*

 After an examination of the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral

argument is unnecessary. Thus, the appeal is submitted on the briefs and the record.

See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Submitted June 2, 2005*

Decided June 2, 2005

Before

Hon. WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge

 Hon. TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge

No. 04-3979

ROBERT DAVIS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF

OPERATING ENGINEERS LOCAL

UNION NO. 965, et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States

District Court for the Central

District of Illinois

No. 04-C-3106

Jeanne E. Scott, 

Judge.

O R D E R

Robert Davis (who is African American) participated in an apprenticeship

program with the defendant union, operating heavy machinery at construction sites

for a number of contractors who are also defendants in this suit. Although Davis

completed a probationary period with the union, he never became a full member;

Davis contends that race discrimination is to blame. In his complaint and the

charge he filed with the EEOC, Davis alleged that the defendants gave him less

desirable work assignments than his white coworkers, unfairly criticized his

UNPUBLISHED ORDER

Not to be cited per Circuit Rule 53
No. 04-3979 Page 2

performance, and prevented him from paying the dues that would have allowed him

to join the union. The district court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss,

which it construed as a motion for summary judgment after allowing Davis to

submit materials outside the pleadings, concluding that the suit was barred by the

statute of limitations. Davis appeals, and we affirm.

On appeal Davis does not address the district court’s conclusion that his

lawsuit was time-barred, but merely recounts his work history and asserts

generally that the district court mishandled his case. This contention is too cursory

to constitute a properly developed argument for appeal. See Smith v. Northeastern

Ill. Univ., 388 F.3d 559, 569 (7th Cir. 2004) (single sentence in brief insufficiently

developed to preserve argument on appeal). Further, because Davis’s brief does not

specifically challenge the grounds of the district court’s decision, he has waived any

opposition to those grounds on appeal. See Kauthar Sdn Bhd v. Sternberg, 149

F.3d 659, 672 (7th Cir. 1998) (appellant waived challenge to district court’s

resolution of RICO claims by neglecting to challenge court’s specific findings). 

Regardless, our review of the record convinces us that the district court was correct

that Davis’s suit was barred because he failed to file it within 90 days of receiving

his right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Dandy v. United

Parcel Serv., Inc., 388 F.3d 263, 270 (7th Cir. 2004). The EEOC sent Davis a rightto-sue notice on January 8, 2004, via certified mail, but he did not file this suit until

May 13, 2004. The date Davis actually received his right-to-sue notice is not

disclosed by this record, but that date is irrelevant here because it is undisputed

that Davis simply failed to collect his certified mail within the period allowed by the

post office.

See Bobbitt v. Freeman Cos., 268 F.3d 535, 538-39 (7th Cir. 2001) (90-day period

measured from date certified mail was sent where claimant failed to pick up rightto-sue notice in timely fashion). Davis cannot rely on the date he received actual

notice to extend the limitations period where the delay in receiving notice was

attributable solely to his own fault. Id. Accordingly, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.