J-S01029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

KEVIN CHINA EVERETTE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 703 MDA 2021

Appeal from the Order Entered May 10, 2021

In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-22-CR-0002463-2007

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 09, 2022

Appellant Kevin China Everette appeals from the order denying his first 

petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA).1 Additionally, 

Appellant’s current counsel (Current Counsel) filed a petition to withdraw and 

a Turner/Finley2 brief.3 We affirm the PCRA court’s order and grant Current 

Counsel’s petition to withdraw. 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.

2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) (providing the 

procedure for counsel to withdraw in collateral attacks on criminal 

convictions); see also Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 

1988) (en banc) (same).

3 We note that Current Counsel erroneously filed a brief pursuant to Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). Because Current Counsel is seeking to 

withdraw as PCRA counsel, she should have proceeded under the 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A prior panel of this Court summarized the factual history underlying 

Appellant’s crimes as follows:

This case arises out of Appellant sexually abusing twin sisters

(“Twin A” and “Twin B”), between September and December 

2006, when they were fifteen years old and living in Harrisburg 

with their mother (“Mother”) and Appellant, her fiancé. Appellant 

and Mother broke up in late 2006, at which time Mother prepared 

to move to Ohio. During the early morning hours of December 2, 

2006, while they finished packing up the house and loading the 

truck, Twin A informed her mother that Appellant had “been 

messing with her.” Mother did not initially take Twin A to a 

hospital or contact the Harrisburg police because the family was 

about to leave for Ohio. However, Mother went with the twins to 

the Harrisburg police on January 4, 2007, and reported what Twin 

A had disclosed. Eventually, Twin B disclosed that Appellant had 

raped her. She underwent a medical examination, and both 

victims began counseling. 

The police charged Appellant with [rape, sexual assault, statutory 

sexual assault, unlawful contact or communication with a minor, 

indecent assault, corruption of minors, and aggravated indecent 

assault4] on March 27, 2007. Following a three-day trial on 

September 13, 14, and 15, 2010, the jury convicted Appellant on 

all charges. The trial court ordered an assessment by the Sex 

Offenders Assessment Board. Prior to sentencing, the trial court 

conducted a hearing and found that Appellant met the

requirements of a sexually violent predator. The trial court then 

sentenced Appellant to incarceration for an aggregate sentence of 

50 years to 100 years. Appellant received the statutory minimum 

of 25 to 50 years on the rape conviction and a consecutive 

statutory minimum of 25 to 50 years on the aggravated indecent 

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Turner/Finley requirements. Commonwealth v. Reed, 107 A.3d 137, 139 

n.5 (Pa. Super. 2014). However, because an Anders brief provides greater 

protection to Appellant, we may accept an Anders brief in lieu of a 

Turner/Finley brief. Id. For purposes of our discussion, we refer to Current 

Counsel’s brief as the Turner/Finley brief.

4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(a)(1), 3124.1, 3122.1, 6318(a)(1), 3126(a)(8), 

6301(a)(1), and 3125(8) respectively.
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assault conviction.[5] Thereafter, Appellant filed a timely postsentence motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and, as ordered by the 

trial court, a timely statement of errors complained of on appeal 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Commonwealth v. Everette, 1233 MDA 2011 at 1-3 (Pa. Super. filed April 

27, 2012) (unpublished mem.) (citations omitted). This Court affirmed 

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on April 27, 2012. Id. 

On October 3, 2012, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition, and 

the PCRA court appointed counsel. After numerous extensions of time and 

changes in counsel, the PCRA court appointed Current Counsel on September 

19, 2019, and permitted Current Counsel to file an amended PCRA petition. 

After additional extensions were granted, Current Counsel filed an amended 

PCRA petition on January 11, 2021. The PCRA court held an evidentiary 

hearing on March 26, 2021, and on May 6, 2021, the PCRA court denied 

Appellant’s PCRA petition.

On June 4, 2021, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. There is no 

order directing Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On June 11, 2021, in lieu of filing 

an additional opinion, the PCRA court filed a statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a) referring this Court to PCRA court’s May 6, 2021 memorandum.

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It is undisputed that Appellant had two prior convictions for crimes of 

violence and received mandatory minimum sentences of twenty-five years and 

maximum sentences of fifty years pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2). 
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On November 12, 2021, Current Counsel filed a Turner/Finley brief in 

this Court. However, before addressing the merits of the identified claim, we 

must first consider whether Current Counsel met the technical requirements 

for withdrawing from representation. Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 

509, 510 (Pa. Super. 2016). As we have explained,

[c]ounsel petitioning to withdraw from PCRA representation must 

proceed . . . under [Turner and Finley] and . . . must review the 

case zealously. Turner/Finley counsel must then submit a “nomerit” letter to the trial court, or brief on appeal to this Court, 

detailing the nature and extent of counsel’s diligent review of the 

case, listing the issues which petitioner wants to have reviewed, 

explaining why and how those issues lack merit, and requesting 

permission to withdraw.

Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy of the “no 

merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s petition to withdraw; 

and (3) a statement advising petitioner of the right to proceed pro 

se or by new counsel.

* * *

Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter that . . . 

satisfy the technical demands of Turner/Finley, the court—trial 

court or this Court—must then conduct its own review of the 

merits of the case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims 

are without merit, the court will permit counsel to withdraw and 

deny relief.

Id. at 510-11 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

Here, Current Counsel’s petition to withdraw and brief detail her review 

of the case and includes the issue Appellant wanted to raise. Turner/Finley

Brief at 11-12. Current Counsel explains why the issue lacks merit and 

requests permission to withdraw. Id. at 12; Petition to Withdraw, 11/12/21, 

at 1-2 (unpaginated). Additionally, Current Counsel provided Appellant with 
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a copy of the Turner/Finley brief and petition to withdraw, as well as a 

statement advising Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or with privately 

retained counsel. Correspondence, 11/12/21, at 1-2 (unpaginated). 

Accordingly, we may permit Current Counsel to withdraw if, after our review, 

we conclude that there are no meritorious issues. 

In the Turner/Finely brief, Current Counsel identified a claim 

challenging trial counsel’s effectiveness and asserting that trial counsel failed 

to properly advise Appellant of the Commonwealth’s plea offer.

Turner/Finley Brief at 4. Our standard of review follows:

[O]ur standard of review from the denial of a PCRA petition is 

limited to examining whether the PCRA court’s determination is 

supported by the evidence of record and whether it is free of legal 

error. The PCRA court’s credibility determinations, when 

supported by the record, are binding on this Court; however, we 

apply a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal 

conclusions.

Furthermore, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel, a defendant must show, by a preponderance of the 

evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the 

circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truthdetermining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or 

innocence could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant 

to prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying claim 

is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic 

basis for his or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors 

and omissions of counsel, there is a reasonable probability that 

the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.

We have explained that a claim has arguable merit where the 

factual averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.

Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal 

determination.

The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis for 

his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel would have 
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chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative, not chosen, 

offered a significantly greater potential chance of success.

Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if they 

effectuated his client’s interests. We do not employ a hindsight 

analysis in comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he 

may have taken.

Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability that, 

but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have 

been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 

to undermine confidence in the outcome.

Boilerplate allegations and bald assertions of no reasonable basis 

and/or ensuing prejudice cannot satisfy a petitioner’s burden to 

prove that counsel was ineffective. Moreover, a failure to satisfy 

any prong of the ineffectiveness test requires rejection of the 

claim of ineffectiveness.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043-44 (Pa. Super. 2019) 

(citations omitted and formatting altered). Moreover: 

Generally, counsel has a duty to communicate plea bargains to his 

client, as well as to explain the advantages and disadvantages of 

the offer. Failure to do so may be considered ineffectiveness of 

counsel if the defendant is sentenced to a longer prison term than 

the term he would have accepted under the plea bargain. Where 

the PCRA court’s determination of credibility is supported by the 

record, we will not disturb it on appeal.

Commonwealth v. Marinez, 777 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Pa. Super. 2001) 

(citations omitted).

The PCRA court addressed this issue as follows:

Here, [Appellant] testified that he was initially represented by 

Attorney Greg Mills and the Dauphin County Public Defender’s 

Office. During the plea bargaining process, [Appellant] pled guilty 

to a 10-20 year sentence including the rape charge. However, 

[Appellant] was permitted to withdraw that plea and was 

appointed subsequent counsel, Attorney Wendy Grella. Trial was 

set for on or about September 8, 2010. Prior to the start of trial, 

Attorney Grella conveyed a plea offer to [Appellant] of a 71⁄2 to 
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15-year sentence. [Appellant] testified that this offer was 

conveyed immediately prior to the start of trial and that his 

daughter was in the courtroom. [Appellant] alleges that the 

reason that he did not accept the plea was because it was unclear 

whether the Commonwealth was willing to remove the rape 

charge.

