Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 1 of 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Steven J. Halbert

Carmel, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Gregory F. Zoeller

Attorney General of Indiana

Robert J. Henke

David E. Corey

Deputy Attorneys General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re J.H. (Minor Child), Child 

in Need of Services,

and 

E.H. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

October 30, 2015

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1503-JC-158

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court, Juvenile Division

The Honorable Marilyn A. 

Moores, Judge, and the Honorable 

Rosanne T. Ang, Magistrate

Trial Court Cause No. 

49D09-1406-JC-1275

Mathias, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 2 of 17

[1] The Marion Superior Court found J.H. to be a Child in Need of Services 

(“CHINS”). J.H.’s mother, E.H. (“Mother”) appeals this determination and 

presents two issues, which we restate as: (1) whether the trial court’s CHINS 

finding is supported by sufficient evidence, and (2) whether the trial court’s 

CHINS finding was based on improper grounds. 

[2] We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[3] J.H. was born in December 2010 to Mother and J.R. (“Father”).

1 J.H. was later 

diagnosed as being on the autism spectrum. For approximately a year and a 

half after J.H.’s birth, Mother and J.H. lived with Father in an apartment 

owned by Mother’s parents in Washington, D.C. Mother moved out of this 

apartment in February 2012 and took J.H. with her. Mother’s reason for 

moving was her belief that Father and her mother (“Grandmother”) were too 

close and had an inappropriate relationship. Mother apparently first moved to 

another location in Washington, then in October 2012, moved to Maryland. In 

December 2013, Mother and J.H. began to live in a shelter in Washington and 

stayed there until January 2013, when they moved to Virginia, where Mother 

 

1

 The record appears to still have some uncertainty regarding J.H.’s paternity. Mother initially admitted that 

J.R. was the child’s father, as he is named on the birth certificate as the father. J.R. later signed a paternity 

affidavit admitting that he was J.H.’s father. During the CHINS proceedings, however, Mother claimed that 

she was still married to another man at the time of J.H.’s birth. She also claimed that another man was 

possibly J.H.’s father. At the time of the CHINS dispositional order, the issue of J.H.’s paternity was still 

unsettled. Thus, J.R. is referred to in the record both as J.H.’s father and alleged father. For purposes of this 

appeal, in which J.R. does not participate, we will refer to him as J.H.’s father. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 3 of 17

worked as a nanny. Then, in February or March of that year, Mother moved to 

Ohio, again taking J.H. with her. In Ohio, Mother lived in two different cities 

and initially stayed in a shelter before moving into a hotel and eventually an 

apartment. During this time, Mother supported herself and J.H. by working as 

a writer for internet sites and by non-court-ordered “child support” money that 

Father gave to help provide for J.H. 

[4] During this time, Mother believed that Father and Grandmother were harassing 

her, which she referred to as “abuse.” See, e.g., Tr. p. 13. Specifically, she 

claimed that they were attempting to “gaslight” her, which she described as 

attempting to make her think that she was insane so that she would kill herself.2

See id. at 8, 13, 19, 56-57. Mother also displayed somewhat paranoid behavior, 

e.g., refusing to provide fingerprints for a job application for fear that 

Grandmother, a retired CIA analyst, would use her fingerprints to track her. 

Mother also suspected that Grandmother had infected her computer with 

spyware because her computer crashed after receiving email from 

Grandmother. 

[5] Spurred by her fear of Father and Grandmother, Mother left Ohio with J.H. 

briefly for Florida to establish a “confidential” address via a P.O. Box, so that 

 

2

 See Mikkelson v. Shackleton, 2015 WL 4935632, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2015) (describing gaslighting 

as “‘methodically providing false information to a person such that the person doubts his or her own 

perception and memory.’ The term comes from the 1938 play Gas Light (also known as Angel Street ) by 

Patrick Hamilton.”); Coburn v. Moreland, 433 S.W.3d 809, 818 (Tex. App. 2014) (describing gaslighting as 

“manipulative behavior used to confuse people into questioning their reactions to events, so much so that the 

victims of gaslighting begin to question their own sanity.”). 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 4 of 17

Grandmother and Father could not locate her. Id. at 8. Mother and J.H. then 

came to Indiana, where she planned to stay temporarily before moving back to 

Florida. While Mother was in Indiana, her car broke down, and she was 

homeless. She eventually found shelter at the home of someone she met

through a local church. Since this arrangement was not permanent, she went to 

a shelter after a few weeks. However, Mother was concerned that her family 

would be able to track her by accessing the shelter’s security cameras, and 

returned to the church member’s home. 

