UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4732

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

JOHN ROBERT MULLEN,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western 

District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. 

Voorhees, District Judge. (5:12-cr-00043-RLV-DCK-1)

Submitted: July 31, 2015 Decided: August 14, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Ross Richardson, Executive Director, Anne L. Hester, FEDERAL 

DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC., Charlotte, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Jill Westmoreland Rose, Acting United 

States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

John Robert Mullen appeals from the sentence imposed after 

he pleaded guilty to bank robbery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a) (2012). Mullen contends that the district court 

plainly erred in ordering him to pay restitution to a police 

officer and the Hickory Police Department based on losses 

incurred while pursuing and apprehending him after the bank 

robbery. Finding no plain error, we affirm.

Mullen argues for the first time on appeal that the losses 

caused by his flight and arrest were not specific conduct that 

was the basis for his conviction of bank robbery. The Mandatory 

Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”) requires a court, when 

sentencing a defendant for a crime where an identifiable victim 

has suffered a pecuniary loss, to order “that the defendant make 

restitution to the victim of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3663A(a)(1), (c)(1)(A)(ii), (B) (2012). For purposes of the 

MVRA, a victim is: 

a person directly and proximately harmed as a result 

of the commission of an offense for which restitution 

may be ordered including, in the case of an offense 

that involves as an element a scheme, conspiracy, or 

pattern of criminal activity, any person directly 

harmed by the defendant’s criminal conduct in the 

course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.

Id. § 3663A(a)(2) (2012). Thus, “to be considered a victim[,] 

. . . the act that harms the individual must be either conduct 

underlying an element of the offense of conviction, or an act 
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taken in furtherance of a scheme, conspiracy, or pattern of 

criminal activity that is specifically included as an element of 

the offense of conviction.” United States v. Davis, 714 F.3d 

809, 813 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted); see

18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(2) (2012) (setting forth definition in 

Victim and Witness Protection Act (“VWPA”), a precursor of the 

MVRA); Davis, 714 F.3d at 813 n.1 (noting similarity of MVRA’s 

and VWPA’s definitions). “A restitution order that exceeds the 

authority of the statutory source is no less illegal than a 

sentence of imprisonment that exceeds the statutory maximum.” 

Davis, 714 F.3d at 812 (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because Mullen failed to object to the restitution order, 

this court reviews for plain error only. See id. at 815-16. To 

establish plain error, Mullen must demonstrate “that the 

district court erred, that the error was plain, and that it 

affected his substantial rights.” United States v. Robinson, 

627 F.3d 941, 954 (4th Cir. 2010) (internal alterations and 

quotation marks omitted). This court has discretion to correct 

such error only if it “seriously affect[s] the fairness, 

integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” United 

States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993) (internal quotation 

marks and alteration omitted).

The Government argues that the officer and police 

department were “directly and proximately harmed as a result of” 
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the bank robbery offense, contending that Mullen’s conduct in 

robbing the bank led directly to his attempt to evade the police 

officers and the damages were incurred during the flight. See

18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(2) (MVRA definition of victim).

We conclude that the district court did not plainly err in 

ordering Mullen to pay restitution to an arresting officer for 

damage to his uniform and to the police department for damage to 

another officer’s service weapon. See United States v. 

Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1268 (11th Cir. 2006) (no error in a 

restitution award to a police department for damage to property 

caused during the defendant’s flight following his commission of 

a bank robbery); United States v. Reichow, 416 F.3d 802, 805

(2005) (no error in order to pay restitution after defendant 

convicted of armed robbery for damage to police cars, 

destruction of uniforms, and medical bills incurred by an 

injured sheriff’s deputy, where damage “occurred ‘during’ the 

robbery”); United States v. Donaby, 349 F.3d 1046, 1051-55 (7th 

Cir. 2003) (bank robbery directly and proximately caused the 

damage to a police vehicle that occurred during the flight from 

the crime scene). 

Finding no plain error, we affirm the sentence and 

restitution imposed by the district court. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED