*

 This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of

law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the

citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under

the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

Filed 6/12/96

TENTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOAN ELLA JENKIN, also known as

Jonna Jennings, also known as Joan

Ramirez,

Defendant-Appellant.

No. 95-6432

(D.C. No. CR-95-80-M)

(W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

Before BRORBY, EBEL, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore ordered

submitted without oral argument.
1

 A bait money order is a money order on which extra digits have been added to

the serial number, which is recorded and kept at the post office. 

- 2 -

Following a Memorial Day weekend robbery of a United States Post Office, a jury

convicted Appellant Joan Ellen Jenkin of stealing and concealing certain Postal Service

property, counterfeiting and forging a money order, and unlawfully possessing stolen

mail. Jenkin now appeals the verdict, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain her

conviction on each count. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM.

Upon arriving to work on May 29, 1995, a postal worker at the Southeast Station

of the Oklahoma City, Oklahoma Post Office noticed that the station had been burglarized

over the Memorial Day holiday. Among the items missing were three “bait” money

orders1

 and a six-piece Integrated Retail Terminal (“IRT”), which looks like a computer

but is used for the dedicated purpose of weighing mail, determining the amount of

postage, and printing receipts and postage labels. On June 1, 1995, Jenkin’s landlord

deposited one of the three bait money orders in the bank, which Jenkin had given to him

in order to pay her rent. Jenkin wrote “Jonna Jennings,” the name by which her landlord

knew her, on the “payor” portion of the money order. When the bait money order was

picked up by postal inspectors, inspectors interviewed Jenkin’s landlord on June 5. On

June 6, inspectors went to Jenkin’s residence, where she consented to a search of the

house. During the search, inspectors found the IRT system which had been stolen from

the post office underneath a pile of articles in the bedroom. They also found a gray bag in
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the living room which contained 200 envelopes addressed to post office boxes at the

Southeast Station. The envelopes contained unnegotiated checks worth about $26,000. 

Inspectors found various other items from the station, including credit cards, a postal

hamper with a Southeast Station mailing label, and two flat tubs containing documents

from the station. The two other money orders which allegedly were stolen have not been

recovered. 

A federal grand jury in the Western District of Oklahoma issued a four-count

indictment against Jenkin on June 22, 1995. Two of the counts--count one and count

three--charged Jenkin and codefendant James Edward Sandersfield with aiding and

abetting each other in receiving, retaining and concealing stolen United States Postal

Service property in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2(a) and 641. Count two charged Jenkin

with attempt to defraud, and falsely making and forging material endorsements and

signatures upon the blank money order in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500. Count four

charged Jenkin and Sandersfield with unlawfully aiding and abetting each other in

unlawfully having in their possession the contents of 200 pieces of mail which had been

taken or stolen from Southeast Station in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1708. The jury

returned a guilty verdict against Jenkin on all four counts. 

In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the record

de novo to determine only whether the evidence--both direct and circumstantial, together

with reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom--viewed in the light most favorable to
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the government, “is substantial enough to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” 

U.S. v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1439

(1995). In conducting this review, we are not to reweigh the credibility of the witnesses,

and we must accept the jury's resolution of conflicting evidence. U.S. v. Sapp, 53 F.3d

1100, 1103 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 796 (1996). We will reverse a

conviction only if no rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the

crime beyond a reasonable doubt. U.S. v. Hoenscheidt, 7 F.3d 1528, 1530) (10th Cir.

1992).

Embezzlement and Theft of Postal Service Property

Count One charged Jenkin with receiving, retaining and concealing the $150

money order, while Count Three charged Jenkin with receiving, retaining and concealing

the IRT. 18 U.S.C. § 2 provides:

(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,

counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a

principal.

Furthermore, 18 U.S.C. § 641 provides:

Whoever receives, conceals, or retains [any record, voucher, money, or thing of

value to the United States] with intent to convert it to his use or gain, knowing it to

have been embezzled, stolen, purloined or converted--

Shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if

the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100, he shall be fined

under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.

The word “value” means face, par, or market value, or cost price, either wholesale

or retail, whichever is greater.
- 5 -

(emphasis added). 

Regarding the bait money order, Jenkin first argues that the government presented

no evidence that its value was more than $100. However, William Wright, an employee

of the Southeast Station, testified that bait money orders are actual money orders which

can be traded. Wright testified that if the bait money order is received in good faith, the

bearer actually will receive $150 for it. We consider this evidence sufficient to support a

jury decision that the stolen money order had a value of $150. 

Second, Jenkin argues that the government presented no evidence that she knew

the money order was stolen. However, we have held that the possession of property

recently stolen, if not satisfactorily explained, is ordinarily a circumstance from which an

inference may reasonably be drawn that the person knew the property had been stolen. 

See United States v. Smith, 833 F.2d 213, 218 (10th Cir. 1987); United States v. Luman,

624 F.2d 152, 154-55 (10th Cir. 1980). See also United States v. Winters, 420 F.2d 523

(3d Cir. 1970). Accordingly, the unexplained possession and the use of stolen money

orders is ample evidence to support a conviction. McGee v. United States, 402 F.2d 434,

437-38 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 908 (1969). Having reviewed the record,

we agree with the government that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from

which a reasonable jury could have found that Jenkin knew the money order was stolen. 

The theft occurred during the Memorial Day weekend in 1995. A few days later, on or

before June 1, Jenkin used the stolen money order--which was identified by its serial
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numbers as one of three bait money orders taken from the Southeast Station--to pay her

rent. Even though she explained that she received the money order in a trade with two

acquaintances, the jury was not obligated to consider this explanation for possessing the

stolen property a satisfactory one.

Regarding the IRT system, Jenkin again argues that the government failed to prove

it had a value of more than $100. The Postal Service purchased the IRT system in 1989

for $2,039. Diana Key Quiroga, a Material Management Specialist for the Postal Service,

testified that the Postal Service keeps items on its books at the acquisition cost because to

replace them likely would cost the same as or more than the acquisition cost. Also, on

cross-examination of Quiroga, Jenkin’s counsel suggested depreciating the IRT $291

each year during the system’s seven-year depreciation life. Even assuming this amount is

the correct amount using straight line depreciation, the system still would be worth $293,

and thus in excess of $100.

Finally, Jenkin argues that the government presented no evidence that she knew

the IRT was stolen. Again, we reject this argument on the ground that the IRT system

was found in the house in which Jenkin resided soon after the theft, thereby supporting an

inference that Jenkin knew the property was stolen. See Smith, 833 F.2d at 218; Luman,

624 F.2d at 154-55. 

Forgery

18 U.S.C. § 500 provides:
- 7 -

Whoever, with intent to defraud, passes, utters or publishes or attempts to pass,

utter or publish any such forged or altered money order or postal note, knowing

any material initials, signature, stamp impression or indorsement thereon to be

false, forged, or counterfeited, or any material alteration therein to have been

falsely made . . . [s]hall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than

five years, or both.

Here, there is evidence that Jenkin forged a signature when she signed the money

order not with her legal name, but with an alias. See United States v. Jaynes, 75 F.3d

1493, 1499 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting that signing a check in a name other than one’s real

name tends to establish fraudulent intent). Furthermore, we believe that an intent to

defraud can be inferred from the fact that Jenkin possessed the money order soon after the

robbery, which suggests that she knew the money order was stolen, and that she used this

stolen money order to pay her rent.

Possession of Stolen Mail

18 U.S.C. § 1708 provides:

Whoever buys, receives, or conceals, or unlawfully has in his possession, any

letter, postal car, package, bag, or mail, or any article or thing contained therein,

which has been stolen, taken, embezzled, or abstracted, as herein described,

knowing the same to have been stolen, taken, embezzled or abstracted--[s]hall be

fined . . . or imprisoned not more than five years.

To prove a violation of Section 1708, the government must establish: (1) the defendant

possessed stolen mail; (2) the mail was stolen from a mail receptacle or mail route; and

(3) the defendant knew the mail was stolen. United States v. Douglas, 668 F.2d 459, 461

(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1108 (1982).
- 8 -

Jenkin argues that the evidence at trial failed to establish the first element of the

crime--that she "possessed" the stolen mail matter discovered in her residence. According

to Jenkin, proof of the possession element is lacking here because the stolen mail was

found inside a gray bag and there was no evidence adduced at trial to show that she knew

the bag contained stolen mail. The district court correctly instructed the jury that

possession could be either actual or constructive. Thus, even if Jenkin did not actually

possess the stolen mail, the jury was entitled to find that she constructively possessed the

mail if she "knowingly [held] the power to exercise dominion and control” over the mail. 

See U.S. v. Sullivan, 919 F.2d 1403, 1430 (10th Cir. 1990) (analyzing constructive

possession involving possession of an unregistered firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. §

922(g)). Dominion, control, and knowledge may be inferred if a defendant had exclusive

possession of the premises; however joint occupancy alone cannot sustain such an

inference. U.S. v. Mills, 29 F.3d 545, 549 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Sullivan, 919 F.2d at

1431). In cases of joint occupancy, where the government seeks to prove constructive

possession by circumstantial evidence, it must present evidence to show some connection

between the defendant and the contraband. Id. A conviction based upon constructive

possession will be upheld “only when there [is] some evidence supporting at least a

plausible inference that the defendant had knowledge of and access to the weapon or

contraband.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mergerson, 4 F.3d 337, 349 (5th Cir. 1993),

cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1310 (1994)).
- 9 -

Here, Jenkin argues that she did not have sole access to the room where the bag of

mail was found, but that co-defendant Sandersfield had access as well. However, as in

Sullivan, there is more evidence connecting Jenkin to the stolen mail than the fact that she

had joint dominion and control over the room where it was found. The fact that she had

passed a money order stolen from the Southeast Station, as well as the presence of the

IRT in her bedroom, lead to an inference that she was aware of the robbery at the post

office and therefore aware of the presence of the stolen mail in her living room. Because

the jury was entitled to infer that Jenkin had knowledge of the stolen mail in her living

room, they also could infer that she exercised dominion and control over the mail and

accordingly possessed it.

Therefore, we AFFIRM for the reasons stated above. The mandate shall issue

forthwith.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT

David M. Ebel

Circuit Judge