DA 13

- 0692 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

2014 MT 147N
STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaint iff and Appellee,
v. BRIAN JOSEPH SPINKS,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Eighteenth Judicial District, In and For the County

of Gallat in, Cause No. DC 03

- 288 Honorable Holly Brown, Presiding Judge
COUNSEL OF RECORD:

For Appellant: Brian Joseph Spinks, self

- represented, Great Falls, Montana For Appellee : Timothy C. Fox, Montana Attorney G eneral, Brenda K. Elias, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana Marty L ambert , Gallat in Count y Attorney, Todd Whipple, Deputy County Attorney, Bozeman, Montana
Submitted on Briefs: May 8, 2014 Decided: June 3, 20 14 Filed:

__________________________________________ Clerk June 3 20142

Chief Justice Mike McGrath delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1 Pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules, this case is decided by me morandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court’s quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports. ¶2 Spinks appeals from the District Court’s Order Denying Motion Challenging Validity of Conviction and Closing Case, filed September 23, 2013. We affirm. ¶3 In 2000 Spinks was involved in an assault against the woman who was then his spouse. The State charged him with misdemeanor partner or family me mber assault for striking her in the nose, and two days later Spinks pled guilty to that offense. Law enforcement officers subsequently interviewed the victim and learned that after Spinks hit her in the nose she attempted to escape from hi m and he chased her down a road. The victim also reported that Spinks brought her back to the residence and forced her to have sexual intercourse without consent. The State then charged Spinks with two felony counts of sexual intercourse without consent

. ¶4 Spinks and the St ate subsequently entered a plea agreement on those charges in which he agreed to plead to amended charges of misdemeanor partner or family me mber assault and negligent endangerment. In December 2003 the District Court accepted Spinks’ plea and sentenced him to five years with the Department of Corrections, all suspended, and ordered him to have no contact with the victim. In November 2007 the District Court revoked Spinks’ suspended sentence based upon unauthorized contact with the vi ctim, and sentenced him to four years with the Department of Corrections. Spinks did not appeal.3

¶5 Spinks subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief challenging the validity of the PFMA conviction that followed from the plea agreement. H e contended that the second PFMA conviction violated his right to not be exposed to double jeopardy because it
arose from the same event as the misdemeanor PFMA charge that he pled guilty to in 2000. The District Court denied Spinks’ petition and this Court aff irmed. State v. Spinks , 2013 MT 150N, 370 Mont. 554, 311 P.3d 444. We agreed with the District Court that Spinks’ petition was time

-barred pursuant to § 46

- 21
- 102(1), MCA. Spinks , ¶ 6. ¶6 Spinks commenced the present action in September 2013 by filing a p leading captioned Motion Challenging Validity of Conviction, arguing that the conviction arising out of his plea agreement in 2003 violated his privilege against double jeopardy. The District Court denied Spinks’ motion and Spinks appeals. ¶7 Spinks’ Motion Challenging Validity of Conviction is properly considered as a petition for postconviction relief, regardless of the caption. State v. Baker, 1999 MT 251, ¶ 15, 296 Mont. 253, 989 P.3d 335; State v. Parrish , 2010 MT 196, ¶ 11, 357 Mont. 375, 239 P.3d 957. The conviction that Spinks complains of was final in 2007 and as such is barred by the one

- year limitation on petitions for postconviction relief in § 46

- 23
- 102, MCA. We reached the same conclusion in Spinks’ last appeal. Spinks , ¶ 6. ¶8 In addition, a defendant who pleads guilty cannot raise independent claims of deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred before the plea. Ellenburg v.Chase , 2004 MT 66, ¶ 21, 320 Mont. 315, 87 P.3d 473. This principle applies to Spinks’ claims in the present case
.4

¶9 While the District Court here relied upon different reasons to deny Spinks’ motion, we will uphold a district court if it reaches the right result, as it did here. State v. Ellison , 2012 MT 50, ¶ 8, 364 Mont. 276, 272 P.3d 646; City of Billings v. Staebler, 2011 MT 254, ¶ 9, 362 Mont. 231, 262 P.3d 1101. ¶10 We have determined to decide this case pursuant to Section I, Paragraph 3(d) of our Internal Operating Rules, which provides for memorandum opinions. The issues in this case are governed by settled M ontana law. ¶11 Affirmed. /S/ MIKE McGRATH We Concur: /S/ JIM RICE /S/ BETH BAKER /S/ PATRICIA COTTER /S/ MICHAEL E WHEAT