The Honorable William J. Hibbler, United States District



Court Judge for the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by

designation.

In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

No. 09-3537

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JEOVANTE JONES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Wisconsin.

No. 3:09-cr-00023-bbc-1—Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.

ARGUED APRIL 23, 2010—DECIDED JULY 30, 2010

Before MANION and ROVNER, Circuit Judges, and

HIBBLER, District Judge.



ROVNER, Circuit Judge. Jeovante Jones was arrested on

July 18, 2008, and indicted on charges of possession of

5 grams or more of a mixture containing cocaine base
2 No. 09-3537

with the intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C.

§ 841(a)(1). The amount of the drugs charged included the

drugs found in the course of a search of Jones’ residence

following his arrest. Jones filed a motion to suppress

both the evidence found at his residence and his subsequent confession as the fruit of an illegal search. After

conducting an evidentiary hearing on the matter, the

magistrate judge recommended denial of that motion.

Jones then entered a conditional guilty plea which reserved his right to challenge the denial of the motion

to suppress. The district court subsequently issued its

Opinion and Order denying his motion to suppress.

The arrest was the culmination of a drug unit investigation targeting Jones, in which a confidential informant

made a number of controlled purchases of crack cocaine

from him. Prior to that date, the informant had completed

controlled purchases of crack from Jones on three occasions, each at locations in the City of Beloit. The July 18

transaction was set up as a “buy-bust” operation, in

which the police were positioned to arrest Jones during

the drug sale. The transaction was to take place in the

parking lot of the apartments at 1993 Colony Court in

Beloit. That address corresponded with one that Jones

had provided to the police as his residence in an arrest

weeks earlier. He indicated at that time that he resided

at 1993 Colony Court Apartment #2, and the informant

had also informed the police that Jones stayed with a

woman living at that residence.

Jones arrived at the parking lot at the scheduled time,

exited a Dodge Durango driven by his girlfriend Ethlyn
No. 09-3537 3

Joseph, and proceeded toward the informant’s vehicle

parked a few spaces away. As Jones reached the informant’s vehicle, the police pulled their undercover van

behind that vehicle, at which time Jones fled on foot. All

of the officers except Officer Halvorsen pursued Jones,

capturing him within minutes. Halvorsen confronted

Joseph who was still parked in the Dodge Durango. With

his gun drawn and pointed downward in the ready

position, he ordered her from the car and handcuffed

her. Three children were also in the Durango. They remained in their seats throughout this time.

Joseph was then escorted to the side of the van and

was placed in a seated position in the van with her

feet outside the van. Within a few minutes a female

officer arrived and searched Joseph for weapons. Officer

Arnold then returned from the chase of Jones, and proceeded to speak with Joseph. At that time, the officers

intended to pursue a search of Jones’ residence. They

intended to seek a warrant for the search if necessary,

but first sought to obtain consent for the search from

Joseph, who resided at the same apartment.

In order to build rapport with Joseph and obtain her

voluntary consent, Arnold removed her handcuffs. He

explained that the police intended to obtain a warrant

to search the residence, that it would take some time to

do so, and that the process would be faster if she chose

to consent to the search. Joseph agreed to consent and

signed a consent-to-search form that on its face apprised her of her right to refuse such consent. The entire

conversation between Arnold and Joseph lasted no
4 No. 09-3537

more than 10 minutes by Joseph’s own account. The

police then searched the apartment and discovered the

drugs which Jones now argues should have been suppressed.

Jones’ arguments on appeal largely are attempts to

overturn the credibility determinations made by the

magistrate following the evidentiary hearing, which

were adopted by the district court, finding that Joseph

voluntarily consented to the search of the residence.

That is an uphill battle. We will reverse a district court’s

finding of voluntary consent only if it is clearly erroneous.

United States v. Dickerson, 975 F.2d 1245, 1249 (7th Cir.

1992). It is not sufficient to demonstrate that two different versions of events were presented at the hearing,

because “ ‘[w]here there are two permissible views of the

evidence, the factfinder’s choice between them cannot

be clearly erroneous.’ ” United States v. McGraw, 571 F.3d

624, 629 (7th Cir. 2009) (quoting Anderson v. City of

Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985)). Therefore,

we examine only whether the district court’s account of

facts is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety. McGraw, 571 F.3d at 629.

Jones argues that the court erred in concluding that

Arnold removed Joseph’s handcuffs prior to the consent. His argument hinges on the inconsistencies in the

officers’ testimony. According to Jones, the court found

that Joseph was handcuffed behind her back, but Arnold

testified that he removed cuffs from her hands that

were in front of her. Jones also points out that no officer

memorialized the removal of her handcuffs in the

police reports.
No. 09-3537 5

None of those alleged inconsistencies would cause us

to conclude that the district court’s finding of facts

was not plausible in light of the record as a whole. Inconsistencies in witness testimony such as those are

weighed by a court in assessing credibility, but they

do not render the credibility determination clearly erroneous. Numerous officers testified that they observed Arnold remove the handcuffs and/or observed

him speaking with Joseph and noted that she was not in

handcuffs at that time. There is sufficient basis to support the finding that Joseph was not in handcuffs at the

time that consent to search was sought or granted.

In addition, Jones argues that Joseph was coerced into

consenting based on Arnold’s “empty threat” that a

search warrant would eventually be obtained. Jones is

correct in asserting that baseless threats to obtain a

search warrant may indeed render a consent to search

involuntary. United States v. Hicks, 539 F.3d 566, 571 (7th

Cir. 2008); United States v. White, 979 F.2d 539, 542 (7th

Cir. 1992). The appropriate focus, then, is on whether

the police had a genuine intention to seek such a warrant, and more specifically, whether they had a reasonable factual basis to believe they had probable cause

to obtain a warrant. Hicks, 539 F.3d at 572.

The officers in this case had a reasonable factual basis

to believe that there was sufficient probable cause to

obtain a warrant. We have recognized that a court, in

determining whether to issue a search warrant, may

draw reasonable inferences, based on the nature of the

evidence and offense, about where evidence is likely to
6 No. 09-3537

be kept. United States v. Lamon, 930 F.2d 1183, 1188 (7th

Cir. 1991). Furthermore, we have repeatedly found that

“participation in drug trafficking activities can create

probable cause to search a participant’s residence, even

without direct evidence that drug-related activity is

occurring there, because ‘[i]n the case of drug dealers,

evidence is likely to be found where the dealers live.’ ”

United States v. Hoffman, 519 F.3d 672, 676 (7th Cir. 2008)

(quoting Lamon, 930 F.2d at 1188).

Jones had engaged in three prior crack deals with

the informant, and therefore was engaged in drug dealing.

He had identified the Colony Court apartment as

his residence to police just weeks earlier when he was

arrested on an unrelated matter. The informant had

also identified the apartment as the place where Jones

stayed. The final transaction was to occur in the parking

lot of that residence. Because a heat source is necessary

to cook cocaine and form crack cocaine, there is further

reason to suspect a connection between transactions

involving crack cocaine and the dealer’s residence. The

officers testified that they had in fact obtained search

warrants based on such a factual predicate. As a whole,

those facts were sufficient for the officers to possess

a reasonable factual basis to believe that there was sufficient probable cause to obtain a warrant.

The remainder of the attacks on voluntariness center

on the court’s credibility determination which found the

police more credible than Joseph. In reviewing the

denial of a motion to suppress, however, we review all

factual determinations for clear error, with special defer-
No. 09-3537 7

ence to the district court’s credibility determinations.

United States v. Villalpando, 588 F.3d 1124, 1127 (7th Cir.

2009). Jones argues that the court erred in finding the

police more credible, but presents nothing more than the

assertions made by Joseph as to the events of the day, and

occasional differences in the testimony by the officers.

Jones has provided no basis for this court to conclude

that the credibility determination was clear error. The

decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.

7-30-10