[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio8024.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8024

THE STATE EX REL OHIO PRESBYTERIAN RETIREMENT SERVICES,INC.,

APPELLANT, v. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF OHIO ET AL., APPELLEES. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Servs., Inc. v. Indus. 

Comm., Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8024.] 

Workers’ compensation—Industrial Commission does not have authority to award 

an injured worker permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 

4123.57(A) when the worker has been previously found to be permanently 

totally disabled under R.C. 4123.58 in the same claim. 

(No. 2015-1074—Submitted May 3, 2016—Decided December 8, 2016.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, No. 14AP-624, 

2015-Ohio-2122. 

_______________________

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellee Sherry L. Redwine was receiving permanent-total-disability 

benefits based solely on the psychological condition in her workers’ compensation 
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2

claim. She subsequently applied for permanent-partial-disability benefits based 

upon the physical conditions in the same claim. 

{¶ 2} Appellee Industrial Commission determined that an injured worker is 

not barred from receiving compensation for permanent partial disability for a 

condition or conditions in a claim that formed no part of the basis for a prior finding 

of permanent total disability in the same claim. Redwine’s employer, appellant, 

Ohio Presbyterian Retirement Services, Inc. (“OPRS”), filed a complaint in the 

Tenth District Court of Appeals seeking a writ of mandamus to compel the 

commission to vacate its order. The court of appeals denied the writ. 

{¶ 3} We hold that the commission has no authority to award an injured 

worker permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) when the 

worker has been previously found to be permanently totally disabled under R.C. 

4123.58 in the same claim, even when the new finding is based on a condition or 

conditions in the claim that formed no part of the basis for the prior finding of 

permanent total disability. Therefore, we reverse the judgment of the court of 

appeals and grant OPRS’s request for a writ of mandamus. 

I. Background 

{¶ 4} On August 13, 2003, Sherry Redwine was injured at work. She filed 

a workers’ compensation claim that was allowed for the following conditions: 

lumbosacral strain, radiculopathy right lower extremity, aggravation of pre-existing 

degenerative disc disease, depression, and ruptured disc at L4-5 with free disc 

fragment. 

{¶ 5} Redwine applied for permanent-total-disability compensation. The 

commission concluded that Redwine was unable to perform any sustained 

remunerative employment due solely to the medical impairment caused by the 

allowed psychological condition in her claim and awarded her benefits beginning 

July 12, 2010, to continue until her death. The commission relied on the medical 

reports of Roberto Madrigal, Ph.D., Thomas W. Heitkemper, Ph.D., and Michael 
January Term, 2016 

3

E. Miller, M.D. Because the decision was based exclusively on a medical 

condition, the commission was not required to consider any nonmedical disability 

factors. 

{¶ 6} In August 2013, Redwine applied for permanent-partial-disability 

compensation. She conceded that she was not entitled to permanent-partialdisability benefits for her psychological condition (for which she had been granted 

permanent-total-disability compensation), but she maintained that she was entitled 

to this award based on the physical conditions allowed in her claim. 

{¶ 7} A district hearing officer denied her application based on a lack of 

statutory authority for concurrent awards under R.C. 4123.57(A) and 4123.58. In 

addition, the hearing officer noted that the physical and psychological conditions 

were the result of the same workplace injury and under State ex rel. Murray v. 

Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855 (1992), a claimant is precluded 

from receiving simultaneous benefits for permanent partial disability and 

permanent total disability for the same injury. 

{¶ 8} On reconsideration, a staff hearing officer concluded that a claimant 

is not barred from concurrent compensation for permanent partial disability if it is 

based on conditions that were not the basis for the prior finding of permanent total 

disability in the same claim. The hearing officer relied in part on the commission’s 

analysis of the same issue in claim No. 02-354357 involving a different injured 

worker. In that case, the commission determined that the analysis of concurrent 

awards focuses on an injured worker’s allowed medical conditions, not the injury 

or claim, citing State ex rel. Missik v. Youngstown, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 

633 (1992), and State ex rel. Hoskins v. Indus. Comm., 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 

N.E.2d 66 (2000). 

{¶ 9} OPRS filed a complaint for a writ of mandamus, alleging that there 

was no statutory authority for the commission’s order and therefore it was not 

supported by some evidence. A magistrate determined that the writ should be 
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denied. The magistrate relied on State ex rel. Mosley v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 13AP-127, 2014-Ohio-1710, and concluded that because the 

psychological condition formed the basis for the permanent-total-disability award, 

Redwine’s physical conditions could be the basis of permanent-partial-disability 

compensation. The court of appeals adopted the magistrate’s decision and denied 

the writ. 

{¶ 10} This matter is before the court on the direct appeal of OPRS. 

II. Analysis 

{¶ 11} OPRS seeks an extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the 

commission to vacate its decision of July 24, 2014, in which the commission 

concluded that an injured worker is not barred from receiving compensation for 

permanent partial disability for a condition or conditions in a claim that were not a 

basis for a prior finding of permanent total disability in the same claim. According 

to OPRS, the commission’s decision was an abuse of discretion because there is no 

statutory authority for concurrent payment of permanent-partial-disability and 

permanent-total-disability compensation in the same claim. 

{¶ 12} A mandatory writ may issue against the commission if it has 

incorrectly interpreted Ohio law. State ex rel. Gassmann v. Indus. Comm., 41 Ohio 

St.2d 64, 65, 322 N.E.2d 660 (1975). The issue before us is whether the 

commission’s decision to consider Redwine’s application for permanent-partialdisability benefits, after she was previously awarded compensation for permanent 

total disability in the same claim, was supported by the law. We find that it was 

not. 

A. Statutory authority is absent 

{¶ 13} Compensation rights for injured workers are limited to those 

conferred by statute. Westenberger v. Indus. Comm., 135 Ohio St. 211, 213, 20 

N.E.2d 252 (1939). R.C. 4123.54 provides that with certain exceptions, every 

employee who is injured in the course of employment is entitled to receive 
January Term, 2016 

5

compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury and such medical services 

as are provided by the Workers’ Compensation Act. 

{¶ 14} There are two types of compensation at issue in this case. 

Compensation for permanent partial disability is authorized by R.C. 4123.57(A) for 

“the percentage of the employee’s permanent disability * * * based upon that 

condition of the employee resulting from the injury or occupational disease and 

causing permanent impairment.” It is intended to compensate injured claimants 

who can still work. State ex rel. Kaska v. Indus. Comm., 63 Ohio St.3d 743, 746, 

591 N.E.2d 235 (1992). 

{¶ 15} Compensation for vocational permanent total disability is authorized 

by R.C. 4123.58(A) when “the allowed conditions either alone or with nonmedical 

disability factors render the claimant unable to do sustained remunerative work.” 

State ex rel. Miller v. Indus. Comm., 97 Ohio St.3d 418, 2002-Ohio-6664, 780 

N.E.2d 268, ¶ 8. The purpose of permanent-total-disability benefits is “to 

compensate an injured worker for impairment of earning capacity.” Ohio 

Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). 

{¶ 16} In certain limited instances, the General Assembly has provided for 

payment of concurrent awards. For instance, R.C. 4123.57(C) authorizes 

compensation for partial impairment in addition to temporary-total-disability 

compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.56, and R.C. 4123.58(E) authorizes 

compensation for permanent total disability in addition to scheduled loss benefits 

under R.C. 4123.57(B). However, neither R.C. 4123.57 nor 4123.58 expressly 

authorizes concurrent payment of permanent-partial-disability and permanenttotal-disability compensation. The conspicuous absence of any reference to 

concurrent payment of benefits in the statute “evinces a legislative intent to prohibit 
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simultaneous receipt of these benefits.” Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d at 475, 588 N.E.2d 

855.1

 

{¶ 17} The court of appeals in this case justified its decision based on R.C. 

4123.95, which mandates a liberal construction of the pertinent statutes in favor of 

injured workers. OPRS, citing Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 

58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 13, and State ex rel. Williams v. Colasurd, 

71 Ohio St.3d 642, 644, 646 N.E.2d 830 (1995), argues that R.C. 4123.95 does not 

allow a court to read into a statute something that cannot reasonably be implied 

from the statute’s language. We agree. R.C. 4123.95 does not authorize courts to 

alter the meaning of unambiguous statutory language. Armstrong, ¶ 13. Thus, the 

court of appeals could not read into either R.C. 4123.57 or 4123.58 authority to 

award concurrent permanent-partial-disability and permanent-total-disability 

compensation. 

B. Case law does not support concurrent benefits in the same claim 

{¶ 18} OPRS also argued that case law does not support concurrent awards 

of permanent-total-disability and permanent-partial-disability compensation in the 

same claim. 

{¶ 19} This court has sanctioned payment of concurrent permanent-partialdisability and permanent-total-disability compensation in limited circumstances. In 

State ex rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.2d 147, 404 

N.E.2d 141 (1980), the claimant had been found to be permanently and totally 

disabled as a result of coal miner’s pneumoconiosis. He had filed a separate claim 

for a work-related low-back injury and had been awarded permanent-partial-

 

1 Murray construed a version of R.C. 4123.57 in effect prior to 1986. In 1986, the statute was 

amended to eliminate temporary-partial-disability compensation and to limit a claimant’s filing of 

an application for permanent-partial-disability compensation from after the “latest period of total 

disability” to the “latest period of payments [for temporary total disability],” a change most likely 

intended to reflect the statute’s elimination of temporary partial disability. Am.Sub.S.B. No. 307, 

141 Ohio Laws, Part I, 767. 
January Term, 2016 

7

disability compensation. The court held that the claimant was entitled to 

permanent-partial-disability compensation for the back injury even though he was 

already receiving permanent-total-disability benefits as a result of coal miner’s 

pneumoconiosis in a different claim. Id. at 149. The court reasoned that this was 

consistent with the philosophy underlying the different types of compensation—an 

award for permanent and total disability is generally aimed at compensating for 

impairment of earning capacity, while benefits for partial disability are more akin 

to damages for work-related injuries. Id., citing State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. 

Indus. Comm, 42 Ohio St.2d 278, 282, 328 N.E.2d 387 (1975). 

{¶ 20} In State ex rel. Litten v. Indus. Comm., 65 Ohio St.3d 178, 602 

N.E.2d 624 (1992), we agreed, following Consolidation Coal, that the claimant was 

eligible to pursue permanent-partial-disability compensation for his foot injury 

while receiving permanent-total-disability compensation for medical conditions 

involving the wrist, back, and shoulder in a different claim. 

{¶ 21} Likewise, in Missik, 65 Ohio St.3d 189, 602 N.E.2d 633, we held 

that an award of permanent-total-disability compensation based on the injured 

worker’s back injury in one claim did not bar eligibility for permanent-partialdisability compensation for a neck and shoulder injury in a different claim. 

{¶ 22} In other cases, we disapproved concurrent or overlapping 

compensation in the same claim. Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855, 

decided consolidated cases, each involving a claimant who had been declared 

permanently and totally disabled as a result of workplace injury not specifically 

identified in the opinion. Each claimant later applied for permanent-partialdisability compensation for the same injury. Murray holds that a claimant may not 

concurrently receive compensation for permanent partial disability and permanent 

total disability for the same injury. The court noted that any statutory “[r]eference 

to concurrent payment of [permanent-partial-disability] and [permanent-totaldisability] benefits is conspicuously absent.” Id. at 475. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

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{¶ 23} In Hoskins, 87 Ohio St.3d 560, 722 N.E.2d 66, the claimant was 

receiving permanent-partial-disability compensation for a work-related injury (not 

identified in the opinion), and the commission later granted permanent-totaldisability compensation in the same claim. There was a period during which the 

payment of the two awards overlapped. Citing Murray, we held that a claimant 

could not receive both types of compensation for the same conditions at the same 

time, regardless of the sequence of payment. 

{¶ 24} The interchangeable use of the terms “injury,” “body part,” and 

“condition,” without additional clarification, has resulted in the inconsistent 

application of the law. Murray, 63 Ohio St.3d 473, 588 N.E.2d 855, considered 

concurrent awards for the same “injury” within the context of one claim. The court 

did not identify the injury, so we may infer that the court intended to include all

allowed conditions by its use of the word “injury.” Hoskins focused on the 

sequence of the concurrent payments for the same injury (also not identified) within 

one claim. We concluded that it was inappropriate for the two types of benefits to 

overlap in the same claim. 

{¶ 25} To clarify any perceived inconsistencies in our prior cases, we 

reiterate that for purposes of workers’ compensation, an “injury” is “any injury, 

whether caused by external accidental means or accidental in character and result, 

received in the course of, and arising out of, the injured employee’s employment.”2 

R.C. 4123.01(C). A work-related injury is the occurrence that triggers the filing of 

a report with the Bureau of Workers’ Compensation to open a claim. 

{¶ 26} Once the claim is approved, the injured worker is entitled to receive 

compensation and benefits for only the allowed medical condition or conditions set 

forth in the claim. Ward v. Kroger Co., 106 Ohio St.3d 35, 2005-Ohio-3560, 830 

N.E.2d 1155, ¶ 10. The allowed conditions are narrowly defined medical diagnoses 

 

2

 A claim may also be initiated as a result of an occupational disease or accidental death that occurred 

in the course of employment. Because this claim does not involve either, we address only injuries. 
January Term, 2016 

9

supported by medical documentation. Multiple allowed conditions may be 

associated with a particular body part. In addition, a psychiatric condition must 

arise from a work-related injury or occupational disease to be an allowed condition 

that is compensable. R.C. 4123.01(C)(1). 

III. Conclusion 

{¶ 27} There is no authority for the commission to award an injured worker 

permanent-partial-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.57(A) when there has 

been a prior award of permanent-total-disability compensation under R.C. 4123.58 

in the same claim. The commission abused its discretion when it decided to 

consider Redwine’s application for permanent-partial-disability compensation in 

the same claim in which she was already receiving permanent-total-disability 

compensation. Thus, we reverse the judgment of the court of appeals denying 

OPRS’s complaint for a writ of mandamus. 

{¶ 28} Our opinion today is consistent with the overall purpose of Ohio’s 

workers’ compensation system, which is to provide to workers compensation for 

loss sustained on account of a workplace injury. Armstrong, 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 

2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 9. Our conclusion is also reinforced by the 

purpose of permanent-total-disability compensation—to compensate for the 

impairment of earning capacity. These are lifetime benefits paid to an injured 

worker for “the inability to perform sustained remunerative employment due to the 

allowed conditions in the claim.” Ohio Adm.Code 4121-3-34(B)(1). It logically 

follows that a claimant who is receiving permanent-total-disability compensation 

is ineligible for concurrent permanent-partial-disability compensation based on a 

different condition in the same claim. 

{¶ 29} OPRS demonstrated a clear right to the relief requested and a clear 

legal duty on the part of the commission to provide the relief. State ex rel. Gen. 

Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 117 Ohio St.3d 480, 2008-Ohio-1593, 884 N.E.2d 
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10 

1075, ¶ 9. We therefore reverse the judgment of the court of appeals and grant a 

writ of mandamus. 

Judgment reversed 

and writ granted. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, KENNEDY, and FRENCH,JJ., 

concur. 

PFEIFER, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by O’NEILL, J. 

_________________ 

PFEIFER, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 30} The majority opinion correctly points out that this court has 

sanctioned payment of concurrent permanent-partial-disability and permanenttotal-disability benefits for various injured claimants in the past. Majority opinion 

at ¶ 19. The reason concurrent payment of these benefits is sometimes necessary 

is that the purpose of permanent-total-disability compensation (to compensate for 

impairment of earnings capacity) is different from the purpose of permanentpartial-disability compensation (to compensate for work-related injuries). State ex 

rel. Consolidation Coal Co. v. Indus. Comm., 62 Ohio St.2d 147, 149, 404 N.E.2d 

141 (1980), citing State ex rel. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Indus. Comm., 42 Ohio St.2d 

278, 282, 328 N.E.2d 387 (1975). 

{¶ 31} In this case, the claimant received an award of permanent-totaldisability benefits because her psychological condition makes it impossible for her 

to perform sustained remunerative employment. She also sought compensation for 

work-related physical injuries. The staff hearing officer concluded that the injuries 

were not the basis for the award of permanent-total-disability benefits and awarded 

concurrent permanent-partial-disability benefits based on the claimant’s physical 

injuries. 

{¶ 32} The court of appeals affirmed the award of concurrent benefits. 

Today, this court reverses the court of appeals, stating that the commission does not 
January Term, 2016 

11 

have statutory authority to award concurrent benefits, even though nothing in the 

statutory scheme specifically prohibits granting concurrent benefits. 

{¶ 33} I acknowledge that the statutory scheme also does not specifically 

allow concurrent benefits. Unlike the majority, I do not assume that that means 

concurrent benefits are prohibited. Instead, I read the statutory scheme liberally in 

favor of the injured claimant, as required by R.C. 4123.95. 

{¶ 34} If the public policy of this state, as evidenced by the enactments of 

the General Assembly, does not countenance the award of concurrent benefits, the 

General Assembly could easily amend the statutory scheme. But even though 

concurrent benefits have been awarded in the past, as noted in the majority opinion, 

the General Assembly has not evinced its desire to prohibit concurrent benefits. 

Therefore, I would allow concurrent benefits in this case. 

{¶ 35} I would affirm the court of appeals. I dissent. 

 O’NEILL, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Rosemary D. Welsh, for 

appellant. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew Alatis, Assistant Attorney 

General, for appellee Industrial Commission. 

Robert A. Muehleisen, for appellee Sherry L. Redwine. 

Philip J. Fulton Law Office, Philip J. Fulton and Chelsea J. Fulton, for amici 

curiae Ohio Association of Claimants’ Council and Ohio Association for Justice. 

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., and Robert A. Minor, for amicus 

curiae Ohio Self-Insurers Association. 

Garvin & Hickey, L.L.C., Preston J. Garvin and Michael J. Hickey, for 

amicus curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce. 

_________________