UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.  No. 01-4880

LEONARD D. SNEED,

Defendant-Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Charleston.

Solomon Blatt, Jr., Senior District Judge.

(CR-99-687-3)

Submitted: November 27, 2002

Decided: December 23, 2002

Before MOTZ and GREGORY, Circuit Judges, and

HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. 

COUNSEL

J. Kevin Holmes, THE STEINBERG LAW FIRM, L.L.P., Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Strom Thurmond, Jr., United

States Attorney, Robert H. Bickerton, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee. 
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See

Local Rule 36(c). 

OPINION

PER CURIAM: 

Following a jury trial, Leonard D. Sneed was convicted on one

count of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute fifty grams or more of cocaine base ("crack"), in violation of 21

U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (Count 1), and four counts of distribution of less

than five grams of crack on four occasions in August and September

1998, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1) (2000), and 18

U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (Counts 5 through 8). The district court sentenced

Sneed to life in prison on Count 1 and imposed concurrent thirty-year

prison terms on Counts 5 through 8. His attorney has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that in his

opinion there are no meritorious issues for appeal but asserting

numerous issues that were raised at trial or at sentencing or that Sneed

asked him to raise on appeal. Sneed was advised on his right to file

a pro se supplemental brief but declined to do so. For the reasons that

follow, we affirm. 

Sneed first contends that the indictment was defective for numerous reasons. His claim that the grand jury foreperson and the government attorney failed to sign the indictment is unsupported by the

record. Contrary to Sneed’s next claim, his indictment does not implicate the concerns raised in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466

(2000). The fifty grams or more drug quantity upon which he was

convicted was charged in the indictment, submitted to the jury with

proper instructions, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Sneed

also argues that the indictment was defective because Counts 5

through 8 charged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2, but none of the counts

contain language alleging that Sneed aided and abetted distribution of

crack. This claim fails because aiding and abetting is implied by an

indictment for any crime and need not be separately specified. United

States v. Duke, 409 F.2d 669, 671 (4th Cir. 1969). In any event, the

evidence presented at trial established that Sneed was a principal in

these offenses rather than an aider and abettor. 

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Next, Sneed asserts that the government violated the Federal Rules

of Criminal Procedure and the Jencks Act by failing to produce the

grand jury transcripts. Grand jury testimony may be disclosed to a

defendant "upon a showing that grounds may exist for a motion to

dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring before the grand

jury." Fed. R. Crim. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii). Sneed made no such showing

in this case. To the extent that Sneed alleges a Jencks Act violation

because the government did not produce the grand jury testimony of

government witnesses who testified at trial, his claim fails because he

did not move for the production of such statements. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3500(b) (2000) (where defendant so moves, court shall order government to produce relevant portion of grand jury testimony of government witness). 

Sneed argues that he should not have received an enhanced sentence on Count 1 for his prior felony convictions because he did not

receive pretrial notice pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2000). This contention is not supported by the record. He also argues that the government failed to offer any evidence that the contraband in question was

crack. However, the parties stipulated that the substance Sneed sold

to Wanda Holmes, an informant, during four controlled buys was

crack. Furthermore, the witnesses who testified at trial concerning

drug dealings with Sneed testified that they either distributed crack to

or received crack from Sneed. 

The government videotaped the four controlled buys that were the

subject of Counts 5 through 8 of the indictment. Sneed challenges the

admissibility of these recordings. As an informant for the government, Holmes was acting under color of law when she cooperated in

the recording of her drug transactions with Sneed. We therefore find

that the evidentiary use of the videotapes was permissible. 28 U.S.C.

§ 2511(2)(c) (2000); United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 660 (7th

Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1014 (2000); Obron Atlantic Corp. v.

Barr, 990 F.2d 861, 863-65 (6th Cir. 1993); United States v. Haimowitz, 725 F.2d 1561, 1582 (11th Cir. 1984); United States v. Tousant, 619 F.2d 810, 813 (9th Cir. 1980). 

Sneed contends that the district court erred in denying his motion

for judgment of acquittal on Count 1, made pursuant to Fed. R. Crim.

P. 29, on the grounds that the evidence was insufficient to support his

UNITED STATES v. SNEED 3
conspiracy conviction. To convict Sneed on the drug conspiracy

count, the government had to prove the existence of an agreement

between Sneed and others to possess with intent to distribute and to

distribute crack, that Sneed knew about the conspiracy, and that he

knowingly and voluntarily joined the conspiracy. United States v.

Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 857 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). A single conspiracy exists when it has "the same objective, . . . the same goal, the

same nature, the same geographic spread, the same results, and the

same product." United States v. Capers, 61 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir.

1995) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, a single conspiracy

may be found even where there is "a loosely-knit association of members linked only by their mutual interest in sustaining the overall

enterprise." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

Evidence presented at trial established that Sneed was engaged in

crack distribution within a section of Beaufort County, South Carolina. Sneed was involved with several other individuals who supplied

and obtained crack from each other. This ongoing drug distribution

occurred from 1992 to 1998. Viewing this evidence in the light most

favorable to the government, we find that the evidence was sufficient

to support Sneed’s conspiracy conviction. Glasser v. United States,

315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). 

Sneed contends that the district court erred by instructing the jury

on the lesser included offenses within Count 1. We find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction and, in

any event, Sneed suffered no prejudice from this instruction. 

Under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A), Sneed received a mandatory

life sentence on Count 1 of the indictment based on three prior crack

distribution convictions in South Carolina. Sneed claims that the

§ 851 notice was inadequate because it failed to specify that 21

U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) was the provision upon which the government was relying for enhancement. However, § 851 only requires that

the information notify the defendant about the particular prior convictions that may be used to enhance his sentence—not the statutory provisions permitting such enhancements. See United States v. Campbell,

980 F.2d 245, 252 (4th Cir. 1992) ("nowhere in section 851 is the

United States Attorney required to specify what subsection he is relying on for enhancement"). Furthermore, although he was sentenced on

4 UNITED STATES v. SNEED
the same day for the three state crack distribution convictions, Sneed

committed each crime on a separate date and, notwithstanding

Sneed’s claims to the contrary, there is no evidence that these convictions were formally consolidated. We find that the district court properly treated them as separate offenses for enhancement purposes.

United States v. Ford, 88 F.3d 1350, 1365-66 (4th Cir. 1996); cf.

United States v. Allen, 50 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 1995). 

Finally, Sneed alleges ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We

find that Sneed’s claims of ineffective assistance are not cognizable

on direct appeal because the record does not conclusively show that

he was denied effective assistance of counsel. United States v. King,

119 F.3d 290, 295 (4th Cir. 1997). 

For these reasons, we affirm Sneed’s convictions and sentence. We

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions

are adequately presented in the materials before the Court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED

UNITED STATES v. SNEED 5