[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

________________________

No. 20-14201

Non-Argument Calendar

________________________

D.C. Docket No. 2:19-cv-00263-RDP

JAYME DAVIDSON, 

 Plaintiff-Appellant,

 versus

CHSPSC LLC,

d.b.a. Grandview Medical Center, 

 Defendant, 

AFFINITY HOSPITAL LLC, 

d.b.a. Grandview Medical Center, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Alabama

________________________

(June 22, 2021)

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Before JORDAN, GRANT, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

Jayme Davidson appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 

favor of her former employer, Affinity Hospital LLC, d/b/a/ Grandview Medical 

Center (Grandview), on her claims for discrimination and retaliation under the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., as amended by 

the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, and for retaliation under the Family and 

Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2615. 

Grandview, which operates an acute care hospital in Birmingham, Alabama,

terminated Davidson from her employment as a social worker on October 30, 

2017, following a series of disciplinary actions. Davidson, who has partial hearing 

loss and had suffered from a C. difficile (C. diff) infection and ankle injury, filed 

suit in federal court, alleging her discipline and termination were the result of 

disability-based discrimination and retaliation for her requests for workplace 

accommodations and use of FMLA leave. In granting summary judgment in favor 

of Grandview, the court determined Davidson had established a prima facie case of 

FMLA retaliation based on two disciplinary actions, but she failed to demonstrate 

Grandview’s reasons for the discipline or termination were pretextual. The court 

also determined Davidson had established a prima facie case of ADA 

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discrimination and retaliation based on her termination, but it again found she 

failed to show Grandview’s reasons for her termination were pretextual.

On appeal, Davidson argues she established a genuine issue of material fact 

as to pretext with respect to both her ADA and FMLA claims. She also argues she 

established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation based on an additional 

disciplinary action and her termination. After review,1 we affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts of this case are set forth accurately and in detail in the district 

court’s opinion. We provide the following background to the extent it is of 

particular relevance to our analysis. 

A. Davidson’s Role

Davidson began working as a social worker for Grandview’s predecessor in 

1997, and in 2007, Grandview promoted her to lead social worker. During the 

relevant time period of 2015 to 2017, Davidson’s primary responsibilities were 

case management and discharge planning for patients on the hospital’s cardiology 

1 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, “construing all facts 

and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Jefferson v. Sewon Am., 

Inc., 891 F.3d 911, 919 (11th Cir. 2018) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is 

appropriate when the record evidence shows “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact

and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 

dispute of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a 

verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

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floor. Davidson reported to Cindy Watson during this timeframe, until Watson left 

Grandview in August of 2017 and was replaced by Kim Colvert. 

B. Hearing Loss and FMLA Leave for C. diff Infection

In 2015, Davidson had 35% hearing loss in both ears and asked Grandview 

to purchase hearing aids for her. Grandview denied her request and subsequent 

appeal. In early 2017, Davidson purchased hearing aids for herself and told 

Watson they were working. 

In August of 2016, Grandview learned Davidson had tested positive for C. 

diff. On four occasions from September of 2016 to January of 2017, Davidson 

requested and received FMLA leave in relation to her C. diff infection. Davidson 

stated in her declaration that Watson told her she should return to work as soon as 

possible because the hospital was short staffed, and, while she was on leave, 

repeatedly told her she should look for another job. Davidson returned to work on 

January 13, 2017. Upon her return to work, Davidson requested that she not be 

required to enter the room of a patient infected with C. diff and submitted a note 

from her doctor recommending that she avoid interacting with patients infected 

with C. diff. On February 15, 2017, Grandview’s human resources (HR) director, 

Jeri Wink, told Davidson she would not be required to enter the room of a patient 

infected with C. diff until her doctor “no longer feels this is an issue” or unless her 

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declining to enter the rooms of infected patients became too burdensome for 

Grandview. 

C. Disciplinary Actions and Ankle Injury

In 2017, for the first time in her career, Davidson was the subject of formal 

disciplinary actions at Grandview, though she had received counseling in response 

to complaints in the past. The first disciplinary action occurred on February 14, 

2017. Two patients had complained to Gretchen Cassavoy, a nurse and the 

assistant director on the cardiac floor, about Davidson’s failure to properly assist 

them in relation to their home health care choices and discharge planning, and the 

second patient had also complained that Davidson was condescending. In addition, 

a doctor complained of Davidson’s lack of responsiveness and dismissive 

behavior. As a result of these complaints, Watson met with Davidson and issued 

her a documented verbal warning. 

Regarding the patient complaints, Cassavoy’s email to Watson referred to 

“Jamie,” which is not how Davidson spells her first name, but is the spelling used 

by Davidson’s coworker, Jamie Callis. Watson testified she could not be sure 

whether the email referred to Davidson or Callis, but stated Davidson would have 

told her if the complaints referred to Callis. Though Watson signed the 

disciplinary action form, she testified she had not seen the underlying complaints 

and only agreed to do so because she feared she would otherwise be fired. 

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On March 1, 2017, Davidson injured her ankle at work. After being seen by 

a doctor and surgeon, she returned to work on March 13, 2017, wearing a walking 

boot for her injury. 

Davidson’s second disciplinary action occurred on March 15, 2017. A 

doctor complained that on March 8, 2017, Davidson failed to communicate with 

him and a patient’s family regarding the patient’s discharge plan. Watson issued 

Davidson a written warning for substandard work based on the doctor’s complaint. 

On May 8, 2017, Davidson had ankle surgery. Later that month, she filed a 

workers’ compensation lawsuit against Grandview based on her ankle injury and 

C. diff infection. Davidson then requested FMLA leave for the period of March 1, 

2017, to June 23, 2017. Davidson had exhausted her FMLA leave as of May 30, 

2017, so her request was only partially granted. Davidson therefore took a 

combination of FMLA and personal leave until June 19, 2017. Davidson then 

returned to work, but she had frequent doctor’s appointments due to her ankle 

injury and related physical therapy. Upon her return to work, Davidson was 

counseled not to discuss her lawsuit or medical conditions with her coworkers, 

who had complained such discussions made them uncomfortable. 

Davidson’s third disciplinary action occurred on July 24, 2017. A nurse and 

nurse practitioner separately complained to Watson that Davidson had provided 

substandard discharge planning to patients, in one instance delaying a patient’s 

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discharge by nine days. Watson issued Davidson another written warning for 

substandard work based on these two complaints. Under Grandview’s progressive 

disciplinary policy, this was a final warning, and Davidson was on notice that the 

next disciplinary action against her could result in her termination. 

Several days after the third disciplinary action, Davidson failed to return to 

work after a doctor’s appointment. Watson expressed her frustration in an email to 

Colvert, stating she was “so tired of this crap” and was “screaming out loud” and

“so over this.” 

D. Additional Leave, Return to Work, and Termination

Davidson had a second ankle surgery on August 24, 2017, and she took 

personal leave from this date until October 23, 2017. While Davidson was on 

personal leave, Grandview hired two social workers, who were set to complete 

their orientation period around the time of Davidson’s return. On October 13, 

2017, Davidson received a letter from Grandview signed by Wink. The letter 

stated, in relevant part, that Davidson had exhausted her FMLA leave and had been 

placed on personal leave, and that Grandview could not guarantee she would be 

returned to her original position, or any position, upon her return from personal 

leave. Wink testified at deposition that this portion of the letter was standardized 

text issued to any employee who had exhausted her FMLA leave. 

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Several days later, Colvert emailed Wink about moving Davidson to another 

floor upon her return. Colvert stated that if Davidson was transferred, it would be 

apparent whether she was “performing her job as she should be,” and she asked 

whether Grandview would then “go through the disciplinary steps.” In a separate 

email with the subject line “email,” Wink wrote: “Let’s discuss in person. Certain 

things don’t need to be mentioned in email (everything is discoverable) and we 

have to be careful how certain comments can be interpreted.” 

Davidson returned to work on October 24, 2017, without any restrictions 

regarding her ankle. She was transferred from cardiology on the seventh floor to 

the medical/surgery unit on the ninth floor. The transfer did not result in any 

change to her job duties, pay, or benefits. 

On October 25, 2017, Davidson met with Michael Dean, the director of the 

Short Stay Unit on the ninth floor, and other staff members. Davidson testified she 

did not mention her lawsuit during this meeting, but instead asked if she could 

have a chair because she had been “made to come back to work before [her] foot 

was healed” and “needed to sit down.” 

On October 26, 2017, Rick Smith, a patient’s son, complained about 

Davidson to Jennifer Perrigin, a charge nurse on the ninth floor. Smith told 

Perrigin that Davidson was more focused on her own medical issues and problems 

with Grandview than she was on his mother’s situation. He asked Perrigin if there 

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was anyone else he could talk to because he did not want to deal with Davidson 

anymore. Perrigin reported the complaint to Michael Dean, director of the Short 

Stay Unit on the ninth floor. She also told Dean that Davidson had made 

comments to her and other staff members about her workers’ compensation lawsuit 

and medical issues. 

That same day, Dean spoke to Smith, who informed him Davidson was not 

concerned about his mother, had spent 25 of 30 minutes in his mother’s room 

complaining in detail of her own medical problems, and had not listened to 

anything he had said regarding his mother’s situation. Dean sent his summary of 

Smith’s complaint to Colvert, who was by then Davidson’s supervisor, and also to 

Callis and Julie Soekoro, Grandview’s chief financial officer. Colvert also 

forwarded the complaint to Wink and Soekoro. Soekoro stated Davidson’s 

conduct warranted disciplinary action, was highly inappropriate and 

unprofessional, and would be addressed through the appropriate HR process. In a 

follow-up email on October 26, 2017, Dean reported Davidson was discussing her 

lawsuit against Grandview with staff and had discussed this issue with him 

personally. Later that day, when Soekoro asked for details, he added Davidson had 

also informed his team she would not go into the room of any patient who had C. 

diff. After receiving Dean’s complaint about Davidson’s discussion of her lawsuit 

and her medical issues, Soekoro emailed Wink, Colvert, and Callis, stating: “Write 

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up #2 today. Michael Dean and his charge nurse apparently heard far more than 

was appropriate or solicited.” 

The following morning, Davidson emailed Callis and told her she wanted to 

discuss the situation with Smith or have him present because she did not want to 

get “railroaded again.” Davidson then called Smith personally and emailed Callis, 

Colvert, and Wink to report he had “no complaints” regarding her discharge 

planning. Dean, however, reported to Soekoro and others that Smith had come to 

his office that morning and told him Davidson was irrational and that he wanted 

his mother to be discharged as soon as possible. That same day, Soekoro met with 

Wink and Drew Mason, Grandview’s chief executive officer, and the decision was 

made to terminate Davidson’s employment. 

Three days later, on October 30, 2017, Wink and Colvert met with Davidson 

and informed her of the termination decision. According to the disciplinary action 

form, the termination was based upon: (1) Smith’s complaints about Davidson; and 

(2) the fact Davidson discussed her lawsuit and medical issues with other 

employees. 

II. DISCUSSION

A. ADA Discrimination and Retaliation 

Under the ADA, employers are prohibited from discriminating against 

qualified employees based on disability “in regard to . . . discharge of 

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employees . . . and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” 42 

U.S.C. § 12112(a). The ADA also makes it unlawful for an employer to retaliate 

against employees who have “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in 

any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].” Id.

§ 12203(a). To establish a prima facie case of ADA discrimination, a plaintiff 

must show that she: (1) was disabled; (2) was a qualified individual; and (3) was 

discriminated against because of her disability. Holly v. Clairson Indus., L.L.C., 

492 F.3d 1247, 1255-56 (11th Cir. 2007). To establish a prima facie case of ADA 

retaliation, an employee must show: (1) she engaged in statutorily protected 

conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal 

connection exists between the conduct and the adverse action. Batson v. Salvation 

Army, 897 F.3d 1320, 1329 (11th Cir. 2018).

Where direct evidence of an employer’s intent is lacking, we analyze ADA 

discrimination and retaliation claims under the burden-shifting framework set forth 

in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See Holly, 492 F.3d 

at 1255; Batson, 897 F.3d at 1328-29; see also Earl v. Mervyns, Inc., 207 F.3d 

1361, 1365 (11th Cir. 2000) (noting “[t]he burden-shifting analysis of Title VII 

employment discrimination claims is applicable to ADA claims”). Under this 

framework, once a plaintiff meets her prima facie burden, the defendant must 

present a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its adverse actions. Cleveland v. 

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Home Shopping Network, Inc., 369 F.3d 1189, 1193 (11th Cir. 2004). The 

employee must then demonstrate that the employer’s proffered reason was

pretextual. See id. To establish pretext, a plaintiff must show the employer’s 

proffered reason was false and the real reason was discrimination. See St. Mary’s

Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 515 (1993).

A plaintiff can show pretext by demonstrating “such weaknesses, 

implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in [the 

employer’s] proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable factfinder 

could find them unworthy of credence.” Springer v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. 

Grp. Inc., 509 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). 

“Provided that the proffered reason is one that might motivate a reasonable 

employer, an employee must meet that reason head on and rebut it, and the 

employee cannot succeed by simply quarreling with the wisdom of that reason.” 

Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012, 1030 (11th Cir. 2000) (en banc). The 

pretext inquiry “centers on an employer’s beliefs,” and the question is whether the 

employer is dissatisfied with an employee for “non-discriminatory reasons, even if 

mistakenly or unfairly so,” or instead merely used those reasons as cover for 

discrimination. Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Devs., Inc., 610 F.3d 1253, 1266 (11th Cir. 

2010); see also E.E.O.C. v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 221 F.3d 1171, 1176-77 (11th 

Cir. 2000) (providing an employer is entitled to rely on a good faith belief an 

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employee has committed professional misconduct and stating pretext cannot be 

demonstrated by showing the employer was mistaken). 

On the other hand, “the McDonnell Douglas framework is not, and was 

never intended to be the sine qua non for a plaintiff to survive summary judgment 

in an employment discrimination case.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 

F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). A plaintiff will also survive summary judgment 

if she presents “a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a 

jury to infer intentional discrimination by the decisionmaker.” Id. (quotation 

marks omitted). Such a convincing mosaic may consist of “evidence that 

demonstrates, among other things, (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, 

and other bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be 

drawn, (2) systemically better treatment of similarly situated employees, and 

(3) that the employer’s justification is pretextual.” Lewis v. City of Union City, 

Ga., 934 F.3d 1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).

Here, we assume without deciding that Davidson established a prima facie 

case of discrimination and retaliation under the ADA based upon her termination 

from Grandview.2

 We further conclude Grandview proffered legitimate, 

2 The district court determined the only adverse employment action for the purposes of 

Davidson’s ADA claims was her termination because her Equal Employment Opportunity 

Commission charge was timely only as to her termination. Davidson does not challenge this 

finding on appeal, and she has therefore abandoned any ADA claim based on the pretermination 

disciplinary actions. See Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 

2014).

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nondiscriminatory reasons for terminating Davidson: (1) Smith’s October 2017 

complaints about Davidson, and (2) Davidson’s discussion of her lawsuit and 

medical issues with hospital staff. We therefore turn to the question of whether 

there is sufficient evidence in the record from which a reasonable jury could find 

Grandview’s reasons for Davidson’s termination were pretextual. 

We conclude Davidson has failed to carry her burden in demonstrating the 

reasons for her termination were a pretext for unlawful discrimination or 

retaliation. Regarding Smith’s complaints, Davidson argues it was not uncommon 

for people to ask about her injury because of the boot she wore, and that social 

workers would often follow up in response to patient complaints about discharge 

plans. As to her discussion of her lawsuit and medical issues with staff, Davidson

asserts that she did not specifically mention her lawsuit but instead asked for a 

chair during a meeting because she was made to return to work before her foot had 

healed. These arguments, however, essentially quarrel with the wisdom of 

Grandview’s business decision and fail to show Grandview lacked a good faith 

belief Davidson had committed the misconduct that formed the basis for her 

termination. See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030; Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266.

Davidson also contends there is a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext 

because there is evidence in the record showing Grandview had a plan in place to 

terminate her. As evidence of this plan, Davidson points to: (1) the October 13, 

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2017, letter in which Grandview stated it could not guarantee her reemployment; 

(2) her transfer to the ninth floor; and (3) the fact Grandview hired two new social 

workers during her absence. This evidence, however, fails to reveal a 

discriminatory plan to terminate Davidson that renders Grandview’s proffered

reasons for her termination “unworthy of credence.” See Springer, 509 F.3d at 

1348 (quotation marks omitted). The portion of the October 13, 2017, letter that 

Davidson relies on was standardized text issued to any employee who had 

exhausted her FMLA leave, not a message directed to Davidson because of her 

disabilities. As to the transfer, even assuming the ninth floor was a more 

challenging work environment, Davidson was released to work without any 

restrictions on the use of her ankle, and the October 2017 emails between Colvert 

and Wink do not reveal any discriminatory animus. The fact Grandview filled

staffing needs by hiring additional social workers likewise does not suggest a 

predetermined plan to eliminate Davidson because of her disabilities or indicate

Grandview’s proffered reasons for terminating Davidson were false.3

3 Davidson also argues that a case manager, Teresa Blocker, asked her to violate federal 

privacy law by looking up Blocker’s personal medical record. Davidson submitted in her 

declaration that she believed she was being set up to violate the law so that Grandview would 

have cause to terminate her, and Blocker “later confirmed this was true.” This evidence does not 

bolster Davidson’s argument, however, as there is nothing in Davidson’s declaration to indicate 

how Blocker “confirmed” the setup or whether any decisionmaker with respect to Davidson’s 

termination had been involved.

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Other pieces of evidence on which Davidson relies similarly fail to 

demonstrate pretext. For instance, Davidson contends the first disciplinary action 

against her may have been intended for Jamie Callis because of how the name 

“Jamie” was spelled on Cassavoy’s underlying complaint, and that Dean “had 

issues” with her because she had made unspecified complaints about him in the 

past. But these arguments offer only speculation as to whether Grandview did not 

honestly believe Davidson engaged in the underlying misconduct and are 

insufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to pretext. Cordoba v. Dillard’s, Inc., 

419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating speculation does not create a 

genuine issue of fact for trial); Mayfield v. Patterson Pump Co., 101 F.3d 1371, 

1376 (11th Cir. 1996) (explaining plaintiff must provide significant probative 

evidence on the issue of pretext). We are also not persuaded that the mere 

mention, in one of Dean’s October 26, 2017, emails, that Davidson had requested 

an accommodation for her C. diff shows that her termination was linked to her 

infection or any other disability, as opposed to the misconduct complained of by 

Smith and Dean. 

As further evidence of pretext, Davidson argues the record is replete with 

evidence that Watson, Colvert, and other colleagues expressed frustration with her 

use of leave due to her disabilities. Davidson mainly discusses stray remarks that 

Watson made, such as Watson’s comment that Davidson should look for another 

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job while she was on leave for C. diff, and the email in which she stated she was 

“screaming out loud” after Davidson failed to return to work after her doctor’s 

appointment. But Watson was not a decisionmaker with respect to Davidson’s 

termination. Indeed, Watson no longer worked at Grandview when the termination 

decision was made by Soekoro, Wink, and Mason. On the record before us, 

without other probative evidence of pretext, remarks by Watson and other nondecisionmakers do not create a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. See 

Rojas v. Fla., 285 F.3d 1339, 1343 (11th Cir. 2002) (stating that although stray 

remarks that are not directly related to an employment decision may contribute to a 

circumstantial showing of discriminatory intent, they must be read in conjunction 

with the entire record and considered with other evidence).

Davidson argues that in addition to demonstrating sufficient evidence of 

pretext under the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework, she has also 

presented a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence that would allow a 

jury to infer intentional discrimination by Grandview. See Smith, 644 F.3d at 

1328. Her “convincing mosaic” arguments, however, are the same as her pretext 

arguments, and they similarly fail to provide sufficient circumstantial evidence of 

discrimination or retaliation under the ADA. 

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B. FMLA Retaliation

We next turn to Davidson’s FMLA retaliation claim. Under the FMLA, an 

eligible employee is entitled to 12 workweeks of leave during any 12-month period 

because of, inter alia, a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to 

perform the functions of her position. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). “[T]he FMLA 

protects the substantive rights it creates by prohibiting an employer from retaliating 

against its employee for engaging in activities protected under the Act.” Batson, 

897 F.3d at 1328 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1)-(2)). To establish a prima facie 

case of retaliation under the FMLA, an employee must demonstrate that: (1) she 

engaged in statutorily protected activity; (2) she suffered an adverse employment 

action; and (3) there is a causal connection between the protected activity and the 

adverse action. Schaaf v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 602 F.3d 1236, 1243 (11th 

Cir. 2010). 

Unless there is direct evidence of the employer’s retaliatory intent in an 

FMLA retaliation case, we employ the burden-shifting framework established in 

McDonnell Douglas. Id. If the employee carriers her initial burden in establishing 

a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to 

articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action. Id. The burden 

then shifts back to the employee to show the employer’s proffered reasons were a 

pretext for discrimination. Id. at 1244.

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Though the district court found Davidson had established a prima facie case 

of FMLA retaliation based on the March 15, 2017, and July 24, 2017, disciplinary 

actions, Davidson contends the district court erred in: (1) failing to consider the 

February 14, 2017, disciplinary action as another basis for her FMLA claim, and 

(2) failing to find a causal connection between her termination and her FMLA 

leave. She also argues the court erred in failing to find that Grandview’s proffered 

reasons for its adverse actions—both the disciplinary actions and her termination—

were pretextual.

We need not address Davidson’s arguments regarding her prima facie case 

because we conclude Grandview proffered legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for 

Davidson’s disciplinary actions and termination, and Davidson failed to show 

those reasons were pretextual. As an initial mater, even assuming arguendo that 

Davidson had established a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation based on her 

termination, her pretext arguments with respect to termination fail for the reasons 

discussed above. 

As to discipline, Grandview presented legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for 

all three disciplinary actions: documented patient and staff complaints primarily 

concerning Davidson’s failure to provide adequate discharge planning. Davidson 

has failed to identify any inconsistencies or implausibilities regarding these 

proffered reasons. Although Davidson again argues Watson and others were 

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frustrated with her taking leave, she has not produced evidence to suggest Watson 

did not in good faith base the disciplinary actions on the unsolicited complaints

regarding Davidson’s misconduct. See Alvarez, 610 F.3d at 1266. Davidson

argues it is unclear whether the complaint underlying the first disciplinary action 

was about her or Jamie Callis, but this argument is speculative, as discussed above. 

She also contends her conduct did not warrant the second disciplinary action 

because she had provided the doctor with the information he required in the 

patient’s chart, and that her conduct did not warrant the third disciplinary action 

because delays in a patient’s discharge were not uncommon. These arguments are 

without merit, as they merely quarrel with the wisdom of Grandview’s actions. 

See Chapman, 229 F.3d at 1030. Finally, though the disciplinary actions were 

close in time to Davidson’s use of FMLA leave, this temporal proximity, without 

more, is insufficient evidence of pretext. See Gogel v. Kia Motors Mfg. of Ga., 

Inc., 967 F.3d 1121, 1138 n.15 (11th Cir. 2020) (en banc).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s decision granting 

summary judgment in favor of Grandview.

AFFIRMED.

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