SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-5931-17T2

BEZALEL GROSSBERGER,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

ROBERT BIFANI and

ROBERT BIFANI, LLC,

Defendants-Respondents.

_____________________________

Argued telephonically October 24, 2019 –

Decided November 18, 2019

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Mawla.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-1384-16.

Bezalel Grossberger, appellant, argued the cause pro se.

Respondents have not filed briefs. 

PER CURIAM

In this longstanding dispute over property located at 413 Oak Glen Road 

in Howell (the property), plaintiff Bezalel Grossberger appeals from a May 1, 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted o n the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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2018 Law Division order denying his request for court transcripts at public 

expense, and denying his request to discharge the claims to the property of 

defendants Robert Bifani, and his company, Robert Bifani, LLC (collectively, 

defendants). We note plaintiff's brief and appendix were muddled and lacking 

in procedural formalities designed for appellate review. We have dismissed 

appeals before for failing to adhere to procedural guidelines. See, e.g., Cherry 

Hill Dodge, Inc. v. Chrysler Credit Corp., 194 N.J. Super. 282, 283 (App. Div. 

1984) (dismissing an appeal for procedural deficiencies); see also In re Zakhari, 

330 N.J. Super. 493, 495 (App. Div. 2000) (holding the court was loathe to 

dismiss an appeal for procedural deficiencies but did so because the deficiencies 

made it impossible to properly review the matter). Nonetheless, here, we affirm. 

We discern the following facts and procedural history from the record. 

Plaintiff unsuccessfully attempted to purchase the property in 2006 from Marion 

and Patrick Ruane, as a result of which there was extensive state and federal 

litigation unrelated to this appeal. See Ruane v. Oak Glen, LLC, No. A-1300-

13 (App. Div. Feb. 2, 2016); Grossberger v. Ruane, 535 F. App'x 84 (3d Cir. 

2013); Grossberger v. Ruane, No. 11-3728 (D.N.J. Dec. 14, 2011). In 2012,

Bifani purchased the property from the Ruanes. In 2016, plaintiff and Bifani's 

representative apparently engaged in brief discussions about selling the property 
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to plaintiff for over $1.7 million, but the parties never reached an agreement. 

However, on April 14, 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint against Bifani and his 

company in the Law Division, asserting "various interferences with prospective 

economic gain through the purchase of [the property] . . . without duly 

compensating . . . plaintiff." 

The complaint alleged that Bifani, through his company, "filed several 

facially apparent fraudulent entries in reference to [the property] on the 

Monmouth County Record in May of 2012." The complaint asserted claims for 

"[u]njust [e]nrichment" and "[t]ortious interference," maintained that "an 

equitable lien attached to the . . . property[,]" and requested relief, including

"compensatory and reimbursement awards for [plaintiff's] efforts and expenses 

towards anticipated purchase of [the] property" because Bifani's "sale," "lease,"

and "occupancy" of the property "would not have been possible without . . . 

plaintiff's work." 

On May 4, 2016, the trial court entered an order, granting plaintiff a 

waiver of fees and costs pursuant to Rule 1:13-2(a), providing for the waiver of 

fees for indigent persons "upon the verified application of such person[s.]" 

Plaintiff then filed a lis pendens on the property, which was discharged on 

August 14, 2017, after Bifani filed a verified complaint in the Chancery Division
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challenging the lis pendens and seeking other relief. In the interim, on 

November 4, 2016, plaintiff's complaint was dismissed without prejudice for 

lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule 1:13-7. When plaintiff moved to reinstate 

the complaint, Bifani cross-moved to enjoin plaintiff from filing further lawsuits 

against defendants without leave of court.

In a December 1, 2017 order, Assignment Judge Lisa P. Thornton denied 

plaintiff's motion to reinstate the underlying complaint, and granted defendant's

cross-motion to enjoin plaintiff from further filings without leave of court. See

Triffin v. Automatic Data Processing, Inc., 394 N.J. Super. 237, 252 (2007) 

("The court has the inherent power to protect itself and litigants against 

harassment and vexatious litigation and an abuse of process.") (quoting 

Atkinson v. Pittsgrove Twp., 193 N.J. Super. 23, 32 (Ch. Div. 1983)). 

Addressing the "good cause" standard specified in Rule 1:13-7(a) in the 

accompanying written opinion, the judge determined plaintiff provided no 

evidence he "properly served [defendants]" as required under the rule. Instead, 

plaintiff "admit[ted]" he failed to pay "a process server" to effectuate service 

upon defendants, and only "left a copy of the complaint at counsel's place of 

business."
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Plaintiff did not appeal the December 1, 2017 order. Nonetheless, despite 

the dismissal of the complaint and injunction against future filings without leave 

of court, plaintiff engaged in extensive motion practice. Pertinent to this appeal, 

in January 2018, plaintiff moved to "[e]nter default judgment against . . . 

defendants by directing the County Recording Clerk to discharge any document 

purporting to support defendant's claim to [the] property title[,]" and to obtain

"free transcripts at public expense for all hearings." In a May 1, 2018 order, the 

court denied plaintiff's motion, finding "no valid grounds for the relief 

requested." As to the former request, the court noted plaintiff provided no 

"logical, legal or [rational] grounds to discharge . . . defendant[s'] claim to the 

. . . property." As to the latter, the court explained there was "no court rule or 

case law" to support plaintiff's request. Citing Stewart v. Stewart, 59 N.J. 301 

(1971) and Robinson v. St. Peter's Medical Center, 236 N.J. Super. 94 (Law Div. 

1989), the court explained that plaintiffs bear the costs of obtaining transcripts 

in civil actions for money damages as involved in this case. 

Plaintiff filed a notice of appeal on May 16, 2018, identifying only the 

May 1, 2018 order. Notwithstanding the pending appeal, plaintiff continued to 

engage in extensive motion practice in the Law Division, resulting in the entry 

of subsequent orders. On April 11, 2019, plaintiff moved to include 
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supplemental documents in his brief and appendix for our consideration. On 

May 16, 2019, we "limited" plaintiff's appeal to the "May 1, 2018" order 

identified in his notice of appeal, and determined that "the court [would] not

consider any arguments in the brief that [were] not addressed to that order." See

1266 Apartment Corp. v. New Horizon Deli, Inc., 368 N.J. Super. 456, 459 

(App. Div. 2004) (explaining that "it is only the judgment or orders designated 

in the notice of appeal which are subject to the appeal process and review") 

(citing Sikes v. Twp. of Rockaway, 269 N.J. Super. 463, 465-66 (App. Div.

1994)). See also R. 2:5-1(f)(3)(A). 

In his merits brief, plaintiff raises the following points for our 

consideration:

POINT 1 SERVICE OF PROCESS

POINT 2 ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

POINT 3 ADVERSE INFERENCE

POINT 4 SUMMARY JUDGMENT

POINT 5 JUDICIALLY NOTICED

POINT 6 TRANSCRIPT

POINT 7 CIVIL ACTION
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Points one through four pertain to the December 1, 2017 order dismissing

the complaint and will not be addressed in accordance with our May 16, 2019

order. In Point five, plaintiff argues "defendant misrepresent[ed] prior [o]rders 

to appear as if he has a clean chain of title" to the property. Plaintiff asserts an 

"[e]rror of [l]aw is an exception to the doctrines of [c]laim [p]reclusion[,]" as 

"detailed at great length in the underlying complaint." This argument is "without 

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion." R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

As to Points six and seven pertaining to the denial of transcripts at public 

expense, we affirm substantially for the reasons stated in the May 1, 2018 order. 

We add only the following comments.

Rule 2:5-3(d) provides in part that "[i]f the appellant is indigent and is 

entitled to have a transcript of the proceedings below furnished without charge 

for use on appeal, either the trial or the appellate court, on application, may order 

the transcript prepared at public expense." Thus, under the rule, indigency and 

entitlement are required, and the decision to grant the transcript at public 

expense is discretionary, not mandatory. "Although the ordinary 'abuse of 

discretion' standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is 'made 

without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, 

or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cty. Prosecutor, 171 N.J. 
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561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. Immigration & Naturalization 

Serv., 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).

The comment to Rule 2:5-3(d) clarifies that while free transcripts are 

unquestioned for indigents in criminal appeals, "[i]n the typical civil action, 

transcripts are not routinely provided without charge to indigents." Pressler & 

Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 4 on R. 2:5-3(d) (2019). Instead, in 

civil appeals, they are available only in very exceptional cases, which warrant 

that kind of public expenditure. See, e.g., In re Adoption of a Child by J.D.S., 

176 N.J. 154, 158-59 (2003) (holding that in a private adoption action requiring 

termination of natural parent's parental rights, an indigent natural parent is 

entitled to transcripts at the expense of the public to pursue appellate review); 

In re Guardianship of Dotson, 72 N.J. 112, 118-19 (1976) (permitting transcripts 

at public expense to indigent parents in custody and termination of parental 

rights cases); In re Civil Commitment of D.L., 351 N.J. Super. 77, 92 (App. Div. 

2002) (providing transcripts at public expense to indigent persons subject to 

civil commitment under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, N.J.S.A. 30:4-27.25, 

where "the right to counsel on appeal carries with it the concomitant right to all 

of the necessary expenses of representation, including the cost of transcripts. ").
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This case is not the type of exceptional civil case warranting public 

expenditure for transcripts. While we acknowledge plaintiff was previously 

granted a waiver of fees and costs pursuant to Rule 1:13-2(a), we also note that 

the crux of this dispute pertains to property presumably valued at over $1 million 

that plaintiff previously attempted to acquire. Thus, we discern no abuse of 

discretion in the court's denial of plaintiff's request for transcripts at public 

expense.

Affirmed.