UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-4880

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL GLENN FULLER,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:08-cr-00599-CCB-1)

Submitted: June 17, 2011 Decided: June 28, 2011

Before SHEDD, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gary E. Proctor, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. PROCTOR, LLC, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States 

Attorney, Clinton J. Fuchs, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Michael Glenn Fuller appeals his conviction for 

possessing a firearm after a felony conviction, in violation of 

18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006). On appeal, Fuller argues that the 

district court erred by excluding as irrelevant evidence of his 

intoxication and by instructing the jury that voluntary 

intoxication is not a defense to a § 922(g)(1) offense. He also 

asserts that the firearm’s manufacture in another state did not 

establish a sufficient interstate commerce nexus. We affirm.

Fuller first asserts that the district court erred by 

excluding as irrelevant expert testimony regarding intoxication 

because such testimony would have rebutted the knowing element 

of the offense. Federal courts have recognized that possession 

of a firearm after a felony conviction is a general intent 

crime. See, e.g., United States v. Moran, 503 F.3d 1135, 1144 

n.6 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Brown, 367 F.3d 549, 556 

(6th Cir. 2004). Because voluntary intoxication is a defense 

only to specific intent crimes, courts agree that the defense 

does not apply to the general intent crime in § 922(g)(1). 

United States v. Williams, 403 F.3d 1188, 1194 (10th Cir. 2005) 

(citing cases). 

Our review of the record leads us to conclude that the 

proposed testimony from the defense expert regarding the effect 

of intoxication on a defendant’s mental state was not relevant 
3

to whether Fuller knowingly possessed the firearm.1

Next, Fuller claims that the district court’s 

instruction regarding the unavailability of a voluntary 

intoxication defense to a § 922(g)(1) offense was not a correct 

statement of the law.

 See Fed. R. 

Evid. 401 (defining relevant evidence). Thus, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion by excluding that testimony. 

See Fed. R. Evid. 402 (“Evidence which is not relevant is not 

admissible.”); United States v. Myers, 589 F.3d 117, 123 (4th 

Cir. 2010) (stating standard of review).

2

A refusal to give a requested theory of defense 

instructions is reversible error only if the 

instruction (1) was correct, (2) was not substantially 

covered by the court’s charge to the jury, and (3) 

dealt with some point in the trial so important that 

the failure to give the requested instruction 

seriously impaired the defendant’s ability to conduct 

his defense.

 1 Although Fuller claims that his extreme intoxication could 

render physical possession unknowing so that a defense could 

exist “if the defendant were comatose and the evidence indicated 

someone dropped the gun in his lap,” United States v. Reed, 991 

F.2d 399, 401 (7th Cir. 1993), the facts of his case do not fall 

within that limited exception. 

2 Fuller notes that one circuit court has held that proof of

constructive possession requires specific intent. See United 

States v. Newsom, 452 F.3d 593, 606 (6th Cir. 2006). However, 

no other circuit has adopted that approach. United States v. 

King, 632 F.3d 646, 654 n.7 (10th Cir. 2011); see United States 

v. Scott, 424 F.3d 431, 435 (4th Cir. 2005) (stating that there 

is no “distinction between actual and constructive possession 

insofar as the intent requirement is concerned”).
4

United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 378 (4th Cir.), cert. 

denied, 131 S. Ct. 271 (2010) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Because voluntary intoxication is no defense to 

knowing possession of a firearm, Fuller’s proposed voluntary 

intoxication instruction was not a correct statement of the law. 

We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in refusing to give the requested instruction. See

id. at 377 (stating standard of review).

Finally, Fuller asserts that, absent additional 

evidence, the fact that the firearm had traveled in interstate 

commerce at some point did not establish a sufficient nexus, 

rendering the evidence insufficient on that element of the 

offense. Fuller’s counsel admits, however, that this claim is 

foreclosed by circuit precedent. See United States v. 

Gallimore, 247 F.3d 134, 138 (4th Cir. 2001).

 Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the 

court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED