J-S35001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.N.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 739 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Decree Entered January 31, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-AP-0000517-2018

IN THE INTEREST OF: H.N.S., A 

MINOR

APPEAL OF: A.S., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 740 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Order Entered January 31, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Juvenile Division at 

No(s): CP-51-DP-0002909-2015

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: Filed: September 10, 2020

A.S. (“Father”), files these consolidated appeals from the decree entered 

on January 31, 2020, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, 

granting the petition of the Philadelphia Department of Human Services 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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(“DHS”) to involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his minor daughter, 

H.N.S., born in October 2011, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 

2511(a)(1), (2), and (b).

1

 Father further appeals from the order dated and 

entered on January 31, 2020 changing H.N.S.’s permanent placement goal to 

adoption pursuant to the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6351.

2

 After review, we 

affirm.

The trial court summarized the procedural and factual history as follows:

[H.N.S.] has been in care continuously for approximately four 

years. DHS initially became involved with this family after two 

CPS [(“Child Protective Services”)] reports were received alleging 

[H.N.S.] was the victim of sexual and emotional abuse, medical 

abuse, neglect and had both an infected dog bite and scabies.[3]

The reports were determined to be valid. On December 10, 2015,

[H.N.S.] was adjudicated dependent and committed to DHS 

because [H.N.S.] was “without proper care or control, 

subsistence, [or] education as required by law or other care or 

control necessary for his physical, mental, or emotional health, or 

____________________________________________

1 By separate decree entered September 9, 2019, the trial court voluntarily 

terminated the parental rights of C.H., Mother (“Mother”), and terminated the 

parental rights of any unknown father. Neither Mother nor any unknown 

father filed a separate appeal or participated in the instant appeals. 

2 Father waived his challenge to the goal change for failure to raise the issue 

in the statement of questions involved section of his brief or address the issue 

in the argument section of his brief. See In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3 

(Pa.Super. 2011) (quoting In re A.C., 991 A.2d 884, 897 (Pa.Super. 2010)) 

(“[W]here an appellate brief fails to provide any discussion of a claim with 

citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the issue in any other 

meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is waived.”). Nevertheless, 

even if Father had properly preserved this issue for review we would find that 

it lacked merit for the reasons discussed with respect to termination of 

parental rights.

3 H.N.S. was in the care of her maternal grandparents at the time. N.T., 

1/31/20, at 10.
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morals.” Based on those concerns, Beverly Leff, the Community 

Umbrella Agency (“CUA”) case manager, testified that her agency 

established single case plan objectives for Father.

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/20, at 1-2 (citations to record omitted).

Throughout the next two years, the trial court conducted regular 

permanency review hearings, maintaining H.N.S.’s placement and permanent 

placement goal. On June 21, 2018, DHS filed petitions to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), 

and (b), and to change the permanency goal to adoption. After several

continuances, the trial court held a combined termination and goal change 

hearing on January 31, 2020. Father was present and represented by counsel. 

H.N.S. was represented by a guardian ad litem as well as counsel, referred to 

on the record as a child advocate.

4

 DHS presented the testimony of Beverly 

Leff, CUA case manager, Catholic Community Services. Child Advocate 

presented the expert testimony of Roya Paller, the forensic social worker, who 

assessed H.N.S.’s understanding of and wishes regarding adoption, 

attachment to her foster parent, and the impact of the termination of parental 

rights. Father testified on his own behalf.

By decree dated and entered January 31, 2020, the trial court 

involuntarily terminated the parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.

§ 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). Thereafter, on February 28, 2020, Father, through 

____________________________________________

4 The guardian ad litem and the child advocate voiced their support for the 

termination of Father’s parental rights as promoting the best interests and 

legal interest of H.N.S., respectively. N.T., 1/31/20, at 83-87. Both filed 

briefs in this Court reiterating their support.
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appointed counsel, filed timely notices of appeal, along with concise 

statements of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). On April 2, 2020, this Court, sua sponte, consolidated 

Father’s appeals.

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by terminating the parental 

rights of . . . Father, under 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 subsections (a)(1) 

and (a)(2)?

2. Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt erred by finding, under 23 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2511(b), that termination of [Father’s] parental rights best 

serves [H.N.S.’s] developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare?

Father’s brief at 4 (suggested answers omitted).

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases 

requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of fact and 

credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported 

by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts 

review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or 

abused its discretion.” Id. “[A] decision may be reversed for an 

abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The 

trial court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely 

because the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 

2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all 
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credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G. 

& J.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of T.B.B.,

835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by § 2511 of the Adoption 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, and requires a bifurcated analysis of the 

grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of the child.

Our case law has made clear that under [§] 2511, the court must 

engage in a bifurcated process prior to terminating parental rights. 

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence 

that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for 

termination delineated in [§] 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his 

or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to [§] 2511(b): determination of the needs 

and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the 

child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis 

concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between 

parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child 

of permanently severing any such bond. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We have 

defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).
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In the case sub judice, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), and (b). As we need only agree 

with the trial court as to any one subsection of § 2511(a), as well as § 2511(b),

we analyze the court’s termination decree pursuant to § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). 

The pertinent provisions which provide as follows:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental wellbeing and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, 

abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be 

remedied by the parent.

. . . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), and (b).

With regard to termination of parental rights pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), 

we have indicated:

In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 
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such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot 

be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those 

grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental 

duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 2002)). “Parents are 

required to make diligent efforts towards the reasonably prompt assumption 

of full parental responsibilities. . . . [A] parent’s vow to cooperate, after a 

long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of 

services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.” In re 

A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

In the case at bar, at the conclusion of the relevant hearing, in 

terminating Father’s parental rights, the trial court stated, in part:

. . . I gave you two visits a week. You’ve seen her a total of five 

times. We gave you a list of things to do. And it wasn’t hard. 

You know, I started looking at -- going back in my notes. And the 

truth is, is that we were happy you were around when this case 

came in.

The issue was, you hadn’t been in her life, and you had to 

make up for that. And you had to do that then. But you did 

nothing. You did nothing. Haven’t completed parenting. Don’t 

have housing. Didn’t give -- engage in drug and alcohol or mental 

health. Didn’t visit, which is probably the biggest thing.

N.T., 1/31/20, at 90.
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Further, in finding grounds for termination of Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to § 2511(a)(2), the court reasoned: 

Applying [M.E.P.] and the elements set forth under 

2511(a)(2) to the instant case, DHS met its burden of 

demonstrating that termination was proper. The evidence 

established that “incapacity” and “refusal” under 2511(a)(2) 

existed given that Father failed to demonstrate a concrete desire 

or ability to care for [H.N.S.]. Father failed to cooperate with the 

services provided by CUA, including drug and alcohol treatment, 

mental health treatment, parenting classes, and visitation. Father 

also failed to obtain stable housing throughout this case and did 

not have housing at the TPR [(“termination of parental rights”)]

hearing. The testimony demonstrated that, because of Father's 

lack of presence in [H.N.S.’s] life and [H.N.S.’s] significant 

emotional and behavioral needs, parenting classes and visitation 

were essential to reunification. However, Father failed to reengage in parenting classes or complete a PCE [(“parenting 

capacity evaluation”)] despite Ms. Leff’s testimony that she 

referred him to classes in Pittsburgh. Additionally, Father failed 

to maintain contact with [H.N.S.] or visit her for more than five

hours total over approximately three years. This [c]ourt found 

that Father’s failure to comply with CUA and consistently visit 

[H.N.S.] has left [H.N.S.] without essential parental care, and the 

cause of such neglect, refusal, and continued incapacity will not 

be remedied by Father. Based on the foregoing, this [c]ourt found 

that competent evidence existed to justify the termination of 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to [§] 2511(a)(2).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/20, at 9 (citations to record omitted).

Father argues that he does not have “an incapacity that would prevent 

him from parenting his [c]hild.” Father’s brief at 13. While admitting to a 

lack of appropriate housing, Father asserts that he completed a mental health 

evaluation, as well as drug screenings and drug treatment. Id. He further 

completed anger management and financial planning classes. Id. He 

indicates that he is employed, and, although he completed “most” of a 
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parenting course, he was unable to finish the course “due to obstacles beyond 

his control,” maintaining that “his employer would not give him time off to 

complete his single case plan objectives.” Id. Finally, Father argues that he 

has attended visitation “regularly” since transportation has been provided by 

CUA. Id.

The certified record supports the trial court’s finding of grounds for 

termination under § 2511(a)(2) and reveals that Father failed to complete his

single case plan objectives aimed at reunification with H.N.S. CUA case 

manager, Barbara Leff, recounted that Father’s single case plan objectives 

included: a Behavioral Health Services (“BHS”) evaluation and parenting

classes, mental health treatment, drug and alcohol treatment, anger 

management programs, visitation, and housing. N.T., 1/31/20, at 12-13. Ms. 

Leff testified that Father was aware of these objectives and the fact that they 

needed to be completed in order to achieve reunification with H.N.S. Id. at 

11. Father’s compliance with these objectives was described as “no 

compliance” at the most recent permanency review hearing on September 9, 

2019. Permanency Review Order, 9/9/19. While acknowledging Father’s 

completion of anger management and financial counseling courses, Ms. Leff 

stated that Father admitted to continuing financial difficulties and failed to 

complete his other objectives. N.T., 1/31/20, at 23-24, 45, 47-48. 
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Significantly, from 2017 to 2020, Father attended only five supervised 

visitations with H.N.S. for a total of approximately four to five hours.

5

 Id. at 

12-15, 73-74. Further, despite referrals, Father never obtained appropriate 

housing. Id. at 24-25, 40-42, 60. Ms. Leff stated, “As of yesterday, he told 

me that he doesn’t have a place to live right now.” Id. at 24. When

questioned, Father admitted that he lacked appropriate housing. Id. at 60. 

Moreover, acknowledging financial difficulties, Father conceded that, while in 

Pittsburgh, he did not contact the CUA for any assistance with the housing

component. Id. at 62-63.

Likewise, Father failed to complete and/or offer proof of completion of 

mental health and drug and alcohol treatment; failed to provide verification of 

completion of parenting classes;

6 and failed to complete a healthy 

relationships program. Id. at 19, 20-23, 43-47. Notably, as to mental health 

treatment, Ms. Leff stated that Father had not engaged in such treatment,

despite recommendation by BHS, nor had he provided verification that he did 

not require such treatment. Id. at 20-21. Rather, she explained, “He has 

____________________________________________

5 As reported by Ms. Leff, aside from the lack of visitation, Father likewise did 

not maintain contact with H.N.S. during this time. Id. at 16. In addition, 

Father did not have contact with H.N.S. between her birth and the adjudication 

in 2015. Id. at 11. 

6 Father testified that he was enrolled in parenting classes at the ARC, but was 

unable to complete the program due to his employment. Id. at 69-72. Ms. 

Leff stated that in 2019 she referred Father for additional parenting classes in 

Pittsburgh, which were not completed. Id. at 19, 22-23, 46-47.
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stated to me that he doesn't have any mental health issues.” Id. at 20. Ms. 

Leff further indicated that Father declined drug and alcohol treatment through 

the ARC.

7 Id. at 22. She also testified that Father did not complete a 

parenting capacity evaluation (“PCE”).

8

 Id. at 18, 20, 44-45. 

Father conceded that he was aware of these objectives and failed to 

complete them. Id. at 74.

MR. MARTIN: Okay. So, you have a list of objectives. And you’re 

actually acknowledging on the record that you knew that you had 

these objectives all the way back to 2016. Is that right?

THE FATHER: Yes.

MR. MARTIN: And you’re admitting to the [c]ourt that you 

haven't completed them. Is that right?

THE FATHER: Yes.

Id.

As a result, Ms. Leff opined that Father was not ready to be reunified 

with H.N.S. and was not any closer to reunification than when H.N.S. was 

____________________________________________

7 Father, however, noted that he went for drug and alcohol treatment through 

the ARC, but did not remember the name of the company he treated with, the 

name of his therapist, or the number of sessions attended, and did not receive 

a certificate of completion. Id. at 67-68.

8 We observe that, despite testimony as to the lack of completion of a PCE, 

there is the suggestion at the beginning of the proceeding that a PCE was 

recently completed. Id. at 5-6. (“Okay. At the last court date, a -- Father 

was ordered for a PCE. We have the results of that PCE. Despite the fact that 

we have the results -- well, I'm passing out a copy of that evaluation. . . . “ 

Id.). It is unclear if this was instead a mental health evaluation. A copy of 

any such evaluation was not admitted as evidence and is not included as part 

of the certified record. Accordingly, we do not consider it as evidence in favor 

of termination. 
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adjudicated dependent. Id. at 18, 33-34. Given Father’s lack of visitation 

and contact, Ms. Leff did not even support unsupervised contact. Id. at 18. 

Critically, she indicated that Father was unable to meet H.N.S.’s daily needs9

and lacked the parental capacity to appropriately care for H.N.S. Id. at 17-

20. Ms. Leff testified:

MR. JOYCE: Ms. Leff, do you have concerns based on your 

interaction with Father about his capacity to parent [H.N.S.]?

MS LEFF: Yes, I do.

MR. JOYCE: What are those concerns?

MS LEFF: He cannot -- he doesn't know how to relate to his child. 

He has admitted to me he has financial problems. He has 

admitted to me that he has -- does not have suitable housing. 

I've asked him to provide pay stubs. He provided from July of 

2019 to September. I asked -- of 2019. And I asked him for 

more. He did not reply. I've asked him to complete parenting 

classes again and also sent him where he could go in Pittsburgh 

since that's where he lives. And he never did it.

