FILED 


FEB 11,2014 


In the Office of the Clerk ofCourt 


W A State Court of Appeals, Division III 


IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 


DIVISION THREE 


STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) 

) No. 30983-5-III 

Respondent, ) 

) 

v. ) 

) 

MARISA MAY FUENTES, ) UNPU6LISHED OPINION 

) 

Appellant. ) 

KORSMO, C.J. - Marisa Fuentes challenges the trial court's suppression rulings 

arising from an investigative stop. We conclude that the officers had articulable 

suspicion to justify the stop and affIrm. 

FACTS 

This case has its genesis in a November 2010 investigation by the Kennewick 

Police Department. Officers performed a series of controlled drug buys at an apartment 

occupied by Richard Fenton. These dealings led to a search warrant and the recovery of 

illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia from the apartment. Almost a year later, officers 

knew that Richard Fenton was still at the apartment and also suspected that other wanted 
No. 30983-5-111 

State v. Fuentes 

individuals frequented the apartment. Based on this information, officers set up a 

stakeout outside. 

On the night ofthe stakeout-October 5-6, 20 Il-officers first observed two 

people outside the apartment. When the officers approached the people to ask if any of 

the wanted individuals were present, the two ran inside and would not answer the door. 

Later during the stakeout, officers observed 8 to 10 people come and go from the 

apartment between 10 p.m. and 12 a.m. All ofthese people stayed between 5 and 20 

minutes. It was also a weeknight. In the officers' training and experience, this activity 

was consistent with illegal drug dealing. 

Just after midnight, officers observed a woman, later identified as Marisa Fuentes, 

arrive at the apartment. Within five minutes of entering the residence, Ms. Fuentes 

returned to her vehicle. She then retrieved from the trunk of her car a white grocery bag 

with unidentified contents about the size of a small football. She then took the bag into 

the apartment and left within another five minutes. When Ms. Fuentes left the apartment, 

the bag was noticeably emptier. Suspecting that she had just delivered illegal drugs, the 

stakeout officers radioed for supporting officers to stop Ms. Fuentes on suspicion of 

delivery of a controlled substance. 

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No, 30983-5-111 

State v, Fuentes 

Officers stopped the car and advised Ms, Fuentes of her Miranda' rights, She 

waived those rights and the officers proceeded to question her, In the course of 

questioning, Ms, Fuentes admitted that she had just delivered marijuana to Mr, Fenton's 

apartment Based on this information, officers were able to obtain a search warrant for 

both Ms, Fuentes's car and Mr, Fenton's apartment The search ofthe apartment yielded 

methamphetamine, marijuana, and other illicit substances, The vehicle search yielded 

methamphetamine, 

Ms, Fuentes was charged with delivery of marijuana to the apartment; no charges 

were filed related to the methamphetamine found in the car,2 Ms, Fuentes moved to 

suppress the evidence derived from the investigative stop of her vehicle, including her 

admission to delivering marijuana, The trial court ruled that officers made a valid stop of 

the vehicle, Ms. Fuentes then was convicted of delivering marijuana at a stipulated facts 

trial. She timely appealed to this court. 

ANALYSIS 

The sole issue in this appeal concerns whether officers had reasonable suspicion to 

stop Ms. Fuentes as she drove away from the apartment. We agree with the trial court 

that the officers had articulable suspicion justifying the stop. 

, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966). 

2 The methamphetamine was found in her purse, which was found in the white bag 

she had placed in the trunk. 

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No.30983-5-III 

State v. Fuentes 

A finding of reasonable suspicion presents a question of law that this court 

reviews de novo. State v. Johnson, 128 Wn.2d 431,443,909 P.2d 293 (1996). In 

reviewing the denial of a suppression motion, conclusions of law are reviewed de novo 

and the findings of fact used to support those conclusions are reviewed for substantial 

evidence. State v. Garvin, 166 Wn.2d 242,249,207 P.3d 1266 (2009). Because Ms. 

Fuentes only challenges whether the uncontested facts were legally sufficient to give rise 

to reasonable suspicion, our review is de novo. 

In the context of a TerrI stop, '" [t]he reasonableness ofthe officer's suspicion is 

determined by the totality ofthe circumstances known to the officer at the inception of 

the stop.'" State v. Lee, 147 Wn. App. 912, 917,199 P.3d 445 (2008) (quoting State v. 

Rowe,63 Wn. App. 750, 753, 822 P.2d 290 (1991». We have noted that "the suspicion 

must be individualized." State v. Richardson, 64 Wn. App. 693, 697, 825 P.2d 754 

(1992). Thus, if officers "have nothing to independently connect such person to illegal 

activity, a search ofthe person is invalid under article I, section 7 [ofthe Washington 

State Constitution]." State v. Parker, 139 Wn.2d 486,498,987 P.2d 73 (1999). Where a 

suspect's activity is consistent with both criminal and noncriminal activity, officers may 

still justifY a brief detention under Terry without first ruling out all possibilities of 

3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,88 S. Ct. 1868,20 L. Ed. 2d 889 (1968). 

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No. 30983-5-111 

State v. Fuentes 

innocent behavior. State v. Kennedy, 107 Wn.2d 1,6,726 P.2d 445 (1986); State v. 

Anderson, 51 Wn. App. 775, 780, 755 P.2d 191 (1988). 

In challenging the Terry stop, Ms. Fuentes chiefly relies on two cases: Richardson 

and State v. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d 57, 239 P.3d 573 (2010). 

In Richardson, Yakima officers were patrolling an area late at night known for 

high drug activity.- Richardson, 64 Wn. App. at 694. Multiple times throughout the 

course of the night, officers observed a man standing on a comer who would then 

approach cars and talk to their occupants. The man would then disappear and reappear at 

the same comer a little bit later. When officers would approach the man, he would walk 

away, disappear out of view, and later show back up at the comer. Based on their 

training and experience, the officers believed the man's activity was consistent with drug 

dealing. Id. at 694-95. When the man showed up again later, this time with another 

person-Richardson-officers stopped the two and detained them on suspicion of drug 

dealing. A search revealed that they were both in possession of illegal drugs. Id. at 695. 

This court ultimately reversed Richardson's conviction because the officers had no 

individualized evidence that he was involved in drug-related activity. Id. at 697-98. 

Although Richardson was seen with a person reasonably suspected4 of drug-related 

activity, "an individual's mere proximity to others independently suspected of criminal 

4 Although dicta, this court opined that officers had reasonable suspicion to detain 

the man on the comer. Richardson, 64 Wn. App. at 697. 

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No.30983-5-III 

State v. Fuentes 

activity justify an investigative stop; the suspicion must be individualized." Id. at 697 

(citing State v. Thompson, 93 Wn.2d 838,841,613 P.2d 525 (1980». 

In Doughty, the appellant similar to here showed up to a suspected drug house late 

at night, stood there for two minutes, and then drove away. Officers then seized Mr. 

Doughty and found methamphetamine in his car. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d at 59-60. The 

Supreme Court reversed the conviction because the officers did not observe Mr. Doughty 

enter the house or observe anyone come to the door and interact with him. Id. at 64. The 

court also noted that Doughty was not seen carrying any unusual objects or otherwise 

acting suspiciously. Id. at 65. 

While some parallels can be drawn from Richardson and Doughty to this case, the 

officers in this case had more information on which to base their suspicions than in those 

cases. In Richardson and Doughty, officers did not see the defendant actually interact 

with the other suspected party. Here, Ms. Fuentes showed up with a suspicious package 

from her trunk and left with the same package noticeably lighter. In Doughty, officers 

only had complaints that the house was a drug house. Doughty, 170 Wn.2d at 60. Here, 

officers knew that the apartment had been and currently appeared to be used for drug 

dealing. In Doughty, officers also did not see Mr. Doughty go inside or see anyone else 

acting suspiciously. Here, officers saw Ms. Fuentes enter and exit twice within minutes 

and also observed 8 to 10 other people do the same earlier in the night. In the officers' 

training and experience, large numbers of people do not show up one at a time late at 

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No.30983-5-III 

State v. Fuentes 

night on a weeknight and stay for only minutes unless illegal activity is occurring. While 

such activity may in some circumstances be consistent with some noncriminal activities, 

the Constitution does not require officers to rule out all possibility ofinnocent behavior 

before making a brief investigatory stop. Anderson, 51 Wn. App. at 780; Kennedy, 107 

Wn.2d at 6. 

The more apt analogy is to Kennedy. There, officers were investigating a house 

suspected ofbeing used for drug dealing based on complaints by neighbors that there was 

heavy traffic in and out ofthe house by people who stayed only minutes. Kennedy, 107 

Wn.2d at 3. One ofthe people that officers observed leave the house was Mr. Kennedy. 

Officers did not see Kennedy enter or leave with any objects or see him otherwise acting 

suspiciously, but stopped him anyway after observing him leave the house. Id. The one 

substantial difference between that case and this one is that officers had a tip from an 

informant that Mr. Kennedy regularly purchased marijuana from the residence he was 

observed leaving. Id. 

While an informant's tip is strong evidence supporting reasonable suspicion, 

nothing in the Kennedy opinion states or suggests that an informant's tip is an absolute 

minimum for establishing reasonable suspicion. Indeed, Kennedy noted that no such rule 

is possible, or even desirable: '" no single rule can be fashioned to meet every 

conceivable confrontation between the police and citizen. Evaluating the reasonableness 

ofthe police action and the extent ofthe intrusion, each case must be considered in light 

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No. 30983-5-111 

State v. Fuentes 

of the particular circumstances facing the law enforcement officer.'" Kennedy, 107 

Wn.2d at 7 (quoting State v. Lesnick, 84 Wn.2d 940,944,530 P.2d 243 (1975)). 

Looking at the facts ofthis case in light of the particular circumstances facing 

officers, we find that the additional facts separating this case from Richardson and 

Doughty sufficed to give officers individualized suspicion that Ms. Fuentes had just been 

involved in the drug dealing that was known to take place at Mr. Fenton's apartment. 

Unlike those cases, she was seen carrying a bag into the apartment and came out carrying 

something different in the bag. Unlike those cases, here, the officers' suspicion that Mr. 

Fenton's apartment was a place of drug dealing was especially well founded, based on 

the search conducted a year earlier. She also went to the apartment after two hours of 

surveillance revealed that apparent drug activity was taking place there that very evening 

shortly before her arrival at midnight on a weekday. It was reasonable to infer that she 

had arrived to help resupply Mr. Fenton and/or would have information about his 

activities that evening. 

There was articulable suspicion as well as individualized suspicion ofMs. 

Fuentes. The trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress. 

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Affinned. 

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 

2.06.040. 

WE CONCUR: 


Brown, J. 

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