J-A14027-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

ALHAJI BAKARIE SARR-DAFFEE

Appellant No. 1851 MDA 2014

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 21, 2014

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-06-CR-0004420-2013

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., JENKINS, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED MAY 22, 2015

Appellant Alhaji Bakarie Sarr-Daffee appeals from the judgment of 

sentence entered in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas following his 

jury trial convictions for robbery,1theft by unlawful taking or disposition,2

receiving stolen property,3resisting arrest or other law enforcement,4and 

false identification to law enforcement authorities.5 We affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3701(a)(1)(ii), and (vi).

2 18 Pa.C.S. § 3921(a).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).

4 18 Pa.C.S. § 5104.

5 18 Pa.C.S. § 4914.
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The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows. 

On August 21, 2013, at approximately 2:00 p.m., Appellant entered the 

Riverfront Federal Credit Union bank, located on South 4th Street in Reading, 

Pennsylvania. N.T., 3/7/14, at 4-5. Appellant approached pregnant bank 

teller Samantha Dix and handed her a note that demanded she give him “all 

the money” because he had a gun. Id. at 5-6. Dix gave Appellant the 

contents of her register, later determined to be $2,200.00. Id. at 7, 21. 

Appellant asked Dix if that was all of the money, Dix told Appellant that it 

was, and Appellant left the bank. Id. at 7. Dix then pressed the panic 

button to alert police of the robbery. Id. at 8.

Officer Wilfredo Ramirez of the City of Reading Police Department 

responded to the radio call and arrived at the bank approximately one-totwo minutes after Dix pushed the panic button. N.T., 3/7/14, at 34-36. Dix 

provided the following description of Appellant: a dark-skinned black male 

with “craters on his face” wearing a dark sweater, polarized sunglasses, and 

a dark colored baseball hat with white lettering. Id. at 37-38, 59. On his 

way to the bank, Officer Ramirez had noticed a black male wearing a dark 

colored baseball hat with white lettering, about a block away from the bank. 

Id. at 38. He left the bank to search for Appellant and broadcasted over the 

police radio that he had seen a black male who fit Appellant’s description 

walking north on Wood Street. Id. at 39.

Officer James Thomas reported to the area, having heard Officer 

Ramirez’s broadcast and the description of Appellant as a “black male, dark 
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skinned” with “craters on his face.” Id. at 59. While he was driving to the 

area in his patrol car, Officer Thomas noticed a black male walking north on 

5

th Street. Id. at 60. The male, later identified as Appellant, turned and 

looked at Officer Thomas about four or five times as the officer sat in his 

patrol car waiting for a stoplight to turn green. Id. Just as Officer Thomas 

was about to pass Appellant, Appellant turned abruptly and began to walk 

south on 5th Street. Id. Officer Thomas turned his vehicle around and 

parked about 20 feet behind Appellant, who was still walking quickly. Id. at 

61. Officer Thomas followed Appellant and said, “Excuse me, can I talk to 

you?” Id. When Appellant turned toward Officer Thomas to respond, Officer 

Thomas noticed bumps on Appellant’s face and neck. Id. Appellant told 

Officer Thomas that he did not want to talk to him and proceeded to walk 

quickly away from him. Id.

Officer Thomas continued to follow Appellant and verbally attempted to 

get him to stop to talk with him regarding a bank robbery. Id. at 62. 

Appellant again stated that he did not want to speak with the officer and 

continued to walk away. Id. When Officer Thomas caught up to Appellant, 

Appellant started to run. Id. Officer Thomas then tried to grab Appellant’s 

arm to stop him, but Appellant pushed the officer away and refused orders 

to stop and get on the ground. Id. at 64. Eventually, four or five officers 

managed to stop Appellant. Id. 

Police detained Appellant until Dix arrived to identify him. N.T., 

3/7/14, at 72, 90. Dix could not immediately identify Appellant, so the 
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police moved him closer so that he was within a few feet from her. Id. at 

90-91. Dix noted that Appellant was no longer wearing black clothing, a hat 

or sunglasses. Id. at 90. After she “had him put the sunglasses on,”6 Dix 

made a positive identification of Appellant, noting that he appeared to have 

the same acne as the person who robbed her. Id. at 11, 91. The 

identification took place approximately twenty minutes after the initial radio 

broadcast of Appellant’s description.7 Id. at 72. 

After Dix identified Appellant, Officer Ramirez searched Appellant for 

weapons and found $2,200.00 in his pocket. Id. at 44. 

On February 7, 2014, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial motion, which 

included a motion to suppress evidence and a motion to suppress out-ofcourt identification. On May 14, 2014, after a hearing on May 7, 2014, the 

court denied Appellant’s motion. Additionally, on July 2, 2014, Appellant 

____________________________________________

6 After Dix pointed out that Appellant was not wearing sunglasses, as he had 

been during the robbery, police officers placed a pair of sunglasses on 

Appellant. N.T., 3/7/14, at 11. The sunglasses belonged to Officer Ryan 

Smith, who helped apprehend Appellant. Id. at 96-98. The sunglasses 

were broken during the apprehension and laying on the sidewalk when other 

officers placed them on Appellant. Id. at 98. Officer Smith was nearby on 

the sidewalk with a group of officers during the identification when he 

realized that his sunglasses were not in his pocket but on Appellant’s face. 

Id.

7 Dix identified Appellant again at the omnibus pretrial hearing on March 7, 

2014 and based her identification on her memory of seeing him at her bank 

teller window. N.T., 3/7/14, at 19.
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filed a motion for release pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, which the court 

denied on July 15, 2014.

On July 17, 2014, a jury convicted Appellant of the aforementioned 

charges. On August 29, 2014, the court sentenced him to 6-15 years’ 

imprisonment for robbery and 1-2 years’ imprisonment, consecutive, for 

resisting arrest or other law enforcement.8 On September 2, 2014, 

Appellant timely filed post-sentence motions, which the court denied on 

October 7, 2014, after conducting a hearing on October 3, 2014. On 

November 3, 2014, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The same day, the 

court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of 

on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and he timely complied on 

November 20, 2014.

Appellant raises the following issues for our review.

1. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE AS: (A) 

THERE WAS AN INSUFFICIENT DESCRIPTION OF THE 

ASSAILANT TO SUPPORT REASONABLE 

SUSPICION/PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFYING AN 

INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION/ARREST OF ANY PERSON LET 

ALONE APPELLANT AND/OR (B) THE APPELLANT DID NOT 

SUFFICIENTLY MATCH THE DESCRIPTION OF THE 

ASSAILANT THAT WAS PROVIDED SO AS TO SUPPORT 

REASONABLE SUSPICION/PROBABLE CAUSE JUSTIFYING 

HIS INVESTIGATIVE DETENTION/ARREST?

____________________________________________

8 The trial court imposed no further penalties on Appellant’s remaining 

convictions and granted him 365 days credit for time served.
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2. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT[’]S 

MOTION TO SUPPRESS THE OUT OF COURT 

IDENTIFICATION OF THE APPELLANT MADE BY SAMANTHA 

DIX AS THE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE BASED ON A 

PAIR OF SUNGLASSES THAT ACTUALLY BELONGED TO A 

POLICE OFFICER WHO PLACED THEM ON THE APPELLANT 

WHO WAS CLEARLY IN POLICE CUSTODY DURING A 

SHOW-UP AS WELL AS ANY IN COURT IDENTIFICATION AS 

SUCH WAS TAINTED BY THE SAID OVERLY SUGGESTIVE 

OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION?

3. DID THE TRIAL COURT [ERR] IN DENYING APPELLANT’S 

RULE 600 FOR RELEASE ON NOMINAL BAIL AS 180 DAYS 

NOT ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE APPELLANT HAD ELAPSED 

SINCE THE FILING OF THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT PRIOR 

TO TRIAL AND THIS ISSUE IS ONE CAPABLE OF 

REPETITION AND LIKELY TO EVADE REVIEW?

