[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as 

Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, Slip Opinion No. 2016-Ohio-8014.] 

NOTICE 

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published. 

SLIP OPINION NO. 2016-OHIO-8014

DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL v. TAMBURRINO. 

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as Disciplinary Counsel v. Tamburrino, Slip Opinion No. 

2016-Ohio-8014.] 

Judges—Judicial campaigns—Misconduct—Violations of the Code of Judicial 

Conduct—One-year suspension with final six months stayed on conditions. 

(No. 2016-0858—Submitted August 31, 2016—Decided December 7, 2016.) 

ON CERTIFIED REPORT by the Board of Professional Conduct of the Supreme 

Court, No. 2015-078. 

_____________________ 

LANZINGER, J.

{¶ 1} Respondent, Ronnie Michael Tamburrino of Rock Creek, Ohio, 

Attorney Registration No. 0021594, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 

1983. Relator, disciplinary counsel, charged Tamburrino with violations of the 

Code of Judicial Conduct in a two-count complaint filed with the Board of 

Professional Conduct. The complaint alleged that Tamburrino disseminated 
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2

campaign materials about his opponent either knowing they were false or in 

reckless disregard of their falsity. 

{¶ 2} After conducting a hearing, a panel of the board issued a report 

finding that Tamburrino had engaged in the charged misconduct. The panel 

recommended a conditionally stayed six-month suspension of his license to practice 

law. The board adopted the panel’s report except for the recommended sanction; 

instead, the board recommended a one-year suspension with the final six months 

stayed. 

{¶ 3} In his objections to the report and recommendation of the board, 

Tamburrino asserts that the alleged violations were not supported by the evidence, 

that Ohio’s disciplinary process regarding campaign speech is unconstitutional, that 

his due-process rights were violated during the disciplinary proceedings, and that 

the board’s recommended sanction is unwarranted. We overrule Tamburrino’s 

objections and adopt the board’s recommendation. 

FACTS 

{¶ 4} In 2014, Tamburrino ran for judicial office for the first time against 

incumbent Judge Timothy P. Cannon for a seat on the Eleventh District Court of 

Appeals. In the last weeks and days before the November 4, 2014 election, 

Tamburrino’s campaign broadcasted two negative campaign advertisements 

against Judge Cannon. 

{¶ 5} Starting in mid-October 2014, Tamburrino’s campaign aired a 

television commercial that made the following statements about Judge Cannon: 

 “60% of Cannon’s Opinions that the Ohio Supreme Court Reviews are 

REVERSED”; 

 “Cannon has heard cases less than 35 Days each of the last two years”; and 

 “Cannon won’t disclose his Taxpayer Funded Travel Expenses.” 

(Capitalization sic.) In fact, however, in the years leading up to the election, Judge 

Cannon had consistently disclosed his travel expenses to the Ohio Judicial 
January Term, 2016 

3

Conference, and neither Tamburrino nor anyone else had asked Judge Cannon to 

disclose his travel expenses to them. 

{¶ 6} Paul Malchesky, Judge Cannon’s attorney and campaign treasurer, 

notified Tamburrino on October 25, 2014, that the commercial contained 

falsehoods. In particular, Malchesky explained that it was false to claim that Judge 

Cannon had refused to disclose his taxpayer-funded travel expenses because those 

expenses “have never been requested by anyone” and “[i]f they had been, they are 

a readily available public record.” The letter demanded that Tamburrino stop 

making false statements about Judge Cannon or else an election complaint would 

be filed. Two days later, on October 27, Tamburrino sent a letter in response, 

denying that the statements identified in Malchesky’s letter were false. 

{¶ 7} Starting the following day, on October 28, Tamburrino’s campaign 

broadcasted another television commercial, which criticized Judge Cannon’s 

concurring opinion in State v. Andrews, 177 Ohio App.3d 593, 2008-Ohio-3993, 

895 N.E.2d 585 (11th Dist.). The commercial begins with a faceless, robed judge 

standing at a courtroom bench pouring Jack Daniels whiskey and serving it to 

children. A voiceover states: 

Everyone knows that a judge would never serve alcohol to kids in a 

courtroom. But appellate judge Tim Cannon did something almost 

as bad. In the case State versus Andrews, Cannon ruled that cops 

couldn’t enter a house to arrest a parent who was hosting a teenage 

drinking party, because he felt teenage drinking wasn’t a serious 

crime. Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is serious. What else 

does he think isn’t serious? We can’t afford Tim Cannon’s bad 

judgment. Elect Ron Tamburrino to the Eleventh District Court of 

Appeals. 
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4

During the voiceover, the commercial shows children carousing and drinking beer 

out of large bottles. Simultaneously with the narration, the following words appear 

on the screen: 

 “Judge Cannon ruled cops couldn’t arrest a parent who hosted a teenage 

drinking party”; 

 “Cannon: ‘There were no exigent circumstances to justify the intrusion’ State 

v Andrews 177 Ohio App.3d 593 (2008)”; 

 “Judge Tim Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is a serious offense”; and 

 “BAD JUDGMENT.” 

(Capitalization sic.) 

{¶ 8} In Andrews, the Eleventh District Court of Appeals held that police 

needed to obtain a warrant before entering a home without the homeowner’s 

consent and searching a party where underage drinking was occurring. To reach 

this holding, the court concluded that there were no exigent circumstances that 

required immediate intrusion. Andrews at ¶ 39. The court noted that the noise from 

the party had stopped, the scene was secure around the house, no one was 

attempting to escape, evidence of the alcohol would not be destroyed, no one 

appeared to be in danger, and the homeowner was complying with a request for 

identification when the police officer forced his way past the homeowner into the 

house. Id. at ¶ 25, 30, and 36. 

{¶ 9} In a concurring opinion, Judge Cannon stated, “While I emphasize 

that I do not wish to impede an officer’s duties to enforce the laws against underage 

drinking,” there was not enough evidence of “exigent circumstances to validate a 

warrantless forced entry and search of [the] home.” Id. at ¶ 43 (Cannon, J., 

concurring). Judge Cannon wrote that it is not a crime for parents to give alcohol 

to their minor children under R.C. 4301.69(E)(1) and that committing the crime of 

giving alcohol to other minors is not among the serious or violent crimes, the mere 
January Term, 2016 

5

commission of which would constitute exigent circumstances. Id. at ¶ 44-45. Judge 

Cannon noted: “While I recognize the great concern for the problems associated 

with contributing to inappropriate underage drinking, I must also recognize the 

rights afforded to an individual, secure in the environment of his or her home, by 

the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at ¶ 42. 

{¶ 10} On October 31, 2014, Judge Cannon’s campaign issued a press 

release regarding both the teenage-drinking and the expense-disclosure 

commercials, denouncing them for containing falsehoods. The press release noted 

that despite a prior demand to cease and desist, Tamburrino’s campaign continued 

to air the two commercials. Tamburrino’s campaign responded with its own press 

release on November 1, 2014, stating that the statements made in his commercials 

were not false and accusing Judge Cannon of fabrications and false accusations. 

Tamburrino did not take either commercial off the air before the election. 

PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

{¶ 11} On October 28, 2014, Malchesky, Judge Cannon’s attorney and 

campaign treasurer, filed a grievance with the board, then known as the Board of 

Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline. With the election only a few days 

away, the board decided not to act on the grievance. The board did, however, 

forward the grievance to relator on October 30, 2014. Relator investigated and on 

October 30, 2015, notified Tamburrino that it had completed its investigation and 

would file a complaint. 

{¶ 12} The official complaint against Tamburrino was filed on December 

10, 2015. A panel of the board determined that probable cause existed and certified 

the complaint to the board. At a hearing on May 2, 2016, the panel received 43 

exhibits and heard testimony from Tamburrino, Judge Cannon, and an additional 

witness from the Ohio State Bar Association. 

{¶ 13} The panel found that the teenage-drinking and expense-disclosure 

commercials contained patently false statements of fact and that Tamburrino made 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6

the statements either knowing that they were false or with reckless disregard of 

their falsity. The panel also found that Tamburrino’s use of false statements was 

inconsistent with the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 

Accordingly, for each of the two counts, the panel concluded that Tamburrino 

violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.2(A)(1) (a judicial candidate shall act in a manner consistent 

with the independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary) and 4.3(A) (a 

candidate shall not knowingly or with reckless disregard disseminate false 

information concerning an opponent). The panel recommended that Tamburrino 

be suspended from the practice of law for six months, stayed in full on the 

conditions that he commit no further misconduct and attend a six hour continuinglegal-education (“CLE”) course regarding judicial campaigns. The panel also 

recommended assessing him the costs of the proceedings. 

{¶ 14} The board adopted the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the 

panel. But the board determined that the recommended sanction would not 

adequately demonstrate to other judicial candidates the seriousness of the violations 

or deter similar future misconduct. The board noted that not only were there blatant 

falsehoods in the commercials but that Tamburrino refused to acknowledge any 

inappropriateness of the content. The board also warned of the chilling affect that 

such advertisements could have on judicial independence and the ability of a judge 

to freely express views in court opinions. In light of these considerations, the board 

increased the recommended sanction to a suspension of a full year with six months 

stayed. 

{¶ 15} Tamburrino now objects to the board’s findings and 

recommendations. His objections are grouped for discussion into constitutional 

and procedural challenges. 

CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 

{¶ 16} In his first objection to the board’s recommendation, Tamburrino 

contends that the board’s decision is unconstitutional because it punishes 
January Term, 2016 

7

misleading rather than false speech, in violation of In re Judicial Campaign 

Complaint Against O’Toole, 141 Ohio St.3d 355, 2014-Ohio-4046, 24 N.E.3d 

1114. In O’Toole, we held that Jud.Cond.R. 4.3’s prohibition of false campaign 

speech was constitutional but that a then-existing clause of the rule did violate the 

First Amendment because it prohibited campaign speech that was merely 

misleading. O’Toole at ¶ 41-42. Here, Tamburrino has been charged with false 

speech, not misleading speech. O’Toole’s holding regarding misleading speech 

does not apply.

{¶ 17} In his fifth objection, Tamburrino argues that even the false-speech 

portion of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is unconstitutional pursuant to a Sixth Circuit decision 

rendered after O’Toole: Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 814 F.3d 466 (6th 

Cir.2016). But that decision reviewed a statute providing that it is a crime

punishable by up to six months in prison and a $5,000 fine for anyone to knowingly 

or with reckless disregard disseminate false information about a political candidate. 

See R.C. 3517.21(B)(10) and 3517.992(V). Our judicial-conduct rules were not at 

issue. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit itself clarified that Susan B. Anthony List does 

not apply to disciplinary sanctions for knowingly or recklessly false statements by 

judicial candidates. Winter v. Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 693 (6th Cir.2016). 

{¶ 18} It is undisputed that Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 is a content-based regulation of 

political speech and therefore must withstand strict scrutiny under the First 

Amendment to the United States Constitution. O’Toole at ¶ 20. The strict-scrutiny 

standard of review requires the rule to be narrowly tailored to promote a compelling 

governmental interest. Id. Nevertheless, unlike R.C. 3517.21(B)(10), Jud.Cond.R. 

4.3 is narrowly tailored. It applies solely to judicial candidates and not to their 

employees, associates, or supporters—let alone members of the general public. It 

is supported by a compelling interest not just in maintaining fairness in a particular 

election but in maintaining trust in the integrity and fairness of the judiciary as a 

whole. O’Toole at ¶ 22-26. We reviewed these factors at length in O’Toole and 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

8

concluded that they withstood strict scrutiny. Id. at ¶ 26-29. We see no reason to 

depart in this case from our reasoning in O’Toole.

{¶ 19} In the remainder of his fifth objection, Tamburrino levels an 

unspecified constitutional challenge to the judicial-candidate disciplinary process 

in general. He asserts that alleged misconduct by judicial candidates should not be 

“reviewed by sitting judges and those who deal with sitting judges on a regular 

basis” due to the risk of bias. This appears to be a due-process argument. See, e.g.,

State v. Dean, 127 Ohio St.3d 140, 2010-Ohio-5070, 937 N.E.2d 97, ¶ 48 (judicial 

bias implicates due process). There is no due-process or other relevant 

constitutional analysis in the decision that Tamburrino cites in support of this 

argument; instead, the case involved a state dentistry board’s attempt to avoid 

liability under federal antitrust law for anticompetitive practices. North Carolina 

State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. Fed. Trade Comm., __ U.S. __, 135 S.Ct. 1101, 

191 L.Ed.2d 35 (2015). Dental Examiners mentions that six of the eight members 

of the dentistry board were practicing dentists, meaning that the board was 

controlled by active market participants. Id. at 1108 and 1110. But apart from the 

many obvious differences between Ohio’s judicial-conduct rules and the federal 

Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq., there is no controlling majority of judges on 

Ohio’s Board of Professional Conduct. Gov.Bar R. V(1)(A) (only 7 of the 28 

commissioners may be active or retired judges). Dental Examiners has no 

application here, and Tamburrino’s constitutional challenge based on that case is 

not well taken. 

PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS 

{¶ 20} In his fourth objection to the board’s recommendation, Tamburrino 

argues that the disciplinary proceedings against him violated his due-process rights 

and that the complaint should be dismissed for four reasons: (1) relator’s 

investigation was unreasonably prolonged, (2) Tamburrino’s reply to the grievance 

was sent to Malchesky, (3) Tamburrino was punished for statements that were not 
January Term, 2016 

9

included in the complaint, and (4) the panel did not compel disclosure of certain 

materials requested in discovery. 

{¶ 21} The boundaries of due process for attorney disciplinary proceedings 

are different from those in civil or criminal proceedings. In re Judicial Campaign 

Complaint Against Carr, 76 Ohio St.3d 320, 322, 667 N.E.2d 956 (1996). A 

disciplinary respondent’s due-process rights have been adequately protected as 

long as the respondent has been “afforded a hearing, the right to issue subpoenas 

and depose witnesses, and an opportunity for preparation to explain the 

circumstances surrounding his actions.” Disciplinary Counsel v. Character, 129 

Ohio St.3d 60, 2011-Ohio-2902, 950 N.E.2d 177, ¶ 76. 

Investigative delay 

{¶ 22} Tamburrino also argues that relator’s investigation violated the time 

limit established in Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D). In order to dismiss a complaint for 

investigational delay, there must be a showing that the delay was unreasonable “and 

that the rights of the respondent to have a fair hearing have been violated.” Gov.Bar 

R. V(9)(D)(3). An investigation exceeding “one year from the date of filing” of the 

grievance is “prima facie evidence of unreasonable delay.” Id.

{¶ 23} The parties do not dispute that the grievance against Tamburrino was 

filed on October 28, 2014, that it was received by relator on October 30, 2014, and 

that relator’s investigation was completed on October 30, 2015. Gov.Bar R. 

V(9)(D)(3) states that the one-year limit starts on the date of filing; thus, relator’s 

investigation extended past the one-year limit and is prima facie evidence of an 

unreasonable delay. 

{¶ 24} Tamburrino has not, however, shown that he was prejudiced by the 

investigational delay. His only assertion of prejudice is that he might have been 

able to access information that might have been relevant if the investigation had 

been completed earlier. It is well settled that the mere possibility that evidence 

might have been lost does not establish prejudice from delay. United States v. 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

10 

Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 325-326, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30 L.Ed.2d 468 (1971). And 

Tamburrino’s suggestion that delay also provides prima facie evidence of prejudice 

is not a correct reading of the rule. Accordingly, the prejudice requirement of 

Gov.Bar R. V(9)(D)(3) was not met and the board did not err in declining to dismiss 

the complaint. 

Tamburrino’s reply sent to grievant 

{¶ 25} Tamburrino next argues that relator violated Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E) by 

sending his response to Malchesky despite Tamburrino’s written request to relator 

not to do so. As a general matter, releasing a respondent’s reply to the grievant is 

“encouraged and consistent with the liberal construction of this rule for the 

protection of the public.” Gov.Bar R. V(8)(E). But if a respondent requests in 

writing that the reply not be sent to the grievant, relator “shall not” do so. Id. 

Relator concedes error and asserts that it was unintentional. Again, though, 

Tamburrino does not establish that this error caused any actual prejudice to his 

proceedings. We therefore find it harmless. 

{¶ 26} Tamburrino notes that the original grievance identified only the 

expense-disclosure commercial, and he contends that the “strength of [his] initial 

response” inspired Judge Cannon’s campaign to find new bases for ethics 

complaints against him as a form of political retaliation. Tamburrino concludes 

that there would have been no charges regarding the teenage-drinking commercial 

but for Malchesky’s receipt of Tamburrino’s reply. There is no support in the 

record for Tamburrino’s accusation of political retaliation. In fact, the record shows 

that Tamburrino himself brought the teenage-drinking commercial to relator’s 

attention in Tamburrino’s reply. Relator had the authority to “investigate any 

matter filed with it or that comes to its attention and may file a complaint pursuant 

to this rule in cases where it finds probable cause to believe that misconduct has 

occurred.” (Emphasis added.) Gov.Bar R. V(9)(C)(1). Tamburrino has failed to 

establish any causal connection between relator’s inadvertent disclosure of 
January Term, 2016 

11 

Tamburrino’s reply to Malchesky and relator’s investigation of the teenagedrinking commercial. This argument is not well taken. 

Uncharged violations 

{¶ 27} Tamburrino also argues that the board violated his due-process rights 

by finding violations that were never charged. He notes that only one statement—

“Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is serious”—is mentioned in the complaint 

in support of the alleged violation of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) in connection with the 

teenage-drinking commercial. Yet the board determined that five additional 

statements made in the teenage-drinking commercial were false: two additional 

statements regarding Judge Cannon’s view that teenage drinking was not serious, 

two statements regarding police authority to enter a home and arrest an occupant, 

and one statement equating Judge Cannon’s statement of opinion with committing 

a crime. 

{¶ 28} The board is not necessarily limited to the allegations stated in the 

complaint “in finding violations based on all the evidence if the respondent has fair 

notice of the charged misconduct.” Gov.Bar R. V(10)(E)(1)(a). But regardless, the 

foregoing findings of fact by the board do not constitute findings of additional, 

uncharged violations. The board concluded from the teenage-drinking commercial 

that Tamburrino committed one violation of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) in connection with 

that commercial, as originally charged. Tamburrino’s third argument fails to 

identify any due-process infirmity. 

Undisclosed discovery 

{¶ 29} Finally, Tamburrino claims a due-process violation arising from a 

discovery ruling by the panel. During discovery, Tamburrino requested written 

communications between Judge Cannon and Malchesky. The parties contested 

whether those communications were protected by the attorney-client privilege and 

whether they would be relevant to Tamburrino’s disciplinary proceedings. Judge 

Cannon provided a privilege log, and the panel eventually conducted an in camera 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

12 

review of the materials. The panel determined that none of the undisclosed 

documents were relevant to the proceedings. As a result, it did not compel Judge 

Cannon to disclose them. Tamburrino did not object or request that the documents 

be preserved for review under seal at that point or later at the hearing. He did 

request two weeks after the hearing that the undisclosed documents be made part 

of the record, but under Gov.Bar R. V(12), evidence is to be presented at the 

hearing. We conclude that Tamburrino has waived this final procedural objection. 

{¶ 30} Considering the totality of the proceedings in this case, we do not 

find that Tamburrino’s due-process rights were inadequately protected as measured 

by the due-process standard of Character, 129 Ohio St.3d 60, 2011-Ohio-2902, 950 

N.E.2d 177, at ¶ 76. 

MISCONDUCT 

{¶ 31} With respect to the merits of the complaint, we first observe that 

when the teenage-drinking and expense-disclosure commercials were aired, 

Tamburrino was a judicial candidate who was obligated to comply with the Code 

of Judicial Conduct. Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 provides: 

During the course of any campaign for nomination or 

election to judicial office, a judicial candidate, by means of 

campaign materials, including sample ballots, advertisements on 

radio or television or in a newspaper or periodical, electronic 

communications, a public speech, press release, or otherwise, shall 

not knowingly or with reckless disregard do any of the following: 

(A) Post, publish, broadcast, transmit, circulate, or distribute 

information concerning the judicial candidate or an opponent, either 

knowing the information to be false or with a reckless disregard of 

whether or not it was false[.] 
January Term, 2016 

13 

(Italics sic.) And Jud.Cond.R. 4.2(A)(1) provides that “[a] judicial candidate shall 

be responsible for * * * [a]cting at all times in a manner consistent with the 

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary.” (Italics sic.) 

Count one—The teenage-drinking commercial

{¶ 32} Count one of the complaint focuses on the second of the two 

commercials that Tamburrino’s campaign aired during the final days of the 2014 

election. The commercial claimed that “[Judge] Cannon doesn’t think teenage 

drinking is serious.” In his second objection to the board’s recommendation, 

Tamburrino argues that the statement was true. 

{¶ 33} But Judge Cannon’s concurring opinion in Andrews, upon which 

Tamburrino relies, does not state that teenage drinking is not serious. Instead, 

Judge Cannon wrote that whether the offense occurring on a property is a 

misdemeanor or a felony is relevant in determining whether exigent circumstances 

exist to justify a warrantless search of the property. Andrews, 177 Ohio App.3d 

593, 895 N.E.2d 585, at ¶ 44 (Cannon, J., concurring). And the meaning of “exigent 

circumstances” provided by the majority opinion’s author and supplemented by 

Judge Cannon is confined to “ ‘only a few emergency conditions,’ ” id. at ¶ 23, 

quoting State v. Townsend, 11th Dist. Lake No. 98-L-036, 1999 WL 689934, *3 

(Aug. 27, 1999), in which there is a “ ‘ “compelling necessity for immediate 

action,” ’ ” id. at ¶ 43 (Cannon, J., concurring), quoting State v. Martin, 1st Dist. 

Hamilton No. C-040150, 2004-Ohio-6433, ¶ 19, quoting United States v. Adams, 

621 F.2d 41, 44 (1st Cir.1980). In other words, Judge Cannon indirectly stated that 

committing the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, by furnishing 

alcohol to minors, is not in itself an exigent circumstance, i.e., an emergency 

condition. Although he implied that teenage drinking is not an emergency situation 

that requires immediate action, he neither stated nor implied that it is not serious. 

Thus, the statement “Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is serious,” by itself, 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

14 

is false.1 Information would have to be added to make the statement true, and the 

commercial failed to do so. 

{¶ 34} Further evidence of the falsity of the statement “Cannon doesn’t 

think teenage drinking is serious” can be found in other language in Judge Cannon’s 

opinion. In particular, Judge Cannon wrote: “I recognize the great concern for the 

problems associated with contributing to inappropriate underage drinking,” id. at 

¶ 42 (Cannon, J., concurring), and “I emphasize that I do not wish to impede an 

officer’s duties to enforce the laws against underage drinking,” id. at ¶ 43 (Cannon, 

J., concurring). It is beyond question that judges are perennially charged with 

carefully balancing rights and duties that are in competition with one another, 

particularly the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals and the duties of police 

officers. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 299-300, 119 S.Ct. 1297, 

143 L.Ed.2d 408 (1999). The fact that a judge’s analysis may end with the scale 

tilting to one side does not mean that the judge viewed the other side as having no 

value. It is no more valid to conclude that a judge is biased against a particular 

party after ruling against that party. See In re Disqualification of Fuerst, 134 Ohio 

St.3d 1267, 2012-Ohio-6344, 984 N.E.2d 1079, ¶ 14 (“a judge’s adverse rulings, 

even erroneous ones, are not evidence of bias or prejudice”). By ignoring these 

obvious indicators that the statement “Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is 

serious” was untrue, Tamburrino was, at a minimum, reckless about the falsity of 

the statement. 

{¶ 35} Finally, after Tamburrino’s campaign began airing the teenagedrinking commercial, he was put on actual notice that the statement was false by 

 

1

 Contrary to the position taken by the dissent, a different result is not required by Winter, 834 F.3d 

681. The disciplinary count against Tamburrino concerning Cannon’s statement about teenage 

drinking does not involve the meaning of a specific word that may be readily capable of more than 

one definition. Instead, Cannon’s conditional statement was turned falsely into an absolute 

statement. For example, a statement that explains “the sky is green if you view it through yellowcolored glasses” would be falsely reported as “the speaker believes the sky is not blue.” 
January Term, 2016 

15 

Judge Cannon’s press release stating that it was false. But Tamburrino continued 

to allow the advertisement to appear on television. At that point, any question of 

recklessness was gone and certainly Tamburrino was broadcasting a statement that 

he knew to be false. 

