IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 22-1974

Filed December 20, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

WICHANG GACH CHAWECH,

Defendant-Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Jeanie K. Vaudt, Judge.

A defendant appeals his convictions for two counts of assault with intent to 

inflict serious injury, willful injury causing serious injury, and intimidation with a 

dangerous weapon with intent to injure or provoke fear. AFFIRMED IN PART, 

VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Theresa R. Wilson, 

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee.

Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ. 
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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Wichang Chawech appeals his convictions and sentences for two counts of 

assault with intent to inflict serious injury, aggravated misdemeanors; willful injury 

causing serious injury, a class “C” felony; and intimidation with a dangerous 

weapon with intent to injure or provoke fear, a class “C” felony. Chawech raises 

three claims. He argues the State failed to present sufficient evidence for the 

convictions, the court erred in failing to merge his convictions for assault with intent 

to inflict serious injury and willful injury, and the court imposed an illegal mandatory 

minimum sentence.

I. Background Facts 

A reasonable jury could find these facts from the evidence presented at trial. 

On October 9, 2021, about one hundred individuals attended a memorial service 

for a former pastor. Chawech and four other individuals, well-acquainted with 

Chawech, attended this memorial—Nyamal Deng, Nyalat Deng,1 Nyador Bilim, 

and Nyalat Dak. After the service, these five individuals and other service 

attendees went to a local bar. Also heading to the same bar that day were 

members of a Quad Cities soccer team, including teammates Maikudi Abdullahi 

and Redemer Gbeddeh. 

On arrival at the bar, there was a confrontation in the back parking lot 

between the group from the memorial service including Chawech and the soccer 

team including Abdullahi. The situation was diffused, and both groups eventually 

entered the bar. On his way into the bar, Chawech and his girlfriend displayed 

1 Because Nyamal Deng and Nyalat Deng share the same last name, they will be 

referred to using both their first and last names going forward.
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weapons to Nyalat Deng. Chawech told Nyalat Deng not to worry, that she would 

be protected. At some point, Chawech recorded a SnapChat video with his 

girlfriend that showed the pair brandishing firearms. 

Once inside the bar, another altercation broke out between Chawech’s 

group and members of the soccer team. That altercation moved back out into the 

parking lot as it escalated. During the fight, Chawech fired a shot at Abdullahi. 

Both Abdullahi and Nyamal Deng fell to the ground. Several witnesses stated they 

heard only a single shot; others reported hearing multiple shots. Chawech left the 

scene before law enforcement arrived. 

Upon arrival, law enforcement found that both Abdullahi and Nyamal Deng

had been shot. At the scene, police found a single spent shell casing and a single 

live round. Both were imprinted with the stamp from a FC 9-millimeter Luger. 

Abdullahi and Nyamal Deng were taken to the hospital. The bullet fired at 

Abdullahi grazed Abdullahi’s cheek and he eventually recovered but Nyamal Deng

passed away nine days after the shooting. 

An autopsy determined that Nyamal Deng had been shot in the back of her 

neck, with the bullet traveling from right to left at an upward trajectory. The bullet 

wound had an irregular shape, which was consistent with the bullet having struck 

something prior to hitting her, causing it to “yaw” or tumble. The medical examiner

that conducted the autopsy also reviewed photos of Abdullahi’s injury. He

determined that Abdullahi had been shot from behind at a downward angle, 

although body positioning at the time of the shooting could mean that an upward 

angle was also possible. 
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A few hours after the bar shooting, police responded to a report of shots 

fired at a nearby park. Chawech was located at the park but not taken into custody. 

Officers later returned to the same park after receiving a report that a shot had 

been fired at a vehicle. Officers located two spent shell casings with a stamp from 

a FC 9-millimeter Luger. Testing revealed the same firearm fired the shells 

recovered at both the bar and the park, although the firearm was never recovered. 

Police identified Chawech as a suspect in the bar shooting.

Two days later, Chawech was observed by law enforcement driving a 

vehicle. When law enforcement began to follow him, he accelerated, crashed the 

vehicle, and fled on foot. He was not apprehended at that time. Chawech was 

eventually interviewed by law enforcement, that interview occurring the day after 

Nyamal Deng’s death. Chawech denied shooting a gun on the night in question,

and he denied seeing anyone else with a gun. He also denied fleeing from law 

enforcement. He did not indicate that he fired a weapon at the bar in self-defense. 

Chawech was charged with four counts: Count I, first degree murder, a 

class “A” felony; Count II, attempted murder, a class “B” felony; Count III, willful 

injury causing serious injury, a class “C” felony; and Count IV, intimidation with a 

dangerous weapon with intent to injure or provoke fear, a class “C” felony. 

Chawech raised defenses of reasonable force, justification, self-defense, and 

defense of others. Chawech testified at trial, and unlike his statements during his 

interviews with law enforcement, he stated that he fired a gun at the bar in selfdefense. The jury found Chawech guilty of the lesser included offenses of assault 

with intent to inflict serious injury, aggravated misdemeanors, as to Counts I and 

II. Chawech was found guilty as charged on Counts III and IV as to willful injury 
5

causing serious injury and intimidation with a dangerous weapon with intent to 

injure or provoke fear. The jury also determined Chawech was in possession of a 

dangerous weapon pursuant to a special interrogatory submitted without objection 

from Chawech. 

At sentencing as to the two misdemeanor convictions, the court sentenced 

Chawech to two years in prison and imposed a $855 fine. As to each of the felony 

convictions, Chawech was sentenced to ten years in prison with a five-year 

mandatory minimum and a suspended $1370 fine. Three of the convictions were 

run consecutively to each other but concurrently to one conviction, for the 

imposition of a twenty-two year prison term. Chawech now appeals.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

Chawech argues that the State presented insufficient evidence to support 

his convictions. We review sufficiency of the evidence claims for corrections of 

errors at law. State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 510, 516 (Iowa 2022). The jury’s 

verdict must be supported by substantial evidence on the record. Id. Substantial 

evidence could convince a rational trier of fact of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. In determining whether evidence is substantial, we view the evidence in the 

light most favorable to the State, and “[w]e draw all legitimate inferences in support 

of the verdict.” Id. But “[e]vidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation, or 

conjecture is insufficient.” Id. (quoting State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 

(Iowa 1992)).

Chawech challenges two aspects of the sufficiency of the evidence. First, 

he alleges that the evidence supported a finding that he acted in self-defense or 

the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Chawech was unjustified in 
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discharging his weapon. And secondly, he alleges that the State failed to present 

sufficient evidence that the weapon he discharged killed Nyamal Deng. 

As to his self-defense claim, Chawech contends that he drew his gun and 

fired only after Abdullahi drew his own firearm and aimed it at him. He also 

contends that he observed Abdullahi and others with guns earlier in the night, and 

that when he fired his weapon, he heard other shots. And as previously 

highlighted, during his interview with law enforcement, he stated he never shot a 

gun at the bar and denied seeing anyone with a gun. True, some of the evidence 

presented at trial supported Chawech’s version of events, as there was testimony 

from witnesses that stated they heard multiple shots and one witness testified that 

he believed surveillance video of the event showed Abdullahi holding a gun. But 

there was also evidence presented to the contrary. Several witnesses testified 

they heard only one shot and that they did not believe the surveillance video 

showed Abdullahi holding a gun. Police recovered from the scene only a single 

empty shell, which matched the shells recovered from the park where police found 

Chawech after the shooting. The medical examiner also determined that Abdullahi

was shot from behind, and Abdullahi testified he was unarmed when shot by 

Chawech. And the jury was able to review the security footage from the night of 

the shooting. 

Although two differing accounts of what happened were presented at trial, 

there was substantial evidence presented to support the convictions. The jury 

instructions outlined for the jurors how to handle inconsistent evidence. “[T]he jury 

instructions become the law of the case for purposes of our review of the record 

for sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Canal, 773 N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009). 
7

In this case, Jury Instruction No. 5 read, in part: “Try to reconcile any 

conflicts in the evidence; but if you cannot, accept the evidence you find more 

believable.” Here, the jury weighed the evidence and made that determination.

And “we are highly deferential to the jury's verdict,” and “[t]he jury's verdict binds 

this court if the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Jones, 967 

N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). “Evidence is not insubstantial merely because we 

may draw different conclusions from it; the ultimate question is whether it supports 

the finding actually made, not whether the evidence would support a different 

finding.” Id. (quoting Brokaw v. Winfield-Mt. Union Cmty. Sch. Dist., 788 N.W.2d 

386, 393 (Iowa 2010)). We conclude substantial evidence was presented for a 

rational fact finder to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Chawech was not 

justified in firing his weapon at Abdullahi. 

Chawech next argues that sufficient evidence was not presented to show it 

was the bullet from his gun that struck Nyamal Deng. Chawech asserts that he 

fired his gun only once, and the medical examiner determined that the bullet that 

struck Abdullahi was traveling at a downward trajectory while the bullet that struck 

Nyamal Deng was traveling at an upward trajectory. While the medical examiner 

testified that a bullet cannot change trajectory, he also stated that it would be 

possible for the same bullet to have struck both Abdullahi and Nyamal Deng,

depending on their body positioning. The medical examiner also determined that 

the bullet which struck Nyamal Deng was tumbling at the time of impact, indicating 

it had struck an intermediary object, such as Abdullahi, before striking her. As 

noted, numerous witnesses heard only one shot, and only one spent shell casing 

was found on the scene.
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We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and “[w]e draw 

all legitimate inferences in support of the verdict,” Crawford, 972 N.W.2d at 516, 

and “we are highly deferential to the jury's verdict,” Jones, 967 N.W.2d at 339. We 

conclude that sufficient evidence was presented to support the jury’s verdict. 

III. Failure to Merge Counts II and III.

Chawech also argues that the court erred in failing to merge his conviction 

under Count II, assault with intent to inflict serious injury, with his conviction under 

Count III, willful injury. The State agrees, as do we. 

“We review an alleged failure to merge convictions as required by statute 

for correction of errors at law.” State v. Johnson, 950 N.W.2d 21, 23 (Iowa 2020).

As to the merger of offenses, Iowa Code section 701.9 (2021) states:

No person shall be convicted of a public offense which is necessarily 

included in another public offense of which the person is convicted. 

If the jury returns a verdict of guilty of more than one offense and 

such verdict conflicts with this section, the court shall enter judgment 

of guilty of the greater of the offenses only. 

Iowa Code § 701.9.

In determining whether convictions should merge, we apply the legalelements test, under which “we compare the elements of the two offenses to 

determine whether it is possible to commit the greater offense without also 

committing the lesser offense.” State v. Halliburton, 539 N.W.2d 339, 344 (Iowa 

1995). The inclusion of assault with intent as a lesser included offense on the

willful injury charge reveals the answer. It was not possible to commit willful injury 

without also committing assault with intent. Our supreme court has stated that 

“comparing the marshaling instructions and statutory elements of willful injury and 

assault with intent, we conclude the offenses should merge,” and “[t]here is no 
9

question that as a general proposition, the crime of willful injury cannot be 

completed without also completing the crime of assault with intent.” State v. Love, 

858 N.W.2d 721, 725 (Iowa 2015). 

In this case, there were not multiple acts to justify multiple convictions, see 

id. at 724–25, and the convictions are not independent. See id. at 725. We 

determine the convictions in relation to Counts II and III must merge. 

IV. Mandatory Minimum Sentence and Dangerous Weapon Enhancement

The question before us as it relates to Chawech’s final issue is this: When 

a special verdict form with the dangerous weapon enhancement is submitted to 

the jury by agreement of the parties, is the sentence illegal because the State did 

not charge the enhancement by trial information? The State argues Chawech 

waived any challenge to the sentence. Chawech argues the sentence is “illegal” 

so as to obviate the need for objections in the district court. See State v. Woody,

613 N.W.2d 215, 217 (Iowa 2000) (“An illegal sentence is void and ‘not subject to 

the usual concepts of waiver, whether from a failure to seek review or other 

omissions of error preservation.’” (quoting State v. Ohnmacht, 342 N.W.2d 838, 

843 (Iowa 1983)); see also Iowa R. Crim. P. 23(5)(a) (“The court may correct an 

illegal sentence at any time.”). Our review of challenges to the illegality of a 

sentence is for errors at law. State v. Carstens, 594 N.W.2d 436, 437 (Iowa 1999).

Iowa Code section 902.7 mandates that a person guilty of a forcible felony 

while “in the immediate possession and control of a dangerous weapon” serve a 

mandatory minimum of five years before becoming eligible for parole. Iowa Code 

§ 902.7. Chawech does not dispute that the dangerous weapon enhancement 

was submitted to the jury and that the jury found Chawech was in possession of a 
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dangerous weapon. Neither party disputes that the enhancement in section 902.7

was not formally recited in the trial information, although the State contends the 

trial information gave Chawech notice of the dangerous weapon enhancement. 

But Chawech does not claim the court imposed a sentence in excess of that 

prescribed by law and thus outside the jurisdiction of the court to impose. His 

claim, a challenge to the adequacy of the trial information, is a procedural error. It

is therefore precluded by our normal error-preservation rules. We therefore affirm 

his conviction and sentence. See Tindell v. State, 629 N.W.2d 357, 360 (Iowa 

2001).

V. Conclusion

Finding sufficient evidence was presented to support the convictions, we 

affirm Chawech’s convictions. We affirm the sentence on Count I and Count IV. 

But because the conviction on Count II, assault with intent to inflict serious injury, 

and Count III, willful injury, should have merged, we vacate Chawech’s sentence 

on Count II, assault with intent to inflict serious injury, and remand for entry of an 

order consistent with this opinion. 

AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.

Greer, P.J., concurs; Ahlers, J., partially dissents.
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AHLERS, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

I agree with and join the well-reasoned majority opinion in all respects 

except one. The exception has to do with the district court suspending the fines it 

imposed without placing Chawech on probation. For the reasons explained in my 

partial dissent in State v. Laue, I believe it is impermissible for the district court to 

suspend any part of a sentence without also placing the defendant on probation. 

See No. 23-0208, 2023 WL 8448475, at *2–3 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 6, 2023) (Ahlers, 

J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Because the district court did so here, 

I believe the sentences imposed are illegal, and we must vacate the sentences 

and remand for resentencing. See id. at *3 (noting that the remedy for a sentencing 

error of this type is to vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing). 

Therefore, I respectfully dissent from that part of the majority opinion that does not 

vacate the sentences and remand for resentencing, and I concur in all other 

respects.