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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

 FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

 WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

ROXANNE BUCK, 

Petitioner, : Case No. 3:17-cv-344 

- vs - District Judge Thomas M. Rose 

Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz 

Warden, 

 Dayton Correctional Institution, 

 : 

 Respondent. 

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

 

 This habeas corpus case is before the Court on Petitioner’s Objections (ECF No. 4) to the 

Report and Recommendations recommending dismissal (ECF No. 3). Judge Rose has 

recommitted the matter for reconsideration in light of the Objections (Recommittal Order, ECF 

No. 5). 

 Petitioner pleads four grounds for relief: denial of constitutional right to a speedy trial 

(Ground One), involuntary waiver of right to speedy trial (Ground Two), ineffective assistance 

of both trial and appellate counsel in handling the speedy trial issue (Ground Three), and 

prosecutorial misconduct (Ground Four). 

 The Report recommended finding no violation of Petitioner’s constitutional right to 

speedy trial because she was brought to trial within the Ohio statutory speedy trial limits which 

are much stricter than the Sixth Amendment guidelines. It further recommended dismissal of 

Ground Two because, without a violation of the speedy trial constitutional right, the 
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voluntariness of the waiver did not affect her federal rights. The Magistrate Judge deferred to 

the Ninth District Court of Appeals on the ineffective assistance of counsel claim. On Ground 

Four the Report also recommends deferring to the court of appeals finding that the probative 

value of the autopsy photographs was not outweighed by the prejudice arising from their 

gruesomeness. 

 Petitioner objects as to all four grounds, each of which requires analysis. 

Ground One: Speedy Trial Violation 

 In her First Ground for Relief, Ms. Buck claims she was denied her constitutional right to 

a speedy trial. On appeal, the Ninth District considered this claim in the First Assignment of 

Error. It noted that she had been arrested March 20, 2014, and remained incarcerated until trial 

began on October 6, 2014. State v. Buck, 2017 Ohio App. LEXIS 271 ¶ 10 (9th Dist. Jan. 25, 

2017). Under the Ohio speedy trial statute, Ohio Revised Code § 2945.71, each day of pre-trial 

confinement counts for three days toward the statutory limit of 270 days. Under the three-forone provision, the statutory speedy trial time expired June 18, 2014. After the time had already 

expired, on July 3, 2014, Buck waived her speedy trial right with an end date of September 15, 

2014, but with no start date. Id. The State moved on August 22, 2014, for a continuance to 

October because a material witness was unavailable material. Buck responded by revoking her 

waiver, demanding a speedy trial and moving for dismissal on speedy trial grounds on the 

morning of trial. Id. 

 Although Buck was not brought to trial until 200 days after her arrest, the Ninth District 
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found no statutory violation because the legal effect of a waiver with no start date was to waive 

all time from arrest until the agreed continuance date, September 15, 2014. Id. at ¶ 11, citing

State v. Maitland, 2010-Ohio-6585 (7th Dist. 2010), and State v. Baugh, 1996 Ohio App. LEXIS 

337 (9th Dist. Jan. 31, 1996). Because the actual trial started less than a month after the time 

began to run under the waiver, the Ninth District concluded the trial was timely commenced. Id. 

at ¶ 11. 

 This Court is bound to accept the Ninth District’s interpretation of state law. Federal 

habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); 

Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Smith v. 

Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). "[I]t is not the province 

of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law questions. In 

conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction violated the 

Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 

(1991). Railey v. Webb, 540 F.3d 393 (6th Cir. 2008), quoting Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 

76 (2005)(“We have repeatedly held that a state court’s interpretation of state law, including one 

announced on direct appeal of the challenged conviction, binds a federal court sitting in habeas 

corpus.”), Maldonado v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2005); Vroman v. Brigano, 346 F.3d 598 

(6th Cir. 2003); Caldwell v. Russell, 181 F.3d 731, 735-36 (6th Cir. 1999); Duffel v. Dutton, 785 

F.2d 131, 133 (6th Cir. 1986). 

 Because Ohio speedy trial law is so much more stringent than federal constitutional law 

on the speedy trial right, a trial found to be timely under Ohio law is almost always also timely 

under the Constitution. As noted in the Report, the four constitutional factors to be weighed are 

(1) the length of the delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) whether the defendant has asserted 
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his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530-32 (1972). 

Delay is presumptively prejudicial where the post-accusation delay approaches one year. Doggett 

v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 

 The Report only noted that “Petitioner was brought to trial in substantially less than a 

year” and did not discuss the other factors. Because the Report characterized the Barker test as a 

“balancing” test and did not discuss the other three factors, Ms. Buck believes the result is 

“unbalanced” (Objections, ECF No. 4, PageID 31). To complete the analysis, the Magistrate 

Judge notes there was a basis for the continuance, noted by the court of appeals, of the 

unavailability of a material witness. The second factor weighs in Respondent’s favor. 

The Petitioner certainly did assert her right by (1) rescinding her waiver, (2) then 

demanding a speedy trial, and then (3) moving to dismiss on the morning of trial, so the third 

factor weighs in Petitioner’s favor. 

Finally, Petitioner asserts prejudice, the fourth factor, from the prosecution’s addition of 

Exhibit 233 on September 17, 2014, and supplementing it on the morning of trial. Petitioner 

does not tell this Court what the exhibit was and it is not reflected in the court of appeals opinion, 

so she has not shown this last factor weighs in her favor, i.e., she has not shown prejudice. On 

balance, although Petitioner vigorously asserted her speedy trial right after August 28, 2014, the 

Magistrate Judge finds she has not proven a violation of her Sixth Amendment right. 

 Buck presented her speedy trial claim to the Ninth District as a constitutional claim; her 

First Assignment of Error expressly mentions her “constitutional right to a speedy trial.” When a 

state court decides on the merits a federal constitutional claim later presented to a federal habeas 

court, the federal court must defer to the state court decision unless that decision is contrary to or 

an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established precedent of the United States 
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Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. ' 2254(d)(1); Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 131 S. Ct. 770, 785 

(2011); Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 140 (2005); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693-94 (2002); 

Williams (Terry) v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379 (2000). Ms. Buck has not shown that the Ninth 

District’s decision is an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme 

Court precedent. It is therefore again respectfully recommended that her First Ground for Relief 

be denied. 

Ground Two: Invalid Waiver of Speedy Trial Right 

 In her Second Ground for Relief, Ms. Buck claims her waiver of her speedy trial right 

was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary and is therefore void. In recommending dismissal of 

this Ground, the Report stated “[b]ecause the State did not violate [Ms. Buck’s] Sixth 

Amendment speedy trial right nor attempt to use her waiver to extend trial beyond one year, 

Ground Two should be dismissed because it does not state a claim on which federal habeas 

corpus relief can be granted.” (ECF No. 3, PageID 21). 

 Ms. Buck objects that she was “misled into authorizing the state to begin calculating time 

on 9-15-14.” She presented this claim as Assignment of Error II on direct appeal and the Ninth 

District decided: 

 [*P15] Here, Buck signed a time waiver on July 3, 2014, which 

expressly stated that she was knowingly and voluntarily waiving 

her right to have her case tried within the time period provided for 

in R.C. 2945.71 and consented to have her case continued until 

September 15, 2014. Buck argues on appeal that her waiver was 

not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily given as she was 

unaware that the waiver related back to the date of her arrest 

instead of the date that she signed the waiver. However, because 

the transcript of the pretrial proceeding where Buck waived her 

speedy trial rights on the record has not been filed with this Court, 
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we must presume regularity and the validity of the time waiver. 

See N. Olmsted v. Rock, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99333, 2013-

Ohio-3152, ¶ 21. 

State v. Buck, supra. 

 What the Ninth District decided, as this Court reads it, is that all the evidence before it on 

this question – the signed waiver itself – showed that it was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. 

Under those circumstances, it had to presume that the trial court proceedings were “regular,” i.e. 

that there was no error. If the transcript showed active misleading by the trial court, e.g., a 

statement by the trial judge that the waiver would start on the date it was signed, then the court of 

appeals could have done something else. 

 Ms. Buck makes her claim in the passive voice: “I was misled.” But by whom? If it was 

the trial judge on the record, then the record should be produced to show that. If it was by her 

attorney, then it was presumably off the record and would have to be raised in a petition for postconviction relief under Ohio Revised Code § 2953.21. However, according to the Habeas 

Petition, no such post-conviction petition was filed (ECF No. 2, PageID 4, ¶ 10). 

 If Ms. Buck was not actively misled by the trial judge or her attorney – if she just didn’t 

understand – she again would have to present evidence of that lack of understanding in a petition 

for post-conviction relief, which she has not filed. This Court cannot hear evidence beyond what 

was presented to the state courts to decide whether she lacked appropriate understanding. Cullen 

v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398, 179 L. Ed. 2d 557 (2011). 

 Upon the record that was before the state courts, Ms. Buck has not proved her waiver was 

involuntary, unknowing, or unintelligent. This Court must therefore defer to the state court’s 

denial of her Second Assignment of Error. 
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Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Trial and Original Appellate Counsel 

 In her Third Ground for Relief, Petitioner asserts she received ineffective assistance of 

trial counsel when her trial attorney did not put a commencement date on the waiver she signed 

and misled her by telling her the continuance could not be beyond September 15, 2014. She also 

asserts she received ineffective assistance of appellate counsel when her original appellate 

attorney did not request pre-trial transcripts which would have shown the speedy trial violations. 

 The Report recommended this Ground for Relief should be dismissed as procedurally 

defaulted because, as to trial counsel, Ms. Buck neither proved ineffective assistance by 

producing the waiver transcript on appeal nor filed for post-conviction relief and showed there 

the bad advice she alleges she was given. As to ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, the 

Ninth District advised Ms. Buck that the appropriate way to raise that claim was by filing a 

motion to reopen the appeal under Ohio R. App.26(B) which she has not done. (Report, ECF 

No. 3, PageID 21-24. 

 Ms. Buck objects that the “waiver itself can be used as proof” and argues that its failure 

to include a starting date it by itself proof of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Not so. Ms. 

Buck has presented no authority showing it is ineffective assistance of trial counsel to fail to put 

a starting date on such a waiver. There can be many good reasons for a trial attorney to agree to 

a waiver, even knowing the effect of one that is undated. The Court will not presume deficient 

performance without some proof of it. Obviously the Ohio courts treated the waiver as valid 

without a starting date. 

 Ms. Buck also claims her attorney told her off the record that the trial could not be 

continued past September 15, 2014. But no sworn proof of that fact was ever before the state 
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courts, as it could have been in a petition for post-conviction relief. Again, this Court cannot 

consider facts that are not in the state court record. Pinholster, supra.

 Ms. Buck suggests she did not file a Rule 26(B) application because she thought the 

reference to that remedy in the Ninth District’s decision was just a suggestion. However, a 

motion under 26(B) is the only way such a claim can be raised in the Ohio courts. State v. 

Murnahan, 63 Ohio St. 3d 60 (1992). Ms. Buck’s ignorance of the law does not excuse her 

failure to file under 26(B) and this Court does not have the power to just waive that requirement 

of Ohio law and decide the question itself. 

Ground Four: Probative Value of Autopsy Pictures 

 In her Fourth Ground for Relief, Ms. Buck asserts she was deprived of due process when 

the prosecutor was permitted to show the jury photographs (power point slides) of the victim’s 

autopsy and the prejudicial effect of those photographs outweighed their probative value. The 

Report noted that the Ninth District had also decided this claim against Ms. Buck when denying 

her fourth assignment of error and concluded its decision was neither contrary to nor an 

objectively unreasonable application of Supreme Court precedent (ECF No. 3, PageID 27). 

 In her Objections, Ms. Buck cites no Supreme Court precedent which is to the contrary. 

This Court must therefore defer to the Ninth District. 

Conclusion 

 Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge again respectfully recommends 
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that the Petition be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with 

this conclusion, Petitioner should be denied a certificate of appealability and the Court should 

certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and therefore should 

not be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis. 

November 6, 2017. 

 s/ Michael R. Merz

 United States Magistrate Judge 

NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS 

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the 

proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report 

and Recommendations. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(d), this period is extended to seventeen 

days because this Report is being served by mail. .Such objections shall specify the portions of 

the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a memorandum of law in support of the 

objections. If the Report and Recommendations are based in whole or in part upon matters 

occurring of record at an oral hearing, the objecting party shall promptly arrange for the 

transcription of the record, or such portions of it as all parties may agree upon or the Magistrate 

Judge deems sufficient, unless the assigned District Judge otherwise directs. A party may 

respond to another party=s objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. 

Failure to make objections in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. See 

United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947, 949-50 (6th Cir. 1981); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 

153-55 (1985).