NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

United States Court of Appeals 

for the Federal Circuit ______________________ 

CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC, AND 

NEW KINGDOMS, LLC,

Appellants,

v.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Appellee,

AND

NINTENDO CO., LTD., AND

NINTENDO OF AMERICA, INC.,

Intervenors.

______________________ 

2014-1072

______________________ 

Appeal from the United States International Trade 

Commission in Investigation No. 337-TA-770.

______________________ 

Decided: December 19, 2014

______________________ 

JAMES R. BARNEY, Finnegan, Henderson, Farabow, 

Garrett & Dunner, LLP, of Washington, DC, argued for 

appellants. With him on the brief were ELIZABETH D.

FERRILL and LAURENCE M. SANDELL. 
2 CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC v. ITC

SIDNEY A. ROSENZWEIG, Attorney Advisor, Office of 

the General Counsel, United States International Trade 

Commission, of Washington, DC, argued for appellee. On 

the brief were DOMINIC L. BIANCHI, General Counsel, 

WAYNE W. HERRINGTON, Assistant General Counsel and 

JIA CHEN, Attorney Advisor. 

STEPHEN R. SMITH, Cooley LLP, of Reston, Virginia, 

for intervenors. With him on the brief were THOMAS J.

FRIEL, JR., of San Francisco, California, and STEPHEN C.

NEAL, TIMOTHY S. TETER and MATTHEW J. BRIGHAM, of 

Palo Alto, California. 

______________________ 

Before NEWMAN, BRYSON, and O’MALLEY, Circuit Judges.

O’MALLEY, Circuit Judge.

Creative Kingdoms, LLC and New Kingdoms, LLC 

(collectively, “Creative Kingdoms”) appeal the International Trade Commission’s (“Commission”) finding that 

Nintendo Co., Ltd. and Nintendo of America, Inc. (collectively, “Nintendo”) did not violate § 337 of the Tariff Act of 

1930 by importing, selling for importation, or selling 

certain video game systems and controllers. Specifically, 

Creative Kingdoms challenges the Commission’s determination that claim 7 of U.S. Patent No. 7,500,917 (the “’917 

Patent”) and claim 24 of U.S. Patent No. 7,896,742 (the 

“’742 Patent”) (collectively, “the asserted claims”) are 

invalid for lack of enablement and written description, 

that the accused Nintendo products do not infringe the 

asserted claims, and that Creative Kingdoms failed to 

establish the existence of a domestic industry relating to 

the patented articles. Because the Commission properly 

determined that the asserted claims are invalid for lack of 

enablement, we affirm. 
CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC v. ITC 3

DISCUSSION

The ’917 and ’742 Patents generally describe motionsensing devices, which detect motion and generate wireless signals based on that motion to create a desired play 

effect in an interactive environment. Specifically, claim 7 

of the ’917 Patent is directed to a toy wand comprising a 

pair of first motion sensors, which detect a motion, and a 

second motion sensor, which detects a different motion 

from the first. These sensors then generate signals based 

on the detected motions, which are transmitted to a 

receiver to control play effects. Similarly, claim 24 of the 

’742 Patent is directed to a motion-sensitive device that 

contains two arrangements of sensors, which detect 

different motions and generate signals that activate or 

control play effects based upon those motions. The two 

asserted patents are related—the ’742 Patent is a continuation-in-part of the ’917 Patent, and it is undisputed 

that the relevant portions of the two specifications are the 

same.

The Commission concluded that the asserted claims 

are invalid for lack of enablement. It first determined 

that a novel aspect of both claims was the combination of 

sensors. Because the scope of the asserted claims encompasses both mechanical and electronic sensors, but the 

specifications do not disclose how to use multiple electronic sensors together to detect different motions, the Commission concluded that the specifications failed to enable 

the full scope of the asserted claims. 

We agree with the Commission’s enablement conclusion. “To be enabling, the specification must teach those 

skilled in the art how to make and use the full scope of 

the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’” 

ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 603 F.3d 935, 940 

(Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted). It is well established 

that a specification need not disclose what is well-known 
4 CREATIVE KINGDOMS, LLC v. ITC

in the art, but “[i]t is the specification, [and] not the 

knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the 

novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. 

Am., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1283 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting 

Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366 

(Fed. Cir. 1997)). 

Here, the novelty of the asserted claims includes the 

use of sensors in combination, and the scope of the asserted claims includes both mechanical and electronic sensors. But the two specifications contain no guidance as to 

how electronic sensors, such as accelerometers and gyroscopes, can be substituted or added to detect different 

motions, as required by the asserted claims. Instead, the 

specifications merely include a laundry list of the types of 

electronic sensors that could be used. ’917 Patent col. 

10:32–42; ’742 Patent col. 10:56–66. Without any further 

guidance, the specifications fail to disclose how to make 

and use the full scope of the asserted claims. Accordingly, 

the asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement.

Because the Commission correctly determined that 

the asserted claims are invalid for lack of enablement, we

need not address Creative Kingdoms’ other arguments

regarding written description, infringement, and domestic 

industry. See Solomon Techs., Inc. v. ITC, 524 F.3d 1310, 

1320 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are not required to address 

every possible ground on which the Commission’s order 

might be sustained.”). Accordingly, we affirm the Commission’s finding of no Section 337 violation.

AFFIRMED