PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

No. 08-3878

___________

JOSEPH ELASSAAD,

 Appellant

v.

INDEPENDENCE AIR, INC.;

DELTA AIR LINES, INC.

_________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 

(D.C. Civil No. 05-cv-02328)

District Judge: Honorable Edmund V. Ludwig

__________________________

Argued January 28, 2010

Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges,

and AMBROSE, District Judge*.

 

*The Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose, Judge of the

United States District Court for the Western District of

Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
2

(Filed: May 12, 2010)

_________

Eugene F. Jarrell, III, Esq. [ARGUED]

211 North Olive Street

Media, PA 19063

 Counsel for Appellant

Jonathan M. Stern, Esq. [ARGUED]

Schnader Harrison Segal & Lewis LLP

750 9th Street, NW, Suite 550

Washington, DC 20006

 Counsel for Appellee

 Independence Air Inc.

 

OPINION OF THE COURT

 

RENDELL, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Elassaad appeals from an order granting summary

judgment in favor of Independence Air, Inc., with respect to his

negligence claim for injuries sustained when he fell while

disembarking from an airplane at the Philadelphia International

Airport. His appeal requires us to consider the extent to which

the Federal Aviation Act (“Aviation Act”), 49 U.S.C. § 40101

et seq., preempts state law concerning tort claims arising from

an air carrier’s conduct in overseeing the disembarkation of

passengers. Although we stated in Abdullah v. American
3

Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir. 1999), that the

Aviation Act preempts “the entire field of aviation safety” from

state regulation, we hold that the “field of aviation safety” does

not include a flight crew’s oversight of the disembarkation of

passengers once a plane has come to a complete stop at its

destination. Abdullah therefore does not control the instant

case. We also hold that the Aviation Act and the regulations

promulgated thereunder do not preempt state tort law with

respect to such negligence claims. Moreover, we conclude that

the federally enacted Air Carrier Access Act (“ACAA”),

49 U.S.C. § 41705 et seq., and its implementing regulations do

not control the standard of care from the standpoint of airline

safety. As a result, we conclude that the standard of care in

Elassaad’s negligence claim is not preempted by federal law,

and we will reverse the grant of summary judgment for

Independence and remand for further proceedings. 

I. Background

Elassaad’s right leg was amputated above the knee in

1978, and he relies on a pair of crutches to walk. On February

9, 2004, he boarded a Boston-to-Philadelphia flight operated by

Independence under the auspices of Delta Air Lines. The flight

was on a Dornier 328, a small commuter jet, which passengers

boarded from the tarmac via a 31⁄2-foot long flight of steps built

into the door of the aircraft. After arriving at his seat without

incident, Elassaad attempted to place his crutches in the

overhead bin, which was not long enough to accommodate

them. Adrien Lavoie, the lone flight attendant on the plane, then

took the crutches and stowed them in the baggage area for the

duration of the flight.
 At his deposition, Elassaad estimated that the steps were 1

between eleven and thirteen inches wide, and he explained that

he had not previously taken note of their narrowness because

descending stairs using crutchesis more difficult than ascending

them. He stated that he was apprehensive of falling because the

stairs were narrow and he sometimes has difficulty maintaining

his balance on tight staircases.

 According to the relevant ACAA-implementing regulation, 2

airline personnel would not have been permitted to carry

Elassaad down the stairs unless there was an emergency. See 14

C.F.R. § 382.39(a)(2) (2004). The Department of

Transportation revised the regulations implementing the ACAA

on May 13, 2008, after Elassaad’s accident. See

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel,

73 Fed. Reg. 27,614 (May 13, 2008). All references to and

quotations of those regulations in the body of this opinion are

4

Upon landing in Philadelphia, Lavoie asked Elassaad to

stay in his seat until the other passengers had deplaned. Lavoie

then returned the crutches to Elassaad, who used them to

approach the aircraft door. At that point, despite having boarded

the aircraft by the same staircase, Elassaad noticed for the first

time that the stairs were narrow. The staircase had a railing on 1

the left side, but not on the right. Though Elassaad recognized

that he “needed assistance” to descend the staircase, App. 117,

he chose not to request help because he believed the only aid the

airline could offer would be to carry him down the stairs.

Elassaad testified that he would have declined such assistance

due to his perception of it as demeaning. However, he would 2
based on the pre-amendment text, which was in effect at all

times relevant to this case. The current prohibition on carrying

a passenger appears at 14 C.F.R. § 382.101 (2009). 

 During his deposition, Lavoie stated that he had told 3

Elassaad about the availability of a wheelchair (though Elassaad

denies this), but not about the availability of an electronic lift or

a “straight back.” A “straight back” is similar in form to a hand

truck.

