### RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0039- 22
IN THE MATTER OF THE CIVIL COMMITMENT OF T.W., SVP 154-01.

____________________________

Argued September 19, 2024

– Decided September 25, 2024 Before Judges Mawla, Natali, and Vinci. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Hudson County, Docket No. S VP

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- 01. Catherine Reid, Designated Counsel, argued the caus e for appellant T.W. (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Publi c Defender, attorney; Catherine Reid, on the briefs). Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Matthew J

. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Rak sa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen Slocum, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Appellant T.W. appeals from a July 28, 2022 judgme nt continuing his confinement to the Special Treatment Unit (STU). W e affirm. NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court. " Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parti es in the case and its use in other cases is limite d. R. 1:36- 3.2 A- 0039

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T.W. has a lengthy and violent adult criminal hist ory, which began in 197 3, when he was arrested for sexually assaulting his fourteen-year-old nephew. In 1974, he was arrested and charged with carnal a buse, and found not guilty by reason of insanity. The following year h e was arrested for sexually assaulting a fourteen-year-old neighbor and sentenc ed to seven years of incarceration. In 1979, he raped a young teenage m ale and returned to prison for three years. Between 1979 and 1985, T.W. was arrested for non-se xual crimes. However, in 1991 he was arrested for assaulting a t eenage boy. In 1992, he assaulted a teenage female. T.W. was sentenced to ten years of incarceration

. While in prison, he committed many institutional in fractions between 1995 and 2000, including assaults. He was transferred to th e STU in 2001 and later that year committed there pursuant to the Sexually Viole nt Predator Act (SVPA), N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. T.W. incurred ninet een inf ractions during the first eight years for fighting, threats, assaults, and assaults with weapons. He has remained infraction-free since 2009. In July 2022, the trial judge conducted an annual review of T.W.'s commitment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. She c onsidered expert testimony on behalf of the State from a psychiatrist and the treating psychologist at the3 A- 0039

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STU. The treating psychologist's testimony corrobo rated the State's expert psychiatrist's testimony. T.W. also presented test imony from an expert psychologist. The trial judge addressed each exper t's testimony in her findings. The judge credited the testimony of the State 's expert psychiatrist who interviewed T.W. and considered his STU progress re ports, treatment notes, and other collateral information. The expert concluded T.W.'s mental abnormality and personality disorder predisposed him to commit acts of violence and T.W. was highly likely to engage in sexual violence, if he was not confined to the STU. The expert recounted the litany of T.W.'s ins titutional infractions. He also administered testing, which showed T.W. perfor med consistently with individuals who had a low I.Q. and were diagnosed with "mild mental retardation." The trial judge pointed out that all three experts found T.W. has been treated at the STU for twenty years and has not adv anced from his current treatment phase for approximately twelve years. Th e evidence showed T.W. "was not very receptive to feedback, particularly f rom his peers, and that he did not present his anger logs in group [therapy] durin g this review . . . period." T.W. struggled to apply the concepts learned in treatment. The judg e found "this could be due to his low cognitive processing skills and low fr ustration tolerance4 A- 0039

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level, which both [of the State's experts 1 ] testified to, has been a big prohibitive factor in [T.W.'s] development and . . . treatment. " Because of T.W.'s "lack of ability to process information . . . [he] easily be comes agitated, often shows poor judgment, and often feels that people are against h im. " According to the judge, this was corroborated by the fact T.W. "did not app ear to have any strong relationship to other peers at the STU , nor . . . any social network that seems to be supportive during his recovery period." T.W. did not thrive when moved to a less-structured environment. The judge found he "has not yet demonstrated a command over his sexual assault cycle, and does not have a relapse prevention plan. " She credited the State's experts who opined that the ability to devise a plan was "ha lted or stalled by his limited cognitive ability and his intellectual disa bility." This was corroborated by a November 2021 report, in which T.W. said he mu st stay away from boys because they are his high-risk situation. The j udge was concerned about this report since T.W. had no strategy when asked how he would handle exposure to boys . T.W. had no support team and socialized with no one in the STU.

