[Cite as In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538.] 

IN RE M.W. 

[Cite as In re M.W., 133 Ohio St.3d 309, 2012-Ohio-4538.] 

Juvenile procedure—R.C. 2151.352—The term “proceedings” as used in R.C. 

2151.352 means court proceedings, and in that context, a child is 

statutorily entitled to representation by legal counsel upon the filing of a 

complaint in juvenile court or upon initial appearance in the juvenile 

court. 

(No. 2011-0215—Submitted December 6, 2011—Decided October 3, 2012.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Cuyahoga County, 

No. 94737, 2010-Ohio-6362. 

____________________ 

SYLLABUS OF THE COURT

The term “proceedings” as used in R.C. 2151.352 means court proceedings, and 

in that context, a child is statutorily entitled to representation by legal 

counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial 

appearance in the juvenile court. 

__________________ 

O’DONNELL, J. 

{¶ 1} The issue we confront in this appeal is whether a juvenile has a 

statutory right to counsel during a police interrogation conducted before a 

complaint is filed or an appearance is made in juvenile court. 

{¶ 2} R.C. 2151.352 provides that a child “is entitled to representation by 

legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under this chapter or Chapter 2152.” 

Because the term “proceedings,” as used in this statute, means court proceedings, 

a juvenile does not have a statutory right to counsel at an interrogation conducted 
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2 

prior to the filing of a complaint or prior to appearing in juvenile court. 

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Facts and Procedural History 

{¶ 3} On August 22, 2009, Cleveland Police Sergeant Thomas Shoulders 

stopped a vehicle driven by M.W. (who at that time identified himself as M.J.) 

and determined he had no valid Ohio driver’s license. When Shoulders asked 

why he lied about his name, M.W. stated he “thought [he] could get away with it” 

and he thought he had been stopped for “something to do with [A.C.]” Shoulders 

knew that A.C. had been arrested for aggravated robbery the previous day and 

therefore asked M.W. what he knew about that robbery. M.W. told Shoulders that 

he heard A.C. robbed “someone at gun point on Thursday night” and then added 

that he had served as the lookout for A.C.: “I kept anyone from walking up on 

him or watched for the police.” M.W. further explained that after the robbery, 

they each ran, intending to split the money the following day, but the police 

arrested A.C. before they had that opportunity. 

{¶ 4} Based on those statements, Shoulders arrested M.W., transported 

him to the Cleveland Second District Police Station, and in the presence of 

Detective David Borden, advised M.W. of his constitutional rights. M.W. signed 

a written waiver of his rights and a written statement.1

 Detective Borden then 

filed a complaint in the Cuyahoga County Juvenile Court alleging M.W. to be 

delinquent for having committed aggravated robbery, in violation of R.C. 

2911.01(A)(1), a felony of the first degree, with firearm specifications pursuant to 

R.C. 2941.141 and 2941.145. 

{¶ 5} The state moved to bind M.W. over to the general division of 

common pleas court in order to prosecute M.W. as an adult. The juvenile court 

 

1. It is this statement that M.W. contests in this appeal; no objection is made to the statements he 

gave to Shoulders at the time he was stopped. 
January Term, 2012 

3 

denied that motion, finding M.W. amenable to care and rehabilitation in the 

juvenile system. 

{¶ 6} Subsequently, a juvenile court magistrate adjudicated M.W. 

delinquent of aggravated robbery with a three-year firearm specification, and the 

juvenile court adopted that decision: it placed M.W. in the custody of the Ohio 

Department of Youth Services for a minimum of one year on the aggravatedrobbery charge and one year on the three-year firearm specification, to be served 

consecutively, for a period of commitment not to exceed 21 years of age. 

{¶ 7} M.W. appealed and raised several claims, urging that the trial court 

erred in admitting his written statement into evidence because Shoulders had 

violated R.C. 2151.352 in obtaining it. That statute provides a juvenile with a 

right to representation by legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings pursuant to 

R.C. Chapters 2151 and 2152. M.W. asserted that giving a written statement to 

Shoulders was a proceeding and triggered his statutory right to counsel. He 

further claimed that based on In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 

874 N.E.2d 1177, he could not waive his Fifth Amendment right to counsel 

during interrogation, recognized in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 

1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), unless he had consulted with a parent, guardian, 

custodian, or attorney regarding the waiver. Because he had not consulted 

anyone, M.W. argued that the waiver of his Miranda right to counsel was invalid 

based on In re C.S. 

{¶ 8} The state disputed the assertion that interrogation constituted a 

proceeding within the scope of R.C. Chapter 2151 at which the right to counsel 

pursuant to R.C. 2151.352 attached, arguing that the term “proceedings” in R.C. 

2151.352 meant court proceedings. It cited the definitions for the terms “court 

proceeding” and “party” contained in Juv.R. 2 and the requirement of Juv.R. 4 

that parties to a juvenile court proceeding are entitled to counsel. The state 

further explained that a juvenile-delinquency proceeding commences when a 
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complaint is filed or a juvenile appears before the juvenile court. In this case, the 

state argued that because M.W. gave his written statement before Detective 

Borden filed the complaint in juvenile court that commenced the delinquency 

proceeding against him, his statutory right to counsel had not attached at the time 

of interrogation. 

{¶ 9} The appellate court rejected M.W.’s claim that giving a written 

statement to Shoulders constituted a stage of the proceedings, explaining that “a 

juvenile proceeding does not commence until the filing of a complaint.” 8th Dist. 

No. 94737, 2010-Ohio-6362, ¶ 16. It concluded that because no complaint had 

been filed against M.W. at the time of the police interrogation, R.C. 2151.352 did 

not apply. Id.

2

 

{¶ 10} M.W. appealed and now presents this proposition of law for our 

consideration: 

 A child has the right to counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings against him. Because Ohio's General Assembly has 

designated interrogation as a stage of the proceedings, a child must 

be represented by his parent, guardian, custodian, or an attorney 

before the child can waive his right to counsel pursuant to 

Miranda. 

{¶ 11} M.W. contends that an interrogation is an R.C. Chapter 2151 

proceeding because it is included in R.C. 2151.311(D)(2) and that he had a 

statutory right to counsel at all stages of the proceedings pursuant to R.C. 

2151.352 that arose before he waived his Miranda right to counsel. He further 

 

2. M.W. never exercised his Miranda right to counsel, as noted by the court of appeals in its 

opinion. Thus, the only basis upon which M.W. claims a right to counsel in this appeal is a 

statutory right to counsel pursuant to R.C. 2151.352. 
January Term, 2012 

5 

asserts that the waiver of his Miranda right to counsel is invalid based on In re 

C.S. because he had not consulted with an attorney or parent. 

{¶ 12} The state contends that an interrogation is not a “proceeding” as 

that term is used in R.C. 2151.352 or within the usual and ordinary definition of 

the term. It also contends that the legislative history of R.C. 2151.352 does not 

support a finding that an interrogation is a proceeding and that the term 

“proceeding” is used consistently throughout the Revised Code to mean a court 

proceeding. The state also asserts that the juvenile rules of procedure similarly do 

not lend support to M.W.’s position, pointing out that Juv.R. 2(G) defines “court 

proceeding” to mean any action taken by a court after the filing of a complaint or 

the time the child first appears before the court and that Juv.R. 4(A) states that the 

right to counsel does not attach until the juvenile becomes “a party to a juvenile 

court proceeding.” Thus, the state contends that because interrogation is not an 

R.C. Chapter 2151 proceeding, the right of a juvenile to counsel pursuant to R.C. 

2151.352 does not arise until the juvenile appears before the court, and, in turn, In 

re C.S. does not apply in this case. 

{¶ 13} Thus, the issue presented by this appeal is whether the statutory 

right to counsel delineated by the General Assembly in R.C. 2151.352 attaches to 

an interrogation of a juvenile prior to the filing of a complaint alleging 

delinquency or prior to an appearance by the juvenile in juvenile court. 

Resolution of that issue rests on the definition of the term “proceedings” as used 

in R.C. 2151.352. 

Law and Analysis 

{¶ 14} R.C. 2151.352 provides: “A child, the child's parents or custodian, 

or any other person in loco parentis of the child is entitled to representation by 

legal counsel at all stages of the proceedings under this chapter or Chapter 2152 

of the Revised Code.” 
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{¶ 15} R.C. 2151.311(C)(1) provides that a person taking a child into 

custody for a delinquent act that would be a felony if committed by an adult may 

hold the child for processing purposes for a maximum of six hours in an adult 

center. The statute further defines “processing purposes” to include 

“[i]nterrogating the child, contacting the child's parent or guardian, arranging for 

placement of the child, or arranging for transfer or transferring the child, while 

holding the child in a nonsecure area of the facility.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 

2151.311(D)(2). 

{¶ 16} In the case of In re C.S., we construed R.C. 2151.352 in the context 

of a delinquency proceeding and held that “a juvenile may waive his 

constitutional right to counsel, subject to certain standards * * *, if he is counseled 

and advised by his parent, custodian, or guardian. If the juvenile is not counseled 

by his parent, guardian, or custodian and has not consulted with an attorney, he 

may not waive his right to counsel.” 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 

N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 98. Here, however, we are concerned with determining whether 

an interrogation that occurs prior to the filing of a complaint in the juvenile court 

is considered a “proceeding” for the purposes of R.C. 2151.352, and it is the 

procedural and timing differences that distinguish this case from In re C.S. 

{¶ 17} This appeal involves a matter of statutory construction. The 

primary goal in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of 

the legislature. State v. Hairston, 101 Ohio St.3d 308, 2004-Ohio-969, 804 

N.E.2d 471, ¶ 11. When analyzing a statute, we first examine its plain language 

and apply the statute as written when the meaning is clear and unambiguous. 

State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 9. This 

analysis also requires that we read words and phrases in context and construe 

them according to the rules of grammar and common usage. R.C. 1.42. 

