SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3984-14T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JUAN D. OSBORNE,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________________

Submitted May 8, 2017 – Decided May 24, 2017

Before Judges Nugent and Currier.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 

13-05-0740.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney 

for appellant (Daniel V. Gautieri, Assistant 

Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the 

brief).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General, 

attorney for respondent (Sarah E. Ross, Deputy 

Attorney General, of counsel and on the 

brief).

PER CURIAM

After losing a suppression motion, defendant Juan D. Osborne 

pleaded guilty to third-degree possession of a controlled 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." 

Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the 

parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3.
2 A-3984-14T1

dangerous substance (CDS), heroin, and a judge sentenced him to 

probation for one year. On appeal, defendant raises a single 

argument:

ONCE THE POLICE, WHO WERE EXECUTING A WARRANT 

TO SEARCH A PARTICULAR APARTMENT, REALIZED OR 

SHOULD HAVE REALIZED THAT THEY WERE IN A 

BASEMENT THAT WAS SHARED WITH OTHER TENANTS, 

THEY ACTED UNREASONABLY IN SEARCHING THERE 

BECAUSE THEY LACKED PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE 

THAT ANY ITEM THEY DISCOVERED WAS THE 

DEFENDANT'S.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm. 

In May 2013, a Monmouth County grand jury charged defendant 

in an indictment with five CDS offenses, including third-degree 

possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1). Following the 

indictment, defendant moved to suppress thirty bags of heroin 

police seized from the basement of the apartment house where he 

lived. The trial court denied the motion. Thereafter, defendant 

agreed to plead guilty to third-degree possession of heroin in 

exchange for the State recommending a non-custodial sentence and 

dismissing the indictment's remaining counts. The court sentenced 

defendant accordingly and imposed appropriate fines and penalties. 

Defendant appealed from the denial of his suppression motion.

Police conducted the search of defendant's apartment and the 

basement of the apartment building after obtaining a search 

warrant. Defendant does not dispute the warrant was lawfully 
3 A-3984-14T1

issued, nor does he challenge the search of his apartment. Rather, 

he challenges the search and seizure of CDS from the apartment 

building's basement.

Defendant lived in "Apartment #1" of an Asbury Park multifamily dwelling. The warrant described the building and 

defendant's residence as:

A three story, multiple family dwelling with 

yellow siding, white trim around the windows 

and doors, and a charcoal gray shingled roof. 

To the right of the center of the front of the 

house is a gray staircase with a gray railing 

leading to a porch. To the right of the stairs 

is a white column supporting the porch roof. 

On the white column are the numbers "512" 

written in black. There are two doors 

accessed from the porch, one directly in front 

of the stairs and the other on the left end 

of the porch. To the left of the main door 

are two mailboxes black in color. To the left 

of the building is a concrete driveway that 

warps around to a parking area. In the middle 

of the back of the building is a white door 

which accesses apartment #1[.]

The warrant authorized the search of "the residence hereinabovenamed including the curtilage and the shed." 

During the hearing on defendant's suppression motion,

Monmouth County Prosecutor's Detective Keith Finkelstein testified 

that on January 23, 2013, he and other law enforcement officers 

arrived at defendant's residence to execute the warrant. Detective 

Finkelstein described the residence as a "three-story house with 
4 A-3984-14T1

yellow siding" and noted the door to Apartment #1 was in the rear 

of the home. 

Detective Finkelstein went to the rear of the house and 

knocked on defendant's apartment door, but received no answer. 

The detective checked the knob, noticed the door was unlocked, and 

entered the home. Upon entering the residence, Detective 

Finkelstein noticed a series of hallways providing access to a 

small bedroom, bathroom, living room and kitchen. Inside the

kitchen was an unlocked door providing access to the basement. 

Detective Finkelstein opened the basement door and observed a 

"tiny landing in the stairs leading to the basement." The 

detective believed the basement was part of Apartment #1 because 

it was accessible from that apartment. The detective searched the 

basement and seized thirty bags of suspected heroin inside a red 

utility lamp. 

According to Detective Finkelstein, the basement had two 

doors: the one providing access to the basement from defendant's 

apartment, and another leading to the exterior driveway. The door

leading to the exterior driveway was secured by an exterior 

padlock. 

In addition to Detective Finkelstein, the State presented the 

testimony of the building's landlord. The landlord explained that 

the building was a "modified single family home" with three 
5 A-3984-14T1

separate apartments, all of which were occupied on the date of the 

search. He further explained that the basement, which spanned the 

entire building, is accessible only by two doors — one from the 

kitchen of Apartment #1 and the other from an exterior door to the 

backyard, padlocked from the outside. The building's tenants had

keys to the exterior padlocked door so they could check their fuse 

boxes. The landlord also testified that he and the other tenants 

stored some of their belongings in the basement. According to the 

landlord, the basement was a shared space; no tenant could place 

something in the basement that "would be protected from access 

from the other tenants." 

The trial court found the testimony of both witnesses 

"straightforward and credible" and denied the motion. In an oral 

opinion delivered from the bench, the court found the tenants had 

a diminished expectation of privacy in the basement "based on the 

fact that [they all] had access to" the items stored therein. The 

court found the search of the basement was within the warrant's 

scope. 

On appeal, defendant argues police unlawfully searched the 

basement "[b]ecause the police could not tell whose items were 

whose" and thus "lacked probable cause to believe that any 

particular items belonged to [defendant]." Defendant contends it 

was not objectively reasonable for Detective Finkelstein to 
6 A-3984-14T1

believe that only defendant had access to the basement, 

particularly in view of the landlord's testimony that the basement 

spanned the entire building. For these reasons, defendant argues 

the police should have contacted a judge by telephone to obtain a 

warrant for the basement or contacted the other tenants in the 

building to have them identify their belongings. 

We review a decision on a motion to suppress evidence by 

"accord[ing] deference to the factual findings of the trial 

court[.]" State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 32 (2016) (citation 

omitted). Our review of a trial court's legal conclusions is 

plenary. State v. Rockford, 213 N.J. 424, 440 (2013) (citations 

omitted). 

The Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article 

I, Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution require that a search 

warrant "particularly" describe the area to be searched. U.S. 

Const. amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Although "pin-point 

precision" is not required, a warrant must describe the premises 

to be searched with reasonable accuracy. State v. Wright, 61 N.J.

146, 149 (1972) (citations omitted). Stated another way, the 

description of the premises requires no more than "practical 

accuracy." State v. Daniels, 46 N.J. 428, 437 (1966). 

"[O]fficers searching a person's home . . . under authority 

of a search warrant are authorized to use only those investigatory 
7 A-3984-14T1

methods, and to search only those places, appropriate in light of 

the scope of the warrant." State v. Reldan, 100 N.J. 187, 195 

(1985) (citing Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145, 152, 67 S.

Ct. 1098, 1102, 91 L. Ed. 1399, 1407 (1947)). For these reasons,

"[a]n analysis of the reasonableness of the methods used in a 

search, as well as the areas searched, should focus upon whether 

the search in its totality was consistent with the object of the 

search." Ibid.

In this regard, "certain 'structures have been deemed 

appurtenant to the premises specified in the search warrant, though 

not physically . . . under the purview of the warrant.'" Wayne 

R. LaFave, Search and Seizure – A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment,

§ 4.10(a) at 940 (5th ed. 2012) (quoting United States v. Fagan, 

577 F.3d 10, 13 (1st Cir. 2009), cert. denied, Fagan v. United 

States, 559 U.S. 958, 130 S. Ct. 1556, 176 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2010)). 

"Structures that have been found to be appurtenant to described 

residential premises include storage closets, cabinets, storage 

rooms and bins, lockers, mailboxes, and birdhouses." Id. at 941.

Fagan involved a motion to suppress evidence seized from a 

storage closet by officers executing a search warrant for the 

neighboring apartment. Supra, 577 F.3d at 12. The court noted 

"[t]he Warrant Clause of the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted 

to permit searches not only of the premises specified in a warrant 
8 A-3984-14T1

but also of structures 'appurtenant' to those premises." Id. at 

11. Explaining that "case law . . . provides very little guidance 

as to how courts should determine whether or not a given structure 

is appurtenant to described premises[,]" the court determined 

the standard to be applied is one of objective 

reasonableness. So long as the officers 

executing the warrant have an objectively 

reasonable basis, in light of the known 

characteristics of the location and the 

evidence at hand, for concluding that a 

structure is appurtenant to the premises 

specified in the search warrant, that 

structure may validly be searched under the 

purview of the warrant.

[Id. at 13 (citation omitted).]

The court noted case law provided "guideposts" for courts 

determining "[w]hether a searching officer reasonably could 

conclude that a specific structure is appurtenant to the premises 

specified in a particular search warrant." Id. at 14. 

These include the proximity of the structure 

to the described premises, see [United States 

v. Ware, 890 F.2d 1008, 1011 (8th Cir. 1989)]

(holding that a storage room next to an 

apartment was "near enough to alert the 

searching officers that it was an appurtenance 

of the apartment"); the location's layout and 

the context-specific relationship between the 

structure and the premises specified in the 

warrant, see [United States v. Principe, 499 

F.2d 1135, 1137 (1st Cir. 1974)]; and 

extrinsic evidence, including evidence 

discovered during admittedly valid portions of 

the search, suggesting that the structure is 

appurtenant to the premises specified in the 

warrant, see Ware, [supra,] 890 F.2d at 1011 
9 A-3984-14T1

(observing that the defendant's key ring 

included keys to a storage room deemed 

appurtenant to the premises specified in the 

warrant).

[Ibid.]

Here, the officers who searched defendant's apartment could 

reasonably conclude the basement was appurtenant to the apartment. 

Defendant had immediate and unfettered access to the basement 

through an unlocked door in his apartment, which opened directly 

into the basement stairway. The only other means of ingress and 

egress to the basement was an exterior padlocked door. Thus, it 

appeared defendant had primary, if not exclusive, access to the 

basement connected to his apartment. Neither of the other two 

units in the building had a door leading to the basement. Under 

these circumstances, the trial court did not err by concluding the 

search of the basement did not exceed the scope of the warrant.

The trial court also concluded defendant had a diminished

expectation of privacy in the basement because, as the landlord 

testified, the landlord and the other tenants had access to the 

basement to check fuse boxes and for storage. Defendant argues 

the trial court erred by finding the search was lawful in view of

defendant's diminished expectation of privacy.

We have held in a somewhat different context — a 

superintendent of a multi-story, multi-unit apartment complex
10 A-3984-14T1

giving consent to law enforcement officers to search a locked room 

in the building's basement used to store recycling material, to 

which the superintendent, the defendant, and one other person had 

keys — "a worker sharing locked work space cannot reasonably have 

an expectation of privacy where other workmen have access to the 

same work space." State v. Brown, 282 N.J. Super. 538, 547 (App.

Div.), certif. denied, 143 N.J. 322 (1995). We further noted "a 

tenant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 

common areas of a building merely because doors to the common 

areas are normally kept locked and require a key for access." Id.

at 547 (citing United States v. Concepcion, 942 F.2d 1170, 1171-

72 (7th Cir. 1991)). Cf., State v. Saez, 268 N.J. Super. 250, 261 

(App. Div. 1993) (holding the defendants had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in their part of the basement partitioned 

off from the adjoining resident's part of the basement by a poorly 

constructed wooden wall that had holes or gaps through which law 

enforcement officers could observe drug activity), rev'd on other 

grounds, 139 N.J. 279, 280 (1995). 

Here, whether defendant had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in the basement is irrelevant, because the search of the 

basement was within the scope of the search warrant. No principle 

of New Jersey Constitutional law is inconsistent with the Fourth 

Amendment jurisprudential principle that appurtenances may be 
11 A-3984-14T1

searched under the authority of a warrant issued for a particular 

residence.

We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and found 

them to be without sufficient merit to warrant further discussion. 

R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.