THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

Mary Cromey, Appellant, 

v. 

South Carolina Department of Revenue, Respondent. 

Appellate Case No. 2018-001739 

Appeal From The Administrative Law Court 

Ralph King Anderson, III, Administrative Law Judge 

Opinion No. 5842 

Heard June 8, 2021 – Filed August 4, 2021 

AFFIRMED 

Joshua Madison Tyler Felder and Richard L. Few, Jr., 

both of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of 

Greenville, for Appellant. 

Nicole Martin Wooten, of Columbia, for Respondent. 

GEATHERS, J.: Appellant Mary Cromey (Taxpayer) challenges an order of the 

Administrative Law Court (ALC) upholding a determination by Respondent South 

Carolina Department of Revenue (the Department) that Taxpayer does not qualify 

as a surviving spouse of a disabled veteran for purposes of the property tax 
exemption set forth in section 12-37-220(B)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2014).1

 

We affirm. 

FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                                                            

1

 Section 12-37-220(B)(1) allows disabled military veterans or their surviving 

spouses to claim a property tax exemption for: 

(a) the house owned by an eligible owner in fee or 

jointly with a spouse; 

(b) the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse 

acquired from the deceased spouse and a house 

subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse. 

The qualified surviving spouse shall inform the 

Department of Revenue of the address of a subsequent 

house; 

. . . 

 (e) As used in this item: 

(i) "eligible owner" means: 

(A) a veteran of the armed forces of the United 

States who is permanently and totally disabled as 

a result of a service-connected disability and who 

files with the Department of Revenue a certificate 

signed by the county service officer certifying this 

disability; 

. . . 

(iii) "qualified surviving spouse" means the surviving 

spouse of an individual described in subsubitem 

(i) while remaining unmarried, who resides in the 

house, and who owns the house in fee or for life. 

. . . . 

(emphasis added). 
The parties agree that the facts in this case are undisputed. Therefore, we 

adopt the following recitation of facts from the order on appeal: 

[Taxpayer] is the surviving spouse of Lloyd D. 

Cromey (Mr. Cromey). In February 2004, the United 

States Veterans Administration (VA) deemed Mr. Cromey 

to be permanently and totally disabled. [Taxpayer] and 

Mr. Cromey lived in a jointly owned home in Owing 

Mills, Maryland, until his death in 2005. Mr. Cromey has 

never been a resident of South Carolina or owned real 

property in South Carolina. 

In 2010, several years after Mr. Cromey's death, 

[Taxpayer] moved to South Carolina and purchased real 

property located at 1551 Ben Sawyer Blvd., Unit 6B, 

Mount Pleasant, South Carolina. [Taxpayer] submitted an 

application to the Department for the disabled veteran 

property tax exemption as a surviving spouse on this 

property beginning with tax year 2011. The Department 

granted [Taxpayer]'s application.[2

] 

In 2016, [Taxpayer] sold the property located at 

1551 Ben Sawyer Blvd., Unit 6B, Mount Pleasant, South 

Carolina, and purchased a new property located at 1885 

Carolina Towne Court (Towne Court), Mount Pleasant, 

South Carolina. [Taxpayer] was, and is, the sole owner of 

Towne Court. Thereafter, on February 17, 2017, 

[Taxpayer] applied for the disabled veteran property tax 

exemption as a surviving [spouse] for Towne Court. The 

Department denied [Taxpayer's] application. [Taxpayer] 

has never remarried. 

(emphasis added). Taxpayer protested the Department's denial of the exemption, 

and the Department ultimately issued a final agency determination upholding the 

denial. Taxpayer then sought a contested case hearing before the ALC. The 

Department and Taxpayer filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the ALC 

granted summary judgment to the Department. This appeal followed. 

                                                            

2

 The Department now asserts that it made a mistake in granting this application. 
 

ISSUE ON APPEAL 

 

Did the ALC err by concluding that Taxpayer did not qualify as a surviving 

spouse of a disabled veteran for purposes of section 12-37-220(B)(1)? 

STANDARD OF REVIEW

 

The Administrative Procedures Act governs the standard of review on appeal 

from a decision of the ALC, allowing this court to 

reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the 

appellant have been prejudiced because the administrative 

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (a) in 

violation of constitutional or statutory provisions; (b) in 

excess of the statutory authority of the agency; (c) made 

upon unlawful procedure; (d) affected by other error of 

law; (e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, 

probative, and substantial evidence on the whole record; 

or (f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of 

discretion or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion. 

S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380(5) (Supp. 2020). 

Further, when a trial court grants summary judgment on a question of law, 

such as statutory interpretation, the appellate court must review the ruling de novo. 

Wright v. PRG Real Estate Mgmt., Inc., 426 S.C. 202, 212, 826 S.E.2d 285, 290 

(2019); see Lightner v. Hampton Hall Club, Inc., 419 S.C. 357, 363, 798 S.E.2d 555, 

558 (2017) ("An issue regarding statutory interpretation is a question of law." 

(quoting Univ. of S. Cal. v. Moran, 365 S.C. 270, 274, 617 S.E.2d 135, 137 (Ct. App. 

2005))). 

LAW/ANALYSIS 

Taxpayer argues that she qualifies as a surviving spouse of a disabled veteran 

for purposes of the property tax exemption set forth in section 12-37-220(B)(1) 

because the statute's plain language does not condition eligibility on first acquiring 

an exempt house from the deceased veteran. We disagree. 
"What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence 

of the legislative intent or will." S.C. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Boulware, 422 S.C. 1, 

8, 809 S.E.2d 223, 226 (2018) (quoting Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 

S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000)). "Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the 

expressed intent of the legislature." Id. (quoting Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d 

at 581). "Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the 

meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d 

at 581. "Where the statute's language is plain and unambiguous[] and conveys a 

clear and definite meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed and 

the court has no right to impose another meaning." Id.; see also State v. Johnson, 

396 S.C. 182, 188, 720 S.E.2d 516, 520 (Ct. App. 2011) ("In interpreting a statute, 

the court will give words their plain and ordinary meaning[] and will not resort to 

forced construction that would limit or expand the statute."). 

"Th[e appellate c]ourt looks beyond a statute's plain language only when 

applying the words literally would lead to a result so patently absurd that the General 

Assembly could not have intended it." Boulware, 422 S.C. at 8, 809 S.E.2d at 226. 

Although our supreme court has expressed a policy of strictly construing tax 

exemption statutes against the taxpayer, "[t]his rule of strict construction simply 

means that constitutional and statutory language will not be strained or liberally 

construed in the taxpayer's favor." CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 

67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011) (quoting Se. Kusan, Inc. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 

276 S.C. 487, 489, 280 S.E.2d 57, 58 (1981)). "It does not mean that [the appellate 

court] will search for an interpretation in [the Department]'s favor where the plain 

and unambiguous language leaves no room for construction." Id. at 74–75, 716 

S.E.2d at 881. 

Section 12-37-220(B)(1) allows disabled military veterans or their surviving 

spouses to claim a property tax exemption for: 

(a) the house owned by an eligible owner in fee or 

jointly with a spouse; 

(b) the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse 

acquired from the deceased spouse and a house 

subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving spouse. 

The qualified surviving spouse shall inform the 

Department of Revenue of the address of a subsequent 

house; 
. . . 

(e) As used in this item: 

(i) "eligible owner" means: 

(A) a veteran of the armed forces of the United 

States who is permanently and totally disabled as a 

result of a service-connected disability and who 

files with the Department of Revenue a certificate 

signed by the county service officer certifying this 

disability; 

. . . . 

(iii) "qualified surviving spouse" means the surviving 

spouse of an individual described in subsubitem (i) while 

remaining unmarried, who resides in the house, and who 

owns the house in fee or for life. . . . 

(iv) "house" means a dwelling and the lot on which it is 

situated classified in the hands of the current owner for 

property tax purposes pursuant to Section 12-43-220(c)[.3

] 

(emphases added). Therefore, a surviving spouse's eligibility for this exemption is 

derivative of the disabled veteran having been eligible for the exemption. Pursuant 

to the statute's clear terms, a disabled veteran's eligibility for the exemption requires 

his ownership of the house in question "in fee or jointly with a spouse" and his having 

filed with the Department "a certificate signed by the county service officer 

certifying [a service-connected] disability." § 12-37-220(B)(1)(e)(i). It is 

undisputed that Taxpayer's husband neither owned property in South Carolina nor 

filed the required certificate with the Department as he and Taxpayer resided in 

Maryland at the time of his death. Curiously, Taxpayer asserts the certification 

requirement does not apply to her because she is an "eligible surviving spouse" as 

set forth in item (1), subitem (b), and "there is no textual link . . . between an eligible 

surviving spouse and the certification requirement." 

                                                            

3

 This property is classified as an owner-occupied legal residence and is taxed at a 

rate of four percent of its fair market value. S.C. Code Ann. § 12-43-220(c)(1) 

(Supp. 2020). 
Subitem (b) identifies the property for which a surviving spouse may claim 

the exemption in the following manner: "the house owned by a qualified surviving 

spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an 

eligible surviving spouse." § 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) (emphasis added). The 

legislature's inclusion of the conjunction "and" rather than "or" indicates there was 

no intent to allow an alternative exemption for a surviving spouse who does not first 

acquire an exempt house from the disabled veteran. Likewise, the inclusion of the 

term "subsequently" indicates a relationship to the term "acquired" within the 

preceding phrase: "the house owned by a qualified surviving spouse acquired from 

the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving 

spouse." § 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) (emphases added). In other words, "subsequently 

acquired" means subsequent to the qualified surviving spouse's acquisition of an 

exempt house from the deceased veteran. Otherwise, the legislature would not have 

included the term "subsequently." See CFRE, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 

("[W]e must read the statute so 'that no word, clause, sentence, provision or part shall 

be rendered surplusage, or superfluous,' for '[t]he General Assembly obviously 

intended [the statute] to have some efficacy, or the legislature would not have 

enacted it into law.'" (citation omitted) (second and third alterations in original) 

(quoting State v. Sweat, 379 S.C. 367, 377, 382, 665 S.E.2d 645, 651, 654 (Ct. App. 

2008))). It logically follows that the entire phrase "and a house subsequently 

acquired by an eligible surviving spouse" relates back to the preceding phrase, 

conditioning eligibility for the exemption on first acquiring an exempt house from 

the deceased veteran. 

Despite the absence of a logically separate and symmetrical subitem 

expressing a third class of persons eligible for the exemption, Taxpayer essentially 

seeks to carve out a third class from subitem (b). Taxpayer asserts that the legislature 

intended "eligible surviving spouse" to mean merely a surviving spouse who remains 

unmarried. Taxpayer attempts to support this assertion with the argument that the 

term "subsequently" relates back to the veteran's death (meaning subsequent to the 

veteran's death) rather than the surviving spouse's acquisition of the veteran's exempt 

house and, thus, a surviving spouse who does not first acquire an exempt house from 

the deceased veteran is eligible for the exemption when she acquires a residence 

from another source. Taxpayer states: "Any house acquired by a surviving spouse 

after the death of the [veteran] would thus be a 'subsequently acquired' house 

qualifying for the [e]xemption under the third category." This is a strained 

interpretation of item (1) that takes its terms out of their critical context to reach a 

result the legislature did not intend. See Singletary v. S.C. Dep't of Educ., 316 S.C. 

153, 162, 447 S.E.2d 231, 236 (Ct. App. 1994) ("The intention of the legislature 
must be gleaned from the entire section and not simply clauses taken out of 

context."). The term "subsequently" is an adverb that modifies the past tense of the 

verb "acquire." Further, although the surviving spouse's acquisition of the deceased 

veteran's exempt house presumably occurs on the same date as the date of the 

veteran's death, the noun "death" does not appear as the event of reference for 

"subsequently" in subitem (b). 

Therefore, the legislature's use of the words "eligible surviving spouse" does 

not indicate a third class of persons who may claim the exemption. If the legislature 

had intended to create such a class, it would have added a separate subitem within 

item (1) setting forth the third class and a separate definition for "eligible surviving 

spouse" as it did for "qualified surviving spouse" and "eligible owner." Rather, the 

context in which the word "eligible" is used in subitem (b) indicates the word is to 

be understood in its plain sense, which is synonymous with "qualified"4

 and simply 

means eligible for the exemption. Accordingly, "eligible surviving spouse" is 

simply a reference to the qualified surviving spouse who has become eligible for the 

exemption on a subsequently acquired house after first acquiring the deceased 

veteran's exempt house. The connection between "the qualified surviving spouse" 

and "subsequent house" in the last sentence of subitem (b) confirms this plain 

reading of the statute: "The qualified surviving spouse shall inform the Department 

of Revenue of the address of a subsequent house[.]" § 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) 

(emphasis added); see Singletary, 316 S.C. at 162, 447 S.E.2d at 236 ("The intention 

of the legislature must be gleaned from the entire section and not simply clauses 

taken out of context."). Under Taxpayer's interpretation of subitem (b), the qualified 

surviving spouse would be required to inform the Department of the address of a 

subsequently acquired house but an "eligible surviving spouse" who does not meet 

the definition of qualified surviving spouse would not have to inform the 

Department. The legislature could not have intended this incongruous result. 

We view section 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) as unambiguous because the only 

reasonable interpretation of the statute is that of the ALC and the Department. Cf. 

S.C. Dep't of Nat. Res. v. Town of McClellanville, 345 S.C. 617, 623, 550 S.E.2d 

299, 302 (2001) ("A contract is ambiguous when the terms of the contract are 

reasonably susceptible of more than one interpretation." (emphasis added)). 

Nonetheless, even if the statute could be considered ambiguous, the interpretation of 

the ALC and the Department better harmonizes with the legislature's expressed 

                                                            

4 See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, Eligible, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/eligible (June 24, 2021) ("1a: qualified to participate or be 

chosen"). 
intent to require proof of a disability before allowing a tax exemption for it. See 

CFRE, 395 S.C. at 74, 716 S.E.2d at 881 ("We . . . should not concentrate on isolated 

phrases within the statute. Instead, we read the statute as a whole and in a manner 

consonant and in harmony with its purpose." (citation omitted)); see also S.C. 

Energy Users Comm. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 388 S.C. 486, 491, 697 S.E.2d 587, 

590 (2010) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate 

the intent of the legislature." (quoting Hardee v. McDowell, 381 S.C. 445, 453, 673 

S.E.2d 813, 817 (2009))); Boulware, 422 S.C. at 8, 809 S.E.2d at 226 ("What a 

legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the 

legislative intent or will." (quoting Hodges, 341 S.C. at 85, 533 S.E.2d at 581)). 

Taxpayer's interpretation allows an "eligible surviving spouse" to obtain the 

exemption even if the corresponding deceased veteran never provided the 

Department with proof of his disability during his lifetime. Yet, this same 

interpretation requires a living disabled veteran to submit such proof before he may 

obtain the exemption for himself under subitem (a). The legislature could not have 

intended this incongruous result, especially given the derivative nature of the 

exemption for surviving spouses. 

Further, we note the Department's representation that it has consistently 

interpreted and applied section 12-37-220(B)(1)(b) in the same way it has applied 

the statute to Taxpayer for her residence at 1885 Carolina Towne Court.5

 Therefore, 

this court may defer to this interpretation. See Kiawah Dev. Partners, II v. S.C. Dep't 

of Health & Envtl. Control, 411 S.C. 16, 32–33, 766 S.E.2d 707, 717 (2014) 

("Interpreting and applying statutes and regulations administered by an agency is a 

two-step process. First, a court must determine whether the language of a statute or 

regulation directly speaks to the issue. If so, the court must utilize the clear meaning 

of the statute or regulation. If the statute or regulation 'is silent or ambiguous with 

respect to the specific issue,' the court then must give deference to the agency's 

interpretation of the statute or regulation, assuming the interpretation is worthy of 

deference." (citations omitted) (quoting Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. 

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984))); id. at 34, 766 S.E.2d at 718 ("[W]e give 

deference to agencies both because they have been entrusted with administering their 

statutes and regulations and because they have unique skill and expertise in 

administering those statutes and regulations."); Brown v. S.C. Dep't of Health & 

Envtl. Control, 348 S.C. 507, 515, 560 S.E.2d 410, 414 (2002) ("[T]he construction 

of a statute by the agency charged with its administration will be accorded the most 

respectful consideration and will not be overruled absent compelling reasons." 

                                                            

5

 The Department asserts that it made a mistake in granting the exemption for the 

property located at 1551 Ben Sawyer Blvd. 
(quoting Dunton v. S.C. Bd. of Exam'rs in Optometry, 291 S.C. 221, 223, 353 S.E.2d 

132, 133 (1987))). 

Finally, Taxpayer asserts that the legislative history of section 12-37-

220(B)(1) supports her position. We disagree. Prior to 2004, item (1) identified the 

property for which a disabled military veteran could claim the exemption in the 

following manner: 

The dwelling house in which he resides and a lot not 

to exceed one acre of land owned in fee or for life, or 

jointly with a spouse, by a veteran who is one hundred 

percent permanently and totally disabled from a serviceconnected disability, if the veteran or qualifying surviving 

spouse files a certificate, signed by the county service 

officer, of the total and permanent disability with the 

Department of Revenue. The exemption is allowed the 

surviving spouse of the veteran and also is allowed to the 

surviving spouse of a serviceman or law enforcement 

officer as defined in Section 23-6-400(D)(1) killed in 

action in the line of duty who owned the lot and dwelling 

house in fee or for life, or jointly with his spouse, so long 

as the spouse does not remarry, resides in the dwelling, 

and obtains the fee or a life estate in the dwelling. A 

surviving spouse who disposes of the exempt dwelling and 

acquires another residence in this State for use as a 

dwelling house . . . may apply for and receive the 

exemption on the newly acquired dwelling, but a 

subsequent dwelling of a surviving spouse is not eligible 

for exemption pursuant to this item. The spouse shall 

inform the Department of Revenue of the change in 

address of the dwelling. To qualify for the exemption, the 

dwelling house must be the domicile of the person who 

qualifies for the exemption. 

Act No. 399, 2000 S.C Acts 3463 (emphasis added). The legislature amended item 

(1) in 2004 to read as it does today. See Act No. 224, 2004 S.C. Acts 2022. 

The plain meaning of the language in the 2000 Act (Act No. 399) simply 

allowed a qualified surviving spouse who chose to move to a new residence to claim 

an exemption for the newly acquired house after relinquishing ownership of the 
exempt house acquired from the deceased spouse. The language also expressly 

limited the exemption to the house acquired from the deceased spouse and one 

subsequently acquired house. If the qualified surviving spouse relinquished 

ownership of the second house and acquired a third house to live in, she could not 

claim an exemption for the third house or any other future residences. 

The plain language of the current version of the statute indicates that the 

legislature extended the exemption to all subsequently acquired residences by (1) 

substituting the phrase "a house subsequently acquired by an eligible surviving 

spouse" for the statement "A surviving spouse who disposes of the exempt dwelling 

and acquires another residence in this State for use as a dwelling house . . . may 

apply for and receive the exemption on the newly acquired dwelling" and (2) 

deleting the language limiting the exemption to the house acquired from the 

deceased spouse and one subsequently acquired house. 

We disagree with Taxpayer's intimation that the 2004 amendment created a 

third class of persons eligible for the exemption, i.e., "an eligible surviving spouse." 

The 2004 amendment simply retained the term "eligible" from the version enacted 

in 2000, which states, in pertinent part: 

A surviving spouse who disposes of the exempt dwelling 

and acquires another residence in this State for use as a 

dwelling house . . . may apply for and receive the 

exemption on the newly acquired dwelling, but a 

subsequent dwelling of a surviving spouse is not eligible

for exemption pursuant to this item. 

Act No. 399, 2000 S.C Acts 3463 (emphasis added). When the legislature expanded 

the exemption in 2004 to all subsequent dwellings, it connected their acquisition to 

a surviving spouse who had become eligible for that exemption after she first 

acquired the deceased veteran's exempt house, resulting in the current language 

found in section 12-37-220(B)(1)(b): "the house owned by a qualified surviving 

spouse acquired from the deceased spouse and a house subsequently acquired by an 

eligible surviving spouse." (emphases added). Therefore, this language did not 

create a third class of persons who may claim the exemption. 

Moreover, we note that the 2004 amendment deleted language allowing the 

surviving spouse to file the certificate verifying the veteran's service-connected 

disability with the Department so that the exemption is not allowed if the veteran 

himself did not file the certificate. This indicates the legislature's intent to ensure 
that the surviving spouse's ability to obtain the exemption is merely derivative. She 

may not obtain the exemption on a house she purchases after the disabled veteran's 

death unless she first acquired a previously exempt house from the deceased veteran. 

We also disagree with Taxpayer's contention that her interpretation is 

supported by the following language in the preamble to Act No. 224: "An Act . . . to 

continue the exemption to subsequent homesteads of surviving spouses and provide 

the requirements for this extended exemption . . . ." We view this language as 

simply expressing the legislature's intent to extend the exemption to all houses 

acquired by the qualified surviving spouse after she leaves the exempt house she 

acquired from the deceased veteran. Prior to Act No. 224, the exemption extended 

to only one subsequently acquired house. 

Based on the foregoing, the ALC correctly ruled that the Department was 

entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), SCRCP (providing that 

summary judgment shall be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to 

interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that 

there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 

to a judgment as a matter of law"). 

CONCLUSION 

 

Accordingly, the ALC's order is   

 

AFFIRMED. 

 

KONDUROS and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.