J-S89007-16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

AKREEM DICKS,

Appellant No. 602 EDA 2016

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence January 15, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006898-2015

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and FITZGERALD,*JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 11, 2017

Appellant, Akreem Dicks, appeals from the judgment of sentence 

entered following his conviction of burglary, criminal trespass, criminal 

mischief, and criminal attempt. We affirm.

The following is the trial court’s summary of the facts of this case:

King Paramore2testified that on June 18, 2015, he went to 

2447 N. 15th Street in Philadelphia, where he owns a residential 

property. At about 7-8 PM, he observed that the metal bars had 

been pried away from the frame of the back door, and the wood 

was splintered. The bars were pried away as if by a crowbar. 

Paramore then secured the interior and exterior doors with 

plywood. 

2 Mr. Paramore is a Temple University Police 

Detective, but he was testifying in his private 

capacity as owner of the subject property.

____________________________________________

*

 Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S89007-16

- 2 -

He had last been to the property the previous day and the 

door was not in the condition he observed on the 18th. The 

property was habitable the day prior to the break-in.

Paramore left the premises after securing the damaged 

door, returning about one-half hour later. Paramore entered the 

property through the front door and while inside he heard what 

sounded like someone kicking the kitchen door. He ran to the 

rear [of] the property where he observed [Appellant] inside the 

summer shed kitchen area, kicking at the inner kitchen door. 

Paramore drew his off-duty weapon and identified himself as an 

off-duty officer, then called police. There was a crowbar in the 

shed kitchen [where] [Appellant] was found. 

Missing from the property were a digital recorder, clothes, 

sneakers, and some jewelry. A small flat screen television had 

been moved and was beside the door. Pipes had also been 

removed from the basement. 

The following day Paramore returned to inspect the 

property and shore up the damaged door. Inside a fenced-in 

area on the steps to [the] shed kitchen, Paramore found a wallet 

with [Appellant’s] Pennsylvania driver’s license and other 

identification.

The damage to the property cost a couple of hundred 

dollars to repair. The items taken were valued at $500. 

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/16, at 2-3 (internal citations omitted). 

The trial court summarized the procedural history of this case as 

follows:

On November 6, 2015, [Appellant] proceeded to trial 

before this [c]ourt, sitting without a jury. [Appellant] was 

convicted of Burglary as a felony of the first degree (18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 3502(A)(1)), Criminal Trespass as a felony of the second 

degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 3503(A)(1)), Criminal Mischief as a 

misdemeanor of the third degree (18 Pa.C.S. § 3304(A)(2)), and 

Criminal Attempt (Theft) as a felony of the first degree (18 

Pa.C.S. § 901(A)).
J-S89007-16

- 3 -

On January 15, 2016, [Appellant] was sentenced [to] 

concurrent terms of 2-4 years [of] incarceration, followed by 

consecutive terms of two years [of] probation, on the Burglary, 

Criminal Trespass and Criminal Attempt convictions. No further 

penalty was imposed on the Criminal Mischief conviction.

A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on February 16, 2016.1

1 Monday, February 15, 2016, was a [c]ourt holiday.

On February 17, 2016, the [c]ourt entered an order 

directing the filing of a Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), within 21 days.

On March 2, 2016, [Appellant] filed a Statement of Errors, 

along with a Request for Extension of Time to File a 

Supplemental Statement of Matters Upon Receipt of All Notes of 

Testimony. 

On March 8, 2016, the [c]ourt denied the Request for 

Extension, without prejudice to seek leave to file an amended 

statement of errors upon receipt of the notes of testimony.

The trial and sentencing notes of testimony became 

available on or before May 11, 2016. As of this date, [Appellant] 

has not sought leave to file an amended statement of errors.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/16, at 1-2.

Appellant presents the following issue for our review:

Was not the evidence insufficient to support the offense of 

burglary where there was no entry into the house and no intent 

to commit a crime inside the building?

Appellant’s Brief at 2. 

Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence establishing that 

he entered or attempted to enter the house as opposed to the shed. 

Appellant’s Brief at 8. Appellant posits that his presence in the shed could 

have been as a result of his attempt to avoid the elements. Id. Appellant 
J-S89007-16

- 4 -

further maintains that “though there was evidence of someone doing 

damage to both the shed and the house the day before, and stealing 

property from within the house, nothing connects [A]ppellant to that prior 

burglary.” Id. Appellant also asserts that the evidence did not demonstrate 

that he had the requisite intent to commit a crime inside the building. Id. at 

7. 

The standard for evaluating sufficiency claims is as follows:

The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the 

evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in 

the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the 

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, 

we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for 

the fact-finder[’s]. In addition, we note that the facts and 

circumstances established by the Commonwealth need not 

preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a 

defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the 

evidence is so weak and inconclusive that as a matter of law no 

probability of fact may be drawn from the combined 

circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of 

proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt 

by means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in 

applying the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and 

all evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the 

finder of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and 

the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part 

or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Estepp, 17 A.3d 939, 943-944 (Pa. Super. 2011).

“A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to commit 

a crime therein, the person . . . enters a building or occupied structure, or 

separately secured or occupied portion thereof that is adapted for overnight 

accommodations in which at the time of the offense any person is present.” 
J-S89007-16

- 5 -

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1). “Intent may be proved by direct evidence or 

inferred from circumstantial evidence.” Commonwealth v. Galindes, 786 

A.2d 1004, 1009 (Pa. Super. 2001).

The trial court provided the following analysis in addressing Appellant’s 

claims:

[Appellant] alleges that his conviction was erroneous 

because the evidence did not demonstrate either that he entered 

the property or that he has the requisite intent to commit a 

crime therein.

The first aspect of this allegation of error is frivolous. The 

complainant was clear that he found [Appellant] in the summer 

shed kitchen of the house, kicking at the locked door that 

connected that room to the kitchen proper. The shed kitchen is 

part of the house. That shed kitchen portion of the house had a 

rear door, opening into a fenced in area, which was also 

damaged, which the complainant returned to “shore up” the next 

day. 

As to the second allegation of error, that the evidence was 

insufficient to demonstrate intent to commit a crime, we found 

ample circumstantial evidence of such intent. The law is clear 

that “specific intent as to the crime of burglary may be inferred 

from the circumstances surrounding entry of the accused.”

* * *

Here, the evidence demonstrating that [Appellant] entered 

the property with intent to commit a crime included entry 

through a rear door, by force, with a tool to effect such entry 

(the crowbar), and attempting by force, to break through a 

second door.

Additionally, although mere gild on the lily of the above 

amply demonstrated entry with intent to commit a crime, there 

was circumstantial evidence of actual and attempted theft. . . . 

[T]he complainant found the metal bars had been pried away 

from the frame of the back door, as if with a crowbar, and the 

wood was splintered. There had been no such damage the 
J-S89007-16

- 6 -

previous day. [The complainant] secured the doors, and left, 

returning about one-half hour later, where he found [Appellant] 

inside the back door, in the shed kitchen, kicking at the door into 

the kitchen proper, with a crowbar nearby. Items, including 

pipes from the basement, were missing from the house, while a 

TV was by the door. 

From all this evidence, particularly the extremely short 

time span between the resealing of the house and [Appellant’s] 

presence inside the re-broken rear door, attempting to get into 

the kitchen, it was reasonable to conclude [Appellant] had 

returned for further booty, including the TV he had left by the 

door.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/7/16, at 4-6 (internal citations omitted).

We agree. Mr. Paramore, in describing the dwelling, explained that 

the shed kitchen is part of the house. N.T., 11/6/15, at 21. The door 

separating the summer shed kitchen and the kitchen proper simply 

happened to be locked, and as a result, hampered Appellant’s further ingress 

to the remainder of the house. Because Appellant was found in the summer 

shed kitchen, which is part of the house, we agree with the trial court’s 

conclusion that there was sufficient evidence to establish that Appellant 

made entry into the building. 

Furthermore, the evidence, both direct and circumstantial, establishes 

that Appellant had the intent to commit a crime within the building. 

Appellant forcefully broke into the structure. Such evidence establishes that 

Appellant had a criminal purpose for being in the building. Commonwealth 

v. Alston, 651 A.2d 1092, 1095 (Pa. 1994) (“Once [an a]ppellant has 

entered the private residence by criminal means we can infer that [the 
J-S89007-16

- 7 -

a]ppellant intended a criminal purpose based upon the totality of the 

circumstances.”). Moreover, a determination that an individual entered a 

building with a criminal purpose is sufficient to establish a conviction of 

burglary. Id. (explaining that “in order to secure a conviction for burglary, 

the Commonwealth is not required to allege or prove what particular crime 

Appellant intended to commit after his forcible entry into the private 

residence.”).

Additionally, the evidence establishes that several items, including 

pipes, a digital recorder, clothes, sneakers, and jewelry were missing from 

the building after Appellant’s unlawful entry. Moreover, the television had 

been moved close to the door, supporting the inference that Appellant had 

previously placed it there for retrieval upon his return. Thus, the combined 

circumstances support the conclusion that Appellant indeed committed a 

crime within the structure, and had made entry with the intent to do so. 

Accordingly, we conclude there was sufficient evidence to support 

Appellant’s conviction of burglary.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 1/11/2017