In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 00-2946

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

MARIO GRACIA,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Illinois.

No. 98 CR 40125--G. Patrick Murphy, Chief Judge.

ARGUED May 17, 2001--DECIDED November 19, 2001 

 Before HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., KANNE, and

ROVNER, Circuit Judges.

 HARLINGTON WOOD, JR., Circuit Judge. 

Mario Gracia ("Gracia") appeals his jury

conviction and sentencing on counts of

conspiracy to commit bank fraud under 18

U.S.C. secs. 371 & 1344, bank fraud

under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1344, wire fraud

under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1343, and conspiracy

to commit money laundering under 18

U.S.C. sec. 1956(h). We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. sec. 1291, and we affirm

both the conviction and sentence.

I. BACKGROUND

 Because most of Gracia’s arguments are

challenges to the factual findings and

sufficiency of the evidence, the facts,

as set forth in the trial transcript, are

presented in detail. In 1995, a group of

approximately fifteen inmates

incarcerated at the federal penitentiary

in Greenville, Illinois devised and

implemented an extensive check kiting

scheme. The scheme was masterminded by

prisoner Ernie Hill and included Jesus

Bonillas. Unable to conduct the bank

transactions themselves, Hill and the

inmates recruited numerous friends and

relatives outside of the prison. Hill

sent blank business checks to his halfbrother Michael Ochoa, who then filled
out the checks which were usually drawn

on the account of a closed or fictitious

mortgage company. The checks, most

written for tens of thousands of dollars,

were then sent directly to various banks

for deposit into the personal bank

accounts of individuals designated by

Hill or other co-conspirators.

 Most of the personal bank accounts were

ones that had not been recently opened

and were in good standing. The account

holders were carefully instructed when to

withdraw funds. Hill or a co-conspirator

would wait until the worthless check was

deposited, then allow a certain amount of

time for the check to be posted. A posted

check makes the funds available in the

account but has not yet been honored (or,

in this case, always declined) by the

bank on which it was drawn. The account

holder was instructed to withdraw money

during this crucial period before the

check bounced. The money was then split

between Hill, Ochoa, and other

participants. The success of the scheme

greatly depended on precision timing,

which necessitated three-way calls to co

ordinate the withdrawals. Gracia’s brief

states that losses to the banks totaled

approximately $430,000.

 Bonillas, who was married to Gracia’s

sister (who was also involved in the

scheme), recruited Gracia. Gracia

contacted his brother Frank ("Frank")/1

about participating. Both Gracia and

Frank resided in Tucson, Arizona. Frank

was instructed by Gracia to come to

Gracia’s home in order to take a

telephone call from Bonillas, who offered

to place a certain amount of money in

Frank’s bank account to be disbursed to

other parties as directed by Bonillas,

with Frank keeping a certain percentage.

Although Bonillas told Frank the money to

be deposited was money owed to himself

and other inmates, Frank testified that

he believed almost from the start that

this was a fraudulent scheme and was

convinced it was fraud by the time he

participated in the first transaction.

Two checks were eventually deposited in

Frank’s account, one for $20,300 and one

for $15,000. Frank was told by Bonillas

to withdraw $18,000 and to purchase two

cashier’s checks for $5,000 made payable

to Luisa Cardenas. At that same time,

Bonillas agreed that Frank could take

$3,000 of the money to purchase a
cashier’s check made payable to Frank’s

mortgage company. Bonillas also

instructed Frank to give $3,000 to

Gracia. 

 Frank sent the check to his mortgage

company but two days later the mortgage

company called to tell him the bank would

not honor the check. When this occurred,

Frank went to complain to his brother.

Gracia placed a call to Bonillas from his

home. Frank spoke with Bonillas and

threatened to go to the authorities about

the scheme if Bonillas did not give him

$3,000. Bonillas then asked to speak to

Gracia, who had remained in the room

during the call. After speaking to

Bonillas, Gracia left the room, returned,

and handed Frank $3,000 in cash. Several

days after a second fraudulent deposit

had been made in Frank’s account, the

bank closed his account.

 The two cashier’s checks for $5,000 were

sent to Luisa Cardenas./2 Cardenas met

Hill sometime in 1989-90, when Hill and

her brother were incarcerated in the

federal prison in San Pedro, California.

Shortly after, she began "doing favors"

for Hill by setting up three-way phone

calls and receiving money from Western

Union wire transfers. Sometime in 1993-

94, she also began writing fraudulent

checks for Hill.

 Cardenas received the two $5,000 checks

sent by Frank, but testified that she

refused to cash them because her name

would then become part of the paper trail

and that it would be too dangerous and

she might get caught. Gracia flew to Los

Angeles to meet Cardenas. At the airport,

Cardenas had a telephone conversation

with Hill, confirming that Gracia had

arrived to pick up the two checks.

Cardenas testified that Gracia questioned

her about how the operation worked. She

told him that Hill arranged for money to

be deposited into an account, then Hill

would tell him to withdraw a certain

amount and Gracia would get to keep half

of the total withdrawal. Gracia asked if

"anybody [had] gotten caught, anybody

gotten in trouble." She told him that as

far as she knew, "no one had gotten in

trouble or caught."

 Upon his return to Tucson, Gracia

attempted unsuccessfully to cash the two

cashier’s checks. He went to a branch
bank where a relative-by-marriage worked

as a service manager. This relative

testified that she refused to cash the

two checks because they were not made out

to Gracia nor were they endorsed over to

him. The original uncashed checks were

submitted as evidence at trial.

 In August of 1995, Gracia also went to

his nephew Phillip Mota and asked Mota to

send money to someone not known to Mota.

Gracia drove Mota to Western Union and

gave Mota approximately $5,000, with $200

to pay for the wiring fees. While Gracia

waited in the car, Mota was instructed to

send a $5,000 wire transfer to a Maria

Rolon./3 Gracia gave Mota $75 for his

help. Rolon, who had been recruited by

Hill, testified that she received several

checks like the one from Mota, totaling

approximately $60,000. She stated that

she kept about $10,000 out of that total

and forwarded the rest to various names

as instructed by Hill.

 Also in August, Miguel Jimenez, an

inmate at the Fairview Heights, Illinois

state prison, contacted his niece, Angie

Jimenez Badilla ("Angie"), in Tucson and

told her he was sending someone to take

her to open a bank account in her name.

Angie was fifteen at the time and did not

drive. Although she was married, she and

her husband Daniel lived with Angie’s

mother. On August 17, 1995, Gracia, a

complete stranger to Angie, picked her up

along with her mother, drove them to a

branch bank in Green Valley, Arizona, and

gave Angie $150 in cash, telling her to

open an account while he waited in the

car. On August 21, two fraudulent

mortgage checks, one for $40,000 and one

for $29,000, were deposited in Angie’s

account. Although both checks were

endorsed with the name Angie Jimenez,

Angie testified that she had never

endorsed the checks. 

 Several days later, Gracia called Angie

and told her to take out as much money as

she could from her bank account. Gracia

met Angie outside the bank and questioned

her when she came out. Angie said that

the teller told her she could withdraw

$11,000, but as she was filling out the

paperwork, she was informed that the

account had been frozen. After telling

Gracia what happened, she returned home.

She was contacted by Gracia a day or two

later. He called her, then arrived at her
house, giving her a cashier’s check made

out to Enedino Egurrola,/4 Bonillas’

aunt, for $7,324.67. Gracia drove her to

a bank in Tucson and told her to cash the

check while he waited in the car. She re

turned with $7,324.67 in cash, which

Gracia took. He gave her $50 for her

cooperation. Another day or so later,

Gracia called Angie again and came to her

house. He drove both her and her husband

to Western Union. He gave Angie $3,000

plus the fee for the wire transfer, and

told her to send it to Delores Rolon

(Maria Rolon’s sister), someone unknown

to Angie. 

 Gracia also used Angie’s husband Daniel

for several transactions. On the first

occasion, Gracia came to the home of

Angie’s mother, where Angie and Daniel

were living. Daniel had never met Gracia.

Gracia asked Daniel to cash a $5,000

cashier’s check for him, which he then

filled out with Daniel’s name. Gracia

drove Daniel to the bank and waited

outside for Daniel to cash the check.

Gracia then took Daniel to Western Union,

giving Daniel the $5,000 plus $200 for

the wiring fee, and instructed him to

send a wire transfer to Cardenas. The

next day Gracia returned to Daniel’s

home, gave Daniel $4,000 plus

approximately $200 for the transfer fee,

took him to Western Union and instructed

him to wire the money to a Norma

Santos./5 Gracia paid Daniel $50 each

time for his assistance. Gracia contacted

Daniel one last time to tell Daniel that

he was going to put some money in

Daniel’s credit union account, explaining

to Daniel that it was money from some of

Gracia’s friends in jail who were owed

money. Gracia drove Daniel to the bank

after the checks had been deposited, but

when Daniel tried to make a withdrawal,

credit union officials informed him that

his account had been frozen. 

 Bonillas sent a fraudulent check for

$22,000 to be deposited in the account of

his elderly aunt, Egurrola, who also did

not speak English. Gracia supervised the

disbursement of the money. Egurrola

testified (through an interpreter) that

although Gracia did not accompany her to

the bank, he called her one morning to

inform her that the money had been

deposited in her account, instructed her

that she had to go and make the

withdrawal immediately, told her how much
to take out, who to send it to, and in

what form. She stated that Garcia

emphasized she was not to use his name in

any way. He then sent someone to her home

that same afternoon to pick up the

checks. Four days later the bank called

Egurrola and asked her to return the

money because the deposited check had

been identified as stolen. She contacted

Gracia and told him they had to return

the money. He told her that was not

possible. Two or three days after

learning of this transaction and the bank

recall, Egurrola’s daughter went to

confront Gracia. She accused him of

involving her mother in "some type of

fraud." He told her to keep away from

him, not to come to his house, and never

to call him because someone could be

tapping his telephone line. Gracia did

tell her he was trying to see if he could

get any money back but that it was money

Bonillas owed to others. He also told her

not to worry because the bank had

insurance. Gracia also had other

relatives and acquaintances cash checks

and wire money for him on several

occasions. 

 Gracia did not testify at trial and

called only one witness, criminal

attorney Robert Hirsh. Hirsh testified

that in early September of 1995, Gracia

retained Hirsch because Gracia was

concerned that law enforcement officers

had been investigating some of his

relatives. He told Hirsch that his

brother-in-law Bonillas had come into

some money while in prison and wanted

Gracia to assist him with some

transactions. Gracia told Hirsh that

Bonillas had assured him that the

activity "was on the up and up." At that

time, Gracia gave Hirsh the two cashier’s

checks made out to Cardenas. Hirsh

testified that he had lost Gracia’s file

except for the two checks and a letter.

Hirsch stated that the letter had been

sent from the state prosecutor’s office

in Tucson, requesting Gracia to come in

and be "debriefed" on the matter of the

bank transactions. The chief deputy of

the state prosecutor’s criminal division

testified at trial that there was no

record of Gracia having come to their

office. However, an FBI agent testified

that he had spoken to Hirsh, and Hirsh

had told him that Gracia would cooperate

with the authorities only if Gracia was

granted transactional immunity.
 On July 20, 1999, a grand jury sitting

in the Southern District of Illinois

returned a twenty-one count superseding

indictment against fifteen defendants.

Gracia, who was named in four of the

twenty-one counts, pled not guilty. The

remaining fourteen defendants pled

guilty. Gracia’s jury trial began on

April 18, 2000, and he was convicted on

all four counts.

 On July 24, 2000, the district court

entered judgment and adopted the

probation officer’s recommended finding

of facts in the Presentence Investigation

Report ("PSR"). Gracia filed several

objections to the PSR. At the sentencing

hearing, he presented no additional

evidence and he restated his objections

to the PSR. He maintained that while the

facts in the PSR were "basically

correct," he did not have the culpable

mental state required to be convicted of

conspiracy to commit money laundering

because the evidence showed that he was

merely an innocent dupe and was never

aware of the underlying illegality of his

actions. He objected to the recommended

enhancement as a manager or supervisor,

again because he was an innocent dupe,

and also objected to an enhancement for

using a minor to commit a crime, again

because he had no idea he was committing

an illegal act.

 Gracia was sentenced pursuant to the

1998 United States Sentencing Guidelines

("U.S.S.G." or "the guidelines"). Under

U.S.S.G. sec. 3D1.3, when multiple crimes

are "closely related," the most serious

count is used to determine the base

offense level. In this case that count

was conspiracy to commit money

laundering, which had a base offense

level of 23. The court added a two-point

enhancement under sec. 3B1.4, on the

ground that Gracia’s offense involved the

use of a minor, and then added another

three points pursuant to sec. 3B1.1(b),

finding that Gracia was a "manager or

supervisor." Adding the two enhancements,

Gracia’s total offense level was 28. With

no previous criminal history, Gracia’s

criminal history category allowed for a

sentence ranging from 78-97 months.

Gracia was sentenced to 60 months

imprisonment for conspiracy to commit

bank fraud and 78 months on the other

three counts, with all sentences running
concurrently. Gracia was also ordered to

pay $142,500 in restitution. 

 Gracia argues four issues in his notice

of appeal: (1) that the district court

erred in denying his motion for a

directed verdict of acquittal on the

conspiracy to commit money laundering

because the government failed to present

sufficient evidence that Gracia entered

into any agreement with others to launder

money, or that he knew of the specific

objective of the conspiracy--that is,

money laundering; (2) that the district

court erred in applying U.S.S.G. sec.

2S1.1, applicable to money laundering

offenses, because Gracia’s charged

conduct did not fall within the

"heartland of conduct" covered by sec.

2S1.1; (3) that the district court erred

in enhancing Gracia’s sentence pursuant

to U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(b) on the ground

that Gracia was a "manager or supervisor"

of a criminal activity involving five or

more participants; and (4) that the

district court erred in applying sec.

3B1.1(b) without making sufficient

findings of fact in support of its

decision.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Money Laundering Conspiracy

 Gracia maintains that the government did

not produce sufficient evidence to

convict him of conspiracy to commit money

laundering, primarily because there was

no evidence of criminal intent. In

reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence

challenge after a conviction, the

evidence is viewed in the light most

favorable to the government in order to

determine whether "any rational trier of

fact could have found the essential

elements of the crime beyond a reasonable

doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (1979) (emphasis in original).

Our review is highly deferential, see

United States v. Barnes, 230 F.3d 311,

314 (7th Cir. 2000), and a conviction is

reversed "only when the record is devoid

of any evidence, regardless of how it is

weighed, from which a jury could find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." United

States v. Garcia, 35 F.3d 1125, 1128 (7th

Cir. 1994).

 Gracia was convicted of conspiracy to

commit money laundering in violation of
18 U.S.C. sec. 1956(h), which states,

"Any person who conspires to commit any

offense defined in this section or

section 1957 shall be subject to the same

penalties as those prescribed for the

offense the commis-sion of which was the

object of the conspiracy."/6 The object

of the conspiracy was money laundering in

violation of sec. 1956(a)(1), which

provides in pertinent part:

Whoever, knowing that the property

involved in a financial transaction

represents the proceeds of some form of

unlawful activity, conducts or attempts

to conduct such a financial transaction

which in fact involves the proceeds of

specified unlawful activity-- 

 (A)(i) with the intent to promote the

carrying on of specified unlawful

activity; or . . .

 (B) knowing that the transaction is

designed in whole or in part-- 

 (i) to conceal or disguise the

nature, the location, the source, the

ownership, or the control of the proceeds

of specified unlawful activity; . . . .

Gracia argues that the government

"offered no evidence that [he] knowingly

agreed with others to participate in a

scheme to launder money, that [there was

no evidence] he used ’proceeds’ to

’promote’ the scheme, or that he knew

others were doing so," and that the case

against him was built solely on

inferences which were not grounded

inevidence. The question to be determined

is whether the government presented

sufficient evidence to demonstrate that

Gracia was knowingly involved with two or

more people for the purpose of money

laundering and that he knew the proceeds

used to further the scheme were derived

from an illegal activity.

 The record states that Gracia supervised

multiple transactions with Angie and her

husband Daniel and with his nephew Philip

Mota. He also facilitated a transaction

with his brother Frank and one with

Bonillas’ aunt. In addition, there was

testimony that Gracia was involved in

obtaining the bank account numbers of two

other participants. There were

transcripts of telephone calls between

Gracia and both Hill and Bonillas. The
cumulative evidence reasonably indicates

that Gracia knew, or should have known,

he was involved in some kind of unlawful

activity: the fact that prison inmates

had sums in the amounts of $20,300,

$15,000, $40,000, $29,000, and $22,000 to

be deposited; the fact that the

withdrawals had to be made before the

deposited checks had time to be sent back

to the bank on which they were drawn; the

fact that he asked Cardenas if anybody

had gotten caught or in trouble; and the

fact that he told others not to come to

his house or contact him. Beyond all of

that, Gracia was there when his brother

Frank threatened to go to the authorities

and expose the scheme if Bonillas did not

give him $3,000. Yet Gracia continued to

participate. From these facts, a jury

could, and did, infer that Gracia knew

that he was involved in an illegal scheme

and that he and others were using

illegally obtained funds to continue the

scheme. Circumstantial evidence is

sufficient support, and may be the sole

support, for a conviction. See United

States v. Jackson, 983 F.2d 757, 766 (7th

Cir. 1993). The record provided

sufficient evidence for the jury to find

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This

finding renders Gracia’s resentencing

argument moot.

B. U.S.S.G. sec. 2S1.1

 Gracia argues that even if our review

finds there was sufficient evidence to

convict him of conspiracy to commit money

laundering, because his conduct was "at

the most incidental to the wire and bank

fraud scheme run by the inmates," it

falls outside the "heartland" of cases

under sec. 2S1.1, and therefore, the

money laundering count should not have

been used to calculate his sentence. 

 Although the Supreme Court held that

appellate courts should review the

decision of a district court to depart

from the guidelines under an abuse of

discretion standard, see Koon v. United

States, 518 U.S. 81, 100 (1996)

(addressing "heartland" analysis),

because Gracia did not object to the

application of sec. 2S1.1 used by the PSR

and the district court to calculate his

sentence, we review only for plain error.

See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,

731 (1993); United States v. Nance, 236

F.3d 820, 824 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, ___ U.S. ___, 70 U.S.L.W. 3235

(U.S. Oct. 1, 2001) (No. 00-9633)

(applying plain error standard to any

argument raised for the first time on

appeal). To find a plain error, the error

must affect a defendant’s "substantial

rights" and have "seriously affected the

fairness, integrity, or public reputation

of the judicial proceedings." Nance, 236

F.3d at 824. 

 Under the guidelines, sec. 3D1.2

requires that "[a]ll counts involving

substantially the same harm shall be

grouped together into a single group."

The counts of conspiracy to commit bank

fraud, bank fraud, and wire fraud all

fall under sec. 2F1.1 of the guidelines

for crimes of fraud, with the fourth

count of conspiracy to commit money

laundering falling under sec. 2S1.1.

Section 3D1.2(d) specifies that offenses

covered by secs. 2F1.1 and 2S1.1 are

to be grouped together. Section 3D1.3(b)

further specifies that with a group of

closelyrelated counts under sec.

