### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03- 06 -00 648 -CR

Al be r t J e r m ain Cl ift on , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 167TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. D-1- DC-06 -20 3379 , HO NORAB LE MI CHAEL LY NCH , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Alber

t J er m ai nC l i ft o n

ap p ea l s h i s co n v i ct i o n s o nt wo co u n t s o f a ggravated
ro bb e ry . T e x. Pe na l Co de Ann. § 2 9. 03 (a)(2 ) (Wes t 20 03 ). Af te r t he jur y fo un d a pp e lla nt guil ty of both counts in a sing le indictment, the trial court assessed punishment when appellant pled “tr ue” to alleg ations that he had be en prev i ously convicted of

two felonies. The trial court imposed
s e n t e n c e s o f

e i g h t e e nye ar s ’ i mp r i s o n m e n to ne a c h c o u n t
. T h e s e n t e n c e s ar e t o r u nc o n c u r r e n t l y.
P OIN TS OF ER RO R Appellant adva

nces f our points o f error. F irst, appellant cha lleng es the leg al sufficie ncy

of the e vidence to sustain the convictions for a g g ra v at ed robber y based on the law of par ties. Second, appe llant con t ends t hat the trial c ourt err ed in not g iving a ppellant’s spec ial requ e s te d ju

r y c h ar g e o n th e St a te ’ s b u r d e n to p r o v e th a t a p p e ll an t w a s c r im in a ll y r e s p o n s ib le for the agg ravating element of eac h offe nse. Third, appellant urg es that the trial c ourt err ed in over ruling2

the mot ion

to s up pr e ss p hy sic a l e vid e nc e . F ou rt h, app e lla nt a sse rt s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s dis c re tio n in

a dmi tti ngint o e vid e nc e a c o- c on sp ir a tor ’s he ars ay

state me nt.
BACK GR OUND Ab o u t6 : 4 5 a. m . o n t h e mo rn i n g o f J u n e 24 , 2 0 0 6 , Hi l d ega rd o Ga rc i a a n d h i s t ee n age son, David, p ar

k e d th e ir F o r d F
- 1 5 0 tr

u c k o n B a tt le B e n d D r iv e in A u s ti n , T r a v is Co u n ty , near the KI A automo b i l e ag ency . They wer e to pick up a f

riend of H ildeg ardo’ s who owned a ranc h wher e they

wer e to lay

water lines later that day
. David Ga rcia testified that he sa

w what a ppear ed to be a g old-co l o red Chry sler P.T. Cruiser stop at a ne arby stop light and then the driver ba cked the motor vehicle near

their truck. D avid re veale d that a y oung , slightly built Hispanic male we aring
a re d shirt and bag g y

pants g ot out of the passeng er side of the g old-colore d car . He a pproac hed David’s fathe r, Hildeg ardo, who was in the driver’ s seat of the truck. The Hispani c m al e, later i d e n t i f i e d a s P a u l S e r r a t o , p o i n t e d

a s i l v e r an d b l a c k p i s t o l a tH i l d e g ar d o a n d d e m an d e d m o n e y. David said t h at h is father strug g led to g et his wallet out of his pants, then opene d his wallet to let the do lla r b ill s f a ll t o th e fl oo rb oa

rd of the tr uc k. Hi s f

a the r t he n sh ow e d the e mpt

y wa lle t to S e rr a to indicating that he had no money . At this point, acc ording to D avid, Serrato c ame around the front of the truc k to the passeng er side w here David was seate d next to an open window. Ser rato pointed the pi st ol at Dav id’ s c he st a nd Da vid be g an p ic kin g up the mon e y fr om t he fl oo rb oa

rd . D a vid testified that at this time a larg e Af rica n-Amer ican male , six foot or so t all and twice the size of Serrato, got out of the driver ’s side of the g old-colore d car , wea ring a dar k shirt with a red towe l around his nec k. He wa s later identified as appellant Albert Cl ifton. David did not see a ny wea pon in a pp e lla nt’ s p os se ssi on , b ut n ote d th a t a pp e lla nt a pp ro a c he d h is f

a the r’ s si de of

the tr uc k w hil eHi l d ega rdo Garcia te stified by use of a Spanish lang uag e interpr eter . The prose cutor 1 pointed out in jury argument that appellant had briefly spoken to David in Eng lish that Hildega rdo may not have unde rstood. 3 Serrato held the pistol on him on the other side of the truc k
. I t appea

red to Da vid that appellant was talking to his father w hile he wa s handing money to Serrato at gunpoint. Appellant then looked
a t D a vid and , s a id t o D a vid

“ y e ah, y ou too .” Da

vid int e rp re te d th is t o me an th a t D a vid sh ou ld a lso
surre nder his m o n ey . Da v i d estimated that he ha nded Serr ato $150. David a nd his father

wer e ins tr uc te d b y Se rr a to t o d

ri ve awa y , tha t the y wo uld be fo llo we d, to thr ow awa y the ir c e ll p ho ne s, and not to call the police. Appellant g ot back into the drive r’s seat of the g old car and Serr ato g ot in the passeng er’ s seat. David repor ted that they wer e followed by the g old car for some distanc e, but when his fathe r t urned off t he acce ss road into a street, the g old car drove onto I -H 35. A pa

rtial Texas license plate number “711” wa s observe d on the g old-colore d car . David and his fa ther drove to a frie nd’s house a

nd called the police. Hildeg ardo g ener ally

corr oborate d his son’s testimony . Both testified that the y had
no t c on se nte d to the takin g of the ir mon e y by Se rr a to a nd tha t th e y ha d be e n pla c e d in fe ar o f t he ir liv es at gunp oi nt. Hi lde g ard o te sti fi e d th a t th e re wa s $ 30 0 in his wa lle t, f

ar m or e tha

n D a vid estimated. Hildeg ardo r eca lled appellant g ot out of the g old car at the same time as Ser

rato a nd then stood by that car . He did not re member a ppellant talking to him or say ing a ny thing to David. At 1 tr ia l bo th Hi lde g ard o and Da vid Ga rc ia ma de in- c ourt

ide nti fi c a tio ns of

a pp e lla nt a s a pa rt ic ipa nt i n the arm e d r ob be ri e s.

Au sti nP o l i c e O f

f i c e r s Lu i s D e l g a d o an d

Jam e s M o r g anr e s p o n d e d t o t h e G ar c ia s’ call and inter

viewed them at the frie nd’s home whe re the y had drive n. Offic er D elg ado talked4

with Hildeg ardo in the Spanish languag e while Of fi ce r Morga

n discussed the e vents with David. Offic er De l gad o p assed his i nformation to Off icer Morg an, who in turn g ave inf ormation to the police dispatche r wh o i s s u ed a BOL O (B e on the L ookout) to all police units. This included the descr iption of the two assailants, the g oldish P.T.-ty pe C ruiser, a

nd the silver and bla ck pistol. The two police off

i ce rs re t u rned to their substation to write the ir repor ts. W ithin a short time, they le arn e d th a t su sp e c ts m a tc hin g the de sc ri pti on s in the B OL O h a d b e e n d e ta ine d. Th e y we nt t o the sce ne o f t he dete ntion where the vehicle and the suspec ts matched the de scriptions g iven by the Ga rc ia s. Austin Pol ice Of

fice r Ke ith W ade w as on patrol on the mor ning of Saturday , J une 24, 2006. He h a d

h e ar d a B O L O a b o u t a na g g r a v a te d

r o b b e r y o nB a tt le B e n d

Ro a d w h ic h g a ve the desc riptions of the two suspects who ha d used a handg un. The BOL O desc ribed the ve hicle as a Chevrole t HHR which re sembled a P.T. Cruis er w ith a partial lice nse plate numbe r “711.” As Offic er Wade later pa ssed the Te x as De partment of Public Safe ty office , Driver ’s L icense Division, at 4719 South Cong ress, he observe d a g old-colore d vehicle matching the B OL O desc ription parked in the fr on tp ar

k i n g l o t
. T h i s l o c a t i o nw a s a b o u ta m i l e an d a h a l f f r o m t h e B a t t l e B e n d

a d dr e ss g ive n in the B OL O, a

nd it w a s tw o ho ur s or so a ft e r t he a lle g e d r ob be ry . O ff

ic e r Wa de tur

ne d h is vehicle around and drove past the g old vehicle a g ain. He sa w a young Hispanic male in the driver’ s
se a t w iththe wi nd owdo wn . H e c ou ld n ot te ll if any on e e lse wa s in the g old ve hic le be c a

us e of its tinted windows and the he avy rain. The dispatcher

was c alled and ba ck-up units wer e re quested. Of fi c e r Wad e tur

ne d his ve hic le aro un d a g a in and dr ov e ba c k, a pp ro a c hin g the g old vehicle in the pa

rking lot, but st opping a

bout seventy -f

i v e fe et awa

y to await the a

rrival of the5

a dd iti on a l po lic e un its . H e the n ob se rv e d that the c ar wa s a Che vr ole t HH R, no t a P.T . Cr uis e r, wi th
a pa rt ia l li c e ns e plate numbe r “ 73 1” ins te a d o f “ 71 1. ” Of fi c e r Wade so on ob se rv e d th e Hi sp anic male g et out of t he gold vehicle with a red g as can and move to the rear of the vehicle. When the Hispanic male made e y e conta ct with Offic er W ade, he dropped the g as ca n and starte d back to the driver’ s door of the g old vehicle.

Offic er W ad e b ec ame concer ned bec ause if the Hispanic male g ot to the car , an automobile chase would ensue on slick rainy streets, e ndang eringthe suspects, the police , and the public. He pulled his police unit within fiftee n fee t of the g old ve hicle, drew his pistol, g ot out of the po lic e un it, and

or de re d th e Hisp ani c mal e to g e t on the g ro un d. Th e su sp e c t di d n ot w ant t o
c omp ly bu t e ve ntu a lly

did . B e fo re se c ur ingthe su sp e ct, Offi c e r Wa de he ard a no ise in t

he g old vehicle a nd he sawthe car rock or move. Throug h a back window, the off icer saw a silhouette inside the car . He y elled to that individual to ke ep his ha nds up and “to stay rig ht the re . ” T h e s u s p ect i n s ide the ca

r wa s slow to respond and c ontinued to move. Offic er Wade could not hear what the suspect inside the c ar w as say ing. O ffice r Wade kne w a ha n d gu n h ad b ee n u sed and w as possibly in the possession of one of the susp ec t s . At t h i s time, the Hispanic male , Serrato, on the g round y elled towar d the ca r, “w aste him, dog , waste him” a nd “shoot him and g et out of her e.” Offic er Wade was still the o n l y o ff i ce r on the sce ne. No shots wer e fire d. Offic er Jesse B arunda
arr ived and took steps to se cure Serrato on the g round. Off icer Wade was the n able to g et the man, later ide ntified as appellant, out of t he gold vehicle. No weapon was found on appellant’ s person. Offic er Wade then saw a handg un on the floorboa rd of the c ar on the driver’ s side. He lef t the6

wea pon there for the c rime sce ne unit. Appellant wa s wea ring a re d bandana around his neck w hich
wa s a pp are ntl y the re d to we l D a vid

Ga rc ia tho ug ht h e sa

w o n a pp e lla nt. Offic er Rodric k May

berr y arr ived on the sce ne. H e d e s c r ib e d a p p e ll a nt as an Af

ricanAmeric an, 6' 3" ta ll, and weig hing a bout 300 pounds. Appell an t h ad $779 on his person whe n
arr ested. At the jail booking , some valuables wer e taken from appellant including wha t ap p ear ed to b e dia mon d e arr ing s th a t D a vid

Ga rc ia re me mbe re d a

pp e lla nt w e ari nga t th e tim e of the ro bb e ri e s. L ee Her nandez, a crime unit specialist, arrive d on the sce ne of the arr ests and took
c us tod y of th e h an d g u n i n t h e c ar an d i t s m a g a z i n e . T h e r e w a s a b u l l e t i n t h e c h a mb e r . She a lso
secur ed $216.35 in cash taken from Serrato. Her nandez swabbe d the handg un g rip and trig g er f or DNA pur poses. On June 27, 2006, in accor dance with a sea rch war rant, a bucca l sw ab wa s taken from appe llant’s mouth.

Cassie Carra dign, a

fore nsic scientist and DNAsupervisor at th e Au s t in Poli ce Depa rtment testified that appe llant’s known DNA sa mple matched the DNA pr ofile take n from the pistol’s handle or g rip.

J aso nFl at o r, a f

i re ar m s ex p er t , t es t i fi edt h e h an d gu nwa s a S m i t h an d W esson firearm in working order

and it was a

deadly wea pon. The mag azine also seized was a Smit h and Wesson mag azine with ten live rounds there in. Appellant called no witnesses and r ested a nd closed with the State a t th e g uil t/i nn oc e nc e sta g e of the tr ia l.
LEGAL SUF F ICIENCY I n his first point of error, appellant challeng es t he lega l sufficie ncy of the e vidence to sustain his convictions for ag g ravated robbery under the law of parties. I n deter mining whe ther7

the evidenc e is leg ally

sufficie nt to support the judg ment of convic tion, we view the e vidence in the light most favor able to the judg ment, asking wheth er an y ra tional trier of f act c ould have f

ound bey ond a rea sonable doubt all the e ssential elements of the offe nse cha rg ed. Se e J

ac k so n v . V irg ini a , 44 3 U .S. 30 7, 31 9 ( 19 79 ); Dr ic ha s v . S tat e , 1 75 S.W. 3d 79 5, 79 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Cardenas

v . S tat e , 3 0 S. W.3 d 3 84 , 3 89 -9 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Ad e lm an v. Stat e , 828 S.W .2d 418, 421 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 92 ). Th is s tand ard g ive s f ull pla y to t he re sp on sib ili ty

of the tr ie r o f f

a c t to
re so lve c on fl ic ts i n th e te sti mony , to we ig h th e e vid e nc e , a nd to d ra w rea so na

ble inf e re nc e s. Jack son , 4 43 U. S. at 31 9; Cla y ton v . S tat e , 235 S.W .3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Th e e vid e nc e vi ewed in t his lig ht, and

a ll r e a so na

ble inf e re nc e s d ra wn the re fr om,
are evaluated in an appe llate re view. Se e Al v arad o v . S tat e , 912 S.W .2d 199, 207 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The r eviewingcourt must consider a ll ev i d en ce, r ightly or wrong ly

admitted, which the trier of fac t was per

mitted to consider. Se e Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 919 S.W .2d 370, 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 94 ); J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 871 S.W .2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
. The standard of revie w is the same for both direct a

nd circ umstantial evidence
. Kitz ne r v . S tat e , 99 4 S.W. 2d 18 0, 18 9 ( Te x. Cr im. A p p . 19 99 ); Gr een v . S

tat e , 840 S.W .2d 394, 401 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992). I n its review of the leg al suffic iency

of the e vidence , the appe ll at e court does not realig n, disreg ard or weig h the evidenc e. Ro dr igu e

z v . S tat e , 939 S.W .2d 211, 218 (T ex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.). The jury is t h e trier of

fac t, is the judge of the c redibility of the witnesse s and the we ight to be g iven the te s ti mo n y , an d ma

y a c c e p t o r r e

je c t a ll o r an y o f a w it

n e s s ’ s te s timony
. See Ma rg ra v es v . S tat e , 34 S.W. 3d

91 2, 91 9 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Sh ar pe v . S tat e , 707 S.W .2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Reconc iliation of evidentiary conflicts is solely

a function of the trier

of fa ct. See M

atsonA dea dly wea pon is a fire arm or a

ny thing manif

estly desig ned, made , o r ad apted f or the 2 purpose of

inflicting se rious bodily

injury or any thing that, in the manner of its use or intended use, is capab le o f causi ng deat h or se ri ou s b od il y in ju ry . T ex . P enal Co de A nn . § 1. 07 (a)(1 7)( A), (B) (West 2006). A “fire arm” means any device desig ned, made , or ada pted to expel a projec tile throug h a ba rr e l by us inge ne rg y

g e ne rate d b y

an e xplos ion

or bu rni ng su

bs tanc e or

any de vic e re a dil y conver tible to that use. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 46.01(3) ( West 2003). 8 v . S tat e , 819 S.W. 2d 83 9, 84 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 93 ); Mi ra nd a v . S tat e , 813 S.W .2d 724, 733-34 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, pet. ref ’d). Pe rt ine nt t o b oth

c ounts of the ind ic tme nt, se c tio n 2 9. 02 pr ov ide s in pa rt : (a ) Ape rs on

c omm its an o ff

e ns e if in t he c ours e of c omm itt ing the ft a s d e fi ne d in Chapter 31 a

nd with intent to obtain or maintain control of the prope rty he:

. . . . (2) intentionally

and knowing ly

threatens or plac es anothe r in fea r of imminent bodil y

injury or death.
Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 29.02(a) (2) ( West 2003).

Rob be ry c an b e c ome a g g ra

vate d r ob be ry

if th e ro bb e ry

is c omm itt e d b y

us e or exhibit ion of a de adly

wea pon. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 29.03(a) (2) ( West 2003). 2 Appellant wa s char g ed with agg ravated robbe ry of Hildeg ardo G arc ia in the first count of the i ndictment and with ag g ravated robbery of David Garc ia in the sec ond count. The i n d i ct m ent alleg ed that ea ch count of robber y beca me ag g ravated by

the use a nd exhibi tion of a de a dly we a po n, to w it: a

fi re arm .9 Th e ind ic tme nt o n it s f

a c e a pp e are d to c ha

rg e a pp e ll ant a s a

pr ima ry a c tor in b oth counts. Ther e we re no a lleg ations that appellant wa s a par ty to the offe nses or that the la w of pa rties
was a pplicable. Such a lleg ations in an indictment are not nece ssary in order for the State to pr ocee d in the case on the t heory

of par ties. Ma rb le v . S

tat e , 85 S.W .3d 287, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); J ac k so n v . S tat e , 8 98 S.W. 2d

89 6, 89 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ); P es i n a v . S t ate , 949 S.W .2d 37 4, 37 7 (T e x. Ap p. —Sa

n An ton io 19 97 , no pe t.)
. Th e State ’s the or y wa s that a

pp e lla nt wa s g uil ty as both a p r im ar

y a c to r an d a p arty
. T h e tr ia l c o u rt s u b mi tt e d th e c a s e to th e ju r y o n ly under the law o f p art ie s.
A person is c riminally

responsible a s a par

ty to an offe nse if the of

fense is committ ed by his own conduct, by the conduct of another for whic h he is criminally responsible, or by both.
Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 7.01(a) (West 2003).

Se c tio n 7 .0 2 o f t

he Pe na l Co de pr ov ide s in pe rt ine nt p art : (a) A person is criminally responsible for the offense commit ted by the conduc t of another if,

. . . . (2) a ct i n g with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offe nse, he solicits, enc ourag es, direc ts, aid s , o r attempts t o aid the other pe rson to commit the offense
. Tex. P enal Code A nn. § 9.02(a) (2) ( West 2003).

To convict a

person a s a par

ty it is first necessar

y to prove t h e g uilt of another person as the primary actor bey ond a re asonable doubt. Ri c ha rd so n v . S tat e , 879 S.W .2d 874, 88210

(Tex. Crim. App. 199 3 ). W h en a pa rty is not the “primary

actor ,” the State must prove be y ond a
re a so na ble do ub t c on du c t c on sti tut ing the of fe ns e c ha rg e d, plu s a

n a c t by the de fe nd ant d on e wi th intent to promote and assist such conduc t. Be ir v . S tate , 687 S.W .2d 2, 3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Chr ist e ns e n v . S

tat e , 2 40 S.W. 3d

25 , 3 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [14th Di st. ] 200 7, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Pesina , 949 S.W .2d at 382. I n order to establish liabilit y

as a pa rty in addition to the ill eg al co n d u ct by the pr ima ry a c tor , it mus t be sh ow n th a t th e a c c us e d h arb or e d th e sp e c if ic int e nt t o p ro mot e or

a ssi st the commission of the offe nse, i.e., a g g ravated robbe ry . Christ ensen , 2 40 S.W. 3d a t 31 ; Pesina , 949 S.W .2d at 382.