[6] On June 11, 2014, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) received 

a report that Mother had unstable housing, had repeatedly moved, and would 

not leave the church member’s home despite requests to do so; the report also 

indicated that J.H. had not been receiving services for his autism. Concerns

about Mother’s mental stability were also reported. During the subsequent 

investigation, DCS determined that Mother did not have stable housing, had 

little or no money, and was waiting for a school stipend to be able to care for 

J.H. Mother claimed to be the victim of domestic violence but declined to 

provide DCS with the name of her domestic violence counselor in Florida. 

Mother declined to return to the shelter due to her fear over the cameras and 

the lack of internet access, which she stated she needed to continue her 

employment as an internet writer. Mother also indicated her desire to return to 

Florida.

[7] On June 13, 2014, DCS filed a petition alleging that J.H. was a CHINS due to 

Mother’s lack of stable housing, the failure to obtain services for J.H.’s autism, 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 5 of 17

and Mother’s apparent mental health issues. DCS did not remove J.H. from 

Mother’s care at that time, but that same day, the trial court entered an initial 

detention hearing at which it ordered J.H. to be placed with Father, who had 

come to Indiana. On June 17, 2014, the trial court denied Mother’s request to 

place J.H. in her care and ordered DCS to file an expedited request to place 

J.H. with Father under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 

(“ICPC”). The court also ordered J.H. to be placed in foster care if Father was 

unable to remain in Indiana. Although the trial court authorized the expedited 

ICPC placement with Father on June 23, 2014, Father returned to North 

Carolina, where he had been residing, and J.H. was placed in foster care. At 

some point in June 2014, Mother moved to Orange County, Indiana. For the 

first several months, she stayed at an extended-stay hotel but later moved into 

an apartment. 

[8] During the CHINS proceedings, Mother admitted that J.H. was on the “autism 

spectrum” and had developmental delays in sensory processing, meaning that 

he is more sensitive to certain feelings and sounds. He had been in therapy since 

he was approximately eighteen months old and received services in Maryland 

and in Ohio. DCS recommended that J.H. receive physical and occupational 

therapy. Father reported that, since being removed from Mother’s care, J.H. 

had improved. In Mother’s care, J.H. was fed only baby food, due to concerns 

that he might choke, and drank from a sippy cup, but in Father’s care, he had 

begun to eat more solid foods and drink from a straw and a water bottle. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 6 of 17

[9] A fact-finding hearing was held on August 27, 2014. At this time, Mother had 

leased a three-bedroom apartment in Orange County, Indiana, and was 

working at a bar and continuing to work as an internet writer. Mother was 

consistent in her visitation with J.H. and was appropriately focused on his 

needs as an autistic child. Mother also consistently participated in the offered 

services. The trial court ordered J.H.’s guardian ad litem (“GAL”) to visit and 

inspect Mother’s home. 

[10] At a placement hearing held on September 4, 2014, the trial court ordered DCS 

to refer Mother to services in Orange County, where she lived, and to place 

J.H. as close to Mother’s home as possible. The trial court held additional factfinding hearings on October 7 and December 10, 2014, and took the matter 

under advisement. 

[11] On January 27, 2015, the trial court entered an order finding J.H. to be a 

CHINS, which found in relevant part: 

21. [J.H.] needs stability and familiarity. [J.H.] also needs 

occupational therapy and physical therapy that he has not been

consistently receiving due to his frequent moves. The only record 

of [Mother] seeking therapeutic services for [J.H.] occurred while 

they were living in Ohio. That provider indicated meeting with 

[Mother] only two times. 

22. Both [Mother] and [Father]’s interactions with [J.H.] have 

been observed to be affectionate and appropriate. 

23. [Mother] does not feel that she needs therapy as the distance 

she has placed between herself and [Father] and [Grandmother] 

have helped her situation. [Mother] believes that she has 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 7 of 17

provided stability for [J.H.] to the extent that she had a daily 

schedule for him as well as took him to the same stores. 

Additionally, [Mother] considers being in hotels as consistent 

and indicated that the child’s first word was “room.” 

24. [Father] does not believe that he needs assistance as he has 

researched how to obtain services for [J.H.] in North Carolina. 

25. [Mother] states concerns for [Father] due to his emotional 

abuse and threats. [Mother] has also made allegations of [Father] 

being domestically violent. [Father] states concerns for 

[Mother]’s mental health and stability. 

26. [J.H.]’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired or 

seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, or 

neglect of the child’s parent . . . to supply the child with 

necessary food, clothing, shelter, medical care, education, or 

supervision. Stability is particularly important for a child who has 

been determined to be on the autism spectrum in order to 

promote daily functioning and consistent therapy. [Mother] has 

failed to provide a stable environment for the child. She has 

moved a significant number of times in the past two years and 

has not established a stable routine for the child. [Father] has also 

failed to provide a stable environment for the child as he has not 

been [J.H.]’s primary caregiver for approximately two years with 

the exception of the month that he spent in Indianapolis under 

the order of this Court. Despite the actions of the parents and

their stated reasons for these actions, the condition of [J.H.] is 

that he is a child who has been determined to be on the autism 

spectrum and who has not had consistent therapy for the past 

two years. 

27. [J.H.] needs care, treatment, or rehabilitation that he is not 

receiving and is unlikely to be provided or accepted without 

coercive intervention of the court. [Mother] has stated that her 

original intention was to continue traveling with the child with 

the ultimate goal of moving to Florida. After the filing of the 

CHINS action, [Mother] has remained in [Orange County] for 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 8 of 17

approximately six months, which is seemingly one of the longest 

periods of stability she has had in over two years. The coercive 

intervention of this Court is needed to ensure that [J.H.] receives 

the consistent therapy that he requires. 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 

DECREED that [J.H.] is a [CHINS]. 

Appellant’s App. pp. 172-73. 

[12] The court then held a dispositional hearing on February 17, 2015. At this 

hearing, DCS indicated that Mother was stable and that J.H. had been enrolled 

in appropriate educational programs. DCS requested that the trial court close 

the case; the GAL, previously unaware of DCS’s plan to request that the case 

be closed, had no recommendation. The trial court ordered Mother to 

participate in home-based therapy and undergo a complete psychological 

evaluation. It also ordered in-home visitation. However, the trial court declined 

to close the case and ordered that J.H. remain in the custody of DCS and 

placed in foster care. The case goal remained reunification. Mother now 

appeals. 

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

[13] Mother first claims that the trial court erred in finding J.H. to be a CHINS 

because the evidence was insufficient to establish that the coercion of the court 

was necessary for J.H. to receive services. 

[14] Indiana Code section 31-34-1-1 provides that a child under eighteen years old is 

a CHINS if:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 9 of 17

(1) the child’s physical or mental condition is seriously impaired 

or seriously endangered as a result of the inability, refusal, 

or neglect of the child’s parent, guardian, or custodian to 

supply the child with necessary food, clothing, shelter, 

medical care, education, or supervision; and;

(2) the child needs care, treatment or rehabilitation that the 

child:

(A) is not receiving; and

(B) is unlikely to be provided or accepted without the coercive 

intervention of the court. 

[15] DCS has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 

child in question is a CHINS. Perrine v. Marion Cnty. Office of Child Servs., 866 

N.E.2d 269, 273 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Ind. Code § 31-34-12-3). The trial 

court should consider the family’s condition not only when the case was filed, 

but also when it is heard. In re S.D., 2 N.E.3d 1283, 1290 (Ind. 2014), reh’g 

denied. When reviewing the sufficiency of evidence to support the trial court’s 

CHINS determination on appeal, we consider only the evidence most favorable 

to the trial court’s judgment and the reasonable inferences flowing therefrom. 

Perrine, 866 N.E.2d at 273. We do not reweigh the evidence or judge the 

credibility of witnesses. Id. 

[16] Here, Mother refers to the evidence indicating that she has adequate housing, is 

bonded and appropriately cares for J.H., and has fully cooperated with 

therapists and caseworkers to engage J.H. in services and treatment. Mother’s 

home-based therapist indicated that she had no concerns for J.H.’s safety if he 

were to be placed in Mother’s care and recommended that J.H. be placed with 

Mother. Even the DCS caseworker testified that she had no concerns with 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 10 of 17

placing J.H. with Mother. Indeed, DCS recommended that the CHINS case be 

closed. 

[17] Still, Mother acknowledges that, in the past, she had inadequate housing and 

that J.H. was not receiving services. She blames this, however, on her fleeing 

from what she refers to as “domestic violence,” though the record does not 

indicate that either Grandmother or Father were ever physically violent towards 

Mother or J.H. Mother’s claims regarding Father and Grandmother, which 

they denied, did not have to be credited by the trial court. Indeed, given the 

concerns over Mother’s paranoia, the trial court could reasonably conclude that 

Mother’s claims were exaggerated, delusional, or a combination thereof. 

