[Cite as Rimmer v. Citifinancial, Inc., 2014-Ohio-5287.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio 

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 101254 

KAREN RIMMER, ETC.

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT 

vs. 

CITIFINANCIAL, INC.

DEFENDANT-APPELLEE 

JUDGMENT: 

REVERSED AND REMANDED 

Civil Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CV-05-564493 

 

BEFORE: E.A. Gallagher, J., Boyle, A.J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: November 26, 2014 
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

Brian Ruschel 

925 Euclid Avenue 

Suite 660 

Cleveland, Ohio 44115 

Patrick J. Perotti 

Dworken & Bernstein Co., L.P.A. 

60 South Park Place 

Painesville, Ohio 44077 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE 

James L. Defeo 

Kip T. Bollin 

Thompson Hine L.L.P. 

3900 Key Center 

127 Public Square 

Cleveland, Ohio 44114 
EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} This is the third appeal by Karen Rimmer in her attempt to certify a class for her 

claim against Citifinancial, Inc. (“Citi”) regarding its failure to timely record the satisfaction of a 

mortgage as statutorily required. Rimmer argues the trial court erred in changing the wording 

of the class definition as ordered by this court in its judgment and mandate issued in Rimmer v. 

Citifinancial, Inc., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99760, 2013-Ohio-5732. Finding merit in the 

instant appeal, we reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the matter for proceedings 

consistent with this opinion. 

{¶2} The facts as reported in Rimmer at ¶ 4 - 9 are as follows: 

Thirteen years ago, in 2000, Rimmer executed a note and security agreement with 

Bank of Yorba Linda for $5,000. Her loan was subsequently assigned to 

Associates Financial Services, Inc. which was merged with Citi several months 

later, and Citi became the holder of Rimmer’s mortgage. On April 10, 2001, 

Rimmer paid off her loan in full. On August 16, 2001, the satisfaction of the 

subject mortgage was recorded with the Cuyahoga County Recorder. 

Four years later, on June 6, 2005, Rimmer filed a class action complaint against 

Citi, alleging Citi failed to file an entry of satisfaction of mortgage with the 

county recorder within 90 days of full payment of the mortgage, in violation of 

R.C. 5301.36. Rimmer sought automatic damages ($250), interest, and costs as 

allowed under R.C. 5301.36(C). 

On January 25, 2006, Rimmer filed a motion for class certification seeking to 

represent a class of all persons who, from March 8, 1999, paid residential 
mortgages in full but for whom Citi did not file an entry of satisfaction of 

mortgage with the county recorder within 90 days of loan payoff. 

Rimmer moved for partial summary judgment as to her individual claim against 

Citi. Citi also moved for summary judgment, alleging that it mailed within the 

statutory time the entry of satisfaction, but the recorder failed to timely process the 

entry. 

The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Rimmer on her individual 

claim. The court, however, denied her motion for class certification, without 

providing an analysis. 

Rimmer appealed the trial court’s denial of class certification. On appeal, we 

affirmed the summary judgment in favor of Rimmer on her individual claim, 

rejecting Citi’s claim that it timely processed Rimmer’s release and was entitled 

to a presumption of timely delivery. Rimmer v. Citifinancial, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga 

No. 89407, 2008-Ohio-1814. 

 {¶3} Applying the requirements for class certification, this court reversed the trial court’s 

decision denying class certification. Id. This court determined that Rimmer met all seven 

requirements under Civ.R. 23. “She defined an identifiable and manageable class; a question of 

law common to all members of the class predominates over any individual legal issues that may 

arise; and a single adjudication as a class action is the most efficient and fair manner by which to 

resolve the matter.” Rimmer at ¶ 11. 

{¶4} Citi appealed to the Supreme Court of Ohio and the court remanded the case to the 

Eighth District for further consideration in light of its decision in Alexander v. Wells Fargo Fin. 

Ohio 1, Inc., 122 Ohio St.3d 341, 2009-Ohio-2962 911 N.E.2d 286. In Alexander, the Ohio 

Supreme Court held that an arbitration agreement is applicable to statutory mortgage satisfaction 

claims. This court, in turn, remanded to the trial court to apply Alexander. Upon remand, the 
trial court issued a decision certifying the class but excluded individuals who had an arbitration 

agreement in their loan agreements. The trial court certified the class as follows: 

All persons who from March 8, 1999 entered into a residential mortgage 

agreement (as defined by R.C. 5301.36) with Citifinancial, Inc. without entering 

into an arbitration provision agreement with Citifinancial, Inc. relating to disputes 

arising out of said mortgage agreement, and thereafter satisfied their obligation 

where Citifinancial, Inc. (or any predecessor or other entity acquired or merged 

with, or otherwise now part of Citifinancial, Inc., including any affiliates, 

subsidiaries, and/or related lending institutions) was the mortgagee at the time of 

satisfaction, and, for each such satisfied mortgage, Citifinancial, Inc. did not 

record the fact of the satisfaction in the appropriate county recorder’s office and 

pay fees required for the recording within 90 days from the date of satisfaction. 

{¶5} Rimmer filed her second appeal seeking to define the class for this litigation. On 

appeal, this court agreed with Rimmer that the trial court’s definition limited the class to persons 

who entered into mortgage agreements only with Citifinancial Inc. 

{¶6} This court determined that the trial court, by inserting the parenthetical clause “(or 

any predecessor or other entity * * * )” at the second mention of “Citifinancial Inc.” rather than at 

the first mention of “Citifinancial Inc.,” inadvertently excluded those who entered into 

agreements with Citi’s predecessors or other entities that were acquired by or merged with Citi. 

Rimmer at ¶ 41. This court ordered the trial court on remand, to revise the definition to properly 

reflect the inclusion of those individuals. 

{¶7} On remand, the trial court again failed to insert the parenthetical clause “(or any 

predecessor or other entity * * * )” after both mentions of Citifinancial as instructed by this court 

in Rimmer at ¶ 41. Rimmer now appeals asserting the following sole assignment of error: 

The trial court erred in changing the wording of the class definition ordered by 

this court in its Judgment/Mandate of December 26, 2013, by omitting certain 

mortgagors of predecessors or other entities acquired, merged with, or otherwise 

now part of Citifinancial, Inc., including affiliates, subsidiaries, and/or related 

lending institutions. 
{¶8} In her sole assigned error, Rimmer argues that the trial court must follow the 

mandate of the reviewing court. We agree. 

{¶9} In Hawley v. Ritley, 35 Ohio St.3d 157, 519 N.E.2d 390 (1988), the Ohio Supreme 

Court stated, 

[t]hus where at a rehearing following remand a trial court is confronted with 

substantially the same facts and issues as were involved in the prior appeal, the 

court is bound to adhere to the appellate court’s determination of the applicable 

law. Moreover, the trial court is without authority to extend or vary the mandate 

given. 

{¶10} This court in its prior decision mandated that the trial court insert the parenthetical 

clause “(or any predecessor or other entity * * * )” at the first and second mention of 

“Citifinancial Inc.” However, on remand, the trial court’s definition of the class only included 

the parenthetical at the first mention of Citifinancial. The effect of this omission is to exclude 

all of those who entered into agreements with Citi’s predecessors or other entities that were 

acquired by or merged with Citi. This result is inconsistent with the mandate of Rimmer and as 

such, must be corrected. Thus, we remand the matter for correction of the class definition to 

read: 

All persons who from March 8, 1999 entered into a residential mortgage 

agreement (as defined by R.C. 5301.36) with Citifinancial, Inc. (or any 

predecessor or other entity acquired or merged with, or otherwise now part of 

Citifinancial, Inc., including any affiliates, subsidiaries, and/or related lending 

institutions) without entering into an arbitration provision agreement with 

Citifinancial, Inc. relating to disputes arising out of said mortgage agreement, and 

thereafter satisfied their obligation where Citifinancial, Inc. (or any predecessor 

or other entity acquired or merged with, or otherwise now part of Citifinancial, 
Inc., including any affiliates, subsidiaries, and/or related lending institutions) was 

the mortgagee at the time of satisfaction, and, for each such satisfied mortgage, 

Citifinancial, Inc. did not record the fact of the satisfaction in the appropriate 

county recorder’s office and pay fees required for the recording within 90 days 

from the date of satisfaction. 

{¶11} The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the matter is remanded for 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is ordered that appellant recover from appellee costs herein taxed. 

The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment into 

execution. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

MARY J. BOYLE, A.J., and 

PATRICIA A. BLACKMON, J., CONCUR