IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO 

EASTERN DIVISION 

DEAN OBEIDALLAH, 

Plaintiff, 

 Case No. 2:17-cv-720 

 Chief Judge Edmund A. Sargus, Jr. 

 v. Magistrate Judge Elizabeth P. Deavers 

 

ANDREW B. ANGLIN, et al., 

 Defendants. 

OPINION AND ORDER 

 This matter is before the Court for consideration of Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to 

Conduct Limited Discovery in Aid of Service and Extend Time for Service. (ECF No. 17.) For 

the reasons that follow, Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. 

I.

This action was filed on August 16, 2017. (ECF No. 1.) In his Motion, Plaintiff details 

his multiple attempts to effect service over Defendant Andrew B. Anglin, both in his capacity as 

an individual Defendant and as the registered agent for Defendant Moonbase Holdings, LLC 

(“Moonbase Holdings”). (ECF No. 17 at 1, 5–11.) Plaintiff hired a licensed professional private 

investigation agency, InfoCorp Investigative Services, LLC (“InfoCorp”), to assist in locating 

and serving Defendants. (Declaration of Tina L. Schroeder, ¶¶ 2–3, ECF No. 17-1 (“Schroeder 

Decl.”).) InfoCorp gathered and reviewed reports from multiple sources, including information 

taken from proprietary databases and from publicly-available materials, to identify Defendant 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 1 of 8 PAGEID #: 186
2 

Anglin’s address. (Id. at ¶¶ 4–7.) This information revealed the following five last-known 

addresses for Defendant Anglin: 

a. 6827 North High Street, Suite 121, Worthington, OH 43085-2517; 

b. 7407 Brandshire Lane, Apartment B, Dublin, OH 43017-3400; 

c. 918 Colony Way, Columbus, OH 43235-1720; 

d. 979 High Street, Suite 2, Worthington, OH 43085-4047; and 

e. 364 West Lane Avenue, Apartment 117, Columbus, OH 43201-1000. 

(Id. at ¶ 8.) 

 On September 8, 2017, the Court issued summonses directed to Defendant Anglin at the 

five addresses and to Defendant Moonbase Holdings c/o Defendant Anglin at the North High 

Street address. (ECF No. 13.) InfoCorp attempted to effect personal service on Defendant 

Anglin at each of the five addresses in September and October 2017, including two attempts at 

the North High Street and Colony Way addresses and three attempts at the West Lane Avenue 

address. (Id. at ¶ 10.) All of these service attempts were unsuccessful. (Id.) Based on the 

information it collected, InfoCorp has concluded that Defendant Anglin does not reside at any of 

the five addresses identified above. (Id. at ¶¶ 10–12.) 

Plaintiff also contends that Defendant Anglin is actively concealing his location and 

purposely evading service of process. Plaintiff notes that, in its fifteen-year history, InfoCorp 

“finds it unusual to find an individual in their early-30s who lacks an established residential 

address.” (Schroeder Decl., ¶ 14.) Plaintiff also explains that Defendant Anglin is named in 

another action captioned Gersh v. Anglin, Case No. 9:17-cv-50, filed in the United States District 

Court for the District of Montana (“the Montana action”). (ECF No. 17 at 9.) The plaintiff in 

the Montana action has attempted service on Defendant Anglin at seven last known addresses 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 2 of 8 PAGEID #: 187
3 

and has been similarly unsuccessful to date in serving Defendant Anglin. (ECF No. 17 at 4–5, 9; 

ECF No. 17-2 (affidavit of non-service filed in the Montana action).) Plaintiff also cites to 

information suggesting that Defendant Anglin’s family and girlfriend are helping him avoid 

service of process. (ECF No. 17 at 9–10; Schroeder Decl., ¶ 12; ECF No. 17-2.) Plaintiff points 

to other information indicating that Defendant Anglin is purposely concealing his physical 

address. (ECF No. 17 at 11.) Plaintiff further refers to Defendant Anglin’s posts on the internet 

since this action was filed, which Plaintiff believes show Defendant Anglin is aware of this 

litigation and “openly mocking the Court[.]” (Id. at 4, 10.) Finally, Plaintiff has emailed both 

Defendant Anglin and Marc Randazza, an attorney who may represent Defendant Anglin, 

seeking their cooperation in effecting service, but Plaintiff has not received any response. (Id. at 

14.) 

The deadline for effecting service of process is November 14, 2017. Fed. R. Civ. P. 

4(m). Plaintiff moves for an additional 90 days to February 12, 2018, in which to effect service 

on Defendants. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff also seeks expedited discovery related to Defendant 

Anglin’s address. (Id.) 

II. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 provides in pertinent part as follows: 

If a defendant is not served within 90 days after the complaint is filed, the court—

on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff—must dismiss the action 

without prejudice against that defendant or order that service be made within a 

specified time. But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court 

must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. . . . 

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). “Plaintiff bears the burden of exercising due diligence in perfecting service 

of process and in showing that proper service has been made.” Malibu Media, LLC v. Downs, 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 3 of 8 PAGEID #: 188
4 

No. 1:14-cv-707, 2015 WL 12734020, at *1 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 9, 2015) (citing Byrd v. Stone, 94 

F.3d 217, 219 (6th Cir. 1996)). 

 In this case, Plaintiff has hired a licensed professional private investigation agency, 

InfoCorp, to assist in locating and serving Defendants. InforCorp has researched public and 

private databases in order to locate Defendants and has attempted to serve Defendant Anglin at 

several last known addresses on multiple occasions. Plaintiff has also pointed to information 

demonstrating that identifying Defendant Anglin’s current address has been difficult. Based on 

this record, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has shown good cause exists for extending the 

service deadline. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for an extension of time to effect service is 

GRANTED. (ECF No. 17.) Plaintiff must effect service over Defendants by FEBRUARY 12, 

2018. 

III. 

Plaintiff also seeks expedited discovery to assist in locating Defendant Anglin’s location 

in order to effect service of process. 

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 prohibits discovery before the Rule 26(f) conference 

except under certain circumstances, including when a court orders such discovery. Fed. R. Civ. 

P. 26(d)(1). Thus, Rule 26(d) vests the district court with discretion to order expedited 

discovery. See Lemkin v. Bell’s Precision Grinding, No. 2:08-CV-789, 2009 WL 1542731, at *1 

(S.D. Ohio June 2, 2009) (citing Qwest Communs. Int’l, Inc. v. Worldquest Networks, Inc., 213 

F.R.D. 418, 419 (D. Colo. 2003)). Courts considering a motion for expedited discovery typically 

apply a good cause standard. Lemkin, 2009 WL 1542731, at *2; see also 8A Fed. Prac. & Proc. 

Civ. § 2046.1 (3d ed.) (“Although the rule [26] does not say so, it is implicit that some showing 

of good cause should be made to justify such an order, and courts presented with requests for 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 4 of 8 PAGEID #: 189
5 

immediate discovery have frequently treated the question whether to authorize early discovery as 

governed by a good cause standard.”). The burden of demonstrating good cause rests with the 

party seeking the expedited discovery. Lemkin, 2009 WL 1542731, at *2 (citations omitted). 

Another court in this circuit previously discussed the following considerations when 

determining whether good cause exists: 

“Good cause may be found where the need for expedited discovery, in 

consideration of the administration of justice, outweighs the prejudice to the 

responding party.” Arista Records, LLC v. Does 1–15, 2:07–cv–450, 2007 WL 

5254326, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 17, 2007). Good cause is often found in cases 

alleging infringement, unfair competition, or where evidence may be lost or 

destroyed with time. Caston v. Hoaglin, No. 2:08–cv–200, 2009 WL 1687927, at 

*2 (S.D. Ohio June 12, 2009). The scope of the requested discovery is also 

relevant to a good cause determination. Russell v. Lumpkin, No. 2:10–cv–314, 

2010 WL 1882139, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 11, 2010). Ultimately, the Court retains 

broad discretion in establishing the timing and scope of discovery [(citing Lemkin, 

2009 WL 1542731, at *2)]. 

Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc. v. Vision Serv. Plan, No. 1:14–cv–581, 2014 WL 4626015, at *3 

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 12, 2014) (acknowledging further that “there is little binding authority on the 

issue of expedited discovery in the Sixth Circuit, and district courts are split on the appropriate 

standard”); see also N. Atl. Operating Co., Inc. v. JingJing Huang, 194 F. Supp. 3d 634, 637 

(E.D. Mich. 2016) (“Within this Circuit, district courts have found good cause for granting 

expedited discovery when the true identities of the defendants are unknown, when the moving 

party alleges infringement, when the scope of the discovery sought is narrow, and when 

expedited discovery would substantially contribute to moving the case forward.”); Barrette 

Outdoor Living, Inc v. Does, No. 1:16 CV 914, 2016 WL 1588672, at *2 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 20, 

2016) (“Courts consider several factors in determining if good causes exists, including: (1) the 

danger that the information sought will be lost or destroyed, (2) whether the discovery would 

substantially contribute to moving the case forward, and (3) the scope of the information 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 5 of 8 PAGEID #: 190
6 

sought.”); Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe, No. 2:15-cv-488, 2015 WL 12732852, at *1 (S.D. Ohio 

Feb. 4, 2015) (finding good cause in the context of a copyright infringement case where the 

plaintiff showed that it could not meet its service obligation under Rule 4(m) without the 

requested discovery from a non-party internet service provider to discover a Doe defendant’s 

identity). 

In this case, Plaintiff, through the assistance of InfoCorp, has taken diligent efforts to 

locate and serve Defendant Anglin. While these efforts reflect that Defendant Anglin is living in 

or around Worthington, Ohio, Plaintiff represents that he is unable to confirm Defendant 

Anglin’s current address. (ECF No. 17 at 5–9.) Plaintiff contends that the likelihood of locating 

Defendant Anglin’s “residence without limited discovery is slim even though he is likely in the 

area.” (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff therefore seeks leave to engage in the following discovery: 

 Third-party document subpoenas to various entities upon which Defendant Anglin 

relies or has relied to publish the Daily Stormer and collect funds to promote it, 

including web hosts, domain registrars, internet-service providers, telephone 

companies, banks, and residential and commercial-leasing companies; 

 Third-party document subpoenas to particular government entities, including the 

United States Post Office; 

 Deposition and document subpoena to Mr. Greg Anglin in connection with his 

registration of the trade name “Andrew Anglin” as the “authorized representative” 

of his son, and his communications with his son, Defendant Anglin, or knowledge 

of his location; 

 Deposition and document subpoena to Mr. Mitchell Anglin in connection with his 

communications with his brother, Defendant Anglin, or knowledge of his 

location; and 

 Any other discovery necessary for the limited purpose of identifying, locating, 

and serving Defendant Anglin in this action. 

(Id. at 13.) 

 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 6 of 8 PAGEID #: 191
7 

Although recognizing Defendants’ apparent attempts to conceal his whereabouts and 

evade service, the Court cannot, at this juncture, authorize the broad requests for expedited 

discovery Plaintiff seeks. The Court acknowledges that locating Defendants has proven both 

challenging and frustrating. Yet, the Court is not persuaded that the present record establishes 

the good cause necessary to warrant the breadth of expedited discovery Plaintiff seeks and that 

he has exhausted all his efforts in this regard. For instance, Plaintiff indicates that he is pursuing 

other avenues to effect service of process, such as contacting Defendants’ attorneys who may 

cooperate to facilitate service, and, among other means, certified mailings. (ECF No. 17 at 14.) 

Most concerning to the Court, however, is the scope of Plaintiff’s requested discovery. 

Plaintiff does not specifically identify the “various entities” on which he seeks to serve 

third-party document subpoenas and what specific information those proposed subpoenas 

would request. (ECF No. 17 at 13.) Similarly, other than naming the United States Post 

Office, Plaintiff does not identify which “government entities” from which he seeks 

discovery, what information he would ask of those entities, and the authority for doing 

so. (Id.) Plaintiff seeks to subpoena and depose Greg Anglin and Mitchell Anglin, but he 

has not shown that the need for such discovery, in consideration of the administration of 

justice, outweighs the prejudice to these individual third parties, particularly where the 

record reflects that Plaintiff has not exhausted his attempts locate and serve Defendant 

Anglin. (Id.) Finally, when seeking leave to conduct “[a]ny other discovery necessary 

for the limited purpose of identifying, locating, and serving Defendant Anglin in this 

action[,]” Plaintiff does not sufficiently explain or specify what discovery he deems 

necessary. Granting such a broad request would be inconsistent with Rule 26(d). Cf. 

Luxottica Retail N. Am., Inc., 2014 WL 4626015, at *3. While this Court has previously 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 7 of 8 PAGEID #: 192
8 

permitted narrow discovery limited to an internet service provider in the context of 

discovering a defendant’s identity in a copyright infringement action, see Malibu Media, 

LLC, 2015 WL 12732852, at *1, here, Plaintiff provides only a passing reference to his 

need for expedited discovery to uncover the identifies of the Doe Defendants in this 

action. (ECF No. 17 at 15.) Plaintiff has not explained what steps, if any, he has taken to 

identify these Doe Defendants or otherwise provided good cause for this particular 

request. Based on the present record, the Court therefore concludes that Plaintiff has not 

established the necessary good cause necessary and that the Court’s discretion is best 

exercised in denying the request for expedited discovery. Should Plaintiff narrow the 

scope of his requests, and provide the requisite specificity to demonstrate his need, the 

Court will again take the matter under advisement. Accordingly, as it relates to this 

request, Plaintiff’s Motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 

IV. 

In sum, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Conduct Limited Discovery in Aid of Service and 

Extend Time for Service (ECF No. 17) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART

consistent with the foregoing. 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

Date: November 9, 2017 /s/ Elizabeth A. Preston Deavers 

 ELIZABETH A. PRESTON DEAVERS 

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 

Case: 2:17-cv-00720-EAS-EPD Doc #: 19 Filed: 11/09/17 Page: 8 of 8 PAGEID #: 193