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The Honorable Linda R. Reade, Chief Judge, United States District Court for

the Northern District of Iowa.

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

___________

No. 07-2436

___________

United States of America, *

*

Appellee, *

* Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

* Northern District of Iowa.

William Perry Lacey, *

* [UNPUBLISHED]

Appellant. *

___________

Submitted: July 6, 2009

Filed: July 8, 2009

___________

Before RILEY, SMITH, and BENTON, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

William Lacey pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography, in violation

of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B) and (b)(2), and the district court1

 sentenced him within

the unobjected-to Guidelines range to 115 months in prison and 15 years of supervised

release. On appeal, Lacey’s counsel has filed a brief under Anders v. California, 386

U.S. 738 (1967), challenging the reasonableness of the sentence by arguing that a

sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range would have been fully sufficient

punishment.
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When the applicable Guidelines range is undisputed, as it is here, we consider

whether the sentence is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. See

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261-62 (2005); United States v. Mathis, 451

F.3d 939, 941 (8th Cir. 2006) (review for reasonableness is akin to review for abuse

of discretion). The sentencing court noted Lacey’s criminal past and his likelihood

of recidivism, and stated it had considered all of the other statutory factors. We see

nothing in the record to suggest that Lacey’s sentence at the top of the advisory

Guidelines range was unreasonable, or that the district court failed to consider a

relevant factor that should have received significant weight, gave significant weight

to an improper or irrelevant factor, or committed a clear error of judgment in weighing

appropriate factors. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-68 (2007)

(approving appellate presumption of reasonableness for sentences within advisory

Guidelines range); United States v. Robinson, 516 F.3d 716, 717 (8th Cir. 2008)

(sentence within advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable); United

States v. Haack, 403 F.3d 997, 1003-04 (8th Cir. 2005) (circumstances indicating

abuse of discretion).

In a pro se supplemental brief, Lacey challenges a special supervised-release

condition banning him from gambling or entering any casino upon being released.

While this condition may have been overbroad or unrelated to Lacey’s circumstances,

we find its imposition did not amount to plain error requiring reversal. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(1)-(3) (court may order appropriate special condition of release so long as

it is reasonably related to factors set forth in § 3553, it involves no greater deprivation

of liberty than necessary, and it is consistent with policy statements of the Sentencing

Commission); United States v. Silvious, 512 F.3d 364, 371 (7th Cir. 2008)

(recognizing as overbroad and arbitrary certain special conditions of supervised

release, including ban on gambling where there was no evidence that defendant had

gambling problem, but finding no plain error because there was no showing that

conditions affected defendant’s substantial rights, and conditions were readily

modifiable at defendant’s request). To the extent Lacey wishes to challenge his
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counsel’s performance, he must do so in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding where the

record can be developed. See United States v. McAdory, 501 F.3d 868, 872-73 (8th

Cir. 2007) (appellate court ordinarily defers ineffective-assistance claims to § 2255

proceedings). We deem Lacey’s remaining contentions to be speculative or irrelevant,

or to raise no more than harmless error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (any error, defect,

or irregularity that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded). 

We have conducted an independent review under Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75,

80 (1988), and we have found no nonfrivolous issues. Accordingly, the judgment is

affirmed, and counsel’s motion to withdraw is granted.

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