## IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

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### No. 16-0651

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### D UDLEY 

### C ONSTRUCTION 

### , L TD 

### ., R ICHARD 

### M ARK 

### D UDLEY 

### , AND 

### H ARTFORD 

### F IRE 

### I NSURANCE 

### C OMPANY 

### , P ETITIONERS 

### ,

v. 

### ACT P IPE AND 

### S UPPLY 

### , I NC 

### ., R ESPONDENT

══════════════════════ ════════════════════ O N P ETITION FOR R EVIEW FROM THE C OURT OF A PPEALS FOR THE S IXTH D ISTRICT OF T EXAS

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Argued December 5, 2017

J USTICE B ROWN delivered the opinion of the Court.
J USTICE B LACKLOCK did not participate in the decision.
This case presents two questions. The first is procedural: Did ACT Pipe and Supply, Inc., in defending a favorable judgment notwithstanding the jury’s verdic t, successfully raise a “crosspoint” in the court of app eals that preserved an alternative argu ment proscribing the jury’s original verdict? We say yes—ACT did not formally labe l its argument a “cross-point,” but the substance of that argument, if accepted, would nonetheless vitia te the jury’s original verdict. The second presents an issue of statutory interpretation: Are attorney’s f ees recoverable for a claim brought under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act? Our an swer is no—neither the Act nor Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001 specifically provides for attorney’s fees, so they are2 unavailable. Accordingly, we affirm the court of a ppeals’ judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
I This appeal stems from a bill ing dispute between a general c ontractor and a pipe supplier. Dudley Construction, Ltd., the general contract or, enlisted ACT Pipe and Supply, Inc., as a supplier for two municipal water- and sewer-improvement projects: the Reclaimed Water Project in College Station and the Tabor Project in Bryan. This dispute primarily concerns the Tabor Project. To assist Dudley in bidding for the Tabor Project, ACT’s operati ons manager, Mark Stroud, quoted prices for the “slip-joint” pipe Du dley anticipated using for the project at $95 per unit of 36-inch and $74.53 per unit of 30-inch pipe. Dudley won th e contract, and Stroud ordered the slip-joint pipe from ACT’s manufacturer to lock in the quot ed prices and ensure timely delivery. After Stroud placed the order, however, the city rejected the proposed use of slip-joint pipe, insisting the project required “r estrained-joint” pipe. Stroud provided Dudley a second proposal, quoting the city’s preferred pipe at a more-expensive price of $109.71 per unit of 36-inch and $82 per unit of 30-inch pipe. The city approved Dudl ey’s revised proposal, bu t ACT never modified the original slip-joint purchase order with the pipe manufacturer. Consequently, Dudley received slip-joint rather than restrain ed-joint pipe at the job site. Dudley’s project manager, Michael Ham, in formed Stroud that Dudley had received the wrong pipe. Stroud advised Ham that restrained-joint pipe was avai lable at a higher cost, but Ham insisted ACT supply the restrained-j oint pipe at the same price AC T quoted for the slip-joint pipe.3 Dudley’s owner, Richard Dudley, began working with ACT’s regional manager, Curt Murray, to resolve the dispute. After reviewing the project pl ans, Murray told Dudley he believed that slipjoint pipe met the project’s specifications and wa s allowed under the contract , the city’s objections notwithstanding. Dudley subsequently took the pos ition with the city that the Tabor Project contract did not specify which pipe must be used and that slip-joi nt pipe was adequate. The city relented, agreeing to Dudley’s us e of slip-joint pipe so long as it was reinforced by external restraints. Dudley agreed. Accordingly, Dudley installed the erran tly ordered slip-joint pipe it had already received along with $17,500 worth of external restraints ACT supplied at no cost. Dudley and ACT could not, however, agree on how much Dudley owed for the pipe. Dudley signed a purchase order on September 14, 2011, for the slip-joint pipe that was ultimately used at the originally quoted price of $95 and $74.53 per 36- and 30-inch unit, respectively. But after the project’s completion, ACT billed Dudley for restrained-joint pipe at the second proposal’s higher cost. Murray testified at tria l that the parties verbally agreed to use the highe r-quoted prices to offset cost reductions for pipe used in the Reclaimed Water Project. Dudley denied any such agreement, but nonetheless submitted ACT’s invoices for both projects to the cities, which paid Dudley for the full amounts ACT sought. Dudley de posited these payments in its account, but citing the ongoing dispute, paid AC T nothing for either project. ACT sued Dudley on a sworn account for $143, 714.19, the total it claims Dudley owes it for the Tabor and Reclaimed Water projects. Because Dudley did no t pay ACT after the cities paid Dudley the amounts due on ACT’s invoices, ACT also alleged misa pplication of trust funds under the Texas Construction Trust Fund Act (TCTFA). As to ACT’s sworn-account claims, the jury found that the prices ACT charged were “in acco rdance with the agreement” for the Reclaimed4 Water Project and awarded ACT $14,214.20. For the Ta bor Project, however, the jury answered that the prices ACT charged were not “in accordance with the agreement,” but nonetheless awarded ACT $110,629.70 for “reasonable compensati on.” The jury also found ACT perfected a bond-payment claim and awarded the same damage s as ACT’s sworn-account claims. Finally, the jury found that Dudley misapplied trust funds under the TCTFA but awarded no corresponding damages to compensate ACT for either project. ACT moved for judgment notwith standing the verdict. It urged the trial court to change the jury’s answer to the sworn-acco unt liability question for the Tabor Project. ACT argued the $110,629.70 damages award necessitated a finding th at ACT had indeed charged Dudley “in accordance with the agreement.” ACT also encourag ed the trial court to disregard the jury’s finding that it was not entitled to damages in light of the jury’s finding that Dudley misapplied trust funds. ACT asked the tria l court to instead substitute the $110,629.70 in damages the jury found for its sworn-account and bond-payment claims. The trial court granted ACT’s motion and issu ed a final judgment. In its judgment, the court set aside the jury’s liability finding on ACT’s sworn-account claim for the Tabor Project, instead concluding it was “conc lusively proven” that the pr ices charged by ACT were in accordance with the parties’ agr eement. The trial court further found that ACT’s damages were uncontroverted and conclusively proven, and substituted the jury’s $110,629.50 award for the Tabor Project and $14,214.20 for the Reclaimed Water Project under the sworn-account and bondpayment claims in place of the jury’s zero-da mages findings for TCTFA damages. The judgment awarded ACT $131,823.99 in attorney’s fees.5 Dudley appealed on several grounds. Relevant to the case here, Dudley argued the trial court erred in rendering judgm ent notwithstanding the verdic t on ACT’s sworn-account claim because sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that the price ACT charged for the Tabor Project was not in accordance with the parties’ agreement. Dudley also argued the evidence supports the jury’s zero-damages finding on ACT’ s TCTFA claim or, altern atively, that the trial court erred in awarding damage s based on the amount the jury aw arded for ACT’s sworn-account and bond-payment claims. Finally, Dudley argues the trial court improperl y awarded attorney’s fees. The court of appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. 531 S.W.3d 744, 748 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016). On the claims relevant to this appeal, it agreed with Dudley that sufficient evidence supported the jury’s finding that the pr ices ACT charged Dudley for the Tabor Project were not in accord with the parties’ agreement. Id. at 754–55. Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court’s judgment on that issu e and rendered judgment th at ACT take nothing on its sworn-account claim for the Tabor Project. Id. at 754. But it rejected Dudley’s argument that the evidence supports the jury’s zero-damages finding for ACT’s TCTFA claim. Id. at 755 (noting Dudley cited no authority to support its argument th at “there was no loss of the construction funds” as Dudley held the funds because of “a dispute between the parties due to ACT’s overcharges as found by the jury”). The court of appeals concluded, however, that the trial court did not substitute “conclusively proven” TCTFA damages in place of the jury’s zero-damages finding when it inserted the jury’s $110,629.70 damages awards fo r the Tabor Project unde r ACT’s sworn-account and bond-payment claims. Id. at 756. “From the documentation pres ented at trial,” the court of6 appeals observed, “it is unclear how the jury re ached its decision on the other damage questions, although it is clear that the trial court based its ac tions on the jury’s findings to those questions.”
Id. at 756. The court of appeals theref ore held that the tr ial court erred in de termining damages for ACT’s TCTFA claim, reasoning that “it does not appear that the obligations of Dudley under any contract yielded exactly $110,629.70.” Id. But the court of appeals also took issue with the jury’s zero-damages finding: “While the jury found zero damages, we conclude that it wa s conclusively proven a nd not really contested that there was some sum of money, more than nothing, that constituted a trust fund under the
statute.” Id . For that reason, the court of appeals revers ed the trial court’s judgment as to ACT’s TCTFA damages and remanded to that court “to de termine the appropriate amount of recovery.”
Id. at 754, 762. A dissenting opinion, however, noted that ACT did not rais e a cross-point on appeal asserting that the evidence did not support the jury’s zero-damages finding for ACT’s TCTFA claim as required by Texas Rule of Civil Proced ure 324(c) and Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(b)(1). In light of ACT’s omission, the dissenti ng insisted these rules “r equire us to render judgment of zero damages on ACT’s trust-fund cause of action.” Id. at 762 (Burgess, J., dissenting). Finally, the court of appeals concluded that a ny attorney’s-fees disput e must be decided on remand. Based on its disposition of the issues before it, the court noted that ACT had yet to establish that it was a prevailing party in an ac tion for which attorney’s fees are recoverable. Id. at 759. However, noting as well that ACT’s TCTFA clai m has “as of yet, undetermined damages” to7 be reconsidered by the trial court, the court of appeals remanded the attorney’s-fees issue for “reexamination.” Id. at 759–60. We granted Dudley’s petition for review.
II We first consider whether ACT waived its ar gument that the court of appeals should not enter judgment on the jury’s origin al verdict after concluding the trial court erroneously rendered judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Like the disse nting opinion at the court of appeals, Dudley argues that two procedural rules—civil-proce dure rule 324(c) and a ppellate-proce dure rule 38.2(b)(1)—required the court of appeals to reinst ate the jury’s zero-damages finding after it concluded the evidence did not support the TCTFA damages award the trial court substituted. The rules are similar in some respects and identical in others. Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 324(c)

states: Judgment Notwithstanding Findings; Cross-Points When judgment is rendered non obstante verdicto or no twithstanding the findings of a jury on one or more ques tions, the appellee may bring forward by cross-point contained in hi s brief filed in the Court of Appeals any ground which would have vitiated the verdict or woul d have prevented an affirmance of the judgment had one been rendered by the tria l court in harmony with the verdict, including although not limited to the ground that one or more of the jury’s findings have insufficient support in the evid ence or are against the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence as a matter of fact, and the gr ound that the verdict and judgment based thereon should be set aside because of improper argument of counsel. The failure to bring forward by cross- points such grounds as would vitiate the verdict shall be deemed a waiver ther eof; provided, however, that if a crosspoint is upon a ground which requires the ta king of evidence in addition to that adduced upon the trial of the cause, it is not necessary that the evidentiary hearing be held until after the appellate court determines that the cause be remanded to consider such a cross-point.8 T EX

. R. C IV

. P. 324(c). Texas Rule of Appellate Procedur e 38.2(b) similarly provides: (b) Cross-Points

. (1) Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdic t. When the tria l court renders judgment notwithstanding the verdict on one or more questions, the appellee must bring forward by cross-point any issue or poi nt that would have vitiated the verdict or that would have prevented an affirman ce of the judgment if the trial court had rendered judgment on the verdict. Failure to bring forward by cross-point an issue or point that would vitiate the verdict or prevent an affirmance of the judgment waives that complaint. Included in this requirement is a point that: (A) the verdict or one or more jury findings have insufficient evidentiary support or are against the overwhelming pr eponderance of the evidence as a matter of fact; or (B) the verdict should be set aside beca use of improper argument of counsel; (2) When Evidentiary Hearing Needed. The appellate court must remand a case to the trial court to take evidence if: (A) the appellate court has sustained a point raised by the appellant; and (B) the appellee raised a cross-point that requires the taking of additional evidence.
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. P. 38.2(b). This Court has previously articulated the ups hot of these rules: “Normally, when a trial court has entered judgment notwithstanding the verdic t, and an appellate court concludes that this was error, it must reverse the judgment of the tr ial court and enter judgment in harmony with the verdict, unless the appellee presen ts by cross-points grounds sufficien t to vitiate the jury’s verdict or to prevent an affirmance of the judgme nt had one been ente red on the verdict.” Jackson v.
Ewton , 411 S.W.2d 715, 717 (Tex. 1967). And we have cl arified the distinction between counterpoints and cross-points. Counter-poi nts “assist the appellate court in finding the answers given to the points of the appellant. From the standpoint of the advocate, their function is to show that the point or points of the oppos ite party are not valid.” Id . Cross-points, on the ot her hand, “are really ‘points’ which are used to preserve error committed by the tria l court. They are the means by which9 an appellee may bring forward comp laints of some ruling or action of the trial court which the appellee alleges constitu ted error as to him.” Id. The Jackson court observed that Rule 324(c) serves to “require a final disposition of the case by the appellate court, where a judgment notw ithstanding the verdict is erroneously rendered by the trial court, on the basis of the record befo re it, and to order a remand only as to questions that require the taking of additional evidence, such as jury misconduct.” Id. at 718. This rule, and its appellate counterpart, promot e judicial economy by providing for “one appeal in the case instead of two.” See id. at 719. If an appellate cour t agrees with an appella nt that the trial court below erroneously set aside the jury’s findings and entered its own judgment, the rules have preemptively burdened the appellee to argue a ny alternative ground th at would prevent the appellate court from restor ing the jury’s answers. “Cross-points” are the rules-prescribed me thod for fulfilling this requirement and preserving such alternative arguments against the jury’s original verdict. But we have never required rigid technical compliance with these rule s. Nor do these rules themselves mandate use of particular labels; a party need not name its arguments “cross-poi nts” to avoid waiver. Whenever possible, we reject form-over-s ubstance requirements that favor procedural machinations over reaching the merits of a case. See Lane Bank Equip. Co. v. Smith S. Equip., Inc. , 10 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. 2000) (Hecht, J., concurring) (“Appellat e procedure should not be tricky. It should be simple, it should be certain, it should make sense, and it should facilitate consideration of the parties’ arguments on the merits.”); see also T EX

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. P. 1 (“The proper objective of rules of civil procedure is to obtain a just, fair, equitable and impartial adjudication of the rights of litigants under established principles of substantive law.”).10 If an appellee makes a substantive argument that would, if accepted, vitiate the jury’s original verdict or prevent an affirmance of th e judgment had one been rendered in harmony with the jury’s verdict, it has presen ted a cross-point sufficient to a void waiver. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals has modeled the correct approach, cons idering arguments as cross-points “even when the appellee does not explicitly refer to them as such.” JJJJ Walker, LLC v. Yollick , 447 S.W.3d 453, 459 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied). If an appellee makes an argument only in response to an appellant’s point of erro r—technically, perhaps, a “counter-point” under the Jackson dichotomy—appellate courts should nonetheless consider it a cross-point if, regardless of how or where it is presented, the substance of the argument would nonetheless undermine the jury’s original verdict. See Holman Street Baptist Church v. Jefferson , 317 S.W.3d 540, 547 Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, pet. denied (“Although [the appellee] did not explicitly term his . . . arguments as ‘cross-points,’ he did make . . . arguments [that would ha ve vitiated the verdict] in response to [the appellant’s] issues. We will th erefore consider these arguments as cross-points and assess the merits of [the appellee’s] contentions.”). Without dispute, ACT did not fo rmally label as cross-points any of its arguments to the court of appeals. It di d, however, argue in defense of the tr ial court’s judgment notwithstanding the verdict overriding the jury’s zero-damages find ing for its TCTFA claim. And its basis for doing so was that the trial court acted properly in disregarding a finding that was against the overwhelming weight of the ev idence and contrary to the ju ry’s finding that Dudley had misapplied trust funds. ACT insisted that the “ove rwhelming evidence presented at trial supported entering [judgment notwithstanding the verdict]” on ACT’s TCTFA claims. It pointed to “records subpoenaed from each city detail[ing] the amount s [Dudley] submitted in pay applications, which11 included the materials supplied by [ACT].” These records “included the city’s approval of the payment applications and the elec tronic funds transfer records identifying the dates and amounts of the funds transferred to [Dudley].” Furthermor e, “Mr. Dudley admitted that [Dudley] submitted and received approval from the city for pay app lications that included the materials for which [ACT] is seeking recovery” and that “he received the funds for [ACT’s] mate rials, as reflected in the city’s records.” And upon cross- examination, Dudley testified that “the funds he received from the city were ‘widely dispersed,’ but none were di spersed to [ACT].” This evidence, ACT insists, “conclusively establishes” its entitlement to damages for its TCTFA claim. Accordingly, ACT asked the trial court to disregard the jury’s ze ro-damages finding and enter “the same damage amounts the jury found in response to damage s questions” for ACT’s sworn-account and bondpayment claims. Dudley concedes that ACT’s failure to label its argument as a “cross-point” is not fatal but insists ACT ultimately failed to preserve its ar gument because it substantively presented only a counter-point to Dudley’s argument that the trial court improperly granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict. But ACT defends the trial court’s decision precisely because it repudiates the jury’s zero-damages finding. ACT’ s argument that “the evidence conclusively establishes ACT’s entitlement to damages” and wh at Dudley insists it should have argued—that the overwhelming weight of the ev idence is against the jury’s verdict—are two sides of the same coin: to defend the judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the evidence is overwhelmingly against the jury’s verdict is to attack the verdict. Whether Jackson would classify ACT’s argument a “counter-point” or a “cro ss-point,” its substance is unmistakable: the evidence commands at least

some damages.12 The court of appeals permissibly considered ACT’s argument a “cross-point,” noting that “[w]hile ACT has not explicitly set out or named any of its appellate points as ‘cross-points,’ it has substantively made arguments that, if accepted, vitiate the original jury verdict of zero damages.” 531 S.W.3d at 756 n.16. Accordingly, it remanded the issue to the trial court “to determine the appropriat e amount of recovery.” Id. at 754, 762. Dudley argue s, however, that under Jackson a remand is improper because “this case does not require the taking of new evidence which the parties had no opportunity to develop in the trial court.” See Jackson , 411 S.W.2d at 718 (“The purpose of [rule 324(c)] was to require a final di sposition of the case by the appellate court, where a judgment notwithstanding the verdic t is erroneously rendered by the trial court, on the basis of the record before it, and to orde r a remand only as to questions that require the taki ng of additional evidence, such as jury misconduct. ”). On this point, we believe Jackson —issued more than forty years ago—may have overstated the constraints ofrule 324(c) and, by implication, appellateprocedure rule 38.2(b). Clearly, the thrust of these rules is to require appellees to present any alternative arguments that would prevent the court of appeals from rein stating the jury’s verdic t should it agree with the appellant that the trial court erred in rendering judgment notwithstanding the verdict. One purpose of this requirement might be to better position courts of appeals to finally di spose of cases instead of remanding them to trial courts for further pro ceedings. But nothing in the text of either rule compels the conclusion that a final disposit ion in the court of appeals is required or that a remand is always limited to instances in which new evidence must be taken. Under the circumstances here, we cannot say the court of appeals erred in remand ing the case to the trial court for reconsideration of ACT’s TCTFA damages. See, e.g. , Texarkana Mem’l. Ho sp., Inc. v. Murdock , 946 S.W.2d 836,13 837 (Tex. 1997) (“Because there is no evidence to support the entire amount of damages awarded by the jury, but there is legally sufficient evidence that [the defendant’s] negligence caused some of the medical expenses, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and remand the cause for a new trial.”). We therefore affirm the court of appeals’ de cision on this issue and agree the case should be remanded to the trial court for further pro ceedings. We acknowledge, however, that the parties disagree as to the scope of the court of appeals’ remand. Indeed, la nguage in the court of appeals’ opinion can be read to suggest that a new trial is required. But the opi nion also states that the trial court may “determine the appropriate amount of r ecovery,” suggesting that the trial court could simply alter its judgment in conformance with evidence already in the record. 531 S.W.3d at 754, 762. Rather than attempt to interpret the scope of remand the c ourt of appeals intended, we will simply remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings in light of the holdings of the court of appeals and of this Court. The court of appeals properly reve rsed the trial court’s judgment regarding ACT’s TCTFA damages—no evidence s upports the damages that the trial court substituted. We further agree with the court of appeals that “it was conclusively proven and not really contested that there was so me sum of money, more than nothi ng, that constitute d a trust fund under the statute.” Id. at 756. Beyond that, we leave the next st ep, including whether a new trial is necessary, to the trial court’s sound discretion.
III Dudley raised several arguments at the cour t of appeals against th e attorney’s-fees award in ACT’s favor. The court of appeals did not c onsider Dudley’s argumen ts, choosing instead to remand the attorney’s-fees issue to the trial cour t for reconsideration in light of the court of14 appeals’ disposition of other i ssues. In doing so, however, the c ourt of appeals suggested that attorney’s fees for a TCTFA claim “are available for a claim that constr uction trust funds were misapplied if the relief requested is compensa tion for work performed or materials supplied.” Id. at 759 n.20 (quoting Perry & Perry Builders, Inc. v. Galvan , No. 03-02-00091-CV, 2003 WL 21705248, at *8 (Tex. App.—Austin July 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Accordingly, because ACT’s TCTFA claim has “as of yet, undeterm ined damages, because damages were not conclusively proven,” the court of appeals remanded the attorney’s-fees issu e for “re-examination” by the trial court. 531 S.W.3d at 759–60. Dudley insists, however, that attorney’s fees are unavailable under the TCTFA and that the court of appeals therefor e erred in remanding the issue for re consideration on that ground. Without question, the TCTFA says nothi ng about attorney’s fees. See T EX

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. C ODE §§ 162.001–.033; see also In re Kirk , 525 B.R. 325, 334 (Bankr. W.D. Te x. 2015) (“Th[e] [TCTFA] does not, however, mention recovery of attorney ’s fees in such actions.”). On this point we have been clear: “For more than a century, Texas law has not allowed recovery of attorney’s fees unless authorized by statute or contract.” Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa , 212 S.W.3d 299, 310 (Tex. 2006). Some courts of appeals, however, have held that Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001 nonetheless makes attorney’s fees available for a claim brought under the TCTFA. In Perry & Perry Builders, Inc. v. Galvan , the court of appeals likened Galvan’s TCTFA claim to his quantum-meruit claim, reasoning that “[i]n bot h claims, [Galvan] seeks payment for work performed on the construction project” and “does not seek recovery under any consequential or punitive tort damage theory.” 2013 WL 21705248, at *8. “Like quantum meruit,” the court reasoned, “his request for an award equal to the am ount of funds that were intended to compensate15 him for work provided is within the statute authorizing an award of attorney’s fees.” Id. (citing
T EX

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. & R EM

. C ODE § 38.001); see also Direct Value, L.L.C. v. Stock Bldg. Supply,
L.L.C. , 388 S.W.3d 386, 394 (Tex. App.—Ama rillo 2012, no pet.) (following Galvan as binding precedent in a case originally appealed to the Austin court of appeals but transferred to the Amarillo court of appeals). Similarly, in Ulusal v. Lentz Engineering, L.C. , the court of appeals held that section 38.001 permits an attorney’s-f ees award for TCTFA claims because the TCTFA “creates a cause of action for failure to make payments under a construction contract” and attorney’s fees are r ecoverable under se ction 38.001 for “rendered se rvices, performed labor, furnished materials, and a contract.” 491 S. W.3d 910, 919 (Tex. App—Hous ton [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.). One court of appeals ha s rejected this approach, observi ng simply that “[m]isapplication of trust funds is not one of th e causes of action listed in sec tion 38.001, and therefore the section does not apply to [a TCTFA claim].” Larrison v. Catalina Design , No. 02-10-00167-CV, 2011 WL 582730, at *5 (Tex. App—Fort Worth Feb. 17, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). We conclude that neither the TCTFA nor Ci vil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001 allow for attorney’s fees for a successful TC TFA claim. Our reasoning is simple: neither statute
says so. See Chapa , 212 S.W.3d at 310. True, section 38.001 makes attorney’s fees recoverable for a variety of claims that might factually form the basis of a TCTFA claim—a “trustee” under the TCTFA, see T EX

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. C ODE § 162.002, might misapply trust f unds at the expense of a beneficiary who has “rendered services,” “perform ed labor,” “furnished material,” or who was a party to “an oral or written contract.” See T EX

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. & R EM C ODE § 38.001(1)–(3),(8). But this does not merge the statutes for attorney’s -fees purposes. Certainly, a pipe supplier might recover attorney’s fees under section 38.001 for wo rk performed, materials provided, or for breach16 of contract. But this does not open the door to attorn ey’s fees for violations of separate statutory provisions simply because the claim is based on the same dispute or because the recovery sought is the same. The TCTFA is a stand-alone, comprehens ive statutory scheme defining whether “construction payments” and “loan receipts” constitute trust funds, see T EX

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. C ODE § 162.001, determining who are “benef iciaries” of trust funds, see id. § 162.003, providing for when trust funds are “misapplied,” see id. § 162.031, and providing for penalties, see id. § 162.032. The legislature could have provided for attorney’s fees in this scheme. It did not. So neither will we. Nor will we reach to find them imp lied by a wholly se parate statute. See Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield , 923 S.W.2d 590, 593 (Tex. 1996) (“The auth orization of atto rney’s fees in civil cases may not be inferred; rather it ‘must be provided for by the expre ss terms of the statute in question.’” (quoting First City Bank-Farmers Branch v. Guex , 677 S.W.2d 25, 30 (Tex. 1984))). In so far as the court of appeals’ remand to c onsider attorney’s fees included fees for ACT’s TCTFA claim, we reverse its judgment and render judgment that attorney’s fees for a TCTFA claim are not recoverable under either the TCTF A itself or Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 38.001.
* * * On the issue of whether ACT preserved its ar gument that judgment should not be entered on the jury’s verdict, we affirm the court of appeal s’ judgment. On the issue of the availability of attorney’s fees for ACT’s TCTFA claim, we re verse the court of appe als’ judgment and render judgment that attorney’s fees ar e unavailable. We remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.17 ________________________________ Jeffrey V. Brown Justice OPINION DELIVERED: April 6, 2018