Timothy C. St ance u, of the United States Court of International Trade , sitti ngby * designation. 07-5 516 -cv Ri char ds v . G as parino UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SE CO ND CI RC UI T SUM M AR

Y O RD ER R UL I NGS BY SUM M ARY ORD E R D O NO T HAVE PR E CE DENTI AL E F F E CT . C I TATI O N TO A SU M M ARY O RD ER F I L ED ON O R AFT ER J A NUA R Y 1, 2007, I S P E R M I T T E D A ND I S G OV E R NE D B Y F E D E R A L R U L E O F A PPE L L ATE P RO CED U RE 3 2 .1 AND T HI S C OU RT ’ S L O C A L R U L E 32. 1. 1. W HEN CI T I NG A SU M M AR Y O RD E R I N A D OCU M E NT F I L E D W I T H THI S C OU RT , A PARTY M U ST CI TE EI THER TH E F E D E R A L A PPE N D I X O R AN EL ECTRO N I C D ATABASE ( WI T H T HE NOT A T I ON “ SU M M ARY O RD ER ”). A PARTY CI TI N G A SU M M ARY O RD ER M U ST S ERVE A CO PY O F I T ON AN Y PARTY N O T REPRE SENTED B Y CO U N SEL . At a stated te rm of the United States Court of A ppeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel Patric k Moy

nihan Courthouse, 500 Pear l Street, in the City of Ne w York, on the 1 day of st April, two thousand ten. PRES ENT: P E T E R

W
. H A LL, GERARD E. LYNCH, 

### Circuit Judges , TI MOTHY C. STANCEU, * 

### Judge.

_______________________________________________ Sandra Richa

rds, Plaintif

f-Appellant , v. No. 07-5516-c v Ric ha rd Ga sp ari no , A de la

Qu ito De fe nd ants -A

pp e lle e s.

______________________________________________ For Appellant: SANDRA D. RI CHARDS, pro s e , Norwa lk, CT. For Appellee s: H. J EFF REY BECK, Stratf ord, CT.2 J AMES V. MI NOR, City

of Stamford L aw Depa rtment, Stamford, CT. Appea l from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut (Eg inton, J. ). U P O ND U E C O N S ID E RA T IO N , i ti s h e r e b y ORDERED, ADJUDG ED AND DECREED that th e jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt

is AF F IRM ED
. Pla int if f- Ap pe lla nt S and ra D. Ric ha rd s a pp e a ls pro se from a judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Conne cticut (Eg inton, J. ) date d November 7, 2007, g rantingsummary

judgme nt to the Defe ndants-Appe llees and dismissing Richa rds’s complaint. We assume the par

ties’ familiarity

with the underly

ing f acts a nd proce dural history

of the c ase. We r e vie w o rd e rs g ra

nti ngsumma

ry jud g me nt de novo and dete rmine whe ther the district
c ourt pr op e rl y c on c lud e d th e re wa s n o g e nu ine iss ue a s to any mate ri a l f

a c t and the mov ingpa

rt y
was e ntitled to judgment as a matter of la

w. See Cronin v. Ae tna Lif e Ins. Co. , 46 F.3d 196, 202-03 (2d Cir. 1995). Plaintiff-Appellant Richar ds brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 arguing that Def endant- Appellee Gaspa

rino is liable for f

alse a rre st, which the district court dismissed on the g round of qua lified immunit y . Richards a lso broug ht a claim under state law a

rguing that Def endant- Appellee Quito is li able f or malicious prosec ution, which the district court dismissed
as a matter of law
. 1. Quali fi ed Im m uni ty

“ [P]ubl ic of

fi c ia ls a re e nti tle d to qu a lif

ie d immun ity

if (1 ) t he ir c on du c t do e s n ot v iol ate clea rly established constitutional rig hts, or (2) it was obje ctively rea sonable for

them to believe3

their ac ts did not vi olate those rights.” W e y an t v . Ok

st , 101 F.3d 845, 857 ( 2d Cir. 1996). “In the context of a qualified immunity defe nse to an a lleg ation of fa lse arr est, the def endingoffice r nee d only show ‘ar guable’ probable cause .” Cal da ro la v . Ca lab re

se , 298 F.3d 156, 162 ( 2d Cir. 2002). “An office r has pr obable c ause to a rre st when in possession of fa cts sufficie nt to warra nt a prude nt person to believe that the suspect ha d committed or was c ommitt ing a n offe nse.” Ri c c iut i v . N. Y

.C. Tra ns it A uth or ity , 1 24 F .3 d 1 23 , 1 28 (2 d Ci r. 19 97 ). A d ist ri c t c ourt sh ou ld look to the “totality

of the c ircumstance s” in deter mining whe ther proba

ble ca use existed at the time of arr est. Cal

da ro la , 298 F.3d at 162. Her e, Ga sparino’s knowle dg e of Richa rds’s past be havior, ba sed on a pr ior Dec ember 2003 arr est, alongwith his observations at Richards’ s apar tment on the date of

the J anuar

y 2004
arr est, provided suff

icient information to lead G aspar ino rea sonably to believe that Richa

rds had arguably committed the crime of

risk of injury

to a minor. Acc ording ly , the district court
c or re c tly de te rm ine d th at G a sp ari no wa s e nti tle d to qu a lif ie d immun ity

and g ra nte d h im
summa ry jud g me nt. 2. Malicious Pr osecution Under Connecticut law, in orde r to establish the tort of malicious prose cution, a plaintiff must prove, inte r a lia , that “the de fenda nt initi ated or

procur ed the institution of criminal proce eding s ag ainst the plaintiff.” Karwowski v. Fardy , 984 A.2d 776, 781-82 (Conn. 2009) (interna l quotation marks omitted). “A private per son can be said to have initiated a criminal proce edingif he ha s insist ed that the plaintiff should be prosec uted, that is, if he has br oug ht pressure of any

kind to bear upon the public office r’s de cision to commence the prosec ution.” McH ale v. W .B.S. Corp. , 446 A.2d 815, 817 (Conn. 1982). How ever , wher e a pe rson “ha s4

undertaken no more than to provide potentially incriminatinginformation to a public off icer [,] . . . made a

full and truthful disclosure[,] and has left the de cision to prosecute entirely in the hands of the public of

fice r, he c annot be he ld liable for malicious prose cution.” Id. Her e, the undisputed fa cts clea rly establish that Quito did no more than provide Gaspa rino with information that one of he r tena nts had repor

ted the “strongodor of g as” in the building whe re Richa

rds’s apa rtment was located. Gaspa rino’s dec ision to arrest Richar ds was ba se d o n h is i nd e pe nd e nt i nv e sti g atio n o f t he c ir c ums tanc e s su

rr ound ingthe g a s le ak. B e c a us e those fac ts preclude a cla im of malicious prosecution, summary judgme nt in favor of

Quito was proper . We have c onsidered a ll of Richards’s a rguments and find them to be without merit. F or the re asons stated a

bove, the judgment of the district cour t is AFF I RMED.

F OR TH E CO UR T: Catherine O ’Ha g an Wolfe, Clerk