An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute 

controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in 

accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of 

Appellate Procedure.

NO. COA14-135

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 19 August 2014

BOBBY P. BRAWLEY and BETTY M. 

BRAWLEY,

Plaintiffs,

v. Iredell County

No. 13 CVS 01289

ELIZABETH TOWNES HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, INC., LADONNA 

CONSTANCE WALDEN and PATRICIA 

HEDRICK, individually and as 

members of THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 

OF ELIZABETH TOWNES HOMEOWNERS 

ASSOCIATION, INC.,

Defendants.

Appeal by plaintiffs from order entered 8 November 2013 by 

Judge W. David Lee in Iredell County Superior Court. Heard in 

the Court of Appeals 21 May 2014.

Kenneth T. Davies for plaintiff-appellants.

McAngus, Goudelock & Courie, PLLC, by Garry T. Davis and 

Jeffrey B. Kuykendal, for defendant-appellees.

PER CURIAM.
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Where plaintiffs’ claims were barred by collateral 

estoppel, defendants’ motions to dismiss were properly granted 

by the trial court.

Plaintiffs Bobby P. Brawley and Betty M. Brawley own a 

townhome in the Elizabeth Townes community in Charlotte. 

Defendant Elizabeth Townes Homeowners Association (“Elizabeth 

Townes HOA”) manages the Elizabeth Townes community, of which 

plaintiffs are mandatory members. Individual defendants LaDonna

Constance Walden and Patricia Hedrick are members of the board 

of directors of the Elizabeth Townes HOA.

Plaintiffs’ daughter, Jane Brawley Jordan, resides at the

Elizabeth Townes’ townhome. Plaintiffs granted Jordan a limited 

power of attorney permitting Jordan to act on plaintiffs’ behalf 

regarding all Elizabeth Townes HOA matters, including the 

ability “to request financial records, to vote [plaintiffs’] 

proxy in [Elizabeth Townes HOA] matters, and to attend 

[Elizabeth Townes HOA] meetings on [plaintiffs’] behalf.”

Beginning in 2005, the relationship between Elizabeth 

Townes HOA, Walden, and Hedrick (“defendants”), and Jordan began 

to deteriorate. Jordan sent numerous emails, text messages, and 

phone calls to defendants regarding alleged mismanagement of the 

Elizabeth Townes community. Jordan also filed four pro se
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lawsuits against Elizabeth Townes HOA, all of which were 

subsequently dismissed either voluntarily by Jordan or with 

prejudice by order of the trial court. 

In 2010, Jordan filed claims with the North Carolina Real 

Estate Commission and the State Bureau of Investigations against 

Elizabeth Townes HOA, alleging that Elizabeth Townes HOA’s

former management company had committed fraud. The resulting 

investigations found no evidence of fraud, and Elizabeth Townes 

HOA invoiced Jordan and plaintiffs for the loss of business 

caused by the investigations. 

In March 2011, defendants filed a complaint and request for 

permanent injunction against Jordan for “continuous and repeated 

harassment.” Defendants also filed claims against plaintiffs, 

alleging that by failing to revoke Jordan’s limited power of 

attorney, plaintiffs had enabled Jordan’s continued harassment 

of defendants.1 Plaintiffs transferred ownership of their 

 

1 After a hearing on defendants’ motion for injunctive relief 

before the trial court in March 2011 during which Jordan and 

plaintiffs appeared “disoriented, distracted, and unresponsive 

to the Court’s inquiries,” Jordan was ordered to undergo a 

mental evaluation. Following Jordan’s refusal to submit to a 

forensic screening, in May 2012 the trial court entered an order 

finding Jordan to be in contempt of court. On appeal, this 

Court, by per curiam opinion, upheld the order of the trial 

court. See State v. Jordan, No. COA12-1264, 2013 N.C. App. 

LEXIS 736 (July 16, 2013).
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Elizabeth Townes townhome to Jordan,

2 and defendants subsequently

dismissed their claims against plaintiffs, leaving Jordan as the 

sole opposing party to the litigation. On 4 February 2013, the 

trial court entered an order for default judgment against Jordan

and awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Elizabeth 

Townes HOA in the amount of “$34,929.59 for increased insurance 

premiums, increased property management fees, [and] direct legal 

costs,” finding that “Jordan engaged in malicious prosecution 

and abuse of process as to [Elizabeth Townes HOA] and defamed 

[Elizabeth Townes HOA].”

On 3 June 2013, plaintiffs filed a complaint against 

defendants alleging claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 

constructive fraud, abuse of process, and unfair and deceptive 

trade practices. On 7 August, defendants filed motions to 

dismiss and to change venue. The trial court, by order entered 

 

2 We note that, based on the record, it is somewhat unclear as to 

whether plaintiffs have resumed ownership of their Elizabeth 

Townes townhome and, thus, have standing to bring this appeal. 

In an August 2012 motion to amend one of her four pro se

lawsuits, Jordan described plaintiff Bobby Brawley as the 

“previous owner” of the townhome. However, in their instant 

complaint, plaintiffs indicate that they are currently the 

owners of the townhome, and in their answers, defendants treat 

plaintiffs as the current owners of the townhome as well, 

stating that “Plaintiffs herein subsequently transferred 

ownership of said property to Jane Jordan for a brief period of 

time.” As such, plaintiffs are viewed in the instant matter as 

being the current owners of the Elizabeth Townes townhome and, 

therefore, have standing.
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8 November, granted defendants’ motions to dismiss. Plaintiffs 

appeal.

_________________________________

On appeal, plaintiffs contend the trial court erred in 

granting defendants’ motions to dismiss. Specifically, 

plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting 

defendants’ motions to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and 

based on collateral estoppel. We disagree. Assuming arguendo

that plaintiffs’ complaint is technically sufficient to survive 

a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’ claims are 

nonetheless barred by collateral estoppel.

Collateral Estoppel

Plaintiffs argue that the trial court erred in granting 

defendants’ motions to dismiss because plaintiffs are not 

collaterally estopped from asserting their claims. 

Res judicata and collateral estoppel are companion 

doctrines created “for the dual purposes of protecting litigants 

from the burden of relitigating previously decided matters and 

promoting judicial economy by preventing needless litigation.”

Bockweg v. Anderson, 333 N.C. 486, 491—92, 428 S.E.2d 157, 161 

(1993) (citations omitted). Under the doctrine of res judicata, 

or “claim preclusion,” “a final judgment on the merits in a 
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prior action will prevent a second suit based on the same cause 

of action between the same parties or those in privity with 

them.” Thomas M. McInnis & Assocs., Inc. v. Hall, 318 N.C. 421, 

428, 349 S.E.2d 552, 556 (1986). Under the doctrine of 

collateral estoppel, or “issue preclusion,” “parties and parties 

in privity with them — even in unrelated causes of action — are 

precluded from retrying fully litigated issues that were decided 

in any prior determination and were necessary to the prior 

determination.” King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 356, 200 

S.E.2d 799, 805 (1973) (citations omitted).

“Like res judicata, collateral estoppel only applies if the 

prior action involved the same parties or those in privity with 

the parties and the same issues.” Goins v. Cone Mills Corp., 90 

N.C. App. 90, 93, 367 S.E.2d 335, 337 (1988) (citing King, 284 

N.C. at 356, 200 S.E.2d at 805) (emphasis added). 

A judgment operates as an estoppel not only 

as to all matters actually determined or 

litigated in the proceeding, but also as to 

all relevant and material matters within the 

scope of the proceeding which the parties, 

in the exercise of reasonable diligence, 

could and should have brought forward for 

determination. 

Moody v. Able Outdoor, Inc., 169 N.C. App. 80, 84, 609 S.E.2d 

259, 261 (2005) (citation and quotation omitted). “In general, 

privity involves a person so identified in interest with another 
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that he represents the same legal right previously represented 

at trial.” State v. Summers, 351 N.C. 620, 623, 528 S.E.2d 17, 

20 (2000) (citations and quotation omitted). In determining 

whether a privity relationship exists, “courts will look beyond 

the nominal party whose name appears on the record as plaintiff 

and consider the legal questions raised as they may affect the 

real party or parties in interest.” Whitacre P'ship v. 

Biosignia, Inc., 358 N.C. 1, 36, 591 S.E.2d 870, 893 (2004) 

(citations and quotation omitted).

Plaintiffs allowed their daughter, Jane Brawley Jordan, to 

reside in their Elizabeth Townes townhome and granted Jordan a 

limited power of attorney “to request financial records, to vote 

[plaintiffs’] proxy in [Elizabeth Townes HOA] matters, and to 

attend [Elizabeth Townes HOA] meetings on [plaintiffs’] behalf.” 

Plaintiffs further acknowledge in their brief that Jordan “was 

deemed to be an agent of [plaintiffs] through a limited power of 

attorney, granting her the same right as [plaintiffs.]” Such 

evidence indicates that a privity relationship exists between

Jordan and plaintiffs. 

Further evidence of a privity relationship can be seen in 

plaintiffs’ current complaint. After Jordan filed four pro se

complaints against Elizabeth Townes HOA, as well as filing 
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allegations of fraud against Elizabeth Townes HOA with the North 

Carolina Real Estate Commission and the State Bureau of 

Investigations, defendants filed claims against Jordan and 

plaintiffs in 2011. Plaintiffs then temporarily transferred 

their ownership of the Elizabeth Townes property to Jordan, and 

defendants dismissed their claims against plaintiffs, leaving 

Jordan as the sole opposing party in the litigation. The trial 

court, in its order granting default judgment to defendants, 

assessed compensatory and punitive damages against Jordan

because “Jordan engaged in malicious prosecution and abuse of 

process as to [Elizabeth Townes HOA] and defamed [Elizabeth 

Townes HOA].” Jordan did not appeal from this award of 

compensatory and punitive damages. Rather, plaintiffs then 

filed the instant complaint, alleging that defendants commenced 

the 2011 litigation “to intimidate the Plaintiffs into silence 

and acceptance of the authority of the Defendants” and that the 

“asserted claims in the 2011 litigation against the Plaintiffs 

were entirely frivolous and without merit.” 

In its order granting defendants’ motions to dismiss, the 

trial court noted that:

[I]t also appearing that the amended 

complaint filed in the [2011 litigation] was 

voluntarily dismissed as to [plaintiffs] on 

January 14, 2013, approximately thirteen 
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months after it was asserted against them 

(and twenty-two months after the 

commencement of the [2011 litigation] and 

that [plaintiffs] were in a position in that 

action to assert the claims now being 

asserted in this action. The claims asserted 

by [plaintiffs] herein are claims based upon 

matters that were relevant and material 

within the scope of the earlier [2011 

litigation] and [plaintiffs], in the 

exercise of reasonable diligence, could and 

should have brought those claims forward for 

determination. [Plaintiffs] should not be 

permitted to reopen the subject of the prior 

[2011] litigation with respect to matters 

which might have been brought forward in 

that proceeding. . . . [Plaintiffs] are 

collaterally estopped from now asserting 

claims for breach of fiduciary duty, 

constructive fraud, abuse of process and 

unfair and deceptive trade practices in this 

action and these claims should be dismissed 

. . . .

We agree with the trial court’s determination that 

plaintiffs are now estopped from bringing their claims, as the 

“successive or mutual relationship in the same rights in [the 

Elizabeth Townes townhome] establishes that the interests of 

both [Jordan] and plaintiff[s] are so intertwined that privity 

exists between them.” Cline v. McCullen, 148 N.C. App. 147, 

150, 557 S.E.2d 588, 591 (2001). Moreover, “privity also exists 

where one not actually a party to the previous action . . . had 

a proprietary interest in the judgment or in the determination 
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of a question of law or facts on the same subject matter.” Id.

(citation omitted).

Jordan, in her four pro se complaints against defendants, 

alleged a variety of claims including, but not limited to: abuse 

of process, malicious prosecution, slander, retaliation, 

defamation, extortion, wrongful prosecution, libel per se, 

willful negligence, malfeasance, federal mail fraud, legal 

malpractice, alienation of affection, breach of contract, 

criminal intent, fraud, and contributory negligence. Although 

Jordan did not make specific claims for breach of fiduciary 

duty, constructive fraud, or unfair and deceptive trade 

practices, a reading of her complaints indicates that such 

claims were all-but asserted. In her first complaint, Jordan 

alleged that defendants failed to act in good faith while 

conducting Elizabeth Townes HOA business, and that defendants’ 

acts amounted to a “breech [sic] of monies;” such allegations 

could support a claim for breach of fiduciary duty. Similar 

statements in Jordan’s first complaint could also support claims

for constructive fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices, 

as Jordan made numerous allegations of fraud, embezzlement, 

deception, mismanagement, and negligence by defendants regarding 

defendants’ handling of Elizabeth Townes HOA business.
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Moreover, similar allegations and statements can be found 

throughout Jordan’s three other complaints. All of Jordan’s 

allegations and claims in each complaint stemmed from her 

ongoing disputes with defendants. Further, in addition to 

Jordan’s claims which are intertwined with plaintiffs as a 

matter of privity, plaintiffs were also directly involved in 

litigation with defendants and had the opportunity to 

counterclaim as to all claims that are now asserted in the 

instant case. 

Here, plaintiffs have brought claims against defendants for 

breach of fiduciary duty, constructive fraud, abuse of process, 

and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Although the only 

claim directly asserted by both Jordan and plaintiffs was a 

claim for abuse of process, all of plaintiffs’ instant 

allegations and claims arise from Jordan’s ongoing disputes with 

defendants. Indeed, plaintiffs’ complaint indicates plaintiffs 

were aware of and involved in the ongoing disputes and 

litigation between Jordan and defendants, as plaintiffs 

reference these disputes and allege that defendants “began a 

campaign of propaganda against [Jordan]” that caused plaintiffs 

to “publically defend[] themselves” against defendants. As 

such, although plaintiffs appear to bring three “new” claims not 
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previously asserted by Jordan, it is clear that these claims 

were essentially alleged and brought by Jordan in her four 

earlier pro se complaints. Moreover, plaintiffs had a 

substantial interest in their townhome to create a proprietary 

interest in the litigation between Jordan and defendants and, 

therefore, this interest supports our earlier determination that 

privity exists between plaintiffs and Jordan.

Accordingly, the trial court’s granting of defendants’ 

motions to dismiss is affirmed.

Affirmed.

Report per Rule 30(e).