IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

TAMMY MICHELLE RANDALL, 

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action 2:17-cv-785

 Judge Algenon L. Marbley

 Magistrate Judge Jolson

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL

SECURITY,

Defendant.

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff, Tammy Michelle Randall, filed this action seeking review of a decision of the 

Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her Title II Social Security 

Disability Benefits and Title XVI Supplemental Security Income Disability applications. For the 

reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 7) be 

OVERRULED, and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Prior Proceedings

Plaintiff filed applications for Title XVI Supplemental Security Disability Benefits and 

Title II Social Security Disability Benefits on January 31, 2014, and May 6, 2014, respectively. 

(See Doc. 7-3, Tr. 72–73, 87-88, PAGEID #: 112–13, 126–27). In both applications, Plaintiff 

alleged disability since October 30, 2013. (Id.). After Plaintiff’s applications were denied 

initially and on reconsideration (Doc. 7-4, Tr. 140–42, 148–49, PAGEID #: 181–83, 189–90), 

Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (id., Tr. 150, PAGEID #: 191). 

Administrative Law Judge Bonnie Hannan (the “ALJ”) held a video hearing on March 

30, 2016. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 36–70, PAGEID #: 75–109). On May 8, 2017, the ALJ issued a 
2

decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled as defined in the Social Security Act. (Id., Tr. 

12–28, PAGEID #: 51–67). The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ’s decision the 

final decision of the Commissioner. (Id., Tr. 1, PAGEID #: 40). 

Plaintiff filed this case on September 5, 2017 (Doc. 1), and the Commissioner filed the 

administrative record on December 15, 2017 (Doc. 6). Plaintiff filed a Statement of Specific 

Errors (Doc. 7), the Commissioner responded (Doc. 8), and Plaintiff filed a Reply (Doc. 9).

B. Relevant Testimony at the Administrative Hearing

1. Plaintiff’s Testimony

Plaintiff testified that she lived in Maryland with her daughter and three grandchildren, 

ages four, seven, and nine, until March 2016. (Id., Tr. 40, 42, PAGEID #: 79, 81). During that 

time, Plaintiff stated that her daughter “was never home” so she was the primary caretaker of the 

three children. (Id.). In March 2016, Plaintiff’s daughter moved to Ohio, and Plaintiff followed 

in October 2016. (Id.). Although Plaintiff stated that she is no longer the primary caretaker of 

all three grandchildren, she is responsible for watching her four-year-old grandson during the 

day, feeding her grandson breakfast and lunch, and watching her two older grandchildren when 

they get home from school. (Id., Tr. 57–58, PAGEID #: 96–97). She stated that she and her

grandson will sit and watch cartoons, and he plays with action figures with her on the couch. 

(Id., Tr. 57, PAGEID #: 96). Plaintiff testified that when she is at her daughter’s house, she has 

to go up and down the stairs several times a day, but she is “crawling up them by the end of the 

night.” (Id., Tr. 43–44, PAGEID #: 82–83). 

When asked the number one reason she was unable to work, Plaintiff stated “I would 

have to say my neck and my hand, my right hand[.]” (Id., Tr. 51, PAGEID #: 90). Plaintiff 
3

elaborated about her neck pain: “It’s a constant pain, constant, just severe chronic pain. Even on 

my medications, I’m, my neck, I’m always in pain. I use Bengay and that tends to be for the 

temporary time, the only thing that really subsides it.” (Id.). With pain medication, Plaintiff 

states her pain on a daily basis is a four or five on a scale of one to ten. (Id., Tr. 52, PAGEID #: 

91). 

In terms of her right hand and wrist pain, Plaintiff stated “I didn’t even know I had carpal 

tunnel until Dr. [Paul] Pritchett told me I did because it never really affected me until like the last 

couple of years.” (Id.). As a result of her pain, Plaintiff testified that she has “very shaken hand 

writing” and tries to eat foods that are soft so she won’t have to use a knife. (Id., Tr. 52–53, 

PAGEID #: 91–92). However, Plaintiff is able to button her pants and zip up a jacket. (Id., Tr. 

53, PAGEID #: 92). 

Plaintiff also testified that she has hip pain. (Id., Tr. 51, PAGEID #: 90). More 

specifically, Plaintiff explained that her pain feels “like a constant, just like a dagger going into 

the bone. . . . It’s just like a constant, like a knife digging in my hip bone and it just won’t go 

away.” (Id.). Plaintiff rated her hip pain with medications at a six or seven out of ten. (Id.). 

When asked if there were any other impairments that affected her ability to work, 

Plaintiff stated that her “memory’s not like it used to be.” (Id., Tr. 53, PAGEID #: 92). Further, 

she testified that she cannot “stay focused very long on the same thing” and doesn’t think she is 

able to follow instructions. (Id., Tr. 56, PAGEID #: 95). Plaintiff testified that she could not do

simple math like add, subtract, and make change “like [she] used to.” (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 44, 

PAGEID #: 83). Plaintiff explained that her boyfriend manages her finances and pays her bills 

because she cannot stay focused. (Id., Tr. 45–46, PAGEID #: 84–85). 
4

As for daily activities, Plaintiff stated that she is tired all the time and “can’t really do 

much with [her] grandkids like [she] used to.” (Id., Tr. 54, PAGEID #: 93). The ALJ asked 

Plaintiff about various functional limitations:

Q: How long can you sit?

A: It, like right in, this is the longest I’ve ever sat. I’m up and down every three, 

two, three, four minutes.

Q: And then how long are you up for before you can sit down again?

***

A: I can usually wash a few dishes or I’ll try to like maybe stand and fold a few 

clothes because it actually takes the pain off the hip. And then I can sit back 

down for about maybe like, about ten minutes. 

(Id.). 

Plaintiff also testified that she can walk to a friend’s house for coffee—approximately ten 

minutes—and lift five to ten pounds. (Id., Tr. 55, PAGEID #: 94). Further, Plaintiff stated that 

she cannot stoop, kneel, crouch, or crawl; she cannot reach overhead; she cannot tie her shoes; 

she cannot do her hair; and she cannot dress herself without difficulty. (Id.). When the ALJ 

asked Plaintiff to describe a typical day, Plaintiff responded that she “star[es] out the window.” 

(Id., Tr. 58, PAGEID #: 97). 

During questioning by her attorney, Plaintiff discussed various other psychological 

difficulties. First, Plaintiff discussed her bipolar disorder and stated “[i]t makes me very mean.” 

(Id., Tr. 59, PAGEID #: 98). Plaintiff elaborated that she is “either crying terribly and extremely 

depressed, or [she is] like a rattlesnake, and I don’t like to be that way because I’m mean to the 

ones that I love.” (Id.). Plaintiff testified, however, that since she began taking Seroquel eight or 

nine months prior, she has “been doing very well” and it has kept her “demons at bay.” (Id.). 
5

Second, Plaintiff stated she has difficulty interacting with others. (Id., Tr. 60, PAGEID #: 99). 

Finally, Plaintiff described her anxiety attacks: “It’s like it, I start getting hot flashes. My chest 

gets real tight. I can’t breathe.” (Id.). Plaintiff testified that she “started taking a lot of stress out 

of [her] life” so the attacks have been occurring less frequently. (Id., Tr. 60–61, PAGEID #: 99–

100). 

2. Vocational Expert’s Testimony 

At the hearing, the ALJ asked vocational expert William Reed (“the VE”) several 

hypothetical questions.

All right, would you assume a hypothetical individual of the Claimant’s age and 

education . . . Further assume the individual is limited to, I’m going to begin a 

light exertional category, light as defined in the regulations. So we’re talking 

about occasionally lifting 20 pounds, frequently 10, occasionally carry 20 pounds, 

frequently 10. Sit, stand and walk up to six hours each and push and pull as much 

as similar to carry. Occasionally climb ramps and stairs, never climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolds, occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl, 

occasional vibration, occasional overhead reaching, limited to perform simple 

routine and repetitive tasks, limited to simple work-related decisions, limited to 

tolerating few changes in a routine work setting defined as performing the same 

duties at the same station or location day to day, and occasional and superficial 

contact with supervisors, coworkers and the public. 

(Id., Tr. 64–65, PAGEID #: 103–04). The VE testified that with these limitations, the 

hypothetical individual could work as a housekeeping cleaner, merchandize marker, or a routing 

clerk. (Id., Tr. 65, PAGEID #: 104). 

The ALJ then changed the hypothetical scenario, adding that the individual could 

perform frequent handling and fingering on the right side and “would need to have the ability to 

change positions a maximum frequency of every 30 minutes.” (Id., Tr. 65–66, PAGEID #: 104–

05). This, according to the VE, would eliminate the housekeeping cleaner, but that individual 

could work as a photocopying machine operator, in addition to the previous jobs mentioned. 
6

(Id., Tr. 66–67, PAGEID #: 105–06). 

Finally, the ALJ reduced the hypothetical individual to sedentary work as defined in the 

regulations, but kept all of the limitations from the previous two hypothetical scenarios, and 

asked if there would be any work that individual could perform. (Id., Tr. 67, PAGEID #: 106). 

The VE explained that an individual with those limitations could work as a surveillance-system 

monitor, an order clerk, and an addresser. (Id.). The ALJ asked the maximum frequency this 

hypothetical individual would be able to change positions from standing to sitting and remain on 

task. (Id.). The VE testified that in all three jobs a worker would be able to change positions 

very frequently (later clarified as every ten to fifteen minutes) and still be productive. (Id., Tr. 

67–68, PAGEID #: 106–07). Indeed, the VE further elaborated that a surveillance-system 

monitor could change positions every five minutes without interfering with productivity. (Id., 

Tr. 69, PAGEID #: 108).

C. Relevant Medical Background

On May 22, 2014, Plaintiff underwent a cervical spine MRI at the request of her treating 

physician, Dr. Paul Pritchett. (Doc. 6-7, Tr. 485, PAGEID #: 529). The MRI showed minimal 

reversal of the normal cervical lordosis, minimal retrolisthesis of C5 over C6, and minimal 

anterolisthesis of C7 over T1. (Id.). Further, there were mild to moderate multilevel 

degenerative changes noted. (Id.). 

Plaintiff saw Dr. Nalin Mathur on September 29, 2014, for a consultative examination. 

(Doc. 6-7, Tr. 489, PAGEID #: 533). Dr. Mathur noted that Plaintiff had a past history of 

chronic pain syndrome in the neck and lower back, cervical spondylosis, degenerative disc 

disease in the low back, and brachial neuropathy. (Id.). Plaintiff reported at the appointment that 
7

she is in chronic pain all day long, cannot walk more than a couple of blocks, and cannot lift 

more than 20 to 30 pounds. (Id.). A physical examination showed Plaintiff could extend her 

hand fully, make a fist, oppose fingers, and her grip strength was 5/5. (Id., Tr. 490, PAGEID #: 

534). Dr. Mathur noted, however, that Plaintiff had a positive straight leg test on her right side 

and was tender bilaterally in the cervical region, as well as the lumbar region. (Id.). Ultimately, 

Dr. Mathur opined that he did not believe Plaintiff could “do more than a few minutes of sitting, 

standing, walking, lifting, [and] carrying any objects.” (Id.). He noted that Plaintiff appeared to 

be in a lot of pain on her left side and she may benefit from an ambulatory aid. (Id., Tr. 490–91, 

PAGEID #: 534–35). Dr. Mathur also stated that Plaintiff was able to hear and understand 

normal conversation. (Id., Tr. 491, PAGEID #: 535).

On November 20, 2014, state agency consultant Dr. M. Lowen opined that Plaintiff could 

occasionally lift and/or carry twenty pounds, frequently lift and/or carry ten pounds, could stand 

and/or walk 6 hours in an 8-hour workday, could sit (with normal breaks) for 6 hours in a 

workday, and had various other postural limitations. (Doc. 6-3, Tr. 81–82, PAGEID #: 121–22). 

Ultimately, Dr. Lowen opined that Plaintiff was capable of light exertional work and was not 

disabled. (Id., Tr. 85–86, PAGEID #: 125–26). Dr. S.K. Najar, also a state agency consultant, 

affirmed Dr. Thomas’s assessment on April 28, 2015. (Id., Tr. 113–14, 117, PAGEID #: 153–

54, 158). 

A cervical spine radiography on September 7, 2016, showed findings suggesting muscle 

spasm and some degenerative changes. (Doc. 6-9, Tr. 872, PAGEID #: 958). There were, 

however, no acute osseous abnormalities present. (Id.). 

On February 8, 2017, Dr. Paul E. Pritchett completed a Disability Impairment 
8

Questionnaire. (Doc. 6-9, Tr. 910, PAGEID #: 956). Dr. Pritchett noted that he began treating 

Plaintiff in August 2013, and sees her monthly. (Id.). Dr. Pritchett listed the following 

diagnoses: “severe chronic pain, unable to keep up with hygiene, sex is very painful, left hip 

needs to be replaced, severe degeneration in neck and spine, arthritis, burcitis [sic] left hip, 

carpal tunnel right, osteoporosis, osteopenia, osteosticulosis [sic] right ear implant.” (Id.). Dr. 

Pritchett stated that household chores, sitting, laying, walking, driving, playing with 

grandchildren, and grocery shopping, inter alia, were factors that aggravate Plaintiff’s pain. (Id., 

Tr. 911, PAGEID #: 957). In terms of limitations during an eight-hour workday, Dr. Pritchett 

opined that Plaintiff could perform a job in a seated position for less than 1 hour and could 

perform a job standing and/or walking for less than 1 hour. (Id., Tr. 912, PAGEID #: 958). 

Further, Dr. Pritchett stated that Plaintiff would need to elevate her left leg to waist level while 

sitting, whenever she had pain. (Id.). Dr. Pritchett also checked the box that Plaintiff could 

never lift or carry 5–10 pounds, but also checked the box that she could occasionally lift or carry 

5–10 pounds. (Id.). 

Additionally, Dr. Pritchett opined that Plaintiff could never/rarely grasp, turn and twist 

objects; use hand/fingers for fine manipulations; or use arms for reaching (including overhead). 

(Id., Tr. 913, PAGEID #: 959). Dr. Pritchett also checked the box that Plaintiff would need to 

take unscheduled breaks to rest at unpredictable intervals during an 8-hour workday. (Id.). The 

Questionnaire asked “how often do you think this will happen?” and “how long will your patient 

have to rest before returning to work?” (Id.). Instead of answering those questions, Dr. Pritchett 

wrote that Plaintiff “has not worked in 31⁄2 years” and that she is “unable to do gainful 

employment.” (Id.). Finally, Dr. Pritchett noted that Plaintiff “has bipolar manic depressive, and 
9

memory loss on right side.” (Id., Tr. 914, PAGEID #: 960).

D. The ALJ’s Decision

The ALJ found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: 

degenerative disc disease, unspecified arthropathies (hallux valgus deformity, osteoporosis); 

bipolar disorder, and anxiety. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 14, PAGEID #: 53). Despite these impairments, the

ALJ held that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or 

equaled a listing. (Id., Tr. 16, PAGEID #: 55). Specifically, the ALJ held that Plaintiff did not 

meet Listing 1.04 (disorders of the spine), because the record did not demonstrate compromise of 

a nerve root with the required additional findings. (Id.). Further, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s 

mental impairments did not meet Listing 12.04 or 12.06, because Plaintiff had only a moderate 

limitation in understanding, remembering, or applying information; a moderate limitation in 

interacting with others; a moderate limitation with regard to concentration, persistence, and pace; 

and mild limitation for adapting or managing oneself. (Id., Tr. 16–17, PAGEID #: 55–56). 

