COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judge Benton, Senior Judge Cole and 

 Retired Judge Trabue*

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

LEE EDWARD SATTLER 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 0146-94-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 MAY 16, 1995 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HANOVER COUNTY 

Richard H. C. Taylor, Judge 

 Robert G. Cabell, Jr., for appellant. 

 Kathleen B. Martin, Assistant Attorney General 

 (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on brief), 

 for appellee. 

 This appeal arises from the trial judge's denial of a motion 

to suppress evidence obtained during a warrantless search. Lee 

Edward Sattler contends that the trial judge erred in holding 

that a police officer lawfully searched Sattler before issuing a 

summons for a traffic violation. We reverse the trial judge's 

refusal to suppress the evidence. 

 The evidence presented at the suppression hearing proved 

that a state police officer observed Sattler's automobile 

abruptly turn from an interstate highway onto an exit. The 

officer followed the automobile but did not signal Sattler to 

stop because he had not decided to stop the driver. The officer 

testified that as the automobile approached a service station he 

 

 *Retired Judge Kenneth E. Trabue took part in the 

consideration of this case by designation pursuant to Code 

§ 17-116.01. 
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saw a radar detector device and made the decision to stop the 

driver and issue a citation. When Sattler drove to the station's 

fuel pump and exited his automobile, the officer parked his 

vehicle behind Sattler's automobile and asked Sattler for his 

driver's license, registration, and radar detector device. The 

officer told Sattler that he would issue a summons for the radar 

detector violation; however, he also told Sattler that he could 

pump the gas, pay for it, and then move his automobile. The 

officer moved his vehicle to a side area. When Sattler completed 

the purchase and moved his automobile to join the officer, the 

officer told Sattler to sit in the officer's vehicle but that he 

would first "pat" Sattler for weapons. The officer testified 

that he "pat[s] everybody down [for weapons] prior to them coming 

back to [his] vehicle." 

 During the frisk for weapons, the officer felt an object in 

Sattler's pocket. He said that when Sattler took a step back, he 

reached into Sattler's pocket and retrieved a pipe. He then 

arrested Sattler for possession of marijuana that he saw in the 

pipe. After placing handcuffs on Sattler, the officer searched 

Sattler's automobile and seized a bag of marijuana and psilocyn. 

 The trial judge found that the officer's search for weapons 

was reasonable and refused to suppress the evidence. At trial, 

where the evidence was admitted, Sattler was convicted of 

possession of marijuana and possession of psilocyn. 

 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and 
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seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968). "Whether a 

search . . . is unreasonable is determined by balancing the 

individual's right to be free from arbitrary government 

intrusions against society's countervailing interest in 

preventing or detecting crime and in protecting its law 

enforcement officers." Stanley v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 873, 

875, 433 S.E.2d 512, 513 (1993). To conduct a patdown search, a 

police officer must be able to "'"point to specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 

from those facts,"' reasonably lead him to conclude, 'in light of 

his experience, that "criminal activity may be afoot" and that 

the suspect "may be armed and presently dangerous."'" Id.

(citations omitted). In Stanley, we held that it was 

unreasonable for police officers to conclude that a person on a 

motor scooter was armed and dangerous because a police officer 

saw a bulge in the person's pocket following a traffic stop. 16 

Va. App. at 877, 433 S.E.2d at 515. 

 The evidence at the suppression hearing failed to prove that 

the officer had specific and articulable facts upon which to 

conclude that Sattler was armed and dangerous. The officer 

initially detained Sattler solely for the purpose of issuing a 

summons for a traffic infraction. Sattler was not under arrest. 

 The officer offered no reason to support a belief that Sattler 

was armed or dangerous or that he possessed illegal drugs. 

 The officer searched Sattler solely because of his general 
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policy of searching every person entering his vehicle. In every 

encounter, "Terry requires reasonable, individualized suspicion 

before a frisk for weapons can be conducted." Maryland v. Buie, 

494 U.S. 325, 334 n.2 (1990). The officer's generalized policy 

of frisking all persons does not satisfy the restrictions imposed 

by Terry. "Indeed, if everyone is assumed to be armed and 

dangerous until the officer is satisfied that he or she is not, 

then officers would be able to frisk at will -- a result not 

contemplated by the Fourth Amendment." State v. Garland, 636 

A.2d 541, 548 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1994). 

 Accordingly, we hold that the trial judge erred in finding 

that the officer's search was reasonable and in refusing to 

suppress the seized evidence. 

 Reversed and remanded. 
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Cole, J., concurring. 

 I concur in the judgment reversing the trial court's refusal 

to suppress the evidence. However, my opinion is based upon the 

inadequate record in this case. 

 The operation of a motor vehicle equipped with a radar 

detector to detect radar used by law enforcement personnel is 

unlawful on the highways of the Commonwealth and constitutes a 

traffic infraction. Code § 46.2-1079. Traffic infractions are 

not felonies or misdemeanors but are violations of public order 

and are not deemed criminal in nature. Code § 18.2-8. However, 

Code § 46.2-937 provides that "[f]or purposes of arrest, traffic 

infractions shall be treated as misdemeanors" and "the authority 

and duties of arresting officers shall be the same for traffic 

infractions as for misdemeanors." If the offense of possession 

of a radar detector was a misdemeanor, the officer could have 

searched the defendant incident to the arrest. See Leeth v. 

Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340-41, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982) 

(holding that because the officer possessed probable cause, he 

could search the car for a radar detector). None of these issues 

was raised in the trial court or on appeal. The only issue 

raised was the reasonableness of the Terry stop. The only reason 

given for the patdown was the officer's personal policy of 

frisking everyone who entered his police car. Based upon this 

record, I join the majority opinion.