Affirmed and Memorandum Opinion filed August 1, 2017.

In The 

Fourteenth Court of Appeals 

NO. 14-16-00217-CR

CECIL MAX-GEORGE, Appellant 

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee 

On Appeal from the 185th District Court 

Harris County, Texas 

Trial Court Cause No. 1475788 

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N 

Appellant Cecil Max-George appeals from a conviction for assault of a public 

servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.01 (West 2011). Appellant raises two issues 

on appeal. In his first issue, appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion 

when it denied his request to represent himself. We overrule this issue because the 

record supports the trial court’s finding that appellant could not represent himself 

without being intentionally disruptive to the court proceedings. 
2

Appellant argues in his second issue that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it removed him from the courtroom during much of his trial, thereby violating 

his constitutional and statutory rights to be present during his trial. We overrule this 

issue because the trial court removed appellant from the courtroom only after he 

failed to heed her warning that he would be removed if his disruptive behavior 

continued, and he was allowed to return once he indicated he was prepared to 

proceed without further disruptions. We therefore affirm the trial court’s judgment. 

BACKGROUND1

 Appellant was driving Russell Jones, a co-worker, away from a job site in 

appellant’s pick-up truck when the automated license plate reader on Houston Police 

Officer Chase Myrick’s patrol car indicated there were warrants connected to the 

pick-up’s license plate. Officer Myrick pulled appellant over. Officer Myrick and 

his partner that day, Officer Daniel Duval, approached the pick-up. As Officer 

Myrick approached the driver’s side door, appellant started swearing and demanding 

to know why he had been pulled over. Officer Myrick asked appellant to calm down, 

but appellant continued to curse and scream at him. Despite the screaming and 

cursing, Myrick was able to verify that appellant was the person named in the 

warrants. After appellant refused to get out of the pick-up when asked to do so, the 

officers returned to their patrol vehicle and called for back-up.

 Three police officers responded to Officer Myrick’s request. One, Officer 

Luke Matthews, then approached appellant again. Despite Matthews’s request that 

everyone remain calm, appellant continued screaming and cursing. At this point, 

Jones asked if he could get out of the pick-up and the police allowed him to do so. 

 

1 Because appellant has not challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his 

conviction, we provide only those facts necessary to address and resolve appellant’s issues on 

appeal.
3

Officer Matthews then opened the driver’s door and attempted to place handcuffs on 

appellant. Appellant knocked Matthews’s hand away and then grabbed Matthews 

by the vest. A struggle ensued as the officers removed appellant from the pick-up, 

put him on the ground, and handcuffed him. During that struggle, two of the officers 

were injured. 

 Appellant was charged with assault of a public servant. The trial court 

appointed defense counsel for appellant and his case was eventually called to trial. 

On the morning trial was scheduled to begin, appellant informed the trial court that 

he wished to waive his right to counsel and represent himself. The trial court held a 

Faretta2

 hearing to determine whether appellant was able to represent himself. 

From the start of the Faretta hearing, appellant disrupted the proceeding by 

continually interrupting the judge. Appellant continued to be disruptive despite the 

judge’s repeated warnings to stop interrupting and to listen to what she was trying 

to say. When appellant did not correct his behavior, the trial judge indicated on the 

record that this was not the first time appellant had been disruptive in court. The 

trial judge noted that appellant had been calling his defense attorney names and, 

during a previous court setting, had become so unruly that it became necessary for 

the judge to have him removed from the courtroom “because you cussed out your 

lawyer in open court.” The judge stated that she had previously warned appellant 

off the record that he would be held in contempt of court if he continued to be 

disruptive, and she warned him again on the record. During the Faretta hearing, 

appellant used inappropriate language, argued with the trial judge regarding his past 

behavior, and claimed that he had been treated unfairly when representing himself

in a previous criminal matter.

 

2 Faretta v. Cal., 422 U.S. 806, 807 (1975).
4

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge expressed her belief, based on 

her past experience with appellant as well as his behavior during the Faretta hearing, 

that he would continue to be disruptive during trial. As a result, the judge found that 

appellant could not represent himself without disrupting the orderly trial of the case. 

Appellant continued to argue with the court’s ruling even after the judge announced 

that her decision was final. Among other things, appellant: claimed the trial judge 

had not allowed him to speak; claimed he was unaware he was going to trial that 

day, although his counsel represented to the trial court that he had explained this to 

appellant; continuously disputed everything the trial judge and his defense counsel 

said; and repeatedly asked that everything be put “on the record” despite having been

informed that the court reporter was present and recording the proceedings. The trial 

judge concluded the hearing and told appellant that there was an “issue with your 

willingness to either listen or understand and that’s also a concern for me in your 

representing yourself.” At that point, the court recessed until after lunch, when voir 

dire was to begin.

After the lunch recess, while the prospective jury panel was entering the 

courtroom, appellant caused a disturbance, demanding once again to represent 

himself and claiming that defense counsel was threatening him. The trial judge

called appellant to the bench, where she stated that “the bailiff was bringing the jury 

into the courtroom and [appellant] continued to disrupt the Court, continued to speak 

in a loud voice in front of the jury.” The judge once again warned appellant that she

would hold him in contempt if he continued to disrupt the proceedings. The trial 

judge also warned appellant that if he continued to be disruptive, she would have to 

put him in a holdover cell and make arrangements for him to listen to his trial from 

there. While still at the bench, appellant again asserted his right to represent himself 

and said that his attorney was threatening him. The judge responded that she saw 
5

what had happened and defense counsel did not threaten appellant. While at the 

bench, appellant repeatedly interrupted the judge and, as the judge put it,

“continue[d] to antagonize this situation.” Appellant continued to argue that he 

wanted to represent himself. He also told the trial judge several times that if allowed 

to represent himself, he was not ready to proceed to trial. The trial judge again told 

appellant that, based on his behavior and everything she had heard, she would not 

let him represent himself. Voir dire began, and despite numerous disruptions by 

appellant, a jury was selected.

The next day, appellant was arraigned and the State made its opening 

statement. Defense counsel then announced that he would reserve his right to make 

an opening statement. At that point, appellant interrupted the proceedings by again 

demanding to represent himself and stating that he wanted to make an opening 

statement. Appellant refused to sit down when the trial judge asked him repeatedly 

to do so, and he stated that “the jury needs to hear exactly what’s going on here.” At 

that point, the judge had the jury removed from the courtroom and spoke directly 

with appellant. As before, appellant continued to interrupt the judge. Appellant then 

said that if his actions were considered an outburst, “then please hold me in contempt 

of Court.” Instead, the trial judge ordered the bailiff to remove appellant from the

courtroom. The judge asked defense counsel to speak to appellant and let him know 

that “I’m happy to have him come back in the courtroom but I can’t do it if we are 

going to continue this behavior.” 

After a short recess, appellant was brought back into the courtroom to speak 

to the judge one more time about his behavior. The judge attempted to get a 

commitment from appellant that he would follow the rules and make no further 

outbursts in court. Appellant refused to make this commitment. He then proceeded 

to argue with the trial judge. Finally, the trial judge ruled that given appellant’s 
6

repeated outbursts in front of the jury, in addition to his yelling at the bailiffs and 

refusing to follow their orders, appellant had “disrupted the orderly proceeding of 

this trial and he will remain in the holdover.” Arrangements were made so that 

appellant could hear the trial proceedings. The trial judge also informed appellant’s

defense counsel that he would have time to confer with appellant before crossexamination of the witnesses. The judge expressed regret that she had to remove

appellant from the courtroom and let defense counsel know that “if at some point 

your client agrees that he can follow the rules of the courtroom, I am happy to let 

him back in. I would love for him to come back.”

After the State’s first witness testified on direct, the court took a brief recess 

so defense counsel could confer with appellant. The trial judge also asked counsel 

to “[p]lease let us know if [appellant’s] stance has changed in regard to joining us in 

the trial so we can make that happen, okay?” Appellant remained outside the 

courtroom until it was his turn to testify. After appellant’s testimony, defense 

counsel asked the court to allow appellant to remain in the courtroom for the 

remainder of the trial because appellant had told him “that he feels that he can control 

himself and that he will not subject the Court, the jury, or anyone else to any further 

outbursts. . . .” The trial judge then allowed appellant to return, explaining:

I told you numerous times yesterday, because I asked whether or not he 

was prepared to follow the courtroom rules and that he could come back 

at any time. I know yesterday that you continually told me you had 

concerns about that. So, as long as that happens.

Appellant remained in the courtroom for the remainder of his trial. Appellant 

made it through closing arguments in the guilt/innocence phase of his trial without 

interruption, but he did interrupt a witness testifying during the punishment stage of 

trial, causing the trial court to reprimand him. The jury found appellant guilty and 

sentenced him to serve fifteen years in prison. This appeal followed.
7

ANALYSIS

I. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied appellant’s 

request for self-representation.

 Appellant argues in his first issue that the trial court abused its discretion when 

it denied his request for self-representation. The Sixth Amendment right of an 

accused in a criminal proceeding to effective assistance of counsel extends to the 

States through the Fourteenth Amendment. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 

342–44 (1963); see U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV. The Supreme Court has also 

found in the Sixth Amendment an independent constitutional right of an accused to 

conduct his own defense. Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819–20. The Court held that it is for 

the accused personally to decide whether assistance of counsel in his particular case 

is to his advantage, and his choice must be honored out of respect for the individual 

even if that choice ultimately may be to his own detriment. Id. at 834. To be 

constitutionally effective, the waiver of counsel must be made (1) competently, (2) 

knowingly and intelligently, and (3) voluntarily. Fletcher v. State, 474 S.W.3d 389, 

395 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

Although courts must respect a competent defendant’s knowing and voluntary 

choice to represent himself, the defendant, in the exercise of the right of selfrepresentation, must respect the “dignity of the courtroom.” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 

834 n. 46. The State’s “‘interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial 

at times outweighs the defendant’s interest in acting as his own lawyer.’” Lewis v. 

State, No. 14-14-00779-CR, 2016 WL 93760, *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

Jan. 7, 2016, pet. ref’d) (quoting Martinez v. Court of Appeals of Cal., Fourth 

Appellate Dist., 528 U.S. 152, 162 (2000)). Therefore, trial courts have discretion 

to deny a request for self-representation by a defendant who intentionally engages 

in serious obstructionist behavior or abuses the dignity of the courtroom. Id. 
8

Because a decision to deny a request for self-representation based on a defendant’s 

deliberately obstructionist behavior turns on an evaluation of credibility and 

demeanor, we afford almost total deference to that decision. Id. 

The trial court found that appellant could not represent himself without 

disrupting the trial and denied his request for self-representation as a result. We 

view the evidence in the light most favorable to this ruling and, in the absence of 

explicit findings, we will imply findings of fact necessary to support the ruling if 

they are supported by the record. Chadwick v. State, 309 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. 

Crim. App. 2010). 

The record, summarized above, contains repeated instances of appellant’s 

disruptive and obstructionist behavior. It also includes numerous representations by 

appellant to the trial court that, if he was allowed to represent himself, he would not 

be ready to start trial that day. We conclude the record supports an implied finding 

by the trial court that appellant’s behavior was a deliberate and intentional effort at 

disrupting and obstructing the trial process and not regular delays normally 

encountered when a defendant chooses to represent himself. See id. at 563; Lewis, 

2016 WL 93760, at *4–6. We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it denied appellant’s request for self-representation. We overrule 

appellant’s first issue. 

II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it removed appellant 

from the courtroom for a portion of his trial.

In his second issue, appellant asserts that the trial court abused its discretion 

when it had him removed from the courtroom for a significant portion of his trial. 

According to appellant, this action by the trial court violated his right to be present 

during trial under the United States and Texas Constitutions as well as his statutory 

right to be present during trial under article 33.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal 
9

Procedure.3 

A criminal defendant may lose his right to be present during trial if, after being 

warned by the trial judge that he will be removed if he continues his disruptive 

behavior, he continues to conduct himself “in a manner so disorderly, disruptive, and 

disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the 

courtroom.” Kessel v. State, 161 S.W.3d 40, 45 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2004, pet. ref’d) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970)). Trial judges 

have discretion to address stubbornly disruptive defendants, and that discretion

includes removal from the courtroom when the defendant’s behavior is of “an 

extreme and aggravated nature.” Id. (quoting Allen, 397 U.S. at 346). We review a 

trial court’s decision to remove a defendant from the courtroom for an abuse of 

discretion. Id. at 44. 

Appellant, despite repeated disruptions, was present during the entire Faretta

hearing as well as the complete voir dire. The trial court warned appellant during 

this first day of his trial that if he continued to disrupt the trial proceedings, he would 

be removed from the courtroom and listen to the trial in a holdover cell. 

Appellant was also present for his arraignment and the State’s opening 

statement when his trial resumed the next day. Appellant once again interrupted the 

proceedings when his attorney deferred making an opening statement. When 

appellant refused to listen to the trial court’s orders to sit down, the trial court had 

the jury removed from the courtroom. Appellant continued to argue with the trial 

 

3

 Because appellant has not provided any explanation or authority for construing the Texas 

Constitution or the Code of Criminal Procedure as conferring greater protection in this area of the 

law than the United States Constitution, we do not separately address his state constitutional and 

statutory arguments. Vasquez v. State, 324 S.W.3d 912, 918 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 

2010, pet. ref’d).
10

judge after the jury left the courtroom. Appellant kept insisting that he was asserting 

his right to self-representation. At that point, the trial judge ordered appellant 

removed from the courtroom. The judge allowed appellant’s defense counsel to talk 

to appellant about what he needed to do to return to the courtroom. 

Appellant was brought back into the courtroom after a recess. With the jury 

still absent, the trial court warned appellant: 

All right Mr. Max-George. Yesterday we discussed the fact that if you 

were going to make outbursts in the courtroom, the Court would not be 

able to allow you to stay in the courtroom, as much as I want you to be 

here for your trial. It’s not helping you and you can’t help your lawyer 

if you’re standing up yelling and not responding to the Court. So, it’s 

really up to you, sir, as to whether you think that you can maintain 

control and go forward without making any outbursts. It’s a very 

simple yes-or-no question. Can you stay in the courtroom and follow 

the rules that all of the other participants are required to follow? 

Rather than answer the judge’s question, appellant continued to argue. The judge 

then ordered appellant removed to a holding cell where he would be able to listen to 

his trial. The judge informed appellant’s attorney that he would be allowed to speak 

with appellant regarding cross-examination and other trial matters. The judge also 

informed appellant’s attorney that appellant would be allowed back into the 

courtroom when he agreed that he could follow the rules. 

 Faced with appellant’s continued disruptions of the trial proceedings after 

having been warned they would result in his removal from the courtroom, as well as 

appellant’s refusal to answer whether he would stop his misconduct, we conclude 

that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered appellant removed 

from the courtroom. See Allen, 397 U.S. at 346 (finding nothing unconstitutional 

about removing defendant from courtroom after “he was repeatedly warned by the 

trial judge that he would be removed from the courtroom if he persisted in his unruly 
11

conduct”); George v. State, 446 S.W.3d 490, 502 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

2014, pet. ref’d) (concluding trial court did not violate defendant’s constitutional and 

statutory rights to be present for trial when, after repeated warnings, it had defendant 

removed from courtroom for disruptive behavior); Ramirez v. State, 76 S.W.3d 121, 

130 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref’d ) (“As the trial court lacked 

reason to believe appellant’s misbehavior would cease, appellant’s expulsion was 

not constitutionally improper.”). We overrule appellant’s second issue. 

CONCLUSION

Having overruled both of appellant’s issues on appeal, we affirm the trial 

court’s judgment.

 

 /s/ J. Brett Busby

 Justice 

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Busby, and Wise. 

Do Not Publish — TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).