### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOX VILLE Fe br ua ry 2, 200 4 S es sio n

BO BB Y R

. P OS EY , an d w if e, S A BRIN A P OS EY , an d D A LE TE A GU E, on behalf of the m selves and all others sim ilarly situated, v. D RY VIT S YS TEM S, INC ., BA RTO N- RILE Y C OMP AN Y, LLC , B LAZ ER HOME S, INC ., JAM ES EDWARD PEE, POL Y-M CONTRACTORS , INC., REEVE CON STR UC TION COM PA NY , IN C. , and THOR NTO N C ONS TRU CTION COMPANY, INC.

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Jeff erson County No. 17,715-IV Hon. O’Duane Slon e, Circ uit Jud ge

F ILED MARCH 22, 2004

No. E2003-00392-COA- R3-CV

I n th is c la ss a c tio n, the Tr ia l Co ur t r e fu se d to permi t Hom ebu ild e rs and ind ivi du a l c la ima

nts to int e rv e ne . O n a

pp e a l, w e re ve rs e a s to Ho me bu ild e rs , b ut a ff ir m a s to the ind ivi du a l c la ima nts

.

Tenn. R. App . P .3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed in p art, Re ve r se d in pa r t, and r e m ande d.

H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , J

. delivere d the opinion of the court, in which D. M I CH A EL S WI NEY , J ., and Willi am H. Inman, Sr. J ., joined.

Ang elia D. Morie , Nashville, Tenne ssee, a nd J ulie Muth Goodman, L exington, Kentucky , for Ap pe lla nts

.
Gordon B all, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, Ga ry E. Mason, Washington, DC, S tuart C. Markman, T ampa, F lor ida , a nd Ev e re tte L . D of

fe rmy re , A tla nta , G e or g ia , f

or Ap pe lle e s.
Ellis A. Sharp and Jon M

. Cope, Knoxvi lle, Tenne ssee, and Peter W . Morg an, R. Br uce H olcomb, and Mar ia Colsey

Hea rd, Washington, DC, for

Appellee , Dry

vit Sy stems, I nc.-2- OP IN ION

I n this class action, the Tr ial Court refuse d to permit appellants to interve ne.

Bac kgr ound

Th e Cla ss A c tio n Co mpl a int wa s f ile d o n N ov e mbe r 1 4, 20 00 , w hic h li ste d th e c la ss repr esentatives as Mr. a

nd Mrs. Wil liam Humphrey , and the de fenda nt as Dry vit Sy stems, I nc. The

su it i nv olv e s a

sy nth e tic stu c c o c la dd ingmate ri a l ma nu fa c tur e d b y

Dr y vit , wh ic h is us e d in residential and commerc ial construction. Plaintiffs asser ted t hat Dry

vit manufac tured, distributed, and mar keted this sy

nthetic stucco pr oduct known as EI FS, while knowingthat it was defe ctive and would not perfor

m as repr esente d. The Complaint further alleg ed that Dr

y vit knew or should have known that wate r could not esc ape f rom bene ath the cla dding, a nd that any

minor p en et ra tion of

water wou ld c a

us e su bs tanti a l da

ma g e to t he str uc tur e un de rn e a th. At

the tim e , p la int if

fs so ug ht

c e rt if ic a tio n o f t

he fo llo wi ngc la ss:
All pe rsons who own a structure in the State of Tenne ssee on which an Ex terior I nsul at i o n and F inish S y stem (“EI F sy stem”) ha s been installed or any previous

owner of such struc tures who incur red any costs or expenses to inspect, re pair or repla ce the EI F sy stem or other pr operty damag es by

the EI F sy stem at any

time from November

14, 1990 until the date Def endant’ s continuing c onduct is terminated ( the “Class Period”)

.
P l a i n t i f f s a l l e g e d v i o l a t i o n s o f

t h e T e nn e s s e e C o n s u

m e r P r o t e c t i o n

A c t , s t r i c t l i a b i l i t y, neg lige nce, intentional misrepr esentatio n , b rea ch of w arr anties, neg lige nt misreprese ntation, and unjust enrichment.

Dry vit removed the case to fede ral c ourt, but it was rema nded to state c ourt afte r the plaintiffs ag ree d to limi t the amount in controve rsy

. Upon remand, on April 8, 2002, plaintiffs filed an Ag ree d Orde r Gra

nting L eave of C ourt to File Second Amended Class Action C omplaint. The Orde r re cites that plaintiffs have leave to file a Sec ond Amended Comp l ai n t, and dee med it filed, but the complaint was not pl ace d in the rec ord at that time. In this Order, f or the fir st tim e, the plaintiffs are listed as Bobby and Sabrina Posey and Dale Tea g ue. There is no explanation in the

rec ord for this chang e of c lass repr esentatives.

On the same date, the ne wly -name d class re prese ntat i v es fi led a Motion for Preliminary

Approva l of S ettlement, and attache d the proposed settlement ag ree ment, which soug ht

c e rt if ic a tio n o f a

natio nw ide , r a the r tha

n a state wi de , c la ss. Th is n e w c la ss w a s d e fi ne d a s f oll ow s:-3- All Persons who, as of the Notice Date, in a ny State other than N orth Carolina, own Property that is clad in whole or in pa rt with Dry

vit EI FS i n s talled af

ter January

1, 19 89 . E xclu de d a

re tho se w ho : ( 1) pr ior

to t he No tic e Date , h ave se ttl e d w ith Settling Def

endant, pr oviding a

rele ase of claims relating to Dry

vit EI FS; or (2) have obtained a judg ment ag ainst Settli ng Def endant f o r a Dr y v it EI FS claim, or ha d a judgme nt entere d ag ainst them on such claim in Settling De fenda nt’s favor

.
Th e pr op os e d se ttl e me nt pr ov ide s e lig ibl e c la ima nts wi th fr e e ho me in sp ectio ns , pay ment of half of

their estimat ed re p ai r costs (under ce rtain conditions), a “ Moisture Fr ee Warranty”, and pay

ment of the c lass counsel’s attorney s fee s. The settlement a lso provides that any class member

who does not opt out by

a ce rtain date is bound by the terms of the settlement ( but they must also file a claim by a certain date to g et any relief ). The Court e ntere d an Or der f or Preliminary Approva l of Settlement, and set a f airne ss hear ing f

or Oc tober 1, 2002.
One g roup of a

ppellants here in, B arton-Riley Company , L L C, Blazer H omes, Inc., J ames E d wa rd Pee, Poly -M Contractor s, I nc., Ree ve Construction Company , I nc., and T hornton Con str uc tio n Co mpa

ny , Inc . ( “ ho me bu ild e rs ” ), are c on tr act ors wh o util ize d th e Dr y vit EI F S in

c onst ructingho me s, and

the y fi le d a No tic e of

I nte nt t o App e ar at th e F a ir ne ss H e ari ng , a

nd a lso fi le d a Mo tio n to I nte rv e ne , statin g that the y ha d sub sta nti a l leg a l inte re sts a t stake , in c lud ingri g hts of c on tr ibutio n a

nd ind e mni ty , w hic h w ou ld b e a dv e rs e ly a ff e c te d b y the se ttl e me nt, and

that th e ir interests we re not a dequate ly repr esente d by

the exist ing pa

rties.
Appellants Mr. a

nd Mrs. J err

y Sulli ns also filed a Notice of I ntent to Appear at the Fa irness He aring , an d Mrs. Sulli ns filed an Af fidavit stating that she was a resident of

Sumner County , Tenne ssee, a

nd that she and her husband owned a home bui lt befor e 1987 which wa s clad wi th D ry vit ’s EI F S. M rs . Su lli ns state d th a t she purc ha se d the ho me in 199 0, and ha d in c ur re d c os ts since that time to repa ir or re place the EI FS.

Severa l other potential class members f iled Notices of I

ntent to Appear

in Opposition to the Proposed Settlement, from state s s u ch as South Carolina, Alabama, Texas, L ouisiana, Missouri, etc. Class Counsel obje ct ed t o t he standingof ce rtain objec tors, and filed a Motion for Final Appr oval of Settlement and Petition for Aw ard of Attorney s Fe es and Exp en s es and Awa rd to Cla ss Re pr e se ntativ e s. Cla ss Couns e l a lso fi le d a Me mor and

um i n O pp os iti on

to t he Mo tio n to I nt erve ne. Cl ass Co un sel th en fi ledth e Fir st Am end men t to th e S ett lem ent , whi ch ame nd s t he E I FS definition. Michael Ang elovich, a me mber of the class, also filed a Motion to I nterve ne, asse rting that class counse l did not adequately repr esent his intere sts.

The fir st fairne s s h earing was he ld on October 1, 2002, but the court did not allow any proof to be prese nted, and only allowed lim ited oral arg ument. During the hearing , the Court commented that the home builders wer e not member s of the class, and thus wer e not bound by the settlement, and that the c lass members we re a dequate ly repr esente d by class counsel. The Court t hen denied the Motion to Interve ne filed by the homebuild er s as unt imely . The Court hea rd fr om the objectors to the se ttlement and class counsel, and there wer e dis cussions reg ardingthe leng th of the-4-

notice per iod, and enha

nceme nts to the settlement. The settlement wa s not approved at that time.

Other doc uments were filed af ter the hear ing by the obj ector s, and cla ss counsel filed

a Se c on d A me ndme nt t o th e Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt, wh ic h p ro vid e d a dd iti on a l op tio ns fo r c la ima nts wi th r e pa ir

c os ts in e xce ss of $1 5, 00 0. 00 but le ss tha n $2 5, 00 0. 00 , a dd iti on a l op tio ns fo r c la ima nts wi th r e pa ir

c os ts i n e xce ss o f $ 25 ,0 00 .0 0, and th ere was a lso a se c tio n a dd e d r e g ard ingmol d

reme diation.

An oth e r h e ari ngwa s h e ld o n D e c e mber 1 8, 20 02 , a nd the Cou rt he ard argume nts from cla ss counsel and some of the objector s. On J anuar

y 14, 2003, the C ourt enter ed an Order and J udg ment Gra

nting F inal Approval o f S ettlement, wher ein the Court found that the se ttlement as amende d was fa ir, rea sonable, a nd an ade quate c ompromise of the c laims ag ainst defe ndant. The Orde r states that the c ertified c lass consists of:

Al l Pe rs on s w ho , a s of June 5, 20 02 , in any State oth e r tha n N or th C aro lin a , in

wh ole or in part, with Dr

y vit EI FS installed afte r January 1, 1989, except persons who ( 1) prior to J une 5, 2002, have se ttled with Dry vit, providing a

rele ase of claims relating to Dry vit EI FS; or (2) have not obtaine d a judg ment ag ainst Settli ng Def endant f or
a Dr y vit EI F S c la im, or

ha d a jud g me nt e nt ere d a g a ins t th e m on su c h a c la im i n Se ttl ingDe fe nd ant’ s f

avo r; and (3 ) a ny e mpl oy e e s o f D ry

vit

.
The homebuilder s then filed a Motion re g arding the descr iption of the class, stating that the class de finition was meaning less, but the Court ig nored this Motion. The F irst Amendment to t he Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt w a s ma de a pa rt of the reco rd , a s w a s th e Se c on d A me nd e d Cl a ss Action Complaint, along w ith a Motion to allow it to be filed nunc pro tunc.

The homebuilder s and Mr. a nd Mrs. Sulli ns filed Notices of A ppeal, a s did severa l of the oth e r o bje c tor s w ho we re c la ss m e mbe rs . H ow e ve r, a ll of the oth e r a

pp e a ls w e re vo luntari ly dis mis se d, su c h th a t th e on ly a pp e lla nts be fo re thi s Co ur

t are the ho me bu ild e rs and Mr

. and Mr s. Sulli ns. The issues on appe al ar e:

1. Whether the t ri al cour t erre d in denying the homebuilders’ Motion to I nterve ne as
u n t i m e l y?

2. Whether the homebuilder s should have bee n g rante d intervention?

3. Whe the r t

he Sul lin s h ave sta

nd ingto a pp e a l?

