This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations from the official paper version filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1 WAYNE SOWELL, ROSE MARIE LAW, 2 KENNETH BORREGO, and KATHLEEN 3 O’DEA, 4 Petitioners-Appellees, 5

v. NO. 33,155 6 MARCELINA MARTINEZ, 7 Respondent-Appellant. 8

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF SANTA FE COUNTY 9 Francis J. Mathew, District Judge 10 Montgomery & Andrews, PA 11 Dakotah Benjamin 12 Santa Fe, NM 13 for Appellees 14 Marcelina Martinez 15 Santa Cruz, NM 16 Pro Se Appellant 171 Under Section 48-1A-3(E) of the LPEA, a “‘non[-]consensual common law 16 lien’ means a document, regardless of self-d escription, that purports to assert a lien 17 against the assets, real or personal, of a person that: (1) is not expressly provided for 18 by a specific state or federal statute; (2) does not depend upon the consent of the 19 owner of the property affected or the existence of a contractfor its existence; or (3) 20 is not an equitable or constructive lien imposed by a court of competent 21 jurisdiction[.]” 22 2 MEMORANDUM OPINION 1 KENNEDY, Chief Judge. 2 {1} Marcelina Martinez (Respondent) appeals fro m a district court order declaring 3 her commercial lien to be a non-consensual common law lien 1 and voiding and 4 releasing said lien pursuant to the LienProtection Efficiency Act (LPEA), NMSA 5 1978, §§ 48-1A-1 to -9 (1999). [DS 3; RP 47- 48] This Court issued a calendar notice 6 proposing summary affirmance. Respondent filed a memorandum in opposition to 7 this Court’s notice of proposed dispos ition, which we have duly considered. 8 Unpersuaded, we affirm. 9 {2} In our calendar notice, we proposed to hol d that the district court did not err in 10 determining that Respondent failed to meet her burden to show cause as to why the 11 lien should not be stricken, and why she s hould not be liable for costs and fees under 12 Section 48-1A-9. [CN 4] We based this proposed conclusion on the fact that 13 Respondent does not claim that the lien in this case is statutorily or judicially created, 14 but rather that the lien is “consensual.” [C N 3] We noted that the only assertions to 153 support Respondent’s consensual lien argument were a series of inapposite definitions 1 and “maxims of law.” [CN 3] In her memorandum in opposition, Respondent has 2 provided a more fully developed argument as to why the lien filed in this case should 3 be considered to be consen sual and thus outside of the definition of a non-consensual 4 common law lien under the LPEA. However, we remain unconvinced that the lien is 5 in fact consensual. 6 {3} First, Respondent contends that Petitioners’ non-response to a series of mailings 7 and filings she describes as an “administrative process” constitutes consent on the part 8 of Petitioners to her commercial lien in th e amount of two million eight hundred forty 9 thousand dollars. [MIO 15-17; RP 11] Specifically, Respondent states that she 10 provided Petitioners with an “Affidavit of Truth” via certified mail, [MIO 6-7; RP 12], 11 containing facts that she alle ges to be “violations of th e constitution and various laws 12 and statutes[.]” [MIO 7] After receiving no response from Petitioners, Respondent 13 subsequently filed with the county clerk an “Affidavit of Non-Response” [RP 14] and 14 an “Affidavit of Obligation Commercial Lien .” [MIO 7; RP 4] The “Affidavit of 15 Non-Response” states that “[a]ll terms, conditi ons, allegations, true bills, ledgers, etc., 16 are now affirmed by [Petitioners] by tacit procuration [.]” [RP 14] Because this 17 argument was not well developed in Respondent’s docketing statement, we proposed 18 to hold in our calendar notice that wewere not persuaded by Respondent’s bare 19 assertion that a lien arising in such a manner is consensual in the absence of 204 supporting legal authority. [CN 4] Respondent acknowledges that our proposed 1 disposition depended in large part on the lack of legal authority to support this 2 contention, but continues to argue that “[t] he only legal authority she could show was 3 evidence that Petitioners did not dispute th e facts.” [MIO 21] Similarly, Respondent 4 claims that “the contract . . . was createdvia legitimate administrative process” [MIO 5 21] and states that the “lien is no different than any other contract create[d] by lack of 6 response.” [MIO 22] Respondent cites to a number of out-of-jurisdiction cases in her 7 memorandum in opposition that do not support her legal theorydescribed above. 8 [MIO 15-17] “[C]ases are not authority for propositions not considered.” Fernandez 9 v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz. , 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15, 115 N.M. 622, 857 P.2d 22 10 (internal quotation marks and citation omitte d). Where a party cites no authority to 11 support an argument, we may assume no such authority exists. In re Adoption of Doe , 12 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. Therefore, we remain 13 unconvinced that a lien arising in such a manner is consensual. 14 {4} Second, Respondent contends that the lie n is “based on non-judicial principals 15 and is a commercial, common law remedy that is not intended to be adjudicated in a 16 statutory court.” [MIO 9] Respondent chos e this remedy to cure alleged “violations 17 of the constitution and various laws and statutes” by Petitioners. [MIO 7] 18 Respondent’s characterization of the lien as a remedy weighs squarely against her 19 contention that the lien was consensual. The simple fact that Respondent may have 205 believed that she would be unsuccessful in a breach of contract cl aim [MIO 13] or tort 1 action [MIO 14] does not somehow convert her lien into one based on consent. Thus, 2 we hold that non-response to an individual’ s self-created “administrative process” 3 does not constitute consent to having a lien placed on one’s real or personal property. 4 {5} Third, Respondent argues that the burden was on Petitioners to prove that the 5 lien fell within the definition of a non- consensual common law lien under the LPEA 6 and that Petitioners failed to do so. [MIO 8, 10] However, the very nature of the 7 statutory scheme demonstrates that once Petitioners petitioned the district court for an 8 order to show cause, the burden was on Res pondent to show cause why the lien should 9 not be stricken. See § 48-1A-8(A) (“A person whose real or personal property is 10 subject to a recorded clai m of a non[-]consensual common law lien and who believes 11 the claim is invalid may petition the district c ourt . . . for an order . . . directing the lien 12 claimant to appear before the district court . . . and show cause, if any, why the . . . lien 13 should not be stricken and other relief provided for by Section [48-1A-9] of the 14 [LPEA] should not be granted.”). We are not convinced otherwise by the cases cited 15 by Respondent, both of which dealt with the burden of production in the summary 16 judgment context. See Fernandez , 1993-NMSC-035, ¶ 15 (“[C]ases are not authority 17 for propositions not considered.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). 18 {6} Finally, Respondent’s memorandum in opposition contends that she was 19 entitled to a jury at the show cause hearing. [MIO 10] We note, however, that this 206 argument was not raised in Respondent’s doc keting statement, and she did not move 1 to amend the docketing statement to add this issue. See Rule 12-208(F) NMRA 2 (permitting the amendment of the docketing statement based upon good cause shown); 3 State v. Rael , 1983-NMCA-081, ¶¶ 15-16, 100 N.M . 193, 668 P.2d 309 (setting out 4 requirements for a successful motion to ame nd the docketing statement). The essential 5 requirements to show good cause for our allo wance of an amendment to an appellant’s 6 docketing statement are (1) the motion be timely, (2) the new issue sought to be raised 7 was either properly preserved below or allowed to be raised for the first time on 8 appeal, and (3) the issues raised are viable. See State v. Moore , 1989-NMCA-073, ¶ 9 42, 109 N.M. 119, 782 P.2d 91, overruled on other grounds by State v. Salgado , 1991- 10 NMCA-044, ¶ 2, 112 N.M. 537, 817 P.2d 730. 11 {7} To the extent that we might construe the addition of this argument as a motion 12 to amend the docketing statement, Respondenthas failed to demonstrate that she 13 meets the requirements for granting a motion to amend. First, Respondent’s 14 memorandum in opposition does not explain how this issue was preserved in the 15 district court. See Rael , 1983-NMCA-081, ¶ 15 (requiri ng a motion to amend the 16 docketing statement to include those issues sought to be added and “how they were 17 preserved” or showing “why they did not have to be preserved”). There does not 18 appear to be anything regarding a jury demand anywhere inthe record proper. Second, 19 we are not convinced that the right to a juryattaches to a show cause hearing, which 207 impacts the viability of this issue. Therefore, because Respondent did not satisfy the 1 requirements to amend the docketing statemen t, we decline to consider the issue of 2 whether she was entitled to a juryat the show cause hearing. 3 CONCLUSION 4 {8} For the reasons stated above, as well as those provided in our calendar notice, 5 we affirm. 6 {9} IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

___________ _________________________ 8 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 98 WE CONCUR: 1

___________________________ 2 JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge 3

___________________________ 4 J. MILES HANISEE, Judge 5