In her Objections, Plaintiff argues that Dr. MacNealy’s opinion is neither
conclusory nor inconsistent with substantial evidence. She notes that she was also
diagnosed with Bipolar 1 Disorder, PTSD, and probable ADHD. Moreover, her GAF
scores indicate that she has serious difficulty in social, occupational, or school
functioning. On two occasions in 2015, Dr. MacNealy indicated that Plaintiff was
“obviously scared,” “terrified and angry,” and her “speech is trembling.”

These facts, however, do not change the outcome. Magistrate Judge
Ovington noted that “a treating physician’s diagnosis is not determinative of the
ultimate disability determination under the Social Security Act.” Doc. #11,
PagelD#1017. The condition must be severe enough to justify an award of
benefits. The ALJ gave Plaintiff's GAF scores limited weight because “[t[hese
subjectively assessed scores reveal only snapshots of impaired and improved
behavior.” She gave greater weight to the “objective details and chronology of the
record, which more accurately describe the claimant’s impairments and limitations.”
Doc. #6-2, PagelD#88. Although Plaintiff cites two occasions on which Dr.
MacNealy noted Plaintiff's observable distress, Magistrate Judge Ovington correctly
pointed out that the ALJ stated that Dr. MacNealy’s opinion was “inconsistent with
the majority of his examinations.” /d.

In the Court's view, the ALJ was justified in not giving Dr. MacNealy’s
opinion controlling weight. Magistrate Judge Ovington correctly found that the
Commissioner’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.

5


Recommendations in their entirety, and AFFIRMS the decision of the Defendant
Commissioner.

The Court agrees with Magistrate Judge Ovington that the Commissioner's
decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under
the Social Security Act, was supported by substantial evidence. Plaintiff's
Objections to the Report and Recommendations (Doc. #12) are OVERRULED.

Magistrate Judge Ovington properly rejected Plaintiff's claims that the ALJ
erred in not giving controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. MacNealy, Plaintiff's
treating physician. Dr. MacNealy stated that Plaintiff suffered from panic attacks,
anxiety and depression that would cause her to be absent from work more than
three times per month and would cause her to be distracted approximately 2/3 of
each 8-hour work day. Doc. #6-9, PagelD##971-72.

As Magistrate Judge Ovington noted, the ALJ provided several “good
reasons” for giving little weight to Dr. MacNealy’s opinion. The ALJ found that Dr.
MacNealy had provided “little explanation and/or specific functional limitations” and
that his opinion was “inconsistent with the medical evidence of record which does
not show frequent reports of panic attacks.” Doc. #6-2, PagelD#88. The ALJ
also noted that the majority of Dr. MacNealy’s medical records indicate that, on
examination, Plaintiff's “speech was normal, her thought process was goal directed,

her behavior was cooperative, and she was oriented to time, place and person.” /d.


Accordingly, judgment shall be entered in favor of the Defendant
Commissioner and against Plaintiff, affirming the decision of the Defendant
Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits

under the Social Security Act.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of
the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division,

at Dayton.

September 25, 2019 f )ocsan Be (edie
WALTER H. RICE, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT



IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

CHERYL J. HANSON,
Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:17-cv-382
vs. : JUDGE WALTER H. RICE
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, :

Defendant.

DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. #11) IN THEIR
ENTIRETY; OVERRULING PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS THERETO (DOC.
#12); JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT
COMMISSIONER AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF, AFFIRMING
COMMISSIONER'S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED
AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ACT; TERMINATION ENTRY

Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a
decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social
Security disability benefits, Widow's Insurance Benefits, and Supplemental Security
Income. On April 8, 2019, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and
Recommendations (Doc. #11), recommending that the Commissioner's decision that
Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social

Security Act be affirmed.


In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Magistrate Judge’s task is to
determine if that decision is supported by "substantial evidence." 42 U.S.C.

§ 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made
to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendations, is required to make a de
novo review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made.
This de novo review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant
evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate Judge, to determine whether the
findings “are supported by substantial evidence.” Valley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
427 F.3d 388, 390 (6th Cir. 2005).

This Court's sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole
contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner’s decision. The
Commissioner's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by “such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971)
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. N.L.R.B., 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S.Ct. 206, 83
L.Ed.2d 126 (1938). “Substantial evidence means more than a mere scintilla, but
only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict.” Foster v. Bowen,
853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1988). To be substantial, the evidence “must do more
than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established. . . . [I]t must
be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the
conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” LeMaster v.

Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting


N.L.R.B. v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300, 59 S.Ct.
501, 83 L.Ed. 660 (1939)).

In determining “whether there is substantial evidence in the record .. . we
review the evidence in the record taken as a whole.” Wilcox v. Sullivan, 917 F.2d
272, 276-77 (6th Cir. 1980) (citing Av/ev. v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir.
1980)). However, the Court “may not try the case de novol;] nor resolve conflicts
in evidence[;] nor decide questions of credibility. Jordan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,
548 F.3d 417, 422 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387
(6th Cir. 1984)). “The findings of the Commissioner are not subject to reversal
merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different
conclusion.” Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). Rather, if the
Commissioner's decision “is supported by substantial evidence, then we must affirm
the [Commissioner's] decision[,] even though as triers of fact we might have arrived
at a different result.” E/kins v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 658 F.2d 437,
439 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Moore v. Califano, 633 F.3d 727, 729 (6th Cir. 1980)).

Based upon reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and Recommendations (Doc. #11) and in the Defendant's Reply to
Plaintiff's Objections to that judicial filing (Doc. #13), as well as upon a thorough de
novo review of this Court’s file, including the Administrative Record (Doc. #6), and a

thorough review of the applicable law, this Court ADOPTS the Report and