COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

March 8, 2022

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 

and RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2021AP1082-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2018CF2412

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

GEORGEANN K. PEARSON,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for 

Milwaukee County: JANET C. PROTASIEWICZ, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Donald, P.J., Dugan and White, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Georgeann K. Pearson appeals a judgment of 

conviction entered following a jury trial for second-degree reckless homicide and 

an order denying postconviction relief. Pearson contends that trial counsel was 

ineffective for failing to object when the State called a witness who was not on its

witness list. In addition, Pearson contends that trial counsel was ineffective for 

failing to object to inaccurate information at sentencing. For the reasons discussed 

below, we reject Pearson’s claims and affirm. 

BACKGROUND

¶2 Pearson and her sister, Shawanee L. Dawkins, were both charged 

with first-degree reckless homicide, as a party to a crime, relating to the death of 

three-month-old Laquis Dawkins, who died from malnutrition on April 10, 2017.

1

 

At birth, Laquis weighed six pounds, eight ounces, which was in the fifty to 

seventy-fifth percentile for weight. At death, Laquis weighed just over eight 

pounds, which was under the fifth percentile for weight, and had sunken features, 

thin and brittle skull bones, edema of the lower extremities, tenting of the skin, 

and decreased adipose tissue. 

¶3 Pearson and Dawkins are the first cousins of Laquis’s mother, 

Crystal Dawkins. According to the criminal complaint, Pearson told police that 

Crystal has a genetic mental deficiency and functions at a cognitively low level. 

As a result, Pearson served as Crystal’s payee for social security benefits, the 

proxy for Crystal’s food stamps, and the legal representative “for anything else 

 

1

 We note that the facts set forth in this decision are relevant to the issues and arguments 

that Pearson raises. Dawkins also filed an appeal. See State v. Dawkins, No. 2020AP1476-CR. 

We do not address the merits of that matter in this opinion. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

3

that may come up.” In addition, Crystal lived with Pearson and Dawkins, who 

allegedly assumed responsibility for caring for Crystal’s two children, Laquis and 

L.D.2 This included feeding, bathing, and changing the children. 

¶4 Prior to trial, the State moved to admit other-acts evidence regarding 

a 2015 hospitalization of L.D., for being underweight. The State argued that the 

other-acts evidence established that Pearson and Dawkins knew Crystal was 

incapable of accepting responsibility for her own children, admitted to being the 

primary caretakers for L.D., and were educated on how to properly feed an infant

and the importance of monitoring an infant’s weight gain. The circuit court ruled 

that the evidence was admissible.3 

¶5 Although Pearson and Dawkins were charged separately, the two 

cases were tried together. In opening statements, Pearson’s attorney argued that 

Crystal was “responsible for her children” and “has a pattern of neglecting her 

children.” Pearson’s attorney stated that they would be calling five people who 

know Crystal “very well” and have “observed her caring for her children, and 

competently doing so. These people will tell you, I anticipate, that she was a 

 

2

 We use initials for confidentiality purposes. 

3

 The Honorable David Borowski presided over the other-acts motion. We refer to Judge 

Borowski as the circuit court. The Honorable Janet C. Protasiewicz presided over Pearson’s trial 

and the postconviction proceedings. We refer to Judge Protasiewicz as the trial court. We also

note that Pearson does not challenge the other-acts ruling on appeal; however, we reference it for 

the purpose of providing additional context. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

4

primary caregiver of her children.” Pearson’s attorney further stated that the jury 

would not be hearing from Crystal.4 

¶6 On the third day of trial, the State indicated that Crystal, who was 

not on its witness list, was available to testify.5 The State asked the trial court for 

permission to amend its witness list so that it could call Crystal in its case-in-chief, 

rather than calling her as a rebuttal witness, out of convenience. The State 

indicated that Pearson and Dawkins had all of the statements Crystal had made 

through the course of the investigation. 

¶7 Pearson’s attorney did not object, but Dawkins’s attorney did. 

Pearson’s attorney told the trial court that “I feel it is important that this jury hear 

from Crystal” and “[t]his jury is supposed to know the truth.” 