1 Although both of the State's witnesses were qualified as experts, we refer to the State's psychiatrist as the State's expert and T.W. 's psychologist as the treating psychologist to differentiate them.5 A- 0039

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Although T.W. claimed he was no longer aroused by children, the j udge found this was not credible because in a different statement he said : "he was very concerned . . . he had to stay away from boys. " The judge was concerned the lack of structure in the event of T.W.'s releas e would cause him to reoffend

. The judge noted the psychological testing conducted by all three experts "placed [T.W.] at an above average risk category fo r being charged or convicted of a sexual offense . . . ." The evidence showed T .W.'s risk of recidivism could be mitigated if he completed a sexual offender trea tment program. The judge found T.W.'s expert testimony that his prior acts were not focused on children, and therefore he was more of a rapist than a child molester not credible. T.W.'s history of sexual violence showed he favored children, and physical violence was a part of his assaults. The judge credited the State's expert that over a twenty-year span there was a "persisten ce of the behavior . . . and a pattern of violent offending . . . aside from the s exual activity." She also found credible the expert's view that T.W.'s numerous inf ractions in the STU showed he "suffers from a low frustration tolerance, diffi culty in controlling his anger, and paranoia that people are doing him wrong." Alt hough T.W. attended numerous treatment programs many were not completed , and he had limited gains.6 A- 0039

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The State's psychiatric expert opined T.W.'s lack o f cognition created a difficulty understanding : concepts in treatment; the causes of sexual offending; the sexual cycle; interruption and relapse prevention skills ; and risky situations

. Both of the State's experts diagnosed T.W. with "ot her specified paraphilic disorder, with a particular focus on minors and aro usal to non-consenting victims, and other specified personality disorder w ith special traits . . . ." Further, "[a]ll experts agreed that . . . neither o f these disorders spontaneously remit, and require treatment, particularly in the . . . sexual offender program." The State's psychiatrist acknowledged the average r ate of recidivism for men in their late sixties, like T.W., was fifteen p ercent. However, T.W.'s conflicts and behaviors "as late as 2019 and 2021 . . . were concerning because [he] has a lifelong difficulty dealing with this an ger and frustration, and also continues to experience fantasies of hurting others ." The trial judge found T.W.'s expert not credible, p articularly the expert's view that T.W.'s actions were not associated with h is victim's ages, because four of T.W.'s victims were approximately the same age. The expert conceded T.W. would be at risk of re-offense if he could not arti culate a plan for relapse prevention and other treatment. He opined that if T.W. were released he would have him carry a card containing "dos and don'ts" to preven t re-offense. The7 A- 0039

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judge found this would be ineffect ive because of T.W.'s "limited cognitive ability" and lack of improvement, despite twenty ye ars of treatment. T.W.'s expert opined he could be released to a Clas s C boarding home. The judge rejected this testimony because "there wa s no explanation in the testimony of how . . . such a boarding home would a dequately reduce the stressors of reintegration." The expert did not ex plain this plan in detail and how it would prevent re-offense. Cross-examination rev ealed Class C boarding homes would not provide the sort of one - on -one monitoring or assistance T.W. required. The judge concluded as follows: "I do not believe that a conditional discharge plan will adequately . . . reduce [T.W.'s ] dangerousness below the level of [commitment], and that is because . . . he thrives primarily in a structured environment, and that with continued tre atment, he will hopefully do better." Citing In re Commitment of W.Z. (W.Z. II), 173 N.J. 109, 132 (2002), she found the State proved T.W. "is highly likely t o reoffend sexually if released
in [ the ] general community." T.W. raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I: THE JUDGE MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED THE SVPA'S THIRD PRONG LEGAL TEST IN TWO CRITICAL WAYS, REQUIRING REVERSAL.8 A- 0039

- 22 A. The judge misinterpreted the Court's "highly likely" language, requiring reversal.
B. The judge applied the 2001 weighing test that the New Jersey Supreme Court replaced in 2002, requirin g reversal.
POINT II: THE JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER THE "ENTIRE CIRCUMSTANCES" AS REQUIRED BY LAW WHEN CONCLUDING T.W. WOULD HAVE SERIOUS DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING SEXUALLY HARMFUL BEHAVIOR SUCH THAT HE WAS HIGHLY LIKELY NOT TO CONTROL IT AND WOULD REOFFEND. POINT III: THE JUDGE'S LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT THE STATE'S EVIDENCE MET THE APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD AT A CLEAR AND CONVINCING LEVEL WAS IN ERROR; THAT CONCLUSION COULD NOT BE REACHED ON THIS RECORD.
I. "The scope of appellate review of a trial court's decision in a commitment proceeding is extremely narrow." In re J.P., 339 N .J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 311 (19 78)). "The reviewing judge's determination should be accorded 'utmost deference' and modified only where the record reveals a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid. (quoting Fields, 77 N.J. at 311). Deference is required because "[t]he judges who hear SVPA cases generally are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in t he subject' is entitled to 'special9 A- 0039

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deference.'" In re Civ. Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2 014) (quoting In re Civ. Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 21 8, 226 (App. Div. 2007)). Also , we "give deference to the findings of our trial j udges because they have the 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the " feel " of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)).
We do "not modify a trial court's determination either to commit or release an individual unless 'the record reveals a clear mi stake.'" Id. at 175 (quoting In re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "So long as the trial court's findings are supported by 'sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' those findings should not be disturbed." Ibid. (quoting Johnson , 42 N.J. at 162).
II. In Point I, T.W. argues the trial judge ignored th at the SVPA requires the State to prove that he "has serious difficulty in c ontrolling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that he . . . will not control" it and will reoffend. W.Z. II , 173 N.J. at 1 32 . Instead, the judge applied a balancing test from In re Commitment of W.Z. (W.Z. I), 339 N.J. Su per. 549, 580 (App. Div. 2001), which the Court did not adopt in W.Z. II.10 A- 0039

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T.W. argues the reasoning in W.Z. I was rejected be cause it creat es "a composite picture of 'future dangerousness'" that i ncludes the impermissible factor of "seriousness of . . . harm." The only fa ctor the trial judge should have considered was the likelihood of future sexually vi olent acts. The judge also misinterpreted W.Z. II's "highly likely" requiremen t as rejecting a "more likely than not standard" whereas the Court meant to direc t trial courts away from using terms like "preponderance" or "more than [fif ty] percent" to describe the "highly likely" standard. He asserts we should app ly a de novo review because the judge mistakenly applied the law. T.W. also alleges the judge misapplied the facts to the law. The treating psychologist did not testify that T.W. was more likely than not to reoffend, and T.W.'s expert testified his likelihood of re -offense was fifteen percent. He complains these facts and the trial judge's misappr ehension of the highly likely standard show the judge mistakenly relied on the State's expert opinion. A commitment under the SVPA requires that a person : (1) must have been "convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not gui lty by reason of insanity for commission of a sexually violent offense, or . . . cha rged with a sexually violent offense but found to be incompetent to stand trial[ ;]" (2) "suffers from a mental abnormality or personality disorder" predisposing h im to commit acts of sexual11 A- 0039

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violence; and (3) as a result be "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4- 27.26. T he first two prongs were stipulated by T.W. As for prong three, the SVPA defines the "likel[ihood] to engage in acts of sexual violence" as "the propensity of a person to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the health and safety of others." Ibid. A person's likelihood to commit sexually vio lent acts "relates to the control determination that the trial court must make." W.Z. II , 173 N.J. at 130. "[T]he State must prove that threat by demonstrating that the individual has serious difficulty in controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that he or she will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will reoffend." Id. at 132 (emphasis added). The Court held the "probability of reoffending and bur den of proof" should be considered distinct, and the clear and co nvincing burden of proof required by the SVPA "does not . . . control[] the substance of the . . . [probability] finding." Id. at 131. The Court sta ted that quantum of proof terminology such as "more than fifty-percent" should not be used because it would cause confusion given that "the trial court m ust evaluate difficult,12 A- 0039

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nuanced medical evidence and reduce it to specific findin gs affecting a person's liberty." Id. at 131-32. In R.F., the Supreme Court overturned our reversal of a trial court's release decision. 217 N.J. at 175. The trial court found the State did not p rove by clear and convincing evidence that R.F. was highly likely to reoffend. Id. at 176.

The experts disagreed about whether the evidence established that the [victims] were prepubescent, a n important factor in assessing the nature of R.F.'s disorder; whether, given R.F.'s cognitive limitatio ns and age, the Static-99 was an appropriate diagnosti c tool for measuring his risk of sexually reoffending; and whether R.F.'s viewing the [victims] as his peers increased or decreased the risk that he would sexua lly reoffend. Additionally, there were conflicting acc ounts about whether violence was used during the sexual encounters and misunderstandings about whether R.F. built a fort and then used it to lure children. [Id. at 177-78.] The Supreme Court found the trial judge "had a full un derstanding of the factual limitations in the record, and that led her to have doubt about whether the State had carried its burden." Id . at 178. Th e analysis did not rely on the percentage or likelihood of reoffending, but instea d weighed many conflicting facts. Ibid. R.F. cautioned an appellate court not to make "its own factfindings" due to "mere disagreement with the trial court's fa ctfindings" if the trial court based its decision on sufficient credible evidence. Ibid.13 A- 0039

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The evidence presented at T.W.'s proceedings suppo rts the understanding that predictions of re-offense are complex. Hence, the reasons for the Court's ruling in R.F. T.W.'s expert explained the "recidivism rates for o ffenders who shared characteristics with [T.W.] . . . are 18.4 percent after [five] years, and [twentyeight] percent after [ten] years, in the community. " He also emphasized "these are the observed recidivism scores for individuals who share characteristics with [T.W.]. It is certainly not a specific risk estimate for [T .W.]." The State's expert also qualified his estimation of T.W.'s likelihood of reoffending the same way, noting "these numerical estimates are group estimat es[,]" and "within that group, there could be variation that may be driven by othe r factors" specific to an individual. The State's expert noted T.W. scored a five on the Static-99R, "which places him at above average risk for sexual reoffen ding." T.W.'s score on the Stable 2007 was eight, "put[ting] him at a moderate level of risk . . . ." The expert testified he "would put . . . more weight to the factors such as impulse control and the low frustration tolerance . . . tha t [T.W.] cannot control [his] anger." The most significant protective factor for T.W. was his age.14 A- 0039

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The treating psychologist testified he interviewed T.W. "a number of times over the years" and found "he tends to be coo perative" and generally welloriented, but "not a reliable historian." As a result, it was " very difficult to assess some of the treatment concepts and his progr ess, because he doesn't provide a consistent presentation." The treating p sychologist also identifi ed T.W.'s risk factors regarding anger and impulse con trol. Sh e noted T.W. had

not received any MAP 2 placements since 2009. However, there was an altercation in 2019 involving another resident who assaulted him, and after a cool-down period, T.W. retaliated. The psychologis t concluded T.W.'s actions were not self-defense, but instead the product of p lanning and aggression. The treating psychologist also noted that in 2019, T.W. had issues with psychiatric stability because he struggled under st ress and became overwhelmed whe n there was less structure. "Almost immediately, [T. W.] demonstrated poor frustration tolerance, anger, he wasn't being coope rative, he was agitated, hostile, the paranoia increased." He react s more when he believes someone had lied about him and "he is unable or unwilling to ac knowledge all of the other behaviors that were going on."

2 MAP stands for "modified activity program."15 A- 0039

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The treating psychologist also scored T.W. a five o n the Static-99R and an eight on the Stable 2007. At some point in 2021 , T.W. received a seven on the Stable 2007. Although the psychologist would not state T.W.'s risk for reoffending was more than fifty percent, she testif ied he is "at high risk" for sexual re-offense

. The evidence amply support ed the trial judge's decision

. However, when the judge was discussing the standard of determining risk, she conflated W.Z. II and W.Z. I. The judge stated "W.Z. [ II ] allows me to weigh . . . [T.W.'s] propensity against the nature or offense of the act that he tends to commit." W.Z.
II did not endorse the balancing test from W.Z. I

. In W.Z. I, we required the court to determine "the magnitude of the risk" for reoffending by considering two factors: "the l ikelihood of the conduct and the seriousness of the harm." 339 N.J. Super. at 5 73. Both factors would be granted some weight in the court's final determinat ion because the potential harm "can vary greatly from mere nuisance-type prop erty damage to serious bodily injury or death." Ibid. (citing State v. Kr ol, 68 N.J. 236, 259 (1975)). Thus, a high likelihood but lower seriousness could weigh in favor of release. Ibid. Likewise, a court could find a lower likelihood to reoffend "coupled with a high degree of seriousness" justifies commitment. Id. at 574.16 A- 0039

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After W.Z. I, the United States Supreme Court decid ed Kansas v. Crane. 534 U.S. 407 (2002). W.Z. then petition ed for certification to our Supreme Court, challenging the constitutionality of the SVP A. Our Supreme Court said that i n Crane, "the Court clarified the substantive due process limitations on a state's ability to ide ntify the mental abnormalities that render a sex offender eligible for civil commi tment because of his or her dangerousness." W.Z.II, 173 N.J. at 113. "Crane h eld that a state may not civilly commit a sex offender without making a determinatio n about the person's 'lack of control' over his or her sexually violent behavi or." Ibid. (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 411). "[T]he [Crane] Court rejected the cl aim that a sex offender's lack of control must be demonstrated to be total or comp lete; rather, the Court acknowledged a state's authority to commit those se x offenders who have 'serious difficulty in controlling [their] behavior .'" Ibid. (quoting Crane, 534 U.S. at 411) (second alteration in original). W.Z. II crystalized the dangerousness analysis by focusing it on determining the individual's likelihood of re-offen se. The Court explained:

[T]o be within the class of persons who may be committed under the SVPA, one must be "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence." That aspect of the "dangerousness" prong of the Act is explained to me an that "the propensity of a person to commit acts of sexual violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the17 A- 0039

- 22 health and safety of others." One's likelihood to commit such acts obviously relates to the control determination that the trial court must make. Although the "likelihood" requirement is not defined further in the Act, we import into that analysis the "serious difficulty" standard. An individual may be conside red to pose a threat to the health and safety of others if he or she were found, by clear and convincing evidence , to have serious difficulty in controlling his or her harmful behavior such that it is highly likely that the ind ividual will not control his or her sexually violent behavi or and will reoffend. [Id. at 129-30.] T.W. suggests the following statement by the trial ju dge demonstrates she applied the wrong standards: "W.Z.[ II ] rejected the idea that scoring the likelihood to reoffend would . . . be tied to any c alculation[,] or to a number[,] or to even a standard that's more likely than not, and that the [c]ourt can look at the victim impact and other factors to assess risk factor." Although the trial judge erred when she noted victim impact was an app ropriate consideration because it is not tied to lack of control or the li kelihood of reoffending considerations, the error was harmless because she never made a finding on victim impact. R. 2:10

- 2. Our law mandates the consideration of other factors in determining likelihood- to -reoffend, lack- of -control beyond percentage calculations, and actuarial tables, and requires courts to obtain a co mprehensive picture. See Doe18 A- 0039

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v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 33 (1995) ; W.Z. II , 173 N.J. at 132; In re Commitment of A.Y., 458 N.J. Super. 147, 172 (App. Div. 2019). T he trial judge fulfilled this obligation when she found T.W. "functions well unde r less stressful environments as evidenced by his difficulty in regu lating his emotions in a more stressful environment . . . . " She noted he did not thrive when he got into an altercation and had to be removed to a less-structu red environment. The judge also satisfied W.Z. II when she found T.W. lacked " command over his sexual assault cycle, and does not have a relapse preventi on plan. And . . . his ability to be able to come up with a relapse prevention pla n is halted or stalled by his limited cognitive ability and his intellectual disa bility." The likelihood of reoffending was addressed by the judge when she said she was "particularly concerned" by a report from Nove mber 30, 2021, in which T.W. stated he needed to be away from boys because they "are his high[-]risk situation." The Static-99R scores, further supported this conclusio n. As did the judge's findings regarding the duration of T.W.'s h istory of threats and violence demonstrated a "persistence of the behavior, and . . . a pattern of violent offending[,]" as well as his history of infractions in STU. The trial judge's detailed analysis of the relevan t facts show s her decision rested on sufficient credible evidence in the recor d. The experts did not differ19 A- 0039

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meaningfully in their risk assessments, and the judge went beyond the percentage risk valuations to consider a multitude of risk factors. We are unconvinced the harmless error committed by the tri al judge led to an unjust result. The facts amply demonstrate T.W.'s commitm ent was warranted.
III. In Point II, T.W. argues two experts opined he woul d not benefit from further STU treatment and the trial judge did not consider his entire circumstances, including the conditions under which he might be discharged and their impact on his likelihood of reoffending. He asserts the judge only considered three conditions, namely: a Class C boa rding house, group therapy, and a therapeutic technique proposed by his expert. He cl aims the judge should have consider ed the other control options, including : GPS monitoring, parole officer supervision, individual therapy, polygraphs , potential home confinement, internet and phone restrictions, and s ubstance testing. He notes the registration and monitoring required by the SVPA would also serve as a bulwark against reoffending because law enforcement would have his picture , home and work addresses, and would go door

- to -door showing his photograph to neighbors, schools, and youth organizations, as required by statute

.20 A- 0039

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"Commitment laws were enacted to strike a balance b etween the interest of safety for the individual and the community, and the fundamental liberty interests of the person the State seeks to commit." In re Commitment of J.J.F. , 365 N.J. Super. 486, 502 (App. Div. 2004) (citing N .J.S.A. 30:4-27.1b). "To attain the balance that the SVPA seeks, the court m ust consider the entire circumstances of the individual, including conditions im posed on the individual that affect the safety of the community." Ibid. Our review of the record convinces us the trial jud ge consider ed the entire circumstances as required by J.J.F. The controls T.W. claims were unaddressed did not outweigh the judge's findings that T.W. lac ked the ability to control his dangerous or violent behavior and that his behavior worsened in a less controlled environment than the STU. As the judge noted, the testimony T.W. presented did not explain how "a boarding home would adequate ly reduce the stressors of reintegration" and T.W.'s expert did not "explain i n detail, why the plan would assure no re[-]offense . . . ." The record support ed the judge's finding T.W.'s behavior would not have improved in the group therapy he would receive in a boarding home as opposed to the one- on -one therapy he received in the STU. Contrary to T.W.'s assertions, the State's expert o pined T.W. could better learn to control his behavior

. And T.W.'s treating psychologist explained that,21 A- 0039

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notwithstanding his limitations , T.W. could continue to benefit from therapy. Therefore, the judge did not err when she concluded T.W.'s risk of reoffending could be further mitigated by completion of sex off ender treatment in the STU.
IV. Finally, T.W. asserts the trial judge erred in find ing the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that he will have serious difficulty controlling sexually harmful behavior if released. He claims t here is no evidence in the record that he presently has difficulty controlling sexual behavior at all. The evidence presented by the State about cognitive lim itations impacting his ability to communicate and internalize treatment was not cl ear and convincing evidence of a lack of

control and a likelihood to reoffend. Nor were th e 2019 and 2021 altercations. T.W. argues the treating psychologist offered the b etter way to assess risk was to provide him with role-playing opportunities, repeat his relapse prevention plan, develop a safety plan, and permit monitored v isits in the community through the furlough process. Additionally, T.W. n otes he passed the most recent polygraph administered by the State in 2018, and he has supportive relationships with a sister and nephew.22 A- 0039

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"To satisfy the intermediate clear-and-convincing s tandard, the fact finder 'must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is "highly probable."'" In re Perskie, 207 N.J. 275, 290 (2011) (quoting 2 McCorm ick on Evidence § 340, at 487 (6th ed. 2006)). "Evidence that is clear and c onvincing 'should produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conv iction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.'" Ibid. (quo ting In re Purrazzella, 134 N.J. 228, 240 (1993)). "To meet that burden, the eviden ce must be 'so clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfi nder] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 75 (1 993)).
Th e record contained clear and convincing evidence wa rranting the judge's commitment decision. S he was correct to be "particularly concerned" by the recency of a November 2021 report , that T.W. said he needed to be away from boys because they "are his high[-]risk situati on." The evidence of persistence of T.W.'s sexual offending prior to com mitment, the pattern of violence in his offenses, and his infractions in the STU we re enough to form "in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conv iction as to the truth" of T.W.'s potential to reoffend. Perskie, 207 N.J. at 290. Affirmed.