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*********************************************** 
LIBERTY TRANSPORTATION, INC.

v. MASSACHUSETTS BAY

INSURANCE COMPANY

(AC 41553)

DiPentima, C. J., and Moll and Norcott, Js.

Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant insurance company for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with lost rental

income and damage to certain of its real property that was sustained

during a hurricane. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting

that the plaintiff lacked standing to bring its claim for lost rental income

because it had sold the property to a third party and assigned the rights

to the insurance proceeds to that third party pursuant to the terms of

the real estate purchase agreement. The plaintiff claimed that it had

standing and was entitled to the insurance proceeds because the damage

occurred before it entered into the real estate purchase agreement with

the third party and because it had retained an interest in the damaged

rental units as a result of its decision to exercise a leaseback provision

in that agreement. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to

dismiss, concluding, inter alia, that the plaintiff lacked standing because,

by virtue of the assignment, it had no legal interest in the insurance

proceeds. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment for the defendant,

from which the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court

properly granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss and rendered judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint; because the trial court’s memorandum of decision thoroughly addressed the arguments raised in this

appeal, this court adopted the trial court’s well reasoned decision as a

proper statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues.

Argued March 18—officially released April 30, 2019

Procedural History

Action to recover damages for, inter alia, breach of

contract, and for other relief, brought to the Superior

Court in the judicial district of Hartford, where the

court, Shapiro, J., granted the defendant’s motion to

dismiss and rendered judgment thereon, from which

the plaintiff appealed to this court. Affirmed.

Stuart G. Blackburn, with whom, on the brief, was

Paige B. Durno, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Stephen O. Clancy, with whom, on the brief, was

Jessica A. R. Hamilton, for the appellee (defendant).
Opinion

PER CURIAM. The plaintiff, Liberty Transportation,

Inc., appeals from the judgment of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss filed by the defendant, Massachusetts Bay Insurance Company. The dispositive issue

in the appeal is whether the court properly concluded

that the plaintiff lacked standing to commence this

action. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

The plaintiff set forth the following allegations in its

complaint. In August, 2011, the plaintiff owned property

located at 11 High Street in Suffield, which the defendant insured for, inter alia, property damage, loss of

income and fair rental value. On or about August 28,

2011, the property suffered wind and water damage

during a hurricane. As a result, the plaintiff claimed to

have sustained damages for lost income and lost fair

rental value, and made an insurance claim to the defendant. The defendant declined to pay the plaintiff’s claim.

In August, 2013, the plaintiff commenced this action

against the defendant. Its complaint set forth claims

for breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. It sought money

damages, interest, attorney’s fees, costs, and any other

relief deemed appropriate by the court. The defendant

filed an answer and raised several special defenses on

January 8, 2016.

On September 6, 2017, the defendant filed a motion

to dismiss pursuant to Practice Book § 10-30. Specifically, the defendant argued that the plaintiff lacked

standing to bring its claim for lost rental income for

two commercial units at the property because the plaintiff had sold the property to a third party on January

10, 2012,1 and had assigned any insurance money

for any damages existing at the time of the January,

2012 real estate closing.2 Specifically, it stated: ‘‘[The]

[p]laintiff’s assignment of its rights to any potentially

recoverable insurance proceeds to [the third party]

unequivocally extinguished [the] [p]laintiff’s corresponding right to recover those amounts. [The] [p]laintiff, therefore, lacks standing to maintain this action on

its own behalf.’’

On October 6, 2017, the plaintiff filed a memorandum

of law in opposition to the defendant’s motion to dismiss. It argued that the loss of rental income occurred

before the formation of the real estate purchase agreement. The plaintiff further claimed it was ‘‘classically

aggrieved in that it has a specific interest in the claimed

insurance proceeds . . . [and] suffered a loss due to

the breach of contract by the [defendant] and has standing to bring this action.’’ It also contended that it had

retained an interest in the damaged units as a result of

its decision to exercise a leaseback provision as set

forth in the real estate purchase agreement.3

On March 27, 2018, the court, Shapiro, J., issued
a memorandum of decision granting the defendant’s

motion to dismiss. It first addressed the defendant’s

argument that the plaintiff had assigned the rights to

the insurance proceeds to the third party pursuant to

the terms of the real estate purchase agreement. It specifically explained: ‘‘An assignment is a transfer of property or some other right from one person (the assignor)

to another (the assignee), which confers a complete

and present right in the subject matter to the assignee.

. . . Succession by an assignee to exclusive ownership

of all or part of the assignor’s rights respecting the

subject matter of the assignment, and a corresponding

extinguishment of those rights in the assignor, is precisely the effect of a valid assignment.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) The court

concluded that a valid assignment had occurred.

The court was not persuaded by the plaintiff’s arguments that (1) it was entitled to the insurance proceeds

because the damage had occurred before it entered into

the real estate purchase agreement with the third party

and (2) the execution of the leaseback provision in the

real estate purchase agreement established its interest

in the property such that it had standing. The court also

rejected the plaintiff’s claim that a separate agreement

with the defendant entitled the plaintiff to any insurance

moneys. Indeed, the plaintiff had failed to provide the

court with a copy of this alleged separate agreement.

The court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding

that ‘‘the plaintiff lacks standing in the present case

because, by virtue of the assignment, it has no legal

interest in alleged insurance proceeds that are due and

payable on account of damage to the [property].’’ This

appeal followed.

We carefully have examined the record and the briefs

and arguments of the parties, and conclude that the

judgment of the trial court should be affirmed. Because

the trial court’s memorandum of decision thoroughly

addresses the arguments raised in this appeal, we adopt

that court’s well reasoned decision as a proper statement of the facts and the applicable law on the issues.

Liberty Transportation, Inc. v. Massachusetts Bay Ins.

Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket

No. CV-13-6044771-S (March 27, 2018) (reprinted at 189

Conn. App. 600, A.3d ). It would serve no useful

purpose for this court to engage in any further discussion. See, e.g., Woodruff v. Hemingway, 297 Conn. 317,

321, 2 A.3d 857 (2010); Bassford v. Bassford, 180 Conn.

App. 331, 335, 183 A.3d 680 (2018); Samakaab v. Dept.

of Social Services, 178 Conn. App. 52, 54, 173 A.3d

1004 (2017).

The judgment is affirmed.

1 The defendant attached a copy of the real estate purchase agreement

for 11 High Street in Suffield. Generally, ‘‘[w]hen a . . . court decides a

. . . question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss, it must consider the

allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light. . . . In this regard,

a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including

those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a
manner most favorable to the pleader. . . . The motion to dismiss . . .

admits all facts which are well pleaded, invokes the existing record and

must be decided upon that alone. . . .

‘‘[I]f the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by

affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types

of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice

may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining a jurisdictional issue, may

consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively

presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint. . . . Rather, those

allegations are tempered by the light shed on them by the [supplementary

undisputed facts]. . . . If affidavits and/or other evidence submitted in support of a defendant’s motion to dismiss conclusively establish that jurisdiction is lacking, and the plaintiff fails to undermine this conclusion with

counteraffidavits . . . or other evidence, the trial court may dismiss the

action without further proceedings.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation

marks omitted.) Caron v. Connecticut Pathology Group., P.C., 187 Conn.

App. 555, 563–64, A.3d (2019); Norris v. Trumbull, 187 Conn. App.

201, 209–10, 201 A.3d 1137 (2019).

2 Paragraph 12 of the real estate purchase agreement provides: ‘‘The [plaintiff] assumes all risk of loss or damage to the [property] until closing and

the PURCHASER assumes same upon closing. If any damage to the [property] shall not be restored prior to closing PURCHASER shall be required

to close title to the [property] and shall receive in an amount not to exceed

the purchase price all insurance monies recovered and recoverable on

account of such damage. In the event of damage or loss [the plaintiff] shall

immediately notify PURCHASER thereof and furnish to PURCHASER a

written statement of the amount of insurance, if any, payable on account

thereof.’’

3 Paragraph 17 of the real estate purchase agreement provides in relevant

part: ‘‘Notwithstanding the transfer of title, if a closing is had the [plaintiff]

shall be entitled at its election to lease back the apartment located in the

front of the building above the barber shop as presently configured and the

small first floor one room office identified as Suite 1 for a term of one year

from closing . . . . At PURCHASERS election [the plaintiff] may lease

either or both of said units for a further one year terms at an increased

rental . . . .’’