J-S03031-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

LATASHA STAPP 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1035 WDA 2019

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 20, 2019

In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-63-CR-0000804-2013

BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 13, 2020

Latasha Stapp (Stapp) appeals pro se from the order entered by the 

Court of Common Pleas of Washington County (PCRA court) dismissing her 

first petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. 

§§ 9541-9546, as untimely. We affirm.

On August 7, 2014, Stapp entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count 

of criminal attempt to commit homicide.1 The charge stems from Stapp’s 

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a).
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shooting of her then-husband twice, nearly killing him.2 On that same day, 

the trial court sentenced her to a term of not less than ten nor more than 

twenty years’ incarceration. Stapp did not file a post-sentence motion or a 

direct appeal.3

Stapp filed the instant pro se PCRA petition approximately four years 

later, on or about December 18, 2018. Appointed counsel filed a 

Turner/Finley4 no merit letter and a motion to withdraw as counsel. On May 

22, 2019, the PCRA court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. The court

then issued notice of its intent to dismiss the PCRA petition, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 

907(1) and its order dismissing it on June 20, 2019. This timely appeal 

followed. Stapp and the PCRA court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P. 

1925(a)-(b).

On appeal, Stapp raises several claims of ineffective assistance of plea 

counsel, asserting that counsel did not explain the plea offer to her but 

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2 Following her arrest, Stapp underwent a mental health evaluation and was 

found competent to assist in her defense. (See PCRA Court Opinion, 9/11/19, 

at 10 n. 22).

3 Stapp’s judgment of sentence, therefore, became final on September 8, 

2014, when her time to file a direct appeal expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 

9545(b)(3) (“A judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, 

including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and 

the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking 

the review.”).

4 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and 

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988).
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nonetheless recommended that she accept it; advise her of the elements of 

the charges against her; investigate her history of mental health issues and 

abuse by her husband. (See Stapp’s Brief, at 4, 7-14). Stapp also contends 

that the court erred in denying her PCRA petition where her guilty plea was 

not knowing and intelligent; the prosecutor failed to provide her with a copy

of her mental health evaluation; and the trial court imposed an excessive 

sentence without considering mitigating factors. (See id. at 4, 15-19).

Preliminarily, we note, “[o]ur standard of review of the denial of a PCRA 

petition is limited to examining whether the record evidence supports the 

court’s determination and whether the court’s decision is free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Shiloh, 170 A.3d 553, 556 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation 

omitted). “The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.” Id.

at 557 (citation omitted).

A petitioner must file a PCRA petition within one year of the date the 

underlying judgment becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). The 

exceptions to the PCRA time-bar allow for three very limited circumstances 

under which the late filing of a petition will be excused. See id.

5

 “It is the 

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5 Specifically, we lack jurisdiction to consider a facially untimely PCRA petition 

unless a petitioner pleads and proves one of the following:

(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of 

interference by government officials with the presentation of the 

claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth 

or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
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petitioner’s burden to allege and prove that one of the timeliness exceptions 

applies.” Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 186 (Pa. 2016) 

(citation omitted).

Stapp filed the instant petition more than four years after her judgment 

of sentence became final and she did not establish the applicability of any of 

the exceptions to the PCRA time-bar. Instead, she raises multiple claims of 

ineffective assistance of plea counsel, which do not constitute a basis for relief 

from the PCRA’s timeliness requirement. “It is well settled that allegations of 

ineffective assistance of counsel will not overcome the jurisdictional timeliness 

requirements of the PCRA.” Commonwealth v Wharton, 886 A.2d 1120, 

1127 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Zeigler, 

148 A.3d 849, 853 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“Appellant’s claim of plea counsel’s 

ineffectiveness does not satisfy an exception to the PCRA time bar.”) (citation 

omitted). Likewise, Stapp’s challenges to the voluntariness of her plea, the 

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(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to 

the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise 

of due diligence; or

(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized 

by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court 

of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and 

has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).
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conduct of the prosecutor relating to her mental health evaluation,6 and the 

discretionary aspects of her sentence do not implicate any of the three 

timeliness exceptions.

Therefore, Stapp’s petition is time-barred and the PCRA court lacked 

jurisdiction to review it. Accordingly, we affirm the court’s order dismissing 

the petition.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/13/2020

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6 The PCRA court notes that all parties and the trial court were provided with 

Stapp’s mental health evaluation at the time of her plea and sentencing. (See

PCRA Ct. Op., at 10 n. 22).