United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued March 10, 2016 Decided June 28, 2016

No. 15–1026

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF THE BLIND, ET AL.,

PETITIONERS

v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

AND ANTHONY FOXX,

RESPONDENTS

Consolidated with 15–5078

On Petition for Review of an Order

of the Department of Transportation and 

on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

(1:14-cv-00085)

Kevin D. Docherty argued the cause for the petitioners. 

Daniel F. Goldstein, Joseph B. Espo and Gregory P. Care

were with him on brief.

Abby C. Wright, Attorney, United States Department of 

Justice, argued the cause for the respondents. Benjamin C. 

Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Michael 

S. Raab, Attorney, Paul M. Geier, Assistant General Counsel 

for Litigation, United States Department of Transportation, 
2

Peter J. Plocki, Deputy Assistant General Counsel for 

Litigation, Joy K. Park, Senior Trial Attorney, and Blane A. 

Workie, Assistant General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement 

and Proceedings, were with her on brief.

Before: HENDERSON, GRIFFITH and PILLARD, Circuit 

Judges.

Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.

KAREN LECRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge: Petitioners 

National Federation of the Blind, Marc Maurer and Anil Lewis 

(collectively, NFB) challenge a rule issued by the United States 

Department of Transportation (DOT). The rule requires that 

air carriers begin to purchase ticketing kiosks accessible to 

blind persons within three years of the rule taking effect so that 

25 per cent of kiosks eventually will be blind-accessible. 

After DOT issued its final rule, NFB filed a complaint in 

district court, challenging the rule because, among other 

reasons, it does not require air carriers to make all airport 

kiosks accessible to the blind. The district court concluded 

that it lacked jurisdiction under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) because 

the rule is an “order” over which the court of appeals has 

exclusive jurisdiction.

Instead of dismissing NFB’s complaint, however, the 

district court transferred the complaint to our court, re-styled as 

a petition for review. NFB subsequently filed a notice of 

appeal—which we construed as a petition for a writ of 

mandamus—challenging the district court’s conclusion that it 

lacked jurisdiction. For the following reasons, we dismiss 

NFB’s petition for review and deny its mandamus petition.
3

I. BACKGROUND

The Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA), Pub. L. No. 

99-435, 100 Stat. 1080, prohibits air carriers from 

“discriminat[ing] against any otherwise qualified handicapped 

individual” on the basis of disability and grants the DOT 

Secretary the authority to promulgate regulations to “ensure 

non-discriminatory treatment of qualified handicapped 

individuals.” Id. Using its authority, DOT issued a 

supplemental notice of proposed rulemaking in 2011 which 

proposed that all future automated ticketing kiosks purchased 

by certain domestic and foreign air carriers1 be accessible to 

blind persons. See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 

Disability in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and 

Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports, 76 Fed. Reg. 59,307, 

59,309 (Sept. 26, 2011). This requirement would have taken 

effect sixty days after promulgation of the final rule. Id. 

DOT nevertheless sought comment on a 

less-than-100-per-cent-accessible kiosk requirement and on 

the timing of implementation. Id. at 59,320.

In light of comments from both air carriers and advocacy

groups for disabled passengers, DOT altered its approach.

DOT now requires that covered air carriers purchase 

blind-accessible kiosks until at least 25 per cent of the 

automated kiosks at each location in domestic airports are 

 1 Both the proposed rule and final rule apply to only United 

States airports having 10,000 or more enplanements per year. 

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: 

Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports, 

78 Fed. Reg. 67,882, 67,883 (Nov. 12, 2013) (Final Rule or Rule); 

Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability in Air Travel: 

Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated Kiosks at U.S. Airports, 

76 Fed. Reg. 59,307, 59,309 (Sept. 26, 2011).
4

accessible.2 See Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Disability 

in Air Travel: Accessibility of Web Sites and Automated 

Kiosks at U.S. Airports (Final Rule or Rule), 78 Fed. Reg. 

67,882, 67,883 (Nov. 12, 2013). The Final Rule became 

effective on December 12, 2013, and DOT provided a grace 

period wherein air carriers are not required to begin purchasing 

accessible kiosks until three years after the effective date of the 

Rule’s implementation. Id. at 67,882–83.

NFB filed its complaint in district court on January 22, 

2014, seventy-one days after DOT issued the Final Rule. 

NFB sought declaratory and injunctive relief under the 

Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, 

for DOT’s alleged failure to comply with the ACAA. NFB 

alleged that the 25 per cent accessibility requirement and 

three-year grace period violated the ACAA’s ban on 

discrimination against disabled individuals and resulted from 

arbitrary and capricious decision-making. The district court 

concluded that it lacked jurisdiction because the Final Rule is 

an “order” and 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) vests the court of appeals 

with exclusive jurisdiction of DOT orders. Nat’l Fed’n of the 

Blind v. DOT, 78 F. Supp. 3d 407, 414 (D.D.C. 2015). 

Although NFB filed its complaint seventy-one days after DOT 

issued the Final Rule—and, if construed to be a petition for 

review, was therefore time barred under the sixty-day filing 

deadline of section 46110(a)—the district court declined to 

dismiss the complaint and instead transferred the complaint to 

our court to determine whether the untimely filing was 

excusable. Id. at 416. NFB subsequently filed a notice of 

appeal on February 26, 2015, challenging the district court’s 

no-jurisdiction conclusion. We construed the notice of appeal 

 2 The Rule also requires that disabled passengers be given 

priority access to the accessible kiosks because not all kiosks will be 

accessible. Final Rule, 78 Fed. Reg. at 67,883.
5

as a petition for a writ of mandamus and consolidated the two 

petitions for review.

II. ANALYSIS

NFB claims that a writ of mandamus should issue because 

the district court erred in its jurisdictional analysis. NFB 

further argues that, even if the district court correctly 

determined that it lacked jurisdiction, NFB’s untimely filing 

should be excused for reasonable grounds under section 

46110(a) due to its confusion over the appropriate forum to 

challenge DOT’s Final Rule. On the merits, NFB asserts that 

we should either vacate the Rule because DOT failed to require 

that all future kiosks be accessible or remand the Rule for 

further review in light of other alleged flaws in DOT’s

decision-making process. We do not reach NFB’s arguments 

on the merits because we conclude that the district court lacked 

jurisdiction of NFB’s complaint and that reasonable grounds 

do not excuse NFB’s untimely filing.

A.

NFB first requests that we issue a writ of mandamus 

because the district court erred in concluding that it lacked 

jurisdiction of NFB’s complaint. In reviewing a request for a 

writ of mandamus, “[t]he threshold question is whether the 

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s . . . ruling constituted legal error. If not, 

mandamus is of course inappropriate.” In re Kellogg Brown 

& Root, Inc., 756 F.3d 754, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2014). “If the 

[d]istrict [c]ourt’s ruling was erroneous,” however, we then 

determine “whether that error is the kind that justifies 

mandamus.” Id. at 756–57. Because we agree with DOT 

that the district court did not err in concluding that it lacked 

jurisdiction, we need go no further. 
6

Section 46110(a) provides that “a person disclosing a 

substantial interest in an order issued by the Secretary of 

Transportation . . . may apply for review of the order by filing 

a petition for review in the United States Court of Appeals for 

the District of Columbia Circuit.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a) 

(emphasis added). Although section 46110(a) does not 

specify a finality requirement, we have interpreted section 

46110(a) in light of the APA’s definition of “order” at 5 U.S.C. 

§ 551(6) to require that a DOT order must be final before it is 

appealable. See SecurityPoint Holdings, Inc. v. TSA, 769 F.3d 

1184, 1187 (D.C. Cir. 2014). We have not, however, 

determined whether a final rule issued by DOT should be 

considered an order under section 46110(a).

According to NFB, the “normal default rule,” Pet’rs’ Br. 

22 (quoting Am. Petroleum Inst. v. SEC, 714 F.3d 1329, 1332 

(D.C. Cir. 2013)), is that the district court is the appropriate 

forum for review of agency rulemaking unless there is an 

applicable direct-review statute that “specifically gives the 

court of appeals subject-matter jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis in 

original) (quoting Watts v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501, 505 (D.C. Cir. 

2007)). NFB then points to language from Safe Extensions, 

Inc. v. FAA, 509 F.3d 593, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2007), and from 

SecurityPoint to argue that we have previously relied on the 

APA to define “order” under section 46110(a). In NFB’s 

view, because the APA both allegedly controls our 

interpretation of section 46110(a) and excludes rulemaking 

from its definition of “order,” section 46110(a) does not vest 

exclusive jurisdiction of DOT rulemaking review in the court 

of appeals. In response, DOT asserts that our recent decision 

in New York Republican State Committee v. SEC (NYRSC), 

799 F.3d 1126 (D.C. Cir. 2015)—which interpreted a nearly 

identical direct-review provision of the Investment Advisers

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a), to include rulemaking under 
7

“order,” see id. at 1129–30—controls the case. We agree with 

DOT that NYRSC is dispositive.

Our precedent holding that “order” in certain 

direct-review statutes encompasses the review of rulemakings 

dates at least to our decision in Investment Company Institute v. 

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 551 F.2d 

1270 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In Investment Co., we reviewed the 

direct-review provision of the Bank Holding Company Act of 

1956. See id. at 1275–78. In light of intervening Supreme 

Court decisions, we abandoned our earlier approach to the 

scope of “order” in direct-review statutes, concluding that 

“ ‘order’ is interpreted to mean any agency action capable of 

review on the basis of the administrative record.” Id. at 1278. 

We further explained that the term should not be limited by the 

APA definition of “order” because it “has several frequently 

utilized meanings which vary in scope, and it is therefore not 

surprising that different sections of the same statute might use 

the word in different ways.” Id.; see also City of Rochester v. 

Bond, 603 F.2d 927, 933 n.26 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (“[C]ourts 

sometimes have construed ‘order’ for purposes of special 

review statutes more expansively than its definition in the 

APA, notably to permit direct review of regulations 

promulgated through informal notice-and-comment 

rulemaking.”).

NYRSC built on the foundation established in Investment 

Co. Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, the 

Congress had provided for direct review of certain orders of the 

Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the court of 

appeals: “Any person or party aggrieved by an order issued 

by the Commission . . . may obtain a review of such order in” 

an appropriate court of appeals. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a). Like 

NFB, the NYRSC plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court 

seeking judicial review of SEC rulemaking and the district 
8

court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter 

jurisdiction. N.Y. Republican State Comm. v. SEC, 70 

F. Supp. 3d 362, 363–64 (D.D.C. 2014). We concluded that 

“order” in section 80b–13(a) included SEC rules. NYRSC, 

799 F.3d at 1129–30. We explained that “[f]or nearly four 

decades, it has been blackletter administrative law that, absent 

countervailing indicia of congressional intent, statutory 

provisions for direct review of orders encompass challenges to 

rules.” Id. at 1129. And, “absent contrary congressional 

intent, a statutory review provision creating a right of direct 

judicial review in the court of appeals of an administrative 

‘order’ authorizes such review of any agency action that is 

otherwise susceptible of review on the basis of the 

administrative record alone.” Id. at 1131. Because, in a 

rulemaking, “there is no need for judicial development of an 

evidentiary record,” we saw “no gain from vesting jurisdiction 

in district courts” and noted that exclusive review in the court 

of appeals would eliminate the potential delay and expense of 

bifurcating review between the district and appellate courts.3

 

Id.