{¶ 36} There was clear and convincing evidence to support the board’s 

conclusion that Tamburrino violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) and 4.2(A)(1) in 

connection with the teenage-drinking commercial. The teenage-drinking 

commercial contained a patently false statement about Judge Cannon, and 

Tamburrino acted knowingly or recklessly about its falsity. Furthermore, to use 

such false statements to denigrate a judge, particularly to denigrate a judge for 

conducting legal analysis, is conduct that is not consistent with the independence, 

integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 

Count two—The expense-disclosure commercial

{¶ 37} Count two of the complaint focuses on the commercial that 

Tamburrino aired a few weeks before the November 2014 election. The 

commercial claimed that “[Judge] Cannon won’t disclose his Taxpayer Funded 

Travel Expenses.” In his second objection to the board’s recommendation, 

Tamburrino argues that the statement was true. 

{¶ 38} The evidence presented at Tamburrino’s hearing showed that Judge 

Cannon has consistently disclosed his expenses to this very court and that no 

request for disclosure of the expenses was made to Judge Cannon. 

{¶ 39} Tamburrino argues from two angles that the statement is not false. 

First, he claims that by “disclose” he meant post the travel expenses as part of a 

detailed budget and expense summary of the entire Eleventh District Court of 

Appeals, including expenses funded by outside state agencies, on the appellate 

court’s website. As with the first count, the statement here that “Cannon won’t 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

16 

disclose his Taxpayer Funded Travel Expenses,” by itself, is false.2 An enormous 

amount of information would need to be added in order to make the statement true 

in the way that Tamburrino claims. The commercial did not provide that 

information. 

{¶ 40} Alternatively, Tamburrino argues that the statement is merely an 

opinion about what he thinks Judge Cannon would do in the future if he were asked 

to produce copies of his travel-expense documentation. Predicting that Judge 

Cannon would violate public-records laws by denying such a request is an 

inflammatory accusation. But for our purposes, nothing about the statement 

indicates that it is a prediction. The commercial listed the statement among other 

alleged facts about Judge Cannon, including his reversal rate at this court and the 

number of days a year that he sits for oral arguments. 

{¶ 41} Moreover, as with the first count, Tamburrino was put on actual 

notice that the statement was false when Judge Cannon’s campaign treasurer 

notified him in writing that it was false as well as when Judge Cannon publicly 

stated that it was false. And again, Tamburrino continued to allow the commercial 

to be run, at which point any question of recklessness was gone and it was certain 

that Tamburrino had broadcasted the statement knowing it to be false. 

{¶ 42} We hold that there was clear and convincing evidence to support the 

board’s conclusion that Tamburrino violated Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A) and 4.2(A)(1) in 

connection with the expense-disclosure commercial. The commercial contained a 

patently false statement about Judge Cannon, and Tamburrino acted knowingly or 

recklessly about its falsity. Furthermore, to use such false statements to insinuate 

 

2

 The dissent’s suggestion that “won’t disclose” is readily capable of being interpreted as “did not 

voluntarily post on a website” is quite a stretch. Given the context of a public official, the most 

readily understandable definition of “disclose” is to respond to a public-records request pursuant to 

R.C. 149.43. 
January Term, 2016 

17 

a judge’s violation of public-records laws is conduct that is not consistent with the 

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. 

SANCTION 

{¶ 43} When considering the appropriate sanction for Tamburrino’s 

violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct, we consider factors including the duties 

violated, the harm caused, Tamburrino’s mental state, other relevant aggravating 

and mitigating circumstances, and sanctions imposed in similar cases. Disciplinary 

Counsel v. Weithman, 143 Ohio St.3d 84, 2015-Ohio-482, 34 N.E.3d 865, ¶ 19; 

Gov.Bar R. V(13)(A). This list is not exhaustive, though, as we are permitted to 

consider “all relevant factors” in determining what sanction to impose. Gov.Bar R. 

V(13)(A). 

{¶ 44} O’Toole explains our purpose in determining and imposing 

sanctions against judicial candidates: 

 “[T]he primary purpose of disciplinary sanctions is not to 

punish the offender, but to protect the public.” Disciplinary Counsel 

v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 815 N.E.2d 286, 

¶ 53. 

We have also found that these sanctions serve as a deterrent 

to similar violations by judicial candidates in future elections. In re 

Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Brigner, 89 Ohio St.3d 1460, 

732 N.E.2d 994 (2000), citing In re Judicial Campaign Complaint 

Against Morris, 81 Ohio Misc.2d 64, 65, 675 N.E.2d 580 (1997). 

Perhaps particularly important here, we have recognized that 

sanctions inform the public of the self-regulating nature of the legal 

profession and enhance public confidence in the integrity of judicial 

proceedings. See, e.g., In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against 

Be[e]ry, 2009-Ohio-113. We believe that the public’s faith in the 
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18 

disciplinary proceedings against judges and judicial candidates is 

fostered by sanctions that reflect the unique injuries inflicted on the 

public by judges and judicial candidates who are not truthful in the 

information they disseminate. In re Judicial Campaign Complaint 

Against Per Due, 98 Ohio St.3d 1548, 2003-Ohio-2032, 787 N.E.2d 

10 (“The purpose of sanctions is to inform other judicial candidates 

of the seriousness of such violations and to deter future similar 

misconduct. A sanction that may result in effective deterrence best 

serves the public interest and the profession”). 

O’Toole, 141 Ohio St.3d 355, 2014-Ohio-4046, 24 N.E.3d 1114, at ¶ 63-64. 

Aggravating and mitigating factors

{¶ 45} In mitigation, the board agreed with the panel’s findings that 

Tamburrino had no prior disciplinary record and was cooperative during the 

proceedings. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(C)(1) and (4). As for aggravating factors, the 

panel found that Tamburrino committed multiple violations by airing two 

commercials on multiple occasions, that he timed them to deprive Judge Cannon of 

the opportunity to counter their effect, and that he expressed no remorse or regret 

for any of his actions. See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(4). The board additionally noted 

that Tamburrino failed to acknowledge that the commercials were inappropriate 

and that such misconduct would have a “chilling effect * * * on judicial 

independence * * * and the ability of a judge to freely express his or her views in 

court opinions.” See Gov.Bar R. V(13)(B)(7). 

{¶ 46} In his third objection to the board’s recommendation, Tamburrino 

disputes the aggravating factors found by the board and asserts that the board failed 

to consider his unblemished, 33-year record as a mitigating factor. As for the latter 

argument, the board did recognize his unblemished attorney record as a mitigating 

factor. But given that this was Tamburrino’s first time running for judicial office, 
January Term, 2016 

19 

he lacked any record in the more relevant arena of judicial conduct to use as 

mitigation. 

{¶ 47} Upon review of the record, we agree with the board’s findings 

regarding aggravating factors. Of particular note, we agree with the finding of a 

lack of remorse and disagree with Tamburrino’s contention that considering this 

factor punishes him for merely presenting a defense to the charges. The problem 

is not that Tamburrino denied the charges that he crossed the line into knowing 

falsehoods; it is that Tamburrino denied that he even came close to the line and 

attacked those who said otherwise. 

{¶ 48} After Judge Cannon denounced Tamburrino’s teenage-drinking 

commercial, Tamburrino accused Judge Cannon—as well as the author of the 

majority opinion in Andrews, Judge Mary Jane Trapp—of “mak[ing] up their own 

facts * * * to support the court’s opinion.” Tamburrino had never reviewed the 

record in Andrews yet insisted to the public that the two judges “ignore[d] sworn 

testimony or other facts, fabricate[d] facts, and then issue[d] a court opinion based 

on those fabricated facts to overrule a trial court judge’s decision.” He continued 

to accuse Judge Cannon of further misdeeds, stating that the judge “won’t post 

decisions like State v. Andrews on the [Eleventh District Court of Appeals’] web 

site for the public to view. What else is he hiding from them?” 

{¶ 49} Tamburrino also lodged attacks against the Ohio State Bar 

Association (“OSBA”) Board of Governors Government Relations Committee, 

which had issued a letter criticizing Tamburrino’s teenage-drinking commercial as 

being contrary to the OSBA’s Unjust Criticism of Judges protocol. Tamburrino 

accused the OSBA of being “nothing more than a Secret Society of Lobbyists in 

Columbus masquerading as lawyers supporting Cannon’s campaign on Halloween” 

and claimed that the OSBA’s action was “orchestrated in a smoke filled room in 

Columbus by supporters of Cannon’s campaign, and nothing else.” 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

20 

{¶ 50} Tamburrino continues to contend that he had every right to make the 

statements contained in his commercials and that they are true. His failure to 

acknowledge the inappropriateness of the commercials and his readiness to cast 

aspersions on critics soundly supports the board’s finding of lack of remorse. 

Lack of applicable precedent

{¶ 51} In the remainder of his third objection to the board’s 

recommendation, Tamburrino points out that no other judicial-campaign 

disciplinary proceeding has resulted in an actual suspension. Although he argues 

that he should receive no penalty at all, he alternatively argues that his sanction 

should not exceed any of the sanctions imposed in O’Toole, 141 Ohio St.3d 355, 

2014-Ohio-4046, 24 N.E.3d 1114 (public reprimand); Disciplinary Counsel v. 

Evans, 89 Ohio St.3d 497, 733 N.E.2d 609 (2000) (stayed six-month suspension); 

In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Hildebrandt, 82 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 675 

N.E.2d 889 (1997) (stayed six-month suspension); In re Complaint Against Harper, 

77 Ohio St.3d 211, 673 N.E.2d 1253 (1996) (public reprimand); In re Judicial 

Campaign Complaint Against Burick, 95 Ohio Misc.2d 1, 705 N.E.2d 422 (1999) 

(public reprimand); and In re Judicial Campaign Complaint Against Roberts, 81 

Ohio Misc.2d 59, 675 N.E.2d 84 (1996) (fine). None of the foregoing cases 

involved conduct as egregious as the conduct in this case, and thus they do not 

require us to reduce the sanction recommended by the board. 

{¶ 52} This case does not involve false statements to merely make 

Tamburrino appear as though he had better credentials or more endorsements. 

Thus, cases involving false or misleading information for purposes of selfaggrandizement do not provide guidance for an appropriate sanction in this case. 

See O’Toole (candidate falsely claimed to be a currently sitting judge); Evans 

(candidate misrepresented endorsements); Roberts (candidate implied that he was 

an incumbent judge and exaggerated endorsements). Here, Tamburrino used false 

statements to impugn the integrity of his opponent. 
January Term, 2016 

21 

{¶ 53} In Harper, the judicial candidate received a public reprimand for 

publishing an advertisement that insinuated that her opponent was receiving 

improper contributions from dishonest attorneys. In Hildebrandt, the judicial 

candidate was sanctioned with a stayed six-month suspension after publishing a 

true but misleadingly incomplete description of an opponent’s history of election 

wins and losses as well as a misleading interpretation of a second-hand report of 

the opponent’s voting record on the death penalty. As unseemly as the insinuations 

may have been in Harper and as misleading as the half-truths may have been in 

Hildebrandt, they do not rise to the level of the patent falsehoods in this case. Thus, 

the public reprimand issued in Harper and stayed suspension issued in Hildebrandt 

would not be adequate here. 

{¶ 54} In Burick, the judicial candidate received a public reprimand after 

she touted her pro-death penalty stance, referred to her opponent’s gubernatorial 

appointment to the bench as an appointment by “political bosses,” Burick, 95 Ohio 

Misc.2d at 5, 705 N.E.2d 422, and, most relevant to this case, allowed a survey to 

be conducted on her behalf that falsely represented facts of a recent criminal case 

over which her opponent had presided. The candidate’s campaign commissioned 

a political survey to be conducted by a third party and provided materials including 

her opponent’s sentencing order in the recent case. Id. at 13-14. The order imposed 

the maximum sentence after the defendant pled guilty to one count of sexual 

battery, but the survey described the defendant as a serial rapist who was sentenced 

to “only five years” in prison. Id. at 8. The candidate ultimately admitted that the 

statement was incorrect but pleaded ignorance due to lack of oversight of the 

survey. Id. at 13. 

{¶ 55} The circumstances in Burick do not reach the level of this case. 

Tamburrino’s multiple, separately broadcasted false statements regarding Cannon’s 

expense disclosures and views on teenage drinking were much more direct in their 

origins than the alleged oversight in Burick, and Tamburrino ultimately made no 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

22 

concession about their inaccuracy. They were also disseminated on a much larger 

scale—in television commercials—than to a limited audience of survey 

respondents. 

{¶ 56} The statement “Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is serious” is 

a false factual declaration that imputes Judge Cannon’s view about a particular 

offense that would certainly arise in future cases at the Eleventh District Court of 

Appeals. And the statement “Cannon won’t disclose his Taxpayer Funded Travel 

Expenses” necessarily implies that Cannon has violated public-records laws. 

{¶ 57} Tamburrino’s misconduct impugned the integrity of his opponent as 

a jurist and as a public servant. It endangered the independence of the judiciary 

and lessened the public’s understanding of public records and the protections of the 

Fourth Amendment. We agree with the board that an actual suspension is necessary 

in this case. 

CONCLUSION 

{¶ 58} Having considered Tamburrino’s violations, the applicable 

aggravating and mitigating factors, and the sanctions imposed in comparable cases, 

we adopt the board’s recommended sanction. Ronnie Michael Tamburrino is 

hereby suspended from the practice of law for one year, with the final six months 

stayed on the conditions that he commit no further misconduct and attend a sixhour CLE course regarding judicial campaigns. If Tamburrino fails to comply with 

either condition of the stay, the stay will be lifted and he will serve the entire oneyear suspension. Costs are taxed to Tamburrino. 

Judgment accordingly. 

O’CONNOR, C.J., and PFEIFER and O’NEILL, JJ., concur. 

O’DONNELL, J., concurs in judgment only. 

FRENCH, J., dissents, with an opinion joined by KENNEDY, J. 

_________________ 

 
January Term, 2016 

23 

FRENCH, J., dissenting. 

{¶ 59} The majority concludes that Tamburrino made two false campaign 

statements in violation of Jud.Cond.R. 4.3(A). I respectfully dissent. Although the 

statements are unquestionably distasteful, I would conclude that they are 

reasonably susceptible to truthful interpretations and, therefore, that relator, 

disciplinary counsel, failed to prove that they are false under the heightened 

standard the First Amendment requires. 

{¶ 60} We have recognized that the state has a compelling interest in 

preserving public confidence in the integrity of its judiciary and may regulate 

judicial elections differently than it regulates other political elections. See In re 

Judicial Campaign Against O’Toole, 141 Ohio St.3d 355, 2014-Ohio-4046, 24 

N.E.3d 1114, ¶ 22. But the political speech of a judicial candidate still commands 

the highest level of First Amendment protection as core political speech about the 

qualifications of candidates for public office. See Republican Party of Minnesota 

v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 774, 122 S.Ct. 2528, 153 L.E.2d 694 (2002) (applying strict 

scrutiny to state judicial-conduct rule prohibiting judicial candidates from 

announcing views on disputed legal or political issues). If the state chooses to elect 

its judges, “the First Amendment does not permit it to achieve its goal by leaving 

the principle of elections in place while preventing candidates from discussing what 

the elections are about.” Id. at 788. 

{¶ 61} The First Amendment protects even false statements to some degree. 

See United States v. Alvarez, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2545, 183 L.Ed.2d 574 

(2012) (plurality opinion). Certainly, “some false statements are inevitable if there 

is to be an open and vigorous expression of views in public and private 

conversation, expression the First Amendment seeks to guarantee.” Id. at 2544, 

citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 

686 (1964). To that expressive end, the state may not prohibit false speech unless 

it is a knowing or reckless falsehood. Alvarez at 2545, citing Sullivan at 280. And 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

24 

in order to survive strict scrutiny, the government must show why “counterspeech” 

would not achieve the same goal. Id. at 2549. 

{¶ 62} Because Jud.Cond.R. 4.3 purports to prohibit only false statements 

made knowingly or with a reckless disregard for falsity, I agree with the majority 

that the rule survives facial constitutional scrutiny. See majority opinion at ¶ 18, 

citing O’Toole at ¶ 26-29. By refusing to acknowledge, however, that 

Tamburrino’s statements were readily susceptible to a truthful interpretation, the 

majority’s application of the rule violates his free-speech rights. See Winter v. 

Wolnitzek, 834 F.3d 681, 693, (6th Cir.2016). 

{¶ 63} In Winter, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit 

evaluated the constitutionality of Kentucky’s canon of judicial conduct that, like 

Ohio’s Jud.Cond.R. 4.3, prohibits judicial candidates from making a false statement 

during a campaign, either knowingly or with reckless disregard for the truth of the 

statement. The court held that the rule was facially valid, but that the state’s 

application of the rule violated one candidate’s First Amendment rights because her 

statement asking voters to “re-elect” her was “readily capable of a true 

interpretation.” Winter at 693. The governor had originally appointed the 

candidate to a judicial seat; she had not been elected to it and therefore in that sense, 

could not seek re-election. But the term fairly could also mean “to elect for another 

term in office”—precisely what the candidate was seeking. Id. On these grounds, 

the court concluded that the state’s judicial-conduct rule, when applied to a 

statement “readily capable of a true interpretation * * * fails to give candidates the 

‘breathing space’ necessary to free debate.” Id., quoting Brown v. Hartlage, 456 

U.S. 45, 60-61, 102 S.Ct. 1523, 71 L.Ed.2d 732 (1982). 

{¶ 64} This court has similarly recognized that statements deserve 

protection if they are “reasonably susceptible of an innocent construction.” 

(Emphasis deleted.) McKimm v. Ohio Elections Comm., 89 Ohio St.3d 139, 146, 

729 N.E.2d 364 (2000). In other words, if we can give allegedly defamatory words 
January Term, 2016 

25 

two meanings—one defamatory and one innocent—then we have to reject the 

defamatory meaning and adopt the innocent one. Id., quoting Yeager v. Local 

Union 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., 6 Ohio St.3d 

369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983), abrogated on other grounds, Welling v. Weinfeld, 

113 Ohio St.3d 464, 2007-Ohio-2451, 866 N.E.2d 1051. And we make that 

judgment from the vantage point of a “reasonable” reader or listener. McKimm at 

143. 

{¶ 65} Here, the statements contained in counts one and two against 

Tamburrino are reasonably susceptible to truthful interpretations. Count one 

concerns Tamburrino’s statement that “Cannon doesn’t think teenage drinking is 

serious.” Considering the statement in the context of Judge Cannon’s concurring 

opinion in State v. Andrews, 177 Ohio App.3d 593, 2008-Ohio-3993, 895 N.E.2d 

585 (11th Dist.), a reasonable viewer of the advertisement could have interpreted 

the statement as, at least, having a basis in truth. Judge Cannon agreed with the 

majority opinion in Andrews that there was insufficient evidence of exigent 

circumstances to validate a warrantless search of a home in which a police officer 

observed underage drinking. Id. at ¶ 43 (Cannon, J., concurring). But Judge 

Cannon wrote separately to address the seriousness of the underlying offense of 

contributing to the delinquency of a minor and its relevance to determining whether 

the police may enter a home without a warrant: 

The majority opinion also indicates that there is no need to address 

the fact that the instant offense is a misdemeanor versus a felony, 

because there were no “exigent circumstances” to justify the 

intrusion. I, however, believe the fact that the instant offense is a 

misdemeanor charge is of particular importance, because it is a 

factor to consider in making the assessment of whether exigent 

circumstances exist. I would want nothing in this decision to deter 
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26 

an officer from exercising his duty if he clearly observes a serious 

misdemeanor offense or an offense of violence, or if he has other 

good cause to make an intrusion. 

(Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 44 (Cannon, J., concurring). 

{¶ 66} Judge Cannon’s opinion uses the word “serious” to make a 

distinction between a “misdemeanor charge” and “a serious misdemeanor offense 

or an offense of violence.” In Judge Cannon’s view, the misdemeanor charge in 

Andrews for contributing to the delinquency of a minor did not justify the 

warrantless entry, but a “serious misdemeanor offense” would provide sufficient 

justification. A reasonable reader could conclude that Judge Cannon did not 

consider the charged offense to be a “serious misdemeanor offense.” 

{¶ 67} Granted, Tamburrino’s teenage-drinking ad did not explain the full 

context of Judge Cannon’s opinion. However, a statement is not false “if, even 

though it is misleading and fails to disclose all relevant facts, the statement has 

some truth in it.” Serv. Emps. Internatl. Union Dist. 1199 v. Ohio Elections Comm., 

158 Ohio App.3d 769, 2004-Ohio 5662, 822 N.E.2d 424, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.), citing 

In re Pirko, 44 Ohio App.3d 3, 5, 540 N.E.2d 329 (10th Dist.1988). Accord Susan 

B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 779 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir.2015). The “gist or sting” 

of Tamburrino’s statement in the ad “appears to have at least some truth, to be 

substantially true, or to be subject to differing interpretations.” Id. 

{¶ 68} Count two concerns Tamburrino’s statement in his expensedisclosure ad that “Cannon won’t disclose his Taxpayer Funded Travel Expenses.” 

This statement too is reasonably susceptible to a truthful interpretation. Relator 

alleged that the statement is false because no one had asked Judge Cannon to 

disclose or produce his travel expenses. Tamburrino offered another interpretation: 

that Judge Cannon did not post his travel expenses on the website of the Eleventh 

District Court of Appeals, even though Tamburrino was campaigning on the issue 
January Term, 2016 

27 

of posting judges’ salaries and expenses on the court’s website. At some point, 

Judge Cannon arranged for the court to post a summary of its expenses on its 

website, but he did not post his travel-expense reports. When viewing 

Tamburrino’s expense-disclosure ad in this context, a reasonable viewer of the ad 

could have construed Tamburrino’s statement as true. The majority isolates the 

statement from the context of the campaign and concludes that “by itself” it is false 

because “[a]n enormous amount of information would need to be added in order to 

make the statement true in the way that Tamburrino claims.” Majority opinion at 

¶ 39. But once again, a statement reasonably susceptible to a truthful interpretation, 

even if fails to disclose all relevant factual context, is not false. 

{¶ 69} I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that Tamburrino acted 

with the requisite mens rea—i.e., that he made both statements with reckless 

disregard for their falsity. The majority concludes that Tamburrino “was put on 

actual notice” because Judge Cannon or his campaign representative had notified 

Tamburrino that the statements were false, and yet, Tamburrino continued to 

broadcast ads containing them. Majority opinion at ¶ 35. That is not recklessness—

it is political discourse. Relying on his own free-speech rights, Judge Cannon 

challenged his opponent’s campaign statements; Tamburrino responded by 

disagreeing with his opponent’s characterizations and standing by his statements. 

{¶ 70} To be clear, I dislike this type of political speech, particularly in a 

judicial campaign. I give no credence to Tamburrino’s statements about his 

opponent, and neither, apparently, did the voting public, who re-elected Judge 

Cannon in 2014. But we must protect speech even when—and, perhaps, especially 

when—we dislike it. See Alvarez, __ U.S. __, 132 S.Ct. at 2551, 183 L.Ed.2d 574. 

Even “ ‘vehement, caustic,’ ” and “ ‘unpleasantly sharp attacks’ ” leveled at 

candidates for public office enjoy “breathing space” under the First Amendment. 

McKimm, 89 Ohio St.3d at 147, 729 N.E.2d 364, quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270, 

84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686. When, as here, one candidate’s statement about his 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

28 

or her opponent involves core political speech susceptible to a truthful 

interpretation, the better course is to let the candidates themselves publicly debate 

the truthfulness of the statement, rather than attempting to act as a truth-declaring 

forum and penalizing candidates for the exercise of their free-speech rights. 

{¶ 71} For these reasons, I respectfully dissent and would dismiss the 

charges against Tamburrino. 

KENNEDY, J., concurs in the foregoing opinion. 

_________________ 

Scott J. Drexel, Disciplinary Counsel, and Joseph M. Caligiuri, Chief 

Assistant Disciplinary Counsel, for relator. 

Taft, Stettinius & Hollister, L.L.P., and Donald C. Brey, for respondent. 

_________________