4. Whether the c lass cer tification and a

pproval of se ttlement were proper ?

Discussion of T he Issues-5- Th e Tr ia l Co ur

t de nie d th e ho me bu ild e rs ’ Mot ion to I nte rv e ne a s unti me ly . A s th is Court ha s p re vio us ly

re c og nize d, “th e ti meline ss o f a n inte rv e nti on

is g ov e rn e d b y

e qu ita ble p ri n cipl es, and is dete rmined by the fa cts and c ircumstance s of ea ch par ticular c ase.” A m erican Materials Technologies, LLC v. City of Chattanooga , 4 2 S

. W

. 3 d 9 1 4 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 2 0 0 0 )

. In deter mining whe ther the motion to intervene was timely filed, the Court is require d to consider:
(1) the point to which the suit has pr og resse d; (2 ) t he purp os e fo r whic h inte rv e nti on is s ou g ht; (3) the leng th of t ime prec eding the application during which the propose d intervene r knew or rea sonably

should have known of

his interest in the ca se; (4) the pr ejudice to the orig inal parties due to the proposed inter vener ’s fa ilure af

ter he k ne w o r r e a so na

bly sh ou ld h ave kn ow n o f h is i nte re st i n th e c a se to a pp ly promptly for inter vention; and (5) the e x istence of unusual circ umstances militating a g ainst or in favor of intervention.

Id. at 916.
The Comp la int i n it iati n g th is li ti g a ti o nw a s f il e d o nN o v e mb e r

1 4 , 2 0 0 0 , and defe ndant neve r filed a

n Answer . The c ase w as re moved t o fede ral court, and then r emande d back to state court in June 2001. The Complaint wa s then allowed to be amende d on April 8, 2002 (but the amende d Complaint was not filed with the court until much l ater , afte r the Judgment had be en enter ed.) A lso on April 8, 2002, the class repr esentatives filed a Motion for Preliminary Approva l of Se ttl e me nt, a lon g wi th the se ttl e me nt a g re e me nt. I t w a s n ot u nti l th e fi lin g of

the se do c ume nts on April 8, 2002, that the propose d cl as s was c hang ed to a nationwide class, the ter ms of the settlement wer e put in the re cord, a nd the class r epre sentatives we re c hange d

. An Orde r g ranting preliminary

approva l to the settlement was sig ned that same day . The notice of the propose d settlement was to be gi n go i n g o u t no later tha n 90 day s from that date , and then the pa rties wer e g iven 90 day s from the notice date to opt out, enter objections, etc. The fairne ss hear ing w as set for October 1, 2002.

Th e ho me bu ild e rs fi le d th e ir Mo tio n to I nte rv e ne on

Se pte mbe r 3, 20 02 , on e month prior to the fa irness hea

ring , and on l y fi v e months from the date the class wa s chang ed and the proposed se ttlement was filed and approve d. The motion wa s filed well within the time limits for objections to the settlement ag ree ment, and wa s filed bef ore the settlement was e ntere d and re duced to a ju d g me n t. T h u s , th e o n ly p r o g r e s s w h ic h th e s u it h a d e xp e r ie n c e d to th a t p o int w a s the settlement itself - ther e wa s no answer , no discovery , no hear ings, e tc.

The homebuilder s’ claimed pur pose for seeking intervention is to insure that none of the ir le g a l rig hts are c omp ro mis e d b y the pr op os e d s e ttl e me nt. Th e ho me bu ild e rs c la im that be c a us e EI FS is inherently

defe ctive, r eq u i ri ng that it may be re paire d and re main on the homes (a s the

se ttl e me nt d oe s) wi ll o nly e xac e rb a te the str

uc tur a l da

ma g e c a us e d to the ho me s, and

c ou ld ult imate ly

inc re a se the lia

bil ity of the ho me bu ild e rs a s w e ll. Thus , th e ho me bu ild e rs so ug ht t o-6-

interven e t o p articipate in the settlement proc eeding s and provide the Court with additional information re g ardingthe viability of the repa irs, etc. The homebuilders also soug ht to question the applicability

of the judg ment reduc tion provision, and its effec t on their rig hts of contribution and indemnity

