UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM A. MARTIN, Case No. 1:17-cv-715

Petitioner,

Dlott, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

BILL MORRISON, ORDER AND REPORT

DIRECTOR, BUTLER COUNTY CSEA, AND RECOMMENDATION

Respondent. 

Petitioner has filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) along with a 

“Notice of Petition Writ of Habeas Corpus Void Support Order for Violation of Due Process” 

(Doc. 3-1).

1 Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) is GRANTED. 

For the reasons set forth below, however, the Court recommends that petitioner’s habeas corpus 

petition (Doc. 3-1) be dismissed with prejudice on the ground that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider it.

On October 30, 2017, this Court entered an Order to show cause why this case should not 

be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it did not appear from the face of the 

petition that petitioner was “in custody” when he filed the petition. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(a) 

and 2241(c)(3). (Doc. 2, at PageID 16-17). Petitioner filed a response on November 27, 2017. 

(Doc. 4). 

Upon review of the petition that petitioner seeks to file (Doc. 3-1) as well as petitioner’s 

response (Doc. 4) to the Court’s October 30, 2017 show cause Order (Doc. 2), the undersigned 

finds that the petition is subject to dismissal with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 4 

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Petitioner’s application to proceed in forma pauperis and an exhibit attached to his habeas petition 

contained privacy information subject to redaction under Rule 5.2(a), Fed. R. Civ. P. The Court directed the Clerk 

of Court to redact the privacy information, to electronically file the redacted in forma pauperis application and 

exhibit, and to seal the original in forma pauperis application and exhibit. (Doc. 2, at PageID 17). The Court refers 

herein to the redacted versions of petitioner’s submissions. (See Doc. 3).

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of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts.2

 

From the petition and the exhibit attached thereto (Doc. 3-1), petitioner appears to be 

challenging a January 20, 2017 amended Income Withholding for Support Order for child 

support payments. (See Doc. 3-1, Exh., p. 1 of 5 (lower right corner)). 

Petitioner does not indicate under which federal habeas statute he brings his challenge. 

Accordingly, this Court finds this action to be governed by the general habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2241, as opposed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which applies to petitioners who are in custody pursuant 

to the judgment of a state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). However, notwithstanding whether 

§ 2241 or § 2254 applies, this action should be dismissed with prejudice for lack of jurisdiction.

“The federal habeas corpus statutes give the United States district courts jurisdiction to 

review habeas corpus petitions only from persons ‘in custody in violation of the Constitution or 

laws or treatises of the United States.’” McClure v. Villa in Park HOA, No. 1:07-cv-366, 2007 

WL 2046799, at *1 (S.D. Ohio May 22, 2007) (Hogan, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation) 

(quoting 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c)(3) and 2254(a) (emphasis original)), adopted, 2007 WL 2021855 

(S.D. Ohio Jul. 6, 2007) (Dlott, J.). A “civil judgment requiring [a petitioner] to pay child 

support does not . . . constitute custody” for purposes of 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241 or 2254. Sevier v. 

Turner, 742 F.2d 262, 269 (6th Cir. 1984). 

In any event, courts that have considered the issue have consistently held out of 

“deference to state expertise in the field of domestic relations” that the extraordinary remedy of a 

writ of habeas corpus is not available, and indeed would be “inappropriate,” in such cases. See, 

e.g., Castorr v. Brundage, 674 F.2d 531, 535-36 (6th Cir. 1982); see also Lehman v. Lycoming 

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Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, the Court 

“must promptly examine” habeas petitions forwarded by the clerk for initial review and “must dismiss” a habeas 

petition “if it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in 

the district court.” See 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 

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Cty. Children’s Services, 458 U.S. 502, 515-16 (1982) (holding that “§ 2254 does not confer 

federal-court jurisdiction” in cases involving child-custody disputes); Jacobson v. Summit Cty. 

Children Services Bd., 202 F. App’x 88, 909 (6th Cir. 2006) (relying on Lehman in holding that 

the court lacked habeas jurisdiction to review the state court’s judgment involuntarily 

terminating parental rights); Collier v. Petro, No. 1:05-cv-2908, 2007 WL 81849, at *5 (N.D. 

Ohio Jan. 8, 2007) (holding that the petitioner was “forbidden from” seeking to “overturn the 

Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in his state-court child visitation battle by way of a habeas 

Petition” because “district courts clearly lack jurisdiction over state court child custody 

decisions”).

Indeed, it is well settled that federal courts generally lack jurisdiction over domestic 

relations matters, including child support, “even when those questions are presented in the guise 

of a federal question.” See Robinson v. Michigan, No. 1:09cv564, 2009 WL 3011225, at *3 

(W.D. Mich. Sept. 16, 2009) (and numerous cases cited therein); see also Stephens v. Hayes, 374 

F. App’x 620, 623 (6th Cir. 2010) (“[u]nder the principles of comity and deference to state 

expertise in the field of domestic relations,” and in accordance with the court’s “consistent 

policy,” the Sixth Circuit “decline[d] to exercise jurisdiction” over claims that constituted 

collateral attacks on state-court judgments pertaining to child custody); Lee v. Johnson-Wharton, 

No. 1:14cv868, 2014 WL 7015178, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2014) (Dlott, J.; Litkovitz, M.J.) 

(relying on Stephens and Sefa v. Kentucky, 510 F. App’x 435, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2013), in holding 

that the district court lacked jurisdiction to consider claims couched in terms of a civil rights 

action, which essentially amounted to a collateral attack of a state-court judgment terminating the 

plaintiff’s parental rights). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which generally prohibits federal 

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district courts from entertaining appeals from cases already litigated in state court,3 also is 

applicable to the extent that the petitioner is complaining about state court rulings issued against 

him before the instant action commenced and is inviting this Court to review and reject those 

determinations. See Lee, 2014 WL 7015178, at *3 (holding that the district court also lacked 

jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to reverse the state court’s decision terminating 

the plaintiff’s parental rights). 

Accordingly, in sum, because it plainly appears that this Court lacks jurisdiction to 

consider the petitioner’s habeas corpus petition, the petition should be dismissed with prejudice 

at the screening stage. See Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States 

District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254; see also Parks v. Warden, No. 1:16-cv-992, 2016 WL 

6084016, at *2-3 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 17, 2016) (Litkovitz, M.J.) (Report & Recommendation), 

adopted, 2016 WL 7046025 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 2, 2016) (Bertelsman, J) (summarily dismissing 

with prejudice habeas corpus petition for lack of jurisdiction where the petitioner challenged an 

order regarding his obligation to make child support payments). 

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED THAT:

1. Petitioner’s motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (Doc. 3) is GRANTED. 

IT IS THEREFORE RECOMMENDED THAT:

1. The petitioner’s pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus (Doc. 3-1), construed as 

governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2241, be DISMISSED with prejudice on the ground that this Court 

lacks jurisdiction to consider it.

2. A certificate of appealability should not issue because petitioner has not stated a 

“viable claim of the denial of a constitutional right,” nor are the issues presented “adequate to 

 3

See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 

263 U.S. 413 (1923); see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudia Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); 

Lawrence v. Welch, 531 F.3d 364, 368 (6th Cir. 2008); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995).

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deserve encouragement to proceed further.” See Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 475 (2000)

(citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 & n.4 (1983)); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c); Fed. 

R. App. P. 22(b).

3. With respect to any application by petitioner to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis,

the Court should certify pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that an appeal of any Order adopting 

this Report and Recommendation would not be taken in “good faith,” and, therefore, should 

DENY petitioner leave to appeal in forma pauperis upon a showing of financial necessity. See

Fed. R. App. P. 24(a); Kincade v. Sparkman, 117 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 1997).

s/ Stephanie K. Bowman

Stephanie K. Bowman 

United States Magistrate Judge

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION 

WILLIAM A. MARTIN, Case No. 1:17-cv-715

Petitioner,

Dlott, J.

vs. Bowman, M.J.

BILL MORRISON,

DIRECTOR, BUTLER COUNTY CSEA,

Respondent. 

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of 

the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on 

timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected 

to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report 

and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral 

hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such 

portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the 

assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections 

WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in 

accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

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