SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0526-18T4

RAHEIM SMITH and 

MICHELLE SMITH,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

ST. JOSEPH'S HOSPITAL AND 

MEDICAL CENTER, t/d/b/a 

ST. JOSEPH'S REGIONAL 

MEDICAL CENTER and t/d/b/a

ST. JOSEPH'S UNIVERSITY

MEDICAL CENTER, ST. 

JOSEPH'S HEALTHCARE, INC., 

ST. JOSEPH'S HEALTHCARE

SYSTEM, INC., ST. JOSEPH'S

PHYSICIANS HEALTHCARE

GROUP, INC., ST. JOSEPH'S 

PHYSICIANS, INC., ST. JOSEPH'S

FACULTY PHYSICIANS, INC.,

UNIVERSITY SPINE CENTER, 

PC, and MICHAEL J. FALOON, 

M.D., 

Defendants-Respondents,

and

VIRTUAL RADIOLOGIC 

PROFESSIONALS, LLC, VIRTUAL 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
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A-0526-18T4

RADIOLOGIC PROFESSIONALS 

OF NEW JERSEY, PA, VIBHU

KAPOOR, M.D., and SETON HALL 

UNIVERSITY,

Defendants.

______________________________

Argued November 27, 2018 – Decided March 19, 2019

Before Judges Fisher and Suter. 

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-1489-16.

Jillian A.S. Roman argued the cause for appellants 

(Cohen, Placitella & Roth, PC, attorneys; Jillian A.S. 

Roman, on the brief).

Charles E. Murray, III, argued the cause for 

respondents St. Joseph's Hospital and Medical Center, 

St. Joseph's Healthcare, Inc., St. Joseph's Healthcare 

System, Inc., St. Joseph's Physicians Healthcare Group, 

Inc., St. Joseph's Physicians, Inc. and St. Joseph's 

Faculty Physicians, Inc. (Farkas & Donohue, LLC,

attorneys; Charles E. Murray, III, on the brief). 

Richard J. Tamn argued the cause for respondents 

Michael J. Faloon, M.D. and University Spine Center, 

PC (Krompier & Tamn, LLC, attorneys; Richard J. 

Tamn, of counsel and on the brief; Elizabeth G. 

Thompson, on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

Plaintiffs Raheim and Michelle Smith were granted leave to appeal from

an order denying the amendment of their medical malpractice complaint that 
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A-0526-18T4

would have added Kumar G. Sinha, M.D. and Leah Abucay, R.N. as additional 

defendants, and a subsequent order that denied their motion for reconsideration. 

We reverse the denial of the amendment because the discovery rule should have 

been applied.1 We also reverse the denial of reconsideration. 

I

We relate facts pertinent to this opinion. Raheim,

2 who was sixteen in 

2015, suffered from severe "idiopathic scoliosis"

3 of the spine. Michelle is his 

mother. On April 7, 2015, defendant Michael J. Faloon, M.D. (Dr. Faloon) and 

Kumar G. Sinha, M.D. (Dr. Sinha), who practiced together in defendant 

University Spine Center, PC, performed scoliosis reconstruction surgery on 

Raheim's spine. The operation was performed at defendant St. Joseph's Hospital 

and Medical Center. Raheim had normal feeling and strength in his legs and 

arms right after the surgery. By about 10:00 p.m. that evening, however, Raheim

complained of lack of feeling or movement in his legs or feet. Neurological 

 

1

 We do not reverse the part of the order that amended the caption to allow 

Raheim Smith to bring the action individually on his own behalf. 

2

 We use first names in this opinion to avoid confusion because plaintiffs share 

the same surname. 

3

 Scoliosis is defined as an abnormal lateral and rotational curvature of the 

vertebral column (spine). Stedman's Medical Dictionary 1734 (28th ed. 2005).
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testing confirmed he had lost feeling below the nipple line, movement in his legs 

and feet and some strength in his left hand. He received medical treatment and 

an MRI was performed. While at the MRI, Raheim regained movement and 

sensation. 

A decision was made to transfer Raheim to the Pediatric Intensive Care 

Unit (PICU) rather than operate on him further that night. When Raheim was 

admitted to PICU at about 2:20 a.m., he reported feeling pain stimulation in both 

legs but his left hand grasp was a little less. Leah Abucay, R.N. (Nurse Abucay),

who was on duty in PICU, performed a number of medical checks throughout

the rest of the night, but did not wake Raheim to conduct neurological tests to 

monitor his movements or feeling. At 6:30 a.m., an orthopedic resident who 

examined Raheim, found he had lost motor function and sensation in his legs 

and feet. Drs. Faloon and Sinha were notified and later that morning they

operated on Raheim to remove the implants they had inserted in the earlier spinal 

surgery. Raheim did not regain sensation or movement thereafter and now 

suffers from paraplegia. Plaintiffs contend the MRI was misread and that 
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A-0526-18T4

Raheim experienced a post-operative epidural hematoma4that compressed the 

spinal cord. 

In March 2016, Michelle filed a malpractice lawsuit for Raheim in her 

capacity as his guardian and for herself individually. Dr. Faloon and others were 

named as defendants. Discovery progressed; there were multiple motions to 

address discovery issues.

In late May 2018, plaintiffs filed a motion to amend their complaint to add 

Dr. Sinha and Nurse Abucay as defendants and, because Raheim no longer was 

a minor, to amend the complaint's caption to reflect that the claims were brought 

by him individually. Plaintiffs claimed they first learned on October 25, 2017, 

when Dr. Sinha was deposed, that he and Dr. Faloon decided jointly not to 

operate on Raheim but to place him in PICU based on the MRI and on Raheim's

regained movement. None of the medical records had shown that Dr. Sinha 

participated in the decision not to operate a second time.

Plaintiffs claimed they learned on November 17, 2017, that Dr. Faloon 

had ordered PICU to perform hourly neurological testing of Raheim. The 

medical records did not show that order, so plaintiffs were not aware of this 

 

4

 An epidural hematoma occurs when a mass of blood forms on or outside of 

the dura matter (the outer most membrane enveloping the brain and spinal cord). 

Stedman's Medical Dictionary 654, 863, and 592 (28th ed. 2005).
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prior to the deposition of a resident where this information was revealed. Also,

on February 20, 2018, plaintiffs obtained a copy of the hospital's policy that 

PICU patients should be assessed every one to two hours or more frequently as 

needed. Plaintiffs' motion sought to add Nurse Abucay as a defendant because 

they alleged she violated her duty of care by not performing hourly neurological 

checks or following the hospital's policy.

The trial court denied plaintiffs' motion to add Dr. Sinha and Nurse 

Abucay as defendants, rejecting their argument that the discovery rule applied. 

The court concluded plaintiffs had "a basis to bring Sinha and . . . Abucay into 

this case long before now." "Dr. Sinha was the assistant in the operation. Nurse 

Abucay was monitoring during the three hours . . . [t]here was enough to put 

you on notice." Plaintiffs were not diligent; the court noted that "the concept of 

due diligence appli[ed] in the discovery rule context." Also, plaintiffs did not 

supply the court with legal authority to support their arguments. However, the 

judge did grant plaintiffs' motion to amend the caption to reflect that Raheim's 

claims now were brought in his individual capacity. 

The court subsequently denied plaintiffs' motion for partial 

reconsideration because plaintiffs' arguments previously had been raised, 
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considered and rejected by the court. We granted plaintiffs' motion for leave to 

appeal. 

On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred by holding they could 

not rely on the discovery rule to amend their complaint when previously they 

were not aware of facts demonstrating medical negligence by Dr. Sinha and 

Nurse Abucay. They also contend the court erred in finding they were dilatory 

in conducting discovery and filing a motion to amend even though their motion 

was filed within two years of discovering the alleged negligence by Dr. Sinha 

and Nurse Abucay and within two years of Raheim reaching eighteen. 

II

We review the trial court's ruling on a motion to amend the pleadings 

under the abuse of discretion standard. Fisher v. Yates, 270 N.J. Super. 458, 

467 (App. Div. 1994). The same standard governs our review of decisions on 

motions for reconsideration. Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J. Super. 374, 389 (App. 

Div. 1996). 

After a responsive pleading has been served, a party may amend a 

pleading "by written consent of the adverse party or by leave of court, which

shall be freely given in the interest of justice." R. 4:9-1. Kernan v. One 

Washington Park Urban Renewal Assocs., 154 N.J. 437, 456-57 (1998). This 
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decision is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. Ibid. The 

"exercise of discretion requires a two-step process: whether the non-moving 

party will be prejudiced, and whether granting the amendment would 

nonetheless be futile." Notte v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., 185 N.J. 490, 501 (2006). 

"[T]he factual situation in each case must guide the court's discretion, 

particularly where the motion is to add new claims or new parties late in the 

litigation." Bonczek v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 304 N.J. Super. 593, 602 (App. 

Div. 1997). "'[C]ourts are free to refuse leave to amend when the newly asserted 

claim is not sustainable as a matter of law.'" Notte, 185 N.J. at 501 (quoting 

Interchange State Bank v. Rinaldi, 303 N.J. Super. 239, 256-57 (App. Div. 

1997)).

Plaintiffs contend the court erred in denying their motion because the 

discovery rule applied. Under that rule, they had two years from when they 

discovered the negligence by Dr. Sinha and Nurse Abucay to file suit. Because 

their motion was filed within that timeframe, it was not "futile" as defendants 

argued.

Medical malpractice actions must be instituted within two years from the 

date of the alleged negligence. N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. However, the discovery rule 

was adopted "[t]o prevent the sometimes harsh result of a mechanical 
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application of the statute of limitations." Martinez v. Cooper Hosp. Univ. Med. 

Ctr., 163 N.J. 45, 52 (2000) (citing Vispisiano v. Ashland Chem. Co., 107 N.J. 

416, 426 (1987), and Fernandi v. Strully, 35 N.J. 434, 449-50 (1961)). As a rule 

of equity, it provides that a cause of action will not accrue "until the injured 

party discovers, or by an exercise of reasonable diligence and intelligence 

should have discovered that he may have a basis for an actionable claim" against 

another party. Lopez v. Swyer, 62 N.J. 267, 272 (1973). It "prevents the statute 

of limitations from running when injured parties reasonably are unaware that 

they have been injured, or, although aware of an injury, do not know that the 

injury is attributable to the fault of another." Baird v. American Medical Optics, 

155 N.J. 54, 66 (1998) (citing Tevis v. Tevis, 79 N.J. 422, 432 (1979)). Further, 

"where a plaintiff knows of an injury, but fault is not self-evident or implicit in 

the injury itself, it must be shown that a reasonable person would have been 

aware of such fault in order to bar the plaintiff from invoking the discovery 

rule." Martinez, 163 N.J. at 55.

The trial court rejected application of the discovery rule because plaintiffs 

knew about Raheim's paralysis, that Dr. Sinha was involved in the original 

operation and that Nurse Abucay was on duty that night in PICU. It was not 

persuaded to apply the rule just because plaintiffs were not aware until much 
10 A-0526-18T4

later in discovery of Dr. Sinha and Nurse Abucay's alleged fault during the 

overnight hours. However:

knowledge of fault for purposes of the discovery rule 

has a circumscribed meaning: it requires only the 

awareness of facts that would alert a reasonable person 

exercising ordinary diligence that a third party's 

conduct may have caused or contributed to the cause of 

the injury and that conduct itself might possibly have 

been unreasonable or lacking in due care.

[Savage v. Old Bridge-Sayreville Medical Group, 134 

N.J. 241, 248 (1993).]

Plaintiffs limit their malpractice claim against Dr. Sinha and Nurse 

Abucay to "the post-surgical care received by [Raheim] during the overnight 

hours of April 7, 2015 to April 8, 2015." Although they were aware that Dr.

Sinha assisted in the reconstructive surgery on April 7, there was nothing in the 

medical records to show that he was involved in any of the decisions during or 

after the MRI. Defendants do not dispute that. Dr. Sinha's involvement with 

that subsequent period was not known until his deposition in October 2017. 

Therefore, although plaintiffs knew the nature of the injury, they reasonably did 

not know that the injury was attributable to the alleged fault of Dr. Sinha. 

The same is true for Nurse Abucay. Plaintiffs were aware she was 

involved with Raheim's care in the early morning of August 8 and that the 

medical records did not reflect neurological testing. Plaintiffs did not know 
11 A-0526-18T4

until November 2017 about Dr. Faloon's order for hourly neurological tests. 

Nurse Abucay acknowledged not waking Raheim to perform neurologic tests.

We are satisfied that the discovery rule applies because a reasonable person 

exercising ordinary diligence would not have been aware that Dr. Sinha and 

Nurse Abucay's conduct "may have caused or contributed to the cause of the 

injury and that conduct itself might possibly have been unreasonable or lacking 

in due care." Savage, 134 N.J. at 248. 

We also are satisfied plaintiffs acted diligently in pursuing these claims. 

There were multiple discovery motions and request to produce documents. 

Discovery was still on-going in the Fall of 2017 when this information was 

obtained. Defendants do not allege they were prejudiced by the time elapsed 

from when the depositions were taken to the time this motion was filed.

The case is similar to Gallagher v. Burdette-Tomlin Mem. Hosp., 163 N.J. 

38 (2000), where the Court affirmed an application of the discovery rule. In 

Gallagher, plaintiff had surgery to alleviate incontinence, but after the operation 

she developed an infection and abscess resulting in her total incontinence. The 

Court applied the discovery rule, recognizing that the statute of limitations for a 

medical malpractice case can run at different times for different defendants. 163 

N.J. at 43. The Court stated "[t]he patient here had no reasonable basis to 
12 A-0526-18T4

suspect that her crippling condition was caused by anything other than the 

original surgery." Ibid. There was "[n]o readily apparent indication of the 

[doctor's] potential contribution to the patient's medical deterioration 

materialized until [the expert physician] brought the failure to treat plaintiff's 

infection to light." Id. at 44. The Court held that "[t]he benefit of the discovery 

rule should be available to this plaintiff who remained reasonably 'unaware . . . 

that the injury [wa]s due to the fault or neglect of an identifiable individual or 

entity.'" Id. at 43-44 (alterations in the original) (quoting Abbond v. Viscomi, 

111 N.J. 56, 62 (1988)).

Even if the discovery rule did not apply, Raheim should have been able to 

amend the complaint to add these claims based on equitable tolling. N.J.S.A. 

2A:14-21 provides:

If a person entitled to commence an action or 

proceeding specified in [N.J.S.2A:14-2] . . . is under the 

age of [eighteen] years . . . the person may commence 

the action or make the entry, within the time as limited 

by [the] statute[], after reaching majority or having the 

mental capacity to pursue the person's lawful rights.

[N.J.S.A. 2A:14-21.]

In LaFage v. Jani, 166 N.J. 412, 430-31 (2001), where the children's 

mother filed a wrongful death action twenty-seven days after the statute of 

limitations had run, the court permitted equitable tolling. More recently in A.T. 
13 A-0526-18T4

v. Cohen, 231 N.J. 337 (2017), the Supreme Court addressed the effect of an 

untimely affidavit of merit, filed on behalf of a minor by her parent, on the 

dismissal of the minor's malpractice action. In that case, the Court found 

extraordinary circumstances to permit reinstatement of that complaint, reversing 

the Appellate Division's majority opinion that had relied on Kubiak v. Robert 

Wood Johnson Univ. Hosp., 332 N.J. Super. 230, 238 (App. Div. 2000) to affirm 

dismissal of the complaint. The denial of Raheim's motion to amend his 

complaint was not consistent with the "solicitude the law affords minors,"

5 or 

the equitable tolling statute.

We are mindful of the potential for prejudice, but in this case defendants 

have been aware of plaintiff's injury and the malpractice lawsuit for a number 

of years, records have been obtained, depositions taken, the additional parties 

have been deposed and the claims against them are limited to their involvement 

in the overnight hours following the reconstructive operation. 

Therefore, we conclude the trial court misapplied its discretion in denying 

plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint to add Dr. Sinha and Nurse Abucay as 

 

5

 A.T. v. Cohen, 445 N.J. Super. 300, 310 (App. Div. 2016) (Fisher, P.J.A.D.,

dissenting) (reversed and remanded by A.T., 231 N.J. 337).
14 A-0526-18T4

defendants. We reverse those portions of the orders and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this decision. We do not retain jurisdiction.

Reversed and remanded.