Filed 4/28/14 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

In re the Marriage of VLADIXA and JOHN M. BOSWELL.

VLADIX A BOSWELL , Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

JOHN M. BO SWELL,
Defendant and Respondent. 2d Civil No. B249141 (Super. Ct. No. D142630) (Ventura County)

This is another frivolous family law appeal . As we shall explain, given well

known appellate rules, it was "dead on arrival" at the appellate courthouse. ( See Estate of Gilkison (1998 ) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449

. ) T he family law court is a court of equity and fairness. Here the trial court, exercising its broad equitable discretion,
refused to enforce a 25 year old judgment for child support arrearages bec ause appellant (mother) concealed the children for 15 years

. It specificall y ruled that doing so would be "inequitable," that the request was "untimely," "unjust" and " [t] his is just

a terribly egregious situation." T he trial court did not credit mother’ s factual explanation . It did credit respondent's ( father’s ) factual explanation , i.e. he did not
visit the children or pay child support because mother did conceal the children

. Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion and applied a faulty legal analysis in making its ruling. In addition, she claims that the trial court should2

.

have credited her declaration that she did not conceal the children

. We will affirm the judgment . We will not impose sanctions for this frivolous appeal only because the
trial court did err by employing a laches rationale as an independent reason for denying enforcement of the judgment.
Factual and Procedural Background
Mother and father dissolve d their marriage in October of 1 985. The trial court awarded p hysical custody of the two children, Denise (dob 2/24/80) and John Jr. (dob 3/6/82) to mother. Father was ordered to pay $70 per month child support per child.
He did so for two months and then mother "disappeared" with the children . Sh e moved from Cali fornia, changed the children ’ s names , and did not notify father of
their new addresses

. Father did not see the chi ldren for approximately 15 years, almost their entire minority. After Den ise reached the age of majority, m other " gave " custody of John Jr. to father in 1 998 when he was 16 years old. He lived with father until he reached majority.
Fifteen years after that, i.e. in 2013, the children were over 30 years old. Then, mother sought to enforce the child support order and sought a judgment of $9 2,734.94. Fairness/Equity Principles

" Family law court is a court of equity. [ Citation

. ] " (I n re Mariage of
Calcaterra & Bada khsh (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 28, 38

. ) " Those who seek e quity, must do equity and have 'clean hands'

. [ Citation .] " ( Id . A t p. 38

. ) "Family law cases

' are equitable proceedings in which the court must have the ability to exercise discretion to achieve fairness and equity. [ Citation .] ' " ( In re Marriage of Egedi (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 1 7, 22

- 23

. )
We n eed not dwell upon or expli cate in detail underlying principles of " active concealment," "estoppel ," or " retroactive modification of child support." The only
issue here is whether the trial court should have used judicial power to achieve an "inequitable result." ( Kendall

- Jackson Winery Ltd. V. Superior Court (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th 970, 985.) I t is sufficient to observe that mother did actively conceal the3

.

children

. This equitably estops her from enforcing a child support j udgment. ( In re Marriage of Damico (1994) 7 Cal.4th 673 , 682

- 683.)
The trial court found that mother had been " unjust " in her unilateral decision to

remove father from the children ’ s lives. This is tantamount to a finding of "unclean
hands." W e reiterate our statement in Keith G. v Suzanne H . (1998) 62 Ca l.App.4th 853, 862: " These are some of t he dirtiest hands we have seen."
As expressly indicate d by the trial court, this was "terribly egregious." " 'The
"clean hands" rule is of ancient origin and given broad application. It is the most important ru le affecting the administration of justice. "Equity denies affirmative relief
for such c onduct even though it thereby leaves undisturbed and in ostensible full legal effect acts or proceedings which would affirmatively be set aside but for such
considerat ion: " ' [ Citations. ] " ( Padgett v. Padgett (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 652, 656.) We hold that a family law court, in the exercise of its broad equitable discretion, and upon a finding of "unclean hands," may decline to enforce a child support arrearage judgm ent

. ( First holding, see infra

. ) Appellate Rules Mother contends that the trial court erroneously did not credi t her factu al showing of why father did not see his children for 15 years. This is folly. The trial court was not required to believe her and
, sitting as trier of fact, had the power and the right to not do so, just as it had the power and right to believe father. (See In re Marriage of Greenberg (2011) 194 Cal .App.4th 1095 , 1099

. ) We do not judge credibility on appeal . An adverse factual finding is a poor platform upon which to predicate reversible error. ( Id , at p. 1097

. ) "We sit as a court [ of law ] to review errors
of law and not [claimed] errors of fact." ( Achen v. Pepsi

- Cola Bottling Co. (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 113, 125.)
Mother has no appreciation for the rules on appeal , i.e. the substantial evidence rule and the rules relating to the exercise of discretion by the trial court and the review thereof by the Court of Appeal. ( Estate of Gilkison, supra
, 65 Cal.App.4th at pp.4

.

1448

- 1449) These rules are well known. They need not be repeated. We hold that, where, as here, the family law court makes a fair and equitable ruling on contested issues of fact, its express or implied factual determinations, are binding on appeal. The

appe llate court may not substitute its discretion for that of the trial court unless the appellant can demonstrate, as a matter of law, that the trial court’s judgment is arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or exceeds the bounds of reason. ( Id . at pp. l448

- l449

. ) (Second holding, see infra .)

A Digression on The Use of the Word, "Holding" There are two holdings in this opinion. In this portion of the opinion
, which is dicta, we explain the proper use of the word "holding." We use the word, "holding" in
it s traditional and strict legal sense. Witkin uses the latin phrase, "ratio decidendi" to describe the word, "holding." " The ratio decidendi is the principle or rule that constitutes the ground of the decision, and it is this principle or rule that has th e effect of a precedent. It is therefore necessary to read the language of an opinion in the light of its facts and the issues raised, to determine (a) which statements of law were necessary to the decision, a nd therefore binding precedents , and (b) which were arguments and general observations, unnecessary to the decision, i.e. dict a, with no force as precedents." ( 9 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008 ) , § 509, pp

. 572

- 573;
see also Hubbard v

. Superior Court (1997) 66 Cal.App.4th 1163, 11 68; United Stee l Workers of America v

. Board of Education (l984) 162 Cal. App. 3d 823, 834

- 835

. ) Here, our two holdings are necessary to our decision and are, therefore, binding precedents.
W e comment on the strict use of the word, " hold, " because there are cases where the appellate court casually characteriz es a trial court's ruling as a " holding " or that the trial court " held " something. (e.g. Johnson v. Prasad ( 2014) 224 Cal .App. 4th 74, 76; Hilton v Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 47, 51; Achen v

. Pepsi

- Cola
Bo ttling Co ., supra, 105 Cal.App.2d at p. 124

. ) Sin ce a trial court cannot create

" binding precedent," it cannot " hold " anything. ( Santa Ana Hospital Medical Center5

.

v. Bleshe  (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 819, 831.) There are also cases where the appellate

courts casually use the word "hold" when it actually means, conclude. For example,
the Hilton court said: "We hold the ruling of the trial court was erroneous as an act in excess of the court's jurisdiction." ( Hilton v. Superior Court, supra, 224 Cal.App.4th at p. 51; see also City of Palmdale v

. City of Lancaster (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 978, 985; People v. Biane (2013) 58 Cal.4th 381, 398.) Extreme care should be taken in the choice of words for a true holding. As
Witkin has said: "A conclusion in which t he holding on legal issues is clearly stated is common and highly desirable." (Witkin, Manuel on Appellate Court Opinions (1977) § 78, p. 137.) Dean Wigmore states: " [ T ] here is one thing that it [an opinion] must do, viz

. , it

must state plainly the r u l e upon which the decision proceeds. This is required , in theory, because the C ourt's function is to declare the law . . . ." (Leflar, Appellate Judicial Opinions, (1974) ch. 7, p. 155.)
Laches As a separate basis for denial of the motion to enforce a child support arrearage judgment, the trial court ruled that there was a laches bar , i.e

. she waited too long to
enforce the order. This theory is erroneous as a matter of law and father so conc edes

. Family Code section 291 subdivis ion (d) provide s th at the defense of laches only applies to child support owed to the state. (See In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39
Cal.4th 179, 1 82; Hogoboom & King, C al. Practice Guide, Family Law ( The Rutter Group, 2013 ) [¶] 6:7 3 9, p. 6

- 293

. )
Sanctions Vel Non
A lthoug h the appeal is friv o lous, we elect not to impose sanctions because mother believes, and apparently prosecuted this appeal, because of the trial court’s ruling on laches. This is the only thing that saves her and her attorney from a sanction
order.6

. Disp osition The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

.

YEGAN, J.

We concur:

GILBERT, P.J.

PERREN, J.7

. Roger Lund, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

______________________________

Ross A. Spector, Spector & Bennet, a Professional Corporation, for Appellant.

Jeffrey S. Graff, for Respondent.