#### *Lewis Moultrie vs. Robert Jennings.*

It is now the settled law of the land, that a voluntary conveyance of a personal chattel, is good against a subsequent purchaser with notice, where there is no fraud in die gift.

2. The Act of die Legislature passed in 1832, on the subject of parol gifts, was never intended to do more than prescribe a rule to govern future cases. Its application could not extend to gifts created before its passage.

*Before*O’Neall, J. *at*Edgefield, *Spring Term,*1837.

This was an action of Trover, to recover the value of a negro woman, Jinsey, and her two children.

The right of the plaintiff to recover, depended upon a parol gift. The plaintiff was the youngest son of Lewis Moultrie, (deed.) who was the stepson of Ebenezer Hill, who had no children. It was proved that Mr. Hill was much attached to his stepson. When the plaintiff was quite an infant, not more than 2 or 3 years old, in the year 1817, he was left with his grandmother and grand-step-father for a short time. On his mother’s coming for him, Mr. Hill asked her, after some time, if Lewis had told her that he had given him a negro'l She said, no. He said he had given one to her daughter, Sally, who was named after his wife, and that he had also given Jinsey to Lewis, who was named after his father, who had helped him to work for his property, and that he intended to make the other children of Lewis Moultrie (deed.) equal to these two, by will. In the frequent visits of the plaintiff and his mother to Mr. and Mrs. Hill, Mr. Hill would tell the plaintiff’s mother that *“*Lewis’s negro outgrew Sally’s,” and on some of these occasions he would make Lewis bring in the negro child, Jinsey, to show her to his mother. To other witnesses, from 1823 to 1825, he said that he *“ had*given” the negro, Jinsey, to Lewis Moultrie, the plaintiff; and it was always understoodby one of the witnesses, that she belonged to the plaintiff. Subsequent to these declarations of Mr. Hill, on the 20th of Jan. 1829, he sold the negro, Jinsey, to the defendant; but according to the testimony of Seaton Moultrie, when the defendant first proposed to buy Jinsey, Mr. Hill told him he had giveu her to the plaintiff On the day on which the defendant bought Jinsey, a will .by which Hill had bequeathed her to the plaintiff, was burned; and after it was burned in his presence, the defendant asked if there was any thing else against the negro, beyond Lewis Moultrie’s claim.

*509There was no other evidence in the cause which is necessary to be reported.

The defendant rested his defence upon the grounds, 1st, that there was no parol gift. 2. If there was, that he was a purchaser, for valuable consideration, without notice. 3. If he had notice, still as a purchaser for valuable consideration, his title was good against the plaintiff, a mere volunteer. 4th. That the Act of 1832 made the gift void. On the first ground the presiding Judge thus instructed the *jury,*— “ That to make a good and legal gift, there must be a delivery, or that which is equivalent. *(Fulford vs.*Lamar, *last July Session.')*I told them that a delivery might be presumed from the words “had given.”' That it was a mere question of fact, on which they had the right to decide. On the 2d and 3d, I said to the jury, that if the defendant was a purchaser for váluable consideration, without notice, that his title was in law to be preferred to that of the plaintiff. But if they were satisfied that he had notice of the plaintiff’s claim, then that his title would be defeated by the previous gift. On the 4th, I said to the jury, that the Act of 1832 must have a prospective operation and effect; that it could not defeat the plaintiff’s title, which was perfect before its passage. The jury found for the plaintiff $1500, and I was entirely satisfied of the correctness of the verdict.

The defendant appeals.*

*

**No grounds of appeal appear ever to have been filed with the record of this case; of course none can be given here. The grounds of appeal may be anticipated, however, from the report and the opinion of the *court.*— Rep.

*Curia, per*

Evans, J.

Upon the first and third grounds, it is sufficient to say, that they were facts which the jury have decided to the satisfaction of both the presiding Judge and of this court. In relation to the 2d ground, I think it unnecessary to say more than that since the case of *Hudnal vs.*Wilder, 4 McC. 305, it has been considered as the settled law, that a voluntary conveyance is good against a subsequent purchaser, with notice. Such conveyances have been set aside in favour of subsequent purchasers and creditors, on the ground of fraud; but it would be absurd to say that a purchaser was defrauded by what he had notice of, at the time he paid his money. The 4th and last ground *510insists that the Act of 1832, on the subject of parol gifts, is a legislative interpretation of the law on that subject, and should govern the case, although the gift was made many years before the passage of the Act. How far the power of the Legislative Department of this government can interfere with vested rights by declaratory laws, is a grave question, but one which will be decided promptly whenever it arises. We think it very clear that that part of the Act which relates to this case, was never intended to do more than to prescribe a rule to govern future cases; and it would be as improper as it is unnecessary to express any opinion on the subject. The motion for a new trial is refused.

Bauskett & Wardlaw, for the motion.

Griffin & Pope, contra.

Gantt, Earle, Richardson and Butler, JJ. concurred.