IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

HOUSTON BYRD, JR., : 

 : Case No. 2:17-cv-981 

 Plaintiff, : 

 : JUDGE ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 v. : 

 : 

JUDGE W. SCOTT GWIN, : Magistrate Judge Jolson 

 : 

 Defendant. : 

OPINION & ORDER 

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 20). 

For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 

I. BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff filed a case in Licking County, Ohio and appealed to the Fifth District Court of 

Appeals. During that process, Plaintiff alleges the Fifth District Court of Appeals committed 

fraud and that the court entries were “against the manifest weight of the evidence,” all in 

violation of his right to due process. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff requested a remand to the appellate 

court. Id. On November 6, 2017, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint 

under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 3). This Court 

dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 

12(b)(1). (ECF No. 15). There was no need to evaluate Defendant’s 12(b)(6) arguments. Id. 

Following dismissal, Plaintiff filed a Motion for Reconsideration. (ECF No. 18). This 

Court dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration because this Court had not made a clear error of 
2 

law in dismissing Plaintiff’s case. (ECF No. 19). Plaintiff then filed the instant Motion for 

Reconsideration. (ECF No. 20). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a court will reconsider its own prior 

decision “if the moving party demonstrates: (1) a clear error of law; (2) newly discovered 

evidence that was not previously available to the parties; or (3) an intervening change in 

controlling law.” Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Arctic Express, Inc., 288 

F.Supp.2d 895, 900 (S.D. Ohio 2003). Courts may also alter or amend a judgment when 

necessary “to prevent manifest injustice.” GenCorp., Inc. v. Am. Int’l Underwriters, 178 F.3d 

804, 834 (6th Cir. 1999). Reconsideration due to a finding of manifest injustice or a clear error 

of law requires “unique circumstances,” such as complete failure to address an issue or claim. 

McWhorter v. ELSEA, Inc., No. 2:00-cv-473, 2006 WL 3483964, at *2 (S.D. Ohio 2006) (citing 

Collison v. Int’l Chem. Workers Union, Local 217, 34 F.3d 233, 236 (4th Cir. 1994)). Even for 

motions to reconsider interlocutory orders, courts respect the importance of “grant[ing] some 

measure of finality ... and [of] discourag[ing] the filing of endless motions for reconsideration” 

in applying the relevant criteria. Id. A motion under Rule 59(e) may not be brought to relitigate 

issues previously considered by the Court or to present evidence that could have been raised 

earlier. See J.P. v. Taft, No. C2-04-692, 2006 WL 689091, at *3 (S.D. Ohio 2006). 

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS 

Like the previous Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff does not cite any intervening 

change in controlling law, claim there is new evidence, or assert manifest injustice. Thus, this 

Court will assume Plaintiff alleges a clear error in the previous order. This Court previously 

found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s case. 
3 

(ECF No. 18). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes federal courts from reviewing state court 

judgments. See District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker 

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). Because Plaintiff’s claim asks this Court to review 

the Fifth District Court of Appeals decision, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits subject 

matter jurisdiction. In addition, any discussion about failure to state a claim upon which relief 

can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) has already been disregarded as moot. 

As to the motion for recusal, Plaintiff’s argument is unpersuasive. Plaintiff argues that he 

objected to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation issued on November 16, 2017 

and that the failure of this Court to consider the objections constitutes fraud and perjury. The 

Sixth Circuit has held “a judge may disqualify himself where a reasonable person with 

knowledge of all facts would conclude that the judge’s impartiality might be questioned.” 

Burley v. Gagacki, 834 F.3d 606, 615–16 (6th Cir. 2016). This is a high standard. 

There is no evidence in the record that supports Plaintiff’s claim for recusal. Objections 

to a Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation must be filed within fourteen days. If 

objections are not filed within this time period, the parties waive their right to have the District 

Judge conduct a de novo review of the Report and Recommendation. The Magistrate Judge 

specifically advised the parties of the timeframe for objecting in the Report and 

Recommendation. (ECF No. 9 at 2–3). Plaintiff filed objections only after this Court had 

adopted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation. Additionally, this Court thereafter 

dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, a matter on which the Magistrate Judge did not rule. 

There was no fraud or perjury by this Court. 
4 

IV. CONCLUSION 

For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration (ECF No. 20) is 

hereby DENIED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 s/ Algenon L. Marbley 

 ALGENON L. MARBLEY 

 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 

DATED: August 13, 2019