[18] Mother still argues, however, that the conditions as they existed at the time of 

the CHINS hearing were insufficient to support keeping the CHINS case open. 

In this regard, Mother likens her situation to that before the Indiana Supreme 

Court in In re S.D., supra. 

[19] In that case, the child, S.D., suffered from a heart condition and was transferred 

from the family’s home in northern Indiana to Riley Hospital in Indianapolis. 

At first, the mother stayed in Indianapolis with S.D. while the other children 

remained with relatives in Gary. However, when all the children moved to 

Indianapolis, the mother struggled to meet the family’s needs—failing to enroll 

the children in school and spending less time with S.D. and attending to her 

needs. The mother then consented to DCS taking custody of the children. By 

the time of the CHINS fact-finding hearing, however, the mother had moved 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 11 of 17

into a three-bedroom home and renovated it adequately for the family to live in. 

The children other than S.D. had been returned to the mother’s care. Although 

S.D. no longer required a ventilator, the hospital would not permit her to be 

released to her mother until she and another caregiver had completed 

“significant medical training” to care for S.D.’s tracheostomy at home. 

“However, [m]other struggled to find a second caregiver and had not finished 

the final step of the necessary medical training [and] had largely spurned DCS’s 

help in identifying sources of social assistance and locating job opportunities.” 

Id. at 1286. Instead, the mother relied on financial help from family, pursued a 

job lead she found on her own, and was still unemployed as of the hearing. Id. 

[20] The trial court found S.D. to be a CHINS because no one in the home had 

completed the necessary medical training to meet S.D.’s special needs. Id. This 

court affirmed in an unpublished memorandum decision, and our supreme 

court granted transfer and held: 

Th[e] evidence, even viewed most favorably to the judgment, 

cannot reasonably support an inference that Mother was likely to 

need the court’s coercive intervention to finish the home-care 

simulation. A CHINS finding should consider the family’s condition 

not just when the case was filed, but also when it is heard. And here, 

Mother had resolved the issues involving S.D.’s siblings by the 

time of the hearing and completed all but the final step necessary 

for S.D.’s return home. Her approach to solving those problems 

was at times fitful or idiosyncratic—but it worked, as 

demonstrated by the siblings’ return home weeks before the factfinding hearing, and the court’s eventual rejection of the CHINS 

allegations as to them. And though the State’s intervention enabled 

some of her progress, such as the ability to renovate the house while the 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 12 of 17

children were out of her care, none of the State’s actions compelled her 

accomplishments. Though the evidence shows she had difficulty 

completing the last step of medical training, we cannot say she 

was unwilling or unable to do so without the court’s 

compulsion—and so the State’s coercive intervention into the 

family cannot stand.

2 N.E.3d at 1290 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 

[21] In the present case, Mother claims that, as in S.D., she too had improved her 

situation such that, by the time of the CHINS fact-finding hearing, the State’s 

coercive intervention was not needed. Although this is admittedly a close call, 

we cannot say that the present case is on all fours with S.D. 

[22] Here, Mother had made recent improvements, but, unlike the mother in S.D., 

she had a history of frequently moving residences and housing instability, 

which adversely affected J.H.’s ability to receive treatment and services for his 

autism. Unlike in S.D., here, the State’s intervention does seem to have 

compelled Mother’s accomplishments. Before DCS’s intervention, Mother 

frequently moved, had no job, little money, and no stability with regard to 

housing. Indeed, she planned on moving to Florida again after spending a short 

time in Indiana. After DCS became involved, Mother secured employment and 

eventually adequate housing. Based on Mother’s prior behavior, the trial court 

was within its discretion to believe that, absent its involvement, Mother might 

again revert to her prior behavior to the detriment of J.H. We therefore reject 

Mother’s claim that DCS’s involvement is what caused the “chaos” into J.H.’s 

life. To the contrary, there is every reason to believe that, absent DCS’s 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 13 of 17

involvement, Mother would not have settled down and been able to improve 

her condition to the extent that she has now, admirably. 

[23] Given the significant deference we give to trial court’s in such matters, we 

cannot say that the trial court’s decision not to close the CHINS case and to 

keep J.H. in the custody of DCS, with trial visitation for Mother, was clearly 

erroneous. Instead, the evidence favorable to the trial court’s decision shows 

that J.H.’s mental condition was seriously impaired or endangered by Mother’s 

inability or refusal to supply him with the necessary medical care and that J.H. 

needs care and treatment that he was not receiving and was unlikely to receive 

without the coercive intervention of the trial court. Accordingly, we affirm the 

trial court’s CHINS finding and dispositional decree. 

