Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A03-1608-CR-1820 | April 4, 2017 Page 1 of 10

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Cara Schaefer Wieneke

Special Asst. to the State Public 

Defender

Wieneke Law Office, LLC

Brooklyn, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

George P. Sherman

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Joseph P. Holstead,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff

April 4, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A03-1608-CR-1820

Appeal from the St. Joseph 

Superior Court

The Honorable Jerome Frese, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71D03-9912-CF-699

May, Judge.
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[1] Joseph P. Holstead appeals the sixty-five-year sentence he received for murder1

and the eight-year sentence he received for Class C felony attempted robbery.2

 

He argues his seventy-three-year sentence is inappropriate. We affirm. 

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Holstead experienced a childhood involving physical, verbal, and sexual abuse, 

as well as his parents’ drug and alcohol abuse. Holstead began using drugs and 

alcohol at a young age, and he had been living on his own since the age of 

sixteen. In November 1999, twenty-four-year-old Holstead began living as a 

tenant in sixty-nine-year-old Peggy Seger’s home

[3] On Friday, December 3, 1999, Holstead left work and began partying with 

friends. Later that evening when his friends had turned in for the night, 

Holstead went to the liquor store where he met with a prostitute. To pay for the 

prostitute’s services, Holstead bought her crack cocaine. Holstead used the 

crack cocaine with the prostitute and another stranger who was with them 

named Weathers. Realizing he was “out of money,” (20113 App. at 29), 

Holstead told the other two he lived with Seger, who had gold and was 

 

1 Ind. Code §§ 35-42-1-1 (1997), 35-41-2-4 (1977).

2 Ind. Code §§ 35-41-5-1 (1977), 35-42-5-1 (1984), 35-41-2-4 (1977).

3

We acknowledge that this case has been in process for more than sixteen years, but the disorganized nature 

of the record presented on Appeal has greatly hindered our review. We recommend, in the future, that 

parties prepare appendices in accordance with Indiana Appellate Rules 50 and 51. Herein, we refer to 

Appellant’s Appendix from his 2011 appeal as “2011 App.” and any references to a transcript refer to the 

transcript of the sentencing hearing held on February 6, 2001.
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probably sleeping, so “they’d probably be able to get in and get it and then get 

back to the house and get more rock.” (Id. at 30.)

[4] Holstead and the others proceeded to Seger’s house, and Holstead entered with 

his key. Holstead and Weathers went upstairs and “fiddled around” in 

Holstead’s room in hesitation. (Id. at 37.) Finally, Weathers told Holstead to 

“get this going.” (Id.) Holstead asked Weathers what to do if Seger woke up, 

and Weathers told Holstead to “grab a pillow and throw it over her face or 

something.” (Id.) The two proceeded to Seger’s bedroom. Seger was in bed 

asleep, but she awoke suddenly as they came in. Holstead “jumped on top of 

her and strangled her” with his hands. (Id. at 38.) Seger struggled against 

Holstead, but eventually she stopped. 

[5] Meanwhile, Weathers went through Seger’s dresser drawers. After Seger 

stopped struggling, Weathers handed Holstead a telephone, and Holstead 

wrapped the cord around Seger’s neck, although he knew she was already dead. 

Seger then fell off the bed. Holstead then reached for a pocketknife, but later 

testified he could not remember why. (Id. at 42.) An autopsy revealed Seger 

suffered stab wounds prior to her death by strangulation. Afterward, Holstead, 

Weathers, and the prostitute used silver coins and jewelry from Seger’s room to 

buy crack cocaine, which they consumed together. 

[6] Seger’s live-in boyfriend, Dennis Jenks, returned to Seger’s home the next 

morning around 7:00 a.m. after a night shift of work. When he returned, the 

front door to the house was ajar, and he found Seger’s bedroom had been 
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ransacked and the contents of the drawers had been dumped on the floor and 

bed. Jenks called the police. Police arrived shortly thereafter and found Seger’s 

body on the floor underneath a pile of clothing by the bed. 

[7] Holstead returned to Seger’s house around 11:00 a.m. and asked what was 

happening. Holstead initially told police he had not been back to the house 

since leaving for work on Friday, December 3. Holstead indicated he began 

partying after work and returned to his father’s house to sleep. Police contacted 

Holstead’s father who informed police he had been up until 4:30 a.m. that night 

and had not seen Holstead.

[8] Holstead consented to a search that would allow police to test his clothing

stains, his fingernail scrapings, and his hair samples. The stains on Holstead’s 

clothing tested positive for human blood. When police notified Holstead of the

test results, Holstead changed his story of the prior night’s events. Holstead 

told the police he led Weathers and the prostitute to Seger’s house to steal 

money and gold jewelry, but Weathers strangled Seger, while Holstead stood by 

and watched. 

[9] On December 6, 1999, the State charged Holstead with murder and Class A 

felony attempted robbery. On September 29, 2000, Holstead pled guilty to 

murder and attempted robbery. The court entered judgment and conviction on 

the murder count and took the attempted robbery plea under advisement to 

decide whether that conviction could be entered as a Class A felony. 
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[10] On February 6, 2001, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court heard 

statements from Holstead, Holstead’s father, Seger’s children, and counsel. 

Holstead expressed the following to Seger’s family at the sentencing hearing: 

I want to tell you from the bottom of my heart that I’m sorry. I 

can’t feel what you’re feeling or what you’ve felt from this, but I 

will tell you that I’m hurting. I’m haunted in my dreams at 

night, and I probably will be for the rest of my life. I’m sorry. I 

wish I could take this all away and give you back your mother, 

because I did like her, and she was my friend. I never thought

that I’d be capable of doing what I’ve done. But what is done is 

done, and I have confessed, and will be held accountable. 

(Tr. at 55.) The court entered a conviction of Class C felony attempted robbery 

in addition to the previously-entered conviction of murder. The court found as 

a mitigator Holstead’s difficult childhood involving physical, verbal, and sexual 

abuse from a very young age, but noted Holstead “became an adult” and had 

the responsibility to take control of his actions. (Id. at 63.) The court rejected 

Holstead’s argument that his being under the influence of crack cocaine when 

he committed the crime was a mitigator, reasoning although “crack cocaine 

[and] alcohol [were] are greatly contributing factors” to the crime “[Holstead] 

did the drugs, and he let the drugs get hold of him” which led to the crime. (Id.

at 64.) Lastly, the court found as a mitigator Holstead’s remorse and 

willingness to accept responsibility for his actions by pleading guilty. 

[11] The court found as a “profound” aggravator the fact Holstead murdered Seger 

in her bedroom, “the most private” room of her home. (Id. at 65-66.) The 

court found as an even “greater” aggravator the fact that Holstead was not a 
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stranger, but someone to whom Seger graciously “extended her hospitality.” 

(Id.) The court noted Seger “allow[ed] him the intimacy of her home, and 

[Holstead] transgressed that most profoundly.” (Id.) The court found Seger’s 

being over the age of sixty-five and “an unprotected single woman in that 

house” as additional aggravators. (Id. at 67.) Lastly, the court found the 

manner in which the murder was committed was an aggravator, noting the 

murder was “simply atrocious,” “terrible,” and undoubtedly created “terror and 

excruciating pain for the victim.” (Id. at 68.) The court concluded “the 

aggravators far outweigh[ed] the mitigators.” (Id.) The court sentenced 

Holstead to maximum terms of sixty-five years for murder and eight years for 

attempted robbery, to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence of 

seventy-three years.

4

Discussion and Decision

[12] Holstead asserts his seventy-three-year sentence is inappropriate. Holstead 

admits “the crimes he committed were deplorable” and makes no argument 

regarding the nature of the offenses as they relate to his sentence. (Appellant’s 

Br. at 9.) Holstead instead argues his character alone warrants a lower 

sentence. 

 

4

 On July 25, 2016, the court granted Holstead permission to file a belated notice of appeal.
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[13] Under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), we may revise a sentence if, after due 

consideration of the trial court’s decision, we find the sentence is inappropriate 

in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender. Williams v. 

State, 891 N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). Revision of a sentence under 

Rule 7(B) requires the appellant to demonstrate his sentence is “inappropriate in 

light of both the nature of the offenses and his character.” Williams v. State, 891 

N.E.2d 621, 633 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis original to Williams). Because 

Holstead failed to present any argument regarding the nature of his offenses, he 

has waived our review of the inappropriateness of his sentence. See Sanders v. 

State, No. 02A04-1608-CR-1903, 2017 WL 727194 at *2 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 24, 

2017) (holding issue waived where appellant failed to present any authority or 

analysis on the nature of his offense). 

[14] Waiver notwithstanding, Holstead has failed to persuade us his seventy-threeyear sentence is inappropriate. The advisory sentence is the starting point for 

determining the appropriateness of a sentence. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 

482, 494 (Ind. 2007), clarified on reh’g 878 N.E.2d 218 (2007). The statutory 

range for a murder sentence was forty-five to sixty-five years, with the 

presumptive5 sentence being fifty-five years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-3 (1995). The 

statutory range for Class C felony robbery was two to eight years, with the

presumptive sentence being four years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6 (1996). 

 

5 Prior to 2005, Indiana used “presumptive” sentences, which were standard sentences prescribed by the 

legislature for a given crime. Harris v. State, 897 N.E.2d 927, 928 (Ind. 2008).
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[15] We assess the trial court’s recognition or nonrecognition of aggravators and 

mitigators as an initial guide to determining whether the sentence imposed was 

inappropriate. Gibson v. State, 856 N.E.2d 142, 147 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). We

consider not only the aggravators and mitigators found by the trial court, but 

also any other facts appearing in the record. Roney v. State, 872 N.E.2d 192, 206 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. Our review is deferential to the trial court’s 

decision, and our goal is to determine whether Holstead’s sentence is 

inappropriate, not whether some other sentence would be more appropriate. 

Conley v. State, 972 N.E.2d 864, 876 (Ind. 2012), reh’g denied. The appellant 

bears the burden of demonstrating his sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. 

State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1080 (Ind. 2006). 

[16] In support of his argument, Holstead points to his “sincere remorse” for the 

crimes he committed, his acceptance of responsibility for his actions by 

pleading guilty, and his extremely troubled childhood. (Appellant’s Br. at 9-

10.) Both the State and the trial court acknowledged the sincerity of Holstead’s 

remorse at the sentencing hearing. However, as the State correctly points out, 

while Holstead expressed remorse for his crimes and pleaded guilty, he only did 

so after realizing the State had built a strong evidentiary case against him. The 

record reflects Holstead initially lied to police. He first denied being at Seger’s 

home at all on the evening of December 3 and early morning of December 4, 

and he told police he had been at his father’s house. When his story was not 

corroborated by his father and the police found physical evidence of the murder

on Holstead’s clothes, Holstead changed his story and implicated Weathers as 
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being the individual who strangled Seger. It was not until months after 

Holstead’s initial statements that he pleaded guilty to murdering Seger himself. 

[17] Despite Holstead’s initial denial of the crimes he committed, we note the trial 

court found Holstead’s remorse and guilty plea to be mitigating factors it took 

into consideration in sentencing him. However, the court found “profound 

aggravation” in that Holstead (1) murdered a woman who offered hospitality to 

him, and (2) murdered Seger by strangling her in her bedroom. (Tr. at 66-68.) 

We agree with the trial court that this was a terrorizing and atrocious crime. As 

the trial court noted, “the fear of every citizen is having their home invaded,” 

especially their bedroom invaded. (Id. at 66.) We cannot say the trial court 

inappropriately accorded these aggravating factors more weight than it 

accorded to the mitigator of Holstead’s remorse. 

[18] With regard to Holstead’s difficult childhood, we note the trial court also 

considered this as a mitigating factor. The trial court noted the sympathy it had 

for “a small child who was being abused in his family.” (Id. at 63.) However, 

while the court was sympathetic towards Holstead for the pain he suffered as a 

child, the court accorded this factor limited weight, noting Holstead “grew up” 

and had a responsibility as part of our society to not use his troubled past as an 

excuse to harm others. (Id. at 63-64.) We agree. While we acknowledge the 

negative impact Holstead’s tragic childhood undoubtedly had on him, Holstead 

committed an extremely egregious crime in murdering Seger. As the trial court 

found, this far outweighs any redeeming aspects of Holstead’s character.

Holstead thus has not persuaded us that his sentence is inappropriate. See 
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Spitler v. State, 908 N.E.2d 694, 697 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (finding the nature of 

the defendant’s offense was so unique and egregious that it substantially 

outweighed any positive aspects of his character). 

Conclusion

[19] In sum, having failed to present any argument regarding the nature of his 

offenses, Holstead has waived Appellate Rule 7(B) review. Waiver 

notwithstanding, in light of Holstead’s character and the undisputed nature of 

his offenses, we conclude his sentence is not inappropriate. Accordingly, we 

affirm. 

[20] Affirmed. 

Najam, J., and Bailey, J., concur.