{¶ 18} R.C. 2151.352 does not define the term “proceedings”; therefore, 

we look to the usual and ordinary definition of that term for guidance. Brecksville 
January Term, 2012 

7 

v. Cook, 75 Ohio St.3d 53, 56, 661 N.E.2d 706 (1996). Black's Law Dictionary

1324 (9th Ed.2009) defines “proceeding” as (1) “[t]he regular and orderly 

progression of a lawsuit, including all acts and events between the time of 

commencement and the entry of judgment” (emphasis added), (2) a way by which 

redress is sought from a tribunal or an agency, (3) “[a]n act or step that is part of a 

larger action,” and (4) “[t]he business conducted by a court or other official body; 

a hearing.” It is also noteworthy that in 1969, when the General Assembly 

enacted R.C. 2151.352, “proceeding” was defined in Black’s Law Dictionary in 

virtually the same way, but the entry included a comment that the term proceeding 

“is properly applicable, in a legal sense, only to judicial acts before some judicial 

tribunal.” Id. at 1368 (4th Ed.1968). Also, Webster's Third New International 

Dictionary 1807 (1986) defines “proceedings” as “the course of procedure in a 

judicial action or in a suit in litigation: legal action * * * : a particular action at 

law or case in litigation.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the term “proceedings” 

denotes acts or events taken between the time of commencing an action at law and 

the entry of a final judgment by a judicial tribunal. “Proceedings” evokes a court 

of law, not the investigatory action taken by police prior to the filing of a 

complaint or a juvenile’s initial appearance before a tribunal. 

{¶ 19} Prior decisions from this court also support interpretation of the 

term “proceedings” to mean court proceedings. In State v. Davis, 132 Ohio St.3d

25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 N.E.2d 466, we construed R.C. 2921.04(B) and held 

that a conviction for witness intimidation could not be sustained when the act of 

intimidation occurred prior to the formal initiation of criminal charges or grand 

jury proceedings, but during a pending police investigation, because a court was 

not yet involved. We reiterated: “Throughout the Revised Code, ‘ “criminal 

action or proceeding” * * * indicates the involvement of a court.’ ” (Emphasis 

added.) Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Malone, 121 Ohio St.3d 244, 2009-Ohio-310, 

903 N.E.2d 614, at ¶ 15; see also Malone at ¶ 18 (“As demonstrated in Ohio's 
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8 

statutory scheme and in this court’s case law, a ‘criminal action or proceeding’ 

implies a formal process involving a court”); State ex rel. Steckman v. Jackson, 70 

Ohio St.3d 420, 432, 639 N.E.2d 83 (1994) (noting that the term “proceeding,” 

used in R.C. 149.43(A)(1), is defined in Black’s to mean the steps in an action 

from commencement to final judgment). 

{¶ 20} In addition, the Juvenile Rules lend support to the view that the 

term “proceedings” in R.C. 2151.352 means court proceedings. See, e.g., Juv.R. 

2(G) defines “court proceeding” to mean “all action taken by a court from the 

earlier of (1) the time a complaint is filed and (2) the time a person first appears 

before an officer of a juvenile court until the court relinquishes jurisdiction over 

such child”; Juv.R. 2(Y) defines a “party” as “a child who is the subject of a 

juvenile court proceeding”; and Juv.R. 4(A) provides that “[e]very party shall 

have the right to be represented by counsel” and that right attaches “when a 

person becomes a party to a juvenile court proceeding.” 

{¶ 21} Finally, the context in which the term “proceedings” is used in R.C. 

2151.352 reveals that the General Assembly contemplated that the term would 

mean court proceedings. The statute applies to a “child, the child’s parents or 

custodian, or any other person in loco parentis of the child” and refers to each as a 

“party,” inferring that a legal action has commenced. The statute also directs the 

court to undertake a variety of actions, including providing counsel to indigent 

parties, observing whether a party is aware of the right to counsel and the right to 

be appointed counsel if indigent, and continuing a case to enable a party to obtain 

counsel or be appointed counsel; a court, however, may take action only after its 

jurisdiction has been invoked. See State ex rel. Pfeiffer v. Lorain Cty. Common 

Pleas Court, 13 Ohio St.2d 133, 136-137, 235 N.E.2d 232 (1968); see also In re 

Hunt, 46 Ohio St.2d 378, 348 N.E.2d 727 (1976), paragraph one of the syllabus 

(“A complaint under Juv.R. 10 and R.C. 2151.27 alleging that a child is 
January Term, 2012 

9 

dependent must state the essential facts which bring the proceeding within the 

jurisdiction of the court”). 

{¶ 22} The fallacy of M.W.’s argument is highlighted by the fact that he 

invokes a right to counsel pursuant to R.C. 2151.352 before the delinquency 

matter is brought against him in juvenile court. His reliance on R.C. 2151.352, 

which requires a court to appoint counsel or ascertain whether a party is aware of 

his right to counsel, is weakened by the fact that the jurisdiction of the juvenile 

court had not yet been invoked, and thus no court had authority to act. 

{¶ 23} In view of these reasons and the plain language of R.C. 2151.352, 

we conclude that an interrogation that occurs prior to the filing of a complaint 

alleging delinquency or prior to an appearance in juvenile court is not a 

proceeding that falls within the scope of R.C. Chapter 2151. This determination 

is consistent with our duty to construe statutes to avoid unjust and unreasonable 

results. R.C. 1.47(C). 

{¶ 24} This conclusion also conforms with our statement in State v. 

Ostrowski, 30 Ohio St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359 (1972): “Taken as a whole, the 

purpose of R.C. 2151.352 is to insure to the juvenile his right to counsel and/or 

his right to have parents present at any hearing.” Id. at 42 (construing an earlier 

version of R.C. 2151.352, which contained the term “stages of the proceedings”). 

{¶ 25} In this case, the complaint filed by Detective Borden commenced 

the delinquency proceeding against M.W. and invoked the jurisdiction of the 

juvenile court and afforded M.W. the right to counsel pursuant to R.C. 2151.352. 

