IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

EASTERN DIVISION

Dana Colbert,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 2:17-cv-876

Commissioner of

Social Security,

Defendant.

ORDER

Plaintiff Dana Colbert brings this action under 42 U.S.C.

§§405(g) for review of a final decision of the Commissioner of

Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her applications for

supplemental security income. In a decision dated March 24, 2017,

the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) found that plaintiff had

severe impairments consisting of various physical impairments

relating to a history of right femur fracture, knee problems, and

asthma/chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, as well as a

depressive disorder and a history of alcohol dependence. PAGEID

52. After considering the entire record, the ALJ found that

plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) would permit her

to perform light work with certain physical and mental

restrictions. PAGEID 55-56. After considering the testimony of a

vocational expert, the ALJ decided that there were jobs which

plaintiff could perform and that plaintiff was not disabled. 

PAGEID 66-67.

This matter is before the court for consideration of

plaintiff’s April 26, 2018, objection to the April 12, 2018, report

and recommendation of the magistrate judge recommending that the

decision of the Commissioner be affirmed.
I. Standard of Review

If a party objects within the allotted time to a report and

recommendation, the court “shall make a de novo determination of

those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or

recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.

§ 636(b)(1); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Upon review, the

court “may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the

findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The court’s review “is limited to determining whether the

Commissioner’s decision ‘is supported by substantial evidence and

was made pursuant to proper legal standards.’” Ealy v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., 594 F.3d 504, 512 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rogers v.

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 486 F.3d 234, 241 (6th Cir. 2007)); see also,

42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (“The findings of the Commissioner of Social

Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence,

shall be conclusive.”). Put another way, a decision supported by

substantial evidence is not subject to reversal, even if the

reviewing court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v.

Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986). Even if supported by

substantial evidence, however, “‘a decision of the Commissioner

will not be upheld where the [Commissioner] fails to follow its own

regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the

merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.’” Rabbers

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 478 F.3d 742, 746 (6th Cir. 2007)).

II. Objection

Plaintiff’s objection concerns the opinions of the state

2
agency psychological consultants. In a June 1, 2013, evaluation,

state agency consultant Melanie Bergsten, Ph.D., was asked to rate

the degree of plaintiff’s mental symptoms, including sustained

concentration and persistence limitations, the section highlighted

in plaintiff’s objection. Dr. Bergsten rated plaintiff

“[m]oderately limited” in the “ability to complete a normal workday

and workweek without interruptions from psychologically based

symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an

unreasonable number and length of rest periods.” PAGEID 252. When

asked to “[e]xplain in narrative form the sustained concentration

and persistence limitations indicated above[,]” Dr. Bergsten stated

that plaintiff “is able to sustain concentration and persistence to

perform simple and some complex tasks that are not fast paced.” 

PAGEID 253.

In her November 19, 2013, report, Kristen Haskins, Psy.D.,

rated plaintiff as being moderately limited in her ability to

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms. PAGEID 266. When asked to explain

this limitation in narrative form, Dr. Haskins stated that

plaintiff “is able to sustain concentration and persistence to

perform simple and some multistep not complex tasks that are not

fast paced.” PAGEID 266.

In the heading of Issue II of plaintiff’s statement of errors,

plaintiff stated that the ALJ’s decision should be reversed because

he improperly relied on the internally inconsistent opinions of the

state psychologists. Doc. 8, p. 12. However, the argument under

that heading did not clearly state why the opinions were

“internally inconsistent.” Instead, plaintiff noted that the ALJ

3
only accorded some weight to the agency opinions and modified the

psychologists’ recommendations to state them in vocationally

relevant terms before including them in the RFC, without

specifically noting the moderate limitations found by those experts

in the RFC. Doc. 8, pp. 13-14. The magistrate judge construed

plaintiff’s statement of error as arguing that the ALJ failed to

properly account for all these moderate limitations in his RFC

determination or in his hypothetical to the vocational expert. 

Doc. 10, p. 18. The magistrate judge concluded that the ALJ

properly considered the moderate limitations, as well as the

accommodations expressed in the narrative sections of the state

agency opinions and the other record evidence, in formulating

plaintiff’s mental RFC. Doc. 10, pp. 18-21.

Plaintiff contends in her objection that the opinions of the

state agency psychological consultants are internally inconsistent

because the psychologists did not repeat the ratings section

language that plaintiff was “moderately limited” in certain areas,

including “[t]he ability to complete a normal workday and workweek

without interruptions from psychologically based symptoms[,]” in

the narrative sections of the form. Plaintiff contends that since

the ALJ failed to address this alleged inconsistency, his RFC

determination “cannot be deemed an accurate depiction of” her

functional capabilities. Doc. 11, p. 3.

The court first notes that there is no internal inconsistency

because the ratings sections are not the consultant’s opinion. 

Courts have rejected the argument that the ALJ should have included

items from the ratings sections of the form in the RFC, holding

that the ratings sections of the evaluation form are merely

4
worksheets for the evaluator which do not constitute the

evaluator’s residual functional capacity assessment. Rather, it is

the narrative portion of the form that embodies the consultant’s

actual assessment. See Griffith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 582 F.

App’x 555, 563 (6th Cir. 2014)(the explanation section of the form

reflects the doctor’s actual findings); Velez v. Comm’r of Soc.

Sec., No. 1:09CV0715, 2010 WL 1487599, *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 26,

2010)(citing cases). 

The reasoning behind this rule of interpretation is

illustrated by the rating category noted by plaintiff in her

objection, which includes two main components: (1) the ability to

complete a normal workday and workweek without interruptions from

psychologically based symptoms; and (2) the ability to perform at

a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest

periods. Without looking to the narrative explanation, it cannot

be said with any degree of certainty that the consultants were

applying the “moderately limited” rating to both of those

components. Dr. Bergsten was apparently concerned about the second

component because, in her narrative, she stated that plaintiff “is

able to sustain concentration and persistence to perform simple and

some complex tasks that are not fast paced.” PAGEID 253. 

Similarly, Dr. Haskins commented that plaintiff “is able to sustain

concentration and persistence to perform simple and some multistep

not complex tasks that are not fast paced.” PAGEID 266.

Even if the rating sections are viewed as expressing the

consultants’ opinions, there is nothing in the record to indicate

that the “moderately limited” ratings are inconsistent with the

work restrictions included in the narrative sections. The mere

5
rating of “moderately limited” does not describe the nature of

plaintiff’s limitations or how those limitations will impact her

ability to work. Rather, the consultants explained restrictions

which would apply to plaintiff’s actual workplace setting in the

narrative sections of the form. The mere failure to include the

“moderately limited” ratings language in the narrative sections did

not result in an inconsistency in the state agency opinions.

The court also agrees with the magistrate judge’s conclusion

that the ALJ’s evaluation of the consultants’ opinions and his RFC

determination were supported by the record. A claimant’s RFC is

the most that a claimant can do despite his or her limitations. 20

U.S.C. §404.1545(a)(1). The ALJ, not a medical expert, ultimately

determines the claimant’s RFC. Coldiron v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.,

391 F.App’x 435, 439 (6th Cir. 2010); 20 C.F.R. §§404.1527(e)(2)

and 404.1546(c). An ALJ’s decision to give weight to medical

opinion evidence does not require the ALJ to incorporate every

restriction proposed by the medical source. Salisbury v. Comm’r of

Soc. Sec., No. 5:11-CV-2277, 2013 WL 427733, *7 (N.D. Ohio Feb. 1,

2013). The ALJ is not required to describe the claimant’s

limitations using the exact language of those medical sources as

long as substantial evidence demonstrates that the ALJ adequately

portrayed the claimant’s limitations in the RFC. See Smith-Johnson

v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 579 F. App’x 426, 436 (6th Cir. 2014).

The ALJ recognized that plaintiff had moderate limitations in

understanding, remembering, and applying information, in

interacting with others, and in concentration, persistence and

pace. PAGEID 54. He noted plaintiff’s daily activities, which

included caring for her personal needs, performing some household

6
chores, walking to the store, using public transportation, paying

bills, making purchases, and watching television. PAGEID 54-55. 

The ALJ further observed that although plaintiff claimed to have

some mental difficulties around confusion and people, she had

contacts with her family and neighbors and could interact with

people in public settings, such as in stores and on public

transportation. PAGEID 62. He noted that although plaintiff

claimed to have memory problems, she was never diagnosed with any

confusion or memory problems, and she correctly performed math

problems and other memory tests during a consultative psychological

examination by Lisa M. Thornton, Ph.D., on May 8, 2013. See PAGEID

62-64; Ex. 4F. The ALJ also found that the record showed no

specialized mental health treatment or medications. PAGEID 55.

The ALJ considered the opinions of the state agency

consultants, who concluded that plaintiff showed moderate

limitations in social functioning, attention and concentration, and

interaction with others. The ALJ gave these mental assessments

some weight. PAGEID 65. Dr. Bergsten commented that plaintiff

“would be limited to simple and some complex familiar tasks[;]”

that she “is able to sustain concentration and persistence to

perform simple and some complex tasks that are not fast paced[;]”

that plaintiff “would be limited to occasional superficial

interactions w/others[;]” and that “[d]ue to [a history] of

substance abuse, she may have difficulty responding to changes” but

she is “able to perform work related tasks in an environment where

duties are relatively static and changes can be explained.” PAGEID

253. Dr. Haskins rendered a similar opinion, noting that plaintiff

“would be limited to simple and some multistep tasks that are not

7
complex” and that she “is able to sustain concentration and

persistence to perform simple and some multistep not complex tasks

that are not fast paced. PAGEID 266-267.

The ALJ explained that after these opinions were rendered,

changes were made to the mental listings, rules and regulations,

and that he considered these changes and applied them. PAGEID 65. 

The ALJ also “modified the moderate limitations found in the

functional capacity [evaluations] to contain vocationally relevant

terms[.]” PAGEID 65. The ALJ formulated the following mental RFC:

The claimant could perform simple, routine, repetitive

tasks involving only simple work related decisions with

few, if any, workplace changes in a setting without

strict production quotas or fast paced work, such as on

an assembly line. The claimant could have occasional

interaction with the general public, coworkers, and

supervisors. 

PAGEID 65. This RFC largely incorporated the recommendations of

the state agency consultants, although it is slightly more

restrictive as it makes no reference to complex or multistep tasks.

The court finds that the ALJ did not commit error in his

consideration of the state agency opinions or in arriving at

plaintiff’s mental RFC, and plaintiff’s objection is not well

taken. 

III. Conclusion

In accordance with the foregoing, the court concludes that the

ALJ’s RFC determination and his finding of nondisability are

supported by substantial evidence. The plaintiff’s objection (Doc.

11) is denied. The court adopts and affirms the magistrate judge’s

report and recommendation (Doc. 10). The Commissioner’s decision

is affirmed, and this action is dismissed. The clerk shall enter

final judgment affirming the decision of the Commissioner. 

8
It is so ordered.

Date: May 14, 2018 s/James L. Graham 

 James L. Graham

 United States District Judge 

9