As to Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ stated:

[T]he claimant has the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work as 

defined in 20 CFR 404.1567(a) and 416.967(a) except the claimant can lift and/or 

carry ten pounds occasionally and less than ten pounds frequently; can sit for six 

hours in an eight-hour workday and stand and/or walk two hours in an eight-hour 

workday. She can push and/or pull as much as she can lift and/or carry. The 

claimant can climb ramps and stairs occasionally and should never climb ladders, 

ropes or scaffolds. She can occasionally balance, stoop, kneel, crouch and crawl. 

The claimant can have occasional exposure to vibration. The claimant would 

need to change positions a maximum frequency of every thirty minutes. The 

claimant retains the ability to understand, remember and carry out simple routine 

and repetitive tasks; can use judgment limited to simple work-related decisions; 

can tolerate few changes in a routine work setting defined as performing the same 

duties at the same duty station or locations from day to day. The claimant is 

limited to occasional and superficial contact with supervisors, co-workers and the 

public. 
10

(Id., Tr. 18, PAGEID #: 57). 

In terms of the weight given to the various physicians, the ALJ expressly stated that she 

considered the following specific factors: (1) examining relationship, (2) treatment relationship, 

(3) supportability, (4) consistency, and (5) specialization. (Id., Tr. 22, PAGEID #: 61). The ALJ 

assigned “partial weight” to state agency consultants Dr. Lowen and Dr. Najar. (Id., Tr. 23, 

PAGEID #: 62). In doing so, the ALJ noted that the two physicians have specialized program 

knowledge and their opinions were consistent with the evidence at the time they were rendered. 

(Id.). The ALJ acknowledged, however, that because evidence received at the treatment level 

suggests that Plaintiff is now more limited, the opinions should be assigned only partial weight. 

(Id.). 

Next, the ALJ assigned “little weight” to Dr. Mathur, who found Plaintiff “could do [no] 

more than a few minutes of sitting, standing, walking, lifting, and carrying any objects.” (Id.). 

The ALJ explained her decision to assign only little weight:

The opinion is not stated in vocationally significant terms. The opinion does not 

discuss any postural limitations, nor does it specify the length of time she could 

sit, stand, walk, lift, and carry. The opinion was made after one examination and 

is inconsistent with the longitudinal medical evidence of record. In October 2016, 

the claimant had full range of motion in the upper and lower extremities. She had 

normal muscle strength and tone (Ex. 10F-4). Further, the opinion is inconsistent 

with the claimant’s actual activities of daily living. The claimant reported that she 

was able to shop in the grocery store and use public transportation (Ex. 7E-5). 

These activities require a certain amount of sitting, walking and standing. The 

claimant testified that she frequently walked ten minutes to have coffee with a 

friend. The claimant further testified that she was responsible for bathing and 

taking care of a four-year old child. At the examination, she stated that she could 

not walk more than a couple blocks and could not lift more than 20–30 pounds, 

which is the weight of her granddaughter (Ex. 5F-1). The claimant was 

reportedly more active than the limitations imposed by this physician. Therefore, 

this opinion is given little weight. 

(Id.).
11

The ALJ also assigned “little weight” to Dr. Pritchett, explaining that his opinion was

inconsistent with his examination and treatment notes:

Treatment notes indicated that she had full range of motion of her upper and 

lower extremities, normal muscle strength and tone. She had a normal 

neurological examination. Her memory was found to be intact and she was noted 

not to be depressed, anxious or agitated (Ex. 8F-20, 53, 56, 59, 63; 10F-5; 13F-3, 

7). The opinion as to claimant’s ability to use her hands is not consistent with the 

medical evidence. The claimant had grip strength of 5/5 upon consultative 

examination (Ex 5F). X-rays of the left wrist were normal (Ex 9F-3, 4). The 

claimant testified that she could eat with utensils, button, zip, hold a cigarette, and 

use a fork. . . . The MRI of the cervical spine showed minimal findings (Ex 4F-2). 

Therefore, this opinion is given little weight. 

(Id., Tr. 24, PAGEID #: 63). 

Finally, the ALJ held that although Plaintiff’s medically determinable impairments could 

reasonably be expected to produce the alleged symptoms, her statements concerning the 

intensity, persistence and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the 

record. (Id., Tr. 25, PAGEID #: 64). The ALJ elaborated on how she reached that finding:

First, the description of the claimant’s symptoms and limitations the claimant 

provided throughout the record were inconsistent with the objective findings. The 

claimant had normal to mild findings throughout the treatment record. The 

primary treating physician who prescribed pain medications had normal physical 

and mental examinations throughout the treatment record (Ex. 8F-20, 53, 56, 59, 

52; 10F-5, 13F-3, 7). Third, [sic] the level of treatment and care is inconsistent 

with the severity of the claimant’s allegations. The claimant has not required 

frequent emergency intervention. The claimant showed improvement with 

conservative management of the impairments, to include prescription medication. 

She reported that she regretting [sic] not getting treatment sooner because the 

medications were somewhat effective (Ex. 11F-20). Fourth . . . the claimant’s 

subjective complaints were not corroborated by objective evidence, to include 

digital imaging and physical examinations. The MRI of the cervical spine were 

minimal findings or retrolithesis and anteriolisthesis (Ex. 4F-2). . . . Finally, 

claimant’s activities of daily living are inconsistent with the intensity and limiting 

effects of the symptoms alleged. The claimant cared full time for three 

grandchildren and reported that she could not walk more than a couple of blocks 

and could not lift more than 20–30 pounds, which is the weight of her 

granddaughter (Ex. 5f-1). While the claimant has some functional limitations set 
12

forth in the above residual functional capacity, the treatment notes throughout the 

medical record do not support the extent of severity alleged by the claimant. The 

residual functional capacity above adequately compensates for the severity of the 

claimant’s impairments as supported by the treatment record. 

(Id.). 

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court’s review “is limited to determining whether the Commissioner’s decision is 

supported by substantial evidence and was made pursuant to proper legal standards.” Winn v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 615 F. App’x 315, 320 (6th Cir. 2015); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 

“[S]ubstantial evidence is defined as ‘more than a scintilla of evidence but less than a 

preponderance; it is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to 

support a conclusion.’” Rogers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007) 

(quoting Cutlip v. Sec’y of HHS, 25 F.3d 284, 286 (6th Cir. 1994)). “Therefore, if substantial 

evidence supports the ALJ’s decision, this Court defers to that finding ‘even if there is 

substantial evidence in the record that would have supported an opposite conclusion.’” Blakley 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Key v. Callahan, 109 F.3d 

270, 273 (6th Cir. 1997)). 

III. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff asserts three assignments of error: (1) the ALJ failed to weigh the medical 

opinion evidence properly; (2) the ALJ improperly evaluated Plaintiff’s testimony; and (3) the 

ALJ relied on a flawed hypothetical question to the VE. (See generally Doc. 7). 

A. Weighing the Medical Evidence 

Here, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ’s decision to assign treating physician Dr. Pritchett 

less than controlling weight. (Id. at 11–17). In so arguing, Plaintiff also expresses disagreement 
13

with the ALJ’s decision to grant more weight to the state agency consultants, while also 

assigning Dr. Mathur’s opinion—which she contends was consistent with Dr. Pritchett—little 

weight. (Id. at 15 (“There is no authority that permits an ALJ to give greater weight to opinions 

from non-treating, non-examining sources who review a markedly undeveloped record and are 

not specialists in relevant areas of medicine over the well-supported opinions from a treating 

doctor.”)). Finally, Plaintiff argues that the “ALJ appears to be substituting her own opinion of 

disability for both the Commissioner’s Regulations and the medical evidence.” (Id. at 14). 

As an initial matter, “[i]t is the Commissioner’s function to resolve conflicts in the 

medical evidence[.]” Ray v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 940 F. Supp. 2d 718, 727 (S.D. Ohio 2013)

(citing Hardaway v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir. 1987)). 

Accordingly, when medical sources rely on the same evidence and reach different conclusions, it 

is the ALJ’s job to resolve the inconsistency. See, e.g., Goodson v. Chater, No. 95-6582, 1996 

WL 338663, at *1 (6th Cir. June 17, 1996). With this standard in mind, the undersigned turns to 

the physicians’ opinions.

1. Dr. Pritchett

Two related rules govern how an ALJ is required to analyze a treating physician’s 

opinion. Dixon v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 3:14-cv-478, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (S.D. Ohio 

Mar. 7, 2016). The first is the “treating physician rule.” Id. The rule requires an ALJ to “give 

controlling weight to a treating source’s opinion on the issue(s) of the nature and severity of the 

claimant’s impairment(s) if the opinion is well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and 

laboratory diagnostic techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence in the 

case record.” LaRiccia v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 549 F. App’x 377, 384 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting 
14

20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Closely associated is “the good 

reasons rule,” which requires an ALJ always to give “good reasons . . . for the weight given to 

the claimant’s treating source opinion.” Dixon, 2016 WL 860695, at *4 (quoting Blakely v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 581 F.3d 399, 406 (6th Cir. 2009) (alterations in original)); 20 C.F.R. 

§ 404.1527(c)(2). The treating physician rule and the good reasons rule together create what has 

been referred to as the “two-step analysis created by the Sixth Circuit.” Allums v. Comm’r of 

Soc. Sec., 975 F. Supp. 2d 823, 832 (N.D. Ohio 2013). 

Here, the ALJ explained that Dr. Pritchett’s opinion was given little weight because it 

was found to be inconsistent with the examination and treatment notes. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 24, 

PAGEID #: 63). Specifically, the ALJ noted that the May 2014 MRI of Plaintiff’s cervical spine 

showed minimal findings (id. (citing Ex. 4F-2)), as did the September 2016 cervical spine 

radiograph. Further, Dr. Pritchett opined that Plaintiff could never/rarely “grasp, turn and twist 

objects, use hands/finger for fine manipulations; or use arms for reaching” (Doc. 6-9, Tr. 913, 

PAGEID #: 959), yet treatment notes show Plaintiff had normal grip strength, and she was able 

to button and zip her clothing, hold a cigarette, and hold a fork. Thus, Plaintiff admitted to 

abilities that contradict Dr. Pritchett’s assessment. 

Finally, The ALJ found that Dr. Pritchett’s own notes were indicative of normal findings. 

(Doc. 6-2, Tr. 25, PAGEID #: 64; see also, e.g., Doc. 6-8, Tr. 531, PAGEID #: 576 (January 12, 

2016 treatment notes finding “full range of motion of the upper and lower extremities” and 

“normal muscle strength and tone”); id., Tr. 619, PAGEID #: 664 (October 27, 2014 treatment 

notes finding “full range of motion of the upper and lower extremities” and “normal muscle 

strength and tone”); id., Tr. 564, PAGEID #: 609 (April 7, 2014 treatment notes finding “full 
15

range of motion of the upper and lower extremities” and “normal muscle strength and tone”)). 

Plaintiff counters that as a “layperson” the ALJ was not qualified to determine what findings 

were indicative as “normal.” (See generally Docs. 7, 9). But it was Dr. Pritchett who classified 

the examination findings as “normal” in his treatment notes, not the ALJ. Finally, Plaintiff avers 

that the ALJ cherry-picked normal findings, while ignoring other abnormalities identified by Dr. 

Pritchett. (Doc. 9 at 2). While the undersigned disagrees with that characterization, it is 

important to note that “the legal determination of disability is ultimately the prerogative of the 

Commissioner, not the treating physician.” Pethers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 580 F. Supp. 2d 572, 

578 (W.D. Mich. 2008) (emphasis in original) (citing Vance v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 260 F.

App’x 801, 804 (6th Cir. 2008)). 

Thus, although Plaintiff may disagree with the ALJ’s ultimate conclusion, the ALJ’s

decision to grant little weight to Dr. Pritchett’s opinion was consistent with the Social Security 

Regulations. Further, the ALJ’s explanation provided sufficient detail to satisfy the goodreasons requirement and appropriately explained the disposition of the case to Plaintiff. See 

Henderson v. Astrue, No. 10-CV-238-JMH, 2011 WL 3608164, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Aug. 16, 2011) 

(Good reasons include, inter alia, “a treating physician’s opinion that contradicts other medical 

evidence in the record[] and a treating physician’s opinion that contradicts other opinions of the 

same treating physician already in the record”); see also Francis v. Comm’r Soc. Sec. Admin., 

414 F. App’x 802, 804 (6th Cir. 2011) (An ALJ has no requirement to provide “an exhaustive 

factor-by-factor analysis” in order to satisfy the good reasons requirement.). It was therefore not 

an error for the ALJ to assign Dr. Pritchett’s opinion little weight. 
16

2. Dr. Mathur and State Agency Consultants

Pursuant to the Social Security regulations, the ALJ is required to evaluate every medical 

opinion and consider a variety of non-exhaustive factors in deciding what weight to assign. Poe 

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 342 F. App’x 149, 156 (6th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 

416.927(d)). Here, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred in failing to give Dr. Mathur’s opinion 

more weight and by giving the state agency consultants too much weight. 

At bottom, the state agency consultants, Dr. Mathur, and Dr. Pritchett provided opinions 

that were inconsistent. That the ALJ resolved these inconsistencies in a manner unfavorable to 

Plaintiff does not mean the ALJ ignored evidence, or that her ultimate conclusion was not 

supported by substantial evidence. Indeed, the ALJ stated explictly that she gave Dr. Mathur’s 

opinion little weight because the opinion was not stated in vocationally significant terms, did not 

discuss any postural limitations, and the opined length of time for sitting, standing, and walking 

was not clear. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 23, PAGEID #: 62). Plaintiff concedes that Dr. Mathur’s opinion is 

somewhat vague, but she argues it is consistent with Dr. Pritchett. But Plaintiff fails to 

acknowledge important discrepancies between the two opinions. For example, Plaintiff told Dr. 

Mathur she could lift up to 30 pounds (Doc. 6-7, Tr. 489, PAGEID #: 533), yet Dr. Pritchett 

checked the boxes that Plaintiff could never or rarely lift or carry 5–10 pounds (Doc. 6-9, Tr. 

912, PAGEID #: 958).

As to the state agency consultants, despite Plaintiff’s characterization, they are “highly 

qualified physicians and psychologists who are experts in the evaluation of the medical issues in 

disability claims under the [Social Security] Act.” Miller v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 811 F.3d 825, 

834 (6th Cir. 2016) (citations omitted). And in some cases, it may be appropriate for an ALJ to
17

assign greater weight to a state agency consultant’s opinion than to that of a treating or 

examining source. See Molebash v. Berryhill, No. 2:16-CV-869, 2017 WL 3473816, at *4 (S.D. 

Ohio Aug. 14, 2017), adopted sub nom. Molebash v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 2:16-CV-869, 

2017 WL 3769353 (S.D. Ohio Aug. 29, 2017). Here, the ALJ explained that the state agency 

consultants had specialized program knowledge, but she also conceded that evidence after the 

time the opinions were issued “suggest that the claimant is more limited.” (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 23, 

PAGEID #: 62). Accordingly, the ALJ’s decision to assign their opinions only “partial weight”

was supported by substantial evidence. 

Ultimately, even if the undersigned were to agree that Dr. Mathur’s opinion could have 

been given more weight and the state agency consultant’s opinions could have been given less 

weight, the ALJ’s decision may not be reversed simply because record evidence supports a 

different conclusion. Felisky v. Bowen, 35 F.3d 1027, 1035 (6th Cir. 1996). Instead, it is the

ALJ’s “function to resolve conflicts in the evidence, see Hardaway v. Sec of H.H.S., 823 F.2d 

922, 928 (6th Cir. 1987),” which is what the ALJ did, while providing explicit rationales for the 

conclusions she reached. Thus, the weight accorded by the ALJ to various physicians was

supported by substantial evidence.

B. Credibility Determination 

Plaintiff next argues that substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s “credibility” 

determination, pursuant to SSR 16-3p, 2016 WL 1119029. (Doc. 7 at 18–21). Recently enacted, 

SSR 16-3p eliminated the use of the term “credibility” in order to “clarify that subjective 

symptom evaluation is not an examination of an individual’s character.” Instead, the regulation 

directs the ALJ to consider whether the claimant’s statements about the intensity, persistence, 
18

and limiting effects of symptoms are consistent with the objective medical evidence and other 

evidence of record. 2016 WL 1119029 at *7.

Here, the ALJ stated explictly that Plaintiff’s statements concerning the intensity, 

persistence, and limiting effects of her symptoms were not entirely consistent with the record and 

listed her reasons for so finding: (1) Plaintiff’s description of her symptoms were inconsistent 

with objective findings; (2) the level of treatment and care was inconsistent with the severity of 

Plaintiff’s allegations; (3) Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were not corroborated by digital 

imaging and physical examinations; and (4) Plaintiff’s daily activities were inconsistent with the 

intensity and limiting effects of the alleged symptoms. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 25, PAGEID #: 64). 

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred, at least in some way, by relying on each of these factors. 

(Doc. 7 at 19–21). 

Despite Plaintiff’s arguments, the ALJ’s credibility finding was based on a variety of 

permissible factors, with no one factor being determinative. For example, the ALJ noted 

Plaintiff had normal to mild findings throughout the treatment record and cited to the various 

treatment notes of Dr. Pritchett that reflected normal range of motion and strength. (Doc. 6-2, 

Tr. 25, PAGEID #: 64). Additionally, as noted above, the MRI and imaging of Plaintiff’s spine 

demonstrated mild findings. Further, courts have held consistently that conservative treatment is 

a permissible factor to consider when evaluating a plaintiff’s complaints. See Kepke v. Comm’r 

of Soc. Sec., 636 F. App’x 625, 638 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that it was proper for ALJ to 

discount Plaintiff’s credibility due, in part, to “conservative treatment for the allegedly disabling 

impairments”); Kendrick v. Astrue, 886 F. Supp. 2d 627, 638 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (relying on the 

fact that Plaintiff had received “only conservative treatment” in finding that Plaintiff’s credibility 
19

was undermined); McKenzie v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 99-3400, 2000 WL 687680, at *4 (6th 

Cir. May 19, 2000) (“Plaintiff’s complaints of disabling pain are undermined by his non 

aggressive treatment.”). Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff testified to conservative management 

of her symptoms, and there was no documentation of any emergency intervention. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 

25, PAGEID #: 64). 

Additionally, Plaintiff testified that upon starting Seroquel she had been “doing very 

well” and that Bengay seemed to improve her neck pain. This type of improvement in 

symptomology is permissible for an ALJ to consider. See, e.g., Dempley v. Astrue, No. 

CIV.A.309CV651, 2010 WL 1979404, at *3 (W.D. Ky. May 14, 2010) (holding that an ALJ’s 

credibility determination was supported by substantial evidence when the ALJ considered, inter 

alia, improvement in a plaintiff’s symptoms). Finally, Plaintiff states that there is no evidence 

she engaged in any activities for sustained periods of time that contradict her allegations that she 

cannot work a full-time job for 8 hours a day, 40 hours a week. (Doc. 7 at 20–21). However, as 

the ALJ noted, Plaintiff was the primary caretaker of her three grandchildren until recently, and 

she still continues to be responsible for the care of her four-year old grandson—including 

feeding and entertaining him. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 19, PAGEID #: 58). Relatedly, Plaintiff stated that 

she and her grandson sit downstairs and watch cartoons together, yet she also claimed she could 

only sit for two to four minutes at a time. Likewise, although Plaintiff alleged severe postural 

limitations, she testified that she goes up and down the stairs at her daughter’s home multiple 

times a day and is able to walk ten minutes to meet her friend. Thus, Plaintiff’s reported 

activities are inconsistent with the alleged limiting effects of her impairments.
20

In this case, the ALJ set forth the various factors that she considered in her credibility 

assessment—including specific citations to medical records, objective clinical findings, 

Plaintiff’s treatment regimen, and her daily activities—and properly relined on these factors. 

(See Doc. 6-2, Tr. 25, PAGEID #: 64). Consequently, the ALJ complied with the regulations, 

and her credibility determination is supported by substantial evidence. And it is not the province 

of the reviewing court to “try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in the evidence, nor decide 

questions of credibility.” Walters v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 127 F.3d 525, 528 (6th Cir. 1997); see 

also Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) (“The ALJ’s findings as to a claimant’s 

credibility are entitled to deference, because of the ALJ’s unique opportunity to observe the 

claimant and judge her subjective complaints.”).

C. Hypothetical Question to the VE

In her final statement of error, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ relied on a flawed hypothetical 

question to the vocational expert:

[T]he ALJ found [Plaintiff] has moderate limitations understanding, 

remembering, and applying information; moderate limitations interacting with 

others; and moderate limitations concentrating, persisting, and maintaining pace 

(Tr. 16–17). However, she failed to adequately account for all these limitations in 

the accepted hypothetical question to the VE. Instead, the accepted hypothetical 

to the VE only restricted [Plaintiff] mentally to simple work-related decisions; 

tolerating few changes in a routine work setting, defined as performing the same 

duties at the same station or location day to day; and, no more than occasional and 

superficial contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public (Tr. 64–65). 

(Doc. 7 at 21). 

In order for a vocational expert’s testimony to serve as substantial evidence in support of 

the conclusion that a plaintiff can perform other work, the hypothetical question posed by the 

ALJ must accurately portray all physical and mental impairments. See Howard v. Comm’r of 
21

Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d at 239, 241 (6th Cir. 2002). Here, Plaintiff’s argument fails to acknowledge 

that the last hypothetical posed to the VE (the one the ALJ ultimately relied upon), included all 

of the mental restrictions ultimately found in Plaintiff’s RFC. Thus, the hypothetical accurately 

described Plaintiff’s restrictions in all significant aspects. (Doc. 7 at 21). It appears then, as the 

Commissioner notes, that Plaintiff’s argument is really one in which she disagrees with the 

opined mental limitations in the RFC, as opposed to a flawed question to the VE.

A plaintiff’s RFC “is defined as the most a [plaintiff] can still do despite the physical and 

mental limitations resulting from her impairments.” Poe, 342 F. App’x at 155; see also 20 

C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a). It is the ALJ, not a physician, who ultimately determines a 

claimant’s RFC. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(B); see also Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 391 F. 

App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010) (“The Social Security Act instructs that the ALJ—not a 

physician—ultimately determines a claimant’s RFC.”). Indeed, “[a]n RFC determination is a 

legal decision rather than a medical one, and the development of a claimant’s RFC is solely 

within the province of an ALJ.” 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(e), 405.1546. 

Here, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in understanding, remembering, 

or applying information, as she is able to count change but cannot pay bills or handle a savings 

account. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 16–17, PAGEID #: 55–56). Further, the ALJ opined that Plaintiff had 

moderate limitation in concentration, persistence, and pace, noting that Plaintiff is able to handle 

some changes in routine, but is unable to finish conversations, chores, or watching a movie. (Id., 

Tr. 17, PAGEID #: 56 (citing Ex. 7E-7)). The fashioned RFC properly takes these limitations 

into account, as it states Plaintiff is limited to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, she is to use 

judgment limited to simple work-related decisions, and can tolerate only few changes in a 
22

routine work setting (id., Tr. 18, PAGEID #: 57). See Gipson v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 5:16 

CV 1108, 2017 WL 3732009, at *12 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2017) (holding that the ALJ’s RFC 

limiting Plaintiff to simple, routine, repetitive tasks, requiring only simple work related 

decisions, complied with the moderate limitations the agency psychiatrists placed on Plaintiff’s 

abilities in concentration and pace.”).

Additionally, the ALJ held that Plaintiff had moderate limitation in interacting with 

others and mild limitation in adapting or managing oneself. (Doc. 6-2, Tr. 17, PAGEID #: 56). 

Again, the RFC was consistent with these findings, as it limited Plaintiff to occasional and 

superficial contact with supervisors, co-workers, and the public. (Id., Tr. 18, PAGEID #: 57). 

Thus, although Plaintiff is seemingly arguing for a more restrictive RFC with additional 

mental limitations, it was within the ALJ’s purview to make a determination about Plaintiff’s 

RFC based on the record as a whole. See Buxton v. Halter, 246 F.3d 762, 773 (6th Cir. 2001) 

(noting that “there is a ‘zone of choice’ within which the Commissioner can act, without the fear 

of court interference”). Taking all of the above into account, the undersigned finds that 

substantial evidence supports the ALJ conclusions.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (Doc. 

7) be OVERRULED and that judgment be entered in favor of Defendant.

Procedure on Objections

If any party objects to this Report and Recommendation, that party may, within fourteen 

(14) days of the date of this Report, file and serve on all parties written objections to those 

specific proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made, together with 
23

supporting authority for the objection(s). A judge of this Court shall make a de novo

determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations 

to which objection is made. Upon proper objections, a judge of this Court may accept, reject, or 

modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made herein, may receive further 

evidence or may recommit this matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. 

§ 636(b)(1). Failure to object to the Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the 

right to have the district judge review the Report and Recommendation de novo, and also 

operates as a waiver of the right to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting the Report 

and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 152–53 (1985).

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: April 10, 2018 /s/ Kimberly A. Jolson

KIMBERLY A. JOLSON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE