UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

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URSULA LENHARDT, 

 Plaintiff - Appellant, 

v. 

MHALSA HOSPITALITY, INC.; 

RAKESH M. PAI, 

 Defendants - Appellees, 

and 

JESSE OJEDA, 

 Defendant. 

No. 20-3061 

(D.C. No. 5:18-CV-04125-SAC-ADM) 

(D. Kan.) 

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before BACHARACH, Circuit Judge, LUCERO, Senior Circuit Judge, and 

PHILLIPS, Circuit Judge. 

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* We conclude that oral argument would not materially help us to 

decide the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

So we have decided the appeal based on the record and the parties’ briefs. 

Our order and judgment does not constitute binding precedent except 

under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. 

But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive value if 

otherwise appropriate. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A). 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

February 26, 2021

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court
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This appeal grew out of a lawsuit for employment discrimination. 

The plaintiff, Ms. Ursula Lenhardt, is an immigrant who worked for a 

motel in Kansas. During her employment, Ms. Lenhardt allegedly 

experienced sexual harassment, spurring her to quit the job in 2015. She 

later sued the employer under Title VII, claiming employment 

discrimination. The district court entered judgment on the pleadings in 

favor of the employer, but allowed Ms. Lenhardt to seek leave to amend 

the complaint. 

She tried, beefing up her claim under Title VII and adding a claim 

under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. But the district court regarded both claims as 

deficient even with the additions proposed in the amended complaint, so 

the court denied leave to amend on the ground of futility. We affirm. 

1. We conduct de novo review on the issue of futility. 

When reviewing denial of leave to amend, we apply the abuse-ofdiscretion standard. Castanon v. Cathey, 976 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir. 

2020). Though this standard is deferential, we regard a legal error as an 

abuse of discretion. Clark v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d 703, 

709 (10th Cir. 2005). And futility involves a legal issue, so we conduct de 

novo review when the district court disallows amendment of a complaint 

based on futility. Peterson v. Grisham, 594 F.3d 723, 731 (10th Cir. 2010). 
3 

2. Title VII: Ms. Lenhardt was late in submitting an administrative 

claim. 

The adequacy of Ms. Lenhardt’s Title VII allegations turns on the 

timing of her administrative complaint. Under Title VII, a victim of 

employment discrimination can sue only after filing an administrative 

complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or a 

similar agency for the state or locality. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1); Proctor 

v. United Parcel Serv., 502 F.3d 1200, 1206 n.3 (10th Cir. 2007). The 

administrative complaint is due 300 days after the alleged discrimination. 

42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1). 

Ms. Lenhardt filed an administrative complaint in 2018. But she had 

quit the job roughly 2 1⁄2 years earlier. So the administrative complaint 

would ordinarily be considered late. 

But the 300-day period can be equitably tolled when an external 

impediment prevents the victim of employment discrimination from 

asserting a statutory right. Million v. Frank, 47 F.3d 385, 389 (10th Cir. 

1995). Ms. Lenhardt urges equitable tolling, arguing that the employer 

prevented her from asserting a claim after she had quit. 

She bases this argument on harassment by a former coworker, Mr. 

Jesse Ojeda. According to Ms. Lenhardt, Mr. Ojeda harassed her at the 

motel’s direction in a ploy to (1) distract her from filing a discrimination 

charge or (2) intimidate her into inaction. 
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We must determine whether this allegation would prevent dismissal. 

To make this determination, we consider whether Ms. Lenhardt has pleaded 

enough factual content for the court to reasonably infer that the employer 

impeded her from timely filing an administrative complaint. See Ashcroft 

v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 

We assume without deciding that Ms. Lenhardt plausibly pleaded the 

motel’s ultimate responsibility for Mr. Ojeda’s harassment. In our view, 

however, Ms. Lenhardt’s allegations wouldn’t plausibly suggest an 

inability to timely file an administrative complaint. We thus agree with the 

district court that the proposed amendments would not have prevented 

dismissal of the claim under Title VII. 

3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981: Ms. Lenhardt failed to plead a plausible claim. 

Ms. Lenhardt also tried to add a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. This 

statute prohibits race discrimination in the making of contracts. 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1981(a). For this claim, Ms. Lenhardt alleges that a co-owner of the 

motel tried to seduce her and retaliated against her through sexual assault 

and discrimination rather than providing her with documentation required 

for lawful employment as an immigrant. 

Though her allegations do suggest misconduct, Ms. Lenhardt ties the 

misconduct to race discrimination based solely on an assertion that the 

sexual discrimination had been racially motivated. That bare assertion is 
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not enough. We thus conclude that the proposed amendments would not 

have prevented dismissal of the new claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 

Affirmed. 

Entered for the Court 

Robert E. Bacharach 

Circuit Judge