J-A29037-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: M.J., FATHER

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 443 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY 

OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND 

FAMILIES

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 540 WDA 2022

Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Family Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.

IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR

APPEAL OF: J.K.B., A/K/A J.B., A 

MINOR CHILD

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 541 WDA 2022
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Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,

Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023

In this matter, M.J. (Father) appeals the order entered by the Allegheny 

County Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily terminated his rights to his threeyear-old son, J.B. (the Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. 

§ 2511(a)(8) and (b). The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and 

Families (CYF or the Agency) had also petitioned for termination under Section 

2511(a)(2) and (a)(5), but the orphans’ court ruled that CYF had failed to 

meet its burden under these other subsections. CYF cross-appeals the denial 

of termination under Section 2511(a)(2) and (5). The Child, through his

appointed representation, also cross-appeals the court’s denial, but only as to 

Section 2511(a)(2).

1

 After review, we affirm the orphans’ court decision to 

terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). Because we need 

only agree with the court’s decision as to any one subsection under Section 

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), we dismiss the cross-appeals as moot.

We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows: The family 

came to the attention of CYF when the Child tested positive for cocaine at 

birth. CYF removed the Child from parental care in July 2018 and petitioned 

____________________________________________

1 The orphans’ court also involuntarily terminated the rights of C.B. (Mother). 

She did not appeal.
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for dependency. The juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent on 

August 3, 2018 and placed the Child in foster care. At the time of the 

adjudication, the identity of the Child’s father was unknown.

Father became involved in this case in January 2019. The juvenile court 

ordered Father to achieve certain goals to aid with reunification. The goals 

were to: bolster parenting skills through coached parenting services; address 

intimate partner violence issues; engage in continued mental health treatment 

that addressed dual-diagnosis issues;

2 and resolve his criminal matters. 

Father also had to address his alcohol issues by providing negative screens.

Throughout the dependency proceedings, Father was cooperative with 

CYF. Father was consistent with his medication management and his 

psychiatric care. Father also visited with the Child. By December 2019, Father 

was permitted unsupervised and overnight visitation. But that same month, 

Father was charged with multiple offenses following an incident of domestic 

violence, where Mother was the victim. Father was charged with felony 

strangulation, misdemeanor simple assault, summary harassment and 

summary public drunkenness. Father was placed on probation for one year, 

prohibited from violent contact with Mother, ordered to complete DNA 

registration, prohibited from possessing a firearm, ordered to complete 

batterer’s intervention, and ordered to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation.

____________________________________________

2 Father reported that his mental health issues included anxiety, depression, 

and post-traumatic stress disorder.
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CYF filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights in March 2021. As Father 

complied with the dependency and criminal cases, he eventually achieved 

unsupervised visitation again. However, in September 2021, Father was 

charged with driving under the influence following a car accident. Father 

refused to provide a blood sample, and charges were apparently dropped, but 

the incident necessitated that the visits revert to being supervised.

The orphans’ court held the hearing on March 29, 2022. During the 

hearing, the court heard the testimony of Father, the CYF caseworker, and the 

psychologist who evaluated Father. Thereafter, the orphans’ court granted 

CYF’s petition to terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b); 

the court determined that CYF had not met its burden under Section 

2511(a)(2) and (a)(5). Specifically, the court determined that CYF did not 

prove that Father “cannot or will not” remedy the causes that led to the Child’s 

dependency. These appeal and cross-appeals followed.

Father’s appeal presents the following issues:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily 

terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 

Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?

2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of 

proving by clear and convincing evidence that 

termination of Father’s parental rights would best 

serve the needs and welfare of the Child pursuant to 

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?

Father’s Brief at 7.
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CYF’s cross-appeal presents the following issue:

Did the Agency prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the 

grounds for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental 

rights to the Child, J.B., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 

2511(a)(2) and (a)(5)?

CYF’s Brief at 5.

Through his representation, the Child’s cross-appeal presents the 

following issue:

Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as 

a matter of law in denying CYF’s petition to terminate 

Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 

2511(a)(2) after CYF presented clear and convincing 

evidence that grounds for termination existed?

Child’s Brief at 9.

We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact 

and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are 

supported by the record. If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A 

decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only 

upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

the record would support a different result. We have 

previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that 

often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning 

multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks 

omitted).
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Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases, 

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K., 

265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108, 

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive 

case involving...the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should 

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports 

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record 

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”). 

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential 

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must 

affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary 

determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation 

omitted).

Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing 

evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory 

grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only 

if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the court 

engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section 

2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the 

child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
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Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re 

C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of 

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)). 

These appeals implicate Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b), which 

provide:

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

[...]

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect 

or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without 

essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for 

his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or 

will not be remedied by the parent.

[...]

