UN ITED STA TES D ISTRIC T C OU RT F OR THE D ISTRIC T OF CO LU M BIA RO SSI M. POT TS, : : Plaintiff, : Civil Action No.: 08-0706 (RMU)

: v. : Document No.: 12

: H O W A R D U

N IV E R S IT Y H O S P IT A L : : an d :

: HOWARD UNIVERSI TY, : : Def endants. : M EM OR

AN DU M OP IN ION G RANT I NG I N P ART AND D E NYI NG I N P A R T THE D EF END A N TS ’ M OT I ON T O D IS M IS S I. IN TR OD UC TIO N This matter come s befor e the c ourt on the def endants’ motion to dismiss and the pla int if f’ s o pp os iti on

the re to. Th e pla int if

f, a fo rm e r e mpl oye e of

Ho wa rd Un ive rs ity

Ho sp ita l,
a lle g e s e mpl oy

me nt d isc ri min atio n b a se d o n h is s e x an d h is m ili tary se rv ic e ob lig atio ns , a s w e ll as termination in re taliation for filinga complaint with the District of Columbia Off ice of Human Rights (“ OHR”). T he def endants have moved to dismiss on statute of limi tations gr ounds. Be cause the Uniforme d Service s Employ ment and Ree mploy

ment Rights Act of

1994 (“U SERRA”) , 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301 et seq. , prohibits the application of a statute of limitations, t he court de nies the def

endants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s USERRA claim. B ut beca use the statut e of lim itatio ns un ambi guo us ly ba rs the c la ims that th e pla int if f a lle g e s und e r t

he D. C. Code, the cour

t gr ants the def

endants’ motion to dismiss as to these c laims.Altho ug h the re are discrepancies betw een the p arties’ acc ounts of so m e ev ents and dates leading 1 up to the instant action , fo r the purpo ses o f R ule 1 2(b)(6) m otions the co urt treats all of the plaintiff’s fa ctual a lleg ations as true . Macharia v. U nited States , 3 34 F
. 3d

6 1, 6 7 (D
. C
. C ir
. 20 03 ). 2

II. F ACTUAL & P ROCEDURAL BACK GR OUND 1 The de fenda

nts employ ed the plaintiff a s an Echoc ardiograph Te chnolog ist (“ET”) from J une 1994 until April 2002. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. to Dism iss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 1, 2. B eca use the plaintiff was a

member of

the authorized collec tive barg ainingunit, the parties we re subjec t to a collective ba

rg ainingag ree ment (“CB A”)
. Id. at 1; Def s.’ Mot. at 3-4. Additionally , while he
was e mploy ed by

the def endant, the pla intiff serve d as a me mber of the U.S. Air For ce Re serve s. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. F or appr ox imately three months in 1998, t he plaintiff wa s on leave for mandatory

rese rve military

training
. Id. at 2; Am. Compl. at 8. The plaintiff provided the de fe nd ants wi th d oc ume ntatio n r e g ard inghis mil ita ry ob lig atio ns and

the de fe nd ants ’
corr espondingleg al obligations. Am. Com pl. at 8-9; Pl.’s Opp’n at 2. Duri nga ll t ime s r e le va

nt t o th is a c tio n, the pla int if f h e ld t he jun ior of tw o E T p os iti on s; J ane Spenc er he ld the senior ET position. Pl.’s Opp’n at 1. When Spencer beca me ill, the defe ndants hired Colleen Williams in August 1999 to fill Spencer’ s spot. Id. at 2. The pla intiff alleg es that the de fenda

nts chose not to hire him to fill the senior ET position, in viol ation of the CBA’ s require ment that hiringbe base d on seniority , beca use of his military

obligations and beca use of his sex. Id. at 1-2. Af ter the pla intiff was pa ssed over for pr omotion to t he senior E T po sit ion , h e fi le d c omp la int s w iththe OH R and the U. S. E qu a l E mpl oy

me nt O pp or

tun ity Commi ssion (“EEOC”)
. Id. ; Am. Compl . at 4. Then, in Apr il 2002, the defe ndants terminated the plaintiff, statingthat he had pla ced a patient on a monitoringsy stem without authorizationThe p la in ti ff f il ed h is c om pl ai nt and a m en de d co m

pl ai nt pro se . See C om

pl.; Am . C om

pl. The 2 pl ai nt if

f ha s si nc e re ta in ed

c ouns el , h ow ev er , and

it w as c ouns el w ho f

il ed th e pl ai nt if

f’ s oppo sition to the defend ants’ m otion to dis m iss, see N ot ic e of App earanc e (S ep t. 8 , 2 00 8) ; P l. ’s Opp ’n. 3 and had f ailed to monitor the patient. Pl.’s Opp’n at 2- 3; Defs.’ Mot. at 4. The plaintiff f iled a second c omplaint with the OHR following his termination. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. The initial OHR investigation concluded a nd the OHR issued the plaintiff a rig ht to sue letter on August 18, 2004. After the sec ond OHR investigation concluded, the O HR issued another r ight to sue le tter on April 1, 2005. Id. The plaintiff f iled his origina l complaint in this court on Apr il 24, 2008, wh ic h h e ame nd e d s ho rt ly the re a ft e r. Th e de fe nd ants mov e to d ism iss , a rguin gthat th e statut e 2 of limitations bars the plaintiff’s cla ims. The plaintiff opposes the motion. The c ourt now turns to the parties’ arguments.

III . A NA LY SIS

A. Le ga l St anda r d forRul e 12 (b )( 6) and St at ut e of Lim it at ion s A def endant may

raise the aff

irmative def

ense of statute of limitations vi a a Rule 12( b)(6) motion when the fa cts that g ive rise to the de fense are clea r fr om the fac e of the complaint. Sm ith -H ay niev . D ist

ric t of Colum bia , 155 F.3d 575, 578 ( D.C. Cir. 1998). Be cause statute of lim itatio ns iss ue s o ft e n d e pe nd on c onte ste d q

ue sti on s o f f

a c t, h ow e ve r, the c ourt

sh ou ld h e sit ate to dismi ss a complaint on statute of limitations grounds ba sed solely on the fa ce of

the complaint. Firestone v. Fire

stone , 7 6 F .3 d 1 20 5, 12 09 (D .C. Cir . 1 99 6) . Rathe r, the c ourt sh ou ld gra

nt a motion to di smiss onl y

if the complaint on its fac e is conc lusively time-barr ed. Id. ; Doe v . Dep’ t of Justice , 753 F.2d 1092, 1115 ( D.C. Cir. 1985). I f “no r easona ble per son could disag ree on theThe Am ended C om plaint c ontains tw o ad ditional claim s no t raised in eithe r the defend ants’ 3 m otion to dis m iss or the p laintiff’s op position
. First, the p laintiff alleg es v iolations unde r 29 U. S.C . § 20 6(d), whic h p rohibits discrim ination on the b asis o f sex by em ploy ers su

bject to the Equ al Pay

A ct of 1963 /Fair L abor Stand ards A ct of 1938
. This section, ho wev er, contain s a statute o f lim itations of tw o y ears afte r the cause of ac tion h as ac crued. 2 9 U .S. C. § 255. These actions are “fo rev er barred unless com m enced w ithin tw o y ears,” excep t that actions arisingout of a “willful v iolation” m ay be com m enced w ithin three y ears. Id. The latest d ate the cau se o f action could hav e acc rued is April 1, 20 05, w hen the p laintiff alleg es the seco nd D. C. O ffice of Hum an R ig hts inv estig ation conclu ded and a rig ht to sue letter w as issu ed. Pl. ’s O pp’n at 3. Beca use the p laintiff did

no t initiate this ac tion until April 24 , 2 008 – o v er three y ears later – the statute o f lim itations bars th is claim
. Seco nd, the Am ended C om plaint re fers to 18 U. S.C . § § 241, 37 2, 1001 (a)(1)- (3) an d 1 001(c )(1)- (2), whic h are no t add ressed in eithe r the defend ants’ m otion or the plain tiff’s opp osition. A m . C om pl. at 11 , 1 2, 23, 31
. While it is unclear whe ther the p laintiff inten ded to ass ert these as claim s, the co urt no tes that crim inal co de p rov isions prov ide n o b asis fo r a priv ate, civ il caus e of action. See Keyte r v. Bu sh , 2 004 WL 3 5911 25, at * 2 (D. D. C. Aug . 6 , 2 004) (dism issingclaim s bro ug ht un der Title 18 of the United States Cod e be caus e cr im in al s ta tute s do n ot c re at e a pr iv at e ri g ht

o f ac ti on ). 4 date” on which the c ause of action ac crue d, the cour

t may dismiss a cla im on statute of limit ations g rounds. Smith v. Brown &W illiamson T

obacco Corp. , 3 F. Supp. 2d 1473, 1475 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 9 8 ) ( ci t i n g Kuwait Airways Corp. v. Am. Sec . Bank, N.A. , 890 F.2d 456, 463 n.11 (D.C. Cir. 1989)). B. T he Co ur t D e nie s t he De fend ant s’ M ot ion to Di sm iss th e USE RR A C lai m Th e pla int if

f a lle g e s th at th e de fe nd ants vio late d U SERRAby int e nti on a lly

de nyinghim

a pr omo tio n b e c a

us e of his se rv ic e ob lig atio ns . Am . Co mpl . at 5- 6. Th e de fe nd ants mov e to 3 dismiss the plaintiff’s USERRA claim, ar guing that it is barr ed by D.C. Code § 12-301(8) , which establishes a thre e-year

statute of limitations i f one is “not other wise spec ially

presc ribed.” De fs .’ Mo t. at 6- 7. Th e pla int if f a rgue s th at th e c la im c ann ot b e tim e -b arr e d b e c a us e USE RRA clea rly states that there is no statute of limit ations. Pl.’s Opp’n at 5. USE RRAe xplic itl y

dir e c ts that no state statut e of lim itatio ns sh a ll a

pp ly to c la imsI n su pport of h is contention that U SER RApro hibits th e ap plication of a statute o f lim itations, the 4 pl ai nt if

f ci te s th e 19 98 v er si on

o f th e st at

ut e. P l. ’s O pp ’na t 5 ( ci ti ng3 8 U
. S
. C
. § 4 32 3( i) (1 99 8) ). Th e co urt n ot es th at U S E RR A w as a m en de d, e ff

ec ti v e O ct ob er

1 0, 2 00 8, to o m it subsec tion (i). See 3 8 U
. S
. C
. § 4 32 3. Th e 20 08 a m en dm en t, h ow ev er , a dd ed an ews ec ti on

to US ERRAestab lishingthat “[i]f any perso n se ek s to file a com plaint o r claim

w ith .
. . a

Fe deral or S tate co urt . . . a lleg inga v iolation of [U SER RA ], th ere sh all be no lim it on the p eriod for filing the com

plaint o r claim .” 38 U .S. C. § 4327 (b). Thus, the am endm ent o f the statute d oes not a ffect the court’s statute o f lim itations inquiry
. Were the court to co nsider the d octrine of lach es, it is n ot clear that the filingof the co m plaint 5 wou ld be so unreaso nable as to bar th e claim , n or is it app arent th at the delay has cau sed any prejudice to the d efendants. A ccordin g ly , th e do ctrine w ould not b e a prope r basis for a m otion to dis m iss. See, e. g. , NA AC P v . N AAC P L egal Def. & Ed

uc. Fun d, Inc. , 753 F.3d131, 137 (D.C. C ir
. 1 98 5) ; Gull Airbo rne Instrum ents, Inc. v. W einberger , 6 94 F
. 2d

8 38 , 8 43 ( D
. C
. C ir
. 1 98 2)
. 5 broug ht under USERRA. 43 U.S.C. § 4327. USERRA, in protecting the rig hts of veter ans and 4 members of

the uniformed se rvice s, has bee n “broa dly construed in f

avor of its mi litary benef iciarie s.” Beattie v. Trump Shuttle, Inc

. , 7 5 8 F. S u p p . 3 0 , 3 4 (D
. D. C
. 1 9 9 1 ) ( ci t i n g Coffy v. Republic Stee l Corp. , 447 U.S. 191, 196 (1980)). B e c a us e USE RRApr os c ri be s a pp lyinga state statut e of lim itatio ns , c ourt s ana ly

zingwh e the r a

USE RRAc la im i s ti me -b arr e d h ave do ne so under the doctrine of

lache s rather

than on statute of limitations grounds. See, e .g. , Ma he r v . Ci ty of Chicago , 4 06 F . Su

pp . 2 d 1 00 6, 10 30 -3 1 (N. D. I ll. 20 06 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t an e ig ht- y e ar d e lay

in filing w as re asonable beca use the re servist fea

red f urther r etaliation and the c ity failed to show prejudice due to the dela

y in filing), aff’d , 54 7 F .3 d 8 17 (7 th C ir . 2 00 8) ; McLain v. City of So me rv ille , 4 24 F . Su

pp . 2 d 3 29 , 3 36 -3 7 ( D. Ma ss. 20 06 ) ( ho ldi ngtha t a thr e e -ye ar d e lay

in filing w as not so unrea sonable a s to justi fy applying the doctrine of

lache s beca

use the c ity

had
no t de mon str ate d p re

jud ic e du e to t

he de lay ). As a re su lt, the c ourt

re je c ts the de fe nd ants ’ 5 contention that the thre e-year statute of limitations contained in D.C. Code § 12-301(8) ba rs the pla int if f’ s U SERRAc la im a

nd de nie s th e de fe nd ants ’ m oti on to d ism iss thi s c la im.6 C. The Court G rants the De fend ant’s Motion to Dism iss the

Cl aim s Br oug htUnd e r th e D. C. Co de The amended c omplaint also mentions D.C. C ode §§ 2-1402.01, 2- 1402.61, 2-1402.64, 2- 14 02 .6 5, 2- 14 02 .6 8, 2- 14 03 .0 7 a nd 2- 14 03 .1 3( a )( 1) -( 2) in t

he dis c us sio n o f t

he de fe nd ants ’
a lle g e dly dis c ri min ator

y c on du c t. Am. C omp l. at 12 , 2 2, 31 . T he de fe nd ants argue tha t th e se claims are barr ed by

the three -y ear

“catch-a ll” provision of the D.C. Code § 12-301( 8). De fs.’ Mot. at 6-7. The pla intiff does not discuss these c laims in his oppos ition. Se e ge ne ra lly Pl.’s Opp’n. The de fenda

nts corre ctly

asser t that § 12-301(8) pr ovides a “ catc h-all” statute of lim itatio ns of

thr e e y e ars fo r c a

us e s o f a c tio n w ith out a

sp e c if ie d s tatut e of

lim itatio ns . D .C. C ODE § 12-301(8) . The sec tions of the D.C. Code that the plaintiff invokes, howe ver, pr ovide their own statute of

limit ations of one year . D. C. C ODE § 2 -1 40 3. 16 (a ) ( statin gtha t “ [a] p ri vate
cause of ac tion pursuant to [ Chapter 14 of Title 2 of the D.C. Code] shall be filed in a c ourt of competent jurisdiction within one y ear of the unlaw ful discriminatory act, or the discover

y there of”) . As discussed in note 3 su pra , the latest date the plaintiff’s c ause of action could have
acc rued is Apr il 1, 2005, when the sec ond OHR investiga tion concluded a

nd a right to sue letter was issued. Pl.’s Opp’n at 3. Be cause the plaintiff did not file the instant suit until April 24, 20 08 , h is c la ims un de r t

he D. C. C od e are c on c lus ive ly tim e -b arr e d; a c c or din g ly , th e c ourt g ra nts the def endants’ motion to dismiss as to these c laims.7 CO NC LU SION F or the fo re g oin gre a so ns , th e c ourt g ra nts in p art and de nie s in pa rt the de fe nd ants ’ motion to di smiss. An Order c onsistent with thi s Memorandum Opinion is separ ately and contempora

neously issued this 20th day

of F ebrua

ry , 2009.

RI CARDO M. URBI NA Un i t edS t at es Di s tri ctJ u d ge