This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Reports. Please 1 see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. 2 Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated 3 errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does 4 not include the filing date. 5 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 6 GEORGE M. MYLES, 7 Respondent-Appellant, 8

v. NO. 30,529 9 STATE OF NEW MEXICO, ex rel. 10 HUMAN SERVICES DEPARTMENT, 11 and REBECCA M. GALAZ, 12 Petitioners-Appellees. 13 APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF DOÑA ANA COUNTY 14 Douglas R. Driggers, District Judge 15
Anna L. Juarez 16 Las Cruces, NM 17 for Appellant 18 Gary K. King, Attorney General 19 Santa Fe, NM 20 Torri Jacobus, Special Assistant Attorney General 21 Albuquerque, NM 22 M. Elizabeth Price, Special Assistant Attorney General 23 Las Cruces, NM 24 for Appellees 25

MEMORANDUM OPINION 262 CASTILLO, Chief Judge. 1 Appellant George Myles (Myles) conte nds that the district court erred in 2 denying his Rule 1-060 NMRA motion and in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction 3 to decide whether his driver’s license should be reinstated. We affirm. 4 BACKGROUND 5 This case began almost seventeen year s ago when, on September 6, 1994, the 6 State of New Mexico Human Services Department, Child Support Enforcement 7 Division (the Department) filed a petition ag ainst Myles to establish paternity as to 8 Myles’ child Marquisha and to establish My les’ child support obligations. In a pro 9 se response, Myles admitted that he was th e biological father of Marquisha. At a 10 hearing on the Department’s petition in N ovember 1994, Myles also admitted that he 11 had another child with Marquisha’s mother, a boy named Ryan. In light of this 12 admission, the Department inquired whether Myles wished to include Ryan in the 13 proceedings, and Myles responded affirmatively. At the close of the hearing, Myles 14 was informed that he was being adjudicatedthe parent of both Marquisha and Ryan, 15 that child support would be determined based on both children, and he was fully 16 informed what his child support obligations would be. An order memorializing these 17 decisions was entered on December 2, 1994. 18 Nine years later, in December 2003, the Department filed a motion for order to 193 show cause that alleged that Myles had failed to comply with the terms of the 1 December 1994 order. Myles wa s ordered to appear before a hearing officer, but he 2 failed to do so. On March 12, 2004, the hearing officer entered a report and decision 3 and certification for contempt with the district court. The order asked the court to find 4 Myles in contempt for refusing to comply with the December 1994 child support order 5 and indicated that Myles owed approximately $8,400 in child support and unpaid 6 judgment interest. 7 Myles filed timely pro se objections and claimed that his nonappearance at 8 court was the result of his attorney’s failure to alert him to the existence of the 9 hearing. As to child support, Myles stat ed that his financial situation had recently 10 changed and further stated that he had recently come to be lieve that Ryan was not his 11 biological child. 12 Finally, he pointed out thathis license had been re voked due to his failure to 13 pay child support, and he asserted that this was a significant impediment to his ability 14 to secure employment. We observe that there is no mention of the license revocation 15 in the March 12, 2004 order. Further, weobserve that there is no order revoking 16 Myles’ driver’s license included with the record in this case. 17 The district court, having received and considered the hearing officer’s report 18 and decision and Myles’ objections, remande d the matter to the hearing officer with 194 instructions to treat Myles’ objections as a motion for reconsideration. When Myles 1 appeared before the hearing officer on remand, he withdrew his objections. As such, 2 the officer filed an order on June 25, 2004, affirming the March 12, 2004 order and 3 again certified the matter to the district court for a finding of contempt. 4 Myles again filed timely pro se objecti ons in which he expressed general 5 concerns about the fairness of the “system, ” complained that he was being lied to by 6 his attorney and others, insisted that he be allowed to test whether Ryan is actually his 7 son, and again asserted that he needed to have his license reinstated. The district court 8 was unpersuaded by Myles’ re newed objections and entere d an order concluding that 9 the June 25, 2004 report and decision affirming the March 12, 2004 report and 10 decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, was supported by 11 substantial evidence, and wa s in accordance with the law. 12 As the district court had not addresse d the issue of contempt, a hearing in 13 district court on that specific issue was set. At that hearing on February 21, 2005, the 14 court not only addressed the c ontempt issue, but also addressed the driver’s license 15 issue and the issue of Myles’ paternity as to Ryan. The court’s decisions were 16 memorialized in two separate orders. Th e contempt and driver’s license issue were 17 addressed in an order file d on March 30, 2005. The paternity issue was addressed in 18 a subsequent order filed on April 25, 2005. 195 With regard to contempt, the court found that Myles now owed approximately 1 $11,000 in child support and interest and f ound that Myles had willfully failed to 2 comply with his child support responsibilities. As such, the c ourt determined that 3 Myles was indeed in contempt of court and sentenced him to a period of incarceration. 4 However, the court ordered the sentence su spended provided that Myles “purge” the 5 contempt order. To purge the order, Myles had to submit a lump sum payment of 6 approximately $4,400 to the Department on or before March 23, 2005. As to the 7 driver’s license issue, the court ordered the Department to initiate restoration of 8 Myles’ driving privileges if Myles submitted the lump sum payment in a timely 9 fashion. As to the paternity issue, th e court granted Myles’ request for paternity 10 testing and specifically noted that Ryan’s mother did not object to the request. The 11 order clearly states, however, that Myles would be responsible for the costs associated 12 with the testing and that “[ s]uch testing [would] not relie ve [Myles] of his obligation 13 to pay child support and to comply with the terms and conditions” of the December 14 1994 child support order. 15 In November 2005, well after the lump sum payment due date, the Department 16 requested another hearing before the districtcourt on the issue of contempt. At that 17 hearing in December 2005, Myles sought relief from both the December 1994 child 18 support order and from the contempt order on the ground that Ryan was not his son. 196 To more fully examine the i ssues, the district court orde red the Department and Myles 1 to brief the issue. In the interim, My les was ordered to continue making support 2 payments. 3 The Department filed its brief in a timely fashion; Myles failed to submit a 4 brief. At a hearing on February 24, 2006, th e district court determined that Myles was 5 not entitled to relief from his child support ob ligations to Ryan or to relief from the 6 contempt order. The court found thatMyles now owed approximately $20,000 in 7 child support and unpaid interest, found Myles to be in willful contempt, and 8 remanded him into the custody of the DoñaAna Detention Center to serve a period 9 of incarceration to begin immediately follo wing the hearing and not to exceed thirty 10 days. The court allowed Myles yet another opportunity to purge the contempt order 11 and secure his immediate release from detention provided he pay $2,500 in child 12 support. An order memorializing these d ecisions was entered on March 6, 2006. The 13 record indicates that Myles serv ed the entire thirty-day sentence. 14 In June 2009, the Department filed yet another motion for order to show cause 15 with the district court and therein requestedthe court to order Myles to appear and 16 show cause why he should not again be found in contempt and imprisoned. The 17 documents attached to th e motion appear to indicate that Myles now owed 18 approximately $40,000 in back child support and unpaid interest. That motion was 197 granted, and Myles was ordered to appear before a hearing officer on December 2, 1 2009. 2 Myles responded by filing two motions with the district court: a pro se motion 3 for continuance, which was granted, and a pro se Rule 1-060 motion in which he 4 asked the court to set aside “the origin al [r]eport and [d]eci sion filed December 2, 5 1994 and subsequent orders for support based on that order.” Prior to filing these 6 motions, Myles secured the assistance of counsel. The motions expressly indicate, 7 however, that counsel did not draft th e motions but only provided “document 8 preparation.” 9 Myles’ Rule 1-060 motion was heard on February 23, 2010. Following that 10 hearing, the parties entered proposed findings of fact and conclu sions of law. Myles’ 11 proposed findings, drafted by counsel, contain falsifications. Counsel asserted that 12 Myles “did not admit paternity at any hearing before the [c]ourt on the [p]etition to 13 [d]etermine [p]arent-[c]hild [r]elationship, wh ether before a [d]istrict [j]udge or [c]hild 14 [s]upport [h]earing [o]fficer.” This is not true; Myles did admit paternity of Ryan at 15 the November 1994 hearing. This misrep resentation is repeated in the proposed 16 conclusions of law. 17 On March 8, 2010, Myles filed a moti on to recaluculate child support and 18 determine arrearages in light of the fact that Ryan had em ancipated. In that motion, 198 Myles again raised the issue of his driver’s license and asked that it be reinstated. At 1 the hearing on that motion on March 22, 2010, the court determined that it lacked 2 authority to address the driver’s licenseissue and concluded that the matter of 3 reinstatement was for the Department to decide. This determination was 4 memorialized in an order regarding timesharing that was filed on April 28, 2010. 5 On March 25, 2010, the Court entered its findings of fact and conclusions of 6 law on Myles’ Rule 1-060 mo tion. The court erroneously adopted Myles’ false 7 statement that he had never admitted paternity of Ryan. The findings were later 8 amended, on the motion of the Department, to reflect the fact that Myles had indeed 9 admitted that Ryan was his son. In any event, the court denied Myles’ Rule 1-060 10 motion because the motion had not been file d within one year of the court’s order. 11 Our review of the recording of the hearing reveals that the order to which the court 12 was referring was the March 6, 2006 order. A final order denying Myles’ Rule 1-060 13 motion was entered in another order filed on April 28, 2010. Myle s had already filed 14 a motion to reconsider before that final order was even entered. The motion to 15 reconsider was denied on May 26, 2010. 16 Myles filed an initial notice of appealon May 27, 2010, then filed a motion to 17 extend the time to file the no tice of appeal, and filed a s econd notice of appeal on June 18 28, 2010. He appeals the April 28, 2010 final order denying his Rule 1-060 motion 199 and the May 26, 2010 order denying his motion to reconsider. He also appeals an 1 order dated May 27, 2010 wherein, he clai ms, “he was not restored his driver’s 2 license.” We have reviewed the May 27, 2010 order and there is no mention of the 3 driver’s license issue. 4 DISCUSSION 5 Before we assess Myles’ arguments on appeal, there are several preliminary 6 matters which require our attention. Counsel for Myles submitted only a brief in 7 chief; no reply brief was filed. In its answer brief, the Department correctly observed 8 that the brief in chief was deficient in several respects: it was not correctly formatted, 9 the standard of review was not identifie d for each argument on appeal, and it did not 10 include citations to the record proper. As such, the Department asked that we dismiss 11 Myles’ appeal. 12 In response, counsel for Myles concededthat the brief was deficient in the 13 manner identified by the Department and asked for an opportunity to amend her 14 submission. We granted th at request, and counsel submitted an amended brief in 15 chief. That document is also deficient. Counsel di d not adequately address the 16 absence of record cites. In the statement of the case section, counsel provided only 17 a scant spattering of citations to the record. Although counsel added a standard of 18 review section, the standard she identified is incorrect given the issues on appeal. 1910 Finally, although counsel was not instructed to remedy this issue, we observe that 1 there are varying arguments and assertions throughout the argument and authority 2 section of the amended brief that are not accompanied by citation to authority. 3 In a letter to this Court explaining the st eps taken to correct the deficiencies in 4 the initial brief in chief, counsel appears to indicate that time constraints and her 5 workload prevented her from amending her brief so that it fully complied with our 6 rules of appellate procedure. She concludes her letter by assuring us that she’ll “never 7 take another pro bono appeal.” This remark troubles us as it appears counsel is 8 suggesting that the deficiencies in briefing are attributable to the fact that she is 9 representing Myles pro bono. 10 Our rules of professional conduct instru ct that “[t]he legal profession has a 11 responsibility to provide legal services to those unable to pay. In fulfilling this 12 responsibility, a lawyer should aspire to: . . . provide legal services without fee or 13 expectation of fee to: . . .persons of limited means[.]” Rule 16-601 NMRA. We 14 commend counsel for her efforts to meet this aspirational goal. We have concerns, 15 however, that the representation provided in this matter did not meet the minimum 16 level of competence. See Rule 16-101 NMRA (“A lawyershall provide competent 17 representation to a client. Competent representation require s the legal knowledge, 18 skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonabl y necessary for the representation.”). 1911 Our concerns do not end there. 1 Myles has misrepresented the facts underl ying this matter. While testifying at 2 the hearing on his Rule 1-060 motion, he falsely denied having admitted that Ryan 3 was his child, denied having agreed to havethe issue of Ryan’s parentage determined 4 at the November 1994 hearing, and deniedhaving been informed that the child 5 support obligations imposed on him at the November 1994 hearing were based on the 6 fact that he was adjudicated the parent of both Ryan and Marquisha. Counsel 7 perpetuated these misrepresentations in her proposed findings of fact and conclusions 8 of law that the district court adopted. The Department, not counsel, saw to it that 9 these misrepresentations were corrected. See Rule 16-303(A)(1) NMRA (“A lawyer 10 shall not knowingly: . . . make a false statem ent of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to 11 correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the 12 lawyer[.]”). Having expressed our concerns, we turn to the arguments on appeal. 13 Myles first asserts that the district c ourt erred in denying his rule 1-060 motion. 14 He appears to argue that the district court erred in construing Rule 1-060(B). He asks 15 that we “set aside the judgm ent that established . . . My les was the father of Ryan,” 16 and “remand the case so that child support might be properly calculated for” Myles’ 17 one biological child. Myles makes varying arguments on appeal to support his claim 18 of error. We address them in turn, but first establish our standard of review and 1912 provide a general outline of the law surrounding Rule 1-060(B). 1 “Relief under Rule [1-0]60 is discretionary with th e trial judge and will be 2 reviewed only for an abuse of that discretion.” Click v. Litho Supply Co. , 95 N.M. 3 419, 420, 622 P.2d 1039, 1040 (1981). “Discretion, in this sense, is abused only when 4 the trial judge has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably.” Conejos County Lumber Co. v. 5 Citizens Sav. & Loan Ass’n , 80 N.M. 612, 614, 459 P.2d 138, 140 (1969). 6 In order to vacate a judgment under Rule [1-0]60(b), the movant must 7 show the existence of a meritorious defense or cause of action and proper 8 grounds for reopening the judgment. Six potential grounds for vacating 9 a final judgment are provided under Rule [1-0]60(b): (1) mistake, 10 inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered 11 evidence; (3) fraud, misrepresentati on or other misconduc t of an adverse 12 party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied, 13 released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has 14 been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the 15 judgment should have prospective app lication; or (6) any other reason 16 justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. 17 Thompson v. Thompson , 99 N.M. 473, 475, 660 P.2d 115, 117 (1983) (citation 18 omitted). “A motion under [Rule 1-0]60(b)(1), (2) or (3) must be filed within one 19 year[.]” Thompson , 99 N.M. at 475, 660 P.2d at 117. A motion under “Rule [1- 20 0]60(b)(4), (5) and (6) may be pres ented within a ‘reasonable time.’” Thompson , 99 21 N.M. at 475, 660 P.2d at 117. “In order to obtain relief under [Rule 1-0]60(b)(6), the 22 movant must show exceptional circumstances , other than those advanced under [Rule 23 1-0]60(b)(1) through (5)[.]” Thompson , 99 N.M. at 475, 660 P.2d at 117 (emphasis 2413 omitted). Exceptional circumst ances are those that, “in the sound discretion of the 1 trial judge, require an exercise of a reservoi r of equitable power to assure that justice 2 is done.” Stein v. Alpine Sports, Inc. , 1998-NMSC-040, ¶ 17, 126 N.M. 258, 968 P.2d 3 769 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 4 Despite having dedicated nearly ten pages of his brief to the propriety of the 5 district court’s ruling on his Rule 1-060 motion, Myles has provided limited guidance 6 regarding the applicability of Rule 1-060(B) . He makes a passing reference to Rule 7 1-060(B)(6) and correctly notes that a judgment may be vacated under this subsection 8 of the rule only if “exceptional circumst ances” are present. He does not, however, 9 specifically identify or assert that exceptional circumstances exist inthis case. Then, 10 at the very end of the section of his brie f dealing with Rule 1-060(B), he claims that 11 misconduct by the Department is a factor indetermining whether relief is available 12 under Rule 1-060. He cites two cases from Alaska for this proposition. 13 We will begin with Rule 1-060(B)(1), (2), and (3) and hold that the district 14 court did not err to the exte nt it held that Myles is precluded from seeking relief under 15 the three subsections of the rule. Myle s filed his Rule 1-060 motion on December 2, 16 2009, and, in that motion, requested relief from the December 2, 1994 order and 17 “subsequent orders for support based on that order.” In our view, Myles’ motion was 18 clearly directed at securing relief from the 1994 order as this is what his motion 1914 expressly states and because the December 1994 order is what gave rise to Myles’ 1 child support responsibilities for Ryan. Th e district court, however, understood the 2 motion as a request for relief from a later or der, dated March 6, 2006, where the court 3 determined that Myles was subject to the terms of the December 1994 support order 4 and concluded that Myles’ contention that he is not Ryan’s father is no defense to his 5 child support responsibilities. Whether the motion was directed at the December 1994 6 order as we believe, or th e March 2006 order as the district court understood, the 7 motion was filed one year after either date and, therefore, Myles cannot avail himself 8 of Rule 1-060(B)(1),(2), or (3). Similarl y, Myles has not argued, and we see no basis 9 for concluding, that Rule 1- 060(B)(4) or (5) apply here. 10 With regard to Rule 1-060(B)(6), the Department contends that Myles did not 11 rely or refer to this specific subsection of the rule below and, alternatively, failed to 12 identify on appeal any exceptional circumst ances which would bring his request for 13 relief within the ambit of this subsection of Rule 1-060(B). The Department is correct 14 on both counts. 15 Myles’ Rule 1-060 motion was filed pro se . It is almost entirely comprised of 16 rhetorical attacks on the honesty and integrityof the Department. It does not include 17 a single case citation or a single reference to a specific subsection of Rule 1-060 and 18 does not provide any guidance as to how Ru le 1-060(B)(6) might apply. Although his 1915 motion was filed pro se, Myles was represented by counsel at the hearing on his 1 motion. We have listened to the recording of that hearing and have discovered that 2 Myles’ counsel also failed to make any specific arguments about the varying 3 subsections of Rule 1-060(B). Counsel di d refer to New Mexico authority, but none 4 addressing whether Myles wa s entitled to relief under Rule1-060(B)(6). Finally, we 5 observe that the district court, when ruling on Myles’ Rule 1-060 motion on February 6 23, 2010, expressly stated that it understood Myles motion as a re quest for relief under 7 Rule 1-060(B)(2) or (3). For these reasons, we conclude that My les failed to preserve 8 the specific assertion that he is en titled to relief under Ru le 1-060(B)(6). See Rule 12- 9 216(A) NMRA (“To preserve a question for review it must appear that a ruling or 10 decision by the district court was fairly invoked[.]”); Conejos County Lumber Co. , 80 11 N.M. at 614, 459 P.2d at 140 (declining to entertain an argument about the 12 applicability of Rule 1-060 where the appellanthad failed to raise that argument at the 13 hearing on the Rule 1-060 motion). 14 Even if this were not the case and pres ervation were not an issue, we would 15 nonetheless conclude that Myles is not entitled to relief under Rule 1-060(B)(6) 16 because Myles has failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances. Myles has not 17 argued on appeal that exceptional circumstan ces are present here. Rather, he merely 18 provides us a disparate assortment of arguments. 1916 Myles claims that he is entitled to relie f because he represented himself pro se 1 at the time Ryan was determined to be hi s son. We do not see how this amounts to 2 exceptional circumstances. We have previous ly explained that “a pro se litigant must 3 comply with the rules and orders of the court, enjoying no greater rights than those 4 who employ counsel.” Newsome v. Farer , 103 N.M. 415, 419, 708 P.2d 327, 331 5 (1985) (emphasis omitted). 6 Myles claims that “[t]he petition with wh ich he had been served didn’t give him 7 notice that the issue of Ryan [’s] paternity” would be adj udicated. The record reflects 8 that, at the hearing on the petition for Marquisha, Myles admitted that Ryan was his 9 son and informed the Departme nt that he wished to incl ude Ryan in the proceedings 10 and resolve the issue of Ryan’s parentage. Myles cannot complain that he did not 11 have notice that Ryan’s parentage woul d be adjudicated when he specifically 12 requested that this occur. See Rule 1-015(B) NMRA (“Whenissues not raised by the 13 pleadings are tried by express or implied cons ent of the parties, they shall be treated 14 in all respects as if they had been raisedin the pleadings.”). Myles’ alleged notice 15 issue does not give rise to exceptional circumstances. 16 Myles cites several statutes governing the manner inwhich parentage may be 17 determined. We are unable to comprehend th e significance of these statutes in relation 18 to Myles’ matter. Two of the statutes cited, NMSA 1978, Section 40-11A-623(A) 1917 (2009), and NMSA 1978, Section 40-11A-631(D) (2009), were not in existence at the 1 time Ryan’s parentage was determined. Myles acknowledges th is and does little to 2 explain how these statutes are relevant. Myles also directs us to statutory language 3 purportedly derived from the version of NMSA 1978, Section 40-11-15 (1993) 4 (repealed 2009) in effect in 1994. Our research reveals that the 1994 version of 5 Section 40-11-15 does not include the cited language. Myles’ statutory arguments do 6 not demonstrate exceptional circumstances. 7 Myles appears to argue that there are inadequate protections available for 8 individuals who assume parental responsibilitie s of children and claims that the state 9 has an obligation to avoid false establishment of parentage. Myles asserts that this 10 issue is somehow connected with an allege d gender bias in our courts. We neither 11 understand these arguments nor see how they give rise to exceptional circumstances. 12 Absent further guidance, we decline to entertain these specific claims. See Headley 13 v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 110 P.3d 1076 14 (declining to entertain a cursory and inadequately developed argument). 15 Myles asserts that he has been placed in a condition of “involuntary servitude” 16 and appears to claim that the December 1994 child support order violates the 17 Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. We decline to consider this 18 bold contention as Myles has done next to nothing to explain the basis for this claim. 1918 See id. 1 Finally, Myles asserts that the Department has acted in a manipulative, devious, 2 and negligent manner. Myles bases this claim on the fact that the Department 3 purportedly did not make ad equate attempts to secure child support from Ryan’s 4 actual father. Myles does not explain how this gives riseto exceptional circumstances 5 and neither cites the record nor case law to support this claim. As such, we decline 6 to consider this argument. See Santa Fe Exploration Co. v. Oil Conservation 7
Comm’n , 114 N.M. 103, 108, 835 P.2d 819, 824 (1992) (declining to consider 8 arguments based on factual allegations wh ich were unsupported by citations to the 9 record proper); ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 10 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969 (declining to consider a 11 proposition that was unsupported by citation to au thority). In conclusion, we hold that 12 the district court committed no error in denying Myles’ Rule 1-060 motion. We 13 proceed to the next issue on appeal. 14 Myles’ second issue concerns his driver’s license. He argues that the district 15 court erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether the Department 16 should reinstate his license. There are many problems with this argument. We focus 17 on only two. 18 First, Myles raised the issue of his li cense for the first time in March 2004, in 1919 objections to the March 12, 2004 report and decision and certification for contempt. 1 As stated earlier, Myles’ driving privilege s were not discussed in the March 12, 2004 2 report and decision, and we do not know why Myles brought th at issue up for the first 3 time in his objections. We havenever seen nor been direct ed to an order or judgment 4 of revocation, and we haveno way of knowing when, or under what authority, the 5 revocation was carried out. “M atters outside the record present no issue for review.” 6 State v. Reynolds , 111 N.M. 263, 267, 804 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Ct. App. 1990). 7 In his notice of appeal, Myles states that he is appealing from the district court’s 8 May 27, 2010 judgment and order and claims that the issue of his driver’s license was 9 addressed in that order. We have reviewed that order and found no mention of the 10 driver’s license issue. The district court addressed the driver’s license issue and 11 determined that it lacked jurisdiction to decide whether reinst atement was appropriate 12 at a hearing on March 22, 2010. That determination was memorialized in an order 13 filed on April 28, 2010. Myles did not appeal that order. 14 We decline to further address the driver’s license issue. 15 CONCLUSION 16 For these reasons, the judgment of the district court is affirmed. 17 IT IS SO ORDERED. 1820 __________________________________ 1 CELIA FOY CASTILLO, Chief Judge 2

WE CONCUR: 3

__________________________________ 4 MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge 5

__________________________________ 6 CYNTHIA A. FRY, Judge 7