Because Shoulders’s interrogation of M.W. occurred prior to the filing of that 

complaint, M.W.’s statutory right to counsel had not attached. 

{¶ 26} We stress that the only claimed right to counsel in this appeal is a 

statutory one premised on R.C. 2151.352, and our narrow holding does not 

address any constitutional right to counsel or the issue of waiver. Although M.W. 

had a Fifth Amendment right to counsel pursuant to Miranda, he did not exercise 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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that right. In re M.W., 2010-Ohio-6362, at ¶ 16. His Sixth Amendment right to 

counsel, which guarantees the right to counsel at all “ ‘critical’ stages of the 

proceedings,” United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 

L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967), had not yet attached because a complaint alleging 

delinquency had not yet been filed. United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 189, 

104 S.Ct. 2292, 81 L.Ed.2d 146 (1984) (right to counsel “attaches at the 

initiation” of adversarial judicial proceedings). 

Conclusion 

{¶ 27} The term “proceedings” as used in R.C. 2151.352 means court 

proceedings, and in that context, a child is statutorily entitled to representation by 

legal counsel upon the filing of a complaint in juvenile court or upon initial 

appearance in the juvenile court. Thus, the right of a juvenile to counsel pursuant 

to R.C. 2151.352 attaches when the jurisdiction of a juvenile court is properly 

invoked. For these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court. 

Judgment affirmed. 

LUNDBERG STRATTON, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

 O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., dissent. 

__________________ 

LANZINGER, J., concurring. 

{¶ 28} I concur in judgment because the statute, the juvenile rules, and the 

cases cited in the majority opinion support the conclusion that the term 

“proceedings” in R.C. 2151.352 relates to juvenile court proceedings that begin 

when a complaint alleging delinquency is filed. Although the dissent is 

impassioned in arguing that a juvenile’s right to counsel should attach at an earlier 

time, such an extension is a policy matter. Just as it amended R.C. 2921.04 to 

define “witness” to mean a person with knowledge of facts “whether or not 

criminal or delinquent child charges are actually filed,” the General Assembly 
January Term, 2012 

11 

may define the term “proceedings” to include a statutory right to counsel for 

juveniles during “investigations of delinquency” if it so chooses. 

CUPP, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

O’CONNOR, C.J., dissenting.

{¶ 29} Because I believe that the majority’s holding offends the United 

States Supreme Court’s constitutional commands on a juvenile’s due process and 

Fifth Amendment rights, our own precedent, and the intent of the General 

Assembly in enacting R.C. 2151.352, I must dissent. 

THE CONFESSION

{¶ 30} In 2009, M.W., a 15-year-old boy, acted as a lookout while his 

friend, another juvenile male, robbed a victim at gunpoint. We believe this to be 

true because soon thereafter, M.W. admitted those facts to Cleveland Police. 

{¶ 31} M.W. confessed after signing a waiver of his rights to an attorney, 

without the benefit of advice from counsel or his parents or guardian. (Evidently, 

it is “typical” for the Cleveland Police Department to interview juveniles without 

their parents being present.) And after doing so, he was interrogated by police 

without an attorney being present. 

{¶ 32} There is no doubt that M.W.’s actions were dangerous and that he 

is in need of intervention. But there is doubt whether his confession, which was 

used against him in the subsequent delinquency proceedings, was constitutionally 

obtained. 

{¶ 33} The majority opinion divorces the relevant analyses from the 

question before us, asserting that there is no need to discuss a juvenile’s 

constitutional protections because M.W. waived any constitutional right against 

self-incrimination. Evidently, the majority ignores that the proposition we 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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accepted for review in this appeal clearly refers to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 

436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).3

{¶ 34} The majority then asserts that the statute at issue, R.C. 2151.352, is 

a plainly worded one and that the statutory term “proceedings” cannot be subject 

to more than one interpretation. 

{¶ 35} The majority is mistaken on both counts. 

CONTEXT IS EVERYTHING 

The Statutory Term “Proceedings” Is Not Clear and Unambiguous 

{¶ 36} The term “proceedings” does not have one plain and ordinary 

meaning. 

{¶ 37} The term can certainly refer to an event in civil litigation or 

criminal prosecution that occurs after the filing of a complaint or an indictment 

with the court. But that understanding of the word is not the exclusive one, nor is 

it dispositive here. After all, the majority concedes that the word “proceedings” 

also refers to “ ‘[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action.’ ” Majority opinion 

at ¶ 18, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1324 (9th Ed.2009). And certainly an 

interrogation of a juvenile is an act or step that is part of a larger action, i.e., the 

process of adjudicating the juvenile as a delinquent. 

{¶ 38} Perhaps more compelling, however, is that Black’s recognizes that 

the term “proceedings” includes “ ‘all ancillary or provisional steps, such as 

arrest.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Black’s at 1324, quoting Edwin E. Bryant, The Law 

of Pleading under the Codes of Civil Procedure 3-4 (2d Ed.1899).4

 Notably, that 

 

3. The question before us is whether a juvenile has the right to counsel at all stages of the 

proceedings against him, and whether in the interrogation stage, the juvenile must be represented 

by his parent, guardian, custodian, or an attorney before waiving his right to counsel pursuant to 

Miranda. 

4. The majority attempts to support its view by pointing to the definitions that were in Black’s

when the statute was enacted in 1969. But 70 years prior to the enactment of the statute, Dean 

Bryant had explained that an “arrest” is a “proceeding.” We must presume that the General 

Assembly was aware of that usage of the term “proceeding” in the common law. In re C.S., 115 
January Term, 2012 

13 

definition is absent from the majority’s opinion, notwithstanding the fact that it 

appears in the same definition upon which the majority relies. 

{¶ 39} Thus, the varied definitions of “proceedings” contradict the 

majority’s insistence that there is only one plain and ordinary meaning of the 

word and its conclusion that the only meaning of “proceedings” is a court event 

that takes place after the filing of a complaint or indictment. Thus, to understand 

what the General Assembly intended, we must look beyond the statute’s words. 

{¶ 40} The majority implicitly agrees that we must look beyond the words 

of the statute because its analysis does not end with a discussion of the plain and 

ordinary meaning of “proceeding.” Instead, it attempts to buttress its conclusion 

with context from our case law. I agree that context controls the analysis here, 

but I strongly disagree with the context upon which the majority relies. 

THE IMPROPER CONTEXT USED BY THE MAJORITY

The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Is Inapplicable in Juvenile Cases 

{¶ 41} The majority holds, “ ‘Proceedings’ evokes a court of law, not the 

investigatory action taken by police prior to the filing of the complaint or a 

juvenile’s appearance before a tribunal.” Majority opinion at ¶ 18. The majority 

would be correct if it were addressing an adult criminal defendant’s Sixth 

Amendment right to counsel in a proceeding, which does not attach until a 

prosecution commences. See, e.g., McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175, 111 

S.Ct. 2204, 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). More specifically, in the adult criminal 

context, the United States Supreme Court has held that a defendant’s right to 

counsel in a proceeding does not commence until the government initiates 

“ ‘adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, 

preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.’ ” Rothgery v. 

Gillespie Cty., Tex., 554 U.S. 191, 198, 128 S.Ct. 2578, 171 L.Ed.2d 366 (2008), 

 

Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 91 (when enacting statutes, we presume the 

General Assembly was mindful of the common law). 
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14 

quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 

(1972) (plurality opinion). 

{¶ 42} But the Sixth Amendment is not applicable here. 

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 

 Controls in Juvenile Cases 

{¶ 43} As we explained in In re C.S., the juvenile’s right to counsel is not 

governed by the Sixth Amendment, but rather by the Due Process Clause of the 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 

2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, ¶ 79, citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41, 87 

S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527 (1967). Because it is founded in due process, the 

juvenile’s right to counsel in proceedings is a malleable right rather than a rigid 

one; it is driven by concerns for fundamental fairness. Id. at ¶ 80. It was that 

sense of fundamental fairness that drove the analysis in In re C.S., a critical point 

that was evidently lost on the majority. 

The Majority’s Reliance on Inapposite Precedent 

{¶ 44} The majority also relies on Ohio case law decided long after the 

General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.352. I do not quibble with the import of 

those cases in other contexts, but they are inapposite here. 

{¶ 45} For example, the majority’s reliance on cases like State v. Davis, 

132 Ohio St.3d 25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 N.E.2d 466, is entirely misplaced. 

{¶ 46} In Davis, we rendered a narrow holding interpreting R.C. 2921.04, 

a modern statute prohibiting intimidation of witnesses. We held, “A police 

investigation of a crime, without more, is not a proceeding in a court of justice, 

and it does not invoke the protection of R.C. 2921.04(B) for a person who 

observes the crime.” Id. at ¶ 19. 

{¶ 47} Davis was decided more than 40 years after the General Assembly 

enacted R.C. 2151.352, and the decision does not interpret R.C. 2151.352 or any 
January Term, 2012 

15 

other juvenile statute. It does not offer even the smallest glimpse of insight into 

the legislative thinking on juvenile rights in 1969.5 

{¶ 48} And notably, while the appeal in Davis was pending, the General 

Assembly sent a clear message rejecting the courts’ narrow interpretation of R.C. 

2921.04, which included the phrase “criminal action or proceeding” when Davis 

was prosecuted. While the appeal was pending, the General Assembly amended 

R.C. 2921.04, clarifying that the statutory scheme is designed to protect “any 

person who has or claims to have knowledge concerning a fact or facts 

concerning a criminal or delinquent act, whether or not criminal or delinquent 

child charges are actually filed.” Davis, 132 Ohio St.3d 25, 2012-Ohio-1654, 968 

N.E.2d 466, ¶ 3, fn. 1, citing 2011 Sub.H.B. No. 20, effective June 4, 2012. If 

anything, the General Assembly’s response to Davis militates in favor of holding 

that the right to counsel precedes the filing of formal charges. 

{¶ 49} Further, our holding in Davis was driven in part by the rule that we 

must construe ambiguity in criminal statutes in favor of the defendant and against 

the state. That rule does not support the majority’s holding in construing R.C. 

