2012 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

4-5-2012

Steven Fleming v. Cape May County

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 12-1260

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Recommended Citation

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CLD-146 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 12-1260

___________

STEPHEN P. FLEMING,

Appellant

v.

CAPE MAY COUNTY, FAMILY PART, (D.Y.F.S.); MS. FLORINE ALEXANDER, 

CMCH; SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY; COUNTIES OF ATLANTIC CITY 

AND CAPE MAY; JUDGE CAROL E. HIGBEE, Atlantic City Courthouse; JUDGE 

DARYL TODD, Cape May Courthouse; CAPT. LIN FRANE, D.A.’s Office, CMCH; 

DONALD A. WILKINGSON, ESQ.

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey

(D.C. Civil No. 1:11-cv-03894)

District Judge: Honorable Jerome B. Simandle

____________________________________

Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant 

to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

March 22, 2012

Before: RENDELL, HARDIMAN and VAN ANTWERPEN , Circuit Judges

(Opinion filed: April 5, 2012)

_________

OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Stephen Fleming, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals District Court 
2

orders dismissing his complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. We have 

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, exercising plenary review over the dismissal of the 

complaint. See Wilson v. Rackmill, 878 F.2d 772, 774 (3d Cir. 1989); Connors v. 

Tremont Mining Co., 835 F.2d 1028, 1029 (3d Cir. 1987). The denial of a motion for 

reconsideration is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Ross v. Meagan

Having examined the record, we are in full accord with the District Court and, 

finding no substantial question presented by this appeal, will summarily affirm its

judgment.

, 638 F.2d 646, 648 

(3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam).

Murray v. Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 248 (3d Cir. 2011); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 

27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Fleming’s complaint, which is confusing and disjointed, does not 

specify the nature of the relief he seeks, and is flawed in several respects. To the extent 

that he directly attacks a state-court judgment, his claims are barred by the RookerFeldman1 doctrine. See Lampe v. Lampe, 665 F.3d 506, 518 n.15 (3d Cir. 2011). Many 

of the named defendants are probably entitled to varying forms of immunity. See, e.g., 

Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976) (delineating the contours of prosecutorial 

immunity); Capogrosso v. Sup. Ct. of N.J., 588 F.3d 180, 184 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) 

(explaining judicial immunity); Pa. Fed’n of Sportsmen’s Clubs, Inc. v. Hess

 1 D.C. Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 

U.S. 413 (1923).

, 297 F.3d 

310, 323 (3d Cir. 2002) (discussing Eleventh Amendment immunity in the context of 

“state agencies and departments and officials when the state is the real party in 
3

interest”).2 The complaint, even read with the degree of liberality afforded to pro-se 

pleadings, see Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam), does not 

appear to state a claim “arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 

States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Federal criminal statutes do not, by their mere presence, 

grant a private right of action for use in civil suits. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 

273, 283–84 (2002). Nor does the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. 

§ 1738A, create such a right of action. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 187 

(1988). To the extent that Fleming’s complaint can be read to imply a suit in diversity 

against defendant Donald Wilkinson, it still fails to “state a plausible claim for relief” due 

to its conclusory approach and lack of well-pleaded facts. Burtch v. Milberg Factors, 

Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 225 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing Ashcroft v. Iqbal

Ordinarily, a District Court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting 

leave to amend. 

, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 

(2009)). In sum, these many defects suggest that the District Court correctly dismissed 

the complaint pursuant to its 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) screening responsibilities.

See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 110–111 (3d Cir. 

2002). Here, however, amendment would be futile; the defects discussed above could not 

be corrected by amending the complaint. Also, while it appears that Fleming may have 

intended to file a motion for appointment of counsel, see

 2 While “immunity, whether qualified or absolute, is an affirmative defense which must 

be affirmatively pleaded,” Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297, 300 (6th Cir. 

1986), it may be raised sua sponte when apparent from the face of the complaint. Ray v. 

Kertes, 285 F.3d 287, 296 (3d Cir. 2002).

Letter, ECF No. 2, his 
4

complaint lacked merit and, as such, a motion for appointment of counsel would have 

been properly denied. See Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 231 (3d Cir. 2004). Finally, 

we detect no abuse of discretion in the denial of Fleming’s motion for reconsideration, as 

he pointed to no “manifest errors of law or fact” in the District Court’s original order and 

did not otherwise “present newly discovered evidence.” Blystone v. Horn

For the foregoing reasons, we will summarily affirm.

, 664 F.3d 397, 

415–16 (3d Cir. 2011).