alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
In the United States Court of Federal Claims 

OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS

No. 19-1491V

UNPUBLISHED

BRIAN OBERSCHMID and HEATHER 

OBERSCHMID, as parents and natural 

guardians of minor child, J.O.,

 Petitioner,

v.

SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND 

HUMAN SERVICES,

 Respondent.

Chief Special Master Corcoran 

Filed: February 18, 2020

Special Processing Unit (SPU);

Ruling on Entitlement; Concession;

Table Injury; Influenza (Flu) Vaccine;

Guillain-Barre Syndrome (GBS)

Kate Gerayne Westad, SiebenCarey, Minneapolis, MN, for petitioner.

Laurie Wiesner, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for respondent.

RULING ON ENTITLEMENT1

On September 26, 2019, Brian and Heather Oberschmid filed a petition for 

compensation, on behalf of their minor child, J.O., under the National Vaccine Injury 

Compensation Program, 42 U.S.C. §300aa-10, et seq.,

2

(the “Vaccine Act”). Petitioners

allege that J.O. suffered Guillain-Barré Syndrome (GBS), which meets the Table 

definition for GBS, after receiving the influenza vaccination on September 27, 2016. 

Petition at 1, ¶¶ 1, 12. The case was assigned to the Special Processing Unit of the 

Office of Special Masters.

 

1 Because this unpublished ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the action in this case, I am 

required to post it on the United States Court of Federal Claims' website in accordance with the EGovernment Act of 2002. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of 

Electronic Government Services). This means the ruling will be available to anyone with access to 

the internet. In accordance with Vaccine Rule 18(b), Petitioner has 14 days to identify and move to 

redact medical or other information, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of 

privacy. If, upon review, I agree that the identified material fits within this definition, I will redact such 

material from public access. 

2 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755. Hereinafter, for 

ease of citation, all “§” references to the Vaccine Act will be to the pertinent subparagraph of 42 U.S.C. § 

300aa (2012).
2

On February 13, 2020, Respondent filed his Rule 4(c) report in which he

concedes that Petitioners are entitled to compensation in this case. Respondent’s Rule 

4(c) Report at 1. Specifically, Respondent concludes “that petitioners have satisfied the 

criteria set forth in the revised Vaccine Injury Table (Table) and the Qualifications and 

Aids to Interpretation (QAI), which afford petitioners a presumption of causation if the 

onset of GBS occurs between three and forty-two days after a seasonal flu vaccination 

and there is no apparent alternative cause.” Id. at 4. Respondent further agrees that 

“based on the current record, petitioners have satisfied all legal prerequisites for 

compensation under the Act.” Id.

In view of Respondent’s position and the evidence of record, I find that 

Petitioner is entitled to compensation.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

s/Brian H. Corcoran

Brian H. Corcoran

Chief Special Master
#### Raymond L. Aronson et al., Plaintiffs, v Cary Crane et al., Defendants.

Supreme Court, Nassau County,

May 10, 1988

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

*Stein, Rubine & Stein*for Cary Crane, defendant. *Fogarty & Fogarty*for 46th Avenue Owners, Inc., defendant. *Goldsmith, Greenwald & Weiss*for plaintiffs.

OPINION OF THE COURT

John S. Lockman, J.

Motion by defendants 220-55 46th Avenue Owners, Inc., Irwin Wolf, Myron Liebrader and Josephine Levy to dismiss plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a cause of action is *745denied. Cross motion by plaintiffs to strike said defendants’ answer is denied.

Plaintiffs, tenant shareholders in a cooperative corporation, entered into a contract of sale with defendants Gary and Andrea Crane, cooperators in the same building, subject to approval of the sale by the individual defendant members of the board of directors of the defendant corporation.

Plaintiffs allege that the board and the Cranes conspired to permit the Cranes to breach the contract of sale without subjecting themselves to damages or a lawsuit. Plaintiffs allege that the board, after approving the Cranes for the sal£, coached them on how to make themselves unacceptable to the board as prospective purchasers.

The moving defendants claim that absent unlawful discrimination, the board had the power to approve or disapprove prospective purchasers for any reason or no reason at all. Thus, they argue, plaintiffs fail to state a cause , of action against them. *(See, Rossi v Simms,*119 AD2d 137; Civil Rights Law § 19-a.)

Defendants are quite correct regarding the approval powers of a board of directors. However, another factor, which does not operate in the ordinary sale of shares and proprietary lease, militates against dismissal at this stage of the pleadings. Here the parties to the contract of sale were each shareholders in the cooperative corporation. The " 'fiduciary or trust relation which directors and officers sustain to stockholders * * * imposes upon directors and officers as fiduciaries the duty not to use their position for their own personal advantage or for that of * * * confederates or to the detriment of stockholders * * * there is * * * a fiduciary principle which protects the stockholders.’ ” *(Schwartz v Marien,*37 NY2d 487, 492.) Where there is a prima facie case of "unequal stockholder treatment” the directors have the burden of proving a "bona fide business purpose”. *(Supra,*at 492; *Goldberg v Goldberg,*131 AD2d 543.) Thus, plaintiffs have stated a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and "bad faith” dealing. *(See also, Goldstone v Constable,*84 AD2d 519; *Van Camp v Sherman,*132 AD2d 453, 454; *see generally, Jamil v South-ridge Coop., Section 4,*93 Misc 2d 383, 385 [bad faith or breach of trust on the part of directors renders judgment exercised by them subject to review in the courts].)

The cross motion to dismiss defendants’ answer for failure to go forward with examinations before trial is denied, *746as any disclosure is automatically stayed while a summary judgment or dismissal motion is pending (CPLR 3214 [b]). Furthermore, the sanction is too drastic under the circumstances of this case.
Exhibit


Exhibit 10.1




AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO
EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


This AMENDMENT NO. 2 TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT (this “Amendment”) is made and entered into as of October 2, 2015, by and between RAYMOND L. GELLEIN, JR. (the “Executive”) and STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS, INC. (the “Company”).
WITNESSETH THAT:
WHEREAS, the Executive and the Company are parties to that certain Employment Agreement, effective as of November 2, 2012, as amended on October 10, 2014 (the “Employment Agreement”); and
WHEREAS, the parties desire to amend the Employment Agreement;
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual promises made herein and for other good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged by the parties, the parties hereby agree as follows:
		
	1.
	Performance of Services.  Paragraph 1(a) of the Employment Agreement is amended by deleting “December 31, 2015” and inserting in lieu thereof “June 30, 2016.”


		
	2.
	Effect of Amendment.  Unless expressly amended by this Amendment, all other provisions of the Employment Agreement shall remain in legal force and effect.


IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this Amendment as of the date first above stated, and to be effective upon such date.


    
	
					
	 
	STRATEGIC HOTELS & RESORTS, INC.

	 
	 

	 
	 
	 

	 
	By:
	/s/ Paula C. Maggio

	 
	Name:
	Paula C. Maggio

	 
	Title:
	Executive Vice President, General Counsel & Secretary

	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 
	RAYMOND GELLEIN, JR.

	 
	 
	 
	 

	 
	 
	 
	/s/ Raymond L. Gellein, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

CAMERON PADGETT, │ Case No. 2:17-cv-00919-ALM-KAJ

│

Plaintiff, │ Hon. Algenon L. Marbley

│

v. │ Mag. Kimberly A. Jolson

│

MICHAEL V. DRAKE, │

In his personal and official capacities as │

president of The Ohio State University, et al. │

│

Defendants. │

│

NOTICE OF KYLE J. BRISTOW WITHDRAWING AS ATTORNEY OF RECORD FOR 

PLAINTIFF CAMERON PADGETT (SUBSTITUTION OF COUNSEL)

By stipulation of Plaintiff Cameron Padgett, Attorney Kyle J. Bristow, and Attorney James 

E. Kolenich:

1. Attorney Kyle J. Bristow is withdrawn from the instant civil action as an attorney of record 

for Plaintiff Cameron Padgett.

2. Plaintiff Cameron Padgett shall continue to be represented by Attorney James E. 

Kolenich—who already has entered his appearance.

/s/ Kyle J. Bristow /s/ James E. Kolenich

Kyle J. Bristow (#0089543) James E. Kolenich (#0077084)

P.O. Box 381164 9435 Waterstone Blvd., Ste. 140

Clinton Twp., MI 48038 Cincinnati, OH 45069

(T): (248) 838-9934 (T): (513) 444-2150

(E): BristowLaw@gmail.com (E): JEK318@gmail.com

Withdrawing Attorney for Cameron Padgett Trial Attorney for Cameron Padgett

/s/ Cameron Padgett

Cameron Padgett

Plaintiff
2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, James E. Kolenich, affirm that on March 2, 2018, I submitted this document to the 

Court’s Electronic Filing System, which should serve said document upon all attorneys of record 

who have registered to receive service of process through said system.

/s/ James E. Kolenich

James E. Kolenich (#0077084)

9435 Waterstone Blvd., Ste. 140

Cincinnati, OH 45069

(T): (513) 444-2150

(E): JEK318@gmail.com

Trial Attorney for Cameron Padgett

Dated: March 2, 2018
CERTIFICATION OF CEO AND CFO PURSUANT TO
                                                18 U.S.C. ss. 1350,
                                              AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                                     ss. 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

In connection  with the Quarterly  Report on Form 10-QSB of Dialex Minerals Inc.
(the  Company)  for the  quarter  ended  September  30,  2003 as filed  with the
Securities and Exchange  Commission on the date hereof (the Report),  I, L. Kirk
Boyd, Chief Financial Officer of the Company,  hereby certifies,  pursuant to 18
U.S.C.  ss. 1350, as adopted  pursuant to ss. 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of
2002, to the best of his/her knowledge, that:

(1) The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The  information  contained in the Report fairly  presents,  in all material
respects, the financial condition and result of operations of the Company.


By:                                    /s/ L. Kirk Boyd
                                      ----------------------------------
                                           L.Kirk Boyd
                                           Chief Financial Officer


                                      October 28, 2003

This  certification   accompanies  this  Report  pursuant  to  ss.  906  of  the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002 and shall not,  except to the extent required by the
Sarbanes-Oxley  Act of 2002,  be deemed filed by the Company for purposes of ss.
18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended.
<PAGE>
                                                                    EXHIBIT 99.2

                 Certification of Chief Financial Officer under
                  Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

         I hereby certify that the Quarterly Report on Form 10-Q of O'Sullivan
Industries, Inc. for the quarter ended December 31, 2002 fully complies with the
requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
and that the information contained in such quarterly report fairly presents, in
all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of
O'Sullivan Industries, Inc.



Date:  February 13, 2002                         /s/ Phillip J. Pacey
                                           -------------------------------
                                                   Phillip J. Pacey
                                                Senior Vice President
                                              and Chief Financial Officer
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

MISTI COUCH, : Case No. 3:17-cv-90
Plaintiff, : District Judge Walter H. Rice
: Magistrate Judge Sharon L. Ovington

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF THE SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,

Defendant.

DECISION AND ENTRY

This case is before the Court on the parties’ Stipulation to Award EAJA Fees
under. (Doc. #14). Specifically, the parties stipulate and petition this Court to enter an
order awarding attorney fees in the total amount of $ 4,000.00 under the Equal Access
to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. The award of attorney fees will fully
satisfy any and all Plaintiff's claims for fees, costs, and expenses under 28 U.S.C. §
2412, that may be payable in this case.

Any fees paid belong to Plaintiff and can be offset to satisfy pre-existing debt

that Plaintiff owes the United States, pursuant to the decision in Astrue v. Ratliff, 560
U.S. 586 (2010). After the Court enters this award, if counsel for the parties can verify
that Plaintiff owes no pre-existing debt subject to offset, Defendant will direct that the
award be made payable to Plaintiffs attorney pursuant to the EAJA assignment duly

signed by Plaintiff. Defendant will direct the Treasury Department to mail any check in



this matter to the business address of Plaintiff's counsel.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. The Parties’ Stipulation to Award EAJA Fees (Doc. #14) is
accepted and the Commissioner shall pay Plaintiffs attorney
fees, costs, and expenses in the total amount of $4,000.00;

De Counsel for the parties shall verify, within thirty days of this
Decision and Entry, whether or not Plaintiff owes a pre-
existing debt to the United States subject to offset. If no such
pre-existing debt exists, Defendant shall pay the EAJA award
directly to Plaintiff's counsel pursuant to the EAJA assignment
signed by Plaintiff; and

3! The case remains terminated on the docket of this Court.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: Gra é& (Nw ioe

Walter H. Rice
United States District Judge
Court of Appeals of the State of Georgia

Clerk's Office, Atlanta, March 09, 2017.

I certify that the above is a true extract from the minutes 

of the Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Witness my signature and the seal of said court hereto 

affixed the day and year last above written.

, Clerk.

Court of Appeals 

of the State of Georgia

ATLANTA, March 09, 2017

The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order

A17I0159. CRS CAPITAL, INC. et al. v. RREF II PB ACQUISITIONS, LLC et al. .

Upon consideration of the Application for Interlocutory Appeal, it is ordered that it be 

hereby DENIED.

LC NUMBERS:

2016V115095
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION
JANE ROE,
Plaintiff, Case No. 2:17-cv-945
CHIEF JUDGE EDMUND A. SARGUS, JR.
v. Magistrate Judge Chelsey M. Vascura

JAVAUNE ADAMS-GASTON, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff Jane Roe’s Motion for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously [ECF No. 4]. Defendants do not object to this request.

A complaint generally must state the names of all parties. Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558,
560 (6th Cir. 2004). However, the Court may excuse a plaintiff from identifying herself in
certain circumstances. /d. A plaintiff can proceed anonymously only if her privacy interests
substantially outweigh the presumption of open judicial proceedings. /d. Several considerations
guide this inquiry: (1) whether the plaintiff is suing to challenge governmental activity; (2)
whether prosecution of the suit will compel the plaintiff to disclose information “of the utmost
intimacy”; (3) whether the litigation compels the plaintiff to disclose an intention to violate the
law; and (4) whether the plaintiff is a child. Jd. (quoting Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185-86
(Sth Cir. 1981).

The Court has balanced Plaintiff's privacy interests against the public’s right of access to
court proceedings. See Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. That Plaintiff is challenging a governmental
activity weighs in favor of her request to proceed anonymously. And, critically, given the

circumstances of this case, requiring Plaintiff to proceed under her real name would disclose


information of the utmost intimacy, including education records protected from disclosure by the
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), 20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 C.F.R. pt. 99. For
these reasons, Plaintiff's privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of open
judicial proceedings, and the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed
Anonymously [ECF No. 4] as “Jane Roe.”

Plaintiff shall inform the Court if her identity becomes public knowledge at any point
during the litigation. The Court would, in that situation, reconsider the analysis supporting

Plaintiff's request to proceed anonymously.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
H=X- 2017 PN
DATE EDMUND)A. SARGUS, JR.

CHIE ITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Final Rule: Mandatory Reporting of Petroleum and Natural Gas Systems 

Meeting Documentation Interagency Meeting – Comments on Rule, October 29, 2010 Date Staff Contact Information 

(Name, email, phone #) 

Name of Organization (Attach list of all attendees names and emails if possible) 

Summary of Discussion (e.g., applicability, reporting 

requirements, etc.)

Written CommProvided? Did they also submit to Dock

10/29 Roger Fernandez, 

Fernandez.roger@epa.gov

202-343-9386 

Agencies attending: OMB, EPA, 

A conference call was held to discuss interagency comments and questions on the final rule. 

Y
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM BALANCE
SHEETS, STATEMENT OF OPERATIONS AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO
SUCH FORM 10-QSB.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1
<CURRENCY> US DOLLARS

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   6-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1999
<PERIOD-START>                             APR-01-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               JUN-30-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                          32,391
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    3,250
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                          0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                35,641
<PP&E>                                          38,543
<DEPRECIATION>                                       0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 292,110
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                           79,133
<BONDS>                                         91,218
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                       838,132
<OTHER-SE>                                    (716,373)
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   292,110
<SALES>                                            684
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                   684
<CGS>                                           13,568
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  149,153
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                60,119
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               2,298
<INCOME-PRETAX>                               (224,454)
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                           (224,454)
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                  (224,454)
<EPS-BASIC>                                       (.05)
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     (.05)


</TABLE>
Exhibit 32.2
                            CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO
                             18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                             AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
                  SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002


         In connection with the Quarterly Report of Quintek  Technologies,  Inc.
on Form 10-QSB for the period ending March 31, 2004 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange  Commission  on the date hereof,  I, Andrew Haag,  Chief  Financial
Officer of the Company,  certify,  pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  ss.  1350,  as adopted
pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

         1. The Report complies with the  requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

         2. The  information  contained in the Report  fairly  presents,  in all
material  respects,  the  financial  condition  and result of  operations of the
Company.

Date:  May 20, 2004

                                /S/ ANDREW HAAG
                                --------------------
                                Andrew Haag
                                Chief Financial Officer
IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

OF TEXAS

NO. AP-75,952

EX PARTE OLIVER WENDELL HART, III, Applicant

ON APPLICATION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

CAUSE NO. 04F0275-005 IN THE 5 DISTRICT COURT TH

FROM BOWIE COUNTY

Per curiam.

O P I N I O N

Pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the

clerk of the trial court transmitted to this Court this application for a writ of habeas corpus. Ex parte

Young, 418 S.W.2d 824, 826 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967). Applicant was convicted of manufacture of

a controlled substance and sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. 

Applicant contends that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance because he failed to

advise him of his right to file an appeal. 

The trial court has determined that trial counsel failed to advise Applicant of his right to

appeal and failed to file notice of appeal on Applicant’s behalf. We find, therefore, that Applicant
is entitled to the opportunity to file an out-of-time appeal ofthe judgment of conviction in Cause No.

04F0275-005 from the 5 Judicial District Court of Bowie County. Applicant is ordered returned th

to that time at which he may give a written notice of appeal so that he may then, with the aid of

counsel, obtain a meaningful appeal. All time limits shall be calculated as if the sentence had been

imposed on the date on which the mandate of this Court issues. We hold that, should Applicant

desire to prosecute an appeal, he must take affirmative steps to file a written notice of appeal in the

trial court within 30 days after the mandate of this Court issues.

Delivered: June 25, 2008

Do Not Publish
Case: 3:17-cr-00184-WHR Doc #: 4 Filed: 09/11/17 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 16