2011 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

8-3-2011

USA v. William Lucas

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 10-1913

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Recommended Citation

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_____________

No. 10-1913

_____________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

v.

WILLIAM L. LUCAS, 

also known as BILLY,

William L. Lucas,

 Appellant

_____________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Crim. No. 1-99-cr-00030-003)

District Judge: Honorable Maurice B. Cohill, Jr.

_____________

Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1

May 12, 2011

Before: SMITH, CHAGARES and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed: August 3, 2011)

_____________

OPINION OF THE COURT

_____________

VANASKIE, Circuit Judge.

William L. Lucas (“Lucas”) admitted to violating the terms of his supervised 

release and was sentenced to twenty-four months‟ imprisonment to be served 
2

consecutively to his existing state sentence. Lucas then appealed. His attorney has 

moved to withdraw as counsel pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). 

For the reasons that follow, we will grant the motion and affirm the Judgment of the 

District Court.

I.

As we write only for the parties, who are familiar with the facts and procedural 

history of the case, we set forth only those facts necessary to our analysis.

Lucas pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base

in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 on January 26, 2000 and was sentenced to ninety-six

months in prison followed by five years of supervised release. Lucas served his term of 

imprisonment and was released in July 2007. On August 5, 2008, while on supervised 

release, Lucas was arrested by the City of Pittsburgh Police and charged with two counts 

each of possession of a controlled substance and possession with intent to deliver. On 

December 9, 2009, Lucas entered a negotiated guilty plea in the Court of Common Pleas 

for Allegheny County to one count each of possession of a controlled substance and 

possession with intent to deliver. He was sentenced to five to ten years‟ imprisonment

followed by ten years‟ probation.

As a result of this conviction, the U.S. Probation Office filed a Petition for 

Probation/Supervised Release Action on December 28, 2009, alleging a violation of his 

supervised release. In his hearing on March 22, 2010, Lucas admitted to violating the 

terms of supervised release by illegally possessing a controlled substance. Based on this 

admission, the District Court found that he had violated his supervised release and further 
3

determined that Lucas‟s advisory guidelines range called for an imprisonment term 

between twenty-four and thirty months.

Lucas‟s counsel requested that the District Court impose no penalty or,

alternatively, impose a sentence to run concurrent with his state sentence. The District 

Court disagreed with counsel‟s recommendation. It stated that it was bothered by the 

similarity between the federal and state convictions and noted that a concurrent sentence 

would amount to essentially no punishment for the violation of supervised release. 

Accordingly, the District Court imposed a sentence of twenty-four months‟ imprisonment 

to be served after the state sentence.

Lucas filed a timely appeal, and appellate counsel was appointed for him. Lucas‟s

attorney has moved to withdraw and submitted an Anders brief.

II. 

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have 

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.

Anders sets forth “the general duties of a lawyer representing an indigent criminal 

defendant on appeal when the lawyer seeks leave to withdraw from continued 

representation on the grounds that there are no nonfrivolous issues to appeal.” United 

States v. Marvin, 211 F.3d 778, 779 (3d Cir. 2000). We implement Anders through Local 

Appellate Rule 109.2, which, in pertinent part, provides:

Where, upon review of the district court record, counsel is 

persuaded that the appeal presents no issue of even arguable 

merit, counsel may file a motion to withdraw and supporting 

brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), 

which must be served upon the appellant and the United 
4

States. The United States must file a brief in response. 

Appellant may also file a brief in response pro se. . . . If the 

panel agrees that the appeal is without merit, it will grant 

counsel‟s Anders motion, and dispose of the appeal without 

appointing new counsel. If the panel finds arguable merit to 

the appeal, or that the Anders brief is inadequate to assist the 

court in its review, it will appoint substitute counsel, order 

supplemental briefing and restore the case to the calendar.

3d Cir. L.A.R. 109.2(a). To meet the requirements of Local Appellate Rule 109.2, 

counsel must “satisfy the court that he or she has thoroughly scoured the record in search 

of appealable issues,” and “explain why the issues are frivolous.” Marvin, 211 F.3d at 

780. However, “[c]ounsel need not raise and reject every possible claim.” United States 

v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001). “[A]t a minimum, he or she must meet the 

„conscientious examination‟ standard set forth in Anders.” Id. This Court, in turn, asks 

“whether counsel adequately fulfilled” the requirements of Rule 109.2, and “whether an 

independent review of the record presents any nonfrivolous issues.” Id. 

When an Anders brief is adequate, we limit our review to the portion of the record 

that is highlighted in the brief. Id. at 301. When the Anders brief is not adequate, we 

may undertake a more expansive review of the record. See id. (consulting portions of the 

record identified by the pro se brief where Anders brief was inadequate). Regardless of 

the adequacy of the Anders brief, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw without 

appointing new counsel if we determine that the appeal is patently frivolous. See United 

States v. Coleman, 575 F.3d 316, 321-22 (3d Cir. 2009).

A.
5

In his Anders brief, counsel raises only the issue of whether the District Court 

imposed an unlawful sentence. In this case, counsel has fulfilled his obligation set forth

in Anders by explaining that the District Court‟s sentence was procedurally and 

substantively reasonable, and that no nonfrivolous appealable issues remain. Lucas has 

not submitted a brief on his own behalf. As a result, pursuant to Youla, we will limit our 

review to the portion of the record addressed in counsel‟s Anders brief.

In a sentencing appeal, we “review the sentence under an abuse-of-discretion 

standard” to ensure

that the district court committed no significant procedural 

error, such as failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) 

the guidelines range, treating the guidelines as mandatory, 

failing to consider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, selecting a 

sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to 

adequately explain the chosen sentence – including an 

explanation for any deviation from the guidelines range.

Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). 

The District Court committed no procedural errors in this case. The record 

indicates the District Court properly calculated Lucas‟s advisory guidelines range as 

twenty-four to thirty months‟ imprisonment, to be served consecutively with his state 

sentence. The District Court also acknowledged the advisory nature of the guidelines, 

measured all arguments presented by the parties, considered the relevant factors set forth 

in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and thoroughly explained why it chose Lucas‟s sentence.

Having found no procedural errors, we turn to whether or not the sentence 

imposed by the District Court was substantively reasonable. “[T]he appellate court 

should consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-
6

of-discretion standard” taking into account “the totality of the circumstances, including 

the extent of any variance from the guidelines range.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. “If the 

district court's sentence is procedurally sound, we will affirm it unless no reasonable 

sentencing court would have imposed the same sentence on that particular defendant for 

the reasons the district court provided.” United States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 568 (3d 

Cir. 2009) (en banc). In the present matter, the District Court carefully considered the 

circumstances of Lucas‟s case and arrived at a sentence at the low end of the guidelines 

range. This was a reasonable sentence.

III.

In sum, we conclude that Lucas‟s appeal does not present any nonfrivolous issues, 

as the District Court did not abuse its discretion in imposing Lucas‟s sentence. 

Accordingly, we will grant counsel‟s motion to withdraw and affirm the Judgment of the 

District Court.