UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 16-4264

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

ALVIN GLASGOW, a/k/a Buju,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of Virginia, at Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, District Judge. 

(1:15-cr-00222-LO-1)

Submitted: December 30, 2016 Decided: January 11, 2017

Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and AGEE, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Alvin Glasgow, Appellant Pro Se. Rebeca Hidalgo Bellows, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Alvin Glasgow appeals his convictions for conspiracy to 

distribute controlled substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 

(2012) (Count 1); three counts of distribution of controlled 

substances, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012) (Counts 2, 3, 

and 4); five counts of possession of firearms in furtherance of 

drug trafficking crimes, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2012) 

(Counts 5, 8, 9, 10, and 14); and possession of a firearm with an 

obliterated serial number, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(k) 

(2012) (Count 25). He contends that (1) he was entrapped; (2) the 

Government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by 

withholding information that one of his coconspirators, Elijah 

Jamal Mayson, was actually an informant; (3) the Government 

committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to inform the jury 

that Mayson was an informant; (4) the indictment was defective 

because it failed to allege that Mayson was an informant; (5) the 

district court improperly directed a verdict against Glasgow 

through an improper jury instruction; and (6) his counsel provided

ineffective assistance. We affirm.

We review de novo the sufficiency of the evidence supporting 

a conviction. United States v. Barefoot, 754 F.3d 226, 233 (4th 

Cir. 2014). We will uphold a conviction if, viewing the evidence 

in the light most favorable to the Government, “any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime 
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charged beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (internal quotation marks 

omitted).

“Entrapment is an affirmative defense consisting of two 

related elements: government inducement of the crime, and a lack 

of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the 

criminal conduct.” United States v. McLaurin, 764 F.3d 372, 379 

(4th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted), cert. denied,

135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015), and sub nom. Lowery v. United States, 135 

S. Ct. 1843 (2015). The defendant bears the “initial burden of 

presenting evidence that the government induced him to commit the 

crime.” United States v. Jones, 976 F.2d 176, 179 (4th Cir. 1992). 

Once the defendant has done so, the burden shifts to the government 

to establish the defendant’s predisposition beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Id. Thus, even if the government did induce a defendant 

to commit a crime, the defense of entrapment fails if the 

government can prove predisposition. United States v. 

Squillacote, 221 F.3d 542, 569 (4th Cir. 2000).

Glasgow contends that he was entrapped as a matter of law. 

In particular, he argues that Mayson was actually a government 

informant, and thus, the Government was required to prove Glasgow’s 

predisposition based on events occurring before Glasgow met with 

Mayson. However, our review of the record convinces us that there 

is simply no evidence that Mayson was an informant. Consequently, 

it was not improper for the district court to point to the 
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undercover law enforcement agent’s meeting with Mayson and Glasgow 

on October 20, 2010, in ruling that Glasgow was not induced by the 

Government, and that Glasgow was predisposed to commit the charged 

offenses. During that meeting, Glasgow provided Ecstasy pills to 

the undercover agent and proposed importing cocaine from Guyana. 

In numerous other meetings, Glasgow continued to deal contraband 

and discuss his plan to import cocaine from Guyana. The undercover 

agent testified that he discussed his willingness to accept cash 

numerous times with Glasgow. However, Glasgow continued to offer 

drugs or firearms in exchange. This evidence shows both that 

Glasgow was not induced and that he was predisposed.

Therefore, in light of the record, we conclude a reasonable 

juror could find that Mayson was not an informant, see Barefoot, 

754 F.3d at 233, and Glasgow was not entrapped as a matter of law, 

see McLaurin, 764 F.3d at 379.

Next, we review for plain error a Brady claim not raised in 

the district court. United States v. Catone, 769 F.3d 866, 871 

(4th Cir. 2014). Glasgow contends that the Government violated 

Brady by withholding information that Mayson was an informant. 

However, there is no support for the assertion that Mayson was an 

informant, and thus, there was no Brady violation.

We review for plain error a claim of prosecutorial misconduct 

not raised in the district court. United States v. Alerre, 430 

F.3d 681, 689 (4th Cir. 2005). Glasgow argues that the Government 
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committed prosecutorial misconduct by failing to correct Mayson’s 

statement before the jury that his only agreement with the 

Government was his plea agreement, which Glasgow contends is false 

because Mayson had another agreement with the Government by acting 

as an informant. As explained above, the record does not support 

the claim that Mayson was an informant, and thus, the Government 

did not commit prosecutorial misconduct.

We review for plain error a claim of a fatally defective 

indictment not raised in the district court. United States v. 

Rendelman, 641 F.3d 36, 43 (4th Cir. 2011). Glasgow contends that 

the indictment is defective because it failed to allege that Mayson 

was an informant. Again, because the record does not show that

Mayson was an informant, the indictment is not defective.

We review challenges to jury instructions for an abuse of 

discretion, “bearing in mind that a trial court has broad 

discretion in framing its instructions to a jury.” Gentry v. E.

W. Partners Club Mgmt. Co., 816 F.3d 228, 233 (4th Cir. 2016) 

(internal quotation marks omitted). We review de novo a claim 

that the jury instructions incorrectly stated the law. Id.

Glasgow contends that the district court directed a verdict 

against him by giving an improper definition of “solicitation” for 

purposes of his entrapment defense. The portion of the jury 

instruction to which Glasgow points reads, “Solicitation by itself 

is not the kind of conduct that would persuade an otherwise 
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innocent person to commit a crime.” This sentence was taken from 

United States v. Sligh, 142 F.3d 761, 763 (4th Cir. 1998), which 

remains controlling authority in this Circuit. Thus, Glasgow’s 

claim fails.

Finally, a prisoner “may raise a claim of ineffective 

assistance of counsel in the first instance on direct appeal if 

and only if it conclusively appears from the record that counsel 

did not provide effective assistance.” United States v. Galloway, 

749 F.3d 238, 241 (4th Cir. 2014) (alteration and ellipsis 

omitted). Absent such a showing, ineffective assistance claims 

should be raised in a motion brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 

(2012), in order to permit sufficient development of the record. 

United States v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 216 n.1 (4th Cir. 2010). 

Because the record here does not conclusively establish the alleged 

grounds for Glasgow’s claim, Glasgow does not meet this demanding 

standard. This claim should be raised, if at all, in a § 2255 

motion.

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court. 

Glasgow’s motions for summary reversal, to expedite decision, and 

for judicial notice of adjudicative facts are denied. We dispense 

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are 

adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED