NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE REHEARING

MOTION AND, IF FILED, DETERMINED

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

OF FLORIDA

SECOND DISTRICT

MAGWITCH, LLC, )

)

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Case No. 2D15-897

)

PUSSER'S WEST INDIES LIMITED, a )

British Virgin Islands corporation, and )

CHARLES S. TOBIAS, )

)

Appellees. )

___________________________________)

Opinion filed September 7, 2016.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for

Hillsborough County; Mark R. Wolfe,

Judge.

Karen Cox of Bush Ross, P.A., Tampa,

for Appellant.

Christine A. Marlewski of Gray-Robinson, 

P.A., Tampa, and John A. McCauley of 

Venable, LLP, Baltimore, Maryland, for 

Appellee Pusser's West Indies Limited. 

No appearance for Appellee Charles S. 

Tobias.

SILBERMAN, Judge.

Magwitch, LLC, a New York company, seeks review of an order 

dismissing with prejudice its collection action against Pusser's West Indies Limited 
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(PWI), a British Virgin Islands corporation. The trial court dismissed the complaint for 

lack of personal jurisdiction based on a determination that PWI's business contacts with 

Florida were insufficient to establish general jurisdiction under Florida's long-arm 

statute. We affirm. 

Long-arm jurisdiction exists over a foreign corporation when (1) the 

requirements of section 48.193, Florida Statutes (2012), are satisfied, and (2) the 

corporation has sufficient minimum contacts with Florida to satisfy the federal 

constitutional due process requirement. Venetian Salami Co. v. Parthenais, 554 So. 2d 

499, 502 (Fla. 1989). Section 48.193 sets forth requirements for specific and general 

jurisdiction, either of which is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the long-arm 

jurisdiction analysis. Specific jurisdiction requires a causal connection between the 

plaintiff's claim and the defendant's activity in the state, but general jurisdiction does not 

require any such connection. At issue herein is only general jurisdiction. 

Section 48.193(2) provides for general jurisdiction over "[a] defendant who 

is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity within this state, whether such activity 

is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise." "Substantial and not isolated activity" is 

construed by Florida courts as involving contacts with Florida that are "continuous and 

systematic." Wiggins v. Tigrent, Inc., 147 So. 3d 76, 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 2014) (quoting 

Two Worlds United v. Zylstra, 46 So. 3d 1175, 1178 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010)). "General 

jurisdiction requires far more wide-ranging contacts with the forum state than specific 

jurisdiction, and it is thus more difficult to establish." Canale v. Rubin, 20 So. 3d 463, 

466 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009). Thus, the satisfaction of section 48.193(2) also fulfills the

second prong of the long-arm jurisdiction analysis. Wiggins, 147 So. 3d at 85. 
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This court conducts a de novo review of the trial court's application of the 

law in ruling on a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Oldock v. DL&B 

Enters., Inc., 100 So. 3d 50, 52 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). In cases in which the trial court 

has heard testimony, we must defer to the court's findings of fact. See id. In this case, 

the trial court made numerous jurisdictional findings of fact.

The court found that PWI is a corporation organized under the laws of the 

British Virgin Islands with its principal place of business, headquarters, and employees 

located in the British Virgin Islands. PWI's core business consists of owning and 

operating Caribbean-themed pubs in the British Virgin Islands, but it also sells Pusser's

branded merchandise through a website that is hosted in the British Virgin Islands. PWI 

has never owned or operated any pubs in Florida or had any employees in Florida. It 

has not owned any real property in Florida or had any bank accounts in Florida. PWI's

sole business contact with Florida is the use of a Florida fulfillment house to process

and distribute its internet orders. 

PWI has been using a fulfillment house located in Florida since 2005. 

Neither of the two fulfillment houses it has used since then has served as an agent of 

PWI or had any ownership interest in its merchandise. Revenues from internet orders 

amount to only 1.3% of PWI's $68,000,000 in total business revenues, and revenues 

from the internet sales of PWI merchandise to residents in Florida amount to only .2% of 

PWI's total business revenues. PWI does not target its marketing toward Florida or 

solicit business from Florida. While PWI registered to do business in Florida and 

appointed a Florida resident agent, it did so to meet its legal obligation of paying Florida 
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sales taxes on internet sales to residents in Florida. The only official act PWI's 

registered agent has taken was receiving service of process in the underlying action.

On appeal, Magwitch argues that PWI has consented to personal 

jurisdiction by registering to do business in Florida and appointing a Florida resident

agent. Magwitch alternatively argues that PWI maintained continuous and systematic 

business contacts with Florida. We are not persuaded by either argument.

Magwitch first argues that PWI consented to personal jurisdiction by 

registering to do business in Florida and appointing a Florida resident agent. In support 

of this argument, Magwitch relies upon Pennsylvania Fire Insurance Co. of Philadelphia 

v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917), and White v. Pepsico, 568 So. 

2d 886 (Fla. 1990). However, Pennsylvania Fire has yielded to the two-prong analysis 

for long-arm jurisdiction set forth in recent decades by the Supreme Court and adopted 

in Venetian Salami. See Brown v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 814 F.3d 619, 639 (2d Cir. 

2016). And we find White to be inapposite because it addressed the sufficiency of 

service of process under section 48.081, Florida Statutes (1983), and not personal 

jurisdiction under section 48.193.

Magwitch alternatively argues that PWI maintained continuous and 

systematic business contacts with Florida by registering to do business in Florida, 

designating a corporate representative in Florida, and engaging in a long-term business 

relationship with a Florida fulfillment house. Magwitch asserts that there are additional 

facts regarding this relationship that were not discussed by the trial court but are 

compelling. According to Magwitch, a significant amount of PWI's merchandise is 

imported to Florida and stored in Florida at the fulfillment house. All of PWI's revenue 
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from internet sales comes from this merchandise, and the call center for processing 

orders is also located in Florida. Further, one of the products distributed by the 

fulfillment house, Pusser's rum cakes, was baked in Florida by a bakery with which PWI 

established a relationship. In support of its argument that these business contacts are 

sufficient to satisfy section 48.193(2), Magwitch relies on Oldock v. DL&B Enterprises, 

Inc., 100 So. 3d 50 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011). 

Before addressing Oldock, we note that "Florida cases have found 

'continuous systematic business contacts' to confer general jurisdiction where a 

nonresident defendant's activities are extensive and pervasive, in that a significant 

portion of the defendant's business operations or revenue derived from established 

commercial relationships in the state." Caiazzo v. Am. Royal Arts Corp., 73 So. 3d 245, 

259 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (quoting Trs. of Columbia Univ. v. Ocean World, S.A., 12 So. 

3d 788, 793 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). However, business activities resulting in Florida 

sales that generate "a de minimus percentage of the total sales" are not sufficient to 

meet the requirements of section 48.193(2). Id. Additionally, the mere presence of a 

website in Florida does not confer general jurisdiction. Id. at 260.

PWI's internet sales to Florida are insufficient in themselves to establish 

general jurisdiction. See Caiazzo, 73 So. 3d at 260. In Caiazzo, the Fourth District 

concluded that the circuit court did not have general jurisdiction over a nonresident 

defendant based on the defendant's internet business because the defendant "does not 

solicit business from Florida, does not target Florida, and only makes 4.35[%] of total 

sales to Florida, a de minimus amount." Id. at 261. As with the nonresident defendant 

in Caiazzo, PWI conducts internet sales in Florida but does not solicit business from 
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Florida or target Florida. Additionally, PWI's revenues from internet sales to Florida only 

amount to the de minimus amount of .2% of PWI's total business revenues. 

Similarly, PWI's use of a Florida fulfillment house to process and distribute 

internet orders is de minimus in that it does not account for a significant portion of PWI's 

business operations or revenue. See Vos, B.V. v. Payen, 15 So. 3d 734, 738 (Fla. 3d 

DCA 2009). In Vos, the nonresident defendant had business contacts with three 

corporations operating in Florida. The defendant had entered into contracts with two of

these companies for the distribution of 1,000,000 pounds of the defendant's chemicals. 

Id. at 735-36. The defendant did not ship any of the chemicals through Florida or its 

ports, but it did maintain long-distance communication with the Florida distributors to 

keep up its business relationships. Id. at 736. The defendant's third Florida business 

contact was a bank that provided the defendant a line of credit to facilitate its sales to 

one of the distributors. 

The Third District concluded that these business contacts with Florida 

were de minimus and insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction. Id. at 737. The 

court explained that the defendant did not have any employees or offices in Florida, it 

did not own any assets or real property in Florida, it did not distribute its chemicals 

through or into Florida, it did not advertise in Florida, and it did not send representatives 

to Florida. Id. at 736-37. Instead, the Florida corporations acted as brokers for the 

defendant's sale of chemicals to international purchasers. Id. at 737. And the 

transactions with the corporations operating in Florida amounted to just .236% of the 

defendant's total sales. Id. at 736. Finally, the defendant's involvement in the use of 
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the line of credit to facilitate its sales to one of the corporations was "virtually nonexistent" because it was all done by document and fund transfers. Id. at 737.

As with the nonresident defendant in Vos, PWI does not have any 

employees or offices in Florida, it does not own any assets or real property in Florida, it 

does not target advertising to Florida, and there is no evidence it sends representatives 

to Florida. While PWI does distribute all of its internet merchandise through a Florida

fulfillment center, the revenue from PWI's internet sales is de minimus at 1.3% of PWI's 

total revenues. To the extent that PWI uses a Florida call center to process internet 

orders and used a Florida bakery to bake its Pusser's rum cakes, those contacts still 

facilitate only 1.3% of PWI's total revenues. And while PWI registered to do business in 

Florida and appointed a corporate representative, PWI only did so to meet its legal 

obligation of paying Florida sales tax for the .2% de minimus revenue from internet 

sales in Florida. In fact, the only official act PWI's registered agent has taken was 

receiving service of process in this case. 

We find Magwitch's reliance on Oldock to be misplaced. In Oldock, the 

nonresident defendant was a North Carolina corporation that grew produce in North 

Carolina. One of two Florida companies acted as the defendant's exclusive sales agent 

for over twenty years. 100 So. 3d at 52. The defendant made almost 100% of its 

revenue from the sales made by its Florida agents. 

In determining that these business contacts were sufficient to establish 

general jurisdiction, this court noted that "a [nonresident] defendant who engages the 

services of brokers, jobbers, wholesalers, or distributors can be subject to jurisdiction if 

the defendant was engaged in a course of conduct in Florida for the purpose of realizing 
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a pecuniary benefit." Id. at 53 (quoting Am. Fin. Trading Corp. v. Bauer, 828 So. 2d 

1071, 1074 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)). This court concluded that the defendant grower "has

been continuously and systematically initiating and maintaining exclusive business 

relationships with Florida companies" for almost 100% of its revenue. Id. Additionally, 

the original Florida sales company and its successor sold about 30% of their produce to 

Florida buyers. And the successor Florida sales company was created by the 

defendant corporation's owners for the purpose of selling their produce.

We do not dispute that a nonresident defendant who engages the services 

of a Florida distributor can be subject to jurisdiction by engaging in a course of conduct 

in Florida for a pecuniary benefit. However, the attendant business contacts must still 

be extensive and pervasive. While the business contacts in Oldock met this high 

threshold, the business contacts in this case do not. The business revenue from the 

Florida contacts in Oldock accounted for almost 100% of the defendant's profits, while

the revenue generated by PWI's business contacts with Florida is de minimus at 1.3% 

of PWI's total business revenues. Additionally, about 30% of the defendant's produce 

was sold to Florida buyers in Oldock, while the revenue from PWI's internet sales in 

Florida is a mere .2%. Furthermore, the defendant in Oldock created the Florida sales 

company for the very purpose of selling its product, but PWI does not have any 

ownership interest in or exclusive contract with its Florida fulfillment house. 

In conclusion, PWI's business contacts with Florida were not extensive 

and pervasive enough to meet the high threshold required to establish continuous and 

systematic business contact with Florida. Therefore, we affirm the order dismissing with 

prejudice Magwitch's complaint against PWI for lack of personal jurisdiction. 
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Affirmed.

VILLANTI, C.J., and CRENSHAW, J., Concur.