RECORD IMPOUNDED 

 SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-0039-22 

IN THE MATTER OF THE 

CIVIL COMMITMENT OF 

T.W., SVP 154-01. 

____________________________

Argued September 19, 2024 – Decided September 25, 2024 

Before Judges Mawla, Natali, and Vinci. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Hudson County, Docket No. SVP-154-01.

Catherine Reid, Designated Counsel, argued the cause 

for appellant T.W. (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public 

Defender, attorney; Catherine Reid, on the briefs). 

Stephen Slocum, Deputy Attorney General, argued the

cause for respondent State of New Jersey (Matthew J. 

Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Melissa H. Raksa, 

Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Stephen 

Slocum, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM 

 Appellant T.W. appeals from a July 28, 2022 judgment continuing his 

confinement to the Special Treatment Unit (STU). We affirm. 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-0039-22

 T.W. has a lengthy and violent adult criminal history, which began in 

1973, when he was arrested for sexually assaulting his fourteen-year-old 

nephew. In 1974, he was arrested and charged with carnal abuse, and found not 

guilty by reason of insanity. The following year he was arrested for sexually 

assaulting a fourteen-year-old neighbor and sentenced to seven years of 

incarceration. In 1979, he raped a young teenage male and returned to prison 

for three years. 

Between 1979 and 1985, T.W. was arrested for non-sexual crimes. 

However, in 1991 he was arrested for assaulting a teenage boy. In 1992, he 

assaulted a teenage female. T.W. was sentenced to ten years of incarceration. 

While in prison, he committed many institutional infractions between 1995 and 

2000, including assaults. He was transferred to the STU in 2001 and later that 

year committed there pursuant to the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA), 

N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.24 to -27.38. T.W. incurred nineteen infractions during the 

first eight years for fighting, threats, assaults, and assaults with weapons. He 

has remained infraction-free since 2009. 

In July 2022, the trial judge conducted an annual review of T.W.'s 

commitment, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.35. She considered expert testimony 

on behalf of the State from a psychiatrist and the treating psychologist at the 
3 A-0039-22

STU. The treating psychologist's testimony corroborated the State's expert 

psychiatrist's testimony. T.W. also presented testimony from an expert 

psychologist. The trial judge addressed each expert's testimony in her findings. 

The judge credited the testimony of the State's expert psychiatrist who 

interviewed T.W. and considered his STU progress reports, treatment notes, and 

other collateral information. The expert concluded T.W.'s mental abnormality 

and personality disorder predisposed him to commit acts of violence and T.W. 

was highly likely to engage in sexual violence, if he was not confined to the 

STU. The expert recounted the litany of T.W.'s institutional infractions. He 

also administered testing, which showed T.W. performed consistently with 

individuals who had a low I.Q. and were diagnosed with "mild mental

retardation." 

The trial judge pointed out that all three experts found T.W. has been 

treated at the STU for twenty years and has not advanced from his current 

treatment phase for approximately twelve years. The evidence showed T.W. 

"was not very receptive to feedback, particularly from his peers, and that he did 

not present his anger logs in group [therapy] during this review . . . period." 

T.W. struggled to apply the concepts learned in treatment. The judge found "this 

could be due to his low cognitive processing skills and low frustration tolerance 
4 A-0039-22

level, which both [of the State's experts1] testified to, has been a big prohibitive 

factor in [T.W.'s] development and . . . treatment." Because of T.W.'s "lack of 

ability to process information . . . [he] easily becomes agitated, often shows poor 

judgment, and often feels that people are against him." According to the judge, 

this was corroborated by the fact T.W. "did not appear to have any strong 

relationship to other peers at the STU, nor . . . any social network that seems to 

be supportive during his recovery period." 

