FILED

April 15, 1999

Cecil Crowson, Jr.

Appellate C ourt Clerk

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT JACKSON

APRIL SESSION, 1999

RONALD WARD, )

) No. 02C01-9806-CC-00173

Appellant )

) HENRY COUNTY

vs. )

) Hon. Julian P. Guinn, Judge

STATE OF TENNESSEE, )

) (Post-Conviction)

Appellee )

For the Appellant: For the Appellee:

Teresa McCaig Marshall Paul G. Summers

Attorney at Law Attorney General and Reporter

308 W. Washington Street

Paris, TN 38242 Georgia Blythe Felner

Assistant Attorney General

Criminal Justice Division

425 Fifth Avenue North

2d Floor, Cordell Hull Building

Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Robert "Gus" Radford

District Attorney General

Post Office Box 686

Huntingdon, TN 38344

OPINION FILED: 

AFFIRMED PURSUANT TO RULE 20

David G. Hayes

Judge
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OPINION

The appellant, Ronald Ward, appeals from an order entered in the Henry

County Circuit Court dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. On appeal, the

appellant contends, first, that his counsel was ineffective for his failure to investigate

and pursue a defense, specifically the defense of entrapment, and second, that his

guilty pleas were involuntary because trial counsel misled him as to the meaning of

the thirty percent (30%) release eligibility date.

After review, we affirm pursuant to Rule 20, Tenn. Ct. Crim. R. App.

On January 15, 1997, the appellant entered guilty pleas to two counts of sale

of cocaine over one-half gram, class B felonies, and one count of sale of cocaine

under one-half gram, a class C felony. The trial court sentenced the appellant as a

range I standard offender to eight years for each class B felony and three years on

the class C felony. The sentences were ordered to be served concurrently. No

direct appeal was taken from the sentence. 

In February of 1998, the appellant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction

relief. The pro se petition was subsequently amended after appointment of counsel. 

A hearing on the merits was held during which evidence was presented revealing

that the drug transactions leading to the charges against the appellant were

videotaped. In response to this evidence, the appellant admitted, “there was no

need in it [going to trial], that he was busted, that they had him.” Moreover, defense

counsel testified that he thoroughly explained the meaning of the thirty percent

(30%) release eligibility date to the appellant. In dismissing the petition on its

merits, the post-conviction court found:
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. . .There is no evidence that would even remotely suggest that a

defense of entrapment or any other defense was available in the

petitioner’s case or, for that matter, that the petitioner’s pleas of guilty

were not knowingly or voluntarily entered. The petitioner fully

understood the sentences he was to and did receive.

In a post-conviction proceeding, the appellant has the burden of establishing

his claims by clear and convincing evidence. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-210(f)

(1997). Moreover, the findings of fact of the post-conviction court have the weight of

a jury verdict and are conclusive on appeal unless the evidence preponderates

against its judgment. Davis v. State, 912 S.W.2d 689, 697 (Tenn. 1995). We

conclude that the appellant has failed to carry his burden of establishing his claims. 

Moreover, we cannot conclude that the evidence preponderates against the trial

court’s findings of fact. As a result, we find no error of law mandating reversal of

the court’s judgment. The post-conviction court’s denial of the appellant’s petition

for post-conviction relief is affirmed in accordance with Tenn. Ct. Crim. R. App. 20.

____________________________________

DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

CONCUR:

________________________________

JOSEPH M. TIPTON, Judge

________________________________

L. T. LAFFERTY, Senior Judge