¶8 The trial court denied Dawkins’s attorney’s objection and allowed 

Crystal to testify. The court stated that the defense opened the door to her 

testimony. In addition, the court observed that Crystal was a central witness and it 

was not a surprise that she might testify. 

¶9 On direct examination, Crystal testified to her age, date of birth, that 

Laquis and L.D. are her children, that Pearson and Dawkins are her first cousins, 

and that she and Laquis lived with Pearson and Dawkins. When asked the names 

 

4

 Pearson’s attorney also stated that “the State contends that [Crystal] is so mentally 

disabled that she should not be charged. But you’re going to hear ... she’s not so disabled that 

she can go down to Racine and party.” The State objected, and the trial court sustained the 

objection. The court instructed the jury to “disregard that response or that comment from 

counsel.” 

5

 Prior to trial, the State filed a witness list and an amended witness list. Crystal was not 

on either list. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

5

of everyone that fed Laquis, Crystal stopped verbally responding. The State then 

asked Crystal to write “yes” or “no” to three questions. Crystal confirmed in 

writing that she fed Laquis, Pearson fed Laquis, and Dawkins fed Laquis. When 

asked if Pearson and Dawkins helped her with Laquis, Crystal wrote “I do not 

know.” 

¶10 On cross-examination, Crystal nodded her head “yes” or “no” in 

response to questions. Crystal indicated that she liked shopping for her children, 

she does not like to cook, she takes care of her children, they slept in the same 

room as her, she likes to travel, she has not traveled to Racine, and she likes 

babysitting other children. 

¶11 After Crystal’s testimony, Dawkins’s attorney moved for a mistrial

based on the State’s failure to include Crystal on its witness list, the fact that the 

State failed to show good cause for its failure, and Crystal’s behavior in front of 

the jury.

6

 Pearson’s attorney joined in the motion for mistrial. 

¶12 The trial court denied the request for a mistrial. The court admitted 

that it “would have been cleaner” for the State to wait to call Crystal in rebuttal. 

The court, however, stated that based on how challenging it was for Crystal to 

testify, “it probably was in her best interest to be called out of order and not have 

to sit around for, potentially, a day or two.” In addition, the court stated that the 

State had good cause for failing to include Crystal on its witness list because 

 

6

 Dawkins’s attorney noted that Crystal had difficulty entering the courtroom, was not 

able to stand up to take the oath, and could not face the defense counsel’s table. Additionally, a 

victim witness advocate sat next to Crystal during her testimony. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

6

Crystal would have been called in rebuttal and the defense opened the door to her 

testimony. 

¶13 Pearson called her son and two daughters to testify. They claimed 

that Pearson did not help care for Crystal’s children and that Crystal would not let 

others help with her children. In addition, one of Pearson’s daughters testified that 

Crystal was a capable mother, and that Crystal “plays off the fact that people think 

she’s slower than the average[.]” 

¶14 Pearson also testified and denied identifying herself as a caregiver 

for Laquis or L.D. Pearson testified that Crystal could read and write, had 

graduated, travelled by herself, and that she was only “somewhat” mentally 

incapacitated. Pearson stated that Crystal would get upset and leave the room 

when anyone said anything that suggested her children needed something. 

Pearson also denied declining services for Crystal. 

¶15 The jury found both Pearson and Dawkins guilty of second-degree 

reckless homicide, a lesser-included offense.

7

 Pearson was sentenced to six years 

of initial confinement and three years of extended supervision. 

