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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE MATTER OF: C.M.W., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2625 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Decree Entered August 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000288-2019

IN THE MATTER OF: C.W., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.C., MOTHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 2626 EDA 2019

Appeal from the Order Entered August 13, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002914-2017

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., STABILE, J., and MURRAY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 04, 2020

J.C. (Mother) appeals from the order changing the permanency goal 

from reunification to adoption with respect to her daughter, C.W. (Child), born 
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in July of 2017, and the decree involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental 

rights.1 Upon careful review, we affirm.

Child was placed in the emergency protective custody of the Philadelphia 

Department of Human Services (DHS) on November 1, 2017, following a 

report alleging, among other things, that Mother suffered from untreated 

mental health issues; she was homeless; and she had not taken Child to 

regular medical appointments. Trial Court Opinion, 10/23/19, at 2; Statement 

of Facts, 4/16/19, at ¶ f.2 The court adjudicated Child dependent on 

November 13, 2017. 

Child’s permanency goal was reunification. The Community Umbrella 

Agency (CUA) established the following objectives for Mother: participate in 

Achieving Reunification Center (ARC) programs offered for housing, 

employment, and domestic violence; participate in supervised visitation; 

comply with mental health treatment; and attend Family School. Trial Court 

Opinion, 10/23/19, at 2. The court conducted permanency review hearings in 

February of 2018, May of 2018, August of 2018, November of 2018, January 

of 2019, and May of 2019. Mother’s visits with Child remained supervised.

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1 By separate decree entered on August 13, 2019, the court involuntarily 

terminated the parental rights of M.W. (Father). Father did not appeal.

2 During the underlying proceeding, Mother’s counsel stipulated to the 

statement of facts attached to the petition for the involuntary termination of 

parental rights. N.T., 8/13/19, at 18.
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On April 16, 2019, DHS filed petitions to change Child’s permanency 

goal to adoption and involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant 

to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). The trial court held a 

combined hearing on August 13, 2019,3, 4 during which DHS presented the 

testimony of the CUA case manager, Carol Smith. Mother testified on her own 

behalf. 

By decree dated and entered August 13, 2019, the trial court

involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights; by order dated and entered 

August 13, 2019, the trial court changed Child’s goal to adoption. 

Mother timely filed separate notices of appeal, along with concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The trial court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 

23, 2019.

We begin Mother’s issues with respect to the goal change order, which 

we review according to the following standard:

In cases involving a court’s order changing the placement 

goal . . . to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. 

To hold that the trial court abused its discretion, we must 

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3

In addition to the petitions for goal change and involuntary termination with 

respect to Child, the trial court heard evidence involving permanency for 

Child’s younger brother, K.W., who resides in the same foster home as Child. 

N.T., 8/13/19, at 3, 10. K.W. is not a subject of this appeal.

4 During the proceeding, Child’s legal interests were represented by Angelina 

Dagher, Esquire, and her best interests were represented by Deborah Fegan, 

Esquire.
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determine its judgment was manifestly unreasonable, that the 

court disregarded the law, or that its action was a result of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will. While this Court is bound by 

the facts determined in the trial court, we are not tied to the court’s 

inferences, deductions and conclusions; we have a responsibility 

to ensure that the record represents a comprehensive inquiry and 

that the hearing judge has applied the appropriate legal principles 

to that record. Therefore, our scope of review is broad. 

In re S.B., 943 A.2d 973, 977 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citations omitted). 

Mother raises five issues relative to the goal change as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal 

to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) without clear

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent to relinquish her

parental claim or refusal to perform her parental duties.

2. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal 

to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) without clear

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s present incapacity to

perform parental duties.

3. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal 

to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) without clear

and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were

made by Department of Human Services to provide [M]other with

additional services and that the conditions that led to placement

of [C]hild continue to exist.

4. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal 

to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8) without clear

and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement 

of [C]hild continue to exist when [M]other presented evidence of

compliance with the goals and objectives of her single case plan.

5. Whether the trial court erred by changing the permanency goal 

to adoption pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) without clear

and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between

[M]other and [C]hild and that changing the permanency goal to 

adoption would serve the best interest of [C]hild.

Mother’s Brief at 7.
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A goal change request is governed by Section 6351(f) of the Juvenile 

Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f), which requires the trial court to consider, inter

alia: (1) the continuing necessity for and appropriateness of the placement; 

(2) the extent of compliance with the family service plan; (3) the extent of 

progress made towards alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the 

original placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current 

placement goal for the child; and (5) a likely date by which the goal for the 

child might be achieved. In re S.B., 943 A.2d at 977. The best interests of 

the child, and not the interests of the parent, must guide the trial court. Id.

at 978.

In her brief, Mother does not set forth the law that governs goal change. 

Rather, she cites Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) of the Adoption 

Act, which concerns the involuntary termination of parental rights. Because 

Mother fails to discuss any relevant statutory or case law, we conclude that 

her issues are waived with respect to the goal change order. See In re W.H., 

25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 (Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that issues are waived if 

appellate brief fails to provide meaningful discussion with citation to relevant 

authority); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). As such, we affirm the order 

changing Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Turning to Mother’s issues regarding the termination of her parental 

rights, we also review for an abuse of discretion. See In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 

251, 267 (Pa. 2013). Mother’s issues are as follows:
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1. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(1) without clear

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s intent to relinquish her 

parental claim or refusal to perform her parental duties.

2. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(2) without clear 

and convincing evidence of [M]other’s present incapacity to 

perform parental duties.

3. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights 

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(5) without clear 

and convincing evidence to prove that reasonable efforts were 

made by Department of Human Services to provide [M]other with 

additional services and that the conditions that led to placement 

of [C]hild continue to exist. 

4. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(a)(8) without clear 

and convincing evidence that the conditions that led to placement 

of [C]hild continue to exist when [M]other presented evidence of 

compliance with the goals and objectives of her single case plan.

5. Whether the trial court erred by terminating the parental rights

of [M]other pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. [§] 2511(b) without clear

and convincing evidence that there is no parental bond between 

[M]other and [C]hild and that termination would serve the best 

interest of [C]hild.

Mother’s Brief at 7.

Section 2511 of the Adoption Act requires a bifurcated analysis in 

considering the involuntary termination of parental rights:

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests 

of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 
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concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).

In this case, we conclude that the certified record supports the decree 

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows.

(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at 

least six months immediately preceding the filing of the 

petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of 

relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or 

failed to perform parental duties.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights 

of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, 

income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the 

control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant 

to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any 

efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein 

which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

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5 Based on this disposition, we need not consider Mother’s issues with respect 

to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 

(Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc) (stating that we need only agree with the trial

court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), 

in order to affirm). 
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With regard to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce 

clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months 

prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to 

relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental 

duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted). We have explained:

[T]he trial court must consider the whole history of a given case 

and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory provision. 

The court must examine the individual circumstances of each case 

and consider all explanations offered by the parent facing 

termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the 

evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination. 

In re N.M.B., 856 A.2d 847, 854-855 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted). 

Our Supreme Court has explained that parental duty “is best understood 

in relation to the needs of a child.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa. 

1977). 

A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These 

needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive 

interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held 

that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires 

affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses 

more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in 

the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and 

association with the child. Because a child needs more than a 

benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent ‘exert himself to 

take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.’

Id. (citations omitted).

Concerning Section 2511(b), this Court has stated, “[i]ntangibles such 

as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 
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needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. 

Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also discern 

the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the 

effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation omitted). 

However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond between the 

parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. The extent of 

any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the circumstances of the 

particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted). Further, we have held that the trial court is not required 

by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by 

an expert. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008). 

Instantly, Mother argues that the evidence is insufficient to support the 

termination of her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1). Mother 

argues that the court found, by July of 2018, that she complied with all the 

programs offered through ARC, and she was actively engaged in mental health

services. With respect to supervised visitation, Mother asserts that she 

consistently attended during the first 18 months of Child’s dependency. 

Mother concedes that she was inconsistent with visitation three months prior 

to the filing of the termination petition. However, Mother claims that CUA 

failed to provide adequate transportation assistance for her to attend the 

visits. This argument is not persuasive.
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Ms. Smith, the CUA case manager, testified that Mother failed to 

complete her permanency objectives involving Family School and mental 

health services. Specifically, on March 8, 2019, Mother was discharged from 

Family School for lack of attendance. N.T., 8/13/19, at 7-8, 37. Likewise, 

she was discharged from her mental health provider, Northeast Community 

Behavioral Health, for lack of attendance. Id. at 11-12, 29.

Mother testified that she has bipolar disorder. Id. at 49. She testified 

that she began treatment at Northeast Community Behavioral Health 

approximately 16 months prior. Id. at 48. Mother conceded that she did not 

attend the appointments regularly. Id. She stated on direct examination:

[Q.] Could you tell us how many you missed?

[A.] I was scheduled to go weekly, and I would go like, probably, 

like, twice a month or once a month, so . . . there was quite a few 

that I missed. Me and my therapist did not have a good 

relationship, and they were medicating me incorrectly.

Id. at 49. Mother then testified that the psychiatrist at Northeast Community 

Behavioral Health switched her to a different medication, from which she 

developed no negative side effects. Id. at 51. Mother explained that in April 

of 2019, after approximately one year of attending appointments 

inconsistently at Northeast Community Behavioral Health, she changed 
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mental health providers. Id. at 50-51. Mother did not identify the new mental 

health provider.6 

As to supervised visitation, Ms. Smith testified that since the last court 

date in May of 2019, Mother attended seven of 13 scheduled visits.7 Id. at 

19. Mother acknowledged that she “did miss quite a few [visits] either 

because I couldn’t get there or my asthma was acting up on one of them. I 

had a rash from the shelter for one of them, so, I didn’t go, because it was 

contagious. . . .” Id. at 60. Mother subsequently testified that on another 

occasion, “I was really late to the agency because of a thunderstorm.” Id. 

Mother stated that she took the bus to supervised visitation, but that CUA has 

not given her tokens for the bus “in months.” Id. at 61. Mother testified on 

direct examination:

[Q.] So, when you go to a visit, do you ask them for tokens?

[M.] They said I have to put [the request] in a week prior, and 

when I text [Ms.] Smith and ask her, it’s -- either she forgets or 

her -- she’s busy. I don’t know, but I don’t get any reply.

Id. 

Ms. Smith testified on rebuttal that Mother “hasn’t had an asthma flareup this summer,” and to her knowledge, Mother did not miss any visits 

because of a thunderstorm. Id. at 75. Rather, Ms. Smith testified that Mother 

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6 Ms. Smith did not dispute that on April 1, 2019, Mother began mental health 

treatment at Community Council. N.T., 8/13/19, at 11-12.

 

7

Included in the seven visits was Mother’s supervised visit on the morning of 

the underlying proceeding. Id. at 19.
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missed visits because Mother did not confirm them, or she was late. Id. at 

74. With respect to assisting Mother with transportation to the visits, Ms. 

Smith testified that she provided assistance when Mother asked. Id. at 78. 

Ms. Smith explained that Mother “knows she has to ask for transportation 

[assistance] 48 hours in advance.” Id. On inquiry by the trial court, Ms. 

Smith testified:

[Q.] Did she ask you for assistance?

[A.] Yes. And every time mom asked me, I would give 

[transportation assistance] to her.

Id. at 79.

As to housing, Ms. Smith testified that since January of 2019, Mother 

moved four times. Id. at 38. She stated that Mother most recently secured

“a boarding room,” which was not suitable for Child because it needs a circuit 

breaker and a stove. Id. at 10. On cross-examination by Mother’s counsel,

Ms. Smith testified that Mother lives on the second floor of a duplex, and has 

a roommate. Id. at 32-33. 

On cross-examination by Child’s best interests counsel, Mother testified 

that in the last two years, she has had approximately seven residences. Id.

at 71. Mother explained:

[Q.] So, you have a pattern of changing your residences 

frequently; is that fair to say?

[A.] It’s not really a pattern. It’s just when they came out to look 

at the . . . places, my friend’s home or the rooms that I had for 

rent, [they were] not approved.
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. . .

[Q.] Well, you have a pattern of picking inappropriate places, then 

. . . for you to live with [Child] –

. . .

[Q.] – is that fair to say?

[A.] [W]hen they advertise these places, they don’t look 

inappropriate, but when you go live there, they’re inappropriate. 

Id. at 69-71.

Ms. Smith likewise testified that Mother has had multiple jobs since the 

most recent court date in May of 2019. Id. at 42. Ms. Smith testified that 

Mother’s jobs normally lasted no longer than one month. Id. She explained 

that Mother was last employed two weeks prior at Kentucky Fried Chicken, 

but she quit that job. Id. at 31. On direct examination, Mother stated that 

she quit because “I tried to date a co-worker, and it became dangerous. . . .” 

Id. at 57. Mother acknowledged on inquiry by the trial court, “I have a hard 

time keeping a job.” Id. at 67.

Based on the foregoing testimony, we discern no abuse of discretion by 

the trial court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 

2511(a)(1). Mother has failed to successfully complete any of her 

permanency plan objectives throughout the 22 months that Child has been 

dependent. As such, Mother has refused or failed to perform parental duties 

far in excess of the statutory six-month minimum.
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With respect to Section 2511(b), Mother argues that the evidence was 

insufficient because she “has established that a strong emotional bond exists 

between her [C]hild, and that she can provide for [C]hild’s needs.” Mother’s 

Brief at 14. We disagree.

This Court has explained:

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally 

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider 

the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability 

the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, this 

Court stated that the trial court should consider the importance of 

continuity of relationships and whether any existing parent-child 

bond can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.

In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010).

 

Further, our Supreme Court has stated, “[c]ommon sense dictates that 

courts considering termination must also consider whether the children are in 

a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their foster parents.” 

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The Court directed that in weighing the bond 

considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must keep the ticking 

clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. The Court observed, “[c]hildren 

are young for a scant number of years, and we have an obligation to see to 

their healthy development quickly. When courts fail . . . the result, all too 

often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

The testimony of Ms. Smith supports the trial court’s conclusion that, 

pursuant to Section 2511(b), there is no parent-child bond between Mother 

and Child. N.T., 8/13/19, at 21. Ms. Smith explained that Child would not 
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suffer any detriment if Mother’s parental rights are terminated because Mother 

“has a history of inconsistency with mental health, employment, housing, and 

visitation. Mother is unstable, impulsive, and does not take responsibility for 

decisions that she makes that negatively affect her child.” Id. at 23. 

Conversely, Ms. Smith testified that Child will suffer irreparable harm if she is 

removed from her foster parents, with whom she has lived since she was four 

months old. Id. at 24. In addition, Child’s legal counsel stated on the record 

in open court that a parent-child bond exists between foster parents and Child. 

Id. at 27. In sum, the evidence establishes that termination serves the 

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare of Child. 

Accordingly, we affirm the decree.

Decree affirmed. Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/4/20