07-0542-cv

Kurzberg v. Ashcroft

1 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 2 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT 3 August Term, 2009 4 (Argued: November 17, 2009 Decided: August 30, 2010) 5 Docket No. 07-0542-cv 6

------------------------------------- 7 SILVAN KURZBERG, PAUL KURZBERG, YARON SHMUEL, OMER GAVRIEL 8 MARMARI, ODED OZ ELNER, 9 Plaintiffs-Appellants, 10 - v. - 11 JOHN ASHCROFT, FORMER ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, 12 JAMES W. ZIGLAR, FORMER COMMISSIONER OF THE IMMIGRATION AND 13 NATURALIZATION SERVICE, MICHAEL ZENK, FORMER WARDEN OF THE 14 METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER, DENNIS HASTY, FORMER WARDEN OF THE 15METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER, JORDAN, BELIEVED TO BE AN EMPLOYEE 16 OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, WHOSE TRUE FIRST NAME AND LAST 17 NAME ARE UNKNOWN TO THE PLAINTIFFS, WHO BELIEVE THEY HEARD HIM 18 CALLED JORDAN, MARIO MACHADO, WILLIAM BECK, RICHARD DIAZ, 19 SALVATORE LOPRESTI, STEVEN BARRERE, MICHAEL DEFRANCISCO AND 20 CHRISTOPHER WITSCHEL, BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYEES OF THE FEDERAL 21 BUREAU OF PRISONS, C. SHACKS, MOSCHELLO, NORMAN, HOSAIN, MOUNBO, 22 M. ROBINSON AND TORRES, FIRST NAMES UNKNOWN, BELIEVED TO BE 23 EMPLOYEES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, RAYMOND COTTON, 24 COUNSELOR BELIEVED TO BE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 25 PRISONS, KEVIN LOPEZ, 26 Defendants-Cross-Defendants-Appellees, 27 F. JOHNSON, FIRST NAME UNKNOWN, BELIEVED TO BE AN EMPLOYEE OF THE 28 FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 29 Defendant-Cross-Claimant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee, 30 BIRAR, BUCK, T. CUSH, GUSS, D. ORTIZ, J., PEREZ, LIEUTENANTS, 31 FIRST NAMES UNKNOWN, BELIEVED TO BE EMPLOYEES OF THE FEDERAL 32 BUREAU OF PRISONS, JOHN DOES 1-30, METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER 33 CORRECTIONS OFFICERS, "JOHN DOE" BEING FICTIONAL FIRST AND LAST 34 NAMES, INTENDED TO BE THE CORRECTIONS OFFICERS AT THE 35 METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER WHO ABUSED THE PLAINTIFFS ANDThe Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as 1set forth above. We do not substitute any of the governmentofficial defendants in favor of their successors under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), because we understand each of the defendants in this Bivens action to be sued in his or her individual capacity, see, e.g., Higazy v. Templeton, 505 F.3d 161, 169 (2d Cir. 2007) ("The only remedy available in a Bivens action is an award for monetary damages from defendants in their individual capacities."), although the plaintiffs have specified as much only for some, not all, of the defendants, see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 17-59. "[A]ny misnomer [in the caption] that does not affect the substantial rights of the parties may be disregarded." Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). The Honorable John F. Keenan, of the United States 2 District Court for the Southern District of New York, sitting by designation. 2 1 VIOLATED THEIR RIGHTS, JOHN ROES 1-30, FEDERAL BUREAU OF 2 IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE AGENTS, "JOHN ROE" BEING 3 FICTIONAL FIRST AND LAST NAMES, INTENDED TO BE THE CORRECTIONS 4 OFFICERS AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER WHO ABUSED THE 5 PLAINTIFFS AND VIOLATED THEIR RIGHTS, 6 Defendants, 7 DR. LORENZO, FIRST NAME UNKNOWN, BELIEVED TO BE AN EMPLOYEE OF 8 THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, J. MIELES AND JON OSTEEN, 9 Defendants-Cross-Defendants, 10 LINDA THOMAS, FORMER ASSOCIATE WARD OF PROGRAMS OF THE 11 METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER, ROBERT MUELLER, DIRECTOR OF THE 12 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, KEVIN LOPEZ, BELIEVED TO BE AN 13 EMPLOYEE OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, KATHLEEN HAWK, FORMER 14 DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS, 15 Cross-Defendants.1 16

------------------------------------- 17 Before:SACK and WESLEY, Circuit Judges, and KEENAN, District 18 Judge.2 19 Appeal from the dismissal of a Bivens action on the 20 ground that the plaintiffs failed to serve process on the United 21 States through service on the Attorney General of the United3 1 States by registered or certified mail, as they were required to 2 do under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i). We conclude that 3 the district court's obligation to allow the plaintiffs a 4 reasonable time to cure a service failure was satisfied here 5 inasmuch as the defendants informed the plaintiffs of the failure 6 of service, and the plaintiffs had sufficient time thereafter to 7 cure it. We also conclude that the defendants did not waive the 8 requirement of service on the United States by failing to raise 9 an improper-service defense by motion or in their pleadings. 10 Affirmed. 11 ROBERT JOSEPH TOLCHIN, Jaroslawicz & 12 Jaros, LLC, New York, NY, for 13 Plaintiffs-Appellants. 14 DENNIS C. BARGHAAN, JR., Assistant 15 United States Attorney, for Chuck 16 Rosenberg, United States Attorney, and 17 Gregory G. Katsas, Acting Assistant 18 Attorney General, New York, NY, for 19 Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee John 20 Ashcroft and Cross-Defendant Robert 21 Mueller. 22 DAVID E. BELL, Crowell & Moring LLP, 23 Washington, DC, for Defendant-Cross24 Defendant-Appellee Dennis Hasty. 25 Linda Cronin, Dominick Revellino, 26 and Rocco G. Avallone, 27 Cronin & Byczek, LLP, Lake Success, NY, 28 for Defendant-Cross-Defendnat-Appellee 29 Elizabeth Torres. 30 Robert Goldman, Esq., New York, NY, for 31 Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee 32 William Beck. 33 Jerold Wolin, Wolin & Wolin Esqs., 34 Jericho, NY, for Defendant-Cross35 Defendant-Appellees Sidney Chase, 36 Michael DeFrancisco, Richard Diaz, and4 1 Mario Machado. 2 Yvonne Shivers, Levitt & Kaizer, 3 Attorneys at Law, New York, NY, for 4 Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee 5 Raymond Cotton. 6 James G. Ryan, Elizabeth Iovino, 7 and Jennifer A. McLaughlin, 8 Cullen and Dykman LLP, Garden City, NY, 9 for Defendant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee 10 Steven Barrere. 11 Keith M. Sullivan, Sullivan & Galleshaw, 12 LLP, Middle Village, NY, for Defendant13 Cross-Defendant-Appellee Kevin Lopez. 14 Barry M. Lasky and Scott L. Steinberg, 15 Lasky & Steinberg, P.C., Garden City, 16 NY, for Defendant-Cross-Defendant17 Appellee C. Shacks. 18 James F. Matthews, Matthews & Matthews, 19 Huntington, NY, for Defendant-Cross20 Defendant-Appellee Marcial Mundo, III 21 ("Mounbo"). 22 James J. Keefe, James J. Keefe, P.C., 23 Garden City, NY, for Defendant-Cross24 Defendant-Appellee Salvatore LoPresti. 25 Gary E. Ireland, Law Offices of Gary E. 26 Ireland, Esq., New York, NY, for 27 Defendants-Cross-Defendants-Appellees 28 Christopher Witschel, Hosain, Moschello, 29 Norman, and for Defendant-Cross30 Claimant-Cross-Defendant-Appellee F. 31 Jonnson. 32 SACK, Circuit Judge: 33 34 This is an appeal from the dismissal for failure to 35 serve process on the United States of an action brought under 36 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of 37 Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The plaintiffs, five Israeli 38 nationals who were illegally present in the United States onThe parties dispute whether the United States is also a 3 party to this action. See Appellants' Br. 8; Ashcroft Br. 3-4 n.3. The plaintiffs did not name the United States as a defendant in their Amended Complaint. For purposes of this appeal, we assume that the United States is not a separate party. That question has no bearing on the resolution of this appeal. 5 1 September 11, 2001, brought the underlying action in connection 2 with certain alleged particulars of their arrest on that day and 3 confinement thereafter at the Metropolitan Detention Center in 4 Brooklyn. They have since been removed from the United States by 5 the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The defendants are 6 then-current and then-former officers of the federal government, 7 including former United States Attorney General John Ashcroft, 8 each of whom is sued in his or her individual capacity for 9 actions taken in connection with his or her employment.3 10 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), in 11 order to bring a Bivens action against these defendants, the 12 plaintiffs were required to serve process on both the individual 13 defendants and -- because the individual defendants were sued for 14 acts or omissions occurring in connection with their performance 15 of their duties -- the United States. In order to serve process 16 on the United States, the plaintiffs were required to deliver a 17 copy of the complaint to the United States attorney for the 18 district in which the action was brought and also send a copy of 19 the summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the 20Attorney General. Here, the plaintiffs failed to comply with 21 Rule 4(i) because they did not effect service on the United 22 States. The plaintiffs failed to do so despite receiving6 1 repeated reminders from the defendants that left the plaintiffs 2 with sufficient time to complete service. 3 Several, but not all, of the defendants, including 4 then-Attorney General Ashcroft, moved to dismiss the action for 5 improper service of process. The United States District Court 6 for the Eastern District of New York (John Gleeson, Judge) 7 granted the motion and dismissed the action in its entirety. The 8 court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the Attorney 9 General's waiver of personal service on himself obviated the 10 requirement of service of process on the United States. The 11 court also determined that the plaintiffs had been afforded a 12 reasonable time to cure their failure to serve, as is required by 13 Rule 4(i). Upon a motion for reconsideration by the plaintiffs, 14 the court rejected the argument that the action should not have 15been dismissed against those defendants who had failed to raise 16 an improper service of process defense by motion or pleading. 17 The court concluded that because these defendants did not have 18 the power to waive the requirement of service on the United 19 States, they did not in fact do so. 20 We agree with the district court for substantially the 21 reasons stated in its rulings, and therefore affirm. We write 22 primarily to make clear, first, that a district court's 23 obligation to allow a plaintiff reasonable time to cure a failure 24 to effect service of process is satisfied if the service failure 25 is called to the plaintiff's attention by the defendant ratherIn addition to damages, the Amended Complaint sought 4 injunctive relief that would not be available in a Bivens action. See, e.g., Higazy, 505 F.3d at 169 (supra, note 1). However, in their papers submitted to this Court the plaintiffs only seek damages, and refer to their lawsuit as a Bivens action.[Blue 3] Moreover, the district court treated the lawsuit as a Bivens action against the defendants in their individual capacities. We therefore treat the underlying lawsuit as a Bivens action. 7 1 than the court, provided that the plaintiff has sufficient time 2 thereafter to complete such service; and second, that an 3 individual defendant in a Bivens action lacks the power to waive 4 the requirement of service of process on the United States. 5 BACKGROUND 6 The plaintiffs filed an Amended Complaint on September 7 21, 2004, asserting a Bivens action against the defendants, then8 current and then-former officers of the United States government, 9 including then-Attorney General John Ashcroft.At the 4 10 conclusion of the 120-day period for service of process provided 11 by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), they sought a 60-day 12 extension of time in which to serve all of the defendants. The 13 district court granted the motion. Ashcroft, through counsel, 14 then wrote a letter to the plaintiffs' counsel waiving personal 15 service insofar as suit was being brought against him in his 16 individual capacity: 17 As you are aware . . . this office [the 18 United States Attorney's Office for the 19 Eastern District of Virginia] is responsible 20 for the representation of Attorney General 21 John Ashcroft, in his individual capacity. I 22 am in receipt of the waiver of service form 23 that you have sent to me, and the instant 24 correspondence concerns the same.8 1 My client has authorized me to accept your 2 offer, and thus not require a process server 3 to effectuate personal service upon him. As 4 I am sure you understand, my client's 5 decision in this regard in no way should be 6 construed as waiving any cognizable defenses. 7 Letter of Assistant U.S. Attorney Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr. dated 8 Feb. 2, 2005. 9 After the 60-day extension period expired, Ashcroft, 10 through Barghaan, requested permission from the district court to 11move to dismiss the case on the ground, inter alia, that the 12 plaintiffs had failed to effect proper service. He argued that 13 the plaintiffs had failed to comply with then-Federal Rule of 14 Civil Procedure 4(i)(2)(B) because they had not served process on 15 the United States through service upon Ashcroft by registered or 16 certified mail and service upon the relevant United States 17Attorney's Office. 18 In his written statement to the district court on 19Ashcroft's behalf, which was copied to plaintiffs' counsel, 20 Barghaan set forth in precise terms what the plaintiffs were 21 required to do: "Pursuant to Federal Rule 4(i)(2)(B), service 22 upon an officer of the United States sued in his individual 23 capacity requires (1) personal service upon the officer; (2) 24 delivering a copy of the summons and complaint to the United 25 State's Attorney's Office for the district in which the action is 26pending; and (3) sending a copy of the same to the Attorney 27 General via registered or certified mail." Letter of Assistant 28 U.S. Attorney Dennis C. Barghaan, Jr. to The Honorable JohnThe rule as then in effect provided: 5 Service on an officer or employee of the United States sued in an individual capacity for acts or omissions occurring in connection with the performance of duties on behalf of the United States -- whether or not the officer or employee is sued also in an official capacity -- is effected by serving the United States in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(i)(1) and by serving the officer or employee in the manner prescribed by Rule 4(e), (f), or (g). Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(B) (pre-2007 amendment). The "manner prescribed by Rule 4(i)(1)" for serving the United States was, in relevant part, as follows:

(1) Service upon the United States shall be effected (A) by delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the United States attorney for the district in which the action is brought . . . and (B) by also sending a copy of the summons and of the complaint by registered or certified mail to the Attorney General of the United States at Washington, District of Columbia . . . . Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1) (pre-2007 amendment). The February 2, 2005 letter from Ashcroft's counsel to 6 plaintiffs' counsel waiving personal service specifically referred to personal service by a process server; it did not purport to waive any required service by registered or certified mail. 9 1 Gleeson dated March 25, 2005 (internal quotation marks omitted).5 2 Barghaan explained that although his February 2, 2005 letter had 3waived service "upon him," id. (emphasis in original), referring 4 to Ashcroft, it had not purported to waive service upon the 5 United States, id.One week later, the plaintiffs requested, 6 6 nunc pro tunc, a second extension of time to serve process on the10 1 defendants. The case was then referred to Magistrate Judge 2 Steven Gold in the Eastern District of New York. The magistrate 3 judge scheduled a status conference and directed the parties to 4 identify "any outstanding issues to be addressed." Kurzberg v. 5Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 3950, Order, Docket No. 17 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 6 20, 2005). 7 In response, Ashcroft, together with three other 8 defendants, submitted a letter to the magistrate judge, copied to 9plaintiffs' counsel via electronic filing, calling attention once 10 again to the issue of service of process on the United States. 11 The letter asserted that the "plaintiffs have not effectuated 12 proper service upon any of [the defendant signatories]" because, 13 inter alia, "Mr. Ashcroft has only waived personal service upon 14 him," and "[s]ervice upon a federal officer sued in his 15 individual capacity . . . [requires] service upon the Attorney 16 General." Letter of Assistant U.S. Attorney Dennis C. Barghaan, 17 Jr. to The Honorable Steven M. Gold dated April 29, 2005. At the 18 status conference, the plaintiffs made an oral motion for 19 additional time to accomplish service of process, which the 20magistrate judge denied without prejudice to the filing of a 21 formal motion to the same effect. 22 The plaintiffs subsequently made a formal motion, under 23 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(3)(A), as then in force, 24 seeking a "reasonable time . . . to cure the failure to serve any 25 defendant who has not been served with process in this action," 26 or a second extension of time under Federal Rule 4(m) to effect11 1 proper service. Pls.' Declaration in Support of Mot. to Enlarge 2 Time to Serve Summons and Complaint, dated May 12, 2005, at 3. 3 In making their motion, the plaintiffs argued that "[t]here is no 4 question that the Attorney General . . . has been served." Pls.' 5Mem. of Law in Support of Mot. to Enlarge Time to Serve Summons 6 and Complaint, dated May 12, 2005, at 2. In response, Ashcroft 7 stated yet again that the plaintiffs' failure to serve the United 8 States was fatal to their claims: 9 Plaintiffs cannot argue that effecting 10 service upon the Attorney General personally 11 (through a waiver of service form to his 12 individual capacity counsel in Alexandria, 13 Virginia) is sufficient to effectuate service 14 on the Attorney General officially. This 15 Court has held that this third and final 16 element of individual capacity must be 17 fulfilled regardless of whether the Attorney 18 General has been provided with notice of the 19 summons and complaint in some other fashion. 20Ashcroft's Mem. in Opp. to Pls.' Motion to Enlarge Time to Serve 21 Summons and Complaint, dated May 26, 2005, at 5 n.4 (emphasis in 22 original). Ashcroft specifically asserted that the plaintiffs 23 "have yet . . . to [direct] a copy of the summons and complaint 24 to the Attorney General via certified or registered mail in the 25 District of Columbia." Id. at 8 (emphasis in original). 26 The magistrate judge denied the plaintiffs' motion 27 under Rule 4(i)(3)(A), as then in force, for a reasonable time to 28 cure, but granted their motion in the alternative under Rule 4(m) 29 for a discretionary extension of time to accomplish service of 30 process. See Kurzberg v. Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 3950, Memorandum 31 and Order, Docket No. 58 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2005). In denying12 1 the plaintiffs' request for a reasonable time to cure under then2 Rule 4(i)(3)(A), the court concluded that the cure provision only 3 applied to actions governed by then-Rule 4(i)(2)(A). He reasoned 4 that Rule 4(i)(2)(A) did not govern the plaintiffs' Bivens action 5because it only governed actions against government officials who 6were sued in their official, rather than individual, capacities. 7 He was of the view that "service of process on defendants in a 8 Bivens action is governed by Rule 4(e)," id. at3-4,the generic 9provision for serving process on individual defendants, which 10 does not require service on the United States, see id.. 11 In explaining his decision to grant a discretionary 12 extension of time under Rule 4(m), the magistrate judge referred 13 to, inter alia, the fact that the statute of limitations would 14 preclude the plaintiffs from re-filing their lawsuit should it be 15 dismissed. See id. at 6-7. He ruled, however, that "this will 16be the final extension of time plaintiffs will be granted by this 17 court." Id. at 7. The decision gave no indication that the 18 plaintiffs' failure to serve process on the United States was a 19 defect -- and indeed, its conclusion that service of process was 20 governed by Rule 4(e) implied to the contrary. 21 The time period for completion of service extended 22 under Rule 4(m) elapsed without the plaintiffs serving process on 23 the United States through service on the Attorney General by 24 registered or certified mail. They did, however, attempt to 25 serve the United States three days before the time period expired 26by sending a copy of the summons and complaint by first-class13 1mail to the mailing address for the Attorney General at the 2 Department of Justice; the attempt was insufficient because it 3 did not make use of registered or certified mail. 4 After the time period granted by the court had expired, 5 several of the defendants, including Ashcroft, moved in the 6 district court to dismiss the action on grounds of improper 7 service of process, including failure to serve the United States 8 through service on the Attorney General by registered or 9 certified mail. The district court (John Gleeson, Judge) 10 dismissed the case with respect to all of the defendants, 11 including those who had not raised an improper service defense by 12 pleading or motion. See Kurzberg v. Ashcroft, No. 04 Civ. 3950, 13 2006 WL 2738991, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68680 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 14 2006) ("Kurzberg I"). The court rejected the plaintiffs' 15 argument that personal service on the Attorney General, which 16 had, they asserted, been accomplished by Ashcroft's waiver, 17 obviated the need to serve process on the United States because 18 the Attorney General was already aware of the lawsuit. The court 19 explained that the drafters of Rule 4(i) had been careful to 20 "keep separate officers' individual and official capacities." 21 Id., 2006 WL 2738991, at *5, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68680, at *16. 22 "Rule 4(i), by its plain text, requires service both upon the 23 individual defendant and upon the United States officially; one 24 will not suffice for the other." Id. 25 The district court also rejected the plaintiffs' 26 argument that they were entitled to a reasonable time to cure14 1 their failure to serve process on the United States. The 2 district court acknowledged that it was bound, under Rule 4(i), 3 to "'allow a reasonable time to serve process . . . for the 4 purpose of curing the failure to serve . . . the United 5 States . . . if the plaintiff has served an officer or employee 6 of the United States sued in an individual capacity,'" id., 2006 7 WL 2738991, at *6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68680, at *17-18 8 (quoting Rule 4(i)(3)(B)), which the plaintiffs had accomplished 9by serving Ashcroft in his individual capacity by means of his 10 waiver. The court concluded, however, that the plaintiffs had 11 already been afforded a reasonable time to cure their failure to 12 serve process on the United States. It reasoned that the 13plaintiffs had been given two extensions of time to effectuate 14 proper service of process, one of which was preceded by "repeated 15 statements of defendants' counsel" explicitly underlining the 16plaintiffs' failure to serve the United States and the steps they 17 had to take in order to effect proper service. Id., 2006 WL 18 2738991, at *6, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68680, at *20. The court 19 did not mention the implication contained in the magistrate 20 judge's earlier decision that service of process on the United 21 States was not necessary, nor do the plaintiffs appear to have 22 argued to the district court that they relied on that 23 implication. The district court's dismissal of the case was 24 effectively with prejudice inasmuch as the statute of limitations 25 on the Bivens claim had run.15 1 The plaintiffs sought partial reconsideration of the 2 court's ruling, arguing that because several of the defendants 3 had not raised a service of process defense by motion or 4 pleading, such a defense had been waived, and dismissal of the 5 case against those defendants was improper. The court, rejecting 6 that argument, denied the motion. See Kurzberg v. Ashcroft, No. 7 04 Civ. 3950, 2006 WL 3717535, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90900 (Dec. 8 15, 2006) ("Kurzberg II"). The court noted that it was empowered 9 under Rule 4(m) to dismiss an action "upon motion or on its own 10 initiative" for failure to serve process, id., 2006 WL 3717535, 11 at *1, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90900, at *4 (internal quotation 12 marks omitted; emphasis in original), and concluded that the 13 requirement of service upon the United States could not be waived 14 by individual defendants in a Bivens action, even though it was 15 in the context of serving such defendants, among others, that 16 service upon the United States was required, id., 2006 WL 17 3717535, at *3-4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90900, at *11-12. The 18 court reasoned that the United States had an independent interest 19 in being served with process. "In this atypical case, when 20 service must be made upon a nonparty [the United States] to allow 21 that nonparty to protect its interests, a named defendant's 22 failure to challenge service of process falls outside the domain 23 of [waiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 12(h)(1)(B)." 24 Id., 2006 WL 3717535, at *4, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68680, at *11- 25 12.The plaintiffs argue that the standard of review is de 7 novo because Rule 4(i) was amended after the district court's rulings in this case, and therefore this Court's application of Rule 4(i), in its current form, to the facts of this case will represent the first such application. However, the amendment at issue was "intended to be stylistic only." Advisory Committee Notes, 2007 Amendment, Rule 4. The plaintiffs' argument is therefore without merit, even if we were to analyze this case using the current version of the rules rather than that which was in place at the time of the district court's rulings. The plaintiffs also argue that the standard of review is de novo because the cure provision in Rule 4(i) is mandatory. That fact does not affect the standard of review. If the district court failed to consider the cure provision, that would qualify as an abuse of discretion. See, e.g., United States v. Hasan, 586 F.3d 161, 168 (2d Cir. 2009) (error of law constitutes, in effect, abuse of discretion).16 1 On appeal the plaintiffs argue that they were never 2 given a reasonable time to cure their failure to serve process on 3 the United States because the court did not, before dismissing 4 the action, make a finding of fact that they had failed to serve 5 the United States. The plaintiffs also contend that dismissal of 6 the action against those defendants who failed to raise a service 7 of process defense by motion or pleading was improper because the 8 defense was thereby waived. The plaintiffs do not raise the 9 issue whether the magistrate judge's opinion implied that service 10 on the United States was not required or what the significance of 11 any such implication might be. 12 DISCUSSION 13 I.Standard of Review 14 "We review for an abuse of discretion a district 15 court's Rule 4(m) dismissal for failure to serve process." 16 Zapata v. City of New York, 502 F.3d 192, 195 (2d Cir. 2007).7The current version of Rule 4(m) reads: 8 If a defendant is not served within 120 days after the complaint is filed, the court –- on motion or on its own after notice to the plaintiff –- must dismiss the action without prejudice against that defendant . . . . But if the plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, the court must extend the time for service for an appropriate period. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) 17 1 II.Service of Process under the Federal Rules 2 Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs 3 the service of process in a civil suit. Because the district 4 court relied upon the pre-2007 incarnation of the rule in the 5 decisions under review, even though, as noted below, the changes 6were intended as stylistic only, we use that version also in an 7 attempt to avoid confusion. We include a reference to the 8 corresponding current version of each provision discussed for the 9 convenience of the reader. 10 The district court dismissed the plaintiffs' action 11 pursuant to Rule 4(m). Under Rule 4(m), 12 [i]f service of the summons and complaint is 13 not made upon a defendant within 120 days 14 after the filing of the complaint, the court, 15 upon motion or on its own initiative after 16 notice to the plaintiff, shall dismiss the 17 action without prejudice as to that 18 defendant . . . . provided that if the 19 plaintiff shows good cause for the failure, 20 the court shall extend the time for service 21 for an appropriate period. 22 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m) (pre-2007 amendment).8 23 In general, the method of serving process on an 24 individual is governed by Rule 4(e), which does not requireThis requirement is now provided in Rule 4(i)(3). 9 18 1 service on the United States even if the individual is a 2 government employee. Service on an officer or employee of the 3 United States sued in his or her individual capacity for acts or 4 omissions occurring in connection with his or her performance of 5 duties on behalf of the United States, however, "whether or not 6 the officer or employee is sued also in an official capacity," 7 requires service of process on both the individual being sued and 8 the United States. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(2)(B) (pre-2007 9 amendment).9 10 In order to serve process on the United States, a party 11must deliver a copy of the summons and complaint to the United 12 States Attorney for the district in which the action is brought, 13 and, of particular importance to this appeal, send a copy of the 14 summons and complaint by registered or certified mail to the 15Attorney General. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(1)(A-B) (pre- and 16post-2007 amendment). 17 The Federal Rules contain a "cure provision" requiring 18 the district court to allow a party who has failed to serve 19process on the United States but is required to do so a 20 "reasonable time" to cure such a failure. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 4(i)(3)(B) (pre-2007 amendment) ("The court shall allow a 22 reasonable time to serve process under Rule 4(i) for the purpose 23 of curing the failure to serve . . . the United States in an 24 action governed by Rule 4(i)(2)(B), if the plaintiff has servedThe current version of the "cure provision," Rule 10 4(i)(4), reads, in relevant part: "The court must allow a party a reasonable time to cure its failure to . . . (B) serve the United States under Rule 4(i)(3), if the party has served the United States officer or employee." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(4). The defendants urge us to ignore this argument because 11 the plaintiffs failed to raise it before the district court. There, the plaintiffs argued that Ashcroft's waiver of personal service upon him in his individual capacity sufficed for service of process on the United States. There is indeed a "general rule that an appellate court will not consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal." Greene v. United States, 13 F.3d 577, 586 (2d Cir. 1994); but see id. ("We will [] sometimes entertain arguments not raised in the trial court if the elements of the claim were fully set forth and there is no need for additional fact finding."). But this is an unusual case inasmuch as the district court raised, sua sponte, the argument that the defendants ask us to ignore, and discussed it at length. The argument was thus raised in the district court, albeit not by the plaintiffs. 19 1 an officer or employee of the United States sued in his 2 individual capacity.").10 3 III.Whether The Plaintiffs Had a 4 Reasonable Time to Cure 5 The plaintiffs argue that they were not afforded a 6 reasonable time to cure their failure to serve process on the 7 United States.The crux of their argument is that the district 11 8 court never "officially determined" that their service of process 9was "in need of being cured." Appellants' Br. at 18. The 10 plaintiffs contend that absent such a determination by the 11 district court, there was nothing to cure. The extensions of 12 time that were granted to the plaintiffs do not constitute time 13 to cure under the Rule because the extensions followed warnings 14 by the defendants, not the court.20 1 We disagree. Nothing in the language of Rule 2 4(i)(3)(A) suggests that a defect in the service of process can 3be identified for purposes of permitting the plaintiff to cure 4 the defect only by the court. The Advisory Committee described 5 the cure provision as requiring that "[a] reasonable time to 6 effect service on the United States must be allowed after the 7 failure is pointed out." Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 8Amendment, Rule 4. Had the Committee meant to require that the 9 error be pointed out by the court, it could easily, and surely 10 would, have said so. 11 Other circuits faced with this issue have concluded 12 that notification to the plaintiff by the defendant, rather than 13by the court, of a defect in the service of process is sufficient 14 to start the clock on the reasonable amount of time afforded to 15 the plaintiff to cure the defect. See Flory v. United States, 79 16 F.3d 24, 25 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) ("By raising the defense 17 of defective service well within the expiration of the 120-day 18 period allowed for service . . . the United States allowed 19plaintiff [] time to cure the defect, which she did not do." 20 (emphasis added)); Tuke v. United States, 76 F.3d 155, 158 (7th 21 Cir. 1996) (concluding that cure provision would not avail a 22 plaintiff who failed to serve the Attorney General after being 23 told twice -- once by defense counsel, and once by an incorrect 24 recipient of the summons and complaint, but neither time by the 25 district court -- that his service of process was defective); see 26 also Hawkins v. Potter, 234 F. App'x 188, 189 n.1 (5th Cir. 2007)21 1 (per curiam) ("There is no legal requirement that a district 2 court notify the party regarding an insufficiency of service 3before deciding a reasonable time to cure has past. . . . 4 [N]otice from [the] other party [is] sufficient."). 5 We find no authority to the contrary, and reach the 6 same conclusion. Indeed, if we were to accept the plaintiffs' 7 proposed requirement of an "official determination" by the court 8 that service of process was defective before the cure provision 9was triggered, this would effectively require that a motion to 10 dismiss for failure to serve process be granted only after such a 11motion had already been made once and denied for the purpose of 12 affording the plaintiff a reasonable time to cure. We do not see 13why, as a practical matter or in the interests of judicial 14 economy, that should be the case. There is nothing we perceive 15 to be inherently wrong with requiring plaintiffs to adhere to a 16 rule of procedure when their failure to do so has been correctly 17 pointed out by an adversary. 18 We repeat that the plaintiffs do not argue on appeal 19 that they relied on any implication in the magistrate judge's 20 opinion to the effect that service on the United States under 21 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i) was not required. The 22 magistrate judge's conclusion that service of process in a Bivens 23 action is governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(e) -- a 24 rule that would not require service on the United States -- was 25 incorrect. But because the plaintiffs do not assert that they 26 relied on that conclusion or its implications in failing to22 1 effect proper service, we need not decide the significance of the 2 error. In any event, the plaintiffs concede that they attempted 3 to serve process on the United States through service on Ashcroft 4 by first-class mail three days before the extension of time 5 expired. In other words, they plainly knew before the "cure" 6 time had run that they were required to serve the United States. 7Any claim of reliance on the magistrate judge's misstatement, had 8 it been made before us, likely would have been unpersuasive. 9 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the 10 district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the 11 plaintiffs were not entitled to any more time to cure their 12 defective service of process on the United States. 13 IV.Whether Service of Process on the United States 14 Was Waived by Certain Defendants 15 The plaintiffs argue that dismissal of their Bivens 16 action against those of the defendants who did not raise the 17 defense of improper service of process by motion or pleading was 18 improper, because that defense was thereby waived as to those 19 defendants. We conclude, however, that an individual defendant 20 in a Bivens action is incapable of waiving service on the United 21 States under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i), and thus 22 incapable of waiving such a defense on its behalf. 23 In general, a defense of insufficient service of 24 process is waived if the party wishing to assert it fails to do 25 so by means of a 12(b) motion or in a responsive pleading. See 26 Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(1). But it should go without saying that a 27 person without the power to waive cannot effect a waiver. See23 1 Zedner v. United States, 547 U.S. 489, 500-01 (2006) (concluding 2 that criminal defendant cannot waive prospective application of 3 Speedy Trial Act because Act protects not only defendant's right 4 to speedy trial, but also "public interest"). The requirement of 5 serving process on the United States in a Bivens action protects 6 interests of the United States separate and apart from those of 7 the individual defendant who may be said to have waived service, 8 intentionally or otherwise. The Advisory Committee has explained 9 in this context: "Service on the United States will help to 10 protect the interest of the individual defendant in securing 11 representation by the United States, and will expedite the 12 process of determining whether the United States will provide 13 representation." Advisory Committee Notes, 2000 Amendment, Rule 14 4 (emphasis added). Indeed, the government will provide 15 representation for a federal employee in these circumstances only 16 if the Attorney General (or his or her designee) determines "that 17 providing representation would otherwise be in the interest of 18 the United States." 28 C.F.R. § 50.15(a). Service of process on 19 the United States thus protects the interest of the United States 20 in choosing whether to provide representation to an individual 21 defendant. Unless we were to reach the unlikely conclusion that 22 the defendant who does not insist on service by the plaintiff on 23 the Unites States forfeits such representation by the government, 24 that interest is not the defendant's to waive. It was therefore 25 not waived by the defendants here in failing to raise it before 26 the district court.24 1 If in another case the failure of the defendant to 2 raise the issue in its pleadings or on motion served to mislead 3 the plaintiff into failure to complete service, there might be 4 relief available to the plaintiff. For the foregoing reasons, 5 however, we do not see how a finding of waiver by the United 6 States would be a form of such relief. 7 V.Remaining Arguments 8 The plaintiffs also argue that the district court 9 interpreted the pre-2007 cure provision to require only the 10 allowance of a reasonable time to effectuate service in the first 11 place, rather than to cure a failure of service, whereas the 12 post-2007 version of the cure provision requires the allowance of 13 a reasonable time to cure a defect in the service of process. 14 This argument is without merit even were we to apply the current 15version of Rule 4. The old version of the rule, applied by the 16 district court, provided that "the court shall allow a reasonable 17 time to serve process . . . for the purpose of curing the failure 18 to serve." Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i)(3)(B) (pre-2007 amendment) 19 (emphasis added). We think it implausible that the district 20 court did not understand that the provision required it to allow 21 the plaintiffs time to cure a failure to serve process. Plainly, 22 it did. See Kurzberg I, 2006 WL 2738991, at *6, 2006 U.S. Dist. 23 LEXIS 68680, at *18 (referring to Rule 4(i)(3)(B) as "cure 24 provision").25 1 CONCLUSION 2 Serving process on the United States through service by 3 registered or certified mail on the Attorney General might seem, 4 from a practical standpoint, to be nothing more than a formality 5 inasmuch as the Attorney General, who is charged with determining 6whether the United States will provide representation to 7 individual defendants, was himself an individual defendant in 8 this lawsuit. That does not, however, excuse noncompliance with 9 the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court did not 10 err in so holding. 11 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of 12 the district court.