IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

2020 WY 31

 OCTOBER TERM, A.D. 2019

March 3, 2020

CATHERINE K. O’HARE,

Appellant

(Defendant),

v.

CHRISTOPHER HULME,

Appellee

(Plaintiff).

CHRISTOPHER HULME,

Appellant

(Plaintiff),

v.

CATHERINE K. O’HARE,

Appellee

(Defendant).

S-19-0093, S-19-0094

Appeal from the District Court of Carbon County

The Honorable Dawnessa A. Snyder, Judge

Representing Catherine K. O’Hare:

Mitchell H. Edwards, Nicholas & Tangeman, LLC, Laramie, Wyoming. Argument 

by Mr. Edwards.

Representing Christopher Hulme:

Nicholas A. Norris, Lubnau Law Office, P.C., Gillette, Wyoming. Argument by 

Mr. Norris.
Before DAVIS, C.J., and FOX, KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, and GRAY, JJ.

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third. Readers are 

requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne, Wyoming 82002, of 

any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before final publication in the 

permanent volume.
1

FOX, Justice.

[¶1] This dispute concerns the property boundary between two residential lots connected 

by a shared driveway in Rawlins, Wyoming. Christopher Hulme filed suit against 

Catherine “Cali” O’Hare, claiming that he had adversely possessed a 30-inch strip of her 

driveway, that he had an easement over the entire driveway, and that she had intentionally 

trespassed on the adversely possessed portion of his property by constructing a fence on it. 

Ms. O’Hare asserted various counterclaims. The parties filed serial motions for summary 

judgment, and the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Mr. Hulme on his 

adverse possession claim, and in favor of Ms. O’Hare on Mr. Hulme’s prescriptive 

easement and implied easement claims.

1

 After the district court denied Ms. O’Hare’s

motion to reconsider its adverse possession decision, the remaining issues proceeded to a 

bench trial. The parties cross appeal the decisions on their first motions for summary 

judgment, the denied motion for reconsideration, and the bench trial. We reverse in part

and remand. 

ISSUES

[¶2] The parties raise a variety of issues that we consolidate and rephrase:2

1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Mr. Hulme on his adverse possession claim?

2. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Ms. O’Hare on Mr. Hulme’s prescriptive easement

claim?

3. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Ms. O’Hare on Mr. Hulme’s implied easement claim?

FACTS

The Driveway

[¶3] The property line between 1017 8th Street, owned by Catherine “Cali” O’Hare, and 

1011 8th Street, owned by Christopher Hulme, runs down a concrete driveway that is 18.2 

feet wide at its widest point. The property line follows a visible concrete pour seam and

1 Other issues were resolved via summary judgment and are not part of this appeal. 2 Ms. O’Hare also challenges the award of damages resulting from her asserted trespass onto Mr. Hulme’s 

property and the denial of her motion for reconsideration. Because the trespass derived from the court’s 

decision that Mr. Hulme had adversely possessed a portion of Ms. O’Hare’s driveway, and because we 

reverse that decision, we do not address the propriety of damages. Likewise, because we reverse the court’s 

decision on adverse possession, we need not address its refusal to reconsider that decision. 
2

puts 10.1 feet of the driveway on Ms. O’Hare’s side, leaving 8.1 feet of driveway on 

Mr. Hulme’s. Mr. Hulme’s side of the driveway leads to a large garage/shop that he uses 

to park and work on various vehicles and pieces of equipment. For many years, a set of 

clothesline posts stood approximately 30 inches to the north of the concrete seam on 

Ms. O’Hare’s lot. Throughout this dispute, Mr. Hulme has asserted that he, his 

predecessors in interest, and the neighboring owners of the 1017 property had always

treated the clothesline posts as the true property boundary. 

1981-2003: “We were just neighborly and we shared it.”

[¶4] The clothesline posts stood on what is now Ms. O’Hare’s lot when Mr. Hulme first 

lived at 1011 8th Street as a young child. Mr. Hulme moved into the property with his 

mother in 1981. The two of them resided there from 1981 until 2003, as did Rick Hulme3

from 1986 to 1996. Mr. Hulme testified that both his mother and their 1017 neighbor,

Jimmy Bentsen, used to hang clothes on the clothesline between the posts. He also testified 

that the posts served as “the divider for the driveway” and that his 1017 neighbors “always 

parked to the north of the[] poles, and [he and his mother] always parked to the south.” 

Between 1981 and 2003, he and his family used the driveway to the south of the poles for 

parking multiple vehicles and various trailers and campers, accessing the garage and the 

backyard, and entering and exiting the property. They maintained the entire driveway by 

3 We refer to Rick Hulme as “Rick” in the remainder of this opinion to avoid confusing him with Christopher 

Hulme, whom we refer to as “Mr. Hulme.” 
3

shoveling, clearing out leaves, and mowing a strip of grass on the 1017 side of the 

driveway. They also used the 1017 side of the driveway to maneuver around other vehicles 

parked on their side in order to avoid moving and reparking every vehicle on their side of 

the driveway whenever they exited and entered it. Jimmy Bentsen used the Hulme’s side 

of the driveway for the same purpose. Mr. Hulme testified that there was never any 

agreement as to how his family and the neighbors used the driveway between 1981 and 

2003; rather, “It was neighborly. We were just neighborly and we shared it.”

[¶5] Rick similarly attested that he and Mr. Hulme’s mother “owned the [1011] property 

up and to the two (2) clothesline posts that split the driveway and we utilized it as if it was 

ours” and “hung rugs and clothes out on that line.” Although he could not “remember any 

specific conversations” with Jimmy Bentsen, Rick asserted that “it was absolutely 

understood that the property boundary ran the length of the driveway in line with the two 

posts.” According to Rick, he, Mr. Hulme, and Mr. Hulme’s mother “utilized the driveway 

right up against the two (2) posts,” “stored things there, kept a garbage can there, parked 

our vehicles, entered and exited vehicles in that space and drove in and out from our 

garage,” and “occasionally even parked [a] semi-tractor . . . with a sleeper in the driveway.” 

Like Mr. Hulme, Rick attested that Jimmy Bentsen “occasionally” used the Hulme’s side 

of the driveway to drive around vehicles parked on his own side “just like we would use 

his side of the driveway to drive around a vehicle parked” on their side. Finally, Rick 

attested that “Jimmy Bentsen never gave [them] permission, nor did [they] have any 

agreement, about our use of the driveway.”

2004-2006 Interlude

[¶6] Mr. Hulme moved out of 1011 8th Street sometime in 2003. His mother moved out

in 2004 and defaulted on her mortgages around that time. In March 2006, another

longtime-8th Street neighbor, Elnagrace Watson, purchased the 1011 property at a 

foreclosure sale. Ms. Watson allowed Mr. Hulme to move into the property immediately 

after she purchased it and then deeded it to him in August 2006 when he was able to secure 

a loan to pay her back the amount of her bid at the foreclosure sale. In sum, the property 

was vacant from sometime in 2004 when Mr. Hulme’s mother moved out, to sometime in 

2006 when he moved back in.4

 

4 Mr. Hulme repeatedly testified that he moved back in to 1011 8th Street in February 2006; however, the 

district court found that he could not have moved back in until March 2006 because public land records 

showed that Ms. Watson purchased the house in March 2006. For her part, Ms. O’Hare argues that the 

2006 to 2016 period of possession could not have begun until August 2006. We need not resolve any 

discrepancy concerning the time that Mr. Hulme regained possession of the 1011 property because our 

analyses of the adverse possession and prescriptive easement claims do not rely on continuity of possession 

or use. 
4

2006-2016: “until Cali O’Hare, I have got along with all of my neighbors.” 

[¶7] Not long after Mr. Hulme moved back in, Jimmy Bentsen died, leaving 1017 8th

Street to two of his children. They gave Mr. Hulme permission to store a large dumpster, 

a trailer, and a camper on the 1017 side of the driveway while the property was vacant. His 

things were still there when Eric Boles purchased the property in February 2008. 

Mr. Hulme told Mr. Boles that he would move his things off the 1017 side of the driveway

before Mr. Boles moved in, explaining that “anything north of the poles [was his] to park.” 

After Mr. Boles moved in, Mr. Hulme testified that he continued to use his side of the 

driveway up to the poles as his family had between 1981 and 2003: for parking various 

vehicles and trailers, intermittent storage of lawn furniture, barrels, and buckets, and for 

ingress and egress onto the property. Mr. Hulme also continued to maintain the entire 

driveway by removing snow, blowing leaves, and trimming the grass on the 1017 side of 

the property. He testified that he did so because he “was just trying to get along” and that 

it was “just easier to [plow] the whole driveway” because “you’re out there anyway. . . . 

And until Cali O’Hare, I have got along with all of my neighbors.” He also continued to 

use Mr. Boles’ side of the driveway to maneuver around vehicles parked on his own side 

of the driveway. Mr. Hulme testified that Mr. Boles never stored anything on the driveway 

south of the poles but that he “may have” occasionally used the driveway south of the poles 

to maneuver around parked vehicles and that such use would not have bothered him. 

[¶8] The status quo continued until Ms. O’Hare moved in to 1017 8th Street in July 2013. 

Ms. O’Hare’s father, Donald O’Hare, purchased the property on July 12, 2013, and 

transferred it to Ms. O’Hare via quitclaim deed the same day. The day Ms. O’Hare moved 

into the house, Mr. Hulme told her father that the clothesline posts marked the property 

line between the two sides of the driveway. Mr. O’Hare was immediately “skeptical” 

because the poles were too close to Ms. O’Hare’s house to allow access to the rear of the 

property and because they did not align with the concrete pour seam in the driveway, which 

he believed was “somewhat typical of property lines. That they would have a pour seam 

on the property line versus 2 and a half feet in.” At some point, Mr. O’Hare explained this 

to Mr. Hulme, who “didn’t believe it or want to talk about it.” In October 2013, Mr. O’Hare

personally measured his daughter’s lot and determined that the property boundary roughly 

aligned with the concrete pour seam. Shortly afterwards, he erected a makeshift fence of 

PVC pipe about two inches north of the seam on his daughter’s lot. Mr. Hulme promptly 

ran it over with his truck. The O’Hares called the police, who suggested that they get an 

official survey of the property. Mr. O’Hare obtained a survey, which confirmed that the 

property boundary did not align with the clothesline posts, but rather with the concrete pour 

seam. 

[¶9] Meanwhile, Mr. Hulme and Ms. O’Hare struggled to get along. Ms. O’Hare 

testified that Mr. Hulme antagonized her dogs by throwing rocks at her fence, repeatedly 

gave her “a menacing look,” called her names, and, on one occasion, threw two severed 

deer legs into her front yard. After Ms. O’Hare’s boyfriend moved in with her in late 2013, 
5

her relationship with Mr. Hulme improved somewhat. However, their feud resumed in 

August 2016. Around that time, Mr. Hulme’s family and friends began parking their 

vehicles at the end of the driveway so as to block Ms. O’Hare from entering and exiting 

her side of the driveway. Ms. O’Hare’s father marked the true property line with florescent 

paint and put up a “No Trespassing” sign. Mr. Hulme’s wife painted over the line. 

According to Ms. O’Hare, Mrs. Hulme threatened her shortly after that incident. After the 

alleged threat, Ms. O’Hare had the sheriff serve Mr. Hulme with a “No Trespass Order”

and applied for a permit to build a fence along the property line.

[¶10] Toward the end of August 2016, Ms. O’Hare’s contractor began constructing a 

fence along the surveyed property line. To fasten the vertical fence posts into the ground, 

the contractor drilled multiple holes into the concrete driveway and cemented the posts into 

the holes. Mr. Hulme testified that, after the fence was completed, he could no longer use 

the driveway because there was not enough room to open the doors of his truck. He also 

testified that the fence did not leave enough room for him to drive wider pieces of 

equipment, such as trailers, to the large garage at the back of his property. He 

acknowledged, however, that a second garage door leading to the alley that runs behind the 

property allowed him access to the garage. 

Course of Proceedings 

[¶11] Mr. Hulme filed a complaint in district court, asserting claims of adverse possession, 

prescriptive easement, implied easement, trespass, ejectment, and injunctive relief.

Specifically, Mr. Hulme claimed to have adversely possessed the disputed area of driveway 

up to the clothesline posts, and he sought an easement over the entire side of Ms. O’Hare’s 

driveway in order to allow free ingress and egress onto his property. His ejectment and 

trespass claims asserted that Ms. O’Hare’s fence interfered with the use of his property and 

his easement; that he was “entitled to an order requiring the removal of the fence” and 

“punitive damages for [Ms. O’Hare’s] intentional trespass”; and that he was “irreparably 

damaged by being denied the quiet enjoyment of his property or the use of his easement 

and damaged by the incurrence of attorney fees[.]” Ms. O’Hare answered, asserting

counterclaims of trespass and intentional infliction of emotional distress, among others. 

Mr. Hulme moved for a preliminary injunction, asserting that Ms. O’Hare’s fence was 

causing him irreparable injury and seeking its removal. Following a hearing, the district 

court denied the motion, concluding that preliminary injunctive relief was not appropriate 

because Mr. Hulme did not make “a clear showing of probable success on the merits or of 

possible irreparable injury.” The court specifically relied on testimony suggesting that use 

of Ms. O’Hare’s driveway up to the clothesline posts was permissive, saying: 

“Use by permission or the absence of objection will not ripen 

into title no matter how long continued.” [Boykin v. Carbon 

Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 2005 WY 158], ¶ 15, 124 P.3d [677,] 682 

[(Wyo. 2005)]. The testimony presented at the hearing 
6

suggested all use of the driveway was permissive, at least until 

the most recent three to four years. On direct examination 

[Mr. Hulme] commented that before [Ms. O’Hare] moved in, 

the property owners “were just neighborly and we used [the 

driveway],” and the property owners . . . would use both halves 

of the driveway for ingress and egress. On cross-examination, 

[Mr. Hulme] confirmed that he had previously had express 

permission to park his camper on the other side of the 

driveway. In short, [Mr. Hulme, Ms. O’Hare], and their 

predecessors used all portions of the driveway permissively, 

each with full knowledge and consent of the others. 

(Some alterations in original.)

[¶12] In April 2017, Mr. Hulme moved for summary judgment on his claims of adverse 

possession and prescriptive easement. Mr. Hulme relied on two affidavits, his own and 

Rick Hulme’s, to support his assertion that no genuine issues of material fact existed as to 

those claims. Ms. O’Hare did not respond to Mr. Hulme’s motion directly, instead filing 

her own motion for summary judgment on Mr. Hulme’s adverse possession, prescriptive 

easement, implied easement, trespass, and ejectment claims. She did not file a W.R.C.P. 

56.1 Statement with her motion, but attached and cited various documents, including a 

transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing, to support her motion. Mr. Hulme 

responded, arguing that Ms. O’Hare’s motion should be denied for failing to comply with 

Rule 56.1 and, alternatively, that it should be denied on its merits. 

[¶13] The district court declined to deny Ms. O’Hare’s motion for failure to file a Rule 

56.1 Statement, saying that the failure was “not fatal to [her] motion because most of the 

relevant facts were established by in-court testimony at the preliminary injunction 

hearing.”5 The court granted Mr. Hulme’s motion for summary judgment on his adverse 

possession claim, concluding: 

Mr. Hulme has presented a prima facie case of adverse 

possession commencing in 1981. Ms. O’Hare has not negated 

one of the elements in order to rebut the presumption of 

adverse possession, nor has she raised a genuine issue of 

material fact in relation to the period of adverse possession 

from 1981 to 2003. Mr. Hulme is entitled to summary 

judgment on his adverse possession cause of action. Title of 

5 We have held “that in a summary judgment proceeding, a court may consider testimony from prior 

hearings only if that testimony is transcribed and authenticated” and “submitted with the motion or already 

filed with the court.” Matthews v. Wyo. Dep’t of Agriculture, 719 P.2d 216, 221-22 (Wyo. 1986). Here, 

Ms. O’Hare submitted a transcript of the preliminary injunction hearing and relied on it in her motion for 

summary judgment. 
7

the disputed 30-inch-wide-strip of driveway vested in the 

Hulmes in 1991 and now rests with Mr. Hulme. 

[¶14] As to Mr. Hulme’s prescriptive easement claim over the entirety of Ms. O’Hare’s 

side of the driveway, the district court concluded that he could not “establish that his use 

of the northern side of the shared driveway (Ms. O’Hare’s side) for ingress and egress 

purposes was anything other than permissive,” and granted summary judgment on that 

claim in favor of Ms. O’Hare. Finally, the district court granted summary judgment in 

favor of Ms. O’Hare on Mr. Hulme’s claim of implied easement, concluding that he could 

not establish that a “common owner used the O’Hare side of the driveway to access the 

Hulme side of the property” or that the claimed easement was “necessary and beneficial to 

the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted.” 

[¶15] In November 2018, Ms. O’Hare filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s 

decision on Mr. Hulme’s adverse possession claim, attaching numerous previously unfiled 

documents to support her argument that material issues of fact existed. The district court 

denied the motion, concluding it was untimely. The case proceeded to trial on the only 

issues remaining after additional motions for summary judgment: damages resulting from 

Ms. O’Hare’s trespass onto Mr. Hulme’s adversely possessed portion of the driveway and 

Ms. O’Hare’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court 

awarded Mr. Hulme actual damages of $7,292 for the cost of repairing the driveway and 

for ten months’ loss of use of his portion of the driveway. It declined to award punitive 

damages. Finally, the court denied Ms. O’Hare’s claim of intentional infliction of 

emotional distress, concluding that she had failed to meet her burden of proof. Both parties 

timely appealed. Additional facts are discussed below as needed. 

STANDARD OF REVIEW 

[¶16] Mr. Hulme makes much of Ms. O’Hare’s failure to file a response to his motion for 

summary judgment or a Rule 56.1 Statement, arguing that this failure requires us to review 

the district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. Neither Rule 56 nor our precedent 

support an abuse of discretion standard of review. The party moving for summary 

judgment has the burden of showing “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 

fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” W.R.C.P. 56(a). We 

consider whether the movant has met this initial burden de novo and afford no deference 

to the district court’s ruling. White v. Wheeler, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 14, 406 P.3d 1241, 1246 

(Wyo. 2017) (citing The Tavern, LLC v. Town of Alpine, 2017 WY 56, ¶ 46, 395 P.3d 167, 

178-79 (Wyo. 2017)). The opposing party has no obligation to respond to the motion with 

materials beyond the pleadings until the movant has met his initial burden of establishing 

a prima facie case that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Little Medicine Creek 

Ranch, Inc. v. D’Elia, 2019 WY 103, ¶ 14, 450 P.3d 222, 227-28 (Wyo. 2019) (citing 

Mantle v. N. Star. Energy & Constr. LLC, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 110, 437 P.3d 758, 794-95 (Wyo. 

2019)). Further, we evaluate the record “from the viewpoint most favorable to the party 
8

opposing the motion for summary judgment, giving that party all the favorable inferences 

which may be drawn from the facts contained in affidavits, depositions, and other materials 

appearing in the record.” Murdock v. Zier, 2006 WY 80, ¶ 9, 137 P.3d 147, 150 (Wyo. 

2006) (citing Ballinger v. Thompson, 2005 WY 101, ¶ 9, 118 P.3d 429, 433 (Wyo. 2005)). 

“When, as here, we review a grant of summary judgment on an adverse possession claim, 

we apply the summary judgment standard with ‘more exacting scrutiny’ because adverse 

possession claims are inherently fact-intensive.” Little Medicine Creek, 2019 WY 103, 

¶ 15, 450 P.3d at 228 (quoting White, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 15, 406 P.3d at 1246). 

[¶17] That said, we review a “‘summary judgment in the same light as the district court, 

using the same materials and following the same standards.’” Little Medicine Creek, 2019 

WY 103, ¶ 15, 450 P.3d at 228 (quoting Mantle, 2019 WY 29, ¶ 110, 437 P.3d at 795). On 

appeal, Ms. O’Hare relies heavily on materials and testimony submitted to the district court 

after it made its decision on the adverse possession claim. We do not consider those 

materials in our review. Toltec Watershed Imp. Dist. v. Johnston, 717 P.2d 808, 812 (Wyo. 

1986) (“Since the district court did not have [documents filed after summary judgment] 

before it, we cannot consider such documents in our review since we must examine the 

judgment in the same light as the district court and use the same materials.”).

DISCUSSION 

I. The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Mr. Hulme on 

his adverse possession claim

[¶18] The district court concluded that Mr. Hulme was entitled to summary judgment on 

his adverse possession claim. On our de novo review, we consider whether disputed issues 

of material fact precluded summary judgment. 

[¶19] “Adverse possession claims are not favored in the law, . . . and ‘a presumption in 

favor of the record title holder exists, unless and until the adverse claimant makes out his 

prima facie case.’” White, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 17, 406 P.3d at 1246 (quoting Hillard v. 

Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1259 (Wyo. 1995) and citing Braunstein v. Robinson Family Ltd. 

P’ship LLP, 2010 WY 26, ¶ 19, 226 P.3d 826, 836 (Wyo. 2010)). To carry its initial burden 

of establishing a prima facie case, the party requesting summary judgment “must show 

actual, open, notorious, exclusive and continuous possession of another’s property which 

is hostile and under claim of right or color of title. Possession must be for the statutory 

period, ten years.” Braunstein, 2010 WY 26, ¶ 17, 226 P.3d at 833) (internal citations 

omitted). 

A hostile possession or use is one that amounts to an assertion 

of ownership adverse to that of the record owner. It must be 

so incompatible with or so in defiance of the rights of the true 

owner that an ordinarily prudent owner would be on clear 
9

notice that his ownership is in jeopardy, that the claimant 

intends to possess the property as his own, and that the owner 

should take some action to protect his title. Graybill v. 

Lampman, 2014 WY 100, ¶ 36, 332 P.3d 511, 522 (Wyo. 

2014). 

White, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 17, 406 P.3d at 1247 (alterations omitted) (quoting Galiher v. 

Johnson, 2017 WY 31, ¶ 20, 391 P.3d 1101, 1106 (Wyo. 2017) (Galiher I)). Further, 

[b]ecause the requirement of notice is fundamental to a claim 

of adverse possession, we have held that a claimant cannot 

establish a prima facie case by relying solely on his testimony 

as to his subjective hostile intent. He must introduce evidence 

that such intent was objectively made manifest by his 

observable words or actions. 

Galiher I, 2017 WY 31, ¶ 21, 391 P.3d at 1106 (citing Braunstein, 2010 WY 26, ¶ 19, 226 

P.3d at 835; Turner v. Floyd C. Reno & Sons, Inc., 769 P.2d 364, 368 (Wyo. 1989)). 

[¶20] If an adverse possession claimant successfully rebuts the presumption in favor of 

the record title holder by making the required prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the 

record title holder “to explain such possession.” White, 2017 WY 146, ¶ 18, 406 P.3d at 

1247 (quoting Osuch v. Gunnels, 2017 WY 49, ¶ 10, 393 P.3d 898, 901 (Wyo. 2017)). 

Because an adverse possession claimant cannot succeed if his use of the property was 

permissive, the record title holder can defeat the claim “by showing that the claimant’s 

possession was permissive.” Braunstein, 2010 WY 26, ¶ 17, 226 P.3d at 833 (quoting 

Hillard, 888 P.2d at 1261). “If the title holder can do that, then it becomes a question of 

weight and credibility to be determined by the trier of fact.” Braunstein, 2010 WY 26, 

¶ 17, 226 P.3d at 833.

[¶21] Here, the district court concluded that Mr. Hulme carried his initial burden of 

establishing a prima facie showing of adverse possession for the 1981 to 2003 period and 

that Ms. O’Hare failed to rebut that showing. Of particular significance is the district 

court’s conclusion as to the hostility element of adverse possession. In finding that 

Mr. Hulme had established the element of hostility in his prima facie case, the district court 

stated: 

Mr. Hulme’s testimony at the preliminary injunction 

hearing establishes [the] hostility element. He unequivocally 

testified that the Hulmes used the southern portion of the 

shared driveway up to the clothesline posts as if they owned it 

from 1981 to at least 2003, and he personally used it in the 

same manner from March 2006 to the end of August 2016. As 
10

to the first period, he stated there was no agreement between 

the Hulmes and their neighbor, Jimmy Bentsen. Since moving 

back into 1011 8th Street in March 2006, every property owner 

behaved as if the clothesline posts were the property boundary

until Ms. O’Hare erected the fence and effectively blocked 

Mr. Hulme from being able to drive his pickup down the 

driveway. 

Turning to the question of whether Ms. O’Hare rebutted Mr. Hulme’s prima facie showing 

of hostility, the district court reasoned and concluded: 

The Court readily admits it had its doubts as to whether 

Mr. Hulme could prevail on the hostility element of his adverse 

possession claim, particularly in light of the following 

testimony he gave at the preliminary injunction hearing: 

Q: Were you aware of any type of agreement 

between your family and the previous owners in 

2017? Jimmy [Bentsen], was there any sort of 

agreement on the use of that driveway?

A: No. We just used it. It was neighborly. We were 

just neighborly and we shared it. 

. . . 

However, in conducting further research on the matter 

in light of the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment 

and reviewing the record, the Court finds Mr. Hulme has in fact 

established the hostility element based on the undisputed 

material facts and Ms. O’Hare has not rebutted that showing or 

pointed to a genuine issue of material fact in response. 

Specifically, even if mistaken about the proper location of the 

property line and lacking ill intent, the Hulmes and Jimmy 

Bentsen conducted themselves as if the boundary between the 

properties was the clothesline posts. Starting in 1981 and 

lasting at least until 2003 (while Mr. Hulme lived at 1011 8th

Street), each neighbor parked their vehicles and stored personal 

property on their respective sides of the clothesline poles. Only 

with permission would one store their property on the opposing 

side of the clothesline poles. 
11

Jimmy Bentsen either chose not to enforce the true 

boundary between the properties or, more likely, 

mistakenly believed the clothesline posts represented the 

true boundary. Likewise, starting in 1981, the Hulmes 

enforced their property rights up to the clothesline posts, 

whether by mistake or with full knowledge of the true 

boundary line. The significant point in all of this, which the 

Court’s additional research solidified, is that possession is not 

with permission simply because the parties are mistaken as to 

the true boundary. “Possession is hostile when the possessor 

holds and claims property as his own, whether by mistake or 

willfully.” Graybill, ¶ 36, 332 P.3d at 522 . . . . Here, the most 

likely explanation, that the Hulmes and Jimmy Bentsen were 

mistaken as to the true boundary between the properties, does 

not turn the Hulmes’ possession of the disputed property 

from hostile to permissive. 

(Emphasis added and emphasis in original omitted.) 

[¶22] We take no issue with the district court’s legal conclusion that a mistaken belief as 

to the true property boundary does not turn possession from hostile to permissive. Graybill, 

2014 WY 100, ¶ 36, 332 P.3d at 522. However, the district court exceeded the bounds of 

summary judgment by making the factual finding that Jimmy Bentsen, more likely than 

not, was mistaken as to the true property line. As the court acknowledged, it may also have 

been that Jimmy Bentsen “chose not to enforce the true boundary between the properties.” 

That possibility raises a question of material fact because “[n]o manner, duration, or scope 

of use can be adverse if the owner permitted it.” Galiher I, 2017 WY 31, ¶ 22, 391 P.3d at 

1106 (citing Graybill, 2014 WY 100, ¶ 27, 332 P.3d at 519-20). We have repeatedly 

explained that “when a landowner allows a neighbor to use his land, that use should be 

deemed permissive.” Galiher I, 2017 WY 31, ¶ 22, 391 P.3d at 1106 (citing Gray v. 

Fitzhugh, 576 P.2d 88, 90-91 (Wyo. 1978)); see also Little Medicine, 2019 WY 103, ¶ 22, 

450 P.3d at 229; Galiher v. Johnson, 2018 WY 145, ¶¶ 21-22, 432 P.3d 502, 512 (Wyo. 

2018) (Galiher II). We have also described “the special relationship that often exists 

between neighbors.” Little Medicine, 2019 WY 103, ¶ 22, 450 P.3d at 229. In short, 

“property owners characteristically allow slight intrusions onto their land by their 

neighbors in order to promote good will and avoid bad feelings and confrontations.” 

Galiher I, 2017 WY 31, ¶ 22, 391 P.3d at 1106 (quoting James C. Smith, Neighboring 

Property Owner § 6:1 (Nov. 2016 Update)). On the flip side, encroaching neighbors

“generally [do] not intend to adversely possess” that land and thereby acquire title to it. 

Smith, Neighboring Property Owner § 6:1.
12

[¶23] Here, Mr. Hulme’s own testimony raised the question of whether Jimmy Bentsen 

permitted his family’s use of the disputed strip of driveway.6

 He testified that use of the 

driveway “was neighborly” and they “shared it.” He also noted that both his mother and 

Mr. Bentsen hung clothes on the clothesline between the posts. Mr. Hulme also testified 

that between 1981 and 2003 he maintained the entire driveway, including a strip of grass 

on Mr. Bentsen’s side of the clothesline posts, and that Mr. Bentsen freely used the Hulme 

side of the driveway for ingress and egress. His testimony suggests the Hulmes and 

Mr. Bentsen indeed had the sort of neighborly “special relationship” resulting in permissive 

encroachments on to one another’s property.

7

 

[¶24] Because the district court granted summary judgment based on the earlier period, it

did not reach a conclusion concerning whether Mr. Hulme had established adverse 

possession in the 2006 to 2016 period. Mr. Hulme raised the second time period below 

and on appeal, and we may affirm on any basis found in the record. Sky Harbor Air Serv., 

Inc. v. Cheyenne Reg’l Airport Bd., 2016 WY 17, ¶ 40, 368 P.3d 264, 272 (Wyo. 2016). 

However, we find no basis to grant summary judgment because there are disputed issues 

of material fact as to the later period as well.

[¶25] Following their father’s death, Mr. Bentsen’s children gave Mr. Hulme permission

to use the entire driveway while the 1017 property was vacant. After Mr. Boles moved in, 

Mr. Hulme continued to maintain the entire driveway because he “was just trying to get 

along” with his neighbors. He also continued to use the 1017 side of the driveway for 

ingress and egress and testified that it would not have bothered him if Mr. Boles had done 

the same on the 1011 side. This testimony raises the possibility that these neighbors 

allowed slight intrusions onto their respective properties to promote good will and avoid 

confrontations. Of course, the testimony does not conclusively establish that the Hulme’s 

use of the strip of driveway was permissive. It does, however, allow for a reasonable 

inference of permissive use, which is sufficient to defeat summary judgment. White, 2017 

WY 146, ¶ 37, 406 P.3d at 1251 (“If multiple reasonable inferences may be drawn from a 

particular fact, that fact is not a basis for summary judgment.”). 

[¶26] Thus, we hold that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor 

of Mr. Hulme because issues of material fact concerning hostility existed. 

6 Mr. Hulme argues that it was Ms. O’Hare’s burden to rebut his showing of hostility with evidence of 

permissive use and that she failed to do so. Thus, he reasons, the district court was free to consider the 

element of hostility undisputed. We disagree. Mr. Hulme introduced evidence that his family’s use of the 

disputed strip of driveway may have been permissive, essentially defeating his own prima facie case of 

adverse possession (at least as viewed on summary judgment). We note that Ms. O’Hare did not appeal the 

denial of her motion for summary judgment on Mr. Hulme’s adverse possession claim. 7 Mr. Hulme and Rick both asserted they did not have an agreement with Mr. Bentsen permitting them to 

use the driveway up to the clothesline posts. We do not doubt that there was no formal agreement between 

the neighbors; however, “permission may be either express or implied.” 3 Am. Jur. 2d Adverse Possession

§ 44 (Feb. 2020 Update). 
13

II. The district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Ms. O’Hare 

on Mr. Hulme’s prescriptive easement claim

[¶27] Mr. Hulme also argued that he had acquired a prescriptive easement to use the entire 

side of the driveway north of the concrete pour seam. This claim encompassed both the 

area which he claimed to have adversely possessed (in the event that his adverse possession 

claim failed) and the remainder of Ms. O’Hare’s driveway. Concerning the portion of the 

driveway between the seam and the posts, Mr. Hulme sought an easement “for the purposes 

that [he] and his predecessors [had] utilized the driveway as described . . . in his claim for 

adverse possession” (i.e. overflow parking, space for exiting and entering vehicles, and 

storage). Concerning the portion of the driveway north of the posts, Mr. Hulme sought an 

easement only for maneuvering around vehicles parked south of the seam. Because the 

court concluded that Mr. Hulme had adversely possessed the strip of driveway from the 

concrete pour seam up to the clothesline posts, it only considered whether the portion of 

the driveway north of the posts was subject to a prescriptive easement. As to that portion, 

the court reasoned that Mr. Hulme had “not overcome the presumption of permissive use 

of Ms. O’Hare’s side of the driveway” and granted summary judgment in Ms. O’Hare’s 

favor. 

[¶28] While not identical, “the requirements for establishing a prescriptive easement are 

similar to those for adverse possession[.]” Koontz v. Town of Superior, 746 P.2d 1264, 

1267 (Wyo. 1987). A party claiming an easement by prescription bears the burden of 

proving adverse use, under color of title or claim of right, sufficient to put the owner of the 

servient estate on notice of his claim, for a continuous and uninterrupted period of at least 

ten years. Powder River Ranch, Inc. v. Michelena, 2005 WY 1, ¶ 9, 103 P.3d 876, 880 

(Wyo. 2005) (citing Coleman v. Keith, 6 P.3d 145, 147 (Wyo. 2000); A.B. Cattle Co. v. 

Forgey Ranches, Inc., 943 P.2d 1184, 1188 (Wyo. 1997)). Prescriptive easements are not 

favored in Wyoming, and a party claiming one has a heavy burden, particularly regarding 

adverse use. Powder River Ranch, Inc., 2005 WY 1, ¶ 9, 103 P.3d at 880 (citing Yeager v. 

Forbes, 2003 WY 134, ¶ 34, 78 P.3d 241, 255-56 (Wyo. 2003); Prazma v. Kaehne, 768 

P.2d 586, 589 (Wyo. 1989)). Indeed, “we generally presume that use of a private roadway 

by a neighbor is permissive.” Powder River Ranch, Inc., 2005 WY 1, ¶ 9, 103 P.3d at 880.8

 

“The presumption of permissive use is, however, rebuttable.” Id. 

8 We note that there is some inconsistency in our case law regarding the presumption that should apply to 

the adversity element of prescriptive easement claims. See Shumway v. Tom Sanford, Inc., 637 P.2d 666,

669 (Wyo. 1981) (identifying cases that have applied a presumption of adverse use and others that have 

applied a presumption of permissive use); see also Koontz, 746 P.2d at 1270 (Urbigkit, J., concurring in 

part and dissenting in part) (criticizing majority for applying presumption that public’s use of street crossing 

private lots was adverse, arguing this presumption is inconsistent with weight of authority applying the 

presumption that the use was permissive). However, we have clarified in numerous cases that a 

presumption of permissive use is appropriate in cases involving claimed prescriptive easements between 

neighbors. See Lincoln Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs v. Cook, 2002 WY 23, ¶¶ 46-47, 39 P.3d 1076, 1088-89 (Wyo. 

2002); A.B. Cattle Co., 943 P.2d at 1188; Weiss v. Pedersen, 933 P.2d 495, 501 (Wyo. 1997), overruled on 
14

[¶29] The district court’s error in granting summary judgment on Mr. Hulme’s adverse 

possession claim resulted in an incomplete analysis of the prescriptive easement claim. 

Because the district court considered the dispute over the area between the seam and posts 

resolved by its adverse possession decision, it did not analyze or come to any conclusion 

concerning an easement over that area. Indeed, had the adverse possession decision been 

correct, there would be no need for an easement over that area. However, our reversal of 

the district court’s decision on the adverse possession claim revives the question of whether 

Mr. Hulme had acquired an easement over the strip of driveway between the seam and the 

posts. Because the prescriptive easement cannot be resolved independent of the adverse 

possession claim, we reverse and remand as to this issue as well.

9

III. The district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of 

Ms. O’Hare on Mr. Hulme’s implied easement claim

[¶30] To establish an implied easement,

10 the following elements must be satisfied: 

(1) common ownership followed by a conveyance separating 

the unified ownership; (2) before severance, the common 

owner used part of the property for the benefit of the other part, 

a use that was apparent, obvious, and continuous; and (3) the 

claimed easement is necessary and beneficial to the enjoyment 

of the parcel previously benefitted. 

Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2010 WY 160, ¶ 10, 245 P.3d 293, 298 (Wyo. 2010) 

(Hansuld II) (quoting Hansuld v. Lariat Diesel Corp., 2003 WY 165, ¶ 15, 81 P.3d 215, 

218 (Wyo. 2003) (Hansuld I)). Whether an easement by implication exists depends on the 

intent of the parties who conveyed the land in question. Hansuld II, 2010 WY 160, ¶ 10, 

245 P.3d at 298 (citing Hansuld I, 2003 WY 165, ¶ 16, 81 P.3d at 218). “The doctrine of 

other grounds by White v. Allen, 2003 WY 39, 65 P.3d 395 (Wyo. 2003). We do not decide the presumption 

to be applied in other circumstances. 

9 We cannot separately analyze the prescriptive easement claim as to the portion of the driveway north of 

the posts, on which the district court did provide analysis and reach a conclusion. To do so would require 

us to decide which facts pertained exclusively to the portion of the driveway north of the posts. Mr. Hulme’s 

asserted uses of the driveway between the seam and posts differed from the use asserted north of the posts, 

as do the facts and testimony on which those uses are based. We are unable to parse those facts on the 

record before us, and the parties provide little assistance in that regard. Moreover, neither party argues that 

we should affirm or reverse the prescriptive easement decision based exclusively on the portion of the 

driveway north of the posts. Instead, they seek a decision on the entirety of the area north of the concrete 

seam. We cannot do so based on the district court’s decision. Any decision on the prescriptive easement 

claim would relate only to the area north of the posts, and the parties give us no indication of what would 

become of the prescriptive easement claim over the 30-inch strip on remand. 

10 In contrast to the prescriptive easement claim, we are able to clearly discern the facts necessary to the 

implied easement analysis from the record and conclude that the claim is not viable for either portion of the 

driveway. 
15

implied easements was created for courts to examine the particular facts suggesting the 

intent of the parties to a conveyance and determine if the parties omitted granting an 

easement reasonably necessary for the use and enjoyment of the property.” Hansuld II, 

2010 WY 160, ¶ 10, 245 P.3d at 298. We “determine the parties’ intent at the time that the 

unified property was severed[.]” Id.

[¶31] Mr. Hulme asserts, and Ms. O’Hare concedes, that the 1017 and 1011 properties 

were once commonly owned and later severed by a conveyance. However, we agree with 

the district court that Mr. Hulme cannot demonstrate that the claimed easement is necessary 

and beneficial to the enjoyment of the parcel previously benefitted. 

[¶32] First, Mr. Hulme has not identified any obvious use of the 1017 lot for the benefit 

of the 1011 lot prior to severance, either in his response to Ms. O’Hare’s motion for 

summary judgment or on appeal. Mr. Hulme argues that it is “clear from the facts” that 

the common owner of the two properties intended the Hulme property to be benefitted “by 

such portion of the O’Hare property as would be required to get to the garage with a 

vehicle[.]” We do not agree. Mr. Hulme has not provided any evidence of how the two 

properties were used prior to severance, let alone any “apparent” or “obvious” uses. 

[¶33] Further, Mr. Hulme cannot show that an implied easement is necessary to enjoyment 

of his property. In In re Estate of Shirran, we explained the concept of necessity in the 

context of implied easements. 987 P.2d 140, 145 (Wyo. 1999). There, a commonly owned, 

mountainous parcel of land was severed. Id. at 141. The owner of one of the severed 

parcels began denying his neighbor access to a road that had been the usual means of 

accessing the neighbor’s parcel when the properties were united. Id. Although use of the 

parcel remained possible via an alternative route, we held that the “necessary and 

beneficial” element of an implied easement claim had been satisfied because the alternative 

route traveled through mountainous terrain on a rough back road and required the neighbor 

to drive four to five additional miles to reach his parcel. Id. at 145. We reasoned that the 

additional four to five miles, particularly when coupled with the condition of the road and 

the mountainous terrain, would require the neighbor to endure disproportionate effort and 

expense. Id. We also found it significant that, prior to severance, the neighbor’s parcel 

had traditionally been accessed via the road traversing the other property, because we look 

to “the condition of the property as it actually was at the time of [severance],” including 

any “obvious preexisting use of one part of the property to benefit another part.” Id. at 

143.

[¶34] Here, the Hulme property can be used without the benefit of the easement, although 

perhaps not exactly as Mr. Hulme would like. Ingress and egress onto the property remains 

possible via the alley running behind the property, where a second garage door provides 

access to Mr. Hulme’s garage. The evidence at summary judgment did not indicate the 

alleyway route required Mr. Hulme to travel a materially greater or more difficult distance. 

Instead, Mr. Hulme asserted that this alternative entry hindered use of his shop because the 
16

alley garage door didn’t “have as much clearance” and that manipulating vehicles into that 

entrance was more difficult, particularly with “full-size large truck[s].” Those 

inconveniences are not so great as those at issue in Shirran and do not deprive Mr. Hulme 

of the use of his property or require him to endure disproportionate effort or expense. 

[¶35] Thus, we hold that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in 

favor of Ms. O’Hare on Mr. Hulme’s implied easement claim. 

CONCLUSION

[¶36] Material issues of fact precluded summary judgment in favor of Mr. Hulme on his 

adverse possession claim. The district court’s error on the adverse possession claim 

resulted in an incomplete analysis of the prescriptive easement claim, hindering our review. 

The district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Ms. O’Hare on 

Mr. Hulme’s implied easement claim. Reversed in part and remanded for further 

proceedings.