Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 1 of 4

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE

Ryan Patrick Rucker

Wabash Valley Correctional Facility 

Carlisle, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Ryan Patrick Rucker,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

November 20, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

35A02-1705-CR-956

Appeal from the Huntington 

Circuit Court

The Honorable Thomas M. Hakes, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

35C01-1110-FA-217

Crone, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 2 of 4

Case Summary

[1] Ryan Patrick Rucker appeals the denial of his motion to correct erroneous 

sentence. Because there is no error on the face of the sentencing judgment, we 

affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] In August 2011, Rucker and his wife were visiting friends in Huntington 

County. Rucker entered the bedroom of his friends’ sleeping eight-year-old 

daughter, pulled down her underwear, and licked her vagina. The child awoke 

and told him to stop. 

[3] The State charged Rucker with class A felony child molesting. The parties 

entered into a plea agreement pursuant to which Rucker pled guilty, with his 

sentence set at twenty-five years executed and no probation. During the March

2012 guilty plea hearing, the State established a factual basis, and the trial court 

accepted Rucker’s guilty plea. In May 2012, the court issued a judgment 

sentencing Rucker according to the terms of the plea agreement. 

[4] In March 2017, Rucker filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, asserting 

that his sentence was illegal and “the result of an illusory plea that propagated 

an invalid plea of guilty made under a false pretense.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 

at 57. The trial court denied Rucker’s motion, as well as his subsequent motion 

to correct error. Rucker now appeals. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 3 of 4

Discussion and Decision

[5] We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to correct erroneous sentence using 

an abuse of discretion standard. Davis v. State, 978 N.E.2d 470, 472 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2012). A motion to correct erroneous sentence is a statutory matter, 

derived from Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-15, which states, 

If the convicted person is erroneously sentenced, the mistake 

does not render the sentence void. The sentence shall be 

corrected after written notice is given to the convicted person. 

The convicted person and his counsel must be present when the 

corrected sentence is ordered. A motion to correct sentence must 

be in writing and supported by a memorandum of law 

specifically pointing out the defect in the original sentence.

The statute provides “prompt, direct access to an uncomplicated legal process 

for correcting the occasional erroneous or illegal sentence.” Robinson v. State, 

805 N.E.2d 783, 785 (Ind. 2004) (quoting Gaddie v. State, 566 N.E.2d 535, 537 

(Ind. 1991)). A motion to correct sentence is appropriate only when the 

sentence is “erroneous on its face.” Id. at 786. This means that “a motion to 

correct sentence may only be used to correct sentencing errors that are clear 

from the face of the judgment imposing the sentence in light of the statutory 

authority.” Id. at 787. “As to sentencing claims not facially apparent, the 

motion to correct sentence is an improper remedy. Such claims may be raised 

only on direct appeal and, where appropriate, by postconviction proceedings.” 

Id. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 35A02-1705-CR-956 | November 20, 2017 Page 4 of 4

[6] Here, the judgment shows that Rucker was convicted of class A felony child 

molesting and sentenced to twenty-five years executed, with zero years 

suspended. The sentencing range for a class A felony is twenty to fifty years, 

with an advisory term of thirty years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-4(a). Thus, Rucker’s 

sentence is within the term allowed by statute for his offense. In other words, 

there simply is no error on the face of the judgment. Rucker’s arguments are 

framed in terms of the face of the record or the face of the waiver or plea agreement

and seem to implicate the voluntariness of his plea. These arguments are not 

properly presented by way of a motion to correct erroneous sentence. As such, 

the trial court acted within its discretion in denying his motion. Accordingly, 

we affirm.

[7] Affirmed.

Robb, J., and Bradford, J., concur.