# FILED

April 15, 1999 Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appellate C ourt Clerk IN THE COURT OF CR IMINAL A PPEALS OF TENN ESSEE AT JA CKSON APRIL SESSION, 1999

RONALD WARD, ) ) No. 02C01-9806-CC-00173 Appellant ) ) HENRY COUNTY vs. ) ) Hon. Julian P. Guinn, Judge STATE OF TENN ESSEE, ) ) (Post-Conviction) Appellee )

For the Appellant : For the Appellee : Teresa McCaig Marshall Paul G. Summers Attorney at Law Attorney General and Repor ter 308 W. Washington Street Paris, TN 38242 Georgia Blythe Felner Assistant Attorney Gener al Criminal Justice Div

ision 425 Fifth Avenue North 2d Floor, Cordell Hul l Building Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Robert "Gus" Radf

ord District Attorney General Post Office Box 686 Huntingdon, TN 38344

OPINION FILED: AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO R ULE 20

David G. Hay

es Judge2 OPINION

The appellant, Ronald W ard, appeals from an order entered in the Henry County Circuit Cour

t dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the appellant contends, first, that h is counsel was ineffectiv e for his failure to invest igate and pursue a defense, specifically the defe nse of entrapment, and second, that his guilty pleas wer

e involuntary because trial counsel misled him as to the meaning of the thirty percent (30% ) release eligibil ity date.

After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. C rim. R. App.

On January 15, 1997, the appellant entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale of cocaine over one-half gr am, class B felonies, and one count of sale of cocaine under one-half gram, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a range I standard offender to eight years for each class B felony and three years on the class C felony. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. No direct appeal was taken fr om the sentence.

In February of 1998, the appell ant filed a pro se petition for post-convic tion relief. The pro se

petition was subsequently amended after appointment of counsel. A hearing on the merits w as held during whic

h evidence was present ed revealing that the drug transactions leading to the charges against the appellant were videotaped. In response to this evidence, the appellant admitted, “there was no need in it [going to trial], that he was busted, that they had him.” Moreover, defense counsel testified that he thoroug hly explained the meaning of the thirty percent (30%) release eligi bility date to the appell ant. In dismissing the pe tition on its merits, the post-convic

tion court found:3 . . .There is no evidence th at would even remotely suggest that a defense of entrapment or any other defense w as available in the petitioner’s case or, for that matter, that the petitioner’ s pleas of guilty were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. The petitioner fully understood the sentences he was to and did receive.
In a post-conviction pr

oceeding, the appellant has the burden of establishing his cla ims by c

lear and convin cing ev

idence. Tenn. Co

de Ann. §

40-30-2 10(f) (1997). Moreover, the findings of fact of the post-convic tion court have the wei ght of a jury verdict and

are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponde rates against its judgment. Davis v. State , 9 12S. W.2 d 6 89 , 6 97 (Ten n. 19 95 ). We conclude that the appellant has fail ed to carry his burden of establishing his clai ms. Moreover, we cannot conclude that the evidence pr eponderates against the tri al court’s findings of fact. As a result, we find no error of law mandating rever sal of the court’s judgment. The post -conviction court’s

denial of the appellant’s petiti on for post-conviction rel ief is affirmed in accordance with Tenn. Ct. Crim. R. App. 20.

____________________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Jud ge

CONCUR:

________________________________ JOSEPH M. TIPT ON, Judge

________________________________ L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge