HOUSTON BYRD, JR., 

Plaintiff, 

 v. 

JUDGE W. SCOTT GWIN, 

 Defendant. 

 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 

Complaint. Defendant argues that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear this action 

and it should therefore be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Defendant also argues 

that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted by this Court, and thus the 

action should be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. All claims by Plaintiff Byrd are DISMISSED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed a civil case in Licking County, Ohio and appealed the matter to the Fifth 

District Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff initiated the instant action on October 12, 

2017, complaining that the Fifth District did not follow applicable rules and law when ruling on 

his appeal.1

 (Id. at 8-9). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that the state trial court’s entries were 

“against the manifest weight of the evidence up for view and law.” (Id. at 3). Continuing, 

Plaintiff alleges “fraud upon the court” consisting of “fraud perpetrated by officers of the 

court...” (Id. at 4) (quoting Kenner v. C.I.R., 387 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 1968) (internal quotations 

 

1

 The docket refers to ECF No. 1 as a “motion to remand” and Defendant refers to it as “complaint.” This Court 

understands them to be the same document and will refer to ECF No. 1 as the “Complaint” throughout the Order. 

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION

:

:

:

:

:

Case No. 2:17-cv-981 

JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

Magistrate Judge Deavers 
omitted). Plaintiff moves this Court to, “[r]emand this matter back to the Appellate Court.” (Id. 

at 9). As a basis for his Complaint, Plaintiff offers the vague claim that the Fifth District Court 

of Appeals violated his constitutional rights and due process of law. (Id. at 3, 9). Plaintiff does 

not specifically explain how or why the Fifth District Court of Appeals violated his rights, 

instead only making the legal assertion that his rights were indeed violated. 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 provides, in relevant part, that: 

(b) Every defense to a claim for relief must be asserted in the responsive pleading if one 

is required. But a party may assert the following defenses by motion: 

 (1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). As noted by this Court, “[f]ederal courts are of limited jurisdiction; 

they are empowered to hear only those cases which are within the judicial power of the United 

States as defined in the United States Constitution and as further granted to them by Act of 

Congress.” Mullins v. Pennymac Loan Services, LLC, No. 3:16-cv-137, 2016 WL 6080286, at 

*1 (S. D. Ohio Oct. 18, 2016). Continuing, this Court explained that, “there is a presumption 

that a federal court lacks jurisdiction until it has been demonstrated.” Id. Notably, the plaintiff 

bears the burden of demonstrating that a court has subject-matter jurisdiction. RMI Titanium Co. 

v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 78 F.3d 1125, 1134 (6th Cir. 1996). Thus, in order to defeat 

Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), Plaintiff must demonstrate that 

this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. 

III. ANALYSIS 

Defendant argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars jurisdiction here. (ECF No. 3 at 

2). Functionally, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine serves as a bar that disallows federal District and 

Circuit Courts from conducting appellate review of state court judgments. The Rooker-Feldman
jurisdictional bar finds its roots in two cases that interpret 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See District of 

Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 

U.S. 413 (1923). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, “is based on the negative inference that if 

appellate court review of such state judgments is vested in the Supreme Court [per § 1257(a)], 

then it follows that such review may not be had in the lower federal courts.” Lawrence v. Welch, 

531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008). Thus, if a state court judgment is the source of injury upon 

which a plaintiff bases his/her federal claim in federal courts other than the Supreme Court of the 

United States, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine applies, barring the claim for lack of subject-matter 

jurisdiction. McCormick v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394 (6th Cir. 2006). 

In the present case, Plaintiff asks this Court to conduct appellate review of a state court 

decision. Due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, this Court is unable to do so. The alleged source 

of the injury to Plaintiff is the state appellate court’s “failure to perform” which led to decisions 

adverse to Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1 at 1, 9). As Defendants point out, the Sixth Circuit Court in 

Durham v. Haslam reinforced a fundamental tenet of the federalist system in writing, “federal 

appellate jurisdiction over a state court decision lies exclusively with the Supreme Court, and not 

lower federal courts.” 528 F. App’x 559, 563 (6th Cir. 2013). Thus, the only federal court that 

has any jurisdiction over state court decisions is the Supreme Court of the United States, and not 

the United States Circuit Courts or United States District Courts. This Court, the United States 

District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Indeed, 

Plaintiff offers no explanation as to why this Court has jurisdiction in this matter, and thus does 

not meet the burden established by RMI Titanium Co., which requires that the plaintiff must 

prove that the court in question has subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, this Court 
GRANTS Defendant’s Motion Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and need not reach 

Defendant’s 12(b)(6) arguments. 

IV. CONCLUSION 

Because Plaintiff has not demonstrated that this Court has the power to hear this case, the 

Court is obligated to dismiss the Complaint in its entirety. Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (ECF 

No. 3) is hereby GRANTED. This case is hereby DISMISSED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

 /s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

Dated: June 25, 2018