On cross-examination, [Appellant] testified that during the first 

plea offer, he was engaged in extensive discussion during the 

plea. However, during the second plea, [Appellant] claims that he 

did not have time to think about the plea. Additionally, he testified 

that trial counsel thought that they could beat the rape charges 

and [Appellant] decided to [go to] trial. 

[Attorney Grella] also testified that she spoke numerous times to 

[Appellant] about pleading guilty. Attorney Grella also indicated 

that she explained to [Appellant] his rights regarding pleading 

guilty and that [Appellant] wanted to confront his accusers and 

proceed to trial. Attorney Grella also testified that she advised 

[Appellant] prior to proceeding to trial. [Appellant] had notice of

[the sentencing] guidelines and was aware that he was facing a 

3rd strike offense if found guilty.

Finally, [Appellant’s] daughter[, Krista Vinson,] testified[.] Ms. 

Vinson testified that prior to trial she had a conversation with 

[Appellant] regarding the offer made by the District Attorney’s

Office. However, this offer included the rape charge and that 

[Appellant] did not want to plead guilty to the rape charge. As 

such, he elected to proceed to trial.

Here, we find trial counsel’s testimony credible that she conveyed 

the offer to [Appellant]. However, [Appellant] was adamant about 

[going to] trial and was proclaiming his innocence. [Appellant]

was no stranger to the plea process and had previously accepted 

a plea offer in the instant matter but subsequently withdrew that 

plea. We are constrained to discredit [Appellant’s] testimony that 

he now claims that he would have accepted the plea when he had

previously rejected a plea. [Appellant] alleges that he did not 

want to plead guilty to the rape charge but there is no indication 

that the rape charge was ever going to be withdrawn.

Additionally, based off the trial counsel’s credible testimony that 

she conveyed the plea offer, that [Appellant] was adamant about 

[going to] trial in order to proclaim his innocence, that there was 

no recollection of the Commonwealth withdrawing the rape 

charge, and that trial counsel previously advised [Appellant] on 
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his rights prior to trial, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective. In 

sum, counsel cannot be deemed ineffective when, having fully 

informed [her] client of a plea offer and its ramifications and 

relative merit, the client directs counsel not to accept it and 

counsel follows that direction. 

PCRA Ct. Mem., 5/6/21, at 5-7 (footnotes omitted).

After review of the record, we agree with the PCRA court’s assessment 

of Appellant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant was 

informed of the Commonwealth’s plea offer, Appellant refused to accept it, 

and he opted to go to trial. See N.T., 3/26/21, at 28-37. Additionally, the 

PCRA court concluded that Appellant’s claims to the contrary were not 

credible. See PCRA Ct. Mem., at 6-7. 

Based on our review, we conclude that the PCRA court’s order is 

supported by the record, and we discern no basis upon which to disturb the 

PCRA court’s credibility determinations. See Sandusky, 203 A.3d at 1043-

44. As such, Appellant cannot sustain his burden of proving that counsel was 

ineffective, and we agree with the PCRA court’s conclusion that Appellant’s 

claim lacks merit. See id.; see also Muzzy, 141 A.3d at 510-11.

After reviewing the issue presented in the Turner/Finley brief and 

following our independent review of the record,6 we agree with Current 

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6 As part of our independent review of the record, and as discussed above, 

Appellant had prior convictions for crimes of violence and, therefore, received 

mandatory minimum sentences pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(2). We are 

cognizant that generally, the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence

based on facts not submitted to the jury is unconstitutional. See Alleyne v. 

United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). However, the imposition of a mandatory 

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Counsel’s assessment and conclude that no relief is due. For these reasons, 

we affirm the order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition and grant counsel’s

petition to withdraw.

Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 03/09/2022

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minimum sentence pursuant to Section 9714, based on prior convictions for 

crimes of violence is an exception. Commonwealth v. Chichkin, 232 A.3d 

959, 965-66 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 

466 (2000)); Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 785 (Pa. Super. 

2015)). Accordingly, Appellant’s mandatory minimum sentences were legal,

and no relief is due.