RECORD IMPOUNDED

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0898-17T4

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DYLIN D. NICKENS,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted December 4, 2018 – Decided 

Before Judges Suter and Geiger.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 16-12-3484.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Tamar Y. Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public 

Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Patrick D. Isbill, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by 

SUTER, J.A.D.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

October 4, 2019
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A-0898-17T4

Defendant Dylin D. Nickens appeals his conviction and sentence arising 

from his participation as an accomplice in a sexual assault. He contends the 

prosecutor's summation improperly shifted the burden of proof to him and 

commented on his right to remain silent. He argues the court's instruction to the 

jury on "consent" also shifted the burden of proof to him, and that the witness 

tampering instruction allowed for a non-unanimous verdict. Defendant requests 

resentencing because of the trial court's analysis of the aggravating and 

mitigating factors. We affirm defendant's convictions and sentence. 

Defendant was indicted in 2016 for second-degree sexual assault as an 

accomplice, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), N.J.S.A 2C:2-6; conspiracy to commit 

sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1), N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2; third-degree burglary, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2(a)(1); and third-degree witness tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-

5(a). Following the denial of his motion to suppress the statement he gave to 

the police, he was convicted by a jury in June 2017 on all counts. He was 

sentenced on the sexual assault charge to an eight-year term subject to an eightyfive percent period of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act 

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. He received four-year sentences on the burglary 

and witness tampering counts. The burglary sentence was concurrent to the 

sexual assault count. The witness tampering sentence was consecutive to the 
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assault count, resulting in an aggregate term of twelve years with a 6.8 year 

period of parole ineligibility. 

I.

Mary1first met defendant on a dating website called "Plenty of Fish," and 

the two exchanged phone numbers. They met at defendant's apartment in midSeptember 2016 for sex. Defendant's twin brother, Devin, was sitting outside 

when Mary arrived and he said hello to her. Mary and defendant had sex that 

night before she left on a trip. 

She received text messages from both defendant and Devin while she was 

away. She texted to Devin that she was not interested in him and would not "go 

from one brother to the next." In response to Devin's entreaties to "hang out," 

she responded that she could not "chill with [him]" because she "had sex with 

[his] brother." She texted him that they could not be friends and then did not 

respond to his further messages. 

Mary made plans to meet defendant when she returned from Florida. 

Mary did not want Devin to be present. It had been "a little awkward" seeing 

Devin the first time and she was told he did not live there. Defendant told Mary

that Devin was in Atlantic City. 

 

1 A pseudonym is used to protect the privacy of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
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A-0898-17T4

On September 20, 2016, Mary arrived at defendant's apartment around 

10:00 to 11:00 p.m. She parked her car, put her purse in the trunk, locked it and 

took her keys and phone with her. It was dark inside the apartment, but the 

television was on. Defendant told her to put her phone and car keys on the 

kitchen table because the bedside window sill was wet. She did not see anyone 

else there. 

Mary testified that defendant did not remember at first that he had told her 

his brother had gone to Atlantic City. When she asked why he did not go there 

too, defendant said he had "work and stuff." Defendant would not let Mary use 

the bathroom, saying it was "messy." He turned on music, went into the 

bathroom to clean it and closed the door. After he came out, she "heard 

something drop" in the bathroom. Threatening to leave, defendant let Mary look 

in the bathroom, but no one was there. 

Defendant and Mary had oral sex in the bedroom. He kept the music 

playing at its "highest maximum volume." Defendant told Mary that his "mouth 

was dry" and went to the kitchen "to get something to drink." They 

recommenced having oral sex. Mary testified that defendant "just popped up 

and walked into the bathroom" for a few seconds and came back. Mary was not 

aware that it was Devin—not defendant—who had walked out of the bathroom 
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A-0898-17T4

and started having oral sex with her. It was not until he "got up and laid on the 

bed and tried to cover himself with the pillow," that she saw "the extra tattoos 

and noticed the different haircut[]" and realized it was Devin, not defendant. 

She promptly dressed and grabbed her phone from the kitchen, but her car 

keys were missing. She went outside and saw defendant "coming out of [her]

car." The door was open, the lights were on and her purse was on the passenger 

seat. Defendant was trying to "duck behind the car so [Mary] wouldn't see him."

She confronted defendant and called 9-1-1, because she believed they had 

robbed her. She did not mention the sexual assault because she was "scared" 

and it was "embarrassing." Her focus was on "[her] car not being stolen or 

anything in [her] car being stolen." The police came to the scene. Mary did not 

want to press charges. 

Shortly after she left, defendant texted her on the "Plenty of Fish" website. 

He denied trying to rob her stating "[a]ll we did was switch on you to get some 

pussy. I'm being honest." She responded that he should leave her alone. 

When the police called Mary the next day, she gave them a full account 

of the incident in a taped statement and copies of the messages between her and 

defendant. She identified defendant and Devin in photographs. She did not file 

charges against the brothers. 
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A-0898-17T4

Defendant called Mary a few days later. He asked her to drop the charges 

because "[his] brother [was] locked up" but she told him, "[she] never pressed 

charges." Mary hung up. She received additional messages from defendant 

telling her that she "should [have] never sent the cop the screen shot of the 

conversation. It wasn't none of his business." In another, he stated "I'm going 

to prison because of you . . . . [Y]ou're the one who called the cops. Nobody 

else. It's your f--king fault . . . we dealing with this and that he locked up." She 

reported all this to the police. 

On appeal, defendant raises these issues:

POINT I

THE PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION 

INAPPROPRIATELY SHIFTED THE BURDEN OF 

PROOF AND COMMENTED ON DEFENDANT'S 

SILENCE. THIS IMPROPER ARGUMENT 

NECESSITATES REVERSAL OF DEFENDANT'S 

CONVICTIONS. (NOT RAISED BELOW)

POINT II

THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON THE ISSUE OF 

CONSENT—THE ONLY CONTESTED ISSUE IN 

THE CASE—UNCONSTITUTIONALLY SHIFTED 

THE BURDEN OF PROOF TO DEFENDANT TO 

SHOW CONSENT. (NOT RAISED BELOW)
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A-0898-17T4

POINT III

THE JURY INSTRUCTION ON WITNESS 

TAMPERING PERMITTED THE JURY TO RETURN 

A NON-UNANIMOUS VERDICT. THEREFORE, 

DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION FOR WITNESS 

TAMPERING MUST BE VACATED. (NOT RAISED 

BELOW)

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY FOUND 

SEVERAL AGGRAVATING FACTORS THAT HAD 

NO BASIS IN THE RECORD AND DISMISSED 

WITHOUT CONSIDERATION MITIGATING 

FACTORS THAT WERE BASED IN THE RECORD. 

THEREFORE, THE SENTENCE MUST BE 

VACATED AND THE CASE REMANDED FOR 

RESENTENCING. 

II.

A.

Defendant argues the prosecutor's summation violated his constitutional 

rights by shifting the burden of proof and by commenting on his right to silence. 

He contends the prosecutor should not have commented to the jury about what 

defendant did not say to the police during his statement to them.

Following defendant's arrest, he waived his Miranda2rights and gave a 

taped statement to the police where he said he did not know Mary. He asserted 

 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
8

A-0898-17T4

that someone he knew as "Crystal" had come over to his apartment on the night 

of September 20, 2016. Defendant denied having a user name on the "Plenty of 

Fish" website and he denied texting Mary. His interview with the police ended 

when he indicated he did not want it to continue. 

Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress his oral statement, but the 

motion was denied. His entire statement was played to the jury, including the 

end when he told the police he just wanted to "cut the interview." 

The prosecutor's summation to the jury commented on the inconsistency 

between defendant's statement to the police, that he did not know Mary, and his 

defense at trial that Mary consented to having sex with defendant and his 

brother. The prosecutor argued: 

[T]he defendant didn't say in his videotaped statement 

that Devin was there to have consensual sex with 

[Mary]. Right? You saw and heard the defendant's 

videotaped statement. What did he say in his 

videotaped statement? He said he didn't even know 

who [Mary] was, let alone have a relationship with her. 

He didn't even know who she was, so . . . how could his 

position be that she was having consensual sex with 

him . . . when he can't even admit he knew who [Mary] 

was? Let alone that she was there to have sex with both 

of them.

If [Mary] was there to have sex with both of them, 

wouldn't the defendant have just said that in his taped 

statement? He didn't say that. What he said in his 

statement was something totally different. Was that I 
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A-0898-17T4

don't even know her....I didn't do anything with her. I 

didn't have any type of a relationship with her. He 

didn't say that she was there to have consensual sex 

with both of them.

Later in the summation, the prosecutor argued:

So what generally does the defendant say in his 

videotaped statement? Basically . . . he never says . . . 

[Mary] was here to have sex with me. I had consensual 

sex with her and she also had consensual sex with 

Devin. He does not say that.

What he says is I don't know [Mary]. Didn't have a 

relationship with her and don't even know her. I was 

talking to some girl named Crystal. Yeah. That text 

that Detective Lyons showed me, yeah. That text 

exchange on September 20th. Yeah, that was me, but I 

wasn't talking to anybody named [Mary] . . . . 

He's not saying how the hell am I being charged with 

sexual assault? I'm totally innocent of that. There's no 

way that I could be guilty of a sexual assault. I've never 

had sex with somebody without their consent. I didn't 

help anybody else to have sex with somebody else 

without their consent. He's not saying that.

Defendant's attorney did not object to the prosecutor's summation. 

Because there was no objection, we review this issue under a plain error 

standard, meaning our inquiry is to determine whether this was an error that was 

"clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2; see State v. Macon, 

57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971). Under that standard, reversal of defendant's conviction 

is required if there was error "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether 
10 A-0898-17T4

[it] led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Green, 

447 N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Macon, 57 N.J. at 336). 

Reversal is not warranted where the alleged error is "harmless." State v. J.R., 

227 N.J. 393, 417 (2017). 

Defendant relies on State v. Muhammad, 182 N.J. 551 (2005) to support 

his argument that the prosecutor's comments in summation violated his right to 

remain silent. In Muhammad, the defendant told the police that the victim had 

been harassing his family members. Id. at 560. When she contradicted this, 

insisting he had forced her to have sex with him, the police sergeant told the 

defendant he could not leave because they would need to conduct an 

investigation. Id. at 560-61. At that point, the defendant did not say anything 

further to the police. 

During the trial, defendant's attorney suggested the victim was "a 

prostitute with whom defendant had a consensual sexual encounter." Id. at 562. 

The prosecutor commented throughout the trial that the defendant had not told

this story to the police when he was at the station. Id. at 562-64. 

The Court found that the prosecutor's comments were "direct references 

to defendant's silence." Id. at 565. "Making reference at trial to what a 

defendant did not say to the police is commenting on his silence." Ibid. The 
11 A-0898-17T4

Court found the State violated the defendant's state law right against selfincrimination because the prosecutor had not just pointed out inconsistencies; 

the prosecutor "called for the jury to reject the consent defense because 

defendant remained silent when he had the opportunity to present it to the 

police." Id. at 566. 

Here, defendant argues that because the prosecutor pointed out in 

summation what defendant did not say to the police during his statement to them,

that this violated Muhammad by commenting on defendant's right to silence. 

We do not agree that Muhammad is violated in this case. 

In State v. Tucker, 190 N.J. 183, 190 (2007), the defendant gave more 

than one post-Miranda statement to the police. At trial, the prosecutor elicited

discrepancies between the statements. The Court held "[a] defendant's right to 

remain silent is not violated when the State cross-examines a defendant on the 

differences between a post-Miranda statement and testimony at trial." Id. at 189.

The Court observed that the defendant who agreed "to give a statement, . . . has

not remained silent, but has spoken." Id. at 189. It concluded that "the State's 

pointing out of inconsistencies in defendant's statements and other evidence at 

trial did not constitute an unconstitutional comment on silence." Id. at 190. 
12 A-0898-17T4

The decision in State v. Kucinski, 227 N.J. 603 (2017) reaffirmed this. In 

that case, the Court found defendant waived his right to remain silent and then 

gave a statement, even though he had refused to answer certain questions during 

the interview. Id. at 623. Because the Court found the defendant waived his 

right to remain silent, "cross-examination [of the defendant] regarding facts to 

which he testified at trial, but omitted in his statement to the police, was proper." 

Ibid. 

Here, defendant did not testify at trial, but he gave a statement to the 

police, post-Miranda, where he said he did not know Mary or text her. He 

insisted another woman named Crystal was at his apartment. Defendant

eventually did stop the interview, but the prosecutor was not precluded from 

pointing out inconsistencies between defendant's defense theory at trial (consent 

by Mary) and his statement to the police (he did not know or text Mary). This 

was not a comment on defendant's silence after he stopped the interview; it was 

about the inconsistencies in defendant's explanations. Defense counsel's "failure 

to object suggest[ed] that defense counsel did not believe the remarks were 

prejudicial at the time they were made." State v. Frost, 158 N.J. 76, 84 (1999).

Considered in the context of the State's overall proofs, the prosecutor's 

summation did not constitute plain error. The State's proofs included text 
13 A-0898-17T4

messages between Mary, defendant and defendant's brother. She made clear in 

her text to defendant's brother that she was not interested in him. There was a 

text message between the defendant and Mary after the incident in which 

defendant admitted making the switch. There were texts and phone calls by 

defendant attempting to persuade Mary not to testify. That Mary saw defendant 

in her car and her purse was no longer locked in the truck, lent credibility to her 

version of events. 

The State's summation did not shift the burden of proof to defendant. The 

prosecutor continually reminded the jury that the State had the burden of proof

on all the charges. The court's instructions to the jury were clear as well, that 

the State, alone, had the burden of proof in the trial. 

There was no objection by defense counsel when defendant's complete 

statement to the police was played to the jury, including the part where the 

interview was stopped. The jury heard: 

Det. Lyons: Do you remember the girl that was 

there?

[Defendant]: I'm saying I would like to cut the 

interview time. I want to just cut it.

Det. Lyons: You don't want to talk to me 

anymore?

[Defendant]: Yeah, (indiscernible).
14 A-0898-17T4

Det. Lyons: (Indiscernible). 

[Defendant]: Un-huh.

In State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 73-77 (1998), the Court considered whether 

a jury should be permitted to hear the defendant invoke his right to silence. The 

Court stated that there were circumstances where such "testimony is essential to 

the complete presentation of the witness's testimony and its omission would be 

likely to mislead or confuse the jury." Id. at 76. In that situation, the court must 

give a cautionary instruction. Ibid. Generally, however, the Court noted "trial

courts should endeavor to excise any reference to a criminal defendant's right to 

invocate his right to counsel." Id. at 75.

Here, although there was no cautionary instruction, we do not find there 

was plain error. The exchange by defendant that terminated the interview was 

very brief, the prosecutor did not comment on it during summation, defendant's 

attorney never objected and the court instructed the jury that defendant had the 

right to not testify at trial. 

B.

Defendant argues the court's jury instruction on sexual assault and consent 

improperly placed the burden on him of proving he did not reasonably believe, 

or could not have reasonably believed, that Mary consented. He contends the 
15 A-0898-17T4

instruction focused on whether defendant reasonably believed that Mary 

consented.

We conclude the jury charge was clear in instructing the State had the 

burden of proof on every element. The judge instructed the State had to prove 

beyond a reasonable doubt that a sexual assault occurred, and listed the required

elements: that the brother committed an act of sexual penetration, acted 

knowingly, used physical force or coercion and the victim did not sustain severe 

personal injury. The trial court was clear that the State had to prove defendant's

brother used physical force or coercion, and instructed the jury it had to decide 

"whether [the brother's] alleged act of penetration was undertaken in 

circumstances that led [the brother] reasonably to believe that the victim had 

freely given affirmative permission to the specific act of sexual penetration." 

The court instructed that if there were "evidence to suggest that the defendant 

reasonably believed that such permission had been given, the State must 

demonstrate beyond a reasonable doubt either that the defendant did not actually 

believe that such permission had been freely given, or that such a belief was 

unreasonable under all the circumstances."

A fair reading of this instruction was that the State had the burden on every 

element and did not require defendant to prove consent. This instruction did not 
16 A-0898-17T4

rise to the level of plain error. It was entirely consistent with the Court's 

guidance in State In the Interest of M.T.S., 129 N.J. 422, 449 (1992), that the 

State bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt "that a reasonable 

person would not have believed that there was affirmative and freely given 

permission." The trial court's jury instruction quoted nearly verbatim from

M.T.S.

C.

Defendant argues the court's jury instruction on witness tampering 

allowed for his conviction on this charge without jury unanimity. We review 

this issue under a plain error standard because it was not raised at the trial. R.

2:10-2.

The court instructed the jury on witness tampering. First, the State had to 

prove that defendant believed an "official proceeding or investigation was 

pending" or about to be instituted. Next, the State had to prove that defendant 

"knowingly" engaged in conduct that a "reasonable person" would believe 

would cause a witness to: testify falsely, withhold testimony or information, or 

not testify or absent himself from the investigation, or "[o]therwise obstruct, 

delay, prevent or impede an official proceeding or investigation." See N.J.S.A. 

2C:28-5(a) (providing the elements of "tampering").
17 A-0898-17T4

The State presented evidence that defendant knew there was an 

investigation and then acted to try to influence Mary to withhold testimony or 

obstruct the investigation. There was evidence that after Mary met with the 

police, she received a phone call from defendant asking her to drop the charges 

because defendant's brother had been arrested. Other messages from defendant 

reproached Mary for giving the police evidence of defendant's text messages and 

blamed her for his legal situation. These messages showed awareness of an 

investigation and an attempt to influence Mary not to cooperate with the police. 

The court's instruction did not present different legal theories about 

defendant's responsibility for witness tampering. Defendant's acts were not 

"contradictory or only marginally related to each other." State v. Cagno, 211 

N.J. 488, 517 (2012) (quoting State v. Parker, 124 N.J. 628, 639 (1991)). They 

all arose from defendant's attempt to convince Mary not to cooperate with the 

prosecution. Also, there was no "tangible indication of jury confusion." Ibid. 

(quoting Parker, 211 N.J. at 639). Thus, there was no requirement in this case

for a specific unanimity charge on witness tampering. 

D.

Defendant contends his sentence was excessive and requests a remand for 

resentencing. He claims the trial court placed too much weight on defendant's 
18 A-0898-17T4

criminal record because he had no convictions for indictable offenses. He 

argues the trial court should have considered the hardship that incarceration 

would have on his family and minor child, and taken into consideration 

defendant's intellectual limitations. Defendant argues the court should have 

considered the victim's wish to sentence him to a lower range. 

Our review of a sentencing determination is limited. See State v. Roth, 

95 N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984). We review a judge's sentencing decision under an 

abuse of discretion standard. State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014). We must 

determine whether the "aggravating and mitigating factors found by the 

sentencing court were . . . based upon competent and credible evidence in the 

record." Ibid. Also, we consider whether the "sentence [is so] clearly

unreasonable so as to shock the judicial conscience." Ibid. We discern no abuse 

of discretion in this case.

The court found aggravating factors three (the risk that defendant will 

commit another offense), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six (defendant's prior criminal 

record), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(6); and nine (the need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 

2C:44-1(a)(9). Based on the presentence report, the trial court noted defendant

was a multi-state offender, who had "multiple juvenile adjudications." He had 

a number of municipal court convictions. His criminal record showed an 
19 A-0898-17T4

escalation in criminal conduct. This record supported the finding that there was 

a need for deterrence. 

Defendant argues the court erred by not finding application of mitigation 

factor eleven (excessive hardship to himself or his dependents), N.J.S.A. 2C: 

44-1(b)(11). However, there was no evidence defendant was the primary 

caretaker for his young son, or that his imprisonment would cause hardship 

beyond that entailed by incarceration.

Defendant argues the trial court should have considered as mitigating the 

report from Avenel that assessed defendant's intellectual functioning as severely

deficient. However, there was no evidence that defendant could not understand 

the charges against him, and the crime itself indicated a level of planning that 

would negate or question the claimed deficiency. 

The court was not required to sentence defendant at the lower end of the 

range, even if the victim requested this. The trial judge found based on Mary's

testimony that "harm was inflicted" on her as a result of defendant's actions. 

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing defendant. It made 

sufficient findings, there was ample evidence in the record to support them and 

the sentence does not shock the judicial conscience. 

Affirmed.