UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ HARPREET SINGH, Petitioner,

v. MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting United States Attorney General,  Respondent. No. 18-9518 (Petition for Review)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT **

________________ _________________ Before LUCERO , KELLY , and PHILLIPS , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Harpreet Singh petitions this cour t for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) panel decision denying his application for asy lum, withholding of

 In accordance with Rule 43(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of Appel late Procedure, Matthew G. Whitaker is substituted for Jefferson B. Sessions, III, as the respondent in this action.

** After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel ha s determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in t he determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G ). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral ar gument. This order and judgme nt is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res j udicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, howev er, for its persuasive value c onsistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 a nd 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### December 7, 2018
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 removal, and relief under the Conv ention Against Torture. Exer cising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252(a), w e deny Singh’s petition.
I Singh is a native and citizen of India who illegally entered th e United States without valid immigration papers on or about February 10, 2017. He applied for asylum, withholding of removal , and relief under the Convention Against Torture on the basis that he feared returni ng to India. He claimed his me mbership in a Sikh political party, the Mann Party , placed him in danger from the rival Sikh political group, the Badal Party. Singh a lleged that members of the Bada l Party attacked him on two occasions. On April 6, 2017, the Department of Homeland Security issued Si ngh a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) charging hi m with removability. Singh appear ed before the immigration judge (“IJ”) for the first time on June 20, 2017, a t a scheduled master calendar hearing. Singh sought a continuance of his merits hea ring so he could obtain counsel. The IJ granted h im a continuance to July 5, 20 17. On July 5, Singh told the IJ his uncle was in c ontact with an attorney and he ne eded another week. The IJ granted a second continua nce to July 19, 2017, but warne d Singh that if he did not have an attorney by that dat e he would be required to repre sent himself. Singh stated that he understood. On July 19, Singh told the IJ he had retained counsel, but requ ested a third continuance. Counsel was not pre sent at the hearing. Singh ad mitted to the factual allegations in the NTA. He also filed his I-589 form to apply for asylum,3 withholding of removal, and prot ection under the Convention Aga inst Torture. The IJ granted Singh a third contin uance to August 16, 2017. On Au gust 16, Singh again appeared without counsel and aske d for more time. The IJ denie d further continuances because Singh had two months to obtain counsel, an d set the merits hearing for August 30, 2017. The IJ informed Singh that all of his supporting documents needed to be submitted t o the court before the hearin g. At the August 30 hearing, Singh said his uncle had found an att orney—Shiv Kapoor with an office in San Ant onio, Texas—to represent him. Singh told the IJ he had been unable to contact Kapoor for the last fifteen days bec ause of bad weather, an apparent reference to Hurrica ne Harvey, which had recently m ade landfall in Houston, Texas. Singh asked fo r a one-month continuance. The IJ took judicial notice that San Antonio had not been impacted by Hurricane Harv ey, and attempted to call Kapoor’s office, but the call went to voice mail. The IJ denied the continuance and proceeded t o take Singh’s testimony. Singh testified he was first att acked by Badal Party members wh en he was hanging Mann Party posters by a ro adside. He said after a vehi cle with Badal Party posters approached him, four men in yellow turbans came out, at tacked him, and told him to leave the Mann Party. The IJ asked if he had been hospi talized for his injuries. Singh answer ed affirmatively, but when the IJ asked if he had any supporting documentation, Singh ch anged his answer and said he received treatment from a village doctor but had no evidence. Later in the hearin g, when the IJ asked why he could not safely return to India, Singh stated for the f irst time that his4 attackers took his personal iden tification information and coul d find and attack him anywhere in India. Singh testified the second attackhappened when he was riding h is motorcycle. He said a car stopped next to his motorcyc le, someone got ahold of the motorcycle handle, he swerved, and the car h it his motorcycle. He said he fell and people came and started hitting him with hoc key sticks, breaking his ankle. Singh stated the attackers threatened to kill hi m unless he left the Mann Party. He testified he was hospitalized for his broken ankl e and wore a cast. Although Si ngh did not provide any documentation supporting the hospitalization, Singh stated he could get the documents from his family in Indi a if the IJ granted another co ntinuance. The IJ asked why he had not obtained th is documentation during the pre ceding months, noting that Singh’s father had previously submitted other docum ents on Singh’s behalf. Singh stated ther e was trouble in India. The IJ found that Singh did not te stify credibly. In a detaile d decision, the IJ noted numerous vague answers, in consistencies, and omissions in Singh’s testimony. The IJ noted that Singh gave nonr esponsive answers and had to b e asked repeatedly to answer certain questions. T he IJ acknowledged that some inc onsistencies were minor, but noted that Singh ofte n omitted key events. Consider ed cumulatively, the IJ found Singh’s asylum applicati on was not credible and that h e had not met his burden to establish eligibility for asylum. Because the burden of proof to establish withholding of removal or relief under the Convention Against T orture is higher, the IJ likewise denied relie f under those provisions.5 The BIA panel concluded the IJ’s denial of Singh’s request for a fourth continuance did not deny him a fundamentally fair hearing. It also concluded the IJ’s credibility determination was not clearly erroneous. The BIA t hus affirmed the IJ’s decision. Singh timely appealed.
II Singh argues he was denied his ri ght to a fundamentally fair he aring because the IJ denied him a continuance to obtain counsel and the IJ’s adverse credibility determination was not suppor ted by substantial evidence. 1 We have jurisdiction to review legitimate constitutional claims. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2) (D). If a three-member panel of the BIA issues a decision, as in thi s case, “the BIA opinion completely supersedes t he IJ opinion for purposes of ou r review.” Uanreroro v. Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006). B ut we may consult the IJ’s decision if it provides a “more complete explanation” of the BIA panel’s condensed description of the IJ’ s credibility findings. Id. at 1204. “On an asylum claim, we review t he BIA’s findings of fact under a substantialevidence standard,” in which “the BIA’s findings of fact are co nclusive unless the record demonstrates that any re asonable adjudicat or would be co mpelled to conclude to the contrary.” Rodas-Orella na v. Holder, 780 F.3d 982, 990 (10th Cir. 2015)

