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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

GARRISON SOUTHFIELD

PARK LLC, 

 

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:17-cv-783

 JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

CLOSED LOOP REFINING

AND RECOVERY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

OLYMBEC USA LLC, 

 

Plaintiff, Case No. 2:19-cv-1041

 JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

CLOSED LOOP REFINING

AND RECOVERY, INC., et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER APPROVING KUUSAKOSKI SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND 

GRANTING VINTAGE TECH’S DISMISSAL

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Garrison Southfield Park LLC and Plaintiff 

Olymbec USA LLC’s (together, the “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Settlement with Defendants 

Kuusakoski Inc., Kuusakoski US LLC, Kuusakoski Glass Recycling LLC, Vintage Tech, LLC 

a.k.a. Vintage Tech Recyclers, Inc., and Vintage Tech Recycling (“Vintage Tech”) (with 

Defendants Kuusakoski Inc., Kuusakoski US LLC, Kuusakoski Glass Recycling LLC, and 

Vintage Tech, 2 respectively and together, the “Defendants”). (ECF No. 669.)1 Also before the 

1 For convenience, the Court will cite to the Garrison docket (2:17-cv-783) unless otherwise noted.

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Court is Defendant Vintage Tech’s Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 717.) For the following reasons, 

both motions are GRANTED. 

I. Kuusakoski Motion for Approval of Settlement

This Court previously held in abeyance the Motion for Approval of Settlement (ECF No. 

669) and directed Plaintiffs to file a notice informing the Court whether the parties intended to 

either (1) accept the Court’s approval of the settlement agreement on the understanding that the 

contribution bar does not extend to claims for express breach of contract and contractual 

indemnification; or (2) withdraw from the settlement agreement. (Order, ECF No. 787.) The 

Plaintiff filed a notice accepting the Court’s approval of settlement. (ECF No. 796.) The Motion

for Approval of Settlement (ECF No. 669) is therefore GRANTED, and the following are hereby 

ordered:

1. The Settlement Agreement between Plaintiffs and Defendant (“Settlement 

Agreement”), attached to the Motion as Exhibit A, is approved, and the terms and conditions of 

the Settlement Agreement are hereby incorporated by reference into this Order as if fully restated 

herein.

2. Except for the exceptions stated in the Settlement Agreement and for claims for 

express breach of contract and contractual indemnification, all claims asserted, to be asserted, or 

which could be asserted against Defendant by persons who are defendants or third-party 

defendants in this case (whether by cross-claim or otherwise) or by any other person or entity 

(except the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (“U.S. EPA”), the United States acting on U.S. 

EPA’s behalf, the Ohio Environmental Protection Agency (“Ohio EPA”), and the State of Ohio 

acting on Ohio EPA’s behalf) in connection with the presence, generation, transportation, storage, 

treatment, disposal, abandonment, release, threatened release, removal, remediation, monitoring, 

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or engineering control of electronic waste at, to or migrating from Garrison’s properties located at 

1655 and 1675 Watkins Road in Columbus, Ohio and Olymbec’s property located at 2200 

Fairwood Avenue in Columbus, Ohio under Sections 107 or 113 of the Comprehensive 

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 

and § 9613, and/or any other federal, state or local statute, regulation, rule, ordinance, law, 

contract, common law, or any other legal theory are hereby discharged, barred, permanently 

enjoined, dismissed with prejudice, satisfied, and are otherwise unenforceable in this case or in 

any other proceeding.

3. The payment by Defendant to Plaintiffs shall be credited pro tanto, and not pro rata, 

during any equitable allocation of response costs among liable parties by the Court in this matter 

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1). The liability of the remaining liable parties shall accordingly 

be reduced by the dollar amount of Defendant’s settlement payment, and the Court need not 

determine Defendant’s proportionate share of liability.

4. All cross-claims against Defendant are dismissed, except for cross-claims for 

express breach of contract and contractual indemnification.

II. Rule 54(b) Certification of Order Approving Kuusakoski Settlement

Plaintiffs additionally seek Rule 54(b) Certification for the settlement with Kuusakoski 

Defendants. (ECF No. 669, at 24.) One Defendant opposes the certification. (ECF No. 707, at 27.)

The Court held this decision in abeyance until the Plaintiffs accepted or withdrew from the 

settlement agreement. (Order, ECF No. 787.) The decision is ripe for review.

Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a district “court may direct 

entry of a final judgment as to one or more, but fewer than all, claims or parties only if the court 

expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Rule 54(b) 

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should not be used routinely but reserved for the infrequent case where certification serves the 

interests of justice and judicial administration. Knafel v. Pepsi Cola Bottlers of Akron, Inc., 850 

F.2d 1155, 1159 (6th Cir. 1988). 

Rule 54(b) certification requires two findings. Gen. Acquisition, Inc. v. GenCorp, Inc., 23 

F.3d 1022, 1026 (6th Cir. 1994). First, the district court must expressly “direct the entry of final 

judgment as to one or more but fewer than all the claims or parties in a case.” Id. Second, “the 

district court must ‘expressly determine that there is no just reason’ to delay appellate review.” Id. 

(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b)). The Court must “clearly explain why it has concluded that 

immediate review of a challenged ruling is desirable.” Id. (citing Solomon v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 

782 F.2d 58, 61–62 (6th Cir. 1986)).

A. Entry of Final Judgment

At the first step, the Court must dispose of one or more but fewer than all claims or parties 

in a multi-claim/multi-party action. Id. at 1026–27. The Court has entered judgment on 25 

settlements in this case, disposing of all claims against the Settlors and dismissing the Settlors 

from this litigation. (ECF Nos. 312, 400, 536, 683, 787.)

B. No Just Reason for Delay

At the second step, the Court must determine that there is no just reason for delay in 

certifying a final judgment. Gen. Acquisition, Inc., 23 F.3d at 1027. This step requires the court 

to “balance the needs of the parties against the interests of efficient case management.” Id. To do 

so, the Court must consider five non-exhaustive factors: 

“(1) the relationship between the adjudicated and non-adjudicated claims; (2) the 

possibility that the need for appellate review might become moot due to future 

developments in the district court; (3) the possibility that the appellate court might 

be required to hear the same issue twice; (4) the presence or absence of a claim or 

counterclaim that might result in a set-off against the final judgment; and (5) other 

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miscellaneous factors, including ‘delay, economic and solvency considerations, 

shortening the time of trial, frivolity of competing claims, expense, and the like.’”

U.S. Citizens Ass’n v. Sebelius, 705 F.3d 588, 596 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing Corrosioneering, Inc. v. 

Thyssen Envtl. Sys., Inc., 807 F.2d 1279, 1283 (6th Cir. 1986)).

First, this order approving the settlement agreements between Plaintiffs and Kuusakoski 

dismisses only claims asserted against Kuusakoski, the Settlor. The adjudicated claims do not 

prevent the non-adjudicated claims from being fully and fairly adjudicated. The adjudicated

claims do affect the liability to be apportioned among the remaining Defendants because the 

settlement utilizes the pro tanto approach, which reduces the amount of the remaining parties’ 

liability by the dollar amount of the settlements. (ECF Nos. 312, 400, 536, 683, 787.) As the 

Court discussed in approving previous settlement agreements, such a result facilitates the purposes 

of CERCLA by “encourag[ing] faster settlements, and a faster clean-up of the e-waste, by shifting 

the financial risks of an overly lenient settlement to the non-settling Defendants.” Garrison 

Southfield Park LLC v. Closed Loop Ref. & Recovery, Inc., No. 2:17-CV-783, 2019 WL 3997683, 

at *6 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 23, 2019). 

Certifying the orders also facilitates the purposes of CERCLA because Plaintiffs have 

already commenced on-site removal of e-waste. (ECF No. 669 at 24.) Entry of final judgment 

will ensure that the Settlors promptly pay, and that Plaintiffs can continue cleanup activities using 

the settlement funds, knowing that the settlements are final. See Pakootas v. Teck Cominco Metals, 

Ltd., 905 F.3d 565, 576 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that Rule 54(b) certification was appropriate 

because “[t]his is a complex case that has been ongoing for fourteen years, and the entry of partial 

judgment . . . would help ensure that a responsible party promptly pays for the contamination . . .

advancing CERCLA’s goals and easing the Tribes’ burden of financing the litigation effort.”)

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Second, there is no prospect of the need for appellate review becoming moot due to future 

developments in the district court. This order dismisses the Settlor from the case with prejudice. 

There will be no future rulings in the Court involving the Settlor that would moot any need for 

appellate review of the issues. Third, the appellate review will not be required to hear the same 

issue twice because appellate review would be specific to the Settlor’s agreement with Plaintiffs. 

Defendant Electronic Manufacturers Recycling Management Co.’s argument that there will be 

multiple, overlapping appeals with Sony is moot because the Court denied the settlement between 

Sony and Plaintiffs. (Resp. in Opp., ECF No. 707 at 28; see Order, ECF No. 787.) These factors 

weigh in favor of Rule 54(b) certification.

Fourth, as the Court discussed above, each settled claim results in a “set-off” against the 

final judgment—it reduces the amount of the reaming liable parties’ liability by the dollar amount 

of the settlements. This is par for the course in CERCLA litigation and furthers CERCLA’s goal 

of effectuating prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites by imposing cleanup costs on responsible 

parties. See Garrison Southfield Park LLC, 2019 WL 3997683, at *4–5. Thus, this factor weights 

in favor of Rule 54(b) certification.

Fifth, the miscellaneous factors also weigh in favor of certification. Providing Plaintiffs 

and the Settlor with a measure of finality will facilitate faster cleanup and mitigate Plaintiffs’ risk 

that settlement funds will have to be refunded potentially several years down the line. As Plaintiffs 

point out, CERLA’s goal is “to remediate hazardous substances in a ‘prompt and efficient 

manner’.” (ECF No. 669, at 32.)

Accordingly, all five factors weigh in favor of granting Plaintiffs’ motion and the Court 

finds that there is no just reason for delay. This order approving settlement shall have the full force 

and effect of a final judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54 and 58. This Court nevertheless retains 

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jurisdiction and shall retain jurisdiction after entry of final judgment in this case to enforce the 

terms and conditions of the Settlement Agreement.

III. Vintage Tech’s Motion to Dismiss

The Court previously held in abeyance Defendant Vintage Tech’s Motion to Dismiss

because it was contingent on the Kuusakoski settlement. (Order, ECF No. 787). Because the 

approved Kuusakoski settlement bars Samsung claims for CERCLA contribution, common law 

contribution, negligence, and declaratory judgment, against Vintage Tech, Vintage Tech’s Motion 

to Dismiss (ECF No. 717) is GRANTED. 

IV. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court:

1. GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Approval of Settlement (Garrison ECF No. 669; Olymbec 

ECF No. 534) and certifies this order under Rule 54(b) as a final judgment.

2. GRANTS Defendant Vintage Tech’s Motion to Dismiss (Garrison ECF No. 717; Olymbec 

ECF No. 575).

This case is to remain open.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

12/31/2021 s/Edmund A. Sargus, Jr.

DATE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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