IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL S OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

Assigned on Briefs June 17, 2024

STATE OF TENNESSEE v. JAMIE REBECCA RYAN

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bedford County

No. 19442 Forest A. Durard, Jr., Judge

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No. M2023-01251-CCA-R3-CD

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Defendant, Jamie Rebecca Ryan, pleaded guilty in Bedford County Circuit Court to one 

count of possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell, a Class 

B felony. The parties agreed to an eight-year sentence, with the manner of service of 

sentence left to the trial court’s discretion. Following a sentencing hearing, the trial court 

ordered Defendant to serve her full sentence in the custody of the Tennessee Department 

of Correction (TDOC), consecutive to a five-year sentence for a prior unrelated offense. 

On appeal, Defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in ordering Defendant to 

serve a sentence of full incarceration and in imposing consecutive sentences. After review, 

we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

MATTHEW J. WILSON, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ROBERT L.

HOLLOWAY,JR., AND JOHN W. CAMPBELL, SR., JJ., joined.

Taylor Payne, Murfreesboro, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jamie Rebecca Ryan.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Lacy Wilber, Senior Assistant Attorney 

General; Robert Carter, District Attorney General; and Michael D. Randles, Assistant 

District Attorney General, for the appellee, State of Tennessee.

07/23/2024
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OPINION

I. Background

A. Guilty Plea

On June 20, 2022, the Bedford County Grand Jury indicted Defendant, Jamie 

Rebecca Ryan, for: possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to 

sell (Count 1); possession of 0.5 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to deliver

(Count 2); and casual exchange of heroin (Count 3). On March 20, 2023, Defendant 

pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to Count 1, with the State dismissing the other 

two counts of the indictment. The parties agreed Defendant would be sentenced to eight 

years as a Range I, standard offender, and be assessed a fine of $2,000. The manner of 

service for Defendant’s sentence was left to the discretion of the trial court, and Defendant 

would remain on bond pending the sentencing hearing.

On July 24, 2023, the trial court entered an order revoking Defendant’s bond; the 

order stated that “Defendant . . . received on July 20, 2023, a new charge of possession of 

Schedule II [controlled substance] for resale, pending sentencing.” The trial court held a 

sentencing hearing in the present case on August 10, 2023.

B. Sentencing Hearing

At the beginning of the sentencing hearing, the trial court, upon motion of the State, 

incorporated by reference “the facts that were read into the record at the time of the plea 

acceptance hearing[.]” The transcript from the plea hearing does not appear in the record. 

In reviewing the presentence report, this court gleans the following facts of the underlying 

offense: On March 19, 2020, agents with the Seventeenth Judicial District Drug Task 

Force executed a search warrant on the residence of Cindy Smith. Ms. Smith, Defendant, 

and Bryan Davis were present when the agents arrived. All three persons were found with 

methamphetamine; the presentence report indicates that 0.36 grams of methamphetamine 

was found in Defendant’s purse, while the return of the search warrant, which is in the 

appellate record, states that three bags of suspected methamphetamine were found in 

Defendant’s lap. In a statement given in advance of the presentence report, Defendant 

claimed Mr. Davis gave her these three bags when he went to check the door when the 

agents knocked. 

At the sentencing hearing, Shane George, director of the task force, acknowledged 

that methamphetamine usage was “hands down” the “number one drug problem” in the 

Seventeenth Judicial District at the time of Defendant’s offense. Director George 

explained that methamphetamine was “readily available,” “cheap,” and “coming into our 
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area literally by the bucket loads.” He acknowledged that his task force had investigated 

“thousands” of cases involving methamphetamine during his twenty-three years with the 

task force. He testified that in his encounters with methamphetamine users and dealers, 

“the incarceration aspect of the punishment is probably the main factor that altered the 

course of their life.” Director George testified that several persons had “thanked us . . . as 

the Drug Task Force[,] for stopping that cycle and incarcerating them and getting them 

away from the drug and off the streets.” 

Director George testified that the task force had continue to investigate Defendant 

after she committed the offense in the instant case. He explained that on March 3, 2023, 

the task force “conducted a Parole/Probation search of [Defendant]’s trailer[.]” Defendant, 

her boyfriend, and a third man were present. Agents found Defendant “in possession of 

about an ounce of crystal methamphetamine” and found more methamphetamine in a 

bedroom. Defendant admitted to the agents that she “had just sold $100 worth of crystal 

methamphetamine” to the third man present at the time agents arrived; the third man had 

seen the agents approaching and attempted to hide the methamphetamine he had just 

purchased. The third man confirmed Defendant’s version of events to the investigating 

agents. 

