart from the employment.’” Bernado v. Carlson Cos.-TGIF, 60 Va. App. 400, 405-06, 782 S.E.2d 508, 511 (2012) (quoting Hill C ity Trucking v. Christian , 238 Va. 735, 740, 385 S.E.2d- 9 - 377, 380 (1989) (emphasis omitted)). The “causal connection is established when ‘the injury can be seen to have followed as a natu ral incident of the work and to have been contemplated by a reasonable person familiar with the whole situation as a result of the exposure occasioned by the nature of the employment.’” C ity of Waynesboro, 51 Va. App. at314, 657 S.E.2d at 784 (quoting Bradshaw v. Aronovitch, 170 Va. 329, 335, 196 S.E. 684 , 686 (1938)). “[W]e view the evidence in t he light most favorable to . . . t he party prevailing below.” Starbucks Coffee Co. v. Shy, 61 Va. App. 229, 233, 734 S.E.2d 6 83, 685 (2012) (quoting Tomes v. James City Fire, 39 Va. App. 424, 429-30, 573 S.E.2d 312, 31 5 (2002)). The evidence establishes the Commission’s findi ng that the caus ative danger in this matter was a risk peculiar to appellee’s employment. Appe llant employed appellee at McClu ster Construction, which was operated from appellant’s propert y. Appellee regularly perform ed manual labor, completing a variety of construction -related jobs as part of his employment. When appellee was injured, he was clearing the mobile home a nd surrounding area. The clearin g process was an act of manual labor that required the use of acompany-owned forklift. The c learing location was on appellant’s property, and appellant sold the parcel and mobile home for business purposes. Appellant and appellee frequentl y used the machine causing appe llee’s injury while doing work for McCluster Construction. Appellant operated the forklift fr om the cab while appellee, with the knowledge and acquiescence of appellant, reclined on the fr ont of the forklift, positioned under the boom. Appellee often rod e on the forklift in this ma nner while performing work as an employee for McCluster Constr uction. The Commission rejected t he testimony of appellant and appellant’s daughter , indicating that th ey did not know how app ellee sustained his injury. The Commission necessarily relied on t estimony from appellee and ex pert Gary Kilpatrick, in addition to blood smears on the boom, emergency calls, and medi cal reports, to conclude that as appellee disembarked from the forklift, appellant lowered the b oom, causing appellee’s injuries.- 10 - Because the clearing was on appellant’s property, from where ap pellant operated his business, required manual labor, involved the use of company machinery, and was done for a business purpose, the risk of injury from th e forklift was peculiar to a ppellee’s employment. The evidence establishes that t he causative danger was inciden tal to the character of the business. Appellant’s company was a construction company. The nature of the work involved manual labor. The clearing served two purposes: Appellee need ed to vacate the premises so he could find other housing, and appell ant testified that the mainpurpose for the clearing was business-related. McCluster C onstruction had fallen on hard fi nancial times, and closing on this sale would allow appellant to take advantage of the proceeds in order to pay off company debts. Therefore, the clearing was inci dental to the character of the business. Additionally, the causative dange r was not independent of the master-servant relationship. Appellant and appe llee had a multi-faceted relat ionship; they were simultaneously landlord and tenant, friend and f riend, and employer and employ ee. On the day in question, appellant, acting as appellee’s employer, supervised and worked with appellee on company property, using company equipment , to complete a project benefi tting the company. Thus, it is clear appellee’s in juries arose out of an actual r isk of his employment. B. In the Course of Employment Appellant contends that no credi ble evidence supported that ap pellee sustained such an injury in the course of his employment. The words “course of employmen t” refer to “the time, place, an d circumstances under which the accident occurred.” Cty. of Chesterfield, 237 Va. at 183, 376 S.E.2d at 74. “[A]n accident occurs ‘in the course of employment’ when it takes pla ce within the period of employment, at a place where the employee may reasonably be, an d while he is reasonably fulfilling duties of his employment or engaged in doing somethi ng incidental thereto.” Combs v.- 11 - Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 259 Va. 503, 511, 525 S.E.2d 278, 2 83 (2000) (quoting Bradshaw, 170 Va. at 335, 196 S.E. at 686). Relev ant to this case, an em ployee is not barred from receiving compensation if he acted voluntar ily “in his employer’s interes t.” Lucas, 212 Va. at 564, 186 S.E.2d at 65. In addition, compens ation is “not confined to in juries occurring only during working hours . . . so long as an employment relationship exist ed during” the inj urious event. Id. at 563, 186 S.E.2d at 65 (citing H onaker v. Hartley, 140 Va. 1, 13-14, 124 S.E. 220, 223 (1924)). Appellee sustained his injuries within the period of his emplo yment. Appellant employed appellee for seven years at appe llant’s company, McCluster Cons truction, paying appellee $10 per hour during the week. As additional compensation, appellan t provided on-site housing and subsidized utility and rent paym ents during months when the wea ther prevented appellee from working. This allowed appellee t o be constantly available to a ppellant. The accident occurred on April 26, 2014. While the acciden t occurred on a Saturday, appellee often worked as needed on weekends. Appellee was sometim es paid for his weekend work. We note that payment for work is not dispositive in thi s assessment. See Purvis v. Port er Cabs, Inc., 38 Va. App. 760, 766, 568 S.E.2d 424, 427 (2002) (stating that “[t]he elements of an employment relationship are: (1) selection and engagement of t he employee, (2) payment of wa ges, (3) power of dismissal, and (4) power of control of the emp loyee’s action[,]” and moreo ver, that only the power of control is dispositive). Appe llant could still fire or evict a ppellee. The accident occurred on appellant’s property, a place where a ppellee was authorized and required to be as part of his employment obligation. Appellant operated McCluster Construction from his property. Thus, McCluster Construction employees are reasonably expected to be present on appellant’s propert y. Appellee had even more reason to be on appellant’s property because appellant rented a mobile home to appellee, and the mob ile home was located on appellant’s land. On the day in que stion, appellee was specifi cally expected to be there because- 12 - appellant sold that mobile hom e and surrounding plot of land. The area needed to be cleared in order for appellant to take a dvantage of the proceeds and pay o ff company debts and for appellee to vacate and move into a new home. Appellee fulfilled duties of his employment or engaged in acts incidental to his employment on April 26th. The C ommission analogized this case to Stapleton v. Powhatan Corr. Ctr., 62 O. I. C 428 (1983), an d Dep’t of Parks v. Howard , 445 S.W.2d 438 (Ky. Ct. App. 1969). In Stapleton, an employee fell while showering on-site. While not requi red to live on-site, the employee did so in or der to be readily available t o his employer. The Commission found that “this employer has made living on the premises a par t of the employment contract; and under such circumstances, the c laimant is considered as act ing within the course of his employment in carrying out his us ual living activities within the living quarte rs provided.” Stapleton, 62 O. I. C. at 431. In D ep’t of Parks, an employee who lived on-site resigned his position. His employer allowed him to use park equipment and p ersonnel in moving out-it was in the employer’s interest to do s o in order for the new employ ee to occupy the on-site residence. The employee directed his coworker to assist him in moving furn iture. The coworker was injured while moving the employ ee’s furniture. The Commission found that the employee sustained injuries arising out of and in the course of employme nt because the injury was sustained “in performing an act f or the benefit of a coemployee . . . [because] it a dvance[d] the employer’s work.” Dep’t of Parks, 445 S.W.2d at 439. In this case, appellee engaged i n activities inc idental to his employment. Living in the mobile home became part of appellee’s employment contract. Add itionally, appellant operated McCluster Construction as a so le proprietorship, so he is perso nally responsible for the liabilities of the company. See Recalde v. ITT Hartford, 254 Va. 501, 505- 06, 492 S.E.2d 435, 437 (1997) (stating “[t]he sole proprietor i s solely liable for all the de bts of the business” (quoting Black’s- 13 - Law Dictionary 1392 (6th ed. 1990))) . Thus, appellant’s busine ss and personal life were interrelated. As such, the clear ing was for the pair’s mutual benefit 3 : appellee was required to vacate the premises, and appellant needed to close on the sale in order to pay off company debts. On April 26th, appellee worked unde r appellant’s direction in c learing the area. Appellant operated the forklift, a company-owned machine, during the clea ring process. Appellee rode along, as he often did on construction jobs, under the boom, an d was seriously injured while disembarking. Because the clearing was for the pair’s mutual b enefit, required the use of company property, and occurred wh ile appellant and appellee wer e acting in their employer-employee capacity, appellee’s actions were either a re sponsibility of or incidental to his employment.
C ONCLUSION We see no reason to disturb the Commission’s findings on appeal . It is clear that the composition of the review panel comported with the Code. The C hairman had acted in compliance with the Code by appointing a deputy commissioner to hear the matter in the event of an absence. Simply because a new commissioner had taken off ice a few days before the panel ruled on appellant’s motion to r econsider its decision, the Com mission was not required to have the new commissioner replace the deputy commissioner in ruling on the motion to reconsider with the two commissioners who ha d joined him in issuing the pa nel’s decision. Because a quorum of the Commission was sti ll achieved, the panel was auth orized to take “judicial, legislative, and discretionar y action.” Code § 65.2-201(E). T herefore, the composition of the review panel was in accordance with the law. In addition, the Commission supported its findings

3 Even if appellee derives a be nefit from the work being done, th at does not bar appellee from receiving compensation. See Brown, 209 Va. at 565-68, 165 S.E.2d at 397-99 (demonstrating that an employee sustaining an injury in an empl oyer-provided parking lot, which existed for the mutual benefit of the employer and the employee , was still able to recover under the Act).- 14 - with credible evidence, incl uding appellee’s direct testimony, expert testimony, physical evidence, medical records, emergency calls, and reports. Thus, appellee sustained compensable injuries arising out of and in the course of his employment. A s such, the Commission did not err in reversing the deputy commissi oner. Therefore, we affirm the Commission’s rulings.

Affirmed.