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******************************************************
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. HOWARD

M. BUCKLAND

(SC 19240)

Rogers, C. J., and Palmer, Zarella, Eveleigh, McDonald, Espinosa and

Robinson, Js.

Argued May 19—officially released August 19, 2014

Sean P. Barrett, with whom, on the brief, was Peter

G. Billings, for the appellant (defendant).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, were Matthew C. Gedansky,

state’s attorney, and Charles W. Johnson, assistant

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

EVELEIGH, J. The defendant, Howard M. Buckland,

was convicted, following a jury trial, of one count of

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor and one count of operating a motor

vehicle while having an elevated blood alcohol content,

in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 14-227a

(a) (1) and (2), respectively.1 The defendant was also

convicted, after a trial to the court, Baldini, J., of speeding in violation of General Statutes § 14-219 (b) (3).2

Subsequently, the defendant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the charge of having previously been convicted of operation of a motor vehicle while under the

influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of § 14-227a.

The trial court imposed a total effective sentence of

two years of incarceration, execution suspended after

eight months, a $2090 fine, and two years probation.

On appeal,3

the defendant argues that: (1) the trial court

improperly denied his motion to suppress evidence

regarding certain breath tests in violation of the confrontation clause as defined in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L. Ed. 2d

314 (2009); and (2) the constable who made the arrest

lacked the requisite authority. The state contends that:

(1) the state experts who testified fulfilled the requirements of Melendez-Diaz; and (2) the constable who

made the arrest in the present case was a duly qualified

special constable with the power of arrest. We agree

with the state and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of

the trial court.

The jury reasonably could have found the following

facts. On the evening of December 11, 2010, Sergeant

James Desso, a special constable employed by the town

of Stafford, was operating a radar gun along Route

190. At approximately 10:40 p.m., Desso observed a car

operated by the defendant traveling at a rate of fiftynine miles per hour in a thirty-five miles per hour zone.

Desso pulled out behind the defendant’s vehicle and

activated his emergency lights and siren. The defendant

traveled approximately seven-tenths of one mile before

stopping his vehicle.

Desso approached the driver’s side of the defendant’s

vehicle and detected the odor of alcohol through an

open window. Desso observed that the defendant’s

‘‘face seemed to be a little flushed, his speech was a

little bit slurred, and his eyes were a little glossy.’’ Desso

asked the defendant for his license, registration and

insurance information. According to Desso, the defendant had difficulty gathering these documents from

both the glove compartment and his wallet. The defendant told Desso that he had consumed two glasses of

wine at a nearby restaurant.

Desso then asked the defendant to exit the vehicle.

Desso observed that the defendant had difficulty walk-
ing and that he was using the side of the car to steady

himself. While instructing the defendant on certain field

sobriety tests, Desso noticed that the defendant was

‘‘swaying.’’ Desso then administered a number of field

sobriety tests, including the horizontal gaze nystagmus

test, the one leg stand test, and the walk and turn test,

all of which the defendant failed. Desso also asked

the defendant to recite the alphabet and the defendant

missed three letters. Thereafter, Desso concluded that

the defendant was operating his vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol and, accordingly, placed the

defendant under arrest. The defendant was then transported to a police station for booking. Another police

officer, who observed the defendant at the station later

that evening, testified that the defendant smelled of

alcohol, slurred his speech and generally acted in a

manner consistent with inebriation.

At the station, Desso informed the defendant of his

right to refuse a breath test. With the defendant’s permission, Desso began to conduct a breath test using a

‘‘Draeger Alcotest 9510’’ (Draeger machine). After the

Draeger machine indicated that it was functioning properly, Desso took two breath samples from the defendant

in accordance with the standard procedures. The first

sample was taken at 11:48 p.m. and produced a reading

of 0.2217. The second sample was taken at 12:07 a.m.

and produced a reading of 0.2173.

The state entered into evidence, as full exhibits, documents containing the results of these samples during

Desso’s testimony at trial. Specifically, the state introduced exhibits 6 and 7, which consist of printed reports

from the Draeger machine that pertain, respectively, to

the two samples collected at the station. The state also

introduced a document, marked as exhibit 4, indicating

that the Draeger machine used in the present case ‘‘was

evaluated and certified for use as an [e]vidential

[b]reath [a]lcohol [t]est [i]nstrument.’’ Although Desso

testified that he operated the Draeger machine, he did

not testify as to how it was calibrated.

The state next presented the testimony of Robert

Powers, the director of the Controlled Substances Toxicology Laboratory for the Department of Emergency

Services and Public Protection. Powers testified at trial

that the laboratory oversees the training of instructors

for breath alcohol instruments, the repairs of old instruments, and the selection of new instruments. Powers

testified that alcohol slows the function of the central

nervous system, causing behavioral changes and that,

for example, slurred speech tends to begin when the

blood alcohol content reaches 0.17. He also explained

the history of breath test machines and gave an overview of how they function, the science upon which they

are based, and the correlation between the breath test

results and blood alcohol content. He testified about

the control tests the Draeger machine performs auto-
matically, describing how the Draeger machine tests

air and gas samples before and afterthe subject’s breath

test. He testified that the Draeger machine reports,

which returned results indicating a blood alcohol content of 0.2217 and 0.2173, indicated that the defendant

had consumed as many as eleven drinks by the time of

his arrest. Powers further testified that the ratios used

to correlate between the breath test results and blood

alcohol content actually err in the average person’s

favor by tending to show a lower blood alcohol content

than is actually present. Powers also testified that,

accounting forthe possibility that the defendant’s blood

breath ratio was not the same as an average person,

his true blood alcohol content could have been as low

as 0.17 or as high as 0.32.

On June 30, 2011, the defendant filed a ‘‘Motion in

Limine Requesting Confrontation or, in the Alternative,

Suppression’’ claiming that his rights underthe confrontation clause would be violated by the admission of the

Draeger machine reports.4 On December 12, 2011, the

defendant filed a second motion to suppress, claiming

that the evidence resulting from his arrest should be

excluded from the trial because Desso lacked authority

to make a warrantless arrest. After a hearing, the court

denied the defendant’s motions. Trial commenced on

December 15, 2011, the jury returned its verdict on

December 19, 2011, and the defendant was sentenced

on February 16, 2012. This appeal followed. Additional

facts will be furnished as necessary.

I

The defendant contends that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the Draeger machine

reports. He argues that, since the state did not produce

four witnesses regarding the Draeger machine and its

calibration, the testimony was insufficient to meet the

requirements of Melendez-Diaz.5 The state maintains

that the production of the two witnesses who testified

at the trial were sufficient to meet the requirements of

Melendez-Diaz. We agree with the state.

We start with the applicable standard of review.

‘‘[O]ur standard of review of a trial court’s findings and

conclusions in connection with a motion to suppress

is well defined. A finding of fact will not be disturbed

unless it is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence

and pleadings in the whole record . . . . [When] the

legal conclusions of the court are challenged, [our

review is plenary, and] we must determine whether

they are legally and logically correct . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Stenner, 281 Conn.

742, 761, 917 A.2d 28, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 883, 123 S.

Ct. 290, 169 L. Ed. 2d 139 (2007).

Prior to addressing the defendant’s precise claim in

this matter, it is instructive to review some recent

Supreme Court decisions regarding the issues raised
by the defendant. ‘‘In Crawford v. Washington, [541

U.S. 36, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2004)], the

[United States] Supreme Court substantially revised its

approach to confrontation clause claims. Under Crawford, testimonial hearsay is admissible against a criminal defendant at trial only if the defendant had a prior

opportunity for cross-examination and the witness is

unavailable to testify at trial. Id., 68. In adopting this

‘categorical’ approach, the court overturned existing

precedent that had applied an ‘open-ended balancing

[test]’; id., 67–68; conditioning the admissibility of outof-court statements on a court’s determination of

whetherthe proffered statements bore ‘adequate indicia

of reliability.’ . . . Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100

S. Ct. 2531, 65 L. Ed. 2d 597 (1980). Although Crawford’s

revision of the court’s confrontation clause jurisprudence is significant, its rules govern the admissibility

only of certain classes of statements, namely, testimonial hearsay. In the wake of Crawford, therefore, the

preliminary step in any confrontation clause analysis

is the determination of whether the subject statements

are testimonial hearsay.’’ State v. Arroyo, 284 Conn.

597, 618, 935 A.2d 975 (2007). In Crawford, the United

States Supreme Court held that the state trial court had

improperly admitted into evidence a recorded statement that the defendant’s wife had given to police during an interrogation, which had provided proof that the

defendant had not stabbed the victim in self-defense,

because it deprived the defendant of his sixth amendment right to confront and cross-examine the witnesses

against him. Crawford v. Washington, supra, 68–69.

Two cases decided by the United States Supreme

Court after Crawford apply the confrontation clause in

the specific context of scientific evidence. In MelendezDiaz v. Massachusetts, supra, 557 U.S. 310–11, the court

held that ‘‘certificates’’ signed and sworn to by state

forensics analysts, which set forth the laboratory results

of the drug tests of those analysts and which were

admitted into evidence in lieu of live testimony from

the analysts themselves, were ‘‘testimonial’’ within the

meaning of Crawford. In so concluding, the court reasoned that: (1) the certificates clearly were a sworn

and solemn declaration by the analysts as to the truth

of the facts asserted; (2) ‘‘under Massachusetts law the

sole purpose of the affidavits was to provide ‘prima

facie evidence of the composition, quality, and the net

weight’ of the analyzed substance’’; and (3) the court

could ‘‘safely assume that the analysts were aware of

the affidavits’ evidentiary purpose, since that purpose—

as stated in the relevant state-law provision—was

reprinted on the affidavits themselves.’’ Id., 311. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, U.S. , 131 S. Ct. 2705,

2710, 180 L. Ed. 2d 610 (2011), the court held that the

confrontation clause also does not permit the prosecution to introduce a forensic laboratory report containing

a testimonial statement by an analyst, certifying to the
results of a blood alcohol concentration test he performed, through the in-court testimony of another scientist ‘‘who did not sign the certification or perform or

observe the test reported in the certification.’’

In the present case, the defendant claims that his

constitutional right of confrontation was violated when

the state was permitted to present the Draeger machine

reports without being required to call additional witnesses. Specifically, the defendant argues that four witnesses were required to satisfy the mandate of

Melendez-Diaz, namely: (1) the breath test operator;

(2) the calibration analyst; (3) the quality assurance

specialist; and (4) the ethanol breath standard analyst.

Although the defendant concedes that the state presented Desso and Powers as witnesses, he argues that

the state’s failure to call additional witnesses who might

have information relevant to the reliability of the

Draeger machine violates Melendez-Diaz and that,

therefore, his conviction must be reversed.

The state contests the defendant’s arguments on the

ground that neither Melendez-Diaz nor Bullcoming

requires the government to present the live testimony

of all of the persons responsible for creating and maintaining the particular scientific equipment used by the

analyst during those tests. Further, the state argues that

data generated by a machine is neither a ‘‘statement’’

nor ‘‘testimonial’’ for the purposes of the confrontation

clause. We agree with the state that neither MelendezDiaz nor Bullcoming require every witness in the chain

of custody to testify. Furthermore, although MelendezDiaz did not address the issue of whether raw data

constitutes testimonial evidence subject to the confrontation clause, we agree with other courts which have

answered that question in the negative.

The defendant’s positions were directly discussed in

Melendez-Diaz as follows: ‘‘[C]ontrary to the dissent’s

suggestion . . . we do not hold, and it is not the case,

that anyone whose testimony may be relevant in establishing the chain of custody, authenticity of the sample,

or accuracy of the testing device, must appear in person

as part of the prosecution’s case.’’ Melendez-Diaz v.

Massachusetts, supra, 557 U.S. 311 n.1. The defendant

claims that the United States Supreme Court only meant

that the state need not present every witness in the

chain of custody of a particular piece of evidence, but

that the state must present every witness who might

testify to the accuracy of the testing device. The court

further stated in Melendez-Diaz that ‘‘[i]t is up to the

prosecution to decide what steps in the chain of custody

are so crucial as to require evidence; but what testimony

is introduced must [if the defendant objects] be introduced live. Additionally, documents prepared in the

regular course of equipment maintenance may well

qualify as nontestimonialrecords.’’(Emphasis omitted.)

Id., 311 n.1. This statement is noteworthy because the
state established the accuracy and reliability of the

Draeger machine, by way of exhibit 4, which was admitted after the defendant expressly represented that he

had no objection to the certificate’s admission. Exhibit

4 established that the Draeger machine utilized in the

present case was both evaluated and certified for use

as an ‘‘[e]vidential [b]reath [t]est [i]nstrument.’’ Thus,

we agree with the state that, having expressly acceded

to the admission of this evidence establishing the

machine’s accuracy in hearsay form, the defendant’s

claim that the mere admission of the subsequent test

results from that machine precluded him from challenging the accuracy and reliability of the machine is meritless. In Crawford, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming,

the witness whose absence from the trial deprived the

defendant of his confrontation rights was the individual

who made the inculpatory statement against the defendant. In this case, the state produced both the person

who performed the test, and an expert to explain the

results of the test. The live presence of these witnesses,

together with the uncontested admission of exhibit 4,

satisfies the requirements of Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.

We also note that the United States Supreme Court

has not addressed the issue of whether the introduction

of raw data generated by a machine falls within the

confines of Crawford or Melendez-Diaz. Both the

majority and the concurrence in Bullcoming emphasized, however, that the holding of that case was limited

to human statements and actions and did not necessarily apply to raw, machine produced data. See Bullcoming v. New Mexico, supra, 131 S. Ct. 2714 (emphasizing

that analyst’s certification as to manner in which he

conducted testing ‘‘relat[es] to past events and human

actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data,’’

that is ‘‘meet for cross-examination’’); id., 2722 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (‘‘this is not a case in which the

[s]tate introduced only machine-generated results, such

as a printout from a gas chromatograph’’).

Other courts that have directly addressed the issue

have concluded that raw data produced by a machine

does not constitute a ‘‘statement’’ for purposes of the

confrontation clause. In United States v. Washington,

498 F.3d 225, 229–30 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 557

U.S. 934, 129 S. Ct. 2856, 174 L. Ed. 2d 600 (2009), the

United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

reasoned as follows: ‘‘Only testimonial statements

cause the declarant to be a witness within the meaning

of the [c]onfrontation [c]lause. It is the testimonial character of the statement that separates it from other hearsay that, while subject to traditional limitations upon

hearsay evidence, is not subject to the [c]onfrontation

[c]lause. . . .

‘‘In the case before us, the statements in question are

alleged to be the assertions that [the defendant’s] blood
sample contained [phencyclidine (PCP)] and alcohol.

But those statements were never made by the technicians who tested the blood. The most the technicians

could have said was that the printed data from their

chromatograph machines showed that the blood contained PCP and alcohol. The machine printout is the

only source of the statement, and no person viewed a

blood sample and concluded that it contained PCP and

alcohol. Yet, the very same data that would have permitted the lab[oratory] technicians to say that the blood

contained PCP and alcohol[was] also seen and interpreted by [the toxicologist who testified at trial]. Moreover,

[that] data [was] the only basis upon which [the toxicologist] stated in court that the blood sample contained

PCP and alcohol. In short, the inculpating statement—

that [the defendant’s] blood sample contained PCP and

alcohol—was made by the machine on printed sheets,

which were given to [the toxicologist]. The technicians

could neither have affirmed or denied independently

that the blood contained PCP and alcohol because all

the technicians could do was to refer to the raw data

printed out by the machine. Thus, the statements to

which [the toxicologist] testified in court—the blood

sample contained PCP and alcohol—did not come from

the out-of-court technicians, and so there was no violation of the [c]onfrontation [c]lause.

‘‘Moreover, there would be no value in cross-examining the lab[oratory] technicians on their out-of-court

statements about whetherthe blood sample tested positive for PCP and alcohol because they made no such

statements. They would only be able to refer to the

machine’s printouts, which [the toxicologist] also had.

The value of cross-examination mightrelate to authentication or to a description of the machines or to the

chain of custody, but none of these were issues at trial,

nor are they issues on appeal. Whether the machines

properly reported PCP or alcohol is determined by the

raw data that the machines generated, and its truth is

dependent solely on the machine.

‘‘Thus, we reject the characterization of the raw data

generated by the lab[oratory’s] machines as statements

of the lab[oratory] technicians who operated the

machines. The raw data generated by the diagnostic

machines are the statements of the machines themselves, not their operators. But statements made by

machines are not out-of-court statements made by

declarants that are subject to the [c]onfrontation

[c]lause.’’ (Citation omitted; emphasis altered; internal

quotation marks omitted.)

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals continued: ‘‘A

‘statement’ is defined by [rule 801 (a) of the Federal

Rule of Evidence] as an ‘(1) oral or written assertion

or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended

by the person as an assertion.’ . . . Obviously, the lab[-

oratory] technicians made no statements of any kind,
and they did not say or write the information generated

by the machines. The machines generated data by

manipulating blood through a common scientific and

technological process. The lab[oratory] technicians’

role was simply to operate the machines. The ‘statement’ that [the defendant’s] blood contained PCP and

alcohol is a conclusion drawn only from the machines’

data, and its source was independent of human observation orreporting. Only the machine, through its diagnostic and technical process, could provide facts about

the chemical composition of [the defendant’s] blood.

Accordingly, the raw data generated by the machines

were not the statements of technicians.

‘‘Additionally, this raw data generated by the

machines were not hearsay statements as implicated

by the [c]onfrontation [c]lause. [Hearsay] is understood

to be ‘a statement, otherthan one made by the declarant

while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.’ Fed.

R. Evid. 801 (c) . . . . ‘A declarant is a person who

makes a statement.’ Fed. R. Evid. 801 (b). . . . And a

‘statement,’ to repeat, is an ‘(1) oral or written assertion

or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended

by the person as an assertion.’ Fed. R. Evid. 801 (a)

. . . . Only a person may be a declarant and make a

statement. Accordingly, ‘nothing ‘‘said’’ by a machine

. . . is [hearsay].’ [4 C. Mueller & L. Kirkpatrick, Federal Evidence (2nd Ed. 1994) § 380, p. 65; see also]

United States v. Hamilton, 413 F.3d 1138, 1142–43 (10th

Cir. 2005) (concluding that the computer-generated

header information accompanying pornographic

images retrieved from the Internet was not a hearsay

statement because there was no ‘person’ acting as a

declarant); United States v. Khorozian, 333 F.3d 498,

506 [3d Cir.] (concluding that an automatically generated time stamp on a fax was not a hearsay statement

because it was not uttered by a [person]) [cert. denied,

540 U.S. 968, 124 S. Ct. 450, 157 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2003)];

People v. Holowko, [109 Ill. 2d 187, 191–93, 486 N.E. 2d

877] (1985) (concluding ‘that the printout of results

of computerized telephone tracing equipment is not

hearsay evidence’ but rather ‘a self-generated record of

its operations’) . . . .

‘‘In short, the raw data generated by the machines

do not constitute ‘statements’ and the machines are not

‘declarants.’ As such, no out-of-court statement implicating the [c]onfrontation [c]lause was admitted into

evidence through the testimony of [the toxicologist].

‘‘Any concerns about the reliability of such machinegenerated information is addressed through the process

of authentication not by hearsay or [c]onfrontation

[c]lause analysis. When information provided by

machines is mainly a product of ‘mechanical measurement or manipulation of data by well-accepted scientific

or mathematical techniques,’ 4 [C.] Mueller & [L.] Kirk-
patrick, [supra, p. 65],reliability concerns are addressed

by requiring the proponent to show that the machine

and its functions are reliable, that it was correctly

adjusted or calibrated, and that the data (in this case,

the blood) put into the machine was accurate (i.e., that

the blood put into the machine was the defendant’s).

In other words, a foundation must be established for

the information through authentication, which Federal

Rule of Evidence 901 (b) (9) allows such proof to be

authenticated by evidence ‘describing [the] process or

system used to produce [the] result’ and showing it

‘produces an accurate result.’ But none of these concerns were issues below, nor are they issues in this

appeal.’’(Emphasis omitted;footnotes omitted.) United

States v. Washington, supra, 498 F.3d 230–31; accord

United States v. Lamons, 532 F.3d 1251, 1260–65 (11th

Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1009, 129 S. Ct. 524, 172 L.

Ed. 2d 384 (2008); United States v. Moon, 512 F.3d 359,

362 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. 812, 129 S. Ct. 40,

172 L. Ed. 2d 19 (2008); United States v. Khorozian,

supra, 333 F.3d 506; People v. Lopez, 55 Cal. 4th 569,

583, 286 P.3d 469, 147 Cal. Rptr. 3d 559 (2012), cert.

denied, U.S. , 133 S. Ct. 1501, 185 L. Ed. 2d 556

(2013); Cranston v. State, 936 N.E.2d 342, 345 (Ind. App.

2010); People v. Dinardo, 290 Mich. App. 280, 290, 801

N.W.2d 73 (2010); Luginbyhl v. Commonwealth, 46 Va.

App. 460, 466–68, 618 S.E.2d 347 (2005).

As in Washington, the defendant’s claim in this

appeal is purely constitutional and he does not claim

that the state failed to lay a sufficient evidentiary foundation for the introduction of the Draeger machine

reports. Moreover, even if such a claim had been pursued before the trial court and in the present appeal,

it would have been meritless. See United States v. Hamblen-Baird, 266 F.R.D. 38, 40–41 (D. Mass. 2010). Therefore, we agree with the reasoning contained in

Washington and the other federal courts that have

addressed the issue. We hold that the machine generated data is not subject to the restrictions imposed by

Crawford, Melendez-Diaz and Bullcoming.

Consequently, for all of the reasons stated, we agree

with the state that the defendant was not denied his

constitutional right of confrontation by the admission

of the Draeger machine reports. Therefore, we conclude

that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s first

motion to suppress.

II

The defendant next claims that the trial court improperly denied his motion to suppress the evidence

resulting from his arrest. In that motion, the defendant

claimed that Desso did not have the authority necessary

to make a warrantless arrest pursuant to General Statutes § 54-1f (a). Therefore, the defendant argued, the

arrest violated his rights under the fourth amendment

to the United States constitution.6 He renews his argu-
ment in this appeal.

Some additional facts are necessary for the consideration of this claim. At the pretrial hearing on the defendant’s motion to suppress the breath test results, Desso

testified on direct examination that he had worked for

the Stafford Police Department for twenty-eight years,

during which he was a sworn police officer, that he

had worked as both a patrolman and a police sergeant,

that he graduated from the Connecticut State Police

Academy, and that he had made approximately 100

arrests for operating under the influence over the years.

On cross-examination, Desso clarified that he was a

‘‘police constable,’’ that he was hired by the town of

Stafford, which put him through municipal training, and

that there is a statute that authorizes him to exercise

police powers. After eliciting this evidence on crossexamination, defense counsel filed a motion to suppress

‘‘any and all evidence gathered as a result of the initial

stop, arrest and detention’’ by Desso on the ground that

Desso’s appointment as a ‘‘special constable’’ was not

done in compliance with all of the pertinent statutory

requirements. During a hearing on the motion, the

defendant argued that, under his reading of the pertinent statutes, Desso was not properly appointed as a

constable because there were no town ordinances

passed by the town of Stafford that specifically authorized the first selectman to make such an appointment.

At the beginning of the state’s argument in response,

the trial court permitted the state to proffer exhibit 1.

This exhibit, which was admitted into evidence without

objection, was signed by the first selectman for the

town of Stafford and expressly certified that Desso was

among the three individuals appointed as special constables between October 28, 2010 and October 15, 2011.

Exhibit 1 explicitly stated that Desso’s appointment

was made ‘‘in accordance with General Statutes § 7-

92.’’7 Following argument, the trial court denied the

defendant’s motion. The court found, inter alia, that the

defendant failed to present ‘‘any conclusive proof that

the town of Stafford does not have an ordinance that

provides for the appointment of constables by the chief

executive authority and the identification of constables

as peace officers.’’ The court expressly relied upon

exhibit 1 as one basis for finding that Desso was authorized by the town of Stafford to serve as a special constable, pursuant to § 7-92. The trial court further found

that Desso ‘‘was a member of a division of state police

within the Department of Public Safety or an organized

local police department within the meaning of General

Statutes § 53a-3 and therefore he had arrest powers

within the meaning of [§] 54-1f.’’

The defendant’s claim on appeal is twofold. First,

he argues that the trial court’s finding that Desso was

appointed as a special constable by his town’s chief

executive officer was clearly erroneous. Second, the

defendant argues that the absence of any ordinances
in the town of Stafford expressly authorizing the first

selectman to appoint a special constable rendered any

such appointment void in this case. In response, the

state argues that the trial court’s finding that Desso was

appointed as a special constable was clearly supported

by the evidence. Further, the state contends that, unlike

some other statutes, § 7-92 does not require that there

be any supporting ordinances in order for such an

appointment to be valid or in order for special constables to exercise the power of arrest. We agree with

the state.

In addition to the standard of review for motions

to suppress discussed previously in this opinion, the

resolution of this issue involves a matter of statutory

construction. ‘‘Because statutory interpretation is a

question of law, our review is de novo. . . . When construing a statute, [o]ur fundamental objective is to

ascertain and give effect to the apparent intent of the

legislature. . . . In other words, we seek to determine,

in a reasoned manner, the meaning of the statutory

language as applied to the facts of [the] case, including

the question of whether the language actually does

apply. . . . In seeking to determine that meaning, General Statutes § 1-2z directs us first to consider the text

of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes.

If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results,

extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall

not be considered. . . . The test to determine ambiguity is whether the statute, when read in context, is

susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation.

. . . When a statute is not plain and unambiguous, we

also look for interpretive guidance to the legislative

history and circumstances surrounding its enactment,

to the legislative policy it was designed to implement,

and to its relationship to existing legislation and common law principles governing the same general subject

matter . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

McCoy v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 300 Conn.

144, 150–51, 12 A.3d 948 (2011).

We begin with the text of the relevant statutes. Section § 54-1f (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Peace officers, as defined in subdivision (9) of section 53a-3, in

theirrespective precincts, shall arrest, without previous

complaint and warrant, any person for any offense in

their jurisdiction, when the person is taken or apprehended in the act or on the speedy information of others, provided that no constable elected pursuant to the

provisions of section 9-200 shall be considered a peace

officer for the purposes of this subsection, unless the

town in which such constable holds office provides, by

ordinance, that constables shall be considered peace

officers for the purpose of this subsection.’’8

General Statutes § 9-200 provides in relevant part:
‘‘Each town shall elect, at its regular municipal election,

unless otherwise provided by law and except as provided in section 9-185, not more than seven constables . . . .’’

General Statutes § 9-185 provides in relevant part:

‘‘Unless otherwise provided by special act or charter

. . . (6) constables . . . shall be elected, provided any

town may, by ordinance, provide for the appointment,

by its chief executive authority, of (A) a constable or

constables in lieu of constables to be elected under

section 9-200 . . . .’’

Section 7-92 provides in relevant part: ‘‘The chief

executive officer of any municipality may appoint such

number of special constables as he or she deems necessary to preserve the public peace within such municipality, who may serve for terms of not more than two

years or during any public celebration or gathering or

any riot or unusual excitement, and such special officers shall have the authority of constables of such town

to serve criminal process and make arrests for commission of crime. . . .’’

The plain and unambiguous language of these statutes creates three types of constables. One type of constable is elected by the municipal voters pursuant to

§ 9-200. The second type of constable is appointed by

a municipality’s chief executive pursuant to § 9-185.

The third type of constable, denominated as a special

constable, is appointed by the municipality’s chief executive officer pursuant to § 7-92.

Constables elected pursuant to § 9-200 are expressly

excluded from being considered ‘‘peace officers’’ with

arrest powers under § 54-1f(a), unless there is a specific

ordinance providing otherwise. See General Statutes

§ 54-1f (a) (‘‘provided that no constable elected pursuantto the provisions of section 9-200 shall be considered

a peace officer for the purposes of this subsection,

unless the town in which such constable holds office

provides, by ordinance, that constables shall be considered peace officers for the purposes of this subsection’’).

Likewise, § 9-185 requires an ordinance expressly

authorizing a municipality’s chief executive officer to

appoint constables in lieu of elections under § 9-200. See

General Statutes § 9-185 (‘‘any town may, by ordinance,

provide for the appointment, by its chief executive

authority, of . . . a constable or constables in lieu of

constables to be elected under section 9-200’’).

The appointment of special constables pursuant to

§ 7-92, unlike the appointment of constables under § 9-

185, does not require the passage of a municipal ordinance. Further, unlike constables elected pursuant to

§ 9-200 or appointed pursuant to § 9-185, special constables appointed pursuant to § 7-92 are not dependent

upon §§ 53a-3 (9) and 54-1f as authority for their arrest
powers. Rather, § 7-92 expressly authorizes special constables to ‘‘make arrests for commission of crime.’’

Therefore, contrary to the defendant’s claims, neither

the authority of a municipality’s chief executive officer

to appoint a special constable, nor the authority of a

special constable to exercise the power of arrest once

appointed, are dependent upon the enactment of a

municipal ordinance. Accordingly, Desso, as a special

constable appointed pursuant to § 7-92, had the power

to make the arrest in the present case.9 Therefore, we

conclude that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s second motion to suppress.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other justices concurred.

1 General Statutes (Supp. 2014) § 14-227a (a) provides in relevant part:

‘‘No person shall operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of

intoxicating liquor or any drug or both. A person commits the offense of

operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor

or any drug or both if such person operates a motor vehicle (1) while under

the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug or both, or (2) while such

person has an elevated blood alcohol content. For the purposes of this

section, ‘elevated blood alcohol content’ means a ratio of alcohol in the

blood of such person that is eight-hundredths of one per cent or more of

alcohol, by weight . . . .’’ We note that the defendant’s two convictions

under § 14-227a were merged by the trial court.

We also note that § 14-227a has been amended by our legislature several

times since the events underlying the present appeal. See, e.g., Public Acts

2013, No. 13-271, § 51. These amendments are not, however, relevant to the

issues presented in this appeal. Hereinafter, all references to § 14-227a are

to the version appearing in the 2014 supplement to the General Statutes.

2 General Statutes § 14-219 provides in relevant part: ‘‘(b) Any person who

operates a motor vehicle . . . (3) on any other highway at a rate of speed

greater than fifty-five miles per hour but not greater than sixty miles per

hour . . . shall commit an infraction . . . .’’

3 The appeal was initially filed in the Appellate Court and we transferred

the matterto this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 (c) and Practice

Book § 65-1.

4

In this motion, the defendant asked the court to suppress the ‘‘results

of the chemical analysis of the [d]efendant . . . .’’ Consequently, we treat

this motion as a motion to suppress.

5 Specifically, the defendant argues that four witnesses were required to

satisfy the mandate of Melendez-Diaz, namely: (1) the breath test operator;

(2) the calibration analyst; (3) the quality assurance specialist; and (4) the

ethanol breath standard analyst.

6 Although the defendant makes one assertion in his brief that his claim

also implicates the sixth and fourteenth amendments to the United States

constitution and article first, §§ 7, 8 and 9, of the Connecticut constitution,

the arguments presented in his brief focus solely on the fourth amendment

and whether the evidence should have been suppressed as ‘‘the fruit of an

illegal search and seizure’’ due to Desso’s allegedly questionable status as

a peace officer. The defendant cites to no specific portion of the sixth

amendment, the fourteenth amendment or the state constitution. Certainly,

there is no meaningful discussion involving these provisions. Accordingly,

we focus on the defendant’s fourth amendment claim. We deem the defendant’s remaining constitutional claims to be abandoned. See State v. Randolph, 284 Conn. 328, 375 n.12, 933 A.2d 1158 (2007) (‘‘We have repeatedly

apprised litigants that we will not entertain a state constitutional claim unless

the defendant has provided an independent analysis under the particular

provisions of the state constitution at issue. . . . Without a separately

briefed and analyzed state constitutional claim, we deem abandoned the

defendant’s claim.’’ [Internal quotation marks omitted.]).

7 General Statutes § 7-92 provides: ‘‘The chief executive officer of any

municipality may appoint such number of special constables as he or she

deems necessary to preserve the public peace within such municipality,

who may serve for terms of not more than two years or during any public

celebration or gathering or any riot or unusual excitement, and such special
officers shall have the authority of constables of such town to serve criminal

process and make arrests for commission of crime. The chief executive

officer may appoint special constables: (1) With limited geographical jurisdiction; or (2) who are appointed at the request of corporations, associations

or businesses and are subject to such limitations, restrictions and conditions

as the chief executive officer of the municipality deems appropriate, and

who shall: (A) Have jurisdiction only on land controlled by such corporation,

association or business; (B) be deemed for all purposes to be agents and

employees of such corporation, association or business; and (C) be paid

for their services by such corporation, association or business.’’

8 General Statutes § 53a-3 (9) defines ‘‘ ‘[p]eace officer’ ’’ as, inter alia, ‘‘a

constable who performs criminal law enforcement duties . . . .’’

9 We also reject the defendant’s argument that there was insufficient evidence for the court to conclude that Desso had been duly appointed by the

executive authority. Exhibit 1, which was admitted without objection or

limitation, is a certification from the first selectman for the town of Stafford

that Desso was among the three individuals appointed as the town’s special

constables between October 28, 2010 and October 15, 2011. Exhibit 1

expressly states that Desso’s appointment was made ‘‘in accordance with

§ 7-92.’’ Although there appears to be some dispute between the parties

whether this exhibit was marked as a full exhibit, or for identification

purposes only for the purposes of the hearing, it is clear that the testimony

before the court serves as a sufficient foundation for us to hold that the

trial court’s factual findings were not clearly erroneous.