Appellant’s Brief at 10-11.

In his first issue, Appellant challenges the court’s denial of his motion 

to suppress evidence. Appellant argues the police did not have reasonable 

suspicion or probable cause to warrant an investigative detention of his 

person. He claims the description upon which the police acted was vague 

and generic, and that it did not fit Appellant’s description when they 

apprehended him. Appellant concludes that the seizure of his person was 

unconstitutional, and that any evidence flowing from that seizure, including 

the cash seized from his person and the out-of-court identification must be 

suppressed. We disagree.

Our standard of review for a trial court’s denial of a suppression 

motion is as follows:

In addressing a challenge to a trial court’s denial of a 

suppression motion we are limited to determining whether 
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the factual findings are supported by the record and 

whether the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are 

correct. Since the Commonwealth prevailed in the 

suppression court, we may consider only the evidence of 

the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the 

defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the 

context of the record as a whole. Where the record 

supports the factual findings of the trial court, we are 

bound by those facts and may reverse only if the legal 

conclusions drawn therefrom are in error.

Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10 A.3d 321, 325 (Pa.Super.2010) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Bomar, 826 A.2d 831, 842 (Pa.2003)). “Our standard 

of review is restricted to establishing whether the record supports the 

suppression court’s factual findings; however, we maintain de novo review 

over the suppression court’s legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. 

Guzman, 44 A.3d 688, 692 (Pa.Super.2012) (citation omitted).

Pennsylvania recognizes three types of interactions between police 

officers and citizens. Commonwealth v. Stevenson, 832 A.2d 1123, 

1126-27, (Pa.Super.2003). “Interaction between citizens and police officers, 

under search and seizure law, is varied and requires different levels of 

justification depending upon the nature of the interaction and whether or not 

the citizen is detained.” Id. 

The first category, a mere encounter or request for 

information, does not need to be supported by any level of 

suspicion, and does not carry any official compulsion to 

stop or respond. The second category, an investigative 

detention, derives from Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 

S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) and its progeny: such a 

detention is lawful if supported by reasonable suspicion 

because, although it subjects a suspect to a stop and a 

period of detention, it does not involve such coercive 
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conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an 

arrest. The final category, the arrest or custodial 

detention, must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Gonzalez, 979 A.2d 879, 884 (Pa.Super.2009) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Moyer, 954 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa.Super.2008) (en banc) 

(quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 836 A.2d 5, 10 (Pa.2003))).

A “mere encounter” can be any formal or informal 

interaction between an officer and a citizen, but will 

normally be an inquiry by the officer of a citizen. The 

hallmark of this interaction is that it carries no official 

compulsion to stop or respond.

In contrast, an “investigative detention,” by implication, 

carries an official compulsion to stop and respond, but the 

detention is temporary, unless it results in the formation of 

probable cause for arrest, and does not possess the 

coercive conditions consistent with a formal arrest. Since 

this interaction has elements of official compulsion it 

requires “reasonable suspicion” of unlawful activity. In 

further contrast, a custodial detention occurs when the 

nature, duration and conditions of an investigative 

detention become so coercive as to be, practically 

speaking, the functional equivalent of an arrest.

Stevenson, 832 A.2d at 1127-29.

We analyze whether a “mere encounter” has risen to the level of an 

“investigative detention” under the following standard:

To guide the crucial inquiry as to whether or not a seizure 

has been effected, the United States Supreme Court has 

devised an objective test entailing a determination of 

whether, in view of all surrounding circumstances, a 

reasonable person would have believed that he was free to 

leave. In evaluating the circumstances, the focus is 

directed toward whether, by means of physical force or 

show of authority, the citizen-subject’s movement has in 

some way been restrained. In making this determination, 

courts must apply the totality-of-the-circumstances 
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approach, with no single factor dictating the ultimate 

conclusion as to whether a seizure has occurred.

Commonwealth v. Downey, 39 A.3d 401, 405 (Pa.Super.2012), appeal 

denied, 50 A.3d 124 (Pa.2012) (quoting Commonwealth v. Coleman, 19 

A.3d 1111, 1116 (Pa.Super.2011)).

“Police must have reasonable suspicion that a person seized is 

engaged in unlawful activity before subjecting that person to an investigative 

detention.” Commonwealth v. Goldsborough, 31 A.3d 299, 306 

(Pa.Super.2011), appeal denied, 49 A.3d 442 (Pa.2012) (quoting 

Commonwealth v. Cottman, 764 A.2d 595 (Pa.Super.2000)).

Reasonable suspicion exists only where the officer is able 

to articulate specific observations which, in conjunction 

with reasonable inferences derived from those 

observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of 

his experience, that criminal activity was afoot and that 

the person he stopped was involved in that activity. 

Therefore, the fundamental inquiry of a reviewing court 

must be an objective one, namely, whether the facts 

available to the officer at the moment of intrusion warrant 

a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that the 

action taken was appropriate.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 116 

(Pa.Super.2005) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).

Police must have probable cause that a person is engaged in criminal 

activity before subjecting that person to an arrest or “custodial detention.” 

Goldsborough, 31 A.3d at 306.

Probable cause is made out when the facts and 

circumstances which are within the knowledge of the 

officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has 
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reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to 

warrant a [person] of reasonable caution in the belief that 

the suspect has committed or is committing a crime. The 

question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief was 

correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require 

only a probability, and not a prima facie showing, of 

criminal activity. In determining whether probable cause 

exists, we apply a totality of the circumstances test.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Williams, 2 A.3d 611 (Pa.Super.2010) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 19 A.3d 1051 (Pa.2011)) (internal citations and 

quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

The key difference between an investigative detention and 

a custodial one is that the latter involves such coercive 

conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of an 

arrest. In determining whether an encounter with the 

police is custodial, the standard is an objective one, with 

due consideration given to the reasonable impression 

conveyed to the person interrogated rather than the 

strictly subjective view of the troopers or the person being 

seized and must be determined with reference to the 

totality of the circumstances. 

Commonwealth v. Pakacki, 901 A.2d 983, 987-88 (Pa.2006) (internal 

citations omitted).

The court considers the totality of the circumstances to 

determine if an encounter is investigatory or custodial, but 

the following factors are specifically considered: the basis 

for the detention; the duration; the location; whether the 

suspect was transported against his will, how far, and why; 

whether restraints were used; the show, threat or use of 

force; and the methods of investigation used to confirm or 

dispel suspicions.

Goldsborough, supra at 306 (quoting Commonwealth v. Teeter, 961 

A.2d 890, 899 (Pa.Super.2008)).
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Instantly, the interaction between Officer Thomas and Appellant began 

as a mere encounter. Officer Thomas was operating his police vehicle and 

looking for a bank robber who matched the description of a dark-skinned 

black male with “craters” on his face wearing certain articles of clothing 

when he saw Appellant. He noticed Appellant glance at him four or five 

times while he was stopped at a red light. Officer Thomas then noticed 

Appellant abruptly turn around when he drove his police vehicle beside him. 

Officer Thomas got out of his police vehicle and called out to Appellant, 

requesting to speak with him. When Officer Thomas asked Appellant to 

speak with him, a reasonable person would have felt free to leave, as 

Appellant obviously did because he told the officer that he did not wish to 

speak with him and continued to walk away. See Downey, supra. The 

level of interaction was therefore a mere encounter, and Officer Thomas did 

not need any suspicion to make a request for information. See Gonzalez, 

supra.

When Appellant turned around and said that he did not wish to speak, 

Officer Thomas observed the bumps on Appellant’s face. At this point, 

Officer Thomas obtained reasonable suspicion to subject Appellant to an 

investigative detention. Officer Thomas observed Appellant within blocks of 

the bank where a robbery had occurred only minutes earlier. Although 

Appellant was not wearing the same hat, sunglasses, or jacket, he was a 

dark-skinned black male with severe acne on his face and neck, matching 
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key components of the description radioed to Officer Thomas. These facts, 

along with Appellant’s nervous behavior, furnished reasonable suspicion that 

Appellant was the bank robber and authorized Officer Thomas to detain him 

for further investigation. See Goldsborough, supra. The police properly 

detained Appellant for less than twenty minutes, without transporting him to 

another area, while awaiting Dix’s arrival for identification purposes. See 

Goldsborough, supra.

When Dix identified Appellant, the police had probable cause to arrest 

him. Upon patting him down for weapons, the police discovered the money 

in Appellant’s pocket. Because the record supports the trial court’s factual 

findings, and the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct, we 

hold that the court properly denied Appellant’s suppression motion.

In his second issue, Appellant argues Dix made the out-of-court 

identification under suggestive and tainted circumstances. He claims that 

Dix’s identification of him was not reliable because police transported Dix to 

him while he was surrounded by police officers. Additionally, Appellant 

contends that because police officers placed sunglasses on him to aid Dix in 

identification, the admission of Dix’s out-of-court identification into evidence 

violated his due process rights. Further, Appellant contends that the 

subsequent in-court identification was tainted by the out-of-court 

identification and should also be suppressed. Again, we disagree.

In reviewing the propriety of identification evidence, the 

central inquiry is whether, under the totality of the 
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circumstances, the identification was reliable. The purpose 

of a “one on one” identification is to enhance reliability by 

reducing the time elapsed after the commission of the 

crime. Suggestiveness in the identification process is but 

one factor to be considered in determining the admissibility 

of such evidence and will not warrant exclusion absent 

other factors. As this Court has explained, the following 

factors are to be considered in determining the propriety of 

admitting identification evidence: the opportunity of the 

witness to view the perpetrator at the time of the crime, 

the witness’ degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior 

description of the perpetrator, the level of certainty 

demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between 

the crime and confrontation. The corrupting effect of the 

suggestive identification, if any, must be weighed against 

these factors. Absent some special element of unfairness, 

a prompt “one on one” identification is not so suggestive 

as to give rise to an irreparable likelihood of 

misidentification.

Commonwealth v. Kearney, 92 A.3d 51, 65 (Pa.Super.2014), appeal 

denied, 101 A.3d 102 (Pa.2014).

Here, Dix viewed Appellant from the bank window when he committed 

the robbery. He was standing only feet away from her while she gathered 

the money in her register and while she assured him that it was all of the 

money. The encounter was brief, but she was very alert because she feared 

for her life and the life of her unborn child. Less than twenty minutes later, 

she identified Appellant on the street. Concededly, Dix identified Appellant 

while he was in police custody and after she asked the police to put 

sunglasses on him, which she admitted made it easier for her to identify 

him. Nevertheless, she made the identification based on Appellant’s facial 

features that she could see at the time of the robbery, especially his acne. 
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Upon viewing Appellant again, in close proximity, Dix was certain that 

Appellant was the man who robbed her. Any corrupting effect of the 

sunglasses and the police presence is outweighed by the other indicia of 

reliability. Further, Dix testified that her subsequent in-court identification 

was based on her memory of Appellant when he robbed the bank. 

After considering the factors, the trial court reasoned:

[B]ased on these factors, [Dix’s] identification of 

[Appellant] at the out-of court identification is reliable. In 

addition, even if the pretrial identification procedures 

contained some element of suggestiveness, this [c]ourt 

finds the circumstances surrounding the encounter 

provided an independent basis for [Dix’s] subsequent in[-] 

court identifications of [Appellant.]

Trial Court Opinion, filed December 2, 2014, at 14. The trial court’s findings 

are supported by the record and its legal conclusions are correct. 

In his third issue, Appellant argues the court erred by denying his Rule 

600 motion. Appellant claims the trial court miscalculated the delay period 

by 18 days, and that his actual delay period of 186 days entitled him to 

nominal bail because it was six days past the period for a speedy trial, 

pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600. This issue merits no relief.

Rule 600 provides, in pertinent part:

Rule 600. Prompt Trial

* * *

(B) Pretrial Incarceration
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Except in cases in which the defendant is not entitled to 

release on bail as provided by law, no defendant shall be 

held in pretrial incarceration in excess of

(1) 180 days from the date on which the complaint is filed; 

* * *

(C) Computation of Time

* * *

(2) For purposes of paragraph (B), only periods of delay 

caused by the defendant shall be excluded from the 

computation of the length of time of any pretrial 

incarceration. Any other periods of delay shall be included 

in the computation.

(3)(a) When a judge or issuing authority grants or denies a 

continuance:

(i) the issuing authority shall record the identity of 

the party requesting the continuance and the 

reasons for granting or denying the continuance; and

(ii) the judge shall record the identity of the party 

requesting the continuance and the reasons for 

granting or denying the continuance. The judge also 

shall record to which party the period of delay 

caused by the continuance shall be attributed, and 

whether the time will be included in or excluded from 

the computation of the time within which trial must 

commence in accordance with this rule.

* * *

(D) Remedies

* * *

(2) Except in cases in which the defendant is not entitled 

to release on bail as provided by law, when a defendant is 

held in pretrial incarceration beyond the time set forth in 

paragraph (B), at any time before trial, the defendant’s 
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attorney, or the defendant if unrepresented, may file a 

written motion requesting that the defendant be released 

immediately on nominal bail subject to any nonmonetary 

conditions of bail imposed by the court as permitted by 

law. A copy of the motion shall be served on the attorney 

for the Commonwealth concurrently with filing. The judge 

shall conduct a hearing on the motion.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

In evaluating Rule 600 issues, we recognize the following principles:

In evaluating Rule 600 issues, our standard of review of a

trial court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its 

discretion. Judicial discretion requires action in conformity 

with law, upon facts and circumstances judicially before 

the court, after hearing and due consideration. An abuse 

of discretion is not merely an error of judgment, but if in 

reaching a conclusion the law is overridden or misapplied 

or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or 

the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown 

by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

The proper scope of review...is limited to the evidence on 

the record of the Rule 600 evidentiary hearing, and the 

findings of the trial court. An appellate court must view 

the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this 

Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind 

Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important 

functions: (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial 

rights, and (2) the protection of society. In determining 

whether an accused’s right to a speedy trial has been 

violated, consideration must be given to society’s right to 

effective prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain 

those guilty of crime and to deter those contemplating it. 

However, the administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not 

designed to insulate the criminally accused from good faith 

prosecution delayed through no fault of the 

Commonwealth.

So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of 

the Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental 
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speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be 

construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to 

punish and deter crime. In considering these matters..., 

courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not 

only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the 

collective right of the community to vigorous law 

enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Tickel, 2 A.3d 1229, 1233 (Pa.Super.2010), appeal 

denied, 23 A.3d 541 (Pa.2011) (internal citations omitted).

Appellant concedes that all of the trial court’s time calculations are 

correct except for the continuance from December 19, 2013 to January 7, 

2014. See Appellant’s Brief at 37. Appellant’s counsel requested a 

continuance to review discovery on these dates. Although Appellant 

contends he only requested the continuance because the Commonwealth 

failed to produce discovery before December 18, 2013, this time period is 

still attributable to Appellant because he requested the continuance. We see 

no misconduct on the part of the Commonwealth in an effort to evade 

Appellant’s fundamental speedy trial rights. See Tickel, supra. Thus, the 

trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s Rule 600 motion 

for release on nominal bail.9

____________________________________________

9

Further, because the court granted Appellant credit for all time served, 

including the six days Appellant alleges were improper, this issue is moot. 

See Commonwealth v. Sloan, 907 A.2d 460, 465 (Pa.2006) (“[g]enerally, 

a case will be dismissed if at any stage of the judicial process it is rendered 

moot.”).
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Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/22/2015