United States Court of Appeals 

for the Fifth Circuit 

No. 21-51208 

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Clarence Edward Roper, 

Defendant—Appellant. 

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Western District of Texas 

USDC No. 7:21-CR-65-1 

Before Higginbotham, Jones, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:

 Clarence Edward Roper was convicted after a bench trial of possession 

of a firearm by a felon. In this appeal, Roper contends that the district court 

erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence. We AFFIRM. 

United States Court of Appeals 

Fifth Circuit 

FILED 

March 28, 2023 

Lyle W. Cayce 

Clerk 

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I. 

“When reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we review 

questions of law de novo and findings of fact for clear error.”1

 “Factual 

findings are clearly erroneous only if a review of the record leaves this Court 

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”2

Determining “[w]hether there is sufficient evidence to support reasonable 

suspicion[,]” at issue in this case, is a question of law reviewed de novo.3

 

“Demonstrating reasonable suspicion is the Government’s burden.”4

Where, as occurred here, “a district court’s denial of a suppression motion 

is based on live oral testimony, the clearly erroneous standard is particularly 

strong because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the 

witnesses.”5

 Moreover, “[e]vidence is viewed in the light most favorable to 

the party that prevailed in the district court—in this case, the Government.”6

Ultimately, “[a] district court’s ruling to deny a suppression motion should 

be upheld ‘if there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.’”7

1 United States v. McKinney, 980 F.3d 485, 491 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing United States 

v. Bolden, 508 F.3d 204, 205 (5th Cir. 2007)). 

2 United States v. Hearn, 563 F.3d 95, 101 (5th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks 

and citation omitted). 

3 McKinney, 980 F.3d at 491 (citing United States v. Monsivais, 848 F.3d 353, 357 

(5th Cir. 2017)). 

4 Id. (citing United States v. Hill, 752 F.3d 1029, 1033 (5th Cir. 2014)). 

5 United States v. Nelson, 990 F.3d 947, 953 (5th Cir.) (citing United States v. Gibbs, 

421 F.3d 352, 357 (5th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 490 (2021). 

6 Id. at 952 (citing United States v. Rodriguez, 702 F.3d 206, 208 (5th Cir. 2012)). 

7 Id. (citing United States v. Massi, 761 F.3d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 2014)). 

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II. 

At approximately 12:30 a.m. on February 21, 2021, a Midland resident 

called the Midland Police Department (“MPD”) to report an individual entering her backyard.8

 MPD Officer Kienan Goodnight responded to the call 

and took photos of the resident’s security camera footage that recorded the 

alleged prowler. Shortly after the call, MPD Sergeant William Welch was 

driving in the area and noticed a then-unidentified individual near the fenceline of a corner lot. The individual dipped his shoulders as if trying to hide 

from Welch. 

Welch stopped his police cruiser at the entrance to the alley and exited 

the vehicle, prompting the then-unidentified individual to begin walking 

towards Welch with his hands raised. The individual stated without 

prompting that “[t]wo Mexican dudes” “in a black truck [were] chasing 

[him].” Welch then directed the individual to place his hands on the police 

cruiser and to identify himself, which he did: Clarence Edward Roper. Welch 

told Roper that he was going to pat him down for weapons and did so while 

asking Roper additional questions. 

Approximately two minutes into this stop, as Welch continued to 

speak with Roper, Goodnight arrived and showed Welch the picture of the 

prowler he had obtained from the resident’s security footage. The 

photograph showed an individual who, like Roper, was a Black male with a 

mustache and earring stud; however, the photographed prowler appeared 

substantially younger and was wearing clothing nothing like what Roper 

donned. Welch nevertheless proceeded to ask why Roper was “in some 

lady’s back yard”; Roper did not deny the implied accusation but instead 

8

 This individual is referred to as a “prowler” in the Parties’ submissions. We 

adopt this here for consistency and clarity. 

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responded, “I was jumping fences, that’s why.” Welch speculated that the 

prowler’s jacket in the photograph was a different color because the image 

was taken from a security-camera in night vision mode and had been captured 

in black and white. Roper then stated that the man in the photograph was the 

one who was chasing him. After radioing in Roper’s identifying information, 

Welch walked along the fence line by which Roper was originally hiding and 

discovered a firearm on the ground. Upon this discovery, Welch promptly 

placed Roper in handcuffs, explained why he was doing so, and read Roper 

his rights. Roper protested that the gun was not his. 

Following a hearing to suppress the gun, the district court 

“conclude[d] that it was not reasonable to think that [Roper] was the prowler 

shown on the security footage.” Nonetheless, the district court denied 

Roper’s motion: 

[T]here was reasonable suspicion to continue Defendant’s 

detention after Officer Goodnight arrived with a photograph of 

the prowler. Sergeant Welch observed [Roper] hiding in the 

alley at approximately one o’clock in the morning, saw him 

come forward in a manner potentially consistent with hiding 

contraband, and [Roper] recited a story about being chased that 

was inconsistent with his physical appearance and demeanor. 

Additionally, [Roper] admitted to “jumping fences.” These 

are specific and articulable facts that support reasonable 

suspicion that criminal activity was afoot. Shortly thereafter, 

Sergeant Welch discovered the pistol at the place in the alley 

where [Roper] was hiding. 

The district court subsequently held a brief bench trial wherein Judge 

Counts convicted Roper and later sentenced him to a 105-month term of imprisonment and a subsequent three-year term of supervised release. Roper 

filed timely notice of his appeal. 

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III. 

The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 

seizures.9

 Pursuant thereto, “[w]arrantless searches and seizures are 

presumptively unreasonable, subject to certain exceptions.”10 The Supreme 

Court carved out such an exception in Terry v. Ohio, which held that “limited 

searches and seizures are not unreasonable when there is a reasonable and 

articulable suspicion that a person has committed a crime.”11 This Court 

“employ[s] a two-part test to determine whether there was ‘reasonable 

suspicion’”: first, “whether the officer’s action was justified at its 

inception,” and, second, “whether the officer’s subsequent actions were 

reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the stop.’”12 

Broadly speaking, the Supreme Court has “deliberately avoided 

reducing” the “somewhat abstract” concept of reasonable suspicion “to a 

neat set of legal rules.”13 Some principles nevertheless guide this inquiry. For 

example, reasonable suspicion need not be found solely on one fact: “factors 

which by themselves may appear innocent, may in the aggregate rise to the 

level of reasonable suspicion.”14 As the Supreme Court noted, “Terry itself 

9

 U.S. CONST. amend IV. 

10 McKinney, 980 F.3d at 490 (citing Hill, 752 F.3d at 1033). 

11 United States v. Santiago, 310 F.3d 336, 340 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 

392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)). 

12 United States v. Jenson, 462 F.3d 399, 404 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States 

v. Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc)). 

13 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274 (2002) (internal quotation marks and 

citations omitted). 

14 United States v. Ibarra-Sanchez, 199 F.3d 753, 759 (5th Cir. 1999). 

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involved a series of acts, each of them perhaps innocent if viewed separately, 

but which taken together warranted further investigation.”15 Accordingly, 

[courts] must look at the “totality of the circumstances” of 

each case to see whether the detaining officer has a 

“particularized and objective basis” for suspecting legal 

wrongdoing. This process allows officers to draw on their own 

experience and specialized training to make inferences from 

and deductions about the cumulative information available to 

them that “might well elude an untrained person.”16 

Additionally, while reasonable suspicion exists if the officer “can 

point to specific and articulable facts” supporting a reasonable belief “that a 

particular person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a 

crime,”17 Terry does not require officers to have a “particularized suspicion 

of a particular, specific crime.”18 Finally, “[i]f the officer develops reasonable 

suspicion of additional criminal activity during his investigation of the 

circumstances that originally caused the stop, he may further detain its 

occupant[] for a reasonable time while appropriately attempting to dispel this 

reasonable suspicion.”19 “Detention, however, may last no longer than 

15 United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9–10 (1989) (internal quotation marks and 

citation omitted). 

16 Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 273 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417–18 

(1981)). 

17 Monsivais, 848 F.3d at 357 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 

18 United States v. Pack, 622 F.3d 383, 383 (5th Cir. 2010). 

19 United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 350 (5th Cir. 2010), opinion modified on 

unrelated grounds on denial of reh’g, 622 F.3d 383. 

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required to effect the purpose of the stop.”20 Simply put, Welch had a 

reasonable suspicion that Roper was engaged in criminal activity in the alley. 

Three factors support this conclusion. First, Roper’s location and 

timing provide a strong foundation for finding reasonable suspicion. While 

one’s “presence in an area of expected criminal activity, standing alone, is not 

enough to support a reasonable, particularized suspicion that the person is 

committing a crime,” the “relevant characteristics of a location” can 

contribute to a finding of reasonable suspicion,21 and the timing of one’s 

movements are a “permissible consideration” in reasonable suspicion 

analysis,22 including holding that a defendant’s “specific moves” gave rise to 

reasonable suspicion where they took place “at night, in a high crime area.”23

That Roper was discovered hiding after midnight near the location of a crime 

supports a finding of reasonable suspicion. 

Second, Roper’s emergence and subsequent actions similarly give rise 

to reasonable suspicion. As Welch approached, Roper emerged from a 

secreted location and offered information without being asked. Welch 

testified that Roper’s actions “walking out of the alley as [he] approached” 

contributed to his suspicion because “it was possible that [Roper] had 

20 Jenson, 462 F.3d at 404 (citing United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420, 430 

(5th Cir. 2005)). 

21 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124, 126 (2000) (emphasis added); see also

United States v. Jaquez, 421 F.3d 338, 340–41 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that, where the only 

facts to justify a stop of a red vehicle was that a red vehicle was involved in a crime fifteen 

minutes ago, the police officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the car); cf. Adams v. 

Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 144, 147–48 (1972) (noting, notwithstanding this rule, that where a 

Terry stop occurred—including in a “high crime area”—was a relevant contextual 

consideration). 

22 See United States v. Villalobos, 161 F.3d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. 

Lujan-Miranda, 535 F.2d 327, 329 (5th Cir. 1976). 

23 United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc). 

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abandoned something – whether it be drugs, some type of contraband – in the 

alley and was distancing himself from that.” Although in another context, 

this Court has previously found reasonable suspicion from efforts to distance 

oneself from contraband.24 We apply the same consideration and credit here. 

Third, Roper’s inconsistent and nonsensical answers to Welch’s 

questions gave rise to reasonable suspicion. A detainee’s inconsistent and 

implausible explanations are pertinent to whether an officer has a reasonable 

suspicion to elongate a stop.25 Roper stated that two individuals were 

“chasing” him, but Roper “didn’t appear to be out of breath like he had been 

running,” nor did he “appear to be sweating or anything like” as if “he was 

running from someone.”26 And when Welch asked if Roper “kn[e]w these 

people that [we]re chasing you,” Roper responded affirmatively, but when 

Welch asked for their names, Roper said only “[t]hey are Mexican, man, but 

I[] can’t pronounce their names.” These statements, when viewed in concert 

with Roper’s timing and location, are themselves “specific and articulable 

facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, 

reasonably warrant that intrusion.”27, 28

24 See United States v. Figueroa, No. 93-2664, 1994 WL 574186, at *2 (5th Cir. Oct. 

4, 1994) (unpublished) (per curiam) (finding reasonable suspicion in part because the 

officer testified that the trafficker had checked his luggage in a fashion “typical of drug 

traffickers who wish to distance themselves from their contraband and begin traveling as 

soon as possible”). 

25 See United States v. Cavitt, 550 F.3d 430, 437 (5th Cir. 2008); Pack, 612 F.3d at 

360–61. 

26 The body camera footage confirms this perception. 

27 Terry, 392 U.S. at 21. 

28 Two additional facts about the discussion, while not vital, are relevant. First, 

Roper said that he was trying to go to the police station, yet upon the police’s arrival, he 

expressed no appreciation for their aid, nor did he request protection or a ride to the station. 

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Accepting the district court’s conclusion that it was unreasonable for 

Welch to believe Roper was the prowler based on the photograph does not 

end the inquiry. Even if Welch and Goodnight came to this realization in the 

moment, Roper’s furtive actions and inconsistent, implausible statements 

remained unresolved. When Welch effectively said to Roper that he was 

caught on camera trespassing, Roper did not contest the accusation, but 

responded in such a way that created additional suspicion for two reasons: 1) 

Roper admitted that he was engaging in suspicious activity by “jumping 

fences” after midnight; and, 2) Roper claimed the photographed man “was 

the person that was chasing [him]”—singular—despite initially claiming that 

two individuals—plural—were chasing him. In sum, even if Welch and 

Goodnight realized in the course of the seizure that Roper was not the 

individual in the photograph, there remained numerous articulable and 

suspicious facts supporting a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing sufficient 

to extend the seizure, namely Roper’s actions and statements before the 

photograph’s arrival as well as his suspicious answers in response to 

questions generated by the picture itself. The district court did not err in 

denying Roper’s motion. 

* * * * 

We AFFIRM. 

Second, Roper volunteered without prompting that he was on probation for aggravated 

assault. 

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