1 Singh also argues for the firs t time on appeal that the IJ vio lated his due process rights by denying his re quest at the hearing for additi onal time to provide documentary evidence. We lack jur isdiction to review this clai m because Singh did not exhaust it before the BIA. See Garcia-Carbajal v. Holde r, 625 F.3d 1233, 1236- 38 (10th Cir. 2010).6 (quotation omitted). “We review t he BIA’s legal decisions de n ovo . . . .” Id. (quotation omitted). “The BIA’s determination that an applican t was not eligible for asylum must be upheld if supported by reasona ble, substantial, and probative evidence on the record consider ed as a whole . . . .” Id. (quo tation omitted). “Credibility determinations a re factual findings . . . subject to the substantial evidence test.” Uanreroro, 443 F. 3d at 1204. “There is no pre sumption of credibility.” 8 U.S.C. §1158(b) (1)(B)(iii). In making credibi lity determinations, the trier of fact should consider “th e totality of th e circumstance s, and all relevant factors,” which include the “de meanor, candor, or responsivenes s of the applicant,” “the consistency between the app licant’s . . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each su ch statement, [and] the consiste ncy of such statements with other evidence of record. ” Id. Inconsistencies do not ha ve to go to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or to a ny relevant factor. Id. “Becaus e an alien’s testimony alone may support an application for withholding of removal or asylum, the IJ must give specific, cogent reasons for disbelievi ng it.” Sviridov v . Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 722, 727 (10th Cir. 2004) ( quotation omitted). “Because aliens do not have a c onstitutional right to enter or remain in the United States, the only protecti ons afforded are the minimal pr ocedural due process rights for an opportunity to be h eard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Arambula-Medina v. Hol der, 572 F.3d 824, 828 (10th Ci r. 2009) (quotation omitted). To establi sh a due process violation base d on an alleged defect in a removal hearing, an alien mu st show that the lack of repre sentation caused7 prejudice that “implicates the f undamental fairness of the proc eeding.” Michelson v. INS, 897 F.2d 465, 468 (10th Ci r. 1990). “To prevail on a due process claim, an alien must establish not only e rror, but prejudice.” Alzainati v. Holder, 568 F.3d 844, 851 (10th Cir. 2009). We conclude the IJ did not viola te Singh’s due process rights b y refusing to continue his case for a fourth t ime after giving him two months to find counsel. The IJ complied with regulatory requi rements by advising Singh of h is right to obtain counsel and providing him with a l ist of free or reduced-cost l egal services that were available to him, and by granting him several continuances to o btain an attorney and the documents he felt were relev ant to his claims for relief. See 8 C.F.R

. § 1240.10(a). The IJ cautioned Singh multiple times that if he did not obtain counsel, he would have to represent hims elf. And there is no Sixth Amen dment right to counsel in removal proceedings. U nited States v. Rangel de Agu ilar, 308 F.3d 1134, 1138 (10th Cir. 2002). Singh was able to obtain counsel for hi s bond hearing. He never explained his failure to obt ain counsel for his merits he aring, other than a vague and unsupported assertion th at bad weather prevented him from contacting an attorney. Singh’s own failure t o obtain counsel does not call into question the fundamental fairness of h is removal proceedings. We also conclude that the BIA’ s credibility findings are suppor ted by substantial evidence. Singh cha llenges the BIA’s example that he failed to disclose that his first attackers took hi s identification papers. In hi s credible-fear interview, Singh did not say that the first attackers took his identificat ion papers, nor did he8 mention this when describing the attack during direct testimony at his merits hearing. Not until later, when the IJ asked why he could not return to a nother part of India, did Singh say that his attackers rumma ged through his pockets and t ook his identification papers. The BIA noted this as a n omission. Singh argues this is not supported by the record because he stated during his credible-fear interview tha t the Badal Party had his “id card” and could find him . The BIA accurately stated, h owever, that Singh omitted the detail that the attackers rummag ed through his pock ets and took his papers when he described the a ttack. The BIA’s characterizatio n of Singh’s omission is supported by the record. 2 Singh asserts he did not give va gue answers to the IJ’s questio ns about how many members were in the Mann Part y and whether he worked for t he Mann Party year-round. We disagree. The BIA ’s characterization of Singh’ s responses to these questions as vague and non-responsive is sup ported by the recor d. Singh also argues his accounts of the second atta ck at the merits and credible-fe ar hearings were consistent. But we conclude the BIA’s characterization of his differing versions as inconsistent is supported by th e record, which shows Singh prov ided two conflicting accounts of the way in which his attackers separated him from h is motorcycle. A reasonable adjudicator would not be compelled to find Singh c redible because the multiple inconsistenc ies and vague or nonresponsive answers identified

2 Singh challenges several other ex amples the IJ gave of his inc onsistent, vague, or nonresponsive answers. B ut we need only address Sing h’s challenges to the examples given by the BIA, b ecause the BIA’s decision super sedes the IJ’s decision. Uanreroro, 443 F.3d at 1203.9 by the BIA are supported by the record. As such, we will not r everse the BIA’s credibility determination. See Htun v. Lynch, 818 F.3d 11 11, 1119 (10th Cir. 2016) (holding we can reverse the BIA ’s findings of fact under the as ylum substantialevidence test only if “any reas onable adjudicator would be comp elled to conclude to the contrary” (quotation omitted)).
III Petition DENIED

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Entered for the Court

Carlos F. Lucero Circuit Judge