UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 13-4905

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

KENTWAN RUSSELL,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge. 

(1:11-cr-00679-CCB-1)

Submitted: May 8, 2014 Decided: May 22, 2014

Before NIEMEYER, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Gary E. Proctor, LAW OFFICES OF GARY E. PROCTOR, LLC, Baltimore, 

Maryland, for Appellant. Michael Clayton Hanlon, Assistant 

United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Kentwan Russell appeals his conviction and 180-month

armed career criminal sentence imposed by the district court

after he pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a 

firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2012). On 

appeal, Russell’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders 

v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying that there are no 

meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning whether the 

district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, and whether 

Russell’s sentence is reasonable. Although advised of his right 

to do so, Russell has not filed a pro se brief. We affirm.

Because Russell did not move in the district court to 

withdraw his guilty plea, we review the Rule 11 hearing for 

plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th 

Cir. 2002); see Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 1121, 

1126-27 (2013) (discussing standard of review). Although the 

district court neglected to inform Russell of certain trial 

rights, we conclude that the court’s minor omissions did not 

affect his substantial rights. See United States v. Massenburg, 

564 F.3d 337, 343 (4th Cir. 2009). Moreover, the district court 

ensured that Russell’s plea was knowing and voluntary and that a 

factual basis supported the plea.

We review a sentence for reasonableness, applying “an 

abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 
3

38, 51 (2007). In so doing, we examine the sentence for 

significant procedural error.” See id. If there is none, we 

“consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence . . ., 

tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” Id. 

Upon a thorough review of the sentencing proceedings, we 

conclude that Russell’s sentence is procedurally reasonable and 

that Russell failed to rebut the presumption of substantive 

reasonableness afforded his within-Guidelines sentence. See

United States v. Montes-Peneda, 445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 

2006) (explaining presumption of reasonableness).

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record 

in this case and have found no meritorious grounds for appeal. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. This court 

requires that counsel inform Russell, in writing, of the right 

to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further 

review. If Russell requests that a petition be filed, but 

counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then 

counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Russell. We dispense with oral argument because 

the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the 

materials before this court and argument would not aid the 

decisional process. 

AFFIRMED