UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

________________ _________________ STEPHEN PLATO MCRAE, Plaintiff - Appellant,

v. MICHAEL CARVAJAL, in his official capacity as the Federa l Bureau of Prisons Director; C. CARTER, Warden of F.C.I. Florence; HOLZAPFEL, Assistant Warden; GICONI, Captain, in their official capacities, Respondents - Appellees. No. 21-1261 (D.C. No. 1:20-CV -01908-CMA-SKC) (D. Colo.)

________________ _________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

________________ _________________ Before HOLMES , Chief Judge, KELLY , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.

________________ _________________ Stephen Plato McRae filed th is case in the United Stat es District Court for the District of Colorado while confined at the Federal Correctional Institution in Florence, Colorado (FCI Florence). He argued that FCI Florence did not do enough to protect him from COVID-19. The district court denied relief. After the district

* After examining the briefs and appella te record, this pa nel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not ma terially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctr ines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cite d, however, for its persuasi ve value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. FILED United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### October 4, 2022 Christopher M. Wolpert Clerk of Court Appellate Case: 21-1261 Document: 010110748503 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 12 court’s ruling the Bureau of Prisons tran sferred Mr. McRae from FCI Florence to a different facility. Becaus e the transfer mo ots this appeal, we dismiss it. Background In a document styled a petition for a wr it of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, Mr. McRae challenged FCI Florence’ s response to the COVID-19 pandemic. He sought various forms of injunctive relief: increased COVID-19 precautions, release from confinement, or transfer to a nother facility. The di strict court denied relief under § 2241 because Mr. McRae challenged not the legality of his confinement but instead the cond itions of his confinement. See Palma-Salazar v.
Davis , 677 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2012) (recognizing that “a prisoner who challenges the conditions of his confinement must do so through a civil rights action” rather than through habeas pr oceedings). And the court fu rther declined to allow the case to proceed as a civil-ri ghts lawsuit. Mr. McRae now seeks to vacate the district court’s order and to be granted leave to f ile an amended complain t “to reflect current circumstances.” Aplt. Opening Br . at 4. He represents hi mself, so we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon , 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). After Mr. McRae filed this appeal, the Bureau of Pr isons transferred him out of FCI Florence. The transfer followed an investigation that concluded Mr. McRae posed a safety or security risk at FC I Florence because he had stalked his unit manager. Arguing that Mr. McRae’s tran sfer moots this app eal, Respondents move to dismiss it. Appellate Case: 21-1261 Document: 010110748503 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 23 Discussion We must first address mootness “becau se the existence of a live case or controversy is a constituti onal prerequisite to fede ral court jurisdiction.” Ind v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr. , 801 F.3d 1209, 1213 (10th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). To decide if a case is moot , we ask “whether granting a present determination of the issues offered will have some effect in the r eal world. When it becomes impossible for a court to grant effective relief, a live controversy ceases to exist, and the case becomes moot.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, a case is “moot when a plaintiff no longer suffers actual injury that can be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). A live controversy no longer exists in th is case. Mr. McRae sought injunctive relief to remedy the conditions of his confinement at FCI Florence. Because he is no longer confined at that faci lity, any changes to the cond itions there will not affect him. Thus, this appeal is moot. See Jordan v. Sosa , 654 F.3d 1012, 1027 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Where the prisoner’s cl aims for declaratory or inj unctive relief relate solely to the conditions of confinement at the pe nal institution at which the prisoner is no longer incarcerated, courts have conclude d that they are unable to provide the prisoner with effective relief.”). Although Mr. McRae does not dispute that a judicial decision can no longer address his claimed injuries, he alleges th at the Bureau of Prisons and counsel for Respondents fabricated “a hei nous act” so that we would di smiss this appeal. Resp. Appellate Case: 21-1261 Document: 010110748503 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 34 to Mot. to Dismiss at 1. We construe this response as an argum ent that we should apply the voluntary-cessation exception to mootness and not dismiss this appeal. A claim is generally not rendered moot when a defendant voluntarily ceases a challenged practice but remains fre e to resume it at any time. Ind , 801 F.3d at 1214. This mootness exception prevents a de fendant from ceasing illegal conduct long enough to moot a lawsuit only to resume the conduct once the lawsuit has been dismissed. See id. Nevertheless, voluntary cessation may moot a case if two co nditions exist: “(1) it can be said with assurance that there is no r easonable expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and (2) interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effect s of the alleged violation.” Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Bureau of Reclamation , 601 F.3d 1096, 1115 ( 10th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). It must be “clear that the defendant has not changed course simply to deprive th e court of jurisdiction.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The party asserting mootness bears the heavy burden of persuading the court that the challenged conduct cannot reas onably be expected to start up again.” Id. at 1116 (brackets and intern al quotation marks omitted). Respondents have submitted a declaration from a Deputy Case Management Coordinator at the Bureau of Prisons. The declaration explains the reason for Mr. McRae’s transfer; asserts th at Mr. McRae is not eligible for transfer back to FCI Florence so long as his former unit manager st ill works there; and asserts that , to the declarant’s knowledge, the Bureau of Pris ons has no plans to transfer Mr. McRae’s Appellate Case: 21-1261 Document: 010110748503 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 45 former unit manager to another facility be fore Mr. McRae comple tes his sentence. Moreover, Mr. McRae very recently completed his term of incarceration. 1 In these circumstances, one cannot reas onably expect Mr. McRae to return to FCI Florence. In sum, this appeal is moot, and the voluntary-cessation exception does not save it from dismissal. 2 We also note that an am endment to the complaint to “reflect current circumstances,” Aplt. Open ing Br. at 4, could not affect mootness.
Conclusion We grant Respondents’ motion to dismis s. We deny all other pending motions and dismiss this appeal.

Entered for the Court

Harris L Hartz Circuit Judge

1 According to the Bureau of Prisons inmate lo cator, Mr. McRae was released September 23, 2022. https://www.bop.gov /inmateloc/ (last visited September 26, 2022).

2 In his opening brief, Mr. McRae “vehem ently opposes the continuation of the proceedings” until he is allo wed access to various legal ma terials. Aplt. Opening Br. at 6. But in light of moot ness, he could not have been harmed by drafting his merits brief without additional resources. He al so complains that the Bureau of Prisons refused to give him postage fo r legal mail. Yet he has fi led an opening br ief, a reply brief, a response to the motion to dismiss, and several motions of his own. Thus, he has suffered no prejudice from any deprivation of postage. Appellate Case: 21-1261 Document: 010110748503 Date Filed: 10/04/2022 Page: 5