[Cite as State v. Starr, 2015-Ohio-3675.]

Court of Appeals of Ohio

EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT 

COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA 

JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION 

No. 102593

STATE OF OHIO

PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

vs. 

WILLIAM V. STARR III

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT 

JUDGMENT: 

AFFIRMED

Criminal Appeal from the 

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas 

Case No. CR-14-582895-A 

BEFORE: S. Gallagher, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and Blackmon, J. 

RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: September 10, 2015 
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT 

Britta M. Barthol 

P.O. Box 218 

Northfield, Ohio 44067 

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Timothy J. McGinty 

Cuyahoga County Prosecutor 

By: Frank Romeo Zeleznikar 

Assistant Prosecuting Attorney 

Justice Center - 9th Floor 

1200 Ontario Street 

Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.: 

{¶1} Appellant William V. Starr III appeals the judgment of the trial court that 

ordered him to pay restitution. For the reasons stated herein, we affirm. 

{¶2} After being charged under a multicount indictment for offenses of rape and 

kidnapping, appellant entered a plea of guilty to amended counts of gross sexual 

imposition and abduction, and the remaining counts were nolled. The offenses were 

merged as allied offenses, and the state elected to have appellant sentenced on the count 

of gross sexual imposition. The trial court imposed an 18-month prison sentence, with 

five years’ mandatory postrelease control. Appellant was determined to be indigent, and 

costs were waived. The court ordered appellant to pay restitution to the victim in the 

amount of $13,220.63. Appellant was found to be a Tier I sex offender. 

{¶3} At the sentencing hearing, the state indicated that the victim was seeking 

restitution in the amount of $13,220.63, which amount reflected “the hospital visit for the 

night of the incident, subsequent blood work that was done of the victim, as well as 

subsequent psychotherapy appointments that the victim attended from the date of the 

incident up until now.” The state indicated that the victim did not have insurance and 

that nothing was covered by insurance. Defense counsel was not provided with a copy of 

the invoices until the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel indicated that the court could 

proceed while he reviewed the documents. When the court inquired if defense counsel 

agreed with the amount of restitution, defense counsel stated “[i]t appears to add up to 
that.” When defense counsel mentioned that Medicaid may be subsidizing part of the 

amount, the state denied this. The court asked if the bills were all to be paid by the 

victim, and the state confirmed. Upon the state’s representations, defense counsel agreed 

the amount was accurate. 

{¶4} Appellant timely filed this appeal. He raises two assignments of error for 

our review. Under his first assignment of error, appellant claims “the trial court erred in 

ordering restitution in an amount not established to a reasonable degree of medical 

certainty.” 

{¶5} R.C. 2929.18(A)(1) authorizes a trial court to impose restitution as part of a 

sentence “in an amount based on the victim’s economic loss.” If the court imposes 

restitution, the court is required to determine the amount of restitution to be made by the 

offender as follows: 

If the court imposes restitution, the court may base the amount of restitution 

it orders on an amount recommended by the victim, the offender, a 

presentence investigation report, estimates or receipts indicating the cost of 

repairing or replacing property, and other information, provided that the 

amount the court orders as restitution shall not exceed the amount of the 

economic loss suffered by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the 

commission of the offense. If the court decides to impose restitution, the 

court shall hold a hearing on restitution if the offender, victim, or survivor 

disputes the amount. 

R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). 

{¶6} A trial court has discretion to order restitution, but the amount may not be 

greater than the amount of economic loss suffered as a direct and proximate result of the 

commission of the offense. State v. Lalain, 136 Ohio St.3d 248, 2013-Ohio-3093, 994 
N.E.2d 423, ¶ 3. Further, the amount of restitution ordered must be supported by 

competent, credible evidence from which the court can discern the amount of restitution 

to a reasonable degree of certainty. State v. Roberts, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 99755, 

2014-Ohio-115, ¶ 7-8. 

{¶7} The record in this case reflects that invoices were submitted to substantiate 

the medical expenses incurred by the victim as a direct and proximate result of the 

commission of the offense. Although defense counsel was not provided a copy of the 

invoices until the time of the hearing, he was able to review them and determine that the 

amount of restitution sought was accurate. The state represented that there was no 

insurance coverage. Because there was no dispute as to the amount of restitution, a 

hearing was not required. We find competent, credible evidence was submitted from 

which the trial court could have discerned the specific amount of restitution to a 

reasonable degree of certainty.1

 Accordingly, we overrule the first assignment of error. 

{¶8} Under his second assignment of error, appellant claims he was denied his 

right to effective assistance of counsel “when trial counsel failed to request a restitution 

hearing in accordance with R.C. 2929.18(A)(1). 

{¶9} In order to substantiate a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the 

appellant must show “(1) deficient performance by counsel, i.e., performance falling 

below an objective standard of reasonable representation, and (2) prejudice, i.e., a 

 1

 Although the appellant’s ability to pay restitution has not been raised, we note that the 

record reflects he was college educated and working as a mechanical engineer.
reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s result would have 

been different.” State v. Perez, 124 Ohio St.3d 122, 2009-Ohio-6179, 920 N.E.2d 104, ¶ 

200, citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-688, 694, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 

L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); State v. Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136, 538 N.E.2d 373 (1989), 

paragraphs two and three of the syllabus. The defendant has the burden of proving his 

counsel rendered ineffective assistance. Perez at ¶ 223. 

{¶10} As discussed above, the state established the amount of restitution by 

submitting invoices of the medical expenses incurred by the victim as a result of the 

offense. These invoices were reviewed by defense counsel, who found the amount 

appeared to be accurate. Further, the trial court heard from the state that the victim did 

not have insurance and the bills were not subsidized by Medicaid. There is simply no 

basis to conclude that defense counsel should have requested a hearing on restitution or 

that he could have presented evidence to dispute the restitution order. We are unable to 

find defense counsel’s conduct in failing to request a hearing on restitution fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness such that appellant was prejudiced. The second 

assignment of error is overruled. 

{¶11} Judgment affirmed. 

It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed. The court 

finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal. 

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common 

pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. The defendant’s conviction having 
been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case remanded to the trial court 

for execution of sentence. 

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of 

the Rules of Appellate Procedure. 

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE 

EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and 

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J., CONCUR