1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MELISSA D. WHICKER-SMITH, Case No. 1:18-cv-52

Plaintiff, Dlott, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Melissa D. Whicker-Smith filed this Social Security appeal in order to 

challenge the Defendant’s finding that she is not disabled. See 42 U.S.C. §405(g). 

Proceeding through counsel, Plaintiff asserts two claims of error, both of which the 

Defendant disputes. As explained below, I conclude that the ALJ’s decision should be 

AFFIRMED, because it is supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole.

I. Summary of Administrative Record

Plaintiff has twice sought social security benefits. The instant case represents 

Plaintiff’s appeal of the Commissioner’s most recent adverse decision, rendered in 2017. 

However, Plaintiff first filed an application for disability insurance benefits on October 13, 

2010, alleging the onset of disability beginning on September 7, 2010. Plaintiff’s first 

claim was denied both initially and upon reconsideration, as well as in a subsequent 

decision (after an evidentiary hearing) by ALJ Larry Temin on March 22, 2013. The 

Appeals Council denied review of that decision on June 24, 2014, and Plaintiff did not 
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seek further judicial review. Therefore, ALJ Temin’s decision became final for purposes 

of administrative res judicata through March 22, 2013.

On August 28, 2014, Plaintiff filed new applications seeking both disability 

insurance benefits (“DIB”) and (protectively) supplemental security income (“SSI”). In her 

2014 applications, Plaintiff initially again alleged a disability onset date in 2010, but she

subsequently amended that date to April 18, 2014. Plaintiff’s 2014 applications were

denied initially and upon reconsideration, following which she sought an evidentiary 

hearing. On December 12, 2016, Plaintiff appeared, along with her non-attorney 

representative, and gave testimony before ALJ Peter Jamison; a vocational expert also 

testified. 

Plaintiff was 49 years old on her alleged disability onset date.

1

 She completed 

high school and attended two years of college for nursing. (Tr. 22). She lives in a house 

with her husband and young adult son. (Tr. 46). She testified to past relevant work as a 

bakery manager and as an assistant manager, but stated that she did not work after 

suffering a heart attack in October 2010. (Id.) 

On February 14, 2017, the ALJ issued an adverse written decision, concluding that 

Plaintiff is not disabled. (Tr. 18-28). The ALJ determined that Plaintiff has severe 

impairments of: “disorders of the back, ischemic heart disease, polycythemia vera, 

affective disorders, anxiety disorders, and somatoform disorders.” (Tr. 21). In addition, 

the ALJ found non-severe impairments of hypertension and hyperlipidemia. (Id.) Plaintiff 

does not dispute the ALJ’s determination that none of her impairments, either alone or in 

 

1Plaintiff changed age categories and was 52 at the time of the ALJ’s 2017 decision.
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combination, met or medically equaled any Listing in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, 

Appendix 1, such that Plaintiff would be entitled to a presumption of disability. (Id.) 

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff cannot perform her past relevant work, which 

was considered “skilled,” but nevertheless found that she retains the residual functional 

capacity (“RFC”) to perform a restricted range of unskilled light work, subject to the 

following limitations:

[S]he can lift, carry, push, and pull twenty pounds occasionally and ten 

pounds frequently. She can sit six hours, stand four hours, and walk four 

hours. She can never operate foot controls with the right foot but can 

frequently operate foot controls with the left foot. She can operate hand 

controls with the right hand frequently. She can also use the left hand to 

operate hand controls on a frequent basis. She can frequently handle items 

with the bilateral hands. Moreover, she can use her bilateral hands for 

frequent fingering and feeling. The claimant can climb ramps and stairs 

occasionally but never ladders, ropes, or scaffolds. She can occasionally 

balance, stoop, kneel, crouch, and crawl. She can never work at 

unprotected heights or moving mechanical parts. Moreover, she can never 

work in humidity and wetness, extreme cold, extreme heat, or vibration. The 

claimant can occasionally operate a motor vehicle. Mentally, the claimant 

is limited to performing simple, routine, and repetitive tasks. She is able to 

sustain concentration and attention for two hours at a time, and then 

requires a break of five minutes. She can interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the public on an occasional and superficial basis. She is 

limited to tolerating few changes in a routine work setting defined as no[t] 

more than ordinary and routine changes in work setting and duties. She 

cannot set her own work goals or make work plans independently of others. 

(Tr. 23). Considering Plaintiff’s age, education, and RFC, and based on testimony from 

the vocational expert, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff could still perform a “significant 

number” of jobs in the national economy, including the representative jobs of routing clerk, 

inspector, and mail clerk. (Tr. 29). Therefore, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not 

under a disability. The Appeals Council denied further review, leaving the ALJ’s decision 

as the final decision of the Commissioner.
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In her appeal to this Court, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in assessing a 

physical RFC that was not supported by substantial evidence, and in making an adverse 

credibility determination. The undersigned finds no reversible error.

II. Analysis

A. Judicial Standard of Review

To be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability.” See 42 U.S.C. 

§1382c(a). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes only physical or 

mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent 

the applicant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial 

gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. See Bowen v. City 

of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 469-70 (1986). 

When a court is asked to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits, the court’s 

first inquiry is to determine whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported by 

substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is “such relevant 

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” 

Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (additional citation and internal quotation 

omitted). In conducting this review, the court should consider the record as a whole. 

Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). If substantial evidence supports 

the ALJ’s denial of benefits, then that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial 

evidence also exists in the record to support a finding of disability. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 

F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1994). As the Sixth Circuit has explained:

The Secretary’s findings are not subject to reversal merely because 

substantial evidence exists in the record to support a different conclusion.... 

The substantial evidence standard presupposes that there is a ‘zone of 

choice’ within which the Secretary may proceed without interference from 

the courts. If the Secretary’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, 

a reviewing court must affirm.
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Id. (citations omitted). 

In considering an application for supplemental security income or for disability 

benefits, the Social Security Agency is guided by the following sequential benefits 

analysis: at Step 1, the Commissioner asks if the claimant is still performing substantial 

gainful activity; at Step 2, the Commissioner determines if one or more of the claimant’s 

impairments are “severe;” at Step 3, the Commissioner analyzes whether the claimant’s 

impairments, singly or in combination, meet or equal a Listing in the Listing of 

Impairments; at Step 4, the Commissioner determines whether or not the claimant can 

still perform his or her past relevant work; and finally, at Step 5, if it is established that 

claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant work, the burden of proof shifts to 

the agency to determine whether a significant number of other jobs which the claimant 

can perform exist in the national economy. See Combs v. Commissioner of Soc. Sec., 

459 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2006); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1520, 416.920. 

A plaintiff bears the ultimate burden to prove by sufficient evidence that she is 

entitled to disability benefits. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1512(a). A claimant seeking benefits must 

present sufficient evidence to show that, during the relevant time period, she suffered an 

impairment, or combination of impairments, expected to last at least twelve months, that 

left her unable to perform any job. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). 

B. Substantial Evidence Supports the ALJ’s Decision 

1. Physical RFC Right Hand/Arm Limitations Are Substantially Supported

Plaintiff’s first claim of error seeks reversal and/or remand on grounds that in his 

2017 decision, the ALJ improperly determined that she could “frequently and bilaterally 
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operate hand controls and finger, feel and handle frequently and bilaterally.” (Tr. 23).2 

Plaintiff points out that the VE testified that all employment would be precluded if Plaintiff 

were instead limited to “occasional” rather than “frequent” use of the right hand and arm 

and to only “occasional” handling, fingering and feeling in her right hand. (Tr. 61).

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She complains specifically that the RFC finding that she could “frequently” use her 

right hand is not supported by substantial evidence, in light of the evidence of decreased 

sensation and sensory deficits on exam. (Tr. 1491-1497). In addition, she asserts that no 

treating or examining physician ever questioned her complaints of numbness and tingling 

in her right arm. Plaintiff argues that it was inconsistent for the ALJ to cite Plaintiff’s

complaints of numbness, tingling and weakness to find she cannot operate foot controls 

at all with her right foot, while simultaneously finding that she could still “frequently” 

operate hand controls and engage in frequent fingering and feeling. 

It is worth noting that the ALJ’s RFC determination concerning Plaintiff’s right lower 

extremity is identical to the finding made by ALJ Temin in the unappealed 2013 decision.

(See Tr. 74). At that time, ALJ Temin found no impairment at all in Plaintiff’s ability to use 

either of her upper extremities. In contrast, ALJ Jamison’s 2017 finding, that Plaintiff is 

limited to no more than frequent use and only frequent handling, fingering and feeling 

bilaterally, reflects a significant departure from the 2013 RFC determination based upon 

new and material evidence that supported some level of upper extremity limitations. (Tr. 

 

2 Plaintiff does not challenge the mental RFC determined by the ALJ in this proceeding.

3 Plaintiff makes no complaint about the ALJ’s determination that she could use her left hand and arm 

“frequently” but argues that the ALJ committed reversible error in his RFC determination of her right arm 

and hand.
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18). The sole issue presented in this case is whether the level chosen by the ALJ is 

substantially supported and within the acceptable “zone of choice.”

The undersigned concludes that it is. Plaintiff is right-handed. The ALJ 

acknowledged Plaintiff’s testimony that she has no feeling on her right side, but 

contrasted that with both clinical records and her report that she does chores, walks her 

dogs, watches television and does puzzle games on the computer. (Tr. 24). Plaintiff is 

independent in all activities of daily living and can occasionally operate a motor vehicle, 

though she testified she no longer does so due to a bad experience with her right leg 

giving out. (Tr. 25-26, 53). The ALJ also pointed to examination notes by Drs. Raza and 

Wallace that were largely “unremarkable,” including normal motor skills and a lack of 

tenderness or weakness. (Tr. 25). In addition, during the period of disability from 

September 2014 through April 2016, Dr. Sarembock’s examination notes showed “normal 

strength, reflexes, motor skills, range of motion, sensation, and gait.” (Tr. 25). Dr. 

Musolino’s examination notes also “consistently revealed only mild tenderness over the 

lower facet area,” with “intact strength and sensation... and no evidence of ...atrophy or 

active synovitis.” (Id.) 

Focusing more specifically on Plaintiff’s complaints of right sided numbness, 

Plaintiff reported to Dr. Sarembock that her numbness occurred only “two to three times 

a month.” (Tr. 26). In September 2015, she reported to a neurologist, Dr. Heil, for 

evaluation of “periods of numbness and tingling but more episodes of numbness on the 

right side.” (Id.) However, at that time, she reported that her symptoms would subside 

“in about an hour” and were worse in her right leg than in her arm. (Id., see also Tr. 1495). 

The ALJ summarized Dr. Heil’s September 2015 examination findings and treatment 

records as follows:
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On exam, she had full motor strength, symmetric reflexes, and a normal 

gait. Sensation in the upper and lower extremities was decreased to light 

touch and pinprick. She was started on B12 injection, which she stated 

were helpful. Dr. Heil noted in October 2016 that she continued to receive 

B12 injection as well as oral B12 supplements. His impression was 

peripheral neuropathy due to B12 deficiency.

(Id.) 

In support of her contention that the ALJ should have limited her use of her right 

arm and hand at the more severe “occasional” level rather than the “frequent” level, 

Plaintiff relies solely upon Dr. Heil’s September 2015 examination findings. In her reply 

memorandum, Plaintiff implies that the ALJ failed to review and evaluate the examination 

notes. However, the undersigned perceives no error in the ALJ’s review of Dr. Heil’s 

records, which the ALJ specifically cited. Nor does the undersigned perceive any error in 

the ALJ’s review of the record as a whole concerning the extent of Plaintiff’s upper 

extremity limitations. A record noting a decrease in sensation does not necessarily 

translate to any manipulative restrictions. While Dr. Heil found that Plaintiff’s right and 

left arm “light touch” and “pinprick” sensations were “decreased from elbow,” he did not 

attempt to quantify the extent of decreased sensation, nor did he offer any functional 

limitations relating to Plaintiff’s bilateral decrease in pinprick or light touch sensation. (Tr. 

1496-1497). In September 2015, Dr. Heil did not have Plaintiff’s complete records, but 

he later offered a diagnostic impression of a B12 deficiency for which Plaintiff was 

prescribed treatment. 

As the Commissioner points out, no physician or treating professional offered any

medical opinion that suggested the more severe functional limitation for which Plaintiff 

now advocates, to “occasional” handling, fingering and feeling with her right upper 

extremity. To the contrary, state agency physicians included no upper extremity 

restrictions at all in their opinions that Plaintiff could perform some light work, simply 
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adopting the RFC from the prior decision. (Tr. 27). The ALJ’s departure from those 

medical opinions, to the extent that the ALJ incorporated some upper extremity 

restrictions, reflects no error. 

The ALJ is ultimately responsible for the determination of the RFC, not a physician. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B). Thus, an ALJ may formulate a limitation based on the 

record as a whole. The RFC need not precisely align with any particular medical source 

opinion of record, so long as the RFC is substantially supported as it is in this case. 

Plaintiff herself reported that her numbness and tingling were worse on her right side, but 

that she experienced more limitation in her right leg than in her right arm. In short, there 

is nothing in the record that would mandate a greater limitation. See Mokbel-Aljahmi v. 

Com’r of Soc. Sec., 732 Fed. Appx. 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2018) (“We have previously rejected 

the argument that a residual functional capacity determination cannot be supported by 

substantial evidence unless a physician offers an opinion consistent with that of the ALJ... 

We similarly find no error here.”). 

2. Law Applicable to Credibility Determination

Plaintiff’s second claim is that the ALJ committed reversible error when he made 

an adverse credibility determination, finding that “the claimant’s statements concerning 

the intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms are not entirely consistent 

with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record for the reasons explained in 

this decision.” (Tr. 24). “The undersigned [ALJ] does not find support for the claimant’s 

allegations that her conditions, individually or in combination, have rendered her totally 

disabled and incapable of all work activity.” (Tr. 28).

The ALJ's assessment of symptoms, formerly referred to as the “credibility” 

determination in SSR 96-7p, was clarified in SSR 16-3p to remove the word “credibility” 
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and refocus the ALJ’s attention on the “extent to which the symptoms can reasonably be 

accepted as consistent with the objective medical and other evidence in the individual’s 

record.” SSR 16-3p, 2017 WL 5180304 at *2 (October 25, 2017) (emphasis added). The 

new ruling emphasizes that “our adjudicators will not assess an individual’s overall 

character or truthfulness in the manner typically used during an adversarial court 

litigation.” See id. at *11. Under SSR 16-3p, an ALJ is to consider all of the evidence in 

the record in order to evaluate the limiting effects of a plaintiff’s symptoms, including the 

following factors:

1. Daily activities;

2. The location, duration, frequency, and intensity of pain or other symptoms;

3. Factors that precipitate and aggravate the symptoms;

4. The type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any medication an individual 

takes or has taken to alleviate pain or other symptoms;

5. Treatment, other than medication, an individual receives or has received for 

relief of pain or other symptoms;

6. Any measures other than treatment an individual uses or has used to relieve 

pain or other symptoms (e.g., lying flat on his or her back, standing for 15 to 20 

minutes every hour, or sleeping on a board); and

7. Any other factors concerning an individual's functional limitations and 

restrictions due to pain or other symptoms.

Id., 2017 WL 5180304, at *7–8; see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c), 416.929(c) and 

former SSR 96–7p. 

Despite clarifying the basis for the analysis of subjective complaints and 

corresponding elimination of the term “credibility” from the text in order to avoid “character 

analysis,” SSR 16-3p was not intended to substantially change existing law. See Banks

v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., Case No. 2:18-cv-38, 2018 WL 6060449 at *5 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 20, 

2018) (quoting explicit language in SSR 16-3p stating intention to “clarify” and not to 
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substantially “change” existing SSR 96-7p), adopted at 2019 WL 187914 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 

14, 2019). Thus, it remains the province of the ALJ and not the reviewing court, to assess 

the consistency of subjective complaints about the impact of a claimant’s symptoms with 

the record as a whole. See generally Rogers v. Com'r, 486 F.3d 234, 247 (6th Cir. 2007).

As stated, the primary distinction between SSR 16-3p and the former SSR 96-7p 

is the elimination of the word “credibility” and clarifying that the focus of the ALJ’s 

evaluation should be on the “consistency” of subjective complaints with the record as a 

whole. The elimination of the word “credibility” from SSR 16-3p is semantically awkward 

in applying prior case law, insofar as virtually all of the case law interpreting the former 

SSR 96-7p uses the catchphrase “credibility determination.” Nevertheless, the essence 

of the regulatory framework remains unchanged. Therefore, courts agree that the prior 

case law remains fully applicable to the renamed “consistency determination” under SSR 

16-3p, with few exceptions. See Duty v. Com’r of Soc. Sec., 2018 WL 4442595 at *6 

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 18, 2018) (“existing case law controls to the extent it is consistent with 

the clarification of the rules embodied in SSR 16-3p’s clarification.”). 

Turning to that case law, it is clear that a reversal of the Commissioner’s decision 

based upon error in a credibility/consistency determination requires a particularly strong 

showing by a plaintiff. Like the ultimate non-disability determination, the assessment of 

subjective complaints must be supported by substantial evidence, but “an ALJ's findings 

based on the credibility of the applicant are to be accorded great weight and deference, 

particularly since an ALJ is charged with the duty of observing a witness's demeanor and 

credibility.” Walters v. Com'r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 531 (6th Cir. 1997). Further, 

a credibility/consistency determination cannot be disturbed “absent a compelling 

reason.” Smith v. Halter, 307 F.3d 377, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, it is proper for 
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an ALJ to discount the claimant's testimony where there are inconsistencies and 

contradictions among the medical records, her testimony, and other evidence. Warner v. 

Com'r of Soc. Sec., 375 F.3d 387, 392 (6th Cir. 2004).

In the case presented, Plaintiff complains that the ALJ overly relied upon 

statements made by Plaintiff during a psychological consultative evaluation dated 

October 1, 2014, in which Plaintiff reported that on a typical day she will get up, do chores, 

take the dogs for a walk, sit on the couch, watch a little TV, do puzzle games on the 

computer, eat and watch TV. (Tr. 743). The ALJ further noted that Plaintiff is independent 

in all activities of daily living. (Tr. 28; see also Tr. 589, 1639, 1770, 1801). Plaintiff argues 

that the ALJ misconstrued her testimony, because Plaintiff testified at the hearing that 

she will “try” to do chores like loading and unloading the dishwasher, but has issues due 

to the loss of feeling in her right arm, which led her to break glass dishes and ultimately 

to switch to plastic. (Tr. 44). Plaintiff further testified to needing to rest after chores, and 

that at one point when she tried to traverse stairs to do the laundry, her leg gave out and 

she fell. (Tr. 54). At the hearing, Plaintiff testified that she no longer walks her dogs 

because she cannot walk more than half-way down the block. (Tr. 56). 

Plaintiff complains that the regulations and case law are clear that the ability to 

perform minimal daily activities should not be viewed as equivalent to the ability to perform 

full-time work on a “regular and continuing basis.” See 20 C.F.R. §1572(c). However, an 

ALJ may “justifiably” consider a plaintiff’s ability to conduct daily life activities in the face 

of complaints of disabling pain. See Warner, 375 F.3d at 392; Blacha v. Sec’y of HHS, 

927 F.3d 228, 231 (6th Cir. 1990). While the undersigned acknowledges that the ability 

to perform limited daily activities, by itself, does not equate to the ability to perform fulltime work, Plaintiff’s argument ignores the reality that the ALJ did not rely solely on her 
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daily activities but cited numerous inconsistencies in the record, indicating that he 

appropriately considered all factors under SSR 16-7p. The differences between the 

activities reported by Plaintiff during her October 2014 psychological exam and her 

hearing testimony was merely one of many inconsistencies. 

For example, in addition to Plaintiff’s activity level, the ALJ considered and 

discounted Plaintiff’s allegations because the objective evidence did not support her 

subjective complaints of a disabling level of pain and limitations. See 20 C.F.R. 

404.1529(c)(2). Among the reasons for her alleged disability, Plaintiff listed heart 

disease, hypertension and hyperlipidemia, and polycythemia vera. (Tr. 24). However, the 

ALJ found Plaintiff’s hypertension and hyperlipidemia to be non-severe impairments, 

meaning they did not impose more than minimal limitations, given that both conditions 

were well-controlled with medication with no related symptoms or evidence of organ 

damage. (Tr. 21). And, despite the fact that Plaintiff’s heart disease was a “severe” 

impairment, the ALJ noted an array of normal findings during multiple examinations from 

2014 through 2016. (See Tr. 24-26, citing clinical findings of normal ECG and 

echocardiogram, normal ejection fraction and left ventricular wall motion, denial of angina, 

reports of feeling well with no complaints of chest pain or shortness of breath, April 2016 

statement that she was asymptomatic and May 2016 statement that coronary artery 

disease was controlled on medication). Similarly, although the ALJ accepted Plaintiff’s 

blood disorder of polycythemia vera as a “severe” impairment, (Tr. 21), he also gave 

“great weight” to Dr. Mehta’s opinion that Plaintiff had no limitations relating to her 

hematological impairments. (Tr. 27).

The undersigned will not repeat the analysis set forth above, in which Plaintiff’s 

complaints of a disabling level of upper extremity limitations were contrasted with the 
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degree of functional limitation found by the ALJ. It is worth noting, however, the ALJ also 

contrasted Plaintiff’s complaints of other disabling musculoskeletal symptoms with 

numerous “unremarkable” examination findings from 2014 through 2016. (Tr. 25, citing 

clinical findings of only mild tenderness over the lower facet area, normal range of motion, 

strength, reflexes, range of motion, motor skills, sensation and gait, and MRI findings that 

revealed only mild degenerative changes). The ALJ summarized inconsistencies 

between the evidence concerning Plaintiff’s mental health allegations and her treatment 

records. (Tr. 26). Additionally, the ALJ considered Plaintiff’s “conservative” treatment 

history and Plaintiff’s response to that treatment. (Tr. 25-27, noting no evidence that an

assistive device had been recommended or prescribed for Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff was 

stable on hydrocodone without significant side effects and that the medication allowed 

her to remain functional without significant issues). 

Plaintiff’s reply memorandum is silent as to the credibility issue. Having examined 

the record as a whole, the undersigned finds that the ALJ’s evaluation of Plaintiff’s 

subjective complaints is amply supported by substantial evidence and is therefore entitled 

to deference. 

III. Conclusion and Recommendation

For the reasons explained herein, IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT Defendant’s 

decision be AFFIRMED as supported by substantial evidence, and that this case be 

CLOSED.

/s Stephanie K. Bowman 

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge
15

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

MELISSA D. WHICKER-SMITH, Case No. 1:18-cv-52

Plaintiff, Dlott, J.

Bowman, M.J.

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Defendant.

NOTICE 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written 

objections to this Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) within FOURTEEN (14) DAYS of 

the filing date of this R&R. That period may be extended further by the Court on timely 

motion by either side for an extension of time. All objections shall specify the portion(s) of 

the R&R objected to, and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of 

the objections. A party shall respond to an opponent’s objections within FOURTEEN (14) 

DAYS after being served with a copy of those objections. Failure to make objections in 

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 

140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).