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[Federal Register Volume 77, Number 237 (Monday, December 10, 2012)]
[Rules and Regulations]
[Pages 73282-73286]
From the Federal Register Online via the Government Printing Office [www.gpo.gov]
[FR Doc No: 2012-29469]

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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Aviation Administration

14 CFR Part 39

[Docket No. FAA-2012-0186; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-268-AD; 
Amendment 39-17278; AD 2012-24-08]
RIN 2120-AA64

Airworthiness Directives; The Boeing Company Airplanes

AGENCY: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), DOT.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: We are adopting a new airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 
The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -700C, -800, -900, and -900ER 
series airplanes. This AD was prompted by reports of flight crew 
failure to activate air data probe heat. This AD requires modifying the 
anti-icing system for the angle of attack sensor, the total air 
temperature, and the pitot probes. We are issuing this AD to prevent 
ice from forming on air data system sensors and consequent loss of or 
misleading airspeed indication on all airspeed indicating systems, 
which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.

DATES: This AD is effective January 14, 2013.
    The Director of the Federal Register approved the incorporation by 
reference of a certain publication listed in the AD as of January 14, 
2013.

ADDRESSES: For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com. You may review copies of the referenced service 
information at the FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind 
Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For information on the availability of this 
material at the FAA, call 425-227-1221.

Examining the AD Docket

    You may examine the AD docket on the Internet at http://www.regulations.gov; or in person at the Docket Management Facility 
between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal 
holidays. The AD docket contains this AD, the regulatory evaluation, 
any comments received, and other information. The address for the 
Docket Office (phone: 800-647-5527) is Document Management Facility, 
U.S. Department of Transportation, Docket Operations, M-30, West 
Building Ground Floor, Room W12-140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 
Washington, DC 20590.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Frank Carreras, Aerospace Engineer, 
Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, Seattle Aircraft 
Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 98057-
3356; phone: 425-917-6442; fax: 425-917-6590; email: 
frank.carreras@faa.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion

    We issued a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 
part 39 to include an AD that would apply to the specified products. 
That NPRM published in the Federal Register on February 28, 2012 (77 FR 
11789). That NPRM proposed to require modifying the anti-icing system 
for the angle of attack sensor, the total air temperature, and the 
pitot probes.

Actions Since Issuance of NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012)

    Since we issued the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012), we 
reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated 
July 10, 2012. (The NPRM referred to Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, dated November 16, 2011.) Among other things, Boeing Alert 
Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012, updates 
certain information, including part numbers, various accomplishment 
steps, certain modules, maintenance manuals, and kit information.

Comments

    We gave the public the opportunity to participate in developing 
this AD. The following presents the comments received on the proposal 
(77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) and the FAA's response to each 
comment. Aviation Partners Boeing stated that installation of winglets 
per STC ST00830SE does not affect the NPRM and stated it would provide 
supporting data to the FAA upon request.

Request To Revise Compliance Time

    Seven commenters requested that we revise the 24-month compliance 
time, as proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012).
    Korean Air Lines (KAL), Air Pacific Limited (APC), Delta Air Lines, 
Inc. (DAL), American Airlines (AAL), United Airlines (UAL), and 
Southwest Airlines (SWA) requested we extend the compliance time. UAL 
and AAL requested we take into account the time needed to obtain 
modification kits and

[[Page 73283]]

