NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DENISE LEONA PALMER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

 v. 

MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of 

Social Security, 

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 22-16448 

D.C. No. 2:21-cv-00190-DLR 

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Arizona

Douglas L. Rayes, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 25, 2024

San Francisco, California

Before: PAEZ, NGUYEN, and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges.

Denise Palmer appeals the district court’s order affirming the denial of her 

application for Social Security benefits.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo an order 

affirming a denial of Social Security benefits and may reverse when the decision is 

not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error. Woods v. 

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

FILED

MAY 1 2024

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
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Kijakazi, 32 F.4th 785, 788 (9th Cir. 2022). Where the evidence is susceptible to 

more than one rational interpretation, we must affirm. Smartt v. Kijakazi, 53 F.4th 

489, 494 (9th Cir. 2022). We affirm.

1. Palmer argues that the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) improperly 

discounted her symptom testimony. The ALJ discounted Palmer’s pain testimony 

both because it was “not entirely consistent” with medical record evidence and 

because her testimony about the severity of her pain and pain-related limitations 

was not corroborated by objective medical evidence. “When objective medical 

evidence is inconsistent with a claimant’s subjective testimony, an ALJ can ‘reject 

the claimant’s testimony about the severity of her symptoms only by offering 

specific, clear, and convincing reasons for doing so.’” Smartt, 53 F.4th at 494 

(quoting Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1014–15 (9th Cir. 2014)). The ALJ’s 

opinion demonstrates specific, clear, and convincing reasons for rejecting Palmer’s 

testimony about the degree of her impairments, including Palmer’s inconsistent use 

of an ambulatory aid. And, although lack of objective corroboration cannot be the 

only basis for discounting pain testimony, it is an additional factor that the ALJ 

may consider in the credibility analysis. Burch v. Barnhart, 400 F.3d 676, 681 (9th 

Cir. 2005).

2. Palmer argues the ALJ improperly discounted the medical opinions of Dr. 

Young and Dr. Koss-Leland. Under the governing regulations, the ALJ “must 
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‘articulate . . . how persuasive’ [she] finds ‘all of the medical opinions’ from each 

doctor or other source [] and ‘explain how [she] considered the supportability and 

consistency factors’ in reaching these findings.” Woods, 32 F.4th at 792 (quoting 

20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b) & (b)(2)). Although the ALJ did not specifically 

articulate her analysis of the supportability and consistency factors, the ALJ’s 

conclusion that Dr. Young and Dr. Koss-Leland’s opinions are inconsistent with 

the normal findings present in Palmer’s treatment records and progress notes is 

supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, to the extent the ALJ erred by 

failing to clearly articulate how she considered the supportability factor, any such 

error was harmless.

AFFIRMED.