COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-12-00010-CR

JACK POSS APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE

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FROM THE 211TH DISTRICT COURT OF DENTON COUNTY

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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I. INTRODUCTION

Appellant Jack Poss received deferred adjudication community supervision 

after he pleaded guilty to indecency with a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. 

§ 21.11(a)(1) (West 2011). The State later filed a petition to proceed to 

adjudication. At the adjudication hearing, Poss pleaded ―true‖ to two of the 

State’s allegations—that he consumed alcohol and that he left the county that he 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
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was conditioned to remain in, both violations of the terms of his community 

supervision. The State also presented evidence that he violated several other 

terms of his community supervision. After hearing testimony from several 

witnesses, including Poss himself, the trial court found eleven additional 

allegations true, adjudicated Poss guilty of indecency with a child, and sentenced 

him to twenty years’ confinement. In a single issue that contains two distinct 

parts, Poss argues that the trial court abused its discretion by (1) adjudicating 

him guilty and by (2) sentencing him to the maximum sentence allowed under the 

indecency with a child statute. We will affirm.

II. DISCUSSION

Appellate review of an order revoking community supervision is limited to 

determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Rickels v. State, 202 

S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Miles v. State, 343 S.W.3d 908, 912 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, no pet.); Cherry v. State, 215 S.W.3d 917, 919 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d). When there is sufficient evidence to 

support a finding that the defendant violated a condition of his community 

supervision, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by revoking the 

supervision. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493–94 (Tex. Crim. App.

1984); Wade v. State, 83 S.W.3d 835, 839–40 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2002, no 

pet.). This is true even in the event when the trial court finds only a single 

violation of community supervision. Leach v. State, 170 S.W.3d 669, 672 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2005, pet. ref’d). As such, a defendant’s plea of ―true‖ to even 
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one allegation in the State’s motion to revoke is sufficient to support the trial 

court’s decision to adjudicate guilt. Cole v. State, 578 S.W.2d 127, 128 (Tex.

Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979); see Ramos v. State, No. 02-08-00363–CR, 2009 

WL 1035120, at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Apr. 16, 2009, pet. struck) (mem. op., 

not designated for publication). Once sufficient evidence is presented of a 

violation of a community-supervision condition, the trial court has broad 

discretion in choosing whether to continue, modify, or revoke the community 

supervision. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, §§ 5, 22, 23 (West Supp.

2012); Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 708 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 

1979); Hays v. State, 933 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, no 

pet.). When deferred adjudication community supervision is revoked, the trial 

court may generally impose any punishment authorized by statute within the 

statutory range. See Von Schounmacher v. State, 5 S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1999).

In part of his sole issue, Poss argues that ―other than [his] plea of true 

regarding drinking alcohol and a few other minor technical violations, the 

evidence was insufficient to support an adjudication.‖ But it is the pleading of 

―true‖ to the State’s allegations that he drank alcohol and that he committed ―a 

few other minor technical violations‖ of his community supervision that alone

supports the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision and proceed 

to adjudication. See Leach, 170 S.W.3d at 672. Therefore, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by adjudicating Poss guilty of indecency with a child and our 
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analysis ends there. See Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763. We overrule this portion 

of Poss’s sole issue.

In the remainder of his sole issue, Poss argues that the trial court abused 

its discretion by ―sentencing him to the maximum sentence allowed under the 

law.‖ Poss’s argument is that the sentence is excessive in light of the evidence 

presented at the sentencing hearing that, by Poss’s account, demonstrates that 

he was a near-model community supervision participant. But as the State points 

out, Poss did not object to his sentence when the trial court imposed it and, 

although he filed a motion for new trial, he did not complain of the sentence or its 

alleged disproportionality in his motion. See Kim v. State, 283 S.W.3d 473, 475 

(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (holding failure to object to sentence at 

time of imposition or to complain of sentence in motion for new trial does not 

preserve complaint for appellate review). We hold that Poss waived this portion 

of his sole issue on appeal because he failed to assert this challenge to the trial 

court. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1; Curry v. State, 910 S.W.2d 490, 497–98 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1995) (holding that failure to make specific objection at trial waives 

Eighth Amendment claim of cruel and unusual punishment); Trevino v. State, 174 

S.W.3d 925, 927–28 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2005, pet. ref’d) (―Because the 

sentence imposed is within the punishment range and is not illegal, we conclude 

that the rights [the appellant] asserts for the first time on appeal are not so 

fundamental as to have relieved him of the necessity of a timely, specific trial 

objection.‖). We overrule this remaining portion of Poss’s sole issue.
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III. CONCLUSION

Having overruled both portions of Poss’s sole issue, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

BILL MEIER

JUSTICE

PANEL: LIVINGSTON, C.J.; DAUPHINOT and MEIER, JJ.

DAUPHINOT, J., filed a concurring and dissenting opinion.

DO NOT PUBLISH

Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

DELIVERED: June 6, 2013