(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency 

for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led 

to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist, 

the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within 

a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance 

reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the 

child within a reasonable period of time and termination of 

the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare 

of the child.

[...]

(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent 

by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an 

agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of 
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removal or placement, the conditions which led to the 

removal or placement of the child continue to exist and 

termination of parental rights would best serve the needs 

and welfare of the child.

[...]

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection 

(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by 

the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which 

are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the 

filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (b).

Critically, we may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis 

exists for the result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. We need only agree 

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well 

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. 

Super. 2004) (en banc).

We begin with Father’s appeal, and thus our focus turns to the orphans’ 

court decision under Section 2511(a)(8). To terminate parental rights under 

Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove: (1) the child has been removed 

from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of the removal; (2) 

the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to 

exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and 
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welfare of the child. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) 

(citation omitted). 

With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(8), “the 

court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice 

of the filing of the petition.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Termination under 

Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current 

willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused the 

placement, or the availability or efficacy of the services provided by the local 

children and youth agency. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted).

Here, there is no question that CYF satisfied the first prong of the 

analysis. The Child was removed from parental care at birth. Approximately 

45 months elapsed between the Child’s removal and the termination hearing

– three times as long as the statutory mandate.

The second prong asks whether the conditions which led to the Child 

removal continue to exist. In its thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion the 

orphans’ court explained that it determined CYF satisfied the second prong, 

notwithstanding Father’s substantial compliance:

At the time of adjudication, Father was not involved – upon 

his participation in the proceedings, the court entered 

numerous orders establishing his goal and setting attendant 

requirements. Initially, Father was to complete coached 

parenting and intimate partner violence classes, continue 

his mental health treatment, and comply with any 

recommended drug and alcohol treatment 

recommendations. As the case progressed and Father’s 

struggles with alcohol came to light, completing dual 
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diagnosis treatment and resolving his criminal matters were 

added as goals. [... T]wo months prior to the filing of the 

TPR petition [...] Father’s compliance was listed as 

“substantial.” From that point forward, Father’s compliance 

was consistently reported as “substantial” until October of 

2021 when his compliance was downgraded to “moderate,” 

seemingly coinciding with Father’s criminal charges 

involving a DUI incident.

In accordance with the showing of general compliance with 

his goals throughout the life of this case, the evidence 

revealed that Father had more or less complied with the 

orders of the court directing him to engage services. 

However, Father was noncompliant in one most important 

area – addressing his underlying substance abuse issues 

with alcohol. Compliance with drug and alcohol treatment 

was court ordered from the beginning of Father’s 

involvement in the case, and initially he was compliant.

Importantly though, as time passed, Father’s struggles were 

revealed. He sounded intoxicated on phone calls with 

caseworkers, he appeared intoxicated during a domestic 

violence incident with Mother, and he was charged with a 

DUI offense to which he and counsel stipulated to the 

underlying facts. Father was also evasive about his alcohol 

use with Dr. Bliss [(the psychologist who conducted the 

evaluation)], which made it challenging for her to effectively 

evaluate his treatment needs. Father admitted that he was 

aware of the requirement that he complete substance abuse 

treatment. The only steps toward completing drug and 

alcohol or dual-diagnosis treatment that Father took were 

after the date of the first scheduled TPR hearing on March 

16, 2022. Father’s last ditch effort to comply with treatment 

for his alcohol use cannot be considered and is arguably 

irrelevant given the lengthy duration of this case – he had 

more than sufficient opportunity to address these concerns.

It is unclear from the record what steps the Agency, through 

[the CYF caseworker], took to assist Father in engaging with 

dual-diagnosis treatment. Absent from [the caseworker’s] 

testimony was any discussion of how the Agency worked 

with Father to alleviate the circumstances that led to the 

Child’s removal and stood between Father and reunification. 

Whether the Agency had engaged in reasonable efforts 

throughout the life of the case is not a subject upon which 
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this [trial judge] can opine as it did not oversee the 

underlying dependency proceedings, but the testimony of 

the caseworker calls into question how much support was 

provided to Father.

Nonetheless, given the above, the court justifiably

concluded that the evidence established the first two 

elements required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).

TCO 16-18 (style adjusted) (citations to the record omitted).

On appeal, Father argues that CYF did not satisfy the second prong of 

the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, because it did not prove that the conditions 

which led to the Child’s placement continued to exist. He claims he had 

participated in mental health treatment, and that the reason he did not 

accomplish his alcohol treatment goal was because the service provider could 

not provide treatment for his dual-diagnosis needs. He explains that the 

service provider could not accommodate him, because of staffing shortages 

resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic. See Father’s Brief at 15-16. 