II. Improper Grounds for Trial Court’s Decision

[24] Mother also contends that the trial court’s dispositional decree, in which J.H. 

was ordered to remain a ward of DCS and Mother ordered to complete 

services, was improper because DCS recommended that the case be closed and 

because the trial court’s true goal was simply to facilitate a visitation schedule 

between Mother and Father. 

[25] First, to the extent that Mother claims that the trial court’s order was improper 

simply because DCS recommended that the case be closed, we disagree. The 

trial court has the ultimate authority to decide the CHINS case. 

[26] Further, we disagree with Mother that the trial court kept the CHINS case open 

and issued its dispositional decree simply to facilitate visitation. As Mother 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 14 of 17

admits, the issue of visitation is not mentioned in the trial court’s dispositional 

order being appealed. Mother instead points to an extended discussion the 

parties had at the end of the fact-finding hearing regarding the issue of 

visitation. See Tr. pp. 373, 379-85. Simply because the trial court discussed the 

issue of visitation, and the concurrent paternity action, does not mean that the 

trial court based its dispositional decree on a desire to facilitate visitation. As 

noted above, evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s CHINS finding 

and dispositional decree. The discussion of visitation with Father does not alter 

this or vitiate the validity of the trial court’s order. 

[27] Affirmed. 

Bailey, J., concurs. 

Baker, J., dissents with opinion.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 15 of 17

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re J.H. (Minor Child), Child 

in Need of Services,

and 

E.H. (Mother),

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

Court of Appeals Case No.

49A02-1503-JC-158

Baker, Judge, dissenting.

[1] I respectfully dissent. In this case, Mother had led an unstable life during the 

years leading to the filing of the CHINS petition. She and J.H. had lived in 

multiple residences in multiple states. During that time, she made an effort to 

ensure that J.H. received the services that he needed but did not always 

succeed. Mother may have also had some mental health issues.

[2] As a result of those circumstances, DCS filed a CHINS petition in June 2014. 

The factfinding was not completed until December 2014. During those six 

months, Mother participated voluntarily in multiple services, including homebased therapy and individual therapy. She fully cooperated with all service 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 16 of 17

providers, even driving repeatedly to Marion County when she was living in 

Orange County to participate with services and visits until DCS transferred her 

services to her home county. By the time of the completion of the factfinding 

hearing, Mother’s home-based therapist had no safety concerns and 

recommended placement of J.H. with Mother; Mother’s individual therapist 

had observed many positive interactions between Mother and J.H. and had no 

safety concerns; and the DCS case manager had no safety concerns. Mother 

also agreed to enroll J.H. in a preschool program and therapy recommended by 

DCS. Additionally, Mother had signed a lease for an appropriate threebedroom home and had been living there for four months at the time the

factfinding hearing was completed.

[3] In sum, Mother needed some help to achieve stability in her life. She welcomed 

and received the assistance provided by DCS. And by the time of the 

completion of factfinding, she had achieved stability. The system worked. There 

is simply no evidence in the record that, at the time of the factfinding hearing, 

the coercive intervention of the court was necessary or that J.H. was in any way 

endangered in Mother’s care. In my view, therefore, the juvenile court erred by 

finding J.H. to be a CHINS.

[4] Furthermore, and in my opinion even more egregiously, the juvenile court erred 

by proceeding to disposition on Mother and J.H. following the CHINS 

adjudication. At the dispositional hearing, all service providers and DCS 

recommended successful case closure. No one voiced a single safety concern. 

Notwithstanding this reality, the juvenile court ordered that J.H. remain a ward 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1503-JC-158 | October 30, 2015 Page 17 of 17

of DCS and ordered Mother to participate in services—services that the 

providers themselves had declared to be unnecessary. From the record, it is 

evident that the reason the juvenile court took this course was to enable Mother 

and J.H.’s father to reach a visitation arrangement. This is an entirely 

inappropriate reason to declare that a child must remain a ward of the State and 

order a parent to participate in services. 

[5] In my opinion, the juvenile court erred twice—first, by adjudicating J.H. to be a 

CHINS, and second, by proceeding to disposition in the face of the 

recommendation of DCS and all service providers that the case be closed 

successfully. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from the majority as I believe we 

should reverse.