Considering the breadth of the language and analysis in 

NYRSC, we can easily conclude that section 46110(a) includes 

review of DOT rulemakings. The language of the 

direct-review provisions in section 46110(a) and section 

80b-13(a) are almost identical—permitting a party “disclosing 

a substantial interest in” (“aggrieved by”) “an order issued by” 

the agency to “apply for review of” (“obtain a review of”) the 

 3 We also cited to multiple earlier examples of the proper 

application of the Investment Co. presumption to direct-review 

statutes—including the district court order before us—and explained 

that our Court’s willingness to exercise jurisdiction on direct review 

sub silentio “is consistent with the recognized controlling force of 

Investment Company.” NYRSC, 799 F.3d at 1131.
9

order in the court of appeals. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a), 

with 15 U.S.C. § 80b-13(a) (language in parentheses). And, 

beyond the close linguistic match between these two 

provisions, the analysis set forth in NYRSC compels the 

conclusion that section 46110(a) includes agency rules within 

the term “order,” as there is no evidence that the Congress 

intended to vest the district court with jurisdiction of

challenges to DOT rules. 799 F.3d at 1131. This conclusion 

is consistent with our precedent and that of our sister circuits 

that have endorsed, either sub silentio or through detailed 

analysis, the court of appeals’s exclusive jurisdiction to review 

DOT or Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) rulemakings 

in the first instance.4

 See, e.g., Avera v. Airline Pilots Ass’n 

Int’l, 436 F. App’x 969, 973 (11th Cir. 2011); Nw. Airlines, 

Inc. v. Goldschmidt, 645 F.2d 1309, 1313–14 (8th Cir. 1981) 

(reviewing rule pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 1486(a) (1980), 

section 46110(a)’s predecessor statute); Sima Prods. Corp. v. 

McLucas, 612 F.2d 309, 312–14 (7th Cir. 1980) (same); see 

also Safari Aviation Inc. v. Garvey, 300 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th 

Cir. 2002) (asserting jurisdiction of FAA rule without 

addressing scope of “order” in section 46110); U.S. Air Tour 

Ass’n v. FAA, 298 F.3d 997, 1012–13 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (same); 

North Carolina v. FAA, 957 F.2d 1125, 1127–28 (4th Cir. 

1992) (same for section 1486(a)). 

 4 The only case NFB identifies where a district court found 

jurisdiction of a challenge to an FAA or DOT rule under section 

46110(a)—Harrington v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. Civ. A. 04–

12558–NMG, 2006 WL 1581752 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 

2006)—involved only a conclusory assertion of jurisdiction with 

little underlying analysis in an unpublished decision. Id. at *7 n.4 

(“Because Class Plaintiffs challenge a rule, not an order, [section 

46110(a)] appears to be inapplicable.”).
10

NFB argues that our precedent, including National Mining 

Ass’n v. DOL, 292 F.3d 849, 856, 858–59 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (per 

curiam), Watts, Safe Extensions and SecurityPoint, supports its 

argument that “order” has a more restricted meaning than 

enunciated in NYRSC. We are unconvinced. NYRSC

addressed National Mining Ass’n and Watts at length. See 

NYRSC, 799 F.3d at 1132–33. We distinguished Watts as 

limited to whether SEC’s instruction to its employees not to 

respond to a testimonial subpoena was either “reviewable 

agency action, or only an ordinary litigation decision.” 

NYRSC, 799 F.3d at 1132 (quotation marks omitted). 

Because the question facing us in Watts was “whether the 

agency acted in its sovereign lawmaking capacity or as a 

litigant,” Watts had “no bearing” on the question addressed in 

NYRSC—or in this appeal. NYRSC, 799 F.3d at 1132. 

Regarding National Mining Ass’n, we noted that the 

direct-review provision at issue in that case “did not 

encompass orders issued by the agency, but rather a specific 

adjudicatory body . . . that had no authority to issue rules.” 

NYRSC, 799 F.3d at 1133. Because of the limited scope of the 

power granted that body, National Mining Ass’n treated the 

review provisions in the Black Lung Benefits Act as wholly 

distinct from the review provisions at issue in NYRSC. 

NYRSC, 799 F.3d at 1133. 

SecurityPoint and Safe Extensions are also 

distinguishable. In Safe Extensions, we were asked only to 

determine whether an FAA advisory circular met the finality 

requirement that we have read into section 46110(a) and 

whether the agency decision must “be accompanied by a 

record sufficient to permit judicial review” in order to qualify 

as a reviewable order. See 509 F.3d at 598–600 (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We held that the advisory circular 

was final and that alone made it a reviewable order. Id. 

SecurityPoint similarly involved an analysis of whether an 
11

agency letter met section 46110(a)’s finality requirement. See 

769 F.3d at 1187. Although SecurityPoint references the 

APA definition of “order” at 5 U.S.C. § 551(6), it turned only 

on the part of the APA definition of “order” requiring finality; 

it did not address the APA’s further elaboration of 

“order”—namely, that “order” excludes a rulemaking. See 

SecurityPoint, 769 F.3d at 1187. But, as we recognized for 

the analogous direct-review provision in NYRSC, the language 

of section 46110(a) sets out an “order” requirement separate 

from the APA and therefore is not restricted to the APA 

definition of “order.” See NYSRC, 799 F.3d at 1132. Thus, 

although the “normal default rule” may be that a challenge to 

agency action begins in district court, Watts, 482 F.3d at 505

(quotation marks omitted), section 46110(a)’s direct-review 

provision removes the Rule from the purview of the district 

court and places it within our exclusive jurisdiction. Because 

the district court did not err in concluding that it lacked 

jurisdiction of NFB’s complaint, we deny NFB’s petition for a 

writ of mandamus.

B.

NFB also argues that, even if the district court lacked

jurisdiction, we should still reach the merits of its appeal in 

light of the district court’s transfer of the complaint to our court 

as a petition for review. But NFB faces a significant 

procedural hurdle. Section 46110(a) states that a petition for 

review “must be filed not later than 60 days after the order is 

issued.” Even assuming the filing of its complaint constituted 

a filing of a petition for review, NFB’s petition was 

untimely—the Final Rule issued on November 12, 2013 and 

NFB filed its complaint on January 22, 2014—eleven days too 

late. NFB’s only possible saving grace is that section 

46110(a) includes a provision permitting our court to “allow 

the petition to be filed after the 60th day” but “only if there are 
12

reasonable grounds for not filing by the 60th day.” 49 U.S.C. 

§ 46110(a). NFB claims that the uncertainty over whether 

“order” in section 46110(a) includes the Final Rule provides 

the reasonable grounds necessary to excuse their tardy filing. 

We disagree.

As recently discussed in our opinion in Electronic Privacy 

Information Center v. FAA (EPIC), No. 15-1075, 2016 WL 

2640535 (D.C. Cir. May 10, 2016), we have “rarely found 

‘reasonable grounds’ under section 46110(a).” Id. at *2. In 

one of those rare instances—Safe Extensions—the FAA, after 

issuing a circular to which the aviation industry objected, 

informed the industry that it was planning to draft a revised 

circular to respond to the industry’s concerns. 509 F.3d at 

603. The agency did not, however, issue a revised circular. 

Id. Because the agency’s own statements “could have 

confused petitioner and others” about whether the order at 

issue would be revised, we concluded that the petitioner’s late 

filing could be excused. Id. at 603–04. Similarly, in 

Paralyzed Veterans of America v. Civil Aeronautics Board, we 

found reasonable grounds for an untimely filing under a 

predecessor statute to section 46110(a). See 752 F.2d 694, 

705 n.82 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.

DOT v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477 U.S. 597 (1986). The 

Civil Aeronautics Board had promulgated a final rule but 

“explicitly left its rulemaking docket open in order to receive 

additional comments from the public as well as from the 

Department of Justice.” Id. The petitioners were “[a]ware 

that the rule might be undergoing modification, [were] unable 

to predict how extensive any modification would be, [and 

therefore] elected to wait until the regulation was in final form 

before seeking review.” Id. We concluded that the 

petitioners’ delay in challenging the final rule until after the 

agency responded to comments “simply served properly to 
13

exhaust petitioners’ administrative remedies, and to conserve 

the resources of both the litigants and this court.” Id.

Nevertheless, we have generally declined to find 

reasonable grounds for untimely filings under both section 

46110(a) and analogous statutes. See Avia Dynamics, Inc. v. 

FAA, 641 F.3d 515, 521 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e have 

heretofore found ‘reasonable grounds’ only in cases in which 

the petitioner attributes the delay to more than simply 

ignorance of the order.”). For example, in EPIC, we found 

that ambiguity in an agency letter denying a petition for 

rulemaking did not constitute reasonable grounds. EPIC, 

2016 WL 2640535, at *2. There, we explained that, instead of 

“assum[ing] the letter did not finally dismiss its petition,” the 

petitioner “should have assumed the opposite and filed 

protectively for judicial review within 60 days.” Id. 

Investment Co. itself clarified that, “[i]f any doubt as to the

proper forum exists, careful counsel should file suit in both the 

court of appeals and the district court or . . . bring suit only in 

the court of appeals.” 551 F.2d at 1280. The Investment Co.

presumption was well-known—NFB therefore cannot cry 

ignorance of the proper forum in seeking to excuse their 

untimely challenge to the Final Rule.

NFB fails to meet our precise standard for reasonable 

grounds. As our sister circuits have adeptly explained, a delay 

caused by filing a petition or complaint in the wrong court by 

itself is not a reasonable ground for failing to meet the statutory 

sixty-day deadline. 5

 See Corbett v. TSA, 767 F.3d 1171, 

 5 In Americopters, LLC v. FAA, 441 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 2006), 

which we cited favorably in EPIC, 2016 WL 2640535, at *2, the 

Ninth Circuit explained that, under section 46110(a), “a delay 

stemming from the filing of a petition or complaint with the wrong 

court is not, in general, a reasonable ground for delay.” 

Americopters, 441 F.3d at 734. Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in 
14

1178–79 (11th Cir. 2014); Americopters, LLC v. FAA, 441 

F.3d 726, 734 (9th Cir. 2006). NFB’s justification for its 

untimely filing is also clearly distinguishable from the rare 

circumstances where we have previously found reasonable 

grounds for delay. In Safe Extensions, the reasonable grounds 

for delay was due to the agency’s misstatements about its 

future actions. See 509 F.3d at 602–04. And in Paralyzed 

Veterans, the reasonable grounds for delay was due to the 

petitioners’ attempt to exhaust administrative remedies. 752 

F.2d at 705 n.82. NFB had no such excuse—there was no 

confusion caused by DOT’s actions or by a desire to further 

exhaust administrative remedies. The only “confusion” here 

was NFB’s own mistaken reading of section 46110(a).6

 Yet 

we have made clear the appropriate recourse when a petitioner 

is unsure of the proper forum for filing a challenge to a rule: 

“If any doubt as to the proper forum exists, careful counsel 

should file suit in both the court of appeals and the district 

court or, since there would be no time bar to a proper action in 

 

Corbett v. TSA, 767 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2014), held that a 

petitioner’s “dogged prosecution of his petition in the district court is 

not a reasonable ground to excuse his failure to file his petition on 

time in” the court of appeals. Id. at 1178–79.

6 NFB claims that reasonable grounds should be found in part 

because of the strength of its statutory construction argument. 

Pet’rs’ Br. 28 (“[T]he Blind Travelers filed when and where they did 

because the applicable rules of statutory construction supported that 

course, there was no controlling case law on the meaning of ‘order’ 

in § 46110(a) holding to the contrary, and Respondents themselves 

labelled [sic] the Final Rule as a ‘rule’ and not an ‘order.’ ”). If the 

scope of a direct-review statute is unclear, petitioners should be 

mindful of the advice of Investment Co. and file in both venues. 

551 F.2d at 1280. NFB did not heed this warning and their resultant 

untimely filing will not be excused simply because they raised 

colorable statutory construction arguments.
15

the district court, bring suit only in the court of appeals.” 

Investment Co., 551 F.2d at 1280. NFB failed to follow that 

path and we will not excuse that failure with the imprimatur of 

reasonable grounds for delay. 

For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss the petition for 

review and deny the petition for a writ of mandamus.

So ordered.