UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

JASON M. FRANCIS, 

Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:17-cv-1022 

 Judge George C. Smith 

v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura 

 

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant. 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 

 Plaintiff, Jason M. Francis (“Plaintiff”), brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for 

review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying his 

application for supplemental security income. This matter is before the undersigned for a 

Report and Recommendation on Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8), the 

Commissioner’s Response in Opposition (ECF No. 13), Plaintiff’s Reply (ECF No. 14), and the 

administrative record (ECF No. 6). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that 

Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors be OVERRULED and that the Commissioner’s decision be 

AFFIRMED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff protectively filed his application for supplemental security income on June 9, 

2014. In his application, Plaintiff alleged a disability onset of January 6, 2014. Plaintiff’s 

application was denied initially on October 9, 2014, and upon reconsideration on November 26, 

2014. Plaintiff sought a hearing before an administrative law judge. Administrative Law 
2 

Judge Noceeba Southern (“ALJ”) held a hearing on November 9, 2016, at which Plaintiff, 

represented by counsel, appeared and testified. Vocational expert Connie O’Brien-Heckler (the 

“VE”) also appeared and testified at the hearing. On January 12, 2017, the ALJ issued a 

decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. 

On September 29, 2017, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review and adopted 

the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s final decision. Plaintiff then timely commenced the 

instant action. 

In his Statement of Errors (ECF No. 8), Plaintiff advances two contentions of error. 

First, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s mental RFC is not supported by substantial evidence 

because the ALJ failed, without sufficient explanation, to incorporate the limitations opined by 

the state agency psychologists whose opinions she assigned significant weight. Specifically, 

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ improperly omitted opined limitations relating to interaction with 

others and fast-paced work. Second, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s consideration and weighing 

of an opinion rendered by Dr. Robert Dominguez, M.D. More specifically, Plaintiff argues that 

the ALJ improperly determined that Dr. Dominguez was not a treating physician and that the 

opinion was merely a conclusory, checkbox form. 

In her Response, the Commissioner maintains that the ALJ’s mental RFC is supported by 

substantial evidence. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ’s decision as a whole 

satisfactorily explains the omitted limitations and supports the RFC determination. 

Additionally, the Commissioner contends that the ALJ’s failure to include the opined limitation 

to limited, superficial interaction with supervisors is harmless because the jobs Plaintiff can 

perform do not involve more than limited, superficial interaction with others. Finally, the 
3 

Commissioner argues that the weight assigned to Dr. Dominguez’s opinion is supported by 

substantial evidence and that the ALJ’s conclusion was properly within the permissible zone of 

choice. 

II. RELEVANT OPINION EVIDENCE 

The record contains five opinions relating to Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related 

activities due to his mental impairments: (1) March 2014 opinion from consultative examiner 

Dr. Marc E. Miller, Ph.D.; (2) September 2014 opinion from consultative examiner Dr. Miller; 

(3) October 2014 opinion from state agency reviewer Dr. Paul Tangeman, Ph.D. at the initial 

level; (3) December 2014 opinion from state agency reviewer Dr. Karla Voyten, Ph.D. upon 

reconsideration; and (4) October 2016 opinion from Dr. Robert Dominguez, M.D. 

In March 2014, consultative examiner Dr. Miller opined that Plaintiff is “able to follow 

one and two-step tasks at a time;” can “understand, remember and carry out [] simple, routine 

job instructions;” has difficulty interacting with others; has “no significant impairment” with 

attention and concentration; has “some difficulty” dealing with the stress and pressure of a work 

environment; and has adequate abilities with respect to persistence and task completion. (R. at 

565.) 

In September 2014, consultative examiner Dr. Miller provided a second opinion, in 

which he stated that Plaintiff has “some issues” understanding, remembering, and carrying out 

instructions; “difficulty” interacting with others; “some difficulty” with attention span and 

concentration; and “some issues” dealing with the stress and pressures of a work environment. 

(R. at 354-55.) 

 In October 2014, state agency reviewing psychologist Dr. Tangeman opined that 
4 

Plaintiff “requires SRTs in a stable, static work environment with limited, superficial interactions 

with others, limited independent decision mak[ing] and limited fast paced production standards.” 

(R. at 67.) Upon reconsideration in December 2014, state-agency reviewing psychologist Dr. 

Voyten affirmed the assessment from Dr. Tangeman. (R. at 77-78.) 

Finally, Dr. Dominguez, a physician at the Fairfield Community Health Center, provided an 

opinion regarding Plaintiff’s ability to perform work-related activities. Dr. Dominguez opined 

that Plaintiff’s mental health impairments cause significant limitations and prevent him from 

maintaining competitive employment. (R. at 626-27.) 

III. THE ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION 

 On January 12, 2017, the ALJ issued her decision. (R. at 12-24.) At step one of the 

sequential evaluation process,1

 the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial 

 

1. Social Security Regulations require ALJs to resolve a disability claim through a five-step 

sequential evaluation of the evidence. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). Although a dispositive 

finding at any step terminates the ALJ’s review, see Colvin v. Barnhart, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th 

Cir. 2007), if fully considered, the sequential review considers and answers five questions: 

1. Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity? 

2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments? 

3. Do the claimant’s severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal 

the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner's Listing of 

Impairments, 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1? 

4. Considering the claimant’s residual functional capacity, can the claimant 

perform his or her past relevant work? 

5. Considering the claimant’s age, education, past work experience, and residual 

functional capacity, can the claimant perform other work available in the 

national economy? 

See 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4); see also Henley v. Astrue, 573 F.3d 263, 264 (6th Cir. 2009); 
5 

gainful activity since June 9, 2014, the alleged onset date. The ALJ found that Plaintiff had the 

severe impairments of organic mental, anxiety disorder, social phobia, and borderline intellectual 

functioning. She further found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of 

impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments described in 20 C.F.R. 

Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. At step four of the sequential process, the ALJ set forth 

Plaintiff’s RFC as follows: 

After careful consideration of the entire record, the undersigned finds that the 

claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all 

exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: the claimant 

requires goal based work, limited to simple routine tasks and few decision-making 

requirements on the job. He requires few changes in the work setting. He should 

not interact with the public, but could have superficial contact with coworkers and 

only occasional interaction with supervisors. He would be off task less than 10 

percent of the workday and would need a position where there is no money 

management or tandem work required. 

(R. at 17.) 

In assessing Plaintiff’s RFC, the ALJ assigned consultative examiner Dr. Miller’s March 

2014 opinion “significant weight,” reasoning that, “[w]hile Dr. Miller did not provide 

vocationally relevant limits for all abilities, the undersigned has interpreted Dr. Miller’s 

statements to be consistent with the residual functional capacity as assessed.” (R. at 21.) The 

ALJ assigned Dr. Miller’s September 2014 opinion “significant weight,” reasoning that, “[w]hile 

Dr. Miller did not provide vocationally relevant limits, the undersigned has interpreted Dr. 

Miller’s statements to be consistent with the residual functional capacity as assessed.” (R. at 

21.) The ALJ assigned “significant weight” to the opinions of state agency reviewing 

psychologists Drs. Tangeman and Voyten, reasoning as follows: 

 

Foster v. Halter, 279 F.3d 348, 354 (6th Cir. 2001). 
6 

The undersigned considered the opinion[s] of the Bureau of Disability 

Determination consultants expressed in the Mental Residual Functional Capcit[ies] 

set forth in Exhibit[s] 1A and 3A. Although neither examining nor treating mental 

health providers, these experts are licensed psychologists with knowledge of the 

Social Security Administration’s program and requirements. Their opinion[s] 

[are] consistent with the medical evidence of record. Therefore, the undersigned 

gives the Bureau of Disability Determination opinion[s] significant weight. 

(R. at 21.) Finally, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to Fairfield Community Health Center 

physician Dr. Dominguez’s opinion, observing that, “although it appears Dr. Dominguez is a 

treating source at the Fairfield Community Health Center, . . . there is no evidence in [the] file 

that he actually treated the claimant or has a longstanding treating relationship with the 

claimant.” (R. at 20.) Additionally, the ALJ explained that the opinion “is merely a check 

box form, which does not offer a function-by-function analysis . . . , merely a conclusory 

assertion.” (Id.) Finally, the ALJ noted that “Dr. Dominguez does not provide sufficient 

clinical and laboratory data to support his conclusion,” and the record reflects that Plaintiff’s 

symptoms were improving with medication and therapy. (Id.) 

 Relying on the VE’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff could perform jobs 

existing in significant numbers in the national economy, including: car washer, Dictionary of 

Occupational Titles (“DOT”) § 919.687-014; dry cleaner helper, DOT § 362.686-010; dryer 

attendant, DOT 581.686-010; floor waxer, DOT § 381.687-034; night cleaner, DOT § 323.687-

014; and security system monitor, DOT § 379.367-010. (R. at 23.) The ALJ therefore 

concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled under the Social Security Act. (R. at 23-24.) 

IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

 When reviewing a case under the Social Security Act, the Court “must affirm the 

Commissioner’s decision if it ‘is supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to 
7 

proper legal standards.’” Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009)

(quoting Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also 42 U.S.C. 

§ 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by 

substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .”). Under this standard, “substantial evidence is 

defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a preponderance; it is such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Rogers, 486 

F.3d at 241 (quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 

1994)). 

Although the substantial evidence standard is deferential, it is not trivial. The Court 

must “‘take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from [the] weight’” of the 

Commissioner’s decision. TNS, Inc. v. NLRB, 296 F.3d 384, 395 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting 

Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 487 (1951)). Nevertheless, “if substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is 

substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 

270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

Finally, even if the ALJ’s decision meets the substantial evidence standard, “‘a decision 

of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the SSA fails to follow its own regulations and 

where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial 

right.’” Rabbers, 582 F.3d at 651 (quoting Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 

(6th Cir. 2007)). 
8 

V. ANALYSIS 

 As set forth above, Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ erred in her consideration of the 

medical source opinions in the record because she (1) failed to explain why she omitted 

limitations opined by Drs. Tangeman and Voyten, whose opinions she assigned significant 

weight, and (2) failed to give good reasons for discrediting the opinion from treating source Dr. 

Dominguez. The undersigned finds these contentions of error to be unpersuasive. 

A. Omission of Limitations from Credited Opinions in the RFC 

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ, without explanation, omitted RFC limitations 

endorsed in opinions to which she assigned significant weight, thereby depriving the RFC of 

support by substantial evidence. The undersigned finds any such error to be harmless. 

A plaintiff’s RFC “is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and 

mental limitations resulting from her impairments.” Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 

149, 155 (6th Cir. 2009); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). The determination of 

RFC is an issue reserved to the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 416.927(e). 

Nevertheless, substantial evidence must support the Commissioner’s RFC finding. Berry v. 

Astrue, No. 1:09CV000411, 2010 WL 3730983, at *8 (S.D. Ohio June 18, 2010). In 

calculating a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ is not required to mirror or parrot medical opinions 

verbatim. Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 157 (6th Cir. 2009). But where, as 

here, the ALJ assigns a particular opinion “significant” weight and states it is consistent with the 

record, she must incorporate all of the opined limitations or provide an explanation for declining 

to do so. See, e.g., Queen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-1082, 2017 WL 6523296, at *9-

10 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 21, 2017) (remanding where the ALJ “failed to include at least one 
9 

limitation” from an opinion he had assigned great weight without explaining the omission). 

 At issue in this contention of error are two limitations the state-agency reviewing 

psychologists opined. As set forth above, the ALJ assigned “significant weight” to the opinions 

of reviewing psychologists Drs. Tangeman and Voyten, concluding that their opinions were 

“consistent with the medical evidence of record.” (R. at 21.) As relevant here, the reviewing 

psychologists opined that Plaintiff required a work environment with “limited fast paced 

production standards” and “limited, superficial interaction with others.” (R. at 67 and 78.) The 

ALJ’s RFC did not copy the these limitations verbatim, but instead restricted Plaintiff to a 

limited range of “goal based work,” adding that “[h]e would be off task less than 10 percent of 

the workday,” and also the following limitation relating to social interaction: “He should not 

interact with the public, but could have superficial contact with coworkers and only occasional 

interaction with supervisors.” (R. at 17.) Thus, at issue is whether the ALJ erred in not 

incorporating these limitations in her RFC assessment. 

 With respect to the first of these limitations—limited fast paced production standards—the 

undersigned concludes that the RFC the ALJ assessed accounts for this limitation and is, in fact, 

more restrictive than opined. Significantly, neither reviewing psychologist opined that Plaintiff 

could not perform fast-paced work, only that the amount of fast-paced production work be 

“limited.” (R. at 67 and 78.) Regardless, the ALJ limited Plaintiff to a significantly reduced 

range of “goal based work,” which is commonly understood to mean work measured by the end 

result as contrasted with pace work.2

 To the extent Plaintiff’s counsel did not understand how 

 

2. See, e.g., Chapman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:18-cv-258, 2018 WL 4292154, at *4 (S.D. 

Ohio Sept. 10, 2018) (RFC included limitation to “a work environment that is not fast-paced or 

does not have unusual production demands, defined as goal-based production or work measured 
10 

the ALJ and the VE defined “goal-based production,” he was free to seek clarification during the 

hearing, but failed to do so. (See R. at 53-57 (seeking clarification about the social limitations 

only).) Moreover, the ALJ included an additional limitation that Plaintiff would be off task less 

than ten percent of the workday. Finally, even if the ALJ erred in not specifically including the 

language “limited fast paced production standards” in the RFC, such error would be harmless 

given that five of the six the jobs identified by the ALJ do not require fast-paced production 

standards. See DOT §§ 919.687-014, available at 1991 WL 687897; 581.686-010, available at 

1991 WL 684213; 381.687-034, available at 1991 WL 673262; 323.687-014, available at 1991 

WL 672783; 362.686-010, available at 1991 WL 673006; cf. Burnett v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-

1637-MGL-MBG, 2017 WL 3835843, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 3, 2017) (noting VE testimony that an 

individual limited to no production or fast-paced work could work as a cleaner, DOT § 919.687-

014, and dryer attendant, DOT § 581.686-010); Scott v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:15-cv-3085, 

2016 WL 6405899, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2016) (recommending that the Court affirm the 

 

by end result, not pace work”); Maxwell v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:17-cv-835, 2018 WL 

2173591, at *6 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 2018) (RFC included limitation to “goal-based production 

where the work is measured by end result, not pace work”); Drews v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 

2:16-cv-191, 2017 WL 782985, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 13, 2017) (same); Blanton v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., No. 3:15-cv-1864, 2016 WL 4272126, at *5 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 15, 2016) (same); Rider 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. No. 2:17-cv-41, 2018 WL 12500029, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 

2018) (RFC included limitation of “goal-based production/work measured by end result, not 

pace work”); Bruce v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:16-cv-1329, 2017 WL 3238049, at *2 (N.D. 

Ohio July 29, 2017) (same); Morris v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-132, 2017 WL 

1287146, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 6, 2017) (same); Sims v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-cv-342, 

2017 WL 4236578, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2017) (RFC included limitation to “goal-based 

production where the work is measured by the end result, without pace-work”); Dorst v. Colvin, 

No. 3:15-cv-1687, 2016 WL 4625010, at *1 (RFC included limitation to “goal based production 

(work measured by the end result, not pace work)”); Hickman v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-

cv-859, 2018 WL 817876, at *6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 12, 2018) (“The ALJ explained that he limited 

[the plaintiff] to goal-based rather than pace-based production . . . because he required a lowstress environment.”). 
11 

Commissioner’s non-disability finding where a plaintiff limited to no strict production quotas or 

fast-paced work was found to be able to work as a floor waxer, DOT § 381.687-034), R&R 

adopted, 2017 WL 1187907 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2017); Blevins v. Colvin, No. 2:14-1572, 2015 

WL 930195, at *14 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (noting VE testimony that a plaintiff limited to no 

fast-paced production standards could work as a night cleaner, DOT § 323.687-014); Blanken v. 

Colvin, No. 2:13cv00050, 2015 WL 627945, at *1 (W.D. Va. Feb. 12, 2015) (noting VE 

testimony that a plaintiff limited to no fast-paced production requirements could work as a drycleaner helper, DOT § 362.686-010). 

The undersigned likewise concludes that the ALJ’s failure to limit Plaintiff to superficial 

interactions with supervisors (as she did with co-workers) is likewise harmless. As the 

Commissioner points out, five of the six jobs the ALJ identified as jobs Plaintiff can perform 

require only limited relationships with people. Specifically, the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles’ descriptions reflect that the level of interaction with others is limited to “taking 

instructions/helping,” at a “not significant” level. See DOT § 919.687-014, available at 1991 

WL 687897; DOT § 362.686-010, available at 1991 WL 673006; DOT § 581.686-010, available 

at 1991 WL 684213; DOT § 323.687-014, available at 1991 WL 672783; DOT § 381.687-034, 

available at 1991 WL 673262.3 As defined in Appendix B of the Dictionary of Occupational 

Titles, “taking instructions/helping” means “[a]ttending to the work assignment instructions or 

orders of supervisor. (No immediate response required unless clarification of instructions or 

orders is needed.) Helping applies to ‘non-learning’ helpers.” DOT App. B–Explanation of 

Data, People, & Things, available at 1991 WL 688701. 

 

3. These are the same five positions that also do not require fast-paced production standards. 
12 

In sum, the undersigned finds Plaintiff’s assertion that the ALJ failed to include a 

limitation with respect to pace work to be without merit. In addition, to the extent the ALJ erred 

in omitting credited limitations from the RFC, such error is harmless because five of the six 

positions identified by the VE are consistent with the at-issue limitations. See, e.g., Wills v. 

Colvin, No. 14-C-960, 2016 WL 1060254, at *9 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 15, 2016) (finding harmless 

error where limitations were omitted, but the representative jobs the VE identified were 

unskilled, explaining “[s]ince unskilled jobs are by definition ‘simple, routine, and repetitive,’ 

the omission from the hypothetical of these limitations is harmless” (citation omitted)); Riley v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:11-cv-194, 2012 WL 553123, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 21, 2012) 

(ALJ’s failure to include certain RFC limitations is harmless error where the claimant could still 

perform her past relevant work despite these limitations); see also Kobetic v. Comm’r, 114 F. 

App’x 171, 173 (6th Cir. 2004) (“When remand would be an idle and useless formality, courts 

are not required to convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game.” (internal 

quotation marks and citation omitted)). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s 

first contention of error be OVERRULED. 

B. Weighing and Consideration of Dr. Dominguez’s Opinion 

Plaintiff next argues that the ALJ erred in discrediting the opinion from treating physician 

Dr. Dominguez. The undersigned disagrees. 

The ALJ must consider all medical opinions that he or she receives in evaluating a 

claimant’s case. 20 C.F.R. § 416.927(c). The applicable regulations define medical opinions 

as “statements from acceptable medical sources that reflect judgments about the nature and 

severity of your impairment(s), including your symptoms, diagnosis and prognosis.” 20 C.F.R. 
13 

§ 416.927(a)(1). 

 The ALJ generally gives deference to the opinions of a treating source “since these 

sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed, longitudinal 

picture of [a patient’s] medical impairment(s) and may bring a unique perspective to the medical 

evidence that cannot be obtained from the objective medical filings alone . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 

416.927(c)(2); Blakley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 408 (6th Cir. 2009). If the 

treating physician’s opinion is “well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory 

diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in [the 

claimant's] case record, [the ALJ] will give it controlling weight.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). 

 If the ALJ does not afford controlling weight to a treating physician’s opinion, the ALJ 

must meet certain procedural requirements. Wilson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 378 F.3d 541, 544 

(6th Cir. 2004). Specifically, if an ALJ does not give a treating source’s opinion controlling 

weight: 

[A]n ALJ must apply certain factors-namely, the length of the treatment 

relationship and the frequency of examination, the nature and extent of the 

treatment relationship, supportability of the opinion, consistency of the opinion 

with the record as a whole, and the specialization of the treating source-in 

determining what weight to give the opinion. 

