Filed 4/2/13 Brown v. Mid-Century Ins. CA2/7 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

LEROY BROWN et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.

MID-CENTURY INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant and Respondent. B238357
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC433800)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superi or Court of Los Angeles County, Richard Rico, Judge. Affirmed. Donna Bader and Donahue & Horrow, Mi chael B. Horrow, for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Stone & Hiles, David L. Schaffer, a nd Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, Robert A. Olson and Gary J. Wa x, for Defendant and Respondent.

__________ ____________2 INTRODUCTION Leroy and Terrie Brown appeal the trial court’s judgment in favor of defendant and respondent Mid-Century Insurance Compan y on the Browns’ claims for breach of contract and breach of the implie d covenant of good faith and fa ir dealing. The trial court
concluded that the Browns’ claim for water damage caused by a br oken pipe in their
house was not covered under their Mid-Cent ury policy and that Mid-Century was entitled to summary judgment. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCED URAL BACKGROUND
A. The Water On or about February 18, 2009 the Br owns began observing condensation on the windows of their three-story, split-level hom e and on the drywall around the windows.
There was moisture from the windowsills running down the wa lls and mildew on some of
the windows and walls. When they cleaned the condensation off the windows, it returned the next day. About a week later, the Brow ns began noticing mold forming around the
inside of their windows and on the walls in the living room and kitchen, “developing everywhere simultaneously.” Every room th at had a window had mold or mildew.
On March 17 or March 18 , 2009 Leroy Brown’s brothe r, Robert Brown, crawled
under the house and observed moisture. Robe rt Brown testified at his deposition that he shined a flashlight into the crawl space and observ ed damp soil. Leroy Brown testified
that he was not able to see the source of th e water, nor did he hear anything like water spraying. After his brother came out of the crawl space, Leroy Brown shut off the water to the house, told his wife ab out the problem, and then either he or his wife called the insurance agent. On March 18, 2009 the Browns hired a plumber, Michael Lewis, to find and fix the leak. Leroy Brown took Lewis to the la undry room, where there was moisture on the walls. Lewis testified in his deposition that when Mr. Brown took him to a hallway and the laundry area, he could see condensatio n and moisture on the walls. Lewis told Mr. Brown that “from experience, it seemed like . . . he had a hot water leak. And because his home was on slab, it probably wa s underneath the cement.” Lewis did a3 couple of tests and determined that it was hot water. Lewis testified that he told
Mr. Brown that “the leak was on the hot water si de. And in that situation, I told him that when you have a slab house, that sometimes you can’t – you can’t find the leak because water [has] a way of traveling. The leak coul d have been anywhere in the bottom floor of the house, and because it already had made a pa th, the water was just trickling, you know, wherever it was coming out at. And I told him, pretty much because we had the most damage in the laundry room, that nine times out of ten, it was going to be in the laundry
room.” 1 Lewis also went into the crawl space under the house where he encountered mud and discovered a pool of water that appear ed “pretty deep.” Wh ile Lewis was in the crawl space, Mr. Brown turned on the water “very low” so Lewis could determine where the water was coming from. Lewis observed th at water was coming into the crawl space from the backside of a vertical pressurized c opper hot water line attached to the hot water
manifold. Lewis then went into the laundry room and began drilling with a jackhammer and searching for the hot and cold water manifolds, with the wate r system still off. When he located the hot water manifold, he “got the pipe exposed and [saw] the leak.” With the water turned on “very low,” Mr. Brown went back into th e house and observed “water coming from an open hole in the pipe,” which “w as just a drip out at that point, just enough to show me where the water was coming out . . . the back side of the pipe.” The water was coming out at “a slow pace, beca use [Leroy Brown] did not turn it on full
blast.” The Browns notified Mid-Century of the problem.

1 Lewis further explained: “Once water – a pipe burst or anything like that leaks and if it’s underground, once it makes its path . . . to where it finds an opening where it can come out at, that doesn’t me an that that’s where the leak is. That’s just . . . where it found a place to come out at . . . . So I wanted to explain th at to him so he could know. Because once I went under the house and [s aw] the pipes coming up on the foundation part of the house, I told him it was possible th at it could be right there, but, also, it could be further. And if it was further than what we agreed on, you know, trying to find it, then the best solution would be to re route the hot water system.”4 B. The Policy Mid-Century had issued the Browns a “Farmers Next Generation Homeowners Policy” providing them with first party proper ty damage coverage for structural damage in the amount of $404,000, with a $1,000 de ductible. The policy insured some, but not all, of the Browns’ property and stated “[c] overage is dependent up on both the (1) cause of the loss or damage and (2) type of loss or damage.” The policy listed certain types of loss or damage that were not covered under the policy, “however caused,” including “loss or damage consisting of, comp osed of or which is water damage.” The policy included an “extension of coverage” th at provided “limited” water da mage coverage “for direct physical loss or damage to covered property from direct contact with water, but only if the water results from . . . [¶] (4) a sudden an d accidental discharge, eruption, overflow or release of water . . . [¶] (i) from within any portion of: (a) a plumbing system.” The policy described what was not included in the limited water damage coverage: “A sudden and accidental discharge, eruption, overflow or rel ease of water does not include a constant or repeating gradual, intermittent or slow release of water, or the infiltration or presence of water over a period of time. We do not cover any water, or the presence of water, over a period of time from any constant or repeating gr adual, intermittent or slow discharge, seepage, leakage, trickle, collecti ng infiltration, or overflow of water from any source . . . whether known or unknown to any insured.” For mold, the policy stated : “We do not insure loss or damage consisting of, composed of, or which is fungi. Further, we do not insure any remediation.” The policy also contained the following exclusion: “‘We do not insure loss or damage directly or indirectly caused by, arising out of or resu lting from fungi or the discharge, dispersal, migration, release or escape of any fu ngi. Further, we do not insure any remediation . . . . ” The policy defined fungi as “any part or form of fungus, fungi [or]
mold . . . .”
C. The Investigation On March 20, 2009 Mid-Century claim re presentative Seann Clifford inspected the Browns’ home and took photographs of the laundry room and the adjacent5 crawlspace. Clifford “observed pervasive, vi sible mold and moisture on the interior walls
of each level” of the Browns’ home. Clifford stated in his declaration that Mr. Brown took him to the laundry room and showed him “the horizontal section of the piping which had been leaking. The section, which was part of a pressurized hot water line attached to the hot water manifold, wa s heavily corroded near a 90 degree angle bend. The horizontal section of the pipe below the bend had been embedded in the room’s concrete slab foundation.” Clifford inspected the pi pe and “observed and ph otographed a hole in the pipe approximately 1/8 inch in diameter in the section of pipe that had been embedded in the room’s concrete foundation,” and saw that the “hole was facing down.” Mid-Century then assigned the Browns’ cl aim to another claims representative, Rosie Acevedo, who inspected the home th e next day, March 21, 2009. Acevedo observed mold on the walls in the laundry room , the office, the second floor living room, the kitchen, and the third floor bathrooms, a nd on clothing in a room next to one of the bathrooms. The Browns told Acevedo, in r ecorded statements, that they began noticing evidence of a water leak, co ndensation on the windows, and mold, approximately one
month earlier. The Browns also told Aceved o that the condensation stopped forming on the windows when they tu rned off the hot water on March 17, 2009. On March 23, 2009 Mid-Century retained American Leak Detection to inspect the
house and determine whether there were an y more leaks in the plumbing system.
American Leak determined th at the interior plumbing syst em was “‘sound’” and that
there were no other leaks. On March 27, 2009 Mid-Centur y denied the Browns’ claim. Acevedo wrote the Browns and stated that Mid-Century’s “investig ation revealed that the pipe in the wall of the laundry room that runs into your crawl sp ace has been leaking water into your crawl space over a period of time ca using condensation and mold growth through out [ sic ] your home. Unfortunately, this loss is uninsur ed or excluded from coverage under your policy.” Acevedo determined that “the cause of loss was wear and tear which caused a hole in the pipe, allowing water to leak in to the crawl space over a period of time.” Acevedo then quoted at length various provisions in the polic y, including the extension of6 limited water coverage for “sudden and acci dental discharge, eruption, overflow or release of water” from a plumbing system or household appliance.
D. The Action
The Browns filed this action on March 16, 2010, alleging causes of action for breach of written contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, unfair comp etition, and declaratory relie f. The Browns allege that their “home was damaged when a plumbing pi pe burst causing Plaintiffs substantial loss.” On May 20, 2010 the Browns dismisse d their causes of action for negligence, fraud, unfair competition, and declaratory relief, leaving onl y their causes of action for breach of contract and breach of the imp lied covenant. Mid- Century answered on June 17, 2010.
E. The Motion for Summary Judgment On August 5, 2011 Mid-Century filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative for summary adjudi cation on the Browns’ claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair deali ng, and for punitive damages. Mid-Century argued that it did not breach the policy or act in bad faith because the water damage in the Browns’ home was caused by a long-term, gradual, incremental discharge or release of water, and not by a sudden and accidental discharge or release of water. Mid-Century also argued that its interpreta tion of the policy was reasonable and that it did not engage in any conduct that could justify a claim for punitive damages. In support of its motion Mid-Century su bmitted the declarations of Clifford and Acevedo, as well as an expert declaration by Claude LeBlanc. LeBlanc is a licensed plumbing contractor with 33 years of experience investigating, diagnos ing, repairing, and replacing “more than 500 broken pressurized hot water lines in residential plumbing systems,” with expertise in “leak detection, duration, and causation and plumbing repair and design.” LeBlanc stated th at on June 14, 2011 he insp ected the 24-inch section of pipe that had been removed from the Brow ns’ house and found “a jagged hole which measured approximately 1/8 inch in diamet er . . . surrounded by corrosion.” LeBlanc also reviewed 89 color photogra phs taken by Clifford depicti ng “the failed section of pipe7 before the section was cut out and preserved,” which showed that “the failed section was
encased in the concrete slab floor of the home’s laundry room which was adjacent to a crawl space that had a dirt floor u nder the home’s second floor.” LeBlanc noted from the photographs that “the portion of the pipe embedded in concrete was not wrapped with a plastic prot ective sleeve,” in violation of the California Plumbing Code, Calif ornia Code of Regulations, title 24 , part 5, sec tions 313.2 and
313.10.1. 2 According to LeBlanc, these regula tions require “copper pipes embedded in concrete to be wrapped with a plastic slee ve which serves to protect the pipe from coming into direct contact with the corrosive metallic elem ents present in concrete,” because otherwise “[t]hese corrosive elements will gradually cause corrosion damage to the exterior wall of a copper pipe.” LeBlanc gave his opinion that “t he hole in the section of copper pipe” he inspected “had formed as a result of ordinary wear and tear to the pipe
which corroded because it had been defectiv ely embedded into concrete without the required protective sleeve. . . . Based on the heavy corrosion evident on the exterior of the pipe during my inspection and the photogra phs I reviewed depicting the pipe before it was removed, it was obvious the section which failed had not been sleeved at the time it was installed.” LeBlanc stated that the pi pe’s “direct contact with these corrosive metallic elements” caused a “slow, gradual an d incremental deterioration of the pipe’s outer wall . . . near the pipe’s bend,” which in turn “cause d a pinhole-sized opening in the pipe to form through which hot water slow ly dripped out.” LeBlanc added that the deterioration process then accelerated beca use (1) hot water has “higher levels of
corrosive minerals than cold water” (because it is heated in a metal heater), (2) hot water

2 The California Plumbing Code is part of the California Building Standards Code. Building standards approved or adopte d by the California Building Standards Commission become part of the Building Standards Code. (See Plastic Pipe & Fittings Assn. v. California Bu ilding Standards Com. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4t h 1390, 1398, 1404- 1406.) Section 313.2 provid es: “No plumbing piping sha ll be directly embedded in concrete or masonry.” Section 313.10.1 provides: “Sleeves shall be provided to protect piping through concrete and mas onry walls and concrete floors.”8 escapes “under 55 to 80 p.s.i. of water pressure,” and (3) “the water pressure striking the
concrete” creates friction. LeBlanc opined that the “hot water whic h first escaped from the pipe was in the form of drips into the concre te which surrounded the pipe. As the size of the hole slowly increased, this dripping gradua lly turned into leakage. Eventually, the escaping water migrated to the adjacent dirt floor of the n earby crawlspace and slowly pooled there. This unabated continuous drippi ng and leaking lasted at leas t five months until the leak
was discovered and the water turned off on Marc h 17, 2009.” LeBlanc also reviewed
water bill and service records for the home, compared them to the previous year, and concluded that the Browns’ monthly water consumption increased during the period water was escaping from the pipe and then decr eased to normal levels after the repair. The Browns opposed the motion and subm itted an expert declaration by Harvey Kreitenberg, a licensed journeyman plumber whose “primary occupation is a forensic consultant plumber.” Kreitenberg also exam ined and photographed the pipe section and found two holes, one approximately 3/32 inch by 1/8 inch and one approximately 1/32 inch. Kreitenberg agreed that the pipe “failed due to a ye t to be identified form of corrosion.” Kreitenberg concluded that what had occurred “can be best described as a sudden breach of the pipe. Th is type of corrosion failure mechanism usually produces a
sudden breach in the wall of the pipe, creating a non water tight condition. As the corrosion process continues, th e size of the breach increases, ultimately producing a mist, stream and spray of water through the breach. It would have taken a mere fraction of [a] second (a ‘nano’ second’ [ sic ]) between the water tight a nd non water tight condition of the pipe in the Brown residence, which is the breach in the pipe.” 3 Kreitenberg concluded that the pipe “faile d suddenly, and ultimately a spra y or stream (not drips) of hot water shot through the holes in the pipe out into the area of th e house where the pipe was located,” and that “[h]ot water would have continued to spray and stream (not drip)
out the holes until the wate r line was shut off.”

3 A nanosecond is one billionth (10 -9 ) of a second.9 F. The Ruling The trial court granted Mid-Century’s mo tion for summary judgment, finding that none of the evidence submitted by the Browns “cre ates a dispute of fact as to the cause of the leak as set forth by Mid-Century’s expe rt.” The court found that Kreitenberg’s opinion that “the pipe’s breach only took a fa ction of a second does not mean that release
of water was ‘sudden.’” The court also noted that the Browns “do not dispute that the pipe leaked over a period of one to two mont hs, and that the leak was caused by corrosion which wore away at the pipe,” and that th e evidence presented by Kreitenberg “shows that the release of water was a ‘gradual . . . release of water . . . over a period of time,’ and not ‘a sudden . . . discharge, erupt ion, overflow or rele ase of water.’” The trial court entered judgment in favo r of Mid-Century on November 3, 2011. Mid-Century gave notice of the entry of judg ment on November 8, 2011, and the Browns filed a timely notice of app eal on January 6, 2012.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review Rulings on motions fo r summary judgment are reviewed de novo. ( Buss v. Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal. 4th 35, 60; see Cole v. Town of Los Gatos (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 749, 757 [“[b]ecause summar y judgment can raise only questions of law, we review the trial court’ s ruling without deference”].) “The standard of review is the same regardless of whether the trial c ourt grants or denies a summary judgment motion.” ( Benson v. Superior Court (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1179, 1184-1185.) “‘“While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.”’” ( Haynes v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2004) 32 Cal.4th 1198, 1204; see Arce v. Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, Inc. (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 471, 499-500.) “Int erpretation of an insurance policy is a question of law and follows the general rules of contract interpretation.” ( TIG Ins. Co. of Michigan v. Homestore, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.Ap p.4th 749, 755; see Waller v. Truck Ins. Exchange, Inc. (1995) 11 Cal.4th 1, 18; Whittaker Corp. v. Alli anz Underwriters, Inc. (1992) 11 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1238.) “The rule s governing policy inte rpretation require us10 to look first to the language of the contract in order to ascertain its plain meaning or the meaning a layperson would ordinarily attach to it.” ( Waller
, supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 18.) The mutual intention of the parties governs the interpretation of the policy, which is “inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract.” ( Ibid. ) “‘The “clear and explicit” meaning of these provis ions, interpreted in their “ordinary and popular sense,” unless “used by the parties in a technical sense or a special meaning is given to them by usage,” controls judicial interpretation.’” ( Ibid. ; see In re Insurance
Installment Fee Cases (2012) 211 Cal.Ap p.4th 1395, 1409.)
B. Breach of Contract
The Browns concede that they had the burden (1) “of proving their water damage is covered under their policy with Mid-Century,” and (2) “to present facts showing a ‘sudden release’ of water, causing damage to their home.” 4 (See Aydin Corp. v. First
State Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1183, 1191-1192.) The Browns do not argue that MidCentury failed to meet its initial burden on summary judgment to show that the damage was not caused by a sudden discharge of water. They do not disput e that the evidence Mid-Century presented regardin g the gradual deterioration of the pipe, the small size of the hole, and the existence of the effects of th e water for at least a month or two, satisfied Mid-Century’s initial burden on summary j udgment. The Browns contend that in response to Mid-Century’s showing they “pre sented admissible evid ence supporting the finding of a triable issue on this fact.” We disagree.
1. There was not “a sudden and accidental dischar ge, eruption, overflow or release of water” The Browns’ primary argumen t on appeal is that Kreitenberg created a triable issue of fact by stating in his declarati on in opposition to Mid- Century’s motion for summary judgment that “the pipe burst su ddenly—in a ‘nano-second,’ spraying water in the crawlspace.” This testimony, however, does not change the fact that the release of water, even if it commenced with a nanos econd “breach in the wa ll of the pipe” and

4 Because there is no dispute that the di scharge of water in the Browns’ home was accidental, the only issue is whet her the discharge was “sudden.”11 resulted in a “mist, stream and spray,” was c onstant or intermittent, and occurred over a period of “a month or two” (according to th e Browns) or five mont hs (according to MidCentury). Even if, as Kreitenbe rg testified, the pipe “faile d suddenly,” the water damage according to Kreitenberg resulted from hot wate r “continu[ing] to spray and stream (not drip) out the holes until the water line was shut off.” The Brow ns’ policy with MidCentury did not cover such a “‘ constant or repeating . . . in termittent or slow release of water,’” whether the release was a drip, spray, or stream. 5 As the trial court recognized, “everybody agrees,” even Kreitenberg, “tha t this was something that occurred over a period of time.” Thus, whether the water leaked or sprayed or stream ed out of the hole(s) in the pipe, the water leaked, sp rayed, or streamed out consta ntly and gradually over time. Such a water discharge does not qualify as “sud den” under the plain meaning of the terms of the Browns’ policy. Nor does it qualify as “sudde n” under California law. “‘Sudden’ has a temporal element and does not mean a gradua l or continuous discharge.” ( Standun, Inc. v.
Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 882, 889; see Travelers Casualty &

5 There is actually no admissib le evidence in the record that water was spraying, as opposed to leaking, out of th e pipe. The only w itness the Browns claim saw a spray was Robert Brown, but the Browns did not su bmit any testimony from him. The Browns assert on appeal that Robert Brown “physic ally inspected the crawlspace under the laundry room and observed a ‘constant spray of water,’ which was not a slow trickle or leak.” In support of this assertion the Browns cite to excerpts of a recorded statement by Leroy Brown submitted by Mi d-Century that was not pr operly authenticated and constituted inadmissible hearsa y by Leroy Brown re peating a statement by his brother. (See Stockinger v. Feather River Community College (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1027-1028.) Moreover, the (inadmissible) statement attributed by Mr. Brown to his brother does not unequivocally state that wa ter was spraying rather than leaking, but states that there was “a constant flow . . . of water that was . . . a constant, you know, spray . . . or running of water.” The Browns also cite to an un authenticated document containing multiple levels of hearsay entitled “Claims Summary/I -Log Details.” This log includes a March 21, 2009 entry by a Mid- Century employee repeating a statement by Mr. Brown memorializing a statement by Robert Brown: “Brother came over on 3/17/09 and went into crawl space and saw alot of water on ground. He saw water coming from pipe. He saw a constant spray of water co ming out of the pipe facing crawl space not wall.”12 Surety Co. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1440, 1455 [“the interpretation of ‘sudden’ must include a temporal componen t; otherwise, the word is rendered mere surplusage”]; Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 715, 754 [“[w]e cannot reasonably call ‘sudden’ a pro cess that occurs slowly and incrementally over a relatively long time, no matter how unexp ected or unintended the process”].) In the context of the phrase “sudden and accidental,” the word sudden “ must , if it is to be anything more than a hiccup in front of the word ‘accidental,’ convey a temporal meaning of immediacy, quickness, or abruptness.” ( ACL Technologies, Inc. v. Northbrook Property & Casualty Ins. Co. (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 1773, 1786.) Thus, “whatever ‘sudden’ means, it does not mean gradual. The ordina ry person would never think that something whic h happened gradually also happened suddenly.” ( Id. at p. 1788.) The nature of the gradual water discharg e from the Browns’ pipe (even if initiated by a nanosecond breach in the wall of the pipe) and of the incremental effects of the water on the Browns’ house prec ludes any finding that the discharge was sudden. (See
Freedman v. State Farm Ins. Co. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 957 , 964 [“[g]iven the small size of the hole(s) through which the water leaked, and given the extensive amount of water damage . . . , the leak must have la sted a sufficiently long time, or stopped and started sufficiently many tim es, to count as ‘continuous’ or ‘repeated’ under any reasonable construction of those terms”]; Truck Ins. Exchange v. Pozzuoli (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th 856, 860 [“[a] ny continuous event, whethe r it be of 30 years’ or 2 months’ duration, is simply not ‘sudden’”].) A dishwater hose breaking in mid-cycle, a water heater giving out and flooding a room , or an overflowing toilet, is a sudden discharge of water. (See, e.g., De Bruyn v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1213 [overflowing toilets sudden and accidental]; but see Cardio Diagnostic Imaging, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (2012) 212 Cal.App. 4th 69, 71 [malfunctioni ng toilet that failed
to shut off water intake and overflowed be cause of blockage in the sewer line was not
covered because of exclusion for loss or da mages caused by water “that backs up or overflows from a sewer”].) A spray/stream/leak of water over several months is not.13 Kreitenberg’s opinion that the nanosecond “breach in the pipe” converted the pipe from a water-tight condition to a non-water-tight condition in an instant did not create a factual issue regarding whether the release of the water was sudden. Those courts that have considered the theory es poused by Kreitenberg have reje cted it. For example, in Saint Paul Surplus Lines In s. Co. v. Geo Pipe Co. (Tex.Ct.App. 2000) 25 S.W.3d 900, the court stated: “According to [the insured], the fact that th e leak was not discovered for a lengthy period of time does not negate the temporal suddenness with which the breach occurred. This argument has been descri bed as the ‘metaphysi cal moment’ theory. Under the logic of this theory, every even t or condition not exis ting from the dawn of
time would be considered ‘sudden’ because at one moment it did not exist and the next moment it did.” ( Id. at p. 905.) The court held that while “the time of discovery does not control whether the discharge was sudden,” a “discharge that continues over a lengthy period of time cannot be considered ‘sudden’ as a matter of law.” ( Ibid. ) Similarly, in American Ins. Co. v. Fa irchild Industries, Inc. (E.D.N.Y. 1994) 852 F.Supp. 1173, affd. (2d Cir. 1995) 56 F. 3d 435, the court rej ected the insured’s “argument that the pipe failure was ‘sudden’ de spite the fact that the process leading to the crack was a gradual one. It is apparently [the insured’s] position that there was some metaphysical moment before which the leak wa s not present. And thus, when the leak finally manifested itself, it was an abrupt event.” ( Id. at p. 1182, fn. 18.) The court noted that “[u]nder this type of reasoning, no event whatsoever could conceivably” not be sudden. ( Ibid. ; see Federated Mutual Ins. Co . v. Botkin Grain Co. (10th Cir. 1995) 64 F.3d 537, 540-541 [rejecti ng the insured’s argument th at “the temporal quality
ascribed to the word ‘sudden’ should be applied to the in ception rather than the duration of the pollution”]; SnyderGeneral Corp. v. Century Indem. Co. (N.D.Tex. 1995) 907 F.Supp. 991, 1001 [“the metaphysical mome nt principle,” which “suggests that every leak occurs suddenly because there will always be an instant in time when a once nonexistent leak ‘suddenly’ develops,” would “read the temporal co mponent of the term ‘sudden’ out of the Policy”], affd. in pa rt and vacated in part on other grounds, (5th Cir. 1997) 113 F.3d 536.) And in Mesa Operating Co. v. Ca lifornia Union Ins. Co.14 (Tex.Ct.App. 1999) 986 S.W.2d 749, the court rejected th e insured’s argument that salt water contamination from an underground we ll “occurred suddenly b ecause at one point in time the well was whole and, an instant later, salt water breached the well and began escaping into the aquifer.” ( Id. at p. 757.) A gradual process, viewed through an el ectron microscope that can show physical changes occurring in nanoseconds, can appear sudden at certain points in time. Given a small enough time interval, even a slow gradual leak is sudden. There is always a time,

t 1 , before the first water molecule breaches th e surface of a corroding pipe, and a time, t 2 , after the first water breaches the surface, such that the breach can appear sudden if t 2 - t 1 is small enough. Such a calculus, howeve r, does not make a gradual release of water
sudden. As the trial court stated, “[i]t was not a sudden burst . . . unless you used ‘sudden’ to just explain at one point in time there was no wate r, then there was water.” In concluding that Kreitenberg’s d eclaration did not create a triable issue of material fact, the trial court properly concluded that “the f act that the pipe’s breach only took a fraction
of a second does not mean the release of water was ‘sudden.’”
2. The efficient proximate cause doct rine does not apply to the Browns’ mold claim The Browns recognize that the policy di d not include coverage for mold. The policy listed mold as one of 13 uninsured types of loss or damage: “We do not insure loss or damage consisting of, composed of or which is fungi.” The policy also listed mold as one of 35 excluded causes of loss or damage: “We do not insure loss or damage directly or indirectly caused by, arising out of or resulting from fungi or the discharge, dispersal, migration, release or escape of a ny fungi.” The Browns argue that their mold damage was covered “because it resulted from di rect contact with the abrupt and sudden discharge of water,” and under the effici ent proximate cause doctrine the sudden discharge of water produced the conden sation and, eventually, the mold.15 The efficient proximate cause doctrine, codified in Insurance Code section 530, 6 provides that when “‘“a loss is caused by a combination of a covered and specifically excluded risks, the loss is covered if the cove red risk was the efficient proximate cause of the loss,” but “the loss is not covered if the covered risk was only a remote cause of the loss, or the excluded risk was the effici ent proximate, or predominate cause.”’” ( De Bruyn , supra , 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216; see Sabella v. Wisler (1963) 59 Cal.2d 21, 31-32 [“‘[i]n determini ng whether a loss is within an exce ption in a policy, where there is a concurrence of different causes, the effi cient cause—the one that sets others in
motion—is the cause to which th e loss is to be attributed, though the other causes may follow it, and operate more im mediately in producing the disaster’”].) The efficient proximate cause doctrine “applies only when tw o or more conceptually distinct perils
combine to cause the loss.” ( Roberts v. Assurance Co. of America (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 1398, 1409.) When “the evid ence shows the loss was in fact occasioned by only a single cause, albeit one susceptible to various characterizations, the efficient proximate cause analysis has no application.” ( Ibid. ) The efficient proximate cause doctrine doe s not apply to the Browns’ mold claim for two reasons. First, the efficient proxima te cause doctrine applies when “‘“a loss is caused by a combination of a covered a nd specifically excluded risks.”’” ( De Bruyn , supra , 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1216.) The on ly potentially “covered risk” the Browns point to is “the abrupt and sudden discharge of water.” As explained above, as a matter of law no sudden discharge of water occurred. Thus, this is not a situation where there is
both a covered risk and an excluded risk. Th ere are only two excluded risks: discharge of water that is not sudden, and mold.

6 Insurance Code section 530 provides: “A n insurer is liable for a loss of which a peril insured against was the proximate cause, although a peril not contemplated by the contract may have been a remote cause of the loss; but he is not liable for a loss of which the peril insured against was only a remote cause.” “The efficient proximate cause doctrine ‘is neither a Californi a invention nor novel.’” ( Julian v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 747, 753.)16 Second, two conceptually distinct risks or events did not cause the Browns’ loss.
In Finn v. Contin ental Ins. Co. (1990) 218 Cal.App.3d 69, where water leaking from a broken sewer pipe “for months or years” had damaged the foundation of the plaintiff’s
house and the insured’s “bro ad peril policy” excluded da mages from “continuous or repeated seepage or leakage of water,” the court held that the efficient proximate cause doctrine did not apply. ( Id. at pp. 70, 71.) The court stat ed: “Plaintiff argues that the break in the pipe was the efficient predomina ting cause, the leakage merely an immediate one. That argument is premised on view ing the leakage and the break as two conceptually distinct events, linked only casually. But ‘leakage’ and ‘seepage’ necessarily imply some break or gap in the thing leaking.” ( Id. at p. 72.) The court held that the efficient proximate cause doctrine “has no applica tion here because leakage and broken pipes are not two distinct or separate perils. . . . Leakage or seepage cannot occur without a rupture or incomplete joining of the pipes. This case involved not multiple causes but only one, a leaking pipe.” ( Ibid. ; cf. Brian Chuchua’s Jeep, Inc. v. Farmers Ins. Group (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1579 [damage ca used by a leak from a crack in an underground gasoline storage tank caused by an earthquake was covered despite a pollution exclusion because under the efficien t proximate cause doctrine there were “two causes: the earthquake and the leaking tank” ].) Similarly, the breaking of the Browns’ pipe was not “conceptually distinct” from the leaking, spraying, or streaming of water.
Like Finn , this case involves only one cause, a leaking/spraying/streaming pipe.
3. The policy is conspicuou s, plain, and clear The Browns argue that the extension of limited water coverage for damage to property from direct contact with water if the water results from a sudden and accidental discharge of water from a plumbing system is not conspicuous, plain and clear because it should be on page 21 of the policy under “Uninsured Lo ss or Damage and Excluded17 Causes of Loss of Damage,” rather than on page 14 of the policy under “Extensions of Coverage.” This argu ment is unconvincing. 7 “Our jurisprudence respecting conspicuou sness, consistently with the inherent logic of that concept, refers to how a coverage-limiting provision actually has been positioned and printed within the policy at issue.” ( Haynes , supra , 32 Cal.4th at p. 1209.) “‘A coverage limitation is conspicuous when it is positioned and printed in a manner that
will attract the reade r’s attention.’” ( Ortega v. Topa Ins. Co. (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 463, 476.) The provision of the Browns’ pol icy extending coverage for damage resulting from a sudden and accidental discharge of wate r, to the extent it is a “coverage-limiting provision,” is printed in read able and adequately-spaced pr int, organized in a helpful outline format, and positioned wh ere it should be in the se ction listing extensions of coverage. It is not hidden or concealed in fine print, a “dense pack” format, or an overcrowded page. (See TIG Ins. Co. of Michigan, supra, 137 Cal.App.4t h at p. 759 & fn. 11.) It actually appears ear lier in the policy than the Browns contend it should appear. Moreover, the section describing the types of uninsured loss and damage lists water damage as the first uncovered damage, and specif ically refers to the prior section of the policy containing the extensions of covera ge: “We do not insure loss or damage consisting of, composed of or which is water damage, except as covered under Section I - Extensions of Coverage, Limite d water coverage.” The sec tion containing the exclusions
lists water second and also refers to the limit water cove rage section: “Except as Section I - Extensions of Coverage, Lim ited water coverage, provides for limited coverage for water damage, we do not insure lo ss or damage directly or indirectly caused by, arising out of or resulting from water.” The table of c ontents refers to all three provisions. (See Mission Viejo Emergency Medical Asso ciates v. Beta Healthcare Group

7 Whether a coverage limitation is conspicuous, plain and cl ear is an issue of law, reviewed de novo. (See Waller
, supra , 11 Cal.4th at p. 18; Thompson v. Mercury Casualty Co. (2000) 84 Cal. App.4th 90, 94; Malcom v. Farmers New World Life Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 296, 300.)18 (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 11 46, 1157 [“[i]t is cons picuous in both the table of contents and the policy”].) The limited coverage for water damage fro m sudden and accidental discharge is also plain and clear. “To be plain and clea r, the substance of the exclusion must be precise and understandable,” and stated “in wo rds that are part of the working vocabulary of the average layperson.” ( TIG Ins. Co. of Michigan
, supra , 137 Cal.App.4th at pp. 759- 760; Malcom
, supra , 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 301.) The Br owns do not identify any language that they claim is not understandable. Although the Browns dispute Mid-Century’s interpretation of the terms of coverage provid ed by the policy, the Browns do not argue
that the words in the extens ion of limited water coverage or the exclusion for water damage (e.g., plumbing, discharge, eruption, overflow, release, constant, repeating, gradual, intermittent, infiltration) are difficult to understand. (Cf. Haynes , supra , 32 Cal.4th at p. 1205 [permissi ve user limitation in the Fi nancial Responsibility Law not “understandable to the average policy holder”]; Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. TAC Exterminators,
Inc. (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 564, 578 [exclusi on for “liability assumed by the insured under any contract or agreement except an incidental contract” not plain and clear]; Ponder v. Blue Cross of Southern California (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 709, 724 [exclusion for “temporomandibular joint syndrome” not “comprehensible to lay persons”].) Finally, as noted above, the policy gives an explanation of what is not included in the limited coverage for water damage: “A sudden and accidental discharge, eruption,
overflow or release of water doe s not include a constant or re peating gradual, intermittent or slow release of water, or the infiltration or presence of water over a period of time. We do not cover any water, or the presence of water, over a period of time from any constant or repeating gradual, intermittent or slow discharge, seepage, leakage, trickle, collecting infiltration, or overflow of wa ter from any source . . . whether known or unknown to the insured.” The Browns argue th at the policy’s use of the term “a period of19 time” in this explanation is “ambiguous and undefined,” and that a “reasonable consumer would not understand what a ‘per iod of time’ entailed . . . .” 8 The fact that the policy does not define “a period of time” does not necessarily create ambiguity. (See Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 866; Carson v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 409, 426- 427.) Moreover, although ther e may be, at the quantum leve l, some ambiguity in the concept of “a period of time,” an average la yperson understands generally what “a period of time” is, and understands th at for water escaping from a pipe, “one to two months” qualifies. The term “a period of time” has a well-established meaning in the context of running water, and the policy’s use of the term is plain and clear.
C. Breach of the Implie d Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing The Browns allege that Mid-Century breac hed the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to investigate thei r claim properly, engaging in unlawful and deceptive claims practices, and refusing to indemnify the Browns under the policy. Because the policy did not cover the Browns’ claims, however, the Browns do not have a claim for breach of the implie d covenant of good faith and fair dealing. (See Kransco v. American Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. (2000) 23 Cal.4th 390, 408 [“without coverage there can be no liability for bad faith on the part of the insurer”]; Cardio Diagnostic Imaging , supra , 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 77, [“because no policy benefits were due under the policy, [the insured’s] clai m for breach of the implied cove nant of good faith and fair dealing cannot be maintained”].)

8 The Browns argue that this alleged ambigu ity “leaves it to th e insurer to decide what is a ‘period of time.’” This suggests that the Browns’ are ac tually arguing that “a period of time” is vague, not ambiguous. (See State of California v. Continental Ins. Co. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 186, 195 [“ [a] policy provision will be c onsidered ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions, both of which are reasonable”].) Vagueness arises when a term lacks a definition, not when the term may have two or more. (See Brooklyn Navy Yard Cogeneration Partners v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 248, 258 [a vague term “has no specific definition or content”].)20 DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. Mid-Cent ury is to recover its costs on appeal.

SEGAL, J. 

We concur:

PERLUSS, P. J.

JACKSON, J.

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.