ENTRY ORDER

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO. 2013-428

JANUARY TERM, 2014

Sheila Boyer } APPEALED FROM:

}

}

 v. } Superior Court, Chittenden Unit,

} Civil Division

Armand Niquette }

} DOCKET NO. 1137-10-13

In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

Plaintiff filed a complaint in the superior court against her landlord, which the trial court 

transferred to small claims court. The case is currently pending in small claims court. At the 

same time, plaintiff has filed an appeal seeking emergency injunctive relief from this Court. 

Plaintiff complains that her landlord has been entering her apartment and removing her 

belongings, and she asks this Court to prevent this from happening. She indicates that she is 

without keys to the apartment, and this apartment is her only dwelling until her landlord provides 

her the proper paperwork to evict her. We construe plaintiff’s filing as a petition for 

extraordinary relief, and we dismiss it. 

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, which we have recognized “is an extraordinary remedy 

and will not be granted routinely unless the right to relief is clear.” Vt. Div. of State Bldgs. v. 

Town of Castleton Bd. of Adjustment, 138 Vt. 250, 256, 415 A.2d 188, 193 (1980); see also 11A 

C. Wright, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2942, at 43 (2d ed. 1995) (“Since an 

injunction is regarded as an extraordinary remedy, it is not granted routinely; indeed, the court 

usually will refuse to exercise its equity jurisdiction unless the right to relief is clear.” (footnote 

omitted)). As a general matter, “the main prerequisite to obtaining injunctive relief is a finding 

that plaintiff is being threatened by some injury for which he [or she] has no adequate legal 

remedy.” Wright, supra, § 2942 at 44; see also Gerety v. Poitras, 126 Vt. 153, 155, 224 A.2d 

919, 921 (1966) (“Equity will not afford relief where there is a plain, adequate, and complete 

remedy at law. And if the complainant does have such remedy, and the main cause of action is of 

a legal nature, equity has no jurisdiction.” (citation omitted)). 

As stated above, plaintiff’s complaint against her landlord is pending in small claims 

court, and she has a legal avenue available to her to pursue her claim for money damages. While 

the small claims court cannot grant injunctive relief, see V.R.S.C.P. 2(a), plaintiff has not 

demonstrated that she has a clear right to such relief. Plaintiff is incarcerated, and as of 

November 19, 2013, she is serving a nine-month to three-year sentence for attempted burglary. 

She has submitted to this Court a letter she received from her landlord wherein he provided her 

formal notice on November 1, 2013 that her tenancy would be terminated on November 18, 2013 

for nonpayment of rent. See 9 V.S.A. § 4467(a) (stating that “landlord may terminate tenancy 
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for nonpayment of rent by providing actual notice to the tenant of the date on which the tenancy 

will terminate, which shall be at least 14 days after the date of the actual notice”). Under these 

circumstances, plaintiff has failed to show a clear right to injunctive relief. Indeed, her claim for 

injunctive relief appears to be moot given the apparent termination of her tenancy and the fact 

that she is in jail. See In re Moriarty, 156 Vt. 160, 163 (1991) (“A case is moot if the reviewing 

court can no longer grant effective relief.” (quotation omitted)). Plaintiff has an adequate legal 

remedy for her remaining claims, which are being considered by the small claims court. 

Plaintiff’s request for emergency injunctive relief, which forms the basis of her “appeal,” is 

denied, and this case is dismissed.

Given our order, plaintiff’s request concerning transcripts is denied, although we note 

that no hearings were held in this case. Plaintiff’s request for two copies of everything in the 

Court’s file is also denied. 

ROBINSON, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. I construe appellant’s appeal as an 

appeal of the trial court’s dismissal of her claims for injunctive relief and referral of damage 

claims to small claims court. The majority does not suggest that plaintiff’s request for an order 

preventing her landlord from entering her apartment without notice and removing her belongings 

would not ordinarily warrant injunctive relief, but instead concludes that the request is moot 

because plaintiff is apparently incarcerated and landlord has apparently provided her notice that 

her tenancy would be terminated on November 18, 2013 for nonpayment of rent. I believe the 

majority has jumped the gun in this regard. A letter initiating the termination of a tenancy is not 

tantamount to a complete and effective termination of that tenancy. Moreover, even assuming 

we can properly conclude that plaintiff is incarcerated without record evidence to that effect, 

plaintiff’s interest in the security of her apartment from unauthorized entry by her landlord, and 

in protecting the belongings therein, does not evaporate with her apparent incarceration.

Dissenting: BY THE COURT:

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Beth Robinson, Associate Justice Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

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John A. Dooley, Associate Justice

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Publish Marilyn S. Skoglund, Associate Justice

Do Not Publish

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Geoffrey W. Crawford, Associate Justice