T.W. did not thrive when moved to a less-structured environment. The 

judge found he "has not yet demonstrated a command over his sexual assault 

cycle, and does not have a relapse prevention plan." She credited the State's 

experts who opined that the ability to devise a plan was "halted or stalled by his 

limited cognitive ability and his intellectual disability." This was corroborated 

by a November 2021 report, in which T.W. said he must stay away from boys 

because they are his high-risk situation. The judge was concerned about this 

report since T.W. had no strategy when asked how he would handle exposure to 

boys. T.W. had no support team and socialized with no one in the STU. 

1

 Although both of the State's witnesses were qualified as experts, we refer to 

the State's psychiatrist as the State's expert and T.W.'s psychologist as the 

treating psychologist to differentiate them. 
5 A-0039-22

Although T.W. claimed he was no longer aroused by children, the judge 

found this was not credible because in a different statement he said: "he was 

very concerned . . . he had to stay away from boys." The judge was concerned 

the lack of structure in the event of T.W.'s release would cause him to reoffend. 

The judge noted the psychological testing conducted by all three experts 

"placed [T.W.] at an above average risk category for being charged or convicted 

of a sexual offense . . . ." The evidence showed T.W.'s risk of recidivism could 

be mitigated if he completed a sexual offender treatment program. 

The judge found T.W.'s expert testimony that his prior acts were not 

focused on children, and therefore he was more of a rapist than a child molester 

not credible. T.W.'s history of sexual violence showed he favored children, and 

physical violence was a part of his assaults. The judge credited the State's expert 

that over a twenty-year span there was a "persistence of the behavior . . . and a 

pattern of violent offending . . . aside from the sexual activity." She also found 

credible the expert's view that T.W.'s numerous infractions in the STU showed 

he "suffers from a low frustration tolerance, difficulty in controlling his anger, 

and paranoia that people are doing him wrong." Although T.W. attended 

numerous treatment programs many were not completed, and he had limited 

gains. 
6 A-0039-22

The State's psychiatric expert opined T.W.'s lack of cognition created a 

difficulty understanding: concepts in treatment; the causes of sexual offending; 

the sexual cycle; interruption and relapse prevention skills; and risky situations. 

Both of the State's experts diagnosed T.W. with "other specified paraphilic 

disorder, with a particular focus on minors and arousal to non-consenting 

victims, and other specified personality disorder with special traits . . . ." 

Further, "[a]ll experts agreed that . . . neither of these disorders spontaneously 

remit, and require treatment, particularly in the . . . sexual offender program." 

The State's psychiatrist acknowledged the average rate of recidivism for 

men in their late sixties, like T.W., was fifteen percent. However, T.W.'s 

conflicts and behaviors "as late as 2019 and 2021 . . . were concerning because 

[he] has a lifelong difficulty dealing with this anger and frustration, and also 

continues to experience fantasies of hurting others." 

The trial judge found T.W.'s expert not credible, particularly the expert's 

view that T.W.'s actions were not associated with his victim's ages, because four 

of T.W.'s victims were approximately the same age. The expert conceded T.W. 

would be at risk of re-offense if he could not articulate a plan for relapse 

prevention and other treatment. He opined that if T.W. were released he would 

have him carry a card containing "dos and don'ts" to prevent re-offense. The 
7 A-0039-22

judge found this would be ineffective because of T.W.'s "limited cognitive 

ability" and lack of improvement, despite twenty years of treatment. 

T.W.'s expert opined he could be released to a Class C boarding home. 

The judge rejected this testimony because "there was no explanation in the 

testimony of how . . . such a boarding home would adequately reduce the 

stressors of reintegration." The expert did not explain this plan in detail and 

how it would prevent re-offense. Cross-examination revealed Class C boarding 

homes would not provide the sort of one-on-one monitoring or assistance T.W. 

required. 

The judge concluded as follows: "I do not believe that a conditional 

discharge plan will adequately . . . reduce [T.W.'s] dangerousness below the 

level of [commitment], and that is because . . . he thrives primarily in a 

structured environment, and that with continued treatment, he will hopefully do 

better." Citing In re Commitment of W.Z. (W.Z. II), 173 N.J. 109, 132 (2002), 

she found the State proved T.W. "is highly likely to reoffend sexually if released 

in [the] general community." 

T.W. raises the following arguments on appeal: 

POINT I: THE JUDGE MISUNDERSTOOD AND 

MISAPPLIED THE SVPA'S THIRD PRONG LEGAL 

TEST IN TWO CRITICAL WAYS, REQUIRING 

REVERSAL. 
8 A-0039-22

A. The judge misinterpreted the Court's "highly 

likely" language, requiring reversal. 

B. The judge applied the 2001 weighing test that the 

New Jersey Supreme Court replaced in 2002, requiring 

reversal. 

POINT II: THE JUDGE DID NOT CONSIDER THE 

"ENTIRE CIRCUMSTANCES" AS REQUIRED BY 

LAW WHEN CONCLUDING T.W. WOULD HAVE 

SERIOUS DIFFICULTY CONTROLLING 

SEXUALLY HARMFUL BEHAVIOR SUCH THAT 

HE WAS HIGHLY LIKELY NOT TO CONTROL IT 

AND WOULD REOFFEND. 

POINT III: THE JUDGE'S LEGAL CONCLUSION 

THAT THE STATE'S EVIDENCE MET THE 

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARD AT A CLEAR 

AND CONVINCING LEVEL WAS IN ERROR; 

THAT CONCLUSION COULD NOT BE REACHED 

ON THIS RECORD. 

I.

"The scope of appellate review of a trial court's decision in a commitment 

proceeding is extremely narrow." In re J.P., 339 N.J. Super. 443, 459 (App. Div. 

2001) (citing State v. Fields, 77 N.J. 282, 311 (1978)). "The reviewing judge's 

determination should be accorded 'utmost deference' and modified only where 

the record reveals a clear abuse of discretion." Ibid. (quoting Fields, 77 N.J. at 

311). Deference is required because "[t]he judges who hear SVPA cases 

generally are 'specialists' and 'their expertise in the subject' is entitled to 'special 
9 A-0039-22

deference.'" In re Civ. Commitment of R.F., 217 N.J. 152, 174 (2014) (quoting 

In re Civ. Commitment of T.J.N., 390 N.J. Super. 218, 226 (App. Div. 2007)). 

Also, we "give deference to the findings of our trial judges because they have 

the 'opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, 

which a reviewing court cannot enjoy.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 

146, 161 (1964)). 

We do "not modify a trial court's determination either to commit or release 

an individual unless 'the record reveals a clear mistake.'" Id. at 175 (quoting In 

re D.C., 146 N.J. 31, 58 (1996)). "So long as the trial court's findings are 

supported by 'sufficient credible evidence present in the record,' those findings 

should not be disturbed." Ibid. (quoting Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162). 

II. 

In Point I, T.W. argues the trial judge ignored that the SVPA requires the 

State to prove that he "has serious difficulty in controlling sexually harmful 

behavior such that it is highly likely that he . . . will not control" it and will 

reoffend. W.Z. II, 173 N.J. at 132. Instead, the judge applied a balancing test 

from In re Commitment of W.Z. (W.Z. I), 339 N.J. Super. 549, 580 (App. Div. 

2001), which the Court did not adopt in W.Z. II. 
10 A-0039-22

T.W. argues the reasoning in W.Z. I was rejected because it creates "a 

composite picture of 'future dangerousness'" that includes the impermissible 

factor of "seriousness of . . . harm." The only factor the trial judge should have 

considered was the likelihood of future sexually violent acts. The judge also 

misinterpreted W.Z. II's "highly likely" requirement as rejecting a "more likely 

than not standard" whereas the Court meant to direct trial courts away from 

using terms like "preponderance" or "more than [fifty] percent" to describe the 

"highly likely" standard. He asserts we should apply a de novo review because 

the judge mistakenly applied the law. 

T.W. also alleges the judge misapplied the facts to the law. The treating 

psychologist did not testify that T.W. was more likely than not to reoffend, and 

T.W.'s expert testified his likelihood of re-offense was fifteen percent. He 

complains these facts and the trial judge's misapprehension of the highly likely 

standard show the judge mistakenly relied on the State's expert opinion. 

A commitment under the SVPA requires that a person: (1) must have been 

"convicted, adjudicated delinquent or found not guilty by reason of insanity for 

commission of a sexually violent offense, or . . . charged with a sexually violent 

offense but found to be incompetent to stand trial[;]" (2) "suffers from a mental 

abnormality or personality disorder" predisposing him to commit acts of sexual 
11 A-0039-22

violence; and (3) as a result be "likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if not 

confined in a secure facility for control, care and treatment." N.J.S.A. 30:4-

27.26. The first two prongs were stipulated by T.W. 

As for prong three, the SVPA defines the "likel[ihood] to engage in acts 

of sexual violence" as "the propensity of a person to commit acts of sexual 

violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the health and safety of others." 

Ibid. A person's likelihood to commit sexually violent acts "relates to the control 

determination that the trial court must make." W.Z. II, 173 N.J. at 130. "[T]he 

State must prove that threat by demonstrating that the individual has serious 

difficulty in controlling sexually harmful behavior such that it is highly likely 

that he or she will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and will 

reoffend." Id. at 132 (emphasis added). 

The Court held the "probability of reoffending and burden of proof" 

should be considered distinct, and the clear and convincing burden of proof 

required by the SVPA "does not . . . control[] the substance of the . . . 

[probability] finding." Id. at 131. The Court stated that quantum of proof 

terminology such as "more than fifty-percent" should not be used because it 

would cause confusion given that "the trial court must evaluate difficult, 
12 A-0039-22

nuanced medical evidence and reduce it to specific findings affecting a person's 

liberty." Id. at 131-32. 

In R.F., the Supreme Court overturned our reversal of a trial court's release 

decision. 217 N.J. at 175. The trial court found the State did not prove by clear 

and convincing evidence that R.F. was highly likely to reoffend. Id. at 176. 

The experts disagreed about whether the evidence 

established that the [victims] were prepubescent, an 

important factor in assessing the nature of R.F.'s 

disorder; whether, given R.F.'s cognitive limitations 

and age, the Static-99 was an appropriate diagnostic 

tool for measuring his risk of sexually reoffending; and 

whether R.F.'s viewing the [victims] as his peers 

increased or decreased the risk that he would sexually 

reoffend. Additionally, there were conflicting accounts 

about whether violence was used during the sexual 

encounters and misunderstandings about whether R.F.

built a fort and then used it to lure children. 

[Id. at 177-78.] 

The Supreme Court found the trial judge "had a full understanding of the 

factual limitations in the record, and that led her to have doubt about whether 

the State had carried its burden." Id. at 178. The analysis did not rely on the 

percentage or likelihood of reoffending, but instead weighed many conflicting 

facts. Ibid. R.F. cautioned an appellate court not to make "its own factfindings" 

due to "mere disagreement with the trial court's factfindings" if the trial court 

based its decision on sufficient credible evidence. Ibid. 
13 A-0039-22

 The evidence presented at T.W.'s proceedings supports the understanding 

that predictions of re-offense are complex. Hence, the reasons for the Court's 

ruling in R.F. 

T.W.'s expert explained the "recidivism rates for offenders who shared 

characteristics with [T.W.] . . . are 18.4 percent after [five] years, and [twentyeight] percent after [ten] years, in the community." He also emphasized "these 

are the observed recidivism scores for individuals who share characteristics with 

[T.W.]. It is certainly not a specific risk estimate for [T.W.]." The State's expert 

also qualified his estimation of T.W.'s likelihood of reoffending the same way, 

noting "these numerical estimates are group estimates[,]" and "within that group, 

there could be variation that may be driven by other factors" specific to an 

individual. 

The State's expert noted T.W. scored a five on the Static-99R, "which 

places him at above average risk for sexual reoffending." T.W.'s score on the 

Stable 2007 was eight, "put[ting] him at a moderate level of risk . . . ." The 

expert testified he "would put . . . more weight to the factors such as impulse 

control and the low frustration tolerance . . . that [T.W.] cannot control [his] 

anger." The most significant protective factor for T.W. was his age. 
14 A-0039-22

The treating psychologist testified he interviewed T.W. "a number of 

times over the years" and found "he tends to be cooperative" and generally welloriented, but "not a reliable historian." As a result, it was "very difficult to 

assess some of the treatment concepts and his progress, because he doesn't 

provide a consistent presentation." The treating psychologist also identified

T.W.'s risk factors regarding anger and impulse control. She noted T.W. had 

not received any MAP2 placements since 2009. However, there was an 

altercation in 2019 involving another resident who assaulted him, and after a 

cool-down period, T.W. retaliated. The psychologist concluded T.W.'s actions 

were not self-defense, but instead the product of planning and aggression. 

The treating psychologist also noted that in 2019, T.W. had issues with 

psychiatric stability because he struggled under stress and became overwhelmed 

when there was less structure. "Almost immediately, [T.W.] demonstrated poor 

frustration tolerance, anger, he wasn't being cooperative, he was agitated, 

hostile, the paranoia increased." He reacts more when he believes someone had 

lied about him and "he is unable or unwilling to acknowledge all of the other 

behaviors that were going on." 

2

 MAP stands for "modified activity program." 
15 A-0039-22

The treating psychologist also scored T.W. a five on the Static-99R and 

an eight on the Stable 2007. At some point in 2021, T.W. received a seven on 

the Stable 2007. Although the psychologist would not state T.W.'s risk for 

reoffending was more than fifty percent, she testified he is "at high risk" for 

sexual re-offense. 

The evidence amply supported the trial judge's decision. However, when 

the judge was discussing the standard of determining risk, she conflated W.Z. II

and W.Z. I. The judge stated "W.Z. [II] allows me to weigh . . . [T.W.'s] 

propensity against the nature or offense of the act that he tends to commit." W.Z. 

II did not endorse the balancing test from W.Z. I. 

In W.Z. I, we required the court to determine "the magnitude of the risk" 

for reoffending by considering two factors: "the likelihood of the conduct and 

the seriousness of the harm." 339 N.J. Super. at 573. Both factors would be 

granted some weight in the court's final determination because the potential 

harm "can vary greatly from mere nuisance-type property damage to serious 

bodily injury or death." Ibid. (citing State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 259 (1975)). 

Thus, a high likelihood but lower seriousness could weigh in favor of release. 

Ibid. Likewise, a court could find a lower likelihood to reoffend "coupled with 

a high degree of seriousness" justifies commitment. Id. at 574. 
16 A-0039-22

After W.Z. I, the United States Supreme Court decided Kansas v. Crane. 

534 U.S. 407 (2002). W.Z. then petitioned for certification to our Supreme 

Court, challenging the constitutionality of the SVPA. 

Our Supreme Court said that in Crane, "the Court clarified the substantive 

due process limitations on a state's ability to identify the mental abnormalities 

that render a sex offender eligible for civil commitment because of his or her 

dangerousness." W.Z.II, 173 N.J. at 113. "Crane held that a state may not civilly 

commit a sex offender without making a determination about the person's 'lack 

of control' over his or her sexually violent behavior." Ibid. (quoting Crane, 534 

U.S. at 411). "[T]he [Crane] Court rejected the claim that a sex offender's lack 

of control must be demonstrated to be total or complete; rather, the Court 

acknowledged a state's authority to commit those sex offenders who have 

'serious difficulty in controlling [their] behavior.'" Ibid. (quoting Crane, 534 

U.S. at 411) (second alteration in original). 