Th e e vid e nc e mus t sh owtha t th e pa rt ie s w e re a c tin g to gethe r to a c c omp lis h th e ir common purpose. W

y gal v . S tat e , 555 S.W .2d 465, 469 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977). The ag ree ment to acc omplish a common purpose, if any , must be made be fore or conte mporane ous with the criminal
e ve nt, bu t in

de te rm ini ngwh e the r o ne ha s pa rt ic ipate d in a

n o ff e ns e , th e c ourt

may e xami ne e ve nts , befor e, during , and af

ter the c ommissi on of the o ff ense. Po we ll v . S

tat e , 194 S.W .3d 503, 507 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Mi lle r v . S tat e , 83 S.W .3d 308, 314 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref ’d). Whil e an a g ree ment of the parties to ac t toge ther in common desig n can se ldom be proved by

direc t evidence , relianc e may be had on the actions of the pa rties showing by

direc t or circ umstantial evidence an under standing and common desig n to do a ce rtain ac t. Bu rd inev . S tat e , 71 9 S.W.2 d 309 , 315 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 86 ); Pesina , 949 S.W .2d at 383. I n fac t, circumstantial evidenc e may

be suff icient alone to e stablish one as a pa rty to an offe nse. Po we ll , 194 S.W .3d at 506; W ygal , 555 S.W .2d at 469.11 The State must show more than mere prese nce to establish participation in a c riminal offe nse. Va lde

z v . S tat e , 6 23 S.W. 2d

31 7, 32 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 81 ); Pesina , 949 S.W .2d at 383. Ev ide nc e is suf

fi c ie nt, ho we ve r, to co nv ic t unde r the la w of pa rt ie s whe re the a c c us e d is ph y sic a lly prese nt at the commission of the offe nse a n d en coura g es its commission by words or othe r ag ree ment. Ra ns om v . S

tat e , 920 S.W .2d 288, 302 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994). To convict a defe ndant as a party to the offe nse of ag g ravated rob b er y i n v o l ving the use or exhibi tion of a dea dly wea pon, a fire arm, the State must prove that the def endant
was c riminally

responsible for

the primary

actor ’s use or e x h i b i t ion of a fir ear m during the commission of the offe nses. Se e Ste ph e ns v . S

tat e , 717 S.W .2d 338, 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Br own v . S

tat e , 21 2 S.W. 3d 85 1, 86 0 (T e x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1st Di st. ] 2 00 6, pet . ref ’d ); W ooden

v . S tat e , 101 S.W .3d 542, 547-48 (Te x . App.—For t Worth 2003, pet. ref’d)
. The undisputed dire ct and circ umstantial e vidence shows that Paul Serrato wa s the primar y a c to r in th e c o mm is s io no f

th e a g g r a v a te d

r o b b e r ie s o f

H il d e g ar d o an d

D a v id G ar c ia by taking money

from them by the us e and exhi bition of a dea dly wea pon, a fire arm, a

nd placingthem in fear of de ath or ser ious bodily injury . Both of the Gar cias identified a ppellant as be ing pr esent
a t th e sc e ne and

a c tin g tog e the r w ithSe rr a to a nd a idi nghim

in t he ro bb e ri e s. I ntent can be inferr ed fr om the acts, words, and conduct of an ac cused. Du es v . S tat e , 63 4 S. W.2 d 3 04 , 3 06 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ); Ro mo v . S tat e , 593 S.W .2d 690, 693 (Tex. Crim. App. 1 9 8 0 ). Proof of a culpable mental state g ener ally relies upon circ umstantial e vidence
. Dillon

v . S tat e , 574 S.W .2d 92, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) . Since mental culpa bility is of such a nature that it ge nera lly

must be inferr ed from circ umstances under w hich the prohibited a ct occ urre d, the trier12

of fa c t may inf

e r int e nt fr om any fa c ts in e vid e nc e wh ic h te nd to pr ov e e xiste nc e of such i nten t. He rn an de z v . S tat e , 819 S.W .2d 806, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). He re , th e e vid e nc e sh ow e d a pp e lla nt d ro ve Se rr a to t o th e sc e ne of the ro bb e ries. Appellant wa s pres en t wh en Serrato was using and exhibiti ng a pistol demanding money from the Gar cias. When Serr ato went to the pa sseng er side of the Gar cia truc k, appellant was outside the g old -c olo re d c a

r p re ve nti ngany

e sc a pe fr om t he dr ive r’ s si de of

the Ga rc ia tr uc k. Da vid Ga rc ia
re c a lle d a pp e lla nt l e anin g in a

t the dr ive r’ s sid e of the tr uc k and te lli ng him , “ y e ah, y ou too ” wh ile Serrato was collec ting money at g unpoint. Appellant was the driver of the g etawa y car and followe d the Gar cia truc k for a

while to pr event them from immediately calling the police. Seve ral hours later and a mile a

nd a half from the sc ene of

t he robbe ries, appe llant was found in the g old-colore d car with Serrato ne arby . DNA e vidence tied appellant to the blac k and silver Smit h and Wesson pist ol also found in the car and identified by the Gar cias a s appea ring to be the we apon used by Serrato. Nea rly eig ht hundred dollars w as found on a ppellant’s per son. Viewingall the evidenc e, direc t a nd circ umstantial, in the light most favor able to the jur y ve rd ic t, w e c on c lud e tha t any re a so na ble t ri er of fa c t c ou ld h a ve fo un d b e y on d a re a so na ble doubt all of the esse ntial elements of e ach c ount of the indictment, including the ag g ravating e lement of e a c h of fe ns e un de r t

he law o f p art ie s. We r e

je c t a pp e lla nt’ s c la im that th e e vid e nc e wa s le g a lly ins uf fi c ie nt t o c on vic t hi m a s a pa rt y to t he tw o a g g ra

vated ro bb e ri e s. Th e fi rs t po int of e rr or is
overr uled. Se e Es c ob ar v . S

tat e , 28 S.W .3d 767, 774 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2000, pet. ref’d) ; J oh ns on v . S

tat e , 6 S.W. 3d

70 9, 71 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —H ou sto n [1s t D ist .] 19 99 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; BrewerAppellant ar g ues that there was a conf l i ct b etwee n Hildeg ardo G arc ia’s testimony and 3 that of David G arc ia as to a ppellant’s activities at the sce ne of the crimes. Contrar y to appellant’s argument, appellant would be g uilty bey ond a re asonable doubt as a pa rty to the offe nses under

either ve rs ion of the fa c ts. Mo re ov e r, the jur y c ou ld h a ve re c on c ile d a

ny c on fl ic t a g a ins t a

pp e lla nt. 13 v . S tat e , 85 2 S.W. 2d 64 3, 64 7 ( Te x. Ap p. —D a lla s 1 99 3, pe t. r e f’ d) ; W e bb e r v . S tat e , 757 S.W .2d 51, 53-55 (Te x . App.—Houston [14th Dis t.] 1988, pet. re f’d)
. 3
JUR Y CH ARGE I n h is s e c on d p oin t of

e rr or , a pp e lla nt u rg e s th a t th e “ tr ia l c ourt

e rr e d in fa ili ngto pr op e rl y ins tr uc t th e jur y re g ard ingthe State ’s re qu ir e me nt to pr ov e a pp e lla nt c ri min a lly

re sp on sib le for the a g g ravating e lement and wa s harmful to appe llant.”

The trial c ourt submitted both counts of ag g ravated robbe ry t o the jury only on the theory

of appe llant’s g uilt as a party . Appellant does not c omplain of eit h er the abstra ct or de fi nit ion a l po rt ion s o f t

he jur y c ha rg e or the a

pp lic a tio n pa

ra g ra ph s su bmi tti ng the law o f p art ie s. Appellant ca lls our attention solely to a s ubsequent portion of the char g e to which he offe red a specia l reque sted char g e or a mendment. See Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.15 (West 2006). I n section “12” of the c harg e, the tria l cou rt gen era lly instructed the jury

on the pre sumption of inn oc e nc e and

that th e burd e n o f p ro of

wa s o n th e State be y on d a re a so na ble do ub t. I n th e se c on d p ara g ra

phof thi s se c tio n, the tr ia l c ourt state d: The prose cution has the burde n of proving the def endant guilty

and it must do so by pr ov inge a c h a

nd e ve ry e le me nt of the of fe ns e c ha rg e d b e y on d a

re a so na ble do ub t, and if it f a ils to d o s o, y ou

mus t a c qu it the de fe nd ant.Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.19 (West 2006). 4 14 Appellant re quested that the tria l court ame nd the above -quoted pa rag raph b y i n s er t i n g:
I n o rd e r t o c on vic t a defe nd ant a s a pa rt y to a n a g g ra vatin g of fe ns e , th e State mus t prove that the defe ndant was c riminally responsible, a s that term is he rein de fined for the a g g ra vatin g e le me nt.
Th e tr ia l c ourt

ov e rr ule d th e re qu e ste d c ha

rg e and state d th a t su c h a

n a dd iti on wo uld be confusing to the j ury

and that the matter

was a dequate ly

cover ed by

other portions of the c harg e. I t appea rs that the re ques t ed charg e wa s for the pur pose of sing ling out the a g g ravating e lement of ea ch off

ense, on which appe llant concluded the State’s evidenc e wa s the wea kest under the law of par ties. Appellant appa

rently d i d n o t co nsider the tria l court’s instruction as to ea ch and e very
e le me nt s uf

fi c ie nt. Appellant cites no a

uthority for his contention, but does cite a line of jury

char g e er ror
case s beg inning with Al

ma nz a v. Sta te , 686 S.W .2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (op. on re h’g ). When a def

endant ha s proper ly

prese rved a

jury char g e i ssue for r eview, the appellate court must first determine unde r the Al ma nz a harm a

naly sis if error

actua lly occur red. Se e Po se

yv . S tat e , 966 S.W .2d 57, 60 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998). An examination of the entire recor d here does not show that any provision of article 36.19 was disreg arde d. There is no error for the pur

pose of the Al

ma nz a 4 harm a naly sis. Posey , 966 S.W .2d at 60. The r e qu e s te d

c h ar g e c o u ld

h av e , a s th e tr ia l c o u rt c o n c lu d e d , c a u s e d th e ju ry confusion, and c ould have r esulted in the t ri al co u rt expressing a n opinion on the weig ht ofTex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 36.14 (West 2006). 5 15 the ev i d en ce as p rohibited by article 36.14 by

singling out one eleme nt. The matter involved 5
was a dequate ly

cover ed by

the par ts of the jury

charg e to which a

ppellant had no objec tion. The trial court did not er

r in ref using the reque sted cha

rg e. The second point of e rror is overrule d.
P RE TR IA L M OTI ON TO SU P P RE SS I n his third p o i n t o f er ror, appellant contends that the “trial c ourt err ed in fa iling to gr ant appellant’ s motion to suppress the phy sical evidenc e.” Be fore discussing the trial cour t’s
ru lin g , w e e xami ne the law a pp lic a ble to p re tr ia l su

pp re ssi on he ari ng s.
THE B UR

DE N O F P RO OF When a def

endant se eks to suppress e vidence by a p re t ri al m otion on the basis of the Four th Amendment to the United States Constitut ion, he, as the mova nt, b ea rs t h e burde n
o f p ro d u ci n g evidenc e that def eats the pr esumption of proper police conduc t. Am ad

or v . S tat e , 22 1 S. W.3 d 6 66 , 6 72 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ru sse ll v. Sta te , 717 S.W .2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). A de fenda

nt meets this init ial burden of p ro o f b y establishing that a sea

rch or seizure
occur red w ithout a warr ant. Fo rd v . S tat e , 1 58 S .W .3 d 488 , 4 92 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Bishop

v . Sta te , 85 S .W.3d

81 9, 82 2 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ru sse ll , 7 17 S.W. 2d a t 9. At thi s p oin t, the burde n shifts to the St ate to prove that the sea rch or seizure was r ea s o n ab l e without a war rant under the totality of the circ umstances. Ru sse ll , 717 S.W .2d at 9. I f, however, the State introduces
or pr od uc e s e vid e nc e of

an e xec ute d s e arc h w arr ant bas ed on pr ob a ble c a us e re fl e c te d in

its underlying a ffidavit, the bur den shifts bac k to t h e d ef en d ant to show the invalidity of the sea

rchFor a fuller discussion of the sta ndard of revie w, se e Am ad

or v . S tat e , 214 S.W .3d 666, 673 6 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007), and Sta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W .3d 808, 818-19 (Te x . Crim. App. 2006). 16 war rant. Fo rd , 158 S.W. 3d

a t 49 2; Ru sse ll , 7 17 S.W. 2d a t 9; se e als o D av ids on v . S tat e , 249 S.W .3d 709, 717-18 (Te x . App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref ’d).
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We ge nera lly

revie w a tria l court’s rulingon a pre trial s uppression motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon , 206 S.W. 3d 58 7, 59 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Swa in v . S tat e , 18 1 S. W.3 d 359 , 365 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Ba le nti ne v . S tat e , 7 1 S. W.3 d 7 63 , 7 68 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g sh ou ld b e up he ld s o lo nga s it is wi thi n the zon e of

re a so na ble disag ree ment. Se e Mo ntgom e ry v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). This is the rathe r common standar d of re view re g ardingthe admissibilit y of evide nce. When we re view a tr ial court’s r uling on a m otion to suppress, we g ive g reat de fe re nc e to t

he tr ia l c ourt’s dete rm inatio n o f h ist or ic a l f a c ts s up po rt e d b y

the re c or d, wh ile
we re vie w the a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he law to the fa c ts de novo
. Torre s v . S tat e , 182 S.W .3d 899, 902 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); D y e r v S t ate , 1 2 5 S
. W.3d 460, 462 (Tex. C rim. App. 2003); Ma x we ll

v . Sta te , 73 S.W. 3d

27 8, 28 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 855-56 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Car mo uc he v . S

tat e , 1 0 S. W.3 d 3 23 , 3 27 ; ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); Guzman

v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 85-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997). 6

We must uphol d the trial cour t’s ruling if it i s s u p p o rt ed b y the re cord a

nd corr ect und e r an y th e o r y o f la w a p p li c a b le to th e c a s e , e v e nif

th e tr ia l c o u rt g a v e th e w r o n g rea son for its ruling
. State v. Stev ens , 235 S.W. 3d 73 6, 74 0 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ar me nd ar iz v . S tat e ,Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 28.01(6) (West 2006). 7 17 12 3 S.W.3 d 401 , 404 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 03 ); State v. Stee lman , 93 S.W. 3d 10 2, 10 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ro ss , 32 S.W .3d at 856.
THE T RIER OF F ACT Th e tr ia l c ourt

is the tr ie r o f f

a c t a t a pr e tr ia l he ari ngon

a mot ion to s up pr e ss evidenc e. W

ie de v . S tat e , 2 14 S.W. 3d

17 , 2 4- 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Al lridg e v . S tat e , 850 S.W .2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)
. The trial court is f ree to be lieve or disbelieve a ll or any part of a witness’s testimony , even if the testimony is uncontrover ted. Ro ss , 32 S.W .3d at 855. I n revie wing the t rial court’s decision, we do not eng ag e in our own factua l review
. Ro me ro v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
A SP EC IA LIZ ED OBJ EC TIO N A pre trial motion to suppress evidence under a rticle 28.01(6) is nothing more tha n 7 a specialized objection t o the admissibilit y of evide nce. Ga lit

z v . S tat e , 617 S.W .2d 949, 952 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). There fore , it must meet the specific ity require ments of an objection. See Te x. R. Ap p. P. 3 3. 1( a )( 1) (A ); Kra us e v . S tat e , 243 S.W .3d 95, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 20 07 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Ma

y fie ld v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 932, 935 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.). He re , b y his “ su pp le me nta l” mot ion

to su pp re ss, a

pp e lla nt, in o rd e r t o avo id p ro c e dura l de fa ult , sp e c if ie d th e g un , th e DN A sw a

bs , and the te st r e su lts a s th e ite ms h e wa nte d to su pp re ss. Se e Swa in
v . S tat e , 1 81 S.W. 3d

35 9, 36 5 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 17 S.W .3d 677, 682-83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).The trial c ourt sug g ested that “ this” is “a wa rra ntless situa t i o n , ” b ut there w as no 8 stipulation of evid en ce t o that eff ect. The prosec utor also insisted that appellant had the burd e n o f p ro of

to e sta bli shhis sta

nd ing to co mpl a in of the ite ms se ize d. With ou t mu c h a rgume nt, appellant c alled the police office rs as witnesse s. The State now conce des that under the circ umstances, a

ppellant had standingto contest his detention and the subse q u ent sea rch. See Br e nd lin v . Ca lif

or nia , 551 U.S. 249 (2007). No claim of misplace ment of the burde n of proof has been a dvance d. Offic er D elg ado intervie wed the G arc ias shortly afte r they

had bee n robbed. He made a 9 r e p o rt d e t a i l i n g a

d e s c r i p t i o no f

t h e s u s p e c t s . H i s r e p o rtw a s u s e d i np art a s t h e b a s i s o f

t h e B O LO he ard by Of fi c e r Wa de . App e lla

nt c omp la ins that D e lg a do ’s de sc ri pti on of the su sp ect s wa s in g r e a t e r d e t a i l t h an W a d e ’ s r e c a l l o f t h e B O LO
. O f f i c e r D e l g a d o , o f c o u r s e , d i d n o t i s s u e t h e B O LO which wa s also based on a repor ted robbe ry

other than the ones alleg ed her e. 18 On Oct o b er 17, 2006, immediately prior to the trial, the tria l court conduc ted a hear ing o n ap p el lant’s amende d motion to s uppress e vidence . After a brie f colloquy

about the burden of moving f

orwa rd with the evide nce, a

ppellant’s co u n s el ca l led two police of fice rs as witnesses, Ke ith Dougla s Wade and L uis Delg ado. These wer e the only witnesses to testify at the 8
su pp re ssi on he ari ng . O ff

ic e r De lg a do wa s no t pr e se nt wh e n a pp e lla nt wa s de ta ine d a

nd lit tle of his te sti mony wa s tr uly re le va nt t o th e su

pp re ssi on iss ue s. 9 Of fi c e r Wa de ’s su

pp re ssi on te sti mony

wa s v ir tua lly the same a s at tr ia l prev iousl y
c ite d i nt h e s u f

f i c i e n c y o f e v i d e n c e d i s c u s s i o n . W e n e e d n o t r e p e att h a tt e s t i m o n y

i ng r e a td e t a il, but will note that the trial court’s ruling is ba sed on the testimony at the suppression hea ring as the issues involved wer e not c onsensually relitig ated at trial. Se e Ra c he l v . S tat e , 917 S.W .2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995).

Offic er Wade rec alled that the B OL O had r efe renc e to two diffe rent robbe ries, one in the Henr

y section and another in the Fr ank section of the City of Austin; the latter be ing the one on Bat tle Be nd Road. He unde rstood the suspects we re a rmed a nd in a g old Chevrolet HHR that“When re quested by the losing pa

rty , the trial cour

t is required to file f

indings of f

act 10 and conc lusions of la

w reg arding its ruling on the motion to s uppress e vidence
. See State v . Oages , 21 0 S. W.3 d 6 43 , 6 44 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); State v. Cullen , 19 5 S.W. 3d 69 6, 69 8- 99 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ). B oth

of the se c a se s in vo lve d s ta te a pp e a ls. 19 rese mbled a P.T. Cruiser. He was g iven a descr iption of both suspects in the BO L O. Sever al hours afte r the robbe ry

on Batt l e Be n d R o ad and a mile and a half from that location, Office r Wade encounte red the two suspects in the par king lot of the DP S office on South C ong ress Ave nue, which
was c losed that Saturday . This encounter discussed ea

rlier ne ed not be r epeated her e. At the conc lusion of the suppression hea ring , the trial cour

t ov er rul ed the supplemental motion to suppress phy sical evide nce. It made no wr itten findings a nd conclusions of law. None wer e re quested. The trial court did di ctate into the r ecor d a runningrec itation of the 10 larg e ly un dis pu te d fa c ts de ve lop e d, and it he ld t hat th e de te nti on s o f a

pp e lla nt a nd the Hi sp anic ma le
wer e “r easona

ble.” The trial court further found that appellant was leg ally arr ested, a nd that at the time of detention, it was lea rned that bo t h s u s p ec t s had outstanding arr est war rants, and that the
sear ch and se izure “wa s not unreasona ble.” The ba sis of appellant’s a rg ument at the suppression hear ing w as that his detention was unlaw ful under the totality of the c ircumstance s, that his subsequent arr est, and the se arc h and
se izur e we re a ll i nv a lid

un de r t he F ourt h A me ndme nt. The U n i t edS t at es S u

p re m e C o u rt h as re co gn i z edt h re e d i s t i n ct t y p es o f p o lice-c itiz en interac tions: (1) arre sts, which mus t be supported by probable cause , se e Br own v . I lli no is , 4 22 U. S. 590, 601 (1975); (2) brief investigatory stops, which mus t be supported by rea sonable suspicion, see Te rry v . O hio , 392 U.S.1, 25-26 (1968); a nd (3) brief encounters between police and citizens which20

require no objective justification. See F lorida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429 , 4 3 4 (1991). Police may approa ch and que stion an individual in a public place without impl icating the Four th Amendment to the United States Constit ution. Florida v. Roye r , 460 U.S. 491, 497-98 (1983).

He re , th e c ru x of a

pp e lla nt’ s c omp la int

is that Offi cer Wad e ha d n o r e a so na ble suspicion to just ify

the Te rry or investigative detention stop of the Hispanic male or a ppellant. An offi c e r c o n d

u c ts a la w f u l te mp o r ar

y d e te n ti o n w h e n h e h a s r e a s o n a b le s u s p ic io n to b e li eve tha t an individu al is violating the law
. Fo rd v . S tat e , 158 S.W .3d 488, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ba le nti ne v . S

tat e , 71 S.W. 3d 76 3, 76 8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Re a so na ble su sp ic ion e xist s if the of fi c e r h a s sp e c if

ic , a rt ic ula ble fa c ts that, w he n c omb ine d w it h ra tio na l in fe re nc e s f ro m th os e fac ts, w ould lead him to rea sonably conclude that a par

ticular pe rson ac tually

is, has been, or

soon will be eng ag ed in cr iminal activity
. Ne al v . S tat e , 256 S.W .3d 264, 280 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Cas tro v . S

tat e , 2 27 S.W. 3d

73 7, 74 1 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ga rc ia v . S tat e , 43 S.W .3d 527, 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). These f acts must amount to more than a mer e hunch or suspicion. Brother

v . S tat e , 166 S.W .3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

The for egoi n g is an objective standa rd that disreg ards a

ny subjective intent of the offic er making the detention or stop and looks solely to whether

an o b j ec t ive basis for the detention or stop exists. Fo rd , 1 58 S.W. 3d a t 49 2; Ga rc ia , 43 S.W .3d at 530. A re asonable

suspicion determination is based on the totality of the c ircumstance s. Neal , 256 S
. W
. 3 d at 280; Fo rd , 1 58 S.W. 3d

a t 49 2- 93 . In c on du c tin g a tot a lity of the c ir c ums tanc e s d e te rm inatio n, we a pp ly the standar d of re view applica ble to mo tions to suppress evidence discussed above
. Se e Ga rc ia , 43 S.W .3d at 530. I n short, we g ive almost total de fer ence to the trial court’ s determination of the21

actua l, fac ts but we revie w de novo wh e the r t ho se fa c ts a

re su ff ic ie nt l e g a lly

to g ive ri se to
rea sonable suspicion. Id . Wil l a de novo revie w of the circumstances here support the trial court’ s
c on c lus ion

that r e a so na

ble su sp ic ion

did in f a c t e xist? The ans we r i s y e s. Her e ag ain, we ne ed n o t repe at the evide nce c oncer ning O ffice r Wade’s e ncounter with appellant and Ser

rato in the pa

rking lot of the DPS Offi ce . Ba s ed on the f acts found by

the trial co u rt and supported by the re cord a

nd our re view of la

w de novo it was rea sonable unde r the totality of the c ircumstance s for Of fice r W ade to suspect that Serrato (the Hispanic ma le) a nd appellant ha d eng ag ed in, w ere eng ag ing in, or would soon be eng ag ed in cr iminal activity . We find that the Te rry detention of appellant, his subse quent war rantless arr est based on probable cause and an outstanding war

rant, a nd the sea rch of his person and vehicle incident to his arr est to be prope r. The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in overr uling the motion to s uppress phy sical evide nce. The third point of er

ror is over

ruled.
HEARSAY I n t h e fo u rt h p o i n t o f erro r, ap p el l an t ar gu es t h at t h e tr i al co u rt erre d i n a l l o wi n g,
ov e r o bje c tio n, the a dmi ssi on of a c o- c on sp ir a tor ’s he ars ay state me nt, “ wa ste him , do g , w a ste him . . . shoot him and ge t out of here .” Appellant contends that the hear say statement was admitted by the t ri al co urt under r

ule 801(e )(2) (E) of

the Texas Rules of Evidence without a showing that the state me nt w a s ma de in the c ours e and fu rt he ra nc e of the c on sp ir a c y . T he ru le , c on c e rn ingstate me nts that are not hear say , provides: “The statement i s offe red ag ainst a party and is a stateme nt bya coconspirator

during the course and in the further ance of the c onspiracy .” Te x . R. Evid. 801(e)( 2)(E)
.22

Appellant urg es that the ter mination of a conspira cy rende rs statements by

a co-co n s p irator inadmissable. Se e De e b v . S tat e , 815 S.W .2d 692 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). We r e v i e w t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s d e c i s i o nt o a d m i to r e xc l u d e e v i d e n c e u n d e r

ana bu se of discre tion s t an d ard. W ill ov e r v . S

tat e , 7 0 S. W.3 d 8 41 , 8 45 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Burden

v . S tat e , 5 5 S. W.3 d 6 08 , 6 15 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Mo ntg om e ry , 81 0 S
. W
. 2 d at 379-80. The Te x as Rules of Evidenc e prohibit the admission of hear say evidenc e except as provided by statute or other r ule pre scribed pur suant to statutory authority
. See Tex. R. Evi d. 802. “‘H ear say ’ is a stateme nt , other than one made by the dec lara

nt while testify ing at the trial or he ari ng , o ff

e re d in e vid e nc e to pr ov e the tr uth of the matte r a sse rt e d. ” Te x. R. E vid . 8 01 (d ). Thus , a stat em ent not offe red to prove the truth of the matter asser ted is not hearsa

y . Gu idr yv . S tat e , 9 S.W. 3d 13 3, 15 2 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 99 ); Di nk ins v . S tat e , 894 S.W .2d 330, 347 (Tex. Crim. App. 19 95 ); Sta ffo rd v . S tat e , 248 S.W .3d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—Be aumont 2008, pet. re f’d) . An out-ofcourt stateme nt which is not offer ed to prove the truth of the matter a sserted the rein, but is offe red for some othe r re ason, is not hear say . Se e Ma rti ne z v . S tat e , 22 S.W .3d 504, 508 (Tex. Crim. App. 20 00 ); Gu idr

y , 9 S.W. 3d

a t 15 2; J on es v . S tat e , 843 S.W .2d 487, 499 (T ex . C ri m . Ap p. 1992) overruled on othe r grounds , Ma x we ll v . S tat e , 48 S.W .3d 196, 200 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001); Sta ffo rd , 24 8 S.W.3 d at 4 07 ; Lop e

z v . S tat e , 200 S.W .3d 246, 254 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2006, pe t. r e f’ d) ; Le e v . S

tat e , 51 S.W .3d 365, 370 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). Expressed another
wa y , a n e xtra jud ic ia l sta te me nt that is of fe re d for the purp os e of wh a t wa s sai d ra the r t ha n th e tr uth of matter a s s er t ed or the truth of w hat was sa id is not hearsay
. See D inkins , 894 S.W .2d at 347;23

Mc Kay v . S tat e , 70 7 S.W. 2d 23 , 33 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 85 ); Cor im e r v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 161, 162 (Tex. App.—Austin 1997, no pet.).

I n 2A Steven Goode, Olin G uy Wellborn, I I I and Micha el Sharlot, Texas Practice : Courtroom Handbook on Texas Ev idence , rule 801(a )-( d) at 541, the c ommentators stated:

An out -of- court stateme nt is not i nadmissable as he arsa y if it has re le va nc y a pa rt fr om t he tr uth of the ma tte r that it

a sse rt s o r i mpl ie s. I f the making of the statement is itself rele vant evidenc e t h at t he statement wa s made is not barr ed by the hea rsay rule.
I n Y an c yv . S tat e , 199 S.W .3d 293, 307 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2006, pet. ref’d) , it was held that the trial c ourt could have rea sonably conclude d that the documents we re not he arsa y beca use they wer e not offe red f

or the truth of the matter a sserted but to show the c ircumstance s surrounding the investig ation and lea ding to Yanc y ’s arrest. Se e als o P ar k e r v . S tat e , 192 S.W .3d 801, 807 (Tex. App.

— Ho u s t o n [ 1st Dist.] 2006, pet. re f’d) (“[W] ithout the testim ony of the information Off

icer Walk er h ad re ceive d the jury would have be en depr ived of a n understanding of the e ve nts le a din gup to a pp e lla nt’ s arr e st. ” ); Da v is v . S tat e , 169 S.W .3d 673, 675-76 (Tex. App.—For

t Worth 2005, no pet.) (testimony of police detec tive about anony mous tips t o show wh y inv e sti g a tio n f

oc us e d o n d e fe nd ant) ; Can o v . S tat e , 3 S.W .3 d 9 9 , 1 1 0 (Tex. App.—Corpus Chri s t i 1999, pet. ref

’d) ( office r’s testimony

that he had r ece ived information about dr ug s being sold a t r e s id e n c e o f d e f

e n d an ts w a s n o t o f

f e r e d f o r tr u th o f matt e r a s s e rte d , b u t to a ssist j ury ’s
u n d e r s t an d i n g o f

e v e n t s b y

p r o v i d i n g c o n t e xt

f o r o f f i c e r ’ s s u b s e qu e n ta c t i o n ); Mars h v . S tat e ,For additional case s in this are a of admissio n o f e v i dence , se e In re Be x ar Cou nty 11 Criminal Dis t. Attorney’s Office , 2 24 S.W. 3d 18 2, 18 8- 89 (T e x. 20 07 ); Sc ott v . S tat e , 222 S.W .3d 820, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2007, no pet.). 24 800 S.W .2d 607, 609 (Tex. A pp.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 1990, pet. re f’d) (deputy ’s testimony was admitted, not for truth of matter asser ted, but rather

to indicate cir cumstance s surrounding another office r’s a

rre st of suspects). 11 I n the in s t an t case , Offic er Wade ’s testimony about the Hispanic male’s state ment “wa ste him, dog, w aste him” a nd “shoot him, and g et out of her e,“ w as not hea rsay under the
c ir c ums tanc e s d e sc ri be d. Of fi c e r Wa de wa s atte mpt ing to a rr e st o r d e ta in t

he Hi sp anic ma le wh ile appellant wa s in a n ea rby car . The stateme nt was not offe red f or the truth of the matter a sserted bu t r a the r t o p ro vid e the j ury th e c on te xt in w hic h a pp e lla nt w a s e ve ntu a lly

arr e ste d a

nd no t to de pr ive the jur

y of an und e rs tand ing of tho se e ve nts
. Th e e vid e nc e wa s pro pe rl y a dmi tte d on th is basis even thoug h the trial cour t did not use this basis for its over ru l i n g o f t h e h ear say objection to Office r Wade’s te stimony . A trial cour t’s ruling on the admission of evidenc e, i f s upported by the re cord a

nd corr ect unde r any

theory of the lawapplicable to the case will be upheld, eve n if the trial court gave a differ ent or wrong rea son for its ruling
. See Ste vens , 235 S.W .3d at 740; Steelman , 93 S.W. 3d

a t 10 7; Sp an n v . S

tat e , 448 S.W .2d 128, 130 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). On appe al, the State for

the first t i m e urg es that, in addition to rule 801(e )(2) (E), the t ri al co u rt was c orre ct in overr uling the he arsa

y objection on the basis of r ule 803(2) of the Texas Rules of Evidence . An excited utteranc e is a “ statement re lati n g t o a startling event or condition made while the de cla ra n t was under the stress or e x citement ca used by the eve nt or25

condition.” Tex. R. C rim. Evid. 803(2). The availability of the declara

nt as a witness is imm ater ial under the rule. T h e S t at e r el i es on W i l k e rso n v . S tat e , 933 S.W .2d 276, 278-79 (Te x . App.—Houston [1st Di st. ] 199 6, pe t. r e f’ d) . T he re , an un de rc ov e r o ff ic e r a nd an in fo rm e r w e nt t o a

pp e lla nt’ s h ou se to buy drug s. Appellant would not se ll the office r a $20 rock of coc aine be cause he did not know the off i cer . Patricia L

usk, who was pr esent, a

nnounced tha

t she was a

ppellant’s par

tner a nd took the $20. Appellant then ha nded the c ocaine to the i nformer . A sig nal was g iven and the a rre st team
c a me int o th e ho us e . App e lla nt a nd Lus k r an to the ba c k o f t he ho us e wi th L

us k y e lli ng , “ F lus h the dope.” The W

ilkerson c ou

rt he ld that the un de rc ov e r of fi c e r’ s te sti mony a s to Lus k’ s “ F lus h the dope” statement wa s not hearsa y under r ul e 8 03(2) be cause the circ umstances indicated that Lusk was under

the stress and e x citement ca used by t h e arr esting team’s a pproac h at the time of her c ontem porane ous statement. Thus, the trial c ourt there did not err in over ruling the hea

rsay objection. Id . at 279.

I n the i n s t an t case, the Hispanic ma le (Serr ato) re treated to the open dr iver’s door of the c ar a fter he spotted Offic er Wade near by
. He was then ordered by Offic er W ade at gunpoint to ge t on the wet g round with his fac e down. Upon complying, Ser rato y elled out the complaine d-of state me nts . T he sta

rt lin g e ve nt w a s h is s ud de n c on fr on ta tio n wit h the po lic e of fi c e r a nd his detention at g unpoint. Serrato wa s clea rly under the stress of e x citement ca used by the startling circ umstances, a

nd his statements were con t em p orane ous with the event. The contents of suc h
s tatements alongwith other circ umstances a s decla rant’s a ppear ance , behavior , and condition26

ma y a ls o b e r e li e d u

p o n to e s ta

b li s h th e o c c u r

r e n c e o f a n e xc it in g e v e n t. Uni ted Sta te s v . M oo re , 79 1 F .2 d 5 66 , 5 70 -7 1 ( 7th Cir . 1 98 6) ; R o s s v . Stat e , 154 S.W .3d 804, 809 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2004, pet. re f’d) . The trial c ourt’s ruling in the instant case is a l s o s upported by the fac t that Serrato’ s statements wer e excited uttera nces unde r rule 803(2). The four th point of error is overrule d. As no te d, the tr ia l c ourt a dmi tte d th e c omp la ine d- of state me nts un de r t

he ba sis of rule 801( e)( 2)(E) as a c o-conspirator’s statement. F or the re asons stated ab o v e, we ne ed not deter mine if that ruling is c orre ct. There is ample leg al basis to support the trial cour t’s ruling
. See W il kerson , 9 33 S.W. 2d

a t 27 8; Ro me ro v . S

tat e , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Spann , 4 48 S.W. 2d

a t 13 0. Our dis po sit ion of thi s poin t of er ro r doe s not que sti on

the c or re c tne ss of the trial c ourt’s ruling based on r ule 801(e )(2) (E). The fourth point of er ror is over

ruled. The judg ment is affirme d.

J ohn F. Onion, Jr., J ustice Be fore J ustices Patterson, Pember ton and Onion* Affir med Filed: August 20, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh
* Be fore J ohn F. Onion, J r., Presiding J udg e (re tired), Texas Court of Criminal Appea ls, sitt ing by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 2005).