UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 15-4502

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

DEAN NELSON SEAGERS,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of 

South Carolina, at Charleston. Patrick Michael Duffy, Senior 

District Judge. (2:06-cr-00967-PMD-1)

Submitted: March 23, 2016 Decided: March 29, 2016

Before KING and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and DAVIS, Senior Circuit 

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston, 

South Carolina, for Appellant. Sean Kittrell, Assistant United 

States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Dean Nelson Seagers appeals the district court’s judgment 

revoking his term of supervised release and sentencing him to a 

term of 24 months’ imprisonment, to run concurrent with his 

state sentence. In accordance with Anders v. California, 386 

U.S. 738 (1967), Seagers’ counsel has filed a brief certifying 

that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Although 

informed of his right to file a pro se brief, Seagers has not 

done so. We affirm the district court’s judgment. 

“We review a district court’s ultimate decision to revoke a 

defendant’s supervised release for abuse of discretion.” United 

States v. Padgett, 788 F.3d 370, 373 (4th Cir. 2015). Here, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in revoking Seagers’ 

supervised release because the revocation was based on Seagers’

arrest and convictions for several state narcotic offenses. See

United States v. Spraglin, 418 F.3d 479, 480-81 (5th Cir. 2005) 

(per curiam) (relying on constitutional protections afforded a 

defendant at a criminal trial, including higher standard of 

proof for criminal conviction, to conclude that criminal 

conviction pending appeal satisfies preponderance standard for

finding supervised release violation).

Turning to the sentence imposed by the district court, 

“[w]e will affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the 

statutory maximum and is not plainly unreasonable.” United 
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States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). We first review the district court’s 

sentence for “significant procedural error.” Gall v. United

States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Next, we review the substantive 

reasonableness of the sentence, “examin[ing] the totality of the 

circumstances to see whether the sentencing court abused its 

discretion in concluding that the sentence it chose satisfied 

the standards set forth in § 3553(a),” United States v. GomezJimenez, 750 F.3d 370, 382 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks 

omitted), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 305 (2014), as applicable to 

a revocation of supervised release proceeding, see 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3583(e). When reviewing the substantive reasonableness of a 

revocation sentence, an appellate court may apply a presumption 

of reasonableness where the imposed term falls within the 

Sentencing Guidelines policy statement range. United States v. 

Aplicano-Oyuela, 792 F.3d 416, 425 (4th Cir. 2015). Finally, 

because Seagers did not object to the imposed term of 

imprisonment before the district court, our review is for plain 

error. Webb, 738 F.3d at 640-41. Our review of the record 

reveals neither a procedural error nor anything overcoming the 

applicable presumption of reasonableness that accompanies the 

district court’s imposition of a within-Guidelines sentence. 

In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire 

record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for 
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appeal. We therefore affirm the district court’s judgment. 

This court requires that counsel inform Seagers, in writing, of 

the right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for 

further review. If Seagers requests that a petition be filed, 

but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, 

then counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from 

representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof 

was served on Seagers.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED