[Cite as State v. Sullivan, 2012-Ohio-4358.]

COURT OF APPEALS 

DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : JUDGES: 

 : Hon. W. Scott Gwin, P.J. 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : Hon. William B. Hoffman, J. 

 : Hon. Sheila G. Farmer, J. 

-vs- : 

 : 

LEONARD M. SULLIVAN : Case No. 12CAA020009 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : O P I N I O N

CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Court of Common 

Pleas, Case No. 11CRI040237A 

JUDGMENT: Affirmed 

DATE OF JUDGMENT: September 24, 2012 

APPEARANCES: 

For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant 

DOUGLAS DUMOLT O. ROSS LONG 

140 North Sandusky Street 125 North Sandusky Street 

Third Floor Delaware, OH 43015 

Delaware, OH 43015 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 2 

Farmer, J. 

{¶1} On April 22, 2011, the Delaware County Grand Jury indicted appellant, 

Leonard Sullivan, on two counts of aggravated robbery in violation of R.C. 2911.01, one 

count of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, and two counts of conspiracy in violation of 

R.C. 2923.01. Said charges arose from the robbery of Sabrina Terry of deposit bags 

which she had just picked up from two different McDonald's restaurants to transport to 

the bank. Appellant was the morning manager of the first McDonald's restaurant, and 

was the brother of Adam Sullivan who was involved in the robbery with Hubert Chafins 

and Kenneth Page. Appellant was accused of texting/telephoning Adam and informing 

him of who the courier would be. 

{¶2} A jury trial commenced on November 9, 2011. At the conclusion of the 

state's case-in-chief and again at the conclusion of the case, appellant moved for a 

Crim.R. 29 motion for acquittal. The motions were denied. The jury found appellant 

guilty as charged. By judgment entry filed February 14, 2012, the trial court merged the 

counts and sentenced appellant to five years in prison. 

{¶3} Appellant filed an appeal and this matter is now before this court for 

consideration. Assignments of error are as follows: 

I 

{¶4} "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED TO THE PREJUDICE OF THE APPELLANT 

BY DENYING APPELLANT'S RULE 29 MOTION AT THE CLOSE OF BOTH THE 

STATE'S EVIDENCE AND AT THAT CLOSE OF THE DEFENSE EVIDENCE." 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 3 

II 

{¶5} "THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY IS UNSUPPORTED 

BY SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE." 

III 

{¶6} "THE APPELLANT'S CONVICTION FOR ROBBERY IS AGAINST THE 

MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE." 

I, II, III 

{¶7} Appellant claims the trial court erred in denying his motions for acquittal 

pursuant to Crim.R. 29, and the verdict was against the sufficiency and manifest weight 

of the evidence. We disagree. 

{¶8} Because all three assignments involve a review of the evidence, we will 

discuss them jointly. 

{¶9} Crim.R. 29 governs motion for acquittal. Subsection (A) states the 

following: 

{¶10} "The court on motion of a defendant or on its own motion, after the 

evidence on either side is closed, shall order the entry of a judgment of acquittal of one 

or more offenses charged in the indictment, information, or complaint, if the evidence is 

insufficient to sustain a conviction of such offense or offenses. The court may not 

reserve ruling on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the state's 

case." 

{¶11} The standard to be employed by a trial court in determining a Crim.R. 29 

motion is set out in State v. Bridgeman (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 261, syllabus: 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 4 

{¶12} "Pursuant to Crim.R. 29(A), a court shall not order an entry of judgment of 

acquittal if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions 

as to whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable 

doubt." 

{¶13} On review for sufficiency, a reviewing court is to examine the evidence at 

trial to determine whether such evidence, if believed, would support a conviction. State 

v. Jenks (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 259. "The relevant inquiry is whether, after viewing the 

evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have 

found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt." Jenks at 

paragraph two of the syllabus, following Jackson v. Virginia (1979), 443 U.S. 307. On 

review for manifest weight, a reviewing court is to examine the entire record, weigh the 

evidence and all reasonable inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and 

determine "whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the jury clearly lost its way and 

created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and 

a new trial ordered." State v. Martin (1983), 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175. See also, State 

v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 1997-Ohio-52. The granting of a new trial "should be 

exercised only in the exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against the 

conviction." Martin at 175. 

{¶14} We note circumstantial evidence is that which can be "inferred from 

reasonably and justifiably connected facts." State v. Fairbanks (1972), 32 Ohio St.2d 

34, paragraph five of the syllabus. "[C]ircumstantial evidence may be more certain, 

satisfying and persuasive than direct evidence." State v. Richey, 64 Ohio St.3d 353, 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 5 

1992-Ohio-44. It is to be given the same weight and deference as direct evidence. 

Jenks, supra.

{¶15} Appellant was convicted of two counts of aggravated robbery in violation 

of R.C. 2911.01, one count of theft in violation of R.C. 2913.02, and two counts of 

conspiracy in violation of R.C. 2923.01. Pursuant to R.C. 2941.25, the trial court 

merged the counts and sentenced appellant on Count 2, aggravated robbery: 

{¶16} "(A) No person, in attempting or committing a theft offense, as defined in 

section 2913.01 of the Revised Code, or in fleeing immediately after the attempt or 

offense, shall do any of the following: 

{¶17} "(1) Have a deadly weapon on or about the offender's person or under the 

offender's control and either display the weapon, brandish it, indicate that the offender 

possesses it, or use it; 

{¶18} "(2) Have a dangerous ordnance on or about the offender's person or 

under the offender's control; 

{¶19} "(3) Inflict, or attempt to inflict, serious physical harm on another." 

{¶20} Appellant does not contest the fact that the aggravated robbery of Sabrina 

Terry occurred and that Hubert Chafins and Kenneth Page were involved in the crime. 

Appellant also appears not to contest that his brother Adam was involved. What 

appellant does contest is the sole evidence that the state contends connects him to the 

crime: text and telephone messages between him and his brother made at the time of 

robbery. Appellant argues it is only "conjecture and speculation" that connects him to 

the crime. Appellant's Brief at 18. Appellant argues although there was direct testimony 

about the robbery, the jury was called upon to make an inference upon an inference in 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 6 

determining that he was the "inside man" who set up the robbery and informed his 

brother Adam of the deposit procedures and the descriptions of the courier and her 

vehicle. 

{¶21} Apart from appellant's testimony wherein he denied involvement in the 

robbery, all the evidence was presented in the state's case-in-chief. 

{¶22} The direct evidence established that Adam, Mr. Chafins, and Mr. Page 

staked out the first McDonald's on Orion until the courier, Sabrina Terry, was seen 

leaving. T. at 158-159, 178, 189. They knew her by a description given to them of her 

vehicle. T. at 158, 178, 189. They followed Ms. Terry and when she completed her 

second pick up at the Gemini McDonald's, Mr. Page robbed her at gunpoint. T. at 160, 

179-180. The identity and description of the courier and her vehicle were unknown until 

the time immediately preceding the first pick up. T. at 155, 157, 167, 178, 189. The 

three then proceeded to Mr. Chafins's house to split the proceeds four ways, as Adam 

took one-fourth of the proceeds for the "other guy." T. at 161-162, 182. 

{¶23} It is the state's position that the "other guy" was appellant. To support this 

theory is the testimony of the courier, Ms. Terry. Ms. Terry was a former employee of 

McDonald's who on the day of the robbery, was filling in for the usual money courier. T. 

at 16. She had not done it in the recent past. As a money courier, she wore regular 

clothes, not a McDonald's uniform, and was driving her own vehicle. T. at 19, 167. To 

anyone staking out the McDonald's, they would have no prior knowledge of her or her 

vehicle. No one would be able to identify her as the money courier except that the 

normal Monday morning procedure included a money pick up. T. at 19, 30. Ms. Terry 

carried the money in an oversized "Jessica Simpson" bag. T. at 19. Her first stop was 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 7 

to the Orion McDonald's wherein appellant was the morning supervisor. T. at 19-21. 

Her second stop was the Gemini McDonald's. T. at 28-29. 

{¶24} Appellant's brother Adam was the initiator of the plan to rob the courier for 

McDonald's. T. at 168. Adam, Mr. Chafins, and Mr. Page met at 8:30 a.m. and about 

fifteen minutes later, drove to the Orion McDonald's to wait and watch for the courier. T. 

at 155-156. Ms. Terry arrived at the Orion McDonald's between 10:00/10:30 a.m. T. at 

19. Adam and appellant texted at 8:27/8:29 a.m. and several more times between 9:52 

a.m. and 10:26 a.m. T. at 86, 92-93, 135; State's Exhibit 9. At 10:28 a.m., appellant 

called Adam, almost an hour and a half before the robbery, and then they texted at 

10:46/10:47 a.m. and again at 12:25/12:27 p.m., approximately twenty minutes after the 

robbery. T. at 101; State's Exhibit 9. The mapping of the cell phone towers and 

telephone calls established Adam and Mr. Chafins were in the area of the robbery at the 

time in question and appellant was at the Orion McDonald's. T. at 103-104; State's 

Exhibit 10. Adam was on the telephone with someone just prior to telling Mr. Chafins 

the description of the courier's vehicle. T. at 167. 

{¶25} It is clear from the direct evidence that Adam, Mr. Chafins, and Mr. Page 

did not know the identity of the courier. They only way they could have known was with 

some inside information. The police immediately suspected there was an inside person, 

but eliminated the owners and Ms. Terry and her boyfriend. T. at 65, 67-68. The only 

suspects left were the employees at the Orion McDonald's. The only person at the 

Orion McDonald's who was in constant contact with Adam was appellant. 
Delaware County, Case No. 12CAA020009 8 

{¶26} We find the sufficient credible direct evidence, coupled with the 

circumstantial evidence, leads to the identity of appellant as the fourth suspect and the 

insider who supplied the information about the identity of the courier. 

{¶27} Upon review, we find the trial court did not err in denying appellant's 

Crim.R. 29 motions for acquittal, and find no manifest miscarriage of justice. 

{¶28} The sole assignment of error is denied. 

{¶29} The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio is 

hereby affirmed. 

By Farmer, J. 

Gwin, P.J. and 

Hoffman, J. concur. 

 

 

 

 s / Sheila G. Farmer_______________ 

 

 _s/ W. Scott Gwin________________ 

 s/ William B. Hoffman_____________ 

 JUDGES 

SGF/sg
[Cite as State v. Sullivan, 2012-Ohio-4358.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

STATE OF OHIO : 

 : 

 Plaintiff-Appellee : 

 : 

-vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY 

 : 

LEONARD M. SULLIVAN : 

 : 

 Defendant-Appellant : CASE NO. 12CAA020009 

For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the 

judgment of the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County, Ohio is affirmed. Costs to 

appellant. 

 s / Sheila G. Farmer_______________ 

 

 _s/ W. Scott Gwin________________ 

 s/ William B. Hoffman_____________ 

 JUDGES