United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit 

Chicago, Illinois 60604 

Submitted May 19, 2021*

Decided May 19, 2021 

Before 

WILLIAM J. BAUER, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge 

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge

No. 20-2850 

KAREN WELIEVER, 

Plaintiff-Appellant, 

v. 

ANDREW M. SAUL, 

Commissioner of Social Security, 

 Defendant-Appellee.

 Appeal from the United States District 

Court for the Southern District of Indiana, 

Indianapolis Division. 

No. 1:19-cv-03960-JMS-DLP 

Jane Magnus-Stinson, 

Judge. 

O R D E R 

Karen Weliever, who was twice denied disability insurance benefits, appeals the 

district court’s decision to uphold both denials. She argues principally that the 

administrative law judge who rejected her initial application three years ago was biased, 

but as the district court correctly explained, Weliever waited too long to challenge that 

*

 We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs 

and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would 

not significantly aid the court. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C). 

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION 

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 
No. 20-2850 Page 2 

decision. Because Weliever raises no meaningful challenge to the denial of her second 

application, we affirm both aspects of the judgment. 

Weliever first applied for disability insurance benefits in 2014, alleging a 

disability onset date in 2009. After holding a hearing on the application, an ALJ ruled 

that Weliever was ineligible for benefits because, during the time of her alleged 

disability, she worked part time, traveled, and played golf. Weliever sought review of 

that decision from the Appeals Council, which denied her request in January 2016. The 

Council told Weliever that she had 65 days from the date of that notice to seek review in 

federal court. The deadline and three more years passed with no federal filing. 

In March 2016 Weliever submitted a second application for disability benefits. 

She alleged a new onset date, October 2014, after which she said she was incapable of 

working because of osteoporosis, bone spurs, fibromyalgia, and anxiety. A different ALJ 

presided over the claim and, after a hearing on this application, concluded that Weliever 

was not disabled. The Appeals Council again denied Weliever’s request for review. 

Within the time to challenge the second denial, Weliever filed this suit in 2019. 

She asked the district court to “reopen” her initial case and review the adverse ruling. 

She also appealed the second denial of benefits, contending that no substantial evidence 

supported that adverse finding. The district court ruled in favor of the Commissioner of 

Social Security in both respects. It first denied Weliever’s request to review her initial 

case, explaining that her 2019 civil action challenging the denial of benefits in 2016 was 

untimely, because she did not file the action within 65 days of the decision. As for the 

denial of Weliever’s second application, the district court concluded that substantial 

evidence supported the conclusion that Weliever was not disabled. 

On appeal, Weliever principally challenges the district court’s denial of her 

request that it review the ruling in her initial case, arguing that the presiding ALJ was 

biased against her. But Weliever does not question the reason that the district court gave 

for refusing to review the denial: Weliever had not timely challenged it. Although we 

liberally construe pro se filings, “an appellate brief that does not even try to engage the 

reasons the appellant lost has no prospect of success.” Klein v. O’Brien, 884 F.3d 754, 757 

(7th Cir. 2018) (emphasis in original). Such a brief runs afoul of Federal Rule of Appellate 

Procedure 28(a)(8), and we could dismiss her appeal on that basis. 

For the sake of completeness, and mindful of Weliever’s pro se status, we have 

independently examined the record and conclude that the district court’s decision is 
No. 20-2850 Page 3 

unassailable. Claimants like Weliever who seek judicial review of a final decision of the 

Commissioner ordinarily must sue within 65 days of the notice of that decision. 

See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (claimants must commence civil action within 60 days “after the 

mailing” of notice); 20 C.F.R. § 422.210(c) (presuming receipt of notice five days after the 

date of notice). This deadline may be extended for good cause. But Weliever waited 

more than three years to challenge the denial of her first application for benefits, and she 

does not argue that the time limit should be tolled. As a result, the Commissioner’s 

findings and decision are binding. 42 U.S.C. § 405(h); see also Bowen v. City of New York, 

476 U.S. 467, 479–80 (1986). In any case, Weliever bases her charge of bias on the ruling 

that the ALJ made against her, but “adverse rulings are not evidence of judicial bias.” 

Trask v. Rodriguez, 854 F.3d 941, 944 (7th Cir. 2017). 

Based on her complaint in the district court, Weliever challenged the decision to 

deny her second application for benefits. But on appeal her entire argument about the 

second denial consists of one unhelpful sentence—“I have nothing left to say.” We 

construe pro se filings liberally but, as stated above, Weliever must engage with the 

reasons that she lost on that aspect of her case. Klein, 884 F.3d at 757. She does not. 

Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.