to modify the panels. SWA and AAL stated that the compliance time will 
result in unscheduled maintenance outside of a heavy maintenance cycle. 
SWA stated unscheduled maintenance visits could last up to four days 
outside of a heavy maintenance cycle. APC noted it would not be able to 
accomplish the actions during this year's C-checks, which are at 2-year 
intervals.
    Turkish Airlines (THY) stated that the proposed 24-month compliance 
time may not be enough for fleet-wide retrofit since the P5-9 panel 
modification restricts the rate of aircraft modification. KAL requested 
that the compliance time be extend to 30 or more months. DAL requested 
that the compliance time be extended to 36 months due to several 
factors. DAL cited the rate at which operators can complete the 
modification, expected late kit release based on revisions in service 
information linked to the service bulletin validation process, and 
``flawed'' service information. DAL also compared the modification 
specified in this NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) with a similar 
modification that installs warning lights to the P1-3 and P3-1 panels, 
and stated that this similar modification has a 36-month compliance 
time.
    We disagree with these requests to extend the compliance time. In 
developing an appropriate compliance time for these actions, we 
considered the urgency associated with the subject unsafe condition, 
the practical aspect of accomplishing the required modification and the 
normal scheduled maintenance times for most affected operators. In 
consideration of these items, as well as parts availability, we have 
determined that the 24-month compliance time for the modification is 
the longest duration allowable that will ensure an acceptable level of 
safety. According to the provisions of paragraph (i) of this AD, 
however, we may approve requests to adjust the compliance time if the 
requests include data substantiating that the new compliance time would 
provide an acceptable level of safety. We have not changed the final 
rule regarding this issue.

Request To Include an Alerting System

    Air Line Pilots Association International (ALPA) requested that we 
revise the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) by including an 
alerting system as part of the proposed requirements. ALPA stated that 
any automatic system design must include a crew alerting system to 
provide the flight crew with an aural and visual indication if the 
heating system does not automatically activate or is not functioning 
properly. ALPA further states that human factors principles should be 
integrated into a warning system design to ensure that factors such as 
pilot field of view and nuisance warnings due to normal ground 
operations (e.g., single engine taxi) are fully evaluated. ALPA stated 
that Boeing Model 747-400 airplanes have an automatic system and this 
system provides crews with an engine indicating and crew alerting 
system (EICAS) message if any item in the air data probe suite is not 
being heated, either due to heating element failure or if the system 
fails to activate upon engine start. ALPA reasoned that a similar 
alerting system should be included in the proposed system for Model 737 
airplanes.
    We agree that if the heating system does not automatically activate 
or is not functioning properly, the flight crew should receive an 
alert. We also agree that human factors principles should be considered 
in an alert system design. These principles are consistent with FAA 
regulations, policy, and guidance.
    However, we disagree with revising this AD to include changes to 
the flight crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions on Model 737 
airplanes because that model incorporates ``CAPT PITOT'' and ``F/O 
PITOT'' caution lights on the P5-9 overhead panel for the captain's and 
first officer's probe heat. Both caution lights are tied to a Master 
Caution light in each pilot's primary field of view and an ``Anti-ice'' 
caution light that alerts the pilots to check the overhead panel for 
the specific condition causing the Master Caution and ``Anti-ice'' 
lights to illuminate. The captain's and/or first officer's PITOT light 
will illuminate whenever a loss of electrical current flow is sensed 
through the respective pitot probe heater. The practical effect of the 
change to automatic probe heat activation is that when the probe heat 
switch is in AUTO, the respective PITOT light should be out when either 
engine is running. Therefore, if the switch is in AUTO and the 
corresponding PITOT light remains on with either engine running, a 
malfunction of the automatic activation system is indicated.
    Flight crew procedures for both normal and non-normal operation of 
the pitot heat system are unaffected by this change. We have determined 
that the existing flight crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions 
provides adequate flight crew alerting for pitot heat malfunctions on 
Model 737 airplanes, whether the system is manually or automatically 
activated. Furthermore, since probe heat is activated with the probe 
heat switch in AUTO when either engine is running, single engine taxi 
should not generate nuisance warnings; a PITOT light during single 
engine taxi would indicate a malfunction of the automatic activation 
system. No change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Request To Revise Precipitating Event Language

