This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2015 UT 91

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

IRVING PLACE ASSOCIATES,

Petitioner,

v.

628 PARK AVE, LLC,

Respondent.

No. 20130937

Filed November 13, 2015

On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals

Third District, Summit County

The Honorable Keith Kelley

No. 100500068

Attorneys:

Bruce H. Shapiro, Andrew M. Wadsworth, Salt Lake, 

for petitioner

Ronald G. Russell, Rodger M. Burge, Salt Lake, for respondent

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE authored the opinion of the Court, in 

which CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, JUSTICE HIMONAS, and JUDGE BRADY

joined.

Having recused herself, JUSTICE DURHAM does not participate herein; 

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE M. JAMES BRADY sat.

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE LEE, opinion of the Court:

¶ 1 By statute, a ―judgment entered by a district court or a justice 

court‖ in Utah ―becomes a lien upon real property if: (i) the 

judgment or an abstract of the judgment containing the information 

identifying the judgment debtor described in Subsection 78B-5-201(4) 

is recorded in the office of the county recorder; or (ii) the judgment 

or an abstract of the judgment and a separate information statement 

of the judgment creditor as described in Subsection 78B-5-201(5) is 
IRVING PLACE v. 628 PARK AVE.

Opinion of the Court

2

recorded in the office of the county recorder.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-5-

202(7)(a) (2008).

1 We are asked to interpret this provision in this case. 

In the proceedings in the district court, a default judgment was 

entered against James P. Ring and in favor of 628 Park Avenue LLC. 

Respondent 628 Park Avenue claims to have acquired a judgment 

lien by recording that judgment—a judgment that was nonfinal 

because claims against other defendants remained pending when it 

was entered.

¶ 2 We hold that 628 Park Avenue failed to acquire a judgment 

lien under the applicable statutory provisions. First, we conclude

that only a final judgment qualifies as a ―judgment‖ sustaining a lien 

under Utah Code section 78B-5-202(7). Second, and alternatively, we 

find that 628 Park Avenue‘s judgment failed to include ―the 

information identifying the judgment debtor‖ required by section 

78B-5-202(7)(a)(i).

I

¶ 3 In late September 2008, 628 Park Avenue filed a complaint 

asserting claims for unlawful detainer, breach of a promissory note, 

breach of lease, and declaratory relief against James Ring and other 

defendants. Ring failed to file an answer by mid-November and the 

court entered default. About three weeks later, in December 2008,

the court entered a default judgment against Ring for $150,144. The

claims against the remaining defendants remained pending. And the 

default judgment against Ring was not certified as final under Utah 

Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b).

¶ 4 Ring was the record owner of a condominium unit in Park 

City at the time the default judgment was entered. With that in 

mind, 628 Park Avenue recorded a copy of the default judgment in 

the Summit County Recorder‘s Office one week after the default 

judgment was entered. The recorded default judgment identified

James P. Ring as the judgment debtor. But it contained no other 

identifying information.2

 

1 These provisions have been amended recently. 2014 Utah Laws 

Ch. 151 (H.B. 315). But we cite the 2008 version of the code because 

that was the governing law at the time of the relevant events in this 

case.

2 628 Park Avenue also claims to have simultaneously submitted to 

the recorder‘s office a separate information statement containing the 

additional information called for in Utah Code section 78B-5-

(continued . . .)
Cite as: 2015 UT 91

Opinion of the Court

3

¶ 5 Ring conveyed the Park City property to Irving Place

Associates by warranty deed in March 2009. Irving Place claims that 

it was not aware of any alleged judgment lien by 628 Park Avenue at 

that time. It claims that it believed it was taking the property free of 

any liens or encumbrances.

¶ 6 In November 2009, 628 Park Avenue subsequently obtained 

an augmented judgment against Ring in the amount of $498,204.

Thereafter, 628 Park Avenue recorded the augmented judgment—a 

recording that this time included the separate information statement 

containing the information called for in Utah Code section 78B-5-

201(4)(b). 628 Park Avenue then obtained a writ of execution on the 

augmented judgment, directing the sale of all of Ring‘s nonexempt 

real property.

¶ 7 628 Park Avenue sought to apply the writ of execution to the 

Park City property that Ring had deeded to Irving Place—citing 

Ring‘s ownership of the property at the time the original default 

judgment was recorded. A day before a scheduled sheriff‘s sale, 

Irving Place filed a declaratory judgment action seeking to invalidate 

628 Park Avenue‘s claimed judgment lien on the Park City property.

¶ 8 The district court initially entered a preliminary injunction 

blocking the sheriff‘s sale during the pendency of the declaratory 

judgment action. But it ultimately entered summary judgment 

against Irving Place and in favor of 628 Park Avenue, holding that

628 Park Avenue possessed a valid judgment lien against the 

property in the amount of the original default judgment.3

¶ 9 First, the district court noted that the operative statute speaks

of liens on a ―judgment‖—not ―final judgment‖—and thus 

concluded that a nonfinal default judgment could qualify. Second, 

the district court determined that the informational requirements of 

the statute were satisfied by the identification of the judgment debtor 

in the judgment recorded with the recorder‘s office.

 

201(4)(b); The default judgment as recorded, however, did not 

include any such statement. So we proceed on the premise that only 

the judgment—and no separate information statement—was filed.

3 The district court also granted summary judgment in favor of 

Irving Place in part, holding that the judgment lien did not include 

the augmented judgment amounts. That issue was not appealed and 

is therefore not before us.
IRVING PLACE v. 628 PARK AVE.

Opinion of the Court

4

¶ 10 A divided panel of the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed. Irving 

Place Assocs. v. 628 Park Ave., LLC, 2013 UT App 204, 309 P.3d 260. 

On the first issue the panel unanimously agreed that the 

―judgment[s]‖ covered by the statute encompassed nonfinal 

judgments. Id. ¶¶ 9–12. On the second issue, the panel was divided. 

The majority agreed with the district court—concluding that the 

statute could be satisfied by the submission of a judgment 

identifying the debtor by name. Id. ¶¶ 13–17. The dissent interpreted 

the statute differently. It concluded that the mere identification of a 

judgment debtor on the face of a judgment was insufficient, and

would have interpreted the statute to require the judgment (or 

abstract) to include ―the same specific information‖ required in the 

separate information statement under Utah Code section 78B-5-

201(4)(b). Id. ¶¶ 19–27.

¶ 11 Irving Place filed a petition for certiorari, which we granted.

The petition presents legal questions of statutory interpretation. We 

consider such issues de novo, affording no deference to the district 

court‘s legal conclusions. See, e.g., Manzanares v. Byington (In re 

Adoption of Baby B.), 2012 UT 35, ¶ 41, 308 P.3d 382. 

II

¶ 12 As a general rule ―a judgment entered in a district court‖ may 

sustain a ―lien upon‖ real property in Utah. UTAH CODE § 78B-5-

201(3)(a) (2008). The code prescribes two alternative means of

establishing such a lien: ―(i) the judgment or an abstract of the 

judgment containing the information identifying the judgment 

debtor as described in Subsection 78B-5-201(4) is recorded in the 

office of the county recorder; or (ii) the judgment or an abstract of 

the judgment and a separate information statement of the judgment 

creditor as described in Subsection 78B-5-201(5) is recorded in the 

office of the county recorder.‖ Id. § 78B-5-202(7)(a); see also § 78B-5-

201(4)(a)–(b) (requiring either the recording of a judgment or abstract 

of judgment including ―the information identifying the judgment 

debtor‖ or a copy of a ―separate information statement,‖ and 

specifying the terms of the separate statement).

¶ 13 Irving Place challenges the judgment lien at issue in this case 

on two statutory grounds. First, it asserts that the ―judgment‖ 

sustaining a lien under the above provisions must be a final 

judgment. Second, it contends that the recorded judgment in this 

case was insufficient because it merely identified the judgment 

debtor by name and did not provide sufficient ―information‖ as 

required by our law. We agree on both counts and reverse.
Cite as: 2015 UT 91

Opinion of the Court

5

A

¶ 14 On the question of whether a nonfinal default judgment 

qualifies as a ―judgment‖ subject to a statutory lien, the court of 

appeals found the governing statutory language ―plain.‖ Irving Place

Assocs. v. 628 Park Ave., LLC, 2013 UT App 204, ¶ 9, 309 P.3d 260. It 

based that determination on the fact that the operative provisions 

―utilize the term  ̳judgment‘ multiple times, but neither contains the 

term  ̳final judgment.‘‖ Id. ¶ 10. Quoting the district court, the court 

of appeals reasoned that the legislature ―could have . . . used the 

term  ̳final judgment‘‖ if it had ―intended that a judgment be final in 

order for a judgment lien to be created.‖ Id. Lastly, the court of 

appeals noted that ―the legislature has used the specific term  ̳final 

judgment‘ in lieu of the more general term  ̳judgment‘ elsewhere in 

Title 78B of the Utah Code.‖ Id. ¶ 11 (citing UTAH CODE § 78B-11-

129(1)(f) (―An appeal may be taken from . . . a final judgment entered 

pursuant to this chapter.‖); UTAH CODE § 78B-5-828(1)(c) 

(― ̳Ultimately prevail on the merits‘ means, in the final judgment, the 

court rules in the plaintiff‘s favor on at least one cause of action.‖).

¶ 15 Unlike the court of appeals, we do not find the governing 

statutory language ―plain.‖ On the question presented here, there is 

threshold ambiguity in the word ―judgment.‖ This legal term of art 

can convey two different meanings. When the law speaks of a 

―judgment,‖ it sometimes has reference only to a disposition of the 

claims and defenses of individual parties—even a nonfinal 

disposition that leaves other claims, including claims involving other 

parties, to be resolved in further litigation.4 Yet that is by no means 

the only notion of ―judgment.‖ Sometimes ―judgment‖ is used to 

refer to a final, appealable order—a decision that disposes of all 

 

4 See, e.g., Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, ¶ 12, 179 P.3d 799 (noting 

that generally parties cannot appeal from a ―nonfinal judgment‖ in 

order to ―preserve[] scarce judicial resources‖); ProMax Dev. Corp. v. 

Raile, 2000 UT 4, ¶ 15, 998 P.2d 254, 258 (holding that ―a trial court 

must determine the amount of attorney fees awardable to a party 

before the judgment becomes final for the purposes of an appeal‖);

THE WOLTERS KLUWER BOUVIER LAW DICTIONARY 577 (Compact ed. 

2011) (―A judgment is the order ruling to grant or deny relief in any 

matter pending before a court. A judgment may be partial or 

complete, preliminary or final, summary or following a trial.‖).
IRVING PLACE v. 628 PARK AVE.

Opinion of the Court

6

claims asserted by all parties, in a manner triggering an appeal of 

right.

5

¶ 16 We cannot resolve this ambiguity by noting that the statutory 

reference is only to the ambiguous term ―judgment,‖ not the 

unambiguous phrase ―final judgment.‖ The latter formulation 

certainly would have eliminated any ambiguity. And it is true that 

the legislature ―could have‖ used this unambiguous phrase. Irving 

Place, 2013 UT App 204, ¶ 10. But the legislature‘s failure to speak 

more clearly tells us little or nothing about its intent in using terms 

that are less clear. ―In any matter of statutory construction of any 

consequence, it will almost always be true that the legislature could 

have more clearly repudiated one party‘s preferred construction. But 

the converse is almost always true as well . . . .‖ Hill v. Nakai (In re 

Estate of Hannifin), 2013 UT 46, ¶ 25, 311 P.3d 1016. Just as the 

legislature could have clearly called for liens only as to ―final 

judgments,‖ it also could have spoken more clearly the other way—

endorsing, for example, liens for ―all judgments, whether 

interlocutory or final.‖ Thus, ―[t]he legislature‘s failure to speak 

more clearly‖ yields no basis for interpreting the ambiguous terms it 

voted into law. Id. ¶ 26. See also LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, ¶ 88, 337 

P.3d 254 (Lee, J., dissenting) (―[T]he legislature‘s capacity to speak 

more clearly—here as almost always—tells us absolutely nothing. . . . 

[T]he failure to speak more clearly gets us nowhere in the face of an 

ambiguity like this one.‖).

¶ 17 The fact that the code speaks elsewhere of ―final judgment[s]‖ 

is unhelpful for the same reason. See Irving Place, 2013 UT App 204, 

¶ 11 (citing UTAH CODE § 78B-11-129(1)(f)). Where that full phrase 

appears, no doubt remains as to the sort of judgment that is 

implicated (a final one). But the appearance of clear terminology 

elsewhere in the code tells us nothing of consequence regarding the 

meaning of other, less clear terms presented for our review.

 

5 See, e.g., Code v. Utah Dep’t of Health, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4, 162 P.3d 1097 

(observing that the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure refer to a 

―final judgment‖ when stating ―notice of appeal . . . shall be filed . . . 

within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment‖); BLACK‘S

LAW DICTIONARY 970 (10th ed. 2014) (defining ―judgment‖ as the 

―final determination of the rights and obligations of the parties in a 

case,‖ and ―any order from which an appeal lies‖).
Cite as: 2015 UT 91

Opinion of the Court

7

¶ 18 For these reasons, the question before us is not one that can be 

resolved by facile resort to ―plain language.‖ The language we 

interpret quite simply is not plain. It is ambiguous. 

¶ 19 Upon acknowledging ambiguity, a first resort for a court is 

the legal and linguistic context of the terms under review. That 

context, after all, will often eliminate one of two possible meanings 

as implausible. See, e.g., Grazer v. Jones, 2012 UT 58, ¶ 23, 289 P.3d 437 

(rejecting a proposed interpretation of a rule because ―an 

understanding of the legal and practical context surrounding it‖ 

foreclosed that construction); Deal v. United States, 508 U.S. 129, 131–

32 (1993) (―[S]usceptibility of all of these meanings does not render 

[a] word . . . ambiguous; all but one of the meanings is ordinarily 

eliminated by context.‖). And in that event we adopt the sense of the 

statutory language that is not eliminated by reference to context.

That is our basis for resolving this case. In light of the legal and 

linguistic context of the judgment lien provisions at issue, we 

interpret the term ―judgment‖ to have reference to the final sense of 

the term.

¶ 20 First, a closely proximate subsection of one of the lien 

provisions at issue states that ―[j]udgments shall continue for eight 

years from the date of entry in a court unless previously satisfied or 

unless enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with 

law.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202(1) (2008). In context, the eight-year 

period is an obvious reference to the eight-year limitations period for 

an action upon a ―judgment‖ set forth in Utah Code section 78B-2-

311. And with that in mind, the ―judgments‖ covered by the lien 

statutes must be final judgments. That is clear from the fact that the 

limitations clock begins to run only upon entry of a final judgment.6 

 

6 See, e.g., Code, 2007 UT 43, ¶ 4 (observing that the until there is a 

final judgment, the thirty-day time period within which an appeal 

must be filed does not begin); see also Hall v. Cole, 76 S.W. 1076, 1077 

(Ark. 1903) (―Until there is a final judgment . . . no cause of action 

accrues to the creditors, and the statute of limitations does not begin 

to run.‖); James v. James, 225 P. 208, 210 (Colo. 1924) (―Ordinarily 

where a statute of limitations is stayed during the pendency of legal 

proceedings or litigation, the statute begins to run from the date of 

the final judgment in such proceedings.‖); Harper v. Cal-Maine Foods, 

Inc., 43 So. 3d 401, 403 (Miss. 2010) (―Absent some argument for 

tolling, the statute of limitations for a bad-faith claim against an 

employer or insurance company for failure to pay benefits begins to 

(continued . . .)
IRVING PLACE v. 628 PARK AVE.

Opinion of the Court

8

Because only a final judgment starts the limitations clock, it cannot 

be said that a nonfinal ―[j]udgment[] shall continue for eight years 

from the date of entry.‖ Id. § 78B-5-202(1) (2008). A nonfinal

judgment, in fact, would continue for longer—for eight years after

the eventual entry of a final judgment. This tells us that the 

―judgments‖ covered by section 202(1) must be the final variety. And 

the canon of consistent meaning tells us that the ―judgment[s]‖ 

 

run when the Commission renders final judgment‖); George v. 

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 412 S.E.2d 43, 43 (N.C. 1992) (holding 

that ―the statute of limitations begins to run when final judgment is 

entered in favor of the lien claimant‖); Shannon v. Shannon, 1238 P.2d 

744, 746 (Or. 1951) (observing that in the context of installments paid 

after a divorce, ―the statute of limitations begins to run as to each 

installment from the due date thereof‖ because each ―constitutes a 

separate and final judgment‖); Am. Star Energy & Minerals Corp. v. 

Stowers, 457 S.W.3d 427, 428 (Tex. 2015) (holding that a judgment 

creditor‘s cause of action accrued and the statute of limitations began 

to run after final judgment was entered); Dep’t of Taxes v. Murphy, 

883 A.2d 779, 781 (Vt. 2005) (finding the statute of limitations began 

to run upon the date of the final judgment in a tax case). The 

―judgment‖ triggering the eight-year limitations period must be a 

final one, as a nonfinal judgment is subject to modification by the 

district court unless and until it becomes final. See, e.g., State v. 

Garner, 2005 UT 6, ¶ 12, 106 P.3d 729 (holding that a modification to 

a criminal judgment did not restart the thirty-day period for filing 

notice since the alteration ―was not a material change to the 

judgment‖ and therefore did not ―constitut[e] a new final judgment 

for purposes of appeal‖); DFI Props. LLC v. GR 2 Enters. LLC, 2010 UT 

61, ¶ 18, 242 P.3d 781 (noting that ―rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure permits trial courts to modify their decisions at any time 

prior to final judgment‖); Johnson v. Johnson, 2014 UT 21, ¶ 18, 330 

P.3d 704 (agreeing with the lower court that because ―[i]nstallments 

under a decree of divorce for alimony or support of minor children 

become final judgments as soon as they are due,‖ they ―cannot 

thereafter be modified‖ (alterations in original)). And a case may 

remain pending for years between the initial entry of a nonfinal 

judgment and the ultimate entry of a final one. For that reason the 

limitations period cannot begin running on a judgment that is 

interlocutory in nature.
Cite as: 2015 UT 91

Opinion of the Court

9

subject to a lien under a neighboring subsection—section 202(7)—are 

also the final kind.7

¶ 21 The canon of consistent meaning is at its strongest when it is 

applied to a term used in neighboring subparts of the same statutory 

provision.8 Quite properly. The same term may be used in different 

ways in different provisions of the code. But it would be quite 

unusual for the legislature to use a term in one sense in one 

subsection of a statute and then to turn around and use the same 

term in a very different sense in a neighboring subsection of the 

same statute. Thus, because the ―judgments‖ spoken of in section 

202(1) are final judgments, we consider the ―judgment‖ lien under 

section 202(7) to be of the same variety.

¶ 22 This conclusion is confirmed by another proviso in section 

202(1)—in the exception to the eight-year period where

―enforcement of the judgment is stayed in accordance with the law.‖

Id. § 78B-5-202(1). In Utah a judgment cannot be enforced until it is 

final. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 64E. So again the statutory notion of 

judgment in section 202 is a final one.

¶ 23 Finally, this construction of ―judgment‖ is also reinforced by 

section 202(5)(a). That provision sets forth terms and conditions for a 

lien to be ―terminated‖ when ―any judgment is appealed.‖ UTAH 

CODE § 78B-5-202(5) (providing for termination ―upon deposit‖ of 

sufficient security with the court). By statute, of course, only a final

 

7 Barneck v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2015 UT 50, ¶ 31, 353 P.3d 140 

(refusing to give a word different meanings ―since under the canon 

of consistent usage [the word] cannot properly mean one thing as 

applied to two of the objects in a series . . . but something else as 

applied to the other object in the same series‖ (footnote omitted)); 

IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (relying in part on ―the 

normal rule of statutory interpretation that identical words used in 

different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have 

the same meaning‖ to sustain the conclusion that a term in one 

subsection of a statute had the same meaning as it did in the 

preceding subsection).

8 See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980) (applying the 

canon and refusing to give a term ―two different meanings in the 

same section of the statute‖); Barneck, 2015 UT 50, ¶ 31 (applying the 

canon and refusing to give a term different meanings as applied to 

terms in the same sentence).
IRVING PLACE v. 628 PARK AVE.

Opinion of the Court

10

judgment is subject to an appeal of right. See UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a) 

(2012). So this provision again reinforces the conclusion that the sort 

of ―judgment‖ spoken of in section 202 is the final (appealable) 

kind.9

B

¶ 24 The second question presented is whether the judgment 

recorded by 628 Park Avenue provided the ―information‖ required 

by Utah Code sections 78B-5-201(4) and 78B-5-202(7). Under these 

provisions, a judgment creditor may satisfy the informational 

requirement of the statute in either of two ways—(1) by recording a

judgment or an abstract of the judgment ―containing the information 

identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78B-5-

201(4)‖; or (2) by recording (in addition to the judgment or an 

abstract thereof) ―a separate information statement of the judgment 

creditor as described in Subsection 78B-5-201(5).‖ UTAH CODE § 78B5-202(7)(a)(i)–(ii) (2008).

¶ 25 As the court of appeals indicated, ―the statute‘s use of the 

word  ̳or‘ clearly indicates that an information statement identifying 

the information listed in [section 201(4)] is not necessary where the 

judgment or abstract of judgment contains  ̳the information 

identifying the judgment debtor.‘‖10 Irving Place, 2013 UT App 204, 

¶ 16 (quoting UTAH CODE § 78B-5-201(4)(a)). ―The question, then, is 

what minimum identifying information must be included [in] the 

judgment in order for it to satisfy‖ the statute. Id. 

¶ 26 The court of appeals majority concluded that the provision of 

the judgment debtor‘s name was sufficient ―information identifying 

the judgment debtor.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202(7)(a)(i) (2008). It 

based that decision on the fact that ―[e]ven the information‖ required 

 

9 We recognize, of course, the existence of exceptions to the final 

judgment rule. But the judgment at issue here was subject to no such 

exception, and the unqualified reference in section 202(5) to ―any 

judgment [that] is appealed‖ suggests that the legislature was using 

the term to refer to an appealable order.

10 The information listed in section 201(4) includes the name, ―lastknown‖ address, social security number, birth date, and driver‘s 

license number of judgment debtors; the name and address of 

judgment creditors; the amount of the judgment; and information 

regarding the existence and expiration dates of stays of enforcement. 

§ 78B-5-201(4)(b).
Cite as: 2015 UT 91

Opinion of the Court

11

to be included in the ―separate information statement‖ is ―not 

strictly required,‖ in that the statute requires the provision of the 

― ̳debtor‘s Social Security number, date of birth, and driver‘s license 

number‘‖ only ― ̳if known,‘‖ and allows a party to avoid providing 

other information by certifying that it ―‘is unknown or unavailable.‘‖

Irving Place, 2013 UT App 204, ¶ 17 (quoting UTAH CODE § 78B-5-

201(4)(b)(iv)). ―Given that the information outlined in subsection 4(b) 

[to be included in the separate information statement] is not strictly 

required,‖ the court of appeals majority held that ―the information 

on the judgment identifying Ring by name was sufficient to create a 

valid lien.‖ Id.

¶ 27 We disagree and reverse. The fact that the statute allows a 

party to omit unknown items from the separate information sheet 

doesn‘t get us very far. At most that suggests that those same items

could also be omitted from the recorded judgment or abstract. That 

still leaves the question of the required (known) content of ―the 

information identifying the judgment debtor.‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-5-

201(4)(a). 

¶ 28 We interpret the statute to require more than just the 

judgment debtor‘s name. The operative statutory phrase—―the 

information identifying the judgment debtor‖—appears in two 

different places in the statute: first in section 201(4)(a), and next in 

section 202(7)(a)(i). The latter use of this phrase is telling. It requires 

that the judgment or abstract include ―the information identifying 

the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78B-5-201(4).‖ Id. § 78B5-202(7)(a)(i) (emphasis added). In context, this is an apparent

reference to the identifying information specified in subsection 

201(4)(b). This conclusion follows from two points. First is the 

statute‘s use of a definite article. What is required is not just some 

undefined ―information.‖ It is ―the information‖ that must be 

provided. That implies the existence of specific information that is 

objectively identifiable in the statute. 

¶ 29 Second, the statute tells us where to look for such 

information—in ―Subsection 78B-5-201(4).‖ Id. In context, this must 

be a reference to subsection 201(4)(b). There is, after all, no specific 

information specified in subsection 201(4)(a), so 201(4)(b) is the only 
IRVING PLACE v. 628 PARK AVE.

Opinion of the Court

12

place one could go to find ―the information‖ that is required to be 

included.11

¶ 30 With this in mind, we disagree with the court of appeals 

majority‘s conclusion that the judgment debtor‘s name counts as 

―the information identifying the judgment debtor‖ under Utah Code 

sections 201(4)(a) and 202(7)(a)(i). The required information is more 

than that. In context, ―the information‖ that must be included is the 

information ―identifying the judgment debtor as described in‖ 

subsection 201(4)(b).

¶ 31 This still leaves the question of how much of the information 

delineated in section 201(4)(b) is to be included in the recorded 

judgment or abstract. At the outset, it is worth reiterating what we 

noted above: By statute, information that is unknown or unavailable 

need not be included. See supra ¶ 26; UTAH CODE § 78B-5-201(4)(iv) 

(requiring social security number, date of birth, and driver‘s license 

number ―if known‖); id. § 78B-5-201(5)(b) (allowing judgment 

creditor to omit other information by stating that it is ―unknown or 

unavailable‖). We also note that what is required is only ―the 

information identifying the judgment debtor.‖ Id. § 78B-5-201(4)(a)

(emphasis added); id. § 78B-5-202(7)(a)(i). Thus, the identifying 

information in the judgment or abstract under sections 201(4)(a) and 

202(7)(a)(i) is not simply a restatement of the identifying information 

delineated in section 201(4)(b); it is a subset thereof, consisting of 

only that information identifying the judgment debtor.

¶ 32 That information consists of the following: ―the correct name 

and last-known address of each judgment debtor and the address at 

which each judgment debtor received service of process,‖ Id. § 78B-5-

201(4)(b)(i), and ―the judgment debtor‘s social security number,12

 

11 The current version of the code states this clearly. It provides for 

the recording of a judgment or abstract ―containing the information 

identifying the judgment debtor as described in Subsection 78B-5-

201(4)(b).‖ UTAH CODE § 78B-5-202(7)(a)(i) (2014) (emphasis added).

This amended provision does not apply in this case; but we cite it to 

note that the approach we outline here is consistent with the current 

version of the code.

12 As we noted during oral argument in this case, the requirement 

of providing the judgment debtor‘s social security number on a 

public document raises significant personal privacy concerns. It also 

runs afoul of our Utah Rules of Judicial Administration. See UTAH R.

JUD. ADMIN. 4-202.09(9)(A) (prohibiting the inclusion of non-public 

(continued . . .)
Cite as: 2015 UT 91

Opinion of the Court

13

date of birth, and driver‘s license number if a natural person,‖ id. 

78B-5-201(4)(b)(iv). The other details set forth in subsection 201(4)(b) 

have nothing to do with ―identifying the judgment debtor,‖ and 

accordingly are not requisite elements of ―the information‖ to be 

included in a recorded judgment or abstract.13

¶ 33 We reverse on this alternative basis as well. 628 Park 

Avenue‘s recorded judgment included only the name of the 

judgment debtor. It accordingly failed to provide ―the information 

identifying the judgment debtor‖ under section 201(4)(b).

 

information in a public record); id. 4-202.02(2)(M), (4)(I) (classifying 

social security and driver‘s license numbers as private information, 

while treating the last four digits of such numbers as public). These 

tensions seem ripe for challenge—either in future litigation, or, if not, 

through legislative amendment. But they are not squarely presented 

here, so we decline to resolve them conclusively.

13 For this reason our decision to reverse the majority of the court of 

appeals is not an endorsement of the position of the dissent. We do 

not read section 201(4)(a) to require the provision of ―the same 

specific information identified in section 78B-5-201(4)(b),‖ Irving 

Place, 2013 UT App 204, ¶27 (Thorne, J., dissenting), but only the 

information in section 201(4)(b) that identifies the debtor.