W.Z. II crystalized the dangerousness analysis by focusing it on

determining the individual's likelihood of re-offense. The Court explained: 

[T]o be within the class of persons who may be 

committed under the SVPA, one must be "likely to 

engage in acts of sexual violence." That aspect of the 

"dangerousness" prong of the Act is explained to mean 

that "the propensity of a person to commit acts of sexual 

violence is of such a degree as to pose a threat to the 
17 A-0039-22

health and safety of others." One's likelihood to 

commit such acts obviously relates to the control 

determination that the trial court must make. Although 

the "likelihood" requirement is not defined further in 

the Act, we import into that analysis the "serious 

difficulty" standard. An individual may be considered 

to pose a threat to the health and safety of others if he 

or she were found, by clear and convincing evidence, to 

have serious difficulty in controlling his or her harmful 

behavior such that it is highly likely that the individual 

will not control his or her sexually violent behavior and 

will reoffend. 

[Id. at 129-30.] 

T.W. suggests the following statement by the trial judge demonstrates she

applied the wrong standards: "W.Z.[II] rejected the idea that scoring the 

likelihood to reoffend would . . . be tied to any calculation[,] or to a number[,] 

or to even a standard that's more likely than not, and that the [c]ourt can look at 

the victim impact and other factors to assess risk factor." Although the trial 

judge erred when she noted victim impact was an appropriate consideration 

because it is not tied to lack of control or the likelihood of reoffending 

considerations, the error was harmless because she never made a finding on 

victim impact. R. 2:10-2.

Our law mandates the consideration of other factors in determining 

likelihood-to-reoffend, lack-of-control beyond percentage calculations, and 

actuarial tables, and requires courts to obtain a comprehensive picture. See Doe 
18 A-0039-22

v. Poritz, 142 N.J. 1, 33 (1995); W.Z. II, 173 N.J. at 132; In re Commitment of 

A.Y., 458 N.J. Super. 147, 172 (App. Div. 2019). The trial judge fulfilled this 

obligation when she found T.W. "functions well under less stressful 

environments as evidenced by his difficulty in regulating his emotions in a more 

stressful environment . . . ." She noted he did not thrive when he got into an 

altercation and had to be removed to a less-structured environment. The judge 

also satisfied W.Z. II when she found T.W. lacked "command over his sexual 

assault cycle, and does not have a relapse prevention plan. And . . . his ability 

to be able to come up with a relapse prevention plan is halted or stalled by his 

limited cognitive ability and his intellectual disability." 

The likelihood of reoffending was addressed by the judge when she said 

she was "particularly concerned" by a report from November 30, 2021, in which 

T.W. stated he needed to be away from boys because they "are his high[-]risk 

situation." The Static-99R scores, further supported this conclusion. As did the 

judge's findings regarding the duration of T.W.'s history of threats and violence 

demonstrated a "persistence of the behavior, and . . . a pattern of violent 

offending[,]" as well as his history of infractions in STU. 

 The trial judge's detailed analysis of the relevant facts shows her decision 

rested on sufficient credible evidence in the record. The experts did not differ 
19 A-0039-22

meaningfully in their risk assessments, and the judge went beyond the 

percentage risk valuations to consider a multitude of risk factors. We are 

unconvinced the harmless error committed by the trial judge led to an unjust 

result. The facts amply demonstrate T.W.'s commitment was warranted. 

III. 

