Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 1 of 8

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

David Wemhoff

South Bend, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Carl A. Greci

Faegre Baker Daniels LLP

Indianapolis, Indiana

Ryan G. Milligan

Faegre Baker Daniels LLP

Chicago, Illinois

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In re: Estate of Lester Frank 

Sumrall, Deceased

Lester L. Sumrall,

Appellant/Petitioner,

v.

Angela N. Grabowski,

Appellee/Counter-Petitioner.

May 21, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

71A05-1710-ES-2476

Appeal from the St. Joseph Probate

Court

The Honorable James N. Fox,

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

71J01-1704-ES-68

Bradford, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 2 of 8

Case Summary

[1] Lester Frank Sumrall (“the decedent”) died on April 28, 1996. On April 3, 

2017, one of the decedent’s grandsons, Appellant Lester L. Sumrall 

(“Appellant”), requested that the decedent’s estate be opened and administered. 

Appellee Angela N. Grabowski (“Appellee”), the decedent’s granddaughter, 

subsequently requested that the probate court deny Appellant’s request to open 

the decedent’s estate. Appellee argued that the decedent had been dead for over 

twenty years and that there were no estate assets to administer. The probate 

court conducted a hearing after which it granted judgment in favor of the 

Appellee. We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] The decedent “founded LeSEA (Lester Sumrall Evangelistic Association) [(“the 

ministry”)] in 1957: A ministry which has subsequently given birth to well over 

one hundred books and study guides, eleven television stations, a satellite 

ministry, three FM radio stations, five shortwave stations reaching over ninety 

percent of the world’s population, and a quarterly magazine.” See

https://lesea.com/about-us/legacy/ (last visited May 9, 2018). The ministry 

has continued to operate following decedent’s death. The decedent died on 

April 28, 1996. At the time of his death, the decedent had three sons: Frank L. 

Sumrall, Stephen P. Sumrall, and Peter A. Sumrall. He was preceded in death 

by his wife. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 3 of 8

[3] On April 3, 2017, Appellant filed “Petition for Probate and Issuance of Letters 

of Administration and for Supervised Administration” of the decedent’s estate. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 10. Appellant claimed to be “interested in the 

decedent’s estate by reason of being the Attorney-In-Fact for Frank Lester 

Sumrall, the eldest son and heir of the decedent.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 

10. In filing this petition, Appellant acknowledged that the time for filing the 

decedent’s will had passed and that the decedent’s estate should be 

administered as if the decedent died intestate. While the Appellant’s request 

did not detail any specific assets or items of personal property, it indicated “[t]o 

the best knowledge of the [Appellant], and after diligent inquiry by the 

[Appellant], the estate of the decedent is believed to be solvent, included in such 

assets is a possible cause of action against entity(ies) and person(s).” 

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 12.

[4] On April 21, 2017, Appellee filed a counter-petition in response to Appellant’s 

petition. Specifically, Appellee responded as follows:

[Appellee] is informed and so believes [d]ecedent’s estate to be 

insolvent in that there are neither assets nor liabilities to 

administer. Decedent died nearly twenty-two years ago on April 

28, 1996. [Appellee] knows of no assets that need [to be] 

administered, nor has any asset of the [d]ecedent been identified 

that needs [to be] administered. Further, [Appellee] knows of no 

cause of action concerning [d]ecedent or his estate that currently 

exists or that existed on [d]ecedent’s date of death, nor has any 

cause of action been identified that needs to be pursued. In any 

event, to the extent any causes of action existed, such causes 

would be barred by the statute of limitations, whether such cause 

exists against or on behalf of [d]ecedent’s estate.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 4 of 8

Appellant’s App. Vol. II, pp. 14–15. In reiterating that decedent “has no estate 

assets to administer[,]” Appellee indicated that she “believes [Appellant] filed 

his Petition solely to give him a platform to bring frivolous causes of action 

personal to him on behalf of [d]ecedent’s estate.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 

15. Five of the six “interested parties and heirs by representation” joined in 

Appellee’s counter-petition.1 Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 17.

[5] On July 13, 2017, the probate court conducted a hearing on the petition and 

counter-petition. During the hearing, Appellant questioned four witnesses and 

gave a lengthy narrative regarding assets that he claimed to have observed in 

either 1996 or 2005. Appellant also discussed (1) a tea set which had allegedly 

belonged to the decedent’s wife and, at some point, had been given to a family 

member as a wedding present; (2) certain copyright interests relating to the 

ministry; and (3) a number of paintings. Appellant, however, did not provide 

any evidence proving that either the copy right interests or the paintings were 

part of the decedent’s estate. At the close of Appellant’s presentation of 

evidence, Appellee’s counsel noted that Appellant did not specify any assets 

that he believed were still in the estate and “admitted that he had ... concerns 

about assets moving in 2005” but did nothing to address these alleged concerns 

until 2017. Tr. Vol. II, p. 82. Thus, Appellee’s counsel stated “I’d like to move, 

essentially, by analogy for a direct verdict.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 82.

 

1

 Appellant’s father, Frank Lester Sumrall, was the only heir not to join Appellee’s counter-petition.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 5 of 8

[6] Following lengthy argument by the parties, the probate court stated the 

following:

I see little choice ... but to, to grant the motion for judgment on 

the evidence, because I just don’t, I’m not hearing that there’s 

assets that clearly were [decedent’s] assets or liabilities that need 

to be paid, that haven’t been paid, or an asset, that was clearly his 

asset, that was to be distributed, in some manner distribute, that 

wasn’t distributed. And in fact, I think when you called your 

Father, you never established that ... there were things he 

believed should have been distributed, and that were his 

Father’s.... I don’t see any choice other than to issue a judgment 

on the evidence, because I just don’t think you presented 

evidence that clearly indicate[s] to me, that, [items of personal 

property] that not only were in the house, but that they were 

assets of, that should have been distributed in the Estate[.] 

Tr. Vol. II, pp. 91–92. The probate court also questioned “why nobody picked 

up the Estate and tried to move it forward, when somebody could have done 

[so] in the intervening time period.” Tr. Vol. II, p. 92. Consistent with its oral 

ruling, the probate court subsequently entered a written order granting 

judgment in favor of the Appellee. 

Discussion and Decision

[7] Appellant waited for more than twenty years following his grandfather’s death 

before requesting that an estate be opened and administered. Appellee 

counters, arguing that the probate court should deny Appellant’s request given 

his failure to make the request in a timely fashion. 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 6 of 8

[8] It is a fundamental rule of law that one who sleeps on his rights 

loses them. Laches addresses delay in the pursuit of a right when 

a party must assert that right in order to benefit from it. The 

doctrine of laches “bars a party’s rights when the party has 

unreasonably delayed their assertion so as to cause prejudice to 

the opposing party. In civil matters, the doctrine of laches 

consists of three elements: (1) inexcusable delay in asserting a 

right; (2) implied waiver from knowing acquiescence in existing 

conditions; and (3) circumstances resulting in prejudice to the 

adverse party. However, the mere passage of time is insufficient; 

the defendant must also show that the plaintiff’s delay was 

unreasonable and that the defendant was prejudiced as a result.

Hutchinson v. Spanierman, 190 F.3d 815, 822–23 (7th Cir. 1999) (interpreting 

Indiana law, internal citations and quotations omitted). “Prejudice may be 

created if a party, with knowledge of the relevant facts, permits the passing of 

time to work a change of circumstances by the other party.” Burns-Kish Funeral 

Homes, Inc. v. Kish Funeral Homes, LLC, 889 N.E.2d 15, 22 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[9] There is no doubt that Appellant delayed in requesting that the decedent’s 

estate be opened and administered. By Appellant’s own admission, he had 

knowledge of the decedent’s personal property at the time of the decedent’s 

death. Despite this knowledge, he waited more than twenty years before 

attempting to open and administer the decedent’s estate. Appellant provided 

no reasonable explanation that would excuse his failure to seek to have the 

decedent’s estate administered at some point during the twenty-plus years since 

the decedent’s death. Further, to the extent that Appellant attempts to explain 

his delay by asserting that he had recently come to believe that the decedent’s 

estate had not been distributed according to decedent’s wishes, the record 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 7 of 8

reveals that Appellant has failed to point to any specific items that he believes 

were distributed contrary to decedent’s wishes. 

[10] Appellant’s delay can also be interpreted as an implied waiver of any request for 

the establishment and administration of an estate. Appellant sat idly by and 

delayed in attempting to preserve any claimed interest that he or his father 

might have had in the property. This includes remaining silent after coming to 

believe that some of the decedent’s personal property was moved or distributed 

in 2005. His twelve years of silence after allegedly learning that some of the 

property at issue had been distributed suggests a knowing acquiesce—if not 

outright approval—of the distribution. 

[11] Furthermore, even if it were possible to reacquire the decedent’s alleged 

personal property, doing so would undoubtedly result in prejudice as it would 

create insurmountable evidentiary issues. In this vein, the Appellee argues the 

following: 

[A]ny estate proceeding would necessitate attempting to (a) 

establish what assets belonged to [the decedent], (b) reconstruct 

over twenty years’ worth of history regarding the possession and 

control of household items of personal property unaided by any 

public records, (c) locate and claw items back from heirs or 

distributes, such as the recipient of the ‘multi piece tea set,’ and 

(d) redistribute those purported assets. This exercise in futility is 

a waste of judicial and financial resources.

Appellee’s Br. p. 23. We agree. The Indiana Supreme Court has noted that 

“[s]uccessful invocation of the doctrine [of laches] in civil cases has included 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 71A05-1710-ES-2476 | May 21, 2018 Page 8 of 8

proof that available witnesses did not have a distinct recollection of the details 

of the case or that they had no access to records which would disclose the 

same.” In re Siegel, 708 N.E.2d 869, 871 (Ind. 1999) (citing French v. State, 547 

N.E.2d 1084, 1088 (Ind. 1989)). The evidentiary issues that would stem from 

attempting to establish ownership of personal property that has been distributed 

over the course of more than twenty years would undoubtedly result in 

prejudice to those adverse to the Appellant’s position as it is unlikely that there 

would be any records of distribution or that any witness would have a clear 

recollection of all of the details surrounding the distribution of the property. 

[12] The judgment of the probate court is affirmed.

Baker, J., and Kirsch, J., concur.