2151.352. Rather, it supports the notion that we must generously read R.C. 

 

5. Rice v. United States, 356 F.2d 709, 710-712 (8th Cir.1966), a case in which union laborers 

were intimidated into withdrawing grievances they had filed with the National Labor Relations 

Board, is a far better explanation of how legislative bodies viewed “proceedings” in the context of 

witness-intimidation statutes at the time. There, the federal appeals court expansively interpreted 

the term “proceeding” to reach the filing of a preliminary charge filed with an administrative 

agency even though the agency had never filed a formal complaint. Rice at 712. The court 

broadly interpreted the term “proceeding” as “a comprehensive term meaning the action of 

proceeding—a particular step or series of steps, adopted for accomplishing something,” thus 

including all steps from the inception of an action to its conclusion. Id. In doing so, it noted the 

importance of understanding the legislative intent behind the word. The court explained that the 

purpose of the statute at issue in Rice was to punish obstruction of the administrative process by 

impeding a witness in any proceeding before a governmental agency. The court stressed that the 

statute reached intimidation “at any stage of the proceedings, be it adjudicative or investigative. 

Congress did not limit the term ‘proceeding’ as used in [the witness-intimidation statute] to only 

those acts committed after a formal stage was reached, and we cannot so limit the term.” 

(Emphasis added.) Id.
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2151.352 in favor of the juvenile’s rights, including his right to counsel and due 

process. The majority does the opposite; it reads the statute in favor of the state. 

{¶ 50} The majority opinion also relies on State v. Ostrowski, 30 Ohio 

St.2d 34, 282 N.E.2d 359 (1972), for the proposition that we interpreted an earlier 

version of R.C. 2151.352 to ensure that juveniles have counsel or their parents 

present at any hearing. That statement is wholly misleading. 

{¶ 51} The full context of the quote used by the majority establishes that 

in Ostrowski, we were concerned with the sequestration of witnesses, including a 

juvenile’s parents, and not the right to have those parents, or counsel, present 

during the proceedings: 

Taken as a whole, the purpose of R.C. 2151.352 is to insure 

to the juvenile his right to counsel and/or his right to have his 

parents present at any hearing. In our opinion, such a provision is 

not intended to and does not take away from a trial court its basic 

right to order a separation of witnesses until such time as such 

witnesses have testified. During such time the exclusion is not of 

parents, as such, but instead is the exclusion of witnesses. 

Moreover, during such time as the parents were so 

excluded, the juvenile was fully and adequately represented by two 

attorneys. Under these circumstances, no possible prejudice to the 

juvenile could result from such exclusion. 

(Emphasis sic.) Id. at 43. 

{¶ 52} Even if Ostrowski had not been focused on the issue of 

sequestration, let us be clear that Ostrowski addressed proceedings in court—not 

custodial interrogations—in which the juvenile at issue had the benefit of two 
January Term, 2012 

17 

attorneys. Thus, in this case, in which a juvenile had no counsel during a 

custodial interrogation, Ostrowski is of no value. 

{¶ 53} It is a difficult task to attempt to define “proceedings” by looking 

to cases that analyzed the term in the era in which R.C. 2151.352 was enacted. 

This is particularly true given that while the General Assembly was crafting R.C. 

2151.352, the federal courts were struggling to define and interpret “proceedings” 

in quasi-judicial proceedings like administrative proceedings. 

{¶ 54} In a host of cases, the federal courts interpreted “proceedings” to 

reach investigations conducted by administrative agencies long before any formal 

complaint or indictment was filed in court. For example, in 1964, the District of 

Columbia District Court considered a Securities and Exchange Commission 

investigation to be a “proceeding.” United States v. Batten, 226 F.Supp. 492, 494 

(D.D.C.1964). And soon thereafter, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a 

conviction for giving false invoices to an investigator in a Federal Trade 

Commission case, holding that the term “proceeding” has a broad scope, 

“encompassing both the investigative and adjudicative functions of a department 

or agency.” United States v. Fruchtman, 421 F.2d 1019, 1021 (6th Cir.1970). 

{¶ 55} Admittedly, the statutory schemes at issue in Batten and 

Fruchtman are not any more akin to R.C. 2151.352 than the cases cited by the 

majority. But they illustrate that at the time the General Assembly used the word 

“proceedings” in R.C. 2151.352, the courts were not limiting its definition to the 

events that occur after the formal filing of charges in a court. Indeed, neither 

lawmakers nor judges of that era myopically viewed the term “proceedings” in the 

manner the majority suggests here. As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 

succinctly stated after reviewing cases like Rice and Batten: 

In sum, the term “proceeding” is not, as one might believe, 

limited to something in the nature of a trial. The growth and 
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expansion of agency activities have resulted in a meaning being 

given to “proceeding” which is more inclusive and which no 

longer limits itself to formal activities in a court of law. Rather, 

the investigation or search for the true facts such as that which is 

described in the indictment here is not to be ruled a nonproceeding simply because it is preliminary to indictment and trial. 

United States v. Browning, 572 F.2d 720, 724 (10th Cir.1978). 

{¶ 56} Having illustrated the reasons why the majority’s contextualization 

is improper, I turn to one that accurately illuminates the statute. 

THE PROPER CONTEXT

R.C. 2151.352 Codifies and Expands a Juvenile’s Constitutional Rights 

{¶ 57} This court recognizes that R.C. 2151.352 is the legislative 

embodiment of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Gault. In re C.S., 

115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 83. “Indeed, 

through R.C. 2151.352, the legislature provided a statutory right to appointed 

counsel that goes beyond constitutional requirements.” Id., citing In re Williams, 

101 Ohio St.3d 398, 2004-Ohio-1500, 805 N.E.2d 1110, ¶ 15, and State ex rel. 

Asberry v. Payne, 82 Ohio St.3d 44, 46, 693 N.E.2d 794 (1998). 

{¶ 58} We must look to the constitutional requirements that the statute 

embodies. And after doing so, we must be true to them and to the statutory right 

that exceeds those requirements. 

Relevant Supreme Court Precedent 

{¶ 59} The General Assembly enacted our juvenile-delinquency statutes in 

the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions in watershed cases like Kent v. United 

States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), and Gault. See In re 

C.S. Those decisions, and their rationales, control here. So, too, do the court’s 

contemporaneous pronouncements on the Fifth Amendment right against self-
January Term, 2012 

19 

incrimination in Miranda, which was announced shortly before Ohio’s enactment 

of R.C. 2151.352. 

{¶ 60} The Fifth Amendment protects an individual from being compelled 

to be a witness against himself, whether in a custodial interrogation or in court 

after formal charges have been brought. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 

542-543, 18 S.Ct. 183, 42 L.Ed. 568 (1897). In Miranda, the Supreme Court 

explained those rights, holding that a police officer, before questioning a suspect 

in custody, must warn the suspect of the right to remain silent and that anything 

said during interrogation could be used against the suspect in court, that the 

suspect has a right to have an attorney present during questioning, and that if the 

suspect cannot afford an attorney but desires one, the court will appoint one prior 

to any questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 478-479, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694. 

{¶ 61} The Miranda warning is more than fodder for television and movie 

depictions of police work. Its purpose is “to dispel the compulsion inherent in 

custodial surroundings.” Id. at 458. Indeed, the warning concerning a suspect’s 

right to counsel is designed to ensure that the privilege against self-incrimination 

“remains unfettered throughout the interrogation process.” Id. at 469. That 

protection is critical for all individuals, but particularly for juveniles. 

{¶ 62} As the Supreme Court recently reiterated, by their very nature, 

custodial police interrogations entail inherently compelling pressures. J.D.B. v. 

North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2394, 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310 (2011), 

citing Miranda at 467. Those pressures are heightened for juveniles: 

Even for an adult, the physical and psychological isolation of 

custodial interrogation can “undermine the individual’s will to 

resist and * * * compel him to speak where he would not otherwise 

do so freely.” [Miranda at 467.] Indeed, the pressure of custodial 

interrogation is so immense that it “can induce a frighteningly high 
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percentage of people to confess to crimes they never committed.” 

Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 [321], 129 S.Ct. 1558, 1570, 

173 L.Ed.2d 443 (2009) (citing Drizin & Leo, The Problem of 

False Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L.Rev. 891, 

906-907 (2004)); see also Miranda, 384 U.S., at 455, n. 23, 86 

S.Ct. 1602 [16 L.Ed.2d 694]. That risk is all the more troubling—

and recent studies suggest, all the more acute—when the subject of 

custodial interrogation is a juvenile. 

Id., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 2401, 180 L.Ed.2d 310. 

{¶ 63} Given the importance of the Fifth Amendment’s protections against 

self-incrimination, it is not surprising that the year after the Supreme Court issued

Miranda, the court announced its decision in Gault, which held that the concept 

of Fifth Amendment rights set forth in Miranda applied to juveniles. Gault, 387 

U.S. at 55, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 18 L.Ed.2d 527. In doing so, the court made clear that 

the juvenile’s right to counsel extended to the juvenile’s interactions with police 

as well as in any courtroom hearings that might follow the interaction with police: 

The participation of counsel will, of course, assist the police, 

Juvenile Courts and appellate tribunals in administering the 

privilege. If counsel was not present for some permissible reason 

when an admission was obtained, the greatest care must be taken to 

assure that the admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that 

it was not coerced or suggested, but also that it was not the product 

of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright or despair. 

(Emphasis added.) Id.
January Term, 2012 

21 

{¶ 64} The rationale for the Supreme Court’s holdings was not shrouded 

in mystery. Rather, the court had previously discussed the need for a juvenile to 

have parents or counsel present during interrogations. “[A juvenile] cannot be 

compared with an adult in full possession of his senses and knowledgeable of the 

consequences of his admissions.” Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54, 82 

S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325 (1962). A juvenile in police custody is often in need of 

“more mature judgment” from an adult relative or counsel, who can give the 

juvenile “the protection which his own immaturity could not.” Id. 

{¶ 65} That understanding of the limitations on a juvenile’s cognitive 

abilities and legal capacity was not new to the court or created by it. Indeed, as 

recognized by Blackstone, the common law is replete with examples of how 

juveniles are treated differently in the law. J.D.B., ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. at 

2403-2404, 180 L.Ed.2d 310, citing 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 

England, *464-465. 

The concept of establishing different standards for a 

juvenile is an accepted legal principle since minors generally hold 

a subordinate and protected status in our legal system. There are 

legally and socially recognized differences between the presumed 

responsibility of adults and minors. Indeed the juvenile justice 

system, which deals with most offenses committed by those under 

eighteen, is substantially different in philosophy and procedure 

from the adult system. This State, like all the others, has 

recognized the fact that juveniles many times lack the capacity and 

responsibility to realize the full consequences of their actions. As a 

result of this recognition minors are unable to execute a binding 

contract, unable to convey real property, and unable to marry of 

their own free will. It would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to 
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hold that one whom the State deems incapable of being able to 

marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their own 

blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an 

adult when asked to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment 

rights at a time most critical to him and in an atmosphere most 

foreign and unfamiliar. 

(Citations omitted.) Lewis v. State, 259 Ind. 431, 437, 288 N.E.2d 138 (1972). 

{¶ 66} In light of the long-held understanding of the unique place 

juveniles occupy in the law and the Supreme Court’s decisions in Gault and 

Miranda, state high courts, in the era in which R.C. 2151.352 was enacted, often 

held that the government may not use a juvenile’s statement or confession at a 

subsequent trial or hearing unless the juvenile and the juvenile’s parents were 

informed of the juvenile’s rights to counsel and to remain silent. See, e.g., People 

v. Burton, 6 Cal.3d 375, 99 Cal.Rptr. 1, 491 P.2d 793 (1971); Lewis at 438; In re 

S.H., 61 N.J. 108, 293 A.2d 181 (1972). The decisions of our sister, the Indiana 

Supreme Court, are illustrative of this history. 

{¶ 67} By 1973, the Indiana high court would simply and succinctly 

announce, “[I]t is clear under the United States Supreme Court rule that a juvenile 

who is alleged to be delinquent is entitled to the assistance of counsel at any 

interrogation that may take place, and at the hearing before the juvenile judge at 

which disposition of this status is made.” Bridges v. State, 260 Ind. 651, 653, 299 

N.E.2d 616 (1973). Since then, it properly recognized that juveniles should be 

afforded safeguards that are in addition to those required by Miranda when 

subjected to custodial interrogation; those holdings were often codified into state 

statutes. See, e.g., D.M. v. State, 949 N.E.2d 327, 333 (Ind.2011). 

{¶ 68} The Indiana approach is consistent with our decision in In re C.S., 

in which we more clearly enunciated our protective philosophy of juvenile justice 
January Term, 2012 

23 

that recognizes the realities of modern delinquency proceedings. That philosophy 

is not reserved only for our courtrooms. Rather, it permeates custodial 

interrogation as well, consistent with the Supreme Court’s teachings in Miranda, 

Gault, and J.D.B., and the fundamental fairness that due process rights are 

intended to protect. 

{¶ 69} The majority opinion defies law, logic, and common sense in 

suggesting that a statute that goes beyond constitutional requirements must be 

considered without any consideration of constitutional requirements.6

 Thus, the 

majority casts aside those constitutional commands, as well as our precedent, and 

reframes the issue before us as simply one of statutory language. In doing so, the 

majority approach impermissibly fails to consider the protections set forth in 

Miranda simply because M.W. purportedly waived those rights under the statute. 

CONCLUSION

{¶ 70} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2151.352 in response to a 

series of directives from the United States Supreme Court calling for courts to 

ensure fundamental fairness in juvenile proceedings, including protecting 

juveniles’ right, from custodial interrogation through adjudication, not to 

incriminate themselves. Given those purposes, the majority’s construction of 

R.C. 2151.352 improperly vitiates the very purpose of the statute and thus violates 

the canon of statutory construction that forbids reading statutes in a manner that 

 

6. The majority’s opinion is curious, at best, given that its author dissented from the holding in In 

re C.S. because he concluded that the holding “invades the province of a parent’s role in raising 

his or her child” and in making important decisions that have significant repercussions in the 

child’s life. In re C.S., 115 Ohio St.3d 267, 2007-Ohio-4919, 874 N.E.2d 1177, at ¶ 125 

(O’Donnell, J., dissenting). Undoubtedly, parents can play a critical role in assisting their minor 

children during a custodial interrogation, as the Supreme Court has made clear. See, e.g.,

Gallegos, 370 U.S. at 54, 82 S.Ct. 1209, 8 L.Ed.2d 325; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600, 68 

S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948). But the majority’s analysis here does not foreclose the use of a 

statement made by a 15-year-old boy who did not have the benefit of counsel or his parents or 

guardian during a custodial interrogation. The custodial interrogation is at least as important as 

the events that subsequently unfold in court, and given its repercussions, a child must be afforded 

the right to counsel and parents during that period. 
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leads to absurd results or that defeats the purpose for which the statute was 

passed. More importantly, it offends fundamental notions of due process and 

fairness. 

{¶ 71} The majority’s holding implicitly endorses a system in which the 

rights our federal and state constitutions were designed to protect, as expressed in 

Miranda, Gault, and C.S., are offended. I cannot countenance such a holding, and 

thus I strongly dissent. 

PFEIFER and MCGEE BROWN, JJ., concur in the foregoing opinion. 

__________________ 

 William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and Daniel T. 

Van and Richard Hanrahan, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, for appellee, state of 

Ohio. 

 Timothy Young, State Public Defender, and Amanda J. Powell, Assistant 

Public Defender, for appellant, M.W. 

 Marsha L. Levick, urging reversal for amicus curiae Juvenile Law Center. 

 Kim Brooks Tandy, urging reversal for amicus curiae Children’s Law 

Center. 

 Nadia Seeratan, urging reversal for amicus curiae National Juvenile 

Defender Center. 

 Joshua Tepfer, urging reversal for amicus curiae Center on Wrongful 

Convictions of Youth. 

 James L. Handiman, urging reversal for amicus curiae American Civil 

Liberties Union of Ohio. 

______________________