United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted November 22, 2011*

Decided November 22, 2011

Before

RICHARD A. POSNER, Circuit Judge

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge

   

No. 11‐1487

AARON DeROO,

Petitioner‐Appellant,

v.

CAROL HOLINKA,

Respondent‐Appellee.                 

Appeal from the United States District

Court for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 11‐cv‐28‐bbc

Barbara B. Crabb,

Judge.

O R D E R

Aaron DeRoo, a federal inmate, appeals from the denial of his petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, arguing that two disciplinary decisions to revoke good‐

time credits were not based on sufficient evidence. Because the evidence in the disciplinary

record amply supports those two decisions, we affirm.

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with

Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

*

Appellee Carol Holinka notified this court that she was never served with process in

the district court and would not be filing a brief or otherwise participating in this appeal.

After examining the appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument

is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the appellant’s brief and the record.

See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
No. 11‐1487 Page 2

Disciplinary officers at Terre Haute Correctional Institution have found DeRoo guilty

of violating several prison rules while incarcerated there. He highlights three decisions on

appeal. First (in June 2000), DeRoo lost 27 days of good‐time credit for possessing

intoxicants. Second (in February 2001), DeRoo admitted to using intoxicants and again lost

27 days of good‐time credit. The hearing officer imposed this penalty after noting that “past

attempts to correct [DeRoo’s] behavior have failed.” Third (in May 2001), DeRoo again

admitted to possessing intoxicants. In revoking 40 days of good‐time credit, the hearing

officer wrote that DeRoo had “numerous charges for this offense” and that “no other

sanction would produce the desired effect” of changing DeRoo’s behavior.

Nine years later, a hearing officer expunged from DeRoo’s record the first violation

from June 2000. The Bureau of Prisons reheard that incident because for several years it

failed to provide a statement of reasons for its decisions. As we concluded in DeRoo v.

Holinka, 373 F. App’x 616, 618–19 (7th Cir. 2010), this failure did not offend due process

because the Bureau, after being sued, provided the missing statement of reasons to DeRoo

and allowed him to pursue a rehearing. Upon rehearing, the hearing officer found no

evidence of guilt and expunged the violation.

DeRoo later petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the Bureau violated

his right to due process by relying on the now‐expunged June 2000 violation to justify

revoking 67 total days of good‐time credit for the February and May 2001 violations. The

district court denied the petition. The court concluded that in both proceedings the prison

had complied with due process by providing timely notice, a fair hearing, and a written

statement of reasons. Moreover, the court reasoned that because DeRoo confessed to each

charge, the prison’s decisions—of both guilt and punishment—were supported by sufficient

evidence.

On appeal DeRoo concedes that his confessions constitute sufficient evidence of guilt

but argues that the district court erred in concluding that the confessions by themselves

supported the Bureau’s decision to revoke good‐time credits. He argues that the district

court misread our decision in Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 940–41 (7th Cir. 2007), as

saying that a prisoner’s confession justifies not only a finding of guilt but any punishment

that the prison sees fit. But even if DeRoo is correct that his confession alone does not

necessarily validate the revocation of good‐time credits, we review de novo the district

court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and may affirm on any basis supported by the record.

Jones v. Cross, 637 F.3d 841, 845 (7th Cir. 2011). In attacking the judgment, DeRoo complains

that the hearing officer was not justified in revoking any good‐time credits for the second

violation in February 2001 because the officer asserted, incorrectly DeRoo says, that “this

[was his] fourth charge for this offense.” According to DeRoo, there is evidence to support

only three of those charges, given that the violation from June 2000 has since been
No. 11‐1487 Page 3

expunged. The hearing officer’s report, however, shows that the officer made the “fourth

charge” comment and relied upon the now‐expunged June 2000 violation only when

revoking commissary privileges, not the good‐time credits. DeRoo does not have a liberty

interest in those privileges, so due process was not offended when the hearing officer relied

upon the expunged violation to rescind them. See Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995);

Thomas v. Ramos, 130 F.3d 754, 762 n.8 (7th Cir. 1997).

DeRoo does have a liberty interest in good‐time credits, Jones, 637 F.3d at 845, and

due process requires us to ensure that some evidence supports the hearing officers’

decisions to revoke them. Superintendent, Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455 (1985).

Under the “some evidence” standard—“the narrowest judicial review we know”—our task

is only to identify a modicum of evidence that supports the decisions. United States v.

Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672, 675 (7th Cir. 2007); see also Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649, 651–52 (7th

Cir. 2000). DeRoo’s disciplinary record easily meets this standard. The officers revoked

DeRoo’s good‐time credits in February and May 2001 because “past attempts to correct his

behavior had failed.” More than some evidence supports this finding: As DeRoo does not

dispute, three intoxicant‐related violations (not counting the expunged June 2000 violation)

were on DeRoo’s disciplinary record at the time of the February 2001 violation, all of which

were added on to his record before the May 2001 violation. Because the record contains

adequate evidence that “past attempts” at correction had failed to stop new offenses, the

revocation of good‐conduct credits comported with due process. We thus conclude that the

district court properly denied his petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

AFFIRMED.