Director George testified that on July 20, 2023, task force agents went to a restaurant 

to arrest Defendant for the March 3, 2023 incident. When the agents reached the restaurant, 

they first arrested Defendant’s boyfriend, who was in Defendant’s vehicle. After searching 

Defendant’s vehicle, the agents found roughly half an ounce of methamphetamine. 

Defendant and her boyfriend both admitted to the agents that “they had reinvolved 

themselves in the distribution of crystal methamphetamine.” As of the sentencing hearing, 

Defendant had not been charged in connection with the recovery of drugs from her vehicle 

in July 2023. 

Director George testified that after Defendant’s arrest in this case, the task force

used her as a confidential informant. She conducted one controlled purchase, but she was 

not used as an informant thereafter. Director George explained that task force agents often 

had trouble contacting her, and when contacted she was uninterested in the proposed work. 

The presentence report (“PSR”) introduced at the sentencing hearing indicated that 

Defendant had a lengthy criminal history that began in September 2009, shortly after her 

eighteenth birthday. Defendant had eighteen prior convictions for offenses including drug 

possession, drug paraphernalia possession, casual exchange, failure to appear, and 

introducing contraband into a penal facility. All but two of Defendant’s prior convictions 

were for misdemeanor offenses, and Defendant’s sentences for at least twelve of these 

offenses were suspended at least in part. Defendant violated probation three times for a 

2015 misdemeanor conviction possession of drug paraphernalia; after the third violation, 
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her probation was revoked in full. She also violated probation once following a 2017 

simple possession conviction in Bedford County. 

Defendant’s first felony conviction was a 2017 Franklin County conviction for 

introducing contraband into a penal facility. At the time of Defendant’s guilty plea, she 

was sentenced to three years, suspended to 120 days in jail and the rest of the term on 

probation. She violated probation four times for this offense; after her second and third 

offenses she received some jail time, and after the fourth violation her probation was 

revoked in full. Her second felony conviction, for possession of Schedule I drugs, resulted 

from a 2018 offense in Bedford County. Defendant pleaded guilty to that offense after she 

committed the offense that is the subject of the instant case. 

The PSR also reflects that Defendant had committed and pleaded guilty to several 

other charges before and after she committed the instant offense. In 2019, Defendant was 

indicted in Bedford County case number 19092 for felony drug possession charge 

referenced above; this offense was committed in June 2018, and she pleaded guilty to the 

offense in August 2020. She received a sentence of five years imprisonment at a service 

rate of thirty percent. A notation on the entry for this offense on the PSR notes this sentence 

would be consecutive “to any other sentence.” On April 4, 2019, she failed to appear in 

Bedford County General Sessions Court; she was not convicted of this offense until 

September 2020. In 2020, she was charged in Coffee County1 with possession of 

methamphetamine, casual exchange and other “undefined” drug offenses for an offense 

which occurred October 6, 2018; she pleaded guilty to casual exchange and simple 

possession in April 2022. 

In her sentencing-hearing allocution, Defendant stated she was “aware of the 

multiple chances [she had] previously squandered,” took “accountability for [her] actions,” 

and said, “I’m not trying to get out of jail today, I do deserve a sentence to serve.” 

Defendant “request[ed] mercy on the length of the total sentence if possible” and stated 

that “if granted one more chance” she would “not make the same mistakes” but “do 

probation and . . . be successful[.]” 

After considering the evidence and the arguments of counsel, the trial court ordered 

Defendant to serve her sentence in the custody of TDOC, denying Defendant’s request for 

full probation or split confinement. The trial court found the Defendant had a lengthy 

history of convictions, including two felony convictions. The trial court observed that 

Defendant’s “social history is not very stellar,” adding “after consumption of this amount 

of illegal substances I don’t know how she could be too good as far as mental condition.” 

1

It is unclear from the record whether Defendant’s Coffee County indictment was returned before 

she committed the instant offense. 
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The trial court also observed that Defendant had a considerable history of sentences less 

than full confinement, and she had been generally unsuccessful on these sentences. 

Specifically, the Defendant violated probation four times for one conviction, three times 

for another conviction, and once for a third conviction. The court also found Defendant’s

potential to reoffend was significant given her lengthy criminal history and prior failed 

attempts at probation. The trial court acknowledged Director George’s testimony about 

incarceration being a deterrent, but the trial judge noted that “when you keep seeing the 

same people in a revolving door after they have been to prison or been incarcerated . . . 

sometimes the [c]ourt questions if these people even care whether they go to jail or not.” 

The trial court emphasized it was not relying on deterrence alone in denying probation, as 

“there [was] too much other evidence” to justify denial of probation. 

The trial court sentenced Defendant to eight years imprisonment. The court found that 

because Defendant was released on bond for her 2018 Bedford County conviction for 

possession of Schedule I drugs at the time she committed the current felony drug offense, 

consecutive sentencing was mandatory. The court ordered the eight-year sentence to be 

served consecutively to Defendant’s five-year Bedford County sentence.

II. Analysis

We review the length and manner of service of within-range sentences imposed by 

trial court “under an abuse of discretion standard with a ‘presumption of reasonableness.’” 

State v. Bise, 380 S.W.3d 682, 708 (Tenn. 2012). Our supreme court has stated that “the 

abuse of discretion standard of appellate review accompanied by a presumption of 

reasonableness applies to all sentencing decisions.” State v. King, 432 S.W.3d 316, 324 

(Tenn. 2014) (citing State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 864 (Tenn. 2013)). Specifically, 

our supreme court has stated this standard also applies to “questions related to probation 

or any other alternative sentence.” State v. Caudle, 388 S.W.3d 273, 278-79 (Tenn. 2012).

To be afforded deference on appeal, the trial court must “place on the record any 

reason for a particular sentence.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 705. There is no presumption of 

reasonableness when the trial court fails to consider and weigh the applicable common law 

factors. King, 432 S.W.3d at 327-28. But as this court has observed:

[T]rial courts need not comprehensively articulate their findings concerning 

sentencing, nor must their reasoning be “particularly lengthy or detailed.” 

Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 706. Instead, the trial court “should set forth enough to 

satisfy the appellate court that [it] has considered the parties’ arguments and 

has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decision[-]making 

authority.” Id.
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State v. Sheets, No. M2022-00538-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 WL 2908652, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. 

App. Apr. 12, 2023) (some alterations in original), no perm. app. filed.

In short, the trial court’s sentencing decision will be upheld on appeal “so long as it 

is within the appropriate range and the record demonstrates that the sentence is otherwise 

in compliance with the purposes and principles listed by statute.” Bise, 380 S.W.3d at 709-

10. A defendant bears the burden of proving the sentence is improper. Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-35-401, Sentencing Comm’n Cmts; see also State v. Ashby, 823 S.W.2d 166, 169 

(Tenn. 1991).

In determining the proper sentence, the trial court must consider: (1) the evidence, 

if any, received at the trial and the sentencing hearing; (2) the PSR; (3) the principles of 

sentencing and arguments as to sentencing alternatives; (4) the nature and characteristics 

of the criminal conduct involved; (5) evidence and information offered by the parties on 

the mitigating and enhancement factors set out in Tennessee Code Annotated sections 40-

35-113 and 114; (6) any statistical information provided by the administrative office of the 

courts as to sentencing practices for similar offenses in Tennessee; (7) any statement the 

defendant made on the defendant’s own behalf about sentencing; and (8) the result of the 

validated risk and needs assessment conducted by the Department of Correction and 

contained in the presentence report. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-210(b); State v. Taylor, 63 

S.W.3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001). The trial court must also consider the potential 

or lack of potential for rehabilitation or treatment of the defendant in determining the 

sentence alternative or length of a term to be imposed. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103. The 

sentence imposed should be “no greater than that deserved for the offense committed” and 

“the least severe measure necessary to achieve the purposes for which the sentence is 

imposed.” Id. § 40-35-103(2), (4). “Appellate courts may not disturb the sentence even if 

we had preferred a different result.” State v. Burns, No. W2021-00939-CCA-R3-CD, 2023 

WL 334659 at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 20, 2023) (citing State v. Carter, 254 S.W.3d 

335, 346 (Tenn. 2007)).

A. Absence of Guilty Plea Submission Hearing Transcript

As stated above, the transcript of Defendant’s guilty plea submission hearing does 

not appear in the record. “[A] transcript of the guilty plea hearing is often (if not always) 

needed in order to conduct a proper review of the sentence imposed.” State v. Keen, 996 

S.W.2d 842, 844 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). As the State observes in its brief, our supreme 

court has stated that “when a record does not include a transcript of the hearing on a guilty 

plea,” this court “should determine on a case-by-case basis whether the record is sufficient 

for a meaningful review under the standard adopted in Bise.” Caudle, 388 S.W.3d at 279. 

In this case, the parties agreed upon the sentence length for this offense, and the only issue 

to be resolved after Defendant’s guilty plea was the manner of service of her sentence and 
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its alignment with the prior sentence. The trial court’s denial of probation and imposition 

of consecutive sentences was based largely on Defendant’s criminal history and her lack 

of success during her prior probationary sentences, factors which would not have relied on 

the circumstances surrounding the current offense. Accordingly, we conclude that the 

record is sufficient to address Defendant’s appellate issues. 

B. Probation

Generally, probation is available to a defendant whose actual sentence imposed is 

ten years or less, and his or her underlying offense is not excluded by law. Tenn. Code 

Ann. § 40-35-303(a). However, no criminal defendant is entitled to a presumption of 

probation, and no defendant is automatically entitled to probation as a matter of law.

Carter, 254 S.W.3d at 347; State v. Davis, 940 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tenn. 1997). The 

defendant must prove his or her suitability of alternative sentencing options. Carter, 254 

S.W.3d at 347 (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-303(b)).

In determining whether incarceration is an appropriate sentence, the trial court 

should consider whether:

(A) Confinement is necessary to protect society by restraining a defendant 

who has a long history of criminal conduct;

(B) Confinement is necessary to avoid depreciating the seriousness of the 

offense or confinement is particularly suited to provide an effective 

deterrence to others likely to commit similar offenses; or

(C) Measures less restrictive than confinement have frequently or recently 

been applied unsuccessfully to the defendant.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-103(1)(A)-(C).

When addressing a defendant’s suitability for probation, the trial court should 

consider: “(1) the defendant’s amenability to correction; (2) the circumstances of the 

offense; (3) the defendant’s criminal record; (4) the defendant’s social history; (5) the 

defendant’s physical and mental health; and (6) special and general deterrence value.” 

State v. Trent, 533 S.W.3d 282, 291 (Tenn. 2017).

As an initial matter, we note that at the sentencing hearing the trial court stated that 

Defendant’s prior convictions would have qualified her to be sentenced as a Range II, 

multiple offender for this offense. However, the parties agreed she would receive a Range 

I sentence of eight years for this conviction—the minimum Range I sentence for a person 

convicted of a Class B felony. See Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 39-17-417(c)(1) (possession of 0.5 

grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to sell is Class B felony), 40-35-112(a)(2) 

(Range I sentence for Class B felony is eight to twelve years). The trial court stated, and 
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on appeal the State contends, that because Defendant’s prior record qualified her as a Range 

II offender, she was not eligible to be considered a favorable candidate for probation. 

However, despite the Defendant’s record of convictions, the parties agreed to, and the trial 

court imposed, a Range I sentence, so the trial court’s reasoning is inapplicable on this 

issue. However, Defendant was still not a favorable candidate for probation, as our 

criminal code makes clear that only “an especially mitigated or standard offender convicted 

of a Class C, D, or E felony, should be considered as a favorable candidate for alternative 

sentencing options in the absence of evidence to the contrary[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. 

§ 40-35-102(6)(A) (emphasis added). Because Defendant pleaded guilty to a Class B 

felony, she could not be considered a favorable candidate for alternative sentencing. And 

as stated above, under Tennessee law no defendant is entitled to a presumption of 

probation. 

Defendant argues that the trial court “failed to appropriately consider the 

presentence report” in ordering Defendant to serve her full sentence in custody. 

Specifically, Defendant asserts the trial court “failed to fully consider . . . the validated risk 

and needs assessment.” At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor said that he did not “put 

a lot of stock in” the “Strong-R” risk and needs assessment completed as part of the PSR 

in this case, but the assessment indicated Defendant had “an overall high risk to re-offend 

for drug related offenses.” In imposing Defendant’s sentence, the trial court stated:

We have the Strong R, which I feel like the General does on that, that 

is a self-reported questionnaire that TDOC takes and they put it in some data 

base and it spits out an answer. The usefulness of that to the court is just not

much. It is like the case we had earlier today where this person was -- their 

risk and needs I assume stemming from the Strong R said minimal, so they 

got to meet twice a year and random drug screens maybe. I don’t think this 

defendant got drug screens, and it was just a joke. I really do not put a great 

deal of stock in that.

The trial court’s comments regarding the Strong-R assessment might have been 

ill-advised, but we agree with the State that the comments reflect that the court did consider 

the assessment as required by statute. As Defendant acknowledges in her brief, “the weight 

to be assigned to the assessment falls within the trial court’s broad discretionary authority 

in the imposition of sentences.” State v. Ailey, No. E2017-02359-CCA-R3-CD, 2019 WL 

3917557, at *31 (Tenn. Crim. App. Aug. 19, 2019) (quotation omitted). The trial court did 

not place much, if any, weight on the assessment, as it was its prerogative under the law. 

There was ample evidence to support the trial court’s denial of probation and 

ordering Defendant to serve her sentence in custody. Our review of the trial court’s 

comments during sentencing shows that the trial court considered the required principles 
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of sentencing before imposing sentence. Of note, Defendant had a lengthy history of 

criminal convictions, including two felony convictions and at least fifteen misdemeanor 

convictions. Defendant had been sentenced to probation several times in the past, but her 

performance on probation had been poor, as she had repeatedly violated. Given 

Defendant’s extensive criminal record and her failure to comply when not incarcerated, her 

amenability to correction was low. Accordingly, we conclude the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in denying probation and ordering Defendant to serve her sentence in custody. 

She is not entitled to relief on this issue. 

D. Consecutive Sentences

Defendant argues the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences. We 

disagree.

The abuse of discretion standard adopted in Bise also applies to the imposition of 

consecutive sentences, “giving deference to the trial court’s exercise of its discretionary 

authority to impose consecutive sentences if it has provided reasons on the record 

establishing at least one of the seven grounds listed in Tennessee Code Annotated section 

40-35-115(b).” State v. Pollard, 432 S.W.3d 851, 861 (Tenn. 2013); see also Tenn. R. 

Crim. P. 32(c)(1) (stating that the trial court, in ordering consecutive sentencing, “shall 

specify the reasons for this decision”). The trial court must find by a preponderance of the 

evidence that one of the statutory classifications for consecutive sentencing exists. See

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b). As relevant to this case, Tennessee Rule of Criminal 

Procedure Rule 32(c)(2)(A)(i) provides:

If the defendant has additional sentences not yet fully served as the result of 

convictions in the same court or in other courts of Tennessee and if this fact 

is made known to the court prior to sentencing, the court shall recite this fact 

in the judgment setting sentence, and the sentence imposed is deemed to be 

concurrent with the prior sentence or sentences, unless it affirmatively 

appears that the new sentence being imposed is to be served consecutively to 

the prior sentence or sentences. The judgment to make the sentences 

consecutive or concurrent shall explicitly relate the judge’s reasons and is 

reviewable on appeal.

In certain instances, the trial court is required to impose consecutive sentences. Rule 

32(c)(3) of the Tennessee Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part:

When a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses from one trial or when

the defendant has additional sentences not yet fully served as the result of 

convictions in the same or other courts and the law requires consecutive 
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sentences, the sentence shall be consecutive whether the judgment explicitly 

so orders or not. This rule shall apply:

. . . .

(C) To a sentence for a felony committed while the defendant 

was released on bail and the defendant is convicted of both 

offenses . . . .

Tenn. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)(C). Additionally, Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-20-

111(b) provides:

In any case in which a defendant commits a felony while the defendant was 

released on bail . . . and the defendant is convicted of both offenses, the trial 

judge shall not have discretion as to whether the sentences shall run 

concurrently or cumulatively, but shall order that the sentences be served 

cumulatively.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-20-111(b).2

As stated above, Defendant committed the offense in the current case on March 19, 

2020. According to the PSR, in 2019, Defendant had been charged in Bedford County 

Circuit Court case number 19092 for possession of Schedule I drugs. The date of that 

offense was June 9, 2018, but the conviction in that case was not entered until August 27, 

2020—after Defendant committed the offense in the current case. The prosecutor argued 

that based on these facts, “mandatory consecutive sentencing . . . applies, she would have 

been on bond for that, bond for a felony she was ultimately convicted of.” In imposing 

consecutive sentences, the trial court stated that “she was certainly on bond” when she 

committed the current offense. Accordingly, the trial court stated, “I think that mandates 

consecutive sentences.” However, there was no proof introduced into the record to 

substantiate the State’s assertion that Defendant was on bond when she committed the 

current offense. Defendant committed the current offense after committing the offense in 

Bedford County case number 19092 but before this other case was resolved, so a 

conclusion that Defendant was on bond when she committed the current offense seems 

reasonable. However, the statements of counsel are not evidence, and we cannot presume 

Defendant’s bond status at the time of the current offense from a silent record. Thus, to 

any extent the trial court ordered the sentence in this case to be served consecutively to the 

2 Rule 32(c)(3)(A) also requires the imposition of consecutive sentences when a person commits a 

“felony committed while on parole for a felony.” Evidence of Defendant’s parole status at the time of this 

offense was unclear, although the parties and court suggested at the sentencing hearing that Defendant did 

not commit the current offense while on parole. The PSR indicated Defendant was on parole at the time of 

the sentencing hearing. 
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sentence in case number 19092 based on Defendant’s purported bond status when she 

committed the current offense, that conclusion was erroneous.

However, the trial court also stated it was imposing consecutive sentences based on 

Code section 40-35-115(b)(2), which provides, “The court may order sentences to run 

consecutively if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that . . . [t]he defendant 

is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive.” When evaluating whether 

the proof establishes that a defendant is an offender whose record of criminal activity is 

extensive, trial courts may consider the following list of non-exclusive factors:

(1) The amount of criminal activity, often the number of convictions, both 

currently before the trial court for sentencing and prior convictions or 

activity;

(2) The time span over which the criminal activity occurred;

(3) The frequency of criminal activity within that time span;

(4) The geographic span over which the criminal activity occurred; 

(5) Multiplicity of victims of the criminal activity; and

(6) Any other fact about the defendant or circumstance surrounding the 

criminal activity or convictions, present or prior, that informs the 

determination of whether an offender’s record of criminal activity was 

considerable or large in amount, time, space, or scope.

State v. Perry, 656 S.W.3d 116, 129 (Tenn. 2022) (footnotes omitted).

In imposing consecutive sentences based on Defendant’s extensive criminal history, 

the trial court stated:

Even if the [c]ourt were to be in error on that, the [c]ourt would find 

that [Defendant] is an offender whose record of criminal activity is extensive. 

We are talking about [two] felonies and [six] different misdemeanor 

violations in her record. And so even people who have no felony record but 

have an extensive misdemeanor record can fall under this section of having 

criminal activity which is extensive. And in this case it is not as extensive as 

some, but it is more extensive than a lot of other cases. Ten of what I just 

mentioned involved simple possession or casual exchange, and [three] of 

those involve drug paraphernalia, which I bet was associated with [three] of 

those [ten] I just mentioned.

The evidence produced at sentencing supports the trial court’s conclusion that 

Defendant had an extensive record of criminal activity. As stated throughout this opinion, 

before committing this offense Defendant had committed at least fifteen misdemeanor 
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offenses and two felony offenses in ten-and-a-half years. Defendant asserts that the trial 

court erred in imposing consecutive sentences because most of her convictions were for 

misdemeanors, but as our supreme court has stated, “Trial courts can consider prior 

misdemeanors in determining whether a defendant has an extensive record of criminal 

activity. Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(2) does not distinguish between felonies and 

misdemeanors.” State v. Dickson, 413 S.W.3d 735, 748 (Tenn. 2013). And while not 

explicitly stated by the trial court in imposing consecutive sentences, we note that the PSR 

reflects that the conviction in Bedford County case number 19092 would run consecutive 

“to any other sentence.” This too supports the trial court’s decision. In sum, we conclude 

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Defendant’s sentence in this case to 

be served consecutively to the sentence in Bedford County case number 19092.

III. Conclusion

In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the trial 

court is affirmed. 

_________________________________

MATTHEW J. WILSON, JUDGE