COURT OF APPEALS

SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS

FORT WORTH

NO. 02-18-00117-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF J.P. AND 

J.P., CHILDREN

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FROM THE 235TH DISTRICT COURT OF COOKE COUNTY

TRIAL COURT NO. CV16-00622

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MEMORANDUM OPINION1

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Appellant M.G. (Mother) appeals the trial court’s judgment terminating her 

parental rights to her children J.P. (John) and J.P. (Jackson).2 In one issue, she 

contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial 

 

1See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.

2We use aliases for the children and their relatives throughout this opinion. 

See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(b)(2).
2

court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best 

interest. We hold that the evidence is sufficient to support termination, and we 

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Background

Mother has a long history of using illegal drugs. She began using 

methamphetamine when she was nineteen years old, and her addiction to that 

drug continued through the time of the termination trial, when she was forty. She 

was sober from 2000 to 2009, but she relapsed when a paramour “got [her] back 

into the addiction.” She also used marijuana when she was twelve years old and 

as late as 2016, and she has misused prescription medications. 

Mother also has a history of involvement by Child Protective Services 

(CPS) with her children: John, Jackson, and two older children who are not 

subject to this appeal. In 2012, CPS determined that Mother had neglected her 

supervision of a child. In the course of Mother consummating a drug deal, one of 

her children was found to be filthy while sitting in a car that had food all over its 

floor. 

Mother gave birth to John in May 2010 and to Jackson in June 2013. She

conceived John with J.G. (Father) in 2009 while she was living with C.P. (Cody) 

and while Cody was at work.3 According to Mother, Father came over one night 

 

3The evidence does not identify Jackson’s father. In its original petition, 

the Department alleged that Cody was Jackson’s father, and Mother told the 

Department that Cody was his father. A DNA test proved otherwise. 
3

and they “just . . . started hanging out” and had sex. Mother became pregnant 

the first time she had sex with Father, and their intimate relationship continued

thereafter. She was not sure that John was Father’s son until she saw him upon 

his birth and determined that he looked like Father. Father has a criminal history; 

in 2015, he was convicted for committing a drug-related offense.

In October 2015, Mother was arrested in Oklahoma for possessing 

methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia, including syringes. She pleaded 

guilty to that offense, and the Oklahoma court placed her on probation. In April 

2016, she tested positive for methamphetamine. She went to an inpatient drug 

treatment facility in the summer of 2016, but only one week after her discharge, 

she began using methamphetamine again. Soon thereafter, in August 2016, she

was arrested in Cooke County, Texas for possessing pills for which she did not 

have a prescription. 

In October 2016, the Department of Family and Protective Services (the 

Department) filed a petition seeking termination of Mother’s parental rights to 

John and Jackson if her reunification with them could not be achieved. To the 

petition, the Department attached an affidavit explaining events leading to the 

filing of the petition, including that Mother had recently used methamphetamine 

and that she had been arrested for possessing the pills. The Department asked 

the trial court to order the removal of John and Jackson from Mother’s legal 

custody. 
4

After a hearing, the trial court found that allowing the children to remain in 

Mother’s custody would be contrary to their welfare, authorized their removal,

and named the Department as their temporary managing conservator. The court 

ordered Mother to complete several services, including a psychological 

evaluation, counseling, parenting classes, and drug assessments. The 

Department filed a service plan that incorporated these services and added other 

requirements. CPS arranged for weekly visits between Mother and the children. 

By Mother’s admission, at the time of the children’s removal, her life was a 

“wreck.” She was using drugs, was unemployed because of her refusal to apply 

for jobs, and was not primarily responsible for caring for the children. According 

to her, the children were being neglected. Upon their removal, Mother urged 

CPS to consider her sister’s residence as a placement, but CPS could not place 

the children there because her sister tested positive for methamphetamine. 

 In February 2017, after Mother failed to report to her probation officer in 

Oklahoma, she tested positive for methamphetamine. She was arrested, 

resulting in her incarceration through virtually the duration of the Department’s 

termination case. The Oklahoma court sentenced her to ten years’ confinement 

but ordered that the sentence would be suspended upon her completion of a 

regimented drug treatment program. Mother completed the program, and she

was released one week before the March 2018 termination trial. Upon her 

release, she began living with her parents, submitting employment applications to 

various employers, and attending outpatient drug treatment. 
5

Because of Mother’s confinement for most of the proceedings in the trial 

court, she attended only a few visits with John and Jackson. Also because of the 

confinement and because of choices she made before the confinement, she did 

not complete requirements of her service plan. For example, before her 

confinement, she was discharged from counseling because of nonattendance. 

Also before her incarceration, Mother missed visits with John and Jackson. She

completed parenting classes and started (but did not complete) a psychological 

evaluation. 

In March 2018, after hearing the parties’ evidence and arguments, the trial 

court granted the Department’s termination petition. Among other findings 

supporting termination, the trial court found that clear and convincing evidence 

proved that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in John’s and Jackson’s 

best interest. Mother brought this appeal. 

Evidentiary Sufficiency to Prove Best Interest

Mother contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to 

show that termination of her parental rights is in John’s and Jackson’s best 

interest. In a termination case, the State seeks to erase parental rights

permanently—to divest the parent and child of all legal rights, privileges, duties, 

and powers normally existing between them, except the child’s right to inherit. 

Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.206(b) (West Supp. 2017); Holick v. Smith, 685 

S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985). Thus, “[w]hen the State seeks to sever permanently 

the relationship between a parent and a child, it must first observe fundamentally
6

fair procedures.” In re E.R., 385 S.W.3d 552, 554 (Tex. 2012) (citing Santosky v. 

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1391–92 (1982)). We strictly 

scrutinize termination proceedings in favor of the parent. In re E.N.C., 384 

S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012); E.R., 385 S.W.3d at 554–55.

For a trial court to terminate a parent-child relationship, the Department 

must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the parent’s actions satisfy 

one ground listed in family code section 161.001(b)(1) and that termination is in 

the best interest of the child.4 Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 

2017); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 803; In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2005). 

Evidence is clear and convincing if it “will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a 

firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be 

established.” Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.007 (West 2014); E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 

at 802.

In evaluating the evidence for legal sufficiency in parental termination 

cases, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the termination

findings to determine whether a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or 

conviction that the Department proved the challenged ground for termination. 

In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). We resolve any disputed facts in 

 

4

In the summary of Mother’s argument, she states that she is “not 

contesting that one or more of the grounds for termination were met” under 

section 161.001(b)(1) but that it is her “position that termination was not in the 

best interest of the children.”
7

favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard all evidence 

that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved. Id.

We are required to perform “an exacting review of the entire record” in 

determining whether the evidence is factually sufficient to support the termination 

of a parent-child relationship. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 500 (Tex. 2014). In 

reviewing the evidence for factual sufficiency, we give due deference to the 

factfinder’s findings and do not supplant the judgment with our own. In re 

H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). We determine whether, on the entire 

record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm conviction or belief of the 

challenged basis for termination. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 161.001(b); In re C.H., 

89 S.W.3d 17, 28 (Tex. 2002).

There is a strong presumption that keeping a child with a parent is in the 

child’s best interest. In re R.R., 209 S.W.3d 112, 116 (Tex. 2006). Nonexclusive 

factors that the factfinder may use in determining the best interest of the child 

include the desires of the child, the emotional and physical needs of the child 

now and in the future, the emotional and physical danger to the child now and in 

the future, the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, the programs 

available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the child, the 

plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking custody, the 

stability of the home or proposed placement, the acts or omissions of the parent 

which may indicate that the existing parent-child relationship is not a proper one, 
8

and any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Holley v. Adams, 544 

S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976) (citations omitted). 

Under these factors, Mother’s addiction to illegal drugs and her long-term 

drug use, including her use while this case was pending, support the trial court’s 

finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest. 

See In re J.L.B., 349 S.W.3d 836, 849 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.); In 

re M.R., 243 S.W.3d 807, 821 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, no pet.); In re 

C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 894 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.); see also In

re K.G.-J.W., No. 01-17-00739-CV, 2018 WL 1161556, at *7 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 6, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (considering a parent’s 

continuing use of narcotics during the pendency of a termination case as 

supporting a trial court’s best-interest finding).

Mother conceded at trial that she has had several opportunities to break 

her addiction and that she has failed to do so. Although she testified that she 

was ready for sobriety because of skills that she learned at the treatment 

program that she had attended while confined and although (mostly because of 

her confinement) she had been sober for more than a year at the time of trial, the 

trial court could have doubted her ability to maintain sobriety based on her long 

history of using methamphetamine and other drugs despite her receipt of 

treatment and despite a previous lengthy period of sobriety.

5

 See In re C.M., No. 

 

5Mother explained, “I have learned the skills and tools to live a better sober 

life. And I know I have made mistakes and made bad choices, but all I’m asking 
9

01-15-00830-CV, 2016 WL 1054589, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 

17, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that a factfinder could have reasonably 

determined that a parent was unlikely to maintain sobriety when the parent had a 

long history of opiate use and a counselor testified that opiate users had a high 

rate of recidivism); see also In re A.M., 385 S.W.3d 74, 83 (Tex. App.—Waco 

2012, pet. denied) (“Evidence of a recent improvement does not absolve a parent 

of a history of irresponsible choices.”); Ray v. Burns, 832 S.W.2d 431, 435 (Tex. 

App.—Waco 1992, no writ) (“Past is often prologue.”).

The trial court could have also considered Mother’s failure to complete 

services, caused in part by her confinement and occurring before her 

confinement, as a factor affecting the children’s best interest. See M.R., 243 

S.W.3d at 821 (“A parent’s . . . failure to comply with a family service plan 

support[s] a finding that termination is in the best interest of the child.”).

Next, Mother admitted at trial that before their removal from her legal 

custody, the children were neglected. See In re J.V.B., No. 01-17-00958-CV, 

2018 WL 2727732, at *9 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] June 7, 2018, no pet. h.)

(mem. op.) (stating that evidence of a child’s neglect supports a trial court’s bestinterest finding); In re H.M.O.L., Nos. 01-17-00775-CV, 01-17-00776-CV, 2018 

WL 1659981, at *18 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Apr. 6, 2018, pet. denied)

 

is for a chance. I don’t want to lose my boys.” Mother testified that she did not 

learn such skills in shorter treatment programs in which she had previously 

participated, such as the summer 2016 inpatient treatment. She testified that she 

did not “take what [that inpatient program] offered.” 
10

(mem. op.) (stating that a parent’s neglect of a child is an indication of a lack of 

parenting abilities). And the trial court received evidence corroborating that 

admission and showing John and Jackson’s improvement to the point of 

flourishing in foster care. See In re D.M., 452 S.W.3d 462, 471 (Tex. App.—San 

Antonio 2014, no pet.) (considering in a best-interest review that a child was 

neglected while in a parent’s care but “healthy, happy, and well-adjusted” after 

being placed in foster care).

Shannon Sharp, a CPS caseworker, testified that the children had 

“blossomed” in their foster home, which included the foster parents, their two 

biological children, John, and Jackson. Concerning Jackson, Sharp explained,

The youngest child . . . was very behind [upon his removal]. He 

didn’t speak. He was very withdrawn. . . . [A]t the time that we 

removed, he was three. And he just didn’t seem to be on the normal 

level of a [three year old]. And since being moved into that foster

home, he just surprises me every time I go see him.

. . . .

. . . He speaks very well.

. . . .

. . . [P]rior to moving there, he seemed to have, in my opinion, 

some fear of other adults. And since he’s been in that home, he’s 

just open and chatty even and he will speak to other adults . . . at 

school or at the store. And prior to being in that home, he never did 

anything like that.

Concerning John, Sharp testified,

[John] has done very well, also. He’s seven now. At the time of 

removal, he was six. He was much more outgoing than his younger 

brother, but since being in the foster home, he’s learned a little bit 
11

about what rules are and . . . things that he needs to be responsible 

for. He has been diagnosed with ADHD. And I think that he really 

struggled with that prior to moving into the foster home. He started 

some treatment medication, and he’s also seeing a therapist, and 

he’s doing very well.

Jeanne Smith, a court-appointed special advocate and the children’s 

guardian ad litem, similarly testified that John and Jackson were “doing great” in 

foster care. She explained that the children’s interactions with adults had 

improved “tremendously” since their placement in foster care, that John was 

progressing well with his education, and that both boys were receiving 

appropriate medical care. 

The evidence showed a strong bond among the foster family, John, and 

Jackson and a comparatively weak bond between the children and Mother. See 

In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222, 230–31 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. 

denied) (op. on reh’g) (considering a child’s bond with a foster family as a factor 

supporting the child’s best interest in the termination of a father’s parental rights). 

Sharp testified that John and Jackson refer to their foster mother as “mom” and 

refer to Mother by her first name. According to Sharp, Mother sent only three or 

four letters to the children while she was confined and was unable to visit them. 

Smith testified that neither John nor Jackson ever asked her about Mother. 

When the Department’s attorney asked Mother about who should care for 

John and Jackson if the trial court terminated her parental rights, she testified, “I 

would like them to be with family. But if not, I would like them to go back with the 

foster family.” Mother acknowledged that the children’s foster family had 
12

arranged for John and Jackson to visit their older siblings. She also stated that 

she had been “told that [the children] were doing very well” in foster care. Mother 

acknowledged that the children are bonded with their foster family and that the 

foster parents want to adopt them. 

Finally, the trial court could have reasonably determined that termination of 

Mother’s parental rights to the children is in their best interest because it provides

them with stability and permanence that they would otherwise lack. See In re 

B.H.R., 535 S.W.3d 114, 124 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.) (stating that 

“[s]tability and permanence are paramount in the upbringing of a child” and that a 

factfinder may consider that “the best interest of the child may be served by 

termination so that adoption may occur rather than the impermanent foster care 

arrangement that would result if termination were to not occur”).6

Mother testified that at the time of the termination trial, she was not in a 

position to care for John and Jackson. Sharp opined that Mother did not 

understand the children’s mental, emotional, and physical needs on the “level 

that she would need to” if the court returned the children to her care. Sharp 

asked the trial court to terminate Mother’s parental rights to the children so that 

they could “achieve permanency.” She explained that the foster family wanted to 

adopt the children immediately and that if the trial court denied termination, the 

 

6On appeal, Mother proposes that the trial court should have denied the 

Department’s termination petition while allowing the Department to maintain 

managing conservatorship of the children and while leaving the children in foster 

care. 
13

Department would not consider returning them to Mother’s custody for 

approximately one year while it waited to determine if she remained sober. 

Smith likewise recommended the termination of Mother’s parental rights; she 

expressed her concern that if the trial court did not terminate the rights, Mother 

would relapse and the “kids would have to go through another upset.” She 

added, “They’re flourishing in a stable life now.” 

For all of these reasons, considering all of the evidence under the factors 

described above, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm belief 

or conviction that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the children’s best 

interest. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 101.007, 161.001(b)(2). We therefore 

hold that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court’s 

termination judgment, and we overrule Mother’s sole issue. See J.P.B., 180 

S.W.3d at 573; C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28.

Conclusion

Having overruled Mother’s only issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment 

terminating her parental rights to John and to Jackson.

/s/ Wade Birdwell

WADE BIRDWELL

JUSTICE

PANEL: MEIER, GABRIEL, and BIRDWELL, JJ.

DELIVERED: August 9, 2018