.
Th e re is n o p ro of in t he re c or d r e g a

rdi ng wh e n th e ho me bu ild e rs kn e w o f t he ir interest in the ca se, but they rea sonably should have known a s of the date the notice of the settlement went out (a ssuming for

this purpose that the not ice was adequate). This would have be en less than 90 day s b ef

ore the Motion to I nterve ne wa s filed. Their motion was f iled promptly

afte r they

rea so n ab l y s h o uld have known of their intere st in the case, a nd thus there wa s no prejudice to the parties due to a fa ilure to file ea rlier.

I n this case, ther e ar e unusual c ircumstance s which militate in favor of interve ntion. This is a nationwide settlement which is estimated t o aff ect at least 95,000 hom eowne rs. Ther e we re serious q u es t i o n s raised ( even by the trial judg e himself) r eg ardingadequa cy of notice a

nd of the terms of the settlement. (The hig h number of opt- outs and the low number of response s in ge nera l de mon str a te the re may

have be e n va lid c on c e rn s as to both .) Th e ho me bu ild e rs have a tte mpt e d to sho w t he Court that there may be numer ous deficie ncies in the re pair protoc ol that the settlement utiliz es, but the Court r efuse d to consider a ny of this proof af

ter findingthe Motion to I nterve ne wa s untimely . The homebuilder s also argued that their i ntere sts were not adequately repr esente d by

the exis tin g p ar ties, and this is obviousl y true c onsideringhow vehe mently the par ties resisted the homebuilders interve ntion.

This action has such f

ar- rea chingimplic at i o ns that consideration of all opposing points of view is imperative. F or all of the above rea sons, it is c lear that the motion to int erve ne filed by the ho me bu ild e rs sh ou ld not have be e n r

ule d unti me ly , a

nd the Tr ia l Co ur

t w a s in e rr or fo r s o
ru lin g

. A s w e h av e n o t e d , d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s t y p e s h o u l d b e b a s e d o n e qu i t a b l e p r i n c i p l e s , an d

it would be inequitable inde ed to deter mine a motion to intervene to be untimely when ther e had be en
n o an s w e r

f i l e d , n o d i s c o v e r

y d o n e , n o f

i n a l j u d g m e n t , an d

w h e ni tw a s f

i l e d w i t h i na re a so nable time of the movants’ knowle dg e of the ir potential interests.

The homebuilder s sought intervention as of rig ht or permissive interve ntion pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P . 24. As to intervention as of rig ht, the hom ebuilders are require d to show “whe n the applica

nt claims an intere st relatingto the proper ty or transa ction which is the subj ect of the action a n d t h e applicant is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a pr actica l matter imp a ir or imp e de the a

pp lic ant’ s a

bil ity to p ro te c t th a t in te re st, un le ss th e ap pli c ant’ s in te re st i s
a de qu a te ly

re pr e se nte d b y

e xistin g pa

rt ie s; .

. . ” . T he de nia l of a mot ion to int e rv e ne a s of right i s revie wed de novo on appea l. State v. Brown &W illiamson T

obacco Corp. , 18 S.W .3d 186 (Tenn. 2000).

As the Sup re me Court in th at case re c og nize d, “ the pr e c ise natur e of the int e re st require d to i n t er v en e as o f rig ht has eluded e x act de finition, . . . the right doe s not include a mer e
c on tin g e nt, re mot e , o r c on je c tur a l po ssi bil ity

of be inga ff

e c te d a s a

re su lt o f t

he su it, but mu stTh e ho me buil ders in an a pp e nd ix to the ir

re ply br ie f, inc lud e d p le a din g s f ro m a F ra nk lin 1 County , T e nn e sse e c a se to th e effect tha t D ry vit ha s atte mpt e d to us e the JRP in o rd e r t o o bta in

-7- inv olv e a dir e c t c la im on the su

bje c t matte r of the su it s uc h th a t th e int e rv e no r w ill e ith e r g a in o r l os e by direc t operation of the judg ment.” Id. at 192. Appellees rely on Brown & W

illiamson to deny intervention. Howe ver, the Brown & W illiamson case is ina

pposite. That case was not a class a ction

a s th e Op ini on

no te s at p. 18 9:

The state’ s Complaint s tated that the suit was brought by the State in its capac ity

as
a so ve re ig n, no t a s a

c la ss a c tio n o n be ha lf of

Te nn e sse e re sid e nts . T hu s, the State was not see king r elief on be half of a ny individual or party

other than itself.

Th e Court we nt o n to ho ld t

hat in te rv e nti on

of ri g ht w a s n ot a

pp ro pr iate to a dju dic a te l ega l interest of a

n indefinite cha

rac ter, nor hy

pothetical or spe culative sc enar ios that may never
c ome to p a ss.

The Rule confe rring the rig ht to intervene is r emedial, a nd is to be liberally

construed. See 59 Am.J ur.2d, Parties , § 168, p.587. The right to intervene in litigation must be a substantial interest, a le g al intere st, an interest known a nd protec ted by

the law, or

must be sufficiently

related to the orig inal action. See 59 Am.J ur.2d., Parties , § 176, p.594.

I n th is c a se the te rm s o f t he Se ttl e me nt e xpre ssl y

imp a c t upo n th e ho me bu ild e rs ’ int e re sts . Se c tio n 1 8. 03 of the Se ttl e me nt A g re e me nt p ro vid e s:

Some settlement class member s may pursue separate actions ag ainst the bui lders or other third parties who ma y be re sponsible for dama g es to their homes, including dama g e s f

or wh ic h th os e thi rd

pa rt ie s ma y c on te nd th a t th e Se ttl ingDe fe nd ant i s liable in whole or in pa

rt. I t is the Parties intent that the Settli ng Def endant sha ll not be re quired to par

ticipate in such sepa

rate ac t i o n s . I f cla ims for indemnity or
c on tr ibutio n a

re br ou g ht ag a ins t a Se ttl ingDe fe nd ant d e sp ite the pr ov isi on s o f t his section and the Class Member’ s counsel is unawa re thereof , the Settling De fenda

nt

s h a l l n o t i f

y t h e C l as s M em b er ’s co u n s el o f t h e a s s er t i o no f t h e c l ai m s

. . . . In addit i o n , the Settling De fenda nt shall, as nece ssary , expressly authorize and acknow ledg e the r ight of the Settlement Class Member to inter vene in his or he r own
n am e o r i n t h e n am e o f t h e S et t l i n g De fe n d an ti nan y p ro ce ed i n g as s er t i n g a
c on tr ibutio n o r i nd e mni ty c la im a g a ins t a Se ttl ing De fe nd ant a s de sc ri be d a bo ve in

or de r t o p le a d a

ny matte r i n d e fe ns e of su c h c ontr ibutio n a nd ind e mni ty

c la im o r i n avoidanc e of any deter

mination of liability which would cause a reduc tion to s uch Se ttl e me nt C la ss Me mbe r’ s judg me nt as pr ov ide d in Sec tio n 1 8. 2 o f t his Ag re e me nt.
This provision would impact upon actions broug ht pursuant to Tenn. R. Civ. P. Rul es 13, and 14. Moreove r, cla ims for indemnity ag ainst Dry

vit Sy stems, Inc., by

the homebuilders c ould exceed the amount of any

judgme nt obtained by

the homeowne r. 1summary

judgme nt in another law su it f il ed by a homeowne r ag ainst the contra ctor, whe re D ry vit was broug ht in by

the contra ctor for

contributions/indemnity

.

-8- We hold that the homebuilders may intervene as of rig ht in this c lass action, and the Or de r o f t he Tr ia l Co ur

t de nyingthe ir

int erv e nti on

is r e ve rs e d. Up on

re mand , th e se ttl e me nt w ill be sta y e d unti l th e int e rv e no rs are a llo we d to p art ic ipate in d e te rm inatio n o f t he ir ri g hts in t

his action. As stated in 59 Am.Jur.2d. Pa rti es, §244 (2002):

By the ver y definition of interve ntion, the inter venor is a party to the action. Af

ter intervention, the interve nor is as much a party to the action as the orig inal parties, a nd rende rs itself vul nera

ble t o complete a djudication of the issues in litigation betwe en its e lf and a dv e rs e pa

rt y . To m ake its ri g ht e ff

e c tua l, t he int e rv e no r m

us t ne c e ssa

ri ly have t h e s am e powe r as the or igina l parties, subjec t to the authority of the Court

rea sonably

to control the proc eeding s in the case

.
J erry andMel anee S ul li ns hav e app eal ed fr om th e ju dgment a pp ro vin g these ttl e me nt, ba sic a lly arguin g tha

t th e y we re me mbe rs of

the c la ss or ig ina lly re qu e ste d to be c e rt if ie d b y the Cla ss Action Complaint, and that they wer e then “cut out” of t he class when it was a mended in the Sec ond Am e nd e d Cl a ss A c tio n Co mpl a int, w ith out no tic e or op po rt un ity to b e he ard . T he se a

pp e lla nts

rec og nize that the first class was never cer tified, but a

rgue that it should not have be en cha ng ed by the c la ss c ouns e l w ith out c ourt sc rutiny , re lyingup on Te nn . R. Civ . P. 23 .0 5, wh ic h s tate s: “ A c la ss action shall n o t b e v o lu

n ta r il y d is mi s s e d

o r c o mp r o mi s e d

w it h o u t t h e a p p r o v a l o f

th e c o u rt, and notice of the proposed dismissal or compr omise shall be g iven to all members of the class in such

a manne r as the c ourt direc ts.”

We have f

ound n o ca s es interpr eting this particular pr ovision. However , the require ments reg ardingcourt a pproval a nd notice apply only afte r a class has been pr operly cer tified. Appella nts c it e c e r

tain fede ral c ases f

rom other jurisdictions which re quired notice and cour t scrutiny of the dismissal of a c lass action bef ore the class wa s cer

tified, but this has now bee n modified by the 20 03 ame ndme nts to t he F e de ra l Ru le s o f Civi l Proc e dure , suc h th a t th e fe de ra l ve rs ion of ru le 23 now states: “The court must approve any settlement, voluntary

dismiss al, or c ompromise of the claims, issues, or def

enses of a ce rtifi ed cl as s.” While we not bound by the fe dera l rules or the decisions interpre ting them, it would be unr easona bly burdensome to r equire trial courts to direc t notice of a

ny chang es in a c lass mak e- u p to all potential class member s befor e the c lass is ever

cer tified as a proper a

nd adequate class. Ac cording ly , since Mr. a nd Mrs. Sulli ns were not a par t of the class a s cer

tified, they

are not bound by this settlement or t hese pr ocee dings in a ny way , and ar e fr e e to p ur su e the ir ow n a c tio n a g a ins t th e de fe nd ant. Th e ir ri g hts have no t be e n p re

jud ic e d b y

thi s laws uit , s inc e the y are no t pa rt ie s to it, and

the y lik e wi se have no sta

nd ingto a pp e a l a s n on -p art ie s. Ac c or din g ly , w e dis mis s th e ir a pp e a l.

F ina lly , it is ob vio us that the Tr ia l Court is re qu ir e d to a dd re ss the mat ter of cla ss definition as containe d in its final order, whic h as ce rt i fi ed is a meaning less class. Thus, that classification must be re visited and the Tria l Court will be required to enter a n Orde r at the-9-

a pp ro pr iate tim e wh ic h p ro pe rl y c e rt if ie s th e c la ss.

F or the fo re g oin g re a so ns , we a ff ir m th e Judg me nt o f t

he Tr ia l Co ur

t in pa rt , r e ve rs e in part, and r emand. One- half of the cost of t he appeal is assessed to Dry vit Sy stems, I nc., and one ha lf of the c os t is a sse sse d to Jer ry and Me lane e Sul lin s.

_________________________ H ER SCH EL P I CKE N S F RAN KS , J.