### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-05-00167- CR

Wil lie F r e d Ho ust on, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF TRAVIS COUNTY , 390TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 90441 16, H ONO RAB LE JULIE H. K OCUREK , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

O P I N I O N A j ur y fo un d Wil lie F re d H ou sto n guil ty of ro bb e ry , a

nd the c ourt se nte nc e d h im t o forty y ear s in prison. See Te x. Pe n. Cod e Ann. § 2 9. 02 (We st 2 00 3) . H ou sto n ap peals his conviction, contendingthat the trial cour t erre d by overr uling his motion to suppress his confe ssion, that the trial court abused its discr etion by admitting evidenc e of the e x istence of a Crime Stoppers ti p , an d th a t t h e tr ia l c o u rt a

b u s e d it s d is c r e ti o nb y

f a il in g to g r an t his reque st for a mi s tr ia l. We aff irm the judg ment of convic tion.
BACK GR OUND

Houston was convic ted of a robber y that took place in the e arly morning hours of J anuar y 1, 2004, at a Dia

mond Shamrock c o n v en i en ce s tore in ce ntral Austin. The robbe ry was2

captur ed on the store’s secur ity came ras. The robbe r appr oache d store employ ee E sedar Abeg az and
announce d “this is a robber y .” The robber

then told Abeg az, “I ’m not playing. I have a pistol. Give
me a ll your t

we nti e s. ” Ab e g a z op e ne d th e c a shre g ist e r, and the ro bb e r g ra bb e d th e mon e y

and le ft
. I t was later

deter mined that $28 was take n from the reg ister. The security footag e conta ined clea

r imag es of the robber , who was neatly dresse d in a sport jacke t, dark slac ks, dress shoes, a nd thick g lasses. De te c tiv e De nn is Cla rk of the Au sti n Pol ic e De pa rtme nt wa s a ssi g ne d to inv e sti g a te t h e c a s e . C l ar

k , w h o h a d

r e c e i v e d a C r i m e S t o p p e r s t i p t h a tH o u s t o nw a s i n v o l v e d i nt h e r o b b e r

y, prod u ce d s till phot og raphs of the robbe r fr om the secur ity footag e. On January

8, Houston
vo lun tari ly

c a me to t he po lic e statio n to sp e a k with De te c tiv e Mic he lle Woo df in ab ou t hi s p os sib le involvement in an assault. C lark was informed that Woodfin was que stioning Houston and joined the two in an interr og at i o n room at the police station. Although Woodfin’s initial questioning of Houston was not re corde d, Clark ac tivated a hidden vide o came ra be fore enter ing the room.

C l ar k i m m e d i a t e l y c o n f

r o n t e d H o u s t o nw i t h a

p h o t o g r a p h f r o m t h e r o b b e r

y:
Yo u’ re we ari ngthe same c oat. T oo c los e to t he c a me ra

Willi e . Yo u g ot t oo c los e to the came ra. Y eah, you’ve g ot gla sses on but it’s y ou. . . . This convenienc e store is on Guadalupe
. I think you reme mber it. Girl attendant. Yea h y ou do. You’ve g ot pe op le sn itc hin g y ou

of f a ny wa y . L e t me re a d you

y our r ig hts . H a ve a

se a t.
After detailing a bit of t he evidence of Houston’s g uilt, C lark re ad Houston the Miranda wa rn ing s. Houston responde d that he under stood his rights and did not want to spea k wit h C l ar k ab o ut the
r o b b e r y:I n Court’s Ex hibit 1, Houston’s response is transcribe d as “N o, Idon’t want to talk about 1 any thing [difficult to hear ].” Although Ho u s t o n ’s ex act r esponse is inaudible, it is clear from the vid e o th a t he e xpre sse d h is d e sir e no t to make a state me nt. 3 Clark: Do y ou ag ree to that? Do y ou ag ree to waive your rig hts so that y ou can

talk to me? H o u s to n : N o . I ’ m n o t g o n n a [i n a u d ib le ]. 1 Clark: That’s fine . I ’m g oing to have to do what I ’m g oing to have to do.
De te c tiv e s Woo df

in a nd Cla rk the n be g an ask ing Ho us ton to a dmi t hi s invo lve me nt i n th e ro bb e ri e s. They assure d Houston of the streng th of the State’s case and appea led to him to t ell his side of the sto ry . T he de te c tiv e s a lso tol d H ou sto n th a t he wa s n ot u nd e r a rr e st:
H o u s t o n : A r e y o ug o i n g t o ar r e s tm e n o w ? C l ar k : No s i r , Ia m n o tg o i n g t o ar r e s ty o un o w . Y o ukn o w w h a t ’ s g o i n g to happen thoug h. How did y ou g et down her e? Houston: Ig ot a ride. Clark: Did y our momma bring y o u d o wn h ere ? I s she her e? No? Your

mom ma ’s no t do wn sta ir s?
C l a r k a g a i nu r g e d

H o u s t o nt o a dm i tt o t h e r o b b e r y: Now, I ’m g oing to a sk y ou ag ain y ou know, I ’ve r ead you y our rig hts and y ou un de rs tand

y our r ig hts and I ’m

g oin g to a sk

you on e mor e tim e sit

do wn and ta lk t o me Will ie. This is sill y . You know I ’ve g ot y ou.4

Houston then admitted that, since his relea se fr om prison, he had r esumed smoking cra ck and ha d committed severa l robberie s , i n cl uding the one at the D iamond Shamrock store . After Houston provided de tails of the robberies, C lark tol d Houston that he would be release d that day if Houston ag ree d to turn himself in once a war rant w as i ssued for his a rre st. Bef

ore the interview e nded,
ano the r o ff

ic er pu lle d Cl ark

a sid e and

tol d h im o f a lle g a tio ns that H ou sto n h a d s e t f ir e to h is g irlfriend’ s home. Clark then e x plained to Houst on that he would not be a llowed to leave based on this new information.
DI SCU SSIO N M ot ion to Suppr e ss

I n h is f ir st two po int s o f e rr or , H ou sto n c on te nd s th a t hi s in c ulp a tor y state ments sh ou ld h a ve be e n su

pp re sse d be c a

us e he wa s su

bje c te d to c us tod ia l in te rr og a tio n a ft e r h e ha d to ld the police that he wished to rema in silent. See U.S. Const. amends. V, XI V; Tex. Code Crim. P roc. Ann. art . 38. 22 (We st 2 00 5) ; Miranda v. Arizona , 384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966). I t is settled law that custodial interrog ation must c ease once a person invokes his r ight to remain silent. Miranda , 384 U. S. at 47 3- 74 ; Ma esta s v. S tate , 987 S.W .2d 59, 61 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (rig ht to remain silent and cut of

f questioning must be scrupulously honored) . Howeve r, the p ro t ec t i o n s aff orded unde r Miranda and ar

ticle 38.22 of the c ode of c riminal proce dure r equire that a per son be in custody
. See Sta ns bu ry v . Ca lif or nia , 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994); Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 38.22 §§ 2, 3. The c ustody

require ment stems from the under ly ing pur pose of Miranda , to prot ect an individual fr o m t h e “inher ently

compelling pressure s” of c ustodial interrog ation. Arizona v. Roberson , 4 865

U. S
. 6 7 5 , 6 8 1 (1 9 8 8 ) ( qu o t i n g Miranda , 384 U.S. at 467). Absent these pressure s, it is presumed that a person will f

ree ly asser

t his privileg e ag ainst self incrimination and no pr otection is neede d. A per son is in custody if, under the totality of t he circumstance s, a re asonable person
wo uld be lie ve his fr e e do m of

mov e me nt w a s r e str a ine d to the de g re e a sso c iate d w itha fo rm a l arr e st. Sta ns bu ry , 5 11 U. S. at 32 2; Do wth itt v . S tate , 931 S.W .2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The initial deter

mination of custody depends on the obj ective circumstanc es of the i nterrog ation, not the subjective view s of the police or the per son being questioned. Sta ns bu ry , 511 U. S. at 32 3; Do wth itt , 93 1 S. W.2 d at 25 4. Th e su bje c tiv e vie ws of

the po lic e re g ard ingc us tod y may be re le va

nt a s a
c ir c ums tanc e of

the int e rr og a tio n if

the y are c on ve y e d to the ind ivi du a l be ingqu e sti on e d, bu t on ly to the extent that the communication of tho s e v i ew s would aff ect a rea sonable pe rson’s understandingof his fre edom of a ction. Se e Sta ns bu ry , 5 11 U. S. at 32 5; Do wth itt , 931 S.W .2d at 254. Stationhouse questioning is not, in and of itself, custodial. Do wth itt , 9 31 S.W. 2d a t 25 5; see Oregon v . Mathiason , 429 U.S. 492, 496 (1977). B ut “ the mere fac t that a n interrog ation beg ins as non-custodial does not pr event custody from arising later; police conduct during the enc ounter may
cause a consensual inquiry to esca late into custodial interrog ation.” Do wth itt , 931 S.W .2d at 255. The parties ag ree that Houston voluntarily came to the police station in order to speak with Detec tive Woodfin about an unrelated matter and that he wa s not in custody prior to Dete ctive Cla rk ’s arr iva l. H ou sto n c on te nd s th a t c us tod y aro se so on

a ft er C lark

be g an q ue sti on inghim
. I ndeed, some of Clark’s a ctions indicate that Houston was in c ustody . Clark re ad Houston MirandaThe re ading of Miranda war nings does not transform a noncustodial setting into custodial 2 i n t er ro gation. Se e Un ite d S tates v . B au tis ta , 145 F.3d 1140, 1148 ( 10th Cir. 1998); S p r o s ty v. Buchler , 79 F.3d 635, 642 ( 7th Cir. 1996); Davis v. Allsbrooks , 778 F.2d 168, 172 (4th Cir. 1985) (t o h old that Miranda war

nings c reate custody

“would convert ad m irable pr eca utionary measure s on the par t of office rs into a

n investigatory

obstruction”); United States v. Charles , 738 F.2d 686, 693 n.6 (5th Cir. 1984). Howe ver, the g iving of Miranda war nings is a f

actor in the deter

mination of whether a rea sonable person would believe that he is unde r ar rest. Se eBa uti

sta , 145 F.3d at 1048; Sp ro sty , 79 F.3d at 642. Moreover , there may be “c ircumstance s w h er e a clash of wills over a suspect’s de sire to r emain silent w ould c reate custody throug h overbe aring police behavior .” Da v is , 778 F.2d at 172 n.1. The trial c ourt g rante d Houston’s motion to suppress a pair of g lasses found by Detec tive 3 Clark in Houston’s coat. The district court e x plained that beca use Houston was not in custody , that State could not “have it both way s” and Clar k could not leg ally

sear ch Ho u s t on’s jacke t without c on se nt. 6 war nings—a rec itation that has become sy nony mous i n o u r cu l ture with for mal arr est. Clark

2
sear ched thr oug h the pocke ts of Houston’s sport coat, while h e wa s n ot wear ing it, without Houston’s consent. Clark also conve y ed the streng th of t he S tate’s case to Houston, including the 3 fac t that Houston resembled a nd was we aringthe same clothes as the man pictured in the vide otape of the robbe ry .

Ho we ve r, the de te c tiv e s expli c itl y tol d Hou sto n that he wa s not und e r ar re st p ri or to his c onfession. Other statements by the detec tives made befor e Houston’s confe ssion also impl ied that Houston was not under arr est and wa s fre e to g o:
Cla rk : B ut, lik e Itol d y ou , y e ah, the re ’s oth e r p e op le ou t th e re that’ s a lr e a dy tol d us that y our doing the robber ies of the conve nience stores. Now, I ’m g lad that y ou a in’ t done that da mn m any of the m y e t. D on ’t

do any mor e un til we g et y ou arr ested, oka

y ? That just ain’t g onna do y ou no g ood. Woodfin: Wil lie, y ou walk out of he re a nd y ou lose y our cha

nce to tell us ho w you ho ne stl y fe e l.7

Clark’s post-conf

ession arr ang ements for Houston to t urn himself in confir m Clark’s subjective belief that Houston was not in custody
.

On this recor d, we f

ind that a re asonable person would not have believed his fr eedom of m ovement was restra ined t o the degr ee associated with a formal a rre st. Se e Sta ns bu ry , 5 11 U. S.
a t 32 2; Do wth itt , 9 31 S.W. 2d a t 25 4. Al tho ug h the re wa s p ro ba ble c a us e to a rr e st a nd the str e ng th of the State ’s c a se wa s readi ly app are nt t o a ll, the e xiste nc e of pr ob a ble c a us e is o nly

a fa c tor in d e t e r m i n i n g c u s t o dy

w h e n“ l aw e n f

o r c e m e n to f

f i c e rs do not t ell the suspect he is free to leave.” Do wth itt , 931 S.W .2d at 255 (e mphasis added) . Her e, the de tectives spec ifically told Houston that he wa s not under ar

rest and implied t h ro u gh their questioning that he could lea ve. More over, the district court re

jected H ouston’s a

r g u me nt that the detec tives’ statements that Houston wa s not under
arr e st w e re a

“ ru se ,” and

we de fe r t o th e tr ia l c ourt ’s de te rm inatio n o f the de te c tiv e s’ c re dib ili ty in this reg ard. H aving found t hat Houst on was not i n custody , we ove rrule his fir st two points of error.
Crim e Stoppers Evidence

I n his third point of error, H ouston contends that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion when it over

ruled his hea

rsay objection to D etec tive Clark’s testimony that Houston was identified as a suspe ct throug h a Crime Stoppers tip. Houston argues that the mention of the Crime Stopper s tip permitted the jury to improperly infer that some unknown s ource had im plicated Houston in t he robber y . I n Sc ha

ffe r v . S tate , the cour

t of criminal appea ls he ld that the hear say rule may not be circ umvented by

infere nce. 777 S.W.2d 111, 114 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). I n that case , theWe note that details of out-of-c ourt statements may be admissible if “the of fice r’s c onduct 4 has bee n challeng ed, for instance, a s lackingprobable cause .” Po ind e x te r v . S tate , 153 S.W .3d 402, 408 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 8 defe ndant asserted t hat he had committed the crime c harg ed in his role as a police informa

nt. See id . at 112-13. The investigating of fice r wa s permitted to testif y that he spoke w ith the office r for wh om t he de fe nd ant c la ime d to be wo rk ingand that, b a se d o n h is c on ve rs a tio n, he wo uld no t “ a sk the State to dr op char g es ag ainst [t he defe ndant].” Id
. at 113. The c ourt of cr iminal appeals stated that the sole intent of this line of questioni ng was to convey to the jury that the investig ating office r had bee n told that th e d ef en d an t wa s not an informant. Id . at 114. B eca use the out-of

-cour t statement wa s offe red f

or its truth, the court held that it was he arsa y . Id . at 115. I n doing so, the court of criminal appea ls disting uished this infe rential hear say from
ou t- of -c ourt state me nts of

fe re d to pr ov ide ne c e ssa

ry c on te xt:
Fr equently , testimony

will have an i m p er missibl e hea rsay aspec t along with a permissible nonhea

rsay aspec t. Almost alway s it will be re levant for a testifying of fi c e r t o r e late ho w s he ha

pp e ne d upo n the sc e ne of a c ri me or a c c ide nt; thu s, it i s permissible for he r to testify that she wa s acting i n response to “information rec eived.” “[A]n arresting office r should not be put in the fa lse position of seeming jus t to have ha

pp e ne d upo n the sc e ne , he sh ou ld be a llo we d some e xplanatio n o f h is pr e se nc e and c on du c t.” A po lic e of fi c e r, ho we ve r, sh ou ld no t be pe rm itt e d to re late historical aspe cts of the c ase, r eplete w ith hearsa y st atements in t he for

m of complaints and re ports on the g rounds that she wa s en t i tled to tell the jury the information upon which she acte d. 4
Id . at 114 (i nte rn a l c ita

tio n o mitte d) ; see also McCormick on Evidenc e, § 249, at 735 ( 3d ed. 1984). Ho we ve r, the c ourt

c a uti on e d o f t

he po te nti a l f

or a bu se in wh ic h o ff

ic e rs are pe rm itt e d to re late ou t-The c ourt of cr iminal appeals sing led out i ts own opinion in Loc k e v . S tate , 334 S.W .2d 5 292, 293 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960), in which an off icer wa s p er m i t t ed to testify that he ac ted on “information rece ived from a reliable source ” as an example of overr eac hing. Se e Sc ha

ffe r v . S tate , 777 S.W .2d 111, 114 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). T h is rece nt statement of the inquiry from the c ourt of cr iminal appeals diff ers f rom our 6 prior holding that testimony is “bac kdoor hearsay”only if “the sole intent in introducingthe evidenc e was to prove the contents of the out-of-c ourt statement.” Gu rk a v . S tate , 8 2 S. W. 3 d

4 1 6 , 4 2 1 ( T e x. App.—Austin 2002, pet. ref ’d). We will follow the m ore rece nt standard set forth by the cour t of criminal appe als. Se e Po ind e x te r v . S tate , 153 S.W .3d at 408 n.21.

9 of-c ourt statements under the g uise of providing context. Schaffer , 777 S
. W
. 2 d at 1 1 4-15 n.3. 5 “The app ro p riate inquiry focuse s on whether

the ‘infor

mation rec eived’ testimony is a g ener al descr iption of possibl e cr iminality or a spe cific de scription of the de fenda nt’s p u r p o r te d involve ment or link to that activity .” Po ind e x te r v . S tate , 153 S.W .3d 402, 408 n.21 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). 6 Her e, the testim ony in question was Detective Clark’s statement t hat he de veloped
a le a d in his inv e sti g a tio n o f t

he ro bb e ry

fr om a Cr ime Sto pp ers ti p im pl ic a tin g Ho us ton . T his testimony did not revea l the details of the tip o r comment on the reliability of its source. See Schaffer , 7 77 S.W. 2d

at 11 4 n .3 ; Mc Cul lo ug

h v . S tate , 116 S.W .3d 86, 89 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h D ist .] 20 01 , p e t. r e f’ d) (B a ir d, J., d iss e nti ng ) ( c ri tic izin g a dmi ssi on of te sti mony

that Cr ime Stoppers tip “ g ave us the name of [appellant] that was responsible for robbing this hotel”). Clark’s ref ere nce to Crime St oppers was mere ly a gene ral description of possible criminality that provided
a n ece ssary

explanation for why

Clark deve loped Houston as a suspe ct and inter viewed him. S

ee10

Poindexte r , 153 S.W .3d at 408 n.21. Acc ording ly , we hold that the district court prope rly admitted Clark’s brie f re fer ence to a Crime Stoppers tip.

Ev e ni f t h e a dm i s s i o no f

t h e C r i m e S t o p p e r s t e s t i m o n y w a s e r r o r , i tw a s h ar

m le ss under r ule of a ppellate pr ocedur e 44.2(b)
. We must disreg ard a non-c onstitut ional err or that does
no t af fe c t Hou sto n’ s subs tanti a l rig hts
. Te x. R. Ap p. P. 4 4. 2( b) ; see also Tex. R. Evi d. 103(a) (er ror
may not be pred ica te d o n r

uli nga dmi tti ngor

e xclu din g e vid e nc e un le ss s ub sta nti a l r ig ht o f p art

y aff ecte d). We may not reve rse if, afte r ex amining the rec ord as a whole, we have fair assura nce that the e rr or did no t ha ve a su bs tanti a l and inj ur iou s e ff e c t or inf lue nc e in d e te rm ini ngthe jur y ’s ve rd ic t. Ga rc ia v . S

tate , 126 S.W .3d 921, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Having closely examined the rec ord in t his c a se , w e are fa ir ly a ssu re d that any e rr or in a dmi tti ngthe re fe re nc e to t he Cr ime Sto pp e rs tip had no substantial and injurious ef fec t on the jury ’s ver dict. Se e id . Houston confe ssed to the cr ime, and the victim of the r obbery testified that she wa s eig hty -per ce n t s u re t h at Houston was the man who robbe d her. F urthermor e, Houston wa s easily i d en t i fi ed from the se curity videotape of

the robber y and appe are d at the police station wear ing the same jacke t a s the one picture d in the video of t he robb e r

y . A lt h o u g h th e s in g le r e f

e r e n c e to th e Cr im e St o p p e r s ti p ma y h a v e b o ls te r e d

the State’s case on identity , there was other, overw helming evidenc e of guilt. W e over rule Houston’s third point of error
. Extraneous Of

fenses I n h is f ourt h p oin t of e rr or , Ho us ton c on te nd s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d b y de nyinghis reque st for a mistrial afte r De tective Clark ma de re fer ence to “three case s” that Houston was a lleg ed to have be en involved with. Houston’s objec tion came dur ing the following exchang e:11

Q. Then what is the meaning behind “I advised him he’s g oing to pr ison and all we need to talk a

bout is how long? ” Why would he nee d t o t alk to y ou if y ou c ou ldn ’t c on tr ol t hat? A. Well, there we re thre e ca ses that he wa s . . .
Clark’s re sponse was inter rupted by an objec tion that the answe r wa s non-re sponsive. The district court sustained the objection and instructe d the jury to disreg ard Clar

k’s answe r. “Or dinarily , a prompt instruction to disreg ard w ill cure e rror associate d with an improper que stion and answe r, eve n one re g ardingextraneous offe nses.” Ov all e v . S tate , 13 S.W .3d 77 4, 78 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ). A m istri a l is a pp ro pr iate fo r o nly

a na rr ow c la ss o f h ig hly prejudicia l and incura

ble er rors. W oo d v . S tate , 1 8 S. W. 3 d

6 4 2 , 6 4 8 ( T e x. Cr im
. A p p . 2 0 0 0 )
. We revie w a c ourt’s dec ision to deny a reque st f

or a mistrial under

an abuse of discre tion standard. Id
. (q u o t i n g Lad

d v . S tate , 3 S.W .3d 547, 567 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999)). I n this case, Clark’ s improper testimony was interr

upted, and the jur

y was immediately instructed to disre g ard the testimony . Such
a va g ue re fe re nc e to “ thr e e c a se s, ” imm e diate ly fo llo we d b y

an in str uc tio n to dis re g ard , d id n ot s o infec t the trial with e rror that an impartial ve rdict could not be r eac hed. Se e id
. Mo re ov e r, the same testimony had alr eady

been e licited by Houston’s counsel without objec tion. Se e Le da yv . S tate , 983 S.W .2d 713, 718 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (er roneous a dmission of t estimony not cause for r ever sal if same fa c t pr ov e n b y

oth e r t e sti mony

no t obje c te d to)
. Ac c or din g ly , w e ov e rr ule Ho us ton ’s fo ur

th point of err or.12 CO NC LU SION Havingov er ru l ed all of Houston’s points of er ror, we aff

irm the judg ment of conviction.

Be a Ann Smith, J ustice Be fore J ustices B . A. Smith, P ury ear and Pember

ton Affir med Filed: F ebrua

ry 16, 2006 Pub lis h