alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL HARTSON FLETCHER,

Plaintiff

- Appellant,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendant

- Appellee. No. 17

- 35936

D.C. No. 6:15

- cv

- 00104

- DLC

MEMORANDUM *

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Montana

Dana L. Christensen, Chief Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 17, 2018 **

Before: WALLACE, SILVERMAN, and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Paul Hartson Fletcher appeals pro se from the district court’s summary

judgment in his Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) action alleging medical

malpractice. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo.

Hutchinson v. United States , 838 F.2d 390, 392 (9th C ir. 1988). We affirm.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36

- 3.

** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). 

# FILED

DEC 19 2018

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLER K

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS2 17

- 35936

The district court properly granted summary judgment because Fletcher

failed to adduce expert testimony and therefore failed to raise a genuine dispute of

material fact as to whether defendant committed medical malpractice. See Jac kson

v. United States , 881 F.2d 707, 712 (9th Cir. 1989) (substantive state law applies in

FTCA actions); Beehler v. E

. Radiological Assocs., P.C. , 289 P.3d 131, 136 (Mont.

2012) (setting forth elements of a negligence claim under Montana law and

declining to apply the “common knowledge” exception to the expert testimony

requirement ); Griffin v. Moseley , 234 P.3d 869, 875 (Mont. 2010) ( “[A] plaintiff

has the burden in a medical malpractice case of presenting evidence on the medical

standard of care ‘ by expert medical testimony unless the conduct complain ed of is

readily ascertainable by a layman. ’ ” (citation omitted) )

.

The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Fletcher’s motions

for appointment of counsel because Fletcher did not demonstrate any exceptional

circumstances. See Palmer v. Valdez , 560 F.3d 965, 970 (9th Cir. 2009) (setting

forth standard of review and “exceptional circumstances” requirement).

We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised a nd argued

in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright , 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

AFFIRMED.
#### Javier Morales et al., Respondents, v Federated Department Stores, Inc., et al., Defendants, and Ace Scaffolding, Appellant. (And Other Titles.)

[774 NYS2d 180]

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant Ace Scaffolding appeals, as limited by its brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Schmidt, J.), dated November 6, 2002, as denied those branches of its motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and § 241 (6) insofar as asserted against it.

Ordered that the order is reversed insofar as appealed from, on the law, with costs, those branches of the motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200, 240 (1), and § 241 (6) insofar as asserted against the appellant are granted, and those causes of action are dismissed insofar as asserted against the appellant.

The injured plaintiff, Javier Morales (hereinafter the plaintiff), an employee of the defendant APA Restoration Corp. (hereinafter APA), was injured when a parapet wall of a sidewalk bridge collapsed, causing his fall to the ground below. The defendant Ace Scaffolding (hereinafter Ace) erected the sidewalk bridge.

Ace was not an owner, general contractor, or statutory agent of either because it had no authority to supervise and control the plaintiffs work. Therefore, it bears no liability under Labor Law § 240 (1) or § 241 (6) (see *Russin v Picciano & Son,*54 NY2d 311, 318 [1981]; *Morris v Pepe,*283 AD2d 558, 559-560 [2001]; *cf. Kehoe v Segal,*272 AD2d 583, 584 [2000]).

Because Ace had no authority to supervise or control the work that caused the plaintiff’s injuries, it cannot be found liable under Labor Law § 200 either (see *Allen v Cloutier Constr. Corp.,*44 NY2d 290, 299 [1978]; *Sprague v Peckham Materials Corp.,**745240 AD2d 392, 394 [1997]; *Noah v 270 Lafayette Assoc.,*233 AD2d 108, 109 [1996]). Since Ace on its appeal does not address the plaintiffs’ claim to recover damages for common-law negligence *(see Kanney v Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,*245 AD2d 1034, 1036 [1997]), we do not decide whether a factual issue exists as to whether the accident was caused by a defect in the scaffold or its erection or whether it was caused by its misuse by the plaintiff or APA. Ritter, J.P., H. Miller, Crane and Cozier, JJ., concur.
```
<DOCUMENT>
<TYPE>EX-32.2
<SEQUENCE>4
<FILENAME>hybridexhbit321-033104.txt
<DESCRIPTION>CERTIFICATION OF CFO PER SECTION 906
<TEXT>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 32.2

                                  CERTIFICATION
                 Pursuant to 18 United States Code Section 1350

      The undersigned hereby certifies that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB
for the quarter ended March 31, 2004 of Hybrid Fuel Systems, Inc.(the "Company")
filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof fully
complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended, and that the information contained
in such report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.

                                            /s/  Mark Clancy
                                            ---------------------------------
                                                 Mark Clancy
                                                 Chief Financial Officer
                                                 October 29, 2004

A signed original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been
provided to Hybrid Fuel Systems, Inc. and will be retained by it and
furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.

</TEXT>
</DOCUMENT>
```
Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas

J U D G M E N T

Sherilyn Rose Angulo, Appellant

No. 06-20-00016-CR v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

Appeal from the 7th District Court of Smith 

County, Texas (Tr. Ct. No. 007-1547-18). 

Memorandum Opinion delivered by Justice 

Stevens, Chief Justice Morriss and Justice 

Burgess participating.

As stated in the Court’s opinion of this date, we find that the appellant’s appeal should be 

dismissed as moot. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

We note that the appellant, Sherilyn Rose Angulo, has adequately indicated her inability 

to pay costs of appeal. Therefore, we waive payment of costs.

RENDERED APRIL 16, 2020

BY ORDER OF THE COURT

JOSH R. MORRISS, III

CHIEF JUSTICE

ATTEST:

Debra K. Autrey, Clerk
Exhibit 10.2


 


Loan Agreement Summary


 


		1.	Lender and borrower:



Borrower: Weifang
Lakeland Safety Products Co., Ltd. (“WF”)


Lender: Bank of
China Anqui Branch (“BOC”)


 


		2.	The borrowing amounts limit: RMB 5 million, WF can select the borrowing amounts within RMB 5 million
(approximately USD $789,000).



 


		3.	Borrowing method: Trading financial, WF is using last year’s line of credit and mortgaged
the building property and land use which is valued at RMB 12,699,700 to the bank. The inventory evaluation fee was paid last year,
so there is no fee this year.



 


		4.	Interests: The annum interest rate is 7.0%. Monthly interest is RMB 29,167 which will be paid monthly.



 


		5.	Borrowing period: up to one year. The longest borrowing period is one year beginning October 10,
2015 and ending October 9, 2016.
#### People v Willis,

No. 90827;

Court of Appeals No. 114355.
##### 



Exhibit 32.01
 Certification of Chief Executive Officer
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, As Adopted Pursuant To
Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  (1)
    
    The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and(2)
    
    The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
material respects, the financial condition and result of operations of
the Company for the periods presented therein.
 Date: March 16, 2006
    /s/ Steve TiradoSteve TiradoPresident and Chief Executive Officer
(Principal Executive Officer)
# In the United States Court of Federal Claims

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19

- 1491 V

UNPUBLISHED

B RIAN OBE R SCHMID and HEATHER

OBERSC HMID , as parents and natural guard ians of minor child, J.O.

,

Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES,

Respondent. Chief Special Master Corcoran

Filed: February 18, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU) ;
Rul ing on Entitlement; Concession;
Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Guillain

- Barre Syndrome (GBS)

Kate Gera yne Westad, Si e benCarey, Minneapolis, MN , for petitioner.

Lau rie Wiesner

, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT 1

On September 26, 2019

, Brian and Heather Oberschmid filed a petition for compensation

, on behalf of their minor child, J.O., under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa

- 10, et seq

. , 2 (the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioner s allege that J. O. suffered Guillain

- Barré Syndrome (GBS) , which meets the Table
definition for GBS, afte r receiving the influenza vaccination on September 27, 2016

. Petit ion at 1, ¶¶ 1, 1 2

. T he case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the Office of Special Masters.

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the E

Government Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Managemen t and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to

the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to

redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such
material from public access.

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 19 86, Pub. L. No. 99

- 660, 100 Stat. 3755

. Hereinafter, for ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subpara graph of 42 U.S.C. §
300aa (2012 ).2

On February 13, 2020

, R espondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he

concedes that P etitioner s are entitled to compensa tion in this case. Respondent’s Rule 4(c) Report at 1. Specifically, R espondent concludes “ that petitioners have satisfied the

criteria set forth in the revised Vaccine Injury Table (Table) and the Qualifications and Aids to Interpretation (QAI), which afford petitioners a presumption of causation if the

onset of GBS occurs betwee n three and forty

- two days after a seasonal flu vaccination and there is no apparent alternative cause. ” Id. at 4 . Respondent further agrees that

“ based on the current record , petitioners have satisfied all legal prerequisites for compensation under the Act. ” Id.

