Filed 8/22/17

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

MICHAEL KERR WALKER,

Petitioner,

v.

APPELLATE DIVISION OF THE

SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS 

ANGELES COUNTY,

Respondent;

THE PEOPLE,

Real Party in Interest.

 No. B280100

 (App. Div. No. BR052772 &

 Super. Ct. No. 5WA25326)

 

 

ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for writ of 

mandate. Patti Jo McKay, Alex A. Ricciardulli, and Barbara 

R. Johnson, Judges. Petition granted in part and denied in 

part.
2

Kelly G. Emling, Chief Deputy Public Defender, Albert 

J. Menaster, Nick Stewart-Oaten, Deputy Public Defenders, 

for Petitioner. 

No appearance for Respondent.

Joseph Lawrence, Interim City Attorney, Yibin Shen, 

Chief Deputy City Attorney, Melanie Skehar, Deputy City 

Attorney, for Real Party in Interest.

_________________________

Petitioner Michael Kerr Walker entered a plea of no 

contest to a misdemeanor count of contracting without a 

license. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (a).)1 As a 

condition of probation, the trial court ordered Walker to pay 

restitution for the actual economic loss suffered by the 

victim, but denied the People’s request to require Walker to 

make full restitution of all payments he received for his 

construction services and attorney fees incurred by the 

victim. On appeal by the People, the Appellate Division of 

the Superior Court of Los Angeles County reversed in a 

published opinion, holding that the victim was entitled to 

restitution for the full amount she paid to Walker, plus 

interest, as well as her attorney fees. In his petition for writ 

of mandate, Walker contends the Appellate Division erred in 

requiring criminal restitution in a manner intended to apply 

to civil actions, and by ordering restitution of attorney fees 

in an amount not proven by substantial evidence. We 

 

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the 

Business and Professions Code.
3

conclude that the civil disgorgement statute relied on by the 

Appellate Division does not control the amount of restitution 

in a criminal action. We further conclude that the Appellate 

Division did not err in ordering restitution of Curto’s 

attorney fees. We therefore grant the mandate petition in 

part and deny in part. 

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In August 2013, Sharon Curto entered into a written 

construction contract with Walker, an unlicensed contractor, 

to paint her home and to install 10 new windows. The 

original contract price was for $49,860. As the work 

progressed, additional work was added to the project and 

additional invoices were issued by Walker. On November 

30, 2013, Walker sent Curto a demand letter stating she 

owed him $9,851. At that point, Curto had paid Walker a 

total of $61,428. Curto subsequently paid Walker $2,000 

against the $9,851 balance. Walker initiated a lawsuit

against Curto for nonpayment of the full amount due. Curto 

hired an attorney to defend her in the lawsuit.

2 Curto filed a 

complaint against Walker with the California Department of 

Consumer Affairs Contractors State License Board (Board). 

During the investigation, the Board discovered Walker was 

not a licensed contractor and referred the matter to the 

Santa Monica City Attorney for criminal prosecution. 

 

2 Walker’s complaint and the related proceedings are 

not provided in the record. 
4

On November 4, 2015, Walker entered his plea of no 

contest to a violation of section 7028, subdivision (a). The 

court suspended imposition of sentence, and placed Walker 

on summary probation for two years. The court set a

hearing to determine the amount of restitution Walker 

would be ordered to pay Curto as a condition of his 

probation. 

The trial court conducted an extensive restitution 

hearing over the course of four days, which included briefing 

by both parties. The People’s brief requested the court order 

Walker to pay Curto the entire amount she had paid him for 

his work, plus interest, and attorney fees incurred in the 

civil action. Later, the People increased the restitution 

request to include the cost for Curto to install one and a half 

windows that were not installed by Walker, and to repair 

and repaint her house. 

The trial court denied the People’s request for a full 

refund of Curto’s payments to Walker. The court further 

denied Curto attorney fees incurred in the civil action. 

However, the court allowed the People to establish the actual 

economic loss suffered by Curto. Curto testified that 

Walker’s work was substandard because the paint was 

fading, chipping, bubbling, and peeling. In December 2015, 

Curto obtained an estimate of $15,800 to repair and repaint 

her house. Curto further testified that Walker did not 

complete the window installation, as he only replaced eight 

and a half out of the ten windows. Curto obtained an 

estimate from the Board suggesting that it will cost at least 
5

$625 to complete the window installation. Sylvester Egan, a 

licensed contractor and expert witness for the defense, 

testified that constant maintenance is required on all paint 

jobs due to a house’s natural weathering. 

The trial court ordered Walker to pay restitution in the 

amount of $1,299. This figure consisted of $1,250 for the 

installation of the one and a half windows, covering the cost 

of labor and materials. The court accepted as reasonable 

Curto’s $15,800 repair and repainting estimate, but found a 

substantial portion was necessitated by normal weathering 

rather than Walker’s substandard performance. Therefore, 

the court discounted this amount by one-half ($7,900). The 

court then subtracted $9,150 ($7,900 for the paint repair 

plus $1,250 for the windows) from the amount that was 

unpaid to Walker ($9,150 minus $7,851), which left a 

balance of $1,299 in economic loss. 

The People filed a Notice of Appeal from the trial 

court’s restitution order. On November 16, 2016, the 

Appellate Division reversed the restitution order in a 

published decision. (People v. Walker (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 

Supp. 38.) The Appellate Division held the trial court 

abused its discretion in not ordering full restitution for all 

compensation Curto paid to Walker, plus interest, as well as 

not ordering attorney fees incurred in the civil action. (Id. at 

pp. 43-46.) In reaching its decision, the Appellate Division 

relied on section 7031, which provides that an unlicensed 

contractor cannot not sue for payment of his unlicensed 

work, and the homeowner has the right to bring a civil 
6

action to recover all sums paid to him. (Id. at p. 43.) The 

Appellate Division recognized that section 7031 is not 

directly applicable in a criminal case, however, “the impact 

of the statute means, in practical terms, that the homeowner 

parted with her money in a situation where she did not have 

to do so. Thus, even if the work performed by [Walker] 

bestowed a benefit to the homeowner, she nonetheless 

incurred an economic loss for purposes of her constitutional 

and statutory right to restitution (see Cal. Const. art. I, § 28, 

subd. (a), Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (a)(1)) in the amount of 

all monies paid to him for his unlicensed work. In addition, 

[Curto] was entitled to restitution of attorney fees incurred 

in defending against [Walker’s] civil action for unpaid 

compensation and in prosecuting her counterclaim to recover 

the money she paid [Walker] under the contract. (See Pen. 

Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(H).)” (Id. at p. 40.) On December 

5, 2016, Walker’s petition for rehearing was denied. 

On December 20, 2016, this court declined to exercise 

its authority to transfer jurisdiction of the matter to this 

court. On February 3, 2017, we summarily denied Walker’s 

petition for writ of mandate. On March 29, 2017, the 

California Supreme Court granted Walker’s petition for 

review and transferred the matter back to this court, with 

directions to vacate our February 3, 2017 order and direct 

the respondent to show cause why relief sought in the 

petition should not be granted. We complied with the orders 

from the Supreme Court by vacating our order denying the 

petition for writ of mandate and issuing the order to show 
7

cause as directed. We now proceed to consider the merits of 

the petition. 

DISCUSSION

“Restitution is constitutionally and statutorily 

mandated in California.” (People v. Keichler (2005) 129 

Cal.App.4th 1039, 1045 (Keichler); see Cal. Const., art. 1, 

§ 28; Pen. Code, § 1202.4.) Penal Code section 1202.4, 

subdivision (f) provides for a direct restitution order “in 

every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a 

result of the defendant’s conduct.” “The order is to be for an 

amount ‘sufficient to fully reimburse the victim or victims for

every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the 

defendant’s criminal conduct.’ (Id., § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)” 

(People v. Brasure (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1037, 1074-1075.) A 

person who utilizes the services of a convicted unlicensed 

contractor is eligible for restitution for economic losses (Pen. 

Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)), regardless of whether he or she 

had knowledge that the contractor was unlicensed. (§ 7028, 

subd. (h).)

“‘The standard of review of a restitution order is abuse 

of discretion. “A victim’s restitution right is to be broadly 

and liberally construed.” [Citation.] “‘When there is a 

factual and rational basis for the amount of restitution 

ordered by the trial court, no abuse of discretion will be 

found by the reviewing court.’” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” 

(People v. Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) “In 
8

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, the ‘“power of the 

appellate court begins and ends with a determination as to 

whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted or 

uncontradicted,” to support the trial court’s findings.’ 

[Citations.] Further, the standard of proof at a restitution 

hearing is by a preponderance of the evidence, not proof 

beyond a reasonable doubt. [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 468-469.) 

The trial court “‘“must use a rational method that could 

reasonably be said to make the victim whole, and may not 

make an order which is arbitrary or capricious.”’ [Citation.]” 

(Keichler, supra, 129 Cal.App.4th at p. 1045.) 

The Appellate Division erred in holding that the trial 

court abused its discretion, as there was a factual and 

rational basis for the restitution order. The plain language 

of Penal Code section 1202.4 limits the trial court’s 

restitution order to actual economic losses suffered by the 

victim in the circumstances of this case. (Pen. Code, 

§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(A) [restitution order should be “the 

actual cost of repairing the property when repair is 

possible”].) The restitution order is not intended to provide 

the victim with a windfall; instead, a victim is entitled to 

reimbursement only for his or her actual loss. (People v. 

Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 28; People v. Fortune 

(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 790, 794-795.) There is no 

requirement the restitution order “reflect the amount of 

damages that might be recoverable in a civil action.” (People 

v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1121; see People v. 

Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1173.) Here, the
9

trial court’s restitution order provided for Curto’s actual 

economic loss, which was determined to be the cost of 

installing the remaining windows and repainting her house, 

adjusted by the full amount she still owed to Walker for his 

services. Under the plain language and meaning of Penal 

Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f), a restitution order 

limiting recovery to the victim’s actual economic losses was 

well within the discretion of the trial court. 

The Appellate Division’s reliance on section 7031 to 

support full recovery was misplaced. As the Appellate 

Division acknowledged, the plain language of Business and 

Professions section 7031 restricts the statute to civil 

proceedings. (§ 7031, subd. (b) [“a person who utilizes the 

services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action in 

any court of competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all 

compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for 

performance of any act or contract”].) 

Contrary to the Appellate Division’s analysis, the 

Legislature did not intend section 7031 to define the amount 

of criminal restitution under section 7028. In 2009, the 

Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 370, which added 

subdivision (h) to section 7028. (Stats. 2009, ch. 319, § 1.) 

Subdivision (h) currently provides: “For any conviction 

under this section, a person who utilized the services of the 

unlicensed person is a victim of a crime and is eligible, 

pursuant to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4 of the Penal 

Code, for restitution for economic losses, regardless of 

whether he or she had knowledge that the person was 
10

unlicensed.” Assembly Bill No. 370 does not indicate that

the Legislature contemplated that section 7031 would apply 

to fix the amount of restitution in criminal cases. To the 

contrary, the Legislature declared that “[c]urrent law states 

that a person who uses an unlicensed contractor may bring a 

civil action to recover all compensation paid to the 

unlicensed contractor. However, no statute specifically 

addresses the issue of criminal restitution for victims of 

unlicensed contractors.” (Assem. Com. on Bus. and Prof., 

Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 370 (2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) Mar. 

31, 2009, p. 2.) “Consumers who intentionally hire an 

unlicensed contractor can already receive all the payments 

made to the unlicensed contractor through the civil courts 

(Business and Professions Code Section 7031(b)). This bill is 

mainly targeted at helping consumers who have few 

resources and little understanding of the process (filing civil 

cases, checking whether a contractor is licensed or not, etc.) 

and making it easier for [consumers] to receive 

compensation for only their economic losses. This bill would 

also make gaining restitution from an unlicensed contractor 

in criminal courts more consistent with existing law 

regarding restitution in civil courts.” (Dept. Consumer 

Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 370 (2009-2010 

Reg. Sess.) June 29, 2009, p. 4, italics added.) The sponsor of 

Assembly Bill No. 370, Los Angeles City Attorney Rocky 

Delgadillo, specifically stated that section 7031 only applies 

to a civil action and emphasized the need for a criminal 

counterpart. (Sen. Com. on Business, Professions and 
11

Economic Development, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 370 

(2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) June 8, 2009, p. 3 [“Business and 

Professions Code 7031(b) states that a person who uses an 

unlicensed contractor may bring a civil action to recover all 

compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor. However, 

no statute specifically addresses the issue of criminal 

restitution for victims of unlicensed contractors”].) 

Delgadillo’s successor, Carmen A. Trutanich, wrote a letter 

to Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger on September 23, 2009, 

urging him to sign Assembly Bill No. 370. Trutanich stated, 

“Presently, our civil laws (§ 7031(b)) specifically mandate 

that unlicensed contractors disgorge all monies paid by their 

victims (more than just economic loss) . . . . However, our 

current criminal laws do not clearly require unlicensed 

contractors to pay restitution for even the economic loss.” 

(City Attorney Carmen A. Trutanich, letter to Governor

Arnold Schwarzenegger re Assem. Bill No. 370 (2009-2010 

Reg. Sess.) Sept. 23, 2009, Governor’s chaptered bill files, ch. 

319.) City Attorney Trutanich concluded, “This bill provides 

victims with restitution, limited to economic loss, should 

they hire an unscrupulous unlicensed contractor who 

performs poor shoddy workmanship.” (Ibid.) 

Under the statutory scheme, the civil remedy of 

refunding “all compensation paid” is intended to deter 

unlicensed contractors by depriving them of all monetary 

benefit (§ 7031, subd.(b)). The restitution statute, in 

contrast, serves primarily to compensate victims for actual 

economic losses. Unlike section 7031, section 1202.4 of the 
12

Penal Code does not provide for a full refund of all payments 

to an unlicensed contractor. A victim who is made whole for 

economic losses under Penal Code section 1202.4 remains

able to pursue the civil law remedy of a full refund. (People 

v. Vasquez (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1126, 1132 [“An order of 

restitution pursuant to [Penal Code] section 1202.4 does not 

preclude the crime victim from pursing a separate civil 

action based on the same facts from which the criminal 

conviction arose”].) We conclude that the trial court acted 

within its discretion in ordering restitution for the actual 

economic loss suffered by Curto. Therefore, the decision in 

People v. Walker (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th Supp. 38, is 

disapproved to the extent it relied on the civil disgorgement 

statute to impose criminal restitution.

Attorney Fees

Contrary to Walker’s contention, the Appellate 

Division did not err in holding the trial court abused its 

discretion in failing to order Curto attorney fees. At trial, 

the People sought restitution for Curto’s attorney fees 

incurred in the civil action, totaling to $6,526.63. The People 

argued Curto had to hire an attorney to recover her economic 

loss and prevent further economic losses “stemming from

[Walker’s] unlicensed and unlawful activities.” The People 

attached to their brief what appears to be an email from 

Curto’s counsel stating the amount of attorney fees expended 

in the civil case. (People v. Millard, supra, 175 Cal.App.4th 
13

at p. 26 [“a prima facie case for restitution is made by the 

People based in part on a victim’s testimony on, or other 

claim or statement of, the amount of his or her economic 

loss”]; People v. Gemelli (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1539,

1542-1543 [Penal Code “[s]ection 1202.4 does not, by its 

terms, require any particular kind of proof].) 

Penal Code section 1202.4, subdivision (f)(3)(H) 

provides that economic loss for the purposes of victim 

restitution includes “[a]ctual and reasonable attorney’s fees 

and other costs of collection accrued by a private entity on 

behalf of the victim.” Reasonable attorney fees incurred by 

the victim are recoverable as an item of restitution only to 

the extent that they were incurred in efforts to recover 

economic damages sustained by the victim as a result of the 

criminal conduct. (People v. Fulton (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 

876, 879, 884-885.) Walker initiated the civil action, 

erroneously because he was not a licensed contractor, to 

recover the remaining balance on the contract. Curto 

retained counsel for the purpose of recovering her economic 

loss and prevent further economic loss “stemming from 

[Walker’s] unlicensed and unlawful activities.” The evidence 

is undisputed Curto incurred attorney fees due to Walker’s 

ill-conceived action. Therefore, the Appellate Division did 

not err in holding that the trial court abused its discretion in 

failing to award Curto restitution for attorney fees incurred 

in efforts to recover her economic damages as a result of 

Walker’s work as an unlicensed contractor. 
14

DISPOSITION

Let a peremptory writ of mandate issue directing the 

Appellate Division of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County to vacate its prior opinion and issue a new opinion 

affirming the trial court’s restitution order as to the victim’s 

actual economic losses, but reversing the trial court’s 

restitution order as to the victim’s attorney fees. 

KRIEGLER, Acting P. J. 

I concur: 

DUNNING, J.3

 

 Judge of the Orange Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the 

California Constitution.
Michael Kerr Walker v. The Appellate Division of the 

Superior Court of Los Angeles County

B280100

BAKER, J., Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part

Business and Professions Code section 7028 provides 

that a victim who uses the services of a person convicted of 

operating as an unlicensed contractor “is eligible, pursuant 

to subdivision (f) of Section 1202.4 of the Penal Code, for 

restitution for economic losses, regardless of whether he or 

she had knowledge that the person was unlicensed.” (Bus. & 

Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (h), emphasis added.) Another 

provision of the Business and Professions Code, section 7031, 

states that “a person who utilizes the services of an 

unlicensed contractor may bring an action in any court of 

competent jurisdiction in this state to recover all 

compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for 

performance of any act or contract.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, 

§ 7031, subd. (b), emphasis added.) Defendant Michael 

Walker (defendant) sustained a conviction for acting in the 

capacity of a contractor without a license, and the People 

attempted to recover the full amount his victim, Sharon 

Curto (Curto), paid him as restitution under Business and 

Professions Code section 7028—Curto did not then bring a 

separate civil action as authorized by Business and 
2

Professions Code section 7031. For reasons I will explain, I 

believe the issue of whether the trial court’s restitution 

award was proper turns less on a question of statutory 

interpretation and more on the question of whether the trial 

court’s restitution calculation was an abuse of its discretion.

Although the Legislature’s statutory scheme invites 

needless civil litigation, I agree with the majority that 

Business and Professions Code section 7031 cannot be used 

to interpret the applicable criminal restitution statutes so as 

to require an unlicensed contractor to make restitution in 

the amount of all payments the contractor received.

1 But 

concluding Business and Professions Code section 7031 is 

not a reliable interpretive guide still leaves another 

 

1 I do concede, though, that there are elements in the 

legislative history of Business and Professions Code section 

7028, subdivision (h) that can be read to point to a contrary 

conclusion. The Enrolled Bill Report cited by the majority, 

for instance, states: “This bill . . . defines people who use 

unlicensed contractors, knowingly or not, as victims in order 

to allow these people to receive restitution for their losses 

through the criminal courts rather than having to spend 

their own time and money to file their own case in the civil 

courts against the unlicensed contractor.” (Dept. of 

Consumer Affairs, Enrolled Bill Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 370 

(2009-2010 Reg. Sess.) June 29, 2009, p. 1.) The same report 

also states: “This bill would also make gaining restitution 

from an unlicensed contractor in criminal courts more 

consistent with existing law regarding restitution in civil 

courts.” (Id. at p. 4.)
3

question—I submit, the key question—unresolved: what is 

the “loss” that is appropriately compensable by restitution?

Defendant argues the issue by repeatedly treating 

Business and Professions Code section 7028, and the crossreferenced provision of the Penal Code, as if they authorize 

restitution for only “actual losses.” Of course, that 

disregards the term the statutes actually use: “economic 

loss(es).” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 7028, subd. (h); Pen. Code, 

§ 1202.4, subd. (f).) The distinction is important. A 

reference to actual loss would more strongly suggest that, in 

an unlicensed contracting case, the pertinent “loss” should 

be calculated as the difference between the quality and value 

of work performed by an unlicensed contractor as compared 

to the quality and value of the work if it were done by a 

contractor with a license.2 The references to economic loss 

that appear in the statute, however, are best read as a 

qualifier to distinguish monetary or financial losses (which 

are compensable) from compensation for psychological or 

other noneconomic harm (which, with exceptions, are not). 

(Compare, e.g., Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f) [“[I]n every case 

in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result of 

the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the 

 

2 I do not believe this is a case of “stolen or damaged 

property,” which would trigger the Penal Code section 1202.4 

provision that limits restitution to “the replacement cost of 

like property, or the actual cost of repairing the property 

when repair is possible.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. 

(f)(3)(A).)
4

defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an 

amount established by court order, based on the amount of 

loss claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to 

the court”] with Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f)(3)(F) [for 

felony violations of Penal Code section 288, a court should 

order restitution for “[n]oneconomic losses, including, but not 

limited to, psychological harm”].)3

By using the malleable term “economic loss,” I believe 

the statutes give trial courts significant discretion to 

determine what in fact constitutes the “loss” in an 

unlicensed contractor case. (People v. Giordano (2007) 42 

Cal.4th 644, 663 [trial courts have broad discretion to choose 

a method for calculating the amount of restitution].) On a 

strong enough record, likely necessitating expert testimony, 

I believe a trial court could order restitution of nearly all (or 

perhaps even all) payments made to a convicted unlicensed

contractor without transgressing the limits of that 

discretion. We have no such record in this case, and that is 

partly why I conclude the result reached by the appellate 

division cannot stand. Having said that, I am nevertheless 

of the view that the manner in which the trial court 

 

3 I leave for another day the task of unraveling how 

Penal Code section 1202.4 can authorize restitution for 

“every determined economic loss incurred as the result of the 

defendant’s criminal conduct, including, but not limited 

to . . . [¶] . . . [¶] Noneconomic losses . . . .” (Pen. Code, 

§ 1202.4, subd. (f)(3).)
5

calculated the restitution award here was an abuse of the 

court’s discretion.

The trial court’s restitution award was partly founded 

on the price of the contract victim Curto entered into with 

defendant. Specifically, the court took the remaining 

balance Curto had not paid on that contract ($7,851) and 

subtracted that amount from the court’s estimate of what it 

would cost to fix the house renovation defects attributable to 

defendant’s work ($9,150). The court ruled the resulting 

figure ($1,299) would be the restitution award.

The problem, of course, is the decision to use the 

contract price in calculating the restitution owed. At the 

time Curto agreed to the contract, she believed (based on 

defendant’s misrepresentations) that he was a licensed 

contractor. Had she known before entering into the contract 

that defendant in fact had no license, there is no reason to 

believe she would have agreed to pay such a high amount. 

Indeed, there is good reason to conclude otherwise: in 

addition to plain common sense, which tells us, for instance, 

that a buyer will pay less for a chair built by IKEA than one 

built by Charles and Ray Eames, Curto’s testimony during 

the restitution hearing indicated she relied on the belief that 

defendant was licensed in selecting him for the renovation 

job. By treating the license-based contract price as a given, 

rather than reducing it to account for defendant’s 

subsequently discovered unlicensed status, the trial court 

gave defendant a windfall—and failed to make Curto fully 

whole. I would accordingly remand the matter to the trial 
6

court to recalculate the restitution award consistent with the 

views I have expressed.4

BAKER, J.

 

4 I agree with the majority that the appellate division 

did not err in ordering Curto’s attorney fees to be included as 

part of the restitution award. (See Rancho Mirage Country 

Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 

252, 263-264.)