IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

April 14, 2021 Session

ALLAN F. WHITE JR., ET AL. v. BRADLEY COUNTY GOVERNMENT 

ET AL.

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Bradley County

No. V-16-493 Lawrence Howard Puckett, Judge

___________________________________

No. E2020-00798-COA-R3-CV

___________________________________

A police officer pursued and shot a man whom she encountered outside her home at two 

in the morning. After the man died from his injuries, his parents and estate brought suit in 

the Bradley County Circuit Court against the officer, the sheriff who supervised her, and 

the county, alleging negligence and violation of the man’s rights under federal law and the 

United States Constitution. Defendants removed the case to the United States District 

Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee (“the district court”). The district court granted 

summary judgment for the defendants on the federal civil rights claims and remanded the 

state law tort claims to the Circuit Court. On remand to the Circuit Court, the claims against 

the sheriff were voluntarily dismissed and the remaining defendants moved for summary 

judgment. In reliance on the district court’s legal conclusions, the Circuit Court granted 

summary judgment to the police officer based on the doctrine of collateral estoppel and to 

the Bradley County government based on governmental immunity. Plaintiffs appealed. 

On appeal, we hold that collateral estoppel bars the claims against both the police officer 

and the county. Accordingly, we affirm.

Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

J. STEVEN STAFFORD, P.J., W.S., delivered the opinion of the court, in which FRANK G.

CLEMENT JR., P.J., M.S., and ARNOLD B. GOLDIN, J., joined.

John M. Wolfe Jr., Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellants, Allan F. White Jr., and 

Marline White.

Thomas E. LeQuire, Chattanooga, Tennessee, for the appellees, Bradley County 

Government and Tiffany Goodwin.

06/15/2021
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OPINION

I. PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND

This case stems from the shooting death of Allan J. White III, (“Mr. White” or 

“White”) by Bradley County police officer Tiffany Goodwin1(“Ms. Goodwin” or 

“Goodwin”) on July 28, 2015. On July 26, 2016, Mr. White’s parents, Allan White Jr. and 

Marline2 White, as next of kin and on behalf of Mr. White’s estate3(collectively, 

“Plaintiffs”) filed a wrongful death suit against the Bradley County Government (“Bradley 

County”), Bradley County Sheriff Eric Watson (“Sheriff Watson”) in his individual and 

official capacity, and Officer Tiffany Goodwin (“Ms. Goodwin”) in her individual and 

official capacity (collectively, “Defendants”) in the Circuit Court for Bradley County (the 

“trial court”). The complaint alleged that Ms. Goodwin killed Mr. White by use of 

excessive force, thereby depriving him of his rights under 42 U.S.C. § 19834and the Fourth 

and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution; that Sheriff Watson and 

Bradley County were also responsible and liable for Mr. White’s death and the violations 

of his constitutional rights due to the policies, practices, and customs of Sheriff Watson 

and the sheriff’s department; and that Mr. White’s death was caused by the negligence of 

Ms. Goodwin, Sheriff Watson, and Bradley County, and thus the Tennessee Governmental 

Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”), Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205, conferred liability 

on Sheriff Watson and Bradley County. 

A. The district court proceedings

On August 8, 2016, Defendants removed the case to the federal district court. 

Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on January 22, 2018, on the grounds of 

qualified immunity for Ms. Goodwin and the failure of Plaintiffs to show any 

unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice of Sheriff Watson or Bradley County. The 

primary issue on appeal involves whether the trial court correctly determined that the 

district court’s final judgment operated to bar the state law claims pursuant to the doctrine 

of collateral estoppel. Because our resolution of this issue requires a detailed examination 

 

1 At the time of the incident relevant to this appeal, Ms. Goodwin’s surname was Oakley, and the 

record in this case has references to her both as Tiffany Oakley and Tiffany Goodwin. We will refer to her 

as Ms. Goodwin throughout this Opinion.

2 Her name is spelled “Marlene” on some documents in the record.

3 Allan F. White Jr. is the administrator of his son’s estate.

4 Section 1983 provides for civil liability against 

any person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 

State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person 

within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws[.]

42 U.S.C. § 1983.
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of the district court judgment, we will quote extensively from the district court’s 

memorandum opinion. According to the memorandum opinion:

5

Bradley County Tennessee police officer Tiffany Goodwin 

(“Goodwin”) returned home while on duty around 2:00 a.m. on July 28, 

2015. As she pulled into her driveway, she saw a man—later identified as 

Allan J. White III (“White”)—squat behind a truck parked near her house. 

Goodwin exited her vehicle, shined her flashlight towards the man, and 

yelled “Sheriff’s office, show me your hands.” Rather than yield, White took

off running towards the back of the house. Goodwin radioed dispatch from 

her portable radio, relaying her location and requesting backup. Flashlight 

and Taser in hand, Goodwin gave chase.

She lost sight of White as he entered the woods behind her house. 

Noting the direction he took, Goodwin cut through neighboring backyards, 

then veered left into the woods, aiming to cut off White’s path. As she 

crested an embankment, she found White laying facedown along a ditch, 

arms beneath him. He faced the opposite direction, motionless. 

Goodwin approached. She stated again, “Sheriff’s office, show me

your hands.” This prompted White to roll over, but Goodwin ordered him 

back onto his stomach with his hands behind his back. Kneeling beside him, 

Goodwin cuffed White’s right wrist with her free hand,6 but White’s left arm 

remained underneath him. After her orders to bring his left arm behind him 

were disregarded, Goodwin attempted to grab the arm. This was met with 

resistance. White jerked his right arm away, rolled over, and rose to his feet. 

As White ripped his arm free, Goodwin pulled the trigger on the Taser. 

Whether she had actually hit him, though, was unclear.

Undeterred, White threw Goodwin to the ground by her collar. As he 

did, Goodwin fired the Taser a second time, though she was again unsure if 

she had made contact. While Goodwin was on her back, White climbed atop 

her, facing the opposite direction. He put his knees on both of Goodwin’s 

shoulders, effectively pinning her to the ground. As the two grappled, White 

put his hands on Goodwin’s face and neck, pushing down on her face, in 

what felt to Goodwin like an effort to choke her.7 With his right hand, White 

began to strike Goodwin’s ribs on her side.

 

5 Footnotes in the cited portions are in the original and have been re-numbered. We have omitted 

the citations to the record.

6 At this point, Goodwin had put away her flashlight and held the Taser in her left hand.

7 Goodwin stated that she felt White’s fingers in her mouth during the struggle. 
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Goodwin struggled beneath him. She attempted to push White off of 

her to no avail. Her orders to get off were disregarded. She attempted to 

access her radio, but it had been loosed from her shoulder during the 

altercation. And she was entangled in the wires of the Taser she had dropped 

moments prior in her attempts to push White aside. Fearing for her life, 

Goodwin grabbed her gun from its holster with her right hand.

Goodwin pointed the gun up over her face, unsure of precisely where 

she was aiming, and pulled the trigger. Still feeling White atop her, she fired 

at least once more.8 At that point, White removed himself from Goodwin, 

yelling, “Ow, ow, okay, I’m done.” Goodwin rose, located her flashlight and 

radio, and informed dispatch that shots were fired. She kept her gun trained 

on White, as he writhed on the ground, attempting to get up. Goodwin 

ordered that he remain on the ground and continued asking who he was. At 

some point, he responded, “I don’t know you.”9

Shortly thereafter, backup units and emergency medical services 

(“EMS”) arrived. EMS first transported White to SkyRidge Medical Center 

in Cleveland, Tennessee, then to Erlanger Medical Center in Chattanooga, 

Tennessee, where he eventually died from his injuries.

On April 16, the district court granted summary judgment dismissing the § 1983 claims 

and constitutional violations against Ms. Goodwin, finding that Ms. Goodwin’s conduct 

was “objectively reasonable.” The district court also dismissed the claims against Sheriff 

Watson and Bradley County because:

Plaintiffs . . . have made no substantive response to Defendants’ arguments 

regarding Bradley County’s policies and procedures, nor Sheriff Watson’s 

alleged liability—in fact, Plaintiffs made no mention of these claims at all in 

their response to the motion before the Court. As a result, Plaintiffs have 

abandoned these claims. Brown v. VHS of Mich., Inc., 545 F. App’x 368, 

372 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A plaintiff is deemed to have abandoned a claim when 

a plaintiff fails to address it in response to a motion for summary judgment.”).

The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims 

and remanded the case to the trial court. No appeal was taken from the judgment of the 

 

8 Goodwin expressed uncertainty as to how many times she fired her weapon. In her interview on 

the morning of the incident, Goodwin intimated she had fired twice but was unsure as to how many 

precisely. In her deposition on November 15, 2017, she suggested there may have been three shots fired. 

The autopsy revealed only two bullet wounds. A third bullet casing was never found.

9 During an interview, Goodwin stated she did not personally know White but did know of him 

from high school. She denied ever having any type of relationship with him or ever engaging in any 

conversation with him, even in high school.
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district court dismissing all of the federal claims against all Defendants.

B. Proceedings upon the remand to the trial court

On July 13, 2018, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on the state law

claims. Plaintiffs gave notice of non-suit of all claims against Sheriff Watson and the 

“official capacity” claims against Ms. Goodwin, and on December 19, the trial court 

dismissed those claims. On July 15, 2019, the trial court denied Bradley County and Ms. 

Goodwin’s motion for summary judgment, stating its reasoning from the bench:

When a situation is where you have a question of the intent of a party, you 

shouldn’t grant summary judgment. And . . . [when] you have to rely upon 

that one witness and they have control over how that version comes out. And 

I find that to be this case. I can’t grant summary judgment because of that.

* * *

[O]ur courts have stated that summary judgment is not proper where 

the outcome of a case hinges upon the credibility of witnesses. 

Ms. Goodwin and Bradley County filed a motion to amend the judgment, in which they 

argued, in part:

In considering Defendants’ federal court motion for summary 

judgment, the District Court considered the same issue, facts and 

circumstances relating to Officer Goodwin’s actions which are now before 

this Court. Plaintiffs did not appeal or otherwise challenge the District 

Court’s conclusions and order and therefore the same are final. Therefore, 

Plaintiffs are now collaterally estopped from relitigating the reasonableness 

of Officer Goodwin’s conduct.

Then on December 19, 2019, the trial court entered an additional order (“final order”),

which clarified:

On July 15, 2019, the Court entered its order denying Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on grounds announced from the bench but 

only upon limited evidentiary issues. The Court did not rule on Defendants’ 

motion for summary judgment on sovereign immunity or res judicata 

grounds.

This matter was last before the Court November 4, 2019, for oral 

argument upon Defendants’ motion to alter or amend the Court’s July 15, 

2019 order denying summary judgment. The motion asks the Court to rule 
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on two remaining grounds of their motion for summary judgment based on 

the county’s sovereign immunity under Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 29-20-

205([2])

[10]

and 29-20-310([a])

[11]

and res judicata.[12]

The order then granted summary judgment to both defendants. With respect to the claims 

against Bradley County, the final order stated:

[T]he court . . . dismisses all claims against Defendant Bradley County 

Government on the basis of the county’s sovereign immunity. The complaint 

against Bradley County Government arises out of an alleged violation of 

plaintiff decedent’s civil rights and is therefore barred by the common law 

immunity of Bradley County. See Cochran v. Town of Jonesborough, 

Tennessee, [586 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019)] and Siler v. Scott,

[591 S.W.3d 84, 93 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2019), appeal denied (Oct. 11, 2019)]. 

In Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-[2]05(2) the legislature retained the common 

law immunity of Bradley County for claims arising out of injury from alleged 

violations of civil rights.

With respect to the claim against Ms. Goodwin, the final order stated:

Plaintiffs’ complaint against the county and Tiffany [Goodwin] in 

federal court alleged that [Ms. Goodwin] used excessive force under the 

circumstances. In [its] Memorandum Opinion, [the district court] specifically 

found that [Ms. Goodwin’s] actions were “objectively reasonable” under the 

circumstances. [The district court] set forth [its] findings of fact and legal 

conclusions in [its] Memorandum Opinion. By order entered November 6, 

2018 the entire federal court record was ordered to be made part of this 

court’s record. . . . 

The Court has reviewed [the district court’s] opinion alongside 

 

10 Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205 provides, in pertinent part, that governmental entities 

are immune from suit “for injury proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within 

the scope of his employment . . . if the injury arises out of . . . civil rights[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-

205(2).

11 Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-310(a) provides:

The court, before holding a governmental entity liable for damages, must first determine 

that the employee’s or employees’ act or acts were negligent and the proximate cause of 

plaintiff’s injury, that the employee or employees acted within the scope of their 

employment and that none of the exceptions listed in § 29-20-205 are applicable to the 

facts before the court.

12 Although the trial court’s order sometimes speaks in terms of res judicata, the order applies the 

test for collateral estoppel. As discussed in detail, infra, the question here involves collateral estoppel, rather 

than the related doctrine of res judicata. 
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Plaintiffs’ complaint in this court with [the collateral estoppel] elements in 

view. The Court finds that the issues before the court are identical to the 

issues decided by [the district court]; that the same parties or those in privity

litigated the issues and that those issues were decided on the merits by [the 

district court]; that the federal court judgment has become final; and that 

Plaintiff[s] had a full and fair opportunity in the earlier suit in federal court 

to litigate the issues now before the court.

* * *

[A]s in Partin v. Scott, [No. E2007-02604-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 

4922412 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008),] the Plaintiff is collaterally 

estopped from relitigating the reasonableness of Defendant [Goodwin’s] 

actions in the present action. 

Plaintiffs timely appealed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiffs appeal, stating these issues for review:

1. In light of the Tennessee Supreme Court case of Massengill v. Scott, 738 

S.W. 2d 629 (1987), did the trial judge err by using the Federal Court 

dismissal as a bar to the remanded State Court actions?

2. Did the Trial Judge err by not stating whether or not he would consider 

the credibility of the witness as fixed as of the date that the Federal Court 

issued its summary judgment?

3. Did the trial judge err by finding that Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-

20-205(2) barred the Plaintiffs[’] claims against the Defendants?

Defendants state the issues as follows:

1. Did the Trial Court properly dismiss Plaintiffs’ case against Bradley 

County pursuant to the immunity provisions of Tennessee Code 

Annotated § 29-20-205?

2. Did the Trial Court properly grant Defendants[’] Motion for Summary 

Judgment and dismiss the case against Tiffany Oakley Goodwin, based 

on the U.S. District Court’s dismissal of the same case in the Doctrine of 

Collateral Estoppel?

3. Did the Trial Court properly deny Plaintiffs’ Motion for Finding of Fact 

because of its dismissal of the case?

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
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The trial court resolved the underlying action by way of summary judgment. 

Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issues of material fact exist, and the 

movant meets its burden of proving that it is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. 

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Bryant v. Bryant, 522 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tenn. 2017). It is “a 

preferred vehicle for disposing of purely legal issues.” Hawkins v. Case Mgmt. Inc., 165 

S.W.3d 296, 299 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208 (Tenn. 1993);

Bellamy v. Fed. Express Corp., 749 S.W.2d 31 (Tenn. 1988)). Because the decision to 

grant a summary judgment motion is a question of law, our review is de novo with no 

presumption of correctness. Tatham v. Bridgestone Americas Holding, Inc., 473 S.W.3d 

734, 748 (Tenn. 2015). Therefore, “we make a fresh determination of whether the 

requirements of Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been 

satisfied.” Rye v. Women’s Care Ctr. of Memphis, MPLLC, 477 S.W.3d 235, 250 (Tenn. 

2015). Those requirements are that the filings supporting the motion show that there is no 

genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04. We must take the strongest view of the evidence in favor 

of the nonmoving party, allowing all reasonable inferences in its favor. Perkins v. Metro.

Gov’t of Nashville, 380 S.W.3d 73, 80 (Tenn. 2012). 

Summary judgment in this case was granted upon the trial court’s determination that 

collateral estoppel applied to the material factual issues. “[S]ummary judgment is an 

appropriate vehicle for resolving a collateral estoppel claim.” Mullins v. State, 294 S.W.3d 

529, 535 (Tenn. 2009). Whether collateral estoppel applies to a particular set of facts is a 

question of law. Torres v. Bridgestone/Firestone N. Am. Tire, LLC, 498 S.W.3d 565, 573 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 2016). Hence, our review of that determination is de novo with no 

presumption of correctness afforded the trial court. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

In their response to Defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts, Plaintiffs 

ostensibly disputed many of the facts; however, most of the disputes were not supported 

by references to evidence in the record as required by Rule 56 of the Tennessee Rules of 

Civil Procedure, but rather relied on argument by counsel. For example:

4. Officer Goodwin got out of her patrol car with her flashlight and 

taser in hand, identified herself as a police officer, and directed that the 

individual she saw, who we now know to be Allan J. White, III (“White”), 

show her his hands. See Officer Goodwin deposition, pages 88-89 and page 

93.

ANSWER: What Officer Goodwin did after she got out of her car is 

unknown, except to her. That she exited her vehicle at some time is true. 

What she directed White to do is known only to her; again, she failed to 
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activate the sound technology that could have given us decisive answers. She 

did not activate the sound devices, either on her uniform or her car. Thus, 

this matter remains in dispute.

See page 66 of Officer Tiffany Goodwin’s deposition, in which she 

admits to have chosen to not make use of the available recording technology.

Plaintiffs’ response above does not set forth specific facts as required by Rule 56. Instead, 

Plaintiffs make the argument that Ms. Goodwin should not be believed because she did not 

activate the recording devices available to her. A party’s “reliance on its own argument . . . 

does not satisfy the demands of Rule 56.04 or create a genuine issue of material fact that 

would preclude summary judgment.” Clarksville Towers, LLC v. John Straussberger, et 

al., No. M2020-00756-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 1884636, at *6 n.2 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 

11, 2021). Plaintiffs repeat, several times, this approach of “disputing” Ms. Goodwin’s 

testimony by responding that there is no recording of the events. Plaintiffs also respond 

by making conclusions for which Plaintiffs cite no facts to support, e.g., “The assault 

described here would have led to physical damage far in excess of what the medical records 

of the officer show” and by arguments such as:

That [Ms. Goodwin] found [Mr. White] not facing in her direction 

shows that the decedent was not keeping a watch on her movements. It 

further tends to prove that he was moving and fell face-forward, most likely 

from a bullet wound that he received seconds before, on or near her 

driveway.[13]

In their denials, Plaintiffs failed to, “by affidavits or one of the other means provided 

in Tennessee Rule 56, ‘set forth specific facts’ at the summary judgment stage ‘showing 

that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” Id. at *3 (quoting Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.06). As the 

nonmoving party, Plaintiffs were required to “‘do more than simply show that there is some 

metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.’” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 265 (quoting Matsushita

Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). In those instances 

where Plaintiffs failed to support their disputed facts as required by Rule 56.06, we deem 

the facts admitted. See Duncan v. Lloyd, No. M2004-01054-COA-R3-CV, 2005 WL 

1996624, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 18, 2005) (“Any fact not specifically disputed 

with citations to the record to support the alleged dispute may be deemed admitted.”); Kidd

v. Dickerson, No. M2018-01133-COA-R3-CV, 2020 WL 5912808, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. 

Oct. 5, 2020), perm. app. denied (Feb. 4, 2021) (holding that alleged disputed statements 

were deemed admitted when plaintiff’s responses were not supported by citations to the 

 

13 An example of evidence that could have been used to support this argument may have included 

an affidavit from a witness competent to testify that either Ms. Goodwin’s or Mr. White’s injuries were not 

consistent with her explanation of events. No such evidence of any kind was offered to support these 

arguments. 
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record); see also Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 86 n.3 (Tenn. 2008) 

(“[A]rgument of counsel is not evidence.”).

In our view, the undisputed facts established at the summary judgment stage 

reflected the following: On July 28, 2015, at around two in the morning, Ms. Goodwin 

pulled into her driveway at her home and saw a man—later identified as Mr. White—near 

her home. With her taser in hand, Ms. Goodwin got out of her vehicle, shined her flashlight 

toward Mr. White, identified herself as an officer, and directed Mr. White to show her his 

hands. Mr. White did not reply, and ran toward the back of Ms. Goodwin’s house. She 

radioed police dispatch from her portable radio and requested backup, and then pursued 

him. Ms. Goodwin lost sight of Mr. White, but continued in the general direction that she 

had seen him run, and when she found him, he was lying face down in a ditch. She asked 

him to identify himself, but he did not respond. Ms. Goodwin told Mr. White to put his 

hands behind his back. He put one hand behind his back, which she was able to cuff. After 

he repeatedly refused to give her his other hand, Ms. Goodwin attempted to use her taser 

on Mr. White, but he got off the ground and grabbed her, taking her to the ground. She 

attempted to tase him a second time, but was not certain whether she made contact. Mr. 

White climbed on top of Ms. Goodwin, held her down with his knees on her shoulders, and 

put his hands on her face and neck, making her feel smothered. Fearing for her life, Ms. 

Goodwin pulled her gun from her holster and fired, unable to take aim because of Mr. 

White’s position relative to her gun. She fired at least two shots before she was free from 

Mr. White. Shortly thereafter, emergency medical services transported Mr. White to 

receive medical care. He died from his injuries.14

Plaintiffs further argue that there are disputed facts because they offered the 

affidavits of two individuals, Carrie Green and Devon Cooper, and that 

[their] sworn statements tend to prove that the Officer and the Plaintiff had a 

personal relationship. Officer [Goodwin] denies such a thing, but the conflict 

in the testimony must be resolved before we can determine what the nature 

of their relationship was in the early hours of July 25, 2015[.]

The summary judgment standard does not require all facts to be undisputed, but that no 

material facts are disputed. “A dispute of material fact is that which ‘must be decided in 

order to resolve the substantive claim or defense at which the motion is directed.’” Tatham, 

473 S.W.3d at 749 (quoting Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215). Here, the dispositive issue involves

whether the final judgment in the district court precludes Plaintiff’s claim of negligence 

raised in this case. It is not necessary to determine whether Ms. Goodwin and Mr. White 

knew each other in order to resolve whether Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from 

asserting negligence in the trial court. Therefore, it is not a material fact.

 

14At this juncture, we note that these facts are in accord with those relied upon by the district court. 

Supra, § I.A.
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Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there are no disputed material 

facts. Therefore, we will consider whether summary judgment was proper based on the

legal issues presented.

Plaintiffs’ negligence claims against Defendants are predicated on the same set of 

circumstances that underlie Plaintiffs’ federal civil rights claim. Plaintiffs alleged that Ms. 

Goodwin negligently caused the death of Mr. White and harm to Plaintiffs because she 

“owed a duty to exercise reasonable care in handling the situation,” and that she “violated 

that duty causing foreseeable harm to [Mr. White].” Moreover, Plaintiffs alleged that 

Bradley County was “negligent in its hiring, retention, and supervision of employees,” thus 

causing injuries to Mr. White and to Plaintiffs, and that, pursuant to the GTLA (specifically 

Tennessee Code Annotated § 29-20-205) Bradley County was not immune from suit 

because the injuries were caused by the negligent acts or omissions of an employee acting 

within the scope of her employment. In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants 

argued, inter alia: 

In considering Defendants’ federal court motion for summary 

judgment, the District Court considered the same issue, facts and 

circumstances relating to Officer Goodwin’s actions which are now before 

this Court. The District Court decided based on the exact same facts and 

circumstances that Officer Goodwin’s conduct was objectively reasonable 

after Plaintiffs were given a full and fair opportunity to challenge the same 

and in fact opposed and challenged Officer Goodwin’s conduct. Plaintiffs 

did not appeal or otherwise challenge the District Court’s conclusions and 

order and therefore the same are final. Therefore, Plaintiffs are now 

collaterally estopped from re-litigating the reasonableness of Officer 

Goodwin’s conduct. As a result, summary judgment must be granted.

Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, is a court-made doctrine that bars the same 

parties from relitigating in a second suit issues that were raised and determined in a prior 

suit. Bowen ex rel. Doe v. Arnold, 502 S.W.3d 102, 107 (Tenn. 2016). The doctrine 

applies both to legal and factual issues. State ex rel. Cihlar v. Crawford, 39 S.W.3d 172, 

179 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000). Our Supreme Court has explained:

The party invoking collateral estoppel has the burden of proof. To

prevail with a collateral estoppel claim, the party asserting it must

demonstrate (1) that the issue to be precluded is identical to an issue decided

in an earlier proceeding, (2) that the issue to be precluded was actually raised,

litigated, and decided on the merits in the earlier proceeding, (3) that the

judgment in the earlier proceeding has become final, (4) that the party against

whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party or is in privity with a party

to the earlier proceeding, and (5) that the party against whom collateral
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estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity in the earlier proceeding

to contest the issue now sought to be precluded.

Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 535 (citations omitted). Collateral estoppel applies “when it 

affirmatively appears that the issue involved in the case under consideration has already 

been litigated in a prior suit between the same parties, even though based upon a different 

cause of action, if the determination of such issue in the former action was necessary to the 

judgment.” Clark v. Sputniks, LLC, 368 S.W.3d 431, 437 (Tenn. 2012) (citation and 

quotation marks omitted). This doctrine applies “even [when] the prior case was in Federal 

Court and the subsequent suit is brought in a State Court,” Whitsey v. Williamson Cty. 

Bank, 700 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). Our Supreme Court has noted:

The decisions of the federal courts are entitled to full faith and credit. U.S. 

Const. art. IV, § 1; Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 87 cmt. a. The 

preclusionary rules serve to “promote the comity between state and federal 

courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the federal system.” Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. at 96, 101 S. Ct. 411. Thus, Tennessee courts have given 

preclusive effect to the decisions of federal courts. See, e.g., Whitsey v.

Williamson County Bank, 700 S.W.2d 562, 564 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985) 

(holding that the summary dismissal of a claim in federal court provided a 

sufficient basis for invoking res judicata in state court).

Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 537 n.3 (Tenn. 2009). “Determinations of an issue or issues that

are not necessary to a judgment have the characteristics of dicta and will not be given

preclusive effect.” Id. at 535. Moreover, “an issue need not be subject to a full evidentiary 

and adversarial trial to be ‘actually litigated’”; on the contrary, “‘[t]he requirement . . . 

is generally satisfied if the issue was properly raised by the pleadings or otherwise placed 

in issue and was actually determined in the prior proceeding.” In re Bridgestone/ 

Firestone, 495 S.W.3d 257, 268 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (quoting Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 

536).

Citing Massengill v. Scott, 738 S.W.2d 629 (Tenn. 1987), Plaintiffs argue that a 

dismissal by the district court is not a bar to the remanded state court actions. Plaintiffs’ 

reliance on that case is misplaced. In Massengill, “the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the 

U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee, alleging that the defendants . . .

had deprived them of certain constitutional rights thereby entitling them to damages as 

provided by 42 U.S.C. § 1983” and also alleged several tort claims under state law. 738 

S.W.2d at 630. The federal court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 

state law tort claims and submitted the civil rights claim to the jury, which returned a 

general verdict for the defendants. Id. The plaintiffs then filed their tort claims in an 

appropriate state court. Id. The trial court granted summary judgment to the defendants 

based on res judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. After this Court affirmed the trial court’s 

holding, the plaintiffs appealed to the Tennessee Supreme Court, which held that res 
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judicata did not apply “because the cause of action in the state court [was] not the same as 

the cause of action in the United States District Court,” id. at 631, nor did collateral estoppel 

apply based on the evidence in the record, id. at 632.

Plaintiffs, in their reliance on Massengill, seem to conflate res judicata (claim 

preclusion) with collateral estoppel (issue preclusion). Although the doctrines necessarily 

overlap in many instances, they are not the same. The Supreme Court has explained:

The doctrine of res judicata bars a second suit between the same parties or 

their privies on the same cause of action with respect to all issues which were 

or could have been litigated in the former suit.[15] Collateral estoppel 

operates to bar a second suit between the same parties and their privies on a 

different cause of action only as to issues which were actually litigated and 

determined in the former suit. 

Id. at 631 (emphasis added). Plaintiffs embrace the Supreme Court’s res judicata

reasoning in Massengill while disregarding its reasoning with respect to collateral estoppel. 

The Court stated:

Because in the instant action the record does not disclose what issues were 

defined and submitted to the jury for their determination and since the jury’s 

verdict was only a general verdict for the defendant, this record does not 

afford a basis for supporting a summary judgment for the defendant on the 

basis of collateral estoppel.

Id. at 632. Like in Massengill, Plaintiffs’ state law claims are not barred by res judicata

because they seek recovery under state law claims which are distinct causes of action from 

the civil rights claims which were dismissed with prejudice. However, unlike in 

Massengill, the record in this case—specifically the district court’s memorandum—is clear 

as to which legal and factual issues were decided in the federal proceedings. Hence, the

holding in Massengill does not bar the application of collateral estoppel to the case before 

us, and we will now consider whether the record supports the application of the doctrine.

A defendant moving for summary judgment may prevail by negating an essential 

element of the plaintiff’s claim or by showing that the plaintiff cannot prove that element 

 

15 A party asserting a res judicata defense has the burden of proving the following elements:

(1) that the underlying judgment was rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, (2) 

that the same parties or their privies were involved in both suits, (3) that the same claim or 

cause of action was asserted in both suits, and (4) that the underlying judgment was final 

and on the merits.

Elvis Presley Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Memphis, 620 S.W.3d 318, 324 (Tenn. 2021).
- 14 -

at trial. Perkins, 380 S.W.3d at 80. Thus, if the district court resolved an issue or issues 

that negate an element of Plaintiffs’ negligence claims, then summary judgment is proper. 

Negligence is essentially “the failure to exercise reasonable care.” Giggers v. Memphis

Hous. Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn. 2009). To make out a prima facie claim for 

negligence, a plaintiff must establish the following elements: “‘(1) a duty of care owed by 

defendant to plaintiff; (2) conduct below the applicable standard of care that amounts to a 

breach of that duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) cause in fact; and (5) proximate, or legal, 

cause.’” Id. (quoting McCall v. Wilder, 913 S.W.2d 150, 153 (Tenn. 1995)). “‘Duty is a 

legal obligation to conform to a reasonable person standard of care in order to protect others 

against unreasonable risks of harm.’” Grogan v. Uggla, 535 S.W.3d 864, 871 (Tenn. 2017)

(quoting Satterfield v. Breeding Insulation Co., 266 S.W.3d 347, 355 (Tenn. 2008)). To 

recover for negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of an employee, “in addition to the 

elements of a negligence claim [, a plaintiff must establish] that the employer had 

knowledge of the employee’s unfitness for the job.” Doe v. Catholic Bishop for Diocese

of Memphis, 306 S.W.3d 712, 717 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008). 

In its memorandum opinion, the district court stated:

The first question the Court addresses . . . is whether Goodwin violated 

White’s Fourth Amendment rights in her use of deadly force during their 

encounter.

To this end, The Court must ask “whether [Goodwin’s] actions, in 

light of the totality of the circumstances, were objectively reasonable.” 

Kostrzewa [v. City of Troy], 247 F.3d [633] at 639 [6th Cir. 2001]. “[T]he 

specific facts of the case are key.” Id.

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their person . . . 

against unreasonable . . . seizures.” 16 U.S. Const. amend. IV. Therefore, whether Ms. 

Goodwin’s conduct was reasonable was necessary to the resolution of the issues before the 

district court. With respect to the reasonableness of Ms. Goodwin’s conduct, the district 

court concluded:

Goodwin happened upon White crouching behind a truck parked near her 

house in the middle of the night. She immediately identified herself and 

ordered him to yield. Rather than comply, White sprinted behind the house 

towards the woods. Goodwin radioed for backup, pursued, and found White 

hiding in a ditch. She ordered he remain supine, hands behind his back, and 

approached. She then attempted to handcuff him. When White resisted and 

 

16 For purposes of the Fourth Amendment, a seizure occurs “when there is a governmental 

termination of freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 

U.S. 593, 597 (1989) (emphasis removed).
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rose to his feet, Goodwin twice fired her Taser to no avail. White then threw 

her down, climbed onto her, and began to choke Goodwin and strike her ribs. 

Beneath White, Goodwin repeatedly demanded White remove himself, 

which was ignored, and struggled to push him aside, unsuccessfully. Only 

when Goodwin feared for her life did she resort to deadly force. 

Furthermore, Goodwin used no additional force once White had climbed off 

her, holding White at gunpoint until backup had arrived. Though Goodwin 

did not observe White commit a crime (beyond trespassing near her house in 

the middle of the night), White “actively resist[ed] arrest,” “attempted to 

evade arrest by flight,” and “pose[d] an immediate threat” to Goodwin as he 

assaulted her on the ground. Kostrzewa, 247 F.3d at 639.

As such, the Court finds Goodwin’s conduct objectively reasonable. 

(Citations to the record omitted.) 

State courts are not reviewing courts for federal courts, so we do not re-examine the 

correctness of the district court’s conclusion. Our Supreme Court has noted:

[T]he doctrine of collateral estoppel do[es] not hinge on the correctness of 

the judgment in the federal proceeding. There is no question that the central 

risk of invoking the preclusionary doctrines (collateral estoppel and res 

judicata) is the possibility that the decision in the first proceeding may be 

mistaken. 18 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4416, at 398. However, 

even an erroneous judgment is entitled to preclusive effect as long as all the 

other prerequisites have been met, see Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 

363, 376 n.15 (Tenn. 2009) (quoting Warwick v. Underwood, 40 Tenn. 238, 

241 (1859)); Moulton v. Ford Motor Co., 533 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tenn. 

1976), unless the parties have engaged in extrinsic fraud or collusion, N.Y. 

Life Ins. Co. v. Nashville Trust Co., 292 S.W.2d 749, 754–55 (1956) (a 

judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud would not support a res judicata 

claim); 18 Federal Practice and Procedure §§ 4423, at 601–02 & 4426, at 

684.

Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 537 n.3 (parallel citations omitted). If the Plaintiffs disagreed with 

the findings of the district court, with regard to credibility or any other issue, the 

appropriate remedy was a timely appeal of that final judgment. See Partin v. Scott, No. 

E2007-02604-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 4922412, at *11 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2008)

(“If Plaintiffs disagreed with the result reached by the District Court, they could and should 

have filed a timely appeal from that judgment, but they did not.”); see also Haase v. 

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 748 F.3d 624, 628–29 (5th Cir. 2014) (remand order 

constituted final judgment permitting appeal of district court’s contemporaneous orders 

granting summary judgment in favor of defendants on federal claim and dismissing certain 
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state claims); Porter v. Williams, 436 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir. 2006) (remand order 

constituted final order that enabled review of district court’s prior order granting partial 

summary judgment); cf. Hyde Park Co. v. Santa Fe City Council, 226 F.3d 1207, 1209 

n.1 (10th Cir. 2000) (“Federal appeals courts have consistently held . . . that they have 

jurisdiction to review a district court order dismissing federal claims on the merits where 

the district court subsequently exercised its discretion under § 1367 

to remand supplemental state law claims to state court.”) (collecting cases).

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the undisputed facts and the district 

court’s conclusion that Ms. Goodwin’s conduct was “objectively reasonable” effectively 

negates a required element of the state tort negligence claims, that of breach of duty. As 

we have previously explained:

Once it is determined that a defendant owed a plaintiff a legal obligation to 

conform to a reasonable person standard of conduct, i.e., a duty—the 

question becomes whether the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care 

under the circumstances, i.e., whether the defendant breached the duty. What 

the defendant must do, or must not do, is a question of the standard of conduct 

required to satisfy the duty.

Ordinary or reasonable care is the care an ordinarily prudent person 

would take under the circumstances. . . .

Marla H. v. Knox Cty., 361 S.W.3d 518, 537 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2011) (brackets, quotation 

marks, and internal citations omitted). In other words, “[a] breach of duty exists only if the 

defendant has not exercised reasonable or ordinary care.” Id. at 538. The district court, 

however, has already conclusively resolved the question of whether Ms. Goodwin failed 

to exercise reasonable care. Thus, the question of whether Ms. Goodwin breached a duty 

for purposes of negligence is identical to the issue adjudicated by the district court—

whether Ms. Goodwin’s actions were “objectively reasonable.” Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 

535.

Moreover, the question of whether Ms. Goodwin’s conduct was reasonable was 

necessary for the resolution of the claims before the district court.

17 The question was also 

fully and fairly litigated between the same parties, and the judgment of the district court is 

 

17 Although Plaintiffs point out this requirement for the application of collateral estoppel in their 

brief, they offer no argument that the trial court erred in its conclusion that this requirement was met. See 

generally Sneed v. Bd. of Pro. Resp. of Supreme Ct., 301 S.W.3d 603, 615 (Tenn. 2010) (“It is not the role 

of the courts, trial or appellate, to research or construct a litigant’s case or arguments for him or her, and 

where a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her contention or merely constructs a skeletal 

argument, the issue is waived.”). 
- 17 -

final.18 See, e.g., Porter, 436 F.3d at 920. Therefore, the outcome in federal court and the 

application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel effectively precludes the Plaintiffs from 

proceeding on the negligence claim against Ms. Goodwin. Mullins, 294 S.W.3d at 535.

Plaintiffs’ claims against Bradley County for negligent hiring, supervision, and 

training necessarily depend on a finding that Ms. Goodwin was negligent, both logically 

and statutorily under the GTLA. Subject to statutory exceptions, governmental entities are 

immune from suit for actions of the government that fall within “the exercise and discharge 

of any of their functions, governmental or proprietary.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-201(a). 

As previously discussed, one exception to the general grant of immunity applies when an 

injury is “proximately caused by a negligent act or omission of any employee within the 

scope of his employment,” except when one of the enumerated exceptions contained in that 

statute is applicable. Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-205. In order to remove immunity under 

this section, the following requirements must be met:

The court, before holding a governmental entity liable for damages, must first 

determine that the employee’s or employees’ act or acts were negligent and 

the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury, that the employee or employees 

acted within the scope of their employment and that none of the exceptions 

listed in § 29-20-205 are applicable to the facts before the court.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-310(a) (emphasis added). Ms. Goodwin’s negligence is 

therefore a necessary element to a finding that Bradley County is liable for negligence. 

Because Plaintiffs are collaterally estopped from asserting that Ms. Goodwin was 

negligent, the tort claims against Bradley County are also barred by collateral estoppel.

19

Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Plaintiffs’ negligence claims against both 

Ms. Goodwin and Bradley County fail as a matter of law. Accordingly, we affirm the trial 

court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Ms. Goodwin and Bradley County.

As a final matter, we consider the trial court’s denial of Plaintiffs’ Rule 52 Motion. 

Following the trial court’s final order, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion for Findings of Fact 

(TRCP52)” which stated:

COME the Plaintiffs, by and through undersigned counsel, and hereby 

ask the Court to make factual finding pursuant to TRCP 52 with regard to the 

 

18 Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute these requirements in their brief either. See id.

19 The trial court determined that Bradley County was immune from suit because the gravamen of 

Plaintiffs’ claim against it sounded in civil rights. Tennessee Court Annotated § 29-20-205(2) provides 

that governmental entities are immune from suit in tort when the governmental employee’s negligent act 

which causes an injury arises out of a civil rights violation. Our holding that collateral estoppel bars relitigation of the issue of negligence pretermits the need to review the trial court’s determination that Bradley 

County was immune from suit in this case. That issue is therefore pretermitted. 
- 18 -

credibility of the individual Defendant as well as to her intent, motive, and 

purpose. 

Plaintiffs would also like a ruling on whether the Court is holding that 

all issues regarding the credibility of the individual Defendant, or that of any 

other witness or party, became fixed at the time that Judge Collier issued his 

2018 ruling.

On appeal, Plaintiffs appear to take issue with the trial court’s decision to first deny 

summary judgment due to unresolved disputes concerning credibility, only to later grant 

Defendants’ motion without “retract[ing] or contradict[ing]” its earlier ruling. Plaintiffs 

also ask us to determine whether the trial court “err[ed] by not stating whether or not [it] 

would consider the credibility of the witness as fixed as of the date that the Federal Court 

issued its summary judgment.” In their brief, Plaintiffs state that they offered two “sworn 

statements [that] tend to prove that [Ms. Goodwin] and [Mr. White] had a personal 

relationship,” and Plaintiffs assert that those statements bear on Ms. Goodwin’s credibility 

because Ms. Goodwin denied having any sort of relationship with Mr. White. Plaintiffs 

ask us “to adopt and adhere to this truism: That the credibility of any witness is subject to 

challenge at any time over the duration of the proceedings.” They offer no authority to 

support that “truism.” 

Rule 52.01 states:

In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, the court shall find the facts 

specially and shall state separately its conclusions of law and direct the entry 

of the appropriate judgment. . . . Findings of fact and conclusions of law are 

unnecessary on decisions of motions under Rules 12 or 56 or any other 

motion except as provided in Rules 41.02 and 65.04(6).

Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.01. “Upon motion of a party made not later than 30 days after entry of 

judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the 

judgment accordingly.” Tenn. R. Civ. P. 52.02. 

The decision to deny or grant a motion for additional findings under Rule 52.02 is 

within the discretion of the trial court, and we will not disturb that absent a finding of abuse 

of discretion. Holladay v. Speed, 208 S.W.3d 408, 415 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005).20 By its 

own terms, Rule 52 excludes motions for summary judgment. A trial court’s duty with 

respect to a motion for summary judgment is not to make findings of fact, but to determine 

 

20 “An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court causes an injustice by applying an incorrect 

legal standard, reaches an illogical result, resolves the case on a clearly erroneous assessment of the 

evidence, or relies on reasoning that causes an injustice.” Gonsewski v. Gonsewski, 350 S.W.3d 99, 105 

(Tenn. 2011).
- 19 -

whether there are material facts in dispute, and, if not, to make the appropriate legal 

findings. The trial court’s final order stated the legal grounds upon which it granted 

Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04 (“The trial court 

shall state the legal grounds upon which the court denies or grans the motion, which shall 

be included in the order reflecting the court’s ruling.”). As such, the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion in failing to grant a motion that was clearly inapplicable. 

In addition, we discern no error in the trial court’s decision to amend its ruling with 

regard to the grant of summary judgment. Until the trial court enters a final order, the case 

“remain[s] in the bosom of the trial court, and any rulings . . . may be modified at any time 

before a final order is entered.” Wall v. Wall, No. W2010-01069-COA-R3-CV, 2011 WL 

2732269, at *22 (Tenn. Ct. App. July 14, 2011) (citing Greer v. Greer, No. W2009-01587-

COA-R3-CV, 2010 WL 3852321, at *6 n.7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010)). 

Finally, in reviewing the trial court’s decision to grant the motion for summary 

judgment, “we make a fresh determination of whether the requirements of Rule 56 of the 

Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure have been satisfied.” Rye, 477 S.W.3d at 250. This 

includes the duty to determine whether factual disputes exist that make summary judgment 

appropriate. See Elrod v. Cont’l Apartments, No. M2007-01117-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 

425947, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 13, 2008) (“When reviewing the evidence, we first 

determine whether factual disputes exist.”). Pursuant to that duty, we reviewed the two 

sworn statements cited by Plaintiffs and determined that they do not create a material 

dispute of fact sufficient to preclude summary judgment on the basis of collateral estoppel,

as discussed supra. Instead, we agree with the trial court’s ruling denying the postjudgment motion, which reiterated that “[a]ll of Plaintiffs’ issues have already been fully 

and fairly litigated and the findings of fact in the detailed opinion of [the district court] 

effectively preclude Plaintiffs from re-litigating those identical factual issues in this case.”

Thus, we conclude that this argument is without merit. 

IV. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to 

the Bradley County Government and Tiffany Goodwin. Costs of this appeal are assessed 

against the appellants, Allan F. White Jr. and Marline White, for which execution may 

issue if necessary.

 S/ J. Steven Stafford 

 J. STEVEN STAFFORD, JUDGE