UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JELANI KHAMISI, Case No. 1:17-819

Petitioner,

Black, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

HAMILTON COUNTY, et al., REPORT AND

Respondents. RECOMMENDATION

Petitioner, a pretrial detainee at the Hamilton County, Ohio, Justice Center, has filed a 

petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1). For the reasons 

stated below, the petition should be dismissed.1

 

In his petition, petitioner asserts that Hamilton County, and various other named 

respondents,

2 “unreasonably seized [him] without probable cause” and “set an excessively high 

or no bond” for him. (Doc. 1, at PageID 2-4).3 

As an initial matter, an “application for a writ of habeas corpus shall be in writing signed 

and verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone acting in his behalf.” 28 

U.S.C. § 2242. Petitioner purported to sign his petition (Doc. 1, at PageID 11), but another 

individual, who has not been shown to have authority to act as a “next friend” of petitioner, 

purported to verify the petition (id., at PageID 13-14). See Tate v. United States, 72 F. App’x 

265, 266 (6thCir. 2003) (setting forth requirements for a putative “next friend”). Although the 

 1

Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the Court 

“must promptly examine” habeas petitions forwarded by the clerk for initial review and “must dismiss” a habeas 

petition “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in 

the district court.” See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 2

“Generally, the proper respondent in a habeas action under § 2241 is the petitioner’s immediate custodian 

at the time of filing.” Banks v. United States Marshal, No. 4:13-cv-490, 2013 WL 3458301, at *2 (N.D. Ohio July, 

9, 2013) (citing Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 436 (2004)). Because the instant petition is subject to dismissal 

without the need of a response, it is unnecessary to determine who the proper respondent is in this case. 3

To the extent that petitioner purports to also file the petition on behalf of Mariah McCollum (see Doc. 1, at 

PageID 2), there is no indication in the petition that petitioner is a licensed attorney. Thus, petitioner may not file 

anything on behalf of others, 28 U.S.C. § 1654, and is deemed to be the only petitioner in this case.

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Court generally would enter a deficiency order to allow petitioner to correct this deficiency, such 

an order is not warranted here because the petition is otherwise subject to dismissal. 

A pretrial detainee, who has exhausted all available state court remedies as a prelude to 

seeking federal habeas relief, may seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. See 

Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 489-90 (1973); Atkins v. 

Michigan, 644 F.2d 543, 546-47 (6th Cir. 1981). However, it is well-settled that a federal court 

should not interfere in pending state court criminal proceedings absent the threat of “irreparable 

injury” that is “both great and immediate.” Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 46 (1971). 

Abstention from adjudicating the merits of an affirmative defense to a state criminal charge prior 

to the state court’s entry of the final judgment of conviction is justified by considerations of 

comity. Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546. Therefore, intrusion into state proceedings already underway is 

warranted only in extraordinary circumstances. Braden, 410 U.S. at 489 (1973); Atkins, 644 

F.2d at 546. Furthermore, even if extraordinary circumstances exist to warrant federal court 

intervention into on-going state criminal prosecutions, the petitioner must exhaust all available 

state court remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. See, e.g., Braden, 410 U.S. at 490; 

Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546.

The Sixth Circuit has recognized exceptions to the Younger abstention doctrine in only 

three scenarios: (1) when the petitioner seeks a speedy trial, Atkins, 644 F.2d at 546-47; (2) when 

the petitioner seeks to avoid a second trial on the ground that it would violate the Double 

Jeopardy Clause, Delk v. Atkinson, 665 F.2d 90, 93 (6th Cir. 1981); and (3) when the petitioner 

seeks to challenge the State’s attempt to retry him rather than permit him to accept an initial plea 

offer originally rejected due to ineffective assistance of counsel, Turner v. Tennessee, 858 F.2d 

1201, 1205 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated on other grounds, 492 U.S. 902 (1989). See, e.g., Pruitt v. 

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3

Ohio, No. 1:10cv313, 2010 WL 2607246, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 19, 2010) (Hogan, M.J.) (Report 

& Recommendation), adopted, 2010 WL 2620804 (S.D. Ohio June 25, 2010) (Barrett, J.); 

Jenkins v. Kentucky, Civ. Act. No. 14-31-HRW, 2014 WL 2758762, at *2 (E.D. Ky. June 3, 

2014) (citing and quoting Simpson v. Jones, No. 11-cv-422-JBC-CJS, 2012 WL 3912755, at *2-3 

(E.D. Ky. July 16, 2012) (Report & Recommendation), adopted, 2012 WL 3912738 (E.D. Ky. 

Sept. 7, 2012)); Coleman v. Jones, No. 3:10cv163, 2010 WL 1643276, at *3 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 

21, 2010); Robinson v. Michigan, No. 1:09cv231, 2009 WL 1067245, at *1 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 

17, 2009). None of those exceptions apply here. Petitioner’s claims do not constitute the type of 

“extraordinary circumstances” recognized by the Sixth Circuit that would permit this Court to 

intervene in the pending state criminal trial proceedings.

In any event, even assuming, arguendo, that extraordinary circumstances exist to justify 

this Court’s intervention in the ongoing state criminal proceedings, it appears that it is subject to 

dismissal because petitioner has not exhausted any available state court remedies before applying 

for federal habeas corpus relief.

4

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. Petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus be DISMISSED without 

prejudice to refiling after petitioner has exhausted all available state court remedies.

2. A certificate of appealability should not issue because, for the foregoing reasons, 

petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right that is 

remediable at this juncture in this proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. R. App. P. 22(b).

3. The Court certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that with respect to any 

application by petitioner to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis, an appeal of any Order 

 4

The online docket report for petitioner’s Hamilton County, Ohio case is available at 

https://www.courtclerk.org/case.asp, under case number B 1705754-D. 

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adopting this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in “good faith,” and therefore 

DENY petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a); Kincade v. 

Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997).

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

JELANI KHAMISI, Case No. 1:17-819

Petitioner,

Black, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

HAMILTON COUNTY, et al.,

Respondents.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of 

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on 

timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected 

to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report 

and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral 

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such 

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the 

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections 

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in 

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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