IN THE UNITED DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION AT CINCINNATI 

CIVIL ACTION NO.: 1:17-cv-00713 (WOB-SKB) 

NICOLE CHRIST PLAINTIFF 

V. MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 

UNIVERSITY OF FINDLAY, ET AL. DEFENDANTS 

 Plaintiff Nicole Christ alleges that defendants University of Findlay and Ultimate Rehab, 

LLC, discriminated against her on the basis of her disabilities in violation of the ADA, the 

Rehabilitation Act, and the Ohio Civil Rights Act. Both defendants have moved for summary 

judgment. (Docs. 29, 34). The Court has reviewed the submitted materials and finds that oral 

argument is not necessary. S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.1(a). The Court now issues the following 

Memorandum Opinion and Order. 

 Factual and Procedural Background 

A. Christ’s diagnoses and academic background. 

 Plaintiff Nicole Christ was diagnosed with anxiety in 1999 and with ADHD in 2008.1

(Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 47, 63). When Christ enrolled in University of Findlay’s (“Findlay”) 

undergraduate program in 2013, she sought accommodations to help alleviate these disabilities’ 

effects. Findlay allowed her to have extra time for lab test sections with few other people in the 

room. (Id. at 105; see also Doc. 38-1). 

1

 Christ also believes she has an auditory processing disorder, but it has never officially been 

diagnosed. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 67-68). She does, however, wear a hearing aid. (Id. at 

10). 
2 

After successfully completing her undergraduate work at Findlay, Christ enrolled in its 

Masters of Occupational Therapy (“MOT”) program. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 176). 

Occupational therapy strives to improve the quality of a patient’s life and their life skills. (Id. at 

75; Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 7-8). It is provided in a variety of settings, including hospitals, inpatient 

rehabilitation centers, and mental health settings. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 76; Coalt Dep., 

Doc. 36 at 8). 

B. Findlay’s Masters in Occupational Therapy Program Requirements. 

The MOT program is comprised of two components: a didactic portion, where the students 

take classes, and a fieldwork portion. (Dillon Dep., Doc. 37 at 19-20). The purpose of fieldwork 

is to prepare students to become generalists, pursuant to the accreditation standards that Findlay is 

required to follow.2

 (Id. at 15). There are two kinds of fieldwork experiences that students must 

complete. The first is referred to as “Level 1” placements. These are one week long and primarily 

give students opportunities to observe practicing therapists along with some hands-on experience. 

(Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 34). A student must successfully complete three Level 1 experiences. 

(Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 135). 

“Level 2” field experiences are more intense. These are twelve weeks long and are meant 

to prepare the students to be entry-level generalists at the end of the placements. (Id. at 135; Dillon 

Dep., 37 at 15). Students are expected to gradually assume their supervisor’s responsibilities and 

duties over the course of the placement. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 135). Per the MOT Program 

Student Fieldwork Manual, a student is not allowed to discontinue or fail more than two fieldwork 

experiences. (Doc. 34-2 at UF/Christ-875). Students are evaluated by their “Fieldwork Educators” 

2

 Findlay’s MOT program is accredited by the Accreditation Council for Occupational Therapy 

Education (“ACOTE”). (Dillon Dep., Doc. 37 at 13). 
3 

(“FEs”) twice during their placement. (Id. at UF/Christ-000907). These evaluations consider 

several facets of occupational-therapist work, including evaluation and screening abilities, 

communication skills, and professional behaviors. (Id. at UF/Christ-000909-11). This rubric also 

looks at a student’s ability to practice safely and ethically. (Id. at UF/Christ-000908). The student 

is generally graded on a scale of one to four, with four being “exceeds standards.” (Id. at UF/Christ000907). For a student’s “Ethics and Safety Items,” though, a student must score at least a three 

for each item on her final fieldwork evaluation. (Id.) 

C. Christ’s Participation in the MOT Program. 

When Christ began the MOT program, she received accommodations for the didactic 

portion—extra time for written tests—and testified that this was effective in helping her learn. 

(Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 177, 179). When Christ began the fieldwork portion, she did not 

request any accommodations for her Level 1 experiences and successfully completed the required 

placements. (Id. at 142, 156-57, 168, 176). 

Christ believed that accommodations would be necessary for her Level 2 placements, 

however, primarily because of the increased documentation she would be required to do.3

 (Id. at 

138-39). Christ’s advisor in the MOT program was Heather Meredith (“Meredith”).4 (Coalt Dep., 

Doc. 36 at 9). The two women worked together to create a list of accommodations for Christ’s 

Level 2 placements. (Id. at 27). They designed several accommodations, but the accommodation 

3

 Christ also believed accommodations would help her more easily adapt to the various computer 

systems she would use at the different fieldwork placement sites, as well as using diagnostic codes. 

(Id. at 138-39). 

 

4

 Meredith has since changed her last name to Coalt. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 4). Any reference in 

the record to Coalt is thus a reference to Meredith. Meredith is also the Instructor/Academic 

Fieldwork Coordinator for Findlay. (Id. at 6). 
4 

most relevant here was Christ’s request for “[e]xtra time:” she requested an “[a]s needed ability to 

come in early or stay late to complete paperwork or prepare for the following day.” (Doc. 38-9 at 

NC000032).5

 Christ believed that these accommodations were appropriate. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 

vol. 2 at 9). Meredith shared these accommodations with each of Christ’s Level 2 placements. 

(Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 36, 51). While fieldwork sites are allowed to say that they cannot provide 

the requested accommodations, none of Christ’s sites expressed such concerns. (Id. at 39). Once a 

site agrees, Meredith largely depends on students to tell her if a site fails to provide a requested 

accommodation. (Id. at 44-45). 

Christ’s requested accommodations were in place for her first Level 2 experience, which 

she passed.6 (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 188, 211). Christ’s next placement was with a hand5

 Her other requested accommodations were: 

1. Complete day of observation, introduction and familiarizing self with facility prior to 

official start date. 

2. Complete documentation in a room with limited distractions. 

3. Wear earphones or noise cancelling headphones during documentation 

4. Clearly outline expectations 

5. Extra time 

a. As needed ability to come in early or stay late to complete paperwork or prepare for the 

following day 

b. Ability to take assessments/manuals or protocols home for review, to prepare for use 

with clients 

6. Scheduling of patients: 

a. When possible to set daily schedule of 1-2 patients and then time to complete 

documentation, 1-2 patients and time to complete documentation for the daily caseload. 

7. To design a template for self-organization of all documentation and responsibilities for 

daily use (notes, billing, etc.). 

8. External Reminders/cues: a. Verbal cue of “hold that thought” b. Visual cue to also cue 

student to refocus. 

(Doc. 38-9 at 13). 

6

 While Christ passed her first Level 2 placement, Meredith was unaware of the specific 

requirements that were in place at the end of this placement. (Meredith Dep., Doc. 36 at 115). 

Christ was only responsible for 50% of her supervising occupational therapist’s caseload and the 

percentage should have been higher. (Id.) Meredith therefore questioned whether Christ’s 
5 

therapy provider that Christ had specifically requested, Hand Rehabilitation & Orthotic Specialists 

(“Hand Rehab”). (Id. at 214; Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 50, 52). Hand Rehab implemented the 

accommodations that Christ requested. (Christ Dep. Doc. 38 vol. 3 at 70-71). 

However, Christ had difficulty due to the fast-paced environment, reporting to multiple 

supervisors and locations, and the specialized nature of the work. (Christ Dep. Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 

214-16; vol. 2 at 9-11). In fact, Christ did not believe she could pass this field placement, and she 

called Meredith to tell her she was upset and overwhelmed. (Christ Depo. Doc. 38, vol. 2 at 9, 16-

17; Coalt Depo. at 57-58). 

Christ’s FE at Hand Rehab also had informed Meredith that Christ was not progressing as 

she should have been and that Christ was overthinking things, which could lead to safety issues. 

(Coalt Dep. Doc. 36 at 56; Doc. 34-2 at UF/Christ000242). Christ’s FE performed an evaluation 

for Christ’s time at Hand Rehab and only scored her safety items at a two. (Doc. 38-11 at 

NC000391). Meredith thus recommended that they remove Christ from the Hand Rehab 

placement, and Christ agreed. (Christ Dep. Vol. 2 at 17; Coalt Dep. at 54-58). 

D. Christ’s first failure at a Level 2 placement. 

Meredith then placed Christ in another hand therapy site, Kettering Physical Medicine and 

Rehab (“Kettering”), because she believed that Christ was still interested in that area. (Id. at 58-

59). Christ now denies that interest but admits that she did not offer any alternative suggestions 

and felt that she “was going to work with what [Meredith] had suggested.”7

 (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 

vol. 2 at 24). 

passing grade was appropriate since her responsibilities were not as great as they should have been. 

(Id. at 115-16). 

7

There is a dispute as to the expectation for Christ’s new placement, specifically concerning how 

far along Christ should have been when she started at this different site. Both Christ and Meredith 
6 

Christ’s accommodations were discussed with the FEs at Kettering, and Christ testified 

that they were supportive of those requests. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 63; Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 

2 at 26). However, Christ still struggled. Performing evaluations was a particular source of trouble, 

and her FEs proposed a plan to help Christ improve her skills by performing mock evaluations. 

(Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 37). Yet Christ was not able to satisfactorily perform these mock 

evaluations. (Id. at 38). The Kettering Fes provided feedback to Christ that she was not completing 

a variety of tasks as expected. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 31-38). 

Christ testified that her anxiety impacted her ability to do evaluations. (Id. at 31, 40). She 

informed Meredith that she was having issues and, while Meredith testified she gave Christ some 

ideas on how to deal with her anxiety, Christ testified that Meredith simply told her not to discuss 

her anxiety with her FEs. (Id. at 40; Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 67-68). Because Christ was not 

improving as her FEs believed she should, they did not believe she would successfully complete 

the program and thus ended Christ’s placement early. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 38 at 71). This was 

Christ’s first Level 2 failure. (Id. at 76). While Christ believes not all of her accommodations were 

met there,8

 she explained that the “number one reason” for her failure was that the site was too 

advanced and too fast-paced for her. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 39, 48). 

agreed that Christ was not starting this next Level 2 placement as if it were brand new; Christ 

received some credit for the time she spent at Hand Rehab and this placement would not last the 

normal 12-week period. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 22-23; Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 69-70). 

