Filed 8/29/16 Woodward v. Church of Scientology CA2/3

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

VANCE WOODWARD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

CHURCH OF SCIENTOLOGY 

INTERNATIONAL, INC., et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

B261813

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. BC540097)

APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles 

County, Michael Johnson, Judge. Affirmed.

Vance Woodward, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Offices of Gary Soter and Gary S. Soter for Defendants and Respondents 

Church of Scientology International; Church of Scientology Western United States; 

Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization; and Church of Scientology Flag Ship 

Service Organization.

Rabinowitz, Boudin, Standard, Krinsky & Lieberman and Eric M. Lieberman for 

Defendants and Respondents Church of Scientology International; Church of Scientology 

Western United States; Church of Scientology Flag Service Organization; Church of 

Scientology Flag Ship Service Organization; and Church of Scientology of San 

Francisco.
2

Law Office of Kendrick L. Moxon and Kendrick L. Moxon for Defendant and 

Respondent Church of Scientology of San Francisco.

_________________________

Plaintiff and appellant Vance Woodward (Woodward), in propria persona, appeals 

an order granting a special motion to strike (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16)1brought by 

defendants and respondents Church of Scientology International, Church of Scientology 

Western United States, Church of Scientology of San Francisco, Church of Scientology 

Flag Service Organization, Inc. and Church of Scientology Flag Ship Service 

Organization, Inc. (collectively, the Church or the Church defendants). Woodward also 

appeals the subsequent judgment awarding $90,507.50 in attorney fees and costs to the 

Church defendants as the prevailing parties on the special motion to strike.

The issues presented include whether Woodward’s lawsuit arose out of the 

Church’s protected activity, and if so, whether Woodward established a reasonable 

probability of prevailing in the action.

We conclude the Church met its initial burden to show the lawsuit arose out of its 

protected activity and that Woodward failed to meet his burden to establish a reasonable 

probability of prevailing on the merits of his claims. The order granting the special 

motion to strike, and the judgment awarding attorney fees and costs to the Church as the 

prevailing party in the action, are affirmed.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1. Pleadings.

On March 21, 2014, Woodward filed suit against the Church defendants alleging 

four causes of action: conversion, breach of contract, common counts and declaratory 

relief. Woodward alleged in relevant part:

In 1989, at the age of 14, he began participating in Scientology in Winnipeg, 

Canada. In 2007, he came to the San Francisco church seeking psychological assistance. 

There, he met various staff members who earned his trust and encouraged him to pay for

 

1 Unless otherwise specified, all further statutory references are to the Code of Civil 

Procedure.
3

counseling services (known as auditing in Scientology) on a fee-per-service basis. The 

Church “systematically made claims as to the benefits of Scientology, including 

superhuman abilities ([OT or Operating Thetan powers]), all of which were frequently 

repeated to [him] in an effort to induce [him] into participating in Scientology services 

and paying huge sums to do so.” The Church periodically administered personality tests; 

whenever the tests showed Woodward had improved, the Church claimed that auditing 

was responsible; when test results showed deterioration, he was accused of failing to 

participate honestly and was required to undergo remedial auditing procedures. The 

Church cajoled him into participating in auditing services, taught him that “Scientology is 

senior to life because Scientology can control life,” that only Scientology could help the 

world, and that if Woodward “failed to immediately act, the entire Earth was at risk of 

destroying itself.” Between 2007 and 2010, Woodward paid about $600,000 to various 

Scientology entities. Some of the monies were advance payments for auditing services to 

be delivered in the future, as well as for food and accommodations.2

Woodward’s complaint denied that the Church’s Religious Services Enrollment 

Application, Agreement and General Release (Enrollment Application) would have any 

impact on his right to a refund of his funds. Woodward pled that even assuming he 

signed the Enrollment Application, it was invalid, void and unenforceable.

In the first cause of action, conversion, Woodward alleged the various entities had 

converted about $210,000 of his funds, which they had refused to return. In the second 

cause of action, breach of contract, he alleged, inter alia, that he paid various sums for 

services that were never delivered, or “for services that were nominally delivered, but 

which were of such substandard quality as to be worth nothing and/or which were in 

certain instances, damaging to [him].” In the third cause of action, he alleged the Church 

defendants were indebted to him on an open book account. On the fourth cause of action, 

declaratory relief, he sought a judicial determination that the Enrollment Application was 

void and inapplicable.

 

2 Woodward alleged, inter alia, that one of the entities owed him $3,693.29 for food 

and accommodations, and that another entity owed him $1,229.60 for the same.
4

2. The Church’s special motion to strike.

On May 29, 2014, the Church defendants jointly brought a special motion to strike 

Woodward’s complaint in its entirety. On the threshold issue, the motion contended that 

Woodward’s lawsuit arose out of the Church’s religious speech, and that Woodward 

could not defeat the motion by characterizing his complaint as alleging a mere claim for a 

refund. “Here, the underlying acts which caused Woodward to make donations to the 

Church Defendants entirely consisted of speech. . . . [R]eligious speech concerning the 

efficacy of religious practices necessarily triggers the protections of the anti-SLAPP 

statute.” Further, the religious speech attributed to the Church concerned issues of 

widespread public interest. “There is, without doubt, continuing widespread public 

interest in religion generally and in the Church of Scientology in particular. . . . 

Accordingly, the burden shifts to Woodward” to show a probability of prevailing at trial.

With respect to the merits, the Church asserted Woodward could not prevail at 

trial for a number of reasons: civil courts are barred from making any determination 

concerning the truth or falsity of the religious speech allegedly made to Woodward; the 

Church defendants did not owe a duty of care in counseling Woodward; he expressly 

agreed in writing that his payments for religious services were gifts without refund 

rights;3returns of donations were exclusively within the ecclesiastical authority and sole 

discretion of the Church’s claims verification board; Woodward signed releases which 

barred his complaint; and his claims, which spanned the years 2007 to 2010, were timebarred.

 

3

The Church’s papers included a copy of its Enrollment Application, which 

specifies that Scientology is a religion; that its religious services include auditing, which 

is Scientology’s form of religious counseling; that no Scientology church “is under any 

duty or obligation whatsoever to return any portion of any religious donation I make”; 

that a refund of donations may be obtained only through strict compliance with the 

Church’s published policies and procedures relating to its Claims Verification Board; and 

that return of donations is “exclusively within the ecclesiastical authority and sole 

discretion” of said board.
5

3. Woodward’s opposition to the special motion to strike.

In opposition, Woodward argued the anti-SLAPP statute does not apply because 

the gravamen of this lawsuit “is breach of contract and related causes of action. 

Defendants took Plaintiff’s money in exchange for goods and personal services. In 

delivering services, [the Church] harmed Plaintiff. [The Church] therefore . . . fell below 

any conceivable minimum expectations of the contracting parties, . . . . Also, Defendants 

failed and refused to deliver other services. Plaintiff demanded a return of his funds. 

Defendants failed or refused to return Plaintiff’s funds. Plaintiff sued for breach of the 

goods-and-services contract and related causes [of action].”

With respect to the merits, Woodward denied that this matter involved a religious 

dispute, arguing “this case has nothing to do with whether or not [the Church defendants] 

adhered to their own doctrine or constitution, nor does it have anything to do with the 

appointment and discipline of clergy or anybody, nor does it have anything to do with the 

management of church assets or management at all.” Further, “resolution of this dispute 

does not require any ruling on the validity of religious belief or practice.”

Rather, according to Woodward, this matter simply involved a contractual claim 

and had the requisite minimal merit to withstand a special motion to strike. Woodward 

asserted: “Defendants acknowledge that Plaintiff paid them money in exchange for 

goods and services. . . . Defendants do not dispute that they delivered some prepaid 

services. They do not dispute that they failed or refused to deliver other prepaid services. 

Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiff demanded that his funds be returned. Defendants 

have not even disputed that they refused to return Plaintiff’s funds, save for some 

throwaway amount that was clearly a setup to lure Plaintiff into giving up his right to 

costs, interest, and over $100,000 in stated balances.”

4. Trial court’s ruling granting the special motion to strike.

After hearing the matter, the trial court granted the special motion to strike, ruling 

that the Church met its initial burden to establish Woodward’s claims arose out of the 

Church’s protected activity and that Woodward failed to establish a probability of success 

on the merits.
6

On the threshold issue, the trial court ruled that “[Woodward’s] causes of action 

all arise from [the Church’s] religious activities. The claims all relate to religious 

instruction, counseling and related religious services. And [Woodward] has made a 

wholesale challenge to the principles and practices underlying [the Church’s] religious 

doctrine. All of this involves religious speech, which is protected under the free speech 

clause of the First Amendment. [Citation.] Section 425.16(e)(4) of the anti-SLAPP 

statute broadly protects ‘conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of . . . free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest’. Courts 

have broadly construed this provision to include ‘something of concern to a substantial 

number of people’. [Citations.] [The Church’s] activities involve a substantial number 

of people, as they are part of a religious organization that has thousands of churches in 

more than 150 countries and over 30 churches and ministries in California.”

With respect to the merits, the trial court found that while Woodward sought to 

characterize his case as involving a simple breach of contract, “[t]he overwhelming 

content of [Woodward’s] 34 page complaint consists of challenges to the teachings of the 

Scientology organization . . . and challenges to the value of the services that [Woodward] 

received from the Scientology organization. [Woodward’s] 66 page declaration largely 

tracks his complaint, and provides even more detail about his dissatisfaction with 

Scientology. [¶] Each of [Woodward’s] causes of action incorporates his allegations 

concerning his religious dispute with [the Church], including his challenges to the 

teachings of the Scientology organization and claims that he suffered emotional harm 

from its religious activities; see Compl. at [paragraphs] 69-106, 263, 275, 291 & 307.

Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim expressly alleges that religious services he received 

were ‘of such substandard quality as to be worth nothing and/or which were in certain 

instances, damaging to [him.] [¶] . . . [¶] [Woodward’s] challenges to [the Church’s] 

religious principles and practices raise a religious dispute that is not proper for the courts 

to decide. [Citations.] [¶] Because [Woodward’s] religious challenges have infused all 

of his causes of action and are so predominant in his arguments, this is not a case in 

which religious parties have presented a discrete property dispute that can be determined 
7

by ‘neutral principles of law.’ [Citations.] . . . [¶] [The Church defendants] have shown 

that [Woodward’s] broad attacks on the Scientology organization raise a religious dispute 

that cannot be determined by the court.”

With respect to the merits, the trial court also found that Woodward’s “claims are 

based upon a[n] [alleged] contractual right to repayment from [the Church], without 

alleging whether the contract was written, oral or implied; see [Complaint, paragraphs]

282-88. [The Church defendants] have shown that [Woodward] signed a written 

agreement on 9/21/2007 which designated his payments as religious donations, and 

expressly stated that ‘No Scientology church is under any duty or obligation whatsoever 

to return any portion of any religious donation I make’ and any return is ‘exclusively 

within the ecclesiastical authority and sole discretion of the Claims Verification 

Board’; . . . . In his declaration, [Woodward] simply describes information which led him 

to believe that his funds could be returned; see Woodward Decl. [paragraphs] 149-58. 

[Woodward] does not identify the source of the statements, and he never describes any 

kind of agreement or understanding with any specific individual within the Scientology 

organization.”

The trial court explained, “A contract requires mutual consent of the parties; see 

Civ. Code §1550, §1565 & §1580 (‘Consent is not mutual, unless the parties all agree 

upon the same thing in the same sense.’). California courts use an objective standard to 

determine mutual consent, and the test ‘is whether a reasonable person would, from the 

conduct of the parties, conclude that there was mutual agreement.’ [Citation.] It is well 

settled that ‘Contract formation is governed by objective manifestations, not subjective 

intent of any individual involved.’ [Citation.] [¶] [Woodward] has not established any 

legal or evidentiary basis for the contract upon which all of his claims depend. At best he 

has presented evidence of his subjective intent and expectations, which does not support a 

contract.”

On October 8, 2014, the trial court signed and filed an order granting the Church’s 

special motion to strike and dismissing Woodward’s complaint.
8

5. Subsequent proceedings.

On October 20, 2014, Woodward filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting new 

facts, circumstances, or law (§ 1008, subd. (a)), and seeking leave to file an amended 

complaint.

On November 24, 2014, the Church defendants, having prevailed on the special 

motion to strike, filed a joint motion for an award of attorney fees and costs (§ 425.16, 

subd. (c)), seeking lodestar attorney fees of $123,550 plus costs for a total award of 

$126,382.50.

On January 7, 2015, the trial court heard the matters and denied Woodward’s 

motions, stating “this is merely an effort to reargue the matter in light of an adverse 

ruling.” As for the Church’s motion, the trial court awarded attorney fees to the Church 

in the amount of $87,675, representing 70 percent of the amount requested, as well as 

$2,832.50 in costs.

On January 16, 2015, the trial court entered a formal judgment awarding attorney 

fees and costs to the Church.

On February 5, 2015, Woodward filed a timely notice of appeal, specifying the 

October 8, 2014 order which granted the special motion to strike and dismissed the 

complaint, as well as the January 16, 2015 judgment pertaining to attorney fees and 

costs.4

CONTENTIONS

Woodward contends: this lawsuit falls within section 425.17’s commercial speech 

exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute; even if the exemption does not apply, this lawsuit is 

a breach of contract action and does not arise out of the Church’s protected activity; even 

assuming the anti-SLAPP statute applies, he established a probability of prevailing on his 

claim; he is entitled to an award of attorney fees, costs and sanctions; the trial court erred 

 

4 On June 17, 2015, this court denied the Church’s motion to dismiss Woodward’s 

appeal as untimely.
9

in denying his motion for reconsideration; and the trial court abused its discretion in 

awarding attorney fees to the Church.5

DISCUSSION

1. No merit to Woodward’s reliance on the commercial speech exemption 

(§ 425.17, subd. (c)) to the anti-SLAPP statute; Woodward waived the issue by failing to 

meet his burden below to establish the applicability of said exemption.

Initially, we address Woodward’s contention that that the commercial speech 

exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (c) bars the application of section 425.16 to this 

action. The argument is not properly before this court.

By way of background, section 425.17, subdivision (c) “exempt[s] from the antiSLAPP law a cause of action arising from commercial speech when (1) the cause of 

action is against a person primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods or 

services; (2) the cause of action arises from a statement or conduct by that person 

consisting of representations of fact about that person’s or a business competitor’s 

business operations, goods, or services; (3) the statement or conduct was made either for 

the purpose of obtaining approval for, promoting, or securing sales or leases of, or 

commercial transactions in, the person’s goods or services or in the course of delivering 

the person’s goods or services; and (4) the intended audience for the statement or conduct 

meets the definition set forth in section 425.17(c)(2).” (Simpson Strong-Tie Company, 

Inc. v. Gore (2010) 49 Cal.4th 12, 30, italics added (Simpson).)

A plaintiff has the burden to establish the applicability of an exemption under 

section 425.17 from the anti-SLAPP statute. (San Diegans for Open Government v. Har 

Construction, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 611, 622.) On appeal, we apply a de novo 

review standard to determine whether the plaintiff met his burden under section 425.17. 

(Ibid.)

 

5

In his reply brief, Woodward also contends that Eric Lieberman, a New York 

attorney who is representing respondents on appeal, is engaging in the unauthorized 

practice of law in California. The argument is meritless in view of this court’s grant of an 

application by Attorney Lieberman to appear pro hac vice in this matter. (Cal. Rules of 

Court, rule 9.40.)
10

On our de novo review, we conclude Woodward failed to meet his burden below 

to establish his lawsuit comes within section 425.17, subdivision (c), i.e., the commercial 

speech exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute. The record reflects that Woodward’s 

opposing memorandum invoked a different exemption below, namely, the public interest 

exemption found at subdivision (b) of section 425.17.6 Because Woodward did not even 

assert the commercial speech exemption in his opposition papers below, he clearly failed 

to meet his burden to establish the applicability of that exemption.7

We are mindful the principle that an appellate court ordinarily will not consider 

arguments raised for the first time on appeal does not apply when “ ‘the new argument 

raises a pure issue of law on undisputed facts.’ ” (Carmona v. Lincoln Millennium Car 

Wash, Inc. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 74, 89-90, fn. 6, italics added; accord, Castaic Lake 

Water Agency v. Newhall County Water Dist. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1196, 1204.) Here, 

however, the applicability of the commercial speech exemption requires, inter alia, a 

showing that the Church is “primarily engaged in the business of selling or leasing goods 

or services . . . .” (§ 425.17, subd. (c).) Because Woodward failed to make the necessary 

showing below, at this juncture the issue is foreclosed.

 

6

The public interest exemption of section 425.17, subdivision (b), states: “Section 

425.16 does not apply to any action brought solely in the public interest or on behalf of 

the general public if all of the following conditions exist: [¶] (1) The plaintiff does not 

seek any relief greater than or different from the relief sought for the general public or a 

class of which the plaintiff is a member. A claim for attorney’s fees, costs, or penalties 

does not constitute greater or different relief for purposes of this subdivision. [¶] (2) The 

action, if successful, would enforce an important right affecting the public interest, and 

would confer a significant benefit, whether pecuniary or nonpecuniary, on the general 

public or a large class of persons. [¶] (3) Private enforcement is necessary and places a 

disproportionate financial burden on the plaintiff in relation to the plaintiff’s stake in the 

matter.” (Italics added.)

7

The reporter’s transcript reflects that at the time of the hearing below, Woodward 

conceded that section 425.17, subdivision (b) is inapplicable but then argued that 

subdivision (c) of the statute does apply. The Church’s counsel then objected, stating 

“Woodward had the burden of raising the exception and proving it as part of his 

opposition to this motion and he never mentioned it and the argument has been waived as 

a matter of law. [¶] He would have to show[, inter alia,] that the Church was primarily 

engaged in a commercial activity . . . .”
11

Accordingly, we reject Woodward’s resort to the commercial speech exemption to 

the anti-SLAPP statute.

2. General principles regarding a special motion to strike.

A special motion to strike “involves a two-step process. First, the defendant must 

make a prima facie showing that the plaintiff’s ‘cause of action . . . aris[es] from’ an act 

by the defendant ‘in furtherance of the [defendant’s] right of petition or free speech . . . in 

connection with a public issue.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) If a defendant meets this 

threshold showing, the cause of action shall be stricken unless the plaintiff can establish 

‘a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.’ ” (Simpson, supra, 49 Cal.4th 

at p. 21, fn. omitted.) The Legislature has “express[ly] command[ed] that section 425.16 

‘shall be construed broadly.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (a).)” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 

Cal.4th 82, 92 (Navellier).)

On the first prong of the two-part test, in determining whether the anti-SLAPP 

statute applies, we analyze whether the defendants’ (the Church’s) acts underlying the

plaintiff’s (Woodward’s) cause of action were in furtherance of the defendants’ right of 

petition or free speech. (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78.)

Appellate review “of an order granting or denying a motion to strike under section 

425.16 is de novo. [Citation.] We consider ‘the pleadings, and supporting and opposing 

affidavits . . . upon which the liability or defense is based.’ (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).)

However, we neither ‘weigh credibility [nor] compare the weight of the evidence.

Rather, [we] accept as true the evidence favorable to the plaintiff [citation] and evaluate 

the defendant’s evidence only to determine if it has defeated that submitted by the 

plaintiff as a matter of law.’ [Citation.]” (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 

39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn. 3.)

3. The Church met its initial burden to show that Woodward’s lawsuit arose from 

the Church’s protected speech activity.

The scope of protected activity is delineated in subdivision (e) of the anti-SLAPP 

statute, which states: “As used in this section, ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right of 

petition or free speech under the United States or California Constitution in connection 
12

with a public issue’ includes: (1) any written or oral statement or writing made before a 

legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official proceeding authorized 

by law, (2) any written or oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue 

under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other 

official proceeding authorized by law, (3) any written or oral statement or writing made 

in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public 

interest, or (4) any other conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right 

of petition or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or 

an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e), italics added.)

As Woodward acknowledges, there is no categorical rule that breach of contract 

claims fall outside the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute. Navellier explained, “conduct 

alleged to constitute breach of contract may also come within constitutionally protected 

speech or petitioning. The anti-SLAPP statute’s definitional focus is not the form of the 

plaintiff’s cause of action but, rather, the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his or her 

asserted liability—and whether that activity constitutes protected speech or petitioning. 

Evidently, ‘[t]he Legislature recognized that “all kinds of claims could achieve the 

objective of a SLAPP suit -- to interfere with and burden the defendant’s exercise of his 

or her rights.” ’ [Citation.] ‘Considering the purpose of the [anti-SLAPP] provision, 

expressly stated, the nature or form of the action is not what is critical but rather that it is 

against a person who has exercised certain rights” (Church of Scientology v. Wollersheim

(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 652).” (Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 92-93.)8

Having reviewed the allegations of Woodward’s complaint, we agree with the trial 

court’s determination that Woodward’s lawsuit arose from the Church’s protected speech 

activity within the meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). Although Woodward 

 

8

In Navellier, the plaintiffs sued a defendant for breach of contract, alleging the 

defendant violated a release agreement by filing counterclaims in a federal action. 

(Navellier, supra, 29 Cal.4th at pp. 86-87.) Navellier held the plaintiffs’ lawsuit was 

based on the defendant’s constitutional free speech and petitioning activity as defined in 

the anti-SLAPP statute, so that the defendant met his threshold burden of demonstrating 

that the plaintiffs’ action arose from protected activity. (Id. at p. 95.)
13

purports to be suing for breach of a commercial contract for the purchase and sale of 

“unlicensed mental-health therapy” services at fixed prices, the allegations of 

Woodward’s complaint, as well as the averments in his declaration filed in opposition to 

the Church’s anti-SLAPP motion, make it clear that Woodward’s complaint arose out of 

the Church’s religious speech. Woodward himself acknowledges his suit arose out of the 

Church’s speech activity; he states in a declaration that the Church “emotionally harmed 

me through practices that involved utterances.” (Italics added.)

Much of the first 29 pages of Woodward’s 34-page complaint (with those 

allegations incorporated into the four causes of action), as well as his 66-page opposing 

declaration, consists of allegations setting forth the ecclesiastical hierarchy of the Church

and describing its core beliefs, doctrines and practices.

Woodward’s opposing declaration stated, inter alia: “98. Scientology teaches that 

Scientology provides a path to achieving or re-achieving spiritual immortality and 

spiritual rehabilitation. Scientology’s method of purportedly assisting spiritual 

rehabilitation includes a form of counseling known as ‘auditing.’ [¶] 99. In one type of 

auditing, Scientology counselors – called ‘auditors’ -- guide and encourage participants –

called ‘preclears’ or ‘PCs’ -- to consciously re-experience painful or traumatic events in 

their past, and to fabricate such events from one’s ‘past lives,’ in order to free themselves 

of their limiting effects. [¶] 100. In another type of auditing – commonly referred to as 

‘security checking’ or ‘sec checking’ – auditors guide preclears to recall and divulge 

prior harmful acts and omissions in the highest possible detail, for [founder L. Ron] 

Hubbard theorized that the problematic effects of those misdeeds could only be 

eliminated by recalling them in exact detail.” Woodward alleged the Church taught that 

by participating in these Scientology practices, “a person could develop superhuman 

abilities,” including the ability to read minds, to communicate telepathically, and to travel 

great distances in ways that scientifically minded persons would consider to be 

impossible, and could evolve from homo sapiens to a new species, “homo novis.”

Woodward repeatedly asserted that he “relied” on the Church’s claims, and that he 

was induced by the Church’s teachings to pay for auditing services. He stated that in 
14

“reliance upon the claims made by Scientologists including representatives of 

Defendants, I believed that, by participating in good faith in Scientology, I would achieve 

the above-mentioned higher states of being and OT abilities or some passable substitute 

therefor.”

Woodward asserted he gave over $600,000 to Scientology, of which roughly 

$200,000 consisted of donations, $200,000 was for goods and services (books, recorded 

lectures, courses and auditing) that were provided to him, and $200,000 in advance 

payments for future goods and services. When he “paid [these] sums, he was under the 

deluded belief that Scientology provides the only path to spiritual or psychological 

betterment,” and he relied on representations by the Church defendants “regarding the 

efficacy of Scientology.”

In suing for breach of contract, Woodward pled he paid “for services that were 

nominally delivered, but were of such substandard quality as to be worth nothing and/or 

which were in certain instances, damaging to [him].” He sought recovery of damages for 

the Church’s allegedly defective services, as well as recovery of his advance payments 

for future Church services he allegedly never received.

On the record presented, we conclude Woodward’s lawsuit arose out of his 

eventual dissatisfaction with the Church’s doctrines and his disappointment in the quality 

and efficacy of the Church’s religious services, particularly, its spiritual counseling or 

auditing services, which did not deliver the benefits that he expected. Stated another 

way, the lawsuit arose out of the Church’s “conduct in furtherance of [its] exercise 

of . . . the constitutional right of free speech” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)), specifically, 

religious speech.

Further, as the trial court found, the religious speech attributed to the Church 

concerned issues of widespread public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) The trial court 

observed that the Church’s “activities involve a substantial number of people, as they are 

part of a religious organization that has thousands of churches in more than 150 countries 

and over 30 churches and ministries in California.” Similarly, this court previously has 

recognized “that the Church is a matter of public interest, as evidenced by media 
15

coverage and the extent of the Church’s membership and assets.” (Church of Scientology 

v. Wollersheim (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 628, 651 (Wollersheim).)9

Accordingly, the Church met its threshold burden below to show that Woodward’s 

lawsuit arose out of the Church’s protected speech activity (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4)), 

thereby shifting the burden to Woodward to show that he was capable of prevailing at 

trial.

4. In opposing the special motion to strike, Woodward failed to meet his burden to 

show a reasonable probability of prevailing in the action.

a. Claims for services that were delivered to Woodward.

To the extent that Woodward’s lawsuit seeks damages “for services that

were . . . delivered, but which were of such substandard quality as to be worth nothing,” 

Woodward clearly cannot prevail on his legal challenge to the efficacy of the Church’s 

services. It is established that civil courts cannot resolve disputes over religious doctrine 

and practice which would require the state to become entangled in essentially religious 

controversies. (Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for U. S. of America and Canada v. 

Milivojevich (1976) 426 U.S. 696, 708-710 [49 L.Ed.2d 151]; New v. Kroeger (2008) 

167 Cal.App.4th 800, 815.)

b. Claims to recover advance payments for future services.

To the extent that Woodward’s lawsuit seeks to recover a refund for advance 

payments that he made for future services, Woodward cannot prevail because he has not 

shown a contractual right to a refund.

As indicated, in this regard the trial court stated: “In his declaration, [Woodward] 

simply describe[d] information which led him to believe that his funds could be 

returned; . . . . [Woodward] d[id] not identify the source of the statements, and he never 

describe[d] any kind of agreement or understanding with any specific individual within 

 

9 Wollersheim concluded that an action by the church against a former member was 

properly subjected to a special motion to strike because the church’s action arose from 

the former member’s petitioning activity in connection with an issue of public interest. 

(Wollersheim, supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at pp. 647-651, disapproved on other grounds in 

Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 68, fn. 5.)
16

the Scientology organization. [¶] . . . It is well settled that ‘Contract formation is 

governed by objective manifestations, not subjective intent of any individual involved.’ 

[Citation.] [¶] [Woodward] has not established any legal or evidentiary basis for the 

contract upon which all of his claims depend. At best he has presented evidence of his 

subjective intent and expectations, which does not support a contract.”

We agree with the trial court’s determination that Woodward’s subjective 

understanding that he was entitled to a refund for advance payments was legally 

insufficient. (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach 

Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.) Woodward’s opposing declaration 

below, in a section captioned “My Understanding of the Contract” (emphasis added),

stated: “In every instance, I understood the essential terms to be the same: I was paying 

for goods and services to be delivered at an unspecified future date. I understood that I 

would, should I request it, be entitled to a return of my funds for (1) any services that I 

received for which I was dissatisfied and (2) any goods or services that I never received 

at all.” The declaration elaborated that Woodward derived this understanding from 

having read online in 2001 that the Church had articulated this policy position on refund

of contributions at the time it sought a tax exemption from the Internal Revenue Service.

However, Woodward did not show that the refund policy articulated by the 

Church in 2001 remained in effect during the years 2007 to 2010, at the time he made the 

subject payments. Nor did Woodward show that said policy, pertaining to refund of 

charitable contributions, was incorporated into an alleged contract between him and the 

Church. Woodward’s mere “understanding” that the Church would refund charitable 

contributions, without more, is insufficient to show a contractual right to a refund of his 

advance payments. 

Woodward’s failure to show an entitlement to a refund of his advance payments is 

also fatal to his other theories of recovery. The elements of conversion include the 

plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property at the time of the conversion 

(Plummer v. Day/Eisenberg, LLP (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38, 45); without a right to a 

refund of his advance payments, Woodward cannot show he was entitled to possession of 
17

said monies. Thus, Woodward did not establish his claim for conversion had possible 

merit. As for Woodward’s allegation that the Church defendants were indebted to him on 

an open book account, the term “ ‘book account’ means a detailed statement which 

constitutes the principal record of one or more transactions between a debtor and a 

creditor arising out of a contract . . . .” (1 Cal. Jur. 3d (2016) Accounts and Accounting 

§ 9.) Having failed to show the Church was contractually obligated to refund his advance 

payments, Woodward did not show the Church was indebted to him. Therefore, 

Woodward did not establish that his claim to recover an indebtedness on an open book 

account had the requisite minimal merit to withstand the Church’s special motion to 

strike. Finally, for the reasons already discussed, Woodward is incapable of prevailing 

on his claim for declaratory relief.

5. No merit to Woodward’s contention the trial court abused its discretion in 

denying reconsideration.

On October 8, 2014, the trial court signed and filed an order granting the Church’s 

special motion to strike and dismissing the complaint. On October 20, 2014, Woodward 

filed a motion for reconsideration, asserting new or different facts, circumstances or law. 

(§ 1008, subd. (a).) On January 7, 2015, the trial court denied the motion, stating “this is 

merely an effort to reargue the matter in light of an adverse ruling.”

On appeal, Woodward contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his 

motion for reconsideration. Woodward acknowledges that a party seeking 

reconsideration must provide not only new evidence or different facts, but also a 

satisfactory explanation for the failure to produce it at an earlier time. (Glade v. Glade

(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1441, 1457.) On appeal, Woodward explains he did not present 

his additional evidence earlier because he had only 13 days to oppose both the antiSLAPP motion and a motion by the Church defendants to compel arbitration.

Given the chronology of the proceedings, the trial court properly rejected 

Woodward’s explanation for not presenting his additional evidence earlier. On May 29, 

2014, the Church filed its special motion to strike the complaint, with a scheduled hearing 

date of June 24, 2014. Thirteen days later, on June 11, 2014, Woodward filed his 
18

opposition to the Church’s motion. However, the hearing on the motion subsequently 

was continued for 104 days, from June 24, 2014, to October 6, 2014. Thus, Woodward 

had ample time to refine his opposition papers and to proffer a supplemental opposition. 

In sum, Woodward’s explanation that he had a mere 13 days to respond to the special 

motion to strike is not supported by the record. Accordingly, in ruling on the motion for 

reconsideration, the trial court properly rejected Woodward’s assertion that he 

“exercise[d] reasonable diligence [in] obtaining this evidence.”

In sum, Woodward has not demonstrated that the trial court abused its discretion 

in denying reconsideration based on Woodward’s failure to present new or different facts 

or law. This obviates the need to address whether the trial court retained authority to 

grant reconsideration following the grant of the special motion to strike, or whether the 

order denying reconsideration is an appealable order.

6. No merit to Woodward’s contention he is entitled to attorney fees, costs and 

sanctions.

Woodward contends he is entitled to an award of attorney fees, costs and sanctions 

because section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1), requires the court to make an award if it finds 

that the movant’s special motion to strike is frivolous or solely intended to cause 

unnecessary delay.

Because we affirm the trial court’s grant of the Church’s special motion to strike, 

Woodward’s contention that he is the party entitled to attorney fees, costs and sanctions 

necessarily fails.

7. Woodward fails to show an abuse of discretion in the amount of attorney fees 

awarded to the Church defendants as the prevailing parties on the special motion to 

strike.

Finally, we address Woodward’s contention the trial court abused its discretion in 

awarding the Church $87,675 in attorney fees as well as $2,832.50 in costs, for a total 

award of $90,507.50.

Section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1) states in relevant part that “a prevailing 

defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover his or her attorney’s 
19

fees and costs.” Therefore, the Church defendants, as the prevailing parties on the special 

motion to strike, were entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs as a matter of right.

Accordingly, the sole remaining issue is whether the amount of the fee award was 

excessive.

a. Standard of appellate review.

The law in this area is well settled. “An order granting an award of attorney fees

is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citations.] In particular, ‘[w]ith respect to 

the amount of fees awarded, there is no question our review must be highly deferential to 

the views of the trial court.’ ([Citation]; see PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 

Cal.4th 1084, 1095 [recognizing trial court’s broad discretion in determining amount of 

reasonable attorney fees because experienced trial judge is in the best position to decide 

value of professional services rendered in court]; Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 

1122, 1132 [same].) ‘An appellate court will interfere with the trial court’s determination 

of the amount of reasonable attorney fees only where there has been a manifest abuse of 

discretion.’ [Citations.]” (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 

1309, 1319-1320.)

b. Trial court’s ruling.

In making the award of attorney fees, the trial court explained: “I think there was 

an enormous amount of work involved, first of all. There was from my standpoint just 

from reviewing the papers and a great deal more by those who prepared the papers. Mr. 

Woodward, himself, said he spent over a hundred hours just on his opposition. Frankly, 

none of that surprises me. [¶] But what I tried to do here is take into account all of the 

work that was done, the hourly rates and reach what I believe to be a fair and reasonable 

award for everything that I saw, which is not only based on what was presented to me 

here, but on my experience with comparable motions and fee applications by what I view 

to be comparable attorneys. I did put a great deal of thought into [this].”
20

c. Trial court acted within the bounds of its discretion in determining 

$87,675 was an appropriate and reasonable fee award.

The Church defendants requested lodestar attorney fees in the amount of 

$123,550, consisting of 116.4 hours at $750 per hour for Gary Soter ($87,300) and 72.9 

hours at $500 per hour for Kendrick Moxon ($36,450). The trial court awarded 70 

percent of the amount requested, ruling that $87,675 “is an appropriate and reasonable 

award.” At this juncture, the burden is on Woodward to demonstrate a manifest abuse of 

discretion. He has not met his burden.

With respect to the amount of time spent on the matter, the Church’s attorneys 

claimed a total of 189.3 hours in litigating the special motion to strike. As for 

Woodward, his declaration below stated “I spent over 100 hours preparing my opposition 

papers.” (Italics added.) Given the significant amount of time expended by Woodward 

in litigating the matter below, we cannot say the 189.3 hours incurred by the Church’s 

counsel were excessive.

As for the value of counsel’s services, it is settled that an experienced trial judge is 

in the best position to decide the value of professional services rendered in court. 

(Ketchum v. Moses, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) Therefore, Judge Johnson, who 

handled the special motion to strike and also ruled on the subsequent motion for attorney 

fees, was ideally situated to determine the value of the services rendered by the Church’s 

counsel. Assuming arguendo the trial court credited the Church’s counsel for the entire 

189.3 hours that were claimed, the adjusted fee award of $87,675 amounted to a rate of 

about $463 per hour. Given the showing made in counsel’s declarations (Attorney Soter 

was admitted to practice in California in 1975, served on the faculty of Southwestern 

University School of Law and has extensive experience in complex civil litigation; 

Attorney Moxon was admitted to practice in 1984, with a practice focused on 

Scientology-related legal issues), we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in 

compensating the Church’s counsel at that hourly rate.
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DISPOSITION

The October 8, 2014 order granting the Church’s special motion to strike, and the 

January 16, 2015 judgment awarding the Church $90,507.50 in attorney fees and costs, 

are affirmed. The Church shall recover its costs on appeal.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

LAVIN, J.

HOGUE, J.*

 

*

 Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to 

article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.