Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-796 | November 29, 2018 Page 1 of 7

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

Dylan A. Vigh

Law Offices of Dylan A. Vigh, LLC

Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

Alexandra M. Curlin

Curlin & Clay Law Association of 

Attorneys

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

David Allen Turner,

Appellant-Respondent,

v.

Darla Jo Turner,

Appellee-Petitioner.

November 29, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

18A-DR-796

Appeal from the Marion Superior 

Court

The Honorable Kimberly D.

Mattingly, Judge Pro Tempore

Trial Court Cause No.

49D07-1605-DR-15637

Bailey, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-796 | November 29, 2018 Page 2 of 7

Case Summary

[1] After dissolving the marriage between David Allen Turner (“Husband”) and 

Darla Jo Turner (“Wife”), the trial court entered a decree in which it purported 

to equally divide the marital estate. Husband now appeals, arguing that the 

court abused its discretion by ordering an equal division of the marital estate.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Husband and Wife began cohabitating in 2004 and married seven years later in 

July 2011. They lived in a home Husband purchased in 1999. During the 

relationship, both Husband and Wife worked. Although Husband initially 

earned more, their earnings were comparable after Wife incurred student loans,

furthered her education, and obtained a higher-paying job in 2009. Husband 

and Wife maintained separate bank accounts and credit cards. They each took 

on different expenses, with Husband paying for the mortgage and Wife paying 

for utilities and groceries. Husband and Wife never had children together.

[4] In late April 2016—unbeknownst to Husband—Wife traded in a vehicle and 

obtained a loan for a new vehicle. Approximately one week later, Wife 

petitioned to dissolve the marriage. The trial court held a hearing on November 

30, 2017, after which it entered a dissolution decree, ordering that “[t]he assets 

and debts of this marriage shall be divided 50/50 and in accordance” with a list

the court had prepared. App. Vol. 2 at 14. Among the listed assets were 
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-796 | November 29, 2018 Page 3 of 7

retirement accounts, including an account Husband acquired through a former 

employer that Husband had worked for during part of the marriage. Although 

the trial court stated that it was equally dividing the marital estate, the court 

ordered that Wife was “solely responsible for the entirety of her student 

loans/debt,” id. at 14, amounting to approximately $51,042. Not taking those 

loans into account, the trial court determined that the marital estate was valued 

at $108,746, and then awarded 50% of that value to Husband and 50% to Wife.

[5] Husband now appeals.

Discussion and Decision

[6] We will not disturb a decision dividing marital property unless the trial court 

has abused its discretion. Fobar v. Vonderahe, 771 N.E.2d 57, 59 (Ind. 2002). 

The trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly against the logic 

and effect of the facts and circumstances before it, including the reasonable 

inferences to be drawn therefrom. Taylor v. Taylor, 436 N.E.2d 56, 58 (Ind. 

1982). Moreover, where—as here—a party has made a timely written request 

for special findings, the court “shall find the facts specially and state its 

conclusions thereon.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). We conduct a two-tiered review 

of those findings, first determining “whether the evidence supports the findings 

and then whether [the] findings support the judgment.” K.I. ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 

903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). In conducting our review, we do not reweigh 

the evidence, Stonger v. Sorrell, 776 N.E.2d 353, 358 (Ind. 2002), and must give 

“due regard . . . to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 
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the witnesses,” T.R. 52(A). We “shall not set aside the findings or judgment 

unless clearly erroneous.” Id. Findings are clearly erroneous when the record 

contains no facts to support them, either directly or by inference. Fischer v. 

Heymann, 12 N.E.3d 867, 870 (Ind. 2014). “A judgment is clearly erroneous 

when there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support 

the judgment.” J.H., 903 N.E.2d at 457. A judgment is also clearly erroneous 

when the court “applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts.” Id.

[7] In entering a dissolution decree, the trial court “shall divide the property of the 

parties . . . in a just and reasonable manner.” Ind. Code § 31-15-7-4. Under 

Indiana’s “one pot” approach to the division of marital property, all property 

owned by the spouses is put into the “marital pot,” where the property is subject 

to division. See I.C. § 31-9-2-98(b) (defining property as “all the assets of either 

party or both parties”); see also Barton v. Barton, 47 N.E.3d 368, 378-79 (Ind. Ct. 

App. 2015), trans. denied. Thus, whether the property was “owned by either 

spouse before the marriage,” individually “acquired by either spouse” before 

the parties finally separated, or acquired through the spouses’ “joint efforts,” 

I.C. § 31-15-7-4, in a dissolution action, there is a single “marital pot” and 

everything the spouses own is potentially divisible, see id.; I.C. § 31-9-2-98(b); see 

also Falatovics v. Falatovics, 15 N.E.3d 108, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

[8] Once the trial court has identified property to be included in the “marital pot,” 

the trial court must evaluate how to “divide the property in a just and 

reasonable manner.” I.C. § 31-15-7-4(b). The trial court begins with the 

“presum[ption] that an equal division of the marital property . . . is just and 
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reasonable.” I.C. § 31-15-7-5. Nevertheless, the court is not obligated to 

equally divide the marital property. See id. Rather, a party may rebut the 

presumption by “present[ing] relevant evidence . . . that an equal division 

would not be just and reasonable.” Id. Our legislature has articulated a nonexhaustive list of factors that bear on the reasonableness of an equal division:

(1) The contribution of each spouse to the acquisition of the 

property, regardless of whether the contribution was income 

producing.

(2) The extent to which the property was acquired by each 

spouse:

(A) before the marriage; or

(B) through inheritance or gift.

(3) The economic circumstances of each spouse at the time the 

disposition of the property is to become effective . . . .

(4) The conduct of the parties during the marriage as related to 

the disposition or dissipation of their property.

(5) The earnings or earning ability of the parties as related to:

(A) a final division of property; and

(B) a final determination of the property rights of the 

parties.

Id.
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[9] Husband contends that he rebutted the statutory presumption, and that the trial 

court abused its discretion by equally dividing the marital property. He argues 

that the court “ignor[ed] evidence” that Husband “had acquired the marital 

residence, certain vehicles, and the majority of his Union 401(k) prior to the 

marriage,” and that he “was the primary contributor to the acquisition of this 

property.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Husband also asserts that “he and Wife shared 

similar economic circumstances at the time of the disposition; Wife dissipated 

certain marital assets immediately before filing for dissolution; and, he and 

Wife had nearly identical earning capacities at the time of dissolution.” Id.

[10] Yet, the trial court valued the marital estate at $108,746—and that calculation 

did not account for $51,042 in student loans that the court wholly allocated to 

Wife. The trial court stated that it was allocating this debt to Wife “[i]n 

accordance with case law on the subject” of student loans. App. Vol. 2 at 14. 

However, under the statutory framework, all marital property is subject to 

division, see I.C. 31-15-7-4, and “[m]arital property includes both assets and 

liabilities.” Birkhimer v. Birkhimer, 981 N.E.2d 111, 120 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 

Thus, student loans—just like other debts incurred before the marital pot 

closes—are marital property subject to division. See I.C. 31-15-7-4; see also 

Roberts v. Roberts, 670 N.E.2d 72, 77-78 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (observing that 

whereas “Indiana does not permit a degree to be included as marital property,”

student loans are “properly considered as part of the marital estate”).

[11] Ultimately, after the court equally distributed the $108,746 in value, Husband 

netted $54,373 and Wife—having been allocated $51,042 in student loans—
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-DR-796 | November 29, 2018 Page 7 of 7

effectively netted only $3,331. Husband now argues that he should have 

received more of the marital estate. Yet, the court’s decision already reflects a 

substantial deviation in his favor: more than 90% of the adjusted net value to 

Husband. We are unpersuaded by Husband’s contention that the court abused 

its broad discretion by failing to award him even more of the marital estate.

[12] Affirmed.

Mathias, J., and Bradford, J., concur.