COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Willis, Fitzpatrick and Overton 

Argued at Salem, Virginia 

ROBERT BRUCE JACKSON 

v. Record No. 2138-95-3 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON 

JEAN JACKSON HARLEY MAY 14, 1996 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 

Charles H. Smith, Jr., Judge 

 Melissa Warner Scoggins (David G. Weaver; 

Gentry, Locke, Rakes & Moore, on briefs), for 

appellant. 

 Charlie R. Jessee (Jessee & Read, P.C., on 

brief), for appellee. 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 

 Robert Bruce Jackson appeals the decision of the trial court 

finding that he has agreed to send all of his three children to 

college and requiring him to pay those expenses. We affirm the 

trial court's ruling as to the first child, but reverse as to the 

two younger children. 

 When Dr. Robert Jackson and Jean Harley Jackson divorced in 

1987, their children were ten, seven, and four years old. The 

Stipulation Agreement incorporated into the divorce decree 

contained a provision concerning college expenses: 

 16. The Parties hereto agree that should each of 

the Parties, decide to send any or all of their 

children, aforesaid, to college, said educational 

expense(s) will be provided for by the Parties on a 

pro-rated basis of his or her income to the other 

Party. 
- 2 - 

 As an example, the following is provided: 

 Husband's annual earnings — $200,000.00 

 Wife's annual earnings — 20,000.00 

 Wife would be obligated to pay ten (10%) of the 

child's college expenses. 

 In Fall 1994 their eldest daughter decided to forego her 

senior year of high school and enrolled at the University of 

Virginia. Dr. Jackson did not want her to go to school this 

early, but instead thought that she should take a year off. He 

eventually paid ninety percent of her college expenses, but 

challenged the provision, arguing that each parent was required 

to agree to send the child to college and he did not agree. The 

court ruled that the agreement contemplated a college education 

for all the children and that neither parent had a veto power. 

The judge further found that the parties in fact had agreed to 

send their children to college. 

 A separation agreement is enforced as any other contract 

between the parties. Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 128, 336 

S.E.2d 157, 162 (1985). "Property settlement and support 

agreements are subject to the same rules of construction and 

interpretation applicable to contracts generally." Fry v. 

Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173, 180, 355 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1987); see

Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 15, 332 S.E.2d 796, 799 

(1985). The intent of the parties as expressed in the contract 

controls the interpretation. Bender-Miller Co. v. Thomwood 

Farms, Inc., 211 Va. 585, 588, 179 S.E.2d 636, 639 (1971). "When 

the terms of a disputed provision are clear and definite, it is 
- 3 - 

axiomatic that they are to be applied according to their ordinary 

meaning." Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App. 510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 

595 (1986). 

 The agreement in question provided that should each of the 

parties decide to send any or all of the children to college, the 

expenses would be split. This language clearly contemplates that 

the parties must both agree that each child should attend 

college. 

 The trial court found that the parties had already agreed to 

send all of their children to college. The record does not 

support this conclusion in its entirety. Robert Jackson did 

demonstrate, by his actions and words, that he agreed to send his 

eldest daughter to college. He objected only to her leaving a 

year early, not to her attending college at all. He ultimately 

did pay for the first year, rather than refusing to contribute to 

her decision. The trial court was correct in holding Dr. Jackson 

responsible for his pro rata share of his first daughter's 

college expenses. 

 The evidence before the court demonstrates that the parties 

have not agreed to send their two younger children to college. 

If they are so inclined, the parties may agree, at any time, as 

to whether either or both of the children shall be sent to 

college, but as neither child is yet of college age, these 

discussions need not be made now. 

 We affirm the trial court's decision concerning the college 
- 4 - 

expenses of the eldest daughter. The portion of the ruling 

concerning the other children is reversed and remanded for the 

trial court to enter an order not inconsistent with this holding. 

 Affirmed in part,

reversed in part,

and remanded.