    Boeing requested we revise the sentence in the Summary section of 
the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) that describes the 
precipitating event, i.e., ``reports of flight crew failure to activate 
air data probe heat.'' Boeing suggested that the phrase ``as required 
by the FAA approved operating procedures'' be added to the end of the 
sentence in question. Boeing reasoned that the suggested text would 
make it clear that existing Boeing Model 737NG operating procedures are 
FAA-approved and that the flight crew failed to perform a required 
action.
    We disagree with the commenter's request to revise the language 
that describes the precipitating event. Regardless of whether the 
flight crew adhered to prescribed operating procedures, we consider 
that failure to activate the air data probe heat on the part of the 
flight crew represents an unacceptable risk to the affected airplanes, 
as evidenced by the current lack of an automatic probe heat activation 
system in combination with the demonstrated accident and incident 
history on the type associated with failure to activate probe heat. In 
addition, the purpose of this AD is to identify and correct an unsafe 
condition in the type design of the affected airplanes. We find that 
the precipitating event statement is accurate as originally worded in 
the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). We have not made any change 
to the final rule in this regard.

Request To Revise Unsafe Condition Statement

    Boeing requested we revise the unsafe condition statement in the 
Summary section, Discussion section, and paragraph (e) of the NPRM (77 
FR 11789, February 28, 2012). Boeing stated that the text ``* * * which 
could lead to loss of control of the airplane'' should read, ``* * * 
which would not provide the necessary air data instrumentation to 
safely fly the airplane.'' Boeing stated that loss of, or erroneous, 
airspeed indications do not necessarily lead to loss of control because 
other indications can be used to safely fly the airplane. Boeing noted 
that multiple in-service

[[Page 73284]]

events have occurred without loss of control when the flight crew 
followed the procedures that mitigate loss of air data.
    We disagree with the commenter's request to revise the unsafe 
condition statement. Although some in-service events might have 
occurred without loss of control, loss of, or misleading airspeed 
indication on all airspeed indicating systems can, in fact, lead to an 
unsafe condition of loss of airplane control. FAA Advisory Circular 
(AC) 25-11A, ``Electronic Flight Deck Displays,'' dated June 21, 2007 
(http://rgl.faa.gov/Regulatory--and--Guidance--Library/
rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/7d6139991c94e7d9862573080063f84d/$FILE/
AC%2025-11A.pdf), typically classifies loss of all airspeed displays 
(including the standby display) as a ``catastrophic'' failure 
condition. ``Catastrophic'' is defined in FAA AC 25.1309-1A, ``System 
Design and Analysis,'' dated June 21, 1988 (http://rgl.faa.gov/
Regulatory--and--Guidance--Library/rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/
50bfe03b65af9ea3862569d100733174/$FILE/AC25.1309-1A.pdf) as a failure 
condition which would prevent continued safe flight and landing. FAA AC 
25-11A also classifies display of misleading airspeed information on 
one primary display combined with a standby failure (i.e., loss of 
airspeed or incorrect airspeed) as a ``catastrophic'' failure 
condition. As specified in National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 
Safety Recommendation A-07-56, dated September 13, 2007 (http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/recletters/2007/a07_55_56.pdf), in at least one 
in-service event on a Boeing Model 737 airplane, it was determined that 
this condition ultimately resulted in a loss of airplane control with 
fatal injuries.
    In addition, we agree with Boeing's identification of the effects 
of unreliable air data, as given in the Background section of Boeing 
Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, dated November 16, 2011; and 
Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012. For these reasons, we find that the 
unsafe condition statement is accurate as originally worded in the NPRM 
(77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). We have not made any change to the 
final rule in this regard.

Request To Revise Discussion Section of the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 
28, 2012)

    Boeing requested we revise certain text in the Discussion section 
of the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012):
     To indicate existing compliance of pitot heat alerting 
with section 25.1326 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 
25.1326);
     To indicate failure of the flight crew to respond properly 
to the amber caution-level indication of a lack of probe heat; and
     To state that the indication is in clear view of a flight 
crew member. Boeing stated the changes are needed for the following 
reasons:
     To correctly state that the system provides indication of 
a lack of probe heat activation, as required by section 25.1326 of the 
Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 25.1326), rather than a positive 
indication of heat activation, as stated by the FAA (and which would 
not be compliant);
     To make it clear that the existing indication is 
compliant;
     To correct the ``blameless'' tone of the passive voice 
used in the first sentence of the Discussion section by making it clear 
that it is only the flight crew that can fail to activate the probe 
heat, which is one of the advantages of a manual system; and
     To make it explicit that the unsafe condition is not only 
a result of flight crew failure to activate the probe heat, but also a 
result of the flight crew ignoring the caution-level indication that is 
in plain view.
    Since the Discussion section of the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 
2012) is not restated in the final rule, we cannot change that section. 
However, we find that clarification is necessary.
    According to section 39.5 of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 
CFR 39.5), we issue ADs when we find that an unsafe condition exists in 
the product, and that the unsafe condition is likely to exist or 
develop in other products of the same type design. We made such a 
finding with respect to the pitot heat system of the affected airplanes 
in this AD action. Therefore, it is our responsibility to correct the 
unsafe condition independent of whether the design was considered 
compliant to applicable airworthiness standards; an AD is the 
appropriate vehicle for doing so.
    Additionally, we do not make findings for the incidents identified 
in safety recommendations issued by the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB). We do not have any information that supports the argument 
that the flight crews involved in the incidents identified in the NTSB 
safety recommendation deliberately disregarded a properly functioning 
pitot heat alert that they had observed. Many possible scenarios 
associated with pitot heat alerting could contribute to the failure of 
the flight crew to activate the probe heat; including a malfunction of 
probe heat alerting resulting in failure to provide an indication of 
lack of activation, the flight crew not observing or properly 
identifying the alert due to various factors (even though certain 
elements of the alerting system are within the pilots' primary field of 
view), or the flight crew not understanding the meaning of the alert or 
the proper procedures for responding to it.
    We have not made any changes to the final rule in this regard.

Request To Revise Cost Estimate

    AAL, DAL, and SWA requested that we revise the cost estimate of the 
NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012). AAL stated the NPRM and service 
information underestimate the labor cost by greater than 50 percent. 
AAL stated that additional out-of-service days and lost opportunity 
cost should be included in the Cost of Compliance section of the NPRM. 
DAL stated there is a significant investment in excess of $250,000 in 
``seed'' modules that are necessary to minimize the risk of not 
accomplishing the proposed changes. DAL concluded that this cost is not 
represented in the Costs of Compliance of the NPRM. SWA stated the 
expected labor cost is underestimated by 32 work-hours due to removal 
and reinstallation of lavatory A and galley 1.
    We partially agree with the commenters' request to revise the cost 
estimate. We do not agree to change the AD to accommodate the 
investment in ``seed'' modules, since this appears to be an operator-
specific cost associated with individual maintenance scheduling. Also, 
we disagree that the cost estimate is underestimated by greater than 50 
percent. However, we revised the Costs of Compliance section of this AD 
as follows. We revised the parts cost to match the information 
presented in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, 
dated July 10, 2012. In addition, we included 30 additional work-hours 
for removing and reinstalling lavatory and galley monuments that might 
be necessary to do the modification. This information was coordinated 
with Boeing.

Request To Reference Revised Service Information

    Several commenters noted that Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, dated November 16, 2011, is inadequate. That service 
information is cited in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) as 
the appropriate source of service information for accomplishing the 
required actions. The commenters requested that the service information

[[Page 73285]]