¶16 Pearson filed a postconviction motion alleging that her attorney was 

ineffective. Pearson contended that trial counsel should have objected to the 

 

7

 The judgment of conviction reflects that Pearson was convicted of second-degree 

reckless homicide as a party to a crime. The jury, however, was not instructed on party to a crime 

liability, and the jury’s verdict did not include a finding that Pearson was guilty as a party to a 

crime. Accordingly, the jury found that Pearson committed the crime of second-degree reckless 

homicide as a direct actor. See State v. Brown, 2012 WI App 139, ¶14, 345 Wis. 2d 333, 824 

N.W.2d 916. Pearson does not request that we amend the judgment of conviction. We observe 

that a person who directly commits a crime is a party to the crime. See WIS. STAT. § 939.05(1)-

(2)(a) (2019-20). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless 

otherwise noted.
No. 2021AP1082-CR

7

State’s request to have Crystal testify. In addition, Pearson alleged that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to object to inaccurate information at 

sentencing. Pearson contended that the trial court relied on inaccurate information 

when it said, “You described a feeding schedule for that child, which contradicted 

the information that was given to the medical providers.” 

¶17 After briefing, the trial court denied the postconviction motion 

without an evidentiary hearing. The court observed that Pearson “opened the 

door” to Crystal’s testimony when it insinuated during opening statements that the 

State was “hiding the ball” by not presenting Crystal’s testimony. The court also 

found that any error on counsel’s part did not prejudice Pearson because it would 

have allowed Crystal’s testimony in rebuttal. The court indicated that there could 

not be any prejudice if the only difference Pearson identifies is the timing of the 

evidence admitted, and not the nature or the substance of the evidence. 

¶18 In regards to the inaccurate information claim, the trial court stated 

that the feeding schedule was not material. The court stated that it agreed with the 

State’s argument that “What was material at sentencing was [Pearson] testifying 

under oath and disavowing any responsibility for [Laquis’s] starvation and death” 

and that Pearson informed multiple people that she and Dawkins were the main 

caretakers for Laquis and responsible for feeding Laquis. This appeal follows. 

Additional relevant facts are referenced below. 

DISCUSSION

¶19 On appeal, Pearson renews her arguments that trial counsel was 

ineffective for: (1) failing to object when the State called Crystal, who was not on

its witness list; and (2) failing to object to alleged inaccurate information at 

sentencing. As discussed below, we reject both of Pearson’s claims. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

8

A. Legal Principles

¶20 To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 

defendant must prove both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the 

defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. 

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). To establish prejudice, a defendant must 

show “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 

result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id. at 694. “A reasonable 

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 

Id. We need not address both prongs of the Strickland test if the defendant does

not make a sufficient showing on one of the prongs. Id. at 697. 

¶21 A trial court is required to hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion 

only if the defendant has alleged “sufficient material facts that, if true, would 

entitle the defendant to relief.” State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶14, 274 Wis. 2d 

568, 682 N.W.2d 433. Whether a defendant’s motion has alleged sufficient 

material facts entitling the defendant to relief is a question of law that we review 

de novo. Id., ¶9. If a postconviction motion “does not raise facts sufficient to 

entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or if the record 

conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief, the circuit 

court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” Id. 

B. Crystal’s Testimony

¶22 WISCONSIN STAT. § 971.23(1)(d) requires the State to disclose to the 

defendant “[a] list of all witnesses and their addresses whom the district attorney 

intends to call at the trial.” “The court shall exclude any witness not listed ... 

unless good cause is shown for failure to comply.” Sec. 971.23(7m)(a). This 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

9

requirement, however, “does not apply to rebuttal witnesses[.]” Sec. 971.23(1)(d); 

State v. Novy, 2013 WI 23, ¶25, 346 Wis. 2d 289, 827 N.W.2d 610. 

¶23 Here, it is undisputed that Crystal was not on the State’s witness list. 

It is also undisputed that Pearson’s attorney intentionally chose not to object to 

Crystal’s testimony.

8

 Pearson’s attorney told the trial court that “I feel it is 

important that this jury hear from Crystal” and “[t]his jury is supposed to know the 

truth.” Nonetheless, Pearson argues that her attorney was ineffective for failing to 

object to Crystal’s testimony. 

¶24 We reject Pearson’s argument that trial counsel was ineffective. 

Even if we assume, without deciding, that trial counsel performed deficiently by 

failing to object and argue that Crystal’s testimony should have been excluded—

and we emphasize that we are not making that finding here—we conclude that 

Pearson has failed to establish that she was prejudiced by Crystal’s testimony. See 

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697. 

¶25 In this case, the State indicated on the record that it had turned over 

all the pretrial statements made by Crystal to the defense prior to trial. Pearson 

does not allege that she failed to receive any of Crystal’s pretrial statements or that 

the content of Crystal’s testimony was a surprise. 

¶26 Moreover, Crystal’s testimony was not damaging to the defense. 

Crystal’s testimony included her age, date of birth, that Laquis and L.D. are her 

 

8

 We note that Pearson’s attorney later joined the motion for a mistrial based on Crystal’s 

testimony. However, as Pearson concedes, this was “too late.” By that time, the jury had already 

heard Crystal’s testimony. A party forfeits an objection to the admission of evidence if the 

objection is not timely. See WIS. STAT. § 901.03(1)(a); State v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶29, 315 

Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

10

children, that she and Laquis lived with Pearson and Dawkins, and that she likes to 

shop and travel. When asked if Pearson and Dawkins helped her with Laquis, 

Crystal wrote “I do not know.” 

¶27 While Crystal confirmed in writing that Pearson and Dawkins fed 

Laquis, this information was merely cumulative to the other testimony presented at 

trial. At trial, Pearson testified that she fed Crystal’s children when she was 

babysitting them. In addition, Detective James Hensley testified that Pearson said

that she and Dawkins shared responsibility for caring for Laquis. Pearson also

told Hensley that when she fed Laquis, she would feed him an entire eight-ounce 

bottle, and a week before his death, they had switched over to feeding him cereal. 

¶28 Pearson contends that she was prejudiced because the jury was able 

to observe Crystal’s “complete inability to have been able to take care of 

[Laquis].” However, the jury heard other testimony regarding Crystal’s level of 

functioning. For instance, Patrice Butler, Crystal’s court appointed guardian, 

testified that Crystal’s cognitive difficulties were severe. Butler testified that 

Crystal was unable to make decisions for herself and that she has difficulty 

retaining information. Butler also testified that Crystal does not take care of 

herself and needs cues. Likewise, social worker Lauren Borkenhagen testified that 

Crystal “functioned at a very low level.” In addition, visiting nurse Evelyn 

Hansen testified that she did not think Crystal was capable of taking care of L.D.9

 

9

 Pearson also claims that the State’s failure to name Crystal on the witness list was 

prejudicial because Pearson was not able to “meaningfully prepare for her testimony” and a 

“detailed investigation would have occurred[.]” This argument is conclusory. Pearson does not 

explain how her testimony would have differed or what an investigation would have revealed. 

We will not develop arguments for parties. State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 

633 (Ct. App. 1992). 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

11

¶29 Thus, we conclude that Pearson has not demonstrated a reasonable 

probability that the verdict would have been different if Crystal’s testimony was 

excluded. See State v. Sholar, 2018 WI 53, ¶46, 381 Wis. 2d 560, 912 N.W.2d 89

(stating that a defendant “need not prove the jury would have acquitted him, but he 

must prove there is a reasonable probability it would have, absent the error” 

(underlining omitted)). Consequently, the trial court properly denied Pearson’s 

ineffective assistance of counsel claim without an evidentiary hearing. 

C. Inaccurate Information 

¶30 A defendant has a due process right to be sentenced based on 

accurate information. State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶17, 347 Wis. 2d 142, 832 

N.W.2d 491. To obtain resentencing based on inaccurate information, a defendant 

“must show both that the information was inaccurate and that the court actually 

relied on the inaccurate information in the sentencing.” State v. Tiepelman, 2006 

WI 66, ¶26, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1 (citations omitted). 

¶31 If a defendant shows that the information is inaccurate, the defendant 

must then prove “by clear and convincing evidence that the circuit court actually 

relied on the inaccurate information.” Travis, 347 Wis. 2d 142, ¶22. If the 

defendant makes that showing, “the burden then shifts to the State to prove the 

error was harmless.” Id., ¶23. “The State can meet its burden to prove harmless 

error by demonstrating that the sentencing court would have imposed the same 

sentence absent the error.” Id., ¶73. 

¶32 At Pearson’s sentencing, the trial court stated “You described a 

feeding schedule for that child, which contradicted the information that was given 

to the medical providers.” Pearson contends that this statement was inaccurate 

and trial counsel should have objected. 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

12

¶33 Even if we assume, without deciding, that the trial court’s statement 

about the feeding schedule was inaccurate, Pearson has not demonstrated by clear 

and convincing evidence that the court actually relied on this statement in 

sentencing. See id., ¶22. Whether the court actually relied on inaccurate 

information “turns on whether the circuit court gave ‘explicit attention’ or 

‘specific consideration’ to the inaccurate information, so that the inaccurate 

information ‘formed part of the basis for the sentence.’” Id., ¶28 (citation 

omitted). 

¶34 Here, the sentencing transcript shows that the feeding schedule 

statement did not “form[] part of the basis for the sentence.” See id. The trial 

court’s remarks reflect that the sentence was based on Pearson’s failure to accept 

responsibility and the horrific circumstances of Laquis’s death. 

¶35 At the outset of its remarks, the trial court stated that “it’s pretty 

clear to me that even now you don’t accept responsibility for the conduct that you 

engaged in that caused this three-month-old infant to starve to death.” The court 

stated that “when ... Milwaukee Child Protective Services went into your home in 

regard to eight-month-old [L.D.] in September of 2015 that you pretty much blew 

them off.” The court stated that it is “obvious” that Crystal is “severely delayed” 

and could not care for a child. The court observed that Pearson indicated that she 

did not want people coming into the home and refused programming for L.D. 

¶36 The trial court described Laquis at the time of his death. The court 

stated that Laquis was “born at six pounds, eight ounces, between the [fifty] and 

[seventy-fifth] percentile for weight, sent home, and ... at his death, he weighs just 

over eight pounds, under the [fifth] ... percentile for weight.” The court stated 

that the autopsy photos were “horrific” and that Laquis was “utterly emaciated.” 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

13

¶37 The trial court further stated that Pearson was “the head of that

household,” the payee, and “basically let [Laquis] starve to death under your 

watch.” The court stated that “It was clear to me from your comments ... in the 

presentence report that either you don’t understand or you refuse to consider just 

how culpable you were in this child’s death.” Thus, we reject Pearson’s argument 

that the court actually relied on the one-sentence feeding schedule statement. 

¶38 Finally, even if the trial court relied on the feeding schedule 

statement, any error was harmless. See id., ¶23. When we consider the court’s 

remarks as a whole, we are satisfied that the court would have imposed the same 

sentence regardless. See id., ¶73. As stated above, the court’s remarks reflect that 

the sentence was based on Pearson’s failure to accept responsibility and the 

horrific circumstances of Laquis’s death. The reference to the feeding schedule 

was merely a single sentence within the remarks as a whole. 

¶39 Moreover, we note that, at the conclusion of sentencing, the trial 

court stated that “quite frankly, when [the prosecutor] told me what his 

recommendation was, I thought it was light.” The court, however, went on to state 

that the prosecutor’s recommendation of six years initial confinement and three 

years extended supervision was an “appropriate sentence” given “the suffering 

you’re going to do having your children basically raising themselves for six years 

outside of your presence” and “the extremely dysfunctional horrible life that you 

had to lead as a young person[.]” Thus, even if the information was inaccurate 

and the court actually relied on it, any error was harmless. 

¶40 Therefore, we conclude that trial counsel was not ineffective for 

failing to object at sentencing and the trial court properly denied the 

postconviction motion without a hearing. See State v. Allen, 2017 WI 7, ¶46, 373 
No. 2021AP1082-CR

14

Wis. 2d 98, 890 N.W.2d 245 (holding that trial counsel could not be ineffective at 

sentencing for failing to make a meritless objection). 

CONCLUSION

¶41 In sum, for the reasons stated above, trial counsel was not ineffective 

for failing to object to Crystal’s testimony or to the feeding schedule statement at 

sentencing. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court properly denied the 

postconviction motion without a hearing. 

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.