IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

WESTERN DIVISION 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff, 

 

 v. 

CIERA RICHTER, 

 Defendant. 

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Case No. 1:17-cr-139 

Judge Susan J. Dlott 

ORDER DENYING PRO SE MOTION 

FOR RECONSIDERATION OF 

SENTENCE 

This matter is before the Court on Ciera Richter’s pro se “Motion for Reconsideration 18 

U.S.C. § 3742(e) Post-Sentencing Rehabilitation Programming.” (Doc. 98.) On November 30, 

2021, the Government responded in opposition. (Doc. 102.) For the reasons that follow, 

Richter’s Motion will be DENIED. 

I. Background 

On June 4, 2018, Richter pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to produce child 

pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(e). (Docs. 34–35.) On March 25, 2019, Richter 

received a below-Guidelines sentence of 132 months of imprisonment followed by ten years of 

supervised release. (Docs. 65–67.) Richter is serving her term of imprisonment at FCI Hazelton, 

and her anticipated release date is March 30, 2027. See Federal BOP, Find an Inmate, 

https://www.bop.gov/inmateloc/ (last visited 12/2/2021). 

On September 20, 2021, Richter filed the motion currently pending before the Court. She 

seeks reconsideration of her sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) based on her rehabilitation, 

which the Government opposes. 

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II. Analysis 

Richter does not provide authority for this Court to reconsider her sentence. She moves 

under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e),1 but that statute vests the court of appeals with authority to reconsider 

a sentence under limited circumstances. Pepper v. United States, also cited by Richter, does not 

provide authority for reconsideration, either. 562 U.S. 476, 491 (2011). Pepper held that a 

district court may consider evidence of a defendant’s post-sentencing rehabilitation when a 

defendant’s sentence has been set aside on appeal—which is not the case here. Id.

A district court may modify a term if imprisonment under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), but 

Richter has not moved pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582 or demonstrated that she meets the 

necessary prerequisites to filing suit. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Alam, 960 

F.3d 831, 834 (6th Cir. 2020) (administrative exhaustion is a mandatory claim-processing rule). 

1

 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) states: 

(e) Consideration.--Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine whether the 

sentence-- 

(1) was imposed in violation of law; 

(2) was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; 

(3) is outside the applicable guideline range, and 

(A) the district court failed to provide the written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c); 

(B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that-- 

(i) does not advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or 

(ii) is not authorized under section 3553(b); or 

(iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or 

(C) the sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines range, having 

regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as set forth in section 3553(a) of 

this title and the reasons for the imposition of the particular sentence, as stated by the district court 

pursuant to the provisions of section 3553(c); or 

(4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly 

unreasonable. 

The court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the 

credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they are 

clearly erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), 

shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With 

respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de 

novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. 

18 U.S.C.A. § 3742(e). 

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Assuming that the defendant exhausted administrative remedies, the district court then (1) 

determines whether “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warrant a reduction and (2) weighs 

the relevant sentencing factors listed in § 3553(a). United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1098, 1101, 

1108 (6th Cir. 2020).2 “Congress did not define what constitutes an ‘extraordinary and 

compelling reason,’ except to state that ‘[r]ehabilitation of the defendant alone shall not be 

considered an extraordinary and compelling reason.’” United States v. Hunter, 12 F.4th 555, 561 

(6th Cir. Aug. 30, 2021) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(t)). But Richter has not moved under 18 

U.S.C. § 3582, nor has she met the other necessary conditions to demonstrate consideration 

under that statute. 

The Court is pleased that Richter is making efforts to rehabilitate herself while 

incarcerated. A defendant’s rehabilitation is among the best outcomes a presiding judge could 

hope for when she sentences a defendant. However, without any grounds to grant her Motion 

(Doc. 98), it is DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 S/Susan J. Dlott___________ 

 Judge Susan J. Dlott 

 United States District Court 

 

2

 The Sixth Circuit determined in Jones that the only U.S. Sentencing Commission Policy Statement potentially 

applicable to motions for compassionate release—U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13—is inapplicable to cases filed by federal 

inmates. 980 F.3d at 1109, 1111. Therefore, the district court has full discretion to define “extraordinary and 

compelling reasons” without reference to the policy statement in § 1B1.13. Id. at 1111; United States v. Elias, 984 

F.3d 516, 519–20 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021). 

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