However, Christ believed that she should have received a “transition” period for orientation to the 

new system and clinic that would have lasted a few weeks. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 22). 

Meredith and the FEs at her new site did not see it this way—they believed that, because this was 

a continuation of her second Level 2 fieldwork placement, she should be treated as though she 

were starting her fourth week despite that fourth week taking place in a new clinic. (Coalt Dep., 

Doc. 36 at 69-70). This difference of opinion, however, does not create a genuine dispute of 

material fact. 

8

 Christ was not given a day of orientation; did not have a room with limited distractions at every 

clinic; possibly could not wear headphones because she needed to be available to answer the 
7 

When a student fails a fieldwork placement, they must complete a “learning contract” that 

addresses why they failed and which creates a plan, including remedial work, to help them 

improve. (See Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 76-78). The remedial work must be completed before a 

student receives her next placement. (Id. at 77-78). One condition clearly stated in the learning 

contract is that a “second failed or discontinued fieldwork experience will result in” no further 

placements and dismissal from the program. (Doc. 38-13 at NC000076; Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 

2 at 47). Christ took issue with this condition since she believed that her first failure was because 

the site was “too advanced for me,” but she understood that the rule that two placement failures 

would lead to dismissal from the program applied to all students. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 

46-47). 

Christ signed the learning contract and completed her remedial work. Prior to her final 

fieldwork placement, Christ asked Meredith about any mental health or home therapy options for 

her last placement. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 84). Meredith testified that she considered these areas 

but did not pursue them because home therapy is rare in the geographic location Christ requested 

and mental health placements are not as beneficial in training students to become generalists as are 

other areas of practice. (Id. at 84-85). 

E. Christ’s placement at Ultimate Rehab. 

Meredith decided to place Christ at Ultimate Rehab, Ltd. (“Ultimate Rehab”) because she 

believed it was a stable environment that would be a good fit for Christ. (Id. at 82-83). Ultimate 

Rehab provides rehabilitation services at nursing homes. (Doc. 29 at 3). Megan Weber (“Weber”) 

was Christ’s FE and supervising occupational therapist. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 87). Christ was 

phone; and designed templates but was told that they were “robotic.” (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 at 50-

53). She did not mention a lack of extra time to document. 
8 

Weber’s first student. (Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 30). Pursuant to her accommodations, Christ met 

with Weber for a day of orientation prior to starting the placement. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 

96-97). She also discussed her other accommodations with Weber and Weber did not believe they 

would be an issue. (Id. at 64-65; Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 7-8). 

Christ does not dispute that Ultimate Rehab provided many of her accommodations.9

 Her 

request for extra time, though, was an issue. It is undisputed that Christ was allowed to come to 

work early, but she was limited in what she could do during that time. Christ was not authorized 

to review case materials for patients that would be evaluated that day because she was not allowed 

to start an evaluation and because that extra time would be billed to clients. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 

vol. 2 at 72, 105; Weber Dep. Doc. 32 at 21-22). 

Staying late was also a point of contention. Weber’s normal workday ended at 4:00 P.M. 

(Id. at 25). Weber agreed to the accommodation of time “[a]s needed . . . to come in early or stay 

late” because she believed that Christ would only need to stay about thirty to forty-five minutes 

late, but Weber testified that it became one to two hours instead. (Id. at 26).10 

Because this was intruding into Weber’s personal time, she spoke to her supervisor, Jessica 

Rolfes (“Rolfes”). (Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 25-26; Rolfes Dep., Doc. 33 at 6, 15). Christ testified 

9

 Christ agrees that she was given a distraction-free room for her documentation; allowed to wear 

headphones; provided with clearly outlined expectations; and allowed to create templates. (Christ 

Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 73, 102-03, 109-10). While she testified that she was not always allowed 

to see four patients a day with a break between her second and third patients, she admits that she 

was allowed to take the required break at least sometimes. (Id. at 112). She does not remember 

Weber using the verbal and visual cues. (Id. at 114-15). 

10 While Christ asked to stay late as she needed to finish her documentation, she did have a weekly 

group therapy session that necessitated leaving around 4:30 P.M., and Christ admits that she was 

able to finish her documentation such that she never missed a group-therapy session. (Christ Dep., 

Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 98, 145). 
9 

that Rolfes thereafter told her to be done with her documentation by 4:00 or even 3:30 P.M. (Christ 

Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 107, 143). Rolfes testified that she asked Christ to finish by the end of 

Weber’s workday at 4:00 but they modified Christ’s schedule so she had more time during the day 

to document. (Rolfes Dep., Doc. 33 at 15-16). Christ disputes this, though, and testified that they 

did not change her schedule to allow for more documentation during the day. (Christ Dep., Doc. 

38 vol. 2 at 107-08). Christ testified that she told Meredith she was not allowed to review certain 

documents in the morning, nor was she allowed to stay late in the evening. (Id. at 72-73). But 

Meredith also thought that Ultimate Rehab was trying to accommodate Christ’s need for extra 

documentation time during the day. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 97). 

Christ admits that she was told her documentation was too slow, but she believed that 

having more time in the evening to improve would help her become quicker. (Christ Dep., Doc. 

38 vol.2 at 79, 139). She wanted to stay until 6:00 P.M., which is when Ultimate Rehab’s lab 

closed, and believed that she could stay without Weber needing to stay as well. (Id. at 140-42). 

However, she admits that she never asked for this accommodation. (Id. at 143). 

In any event, Weber testified that there would have been two problems with that 

arrangement. The first was that Weber was protective of Christ since Christ was her first student. 

(Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 27). The second, and more important issue, is that Ultimate Rehab has a 

corporate policy that requires paperwork to be done by the end of the day. (Schoenberger Dec., 

Doc. 29-1 ¶ 6). This is designed to maintain accurate, complete, and timely records. (Id. ¶ 7). Christ 

was aware of this policy and understood that it applied to her. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 143-

44). Because Weber was Christ’s supervisor, Christ’s documentation required Weber to sign off 

on it for it to be complete. (Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 30). Therefore, allowing Christ to stay late 

without Weber would not comport with this policy. 
10 

F. Christ commits several safety violations that result in her termination and 

dismissal. 

Christ was also spending much of her time working with patients. It was certain patient 

encounters that lead to Christ’s release from Ultimate Rehab. Over the course of two weeks, Christ 

committed three separate safety violations. 

The first violation occurred when Christ instructed a patient, who had recently undergone 

shoulder surgery and was not supposed to use one arm, to take off or put on a sock—a task that 

involved both arms and therefore violated his post-surgery restrictions. (Christ Dep. Doc. 38 vol. 

2 at 115; Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 37). Weber intervened before the patient carried out the 

instruction. (Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 37). Christ admits that this created a risk for the patient and 

that none of her accommodations required a site to compromise its safety rules. (Christ Dep., Doc. 

38 vol. 2 at 117). 

Later that same week, Christ was working with a patient who, due to balance issues, needed 

the therapist to constantly be in close proximity to prevent a fall. When Christ realized she had 

left her computer open for others to see, Christ turned away from the patient—which was a safety 

violation. (Id. at 117-19, 134). 

Weber reported these safety incidents to Stacy Schoenberger (“Schoenberger”). (Id. at 39-

40). Schoenberger oversaw the student program at Ultimate Rehab and was involved in deciding 

if students should be removed from the placement. (Schoenberger Dep., Doc. 35 at 6-7). Weber 

testified that Schoenberger and Rolfes instructed her to tell Christ that an actual clinician could be 

terminated for these violations. (Weber Dep., Doc. 32 at 39-40). Christ does not remember this 

conversation, though. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 135). While Schoenberger was not 
11 

considering terminating Christ at this time, she did email Meredith after these incidents and ask 

her to come for a site visit the following week. (Schoenberger Dep., Doc. 35 at 24; Doc. 36-18 at 

UF/Christ-000342). 

 On the day of the final safety incident, Rolfes told Christ she needed to finish her 

documentation by 1:00 P.M. because the computers were set to go down around that time. (Christ 

Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 130). While Christ was able to complete her documentation, she felt that 

this temporary deadline created anxiety for her. (Id. at 132). The same day, Christ was working 

with a patient in a wheelchair and Weber reminded her to ensure that the wheels were locked. (Id.

at 123). Christ did not check both wheels before the patient sat down and one of the wheels was 

only partially locked and moved a little. (Id. at 123-24). Christ admits that both wheels should have 

been fully locked and that this constituted a safety violation. (Id. at 124). 

 After this third incident, Schoenberger, along with someone in the executive office, decided 

to terminate Christ’s placement. (Schoenberger Dep., Doc. 35 at 43). Schoenberger and Weber 

informed Meredith at their previously scheduled meeting that Christ was terminated because of 

her safety violations. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 101-02). 

 Meredith thereafter met with Christ and told her that Ultimate Rehab had terminated her 

placement due to the safety violations. (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 103-04; Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 

2 at 147). Christ “[a]bsolutely” understood that safety was the reason for her termination. (Christ 

Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 148). On February 2, 2017, Christ was officially terminated from the MOT 

program at Findlay because of her safety violations and her failures in two Level 2 Placements. 

(Doc. 38-17 at NC000022; Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 at 104). 

 Christ appealed this dismissal. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 3 at 12-13). Findlay reviewed the 

decision, but Christ was not reinstated to the program. (Id. vol. 2 at 87-89). 
12 

G. Procedural History 

Christ brought suit against both Findlay and Ultimate Rehab on October 25, 2017. (Doc. 

1). She alleges claims under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the 

Rehabilitation Act, and the Ohio Civil Rights Act against Findlay for discriminating against her 

on the basis of her disability. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 59-80). She also sued Ultimate Rehab under Title III and 

the Ohio Civil Rights Act.11 (Id. ¶¶ 81-93). Both defendants have moved for summary judgment 

on all claims brought against them.

Analysis 

1. Title III of the ADA, the Ohio Civil Rights Act, and the Rehabilitation Act. 

Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as 

to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 

56(a). The Court must review the factual evidence in a light that is most favorable to the 

nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in her favor. Smith v. Perkins Bd. of Educ., 

708 F.3d 821, 825 (6th Cir. 2013). “The defendant’s motion for summary judgment should be 

granted ‘when the plaintiff fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an 

element essential to her case, and on which she will bear the burden of proof at trial.’” Stallings v. 

Detroit Pub. Schs., 658 F. App’x 221, 224-25 (6th Cir. 2016) (quoting Cleveland v. Policy Mgmt. 

Sys. Corp., 526 U.S. 795, 805-06 (1999)) (internal quotations omitted). 

Christ brought suit under Title III of the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Ohio Civil 

Rights Act. Title III of the ADA protects people with disabilities by prohibiting “discriminat[ion] 

11 Christ also brought an employment action under Ohio anti-disability discrimination law against 

Ultimate Rehab, too. (Doc. 11 ¶¶ 94-100). However, Ultimate Rehab successfully moved to 

dismiss this claim. (Doc. 21). 
13 

. . . on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, 

privileges, advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person 

who owns, leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 

12182(a). Ohio also prohibits places of public accommodation and educational institutions from 

discriminating against people based on their disabilities. O.R.C. §§ 4112.02(G), 4112.022. Claims 

brought under the Ohio Civil Rights Act are generally analyzed by looking to the ADA and the 

Rehabilitation Act. See Jakubowski v. Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 201 (6th Cir. 2010). The 

Rehabilitation Act provides similar protection, with its main distinction being that it applies to 

entities that receive federal funding. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); see also McPherson v. Michigan High 

Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 119 F.3d 453, 460 (6th Cir. 1997). 

A more thorough discussion of the merits of Christ’s claims follows below, but an initial 

point must be addressed. Title III allows for injunctive relief, but not monetary damages. Neal v. 

Second Sole of Youngstown, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-1625, 2018 WL 1740140, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 

2018). Thus, “in order to have standing to sue under the ADA, a plaintiff must demonstrate a threat 

of future injury by showing an intent to return to the noncompliant accommodation or that he 

would return, but is deterred from visiting the noncompliant accommodation because of the alleged 

accessibility barriers.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). 

Because Christ has not pled any facts to establish that she is “likely to suffer discrimination 

in the future,” Gomez v. Dade Cnty. Fed. Credit Union, 610 F. App’x 859, 863 (11th Cir. 2015), 

she does not have standing to sue under the ADA against either defendant. Christ seems to concede 

this by failing to address it in her response to Findlay’s motion and by arguing that her state-law 
14 

claim allows for “much broader” relief than the ADA in her response to Ultimate Rehab.12 (Doc. 

42 at 17 n.8). However, since the statutes’ analyses overlap to a large extent, the ADA’s principles 

are discussed below despite Christ’s lack of standing. 

2. Christ’s claims against Findlay will be dismissed because she cannot establish an 

element of her prima facie case. 

Christ argues that there is a genuine question as to whether she was reasonably 

accommodated by Findlay, particularly since she believes Meredith failed to enforce Christ’s 

requested accommodations. (See, e.g., Doc. 41 at 18, 21). However, Christ’s claims must be 

dismissed because she cannot establish that she was otherwise qualified to participate in Findlay’s 

program. 

“To establish that [s]he was dismissed from an academic program in violation of the ADA 

or Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) [s]he is handicapped or disabled, (2) [s]he is 

‘otherwise qualified’ to continue the program, and (3) [s]he was dismissed on the basis of [her] 

handicap or disability.”13 Shaikh v. Lincoln Mem’l Univ., 608 F. App’x 349, 353 (6th Cir. 2015); 

see also Ohio Civ. Rights Comm’n v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 666 N.E.2d 1376, 1383 (Ohio 1996) 

(“In the past, we have looked to federal law to support a finding of discrimination under R.C. 

Chapter 4112.”). To be otherwise qualified, a person with a disability must be able to meet the 

program’s necessary requirements with reasonable accommodations. Shaikh, 608 F. App’x at 353; 

Kaltenberger v. Ohio Coll. of Podiatric Med., 162 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 1998). 

12 Christ is correct that her state-law claims allow for broader relief: “[w]hoever violates this 

chapter is subject to a civil action for damages, injunctive relief, or any other appropriate relief.” 

O.R.C. § 4112.99. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act also allows for compensatory damages. 

See Johnson v. City of Saline, 151 F.3d 564, 573 (6th Cir. 1998). 

13 For the purpose of this motion, Findlay does not dispute that Christ is disabled. (Doc. 34-1 at 

12). Findlay also does not dispute that it receives federal financial assistance and is subject to 

claims under the Rehabilitation Act. (Id.). 
15 

The burden is on the plaintiff to prove that she is otherwise qualified. Shaikh, 608 F. App’x 

at 353. “A plaintiff thus bears the burden of proposing an accommodation and proving that it is 

reasonable, including establishing that he can meet a program’s necessary requirements with that 

accommodation.” Id. (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted). 

Further, because this is an academic program, the Court defers to the educational institution 

in its decisions concerning academic performance and its necessary requirements.14 Id. “We should 

only reluctantly intervene in academic decisions especially regarding degree requirements in the 

health care field when the conferral of a degree places the school’s imprimatur upon the student as 

qualified to pursue his chosen profession.” Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 437 (internal quotations 

omitted). Additionally, “discrimination laws do not require an educational institution to lower or 

to effect substantial modifications of standards to accommodate a handicapped person.” Id. at 436 

(internal quotations omitted). 

While Findlay points to a number of ways in which Christ was allegedly not qualified, the 

important issue is that of patient safety. Findlay argues that patient safety is “of primary 

importance” and that its requirements regarding patient safety are “essential.” (Doc. 34-1 at 13). 

Students pass a fieldwork experience when their final score is based on receiving an average of 

three out of four points for most criteria. (Id. at 2-3). For the “Ethics and Safety Items,” however, 

a student must receive at least a three on each item for the final evaluation. (Doc. 34-2 at 

UF/Christ-000907). Therefore, Findlay’s evaluation process clearly prioritizes a student’s ability 

to practice safely over other factors. 

14Christ argues that Findlay does not deserve deference by relying on a non-binding case from 

another court in this district. (Doc. 41 at 25). Because Findlay made its decision after three 

undisputed safety violations and Christ herself agrees that safety is of “paramount importance” 

and should not be compromised even through accommodations, the Court declines to follow this 

other decision. 
16 

Christ does not dispute that patient safety is of utmost importance. It is clear that Christ 

struggled to focus appropriately when working with patients, which caused safety concerns at her 

placements and then three actual safety violations at Ultimate Rehab. (See Doc. 34-2 at UF/Christ000242; Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 115-18, 122-24). Consequently, because working safely 

with patients was a necessary requirement in Findlay’s MOT Program that Christ struggled to 

satisfy, she needed to propose a reasonable accommodation that would enable her to meet this 

requirement. See Jakubowski, 627 F.3d at 202. 

Unfortunately for Christ, she is unable to do so. Christ’s requested accommodations, 

particularly her request for extra time in the mornings and evenings, are related not to safety, but 

to alleviating distractions while documenting or reviewing materials. Christ testified that she 

primarily wanted accommodations in order to better handle the increased documentation in her 

Level II fieldwork placements. (Christ Dep. Doc. 38 vol. 1 at 139) (“So when it came to the Level 

II, that was my biggest concern, was the fact that I definitely needed more time to be able to 

write.”). Her requested accommodations were not designed to help her safely interact with patients. 

The disconnect between her accommodations and her inability to practice safely with patients is 

underscored by her testimony that distractions from other people and issues contributed to her 

safety violations. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 116-19; 126-27). 

Even at Hand Rehab—where Christ concedes she was accommodated—her FE had safety 

concerns because of Christ’s inability to focus when working with patients and she received low 

safety scores. (Id. vol. 3 at 70-71; Doc. 38-11 at NC000391; Doc. 34-2 at UF/Christ-000242). 

Additionally, at Christ’s second Level II placement, she did not testify that they refused to give 

her extra time to document and she still was unable to successfully complete patient evaluations. 

(Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 37-38, 50-53). Christ primarily attributes her failure at this site to it 
17 

being too advanced for her—not a lack of any accommodation. (Id. at 48) (“[T]he placement was 

too advanced for me. And that is the number one reason.”). Hence, while she now argues that she 

was not given many of her accommodations, her testimony reveals that her accommodations were 

not the cause of her first failure. Thus, it is clear that Christ’s requested accommodations were not 

designed to help her meet the necessary requirement of working safely with patients. 

The Sixth Circuit found that a plaintiff was not qualified in a similar situation in 

Jakubowski. The plaintiff was a medical resident who was required to communicate effectively 

with both his colleagues and his patients as part of the residency program—which he could not do 

without an accommodation. 627 F.3d at 201-02. His proposed accommodation enabled him to 

communicate with his colleagues but did not help him communicate with his patients. Id. at 202. 

Since his proposed accommodation only helped him meet one essential requirement as opposed to 

both, he was unable to satisfy the essential requirements of the program and was not qualified to 

continue. Id.

In her response, Christ fails to address the primary reason for her dismissal from the MOT 

program—patient safety. While she relies heavily on her belief that Meredith15 did not ensure that 

Christ’s accommodations were actually provided to her, she does not explain how these 

15Christ makes much out of the fact that she asked Meredith about a placement in either a home 

therapy setting or a mental health setting. (Doc. 41 at 20). While she never explicitly characterizes 

this as a request for an accommodation, she seems to at least imply that it would have been an 

appropriate accommodation for her disabilities. (Doc. 41 at 20, 23). However, she did not request 

this as an accommodation. While a plaintiff does not have to use magic words in order to 

sufficiently request an accommodation, the context of the request needs to make clear that it is 

made “in order to conform with existing medical restrictions.” Hobbs v. Mahoning Cnty. Gen. 

Health Dist., No. 4:16CV2582, 2018 WL 1035140, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 22, 2018). Christ’s email 

to Heather was not a request for an accommodation. She merely asked if there was a rotation in 

home therapy and said she was “wondering about a mental health rotation.” (Coalt Dep., Doc. 36 

Exh. 36-16). This general inquiry is not connected to Christ’s disabilities or restrictions in any way 

and, to the extent that Christ argues this was a request for an accommodation, this argument fails. 
18 

accommodations would have helped her practice safely had they been implemented as she 

requested. Christ cannot simply say that, because she successfully passed her first Level 2 

fieldwork placement where she was accommodated, it is clear that her accommodations made her 

qualified. (Doc. 41 at 19). Christ bears the burden of establishing that her requested 

accommodations enabled her to safely interact with patients; an ipso facto argument that rests 

solely on one successful Level 2 placement is not enough. 

“Because the accommodations—that [the plaintiff] had the burden to propose—do not 

address a key obstacle preventing [her] from performing a necessary function . . ., [she] has not 

met [her] burden under the [ADA] of proving [she] is an otherwise qualified individual for the 

position.” Jakubowski, 627 F.3d at 202. Since an element of Christ’s prima facie case—being 

otherwise qualified—is lacking, her claims against Findlay will be dismissed. 

3. Because Christ is not qualified, her claims against Ultimate Rehab are also dismissed.

Christ’s claims against Ultimate Rehab16 fail for a similar reason—she has not created a 

genuine question as to whether she was qualified to perform the necessary requirements. Christ’s 

claims against Ultimate Rehab boil down to a failure-to-accommodate theory and, seemingly, 

disparate treatment since she argues against her termination by pointing to an allegedly similarly 

situated employee who received different treatment.17 (Doc. 42 at 23-25). “Under the ADA a 

16 Ultimate Rehab does not dispute that Christ is disabled for purposes of this motion. (Doc. 29 at 

12 n.13). 

17 Christ’s attempt to compare herself to this unnamed employee suffers from serious flaws. First, 

there is not enough detail in her response to establish that the two are similarly situated in relevant 

aspects. See Badri v. Huron Hosp., 691 F. Supp. 2d 744, 760 (N.D. Ohio 2010). Further, it is hard 

to see how Christ was treated any worse than this employee since both were fired after their third 

safety violation. While Christ emphasizes that this other employee was not “immediately fired,” 

there is no factual support to establish that Christ’s termination was any more immediate than this 

unnamed employee’s—they were both fired after their third violation. (Doc. 42 at 24). Therefore, 

her disparate-treatment theory fails. 
19 

plaintiff may purs[u]e a claim for disparate treatment or for a failure to accommodate.” Badri v. 

Huron Hosp., 691 F. Supp. 2d 744, 756 (N.D. Ohio 2010); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). 

 “[A] plaintiff must show that (1) she is handicapped or disabled as defined in [the] statute, 

(2) she is ‘otherwise qualified’ to continue in the program, and (3) she was dismissed from the 

program on the basis of her handicap or disability.”18 Kaltenberger, 162 F.3d at 435. The 

“otherwise qualified” element is required even in failure-to-accommodate claims. Stallings, 658 

F. App’x at 225. Therefore, the same elements for her claims against Findlay apply to her claim 

against Ultimate Rehab. 

In its motion, Ultimate Rehab did not argue that Christ was not qualified; hence, Christ did 

not have to respond by establishing that she was qualified for her claims against Ultimate Rehab. 

The Court is allowed to grant summary judgment on grounds that are not raised by the party. Fed. 

R. Civ. P. 56(f)(2). However, the Court acknowledges that it should give notice and a reasonable 

time for the party to respond prior to doing so. Id. 

Even though the Court did not provide formal notice to Ultimate Rehab and Christ that it 

was considering this element under these claims, issuing judgment on this element is otherwise 

appropriate. While the Court believes Christ was sufficiently on notice that it would consider this 

18 The Court notes that Kaltenberger requires plaintiffs to be otherwise qualified under Title III 

even though Title III itself does not explicitly state that a plaintiff must be qualified. See 42 U.S.C. 

§ 12182(a). This has been a necessary element for Title III claims in contexts other than academic 

programs. See Dunning v. War Mem’l Hosp., 534 F. App’x 326, 332-33 (6th Cir. 2013). Other 

circuits have recognized that this is an essential element in the Sixth Circuit. Singh v. George 

Washington Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Scis., 508 F.3d 1097, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Requiring 

a plaintiff to prove that she is qualified makes sense, especially when “the public accommodation 

at issue is available to only qualified members of the general public.” Redding v. Nova Se. Univ., 

Inc., 165 F. Supp. 3d 1274, 1289 (S.D. Fla. 2016). Christ was afforded an opportunity that made 

her much more like Ultimate Rehab’s employees than other members of the public. Therefore, it 

is appropriate to first determine if she was qualified to have that opportunity. 
20 

element when deciding these motions,19 the Court’s judgment on this ground “will be upheld 

unless the losing party can demonstrate prejudice.” Smith, 708 F.3d at 829. For prejudice, the party 

would have to “demonstrate that [she] could have produced new favorable evidence or arguments 

had more notice been given.” Id. at 831 (internal quotations and alterations omitted). Under this 

factor, the Court notes the voluminous record before it and decides that it is unlikely that Christ 

could have adduced more evidence had she been given explicit notice that this element was being 

considered in her claims against Ultimate Rehab. See Excel Energy, Inc. v. Cannelton Sales Co., 

246 F. App’x 953, 961 (6th Cir. 2007). Further, the fact that Christ bore this same burden for the 

same accommodations in response to Findlay’s motion means that Christ’s favorable arguments 

or evidence should already be before the Court. Consequently, it is hard to see how she is 

prejudiced in this instance. 

Thus, Christ needed to prove that she was qualified under her claims against Ultimate 

Rehab in the same way that she needed to prove she was qualified for her claims against Findlay. 

The same accommodations are involved and Ultimate Rehab can point to three safety violations 

that undisputedly lead to her termination as proof that Christ could not perform its necessary 

requirements without accommodation. The most that Christ can say is that, if her accommodations 

19 For notice, “[t]he key inquiry is whether the losing party was on notice that he had to muster the 

necessary facts to withstand summary judgment, lest he face the dismissal of his claims.” Smith, 

708 F.3d at 829 (internal quotation omitted). Determining if a party was on notice is based on the

totality of the proceedings before the Court. Id. While Ultimate Rehab did not explicitly argue that 

patient safety was a necessary requirement of its program, it is a clinic that provides rehabilitative 

services at nursing homes and it is inconceivable that a site like this would not highly prioritize 

patient safety. (Doc. 29 at 3). Ultimate Rehab also explained that it terminated Christ’s placement 

because of safety incidents. (Id. at 16). Therefore, Ultimate Rehab would seemingly agree that 

Christ was required to practice safely in order to be qualified. Christ is familiar with this argument 

since she had to confront it head-on in response to Findlay’s motion. The Court may consider codefendant’s motions when determining if a party was on notice that a particular ground would be 

considered. Grand Rapids Plastics, Inc. v. Lakian, 188 F.3d 401, 407 (6th Cir. 1999). 
21 

had been implemented as she requested them, then maybe safety violations would not have 

occurred. (See Doc. 42 at 25). 

“But it is well-established in our case law that a party may not avoid summary judgment 

by resorting to speculation, conjecture, or fantasy.” K.V.G. Props., Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 900 

F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation omitted). This assertion amounts to speculation 

that becomes even more unlikely when Christ’s testimony regarding her three safety incidents at 

Ultimate Rehab is considered. For each violation, Christ testified that she was distracted by other 

people’s presence or concerns, such as leaving her computer open. (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 

116-18; 127, 129-30). Christ did explain that, on the day of the third violation, Rolfes had told her 

she needed to finish her documentation by 1:00 P.M—which she was able to do—and this 

supposedly caused her to lose focus when working with this patient. (Id. at 131-32). But this is the 

only incident that is in any way related to her need for extra time to document and, again, she 

explained that there were other factors that distracted her.20 Thus, even for the one incident that is 

somewhat connected to her documentation accommodation, it is not clear that having extra time 

in the evening would have helped Christ avoid this incident since it would not have removed the 

other distractions. 

 “[T]he plaintiff has the burden of proving that he will be capable of performing the 

essential functions of the job with the proposed accommodations.” Jakubowski, 627 F.3d at 202. 

To assert that something might be true with no explanation or supporting facts does not satisfy this 

20 In her testimony, Christ said that she was focused on the patient but also that “there was a lot of 

things going on.” (Christ Dep., Doc. 38 vol. 2 at 127; see also id. at 130). She explained that Weber 

was supposed to be in close proximity when working with this patient, but she was not and Christ 

had to find Weber when walking with this patient. (Id. at 128-29). Christ also repeatedly mentions 

that, unbeknownst to Christ, Schoenberger was in the room when Christ was not expecting her to 

be; she admits that she would not be distracted if she did not know Schoenberger was there, but 

mentions her presence more than once all the same. (Id. at 125, 129, 133). 
22 

burden. While the record is clear in establishing Christ’s interest in and dedication to pursuing 

occupational therapy, it is also clear that she was not qualified at these times to serve at Ultimate 

Rehab. For this reason, her claims against Ultimate Rehab will be dismissed. 

Conclusion 

Therefore, having reviewed the matter, and the Court being otherwise advised, IT IS 

ORDERED that: 

(1) The defendants’ motions for summary judgment (Docs. 29, 34) be, and are hereby, 

GRANTED; and 

(2) A separate judgment shall enter concurrently herewith 

This 11th day of February 2020.