Opinion filed June 17, 2021

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals

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No. 11-20-00290-CV

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IN THE INTEREST OF P.M., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 326th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 9855-CX

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

This is an appeal from an order in which the trial court terminated the parental 

rights of the mother of P.M. The mother filed this appeal. On appeal, she presents 

a single issue in which she challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial 

court’s best interest finding. Because the evidence is sufficient to support the 

challenged finding, we affirm the trial court’s order.

Termination Standards and Findings

The termination of parental rights must be supported by clear and convincing 

evidence. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b) (West Supp. 2020). To determine if 

the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we review all of the 

evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine whether a rational 
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trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. 

In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence is 

factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on 

the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about 

the truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25–26 (Tex. 

2002). We note that the trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility and demeanor 

of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (citing In re J.L., 163 

S.W.3d 79, 86–87 (Tex. 2005)).

With respect to the best interest of a child, no unique set of factors need be 

proved. In re C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d 261, 266 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. denied). 

But courts may use the non-exhaustive Holley factors to shape their analysis. 

Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976). These include, but are not 

limited to, (1) the desires of the child, (2) the emotional and physical needs of the 

child now and in the future, (3) the emotional and physical danger to the child now 

and in the future, (4) the parental abilities of the individuals seeking custody, (5) the 

programs available to assist these individuals to promote the best interest of the 

child, (6) the plans for the child by these individuals or by the agency seeking 

custody, (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement, (8) the acts or 

omissions of the parent that may indicate that the existing parent–child relationship 

is not a proper one, and (9) any excuse for the acts or omissions of the parent. Id. 

Additionally, evidence that proves one or more statutory grounds for termination 

may also constitute evidence illustrating that termination is in the child’s best 

interest. C.J.O., 325 S.W.3d at 266.

In this case, the trial court entered an order of termination in which it found 

that Appellant had committed three of the acts listed in Section 161.001(b)(1). See

FAM. § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (N), (O). Appellant does not challenge these findings on 

appeal. The trial court also found, pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(2), that 
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termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in the best interest of P.M. See 

id. § 161.001(b)(2). It is this finding that Appellant challenges on appeal.

Evidence at Trial

At the time of trial, P.M. was twelve years old and had been in the care of the 

Department of Family and Protective Services for almost one year. P.M. had been 

removed from Appellant’s care after P.M. made an outcry that he had been sexually 

assaulted by a relative. The intake also included an allegation that Appellant was 

using drugs while P.M. was in her care. P.M. subsequently tested positive for 

methamphetamine, was removed from Appellant’s care, and was placed in foster 

care. P.M.’s father was deceased.

The trial court ordered Appellant to participate in various services in order for

P.M. to be returned to her care. Appellant did not comply. She failed to obtain a 

stable home or stable employment, attend parenting classes, go to the NOAH project, 

get in-patient treatment, obtain a psychological evaluation, and go to counseling. 

She also continued to use methamphetamine, testing positive at a “very, very high” 

level less than three weeks before the final hearing in this cause.

The record also shows that, throughout the case below, Appellant failed to 

maintain contact with the Department and that she had not addressed the reasons for 

removal. Additionally, Appellant had a long history with the Department that 

revealed a pattern of parenting issues. The past cases dealt not only with P.M. but 

also with Appellant’s other children, who were not in Appellant’s care at the time of 

P.M.’s removal—either because they had been placed elsewhere or because

Appellant’s parental rights had been terminated.

According to the permanency case manager, P.M. was doing very well in 

foster care. P.M. had been placed in a long-term foster home, but the Department’s 

goal for P.M. was for him to be adopted—either by a relative or a nonrelative. The 

case manager believed that, even though P.M. desired to maintain contact with 
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Appellant, it would be in P.M.’s best interest for Appellant’s parental rights to be 

terminated. She explained that Appellant and P.M. loved each other and were 

bonded but that not terminating Appellant’s parental rights would leave P.M. in 

limbo indefinitely, “getting his hopes up over and over.” Appellant’s inability to be 

an appropriate parent and provide for P.M. guided the case manager’s conclusion 

that termination would be in P.M.’s best interest. If Appellant’s rights were 

terminated, P.M. would be available for adoption and, therefore, could be placed on 

the “TARE website.” The case manager described P.M. as “a great kid” who 

“deserves a forever home.” The trial court conferred with P.M. off the record.

Best Interest—Analysis

We note that the trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses 

at a trial and that we are not at liberty to disturb the determinations of the trier of fact 

as long as those determinations are not unreasonable. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 

573 (Tex. 2005). Based upon the evidence in the record, as set forth above, and the 

Holley factors, we cannot hold that the trial court’s best interest finding is not 

supported by clear and convincing evidence. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 371–72. We 

hold that the trial court could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction that 

termination of Appellant’s parental rights would be in P.M.’s best interest. See id. 

Upon considering the record as it relates to the desires of the child, the emotional 

and physical needs of the child now and in the future, the emotional and physical 

danger to the child now and in the future, the parental abilities of those involved, the 

plans for the child by the Department, Appellant’s continued use of 

methamphetamine, Appellant’s long history with the Department, and the instability 

of Appellant’s situation, we further hold that the evidence is legally and factually 

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental 

rights is in the best interest of P.M. See id. Accordingly, we overrule Appellant’s 

sole issue on appeal.
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This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the trial court’s order of termination.

W. BRUCE WILLIAMS

JUSTICE

June 17, 2021

Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,

Trotter, J., and Williams, J.