5

have accepted the assistance of a wheelchair or an electronic lift

had he known that this type of assistance was available to him.3

As Elassaad began to descend the stairs, he lost his

balance and fell off the right side of the staircase, striking his

shoulder on the pavement. According to his complaint, this

resulted in severe injuries, including torn cartilage in his

shoulder that required surgical repair.

Elassaad commenced this lawsuit in the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania,

advancing three separate negligence claims under Pennsylvania

law against Independence and Delta: that the airlines were

negligent in (1) operating an aircraft made defective by design

features of the aircraft steps; (2) failing to inspect and maintain

the steps; and (3) failing to offer and render personal assistance

to Elassaad as he disembarked from the jet. The case was

removed to the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Pennsylvania on May 18, 2005, based on diversity of

citizenship. Shortly thereafter, on June 14, 2005, Elassaad
 When referring to the ACAA-implementing regulations 4

hereafter, we will simply say “the ACAA regulations.”

6

voluntarily dismissed Delta from the suit. Independence then

moved for partial summary judgment with respect to the first

claim. The District Court granted Independence’s motion as

unopposed. By that time, Elassaad had withdrawn his second

claim, which was based on Independence’s alleged failure to

inspect and maintain the steps, leaving, in the words of the

District Court, “the sole liability issue [as] whether

[Independence] negligently failed to assist [Elassaad] in

disembarking the airplane, including, without limitations,

making available all appropriate safety measures and devices.”

App. 3.

Independence moved for summary judgment on

Elassaad’s remaining claim, arguing that the controlling

standard of care, dictated by federal law, obligates an airline to

provide assistance only upon request, and that it is undisputed

that Elassaad did not ask for assistance. Specifically,

Independence argued that the regulations implementing the

ACAA, which address air carriers’ conduct toward the disabled, 4

see 14 C.F.R. §§ 382.1–.70 (2004), preempt state law

negligence standards. The ACAA regulations require air

carriers to “provide assistance requested by or on behalf of

qualified individuals with a disability, or offered by air carrier

personnel and accepted by qualified individuals with a

disability, in enplaning and deplaning.” 14 C.F.R. § 382.39(a)
 The provisions of § 382.39(a) that are pertinent to this case 5

currently appear in 14 C.F.R. § 382.95(a) (2009), and impose

requirements that are substantively identical to the former

§ 382.39(a). 

 That obligation currently appears in 14 C.F.R. § 382.41(c) 6

(2009). 

7

(2004). Neither the ACAA nor its regulations expressly require

5

air carriers to offer assistance, and Elassaad made no such

request for assistance. Nor do the ACAA regulations obligate

carriers to inform a disabled passenger of available assistive

measures unless the passenger states the need for a wheelchair.

See 14 C.F.R. § 382.45(a)(2) (2004).6

Elassaad responded to Independence’s motion for

summary judgment by asserting that the ACAA and its

regulations were intended only to prevent discrimination against

disabled passengers, not to establish standards for the safe

operation of an aircraft. He argued that air carriers could be

held liable for failing to affirmatively offer assistance to

disabled passengers, notwithstanding the ACAA, if that failure

compromised passenger safety. Elassaad noted that the Federal

Aviation Administration (“FAA”), which has the authority to

establish air safety standards, has not promulgated any safety

regulations describing what, if any, assistance air carriers must

offer passengers when deplaning. In the absence of a

controlling federal safety regulation, Elassaad argued, state

negligence law governs an air carrier’s duty of care in that

situation, and the failure of Independence to offer him aid
8

constituted negligence under Pennsylvania common law.

Alternatively, Elassaad argued that, if the Aviation Act does

control, the general standard of care set forth in 14 C.F.R.

§ 91.13, which prohibits carriers from operating an aircraft in a

“careless or reckless manner,” imposed a duty of care on

Independence to offer him deplaning assistance and that the

airline consequently breached that duty when it failed to offer

him such assistance.

The District Court concluded that, under our holding in

Abdullah, federal law dictated the standard of care for

Elassaad’s negligence suit. The District Court adopted

Independence’s view of the applicable standard of care, as found

in the ACAA regulations. The District Court concluded that the

ACAA and its regulations impose no affirmative duty to offer

assistance to a disabled airline passenger, and that, even if the

standard under 14 C.F.R. § 91.13 applied, Elassaad had failed to

“point[] to caselaw or expert testimony to establish that the

failure of Independence to offer assistance to [Elassaad]

constituted careless or reckless conduct.” App. 6-7. The

District Court granted Independence’s motion for summary

judgment, and Elassaad filed a timely appeal.

II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review

Independence removed the present action to federal court

under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. The District Court exercised diversity

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Our jurisdiction arises

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo district court

orders granting or denying summary judgment. See Levy v.

Sterling Holding Co., 544 F.3d 493, 501 (3d Cir. 2008). We
9

also exercise de novo review of a preemption determination, as

it is a question of law. See Horn v. Thoratec Corp., 376 F.3d

163, 166 (3d Cir. 2004). 

Summary judgment is proper where “the pleadings, the

discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits

show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(c). Because summary judgment was entered

against Elassaad, we view any disputed facts in his favor. See

Brewer v. Quaker State Oil Ref. Corp., 72 F.3d 326, 330 (3d Cir.

1995).

III. Discussion

On appeal, Elassaad challenges the District Court’s

determination that the ACAA and its implementing regulations

preempt state negligence law with respect to an air carrier’s duty

to offer aid to disabled passengers when deplaning. Elassaad

asserts that state negligence law governs an air carrier’s duty of

care under such circumstances, or in the alternative, that if our

holding in Abdullah dictates that there is federal preemption,

then the standard of care is the “careless or reckless” standard

established by 14 C.F.R. § 91.13.

Independence argues that whether or not Abdullah

applies, the ACAA and its implementing regulations “preempt

state law on air carrier interaction with passengers with a

disability.” Appellee’s Br. at 7. Independence alternatively

urges that Abdullah “remains good law, extends to boarding and

disembarking, and applies in this case,” but that the level of care
10

provided was above the “careless or reckless” standard imposed

by § 91.13. Id. at 5.

We agree with Elassaad’s main contention, namely, that

his common law negligence claim is not preempted by federal

law. We will explain our reasoning by addressing each of the

arguments made by Independence on appeal. To do this, we

will begin by discussing our decision in Abdullah, the scope of

its holding, and why the instant case does not fall within that

scope. Then we will discuss why the Aviation Act and the

ACAA, and the regulations implementing those statutes, do not

preempt the state law standard of care in this case. These are

issues of first impression in our court, as we have not previously

considered the intersection of the Aviation Act safety

regulations and the ACAA regulations, or their proper

applications in this context. 

A.

In Abdullah, passengers aboard an American Airlines

flight were injured as a result of severe turbulence en route from

New York to Puerto Rico. 181 F.3d at 365. The passengers

initiated two separate lawsuits in the District Court of the Virgin

Islands against American Airlines, which were consolidated for

trial. Id. The passengers claimed that the flight crew was

negligent as a matter of Virgin Islands law both in failing to take

reasonable precautions to avoid, and in failing to warn the

passengers about, the turbulence. Id. After a jury in Saint Croix

returned a verdict in favor of the passengers, the trial court

granted American Airlines’ motion for a new trial, on the

ground that the court had improperly instructed the jury on the
11

local standard of care rather than on the standard prescribed by

the Aviation Act. Id. at 366.

At the passengers’ request, the trial court then certified

a two-part question for appeal: “Does federal law preempt the

standards for air safety, but preserve State and Territorial

damage remedies?” Id. at 364. We granted interlocutory

review, and answered both parts of the question in the

affirmative. We held that there was “implied preemption of the

entire field of aviation safety,” but that “despite federal

preemption of the standards of care, state and territorial damage

remedies still exist for violation of those standards.” Id. at 365.

Abdullah’s holding was grounded in our finding that

Congress, by enacting the Aviation Act, intended “‘to promote

safety in aviation and thereby protect the lives of persons who

travel on board aircraft’” by resting “sole responsibility for

supervising the aviation industry with the federal government.”

Id. at 368 (citation omitted). This conclusion as to

congressional intent was primarily supported by the Aviation

Act’s legislative history and its judicial interpretation in City of

Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).

We noted that the Supreme Court in City of Burbank had

analyzed the Aviation Act’s legislative history to reach the

conclusion that “Congress’s consolidation of control of aviation

in one agency indicated its intent to federally preempt aviation

safety.” Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 369 (citing City of Burbank, 411

U.S. at 639). 

 In Abdullah, we specifically found that Congress

intended the Administrator of the FAA to exercise “sole
12

discretion in regulating air safety” by vesting the Administrator

with broad regulatory authority. Id. We stated that, to

effectuate this authority, the Administrator “has implemented a

comprehensive system of rules and regulations” to promote

flight safety. Id. Based on the comprehensive regulatory

system, we determined that federal law so thoroughly occupies

the legislative field of aviation safety that federal law impliedly

preempts state regulation in that area. Id. at 371. Our finding of

field preemption notwithstanding, we held that state common

law remedies were still available to the injured passengers based

on the specific language of the Aviation Act’s savings and

insurance clauses. Id. at 375-76. We remanded proceedings to

the trial court to determine whether the jury instructions based

on Virgin Islands law nevertheless comported with the federal

standard of care. Id. at 376.

We did not conclude in Abdullah that the passengers’

common law negligence claims themselves were preempted;

instead, we determined only that the standard of care used in

adjudicating those claims was preempted. Local law still

governed the other negligence elements (breach, causation, and

damages), as well as the choice and availability of remedies.

This was consistent with our prior observation, in the context of

airline deregulation, that “[i]t is highly unlikely that Congress

intended to deprive passengers of their common law rights to

recover for death or personal injuries sustained in air crashes.”

Taj Mahal Travel, Inc. v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186, 194

(3d Cir. 1998). 

Again, Abdullah’s primary holding was that federal law

preempted “the entire field of aviation safety.” 181 F.3d at 365.
13

Of critical import here is the fact that precedent is controlling

only as far as it goes. Because the parties debate whether and

when Abdullah applies, we will provide clarification on that

issue.

B.

Courts have recognized three species of preemption:

express preemption, conflict preemption, and field preemption.

Express preemption requires that Congress’s intent to preempt

be “‘explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implicitly

contained in its structure and purpose.’” Cipollone v. Liggett

Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992) (citation omitted).

Conflict preemption occurs when state law “actually conflicts

with federal law.” Id. There is no basis for finding that express

preemption or conflict preemption applies in this case, and the

parties do not contend otherwise. To the extent that preemption

exists in this case, it must be in the form of field preemption,

which occurs when a field is “reserved for federal regulation,

leaving no room for state regulation,” and “congressional intent

to supersede state laws [is] clear and manifest.” Holk v. Snapple

Beverage Corp., 575 F.3d 329, 336 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted). Both statutes and

regulations can preempt state law. Id. at 339.

In Abdullah, we found that there was implied field

preemption “of the entire field of aviation safety” as a result of

the Aviation Act and its implementing regulations. 181 F.3d at

365. However, our analysis of field preemption in

Abdullah—specifically, the “field” of “aviation safety”—was in

the context of in-flight safety. This is clear from a careful
14

reading of our decision. In describing our conclusion regarding

preemption, we stated that “federal law establishes the

applicable standards of care in the field of air safety,” and that

the FAA has “sole discretion in regulating air safety.” Id. at

367, 369 (emphases added). As examples of what we meant by

the term “air safety,” we noted that a goal of the Aviation Act

was to reduce “accidents in air transportation,” id. at 369

(quoting 49 U.S.C. § 44701(c)); we referred to the FAA’s

regulation of “pilot certification, pilot pre-flight duties, pilot

flight responsibilities, and flight rules,” id. at 369 (footnotes

omitted); and we described case law regarding issues “such as

airspace management, flight operations, and aviation noise,” id.

at 371. Accordingly, we identified the standard of care

applicable in Abdullah as that supplied by 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a),

which states, with respect to “[a]ircraft operations for the

purpose of air navigation,” that “[n]o person may operate an

aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to endanger the

life or property of another.” 14 C.F.R. § 91.13(a); see 181 F.3d

at 372. This is, of course, consistent with the facts of Abdullah,

in which plaintiffs brought suit based on injuries sustained while

the aircraft was in the air, transporting passengers from New

York to Puerto Rico. 181 F.3d at 366.

 Our discussion of the regulatory framework giving rise

to preemption in Abdullah focused exclusively on safety while

a plane is in the air, flying between its origin and destination.

Our use of the term “aviation safety” in Abdullah to describe the

field preempted by federal law was thus limited to in-air safety.

The supervision of the disembarkation process by a flight crew

therefore falls outside the bounds of what we were considering
 The parties argue at length about whether our holding in 7

Abdullah survives the Supreme Court’s decision in Wyeth v.

Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187 (2009). Because Abdullah does not

apply to the facts of this case, we make no comment regarding

what effect, if any, Wyeth has on Abdullah’s continued vitality.

 As the Supreme Court has recently stated, a cornerstone of 8

its preemption jurisprudence is “the assumption that the historic

police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the

Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of

Congress.” Wyeth, 129 S. Ct. at 1194-95 (internal quotation

marks and citation omitted).

15

in Abdullah. 

7

As we have not opined as to the preemptive effect of

federal law in this context, we must do so here. Accordingly,

we will consider an issue presented to us for the first time:

whether the Aviation Act, the ACAA, and their implementing

regulations preempt state tort law with respect to accidents that

occur when a passenger is disembarking a plane.

C.

When considering preemption of an area of traditional

state regulation, we “begin our analysis by applying a

presumption against preemption.” Holk, 575 F.3d at 334

(citations omitted). It is beyond dispute that it has traditionally 8

been the province of state law to govern disputes in cases where

a plaintiff alleges that he fell as a result of the defendant’s
16

negligence. Moreover, as we recognized in Taj Mahal, Inc. v.

Delta Airlines, Inc., 164 F.3d 186 (3d Cir. 1998), it is

appropriate to use a restrained approach in recognizing the

preemption of common law torts in the field of aviation.

Although Taj Mahal focused on the impact of the Airline

Deregulation Act, we reasoned that preemption of tort law in

aviation should be constrained in part because “the Department

of Transportation has neither the authority nor the apparatus

required to superintend” tort disputes. 164 F.3d at 194. In

addition, as Justice Stevens has stated, “‘Congress did not intend

to give airlines free rein to commit negligent acts subject only to

the supervision of the Department of Transportation, any more

than it meant to allow airlines to breach contracts with

impunity,” because “the standard of ordinary care, like contract

principles, ‘is a general background rule against which all

individuals order their affairs.’” Id. at 192 (quoting Am.

Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 236-37 (1995) (Stevens,

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Even though Taj

Mahal addressed a different statute than the federal laws at issue

in this case, we adhere to its conservative approach today.

As noted above, to find field preemption, we must find

that federal law “leav[es] no room for state regulation” and that

Congress had a “clear and manifest” intent to supersede state

law. Holk, 575 F.3d at 336 (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). In undertaking this inquiry, we consider the

language and goals of the applicable statute and regulations, as

well as any explicit statements by Congress or an agency

regarding preemption. Id. at 336-39.
17

1.

When the Aviation Act was enacted in 1958, it, among

other things, created the FAA, gave the government authority to

review airfares, instituted a system for registering and certifying

aircraft, and set safety standards for air carriers and aircraft. See

Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731.

Only the portions of the Aviation Act relating to safety are

relevant here. In their current form, the statute’s safety-related

provisions set forth standards for certifying pilots, flight

attendants, air carriers, airports, and other facilities, see 49

U.S.C. §§ 44702-44711, 44728, and require the FAA to regulate

such issues as collision avoidance systems, aircraft inspections,

and “aircraft operations during winter conditions,” see

§§ 44713, 44716, 44717, 44722. The statute also directs the

FAA to issue regulations in keeping with two safety-related

goals: the “reduc[tion] or eliminat[ion] [of] the possibility or

recurrence of accidents in air transportation,” and the

“promot[ion] [of] safe flight of civil aircraft,” such as by

prescribing standards for the construction and maintenance of

aircraft, “the reserve supply of fuel and oil carried in flight,” and

“the maximum hours or periods of service of airmen and other

employees of air carriers.” § 44701(c), (a). Nothing in the

statute pertains to safety during disembarkation; rather, the

statute’s safety provisions appear to be principally concerned

with safety in connection with operations associated with flight.

Indeed, as we noted in Abdullah, Congress enacted the Aviation

Act to “protect the lives of persons who travel on board

aircraft.” 181 F.3d at 368 (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted).
 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 21.127(a) (“Each person 9

manufacturing aircraft . . . shall establish an approved

production flight test procedure and . . . flight test each aircraft

produced.”); 14 C.F.R. §§ 23.21-.29 (governing weight limits

within which aircraft may be safely operated); 14 C.F.R. § 23.51

(governing takeoff speeds).

 See 14 C.F.R. § 91.107 (seatbelts); 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.21 and 10

135.144 (electronic devices); 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.523, .525 (carryon baggage); 14 C.F.R. § 91.535 (food and beverage

equipment).

 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 61.159 (“[A] person who is applying 11

for an airline transport pilot certificate with an airplane category

and class rating must have at least 1,500 hours of total time as

a pilot . . . .”); 14 C.F.R. § 65.33 (governing general eligibility

requirements for air traffic controllers); 14 C.F.R. § 91.533(b)

(“No person may serve as a flight attendant on an airplane . . .

18

It is not surprising, then, that most of the regulations

adopted pursuant to the Aviation Act concern aspects of safety

that are associated with flight. For example, the regulations

detail certification and “airworthiness” requirements for aircraft

parts. They include flight rules familiar to air travelers, such as 9

those requiring the use of seatbelts, restricting the use of

electronic devices, regulating where carry-on baggage can be

stored, and requiring the stowage of food and beverage

equipment during taxiing, takeoff, and landing. They also set 10

qualifications for pilots, flight attendants, and air traffic control

operators, and regulate the conduct of crew members during 11
unless that person has demonstrated to the pilot in command

familiarity with the necessary functions to be performed in an

emergency or a situation requiring emergency evacuation and is

capable of using the emergency equipment installed on that

airplane.”).

 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.15 (“No pilot in command of a 12

civil aircraft may allow any object to be dropped from that

aircraft in flight that creates a hazard to persons or property.”);

14 C.F.R. § 91.17(a)(2) (“No person may act or attempt to act as

a crewmember of a civil aircraft—While under the influence of

alcohol . . . .”); 14 C.F.R. § 135.100(b) (“No flight crewmember

may engage in, nor may any pilot in command permit, any

activity during a critical phase of flight which could distract any

flight crewmember from the performance of his or her duties or

which could interfere in any way with the proper conduct of

those duties.”).

 See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.117(a) (“[N]o person may operate 13

an aircraft . . . at an indicated airspeed of more than 250 knots

(288 m.p.h.).”); 14 C.F.R. § 91.119 (setting minimum altitudes

for various situations); 14 C.F.R. §§ 91.126, .127, .129, .130,

.131, and .135 (prescribing requirements for communications

with air traffic control towers); 14 C.F.R. § 91.145 (describing

temporary flight restrictions that may be imposed “to prevent the

unsafe congestion of aircraft in the vicinity of an aerial

demonstration or major sporting event”). 

19

flight. Similarly, the regulations impose restrictions on an 12

aircraft’s speed, altitude, communications, and flight path. We 13
20

note that the regulations under the Aviation Act do not

specifically regulate the conduct of the crew in connection with

the loading or unloading of passengers. The primary purpose of

these regulations appears to be the prevention of accidents, and

the assurance of passenger safety, in connection with flight.

The regulations also contain a broader standard in 14

C.F.R. § 91.13, which we identified in Abdullah as “provid[ing]

a general description of the standard required for the safe

operation of aircraft” even “where there is no specific provision

or regulation governing air safety.” 181 F.3d at 371. That

regulation contains two paragraphs. Section 91.13(a) applies

when an aircraft is being operated “for the purpose of air

navigation”; section 91.13(b) applies when an aircraft is being

operated “other than for the purpose of air navigation.”

Section 91.13(a) provides as follows: “Aircraft

operations for the purpose of air navigation. No person may

operate an aircraft in a careless or reckless manner so as to

endanger the life or property of another.” Independence

contends that the aircraft was being “operat[ed] for the purpose

of air navigation” within the meaning of this regulation. We are

not so sure.

In order to interpret the phrase “operations for the

purpose of air navigation” as used by § 91.13(a), we begin by

considering the definitions provided by the regulations

themselves. The general definitions section of the regulations

defines “operate” to mean “use, cause to use or authorize to use

aircraft, for the purpose (except as provided in [§ 91.13]) of air

navigation including the piloting of aircraft, with or without the
21

right of legal control (as owner, lessee, or otherwise).” 14

C.F.R. § 1.1. As that definition indicates, the meaning of

“operate” is derived in part from § 91.13. Since § 91.13(a), like

the general definition of “operate,” refers to “operations for the

purpose of air navigation,” the reference to § 91.13 appears to

mean § 91.13(b), which we will discuss below.

The definitions provided by the Aviation Act also help to

elucidate the meaning of § 91.13(a). The statute defines

“‘operate aircraft’ and ‘operation of aircraft’ [to] mean using

aircraft for the purposes of air navigation, including—(A) the

navigation of aircraft; and (B) causing or authorizing the

operation of aircraft with or without the right of legal control of

the aircraft.” 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(35). Although the statute

does not define “air navigation,” it does define two related

terms: “navigate aircraft” and “air navigation facility.”

“‘[N]avigate aircraft’ and ‘navigation of aircraft’ include

piloting aircraft.” § 40102(a)(33). “‘[A]ir navigation

facility’. . . includ[es]—(A) a landing area; (B) a light; (C)

apparatus or equipment for distributing weather information,

signaling, radio-directional finding, or radio or other

electromagnetic communication; and (D) another structure or

mechanism for guiding or controlling flight in the air or the

landing and takeoff of aircraft.” § 40102(a)(4).

In light of these definitions, we conclude that the aircraft

was not being operated for the purpose of air navigation at the

time of Elassaad’s accident, and thus that the standard of care

provided by § 91.13(a) did not apply to this situation. By the

time of the accident, the aircraft had landed, taxied to the gate,

and come to a complete stop; the crew had already opened the
 We do not reach the issue of whether other activities that 14

occur while a plane is on the ground, such as taxiing or the

process of opening an aircraft’s doors, would constitute

“operations” such that they would be subject to federal

preemption.

22

door and lowered the plane’s stairs; and all of the passengers

other than Elassaad had deplaned. As discussed above, the

statutory and regulatory definitions of “operate” state that a

plane is only being operated, within the meaning of § 91.13(a),

when it is being “use[d]” for “navigation,” and the Aviation

Act’s definitions of “navigate aircraft” and “air navigation

facility” demonstrate that the term “navigation” principally

applies to the takeoff and landing of an aircraft, and the

“piloting” that occurs during the flight. These definitions

contemplate a flight crew’s interaction with an aircraft and with

passengers who are on the aircraft. By contrast, we conclude

that a flight crew’s oversight of the disembarkation of

passengers—after a plane has finished taxiing to the gate, and its

crew has opened the aircraft’s door and lowered its stairs—does

not constitute “operations for the purpose of air navigation.”14

We also conclude that the aircraft was not being operated

“other than for the purpose of air navigation” as envisioned by

14 C.F.R. § 91.13(b). Both parties concede this, and we agree.

That portion of the regulation provides as follows:

Aircraft operations other than for

the purpose of air navigation. No

person may operate an aircraft,
 At the time, § 91.13(b) was known as 14 C.F.R. § 91.10. 15

The regulation was later renumbered, without any textual

revisions, in 1989. See Revision of General Operating and

Flight Rules, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,284, 34,289 (Aug. 18, 1989).

23

other than for the purpose of air

navigation, on any part of the

surface of an airport used by

aircraft for air commerce (including

areas used by those aircraft for

receiving or discharging persons or

cargo), in a careless or reckless

manner so as to endanger the life or

property of another.

§ 91.13(b). The comments made by the FAA in conjunction

with the issuance of this regulation help to clarify its meaning. 15

The agency explained that the term “‘operate an aircraft other

than for the purpose of air navigation’ . . . is employed in this

rule in order to clearly limit the applicability of the rule to those

acts which impart some physical movement to the aircraft, or

involve the manipulation of the controls of the aircraft such as

starting or running an aircraft engine.” Careless or Reckless

Ground Operation of Aircraft, 32 Fed. Reg. 9640, 9640-41 (July

4, 1967) (emphasis added). There is no evidence that, by

watching Elassaad exit the plane, the flight crew was engaging

in any acts that “impart[ed] some physical movement to the

aircraft, or involve[d] the manipulation of the controls of the

aircraft.” Id. As noted above, not only had the aircraft come to

a complete stop, but the aircraft’s door had been opened, its
24

stairs had been lowered, and most of the passengers had already

disembarked. The crew’s conduct with respect to Elassaad’s

disembarkation therefore did not constitute “operations” for any

purpose under § 91.13.

The statutory and regulatory framework of the Aviation

Act thus provides no evidence of any intent—much less a “clear

and manifest” intent—to regulate safety during disembarkation.

In Abdullah, we concluded that, given the overwhelming

number of relevant Aviation Act safety regulations, the Aviation

Act preempted the field of aviation safety. Here, there is no

indication that either Congress or the FAA intended that federal

law would impose a legal duty in an area that is neither

specifically regulated by federal law nor clearly governed by a

general federal standard of care: the assistance provided to

passengers during their disembarkation. Accordingly, we

conclude that the Aviation Act and its safety regulations do not

preempt state law standards of care in this negligence action.

2.

After the District Court found federal preemption based

on Abdullah, it looked to the ACAA regulations for the

applicable standard of care. On appeal, Independence goes

further than the District Court, and argues that the ACAA

independently preempts Elassaad’s negligence claim. We reject

this argument.

Congress passed the ACAA in 1986 as an amendment to

the Aviation Act. See Pub. L. No. 99-435 § 2(a), 100 Stat. 1080

(1986). The statute was intended to close a gap in anti-
 The FAA goes so far as to advise air carriers on the proper 16

content of, and tone used in, communications with disabled

passengers. See 70 Fed. Reg. 41,504 (“Emotions matter . . . .

When acknowledging the emotions of others, it may be more

effective to use ‘you’ rather than ‘I.’ For example, use, ‘You

must be frustrated by having to wait for your checked

wheelchair.’ Not, ‘I completely understand how you feel, I had

to wait forever at a supermarket check-out yesterday.’”); id. (“If

you have any doubts as to how to assist a passenger with a

disability, you should ask the passenger for guidance before

acting. Avoid being overly enthusiastic about helping and

always think before you speak and act when offering

assistance.”).

25

discrimination law that was made apparent by the Supreme

Court’s decision in Department of Transportation v. Paralyzed

Veterans of America, 477 U.S. 597, 610-12 (1986), in which the

Court held that, despite receiving federal funding, air carriers

were not subject to certain provisions of the Rehabilitation Act,

29 U.S.C. § 794. The ACAA was designed to address and

prohibit airline discrimination based on disabilities, and directed

the FAA to issue regulations “to ensure nondiscriminatory

treatment of qualified handicapped individuals consistent with

safe carriage of all passengers on air carriers.” § 3, 100 Stat. at

1080; see also 49 U.S.C. § 41705(a). More than just prohibiting

overtly discriminatory conduct, these regulations “are aimed at

ensuring that services, facilities, and other accommodations are

provided to passengers with disabilities in a respectful and

helpful manner.” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability

in Air Travel, 70 Fed. Reg. 41,482, 41,504 (July 19, 2005).16
 The directive of section 382.3(d) was replaced with similar 17

language that now appears in 14 C.F.R. § 382.7(g) (2009): 

“Notwithstanding any provisions of this Part, you must comply

with all FAA safety regulations . . . .”

 Even if Elassaad were alleging discriminatory treatment, it

18

is not clear whether he would have a right of action under the

ACAA. Compare Shinault v. Am. Airlines, 936 F.2d 796, 800

(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that the ACAA creates a private cause

of action), and Tallarico v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 881 F.2d

26

Despite the statute’s reference to the “safe carriage of all

passengers,” the ACAA regulations do not displace Aviation

Act safety regulations. See 14 C.F.R. § 382.3(d) (2004)

(“Nothing in this part shall authorize or require a carrier to fail

to comply with any applicable FAA safety regulation.”). 

17

It is clear that the ACAA is aimed at ensuring respect and

equal treatment for disabled airline passengers. If Elassaad had

claimed that he was discriminated against by Independence or

Delta on the basis of his disability, his claim would arguably be

preempted by the ACAA. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis

of Handicap in Air Travel, 55 Fed. Reg. 8008, 8014 (Mar. 6,

1990) (“[The ACAA] is a detailed, comprehensive, national

regulation, based on Federal statute, that substantially, if not

completely, occupies the field of nondiscrimination on the basis

of handicap in air travel . . . . [I]nterested parties should be on

notice that there is a strong likelihood that state action on

matters covered by this rule will be regarded as preempted.”

(emphasis added)). But Elassaad did not claim that 18
566, 570 (8th Cir. 1989) (same), with Boswell v. Skywest

Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (holding

that the ACAA does not create a private cause of action), and

Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2002)

(same). See also Tunison v. Continental Airlines Corp., 162

F.3d 1187, 1188 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (expressly reserving

decision on the question); Bower v. Fed. Express Corp., 96 F.3d

200, 204 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996) (same). However, we need not

resolve this issue today. 

 Although we conclude that the ACAA does not provide an 19

applicable, controlling standard of care here, we offer one

caveat: the ACAA regulations cited by the District Court are

not entirely irrelevant. If this case goes to a jury, the jury will

most likely be instructed as to the relevant regulations and told

it can take them into consideration in assessing whether

27

Independence violated any of its obligations under the ACAA,

nor did he even suggest that discrimination played any role in its

conduct toward him. Instead, Elassaad alleged in his complaint

that Independence was negligent, inter alia, in failing to provide

both “a means for Plaintiff to safely exit the plane given his

physical condition and need to use crutches” and “personal

assistance to help Plaintiff go down the steps.” App. 16-17.

The ACAA regulations are intended to protect passengers from

discrimination by air carriers; they are not intended to dictate a

standard of care in a negligence action, even if federal law

applies through preemption. Accordingly, we conclude that the

ACAA does not preempt any standard of care that governs a

flight attendant’s conduct in a situation such as this.

19
Independence and its crew fulfilled their duty toward Elassaad

as he disembarked. For example, the model jury instructions in

Pennsylvania state that “[n]egligent conduct may consist either

of an act or a failure to act when there is a duty to do so.”

Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Civil Jury Instructions § 3.01

(3d ed. 2005). To the extent that the ACAA regulations set forth

an aspect of the duty owed to Elassaad as a disabled person, it

would be appropriate for the jury to consider them.

28

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons given above, we conclude that Elassaad’s

case is governed by state law negligence principles and, since

the District Court measured Elassaad’s claim according to a

different standard, we will vacate the District Court’s order and

remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.