### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 7 -00 521 -CV

M e lis sa Be nne tt , A ppe lla nt

v. Texas Depart m ent of Fam ily and P rote ctive Service s , Appellee

FR OM C OU N T Y C OU R T A T L A W OF BA S T R OP C OU N T Y NO. 06-1 0474 , HO NORAB LE H. R. TOWSLEE , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N
Me lis sa B e nn e tt ap pe a ls fr om the tr ia l court ’s or de r t e rm inatin g he r p are nta l r ig hts to her tw o c h il dr e n , A
. J. an d J. M
. , a f te r a ju r y f o u n d th a t s u c h r ig h ts s h o u ld b e te r mi n a te d. On appea l, Be nnett argues that the trial co u rt er red in e x cluding evidenc e that plac ement with Donna
and B ra d Z imm e rh anze l, the po te nti a l a do pti ve pa re nts , wa s no t in the c hil dr e n’ s b est in ter e st. Be nnett also argues t hat t he evidence was l eg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to establish a statutory g ro un d f or the ter min a tio n o f h e r p are nta l r ig hts and to e sta bli shthat te rm inatio n is in t he be st interest of th e c h il dr e n . B e c a u s e w e h a v e d e te r

mi n e d th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt d id

n o t e r r in e xc lu d ing evidenc e re g ardingthe suitability of the Z immerhanzels as adoptive pare nts a nd that the evidenc e was both leg ally

and fa ctually sufficie nt to establish (1) statutory g rounds for ter mination and (2) that termination is in the children’s be st interest, we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r of ter mination.2 BACK GR OUND Th e De pa rtme nt of F a mil y and Pr ote c tiv e Se rv ic e s (t he “ De pa rtme nt” ) b ro ug ht s uit fo r t e rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts a g a ins t Me lis sa B e nn e tt, the mot

he r o f A .J. and J.M.; To dd John s, the father of A .J .; and J osh Miller, the alleg ed fathe r of J.M . Br ad and D onna Z immerhanzel, the pater nal aunt and unc le of A.J ., intervene d to pr otect their interest in adopting both of the childre n.

B e nn e tt’s inv olv e me nt w iththe De pa rtme nt b e g an in

Janu ary 20 06 , w he n B e nn e tt broug ht J .M., who was seven weeks ol d at t he ti me, t o the emerg ency room beca use hi s left legwas swelling
. J .M. was transporte d to Bra ckenr idge Children’s Hospital, wher e doctor s discovere d that he had suf

fer ed a f rac tured fe mur in his left leg , as well as fr actur ed tibias in both leg s and a le sion on one of his ribs that appe are d to be an older , healingfra cture
.

Dr. Ge org e Edwa

rds, who tre ated J.M., testi fied that whe n J .M. was admitted to the hospital, Benne tt and Miller maintained tha t t h ey d i d not know how the injuries had oc curr ed, al t h o u gh Be n n et ts u gges t edt h ats h e c o u l d h av e r o l l edo v er

o n t o J
. M
. wh i l e s h e w as s l ee p i n g. Dr. Edwar ds testified that the femur fra cture was an oblique or spiral fra cture , meaningthat it was
cause d by a torque or twisting motion. He f urther testified that J .M.’s injuries wer e sug g estive of
a non-a ccide ntal trauma, a nd that beca

use J.M . was not old enoug h to cra wl or roll over on his own, he could not have produce d such injuries himself.

A.J ., wh o was five y ear s old at the time J .M. was admitted to the hospital, was interviewe d separ ately

reg ardingher br other’s injuries. K risti Me cc i a, a Department ca se worke r who was c alled to the hospital as a r esult of the injuries, testified th at A.J. reported incide nts of domestic violence betwee n Miller and B ennett.3 I n addition to J .M.’s injuries, the Depa rtment was also conce rned abo u t Be nnett’s his tor y of dr ugus e a nd

re la tio ns hip s in vo lvi ngdo me sti c vio le nc e . B e nn e tt t e sti fi e d th a t John s, A.J .’s father, wa s phy sically abusive t o wa rd B ennett duringtheir marr iag e. B ennett ende d her
re la tio ns hip wi th Joh ns in 2 00 1, wh e n A .J. w a s a pp ro xima te ly on e y e ar old . In M ay 20 04 , B e nn e tt put A.J . in the car e of Johns and his mother, in order to e nter an in-patient treatment prog ram for an
a d d ic ti o n to me th a mp h e ta mi n e . B e n n e tt te s ti f

ie d th a t s h e c o mp le te d th e tr e a tm e n t p r o g ram, but briefly rela psed in late 2004. Around the time of her rela pse, she be came involved with Mill er, w ho
was a lso addicted to methamphetamine, had re cently been r elea sed fr om prison, and had a history of vio le nt b e havio r. She fu rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t sh e sto pp e d u sin g meth amph e tamin e c omp le te ly in Dec ember 2004. The only other evidenc e of B ennett’s dr ug use wa s her testimony

that she smoked marijuana on a sing le occ asion in J anuar y 2006, afte r a phy sical alter cation with Miller. I n May 2005, Be nnett retrie ved A.J. from the home of Johns ’ s mo th e r , where A.J . was liv inga t th e tim e . Fr om May 20 05 un til the c hil dr e n w e re re mov e d in Janu ary 20 06 , A .J. li ve d w ith B e nn e tt and Mil le r. J.M. w a s b or n in De c e mbe r 2 00 5. B e nn e tt t e sti fi e d th a t Mi lle r w a s p hy sic a lly abusive towa

rd her, including an i ncident in which he threw a lighter at her while she wa s holding J. M
. S h e f

u rt h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a tM i l l e r

n e v e r p h y s i c a l l y

a b u s e d A
. J. A.J . and J.M. were ini tially place d in foster care afte r t heir removal from Mil ler a nd Be nnett’s home. In April 20 0 6 , t hey wer e plac ed with B rad a nd Donna Z immerhanzel, A.J.’s pater nal aunt and unc le.

Af t er the childre n wer e re moved, B ennett and Miller e nrolled in a c ounseling pr og ra m, as re qu ir e d by the De pa rtme nt’ s ser

vic e pla n. B ud Hi bb s, the c ouns e lor wo rk ing wi th b othI t is disputed whether Be nnett actua lly ended he r re lationship with C rutche r af ter lea rning 1 of his crimi n al hi story

beca use some of Crutc her’ s belong ings r emained a t Be nnett’s re sidence
. Be nnett testified that she merely allowed Crutcher to store it ems at her house bec ause he was living with friends a

nd had no storag e spac e. 4 pare nts, advised B ennett that she shou l d not attempt to protect Miller by conce aling any responsibility he may have had for J .M.’s injuries. After a fe w counse ling se ssions, Benne tt ended he r r e la tio ns hip wi th M ill e r a nd re po rt e d th e inc ide nt t

hat sh e be lie ve d may

have c a us e d th e inj ur ie s. Be nnett stated that appr ox imately two wee ks befor e J .M. was admitted to the hospital, Mill er a nd B e nn e tt h a d b e e n a

rguing bec aus e Mi lle r w a nte d to g o to his mot

he r’ s h ou se wi th J.M ., wh ile Be nnett opposed the idea
. During this argument, there was a “tug -of- war ” incident in which Miller and B ennett pulled J.M. i n opposite directions.

I n Aug ust 2006, Be nnett moved to Kosse, Te x as, nea r her fathe r’s home, w here she
was a ble to secur e suitable housing , obtain em p l o y m ent in a fe ed store, a

nd attend the c lasses require d by her Depar

tment service plan. She briefly lived with a new boy friend, Mic hael Crutche r, but ended this relationship when the Depa rtment informed he r that he ha d a criminal history and had b een relea sed fr om prison within the previous y ear . All of her dr ug tests during this ti me per iod 1
c a me ba c k n e g a tiv e and

he r s up e rv ise d v isi ts w iththe ch il dren w e re c on sid e re d s uc c e ssf ul. As a result, in D ece mber 2006, the Depa rtment rec ommended an incre ased visitation sche dule, with the stated g oal of e ventually

returningboth A.J . and J.M. t o Be nnett’s ca re. Ho we v e r , i n

F e b r u ary 20 07 , B e nn e tt w a s la id o ff fr om h e r e mpl oy

me nt. He r t

he ra pis t at the time, D r. Richard Br unn, testified that the loss of her job c aused Be nnett to be come de presse d. As a result of he r depr ession, Be nnett reduc ed her visits wit h the childre n, failed to maintain c ontact with her De partment c ase w orker , missed two drug tests, and eventually cea sed visitation altoge ther.M i l l e rw a s i n c ar c e r a t e d a f t e r a c o n v i c t i o nf

o r e n g a g i n g i no r g an i z e d

c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. 2 Ho we ve r, a t th e tim e of

tr ia l, h e ha d a lso be e n in dic te d f or inf lic tin g J.M.’ s in

jur ie s. 5 Due to B ennett’s f

ailure to fulf

ill the requireme nts of her s er v i ce p l an in the springof 2007, the Depa rtment cha

ng ed its rec ommendation from f am i l y reunific ation to termination of B ennett’s pa re nta l r ig hts
. Prior to trial, both J ohns and Miller sig ned af fidavits of voluntary

relinquishment of the ir pa re nta l r ig hts re g ard ing A. J. and J.M., re sp e c tiv e ly . Joh ns e xec ute d a Rul e 11 a g re e me nt w ith the Depa rtment stating that the Depa rtment would not seek ter

mination of either Johns’s or Miller’s pa re nta l r ig hts un le ss B e nn e tt’ s r ig hts we re a lso te rm inate d. Mil le r, wh o w a s in c arc e ra te d at th e tim e of tr ia l, d id n ot s ig n th is a g re e me nt. 2

Due to the voluntar

y relinquishments signe d by the fathers, only

the ca se of B ennett’s pa re nta l r ig hts wa s tr ie d to th e jur y . Joh ns wa s a lig ne d w iththe De pa rtme nt a t tr ia l, w hil e Mil le r d id not participate . After a five -day trial, the jury

found that B ennett’s pa renta l rig hts should be terminated. The trial co u rt en t ere d judgme nt on the verdic t, entere d judgme nt ag ainst the fathe rs based on the ir voluntary

relinquishments, and appointed the Depa rtment as per

manent mana g ing
conser vator. B ennett’s motion for ne w trial wa s denied a nd this appeal followe d.
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW The inclusion and e x clusion of evidenc e is comm i t t ed t o the trial cour t’s sound discretion. Te

x as De p’ t of Tra ns p. v . A ble , 35 S.W .3d 608, 617 (Tex. 2000). A trial cour t abuses its discretion when it ac ts without reg ard for any g uiding rules or principles. Downer v. Aquam arine Operators, Inc. , 701 S.W .2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985)
. The mere fac t that the trial court e x erc ised6

its discretion in a differe nt manner tha n appellate courts have done in similar circ umstances doe s not demonstrate a

n abuse of

discretion. Id . at 42. I n a leg al-suff

iciency revie w of a termination case , we must look at all the evide nce in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he jur y ’s fi nd ingto d e te rm ine wh e the r a re a so na ble tr ie r o f f

a c t c ou ld have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding wa s true. In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002). We assume that the fa ctfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of i ts finding whe re a
rea sonable fa ctfinder

could do so, and disre g ard a ll evidence that a re asonable fac tfinder c ould have disbelieved or found to be incr edible. Id. We ma y not substitute our judg ment for the jur y ’s, and we must defe r to the jury ’s deter minations of the cre dibilit y of the witnesses, the w eig ht to be g iven the testimony , and the r esolution of evidentiar y conflicts. City of Keller v. W ilson , 168 S.W .3d 802, 819, 822 (Tex. 2005).

Ev ide nc e is f

a c tua lly su ff ici ent in t e rm inatio n c a se s if the e vid e nc e is s uc h th a t a fa c tf ind e r c ou ld re a so na

bly fo rm a fi rm be lie f o r c on vic tio n a

bo ut t he tr uth of the State ’s a lle g a tio ns . In re C.H. , 89 S.W .3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). This standard “re tains the defere nce a n appellate court must have for

the fa ctfinder ’s role.” Id . at 26. I n a fa ctual-suf ficienc y revie w, we ma

y not pass upon the wi tne sse s’ c re dib ili ty or su bs tit ute our jud g me nt f

or that of the jur y , e ve n if the e vid e nc e wo uld support a differe nt result. Landry’s Seafood House- Addison, Inc. v . Snadon , 233 S.W .3d 430, 436 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pe t. filed).
DI SCU SSIO N Exc lusion of Evidence

Be n n ett argues that the trial c ourt err ed in excluding e vidence that Br ad Z immerhanzel had a

history of substance abuse a

nd domestic violence , wh i ch t h e trial courtTh e e xclu de d e vid e nc e , w hic h B e nn e tt’ s c ouns e l pr e se rv e d in a bil l of e xce pti on s, c e rt a inl y 3 ra ise d le g iti ma te qu e sti on s a bo ut t he su ita bil ity of th e Z imm e rh anze ls a s a do pti ve pa re nts . T his evidenc e included numerous detailed police repor ts r eg ardingepisodes of dome stic violence at the Z immerhanzel reside nce. 7 e xclu ded on rele va

nc y g ro un ds
. Be nnett claims that the jury neede d information about the 3 Z imm e rh anze ls i n o rd e r t o d e te rm ine wh e the r t he c hil dr e n’ s b est in ter e sts lie wi th t he ir re tur n to their mother or

with post-termination adoption by the Z immerhanzels. The issue of the children’ s post-adoptive place ment was introduced dur ing ope ning state me nts , w he n th e De pa rtme nt su g g e ste d that the Z imm e rh anze ls c ou ld pr ov ide a sa fe and sta ble ho me fo r t

he c hil dr e n. B e nn e tt obj e c te d, no tin g that the re wa s n o gua ra nte e wh a t w ou ld h a

pp e n to the childre n in the event of termination, and the court responded, “ Iag ree with it. That’s not what this case is about. I

sustain the objection.” In a subseque nt bench c onfer ence , the cour t stated: [T] here ’s no g uara

ntee that [t he Z immerhanzels] wil l adopt. And what bother s me, and Ithi nk pr ob a bly wh a t bo the rs the jur

y , too, is— and that is, he re we ’r e g oin g to compar e one pare nt w ith pr ospective pare nts a nd say , well, if they

wouldn’t be in the home of the Z immerhanzels, instead of wher e they are rig ht now—Ithink what we need to lo o k a t in th is c a s e is w h e th e r o r n o t y o u h a v e g r o u n d s to te r mi nate the pa re nta l r ig hts of

the mot he r at th is p oin t. Throug hout the rema inder of the trial, the court not only excluded Be nnett’s evidenc e attac king the suitabilit y of the Z immerhanzels as adoptive pa rents, but also any

evide n ce t he De partment attempted to pre sent in support of the Z immerhanzels as adoptive pa rents. Evidence which is not releva nt is inadmiss ible. Tex. R. Evi d. 402. To be c onsidered rele vant, the off

ere d evidenc e must logic ally tend to make more or less likely a particula

r proposition that is of some conseque nce to some issue in the tria l. Tex. R . Evid. 401.Th is Co ur t pr e vio us ly

a dd re sse d f a c ts s imi lar t o th e pr e se nt c a se and c a me to t

he same 4 conclusion, stating that “the tria l court did not abuse its discr etion in e x cluding evidenc e re g arding the suitabilit y of the curr ent foster home and possible a doptive place ment.” Sharp v. Texas De p’t of Pro te c tiv e & Reg ulato ry Se rv s. , No. 03-96-00292- CV, 1997 Tex. App. L EXI S 3181, at *7 (Tex. App.—Austin J une 19, 1997, no wr it) (not desig nated f or publication). 8 The sole issue at trial was whe ther B ennett’s pa ren t al ri g hts should be terminated. Te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts me re ly c le ars the wa

y fo r t he po ssi bil ity

of an a do pti on , w hic h w ou ld have to b e de c ide d in a sep arate pr oc e e din g and wh ic h, a s a ll p art ie s a g re e d, wo uld no t ne c e ssa

ri ly result in a doption by the Z immerhanzels. There fore , we a g ree with the trial court’ s determination that the merits of a

prospec tive adoptive home a re irrel ev an t t o the issue of whe ther B ennett’s pare ntal rig hts should be terminated. B e c a us e th e tr ial c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in 4
e xclu din g e vid e nc e re la te d to the s u i t a b i l i t y o f t h e Z i mm e rh anze ls a s a do pti ve pa re nts , B e nn e tt’ s f

ir st point of err or is overr

uled. Sufficiency of the E

videnc e: Statutory Grounds for Termination I n order for a court to terminate parenta l rig hts, the Depa rtment must show, by

clea r
and c on vin c ing e vid e nc e , that a t le a st on e of the tw e nty

statut or y g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatio n a pp lie s. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1)(A) -(T) (West Supp. 2007). The trial court must also find that termination is in the best interest of the childre n. Id . § 161.001(2) ( West S upp. 2007). In her se cond po int of e rr or , B e nn e tt a

rgue s th a t th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly and fa c tua lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o e sta

bli sh statutory g rounds for te rmination. The trial c ourt g rante d termination of B ennett’s pa renta l rig hts on the g rounds t h at Be nnett had (1) knowing ly place d or knowing ly

allowed the c hildren to remai n i n conditions or surrounding s which endang ere d their phy sical or emotional well-be ing, ( 2) eng ag ed in conduc t orThe De partment a lso in t ro d u ce d ev idence that Be nnett had moved in with another 5 boy friend in the spr ing of 2007, wh o al so had a c riminal history . Be nnett testified that her relationship wit h this indi vidual was ove r by the time of trial, and ther e is no evidenc e that he ha d a history of druguse or domestic violenc e. Be nnett also testified to a separ ate incident in w hich Miller threw a cig are tte lighter at her 6 while she wa s holding J.M., but stated that she wa s able to twist her body so that the lighte r hit her rathe r t ha n J.M. Th e re wa s n o e vid e nc e that J.M. wa s in jur e d b y that pa rt ic ula r i nc ide nt. 9 knowing ly

place d the childre n with persons who e ng ag ed in conduc t which enda ng ere d the phy sical or emotional we ll-being of the c hildren, or ( 3) fa iled to comply with the provisions of a cour t order that specific ally

established the a ctions nece ssary for he r to obtain the re turn of the c hildren, who ha d be e n in the te mpo ra

ry mana g ingc on se rv a tor sh ip o f t he De pa rtme nt f or no t le ss t ha n n ine mon ths
. Se e id . § 161.001(1)( D), (E ), (O)
.

The fir st two statutory g rounds—placingthe childre n in dang erous surr oundings a nd knowing ly

placingthem with people whose conduct e n d a n g e r s th e c h il d

r e n—can both be established by the evidenc e showing t hat Bennett had a pattern of exposi ng the childre n to men with histories
o f v io le n t c r im e , dr

u g u s e , an d

/o r d o me s ti c v io le n c e
—

n a me ly Jo h n s , M il le r , an d Crutcher
. Th is

5 pattern e ventually

resulted i n J .M. suffer ing se vere injuries in an alter cation betwe en Be nnett and Miller. 6

I n addition, Be nnett demonstrated a lack of candor to the authorities re g ardingJ .M.’s inj ur ie s. Whe n q

ue sti on e d at th e ho sp ita l a bo ut p os sib le c a

us e s o f t he inj ur ie s, B e nn e tt f a ile d to
re ve a l the “ tug -o f- wa

r” inc ide nt, bu t mer e ly su g g e ste d tha t she may have ro lle d ove r o nto J.M. w hil e sleeping in the same be d. Acc ording to Ben n et t ’s t es timony , the tug -of- war incident occ urre d approximately

two wee ks prior to the time she took J.M. to the hospit al. Dr. Edw ards testified that this ty pe of a ltercati o n co u l d ex plain J .M.’s injuries, stating, “ [I ]t would have to have bee n veryAs pr e vio us ly no te d, B e nn e tt a lso a dmi tte d to smo kin g mari jua na on a sin g le oc c a sio n in 7 J anuar y 2006, afte r an a ltercation with Mi ller. 10 vio le nt t o r e su lt i n th re e dif fe re nt s ke le ta l in

jur ie s. An d I

wo uld c ert ain ly th in k that a

re a so na ble pe rs on wo uld have ha d s uf

fi c ie nt a wa re ne ss o f s uc h—

that su c h a

vio le nt s itu a tio n mi g ht r e sult in harm to the c hild.”

Un ex pla ine d b ro ke n b on e s in an in fa nt h a ve be e n c on sid e re d le g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o uphold a judg ment of termination u n d er section 161.001(1)( D), e ven in light of evidenc e that the pare nt sought medic al treatment for the infa nt. In re J

.P.B. , 180 S.W .3d at 574. Furth e r mo r e , w h il e th e r e w a s n o e v id e n c e th a t A
. J. w a s e v e r p h y s ic a ll y abused, a pa re nt’ s c on du c t do e s n ot n e c e ssa ri ly have to be d ir e c te d at th e c hil d, no r i s th e c hil d r e qu ir e d to actua lly suffe r injury , to suppor

t a finding that the child was e ndang ere d. See Tex as Dep’t of Human Servs. v . Boyd , 727 S.W .2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).

I n addition to the violent home environment, B en n et t ’s h i story of druguse fur

ther establishes that she plac ed the c hildren in dang erous surr oundings or eng ag ed i n conduct that endang ere d the children. Be nnett testified t hat she lef t A.J . with J ohns and his mother—who wa s
a lso A
. J. ’ s g r an d m o t h e r

— w h i l e s h e s t r

u g g l e d w i t h ana d d i c t i o nt o m e t h a mp h e t a m i n e s , “ b e c a us e [she] didn’t think [her] daug hter deserve d to be in t hat atmosphere .” Af ter c ompleting a

n in-patient reha bilitation progra

m, Be nnett rela

psed. Howe ver, B ennett testified that she stopped using methamphetamine c ompletely in Dece mber 2004. Her drug test re sults are c onsistent 7

w i t h t h i s t e s t i m o n y.

A h ist or y of dr uga dd ic tio n ma

y e sta bli shan e nd ang e ri ngc ours e of c on du c t, even if the par ent is drug -fr ee at the time of trial. I n re T.N.S. , 2 3 0 S .W.3d 434, 439More spe cifica lly , Be nnett left A.J . in the car e of Johns, who had bee n phy sically abusive 8 toward B ennett duringtheir marr iag e. 11 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2007, no pet.). F urthermor e, a child’s emotional and phy sical we ll-being
can be endang ere d when a pare nt’s drug addiction leads to unc erta inty and instabilit y in the child’s lif e , s uc h a s th e po ssi bil ity

of be ingle ft

a lon e whe n a

pa re nt e nte rs a

dr ugre ha bil itatio n p ro g ra

m. In re S.D. , 980 S.W .2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied)
.

I n revie wing the leg al sufficie ncy of the evidenc e, we look at all evidenc e in the lig ht most favora

ble to the findi ng . In re J .F .C. , 96 S.W .3d at 266. The e vidence at trial showed that Be nnett had a pattern of e x posing he r childre n to a violent home environment, including a n incident of domestic violence that resulted in J.M. suff ering sever e injuries. I t also showed that B ennett had a history of drugaddiction, had lef t A.J . in the car e of r elatives in order to e nter a reha bilitation 8 prog ram, a

nd had re lapsed shortly

afte r completing the prog ram. Th e e vid e nc e in B e nn e tt’ s fa vo r inc lud e d the te sti mony of a c ouns e lor , B ud

Hi bb s, who s tated

th a t B e n n e tt

“ b o o te d ” M il le r

f r o m h e r li f e a f te r a c o u n s e li n g s e s s io nin

w h ic h Hibbs informed B ennett that it was not in her be st interest to conce al Mil l er ’s re s p o nsibili ty for J.M.’s injuries. Howeve r, the e vidence also shows t h at Be n nett did conce al Miller’s re sponsibili ty for J .M.’s injuries when initially questioned at the hospital and that she a llowed two wee ks to pass after the tug -of- war

incident bef

ore obta ining medic al attention for J.M.’s severe fra cture s. Viewingthe evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the jury ’s finding , a rea sonable fa ctfinder could have resolved this conflict in f

avor of a finding that Be nnett allowed the c hildren to be in a ha rmful environme nt and allowed them to be in the pre sence of people whose c onduct enda ng ere d their saf

ety , despite the fac t that she later “ booted” Miller f rom her life
.12 F ur the r e vid e nc e in B e nn e tt’ s favo r wa s her te sti mony that she e nd e d h e r r e la tio ns hip with Crutcher immediate ly upon lear ning of his c r im in a l h is tory

from the De partment. This evide nce
was c ontradicte d by

her te stimony

that some of Crutche r’s be longing s remaine d at h er house for
sever al months after she claims to ha ve ended the rela

tionship. Ag ain, viewingthe evidenc e in the light mos t favor able to the j ury ’s findi ng , a reasonable fac tfinder could have resolved this conflict by det er m i n i n g that Be nnett did not in fact end the relationship wit h Crutcher immediately

upon lear ning of his criminal hi story
. Fur thermore , a reasonable fac tfinder may have be en per suaded by the Depa rtment’s ar g ument that Be nnett, who was seeking to ha ve her c hildren re turned to her at that time, should have investig ated Crutche r’s c riminal history herse lf befor e allowing h i m to move into her home. Reg arding Be nnett’s drug use, the evidenc e in he r favor was that she ha d passed e ach of her court-or dere d drug tests since the c hildren’s re moval. Howeve r, B ennett also fa iled to show up to r equire d drug tests in April and May 2007, which wer e rec orded as positive results pursuant to Depar tment policy . A re asonable fac tfinder c ould have interpre ted B ennett’s f ailure to show up fo r d ru g te sts a s e vid e nc e that she ha d en g a g e d in dr ugus e . F ur

the rm or e , b e ingdr

ug -f re e a t th e tim e of trial does not ne cessa

rily negat e t h e ef

fect of evidenc e of pa st drug abuse. See I n re T.N.S. , 230 S.W .3d at 439.

Viewingthe evidenc e in the lig ht most fav o ra b l e t o the ver dict, we hold that the
e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly

su ff ic ie nt t o d e te rm ine that B e nn e tt h a d k no wi ng ly pla c e d o r know in g ly allowed the c hildren to rema in in conditions or surrounding s which enda ng ere d t h ei r phy sical or emotional well-be ing, a

nd eng ag ed in conduc t or knowing ly place d the children w ith persons who13

eng ag ed in conduc t which enda ng ere d the phy sical or e motional well-being o f t h e ch i l dren. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1)(D) , (E).

I n a fa ctual-suf

ficienc y revie w, we look at the evidenc e in a ne utral lig ht and d et er m i n e wh et h er

a r ea s o n ab l e f

ac t fi n d er co u l d h av e r es o l v edt h e e v i d en ce i nfa v o r o f t h e f i n d i n g. In re S.A.P. , 169 S.W .3d 685, 710 (Tex. App.—Waco 2005, no pet.). Vi ew ing the evidenc e previously

discussed in a ne utral lig ht, the evidenc e in B ennett’s f avor—he r neg ative drug tests and her w illingness to end r elationships with both Mi ller and Crutcher in or der to obta in the return of her children—w ould not prevent a rea sonable fa ctfinder

from for ming a firm belief

or convic tion that B e nn e tt’ s p a st d

ru g a dd ic tio n and su

bs e qu e nt re la

ps e , a s we ll a s he r patte rn of int ro du c ing me n w ith histories of cr ime and do m es t i c v i o lence into her home, e ndang ere d the childre n. As a re sult, we hold that the evidenc e is f

actua lly sufficie nt to de termine that statutory g rounds exist for ter

minating Be nnett’s par ental rig hts under par ts (D) a nd (E) of family code se ction 161.001(1). Th e thi rd statut or y g ro un d c ite d b y the tr ia l c ourt fo r t e rm inatin g B e nn e tt’ s r ig hts is her f ailure to c omply with a court-orde red service plan t hat established the actions necessa ry for he r to obtain the return of

her c hildren. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1)(O) . The De partment pu t on e vid ence th a t, o ve r a

pe ri od of e ig hte e n mo nth s, B e nn e tt f a ile d to ma int a in s uit a

ble employ ment, failed to ma in

ta in suitable housing, a

nd failed to maintain c ontact with her case worke r. B e nn e tt c on c e de s th a t sh e fa ile d to ma int a in s uit a ble e mpl oy

me nt, fa ile d to ma int a in suitable housing, a

nd failed to maintain contac t with her ca se worke r, as r equire d by her se rvice plan. B e nn e tt a rgue s th a t sh e su

bs tanti a lly

c omp lie d with he r se rv ic e pla n by c omp le tin g a

pa re nti ngc la ss, two counseling prog rams, therapy sessions, a viol ence -interve ntion prog ram, and an eva luation ofB ud Hi bb s, the c ouns e lor wh o ev a luate d B e nn e tt’ s n e e d f or dr ugre ha bil itatio n s e rv ic e s, 9 r e c o m m e n d e d

t h a ts h e e n t e r

e i t h e r i n - p a t i e n to r

o u t
- p a t i e n tt r e a t m e n tf

o r c h e m i c a l d e p e n d e n c y. Th e re is n o e vid e nc e that B e nn e tt f oll ow e d u p o n th e se re c omm e nd a tio ns . 14 he r n e e d f or dr ugre ha bil itatio n s e rv ic e s. She was also able to obtain housing and employ ment for 9 temporary p e r io d s w h il e th e s e r v ic e p la n w a s in e f

f e c t, a lt h o u g h s h e w a s u n a

b le to ma in ta in suc h
e mpl oy me nt o r h ou sing on a

mor e pe rm ane nt b a sis . Pr ior to l os inghe r j ob a t a

fe e d s tor e in Fe bruar y 2007, Be nnett had begun making substantial prog ress towa rd fulfilling her s er v i ce plan, as she wa s employ ed, attendingher r equire d classes, pa ssing he r drugtests, visit i ng the childre n regul arl y , a

nd re nti nga ho us e . H ow e ve r, B e nn e tt t e sti fi e d th a t a ft e r s he los t he r j ob , s he be c a me depre ssed and “started to lose hope.” I t was at this time that Be nnett stopped visiting the childre n, lost contact with her c ase w orker , and failed to show up to two require d drug tests. I n support of her argument that substantial compliance is suff icient to avoid termination, B ennett p o i n t s t o the testimo n y o f Jil l K a mm e r d ie n e r

an d K r is ti M e c c ia , tw o D e p artm e n t c a s e w o r k e r s w h o h a d

b e en
a ssi g ne d to B e nn e tt’ s c a se , w ho bo th s ta te d th a t th e ma jor ity of pe op le do no t f

ull y c omp ly wi th t he ir service plans. Te xas c ourt s h a ve he ld t hat su bs tanti a l c omp lian ce is no t su ff ic ie nt t o avo id termination fo r fa i l u re to comply with a servic e plan. In re T.T. , 228 S.W .3d 312, 319 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“Rese arc h reve als that substantial completion
or su bs tanti a l c omp lia

nc e is n ot e no ug h to a vo id a te rm inatio n f

ind ingun de r t

his sect io n.” ); In re T.N.F. , 205 S.W .3d 625, 631 ( T e x. A p p . —Waco 2006, pet. denie d). F urthermor e, eve n if substantial
c omp lia nc e wa s su ff

ic ie nt to av oid te rm inatio n, a re a so na ble fa c tf ind e r c ou ld h a ve de te rm ine d, in lig ht o f B e n n e t t ’ s f

a i l u r e t o m a i n t a i ns u i t a

b l e e mp l o y

m e n tan d h o u s i n g an d

f a i l u r e t o m a i n ta in
c on ta c t w ithhe r c a se wo rk e r, tha t Be nn e tt’ s att e nd anc e a t ce rt a in re qu ir e d c la sse s a nd pr og ra ms d id
no t c on sti tut e su

bs tanti a l c omp lia

nc e . A s a re su lt, we ho ld t

hat th e e vid e nc e is le g a lly and fa c tua llyWhil e we find that all three of the De p ar t m en t ’s cited g rounds ar e supported by the 10 evidenc e in this case, w e note that only one statutory g round is nece ssary

to support a termination. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1) (West Supp. 2007)

. 15 sufficie n t to determine that Be nnett failed to c omply with a cour

t-order ed ser

vice plan that established the a ctions nece ssary for he r to obtain the re turn of her children, a

statutory g round for termination of par ental rig hts. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 1)(O)
.

I n light of our

deter mination that the evidence is both lega lly and fa ctually

sufficie nt to s up po rt

a ll thr e e of

the De pa rtme nt’ s c ite d g ro un ds fo r t e rm inatin g B e nn e tt’ s p are nta l r ig hts , Be nnett’s sec ond point of err or is overr uled. 10 Sufficiency of the E

videnc e: Be

st Interest of the Children Be nnett’s third point of err or is that the evidenc e is leg ally and fa ctually

insufficient to establish that termination of her pare ntal rig hts is in t he best i n t erest of the childre n. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001( 2).

Be nnett argues that the conflicting e vidence and re commendations of va rious witnesses neg ates proof

by clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that termination is i n the childre n’s best interest. B e nn e tt p oin ts o ut t hat th e c hil dr e n’ s a

tto rn e y a d li te m di d n ot u

rg e the jur

y to te rm inate he r p are nta l r ig hts in h is c los ingargume nt. I ns te a d, the a d lit e m de sc ri be d B e nn e tt a s a “likeable person” with a supportive fa mily and ac cess to State ser

vices, a nd stated: [W]ha t y ou

have to a sk y ours e lf is w he the r o r n ot s he ’s a ble to u se wh a t sh e ’s g ot, and that’s more than a lot of pe ople have , and that’s not nec essar i l y a comment on wh a t I thi nk y ou sh ou ld fi nd or do —b ut wh a t y ou have to d e c ide is i f i n s pit e of a ll this, do y ou fee l like the evidenc e has shown that she has the a bility to provide a nurturing , stable, saf

e envir onment for these children.16 As a prel im ina

ry ma tte r, c ouns e l’ s c omm e nts duri ngc los ingdo no t c on sti tut e evidenc e. B az a n v. Bazan , 7 6 2 S.W .2d 357, 360 n.3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ). F ur the rm or e , w hil e the a d lite m did not ur g e the jur

y to t e rm inate B e nn e tt’ s p are nta l r ig hts , h e a lso did no t a dv oc a te that Be nn e tt re ta in he r pare nta l rig hts . I ns te a d, he g a ve a ne utr a l c los ing , s imp ly asking the jury

to do what it thinks i s best. Even view ing his stateme nt in the neutra l light re quired for a fac tual-suffic iency

revie w, such a

statement wo u l d n o t preve nt a re asonable fac tfinder f rom forming the firm convic tion that termination would be in the children’ s best interest.

Be nnett argues that the testimony of multi p l e wi tnesses contra dicted a f inding that termination of par ental rig hts would be in the children’ s best interest. B ennett’s a rg ument, howeve r, ignor es other e vidence in the rec ord re flec ting that the w itnesses testifying in he r fa vor wer e unaw are
o f m an y o f t h e r e l e v an tf

a c t s o f h e r c a s e . E i l e e n W o r s t , a c a s e a i d w o r k e r f o r B a s t r o p C o u n t y, testified that she ove rsaw se ven of B ennett’s supe rvised visits with the children betwe en May 2006
and Au g us t 2006
. Wor st te sti fi e d tha t Be nn e tt wa s “r e a lly g oo d with the kid s” and tha t no pr ob le ms
occur r e d d u r in g th e v is it s . H o w e v e r , w h e n Wo r s t w a s a s k e d if s h e c o u ld s p e a k to th e issue of terminating Be nnett’s rig hts, she stated , “No, not re ally , beca use I don’t know what’s happene d betwee n now and—this and now.”

Clyde Ni c ho la s, the pa sto r of a c hurc h B e nn e tt a tte nd e d in Ko sse , te sti fi e d th a t in his opinion, Benne tt’s rig hts should not be terminated. Nichola s noted that Be nnett was under a g reat deal of “stress a

nd pressure ” fr om the Depa rtment, cha racterizing he r experienc es with the Depa rtment as “a

perse cution.” Howeve r, Nicholas later testified that he was not a war e of Crutche r or Miller’s c rimina l h i s t o ri es , t h e h i s t o ry o f d o m es t i c v i o l en ce b et we en Be n n et tan d M i l l er , Be n n ett ’s
me tha mph e tamin e a dd ic tio n, or the fa c t th a t B e nn e tt ha d c e a se d vis iti ngthe c hil dr e n a ft e r s he los tWhen Be nnett reloc ated f rom the B astrop ar ea to Kosse , which is near Waco, Hankins was 11 a ssi g ne d b y

the De pa rtme nt’ s Wac o of

fi c e to pr ov ide c ourt e sy su pe rv isi on ov e r B e nn e tt’ s c a se , in order to assist the Bastrop c onservatorship unit, where the case orig inated. 17 her job. Af

ter be ing informed of these circ umstances, Nicholas stated, “Well, I only know one side, and that wa s hers. I

didn’t know the other side .” Be nnett’s psy cholog ist, Dr. Richard Brunn, testified that he would re commend that the childre n be re turned to B ennett if she was able to “ma intain a domicile and have a job, a nd keep up the prog ress she ha d made.” When Brunn w as informe d that Be n nett had stopped visiting the
c hil dr e n a ft e r l os ing he r job , he state d th a t th is r e sp on se wa s n ot “ a ve ry g oo d in dic a tor

tha t pr og re ss is being made towa

rd re unification,” a

nd that he mig ht not rec ommend reunific ation in light of that
c ha ng e in c ir c ums tanc e s.

Paige Hankins, a Wac o-base d courte sy worke r for the Depar

tment, testified t hat she 11 did no t be lie ve te rm inatio n o f B e nn e tt’ s p are nta l r ig hts wo uld be a pp ro pr ia te and that B e nn e tt s ho uld be g iven another

chanc e to complete he r ser vi ce p l an , s tating, “ [F]rom what I ’ve se en fr om her befor e and he r true de sire for those children, and her w illingness to do any thing it took when I

was involved with her, I

think she does dese rve to try to complete these service s.” Ha nkins also testified that sh e ha d n ot i nte ra c te d w iththe c hil dr e n, and that he r w or k w ithB e nn e tt w a s li mit e d to mon thl y vis its and dr ugte sts fr om N ov e mbe r 20 06 to F e br ua ry 20 07
. Whe n a sk e d if

sh e wa s f a mil iar w ith Be nnett’s ca se, Ha

nkins responded, “ Ido not know the whole story , I ’ll be honest with y ou. Ijust—my

