NO. 07-00-0530 -CV IN THE COU RT OF APP EALS FOR THE SEVENT H DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMA RILLO PANE L A APRIL 16, 2002

______________________________ THE STATE OF TEXAS FOR THE BEST I NTEREST AND PR OTECTION OF K .D.C., ASA ME NTALLY ILL P ERSON

_________________________________ FROM THE COUNT Y COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY; NO. 2000-789,652; HO NORABL E TOM H EAD, J UDGE

_______________________________ Before BOYD, C.J., and REAVIS and JOHNSON, JJ. Appellant K.D.C. a ppeals from orders com mitting her for tem porary inpatient mental health services and authorizing adm inistration of psychoactive m edication. W e reverse and render as to both orders.
BACKGROUND
On N o vem ber 1 , 2000, K.D.C . was detained in Levelland, Hockley County, and taken to the Sunrise Canyon Hospi tal (the ho spital ) in Lubbo ck . An Order for Protective Custody was issued by the Lubbock County j udge (the “trial judge” or “trial court”) pursuant to an Appli cation for Em ergency Detention and Tem porary Mental Health Services. The1 Further references to provisions of the Health an d Safety Code will be by reference to “HSC § _. ” 2 appli cation al leged that K.D.C. was m entall y ill and evidence d a substantia l risk of harm to herself or others in tha t she was exhibiting manic beha vior and hyper-religiosi ty, and
wasunable to care for herself. The order for protect ive custod y was to expire on Novem ber

6, 2000. Pursuant to agr eement of K.D.C.’s attorney ad li te m , the order was extended unt il November 9, 200 0.
On Novem ber 9, 2000, the trial court held a hearing to determine whether K.D.C. sho uld be detained for court-ordered tem porary inpatient mental health services for u p to 90 days. See

T EX . H EALTH & S AFET Y C ODE A NN . § 574.034(a) (Vernon S upp. 2002). 1 The trial court granted the S tate’s m otion. The court’s orde r incl uded findi ngs that K.D.C. was m ent ally ill and that each of the subdivisions of HSC § 574.034(a)(2) w ere applicable. The court adjudged ap pellant mentally ill, determined that she required inpatient car e an d treatm entin a menta l health facility and ordered that she be com mitted for inpatient mental health services for a period not exceeding 90 days. See HSC § 574.034(g). After finding thatK.D.C. requ ired inpatient care and treatment and ordering that she be com mitted for such treatm ent, the court held a hearing on and granted t he State’s ap plication to administer psych oactive m edications to K.D.C.
K.D.C. does not challenge the determ ination that she was me ntally ill

. See HSC § 574.034 (a)(1). Howe ver, she challenges the evidenti ary support for findings required3

pursuantto H SC§ 57 4.0 34( a)( 2). Sh e als o ch all eng es the order authorizing administration of psycho active m edications.
K.D.C. as serts five issues, but groupsthe first four together for argum ent. By her first issue, K.D.C. argues tha t the evidence was insufficient to prove thatshew ould like ly
cause harm to herself or others. See HSC § 574. 034(a)(2)(A) and (B). He r second issue alleges that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she w as suffering severe distr ess, see HSC § 574. 034(a)(2)(C)(i), or deterioration of her abili ty to function indep end ently. See HSC§ 574.0 34(a)(2)(C )(ii). In her third issue, K.D.C. a sserts that the ev idence was insufficient to prove that she was not capable of

surviving safely in freedom. By her fourth issue, K.D.C. g enerally contends that the evidence w as insufficient t o p rove that the requirementsof HSC § 574.034 were met as to her. Her

fifth issue urges that the order authorizing adm inistration of psychoactive me dications is invali d because it m ust be based
on a valid order that she be com mitted for inpatient care, and the orde r for inpat ient care
wasnot valid for the reasons urged in her first four issues. See HSC § 574. 10 4(a)(3), (b)(3). Although K.D.C . does not clearly set o ut whether she is challenging the legal or factual suffi ciency of the evidence, we construe the issues to be both legal and factual sufficiency challenges. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 38.1(e).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In instances requiring the trial court to exercise its function as a f actfinder and to also ma ke legal determinations and to exercise its discretion in making a decision based4

on com bination of the two func tions, ap pellate review is m ulti-faceted. See Bocquet v. Herring , 972 S.W.2d 19, 21 (Tex. 1998). Neces sary underlying factual findings by the trial court are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence. Id

. Decisions vested in the discretion of th e tr ia l court based on predicate factual findings supported by the evidence, dec is ions i nvolving application of legal principles, or decisions involvi ng application of or m atters of law are rev iewed o nly

to determ ine whether the trial court acted without refe rence to any guiding rules and principles. See Craddock v. S unshine Bus Lines, Inc. , 134 Tex. 38 8, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).
An appellate cour t reviewing “no evidence” or legal sufficiency com plaints may consider only the evi dence and infer ences that tend to supp ort the find ing and must disregard all con t rary evidence and inferences. See Continenta l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez , 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996). In the absence of direct evidence, a finding may be upheld on circum st ant ial ev iden ce if thefind ing m ay b e fa irly a nd r eas ona bly inferred from the facts. See Blount v. Bordens, In c. , 910 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex. 1995).
If a finding is challenged for factual sufficiency of the evidence, all of th e evidence is reviewed. Se e Loft on v. Te xasBrine C orp ., 720 S.W.2d 804, 805 (Tex. 1986). The review includes evidence both favorable to and contrary to the f indings. See In re King’s Estate , 150 Tex. 66 2, 664-65, 244 S. W .2d 660, 661 (195 1). W e reverse on the basis of factual insufficiency only if the verdict is so agai nst the great weight an d preponder ance of the evidence that it is m anifestly erroneous or unjust

. Id . W here enough evidence is before thefac

tfin der tha t re aso nab le minds could differon the m eaning of the evidence or5

the inferences and conclusions to be drawn f rom the evidence, we m ay not substitute our judgm entfor that of the fac tfinder. See Herbert

v. He rbert , 754 S.W. 2d 1 41 , 1 44 (T ex. 1988).

LAW
A judge ma y order a proposed patient to receive court-ordered, tem porary inpatient mental health services only if the judge finds, from clear and convincing evidence, that: (1) the proposed patient is m entally ill ; and (2) as a result of that m ental ill ness the proposed patient: (A) is likely to cause serious harm to himse lf; (B) is likely to cause serious harm to others; or (C) is: (i) suffer ing sever e a nd a bno rm al m ent al, emotional, or physi cal dist ress; (ii) experiencin g substantia l mental or phys i cal deterioration of

the proposed patient’s ability to function independently, which is ex hibited by the p roposed patient’s inability, except for reason s of indigence, to provide for the p ro posed patient’s basic needs , including food, clothing, health, or safety; and (iii) unable t o make a rational and informed decision as t o wh etheror not to subm it to treatm ent. HSC § 574.03 4(a).6

Clear and con vinc ing e vide nceis that m eas ure or d egr ee o f ev iden ce t hat

w ill produce in the mind of t he trier of fa ct a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the allegations sought to be established. In re Breeden , 4 S.W.3d 782, 784 (Tex.App.--S an An ton io 1999, no pet.). In order to m eet the clear and convincing standard required by HSC § 574. 034(a), the evidence m ust include expert test imony and, unless waived,
ev i de nc e o f a re ce nt ov er t a ct or a c on ti nu i ng pa tt er n o f b eh av i or th at te nd s t o c on fi rm:

(1) the likelihood of serious harm to the proposed patient or others; or ( 2) the p roposed patient’s distress and thedeterioration of the proposed patient’s ability to function. HSC § 574.034 (d).
An expert opinion recom mending involuntary comm itment m ust be supported by a showing of the factual basis on w hich it is grounded. See In re Breeden , 4 S.W.3d at 784; Gold w ait v. State , 961 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex.A pp.--Houston [1 stDist.] 1997, no w rit). A threatof harm

to the patient

or others m ust be substantial and based on ac tual dangerous behavior manifested by some overt actor threats in the recent past. See Taylor v. State , 671 S.W.2d 535, 538 (Tex.App.--Houston [1 stDist.] 1983, no w rit). Evidence th a t an individual is menta lly il l and in need of hos pita liz ation is not

evidencethat t he stat utory standa rd for involuntary com mitm ent has been m et. See Broussard v. State , 827 S.W.2d 619, 622 (Tex .App. --Corpus Christi 199 2, no w rit); State for Interest of P. W

. , 801 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.A pp.--Fort W orth 1990, writ denied). Psyc hotic behavior alone is insufficient to7

justify com mitm ent on grounds of m ental distress and deterioration of the ability to function indepen dently. See Broussard , 827 S.W.2d at 622; T.G. v. State , 7 S.W.3d 248, 252 (Tex.App.--D allas 1999, no pet.). M oreover, such behavior is not evidence of a “continuing pattern of behavior that tends toconfirm t he likelihood of serious harm to [the proposed patient] or others .” Id

.

ANALY SIS
As w e ha ve p rev ious lynoted, K.D.C . does not challenge the trial court’s finding that she was m entally ill . She challenges, in effect, the proof and findings of a recent overt act or a continuing pattern of behavior on her part as required by H SC § 574.034(d).
The State presented testim ony from three witnesses : Margaret Lair, director of social services at Sunri se Canyon Hospita l; Harol d Veits, M.D., a psychiatr ist; and K.D.C. K.D.C. called her husband, W .T.C., as a w itness.
Lair was as signed as K.D.C. ’s social worker in the hos pital and ha d wo rk ed wi th K.D.C. every day that K.D.C. had been i n the hospita l, exce pt for o ne Sa tur day . La ir testified to the history given by K. D.C. According to thathistory, at the tim e K.D.C. was2 Lair noted that hospi tal personn el at first were concerned that K.D.C . m ight be pregnant and did not want to give her any m edications until they were sure that s he was not pregnant, w hich was after the blood test. 8 detained in Levelland, she and W .T.C. were on their way to Whiteface, Texas. K .D.C. had lived at Girlstown in Whi teface and had attended high school there. S he wanted to try to find out about

her past, and her husband was going to try to find a job there. Addi tional ly, K.D.C. w as g oing to t ry to fin d P ost Off ic e Box

179, which w

as a drug and alcohol tr e atm entcenter, to try to f ind out what God wanted her to do. K.D.C . and W.T.C. had walked fro m Mid land to L eve lland on t heir way to W hiteface. K.D.C . related that she had been diagnos ed w ith bipolar disorder and that she had been hospitalized in Victoria, Texas, for abo ut three days in October, 2000

. According to Lair, K.D .C. was exhibiting rapid, pressured speech and religious ideations when first adm itted to the hospital. F or exa mp le, accordi ng to Lair, K.D.C. believed she was

experiencing a “m iraculous birth” because K.D.C. reported a recent positi ve pregnancy test des pite having had a previous hysterectomy. Lair testified that the hospital also administer ed a pregnancy test to K.D.C . and that it was positive. Lair termed the hospital ’s test result as a “false ” positive, however, because the hospital later performed a blood test on K.D .C., and the results i ndicated th at K.D.C. was not pregnant. Lair further testified that despite the results fromthe blood test, K.D .C. refused me dication atfirst because she continued to b elieve that she was pregnant. 2 According to Lair, K.D.C. agreed to a cce pt H aldo l a fter she w as convinced that it would be the least dangerous9

m edicatio n fo r he r if

indeed she were pre gnant. K.D.C. also agreed to take Depaco te, a mood stabilizing medication.
Lair’s op i ni on was th at K. D. C. ha d s ho wn re mar ka bl e i mp rov ement (“about 80 percent”) during he r hospital izati on. W hen asked by the State’s attor ney if, desp i te her improvements, K. D.C . “issti ll su ffe ring a de ter iora tion of h er a bility to f unc tion ” La ir responded that K.D.C . had m ade remarkable improvem ent and recognized her need for medication, but that the hospi tal person nel questi oned K.D.C.’s s uppo rt systemoutside the hos pita l, and tha t La ir ha d “conc ern ” th at “ w e” d o no t kn ow K. D.C . well en ough to know whether she wou ld continue to take h er m edic atio ns a nd t hat if s he d id no t, s he w

ould becom e ps ych otic

again. Lair was also “concerned” abo ut K.D.C. ’s m ood level and that her me dication dosage might need to be changed.
On cross-exa mination, Lair reported that the h ospital had no history of K.D.C. f ailing
or ref usin g totake m edicatio n w hen itwasprescribed for her. She also reiterated her prior testimony that K.D.C . told Lair and Dr. Veits that she k new she needed to be on medication. Lai r opined that appell ant was not a danger to other s.
Dr. Harold Veits attended and e xam ined appellant during her hospitali zation. Dr. Veits testified asan ex pert in su pport of the app lication, and his qualifications are not in dispute. Dr. Veits evaluated appellant and diagnosed her as suffering frombipolar disorder, manic phase, which is consi dered a mental il lness. He concurr ed in Lai r’s opinion that appellant was not likely to cause serious harm to others. Nev er theless, he10

opined tha t (1 ) K .D. C. pos ed athr eat of s erio us harm to herself in the sense that she
w ould be unable to function in the com munity due to her lack of organization and inability to conduc

t her daily a ffairs; (2 ) appe llant w as s uff

erin g se ver

e an d ab nor m al m ent al, emot ional or physical distress because she w as being hel d in a hospital, and not being allowed to pursue her interests and co ncerns; (3) as a result of app ella nt’s mental ill ness, she was ex periencing substantial mental or physical deterioration of her ability to function
as exhibited by appellant’s inability to provide for her own needs, although he had seen
no indication that appellant was ma lnourished or starving, and thatat least since she had been in the hospital she had been taking care of her hygiene in a normal m anner; (4) as
a result of her m ental ill ness, appellant was un able to make a rational and informed decision as to whether or not she should subm it to treatm ent; (5) a continuing pattern of behavior tended to confirm app ellant’s distress and deterioration of her ability to function, in that appellant had been recently hospitalized in Victoria, although he clari fied on crossexam ination that K .D.C. ’s con dition had be gun im proving over “the las t day o r two”; (6) he did not belie ve t hat

app ellan t co uld s uccessfully be t rea ted on a n ou tpa tie nt basis. D r. Veits assum ed that

much of the recent im provem ent in appellant was due to the Haldol she agreed to take, and since the hospital had only rece ntly changed appell ant’s me dication, he believed that app ellan t w ould sto p ta king m edicatio n if she were to leave the hospital imm ediately.
The State nex

t called K .D.C. to testify. K.D .C. did not know whether s he was pregnantor n ot. Sh e ha d be en told both that she w as and that she w

as not, although she11

knew tha t she previously had a hysterectomy. She recognized that s he needed help for her em otional problems, and that m edication was part of t he help that she needed. S he knew the dates that sh e had been hospitalized in Victoria, Texas, that she had been on Haldol while she was hospitalized there, a n d that she w as discharged without any medications prescribe d. Haldol made her sleepy when she took it i n Victori a and also when she took it at the hosp ital. She an d her hus band plann ed to ret urn to Victori a to live with h er “ ado pte d” f

ath er w hen shew as r

elea sed fro m thehos pita l. S he w as c ryin g a t timesduring the hearing because she was scared by the legal process in w hich she was invol ved, which included an appointed lawyer s he had never m et before and being in a courtroom in Lubbock where she had never been before. She was also distressed because she was

locked up in a hospital and wanted togo hom e and “people won’t let
me. ” She recognized that shewas going toneed m edicine for a while and was willing to take wha t Dr. Veits prescribed until she saw another psychiatrist.
Afterthe State rested, K.D.C. call ed her husband, W .T.C., as a witness. W .T.C. agreed that K.D.C. was very religi ous, as was he. He had known K.D.C. for 15 years and she had never hurt herself or anyone else. When she was notwith W .T.C., she stayed prettymu ch to herse lf. Sh e re ceived p syc holo gica l helpin V icto ria, fro m a do cto r in Midland, and while she had been in Lubbo ck. She had at one tim e been em ployed by Skill et’s Restaurant as a w aitress, but had been fired. W .T.C. visited K.D.C. in the ho spital in Lubbock on adaily

basis. He was not em ployed at the tim e of the hearing, but had been12

in the past and planned on returning to work when he a nd K.D.C. returned to Victo ria. He confirmed th at they had a place to stay with K .D.C.’s “adopted” father in Victoria.
The legislature has specified that proof of m ental illness is insuffici ent reason for
a person to be i nvoluntar ily confined forinpatient mental health services. See HSC § 574.034(a), (d). To justify invol untary confi nement, clear and convi ncing evi dence must be offered of (1) a recent ov ert act or pattern of behav ior on the part of the propose d pati entth at te nd s t o c on fi rm t he pr op os ed pa ti en t i s l i ke l y t o s er i ou sl y h ar m h erself o r others; or (2) the proposed pat ient’s distress and deterioration of the proposed pat ient’s ability to function. See id

. We first consider K.D.C.’ s legal sufficiency challenge to the evidence. In doing so,
we view the evidence and inferences from the evidence in the light mo st favorable to the trial court’ s findings and disreg ard all contr aryevidence and inferences. See Cazarez , 937 S.W.2d at 450. In review ing the evidence according to such standard, we note that the record contains m eager evidence of any overt acts by K.D.C. Evide nce waspresented thatshe stayed in a hospital in Victoria until she was discharged. The specific reason for her hospitalization was not proved, although testimony supports the inference that it was for mental pr oble ms. Foll owing he r rel ease fr om the Victo ria hospi tal, K. D.C . and her husband left Victoria and som ehow arrived in Midland. In M idland she was treated by a doctor in some manne r for her m ental difficulties. She and her husband were walking from Midland to Whi teface w hen deputies in Levelland picked her up and transported her to the hospital in Lu bbo ck. The only evidence introduced at the hearing as to w hat prom pted the3 For a discussion of

appellate no evidence and legal insufficiency evidence review of exp ertand expert o pinion evidence, see Me rre ll Dow P harmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner , 953 S.W.2d 706, 712, 714 (Tex. 1997). 13 deputies to pick her

up was K .D.C.’s te stimony that the deputies thought sh e was on street drugs. The fac

tua l bas is for such alleged belief by the deputies was not proved. K.D.C. de ni ed ha vi ng us ed st re et dr ug s; sh e d i d n ot l i ke th em.
The only evidence as to K.D .C.’s condition w hen she was adm itted to the hospital
wasgiven by

Lair: K.D.C. w

as exhibiting rapid, pressured speech and religious ideati ons. T he re ligi ous ideati ons continue d during her hospita l stay as evid enced by Lair ’s descriptions of K.D.C.’ s statem ents and biblical references in her conversations.
Dr. Veits testified to his conclusions that appellant wasin a deteriorating condition priorto the last few

days before the hearing. The basis for h is conclusion was her stay in the Vic tor ia ho spital, althoug h he did not testify to the reasons , if he knew, for her hospitalization and no one disputed K.D.C .’s testim ony that she had been discharged from Vic tor ia without m edications or prescriptions, and on her “own recognizance.” Dr. Veits also was of

the opinion that K.D.C. wasa danger to herself because she was disorganized and would be unable to func tion outside the hospital setting. However, he did not testify to anyspecific o vert

act or pattern of behav ior supporting his conclusion that K.D.C. w as disorganized and that the disorganization w as s o dis rup tivetha t it w ould ren der her una ble to function outside the hospital. Such foun da tion for his opinion is required. See In re Breede n , 4 S.W.3d at 784; Gold w ait , 961 S.W.2d at 434. 3 Although Lair and Dr. Veits expressed subjec

tive fears about K.D .C.’s ability to m aintain a medication regime n and14

care for herself outside the hospital, both Lair an d Dr. Veits consi dered that K.D.C.’s mental condition had recently improved as of the tim e of the hearing and neither testified to recent specif ic, overt actions or pattern of behavior by K.D.C . to support their opinions
as to how she would conduc t herself if not com mitted for inpatient ser vic es. The only pattern of behavior

testified to was D r. Veits’ reference to K .D.C.’s prior hos pita lizat ion in Victoria. But, the bare fact of K.D.C .’s hospitalization in Victori a, without more, such as a factual history giving the b asis for the hospitalization, diagnoses made during the hospitalization, trea tme nt given K.D.C. during the hospitalization, and discharge instructions and restri ctions pl aced on K.D.C., if any, doe s n ot suff ice to prove a recent “pattern of behavior” in conjunction w ith her hospitalization i n Lubbock w he n the only evidence of t he r

eas on d epu tiesbro ugh t he r totheLub boc k ho spital was K .D.C.’ s statem entthat they thought s he was o n street drugs, w ithout relati ng any underl ying facts. And, alth ough Lair’s opinions might w ell have been valid, the legislature has mandated thatmo re than conclus ory opinions by experts is required before a person m ay be involuntarily comm itted for inpatient mental health services.
K.D.C. recognized that she needed help and that me dication was part

of that help. No evidence contradicted the factual test imony of K.D.C. and her husband that they lived and worked in Victori a, were then in Midl and and walked to Level land. No evidence was presented of overt acts or patter n of behavio r on the part of K.D.C. such as evidence that eitherat or before the tim e she wa s brought to the hospital or at the tim e of the hearing she had bee n ph ysi c ally abused or injured by others, h ad physically abused or injured15

herself, was m alnouri shed, refused to ea t or sleep, was unabl e or unwill ing to pract ice proper hyg iene , or

had eith er d isc ont inue d us ing m edicatio ns p res crib ed f or h er p rev ious ly or refused m edications in the hospital except out of concern that

she m ight be pregnant and did not want to take any medicin e which m ight be d etr im ent al if

she were pregnant. Proof of K.D.C.’s m ental i llne ss, which she admitted, reli gious i deations o r psycho tic behavior, without m ore, does not fulfill the statutory requirem entfor orde ring involunta ry inpatient me ntal health services under HSC § 574.034(a). See T.G. , 7 S.W.3d at 252; Brous sard , 827 S.W.2d at 622; State for Interest of P.W. , 801 S.W.2d at 3.
W e conclude that the State offered legally insufficient evidence to prov e an ove rt act or cont inuing patte rn of beh avior by K .D.C. that t ended toconfirm(1) the likelihood of serious harm to K.D.C. or others; or (2) deterioration of K.D.C.’sability to function. See HSC § 574.034 (d); Cazarez , 93 7 S .W.2d a t 45 0. A cco rdin gly, theevid enc e is lega lly insufficient to sup port thefactua l findings requ ired by HS C §§ 57 4.034(a) (2 ) (A), (B), or (C)(ii). W ithout such evidence, the trial court’s order w as not authorized by statute, and
wasan abuse of discretion. See Bocquet , 972 S.W.2d at 21. More over, even if t he recor d evidence is legally sufficient to sustain eithe r such find ing, we conclud e fromthe ent ire record, as ana lyz ed a bov e, t hat a fi ndin g of

suc h an ove rt a ct o r co ntin uing patte rn of behavior is manifestly unj ust and based on fac tually insufficient evidence. See Lofton , 720 S.W.2d at 805.
We sustain K.D.C.’s fir stand second issues for legal insufficiency of the evidence. Sustaining such issues requires that w e reverse the trial court order authorizing inpatient16

mental health services. Gener ally, if an appellate court sustains a “no evidence” or “legal in suffici ency” issue, the appellate court m ust reverse and render j udgme nt. S ee Vist a Chevrolet, Inc . v. Lew is , 709 S.W. 2d 176, 176 (T ex. 1986). Thus, we also w ill render judgm entin favor of K.D.C. Because ou r d is po si ti on of he r f ir st two issues is de terminative of the appeal as to the trial court’s order authorizing inpatient health services, we need not address K.D.C .’s third and fourth issues. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 47.1.
An order authorizing the adm inistration of psychoactive m edication may be entered only if the patientis under a valid order for tempo rary or extended mental health services pursu ant to HSC § 574.0 34 or § 574.035. See HSC § 574. 106(a)(1). In the absence of
a va lid order for tem porary or extende d m ental health services, the order authorizing the administration of

psy choactive m edication is not authorized by statute. Thus, hav ing sust ained K.D.C.’ s first two issues and having reversed the order authorizing inpatient mental health services, we also sustain K.D.C.’s fift h i ssue and reverse th e trial court’s order authorizing administration of psychoact ive medication. See id

. CONCLUS ION
We sustain K.D.C.’s i ss ues one, tw o and five. We do not consider her third or fourth issues. W e reverse the order of the trial court authorizing tem porary inpatient mental health services and render an order that the State ’s application for court-ordered tem porary

inpa tien t m ent al he alth ser vic es is den ied. W e reverse the order of the t rial court authorizing administration of psychoactive m edications and render an order that the17

State’s application for order to auth oriz e ad m inist rat ion o f ps ych oac tivem edicatio ns is denied. See T EX . R. A PP . P. 43.2(c).

Phil Johnson Justice
Publish.