### TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03
- 21
- 00321
- CV

Employees Retirement System of Texas and Minnesota Life Insurance Company , Appellant s

v. LaRae Walker , Appellee

FROM THE 345TH DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY NO. D
- 1
- GN
- 19
- 00274 4 , THE HONORABLE JAN SOIFER , JUDGE PRESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The Em ployees Retir ement System of Te xas (ERS ) and Minnesota L i fe I n surance Company appeal from the tri al court ’ s judgme nt t hat reversed ERS ’ s decision to deny
LaRae Wal k er ’ s claim for accidental

- death benefits and ordered Min nes ota Life to pay the claim. On review, we must determine whether subst antial evidence supports ERS ’ s conclusion that Walker ’ s husband ( D ecedent) was intoxicated , which substantia lly contributed to hi s decision to attempt to cross a busy freeway on foot

. We conclude that it does and accordingly reverse the
tr ial cour t ’ s judgment and render judgment affirming ERS ’ s order.

PROCEDURAL BACKGRO UND Walker, an employee of the S tate of T e xas, purch ased De pendent Voluntary Accid ental Death and Dismemberment (AD&D) Insurance under the Renewable Gro up Term Life Insurance policy established by the ERS Board of Trustees and administered by Minnesota2

Life. T he policy covers loss of li fe as a dire ct resul t of ac cidental bodily in jury to the employee or dependent. Walker ’ s spouse was a depen dent and insured under the pol icy. On April 22, 2015, at about 6:15 a.m., Walker ’ s spouse attempted to walk across Interstate Highway 635 in Dalla s and was str uck by f ive car s and killed. The autopsy report indicated that Decedent ’ s blood contained meth amphetamine and co caine metabolites.

Walker filed a claim for acci dental

- death benefits with Minnes ota Life , which determined that the policy exc luded her spouse ’ s d eath fr om coverage pursuant to a clause providing that the policy “ d oes not cover any lo ss caus ed by, resulting from or subst antially contributed to by . . . [t]he insur ed individual being into xicated by reason of alcohol or d rug use,

o r a com bination ther eof. ” Th e p olicy defined “ intoxication ” as in Section 49.01 of the Texas
Pe nal Code

. See Tex. Pen al Code § 49.01 ( defining ter m , relevantly, to mean “ not having the normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the i ntrod uction of . . . a cont ro lled sub stance, a drug, a dangerous drug, [or] a combination of t wo or more of these s ubstances ” ). After Minnesota Life denied her claim, Walker appealed to ERS, which conc urred with the denial. Walker requested a conteste d

- case hearing befor e the S tate Office o f Administrative Hearings (SOAH). At the h earing, Walker had the bu rden by a preponderance of the evidence to prove that she was entitled to benefits under the policy

. See Tex . Ins. Code § 1551.357 (d) ; 3 4 Tex. Admi n. Code § 67.55(b) ( 2 022 ) ( Empl oyees Ret irement Sys., Ord. of Proc.). T h e admin istrative law judge (ALJ) co ncluded that Walker failed to prove that the intoxication exclusion does not apply and did not prove that she is eli gible to rec eive the accidental

- death benefits for t he deat h of her spou se . The ERS Ex ecutive Director ente red an order adopting the ALJ ’ s finding s of fact and conclus ions of law, concurring that Walker was not3

e l igible for accidental

- death benefit s. Walker filed a m otion for rehearing , which was overrule d by op erat ion of la w.

Walker filed a suit for judicial review in the trial court c hall enging ERS ’ s final order. See T ex. I n s. Code § 1551.359 (providing right to judicial revi ew for perso n aggrieve d by
ERS final decision and f or “ substantial evid ence ” stan dard o f revi ew). After a he aring on the

mer its, the trial court reversed ERS ’ s d ecis ion and ordered Minnesota Life to pay Walker the claim. ERS and Minnesota Life perf ected this appeal.

EVIDENC E ADMITTED BY THE ALJ The ALJ admitted the de po sitions of the fo l l owing per sons : Step he n Hastings,
M. D. , a pathologist and the med ical examiner who performed the autopsy on Decedent ; Ross Stedman, the claims manager of the AD&D program for Minnesota Life ; and Jon Rod McCutcheon , a forensic tox icologi st. Do cu m entary ex h i bits admi tted included Decedent ’ s autop sy report and certified d eath cer tificate, both of which were attached to Dr. Hastings ’ s dep osition ; McCu tcheon ’ s t oxicology report, which was based on the autopsy toxicology

r esults and was attac hed to his depositi o n ; and the polic e report from the incident c ausing Decedent ’ s death

.
Au topsy report and death certificate

The autopsy report is signed by Dr. H as tings as well as Tracy Dy er, M.D. , Medical Examiner , and Jeffre y Ba rnard, M.D., Directo r and Chief Medical E x a miner of the Dallas County Medical Examiner ’ s O f fice . It re ports the manner of deat h

— “ a ccident ”

— and
states th at “ [b]ased on the case history and autopsy findi ngs, it is our opinion that [ Decedent ]

. . . died as a result of blunt for ce injuries. ” The to x i colog y po rtion of the r eport in dic a te s the4

following substances in Decedent ’ s blood: (1) methamphetamine ( 0 .91 mg/L ) , (2) amp hetamine ( 0 .06 mg/L ) (together li sted under the subheading “ Alkaline Quantitation ” ) , (3) ecgonine methyl
est er ( 0 .026 mg /L ) , and ( 4 ) b enzoyl ecgonine ( 0 .116 mg/L ) (together listed under the subhe ading

“ Cocaine and Metabolites ” )

. The c ertified death certif icate identifies th e “ immediate c ause ” of death as “ blunt force injuries ” and the manner of death as “ acciden t

. ” Althoug h it cont a i ns a
spac e for adding “ significant conditions cont ributing to death , ” th at space is blank.
Police report The police report narrates t hat Decedent , “ a pedestrian, was attempting to cross the wes tbound traffic l anes of L.B.J. Frw y. f rom so uth to north , ” a n d that a car t raveling in the second lan e from t he left “ colli ded ” with him , after which Decedent “ was v aulted into the air , ”

“ fell to the roadway, ” and “ was subsequently run over by ” four other cars travel ing westbound on the road way . The na rra tive con c l ud es, “ Th is report had been ma rked incomple te pe nding

an analysis of a speci men of the pede strian ’ s bloo d. ” No further evidence from the p olice department was admitted.

Medical examiner ’

s depo sition
Dr

. Hastin gs performed the autopsy the day after De c e dent ’ s de ath, within the usual period from which an examiner can generally “ get a pr etty good idea of what ’ s going on with so meone. ” The extensive, severe injuries to Decedent ’ s bod y were “ consi stent with a pedestrian getting hit by a motor vehicle or m u l tiple mot or vehicles ” and with the information Dr. Hastings had received from inv estigative sources that med ical ex aminers typically consult before per forming an autopsy.5 Dr. Hasti ngs expl ai ned that medical examiners at his off ice routinel y order a
tox i c o logy rep ort for every aut op sy performed , and that in some cases the report is helpful
t o determine “ what caused the death of the person

. ” He testified that Decedent ’ s toxicology report sho wed the pr esence of methamphetamine, amphetamin e, e cgonine met hy l ester, an d benzoy lecgonine in his blo od. Me thamphetamine and amphetamine are “ in to xicating substances , ” and the former is an illegal drug , while the latter “ can either be a metabolit e of methamphetam ine or . . . a prescription drug. ” D r. H ast ings expla i n ed that w hen cocaine is metabolized by the body, the two substances identified in the toxicology screen as ecgonine methyl ester and benzoylecgonine will b e present. T h ose two cocain e metabolites can not “ show
up ” on a toxicology report if s omeone “ doesn ’ t take coc aine. ”

D r. Hastings did not d eem the toxicology results “ relevant” “ as far as the cause and mann er of death

. ” Be cause of Decedent ’ s “ exten sive blunt force injuries, ” the toxicology substan ces were not lis ted as “ contributory ” to the cause and m anner of death. D r . Hastings did not attri bute any of the dr ugs found in Decedent ’ s blood “ to causing his death ” and would on ly
i nclude such inf

ormation when “ there ’ s not h ing else [to explain] [a] cau se of death, ” such as when someone i s “ f

ound dead wit h a syringe in their arm

. ” W hen asked whether Decedent had

“ levels of d rugs that would cause death, ” Dr. Hastings respon ded, “ There ’ s no safe amoun t of

me thamphetamine. So methamphetamine can cause dea th at really any dosage

. ” He made th e

sa me statement w ith respe ct to cocaine and stated that there is no “ ther apeutic level ” for methamphetamine

. The autopsy revealed that Decedent was alive when he suf fered the blunt

force injuries and had not died (su ch as from drug overdo se) before then.

D r . H astings te stifie d t hat the drug s prese nt in Decedent ’ s system when he died could cause someone to “ bec ome agitated, delirious, unaware of their surroundings, have6

decreased spatial awar ene ss, [and] not be able to walk straight. ” However, he further te st if ied, the d rugs foun d in Decedent ’ s system affec t in dividuals differently and that, ab sent evidence documenting how a person was acting, one could not disc ern a person ’ s level of i mpairment from the t ox icology results alone. Dr. Hasti ngs testified that D ec edent ’ s de ath did “ not result ” f rom in toxicatio n, as d efined in the Texas Penal Code , and that intoxication did not

“ substantially contribute ” to his death. Ho wever, Dr. Hastings clarified that, as a medical examiner, he is not charg ed with determinin g ho w an incid ent or ac cident occurs and th at
gen erally he is “ looking at the immediate cause of death. ” He also did not have an opinion “ one way or the other ” about whether intoxication led to the incident wher e [ Decedent ] was killed. ”
T ypically , he wou ld no t “ look in to ” what led to a n incident caus ing death “ unless it ’ s a suspected homi cide o r something along those lines. ” From his point of view as the medical examiner, in

c onducting auto psies, he focuses on the “ immediate cause of death. ” Although hi s o ff ice routin ely perfo rm s tox icology tests, th ose results “ wo n ’ t be relevant ” to “ caus e of death ” as noted in auto psy reports except in cases such as drug overdose or homicide. He also does not
ge nerally “ form a co nclusion ” a bout whether someone was int oxi ca ted in a c ase such as this.

Dr. Hastings testified that methamphetamine and cocaine are central

- nervous system stimulan t s , and that Decedent had taken both “ at some point ” before his death. He could not say that Decedent was not int oxicated at his ti me of death or that i ntoxication did
not lead to the events that caused his death. He testified that both drugs can c ause “ euphoria, excitation and a rapid flow of thoughts, ” a “ heightened sense of well

- bei ng, ” “ irratio nal behavior, ” hallucinations, ps ych os is, sympto ms o f sch izophrenia , and the “ ill advised ” decision
to “ attempt to cross the LBJ F reeway on foot. ” One ’ s attempting to cross the interstate on foot might be due to his not having h is “ normal ment al faculties, ” but b ecause Dr. Hastings did n ot7

se e Decedent before h e died, he could not determine his “ degree of intoxication , ” and he would not assume that Decedent was acting “ crazy, schizophrenic , or strang e[ly] ” merely because he had drugs in his system.

Forensi c t

oxicologist ’

s deposition
McCut c he on is ce rt ified by the American Board of Forensic Toxicology and ha s previously served as the chi ef forensic toxicol ogist in both the Travis County and Bexar County Medical Examiner ’ s Offices. While ser ving in those r oles, he had been called to t e stify in criminal and civil proceedings to “ interpret the findings o f whatever drug that was present or alc ohol t hat was present ” in a person ’ s system and “ how that might affect the persons, whether it caused impairment, or if it could have been the cause of de a th in an ove rdo se sit uation. ”
McCu t c h eon reviewed the autopsy here , specifically the toxic o logy results, and testified that “ it was fair ” to conclude that Decedent had ingested both methamphetamine and cocaine in the ho urs preced ing his death.

Meth a mphet am ine i s a c entral

- ne rvous - system s timulant that has some therapeutic use as a prescription drug for narcol epsy and attention

- deficit disorder ; however , it is more commonly used as an ill icit drug. A therapeutic do s age would have “ a fairly low

c once n trati on ” in the r ange of 0 .02 to 0.05 mg/L , with “ some literature ” indicating that it can
range “ up to .2 ” mg/L

. Decedent ’ s concentration ( of 0. 91 mg/L ) was higher than the therapeutic concentration and “ is consistent wi th what has been shown in the liter at ure t o be an ab use level or an abuse concentration. ” McCutcheon identified the “ literature ” and so urces he reviewed to complete his rep ort, and he stated that they are the type s of informatio n upon which experts such as himself rely for information abou t dru gs .8 He t es tified th at, in his capacity as a forensic toxicologist, he is familiar with what effect methamphetamine can have on someone if it is abused: being “ more awake ” ; feelings of excitement , euphoria, heightened awareness , or paranoia ; sp eedin g thou gh ts ; someti mes viole n t behavior ; and an increase in b lood pressure and heart rate . Additionally, people who have been observed with abuse concentrat ions have exhibited irrat ional , ag gressiv e, impu lsive , and risky behavior (e.g., high

- speed dri ving) ; rapi d speaking ; and inc oh erent thinking

. Cocaine is als o a central

- nervous - system stimulant and can have the same effects in terms of impulsiveness and risk

- taking behavior.

Based on the toxico log y findings in the auto psy report, McCu tcheon c oncluded that D ec edent was intoxicat e d at the time of his death

. H is report st ates, “ In my opinion, within reasonable toxicological possib ility, [ Decedent ] had lost the n ormal use of h i s mental and physical fa culties, due to the me thamphetamine in his s ystem, at the tim e of his dea th. ” He stated that he is familiar with the LBJ Fre eway in No rth Dallas, which ranges between six and ei ght lanes across in the area where Decedent was found a nd believes that it “ would be foolis h to try to cross it on foot ” a nd that attemptin g to do so i s both “ i ll

- advised ” and “ consistent with someone who does not have his or her normal mental faculties. ” He opined that Decedent ’ s intoxication subs tantially cont ributed to his death

. He stated the bas es for his co nclusion : t he amount of me th am phetamine i n Decede nt ’ s blood , indicating that he was intoxicated at the time of death , and the “ circumstantial si tuation indicated by ” the polic e r eport indi cating that

“ [s]omething was affecting [ Decedent ’ s] perception and h is decision

- making at that t im e to
tr y t o cross t he very busy freeway. ” He explained that even if Decedent in a sober state had impu lsive and irrational tendencies, his intoxication would have increased them

. Due to the high

concen tration of methamphetam ine in Dece dent ’ s system , “ t he re definit ely will be significant9

effects from the drug. ” However, McCutcheon admitted that he did not know how Decedent was

ac ting just before trying to cro ss the freeway , what his usual sober state of behavior or risk

takin g level was , or what level o f t olerance to metham phetamine he may have acquired

.
Cl aims manager ’

s deposition Stedman made the decision fo r Minnesota Life to deny Walker ’ s claim. He
t es tified that he and his staff rely on m e dical doctors, toxicologis ts, and other medical profession al s in makin g such de cisions. In this case, the decision was based on a records review by Dr. Battis, a medical doctor employed by Minnesota Lif e. In an entr y in the claim file,
Dr. Battis noted: “ The toxicology reveals [ Decedent ] had c ocaine and methamp he tamine bot h of whic h would have rendered him not to have the normal use of his mental facultie s ” and that such int oxication “ should have also been lis ted in the [death certificate] as a contributing cause based upon these rec ord s. ”

DISCUSSION

The immed ia te c ause o f Deceden t ’ s death is undi sp uted

— blunt

- force injuries from being hit by one or more vehicles on the freeway as he att empted t o cross it on foot. The dispute l ies in whether ERS could reason ably have conclu ded that th e un disputed levels of ille ga l drugs in Decedent ’ s system at the time of his death caused him to be into xicated and that such intoxication s ubstantially contributed to his death

. The ALJ concluded that McCutcheon ’ s testimony est ablished that Decedent was into xica ted and that it was “ reasonable to infe r ” that his intoxication “ caused or s ubstantially contri buted to his decision to cross the freeway, which in turn led to his death. ” He further concluded that Walker was unable to meet her burden of pr oof
to esta blish that Decedent “ ei th er was not intoxica ted or that his intoxication did not substantially10

contribute to his decision to cross the freeway. ” She therefore “ failed to prove ” tha t the policy exception did not apply and t hat she is eli gible to receive th e AD&D benefit s .
Standa rd of review

T he “ s ubst antial ev idence ” st andard of review authorizes revers al or remand of

an agency decision that pr ejudices the appellant ’ s substan tial rights because the adm inistrative findings, inferences, conc lusions, or decisions (1) violate a con st itutional or sta t ut ory provision , (2) exceed the agency ’ s statutory authority, (3 ) were made through unlawful procedure, (4) are

a ffected by other error of law, or (5) are arbit rary or capricious or characterized by abuse of d iscretion or clearly unwarra nt ed exercis e of di sc retion. T ex. Gov ’ t Code § 2001.174 . It also authorizes a r eviewing court to test an agency ’ s findings, infere nces, conclusions , and decisions to determine w hether they are reasonably supported b y substanti al evidence consi dering the

re liable and pr obat iv e evidence in the record as a whole. Id. § 2001.174( 2)(e) ; Scally v. Texas
State Bd. of Med. Exam ’ rs , 351 S.W.3d 434, 440

– 41 (Tex . A pp.

— Austin 2011, pet. denied )

. Under this defe rential standard, we presum e that the Board ’ s order is s up ported by substanti al evidence, and Wa lker bears the burden of proving otherwise. See Scally, 351 S.W.3d at 440

– 41

.

“ Th e bur den is a heavy one

— e ven showing that the evidence p reponderates against the agency ’ s decision will not be enough to overcome it, if ther e is some reas on abl e basis in the record for the action taken by the agen cy. ” Id. at 441 (citing Texas Health Facilities Co m m ’ n v. Charter Med.

- Dall. , Inc. , 665 S.W.2d 44 6, 453 (Tex. 1984) ). Our ultimate concern is t he reasonableness of the
ag ency ’ s orde r, no t its cor re ctn ess . Id

. “The crux of a substantial evidence analysi s is whether the agency ’ s factual findings are reasonable in light of the evidence from which they were purportedly inferred. ” Granek v. Texas St ate Bd. of Med. E x a m ’ rs , 17 2 S.W.3d 761 , 7 78 (T ex.11

Ap p.

— Austin 2005, no pet.) (inte rnal quotation omitted)

. The refore, if there is evidence to support either affirmative or negative findings on a specific matt er, the decision of the agency must be upheld. Charter

- Med. Dall. , 665 S .W.2d at 453

.

Whether th e a gency ’ s order sa tis fies the substantial

- evidence s tandard is a question of law

. Scally , 351 S.W.3d at 441

. Thus, the trial court ’ s judgment tha t ther e was not subst antial evidence supporting the Board ’ s final order is n ot entitl ed to de fere nce on ap pe al. Id

. On appeal from the trial c ourt ’ s j udg ment, the focus of our revi ew, as in the trial c ourt, is on the Board ’ s decision. Id. W e revi ew the Board ’ s legal conclusions for errors of law and its f actual findings for su ppo rt by substantial e vidence. I d. Substantial e vidence “ does n ot mean a l arge

or considerable amount of evidence, but rather such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
mi ght accept as adequate to support a conclusion of fact. ” Id. (citation omitted). Al though the evidenc e must am ou nt to more than a mere scin tilla, “the evide nce in the record may preponderate against the agency decision and still amount to substantial evi dence.” Poole v. Karnack Indep. Sch. Dist. , 34 4 S.W.3d 440, 443 (Tex. App.

— Austin 20 11, no pet.)

. Thu s, we wil l sus tain the agency ’ s decision if the evidenc e as a whole is such that reasonable minds could have reached the co nclusion that the agency must have reached in order to j ustify its action.
S cally , 351 S.W.3d at 441

. Analys is
O n this record, we conclude th at ERS could reasonably have concluded t hat Decedent was intoxicated and that his intoxication subst a ntially contributed to his death.
Th erefore, its decision that Walker had n ot prove d that she was entitled to benefits is supported12

by s ub stanti al eviden ce , a nd the trial court erred i n concludi ng otherwise and reversing
ERS ’ s decision.

We first address Walker ’ s argument that McCutcheon ’ s deposition testimony should not have been considered because he was “ not qualif ied to render any o pinion in this

case ” bec ause he is not a doctor and c o uld not opin e as to the cause of Decedent ’ s death based on

a “ reasonable medical probabilit y. ” See 3 4 Tex. Admin. Code § 67.69(b) ( 2022 ) (Employees Retirement Sys

. , Rules of Evi dence) (noting that “ opinion evide n ce o f a m edical cond ition or cause must be based on reasonable medical probability and supported by o bjective medical evide nce ” )

. Howev er, Walker did not object to McCutcheon ’ s testimony when it w as admitted, and the ALJ was free to consider it. See Dye r v. Comm ission on Envt ’ l Quality , 639 S.W.3d 721,
734 (Tex. App.

— Austin 2019 ) ( noting that evi dence a dmitted at contested

- case h earing without objection was properly considered by ALJ ) , af f ’ d , 646 S.W.3d 498 (Tex . 2022 ) ; Tex. Gov ’ t Code § 2001. 081 ( noting that rul es of evidence “ as applied in a nonjury civil case in a district cour t of this state shall apply to a contested cas e ” ) ; T ex. R. Evid. 103(a) ( stating t hat to preserve claim of

erro r about admission of evi dence , party must timely object or move to s trik e an d state specific ground for objection unless it is apparent from cont ext ); see also City of San Antoni o v. Pollock , 28 4 S.W.3d 809, 81 8 (Tex. 2009) (holding that s ci entific opinion s admitted without o bj ec tion

m ay be considered probat ive evidence “ e ven if t he basis for the opinion is unreliable ” ) ; Tex. R. Evid. 702 ( stating that expert witness may tes tify “ in the form of an opinion ” if his specialized knowledge will he lp trier of fact understand evidence or deter mine fact i n issue)

. However,

even h ad W alke r preserved the issue for review , we would conclude that the ALJ did not

err in considering McCut cheon ’ s testimony

— specifically his conclu sion that Decedent was intoxicated

— because courts routinely accept the te stimony of non - M

. D. forensic toxic olo gist s to13

establish whether a person was intoxicated. See, e .g. , Haley v. State , 396 S.W.3d 756 , 766 (Tex. App.

— Houston [14 th Dist.] 2013, no pet. ) ( affirm ing t rial court ’ s ruling that toxicologist ’ s testimony was relia ble where expert opined that appel lan t ’ s bl ood

- methamphetamine level of
0.80 m g /L was “ so high ” that his coordination , attention, and driving

- ability must have been affected and contributed to accident)

. We th us proceed to consi de r the reasonableness o f ERS ’ s decision based on the evid enc e as a wh ole.

The evidence showed that Decedent had high levels of me th amp he tamine (more than four times the highest possible therapeutic level

— i.e., an “ abuse le v el ” ) and cocai ne metabolites in his system when he att empted to cross the busy freeway. He had used both illegal substances within hours of doing so. Methamphet amine and cocaine, used se parately or

com bined, hav e various physical and mental effec ts , inc luding irrational, impulsive, and risk

taking behavior ; halluci nations; paranoia; inabili ty to w alk s traight; and incoherent thinking. With the high metha mphetamine levels present in Decedent ’ s blood, McCutcheon believed that Decedent had lost the normal use of his physical and mental facu lties

. While Dr. Ha stings would not opine on whether h e b elie ved t hat Decedent had lost the use of his physical and mental faculties, he explained that h is d uties do n ot typically ent ail such conclusions but merely the d etermination of the direct cause and man ner of death. Both experts agreed that c rossing t he busy free way on foot would be ill

- a dvise d and consiste nt with someone functioning witho ut his no rmal use of mental f acul ties. A lthough it was her burden to prove that the in toxication

ex clusion d id not apply, Walker o ffered no evidence to explain why h er hus b and m ight have attempted to cross the freeway or what his prior drug usage or sober behavior were like , such as
to demonstrate , for example, that his drug use had not im paired his physical and mental faculties

.14 A lthough it is undisputed that the i mme diat e cau se of Decedent ’ s death was the blunt

- force inj uries he su sta ined from cars , the AD&D policy exclude s loss not only “ caused by ” intoxication but also which is “ resulting from or substantially contributed to ” by intoxication. When drug use i s not th e di rect caus e of death (such as in overdo se cases), circumstantial evidence may be offered to prove that drug

- in duced impairment has substantially contributed to the accident that directly results in death

. See Dutk a ex rel. Estate of T.M. v. AIG Life In s . , 573 F

. 3d 210, 214 ( 5 th Cir. 2009) ( affi rming insurer ’ s decision that plane crash resulted “ in part ” from p ilot ’ s intoxication because circumstantial evide nce , including nature o f accident itself and absence of evi dence of mechanical failures or poor vi sual cond i tions, supported such finding).
On t his record, it is a reasonable inference that Decedent did not have “ the normal use of [his] mental or physical facu l ties by reason of the introduction of . . . drug[s]

... into [his] body ” and that such condi tio n “ s ubst a ntially contributed ” to his d eath

. Therefore, we hold that substantial evidence supports ERS ’ s c onclusion that Walker did not prove her entitlement to accidental

death benefits, s ee Scally , 351 S.W.3d at 44 1 , and we sustain ERS ’ s and Minnesota Li fe ’ s

res p ective first iss ues. 1

C ONCLUSION

Having sust ained ERS ’ s first issue a nd Minnesota Life ’ s sole issue, we m ust reverse the trial court ’ s judgment and render judgment affirming ERS ’ s final orde r.

1 We therefore need not address ERS ’ s second issue , in which it cont ends that the trial court violated the “ separation of powers doctrine ” by reversing th e ERS order without first

“ fin ding a n error in th e decision ” and rem andi ng th e cause to the agency to correct the error. S e e Tex. R. A pp. P. 47.1

.15 ________ __________________________________ Thomas J. Baker , Ju stice Before Justices Goodwin, Baker, and Triana Reversed and Rendered
Fil ed: September 14 , 2022