IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DEAN OBEIDALLAH, 

Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:17-cv-720 

 Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. 

 v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

ANDREW B. ANGLIN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for 

Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery in Aid of Service (ECF No. 23), Plaintiff’s Motion for 

Service by Publication and to Extend Time for Service (ECF No. 24), and Plaintiff’s Motion to 

Extend Time for Service (ECF No. 33). 

I.

Plaintiff, an American Muslim, is a comedian and commentator who hosts a national 

daily radio show and resides in New York. (Complaint ¶ 11, ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”).) Defendant 

Andrew B. Anglin is the founder and publisher of a website named the Daily Stormer, which is a 

popular white nationalist website. (Id. at ¶¶ 12, 21.) Defendant Moonbase Holdings, LLC is an 

Ohio, for-profit, limited liability corporation registered by Defendant Anglin that assists in the 

operation of the Daily Stormer. (Id. at ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that on June 1, 2017, the Daily 

Stormer published an article authored by Defendant Anglin entitled, “Dean Obeidallah, 

Mastermind Behind Manchester Bombing, Calls on Trump to Declare Whites the Real 

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Terrorists” (“the Article”). (Id. at ¶¶ 21–22.) Defendants also republished the Article on 

Twitter. (Id. at ¶ 21.) The Article referred to Plaintiff as an “ISIS terrorist” and “the 

mastermind” behind the terrorist attack in Manchester, England. (Id. at ¶ 23.) The Article 

asserted that Plaintiff is “a confessed terrorist wanted by Europol, MI-5, Interpol and a litany of 

other international authorities.” (Id.) Defendants also fabricated Twitter messages and included 

these messages in the Article to convince the Article’s readers that Plaintiff had admitted a role 

in the Manchester bombing. (Id. at ¶¶ 27–45.) Plaintiff, however, is not affiliated with ISIS, is 

not a terrorist, is not wanted by any law enforcement authorities, and had no role in the 

Manchester bombing. (Id. at ¶¶ 23, 34.) In response to the Article, several commentators, 

believing the statements and messages within the Article, threated Plaintiff with violence and/or 

death. (Id. at ¶¶ 46–58.) 

On August 16, 2017, Plaintiff filed this action, asserting claims for libel, false light 

invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional 

distress, common-law misappropriation of name and likeness, and civil conspiracy. (See 

generally Compl.) Since filing this action, Plaintiff has attempted on multiple occasions to effect 

service of process over Defendant Andrew B. Anglin both in his capacity as an individual 

Defendant and as the registered agent for Defendant Moonbase Holdings, LLC (“Moonbase 

Holdings”). The Court previously detailed these attempts, which are incorporated by reference 

herein. (ECF No. 19.) On November 9, 2017, the Court denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s 

request to conduct expedited discovery in aid of service. (Id.) While the Court recognized 

Defendants’ apparent attempts to conceal Defendant Anglin’s whereabouts and evade service, 

the Court concluded that it could not, at that time, authorize the broad requests for expedited 

discovery sought by Plaintiff. (Id. at 7.) The deadline for effecting service has since been 

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extended with a current deadline of April 17, 2018. (Id.; ECF Nos. 27, 30.) On March 23, 2018, 

the Clerk certified that the Complaint and summons were sent via certified mail to Defendant 

Anglin. (ECF No. 29.) 

Plaintiff has now filed a Renewed Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery in 

Aid of Service (ECF No. 23), a Motion for Service by Publication and to Extend Time for 

Service (ECF No. 24), and a Motion to Extend Time for Service (ECF No. 33). The Court 

addresses each motion in turn. 

II. 

Plaintiff seeks expedited discovery to assist in locating Defendant Anglin’s residence in 

order to effect service of process. (ECF No. 23.) 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 prohibits discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference 

except under certain circumstances, including when a court orders such discovery. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(d)(1). Thus, Rule 26(d) vests the district court with discretion to order expedited 

discovery. See Lemkin v. Bell’s Precision Grinding, No. 2:08-CV-789, 2009 WL 1542731, at *1 

(S.D. Ohio June 2, 2009) (citing Qwest Communs. Int’l, Inc. v. Worldquest Networks, Inc., 213 

F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003)). Courts considering a motion for expedited discovery typically 

apply a good cause standard. Lemkin, 2009 WL 1542731, at *2; see also 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. 

Civ. § 2046.1 (3d ed.) (“Although the rule [26] does not say so, it is implicit that some showing 

of good cause should be made to justify such an order, and courts presented with requests for 

immediate discovery have frequently treated the question whether to authorize early discovery as 

governed by a good cause standard.”). The burden of demonstrating good cause rests with the 

party seeking the expedited discovery. Lemkin, 2009 WL 1542731, at *2 (citations omitted). 

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Another court in this circuit previously discussed the following considerations when 

determining whether good cause exists: 

“Good cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in 

consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the 

responding party.” Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1–15, 2:07–cv–450, 2007 WL 

5254326, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2007). Good cause is often found in cases 

alleging infringement, unfair competition, or where evidence may be lost or 

destroyed with time. Caston v. Hoaglin, No. 2:08–cv–200, 2009 WL 1687927, at 

*2 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2009). The scope of the requested discovery is also 

relevant to a good cause determination. Russell v. Lumpkin, No. 2:10–cv–314, 

2010 WL 1882139, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 2010). Ultimately, the Court retains 

broad discretion in establishing the timing and scope of discovery [(citing Lemkin, 

2009 WL 1542731, at *2)]. 

Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc. v. Vision Serv. Plan, No. 1:14–cv–581, 2014 WL 4626015, at *3 

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2014) (acknowledging further that “there is little binding authority on the 

issue of expedited discovery in the Sixth Circuit, and district courts are split on the appropriate 

standard”); see also N. Atl. Operating Co., Inc. v. JingJing Huang, 194 F. Supp. 3d 634, 637 

(E.D. Mich. 2016) (“Within this Circuit, district courts have found good cause for granting 

expedited discovery when the true identities of the defendants are unknown, when the moving 

party alleges infringement, when the scope of the discovery sought is narrow, and when 

expedited discovery would substantially contribute to moving the case forward.”); Barrette 

Outdoor Living, Inc v. Does, No. 1:16 CV 914, 2016 WL 1588672, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 

2016) (“Courts consider several factors in determining if good causes exists, including: (1) the 

danger that the information sought will be lost or destroyed, (2) whether the discovery would 

substantially contribute to moving the case forward, and (3) the scope of the information 

sought.”); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:15-cv-488, 2015 WL 12732852, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 

Feb. 4, 2015) (finding good cause in the context of a copyright infringement case where the 

plaintiff showed that it could not meet its service obligation under Rule 4(m) without the 

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requested discovery from a non-party internet service provider to discover a Doe defendant’s 

identity). 

Here, the Court has previously detailed the diligent efforts undertaken by Plaintiff to 

locate and serve Defendant Anglin. (ECF No. 19.) Since that time, Plaintiff has taken additional 

steps to find Defendant Anglin. Specifically, on December 15, 2017, Plaintiff’s counsel emailed 

counsel who appeared on behalf of Defendant Anglin in another action filed in the United States 

District Court for the District of Montana. See Gersh v. Anglin, No. 9:17-cv-00050-DLC-JCL1

(D. Mont.) (“Gersh” or “the Gersh action”), ECF Nos. 20 (notice of appearance by Attorney 

Mathew Stevenson), 25 (order granting leave for Attorney Jay M. Wolman to appear pro hac 

vice on behalf of Defendant Anglin); Exhibit 4 (ECF No. 23-5 (email directed to Attorney 

Wolman)); Exhibit 5 (ECF No. 23-6 (email directed to Attorney Stevenson)). Plaintiff’s counsel 

received no response to these emails. (ECF No. 23 at PAGEID # 213.) In addition, Plaintiff 

sought to serve Defendant Anglin via certified mail to five different addresses in Ohio. (ECF 

No. 18.) Four of those mailings have been returned as undeliverable to the Clerk. (ECF Nos. 20, 

21, 22, 28.) On March 23, 2018, a copy of the Complaint and issued summons were sent via 

certified mail to Defendant Anglin’s attention. (ECF No. 29.) Plaintiff, however, notes that 

mailings to Defendant Anglin in Ohio in the Gersh action were returned as undeliverable. (ECF 

No. 23 at PAGEID # 213 n.4.) 

Plaintiff therefore seeks leave to engage in expedited discovery to find Defendant Anglin 

and effect service of process. While his original request (ECF No. 17) did not specifically 

identify the “various entities” from which he sought discovery, Plaintiff now identifies the 

following individual and entities: Greg Anglin (Ohio resident), Zappitelli CPAs, Inc. (certified 

 

1

 Plaintiff incorrectly identified the case number as 9:17-cv-00060-DLC-JCL. (ECF No. 

23 at PAGEID # 210.) 

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public accounting business), GoDaddy (Internet domain registrar and web host), Bandwidth 

(telephone services provider), and the United States Postal Service (collectively, “the entities”). 

(ECF No. 23 at PAGEID ## 212–223.) 

As set forth above, the record reflects that two certified mailings to Defendant Anglin 

have not yet been returned as undeliverable. However, assuming for the moment that Plaintiff 

has exhausted all efforts in this regard, the Court again recognizes that locating Defendant 

Anglin has been both challenging and frustrating and acknowledges Defendant Anglin’s 

apparent attempts to conceal his whereabouts and evade service. Nevertheless, the Court 

remains concerned about the scope of Plaintiff’s requested discovery. Plaintiff provides the 

proposed requests for information, but “[f]or the sake of brevity,” he did not provide 

“definitions, instructions, and other portions of the proposed subpoenas which are ancillary to 

assessing whether the requests are narrowly tailored and minimize burden.” (Exhibit 1 (ECF No. 

23-2 at PAGEID # 230.) Plaintiff offers to provide “fuller versions of the subpoenas” upon 

request, which the Court does find are necessary in order to assess the propriety of Plaintiff’s 

proposed subpoenas. For example, Plaintiff proposes to send the following four requests 

(Plaintiff refers to each as a “Request for Production”) in a subpoena to Greg Anglin: 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 1: 

Documents and things sufficient to show each of Defendant Anglin’s 

prior, current, or planned occupancy of an address during the Relevant Period[], 

including, but not limited to, communications that may reflect information 

showing each of Defendant Anglin’s prior, current, or planned occupancy of an 

address during the Relevant Period. 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 2: 

Documents and things sufficient to show each manner of Andrew Anglin’s 

use, whether directly or indirectly (e.g., through a third party), of Greg Anglin’s 

Office during the Relevant Period. 

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REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 3: 

Documents and things sufficient to show each manner of Andrew Anglin’s 

use, whether directly or indirectly (e.g., through a third party), of Post Office Box 

208, Worthington, Ohio 43085 during the Relevant Period. 

REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION NO. 4: 

Documents and things sufficient to show each of Defendant Anglin’s 

relationships with any Financial Institution[] during the Relevant Period. 

(Id. at PAGEID # 231 (emphasis in original).) Plaintiff defines “Relevant Period” as March 19, 

2013 (one day prior to the Daily Stormer’s original domain registration) to the present and 

“Financial Institution” as “an entity involved in financial activities whose primary activity is 

engaging in financial transactions. A bank is a financial institution.” (Id. at nn. 1–2.) However, 

Plaintiff fails to define what “things” are and it is not clear from the context what items or 

information are included in that undefined term. (See generally id. at PAGEID # 231.) The 

proposed requests in subpoenas directed to the entities—Zappitelli CPAs, Inc., GoDaddy, 

Bandwidth, and the United States Postal Service—contain the same deficiency. (Id. at PAGEID 

## 231–34.) Similarly, Plaintiff fails to define “relationships” in his fourth request directed to 

Greg Anglin. (Id. at PAGEID # 231.) 

 Even if Plaintiff provides fuller versions of the proposed subpoenas and sufficiently 

defines the term “things” and “relationships,” however, the Court remains concerned with 

Plaintiff’s requests as presently formulated. The proposed requests (subpoenas) are often vague 

and difficult to follow. For example, Plaintiff’s use of the phrase “sufficient to show,” which 

appears throughout his requests directed to Greg Anglin and all of the entities, is subjective and 

it is not clear what information would be responsive to this request. (Id.) Additionally, the Court 

finds Plaintiff’s first request directed to Greg Anglin for “[d]ocuments and things sufficient to 

show each of Defendant Anglin’s prior, current, or planned occupancy of an address during the 

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Relevant Period” unclear and difficult to follow. (Id. at PAGEID # 231.)2

 The Court likewise 

does not understand what Plaintiff seeks when he asks Greg Anglin for documents or things 

sufficient to show the “manner of Andrew Anglin’s use” of an office and P.O. Box. (Id.) If 

Plaintiff seeks specific dates on which, or specific purposes for which, Andrew Anglin uses the 

office or P.O. Box, the requests (subpoena) should precisely state what information Plaintiff 

seeks. 

 Without defining certain terms and more specifically stating what information he seeks 

from Greg Anglin and the entities, the Court is unable, on the present record, to assess whether 

the expedited discovery Plaintiff seeks is warranted. In short, the Court cannot, at this time, 

authorize the requested discovery as presently formulated. Should Plaintiff rephrase his requests, 

and provide the requisite specificity to demonstrate his need and the information he seeks, the 

Court will again take the matter under advisement. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for 

Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery in Aid of Service (ECF No. 23) is DENIED WITHOUT 

PREJUDICE. 

III. 

Plaintiff also moves for leave to effect service by publication and to extend the time for 

service. (ECF No. 24.) Plaintiff explains that his request to effect service by publication is not 

inconsistent with his request for expedited discovery. (Id. at PAGEID # 327 n.1.) 

A. Standard for Service by Publication 

Under Ohio law, service of process on an individual is generally made by delivering 

personally to the individual a copy of the summons and complaint; by leaving a copy of each at 

that individual’s residence “with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there”; or 

 

2

 Plaintiff directs similar requests to the entities. (See id. at PAGEID ## 231–34.) 

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by delivering a copy of each to an authorized agent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2)(A), (B), (C). 

Alternatively, service may be made in accordance with state law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(1). Ohio 

Rule of Civil Procedure 4.4(A)(1) provides that “if the residence of a defendant is unknown, 

service shall be made by publication in actions where such service is authorized by law.” Rule 

4.4(A)(1) goes on to explain the steps necessary to effect service of process by publication. Id. 

First, before such service may be made, a party or his counsel must file an affidavit “aver[ring] 

that service of summons cannot be made because the residence of the defendant is unknown to 

the affiant, all of the efforts made on behalf of the party to ascertain the residence of the 

defendant, and that the residence of the defendant cannot be ascertained with reasonable 

diligence.” Id. Second, once the affidavit is filed, 

the clerk shall cause service of notice to be made by publication in a newspaper of 

general circulation in the county in which the complaint is filed. If no newspaper 

is published in that county, then publication shall be in a newspaper published in 

an adjoining county. The publication shall contain the name and address of the 

court, the case number, the name of the first party on each side, and the name and 

last known address, if any, of the person or persons whose residence is unknown. 

The publication also shall contain a summary statement of the object of the 

complaint and demand for relief, and shall notify the person to be served that he 

or she is required to answer within twenty-eight days after the publication. 

Id. Finally, Rule 4.4(A)(1) requires the following as to the publication: 

The publication shall be published at least once a week for six successive weeks 

unless publication for a lesser number of weeks is specifically provided by law. 

Service shall be complete at the date of the last publication. 

After the last publication, the publisher or its agent shall file with the court an 

affidavit showing the fact of publication together with a copy of the notice of 

publication. The affidavit and copy of the notice shall constitute proof of service. 

B. Service by Publication in This Action 

As set forth above, Ohio law permits service by publication in only certain 

circumstances, i.e., “where such service is authorized by law.” Ohio Civ. R. 4.4(A)(1). Ohio 

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Revised Code § 2703.14 identifies the types of actions in which service may be made by 

publication. Although Plaintiff does not explicitly identify a particular statutory provision, he 

specifically argues that Defendant Anglin “continues to elude service of process by concealing 

his Ohio residence.” (ECF No. 24 at PAGEID # 327.) Based on this record, the Court 

understands Plaintiff to take the position that this is “an action in which the defendant, being a 

resident of this state, has departed from the county of his residence . . . to avoid the service of a 

summons, or keeps himself concealed with a similar intent.” Ohio Rev. Code § 2703.14(L). 

Plaintiff submits the Affidavit of Donald Screen, who serves as counsel of record for 

Plaintiff in this action. (Affidavit of Donald Screen (ECF No. 24-1) (“Screen Affidavit”).) 

Attorney Screen details all of the efforts Plaintiff has undertaken to effect service of process on 

Defendant Anglin. (Id. at ¶¶ 2–20.) These efforts are described above and were previously 

described in the Court’s prior Opinion and Order. (Id.; ECF Nos. 19.) Considering this record 

as a whole, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to 

locate Defendant Anglin. Briefly, these efforts included retaining a licensed professional private 

investigation agency and attempting to serve Defendant Anglin at the following five different 

addresses: 

a. 6827 North High Street, Suite 121, Worthington, OH 43085-2517; 

b. 7407 Brandshire Lane, Apartment B, Dublin, OH 43017-3400; 

c. 918 Colony Way, Columbus, OH 43235-1720; 

d. 979 High Street, Suite 2, Worthington, OH 43085-4047; and 

e. 364 West Lane Avenue, Apartment 117, Columbus, OH 43201-1000. 

(Id.; ECF Nos. 13 (issued summonses), 24-2 (Declaration of Tina L. Schroeder, owner of the 

private investigation agency retained by Plaintiff).) 

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 The summonses directed to Defendant Anglin at the first (a), second (b), third (c), and 

fifth (e) addresses above were returned unexecuted. (ECF Nos. 20, 21, 22, 28.) As to the 

remaining summons directed to Defendant Anglin at 979 High Street, Suite 2, in Worthington, 

Ohio, Plaintiff’s counsel avers that the records from the United States Postal Service (“USPS”) 

reflect that the certified mailing was “‘[d]isposed by Post Office’ because it ‘could not be 

delivered to the intended recipient or returned to sender.’” (Screen Affidavit at ¶ 18(e); Exhibit 

1-D (ECF No. 24-5) (printouts of USPS tracking information).)3

 

 In addition, although unsuccessful to date, Plaintiff has also twice asked the Court for 

leave to conduct expedited discovery to ascertain Defendant Anglin’s whereabouts. (ECF Nos. 

17, 23.) 

 This record evidence and the Screen Affidavit demonstrate that Plaintiff has exercised 

reasonable diligence in attempting to serve Defendant Anglin at his last known addresses in 

Dublin, Ohio; Columbus, Ohio; and Worthington, Ohio. This evidence further reflects that 

service cannot be made upon Defendant Anglin because his residence is unknown and cannot be 

ascertained with reasonable diligence and that Defendant Anglin is attempting to avoid service of 

process. In sum, service by publication is appropriate. Ohio Civ. R. 4.4(A)(1); cf. Sizemore v. 

Smith, 6 Ohio St. 3d 330, 332–33 (1983) (stating that “where reasonable diligence has been 

exercised and a defendant still has not been found there arises an inference of concealment”); see 

also Rittner v. Huggins, No. 2:07-cv-413, 2008 WL 5111177, at *2 (Dec. 1, 2008) (quoting 

Sizemore, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 332–33). 

 

3

 On March 23, 2018, the Clerk certified that a copy of the Complaint and issued 

summons were again sent via certified mail to Defendant Anglin at 6827 North High Street, 

Suite 121, in Worthington, Ohio. (ECF No. 29.) However, the Court notes that this is one of the 

above addresses at which Plaintiff previously unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendant 

Anglin. (ECF No. 28; Screen Affidavit at ¶ 18(d).) 

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 Plaintiff proposes to publish the notice set forth in ECF No. 24-6, PAGEID # 371, once 

per week for six consecutive weeks in the Daily Reporter, a newspaper of general circulation and 

the official newspaper for all courts of record of Franklin, County, Ohio. (ECF No. 24 at 

PAGEID ## 328–29.) The Court has reviewed the proposed public notice and finds that it 

complies with the requirements of Ohio Civil Rule 4.4(A)(1) with one exception.4 As presently 

formulated, the proposed public notice advises Defendant Anglin “to answer said complaint 

within twenty-eight (28) days after the last day of publication.” (ECF No. 24-6 at PAGEID # 

371.) However, the Court finds that this sentence should be modified to include a date certain by 

which Defendant Anglin should respond to the Complaint. Plaintiff should be able to ascertain 

and include that specific response date once he follows the directives related to publication 

outlined in Ohio Civil Rule 4.4(A)(1). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request to effect service by 

publication (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED consistent with the foregoing. Plaintiff shall publish a 

public notice (as modified to reflect a specific response date) in the Daily Reporter for once per 

week for a period of six consecutive weeks. Ohio Civ. R. 4.4(A)(1); U.S. Commodity Futures 

Trading Comm’n v. Majestic Enter. Collision Repair, Inc., No. 4:10-cv-2287, 2011 WL 767890, 

at *2 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 28, 2011). 

C. Extension of Time to Effect Service of Process 

Plaintiff seeks to extend the deadline for effecting service, which is April 17, 2018. (ECF 

No. 30.) Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides in pertinent part as follows: 

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—

on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action 

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a 

 

4

 The Court notes that Plaintiff provides the proposed public notice in the context of an 

Order to be signed by an officer of this Court. (ECF No. 24-6.) The Court’s present discussion 

relates only to the language of the notice appearing on the second page of the proposed Order. 

(Id. at PAGEID # 371.) 

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specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court 

must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “Plaintiff bears the burden of exercising due diligence in perfecting service 

of process and in showing that proper service has been made.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Downs, 

No. 1:14-cv-707, 2015 WL 12734020, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2015) (citing Byrd v. Stone, 94 

F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996)). 

 As set forth above, the Plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence in attempting to effect 

service of process. Moreover, extending the current service deadline will provide time for 

Plaintiff to effect service by publication. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for an extension of 

time to effect service (ECF No. 24) is GRANTED. The deadline for effecting service of process 

over Defendant Anglin is JUNE 1, 2018. Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time for Service (ECF 

No. 33) is therefore DENIED AS MOOT. 

IV. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s Renewed Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery in Aid of 

Service (ECF No. 23) is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE consistent with the foregoing; 

Plaintiff’s Motion for Service by Publication and to Extend Time for Service (ECF No. 24) is 

GRANTED consistent with the foregoing; and Plaintiff’s Motion to Extend Time for Service 

(ECF No. 33) is DENIED AS MOOT. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: April 13, 2018 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

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