In view of R espondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that

P etitioner is entitle d to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/ Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
# Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida Opinion filed April 20, 2022. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________ Nos. 3D21-0373 & 3D21-0668 Lower Tribunal No. 16-28602

________________ 

### Max Kraushaar, et al. , Appellants, vs. 

### Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. , 

### etc.,

Appellee. Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara Areces, Judge. Marrero, Chamizo, Marcer Law, LP, and Julio C. Marrero, for appellants. Lapin & Leichtling, LLP, and Justin G. Prociv, for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. PER CURIAM.2

Affirmed. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985); Person v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 201 So. 3d 842, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
Case: 1:17-cv-00783-WOB-KLL Doc #: 38 Filed: 07/18/19 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 236
IIB 

111TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 4425 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

FEBRUARY 23, 2010 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

AN ACT 

To designate the facility of the United States Postal Service 

located at 2–116th Street in North Troy, New York, 

as the ‘‘Martin G. ‘Marty’ Mahar Post Office’’. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
2 

HR 4425 RFS 

1 SECTION 1. MARTIN G. ‘‘MARTY’’ MAHAR POST OFFICE. 

2 (a) DESIGNATION.—The facility of the United States 

3 Postal Service located at 2–116th Street in North Troy, 

4 New York, shall be known and designated as the ‘‘Martin 

5 G. ‘Marty’ Mahar Post Office’’. 

6 (b) REFERENCES.—Any reference in a law, map, reg7 ulation, document, paper, or other record of the United 

8 States to the facility referred to in subsection (a) shall 

9 be deemed to be a reference to the ‘‘Martin G. ‘Marty’ 

10 Mahar Post Office’’. 

Passed the House of Representatives February 22, 

2010. 

Attest: LORRAINE C. MILLER, 

Clerk. 


hsrobinson on DSK69SOYB1PROD with BILLS
Third District Court of Appeal

State of Florida

Opinion filed April 20, 2022.

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

Nos. 3D21-0373 & 3D21-0668

Lower Tribunal No. 16-28602

________________

Max Kraushaar, et al.,

Appellants,

vs.

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., etc.,

Appellee.

Appeals from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Barbara 

Areces, Judge.

Marrero, Chamizo, Marcer Law, LP, and Julio C. Marrero, for 

appellants.

Lapin & Leichtling, LLP, and Justin G. Prociv, for appellee.

Before FERNANDEZ, C.J., and LINDSEY, and MILLER, JJ. 

PER CURIAM.
2

Affirmed. See Tillman v. State, 471 So. 2d 32, 35 (Fla. 1985); Person 

v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon Tr. Co., 201 So. 3d 842, 843 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
#### Ward *v.*Ward.

4-2650

Opinion delivered October 3, 1932.

*197*Harney M. McGehee,*for appellant.

*Pryor*& *Pryor,*for appellee.

Kirby, J.,

(after stating the facts). The right of sur-vivorship where the real property is held by the entirety has not been destroyed by our statute (Crawford & Moses ’ Digest, § 6232), and it has also been held that the character of such estate by the entirety is not changed by a divorce of the parties. *Raulston*v. *Hall,*66 Ark. 305, 50 S. W. 690; 74 Am. St. Rep. 97; *Davies*v. *Johnson,*124 Ark. 390, 187 S. W. 323; *Woodall*v. *Woodall,*144 Ark. 159, 221 S. W. 463; and *Heinrich*v. *Heinrich,*177 Ark. 250, 6 S. W. (2d) 21.

*198It is doubtless true, as appellant insists, that this holding is the minority rule, a great majority of the cases holding that the effect of a divorce of the parties is to sever an estate by the entirety and render the parties tenants in common, bnt onr holding has been consistently that a divorce has no such effect, our last case being *Heinrich*v. *Heinrich, supra.*As the court could have granted no greater relief, we do not consider it necessary to change our ruling here.

This being true, we do not find it necessary, in view of this holding, there being no cross-appeal, to determine what effect should have been given to the alleged agreement of a division of the property claimed to have been made by appellant and denied by appellee, since both admit that there was no separation of the parties in contemplation at the time of its being made, if it was made.

We find no error in the record, and the decree is accordingly affirmed.

Mehaffy, J., concurs.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

NELSON OSEMWENGIE,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 13-15700

D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01024-MMD

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Nevada

Miranda M. Du, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 13, 2014

** 

Before: CLIFTON, BEA, and WATFORD, Circuit Judges.

Federal prisoner Nelson Osemwengie appeals pro se from the district court’s

order denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence.

We have jurisdiction under § 2253. We review de novo a district court’s denial of a

FILED

MAY 22 2014

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

 * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

 ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision

without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
section 2255 motion, see United States v. Manzo, 675 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2012),

and we affirm.

Osemwengie contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him

adequately during plea negotiations. This contention fails because Osemwengie has

not shown a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s conduct, he would have

received a shorter sentence. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984);

see also Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (to establish prejudice where a

plea offer has been rejected because of counsel’s deficient performance, defendant

must show “a reasonable probability that the end result of the criminal process would

have been more favorable by reason of a plea to a lesser charge or a sentence of less

prison time”).

Osemwengie also contends that his counsel was ineffective for failing to request

credit toward his sentence for the time he spent in pretrial detention. This contention

is unpersuasive. Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), a defendant is not entitled to credit for

time served in pretrial detention if that time has been credited against another sentence.

Moreover, the terms of Osemwengie’s plea agreement prohibited him from seeking

any downward departure or variance from the Guideline range. Accordingly,

Osemwengie has not established either deficient performance or prejudice. Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687.

AFFIRMED.

2 13-15700
----

Exhibit 32.1

**CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO****13 U.S.C. SECTION 1350, AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO****SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002**

In connection with the quarterly report of WiFiMed Holdings Company, Inc. (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Gregory D. Vacca, Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 13 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

1.         The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

2.         The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.

Date: November 14, 2008

| /s/ Gregory D. Vacca                              |
|---------------------------------------------------|
|                                                   |
| Gregory D. Vacca          Chief Executive Officer |
```

[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 33 (Friday, February 17, 2012)]
[Notices]
[Page 9631]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-3857]

=======================================================================
-----------------------------------------------------------------------

CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION

Sunshine Act Meeting

TIME AND DATE: Wednesday, February 22, 2012, 10 a.m.-12 p.m.

PLACE: Hearing Room 420, Bethesda Towers, 4330 East West Highway, 
Bethesda, Maryland.

STATUS: Commission Meeting--Open to the Public.

Matter To Be Considered: Decisional Matter: Bed Rails--Final Rule.
    A live webcast of the Meeting can be viewed at www.cpsc.gov/webcast.
    For a recorded message containing the latest agenda information, 
call (301) 504-7948.

CONTACT PERSON FOR MORE INFORMATION: Todd A. Stevenson, Office of the 
Secretary, U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 4330 East West 
Highway, Bethesda, MD 20814, (301) 504-7923.

    Dated: February 14, 2012.
Todd A. Stevenson,
Secretary.
[FR Doc. 2012-3857 Filed 2-15-12; 11:15 am]
BILLING CODE 6355-01-P
```
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-6866

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JAMELL MASON, a/k/a JAH, a/k/a Tremaine Mason,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern 

District of West Virginia, at Martinsburg. John Preston Bailey, 

District Judge. (3:09-cr-00087-JPB-JES-6; 3:16-cv-00044-JPBRWT)

Submitted: October 18, 2016 Decided: October 21, 2016

Before WILKINSON, KING, and FLOYD, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Jamell Mason, Appellant Pro Se. Shawn Michael Adkins, Paul 

Thomas Camilletti, Erin K. Reisenweber, Assistant United States 

Attorneys, Anna Zartler Krasinski, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES 

ATTORNEY, Martinsburg, West Virginia; Jarod James Douglas, David

J. Perri, Assistant United States Attorneys, Wheeling, West 

Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Jamell Mason appeals the district court’s order accepting 

the recommendation of the magistrate judge and dismissing his 28 

U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) motion as successive and unauthorized. We 

have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. 

Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district 

court. United States v. Mason, Nos. 3:09-cr-00087-JPB-JES-6; 

3:16-cv-00044-JPB-RWT (N.D. W. Va. June 20, 2016). We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED