J-S31034-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

EDWARD LOVE 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 556 EDA 2021

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 15, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004334-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED OCTOBER 4, 2022

Appellant Edward Love appeals from the Judgment of Sentence entered 

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on May 15, 2019,1

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 The trial court docket reveals that on May 20, 2019, a counseled “Motion For

Reconsideration Of Sentence” was filed on Appellant’s behalf. On May 24, 

2019, Appellant’s new counsel filed a “Motion To Withdraw Plea Of Guilty.” On 

August 14, 2019, an “Order Denying Motion To Withdraw Guilty Plea” was 

filed. On February 27, 2020, a PCRA petition was filed. On March 4, 2021, an 

“Order Granting Reinstatement Of Appellate Rights Nunc Pro Tunc” was filed. 

On March 8, 2021, counsel for Appellant filed the instant notice of appeal 

stating the appeal was from the order entered “on the 14 of August, 2019” 

(emphasis added). Counsel for Appellant erroneously appealed from the 

August 14, 2019 order denying the post-sentence motion. See 

Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2001) 

(en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 800 A.2d 932 (Pa. 2002) (“In a 

criminal action, appeal properly lies from the judgment of sentence made final 

by the denial of post-sentence motions.”). The Appeal Docket has been 

corrected to reflect that the appeal lies from the judgment of sentence 

imposed on May 15, 2019. 
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following his open guilty plea.2 On appeal, Appellant asserts he has offered a 

“fair and just” reason for withdrawing his guilty plea and that the 

Commonwealth will not be prejudiced were he permitted to do so. Following 

our review, we affirm.

The trial court set forth the relevant facts and procedural history herein 

as follows: 

1. CASE HISTORY

On December 26, 2018, [Appellant] entered into a nonnegotiated open plea to the charges of Aggravated Assault F2, 

Criminal Attempt-Criminal tres F2, Criminal mischief S, Poss 

Instrument of Crime M1, Simple Assault M2, and Recklessly 

Endangering Another Person M2. 

On May 15, 2019, [A]ppellant was sentenced to 18-36 

months[’] confinement on the Aggravated Assault F2 and the Poss 

Instrument of Crime M1. The remaining charges were nolle 

prossed. 

A motion to withdraw guilty plea was filed on May 24, 2019 

and subsequently denied on August 14, 2019. Appellant then filed 

a PCRA on February 27, 2020. The PCRA petition was granted for 

the purpose of reinstating appeal rights on March 4, 2021. A 

notice of appeal was filed on March 8, 2021. 

2. FACTUAL HISTORY 

On May 7th, 2018, the complainant arrived home around the 

1900 block of Kinsey St. in Philadelphia. She saw [A]ppellant 

urinating on the sidewalk by her house. She told him to stop and 

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2 Under an open guilty plea, the defendant does not enter into an agreement 

with the Commonwealth, and there is no quid pro quo exchange between the 

defendant and the Commonwealth whereby the Commonwealth agrees to 

some action in exchange for the defendant’s guilty plea. Pa.R.Crim.P. 590(B).
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at that time an argument ensued. Complainant then stepped out 

of her house to tell him to go away. Appellant approached the 

complainant and punched her in her mouth. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 12/23/21, at 1-2. 

On May 31, 2021, Appellant filed a Statement of Matters Complained of 

on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). On December 23, 2021, the trial 

court filed its Rule 1925(a) Opinion. 

In his brief, Appellant presents a single issue for this Court’s review: 

Whether Appellant’s motion to withdraw his plea of guilty offers a 

fair and just reason for rescinding Appellant’s plea and withdrawal 

can be accomplished without substantial prejudice to the 

Commonwealth?

Brief for Appellant at 7. 

 Appellant argues the trial court has the discretion to permit a criminal 

defendant to withdraw his or her guilty plea for any fair and just reason and 

that his assertion of innocence constitutes such a reason. Brief for Appellant 

at 12, 13. Appellant further contends he had been provided with a “false 

understanding” of the terms of his plea agreement and told counsel he was 

“uncomfortable” taking the plea. He also stresses the steps he has made to 

address his anger management issues and his family’s need for his assistance

support his position that he should be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea.

Id. at 14. Appellant claims he informed trial counsel of his desire to withdraw 

his plea right after he was sentenced and posits that the Commonwealth will 
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not incur substantial prejudice were he permitted to rescind his plea. Id. at 

14-15. 

A defendant's burden of proof for withdrawing a guilty plea “differs 

depending on whether the defendant seeks to withdraw the plea before or 

after sentencing.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa.Super. 

2017). Herein, there is no dispute Appellant sought to withdraw his guilty

plea after his sentence had been imposed. In Commonwealth v. Broaden, 

980 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super. 2009), this Court summarized the principles 

governing post-sentence motions to withdraw pleas as follows:

[P]ost-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher 

scrutiny since courts strive to discourage entry 

of guilty pleas as sentence-testing devices. A defendant must 

demonstrate that manifest injustice would result if the court were 

to deny his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea. 

Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was not tendered 

knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. In determining whether 

a plea is valid, the court must examine the totality of 

circumstances surrounding the plea. A deficient plea does not per

se establish prejudice on the order of manifest injustice.

Id. at 129 (citations omitted). “It is well-settled that the decision whether to 

permit a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea is within the sound discretion of 

the trial court.” Commonwealth v. Hart, 174 A.3d 660, 664 (Pa.Super. 

2017).

Instantly, the trial court found Appellant did not disagree with the facts 

that were read to him during the colloquy portion of his guilty plea hearing. 

Trial Court Opinion, 12/23/21, at 3 (unnumbered). The court also stated 

Appellant completed a written guilty plea colloquy which it reviewed with him 
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on in detail. At that time, the trial court informed Appellant he was presumed 

innocent, had an absolute right to a trial, and did not have to plead guilty. 

The trial court also explained the maximum sentence Appellant could face. 

Appellant neither expressed any concerns regarding his rights with the trial 

court nor asked for additional time to consult with his counsel. Instead, 

Appellant affirmatively stated he understood his rights and wished to enter a 

guilty plea. Id. at 4-5. The trial court noted that Appellant expressed 

dissatisfaction with his guilty plea only after he was sentenced, “not because 

he ever actually felt discomfort in pleading before this [c]ourt.” Id. at 5. 

Following our review of the record, we agree.

In setting forth his arguments, Appellant erroneously relies upon the 

standard of review for a presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea,

although he did not file his motion to withdraw his plea until after he had been 

sentenced and his post sentence motion had been denied.3 

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3 Besides relying upon the incorrect standard, Appellant erroneously applies it 

when relying upon Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 78 A.3d 1120, 1126 

(Pa.Super. 2003) for the proposition that that “no ‘rational’ support is required 

by the law to accompany the assertion of innocence.” Brief for Appellant at 

13. To the contrary, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that controlling 

jurisprudence on pre-sentence assertions of innocence requires an appellant 

to demonstrate a fair and just reason for withdrawing 

his plea. Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d 1284, 1292 (Pa. 2015). 

As to what constitutes such a qualifying reason, this Court has observed:

The Carrasquillo Court, breaking with prior precedent, held that 

a bare assertion of innocence is no longer a fair and just reason 

permitting a pre-sentence withdrawal of a guilty plea. Instead, “a 

defendant's innocence claim must be at least plausible to 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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In Commonwealth v. Broaden, 980 A.2d 124 (Pa.Super. 2009), this Court 

described the less stringent standard and noted that “prior to the imposition 

of sentence, a defendant should be permitted to withdraw his plea for any fair 

and just reason, provided there is no substantial prejudice to the 

Commonwealth.” Broaden, 980 A.2d at 128 (citation and quotation marks 

omitted).

Appellant’s signed, written guilty plea colloquy and his verbal 

representations to the trial court at the guilty plea hearing that he understood 

the terms thereof belie his bald claims of innocence and discomfort he now 

asserts. N.T., 12/26/18, at 5. After the prosecutor recited the facts that 

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demonstrate, in and of itself, a fair and just reason for 

presentence withdrawal of a plea.” Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 

1292. Our High Court outlined that the correct inquiry “on 

consideration of such a withdrawal motion is whether the accused 

has made some colorable demonstration, under the 

circumstances, such that permitting withdrawal of the plea would 

promote fairness and justice.” Id. In that decision, our Supreme 

Court ruled that the defendant had not offered a plausible 

innocence claim given that it was rather bizarre—a “devil made 

me to it” claim of innocence—and since the innocence claim was 

offered just prior to sentencing. Id. See also Commonwealth v.

Hvizda, [116 A.3d 1103 (Pa. 2015)] (companion case 

to Carrasquillo).

Commonwealth v. Baez, 169 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa.Super. 2017)

As shall be discussed more fully infra, Appellant’s statements made 

during not only the written and oral plea colloquies but also at 

the sentencing hearing admitted the accusations against him. Therefore, 

without a plausible claim of innocence, a fair and just reason 

for withdrawing Appellant’s plea was lacking even if he had sought to 

withdraw his plea pre-sentence. See Carrasquillo, 115 A.3d at 1292.
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formed the basis of all the charges against Appellant, the trial court asked 

Appellant if there were “anything [he] wished to disagree with,” to which 

Appellant replied “No.” Id. at 6-7. 

Appellant again admitted his guilt to the trial court at the sentencing

hearing when he said, prior to his sentence being imposed: 

I’d first like to apologize to the victim and her family. . . . I wish 

that I could have taken that incident back, because it just totally 

got out of hand. . . . It was just an incident-not to minimize itthat got out of hand and I’m working towards it never happening 

again by obtaining anger management that I signed myself up for. 

. . . I know that I am not perfect, and I also know that I made 

mistakes, but people do change. . . . 

N.T. 5/15/19, at 30-31. 

Furthermore, as the Commonwealth stresses in its brief: 

[Appellant] plead guilty in December of 2018 and was not 

sentenced until May of 2019. At no point in the intervening months 

did he declare his innocence or ask to withdraw his guilty plea. 

Even after sentencing, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence motion to 

reconsider the sentence which explicitly admitted his guilt: “the 

defendant demonstrated responsibility for his actions by entering 

a guilty plea” and that he is “taking steps to address any anger 

management issues by taking classes” ([Appellant’s] Postsentence Motion 9/20/19, 2).

Brief for the Commonwealth as Appellee at 6. 

Moreover, to the extent Appellant states he misunderstood the 

implications of pleading guilty due to trial counsel’s representations and that 

trial counsel had been unprepared to call character witnesses on his behalf,

such arguments sound in ineffective assistance of counsel, which must be 

raised on collateral review. See Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 
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576 (Pa. 2013) (reaffirming the holding in Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 

A.2d 726 (Pa. 2002), that, absent certain limited exceptions, claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel should be deferred until collateral review 

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546)).

In light of all of the foregoing, the totality of the circumstances supports 

the conclusion that Appellant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently entered 

into the guilty plea. Thus, he cannot show he suffered prejudice on the order 

of manifest injustice required for the withdrawal of a plea after he 

was sentenced. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 10/4/2022