IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

JOHN FASTRICH and UNIVERSAL 

INVESTMENT SERVICES, INC. and 

REGINALD J. GOOD D/B/A REGINALD J. 

GOOD AGENCY,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

CONTINENTAL GENERAL INSURANCE 

COMPANY, GREAT AMERICAN 

FINANCIAL RESOURCE, INC., 

AMERICAN FINANCIAL GROUP, INC., 

LOYAL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY, and AMERICAN 

RETIREMENT LIFE INSURANCE 

COMPANY,

Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:17-cv-00615-MRB

JUDGE MICHAEL R. BARRETT

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFFS’ UNOPPOSED MOTION 

FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .........................................................................................................iii

I. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 1

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND TERMS OF SETTLEMENT ........................................... 6

A. The Notice Provisions in the Settlement Agreement Have Been Satisfied. ........................ 6

B. Response from Settlement Class Members.......................................................................... 8

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE FINALLY APPROVED...................... 8

A. Applicable Legal Standard for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement Pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 ........................................................................................................................ 8

B. The Proposed Settlement Satisfies the Relevant Criterion for Final Approval Pursuant to 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. ....................................................................................................................... 9

1. The Notice Provisions Were Followed and Provided Adequate Notice to the Class That 

Satisfies Due Process............................................................................................................... 9

2. The Proposed Settlement Resolves a Bona Fide Dispute. ............................................. 10

3. The Proposed Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate....................................... 11

i. There Is No Risk of Fraud or Collusion in the Settlement. ........................................ 12

ii. Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration of Litigation Supports Approval of 

Settlement. ......................................................................................................................... 13

iii. The Amount of Discovery Engaged in by the Parties Supports Approval of 

Settlement. ......................................................................................................................... 13

iv. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits Weighs in Favor of Approval. .................. 14

v. Opinions of Class Counsel Support Settlement Approval.......................................... 16

vi. The Settlement Class’ Response Supports the Settlement. ........................................ 17

vii. Approving This Settlement Is in the Public Interest............................................... 17

IV. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE FINALLY CERTIFIED............................. 18

A. Applicable Legal Standard for Final Class Certification................................................... 18

B. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a) Factors Are Satisfied......................................................................... 18

1. The Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous. ........................................................... 18

2. The Settlement Class Seeks Resolution of Common Questions. ................................... 19

3. The Claims of the Named Plaintiffs Are Typical of the Settlement Class..................... 20

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4. Class Counsel and Plaintiffs Meet the Adequacy Requirements. .................................. 21

C. The Settlement Class Satisfies the Predominance and Superiority Requirements of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 23(b)(3).......................................................................................................................... 22

V. CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 23

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Basile v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 105 F.R.D. (S.D. Ohio 1985)................. 19

Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554 (6th Cir. 2007) ............................................................ 21

Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand, 216 F.R.D. (S.D. Ohio 2003) ....................................................... 20

Brent v. Midland Funding, LLC, No. 3:11 CV 1332, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98763, (N.D. Ohio 

Sept. 1, 2011) ............................................................................................................................ 13

Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 F.3d (6th Cir. 2006)..................................................................... 19

Doe v. Déjà Vu Consulting, Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16562, *10, 2019 FED App. 0113P (6th 

Cir.) ................................................................................................................................... 8, 9, 14

Dukes, 131 S. Ct............................................................................................................................ 19

Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC, 822 F.3d (6th Cir. 2016).......................................... 8, 9

Gascho, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46846 ........................................................................................ 19

Gen. Tel. Co. of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982)............................................................ 20

Gentrup, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67887 ....................................................................................... 11

Glazer, 722 F.3d ..................................................................................................................... 18, 19

Glazer, 822 F.3d ........................................................................................................................... 18

Granada Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d (6th Cir. 1992)........................................... 16

Hainey v. Parrott, 617 F. Supp. 2d (S.D. Ohio 2007) .................................................................. 17

Heibel v. United States Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 2:11-cv-00593, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193333, at 

*3-4 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 2014) ................................................................................................ 10

Higgs v. Warranty Group, No. 2:02-CV-1092, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8408, (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 

2009).................................................................................................................................... 12, 17

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In re Am. Med., 75 F.3d ................................................................................................................ 20

In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., No. 1:10 MD 2196, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23482, 

(N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2015) ........................................................................................................ 12

In re: Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 726 F.2d (6th Cir. 1984) ........................................... 15

Kritzer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74994 ................................................................................... 11, 16

Lonardo v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d (N.D. Ohio 2010)....................................... 18

Mees v. Skreened, Ltd., No. 14-cv-142, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1242, (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2016) 

(Kemp, J.).................................................................................................................. 9, 12, 13, 17

Moore v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2701, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102621, (S.D. Ohio June 30, 

2017)........................................................................................................................ 13, 14, 16, 18

Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d (6th Cir. 2009) ................................................................. 13

Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. (1950)...................................................... 9

Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. (D. Colo. 1974)..................................................... 16

Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985). 23

Putnam v. Davies, 169 F.R.D. 89, 93 (S.D. Ohio 1996)............................................................... 20

Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 257 F.R.D. 435 (S.D. Ohio 2009).......................................... 20

Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Ret. Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 F.3d (6th Cir. 2013)........ 18

Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Correction, No. 2:08-CV-15, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1440254, 

(S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2012)............................................................................................. 16, 20, 21

Stinson v. Delta Mgmt. Assocs., 302 F.R.D. (S.D. Ohio 2014) .................................................... 14

Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:11-CV-88, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94450, (S.D. Ohio July 11, 

2014).......................................................................................................................................... 17

UAW v. GMC, 497 F.3d (6th Cir. 2007)......................................................................... 8, 9, 12, 15

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Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1983)........................................................... 9, 13, 17

Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d (6th Cir. 2012)...................................................... 18

Rules

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) ............................................................................................................... 20, 23

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) ..................................................................................................................... 24

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c) ....................................................................................................................... 9

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ....................................................................................................................... 7

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I. INTRODUCTION

This class action against Defendants Continental General Insurance Company (“CGI”), 

Great American Financial Resource, Inc. (“GAFRI”), American Financial Group, Inc., Loyal 

American Life Insurance Company (“LALIC”), and American Retirement Life Insurance 

Company (“ARLIC”) (collectively, “Defendants”) has been settled subject to Court final approval 

and Plaintiffs John Fastrich, Universal Investment Services, Inc., and Reginald J. Good

(“Plaintiffs”) respectfully submit this memorandum of law in support of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed 

Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement.

1 The Court granted preliminary approval 

of this Settlement on April 2, 2019 (ECF No. 38), and set a Fairness Hearing for September 17, 

2019 (ECF No. 46). Now, after the Court-approved Notice has been sent to the Settlement Class

Members, final approval of this Settlement is appropriate.2 

This class action (the “Action”) was originally initiated in this Court by Plaintiffs John 

Fastrich and Universal Investment Services Inc. on behalf of themselves and “[a]ll current and 

former regional managers, general agents, associate general agents, and agents of CGI . . . who 

have lost commissions, renewals, and/or overrides as a result of Defendants’ wrongful conduct . . 

. ,” by filing the initial complaint. ECF No. 1.

The initial complaint alleged that Plaintiffs contracted with CGI to sell CGI’s insurance 

products such as Medicare supplements, long-term care, senior life policies, and annuities to 

various customers. In exchange, Plaintiffs were to be compensated in the form of commissions, 

renewals, and overrides (together, “Commissions”) on insurance products they sold. The payment 

1 A copy of the Settlement Agreement is attached as Attachment #2 to the Plaintiffs’ Motion for 

Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement. ECF No. 37-2. 

2 To the extent not otherwise defined herein, capitalized terms shall have the same meaning as in 

the Settlement Agreement. 

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structure of the Commissions centered on a contracting hierarchy. Regional managers were at the 

top of the payment hierarchy, then general managers, general agents, associate general agents, and 

agents. Once an agent sells an insurance product, that agent becomes the agent of record and is 

entitled to commissions and/or renewals resulting from the sale. Overrides are the difference 

between the compensation paid to individuals in the hierarchy. Regional managers and general 

agents are entitled to such overrides from the agents in their hierarchy. ECF No. 1. On February 

14, 2019, Plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint joining Plaintiff Reginald Good as well as 

additional Defendants to this Action (the “FAC”). ECF No. 26.

Plaintiffs claimed that they and other Class Members were harmed when Defendants 

obtained state “approval for various new products” and thereafter “began contacting existing 

policyholders and replacing the in-force policies with the new products.” FAC ¶ 29. Plaintiffs 

contend that Defendants “instructed policyholders to switch policies when receiving rate increase 

letters” and that when existing policies were replaced with new policies, the existing producers of 

record were terminated and replaced with new producers of record, some of whom were in-house 

producers. Id. Plaintiffs claim that they and other similarly situated former producers lost initial, 

renewal, and override commissions on policies that were replaced. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs allege that 

the policy replacements caused many producers to become “non-vested” pursuant to their 

agreements with Defendants. Id. ¶ 34. Plaintiffs also allege that contracts with Defendants entitled 

them to receive commissions on premium increases for long-term care insurance policies issued 

prior to January 2000. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiffs further contend that Defendants breached their contracts 

with Plaintiffs and other Class Members when they did not remit non-vested commissions up the 

hierarchy to the next agent, allegedly retaining commissions from non-vested agents, and did not 

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pay commissions on premium increases. Id. ¶¶ 41-42. Defendants expressly deny Plaintiffs’ 

allegations.

After the initial pleadings were filed the parties engaged in informal discovery, exchanged 

considerable document production for settlement purposes, participated in extensive arm’s-length 

negotiations, and participated in a mediation before the Honorable Richard Neville, beginning on 

January 26, 2018, in Chicago, Illinois. The parties conducted damages calculations and exchanged 

various settlement demands, offers, counter-demands, and further counter-offers. Plaintiffs’ 

counsels reviewed a massive amount of records made available to them by the Class 

Representatives – whole boxes of records going back nearly 20 years – including insurance 

policies, agent agreements, and commission payments. With additional assistance from Judge 

Neville over the next several weeks, the parties were later able to negotiate a class settlement to 

resolve this matter. The terms of the parties’ settlement are set forth in the Settlement Agreement 

(the “Settlement Agreement”) submitted to the Court with the Motion for Preliminary Approval, 

ECF No. 37-2. Plaintiffs’ Counsel believes that the negotiated Settlement Agreement provides an 

excellent settlement for Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class, with respect to their claims for unpaid 

commissions on the sale of various insurance products.

The Settlement Agreement provides that Defendants will pay a Class Payment of 

$1,250,000.00 to settle the class claims of all Settlement Class Members. In view of the hurdles 

posed by formidable defenses to Plaintiffs’ claims, as more fully detailed below, this is a 

remarkable result of 31.25% of the total damages as calculated by the Class Counsels, of 

approximately $4 million in past commissions and non-vested agent payments. The Class Payment 

includes amounts to cover a proposed $7,500.00 total service award to Plaintiffs John Fastrich and 

Universal Investment Services, Inc., and proposed $7,500.00 service award to Plaintiff Reginald 

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J. Good, for their respective efforts in bringing and prosecuting this matter and reimbursement of 

their respective expenses (the “Service Awards”). After the payment of the Service Awards, all 

Settling Class Members will receive their pro-rata share of the Class Payment, net of attorney’s 

fees and expense, with no portion of that amount ever reverting to Defendants. 

Concomitantly with this Motion, Lead Counsel have filed a separate application seeking 

an award of attorney’s fees, reimbursement of litigation expenses, and claims administration costs 

to be paid from the settlement fund in the sum of $450,000, to be allocated as follows: attorney’s 

fees: $353,983.19 (or 28.3% of the gross recovery of $1,250,000); reimbursement of expenses:

$81,016.81; and Service Awards for the class representatives as outlined immediately above: 

$15,000.00 total (the “Application”). As more fully detailed in the Application and below, Lead 

Counsel seeks fees and expenses through May 26, 2019, and no fees and expenses associated with 

the Second Notice, described below, were included in the Application.

As per the Court’s Order granting preliminary approval, Class Counsel, through the Claims 

Administrator, printed and mailed by first class mail the Court-approved Notice to the 4,446

potential Settlement Class Members. Evans Decl.

3

¶ 4. The Notice advised each Settlement Class 

Member that the parties had reached a Settlement, subject to Court approval, pursuant to which 

they would receive an amount of money from the $1,250,000.00 Allocation Fund, to be distributed 

on a pro rata basis to Class Members who submit valid Claim Forms. Notice of Proposed Class 

Action Settlement, ECF No. 45-2 at p.6. The Court ordered a second Long Form Notice and Claim 

Form to be sent to class members to provide information that had been inadvertently left out of the 

3 This abbreviation is used for the Declaration of Sarah Evans Concerning: (A) The Mailing of the 

Memorandum Concerning the Sending of Second Long Form Notice the Long Form Notice of 

Proposed Class Action Settlement and the Claim Form; (B) Exclusion Received; and (C) 

Objections Submitted. A copy of the declaration is attached to this memorandum. 

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first notice (the “Prior Notice”). ECF No. 46. The “Notice” referenced throughout this brief means 

the second, operative notice.

The Notice further advised each Settlement Class Member that the Class Counsel will 

apply to the Court for an award of attorneys’ fees and reimbursement of litigation expenses and 

claims administration costs in an amount not to exceed $450,000 of the common fund. ECF No. 

45-2 at pp.7-8. Thus, the net portion of the Allocation Fund payable to the class members totals 

$800,000.

At the direction of Class Counsel, the Claims Administrator also set up a website to provide 

information regarding the settlement, at www.strategicclaims.net/continental, updated with the 

second Long Form Notice and Claim Form on July 23, 2019. The website contained downloadable 

copies of the Long Form Notice and Claim Form and also a link to the online claims filing system. 

Evans Decl. ¶ 8.

The response to the Settlement from the Settlement Class Members has been positive. As 

of August 27, 2019, Class Counsel has received zero objections and only ten unique requests for 

exclusion (for a total of 11 requests, including one duplicate), and 431 Settlement Class 

Members submitted claims. Evans Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.

4 One of the exclusions received indicated that 

the recipient believed he was not owed unpaid commissions and did not want his name associated 

with the Settlement. The remaining 10 exclusion requests did not list a reason for wanting to be 

excluded. Id. ¶ 9.

5

4 All claims were to be postmarked by August 24, 2019.

5 The deadline for exclusion requests and objections to be postmarked was August 19, 2019. See 

infra, p.6. 

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The proposed Settlement Agreement satisfies all the criteria for final approval under 

federal and state laws and is fair, reasonable, and adequate. Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully 

submit that the Court issue an Order:

(1) Granting final approval of the proposed Settlement Agreement; 

(2) Granting final approval of the Settlement Class pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23;

(3) Finally approving Plaintiffs John Fastrich, Universal Investment Services, Inc., and 

Reginald J. Good as Class Representatives;

(4) Approving Shindler, Anderson, Goplerud & Weese, P.C., RoscaLaw LLC, Peiffer 

Wolf Carr & Kane, APLC, and Whitfield & Eddy P.L.C. as Class Counsel for the 

Settlement Class; and 

(5) Dismissing this class and collective action with prejudice. 

Defendants do not oppose this Motion. Plaintiffs have submitted a proposed final approval 

order for the Court’s consideration.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND TERMS OF SETTLEMENT

Plaintiffs incorporate by reference the Procedural History and Terms of the Settlement 

Agreement Sections, as set forth in the Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Unopposed 

Motion for Preliminary Approval of Settlement Agreement. ECF No. 37-1 at pp. 3-7. 

A. The Notice Provisions in the Settlement Agreement Have Been Satisfied.

Since the Court granted preliminary approval of the Settlement Agreement on April 2, 

2019, the parties have fully complied with the Notice provisions detailed in the Settlement

Agreement. See Settlement Agreement § II(D), pp. 16-17. 

Pursuant to the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendants sent to Class Counsel an 

updated electronic database containing the mailing addresses for the Settlement Class Members, 

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(the “Class List”). Id. § II(D)(4), p.16. The Class List contained data for 4,446 Settlement Class 

Members. Evans Decl. ¶¶ 4-5. Pursuant to the Court Order granting preliminary approval (ECF 

#38) and the Order Granting Unopposed Motion [for] Approval of Documents to Be Sent to Class 

Members and New Deadlines Pertaining to the Class Action Settlement and to Set Date for Final 

Fairness Hearing (ECF #46), Class Counsel through the Claims Administrator mailed the Courtapproved Notice to the 4,446 Settlement Class Members contained in the Class List via First Class 

mail direct. Id. ¶ 4. At the direction of Class Counsel, on July 23, 2019 the Claims Administrator 

also updated website launched to provide information regarding the settlement, at 

www.strategicclaims.net/continental, by adding the second Long Form Notice and Claim Form 

and updated deadlines. Id. ¶ 8. The website contained the important dates for the case such as 

claims filing deadline, exclusion deadline, objection deadline, and Settlement Hearing date; and 

downloadable copies of the Notice and Claim Form and the Settlement Agreement, and also a link 

to the online claims filing system. Id. ¶ 8.

The Notice advised Settlement Class Members that they could mail a written objection to 

the settlement or a written request for exclusion by August 19, 2019. Evans Decl. ¶ 9. Settlement 

Class Members were able to submit their objections and written exclusions via regular mail. Id.

Notices from 519 Settlement Class Members were returned by the post office as 

undeliverable; 33 of these returned Notices contained a forwarding address. Evans Decl. ¶ 7. The 

Claims Administrator re-mailed the 33 returned Notices with a forwarding address to the 

forwarding address provided via U.S. First Class Mail. Id. ¶ 7. For the remaining 486 returned 

Notices, the Claims Administrator searched Experian’s Address Search system for updated 

mailing addresses. Id. ¶ 7. The Claims Administrator was able to locate 132 Settlement Class 

Members and re-mailed the returned Notices to them. As of August 13, 2019, the Claims 

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Administrator deemed the remaining 354 Notices – out of 4,446 total notices sent –undeliverable 

via mail and email. Id. ¶ 7. Thus, Notices were ultimately received by 92% of the Settlement Class 

Members.

B. Response from Settlement Class Members 

The Claims Administrator received 431 claims from Class Members, has not received any 

objections, and has only received ten unique requests for exclusion from the Settlement. Id. ¶¶ 9-

11. As indicated above, one of the individuals requesting exclusion stated that he believed he was

not owed unpaid commissions and did not want his name associated with the Settlement, while the 

remaining 10 exclusion requests did not list a reason for wanting to be excluded. Id. ¶ 9. 

III. THE PROPOSED SETTLEMENT SHOULD BE FINALLY APPROVED

Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court enter the accompanying proposed order finally 

approving the class action settlement.

A. Applicable Legal Standard for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23

The Sixth Circuit has explained that, “[b]efore approving a settlement, a district court must 

conclude that it is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’” UAW v. GMC, 497 F.3d 615, 631 (6th Cir. 

2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(A)(C)); see also Gascho v. Global Fitness Holdings, LLC,

822 F.3d 269, 276 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[A] court may approve a settlement upon holding a fairness 

hearing and concluding that it is ‘fair, reasonable, and adequate.’”);

Doe v. Déjà Vu Consulting, Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16562, *10, 2019 FED App. 0113P (6th 

Cir.). The Sixth Circuit has established “[s]everal factors to guide the court’s inquiry . . . (1) the 

risk of fraud or collusion; (2) the complexity, expense and likely duration of the litigation; (3) the 

amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (4) the likelihood of success on the merits; (5) the 

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opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (6) the reaction of absent class members; and 

(7) the public interest.” Gascho, 822 F.3d at 276-77; Déjà Vu Consulting, Inc., 2019 U.S. App. 

LEXIS 16562 at *10; Mees v. Skreened, Ltd., No. 14-cv-142, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1242, at *5-

6 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 6, 2016) (Kemp, J.) (both citing UAW, 497 F.3d at 631).

While these factors are helpful in guiding the analysis, the “fairness of each settlement 

turns in large part on the bona fides of the parties’ legal dispute,” that is, whether there are real 

issues and risks in the case that would lead each party to opt toward settlement. UAW, 497 F.3d at 

631; see also Williams v. Vukovich, 720 F.2d 909, 922-23 (6th Cir. 1983).

B. The Proposed Settlement Satisfies the Relevant Criterion for Final Approval 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.

1. The Notice Provisions Were Followed and Provided Adequate Notice to the Class 

That Satisfies Due Process.

The U.S. Supreme Court has held that notice of a class action settlement must be 

“reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency 

of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 

Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). This Court held that Notice is considered “best notice 

practicable” and “satisfie[s] constitutional due process concerns” when it is mailed to the lastknown address of each individual class member, when follow up efforts are made to resend notices 

returned as undeliverable, and when the notice adequately describes the relevant parts of the 

proposed settlement, and the requested service awards and fee awards. E.g., Heibel v. United States

Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 2:11-cv-00593, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193333, at *3-4 (S.D. Ohio May 21, 

2014) (Sargus, J.).

Here, the Court-approved Notice and manner of distribution negotiated and agreed upon 

by the parties was “the best notice practicable,” as required under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). As 

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described above, the Notice provisions of the Settlement Agreement, as per the Court’s July 19, 

2019 Order (Docket # 46), were followed by the parties. Evans Decl. ¶ 6. The Notices were mailed

to each of the individual Settlement Class Members. Id. ¶¶ 4-6. Significant follow-up efforts were 

undertaken to resend the Notices to those individuals whose original Notices were returned as 

undeliverable. Id. ¶¶ 5,7. Ultimately, Notices were received by 92% of the Settlement Class 

Members. Moreover, the Notice adequately described the details of the Settlement, the requested 

Service Awards for the Plaintiffs as well as the requested fee award for Class Counsel’s attorneys’ 

fees and expenses. Such Notice was the “best notice practicable” and satisfies constitutional due 

process. See Heibel, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 193333, at *3-4 (Sargus, J.).

2. The Proposed Settlement Resolves a Bona Fide Dispute.

The Settlement resolves bona fide disputes between the parties under the Ohio and 

Nebraska state laws. Plaintiffs maintained that they and the Settlement Class Members were owed 

compensation as a result of Defendants’ failure to pay appropriate commissions, renewals, or 

overrides on insurance products sold by licensed agents, that they were entitled to certain 

contractual damages, equitable damages, and statutory damages under Nebraska state laws for 

Defendants’ failure to promptly pay them such commissions, renewals, or overrides.

Prior to reaching a settlement, the parties engaged in contested litigation in two fora, 

extensive informal discovery, and lengthy arm’s-length negotiations. Specifically, and as more 

fully set forth in the Procedural History section of the Brief in Support of Preliminary Approval, 

ECF No. 37-1 pp.4-5, incorporated herein, the parties reached their proposed Settlement only after 

(1) pre-Answer motion practice in a related action in United States District Court for the District 

of Nebraska (the “Nebraska Action”); (2) the exchange of substantial documents and records; (3) 

exchanges of damages calculations; (4) assessment of strengths and weaknesses of each of the 

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claims; and (5) a lengthy in-person mediation session and weeks of subsequent negotiations with 

the assistance from the mediator. Defendants vigorously defended this action and indeed were 

successful in securing a partial dismissal of the Nebraska Action, as more fully set forth in the 

Procedural History section of the Brief in Support of Preliminary Approval, ECF No. 37-1 p.4. 

Accordingly, the risks and costs of continued litigation were significant. Kritzer, 2012 U.S. Dist. 

LEXIS 74994, at *17 (settlement resolves a bona fide dispute when parties disagree about the 

payment of wages); Gentrup, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67887, at *6-7 (settlement is a reasonable 

compromise over bona fide disputed wage issues). 

3. The Proposed Settlement Is Fair, Reasonable, And Adequate

Plaintiffs believe that the Settlement is an excellent result for the members of the 

Settlement Class. Assuming the Court approves the proposed attorney’s fees, expenses, and 

Service Awards, the 431 members who submitted claims will be entitled to receive an average 

recovery of approximately $1,856 of the total $800,000 portion of the settlement net of attorney’s 

fees, expenses, and service awards. There will be no reversion of funds to Defendants. See

Settlement Agreement § II(H) ¶ 26, ECF No. 37-2 pp. 23-24. 

Critically, while 92% of the Settlement Class Members received Notice, no class members 

attempted to file objections to the Settlement. “The lack of opposition by a well-noticed class 

strongly supports the fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of the Stipulation and Class Counsel’s 

Application for Fees.” Higgs v. Warranty Group, No. 2:02-CV-1092, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

8408, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 5, 2009) (Sargus, J.) (Court found it significant that after 90% of 

Class Members received Notice, no objections were filed).

Given the significant monetary settlement that was negotiated, continuing the litigation of 

this case and exposing the case to those risks is not warranted. As more fully set forth below, the 

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UAW factors (i.e., (i) the risk of fraud or collusion; (ii) the complexity, expense and likely duration 

of the litigation; (iii) the amount of discovery engaged in by the parties; (iv) the likelihood of 

success on the merits; (v) the opinions of class counsel and class representatives; (vi) the reaction 

of absent class members; and (vii) the public interest) strongly support final approval of this 

Settlement. UAW, 497 F.3d at 631.

i. There Is No Risk of Fraud or Collusion in the Settlement.

“Courts presume the absence of fraud or collusion unless there is evidence to the contrary.”

In re Polyurethane Foam Antitrust Litig., No. 1:10 MD 2196, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23482, at 

*13 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 26, 2015); Mees, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1242, at *6 (Kemp, J.) (“Absent 

evidence to the contrary, courts presume that a class settlement is the result of arm’s length 

negotiations and is not the product of fraud or collusion.”).

In this case, the Settlement was reached only after (1) significant litigation in the form of preAnswer motion practice in a related action in United States District Court for the District of 

Nebraska (the “Nebraska Action”), which resulted in a partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims; (2) 

the exchange of substantial documents and records; (3) exchanges of damages calculations; (4) 

assessment of strengths and weaknesses of each of the claims; and (5) a lengthy in-person 

mediation session and many weeks of subsequent negotiations with the assistance from the

mediator. Defendants’ success in securing the partial dismissal of Plaintiffs’ claims best illustrates 

the lack of any fraud or collusion in the settlement. 

Thus, there is not even a hint of collusion between the parties or their counsel, and certainly 

no evidence of such behavior. Moreover, no one has objected to the Settlement or otherwise “made 

the case that the agreement is a product of collusion.” Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 

351 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing Williams, 720 F.2d at 921); Mees, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1242, at *6-

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7 (Kemp, J.) (finding no risk of fraud or collusion where counsel represented that the agreement 

was the “result of arms’ length good faith negotiations which took place over the course of many 

months” and no one made an argument that fraud or collusion exists). Based on the foregoing, 

consideration of this factor supports approval of the Settlement.

ii. Complexity, Expense and Likely Duration of Litigation Supports 

Approval of Settlement.

“Most class actions are inherently complex and settlement avoids the costs, delays and 

multitude of other problems associated with them.” Moore v. Aerotek, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-2701, 

2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102621, at *10 (S.D. Ohio June 30, 2017) (Kemp, J.). This case is no 

different. In the absence of the Settlement, this litigation would likely continue over the course of 

several years, requiring depositions in numerous states, class certification briefing, and other 

motion practice, including post-trial motions and possibly appeals, resulting in litigation that is 

both lengthy and costly. Moreover, given the bona fide disputes in this case, there would be no 

guarantee that Plaintiffs would prevail at trial or obtain class certification in this case. Indeed, “[i]n 

most situations, unless the settlement is clearly inadequate, its acceptance and approval are 

preferable to lengthy and expensive litigation with uncertain results.” Brent v. Midland Funding,

LLC, No. 3:11 CV 1332, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98763, at *43 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 1, 2011) (citations 

and internal quotations omitted). The Settlement obviates the need to litigate these issues and the 

concomitant expense. This factor therefore weighs in favor of approval of the Settlement. 

iii. The Amount of Discovery Engaged in by the Parties Supports Approval 

of Settlement.

The parties exchanged extensive informal discovery, including policy information 

concerning several types of insurance, insurance policy commission rate information, insurance 

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policy premium data and data concerning non-vested accounts. Furthermore, the parties confirmed 

there was no written or unwritten company policy to replace agents or record with in-house agents.

Based on the information exchanged, the parties were able to fully explore the strengths, 

weaknesses and potential value of their respective claims and defenses under the Ohio and 

Nebraska state laws. Class Counsel reviewed a massive amount of insurance policies, agent 

contracts, and commission payment-related records – many boxes of documents, covering nearly 

20 years of records – that the class representatives made available to them. Further, Class Counsel 

extensively investigated the applicable law as applied to the relevant facts discovered in this action, 

and the potential defenses thereto. Defendants produced critical information about their policy 

commissions that helped to inform the parties’ decision to settle. Once these documents were 

analyzed by the parties, additional discovery would not likely have changed the outcome of the 

Settlement. There has been sufficient investigation and discovery conducted in this matter to allow 

Class Counsel and the Court to act intelligently concerning the settlement of the claims. See Stinson

v. Delta Mgmt. Assocs., 302 F.R.D. 160, 164 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Moore, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

102621, at *12 (Kemp, J.). Consideration of this factor likewise supports final approval of the 

Settlement.

iv. The Likelihood of Success on the Merits Weighs in Favor of Approval.

"The most important of the factors to be considered in reviewing a settlement is the 

probability of success on the merits." Déjà Vu Consulting, Inc., 2019 U.S. App. LEXIS 16562 at 

*10. This factor seeks to measure whether a settlement is reasonable in light of known or perceived 

risks. See, e.g., UAW, 497 F.3d at 631 (Although examination of this factor does not require the 

Court to resolve the outstanding legal or factual issues on the merits, the Court cannot adequately 

assess the fairness of the proposed settlement without “weighing the plaintiff's likelihood of 

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success on the merits against the amount and form of the relief offered in the settlement.”) 

(citations and internal quotations omitted). “The likelihood of success, in turn, provides a gauge 

from which the benefits of the settlement must be measured.” In re: Gen. Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. 

Litig., 726 F.2d 1075, 1086 (6th Cir. 1984).

As discussed above, absent settlement, the parties would have engaged in additional 

discovery (including written discovery and depositions), motion practice (class certification, 

dispositive motions on merits and damages issues), and possibly appeals. The parties had bona 

fide disputes and vigorously supported their respective positions, as illustrated by Defendants’ 

success in the related Nebraska Action in securing the dismissal of some of Plaintiffs’ claims. 

While Plaintiffs believe they will be meritorious in their claims, they recognized the inherent risk 

of litigation and trial. Critically, Plaintiffs’ claims were subject to strong “statute of limitations” 

arguments given that key alleged conduct by Defendants occurred nearly 20 years ago, as well as 

substantial risks that the class may not be certified, given the different versions of agent contracts 

at issue over the years that the alleged conduct occurred; the many different commission rates at 

issue; and the many different insurance policy products. While Plaintiffs believe that ultimately 

they would have prevailed on the statute of limitations issues and class certification, the outcome 

was far from certain. 

In view of the serious risk posed to a potential recovery by such formidable defenses and 

hurdles, the $1.25 million settlement is a remarkable result that secures 31.25% of the total 

damages as calculated by the Class Counsels, of approximately $4 million in past commissions 

and non-vested agent payments.

The Settlement provides a remarkable and immediate, meaningful recovery to Plaintiffs

and Eligible Class Members and eliminates the risks that the parties would otherwise bear if this 

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litigation were to continue on for years. The possibility that the class “might have received more 

if the case had been fully litigated is no reason not to approve the settlement.” Granada 

Investments, Inc. v. DWG Corp., 962 F.2d 1203, 1206 (6th Cir. 1992). Where a proposed settlement 

provides for relief now, not perhaps some years down the road, it is proper for the parties “to take 

the bird in the hand instead of a prospective flock in the bush.” Oppenlander v. Standard Oil Co., 

64 F.R.D. 597, 624 (D. Colo. 1974).

Without negating the strength of Plaintiffs’ claims and legal arguments, for foregoing 

considerations demonstrate the ultimate success in the case was by no means assured. As such, 

analysis of this factor also supports final approval of the Settlement.

v. Opinions of Class Counsel Support Settlement Approval. 

This Court “gives weight to the belief of experienced counsel that a settlement is in the 

best interests of the class.” Kritzer, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74994, at *23; see, e.g., Moore, 2017 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102621, at *16 (Kemp, J.) (counsel’s opinion that the proposed settlement is

fair, reasonable, and adequate “is entitled to considerable weight”); Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab.

& Correction, No. 2:08-CV-15, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58634, at *61-63 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 

2012) (courts will give deference to class counsel’s determination to settle a case).

Here, Class Counsel are highly experienced class action litigators. Moreover, these

experienced attorneys have engaged in considerable discovery and litigation in this matter and

have extensively explored and evaluated the strengths of the case. After such analysis and

evaluation, these experienced class action attorneys believe that this case is appropriate for 

settlement, that the proposed Settlement is fair, reasonable, adequate, and is in the best interest of 

the class. See, e.g., Williams, 720 F.2d at 922-23 (“The court should defer to the judgment of

experienced counsel who has competently evaluated the strength of his proofs” and deference

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“should correspond to the amount of discovery completed and the character of the evidence

uncovered.”). Accordingly, this factor also supports final approval of the Settlement.

vi. The Settlement Class’ Response Supports the Settlement.

The Settlement Class Members’ collective response to the Settlement overwhelmingly 

supports final approval. With the deadline for making objections and opting out of the Settlement 

having passed, it is highly significant that there have been zero objections and only ten unique

requests for exclusion to the proposed Settlement. See Evans Decl. ¶¶ 9-10; Evans Decl. Exh. C. 

This overwhelmingly positive response from the Settlement Class demonstrates the fairness and 

adequacy of the Settlement’s terms. E.g., Swigart v. Fifth Third Bank, No. 1:11-CV-88, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 94450, at *11 (S.D. Ohio July 11, 2014) (holding overwhelmingly positive reaction 

to the settlement supports approval). Given the Court’s preliminary approval and the absence of 

any objections by Settlement Class Members, final approval of the settlement is warranted. Higgs,

2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8408, at *14 (Sargus, J.) (lack of opposition “strongly supports” the 

fairness, reasonableness and adequacy of a settlement); Mees, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1242, at *12 

(Kemp, J.) (having no objectors to the fairness of a class settlement weighs in favor of its final 

approval).

vii. Approving This Settlement Is in the Public Interest.

“Public policy generally favors settlement of class action lawsuits.” Swigart, 2014 U.S. 

Dist. LEXIS 94450, at *11 (citing Hainey v. Parrott, 617 F. Supp. 2d 668, 679 (S.D. Ohio 2007)). 

There is an equally strong public policy in favor of class actions, which vindicate the rights that 

are legitimate and meaningful, but are nonetheless uneconomical to prosecute individually. See,

e.g., Lonardo v. Travelers Indemn. Co., 706 F. Supp. 2d 766, 782 (N.D. Ohio 2010). Here, the 

Settlement provides significant and immediate relief for Eligible Class Members and avoid 

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prolonged litigation, “resulting in the conservation of both the parties’ resources and the Court's 

resources.” Moore, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102621, at *17 (Kemp, J.). This factor also supports 

granting final approval of the Settlement.

IV. THE SETTLEMENT CLASS SHOULD BE FINALLY CERTIFIED

A. Applicable Legal Standard for Final Class Certification

A class action is an ideal vehicle for resolving those cases in which: “(1) the class is so 

numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact 

common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the 

claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect 

the interests of the class.” Schumacher v. AK Steel Corp. Ret. Accumulation Pension Plan, 711 

F.3d 675, 683 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a)). “The proposed class must also meet 

at least one of the three requirements listed in Rule 23(b).” Schumacher, 711 F.3d at 683; Glazer, 

822 F.3d at 850 (citing Young v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 693 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 2012)). In 

this instance, certification is appropriate for settlement purposes under Rule 23(b)(3), because “the 

questions of law or fact common to class members predominate over any questions affecting only 

individual members” and that the class action is “superior to other available methods” to adjudicate 

the controversy fairly and efficiently.” Glazer, 722 F.3d at 850-51.

When certifying a class for settlement purposes, district courts are afforded broad 

discretion. In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1079 (6th Cir. 1996). In this instance, and in this 

context, the requirements for class certification are readily met.

B. Fed R. Civ. P. 23(a) Factors Are Satisfied.

1. The Settlement Class Is Sufficiently Numerous.

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To meet the numerosity requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1), the class size only need 

be large enough that it makes joinder impracticable. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). While the law does 

not establish a “strict numerical test,” whenever “substantial numbers” of people are affected, 

numerosity requirement is satisfied. Glazer, 722 F.3d at 852 (citing Daffin v. Ford Motor Co., 458 

F.3d 549, 552 (6th Cir. 2006)). The Settlement Class meets the numerosity requirement since 431

Class Members have submitted claims. Evans Decl. ¶ 11. Indeed, the Settlement Class is 

sufficiently large that joinder of all class members would be impracticable. See, e.g., Basile v.

Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 105 F.R.D. 506, 508 (S.D. Ohio 1985) (23 members 

was enough to meet the numerosity).

2. The Settlement Class Seeks Resolution of Common Questions.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) requires that a proposed class action raise “questions of law or fact 

common to the class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2). The class members’ claims must depend upon a 

common contention that is capable of class-wide resolution. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2562. The 

commonality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) is satisfied if the named plaintiffs share at 

least one question of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class. See Gascho, 2014 

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46846, at *24-27; see also Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2556 (“We quite agree that for 

purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) ‘[e]ven a single [common] question’ will do[.]”) (internal quotations 

and citations omitted; alterations in original). Additionally, “the commonality requirement will be 

satisfied as long as the members of the class have allegedly been affected by a general policy of 

the Defendant and the general policy is the focus of the litigation.” Bovee v. Coopers & Lybrand, 

216 F.R.D. 596, 608 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (Sargus, J.) (quoting Putnam v. Davies, 169 F.R.D. 89, 93 

(S.D. Ohio 1996)); see also Glazer, 722 F.3d at 853 (commonality standard turns on whether there 

are unifying allegations regarding a defendant’s common conduct toward the class). 

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Here, Plaintiffs’ and the Settlement Class Members’ claims arise from Defendants’

common commission payment policies. The alleged common issues include, for example: (1) 

whether the Settlement Class Members were entitled to commission payments on insurance 

products sold; (2) whether the policy of failing to pay such commissions breached the contract 

between the Settlement Class Members and the Defendants. These sample common questions of 

law and fact, which Plaintiffs contend apply uniformly to all members of the Settlement Class, are 

sufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement. Id.

3. The Claims of the Named Plaintiffs Are Typical of the Settlement Class.

Since Plaintiffs’ claims “arise [ ] from the same event or practice or course of conduct that 

gives rise to the claims of other class members,” namely, Defendants’ commission payment

policies, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of the Settlement Class. In re Am. Med., 75 F.3d at 1082; 

Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Correction, No. 2:08-CV-15, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1440254, 

at *14 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2012). The typicality requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3) is satisfied 

for purposes of preliminarily approving the Settlement when, as here, the class representatives 

possess the same interest and suffered the same injury as the absent class members. Gen. Tel. Co. 

of the S.W. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982); Ross v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., 257 F.R.D. 

435, 445 (S.D. Ohio 2009). “A ‘typical’ claim ‘arises from the same event or practice or course of 

conduct that gives rise to the claims of other class members, and [must be] based on the same legal 

theory.” Smith v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Correction, No. 2:08-CV-15, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 

1440254, at *14 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 26, 2012) (quoting Beattie v. CenturyTel, Inc., 511 F.3d 554, 561 

(6th Cir. 2007)). However, representatives and class members’ claims “need not always involve 

the same facts or law, provided there is a common element of fact or law.” Id. (internal quotation 

marks and citations omitted).

