NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

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No. 12-4313

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.

CONSTANCE TAYLOR,

 Appellant

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On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. No. 2-06-cr-00658-003)

District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody

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Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)

January 16, 2014

Before: AMBRO, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges.

(Filed: January 16, 2014)

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OPINION

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.

Constance Taylor appeals an order of the District Court imposing restitution after 

we vacated and remanded the original restitution order for clarification. Counsel for 

Taylor has moved for permission to withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 
2

738 (1967). We will grant counsel’s motion and affirm the District Court’s order. 

I

Because we write for the parties, who are well acquainted with the case, we recite 

only the facts and procedural history essential to our decision. 

Taylor was convicted on one count of conspiracy to defraud the United States, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371, and two counts of interference with the administration of 

internal revenue laws, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a). The District Court sentenced 

Taylor to 60 months’ imprisonment on the conspiracy charge, 30 months’ imprisonment 

for each count of interference, and three years of supervised release for all three counts. 

The two interference sentences were to be served concurrently to each other but 

consecutive to the conspiracy conviction for a total term of 90 months’ imprisonment. 

The District Court also entered an order for a special assessment of $300 and restitution 

of $3.3 million.

In Taylor’s prior appeal, we held the restitution order deficient because the District 

Court failed to consider Taylor’s financial situation and never set the manner and 

schedule of restitution payments. See United States v. Crim, 451 F. App’x 196, 210 (3d 

Cir. 2011). This violated the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act, which requires the 

District Court to specify the manner in which the defendant will pay restitution in light of 

a defendant’s economic circumstances. See 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). Thus, we vacated 

and remanded the restitution order for clarification by the District Court. Crim, 451 F. 
3

App’x at 210. 

On remand, the District Court considered the fact that Taylor will make only $100 

per year during her period of incarceration and ordered her to pay restitution at $100 per 

year until further order. Taylor filed this timely appeal, and her counsel moved to 

withdraw pursuant to Anders.

1

II

In a case arising under Anders, we determine whether: (1) counsel has adequately 

fulfilled the Anders requirements; and (2) an independent review of the record presents 

any non-frivolous issues. United States v. Youla, 241 F.3d 296, 300 (3d Cir. 2001).

To meet the first prong, appointed counsel must examine the record, conclude that 

there are no non-frivolous issues for review, and request permission to withdraw. 

Counsel must accompany a motion to withdraw with “a brief referring to anything in the 

record that might arguably support the appeal.” Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Taylor’s 

counsel identified one potential ground for appeal—Taylor’s allegation of prosecutorial 

misconduct stemming from a violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)—and 

discussed why it lacks merit. Our remand order sought clarification from the District 

Court only on the manner of restitution payments, and the District Court complied with 

our order. See Crim, 451 F. App’x at 210.

 

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
4

We find that counsel’s discussion of the reasons why no appealable issue exists 

meets the requirements of Anders’s first prong. As we explain below, our independent 

review of the record confirms counsel’s view that there are no meritorious issues for 

appeal.

III

Taylor argues the District Court failed to consider her economic circumstances in 

ordering the manner and schedule of restitution payments as required by the Mandatory 

Victims Restitution Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). We exercise plenary review over the 

District Court’s application of those legal standards to the restitution order. United States 

v. Quillen, 335 F.3d 219, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2003). Under the Act, the District Court must 

review the defendant’s assets, projected earnings, and financial obligations in order to set 

a schedule for the payment of restitution. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(2). The District Court 

considered Taylor’s economic circumstances by noting that she would earn $100 during 

her period of incarceration and ordered her to make annual restitution payments in this 

amount. This satisfied our remand order and the requirements of the Mandatory Victims 

Restitution Act. 

Taylor next claims the District Court failed to prove the total restitution amount on 

remand. We vacated and remanded “so that [the District Court] may specify the amount 

of restitution and the method, manner and schedule of payment . . . .” Crim, 451 F. App’x 

at 210. The District Court did precisely what we directed it to do by entering an amended 
5

judgment that ordered Taylor to pay $3.3 million in restitution at $100 per year. By 

instructing the District Court to “specify the amount of restitution” on remand, we did not 

ask it to make this calculation anew. Id. We remanded only to allow the District Court to 

correct its “failure to take into account [Taylor’s] financial resources and [its] failure to 

state on the record the manner and schedule of payments.”

The balance of Taylor’s brief argues the Government failed to provide sufficient 

evidence to merit a conviction, committed Brady violations at trial, conducted illegal 

searches prior to her indictment, unlawfully arrested and detained her, and illegally 

intercepted her communications. All of these issues go beyond the scope of our remand 

to the District Court. It would have been error for the District Court to consider these 

arguments on remand, and we may not consider them in reviewing the District Court’s 

restitution order. See Skretvedt v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours, 372 F.3d 193, 203 (3d Cir. 

2004). We rejected Taylor’s sufficiency of the evidence arguments for the interference 

convictions in her last appeal, and she waived her sufficiency of the evidence argument 

on the conspiracy charge by not raising it then. See Crim, 451 F. App’x at 202–03. Her 

remaining arguments were either waived by her failure to raise them then, see United 

States v. Pultrone, 241 F.3d 306, 307–08 (3d Cir. 2001), or should be brought before the 

District Court in collateral proceedings, see United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311–

12 (3d Cir. 1989).
6

IV

For the reasons stated, we will affirm the District Court’s restitution order, and in a 

separate order, grant counsel’s motion to withdraw.