1 Cite as: 56 4 U
. S. ____ (2011) Per Curia m 

## SUPREME CO URT O FTHE UNI TED STATES UNITE D STATE S v. J UVENILE MALE ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED

STATE S COU R T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIR C UIT No. 09–9 40 Dec i ded Ju n e 27, 201 1 P ER C UR IAM . The Court of Appeals in this case held that the requir e ments of t h e Sex Off e nder Regi stration an d Notificati on Act (SORNA), 42 U. S. C. §16901 et seq ., violate the Ex Post Fa ct oClause of the Constitution, Art. I, §9, cl. 3, when applied to juveniles adju dicated as delin quent before SOR NA’ s enactment. We conclude that the Court of Ap

peals had no authority to ente r th at judgment because it had no live controversybefore it. I Respondent Juvenile Male was 13 years old when h e began sexually abusin g a 10-yea r -old boy on the Fort Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana. The ab use continued for approxi m ately two years, until respondent was 15 and his victim 12. In2005, res p ondent was charged inthe District of Montana withdelinquen c y under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U. S. C. §5031 et se q . Respondent pleaded “true” to charges tha t he knowingly engaged in sexual acts with a child under 12, which would have been a feder a l crime had respondent been an adult. See §§2241(c), 1153(a). The court sen

tenced respondent to two ye ars of juvenile detention , followed by juvenile supervision until his 21st birthda y. Respondent was to s p end the first six months of his post

confinemen t supervision in a prerelease c e nter. See United S t a t esv. Juven ile Male , 560 U. S. ___, __ _ (201 0) (per cu riam ) (slip op., a t1). In 2006, w h ile respon dent remained in juvenile deten

-2 UNITED STAT ES v. JUVENILE MALE Per Curia m tion, Congress enacted SORNA. 120 Stat. 5 90. Under SORNA, a sex offender must “register, and k eep the re

gistration current, in each jurisdiction” where the offen

der resides, is employed, or attends school. 42 U. S. C. §16913(a). This registration requirement extends to cer

tain juveniles adjudicated as delinquent for serious sex offenses. §16911(8). In addition, an interim rule issu ed by the Attorn ey General mandates that SOR NA’s require

ments appl y ret r oactiv e ly to se x offenders convicted before the statute’s enactment. 72 Fed. Reg. 8897 (2007) (codi

fied at 28 CFR pt. 72 (2 010)); see 4 2 U. S. C. §16913(d). 1 In July 2007, the Dis trict Court determined that re

spondent had failed to comply with the requirements of his prerele a se program. Th e court revo kedrespondent’s juvenile su pervision, imposed an additional 6-month term of detention , and ordered thatthe detention be followed by supervision until respondent’s 21st birthday. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op ., at 1–2). At the Go vernment’s urging, and over respondent’s objection, the court also imposeda “special conditio[n]” of supervision requiring respondent to register and k eep current as a sex offender. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Pet. for Cert. 9 (noting the Government’s argu ment in the District Court that respondent should be required to regi s ter under S O RNA “ ‘at least until’ ” his release from juve

nile supervision on h i s 21st birthday). On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, respondent challenged this “special conditio[n]” of su pervi s ion. He requested that the Court o f Appeals “r everse th[e] portion of his sentence

——————

1 On Dec e mber 29, 2010, th e Attor n eyGener a l fin a lized th e in ter i m r u le. See 75 Fed. Reg
. 818 49. In Reynoldsv. Unit ed States , No. 10– 6 5 4 9 , t h is Cou r tgra n t e d cert iora ri on the question whether sex offend

er s c o nv ic ted befor ethe enac tment of S O RNA hav es t andingto c h al

len g e th e v a lidityof th e Att o r n ey Gen e r a l ’ s in ter i m r u le. 562 U. S. __

_ (201 1); Pet. fo rCer t . in Reynolds , p. i
. Reynolds i s s l a t e dt ob eh e a r d next Term.3 Cite as: 56 4 U
. S. ____ (2011) Per Curia m requiring Sex Offender Regi stra tion and remand with instructions that the district court .
. . stri k[e] SexOf

fender Registration as a condit ion of juvenile supervision.” Opening Brief for Defendant-Appellant in N o . 07–3029 0 (CA9), p. 25. Then, in May 200 8, with his appeal still pending in the Ninth Circuit, res p ondent turned 21, and the juvenile-supervision order req u iring him to register as a sex offend er expired. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). Over a year after respondent’s 21st birthday, the Cou r t of Appeals handed down its decis i on. 581 F. 3d 977 (CA9 2009), amended, 590 F. 3d 924 (2010). No party ha d raised any issue of mootness inthe Ninth Circuit, and th e Court of Appeals did not address the issue sua sponte . The court ’ s opinion discussed only the meri ts and con cluded that applying SORNA to juvenile delinquents who committed their offens es “before SORNA’s passage vio

lates the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id. , at 9 27. On th at basis, the court vacate d the Di strict Court’s condition of supervision requiring sex-offe nder registration and report

ing. Id ., at 942. The United State s petitioned for a writ o f certiorari. While that petition was pending, this Court entered a per curiam opinion inthis case certifying a preliminary question of Montana law to the M o ntana Supreme Court. 560 U. S. ___ (2010). The opinionnoted that a “threshold issue of mo otness” might prevent us from re viewing the decision below on the merits. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 2)
. We explained that, be cause respondent is “n o longer . .
. subject” to the DistrictCou rt’s “s ex-offender-registration conditions,” respondent must “show that a de cision invali

dating” tho s e conditions “would be sufficiently likely t o redress ‘collateral consequences a d equate to meet Articl e III’s injury-in-fact requirement.’ ” Id. , at _
__ (slip op., at 2–3) (quoting Sp encerv. Ke m n a , 523 U. S. 1, 14 (1998 )). We noted that by the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, “respondent had beco me registered as a se x offender in4 UNITED STAT ES v. JUVENILE MALE Per Curia m Montana.” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quota

tion marks omitted). Thus, “[p] erhaps the most likely potential ‘collateral consequenc [e] ’that might be remedied by a judgm e nt in resp ondent’s favor is the requirement that respondent remain regist ered as a sex offender under Montana law.” Ibid
. In orderto ascerta in whethera decision invalidating the Distric tCourt ’ s registration conditions would enable resp ondent to remove his name from the M o ntana sex-offender registry, the Court certi

fied the following question to th e Montana Supreme Court: “Is respondent’s dut y to remain registered as a sex offender u n der Montana law contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal juvenile-su p ervision order that required him to regis

ter as a sex offender, or is the duty an independent requiremen tof Montana law that is unaffected by the validity or inval i dity of the federal juvenile

supervision conditions?” Id. , at ___ (sl i p o p ., at 3) (citations omitted). The Montana Suprem e Court has now respo n ded to our certified question. See United S t a t esv. Ju ven ile Male , ___ P. 3d ___, 2011 WL 2162807 (2011). Its answer is that respondent’s “state law duty to re main registered as a sex offender is not contingent upon the validity of the condi

tions of his federal supervision order, but is an independ

ent requirement of Montana law.” Id. , at ___, 2011 WL 2162807,*1. II It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case or controve rsy must re main “extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans for OfficialEnglishv. Arizona , 5 20 U. S. 43, 67 (1997) (internal quotation mark s omitted). “[T]hroughout the5 Cite as: 56 4 U
. S. ____ (2011) Per Curia m litigation,” the party s eeking relief “ ‘must have suffered, or be threatened with, an act ual injury tra ceable to the de

fendant an d likely to be redre ssed by a fa vorable judicial decision.’ ” Spen cer , supra , at 7 (quoting Lewisv. Con t i

nental Ban k Corp. , 494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990)). In criminal cases, this requiremen tmeans that a defen

dant wishing to conti nue his appeals after the expirati on of his sentence must suffer some “continuing injury” o r “collateral consequenc e” suffici ent to satisfy Article III. See Spence r , 523 U. S., at 7–8. When the def e ndant chal

lenges his underlying conviction , this Court’s cases have long presumed the existence of collateral consequenc es. Id. , at 8; s ee Sibronv. New York , 392 U. S. 40, 55–56 (1968). Bu t when a defendant ch allenges only an expi red sentence , no such presumption applies, a n d the defendant must bear the burden of identifying some on going “collat

eral consequenc[e]” that is “traceable” to the challenged portion of th e sentenc eand “lik e l y to be re dressed by a favorable judicial decisi on.” See Spencer , supra , at 7, 14. At the time of the Ninth Circuit ’s decision in this case, the Distric tCourt’s order of juvenile sup e rvision ha d expired, an d respondent was no l o nger subject to the sex

offender-registration conditions that he sou ght to chal

lenge on appeal. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). As a result, respondent’s challenge was moot befor ethe Ninth Circuit unl ess he could “show tha ta decision invalidating” the Distric tCourt’s or d e r wo uld likely redress some collat

eral consequence of the registrati on conditions. Id. , at ___ (slip op., at 2–3) (citing Spencer , su pra , at 14). As we noted in our prior opinion, one “potential collat

eral consequence that might be remedied” by an order invalidating the regis tration con d itions “is the require

ment that respondent remain registered” under Montana law. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotati on marks and brackets omitted). But as the Montana Su

preme Court has now clarified, respondent’s “state law6 UNITED STAT ES v. JUVENILE MALE Per Curia m duty to re main regist ered as a s e x offender is not cont in

gent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order,” 201 1 WL 2162807, *1, and continues to apply rega rdless of th e outcome in this case. True, a favorable decision in this case might serve as a useful precedent for respondent in a hypothetical lawsuit chal

lenging Montana’s registration requirementon ex post facto groun d s. Butt h is possible, indirect benefit in a future laws uit cannot save thiscase from mootness. See Camre t a v. Gr een e , 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 16); Commodity Futures Tradin g Comm’nv. Board of Trad e of Chicago , 701 F. 2d 653, 656 (CA7 1989) (Posner, J.) (“[O]ne can never be certain that findings made ina decision concluding one lawsuitwill nots o me day .
. . control the outcome of another suit. But if that wer e enough to avoid mootness, no casewould ever be moot”). Respondent also argues that this case “cannot be con

sidered moot in any practical sen s e” because, under cu r rent law, respondent may have “an indepen d ent duty to register as a sex offen d er” under SORNA its e lf. Brief in Opposition 6. 2But the duty to register under SORNA i s not a consequence—collateral or otherwise—of the District Court’s spe c ial conditions of supervision. The statutory duty to register is, as respon dent notes, an obligation that exists “independent” of those conditions. That continuing obligation might provide grounds for a pre-enforceme nt challenge to SORNA’s registrati on requirements. It does not, however, render the cu rrentcontrovers y regardin g the validity of responde nt’s sentence any less moot. Respondent further argues that this case falls within

——————

2 See 42 U. S. C
. §169 11(8) (S ORNA ap p licab le if the juvenile was “1 4 years of age or older at the time of the off e nse and the offense adjudi

c a ted was c o mpar able to or mor esev e r eth anag gr av ated sex u al ab u s e (as desc r ibed i nsec t ion2241 of title 18)”); 72 Fed. Reg
. 8 897 (c odified a t 28 CFR pt. 7 2 ) (SOR NA’ s r e qu ir emen ts ex tend to sexoffender s c o n victed before the statute’s enactment).7 Cite as: 56 4 U
. S. ____ (2011) Per Curia m the established exception to mo otness for disp utes that are “ ‘ca p able of repetition, yet evadi n g review.’ ” Id. , at 8 (quoting Weinsteinv. Bradford , 423 U. S. 147, 148–14 9 (1975) (percuriam)). This exception, however, applies only where “(1) the challenged ac tion [is] in its duration too short to be fully litigated priorto cessation or expira

tion, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the same complaining party [will] be subject to the same action again.” Spence r , supra , at 17 (intern a l quotation marks omitted). At the very least, respondent cannot satisfy the second of these requirements. He has no w turned 21, and he will never again be subjec t to an orde r imposing special conditions of juvenile supervision. See, e.g. , DeFunisv. Od ega a rd , 416 U. S. 312 (1974) (per cu

riam)
. The capable-o f-repetition exception to mootnes s thus does not apply, and the Ninth Circuit lacked the authority under Article III todecide this case on th e merits. The petition for a wr it of certio r ari andre spondent’s motion to proceed in forma pau perisare granted. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case is remanded with instr u ctions to dismiss the appeal. It is so orde red. J USTICE G INSBU R G , J USTICE B REYER , an d J U S TI CE S OTOMAYO Rwould remand the case to the Ninth Circ uit for that co urt’s consideration of mootness in the first instance. J USTICE K AGANtook no part i nthe cons ideration or decision of th is case.