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Plaintiffs’ claims for commission payments on various insurance products are typical of 

the claims of the Settlement Class. The Plaintiffs, between their respective insurance practices, 

have sold the types of insurance policies and products at issue in this case, and as stated in their 

operative pleadings believe they have been victimized by Defendants through the entire breadth 

of conduct alleged in this case, specifically through Defendants’ (1) failure to pay them 

commissions on premiums paid by policyholders to whom they sold long-term care insurance 

policies and other products, due to premium rate increases on such long-term care insurance 

policies and products; (2) failure to properly calculate and/or pay them commissions in accordance 

with the vesting provisions of their agreements with Defendants; and (3) replacement of Plaintiffs 

as the agents of record in connection with some of their sales of insurance policy or product to 

policyholders. Thus, Plaintiffs’ claims are typical of those of the Settlement Class.

4. Class Counsel and Plaintiffs Meet the Adequacy Requirements.

To meet the adequacy requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4), the named plaintiffs must 

show: 1) that they have common interests with unnamed class members and 2) that they will 

vigorously prosecute the interests of the class through qualified counsel. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & 

Correction, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1440254, at *16.

The adequacy of representation requirement is met here because Plaintiffs have the same 

interests as the Settlement Class Members: the desire to recover unpaid insurance commissions 

they believe they were owed by Defendants. As indicated above, Plaintiffs’ claims, between their 

two respective insurance practices, cover the entire gamut of claims of the Settlement Class as set 

forth in the operative pleadings. Plaintiffs have extensively cooperated with their chosen counsel 

by meeting in person with the Counsel and reviewing, selecting, and providing to Counsel entire 

boxes of records related to their sales of insurance products for Defendants. 

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Plaintiffs’ counsel are skilled and experienced class action litigators and have spent 

considerable time and resources prosecuting this case. See Declarations of J. Barton Goplerud, 

Lydia Floyd, Thomas Reavely, and Alan Rosca, attached to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, 

Expenses, and Class Representative Award. Among its efforts, Plaintiffs’ counsel travelled for 

three in-person meetings with the individual Plaintiffs, one of whom is located in Indiana and the 

other one in Montana; have collected and reviewed numerous boxes of records from Plaintiffs, 

have prepared reports based on those records; and have participated to an in-person mediation in 

Chicago. 

Lastly, there is no conflict between Plaintiffs and the members of the Settlement Class, and 

Plaintiffs’ claims are in line with the claims of the Class.

C. The Settlement Class Satisfies the Predominance and Superiority 

Requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3), class certification is appropriate if “the court finds that the 

questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions 

affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods 

for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

Common questions of law and fact predominate in this case. As discussed above, Plaintiffs 

have alleged that Defendants (1) failed to pay certain commissions on premiums paid by 

policyholders to whom they sold certain products, due to premium increases on those products; 

(2) failed to properly pay commissions in accordance with the applicable agreements; and (3) 

improperly replaced agents of record on certain products. Defendants’ alleged conduct was 

directed toward Plaintiffs and the Settlement Class members equally, and thus common questions 

of law and fact predominate over any individual issues. Such common questions include, for 

example, whether Defendants’ alleged conduct was wrongful, whether Defendants’ alleged 

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23

conduct gives rise to certain legal claims for damages, whether Defendants’ alleged conduct 

caused the alleged damages, and, the amount of damages. While the amount of each Settlement 

Class member’s damages varies, the damages are calculable on a class-wide basis by allocating 

the net settlement proceeds among the three groups of claims and then to the Settlement Class 

members based on the number of policies at issue within each group.

Similarly, a class action is superior to other methods of resolution for the Settlement Class 

members. Each Settlement Class member has the opportunity to participate in a settlement that 

yields an immediate and substantial benefit. On the other hand, if this matter were not resolved on 

a class-wide basis, hundreds of individual plaintiffs would be forced to bring a multiplicity of 

individual and duplicative proceedings in this Court. These individual cases would burden the 

Court’s resources and may result in inconsistent outcomes. And, many cases would not be 

economically viable on an individual basis—Plaintiffs believe many of the Settlement Class 

members’ damages are several thousand dollars or less—potentially leaving those persons’ 

contractual rights unadjudicated. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809, 

105 S. Ct. 2965, 86 L. Ed. 2d 628 (1985) (“Class actions . . . permit the plaintiffs to pool claims 

which would be uneconomical to litigate individually.”). Accordingly, Plaintiffs respectfully 

request that the Court finally certify the Settlement Class for settlement purposes.

V. CONCLUSION 

Based upon the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court approve the 

Settlement and certify the class. 

Dated: August 27, 2018 Respectfully submitted,

______/s/ James P. Booker________

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24

PEIFFER WOLF CARR & KANE

A PROFESSIONAL LAW CORPORATION

James Booker

Lydia Floyd

1422 Euclid Avenue, Suite 1610

Cleveland, Ohio 44115

Telephone: (216) 589-9280

Facsimile: (216) 916-9220

E-Mail: jbooker@pwcklegal.com

 lfloyd@pwcklegal.com

SHINDLER, ANDERSON, GOPLERUD, & 

WEESE, P.C.

J. Barton Goplerud

5015 Grand Ridge Drive, Suite 100

West Des Moines, Iowa 50265

Telephone: (515) 223-4567

Fax: (515) 223-8887

Email: goplerud@sagwlaw.com

ROSCALAW LLC

Alan Rosca

23250 Chagrin Blvd, Suite 100

Beachwood, Ohio 44122

Telephone: (216) 570-0097

Email: arosca@roscalaw.com 

WHITFIELD & EDDY, P.L.C.

Thomas S. Reavely 

699 Walnut St., Suite 2000

Des Moines, IA 50309-4195

Telephone: (515) 288-6041

Fax: (515) 246-1474

Email: reavely@whitfieldlaw.com

Attorneys for the Plaintiffs and 

the Proposed Class

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