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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE 

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 

STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 09–940 Decided June 27, 2011

 PER CURIAM. 

The Court of Appeals in this case held that the requirements of the Sex Offender Registration and Notification 

Act (SORNA), 42 U. S. C. §16901 et seq., violate the Ex 

Post Facto Clause of the Constitution, Art. I, §9, cl. 3,

when applied to juveniles adjudicated as delinquent before 

SORNA’s enactment. We conclude that the Court of Appeals had no authority to enter that judgment because it 

had no live controversy before it. 

I 

Respondent Juvenile Male was 13 years old when he

began sexually abusing a 10-year-old boy on the Fort 

Belknap Indian Reservation in Montana. The abuse 

continued for approximately two years, until respondent 

was 15 and his victim 12. In 2005, respondent was 

charged in the District of Montana with delinquency 

under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U. S. C.

§5031 et seq. Respondent pleaded “true” to charges that

he knowingly engaged in sexual acts with a child under 

12, which would have been a federal crime had respondent 

been an adult. See §§2241(c), 1153(a). The court sentenced respondent to two years of juvenile detention,

followed by juvenile supervision until his 21st birthday.

Respondent was to spend the first six months of his postconfinement supervision in a prerelease center. See 

United States v. Juvenile Male, 560 U. S. ___, ___ (2010) 

(per curiam) (slip op., at 1). 

In 2006, while respondent remained in juvenile deten-
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tion, Congress enacted SORNA. 120 Stat. 590. Under 

SORNA, a sex offender must “register, and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction” where the offender resides, is employed, or attends school. 42 U. S. C. 

§16913(a). This registration requirement extends to certain juveniles adjudicated as delinquent for serious sex

offenses. §16911(8). In addition, an interim rule issued by 

the Attorney General mandates that SORNA’s requirements apply retroactively to sex offenders convicted before 

the statute’s enactment. 72 Fed. Reg. 8897 (2007) (codified at 28 CFR pt. 72 (2010)); see 42 U. S. C. §16913(d).1 

In July 2007, the District Court determined that respondent had failed to comply with the requirements of

his prerelease program. The court revoked respondent’s

juvenile supervision, imposed an additional 6-month term 

of detention, and ordered that the detention be followed by 

supervision until respondent’s 21st birthday. 560 U. S., at 

___ (slip op., at 1–2). At the Government’s urging, and 

over respondent’s objection, the court also imposed a 

“special conditio[n]” of supervision requiring respondent to 

register and keep current as a sex offender. Id., at ___ 

(slip op., at 2) (internal quotation marks omitted); see Pet.

for Cert. 9 (noting the Government’s argument in the 

District Court that respondent should be required to register under SORNA “‘at least until’” his release from juvenile supervision on his 21st birthday). 

On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, respondent challenged 

this “special conditio[n]” of supervision. He requested that

the Court of Appeals “reverse th[e] portion of his sentence 

—————— 

1On December 29, 2010, the Attorney General finalized the interim

rule. See 75 Fed. Reg. 81849. In Reynolds v. United States, No. 10– 

6549, this Court granted certiorari on the question whether sex offenders convicted before the enactment of SORNA have standing to challenge the validity of the Attorney General’s interim rule. 562 U. S. ___ 

(2011); Pet. for Cert. in Reynolds, p. i. Reynolds is slated to be heard 

next Term. 
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requiring Sex Offender Registration and remand with 

instructions that the district court . . . strik[e] Sex Offender Registration as a condition of juvenile supervision.” 

Opening Brief for Defendant-Appellant in No. 07–30290 

(CA9), p. 25. Then, in May 2008, with his appeal still

pending in the Ninth Circuit, respondent turned 21, and 

the juvenile-supervision order requiring him to register as 

a sex offender expired. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). 

Over a year after respondent’s 21st birthday, the Court 

of Appeals handed down its decision. 581 F. 3d 977 (CA9

2009), amended, 590 F. 3d 924 (2010). No party had 

raised any issue of mootness in the Ninth Circuit, and the 

Court of Appeals did not address the issue sua sponte. 

The court’s opinion discussed only the merits and concluded that applying SORNA to juvenile delinquents who 

committed their offenses “before SORNA’s passage violates the Ex Post Facto Clause.” Id., at 927. On that 

basis, the court vacated the District Court’s condition of 

supervision requiring sex-offender registration and reporting. Id., at 942. The United States petitioned for a writ of 

certiorari. 

While that petition was pending, this Court entered a 

per curiam opinion in this case certifying a preliminary 

question of Montana law to the Montana Supreme Court. 

560 U. S. ___ (2010). The opinion noted that a “threshold 

issue of mootness” might prevent us from reviewing the

decision below on the merits. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 2). 

We explained that, because respondent is “no longer . . .

subject” to the District Court’s “sex-offender-registration

conditions,” respondent must “show that a decision invalidating” those conditions “would be sufficiently likely to

redress ‘collateral consequences adequate to meet Article

III’s injury-in-fact requirement.’” Id., at ___ (slip op., at

2–3) (quoting Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U. S. 1, 14 (1998)). 

We noted that by the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision, 

“respondent had become registered as a sex offender in 
4 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE 

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Montana.” 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, “[p]erhaps the most likely

potential ‘collateral consequenc[e]’ that might be remedied

by a judgment in respondent’s favor is the requirement 

that respondent remain registered as a sex offender under 

Montana law.” Ibid. In order to ascertain whether a 

decision invalidating the District Court’s registration

conditions would enable respondent to remove his name 

from the Montana sex-offender registry, the Court certified the following question to the Montana Supreme

Court: 

“Is respondent’s duty to remain registered as a sex

offender under Montana law contingent upon the 

validity of the conditions of his now-expired federal

juvenile-supervision order that required him to register as a sex offender, or is the duty an independent 

requirement of Montana law that is unaffected by 

the validity or invalidity of the federal juvenilesupervision conditions?” Id., at ___ (slip op., at 3) 

(citations omitted). 

The Montana Supreme Court has now responded to our

certified question. See United States v. Juvenile Male, ___ 

P. 3d ___, 2011 WL 2162807 (2011). Its answer is that 

respondent’s “state law duty to remain registered as a sex

offender is not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal supervision order, but is an independent requirement of Montana law.” Id., at ___, 2011 WL 

2162807,*1. 

II 

It is a basic principle of Article III that a justiciable case

or controversy must remain “extant at all stages of review,

not merely at the time the complaint is filed.” Arizonans 

for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U. S. 43, 67 (1997)

(internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]hroughout the 
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litigation,” the party seeking relief “‘must have suffered, 

or be threatened with, an actual injury traceable to the defendant and likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial 

decision.’” Spencer, supra, at 7 (quoting Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U. S. 472, 477 (1990)).

In criminal cases, this requirement means that a defendant wishing to continue his appeals after the expiration 

of his sentence must suffer some “continuing injury” or

“collateral consequence” sufficient to satisfy Article III.

See Spencer, 523 U. S., at 7–8. When the defendant challenges his underlying conviction, this Court’s cases have 

long presumed the existence of collateral consequences. 

Id., at 8; see Sibron v. New York, 392 U. S. 40, 55–56 

(1968). But when a defendant challenges only an expired 

sentence, no such presumption applies, and the defendant

must bear the burden of identifying some ongoing “collateral consequenc[e]” that is “traceable” to the challenged

portion of the sentence and “likely to be redressed by a 

favorable judicial decision.” See Spencer, supra, at 7, 14. 

At the time of the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case, 

the District Court’s order of juvenile supervision had 

expired, and respondent was no longer subject to the sexoffender-registration conditions that he sought to challenge on appeal. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2). As a 

result, respondent’s challenge was moot before the Ninth

Circuit unless he could “show that a decision invalidating” 

the District Court’s order would likely redress some collateral consequence of the registration conditions. Id., at ___ 

(slip op., at 2–3) (citing Spencer, supra, at 14).

As we noted in our prior opinion, one “potential collateral consequence that might be remedied” by an order 

invalidating the registration conditions “is the requirement that respondent remain registered” under Montana

law. 560 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 3) (internal quotation 

marks and brackets omitted). But as the Montana Supreme Court has now clarified, respondent’s “state law 
6 UNITED STATES v. JUVENILE MALE 

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duty to remain registered as a sex offender is not contingent upon the validity of the conditions of his federal 

supervision order,” 2011 WL 2162807, *1, and continues to 

apply regardless of the outcome in this case. True, a 

favorable decision in this case might serve as a useful

precedent for respondent in a hypothetical lawsuit challenging Montana’s registration requirement on ex post 

facto grounds. But this possible, indirect benefit in a 

future lawsuit cannot save this case from mootness. See 

Camreta v. Greene, 563 U. S. ___, ___ (2011) (slip op., at 

16); Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Board of 

Trade of Chicago, 701 F. 2d 653, 656 (CA7 1989) (Posner, 

J.) (“[O]ne can never be certain that findings made in a 

decision concluding one lawsuit will not some day . . . 

control the outcome of another suit. But if that were 

enough to avoid mootness, no case would ever be moot”). 

Respondent also argues that this case “cannot be considered moot in any practical sense” because, under current law, respondent may have “an independent duty to 

register as a sex offender” under SORNA itself. Brief in 

Opposition 6.2 But the duty to register under SORNA is 

not a consequence—collateral or otherwise—of the District 

Court’s special conditions of supervision. The statutory

duty to register is, as respondent notes, an obligation that 

exists “independent” of those conditions. That continuing

obligation might provide grounds for a pre-enforcement 

challenge to SORNA’s registration requirements. It does 

not, however, render the current controversy regarding

the validity of respondent’s sentence any less moot. 

Respondent further argues that this case falls within 

—————— 

2See 42 U. S. C. §16911(8) (SORNA applicable if the juvenile was “14

years of age or older at the time of the offense and the offense adjudicated was comparable to or more severe than aggravated sexual abuse

(as described in section 2241 of title 18)”); 72 Fed. Reg. 8897 (codified at

28 CFR pt. 72) (SORNA’s requirements extend to sex offenders convicted before the statute’s enactment). 
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the established exception to mootness for disputes that are 

“‘capable of repetition, yet evading review.’” Id., at 8 

(quoting Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147, 148–149 

(1975) (per curiam)). This exception, however, applies

only where “(1) the challenged action [is] in its duration 

too short to be fully litigated prior to cessation or expiration, and (2) there [is] a reasonable expectation that the

same complaining party [will] be subject to the same

action again.” Spencer, supra, at 17 (internal quotation 

marks omitted). At the very least, respondent cannot 

satisfy the second of these requirements. He has now 

turned 21, and he will never again be subject to an order 

imposing special conditions of juvenile supervision. See, 

e.g., DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312 (1974) (per curiam). The capable-of-repetition exception to mootness

thus does not apply, and the Ninth Circuit lacked

the authority under Article III to decide this case on the 

merits. 

The petition for a writ of certiorari and respondent’s

motion to proceed in forma pauperis are granted. The 

judgment of the Court of Appeals is vacated, and the case 

is remanded with instructions to dismiss the appeal. 

It is so ordered. 

JUSTICE GINSBURG, JUSTICE BREYER, and JUSTICE 

SOTOMAYOR would remand the case to the Ninth Circuit 

for that court’s consideration of mootness in the first 

instance. 

JUSTICE KAGAN took no part in the consideration or 

decision of this case.