3D1.2(d), "[w]hen the counts involve

offenses of the same general type to

which different guidelines apply (e.g.,

theft and fraud), apply the offense

guideline that produces the highest

offense level." The base offense level

under sec. 2F1.1 was 6. Section 2S1.1

provides for a base offense level of 23

if a defendant is convicted of money

laundering under 18 U.S.C. sec.

1956(a)(1)(A). The guidelines mandated

using the base offense level of 23. 

 A sentencing court "may ask whether

there are features of the case that take

it out of the ’heartland’ of

casesanticipated in the Guidelines."

United States v. Crucean, 241 F.3d 895,

898 (7th Cir. 2001). The "heartland" of

cases is the "set of typical cases

embodying the conduct that each guideline

describes." Koon, 518 U.S. at 93 (quoting

U.S.S.G. ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b), intro. cmt.

4(b) (1995)). The guidelines "authorize

district courts to depart in cases that

feature aggravating or mitigating

circumstances of a kind not adequately

taken into consideration by the

[Sentencing] Commission," id. at 92; that

is, departure is allowed if "some unusual

feature of the case takes it out of the

heartland: the conduct at issue differs

significantly from the norm even though

the guideline linguistically applies."
United States v. Jaderany, 221 F.3d 989,

994-95 (7th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531

U.S. 1151 (2001) (citing Koon, 518 U.S.

at 93-95).

 A departure from the specific relevant

guideline

is appropriate only in limited situations

where an unmentioned factor places a case

outside the heartland of cases

contemplated by both the specific,

relevant guideline(s) and the Guidelines

as a whole. The Sentencing Commission

views this departure power as quite

limited and expects "that departures

based on grounds not mentioned in the

Guidelines will be ’highly infrequent.’"

Koon, 518 U.S. at 94-96 (quoting U.S.S.G.

ch. 1, pt. A(4)(b), intro. cmt.)).

United States v. Schulte, 144 F.3d 1107,

1109-10 (7th Cir. 1998). However, Gracia

is not asking for a mere downward

departure but wants us to simply

disregard the money laundering count.

 This same argument was addressed in

United States v. Buckowich, 243 F.3d 1081

(7th Cir. 2001). In Buckowich, the

defendant was convicted of wire fraud

under 18 U.S.C. sec. 1343 and unlawful

financial transactions under 18 U.S.C.

sec. 1957. Id. at 1082. Because the

guidelines treat sec. 1957 as a form of

money laundering, the district court used

the base offense level for money

laundering in U.S.S.G. sec. 2S1.2(a)

rather than the fraud count under sec.

2F1.1(a). Id. at 1083. Buckowich argued

that her circumstances were not within

the "heartland" of the applicable

guideline. Id. at 1084. Buckowich, as did

Gracia, relied on United States v. Woods,

159 F.3d 1132 (8th Cir. 1998). In Woods,

the money laundering consisted of

financial transactions which concealed

funds from the bankruptcy court. The

district court held that Woods’ offense

was a bankruptcy crime, therefore the

money laundering guideline did not apply

because "the underlying offense was . . .

fraud, and not drug trafficking or some

other offense typical of organized crime

[as intended under sec. 2S1.2]." Id. at

1134-35. The Eighth Circuit agreed.

However, the Seventh Circuit in Buckowich

rejected this line of reasoning, stating

that "Woods is incompatible with the law

of this circuit. Buckowich was convicted
of both wire fraud and money laundering;

the judge in sentencing must consider

both offenses and may not act as if the

defendant had been convicted of just

one." Buckowich, 243 F.3d at 1084

(emphasis in original).

 Although not applicable to the 1998

guidelines used in Gracia’s case, we note

that as of November 1, 2000, the

Sentencing Commission amended the

Statutory Index (Appendix A), specifying

which guideline section applies to the

statutory conviction. The Commission

wrote:

The amendment modifies secs. 1B1.1(a),

1B1.2(a), and the Statutory Index’s

introductory commentary to clarify the

inter-relationship among these

provisions. The clarification is intended

to emphasize that the sentencing court

must apply the offense guideline

referenced in the Statutory Index for the

statute of conviction unless the case

falls within the limited "stipulation"

exception set forth in sec. 1B1.2(a).

Therefore, in order for the enhanced

penalties in sec. 2D1.2 to apply, the

defendant must be convicted of an offense

referenced to sec. 2D1.2, rather than

simply have engaged in conduct described

by that guideline. Furthermore, the

amendment deletes Application Note 3 of

sec. 1B1.2 (Applicable Guidelines) . . . 

[which] note has been used by some courts

to permit a court to decline to use the

offense guideline referenced in the

Statutory Index in cases that were

allegedly "atypical" or "outside the

heartland."

U.S.S.G. App. C Supp., amend. 591, at 32

(2000) (emphasis added). This amendment

expressly rejects exceptions under the

"heartland" analysis.

 The district court correctly determined

there were no unusual circumstances and

the facts of Gracia’s case fell within

the "heartland" of sec. 2S1.1. Gracia was

convicted of both fraud and money

laundering and, under the guidelines, his

base offense level must be the greater of

the two levels pursuant to the two

separate guidelines. The district court

did not err in setting Gracia’s base

offense level at 23.

C. U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1(b)
 Gracia argues two issues under sec.

3B1.1(b): that the district court erred

in enhancing his sentence pursuant to

sec. 3B1.1(b) on the ground that he was a

"manager or supervisor" of a criminal

activity involving five or more

participants; and that the court did not

make sufficient findings of fact in

support of its decision. Gracia maintains

that "there is no way to conclude from

the trial record that Mr. Gracia was a

’manager or supervisor.’" 

 Section 3B1.1(b) states, "If the

defendant was a manager or supervisor

(but not an organizer or leader) and the

criminal activity involved five or more

participants or was otherwise extensive,

increase by 3 levels." A participant is

"a person who is criminally responsible

for the commission of the offense, but

need not have been convicted." U.S.S.G.

sec. 3B1.1, cmt. n.1. Whether a defendant

is a manager or supervisor is a question

of fact subject to the clearly errone-ous

standard of review. United States v.

Hall, 101 F.3d 1174, 1176 (7th Cir.

1996). A finding is "’clearly erroneous’

when although there is evidence to

support it, the review-ing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite

and firm conviction that a mistake has

been committed." United States v. United

States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395

(1948). 

 "The central purpose of sec. 3B1.1(b) is

to punish a defendant for his relative

responsibility within a criminal

organization." United States v. Fones, 51

F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 1995). If it is

determined that a defendant had no

greater role than any other participant,

he cannot receive a sec. 3B1.1 increase.

United States v. Mustread, 42 F.3d 1097,

1103 (7th Cir. 1994). In determining

whether a defendant played a greater role

as a manager or supervisor,

[f]actors the court should consider

include the exercise of decision making

authority, the nature of participation in

the commission of the offense, the

recruitment of accomplices, the claimed

right to a larger share of the fruits of

the crime, the degree of participation in

planning or organizing the offense, the

nature and scope of the illegal activity,

and the degree of control and authority
exercised over others.

U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. n.4; Fones, 51

F.3d at 665 (list-ing cases). All factors

need not be present, but the defendant

must have "exercised some control over

others involved in the commission of the

offense." United States v. Pagan, 196

F.3d 884, 892 (7th Cir. 2000), cert.

denied, 530 U.S. 1283 (2000) (citing

United States v. House, 110 F.3d 1281,

1287 (7th Cir. 1997) (emphasis in

original)). It is sufficient that the

defendant orchestrated or coordinated the

activities of others. Fones, 51 F.3d at

666 (citations omitted). While the

criminal activity must involve five or

more participants, to qualify for the

increase as manager or supervisor, the

district court had to find that Gracia

had control over only one participant.

U.S.S.G. sec. 3B1.1, cmt. n.2; Fones, 51

F.3d at 668.

 The PSR noted that Gracia directed and

supervised the actions of Angie, Daniel,

and Mota: driving Angie to the bank,

giving her money to open a bank account,

driving her to withdraw money, driving

her to cash a check and purchase money

orders; driving Daniel to the credit

union and instructing him to withdraw

money, taking Daniel to Western Union and

giving him money to send wire transfers

to individuals unknown to Daniel; and

giving money to Mota and driving him to

Western Union to place wire transfers on

two occasions. Although Angie, Daniel,

and Mota were not charged as coconspirators, all three testified at

Gracia’s trial as to the criminal scheme

in which they were involved. Gracia also

directed the actions of Bonillas’ aunt

and involved his own brother in the

conspiracy. Bonillas’ aunt also testified

concerning her involvement in the

conspiracy at Gracia’s trial. In

addition, as a mid-level manager, Gracia

provided or directed large sums of money

far greater than the $50 or $75 paid to

the minor participants and received a

correspondingly far larger share. Gracia

not only recruited participants and

claimed a larger share, but both the PSR

and the record provide more than

sufficient evidence that he coordinated

and orchestrated the activities of Angie,

Daniel, Mota, and Bonillas’ aunt. He had

a "real and direct influence" on those

participants in the conspiracy. Mustread,
42 F.3d at 1103. The district court made

no mistake in enhancing Gracia’s sentence

under sec. 3B1.1(b).

 As to the findings of fact issue, it is

true that district courts are required to

make specific findings which present the

evidentiary basis for a sentencing

determination. See United States v.

Johnson, 999 F.2d 1192, 1197 (7th Cir.

1993). Although Gracia is correct that

the district court gave an abbreviated

explanation in finding Gracia was a

manager,/7 in addition to specifically

adopting the findings of the PSR at the

sentencing hearing, the district

courtrelied on the evidence presented at

trial and noted that the government "has

certainly carried its burden of proof by

a preponderance of the evidence regarding

[the sec. 3B1.1(b)] matters." This

circuit has held that the district court

"must adopt the PSR’s recommended

findings or make independent findings

sufficient to support its conclusion" in

applying an enhancement under sec.

3B1.1(b). United States v. Patel, 131

F.3d 1195, 1203 (7th Cir. 1997). The

district court not only adopted the

findings of the PSR, which in turn are

supported by the record, but referenced

the evidence from the trial record

concerning this enhancement when it noted

that the government had satisfied its

burden of proof. These statements make

the findings sufficiently clear to

support the sec. 3B1.1(b) enhancement.

III. CONCLUSION

 For the above stated reasons, we AFFIRM

Gracia’s conviction and sentence.

FOOTNOTES

/1 The government indicted fifteen co-conspirators,

including Gracia. Gracia was the only defendant

who went to trial. The other fourteen, including

Frank, all pleaded guilty.

/2 Cardenas was also one of the fifteen indicted coconspirators who pled guilty.

/3 Rolon was also one of the fifteen indicted coconspirators.

/4 Although there are several spellings of her name

in the record, this is the way she spelled it out

at trial. 
/5 Santos was also an indicted co-conspirator.

/6 Although the judgment indicates the conspiracy to

commit money laundering was charged under "18

U.S.C. secs. 1343, 2," Count 21 of the indictment correctly reads "18 U.S.C. sec. 1956(h)--

Conspiracy to Commit Money Laundering."

/7 The district court’s only statements regarding

the sec. 3B1.1 enhancement were:

Now, similarly, [Gracia] was a mid-level manager.

In his own mind, he wasn’t, but that’s not the

mental statement [sic] required here. He was over

two or three people; maybe not in a formal sense

that we think of as a floor manager in a factory,

but in a legal sense, for purposes of the guidelines, he was a manager, so those objections have

to be overruled. The Government has certainly

carried its burden of proof by a preponderance of

the evidence regarding these matters.