I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 375 

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional 

capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to 

promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal 

adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for 

other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

JANUARY 9, 2009 

Ms. ROS-LEHTINEN (for herself, Mr. BURTON of Indiana, and Mr. MACK) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 

A BILL 

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and 

bolster regional capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to promote cooperation in 

the Western Hemisphere to prevent the proliferation of 

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; DEFINITIONS; TABLE OF CON2 TENTS. 

3 (a) SHORT TITLE.—This Act may be cited as the 

4 ‘‘Western Hemisphere Counterterrorism and Non5 proliferation Act of 2009’’. 

6 (b) DEFINITIONS.—In this Act: 

7 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT8 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com9 mittees’’ means— 

10 (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and 

11 the Committee on Homeland Security of the 

12 House of Representatives; and 

13 (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations 

14 and the Committee on Homeland Security and 

15 Governmental Affairs of the Senate. 

16 (2) NONHUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE.—The 

17 term ‘‘nonhumanitarian assistance’’ means— 

18 (A) any assistance under the Foreign As19 sistance Act of 1961 (including programs under 

20 title IV of chapter 2 of part I of such Act, re21 lating to the Overseas Private Investment Cor22 poration), other than— 

23 (i) disaster relief assistance, including 

24 any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of 

25 such Act; 


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1 (ii) assistance which involves the pro2 vision of food (including monetization of 

3 food) or medicine; and 

4 (iii) assistance for refugees; 

5 (B) sales, or financing on any terms, under 

6 the Arms Export Control Act; and 

7 (C) financing under the Export-Import 

8 Bank Act of 1945. 

9 (3) STATE SPONSOR OF TERRORISM.—The term 

10 ‘‘state sponsor of terrorism’’ means a country the 

11 government of which has been determined by the 

12 Secretary of State, for purposes of section 6(j) of 

13 the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 

14 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 

15 40 of the Arms Export Control Act, or other provi16 sion of law, is a government that has repeatedly pro17 vided support for acts of international terrorism. 

18 (c) TABLE OF CONTENTS.—The table of contents for 

19 this Act is as follows: 

Sec. 1. Short title; definitions; table of contents. 

TITLE I—COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

Sec. 101. Findings. 

Sec. 102. Statement of policy regarding regional efforts to counter terrorism in 

the Western Hemisphere. 

Sec. 103. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism. 

Sec. 104. Amendments to annual determination procedures. 

Sec. 105. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report. 

Sec. 106. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere. 

Sec. 107. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El Salvador. 

Sec. 108. Actions regarding the Organization of American States. 


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Sec. 109. Amendment to Department of State Rewards Program. 

TITLE II—NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND 

BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

Sec. 201. Findings. 

Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, technology, and facilities. 

Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol. 

Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation 

by countries in the Western Hemisphere. 

Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication. 

Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative. 

Sec. 208. Prohibited transactions. 

Sec. 209. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba. 

TITLE III—WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION 

CENTERS 

Sec. 301. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination 

Centers. 

Sec. 302. Regional Security Initiative. 

Sec. 303. Authorization of appropriations. 

TITLE IV—PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN 

WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES 

Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere countries. 

TITLE V—REPORT 

Sec. 501. Report. 

1 TITLE I—COUNTERTERRORISM 

2 IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

3 SEC. 101. FINDINGS. 

4 Congress finds the following: 

5 (1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having en6 tered the United States illegally from Mexico, was 

7 charged with supporting Hezbollah financially and 

8 was described by the United States Attorney as a 

9 ‘‘fighter, recruiter and fundraiser’’. 


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1 (2) In December 2006, the Department of the 

2 Treasury designated nine individuals and two enti3 ties as part of a network that is ‘‘a major financial 

4 artery to Hezbollah in Lebanon’’ and announced an 

5 effort to target Hezbollah fundraising in the tri-bor6 der area of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. 

7 (3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established rou8 tine civilian airline flights between Venezuela and 

9 designated State Sponsors of Terrorism, Iran, and 

10 Syria. 

11 (4) In October 2007, Secretary of Homeland 

12 Security Michael Chertoff said, in response to a 

13 question about relations between Iran and Ven14 ezuela, ‘‘I think [there is] an emerging threat and 

15 challenge to the West, which is the export of ide16 ology that we see among Islamist extremists in the 

17 Middle East from Iran, and the marriage of that 

18 with others who, perhaps for their own reasons, have 

19 strong anti-American views or who simply exploit 

20 anti-Americanism as a way of promoting their own 

21 ideological or power agendas.’’. 

22 (5) In November 2007, Interpol’s General As23 sembly agreed to issue red capture notices for the 

24 arrest of a Hezbollah leader and five former senior 

25 Iranian officials charged by Argentina in the 1994 


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1 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) ter2 rorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed 

3 and 300 more were wounded. 

4 (6) A 2007 Drug Enforcement Administration 

5 report linked nearly half of foreign terrorist organi6 zations around the world today to narcotics trade, 

7 underscoring the fact that the fight against ter8 rorism must also include a corresponding fight 

9 against illicit drugs. 

10 (7) In February 2008, Director of National In11 telligence Mike McConnell reported to Congress in 

12 his presentation of the Intelligence Community’s An13 nual Threat Assessment that the governments of Ec14 uador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, ‘‘to varying degrees, 

15 have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned 

16 with Venezuela and Cuba—and increasingly Iran— 

17 on international issues, and advocated measures that 

18 directly clash with U.S. initiatives’’. 

19 (8) In February 2008, a United States Federal 

20 law-enforcement official shared, ‘‘We’ve known for 

21 some time that Islamic extremists groups were gain22 ing momentum and exploiting the region . . . Iran 

23 is no exception—now with Cuba and Venezuela, the 

24 door is open.’’. 


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1 (9) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilat2 eral agreements with Iran on military cooperation, 

3 the sharing of intelligence, expanding financial co4 operation, and initiating cultural exchanges, among 

5 others. 

6 (10) According to United States intelligence of7 ficials, Iran possesses the potential to use its close 

8 relationship with Venezuela to facilitate the smug9 gling of people, drugs, and weapons into the West10 ern Hemisphere through terrorist proxy groups. 

11 (11) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a 

12 raid against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Co13 lombia and seized computers containing documents 

14 that suggest evidence of $300,000,000 in payments 

15 to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan 

16 Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with 

17 officials from Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by 

18 the FARC to obtain 50 kilograms of uranium. 

19 (12) The Inter-American Convention Against 

20 Terrorism of the Organization of American States 

21 commits all State parties to establish domestic regu22 latory institutions that eradicate the financing of 

23 terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow signatories 

24 to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance in 

25 counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist 


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1 offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the 

2 convention designed to prevent, punish, and elimi3 nate terrorist offenses. 

4 (13) In June 2008, the Department of the 

5 Treasury designated two Venezuela-based supporters 

6 of Hizballah, Ghazi Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan’an, 

7 along with two travel agencies owned and controlled 

8 by Kan’an, explaining it is ‘‘extremely troubling to 

9 see the Government of Venezuela employing and 

10 providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and 

11 fundraisers.’’. 

12 (14) In May 2008, for the third year in a row, 

13 the Department of State determined, pursuant to 

14 section 40A of the Arms Export Control Act, that 

15 Venezuela was not cooperating fully with United 

16 States antiterrorism efforts. 

17 (15) In April 2008, for the fouth year in a row, 

18 the Department of State’s Annual Country Report 

19 on Terrorism stated that the Government of Cuba 

20 provided safe haven to members of [several Latin 

21 American terrorist groups] and maintained close re22 lationships with other state sponsors of terrorism 

23 such as Iran. 

24 (16) In April 2008, for the fifth year in a row, 

25 the Department of State’s Annual Country Report 


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1 on Terrorism also noted that Venezuelan citizenship, 

2 identity, and travel documents remain easy to ob3 tain, making Venezuela a potentially attractive way4 station for terrorists. 

5 (17) August to December 2008 marked a resur6 gence in deadly attacks by the Shining Path, a De7 partment of State-designated foreign terrorist orga8 nization, in Peru. Peruvian security officials say that 

9 while the group’s numbers have dwindled, its arsenal 

10 is stronger than in the past, as profits from the drug 

11 trade allow it to buy more powerful weapons. 

12 (18) In October 2008, reports surfaced that the 

13 Chavez government, with help from Cuban military 

14 advisors and FARC guerrillas, was allegedly oper15 ating a secret paramilitary training camp in a 

16 closed-off tourist campground in Venezuela. 

17 (19) In October 2008, the Department of the 

18 Treasury designated Banco Internacional de 

19 Desarollo, C.A., a financial institution located in 

20 Venezuela, to be owned or controlled by or acting or 

21 purporting to act for or on behalf of, directly or in22 directly, the Export Development Bank of Iran 

23 (EDBI). EDBI was designated for its role in help24 ing Iran violate United Nations sanctions and han25 dle its illicit transactions. 


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1 (20) In December 2008, media sources reported 

2 that Iran is using its close ties with Venezuela to 

3 dodge United Nations sanctions by using aircraft 

4 from Venezuelan airline Conviasa to transport com5 puters and engine components to Syria for use in 

6 missiles. 

7 SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING REGIONAL 

8 EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM IN THE 

9 WESTERN HEMISPHERE. 

10 To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere 

11 and bolster regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall 

12 be the policy of the United States to promote the signing, 

13 ratification, and implementation by all countries in the 

14 Western Hemisphere of the following: 

15 (1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII–O/02) Inter16 American Convention Against Terrorism. 

17 (2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 

18 Recommendations on Money Laundering (ML) and 

19 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on Terrorist Fi20 nancing (TF). 

21 (3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences 

22 and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air23 craft. 

24 (4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Sup25 pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft. 


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1 (5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Sup2 pression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil 

3 Aviation. 

4 (6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on 

5 the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against 

6 Internationally Protected Person, including Diplo7 matic Agents. 

8 (7) The 1979 United Nations International 

9 Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 

10 (8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppres11 sion of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serv12 ing International Civil Aviation, Supplementary to 

13 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts 

14 Against the Safety of Civil Aviation. 

15 (9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppres16 sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Mari17 time Navigation. 

18 (10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppres19 sion of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed 

20 Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf. 

21 (11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Mark22 ing of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detec23 tion. 


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1 (12) The 1997 United Nations International 

2 Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bomb3 ings. 

4 (13) The 1999 United Nations International 

5 Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of 

6 Terrorism. 

7 (14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Cre8 ation of Counter Terrorism Committee (CTC). 

9 (15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Pro10 hibition of incitement to commit terrorist act or 

11 acts. 

12 SEC. 103. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS 

13 ON TERRORISM. 

14 Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations Authoriza15 tion Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 

16 2656f(b)) is amended— 

17 (1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking ‘‘and’’ at 

18 the end; 

19 (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at 

20 the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; 

21 (3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) 

22 and the second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and 

23 (7), respectively; 

24 (4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by 

25 striking ‘‘and’’ at the end; 


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1 (5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by 

2 striking the period at the end; and 

3 (6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the fol4 lowing new paragraphs: 

5 ‘‘(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United 

6 States assistance available to combat terrorism in 

7 each country that is a subject of such report; and 

8 ‘‘(9) with respect to countries in the Western 

9 Hemisphere that are the subjects of such report, the 

10 level in each such country of threat posed by radical 

11 Islamist terrorism.’’. 

12 SEC. 104. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL DETERMINATION PRO13 CEDURES. 

14 Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization 

15 Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107–228; 22 U.S.C. 

16 2291j–1) is amended— 

17 (1) in paragraph (2)— 

18 (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking 

19 ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

20 (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as 

21 subparagraph (C); 

22 (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) 

23 the following new subparagraph: 

24 ‘‘(B) designate each country, if any, identi25 fied in such report in which a link has been deVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:55 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H375.IH H375

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1 termined to exist between illicit drug trafficking 

2 and a designated foreign terrorist organization 

3 and that has failed demonstrably, during the 

4 previous 12 months, to make substantial ef5 forts— 

6 ‘‘(i) to adhere to its obligations under 

7 international counterterrorism agreements; 

8 and 

9 ‘‘(ii) to implement effective counter10 terrorism measures, including action on 

11 such issues as the rule of law, denying safe 

12 haven to terrorists, financing and money 

13 laundering, and law enforcement; and’’; 

14 and 

15 (D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesig16 nated, by inserting before the period at the end 

17 the following: ‘‘under subparagraph (A) or 

18 (B)’’; 

19 (2) in paragraph (3)— 

20 (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ‘‘or’’ 

21 at the end; 

22 (B) in subparagraph (B)(2), by striking 

23 the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

24 (C) by adding at the end the following new 

25 subparagraph: 


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1 ‘‘(C) subsequent to the designation being 

2 made under paragraph (2)(B), the country has 

3 made substantial efforts— 

4 ‘‘(i) to adhere to its obligations under 

5 international counterterrorism agreements; 

6 and 

7 ‘‘(ii) to implement effective counter8 terrorism measures, including action on 

9 such issues as the rule of law, denying safe 

10 haven to terrorists, financing and money 

11 laundering, and law enforcement.’’; 

12 (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as para13 graph (9); and 

14 (4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the fol15 lowing new paragraph: 

16 ‘‘(8) BILATERAL AGREEMENTS.—If a country 

17 designated under subparagraphs (A) and (B) of 

18 paragraph (2) does not receive a determination 

19 under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3), 

20 the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such 

21 country a bilateral agreement describing actions to 

22 be taken by the United States and such country to 

23 satisfy such determinations during the one year pe24 riod following such a designation. Such a bilateral 

25 agreement should include a needs assessment, a biVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:55 Jan 12, 2009 Jkt 079200 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H375.IH H375

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1 lateral action plan, the provision of United States 

2 training and assistance, the use of International 

3 Law Enforcement Academy facilities in the region, 

4 and an exchange of model laws and best practices.’’. 

5 SEC. 105. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS 

6 CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT. 

7 Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 

8 (22 U.S.C. 2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end 

9 the following new paragraph: 

10 ‘‘(9) A separate section that contains informa11 tion relating to any links between illicit narcotics 

12 trafficking or money laundering and terrorists, ter13 rorist acts, or designated foreign terrorist organiza14 tions (as such term is used in section 219 of the Im15 migration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1189)), 

16 and any actions taken by the United States Govern17 ment or foreign government to address such links.’’. 

18 SEC. 106. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN 

19 HEMISPHERE. 

20 (a) DETERMINATION.—For any country in the West21 ern Hemisphere that the President has determined— 

22 (1) is engaged in military cooperation with a 

23 state sponsor of terrorism, 

24 (2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a 

25 state sponsor of terrorism, 


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1 (3) is carrying out policies that threaten United 

2 States national security interests, or 

3 (4) is not fully cooperating with United States 

4 counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts, 

5 the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions 

6 described in subsection (b). 

7 (b) SANCTIONS.—For any country in the Western 

8 Hemisphere with respect to which the President has made 

9 a determination in accordance with subsection (a), the 

10 President is authorized to— 

11 (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian 

12 foreign assistance to the government of that country; 

13 and 

14 (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of 

15 articles, including the issuance of any specific license 

16 or grant of any other specific permission or author17 ity to export any goods or technology under— 

18 (A) the Export Administration Act of 

19 1979; 

20 (B) the Arms Export Control Act; 

21 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 

22 (D) any other statute that requires the 

23 prior review and approval of the United States 

24 Government as a condition for the export or re25 export of goods or services. 


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1 SEC. 107. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY 

2 IN SAN SALVADOR, EL SALVADOR. 

3 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con4 gress that the International Law Enforcement Academy 

5 (ILEA) in San Salvador, El Salvador, should continue to 

6 serve as a critical component of United States regional 

7 counterterrorism efforts. 

8 (b) NEGOTIATION.—The Secretary of State shall ne9 gotiate with the appropriate agency entities to ensure that 

10 counterterrorism, including radical Islamist extremism 

11 within the Western Hemisphere, nonproliferation, and 

12 border security courses are instituted as part of the core 

13 curriculum at the International Law Enforcement Acad14 emy in San Salvador. 

15 (c) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There 

16 are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 

17 necessary to— 

18 (1) complete all physical aspects of the ILEA 

19 facility in San Salvador; and 

20 (2) implement the ILEA Global Network. 

21 SEC. 108. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF 

22 AMERICAN STATES. 

23 (a) DECLARATION REGARDING TERRORISM.—The 

24 Secretary of State shall direct the United States Rep25 resentative to the Organization of American States (OAS) 

26 to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 


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1 at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting 

2 of Member States of the OAS convened after the date of 

3 the enactment of this Act calling on countries to system4 atically deny the use of their territories by terrorists or 

5 terrorist organizations. 

6 (b) REDUCTION IN UNITED STATES CONTRIBU7 TION.— 

8 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

9 reduce by 50 percent the amount of the United 

10 States assessed contribution to the OAS for fiscal 

11 year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal year. 

12 (2) USE OF FUNDS.— 

13 (A) IN GENERAL.—Of the amount reduced 

14 pursuant to paragraph (1), not less than ten 

15 percent of such amount shall be added to 

16 United States voluntary contributions to each 

17 of the organizations specified in subparagraph 

18 (B) and the remaining amount shall be used to 

19 establish and maintain the Western Hemisphere 

20 Regional Coordination Centers under section 

21 301. 

22 (B) ORGANIZATIONS SPECIFIED.—The or23 ganizations referred to in subparagraph (A) are 

24 the following: 


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1 (i) The OAS Inter-American Com2 mittee Against Terrorism (CICTE). 

3 (ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug 

4 Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). 

5 SEC. 109. AMENDMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE RE6 WARDS PROGRAM. 

7 Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Au8 thorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended— 

9 (1) in paragraph (6), by striking ‘‘or’’ at the 

10 end; 

11 (2) in paragraph (7)(B), by striking the period 

12 at the end and inserting ‘‘; or’’; and 

13 (3) by adding at the end the following new 

14 paragraph: 

15 ‘‘(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of 

16 any individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant 

17 to red notices duly issued by Interpol, if such reward 

18 would help advance United States interests or the 

19 interests of United States allies in the global strug20 gle against international terrorism.’’. 


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1 TITLE II—NONPROLIFERATION 

2 OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, 

3 AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 

4 IN THE WESTERN HEMI5 SPHERE 

6 SEC. 201. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 

8 (1) Venezuela and Iran have established exten9 sive political, military, and economic cooperation. 

10 (2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo 

11 Chavez, has publicly supported Iran’s development 

12 of a capacity to enrich uranium, which many observ13 ers believe is part of a nuclear weapons program. 

14 (3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was 

15 seeking assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear 

16 program in Venezuela. 

17 (4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of 

18 only three countries to vote against a resolution by 

19 the Board of Governors of the International Atomic 

20 Energy Agency, or IAEA, to report Iran to the 

21 United Nations Security Council for violating its ob22 ligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Trea23 ty. 

24 (5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the 

25 Iranian parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated 


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1 that his government was prepared to discuss pro2 viding technical assistance to a Venezuelan nuclear 

3 program. 

4 (6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel 

5 El Zabayar, a member of Venezuela’s National As6 sembly and Mining Commission, stated that Iran 

7 will ‘‘practically give away’’ its civilian nuclear tech8 nology and that ‘‘if relations with Iran lead to shar9 ing nuclear technology with us, we would then give 

10 it away to our brothers in Latin America once we 

11 are successful.’’. 

12 (7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken 

13 steps toward establishing a civilian nuclear program 

14 and that cooperation in this area was being dis15 cussed with the Governments of Iran and Belarus. 

16 (8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of 

17 uranium ore in the Guiana Shield region. 

18 (9) In 1985 the Brazilian government an19 nounced that it had terminated a clandestine nuclear 

20 weapons program run by the military since 1975. 

21 (10) In August 2005 a former high-ranking 

22 Brazilian nuclear official stated that the military 

23 had continued to develop elements of a nuclear 

24 weapons program into the 1990s. 


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1 (11) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General 

2 Jose Benedito de Barros Moreira publicly called for 

3 Brazil to develop the technological capacity to manu4 facture nuclear weapons. 

5 (12) The centrifuges at Brazil’s Resende ura6 nium enrichment plant can be reconfigured to 

7 produce highly enriched uranium in quantities suffi8 cient to produce several nuclear weapons annually. 

9 (13) Brazil has denied inspectors from the 

10 IAEA full access to its uranium enrichment cen11 trifuges at Resende on the grounds that it is pro12 tecting commercial secrets. 

13 (14) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved 

14 only by the IAEA agreeing to limit its verification 

15 methods to indirect inspections without direct in16 spection of the centrifuges, which many non17 proliferation experts fear could be used as a prece18 dent by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA 

19 inspectors from examining their suspect nuclear fa20 cilities. 

21 (15) A prototype nuclear reactor is being devel22 oped at the Armar Research Center for use in Bra23 zil’s nuclear-powered submarine program. 

24 (16) On February 24, 2008, the Governments 

25 of Argentina and Brazil agreed to begin negotiations 


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1 regarding the joint development of a nuclear reactor 

2 and construction of a uranium enrichment plant. 

3 (17) Until 1990 the Argentine Government con4 ducted a clandestine nuclear weapons program. 

5 (18) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran 

6 signed a nuclear cooperation agreement in which Ar7 gentina agreed to supply Iran with highly enriched 

8 uranium. 

9 (19) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three 

10 agreements with Iran for converting a nuclear reac11 tor to use enriched uranium, for building pilot plants 

12 for uranium-dioxide conversion and fuel fabrication. 

13 (20) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nu14 clear program was reduced, but not terminated, fol15 lowing pressure by the United States. 

16 (21) Several countries in Latin America, includ17 ing Brazil and Argentina, have not signed and im18 plemented an Additional Protocol which provides 

19 IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to nuclear fa20 cilities. 

21 (22) Some Western Hemisphere countries have 

22 not ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the 

23 Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 

24 Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, also re25 ferred to as The Chemical Weapons Convention. 


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1 (23) Several countries in Latin America have 

2 not signed and ratified The Convention on the Pro3 hibition of the Development and Stockpiling of Bac4 teriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 

5 Their Destruction, also referred to as The Biological 

6 Convention. 

7 SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PRO8 LIFERATION OF WEAPONS-RELATED NU9 CLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATE10 RIALS, TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES. 

11 (a) IN GENERAL.—To enhance the prevention of the 

12 proliferation of weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and bi13 ological materials, technology, and facilities, it shall be the 

14 policy of the United States to— 

15 (1) promote the negotiation and implementation 

16 by all countries of— 

17 (A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement 

18 with the International Atomic Energy Agency 

19 (IAEA); and 

20 (B) an Additional Protocol to the safe21 guards agreement; 

22 (2) secure guarantees by all countries of unre23 stricted access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-re24 lated materials and facilities in territories under the 

25 control of the host country; 


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1 (3) promote the implementation by all countries 

2 of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 

3 and 

4 (4) promote the accession to and ratification 

5 and implementation of— 

6 (A) the Convention on the Prohibition of 

7 the Development, Production, Stockpiling and 

8 Use of Chemical Weapons and on their De9 struction (also referred to as the Chemical 

10 Weapons Convention); 

11 (B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the 

12 Physical Protection of Nuclear Material; 

13 (C) the 2005 United Nations International 

14 Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nu15 clear Terrorism; and 

16 (D) the Convention on the Prohibition of 

17 the Development and Stockpiling of Bacterio18 logical (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on 

19 their Destruction (also referred to as the Bio20 logical Weapons Convention). 

21 (b) ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL DEFINED.—In this sec22 tion, the term ‘‘Additional Protocol’’ means the Protocol 

23 Additional to an agreement between a country and the 

24 International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application 

25 of Safeguards. 


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1 SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL 

2 QUANTITIES PROTOCOL. 

3 Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets 

4 aside many of the operative provisions of a general safe5 guards agreement, the ability of the IAEA to verify that 

6 nuclear materials and facilities in a country with an SQP 

7 are not being diverted for illicit purposes is significantly 

8 impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the 

9 United States to— 

10 (1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an 

11 SQP for any country that did not have an SQP as 

12 of January 1, 2008; and 

13 (2) encourage every country with an SQP to 

14 withdraw formally from or renegotiate that agree15 ment for the purpose of increasing transparency and 

16 eliminating any exemption or provision that could 

17 restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify that a 

18 country’s nuclear materials and facilities are not 

19 being diverted to impermissible uses. 

20 SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS RE21 GARDING NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION BY 

22 COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—The President shall use all avail24 able political, economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure 

25 that each country in the Western Hemisphere— 


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1 (1) has signed and implemented a comprehen2 sive safeguards agreement with the IAEA; 

3 (2) has signed and implemented an Additional 

4 Protocol to its safeguards agreement; 

5 (3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA 

6 personnel to all nuclear-related facilities; 

7 (4) has implemented the provisions of United 

8 Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; 

9 (5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully imple10 mented the conventions referred to in section 

11 202(a)(4); 

12 (6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP 

13 if that country did not have an SQP as of January 

14 1, 2008; and 

15 (7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an 

16 SQP agreement if a country has such an agreement. 

17 (b) SANCTIONS.—For any Western Hemisphere 

18 country that has not satisfied all of the requirements spec19 ified in subsection (a), the President is authorized to— 

20 (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian 

21 foreign assistance to the government of that country; 

22 and 

23 (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of 

24 articles, including the issuance of any specific license 


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1 or grant of any other specific permission or author2 ity to export any goods or technology under— 

3 (A) the Export Administration Act of 

4 1979; 

5 (B) the Arms Export Control Act; 

6 (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or 

7 (D) any other statute that requires the 

8 prior review and approval of the United States 

9 Government as a condition for the export or re10 export of goods or services. 

11 SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR 

12 FUEL FABRICATION. 

13 (a) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It shall be the policy 

14 of the United States to oppose the development or acquisi15 tion by any country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel 

16 if such country did not have such capacity as of January 

17 1, 2008. 

18 (b) PREVENTION OF CAPACITY TO FABRICATE NU19 CLEAR FUEL.—The President shall use all available polit20 ical, economic, and diplomatic tools, and shall use the 

21 voice, vote, and influence of the United States in all inter22 national organizations and associations of which it is a 

23 member, including the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers 

24 Group, to prevent the development or acquisition by any 


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1 country of a capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such 

2 country did not have such capacity as of January 1, 2008. 

3 (c) NUCLEAR TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH THE

4 IAEA.—The President shall direct the United States Per5 manent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, 

6 and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 

7 the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, envi8 ronmental, or nuclear science assistance or activity to a 

9 country the government of which— 

10 (1) the Secretary of State has determined, for 

11 purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administra12 tion Act of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign As13 sistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 

14 Control Act, or other provision of law, is a govern15 ment that has repeatedly provided support for acts 

16 of international terrorism; 

17 (2) is actively cooperating with a government as 

18 described in paragraph (1); 

19 (3) is under investigation for a breach of or 

20 noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the pur21 poses and principles of the Charter of the United 

22 Nations; or 

23 (4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the 

24 purposes and principles of the Charter of the United 

25 Nations. 


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1 SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECU2 RITY INITIATIVE. 

3 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following: 

4 (1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the 

5 Proliferation Security Initiative, also referred to as 

6 the PSI, has repeatedly demonstrated its effective7 ness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of 

8 mass destruction. 

9 (2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the 

10 National Defense University regarding additional 

11 measures to enhance global efforts against the pro12 liferation of weapons of mass destruction President 

13 Bush proposed that ‘‘the work of the Proliferation 

14 Security Initiative be expanded to address more than 

15 shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we’ve 

16 developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct ac17 tion against proliferation networks. We need greater 

18 cooperation not just among intelligence and military 

19 services, but in law enforcement, as well. PSI par20 ticipants and other willing nations should use the 

21 Interpol and all other means to bring to justice 

22 those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down 

23 their labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their as24 sets. We must act on every lead. We will find the 

25 middlemen, the suppliers and the buyers.’’. 


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1 (3) The number of countries participating in 

2 PSI has steadily increased, thereby greatly enhanc3 ing its effectiveness. 

4 (4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere 

5 formally or informally cooperate with the PSI. 

6 (5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation 

7 throughout the Western Hemisphere, including by 

8 means of greater coordination of policies, improved 

9 communications, and enhanced capabilities would 

10 significantly promote the objectives of the PSI. 

11 (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS CONCERNING STRENGTH12 ENING COOPERATION REGARDING NONPROLIFERA13 TION.—It is the sense of Congress that— 

14 (1) it is in the national security interest of the 

15 United States to establish comprehensive coopera16 tion to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 

17 and biological materials in the Western Hemisphere; 

18 and 

19 (2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure 

20 the formal or informal cooperation by Western 

21 Hemisphere countries for the purpose of securing 

22 the goals of the Proliferation Security Initiative an23 nounced by the President on May 31, 2003. 


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•HR 375 IH

1 SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

2 NONPROLIFERATION PARTNERSHIP INITIA3 TIVE. 

4 (a) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State is author5 ized, in consultation with relevant United States Govern6 ment agencies, to negotiate with the leaders of the govern7 ments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat8 eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international 

9 agreements under which such governments work in part10 nership to establish an initiative to be known as the 

11 ‘‘Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Ini12 tiative’’ (NPI). 

13 (b) PURPOSE.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The NPI shall— 

15 (A) encourage the establishment of con16 tacts and cooperative relationships, including 

17 the sharing of intelligence, between the respon18 sible individuals and agencies of each partici19 pant country with their counterparts in the 

20 United States Government and in other partici21 pating countries; and 

22 (B) encourage bilateral and multilateral 

23 support, cooperation, and coordination of na24 tional programs and efforts to promote effective 

25 and in-depth cooperation to counter the illicit 

26 acquisition or trade of weapons-related nuclear, 


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•HR 375 IH

1 chemical, or biological materials, technology, or 

2 facilities. 

3 (2) COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS.—The cooperative 

4 programs referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall 

5 include the following: 

6 (A) Training for government officials and 

7 agents from participating countries regarding 

8 the development and operation of NPI pro9 grams. 

10 (B) Assistance in developing a comprehen11 sive legal and regulatory framework in each 

12 country, as appropriate, to enable the establish13 ment and effective implementation of export 

14 controls and the capacity to track nuclear, 

15 chemical, and biological materials, equipment, 

16 technology, and facilities. 

17 (C) Provision of equipment, development of 

18 infrastructure, and the acquisition of other re19 sources required by participating countries to 

20 effectively carry out the tasks referred to in 

21 subparagraphs (A) and (B). 

22 SEC. 208. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS. 

23 (a) IN GENERAL.—No defense article or defense serv24 ice may be sold or licensed for export under this Act in 

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1 mines and certifies to Congress, not later than May 15 

2 of the calendar year in which such fiscal year begins, is 

3 carrying out policies aimed at undermining United States 

4 national security interests or is not cooperating fully with 

5 United States nonproliferation efforts. 

6 (b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the prohibi7 tion under subsection (a) with respect to a specific trans8 action if the President determines that such transaction 

9 is important to the national security interests of the 

10 United States. 

11 SEC. 209. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH 

12 COUNTRIES ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PRO13 GRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA. 

14 (a) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provi15 sion of law or any international agreement, no agreement 

16 for cooperation between the United States and the govern17 ment of any country that is assisting the nuclear program 

18 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conven19 tional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be 

20 submitted to the President or to Congress pursuant to sec21 tion 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 

22 2153), no such agreement may enter into force with such 

23 country, no license may be issued for export directly or 

24 indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facili25 ties, components, or other goods, services, or technology 


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•HR 375 IH

1 that would be subject to such agreement, and no approval 

2 may be given for the transfer or retransfer directly or indi3 rectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities, 

4 components, or other goods, services, or technology that 

5 would be subject to such agreement, until the President 

6 determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Af7 fairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee 

8 on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the government 

9 of the country that is assisting the nuclear program of 

10 Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional 

11 weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba— 

12 (1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Ven13 ezuela or Cuba and all transfers of advanced conven14 tional weapons and missiles to Venezuela or Cuba; 

15 and 

16 (2) is committed to maintaining such suspen17 sion until Venezuela or Cuba has implemented meas18 ures that would permit the President to make the 

19 determination described in paragraph (1). 

20 (b) RULES OF CONSTRUCTION.—The restrictions de21 scribed in subsection (a)— 

22 (1) shall apply in addition to all other applica23 ble procedures, requirements, and restrictions re24 quired by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any 

25 other law; and 


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•HR 375 IH

1 (2) shall not be construed as affecting the valid2 ity of agreements for cooperation that are in effect 

3 on the date of the enactment of this Act. 

4 (c) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

5 (1) AGREEMENT FOR COOPERATION.—The term 

6 ‘‘agreement for cooperation’’ has the meaning given 

7 that term in section 11 b. of the Atomic Energy Act 

8 of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.). 

9 (2) ASSISTING THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF

10 VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—The term ‘‘assisting the nu11 clear program of Venezuela or Cuba’’ means the in12 tentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a govern13 ment, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of 

14 a government with the knowledge and acquiescence 

15 of such government, of goods, services, or technology 

16 listed on the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for 

17 the Export of Nuclear Material, Equipment and 

18 Technology (published by the International Atomic 

19 Energy Agency as Information Circular INFCIRC/ 

20 254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or 

21 Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual22 Use Equipment, Material, and Related Technology 

23 (published by the International Atomic Energy 

24 Agency as Information Circular INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/ 

25 Part 2, and subsequent revisions). 


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•HR 375 IH

1 (3) COUNTRY THAT IS ASSISTING THE NU2 CLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA OR

3 TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL WEAP4 ONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.—The 

5 term ‘‘country that is assisting the nuclear program 

6 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced con7 ventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba’’ 

8 means— 

9 (A) Russia; and 

10 (B) any other country determined by the 

11 President to be assisting the nuclear program 

12 of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced 

13 conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela 

14 or Cuba. 

15 (4) TRANSFERRING ADVANCED CONVENTIONAL

16 WEAPONS OR MISSILES TO VENEZUELA OR CUBA.— 

17 The term ‘‘transferring advanced conventional weap18 ons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba’’ means the in19 tentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a govern20 ment, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of 

21 a government with the knowledge and acquiescence 

22 of such government, of goods, services, or technology 

23 listed on— 

24 (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of 

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1 tions list of July 12, 1996, and subsequent revi2 sions; or 

3 (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime 

4 Equipment and Technology Annex of June 11, 

5 1996, and subsequent revisions. 

6 TITLE III—WESTERN HEMI7 SPHERE REGIONAL COORDI8 NATION CENTERS 

9 SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

10 REGIONAL COORDINATION CENTERS. 

11 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con12 gress that— 

13 (1) the United States Government should carry 

14 out a comprehensive and integrated approach to 

15 United States counterterrorism and nonproliferation 

16 efforts, both domestically and abroad; and 

17 (2) the Secretary of State should seek to en18 gage leaders of the governments of countries in the 

19 Western Hemisphere to develop a comprehensive 

20 multilateral strategy to counter current and emerg21 ing threats and prevent the proliferation of nuclear, 

22 chemical, and biological weapons. 

23 (b) PURPOSE.—Western Hemisphere Regional Co24 ordination Centers shall serve as joint operational facilities 

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1 ligence among participating countries to counter current 

2 and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of nu3 clear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the 

4 Western Hemisphere. 

5 (c) ESTABLISHMENT.—The Secretary of State shall 

6 negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries 

7 in the Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral 

8 basis, as appropriate, international agreements under 

9 which such governments work in partnership to establish 

10 centers to be known as the ‘‘Western Hemisphere Regional 

11 Coordination Centers’’ (RCC). 

12 (d) COOPERATION WITH GOVERNMENTS IN THE

13 WESTERN HEMISPHERE.— 

14 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State shall 

15 negotiate with— 

16 (A) the governments of countries in Cen17 tral and South America agreements for the es18 tablishment of one RCC in a country in Central 

19 America and one RCC in a country in South 

20 America; and 

21 (B) the Government of Brazil, the Govern22 ment of Argentina, and the Government of 

23 Paraguay an agreement for the establishment 

24 of a RCC specifically in the tri-border area. 


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•HR 375 IH

1 (2) COORDINATION.—The Secretary of State 

2 shall negotiate with the leaders of the governments 

3 of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a bilat4 eral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, agreements 

5 under which a method is established for staffing par6 allel representatives, from each participating country 

7 or region, for each United States agency represented 

8 at the relevant RCC. 

9 (e) PARTICIPATION OF UNITED STATES GOVERN10 MENT AGENCIES.— 

11 (1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary of State, in 

12 consultation with the Director of National Intel13 ligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall deter14 mine which departments and agencies of the United 

15 States Government, including the Department of 

16 Defense, the Department of Energy, the Department 

17 of Homeland Security, the Department of the Treas18 ury, the Department of Justice, the Drug Enforce19 ment Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investiga20 tion, are necessary to ensure the establishment and 

21 operation of the RCCs. The Secretary of State, in 

22 consultation with the Director of National Intel23 ligence and the Secretary of Defense, shall negotiate 

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1 sure their full participation and cooperation in such 

2 establishment and operation. 

3 (2) ASSIGNMENT OF REGIONAL ATTACHES AND

4 ADVISORS.—The Secretary of State shall transfer to 

5 appropriate RCCs regional attaches and advisors 

6 serving at United States diplomatic and consular 

7 missions in the Western Hemisphere. 

8 (f) STRUCTURE.— 

9 (1) MANAGEMENT OF THE RCCS.—The Sec10 retary of State, in consultation with the Director of 

11 National Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, 

12 shall be responsible for the management of the 

13 RCCs, including development of the budget, prior14 ities, and programs of the RCCs. 

15 (2) STAFFING AND DUTIES.—Each RCC shall 

16 have one United States Director, at least one but 

17 not more than two United States Deputy Directors, 

18 and one host country General Director. The United 

19 States Director and United States Deputy Directors 

20 may be employees of any of the United States na21 tional security agencies and shall be chosen by the 

22 Secretary of State, in consultation with the Director 

23 of National Intelligence and Secretary of Defense. 

24 The Director and Deputy Directors of each RCC 

25 shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States 


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•HR 375 IH

1 Embassies in the host country of such RCC fully in2 formed of activities and operations of such RCC. 

3 (3) RCC POLICY BOARD.— 

4 (A) ESTABLISHMENT.—There is estab5 lished the RCC Policy Board. 

6 (B) COMPOSITION.—The RCC Policy 

7 Board shall be comprised of senior representa8 tives from the departments and agencies deter9 mined by the Secretary of State, in consultation 

10 with the Director of National Intelligence and 

11 the Secretary of Defense, to be necessary to en12 sure the establishment and operation of the 

13 RCCs in accordance with subsection (e). 

14 (C) DUTIES.—The Policy Board shall 

15 monitor and provide guidance and oversight for 

16 the RCCs to ensure that their operations are 

17 consistent with United States foreign policy and 

18 law enforcement goals. 

19 (D) MEETINGS.—The Policy Board shall 

20 meet bi-monthly and shall be co-chaired by offi21 cers from the Office of the Coordinator for 

22 Counterterrorism of the Department of State 

23 and the National Counterterrorism Center of 

24 the Office of the Director of National Intel25 ligence. 


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•HR 375 IH

1 SEC. 302. REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE. 

2 (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con3 gress that the Latin America Regional Strategic Initiative 

4 (RSI) should serve as a critical component of United 

5 States regional counterterrorism and nonproliferation ef6 forts. 

7 (b) PARTICIPATION WITH THE RCCS.—The Latin 

8 America RSI shall conduct at least one inter-agency meet9 ing at one of the three RCCs each fiscal year. The Direc10 tor, a Deputy Director, or both, of each RCC shall partici11 pate in all RSI meetings organized by the Department of 

12 State. 

13 (c) REPORT.—Not later than 45 days after the con14 clusion of each RSI meeting, the Secretary of State shall 

15 submit to the appropriate congressional committees a re16 port, which shall include a classified annex if necessary, 

17 that describes— 

18 (1) the defined objectives of the RSI; 

19 (2) the extent to which such objectives have 

20 been achieved; 

21 (3) the steps taken by the United States to ac22 complish such objectives; 

23 (4) the extent of cooperation by other countries 

24 in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such 

25 objectives; and 


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•HR 375 IH

1 (5) the steps the United States will take in the 

2 subsequent months to accomplish such objectives. 

3 SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS. 

4 There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as 

5 may be necessary for fiscal year 2009 and each subsequent 

6 fiscal year to carry out this title. 

7 TITLE IV—PROHIBITIONS ON EN8 GAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN 

9 WESTERN HEMISPHERE 

10 COUNTRIES 

11 SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN 

12 WESTERN HEMISPHERE COUNTRIES. 

13 Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening 

14 or removing any prohibitions on United States engage15 ment with or assistance to any country in the Western 

16 Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has designated as 

17 a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of three con18 secutive years. 

19 TITLE V—REPORT 

20 SEC. 501. REPORT. 

21 (a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the 

22 date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, 

23 the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate con24 gressional committees a report on the activities carried out 


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•HR 375 IH

1 to achieve the objectives described in titles II and III that 

2 describe— 

3 (1) the extent to which each such objective has 

4 been achieved; 

5 (2) the steps taken by the United States and 

6 countries in the Western Hemisphere in the pre7 ceding calendar year to accomplish such objectives; 

8 (3) the extent of cooperation by other countries 

9 in the Western Hemisphere toward achieving such 

10 objectives; and 

11 (4) the steps the United States will take in the 

12 current calendar year to accomplish such objectives. 

13 (b) PREPARATION AND FORM OF REPORT.—The re14 port required under subsection (a) shall rely on public in15 formation to the extent possible, and shall include a classi16 fied annex, if necessary. 

Æ 


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