UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

PAUL JOE CRAMER, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:18-cv-62 

 v. Judge James L. Graham 

 Magistrate Judge Chelsey A. Vascura 

 

JUDGE JOHN A. VAVRA,

 

 Defendant. 

 

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, Paul Joe Cramer, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, brings this action against Judge John A. Vavra, a state-court judge with the Belmont 

County Court of Common Pleas. This matter is before the Court for the initial screen of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and to 

recommend dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, 

fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant 

who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen, 

for the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this action 

pursuant to § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

I. 

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to 

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 
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assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 

U.S. 319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e)1, which 

provides in pertinent part as follows: 

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that-- 

 * * * 

 (B) the action or appeal-- 

 (i) is frivolous or malicious; 

 (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . . 

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31. Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte

dismissal of an action upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or 

upon determination that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. 

 To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, a plaintiff must satisfy the 

basic federal pleading requirements set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also 

Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(6) standards to review under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule 

8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 

pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factual 

demands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 Southfield Ltd., P’Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 

727 F.3d 502, 503 (6th Cir. 2013). 

 Although this pleading standard does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ . . . [a] 

 

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Formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d). 
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pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause 

of action,’” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A complaint will not “suffice if it tenders ‘naked 

assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). 

Instead, to survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), “a 

complaint must contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on 

its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). Facial plausibility is established “when the 

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the 

defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “The plausibility of an inference depends on 

a host of considerations, including common sense and the strength of competing explanations for 

the defendant’s conduct.” Flagstar Bank , 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further, the 

Court holds pro se complaints “‘to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by 

lawyers.’” Garrett v. Belmont Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t., 374 F. App’x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010) 

(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). This lenient treatment, however, has 

limits; “‘courts should not have to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.’” Frengler v. Gen. 

Motors, 482 F. App’x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 

(6th Cir. 1989)). 

II. 

According to Plaintiff’s Complaint, Defendant Judge Vavra presided over a state-court 

criminal case in which Plaintiff was a defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Vavra accepted his 

guilty plea and sentenced him. Plaintiff further alleges that he did not agree to the sentence 

Judge Vavra imposed and also that Judge Vavra imposed the sentence without ordering a 
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presentence investigation report. In terms of relief, Plaintiff requests an order “to keep this from 

happening again.” (Compl. 4, ECF No. 1-1.) 

No matter how liberally the Court construes Plaintiff’s Complaint, his claims against 

Defendant Judge Simmons are barred by the doctrine of judicial immunity. “It is wellestablished that judges enjoy judicial immunity from suits arising out of the performance of their 

judicial functions.” Brookings v. Clunk, 389 F.3d 614, 617 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Pierson v. 

Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-54 (1967)). Judicial immunity is overcome only if the actions taken are 

not within the judge’s judicial capacity or if the actions, “though judicial in nature, [are] taken in 

the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991) (citations 

omitted). A review of Plaintiff’s Complaint reveals that those exceptions do not apply here. 

Thus, because Judge Vavra is entitled to absolute judicial immunity, it is recommended that 

Plaintiff’s claims against Judge Vavra be dismissed. 

III. 

For the reasons set forth above, it is RECOMMENDED that this action be dismissed 

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 

question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 
 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge 

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l 

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [the defendant’s] ability to appeal 

the district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding 

that defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely 

object to magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation 

omitted)). 

 

 /s/ Chelsey M. Vascura 

CHELSEY M. VASCURA 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE