57470 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 182 / Thursday, September 19, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

harvest and the mangoes are found free 

of C. mangiferae. 

(d) Prior to export from Australia, the 

mangoes must be inspected by the 

national plant protection organization 

(NPPO) of Australia and found free of 

Cytosphaera mangiferae, Lasiodiplodia 

pseudotheobromae, Neofusicoccum 

mangiferae, Neoscytalidium 

novaehollandiae, Pseudofusicoccum 

adansoniae, Phomopsis mangiferae, and 

Xanthomomas campestris pv. 

mangiferaeindicae. 

(e)(1) Each consignment of fruit must 

be accompanied by a phytosanitary 

certificate issued by the NPPO of 

Australia with additional declarations 

that: 

(i) The mangoes were subjected to one 

of the pre- or post-harvest mitigation 

options described in paragraph (c) of 

this section, and 

(ii) The mangoes were inspected prior 

to export from Australia and found free 

of C. mangiferae, L. pseudotheobromae, 

N. mangiferae, N. novaehollandiae, P. 

adansoniae, P. mangiferae, and X. 

campestris pv. mangiferaeindicae. 

(2) If the fruit is treated with 

irradiation outside the United States, 

each consignment of fruit must be 

inspected jointly by APHIS and the 

NPPO of Australia, and be accompanied 

by the phytosanitary certificate 

certifying that the fruit was treated with 

irradiation in accordance with part 305 

of this chapter. 

(Approved by the Office of Management and 

Budget under control number 0579–0391) 

Done in Washington, DC, this 13th day of 

September 2013. 

Kevin Shea, 

Administrator, Animal and Plant Health 

Inspection Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–22786 Filed 9–18–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 3410–34–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. FAA–2013–0650; Notice No. 23– 

13–01–SC] 

Special Conditions: Eclipse, EA500, 

Certification of Autothrottle Functions 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final special conditions. 

SUMMARY: These special conditions are 

issued for the Eclipse EA500 airplane. 

This airplane as modified by Innovative 

Solutions and Support (IS&S) will have 

a novel or unusual design feature(s) 

associated with the autothrottle system 

(ATS). The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for this 

design feature. These special conditions 

contain the additional safety standards 

that the Administrator considers 

necessary to establish a level of safety 

equivalent to that established by the 

existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: The effective date of these 

special conditions is September 11, 

2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Mark S. Orr, FAA, Programs and 

Procedures Branch, ACE–114, Small 

Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service, 901 Locust; 

Kansas City, Missouri 64106; telephone 

(816) 329–4151; facsimile (816) 329– 

4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Background 

On April 15, 2011, Innovative 

Solutions and Support (IS&S) applied 

for a supplemental type certificate for an 

update to the aircraft software to 

activate the previously installed 

autothrottle provisions in the EA500. 

The EA500 is a pressurized monoplane 

with provisions for up to six persons 

(standard seating five people) and may 

be operated as a single or two pilot 

aircraft (reference Minimum Flight Crew 

Limitation, AFM 06–122204 Rev 4 

section 2–4). The airplane is operated 

under 14 CFR part 91 with standard 

systems installed and under 14 CFR part 

135 with additional equipment 

installed. The Eclipse Model EA500 was 

certificated under part 23 by the FAA on 

September 30, 2006 (Type Certificate 

A00002AC) with autothrottle provisions 

(i.e., motors and controls) installed yet 

rendered inactive through ‘‘collaring’’ of 

the ATS motor Electronic Circuit 

Breaker (ECB). Under the original Type 

Certification program, no certification 

credit was received nor the regulatory 

basis established for the autothrottle 

functions of the Eclipse Model EA500 

aircraft. 

Current part 23 airworthiness 

regulations do not contain appropriate 

safety standards for autothrottle system 

(ATS) installations, so special 

conditions are required to establish an 

acceptable level of safety. Part 25 

regulations contain appropriate safety 

standards for these systems, so the 

intent for this project is to apply the 

language in § 25.1329 for the 

autothrottle, substituting § 23.1309 and 

§ 23.143 in place of the similar part 25 

regulations referenced in § 25.1329. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of § 21.101, 

IS&S must show that the EA500, as 

changed, continues to meet the 

applicable provisions of the regulations 

incorporated by reference in A00002AC 

or the applicable regulations in effect on 

the date of application for the change. 

The regulations incorporated by 

reference in the type certificate are 

commonly referred to as the ‘‘original 

type certification basis.’’ The regulations 

incorporated by reference in A00002AC 

are as follows: 

14 CFR Part 23 through Amendment 55 

(except 14 CFR 23.1303 Amendment 23–62), 

Part 34 through Amendment 34–3, and Part 

36 through Amendment 36–26. 

Special Conditions: 

23–128–SC for Engine Fire Extinguishing 

System 

23–121–SC for Electronic Engine Control 

System 

23–112A–SC for High Intensity Radiated 

Fields (HIRF) Protection 

Equivalent Levels of Safety Findings: 

ACE–02–19: 14 CFR 23.777(d) and 23.781 

Fuel Cutoff Control 

ACE–05–32: 14 CFR 23.1545(a) and 

23.1581(d) for Indicated Airspeeds 

ACE–05–34: 14 CFR 23.181(b), Dynamic 

Stability 

ACE–05–35: 14 CFR 23.1353(h), Storage 

Battery Design and Installation 

ACE–05–36: 14 CFR 23.1323(c), Airspeed 

Indicating System 

ACE–06–01: 14 CFR 23.1545(b)(4), Airspeed 

Indicator 

ACE–06–05: 14 CFR part 23, Appendix H, 

§ H23.5, Installation of an Automatic 

Power Reserve System 

ACE–07–04: 14 CFR 23.1545(b)(4), Airspeed 

Indicator 

ACE–08–12, 14 CFR 23.201(b)(2) Wings Level 

Stall, and 23.203(a), Turning Flight and 

Accelerated Turning Stalls for flight into 

known icing (FIKI) 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., part 23) do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for the 

EA500 because of a novel or unusual 

design feature, special conditions are 

prescribed under the provisions of 

§ 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the applicant apply 

for a supplemental type certificate to 

modify any other model included on the 

same type certificate to incorporate the 

same or similar novel or unusual design 

feature, the special conditions would 

also apply to the other model under 

§ 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the EA500 must comply 

with the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of part 34 and the noise 

certification requirements of part 36. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 182 / Thursday, September 19, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 57471 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.101. 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The EA500 will incorporate the 

following novel or unusual design 

features: Innovative Solutions and 

Support (IS&S) has applied for a 

Supplemental Type Certificate (STC) to 

update the aircraft software for 

implementation of an autothrottle 

function on the EA500 aircraft. Included 

with the software upgrade is the 

activation of previously installed 

autothrottle provisions. Since the 

current part 23 airworthiness 

regulations do not contain appropriate 

safety standards for ATS installations, 

special conditions are required to 

establish an acceptable level of safety. 

Part 25 regulations contain appropriate 

safety standards for these systems, so 

the intent for this project is to apply the 

language in § 25.1329 for the 

autothrottle, substituting § 23.1309 and 

§ 23.143 in place of the similar part 25 

regulations referenced in § 25.1329. In 

addition, proper function of the ATS 

must be demonstrated according to 

§ 23.1301 in a manner acceptable to the 

administrator, as prior evaluations of 

the system components included in the 

existing type design did not include 

demonstration of proper installed 

function on the ground or in the air. 

Discussion 

Part 23 at this time does not 

sufficiently address autothrottle 

technology and safety concerns. 

Therefore, special conditions must be 

developed and applied to this project to 

ensure an acceptable level of safety has 

been obtained. For approval to use the 

ATS during flight, the Eclipse EA500 

airplane must demonstrate compliance 

to the intent of the requirements of 

§ 25.1329, applying the appropriate part 

23 references to § 23.1309 (to include 

performing FHA/SSA to determine the 

appropriate/applicable Software and 

Airborne Electronic Hardware assurance 

levels) and § 23.143 and the following 

special conditions: 

The following special conditions, 

derived from § 25.1329, are issued for 

the Eclipse EA500 airplane: 

(a) Quick disengagement controls for the 

autothrust functions must be provided for 

each pilot. The autothrust quick 

disengagement controls must be located on 

the thrust control levers. Quick 

disengagement controls must be readily 

accessible to each pilot while operating the 

thrust control levers. 

(b) The effects of a failure of the system to 

disengage the autothrust functions when 

manually commanded by the pilot must be 

assessed in accordance with the requirements 

of Sec. 23.1309. 

(c) Engagement or switching of the flight 

guidance system, a mode, or a sensor may not 

cause the autothrust system to effect a 

transient response that alters the airplane’s 

flight path any greater than a minor transient, 

as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of this section. 

(d) Under normal conditions, the 

disengagement of any automatic control 

function of a flight guidance system may not 

cause a transient response of the airplane’s 

flight path any greater than a minor transient. 

(e) Under rare normal and non-normal 

conditions, disengagement of any automatic 

control function of a flight guidance system 

may not result in a transient any greater than 

a significant transient, as defined in 

paragraph (l)(2) of this section. 

(f) The function and direction of motion of 

each command reference control, such as 

heading select or vertical speed, must be 

plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each 

control if necessary to prevent inappropriate 

use or confusion. 

(g) Under any condition of flight 

appropriate to its use, the flight guidance 

system may not produce hazardous loads on 

the airplane, nor create hazardous deviations 

in the flight path. This applies to both faultfree operation and in the event of a 

malfunction, and assumes that the pilot 

begins corrective action within a reasonable 

period of time. 

(h) When the flight guidance system is in 

use, a means must be provided to avoid 

excursions beyond an acceptable margin 

from the speed range of the normal flight 

envelope. If the airplane experiences an 

excursion outside this range, a means must 

be provided to prevent the flight guidance 

system from providing guidance or control to 

an unsafe speed. 

(i) The flight guidance system functions, 

controls, indications, and alerts must be 

designed to minimize flightcrew errors and 

confusion concerning the behavior and 

operation of the flight guidance system. 

Means must be provided to indicate the 

current mode of operation, including any 

armed modes, transitions, and reversions. 

Selector switch position is not an acceptable 

means of indication. The controls and 

indications must be grouped and presented 

in a logical and consistent manner. The 

indications must be visible to each pilot 

under all expected lighting conditions. 

(j) Following disengagement of the 

autothrust function, a caution (visual and 

auditory) must be provided to each pilot. 

(k) During autothrust operation, it must be 

possible for the flightcrew to move the thrust 

levers without requiring excessive force. The 

autothrust may not create a potential hazard 

when the flightcrew applies an override force 

to the thrust levers. 

(l) For purposes of this section, a transient 

is a disturbance in the control or flight path 

of the airplane that is not consistent with 

response to flightcrew inputs or 

environmental conditions. 

(1) A minor transient would not 

significantly reduce safety margins and 

would involve flightcrew actions that are 

well within their capabilities. A minor 

transient may involve a slight increase in 

flightcrew workload or some physical 

discomfort to passengers or cabin crew. 

(2) A significant transient may lead to a 

significant reduction in safety margins, an 

increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort 

to the flightcrew, or physical distress to the 

passengers or cabin crew, possibly including 

non-fatal injuries. Significant transients do 

not require, in order to remain within or 

recover to the normal flight envelope, any of 

the following: 

(i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are 

greater than those specified in Sec. 23.143(c). 

(iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the 

airplane that might result in further hazard 

to secured or non-secured occupants. 

The applicant must also functionally 

demonstrate independence between the 

left and right ATS installation to prove 

they cannot have a single point failure 

that is not extremely improbable that 

inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or 

to substantial uncommanded thrust 

changes and transients, in both engines 

simultaneously. 

Discussion of Comments 

Notice of proposed special conditions 

No. 23–13–01–SC for the Eclipse EA500 

airplane was published in the Federal 

Register on July 31, 2013, (78 FR 

46295). No comments were received, 

and the special conditions are adopted 

as proposed. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the EA500. 

Should IS&S apply at a later date for a 

supplemental type certificate to modify 

any other model included on A00002AC 

to incorporate the same novel or 

unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

EA500 of airplanes. It is not a rule of 

general applicability and it affects only 

the applicant who applied to the FAA 

for approval of these features on the 

airplane. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

Citation 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Special Conditions 

Accordingly, pursuant to the 

authority delegated to me by the 


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57472 Federal Register / Vol. 78, No. 182 / Thursday, September 19, 2013 / Rules and Regulations 

Administrator, the following special 

conditions are issued as part of the type 

certification basis for Eclipse EA500 

airplanes modified by IS&S. 

1. Certification of Autothrottle 

Functions under Part 23. 

The following special conditions, 

derived from § 25.1329, are issued for 

the Eclipse EA500 airplane: 

(a) Quick disengagement controls for the 

autothrust functions must be provided for 

each pilot. The autothrust quick 

disengagement controls must be located on 

the thrust control levers. Quick 

disengagement controls must be readily 

accessible to each pilot while operating the 

thrust control levers. 

(b) The effects of a failure of the system to 

disengage the autothrust functions when 

manually commanded by the pilot must be 

assessed in accordance with the requirements 

of Sec. 23.1309. 

(c) Engagement or switching of the flight 

guidance system, a mode, or a sensor may not 

cause the autothrust system to effect a 

transient response that alters the airplane’s 

flight path any greater than a minor transient, 

as defined in paragraph (l)(1) of this section. 

(d) Under normal conditions, the 

disengagement of any automatic control 

function of a flight guidance system may not 

cause a transient response of the airplane’s 

flight path any greater than a minor transient. 

(e) Under rare normal and non-normal 

conditions, disengagement of any automatic 

control function of a flight guidance system 

may not result in a transient any greater than 

a significant transient, as defined in 

paragraph (l)(2) of this section. 

(f) The function and direction of motion of 

each command reference control, such as 

heading select or vertical speed, must be 

plainly indicated on, or adjacent to, each 

control if necessary to prevent inappropriate 

use or confusion. 

(g) Under any condition of flight 

appropriate to its use, the flight guidance 

system may not produce hazardous loads on 

the airplane, nor create hazardous deviations 

in the flight path. This applies to both faultfree operation and in the event of a 

malfunction, and assumes that the pilot 

begins corrective action within a reasonable 

period of time. 

(h) When the flight guidance system is in 

use, a means must be provided to avoid 

excursions beyond an acceptable margin 

from the speed range of the normal flight 

envelope. If the airplane experiences an 

excursion outside this range, a means must 

be provided to prevent the flight guidance 

system from providing guidance or control to 

an unsafe speed. 

(i) The flight guidance system functions, 

controls, indications, and alerts must be 

designed to minimize flightcrew errors and 

confusion concerning the behavior and 

operation of the flight guidance system. 

Means must be provided to indicate the 

current mode of operation, including any 

armed modes, transitions, and reversions. 

Selector switch position is not an acceptable 

means of indication. The controls and 

indications must be grouped and presented 

in a logical and consistent manner. The 

indications must be visible to each pilot 

under all expected lighting conditions. 

(j) Following disengagement of the 

autothrust function, a caution (visual and 

auditory) must be provided to each pilot. 

(k) During autothrust operation, it must be 

possible for the flightcrew to move the thrust 

levers without requiring excessive force. The 

autothrust may not create a potential hazard 

when the flightcrew applies an override force 

to the thrust levers. 

(l) For purposes of this section, a transient 

is a disturbance in the control or flight path 

of the airplane that is not consistent with 

response to flightcrew inputs or 

environmental conditions. 

(1) A minor transient would not 

significantly reduce safety margins and 

would involve flightcrew actions that are 

well within their capabilities. A minor 

transient may involve a slight increase in 

flightcrew workload or some physical 

discomfort to passengers or cabin crew. 

(2) A significant transient may lead to a 

significant reduction in safety margins, an 

increase in flightcrew workload, discomfort 

to the flightcrew, or physical distress to the 

passengers or cabin crew, possibly including 

non-fatal injuries. Significant transients do 

not require, in order to remain within or 

recover to the normal flight envelope, any of 

the following: 

(i) Exceptional piloting skill, alertness, or 

strength. 

(ii) Forces applied by the pilot which are 

greater than those specified in Sec. 23.143(c). 

(iii) Accelerations or attitudes in the 

airplane that might result in further hazard 

to secured or non-secured occupants. 

The applicant must also functionally 

demonstrate independence between the 

left and right ATS installation to prove 

they cannot have a single point failure 

that is not extremely improbable that 

inadvertently leads to a loss of thrust, or 

to substantial uncommanded thrust 

changes and transients, in both engines 

simultaneously. 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on 

September 11, 2013. 

Earl Lawrence, 

Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2013–22848 Filed 9–18–13; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 95 

[Docket No. 30922; Amdt. No. 3557] 

IFR Altitudes; Miscellaneous 

Amendments 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: This amendment adopts 

miscellaneous amendments to the 

required IFR (instrument flight rules) 

altitudes and changeover points for 

certain Federal airways, jet routes, or 

direct routes for which a minimum or 

maximum en route authorized IFR 

altitude is prescribed. This regulatory 

action is needed because of changes 

occurring in the National Airspace 

System. These changes are designed to 

provide for the safe and efficient use of 

the navigable airspace under instrument 

conditions in the affected areas. 

DATES: Effective Date: 0901 UTC, 

October 17, 2013. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Harry Hodges, Flight Procedure 

Standards Branch (AMCAFS–420), 

Flight Technologies and Programs 

Division, Flight Standards Service, 

Federal Aviation Administration, Mike 

Monroney Aeronautical Center, 6500 

South MacArthur Blvd., Oklahoma City, 

OK 73169 (Mail Address: P.O. Box 

25082 Oklahoma City, OK 73125) 

telephone: (405) 954–4164. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: This 

amendment to part 95 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR part 95) 

amends, suspends, or revokes IFR 

altitudes governing the operation of all 

aircraft in flight over a specified route 

or any portion of that route, as well as 

the changeover points (COPs) for 

Federal airways, jet routes, or direct 

routes as prescribed in part 95. 

The Rule 

The specified IFR altitudes, when 

used in conjunction with the prescribed 

changeover points for those routes, 

ensure navigation aid coverage that is 

adequate for safe flight operations and 

free of frequency interference. The 

reasons and circumstances that create 

the need for this amendment involve 

matters of flight safety and operational 

efficiency in the National Airspace 

System, are related to published 

aeronautical charts that are essential to 

the user, and provide for the safe and 

efficient use of the navigable airspace. 

In addition, those various reasons or 

circumstances require making this 

amendment effective before the next 

scheduled charting and publication date 

of the flight information to assure its 

timely availability to the user. The 

effective date of this amendment reflects 

those considerations. In view of the 

close and immediate relationship 

between these regulatory changes and 

safety in air commerce, I find that notice 

and public procedure before adopting 

this amendment are impracticable and 

contrary to the public interest and that 

good cause exists for making the 

amendment effective in less than 30 

days. 


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