I 

111TH CONGRESS 

1ST SESSION H. R. 3832 

To enhance the effectiveness of United States diplomatic efforts with respect 

to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined 

petroleum, require the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain 

viable military options to prevent the successful development or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of Iran, and 

for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

OCTOBER 15, 2009 

Mr. FRANKS of Arizona introduced the following bill; which was referred to 

the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on 

Financial Services, Armed Services, Ways and Means, and Oversight and 

Government Reform, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 

Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within 

the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To enhance the effectiveness of United States diplomatic 

efforts with respect to Iran by expanding economic sanctions against Iran to include refined petroleum, require 

the Secretary of Defense to develop and maintain viable 

military options to prevent the successful development 

or deployment of a nuclear weapons capability by the 

Government of Iran, and for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 


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1 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

2 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Peace Through 

3 Strength Act of 2009’’. 

4 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

5 (a) IRANIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.—Congress 

6 finds the following: 

7 (1) On October 25, 2007, the Secretary of the 

8 Treasury designated under Executive Order 13224 

9 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to designating and 

10 blocking assets of foreign individuals and entities 

11 that commit, or pose a significant risk of commit12 ting, acts of terrorism) the Islamic Revolutionary 

13 Guard Corps (IRGC)-Quds Force for providing ma14 terial support to the Taliban and other terrorist or15 ganization and Iran’s state-owned Back Saderat as 

16 a terrorist financier. 

17 (2) In the 2008 Department of State Country 

18 Report, the Secretary of State determined that of all 

19 state sponsors of terrorism, the Government of Iran 

20 is the most active sponsor of terrorism, threatening 

21 peace in the Middle East and Afghanistan. 

22 (3) According to the State Department, despite 

23 its pledge to support the stabilization of Iraq, the 

24 Government of Iran continues to provide lethal sup25 port, including weapons, training, funding, and guidVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:38 Oct 17, 2009 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3832.IH H3832

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1 ance, to Iraqi militant groups that target Coalition 

2 and Iraqi forces and kill innocent Iraqi civilians. 

3 (4) Iranian-produced advanced rockets, sniper 

4 rifles, automatic weapons, explosively formed 

5 penetrators, and mortars have killed Iraqi and Coali6 tion Forces as well as civilians. 

7 (5) Iran has aided and abetted groups certified 

8 by the United States Government as foreign ter9 rorist organizations for nearly 3 decades, including 

10 Lebanese Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Palestinian Is11 lamic Jihad. 

12 (6) In April 2008 the Commanding General 

13 Multi-National Force-Iraq, General David H. 

14 Petraeus, testified before the Committee on Armed 

15 Services of the House of Representatives that Iran 

16 has fueled the violence in a particularly damaging 

17 way, through its lethal support to the ‘‘special 

18 groups’’ operating against coalition forces in Iraq. 

19 (7) United States Ambassador to Iraq, Ryan C. 

20 Crocker, testified in April 2008 that Iran continues 

21 to undermine the efforts of the Government of Iraq 

22 to establish a stable, secure state by training crimi23 nal militia elements engaged in violence against 

24 Iraqi security forces, coalition forces, and Iraqi civil25 ians. 


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1 (8) The Director of the Central Intelligence 

2 Agency, General Michael V. Hayden, stated on May 

3 30, 2008, that ‘‘It is the policy of the Iranian gov4 ernment, approved at the highest levels of that gov5 ernment, to facilitate the killing of American and 

6 other coalition forces in Iraq. Period.’’. 

7 (9) The Director of Defense Intelligence Agen8 cy, Lieutenant General Michael D. Maples, stated in 

9 his March 10, 2009, testimony before the Senate 

10 Armed Services Committee, ‘‘Iran continues to pro11 vide money, weapons and training to some Iraqi 

12 Shia militants despite pledges by senior Iranian offi13 cials to stop such support. The weapons include Ex14 plosively Formed Penetrators (EFPs) with radio15 controlled, remote arming and passive infrared deto16 nators, mortars, rockets, rocket-propelled grenades 

17 and launchers, small arms ammunition and explo18 sives.’’. 

19 (b) IRAN’S BALLISTIC MISSILE FLEET DEVELOP20 MENTS AND TESTING.—Congress finds the following: 

21 (1) The Government of Iran continues to en22 hance the capabilities of its ballistic missile fleet, 

23 holding United States interest in Southern Europe, 

24 the Persian Gulf region, and South Asia at risk of 

25 an attack. 


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1 (2) In September 2004, the Government of Iran 

2 showed off its range of ballistic missiles at an an3 nual military parade, with the rockets draped in 

4 banners vowing to ‘‘crush America’’ and ‘‘wipe Israel 

5 off the map’’. 

6 (3) On October 25, 2007, the Secretary of 

7 State designated under Executive Order 13382 (50 

8 U.S.C. 1701 note; relating to blocking property of 

9 weapons of mass destruction proliferators and their 

10 supporters) two key Iranian entities of missile pro11 liferation concern, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

12 Corps (IRGC) and the Ministry of Defense and 

13 Armed Forces Logistics. In addition, the Secretary 

14 of the Treasury designated under Executive Order 

15 13382 for proliferation activities nine IRGC-affili16 ated entities and five IRGC-affiliated individuals as 

17 derivatives of the IRGC, Iran’s state-owned Banks 

18 Melli and Mellat, and three individuals affiliated 

19 with Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization. 

20 (4) The IRGC has been outspoken about its 

21 willingness to proliferate ballistic missiles capable of 

22 carrying weapons of mass destruction. 

23 (5) The IRGC’s ballistic missile inventory in24 cludes missiles which could be modified to deliver 

25 weapons of mass destruction. The IRGC is one of 


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1 the primary organizations of the Iranian regime tied 

2 to developing and testing the Shahab-3 missile. The 

3 IRGC attempted, as recently as 2006, to procure so4 phisticated and costly equipment that could be used 

5 to support Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear pro6 grams. 

7 (6) Iranian Defense Minister, Brigadier General 

8 Mostafa Mohammad Najjar, has stated that one of 

9 the major projects of the Iranian Ministry of De10 fense and Armed Forces Logistics is the manufac11 turing of Shahab-3 missiles, and that this project 

12 will not be halted. 

13 (7) Michael McConnell, then Director of Na14 tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed 

15 Services Committee February 27, 2009, ‘‘Iran con16 tinues to deploy ballistic missiles inherently capable 

17 of delivering nuclear weapons, and to develop longer18 range missiles. I note again that two activities rel19 evant to a nuclear weapons capability continue: ura20 nium enrichment that will enable the production of 

21 fissile material and development of long-range bal22 listic missile systems.’’. 

23 (8) Iran test-fired nine long-range and medium 

24 range missiles on July 9, 2008, and according to 


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1 Iranian state television, one of the missile systems 

2 was the Shahab-3, capable of striking Israel. 

3 (9) Iran currently possesses short-range bal4 listic missiles (SRBM), as well as medium-range bal5 listic missiles (MRBM), capable of reaching much of 

6 the Middle East region, including Israel, and reach7 ing Turkey. 

8 (10) On April 5, 2009, the President Barack 

9 Obama said, ‘‘So let me be clear: Iran’s nuclear and 

10 ballistic missile activity poses a real threat, not just 

11 to the United States, but to Iran’s neighbors and 

12 our allies.’’. 

13 (11) On February 3, 2009, the Government of 

14 Iran successfully launched its first satellite into 

15 orbit—an act in direct violation of United Nations 

16 Security Council Resolution 1737, limiting Iran from 

17 missile activity. 

18 (12) Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na19 tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed 

20 Services Committee in March 2009, ‘‘Space launch 

21 technology is no different from military technology, 

22 and the Safir launch last month shows that Iran is 

23 mastering the use of ballistic weapons.’’. 

24 (13) Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Director of Na25 tional Intelligence, stated before the Senate Armed 


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1 Services Committee in March 2009, ‘‘Militarily, Iran 

2 continues to strengthen the three pillars of its stra3 tegic deterrence: surface-to-surface missiles, long4 range rockets and aircraft for retaliation; naval 

5 forces to disrupt maritime traffic through key water6 ways; and unconventional forces and surrogates to 

7 conduct worldwide lethal operations. Although many 

8 of their statements are exaggerations, Iranian offi9 cials throughout the past year have repeatedly 

10 claimed both greater ballistic missile capabilities that 

11 could threaten United States and allied interests.’’. 

12 (14) General Michael Maples, Director of the 

13 Defense Intelligence Agency stated before the Senate 

14 Armed Services Committee in March 2009, ‘‘Iran’s 

15 February 3, 2009, launch of the Safir space launch 

16 vehicle shows progress in mastering technology need17 ed to produce ICBMs.’’. 

18 (15) On May 19, 2009, the Government of Iran 

19 test-fired a new two-stage, medium-range, solid fuel, 

20 surface-to-surface missile, claiming it can span the 

21 entire nation of Israel and United States forces de22 ployed in the Persian Gulf Region. 

23 (c) IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM.—Congress finds the 

24 following: 


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1 (1) An Iranian Government armed with nuclear 

2 weapons would be significantly destabilizing to the 

3 Middle East region, placing United Sates interests 

4 at grave risk, and inspiring regional proliferation to 

5 counter-balance an Iranian nuclear-strike capability. 

6 (2) An Iranian Government equipped with nu7 clear weapons could have a far greater ability to 

8 quash domestic dissent with little fear of national 

9 intervention, hereby dimming prospects for internal 

10 democratic transformation within Iran. 

11 (3) The Government of Iran is actively devel12 oping the means to indigenously produce enriched 

13 uranium, a necessary element to develop a nuclear 

14 weapons capability, and has resisted international 

15 calls for transparency and accountability measures 

16 that would build confidence in the proclaimed peace17 ful intent of Iran’s nuclear program. 

18 (4) On February 5, 2008, the Director of Na19 tional Intelligence testified before the Select Com20 mittee on Intelligence of the Senate that ‘‘Declared 

21 uranium enrichment efforts, which will enable the 

22 production of fissile material, continue. This is the 

23 most difficult challenge in nuclear production. Iran’s 

24 efforts to perfect ballistic missiles that can reach 

25 North Africa and Europe also continue.’’. 


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1 (5) In March 2009 Secretary of State Hillary 

2 Clinton, in referring to United States allies, the 

3 Czech Republic and Poland, said ‘‘They recognize 

4 there is a real potential future threat, that missiles 

5 not only with a nuclear warhead, but with a conven6 tional warhead or some other chemical or biological 

7 weapon could very well be in the hands of a regime 

8 like Iran’s, which we know will use whatever advan9 tage they have to intimidate as far as they think 

10 their voice can reach.’’. 

11 (6) On April 6, 2009, the President Barack 

12 Obama stated, ‘‘The peace of the region will also be 

13 advanced if Iran forgoes any nuclear weapons ambi14 tions.’’. 

15 (7) According to Israeli Defense estimates, 

16 Tehran is believed to currently have an arsenal of 

17 100–200 long-range Shahab missiles that have a 

18 range of up to 2,000 kilometers and carry up to one19 ton warheads. 

20 (8) According to Israeli Defense estimates, it is 

21 the Government of Iran’s plan to obtain 500 missile 

22 launchers and over 1,000 missiles with a range of 

23 2,500 km by 2015. 

24 (9) On May 18, 2009, the President Barack 

25 Obama claimed, ‘‘the Islamic Republic’s obtaining a 


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1 nuclear weapon would be not only a threat to Israel 

2 and the United States, but ‘profoundly destabilizing’ 

3 to the international community in general’’. 

4 (10) On May 18, 2009, while meeting with the 

5 President Barack Obama, Israeli Prime Minister 

6 Benyamin Netanyahu said, ‘‘[A nuclear Iran] could 

7 give the nuclear umbrella to terrorists or worse, it 

8 could actually give nuclear weapons to terrorists I 

9 believe it would put all of us in great peril.’’ Iran’s 

10 obtaining nuclear weapons would be an existential 

11 threat not only to Israel but the rest of the world. 

12 (11) According to the IAEA, Iran has installed 

13 2 or 3 types of next-generation centrifuges at 

14 Natanz FEP, including IR–2 and the IR–3. 

15 (12) On March 17, 2009, British Prime Min16 ister Gordon Brown states, ‘‘[L]et me be equally 

17 clear that Iran’s current nuclear program is unac18 ceptable. Iran has concealed nuclear activities, re19 fused to cooperate with the IAEA, and flouted 

20 United Nations Security Council Resolutions. Its re21 fusal to play by the rules leads us to view its nuclear 

22 program as a critical proliferation threat. Iran there23 fore faces a clear choice—continue in this way and 

24 face further and tougher sanctions, or change to a 

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1 gram that will bring the greatest benefits to its citi2 zens.’’. 

3 (13) An International Atomic Energy Agency 

4 (IAEA) report released on June 5, 2009, confirmed 

5 that the number of centrifuges enriching uranium at 

6 the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) has in7 creased to 4,920 (up from 3,936) with an additional 

8 2,132 installed and operating under vacuum. This 

9 brings the total number of centrifuges either enrich10 ing uranium or installed and ready to begin enrich11 ment to 7,052. 

12 (14) On July 8, 2009, Chairman of the Joint 

13 Chief of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen stated, the 

14 ‘‘window is closing’’ for preventing Iran from acquir15 ing a nuclear weapon. He continues saying, ‘‘Iran is 

16 very focused on developing this capability and the 

17 clock is ticking and that’s why I’m as concerned as 

18 I am.’’. 

19 (15) On September 25, 2009, it was announced 

20 that Iran possessed a covert uranium enrichment fa21 cility along a road leading to the city of Qom. 

22 (16) On September 30, 2009, Iran’s nuclear 

23 chief Ali Akbar Salehi said, ‘‘The [Qom] facility was 

24 built inside a mountain next to a military compound 

25 of the Revolutionary Guard, and is equipped with air 


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1 defense systems.’’. He openly expressed this will en2 sure continuity of its nuclear activities in case of an 

3 attack. 

4 (17) British Prime Minister Gordon Brown 

5 commented on the Iranian nuclear facility at Qom 

6 saying, ‘‘this is clear evidence of Iran’s serial decep7 tion. The size and configuration of this facility is in8 consistent with a peaceful programme. Iran is break9 ing rules that all nations must follow—endangering 

10 the nonproliferation regime, denying its people ac11 cess to the opportunity they deserve, and threat12 ening the stability and security of the region and the 

13 world.’’. 

14 (18) Prime Minister Netanyahu called Iran 

15 ‘‘the major terrorist-sponsoring state of our time’’. 

16 He says, ‘‘that Tehran could give those nuclear 

17 weapons to terrorists or give them a nuclear um18 brella that would bring terrorism beyond our wildest 

19 dreams’’. 

20 (19) In September 2009, it was reported Iran 

21 is helping to detect uranium deposits in Venezuela. 

22 Iran’s Mining Minister Rodolfo Sanz said ‘‘Iran has 

23 been assisting Venezuela with geophysical survey 

24 flights and geochemical analysis of the deposits, and 

25 that evaluations indicate the existence of uranium in 


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1 western parts of the country and in Santa Elena de 

2 Uairen’’. Sanz told reporters of this discovery, ‘‘We 

3 could have important reserves of uranium.’’. 

4 (20) Department of State spokesman Ian Kelly 

5 said recently that United States officials also have 

6 ‘‘concerns’’ about a possible transfer of nuclear ma7 terials between Iran and Venezuela. 

8 (d) U.S. THREAT OF ELECTROMAGNETIC PULSE

9 (EMP) ATTACK.—Congress finds the following: 

10 (1) According to the EMP Commission, a single 

11 nuclear weapon exploded at high altitude above the 

12 United States will produce an electromagnetic pulse 

13 (EMP). 

14 (2) According to the EMP Commission, an 

15 EMP attack would disrupt electrical power necessary 

16 to support other critical infrastructures, including 

17 supply and distribution of water, food, fuel, commu18 nications, transport, financial transactions, emer19 gency services, government services, and all other in20 frastructures supporting the national economy and 

21 welfare. If significant parts of the electrical power 

22 infrastructure are lost for any substantial period of 

23 time, the Commission believes that the consequences 

24 are likely to be catastrophic, and many people may 

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1 essary to sustain life in dense urban and suburban 

2 communities. 

3 (3) The EMP Commission stated in its report 

4 that certain types of relatively low-yield nuclear 

5 weapons can be employed to generate potentially cat6 astrophic EMP effects over wide geographic areas, 

7 and designs for variants of such weapons may have 

8 been illicitly trafficked for a quarter-century. 

9 (4) According to the EMP Commission, China 

10 and Russia have considered limited nuclear attack 

11 options that, unlike their Cold War plans, employ 

12 EMP as the primary or sole means of attack. 

13 (5) The EMP Commission recognizes a deter14 mined adversary can achieve an EMP attack capa15 bility without having a high level of sophistication. 

16 (6) Having already conducted tests from sea17 based platforms, detonating warheads at the highest 

18 point of the missile trajectory, Iran is exploring a 

19 workable research program to deliver an EMP at20 tack against its enemies. 

21 (e) IRANIAN DEPENDENCE ON PETROLEUM IM22 PORTS.—Congress finds the following: 

23 (1) Iran is OPEC’s largest oil producer after 

24 Saudi Arabia with a refining capacity of some 1.5 

25 million barrels per day but still has to import 


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1 around one-third of its gasoline to meet domestic de2 mand. 

3 (2) Iran imports around 140,000 barrels per 

4 day of gasoline, most of which is shipped in 30,000- 

5 to 35,000-ton cargoes to the Mideast Gulf port of 

6 Bandar Abbas. 

7 (3) An interruption or significant limiting of 

8 the supply of gasoline to Iran would considerably im9 pact the Iranian economy. 

10 (4) An international restriction of gasoline ex11 ports to Iran would significantly bolster current dip12 lomatic initiatives. 

13 (5) On June 4, 2008, then-Senator Barack 

14 Obama said, ‘‘we should work with Europe, Japan, 

15 and the Gulf states to find every avenue outside the 

16 United Nations to isolate the Iranian regime—from 

17 cutting off loan guarantees and expanding financial 

18 sanctions to banning the export of refined petroleum 

19 to Iran.’’. 

20 (6) On October 7, 2008, then-Senator Barack 

21 Obama said, ‘‘Iran right now imports gasoline . . . 

22 if we can prevent them from importing the gasoline 

23 that they need . . . that starts changing their cost24 benefit analysis. That starts putting the squeeze on 

25 them.’’. 


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1 (f) VIOLATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS.—Congress finds 

2 the following: 

3 (1) Reports indicate the Government of Iran di4 rected Iranian children to clear the minefields dur5 ing the Iran-Iraq war, resulting in their deaths. 

6 (2) The Department of State’s International 

7 Religious Freedom Report of 2008 concluded that 

8 there was a continued deterioration of the Govern9 ment of Iran’s extremely poor status regarding re10 spect for religious freedom, and every year since 

11 1999 the Department of State has designated Iran 

12 a ‘‘country of particular concern’’ under the Inter13 national Religious Freedom Act of 1998 for its viola14 tions of religious freedom. 

15 (3) The Department of State’s Human Rights 

16 Report of 2008 concluded the Government of Iran’s 

17 poor human rights record worsened, and it contin18 ued to commit numerous serious abuses. 

19 (4) The Government of Iran severely limits citi20 zens’ right to modify their government peacefully 

21 through free and fair elections. 

22 (5) The Government of Iran carries out sum23 mary executions, including executions of minors, fol24 lowing trials that lack due process. 


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1 (6) Many arrests in Iran are carried out by 

2 plain-clothed officials who fail to identify themselves 

3 and who do not produce an official arrest warrant 

4 or state a reason for the arrest. 

5 (7) On December 18, 2008, for the sixth con6 secutive year, the United Nations General Assembly 

7 adopted a resolution on Iran expressing ‘‘deep con8 cern at ongoing systematic violations of human 

9 rights’’. 

10 (8) The Government of Iran systemically sup11 presses the freedoms of expression and the press, 

12 and severely limits the freedom of assembly of its 

13 own citizens. 

14 (9) The Government of Iran takes away the 

15 rights of women in Iran, including their right to the 

16 freedoms of movement, association, thought, con17 science, and religion, as well as freedom from coer18 cion in matters or belief. 

19 (10) Iranian President Mahmoud 

20 Ahmadinejad’s denials of the Holocaust and state21 ments calling for Israel to be ‘‘wiped off the map’’ 

22 have created a climate of fear among Iran’s Jewish 

23 community. 

24 (11) The Government of Iran continues to 

25 abuse and torture detainees and prisoners, including 


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1 carrying out severe punishments such as amputa2 tions and floggings. 

3 (12) On February 9, 2009, Malcolm Smart, Di4 rector of Amnesty International’s Middle East and 

5 North Africa programme said, ‘‘Thirty years on, 

6 some of the worst abuses of the Shah’s time—tor7 ture, executions and the suppression of legitimate 

8 dissent—are still being replicated in Iran, despite 

9 the efforts of the country’s growing and valiant com10 munity of human rights defenders.’’. 

11 (13) Christians, in particular Evangelicals and 

12 other Protestants, in Iran continue to be subject to 

13 harassment, arrests, close surveillance, and impris14 onment, and many converts from Islam to Christi15 anity have fled the country for fear of persecution. 

16 (14) According to Amnesty International, peo17 ple in Iran are still enduring a catalogue of human 

18 rights abuses, 30 years after the Islamic Revolution. 

19 SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY. 

20 (a) IN GENERAL.—It shall be policy of the United 

21 States to seek normalization of relations with Iran once 

22 the following conditions are satisfied: 

23 (1) The Government of Iran denounces the use 

24 of terrorism as a means to further political ends. 


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1 (2) The Government of Iran turns over to the 

2 United States Al Qaeda members known by the Gov3 ernment of Iran to be living in Iran. 

4 (3) The Government of Iran stops providing 

5 material support to groups designated as terrorist 

6 organizations under United States law. 

7 (4) The Government of Iran ceases support for 

8 the wounding and killing of United States and coali9 tion forces in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

10 (5) The Government of Iran dismantles its 

11 chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weap12 ons programs and commits to combating the pro13 liferation of such weapons. 

14 (6) The Government of Iran ceases the develop15 ment and testing of long range ballistic missiles. 

16 (7) The Government of Iran respects the 

17 boundaries, sovereignty, and right to exist of its 

18 neighbors, including the State of Israel, and contrib19 utes positively toward the Israeli-Palestinian peace 

20 process. 

21 (8) The Government of Iran upholds and de22 fends the human rights and civil liberties of its citi23 zens. 

24 (b) POLICY ON INTERNATIONAL ENGAGEMENT.— 

25 The United States shall take the following actions: 


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1 (1) The United States shall cooperate with al2 lies to employ all instruments of national power to 

3 prevent the successful development or deployment of 

4 a nuclear weapons capability by the Government of 

5 Iran. 

6 (2) The United States may not compromise ele7 ments of national missile defense systems, or offen8 sive strategic weapons in exchange for Russia put9 ting pressure on Iran. 

10 (3) The United States shall cooperate with al11 lies to expeditiously deploy a missile defense system 

12 that is capable of intercepting Iranian short, me13 dium, and long-range missiles aimed at the United 

14 States or North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

15 (NATO) allies. 

16 (4) The United States shall support the right of 

17 Israel to protect itself and shall remain committed 

18 to the defense of Israel, including support of the de19 velopment of a national missile defense shield for 

20 Israel to defeat missile and rocket attack. 

21 SEC. 4. AMENDMENTS TO THE IRAN SANCTIONS ACT OF 

22 1996 AND RELATED PROVISIONS. 

23 (a) EXPLANATION OF SANCTIONS TO REFINED PE24 TROLEUM.—Section 4 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 


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1 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at the end 

2 the following new subsection: 

3 ‘‘(g) UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD IRAN.—It 

4 shall be the policy of the United States to encourage for5 eign governments to— 

6 ‘‘(1) direct state-owned entities to cease all in7 vestment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports of 

8 refined petroleum resources to Iran; and 

9 ‘‘(2) persuade, and, where possible, require pri10 vate entities based in their territories to cease all in11 vestment in Iran’s energy sector and all exports of 

12 refined petroleum resources to Iran.’’. 

13 (b) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOP14 MENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN AND EXPORT

15 OF REFINED PETROLEUM RESOURCES TO IRAN.—Section 

16 5(a) of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 

17 note) is amended to read as follows: 

18 ‘‘(a) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE DEVELOP19 MENT OF PETROLEUM RESOURCES OF IRAN.—Except as 

20 provided in subsection (f), the President shall impose 2 

21 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs (1) 

22 through (6) of section 6 if the President determines that 

23 a person has, with actual knowledge, on or after the date 

24 of the enactment of this subsection, made an investment 

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1 ments of at least $5,000,000 each, which in the aggregate 

2 equals or exceeds $20,000,000 in any 12-month period), 

3 that directly and significantly contributed to the enhance4 ment of Iran’s ability to develop petroleum resources of 

5 Iran.’’. 

6 (c) MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO DE7 VELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR

8 OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—Section 5(b) of the 

9 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 

10 amended to read as follows: 

11 ‘‘(b) MANDATORY SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO

12 DEVELOPMENT OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION OR

13 OTHER MILITARY CAPABILITIES.—The President shall 

14 impose two or more of the sanctions described in para15 graphs (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President deter16 mines that a person has, on or after the date of the enact17 ment of the subsection, provided Iran with refined petro18 leum resources, engaged in an activity, including produc19 tion, brokerage, insurance, and tanker delivery services, 

20 that could contribute to Iran’s ability to import refined 

21 petroleum resources, or exported, transferred, or otherwise 

22 provided to Iran any goods, services, technology, or other 

23 items knowing that the provision of such goods, services, 

24 technology, or other items would contribute materially to 

25 the ability of Iran to— 


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1 ‘‘(1) acquire or develop chemical, biological, or 

2 nuclear weapons or related technologies; or 

3 ‘‘(2) acquire or develop destabilizing numbers 

4 and types of advanced conventional weapons.’’. 

5 (d) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IMPORTATION OR

6 EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS OR SERVICES.—Sec7 tion 5 of the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 

8 note) is amended— 

9 (1) by redesignating subsections (c) through (f) 

10 as subsections (d) through (g), respectively; 

11 (2) by inserting after subsection (b) the fol12 lowing new subsection: 

13 ‘‘(c) SANCTIONS WITH RESPECT TO IMPORTATION

14 OR EXPORTATION OF CERTAIN GOODS OR SERVICES.— 

15 Except as provided in subsection (g), the President shall 

16 impose 2 or more of the sanctions described in paragraphs 

17 (1) through (6) of section 6 if the President determines 

18 that a person has, on or after the date of the enactment 

19 of this subsection— 

20 ‘‘(1) imported, or financed such importation of, 

21 any goods or services of Iranian origin, other than 

22 Iranian-origin publications and materials imported 

23 for news publications or news broadcast dissemina24 tion; or 


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1 ‘‘(2) exported to Iran, the Government of Iran, 

2 or to any entity owned or controlled by the Govern3 ment of Iran, or finances such exportation of, any 

4 goods or technology, other than goods for humani5 tarian purposes.’’; 

6 (3) in subsection (a), by striking ‘‘subsection 

7 (f)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection (g)’’; 

8 (4) in subsection (d), as redesignated by para9 graph (1) of this subsection— 

10 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), 

11 by striking ‘‘subsections (a) and (b)’’ and in12 serting ‘‘subsections (a), (b), and (c)’’; and 

13 (B) in paragraph (1), by striking ‘‘sub14 section (a) or (b)’’ and inserting ‘‘subsection 

15 (a), (b), or (c)’’; and 

16 (5) in subsection (g), as redesignated by para17 graph (1) of this subsection— 

18 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph (1), 

19 by striking ‘‘subsection (a) or (b)’’ and insert20 ing ‘‘subsection (a), (b), or (c)’’; and 

21 (B) by adding at the end the following new 

22 sentence: 

23 ‘‘The exceptions specified in this subsection shall not 

24 apply to the Iranian state broadcasting system, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:38 Oct 17, 2009 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3832.IH H3832

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1 cluding Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 

2 (IRIB).’’. 

3 (e) ADDITIONAL SANCTIONS.—Section 6(6) of the 

4 Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is 

5 amended— 

6 (1) by striking ‘‘The President’’; and inserting 

7 the following new subparagraph: 

8 ‘‘(A) IN GENERAL.—The President’’; and 

9 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub10 paragraphs: 

11 ‘‘(B) FOREIGN EXCHANGE.—The Presi12 dent shall, under such regulations as the Presi13 dent may prescribe, prohibit any transactions in 

14 foreign exchange by the sanctioned person. 

15 ‘‘(C) BANKING TRANSACTIONS.—The 

16 President shall, under such regulations as the 

17 President may prescribe, prohibit any transfers 

18 of credit or payments between, by, through, or 

19 to any financial institution, to the extent that 

20 such transfers or payments involve any interest 

21 of the sanctioned person. 

22 ‘‘(D) PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS.—The 

23 President shall, under such regulations as the 

24 President may prescribe, prohibit any acquisi25 tion, holding, withholding, use, transfer, withVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:38 Oct 17, 2009 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3832.IH H3832

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•HR 3832 IH

1 drawal, transportation, importation, or expor2 tation of, dealing in, or exercising any right, 

3 power, or privilege with respect to, or trans4 actions involving, any property in which the 

5 sanctioned person has any interest by any per6 son, or with respect to any property, subject to 

7 the jurisdiction of the United States.’’. 

8 (f) WAIVER.—Section 9(c) of the Iran Sanctions Act 

9 of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended by adding at 

10 the end the following new paragraph: 

11 ‘‘(4) OVERSIGHT HEARINGS.—If the President 

12 exercises the waiver authority under this subsection, 

13 Congress shall, not later than 30 days after receipt 

14 of the report under paragraph (1), conduct oversight 

15 hearings with respect to the exercise of such waiver 

16 authority.’’. 

17 (g) CERTAIN BIANNUAL REPORTS.—Section 10 of 

18 the Iran Sanctions Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) 

19 is amended by adding at the end the following new sub20 sections: 

21 ‘‘(d) BIANNUAL REPORTS ON REFINED PETROLEUM

22 EXPORTS TO IRAN.—Not later than six months after the 

23 date of the enactment of this subsection and every six 

24 months thereafter, the President shall transmit to the apVerDate Nov 24 2008 02:38 Oct 17, 2009 Jkt 089200 PO 00000 Frm 00027 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H3832.IH H3832

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1 propriate congressional committees a report describing, 

2 with respect to the preceding six-month period— 

3 ‘‘(1) any person that has provided Iran with re4 fined petroleum resources, and the petroleum re5 sources so provided; 

6 ‘‘(2) any activity, including production, broker7 age, insurance, and tanker delivery services, engaged 

8 in that could contribute to Iran’s ability to import 

9 refined petroleum resources; 

10 ‘‘(3) any person that has provided Iran with 

11 goods, services, or technology for refining petroleum, 

12 and the goods, services, or technology so provided; 

13 and 

14 ‘‘(4) steps taken by the President to carry out 

15 the policy set forth in section 4(g). 

16 ‘‘(e) BIANNUAL REPORTS ON POLITICAL LEADER17 SHIP AND OTHER INDIVIDUAL AND BUSINESS INTER18 ESTS.—Not later than six months after the date of the 

19 enactment of this subsection and every six months there20 after, the Secretary of the Treasury shall submit to the 

21 appropriate congressional committees a report that— 

22 ‘‘(1) lists the top political leadership of Iran, 

23 the individuals and corporate entities supporting 

24 such political leadership, and the foreign trading 


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1 partners of such individuals and corporate entities; 

2 and 

3 ‘‘(2) establishes a list of key individuals and 

4 commercial entities associated with the Islamic Rev5 olution Guards Corps (IRGC) and the foreign trad6 ing partners of the IRGC.’’. 

7 SEC. 5. DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY OPTIONS FOR PRE8 VENTING IRAN FROM DEVELOPING OR DE9 PLOYING A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. 

10 (a) DECLARATION OF POLICY.—Congress declares 

11 that the United States is wholly capable, willing, and 

12 ready to use military force to prevent Iran from obtaining 

13 or developing a nuclear weapons capability. 

14 (b) DEVELOPMENT.—As part of a United States pol15 icy that uses all instruments of national power to prevent 

16 the Government of Iran from successfully developing nu17 clear weapons and the means to hold United States inter18 ests at risk with those weapons, the Secretary of Defense 

19 shall develop and maintain viable military options to pre20 vent the successful development or deployment of a nu21 clear weapons capability by the Government of Iran. 

22 (c) REPORT.—Not later than six months after the en23 actment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary 

24 of Defense shall submit to the Committee on Armed Serv25 ices of the House of Representatives and the Committee 


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1 on Armed Services of the Senate a report describing the 

2 following regarding military options toward the Govern3 ment of Iran: 

4 (1) An update on Iranian nuclear and ballistic 

5 missile threat to include all ballistic missile testing 

6 conducted, the status of Iran’s ability to produce or 

7 acquire fissile material, and nuclear stockpile 

8 changes in the previous one-year period. 

9 (2) An outline of Department of Defense mili10 tary options toward the Government of Iran to 

11 counter a nuclear ballistic missile threat. 

12 (3) A readiness update on the status of forces 

13 used in the various military options. 

Æ 


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