involvement was strictly making sure that on a monthly basis [Bennett] had fac e to fa ce
c on ta c t and

a dr ug te st done .” Hanki ns fu

rt he r t e sti fi e d th a t if

B e nn e tt h a d b e e n g ive n mu lti ple18

chanc es in the past, t h en her rec ommendation might cha ng e, stating that, “[I ]t would be wa sting
ever y one’s time if this is just t he same song six th verse or whateve r.” I n addition to the evidence showing that witnesses t estifying in B ennett’s f avor w ere
unawa re of key fac ts and cir cumstance s, the Depa rtment prese nted multiple witnesses who testified that termination was in the c hildren’s be st interest. Kristi Mecc ia, the De partment case wor ker
a ssi g ne d to B e nn e tt’ s c a se , te sti fi e d that B e nn e tt ha d de mon str a te d a su bs tanti a l fa ilure to c omp ly wi th t he c ourt -o rd e re d s e rv ic e pla n a nd that te rm inatio n w a s in the c hil dren’ s b e st i nte re st. Jill K a mme rd ie ne r, the De pa rtme nt c a se wo rk e r w ho ha d b e e n a ssi g ne d to B e nn e tt’ s c a se be fo re it was transfer

red to Mecc ia, also testified t hat t ermination was in the children’s best interest, base d on Ben n et t ’s history

of involving da

ng erous men in the c hildren’s lives, the f act that the c hildren would have a

n opportun i ty

to be adopted, a

nd the fa ct that B ennett had c ease d visitation wit h the
c h i l dr e nd u e t o h e r “ i n a b i l i t y t o p r o v i d e c ar e f

o r t h e m e v e nf

o r a f u l l w e e k e n d

a ta t i m e . ” F i n a l l y, Terr y Vaug hn, a Court A

ppointed Special Advoc ate ( CASA) volunteer w ho worke d on Be nnett’s
ca s e, t es t i fi edt h at t er m i n at i o no f p ar en t al ri gh t s w a s i nt h e c h i l dre n ’s b es ti n t er es t , s t at i n g, “Sevente en months have g one by since this case started, when one was actively involved in try ing to ge t [ Be nnett] back to a point where she could have the c hildren and it hasn’ t happene d.”

Be nnett asser

ts that the Depa

rtment failed to keep up w ith her re cent pr og ress, noting that her c ase w orker

was una war e that she ha d moved to Cedar Par k, was c urre ntly

employ ed, and had re g istered to take colleg e cour ses. Howe ver, Be nnett’s own fa ilure to maintain contac t with her
case worke r, as r equire d by her se rvice plan, was one of the re asons cited b y t h e De partment for choosing to pursue ter

mination of Be nnett’s rig hts. Further more, e vidence that a par ent has made19

lif e sty le imp ro ve me nts pr ior to tr ia l do e s n ot p re c lud e a fi nd ingtha

t te rm inatio n o f p are nta l r ig hts is in the best interest of the c hildren. I n r e S

. A

. W. , 131 S.W .3d 704, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.). The e vidence at trial showed that Be nnett had esta blished a patter

n of exposing her children to men wi t h h i s tories of c rime and dome stic violence, that she had be en involved in an alterc ation with Miller that resulted in J .M. suffe ring sever e inj uries, that she di d not seek me dical attention for J.M. unti l approxim ately two wee ks after

the alt er ca tion, that she initi ally conce aled Miller’s re sponsibili ty

fo r J
. M
. ’s injuries, that she fa iled to maintain suitable employ ment and housing w hile her service plan was in e ffe ct, that she c ease d visitation wit h the childre n afte r losing her job, that she f

ailed to maintain contac t with her ca se worke r, and that she demonstrated a history of dr uga dd ic tio n. Vi e wi ngthi s e vid e nc e in t he lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to t he jur y ’s fi nd ing , we ho ld that a re asonable fac tfinder c ould have f ormed a firm conviction that ter

mination of Be nnett’s pa re nta l r ig hts wa s in

the c hil dr e n’ s b e st i nte re st. Th e re fo re , th e e vid e nc e is l e g a lly su ff ic ie nt t o
s u p p o rt t h i s fi n d i n g.

Fur t hermore , viewing this evidence in a neutra l light does not cha ng e our deter mination that a rea sonable factfinde r could have for med a f irm conviction that termination was in the children’ s best interest. Be nnett does not dispute that she failed to maintain c ontact with her
case worke r, that she failed to ma intain suitable housing or employ ment, that she plac ed J.M. i n an environment that caused him to sustain sever e inj uries and subsequently failed to disclose Mill er’ s involvement in those injuries, that she ce ased visitation with the children in the spr ing of 2007, or her pa st history

of drugaddiction. Fur

thermore , the witnesses testify ing in B ennett’s f

avor r evea led20

that they wer e unaw are of key

fac ts and circ umstances that mig ht change their opinion of the children’ s best interest. Be cause the evidenc e is both leg ally and fac tually sufficie nt to support the jury ’s finding , we ove rrule B ennett’s third issue.
CO NC LU SION B e c a us e we have de te rm ine d th a t th e tr ia l c ourt did no t a bu se it s disc re tio n in excluding evide nce r eg arding the s uitability of t he Zimmerha nzels as adoptive pare nts, and that the evidenc e wa s leg ally and fa ctually sufficie nt to establish (1) statutory g rounds for te rmination and (2) that ter

mination is i n the best intere st of A. J
. an d J .M., we a ffirm the tria l court’s orde r of termination.

__________________________________________ Diane H enson, Jus tice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pury ear and He nson Affir med Filed: Apr il 3, 2008