In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 14-2072

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JASON DADE,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 CR 497-1 — Sharon Johnson Coleman, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED APRIL 28, 2015 — DECIDED JUNE 3, 2015

____________________

Before FLAUM, KANNE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

FLAUM, Circuit Judge. Jason Dade, a former licensed real 

estate agent, pleaded guilty to one count of bank fraud, 18 

U.S.C. § 1344, for his role in helping prospective real estate 

buyers assemble fraudulent mortgage loan applications. On 

appeal Dade challenges one aspect of his sentence: He 

contests the district court’s decision to apply a 2-level 

upward adjustment for his aggravating role in the offense. 
2 No. 14-2072

See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(c). Because the court did not clearly err 

in applying the adjustment, we affirm. 

I. Background

Over a four-year period, Dade, along with codefendants 

Cheryl Ware, Tiffini Chism, and Tamika Peters, carried out a 

mortgage-fraud scheme in which they facilitated bank loans 

to purchase residential real estate by knowingly providing 

lenders with false statements and documents. Dade referred 

potential buyers, including Peters, to Ware and Chism, who 

were loan officers. Dade provided Ware and Chism with 

false documents—including payroll stubs and W-2 forms 

from fake companies—so that unqualified buyers would be 

approved for loans. On one occasion Dade (with Chism’s 

help) refinanced a mortgage on a property he owned in 

Chicago, Illinois. On his loan application Dade stated that he 

was paying monthly rent of $1,450 (he did not live in the 

house he was refinancing), and he backed up this claim with 

a rental verification from “Jireh Development Corp.” Such 

entity did not exist, and Dade was actually renting from his 

mother-in-law for under $600 monthly. As a consequence of 

this representation on the loan application, Dade was able to 

receive a $156,000 loan from Fremont Investment & Loan. 

Dade was charged with two counts of bank fraud, 18 

U.S.C. § 1344, one count of wire fraud, id. § 1343, and two 

counts of mail fraud, id. § 1341. He pleaded guilty to one 

count of bank fraud based on the fraudulent refinancing of 

his property. In exchange the government dismissed the 

remaining four charges. 
No. 14-2072 3

The government initially alerted Dade that it would seek 

a 2-level upward adjustment for his role as an organizer, 

leader, manager, or supervisor in the offense, see U.S.S.G. 

§ 3B1.1(c). When preparing the presentence report, however, 

the probation officer concluded that a 4-level upward 

adjustment would be appropriate. According to the 

probation officer, the scheme had involved five or more 

participants (Dade, Chism, Ware, Peters, numerous buyers, 

and James Wilson, who provided the fake documents). In 

the probation officer’s view, Dade had organized the scheme 

by obtaining false documents and referring buyers to Chism 

and Ware.

The government then adopted the probation officer’s 

position. In support the government recounted its version of 

the facts underlying the charges dismissed as part of Dade’s 

plea agreement. In Count Two (bank fraud) Chism had 

referred “Buyer A” to Dade for help in finding two 

investment properties. Dade encouraged Buyer A to acquire 

a third property, and Chism told Dade how much income 

Buyer A would need to qualify for another loan. Dade then 

provided Chism with fake pay stubs and an employment 

verification reflecting the necessary salary. In Count Three 

(wire fraud) Dade had referred Peters to Ware, who 

prepared a loan application using fake pay stubs provided 

by Dade. In Count Four (mail fraud) Dade had directed 

Peters to prepare a fake rent verification for “Buyer B.” And 

in Count Five (mail fraud) Dade had refinanced another 

residence he owned by providing a loan officer with fake 

income tax returns and bank statements. 
4 No. 14-2072

Dade objected to the application of § 3B1.1. Citing United 

States v. Weaver, 716 F.3d 439 (7th Cir. 2013), Dade argued 

that the upward adjustment is appropriate only if the 

defendant exercised authority, control, and ongoing 

supervision over others and, according to Dade, he did not. 

Dade argued that the government needed to show that he 

had the ability to coerce, reward, or punish members of the 

criminal enterprise; this requirement, he continued, was not 

met by the probation officer’s assertion that he organized the 

offense by obtaining false documents and referring buyers to 

loan officers who prepared false applications. 

The district court ultimately concluded that a 2-level 

upward adjustment would adequately account for Dade’s 

role in the offense. Dade was “clearly a leader,” the court 

concluded, but “as to the amount of coercion considering the 

roles of some of the other people involved,” only a 2-level 

adjustment was warranted. With that adjustment, the court 

calculated a total offense level of 24 and criminal history 

category of I, yielding a guidelines imprisonment range of 51 

to 63 months. The court then imposed a sentence of 20 

months’ imprisonment. 

II. Discussion

Despite Dade’s below-guidelines sentence, which is less

than half the low end of his guidelines range, he seeks 

review and thus risks receiving a less favorable sentence if 

successful on appeal. He principally contends that the 

district court’s application of § 3B1.1(c) runs afoul of the 

standard that this court purportedly outlined in Weaver. In 

Weaver the government argued that the defendant, a 
No. 14-2072 5

methamphetamine dealer, had exercised decision-making 

authority and control over customers who were fronted 

drugs and thus was a manager or supervisor under 

§ 3B1.1(b). 716 F.3d at 440, 443. “For purposes of § 3B1.1,” we

clarified, “a defendant exercises control and authority over 

another when he ‘tells people what to do and determines 

whether they’ve done it.’” Id. at 443 (quoting United States v. 

Figueroa, 682 F.3d 694, 697 (7th Cir. 2012)). Dade asserts that 

the information in his presentence report—that he organized 

the offense by obtaining false documents and referring 

buyers to the codefendant loan officers—does not establish 

“the type of coercion or control required by Weaver.”

We disagree with Dade’s reading of Weaver. First, Dade 

interprets that decision to mean that an ability to coerce is 

essential to apply § 3B1.1, but Weaver notes that coercion is 

just one factor for the sentencing judge to consider in 

making an otherwise “commonsense judgment about the 

defendant’s relative culpability given his status in the 

criminal hierarchy.” 716 F.3d at 443–44. Second, Dade 

accepts that Weaver stands for the proposition that exercising

control means being able to dole out a reward or 

punishment to inferiors, see id. at 444, and yet Dade ignores 

that he rewarded Ware and Chism with continued business 

that easily could have been withheld. In any event, Weaver 

does not limit the adjustment to situations where there had 

been a finding of control and coercion; that is just one 

measure. In addition to exercising control, a defendant also 

fits into one of § 3B1.1’s aggravating roles if he was 

“responsible for organizing others for the purpose of 

carrying out the crime.” United States v. Rosen, 726 F.3d 1017, 

1025 (7th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation 
6 No. 14-2072

omitted); see United States v. Vasquez, 673 F.3d 680, 685 (7th 

Cir. 2012); United States v. Knox, 624 F.3d 865, 874 (7th Cir. 

2010); see also U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 app. n.4 (listing degree of 

control and authority as one of seven factors).

Dade has not argued that his conduct fell short of this 

alternative standard. The government advances that it was 

not clear error for the district court to apply the adjustment 

because Dade referred buyers to codefendants Chism and 

Ware, sometimes paid Ware, and provided these loan 

officers with the fake documents used in the loan 

applications. We agree with the government that the 

evidence shows that Dade “influence[d] the criminal activity 

by coordinating its members.” See United States v. Skoczen, 

405 F.3d 537, 550 (7th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted); see also United States v. Robertson, 662 

F.3d 871, 877–78 (7th Cir. 2011) (concluding that § 3B1.1(c) 

was appropriately applied to defendants in mortgage-fraud 

scheme who provided buyers with money and fake 

documents and instructed them to lie about source of funds); 

United States v. Watts, 535 F.3d 650, 660 (7th Cir. 2008) 

(upholding district court’s decision to apply § 3B1.1(c) based 

on defendant recruiting his wife into bank-fraud scheme).

Thus, we conclude that the district court appropriately 

applied the 2-level upward adjustment.

III. Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the 

district court.