COURT OF APPEALS

DECISION

DATED AND FILED

February 16, 2023

Sheila T. Reiff

Clerk of Court of Appeals

NOTICE

This opinion is subject to further editing. If 

published, the official version will appear in 

the bound volume of the Official Reports. 

A party may file with the Supreme Court a 

petition to review an adverse decision by the 

Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and 

RULE 809.62. 

Appeal No. 2022AP245 Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV2487

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS

DISTRICT IV

PASTORI M. BALELE,

 PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

 V.

CT SYSTEMS CORPORATION,

TRINITY PROPERTY CONSULTANT,

FLT WATERLEAF LLC AND RENEW MADISON,

 DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Dane County: 

RHONDA L. LANFORD, Judge. Affirmed. 

Before Blanchard, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Graham, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent 

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3). 
No. 2022AP245

2

¶1 PER CURIAM. Pastori Balele, pro se, appeals the circuit court’s

order dismissing his complaint against CT Systems Corporation, Trinity Property 

Consultant, FLT Waterleaf, LLC, and ReNew Madison. Balele also appeals the 

court’s order denying his motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his 

complaint. We affirm the orders because we agree with the circuit court that 

Balele’s complaint fails to state any claim upon which relief may be granted. 

¶2 “Whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted 

is a question of law that we review de novo.” Milwaukee Deputy Sheriffs’ Ass’n 

v. Milwaukee Cnty., 2016 WI App 56, ¶5, 370 Wis. 2d 644, 883 N.W.2d 154. 

“When determining whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief may be 

granted, courts must ‘accept as true all facts well-pleaded in the complaint and the 

reasonable inferences therefrom.’” Cattau v. National Ins. Servs., 2019 WI 46, ¶4, 

386 Wis. 2d 515, 926 N.W.2d 756 (quoting Data Key Partners v. Permira Advisers 

LLC, 2014 WI 86, ¶19, 356 Wis. 2d 665, 849 N.W.2d 693). 

¶3 “[T]he pleadings are to be liberally construed to do substantial justice 

between the parties, and the complaint should be dismissed as legally insufficient 

only if it appears to a certainty that no relief can be granted under any set of facts 

that the plaintiff can prove in support of [the plaintiff’s] allegations.” Strid v. 

Converse, 111 Wis. 2d 418, 422, 331 N.W.2d 350 (1983). “‘If the facts reveal an 

apparent right to recover under any legal theory, they are sufficient as a cause of 

action.’” Cattau, 386 Wis. 2d 515, ¶4 (quoting Strid, 111 Wis. 2d at 423). 

¶4 However, “courts cannot add facts to a complaint, and do not accept 

as true legal conclusions that are stated in the complaint.” Id., ¶5 (quoting Data 

Key, 356 Wis. 2d 665, ¶19). A complaint will be dismissed if, “‘under the guise of 

notice pleading, the complaint before us requires the court to indulge in too much 
No. 2022AP245

3

speculation leaving too much to the imagination of the court.’” John Doe 67C v. 

Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 2005 WI 123, ¶36, 284 Wis. 2d 307, 700 N.W.2d 180 

(quoted source and alteration omitted). 

¶5 Balele’s arguments on appeal do not meaningfully address these legal 

standards for whether a complaint states a claim. Most of his arguments are difficult 

to follow, are undeveloped in terms of applying legal standards to the allegations in 

his complaint, and appear misdirected at tangential matters that do not affect our de 

novo review of whether his complaint states a claim. We decline to address such 

arguments. We will, however, explain why Balele’s complaint fails to state a claim. 

We will also address Balele’s relevant arguments that we have been able to discern 

from his briefing, and we will explain why those arguments do not support reversal 

of the circuit court’s orders.1 

¶6 The caption on Balele’s complaint contains multiple labels that appear 

intended to refer to claims that Balele wishes to allege. The labels include 

“Negligence” and a series of other labels that appear intended to refer to claims for 

discrimination based on race.2 Additionally, the complaint allegations support an 

inference that Balele intends to allege a claim for breach of a lease. 

¶7 The primary failing in Balele’s complaint is that it does not allege 

sufficient facts that, if true, would establish the elements of negligence, unlawful 

discrimination, breach of a lease, or any other discernable cause of action. The court 

 

1

 “Pro se litigants are generally granted ‘a degree of leeway’ in recognition of the fact that 

they are ordinarily unfamiliar with the procedural rules and substantive law that might govern their 

appeal.” State ex rel. Wren v. Richardson, 2019 WI 110, ¶25, 389 Wis. 2d 516, 936 N.W.2d 587. 

We have provided Balele with leeway here by construing his submissions liberally and making 

every effort to discern his arguments. 

2

 For example, the labels include “Using Employees to Deny Blacks Enjoyment of 

Housing” and “Using Employees to harass and provoke Blacks.” 
No. 2022AP245

4

and the responding parties are instead left to “‘indulge in too much speculation.’” 

See John Doe 67C, 284 Wis. 2d 307, ¶36 (quoted source omitted). We are left to 

guess at the concrete basis for any of Balele’s purported claims and how any could 

support potential relief. Nonetheless, we will now discuss examples of purported 

claims, as they are referenced in the complaint, and explain why we conclude that 

dismissal of the complaint is appropriate.

¶8 Negligence. In order to maintain a cause of action for negligence, 

“there must exist: (1) A duty of care on the part of the defendant; (2) a breach of 

that duty; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury; and (4) an 

actual loss or damage as a result of the injury.” Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 

409, 418, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995). Balele’s complaint does not allege any of these 

legal elements even in conclusory fashion, nor does it allege sufficient facts that, if 

true, would establish that one or more of the respondents breached a duty to Balele, 

thereby causing him loss or damage. Balele alleges that the respondents’ conduct 

caused him mental or emotional distress. However, Balele makes no allegations 

that, if true, would show that one or more of the respondents breached a duty of care 

owed to Balele. 

¶9 Discrimination. Balele’s complaint is similarly deficient with respect 

to any discrimination claim. It does not allege the elements of any particular legal 

theory for unlawful discrimination such as, for example, a claim for an open housing 

violation under WIS. STAT. § 106.50 (2021-22).3 Likewise, Balele’s arguments 

before this court do not explain how the allegations in his complaint might be 

construed to state a cognizable legal claim for discrimination. 

 

3

 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version.
No. 2022AP245

5

¶10 Additionally, the complaint’s factual allegations relating to 

discrimination are both vague and conclusory. Balele alleges that during the time 

that he has lived in his apartment, since 2004, each new owner or manager of the 

property has had “some kind of racist overtones towards Blacks”; that “[u]sually 

[the] new owners ... did not want Black people as tenants ... and preferred to replace 

them with Caucasian tenants”; and that “Balele knew Defendants collectively were 

treating him differently because of his Black race.” These factual allegations are 

not sufficiently concrete or specific to support a discrimination claim against one or 

more of the respondents.

¶11 In short, Balele’s allegations do not provide “fair notice” of what his 

particular legal claims for discrimination might be, and they do not support a 

reasonable inference that one or more of the respondents actually discriminated 

against him based on his race. “[A] pleading must give the defending party fair 

notice of not only the plaintiff’s claim but ‘the grounds upon which it rests’ as well.” 

Hlavinka v. Blunt, Ellis & Loewi, Inc., 174 Wis. 2d 381, 403, 497 N.W.2d 756 (Ct. 

App. 1993) (quoted source omitted). “[I]t is not enough to indicate merely that the 

plaintiff has a grievance, but sufficient detail must be given so that the defendant, 

and the court, can obtain a fair idea of what the plaintiff is complaining, and can see 

that there is some basis for recovery.” Id. at 403-04 (quoted sources and internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

¶12 Breach of lease. Balele appears to allege in his complaint that the 

respondents breached a renewed lease agreement that took effect on October 1, 

2021. However, Balele does not allege facts that, if true, would show that a renewed 

lease was properly executed. Rather, Balele alleges that he emailed the respondents 

that he was accepting a renewal offer and that “the renewal should be deemed signed 

electronically.” (Emphasis omitted.) There is no allegation that Balele or any of 
No. 2022AP245

6

the respondents actually executed a renewed lease, and Balele did not attach to his 

complaint a copy of the alleged lease or any other document.

¶13 Balele argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing his complaint 

based on failure to state a claim because the parties had requested that the court 

decide Balele’s case on summary judgment. We disagree that the court erred in this 

respect. “[T]he first step in summary judgment methodology is to determine if the 

complaint states a claim for relief.” Broome v. DOC, 2010 WI App 176, ¶12, 330 

Wis. 2d 792, 794 N.W.2d 505. “This is the same analysis as that employed on a 

motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id. Accordingly, the court properly 

considered whether Balele’s complaint states a claim. 

¶14 Next, Balele makes an argument that relates to only one of the 

defendants, CT Systems Corporation. The circuit court dismissed CT Systems from 

the case based on the court’s conclusion that CT Systems is not a proper party 

because CT Systems is an entity that accepts service on behalf of other entities and 

has no relationship to Balele’s claims. Balele argues that the court erred in 

dismissing CT Systems because CT Systems failed to file any rebuttal to Balele’s 

contentions in the circuit court. 

¶15 Balele’s argument relating to CT Systems is not entirely accurate. 

Although CT Systems has not participated in this case to the extent that the other 

named defendants have, CT Systems filed a letter in the circuit court explaining that 

it was a service agent and requesting to be removed from the case as a defendant. 

Regardless, we are not persuaded by Balele’s argument because Balele has not 

identified any flaw in the circuit court’s reasoning for why CT Systems is not a 

proper party. Moreover, even if CT Systems were a proper party, Balele’s 
No. 2022AP245

7

complaint would not state a claim against CT Systems for the same reasons that it 

does not state a claim against the other named defendants.

¶16 In sum, for all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s 

order dismissing Balele’s complaint, and we also affirm the court’s order denying 

Balele’s motion for reconsideration of the order dismissing his complaint.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.

RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.