IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 14-0923

Filed July 9, 2015

DARRYL WASHINGTON,

Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,

Respondent-Appellee.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, Nancy S. 

Tabor, Judge. 

An applicant appeals the summary dismissal of his application for 

postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

William R. Monroe of the Law Office of William Monroe, Burlington, for 

appellant.

Darryl Washington, Fort Madison, appellant pro se.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Bridget A. 

Chambers, Assistant Attorneys General, Patrick C. Jackson, County Attorney, 

and Amy Beavers, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered by Vogel, P.J., Mullins, J., and Goodhue, S.J.* Tabor, J., 

takes no part.

*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2015). 
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MULLINS, J.

Washington’s second postconviction application was summarily dismissed 

for exceeding the statute of limitations, as mandated by Iowa Code section 822.3 

(2011). Washington appeals from the summary dismissal on two theories. First, 

Washington claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel in his first 

postconviction-relief case and ineffective assistance of counsel claims do not 

need to be preserved for review. Second, he claims the trial information he was 

charged under was defective because it was not specific enough to advise him 

what provisions of Iowa Code section 707.2 (2005) he was accused of violating. 

Washington claims because of this flaw, the district court that convicted him 

lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Washington argues his appeal is not time 

barred because issues of subject matter jurisdiction can always be raised. The 

State asserts the postconviction court correctly granted the State’s summary 

dismissal because of the three-year statute of limitations on postconviction relief. 

Washington was found guilty of murder in the first degree and sentenced 

to life in prison without parole in 2006. Washington appealed, and the Iowa 

Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence. State v. Washington, No. 

06-0908, 2007 WL 2710826, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Sept. 19, 2007). The Iowa 

Supreme Court denied further review. Procedendo was issued on November 20, 

2007. 

Washington filed a pro-se application for postconviction relief, but his 

petition was denied. Washington appealed, and the appeal was denied. 

Washington v. State, No. 11-0583, 2012 WL 4513867, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 
3

3, 2012). Washington filed this second postconviction-relief application in 2013. 

The district court dismissed Washington’s postconviction application, and

Washington filed a pro se Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 1.904(2) motion, which 

the court denied. This appeal followed.1

An appeal from a denial of an application for postconviction relief, 

including a summary dismissal, is reviewed for corrections of errors at law. 

Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 792 (Iowa 2011). Ineffective-assistance-ofcounsel claims are constitutional claims and, as such, are reviewed de novo. Id.

A postconviction court may grant a summary disposition “when it appears 

from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and 

agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 

matter of law.” Iowa Code § 822.6 (2011); see also Iowa R. Civ. P. 1.981(3).

Applications for postconviction relief “must be filed within three years from 

the date the conviction or decision is final or, in the event of an appeal, from the 

date the writ of procedendo is issued.” Iowa Code § 822.3. “However, this 

limitation does not apply to a ground of fact or law that could not have been 

raised within the applicable time period.” Id.; see also State v. Edman, 444 

N.W.2d 103, 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 1989). 

 

1 The State argues this appeal is untimely because it was not filed within thirty days of 

the district court’s summary dismissal. The district court dismissed Washington’s 

application on April 22, 2014, and this appeal was filed on June 3, 2014. Although the 

appeal was filed within thirty days of the denial of the rule 1.904(2) motion, the State 

argues Washington’s motion did not toll the thirty days because it raised a purely legal 

issue. We choose to reach the merits of this appeal without deciding whether the appeal 

is timely. 
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The Iowa Supreme Court issued procedendo on Washington’s direct 

appeal on November 20, 2007, and therefore, the postconviction-relief statute of 

limitations expired on November 20, 2010. The current postconviction-relief 

application was filed February 6, 2013, more than two years after the statute of 

limitations had expired. Thus, Washington’s application is untimely unless it 

comes within the exception for claims based on “a ground of fact or law that

could not have been raised within the applicable time period.” See Iowa Code 

§ 822.3. Washington has two arguments as to why the statute of limitations

should not apply to him. 

First, Washington asserts ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are not 

bound by traditional error-preservation rules and his action should not be barred 

by the statute of limitations because he is claiming ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel does not excuse a failure to comply 

with the statute of limitations. State v. Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d 822, 824 (Iowa

1994). The court in Wilkins adopted the above approach in the interest of 

promoting the legislative intent of section 822.3, to “conserve judicial resources, 

promote substantive goals of the criminal law, foster rehabilitation, and restore a 

sense of repose in our system of justice.” Id.; see also Edman, 444 N.W.2d at 

106. Our precedents are clear: a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel will 

not save Washington from his untimely postconviction-relief application. See 

Wilkins, 522 N.W.2d at 824. 

Second, Washington asserts that because his claims involve subject 

matter jurisdiction, they can be raised at any time. Specifically, Washington 
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alleges the district court in the criminal trial never had subject matter jurisdiction 

because the trial information was flawed. Subject matter jurisdiction issues can 

be raised at any time. Christie v. Rolscreen Co., 488 N.W.2d 447, 450 (Iowa 

1989). 

Subject matter jurisdiction is the power of a court “to hear and determine 

cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong, not 

merely the particular case then occupying the court’s attention.” State v. 

Mandicino, 509 N.W.2d 481, 482 (Iowa 1993). In State v. Ambrose, the 

defendant argued the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because of a 

defect in the trial information. 861 N.W.2d 550, 561 (Iowa 2015). Our supreme 

court ruled the trial court did have subject matter jurisdiction because the trial 

information adequately described the proceeding as a criminal case, a general

class of cases over which the district court has jurisdiction. Id. The court 

characterized Ambrose’s failure to challenge any deficiency or uncertainty in the 

charges prior to trial as an implicit acknowledgment of the criminal nature of the 

proceeding and the charges against him. Id. Because Ambrose acknowledged 

his case was a criminal case, he acknowledged the district court had subject 

matter jurisdiction over this case. Id. Here, Washington did not challenge the 

charges before trial and implicitly acknowledged the district court’s subject matter 

jurisdiction over his case. We conclude the district court was not lacking subject 

matter jurisdiction in Washington’s case.

The district court properly granted summary dismissal to the State 

because Washington filed his claim beyond the three-year statute of limitations 
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for postconviction-relief claims, and the exception to the statute of limitation does 

not apply. 

AFFIRMED.