plead specific facts, the “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Jd. (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 570). A plaintiff must “plead[] factual content that allows the court to
draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Jd.
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). The Court must hold pro se pleadings to
less stringent standards than those prepared by attorneys and must liberally construe them when
determining whether they fail to state a claim. See, e.g., Martin v. Overton, 391 F.3d 710, 712
(6th Cir, 2004).

B. Plaintiff’s false arrest and false imprisonment claims should be dismissed.

When a § 1983 plaintiff brings a claim of false arrest, “[t]he federal constitutional right
implicated . . . is the Fourth Amendment right to be arrested only upon probable cause.”
Crockett v. Cumberland Coll., 316 F.3d 571, 579-80 (6th Cir. 2003) (citing Pyles v. Raisor, 60
F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding that a claim for wrongful arrest turns on whether officer
had probable cause under the Fourth Amendment); Radavansky v. City of Olmstead Falls, 496
F.3d 609, 614 (6th Cir. 2007) (to prevail on Fourth Amendment false arrest claim, plaintiff must
establish officer lacked probable cause to believe person committed or was committing an
offense). Claims of false arrest and false imprisonment under § 1983 overlap, with false arrest
being a species of false imprisonment. Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 388 (2007). False
imprisonment is detention without legal process. Jd. at 389. False imprisonment necessarily
ends when the individual becomes held pursuant to legal process, e.g., when he is arraigned on
charges. /d. To prevail on a false arrest and false imprisonment claim under the Fourth
Amendment, a plaintiff must show that he was arrested without probable cause and detained

without legal process. Wallace, 549 U.S. at 390. The Supreme Court has defined probable cause


Plaintiff's complaint fails to allege sufficient facts stating a denial of medical care claim
against defendants Rager, Popp, and Juillerat. Objectively, plaintiff has stated a serious medical
need— that he suffered from a seizure during the arrest. Parsons v. Caruso, 491 F. App’x 597,
601 (6th Cir. 2012) (seizure disorder is a sufficiently serious medical need). Subjectively,
however, plaintiff has failed to plead sufficient facts that any actions on part of defendants
Rager, Popp, and Juillerat amounted to deliberate indifference. Plaintiff fails to allege specific
facts supporting his claim that defendants “interfered” with his ability to receive medical care.
Indeed, plaintiff alleges on the face of his complaint that he received medical treatment from a
doctor following the arrest. (Doc. 5 at 11). Plaintiff seeks to cast blame on defendants Rager,
Popp, and Juillerat for a doctor’s conclusion that he was deemed “fit for incarceration.” (/d.).
Plaintiff's allegations in this regard amount to no more than “a difference of opinion . . . anda
dispute over the adequacy of his treatment,” which is insufficient to establish deliberate
indifference. Gilmore v. Hitchens, No. 2:17-cv-00052, 2017 WL 6035233, at *7 (S.D. Ohio
Dec. 6, 2017) (quoting Apanovitch v. Wilkinson, 32 F. App’x 704, 707 (6th Cir. 1976)), adopted,
2018 WL 527102 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 24, 2018). Accordingly, plaintiff's denial of medical care
claim should be dismissed.

IV. Plaintiff's Motion for Settlement (Doc. 20)

Plaintiff moves the Court to issue a settlement in his favor. (Doc. 20). Plaintiff alleges
that he is “presently in a moribund state (i.e. battling severe cirrhosis, cancer, etc.)” and thus
seeks “reasonable relief/damages for my/the beyond de minimus injuries already incurred.”
(Id.). As the Court has recommended that all of plaintiff's claims be dismissed, plaintiff's

motion for settlement (Doc. 20) is DENIED as MOOT.


29, 2014) (holding that plaintiff failed to plausibly plead claims of false arrest or false
imprisonment under § 1983 because public records indicated that plaintiff entered a guilty plea).

On April 4, 2017, plaintiff was also charged with violating Ohio Rev. Code §
4931.49(D)* for “knowingly us[ing] the telephone number of the 911 system to report an
emergency if [he] knows that no emergency exists.” (Case No. 15CRB517B, Exh. B., Doc. 14-1
at 23). In a sworn affidavit executed on the day of the arrest, defendant Juillerat states that he
responded to a 911 emergency call and upon arrival, plaintiff admitted to calling 911 for a non-
emergency situation. (/d. at 24). This charge was dismissed on motion of the state. (/d. at 22).
Although plaintiff argues that the charge against him under Ohio Rev. Code § 4931.49(D) was
dismissed (See Doc. 17 at 13), “an arrest grounded in probable cause does not become invalid
simply because the charges are later dropped or the defendant is acquitted.” Manley v.
Paramount's Kings Island, 299 F. App’x 524, 530 (6th Cir. 2008) (citing Williams ex rel. Allen
v. Cambridge Bd. of Educ., 370 F.3d 630, 638 (6th Cir. 2004)). Probable cause is apparent from
the face of defendant Juillerat’s affidavit. (Ex. B, Doc. 14-1 at 24). See Radvansky, 395 F.3d at
305 (An officer has probable cause when he discovers reasonably reliable information that a
suspect has committed a crime). Accordingly, because probable cause existed for plaintiff's
arrest on April 4, 2017, plaintiff's claims of false arrest and false imprisonment fail as a matter of
law.

Likewise, probable cause also existed for plaintiff's second arrest on April 6, 2017
because he was arrested pursuant to a March 17, 2017 warrant from the New York Department
of Corrections and Community Supervision. (Ex. C, Doc. 14-1 at 26). “An arrest pursuant to a

facially valid warrant is generally a complete defense to a claim for false arrest or false

4 Ohio Rev. Code § 4931.49(D) has been relocated to Ohio Rev. Code § 128.32.
7


as “the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the
suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).

In the present case, plaintiff alleges that he was falsely arrested and falsely imprisoned in
connection with his arrests in Wilmington, Ohio on April 4, 2017 and April 6, 2017. (Doc. 5 at
11). However, plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts establishing that he was arrested or
imprisoned without probable cause as required to establish a violation of his constitutional rights.

Moreover, defendants’ exhibits, which the Court is permitted to consider on a motion to
dismiss as a matter of public record,? demonstrate that there was probable cause for the charges
and proceedings against plaintiff. The exhibits show that on April 4, 2017, plaintiff was charged
with violating Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.13(A)(3) for “knowingly mak[ing] a false statement . . .
when . . . the statement was made with purpose to mislead a public official in performing his
official function.” (Case No. 17CRBS517A, Ex. A, Doc. 14-1 at 17-20). Plaintiff pled guilty to
this charge on May 11, 2017 and was sentenced to 180 days in jail. (/d. at 17). As such,
plaintiff's guilty plea for the charge under Ohio Rev. Code § 2921.13(A)(3) “estop[s] [him] from
now asserting in federal court that the defendant police officers acted without probable cause”
for the underlying arrest and confinement. Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138, 142 (6th Cir.

1988). See also Fannon v. Patterson, No. 3:13-cv-14, 2014 WL 4273337, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Aug.

+ In ruling on a motion to dismiss the Court can consider “exhibits attached thereto, public records, items appearing
in the record of the case and exhibits attached to [the] defendant’s motion to dismiss, so long as they are referred to
in the Complaint and are central to the claims contained therein.” Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 528
F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008). See also Mediacom Southeast LLC v. BellSouth Telecommunications, Inc., 672 F.3d
396, 399 (6th Cir. 2012).


fails as a matter of law. Barnes v. Wright, 449 F.3d 709, 720 (6th Cir. 2006). See also
Hightower v. City of Columbus, No. 2:12-cv-437, 2013 WL 5963215, at *6-7 (S.D. Ohio Nov. 7,
2013).

Here, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim fails as a matter of law because, as
explained above, probable cause existed for his arrests on April 4, 2017 and April 6, 2017.
Accordingly, plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claim should be dismissed.

D. Plaintiff’s denial of medical care claim should be dismissed.

The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids officers from acting with
“deliberate indifference” towards a pretrial detainee’s serious medical needs. Blackmore v.
Kalamazoo Cty., 390 F.3d 890, 895 (6th Cir. 2004). A constitutional claim for denial of medical
care has both objective and subjective components. /d. (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 US. 825,
834 (1994). The objective component requires the existence of a “sufficiently serious” medical
need. Id. A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating
treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Jd. at 897. The subjective component requires that officers have a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind in denying medical care.” Jd. at 895. “[T]he official must
both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious
harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Jd.

Here, plaintiff alleges that defendants Rager, Popp, and Juillerat denied him medical care
during his first arrest when he suffered from a seizure. (Doc. 5 at 11). Plaintiff alleges: “[o]nce I
had a seizure, these officers subjected me to extreme cynicism (personal) as to the authenticity of
my epilepsy (seizure disorder) thus interfering with my treatment. Furthermore these officers

unlawful[ly] unconstitutionally coached/ordered doctor to deem me fit for incarceration.” (/d.).


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION
RAHSON STAPLES, Civil Action No. 1:17-cv-742
Plaintiff, Black, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.
CODEY JILLERAT, et al., REPORT AND
Defendants. RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Rahson Staples, proceeding pro se, brings this action against defendants Duane
Weyand, Neil Rager, Joshua Riley, Jerry Popp, and Codey Juillerat! under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging claims of First Amendment retaliation, false arrest and false imprisonment, and denial of
medical care following two arrests and a detention in Wilmington, Ohio. (Doc. 5). This matter
is before the Court on defendants’ motion to dismiss (Doc. 14), plaintiff's response in opposition
(Doc. 17), and defendants’ reply memorandum (Doc. 19). This matter is also before the Court
on plaintiff's motion for settlement. (Doc. 20).

I. Procedural Background

Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis and filed his complaint on
January 8, 2018. (Docs. 4, 5). That same day, the undersigned conducted a sua sponte review of
plaintiffs complaint under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and 1915A(b)(1). (Doc. 6). The
undersigned recommended that plaintiff could proceed with his claims against defendants
Juillerat, Popp, Rager, Weyand, and Riley in their individual capacities, but dismissed plaintiff's
remaining claims. (/d. at 13). Both parties filed objections to the Report and Recommendation.

(Docs. 9, 12). On March 14, 2018, defendants filed their motion to dismiss. (Doc. 14). On May

' Plaintiff lists “Cody Jillerat” in the complaint, but the correct spelling is “Codey Juillerat.” (Doc. 14).


UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION

RAHSON STAPLES, Case No: 1:17-cv-742
Plaintiff, Black, J.
Litkovitz, M.J.
vs.

CODEY JILLERAT, et al.,
Defendants.

NOTICE

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy of
the recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations. This period may be extended further by the Court on
timely motion for an extension. Such objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected
to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the objections. If the Report
and Recommendation is based in whole or in part upon matters occurring on the record at an oral
hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the transcription of the record, or such
portions of it as all parties may agree upon, or the Magistrate Judge deems sufficient, unless the
assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may respond to another party’s objections
WITHIN 14 DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections in
accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140

(1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981).

12


V. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, it is RECOMMENDED that defendants’ motion to dismiss

(Doc. 14) be GRANTED.

It is ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for settlement (Doc. 20) is DENIED as MOOT.

pate 2/8/18 len XS
Karen L. Litkovitz

United States Magistrate Judge

11


imprisonment brought under § 1983.” Voyticky v. Village of Timberlake, Ohio, 412 F.3d 669,
677 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 143-44 (1979)). However, where
an officer intentionally provided misleading information or omitted information at a probable
cause hearing for an arrest warrant and the misleading or omitted information is critical to the
finding of probable cause, the officer may not rely on the judicial determination of probable
cause. Jd. n.4 (citing Mays v. City of Dayton, 134 F.3d 809, 816 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v.
Atkin, 107 F.3d 1213, 1217 (6th Cir. 1997)). Here, plaintiff's complaint fails to allege specific
facts relating to the probable cause determination surrounding the issuance of his arrest warrant
out of New York state. Accordingly, plaintiff's claims of false arrest and false imprisonment
should be dismissed because there was probable cause for both arrests.

C. Plaintiff’s First Amendment retaliation claim should be dismissed.

Plaintiff appears to allege that defendants arrested him in retaliation for the exercise of
his First Amendment religious beliefs. Plaintiff alleges: “I assert Ist .. . Amendment violations
due to my initial arrest due to officers seeing me in religious attire and asserting a special interest
in me.” (Doc. 5 at 11). Plaintiff alleges to be a devout adherent to the Islamic faith who dresses
only in “traditional prayer garb.” (/d. at 10). Plaintiff alleges that defendants arrested him as a
result of a current trend of “Islamophobic sentiments” and “severe religious animus.” (/d.).

To state a claim for retaliation, a plaintiff must allege that “(1) [he] engaged in protected
conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against [him] that would deter a person of ordinary
firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a casual connection between
elements one and two—that is, the adverse action was motivated at least in part by the plaintiff's
protected conduct. Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999). The Sixth Circuit

has held that where there is probable cause for an arrest, a First Amendment retaliation claim


symptoms of physical distress that would have put defendants Juillerat, Popp, and Rager on
notice that he needed medical care during the first arrest. (/d. at 12). Defendants further argue
that because plaintiff received some medical care while he was briefly detained, his denial of
medical care claim cannot stand. (/d. at 12-13).

In response, plaintiff argues that defendants had no probable cause for his arrests. (Doc.
17 at 5). Plaintiff argues that he was wrongfully charged for misusing the 911 system to report
an emergency because the call was placed by his friend, Miss Roberson. (/d. at 12). Plaintiff
argues that the charge was later dropped. (/d. at 13). Plaintiff argues that he “adamantly
refused” to plead guilty for his second charge—misleading a public official. (/d. at 18). Plaintiff
argues that at no time during the initial arrest did defendants have knowledge of the arrest
warrant from New York (which formed the basis for his second arrest). (/d. at 11). Plaintiff
maintains that he was arrested on the basis of his race and religion. (/d. at 3-4).

In reply, defendants contend that there was probable cause for the first arrest because
plaintiff pled guilty to one of the charges stemming from this arrest. (Doc. 19 at 2).

A. Rule 12(b)(6) standard

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept all factual
allegations as true and make reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Keys v.
Humana, Inc., 684 F.3d 605, 608 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575
(6th Cir. 2005)). Only “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief” is required. Jd. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)). “[T]he statement need only
give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.” Jd.
(quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Although the plaintiff need not


an immense amount of discrimination and personal bias interest, motive and intent to single me
out, exploit my religious propensities and punish me in any way possible.” (/d.).

As best the Court can discern, plaintiff brings claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for First
Amendment religious retaliation, false arrest and false imprisonment, and denial of medical care
based on these facts. (See Doc. 5 at 12). For relief, plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Jd. at
15).

Ill. Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 14)?

Defendants move to dismiss the complaint with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
on the ground that the complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc.
14). First, defendants contend that plaintiff fails to state claims for false arrest and false
imprisonment under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because there was probable cause for his arrests, which
defeats a finding for both of these claims. (/d. at 7). In support, defendants attach public records
to their motion to dismiss, showing the three charges for plaintiff's two arrests and the
disposition of these charges. (Doc. 14-1).

Second, defendants contend that plaintiff fails to state a claim for First Amendment
retaliation because the probable cause for his arrest defeats a finding of retaliation. (Doc. 14-1 at
9) (citing cases within the Sixth Circuit and Southern District of Ohio). Defendants also argue
that even if there was no probable cause for both of the arrests, plaintiff fails allege the requisite
elements to state a claim for retaliation. (/d. at 10). Defendants also contend that they are
entitled to qualified immunity. (/d.).

Third, defendants argue that plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts that they denied or

interfered with his medical treatment. (/d. at 11). Defendants argue that plaintiff fails to identify

? Defendants’ motion to dismiss reiterates the same arguments as their objections to this Court’s January 2018
Report and Recommendation. (Doc. 14).


18, 2018, the District Judge adopted the Report and Recommendation, concluding that “the
information contained in the motion to dismiss and the responsive memoranda more thoroughly
outlines the parties’ competing arguments than do the objections to the Report and
Recommendation.” (Doc. 22 at 2). The District Judge overruled the objections and noted that “a
more thorough evaluation of the merits of Plaintiff's claims is appropriate.” (/d.).

Il. The Complaint

In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that while at the home of his friend Judy Roberson in
Wilmington, Ohio in April 2017, Officers Juillerat, Popp, and Rager arrived and insisted that he
identify himself and produce identification. (Doc. 5 at 11). Plaintiff alleges he did not provide
identification and was subsequently arrested. (/d.). Plaintiff, who suffers from epilepsy, alleges
that he experienced a seizure during the arrest. (/d.). Plaintiff alleges: “these officers subjected
me to extreme cynicism (personal) as to the authenticity of my epilepsy (seizure disorder) thus
interfering with my treatment. Furthermore these officers unlawful [sic] unconstitutionally
coached/ordered doctor to deem me ‘fit for incarceration.”” (/d.). According to plaintiff, he was
released from jail hours later. (/d.).

Plaintiff alleges he received a telephone call from defendant Chief Weyand the next day,
informing plaintiff that he had “some religious info and organizations to work with [plaintiff].”
(d.). Plaintiff claims that defendant Chief Weyand instructed him to meet at the police station
and plaintiff complied. (/d.). Plaintiff alleges that he was arrested by defendant Detective J.R.
Riley upon arrival. (/d.). Plaintiff alleges that Chief Weyand “devised a ruse to trap [plaintiff]
though [his] religious intentions” and defendant Riley personally “issued an individuals warrant

on me as a fugitive from justice from New York.” (/d.). Plaintiff alleges: “[o]bviously there was