be revised to incorporate certain clarifications. One airline, DAL, 
specifically requested that the final rule not be released until the 
service information has been validated.
    We agree. As explained previously, Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012, has been issued. This 
service information has been validated by means of use of an aircraft 
in maintenance, and is referenced in this final rule as the appropriate 
source of service information. In addition, we added a new paragraph 
(h) to this AD (and re-designated subsequent paragraphs) to provide 
credit for certain actions performed before the effective date of this 
AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, dated November 16, 
2011.
    DAL also requested we specify ``revisions to BAE Systems Service 
Bulletin 233A3201-30-02'' as approved service information, and provide 
contact information for BAE. (The commenter did not specify a revision 
level or date for the BAE service information.) DAL stated that its 
review of the BAE Systems service information (which provides 
instructions on how to modify the P5-9 window/pitot heat module to the 
required ON and AUTO pitot heat switch configuration) identified 
discrepancies in the Accomplishment Instructions.
    DAL provided examples of the identified discrepancies, including 
connector identifications and the number of printed wire assemblies on 
the P5-9 modules. DAL stated it has contacted Boeing and BAE Systems to 
seek resolution of these discrepancies.
    DAL added that BAE concurred that its service information will 
require revision. DAL indicated that additional revision of the Boeing 
service information might be required in light of any BAE Systems 
service information revision. DAL noted that the service information, 
as currently published, would necessitate that operators request 
approval of alternative methods of compliance (AMOC) for resolutions to 
the identified discrepancies in order to comply with the final rule.
    We find that clarification is necessary. The intent of this AD is 
to require installation of a P5-9 module with AUTO and ON pitot heat 
switch functionality that supports automatic pitot heat activation. As 
discussed previously, we reviewed Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, dated November 16, 2011; and Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 
737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012; and determined that this 
service information provides sufficient instructions to adequately 
correct the unsafe condition. Operators may use either the original 
issue or Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated 
July 10, 2012, to comply with the AD requirements. However, this AD 
does not require accomplishment of the BAE service information. No 
change to the final rule is necessary in this regard.

Conclusion

    We reviewed the relevant data, considered the comments received, 
and determined that air safety and the public interest require adopting 
the AD with the changes described previously. We have determined that 
these minor changes:
     [Agr]re consistent with the intent that was proposed in 
the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012) for correcting the unsafe 
condition; and
     Do not add any additional burden upon the public than was 
already proposed in the NPRM (77 FR 11789, February 28, 2012).
    We also determined that these changes will not increase the 
economic burden on any operator or increase the scope of the AD.

Costs of Compliance

    We estimate that this AD affects 1,025 airplanes of U.S. registry.
    We estimate the following costs to comply with this AD:

                                                 Estimated Costs
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                         Cost per
           Action                  Labor cost          Parts cost        product        Cost on U.S.  operators
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Modification, including       90 to 109 work-hours  $6,674 to        Up to $17,316..  Up to $17,748,900.
 removing and reinstalling     x $85 per hour =      $8,051.
 galleys and lavatories.       $7,650 to $9,265.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Authority for This Rulemaking

    Title 49 of the United States Code specifies the FAA's authority to 
issue rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, section 106, describes the 
authority of the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: Aviation Programs, 
describes in more detail the scope of the Agency's authority.
    We are issuing this rulemaking under the authority described in 
Subtitle VII, Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: ``General 
requirements.'' Under that section, Congress charges the FAA with 
promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in air commerce by prescribing 
regulations for practices, methods, and procedures the Administrator 
finds necessary for safety in air commerce. This regulation is within 
the scope of that authority because it addresses an unsafe condition 
that is likely to exist or develop on products identified in this 
rulemaking action.

Regulatory Findings

    This AD will not have federalism implications under Executive Order 
13132. This AD will not have a substantial direct effect on the States, 
on the relationship between the national government and the States, or 
on the distribution of power and responsibilities among the various 
levels of government.
    For the reasons discussed above, I certify that this AD:
    (1) Is not a ``significant regulatory action'' under Executive 
Order 12866,
    (2) Is not a ``significant rule'' under DOT Regulatory Policies and 
Procedures (44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979),
    (3) Will not affect intrastate aviation in Alaska, and
    (4) Will not have a significant economic impact, positive or 
negative, on a substantial number of small entities under the criteria 
of the Regulatory Flexibility Act.

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39

    Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation safety, Incorporation by 
reference, Safety.

Adoption of the Amendment

    Accordingly, under the authority delegated to me by the 
Administrator, the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as follows:

PART 39--AIRWORTHINESS DIRECTIVES

0
1. The authority citation for part 39 continues to read as follows:

    Authority:  49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701.

[[Page 73286]]

Sec.  39.13  [Amended]

0
2. The FAA amends Sec.  39.13 by adding the following new airworthiness 
directive (AD):

2012-24-08 The Boeing Company: Amendment 39-17278; Docket No. FAA-
2012-0186; Directorate Identifier 2011-NM-268-AD.

(a) Effective Date

    This AD is effective January 14, 2013.

(b) Affected ADs

    None.

(c) Applicability

    This AD applies to The Boeing Company Model 737-600, -700, -
700C, -800, -900, and -900ER series airplanes; certificated in any 
category; as identified in Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012.

(d) Subject

    Joint Aircraft System Component (JASC)/Air Transport Association 
(ATA) of America Code 3030, Pitot/Static Anti-Ice System.

(e) Unsafe Condition

    This AD was prompted by reports of flight crew failure to 
activate air data probe heat. We are issuing this AD to prevent ice 
from forming on air data system sensors and consequent loss of or 
misleading airspeed indication on all airspeed indicating systems, 
which could lead to loss of control of the airplane.

(f) Compliance

    Comply with this AD within the compliance times specified, 
unless already done.

(g) Modification

    Within 24 months after the effective date of this AD: Modify the 
anti-icing system for the angle of attack sensor, the total air 
temperature, and the pitot probes, in accordance with the 
Accomplishment Instructions of Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-
30A1063, Revision 1, dated July 10, 2012.

(h) Credit for Previous Actions

    This paragraph provides credit for actions required by paragraph 
(g) of this AD, if those actions were performed before the effective 
date of this AD using Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, 
dated November 16, 2011, which is not incorporated by reference in 
this AD.

(i) Alternative Methods of Compliance (AMOCs)

    (1) The Manager, Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 
FAA, has the authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if requested 
using the procedures found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 14 
CFR 39.19, send your request to your principal inspector or local 
Flight Standards District Office, as appropriate. If sending 
information directly to the manager of the ACO, send it to the 
attention of the person identified in the Related Information 
section of this AD. Information may be emailed to: 9-ANM-Seattle-ACO-AMOC-Requests@faa.gov.
    (2) Before using any approved AMOC, notify your appropriate 
principal inspector, or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 
of the local flight standards district office/certificate holding 
district office.

(j) Related Information

    For more information about this AD, contact Frank Carreras, 
Aerospace Engineer, Systems and Equipment Branch, ANM-130S, FAA, 
Seattle Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 
Renton, WA 98057-3356; phone: 425-917-6442; fax: 425-917-6590; 
email: frank.carreras@faa.gov.

(k) Material Incorporated by Reference

    (1) The Director of the Federal Register approved the 
incorporation by reference (IBR) of the service information listed 
in this paragraph under 5 U.S.C. 552(a) and 1 CFR part 51.
    (2) You must use this service information as applicable to do 
the actions required by this AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise.
    (i) Boeing Alert Service Bulletin 737-30A1063, Revision 1, dated 
July 10, 2012.
    (ii) Reserved.
    (3) For service information identified in this AD, contact 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Attention: Data & Services Management, 
P.O. Box 3707, MC 2H-65, Seattle, WA 98124-2207; telephone 206-544-
5000, extension 1; fax 206-766-5680; Internet https://www.myboeingfleet.com.
    (4) You may view this service information at FAA, Transport 
Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA. For 
information on the availability of this material at the FAA, call 
425-227-1221.
    (5) You may view this service information that is incorporated 
by reference at the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). For information on the availability of this material at 
NARA, call 202-741-6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/cfr/ibr-locations.html.

    Issued in Renton, Washington, on November 23, 2012.
Ali Bahrami,
Manager, Transport Airplane Directorate, Aircraft Certification 
Service.
[FR Doc. 2012-29469 Filed 12-7-12; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 4910-13-P
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