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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 

STRANGE, et al, 

Plaintiffs, 

v. 

ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al, 

Defendant. 

Civil Action No. 14-435 (CKK) 

MEMORANDUM OPINION 

(April 8, 2014) 

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs’ [3] Motion to Transfer Case Pursuant to Rule 

57.13(a). Plaintiff moves the Court to transfer the above-captioned matter to another district 

judge “in light of the ongoing litigation between Plaintiffs’ counsel and this District Court 

Judge.” Pls.’ Mot. at 1. Plaintiffs contend that “in the interest of fairness and to avoid the 

appearance that any decisions by the district court judge in the above styled case could be 

influenced by the ongoing litigation,” this matter should be transferred to another district court 

judge. Id. Defendants did not file a response to Plaintiffs’ Motion to Transfer. 

Although not styled as such, Plaintiffs’ Motion is effectively a Motion for Recusal. The 

disqualification of a federal judicial officer is governed by 28 U.S.C. §455, which provides, in 

pertinent part: 

(a) Any justice, judge, or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify 

himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned. 

(b) He shall also disqualify himself in the following circumstances: 
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(1) Where he has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party, or 

personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the 

proceeding. 

28 U.S.C. § 455(a), (b)(1). 

In assessing section 455(a) motions for recusal, the D.C. Circuit applies an “objective” 

standard: “Recusal is required when ‘a reasonable and informed observer would question the 

judge’s impartiality.’” S.E.C. v. Loving Spirit Found., Inc., 392 F.3d 486, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2004) 

(quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 114 (D.C. Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 

U.S. 952 (2001)). Further, a party moving for recusal pursuant to Section 455(a) “must 

demonstrate the court’s reliance on an ‘extrajudicial source’ that creates an appearance of 

partiality or, in rare cases, where no extrajudicial source is involved, . . . a deep-seated favoritism 

or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” Middlebrooks v. St. Coletta of 

Greater Washington, Inc., 710 F. Supp.2d 77, 78 (D.D.C. 2010), aff’d, 2011 WL 1770464 (D.C. 

Cir. Apr. 4, 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 243 (2011) (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). A party moving for recusal pursuant to Section 455(b) must likewise demonstrate 

“actual bias or prejudice based upon an extrajudicial source.” Id. at 79 (citations omitted). 

Importantly, a judge is not required to recuse him or herself merely because a party files suit 

against him. See In re Taylor, 417 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2005) (“There is no rule that requires 

a judge to recuse himself from a case, civil or criminal, simply because he was or is involved in 

litigation with one of the parties.”); In re Hipp, Inc., 5 F.3d 109, 116 (5th Cir. 1993); United 

States v. Watson, 1 F.3d 733, 735 (8th Cir. 1993); United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 940 

(9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1977). 

Plaintiffs have presented no evidence of judicial bias other than the existence of separate 

litigation involving the undersigned District Court Judge. Nor have Plaintiffs identified any 
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extrajudicial acts by this Court that demonstrate pervasive bias or prejudice against Plaintiffs. 

See Middlebrooks, 710 F. Supp.2d at 78. Granting a motion to recuse solely because a party has 

sued the judge would transform such motions to recuse into vehicles for judge shopping. See In 

re Taylor, 417 F.3d at 652; see also United States v. Cooley, 1 F.3d 985, 993 (10th Cir. 1993) 

(concluding that section 455 “is not intended to give litigants a veto power over sitting judges, or 

a vehicle for obtaining a judge of their choice”). Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiffs’ Motion 

is without merit. 

CONCLUSION 

 For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall DENY Plaintiffs’ [3] Motion to Transfer. An 

appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum Opinion. 

____/s/________________________ 

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY 

United States District Judge