[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

ex rel. Sanford v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, Slip Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8723.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2017-OHIO-8723

THE STATE EX REL. SANFORD, APPELLANT, v. BUREAU OF SENTENCE 

COMPUTATION, APPELLEE. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State ex rel. Sanford v. Bur. of Sentence Computation, Slip 

Opinion No. 2017-Ohio-8723.] 

Mandamus—Writ of mandamus sought to compel Bureau of Sentence computation 

to calculate time served under a state sentence as if the sentence were 

served concurrently with a federal sentence—Dismissal of petition for writ 

affirmed. 

(No. 2017-0014—Submitted June 20, 2017—Decided November 30, 2017.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

No. 16AP-276, 2016-Ohio-7872. 

________________ 

 Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} Appellant, John W. Sanford, appeals the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals’ dismissal of his petition for a writ of mandamus. We affirm. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2

Background 

{¶ 2} Sanford’s complaint sets forth the following facts, which, for 

purposes of the motion to dismiss, the court of appeals was required to accept as 

true. In June 1992, Sanford was convicted of murder in Wood County, Ohio. State 

v. Sanford, Wood C.P. No. 91-CR-238 (June 5, 1992). The judgment entry 

sentenced Sanford to the custody of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and 

Correction to be imprisoned for an indefinite term of a minimum of 15 years to life, 

to be served consecutively to the sentence defendant was then serving on federal 

charges. 

{¶ 3} On February 19, 2016, Sanford commenced the present action against 

appellee, Bureau of Sentence Computation (“BSC”), in the Tenth District Court of 

Appeals.1

 Sanford requested a writ of mandamus to compel BSC to calculate his 

time served under his state sentence as if the sentence were being served 

concurrently with—not consecutively to—the federal sentence. 

{¶ 4} BSC filed a motion to dismiss. The court of appeals accepted the 

magistrate’s recommendation to grant the motion. Sanford timely appealed. 

Analysis

{¶ 5} At the time of Sanford’s sentencing, former R.C. 2929.41, 143 Ohio 

Laws, Part I, 1307, 1438, provided: 

(A) Except as provided in division (B) of this section, a 

sentence of imprisonment shall be served concurrently with any 

other sentence of imprisonment imposed by a court of this state, 

another state, or the United States. In any case, a sentence of 

 

1

 The case was initially filed in the Sixth District Court of Appeals as State ex rel. Sanford v. Bur. 

of Sentence Computation, 6th Dist. No. 2016 WD 0008, but it was dismissed without prejudice. 

Sanford appears to have refiled the same document in the Tenth District without changing the 

caption. 
January Term, 2017 

3

imprisonment for misdemeanor shall be served concurrently with a 

sentence of imprisonment for felony served in a state or federal 

penal or reformatory institution. 

(B) A sentence of imprisonment shall be served 

consecutively to any other sentence of imprisonment, in the 

following cases: 

(1) When the trial court specifies that it is to be served 

consecutively. 

Thus, under that law, a sentencing court could designate a second sentence to run 

consecutively to “any other sentence of imprisonment.” Sanford contends that as a 

matter of statutory definition, incarceration on a federal crime did not qualify as 

“any other sentence of imprisonment.” 

{¶ 6} The plain language of former R.C. 2929.41 disproves Sanford’s 

claim. The first sentence in division (A) referred to “a sentence of imprisonment 

imposed by * * * the United States.” Thus, the statute plainly included federal 

sentences as one type of “sentence of imprisonment.” Sanford’s argument would 

prevail only if use of the phrase in division (B) was construed differently than the 

use of the same phrase in division (A), which is an absurd suggestion. 

{¶ 7} Sanford’s reliance on R.C. 1.05(A) to reach a contrary result is 

misplaced. That provision defines “imprisoned” as confinement in a state, county, 

municipal, or other nonfederal facility. But R.C. 1.05(A) has a caveat: the 

definition it provides applies “unless the context otherwise requires.” As shown in 

the previous paragraph, the context of former R.C. 2929.41 requires otherwise. 

{¶ 8} Alternatively, Sanford points to former R.C. 2929.41(C)(1), 143 Ohio 

Laws, Part I, at 1439, which spells out how to calculate minimum and maximum 

terms “[w]hen consecutive sentences of imprisonment are imposed for felony under 

division (B)(1).” Sanford assumes that “imposed for felony” meant a felony under 
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Ohio law and therefore subdivision (B)(1) could not apply to a federal felony 

sentence. But of course nothing in subdivision (C)(1) limits the consecutive 

sentences to only those circumstances involving two state convictions. 

{¶ 9} Finally, Sanford argues that running his two sentences consecutively 

violates equal protection and due process. Sanford raised this argument for the first 

time in his objections to the magistrate’s recommendation. He did not raise 

constitutional arguments in his complaint or in his pleadings in opposition to the 

motion to dismiss. In an original action for mandamus, an issue raised for the first 

time in objections to the magistrate’s decision, without having appeared in the 

complaint, has been waived. State ex rel. Durbin v. Indus. Comm., 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 10AP-712, 2012-Ohio-664, ¶ 10, and cases cited therein. 

{¶ 10} We affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. 

Judgment affirmed. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and O’DONNELL, KENNEDY, FRENCH, O’NEILL, FISCHER,

and DEWINE, JJ., concur. 

_________________ 

John W. Sanford, pro se. 

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Kelly N. Brogan, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee. 

_________________