The Honorable Fernando J. Gaitan, Jr., United States District 1

Judge for the Western District of Missouri.

___________

No. 96-2791

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Patricia L. Crawford, *

 *

Appellant, *

 *

v. * Appeal from the United States

 * District Court for the

Shirley S. Chater, Commissioner * Western District of Missouri.

of the Social Security *

Administration, * (UNPUBLISHED

 *

Appellee. *

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 Submitted: December 30, 1996

 Filed: April 14, 1997

___________

Before BEAM, HANSEN, and MORRIS SHEPPARD ARNOLD, Circuit Judges.

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PER CURIAM.

Patricia L. Crawford appeals the judgment of the district court1

affirming the Commissioner's denial of disability insurance benefits (DIB)

and supplemental security income (SSI). We affirm.

Crawford filed applications for DIB and SSI, alleging disability due

to bilateral forearm and hand pain. Evidence at a hearing before an

administrative law judge (ALJ) revealed Crawford underwent carpal tunnel

release. She was running a child-care business in her home on a full-time

basis for five young children, ranging in age from eight months to four

years. The ALJ determined Crawford had the residual functional capacity

to perform at least light work involving no repetitive use of the upper

extremities, no 
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vibration to the upper extremities, no lifting over ten pounds, and no

tasks requiring fine finger dexterity or sensation. Based on testimony of

a vocational expert (VE), the ALJ found there were a significant number of

jobs in the national economy Crawford could perform.

On appeal, Crawford asserts the ALJ erred in finding she could

perform light work (when she could no longer perform sedentary work), in

determining she could perform jobs as a security monitor, laundry

attendant, and dressing room attendant as those jobs are described in the

Dictionary of Occupational Titles (4th Ed. 1991) (DOT), and in finding her

subjective complaints only partially credible.

We conclude the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence

on the record as a whole. See Piepgras v. Chater, 76 F.3d 233, 236 (8th

Cir. 1996) (standard of review). The ALJ properly evaluated Crawford's

subjective complaints under Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th

Cir. 1984). Even Crawford's physicians expressed the opinion Crawford

could do work that did not involve repetitive hand use. See Edwards v.

Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 809 F.2d 506, 508 (8th Cir. 1987)

(examining physician's failure to find disability factor in discrediting

subjective complaints). While Crawford correctly asserts that the ability

to do minor household chores does not demonstrate the ability to perform

substantial gainful activity, see Easter v. Bowen, 867 F.2d 1128, 1130 (8th

Cir. 1989), Crawford is in the business of caring for at least five infants

and toddlers full-time, in addition to performing her own housework. The

ALJ properly considered Crawford's receipt of unemployment benefits in

assessing her credibility. See Barrett v. Shalala, 38 F.3d 1019, 1024 (8th

Cir. 1994) (unemployment recipient must sign documents stating capable of

work and seeking work).

The ALJ properly concluded Crawford could perform light work 
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with the enumerated restrictions. While persons who can perform light

work can generally perform sedentary work, the Code of Federal Regulations

notes exceptions where "there are additional limiting factors such as loss

of fine dexterity or inability to sit for long periods of time." 20 C.F.R.

§§ 404.1567(b), 416.967(b). 

The jobs described by the VE are similar to the DOT descriptions of

gate guard (372.667-030), laundry attendant (369.677-010), and sales

attendant (299.677-010). While these jobs, as listed in DOT, may require

additional or different duties than those described by the VE, the DOT

descriptions provide the maximum requirements of jobs, not the range; and

as such may not coincide in all respects with jobs as performed in

particular establishments or locales. See Jones v. Chater, 72 F.3d 81, 82

(8th Cir. 1995). We can assume the VE considered all the impairments

listed by the ALJ in fashioning her response to the hypothetical, see

Whitehouse v. Sullivan, 949 F.2d 1005, 1006 (8th Cir. 1991), and her

testimony based on that hypothetical, which included the limitations the

ALJ found credible, constitutes substantial evidence. See Miller v.

Shalala, 8 F.3d 611, 613 (8th Cir. 1993) (per curiam). 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.