United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted October 31, 2017*

Decided November 3, 2017

Before

DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge

JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge

DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge

No. 17-1861

MATTHEW SIPP,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NANCY A. BERRYHILL,

Acting Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 16 C 7261

Milton I. Shadur,

Judge.

O R D E R

Matthew Sipp, whose vision is impaired, appeals from a judgment upholding an 

administrative law judge’s determination that he was not disabled between January 13, 

2014, and January 29, 2015. We affirm the judgment.

 

* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
No. 17-1861 Page 2

Sipp first applied for SSI and disability insurance benefits in 1993. An ALJ 

evaluated Sipp’s application in 1996 and found that he was entitled to benefits based on 

his 20/400 uncorrected vision and his inability to tolerate corrective lenses. His benefits 

were discontinued in 2005. Sipp acknowledges knowing around this time that his 

benefits had stopped. In December 2005, he applied for disability insurance benefits, but 

that application was denied the following year. 

In early 2014 Sip filed a new SSI application based on his vision difficulties. 

Another ALJ denied his application, concluding based on examinations conducted by 

state-agency physicians that his vision had improved substantially, that he could 

perform unskilled work at all exertional levels, and that he was not disabled from the 

January 13, 2014 application date to her decision on January 29, 2015.

After the Appeals Council denied review, Sipp sought judicial review. He 

argued that the discontinuation of his benefits in 2005 was unlawful because he never 

had received a written notice that his benefits would be terminated. He also contended 

that, before his hearing, he did not receive the encrypted compact disc that contained 

the relevant documents from the administrative record (the CD apparently had been 

mailed to the wrong address), and this impeded his ability to write his brief.

The district judge rejected Sipp’s arguments and granted the Commissioner’s 

motion for summary judgment. The judge first determined that Sipp could not appeal 

the Commissioner’s decision in 2005 to terminate benefits because Sipp did not file his 

appeal within the requisite 60 days, see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). And even if he was unaware 

at that time that his benefits had been terminated, he should have become aware of the 

termination once he filed a new application for benefits in December 2005 and stopped 

receiving them. There was no evidence that Sipp could not file the claim earlier, the 

court added, and he could not circumvent the 60-day rule by seeking to reopen the 

earlier decision in his 2014 application. As for the ALJ’s 2014 denial of benefits, the 

judge agreed with the Commissioner that the uncontradicted medical evaluations in the 

record showed that Sipp no longer was disabled. Finally, the judge found that Sipp was 

not prejudiced by not receiving the CD before his appeal because he did not point to 

any information in the administrative record of which he was unaware.

On appeal Sipp first argues that the ALJ erred by refusing to construe his 2014 

application as an appeal from the Commissioner’s 2005 decision to terminate his 

benefits. But there was no error. If Sipp wanted to appeal the 2005 ruling, he needed to 

file a written request with the Appeals Council within 60 days, 20 C.F.R. § 416.1468(a), 

or otherwise seek an extension of time from the Appeals Council to file an appeal. 
No. 17-1861 Page 3

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Casey v. Berryhill, 853 F.3d 322, 326 (7th Cir. 2017); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 416.1468(b); id. § 416.1411. Sipp filed, however, not a request for an extension but a 

new application for benefits. Therefore the ALJ did not error by evaluating Sipp’s filing 

as a new application.

Sipp then insists that the ALJ ignored evidence—the Commissioner’s 1996 

decision granting him benefits as well as other unspecified “statements.” But an ALJ 

need not give a written evaluation of every piece of evidence as long as she builds a 

“logical bridge” to her conclusion. See Murphy v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 811, 815 (7th Cir. 2014). 

The ALJ did so here. She considered Sipp’s complaints that he suffered from panic 

attacks and social anxiety, as well as the medical opinions in the record. See 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(b), (c). Sipp does not point to any relevant evidence that the ALJ did not 

address.

We have considered Sipp’s other contentions but none merits discussion.

AFFIRMED.