Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed April 23, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00327-CV

DAVID J. FELT, AKA DAVID JOEL FELT, Appellant

V.

HARRIS COUNTY, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND OTHER COUNTYWIDE TAXING AUTHORITIES, THE HARRIS COUNTY DEPARTMENT 

OF EDUCATION, THE PORT OF HOUSTON AUTHORITY OF HARRIS 

COUNTY, THE HARRIS COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL DISTRICT, THE 

HARRIS COUNTY HOSPITAL DISTRICT, CITY OF HOUSTON, 

HOUSTON INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND HOUSTON

COMMUNITY COLLEGE SYSTEM, Appellees

On Appeal from the 281st District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-21534

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

In this suit to collect delinquent ad valorem taxes, defendant David J. Felt 

appeared and testified at trial, but in the judgment against him, the trial court 
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erroneously indicated that he failed to appear. In his appeal, Felt argues that if the 

trial court ruled based on the evidence, then the judgment must be reversed 

because the evidence presented at trial is legally insufficient to support the 

judgment against him in his personal capacity. He argues in the alternative that if 

the trial court based the judgment on Felt’s failure to appear for trial, then the 

judgment must be reversed because the record establishes that he did appear and 

testify. We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the 

judgment, and that Felt waived his alternative argument by failing to file a motion 

for new trial. We accordingly affirm the judgment. 

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Harris County, acting for itself and on behalf of several county-wide taxing 

authorities,1sued David J. Felt for payment of delinquent ad valorem taxes for tax 

years 1987–2009, special assessments against the property, penalties, interest, 

attorney’s fees, and abstract fees. The County prayed for foreclosure of its liens 

against the property, and for a personal judgment against Felt. Felt filed a general 

denial and asserted that he “was never in the chain of title individually.” In March 

2011, the trial court rendered a default judgment against Felt for delinquent taxes 

for the years 1990–2009, for the taxes then due for tax year 2010, and for the 

special assessments. The judgment signed by the trial court had been submitted by 

the County’s attorney, and in the proposed judgment, counsel wrote that Felt 

“appeared/failed to appear in court.” In the signed judgment, the word “appeared”

is crossed out. Felt moved successfully for a new trial, and the case was tried 

without a jury. 

 

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These were identified as the Harris County Department of Education, the Port of 

Houston Authority of Harris County, the Harris County Flood Control District, the Harris 

County Hospital District, the City of Houston, Houston Independent School District, and 

Houston Community College System. 
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At trial, the County produced evidence documenting its claims. This 

evidence included a certified delinquent-tax statement covering the years 1990–

2011 for real property identified as a .1487-acre parcel located at Lot 327, Block 

13, MacGregor Terrace Section 1. On the tax statement, the owner is identified as 

Equi-Share, Inc. The County also introduced a certified copy of a 1983 warranty 

deed in which Equi-Share, Inc. conveyed the property—again identified as Lot 

327, Block 13, MacGregor Terrace Section 1—to David J. Felt in exchange for his 

promissory note for $12,260.00. The deed was signed by David J. Felt, President, 

Equi-Share, Inc. His signature was notarized, and the deed was recorded in the 

Harris County Clerk’s office more than a month after it was executed.

Felt, on the other hand, testified that he did not “intentionally” do anything 

that would cause him to own the property, and that he never paid for it or 

exchanged anything of value for it. He stated that he does not own the property, 

does not know where it is located, does not know if it contains any improvements, 

has never attempted to lease the property, and has done nothing to exercise any 

control over it. He further testified that he was not familiar with the 1983 warranty 

deed. After examining it, Felt admitted that signature on the deed looked like his 

own, but stated that if he did sign the warranty deed, he did not do so intentionally.

The trial court took the case under advisement, and the County’s attorney 

submitted another proposed judgment. Except for a change in the date, the typed 

content on the first page of the judgment is identical to the first page of the default 

judgment that had been set aside. Once again, counsel wrote that Felt 

“appeared/failed to appear in court,” and once again the word “appeared” is 

crossed out. Unlike the earlier judgment, the trial court made a substantive change 

to the proposed judgment by crossing out the portion of the judgment in which Felt 

would have been held liable for the principal, interest, and attorney’s fees 
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associated with the special assessment. Felt appealed without filing any postjudgment motions. 

II. LEGAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue, Felt challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence. He 

did not request any findings of fact, so we must imply that the trial court made all 

findings necessary to support the judgment. Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 

111 S.W.3d 46, 52 (Tex. 2003). When reviewing the legal sufficiency of the 

evidence, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the findings and 

indulge every reasonable inference that would support them. See City of Keller v. 

Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We credit favorable evidence if a 

reasonable factfinder could and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable 

factfinder could not. See id. If the evidence at trial would enable reasonable and 

fair-minded people to find the facts at issue, then the evidence is legally sufficient. 

Id.

Felt contends that there is no competent evidence that he owed the taxes and 

no competent evidence of the amount of taxes owed. We disagree. In a suit to 

collect delinquent taxes, the taxing authority can meet its initial burden to establish 

the amount of the tax, penalties, and interest in the manner specified in section 

33.47(a) of the Texas Tax Code: 

In a suit to collect a delinquent tax, the taxing unit’s current tax roll 

and delinquent tax roll or certified copies of the entries showing the 

property and the amount of the tax and penalties imposed and interest 

accrued constitute prima facie evidence that each person charged with 

a duty relating to the imposition of the tax has complied with all 

requirements of law and that the amount of tax alleged to be 

delinquent against the property and the amount of penalties and 

interest due on that tax as listed are the correct amounts.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 33.47(a) (West 2008). The County produced such 
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evidence here. 

By introducing such records, the taxing authority establishes a prima facie 

case as to every material fact necessary to establish its cause of action. Nat’l Med. 

Fin. Services, Inc. v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist., 150 S.W.3d 901, 906 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2004, no pet.) (citing Davis v. City of Austin, 632 S.W.2d 331, 333 (Tex.

1982)). A rebuttable presumption arises that the amounts in question are due, 

delinquent, and unpaid. Id. (citing Flowers v. Lavaca Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 766 

S.W.2d 825, 828 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied)). Because the tax

roll also identifies the person against whom the taxes were assessed, the same 

documents additionally establish that the defendant owned the property on January 

1 of the year for which the tax was imposed. Id.

Felt points out that in the certified delinquent-tax statement introduced by 

the County, the property’s owner is identified as Equi-Share, Inc. Quoting Pete 

Dominguez Enterprises, Inc. v. County of Dallas, 188 S.W.3d 385, 387–88 (Tex. 

App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.), Felt argues that “[i]f the identity of the entity named 

as owner of the property on that tax roll does not match the identity of the 

defendant sued for non-payment, then no presumption [of compliance with the 

law] arises and no prima facie case is established by the taxing authority.” But 

there is a difference between prima facie evidence of a material fact in the case and 

prima facie evidence of every material fact. 

We agree that the certified delinquent-tax statement did not give rise to a 

presumption that Felt owned the property, but on the question of ownership, the 

County did not rest its case solely on a presumption. The tax statement created a 

presumption that Equi-Share, Inc. owned the property, but the County also 

introduced and relied on a certified copy of a warranty deed conveying the 

property to Felt in 1983, and on Felt’s notarized signature on the deed. This is 
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competent, unrebutted evidence that Felt was the owner of the property for each of 

the tax years at issue in this case. See Seiflein v. City of Houston, No. 01-09-

00361-CV, 2010 WL 376048, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 4, 2010, 

no pet.) (mem. op.) (affirming judgment where tax statements failed to identify the 

defendant as the property owner, but the taxing authorities introduced evidence of 

ownership, including a certified copy of a deed showing that the property was 

conveyed to the defendant). As for the amounts at issue, a certified delinquent-tax 

statement is prima facie evidence of the amount of penalties, tax, and interest, and 

on those matters, and the County relied solely on the presumption under section 

33.47(a) that these amounts are due, delinquent, and unpaid. Felt offered no 

evidence to rebut that presumption, which is not undermined by the 

misidentification of the property’s owner. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 25.02(b) 

(West 2008) (“A mistake in the name or address of an owner does not affect the 

validity of the appraisal records, of any appraisal or tax roll based on them, or of 

the tax imposed.”).

Felt additionally argues that “reasonable jurors would not credit the Taxing 

Authorities’ evidence as probative against Felt” because the taxing authorities did 

not change the certified records to substitute his name and address for that of EquiShare, Inc. When a case is tried without a jury, the trial court is the sole judge of 

the witnesses’ credibility and the weight to be given to their respective testimony. 

Beck v. Walker, 154 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.). As a 

factfinder, the trial court can reject the uncontroverted testimony of an interested 

witness unless the testimony is readily controvertible, clear, positive, direct, and 

there are no circumstances tending to discredit it. In re Doe 4, 19 S.W.3d 322, 325 

(Tex. 2000). Here, a reasonable factfinder could have credited the evidence 

produced by the County.
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We overrule Felt’s first issue.

III. POST-ANSWER DEFAULT JUDGMENT

In his second issue, Felt contends that the trial court erred in rendering a 

default judgment against him. He reasons that the trial court indicated that it did 

not consider the evidence presented at the trial, because in the portion of the 

judgment indicating that Felt “appeared/failed to appear in court,” the word 

“appeared” is crossed out. 

If Felt were correct and this truly had been a default judgment, and the trial 

court had not considered the evidence from the trial, then Felt would have been 

required to file a motion for new trial to preserve this issue for appeal. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 324(b)(1) (“A point in a motion for new trial is a prerequisite . . . [for a] 

complaint on which evidence must be heard such as . . . failure to set aside a 

judgment by default . . . .”). Here, because Felt failed to file a motion for new trial, 

this argument has not been preserved for appeal. 

IV. CONCLUSION

We conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the judgment. 

If, as Felt contends, this was a default judgment, then he failed to preserve a 

challenge to the judgment by a timely motion for new trial. We accordingly 

affirm.

/s/ Tracy Christopher

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Christopher, Jamison, and McCally.