Moreover, Father alleges that his delay in treatment did not pose a concern

for CYF, as evidenced by the fact that CYF never claimed that he was 

intoxicated during a visit with the Child. Id. Father concludes his argument 

by noting the Agency’s lack of assistance in helping him find suitable treatment 

in a timely manner.

In our review, we observe that the orphans’ court was persuaded by 

Father’s argument that his delay in treatment was excusable and that perhaps

CYF bore some of the blame. The court found that CYF did not meet its burden

under Section 2511(a)(2), because that subsection asks whether the causes 
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of the Child’s dependency “cannot or will not” be remedied. The court 

determined that CYF could not prove that element by clear and convincing 

evidence. See T.C.O. at 20-21. Similarly, the court determined that CYF 

failed to meet its burden under Section 2511(a)(5). That subsection expressly 

inquires into the services or assistance that was reasonably available to Father

to ask the larger question of whether the conditions leading to placement can 

be remedied. The orphans’ court was not satisfied with the Agency’s 

testimony regarding its services and assistance.

However, the orphans’ court was not persuaded by Father’s arguments

as to its analysis of Section 2511(a)(8). The court was cognizant that the 

question of Father’s ability to remedy the conditions and of CYF’s reasonable 

efforts had limited applicability in a Section 2511(a)(8) analysis. We discern 

no issue with the court’s approach.

As our Supreme Court noted in In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 662, 672 (Pa. 

2014), neither Section 2511(a) nor (b) requires a court to consider the 

reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to the termination of parental 

rights.

The High Court explained:

[T]his Court has observed that the provision or absence of 

reasonable efforts may be relevant to a court’s 

consideration of both grounds for termination and the best 

interests of the child. For example, as applicable to 

subsection (a)(2), a court may find an agency’s lack of 

assistance to a parent relevant to whether a parent’s 

incapacity “cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.” 

[...]
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Further, while we acknowledge that other states have 

included reasonable efforts as either an element or merely 

a factor in their termination provisions, the Pennsylvania 

legislature has not incorporated reasonable efforts into the 

language of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and it would be 

improper and, indeed, unwise for this Court to add such an 

element to the statute by judicial fiat. In contrast, we 

recognize that the legislature included consideration of the 

reasonable services available to the parent in regard to 

another ground for termination, subsection 2511(a)(5) 

(providing consideration of whether “the services or 

assistance reasonable available to the parent are not likely 

to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or 

placement of the child within a reasonable period of time.”).

D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 672-73 (citations omitted); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511

cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(9) (concerning matters to be determined at the 

permanency review hearing, including whether the agency has provided the 

family with necessary services).

Having concluded that the orphans’ court’s approach to Section 

2511(a)(8) was proper, the question remains: did the conditions which led to 

the Child’s placement continue to exist? The orphans’ court determined that 

Father’s alcohol abuse was a condition that led to the Child’s placement and 

was the primary barrier to reunification. The court further determined that 

Father’s first meaningful steps toward alcohol treatment occurred days before 

the termination hearing. Thus, the court ruled that the conditions that led to 

the Child’s placement continued to exist. To be sure, the orphans’ court 

carefully considered Father’s reasons for why he did not obtain appropriate

treatment sooner. While the court apparently found Father’s reasons to be 
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persuasive insofar as Section 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5) were concerned, the court 

did not have to factor his reasons into its analysis of Section 2511(a)(8). 

Moreover, the orphans’ court was not persuaded by Father’s attempt to 

downplay the alcohol issue. Father claimed that the Agency was not 

concerned about whether he appeared intoxicated during the visits with the 

Child. Father seems to argue that because he substantially complied with the 

rest of his permanency plan, and because his alcohol use was a minor issue, 

the court’s termination was unwarranted. The orphans’ court was not moved 

by this argument, and neither are we. To the extent that the Agency was 

confident Father would be appropriate during the visits, it does not follow that 

the Agency was unconcerned with Father’s alcohol abuse. Ultimately, we 

discern no abuse of discretion, nor error of law on this second prong of the 

Section 2511(a)(8) analysis.

Having concluded that the orphans’ court properly determined that CYF 

established the first two prongs of the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, we address 

the court’s conclusions under the third element: whether termination best 

served the needs and welfare of the Child. Father challenges the court’s best 

interest analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) contemporaneously with his 

challenge to the court’s best interest analysis under Section 2511(b). Thus, 

we do the same.

Both analyses consider “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and 

stability.” In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 12 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). The 

court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying 
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close attention to the effect of permanently severing the bond.” I.J., 972 A.2d 

at 12 (citation omitted). In performing a “best interests” analysis:

The court should also consider the importance of continuity 

of relationships to the child, because severing close parental 

ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider 

whether a natural parental bond exists between child and 

parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing, 

necessary and beneficial relationship. Most importantly, 

adequate consideration must be given to the needs and 

welfare of the child.

Id. (citations omitted).

This Court has explained further:

[S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. 

In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), 

this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort, 

security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the 

needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed 

that the trial court must also discern the nature and status 

of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect 

on the child of permanently severing that 

bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of 

a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer 

that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63 

(Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bondeffect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of 

the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists, 

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial 

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S., 

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child 
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had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting 

bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert 

testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)). 

“Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also 

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they 

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. Finally, we 

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child 

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is 

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when 

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted). 

In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court thoroughly set forth its 

findings:

The evidence in this matter supports this court’s conclusion 

that the Child’s bond with Father is not significant enough 

that the Child will suffer extreme emotional consequences 

from termination of Father’s parental rights. The only 

evidence regarding a bond between Father and the Child is 

found in Dr. Bliss’s report of June 21, 2021, which states 

that at that time, they did not have a close parent-child 

bond, but that they could very likely foster one over time. 

This court also gave great weight to Dr. Bliss’s testimony 

that there would be concerns with removing this Child from 

his primary attachment [with the foster mother]. In June of 

2021, Dr. Bliss stated that reunification remained a viable 

goal. [At the time of the termination hearing in March 2022, 

Dr. Bliss] no longer believes that to be the case.

The timeline of this case as well as the uncontradicted 

expert testimony presented at the termination hearing drive 
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the analysis of this factor. By the date of the TPR hearing, 

the child had been in placement for approximately 45

months. The Child’s primary bond, resembling that of a 

parent and child, is with his foster mother, D.M. Dr. Bliss 

further testified that based upon the interactional evaluation 

of Father and Child, there was not a significant bond 

between the two – despite Father’s demonstrated ageappropriate play and direction with the Child.

In addition to the potential harm to the Child and separating 

him [from] the only parent figure that he has known, the 

Child’s need for permanency also militates in favor of 

termination. If reunification were to occur, Father’s history 

makes it unlikely that reunification would be permanent. 

This court must defer to the judgment of those who presided 

over this case during the dependency phase and could 

properly gauge the likelihood of success of any permanency 

strategy. During the three years that the Child was in care 

of a foster parent, Father never demonstrated to the 

satisfaction of the court that he was capable of unsupervised 

visits for any significant length of time. This court also gave 

great weight to Dr. Bliss’s opinions regarding Father’s

inability to independently parent his Child. Father’s 

inconsistent approach to his own health and safety 

demonstrate that he cannot provide the reliable support and 

attention that a child needs. The Child’s need for safety, 

permanency, and stability outweighs the potential benefit to 

him of maintaining his relationship with Father and, further, 

that termination of Father’s parental rights best serves the 

Child’s needs and welfare.

T.C.O. at 25-27 (style adjusted) (citations to the record omitted).

In his Brief, Father argues that the orphans’ court’s best interests 

analyses under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b) were erroneous. In our view, 

Father takes primary aim at the weight that the court afforded certain aspects 

of Dr. Bliss’s testimony. He highlights that portion of the testimony that 

indicates he is an appropriate parent, with whom the Child enjoys spending 

time. See Father’s Brief at 20-21.
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Father misunderstands our appellate function. The abuse-of-discretion 

standard in terminations cases is highly deferential, and we must affirm the 

lower court’s decision even when evidence exists that would support a 

contrary determination. See P.Z., 113 A.3d at 849. This Court may not 

search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that 

of the orphans’ court. See S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at 1124. Rather, our function 

is merely to review the record to determine whether it supports the decision 

of the orphans’ court. Id.

Upon such review, we conclude the record supports the determinations 

of the orphans’ court. The history of Father’s alcohol abuse supported the 

court’s determination that permanent reunification would not transpire any 

time soon. In other words, the court properly determined that the Child’s 

need for permanency was superior to whatever detrimental effect that 

termination might have. Moreover, the record supports the court’s weighted 

consideration of the relationship that the Child has with the foster parent. We 

do not overlook Father’s efforts, and we recognize the positive relationship he 

maintained with the Child. But Father’s efforts do not distract us from the fact 

that he has never been the Child’s caregiver. Instead, it is foster parent with 

whom the Child has developed a primary attachment.

In sum, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its 

discretion when it determined that CYF proved termination was warranted 

under each prong of Section 2511(a)(8) as well as Section 2511(b). Having 

resolved that Father’s appeal lacks merit, we do not reach the claims made by 
J-A29037-22

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CYF and the Child in their respective cross-appeals. As noted above, we need 

only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. B.L.W., 843 A.2d at

384. Our disposition of Father’s appeal means that even if ruled in favor of

CYF or the Child, such a ruling would not have any legal force or effect. For 

that reason, the cross-appeals are moot. See Interest of D.R.W., 227 A.3d 

905, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon 

the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”).

Order affirmed. Cross-appeals dismissed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 2/3/2023