[Cite as In re K.J., 2014-Ohio-2488.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

IN RE: K.H., : JUDGES: 

 A MINOR CHILD : 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 : Hon. John W. Wise, J. 

 : Hon. Craig R. Baldwin, J. 

 : 

 : 

 : Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 

 : 

 : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Tuscarawas County 

 Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile 

 Division, Case No. 13JD00151 

JUDGMENT: Reversed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: June 5, 2014 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellee 

BROOKE M. BURNS RYAN D. STYER 

Assistant State Public Defender Tuscarawas County Prosecutor 

250 East Broad Street, Suite 1400 

Columbus, OH 43215 AMANDA K. MILLER 

 Assistant County Prosecutor 

 125 East High Ave. 

 New Philadelphia, OH 44663 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 2 

Baldwin, J.

{¶1} Appellant K.H. appeals a judgment of the Tuscarawas County Common 

Pleas Court, Juvenile Division, finding him delinquent by reason of complicity in drug 

trafficking (R.C. 2925.03(A)(1)). Appellee is the State of Ohio. 

STATEMENT OF FACTS AND CASE

{¶2} On March 21, 2013, 14-year-old Z.C. stole ten Percocet pills from his 

mother’s prescription bottle and brought them with him to middle school in order to get 

high. He gave three of the pills to his friend, appellant, in the boy’s bathroom at the 

school. He later sold K.H. two pills for $4.00 because he wanted cash to purchase a 

drink from a vending machine. 

{¶3} M.D. and two other boys witnessed a pill exchange in the bathroom 

between Z.C. and appellant. M.D. did not see money exchanged. The boys told their 

school principal that they saw the exchange of drugs in the bathroom. The principal did 

not find pills in the possession of appellant or Z.C., but contacted law enforcement. 

{¶4} On April 3, 2013, appellee filed a complaint in the juvenile court alleging 

that “[K.H.] did knowingly sell or offer to sell a controlled substance to-wit: was complicit 

in drug trafficking by purchasing Percocet from a juvenile in the company of other 

juvenile males, in violation of §2825.03(A)(1) (Trafficking in Drugs), a felony of the fourth 

degree.” 

{¶5} The case proceeded to trial. At trial, appellant admitted that he had taken 

Percocet earlier in the week in question when Z.C. brought pills to his house, but denied 

ingesting Percocet on March 21, 2013. He denied having cash on the day of the 

incident, but claimed he saw Z.C. selling pills to two other boys during lunch. 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 3 

{¶6} Appellant was found delinquent as charged. At disposition, the court 

found that K.H. had been using drugs since he was ten years old, and had a lengthy 

history in the juvenile court. Based on these facts, the court committed appellant to the 

Ohio Department of Youth Services for a minimum of six months, to a maximum of his 

twenty-first birthday. Appellant assigns a single error: 

{¶7} “THE TUSCARAWAS COUNTY JUVENILE COURT VIOLATED K.H.’S 

RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW WHEN IT ADJUDICATED HIM DELINQUENT OF 

DRUG TRAFFICKING, IN THE ABSENCE OF CREDIBLE AND COMPETENT 

EVIDENCE THAT HE SOLD OR OFFERED TO SELL A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 

OR THAT HE ACTED WITH THE KIND OF CULPABILITY REQUIRED FOR THE 

COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.” 

{¶8} Appellant argues that the judgment finding him delinquent by reason of 

complicity to drug trafficking is not supported by sufficient evidence. 

{¶9} An appellate court's function when reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is to determine whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to 

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the 

crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St. 3d 259, 574 

N.E.2d 492, paragraph two of the syllabus (1991). 

{¶10} R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) defines trafficking in drugs: 

{¶11} “(A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following: 

{¶12} “(1) Sell or offer to sell a controlled substance or a controlled substance 

analog[.]” 

{¶13} R.C. 2923.02(A) defines complicity: 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 4 

{¶14} “(A) No person, acting with the kind of culpability required for the 

commission of an offense, shall do any of the following: 

{¶15} “(1) Solicit or procure another to commit the offense; 

{¶16} “(2) Aid or abet another in committing the offense; 

{¶17} “(3) Conspire with another to commit the offense in violation of section 

2923.01 of the Revised Code; 

{¶18} “(4) Cause an innocent or irresponsible person to commit the offense.” 

{¶19} To support a conviction for complicity by aiding and abetting pursuant to 

R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), the evidence must show that the defendant supported, assisted, 

encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in the commission of the 

crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the principal. Such intent may 

be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime. State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio 

St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001), syllabus. 

{¶20} Appellant argues that he did not have the culpability required for the 

commission of the offense of trafficking, nor did he solicit Z.C. to commit the offense, aid 

or abet Z.C. in committing the offense, conspire with Z.C. in committing the offense, or 

cause an innocent person to commit the offense. The State argues that appellant’s 

encouraging, supportive and cooperative conduct in the morning would probably cause 

Z.C. to give him the remaining Percocet pills in the afternoon, and thus he acted with 

the mental state required for a conviction of trafficking and aided or abetted Z.C. in 

committing the offense. 

{¶21} There is no evidence that appellant possessed the criminal intent to sell 

the Percocet. While he may have intended for Z.C. to sell the drugs to him, appellant 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 5 

himself did not have the intent to sell the drugs, he merely had the intent to receive the 

drugs from Z.C. The definition of drug trafficking by its nature requires two parties: a 

seller and a buyer. In virtually every transaction, the buyer has the intent for the seller 

to sell or offer to sell the controlled substance; however, the legislature did not see fit to 

include the buyer in the definition of trafficking in drugs. 

{¶22} While Z.C. testified that he knew appellant would want the Percocet pills 

because the two of them had engaged in recreational drug activity in the past, this 

evidence without more is insufficient to support a finding that appellant shared the 

criminal intent of Z.C. and that appellant supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated 

with, advised, or incited Z.C. in the commission of the crime. While we decline to hold 

that there will never be a case where the buyer’s conduct supports a conviction of 

complicity to drug trafficking, the evidence in the instant case is insufficient to 

demonstrate that appellant acted with the culpability required for commission of drug 

trafficking and that he took any of the actions set forth in R.C. 2923.02(A). 

 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 6 

{¶23} The assignment of error is sustained. The finding of delinquency is 

vacated. This case is remanded to the Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court, 

Juvenile Division, with instructions to discharge appellant on the instant finding of 

delinquency. Costs are assessed to appellee. 

By: Baldwin, J. 

and Wise, J. concurs. 

Gwin, P.J., concurs separately 

 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 7 

Gwin, concurs separately 

{¶24} I concur in the decision reached by the majority; however, I do so for the 

following reasons. 

{¶25} In Robinson v. Texas, 815 S.W.2d 361(Tex.Crim.App. 1991), the Court 

reviewed the consensus on this issue, 

We believe Professor LaFave correctly states the general rule 

regarding exceptions to the law of complicity: 

There are ... some exceptions to the general principle that a person 

who assists or encourages a crime is also guilty as an accomplice. For 

one, the victim of the crime may not be held as an accomplice even 

though his conduct in a significant sense has assisted in the commission 

of the crime.... 

Another exception is where the crime is so defined that participation 

by another is inevitably incident to its commission. It is justified on the 

ground that the legislature, by specifying the kind of individual who was 

guilty when involved in a transaction necessarily involving two or more 

parties, must have intended to leave the participation by the others 

unpunished.... Thus, under this exception one having intercourse with a 

prostitute is not liable as a party to the crime of prostitution, a purchaser is 

not a party to the crime of illegal sale,.... 

2 W. LaFave & A. Scott, Substantive Criminal Law § 6.8(e) at 165–

66 (1986) (citations omitted) (emphasis added). Other commentators 

agree: “A purchaser of liquor is not regarded as an accomplice of the 

person charged with selling such liquor; nor is a purchaser of narcotics an 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 8 

accomplice of the person charged with selling such narcotics.” 1 C. Torcia, 

Wharton's Criminal Law, § 38 at 202 (14th ed. 1978) (citations omitted). 

Numerous jurisdictions have addressed the question presented 

here, and all have reached the same result. See Thompson v. State, 347 

So.2d 1384, 1386 (Ala.Crim.App.1977); Sweatt v. State, 251 Ark. 650, 473 

S.W.2d 913, 914–15 (1971); People v. Lamb, 134 Cal.App.2d 582, 285 

P.2d 941, 942–43 (1955); State v. Hayes, 351 N.W.2d 654, 657 

(Minn.Ct.App.1984); Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938, 940 

(1968); People v. Tune, 103 A.D.2d 990, 479 N.Y.S.2d 832, 834 (1984); 

State v. Nasholm, 2 Or.App. 385, 467 P.2d 647, 648 (1970); State v. Fox,

313 N.W.2d 38, 40 (S.D.1981); Brown v. State, 557 S.W.2d 926 

(Tenn.Crim.App.1977); State v. Berg, 613 P.2d 1125, 1126 (Utah 1980); 

State v. Warnock, 7 Wash.App. 621, 501 P.2d 625, 625–26 (1972); 

Wheeler v. State, 691 P.2d 599, 602 (Wyo.1984). The opinion of the 

Supreme Court of Wyoming in Wheeler provides a good example of the 

reasoning employed in these decisions: 

There is a definite distinction between a seller and a buyer. Their 

separate acts may result in a single transaction, but the buyer is not aiding 

the “selling act” of the seller and the seller is not aiding the “buying act” of 

the buyer. The buyer and seller act from different poles. They are not in 

association or confederacy. An accomplice is one who participates in the 

same criminal conduct as the defendant, not one whose conduct is the 
Tuscarawas County, Case No. 2013 AP 11 0042 9 

antithesis of the defendant, albeit the conduct of both is involved in a 

single transaction. 

Wharton's Criminal Evidence (13th ed. 1973) tells us that a 

purchaser of narcotics is not an accomplice of the defendant charged with 

selling such narcotics, Id. Vol. 3, § 648, pp. 360–361, and we so hold. The 

purchaser of controlled substances commits the crime of “possession” and 

not “delivery,” and, thus, is not an accomplice to a defendant charged with 

unlawful distribution. 

Wheeler, 691 P.2d at 602. 

Robinson, 815 S.W.2d at 363-64. Accord, Sobrino v. State, 471 So.2d 1333 

(Fla.App. 1985). 

{¶26} R.C. 2923.03(F) states, “A charge of complicity may be stated in terms of 

this section, or in terms of the principal offense.” It is axiomatic that one cannot be 

convicted of trafficking in drugs on a theory that one sold the drugs to oneself. This is 

not a case where the defendant acted as an agent in purchasing the drugs from the 

seller on behalf of a third-party buyer. 

{¶27} Accordingly, I concur in the decision to reverse the decision of the trial 

court.