Interim Decision #3228 

MATTER OF FRANKLIN 

In Deportation Proceedings 

A-40191863 

Decided by Board September 13, 1994 

A conviction for involuntary manslaughter pursuant to sections 562.016(4) and 

565.024(1) of the Missouri Revised. Statutes constitutes a crime involving moral 

turpitude within the meaning of section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Immigration and 

Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(i) (Stipp. V 1993), where Missouri law 

requires that the convicted person must have consciously disregarded a substantial and 

unjustifiable risk, and that such disregard constituted a gross deviation from the 

standard of care that a reasonable person would cAcrciss in the situation. Matter of 

Ghunaim, 15 1&N Dec. 269 (BIA 1975) Matter of Lopez, 13 1&N Dec. 725 (BIA 1971); 

Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I&N Dec. 264 (BIA 1965); and Matter of B-, 4 I&N Dec. 

493 (B1A 1951), modified. Matter of Szegedi, 10 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 1962), overruled. 

CHARGE: 

Order: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(a)(1)(D)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(D)(01—Conditional 

resident status terminated 

Lodged: Act of 1952—Sec. 241(aX2)(A)(i) [8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(2)(A)(81—Crime involving moral turpitude 

ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT; 

Henri J. Watson, Esquire 

Watson & Darneron 

2500 Holmes 

Kansas City, Missouri 64108-2743 

ON BEHALF OF SERVICE: 

Joseph R. Dierkes 

General Attorney 

BY: Dunne, Acting Chairman; Vacca and Heilman, Board Members; Holmes, 

Alternate Board Member 

The respondent has appealed from a decision of an immigration 

judge dated March 8, 1994, which found the respondent to be 

deportable as charged and ordered her deported to the Philippines. 

The appeal will be dismissed. 

The respondent is a 28 -year-old native and citizen of the Philippines. She was admitted to the United States as a lawful permanent 

resident on a conditional basis on December 15, 1987. On August 3, 

1992, the respondent was found guilty in the Circuit Court of Jackson 
Interim Decision #3228 

County, Missouri, of involuntary manslaughter, a class C felony, in 

violation of section 565.024 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. The 

respondent was sentenced to a 3-year term of imprisonment for this 

conviction. 

On May 21, 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 

issued an Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221), 

charging the respondent with deportability pursuant to section 

241(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.B.C. 

1251(a)(1)(D)(i) (Supp. V 1993), as an alien whose conditional 

permanent resident status has been terminated. On February 14, 1994, 

the Service lodged the additional charge that the respondent is 

deportable under section 241(a)(2)(A)(i) of the Act because she has 

been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude committed within 

5 years of entry. 

The immigration judge found the respondent to be deportable 

under both charges and ordered her deportation to the Philippines. 

While the respondent's appeal was pending, the Service advised the 

Board that it was withdrawing the charge of deportability under 

section 241(a)(1)(D)(i) of the Act. 

The sole issue on appeal is whether the respondent was properly 

found to be subject to deportation as an alien who has been convicted 

of a crime involving moral turpitude. The Service argues that the 

immigration judge's decision should be upheld, because he correctly 

concluded that the respondent is deportable from the United States as 

an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. 

The respondent maintains in her brief on appeal that convictions for 

involuntary manslaughter traditionally have not been considered to 

involve moral turpithde, and that the deportation proceedings against 

her should accordingly be terminated. 

Moral turpitude refers generally to conduct which is inherently base, 

vile, or depraved, and contrary to the accepted rules of morality and 

the duties owed between persons or to society in general. See Matter of 

Danesh, 19 I&N Dec. 669 (BIA 1988); Matter of Flores, 17 MN Dec. 

225, 227 (BIA 1980). Moral turpitude has been defined as an act which 

is per se morally reprehensible and intrinsically wrong, or malum in se, 

so it is the nature of the act itself and not the statutory prohibition of it 

which renders a crime one of moral turpitude. Matter of P-, 6 I&N 

Dec. 795 (BIA 1955). Among the tests to determine if a crime involves 

moral turpitude is whether the act is accompanied by a vicious motive 

or a corrupt mind. See Matter of Perez-Contreras, 20 I&N Dec. 615 

(BIA 1992); Matter of S'erna, 20 I&N Dec. 579 (BIA 1992); Matter of 

Short, 20 I&N Dec. 136 (BIA 1989); Matter of Flores, supra, at 227. 

We stated the following in Matter of Short, supra: "In determining 

whether a crime involves moral turpitude, ... [t]he statute under 

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Interim Decision #3228 

which the conviction occurred controls. If it defuses a crime in which 

turpitude necessarily inheres, then the conviction is for a crime 

involving moral turpitude for the purposes of the deportation statute." 

Id at 3. 

The record reflects that the respondent was convicted under section 

565.024(1) of the Missouri Revised Statutes, which provides as 

follows: "A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter if 

he ... [r]ecklessly causes the death of another person." Section 

562.016(4) of the Missouri Revised Statutes provides, in turn, that "[a] 

person 'acts recklessly' or is reckless when he consciously disregards a 

substantial and unjustifiable risk that circumstances exist or that a 

result will follow, and such disregard constitutes a gross deviation from 

the standard of care which a reasonable person would exercise in the 

situation." 

In Matter of Szegedi, 10 I&N Dec. 28 (BIA 1962), the Board held 

that a conviction for "homicide by reckless conduct" under Wisconsin 

law was not a crime involving moral turpitude. The Board observed 

that the statute under which the alien was convicted did not require "a 

specific intent to kill" and further stated that "voluntariness or intent 

to commit the act or some act must exist before we can find that the 

crime involves moral turpitude." Id at 34; see also Matter of GantusBobadilla, 13 I&N Dec. 777 (BIA 1971), modified, Matter of Wojtkow, 

18 I&N Dec. 111 (BIA 1981). 

In Matter of Medina, 15 I&N Dec. 611 (BIA 1976), affd sub nom. 

Medina-Luna v. INS, 547 F.2d 1171 (7th Cir. 1977), the Board 

revisited the issue of whether criminally reckless conduct constituted a 

crime involving moral turpitude. In Medina, the alien had been 

convicted of aggravated assault in violation of Illinois law_ Holding 

that the criminally reckless conduct defined by. the Illinois "recklessness" statute provided the basis for a finding of moral turpitude, 

the Board construed the statute as follows: 

The person acting recklessly must consciously disregard a substantial and unjustifiable risk, and such disregard must constitute a gross deviation from the standard of 

care which a reasonable person would exercise in the situation. This definition of 

recklessness requires an actual awareness of the risk created by the criminal violators 

action. While the Illinois recklessness statute may not require a specific intent to 

cause a particular harm, the violator must show a willingness to commit the act in 

disregard of the perceived risk. The presence or absence of a corrupt or vicious mind 

is not controlling. 

Id. at 613-14. 

Later, in Matter of Wojtkow, supra, the Board relied upon the 

holding in Medina to conclude that an alien's conviction for second 

degree manslaughter under the New York Penal Law constituted a 

crime involving moral turpitude. Quoting the New York statute, the 

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Interim Decision #3228 

Board noted that a person is guilty of second degree manslaughter in 

New York if 'he recklessly causes the death of another person.' 

Matter of Wojtkow, supra, at 112 n. I. The Board further observed that 

the definition of "recklessness" under New York law was the same as 

the definition under Illinois law that had been analyzed in Medina. Id. 

at 112-13. 

We most recently addressed the issue of criminal recklessness as it 

relates to moral turpitude in Matter of Perez -Contreras, supra. We 

concluded there that a conviction for third degree assault under 

Washington law, where the alien had caused injury to the victim "with 

criminal negligence," was not a crime involving moral turpitude. Id. at 

7. We emphasized that unlike Wojtkow and Medina, the alien's 

conviction in Perez-Contreras did not involve "the conscious disregard 

of a substantial and unjustifiable risk." Id. We thus concluded: "Since 

there was no intent required for conviction, nor any conscious 

disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk, we find no moral 

turpitude inherent in the statute." Id. 

Returning to the facts before us, we find that the respondent's case 

is controlled by our decisions in Wojtkow and Medina. The respondent 

was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, which, under MisSouri 

law, is defined as "Necklessly caus[ing] the death of another person.." 

See Matter of Wojtkow, supra, at 112 n. 1 . Moreover, Missouri's 

statutory definition of "recklessness" is essentially identical to the 

definitions which we construed in Wojtkow and Medina, i.e., a 

conscious disregard for a substantial and unjustifiable risk, where the 

disregard constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care which 

a reasonable person would employ. Accordingly, because the statute 

under which the respondent was convicted requires that she acted with 

a "conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk," the 

conclusion necessarily follows that she has been convicted of a crime 

involving moral turpitude. Matter of Perez-Contreras, supra, at 7; see 

also Matter of Wojtkow, supra; Mauer of Medina, supra. 

Finally, we note that the respondent relies heavily upon cases 'in 

which the Board stated generally that "voluntary manslaughter 

involves moral turpitude, although involuntary manslaughter does 

not." Matter of Lopez, 13 I&N Dec. 725, 726 (BIA 1971) (citation 

omitted); see also Matter of Ghunaim, 15 I&N Dec. 269, 270 (BIA 

1975); Matter of Sanchez-Marin, 11 I&N Dec. 264, 266 (BIA 1965); 

Matter of B-, 4 I&N Dec. 493, 496 (BIA 1951). These decisions all 

preceded our holdings in Wojtkow and Medina, where we reexamined 

the question of whether criminally reckless behavior involved moral 

turpitude. Upon reviewing the statute under consideration in the 

present-case, we find that a "black-letter" holding that convictions for 

involuntary manslaughter do not constitute crimes involving moral 

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Interim Decision #3228 

turpitude is not workable. In view of the myriad state classifications 

for manslaughter convictions, one must analyze the specific statute 

under which the alien was convicted on a case-by-case basis in order to 

determine whether the conviction is for a crime involving moral 

turpitude. Accordingly, the precedent decisions cited above which 

contain the categorical statement that involuntary manslaughter is not 

a crime involving moral turpitude are hereby modified. The Board's 

decision in Matter of Szegedi, supra, at 34, holding that a conviction 

for "homicide by reckless conduct" was not a crime involving moral 

turpitude because the conviction did not require "a specific intent to 

kill," is hereby overruled. 

The respondent's deportability as an alien convicted of a crime 

involving moral turpitude which was committed within 5 years of 

entry has been established by clear, unequivocal, and convincing 

evidence. Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276 (1966). The respondent's 

appeal from the decision of the immigration judge ordering her 

deportation to the Philippines will accordingly be dismissed. 

ORDER: The appeal is dismissed. 

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