1

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

WESTERN DIVISION

BEANSTALK INNOVATION, INC., : Case No. 1:17-cv-553

:

Plaintiff, : Judge Timothy S. Black

:

vs. :

:

SRG TECHNOLOGY, LLC, :

:

Defendant. :

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (Doc. 5) AND

ISSUANCE OF TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

This civil action is before the Court regarding Plaintiff Beanstalk Innovation, 

Inc.’s motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. 5) and the parties’ responsive 

memoranda (Docs. 9, 13). 

I. BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Beanstalk Innovation, Inc. is a corporation in the business of marketing 

and reselling various technology, content, and media products and services. On 

September 1, 2014, Plaintiff entered into a “strategic reseller agreement” with Defendant 

SRG Technology, LLC. (Doc. 1-1). Per the agreement, Plaintiff provided direct sales 

services for Defendant to assist in securing a contract between Defendant and the 

Hamilton County, Ohio Education Service Center (“HCESC”), which is not a party to 

this action. In exchange, Defendant was to pay Plaintiff a sales fee of $437,500,
2

in four equal installments of $109,375; each payment was due within 30 days of 

Defendant receiving a scheduled payment of license fees from HCESC. (Id. at 4).

Defendant made the first payment to Plaintiff on schedule, but failed to pay 

Plaintiff within 30 days of receiving its second license fee payment from HCESC. 

Plaintiff accordingly filed suit in this District on October 26, 2015, to recover the amount 

owed under the contract. Beanstalk Innovation, Inc., v. SRG Technology, LLC, Case No. 

1:15-cv-695, Doc. 1 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 26, 2015). 

On January 13, 2016, Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a settlement agreement. 

(Doc. 1-2). Under the terms of the Settlement Agreement, Defendant agreed to make the 

second installment payment, as well as additional amounts for interest and attorneys’ 

fees, in two payments on dates specified in the Settlement Agreement. (Id. at 2). 

Defendant also agreed that, upon receipt of the forthcoming third and fourth licensing fee 

payments from HCESC, Defendant would hold the amount from each payment owed to 

Plaintiff in trust for Plaintiff’s benefit until the money was transferred to Plaintiff. (Id. 

at 3). 

As a result of the settlement, the prior case filed in this District was closed. 

Defendant made the second installment payments (modified by the settlement agreement) 

as required. (Doc. 1, at 4). Defendant also made the third of four installment payments 

as required and without issue. (Id.).

Defendant received funds from HCESC for its final licensing fee payment on 

April 19, 2017. (Doc. 9). Defendant admits that it did not hold that portion of the final 

payment owed to Plaintiff in trust as required by the settlement agreement; instead, 
3

Defendant comingled the entirety of the final payment from HCESC with Defendant’s 

general finds and spent the money received from HCESC on “operating expenses.” (Id.

at 2). 

Plaintiff filed the instant complaint in this Court on August 22, 2017, advancing a 

breach of contract claim against Defendant for failing to abide by the settlement 

agreement from the previous case in this district. (Doc. 1). The same day, Plaintiff filed 

the motion for temporary restraining order currently before the Court. (Doc. 5). 

Plaintiff’s motion requests that the Court enjoin Defendant from distributing the funds 

held in trust for Plaintiff except to the extent that said funds are paid to Plaintiff. (Id. at 

10). In the alternative, Plaintiff requests that the Court impose a constructive trust against 

Defendant’s assets to protect the res of the trust while litigation moves forward. (Id.).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Per the original contract of the parties, as modified by the subsequent settlement 

agreement closing the previous case filed in this District, this breach of contract claim is 

governed by Florida law. (Doc. 1-1, at 3).

The factors to be evaluated in reviewing a motion for temporary restraining order 

under Florida law are identical to those evaluated in reviewing a motion for preliminary 

injunction. “The requirements for establishing the right to preliminary injunctive relief 

are: (a) the likelihood of irreparable harm, and the unavailability of an adequate remedy 

at law, (b) the substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (c) the threatened injury to 

petitioner outweighs any possible harm to the respondent, and, (d) the issuance of the 

injunction will not disserve the public interest.” Sanchez v. Solomon, 508 So. 2d 1264, 
4

1265 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1987). “The trial court may exercise broad discretion in 

granting, denying, dissolving, or modifying injunctions, and unless a clear abuse of 

discretion is demonstrated, this court will not disturb the trial court's decision.” Id.

III. ANALYSIS

A. Plaintiff has demonstrated the likelihood of irreparable harm and the 

unavailability of an adequate remedy at law

Typically, a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction is an 

inappropriate remedy when the moving party seeks only monetary compensation, as the 

law provides an adequate remedy for monetary harm. Bender v. CenTrust Mortg. Corp., 

51 F.3d 1027, 1030 (11th Cir. 1995); see also Landmark at Crescent Ridge LP v. Everest 

Financial, Inc., 219 So. 3d 218, 220 (Fla. 1st DCA 2017) (“irreparable harm is not 

established where the potential loss can be adequately compensated for by a monetary 

award”). This is the case even when, as in this case, a plaintiff claims that an injunction

is necessary because a failure to quickly act could result in the plaintiff being 

permanently unable to recover the full amount owed. See id.; see also IMG Fragrance 

Brands, LLC, 2009 WL 10667869 at *2 (citing Florida precedent that the test is whether 

a judgment can be obtained in a proceeding at law, not whether that judgment would 

procure monetary compensation).

However, this case differs from a typical case alleging monetary harm because 

Plaintiff does not seek general damages for breach of contract but specific funds that 

Defendant agreed to hold in trust per the previous settlement agreement between the 

parties. The settlement agreement supports Plaintiff’s claim:
5

4.

...

(b) SRGT will hold in trust for the benefit of Beanstalk that portion of the 

third and fourth payments received from HSESC that are owed to Beanstalk 

under the Agreement. On or before the third business day following the 

clearance of such funds in the accounts of SRGT, SRGT will pay to 

Beanstalk the portion from the third and fourth payments under the 

Agreement owed to Beanstalk as a result of such applicable third or fourth 

payment[.]

(Doc. 1-2, at 1–2 (emphasis added)). Florida courts have held that an injunction may be 

entered to prevent the dissolution of funds held in trust for the benefit of a plaintiff. See 

Georgia Banking Co. v. GMC Lending, 923 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App 2006). 

Defendant’s response to Plaintiff’s argument regarding injunctive relief for funds 

held in trust is that there are in fact no funds held in trust for the benefit of Plaintiff. 

Although the settlement agreement between the parties required Defendant to hold the 

last payment due to Plaintiff in trust, Defendant admits that it failed to do so. Instead, 

Defendant spent the money on “operating expenses.” (Doc. 9, at 2). Defendant claims 

that “[t]he specific funds received from HCESC are no longer in any bank account 

belonging to (Defendant), nor were they used to buy or improve any property belonging 

to (Defendant).” (Doc. 9-1, at 2). Therefore, Defendant argues, Plaintiff cannot receive 

injunctive relief despite Florida courts allowing injunctive relief to prevent dissipation of 

trust funds because Defendant’s actions have ensured that no such trust funds exist.

Adopting Defendant’s argument would completely undermine the additional 

protections given to trust assets in the form of allowed injunctive relief. The Florida 

Supreme Court agrees with this assessment, and has held that a party cannot avoid its 
6

obligations as the holder of funds in trust by comingling designated trust funds with 

general funds:

General depositors also know, or should know, that by the commingling of 

trust funds with the general funds of the banking institution all the funds so 

commingled become impressed with the trust and the entire commingled 

fund is available to discharge the trust.

Glidden v. Gutelius, 119 So. 140, 145 (Fla. S. Ct. 1928). In this case, $109,375 of the 

money received from HCESC was money Defendant held in trust for the benefit of 

Plaintiff per the settlement agreement. Defendant’s admission that it comingled those 

funds with its general funds and spent them does not prevent this Court from granting 

equitable relief that would otherwise be available to protect funds held in trust. 

In its brief in opposition, Defendant cites to several Florida cases which stand for 

the proposition that injunctive relief cannot be used to freeze the general accounts of an 

entity or individual. The cases relied on by Defendant are distinguishable from the case 

before the Court as none of those cases involved an agreement in which a preexisting 

obligation to hold funds in trust was actually established. See, e.g., Stand Up for 

Animals, Inc. v. Monroe County, 69 So. 3d 1011, 1013 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2011) (“The County 

does not claim that SUFA’s bank accounts are trust accounts or that all of the funds 

deposited in them belong to or are being held for the benefit of the County.”); Bank of 

America v. Bank of Salem, 48 So. 3d 155, 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2010) (finding that specific 

funds could not be traced back to the original loan made by bank); Bender v. CenTrust 

Mort. Corp., 51 F.3d 1027, 1029 (11th Cir. 1995) (finding plaintiff failed to state a claim 

for constructive trust in his complaint); Trend Setter Villas of Deer Creek v. Villas on the 
7

Green, Inc., 569 So. 2d 766, 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1990) (finding no connection between the 

specific trust funds and the general assets at issue); Noventa Ocho LLC v. PBD Props. 

LLC, 284 Fed. App’x 726, 728 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding that no specific trust funds were 

identified and the only relief requested was for damages); M.I. Indus. USA, Inc. v. 

Attorneys’ Title Ins. Fund, Inc., 6 So. 3d 627, 628 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 2009) (finding that a 

claim for money damages does not support injunctive relief).

In this case, Plaintiff is not asking for the Court to create a constructive trust over 

Defendant’s general assets merely to assist in collecting on a traditional debt. The 

language of the settlement requiring Defendant to hold funds “in trust” for Plaintiff gives 

Plaintiff options for injunctive relief that would not otherwise exist. That phrase –

“in trust” – is crucial to this Court’s finding that Plaintiff does not have an adequate 

remedy at law in the absence of injunctive relief, and likely was negotiated by the parties 

into the settlement agreement for that reason. Florida law is clear: Defendant may be 

enjoined from disbursing funds that they were bound by agreement to hold in trust for

Plaintiff’s benefit, and the fact that those funds were comingled with Defendant’s general 

assets means that a constructive trust over Defendant’s general assets is warranted at this 

stage.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated potential irreparable harm and the absence 

of an adequate remedy at law sufficient to justify the issuance of a temporary restraining 

order.
8

B. Plaintiff is substantially likely to succeed on the merits

Based on the evidence provided to the Court, Plaintiff appears substantially likely 

to succeed on the merits of its breach of contract claim. The settlement agreement 

between the parties, that resolved the prior lawsuit filed in this District, states that upon 

receipt of the 3rd and 4th payments of licensing fees owed to Defendant by HCESC, 

Defendant would hold in trust that portion of the payment it owed to Plaintiff. (Doc. 1-2, 

at 3). Defendant would then pay to Plaintiff the trust funds within three business days of 

receiving payment from HCESC. (Id.). In a declaration included with Defendant’s 

response to the current motion for temporary restraining order, Defendant’s general 

counsel, Garry Johnson, states that upon receipt of the final payment from HCESC, 

Defendant comingled the payment with other operating funds and then used the entirety 

of that payment to pay various expenses. (Doc. 9-1, at 2). Defendant’s actions, as 

admitted in a declaration from Defendant’s general counsel, were in violation of the 

settlement agreement.

Defendant’s declaration attached to its response to the motion for temporary 

restraining order indicates that Defendant “believes it has valid defenses for the failure to 

pay the funds and the amount thereof demanded by Plaintiff[.]” (Id.). However, there is 

no real indication as to what those defenses are. Defendant does suggest that an oral 

agreement was reached with Plaintiff to reduce the final payment owed to Plaintiff from 

$109,375 to $86,777. (Id.). Nevertheless, the truth remains that Defendant has admitted 

to paying none of the funds held in trust for Plaintiff’s benefit to Plaintiff in accordance 

with the settlement agreement.
9

Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated a high likelihood of success on the merits 

of its breach of contract claim, which supports Plaintiff’s request for a temporary 

restraining order.

C. The threatened injury to Plaintiff outweighs the possible harm to 

Defendant 

Plaintiff’s motion for temporary restraining order states that Plaintiff is requesting 

immediate injunctive relief due to a concern that the money held in trust for Plaintiff will 

be unrecoverable without an injunction. As discussed above, such a concern is typically 

insufficient to justify injunctive relief in a case seeking money damages, but injunctive 

relief is appropriate when funds specifically held (or to be held) in trust are at risk. See 

supra Part III.A. Defendant’s admission that it has already comingled and spent the 

money supposed to be held in trust for Plaintiff supports Plaintiff’s stated concerns, and 

the failure to impose a constructive trust over Defendant’s remaining assets could prevent 

Plaintiff from being able to recover the trust funds owed. In contrast, the potential harm 

to Defendant is minimal; a temporary restraining order is short-term injunctive relief that 

is only intended to last until the parties can more thoroughly brief the Court as to a 

motion for preliminary injunction (or resolve the matter themselves). If Defendant is 

ultimately able to defeat the pending motion for preliminary injunction, it will once again 

regain control over all its assets.

Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting a temporary restraining order.
10

D. An injunction is in the public interest

Granting an injunction to protect trust assets owed to a person is in the public 

interest. Here, as discussed above, Plaintiff has demonstrated a high likelihood of 

success on the merits, and granting a temporary restraining order in this case will serve to 

ensure Defendant meets its contractual obligations under the settlement agreement. See 

supra Part III.B. The public interest is served through rulings that enforce contractual 

obligations. Defendant’s response to the motion for temporary restraining order does not 

contest this factor.

Accordingly, Plaintiff has demonstrated that a temporary restraining order is in the 

public interest.

E. Bond

Defendants have requested that, in the event the Court finds Plaintiff’s motion for 

temporary restraining order to be meritorious, Plaintiff be required to post an adequate 

bond. Florida law limits damages a defendant can recover for an improper injunction to 

the amount of the bond posted with that injunction. Parker Tampa Two, Inc. v. Somerset 

Development Corp., 544 So. 2d 1018, 1021 (Fla. 1989) (“We too adopt the majority view 

and limit liability to the bond amount where the injunction is obtained in good faith.”). 

Accordingly, a court issuing an injunction must require the moving party to post an 

appropriate bond to compensate the non-moving party from any damages it may suffer 

should the injunction ultimately prove to be without merit. Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.610 (“No 

temporary injunction shall be entered unless a bond is given by the movant in an amount 
11

the court deems proper, conditioned for the payment of costs and damages sustained by 

the adverse party if the adverse party is wrongfully enjoined.”).

Defendant asks that bond be valued at $109,375, the amount Plaintiff seeks to 

enjoin, plus an additional amount for prospective attorney’s fees. This would far exceed 

any reasonable damages Defendant would suffer from being unnecessarily enjoined from 

using the disputed assets for the length of the temporary restraining order. Should the 

temporary restraining order prove meritless, Defendant will immediately regain the use of 

the $109,375 in dispute; to award Defendant an equal amount for what would ultimately 

be a minor, short term deprivation, plus attorney’s fees, would grant Defendant an 

improper windfall.

Defendant will undoubtedly suffer some expense should the temporary restraining 

order granted by the Court prove to be ultimately meritless. The Court has not received 

detailed information from Defendant that would allow it to accurately assess that 

potential damage; given the expedited timeframe in which the parties were required to 

respond to the pending motion, this is understandable. Fortuitously, “should [the value of 

a bond initially set by the Court] prove insufficient or excessive, an affected party is free 

to move for modification.” Parker, 544 So. 2d at 1021. At this time, given the amount in 

dispute and the relatively short duration of the temporary restraining order the Court shall 

impose, the Court finds that a bond of $1,000 is appropriate.
12

IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

A. A constructive trust is imposed over the $109,375 portion of the fourth payment 

Defendant received from HCESC and held for the benefit of Plaintiff.

B. Defendant shall not disburse or dissipate all or part of the $109,375 portion of the 

fourth payment Defendant received from HCESC and held for the benefit of 

Plaintiff, pending further Orders from this Court.

C. If Defendant has disbursed or dissipated all or part of the $109,375 portion of the 

fourth payment Defendant received from HCESC and held for the benefit of

Plaintiff, then Defendant shall create or fund an account in in the amount of 

$109,375, and Paragraphs A and B set forth above in this Temporary Restraining 

Order shall apply with full and equal force to such account. 

D. Within three business days of this Order, Defendant shall file a sworn affidavit 

attesting to and describing in detail Defendant’s full compliance with this 

Temporary Restraining Order.

E. This Temporary Restraining Order shall be filed forthwith in the Clerk’s office. It 

shall remain in effect for fourteen days from the date it was issued unless extended 

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b). 

F. This Temporary Restraining Order is entered to maintain the status quo and is 

without prejudice to the merits, the claims, or defenses which have been or may be 

asserted in this litigation.

G. Within three business days of this Order, Plaintiff shall post with the Clerk of 

Court a bond in the amount of $1,000.00.

H. The Court shall retain jurisdiction of this action for the purpose of enforcing this 

Temporary Restraining Order. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: 8/31/17 

__________________________

Timothy S. Black

United States District Judge