THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA In The Court of Appeals

Mary Cromey, Appellant,

v.

South Carolina Department of Revenue, Respondent.

Appellate Case No. 2018-001739

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge

Opinion No. 5842 Heard June 8, 2021 – Filed August 4, 2021

AFFIRMED

Joshua Madison Tyler Felder and Richard L. Few, Jr.,

both of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of Greenville, for Appellant.

Nicole Martin Wooten, of Columbia, for Respondent.

GEATHERS, J.: Appellant Mary Cromey (Taxpa yer) challenges an order of the Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholdi ng a determination by Respondent South Carolina Department of Revenue (the De partment) that Taxpa yer does not qualify as a surviving spouse of a disabled veteran for purposes of the property taxexemption set forth in section 12-37-220(B)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2014). 1

We affirm.

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

1 Section 12-37-220(B)(1) allows disabled military veterans or their surviving spouses to claim a property tax exemption for:

(a) the house owned by an e ligible owner in fee or jointly with a spouse;

(b) the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse. The qualified surviving s pouse shall inform the Department of Revenue of th e address of a subsequent

house;

. . .

(e) As used in this item:

(i) "eligible owner" means:

(A) a veteran of the armed forces of the United States who is permanently and totally disabled as a result of a service-connected disability and who files with the Department of Revenue a certificate signed by the county service officer certifying this disability;

. . .

(iii) "qualified surviving spouse" means the surviving spouse of an individual described in subsubitem (i) while remaining unmarried, who resides in the

house, and who owns the house in fee or for life.

. . . .

(emphasis added).The parties agree that the facts in th is case are undisputed . Therefore, we adopt the following recitation of facts from the order on appeal:

[Taxpayer] is the surv iving spouse of Lloyd D. Cromey (Mr. Cromey). In February 2004, the United

States Veterans Administratio n (VA) deemed Mr. Cromey to be permanently and totally disabled. [Taxpayer] and Mr. Cromey lived in a jointly owned home in Owing Mills, Maryland, until his death in 2005. Mr. Cromey has never been a resident of South Carolina or owned real property in South Carolina

.

In 2010, several years after Mr. Cromey's death, [Taxpayer] moved to South Carolina and purchased real property located at 1551 Ben Sawyer Blvd., Unit 6B, Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. [Taxpayer] submitted an application to the Department for the disabled veteran property tax exemption as a surviving spouse on this property beginning with tax y ear 2011. The Department granted [Taxpayer] 's application.[ 2 ]

In 2016, [Taxpayer] sold the property located at 1551 Ben Sawyer Blvd., Unit 6B , Mount Pleasant, South Carolina, and purchased a new property located at 1885 Carolina Towne Court (Towne Court), Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. [Taxpayer] wa s, and is, the sole owner of Towne Court. Thereafter, on February 17, 2017, [Taxpayer] applied for the di sabled veteran property tax exemption as a surviving [spou se] for Towne Court. The Department denied [Taxpayer's] application. [Taxpayer]

has never remarried.

(emphasis added). Taxpayer protested the Department's denial of the exemption, and the Department ultimately issued a fi nal agency determination upholding the denial. Taxpayer then sough t a contested case heari ng before the ALC. The Department and Taxpayer filed cross-mo tions for summary judgment, and the ALC granted summary judgment to the Depart ment. This appeal followed.

2 The Department now asserts that it made a mistake in granting this application.ISSUE ON APPEAL

Did the ALC err by concluding that Ta xpayer did not qualify as a surviving spouse of a disabled veteran for pur poses of section 12-37-220(B)(1)?

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Administrative Procedures Act governs the standard of review on appeal from a decision of the ALC, allowing this court to

reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by other error of law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; or (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarrant ed exercise of discretion.

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23- 380(5) (Supp. 2020).

Further, when a trial court grants summary judgment on a question of law, such as statutory interpretation, the appella te court must review the ruling de novo. Wright v. PRG Real Estate Mgmt., Inc. , 426 S.C. 202, 212, 826 S.E.2d 285, 290 (2019); see Lightner v. Hampton Hall Club, Inc. , 419 S.C. 357, 363, 798 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2017) ("An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law." (quoting Univ. of S. Cal. v. Moran , 365 S.C. 270, 274, 617 S. E.2d 135, 137 (Ct. App. 2005))).

LAW/ANALYSIS

Taxpayer argues that she qualif ies as a surviving spouse of a disabled veteran for purposes of the property tax exempt ion set forth in section 12-37-220(B)(1) because the statute's plain language does not condition eligibility on first acquiring an exempt house from the decease d veteran. We disagree."What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Boulware , 422 S.C. 1, 8, 809 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2018) (quoting Hodges v. Rainey , 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). "The refore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature." Id. (quoting Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581). "Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d

at 581. "Where the statut e's language is plain and unambiguous[] and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interp retation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another meaning." Id. ; see also State v. Johnson

, 396 S.C. 182, 188, 720 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In interpreting a statute, the court will give words their plain and or dinary meaning[] and will not resort to

forced construction that would lim it or expand the statute.").

"Th[e appellate c]ourt looks beyond a statute's plain language only when applying the words literally would lead to a result so patently absurd that the General Assembly could not have intended it." Boulware , 422 S.C. at 8, 809 S.E.2d at 226. Although our supreme court has expressed a policy of strictly construing tax exemption statutes against the taxpayer, "[ t]his rule of strict construction simply means that constitutional and statutory langua ge will not be stra ined or liberally construed in the taxpayer's favor." CFRE, LLC v. Green ville Cty. Assessor , 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011) (quoting Se. Kusan, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n

, 276 S.C. 487, 489, 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981)). "It does not mean that [the appellate court] will search for an interpretation in [the Department]'s favor where the plain and unambiguous language leaves no room for construction." Id. at 74–75, 716

S.E.2d at 881.

Section 12-37-220(B)(1) allows disabled military veterans or their surviving spouses to claim a property tax exemption for:

(a) the house owned by an eligible owner in fee or jointly with a spouse;

(b) the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse. The qualified surviving spouse shall inform the Department of Revenue of th e address of a subsequent

house;. . .

(e) As used in this item:

(i) "eligible owner" means:

(A) a veteran of the armed forces of the United States who is permanently and totally disabled as a result of a service-connected disability and who files with the Department of Revenue a certificate signed by the county service officer certifying this disability;

. . . .

(iii) "qualified surviving spouse" means the surviving spouse of an individual described in subsubitem (i) while remaining unmarried, who resi des in the house, and who

owns the house in fee or for life. . . .

(iv) "house" means a dwelling and the lot on which it is

situated classified in the hands of the current owner for

property tax purposes pursuant to Section 12-43-220(c)[. 3 ]

(emphases added). Therefore, a surviving spouse's eligibility for this exemption is derivative of the disabled veteran having been eligible for the exemption. Pursuant to the statute's clear terms, a disabled ve teran's eligibility for the exemption requires his ownership of the house in question "in fee or jointly with a spouse" and his having filed with the Department "a certific ate signed by the county service officer certifying [a service-connected] disability ." § 12-37-220(B)(1)(e)(i). It is undisputed that Taxpayer's husband neith er owned property in South Carolina nor filed the required certificate with the De partment as he and Taxpayer resided in Maryland at the time of hi s death. Curiously, Taxpaye r asserts the certification requirement does not apply to her because sh e is an "eligible surviving spouse" as set forth in item (1), subitem (b), and "there is no textual link . . . between an eligible surviving spouse and the certification requirement."

3 This property is classified as an owner-o ccupied legal residen ce and is taxed at a rate of four percent of its fair market value. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(1) (Supp. 2020).Subitem (b) identifies the property for which a surviving spouse may claim the exemption in the following manner: "the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse." § 12-37- 220(B)(1)(b) (emphasis added). The legislature's inclusion of the conjunction "a nd" rather than "or" indicates there was no intent to allow an alternative exemption for a surviving spouse who does not first acquire an exempt house from the disabled veteran. Likewise, the inclusion of the term "subsequently" indicates a relationshi p to the term "acquired" within the preceding phrase: "the house owne d by a qualified surviving spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse." § 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) (emphases a dded). In other words, "subsequently acquired" means subsequent to the qualifie d surviving spouse's acquisition of an exempt house from the deceased veteran. Ot herwise, the legislature would not have included the term "subsequently." See CFRE

, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 ("[W]e must read the statute so 'that no wo rd, clause, sentence, provision or part shall be rendered surplusage, or superfluous,' for '[t]he General Assembly obviously intended [the statute] to ha ve some efficacy, or the legislature would not have enacted it into law.'" (citation omitted) (s econd and third altera tions in original) (quoting State v. Sweat , 379 S.C. 367, 377, 382, 665 S. E.2d 645, 651, 654 (Ct. App. 2008))). It logically follows that the entire phrase "and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surv iving spouse" relates back to the preceding phrase, conditioning eligibility for the exempti on on first acquiring an exempt house from

the deceased veteran.

Despite the absence of a logically separate and symmetrical subitem expressing a third class of persons eligib le for the exemption, Taxpayer essentially seeks to carve out a third class from subitem (b ). Taxpayer asserts that the legislature intended "eligible surviving spouse" to mean merely a surviving spouse who remains unmarried. Taxpayer attempts to support this assertion with the argument that the term "subsequently" relates back to the ve teran's death (meaning subsequent to the veteran's death) rather than the surviving spouse's acquisition of the veteran's exempt house and, thus, a surviving spouse who does not first acquire an exempt house from the deceased veteran is eligible for th e exemption when she acquires a residence from another source. Taxpayer states: "Any house acquired by a surviving spouse after the death of the [veteran] would thus be a 'subsequently acquired' house qualifying for the [e]xemption under the th ird category." This is a strained interpretation of item (1) that takes its term s out of their critical context to reach a result the legislature did not intend. See Singletary v. S.C. Dep't of Educ. , 316 S.C. 153, 162, 447 S.E.2d 231, 236 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The intention of the legislaturemust be gleaned from the entire section and not simply clauses taken out of context."). The term "subsequently" is an a dverb that modifies the past tense of the verb "acquire." Further, although the surv iving spouse's acquisition of the deceased veteran's exempt house presumably occurs on the same date as the date of the veteran's death, the noun "death" does not appear as the event of reference for "subsequently" in subitem (b).

Therefore, the legislature's use of th e words "eligible surviving spouse" does not indicate a third class of persons who ma y claim the exemption. If the legislature

had intended to create such a class, it w ould have added a sepa rate subitem within item (1) setting forth the third class and a se parate definition for "eligible surviving spouse" as it did for "qualified surviving s pouse" and "eligible owner." Rather, the context in which the word "elig ible" is used in subitem (b ) indicates the word is to be understood in its plain sense, wh ich is synonymous with "qualified" 4 and simply means eligible for the exemption. Acco rdingly, "eligible surviving spouse" is simply a reference to the qualified survivi ng spouse who has become eligible for the exemption on a subsequently acquired hous e after first acquiring the deceased veteran's exempt house. Th e connection between "the qualified surviving spouse" and "subsequent house" in the last sentence of subitem (b) confirms this plain reading of the statute: "The qualified surv iving spouse shall inform the Department

of Revenue of the address of a subsequent house[.]" § 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) (emphasis added); see Singletary , 316 S.C. at 162, 447 S.E.2d at 236 ("The intention of the legislature must be gleaned from the entire section and not simply clauses taken out of context."). U nder Taxpayer's interp retation of subitem (b), the qualified surviving spouse would be required to info rm the Department of the address of a subsequently acquired house but an "eligib le surviving spouse" who does not meet the definition of qualified surviving spouse would not have to inform the Department. The legislature could not have intended this incongruous result.

We view section 12-37-2 20(B)(1)(b) as unambiguous because the only reasonable interpretation of the statute is that of the ALC and the Department. Cf. S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of McClellanville , 345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 299, 302 (2001) ("A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the contract are reasonably susceptible of more than one in terpretation." (emphasis added)).

Nonetheless, even if the st atute could be considered am biguous, the interpretation of the ALC and the Department better harmoni zes with the legislature's expressed

4 See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Eligible , https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/eligib le (June 24, 2021) ("1a: qualif ied to participate or be chosen").intent to require proof of a disability before allowing a tax exemption for it. See

CFRE

, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 ("We . . . should not concentrate on isolated phrases within the statute. Instead, we re ad the statute as a whole and in a manner consonant and in harmony with its purpose." (citation omitted)); see also S.C. Energy Users Comm. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n , 388 S.C. 486, 491, 697 S.E.2d 587, 590 (2010) ("The cardinal rule of statutory c onstruction is to ascer tain and effectuate the intent of the legislature." (quoting Hardee v. McDowell , 381 S.C. 445, 453, 673 S.E.2d 813, 817 (2009))); Boulware , 422 S.C. at 8, 809 S. E.2d at 226 ("What a legislature says in the text of a statut e is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will." (quoting Hodges , 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581)). Taxpayer's interpretation a llows an "eligible surviving spouse" to obtain the exemption even if the corresponding de ceased veteran never provided the Department with proof of his disability during his lifetime. Yet, this same interpretation requires a living disabled vete ran to submit such pr oof before he may obtain the exemption for himself under subite m (a). The legislature could not have intended this incongruous result, especia lly given the derivative nature of the exemption for surviving spouses.

Further, we note the Department's re presentation that it has consistently interpreted and applied section 12-37-220(B )(1)(b) in the same way it has applied the statute to Taxpayer for her re sidence at 1885 Carolina Towne Court. 5 Therefore, this court may defer to this interpretation. See Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't of Health & Envtl. Control , 411 S.C. 16, 32–33, 766 S.E.2d 707, 717 (2014) ("Interpreting and applying statutes and re gulations administered by an agency is a two-step process. First, a court must de termine whether the language of a statute or regulation directly speaks to the issue. If so, the court must u tilize the clear meaning of the statute or regulation. If the statut e or regulation 'is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,' the court th en must give deference to the agency's interpretation of the statute or regulation, assuming the interpretation is worthy of deference." (citations omitted) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.

Council, Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))); id. at 34, 766 S.E.2d at 718 ("[W]e give deference to agencies both because they have been entrusted with administering their statutes and regulations and because th ey have unique skill and expertise in administering those statutes and regulations."); Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health &

Envtl. Control , 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002) ("[T]he construction of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons."

5 The Department asserts that it made a mistake in granting the exemption for the property located at 1551 Ben Sawyer Blvd.(quoting Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry , 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 132, 133 (1987))).

Finally, Taxpayer asserts that the le gislative history of section 12-37- 220(B)(1) supports her position. We disagree. Prior to 2004, item (1) identified the property for which a disabled military veteran could cl aim the exemption in the following manner:

The dwelling house in which he resides and a lot not

to exceed one acre of land ow ned in fee or for life, or jointly with a spouse, by a veteran who is one hundred percent permanently and tota lly disabled from a serviceconnected disability, if the ve teran or qualifying surviving spouse files a certificate, signed by the county service officer, of the total and permanent disability with the Department of Revenue. Th e exemption is allowed the surviving spouse of the veteran and also is allowed to the surviving spouse of a servic eman or law enforcement officer as defined in Section 23-6-400(D)(1) killed in action in the line of duty w ho owned the lot and dwelling house in fee or for life, or jointly with his spouse, so long as the spouse does not remarry, resides in the dwelling, and obtains the fee or a life estate in the dwelling. A surviving spouse who disposes of the exempt dwelling and acquires another residence in this State for use as a dwelling house . . . may apply for and receive the exemption on the newly acquired dwelling, but a subsequent dwelling of a surviving spouse is not eligible for exemption pursuant to this item . The spouse shall inform the Department of Revenue of the change in address of the dwelling. To qualify for the exemption, the dwelling house must be the domicile of the person who qualifies for the exemption.

Act No. 399, 2000 S.C Acts 3463 (emphasis a dded). The legislature amended item (1) in 2004 to read as it does today. See Act No. 224, 2004 S.C. Acts 2022.

The plain meaning of the language in the 2000 Act (Act No. 399) simply allowed a qualified surviving spouse who chose to move to a new residence to claim an exemption for the newly acquired hous e after relinquishing ownership of theexempt house acquired from the deceased spouse. The language also expressly limited the exemption to the house acqui red from the deceased spouse and one subsequently acquired house. If the qualified surviving spouse relinquished ownership of the second house and acquire d a third house to live in, she could not claim an exemption for the third hous e or any other future residences.

The plain language of the current versi on of the statute i ndicates that the legislature extended the exemption to all subsequently acquired residences by (1) substituting the phrase "a house subseque ntly acquired by an eligible surviving spouse" for the statement "A surviving spouse who disposes of the exempt dwelling and acquires another residenc e in this State for use as a dwelling house . . . may apply for and receive the exemption on the newly acquired dwelling" and (2) deleting the language limiting the exem ption to the house acquired from the deceased spouse and one subs equently acquired house.

We disagree with Taxpayer's intima tion that the 2004 amendment created a third class of persons eligible for the exemp tion, i.e., "an eligible surviving spouse." The 2004 amendment simply retained the te rm "eligible" from the version enacted in 2000, which states, in pertinent part:

A surviving spouse who disposes of the exempt dwelling and acquires another residence in this State for use as a dwelling house . . . may a pply for and receive the exemption on the newly acquired dwelling, but a subsequent dwelling of a surviving spouse is not eligible for exemption pursuant to this item.

Act No. 399, 2000 S.C Acts 3463 (emphasis a dded). When the legislature expanded the exemption in 2004 to all subsequent dwellings, it connected their acquisition to a surviving spouse who had become eligible for that exemption after she first acquired the deceased vetera n's exempt house, resulting in the current language found in section 12-37-220( B)(1)(b): "the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse ." (emphases added). Therefore, this language did not create a third class of persons w ho may claim the exemption.

Moreover, we note that the 2004 ame ndment deleted langua ge allowing the surviving spouse to file the certificate ve rifying the veteran's service-connected disability with the Department so that th e exemption is not allowed if the veteran

himself did not file the certificate. This i ndicates the legislature's intent to ensurethat the surviving spouse's ability to obtain the exemption is merely derivative. She may not obtain the exemption on a house she purchases after the disabled veteran's death unless she first acquired a previously exempt house from the deceased veteran.

We also disagree with Taxpayer's co ntention that her interpretation is supported by the following language in the pr eamble to Act No. 224: "An Act . . . to continue the exemption to subsequent hom esteads of surviving spouses and provide the requirements for this extended exempti on . . . ." We view this language as simply expressing the legislature's intent to extend the exemption to all houses acquired by the qualified surviving spouse after she leaves the exempt house she acquired from the deceased veteran. Prior to Act No. 224, the exemption extended to only one subsequently acquired house.

Based on the foregoing, the ALC correc tly ruled that the Department was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing that summary judgment shall be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affi davits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and th at the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law").

CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the ALC's order is

AFFIRMED.

KONDUROS and MCDONAL D, JJ., concur.