1

 RICKY LEE STROSNIDER, ) 

 ) 

 Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 

 ) 

v. ) No. SD34221 

 ) 

COLONEL RONALD REPLOGLE, ) Filed: Nov. 9, 2016 

Missouri State Highway Patrol ) 

Superintendent, ) 

 ) 

Defendant-Respondent, ) 

 ) 

and ) 

 ) 

RANDY MARTIN, Crawford County ) 

Sheriff’s Department, and J. KENT ) 

HOWALD, Crawford County Prosecutor, ) 

 ) 

 Defendants-Respondents. ) 

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CRAWFORD COUNTY 

Honorable Kelly W. Parker 

AFFIRMED 

 Ricky Lee Strosnider (“Plaintiff”) appeals the judgment denying his petition for 

declaratory judgment seeking to have his name removed from the Missouri sex offender 
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registry. See section 589.400.1

 Plaintiff’s sole point on appeal claims “[t]he trial court 

erred as a matter of law . . . because [Plaintiff] did not knowingly fail to comply with the 

sex offender registration requirements of § 589.400.” Finding no merit in the claim, we 

affirm. 

Applicable Principles of Review and Governing Law 

 Although the trial court denied [Plaintiff’s] declaratory judgment 

and issued a judgment in favor of the Respondents, we review this case 

under the same standard as if the declaratory judgment was ordered. This 

court reviews a declaratory judgment under the standard applicable to 

other court-tried cases. We affirm the trial court’s judgment regarding 

issues of fact unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is 

against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the 

law. We review questions of law de novo. 

 

Andresen v. Bd. of Regents of Mo. W. State Coll., 58 S.W.3d 581, 585 (Mo. App. W.D. 

2001) (footnotes omitted). 

 At the time of Plaintiff’s guilty plea, a person required to register on the sexual 

offender registry (“the registry”) had to do so “within ten days of . . . placement upon 

probation” after being convicted of a qualifying sexual offense. Section 589.400.1 and 

.2.2

 Unless certain exceptions apply, registration is a life-long requirement. Section 

589.400.1, .2 and .3. One exception is for a registrant who “petition[s] the court for 

removal or exemption from the registry under subsection . . . 8 of this section and the 

court orders the removal . . . of such person from the registry.” Section 589.400.3(4). 

Section 589.400.8 provides that someone on the registry 

having pled guilty . . . to an offense included under subsection 1 of this 

section may file a petition after two years have passed from the date the 

 

1

 Unless otherwise indicated, all statutory references are to RSMo Cum. Supp. 2013. Section 589.400 et. 

seq. is often referred to as “SORA.” Although Plaintiff’s petition was answered by all Respondents, only 

Col. Replogle filed a respondent’s brief. 

2

 RSMo Cum. Supp. 2006. This provision has subsequently been amended to require registration within 

three days. RSMo Cum. Supp. 2009. 
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offender . . . pled guilty . . . in the civil division of the circuit court in the 

county in which the offender . . . pled guilty . . . to the offense . . . for 

removal of his or her name from the registry if such person was nineteen 

years of age or younger and the victim was thirteen years of age or older at 

the time of the offense and no physical force or threat of physical force 

was used in the commission of the offense[.] 

 

After the petition is filed, “[t]he court may grant such relief under subsection . . . 8 of this 

section if such person demonstrates to the court that he or she has complied with the 

provisions of this section and is not a current or potential threat to public safety.” Section 

589.400.9(1). A person whose name is removed from the registry based upon subsection 

8 “shall no longer be required to fulfill the registration requirements . . . unless such 

person is required to register for committing another offense after being removed from 

the registry.” Section 589.400.11. 

Evidentiary and Procedural Background 

 Plaintiff testified at the hearing on his petition in October 2015. No exhibits or 

other testimony was presented. Plaintiff’s testimony was as follows. 

In February 2006, Plaintiff pleaded guilty to child molestation in the second 

degree (“the offense”), a misdemeanor, and he was ordered to complete a period of 

probation. See section 566.068, RSMo 2000. The victim was 15 at the time of the 

offense, Plaintiff was 18, and no force was involved. 

Plaintiff registered as a sex offender for the first time in December 2014. He was 

not told to register before that time. Plaintiff acknowledged that he had been criminally 

charged with failing to register, but that charge was later dismissed, and no other criminal 

charges had been filed against him. 

The trial court took the matter under advisement and later entered judgment in 

favor of Respondents in October 2015 (“the judgment”). The judgment found that 
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Plaintiff “was nineteen years of age or younger at the time the offense was committed, 

the victim was thirteen years of age or older at the time the offense was committed, and 

no physical force or threat of physical force was used in the commission of the offense.” 

The judgment found that two years had elapsed since Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the 

offense, and Plaintiff “met his burden of proving he is not a current or potential threat to 

public safety.” 

The judgment noted that at the time Plaintiff pleaded guilty to the offense, he was 

required to register “within 10 days of being placed on probation[.]” The judgment found 

that “Plaintiff testified he was not told to register until December of 2014, had not 

registered prior to that date, but subsequently registered and remains registered to this 

date.”3

 The judgment found that “[P]laintiff failed to demonstrate he ‘has complied with 

the provisions of’ Section 589.400” as he failed to register “within 10 days of being 

placed upon probation . . . [and he], therefore, has not complied with the provisions of 

Section 589.400[.]” The trial court concluded that it “lack[ed] the authority to grant the 

relief requested by [P]laintiff.” Plaintiff’s motion to reconsider the judgment was denied 

after a hearing,4

 and this appeal timely followed. 

Analysis 

 Plaintiff acknowledges that he was “required to register within ten days of his 

release on probation,” but he insists that it was an error of law to deny him removal from 

the registry when he “did not knowingly fail to comply with the sex offender registration 

requirements[.]” Subsection 589.400.9(1) expressly requires compliance with section 

589.400 as a prerequisite to seeking removal from the registry under section 589.400.8. 

 

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 The judgment does not indicate if the trial court found any portion of this testimony credible. 

4

 At this hearing, the trial court stated that “the only reason that [the trial court] denied [Plaintiff’s] request” 

was that Plaintiff had not complied with the registration requirements of section 589.400. 
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“The primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as 

reflected in the plain language of the statute.” State ex rel. Young v. Wood, 254 S.W.3d 

871, 872-73 (Mo. banc 2008). Subsection 589.400.9(1) does not include an exemption 

from compliance with the requirements of section 589.400 as an alternative means of 

seeking removal under section 589.400.8. Essentially, Plaintiff’s suggested construction 

would rewrite the statutory requirement from “has complied with the provisions of this 

section” to “has not knowingly failed to comply with the provisions of this section.” See

section 589.400.9(1). We must reject such a construction as we are not free to add 

“words by implication to a statute that is clear and unambiguous.” Id. at 873. 

Plaintiff cites no authority departing from established principles of statutory 

interpretation. Instead, he analogizes to the requirement that a criminal defendant must 

act knowingly in order to be found guilty of having committed the criminal offense of 

failure to register in violation of section 589.425. Cf. State v. Jacobs, 421 S.W.3d 507, 

513-14 (Mo. App. S.D. en banc 2013) (citing State v. Younger, 386 S.W.3d 848, 858 

(Mo. App. W.D. 2012), and section 562.021.3).5

 But in creating the possibility for 

removal from the registry after two years, the legislature was creating a civil action. See

Horning v. White, 314 S.W.3d 381, 385 (Mo. App. W.D. 2010) (section 589.400 “gives 

rise to a civil action”); see also section 589.400.8 directing that the petition be filed in the 

civil division of the court. Plaintiff reasons that “both the criminal act and the right [sic6] 

to removal involve compliance with SORA.” Any such similarity does not override basic 

 

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 RSMo 2000. As Younger notes, section 589.425 does not specify a requisite mental state. Younger, 386 

S.W.3d at 853. Instead, the required mental state is supplied by section 562.021.3. In relevant part, that 

subsection states that “[I]f the definition of any offense does not expressly prescribe a culpable mental state 

for any elements of the offense, a culpable mental state is nonetheless required and is established if a 

person acts purposefully or knowingly[.]” Id. Plaintiff cites no authority supporting his argument that this 

criminal statute applies to a civil proceeding seeking removal from the registry. 6

 Although Plaintiff refers to the “right” to be removed from the registry, the language stating that the court 

“may grant such relief” suggests that removal is permissive, not mandatory. 
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principles of statutory interpretation so as to essentially create a new civil action under 

Chapter 589 for sex offenders who did not comply with the registration law. Cf. Lafferty 

v. Rhudy, 878 S.W.2d 833, 836 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994) (declining to expand the 

interpretation of a criminal statute beyond the legislature’s obvious intent so as to create a 

new civil action). 

 Plaintiff also argues that “[t]he 2006 trial court [“the plea court”] neither advised 

[him] of his duty to register nor reported his address to the chief law enforcement officer 

as required.”7

 Based on this assertion, Plaintiff argues that “he cannot be held 

accountable for the [plea] court’s failure to notify him of his duty [to register], and in 

turn, be barred from relief under subsection 9.” The trial court found that “Plaintiff 

testified he was not told to register until December of 2014[.]” The judgment did not find 

that the plea court actually failed to inform Plaintiff of his obligation to register when it 

accepted Plaintiff’s plea and placed him on probation. More importantly, Plaintiff offers 

no authority for the premise that if the plea court failed to fulfill a notification obligation, 

then Plaintiff is entitled to an alteration of the statutorily-created method of petitioning 

for removal from the registry. 

As Respondent Replogle notes in his brief, individuals are presumed to know the 

law. See Grace v. Mo. Gaming Comm’n, 51 S.W.3d 891, 903 (Mo. App. W.D. 2001) 

(holding that an individual’s claim “that he consumed alcohol on the premises for five 

years without knowledge of the requirement” of prior authorization did not prevent 

application of the statute). We reject the notion that courts are free to modify the 

 

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 Plaintiff asserts that the “fact” that he was not “told he was obligated to” register was “the precise reason 

Respondent Prosecuting Attorney chose to dismiss the criminal charge of failing to register.” Plaintiff is in 

violation of Rule 84.04(e) in not citing the record in support of this assertion, and he offers no authority for 

the proposition that the prosecutor’s actions related to a charge for failure to register, see section 589.425, 

are relevant to the application of section 589.400.9. Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules (2016). 
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provisions of section 589.400.9(1) as some sort of remedy for a plaintiff’s failure to 

comply with the registration directive in section 589.405 when the legislature has not so 

provided. Cf. Frye v. Levy, 440 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Mo. banc 2014) (“[w]hen the 

legislature imposes a deadline or other mandate, this Court has held that courts have no 

authority to impose a sanction for non-compliance when the legislature has chosen not to 

do so”). 

Plaintiff’s point is denied, and the judgment of the trial court is affirmed. 

DON E. BURRELL, J. – OPINION AUTHOR 

JEFFREY W. BATES, P.J. – CONCURS 

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, C.J. – CONCURS