[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 18-12114

Non-Argument Calendar

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Agency No. A060-009-810

CHAD PARCHMENT-BERRY, 

 Petitioner,

 versus

U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL, 

 Respondent.

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Petition for Review of a Decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

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(December 17, 2018)

Before WILSON, NEWSOM, and HULL, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Chad Parchment-Berry, a native of Jamaica, appeals the final order of the 

Board of Immigration Appeals upholding the Immigration Judge’s determination 

that he was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C.

§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Specifically, the IJ concluded that Parchment-Berry was 

removable for having committed a “crime of violence,” as defined by 18 U.S.C. 

§ 16(a), because of his Florida conviction for robbery with a weapon under Fla. 

Stat. § 812.13(1).

1

 On appeal, Parchment-Berry argues that his robbery offense is 

not a “categorical match” to § 16(a) because it is “overbroad to the federal 

definition of a crime of violence.” 

Section 16 defines “crime of violence” as “an offense that has as an element 

the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or 

property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 16(a).2 In determining whether a state 

conviction is a “crime of violence,” this Court “examine[s] what the state 

conviction necessarily involved, not the facts underlying the case” and “must 

 1 Florida’s robbery statute defines robbery as:

the taking of money or other property which may be the subject of larceny from 

the person or custody of another, with intent to either permanently or temporarily 

deprive the person or the owner of the money or other property, when in the 

course of the taking there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting in fear.

Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1). 

2 The Supreme Court recently held that the “residual clause” of the crime of violence definition 

found in 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) is unconstitutionally vague. See Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 

1216 (2018). 

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presume that the conviction rested upon [nothing] more than the least of th[e] acts 

criminalized.” Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 190–91 (2013) (quotations 

omitted). 

Parchment-Berry argues that the Florida robbery statute is not a crime of 

violence because it does not necessarily involve “the use, attempted use, or 

threatened use of physical force.” Specifically, he points to the fact that one can be 

convicted for robbery in Florida not just for the “use of force, violence, [or] 

assault,” but also for “putting [another] in fear.” The problem with this contention, 

however, is what Parchment-Berry calls the “800 pound pink gorilla in the 

room”—namely, that we have already held that Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) is a “crime of 

violence” in the context of the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) and 

the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). See United States v. 

Seabrooks, 839 F.3d 1326, 1341 (11th Cir. 2016); United States v. Lockley, 632 

F.3d 1238, 1245 (11th Cir. 2011). Because § 16(a)’s definition of “crime of 

violence” is essentially identical to the definitions in § 924(e) and § 4B1.2(a)(1), 

we conclude—based on Seabrooks and Lockley—that Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) is a 

“crime of violence” within the meaning of § 16(a). See Hernandez v. U.S. Att’y. 

Gen., 513 F.3d 1336, 1341 (11th Cir. 2008) (relying on a Guidelines decision to 

hold that a Georgia offense is a crime of violence under § 16(a) because the

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“sentencing enhancement defined the term ‘crime of violence’ just as it is defined 

in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a)”). 

Parchment-Berry argues that these decisions were incorrect. But that 

contention cannot carry the day; those decisions “[are] binding on all subsequent 

panels unless and until [they are] overruled or undermined to the point of 

abrogation by the Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.” United States v. 

Sneed, 600 F.3d 1326, 1332 (11th Cir. 2010). See also United States v. Lee, 886 

F.3d 1161, 1164–65 (11th Cir. 2018) (holding that Seabrooks and Lockley remain 

good law). We are thus compelled to conclude that Parchment-Berry’s robbery 

conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a). Accordingly, 

the BIA correctly determined that Parchment-Berry was removable based on his 

conviction of an aggravated felony. 

PETITION DENIED.

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