. . . .

MR. JOYCE: Do you think Father's capable of taking care of 

himself?

MS LEFF: No.

MR. JOYCE: Do you -- does that give rise to any concerns about 

his ability to care for a special needs child, like [H.N.S.]?

MS LEFF: Yes.

Id. at 19-20. 

____________________________________________

9 Ms. Leff indicated that H.N.S. has emotional, behavioral, and educational 

needs. Id. at 17.
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Hence, the record substantiates the conclusion that Father’s repeated 

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused H.N.S. to be 

without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for her physical 

and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., supra at 1272. 

Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. Therefore, we do 

not disturb the trial court’s findings.

Next, we address whether termination was proper under § 2511(b). As 

to § 2511(b), our Supreme Court has stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a 

court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. 

§ 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child have 

been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as love, 

comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781, 791 

(Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], 

this Court held that the determination of the child’s “needs and 

welfare” requires consideration of the emotional bonds between 

the parent and child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to 

discerning the effect on the child of permanently severing the 

parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as 

discussed below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., supra at 267. “In cases where there is no evidence of any bond 

between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists. 

The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the 

circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 

(Pa.Super. 2008) (citation omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “[T]he court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 
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well. Additionally, § 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding evaluation.” 

In re Z.P., supra at 1121 (internal citations omitted). 

Moreover, 

While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major 

aspect of the [§] 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless 

only one of many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can 

equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and 

should also consider the intangibles, such as the love, 

comfort, security, and stability the child might have 

with the foster parent. . . . 

In re Adoption of C.D.R., supra at 1219 (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa.Super. 2011)) (quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In finding that H.N.S.’s emotional needs and welfare favor termination 

pursuant to § 2511(b), the trial court reasoned as follows:

In the instant matter, this [c]ourt determined that [H.N.S.]

would not suffer irreparable emotional harm if Father’s parental 

rights were terminated. The testimony demonstrated that 

[H.N.S.’s] primary bond is with the foster parent and that the 

foster parents meet [H.N.S.’s] daily medical, general and 

therapeutic needs. Although [H.N.S.] expressed a willingness to 

speak with Father occasionally, she clearly expressed her desire 

to be adopted by her foster parents. Notably, there was credible 

testimony that [H.N.S.] was aware of Father’s instability, 

especially with visitation, and wanted the stability of adoption. 

There was testimony that [H.N.S.] is very bonded with her foster 

mother, father and brother and enjoys her primary parent-child 

relationship with her foster mother. Most significantly, Father has 

had very little contact with [H.N.S.] throughout her entire life. 

Father acknowledges that he did not see [H.N.S.] between her 

birth and adjudication and then for only . . . approximately five 

hours between 2017-2020. Additionally, in determining that 

termination would best serve the needs and welfare of [H.N.S.], 
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this [c]ourt considered that Father had not been able to meet 

[H.N.S.’s] emotional, physical, and developmental needs for 

almost four years prior to the TPR hearings. Ms. Leff characterized 

the relationship between Father and [H.N.S.] as “childlike” and 

expressed her concerns that Father could adequately parent 

[H.N.S.] with her special needs. Additionally, Father’s 

acknowledged financial issues and lack of housing remained 

barriers to reunification and prevented [H.N.S.’s] permanency. 

For the foregoing reasons, this [c]ourt properly granted DHS’s 

petition to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of Father 

pursuant to [§] 2511(b).

Trial Court Opinion, 4/24/20, at 10-11 (citations to record omitted) (footnote 

omitted).

Father argues that he was not given the opportunity to establish a 

relationship with H.N.S. through appropriate visitation. Father’s brief at 15. 

He points to the fact that he has attended visitation regularly since the court 

ordered CUA to provide transportation. Id. He further offers that evidence 

was presented that H.N.S. would like to continue to have contact with Father. 

Id. Father challenges that termination of parental rights would meet H.N.S.’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare and asserts that, 

if he had another chance, he could be “the [f]ather [H.N.S.] needs him to be.” 

Id. at 15-16.

We disagree. Contrary to Father’s protestations and empty promises, 

the certified record supports the trial court’s finding that H.N.S.’s

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare favor termination 

of Father’s parental rights pursuant to § 2511(b). While Father professes to 

love H.N.S., a parent’s own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone, 

will not preclude termination of parental rights. In re Z.P., supra at 1121. 
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At the time of the hearing, H.N.S. had been in placement for approximately

four years, and is entitled to permanency and stability. A child’s life “simply 

cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to 

handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. 

Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decree 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and 

(b).

Decree and order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/10/20