### In the



# United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

____________________

No. 15

‐ 2509

U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA

, Plaintiff

‐ Appellee

,

v.

J OHN T HOMAS

, Defendant

‐ Appellant

.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 14 CR 216

‐ 1

— James B. Zagel

, Judge

.

____________________

S UBMITTED O CTOBER 27, 2016

— D ECIDED N OVEMBER 3, 2016

____________________

Before P OSNER

, F LAUM

, and R IPPLE

, Circuit Judges

.

P OSNER

, Circuit Judge

. The defendant pleaded guilty to

committing wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, by

submitting fraudulent invoices to an Illinois town

(Riverdale), which reimbursed him for $374,000 claimed in

the invoices but not owed him by the town. The district

judge sentenced him to 60 months in prison to be followed

by 36 months of supervised release. The appeal challenges

the conditions of supervised release and not the prison sen

‐2 No. 15

‐ 2509

tence, but asks us to order a full resentencing of the defend

‐

ant.

Apart from certain mandatory conditions of supervised

release, which are not challenged, the judge at the sentenc

‐ ing hearing imposed (and we quote) the following “discre

‐ tionary conditions of supervised release, most of which have

to do with restitution and money and seeking work, these

are number 1; number 2; number 4; number 6 and number 7;

number 8; number 9; number 14; number 15; number 16

which includes virtually every place where a probation of

‐

ficer could visit the defendant at a reasonable time. 17, noti

‐ fying of change in residence. 18, notifying a probation officer

promptly within 72 hours of arrest or questioned by a law

enforcement officer.”

The judge also imposed (again we are quoting) “certain

special conditions [of supervised release] which is another

list. Under special condition number 3, which requires

community service, if there is unemployment for the first 60

days on supervision. Number 5, restricting credit charges.

Number 7 is giving the probation officer information as to

financial information. Notifying the court, number 7, notify

‐ ing the court in any material change in defendant’s circum

‐

stances. This is number 10 under special, he will have to con

‐

tribute an amount that ʹ s at least 10 percent of his net month

‐ ly income to the extent that other financial obligations have

not been met. And he may not enter into any agreement to

act as an informer or a special agent of a law enforcement

agency without the permission of the Court.”

The number references are to the written judgment (no

number, however, was given for the last condition of super

‐

vised release that the judge imposed). A sentencing judge isNo. 15

‐ 2509 3

required to give reasons for the conditions that he imposes;

that was not done. The judge should also read the conditions

of supervised release to the defendant, United States v.

Kappes

, 782 F.3d 828, 862 (7th Cir. 2015); United States v. John

‐

son

, 765 F.3d 702, 710–11 (7th Cir. 2014), along with the rest

of the sentence; that was not done either, and the judge did

not explain the omission. It’s true that United States v. Bloch

,

825 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 2016), holds that a judge may during

sentencing state that he’s incorporating by reference super

‐

vised

‐ release conditions listed in his written notice of pro

‐ posed conditions, but only if the defendant has had an op

‐ portunity to review the proposed conditions before sentenc

‐ ing and there is no conflict either between the conditions in

the written notice and the conditions actually imposed in the

written judgment or between the conditions stated orally by

the judge at the sentencing hearing and those in the written

judgment. Id. at 872–73, citing United States v. Kappes

, supra

,

782 F.3d at 862.

In the present case the written notice was prepared by

the probation office, but the judge imposed a condition—

that the defendant “participate, at the direction of a proba

‐

tion officer, in a substance abuse treatment program, which

may include urine testing up to a maximum of 104 tests per

year” that was not in the written notice. Furthermore, the

judge imposed special condition 7 twice, the first time incor

‐ rectly, saying that “Number 7 is giving the probation officer

information as to financial information.” No, that is Number

6 in the written judgment, so there is a discrepancy between

oral and written, in violation of Bloch and Kappes

.

And finally the judge gave no reason, as he was also re

‐ quired to do, see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c); United States v. Kappes

,4 No. 15

‐ 2509

supra

, 782 F.3d at 845–46, for the term of supervised re

‐

lease—36 months—that he was imposing.

The errors we’ve enumerated were serious. The govern

‐

ment joins the defendant in asking us to reverse the judg

‐

ment with instructions for a full resentencing. See, e.g., Unit

‐

ed States v. Harper

, 805 F.3d 818, 822 (7th Cir. 2015); United

States v. Downs

, 784 F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015).

The judgment is reversed and the case remanded with

instructions for a full resentencing of the defendant.