UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4651

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

JESSE JAMES BALDWIN, JR.,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle 

District of North Carolina, at Greensboro. Thomas D. Schroeder, 

District Judge. (1:13-cr-00318-TDS-2)

Submitted: June 30, 2015 Decided: July 30, 2015

Before NIEMEYER and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior 

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Thomas H. Johnson, Jr., GRAY & JOHNSON, LLP, Greensboro, North 

Carolina, for Appellant. Ripley Rand, United States Attorney, 

Joanna G. McFadden, Assistant United States Attorney, 

Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee. 

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Jesse James Baldwin, Jr., pled guilty to conspiracy to pass 

counterfeit obligations and passing counterfeit obligations, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371, 472 (2012). Baldwin was 

sentenced to 28 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $48,800 

in restitution. On appeal, Baldwin argues that his sentence was 

unreasonable and that the court’s restitution order was not 

adequately supported by evidence. Our review reveals no 

reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm. 

I.

We review a sentence for reasonableness under a deferential 

abuse-of-discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 

38, 51 (2007); United States v. Rivera–Santana, 668 F.3d 95, 100 

(4th Cir. 2012). First, we ensure “that the district court 

committed no significant procedural error, such as failing to 

calculate (or improperly calculating) the [Sentencing]

Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing 

to consider the [18 U.S.C.] § 3553(a) [(2012)] factors, 

selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or 

failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence.” Gall, 552 

U.S. at 51. We review a preserved claim of sentencing error for 

abuse of discretion and, if error is found, will reverse unless 

we conclude that the error was harmless. United States v. Lynn, 

592 F.3d 572, 576 (4th Cir. 2010).
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If the sentence is free of “significant procedural error,” 

we review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, 

“tak[ing] into account the totality of the circumstances.” 

Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. We presume on appeal that any sentence 

within or below a properly calculated Guidelines range is 

reasonable. United States v. Louthian, 756 F.3d 295, 306 (4th 

Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 421 (2014). “A defendant can 

only rebut the presumption by demonstrating that the sentence is 

unreasonable when measured against the § 3553(a) factors.” 

United States v. Dowell, 771 F.3d 162, 176 (4th Cir. 2014)

(alteration omitted).

Baldwin argues that the district court procedurally erred 

by accepting the presentence report’s calculation of his 

criminal history points, which assessed Baldwin seven criminal 

history points for offenses he committed at age 16. We reject 

Baldwin’s argument, as the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual

§ 4A1.2(d)(2)(A) (2013) contemplates that juvenile offenses may, 

in certain circumstances, be taken into account when calculating 

criminal history points. Baldwin’s convictions meet these 

circumstances, and thus were appropriately assessed criminal 

history points. Id. 

Baldwin also argues that his within-Guidelines sentence was 

substantively unreasonable because his sentence was longer than 

those of his codefendants. We have reviewed the record and 
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conclude that, though Baldwin’s sentence was longer than the 

sentences imposed on his codefendants, Baldwin’s sentence was 

reasonable. He had a higher offense level than one codefendant 

and a greater criminal history category than the others. See 18 

U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6). Additionally, during sentencing, the 

court’s reasoning and reliance on factors found in § 3553(a) was 

thorough and Baldwin has not presented–nor does the record 

provide–any basis for finding that his within-Guidelines 

sentence was substantively unreasonable when compared with the 

§ 3553(a) factors.

II.

Baldwin next argues that his restitution order was not 

adequately supported by the evidence. We “review the district 

court’s restitution award for an abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Catone, 769 F.3d 866, 875 (4th Cir. 2014); see also

United States v. Grant, 715 F.3d 552, 557 (4th Cir. 2013) (“A 

district court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily or 

irrationally, fails to consider judicially recognized factors 

constraining its exercise of discretion, relies on erroneous 

factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.”). The 

district court issued Baldwin’s restitution order pursuant to 

the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (“MVRA”), 18 U.S.C. 

§§ 3663A-3664 (2012). The MVRA requires that a sentencing court 

order the defendant to make full restitution to victims of an 
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offense against property. § 3663A(a), (c)(1)(A)(ii); see also

United States v. Roper, 462 F.3d 336, 338 (4th Cir. 2006). When 

the underlying offense is a criminal scheme or conspiracy, 

restitution must be paid to “any person directly harmed by the 

defendant’s criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, 

conspiracy, or pattern,” § 3663A(a)(2); see United States v. 

Newsome, 322 F.3d 328, 341 (4th Cir. 2003).

Baldwin argues that his restitution order of $48,800 was 

not adequately supported by the evidence. We disagree. The 

presentence report, which was adopted by the district court,

served as the basis for the $48,800 figure. Although Baldwin 

may have desired a more thorough explanation, the court’s 

decision was based on the adopted factual findings, in 

accordance with the MVRA, and not irrational or erroneous. 

Thus, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its 

discretion in imposing restitution. Further, as to Baldwin’s 

arguments regarding the amount of his restitution order compared 

with his codefendants’, we lack the discretion to reduce 

Baldwin’s restitution order, as the MVRA dictates that the 

victims must receive full restitution.

We affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with 

oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
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adequately presented in the materials before this court and 

argument would not aid the decisional process. 

AFFIRMED