1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

Jeffrey L. Butler, Jr., : Case No. 1:17-cv-00604

Plaintiff, : Judge Michael R. Barrett

v. :

City of Cincinnati, Ohio, et al., :

Defendants. :

OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Third 

Amended Complaint. (Doc. 43). Plaintiff filed a Response in Opposition.1 (Doc. 46). 

Defendants did not file a Reply and the time to do so, without leave of Court, has passed. 

See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(2).

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff has served in the Cincinnati Police Department (“CPD”) since 1986 and 

has held the rank of captain since 2005. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 1-2). Defendants are the City of 

Cincinnati, the former City Manager, Harry Black, the former Assistant City Manager, 

Sheila Hill-Christian, the Mayor of the City of Cincinnati, John Cranley, and the Chief of 

Police of the City of Cincinnati, Eliot Isaac. (Id. ¶¶ 3-7).

1 Plaintiff’s Response exceeds the permissible page length set forth in the Court’s Local Rules and the 

undersigned’s Standing Orders, and Plaintiff neither requested nor received leave to file a Response in 

excess of twenty pages. See S.D. Ohio Civ. R. 7.2(a)(3); Standing Order on Civil Procedures, Michael R. 

Barrett, I.G and I.F. The Court accepts the Response for filing and trusts that Plaintiff will comply with those 

rules in the future.

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 1 of 25 PAGEID #: 553
2

Effective January 3, 2016, Plaintiff commanded the city’s Emergency 

Communications Center (“ECC”) where he was responsible for the management of all 

ECC roles for the CPD, including budget, discipline, hiring, training, and strategic 

planning. (Id. ¶¶ 11, 13, 29). Plaintiff alleges that, during this command, he became aware 

that Defendant City of Cincinnati was misusing both state funds that were earmarked for 

emergency services and federal grant funds from the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security. (Id. ¶¶ 29-32). Plaintiff brought the alleged misuse of funds to Defendant Black’s 

and Defendant Hill-Christian’s attention and, in March 2016 and April 2016, Defendant 

Hill-Christian allegedly instructed Plaintiff to stop discussing the claims. (Id. ¶¶ 33-35).

On August 25, 2016, Plaintiff submitted a written request to be reclassified from 

the rank of captain to the rank of assistant chief of police. (Id. ¶ 18). He asserts that his 

equivalent colleague at the Cincinnati Fire Department, who was also stationed at the 

ECC, received a reclassification to the rank of assistant fire chief in April 2016. (Id. ¶¶ 15-

17). On September 25, 2016, Plaintiff resubmitted paperwork for his reclassification 

request in light of a new Civil Service/Human Resources (“HR”) Reclassification process.

(Id. ¶ 20). On October 25, 2016, the CPD’s Personnel Manager concluded that Plaintiff’s 

reclassification request should be denied, but did not inform Plaintiff of that decision. (Id.

¶¶ 22-23). 

On December 6, 2016, Plaintiff met with Defendant City of Cincinnati’s HR Director 

to discuss the status of his reclassification request. (Id. ¶ 25). She informed him that HR

would not make or issue a decision, and that he should check with Defendant Isaac

because only the chief of police has the power to make a recommendation regarding

reclassification to the rank of assistant chief of police to the city manager and to increase 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 2 of 25 PAGEID #: 554
3

the assistant chief complement if the city manager agrees. Id. On December 7, 2016, 

Plaintiff met with Defendant Isaac, who advised Plaintiff that Defendant Black did not wish 

to increase the complement of assistant police chiefs. (Id. ¶ 26). That same day, Plaintiff 

submitted what he styled as a notice of appeal of Defendant Isaac’s denial of his request 

for reclassification and what HR styled as an appearance request at the next Civil Service 

Commission meeting. (Id. ¶ 27). At the December 15, 2016, Civil Service Commission 

meeting, the Commission denied Plaintiff’s reclassification request, based on the CPD 

Personnel Manager’s October 25, 2016 conclusion, without a hearing. (Id. ¶ 28).

Effective January 1, 2017, Plaintiff was transferred from his command in the ECC 

to a position as the highest-ranking officer in the CPD’s Inspection Section. (Id. ¶ 38, 59).

On September 12, 2017, Plaintiff filed his Initial Complaint in this matter and 

included five claims against Defendants related to the denial of his reclassification 

request: abuse of power; tortious interference with business relations; a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 

claim of First Amendment retaliation; and two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for violations of 

the Fourteenth Amendment. (Doc. 1). He alleges that the denial of his reclassification 

request and transfer to the Inspection Section were made in retaliation for his complaints 

about Defendants’ misuse of state and federal funds for the ECC. (Id. ¶ 39).

Plaintiff subsequently filed a timely First Amended Complaint that included two 

additional claims: defamation and civil conspiracy. (Doc. 5); see FED. R. CIV. P.

15(a)(1)(A). He alleges that, after he filed this lawsuit, Defendants Cranley and Black

conspired to orchestrate a distracting smear campaign against him, branding him a 

“racist,” a “bad cop,” and someone whose federal lawsuit was meant to undermine the 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 3 of 25 PAGEID #: 555
4

contracts between minority-owned businesses and Defendant City of Cincinnati. (Doc. 41

¶¶ 55-56).

In early 2018, after the Court heard oral argument on Defendants’ Motion for 

Judgment on the Pleadings, but before Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File a Second 

Amended Complaint, Plaintiff was tasked with supervising the semi-annual CPD audit of 

overtime usage. (Id. ¶ 59). Personnel of the CPD’s Inspection Section conducted this

audit under Plaintiff’s command and Executive Assistant Chief of Police David Bailey’s 

oversight. (Id. ¶ 60).

Plaintiff alleges that the final February 15, 2018 audit report found that the CPD 

had incurred significant overtime expenses, often as a result of inappropriate and illegal 

conduct, especially in the CPD’s District 5 that was commanded by Captain Bridget 

Bardua. (Id. ¶ 61); (Doc. 41-1) (Feb. 15, 2018 Semi-Annual Audit of Overtime report).

Plaintiff believes that the alleged systemic abuse of overtime in District 5 constitutes

felony theft. (Id. ¶ 79). He states that he voiced his concerns regarding the alleged 

overtime abuse directly to Captain Bardua and Defendant Isaac before the audit report 

was finalized (id. ¶¶ 70-72), but they took no remedial action (id. ¶¶ 76-77). He also 

alleges that Captain Bardua and Defendant Isaac have an inappropriate close personal 

relationship given the chain of command supervisory relationship. (Id. ¶¶ 85-90).

Effective March 18, 2018, Plaintiff was transferred from the CPD’s Inspection 

Section to the Cincinnati Police Academy, where he asserts that he has no substantive 

responsibility. (Id. ¶ 97).

In April 2018, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File a Second Amended 

Complaint, and the Court later granted that Motion. Plaintiff’s Second Amended 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 4 of 25 PAGEID #: 556
5

Complaint includes four additional claims: a second 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim of First 

Amendment retaliation; a second defamation claim; a statutory whistleblower claim; and 

a common law whistleblower claim. (Doc. 23). He asserts that Defendants marginalized 

him in retaliation for his complaints about Defendant Isaac’s relationship with Captain 

Bardua, his complaints about Defendant Isaac’s failure to act on Captain Bardua’s abuse 

of the overtime system, Plaintiff’s role in supervising the audit, and Defendant Isaac’s 

mistaken belief that Plaintiff was involved in the public disclosure of the audit report.

(Doc. 41 ¶ 96).

Also in April 2018, Hamilton County Prosecutor Joseph Deters impaneled a Grand 

Jury due to the allegations in Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint of felony abuse, and

Prosecutor Deters also referred the matter to Ohio Auditor David Yost for investigation. 

(Id. ¶¶ 98, 100). On April 27, 2018, that Grand Jury issued a subpoena for documents 

related to the February 2018 audit report. (Id. ¶ 99). Auditor Yost’s investigative team 

subsequently requested documents related to the February 2018 audit report. (Id. ¶ 101).

Plaintiff alleges that at least one Bankers Box containing documents related to the 

February 2018 audit report went missing after he filed his Second Amended Complaint in 

this matter. (Id. ¶ 101). He asserts that Defendants have known that the Bankers Box was 

missing since, at least, June 2018 and have done nothing to find it. (Id. ¶ 102). In light of 

Defendants’ alleged inaction to find the missing box of documents, in October 2018, 

Plaintiff asked the Acting City Manager for an external administrative and/or criminal 

investigation into the matter. (Id. ¶ 103); (Doc. 41-2) (written request for external 

administrative and/or criminal investigation).

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 5 of 25 PAGEID #: 557
6

In November 2018, Plaintiff filed his Motion for Leave to File a Third Amended 

Complaint, and the Court later granted that Motion. Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint 

includes a spoliation of evidence claim. (Doc. 41). Plaintiff’s 12-count Third Amended 

Complaint brings an abuse of power claim, two First Amendment claims, two Fourteenth 

Amendment claims, a tortious interference with a business relationship claim, two 

defamation claims, a civil conspiracy claim, a statutory whistleblower claim, a common 

law whistleblower claim, and a spoliation of evidence claim. Id. He asserts that these

claims stem from Defendants’ retaliatory conduct against him for reporting corruption and 

illegal activity, namely his allegations regarding the misuse of state and federal funds in 

the ECC and his allegations regarding the February 2018 audit report. Id.

II. ANALYSIS

In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, this Court must "construe the

complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accept [the plaintiff’s] allegations as

true, and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff." Bassett v. Nat'l Collegiate

Athletic Ass'n, 528 F.3d 426, 430 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d

471, 476 (6th Cir. 2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint

must contain "(1) 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible,' (2) more than 'a

formulaic recitation of a cause of action's elements,' and (3) allegations that suggest a

'right to relief above a speculative level.'" Tackett v. M&G Polymers, USA, LLC, 561 F.3d

478, 488 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007)).

"A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the

court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663 (2009).

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 6 of 25 PAGEID #: 558
7

a. Abuse of Power Claim

Plaintiff brings a claim for abuse of power against Defendants Black and HillChristian and asserts that they acted beyond the scope of their authority under the City 

Charter when they denied his requested reclassification to the rank of assistant chief of 

police and transferred him out of his ECC command. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 106-08). He asserts that 

his abuse of power claim is meant to “highlight Defendants’ retaliation against [him] as 

punishment for his complaints about Defendants’ flagrant misuse of [ECC] funding 

sources and grants” and concedes that this claim is founded on “Defendants’ violations 

of his substantive due process and procedural due process rights.” (Doc. 46 PageID 507).

Ohio law does not recognize a standalone abuse of power claim, and Plaintiff

cannot state a claim for abuse of power under Ohio law. See Schwartz v. City of 

Conneaut, Ohio, No. 1:09CV1222, 2009 WL 4730594, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2009); 

Peters v. Ohio Dep't of Nat. Res., 2003-Ohio-5895, ¶ 15 (“[N]o Ohio court has ever 

recognized the existence of the tort of ‘abuse of power.’”). To the extent that he argues 

that this claim is founded on his federal due process rights, the Court will discuss those 

arguments below. See Schwartz, 2009 WL 4730594, at *6 (“an abuse of power claim can 

be brought in federal court as substantive or procedural due process arguments”) (citing 

Myers v. Delaware Cty., Ohio, No. 2:07-CV-844, 2008 WL 4862512, at *9-10 (S.D. Ohio 

Nov. 7, 2008)). Plaintiff’s standalone abuse of power claim fails to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted, and dismissal is proper.

b. First Amendment Claims

Plaintiff brings two claims of First Amendment retaliation pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 

§ 1983. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 109-13, 144-49). He alleges that, due to his speaking out about 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 7 of 25 PAGEID #: 559
8

Defendants’ misuse of state and federal funds for the ECC and the overtime audit report,

Defendants denied his reclassification request, Defendants transferred him out of his 

ECC command, and Defendant Isaac publicly acted against and chastised him. Id.

Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely provides ‘a 

method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 

386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)).

Section 1983 imposes civil liability on a person acting under color of state law who 

deprives another of the “rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 

laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A plaintiff must allege two elements to establish a prima facie 

case under Section 1983: (1) that the action occurred “under color of law”; and (2) that 

the action was a deprivation of a constitutional right or a federal statutory right. See Parratt 

v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels v. Williams, 

474 U.S. 327 (1986). There does not appear to be a dispute whether Defendants acted 

under color of state law and the Court will assume that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled state 

action for purposes of this Motion. (Doc. 43 PageID 478-83); see Handy-Clay v. City of 

Memphis, Tenn., 695 F.3d 531, 539 (6th Cir. 2012). The parties dispute whether Plaintiff’s 

Third Amended Complaint states plausible deprivations of his First Amendment rights.

Compare (Doc. 43 PageID 478-83), with (Doc. 46 PageID 508-12).

A Section 1983 plaintiff alleging employment retaliation for the exercise of his 

constitutional right to free speech must plead factual allegations sufficient to establish that 

(1) he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken 

against him that would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in 

that conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated at least in part by his protected

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 8 of 25 PAGEID #: 560
9

conduct. Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 539 (citing Fritz v. Charter Twp. of Comstock, 592 F.3d 

718, 723 (6th Cir. 2010)).

i. Constitutionally Protected Conduct

“When a citizen enters government service, the citizen by necessity must accept 

certain limitations on his or her freedom.” Id. (citing Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 

418 (2006)). “However, public employees do not forfeit all their First Amendment rights 

simply because they are employed by the state or a municipality,” and “the First 

Amendment protects a public employee's right, under certain circumstances, to speak as 

a citizen on matters of public concern.” Id. (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 417). “However, 

when a public employee speaks as an employee on matters of personal interest, ‘a federal

court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a personnel decision 

taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's behavior.’” Id. (citing 

Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983)).

“[T]he Supreme Court has established a three-part test for evaluating whether a 

public employee's speech is constitutionally protected.” Id. A plaintiff must show (1) that 

his speech was made as a private citizen, rather than pursuant to his official duties; (2) 

that his speech involved a matter of public concern; and (3) that his interest as a citizen 

in speaking on the matter outweighed the state's interest, as an employer, in promoting 

the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. Id. (citing Garcetti, 

547 U.S. at 417-18).

The inquiry into whether statements were made pursuant to an employee’s official 

duties, and not as a private citizen, is a practical one. Colorez v. City of Cincinnati, Case 

No. 1:17-cv-737, Doc. 14 PageID 84, (S.D. Ohio Aug. 3, 2018) (citing Garcetti, 547 U.S. 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 9 of 25 PAGEID #: 561
10

at 427). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (“Sixth Circuit”) has identified a 

number of factors to consider in this inquiry, including: the impetus for the plaintiff’s

speech, the setting of his speech, the speech's audience, the speech’s general subject 

matter, whether the statements were made to individuals up the chain of command,

whether the content of the speech is nothing more than the quintessential employee beef

that management has acted incompetently, whether the speech was made inside or 

outside of the workplace, or whether the speech concerned the subject-matter of the 

plaintiff’s employment. Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 540-41 (citations omitted) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The critical question is “whether the speech at issue is itself 

ordinarily within the scope of an employee’s duties,” and is “not whether [the speech] 

merely concerns those duties.” Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 240 (2014).

The Third Amended Complaint states that, before Plaintiff commanded the ECC, 

he had “been assigned to audit ECC” and, in his position in the Inspection Section, he 

“was tasked with supervising the semi-annual Police Department audit of overtime 

usage.” (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 12, 59). Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s speech was made pursuant 

to his official duties at the ECC and in the Inspection Section and not as a private citizen. 

(Doc. 43 PageID 479-81). At this stage in the proceedings, viewing only the facts alleged 

in the Third Amended Complaint and doing so in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, his

specific job duties at the ECC and in the Inspection Section are not so clear such that the 

Court can find that he spoke pursuant to his official job duties or that Defendants 

specifically tasked Plaintiff with the speech at issue. See Colorez, Case No. 1:17-cv-737, 

Doc. 14 PageID 85. The Third Amended Complaint “does not include sufficient 

information regarding the statements’ content, context, impetus, setting, or audience from 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 10 of 25 PAGEID #: 562
11

which the Court could conclude the statements at issue in this case are ‘ordinarily within 

the scope’ of [Plaintiff]’s official duties (whatever those duties are).” Id. Although the Third 

Amended Complaint suggests that overseeing the production of the audit report was a 

part of Plaintiff’s job, nothing in the Third Amended Complaint suggests that his

allegations about Defendant Isaac’s relationship with Captain Bardua or about Defendant

Black’s misdirection of funds were within Plaintiff’s ordinary job duties. See (Doc. 41). The 

Third Amended Complaint provides relatively little information regarding what Plaintiff’s 

job duties at either the ECC or Inspection Section were. (Doc. 41). The facts alleged are 

sufficient to justify an inference that Plaintiff spoke on the issues alleged as a private 

citizen concerned about Defendants’ misuse of funding and taxpayer monies.

Further, and although Defendants do not contest the second and third prong of the 

constitutionally protected conduct analysis, the Third Amended Complaint sufficiently 

alleges concerns about their alleged misuse of funding and taxpayer monies which the 

Sixth Circuit has recognized are of public concern. (Doc. 46 PageID 510-12); see Chappel 

v. Montgomery Cnty. Fire Protection Dist. No. 1, 131 F.3d 564, 576 (6th Cir. 1997)

(“‘[p]ublic interest is near its zenith when ensuring that public organizations are being 

operated in accordance with the law,’ when ‘expos[ing] graft and corruption,’ and when 

‘seeing that public funds are not purloined’ or wasted.”) (quoting Marohnic v. Walker, 

800 F.2d 613, 616 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also Perry v. McGinnis, 209 F.3d 597, 607 (6th 

Cir. 2000) (explaining that, in many cases, due to inadequate factual development, the

prong two balancing test cannot be performed on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion).

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 11 of 25 PAGEID #: 563
12

ii. Adverse Action

Defendants argue that Plaintiff has not experienced an adverse action because he

was, and remains, a police captain with no change in compensation since January 2016.

(Doc. 43 PageID 481-82). Plaintiff asserts that the Third Amended Complaint sufficiently 

alleges that that he suffered economic damages. (Doc. 46 PageID 512). The Third 

Amended Complaint alleges that Plaintiff has no substantive responsibility at the Police 

Academy and his transfer there caused him a loss in renumeration (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 97, 161).

An adverse action, in the First Amendment retaliation context, is one that causes 

“an injury that would likely chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage 

in [protected activity].” Scarbrough v. Morgan County Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 255 

(6th Cir. 2006). “[E]xamples of ‘adverse action’ that would chill a person of ordinary 

firmness from engaging in protected conduct ‘include discharge, demotions, refusal to 

hire, nonrenewal of contracts, and failure to promote.’” Crawford v. Columbus State Cmty. 

Coll., 196 F. Supp. 3d 766, 778 (S.D. Ohio 2016) (citing Thaddeus–X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 

378, 396 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). It is a closer call than the analysis above, but at this 

stage in the proceedings, taking the allegations in the Third Amended Complaint as true, 

Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that he experienced an adverse action that would 

dissuade any person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in free speech. Cf.

Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois., 497 U.S. 62, 110 (1990) (holding that placing 

employees in dead-end positions and unreasonably denying transfers may constitute an 

adverse action in the First Amendment retaliation context).

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 12 of 25 PAGEID #: 564
13

iii. Motivation

Defendants assert that there is no causal connection between the alleged 

protected activity and the alleged adverse employment action. (Doc. 43 PageID 482-83). 

For purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) Motion, and based on the facts of this case, the Court 

finds that Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that his speech was a substantial or motivating 

factor in Defendants’ decision to take the alleged adverse employment action against him. 

See Hughes v. Region VII Area Agency on Aging, 542 F.3d 169, 181 (6th Cir. 2008); see 

also Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 545 (“[a] defendant's motivation for taking action against 

the plaintiff is usually a matter best suited for the jury.”).

In sum, Plaintiff alleges plausible First Amendment retaliation violations and 

dismissal of these two counts is not warranted.

c. Substantive Due Process Claim

Plaintiff brings one claim for a violation of his substantive due process rights

pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 114-17). He alleges that Defendants unlawfully 

denied his reclassification request, thereby foreclosing any possible career advancement, 

and deprived him of his protected interest in his good name and professional reputation

each in retaliation for his speaking out about Defendants’ misuse of funds in the ECC. Id.

Similar to the First Amendment analysis above, there does not appear to be a dispute 

whether Defendants acted under color of state law and the Court will assume that Plaintiff 

has sufficiently pled state action for purposes of this Motion. (Doc. 43 PageID 484); see

Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 539. The parties dispute whether the Third Amended Complaint 

states a plausible deprivation of Plaintiff’s substantive due process rights. Compare (Doc. 

43 PageID 484), with (Doc. 46 PageID 513-15).

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 13 of 25 PAGEID #: 565
14

With respect to Plaintiff’s attempt to bring a substantive due process claim that is 

based on alleged First Amendment violations, the Court finds that any such claim is 

impermissibly duplicative. See Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 547-48 (explaining that Sixth 

Circuit precedent “precludes reliance on substantive due process standards when 

evaluating claims covered by explicit constitutional protections.”). Plaintiff must invoke the 

express protections of the First Amendment rather than rely on a substantive due process 

argument. See id. He cannot succeed on a substantive due process claim based on a 

First Amendment violation, and dismissal of any such claim is proper.

He also contends that his substantive due process rights protect against his loss 

of the reclassification in rank. (Doc. 46 PageID 514). “Substantive due process claims 

may be loosely divided into two categories: (1) deprivations of a particular constitutional 

guarantee; and (2) actions that ‘shock the conscience.’” Valot v. Southeast Local Sch. 

Dist. Bd. of Educ., 107 F.3d 1220, 1228 (6th Cir.1997) (citations omitted). Plaintiff does

not argue that the denial of his reclassification request constitutes behavior that shocks

the conscience. (Docs. 41, 46). He argues that he has been deprived of a particular 

constitutional guarantee and states that his “loss of the position to which he was entitled—

Assistant Chief—is [ ] protected by his substantive due process rights.” (Doc. 46 PageID 

514-15) (citing Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317, 1328 (6th Cir. 1988) and Hopkins v. 

Canton City Bd. of Educ., 477 F. App’x. 349, 365-66 (6th Cir. 2012)).

Plaintiff, though, relies on caselaw that “recognizes a narrow substantive due 

process right to protection against losing one's job because of an independent 

constitutional violation, such as an equal protection violation.” Hopkins, 477 F. App'x at 

365-66. The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff lost his job. (Doc. 41). 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 14 of 25 PAGEID #: 566
15

It alleges that he did not receive a reclassification to a rank to which he believes he was 

entitled and that he otherwise remains employed as a captain in the CPD. Id. The Court 

declines to expand substantive due process protection to his alleged loss of a grant of a

reclassification request. See Perry v. Quill, No. 2:10-CV-78, 2010 WL 3659591, at *5 

(S.D. Ohio Sept. 14, 2010) (“In the employment law context, the Sixth Circuit [ ] has 

rejected attempts to expand substantive due process protection to claims involving 

property interests in employment.”); see also Sutton v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 958 F.2d 

1339, 1350 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding that a state-created right to tenured position lacks 

substantive due process protection); Charles v. Baesler, 910 F.2d 1349, 1355 (6th Cir.

1990) (holding that there is no substantive due process protection for state-created 

promotion rights)); cf. Young v. Twp. of Green Oak, 471 F.3d 674, 684 (6th Cir. 2006) 

(explaining that, generally, “the termination of public employment does not constitute a 

denial of substantive due process”). Dismissal of this claim is proper.

d. Procedural Due Process Claim

Plaintiff brings one claim of a violation of his procedural due process rights

pursuant 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 118-25). He alleges that he has a protected

property interest in the reclassification to the rank of assistant chief of police and 

Defendants failed to provide him with pre-deprivation and post-deprivation process in 

violation of the City Charter and his due process rights. Id. There does not appear to be 

a dispute whether Defendants acted under color of state law and, again, the Court will 

assume that Plaintiff has sufficiently pled state action for purposes of this Motion. (Doc. 

43 PageID 484-86); see Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 539. The parties dispute whether the

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 15 of 25 PAGEID #: 567
16

Third Amended Complaint states a plausible deprivation of his procedural due process 

rights. Compare (Doc. 43 PageID 484-86), with (Doc. 46 PageID 515-17).

Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have a protected property interest in a 

promotion, because the rank of assistant chief of police is an unclassified, at-will position 

and there is no property interest in an unclassified position, and his claim is based on a 

unilateral expectation to the reclassification. (Doc. 43 PageID 484-86). Plaintiff counters 

that the CPD’s customs, policies, and practices form the basis for his protected property 

interest and he had more than a unilateral expectation. (Doc. 46 PageID 515-17).

The Court must determine whether a protected liberty or property right is at stake 

and, if so, what process is due. Handy-Clay, 695 F.3d at 546. A property interest can be 

created by a state statute, a formal contract, or a contract implied from the circumstances. 

Singfield v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 389 F.3d 555, 565 (6th Cir. 2004) (citing Perry v. 

Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)). An employer’s policies and practices can justify an 

employee’s claim of entitlement to continued employment. Christian v. Belcher, 888 F.2d 

410, 417 (6th Cir. 1989). Plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a deprivation of a protected 

property interest based on Defendant City of Cincinnati’s customs and practices in 

allowing those CPD officers interested in rank reclassifications to submit paperwork in a 

reclassification process; Defendant City of Cincinnati’s request that he resubmit his 

specific paperwork in light of a new Civil Service/HR reclassification process; the grant of 

the reclassification in rank to his comparable colleague in the Cincinnati Fire Department;

and Defendant City of Cincinnati’s providing him with a Civil Service Commission hearing

regarding the reclassification denial. (Doc. 41). While the customs and practices that 

Plaintiff alleges may be difficult to prove at later stages in this matter, the Court assumes 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 16 of 25 PAGEID #: 568
17

that they exist at this stage. See Martinez v. City of Cleveland, No. 1:15-CV-01686, 2016 

WL 5338013, at *4 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 23, 2016), aff'd, 700 F. App'x 521 (6th Cir. 2017); 

see also Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm'n, 946 F.2d 1233, 1236 (6th Cir. 

1991). Dismissal of this claim is not warranted.

e. Tortious Interference with a Business Relationship Claim

The Third Amended Complaint alleges that Defendants tortiously interfered with 

Plaintiff’s reasonably expected future employment by denying his reclassification request. 

(Doc. 41 ¶¶ 126-31). To recover in Ohio on a claim of tortious interference with business 

relationships, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a business relationship; (2) the wrongdoer's 

knowledge thereof; (3) an intentional interference causing a breach or termination of the 

relationship; and (4) damages resulting therefrom.” Prosonic Corp. v. Stafford, 539 F. 

Supp. 2d 999, 1006 (S.D. Ohio 2008).

2

The Ohio Supreme Court held that a plaintiff could not bring an action for tortious 

interference against her former supervisor, the defendant, because an action did not exist 

when the act complained of was within the defendant's duties. Anderson v. Minter, 

291 N.E.2d 457, 461 (1972) (noting, however, that an action may be maintained against 

an outsider to an employment relationship); cf. A&B-Abell Elevator Co. v. Columbus/Cent. 

Ohio Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 651 N.E.2d 1283, 1294 (1995) (“Tortious 

interference with business relationships ‘generally occur[s] when a person, without a 

privilege to do so, induces or otherwise purposely causes a third person not to enter into 

or continue a business relation with another.’”). Likewise, “[a] person in a supervisory 

2 Cf. Miami Valley Mobile Health Servs., Inc. v. ExamOne Worldwide, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 2d 925, 942 (S.D. 

Ohio 2012) (“The main distinction between tortious interference with a contractual relationship and tortious 

interference with a business relationship is that interference with a business relationship includes intentional 

interference with prospective contractual relations, not yet reduced to a contract.”).

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 17 of 25 PAGEID #: 569
18

capacity or other position of authority over the employee cannot be sued for interfering 

with the employment relationship that it is his duty to monitor, supervise, or enforce.”

Slyman v. Shipman, Dixon & Livingston, Co., L.P.A., 2009-Ohio-4126, ¶ 12.

As Defendants were Plaintiff’s supervisors in the business relationship with which 

they allegedly interfered, and the decision of whether to reclassify Plaintiff occurred within 

the employment relationship between Defendants and Plaintiff, Defendants cannot be 

held liable for tortious interference. See id.; Anderson, 291 N.E.2d at 461. The Court is 

not persuaded by Plaintiff’s assertion, without citation to supporting authority, that 

Defendants are liable because they acted in retaliation and thus outside of their 

employment duties. (Doc. 46 PageID 518); see Slyman, 2009-Ohio-4126, ¶ 12 (“Liability 

will not arise even in instances where a supervisor's conduct may be characterized as 

malicious.”) (citing Anderson, 291 N.E.2d at 461). Defendants’ denial of Plaintiff’s 

reclassification request took place in an employment context such that Plaintiff cannot 

bring a tortious interference claim, and dismissal is proper.

f. Defamation Claims

Plaintiff brings two defamation claims: one against Defendants Cranley and Black 

together (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 132-40) and one against Defendant Black separately (id. ¶¶ 164-

180). Plaintiff clarifies that he brings these two claims as claims of defamation per se. 

(Doc. 46 PageID 520).

In Ohio, the tort of defamation has four elements: a false and defamatory statement 

concerning another; unprivileged publication to a third party; fault amounting to at least 

negligence by the publisher; and either actionability of the statement irrespective of a 

special harm or the existence of a special harm caused by the publication. Harris v. 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 18 of 25 PAGEID #: 570
19

Bornhorst, 513 F.3d 503, 522 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Akron-Canton Waste Oil, Inc. v. 

Safety-Kleen Oil Serv., Inc., 611 N.E.2d 955, 962 (1992)). To constitute defamation per 

se, the “words must be of such a nature that courts can presume as a matter of law that 

they tend to degrade or disgrace the person of whom they are written or spoken, or hold 

him up to public hatred, contempt or scorn.” Moore v. P. W. Pub. Co., 209 N.E.2d 412, 

415 (1965). “A statement is defamation per se if it ‘tends to injure a person in his or her 

trade, profession, or occupation . . . [and] both damages and actual malice are presumed 

to exist.’” Lennon v. Cuyahoga Cty. Juvenile Court, 2006-Ohio-2587, ¶ 25 (quoting 

Knowles v. Ohio State Univ., 2002-Ohio-6962, ¶ 24). Regarding defamation per se,

although the law presumes the existence of damages and actual malice, the plaintiff must 

still present sufficient evidence of the remaining elements of a defamation claim. Edelstein 

v. Stephens, No. 1:17CV305, 2020 WL 1846745, at *10 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 13, 2020).

i. Defendants Cranley and Black

Defendants Cranley and Black contend that Plaintiff’s defamation claim against 

them constitutes an impermissible recitation of legal conclusions and contains insufficient 

factual allegations to state a claim. (Doc. 43 PageID 488). The Third Amended Complaint 

includes three specific statements by Defendants Cranley and Black that Plaintiff argues

are actionable and false: that he is “racist,” that he is a “bad cop,” and that he filed this 

lawsuit because he wanted to undermine city contracts with minority-owned businesses. 

(Doc. 41 ¶ 142).

Starting with the first element of defamation—a false and defamatory statement 

concerning another—the question of whether a given statement is actionable is a matter 

of law to be determined by the Court. Am. Chem. Soc. v. Leadscope, Inc., 978 N.E.2d 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 19 of 25 PAGEID #: 571
20

832, 853 (2012). To determine whether a statement is an actionable false statement of 

fact, or an opinion protected by the First Amendment, “[c]onsideration of the totality of 

circumstances to ascertain whether a statement is opinion or fact involves at least four 

factors. First is the specific language used, second is whether the statement is verifiable, 

third is the general context of the statement and fourth is the broader context in which the 

statement appeared.” Scott v. News-Herald, 496 N.E.2d 699 (1986).

Use of the term racist “weighs heavily toward actionability,” and the more difficult 

issue in determining whether the term racist is actionable is whether it is verifiable, i.e., 

objectively capable of proof or disproof. See Lennon, 2006-Ohio-2587, ¶ 30. One factor 

that points towards verifiability is whether a reasonable observer would think that the 

accusation of racism is based on undisclosed fact. See id. Here, the Court finds that a 

reasonable observer would think that the accusation of racism is based on an undisclosed 

fact because it is the mayor and the city manager speaking about a high-level city 

employee to local leaders. In terms of the context of the statement, the mayor speaking 

on the record to local leaders and the news media suggest that this is more than, for 

example, the workplace gossip at issue in Lennon. Based on the facts alleged in the Third 

Amended Complaint, and for purposes of this Motion only, the Court find that this specific 

Plaintiff allegedly being called racist is plausibly defamatory as a matter of law. For similar 

reasons, the Court finds that this Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendant Cranley’s and 

Defendant Black’s statements that Plaintiff was a bad cop who acts to undermine city 

contracts with minority businesses are plausibly defamatory as a matter of law.

Turning to the second element of defamation, the Third Amended Complaint 

sufficiently alleges publication, as it states that “Defendants published these statements 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 20 of 25 PAGEID #: 572
21

to various persons, including but not limited to Cincinnati City Council, employees of the 

City, prominent members of the African-American community, and local news media,” 

and provides a general time-frame, “[s]ince September 12, 2017.” (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 133, 135).

Regarding the remaining defamation elements, the Third Amended Complaint sufficiently 

alleges that Defendants Cranley and Black made these statements with actual malice

and that these statements are defamation per se. The Court finds that this defamation 

claim should not be dismissed.

ii. Defendant Black

Defendant Black argues that Plaintiff’s separate defamation claim against him

must fail, as the Third Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege that his statements 

were about Plaintiff. (Doc. 43 PageID 489). Plaintiff does not respond to this argument 

(Doc. 46 PageID 518-20), and the Court will construe his silence as a concession.

Dismissal of the defamation claim against Defendant Black is proper.

g. Civil Conspiracy Claim

The Third Amended Complaint includes a state law civil conspiracy claim against 

Defendants Cranley and Black and alleges that they maliciously conspired to defame 

Plaintiff through an agreement to publish, and to encourage and compel others to publish, 

comments about Plaintiff describing him as a “racist,” a “bad cop,” and someone who 

intended to undermine the contractual relationship between minority-owned businesses

and Defendant City of Cincinnati. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 141-43).

The Supreme Court of Ohio defines civil conspiracy as “‘a malicious combination 

of two or more persons to injure another in person or property, in a way not competent 

for one alone, resulting in actual damages.'” Dunning v. Varnau, No. 1:14CV932, 2015 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 21 of 25 PAGEID #: 573
22

WL 5729332, at *13 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 30, 2015) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Leahey 

Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519, 534 (6th Cir. 2000)). To state a claim of civil conspiracy, the 

following elements must be shown: (1) a malicious combination; (2) two or more persons; 

(3) injury to person or property; and (4) existence of an unlawful act independent from the 

actual conspiracy. Id.

Defendants assert that Plaintiff’s claim is barred by the intra-corporate conspiracy

doctrine. (Doc. 43 PageID 489-90). ”The intra-corporate conspiracy doctrine provides that 

employees of a corporation or governmental entity cannot conspire among themselves 

because they are treated as one entity.” Dunning, 2015 WL 5729332, at *14 (citing Nuovo 

v. The Ohio State Univ., 726 F. Supp. 2d 829, 845 (S.D. Ohio 2010)). An exception to the 

doctrine exists when the challenged activity takes place outside the scope of employment. 

Id. (citing Johnson v. Hills & Dales General Hosp., 40 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1994)). Here, 

Plaintiff sufficiently alleges that the challenged alleged activity, publishing the above 

comments about Plaintiff, took place outside of the scope of Defendant Cranley’s and 

Defendant Black’s employment. (Doc. 41 ¶ 142). Dismissal is not warranted.

h. Statutory Whistleblower Claim

The Third Amended Complaint includes a statutory whistleblower claim against 

Defendant City of Cincinnati regarding the February 2018 overtime audit report. (Doc. 41 

¶¶ 150-56). Defendants contend that this claim fails, as the Third Amended Complaint 

does not include sufficient allegations that Plaintiff strictly complied with the requirements 

of Ohio’s whistleblower statute. (Doc. 43 PageID 490-91).

Ohio’s whistleblower statute, Ohio Revised Code § 4113.52, “provides a procedure 

for an employee to follow if the employee becomes aware of a violation of any state or 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 22 of 25 PAGEID #: 574
23

federal statute, ordinance or regulation, work rule or company policy, that the employee 

reasonably believes is a criminal offense, or is likely to cause an imminent risk of physical 

harm to persons or a hazard to public health or safety, or is a felony.” Keehan v. Certech, 

Inc., No. 5:15-CV-1236, 2015 WL 8483179, at *3 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 10, 2015). “That 

procedure begins with oral notification of the employee's supervisor, followed by a written 

report.” Id. (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52(A)(1)(a)). The “statute prohibits an employer 

from taking disciplinary or retaliatory action against an employee for making a report 

authorized by § 4113.52(A).” Id. (citing Ohio Rev. Code § 4113.52(B)). Strict compliance 

with the dictates of the whistleblower statute is required for an employee to obtain its 

protection. Contreras v. Ferro Corp., 652 N.E.2d 940, 946 (1995).

According to the Third Amended Complaint, Plaintiff supervised the overtime audit, 

believed that Captain Bardua’s alleged abuse of overtime system constituted felony theft, 

and orally notified Captain Bardua and Defendant Isaac of his concerns regarding Captain 

Bardua’s overtime abuse. (Doc. 41). The Third Amended Complaint does not allege that 

Plaintiff drafted, authored, co-authored, or submitted the written audit report to Defendant 

Isaac. Id. In Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, he 

alleges, for the first time, that, when Defendant Isaac failed and/or refused to 

acknowledge Plaintiff’s concerns about Captain Bardua’s improper use of overtime,

“Captain Butler and Lt. Col. Bailey issued the Audit Report that they had coauthored.” 

(Doc. 46 PageID 525). The Court declines to consider this argument, as Plaintiff may not 

use his Response in Opposition to amend his operative complaint in this matter for a 

fourth time. See, e.g., Brown v. Whirlpool Corp., 996 F.Supp.2d 623, 645 (N.D. Ohio 

2014). Because the Third Amended Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff submitted a 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 23 of 25 PAGEID #: 575
24

written report to his supervisor, the Third Amended Complaint does not sufficiently allege 

his strict compliance with the Ohio Whistleblower statute, and dismissal of this claim is 

proper.

i. Common Law Whistleblower Claim

The Third Amended Complaint includes a common law whistleblower claim,

commonly referred to as a Greeley claim, against Defendant City of Cincinnati and 

Defendant Isaac. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 157-63). Defendant City of Cincinnati and Defendant Isaac 

argue that this claim fails, as Plaintiff is a classified employee and represented by a union. 

(Doc. 43 PageID 490). Plaintiff does not respond to this argument (Doc. 46 PageID 522-

26), and the Court will construe his silence as a concession. Dismissal of Plaintiff’s 

common law whistleblower claim is warranted.

j. Spoliation of Evidence Claim

The Court has already found that Plaintiff’s intentional spoliation of evidence claim 

is sufficiently pled such that dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is not proper. (Doc. 40).

k. Qualified Immunity

The individual Defendants assert that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to 

Plaintiff’s federal claims, as he cannot establish violations of his constitutionally protected 

rights. (Doc. 43 PageID 492-93). In light of the above holdings regarding Plaintiff’s First 

Amendment retaliation and procedural due process right claims, the Court declines to 

hold that the individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity at this stage in 

proceedings. See Wesley v. Campbell, 779 F.3d 421, 433 (6th Cir. 2015) (“it is generally 

inappropriate for a district court to grant a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on the basis of 

qualified immunity.”); see also Evans–Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City Exempted 

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 24 of 25 PAGEID #: 576
25

Village Sch. Dist., 428 F.3d 223, 235 (6th Cir. 2005) (Sutton, J., concurring) (explaining

that the fact-intensive nature of the qualified immunity test make it “difficult for a defendant 

to claim qualified immunity on the pleadings before discovery”) (emphasis in original).

l. State Law Immunity

The individual Defendants also argue that they are entitled to immunity pursuant 

to Ohio Revised Code § 2744.09(A)(6). (Doc. 43 PageID 493-94). With the exception of 

Defendant Hill-Christian, the Court finds that Defendants are not entitled to individual 

immunity under Ohio law at this juncture in light of Plaintiff’s allegations in the Third 

Amended Complaint that the individual Defendants acted maliciously. (Doc. 41 ¶¶ 112, 

124, 137, 140, 124, 148); see Colorez, Case No. 1:17-cv-737, Doc. 14 PageID 92. The 

Court agrees that the state law claims against Defendant Hill-Christian should be 

dismissed.

III. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 

Plaintiff’s Third Amended Complaint (Doc. 43) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part,

as discussed above. It is further ORDERED that the Clerk shall update the docket in this 

matter to reflect that the Court previously GRANTED Defendants’ Motion to Stay 

Discovery (Doc. 49) at the February 11, 2020 telephone status conference. See Feb. 11, 

2020 Docket Entry. The Court will schedule a telephone conference to discuss the 

calendar in this matter shortly.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

_s/ Michael R. Barrett________

Michael R. Barrett, Judge

United States District Court

Case: 1:17-cv-00604-MRB Doc #: 52 Filed: 07/27/20 Page: 25 of 25 PAGEID #: 577