IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, Respondent, No. 69195-3-1 DIVISION ONE 2 <"0 v. GARY D. KOLLMAN, Appellant. UNPUBLISHED CO r-,0 CD FILED: February 18. 2014 2J CD Cox, J. — Gary Kollman appeals hisjudgment and sentence for his conviction ofattempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle. He claims thatthe trial court abused its discretion by admitting certain police officer testimony at trial. Kollman also claims that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion for a new trial, refused to strike thejury's special verdict finding, and refused to grant an exceptional sentence downward. In his Statement of Additional Grounds, Kollman makes additional 

### arguments that we discuss later in this opinion. Because we conclude there was
no reversible error in this case, we affirm. The State charged Kollman with attempting to elude a pursuing police 

### vehicle. The charge was based on an incident that occurred in2010. The information alleged that the crime "was aggravated by the following circumstance: one or more persons other than the defendant or the pursuing law .-2> —. "3TM CO, .,

""•CDNo. 69195-3-1/2 enforcement officer were threatened with physical injury or harm by [Kollman's] actions while committing the crime Before trial, the defense moved in limine to prohibit, among other things, "[a]ny opinion testimony that [Kollman's] driving was 'reckless' or that he was endangering other motorists on the road." The court granted this motion. At trial, Sergeant Bart Foutch, one ofthe pursuing police officers, described Kollman's driving. He testified that he observed Kollman cut off another vehicle on the road. Officer Foutch then stated that he "thought [Kollman] was going to kill the people that were inthat car" and that he "was almost certain that they were going to die." Kollman objected, and itwas overruled. 

### The jury found Kollman guilty. The jury also returned a special verdictin favor of the aggravating factor. 

### Several days later, Kollman moved for a new trial or, in the alternative, to 

### strike the jury's special verdictfinding on the grounds that the court "allowed Officer Foutch to repeatedly state that he thought innocent bystanders were 

### 'dead' when [Kollman] cut in front of them." The court denied this motion. Atsentencing, Kollman argued for an exceptional sentence below the 

### standard range pursuant to a statutory mitigating factor for diminished capacity based on Kollman's history ofpanic disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder. The court concluded that an exceptional sentence was unwarranted and sentenced Kollman to confinement for twelve months and one day. Kollman appeals.No. 69195-3-1/3
OPINION TESTIMONY Kollman argues that the trial court abused its discretion when itadmitted 

### certain testimony at trial from Officer Foutch. He also contends that the error
was not harmless. We hold that any error in admitting this evidence over Kollman's objection was harmless. Preservation ofIssue 

### As a preliminary matter, the State argues that this issue has not been 

### preserved for appeal. The State contends that Kollman did notspecify the 

### particulargroundsupon which hisobjections attrial were based. The State also argues that the issue cannot be heardfor thefirst time on appeal because it is not "manifest constitutional error." We disagree with the first and need not reach the second argument. 

### ER 103(a)(1) requires "atimely objection
.. . stating the specific ground of 

## objection, ifthespecificgroundwas notapparentfrom the context "1 Here, the specific ground of objection was apparentfrom the context. Kollman's motion in limine sought to prohibit "[a]ny opinion testimony that 

### [Kollman's] driving was 'reckless' or that he wasendangering other motorists on the road." During a pretrial hearing, Kollman indicated that he "may objectto 

### some specific questions" related to thismotion. Further, as Kollman points out, 

### theprosecutor responded to the objection by stating: "That's [Officer Foutch's] perception at thetime, as he isobserving the events." Theprosecutor's

1(Emphasis added.)No. 69195-3-1/4 response provides further support that the ground for the objection was apparent from the context. The State also contends that the testimony was not manifest constitutional
error that can be raised for the first time on appeal. But, as discussed above, Kollman is not raising this issue forthe first time on appeal. Accordingly, we need not consider this argument any further. OfficerFoutch's Testimony 

### Kollman argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed 

### "highly prejudicial, subjective opinion testimony" from Officer Foutch. 

### Specifically, he argues that the testimonywas improper because it violated an order inlimine, itwas not competent expert testimony, itwas inflammatory, and it 

### invaded the province of thejury. Assuming without deciding that the admission of this testimonywas improper, we conclude that the admission of such evidence

was harmless under both the constitutional and nonconstitutional standards. 

### Atrial court's decision to admit opinion testimony is reviewed forabuse of discretion.2 A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is "manifestly 

### unreasonable or based upon untenable grounds or reasons." The record reflects the following exchanges: 

### [Prosecutor]: When [Kollman] cut to his left in front of what you have marked as Vehicle 1, did that concern you? 

### [Officer Foutch]: / thoughtthey were dead. [Prosecutor]: Who is "they"? 2State v. Ortiz. 119 Wn.2d 294, 308, 831 P.2d 1060 (1992). 3 State v. Brown. 132 Wn.2d 529, 572, 940 P.2d 546 (1997).No. 69195-3-1/5 [Defense Counsel]: Iobject; Imove to strike that answer. [Prosecutor]: That's his perception at the time, as he is observing the events. The Court: The objection is overruled. 

### [Officer Foutch]: / thoughthe was going to kill thepeople that were in that car. [Prosecutor]: How come? 

### [Officer Foutch]: They were traveling sixty miles an hour; and you have a vehicle that takes a left-hand turn in front of you at sixty miles an hour, and he's doing seventy or eighty, / was almost certain that they were going to die. 

### [Prosecutor]: Did they take any evasive action? [Officer Foutch]: Ibelieve that they

- - 

### [Defense Counsel]: Same objection, your Honor. I'd like a continuing objection. 

### [The Court]: You may have a continuing objection. Theobjection is overruled.141 

### The trial court overruled these objections during trial. Likewise, when Kollman moved for a new trial based on this testimony after thejury's adverse 

### verdict, the trial court reasoned that this testimony was proper because Officer 

### Foutch was talking about hisobservations and hisfearfor his safety and that of others.5 

### Kollman argues here as he did below that this testimonyviolated the trial court's order in limine. The court's ruling on the motion inlimine was that "[the
4Report of Proceedings (June 26, 2012) at70-71 (emphasis added). 5Report of Proceedings (Aug. 2, 2012) at 536.No. 69195-3-1/6 

### officer] can testify onlyas to what he observed. He can't use the term 'reckless.'" As this record plainlyshows, Officer Foutch did testify to what he observed and did not use the term "reckless." Thus, the testimony to which Kollman objected complied with the court's ruling. Kollman next argues that OfficerFoutch's testimony was improper expert 

### testimony because itdid not meet the requirements of ER 702. Butthis 

### testimonywas not based on scientific or specializedknowledge. As the trial 

### courtcorrectly stated, Officer Foutch was nottestifying as an expert. Officer Foutch's testimony was based upon his perceptions and observations as he 

### pursued Kollman. Hewas testifying in this respect as a lay witness. Kollman also argues that Officer Foutch's statements were prejudicial "because of their inherent tendency to arouse the emotions of the jury." He 

## primarily relies on CityofAuburn v. Hedlundto supportthis argument.6 There, a 911 callerdescribed agruesome accident scenewith decapitated bodies.7 The court concluded that the prejudice outweighed the probative value ofthe 

### testimony.8 Butthat case isdistinguishable. Here, the officer's perception that 

### people might die wasnot nearly as inflammatory orprejudicial as thatcase. His reliance on this case is not persuasive. 

### Lastly, Kollman argues that the testimony was improper because it invaded the province ofthejury on the issue of dangerousness toothers. This

6 165 Wn.2d 645, 201 P.3d 315 (2009). 7]d at 655. 8 Id. at 656.No. 69195-3-1/7 question was inthe special verdict form. The special verdict form asked thejury: "Was any person, other than Gary Kollman or a pursuing law enforcement officer, threatened with physical injury or harm by the actions of Gary Kollman during his commission ofthe crime ofattempting to elude a police vehicle?" 

### As a general rule, "nowitness, lay or expert, may 'testify to his opinion as 

### to the guilt ofadefendant, whetherby direct statementorinference.'"9 Such an opinion is unfairly prejudicial because it "'invad[es] the exclusive province of the 

### finder offact.'"10 Likewise, a witness may notgive improper legal conclusions, 

## parrotalegal standard, oruse conclusory legal terms such as"guilt" or "intent."11 "The goal in prohibiting a witness from expressing an opinion about the 

### defendant's guilt or innocence is to avoid having the witnesstell thejury what result to reach."12 

### But"testimony that is not a direct comment on the defendant's guilt or on 

### the veracity of a witness, isotherwise helpful to thejury, and is based on 

### inferences from theevidence is not improperopinion testimony."13 In fact, ER 704expressly allows for opinion testimony on an ultimate issue, as long as the evidence is otherwise admissible.14 "The fact that an opinion supports a finding
9Citv ofSeattle v. Heatlev. 70 Wn. App. 573, 577, 854 P.2d 658 (1993) (quoting State v. Black. 109 Wn.2d 336, 348, 745 P.2d 12 (1987)).

10 ]d (alteration in original) (quoting Black. 109Wn.2d at 348). 11 See State v. Blake. 172 Wn. App. 515, 525-28, 298 P.3d 769 (2012), review denied. 177 Wn.2d 1010 (2013). 12 State v. Baird. 83 Wn. App. 477, 485, 922 P.2d 157 (1996). 13 Heatlev, 70 Wn. App. at 578. 14 id at 578-79. 7No. 69195-3-1/8 

### ofguilt. . . does not make theopinion improper.'"15 The trial court "must be accorded broad discretion to determine the 

### admissibility ofultimate issuetestimony."16 This court has expressly declined to take an expansiveview ofclaims thattestimony constitutes an opinion ofguilt.17 "Whether testimony constitutes an impermissible opinion on guilt or a permissible opinion embracing an 'ultimate issue' will generally depend on the 

### specific circumstances of each case . . . ,"18 State v. Montgomery citesfive 

### factors that a court may consider in deciding whethertoadmit suchevidence.19 They include: "'(1) 'the type ofwitness involved, (2) the specific nature ofthe testimony, (3) the nature ofthe charges, (4) the type ofdefense, and (5) the other evidence before the trier offact.'"20 At oral argument, we gave the parties an opportunity to comment on the 

### applicability oftheMontgomery factors tothis case.21 Nothing said in reply to our request for comment convinces us that the admission ofthe testimony was anything other than harmless.

15 Blake. 172Wn.App. at 523 (alteration inoriginal) (quoting State v. Collins, 152 Wn. App. 429, 436, 216 P.3d 463 (2009)). 16 Heatlev. 70 Wn. App. at 579. 17 ]d 18 Id 19163Wn.2d 577, 183 P.3d 267 (2008). 20 id at 591 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Demery, 144 Wn.2d 753, 759, 30 P.3d 1278 (2001)). 21 163 Wn.2d 577, 591, 183 P.3d 267 (2008). 8No. 69195-3-1/9 Kollman relies here as he did below on State v. Farr-Lenzini to argue that OfficerFoutch's testimony was improper because itaddressed the major 

### contested issue attrial.22 In Farr-Lenzini. the major issue was whetherFarr

### Lenzini waswillfully eluding.23 There, theprosecutor asked theofficerfor an 

### "opinion as to whatthe defendant's driving pattern exhibited."24 The officer stated that the person "was attempting to get away from [him] and knew [the 

### officer] was backthere and refusing to stop."25 Here, the prosecutor did not ask for the officer's opinion, and the 

### objectionsdid notappearto focus on the questions that the prosecutor asked. 

### Rather, they appeared to focus on Officer Foutch's responses. Additionally, the issue ofdangerousness tothird partiesdid not appear to be a major contested issue at trial. But the issue ofdangerousness was the core issue in the special
verdict.Kollman also relies here, as he did below, on State v. Carlin. and State v. 

### Haga.26 InCarlin. the court stated itwas arguably improper opinion for an officer 

## to testifythatatrained canine couldtrackthe defendant's "fresh guiltscent."27
22 Appellant's Opening Briefat 19(citing Statev. Farr-Lenzini. 93Wn. App. 453, 970 P.2d 313 (1999)). 23 Farr-Lenzini. 93 Wn. App. at 464. 24 Id at 458. 25 id 

### 26Appellant's Opening Briefat 19-20 (citing Statev. Carlin. 40Wn. App. 698, 700 P.2d 323 (1985), overruled on other grounds bvCitv of Seattlev. Heatlev. 70Wn. App. 573, 854 P.2d 658 (1993), State v. Haga. 8 Wn.App. 481, 507 P.2d 159 (1973)). 27 Carlin. 40 Wn. App. at 703.No. 69195-3-1/10 The court said this was particularly so where such an opinion is expressed by a 

### government official such as a police officer.28 In Haga. thecourt held thatitwas improper opinion for an ambulance driver to testifythat the defendant showed no 

### signs ofgrief.29 Those two cases examined testimony that expressed an opinion about the 

### defendants' overall guilt.30 Here, in contrast, Officer Foutch did notexpress an opinion as to Kollman's overall guilt. Moreover, he did not expressly give improper legal conclusions, parrot a legal standard, or use conclusory legal terms such as "guilt" or "intent." But, like Carlin. the testimony here was from a police officer. And arguably, the officer expressed an opinion on the aggravating factor. Overall, none of the authorities cited by Kollman help answer the specific 

### question presented in thiscase—howto examine thistestimony as it relates to the core issue of an aggravating factor or special verdict. On one hand, a witness is permitted to express an opinion on an ultimate 

### issue offact, and the aggravating factor is justthat—a factual determination. On the other hand, this factual determination is the core issue and sole question for 

### thejury toresolve in orderto answer the special verdict. Arguably, expressing
an opinion about thisfactual issue isakin toexpressing an opinion onguilt as to 

### the aggravating factor, giving a legal conclusion, ortelling thejury how toresolve the special verdict.

28 id 29 Haga. 8 Wn. App. at 491-92. 30 See Carlin. 40 Wn. App. at 703; Haga. 8 Wn. App. at 491-92.

10No. 69195-3-1/11 We conclude on the basis ofthe authorities that we havejust discussed that it is unnecessary for us to determine whether Officer Foutch's testimony invaded the province ofthejury. Assuming without deciding that it did, the admission of such evidence was harmless under both the constitutional and nonconstitutional standards. Harmless Error 

### Kollman argues that the error of admitting OfficerFoutch's statements cannot be deemed harmless. We disagree. 

### Oursupreme court adopted the "overwhelming untainted evidence" test as 

### the proper standard for harmless erroranalysis in Washington.31 Underthis test, the appellate court"looks only at the untainted evidence to determineifthe untainted evidence is so overwhelming that itnecessarily leads to a finding of 

### guilt."32 "A constitutional error isharmless iftheappellate court isconvinced beyond a reasonabledoubt that any reasonablejury would have reached the
same result in absence of the error."33 "Where an error is not of constitutional magnitude, it requires reversal only 

### if, within reasonable probabilities, the outcome of the trial would have been 

## materially affected had the errornotoccurred."34

31 State v. Frost. 160 Wn.2d 765, 782, 161 P.3d 361 (2007) (citing State v. Gulov. 104 Wn.2d 412, 426, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985), cert, denied. 475 U.S. 1020 (1986)). 32 Gulov. 104Wn.2dat426. 33 id at 425. 34 State v. Ashurst. 45 Wn. App. 48, 54, 723 P.2d 1189 (1986). 11No. 69195-3-1/12 Here, under either standard, the error was harmless. We are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any reasonablejury would have reached the
same result in absence ofthe claimed error. The record is replete with untainted 

### testimony from pursuing officers about Kollman's dangerous driving maneuvers, high rates of speed, and near collisions. 

### For example, Officer Foutch testified that Kollman was driving between 

### "seventy to eighty miles an hour" on a roadwith a "forty orforty-five" speed limit. He also testified: "Traffic would be slowing down for the traffic lights, and 

### [Kollman] would cutvehicles off. [Kollman] would weave to the left and to the 

### right. [Kollman] would pass vehicles on the right-hand side,which isextremely dangerous." Officer Foutch testified that he believed that the lights at three intersections were red and that "[Kollman] blew through the lights without stopping and without perceptibly slowing Officer Foutch also described an instance where "[Kollman] came up on 

### two vehicles that were traveling side by side
.. . [and Kollman] pulled out of his lane of travel and basically straddled the dotted line and splitthese two vehicles. 

### To keep from being hit by [Kollman's] vehicle, both vehicles had to gooffthe side of the road." 

### OfficerTonyBittinger, another pursuing officer, described an instance where a vehicle "was forced to the rightshoulder to avoid a collision." 

### Additionally, hetestified that Kollman traveled in speeds "[u]p to ninety miles per hour in a sixty mile per hour zone."

12No. 69195-3-1/13 This evidence was not disputed. Significantly, Kollman testified that he could not remember much ofwhat took place during the police pursuit. Thus, he
was not in a position to contest the observations and testimony of Officer Foutch and Officer Bittinger. We further note that during opening remarks to thejury, the State 

### specificallyasked the jury to find Kollman guilty of the underlying charge as well 

### as theaggravating factor.35 Kollman askedfor an acquittal on theunderlying 

### charge butmade no mention ofthe aggravating factor.36 This requestwas consistent with Kollman's earlier representation to the court during argument on the motion in limine that whether Kollman's driving was reckless was "not an 

### issue that [was] going to be greatly in dispute " We recognize that this statement was made while reserving the right to challenge specific testimony at the trial that followed. Nevertheless, the representation to the court that the issue 

### would not be greatly disputed was a matter of record. 

### During closing argument to thejury, the State again asked for thejury to find Kollman guilty on the underlying charge as well as to decide that the 

### aggravating factor existed. Kollman saidnothing aboutthe aggravating factor during closing. In fact, Kollman's attorney stated the "onlyissue" was whether 

### Kollman wasacting willfully.37

35 Report ofProceedings (June 25, 2012) at 32. 36 Id at 33-42. 37 Report of Proceedings (June 28, 2012) at 493.

13No. 69195-3-1/14 In sum, based on the evidence in the record and the arguments ofthe parties, and assuming without deciding that Officer Foutch's testimony was improper opinion testimony, we conclude that such error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. There is no reversible error in this respect. Kollman cites to the "contribution test" to argue that the error was not harmless. But in State v. Gulov. our supreme court rejected use ofthe 

### "contribution test."38 Accordingly, anyreliance onthis test is notpersuasive. Kollman also argues that the error is not harmless because Officer Foutch's testimony is "the only testimony in the entire trial court record that is relevant to the aggravating factor." He is mistaken. As we discussed earlier in 

### this opinion, Kollman had no recollection of the events during the chase and 

### pursuing officers revealed manydetails relevant to the aggravating factor. These details included Kollman's dangerous driving maneuvers, high speeds, and near collisions. 

### Next, Kollman argues that Officer Foutch's testimonyregarding one of the
near collisions was not corroborated by the other pursuing officers. But we know 

### of noauthority that holds that the absence ofcorroboration bars admissibility. More importantly, this court does notreview credibility determinations on 

### appeal.39

38104 Wn.2d 412, 425-26, 705 P.2d 1182 (1985); see also State v. Coristine. 177 Wn.2d 370, 390-91, 300 P.3d 400 (2013) (Gonzalez, J., dissenting). 39 Recreational Eouip. Inc. v. World Wrapps Nw.. Inc.. 165 Wn. App. 553, 568, 266 P.3d 924 (2011).

14No. 69195-3-1/15 

### Finally, Kollman points out that although he drove through red lights, there
was no cross traffic at the time. He further argues that "no one testified that this 

### driving actually endangered other drivers." But Kollman expressly moved in limine to prohibitsuch testimony. And these arguments ignore the other 

### evidence supporting a finding ofdangerousness—specifically the testimony of pursuing officers describing how Kollman almost caused accidents. In sum, the error, ifany, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. For the same reasons, we also conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itdenied Kollman's motion for a new trial, or, in the alternative, to strike the special verdict finding. 

### A court's decision to deny a motion for a newtrial is reviewed forabuse of discretion.40 

### Kollman's motionwas premised on the same theory—that the admission 

### ofOfficer Foutch's testimony was improper. As discussed previously, the admission of OfficerFoutch's testimony was, at worst, harmless error. The court's denial of the motion was not an abuse of discretion. SENTENCE 

### Kollman argues that the trial courtabused itsdiscretion in refusing to grant
an exceptional sentence downward. We disagree. 

### Generally, courts do notreview a standard range sentence. In State v. Williams, the supreme court explained: "[S]o long as the sentence falls within the 

### properpresumptive sentencing ranges set by the legislature, there can be no

40 State v. Burke. 163 Wn.2d 204, 210, 181 P.3d 1 (2008).
15No. 69195-3-1/16 

### abuse ofdiscretion as a matteroflaw as to the sentence's length."41 Courts have stated that "[a] sentence range increased by an enhancement is still a 

### standard range sentence."42 But a criminal defendant"may appeal a standard range sentence ifthe sentencing court failed to comply with procedural 

### requirements oftheSRA orconstitutional requirements."43 When a sentencing court declines to impose an exceptional sentence downward, appellate review "is limited to circumstances where the court has refused to exercise discretion at all or has relied on an impermissible basis for 

### refusing to impose an exceptional sentence belowthe standard range."44 "A court refuses to exercise its discretion if it refuses categorically to impose an 

### exceptional sentence below the standard range under any circumstances; i.e., it 

### takes the position that it will never impose a sentence below the standard 

### range."45 And a court relies on an impermissible basis if, for example, "it refuses 

### to considerthe request because ofthe defendant's race, sex, orreligion."46 "[A] trial court that has considered the facts and has concluded that there is no basis for an exceptional sentence has exercised its discretion," and the 

### ruling may not beappealed.47

41 149 Wn.2d 143, 146-47, 65 P.3d 1214 (2003). 42 Gutierrez v. Dep't of Corrs. 146 Wn. App. 151, 155, 188 P.3d 546 (2008). 43 State v. Osman. 157 Wn.2d 474, 481-82, 139 P.3d 334 (2006). 44 State v. Garcia-Martinez. 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). 45 id 46 Id 47 id 16No. 69195-3-1/17 Here, the court exercised its discretion and did not rely on an impermissible basis. The court acknowledged the provision allowing it to consider diminished capacity, and itacknowledged that Kollman was diagnosed with panic disorder and posttraumatic stress disorder Butthe court also pointed to Kollman's history of "driving issues" and noted that Kollman made the choice to get into a car. In sum, the court exercised its discretion when itconsidered the 

### competing factors, and it relied on a permissible basis when it concluded that the requirements of diminished capacity had not been met. The court acted within its discretion when it sentenced Kollman at the bottom end of the standard range. STATEMENT OF ADDITIONAL GROUNDS In his Statement ofAdditional Grounds, Kollman alleges a number of
errors. None require reversal. 

### First, Kollman argues that "[b]ecause ofmedications and extreme 

### cognitive impairment, and terrible pain, and trauma, [he] was under extreme duress and should not have been making any statements" to lawenforcement 

### after this incident. But itappears from the State's amended trial brief that Kollman entered into a stipulation before trial "allowing the State to elicit 

### statements [Kollman] made immediately following his arrest." Accordingly, this argument is not persuasive. 

### Second, Kollman argues against the admission of a psychiatric report. 

### But it is not clear what report Kollman is referring to, or how itwas "used against

17No. 69195-3-1/18 

### [him]" as he alleges. Because this argument is not supported by credible 

### evidencein the record, we do notreview it.48 Third, Kollman says "itshould be noted" that there was prosecutorial misconduct prior to trial. This statement is true. Prior to trial, the State moved to amend the information, and Kollman moved to dismiss on the grounds that it constituted misconduct and prejudiced his rights to a fair trial. The court denied 

### the motion to dismiss, concluding that the government's error constituted misconduct but that Kollman was not prejudiced in his ability to present a defense. Nevertheless, Kollman does not make any argument about this misconduct that this court can review. 

### Fourth, Kollman argues that he did not have the requisite mental state and lacked the intent and ability to control his actions. It appears that Kollman is 

### challenging the sufficiency oftheevidence as to thewillfulness element. Thejury rejected Kollman's diminished capacity defense by finding him guilty. To convictKollman of attempting to elude a pursuing police vehicle, the 

### State was required to prove, among otherthings, that "[Kollman] willfully failed or refused to immediately bring the vehicle to a stop." 

### Evidence is sufficientwhen any rational trier of fact couldfind the essential 

### elements ofthe crime beyond areasonable doubt.49

48 See RAP 10.10(c) (stating that an appellate courtwill not consider an 

### argument made in a statementofadditional grounds for review ifitdoesnot inform the court of the nature and occurrence ofthe alleged errors). 49 State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980); Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L Ed. 2d 560 (1979).

18No. 69195-3-1/19 At trial, there was sufficient evidence for a rational trier or fact to find that Kollman's actions were willful. The State argued that Kollman engaged in difficult driving maneuvers requiring mental concentration, that he obeyed commands from the police, that he was "cognizant," and that he made tactical decisions. There was testimony that Kollman briefly put his hands inthe air when commanded. Kollman's wife testified that during a prior similar incident, Kollman


### was cognizant and able to pull over. The State's expert testified that after this incident Kollman stated: "The biggest thing was not to stop. Four-wheel drive
cars when they spin, you stall." This testimony supports the State's arguments. 

### Finally, Kollman argues that the judge should have granted his request for an exceptional downward sentence. But, for the reasons discussed above, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when itdenied this request. We affirm thejudgment and sentence.

WE CONCUR: 

# &*iIl 

# \9^\^qQc.i

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