In Point II, T.W. argues two experts opined he would not benefit from 

further STU treatment and the trial judge did not consider his entire 

circumstances, including the conditions under which he might be discharged and 

their impact on his likelihood of reoffending. He asserts the judge only 

considered three conditions, namely: a Class C boarding house, group therapy, 

and a therapeutic technique proposed by his expert. He claims the judge should 

have considered the other control options, including: GPS monitoring, parole 

officer supervision, individual therapy, polygraphs, potential home 

confinement, internet and phone restrictions, and substance testing. He notes 

the registration and monitoring required by the SVPA would also serve as a 

bulwark against reoffending because law enforcement would have his picture, 

home and work addresses, and would go door-to-door showing his photograph 

to neighbors, schools, and youth organizations, as required by statute. 
20 A-0039-22

"Commitment laws were enacted to strike a balance between the interest 

of safety for the individual and the community, and the fundamental liberty 

interests of the person the State seeks to commit." In re Commitment of J.J.F., 

365 N.J. Super. 486, 502 (App. Div. 2004) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.1b). "To 

attain the balance that the SVPA seeks, the court must consider the entire 

circumstances of the individual, including conditions imposed on the individual 

that affect the safety of the community." Ibid. 

Our review of the record convinces us the trial judge considered the entire 

circumstances as required by J.J.F. The controls T.W. claims were unaddressed 

did not outweigh the judge's findings that T.W. lacked the ability to control his 

dangerous or violent behavior and that his behavior worsened in a less controlled 

environment than the STU. As the judge noted, the testimony T.W. presented 

did not explain how "a boarding home would adequately reduce the stressors of 

reintegration" and T.W.'s expert did not "explain in detail, why the plan would 

assure no re[-]offense . . . ." The record supported the judge's finding T.W.'s 

behavior would not have improved in the group therapy he would receive in a 

boarding home as opposed to the one-on-one therapy he received in the STU. 

Contrary to T.W.'s assertions, the State's expert opined T.W. could better learn 

to control his behavior. And T.W.'s treating psychologist explained that, 
21 A-0039-22

notwithstanding his limitations, T.W. could continue to benefit from therapy. 

Therefore, the judge did not err when she concluded T.W.'s risk of reoffending 

could be further mitigated by completion of sex offender treatment in the STU. 

IV. 

Finally, T.W. asserts the trial judge erred in finding the State proved by 

clear and convincing evidence that he will have serious difficulty controlling 

sexually harmful behavior if released. He claims there is no evidence in the 

record that he presently has difficulty controlling sexual behavior at all. The 

evidence presented by the State about cognitive limitations impacting his ability 

to communicate and internalize treatment was not clear and convincing evidence 

of a lack of control and a likelihood to reoffend. Nor were the 2019 and 2021 

altercations. 

T.W. argues the treating psychologist offered the better way to assess risk 

was to provide him with role-playing opportunities, repeat his relapse prevention 

plan, develop a safety plan, and permit monitored visits in the community 

through the furlough process. Additionally, T.W. notes he passed the most 

recent polygraph administered by the State in 2018, and he has supportive 

relationships with a sister and nephew. 
22 A-0039-22

"To satisfy the intermediate clear-and-convincing standard, the fact finder 

'must be persuaded that the truth of the contention is "highly probable."'" In re 

Perskie, 207 N.J. 275, 290 (2011) (quoting 2 McCormick on Evidence § 340, at 

487 (6th ed. 2006)). "Evidence that is clear and convincing 'should produce in 

the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the 

allegations sought to be established.'" Ibid. (quoting In re Purrazzella, 134 N.J. 

228, 240 (1993)). "To meet that burden, the evidence must be 'so clear, direct 

and weighty and convincing as to enable [the factfinder] to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue.'" Ibid. (alteration in 

original) (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 75 (1993)). 

The record contained clear and convincing evidence warranting the 

judge's commitment decision. She was correct to be "particularly concerned" 

by the recency of a November 2021 report, that T.W. said he needed to be away 

from boys because they "are his high[-]risk situation." The evidence of 

persistence of T.W.'s sexual offending prior to commitment, the pattern of 

violence in his offenses, and his infractions in the STU were enough to form "in 

the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth" of T.W.'s 

potential to reoffend. Perskie, 207 N.J. at 290. 

 Affirmed.