Id. Furthermore, an ALJ must “always give good reasons in [the ALJ’s] notice of 

determination or decision for the weight [the ALJ] give[s] your treating source's opinion.” 20 

C.F.R. § 416.927(c)(2). Accordingly, the ALJ’s reasoning “must be sufficiently specific to 

make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source’s 

medical opinion and the reasons for that weight.” Friend v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 375 F. App’x 

543, 550 (6th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation omitted). The United States Court of Appeals for 
14 

the Sixth Circuit has stressed the importance of the good-reason requirement: 

“The requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the 

disposition of their cases,” particularly in situations where a claimant knows that 

his physician has deemed him disabled and therefore “might be especially 

bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some 

reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128, 134 

(2d Cir. 1999). The requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the treating 

physician rule and permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule. 

See Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2004). 

Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544–45. Thus, the reason-giving requirement is “particularly important 

when the treating physician has diagnosed the claimant as disabled.” Germany-Johnson v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 313 F. App’x 771, 777 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Rogers, 486 F.3d at 242). 

There is no requirement, however, that the ALJ “expressly” consider each of the Wilson factors 

within the written decision. See Tilley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 394 F. App’x 216, 222 (6th Cir. 

2010) (indicating that, under Blakley and the good reason rule, an ALJ is not required to 

explicitly address all of the six factors within 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) for weighing medical 

opinion evidence within the written decision). 

 Finally, the Commissioner reserves the power to decide certain issues, such as a 

claimant’s residual functional capacity. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). Although the ALJ will 

consider opinions of treating physicians “on the nature and severity of your impairment(s),” 

opinions on issues reserved to the Commissioner are generally not entitled to special 

significance. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d); Bass v. McMahon, 499 F.3d 506, 511 (6th Cir. 2007). 

As discussed above, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to the October 2016 opinion from 

Dr. Dominguez. Although Plaintiff maintains that the ALJ failed to give good reasons for the 

weight assigned, the ALJ provided the following lengthy discussion of how she arrived at her 

determination: 
15 

Robert Dominguez, MD, provided a checkbox form dated October 11, 2016, 

indicating that the claimant was significant limited by his mental impairments (Ex. 

36F). First, although it appears Dr. Dominguez is a treating source at the Fairfield 

Community Health Center, as that is where the form was sent, there is no evidence 

in that file that he actually treated the claimant or has a longstanding treating 

relationship with the claimant allowing him to provide a valid opinion on the 

claimant’s functioning. The record from Fairfield Community Health Center only 

document care from two certified nurse practitioners and a therapist (see e.g., 

Exhibits 34F; 35F). Moreover, this opinion is merely a check box form, which 

does not offer a function-by-function analysis of what the claimant can do despite 

his impairments, merely a conclusory assertion. Further, Dr. Dominguez does not 

provide sufficient clinical and laboratory date to support his conclusion, as it 

appears at the last actual therapy session, the claimant’s symptoms and functioning 

were improving with medication management and therapy (Ex. 34F/31). 

Therefore, the undersigned gives this checkbox form, insofar as it is considered an 

opinion, little weight. 

(R. at 20.) 

 The undersigned finds no error with the ALJ’s consideration and weighing of Dr. 

Dominguez’s opinion. The ALJ articulated the weight she afforded the opinion and properly 

declined to afford it controlling weight on the grounds it was unsupported and conclusory. See

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2) (identifying “supportability” as a relevant consideration). 

 First, the ALJ reasonably discounted Dr. Dominguez’s opinion due to the apparent lack 

of a treating relationship between Dr. Dominguez and Plaintiff. The length and the nature and 

extent of a treating relationship are proper considerations when weighing an opinion from a 

treating source. See 20 C.F.R § 404.1527(c)(2)(i)-(ii). To qualify as a treating source, the 

physician must have an “ongoing treatment relationship” with the claimant. 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1502. A Court must determine whether or not an ongoing treatment relationship exists at 

the time the physician’s opinion is rendered. Kornecky v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 04-2171, 

167 F. App’x 496, 506 (6th Cir. Feb. 9, 2006) (“[T]he relevant inquiry is . . . whether [claimant] 

had the ongoing relationship with [the physician] at the time he rendered his opinion. [V]isits to 
16 

[the physician] after his RFC assessment could not retroactively render him a treating physician 

at the time of the assessment.”); see also Yamin v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 67 F. App’x 883, 885 

(6th Cir. 2003) (“These two examinations did not give [the physician] a long term overview of 

[the claimaint’s] condition.”). Here, the record reflects that Plaintiff received treatment at the 

Fairfield Community Health Center since at least January 2016. (See R. at 574-625.) But the 

records reflect only that Plaintiff was treated by Marie Jones, CNP (R. at 574-77, 608-11, 616-

21); Molly Thomas, LISW (R. at 578-95, 604-07); and Melanie Perkins Graham, CNP (R. at 

596-603, 612-15, 622-25). To the extent other records exist that would establish a treating 

relationship, it was Plaintiff’s burden to supply those records. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a)(1) 

(“You must inform us about or submit all evidence known to you that relates to whether or not 

you are blind or disabled.”) Thus, the ALJ did not err in discounting Dr. Dominguez’s opinion 

given the absence of record evidence establishing a treatment relationship. 

 Second, the ALJ reasonably discredited Dr. Dominguez’s opinion on the basis that it was 

a conclusory, checkbox form without “sufficient clinical or laboratory data to support his 

conclusion.” (R. at 20.) As the Sixth Circuit has held, an ALJ may properly assign little 

weight to checkbox form opinions from treating sources “where the physician provided no 

explanation for the restrictions entered on the form and cited no supporting objective medical 

evidence.” Ellars v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 647 F. App’x 563, 567 (6th Cir. 2016). In this case, 

the opinion form from Dr. Dominguez comprised a series of checkboxes related to Plaintiff’s 

mental abilities to work, as well as a comment section where Dr. Dominguez explained: 

[A]nxiety [and a] desire to completely avoid people prevent Jason from maintaining 

employment. Patient reports feeling angry when he has to talk to people. Patient 

has had three jobs[,] one which lasted two days and two lasting only two hours. 

Moderate impaired ability to make good judgment. Thought content: obsessional, 
17 

paranoid, fear & avoidance of people. 

(R. at 626-27.) Significantly, in his remarks, Dr. Dominguez did not cite any supporting 

objective medical evidence or reference treatment notes that would support his conclusions. 

Additionally, the opinion form included sections for Dr. Dominguez to “[e]xplain limitations 

falling in the three the most limited categories . . . and include the medical/clinical findings that 

support this assessment,” (R. at 627), yet Dr. Dominguez failed to complete this section of the 

form. At best, it appears that Dr. Dominguez relied on Plaintiff’s subjective reports and 

complaints. Cf. Poe v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2009) 

(“[S]ubstantial evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that the opinion of Dr. Boyd, [the 

claimant’s] treating physician, was not entitled to deference because it was based on [the 

claimant’s] subjective complaints, rather than objective medical data.”). 

Finally, as the ALJ points out, recent progress notes from the Fairfield Community 

Health Center contradict Dr. Dominguez’s restrictive opinion and reflect that Plaintiff’s 

symptoms were improving with treatment. (See R. at 604 (March 2016 process notes indicating 

“[s]ome progress,” including decreased anxiety and increased social interactions).) The 

undersigned is therefore persuaded that the ALJ gave good reasons for discrediting Dr. 

Dominguez’s opinion and that those reasons are supported by substantial evidence. 

In sum, the undersigned concludes that the ALJ did not violate the treating physician rule 

or otherwise err in her consideration and weighing of Dr. Dominguez’s opinion. It is therefore 

RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s second contention of error be OVERRULED. 
18 

VI. DISPOSITION 

From a review of the record as a whole, the undersigned concludes that substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision denying benefits. Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED 

that the Court OVERRULE Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors and AFFIRM the Commissioner of 

Social Security’s decision. 

VII. PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS 

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those 

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with 

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo 

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations 

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, 

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive 

further evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). 

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 

the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981). 
19 

 /s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE