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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

RICHARD E. ENYART, 

 

 Plaintiff, 

 Civil Action 2:17-cv-877 

 v. Judge George C. Smith 

 Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

RON O’BRIEN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

 

INITIAL SCREEN REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

 Plaintiff, a state inmate under the supervision of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation 

and correction, brings this prisoner civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF Nos. 1 & 

16.) This matter is before the Court sua sponte for an initial screen of Plaintiff’s Complaint as 

required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A to identify cognizable claims and to recommend dismissal of 

Plaintiff’s Complaint, or any portion of it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim 

upon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune 

from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). Having performed the initial screen, for the reasons 

that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that the Court DISMISS this Plaintiff’s claims against 

Defendants for failure to assert any claim over which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. 
I.

 Congress has authorized the sua sponte dismissal of complaints that fail to state a claim 

upon which relief maybe granted. 2 8 U.S.C. §§ 1915 (e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). A 

complaint filed by a pro se plaintiff must be “liberally construed” and “held to less stringent 

standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) 

(per curiam) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). By the same token, however, 

the complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief 

that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic 

Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Hill v. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470-71 (6th 

Cir. 2010) (“dismissal standard articulated in Iqbal and Twombly governs dismissals for failure 

to state a claim” under §§ 1915A(b)(1) and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). 

 A federal court has limited subject matter jurisdiction. “The basic statutory grants of 

federal court subject-matter jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, which provides for 

‘[f]ederal-question’ jurisdiction, and § 1332, which provides for ‘[d]iversity of citizenship’ 

jurisdiction.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 501 (2006). Federal-question jurisdiction is 

invoked when a plaintiff pleads a claim “arising under” the federal laws, the Constitution, or 

treaties of the United States. Id. (citation omitted). For a federal court to have diversity 

jurisdiction pursuant to Section 1332(a), there must be complete diversity, which means that 

each plaintiff must be a citizen of a different state than each defendant, and the amount in 

controversy must exceed $75,000. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). 

II. 

 According to the Complaint, Defendants were involved in various capacities with 

searches of Plaintiff’s residence and Plaintiff’s subsequent arrest, police interrogation, and 
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prosectution in 2007. (ECF No. 1 at 4-.11) Plaintiff argues that Defendants’ actions violated his 

rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. 

Constitution. (Id. at 12-21.) Plaintiff seeks various declaratory judgments; nominal, 

compensatory, and punitive damages against all defendants; and, an award of costs and fees. (Id. 

at 24.) 

III. 

A. Statute of Limitations 

 Plaintiff purports to bring his claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 2.) The statute of 

limitations applicable to claims arising in Ohio under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is the two-year statute of 

limitations found in Ohio Revised Code § 2305.10. Boddie v. Barstow, No. 2:14-CV-0106, 2014 

WL 2611321, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 2, 2014), report and recommendation adopted, No. 2:14-

CV-106, 2014 WL 2608123 (S.D. Ohio June 11, 2014) (citing Browning v. Pendleton, 869 F.2d 

989 (6th Cir. 1989)). 

 “Although the statute of limitations is normally an affirmative defense that must be raised 

by defendants in an answer, if the limitations bar appears on the face of the complaint, the Court 

may apply it during the initial screening process.” Boddie, 2014 WL 2611321, at *3 (citing 

Watson v. Wayne County, 90 F. App’x. 814, at *1 (6th Cir. January 26, 2004)) (“If a statute of 

limitations defense clearly appears on the face of a pleading, the district court can raise the issue 

sua sponte”). This Court has applied that rule in cases screened under § 1915A. Id. (citing 

Smith v. Warren County Sherif’s Dept., 2010 WL 761894 (S.D. Ohio March 2, 2010)). 

Accordingly, the Court must look to the allegations in the Complaint to determine whether the 

action has been filed within the applicable two-year period. 
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 Here, it is clear that all of the conduct alleged in the Complaint occurred prior to the 

applicable two-year period. The alleged actions took place ten years ago, between August and 

January 2008. (ECF No. 1). The Undersigned, therefore, recommends that the Complaint be 

dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 

B. Habeas Corpus Claims

 Plaintiff purports to bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. To the extent that Plaintiff 

seeks an order declaring that his state court conviction was obtained in violation of his rights 

guaranteed under the United States Constitution, however, Plaintiff must proceed by filing a 

petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.1

 A civil rights action is not a 

substitute for habeas corpus. When a prisoner challenges the fact or duration of his confinement, 

his sole federal remedy is habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 787 (1994); Skinner 

v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 525 (2011) (“Habeas is the exclusive remedy . . . for a prisoner who 

seeks immediate or speedier release from confinement.”). A convicted criminal defendant 

cannot bring a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 if a judgment on the claim “would necessarily 

imply the invalidity” of his criminal conviction and that conviction has not been set aside. Heck, 

512 U.S. at 487. Here, Plaintiff seeks declaratory judgments that his Fourth, Sixth, and 

Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated during evidentiary searches, his arrest, post-arrest 

 

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 The Court notes that Plaintiff has already sought post-conviction relief, including habeas 

corpus relief, in both the state and federal courts on grounds identical to those presented here. 

Plaintiff was denied relief in both systems, and in both cases the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 

issue a writ of certiorari. Enyart v. Coleman, 29 F. Supp. 3d 1059 (N.D. Ohio 2014), petition for 

cert. denied sub nom. Enyart v. Erdos, 136 S. Ct. 339 (2015) (denying cert. for habeas corpus 

review); State v. Enyart, Nos. 08AP-184, 08AP-318, 2010 WL 4681889 (Ohio App. 10th Nov. 

18, 2010), petition for cert. denied sub nom. Enyart v. Ohio, 565 U.S. 862 (2011) (denying cert. 

for direct review of his state court conviction). 

 
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searches, and post-arrest police interrogation, which would necessarily implicate the validity of 

his conviction. A judgment for plaintiff, therefore, would necessarily undermine his criminal 

conviction. Consequently, the Complaint fails to state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 

 If, alternatively, the “due process” which Enyart seeks consists of monetary damages 

from Defendants, he cannot recover damages in a § 1983 proceeding, based on the doctrine set 

forth in Heck. Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants violated his constitutional rights during 

various stages of his state criminal case amount to no more than a collateral challenge of his 

imprisonment. “[I]n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or 

imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a 

conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has 

been [overturned].” Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87. In other words, before Plaintiff may seek money 

damages in a federal civil rights proceeding in which he appears to claim that his conviction was 

unlawfully obtained, he must first show that his conviction has been overturned or set aside. 

IV.

 For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to assert any claim over 

which this Court has subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Undersigned finds that 

Plaintiff has not made out viable claims upon which relief may be granted against any of the 

named defendants. It is therefore RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims 

pursuant to Section 1915A. 

PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONS

 If any party seeks review by the District Judge of this Report and Recommendation, that 

party may, within fourteen (14) days, file and serve on all parties objections to the Report and 

Recommendation, specifically designating this Report and Recommendation, and the part in 
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question, as well as the basis for objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

Response to objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy. 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). 

 The parties are specifically advised that the failure to object to the Report and 

Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to de novo review of by the District Judge 

and waiver of the right to appeal the judgment of the District Court. See, e.g., Pfahler v. Nat’l 

Latex Prod. Co., 517 F.3d 816, 829 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding that “failure to object to the 

magistrate judge’s recommendations constituted a waiver of [th defendant’s] ability to appeal the 

district court’s ruling”); United States v. Sullivan, 431 F.3d 976, 984 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that 

defendant waived appeal of district court’s denial of pretrial motion by failing to timely object to 

magistrate judge’s report and recommendation). Even when timely objections are filed, 

appellate review of issues not raised in those objections is waived. Robert v. Tesson, 507 F.3d 

981, 994 (6th Cir. 2007) (“[A] general objection to a magistrate judge’s report, which fails to 

specify the issues of contention, does not suffice to preserve an issue for appeal . . . .” (citation 

omitted)). 

 

 

 

Date: November 13, 2017 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE