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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

ROBERT E. WHITE, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:18-cv-155

JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY

Magistrate Judge Jolson

FEDERAL MORTGAGE

ASSOCIATION, et al.,

Defendants.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

& ORDER

Plaintiff, Robert E. White, an Ohio resident who is proceeding without the assistance of 

counsel, filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 2) as well as a Complaint

(Doc. 1) on February 22, 2018. This matter is now before the undersigned for consideration of

Plaintiff’s Motion and the initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 

Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is GRANTED. All judicial officers who render 

services in this action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). 

However, having performed an initial screen, for the reasons that follow, it is 

RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this case.

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in forma pauperis statute, seeking to 

“lower judicial access barriers to the indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). 

In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigant whose filing fees and court costs are 

assumed by the public, unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrain from 

filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’” Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 
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319, 324 (1989)). To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) as part of the 

statute, which provides in pertinent part:

(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof, that may have been 

paid, the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that--

* * *

(B) the action or appeal--

(i) is frivolous or malicious;

(ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or . . . .

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii). Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an action 

upon the Court’s determination that the action is frivolous or malicious, or upon determination 

that the action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to set forth “a 

short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” In reviewing 

a complaint, the Court must construe it in favor of Plaintiff, accept all well-pleaded factual 

allegations as true, and evaluate whether it contains “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is 

plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A claim has facial 

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 

662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

II. DISCUSSION

In his Complaint, Plaintiff has labeled himself as the “Consumer,” and has purported to 

bring this case on behalf of the United States. (See generally Doc. 1). He asserts the following 

claims:
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CLAIM FOR FRAUD VIOLATIONS OF THE FAIR DEBT COLLECTION 

PRACTICE ACT, OHIO CONSUMER SALES PRACTICES ACT, 

CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT FRAUD, SLANDER OF TITLE, VIOLATION 

OF CFPDA, TILA, FTC, PREJURY, TREASON, PIRACY, ENGAGING IN

HARASSING, OPPRESSIVE, ABUSIVE CONDUCT, DECEPTIVE 

PRACTICES, DEFAMATION OF CHARACTER, ARMED ROBBERY, 

RECEIVING & SELLING STOLEN PROPERTY, MAIL FRAUD, WIRE 

FRAUD, TAX EVASSION [sic], IMPERSONATING THE UNITED STATES 

AND VIOLATING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 

AMERICA

(Doc. 1 at 1). Plaintiff has named a number of defendants: Federal National Mortgage 

Association; Reimer Law Co.; Robert G. Montgomery, Franklin County Recorder Office; Iris 

Jin, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, County of Franklin; Maryellen O’Shaughnessy, Clerk of 

Court; Treasurer of Franklin; Equitable Mortgage Corporation; Expedient Title; Constellation 

Enterprises LLC et al.; ACE Mortgage Funding; Seterus, Inc.; and Supra and Autumnwood 

Investments, Brain Knoppe. (Id.).

Plaintiff begins his “substantive allegations” by discussing the “foreclosure crisis since 

mid-2007” and the complexity of the law, and then proceeds to discuss a case that the 

undersigned assumes was Plaintiff’s foreclosure action in the Franklin County Court of Common 

Pleas. (See Doc. 1 at 3–4). Next, Plaintiff seems to cite certain “transactions” involving a 

number of the Defendants. (Id.). Plaintiff does not, however, assert wrongdoing on the part of 

any Defendant related to these transactions. Indeed, the transactions listed are indiscernible. For 

example:

Seterus, INC. ITS SUCCESSORS AND/OR ASSINGS [sic] P.O BOX 961299, 

FORT WORTH, TX 76171 ref. Loan number xxxxxx6843 Primary dwelling 

amount of insurance 367,400.00. Seterus has directed QBE Insurance 

Corporation 88 Pine Street, 16th Floor New York, NY 10005 C/O CT 

Corporation System 116 Pine Street Suite 320 Harrisburg, PA 17101 (An 

insurance binder is temporary proof of insurance until a formal policies is issued.

[sic]
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(Id. at 4). Plaintiff then cites the “Veterans Entrepreneurship Act of 2015,’’ Public Law 114-38, 

and the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. 1601, et seq. (Doc. 1 at 5–9). But again, Plaintiff does 

not allege that any Defendant violated these laws. 

Plaintiff subsequently discusses the requirements of default judgment and asks this Court 

to enter “default judgment against Federal National Mortgage Association, et al., for violations 

of the CFPA and the (FDCPA).” (Id. at 10).

The next page of the Complaint is titled “Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 

Supporting Petitioners.” (Doc. 1 at 11). Plaintiff avers that he is enforcing certain laws, he has 

authority to enforce the Constitution of the United States and has authority over Debt Collectors, 

and he is in the United States; thus, the United States has an interest in this lawsuit. (Id.) Next, 

Plaintiff asks “federal questions”:

66. Association: District Courts standing enforcing the Fair Debt Practices Act, 15

U.S.C. 1692[A (7)]. What is the association of the debt collectors’?

67. Why the recession and the cease and desist notices not acknowledged?

68. Why are their undocumented, unincorporated entities trespassing in

commerce?

69. Why are these entities doing business illegal acts in your district?

70. Pursuant 15 U.S.C. 1692 C, defendant must go through the United States / or a 

Court of competence to collect a debt?

71. What Jurisdiction are these LLC’s, LLP’s and LPA’s (debt collectors), in?

72. Why wasn’t their proper verification shown? (5013c)

73. Who are the Debt collectors in this matter, the Principal or the Interest?

74. Are the debt collectors’ organized for profit?

75. Pursuant 1692 CFPB; 1681, in commerce the consumer is not the subject to 

certain taxes, or article 1 courts; Entities’ cannot be undocumented associations 
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and be in commerce. Is it Tax evasion the reason these debt collectors’ are doing 

business in interstate commerce in your district?

76. Are [the Debt collectors’] in compliance with 15 U.S.C. Commerce and Trade 

Act 1443?

77. The primary transaction [was/ is] a consumer transaction, for personal family 

household purposes. Is it Tax evasion, these abusive practices were exercised?

(Doc. 1 at 11–12).

As for damages, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief as well as $30,862,268.88 for himself 

and his family. (Doc. 1 at 19).

As noted above, a complaint is frivolous “where it lacks an arguable basis in law or in 

fact, including fanciful allegations.” Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 325. The undersigned finds that much 

of the Complaint fits this definition, especially because of Plaintiff’s request for extraordinary 

damages and the assertion that Plaintiff has brought this case on behalf of the United States.

Further, and also as noted, a complaint may be dismissed for failure to state a claim if the 

pleading fails to contain “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Even reading the Complaint liberally, Plaintiff fails to allege any 

coherent facts that could support a claim against any Defendant (let alone all of them). Further, 

the Court is unable to review Plaintiff’s claims for considerations like the statute of limitations, 

because no specific “violation” dates are articulated. See In re Fox, 391 B.R. 772, 779 (Bankr. 

N.D. Ohio 2008) (explaining the Federal Truth in Lending Act’s (TILA) one year statute of 

limitations for claims seeking damages) (citing 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640)). In addition, assuming 

Plaintiff is attempting to challenge his state-court foreclosure action, see, e.g., Doc. 1 at 3–4, res 

judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine would bar such a claim. See Daina v. Carrington 

Mortg. Servs., LLC, No. 1:17-CV-01607, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3066, at *2–3 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 

8, 2018) (dismissing plaintiff’s challenge to the validity of her state-court foreclosure action 
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because “res judicata stops a party who has received a final judgment on the merits of a claim 

from bringing a subsequent lawsuit on the same claim . . .” and the “Rooker-Feldman Doctrine 

[prevents] a party losing his case in state court [from filing] an action in a Federal District Court 

claiming in essence that the state court judgment itself violated his or her federal rights”). 

Consequently, the Court finds that the Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be 

granted.

III. CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis is 

GRANTED. However, having performed an initial screen, for the reasons set forth above, it is 

RECOMMENDED that this case be DISMISSED. 

Procedure on Objections to Report and Recommendation

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those 

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with 

supporting authority for the objection(s). A Judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the Report or specified proposed findings or recommendations 

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a Judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 

evidence or may recommit this matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1).

The parties are specifically advised that failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to have the District Judge review the Report 

and Recommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of 
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the District Court adopting the Report and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: March 9, 2018 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE