UNITED STATES COU RT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

FRANK R. MONTERO, Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 18-5011 D.C. No. 4:17-CV -00622-TCK-JFJ (N.D. Okla.) v.

TULSA AIRPORT IMPROVEMENTS TRUST, Defendant - Appellee.

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before MATHESON , McKAY , and BACHARACH , Circuit Judges.

In this case, a pro se plaintiff sued in state court and then p urported to transfer or remove the case to federal court. The federal di strict court dismissed the action based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Though this doctrine doesn’t apply, a plaintiff can’t transfer or remove a case to federal

* Oral argument would not materi ally help us to decide this app eal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). We have thus decided the appeal based on the briefs and record on appeal. This order and judgme nt does not constitut e binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and colla teral estoppel. But the order and judgment may be cited for its persuasive valu e if otherwise appropriate. Fed. R. A pp. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32 .1(A). FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### May 20, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker Clerk of Court2 court after suing in state court. We thus vacate the dismissal and remand with directions to remand the cas e to state district court.
1. Background Mr. Frank Montero sued the Tulsa Airport Improvements Trust in Oklahoma state district court. T he state district court entered judgment for the Trust and aw arded attorney’s fees to the Trust. Mr. Montero then unsuccessfully moved for post-judg ment relief and appealed to t he Oklahoma Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending in th e Oklahoma Supreme Court, Mr. Montero began this action in federal district court by moving t o transfer venue. In the moti on, Mr. Montero

 referred to the state case and

 purported to either tr ansfer the state case to federal district court (under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)) or rem ove the state case to federal district court ( under 28 U.S. C. § 1441). The federal district court dismissed the action sua sponte under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which would preclude subject-matter jurisdiction. 1 The plaintiff appeals the dismissal. 2

1 The Trust also moved to strik e Mr. Montero’s filings and to d ismiss the case for lack of su bject-matter jurisdic tion. The district court did not rule on these motions.

2 Mr. Montero also filed a motio n to alter the dismissal. The d istrict court denied this motion, but Mr. Montero did not file a notice of appeal with respect to that ruling.3 2. The District Court’s Reliance on the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine We engage in review d e novo of the dismissa l for lack of subje ctmatter jurisdiction. Chapman v. Oklahoma , 472 F.3d 747, 749 (10th Cir. 2006). Exercising de novo review, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the action under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. “[F]ederal jurisdiction is no t barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine if suit ‘was filed before the end of the state courts’ appeal process.’” Id. (quoting Guttman v. Khalsa , 446 F.3d 1027, 1029 (10th Cir . 2006)). Mr. Mon tero brought this suit before the state-cou rt appeal was decided, so the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply.
3. Invalidity of Mr. Monter o’s Transfer or Removal But we conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction be cause a plaintiff cannot

 transfer a case from state court to federal district court unde r 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) or

 remove a case from state court to federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. 3

3 Mr. Montero argues that the de fendant was late in moving to d ismiss. A motion to dismiss (or remand) f or lack of subject-matter juri sdiction can be made at any time. See Kontrick v. Ryan , 540 U.S. 443, 455 (2004) (“A litigant generally may r aise a court’s lack of subject-matter j urisdiction at any time in the same civil action , even initially at the highes t appellate instance.”); Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht , 524 U.S. 381 , 392 (1998) (noting that a motion to remand for lack of subject-matter juri sdiction may be made “at any time”). But even if the Trust had been late in raising the issue, we would need to decide sua sponte whether jurisdiction existed in4 Section 1404(a) authorizes a fed eral district court to transfe r a case on its docket to another federa l district court; this section d oes not allow a state court to transfer a case to federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a); see also Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country Chrysler, Inc. , 928 F.2d 1509, 1515 (10th Cir. 1991) (“Congress enac ted 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) in 1948 ‘as a federal housekeeping measure, all owing easy change of venue wit hin a unified federal sy stem.’” (quoting Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno , 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981))). Section 1441 does permit removal of a case from state court to federal court. But a plaintiff li ke Mr. Montero cannot remove t he case. See Hamilton v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co. , 5 F.3d 642, 643 ( 2d Cir. 1993) (per curiam) (“No section [ of the U.S. Code] prov ides for removal by a plaintiff.”); see also 14C Charles Alan Wright, et al. , Federal Practice and
Procedure § 3730, at 607 (2018) (stating t hat “plaintiffs cannot remove” cases to federal court).
* * *

district court. Cellport Sys., Inc. v. Pe iker Acustic GMBH & Co. KG , 762 F.3d 1016, 1029 (1 0th Cir. 2014).5 Mr. Montero could not transfer o r remove his case from state co urt to federal court, so the federal court never obtained jurisdiction

. 4 The case should thus retu rn to state court. So we vacate the dismissal a nd remand with directions for the federal d istrict court to remand to the state district

court. Entered for the Court

Robert E. Bacharach Circuit Judge

4 After Mr. Montero purported to transfer or remove the suit, h e filed a federal petition that in cluded federal claim s. But Mr. Montero’ s right to transfer or remove the case is determined at the time of the pu rported transfer or removal. See Pullman Co. v. Jenkins , 305 U.S. 534, 537 (1939) (noting that the “right to remov e” is “to be determined accordi ng to the plaintiffs’ pleading at the time of the petition for removal”); Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 929 F.2d 1484, 1488 (10t h Cir. 1991) (“[T]he propriety of removal is judged on the complaint as it stands at the time of the removal.”). Accordingly, we do not address th e issues that Mr. Montero raises in his fe deral petition.