[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Shanahan, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-448.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-448

THE STATE EX REL. CINCINNATI ENQUIRER v. SHANAHAN, JUDGE.

THE STATE EX REL. VOLOKH v. SHANAHAN, JUDGE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Shanahan, Slip Opinion 

No. 2022-Ohio-448.]

Mandamus—Prohibition—Writs sought to compel a judge to grant full access to 

documents filed in a lawsuit brought by a police officer and to prevent the 

judge from continuing to permit the police officer to proceed with the 

lawsuit under a pseudonym—Writs granted.

(Nos. 2021-0047 and 2021-0169—Submitted November 9, 2021—Decided 

February 17, 2022.)

IN MANDAMUS and PROHIBITION.

__________________

STEWART, J.

{¶ 1} In July 2020, a Cincinnati police officer using the pseudonym “M.R.” 

filed a complaint for injunctive relief in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas 
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alleging that several people, whom he named as defendants, had publicly made the 

false claim that he is a white supremacist. Along with his complaint, M.R. filed a 

motion for a temporary restraining order and an affidavit in support of the motion. 

Respondent, Judge Megan E. Shanahan, allowed M.R. to proceed in the lawsuit using 

the pseudonym and partially sealed M.R.’s affidavit at his request.

{¶ 2} Relators, the Cincinnati Enquirer(“the Enquirer”) and Eugene Volokh,

filed separate original actions in this court, each seeking a writ of mandamus and a 

writ of prohibition to compel Judge Shanahan to grant full access to M.R.’s affidavit 

and to prevent the judge from continuing to permit M.R. to use a pseudonym. We 

granted alternative writs in both cases and consolidated the cases for the submission 

of evidence and briefs. 162 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2021-Ohio-1398, 166 N.E.3d 1270; 

162 Ohio St.3d 1442, 2021-Ohio-1398, 166 N.E.3d 1273. We now consolidate the 

cases for the purpose of this opinion and grant the writs.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Proceedings in the common pleas court

{¶ 3} On June 24, 2020, M.R. was on duty providing crowd control and 

security for a meeting at Cincinnati’s city hall. M.R. alleges that he was in a hallway 

“occupied by a loud, unruly crowd of people that were anti-police and urging City 

Council to defund the police” when he made an “okay” hand gesture to someone who 

had asked him about the status of another officer who had just left the scene. Some 

people in the crowd interpreted the gesture as a white-supremacy hand signal. M.R. 

alleges that the next day, several people made derogatory comments about him on 

social media, portraying him as a white supremacist. In addition, two people filed 

complaints about M.R.’s conduct with the city’s Citizen Complaint Authority. See 

Cincinnati City Code, Article XXVIII (creating the Citizen Complaint Authority).

{¶ 4} On July 22, 2020, M.R. filed a complaint in the Hamilton County 

Common Pleas Court against Julie Niesen, James Noe, Terhas White, Alissa Gilley, 

“Friends of Bones,” and John Does Nos. 1 through 20. M.R. alleged claims of false-
January Term, 2022

3

light invasion of privacy, defamation, injury based on the criminal act of making a 

false claim against a peace officer (civil remedy permitted under R.C. 2307.60), and 

negligence/recklessness. When M.R. filed his complaint, he sought leave to proceed 

under a pseudonym and to file under seal his affidavit in support of his motion for a 

temporary restraining order. The affidavit included some personal details about M.R. 

(including his actual name and the fact that he has a wife and children) and had 

attached to it as exhibits several social-media posts and the citizen complaints that 

had been filed against him. Judge Shanahan granted M.R.’s requests that same day.

{¶ 5} On July 27, the Enquirer filed a motion under Sup.R. 45(F) to unseal 

the affidavit. Volokh filed a similar motion on August 5. The Enquirer later 

withdrew its motion, but Judge Shanahan eventually held a hearing on Volokh’s 

motion. The hearing consisted only of arguments by counsel; although M.R.’s 

counsel played a surveillance video of the June 24 incident, no witnesses testified, 

and no evidence was admitted. M.R.’s counsel argued that it was appropriate to allow 

M.R. to proceed using a pseudonym and to keep the affidavit sealed because people 

were acting “with actual malice intending to injure [M.R.] by releasing his private, 

personal, confidential information.”

{¶ 6} Judge Shanahan issued a second sealing order on September 21, 2020, 

finding that “risk of injury to persons, individual privacy rights and interests, and 

public safety” supported restricting public access to M.R.’s name and affidavit. The 

order stated:

The plaintiff, a police officer, is involved in the apprehension of very 

violent and dangerous criminals. The officer’s job duties expose the 

officer to physical harm. To require that a document with identifying 

information be available to the public would further risk injury to the 

officer and others. In the current climate, with the uptick in violent 

acts being perpetrated against law enforcement both on-duty and off, 
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active and retired, the Court finds there is a real and serious threat of 

physical harm. In the present case, one defendant has threatened, in 

writing, to publish the officer’s personal identifying information and 

other information for the purpose of “doxing”[1]the officer. The 

Court finds this to be a real and present threat.

{¶ 7} Although Judge Shanahan did not expressly identify the evidence 

supporting her finding that M.R. had been threatened, she likely was referring to a 

social-media post that was attached as an exhibit to M.R.’s affidavit. The author of 

that post stated that he was thinking about publicizing M.R.’s name, address, and 

phone numbers but expressed concern about the legality of doing so. After 

exchanging messages with others, the poster ultimately stated that he would keep the 

information to himself, “[f]or now.”

{¶ 8} Judge Shanahan’s second sealing order continued to allow M.R. to 

proceed pseudonymously but it modified the original order by making parts of M.R.’s 

affidavit available to the public. The partially redacted affidavit omitted all 

references to M.R.’s name and to the fact that M.R. has a wife and children. The 

exhibits to the affidavit remained sealed.

B. Identification of M.R. from other sources

{¶ 9} The parties to these cases have presented evidence showing that M.R.’s 

identity has been revealed publicly multiple times since he filed his complaint.

{¶ 10} Judge Shanahan submitted four news articles published by the 

Enquirer that name the police officer as the plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit and as 

the person against whom citizen complaints were made alleging the use of a whitesupremacy hand gesture. In addition, Volokh submitted a redacted transcript of a 

1. “Dox” is an informal word that means to “publicly identify or publish private information about

(someone) especially as a form of punishment or revenge.” https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/dox (accessed Jan. 6, 2022) [https://perma.cc/P7TE-CMYC].
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hearing held before a common-pleas-court magistrate on September 18, 2020, on a 

petition for a civil protection order filed by M.R.’s wife. M.R.’s wife had sought a 

civil protection order against someone who had allegedly used social media to 

identify her as M.R.’s wife, publicize her address, and disclose the fact that she has 

children. During the hearing, M.R.’s wife’s attorney (who is also M.R.’s attorney) 

referred to M.R. by name and identified him as the police officer who filed the lawsuit 

underlying these cases.

C. The mandamus and prohibition claims

{¶ 11} In these original actions, the Enquirer and Volokh seek writs of 

mandamus to compel Judge Shanahan to grant public access to all court records in 

M.R.’s case and to direct M.R. to file a complaint using his name. They also seek 

writs of prohibition to prevent the judge from enforcing her sealing orders.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Joint motion for in camera review

{¶ 12} The parties have jointly moved the court to review in camera M.R.’s 

unredacted affidavit. Because the unredacted affidavit is relevant to the issues 

presented, the motion is warranted.

{¶ 13} The request, however, is complicated by the fact that the parties in 

these cases (the Enquirer, Volokh, and Judge Shanahan) do not have access to the 

unredacted affidavit. But this court has access to the affidavit because it is part of the 

record of a pending discretionary appeal involving M.R.’s lawsuit, Supreme Court 

case No. 2020-1131, M.R. v. Niesen. The parties have jointly requested that we direct 

the clerk of this court to supplement the record in these cases with that document,

under seal. We grant that request and direct the clerk to supplement the record in 

these cases with the unredacted affidavit. Because we are granting writs of 

mandamus ordering Judge Shanahan to make the unredacted affidavit fully 

accessible to the public, there is no need for the clerk to file the affidavit under seal.
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So, we grant the request to supplement the record with the unredacted affidavit 

(including its attached exhibits) but deny the request to file the affidavit under seal.

B. Distinguishing between the law that applies to the sealing of the affidavit

and the law that applies to the use of the pseudonym

{¶ 14} Documents filed in a judicial action generally are “case documents” 

under Sup.R. 44(C)(1). A case document is a “court record,” Sup.R. 44(B), and 

“[c]ourt records are presumed open to public access,” Sup.R. 45(A).

{¶ 15} But a document is not considered to be a case document—and thus is 

not open to public access—if a court has restricted access to it under Sup.R. 45(E). 

Sup.R. 44(C)(2)(c). Sup.R. 45(E)(2) provides that a court shall restrict public access 

to a case document “if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption 

of allowing public access is outweighed by a higher interest.” The rule directs a court 

to consider (1) “[w]hether public policy is served by restricting public access,” 

(2) “[w]hether any state, federal, or common law exempts the document or 

information from public access,” and (3) “[w]hether factors that support restriction 

of public access exist, including risk of injury to persons, individual privacy rights 

and interests, proprietary business information, public safety, and fairness of the 

adjudicatory process.” Sup.R. 45(E)(2). When a court restricts public access, it must 

use “the least restrictive means available.” Sup.R. 45(E)(3).

{¶ 16} Judge Shanahan’s restriction of access to M.R.’s affidavit prevents 

the public from seeing a document that was filed in M.R.’s case. That restriction 

falls squarely within the scope of Sup.R. 45(E).

{¶ 17} M.R. also invoked Sup.R. 45(E) in seeking leave to proceed under a 

pseudonym. M.R. relied on Sup.R. 45(E)(3), which provides that “[w]hen 

restricting public access to a case document or information in a case document 

pursuant to this division, the court shall use the least restrictive means available, 

including * * * (e) [u]sing initials or other identifier for the parties’ proper names.” 

But Judge Shanahan’s order cannot be viewed as an application of Sup.R.
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7

45(E)(3)(e), which assumes that the court possesses a document that needs to be 

restricted in some way. Sup.R. 45(E)(3)(e) does not apply here, because Judge 

Shanahan never restricted access to any part of M.R.’s complaint. Sup.R. 45 does 

not authorize a person in M.R.’s situation to file a complaint using a pseudonym, nor 

does it authorize a judge to validate such a filing. The pseudonym issue therefore 

cannot be analyzed under the framework of Sup.R. 45.

C. The sealing of the affidavit

1. Mandamus

a. Legal standard

{¶ 18} To be entitled to a writ of mandamus, a relator must establish by 

clear and convincing evidence a clear legal right to the requested relief and a clear 

legal duty on the part of the respondent to provide it. State ex rel. Waters v. Spaeth, 

131 Ohio St.3d 55, 2012-Ohio-69, 960 N.E.2d 452, ¶ 6, 13. A relator in a 

mandamus case usually must also demonstrate that he lacks an adequate remedy in 

the ordinary course of law. Id. But Sup.R. 47(B) provides that a person aggrieved 

by a court’s failure to comply with Sup.R. 44 through 47 may pursue an action in 

mandamus under R.C. Chapter 2731. Because the rule authorizes a mandamus 

action, the Enquirer and Volokh do not need to show that they have no other 

remedy. See State ex rel. Xenia v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 160 Ohio St.3d 

495, 2020-Ohio-3423, 159 N.E.3d 262, ¶ 7.

{¶ 19} These mandamus claims require us to review the correctness of Judge 

Shanahan’s orders. Judge Shanahan argues that in doing so we may examine only 

whether she complied with Sup.R. 45(E)’s procedural requirements. She invokes the 

rule that “mandamus will not lie to control judicial discretion, even if that discretion 

is abused,” State ex rel. Rashada v. Pianka, 112 Ohio St.3d 44, 2006-Ohio-6366, 857 

N.E.2d 1220, ¶ 3. But in cases like these—when a court has shielded documents 

under Sup.R. 45(E) and a nonparty seeks mandamus relief—we have reviewed the 

trial-court order de novo. See State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Lyons, 140 Ohio 
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8

St.3d 7, 2014-Ohio-2354, 14 N.E.3d 989, ¶ 15, 31; State ex rel. Vindicator Printing 

Co. v. Wolff, 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 2012-Ohio-3328, 974 N.E.2d 89, ¶ 34, 37; see also 

State ex rel. Scripps Howard Broadcasting Co. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Div., 73 Ohio St.3d 19, 23, 652 N.E.2d 179 (1995) (applying de novo 

review in case decided prior to the promulgation of Sup.R. 45). We therefore need 

not defer to Judge Shanahan’s factual findings.

b. Clear legal right/clear legal duty

{¶ 20} The issue here is whether Judge Shanahan improperly restricted 

access to M.R.’s affidavit under Sup.R. 45(E). If the judge erred, M.R.’s unredacted 

affidavit is a case document under Sup.R. 44(C)(1). And if the affidavit is a case 

document, then the Enquirer and Volokh have a clear legal right to access it and 

Judge Shanahan has a clear legal duty to allow access. See Sup.R. 44(B) and 45(A).

{¶ 21} Sup.R. 45(E)(2) authorizes a court to restrict public access to a 

document only “if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the presumption of 

allowing public access is outweighed by a higher interest.” Judge Shanahan 

acknowledges that the party promoting the restriction has the burden of proof. So,

for the Enquirer and Volokh to prevail, they need to show only that the judge’s 

findings were not supported by clear and convincing evidence.

{¶ 22} As noted above, Sup.R. 45(E)(2) provides a nonexhaustive list of 

factors a court must consider when deciding whether to restrict public access to a 

document. In her second sealing order, Judge Shanahan found that “risk of injury to 

persons, individual privacy rights and interests, and public safety” supported 

restricting public access to M.R.’s affidavit. In the judge’s view, identifying M.R. 

would increase the risk of physical harm to M.R. and his family, particularly “[i]n 

the current climate, with the uptick in violent acts being perpetrated against law 

enforcement.” The judge noted that one of the defendants had “threatened, in writing, 

to publish [M.R.’s] personal identifying information and other information for the 

purpose of ‘doxing’ [M.R.].”
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9

{¶ 23} The Enquirer and Volokh argue that these findings were not supported 

by evidence, much less the clear and convincing evidence required under Sup.R.

45(E)(2). They contend that M.R. did not present any evidence showing that he has 

been threatened and that Judge Shanahan merely speculated about the general risks 

police officers face. The Enquirer and Volokh also note that although M.R. testified 

in his affidavit that his work as a police officer causes him to be concerned for his 

personal safety and the safety of his family, he failed to tie those concerns to his 

lawsuit or the incident at city hall.

{¶ 24} For her part, Judge Shanahan argues that there is evidence that one of 

the defendants “claimed to be in possession of M.R.’s address, with the clear intent 

of eventually publishing it to his followers.” The judge adds, without elaboration, 

that “M.R.’s complaint makes numerous allegations of social media postings that 

certainly could be considered threatening in nature.” At bottom, the judge attempts 

to justify her orders by arguing that “at least one defendant has threatened to publish 

M.R.’s personal identifying information for the purpose of ‘doxing’ the officer.”

{¶ 25} Judge Shanahan has not shown that the evidence clearly and 

convincingly justified restricting access to M.R.’s affidavit. To start, the socialmedia post the judge refers to did not express a clear intent to publicize M.R.’s name, 

address, and phone numbers. The poster posed a question about whether it would 

be legal for him to release information about M.R. Although the poster left open 

the possibility that he might release M.R.’s information, he suggested that he would 

not do so unless he was told that it was legal. Moreover, making M.R.’s affidavit 

publicly available would not increase the risk that the poster would publish M.R.’s 

name, address, and phone numbers, because the poster already has that information.

{¶ 26} And even if the poster’s statement constituted a genuine threat to 

publicize M.R.’s information, Judge Shanahan has not shown that the publication 

would create a risk of injury to M.R. or his family within the meaning of Sup.R. 

45(E)(2). See United States v. Cook, 472 F.Supp.3d 326, 335 (N.D.Miss.2020) 
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(discussing “doxing” and concluding that “sharing public information, while 

potentially offensive and disagreeable, does not rise to the level of a true threat”). 

Although in her order restricting public access to M.R.’s affidavit Judge Shanahan 

cited real risks that police officers face, M.R. had not presented any evidence of a 

threat of physical harm directed at him or his family.

{¶ 27} As a final matter, Judge Shanahan argues that the Enquirer and 

Volokh have not been harmed by the partial sealing of M.R.’s affidavit, because her 

courtroom remains open to the public and the Enquirer has published the name of 

the person it believes to be M.R. The issue, however, is not whether the Enquirer

and Volokh have knowledge of M.R.’s identity or whether they can publish his name. 

The issue is whether documents filed in M.R.’s case are court records that must be 

accessible to the public. The Enquirer and Volokh do not need to prove that they 

have been injured to be entitled to relief in mandamus in these cases.

{¶ 28} The Enquirer and Volokh have a clear legal right of public access to 

M.R.’s affidavit, and Judge Shanahan has a clear legal duty to provide that access. 

Accordingly, we grant a writ of mandamus in both cases ordering Judge Shanahan

to make the affidavit fully accessible to the public.

2. Prohibition

{¶ 29} To be entitled to writs of prohibition, the Enquirer and Volokh must 

prove that Judge Shanahan has exercised or is about to exercise judicial power 

without authority and that they lack an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of 

law. State ex rel. Sliwinski v. Burnham Unruh, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 

886 N.E.2d 201, ¶ 7. In Wolff, when we issued a writ of mandamus to compel access 

to court records, we also issued a writ of prohibition to invalidate the trial court’s 

erroneous orders and prevent the judge from restricting access. 132 Ohio St.3d 481, 

2012-Ohio-3328, 974 N.E.2d 89, at ¶ 38-40. For the reasons discussed above, we

hold that the Enquirer and Volokh have shown that they are entitled to writs of 

prohibition to prevent Judge Shanahan from restricting access to M.R.’s affidavit. 
January Term, 2022

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See also State ex rel. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Geauga Cty. Court of Common 

Pleas, Juvenile Div., 90 Ohio St.3d 79, 82, 734 N.E.2d 1214 (2000) (“Prohibition is 

the appropriate action to challenge trial court orders restricting public access to 

pending litigation”).

D. The use of the pseudonym

1. Prohibition is the appropriate remedy

{¶ 30} Civ.R. 10(A) requires plaintiffs to provide their names and addresses 

in the captions of their complaints. The rule ensures that judicial proceedings will 

be conducted in public, Doe v. Bruner, 12th Dist. Clinton No. CA2011-07-013, 

2012-Ohio-761, ¶ 5, and it supports the principle that “[t]he people have a right to 

know who is using their courts,” Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of 

Wisconsin, 112 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir.1997).

{¶ 31} The public’s right to know a litigant’s identity derives from the 

United States and Ohio Constitutions and the common law. See Doe v. Stegall, 653 

F.2d 180, 185-186 (5th Cir.1981) (recognizing that a party’s use of a pseudonym 

implicates the public’s First Amendment rights); Ohio Constitution, Article I, 

Section 16 (“All courts shall be open * * *”); Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile 

Corp., 214 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir.2000) (“Plaintiffs’ use of fictitious names runs 

afoul of the public’s common law right of access to judicial proceedings”). The 

public, therefore, must have a way to challenge a court order that limits access to 

judicial proceedings. See Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk Cty., 

457 U.S. 596, 609, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982), fn. 25. The Enquirer

and Volokh each seek both a writ of mandamus and a writ of prohibition.

{¶ 32} The Enquirer and Volokh seek writs of mandamus to compel Judge 

Shanahan to “order M.R. to proceed under his real name.” Although the Enquirer

and Volokh frame their mandamus claims in terms of compelling Judge Shanahan 

to act, in substance they seek to undo the effect of her orders allowing M.R. to forgo 

the requirements of Civ.R. 10(A). Under these facts, the appropriate remedy is 
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prohibition, not mandamus. Indeed, in cases involving other types of limitations 

on public access, we have held that “prohibition is the only remedy available to 

nonparties who wish to challenge an order which restricts the rights of free speech 

and press.” (Emphasis sic.) State ex rel. News Herald v. Ottawa Cty. Court of 

Common Pleas, Juvenile Div., 77 Ohio St.3d 40, 43, 671 N.E.2d 5 (1996) 

(involving a gag order); see also Plain Dealer, 90 Ohio St.3d at 82, 734 N.E.2d 

1214 (involving a court order denying public access to court proceedings).

2. Standard of review

{¶ 33} As previously mentioned, to be entitled to writs of prohibition, the 

Enquirer and Volokh must prove that Judge Shanahan has exercised or is about to 

exercise judicial power without authority and that they lack an adequate remedy in 

the ordinary course of law. Sliwinski, 118 Ohio St.3d 76, 2008-Ohio-1734, 886 

N.E.2d 201, at ¶ 7. There is no question that Judge Shanahan has exercised judicial 

power. Nor is there any question that the Enquirer and Volokh lack an adequate 

remedy in the ordinary course of law. Judge Shanahan argues that Sup.R. 45(F)(1) 

provides an adequate remedy because it allows “any person” to file a motion 

requesting access to a case document that has been restricted under Sup.R. 45(E). 

But as discussed above, Sup.R. 45 does not apply to Judge Shanahan’s decision 

allowing M.R. to use a pseudonym.

{¶ 34} As to whether Judge Shanahan lacked authority to allow M.R. to use 

a pseudonym, the judge argues that the scope of our review is limited to whether 

she abused her discretion. In support, the judge points to several cases in which an 

appellate court reviewed whether a trial court had abused its discretion by granting 

or denying a party’s motion to proceed pseudonymously. It appears that when 

reviewing such orders on appeal, appellate courts regularly review them for an 

abuse of discretion. See, e.g., Bruner, 2012-Ohio-761, at ¶ 8; Doe v. Megless, 654 

F.3d 404, 407 (3d Cir.2011); Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 

190 (2d Cir.2008); Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir.2004); Unwitting 
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13

Victim v. C.S., 273 Kan. 937, 949, 47 P.3d 392 (2002); Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d 

at 1069; M.M. v. Zavaras, 139 F.3d 798, 802 (1998); James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 

233, 239 (4th Cir.1993); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320, 323 (11th Cir.1992).

{¶ 35} But the cases before us are not appeals. They are original actions in 

which nonparties to the underlying litigation claim infringement of their 

constitutional and common-law rights. These cases require us to decide a legal 

question: Has M.R. overcome the constitutional and common-law presumption that 

he must litigate his lawsuit using his actual name? We cannot defer to Judge 

Shanahan’s answer to that question, because doing so would reverse the 

presumption of openness by requiring the Enquirer and Volokh to show that they 

have a right to see M.R.’s name on court filings. We therefore consider de novo

whether it is appropriate for M.R. to proceed using a pseudonym.

3. M.R.’s use of a pseudonym

{¶ 36} It is the rare exception for a litigant to be allowed to proceed 

anonymously. See Megless at 408. A court may excuse a plaintiff from identifying 

himself only when his “privacy interests substantially outweigh the presumption of 

open judicial proceedings.” Porter at 560. Courts have identified numerous factors 

that may be relevant to balancing a plaintiff’s privacy interests against the 

presumption of openness. See, e.g., Porter at 560-561, citing Stegall, 653 F.2d at 

186; Sealed Plaintiff at 190. Relevant to the cases before us, two factors are at 

issue—threat of retaliation against the plaintiff and public disclosure of the 

plaintiff’s identity.

{¶ 37} M.R. asked to remain anonymous based on his concern that someone 

had threatened to publish his personal information. Judge Shanahan found that this 

threat was real and could lead to an act of violence against M.R. or his family. But 

this potential threat against M.R. was insufficient to justify his use of a pseudonym. 

A plaintiff seeking to proceed anonymously for fear of retaliation must show that 

the filing of the lawsuit causes a risk of retaliation. See Porter, 370 F.3d at 560-
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562; Sealed Plaintiff, 537 F.3d at 190; Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186; Bruner, 2012-Ohio761, at ¶ 9. M.R. did not establish that causal connection; he did not show that any 

risk of harm against him or his family would increase if he were required to 

prosecute his lawsuit using his name.

{¶ 38} Moreover, M.R. did not show that the threat of his name, address, 

and phone numbers being published was the sort of threat that could justify the use 

of a pseudonym. The Ninth Circuit has identified three factors that courts should 

consider when a plaintiff alleges that the use of a pseudonym is necessary to protect 

against a threat of retaliation: “(1) the severity of the threatened harm, (2) the 

reasonableness of the anonymous party’s fears, and (3) the anonymous party’s 

vulnerability to such retaliation.” (Citations omitted.) Advanced Textile, 214 F.3d 

at 1068. M.R. did not show that anyone actually threatened him or his family or 

that his concerns are reasonable.

{¶ 39} As noted in a parenthetical above, a threat to publicize someone’s 

name, address, and phone numbers, though potentially “offensive and 

disagreeable,” does not create an inherent risk of injury to that person. Cook, 472 

F.Supp.3d at 335. M.R. and Judge Shanahan both cited real risks that police officers 

face, and they referred to current societal factors that may put law-enforcement

officers at an even greater risk of harm. But these general risks do not show that 

M.R. “uniquely will face an increased threat of violence—above the generalized 

threat of violence that all police officers face—as a result of filing [his] lawsuit,” 

Doe v. McKesson, 322 F.R.D. 456, 458 (M.D.La.2017), vacated on other grounds 

sub nom. McKesson v. Doe, __ U.S. __, 141 S.Ct. 48, 208 L.Ed.2d 158 (2020); see 

also Doe v. McKesson, 945 F.3d 818, 835 (5th Cir.2019), fn. 12 (affirming the

district court’s decision disallowing the use of a pseudonym), vacated on other 

grounds sub nom. McKesson v. Doe, __ U.S. __, 141 S.Ct. 48, 208 L.Ed.2d 158.

{¶ 40} And finally, even if M.R. had identified a threat of harm attributable 

to the filing of his lawsuit, the weight of his privacy interest diminished 
January Term, 2022

15

significantly when he disclosed in his complaint that on June 25, 2020, Terhas 

White and Alissa Gilley filed citizen complaints against him with the Citizen 

Complaint Authority. M.R. acknowledged that those complaints—which disclose 

his name—are public records. And the Enquirer referred to the citizen complaints 

when it published four news articles identifying M.R. by name. Thus, M.R. himself 

did not completely conceal his identity in filing his lawsuit and undermined his 

claimed right to privacy. In addition, M.R.’s attorney disclosed M.R.’s identity in 

open court while seeking a civil protection order on behalf of M.R.’s wife.

{¶ 41} Judge Shanahan suggests that the reporting of M.R.’s identity 

supports the continued use of a pseudonym, because it shows that the Enquirer and 

Volokh know his identity and have not been harmed. The judge argues that “[t]he 

only practical effect of [her] order allowing M.R. to proceed pseudonymously is 

that a member of the public cannot glean his identity with a simple search of the 

clerk’s website.” But that is exactly the point—the public (not just the relators in 

these cases) has a right to know who is using the court. Except in rare cases, the 

public has a right to learn that information from the court itself.

{¶ 42} Judge Shanahan has the authority to excuse M.R. from identifying 

himself in his complaint only if M.R.’s “privacy interests substantially outweigh the 

presumption of open judicial proceedings.” Porter, 370 F.3d at 560. M.R. failed to 

identify any significant privacy interest, and he undermined any privacy interest he 

did have by disclosing information that led to the discovery of his identity. We grant 

a writ of prohibition in both cases vacating Judge Shanahan’s orders and barring 

Judge Shanahan from allowing M.R. to proceed using a pseudonym.

III. CONCLUSION

{¶ 43} We grant the parties’ request to direct the clerk of this court to 

supplement the record in these cases with the unredacted affidavit of M.R. (including 

its attached exhibits) that is part of the record in case No. 2020-1131, M.R. v. Niesen

(docket item No. 11 in the supplemental record filed on April 26, 2021), but we deny 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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the motion asking that the affidavit be filed under seal. We grant the writs of 

mandamus ordering Judge Shanahan to allow complete public access to M.R.’s 

affidavit. We also grant writs of prohibition, vacating Judge Shanahan’s orders and 

barring Judge Shanahan from allowing M.R. to proceed using a pseudonym.

Writs granted.

O’CONNOR, C.J., and FISCHER, DEWINE, DONNELLY, and BRUNNER, JJ., 

concur.

KENNEDY, J., concurs in judgment only.

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Graydon Head & Ritchey, L.L.P., John C. Greiner, Darren W. Ford, and 

Kellie A. Kulka, for relator in 2021-0047, the Cincinnati Enquirer.

Stagnaro, Saba & Patterson, Co., L.P.A., and Jeffrey M. Nye, for relator in 

2021-0169, Eugene Volokh.

Joseph T. Deters, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and Pamela J. 

Sears, Michael J. Friedmann, and James S. Sayre, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, 

for respondent.

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