alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
```

[Congressional Bills 111th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 4282 Introduced in House (IH)]

111th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 4282

 To amend title XII of the Social Security Act to extend the provision 
 waiving certain interest payments on advances made to States from the 
      Federal unemployment account in the Unemployment Trust Fund.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 10, 2009

  Mr. Welch introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
 To amend title XII of the Social Security Act to extend the provision 
 waiving certain interest payments on advances made to States from the 
      Federal unemployment account in the Unemployment Trust Fund.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. EXTENSION OF PROVISION GRANTING TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR 
              STATES WITH ADVANCES.

    Section 1202(b)(10) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 
1322(b)(10)), as added by section 2004 of the Assistance for Unemployed 
Workers and Struggling Families Act (Public Law 111-5; 123 Stat. 443), 
is amended in subparagraph (A) by striking ``December 31, 2010'' and 
inserting ``December 31, 2012''.
                                 <all>
```
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 10-40293

Summary Calendar

KELSEY HACKLER DRENNAN, Individually and on Behalf of All Other

Persons Similarly Situated,

Plaintiff-Appellant

v.

FIRST RESOLUTION INVESTMENT CORPORATION; HOSTO &

BUCHAN, PROFESSIONAL LIMITED LIABILITY CORPORATION;

MELVIN THATHIAH,

Defendants-Appellees

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Texas

USDC No. 2:08-CV-461

Before WIENER, PRADO, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

*

Plaintiff-Appellant Kelsey Hackler Drennan appeals from the Order of the

District court that adopted the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate

judge and granted the motion of the Defendants-Appellees for a judgment on the

pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c), resulting in the dismissal of Drennan’s suit

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

F I L E D

August 4, 2010

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

 Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion should not *

be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR.

R. 47.5.4.

Case: 10-40293 Document: 00511193626 Page: 1 Date Filed: 08/04/2010
No. 10-40293

grounded in the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”), 15 U.S.C. §1692.

The gravamen of Drennan’s claim is that the conduct of First Resolution

Investment Corporation, as assignee of Drennan’s credit card debt, and of the

remaining Defendants-Appellees as attorneys-at-law representing First

Resolution in filing a state court suit against Drennan styled as a suit on a

sworn account, violated the FDCPA.

In a thoughtful, thorough, and exhaustive analysis of the pleadings that

set forth Drennan’s claims, the magistrate judge concluded that, even when

considering all of the well-pleaded facts in the complaint as being true, the filing

of a suit on account to collect a credit card debt did not constitute either a false

or misleading representation or one that was so harassing, oppressive, or

unconscionable that it was actionable under the FDCPA, even if, arguendo, the

use of a suit on account on a credit card debt did not meet the necessary

requirements of Texas’s Rule 185 or any other such rules or regulations. The

district court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the magistrate judge,

and granted the motion of Defendants-Appellees to dismiss Drennan’s action on

the pleading. The court concluded that the circumstances of this case do not

constitute a violation of the FDCPA, even if the underlying action was not a

proper suit on a sworn account.

We have carefully reviewed the record on appeal and the applicable law

as presented in the briefs of the parties, and we have considered the Report and

Recommendation of the magistrate judge and the order of the district court. As

a result, we are satisfied that the district court correctly disposed of this matter.

For essentially the reasons set forth in the Report and Recommendations of the

magistrate judge, the order of the district court is, in all respects,

AFFIRMED.

2

Case: 10-40293 Document: 00511193626 Page: 2 Date Filed: 08/04/2010
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18 U.S.C.
SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the Quarterly Report of Sinoenergy Corporation (the “Company”)
on Form 10-Q for the period ended March 31, 2009 as filed with the Securities
and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the “Report”), I, Bo Huang, chief
executive officer of the Company, and Shiao Ming Sheng, chief financial officer
of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)
            The
      Report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of
      the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
and





(2)
            The
      information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material
      respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the
      Company.





Date:  August
      14, 2009
            /s/ Bo
      Huang
              Bo
      Huang
              Chief
      Executive OfficerDate:  August
      14, 2009
            /s/ ShiaoMing
      Sheng
              ShiaoMing
      Sheng
              Chief
      Financial Officer





A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906, or other document
authenticating, acknowledging, or otherwise adopting the signature that appears
in typed form within the electronic version of this written statement has been
provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company and furnished to the
Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon request.
EXHIBIT
32.1





CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO 18 USC, SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906


OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In connection with the Quarterly Report
of World Am, Inc. (the “Company”) on Form 10-Q for the quarter ended September
30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on or about the
date hereof (the “Report”), I, Fredrick T. Rogers, President of the Company,
certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1350, as adopted pursuant to Sec. 906 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:





(1)           The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or 15(d) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2)           Information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
condition and results of operations of the Company.





Dated:  December
      18, 2008
            /s/
      Fredrick T. RogersBy:
      Fredrick T. RogersIts:  President




A signed
original of this written statement required by Section 906 has been provided
to  World Am, Inc. and will be retained by  World Am, Inc.
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff upon
request.
<PAGE>   1
                                                                  Exhibit 12.1


                        ACC Consumer Finance Corporation

                   Statement Regarding Computation of Ratios


<TABLE>
<CAPTION>
                                       Year Ending          Year Ending
                                    December 31, 1996    December 31, 1995
                                   -------------------  -------------------
<S>                                   <C>                   <C>
Interest Expense                       $4,610,963           $4,199,336
Allocated rents                           271,907              184,752
                                   -------------------  -------------------
                                        4,882,870            4,384,088

Net Income Before Taxes                 8,791,691            3,675,355
Fixed Charges                           4,882,870            4,384,088
                                   -------------------  -------------------
                                      $13,674,561           $8,059,443
  Earnings to Fixed Charges Ratio            2.80                 1.84
</TABLE>
#### Hiram J. Hanchett v. James McKelvey.

*Evidence: Payment.*The evidence in this case sustains the case made by the hill, that the mortgage held by defendant, and which he was seeking to foreclose by advertisement, had been fully paid and satisfied.

*Heard April 21.*

*Decided April 27.*

Appeal in Chancery from Barry Circuit;.

This was a bill to restrain the foreclosure of a mortgage held by defendant on lands owned by complainant, and which the latter claimed had been fully paid and satisfied, but which, nevertheless, the defendant was proceeding to foreclose by advertisement. The case was heard on pleadings and proofs, and the court below held that there was still due on the mortgage the sum of ninety-eight dollars and twenty-five cents, and decreed accordingly. The complainant appealed.

*Wright*cG *Holbrook,*for complainant.

*G. G. IIoTbrooh*tand *I. M. Gram,*for defendant.

PER C ctbiau:

We are of opinion that on the evidence the mortgage held by defendant should have been decreed paid and satisfied.

The decree will be reversed, and decree entered in this court'for complainant, with costs of both courts.
FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

OCT 26, 2007

THOMAS K. KAHN

CLERK

[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 06-16238

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D. C. Docket No. 06-00817-CV-IPJ-TMP

CARL ANGELO GREEN, 

Petitioner-Appellant, 

versus 

JAMES HAYES, 

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE 

STATE OF ALABAMA, THE 

Respondents-Appellees. 

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

_________________________

(October 26, 2007)

Before TJOFLAT, DUBINA and CARNES, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

On April 12, 2006, in the Circuit Court of Etowah County, Alabama, a jury
 See Ala. Code § 13A-6-91 (1975). 1

2

convicted petitioner of aggravated stalking and the court sentenced him to prison 1

for a term of ten years. He timely appealed his conviction to the Alabama Court of

Criminal Appeals, and while his appeal was pending, he petitioned the United

States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama for a writ of habeas

corpus. His petition stated that, prior to standing trial for aggravated stalking, he

had been convicted in “misdemeanor cases” in the “Gadsden City Court” of

“domestic violence” and that those misdemeanor cases involved the “same

evidence” and “same witnesses” the State used to obtain his conviction for

aggravated stalking. Because the State had already used such evidence to obtain

the misdemeanor convictions, he contended, the State was barred by the Double

Jeopardy Clause (as applied to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment) from

prosecuting him on the aggravated stalking charge. 

The district court correctly noted that petitioner’s habeas petition was

premature and therefore dismissed it without prejudice. At the same time, the

court granted petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on the issue of whether

petitioner’s double jeopardy claim was exhausted. 

We affirm the district court’s judgment dismissing the petition without

prejudice. At the time the district court entered its order, petitioner’s appeal was
3

still pending; thus, the district court could not have known the disposition the

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals may have made of petitioner’s double

jeopardy claim. Accordingly, the COA should not have been entered.

The district court’s dismissal of the instant petition without prejudice is 

AFFIRMED.
Case: 3:17-cr-00164-TMR Doc #: 15 Filed: 09/05/17 Page: 1 of 1 PAGEID #: 34
#### Julian Diaz, Plaintiff, v City of New York et al., Defendants. Aries Parking Lot, Third-Party Plaintiff-Appellant, 2-6 Marcy Place Associates, Third-Party Defendant-Respondent.

[772 NYS2d 811]

Order, Supreme Court, Bronx County (Jerry Crispino, J.), entered on or about January 31, 2003, which, in an action for personal injuries sustained on the sidewalk adjacent to premises occupied by defendant and third-party plaintiff commercial tenant, granted third-party defendant landlord’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the third-party complaint, and for summary judgment on its counterclaim to recover its litigation costs incurred in defending the third-party action, unanimously affirmed, without costs.

Insofar as pertinent, the lease required tenant to procure insurance covering the landlord as well as itself for accidents occurring on the adjacent sidewalk. Tenant failed to procure the insurance. The penalty for such breach is liability for all resulting out-of-pocket damages, including landlord’s cost of defending tenant’s third-party action against it *(cf. Inchaustegui v 666 5th Ave. Ltd. Partnership,*96 NY2d 111 [2001]; *Kinney v G.W. Lisk Co.,*76 NY2d 215, 219 [1990]; *Morel v City of New York,*192 AD2d 428 [1993]).

*196We have considered tenant’s other arguments and find them unavailing. Concur—Buckley, P.J., Williams, Lerner and Marlow, JJ.
Exhibit 32.2   CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350 AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002  In connection with the Quarterly Report of USA Video Interactive Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended September 30, 2010, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), I, Anton J. Drescher, Chief Financial Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 1350, as adopted pursuant to section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 that:  1. this report fully complies with the requirements of Sections 13(a) or  15(d) of the 1934 Act, and  2. the information contained in this report fairly presents, in all material respects, the registrant's financial condition and results of  operations of the registrant.  By: /s/ Anton J. Drescher ------------------------------------ Name: Anton J. Drescher Title: Secretary and Chief Financial Officer  Date:November 18, 2010
exv10w9







    Exhibit 10.9






    FOURTH
    AMENDMENT TO SECOND AMENDED AND RESTATED




    EXECUTIVE SERVICES AGREEMENT



 



    This Fourth Amendment (the “Amendment”) to that
    certain Second Amended and Restated Executive Services Agreement
    dated as of November 30, 2009 (the “Employment
    Agreement”) by and between Pain Cuit, Inc., (the
    “Lender”), Mark Gill (“Employee”) and The
    Film Department Holdings Inc., a Delaware corporation, as
    successor-in-interest
    to The Film Department, LLC, (the “Company”), is made
    as of May 12, 2010 (the “Effective Date”), and is
    entered into by and between Company, Lender and Employee.



 



    WHEREAS, Company, Lender and Employee have previously entered
    into the Employment Agreement; and



 



    WHEREAS, Company, Lender and Employee have agreed to amend
    specific terms of the Employment Agreement in accordance with
    the terms set forth below. All capitalized terms not defined
    herein shall have the meanings ascribed to such terms in the
    Employment Agreement.



 



    NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the agreements made herein,
    the parties hereto agree as follows:



 



    1. The Employment Agreement is hereby amended by deleting
    both references to “May 14, 2010” in
    Sections 1 and 4, and substituting “June 1,
    2010” in lieu thereof in both instances.



 



    2. This Employment Agreement is intended to comply with
    Section 409A of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
    amended (the “Code”) and the regulations and guidance
    promulgated thereunder (collectively, “Code
    Section 409A”) and will be interpreted in a manner
    intended to comply with Code Section 409A.



 



    IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties have duly executed this
    Amendment as of the date first above written.



 


	 	 	 
	

    THE FILM DEPARTMENT HOLDINGS INC.


	
 
	
    PAIN CUIT, INC.

	
 
	
 
	
 

	
 
	
 
	
 

	
    /s/  Neil
    Sacker


    

	
 
	
    /s/  Mark
    Gill


    


	

    By: Neil Sacker


	
 
	
    By: Mark Gill

	

    Its: President & COO


	
 
	
    Its: President

	
 
	
 
	
 

	
 
	
 
	
 

	
 
	
 
	
    /s/  Mark
    Gill


	
 
	
 
	
    


	
 
	
 
	
    Mark Gill









 


 



    4th

    Amendment to
    2nd

    Amended and Restated Exec. Srvcs Agrmt.
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 97-10396

Conference Calendar

 

JOHNNY DWAYNE STATEN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

versus

BOB PRUITT; HENDRICK MEDICAL CENTER,

HERMAN SCHAFFER, Dr.; JOHN C. VALCIK, Dr., 

Defendants-Appellees.

- - - - - - - - - -

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Texas

USDC No. 1:97-CV-3-C

- - - - - - - - - -

October 22, 1997

Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and WIENER and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Johnny Dwayne Staten (#682286), a state prisoner, has

appealed the dismissal of his civil rights complaint as

frivolous. Staten contends that the defendants acted with

deliberate indifference to his various medical conditions. We

have carefully reviewed the record and Staten’s briefs. 

Essentially for reasons stated by the district court, Staten v.

Pruitt, No. 1:97-CV-003-C (N.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 1997) (unpublished),

we hold that Staten has failed to demonstrate that the district
No. 97-10396

-2-

court abused its discretion in dismissing the complaint as

frivolous. 

Staten’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief is

GRANTED. All remaining motions are DENIED.

Staten’s appeal is without arguable merit and thus

frivolous. See Howard v. King, 707 F.2d. 215, 219-20 (5th Cir.

1983). Because the appeal is frivolous, it is DISMISSED. See

5th Cir. R. 42.2. We caution Staten that any additional

frivolous appeals filed by him will invite the imposition of

sanctions. To avoid sanctions, Staten is further cautioned to

review any pending appeals to ensure that they do not raise

arguments that are frivolous. 

APPEAL DISMISSED; SANCTION WARNING ISSUED; MOTION FOR LEAVE

TO FILE SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF GRANTED; REMAINING MOTIONS DENIED.
FacilityID SourceID LocationType Longitude Latitude UTMzone

EE1_NEI11153 EE101004 L -89.315722 31.335861

EE1_NEI11153 EE102001 L -89.31501007 31.33832932

EE1_NEI11153 EE102002 L -89.31472778 31.33832932

EE1_NEI11153 EE102003 L -89.31333923 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102005 L -89.31555939 31.33832932

EE1_NEI11153 EE102006 L -89.31528473 31.33805275

EE1_NEI11153 EE102007 L -89.31528473 31.33832932

EE1_NEI11153 EE102008 L -89.31528473 31.33832932

EE1_NEI11153 EE102009 L -89.31555939 31.33805275

EE1_NEI11153 EE102010 L -89.31555939 31.33805275

EE1_NEI11153 EE102011 L -89.31501007 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102012 L -89.31501007 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102013 L -89.31501007 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102014 L -89.31501007 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102015 L -89.31501007 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102016 L -89.31501007 31.33777428

EE1_NEI11153 EE102017 L -89.31555939 31.33805275

EE1_NEI11153 EE102018 L -89.31555939 31.33805275
SourceType Lengthx Lengthy Angle HorzDim VertDim

A 182.8799997 30.47999995 90

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0

P 0 0 0
AreaVolReleaseHgt StackHgt_m StackDiameter_m ExitGasVel_m ExitGasTemp_K Elevation_m

0.99974399 0.99974399 0.0009144 9.144E-05 295.37

0 6.736080106 0.609599999 15.00000067 324.8115

0 6.736080106 0.609599999 15.00000067 324.8115

0 30.78479995 0.0762 8.999982033 588.674

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405

0 14.30426407 0.982979969 7.459492344 368.1405
HillHeight
#### Walters *v.*Burnett.

5-1330

305 S. W. 2d 549

Opinion delivered October 7, 1957.

*Claude A. Fuller,*for appellant.

*Festus 0. Butt,*for appellee.

Sam Bobiksok, Associate Justice.

Appellant, Thomas F. Walters, filed this suit to enforce a lease agreement in which he is named lessee, containing an alleged option to purchase. Appellee, Burnett, demurred to the complaint, and the Court sustained the demurrer in part. We do not reach the merits of the controversy because there is no final order from which an appeal will lie. *Ark. State Board of Architects*v. *Larsen,*226 Ark. 536, 291 S. W. 2d 269. The alleged cause of action to which the demurrer was sustained was not dismissed. The order is as follows:

> “On this day comes on for consideration the demurrer to complaint by the defendant Burnett; and on hearing the same and argument of counsel the court finds that paragraph 3 of the lease contract pleaded setting out a purported option contract is void because of want of consideration for said option contract and because the contractual provisions therein are indefinite and uncertain and meaningless. The demurrer is therefore sustained as to said paragraph and as to said alleged option contract and as to all parts of the complaint based thereon. The demurrer as to the remainder of complaint based on the pleaded lease is overruled. To which action as to said option contract the plaintiff excepts; as to such action as to the lease alleged, and to refusal of the court to enter formal declaratory judg*46ment denouncing such alleged option contract as void, the defendant excepts.”

On appeal, appellant says:

> “The Court erred in dismissing that part of appellant’s complaint by which he claimed the right of buying said property, without permitting plaintiff a reasonable time to amend said complaint.”

As we view the order, it dismisses no part of the complaint. Appellant is at liberty to stand on his complaint and refuse to plead further, or he can amend; but he must do one or the other, and he still has that right.

Appeal dismissed.