Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 71 / Tuesday, April 14, 2015 / Proposed Rules 19889 

agree to reinstate the Principal, if the 

Surety has settled its claim with the 

Principal, or any of its Affiliates, for an 

amount that results in no Loss to SBA 

or in no amount owed for Imminent 

Breach payments, or OSG finds good 

cause for reinstating the Principal 

notwithstanding the Loss to SBA or 

amount owed for Imminent Breach 

payments; or 

(ii) Reinstate a Principal’s eligibility 

upon the Surety’s determination that 

further bond guarantees are appropriate 

after the Principal was deemed 

ineligible for further SBA bond 

guarantees under § 115.14(a) (1), (2), (3), 

(5) or (6). 

(c) Underwriting after reinstatement. 

A guarantee application submitted after 

reinstatement of the Principal’s 

eligibility is subject to a very stringent 

underwriting review. 

■ 5. Amend § 115.16 by revising 

paragraphs (e)(1) and (f)(1) to read as 

follows: 

§ 115.16 Determination of Surety’s Loss. 

* * * * * 

(e) * * * 

(1) Amounts actually paid by the 

Surety for specialized services that are 

provided under contract by an outside 

consultant, which is not an Affiliate of 

the Surety, in connection with the 

processing of a claim, provided that 

such services are beyond the capability 

of the Surety’s salaried claims staff; and 

* * * * * 

(f) * * * 

(1) Any unallocated expenses, all 

direct and indirect costs incurred by the 

Surety’s salaried claims staff, or any 

clear mark-up on expenses or any 

overhead of the Surety, its attorney, or 

any other party hired by the Surety or 

the attorney; 

* * * * * 

■ 6. Amend § 115.18 by revising 

paragraph (a)(2) to read as follows: 

§ 115.18 Refusal to issue further 

guarantees; suspension and termination of 

PSB status. 

* * * * * 

(2) Regulatory violations, fraud. Acts 

of wrongdoing such as fraud, material 

misrepresentation, breach of the Prior 

Approval or PSB Agreement, the 

Surety’s failure to continue to comply 

with the requirements set forth in 

§ 115.11, or regulatory violations (as 

defined in §§ 115.19(d) and 115.19(h)) 

also constitute sufficient grounds for 

refusal to issue further guarantees, or in 

the case of a PSB Surety, termination of 

preferred status. 

* * * * * 

■ 7. Amend § 115.36 to read as follows: 

■ a. Revise the section heading; 

■ b. Remove the paragraph heading ‘‘(a) 

Indemnity settlements.’’; 

■ c. Remove paragraphs (b) and (c); and 

■ d. Redesignate paragraphs ‘‘(1)’’, 

‘‘(2)’’, and ‘‘(3)’’, as ‘‘(a)’’, ‘‘(b)’’, and 

‘‘(c)’’. 

§ 115.36 Indemnity settlements. 

* * * * * 

§ 115.60 Selection and admission of PSB 

Sureties. [Amended] 

■ 8. Amend § 115.60 to read as follows: 

■ a. Amend § 115.60(a)(1) by removing 

‘‘$2,000,000’’ and inserting 

‘‘$6,500,000’’ in its place; and 

■ b. Remove paragraph (a)(5) and 

redesignate paragraph (a)(6) as 

paragraph (a)(5). 

Dated: April 6, 2015. 

Maria Contreras-Sweet, 

Administrator. 

[FR Doc. 2015–08297 Filed 4–13–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 8025–01–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 23 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–0721; Notice No. 23– 

15–03–SC] 

Special Conditions: Honda Aircraft 

Company, Model HA–420 HondaJet, 

Lithium-Ion Batteries 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed special 

conditions. 

SUMMARY: This action proposes special 

conditions for the Honda Aircraft 

Company, Model HA–420 airplane. This 

airplane will have a novel or unusual 

design feature associated with the 

installation of lithium-ion (Li-ion) 

batteries. The applicable airworthiness 

regulations do not contain adequate or 

appropriate safety standards for this 

design feature. These proposed special 

conditions contain the additional safety 

standards that the Administrator 

considers necessary to establish a level 

of safety equivalent to that established 

by the existing airworthiness standards. 

DATES: Send your comments on or 

before May 4, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: Send comments identified 

by docket number [FAA–2015–0721] 

using any of the following methods: 

D Federal eRegulations Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov and follow 

the online instructions for sending your 

comments electronically. 

D Mail: Send comments to Docket 

Operations, M–30, U.S. Department of 

Transportation (DOT), 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Room W12–140, West 

Building Ground Floor, Washington, DC 

20590–0001. 

D Hand Delivery of Courier: Take 

comments to Docket Operations in 

Room W12–140 of the West Building 

Ground Floor at 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC, between 9 

a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. 

D Fax: Fax comments to Docket 

Operations at 202–493–2251. 

Privacy: The FAA will post all 

comments it receives, without change, 

to http://regulations.gov, including any 

personal information the commenter 

provides. Using the search function of 

the docket Web site, anyone can find 

and read the electronic form of all 

comments received into any FAA 

docket, including the name of the 

individual sending the comment (or 

signing the comment for an association, 

business, labor union, etc.). DOT’s 

complete Privacy Act Statement can be 

found in the Federal Register published 

on April 11, 2000 (65 FR 19477–19478), 

as well as at http://DocketsInfo.dot.gov. 

Docket: Background documents or 

comments received may be read at 

http://www.regulations.gov at any time. 

Follow the online instructions for 

accessing the docket or go to the Docket 

Operations in Room W12–140 of the 

West Building Ground Floor at 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC, between 9 a.m., and 5 p.m., Monday 

through Friday, except Federal holidays. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Les 

Lyne, Policies & Procedures Branch, 

ACE–114, Federal Aviation 

Administration, Small Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification 

Service, 901 Locust; Kansas City, 

Missouri 64106; telephone (816) 329– 

4171; facsimile (816) 329–4090. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite interested people to take 

part in this rulemaking by sending 

written comments, data, or views. The 

most helpful comments reference a 

specific portion of the special 

conditions, explain the reason for any 

recommended change, and include 

supporting data. We ask that you send 

us two copies of written comments. 

We will consider all comments we 

receive on or before the closing date for 

comments. We will consider comments 

filed late if it is possible to do so 

without incurring expense or delay. We 

may change these special conditions 

based on the comments we receive. 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
19890 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 71 / Tuesday, April 14, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

Background 

On October 11, 2006, Honda Aircraft 

Company applied for a type certificate 

for their new Model HA–420. On 

October 10, 2013, Honda Aircraft 

Company requested an extension with 

an effective application date of October 

1, 2013. This extension changed the 

type certification basis to amendment 

23–62. 

The HA–420 is a four to five 

passenger (depending on configuration), 

two crew, lightweight business jet with 

a 43,000-foot service ceiling and a 

maximum takeoff weight of 9963 

pounds. The airplane is powered by two 

GE-Honda Aero Engines (GHAE) HF– 

120 turbofan engines. 

The current regulatory requirements 

for part 23 airplanes do not contain 

adequate requirements for the 

application of Li-ion batteries in 

airborne applications. This type of 

battery possesses certain failure, 

operational characteristics, and 

maintenance requirements that differ 

significantly from that of the nickel 

cadmium and lead acid rechargeable 

batteries currently approved in other 

normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter 

category airplanes. Therefore, the FAA 

is proposing this special condition to 

require that all characteristics of the 

rechargeable lithium batteries and their 

installation that could affect safe 

operation of the HA–420 are addressed, 

and appropriate Instructions for 

Continued Airworthiness which include 

maintenance requirements are 

established to ensure the availability of 

electrical power from the batteries when 

needed. 

Type Certification Basis 

Under the provisions of 14 CFR 21.17, 

Honda Aircraft Company must show 

that the HA–420 meets the applicable 

provisions of part 23, as amended by 

Amendments 23–1 through 23–62 

thereto. 

If the Administrator finds that the 

applicable airworthiness regulations 

(i.e., 14 CFR part 23) do not contain 

adequate or appropriate safety standards 

for the HA–420 because of a novel or 

unusual design feature, special 

conditions are prescribed under the 

provisions of § 21.16. 

Special conditions are initially 

applicable to the model for which they 

are issued. Should the type certificate 

for that model be amended later to 

include any other model that 

incorporates the same or similar novel 

or unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would also apply to the other 

model under § 21.101. 

In addition to the applicable 

airworthiness regulations and special 

conditions, the HA–420 must comply 

with the fuel vent and exhaust emission 

requirements of 14 CFR part 34 and the 

noise certification requirements of 14 

CFR part 36, and the FAA must issue a 

finding of regulatory adequacy under 

section 611 of Public Law 92–574, the 

‘‘Noise Control Act of 1972.’’ 

The FAA issues special conditions, as 

defined in 14 CFR 11.19, in accordance 

with § 11.38, and they become part of 

the type-certification basis under 

§ 21.17(a)(2). 

Novel or Unusual Design Features 

The HA–420 will incorporate the 

following novel or unusual design 

feature: The installation of Li-ion 

batteries. 

The current regulatory requirements 

for part 23 airplanes do not contain 

adequate requirements for the 

application of Li-ion batteries in 

airborne applications. This type of 

battery possesses certain failure, 

operational characteristics, and 

maintenance requirements that differ 

significantly from that of the nickel 

cadmium and lead acid rechargeable 

batteries currently approved in other 

normal, utility, acrobatic, and commuter 

category airplanes. 

Discussion 

The applicable parts 21 and 23 

airworthiness regulations governing the 

installation of batteries in general 

aviation airplanes, including § 23.1353, 

were derived from Civil Air Regulations 

(CAR 3) as part of the recodification that 

established 14 CFR part 23. The battery 

requirements, which are identified in 

§ 23.1353, were a rewording of the CAR 

requirements that did not add any 

substantive technical requirements. An 

increase in incidents involving battery 

fires and failures that accompanied the 

increased use of Nickel-Cadmium (NiCad) batteries in aircraft resulted in 

rulemaking activities on the battery 

requirements for transport category 

airplanes. These regulations were 

incorporated into § 23.1353(f) and (g), 

which apply only to Ni-Cad battery 

installations. 

The proposed use of Li-ion batteries 

on the HA–420 airplane has prompted 

the FAA to review the adequacy of the 

existing battery regulations with respect 

to that chemistry. As the result of this 

review, the FAA has determined that 

the existing regulations do not 

adequately address several failure, 

operational, and maintenance 

characteristics of Li-ion batteries that 

could affect safety of the battery 

installation of the HA–420 airplane 

electrical power supply. 

The introduction of Li-ion batteries 

into aircraft raises some concern about 

associated battery/cell monitoring 

systems and how these may affect 

utilization of an otherwise ‘‘good’’ 

battery as an energy source to the 

electrical system when monitoring 

components fail. Associated battery/cell 

monitoring systems (i.e., temperature, 

state of charge, etc.) should be 

evaluated/tested with respect the 

expected extremes in the aircraft 

operating environment. 

Li-ion batteries typically have 

different electrical impedance 

characteristics than lead-acid or Ni-Cad 

batteries. Honda Aircraft Company 

needs to evaluate other components of 

the aircraft electrical system with 

respect to these characteristics. 

At present, there is very limited 

experience regarding the use of Li-ion 

rechargeable batteries in applications 

involving commercial aviation. 

However, other users of this technology 

range from wireless telephone 

manufacturers to the electric vehicle 

industry and have noted significant 

safety issues regarding the use of these 

types of batteries, some of which are 

described in the following paragraphs: 

1. Overcharging. In general, lithium 

batteries are significantly more 

susceptible to internal failures that can 

result in self-sustaining increases in 

temperature and pressure (i.e., thermal 

runaway) than their nickel-cadmium or 

lead-acid counterparts. This is 

especially true for overcharging, which 

causes heating and destabilization of the 

components of the cell, leading to the 

formation (by plating) of highly unstable 

metallic lithium. The metallic lithium 

can ignite, resulting in a self-sustaining 

fire or explosion. Finally, the severity of 

thermal runaway due to overcharging 

increases with increasing battery 

capacity due to the higher amount of 

electrolyte in large batteries. 

2. Over-discharging. Discharge of 

some types of lithium battery cells 

beyond a certain voltage (typically 2.4 

volts) can cause corrosion of the 

electrodes of the cell; resulting in loss 

of battery capacity that cannot be 

reversed by recharging. This loss of 

capacity may not be detected by the 

simple voltage measurements 

commonly available to flight crews as a 

means of checking battery status—a 

problem shared with nickel-cadmium 

batteries. 

3. Flammability of Cell Components: 

Unlike nickel-cadmium and lead-acid 

batteries, some types of lithium batteries 

use liquid electrolytes that are 

flammable. The electrolyte can serve as 

a source of fuel for an external fire if 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 71 / Tuesday, April 14, 2015 / Proposed Rules 19891 

there is a breach of the battery 

container. 

These safety issues experienced by 

users of lithium batteries raise concern 

about the use of these batteries in 

commercial aviation. The intent of the 

proposed special condition is to 

establish appropriate airworthiness 

standards for lithium battery 

installations in the HA–420 and to 

ensure, as required by §§ 23.1309 and 

23.601, that these battery installations 

are not hazardous or unreliable. 

Additionally, the Radio Technical 

Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), in 

a joint effort with the FAA and industry, 

has released RTCA/DO–311, Minimum 

Operational Performance Standards for 

Rechargeable Lithium Battery Systems, 

which gained much of its text directly 

from previous Li-ion special conditions. 

Honda Aircraft Company proposes to 

use DO–311 as the primary 

methodology for assuring the battery 

will perform its intended functions 

safely as installed in the HA–420 

airplane and as the basis for test and 

qualification of the battery. This Special 

Condition incorporates applicable 

portions of DO–311. 

Applicability 

As discussed above, these special 

conditions are applicable to the HA– 

420. Should Honda Aircraft Company 

apply at a later date for a change to the 

type certificate to include another 

model incorporating the same novel or 

unusual design feature, the special 

conditions would apply to that model as 

well. 

Provisional certification of the HA– 

420 is currently scheduled for June 

2015. The substance of these special 

conditions has been subject to the notice 

and public-comment procedure in 

several prior instances, specifically 

special conditions 23–236–SC, 23–247– 

SC, and 23–249–SC. Therefore, because 

a delay would significantly affect the 

applicant’s both installation of the 

system and certification of the airplane, 

we are shortening the public-comment 

period to 20 days. 

Conclusion 

This action affects only certain novel 

or unusual design features on one model 

of airplanes. It is not a rule of general 

applicability. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 23 

Aircraft, Aviation safety, Signs and 

symbols. 

The authority citation for these 

special conditions is as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701, 

44702, 44704. 

The Proposed Special Conditions 

Accordingly, the Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA) proposes the 

following special conditions as part of 

the type certification basis for Honda 

Aircraft Company, HA–420 airplanes. 

1. Lithium-Ion Battery Installation 

a. Safe cell temperatures and 

pressures must be maintained during 

any probable charging or discharging 

condition, or during any failure of the 

charging or battery monitoring system 

not shown to be extremely remote. The 

applicant must design Li-ion battery 

installation to preclude explosion or fire 

in the event of those failures. 

b. The applicant must design the Liion batteries to preclude the occurrence 

of self-sustaining, uncontrolled 

increases in temperature or pressure. 

c. No explosive or toxic gasses 

emitted by any Li-ion battery in normal 

operation or as the result of any failure 

of the battery charging or monitoring 

system, or battery installation not 

shown to be extremely remote, may 

accumulate in hazardous quantities 

within the airplane. 

d. Li-ion batteries that contain 

flammable fluids must comply with the 

flammable fluid fire protection 

requirements of § 23.863(a) through (d). 

e. No corrosive fluids or gasses that 

may escape from any Li-ion battery may 

damage surrounding airplane structure 

or adjacent essential equipment. 

f. The applicant must provide 

provision for each installed Li-ion 

battery to prevent any hazardous effect 

on structure or essential systems that 

may be caused by the maximum amount 

of heat the battery can generate during 

a short circuit of the battery or of its 

individual cells. 

g. Li-ion battery installations must 

have— 

(1) A system to control the charging 

rate of the battery automatically so as to 

prevent battery overheating or 

overcharging; or 

(2) A battery temperature sensing and 

over-temperature warning system with a 

means for automatically disconnecting 

the battery from its charging source in 

the event of an over-temperature 

condition; or 

(3) A battery failure sensing and 

warning system with a means for 

automatically disconnecting the battery 

from its charging source in the event of 

battery failure. 

h. Any Li-ion battery installation 

whose function is required for safe 

operation of the airplane, must 

incorporate a monitoring and warning 

feature that will provide an indication 

to the appropriate flightcrew members 

whenever the capacity and State of 

Charge (SOC) of the batteries have fallen 

below levels considered acceptable for 

dispatch of the airplane. 

i. The Instructions for Continued 

Airworthiness (ICA) must contain 

recommended manufacturers 

maintenance and inspection 

requirements to ensure that batteries, 

including single cells, meet a safety 

function level essential to the aircraft’s 

continued airworthiness. 

(1) The ICA must contain operating 

instructions and equipment limitations 

in an installation maintenance manual. 

(2) The ICA must contain installation 

procedures and limitations in a 

maintenance manual, sufficient to 

ensure that cells or batteries, when 

installed according to the installation 

procedures, still meet safety functional 

levels essential to the aircraft’s 

continued airworthiness. The 

limitations must identify any unique 

aspects of the installation. 

(3) The ICA must contain corrective 

maintenance procedures to check 

battery capacity at manufacturers 

recommended inspection intervals. 

(4) The ICA must contain scheduled 

servicing information to replace 

batteries at manufacturers 

recommended replacement time. 

(5) The ICA must contain 

maintenance and inspection 

requirements to check visually for 

battery and/or charger degradation. 

j. Batteries in a rotating stock (spares) 

that have experienced degraded charge 

retention capability or other damage due 

to prolonged storage must be 

functionally checked at manufacturers 

recommended inspection intervals. 

k. The System Safety Assessment 

(SSA) process should address the 

software and complex hardware levels 

for the sensing, monitoring, and 

warning systems if these systems 

contain complex devices. The 

functional hazard assessment (FHA) for 

the system is required based on the 

intended functions described. The 

criticality of the specific functions will 

be determined by the safety assessment 

process for compliance with § 23.1309. 

Advisory Circular 23–1309–1C contains 

acceptable means for accomplishing this 

requirement. For determining the failure 

condition, the criticality of a function 

will include the mitigating factors. The 

failure conditions must address the loss 

of function and improper operations. 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS
19892 Federal Register / Vol. 80, No. 71 / Tuesday, April 14, 2015 / Proposed Rules 

Issued in Kansas City, Missouri, on April 

6, 2015. 

Pat Mullen, 

Acting Manager, Small Airplane Directorate, 

Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2015–08586 Filed 4–13–15; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2015–0824; Directorate 

Identifier 2013–NM–191–AD] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Airbus 

Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Notice of proposed rulemaking 

(NPRM). 

SUMMARY: We propose to supersede 

Airworthiness Directive (AD) 98–20–27, 

for all Airbus Model A300 B4–600, B4– 

600R, and F4–600R series airplanes, and 

Model A300 C4–605R Variant F 

airplanes (collectively called Model 

A300–600 series airplanes). AD 98–20– 

27 currently requires repetitive 

inspections to detect fatigue cracking of 

the wing top skin at the front spar joint; 

and a follow-on eddy current inspection 

and repair, if necessary. Since we issued 

AD 98–20–27, we have received reports 

of cracking of the wing top skin in an 

area not required for inspection by AD 

98–20–27. This proposed AD would 

reduce the inspection compliance time 

and intervals, and extend the inspection 

area of the wing top skin at the front 

spar joint. We are proposing this AD to 

detect and correct fatigue cracking of the 

wing top skin at the front spar joint, 

which could result in reduced structural 

integrity of the airplane. 

DATES: We must receive comments on 

this proposed AD by May 29, 2015. 

ADDRESSES: You may send comments by 

any of the following methods: 

• Federal eRulemaking Portal: Go to 

http://www.regulations.gov. Follow the 

instructions for submitting comments. 

• Fax: (202) 493–2251. 

• Mail: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, 

M–30, West Building Ground Floor, 

Room W12–140, 1200 New Jersey 

Avenue SE., Washington, DC 20590. 

• Hand Delivery: U.S. Department of 

Transportation, Docket Operations, M– 

30, West Building Ground Floor, Room 

W12–140, 1200 New Jersey Avenue SE., 

Washington, DC, between 9 a.m. and 5 

p.m., Monday through Friday, except 

Federal holidays. 

For service information identified in 

this proposed AD, contact Airbus SAS, 

Airworthiness Office—EAW, 1 Rond 

Point Maurice Bellonte, 31707 Blagnac 

Cedex, France; telephone +33 5 61 93 36 

96; fax +33 5 61 93 44 51; email 

account.airworth-eas@airbus.com; 

Internet http://www.airbus.com. You 

may view this referenced service 

information at the FAA, Transport 

Airplane Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue 

SW., Renton, WA. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http://

www.regulations.gov by searching for 

and locating Docket No. FAA–2015– 

0824; or in person at the Docket 

Management Facility between 9 a.m. 

and 5 p.m., Monday through Friday, 

except Federal holidays. The AD docket 

contains this proposed AD, the 

regulatory evaluation, any comments 

received, and other information. The 

street address for the Docket Operations 

office (telephone 800–647–5527) is in 

the ADDRESSES section. Comments will 

be available in the AD docket shortly 

after receipt. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Dan 

Rodina, Aerospace Engineer, 

International Branch, ANM–116, 

Transport Airplane Directorate, FAA, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, WA 

98057–3356; telephone 425–227–2125; 

fax 425–227–1149. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Comments Invited 

We invite you to send any written 

relevant data, views, or arguments about 

this proposed AD. Send your comments 

to an address listed under the 

ADDRESSES section. Include ‘‘Docket No. 

FAA–2015–0824; Directorate Identifier 

2013–NM–191–AD’’ at the beginning of 

your comments. We specifically invite 

comments on the overall regulatory, 

economic, environmental, and energy 

aspects of this proposed AD. We will 

consider all comments received by the 

closing date and may amend this 

proposed AD based on those comments. 

We will post all comments we 

receive, without change, to http://

www.regulations.gov, including any 

personal information you provide. We 

will also post a report summarizing each 

substantive verbal contact we receive 

about this proposed AD. 

Discussion 

On September 16, 1998, we issued AD 

98–20–27, Amendment 39–10793 (63 

FR 50981, September 24, 1998). AD 98– 

20–27 requires actions intended to 

address an unsafe condition on all 

Airbus Model A300 B4–600, B4–600R, 

and F4–600R series airplanes, and 

Model A300 C4–605R Variant F 

airplanes (collectively called Model 

A300–600 series airplanes). 

Since we issued AD 98–20–27, 

Amendment 39–10793 (63 FR 50981, 

September 24, 1998): The European 

Aviation Safety Agency (EASA), which 

is the Technical Agent for the Member 

States of the European Union, has 

issued EASA Airworthiness Directive 

2013–0232R1, dated October 2, 2013 

(referred to after this as the Mandatory 

Continuing Airworthiness Information, 

or ‘‘the MCAI’’), to correct an unsafe 

condition. The MCAI states: 

During full-scale fatigue testing conducted 

in the early 1990’s, cracks were found on the 

top skin of the wing between Ribs 1 and 7, 

starting at the front spar fastener holes. 

This condition, if not detected and 

corrected, could adversely affect the 

structural integrity of the wing. 

Consequently, Airbus issued Service 

Bulletin (SB) A300–57–6045 and DGAC 

[Direction Ge ́ne ́rale de l’Aviation Civile] 

France issued AD 97–374–238 [http://

ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/19973740tb_

superseded.pdf/AD_F-1997-374-238_2] for 

A300–600 aeroplanes and AD 1999–008–020 

[http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/19980080tb_

superseded.pdf/AD_F-1999-008-020_2] for 

A300–600ST aeroplanes to require repetitive 

detailed inspections of the wing top skin and, 

in case of findings, an Eddy Current (EC) 

inspection, and, depending on the size of the 

cracks, repair. 

After those [DGAC] ADs were issued, 

further cracks to the wing top skin were 

reported by operators, within an area not 

covered by the existing [DGAC] ADs. To 

address this potential unsafe condition, 

Airbus revised SB A300–57–6045 to extend 

the area to be inspected. 

In addition, a fleet survey and updated 

Fatigue and Damage Tolerance analyses were 

performed in order to substantiate the second 

A300–600 Extended Service Goal (ESG2) 

exercise. The results of these analyses have 

determined that the inspection thresholds 

and intervals must be reduced to allow 

timely detection of these cracks and the 

accomplishment of applicable corrective 

action(s). 

As the ESG2 exercise is only applicable to 

A300–600 aeroplanes, A300–600ST 

aeroplanes are now addressed through new 

Airbus SB A300–57–9026. 

For the reasons described above, this 

[EASA] AD retains the requirements of DGAC 

France AD 97–374–238(B) [http://

ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/19973740tb_

superseded.pdf/AD_F-1997-374-238_2] 

[which corresponds to FAA AD 98–20–27, 

Amendment 39–10793 (63 FR 50981, 

September 24, 1998)] and [DGAC] AD 1999– 

008–020(B) [http://ad.easa.europa.eu/blob/

19980080tb_superseded.pdf/AD_F-1999-008- 

020_2], which are superseded, but requires 


asabaliauskas on DSK5VPTVN1PROD with PROPOSALS